Handbook of Loss Prevention and Crime Prevention, Fourth Edition

Handbook of Loss Prevention and Crime Prevention This Page Intentionally Left Blank Handbook of Loss Prevention and...

Author: Lawrence Fennelly

542 downloads 3392 Views 6MB Size Report

This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form

DOWNLOAD PDF

Handbook of Loss Prevention and Crime Prevention

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

Handbook of Loss Prevention and Crime Prevention Fourth Edition Lawrence J. Fennelly, Editor Crime Prevention Specialist

AMSTERDAM • BOSTON • HEIDELBERG • LONDON NEW YORK • OXFORD • PARIS • SAN DIEGO SAN FRANCISCO • SINGAPORE • SYDNEY • TOKYO

Elsevier Butterworth–Heinemann 200 Wheeler Road, Burlington, MA 01803, USA Linacre House, Jordan Hill, Oxford OX2 8DP, UK Copyright © 2004, Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Permissions may be sought directly from Elsevier’s Science & Technology Rights Department in Oxford, UK: phone: (+44) 1865 843830, fax: (+44) 1865 853333, e-mail: [email protected]. You may also complete your request on-line via the Elsevier homepage (http://elsevier.com), by selecting “Customer Support” and then “Obtaining Permissions.’ Recognizing the importance of preserving what has been written, Elsevier prints its books on acid-free paper whenever possible. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Application submitted. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: 0-7506-7453-9 For information on all Butterworth–Heinemann publications visit our website at www.bh.com 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America

To Norman Bottom John Fay Robert Fischer/Gion Green Philip P. Purpura Sandi Davies/Ron Minon James Schaub/Ken Berry Louis A. Tyska Charles Sennewald


Contents Contributing Authors Preface PART ONE / INTRODUCTION 1. Risk Assessment and Management Murray Neal

PART TWO / LOSS PREVENTION AND CRIME PREVENTION METHODS 2. Designing Security with the Architects Lawrence J. Fennelly

xiii xv 1 3

7 9

Designing Security with the Architects. Designing Security and Layout of Site. Building Site Security and Contractors. Ironmongery. Closed Circuit TV Checklist. Card Access Control Checklist. Storage Rooms, Safes, and Vaults Checklist. Exterior Lighting Checklist. Crime Prevention Awareness Points. Appendix 2.A. Model Residential and Commercial Building Security Ordinance. Appendix 2.B. Standards 3. Security Surveys Lawrence J. Fennelly

19

The Best Time to Conduct the Survey. Classification of Survey Recommendations. Developing Security Points. Nine Points of Security Concern. Personality of the Complex. Positive and Negative Aspects of Making Recommendations. Crime Analysis. Key Control. Closed Circuit Television. Intrusion Alarms. Lighting and Security. Other Security Aspects. Security Survey Follow-Up. Residential Security. Alarms. Appendix 3.A. Site Survey and Risk Assessment. Appendix 3.B. Physical Security Survey. Appendix 3.C. Plant Security Checklist. Appendix 3.D. Guard Security Checklist. Appendix 3.E. Office Security Checklist. Appendix 3.F. Home Security Checklist. Appendix 3.G. Fire Safety Inspection 4. Internal Theft Controls Robert Fischer

44

Introduction. What Is Honesty?. The Dishonest Employee. Management Responsibility in Loss Prevention. Program for Internal Security. Procedural Controls. When Controls Fail. Case Study. Summary 5. Executive Protection Charles J. Diecidue

59

Rise of Terrorism in the United States. Formulating a Protection Plan. Threat Assessment. Planning. Home and Office Survey. Procedural Vulnerability. Physical Vulnerability. Protection in Transit. Everyday Security Awareness. If an Abduction Occurs vii

viii

HANDBOOK OF LOSS PREVENTION AND CRIME PREVENTION

6. Awareness Robert Hanna

66

Awareness and Knowledge Strategies. Neighborhood Watch Guidelines. How to Avoid Becoming the Victim of an Attacker. Safety Checklist for Apartments. Robbery Prevention— Tips for Small Business. Burglary Prevention—Tips for Small Business. Suspicious Situations to Report. Vehicle Theft—a Big Problem. Safety Skills for Children. Street Smarts—How to Protect Oneself. The Con Artist. Crime Prevention Tips for Senior Citizens. Protection from Telemarketing Fraud. Crime Prevention Tips at ATMs 7. Crime Prevention through Environmental Design Strategies and Applications Timothy Crowe

82

Crime Prevention through Environmental Design Strategies. CPTED Applications. Objectives for the Commercial Environment. Downtown Streets and Pedestrian Areas. Parking Lots and Structures. Office and Industrial Systems. Hallways and Restrooms. Malls and Shopping Centers. Convenience Stores. Branch Banks. Objectives for the Residential Environment. Objectives for the School Environment. Convention Centers and Stadiums PART THREE / SECURITY OPERATIONS AND EQUIPMENT 8. Approaches to Physical Security Richard Gigliotti and Ronald Jason

133 135

Levels of Physical Security. The Psychology of Maximum Security. The Value of Planning. Physical Barriers. The Security Plan. Conclusion 9. Physical Barriers Richard Gigliotti and Ronald Jason

148

Doors. Roofs. Floors. Fences. Walls and Moats 10. The Use of Locks in Physical Crime Prevention James M. Edgar and William D. McInerney

165

Lock Terminology and Components. Key-Operated Mechanisms. Combination Locks. Lock Bodies. Door Lock Types. Strikes. Attacks and Countermeasures. Locks and the Systems Approach to Security. Key Control. A New Standard Set for Exit Devices, Locks, and Alarms. Appendix 10.A. Key Control and Lock Security Checklist. Appendix 10.B. Terms and Definitions for Door and Window Security 11. Safes, Vaults, and Accessories Kenneth Dunckel

207

Choose the Right Container. UL-Rated Combination Locks. Relocking Devices. Locking Dials. Lockable Handles. Time Locks. Time-Delay Combination Locks. Alarmed Combination Locks. Vision-Restricting and Shielded Dials. Combination Changing. Safe Burglaries. Overcoming Safe-Opening Problems. Appendix 11.A. Rating Files, Safes, and Vaults 12. Security Lighting Philip P. Purpura, Lawrence J. Fennelly, Gerard Honey, and James F. Broder Illumination. Lamps. Twenty-Five Things You Need to Know about Lighting. Energy Management. Lighting Checklist. Protective Lighting Checklist

218

Contents

13. Alarms: Intrusion Detection Systems Mike Rolf and James Cullity

ix

223

Components of Alarm Systems. Application. Alarm Control. Alarm Transmission/Signaling. Alarms Deter Crime. False Alarms. Alarm Equipment Overhaul. Additional Resources. Conclusion. Appendix 13.A. Smoke Detectors 14. CCTV Surveillance Herman Kruegle

236

Protection of Assets: An Overview. History. Role of CCTV in Asset Protection. CCTV as Part of the Emergency and Disaster Plan. Emergency Shutdown and Restoration. Security Investigations. Safety. The Security Officer’s Role. Training and Education of Employees. Synergy through Integration. CCTV’s Role and Applications. Problems Solved by CCTV. Choice of Overt or Covert CCTV. Security Surveillance Applications. Safety Applications. CCTV Access Control. The Bottom Line. Appendix 14.A. Glossary. Appendix 14.B. Designing Effective CCTV Systems 15. Guard Service in the Twenty-First Century Joseph G. Wyllie

253

Liabilities Connected with Guard Force. Power and Authority of the Security Guard. Training. Report Writing. Weapons Safety. Safety. Safety Checklist. Bomb Threats. Bomb Search. Fire Protection. Fire Prevention. Emergency Medical Assistance. Reporting a Medical Case. Guard Supervision. Conclusion 16. Bomb and Physical Security Planning Stephen E. Higgins

266

Bombs. Bomb Threats. Why Prepare?. How to Prepare. Security against Bomb Incidents. Responding to Bomb Threats. Decision Time. Evacuation. Search Teams. Search Technique. When a Suspicious Object Is Located. Handling the News Media. Summary. Appendix 16.A. Suspect Package Alert. Appendix 16.B. Bomb Threat Checklist. Appendix 16.C. Mail Handlers and Suspicious Mail Procedures PART FOUR / SECURITY AND CRIME PREVENTION APPLICATIONS

277

17. Cargo Security: Intermoda/Logistics—The Complete Overview Louis A. Tyska

279

Prevention Plan. Pilferage. Theft. Organized Crime. Cargo Package and Movement Controls. Trucking Operations. Appendix 17.A. Cargo Security Checklist. Appendix 17.B. Personnel Security Checklist. Appendix 17.C. Physical Security Checklist. Appendix 17.D. Inspection Report Forms. Appendix 17.E. Documentation. Appendix 17.F. The Role of Private Security 18. Lodging (Hotel/Motel) Security Mark Beaudry and Skip Brandt

312

Security Department Structure. Size of the Department. Reporting Level in the Organization. Role of Security. Training. Theft. Opportunities and Trends. Legal Issues. The Future of Lodging Security 19. Retail Security: Lessons Learned from Convenience Store Research Rosemary J. Erickson and Arnie Stenseth New Challenges. Increase in Crime. The Research. Research Underway. The Recommended Program. Conclusions

330

x


20. Putting an Extra “EYE/I”on CCTV: Managing Risk in Retail Scott Greenwald

341

Old Tech to New Tech. Rationale for Technology. Definition of Interactive. How Interactive Monitoring Reduces Risk. How to Evaluate the Service Provider. Why Isn’t This Everywhere: Cost versus Availability?. How ICCTV Works. CCTV versus ICCTV 21. Perspectives on Safe School Administration G. Edward Richards

345

Emphasize Crime and Deviance Prevention during Teacher Education. Maintain a Sense of Ownership in School Grounds and the Surrounding Neighborhood. Conduct Periodic Risk Assessments or Security Surveys. Clearly State Rules and Regulations. Conduct a Crime and Deviance Analysis. Develop an Incident Mapping System. Utilize Parent Volunteers as Monitors and Student Aides. Institute After-School Programs. Security Considerations Should Be Incorporated from the “Ground Up.” Establish In-Class Communication between Teachers and Administration. Institute a Safety and Security Committee. Value the Contributions of Custodial Personnel. Train Personnel in Graffiti Interpretation. Schools Need Central Office Support. Value Aesthetics. Foster Students’ Beliefs They Are Connected to the School. Do Not Use Student Monitors. The “Combustible Engine” Model of School Communities. Create a Crisis Management Plan. Train Personnel in Conflict Resolution. Implement Character Education Curricula. Create Law-Related Education Modules to Be Incorporated in Social Studies Courses. Establish “Communities within Schools.” Avoid Peer-Group Counseling. Instill an Awareness of the Dangers of Terrorism 22. Campus Security and Crime Prevention Bronson S. Bias

350

Communication. Key Elements in a Campus Crime Prevention Program. Commitment. Cycle of Activity. Specific Programs. The Campus Security Act of 1990. Neighborhood Watch on the College Campus. Phones on Campus. Thefts in the Library. Bicycle Theft Prevention. Administration Office Security Programs. Operation Identification. Intrusion Alarms. Conclusion 23. Hospitals and the Health-Care Security Environment Russell L. Colling

357

Categories of Health Care. Types of Hospitals. The Foundation of Health-Care Security: Risks and Areas of Vulnerability. Basic Health-Care Security Risk and Areas of Vulnerability 24. Library Security R. A. (Rick) Draper and Susan Urosevic

362

Risk Assessment Terminology. Identifying Risks. Assessing Likelihood. Assessing Consequences. Qualifying Risks. Managing the Risk. The Scope of Security Problems in Libraries. Security Risk Management Strategies. Dealing with Specific Threats. Conclusion. Security Management Resources 25. High-Rise Security and Fire Life Safety Geoff Craighead High-Rise Assets. Threats to Security and Fire Life Safety. Security of Modern High-Rise Buildings. Fire Safety of Modern High-Rise Buildings. Summary

370

Contents

26. Multiresidential Security Norman R. Bottom

xi

376

Apartments. Condominiums. Levels of Security. Personnel. Physical Security and Hardware. Procedures. The Elderly. Some Special Areas of Vulnerability. Disasters. Legislation. Basic Steps to Remember in Multiresidential Security 27. Workplace Violence: Anticipation through Process, Not Prediction of Results Revisited John H. Lombardi

387

Causes and Avoidance of Claims of Inadequate Security. Job Applicant. Narrowing the Focus of the Workplace Violator Profile. Case Studies in Workplace Violence. Organizational Dynamics. The “Team” Concept and Shared Expectations as an Approach to Workplace Motivation. “Why Don’t Subordinates Do What They Are Supposed to Do?”. Steps to Reduce the Opportunity for Workplace Violence. The Predatory Prevention Matrix. Process versus Output, or the Difference between “High Crime” and “High Profit.” Uses of the Predatory Prevention Matrix. An Apartment Case Study. The Magic Chair. Defense against Workplace Violence: Possible or Probable? 28. Domestic Violence: Everyone’s Problem Ingeborg Sebyan

402

What Is It. Who Are the Victims. Why Abusers Abuse. What We Do Know. Law Enforcement Response. Options for Protection. Government Involvement. Conclusion 29. Personal Safety and Self-Defense Melissa Soalt

407

Introduction. Violent Crimes. Self-Defense 30. Designing Crime Risk Management Systems National Crime Prevention Institute

410

Understanding Crime Risk Management. Who Is the Client?. The Client-Practitioner Relationship. Crime Pattern Analysis. Conducting the Security Survey. Determination of Probable Maximum Loss. Making Recommendations to Clients. Conclusion 31. Planning, Management, and Evaluation Charles M. Girard

418

The Concepts Defined. Statistical Information: The Backbone for Design of a Prevention Program. Crime Statistics. Demographic Data. Efficiency Analysis: Measuring Activity. Effectiveness Analysis: Measuring Program Impact. Attitudinal Analysis: Gathering Opinions on the Program Impact. A Strategy to Facilitate Implementation of the Evaluation 32. Financial Institution Security Edward F. McDonough, Jr., and Linda F. Mikitarian

431

The Bank Protection Act of 1968. The Role of the Security Department. Current Risks Affecting Financial Institutions. Criminal Reporting. Bank Security Devices. Security Training in Financial Institutions. Other Federal Regulations with an Impact on Banking. Critical Issues in Financial Institution Security 33. Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs) Jerry Wright Responsibility of an ATM Owner. Case Study from Ann Arbor Police Department: Law Enforcement and ATM Safety. Ann Arbor, Michigan’s Guidelines for Automatic Teller

442


xii

Machines User Safety. Appendix 33.A. ATM Safety Tips. Appendix 33.B. ATM Safety Checklist 34. Telecommunications Fraud Mark D. Farrell

447

How Does It Happen?. How to Find Out. How to Reduce Vulnerability. How to Stop It 35. Electronic Surveillance and Wiretapping Philip P. Purpura

449

Countermeasures. Economic Espionage Act of 1996 36. Safety Websites Richard A. Phelan

453

Introduction. Safety Websites 37. Homeland Security Lawrence J. Fennelly

454

Gov. Ridge Announces Homeland Security Advisory System. National Framework for Federal, State, and Local Governments, Private Industry, and the Public. Factors for Assignment of Threat Conditions. Unified System for Public Announcements. A Tool to Combat Terrorism. Homeland Security in 2002. HITS and IFPO Computer-Based and Web-Based Security Officer Training. Final Comments 38. Security of Information Systems Joseph C. Nelson

457

Conclusion. Security Organizations 39. Counterespionage and Information Security Management Norman R. Bottom

461

Reasons for Attacking Computers. Methods of Attacking Computer Systems. Methods of Defense. Roots of Industrial Espionage. Historic Attacks on Computers and Networks. Recent Lawsuits. Covert Action. Theft. Other Causes of Information Loss. Why People Steal Information. Types of Attacks. Espionage Methods. Rogue Use. Competitive Intelligence. Human Error. The WAECUP Human Factors Protocol. Human Factor Training Practices. Electronic Surveillance and Countermeasures. Telecommuting. Wireless Mike Dangers: An Example. Computer Passwords. Current Security Issues. Host-Based Perimeter Defense. EMail. Local Area Network. Radio Links. Encryption. Investigations. Trade Secrets 40. Emergency Management Norman Bottom

481

Crisis, Disaster, Catastrophe—Are You Ready?. The Emergency Management Plan Is Only as Good as the Last Drill 41. The Security Professional, Terrorism, Bio-Terrorism, and the Next Level Karl J. Leger

487

The Security Professional and Terrorism. Terrorism and the Terrorist. Understanding Terrorism. Terrorist Groups and Organizational Structure. Mechanism of Violence and Associated Risk Factors. Assessing Threats from Terrorism and Developing Effective Countermeasures. The Security Manager’s Responsibilities. Conclusion Index

504

Contributing Authors Mark Beaudry, CPP, Security Consultant, Cambridge, Massachusetts Bronson S. Bias, CPP, CFE, CPO, Director of Public Safety, Nova Southern University, Fort Lauderdale, Florida Norman Bottom, Jr., CPP, CST, CPO, FCPP, CFE, CFCO, CCIS, Miami, Florida Skip Brandt, CPP, Security Consultant, Boston, Massachusetts Randolph D. Brock, III, CPP, Senior Vice President (retired), Fidelity Investments, Boston, Massachusetts James F. Broder, CPP, Security Consultant, San Marino, California Russell L. Colling, Colling and Kramer Healthcare Security Consultation Services, Salida, Colorado Geoff Craighead, Vice President of High-Rise/Real Estate Services of Pinkerton, a Securitas Company Timothy Crowe, Criminologist, Louisville, Kentucky James Cullity, American Alarm Company, Arlington, Massachusetts Charles J. Diecidue, CPP, Vice President, Special Services, American Stock Exchange, New York R. A. (Rick) Draper, AMTAC Professional Services, Brown Plains, Queensland, Australia Kenneth Dunckel, Safecracker, Pacifica, California James M. Edgar, J. D., Phoenix, Arizona Rosemary J. Erickson, Ph.D., President, Athena Research Corporation, Imperial Beach, California Mark D. Farrell, Director, Corporate Security, Delaware North Companies, Inc., Buffalo, New York Lawrence J. Fennelly, CPO, CSS, Security Consultant, Quincy, Massachusetts Robert Fischer, Law Enforcement Administration, Western Illinois University, Macomb, Illinois Richard Gigliotti, Corporate Security Director, UNC Naval Products, Montville, Connecticut Charles J. Girard, Ph.D., President, International Training, Research and Evaluation Council, Fairfax, Virginia Scott Greenwald, Westec Security, Irvine, California xiii

xiv


Robert Hanna, Crime Prevention Officer, Quincy Police Department, Quincy, Massachusetts Stephen E. Higgins, Former Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Washington, D. C. Gerald Honey, Systems Installer, Durham, United Kingdom Ronald Jason, Security Training Officer, UNC Naval Products, Uncasville, Connecticut Herman Kruegle, President, Avida, Inc., Park Ridge, New Jersey Ingeborg Sebyan-Larson, CPP, CPO, Security Consultant, Minneapolis, Minnesota Karl J. Leger, Compliance Solution Inc., Houston, Texas John H. Lombardi, Ph.D., CST, CPO, Criminologist Consultant, Montgomery, Alabama Edward F. McDonough, Jr., Director Corporate Services, ADT Security Services, Jacksonville, Florida William D. McInerney, AHC, CPP, Security Consultant, Oxnard, California Linda F. Mikitarian, CPP, CFE, Vice President of Corporate Security, First Union Corporation, Charlotte South Carolina National Crime Prevention Institute, University of Louisville Murray Neal, Pinnacle Armor, Fresno, California Joseph C. Nelson, CPP, Director of Corporate Security, Teradyne Corp., Andover, Massachusetts Richard A. Phelan, CFO, I.V. Corporation, Cape Cod, Massachusetts Robert Pomplum, Loss Control Solutions, Golden Valley, Minnesota Philip P. Purpura, CPP, Director, Security Training Institute and Resource Center, South Carolina G. Edward Richards, University of Akron, Akron, Ohio Mike Rolf, President, Microsystems Services, Harrison, Ohio Melissa Soalt, President of Power Pact, Inc., Psychotherapist, Atlanta, Georgia and Amherst, Massachusetts Arnie Stenseth, CPP, Athena Research Corporation, San Diego, California Michael A. Stroberger, CPP, Director of Loss Prevention, Ritz Carlton Hotel, Naples, Florida Louis A. Tyska, CPP, Security Consultant, Hollis, New Hampshire Susan Urosevic, AMTAC Professional Services, Browns Plains, Queensland, Australia Jerry Wright, CPP, Deceased Joseph G. Wyllie, J. Wyllie & Associates, Inc., Hicksville, New York

Preface

We live in terrorist times and days of unrest. President George W. Bush creates Homeland Security, whose one objective is to create awareness across the nation. The FBI is being proactive in its overall operation. Meetings are taking place between the public and private sectors discussing a whole range of issues. Crime prevention and loss prevention are closely allied fields differing primarily in their forms of management and sources of authority. A crime prevention officer is a public servant who possesses police powers. A loss prevention manager or security director works in the private sector and receives whatever authority he or she possesses from an employer but is not granted the powers of a public law enforcement officer. The job descriptions of these two positions, however, are quite similar and the skills required identical. Prevention is the focus in both cases. The crime prevention officer and the loss prevention manager are expected to assess crime vulnerability—no matter whether it is of a residential area, small business, college campus, hospital, or a corporation—and recommend cost-effective security measures. Security problems are common to both the public and the private sectors and so, too, are solutions. Vulnerability assessment and target hardening encompass very important components of the crime/loss prevention field, and for this reason, a good deal of this book is devoted to security methods and equipment, along with their application to those institutions and industries where the need for security is great. We have also included material on management, for to implement and supervise a security program requires an understanding of public relations, CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) program planning, and evaluation. The director of the program is in every respect a manager, and these skills are vital to the smooth operation of the department.

This edition of Handbook of Loss Prevention and Crime Prevention has been updated and expanded to be of even more assistance to the security professional and crime prevention practitioners. New chapters have been added on awareness, retail security, college security, hotel security, risk assessment, counterespionage and information security management, hacking, approaches to physical security, physical barriers, and hospital security. Like its predecessor, this fourth edition is a collection of material, some published in other sources and some written specifically for this book. The intent of this handbook is to provide the security professional with a single-volume reference, where practical information on a large number of topics is readily accessible. With so much useful material already available and so many experts willing to share their expertise, the trick was to pull together this information into a single source. I believe that this edition will continue to be seen as a definitive reference, not because of my efforts but because it reflects the thinking of some of the best practitioners in the field. I am indebted to all the contributors who wrote chapters or gave me permission to use their previously published material in this edition. A special thanks to all of those individuals and groups who aided and supported the previous editions and to those who reviewed, rewrote, and updated their material. On a personal note, I have always felt that no one person had all the knowledge contained in a book like this and, through a collaborative effort, such a book would make a difference. Crime prevention by definition is the anticipation, recognition, and appraisal of crime risk and the initiation of some action to remove or reduce it.

xv


ONE INTRODUCTION


Chapter 1 Risk Assessment and Management MURRAY NEAL

Risk assessment and management can be defined as “a method to identify precisely, the risks and all the probable effects those risks will have on the person(s) and/or organization being protected, to minimize that risk to an acceptable level, and the proper implementation of measures to deal with the remaining elements associated with that risk.” Risk cannot be eliminated, but it can be managed. Risk can be reduced to a manageable level through the proper risk analysis research and assimilation of data—then, a thorough implementation of measures designed to avoid, reduce, or eliminate the remaining factors associated with that risk. Good security and crisis management policies and procedures evolve from an accurate analysis of perceived risk. You need to know exactly what you are up against. You will not know which policies and procedures are necessary until you have properly assessed your risk. To perform a risk assessment, you must collect as much information, whether “dirty” or not, as possible about the company and its key personnel. This information needs to be evaluated and quantified to a level of significance to ensure that it is not “bad” information. The information is then broken into subcategories to establish a linking pattern (trends and patterns), these trends and patterns allow you to establish the problem or associated risk(s). From this point, you may then start the risk analysis process. This process starts with a thorough understanding of the factors that greatly enhance the chances of risk occurring. These are predictability, probability, and convenience.

Risk Predictability 100% 0% 100% The preceding shows the relation risk has to the predictability of risk. The predictability is the percentage of chance that one can predict that upcoming events are likely to cause great security risk to persons or organizations. The greater is the risk, the less likely you can predict events leading to that risk. On the other hand, the more that you can foresee and predict upcoming events, the less risk there is or the more you can reduce that risk factor. Predictability for security purposes is mainly an indicator of behavior. That behavior is an observable response based on stimuli.The stimuli are the actions or inactions incurred by the person or organization, so that Risk Probability 100% 0% 100% This shows the relation risk has to the probability of risk. Probability reflects what is historically known and is directly related to risk. Probability takes into consideration the likelihood of an incident occurring by the number of actual occurrences of incidents in the past, which are supported by empirical evidence. Probability is considered more of a true indicator of events than predictability when discussing security, as it is based on actual history. Terrorism, for example, has shown through history to continue its ideologies, strategies, and tactics over and over and with a high percentage of probability. When risk is high and incidents have occurred repeatedly, there is a great probability that, 3

4

INTRODUCTION

when that risk is high again, like incidents may occur in the same manner. As before, predictability for security purposes is mainly an indicator of behavior. For example, terrorist activity including kidnapping has occurred numerous times and the kidnapped individual provides for several needs or requirements of the terrorists: money from ransom, propaganda, supplies, release of sympathizers for hostages, and so forth. History also shows that the majority of kidnappings happen in a vehicle en route to or from a residence. Therefore, the probability of risk is shown to be high, indicating that future kidnappings probably will be from a vehicle and are likely to be used to fulfill such needs or requirements. The predictability shows us that the terrorists always choose their targets based on their stimuli or reaction to their goals and beliefs. It is highly predictable that those who press close to an incursion with those goals and beliefs or those who provide immediate response to their goals have a higher risk of terrorist involvement. Actually, probability and predictability work well for security, as one will fill in information where the other is lacking information. When there are no facts to support a probability, then the security/protection detail can objectively base the predictability of an occurrence through their judgment guided by behavioral traits. If sufficient information is lacking to show any history or severity of incidence, then the probability is low and the predictability takes its place in the assessment of events or incidents. Therefore, risk assessment, as we are concerned with it, deals with the methods utilized to identify all the risks involved by determining the risk’s probability and predictability as it relates to security. Risk management, as we are concerned with it, deals with our ability to properly implement and maintain an effective security plan or, better yet, a definitive protection plan based on what is known, derived from our assessment. Through this implemented protection plan, we manipulate the elements that are foreseeable by either eliminating, avoiding, or controlling each to increase our predictability. Increasing our predictability reduces our risk factor. Implementation of security measures or strategies designed to reduce these elements is accomplished only after thorough and proper security advance work, research, reconnaissance, or surveillance and analysis of such data. The saying “proper planning prevents poor performance” or “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” too often is taken for granted. The

first saying can be directly related to the integrity of the security or protection plan, in that, only if all elements are taken into consideration (personnel, equipment, scheduling, liaisons with outside agencies, training, proper advance work, research and intelligence, proper assimilation of data, and the proper implementation of measures) can one reasonably expect to have far better than average performance when needed. Too often, the advance information obtained that is crucial to a company’s executive in travel is always days old or not even current at all. Always expect the unexpected. Do not fall in along side those who have thought it could happen only to the other guy. Do not be incident driven. Just because something has not happened yet, does not make a good excuse not to enact preplanned, proactive, preventive measures. Oftentimes, events such as involvement in other countries or sales of a specific product to new customers has a profound effect upon people directly or indirectly related to such events. Remember, we live in a politically, socially, and economically volatile world. These types of events probably have not occurred yet, but as most companies and people find out as they continue to grow and reach out, especially on an international scale, it happens all too soon. Cost-consciousness is often looked at by “bean counters” in a cost effective/productive means at the present and usually counters any necessary security plans by justifying figures with such statements as, “It is not cost effective to implement at this time,” all the while not foreseeing the immediate future. This type of decision making oftentimes does not weigh the risk factors enough to consider the maximum loss due to substantial interruption of corporate or individual activity, direct cost loss, indirect cost loss, replacement cost loss, and future loss due to the events, whether implicated directly or not. Oftentimes, companies spend a dollar to save a dime. It is always more prudent to prepare for a disaster and not need that preparation than to need it and not be prepared. Such words of wisdom have been handed down by those fortunate enough to have the foresight to try to keep others from falling into the same pitfalls. History need not continue to repeat itself. Once you get behind the “eight ball,” so to speak, you never get ahead of it; you are always playing catch up. Dealing with life-and-death situations, one should never be anywhere but ahead of the game or “eight ball.”

Risk Assessment and Management

The elements of risk that the security or protection detail is assigned to avoid and eliminate should always be in arrears; ensure that those elements always have to chase and run to keep up. If you maintain and control your direction and objectives, then the risk factor or vulnerability is reduced substantially. The implementation of such measures and strategies pose one other objective to overcome: being able to provide the necessary measures and strategies, while not inconveniencing the persons or the organization to an unacceptable degree. Risk Convenience 100% 0% 100% The more “hard line” is the security, the less convenient it is for the person(s) or organization. The more convenient it is, the less secure is the person(s) or organization. Convenience also guides or invites the chances of risk occurring. If the opportunity is offered and it is convenient, then the risk is low to the “terrorist,” who will accept the remaining minimal risk and attack. However, if you harden the target and increase the “terrorist’s” risk during an attack, then your chances of a higher risk leading to an attack are minimized. Statistics have shown that terrorists choose the targets that provide at least an 80% chance of success. Therefore, it is necessary to have a specific sequence for risk analysis to follow. Risk management can be maintained only through a complete and proper analysis and then only through the proper implementation of strictly adhered-to measures. There is a price to implement an effective risk assessment and management program. However, the price of not having the program is far higher in the long term, as overconfidence arises due to the “threat” usually being underestimated, and when the minimal program becomes necessary, it usually only has a minimal impact on the actual risk. Any security specialist, whether in an executive position or field operative, should always be extremely prudent in his or her decision-making process. Prudence is defined as, “care, caution, good judgment, and wisdom in looking and planning ahead.” The process from risk analysis through risk management follows a very definitive sequence of 10 steps: 1. Define the problem. 2. Define the objective(s). 3. Evaluate current measures and resources.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

5

Identify the risk. Evaluate the risk. Select risk reduction measures. Develop risk reduction measures. Implement risk reduction measures. Evaluate risk reduction measures. Redefine risk identification and restart the risk analysis process.

There are extensive relationships among all the respective elements within each category and subcategory. Simply outlining each makes the task easier. However, as programmers have learned, the most effective way to track and analyze all the interrelated information is to use a flowchart. Techniques in flowcharting are used where large amounts of information has to be either analyzed or a linking pattern of continuity established. Illustrations always provide a clearer view for such complex relationships. Flowcharts can have categories color-coded for use by those assigned to analyze all necessary information in their charge. Color-coding enhances areas that are affected or not affected or places emphasis on the severity or importance of specific events, incidents, and information. Using a flowchart is like using a road map instead of written directions, and it aids in the analysis process. One of the most difficult and time-consuming processes that must be accomplished to establish a linking pattern between risk and the exposures leading to it is to ensure that all flowcharts contain every conceivable risk listed for every activity. One of the best places to start is to locate trends and patterns consistent with the company or individual activities. When looking for trends and patterns (routines), whether new or changes in those previously established, it is often too easy to overlook specifics or details when such are included in your daily routines. To see changes, usually we look at broad-range statistical reports, charts, graphs, and the likê. When looking through such sources, take a close look at the “statistically significant” targets. Oftentimes, you might be assessing risk for a venue to which you will travel. However, do the statistics cover your traveled course en route? Probably not, just specific incidents relating to the venue location. There are many significant incidents of violence throughout the world. You need to ensure that chronology is designed to encompass your specific needs. Furthermore, many incidents are omitted due to the sensitive nature of the information associated with them.


TWO LOSS PREVENTION AND CRIME PREVENTION METHODS


Chapter 2 Designing Security with the Architects LAWRENCE J. FENNELLY, CPO, CSS

Too often, when a building complex was built, the contractor turned over the keys to the owner and that was it. During the 1990s, management was saying: “Hold it, we want some say as to what type of locks, lighting, and alarms you install and exactly what kind of hardware you put on our exit doors.” Security was being neglected because the security personnel had no chance for input. Yes, it is a great building and the contractor can be proud; the cement, plumbing, and electrical work is perfect, but to cut costs, deadbolt locks, eye viewers in the doors, chains, and nonremovable hinges were omitted. Keyin knob locks were installed. A pipe wrench opens this type of door lock or expansion of the doorframe pops the door open. The crime/loss prevention officer is not concerned just with locks. The concern is the overall vulnerability of the site. If you believe that most crimes can be prevented, then you must be involved in the early stages of designing security. We have, from the 1990s, seen a new approach; namely, building security codes (see Appendix 2.A, which follows). Buildings should be constructed with a level of security in mind. Law enforcement has the knowledge of crime trends and burglary; therefore, it should be involved with state and local planning boards.

Designing Security with the Architects Crime prevention and security officers throughout the country today are working with various architects for the sole purpose of improving the state of security within the community. Crime is not always

predictable, because it is the work of human scheming. In our efforts to combat this threat, it is essential that we all attempt to reduce the opportunity so often given to the criminal to commit crime. Every building, large or small, creates a potential crime risk and planners and architects owe it to their clients to devise and implement effective security measures. The subject of designing security with architects is another way of conducting a security survey, but in this case, it is before construction. It extends far beyond the protection of doors and windows. It even deals with the quality of one vendor’s products versus another of a lesser quality. The following checklist is for use as an initial guide to assist you with the architects to obtain better security.

Anticipation of Crime Risk Checklist 1. As with any security survey, your first step is to consult with the occupants of the complex. 2. Identify areas that will house items of a sensitive nature or items of value, like safes or audiovisual equipment. 3. Identify the main crime targets. 4. Assess the level of protection required. 5. Examine the facilities that the company currently occupies. From that survey, the building characteristics and personality can tell you how the structure has been used or abused. 6. Is cash being handled within the building that has to get to a bank? 7. Is there a concentration or even distribution of valuables within the complex? Decide on the area most vulnerable to criminal attack and 9

10

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

14.

LOSS PREVENTION AND CRIME PREVENTION METHODS

make your recommendation to harden that target. Reduce entrances to a minimum, thereby reducing movement of staff and visitors. What crime risk is in the area? What is the level of police patrol and police activity is in the area? What are the distances from the complex to the local police and fire stations? Have the materials being used met state and national standards? Who cleans and secures the complex day and night? Are these people dependable, intelligent, and reliable? Make note of employee behavior.

c. d. e. f.

3.

4. 5. 6. 7.

Designing Security and Layout of Site Designing security into a new complex should begin with interior security. Work your way to the exterior and then to the outer perimeter. Keep in mind these six points before you sit down with the architects: 1. Elimination of all but essential doors and windows. 2. Specification of fire-resistant material throughout the interior. 3. Installation of fire, intrusion, and environmental control systems. 4. Separation of shipping and receiving areas. 5. Provisions for the disabled. 6. Adequate lighting around the perimeter, before, after, and during construction.

Building Site Security and Contractors It is safe to say that all contractors experience a theft of stocks or material before completion of the site. They should be made aware of this and be security conscious at the beginning of construction, before theft gets costly. Thefts that appear to be of an internal nature should be analyzed in relation to previous such thefts at other sites.

Site Security Checklist 1. The contractor should appoint security officers or a liaison staff person to work with police on matters of theft and vandalism. 2. Perimeter protection: a. Gate strength. b. Hinges.

8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13. 14. 15.

Locks and chains. Lighting. Crime rate in the neighborhood. Construct a 10- or 12-foot fence topped with three rows of barbwire. Location of contractor’s building on site: a. Inspect security of this building. b. Review security procedures and controls. c. Light building inside and out. No employees should be permitted to park private cars on the site. Materials and tools on site should be protected in a secured yard area. Facilities for storage and security of workers’ tools and clothes should be kept in a locked area. The subcontractor is responsible to the main contractor. Security officers should patrol at night and on weekends. Use a temporary alarm protection for the site. Payment or wages to employees should be with checks. Deliveries of valuable material to site and the storage of such items should be placed in a secured area. Establish a method to check fraudulent deliveries using authorized persons only. Check for proper posting of signs around the perimeter. Identify transportable material and property. Operation identification should be available. Method used to report theft: a. Local police. b. Office. c. Insurance company. d. Security company.

If guards are needed to protect the site, determine 1. The hours of coverage. 2. Whether guards answer to the general contractor or the owner of the complex. (They should answer to the general contractor.) 3. Whether they are employed by the general contractor or a contract guard company. 4. Their police powers. 5. How they are supervised. 6. What type of special training they receive. 7. Whether local police have been advised of their presence on the site. 8. The uniform of the guard on duty, flashlight (size), firearms, night sticks, or chemical agents. 9. How promotions in the guard company are obtained. 10. What keys to the complex the guard has.

Designing Security with the Architects

11. What the guard’s exact duties are. Whether guard has a fixed post or a roving patrol. 12. Review the guard’s patrol. 13. Whether guards carry a time clock. 14. Whether they write a report on each shift. 15. Who reviews these reports. 16. Whether each guard has sufficient responsibilities and is active during the tour of duty. 17. Whether the guard has an up-to-date list of who to call in case of emergency.

Building Design: Interior Checklist 1. Locate the payroll office. 2. Examine security as it pertains to cash and the storage of cash overnight. 3. Be familiar with cars parking within the complex. 4. Employ staff supervision of entryways. 5. Avoid complex corridor systems. 6. Visitors: a. Are they restricted as to how far they can maneuver? b. Are there special elevators? c. Is there limited access? 7. Determine the provisions and placement of the reception desk? 8. Determine where vulnerable equipment and stock are housed? 9. Custodial quarters: a. Where are they housed? b. Is there a phone? c. What other security devices are installed? d. Can this area be secured when the staff leaves at night? 10. Proper security of staff quarters. 11. Industrial plants designed and laid out to combat internal vandalism. 12. Electric, water, and gas meters built into the outside wall for service access. 13. Department stores and other buildings accessible to public use, in addition to shape and layout, designed with deterrents to prevent crime: a. Access for disabled persons—guard rails, telephones, toilets. b. Provisions for one-way mirrors throughout the store. c. Closed circuit television—Who monitors it? Is it hooked up to the alarm system with a recorder? d. Beeper or signal system. e. Zoned intrusion alarm panel on street floor for quick police response.

11

f. Zoned fire alarm panel on street floor for quick fire department response. g. Lighting 24 hours a day. h. Display area vulnerabity. i. Freight elevator access to the street. 14. Apartments: a. Avoid overdensity. b. Avoid five hazards and floods. c. Plan on reduction of vandalism. d. Trash chutes and storage areas kept clear. e. Basement access reduced. f. Security in tenants’ storage area. g. Key security implemented. h. Foyer also locked. i. Vandal-proof mailboxes. j. Who occupies the complex—Upper, middle, or lower class people? All white, all nonwhite, or mixed families? Combination of classes and races? Senior citizens?

Building Design: Exterior Access Checklist 1. External doors: a. Choose of final exit door. b. Design style and strength of door and frame. c. Choice and strength of panels: glass and wood. d. Ensure hinges cannot be removed from the outside. e. Minimize number of entrances. f. Secure fire doors. g. Make tools and ladders accessible (garage doors). h. Provide lights over entrances. i. Choose of locks and hardware. j. Use only steel doors and frames. k. Eliminate exterior hardware on egress doors wherever possible. 2. Building line: a. Lines of vision. b. Hidden entrances. 3. Architectural defects affecting security. 4. Roof: a. Access. b. Skylights. c. Pitch angle. 5. External pipes—flush or concealed? 6. Podium blocks—access to upper windows? 7. Basement: a. Access points inside and out. b. Storage areas. c. Lighting. d. Fuel storage areas.

12


e. Number of entries to basement, stairs, and elevators. f. Grills on windows. 8. False ceilings—access to and through. 9. Service entrances: a. Service hatches. b. Ventilation ducts. c. Air vent openings. d. Service elevators. e. Grills on all ducts, vents, and openings over 12 inches.

Ironmongery

Building Access: Windows and Glass

1. Perimeter entrance gates: a. Design. b. Locking devices and hardware. c. Aesthetics. 2. Door ironmongery: a. Theft-resistant locks—choice of manufacturer, design. b. Electrically operated. c. Access control. d. Mortise security locks. e. Sliding bolts. f. Flush bolts. g. Deadbolts. h. Hinge bolts. i. Nonremovable hinges on all outside doors. j. Key control system. k. Door viewers. l. Safety chains. m. Choice of panic bolts. n. Fire doors. o. Sliding doors. p. Additional locks and padlocks. q. Quality of locks used. r. Sheet metal lining protection of door. 3. Window ironmongery: a. Security window locks built-in during manufacture. b. Security window locks fitted after manufacture. c. Transom window locks. d. Locking casement stays. e. Remote-controlled flexible locks. 4. Additional ironmongery: a. Hardware of the highest quality b. Control of keys c. High-grade steel hasps d. Strong lock for strong door or window needs a strong frame.

The purpose of the window, aside from aesthetics, is to let in sunlight, allow visibility, and provide ventilation. The following types of windows provide 100% ventilation: casement, pivoting, jalousie, awning, and hopper. The following provide 50–65% ventilation: double-hung and sliding. Factors to consider in the selection of type and size of a window are 1. Requirements for light, ventilation, and view. 2. Material and desired finish—wood, metal, aluminum, steel, stainless steel. 3. Window hardware—durability, function. 4. Type of glazing. 5. Effectiveness of weather stripping. 6. Appearance, unit size, and proportion. 7. Method of opening (hinge or slider), choice of line of hinges. 8. Security lock fittings. 9. Accessible louver windows. 10. Ground floor—recommend lower windows, large fixed glazing and high windows, small openings. 11. Size and shape to prevent access. 12. Size because of cost due to vandalism. 13. Use of bars or grilles on inside. 14. Glass: a. Double glazing deterrent. b. Type of glass. c. Vision requirements. d. Thickness. e. Secured fixing to frame. f. Laminated barrier glass—uses. g. Use of plastic against vandalism. h. Fixed, obscure glazing for dwelling house garages. i. Shutters, grilles, and louvers for sun control and visual barriers as well as security barrier.

The Lock and Its Installation By definition, a lock is a mechanical, electrical, hydraulic, or electronic device designed to prevent entry to a building, room, container, or hiding place to prevent the removal of items without the consent of the owner. A lock temporarily fastens two separate objects together, such as a door to its frame or lid to a container.The objects are held together until the position of the internal structure of the lock is altered—for example, by a key—so that the objects are released.

Our objective is prevention of the defeat of locks through force. When stress is applied to a door in the form of bodily force, pry bars, or jacks, something has


to give. Every mechanical device has its fatigue and breaking points, although no one, to our knowledge, has properly defined this point for doors, locks, and frames in terms of pounds of pressure or force.

Doors There are four types of door operation: swinging, bypass sliding, surface sliding, and slide-hinged folding. Physical door types are wood, metal, aluminum, flush, paneled, French, glass, sash, jalousie, louvered, shutter, screen, Dutch, hollow-core doors, solid-core doors, batten doors, pressed wood doors, hollow metal-framed doors, and revolving doors. Garage and overhead doors can be constructed in panels, flush, or webbed. Each of these doors needs a specific type of security hardware. I am not going to go into these specifics, but I want to mention some additional factors to consider in the selection of hardware: 1. Function and ease of door operation. 2. Material, form, surface texture, finish, and color. 3. Durability in terms of anticipated frequency of use and exposure to weather and climatic conditions. Finish aluminum and stainless steel are recommended in humid climates and where corrosive conditions exist (e.g., sea air). Finish door hardware should include 1. Locks, latches, bolts, cylinders, and stop works, operating trim. 2. Nonremovable hinges. 3. Panic hardware. 4. Push and pull bars and plates. 5. Kick plates. 6. Stops, closers, and holders. 7. Thresholds. 8. Weather stripping. 9. Door tracks and hangers. Standards have yet to be adjusted to determine the minimum lock requirements necessary for security, but various considerations are evident from the variety of provisions that currently exist. A deadbolt, dead latch, or both is essential. The standard latch, which functions primarily to keep the door in a closed position, can easily be pushed back with such instruments as a credit card or thin metal objects. The door should be of solid construction. If wood is used, the door should have a solid wood core. Doors should be installed so that hinges are located on the inside. If this is not possible, hinges should be

13

installed in a manner that prohibits their being removed or the pins being tampered with. Rolling overhead doors not controlled or locked by electric power can be protected by slide bolts on the bottom bar.With crank-operated doors, the operating shaft should be secured. Chain-operated doors can be secured in a manner that allows a steel or castiron keeper and pin to be attached to the hand chain.

Intrusion Alarm Systems Checklist 1. Quality of products being used—Are they listed in Underwriters Laboratories? 2. Vulnerable materials in protected areas. 3. Smallest area to be protected. 4. Audible alarm termination type of horn. 5. Instant or delayed audible warning. 6. Silent alarms, connected to police or central station. 7. Choice of detection equipment—motion, infrared magnetic contacts, or the like. 8. Degree of protection—building perimeter, site perimeter, target protection, internal traps, overall construction. 9. Sufficient alarm zones (plus extras) to fit the lifestyle of the complex. 10. If a union contractor, then the alarm company must be a union company or obtain permission for a nonunion alarm vendor. 11. Influence of environmental aspect in architects’ in selection of alarm components. 12. Electric outlets for areas where power is needed. 13. Methods of monitoring a supervised line. 14. Service provider in the event of breakdown.

Closed Circuit TV Checklist 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Quality of products used—analog or digital. Type and style of lens and monitors used. Monitoring the monitors. Electric outlets at each camera location. Service provider in the event of breakdown. Size of control room to determine the amount of controls and panel that can be monitored. 7. Installation and repair system providers. 8. Time lapse recorder and tape quality or digital recorder.

Card Access Control Checklist 1. Credit card size, private post office box number printed on it, so lost cards can be returned.

14


2. Card type—magnetic, electric circuit continuity, magnetic stripe, passive electronic, IR optical, differential optics—and capacities. 3. Site location to determine: a. Number of entry control points. b. Number of badges needed. c. Rate at which persons must be passed through entry-control points. d. The number of levels of access accommodated. e. Procedures used to issue badges. 4. Equipment: a. Tamper alarm to detect tampering with the electrical circuits. b. Battery backup supply. c. Capability to detect tampering with line circuits. 5. Card access control over lifestyle of building. 6. Applications, aside from security: a. Controlled access to buildings, parking areas. b. Alarms. c. CCTV, digital cameras, and vendors. d. Watch guard tours. e. Heating system. f. Smoke and fire detection. g. Temperature and humidity controls. h. Refrigeration and air conditioning controls. i. Time and attendance. j. Elevator control. k. Gas pump control. l. Xerox copy control.

Safes 1. Correct type of safe required for needs; moneyversus document-type safe. 2. Wheels removed and bolted down. 3. Placement of safe—visibility. 4. Weight factor and floor weight capacity. 5. Security of safe to fabric of building. 6. Provisions of area in concrete for installation of floor safe.

Vaults 1. A U.S. government Class 5 security vault door, which has been tested and approved by the government under Fed. Spec. AA-D-600B (GSAFSS) and affords the following security protection, which applies only to the door and not to the vault proper: a. 30 worker-minutes against surreptitious entry. b. 10 worker-minutes against forced entry. c. 20 worker-hours against lock manipulation. d. 20 worker-hours against radiology techniques. 2. Door options: a. Right- or left-hand door swing. b. Hand or key change combination lock. c. Optical device. d. Time-delay lock. 3. Weight of vault versus floor strength. 4. Wall thickness. 5. That which is protected determines the degree of protection.

Storage Rooms, Safes, and Vaults Checklist Storage Rooms

Exterior Lighting Checklist

1. Considerations: a. Vulnerabilities. b. Contents. c. Risk management principles. d. Type of storage area. e. Period of complex occupancy. f. Underwriters Laboratory listing. 2. Placement—Can it be seen from outside? 3. Construction and type of material. 4. Restrictions on open area around storage room. 5. Installation factors in design stage. 6. Intrusion protection. 7. Fire protection. 8. Ventilation of storage room. 9. Water- and fireproofing. 10. Emergency exit.

1. Lighting adequate to illuminate critical areas (alleys, fire escapes, ground-level windows). 2. Foot-candles on horizontal at ground level (a minimum of 5 foot-candles). 3. Sufficient illumination over entrances. 4. Perimeter areas lighted to assist police surveillance of the area. 5. Protective lighting system and working lighting system on the same line. 6. Auxiliary system designed to go into operation automatically when needed. 7. Auxiliary power source for protective lighting. 8. Frequency of auxiliary system testing. 9. Protective lights controlled by automatic timer or photocells or manually operated. 10. Hour this lighting is used. 11. Switch box(es) and automatic timer secure.


12. Ease of compromising protective lights (e.g., unscrewing of bulbs). 13. Type of lights installed around the property? 14. Cost-effectiveness. 15. Vandal-proofing of fixtures. 16. Is there a glare factor? 17. Is there an even distribution of light? 18. Are the lights mounted on the building versus pole fixtures?

Crime Prevention Awareness Points 1. Has the general contractor made arrangements to secure the perimeter and provide adequate lighting of the complex before starting work? 2. Has the general contractor been advised to secure equipment and work area from internal theft and so advise all subcontractors? Be sure to inspect the area and make immediate recommendations. 3. How good is entrance gate security? 4. Can vehicles park close to the construction site? 5. Is the building too close to adjoining property? 6. Is the site subject to vandalism or attack before completion?

15

7. Will cars be parking around the complex after completion? 8. Could landscape coverage pose a crime risk? 9. Are external lights on the building or the grounds? 10. What security is given to main utilities, transformers, and the like, preferably underground? 11. Are temporary construction locks installed throughout the building during the construction process and later replaced with the permanent hardware after all exterior and interior work has been completed and the site is ready for occupancy? 12. Times when site is most vulnerable, between the time construction has ended and when the new occupants have completely moved in, there tends to be confusion. Are movers and decorators allowed uncontrolled access to the site? While something can be carried in, something else can be carried out. Identification badges should be used during this period. 13. Do the size of the complex and amount of occupancy give you an idea of the complex’s potential crime rate? 14. Does the period our society is going through have an effect on the conditions the architects are working under in planning a building for construction.

Appendix 2.A Model Residential and Commercial Building Security Ordinance Any builder, contractor, or owner desiring to have a decal awarded to any single- or multifamily dwelling currently existing, under construction, or to be constructed may voluntarily meet the following specifications dealing with building security.

Residential Buildings

Exterior Doors 1. All exterior doors, except sliding glass doors or metal doors, with or without decorative moldings,

shall be either solid-core wood doors or stave or solid wood flake doors and shall be a minimum of 13/8 inches in thickness. No hollow-core door or hollow-core door filled with a second composition material, other than just mentioned, is considered a solid-core door. 2. All exterior door hinges shall be mounted with the hinge on the interior of the building, except where a nonremovable pin hinge or stud bolt is used (such hinges may be installed with the hinge facing the exterior of the building).

16


3. The shim space between the door buck and door frame shall have a solid wood filler 12 inches above and below the strike plate area to resist spreading by force applied to the door frame. Screws securing the strike plate area shall pass through the strike plate and door frame and enter the solid wood filler a minimum of 1/4 inch. 4. No glazing may be used on any exterior door or window within 40 inches of any lock, except a. That glass shall be replaced with the same thickness of polycarbonate sheeting of an approved type. (Plexiglass shall not be used to replace glass.) b. That door locks shall be a double cylinder keyed lock with mortised deadbolt that extends into the strike plate a minimum of 1 inch. c. French doors shall have a concealed header and threshold bolt in the stationary, or first/closed door, on the door edge facing. d. Dutch doors shall have a concealed header type securing device interlocking the upper and lower portions of the door in the door edge on the door strike side provided that a double cylinder lock with a 1-inch deadbolt be provided on the upper and lower sections of the door and the header device be omitted. e. Sliding glass doors: (1) Sliding glass doors shall be installed so as to prevent the lifting and removal of either glass door from the frame from the exterior of the building. (2) Fixed panel glass doors (nonsliding) shall be installed so that the securing hardware cannot be removed or circumvented from the exterior of the building. (3) Each sliding panel shall have a secondary locking or securing device in addition to the original lock built into the panel. The second device shall consist of a Charley bar type device, a track lock, wooden or metal dowel, or inside removable pins or locks securing the panel to the frame. (4) All “glass” used in exterior sliding glass doors and fixed glass panels is to be laminated safety glass or polycarbonate sheeting. Plexiglass or single-strength glass does not qualify for this program. 5. Locks and keying requirements: a. Except as provided in Section 4.b (glass in exterior doors), all exterior doors where the lock is not within 40 inches of breakable glass shall incorporate a single cylinder mortised or bored locking device with a 1-inch deadbolt. b. Locking materials:

(1) No locking device on an exterior door shall be used that depends on extruded plastics for security or strength feature of the locking or securing mounts. Plastics and nylon materials may be used to a minimum degree in lubricant or wear-resistant features. (2) Cylinders used in locking devices must resist pulling from the exterior of the building. (3) Cylinder rings shall be compression resistant and may or may not be free turning to resist circumvent the exterior. (4) Deadbolts shall be case-hardened steel or contain a case-hardened steel rod, fixed or movable, inside the deadbolt feature. The deadbolt is to be deadlocked against reasonable end pressure. c. During construction, each contractor or party building a home or apartment for occupancy by another shall, during the construction period, use a keying system that satisfies either (1) The original cylinders used during the construction period may be repinned and new keys furnished to the owner or occupant. (2) Reasonable key control shall be exercised and all full-cut keys fitting the exterior doors on occupancy shall be given to the renter or owner. In cases of rental property, master keys and grant master keys shall be kept under security.

Windows

Double Hung Wood 1. All locking devices to be secured with 3/4-inch full-threader screws. 2. All window latches must have a key lock or a manual (nonspring-loaded or flip type) window latch. When a nonkey-locked latch is used, a secondary securing device must be installed. Such secondary securing device may consist of a. Each window drilled with holes at two intersecting points of inner and outer windows and appropriate-sized dowels inserted in the holes. Dowels to be cut to provide minimum grasp from inside the window. b. A metal sash security hardware device of approved type may be installed in lieu of doweling. Note: Doweling is less costly and of a higher security value than more expensive hardware.


Sliding Glass Windows

17

and toe of the shackle and a minimum of four-pin tumbler operation.

The same requirements apply as for sliding glass doors.

Other Exterior Openings Awning-Type Wood and Metal Windows 1. No secondary device is required on awning-type windows, but crank handle may be removed by owner as security feature after residence establishment. 2. Double-hung metal windows are secured similarly to the double-hung wood windows, using metal dowels.

Miscellaneous All front entrance doors without other means of external visibility shall be equipped with a door viewer that shall cover at least 160° of viewing. Such viewer shall be installed with the securing portion on the inside and be nonremovable from the outside.

Commercial Buildings

Doors 1. All exterior doors shall meet the requirements as set forth for residential buildings. Should glazed doors be installed, they shall be of laminated safety glass or polycarbonated sheeting. 2. Doors not controlled or locked by electric power operation, such as rolling overhead or cargo doors, shall be equipped with locking bars that pass through guide rails on each side. The locking bars shall have holes drilled in each end and a padlock placed in each end once the bar is in the locked position. The padlock shall have a casehardened shackle with locking lugs on the heel

1. Fixed-glass panels, sliding-glass and double-hung windows, awning-type and metal windows must meet or exceed the requirements set forth for residential buildings. 2. Skylights and other roof openings shall be constructed of laminated safety glass or polycarbonated sheeting. 3. Hatchways shall be of metal construction or wood with a minimum of 16-gauge sheet metal attached with screws. Unless prohibited by local fire ordinances, the hatchways shall be secured by casehardened steel hasps and padlocks meeting the requirements set forth in cargo doors. 4. Air ducts or air vent openings exceeding 8 ¥ 12 inches shall be secured by installing a steel grille of at least 1/8-inch material of 2-inch mesh or iron bars of at least 1/2 inch round or 1 ¥ 1/4-inch flat steel material spaced no more than 5 inches apart and securely fastened with round-headed flush bolts or welded. 5. Single-unit air conditioners mounted in windows or through the wall shall be secured by flat steel material 2 ¥ 1/4 inch formed to fit snugly over the air conditioning case on the outside and secured with round-headed flush bolts through the walls. 6. All commercial establishments maintaining an inventory and assets of $5000 or more or having a high incident rate of housebreaking in the past shall have an intrusion detection system installed. The system shall cover all possible points of entry to include entry through the walls and roof. The system shall be a silent type with a hookup to the servicing police agency and shall have a backup energizing source.

Appendix 2.B Standards I do not have enough time and space in this chapter to address the subject of standards. The following is a list of organizations that have implemented or produced and supported standards:

International Code Council (ICC). International Building Code (IBC). American Institute of Architects.

18


BOMA, International and the Associated General Contractors. Building Officials and Code Administrators International. Southern Building Code Congress International, Birmingham, AL. International Conference of Building Officials, Whittier, CA. U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). American National Standards Institute (ANSI). National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) 5000 Building Construction and Safety Code. American Society of Chemical Engineers (ASCE). U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). ASIS (January 2003 General Security Risk Assessment Guidelines). National Lighting Bureau. Illuminating Engineering Society of North America International Association of Lighting Management Companies.

Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), National Association of Architectural Metal Manufacturers (NAAMM), NFPA, Steel Door Institute (SDI), Underwriters Laboratory (UL), and International Standards Organization (ISO).

Standards for Windows Standards that apply to windows have implemented or produced and supported by the AAMA, ANSI, UL, ASTM, Consumer Product Safety Commission, ISO, ASTM F1233 (8), UL 752, UL 972, and NSA 65-8.

Standards for Alarms Standards that apply to alarms have implemented or produced and supported by the UL, Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), ISO, NFPA, and National Burglary and Five Alarm Association (NBFAA).

Standards for Doors Conclusion Standards that apply to doors have implemented or produced and supported by the Architectural Manufacturers Association (AAMA), ANSI, American

Have you met the required standard for the project you are working on?

Chapter 3 Security Surveys LAWRENCE J. FENNELLY, CPO, CSS

A security survey is a critical on-site examination and analysis of an industrial plant, business, home, or public or private institution to ascertain the present security status, identify deficiencies or excesses, determine the protection needed, and make recommendations to improve the overall security.1 It is interesting to note that a definition of crime prevention as outlined by the British Home Office Crime Prevention Program—“the anticipation, recognition and appraisal of a crime risk and the initiation of action to remove or reduce it”—could, in fact, be an excellent description of a security survey. The only difference, of course, is that a survey generally does not become the “action” as such but rather a basis for recommendations for action. This definition can be divided into five components and analyzed so that its implications can be applied to the development of a working foundation for the security surveyor: 1. Anticipation. How does the anticipation of a crime risk become important to the security or crime prevention surveyor? Obviously, a primary objective of a survey is the anticipation or prevention aspects of a given situation—the pre- or before concept. Thus, an individual who keeps anticipation in the proper perspective maintains a proper balance in the total spectrum of security surveying. In other words, the anticipatory stage could be considered a prognosis of further action. 2. Recognition. What does an individual need to conduct a survey of the relationships between anticipation and appraisal? Primarily, the ability to recognize and interpret what seems to be a crime risk becomes an important skill a security surveyor acquires and develops.

3. Appraisal. The responsibility to develop, suggest, and communicate recommendations is certainly a hallmark of any security survey. 4. Crime risk. As defined in this text, a crime risk is the opportunity gained from crime. The total elimination of opportunity is most difficult, if not improbable. Therefore, the cost of protection is measured in (1) protection of depth and (2) delay time. Obviously, the implementation of the recommendation should not exceed the total (original or replacement) cost of the item(s) to be protected. An exception to this rule would be human life. 5. The initiation of action to remove or reduce a crime risk. This section indicates the phase of a survey in which the recipient of the recommendations decides whether to act, based on the suggestions (recommendations) set forth by the surveyor. In some cases, the identification of security risk is made early in a survey and it is advisable to act on the recommendation prior to completing the survey. The responsibility to initiate action based on recommendations is the sole duty of the recipient of the survey. This is to suggest that the individual who receives the final evaluation and survey is the individual who has commensurate responsibility and authority to act.2 There are basically three types of surveys: 1. A building inspection is used to advise a tenant in a large complex of his or her vulnerabilities as they pertain to the physical characteristics of the dwelling. 2. A security survey, on the other hand, would be conducted on the whole complex in contrast to only a portion of the site. 19

20


3. A security analysis is a more in-depth study, including risk management, analysis of risk factors, environmental and physiological security measures, analysis of crime patterns, and fraud and internal theft.

will blow up when an intruder attempts to pick the lock. It is dramatic and it is ultramaximum. It is not ridiculous for Fort Knox to provide ultramaximum security to protect its billions in gold bullion.

Medium Security

The Best Time to Conduct the Survey Most crime prevention officers and security directors agree that a survey is most effective after a crisis within the corporation, after a breaking and entering or major larceny, or on request.There are times when a merchant, hoping to get something for nothing, calls the crime prevention officer in the town to conduct such a survey, when in reality there is no intention of spending a dime for improvement. A close friend of mine conducted a detailed security survey on a factory warehouse and office building. The recipient of the survey followed only one of his recommendations, which was to leave a light on over the safe in the back room of his warehouse. The owner had completely disregarded recommendations such as hardware improvements on doors, windows, and skylights. Unfortunately, thieves returned and almost put him out of business.

A medium security classification recommendation would read: Alarm all basement windows and all ground floor windows that are at the rear of the building. Install one panic alarm by the main entrance. Alarm the six paintings worth $12 million, each alarm on a separate 24-hour zone.

Minimum Security Finally, a minimum security classification recommendation would read: From a risk management point of view, alarm the six paintings worth $12 million, each painting to be alarmed on a separate 24-hour zone.

First Step

Classification of Survey Recommendations The various classifications of recommendations can be best explained through an example. The classifications are maximum, medium, and minimum. The example selected is a museum that contains $25 million in various art treasures; the complex has no security.

Maximum Security Obviously, the museum needs an alarm system; therefore, our maximum security classification recommendation should read: Alarm the perimeter (all exterior and interior doors, all windows and skylights). Four panic alarms to be installed at various locations, and six paintings, which are worth $12 million, should be alarmed—each on a separate 24-hour zone.

I specifically did not mention ultramaximum security because this term applies to an armed camp— machine guns, guards in full battle dress armed with semiautomatic rifles, grenades, flamethrowers, mines, and locking devices equipped with dynamite, which

These three examples clearly show the degree of security one can obtain by trying to plan a security package. I stated these examples because your first step in conducting a security survey is an interview with the individual to whom you turn over your report. During this interview, you form an appraisal on the degree of protection required. Sometimes, you may have to state all three recommendations in a report. Other times, you must be conscious that you may force the receiver of your report to accept less security than you suggest because you did not thoroughly and clearly explain your security points.

Developing Security Points Like most professionals, we need tools to do an effective job. The following are suggested to assist you when conducting your surveys: tape measure, floor plans, magnifying glass, flashlight, camera with flash, small tape recorder, screwdriver, penknife, pencil, and paper. Your survey is conducted systematically so that the recipient can follow your recommendations in

Security Surveys

some kind of order. Start with the perimeter of the building. Once inside the building, start at the basement and work your way to the attic. Do not be afraid to be critical of the area that you are in. This is what the recipient wants. After you have done several surveys you will develop a style of putting them together and they become easy.

Dos and Don’ts in Developing a Report

Dos 1. Be honest in your recommendations. You are the expert. 2. Call the shots as you see it. 3. Be critical—physically tear the property apart in your mind as part of the process.

Don’ts 1. Don’t over exaggerate your reports. They are too important. 2. Don’t inflate the report with maps and floor plans. 3. Don’t repeat your statements. The written report should include the following: Page One: Introduction or sample covering letter Page Two: A. Identification of building B. Specific statement of the major problem. C. Alternative recommendations to the problems. D. List of your further recommendations. General statements such as the following can be included in the report: 1. Physically inventory all property at least once a year. Your inventory should list the name of the item, the manufacturer, model, serial number, value, color, and date purchased. 2. Engrave all property in accordance with the established operation identification program. 3. All typewriters should be bolted down and all files, cabinets, and rooms containing valuable information or equipment should be locked when not in use.

Other Keys to Being an Effective Surveyor Only when you have developed the ability to visualize the potential for criminal activity will you become an effective crime scene surveyor. This ability is the part of the process referred to as an art. Nonetheless,

21

it is important that, when you arrive on a survey site, you are prepared to give a property owner sound advice on the type of security precautions to consider. In summary, to be a good crime prevention surveyor, you have to be a good investigator. You must understand criminal methods of operation and the limitations of standard security devices. In addition, you must be knowledgeable about the type of security hardware necessary to provide various degrees of protection.3

Nine Points of Security Concern 1. General purpose of the building (i.e., residence, classroom, office). Consider the hours of use, people who use the building, people who have access, key control, maintenance schedule. Who is responsible for maintenance? Is the building used for public events? If so, what type and how often? Is the building normally opened to the public? Identify the significant factors and make recommendations. 2. Hazards involving the building or its occupants. List and assign priorities (e.g., theft of office equipment, wallet theft, theft from stockrooms). Identify potential hazards that might exist in the future. 3. Police or guard security applications. What can these guards do to improve the response to the building and occupants from a patrol, investigation, or crime prevention standpoint? Would the application of guards be operationally effective or cost effective? 4. Physical recommendations. Inspect doors, windows, lighting, access points. Recommend physical changes thst would make the building more secure, such as pinning hinges on doors and fences. 5. Locks, equipment to be bolted down, potential application of card control, and key control. Make specific recommendations. 6. Alarms. Would an alarm system be cost effective? Would the use of the building preclude the use of an alarm? Are the potential benefits of an alarm such that the building use should be changed to facilitate it? Consider all types of alarms, buildingwide or in specific offices. Consider closed circuit television and portable or temporary alarm devices. 7. Storage. Does the building have specific storage problems, such as expensive items that should be given special attention, petty cash, stamps,

22


calculators, microscopes? Make specific recommendations. 8. Trespassing. Are adequate “No Trespassing” signs posted? Are other signs needed? 9. Custodians. Can custodians be used in a manner that would be better from a security standpoint?

Personality of the Complex Each complex that you survey has a distinctive personality. Let us take an average building, which is opened from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. The traffic flow is heaviest during this period. During the span from 5 p.m. to 1 a.m., the building is closed to the public. Some staff members may work late. Who secures the building? At 1 a.m., the cleaning crew arrives and prepares the building for another day. The whole personality of the complex must be taken into consideration before your report is completed. Let us take a further example of building personality. The complex is 100 ¥ 100 feet and it has two solid-core doors, one large window at the front of the building, and is air conditioned. Case 1. The complex is a credit union on the main street next door to the local police department versus the same credit union on the edge of town. Case 2. This is a large doctor’s office. The doctor is an art buff and has half a million dollars in art in the office versus a doctor who has no art but has a small safe with about $200 worth of Class A narcotics inside. Case 3. This building houses a variety store that closes at 6 p.m. versus a liquor store that is open until 2 a.m. In these cases, I give six examples of the personality of a complex. As I stated, your recommendations must be tailored to fit the lifestyle and vulnerabilities of these buildings.

Positive and Negative Aspects of Making Recommendations In making your recommendations for security improvements, you must consider the consequences of your suggestion in the event the property owner implements it. Negative as well as positive aspects are involved. Take, for example, a housing complex that has a high crime rate from outsiders and within. Your recommendation is, “Build a 10-foot high fence around the complex.”

Positive Aspects Crime is reduced—the environment can be designed so that the individual considering a criminal act feels that there is a good chance to be seen by someone who will take action and call the police. Vandalism is less—the target of attack can be made to appear so formidable that the person does not feel able to reach the target. It adds to the physical aesthetics of the area through environmental design. The visual impact is negative—this ensures the property of the residents, adding to their secure environment. Limiting the number of points of entry and establishing access control primarily decreases crimes opportunity and keeps out unauthorized persons.

Negative Aspect A fortress environment may create more of a psychological barrier than a physical one. It is socially undesirable and yet is being replicated throughout our country at an increasing rate.

Community Reaction This cannot be disregarded. Furthermore, vandalism at the time of early installation should be considered. Consciousness of fear may develop by those tenants whose apartments face the fence; but as the tenants come and go, it will eventually be accepted. All fences are subject to being painted by groups with a cause.

Crime Analysis It is not necessary for you to be a statistician, but the more you know about and understand the local crime problems, the better equipped you are to analyze the potential crime risk loss in surveying a business or a home. Crime analysis collection is simply the gathering of raw data concerning reported crimes and known offenders. Generally, such information comes from crime reports, arrest reports, and police contact cards. This is not to say that these are the only sources available for collecting crime data. The analysis process as applied to criminal activity is a specific step-by-step sequence of five interconnected functions: crime data collection, crime

Security Surveys

data collation, data analysis, dissemination of analysis reports, and feedback and evaluation of crime data. Crime analysis of the site you survey supplies you with specific information to enable you to further harden the target in specific areas where losses have occurred. It is a means of responding “after the fact,” when a crime has been committed.

䊉

䊉

Key Control Key control is a very important factor in conducting a survey. Check whether the clients are in the habit of picking up keys from employees at their termination and if they have an accurate record of who has which keys. Within a few short minutes, you should realize whether or not the recipient of your survey has a problem. Almost every company has some sort of master key system, because many people must have access to the building without the inconvenience of carrying two dozen keys around every day. Master keys are required for company executives, middle managers, security department, as well as the maintenance department.

23

duce keys previously issued at the time of termination. Periodic inspections should be made to ensure that possession of keys conforms to the record of issuance. These periodic inspections should be utilized to remind key holders that they should immediately notify you of any key loss. The original issue of keys and subsequent fabrication and reissuance of keys should ensure that their identity is coded on the keys so the lock for which they were manufactured cannot be identified in plain language.

Closed Circuit Television Closed circuit television (CCTV) is a valuable asset to any security package and an even more valuable tool if hooked up to a recorder. CCTV is a surveillance tool that provides an added set of eyes. If this equipment is on the site you are surveying, it is your job to evaluate its operation and effectiveness: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Is it working properly? How is it being monitored? Is it placed where it will be most beneficial? What are the type and quality of the lens and components?

Guidelines for Key Control 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Purchase a large key cabinet to store and control the many keys in your possession. Two sets of key tags should be furnished or obtained with the new key cabinet: One tag should read “file-key, must not be loaned out,” and the second tag should read “Duplicate.” The key cabinet should be equipped with loan tags, which identify the person to whom a key is loaned. This tag is to be hung in the numbered peg corresponding to the key that was used. Establish accurate records and files, listing the key codes, date key was issued, and who received it. Have each employee sign a receipt when he or she receives a key. All alarm keys should be marked and coded. A check should be made of what keys are in the possession of guards and staff. Do not issue keys to any employee unless absolutely necessary. Only one person should order and issue keys for the complex. Change the key cylinder when an authorized key holder is discharged for cause. Furthermore, discharged or retired employees should pro-

Intrusion Alarms If the site you are surveying already has an alarm system, check it out completely. Physically walk through every motion detector unit. Evaluate the quality of the existing alarm products versus what is available to meet the needs of the client. I surveyed a warehouse recently that was only 5 years old. It was interesting to note that the warehouse had a two-zone alarm system. The control panel was to the right of the front door, which was about 15 feet from the receptionist. Both alarm keys were in the key cylinders, and according to the president of the company, “The keys have been there since the system was installed.” My point is, for a dollar, another key could be duplicated and then the area is vulnerable to attack. Another time, while doing a survey of an art gallery in New York, the security director stated that he had not had a service call on his alarm system in 2 years. We then proceeded to physically check every motion detection unit and magnetic contact. You can imagine his reaction when he found out that 12 out of the 18 motion detection units were not working.

24


In conclusion, intrusion alarms come in all shapes and sizes, using a variety of electronic equipment. It is advisable to be familiar with the state of art of electronics so that you can produce an effective report.

Lighting and Security What would happen if we shut off all the lights at night? Think about it. Such a foolish act would create an unsafe environment. Senior citizens would never go out and communities would have an immediate outbreak of theft and vandalism. Commercial areas would be burglarized at an uncontrollable rate. Therefore, lighting and security go hand in hand.This example may seem far-fetched, but in fact, installation of improved lighting in a number of cities has resulted in the following: decreased vandalism, decreased street crime, decrease in suspicious persons, decreased commercial burglaries, and in general, a reduction in crime.

Streetlights Streetlights have received widespread notoriety for their value in reducing crime. Generally, streetlights are rated by the size of the lamp and the characteristics of the light dispersed. More specifically, four types of lighting units are utilized in streetlighting.The most common, and oldest, is the incandescent lamp. It is the least expensive in terms of energy consumed and the number needed.As such, incandescent lighting is generally recognized as the least efficient and economical type of street lighting for use today. The second type of lighting unit that, as a recently developed system, has been acclaimed by some police officials as “the best source available,” is the high-intensity sodium vapor lamp. This lamp produces more lumens per watt than most other types. It is brighter, cheaper to maintain, and the color rendition is close to that of natural daylight. The third and fourth types of devices commonly used for streetlighting are the mercury vapor and metal halide lamps. Both are bright and produce good color rendition. However, the trend now is to use metal halide because it is more efficient than mercury vapor.

1. Communications network, walkie-talkies, and locations of interior and exterior phones. 2. Guard force and security personnel, their training, police powers, uniforms, use of badges, and method of operation. Your objectives are to identify vulnerabilities, evaluate the site, and provide critical assessment. Methodology and style are purely those of the surveyor, but do not forget they also represent a document from you and your department.

Security Survey Follow-Up The follow-up to your security survey takes many forms, from actually sitting down with the recipient to going by the site and seeing if any changes have actually taken place. Some police departments produce five to seven surveys a day. They do not evaluate their performance because of the time and personnel involved. In this way, they fail to examine their own effectiveness. The reason for the follow-up is to encourage increased compliance and ensure that recommendations are understood. Without this step, you will not know if the recipient has taken any action. The basic security survey framework consists of five steps: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Generating the survey request. Conducting the physical inspection. Delivering survey recommendations. Following up after the report is completed. Evaluating the program.

For every crime committed, there is a crime prevention or loss reduction defense or procedure that, if followed, could delay or prevent a criminal from committing that act. Physical security involves implementing those measures that could delay or deny unauthorized entry, larceny, sabotage, fire, and vandalism. This chapter on security surveys is geared to assist both private security and public law enforcement to harden a target and assist the community to further reduce losses. To further assist your security survey, several checklists are included at the end of this chapter.

Other Security Aspects

Residential Security

Depending on the type of facility that you are surveying, the following should be reviewed:

A large percentage of home burglars enter by a door or window. In most cases the front, rear, bulkhead,

Security Surveys

25

or garage door is unlocked. Front and rear doors often have inadequate locks or are built in such a way that breaking the glass to the side of the door or on the door itself allows the burglar to simply reach inside and unlock the door. Windows on the firstfloor level are the crook’s next choice for entry. Basement windows are the least desirable because they may require the burglar to get dirty and, like executives, this person is concerned about appearance.

Defensive Measures

Doors (Front, Rear, Basement, and Garage) The first important item is to install deadbolts on all entry doors. A cylinder deadbolt with a 1-inch projecting bolt, made of hardened steel should be utilized. This lock should be used in conjunction with a standard entry knob lock. Viewing devices with a wide angle lens on entry doors is also standard to prevent unwanted intrusions into the home. 1. Doors with glass in them. The backdoor is one of the burglar’s favorite entryway. Most rear doors are made partly of glass, and this is an open invitation to a burglar. This type of door must have a double cylinder deadbolt for protection. This type of lock requires a key to open it from the inside as well as the outside, because most burglars break the glass and try to gain entry by opening the locked door from inside. 2. Sliding glass doors. These entries should be secured so they cannot be pried out of their track. Also, you can prevent jimmying of your door by putting a “Charley bar” made from wood or metal and cut to size and placed in the track when closed (see Figure 3-1). Bulkheads should also be included as part of your overall security package, and secured with square bolt or deadbolt locks.

Windows Windows come in a variety of shapes, sizes, and types, each of which presents a different type of security problem. Windows provide an inviting entryway for a burglar, who does not like to break glass because the noise may alert someone. On double-hung sashtype windows, drill a hole through the top corner of the bottom window into the bottom of the top window. Place a solid pin into the hole to prevent the window from being opened (see Figure 3-2). Keyed window latches may also be installed to prevent the

Figure 3-1. To prevent forced sliding of aluminum sliding doors, you can mount a Charley bar, which folds down from the side.

window from being opened. In addition, grilles and grates may be installed over extremely vulnerable accesses.

Entrances Any opening through which a human body can pass is an entrance. Front doors, basements, patio doors, garages that have access to the house, and windows on the second floor are all entryways to burglars. No one way is more important to protect than another.

Setting up Inner Defenses Even with the precautions already mentioned, a burglar may still get into the home. Once there, you should try to slow down this spree, as time is the one element working against the criminal. One successful method is to convert a closet into a vault, by installing a deadbolt lock on the door. You have now considerably strengthened the inner defenses. Restricting access from one part of the home to another via deadbolts and the like gives the burglar yet another obstacle to overcome. Having a burglar alarm stand watch is like an insurance policy. The homeowner may never need it, but it is comforting to know it is there. The very best system is a perimeter system that stops an intruder before entering the dwelling, but it is also costly. Less expensive methods involve using pads under rugs and motion detectors. Remember, no home can be made 100% burglarproof, but in most instances, by making it extremely difficult for the burglar to enter the home, you discourage crime. The burglar will move on to a home where the pickings are easier.

26


Figure 3-2. A double-hung window can be easily jimmied open with a screwdriver. Glass can be broken adjacent to the crescent latch or by prying against hardware, and the screws can be popped out. To prevent this, drill a hole through the top corner of the bottom window and place a solid pin in the hole. You can also install a key-operated lock.

Residential security is more important than we realize. Just ask the victim of a home that has been burglarized. The mother and wife responds, “I felt personally threatened and upset over the losses but more upset over the fact that our home was violated.” The father and husband responds, “I’m happy my wife and daughter weren’t home or they could have been hurt. Now I’ve got to call the police, my insurance agent, the repairman, and maybe an alarm company.” Too often people say, “It won’t happen to me,” “Our neighborhood never had a theft,” “I sleep with a small gun by my bed,” “I have a dog for protection,” or “I don’t need an alarm system.” These are before-the-incident excuses. The cause of residential crime can be found in the individual’s environment and lifestyle. Crime can be controlled and losses reduced by corrective human behavior. Physical security measures play an important role in preventing many crimes, but these measures are effective only if they are installed and used properly.

Alarms Residential intrusion alarms are becoming more popular and installed more frequently. The control panel (Underwriters Laboratories listed) also bandies the fire alarm system. An audible horn distinguishes which system has gone off. The control panel should have an entrance/exit delay feature, which aids in the overall reduction of false alarms. Depending on the style of the home, any number of

components can be used. However, keep in mind that only a total coverage system should be recommended and installed.

Lighting Improved lighting provides another residential security measure. Although some studies documented crime reduction after improved lighting systems were installed, these studies typically have not accounted for displacement effects. Even if individuals living in a residence reduce the likelihood of a burglary by better lighting, they may only be displacing the burglary to another, less lit area.

Home Security Checklist Massachusetts Crime Watch4 put together the following home security checklist, which deals with 35 security check points:

Entrances 1. Are the doors of metal or solid wood construction? 2. Are door hinges protected from removal from outside? 3. Are there windows in the door or within 40 inches of the lock? 4. Are there auxiliary locks on the doors? 5. Are strikes and strike plates securely fastened?

Security Surveys

6. If there are no windows in the door, is there a wide-angle viewer or voice intercommunications device? 7. Can the lock mechanism be reached through a mail slot, delivery port, or pet entrance at the doorway? 8. Is there a screen or storm door with an adequate lock? 9. Are all exterior entrances lighted? 10. Can entrances be observed from the street or public areas? 11. Does the porch or landscaping offer concealment from view from the street or public area? 12. If the door is a sliding glass door, is the sliding panel secured from being lifted out of the track? 13. Is a Charley bar or key-operated auxiliary lock used on the sliding glass door? 14. Is the sliding door mounted on the inside of the stationary panel?

Entrances from Garage and Basement 15. Are all entrances to living quarters from garage and basement of metal or solid wood construction? 16. Does the door from garage to living quarters have auxiliary locks for exterior entrance? 17. Does the door from basement to living quarters have an auxiliary lock operated from living quarters side?

Ground Floor Windows 18. Do all windows have key-operated locks or a method of pinning in addition to the regular lock? 19. Do all windows have screens or storm windows that lock from inside? 20. Do any windows open onto areas that may be hazardous or offer special risk of burglary? 21. Are exterior areas of windows free from concealing structure or landscaping?

Upper Floor and Windows 22. Do any upper floor windows open onto porch or garage roofs or roofs of adjoining buildings? 23. If so, are they secured as adequately as if they were at ground level? 24. Are trees and shrubbery kept trimmed back from upper floor windows? 25. Are ladders kept outside the house where they are accessible?

27

Basement Doors and Windows 26. Is there a door from the outside to the basement? 27. If so, is that door adequately secure for an exterior door? 28. Is the outside basement entrance lighted by exterior light? 29. Is the basement door concealed from the street or neighbors? 30. Are all basement windows secured against entry?

Garage Doors and Windows 31. Is the automobile entrance door to the garage equipped with a locking device? 32. Is garage door kept closed and locked at all times? 33. Are garage windows secured adequately for ground floor windows? 34. Is the outside utility entrance to garage as secure as required for any ground floor entrance? 35. Are all garage doors lighted on the outside?

Protecting Personal Property A number of programs have been developed throughout the country that are geared to aid the citizen to reduce losses in the community. A number of these programs follow: 1. Operation Identification is a program started in 1963 in Monterey Park, California. This program encourages citizens to engrave their personal property with a state driver’s license number. 2. Bicycle registration and antitheft program. Some communities have started a mandatory registration of bicycles as well as an educational program. The educational program identifies poor-quality locks used to secure bikes as well as providing instructions for properly securing a bike. 3. Auto theft prevention is another educational program, which is generally implemented by the distribution of printed material and covered at community meetings. How many times have you seen a person keep the engine running while going into the store to buy milk? This is an example of giving the criminal an opportunity to commit a crime. 4. Neighborhood watch. This program, initiated in 1971, encourages people to report suspicious

28


circumstances in their neighborhoods to the police, as well as familiarizing the citizens with crime prevention techniques to reduce criminal opportunity. Be alert for these suspicious signs:5 䊉 A stranger entering a neighbor’s house when the neighbor is not home. 䊉 Unusual noises, like a scream, breaking glass, or an explosion. 䊉 People, male or female, in your neighborhood who do not live there. 䊉 Someone going door-to-door in your neighborhood, if he or she tries to open the doors or goes into the backyard, especially if a companion waits out front or a car follows close behind. 䊉 Someone trying to force entry into a home, even if wearing a uniform. 䊉 A person running, especially if carrying something of value. The person who sees anything suspicious is to call the police immediately. Give the responding officers a physical description of the person and license plate number of the car. Even if nothing is wrong, such alertness is appreciated. 5. Security surveys. Many police departments today have trained crime prevention officers who can provide security survey assistance to residents, enabling the citizen to better protect the family, home, and environment. 6. Citizen patrols. The citizen patrol can be viewed as part of the long historical tradition of vigilantism in this country, with all the ambivalence present in that term. Presently, where their numbers are reported to be increasing in a number of suburban communities and cities across the country, citizen patrols are seen ideally as performing a relatively simple and narrowly defined role—to deter criminal activity by their presence. Their function should be that of a passive guard—to watch for criminal or suspicious activity and alert the police when they see it. Drawing on information that exists about current citizen groups, what are the advantages over other protective measures? 䊉 Patrols are relatively inexpensive. 䊉 Patrols can perform a surveillance function effectively. 䊉 Patrols take advantage of existing behavior patterns.

Patrols can improve an individual’s ability to deal with crime. 䊉 Patrols contribute to other desirable social goals related to neighborhood cohesiveness and the provision of a desirable alternative to less acceptable activity. In practice, however, patrols exhibit serious shortcomings: 䊉 The typical patrol is formed in response to a serious incident or heightened level of fear about crime. The ensuing pattern is cyclic: increased membership, success in reducing criminal activity at least in a specific area, boredom, decreasing membership, dissolution. As a result, patrols tend to be short-lived. 䊉 The passive role of a patrol is difficult to maintain. 䊉 The police are reluctant to cooperate with a patrol and may even oppose it. 䊉 The patrol may aggravate community tensions. The principal problems of patrols relate to their inability to sustain the narrow, anticrime role they initially stress. They may be an effective temporary measure to deal with criminal contagion in a particular area. Over the longer term, however, the inherent risks may outweigh the continued benefits. The proliferation of patrols in recent years is evidence that they fill a need, but it should be recognized that patrols are no substitute for adequate police protection. 䊉

In conclusion, residential security can best be obtained by getting the facts on what you can do to secure the home, analyzing these facts, and arriving at a decision and implementing security measures.

References 1. Raymond M. Momboisse. Industrial Security for Strikes, Riots and Disasters. (Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas, 1968), p. 13. 2. Arthur A. Kingsbury. Introduction to Security and Crime Prevention Surveys. (Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas), pp. 6, 7. 3. Washington Crime Watch. Crime Prevention Training Manual. Security Survey Section, p. 8. 4. Massachusetts Crime Watch. Home Security Test Booklet. LEAA, 1980. 5. Dick LaFaver. The Home Security Book, #16. Shell Oil Company, p. 6.

Security Surveys

29

Appendix 3.A Site Survey and Risk Assessment* VICTOR HAROLD

Crime prevention, or lessening the potential for crime, begins with a major in-depth security analysis of the business or facility.A survey of the interior and exterior will point out security deficiencies and potential for intrusion or the probability that a crime will occur at that spot. After the survey, an appraisal and recommendation for action should be immediately undertaken. A timetable for implementing the recommendations should be originated and strictly followed. It is possible the site survey is beyond the ability of most business managements. If it is, you are advised to obtain the services of a qualified security professional. You are also urged to have this service performed immediately. Consider the vulnerability of your business to imminent criminal intrusion. Many burglarized companies as well as those which were victimized by white collar crime have suffered irreversible losses, slowdown, and even shutdown. This appendix broadly points out the external and internal geographical areas which may require immediate and long-term consideration to help prevent criminal breach of the premises. 1. Can you obtain a neighborhood crime statistics report from the local police? 2. Can you determine if there has been any labor unrest in the area? 3. Can you obtain a report which details the extent of damage a labor unrest may have had on a firm in the area? * Reprinted with permission of Victor Harold from How to Stop Theft in Your Business.

4. What is the prevalent type of damage done to companies during a labor unrest in the area? 5. Has your company ever been victimized by the labor unrests of other companies in the area? 6. Have prior tenants or owners of your facility ever reported a criminal incident? 7. What types of crimes are the most prevalent in the area? List by percentage and frequency. 8. Is your facility very visible from the local roads? 9. Is there easy access by emergency vehicles to your building from the local roads? 10. Have you a chart showing the frequency of police patrols in the area? 11. Do you know how long it would take an emergency or police vehicle to reach your facility? 12. Have you an evaluation of your building’s roof and doors which details the length of time it will take for a break-in to be successful? 13. Have you an evaluation of the safes, locks, and other devices to ascertain how long they can delay being opened? 14. If you require separate storage of high-risk or valuable items, are they placed in a high security area which may discourage intrusion? 15. Is personnel movement within the building controlled? 16. Have the door and window hardware been evaluated for ease of entry? 17. Have window openings been secured? (Check with local fire department codes.) 18. Are important files and computer operations secured in an area that prohibits unauthorized entry? 19. Is the lighting sufficient throughout all work areas?

30


20. Are vent and roof access panels and doors wired and latched to prevent intrusion? 21. Have you prevented external access to the locker rooms, vending and lounge areas? 22. Are the financial handling areas separate and secure? 23. Do you keep confidential your safe’s contents, the combinations and the controls needed to maintain security? 24. Are the removable panels and grates in which a person or inventory may be concealed periodically removed and checked? 25. Can these panels and grates be more securely fastened without compromising the item to which they are installed? 26. Will you require police, fire department, or building department approval to more securely fasten those panels and grates? 27. Are the incoming electrical lines well secured and vandal free? 28. Are the panels on all electrical items fastened? 29. Are the electrical power grids, panels, backup, power supplies, etc., kept in a separate locked area? 30. Have you conducted a walk around the property to see if trees, hedges, walls, and fences can hide a person or goods? 31. Have you considered immediate action to correct? 32. If some visibility obstructions exist, are you taking steps to correct? 33. To prevent inventory from going out with the trash, are you keeping a secure trash collection area? 34. To prevent roof access, are trees and their branches next to buildings removed?

35. Are ladders kept secure? 36. Are you aware that noisy equipment can mask unauthorized entry? 37. Are all exterior building entry points alarmed? 38. Are you aware that certain internal and external conditions may affect the alarm? 39. Is there a log of alarm malfunctions and their causes? 40. Have all the causes of alarm malfunction been remedied? 41. Is there an alarm listing and maintenance schedule? 42. Has the police or security company’s response to an alarm been tested? 43. Are key management personnel frequently tested on alarm use? 44. Have key personnel been given specific alarm control assignments, to include alarm opening, closing, checkout procedures, and accountability? 45. Are there clearly established money handling procedures to follow for safeguarding cash deposits etc.? 46. Do you have a policy for reporting thefts other than security breaches? (Anonymously, if you think it is best.) 47. Are office machines, shop equipment, and other easily movable items marked for identification purposes? 48. Are vendors, salespeople, and repair persons logged in and out and, when necessary, given visitor’s passes? 49. Are the employees frequently updated on security procedures? 50. Are you keeping a file of security deficiencies and a schedule for correction?

Security Surveys

31

Appendix 3.B Physical Security Survey* VICTOR HAROLD

Exterior Physical Characteristics: Perimeter Grounds 1. Is the fence strong and in good repair? 2. Is the fence height designed so that an intruder cannot climb over it? 3. Is the distance of the fence from the building designed so that an intruder cannot crawl under it? 4. Are boxes or other materials placed at a safe distance from the fence? 5. Are there weeds or trash adjoining the building, which should be removed? 6. Are stock, crates, or merchandise allowed to be piled near the building? 7. Is there a clear area on both sides of the fence? 8. Are unsecured overpasses or subterranean passageways near the fence? 9. Are the fence gates solid and in good condition? 10. Are the fence gates properly locked? 11. Are the fence gates’ hinges secure and nonremovable? 12. What types of lock and chain are used to secure gate? 13. Have unnecessary gates been eliminated? 14. Do you check regularly those gates that are locked? 15. Are blind alleys near buildings protected? 16. Are fire escapes and exits designed for quick exit but difficult entry? 17. Is the perimeter reinforced by protective lighting? * Reprinted with permission of Victor Harold.

18. Has shrubbery near windows, doors, gates, garage, and access roads been kept to a minimum? 19. What are the physical boundaries of the residence’s grounds? 20. Does lighting illuminate all roads? 21. Is there a procedure to identify vendors, subcontractors, and visitors before entrance to the gate?

Exterior Doors 1. Are all doors strong and formidable? 2. Are all door hinge pins located on the inside? 3. Are all door hinges installed so that it would be impossible to remove the closed door(s) without seriously damaging the door or jamb? 4. Are all door frames well constructed and in good condition? 5. Are the exterior locks double cylinder, deadbolts, or jimmy proof? 6. Can the breaking glass or a door panel allow the person to open the door? 7. Are all locks working properly? 8. Are all doors properly secured or reinforced? 9. Are all unused doors secured? 10. Are the keys in possession of authorized personnel? 11. Are keys issued only to personnel who actually need them? 12. Are the padlocks, chains, and hasps heavy enough? 13. Are the hasps installed so that the screws cannot be removed?

32


14. Are all hasps, padlocks, and chains casehardened?

Exterior Windows 1. Are nonessential windows either bricked up or protected with steel mesh or iron bars? 2. Are all windows within 14 feet of the ground equipped with protective coverings? 3. Are the bars or screens mounted securely? 4. Do those windows with locks have locks designed and located so they cannot be reached or opened by breaking the glass? 5. Are small or expensive items left in windows overnight? 6. Is security glass used in any of these windows? 7. Are windows located under loading docks or similar structures protected? 8. Can windows be removed without breaking them? 9. Are all vents and similar openings having a gross area of 1 square foot or more secured with protective coverings? 10. Are windows connected to an alarm system adequately protected? 11. Are windows not secured by bars or alarms kept locked or otherwise protected? 12. Have windows (doors) been reinforced with Lexan? 13. Are all windows properly equipped with locks, reinforced glass, or decorative protective bars or sturdy shutters? 14. Are unused windows permanently closed?

Other Openings 1. Do you have a lock on manholes that give direct access to your building or to a door that a burglar could easily open? 2. Have you permanently closed manholes or similar openings that are no longer used? 3. Are your sidewalk doors or grates locked properly and secured? 4. Are your sidewalk doors or grates securely in place so that the entire frame cannot be pried open? 5. Are your accessible skylights protected with bars or an intrusion alarm? 6. Did you eliminate unused skylights, which are an invitation to burglary? 7. Are exposed roof hatches properly secured? 8. Are fan openings or ventilator shafts protected?

9. Does a service tunnel or sewer connect to building? 10. Do fire escapes comply with city and state fire regulations? 11. Are your fire exits or escapes designed so that a person can leave easily but would have difficulty entering? 12. Do fire exit doors have a portable alarm mounted, to communicate if the door is opened, or is it hooked up to the intrusion alarm? 13. Can entrance be gained from an adjoining building?

Exterior Lighting 1. Is the lighting adequate to illuminate critical areas (alleys, fire escapes, ground level windows)? 2. How many foot-candles is the lighting on horizontal at ground level (estimation, Underwriters Laboratories)? 3. Is there sufficient illumination over entrances? 4. Are the perimeter areas lighted to assist police surveillance of the area? 5. Are the protective lighting system and the working lighting system on the same line? 6. Is there an auxiliary system that has been tested? 7. Is there an auxiliary power source for protective lighting? 8. Is the auxiliary system designed to go into operation automatically when needed? 9. Are the protective lights controlled automatically by a timer or photocells or is it manually operated? 10. What hours is this lighting used? 11. Does it use switch box(es) or is it automatically time secured? 12. Can protective lights be compromised easily (e.g., unscrewing of bulbs)? 13. What type of lights are installed around the property? 14. Are they cost effective? 15. Are the fixtures vandal proof? 16. Is there a glare factor? 17. Is there an even distribution of light?

Interior Physical Characteristics 1. Name of the site. 2. Address. 3. Full name and exact title of the administrative officer.

Security Surveys

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

Telephone number. Name of the surveying officer. Full name and exact title of the security liaison. Describe the security problem at this site. What is the general purpose of the site? What is the range of hours in use? Which hours and days represent high-activity use? How many people have access to the site? Is the site normally open to the public? List the number of rooms occupied by the various departments and offices. Who does maintenance? On what schedule does maintenance operate? List the estimated dollar value of equipment and property in each department or office. What area has the highest dollar value? What area contains the most sensitive material?

Interior Lighting 1. Is there a backup system for emergency lights? 2. Is the lighting provided during the day adequate for security purposes? 3. Is the lighting at night adequate for security purposes? 4. Is the night lighting sufficient for surveillance by the local police department?

Doors 1. Are doors constructed of a sturdy and solid material? 2. Are doors limited to the essential minimum? 3. Are outside door hinge pins spot welded or bradded to prevent removal? 4. Are those hinges installed on the inward side of the door? 5. Is there at least one lock on each outer door? 6. Is each door equipped with a locking device?

Offices 1. Can entrances be reduced without loss of efficiency? 2. Are office doors locked when unattended for long periods? 3. Does the receptionist desk have a clear view of the entrance, stairs, and elevators? 4. Are maintenance people, visitors, and the like required to show identification to the receptionist?

33

5. Are desks and files locked when the office is left unattended? 6. Are items of value left on desks or in an unsecure manner? 7. Are all typewriters bolted down? 8. Are floors free of projections, cracks, and debris? 9. During normal working hours, is the storage facility kept locked when not in use? 10. How many people have keys to this door?

Keys 1. How many keys are issued? How many master keys? 2. Is there a key control system? 3. What is the basis of issuance of keys? 4. Is an adequate log maintained of all keys issued? 5. Are key holders ever allowed to duplicate keys? 6. Are keys marked “Do Not Duplicate”? 7. If master key(s) are used, are they devoid of markings identifying them as such? 8. Are losses or thefts of key(s) promptly reported to security officer or police? 9. Who (name and title) is responsible for issuing and replacing keys? 10. When was the last visual key audit made (to ensure they had not been loaned, lost, or stolen)? 11. Were all the keys accounted for? (If not, how many were missing? How often do you conduct visual audits?) 12. Are duplicate keys stored in a secure place? Where? 13. Are keys returned when an employee resigns, is discharged, or is suspended? (If not, why not?)

Locks 1. Are all entrances equipped with secure locking devices? 2. Are they always locked when not in active use? (If not, why not?) 3. Is the lock designed or the frame built so that the door cannot be forced by spreading the frame? 4. Are all locks in working order? 5. Are the screws holding the locks firmly in place? 6. Is the bolt protected or constructed so that it cannot be cut? 7. Are locks’ combinations changed or rotated immediately on resignation, discharge, or suspension of an employee having possession of a master key(s)? If not, why not?


34

8. Are locks changed once a year regardless of transfers or known violations of security? If not, why not? 9. When was the last time the locks were changed?

Petty Cash 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

7. 8. 9. 10.

How much petty cash is kept? Are funds kept to a minimum? Where is petty cash secured? Are blank checks also stored there? Are checks presigned? Is the accounting system adequate to prevent loss or pilferage of funds accessible to unauthorized persons at any time? Are funds kept overnight in a safe, locked desk, or file cabinet? Is this storage area secure? Are locks in the storage area replaced when keys are lost, missing, or stolen? How many people handle petty cash.

4. Is your safe designed for burglary protection as well as fire protection? 5. Where is (are) safe(s) located? 6. Is it well lit at night? 7. Can it be seen from outside? 8. Do you keep money in your safe? 9. Do you keep cash at a minimum by banking regularly? 10. Do you use care in working the combination so that it is not observed? 11. Do you spin the dial rather than leaving it on “day lock”? 12. Do you have a policy of making certain that the safe is properly secured and the room, door(s), and windows locked, night light(s) on, and no one is hidden inside? 13. Is your safe secured to the floor or wall? 14. Are combinations changed at least every 6 months? If not, when was the last time? 15. Do you have a protective theft alarm? If yes, is it local or central? 16. When was the system last tested?

Inventory Control Safes 1. What methods are used to protect the safe combination? 2. Are combinations changed or rotated immediately on resignation, discharge, or suspension of an employee having possession of the combination? If not, why not? 3. Is your safe approved by Underwriters Laboratories?

1. When was the last time an inventory of business equipment was made, listing serial numbers and descriptions? 2. Were any items missing or unaccounted for? 3. Are all typewriters and the like bolted down or otherwise secured? 4. Has the firm marked all its business equipment? 5. Is all expensive business equipment stored in a security cabinet or room?

Security Surveys

35

Appendix 3.C Plant Security Checklist* VICTOR HAROLD

1. Have you obtained a list of certified protection professionals (CPP) from the American Society for Industrial Security (Arlington, Virginia)? 2. Have you assigned a senior executive to act as liaison with the security consultant? 3. Have you assessed overall plant vulnerability to a variety of risks? 4. Have you checked with local police agencies about the incidence of vandalism, damage, reported internal losses, burglaries, and other crimes in the vicinity? 5. Have you checked with fire officials about the local incidence and type of fires and extent of losses? 6. Do you do periodic reviews of the plant security system, especially with a view toward effectiveness? 7. Do you periodically review the efficiency and willingness of the assigned security executive to carry out the function? 8. In many situations, the cost of security is far greater than the actual or expected loss. Have your circumstances been analyzed for cost effectiveness? 9. Do you maintain a list of security regulations? Is it properly posted? Is it periodically reviewed? 10. Are you certain there has been no negligence in the guard force? 11. How often do you review the methods used to screen new employees, and are you certain screening is done? 12. Is there a policy to prevent laxity and indiscriminate use of badges and passes? * Reprinted with permission of Victor Harold.

13. On termination of employment of a senior executive, are locks, codes, and passwords changed? 14. Have you trained line supervisors to check daily the plant’s physical condition, both interior and exterior? 15. Do you tell your plant engineers to check daily critical utility areas for damage; that is, sewers, telephone, water, and electricity? 16. If security equipment is to be installed, has the installation plan been approved by a qualified group; that is, fire department, architect, police department, or engineer? 17. Has there been a recent security evaluation of hardware, containers, fire control equipment, safety items, locks, and bars? 18. Do you have a daily inspection of interior and exterior intrusion detection systems, fire systems, and sprinkler systems? 19. Do you daily test and examine your alarm system for jumpers and proper operation? 20. Is your alarm system of the divided type; that is, can small segments be disconnected from the still operational main system? 21. Do you have a security communication network? Are all parts operating? 22. If you use closed circuit television and cameras, are all stations functioning well? 23. When purchasing new equipment, is the suitability and reliability of the items checked out by a dependable group? 24. Have you a study showing that your security measures can generate a return on investment because losses are avoided and assets are recovered?

36


25. Has a thorough security survey identified various probable events, such as pilferage or white collar crime, to which the company is vulnerable? 26. Can an approximate dollar amount be placed on each factor? 27. Will the survey estimate the cost versus benefit ratio of attempting to correct any security infringement? 28. Does the security survey answer the following: a. What is the possibility of a specific occurrence? b. What is the probability of a specific occurrence? c. What set of circumstances has to be in place for a situation to happen? d. If a problem occurs, how much will it cost to correct and restore? e. Is there any personal risk to people? f. If we do not install a security system, can we handle most situations on our own? g. What is the correct security level required to accomplish the mission? 29. Do you minimize contact between employees and nonemployees (as much as possible)? 30. Do you keep a record of which employee has keys to specific areas? 31. Are locks changed regularly? 32. Are doors double or triple locked? 33. Are external signs posted stating that alarm systems are in operation? 34. Because the roof is a weak spot, has it been properly protected from intrusion, such as with sensitive sonic alarms or microwave? 35. Have perimeter entrances been minimized to prevent accessibility by key? 36. Have you determined whether you need a badge or employee pass identification system? 37. Are your employees trained to challenge an unrecognized visitor or nonpass-wearing person? 38. Are outside service vendors escorted to the job site? Periodically checked or stayed with? Escorted out? 39. Do you retain a security consultant to annually review physical security needs and update security devices? 40. Do your employees know you will prosecute theft offenders? 41. Have you requested that your alarm agency notify you if the premises have been visited during unusual hours by an employee with a key? 42. Are office keys given only to those who need access?

43. Have you a record of which key was given to whom? 44. Do you collect keys immediately from discharged employees? 45. Do you change the locks of areas in which discharged employees had access? 46. Are keys marked with “Do Not Duplicate” logos? 47. Are serial numbers ground off keys to prevent duplication by number? 48. Is a responsible executive in charge of key distribution? 49. Are spare keys kept in a secure cabinet? 50. Are duplicate records kept, indicating key distribution, date and time issued? 51. Can your telephones be locked to prevent unauthorized after-hours use? 52. Have you a locksmith who periodically checks all lock operations? 53. Can personal items be secured in a locked desk drawer? 54. Are important papers kept in a double-locked and fireproof file? 55. When filing cabinets are unlocked for use, are keys removed and secured? 56. Are office machines bolted down and locked? 57. Are your office machines and plant equipment marked for identification? 58. Are the serial numbers of office and plant equipment recorded, duplicated, and secured? 59. Are briefcases with important documents left in a locked cabinet? 60. Are important papers removed from desks and locked when the area is not staffed? 61. When the building shuts down for the evening or weekend, are doors and windows checked by a manager? 62. Do service personnel from outside vendors have proper identification? 63. When shutting down for the evening, are potential hiding places checked? 64. Are the police and fire department numbers posted near each telephone? 65. Are safe combinations changed very frequently? 66. Are the guards’ watch-clock tapes checked every evening? 67. Have you determined if a shredder is necessary? 68. Do you avoid keeping large sums of cash overnight? 69. Do visitors sign in? 70. If the employees wear passes, do your security people check them even if the wearers are familiar? 71. If you have a facility that requires constant security, do you escort your visitors?

Security Surveys

72. Is a vigil kept on outside maintenance people, especially communications workers? 73. If you have a sensitive security area, is access to it kept limited? 74. Is the security area marked with signs and color coded? 75. Do you need an area where sensitive talks take place? 76. Do you periodically check offices for signs of tampering, such as moved desks, paint marks, putty and other fillers used to seal holes, dust and scratch marks, and more? 77. Do you avoid discussing on the phone what you are going to do about your security situation? 78. Do you avoid ordering security sweeps and changes in security structure over the phone?

37

79. Do you test the integrity of the security service by ascertaining if they will plant a device? 80. Do your security officers observe the countersurveillance people at work? 81. Are the items prone to tapping or targets for security intrusion sealed? Are the seals checked regularly? 82. If a bug is found, do you continue to search for more? 83. Are all entry places alarmed? 84. Do you have a locker area for employees’ personal use? Is the facility kept secure? 85. Are your security guards routinely given polygraphs?

Appendix 3.D Guard Security Checklist* VICTOR HAROLD

1. Have you determined whether or not you have limited security requirements? 2. If you have determined that your security needs are complex, have you talked about your needs to a select group of trustworthy agencies? 3. If your security needs are simple, are you aware that it is time consuming and a waste of productivity to obtain a wide variety of competitive bids? 4. Have you checked with a local law enforcement official for recommendations? 5. Have you checked with colleagues who use security services for recommendations? 6. If you are analyzing a security agency, have you requested information on the amount, type, and stipulations of their insurance coverage? 7. Have you requested information on the security agency’s clients, the names of current customers,

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

* Reprinted with permission of Victor Harold.

and the length of time the account has been with the agency? Have you requested information on the agency’s financial status? Is the agency willing to reveal guard training techniques? Does the agency have guard incentive programs? Does the agency have a career program for its guards? Do the guards meet educational and medical checks? Has the agency a set of standards to which guards are held? What are they? Have you reviewed the credentials of the senior executives of the guard company? Will your account have a representative assigned who is from the highest level of management? Will the agency you select have the capabilities to offer other services, such as investigations,

38

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

23. 24.

25.


disaster planning, executive protection, employee screening, and polygraph testing? Have you determined if the agency you are selecting has a union affiliation? Which one? Will there be a union conflict if your employees go on strike? Have you visited the agency’s local office? Have you discussed prior clients and why they no longer are clients? Have you visited current accounts and talked to management? In the contractual arrangement with the guard company, have you avoided too much control over their employees? Have you double-checked the insurance liability of the agency? Does the contract with the guard company assure that it is an independent contractor, relieving your firm of joint employer liability? Have you reviewed the contract’s provisions for replacing unsatisfactory guards and terminating the contract?

26. Does the contract guarantee costs? 27. Does the contract contain penalties for nonperformance or poor performance? 28. Is there an agreement by the guard company to refrain from doing business with a competitive company? 29. Have you assigned a senior person to monitor security services to determine that standards are being met and the agency’s contractual obligations are being fulfilled? 30. If your plant is paying for guard services, have you discussed wages and job-related expenses, such as travel, holidays, supervisors? 31. Have you discussed any special training required to accomplish the assignment, such as firearms, CPR, fire safety, first aid? 32. If your situation requires a formal presentation and contract, have the documents been reviewed by your legal counsel and insurance company? 33. Have you reviewed provisions for contract terminations?

Appendix 3.E Office Security Checklist The UCLA Campus Police Department put together the following office security checklist, which deals with 30 security points pertaining to operational procedures as well as physical characteristics. 1. Do you restrict office keys to those who actually need them? 2. Do you keep complete, up-to-date records of the disposition of all office keys? 3. Do you have adequate procedures for collecting keys from former employees? 4. Do you secure all typewriters, adding machines, calculators, photocopiers, and the like with maximum security locks? 5. Do you restrict duplication of office keys, except for those specifically ordered by you in writing? 6. Do you require that all keys be marked “Do Not Duplicate” to prevent legitimate locksmiths from making copies without your knowledge?

7. Have you established a rule that keys must not be left unguarded on desks or cabinets, and do you enforce that rule? 8. Do you require that filing cabinet keys be removed from locks and placed in a secure location after opening cabinets in the morning? 9. Do you have procedures that prevent unauthorized personnel from reporting a “lost key” and receiving a “replacement”? 10. Is a responsible person in charge of issuing all keys? 11. Are all keys systematically stored in a secured wall cabinet either of your own design or from a commercial key control system? 12. Do you keep a record showing issuance and return of every key, including name of person, date, and time? 13. Do you use telephone locks to prevent unauthorized calls when the office is unattended?

Security Surveys

14. Do you provide at least one lockable drawer in every secretary’s desk to protect purses and other personal effects? 15. Do you have at least one filing cabinet secured with an auxiliary locking bar so that you can keep business secrets under better protection? 16. Do you record all equipment serial numbers and file them in a safe place to maintain correct identification in the event of theft or destruction by fire? 17. Do you shred all important papers before discarding in wastebaskets? 18. Do you lock briefcases and attaché cases containing important papers in closets or lockers when not in use? 19. Do you insist on identification from repair personnel who come to do work in your office? 20. Do you deposit incoming checks and cash each day so that you do not keep large sums in the office overnight? 21. Do you clear all desks of important papers every night and place them in locked, fireproof safes or cabinets?

39

22. Do you frequently change the combination of your safe to prevent anyone from memorizing it or passing it on to a confederate? 23. When working alone in the office at night, do you set the front door lock to prevent anyone else from getting in? 24. Do you have the police and fire department telephone numbers posted and handy? 25. Do you check to see that no one remains behind hiding at night if you are the last to leave the office? 26. Are all windows, transoms, and ventilators properly protected? 27. Do you double-check to see that all windows and doors are securely locked before you leave? 28. Are all doors leading to the office secured by heavy-duty, double-cylinder deadbolt locks? 29. If your office is equipped with a burglar alarm system or protected by a guard service, do you make sure the alarm equipment is set properly each night? 30. Do you have a periodic security review made by a qualified security expert or locksmith?

Appendix 3.F Home Security Checklist VICTOR HAROLD

Exterior 1. Do you have a burglar alarm? 2. Are there stickers on your windows and doors, stating that the property is under surveillance? 3. Are bicycles, garden equipment, and other items kept indoors and locked? 4. Is your mailbox locked? 5. Are front and back doors kept lighted in the evening? 6. Are shrubs and trees trimmed low, below window level? 7. Do you arrange for mail and newspaper pickup or stop deliveries, if you are not at home? 8. Is your grass kept mowed while you are away?

9. Is there a neighborhood watch program? 10. Do you place lights on timers or photocells if you go away? 11. Are police notified of your extended absence?

Doors 1. Do all doors, especially the garage, close tightly? 2. Are all doors double locked? 3. Are overhead doors locked when not in use? Is there a track lock? 4. If padlocks are used, are they of high quality? 5. If hinges and hasps show, are the screws and hinge pins of the type that cannot easily be removed?

40


6. If your car is in the garage, are the doors locked and the keys removed? 7. Are the entrance doors solid core? 8. Is there a security plate in the lock area to prevent jimmying? 9. Are there peepholes in the entrance doors? 10. If the entry doors have glass, is the glass 40 or more inches from the lock? 11. Are sliding doors locked and has an antislide bar on the lower track, as well as bars on top of the doors, been installed to prevent lifting the door off the track?

Windows 1. Are the window air conditioners bolted to prevent removal from the outside? 2. Can the basement windows be locked? 3. Do you use auxiliary pins and other locks on all windows? 4. If windows are kept open for ventilation, can they be locked in the open position?

General Home Security 1. Can all exterior doors be locked from the inside? 2. Are the locks on all exterior doors of the deadbolt type? 3. If a door or window is opened while you are home, will there be a warning sound or light? 4. When you retire or leave, do you check doors and windows to be certain they are locked? 5. When repair people and utility company representatives come to your door, do you request identification? 6. Can your basement door be locked to prevent entry into the house? 7. Are extra house keys kept isolated or hidden? 8. Do you avoid indiscriminate handing out of duplicate keys? 9. If you park your car in a public lot, do you separate the car keys from the house keys?

10. Have you an outside light that remains on all night? 11. Are all low-level windows that are easily accessible kept doubly secure with latches and bolts? 12. Have you installed window and door devices that audibly and visually indicate that a break-in is in progress or has occurred? 13. Are your skylights well secured; that is, not easily removed from the roof? 14. Are window air conditioners well installed and not removable from the outside? 15. Are your portable fire extinguishers kept in good condition? 16. Are they kept in easily accessible areas? 17. Are smoke and heat detectors installed near sleeping areas and on every level of the house? 18. Are the detectors tested frequently? 19. Are fire drills a regular routine with your family? 20. Do you have an emergency notification system to enable other households to know that a situation (medical, panic, robbery) is occurring? 21. If a suspicious vehicle is in the area, is a description and the license number noted? 22. If you go away, can you get a neighbor to park a spare car in your driveway? 23. Do you have a home safe for valuable items? 24. Should you have an alarm system survey to help determine your security and safety needs?

Miscellaneous 1. Is valuable property inventoried, periodically updated, and the list secured? 2. Is the list of serial numbers of those items that have been recorded kept off the premises? 3. Are valuable items marked with a scriber and an identifying number? 4. Are emergency telephone numbers memorized and prominently displayed near the telephone? 5. Do you avoid keeping cash in the house? 6. If you have weapons, are they secured?

Security Surveys

41

Appendix 3.G Fire Safety Inspection MICHAEL SROBERGER, CPP, CPO, CSS

The following inspection is designed to be the basis of a revised and property-specific inspection program. Some of the entries refer to functions performed with a “reasonable frequency.” In reviewing your specific property or location, care should be taken to consider the nature of the structure, geographic location, intended use, and actual use. In many cases, functions that are best performed on a daily basis, in one environment, can be reasonably performed on a weekly or possibly monthly basis, in a different environment. In addition, note that every application is unique, in some manner. As such, what might be prudent for one location, however seemingly similar, might be insufficient at another location. While benchmarking of a similar program is highly recommended, this also should be seen as simply a basic guideline, in the creation of a customized, locationspecific program. Some sections pose inspection inquiries that reference a large number of possible locations or items to be reviewed. One example would be the inspection of sprinkler heads. In designing the actual checklist for such an inspection, it is often desirable to break down the physical layout of the facility into reasonable and manageable zones. Identifying sets of sprinkler heads by the room in which they are installed allows the person performing the inspection to review them as a set and make comments in reference to that area of coverage. In cases such as fire doors, it might be reasonable to identify them with a location number, which could be included not only on the inspection form, but a numbered tag, on the hinge-side edge of the door, for later identification.

Administrative and Planning Phase 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Are copies of all locally enforced codes maintained on site, for reference? Does the facility meet requirements of locally enforced Building Code? Does the facility meet requirements of locally enforced Fire Prevention Code? Does the facility meet requirements of locally enforced Life Safety Code? Does the facility have a written and appropriately distributed Fire Prevention and Response Plan? Is this plan known to all employees? Is training provided to those with defined responsibilities? Is all training documented and securely filed? Is the plan reviewed annually, updated as required, and redistributed? Does the facility maintain a fire brigade? Is the fire brigade training documented and securely filed? Is the fire brigade training conducted in conjunction with the local fire department? Is the fire brigade composed of persons, or positions, that are present or represented at all times? Are all inspection reports retained for a reasonable number of years, as defined by local codes, insurance requirements, or industry standards? Are inspection reports filed in a secure location? Are all employees trained in basic fire prevention concepts and fire event response procedures? Is the content of this training consistent and reasonably inclusive? Is this training documented and securely filed?

42


Is annual refresher training conducted? Is annual refresher training documented and securely filed?

General Physical Inspection Phase 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Are all fire exit routes clearly marked? Are all exit routes unobstructed at all times? Are all exit routes and egress hardware items in compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act requirements? Are all fire doors and egress hardware items in proper working order? Are service areas secured against unauthorized entry when not in use? Are all areas free of loose or disorganized combustible items (such as rags or empty boxes)? Are all storage areas well organized, to allow ease of access in emergency situations? Are flammable or combustible items properly stored to protect against accidental ignition? Are flammable or combustible items properly stored to protect against unauthorized usage or tampering? Are all fire lanes clearly marked? Are fire lanes maintained in an unobstructed condition, at all times? Are master keys available for Fire Department use, at all times? Are all electrical panels accessible at all times? Are all panels clearly marked, to facilitate emergency power disconnection? Are gas line shutoff valves accessible at all times? Are all gas-operated pieces of equipment inspected for wear and damage with reasonable frequency? Are inspections documented and filed in a secure location? Are all heat-generating devices (such as boilers, furnaces, and dryers) provided a reasonable clear zone, based on levels of heat output, where storage of any kind is prohibited? Are all ducts inspected regularly and cleaned as required? Is the use of extension cords discouraged in all areas? Are all electrical cords and electrically operated items inspected for wear or damage with reasonable frequency? Are such inspections documented? Are designated smoking areas clearly defined and at a proper minimum safe distance from any common or identified ignition threats? Are appropriate ash and cigarette receptacles available for use in these areas?

Extinguisher Inspection Phase 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Have all extinguishers been inspected and serviced as required by a licensed vendor or trained technician within the past 12 months? Are all extinguishers of a type appropriate for most probable types of fires in the immediate area? Are specialty extinguishers available in those areas that would require them? Are persons trained in the use of the extinguishers available in the areas where they are typically present? Is this training documented and filed in a secure location? Are extinguishers inspected with reasonable frequency (daily, in most cases), to ensure that they are present and have not been tempered with or discharged? Is each extinguisher inspection fully documented and securely filed?

Stand Pipe, Fire Hose, and Control Valve Inspection Phase 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Do tamper switches, linked to an alarm system, monitor all control valves? Are all control valves inspected and tested annually by a licensed vendor or trained technician? Are all stand pipes, control valves, and fire hoses accessible at all times? Are fire hoses inspected, per manufacturer recommendations, for wear and decay?

Sprinkler System Inspection Phase 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Are all flow switches inspected and tested annually by a licensed vendor or trained technician? Are all sprinkler heads of a type appropriate for the location in which it is installed? Are all sprinkler heads installed and maintained within the manufacturers recommendations? Are all sprinkler heads provided with a clear area of operation, in compliance with the local Fire Code? Does the sprinkler system have a pressure maintenance pump? If so, is this pump inspected and tested with reasonable frequency (weekly, in most cases) by a licensed vendor or trained technician? Are all areas requiring sprinkler system coverage, per the local Fire Code, provided with such coverage?

Security Surveys

Hazardous Materials Inspection Phase 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Are proper warning placards utilized in areas of chemical storage and usage? Is proper personal protective equipment (PPE) provided for initial response to fire and emergency situations related to any hazardous materials maintained or utilized on site? Is training provided in the use of this PPE? Is such training documented and filed in a secure location? Is the Fire Department made aware of storage areas, use areas, and large arriving or departing shipments of hazardous materials? Are all appropriate containment, standoff distance, and warning signs utilized in storage areas?

䊉

䊉

43

Does the system automatically recall or drop elevators, on activation? Are override keys available for Fire Department use? Are detector types installed, as appropriate for the specific location of installation? If the intended use of a given area is altered, is the type of detector also reviewed and changed to match the updated intended use of that area?

Conclusion In January 2003, the American Society for Industrial Security International came out with a set of “General Security Risk Assessment Guidelines.” In these guidelines, it recommended that, when conducting a security survey or risk assessment of a complex, you consider the following seven points from their report:

Alarm System Inspection Phase 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Is the system monitored by a licensed, off-site monitoring service? Is the system inspected and tested annually by a licensed vendor or trained technician? Is this inspection documented and filed in a secure location? Is the area of coverage broken down into identified zones? When activated, does the alarm system clearly identify the location of the potential fire? Are audible alarms heard in all areas of a zone, when activated? Is the system designed to warn adjacent zones, inclusive of floors above or below? Are strobes visible in all areas of a zone, when activated? Is the system designed to warn adjacent zones, inclusive of floors above or below? Does the alarm system record activation and use history? For what length of time is this history retained? Does the system audible signal include a prerecorded advisory message? If so, does this message recommend a route or method of egress? If so, does this message advise against the use of elevators, if any are present?

1. Assets are people, property, intangible property, and information; identify the risks attached to each. 2. Conduct a cost/benefit analysis and explore the value of all benefits to be a accrued. Are the recommendations made affordable, feasible, available, practical, and state of the art. 3. Consider the risk, risk analysis, risk assessment, probability, and vulnerability to incidences. 4. Gather statistical data: material obtained from in house, material obtained from local and state police agencies, material from the FBI Uniform Crime Report database, and the type of incidents in similar complexes as well as rating of current Homeland Security color code. 5. Examine the frequency of events and what can be done to reduce and remove the overall threat. 6. Identify the assets; for example, a warehouse with a million-dollar inventory—30 people have access, maybe more—alarm system control panel is a dialer non-UL, 22 years old; or a museum with a $52-million dollar inventory, four people have total access, and the 5-year-old fire and intrusion alarm at all points is tested monthly. 7. Reassess your complex annually.

Chapter 4 Internal Theft Controls* ROBERT FISCHER

Introduction It is sad but true that virtually every company suffers losses from internal theft—and these losses can be enormous. Early in this new century, even the large corporate giants such as Enron and WorldCom were affected by internal corruption that reached the highest levels of the organization. Security reports that, in the retail business alone, 1 in every 27 employees is apprehended for theft from their employer. Internal theft in the retail business outstrips the loss from shoplifting approximately 7.9 times.1 Loss Prevention Consultants reported the significance of the employee-theft problem. Their study, based on the confessions of 345 employee thieves, documents a combined shrinkage of over $1 million over a 4-year period. The study notes that employee theft is not seasonal and accessibility rather than need triggers the desire to steal. The report notes, however, that 51% of the thieves over 41 years of age reported that they stole to satisfy financial needs. Younger employees tend to steal gadgets, while older thieves take money.2 Based on past projects undertaken to evaluate the cost of economic crime in 1990, Hallcrest Report II found that employee-theft estimates range from $130 billion to $320 billion annually.3 The significance of employee theft is pointed out in the October 2002 issue of Security, which reported that, in just 30 retail companies, the losses from shoplifting and employee theft in 2001 exceeded $5 billion.4 A 1998 * From Robert J. Fischer and Gion Green, Introduction to Security, 7th ed. (Boston: Butterworth–Heinemann, Elsevier, 2003).

44

report placed employee theft at more than $40 billion annually.5

What Is Honesty? Before considering the issue of dishonest employees, it is helpful to understand the concept of honesty, which is difficult to define. Webster says that honesty is “fairness and straightforwardness of conduct, speech, etc.; integrity; truthfulness; freedom; freedom from fraud.” In simple terms, honesty is respect for others and their property. The concept, however, is relative. According to Charles Carson, “Security must be based on a controlled degree of relative honesty” since no one fulfills the ideal of total honesty. Carson explores relative honesty by asking the following questions:6 1. If an error is made in your favor in computing the price of something you buy, do you report it? 2. If a cashier gives you too much change, do you return it? 3. If you found a purse containing money and the owner’s identification, would you return the money to the owner if the amount was $1? $10? $100? $1000?

Honesty is a controllable variable, and how much control is necessary depends on the degree of honesty of each individual. The individual’s honesty can be evaluated by assessing the degree of two types of honesty: moral and conditioned. Moral honesty is a feeling of responsibility and respect that develops during an individual’s formative years; this type of honesty is subconscious. Conditioned honesty results

Internal Theft Controls

from fearing the consequences of being caught; it is a product of reasoning. If an honest act is made without a conscious decision, it is because of moral honesty, but if the act is based on the conscious consideration of consequences, the act results from conditioned honesty.

Honesty is a controllable variable, and how much control is necessary depends on the degree of honesty of each individual.

It is vital to understand these principles because the role of security is to hire employees who have good moral honesty and condition employees to greater honesty. The major concern is that the job should not tempt an employee into dishonesty. Unfortunately there is no sure way by which potentially dishonest employees can be recognized. Proper screening procedures can eliminate applicants with unsavory pasts or those who seem unstable and therefore possibly untrustworthy. There are even tests that purport to measure an applicant’s honesty index. But tests and employee screening can only indicate potential difficulties. They can screen out the most obvious risks, but they can never truly vouch for the performance of any prospective employee under circumstances of new employment or under changes that may come about in life apart from the job. The need to carefully screen employees has continued to increase. In today’s market, there are many individuals who have been called the “I deserve it!” generation. According to a study by the Josephson Institute for the Advanced Study of Ethics, “cheating, stealing and lying by high school students have continued their alarming, decade-long upward spiral.” The institute, which conducts nonpartisan ethics programs for the Internal Revenue Service, the Pentagon, and several major media organizations and educators, states that their findings show “evidence that a willingness to cheat has become the norm and that parents, teachers, coaches and even religious education have not been able to stem the tide.”To support the research, the institute notes that, in 2002, 37% of the high school youth reported that they would be willing to lie to get a good job, compared to 28% in 2000 and 25% in 1992. Seventy-four percent of high school students reported they cheated on tests during 2002 compared to 61% in 1992.7

45

The Dishonest Employee Since there is no fail-safe technique for recognizing the potentially dishonest employee on sight, it is important to try to gain some insight into the reasons why employees may steal. If some rule of thumb can be developed that will help to identify the patterns of the potential thief, it would provide some warning for an alert manager. There is no simple answer to the question of why heretofore-honest people suddenly start to steal from their employers. The mental and emotional processes that lead to this are complex, and motivation may come from any number of sources. Some employees steal because of resentment over real or imagined injustice that they blame on management indifference or malevolence. Some feel that they must maintain status and steal to augment their incomes because of financial problems. Some may steal simply to tide themselves over in a genuine emergency. They rationalize the theft by assuring themselves that they will return the money after the current problem is solved. Some simply want to indulge themselves, and many, strangely enough, steal to help others. Or employees may steal because no one cares, because no one is looking, or because absent or inadequate theft controls eliminate the fear of being caught. Still others may steal simply for excitement.

The Theft Triangle A simplified answer to the question of why employees steal is the theft triangle. According to this concept, theft—much like fire—occurs when three elements are present: (1) motive, (2) desire, and (3) opportunity. In simple terms, motive is a reason to steal. Motives might be the resentment of an employee who feels underpaid or the vengefulness of an employee who has been passed over for promotion. Desire builds on motive by imagining the satisfaction or gratification that would come from a potential action. “Taking a stereo system would make me feel good, because I always wanted a good stereo system.” Opportunity is the absence of barriers that prevent someone from taking an item. Desire and motive are beyond the scope of the loss-prevention manager; opportunity, however, is the responsibility of security. A high percentage of employee thefts begin with opportunities that are regularly presented to them. If security systems are lax or supervision is indiffer-

46


ent, the temptation to steal items that are improperly secured or unaccountable may be too much to resist by any but the most resolute employee. Many experts agree that the fear of discovery is the most important deterrent to internal theft. When the potential for discovery is eliminated, theft is bound to follow. Threats of dismissal or prosecution of any employee found stealing are never as effective as the belief that any theft will be discovered by management supervision.

low-interest loans in such cases. Alternatively, some arrangement might be worked out through a credit union. In any event, employees in such extremities need help fast. They should get that help both as a humane response to the needs and as a means of protecting company assets. In addition to these general categories, specific danger signals should be noted: 䊉䊉䊉

Danger Signs The root causes of theft are many and varied, but certain signs can indicate that a hazard exists. The conspicuous consumer presents perhaps the most easily identified risk. Employees who habitually or suddenly acquire expensive cars or clothes and who generally seem to live beyond their means should be watched. Such persons are visibly extravagant and appear indifferent to the value of money. Even though such employees may not be stealing to support expensive tastes, they are likely to run into financial difficulties through reckless spending. Employees may then be tempted to look beyond their salary checks for ways to support an extravagant lifestyle. Poor hiring decisions are at the root of many management problems. Employees who show a pattern of financial irresponsibility are also a potential risk. Many people are incapable of handling their money. They may do their job with great skill and efficiency, but they are in constant difficulty in their private lives. These people are not necessarily compulsive spenders nor do they necessarily have expensive tastes. (They probably live quite modestly since they have never been able to manage their affairs effectively enough to live otherwise.) They are simply people unable to come to grips with their own economic realities. Garnishments or inquiries by creditors may identify such employees. If there seems a reason to make one, a credit check might reveal the tangled state of affairs. Employees caught in a genuine financial squeeze are also possible problems. If they have been hit with financial demands from illnesses in the family or possibly heavy tax liens, they may find the pressures too great to bear. If such a situation comes to the attention of management, counseling is in order. Many companies maintain funds designated to make

䊉䊉䊉

Gambling on or off premises. Excessive drinking or signs of other drug use. Obvious extravagance. Persistent borrowing. Requests for advances. Bouncing personal checks or postdated checks.

What Employees Steal The employee thief will take anything that may be useful or has resale value. The thief can get at the company funds in many ways, directly or indirectly, through collusion with vendors, collusion with outside thieves or hijackers, fake invoices, receipting for goods never received, falsifying inventories, payroll padding, false certification of overtime, padded expense accounts, computer records manipulation, overcharging, undercharging, or simply by gaining access to a cash box. This is only a sample of the kinds of attacks that can be made on company assets using the systems set up for the operation of the business. The greatest losses can occur in these areas, since they are frequently based on a systematic looting of the goods and services in which the company deals and the attendant operational cash flow. Significant losses do occur, however, in other, sometimes-unexpected areas. Furnishings frequently disappear. In some firms with indifferent traffic control procedures, this kind of theft can be a very real problem. Desks, chairs, computers and other office equipment, paintings, rugs—all can be carried away by the enterprising employee thief. Office supplies can be another problem if they are not properly supervised.Beyond the anticipated attrition in pencils, paper clips, note pads, and rubber bands, sometimes these materials are often stolen in case lots. Many firms that buy their supplies at discount are in fact receiving stolen property.The market in stolen office supplies is a brisk one and becoming more so as the prices for this merchandise soar. The office equipment market is another active one, and the inside thief is quick to respond to its needs. Computers always bring a good price, as well


as calculators and equipment used to support the microcomputer. Personal property is also vulnerable. Office thieves do not make fine distinctions between company property and that of their fellow workers. The company has a very real stake in this kind of theft since personal tragedy and decline in morale follow in its wake. Although security personnel cannot assume responsibility for losses of this nature since they are not in a position to know about the property involved or to control its handling (and they should so inform all employees), they should make every effort to apprise all employees of the threat. They should further note from time to time the degree of carelessness the staff displays in handling of personal property and send out reminders of the potential dangers of loss.

Methods of Theft Various studies estimate that 7 to 30% of business failures are the result of some form of employee dishonesty.8 Therefore, the need to examine the shapes the dishonesty frequently takes is very real. There is no way to describe every kind of theft, but some examples may serve to give an idea of the dimensions of the problem: 1. Payroll and personnel employees collaborating to falsify records by the use of nonexistent employees or retaining terminated employees on the payroll. 2. Padding overtime reports and kicking back part of the extra unearned pay to the authorizing supervisor 3. Pocketing unclaimed wages. 4. Splitting increased payroll that has been raised on signed, blank checks for use in the authorized signer’s absence. 5. Maintenance personnel and contract service people in collusion to steal and sell office equipment. 6. Receiving clerks and truck drivers in collusion on falsification of merchandise count (extra unaccounted merchandise is fenced). 7. Purchasing agents in collusion with vendors to falsify purchase and payment documents (the purchasing agent issues authorization for payment on goods never shipped after forging receipts of shipment). 8. Purchasing agent in collusion with vendor to pay inflated price.

47

9. Mailroom and supply personnel packing and mailing merchandise to themselves for resale. 10. Accounts payable personnel paying fictitious bills to an account set up for his or her own use. 11. Taking incoming cash without crediting the customer’s account. 12. Paying creditors twice and pocketing the second check. 13. Appropriating checks made out to cash. 14. Raising the amount on checks after voucher approval or raising the amount on vouchers after their approval. 15. Pocketing small amounts from incoming payments and applying later payments on other accounts to cover shortages. 16. Removal of equipment or merchandise with the trash. 17. Invoicing goods below regular price and getting a kickback from the purchaser. 18. Manipulation of accounting software packages to credit personal accounts with electronic account overages. 19. Issuing (and cashing) checks on returned merchandise not actually returned. 20. Forging checks, destroying them when they are returned with the statement from the bank, and changing cash account records accordingly.

Management Responsibility in Loss Prevention Many security specialists have speculated that the enormous losses in internal theft come largely from firms that have refused to believe that their employees would steal from them. As a result, their lossprevention systems are weak and ineffective. Managers of such companies are not naive. They are aware that criminally inclined employees exist— and in great numbers—but believe they exist in other companies. Such managers are truly shocked when they discover how extensive employee theft can be. This does not mean that a high percentage of the employees are involved (though they may be). Two or three employees, given the right opportunity, can create havoc in any business in a very short time, and the majority of them go undetected. National crime figures do not necessarily concern each manager. These figures can be shrugged off as an enormous problem that someone else must deal with, one that has no effect on the operation, and ideally this is correct. But managers cannot afford to close their eyes to the potential damage. They must be convinced that one of their employees might

48


steal. Managers must be persuaded that there is at least a possibility of embezzlement and maybe sooner or later someone will be unable to resist the temptation to take what is so alluringly available. It may be surprising to find that some shrewd businesspeople are still willing to ignore the threat of internal theft and therefore unwilling to take defensive steps against it. But the fact is the possibility of internal theft does indeed exist. Many security people report that the biggest problem is in convincing management that the problem is there and steps must be taken to protect employer and employee alike. There is some evidence and even more speculation that these managers are reluctant in effect to declare themselves as suspicious of the employees, to overtly imply distrust of employees, many of whom are perhaps old and trusted members of the corporate family. Such an attitude does the manager honor, but it is somewhat distorted. It fails to take into account the dynamics of all our lives. The employee who today would stand firm against the most persuasive temptation may be in different circumstances tomorrow, perhaps with different resultant attitudes. Whereas today the thought of embezzlement is repugnant, tomorrow the notion might be viewed differently. Remember the projections for the “I deserve it!” generation.

The Contagion of Theft Theft of any kind is a contagious disorder. Petty, relatively innocent pilferage by a few spreads through the facility.As more people participate, others follow, until even the most rigid break down and join in. Pilferage becomes acceptable, even respectable. It gains general social acceptance reinforced by almost total peer participation. Few people make independent ethical judgments under such circumstances. In this microcosm, the act of petty pilferage is no longer viewed as unacceptable conduct. It has become not a permissible sin but a right. The docks of New York City were an example of this progression. Forgetting for the moment the depredations of organized crime and the climate of dishonesty that characterized that operation for so many years, even longshoremen not involved in organized theft had worked out a system all their own. For every so many cases of whisky unloaded, for example, one case went to the men. Little or no attempt was made to conceal this. It was a tradition, a right. When efforts were made to curtail the practice, labor difficulties arose. It soon became evident that certain pilferage would have to be accepted as

an unwritten part of the union contract under the existing circumstances. This is not a unique situation. The progression from limited pilferage through its acceptance as normal conduct to the status of an unwritten right has been repeated time and again. The problem is, it does not stop there. Ultimately, pilferage becomes serious theft, and then the real trouble starts. Even before pilferage expands into larger operations, it presents a difficult problem to any business. Even where the amount of goods taken by any one individual is small, the aggregate can represent a significant expense. With the costs of materials, manufacture, administration, and distribution rising as they are, there is simply no room for added, avoidable expenses in today’s competitive markets. The business that can operate the most efficiently and offer high-quality goods at the lowest prices because of the efficiency of its operation has a huge advantage in the marketplace. When so many companies are fighting for their economic life, there is simply no room for waste—and pilferage is just that.

Moral Obligation to Control Theft When we consider that internal theft accounts for at least twice the loss from external theft (that is, from burglars and armed robbers combined), we must be impressed with the scope of the problem facing today’s businesspeople. Businesses have a financial obligation to stockholders to earn a profit on their investments. Fortunately, steps can be taken to control internal theft. Setting up a program of education and control that is vigorously administered and supervised can cut losses to relatively insignificant amounts. It is also important to observe that management has a moral obligation to its employees to protect their integrity by taking every possible step to avoid presenting open opportunities for pilferage and theft that would tempt even the most honest people. This is not to suggest that each company should assume a paternal role toward its employees and undertake their responsibilities for them. It is to suggest strongly that the company should keep its house sufficiently in order to avoid enticing employees to acts that could result in great personal tragedy as well as in damage to the company.

Program for Internal Security As for all security problems, the first requirement before setting up protective systems for internal


security is to survey every area in the company to determine the extent and nature of the risks. If such a survey is conducted energetically and exhaustively and its recommendations for action are acted on intelligently, significant losses from internal theft will be a matter of history. Security surveys and their companion, the operational audit, are discussed in detail in Chapter 7 of Introduction to Security, Sixth Edition, by Fishcher and Green (Butterworth–Heinemann, 1998).

Need for Management Support Once concerns have been identified, it is especially important that the strong support of top management be secured. To implement needed security controls, certain operational procedures may have to be changed. This requires cooperation at every level, and cooperation is sometimes hard to get in situations where department managers feel their authority has been diminished in areas within their spheres of responsibility. The problem is compounded when those changes determined to be necessary cut across departmental lines and even, to some degree, alter intradepartmental relationships. Affecting systems under such circumstances requires the greatest tact, sales ability, and executive ability. Failing that, it may be necessary to fall back on the ultimate authority vested in the security operation by top management. Any hesitation or equivocation on the part of either management or security at this point could damage the program before it has been initiated. Without sound procedures and tight inventory controls, it may be difficult to determine what the problem is and who is responsible. This does not, of course, mean that management must give security carte blanche. Reasonable and legitimate disagreements inevitably arise. It does mean that proposed security programs based on broadly stated policy must be given the highest possible priority. In those cases where conflict of procedures exist, some compromise may be necessary, but the integrity of the security program as a whole must be preserved intact.

Communicating the Program The next step is to communicate necessary details of the program to all employees. Many aspects of the

49

system may be proprietary or on a need-to-know basis, but since part of it will involve procedures engaged in by most or all of company personnel, they need to know those details to comply. This can be handled by an ongoing education program or by a series of meetings explaining the need for security and the damaging effects of internal theft to jobs, benefits, profit sharing, and the future of the company. Such meetings can additionally notify all employees that management is taking action against criminal acts of all kinds at every level and that dishonesty will not be tolerated. Such a forceful statement of position in this matter can be very beneficial. Most employees are honest people who disapprove of those who are criminally inclined. They are apprehensive and uncomfortable in a criminal environment, especially if it is widespread. The longer the company condones such conduct, the more they lose respect for it, and a vicious cycle begins. As they lose respect, they lose a sense of purpose. Their work suffers, morale declines, and at best effectiveness is seriously diminished. At worst, they reluctantly join the thieves. A clear, uncompromising policy of theft prevention is usually welcomed with visible relief.

Continuing Supervision Once a system is installed, it must be constantly supervised if it is to become and remain effective. Left to their own devices, employees soon find shortcuts, and security controls are abandoned in the process. Old employees must be reminded regularly of what is expected of them, and new employees must be adequately indoctrinated in the system they are expected to follow. A continuing program of education is necessary if expected results are to be achieved. With a high turnover within the white-collar workforce, it can be expected that the office force, which handles key paperwork, is replaced at a fairly consistent rate. This means that the company has a regular influx of new people who must be trained in the procedures to be followed and the reasons for these procedures.

Program Changes In some situations, reasonable controls create duplication of effort, crosschecking, and additional paperwork. Since each time such additional effort is required there is an added expense, procedural innovations requiring it must be avoided wherever possible, but most control systems aim for

50


increased efficiency. Often this is the key to their effectiveness. Many operational procedures, for a variety of reasons, fall into ponderous routines involving too many people and excessive paper shuffling. This may increase the possibility of fraud, forgery, or falsification of documents. When the same operational result can be achieved by streamlining the system and incorporating adequate security control, it should be done immediately. Virtually every system can be improved and should be evaluated constantly with an eye for such improvement, but these changes should never be undertaken arbitrarily. Procedures must be changed only after the changes have been considered in the light of their operational and security impact, and such considerations should further be undertaken in the light of their effect on the total system. No changes should be permitted by unilateral employee action. Management should make random spot checks to determine if the system is being followed exactly. Internal auditors or security personnel should make regular checks on the control systems.

audits, even the most reckless criminal would hesitate to try to set up even a short-term scheme of theft. These audits normally cover an examination of inventory schedules, prices, footings, and extensions. They should also verify current company assets by sampling physical inventory, accounts receivable, accounts payable (including payroll), deposits, plant, and outstanding liabilities through an ongoing financial audit. In all these cases, a spot check beyond the books themselves can help establish the existence of legitimate assets and liabilities, not empty entries created by a clever embezzler.

Cash Any business handling relatively few cash payments in and out is fortunate indeed. Such a business can avoid much of the difficulty in this securitysensitive area, since cash handling is certainly the operation most vulnerable and the most sought after by larcenous staff members.

Cash by Mail Violations Violations should be dealt with immediately. Management indifference to security procedures is a signal that they are not important, and where worksaving methods can be found to circumvent such procedures, they will be. As soon as any procedural untidiness appears and is allowed to continue, the deterioration of the system begins. It is well to note that, while efforts to circumvent the system are frequently the result of the ignorance or laziness of the offender, a significant number of such instances are the result of employees probing for ways to subvert the controls to divert company assets to their own use.

Procedural Controls Auditing Assets Periodic personal audits by outside auditors are essential to any well-run security program. Such an examination will discover theft only after the fact, but it will presumably discover any regular scheme of embezzlement in time to prevent serious damage. If these audits, which are normally conducted once a year, were augmented by one or more surprise

If cash is received by mail—a practice almost unheard of in most businesses—its receipt and a responsible, bonded supervisor or supervisors must undertake handling. This administrator should be responsible for no other cash handling or bookkeeping functions and should personally see to it that all cash received is recorded by listing the amount, the payer, and such other pertinent information as established procedures have indicated. There is clearly a danger here at the very outset. If cash is diverted before it is entered into the accounting system, there is no record of its existence. Until it is channeled into company ledgers in some way and begins its life as a company asset, there is no guarantee that it will not serve some more private interest. This requires supervision of the supervisor. In a firm doing a large catalogue business that receives large amounts of cash in spite of pleas for checks, credit card purchases, or money orders, it has sometimes been felt that the operation should be conducted in a special room reserved for the purpose.

Daily Receipts All cash accounting entries must be checked against cash on hand at the end of each day. Spot checks on an irregular basis should be conducted.


Cash receipts should be deposited in the bank, and each day’s receipts should be balanced with the daily deposit. Petty cash as needed should be reimbursed by check. All bank deposits should be accompanied by three deposit slips. One is receipted by the bank and returned by the cashier to the person making the deposit; the second should be mailed to the office accounting department; and the third is the bank’s copy.

Bank Statements Bank statements should be received and reconciled by someone who is not authorized to deposit or withdraw funds or to make a final accounting of receipts or disbursements. When bank statements are reconciled, canceled checks should be checked against vouchers for any possible alterations and for proper endorsement by the payee. Any irregularities in the endorsements should be promptly investigated. If the statement itself seems out of order by way of erasure or possible alteration, the bank should be asked to submit a new statement to the reconciling official’s special personal attention.

Petty Cash A petty cash fund set aside for that purpose only should be established. The amount to be carried in such a fund is based on past experience. These funds must never be commingled with other funds of any kind and should be drawn from the bank by check only. They should never be drawn from cash receipts. No disbursements of any kind should be made from petty cash without an authorized voucher signed by the employee receiving the cash and countersigned by an authorized employee. No voucher should be cashed that shows signs of erasure or alteration. All such vouchers should be drawn up in ink or typed. In cases of typographical error, new vouchers should be prepared rather than correcting the error. If there is any reason for using a voucher on which an erasure or correction has been made, the authorizing official should initial the change or place of erasure. Receipts substantiating the voucher should accompany it and should wherever possible be stapled or otherwise attached to it. The petty cash fund should be brought up to the specified amount required by a check to the amount of its depletion. The vouchers on which disbursements were made should always be verified by an employee other than the one in charge of the fund.

51

All vouchers submitted and paid should be canceled to avoid reuse. Petty cash should be balanced occasionally by management, at which time vouchers should be examined for irregularities.

Separation of Responsibility The principle of separation of responsibility and authority in matters concerning the company’s finances is of prime importance in management. This situation must always be sought out in the survey of every department. It is not always easy to locate. Sometimes even the employee who has such power is unaware of the dual role. But the security specialist must be knowledgeable about its existence and suggest an immediate change or correction in such operational procedures whenever they appear. An employee who is in the position of both ordering and receiving merchandise or a cashier who authorizes and disburses expenditures are examples of this double-ended function in operation. All situations of this nature are potentially damaging and should be eliminated. Such procedures are manifestly unfair to company and employee alike. They are unfair to the company because of the loss that they might incur; they are unfair to the employee because of the temptation and ready opportunity they present. Good business practice demands that such invitations to embezzlement be studiously avoided. It is equally important that cash handling be separated from the record-keeping function. Cashiers who become their own auditors and bookkeepers have a free rein with that part of company funds. The chances are that cashiers will not steal, but they could and might. They might also make mathematical mistakes unless someone else double-checks the arithmetic. In some smaller companies, this division of function is not always practical. In such concerns, it is common for the bookkeeper to act also as cashier. If this is the case, a system of countersignatures, approvals, and management audits should be set up to help divide the responsibility of handling company funds from that of accounting for them.

Promotion and Rotation Most embezzlement is the product of a scheme operating over an extended period of time. Many embezzlers prefer to divert small sums on a systematic

52


basis, feeling that the individual thefts will not be noticed and that therefore the total loss is unlikely to come to management’s attention. These schemes are sometimes frustrated either by some accident that uncovers the system or the greed of the embezzlers, who are so carried away with success that they step up the ante. But while the theft is working, it is usually difficult to detect. Frequently, the thief is in a position to alter or manipulate records in such a way that the theft escapes the attention of both internal and external auditors. This can sometimes be countered by upward or lateral movement of employees. Promotion from within, wherever possible, is always good business practice, and lateral transfers can be effective in countering possible boredom or the danger of reducing a function to rote and thus diminishing its effectiveness. Such movement also frustrates embezzlers. When they lose control of the books governing some aspect of the operation, they lose the opportunity to cover their thefts. Discovery inevitably follows careful audits of books they can no longer manipulate. If regular transfers were a matter of company policy, no rational embezzler would set up a long-term plan of embezzlement unless a scheme was found that was audit-proof—and such an eventuality is highly unlikely. To be effective as a security measure, such transfers need not involve all personnel, since every change in operating personnel brings with it changes in operation. In some cases, even subtle changes may be enough to alter the situation sufficiently to reduce the totality of control an embezzler has over the books. If such is the case, the swindle is over. The embezzler may avoid discovery of the previous looting, but cannot continue without danger of being unmasked. In the same sense, embezzlers dislike vacations. They are aware of the danger if someone else should handle their accounts, if only for the two or three weeks of vacation, so they make every effort to pass up holidays. Any manager who has a reluctant vacationer should recognize that this is a potential problem. Vacations are designed to refresh the outlook of everyone. No matter how tired they may be when they return to work, vacationers have been refreshed emotionally and intellectually. Their effectiveness in their job has probably improved, and they are, generally speaking, better employees for the time off. The company benefits from vacations as much as the employees do. No one should be permitted to pass up authorized vacations, especially one whose position involves control over company assets.

Access to Records Many papers, documents, and records are proprietary or at least available to only a limited number of people who need such papers in order to function. All other persons are deemed off limits. They have no apparent need for the information. Such records should be secured under lock and key or through access control in the case of electronically stored data and, depending on their value or reconstructability, in a fire-resistant container.

Forms Certain company forms are often extremely valuable to the inside as well as the outside thief. They should be secured and accounted for at all times. They should be sequentially numbered and recorded regularly so that any loss can be detected at a glance. Blank checks, order forms, payment authorizations, vouchers, receipt forms, and all papers that authorize or verify transactions are prime targets for thieves and should therefore be accounted for. Since many effective operational systems are used to order, ship, or receive goods as well as authorize payments, from petty cash to regular debt discharge, no one security system to protect against illegal manipulation within such systems applies universally. It can be said, however, that, since every business has some means of authorizing transactions of goods or money, the means by which such authorizations are made must be considered in the security program. Security of such means must be considered an important element in any company’s defense against theft. Generally speaking, all forms should be prenumbered and, wherever possible, used in numerical order. Any voided or damaged forms should be filed and recorded, and forms reported lost must be accounted for and explained. All such numbered forms of every kind should be inventoried and accounted for periodically. In cases where purchase orders are issued in blocks to various people who need such authority, such issuance must be recorded and disposition of their use should be audited regularly. In such cases, it is customary for one copy of the numbered purchase order to be sent to the vendor, who uses that number in all further dealings on that particular order; another copy is sent to accounting for payment authorization and accrual if necessary; and


one copy is retained by the issuing authority. Each block issued should be used sequentially, although since some areas may have more purchasing activity than others, purchasing order copies as they are forwarded to accounting may not be in overall sequence.

Computer Records or Electronic Mail and Funds Transfer or Fax The computer has become the most powerful tool for record-keeping, research and development, funds transfer, electronic mail, and management within most companies today. It is essential that the computer and its support equipment and records be adequately protected from the internal thief. In addition to the computer, the transfer of information via fax has become an everyday occurrence.

Purchasing

Centralized Responsibility Where purchasing is centralized in a department, controls always are more effective. Localizing responsibility as well as authority reduces the opportunity for fraud accordingly. This is not always possible or practical, but in areas where purchasing is permitted by departments needing certain materials and supplies, there can be confusion occasioned by somewhat different purchasing procedures. Cases have been reported of different departments paying different prices for the same goods and services, thus bidding up the price the company is paying. Centralization of purchasing overcomes this problem. The use of computers and networking has allowed for centralized control with decentralized operations. Purchasing should not, however, be involved in any aspect of accounts payable or the receipt of merchandise other than as an information ally.

Competitive Bids Competitive bids should be sought wherever possible. This, however, raises an interesting point that must be dealt with as a matter of company policy. Seeking competitive bids is always good practice, both to get a view of the market and to provide alternatives in the ordering of goods and materials, but it does not follow that the lowest bidder is always the vendor with which to do business.

53

Such a bidder may lack adequate experience in providing the services bid for or may have a reputation of supplying goods of questionable quality even though they may meet the technical standard prescribed in the order. A firm may also underbid the competition in a desperate effort to get the business, then find it cannot deliver materials at that price, no matter what it has agreed to in its contract. To function wisely and exercise good judgment in its area of expertise, purchasing must be permitted some flexibility in its selection of vendors. This means that the low bidder is not always the one who wins the contract. Since competitive bidding provides some security control in reducing favoritism, collusion, and kickbacks between the purchasing agent and the vendor, these controls would appear to be weakened or compromised in situations where the purchasing department is permitted to select the vendor on considerations other than cost. This can be true to some degree, but this is a situation in which business or operational needs may be in some conflict with tight security standards and in which security should revise its position to accommodate the larger demands of efficiency and ultimate economy. After all, cheap is not necessarily economical. Controls in this case could be applied by requiring that, in all cases where the lowest bid was not accepted, a brief explanation in outline form be attached to the file along with all bids submitted. Periodic audits of such files could establish if any pattern of fraud seems likely. Investigation of the analysis or assumptions made by purchasing in assigning contracts might be indicated in some situations to check the validity of the stated reasoning in the matter.

Other Controls Copies of orders containing the amount of merchandise purchased should not be sent to receiving clerks. These clerks should simply state the quantity actually received with no preconception of the amount accepted. Payment should be authorized only for the amount actually received. Vendor invoices and receipts supporting such vouchers should be canceled to avoid the possibility of their resubmission in collusion with the vendor. Purchasing should be audited periodically, and documents should be examined for any irregularities.

54


Payroll

Payroll Audits

It is important that the payroll be prepared by persons not involved in its distribution. This is consistent with the effort to separate the various elements of a particular function into its components, then distribute the responsibility for those parts to two or more persons or departments. Every effort should be made to distribute the payroll in the form of checks rather than cash, and such checks should be of a color different from those used in any other aspect of the business. They should also be drawn on an account set aside exclusively for payroll. It is important that this account be maintained in an orderly fashion. Avoid using current cash receipts for payroll.

The payroll should be audited periodically by external auditors for any irregularities, especially if there has been an abnormal increase in personnel or net labor costs. To further guard against the fraudulent introduction of names into the payroll, distribution of paychecks should periodically be undertaken by the internal auditor, the treasurer, or some other responsible official. In large companies, this can be done on a percentage basis, providing at least a spot check of the validity of the rolls.

Personnel Records Initial payroll information should be prepared from personnel records, which in turn have come from personnel as each employee is hired. Such records should contain basic data such as name, address, attached W-2 form, title, salary, and any other information that the payroll department may need. The record should be countersigned by a responsible executive verifying the accuracy of the information forwarded. This same procedure should be followed when an employee terminates employment with the company. All such notifications should be consolidated into a master payroll list, which should be checked frequently to make sure that payroll’s list corresponds to the current personnel employment records.

Unclaimed Payroll Checks Unclaimed paychecks should be returned to the treasurer or controller after a reasonable period of time for redeposit in the payroll account. Certainly such cases should be investigated to determine why the checks were returned or why they were issued in the first place. All checks so returned should be canceled to prevent any reuse and filed for reference. Since payrolls reflect straight time, overtime, and other payments, such payments should be supported by time sheets authorized by supervisors or department heads. Time sheets of this nature should be verified periodically to prevent overtime padding and kickbacks. Time cards should be marked to prevent reuse.

Accounts Payable As in the case of purchasing, accounts payable should be centralized to handle all disbursements on adequate verification of receipt and proper authorization for payment. These disbursements should always be by checks that are consecutively numbered and used in consecutive order. Checks that are damaged, incorrectly drawn, or for any reason unusable must be marked as canceled and filed for audit. All checks issued for payment should be accompanied by appropriate supporting data, including payment authorizations, before they are signed by the signing authority. It is advisable to draw the checks on a check-writing machine that uses permanent ink and is as identifiable to an expert as handwriting or a particular typewriter. Checks should be printed on safety paper that shows almost any attempted alteration. Here, as in order departments, periodic audits must be conducted to examine the records for any sign of nonexistent vendors, irregularities in receipts or payment authorizations, forgeries, frauds, or unbusinesslike procedures that could lead to embezzlement.

General Merchandise Merchandise is always subject to pilferage, particularly when it is in a transfer stage, as when it is being shipped or received. The dangers of loss at these stages are increased in operations where controls over inventory are lax or improperly supervised.

Separation of Functions To control sensitive aspects of any operation involving the handling of merchandise, it is desirable to


separate three functions: receiving, warehousing, and shipping. These functions should be the responsibility of three different areas. Movement of merchandise from one mode to another should be accompanied by appropriate documents that clearly establish the responsibility for special amounts of merchandise passing from one sphere of authority to another. Receipting for a shipment places responsibility for a correct count and the security of the shipment on the receiving dock. This responsibility remains there until it is transferred and receives a proper receipt from the warehouse supervisor. The warehouse supervisor must verify and store the shipment, which is then the warehouse supervisor’s responsibility until it is called for (by the sales department, for example) or directed to be shipped by an authorized document. The warehouse supervisor ensures that the goods are assembled and passed along as ordered and receives a receipt for those goods when they are delivered. In this process, responsibility is fixed from point to point. Various departments or functions take on and are relieved of responsibility by use of receipts. In this way, a perpetual inventory is maintained as well as a record of responsibility for the merchandise. Requisitions must be numbered to avoid the destruction of records or the introduction of unauthorized transfers into the system. In addition, merchandise stock numbers should accompany all of that merchandise’s movement to describe the goods and thus aid in maintaining perpetual inventory records. In small firms where this separation of duties is impractical and receiving, shipping, and warehousing are combined in one person, the perpetual inventory is essential for security, but it must be maintained by someone other than the person actually handling the merchandise. The shipper-receiver-warehouser should not have access to these inventory records at any time.

Inventories Inventories are always an important aspect of merchandise control, no matter what operations are in effect. Such inventories must be conducted by someone other than the person in charge of that particular stock. In the case of department stores, for purposes of inventory, personnel should be moved to a department other than their regularly assigned one. In firms where a perpetual inventory record is kept, physical counts on a selective basis can be

55

undertaken monthly or even weekly. In this procedure, a limited number of certain items randomly selected can be counted and the count compared with current inventory record cards.Any discrepancy can be traced back to attempt to determine the cause of the loss.

Physical Security It is important to remember that personnel charged with the responsibility for goods, materials, and merchandise must be provided the means of properly discharging that responsibility. Warehouses and other storage space must be equipped with adequate physical protection to secure the goods stored within. Authorizations to enter such storage areas must be strictly limited, and the responsible employees must have means to further restrict access in situations where they feel that the security of goods is endangered. Receiving clerks must have adequate facilities for storage or supervision of goods until they can be passed on for storage or other use. Shipping clerks must also have the ability to secure goods in dock areas until they are received and loaded by truckers. Without the proper means of securing merchandise during every phase of its handling, assigned personnel cannot be held responsible for merchandise intended for their control, and the entire system breaks down. Unreasonable demands, such as requiring shipping clerks to handle the movement of merchandise in such a way that they are required to leave unprotected goods on the dock while filling out the rest of the order, lead to the very reasonable refusal of personnel to assume responsibility for such merchandise. When responsibility cannot be fixed, theft can result.

The Mailroom The mailroom can be a rich field for a company thief. Not only can it be used to mail company property to an ally or to a prearranged address, it also deals in stamps—and stamps are money. Any office with a heavy mailing operation must conduct regular audits of the mailroom. Some firms have taken the view that the mailroom represents such a small exposure that close supervision is unnecessary. Yet, the head of the mailroom in a fair-sized eastern firm got away with over $100,000 in less than 3 years through manipulation of the postal meter. Only a firm that can afford to lose $100,000 in less than 3 years should think of its mail-

56


room as inconsequential in its security plan. In addition, recent events related to bio-terrorism make mailroom security an even greater responsibility.

Trash Removal Trash removal presents many problems. Employees have hidden office equipment or merchandise in trash cans, then picked up the loot far from the premises in cooperation with the driver of the trashcollecting vehicle. Some firms have a problem when they put trash on the loading dock to facilitate pickup. Trash collectors made their calls during the day and often pick up unattended merchandise along with the trash. On-premises trash compaction is one way to end the use of trash containers as a safe and convenient vehicle for removing loot from the premises. Every firm has areas vulnerable to attack. What and where they are can be determined only by thorough surveys and regular reevaluation of the entire operation. There are no shortcuts. The important thing is to locate the areas of risk and set up procedures to reduce or eliminate them.

When Controls Fail There are occasions when a company is so beset by internal theft that problems seem to have gotten totally out of hand. In such cases, it is often difficult to localize the problem sufficiently to set up specific countermeasures in those areas affected. The company seems simply to “come up short.” Management is at a loss to identify the weak link in its security, much less to identify how theft is accomplished after security has been compromised.

Undercover Investigation In such cases, many firms similarly at a loss in every sense of the word have found it advisable to engage the services of a security firm that can provide undercover agents to infiltrate the organization and observe the operation from within. Such agents may be asked to get into the organization on their own initiative. The fewer people who know of the agents’ presence, the greater is the protection and the more likely they are to succeed in investigations. It is also true that, when large-scale thefts take place over a period of time, almost anyone in the company could be involved. Even one

or more top executives could be involved in serious operations of this kind. Therefore, secrecy is of great importance. Since several agents may be used in a single investigation and they may be required to find employment in the company at various levels, they must have, or very convincingly seem to have, proper qualifications for the level of employment they are seeking. Over- or underqualification in pursuit of a specific area of employment can be a problem, so they must plan their entry carefully. Several agents may have to apply for the same job before one is accepted. Having gotten into the firm’s employ, agents must work alone. They must conduct the investigation and make reports with the greatest discretion to avoid discovery. But they are in the best possible position to get to the center of the problem, and such agents have been successful in a number of cases of internal theft in the past. These investigators are not inexpensive, but they earn their fee many times over in breaking up a clever ring of thieves. It is important to remember, however, that such agents are trained professionals. Most of them have had years of experience in undercover work of this type. Under no circumstances should a manager think of saving money by using employees or well-meaning amateurs for this work. Such a practice could be dangerous to the inexperienced investigator and would almost certainly warn the thieves, who would simply withdraw from their illegal operation temporarily until things had cooled down after which they could return to the business of theft.

Prosecution Every firm has been faced with the problem of establishing policy regarding the disposal of a case involving proven or admitted employee theft. They are faced with three alternatives: to prosecute, to discharge, or to retain the thief as an employee. The policy that is established is always difficult to reach because there is no ready answer. There are many proponents of each alternative as the solution to problems of internal theft. However difficult it may be, every firm must establish a policy governing matters of this kind. And the decision about that policy must be reached with a view to the greatest benefits to the employees, the company, and society as a whole. An enlightened management would also consider the position of the as-yet-to-be-discovered thief in establishing such policy.


Discharging the Thief Most firms have found that discharge of the offender is the simplest solution. Experts estimate that most of those employees discovered stealing are simply dismissed. Most of those are carried in the company records as having been discharged for “inefficiency” or “failure to perform duties adequately.” This policy is defended on many grounds, but the most common are as follows: 1. Discharge is a severe punishment, and the offender will learn from the punishment. 2. Prosecution is expensive. 3. Prosecution would create an unfavorable public relations atmosphere for the company. 4. Reinstating the offender in the company—no matter what conditions are placed on the reinstatement—appears to condone theft. 5. If the offender is prosecuted and found not guilty, the company is open to civil action for false arrest, slander, libel, defamation of character, and other damages. There is some validity in all of these views, but each one bears some scrutiny. As to learning (and presumably reforming) as a result of discharge, experience does not bear out this contention. A security organization found that 80% of the known employee thieves they questioned with polygraph substantiation admitted to thefts from previous employers. Now, it might well be argued that, since they had not been caught and discharged as a result of these prior thefts, the proposition that discharge can be therapeutic still holds or at least has not been refuted. That may be true, and it should be considered. Prosecution is unquestionably expensive. Personnel called as witnesses may spend days appearing in court. Additional funds may be expended investigating and establishing a case against the accused. Legal fees may be involved. But, can a company afford to appear so indifferent to significant theft that it refuses to take strong action when it occurs? As to public relations, many experienced managers have found that they have not suffered any decline in esteem. On the contrary, in cases where they have taken strong, positive action, they have been applauded by employees and public alike. This is not always the case, but apparently a positive reaction is usually the result of vigorous prosecution in the wake of substantial theft. Reinstatement is sometimes justified by the circumstances. There is always, of course, a real danger of adverse reaction by the employees, but if rein-

57

statement is to a position not vulnerable to theft, the message may get across. This is a most delicate matter that can be determined only on the scene. As far as civil action is concerned, that possibility must be discussed with counsel. In any event, it is to be hoped that no responsible businessperson would decide to prosecute unless the case were a very strong one.

Borderline Cases Even beyond the difficulty of arriving at a satisfactory policy governing the disposition of cases involving employee theft, some cases are particularly hard to adjudicate. Most of these involve the pilferer, the long-time employee, or the obviously upright employee in financial difficulty who steals out of desperation. In each case, the offender freely admits guilt and pleads being overcome by temptation. What should be done in such cases? Many companies continue to employ such employees, provided they make restitution. They are often grateful, and they continue to be effective in their jobs. In the last analysis, individual managers must determine the policy in these matters. Only they can determine the mix of toughness and compassion that guides the application of policy throughout. It is hoped that every manager will decide to avoid the decision by making employee theft so difficult and so unthinkable that it will never occur. That goal may never be reached, but it is a goal to strive for.

Consider the following actual case study, then decide how you would answer the questions posed at the end.

Case Study J. Jones, a sales representative traveling a territory in his own car, receives a travel allowance of 34.5 cents a mile from his company to pay all car expenses. The vehicle is also used as a second family car when he is at home. He considers the 34.5 cents a mile figure too low. Jones reclaims this and other travel expenses in a monthly expense account. In this account, he is required to list only a total of miles driven each day and a total of miles for the month. He always claims total miles each month, business and personal, by making a small daily increase in mileage driven on

58


company business. Around Christmas time, his personal expenses are higher and his company car travel is less. His practice then is to add extra miles arbitrarily to his expense account for November and December. The company pays expense accounts each month without auditing them. External auditors select a few sales reps each year for expense account audit. The sales reps know this because any errors located in this random audit are reported to them and the errors, plus or minus, are corrected. Jones arbitrarily increased the total of one monthly expense account total by $200. He knew he could keep this if his expense accounts were not chosen for the audit that year. If caught in an audit, he knows it would simply be attributed to an error in addition on his part. Jones’s total increase of reported expenses over actual expenses this year was about 5%. He has no unusual expenses of a nonrecurring nature.

Questions 1. Who ultimately pays the padded 5% in Jones’ expense accounts? 2. In future years, will Jones’s expense account padding, under present reimbursement policies probably stay the same, increase, or decrease? 3. What minimum action should the company take to prevent expense account padding?

Summary The issue of internal theft is probably the single most important issue for a loss prevention manager. More companies fail as a result of employee theft than from another security or loss prevention vulnerability. Understanding the nature of theft provides a

basis for its control. The simple most effective measure in reducing employee problems is a thorough background check.

Review Questions 1. What are some of the common danger signals of employee dishonesty? 2. Discuss procedural controls for decreasing the incidence of employee theft in specific departments. 3. What should management’s role be in effecting internal security? 4. Should employees be prosecuted for stealing? Why?

References 1. Bill Zalud. “2002 Industry Forecast Study Security Yin-Yang: Terror Push, Recession Drag.” Security (January 2002). 2. “Weak Awareness Secures Sky-High Theft Figures.” Security (August 1990), p. 13. 3. William C. Cunningham, John J. Strauchs, and Clifford W. Van Meter. The Hallcrest Report II: Private Security Trends 1970–2000 (Boston: Butterworth–Heinemann, 1990), p. 29. 4. Zalud, “2002 Industry Forecast Study.” 5. Courtney Price. “Emtrepreneurs: Employee Theft and Dishonesty.” Naples [Florida] Daily News (September 21, 1998), available at http://www.insidenaples.com/ today/business/d369398a.htm. 6. Charles P. Carson. Managing Employee Honesty (Boston: Butterworth, 1977). 7. The Ethics of American Youth, 2002 Report Card, Josephson Institute of Ethics, available at http:// www.josephsoninstitute.org/Survey2002. 8. Richard C. Hollinger and John P. Clark. Theft by Employees (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983), p. 4.

Chapter 5 Executive Protection CHARLES J. DIECIDUE, CPP

With the surge in terrorist activity, major corporations are coming to the realization that they could become targets. Situations such as kidnapping of business executives and their families, along with threats against employees or corporate properties to extort sums of money, are causing increasing alarm and concern. Present indications show that this type of fanatical activity is on the rise. To achieve a realistic view of the current situation, it may be useful to examine the recent domestic and worldwide growth of terrorism. Over the past few years, individuals and small groups with unlimited capacity for violence, through such tactics as bombings, assassination attempts, extortion, and kidnapping, have had a disproportionately large impact on the United States and the world. They have compelled governments and large corporations to negotiate with them on their terms, often winning mammoth concessions.

Rise of Terrorism in the United States Most Americans once regarded political terrorism as something that happened only abroad. Unfortunately, this is not true. In the 1980s, we experienced senseless explosions, assassination attempts, kidnappings, attacks on the police, along with other forms of harassment and sabotage against institutions both public and private. The invidious and startling bombing of the World Trade Center in 1991 and the planes that crashed into the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, traumatized the United States with the dangers we face at home at the whim of fanatics.

In the past, the crime of kidnapping was primarily a method of extorting money. However, kidnapping in current times has also become one of the most effective political weapons of the terrorist. Terrorists have abducted government officials, journalists, diplomats, and corporate executives. Corporate executives, in fact, have become their favorite targets. Placing lives in the balance, terrorists in turn received release for imprisoned colleagues, military aid, money, and safe passage for themselves to nations offering asylum. Ironically and sadly, political kidnapping seems to work. In today’s society, the threat of kidnapping is used to extort large sums of money from corporations, financial institutions, and wealthy individuals. Actually, kidnapping for purposes of ransom are increasing at a faster rate than those stemming from political motives. While kidnapping in the United States is still a rare crime, it has increased in recent years. Although political kidnapping has heretofore been almost nonexistent in this country, target lists of corporate executives have been discovered in the headquarters of extremists groups. In the late 1980s, a corporate kidnapping was forcefully and deplorably brought to the surface with the abduction and subsequent death of an Exxon executive in New Jersey. Ironically, a security manager and his wife conceived the whole debacle. More recently, the murder of an advertising executive by a package bomb ruefully brought out the meaning of executive protection. Consequently, it cannot be easily dismissed that political terrorists in the United States could choose targets for kidnapping or extortion as they did in the past for bombing attacks. Therefore, executives who own or work for 59

60


major corporations (especially those with foreign operations), utilities, and financial institutions can be considered potential targets of political or criminal kidnapping in America.

Formulating a Protection Plan The purpose of this chapter is to increase awareness of the nature of the terrorist threat and provide a set of guidelines for the formulation of procedures to reduce the probability of falling victim to a criminal attack.The security suggestions here are by no means all-inclusive. They are intended to provide only a basic foundation in the preparation of a kidnapping program. In the last analysis, the safety of corporate executives depends to a great degree on the company’s own protection efforts. Law enforcement agencies can only offer assistance. Usually, resistance in executive protection programs comes from the executives themselves. Security is a tough item to sell. Undoubtedly, convincing top executives to alter their lifestyles and accept certain precautions is a painstaking task. Executives worry about their image, the cost of protection, and the inconvenience that such procedures place on themselves and their families. However, more and more today, executives are beginning to face the issue of their own protection.

Planning The value of a security program depends not only on the excellence of the resources utilized but should coincide with the relevance of the resources. Nothing is more vital to the long-term success of a security program than planning. Planning is essential in developing and implementing policy that is pragmatic and convincing. Consequently, a security policy must be sufficiently broad and flexible, as well as dynamic, to ensure its effectiveness over a period of time.

Establish Objectives Prior to the initiation of the planning effort, security objectives should be discussed and established. The type of input furnished should determine the overall kidnapping program. Once these objectives are organized and agreed on by the executive board members, the security director (planner) can begin to become familiar with both the evolving hardware and the environment within which the program is to operate. Precautions should be taken to avoid overreaction, such as creating an “Orwellian” atmosphere or, conversely, by putting together a program that has minimum or average standards.

Risk Management Analysis

Threat Assessment The security director or manager should be receptive to every conceivable criminal probability that can be directed against the company and its personnel. If the probability of kidnapping exists, it is the director’s responsibility to prevent or forestall the likelihood. Statements such as “Kidnapping . . . will never happen here” or “You can’t do anything about it” signify a sorry attitude of fatalism and defeatism, which is quite common today, even among security professionals. It should be understood that security is a relative concept: Only degrees of security can be achieved, not absolute protection. Therefore, no security program can be effective unless it is based on a clear understanding of the actual risks it is designed to control. Until that threat is assessed accurately, precautions and countermeasures, even those of the highest quality, reliability, and reputation cannot be chosen properly. Without cogent assessment of the risks important decisions are left to speculation.

Weighing budgetary considerations, every company should strive for maximum security. Analyzing the following risk management elements gives the security planner a head start in gathering some of the information needed to identify and measure entry vulnerabilities: 䊉䊉

䊉

Who are the top executives in the organization? Which individuals have access to large amounts of money? Which individuals can generate publicity?

Reports indicate that a majority of individuals kidnapped are linked to a source of money, have power, or are a source of publicity. Political kidnappers want all three: money, power, and publicity.

Home and Office Survey A comprehensive survey of the home and office should be conducted by the security director or

Executive Protection

designate or by a reputable consultant or firm. The survey is a blueprint of the anticipated problems. A salient factor of the survey should be the types of illegal entry that can be accomplished; these include the use of force or entry by trick or other surreptitious means. If intrusion is necessary to carry out a kidnapping, the abductor is swayed to go where the most opportunity is offered at minimal risk. If the entry potential is difficult, especially if it increases the probability of apprehension, it is likely the criminal will pass it by. The methods of decreasing the possibility for an intrusion usually embody common sense. Time can be an intruder’s ally or foe; a wellthought-out program can make time an enemy. Statements such as, “There are no burglarproof locks or alarm systems” or “Given enough time a skilled professional can crack Fort Knox” have some credence, but every minute longer it takes to gain entry increases the probability of apprehension and an involuntary stay in the penitentiary. Various perimeters of security should be established and utilized as stumbling blocks to the intruder. Little opportunity, fear of apprehension, and frustration should confront an intruder. This is accomplished by the placing of burglary-resistant locks on doors and windows and using a state-of-theart alarm system with silent central station transmission and audible horns. Additionally, a well-lighted home area that is visible from the street increases the intruder’s exposure and reduces the time he or she wants to spend there. These are simple and effective stumbling blocks that can be used against the potential intruder.

䊉

61

Is the responsibility for security fixed in the home?

Physical Vulnerability List all means of entry into the home or office. This includes elevator shafts, skylights, ventilators, any opening more that 18 inches square, as well as all doors and windows. Using the list, describe any burglary-resistant devices and alarm systems already installed.Are they adequate? How and where should protection be increased? For example, if a central station system is being utilized, here are some questions to be asked: 䊉䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Is there line supervision? Are tamper-resistant contacts on all doors and windows? Does the alarm system employ motion detectors, sonic, photoelectric beams, and the like? Is the telephone pair box protected against a possible bypass? Does the alarm company mark the telephone pairs with red flags that denote the route of the alarm system? When was the alarm system last tested? What type of test was conducted? How far is the central station from the premises? What is the average response time by police or alarm personnel after an alarm has been transmitted? Are keys to the home or office given to alarm company personnel? What procedure is used in checking the home or office after an alarm has been transmitted?

Other considerations in evaluating vulnerability of a possible intrusion include

Procedural Vulnerability Check to see where you are vulnerable: 䊉

䊉䊉

䊉

䊉

Are door cylinders or locks changed each time any employee or servant with access severs with the company or home? Is there key control? Has responsibility been fixed to ensure that all doors and windows are locked? Are the alarm system and emergency power batteries tested on a scheduled basis? Are the alarm codes changed periodically? Has responsibility been fixed to assure that all doors and windows are locked and the alarm system is activated at the proper hours?

䊉䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Are highly pick-resistant locks utilized? Is there proper illumination around the perimeter of the home? Are telephone numbers of police, FBI, fire department, and the security director easily accessible? Could the shrubbery in front of the home provide cover for a potential intruder? Has thought been given to the installation of a discreet closed circuit television, integrated with a voice intercom at the front, rear, and side doors? Should glass doors or door side panels be replaced with break-resistant laminate or polycarbonate material? Has the use of a possible “buddy” alarm system been explored with a neighbor?

62


Protection in Transit Kidnapping is a sophisticated crime that usually requires elaborate plans for success. Inherent in the development of a kidnapping scheme is the observation and scrutiny given to a victim’s routine. Accordingly, one of the most vulnerable areas is when the targeted victim is in transit. Over 70% of all successful kidnappings take place while the victim was in transit—in most cases while driving.

䊉

Executives and their drivers should practice the following exercises in preventing an attempted kidnapping: 䊉

The Vehicle 䊉䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

The vehicle should be in excellent condition and serviced by a reliable company. Equipment should include an audible alarm system to announce tampering at the hood, trunk, door, and window areas. The alarm should be extended to the interior area, allowing emergency activation by the driver or a passenger. All vehicles should be equipped with a keyoperated locking gas cap. (In the early 1980s, an individual who manufactured explosive capsules was apprehended by federal authorities in New York City. Thrown into a gas tank, the capsule would detonate in seconds. This individual had sold 150 of these destructive devices, known as fireflies. They were composed of metallic sodium and calcium carbide in a gelatin capsule. A simple locked gas cap defeats or at least deters such an attack.) A cellular telephone with speed dialing should be utilized. The gas tank should be kept at least half-full at all times. For greater anonymity, the vehicle should be registered in the name of the corporation rather than the individual executive. A company car pool may be established, preventing the repeated use of the same vehicle by the same executive. Company logos on vehicles should be avoided. Executives’ names should not be posted in company parking areas. Executives should avoid using the same taxi stand or car service repeatedly. Chauffeurs and relief drivers should be thoroughly screened before being hired. Consideration should be given to training in evasive driving maneuvers along with the proper procedures to follow in the event of a kidnapping attempt. The chauffeur should be instructed to give a prearranged trouble signal before the execu-

tive enters the vehicle if the chauffeur is under duress. If possible, the chauffeur should not be given advance notice of the executive’s destination or schedule.

䊉䊉

䊉䊉

Before entering the vehicle, check the interior. If anything suspicious, such as a package or other item is observed, do not enter the vehicle or touch the suspected object. After entering the vehicle, lock all doors. Do not take the same routes at predictable times. Be alert for possible setup distress situations or accidents; carefully evaluate each situation. Travel with others when practicable. Chauffeurs should be alert to being following. If you suspect you are being followed, phone ahead immediately. Note the location, the direction in which you are traveling, and if possible, the description and license number of the vehicle. Do not stop or force a confrontation; seek police assistance. If you are unable to contact the police, activate the vehicle alarm system or sound the horn to attract attention. The best time to prevent a possible successful kidnapping is during the attempt. Abductors do not look for attention or want their victims killed during the attempt. Today, major corporations expend a large amount of money in having their chauffeurs professionally trained in the art of evasive driving. Professional guidance in this type of driving is extremely important in such situations.

Here are some practical considerations to follow if the vehicle is attacked. Try to evade the kidnapper’s vehicle by veering left and right so it cannot hit your vehicle broadside or cut you off. Stay in the vehicle, escape attempts on foot are not advised. Again, attract as much attention you can: Sound the horn and activate the alarm system. If the auto is about to be boxed in or blocked, do not stop; attempt to accelerate or move around the obstruction. If this is not feasible, ram the blocking vehicle at the end opposite the engine, causing it to swing or rotate around the engine weight. Outracing an abductor’s auto is not an end in itself, since speed entails great risk and achieves only a temporary evasion; it should be used only to get to a specific point quickly. Finally, if the abductors are close enough to fire weapons at the driver, stop the vehicle and submit—it is not the time for heroics.


On Foot 䊉

䊉䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Try to walk in populated areas, preferably with others. Do not walk close to the building line. If the walk is not too far, carry a panic or distress alarm remote. If you suspect you are being followed, go to the nearest store, restaurant, or other public place and call the police. Always carry change in case you have to make an emergency call. If practical, carry a cellular phone.

63

Everyday Security Awareness Family Education 䊉

䊉

䊉

For security to be effective, it must permeate through every member of the family, including the children. The idea is not to create anxiety or paranoia but to generate security-minded attitudes and habits from which all family members benefit. The spouse should be trained and become thoroughly familiar with the proper security procedures to be taken, not only in a kidnapping situation but all emergency occurrences. Servants should be thoroughly screened and subsequently trained in proper security procedures.

Traveling by Plane 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

If company planes are utilized, are they properly secured? Thorough screening must also be applied to company or outside contract pilots. Commercial airline tickets should be obtained on a low-key basis with little or no recognition given to the corporation or the executive. For example, “I would like reservations for Mr.____, chairman of the board of the ____” should not be used. It should be noted that the greatest emphasis concerning air travel should be given to transit to and from the airport. Accordingly, executives who fly should keep their time of arrival and departure as confidential as possible.

Traveling Abroad

Home Security Suggestions 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Executives traveling aboard should familiarize themselves with certain foreign phrases, such as, “I need the police.” Establish signals with secretaries, family, and business associates to alert them that you are in a dangerous situation. Executives associated with overseas operations should be thoroughly briefed about the host country and its political and social climate. Have there been past kidnappings? What type were they? Who were the abductors? What methods were employed? Establish contacts and liaison with various police departments, Interpol, U.S. Armed Forces, or highly placed foreign officials. Such contacts can be extremely helpful in a time of difficulty, in addition to facilitating collection of local intelligence. The adage “It’s who you know” applies.

䊉䊉䊉

䊉䊉

䊉

䊉

The identity of all unknown visitors, such as repair, telephone, and utility service personnel, should be verified before they are allowed access to the home. Identification should be requested and inspected. If doubt still exists, call the company for verification. Servants should be aware of all new delivery personnel who have access to the home. Possible observance of the home from the outside (either physically or through binoculars) should be checked and evaluated. Social page publicity involving entertaining, going on vacation, parties, or other functions that pinpoint the executive’s location should be avoided. All cleaning personnel should be supervised. Be alert to suspicious individuals loitering on foot, in vehicles, or on bicycles near the home. Home telephone numbers should be unlisted. Treat unexpected packages with suspicion. Do not become routine in shopping, appointments, or the like. Give little information to strangers on the phone. Educate children in conversing with strangers on the telephone, answering the door, while playing outdoors, and going to and from school. Use a private conveyance to take children to school or at least accompany them to the school bus. Executives with children in school should insist that the school authorities never release a child from school without parental consent. Many school administrators can be easily convinced or deceived by a well-dressed individual arriving in a chauffeured limousine. Pretexts such as the

64

䊉䊉

䊉


parents being injured or other emergencies have been used to remove children from school. A claim to be the parent of a child must be confirmed by the school authorities. If any doubt exists, the child should not be released. If an individual states he or she is acting on behalf of the parent, the parent must be contacted prior to release. If it is impossible to reach the parent, an additional contact of a trusted individual should be designated to give authorization for release. Advise children to stay with friends at all times. Needless to say, children should be instructed never to enter a stranger’s auto, even though the stranger claims to know “Mommy and Daddy.” Parents should always know where their child is going and with whom.

䊉

Hostage Behavior How should the hostage react or behave in the event of a kidnapping? The chances for the hostage’s survival depend in large part on his or her conduct while in captivity. Although each abduction represents a unique set of circumstances, law enforcement experts suggest several commonsense guidelines to follow: 䊉䊉

If an Abduction Occurs 䊉

Telephone Threats 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

In the event of a threat by phone, top executives should have their phones interfaced with a tape recorder. Recordings assist law enforcement in pursuing leads and prosecuting the individual if apprehended. If this is not possible, establish a signal to alert an associate or secretary to listen in. In speaking to a kidnapper over the phone, express a willingness to cooperate and ask to speak to the hostage. Beware of hoax kidnappings. Always ask the kidnapper to describe the hostage: facial features, scars, color of eyes, hair, and so forth. Immediately after the first confrontation, hoax or not, notify local law enforcement authorities. Have law enforcement clear all statements given to the press.

Mail Threats 䊉

䊉

䊉

Company mailroom personnel as well as family members should be given proper training in the handling of suspicious correspondence or packages. If a threatening letter is received, avoid its handling by numerous individuals. Place it in a plastic bag and turn it over to law enforcement authorities for examination. Make a record of all personnel who handled the material.

Look for telltale signs such as childish addressing, wiring, untidy wrapping, no return address. If it appears suspicious or you are not comfortable, handle it as a threat.

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Remain as calm and businesslike as possible. Be alert, do not panic, and do not struggle. Even the most rational of kidnappers may react violently when a hostage tries to resist or escape. If blindfolded, keep a precise mental diary of all incidents, no matter how trivial, that occur during the period of abduction. While in transit, make mental notes of direction traveled, length of time involved, and approximate speed of the vehicle. Make a note of unusual noises, acoustics, and landmarks. Be cognizant of any sensations, odors, and vibrations that may aid in determining the destination. Leave your fingerprints by touching various parts of the vehicle such as the door and windows. Take special note of the abductors, their physical appearance, height, weight, mannerisms, scars, tattoos, and habits. Listen to their speech patterns, slang, profanities, and any other conversation that reflects their motives and attitudes. Do not become argumentative or provoke your abductors. Remain impartial in any philosophical or social discussions initiated by the captors. Conversely, do not become overly subservient in siding with their ideas and philosophy. Do not discuss rescue efforts, ransom terms, amnesty offers, or anything else that may obstruct or hinder the plans that law enforcement or family are making concerning your rescue. Do not attempt to escape unless you have carefully and thoroughly assessed the probability for success. Until the odds are completely in your favor, do not make the attempt. Always bear in mind that every possible effort will be expended by your family, company, and law enforcement in obtaining your quick and safe release.


Role of Law Enforcement Law enforcement officials make every effort to ensure the safe return of the hostage. Accordingly, the crucial point of the kidnapping is the initial notification. It is most important that law enforcement officials be notified and apprised of the total situation. Individuals who assume they can competently direct a kidnapping situation without law enforcement assistance are sadly mistaken. Government authorities not only have the experience and tools, they have the personnel and time to pursue the investigation. With access to voluminous records and the use of their street informants, they can rapidly garner valuable information. This is why the immediacy of notification is extremely important. Law enforcement’s function throughout the investigation is to pursue all active leads, check on possible suspects, set up and coordinate activities with the telephone company and postal authorities, arrange for money transfers, and set up sophisticated electronic equipment.

65

Throughout the investigation, law enforcement keeps the family apprised of all anticipated actions as well as progression of the case. The authorities accommodate and work with the family or their representatives. Decisions concerning the rescue of the victim should not be made unless it is with concurrence of the family. Law enforcement should be notified of any offer or communication from the kidnappers. Family or friends of the hostage should avoid and be particularly wary of working out secret private deals with the kidnappers. In conclusion, it should be remembered that law enforcement officials’ main objective is the safe return of the hostage. The emotional entanglements caused by this contemptible crime make it very difficult for the authorities to function without justified distractions. To aid the efficient operation of law enforcement’s investigation, wholehearted assistance should be given by the family and friends of the victim. With this cooperation and assistance, more can be accomplished to ensure the safe return of the hostage.

Chapter 6 Awareness ROBERT HANNA

Awareness and Knowledge Strategies1 Awareness and knowledge strategies are basically aimed at informing the public as to what crime prevention is, how it works, what citizens can do, why they should act, and what services and resources are available to them.

ness. Increasing numbers of national associations, for example, provide crime prevention educational materials to local constituents and urge local affiliate organizations to develop local crime prevention education programs. Local people already touched by crime prevention in this or other ways may be only too glad to respond to the “awareness call” sounded by the practitioner.

Awareness Knowledge The awareness component consists of newspaper articles, television and radio public service spots and interviews, billboards, posters, shopping center exhibits, brochure mailings, and other general audience approaches. The information should be simple and repetitive. The campaign should, if possible, be continued on a perpetual basis, or at least be repeated at regular intervals. Increasing numbers of states have established statewide crime prevention media campaigns, and these can be very helpful to the local practitioner. However, they should supplement, not replace, the continuing local public awareness program. The cooperation of the news media, advertising agencies, and other members of the local communications industry are essential to the success of a public awareness campaign. The practitioner should take pains to explain the program to communications people and request their help. In turn, he or she should learn from them how and in what format to prepare news releases, promotional copy, visuals, print materials and so forth. A close working relationship is of the utmost importance. It should be noted here that the practitioner would hardly ever be working in a vacuum of aware66

The awareness campaign, though important, only opens the door to citizen participation. The next step is to add knowledge to awareness. A public awareness campaign results in widespread recognition of crime prevention and the purposes and methods of the local program. It triggers requests for information, security surveys, speaking engagements, and other direct assistance. In addition, the practitioner can expect some direct action to result—usually, simple actions like Operation Identification registrations and purchase of deadbolt door locks. The people who make contact with the practitioner in response to an awareness campaign are a small fraction of the population, but they are likely to be people who can lead in further development of citizen participation. The practitioner must be prepared to respond quickly and skillfully to all public requests for assistance, because this is how he or she establishes a record of accomplishment or high-quality client service. Such service delivery may mean working overtime; citizen groups seldom meet during the normal business day. Nevertheless, the dedicated practitioner will be prepared to sacrifice his or her

Awareness

own convenience, because the ultimate success of citizen participation strategies depends on a high-quality response by the practitioner at this stage. The primary focus of the practitioner at this citizen knowledge-developing stage is to further educate those who have expressed preliminary interest and further attract those who, by virtue of position with the community, need to be involved. Second, the practitioner must be prepared to help those ready and willing to start taking action. For the individual, this means providing crime risk management guidance and security surveys. For the citizen group or civic group, it means providing accurate information on subjects of interest to members. A business group, for example, might be primarily interested in commercial burglary or robbery prevention and asset protection. A neighborhood group might be interested in preventing street crime. Women’s and senior citizens’ groups may be interested in reducing crime risk from assault, purse snatching, fraud, and so on. Each special group has a special need. The practitioner, in meeting these knowledge needs, sets the stage for additional knowledge delivery services, because “satisfied customers” create other clients. If one women’s group hears an interesting talk on rape prevention, the word will spread and other groups will want to follow suit. This natural process builds demand for additional services. Thus, the practitioner builds a wider clientele through delivery of quality services and “word of mouth” promotion of those services. This domino effect of the knowledge-building strategy is to be both desired and expected. The practitioner should not hesitate to use volunteers to share and extend the workload. Interested persons can and should be trained to help in the knowledge-spreading process. Citizen-volunteer spokespeople, although their total knowledge of crime prevention is more limited than that of the practitioner, are sometimes more effective in educating colleagues and social peers than the practitioner. It is also essential at this stage that the practitioner reach out to provide knowledge to a variety of community officials, starting with members of law enforcement agencies and extending to elected and appointed officials throughout government. These are the people who will later provide the political, economic, and direct service support of the comprehensive crime prevention program; and they must become involved at the knowledge stage

67

if they are to support the program in the action stages.

Neighborhood Watch Guidelines What Is Suspicious? No police department can function effectively without the concerned assistance of responsible citizens. The police depend on citizens to call when they observe suspicious persons or actions. Some people fail to call the police simply because they are not aware of what seemingly innocent activities might be and are hesitant to call for fear of being a “nosy neighbor” or a “crank.” Still others take it for granted that someone else has called. Citizens should call the police immediately about all suspicious activity. They should have no worry about “bothering” the police because this is what police are there for, even if suspicions are unfounded. Basically, anything that seems even slightly “out of place” for the area or time of day at which it occurs may mean criminal activity. Some of the most obvious things to watch for and report include 1. A stranger entering a neighbor’s house when it is unoccupied may be a burglar. 2. A scream heard anywhere may mean a robbery or rape in progress. 3. Offers of merchandise at ridiculously low prices could mean stolen property. 4. Anyone removing accessories, license plates, or gasoline from a car should be reported. 5. Anyone peering into parked cars may be looking for a car to steal or valuables left displayed in the car. 6. Persons entering or leaving a business place after hours could be burglars. 7. The sound of breaking glass or other loud explosive noises could mean an accident, burglary attempt, or vandalism to property. 8. Persons loitering around schools, parks, secluded areas, or in the neighborhood could be sex offenders. 9. Persons around the neighborhood who do not live there could be burglars. Not every stranger who comes into a neighborhood is a criminal by any means. Many perfectly legitimate people move about a city all the time. But criminals take advantage of this by assuming the guise of the legitimate business representative. After all, a

68


criminal who looked like a criminal would be spotted immediately.

Watchers Can Reduce Crime By reducing the opportunity for crime, looking out for neighbors, and acting as extra eyes and ears for law enforcement, members of a watch group can improve the quality of life in their community. First, they should check security in their own homes. The police or sheriff’s department may provide a free home security survey. Make sure that good locks are on exterior doors and windows and used. Encourage citizens to lock up when they go out, even if it is only for a few minutes. They also should trim shrubbery that hides doorways or windows and join Operation Identification to mark valuables. While on vacation, they should use timers on lights and radios to make the home appear lived-in and have a neighbor take in mail and newspapers. They should make an effort to know neighbors and their daily routines. A block map near the telephone is helpful in emergencies. Neighborhoods can be checked for things that might contribute to crime, like poor street lighting, abandoned cars, vacant lots littered with debris, or boarded-up buildings. An important responsibility of watch groups is to report anything suspicious to the police or sheriff’s department. They should look for 䊉䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Someone running from a car or home. Someone screaming. If they cannot determine what the screams are for, they should call the police and report it. Someone going door-to-door in the neighborhood, looking in windows and parked cars. A person who seems to have no purpose wandering in the neighborhood. Any unusual or suspicious noise that cannot be explained, such as breaking glass or pounding. Vehicles moving slowly, without lights, or with no apparent destination. Business transactions conducted from a vehicle. This could involve the sale of drugs or stolen goods. Offers of merchandise at ridiculously low prices. They are probably stolen. Property carried by persons on foot at an unusual hour or place, especially if the persons are running. Property being removed from closed business or residence known to be unoccupied. A stranger in a car stopping to beckon to a child. A child resisting the advances of an adult.

How to Report The police need accurate information as quickly as possible about a suspicious activity or crime in progress. The caller should 䊉

䊉

䊉䊉

䊉

Give his or her name and identify him- or herself as a member of a watch group. Describe the event in as brief a manner as possible: where, when, how, and who did it. Tell if the crime is in progress or has occurred. Describe the suspect—sex, race, age, height, weight, hair color, clothing, accent, beard or moustache, and distinctive characteristics or clothing. Describe the vehicle if one was involved—color, make, model, year, license plate, special markings, dents, which way it went.

How to Avoid Becoming the Victim of an Attacker The following recommendations help citizens avoid becoming victims: 1. Keep alert for the unexpected. While walking, pay attention to what is going. 2. Take no unnecessary chances— Walk confidently, know where you are going. Be extra alert, know who and what is around you at all times. Whenever possible, walk with another person. Stay near people. Walking in deserted areas invites trouble. Stay in well-lit areas. Avoid shortcuts. 3. If you are followed, Cross the street. Reverse direction. Go to a business that is open and ask for help. In a residential area, go to a home and ask for help. Attract attention: yell, scream, flag down a passing car. You may also carry a whistle and blow it to attract attention. Act suspicious. Keep looking back at the persons following you to let that person know you cannot be taken by surprise. 4. If you are attacked, Yell and scream to attract attention and scare your attacker off. Swing an umbrella, briefcase, or anything you have in your hand at the attacker’s head. Make a scene. Take your attacker by surprise. Jab the attacker with your elbow.

Awareness

Twist your body to break free from the attacker’s hold. Bite the attacker hard. Scratch the attacker’s face with your fingernails. Bend the attacker’s finger back. Kick the attacker with the toe of your shoe. Punch the attacker in unprotected areas. Get away from the attacker. 5. Get a description of your attacker. Try to remember such things as Height. Weight. Age. Skin tone. Hair color. Eye color. Color and type of clothes. Any jewelry the attacker may be wearing. Any scars, tattoos or disabilities the attacker may have. Any odor you may detect about the attacker’s person, such as alcohol, drugs, cologne Anything of which you were suspicious of prior to the attack, a motor vehicle that may have passed you several times or someone who may have been watching you. Anything the attacker may say to you and whether the attacker had an accent. A description of any weapon used. 6. Carrying a weapon is discouraged unless you are thoroughly trained in its use and licensed to carry it. Two things to remember are Anything you use as a weapon can also be taken from you and used against you. You would be better off using the time that it would take getting a weapon out to get out of the situation or attract attention. An umbrella is a good weapon to have in your hand and be ready to use in case of attack. 7. What about self-defense? Karate, judo, and other martial arts can improve your self-defense skills, but you must remember that it takes years of practice to become good at these skills. Above all, the victim should report anything suspicious to the police department immediately. Following these suggestions diminishes the chance of becoming the victim of an attacker.

䊉

䊉䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Does the entry door have a deadbolt lock and a peephole? Are sliding glass doors leading to balconies secured by pins in the frame or a wooden rod in the track? Does the manager permit tenants to change locks when they move in? Does the tenant leave a radio playing and a light on while out? Does the tenant alert neighbors or ther building manager when on a trip or vacation?

Securing the Apartment or Condominium The following tips can make a home more burglary resistant: 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Look at the Building 䊉

Is there some kind of control over who enters and leaves the building?

Are entrances, parking areas, hallways, stairways, and laundry rooms well lighted? Are fire stairs locked from the stairwell side? Are laundry rooms and storage areas kept locked? Are mailboxes in a well-traveled area? Do they have good locks? Have any apartments been burglarized recently? If so, how did the thieves get in?

Look at the Apartment

Safety Checklist for Apartments

䊉

69

All exterior doors should be checked for adequate security. After moving in, ask the management to have a licensed locksmith rekey all exterior door locks. Deadbolt locks should be installed on exterior doors. Do not give master keys to these locks to management, because that defeats their purpose. If necessary, keys in sealed envelopes should be given to managers for emergency use only. Secure all sliding glass doors and windows regardless of which floor the apartment is on. Doors and windows should always be locked when the tenant leaves, even if just for a few minutes. Demand adequate lighting for stairwells, laundry rooms, parking lots, and the building’s exterior. Have shrubs trimmed so they cannot conceal burglars or attackers. When taking vacations or trips, tenants should tell trusted neighbors of plans and where to reach them. Have newspapers and mail picked up. Stop other deliveries. Be cautious of door-to-door solicitors who want to give something for nothing. Never let a stranger into the home.

70

䊉

䊉


Women living alone should not use their first initial and last name on mailboxes and telephone listings. Using a listing like “The Smith Family” gives a potential thief the idea that more than one person lives at this address. Elevators are potential places for assault. If the building has an elevator, make sure the ground floor elevator is well lighted and visible from the street or manager’s office. Before entering an elevator, see who is already onboard. Do not get on if a person already on looks suspicious.

ways between bedrooms can save lives. Check to see whether the community requires smoke detectors in homes and apartments.

Get to Know Neighbors and Work Together 䊉

䊉

Residential Burglar Alarms Residential burglar alarms are not universal solutions to home burglary. They are no substitute for locked doors and windows or for precautions the police department can suggest. It may be appropriate to obtain alarm protection if the person lives in an isolated area, is absent from home for considerable periods of time, or keeps many valuables in the home (a practice that is not recommended). The purpose of an alarm system is to deter potential intruders (most burglars would reconsider forced entry if they knew an alarm system was in operation) and alert police to apprehend the burglar. To accomplish these objectives, alarms must complete an operation cycle consisting of sensing, signaling, and response. Sensing and signaling are mechanical aspects of the alarm system, while response involves human interaction with the system. The sensing cycle involves a series of electronic components designed to establish a secure perimeter, space, or point. The alarm emits a signal if an intruder enters the space. The signal can either sound at the site (local alarm), at some remote location, or both.Who receives the alarm signal and the expected response are important design considerations. Alarms must have an on-site signal if they are to alert occupants. If a house is in an isolated area, it makes little sense to depend solely on a local alarm to alert neighbors or scare off the intruder. In this case, a remote signal is also needed. The remote signal alarm is constantly monitored. Any time the alarm is activated, the police respond. The most dependable alarm system is operated on household power with emergency battery power. It is a good idea to have at least one smoke detector built into an alarm system. Smoke is the primary killer in a fire, and smoke detectors placed in hall-

䊉

䊉

Think about organizing an apartment watch so that neighbors can look out for each other. In large complexes and buildings, consider volunteer tenant patrols to watch for crime in and around the building, provide escort services for the elderly and people who may be out at night, or sit in the lobby to monitor people who may be out at night and people entering the building. Teenagers can be great resource for these efforts. Work to ensure that management provides adequate building security. If someone has been the victim of a crime, be a good neighbor. Lend an ear and lead the victim to others who can help.

Robbery Prevention—Tips for Small Business Businesses are robbed 10 times more often than individuals, but common sense can reduce the chance of becoming a victim as well as the amount of money lost if robbed. The following are some simple tips to prevent robbery at a business.

Cash 䊉

䊉䊉䊉䊉

Keep small amounts on hand and advertise that fact. Make frequent bank deposits. Have a drop safe or time delay safe. Vary your deposit times and route. Count your cash in a private area.

Lights, Locks, and Alarms 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Have exterior and interior lighting that allows visibility into the store from the street. Have an emergency alarm system and test it every so often to make sure it works. Encourage a buddy system signal with a neighboring store in case a suspicious person enters. Keep seldom-used doors and windows locked at all times. Use mirrors, cameras, or one-way glass to observe all areas of store.

Awareness

䊉

䊉

Employees: Have more than one person open and close the store. Carefully screen employees before hiring. Instruct employees to call the police about any suspicious person who may be hanging around the store. Train your employees how to effectively handle and report a robbery situation. Also, Arrange the stock to allow clear visibility in the store. Set up a signal with police patrol officer in case of problems. Arrange for a security survey with the local police department or security consultant.

If Confronted by a Robber

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Here are some tips for the small business owner confronted by a robber: 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Stay as calm as possible. Try not to panic or show any sign of anger or confusion. Consider your well-being and that of your employees as the highest priority. Do not escalate the incident into a violent confrontation in which someone may be injured or killed. Make a conscious effort to get an accurate description of the robber(s)—approximate age, height, weight, type and color of clothing. After the robber leaves, call the police immediately.

Following these tips reduces the chances of robbery and the chance of injury during a robbery.

Burglary Prevention—Tips for Small Business Burglary is a property crime that occurs when the business is closed. The burglar may enter through any opening (door, window, air conditioning duct, skylight) or even create one through an interior shared wall or outside wall. The risk should be reduced as much as possible. Burglary is a crime of opportunity that can be prevented.

䊉

71

Purchase high-quality door locks and use them. Grilles and storefront gates delay entry. Use an Underwriters Laboratories listed money safe, bolted to the floor and visible from the street. Know who has a key and restrict access to the front door. Rekey the lock if a once-trusted employee is discharged for cause. Rekey locks annually if you have a high turnover of employees. Consider an access control system rather than keys. Install a good-quality alarm system to detect unauthorized entry. Check with the Chamber of Commerce and law enforcement people before making this investment. Consider burglar-resistant glass in accessible areas. Unbreakable polycarbonate may work even better, particularly if you have high-value items in window displays. Keep areas around the store clean to aid visibility. Display the most valuable articles near the center of the store to force a burglar to take the longest possible escape route. Keep merchandise displays organized to allow maximum visibility throughout the store. Check closets and restrooms before locking up—no “visitor” should be able to stay inside the store after closing hours. These techniques certainly diminish the chance of becoming a victim of burglary. Closed circuit television (CCTV), which basically consists of a specific type of camera, monitor, time-lapse record, and high-grade tape has frequently been a tool for security and law enforcement, when the equipment has recorded criminal in the act of or about to commit a crime.

Businesses can reduce their vulnerability to crime in many ways. Measures such as locks, alarms, and good lighting make any establishment a less attractive target for criminals. A major ally is the local police department; its officers can conduct a free security survey and give advice on alarm systems and other security devices. Community service and involvement are important safeguards against crime. Customers and neighbors who view a business as a valued resource to the community watch out for its property and employees.

Employees and Crime Surveillance and Security Are Critical 䊉

Install bright interior and exterior lighting to make all openings visible from both the outside and inside of the store.

Employees can help a business be profitable or hurt it through waste, inattention to customers, or stealing. The business owner sets the example for honesty and develops clear policies regarding security and theft.

72

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉


Develop and advise all employees of inventory control procedures. All merchandise entering and exiting the premises should be accounted for. Screen employees carefully before hiring them. Check their backgrounds to be sure they have not been fired for behavior you find dangerous or unacceptable. A Polaroid photo helps police in any investigation that involves a dishonest employee. Train employees in proper cash handing and security measures. Set policy regarding cash on hand and stick to it. Research shows that employees steal from business that are impersonal and lack clear policies. Show employees you care about them and their property. Provide a clean orderly work environment with secure places for employees’ personal property. A satisfied employee can be the first line of defense against crime in a business.

How to Put Burglars Out of Business, the Rest of the Story How to make a business uninviting to a burglar and hard to enter was just discussed. We now discuss other methods of discouraging burglars. 䊉

䊉

Make it hard to find or remove valuable items. Safes and cash registers should be clearly visible from the street. Leave the cash drawer open and empty after business hours. The safe should be of good quality and firmly anchored. Lock the firm’s check protector and blank checks in the safe. Avoid having large amounts of cash on the premises. Make bank deposits at varying times during the day. If good lighting does not scare a burglar, it will make it harder to go unnoticed while working inside or outside the building. If possible, hide or lock in the safe high-value items (such as expensive rings or watches) that would be especially attractive to a thief. Make it likely the thief will get caught. Consider installing a burglar alarm system. They range from the simple, inexpensive type that merely makes a noise in the building to the complex, expensive, silent type tied into a police station or security agency. What kind you need depends on several factors: how likely it is that a thief would be detected without one, how far the business is from a police station, how the system’s cost compares with the cost of the goods to be protected.

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Get a system that either monitors itself or can be easily checked to make sure it is in good operating condition. Shop carefully and buy from a reputable company. A good alarm system will probably get the owner a discount on business insurance. In lieu of (or in addition to) an alarm system, hire a security guard or security service to patrol the business at night. If not, make sure someone (either the owner or an employee) is responsible for checking security of the business before closing time. Record all serial numbers of large-denomination bills. Also, a small amount of marked “bait” money may help police trace a thief. Try to keep a good inventory of the stock, including serial numbers of valuable goods and theft-prone items and equipment. This helps police trace stolen goods and helps the owner in filing an insurance claim. If the business become a burglary victim, the owner should cooperate with the police, including pressing charges if they catch a suspect and have evidence to convict.

The first initials of the following items sum up its message—lock it up. Locks for doors should be the deadbolt type. Doors should be heavy and solid. Protect windows with grillwork or heavy-duty screen. Openings other than doors and windows, such as skylights and ventilators, should be protected. Fences should be high, sturdy and topped with barbwire. Cover is something burglars must not have. Adequate lighting—inside and outside—is a must. Do not stack boxes or leave a vehicle parked next to the building. Keep valuable items out of display windows at night. Hide them or lock them in a safe. Insurance on the business is something the owner must not be without. How good a security is has a bearing on the premium. Trip up a thief by installing an effective alarm system, leaving cash register drawer open and empty, anchoring safes firmly, and recording serial numbers of large bills. Understand the importance of checking out potential employees before hiring. Make one person responsible for checking security before closing. Protect this business and others by working to improve the effectiveness of crime prevention in the community.

Awareness

73

Suspicious Situations to Report

Additional Suspicious Situations to Report

Suspicious Vehicles

The following are some examples of situations involving people to report to the police:

The following situations involving vehicles should be reported to the police: 1. Any vehicle moving slowly and without lights or following a course that appears aimless or repetitive should be considered suspicious. Occupants might be “casing” the area for places to rob or burglarize. Vehicles acting like this around schools, parks, or playgrounds should be considered suspicious and reported to police. These individuals could be drug dealers or sex offenders. 2. Parked vehicles with one or more persons inside should be considered suspicious, particularly if they are observed at an unusual hour. These individuals could be waiting for other burglars. 3. Vehicles being loaded with valuables are suspicious if parked in front of a closed business or unoccupied residence. A burglar may go to the trouble of placing signs on the vehicle to make it appear legitimate. 4. Apparent business transactions conducted from a vehicle should be considered suspicious, more so if the vehicle is parked around schools or parks. The occupants could be drug dealers. 5. Anyone being forced into a vehicle could be a victim of kidnapping, rape, or hijacking; call police immediately. 6. Abandoned vehicles parked on a block could be stolen cars. 7. While most, if not all, of these suspicious situations could have innocent explanations, the police would rather investigate a suspicious situation than be called when it is too late. The call could save a life, prevent an injury, or stop a criminal act.

What to Report 䊉

䊉

䊉

Description of persons: clothing, age, race, sex, height and weight (approximately), any unique characteristics such as scars, tattoos, jewelry. Description of vehicle: make, model, body style (two door, four door, station wagon, truck), license plate number, and direction of travel. Get as much information as possible and report it to the police immediately. Call 911 or the local police number. The caller is not be required to identify him- or herself. The sooner the call is placed, the sooner the police catch the offender.

1. Someone going door-to-door in a neighborhood. If, after a few houses are visited, one or more of the persons tries a door to see if it is locked or enters a backyard, it could be a burglar. Such action is even more suspicious if one person remains in the front when this occurs or a car follows a few houses away. 2. Someone waiting in front of a house that is unoccupied or parked in front of a business that is closed. 3. Anyone using force to gain entrance to or tamper with a residence, business, or vehicle. 4. A person running, especially if carrying something of value. This could be a burglar leaving the scene of a crime. 5. Carrying of property could be suspicious too, if it is at an unusual place or the property is not packed as if just purchased. 6. A person exhibiting unusual mental or physical symptoms. The person may be injured or under the influence of drugs or alcohol and need medical or psychiatric help. 7. Many people coming and going from a particular residence. This is not necessarily a suspicious circumstance unless it occurs on a daily or regular basis, particularly at unusual hours. It could be the scene of drug activity or a fencing operation to move stolen property.

Vehicle Theft—a Big Problem Over 1 million vehicles (cars, trucks, buses, motorcycles, and trailers) are stolen every year. In 2002, 2.2 million thefts of contents and almost 1.9 million thefts of accessories were taken from motor vehicles. The recovery rate for stolen motor vehicles in 2002 was 72%. In the time it takes to read this section, nine cars will be stolen. The following steps can be taken to protect a vehicle: 䊉

䊉

Lock the vehicle and pocket the key whether it is left untended for a minute or several hours. Close the windows all the way and make sure the trunk is locked. Control the keys. Never leave an identification tag on a key ring. If keys are lost or stolen, this could help a thief locate the car and burglarize the owner’s home.

74

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉


Do not leave the registration inside the vehicle. Important identification papers or credit cards should never be left in a glove compartment. Keep everything of value in the trunk if possible. If packages, clothing, or other articles are left in the car, they should be out of sight or covered. Park in well-lighted and busy areas. Avoid leaving a vehicle in unattended parking lots for long periods of time. If parked in a lot where the key must be left, leave the ignition key only. When buying a car, ask about antitheft options, such as steering column locks, alarms, switches that interrupt the fuel or electronic systems, and locks for tape decks, batteries, and gas tanks. Many insurance companies offer reduced rates to owners who install security devices. Keep your car’s VIN (vehicle identification number) and a complete description in a safe place at home. Since 1969, the federal government has required manufactures to engrave a unique number, the VIN, on all passenger cars in one visible and several hidden locations. One VIN is engraved on a metal plate on the dashboard near the windshield. VINs are registered with the FBI’s computerized National Crime Information Center.

䊉

䊉

Lock up all easy-to-carry items like motors and camping gear before leaving a vehicle. Use secured “toppers” and tool boxes. Do not assume a thief cannot lift a box because it is heavy.

CB Alert Citizen band radios are very popular targets for thieves. Locking the car, parking in a well-lighted place, and moving the antenna offer some protection. For maximum security, have the radio installed in a slide mount so it can be taken into the home or office or locked in the trunk when the car is not occupied. Keep a record of the CB’s serial and model numbers and engrave an identifying number or the radio. Another alternative is a factory-installed CB, which is harder to rip out than a portable one. Antitheft devices are also available. Do not buy a CB from a stranger when the price is unreasonably low, it might be stolen. The ease of sale contributes to the present high rate of theft.

Do Not Make It Easy for Thieves to Steal a Vehicle Tips for Protecting Special Vehicles Bicycles, Motorcycles, and Trail Bikes 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Park the vehicle out of sight in a garage or basement or use a cover. Mark it with an operational identification number recommended by local law enforcement. Lock the bicycle with a case-hardened chain or cable and lock, winding the cable through the frame and both wheels, then around a fixed object. Use the fork lock found on most street motorcycles. For extra protection, invest in a heavy Ushaped lock with sleeve adapter made of extremely hard steel that cannot be hacksawed or a case-hardened chain and sturdy padlock. Watch out for key numbers. Some motorcycle manufacturers stamp the key number on the lock. With this number, anyone can have a key cut that will fit perfectly. Many key makers ask for identification, but it is better to write down the key number, then file it off the lock. Many specialized vehicles (such as trucks and recreational vehicles) have no VIN and should be marked with an identification number, such as a driver’s license.

Jack’s father finally let him take the family’s new car to school on a beautiful spring day. Jack showed off to all his friends—and anyone who would listen—until classes started. The keys were uncomfortable in his jeans, so he left them in his locker. When he went back after lunch, the keys were gone—so was the car. Because her mother knew Lisa was a good driver, she let her pick up some friends and drive to the mall for a day of shopping. Lisa was so busy talking about last night’s dance she forget to lock all the car doors. When she came back, several hours later, the car’s tape deck and her friends’ jackets (they didn’t want to drag them around the mall) were gone. Charlie usually hopped on his new motorcycle when school was out and rode to his part-time job at a fast food restaurant. One evening after work, some friends stopped by and asked him to go out with them. So he left the bike at the restaurant, figuring he would pick it up first thing in the morning. His bike was gone. Jack, Lisa, and Charlie all became victims of a crime that gets to be a bigger problem every year— vehicle theft.

Awareness

What to Do If It Happens If a vehicle is stolen or tampered with, report it to the police immediately. Stolen vehicles are often used in other crimes. Quick action can not only help recover the vehicle but may also prevent its use for illegal purposes.

Safety Skills for Children While most children pass through childhood without experiencing physical harm, some are frightened or hurt by crime. A parental responsibility is to teach children how to protect themselves and respond to threatening situations. Parents should always take the time to listen carefully to children’s fears and feelings about people or places that scare them or make them feel uncomfortable. The following are some of the basics children must know: 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉䊉

Rehearse with children their full name, address, and phone number (including area code) and how to make emergency phone calls from home and public phones. Walk the neighborhood with the children. Show them safe places they can go to in an emergency, like a neighbor’s house or an open store. Tell children never to accept gifts or rides from someone they do not know very well. Check the neighborhood for areas that threaten children’s safety, such as brush in wooded areas, overgrown shrubbery, bad lighting, vacant lots littered with debris, absence of sidewalks or bike paths next to busy streets. Teach children to go to a store clerk or security guard and ask for help if you become separated in a store or shopping mall. Tell them never to go into the parking lot alone. Accompany children to public restrooms. Teach children that no one, not even someone they know, has the right to touch them in a way that makes them feel uncomfortable. Tell them they have the right to say “No” to an adult in this situation.

children are among a few of the things that can give kids the message that being violent or being a victim of violence is OK. Talking with children about violence, disagreement, frustration, anger, and conflict can start in a child’s earlier years and continue through the teen years. Respect for oneself and others, using examples of conflicts or arguments settled without violence, learning not to use hurtful words—each is a positive skill that can last a lifetime. Child development experts tell us that, for very young children, some physical acts, such as hitting, kicking, and biting may be just part of early development. But by age 3, most children are able to understand nonviolent ways to deal with the world, even if they are not perfect at practicing those skills. Here are some ideals to help in talking with children, of whatever age, about preventing violence: 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Talking with Kids about Violence No one wants to see kids victimized by violence. No one wants to see kids perpetuate it. But peer pressure, community lifestyles and values, the media, even the behavior of adults learned when they were

75

䊉

Be clear with other adults in a child’s life about values with respect to violence. It does not help to have a grandparent, cousin, and a parent sending contradictory messages. Do not wait until the issue comes up because of a specific incident; talk about family values and violence, in advance and in as calm and neutral a setting as possible. Be clear that you do not approve of violent behavior by the child or violence done to the child. Explain the difference between feelings of anger and frustration and acting on those feelings. Do not cram everything into one short discussion. Make the discussion an ongoing affair, occurring in natural installments. Know the child’s friends and their views on violence. Know the child’s whereabouts and companions at all times. Set a good example. Even in tense or difficult personal situations, refuse to resort to violence to settle disputes or relieve frustrations. Ask about the child’s ideas on violence. Listen and encourage expression of worries, questions, and fears. Show that you respect the youngster’s concerns and value a willingness to think about a tough issue. Take advantage of teachable moments. When a violent scene appears in the media, talk about what happened and how it might have been prevented. When something happens at school or in the community, talk about what choices—other than violence—might have been available. Find out about conflict management and mediation training for adults and children. Conflict management training provides skills in settling

76

䊉

䊉

䊉


disputes peacefully. Mediation training teaches how to assist others to settle disputes peacefully. Help develop enjoyable, attractive activities in the community for all young people, so they have better things to do, with an adult mentoring and supervising them. Help children get involved in helping the community. If they see how they can play an important role in building the community, they will resist violence that would tear it down. To reduce the risk of being involved in violence, children can Play, walk, or skate with a friend rather than alone. Always let a responsible adult know where they are and with whom. Never go anywhere with someone the child or his or her parents do not know and trust. Do not hang around known trouble spots or with kids who think violence is cool. Do not use alcohol or other drugs; they attract violent types of people and encourage violence as part of their mind-altering properties. Learn how to be a conflict solver for friends and schoolmates. Get training in mediation skills to help others work out problems without force. Do not carry a weapon. It could be lost or used against the child.

䊉

䊉

䊉

Safety Skills at Home 䊉

䊉

䊉䊉

䊉

What Is a Stranger? Explain to children that a stranger is anyone they do not know very well. A stranger can be a man or a woman, well-dressed or shabby, kind or threatening, pretty or ugly. If a stranger tries to follow them or grab them, they should scream and make lots of noise. Tell children to run to the nearest place where there are people and shout, “This person is trying to hurt me!” or “Stay away from me” instead of “Help.”

Parents should review these safety recommendations with their children to ensure that children have an enjoyable and safe Halloween. Children should 䊉

䊉

Safety Skills at School and Play 䊉

䊉

䊉

Make sure children take the safest route to school and friends’ houses, one that avoids danger spots like alleys, new construction, and wooded areas. Test walk it together. Encourage children to talk and play with friends, not alone, and stay in well-lighted, open areas where others can see them. Do not hang a house key around a child’s neck. It’s a telltale sign that parents are not at home when they return from school. Put the key inside a pocket or sock.

Make sure children can reach their parents at work by phone. Post a work number, along with numbers for a neighbor, the police and fire departments, and poison control center near all home phones. Have children check in with a parent at work or a neighbor when they get home. Agree on rules for having friends over and going to someone else’s house when no adult is present. Work out an escape plan in case of fire. Tell children never to open the door to a stranger when they are alone in the house or apartment. Caution them about answering the phone and accidentally letting a stranger know they are alone. Kids can always say their parents are busy and take a message. Make sure that children know how to work the door and window locks and that they keep them locked when home alone.

Halloween Safety Tips for Kids

䊉

䊉

Teach children to walk confidently and stay alert to what is going on around them. Tell children to stay away from strangers who hang around playgrounds, public restrooms, and empty buildings. Teach children to write down and report to you the license numbers of people who offer rides, loiter around playgrounds, or appear to follow them.

䊉

䊉

Cross the street only at corners. Never cross between parked cars. Walk facing the oncoming traffic if there is no sidewalk. Always remove masks before crossing streets. Be aware of cars that may be turning into or backing out of driveways. Never go into a stranger’s house.

Parents should 䊉䊉䊉

䊉

Know the route their children will be taking. Make sure children are accompanied by an adult. Know what other activities a child may be attending, such as parties. Set time limits on when children should return home.

Awareness

䊉

䊉

Explain to children the difference between tricks and vandalism. Instruct children not to eat treats until they return home and parents have had a chance to inspect those treats.

䊉

䊉

Costumes should 䊉䊉䊉

䊉

Be made of flame-retardant material. Be made of bright material. Include a flashlight or reflector strips, so that children can be seen. Not include high heel shoes or long dangling pieces that a child may trip over.

䊉

䊉

䊉

Motorists should drive cautiously on Halloween. Excited youngsters may forget some of these safety rules and dart out in front of a car. Residents should 䊉

䊉

Remove all obstacles from their lawns and steps to prevent children from being injured. Have a well-lighted home, both inside and out, to prevent vandalism and injuries to little ghosts and goblins.

䊉

䊉

䊉

Every day, over 2000 violent crimes are committed against teenagers by strangers. Young people are victims of theft more frequently than adults. Older teenagers and young adults are physically assaulted at a higher rate than any other age group. Two-thirds of violent crimes against teens are committed by other teens. Half of those teens are strangers to their victims.

So, knowing how to protect oneself and friends makes good sense. No one needs to be a walking statistic.

䊉

䊉䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Use stops that are well-lighted and popular. If your stop is isolated, have someone meet you there. Make sure you know which stop is closest to your destination. Check a map or ask the driver. Do not fall asleep. Stay alert. If you are harassed by anyone, attract attention by talking loudly or screaming.

What to Do If a Victim of a Crime

Be Streetwise and Safe Stand tall and walk confidently. Watch what’s happening around you. Stick to well-lighted, busy streets. Walk with friends. Avoid shortcuts through dark alleys, deserted streets, and wooded areas. If harassed from a car, walk quickly or run in the opposite direction to safety. If really scared, scream. Never hitchhike. Accept rides only from people you know and trust.

Go with a friend and take familiar, well-traveled routes. Do not jog or bike at night. Try jogging without stereo headphones. It is safer to remain alert to what happens around and behind you.

On the Bus or Subway

䊉

䊉

Do not flash your cash. Just carry enough money for the day. Always carry “emergency” change needed for a phone call. Know the neighborhood: When are stores and restaurants open? Where are police and fire stations, libraries, and schools? You might need them in an emergency. If you go out late at night, take a friend. Do not go alone. Most assaults happen to lone victims. Let someone know where you are going and when you will be back. Call if you are going to be late. If driving, park the car in a well-lighted area and lock it. Check for uninvited passengers in the backseat or on the floor before getting back in.

Jogging or Biking

Street Smarts—How to Protect Oneself 䊉

77

䊉

䊉

Try not to panic. Look at the attacker carefully so you can give a good description to the police. Try to remember key things like age, race, complexion, build, clothing, height, weight, hair, eyes, or unusual features. If the attacker has a weapon and only wants your money or possessions, do not fight back. Life and safety are more important. If harassed by a gang, go to an open store, gas station, firehouse, or anywhere people are present. Ask for help.

Following these suggestions greatly diminishes the chance of being a crime statistic.

78


The Con Artist The clever con artist is a good actor who disarms the victim with an affable “nice guy” approach. But, behind this friendly exterior is a shrewd psychologist who can isolate potential victims and break down their resistance to his or her proposals. Each conquest is part of a game in which the con artist must “best” others. The typical con artist is amoral, but seldom violent, and mobile, with an excellent sense of timing. He or she sincerely believes victims deserve their fate. And, if caught, the con artist will probably strike again later. Con artists are seldom rehabilitated.

The Victim Anyone can be a victim, even one who is too intelligent or sophisticated to be “conned.” During the 1920s, “Yellow Kid” Weil routinely swindled bankers, saying “That’s where the money is.” Many victims share certain characteristics. Often, but not always, they are older women, living alone. They are trusting of others, even strangers, and may need or desire supplemental income. Loneliness, willingness to help, and a sense of charity are characteristics a con artist exploits to gain a victim’s cooperation. The con artist ultimately exploits the victim’s assets, including life insurance benefits, pensions or annuities, “nest eggs,” home equity, or other tangible property. And, the con artist usually obtains the willing cooperation of the victim to complete the scheme.

Too good to be true. Such a scheme is probably not good or true. Last chance. If it is a chance worth taking, why is it offered on such short notice? Leftover material. Leftover material might also be stolen or defective. The following is a list of schemes of “con games” that the con artist is likely to try: Home improvement. Home repair or improvement artists may pose as a city inspector; termite or pest control inspector. Bank-related schemes. The con artist may pose as a bank examiner or be part of a pigeon drop. Investments. These include franchise or vending, land frauds, inventions, security investments, and workat-home schemes. Postal frauds. Some examples are chain letters, magazine subscriptions, unordered merchandise, and correspondence courses. Other cons include bait and switch, charity rackets, computer dating, debt consolidation, contracts, dance lessons, freezer plans, acting as psychic or fortune tellers, health clubs, job placement services, lonely hearts clubs, medical quackery, missing heirs, referral sales, pyramid schemes, or acting as talent scouts or officials.

Some Rules 䊉

䊉

Key Words 䊉

A con artist is difficult to detect by looks alone but often can be spotted by words or expressions, including the following: Cash only. Why is cash necessity for a proposed transaction? Why not checks? Get rich quick. Any scheme should be carefully investigated. Something for nothing. A “retired” swindler once said that any time you are promised something for nothing, you usually get nothing. Contests. Make sure these are not a “come-on” to draw you into a money-losing scheme. Haste. Be wary of any pressure that you must act immediately or lose out. Today only. If something is worthwhile and available today, it is likely to be available tomorrow.

䊉

䊉

Always investigate before investing money or signing a contract. Be suspicious of extraordinary promises of high or unusual monetary returns or a “bargain” no one else can match. Do not discuss personal finances or give cash to strangers. Do not be too embarrassed to report being victimized or swindled. Testify in court, if asked to help stop this kind of crime.

The Con Game Most successful con games are old schemes for today’s circumstances. The old “salting a gold mine” scheme is still being practiced, for example, but today’s “salting” occurs in living rooms, not abandoned mines. In the old ruse, unscrupulous mine owners would place a few gold nuggets in exhausted mines so they could sell them for inflated profits.

Awareness

In one recent scheme, a con artist bought six color television sets at the regular price from a retail store, then sold them, still in their cartons, to six prominent persons for one-fifth their original price. Later, he hired several high school students as telephone solicitors to sell “carloads” of TV sets purchased new from a bankrupt retail chain. When potential customers balked, the con artist used as references the original six customers who had been “salted.” Before the police were alerted, he collected almost $60,000.

Victims Are Not Alone

79

failure to pay on time will permit a judgment to be entered against you. Contracts can be sold to a bank or finance company for collection, although these institutions have no responsibility for the quality of the product delivered or work performed. 8. Be wary of any pressure that you must act immediately or lose out. There is no better insurance than dealing with reputable business or people. 9. Report scams to the police, and if asked, testify in court to help stop this type of crime. 10. If you have any questions about the reliability or legitimacy of a firm, contact the Attorney General’s Office of Consumer Affairs.

Have you ever 䊉

䊉䊉

䊉䊉䊉

Given your credit card number to a phone solicitor? Purchased land you have not seen? Agreed to home repairs that were quick, cheap, and paid for up front? Bought stock on a stranger’s suggestion? Sent money as part a chain letter? Invested in a promising new company that quickly went out of business?

Last year (2002), swindlers used scams to cheat consumers out of about $40 million. Be skeptical of anything that sounds too good to be true or promises easy money. Victims of a con artist should report the crime to the police immediately and get the word out to help protect friends and neighbors.

Crime Prevention Tips for Senior Citizens Senior citizens can help make their community a safer place to live and not let fear of crime restrict their activities. Being alert to their surroundings, installing good locks on doors and windows, and taking commonsense precautions while inside and outside the home can reduce opportunities for crime. For that extra margin of security, they should 䊉

䊉䊉

䊉

Think Smart, Avoid Cons 䊉

1. If it sounds too good to be true, it probably is. 2. Do not trust strangers who offer instant cash. 3. Get more information before buying “the sure thing.” 4. Check out charities before contributing. 5. Do not give your credit card number to anyone over the phone. 6. Whenever you are asked to turn over a sizable amount of cash, be cautious. Why is cash necessary? Why not a check? Avoid a large cash transfer. Consult with trusted friends or family before making such a decision. 7. It is unfortunate, but homes have been lost as a result of signing a simple TV repair contract. Signing a contract is not a frivolous matter. The contract may be secured by a deed of trust on your home. It may include a provision that

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Use direct deposit for pension and social security checks. Not display large amounts of cash in public. Be wary of talkative strangers when the conversation turns to money. Read every newspaper report on con games and be ready to say no to a get-rich scheme. Travel with friends to go shopping, to the bank, or to a doctor. Get to know neighbors and keep their phone numbers handy for emergencies. Work out a “buddy” system with a friend to check on each other’s welfare daily. If living alone, do not advertise it. Use only a first initial in phone books, directories, and apartment lobbies. Carry a purse close to the body. Leave no wallet or purse on a counter or in a shopping cart unattended. If threatened by physical force, do not resist. Remain calm and observe the assailant to give an accurate description to the police. Organize or join a neighborhood watch program or a window watch program to keep an eye out for unusual activity in the neighborhood or complex. A neighborhood where people are active and involved is always a safer, better place to live.

80


Take Action—Stop the Violence

Protection from Telemarketing Fraud

At Home

The best protection is to just hang up the phone. It is not rude to tell unsolicited callers politely that you are not interested, do not want to waste their time, and please do not call back—then hang up. If caught up in a sales pitch, remember the federal government’s telemarketing rules:

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Teach children, from preschoolers to teenagers, that guns and other weapons hurt and kill. Show children how to settle arguments without resorting to words or actions that hurt. Parents, relatives, older brothers and sisters, teachers, and babysitters should set a positive example. Consider removing guns, especially handguns, from homes with children or teens. Look at ways other than firearms to protect oneself. Invest in top-grade locks, jamming devices for doors and windows, a dog, a security system. Ask the police to recommend a self-defense class. When owning firearms, handguns, rifles, or shotguns, make sure they are unloaded and securely stored. Invest in trigger locks, gun cabinets with locks, or pistol lock boxes. Lock up ammunition separately.

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

At School 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Support school staff in their efforts to keep guns, knives, and other weapons out of school. Encourage students to report any weapons they know about on school grounds to the police or school authorities. Involve students in the issue. Young people can and do organize against handgun violence. Show students how to settle arguments without resorting to violence.Teach them to deal with conflict by calming down, identifying the problem, compromising, and asking someone else to listen to both sides.

In the Community 䊉

䊉䊉

Launch a public education campaign to raise awareness of the danger of firearms and the risks of keeping a gun in the home. Report stolen weapons to the police immediately. Work with a neighborhood watch or other group to hold a forum on how guns and violence affect the community. Include police, school, youth, local government, youth agencies, and religious organizations.

Each year, guns end the lives of thousands of young people. Their families and friends are left to cope with the loss of a life barely lived and to face a future overshadowed by violence.

䊉

You have to be told the name of the company, the fact that it is a sales call, and what is being sold. If a prize is offered, you have to be told immediately that no purchase is necessary to win. If the caller says you have won a prize, you cannot be asked to pay anything for it. You cannot be required to pay even shipping charges. If it is a sweepstakes, the caller must tell you how to enter without making a purchase. You cannot be asked to pay in advance for services such as cleansing your credit card, finding you a loan, acquiring a prize already won. You pay for services only if they are actually delivered. You should not be called before 8 a.m. or after 9 p.m. If you tell telemarketers not to call again, they cannot. If they do, they have broken the law. If you are guaranteed a refund, the caller has to tell you all the limitations.

Remember, those called should not give telemarketers a credit card number, bank account number, or Social Security number—or authorize bank drafts—ever. If fraud is suspected, call the National Fraud Information Center at 1-800-876-7060, or check www.fraud.org for additional information.

Crime Prevention Tips at ATMs Using common sense and trusting to intuition can prevent people from being a victim at an ATM.

Drive-up ATMs 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Keep your car engine running, the doors locked, and the windows up at all times when waiting in line at a drive-up ATM. When possible, leave enough room between cars to allow for a quick exit should it become necessary. If an ATM is obstructed from view or poorly lit, go to another ATM. Report the problem to the financial institution that operates the ATM. Before rolling down the window, observe the entire area around the ATM. If you see anyone or

Awareness

䊉

䊉

䊉

anything that appears to be suspicious, drive away from the area at once and call the police. Minimize the time spent at the ATM by having your card out and ready to use. Once you have completed the transaction, take the money, card, and receipt and immediately drive away from the terminal. If you see anyone or anything suspicious while conducting the transaction, cancel the transaction and leave immediately. If anyone follows after making a transaction, go immediately to a crowded, well-lighted area and call the police.

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Walk-up ATMs 䊉

䊉

䊉

Always observe the surroundings before conducting an ATM transaction. If driving to an ATM, park as close as possible to the terminal. Observe the entire area from the safety of the car before getting out. If anyone or anything appears suspicious, leave the area at once. If an ATM is obstructed from view or poorly lit, go to another ATM. Report the problem to a financial institution that operates the ATM. When possible, take a companion along when using an ATM, especially at night.

81

Minimize the time spent at the ATM by having the card out and ready to use. If the ATM is in use, give the person using the terminal privacy. Allow the person to move away from the ATM before approaching the terminal. Stand between the ATM and anyone waiting to use the terminal, so that others cannot see the secret code or transaction amount. Once the transaction completed, take the money, card, and receipt and immediately move away from the terminal. If anyone or anything appears suspicious while conducting a transaction, cancel the transaction and leave immediately. If anyone follows after making the ATM transaction, go immediately to a crowded, well-lighted area and call the police.

Reference 1. “Awareness and Knowledge Strategies” are reprinted with permission from National Crime Prevention Institute, Understanding Crime Prevention, 2nd edition, Butterworth–Heinemann, available at www.bh.com, copyright 2001.

Chapter 7 Crime Prevention through Environmental Design Strategies and Applications TIMOTHY CROWE

Crime Prevention through Environmental Design Strategies Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) strategies have emerged from history and contemporary crime prevention experiments. Most of the strategies are self-evident. That is, the reader will probably think, “I knew that.” The strategies and examples contained in this chapter are basic. Their applications are unlimited. CPTED concepts have been and are being used in public housing projects. School and university properties are using CPTED applications that were initially pioneered in the Broward County, Florida, school CPTED program that was funded by the federal government. The list of potential CPTED applications is endless. It would be difficult to find any human function that is not amenable to the use of CPTED concepts. It is merely a matter of looking at the environment from a different perspective, questioning everything, and learning the language of the various professions involved in making decisions about our communities. Learning the language means being able to communicate with others and understand their objectives. This is the principal reason why CPTED planners are trained to share concepts and ask questions that no one would have thought to ask. CPTED planners are trained to reprogram their thinking from focusing solely on security and crime prevention to emphasizing the objectives of the 82

agency or organization they are trying to help. It is important to remember a CPTED motto, “What are you trying to do here, and how can we help you do it better?” If you are meeting your objectives, the potential for crime and loss is reduced. It is an axiom that human functions that achieve their objectives experience fewer crimes and losses. Crime and loss are a by-product of human functions that are not working. Following nine major CPTED strategies may be used in any number of combinations: 1. Provide clear border definition of controlled space. It is common law requirement that space must be defined to preserve property rights. Boundaries may be identified physically or symbolically. Fences, shrubbery, or signs are acceptable border definition. The underlying principle is that a “reasonable individual” must be able to recognize that he or she is passing from public to private space. The arrangements of furniture and color definition are means of identifying interior spaces. Plaques and pictures on walls in hallways help to define ownership and are powerful environmental cues that affect the behavior and predisposition of owners, normal users, and abnormal users alike. 2. Provide clearly marked transitional zones. It is important to provide clearly marked transitional zones on moving from public, to semi-public, to semi-private, to private space. As the transitional

Crime Prevention through Environmental Design Strategies and Applications

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

definition increases, the range of excuses for improper behavior is reduced. The user must be made to acknowledge movement into controlled space. Relocation of gathering areas. It is appropriate to formally designate gathering or congregating areas in locations with good natural surveillance and access control. Gathering areas on campuses may be placed in positions that are out of the view of undesired users to decrease the magnetic effect or attraction. Place safe activities in unsafe locations. Within reason, this strategy may be used to overcome problems on school campuses, parks, offices, or institutional settings. Safe activities serve as magnets for normal users, who exhibit challenging or controlling behaviors (e.g., staring) that tell other normal users that they are safe and tell abnormal users that they are at greater risk of scrutiny or intervention. Some caution must be used to ensure that a safe activity is not being placed in an unreasonable position it cannot defend. Place unsafe activities in safe locations. Positioning vulnerable activities near windows of an occupied space or within tightly controlled areas helps overcome risk and make the users of these areas feel safer. Redesignate the use of space to provide natural barriers. Conflicting activities may be separated by distance, natural terrain, or other functions to avoid fear-producing conflict. For instance, the sounds emanating from a basketball court may be disruptive and fear-producing for a senior citizen or toddler gathering or play area. The threat need not be real to create the perception of risk for the normal or desired user. Improve the scheduling of space. It has been found, generally, that the effective and productive use of spaces reduces risk and the perception of risk for normal users. Conversely, abnormal users feel at greater risk of surveillance and intervention in their activities. Well-thought-out temporal and spatial relationships improve profit and productivity, while increasing the control of behavior. Redesign or revamp space to increase the perception of natural surveillance. The perception of surveillance is more powerful than its reality. Hidden cameras do little to make normal users feel safer and, therefore, act safer when they are unaware of the presence of these devices. Likewise, abnormal users do not feel at greater risk of detection when they are oblivious to surveillance

83

potentials. Windows, clear lines of sight, and other natural techniques are often as effective as the use of mechanical or organized (e.g., guards) methods. 9. Overcome distance and isolation. Improved communications and design efficiencies increase the perception of natural surveillance and control. School administrators have learned to carry portable radios to improve their productivity, as well as create the perception of immediate access to help. Restroom locations and entry designs may be planned to increase convenience and reduce the cost of construction and maintenance.

CPTED Applications There are many examples of CPTED applications. Those that follow are intended to stimulate readers to think of adaptations to their own environmental setting. Each situation is unique, requiring its own individual application of CPTED concepts. No two environmental settings are exactly the same, even though they serve the same function. Accordingly, the reader, now ideally a CPTED user, must use the strategies that make the most sense within each different location.

Objectives for the Commercial Environment 1. Access controls. Provide secure barriers to prevent unauthorized access to buildings grounds, or restricted interior areas. 2. Surveillance through physical design. Improve opportunities for surveillance by physical design mechanisms that increase the risk of detection for offenders, enable evasive actions by potential victims, and facilitate intervention by police. 3. Mechanical surveillance devices. Provide businesses with security devices to detect and signal illegal entry attempts. 4. Design and construction. Design, build, or repair buildings and building sites to enhance security and improve quality. 5. Land use. Establish policies to prevent illadvised land and building uses that have a negative impact. 6. Owner and management action. Encourage owners and managers to implement safeguards to make businesses and commercial property less vulnerable to crime.

84


Figure 7-1.

7. User protection. Implement safeguards to make shoppers less vulnerable to crime. 8. Social interaction. Encourage interaction among business people, users, and residents of commercial neighborhoods to foster social cohesion and control. 9. Private security services. Determine necessary and appropriate services to enhance commercial security. 10. Police services. Improve police services to efficiently and effectively respond to crime problems and enhance citizen cooperation in reporting crime. 11. Police and community relations. Improve police and community relations to involve citizens in cooperative efforts with police to prevent and report crime. 12. Community awareness. Create community crime prevention awareness to aid in combating crime in commercial areas. 13. Territorial identity. Differentiate private areas from public spaces to discourage trespass by potential offenders. 14. Neighborhood image. Develop a positive image of the commercial area to encourage user and investor confidence and increase the economic vitality of the area.

Downtown Streets and Pedestrian Areas Downtown Streets Poor design and use are shown in Figures 7-1 and 7-2. 1. The growing dominance of the vehicle over pedestrians resulted in off-street parking, oneway streets, synchronized traffic signals, and shrunken sidewalks to accommodate the auto. 2. Pedestrian-oriented businesses have failed or enticed the buyer to the shopping centers and malls. As businesses moved, there was less pedestrian activity, which forced more businesses out. 3. Narrow pedestrian footpaths increased conflict and fear of vagrants and other abnormal users of space. Normal users avoided these streets, thereby reinforcing the decline of business and normal downtown activities. 4. Downtown streets became “no man’s” land at nights and on weekends. 5. Pedestrian malls were created to replace the vehicle with people, but most failed because the designers lost track of the three Ds (detect, deter, deny). Aesthetics outweigh function, resulting


85

Figure 7-2.

Figure 7-3.

in the replacement of the vehicle with cement objects, in the place of people. 6. Many of the cement objects—amenities and landscaping—attract abnormal users. Litter and bird droppings make outdoor sitting areas undesirable for normal users. 7. Normal users feel threatened and unsafe in these areas. Abnormal users feel safe and at low risk of

intervention. Authorities are obliged to surrender these areas to vagrants because of special interest group pressure and the lack of any consistent normal use of the area. For good design and use, see Figures 7-3 and 7-4. 1. One option is to purposely decrease the vehicle capacity of the street by reestablishing on-street

86


Figure 7-4.

2.

3.

4.

5.

parking, wide sidewalks, two-way streets, and nonsynchronous traffic signals. This should reroute commuter and other through traffic. Higher pedestrian capacity limits vehicular access to those with terminal objectives on the block (e.g., residents or purposeful shoppers). Another option is to schedule the street for temporary closing on target shopping days and festival times. Portable amenities may be used that can be stored when not in use. Businesses may be granted variances of local codes to use vendor carts and other forms of extended business activities in the street. The planned increase of normal users makes them feel safer and exhibit controlling and challenging behaviors much as they do in indoor shopping malls. Abnormal users feel at greater risk.

Barriers to Conflict For poor design, see Figure 7-5. 1. A toddler or senior recreation is immediately contiguous to a conflicting activity of basketball. 2. Basketball involves aggressive behavior and noise, which is annoying and threatening to senior citizens and parents with small children. 3. The athletic activity may serve as a magnet for abnormal users of space. 4. The designated athletic activity may legitimize certain offensive behaviors, such as swearing and

physical abuse, which threatens normal users and passersby. For good design, see Figure 7-6. 1. A natural barrier of distance, elevation, or the parking lot may be used to avoid conflict. 2. Any natural barrier reduces the propensity for the undesirable or abnormal users to preempt the contiguous spaces. 3. Abnormal users feel at greater risk when they have to pass through a clear barrier.

Outdoor Sitting Areas For poor design and use, see Figure 7-7. 1. Sitting walls have replaced the traditional benches and picnic tables in open spaces, but they are easy to hide behind and serve as a barrier to effective surveillance. 2. Elevation drops and terraced sitting areas reduce perceived opportunities for natural surveillance, which makes abnormal users feel safer in colonizing or preempting these spaces. 3. Tourists and office workers who may desire to eat lunch in these areas or take an evening stroll are afraid to go there if vagrants are already there or have left signs of regular use (e.g., litter, graffiti, human waste). 4. Litter and waste present odor problems and may attract scavengers. If it looks and smells bad, it must be bad, which defeats the purpose.


Figure 7-5.

Figure 7-6.

87

88


Figure 7-7.

For good design and use, see Figure 7-8. 1. Sitting rails may be used in the place of the more expensive walls. These increase natural surveillance and prevent improper use while still meeting the functional and aesthetic demands of the open space. 2. Terraced sitting or staging areas should be oriented so they are clearly visible from the street. 3. Open spaces can be made to work with CPTED concepts while reducing overall construction costs. Normal users feel better about coming to these areas and displace abnormal users.

Plazas For poor design and use, see Figure 7-9. 1. A typical plaza in a rehabilitated business area meets all the local code requirements for landscaping and aesthetics but at the cost of reducing the usable square footage. 2. Aesthetics or form outweighed function in the selection of cobblestones to use in replacing the street paving.These stones are difficult to walk on,

especially for women in high-heeled shoes and the elderly. 3. Benches, tables, and the fountain area may easily be colonized by vagrants or serve as targets for pigeons. 4. Normal users feel at risk and abnormal users feel safe. For good design and use, see Figure 7-10. 1. Compromises must be made between form and function. Paving tiles may be used in the place of cobblestones to make it easier for walking. 2. Portable amenities and landscaping may be substituted for permanent furnishings to increase flexibility in planning outdoor events. 3. Vehicles may be allowed limited and restricted access to facilitate a wide range of uses and to allow police patrols. 4. A well and constantly used plaza attracts normal users and makes people feel safe.

Pedestrian Mall For poor design and use, see Figure 7-11.


Figure 7-8.

Figure 7-9.

89

90


Figure 7-10.

Figure 7-11.

1. The present design and traffic flow pattern reduce the parking opportunities. 2. The pedestrian area and upgraded median are excellent, but is all of this space needed everyday? Will it be used regularly or mostly on holidays and weekend shopping days? 3. This design plan is a problem for senior citizen shoppers who may have to park some distance

away. Parallel parking is also a problem for the senior citizen shopper. For good design and use, see Figures 7-12 and 7-13. 1. Traffic flows may be controlled to allow for angle parking to recover needed parking close to shops.


Figure 7-12.

Figure 7-13.

91

92


Figure 7-14.

Figure 7-15.

2. Vehicular speed may be radically controlled to reduce pedestrian conflict. 3. Barricades may be used to close off vehicular access during certain periods of high pedestrian activity or low use. The design is flexible, allowing a variety of use patterns based on commercial and promotional planning. 4. Barricades in Figure 7-13 may be used permanently or temporarily to control through access of vehicles.

1. Barriers are used to divert parking activity to create safe locations for the late arrival. 2. A variety of plans may be used, depending on a parking needs assessment. Floors may be alternately closed. Aisles may be partially opened. 3. Some balance between the legitimate needs of the early arrivals and late arrivals should the met. 4. Physical barriers (e.g., cones or barricades) are less upsetting to users than attendants or guards directing the flow past what are perceived as choice spots. However, guards or attendants are useful in a rule enforcement or reinforcement function.

Parking Lots and Structures Parking Lots For poor design and use, see Figure 7-14. 1. A typical lot layout on the ground level or each level of an off-street garage. Late arrivals get the less desirable spots, which are generally located in unobserved places. Early arrivals take the best, safest spots, but they are the first to leave—at the safest times when an attendant may still be there. 2. The last in are the last out, generally when the lot is deserted. 3. This situation has been overlooked for years, with the assumption that the early arriver should naturally get the advantage. This is not a valid assumption where customers or employees are legitimately shopping later hours or scheduled for late shifts. Fear, higher victimization, and liability problems arise. For good design and use, see Figure 7-15.

Parking Lot Access For poor design and use, see Figure 7-16. 1. The parking attendant’s location prevents this person from providing natural surveillance over the employee parking area. 2. Landscaping may serve as additional barriers to natural surveillance. 3. Employees feel less safe and abnormal users perceive a low risk of detection. 4. A guard has to be employed to protect employees and their vehicles. For good design and use, see Figure 7-17. 1. The parking attendant’s location is naturally in a position to control all parking areas. 2. Employees feel safer and abnormal users know they will risk detection. 3. This design frees the guard for patrolling activities elsewhere.

Figure 7-16.

Figure 7-17.

94


Parking Structures For poor design and use, see Figure 7-18. 1. Ground levels of parking garages are underused and create a fortress effect on the pedestrian, as well as on contiguous land uses. 2. Reinforced concrete retaining walls are used commonly and reduce surveillance opportunities. This creates the perception of lack of safety for the normal user and low risk for abnormal users. 3. Retaining walls do more to hide the automobile than assure safety. Designers and local planners are often confused regarding the purpose of the walls. 4. Lighting inside is located generally over the driving lanes, instead of illuminating the parking spots where people are outside of their cars,

and most vulnerable. Cars have their own lights; people do not. For good design and use, see Figure 7-19. 1. Ground spaces should be dedicated to pedestrianoriented businesses and activities, leaving the airspace for the car. This increases business revenue and enhances the perception of natural surveillance and access control for the garage and adjoining street space. 2. Retaining walls should be replaced with stretched cable or railings that allow for maximum surveillance and illumination. This produces a considerable cost saving and improves the perception of safety for normal users. Designers may even improve on the aesthetics over the concrete walls. 3. Reflective paint or materials should be used inside, and all pedestrian areas should be illuminated to increase feelings of safety.

Figure 7-18.

Figure 7-19.


3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Office and Industrial Systems Office Access For poor design and use, see Figure 7-20. 1. Elevators from below ground to working floors so that people have access to all floors. 2. Main entrance from which people could go directly to elevators without registering. 3. Side entrance that allows no surveillance by receptionist or guard and access to the elevators. 4. Guard or receptionist booth that is not centrally located but positioned so the person stationed there cannot see who enters or exists. For good design and use, see Figure 7-21. 1. Elevators serving lobby and floors above. 2. Elevators serving lobby and floor below.

95

Restrooms which are visible from the entrances. Main entrance. Main floor corridor visible from main entrance. Controlled access/egress door. Security or receptionist station to screen entrance.

Office Building Site Plan and Parking For poor design and use, see Figure 7-22. 1. Parking is undifferentiated by time of day and day of week. 2. Through access and night-time use are poorly defined and unclear. 3. Cars parked anywhere are not subject to scrutiny by security, law enforcement officials, or building management. For good design and use, see Figure 7-23.

Figure 7-20.

Figure 7-21.

Figure 7-22.

Figure 7-23.


97

Figure 7-24.

OFFICES

MAIN FACILITY

PLANT

PLANT STORAGE

-

1. Parking is zoned and clearly identified by allowable spatial and temporal uses. 2. Improper parking is more subject to notice and scrutiny by local law enforcement officials and security officers. 3. Zones may be closed, depending on need.

3. Shipping and receiving separated by distance, which reduces range of excuses. 4. Legitimate behavior narrowly defined by location. 5. Transitional definition of movement is clear from opportunities for signs and rule enhancement in purchase and shipping orders and policies.

Shipping and Receiving and Vehicle Access

Plant Design

For poor design, see Figure 7-24.

For poor design, see Figure 7-26.

1. Confused and deep internal access for external vehicles. 2. Easy mix of external vehicles with those of employees. 3. Multiple access from facilities to employees’ vehicles. 4. Shipping and receiving in same location legitimizes people coming and going with boxes. 5. Guard or full-time monitor required to screen access and packages. 6. Wide range of excuses for improper behavior, thus increasing pressure on guards or shipping and receiving clerks.

1. Confusing vehicular internal access. 2. Too much access for external vehicles to building entrances, which may easily promote collusion between employees and vendors or subcontractors. 3. Shipping and receiving located in same site, which may encourage abuse. 4. Extended locations of employee parking and strict access control through security negatively affects morale and subsequent labor negotiations. 5. Receptionist position provides little natural access control and surveillance. 6. Perimeter security fencing encloses a large area, which increases cost and vulnerability.

For good design, see Figure 7-25. 1. Parking segregated from external delivery and vendor vehicle access to property. 2. All employee and visitor parking clearly visible from buildings.

For good design, see Figure 7-27. 1. Campus site plan, which emphasizes openness and natural distance to increase an intruder’s perception of risk of surveillance.


98

Figure 7-25.

ADMINISTRATION BUILDING

VISITORS

MANAGEMENT

EMPLOYEE PARKING RECEIVING

SHIPPING

OFFICE

MANUFACTURING

SERVICE ROAD

DOORS NOT BLOCKED

SHIPPING/ RECEIVING

MANAGEMENT PARKING

SERVICE ROAD

EMPLOYEE PARKING

SERVICE ROAD

WALK

MANUFACTURING

WALK

DOORS NOT BLOCKED

SERVICE ROAD

PLANT STORAGE

2. Convenient employee parking in front of building increases perception of surveillance of the employee from the building, while decreasing the negative effect of isolated parking on morale. 3. Segregated shipping and receiving may reduce opportunity for theft. 4. Guard post may be partially staffed or eliminated altogether, replacing it with a receptionist or other natural (nonorganized) function to provide the perception of natural access control and surveillance. 5. Reduced magnitude and cost of perimeter security. 6. Employee parking is protected by distance from public street access and direct line of sight from the reception areas. 7. Site development and building costs are reduced. Internal space footage requirements also are reduced.

Hallways and Restrooms Hallways For poor design and use, see Figure 7-28.

Figure 7-26.

1. Most hallways in schools, hospitals, and offices are left undifferentiated. They do not identify what is on the other side of the wall nor who owns it. 2. Hallway uses become confused by the placement of lockers and furniture. Hallways are for movement, not for gathering.

Figure 7-27.

DOORS BLOCKED

PLANT SHIPPING

PARTIALLY STAFFED GUARD POST RECEPTIONIST

VISITOR PARKING

RECEIVING

EMPLOYEE PARKING

LANDSCAPING

Figure 7-28.

100


3. Tenants or persons assigned internal spaces or work areas actively control their spaces but assume little proprietary regard for the adjoining hallways or corridors. 4. Hallways usually carry the definition of extremely public space, even though extremely private space is only inches away. 5. Some new buildings prohibit any decoration or encroachment by tenants into hallway systems, as part of an interior decorating plan. 6. Multiple-purpose classrooms or meeting spaces suffer from lack of ownership. 7. Normal users demonstrate avoidance behavior in these undifferentiated spaces, which makes abnormal users feel safer and in control. For good design and use, 1. Hallways may be assigned to the tenant of the adjoining internal space.Users should be influenced to mark their turf to identify their boundaries. 2. Boundaries and turf cues should be extended to consume unassigned or undifferentiated spaces. 3. The legitimate uses of hallways and corridors need to be reinforced through policies and signs. 4. Graphics may be used to promote movement and indicate direction. 5. Floor coverings and colors may be used to identity public versus private spaces. 6. Normal users recognize and honor others’ turf or ownership cues. Normal users feel safer in these areas and exhibit challenging and controlling behaviors. Abnormal users respond to these cues by avoiding these areas or with avoidance when they are in the vicinity.

Restroom Location and Entrance Design For poor design and use, see Figure 7-29. 1. Restrooms are traditionally isolated by location, as a cultural sensitivity and for economic reasons. 2. Public restrooms are common sites for illegal and illicit activity. 3. Many children are afraid to use the restroom at school. 4. Malls and shopping centers have tended to hide the restroom, as a means of reducing demand for this nonrevenue-bearing activity. 5. The lack of convenient and clean restrooms clearly reduces the average time per visit to most stores and businesses, thereby reducing sales. 6. Isolated locations and double-door entry systems present unsafe cues to normal users and safe cues to abnormal users.

7. Double-door entry systems produce a warning sound and transitional time that is an advantage to abnormal users. 8. A normal user or guard must move inside the second door swing to figure out what is going on in a restroom. For good design and use, see Figure 7-30. 1. Restrooms should be located in the most convenient and accessible location to increase use, which increases the perception of safety. 2. A maze-type entry system or doors placed in a locked open position increase convenience and safety. 3. Normal users may determine who is in the restroom by glancing around the privacy screen or wall. 4. Abnormal users feel at greater risk of detection. 5. Customer (or student) convenience and safety should contribute to attaining the objectives of the space.

Informal Gathering Areas For poor design, see Figure 7-31. 1. Hallways and corners in schools, office buildings, malls, and apartments attract small groups of abnormal users who preempt this space and promote conflict. 2. Normal users avoid these areas, which reinforces the perception of risk. 3. Congestion is often created elsewhere because of the avoidance by normal users. 4. The avoidance reinforces the perception of safety and turf ownership of the abnormal users. For good design, see Figure 7-32. 1. A safe activity may be located in the poorly used space to displace the unsafe use. 2. A safe activity serves as a magnet for normal users, who are attracted to the area. 3. The safe activity and normal user behavior create and intensify the perception of risk for the abnormal user. 4. Space utilization and productivity go up in most cases.

Malls and Shopping Centers Shopping Mall Parking For poor design, see Figure 7-33. 1. Parking is 360° and undifferentiated.


101

Figure 7-29.

2. Safety hazards persist because of uncontrolled access to all lanes. 3. Undesirable night-time activities can occur. 4. Transition from public to private space is not defined. For good design, see Figure 7-34. 1. Parking is in enclaves in relation to business entrances. 2. Lateral access by vehicles is severely restricted. 3. Aesthetic design opportunities are enhanced to screen ugly parking lots. 4. Extreme transitional definition exists, thereby reducing escape opportunities. 5. Parking areas may be closed with barricades at different times of the day.

Mall Design For poor design and use, see Figure 7-35. 1. Malls have traditionally been designed in a fortress style, which turns it back on the parking areas. 2. Many dead walls on the last used sides, or backsides, of malls prevent opportunities for advertising and limit natural surveillance. 3. Designers tend to reflect their perceptions of an areas in their designs. Buildings in isolated areas end up fortresslike in form.The dead walls serve as a barrier to surveillance from or to the building, even though many people are inside the building, separated by a 16-inch wall from the parking area.

102


Figure 7-30.

For good design and use, see Figure 7-36. 1. Display cases may be attached to dead walls to market products and reduce the negative effect of the fortress designs. 2. Active displays with lighting and mannequins attract attention and create the impression of natural surveillance. 3. False windows and lighting panels also break up the monotony of the fortress design and reinforce the impression of natural surveillance.

Barriers to Conflict For poor design, see Figure 7-37. 1. Shopping center parking is contiguous to a major conflicting activity, a play area.

2. The location of the basketball hoops legitimizes the presence of young persons in and near the parking area, to chase balls and for informal gathering. 3. Normal users feel that their property and persons are at greater risk. 4. Abnormal users feel safer. 5. Even legitimate use of the play area is perceived negatively by others. For good design, see Figure 7-38. 1. Distance may be used as a natural barrier to conflicting activities. 2. The natural barrier of distance reduces the range of excuses for being in the wrong place. 3. Abnormal users feel at greater risk of scrutiny and detection.


Figure 7-31.

Figure 7-32.

103

104


Figure 7-33.

Convenience Stores Convenience Stores: Traditional Design For poor design and use, see Figure 7-39. 1. Gas pumps were installed after original site planning, so most were placed wherever there was an open area. This often resulted in a site placement difficult to watch from the cashier location in the building. Some stores installed windows that affect the location and surveillance of the cashier. 2. Parking is traditionally in front, but walkways are generally too narrow for customers to avoid close contact with young people or construction workers who legitimately hang out in these areas. 3. Telephones are often placed too close to the store entrance. Young people, as well as some undesirables, hang out in these areas, which

turns off normal adult customers. Robbers like to stand at a pay phone as a cover for casing the store. 4. Although the research is conflicting, the centrally located cashier station results in the cashier having his or her back to customers when only one clerk is on duty. A frontal or rear location of a central cashier station would be preferable. 5. It is common for stores to obscure the front windows with signs and orient gondolas and shelves perpendicular to the front of the store. Signs prevent customers and police from looking into or out of the store. Improper gondola and shelf orientation prevents clerks from observing customers. Likewise, abnormal users feel safer in stores where gondolas and shelf systems eliminate natural surveillance. For good design and use, see Figure 7-40.

Figure 7-34.

Figure 7-35.

Figure 7-36.

Figure 7-37.

Figure 7-38.


Figure 7-39.

Figure 7-40.

107

108


Figure 7-41.

1. Parking in front is always more convenient and safer. 2. Most stores use ample amounts of glass in the front, which improves both natural and perceived surveillance.

the store. The fence increases the offender’s perception of exposure, even though it does not provide a continuous enclosure of the property.

Convenience Stores: Hexagon Shaped Convenience Stores in Locations near Dense Commercial or Housing Sites 1. Convenience stores located in these sites experience robberies associated with access from the rear of the store to the front. Escape is easy around the back of the store into dense commercial building or housing sites. 2. Customers are afraid to use these stores because of hanging-out by local residents and undesirable users, such as drug dealers and unruly young people. 3. The standard modus operandi is for the perpetrator to come from behind the building to the front and rob the cashier. Escape is so easy that stake-out teams of police may not catch the robber they observe committing the offense, because the person may easily melt into the buildings contiguous to and behind the convenience store. 4. A fenced line that takes the corner of the building diagonally to the property line reduces or eliminates the robberies that come from behind

Elements of poor design and use include 1. Double entry systems make customer control difficult. 2. Eating areas that attract people who hang out. 3. A design that works only on corner lots. For good design and use, see Figure 7-41. 1. Telephone location and interior management may reduce customer conflict between juveniles or construction workers and adult buyers. 2. Well-lighted gasoline areas serve as a sea of light, attracting customers. 3. Eating areas in the front of the store attract adult customers, who may find it inconvenient to eat hot food in their automobiles. Small seat and table designs keep people from lingering or hanging out. 4. Marketing studies demonstrate that impulse customers prefer a store that has other customers, which means that they have to see them to be attracted.


109

Figure 7-42.

5. Segregation of customer groups is achieved by the hexagonal design, which makes these groups less threatening to each other.

Convenience Stores: Fan Shaped Some examples of poor design and use include 1. Stores that do not have continuous glass across the front. 2. Fan designs, which are ineffective in midblock locations.

3. Late night robbery control through use of a bank teller window. 4. Welcoming environment includes high light levels and bright colors. 5. Newer site plans place the car wash to the side instead of the back of the property. 6. Employee compliance with security procedures makes the kiosk store one of the most safe and defensible.

Branch Banks

For good design and use, see Figure 7-42.

For poor design and use, see Figure 7-44

1. Clear view for cashier of all parking and gas pump areas. 2. Corner locations allow for effective vehicle access and excellent surveillance and control. 3. Elevated store and cashier locations increase control and customer confidence in safety. 4. Site efficiency, in terms of cost/benefit.

1. Most branch banks were designed as minifortresses, reflecting the architect’s perception that people have more confidence that their money is safe. 2. Corner lots are the most desired to allow for drive-through on the side and back. Engineers desired this to reduce the hazard of vehicles slowing down on the public street to enter a parking area that is visible from the street. Planners desired parking on the side or in back to hide the vehicles. Planners concluded by the middle to late 1950s that cars were ugly and asphalt parking lots were uglier, so they promoted local codes requiring that buildings be placed on the front lot

Convenience Stores: Kiosk Shaped (Figure 7-43) 1. Store oriented to gas sales. 2. 300° surveillance for cashier.

110


Figure 7-43.

line, so that parking could be hidden behind the structure. 3. Automatic teller machines (ATMs) were originally located adjacent to the secure teller area so that they could be serviced easily, but the traditional design and flow plan caused the secure teller areas to be in the back of the bank, so ATMs ended up being placed in areas with little or no natural surveillance. 4. Customers have to park on the side or in the back of the bank and then come around on foot to the front or side doors. This is inconvenient and increases their perceived exposure to robbers. 5. Studies have shown that robbers prefer the fortress-type branch bank, because they feel that they are less exposed to surveillance from the outside. The fortress design is based on an assumption that went unchallenged for over 30 years. For good design and use, see Figure 7-45. 1. Bank placed on the rear lot line, allowing customer parking and access from the front. 2. ATM located in area with the greatest natural surveillance and independent from the building.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Customers prefer to drive up to the ATM and remain in or close to their vehicle for safety and convenience. Parking should be in front, where it is most visible. A curb lane should be used to bring the vehicle deep into the property prior to allowing it to disperse into the parking area. This reduces the concern about traffic hazards by increasing the exit speed of the vehicle. The curb lane for vehicle access serves as a transitional process that forces the user to acknowledge movement from public to semi-public to private space. The building design should emphasize a maximum of glass to increase the perception of natural surveillance and openness from and to the structure. Abnormal users feel a greater risk because of he improved natural surveillance and access.

Objectives for the Residential Environment 1. Access control. Provide secure barriers to prevent unauthorized access to building grounds, buildings, and restricted building interior areas.


Figure 7-44.

Figure 7-45.

111

112


2. Surveillance through physical design. Improve opportunities for surveillance by physical design mechanisms that increase the risk of detection for offenders, enable evasive actions by potential victims, and facilitate intervention by police. 3. Mechanical surveillance devices. Provide residences with security devices to detect and signal illegal entry attempts. 4. Design and construction. Design, build, or repair residences and residential sites to enhance security and improve quality. 5. Land use. Establish policies to prevent illadvised land and building uses that have a negative impact. 6. Resident action. Encourage residents to implement safeguards on their own to make homes less vulnerable to crime. 7. Social interaction. Encourage interaction by residents to foster social cohesion and control. 8. Private security services. Determine appropriate paid professional or volunteer citizen services to enhance residential security needs. 9. Police services. Improve police service to provide efficient and effective policing. 10. Police/community relations. Improve police/ community relations to involve citizens in cooperative efforts with police to prevent and report crime. 11. Community awareness. Create neighborhood/ community crime prevention awareness to aid in combating crime in residential areas. 12. Territorial identity. Differentiate private areas from public spaces to discourage trespass by potential offenders. 13. Neighborhood image. Develop positive neighborhood image to encourage resident and investor confidence and increase the economic vitality of the area.

Residential Streets In Figure 7-46, 1. Street is quiet with a small amount of through traffic. 2. Residents recognize neighbors’ cars and stare at nonresidents, who may be passing through or stopping. 3. Gutters are clean and front yards are well maintained, which indicates extended territorial concern. Front porches have furniture and other signs of use. In Figure 7-47,

Figure 7-46.

Figure 7-47.

1. A proposed land use change involves building a new neighborhood school, which is generally socially desirable. 2. The school generates increased pedestrian and vehicular activity. Nonresident cars park in front of homes, taking up what previously was viewed as the proprietary space of residents. 3. Property value growth and retention falls. Residents subconsciously turn their backs to the street and alter their patterns of property use. 4. The controlling or challenging behavior of residents (e.g., staring and verbal challenges) diminishes. In Figure 7-48, 1. The neighborhood school is changed to an expanded school that loses its neighborhood identity. Users have very little attachment or concern for the neighborhood.


113

Figure 7-48.

Figure 7-50.

3. The neighborhood is already susceptible to zoning change requests and the possibility of the development of transient housing, which may be disguised as low-income or scattered-site publicly supported housing. 4. Any major land use change contributes to higher demand for public services, increased housing turnover, and a growing crime rate. In Figure 7-50, Figure 7-49.

2. Traffic increases and more parking occurs in the neighborhood. Property values drop and longterm or original residents move out. 3. New residents accept the changed conditions and exhibit few signs of extended territorial identity and concern. In Figure 7-49, 1. The expanded school is further developed to regional status. 2. Streets already are upgraded from residential and subcollector status to the next higher level of traffic flow. Street capacity improvements result in the increase of on-street parking and the removal of the trees. Sidewalks and front yards are pushed closer to the dwelling units.

1. The encroachment of marginal business or transient housing ultimately is replaced by highdensity commercial or industrial activities, which are the only viable land uses once the original site has deteriorated. 2. Vacant or abandoned lots are used in the interim for overflow parking and unauthorized drug dealing or recreational use. The area is perceived as dangerous or undesirable for residential uses. Normal users avoid the area and abnormal users feel that they have lower risk of detection or intervention. 3. Some unscrupulous developers use this process as a means of controlling large parcels of land for long-term development, while capitalizing the long-term plans through the short-term investment in transient housing or marginal commercial activities, both of which help progressively reduce the property value.

114


Figure 7-51.

In Figure 7-51, 1. Access to the new school is isolated from the contiguous residential streets, school property vehicular access is planned for an alternative location connected to an existing high-capacity commercially or industrially oriented street. 2. Pedestrian flow through the residential area still increases, but vehicular and parking activity are diverted. In Figure 7-52, 1. An alternative strategy to the conflict created by the new school is to create a major setback to allow for a transition lane and temporary waiting lane for buses and parents picking up students. 2. Traffic control devices or procedures are used to direct and divert vehicles from the residential area. In Figure 7-53, a partial choker is used to divert right turn traffic from the affected neighborhood. In Figure 7-54,

1. The street affected by the traffic associated with the school may be permanently diverted by closing the street with a cul-de-sac or turnaround T. 2. Emergency vehicle access may be enhanced through the use of drive-over plantings or knockdown gates. Malleable steel pins or links may be used in latching devices or chains to make it easy for emergency vehicles to push open the barriers. In Figure 7-55, The street affected by the traffic associated with the school is closed in the middle, creating a dead end. The middle street closure uses a turnaround ball or T to facilitate emergency and public service vehicle access. In Figure 7-56, 1. The street affected by the traffic associated with the school is choked off by the installation of entrance narrowing devices, walls, and columns. 2. The entrance definition is physical or symbolic. Columns and entrance definition may be installed


Figure 7-52.

Figure 7-53.

Figure 7-54.

115

116


Figure 7-55.

Figure 7-57.

Figure 7-56.

without encroaching on the roadway in situations where the street entrance is too dangerous for a choking effort or other factors are involved, such as the preferences of residents. In Figure 7-57, 1. The street affected by the traffic associated with the school is choked off with entrance definition devices. 2. The pedestrian walkway is upgraded through the installation of paver tiles or by raising the crosswalk by 3 inches to serve as a modified speed bump that warns drivers that they are entering a private area.

Residential Development: Curvilinear Streets In Figure 7-58,

Figure 7-58.

1. Conventional curvilinear plans minimize unassigned space, which extends territorial concern. 2. Children are more likely to be observed and controlled by residents. 3. Some bleed-through traffic may occur if drivers become aware that they may avoid the northwest major intersection. In Figure 7-59, 1. Cluster curvilinear streets are presently more appealing because of amenities and green areas, which are marked heavily by developers. Many local planning regulations require these features in planned unit developments.


117

Figure 7-60. Figure 7-59.

2. The increase in unassigned areas may result in reduced proprietary concern of residents. Unassigned areas may be aesthetically appealing, but residents feel little attachment and may psychologically turn their backs on activities occurring there. 3. Deed restrictions or covenants are often very strict in terms of what residents may do in the open areas.This further reduces territorial concern. 4. Young people often go unsupervised in the open or green areas. There is some evidence in public housing, as well as in planned developments (cluster concept), that children growing up in undifferentiated environments fail to learn respect for property rights, which negatively affects their values and behavior. 5. CPTED planners may recommend that open areas be assigned to contiguous cluster of homes. Landscaping or other physical changes may be used to establish border definition. 6. Residents may be provided financial and other inducements to participate in the maintenance of the open or green areas. This participation increases their proprietary concern for the previously unassigned space. In Figure 7-60, 1. A townhouse cluster design is economically viable. Open spaces and amenities are important attractions to buyers. 2. This townhouse development creates an excessive amount of unassigned space, which is often protected by strict deed restrictions or covenants. 3. Territorial concern is reduced and abnormal users feel safer in accessing the open areas.Young people are less likely to be scrutinized in these areas. 4. The ball field and tennis courts serve as a magnet to nonresidents. This could produce conflict and

reduce the likelihood of controlling behavior by residents. Use by nonresidents legitimizes their presence in the development, which increases the abnormal users’ perception of safety (low risk of detection or intervention). The normal user feels threatened and therefore exhibits avoidance, which affects other normal users. Abnormal users are reinforced by these cues, which say that no one owns this space or is willing to challenge its improper use. Normal users stop using these areas altogether, which has been a problem in public housing and parks. 5. CPTED planners may recommend the assignment of open areas to clusters of buildings. Landscape and other physical changes may be made to enhance border definition. 6. Residents may be induced to participate in maintenance of these areas through financial or other inducements. This extends proprietary concern for these areas. 7. CPTED planners may recommend the addition of one or two buildings on the north side of the development to provide a natural barrier to potentially conflicting activities. This appeals to the developer as a profitable move that produces the added benefit of increased perception of safety. CPTED planners may recommend the closure of the internal street in the middle, or at one end, to eliminate through traffic. This helps eliminate or reduce the probability of drive-by drug sales.

Residential Streets: Options for Private Use In Figure 7-61, 1. Each end of the block is choked off. One end uses a closure of the incoming lane (ingress). The other end closes the outgoing lane (egress).

118



2. Play areas are installed to thrust activities more into previously public areas to increase visual and physical attention. 3. A combination of straight-in and parallel parking is used. In Figure 7-62, 1. Additional crosswalks are added to break the street into four areas. This increases the definition of the pedestrian space in the street. 2. Crosswalks should be legally designated under local ordinances to create pedestrian right of way. 3. Crosswalks are raised 2–3 inches to reinforce the driver’s perception of transition. In Figure 7-63, 1. A combination of parking, parallel and straight in, may be introduced to create space for more land-

scaping. The combination of landscaping and parking narrows the entrance (ingress and egress). 2. Crosswalks are upgraded to enhance transitional definitions. 3. A middle block or central area is defined with a texture change, to be used for occasional block activities. Entrances are choked off or closed with barricades during planned block parties or functions. In Figure 7-64, 1. One end of the street is closed by installing a play area with safety barriers. 2. Parking arrangements are alternated between angle and parallel to create more parking and narrow the street. In Figure 7-65,


119


1. Entrances are choked to slow traffic. 2. A block gathering area is installed to create a place for parties and other functions. These areas also further the perception of the block as private. In Figure 7-66, 1. A simple closure creates a cul-de-sac effect that eliminates through traffic. 2. A drive-over (for emergency vehicles) area is created by reducing the elevation of the center of the planter. Replaceable flowers or bushes are used to increase the perception of closure in the drive-over area. Another option is to use knockdown bollards. In Figure 7-67, 1. Landscaping improvements are installed to make the street more appealing for pedestrian activity.

2. An additional crosswalk is installed in the middle of the block to enhance pedestrian convenience and slow traffic. 3. Crosswalks should be legally designated under city ordinance. They may also be raised 2–3 inches to reinforce drivers’ perception of transition.

Residential Streets: Recovery of Grid Systems In Figure 7-68, 1. Boundary control is established by creating culde-sacs in the middle of most access streets. 2. Access is limited to two points that connect with internal streets. In Figure 7-69,

120



1. Internal controls are established by installing a system of diagonal diverters to loop traffic in and out. 2. Through traffic is denied. The diverter angles should be based on resident input and an analysis of access needs.

1. An ad-hoc plan of cul-de-sacs, diagonal diverters, and one-way flows make the streets more private. 2. This approach provides some flexibility for longterm planning.

Objectives for the School Environment

In Figure 7-70, 1. One-way traffic flows are established to reduce through access. 2. Speed controls are used reduce the pedestrian and vehicle conflict that result from higher speeds on the one-way system. 3. Parking plans may be altered to include alternating combinations of angle parking and street landscaping. In Figure 7-71,

1. Access control. Provide secure barriers to prevent unauthorized access to school grounds, schools, or restricted interior areas. 2. Surveillance through physical design. Improve opportunities for surveillance by physical design mechanisms that increase that risk of detection for offenders. 3. Mechanical surveillance devices. Provide schools with security devices to detect and signal unauthorized entry attempts.


121

Figure 7-69.

Figure 7-70.

Figure 7-67.

Figure 7-71.

Figure 7-68.

4. Congestion control. Reduce or eliminate causes of congestion that contribute to student confrontations. 5. Psychological deterrents. Provide psychological deterrents to theft and vandalism.

6. User monitoring. Implement staff and student security measures at vulnerable areas. 7. Emergency procedures. Provide teachers with the means to handle emergency situations. 8. User awareness. Initiate programs to promote student awareness of security risks and countermeasures. 9. User motivation. Encourage social interaction, social cohesion, and school pride by promoting extracurricular activities, providing amenities, and upgrading the visual quality of the school. 10. Territorial identity. Highlight the functional identities of different areas throughout the

122


Figure 7-72.

school to increase territorial identity and reduce confusion. 11. Community involvement. Promote public awareness and involvement with school faculty and student achievements and activities.

School Campus Control

1. By designating formal gathering areas, all other areas become off limits. 2. Anyone observed in spaces not designated as formal gathering areas is automatically subject to scrutiny. 3. Abnormal users feel at greater risk and have fewer excuses for being in the wrong places. 4. Teachers and administrators assume greater challenging powers by the clear spatial definition.

For poor design, see Figure 7-72. 1. Informal gathering areas are preempted by groups of students, who often promote conflict. 2. Isolated areas are used by students who wish to smoke or engage in unauthorized or illicit behavior. 3. Interlopers or trespassers seek out out-of-sight areas to contact students for drug sales or other improper activities. 4. Areas are very difficult to monitor and control. 5. Most authorities attempt to maintain surveillance of these areas in an attempt to control behavior. For good design, see Figure 7-73.

High School Parking Lots For poor design, see Figure 7-74. 1. Multiple access points increase the perception that the parking area is public and provide many escape routes for potential offenders. 2. The location on the periphery of the site reduces any clear transitional definition of movement from public to private space, allowing an abnormal user to feel safe or at low risk of confrontation.


Figure 7-73.

Figure 7-74.

123

124


Figure 7-75.

3. The openness of the lot increases the range of excuses for improper use. For good design, see Figure 7-75. 1. Use of barricades to close off unsupervised entrances during low-use times controls access and reinforces the perception that the parking area is private. 2. The curb lane in the open entrance forces the user to make a transition from public to semi-public to private space, with a radical turn into the parking area. 3. The symbolic isolation creates the perception that escape is easily blocked. 4. Violation of the barricade and traffic control devices draws attention to the abnormal user and establishes probable cause sufficient to stop the individual for questioning.

3. The isolated location has few opportunities for natural surveillance. 4. Poor transitional definition creates the perception of safety for abnormal users and risk for normal users. For good design, see Figure 7-77. 1. Driver education is safe activity, monitored by responsible teachers and students. 2. The switch of driver education with student parking in an existing location provides a natural opportunity to put a safe activity in an unsafe location and an unsafe activity in a safe location. 3. The new location for student parking (in this hypothetical example) is in the direct line of sight from office windows.

Courtyards and Corridors Student Parking and Driver Education Relationships For poor design, see Figure 7-76. 1. Student parking is an unsafe activity. 2. Student parking on the periphery of the campus is in an unsafe location.

For poor design and use, see Figure 7-78. 1. Many site planners or users of space fail to adequately define the intended purpose and uses of courtyards. 2. Uses could be aesthetics, thermal support of the building, or as gathering areas. Each use presents


125

Figure 7-76.

3.

4.

5. 6. 7.

different requirements and space management plans and policies. Corridor and courtyard confusion is exacerbated by the installation of benches and other furnishings along the corridors. Benches are sometimes used as barriers to access to courtyards, with the mistaken idea of protecting the grass from encroachment by students or pedestrians. Corridor and courtyard conflict often leads to congestion, noise, and personal conflict. Groups of students or others often colonize or preempt spaces, creating further conflict and fear. Normal users avoid using these areas. Abnormal users feel safer and at low risk of detection or intervention.

2. Furnishings for courtyards intended for gathering are designed to break up group size or to provide only minimal comfort to shorten the staying time. 3. Portable amenities may be used more effectively than permanent ones, depending on intended use patterns. Accordingly, physical support is provided only when the specific behavior is desired. 4. Normal users feel safer in moving through these areas. Abnormal users are more subject to control and find it more difficult to preempt these spaces.

School Lunchtime Hallway Use

For good design and use, see Figure 7-79.

For poor design and use, see Figure 7-80.

1. The intended purpose and uses of the courtyards and adjoining corridors are clearly defined both in policy and physical design.

1. The same hallway is used for coming and going. 2. Conflict occurs as some groups attempt to go to the cafeteria while others attempt to return to class.

Figure 7-77.

Figure 7-78.

Figure 7-79.

Figure 7-80.

128


Figure 7-81.

3. The arrival of the first group and departure of the second are the most controlled because no other group moves at the same time. All persons are supposed to be going in the same direction, so the hall monitors and administrators are perceived to be more powerful. There is a limited range of excuses for improper behavior. 4. Hall monitors lose control because of the coming and going after the first group eats. 5. Getting groups,after the first,through the lunch line takes longer because of the conflict and congestion. 6. Most classroom and locker thefts in school systems occur during the lunch period. For good design and use, see Figure 7-81. 1. Ingress and egress to the cafeteria may be separated spatially and temporally to define movement relationships. 2. Each group arrives faster, with fewer stragglers. 3. Abnormal users of space feel at greater risk of detection. 4. A time, or temporal, separation of movements to and from the classroom area requires the addition

of at least 5 minutes for each shift. This time may be taken from that allotted for eating, since each group arrives faster and, therefore, is fed faster.

Safe Activities in Unsafe Locations For poor design, see Figure 7-82. 1. Many noncurricular activities at schools (e.g., military recruiting, college orientation, picture and ring sales, club functions) are assigned to locations in the office, cafeteria, or gymnasium. 2. Office, cafeteria, and gymnasium areas provide poor design support for these noncurricular activities. 3. These noncurricular activities often impede the normal operations of the functions of the existing space. For good design, see Figure 7-83. 1. Problem areas on school campuses are well known and easy to map.

Figure 7-82.

Figure 7-83.

130


2. Problem areas shift with changing groups and trends of supervision. 3. Safe activities may be placed reasonably in many problem areas to attract normal users and displace abnormal or undesirable activity. 4. Normal users feel safer and abnormal users feel at greater risk or unsafe.

Convention Centers and Stadiums Convention Center

5. Local codes generally require the creation of plazas and open sitting areas. Developers are influenced to install fountains to enhance the aesthetics of an open area, but experience has shown that fountains and amenities in open areas attract vagrants, especially if they have already become established as the indigenous population. 6. Convention centers and their related parking structures usually are not designed to contain a variety of pedestrian-oriented businesses at the ground level, which would attract people all day and on weekends.

For poor design and use, see Figure 7-84.

For good design and use, see Figures 7-85 and 7-86.

1. Many convention centers are purposely placed in deteriorated areas to stimulate renewal. They are financed largely by public tax dollars or publicly backed bonds, since normal investors will not take the risk. 2. Convention centers suffer from fortress designs, which must reflect the designer’s negative perception of the location, as well as the unique logistic requirements of convention activities. 3. Parking and pedestrian access are impeded by the fortress designs and the deteriorated condition of surrounding areas. 4. Local codes often require parking to be placed behind structures and obscured by landscaping.

1. Change local codes to allow parking in front of convention centers, where it is safer. 2. Delay the installation of permanent amenities and fountains until the intended user population has clearly taken control of the site. 3. Thrust the convention center and parking structures into the airspace above, and place businesses and nightclubs at the ground level to increase year round and evening activity. This improves business and increases the number of normal users, who feel and act safer. 4. Consider altering the exterior and use patterns of existing sites by adding galleries to offset fortress efforts and increase both real and perceived surveillance opportunities. Galleries may be used to

Figure 7-84.


131

Figure 7-85.

Figure 7-86.

increase outdoor activities for exhibits and vendors, thus putting safe activities in what had been perceived to be unsafe locations.

Stadium Entrance and Ticket Control For poor design and use, see Figure 7-87. 1. Traditional designs provide no transition from undifferentiated parking and informal gathering areas to the entrance and ticket control functions.

2. Groups of students and others tend to congregate in front of entrance locations, which produces fear and concern for adults and young people who wish to enter the stadium. 3. Ticket booth personnel and gate attendants cannot see over the groups of bystanders. 4. Normal users feel the lack of control and avoid these areas or pass through them quickly, reinforcing the control by abnormal users. For good design and use, see Figure 7-88.

132


Figure 7-87.

Figure 7-88.

1. A funnel design forces informal gathering farther out into the parking area. 2. Gathering is more difficult deeper into the parking area because of the perceived pedestrian/vehicular conflict. 3. Gate attendants have greater line-of-sight control of the parking lot and pedestrian areas. 4. The range of excuses for different behaviors

narrows with the width of the funnel as one approaches the gate. Attendants have more power to exert their influence over persons seeking entry as they are channeled into the funnel. 5. Normal users feel safer as they approach the entrance because of the narrow definition of behavior deep into the funnel—movement only.

THREE SECURITY OPERATIONS AND EQUIPMENT


Chapter 8 Approaches to Physical Security* RICHARD GIGLIOTTI and RONALD JASON

Protection of one’s person and possessions is natural and universally accepted. Unfortunately, there are those who have made it their objective to deprive some of us of one or both of these. In the battle against the criminal element, our resourcefulness in designing and developing more and better methods of protecting our life, property, and livelihood has been unbounded. No system, however, can be made completely secure. Any system conceived can be defeated. In other words, no physical protection system is 100% defeat proof. If it can be designed to eliminate most threats, it will have its weak links; for example, the perimeter fence or the alarm system. In any event, if a system cannot fully protect against a threat, it must at a minimum offer enough protection to delay the threat unit the system can be upgraded, at least temporarily, to the point at which the threat can be defeated (e.g., the arrival of local law enforcement authorities or on-site guard force, the implementation of contingency measures such as additional physical barriers, the release of noxious gases). Maximum security is a concept. Physical barriers, alarm systems, guard forces, and all the other components of a security system do not individually achieve maximum security. The parts of the system cannot realize the ultimate aim unless they are combined in the right proportions.

Levels of Physical Security How would one categorize a particular security system? Would one consider protection minimum, medium, or maximum, and what criteria would be used in making this determination? Would a facility be compared to a prison, nuclear rector, department store, or the average American home? While the initial question may appear to be answered easily, arriving at an intelligent and impartial assessment becomes much more difficult simply because there are no known universally accepted standards by which the security professional may evaluate a security system. This lack of standards often deludes responsible individuals into believing that the protection they provide (or are paying for) is of a higher level than is actually the case. Because of the confusion and lack of cohesive opinion on the subject, this chapter considers the following five levels of security system (also see Figure 8-1):1 Level 1—minimum security Level 2—low-level security Level 3—medium security Level 4—high-level security Level 5—maximum security

Minimum Security * Originally from Security Design for Maximum Protection, by Richard Gigliotti and Ronald Jason (Boston, MA: Butterworth–Heinemann, 2000). Updated by the editor, Elsevier, 2003.

Such a system would be designed to impede some unauthorized external activity. Unauthorized external activity is defined as originating outside the scope of the security system and could range from simple 135

136

SECURITY OPERATIONS AND EQUIPMENT

Figure 8-1. The level of physical security. (Courtesy of Security Management.)

intrusion to armed attack. By virtue of this definition, a minimum security system would consist of simple physical barriers such as regular doors and windows equipped with ordinary locks. The average American home is the best example of a site protected by a minimum security system.

Low-Level Security This refers to as system designed to impede and detect some unauthorized external activity. Once simple physical barriers and locks are in place, they can be supplemented with other barriers such as reinforced doors, window bars, and grates, highsecurity locks, a simple lighting system that could be nothing more elaborate than normal lighting over doors and windows, and a basic alarm system that would be an unmonitored device at the site of the intrusion that provides detection capability and

local annunciation. Small retail stores, storage warehouses, and even older police stations are examples of sites that could be protected by low-level security systems.

Medium Security A system of this type would be designed to impede, detect, and assess most unauthorized external activity and some unauthorized internal activity. Such activity could range from simple shoplifting to conspiracy to commit sabotage. When a system is upgraded to the medium level, those minimum and low-level measures previously incorporated are augmented with impediment and detection capability as well as assessment capability. To reach the medium level of security, it is necessary to 1. Incorporate an advanced intrusion alarm system that annunciates at a staffed remote location.

Approaches to Physical Security

2. Establish a perimeter beyond the confines of the area being protected and provide high-security physical barriers such as penetration-resistant fences at least 8 feet high and topped with multiple strands of barbwire or barbed tape at that perimeter or use guard dogs in lieu of perimeter protection. 3. Use an unarmed guard (with basic training) equipped with the means for basic communication (e.g., commercial telephone) to off-site agencies. Medium security facilities might include bonded warehouses, large industrial manufacturing plants, some large retail outlets, and National Guard armories.

High-Level Security A system of this sort would be designed to impede, detect, and assess most unauthorized external and internal activity. After those measures previously mentioned have been incorporated into the system, high-level security is realized with the addition of the following: 1. State of the art in all equipment installed. 2. Closed-circuit television (CCTV) with state-ofthe-art components. 3. A perimeter alarm system, remotely monitored, at or near the high-security physical barriers. 4. High-security lighting, which at a minimum provides at least 0.02 foot-candles of light around the entire facility. 5. Highly trained armed guards or unarmed watch people who have been screened for employment and who are equipped with advanced means of communications, such as dedicated telephone lines, two-way radio links to police, duress alarms. 6. Controls designed to restrict access to or within a facility to authorized personnel. 7. Formal plans prepared with the knowledge and cooperation of police dealing with their response and assistance in the event of specific contingencies at the protected site. 8. Varying degrees of coordination with local law enforcement authorities. 9. Annual assessment conducted. Examples of high-level security sites include certain prisons, defense contractors, pharmaceutical companies, and sophisticated electronics manufacturers.

137

Maximum Security Such a system is designed to impede, detect, assess, and neutralize all unauthorized external and internal activity. In addition to those measures already cited, it is characterized by 1. A sophisticated state-of-the-art alarm system too strong for defeat by a lone individual; remotely monitored in one or more protected locations, tamper-indicating with backup source of power. 2. On-site response force of highly screened and trained individuals armed 24 hours a day, equipped for contingency operations, and dedicated to neutralizing or containing any threat against the protected facility until the arrival of off-site assistance. The highest level of physical security protection will be found at nuclear facilities, some prisons, certain military bases and government special research sites, and some foreign embassies. To upgrade a security system to the next highest level, all criteria for that level must be met (see Figure 8-1). Remember that individual criteria from a higher level can be met without the total system being upgraded. For example, if a medium security facility institutes access controls and installs a closedcircuit television (CCTV) system, the overall level of security has not been upgraded to high level. In reality, what results is a medium security system with some high-level characteristics.2 Depending on its capabilities, a high-level system could achieve maximum security by the addition of a neutralizing capability. By using modern methods, materials, and technology, a maximum security system can be developed or an existing system upgraded. This chapter focuses on several examples of components that could result in maximum security.When the term maximum security is used, it denotes the high level of physical security offered by the total system. There is little discussion of less than highsecurity components, such as wooden doors, local alarm systems, and simple fences, because their presence in a maximum security environment is incidental and does not significantly contribute to the maximum security concept. Maximum security is security in depth—a system designed with sufficient diversity and redundancy to allow the strength of one particular component to offset the weakness of another. There is no set rule regarding the number of protective layers; again, it depends on the material being protected. As a general rule, however, the more layers, the more

138


difficult it is to defeat the total system. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has for years inspected nuclear facilities on a component-specific basis. While such evaluation certainly can point out weaknesses in any component, it by no means attests to the effectiveness of the total system. Maximum security depends on the total system, not on its individual components.

The Psychology of Maximum Security The concept of maximum security is as much psychological as it is physical. To the casual criminal, a maximum security facility is a target to be given up in favor of a minimum (or zero) security facility. To the security director, maximum security accurately describes the system of protection designed to allow him or her to go home at night with the conviction, real or imagined, that the assets entrusted for protection will still be there in the morning. To the average citizen, maximum security is a state of mind more than physical components. When designing a protection system, one can capitalize on the psychological aspects of maximum security. If a system can create the appearance of being next to impenetrable, then it has succeeded in deterring some lesser adversaries. The same principle can be seen when one compares a threat dog to an attack dog. The former has been trained to put on a show of aggression, while the latter has been trained to carry out the threat—a case of bite being worse than bark. While the concept of maximum security may deter those not up to the challenge, it will not turn aside those who are. Whenever the value of the protected assets exceeds the degree of perceived risk, there will always be takers. For a criminal to act and, for that matter, a crime to be committed, there must be desire and opportunity; the criminal must want to commit the act and must have the opportunity. The effectiveness of the system can be measured in terms of eliminating the opportunity; the psychology of the system can be measured in terms of eliminating the desire. The desire to commit a crime can be eliminated or reduced in a variety of ways. The result is that the criminal feels the risk outweighs the treasure and moves on to another target. The strongest reason for a criminal to lose desire is the threat of getting caught. The possibility of apprehending the criminal may be increased by the use of lighting for observation capabilities, barriers that delay intrusion, alarms that signal an intrusion, and a security force that can neutralize intrusion. For the maximum psychological

effect to be achieved, the capabilities of the protection system must be known to the criminal; that is, they must convince the criminal that the odds of getting caught are high. This can be accomplished by posting signs in and around the facility advertising its protection. While the capabilities of the system should be announced, details should be considered proprietary information and safeguarded accordingly. This is the primary reason that certain details of maximum security (e.g., radio codes, access controls, locks) are changed whenever key personnel terminate their employment. It is far simpler and cheaper to attempt to eliminate a criminal’s desire than it is to eliminate the opportunity. There are those who disagree on the value of advertising a security system’s capabilities. They feel that maintaining a low profile somehow contributes to the overall effectiveness of the system and that criminals will not know that an attractive target exists. This philosophy can be called the ostrich syndrome; it may have been true before the advent of mass media and multimedia, but it certainly is not today. A security director who plans to maintain so low a profile that a criminal will be fooled is merely risking the assets he has been entrusted to protect. Rather, anyone scrutinizing a protected facility, passively or actively, will understand that she or he will have to plan carefully and more than likely enlist additional help. It is important, therefore, that consideration be given to the psychological aspects of maximum security when designing or maintaining a system. An implied presence can do wonders in dissuading criminals from targeting a facility.

The Value of Planning When setting up a maximum security system, the best results come from a careful and detailed plan. Two basic questions must first be answered: 1. What is being protected? What assets? 2. How important is it? (This is measured in terms of political and economic impact, corporate commitment to its protection, and health and safety of the public.) A third question is sometimes asked: Do the costs of protecting it outweigh its value? While this may be a consideration when planning for a security system less than maximum, it is tacitly implied that something calling for maximum security is worth the cost to someone. Once these questions have been answered, planning can commence.


Table 8-1. Components to Impede Physical Barriers Perimeter fence High-security doors High-security windows Vault Security Force Manning levels Training Equipment

139

Table 8-3. Components to Assess Locks Perimeter fence Openings Designated doors

Lighting Perimeter Protected areas Vital areas

Communications

CCTV

On site Off site

Perimeter Protected areas Vital areas

Access Controls Protected areas Vital areas

Table 8-2. Components to Detect

Table 8-4. Components to Neutralize Security Force

Response Force

LLEA Coordination

Manning levels

Manning levels

Training Equipment

Training Equipment

Contingency planning Training drills

Alarm Systems Doors Perimeter Protected areas Vital areas

One of the best approaches to take is to list the basic prerequisites of the security system. As was previously stated, maximum security is designed to impede, detect, assess, and neutralize all unauthorized external and internal activity. Under each prerequisite are listed those components that would accomplish it. If the system includes a capability to neutralize, this is stated and provided for accordingly: Security force Response force Coordination with local law enforcement authorities (LLEA) Next, decide which components are going to be used to impede (Table 8-1), detect (Table 8-2), assess (Table 8-3), and (if necessary) neutralize (Table 8-4). Once the decision is made on the components that will be used to make up the maximum security system, attention should be directed to developing a design-reference threat.

Design-Reference Threat The design-reference threat defines the level of threat with which the facility’s physical protection system could contend (or is designed to defeat). This is a most important consideration when designing or upgrading a system and is essential for cost-effective planning. The security director should list all possible threats to a particular facility. For example, a hospi-

tal’s security director might list the following as conditions or situations the system should be able to defeat: Emergency room coverage Pharmacy coverage Disorderly conduct Internal theft or diversion Assaults on employees or visitors inside and outside Armed attack on facility Burglary Robbery, theft of drugs Kidnapping, rape Auto theft from parking lot Hostage incident The next step is to evaluate these threats in descending order of credibility; that is, which are the most credible based on past experience, loss rates, crime statistics, and so on. The hospital in this example could list as follows, going from the most credible to the least: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Internal theft or diversion Auto theft from parking lot Disorderly conduct Assaults on employees or visitors Burglary Robbery Hostage incident Kidnapping Armed attack

In this example, internal theft or diversion is considered a very real possibility (probably based on past experience), followed by theft of automobiles from the hospital’s parking lot. Although possible, the threat of armed attack carries low credibility and therefore is of far less concern when deciding on the

140


design of and money to be invested in the security system. Once the credible, realistic threats have been identified and given higher priority, this information can be used to arrive at the design-reference threat. The type of adversaries that would likely be encountered by the security system is another area of consideration when determining the designreference threat. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission describes six generic categories of adversaries and the characteristics of each:3 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Terrorist groups Organized sophisticated criminal groups Extremist protest groups Disoriented persons (psychotic, neurotic) Disgruntled employees Miscellaneous criminals

The security director should now assess these potential adversary groups in terms of likelihood of encounter, from most likely to least. The hospital’s list would probably look like this: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Miscellaneous criminals Disgruntled employees and workplace violence Disoriented persons Organized sophisticated criminal groups Extremist protest groups Terrorist groups

The most likely threat group would include petty thieves from within the hospital’s workforce. Time, location, and circumstance influence the likelihood of a threat from a particular group. For example, labor disputes could lead to threats by disgruntled employees; hospitalizing an unpopular political figure could lead to threats by terrorists. In any case, extraordinary circumstances should not influence the determination of likely adversaries but should be considered during contingency planning. Once the likely threats and adversaries have been determined, it becomes necessary to correlate the two and establish a specific design-reference threat. The process begins by comparing the most credible threats with the most likely adversaries for a particular facility (in this case, the hospital). 1. Internal theft or diversion Miscellaneous criminals Disgruntled employees Organized sophisticated criminals 2. Auto theft Miscellaneous criminals Organized sophisticated criminals 3. Disorderly conduct Disoriented persons Miscellaneous criminals

4. Assaults Miscellaneous criminals Disoriented persons Organized sophisticated criminals 5. Burglary Organized sophisticated criminals Miscellaneous criminals 6. Robbery Disoriented persons Miscellaneous criminals 7. Hostage incidents Disoriented persons Miscellaneous criminals Disgruntled employees Extremist protesters 8. Kidnapping Organized sophisticated criminals Terrorists Extremist protesters Miscellaneous criminals 9. Armed attack Terrorists Extremist protesters There is always overlap among adversary groups, and this fact must be kept in mind when preparing a threat-versus-adversary analysis. In the example, the hospital’s security director has defined the primary threat to the facility as being internal theft or diversion and the most likely adversaries in this area as miscellaneous criminals followed by disgruntled employees and organized sophisticated criminals. The protection system must be designed or upgraded to counter the most real threat. The most worthy adversary, however, appears to be an organized sophisticated criminal, probably because of the hospital’s drug supply. While the least likely adversary in this threat, this is the most capable (in terms of desire, resources, and capability), and therefore the system must be designed to defeat her or him. At the same time, adversaries of lesser capability will also be defeated. A very simple analogy illustrates this principle: A screened door, if properly installed, keeps out flies; it also keeps out wasps, butterflies, and birds. Continuing the process of determining the adversary most capable of carrying out the most credible threats, the hospital’s security director probably comes up with the following results: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Internal theft—organized sophisticated criminals Auto theft—organized sophisticated criminals Disorderly conduct—disoriented persons Assaults—organized sophisticated criminals Burglary—organized sophisticated criminals Robbery—miscellaneous criminals


7. Hostage incident—terrorists 8. Kidnapping—terrorists 9. Armed attack—terrorists Planning a system to address a realistic security concern as well as the adversary most capable of causing that concern allows the system’s architect to prepare for the worst possible case and least capable adversary alike. Establishing the design-reference threat, therefore, is contingent on determining the groups to which the specific threats or adversaries belong: 1. Internal theft (crimes against property) Auto Burglary 2. Violent conduct (crimes against persons) Robbery Disorderly conduct Assaults Hostage incidents Kidnapping Armed attack On this basis, the hospital’s security director knows where to channel resources and the degree of protection needed. Since internal theft or diversion has been defined as the most credible threat, the system should be designed to counter this crime as it would be perpetrated by an organized sophisticated criminal. This is where much of budget money is used. The next most credible threat is auto theft from the parking lot. Again, resources have to be directed to counter auto theft perpetrated by an organized sophisticated criminal. At the other end of the scale, an armed attack on the facility is a very remote possibility: If it were to happen, chances are the act would be perpetrated by terrorists. Since the possibility is quite low, attention and resources (and budget money) are minimal if any in this area, and more than likely consist of contingency planning or local law enforcement coordination. The design-reference threat and its supporting analysis become the basis for planning the measures to be instituted to preclude its occurrence or counter its effects.

Example: A Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facility Determining the design-reference threat for a nuclear fuel cycle facility, for example, would follow the same process. 1. Possible threats Internal theft or diversion Armed attack

141

Hostage incident Burglary Civil disturbance Auto theft Sabotage Employee pilferage Kidnapping Robbery Assaults 2. Credible threats (most to least) Internal theft or diversion of nuclear material Sabotage (including threats) Armed attack (as a prelude to other action) Civil disturbance (including antinuclear demonstrations) Employee pilferage (of nonnuclear material) Assaults Auto theft (from parking lot) Kidnapping Hostage incident Burglary Robbery 3. Potential adversaries (most to least) Terrorist groups Disoriented persons Disgruntled employees Extremists or protesters Miscellaneous criminals Organized sophisticated criminals 4. Match-up of threats and adversaries a. Internal theft or diversion Disgruntled employees Disoriented persons Terrorists b. Sabotage Terrorists Disoriented persons Disgruntled employees c. Armed attack Terrorists d. Civil disturbance Extremists or protesters e. Pilferage Miscellaneous criminals f. Assaults Disoriented persons g. Auto theft Miscellaneous criminals h. Kidnapping Terrorists Disoriented persons i. Hostage incident Terrorists Disoriented persons Disgruntled employees

142


j. Burglary Miscellaneous criminals k. Robbery Miscellaneous criminals 5. Most credible threat—most capable adversary a. Internal theft or diversion—terrorists b. Sabotage—terrorists c. Armed attack—terrorists d. Civil disturbance—extremists or protesters e. Pilferage—disgruntled employees f. Assault—disoriented persons g. Auto theft—miscellaneous criminals h. Kidnapping—terrorists i. Hostage incident—terrorists j. Burglary—miscellaneous criminals k. Robbery—miscellaneous criminals 6. Basic generic threats a. Theft Internal and external Pilferage Auto Burglary b. Violence Sabotage Armed attack Civil disturbance Assault Kidnapping Hostage incident Robbery We can see that a nuclear fuel cycle facility’s number 1 security concern is the theft or diversion of nuclear material. The most capable adversary (although the least likely) is a terrorist group. While theft may be the most serious concern, other violent actions, including sabotage and armed attack, are very real possibilities. The chance of a fuel cycle facility being burglarized or robbed (in the traditional sense) is negligible due to the heavy protection provided. The security director must therefore base this system on a design-reference threat that reflects the most serious concerns. The Code of Federal Regulations requires that nuclear fuel cycle facilities “must establish and maintain . . . a physical protection system . . . designed to protect against . . . theft or diversion of strategic special nuclear material and radiological sabotage.”4 The Code describes the threats the system must be able to defeat:5 1. Radiological or biological sabotage. (i) A determined violent external assault, attack by stealth, or deceptive actions, of several persons with the following attributes, assistance, and equipment: (A) well trained, (B) inside assistance, which may include a

knowledgeable individual who attempts to participate in a passive role, an active role, or both, (C) suitable weapons, up to and including hand-held automatic weapons, equipped with silencers and have effective long-range accuracy, (D) hand-carried equipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives; (ii) an internal threat of an insider, including an employee (in any position). [Read the bioterrorism chapter of this text.] 2. Theft or diversion of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material. (i) A determined, violent, external assault, attack by stealth, or deceptive actions by a small group with the following attributes, assistance, and equipment: (A) well trained, (B) inside assistance, which may include a knowledgeable individual who attempts to participate in a passive role, an active role, or both, (C) suitable weapons, up to and including hand-held automatic weapons, equipped with silencers and having effective longrange accuracy, (D) hand-carried equipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives, (E) the ability to operate as two or more teams; (ii) an individual, including an employee (in any position); and (iii) conspiracy between individuals in any position.

In summary, a design-reference threat is a systematic analysis of all possible threats and adversaries so that credible threats and adversaries can be identified and this information used as a basis for planning and implementing a physical protection system.

Layering for Protection The designer must remember the principle of security in depth. Protection must be layered to provide diversity and redundancy (Figure 8-2). Whenever and wherever possible, layer components. Conduct a walk-through of the facility and likely threat routes. Start either at a point outside and work in, or start at the most sensitive point within the facility and work out.

Physical Barriers Physical barriers should be checked at the area considered the most sensitive, such as the vault, cell block, tool crib, or shipping department. This area is called the objective. 1. Provide a high-security barrier around the objective. 2. Enclose a high-security barrier within another high-security barrier. 3. Surround the outer barrier with a penetrationresistant fence.


143

and who will be allowed unrestricted access within it. Generally, the protected area includes the facility itself and the outside area around it, up to the first penetration-resistant fence. Vital areas include the vault or strong room and could include the alarm stations, emergency generator buildings, or other areas that could be considered vital to the protection of the objective and the facility. (One must not overlook the possibility that the facility itself, rather than its contents, could be the target of an action.)

Security Force

Figure 8-2. Layering. (Courtesy of Security Management.)

4. Establish isolation zones on either side of the penetration-resistant fence. 5. Surround the outer isolation zone with yet another penetration-resistant fence and isolation zone. 6. Establish an isolation zone on the outside of the outermost fence. Entry and exit points should be identified and those vital to the effectiveness of the total system determined. High-security doors and windows must be installed or upgraded where appropriate. As a general rule, if a window is not needed at a particular location, it should be eliminated. The area containing the objective should be a vault or other such strong room, depending on cost considerations and the effectiveness of the total system. It is important to evaluate the structural components of the facility, including walls, ceilings, and floors, and determine their ability to withstand a threat equivalent to the design-reference threat. Physical barriers are not exclusively for keeping someone out: They can also be used to keep someone in.

Locks After deciding which openings require locks (highsecurity and otherwise), the types of locks are selected.

Appropriate staffing levels of the security force for each shift are established, with the amount of training necessary and desirable. (Some states have mandated training levels for security officers.) The force is equipped with resources to handle the designreference threat.

Alarm Systems A maximum security system should have a state-ofthe-art perimeter alarm system capable of detecting an intrusion anywhere on the perimeter. Additionally, all vital areas should be equipped with alarms capable of detecting the presence of an intruder. All doors that contribute to the protection system should have alarms and all alarms continuously monitored by a person in a remote location on-site. Alarm circuits should be supervised so that tampering with the system or its components causes an alarm.

Lighting The value of lighting should be considered for impeding as well as for assessing. In deciding where security lighting should be directed, it should be kept in mind that proper placement avoids silhouetting security personnel. High-intensity glare lighting, positioned to illuminate the isolation zone outside of the protected area, is always appropriate in a maximum-security environment. Also, inside areas can be illuminated to facilitate the use of state-of-the-art CCTV, thus saving money on expensive low-light cameras, energy costs notwithstanding.

Communications Access Controls Protected and vital areas are designated and a decision made as to who will be admitted to the facility

The ability to communicate on-site is of vital importance to the security force. Consider the alternatives for communications. In addition to commercial

144


telephones, the security force should be equipped with at least one dedicated and supervised hot line to local law enforcement authorities (LLEA) and a two-way radio network. Each officer should have a two-way radio and the system should have at least a two-channel capability. Additionally, the facility should be able to communicate with the LLEA by two-way radio.

CCTV The CCTV cameras should be placed to ensure proper surveillance and assessment. Depending on the type and quality of equipment, the perimeter and protected and vital areas can be effectively monitored.The use of CCTV instead of personnel to serve this function can save money.

Response Force If the nature of the security system requires it to neutralize a threat, attention must be directed toward establishing a response force of security personnel properly trained and equipped for that purpose. The number of personnel constituting a response force should be sufficient to counter the design-reference threat.

LLEA Coordination When a system has been designed or upgraded to safeguard something that requires protection of this magnitude, local law enforcement authorities should be brought into the picture. It always helps to establish liaison very early in the game. Once the cooperation of LLEA is secured, it is helpful to consult with them on contingency planning to meet the design-reference threat and, if possible, schedule joint training sessions and drills to exercise the plans. Once the process of analysis has been completed, it is time to plan the security system. It is much easier to incorporate security features when a facility is constructed. In this respect, corporate support is essential. The security director should work with the architects and contractors throughout the construction. When this is not possible and an upgrade to an existing facility is necessary, the security director more often than not becomes the chief architect of the upgrade. Whenever this happens, the value of planning as discussed becomes evident, as it is the basis for the formal security setup.

The Security Plan The security plan is frequently contracted out to a consultant who works with the security director. Before system implementation, it is a necessary building document; after implementation, it becomes a necessary reference document. Needless to say, the plan should be treated as proprietary, and access to it should be restricted to those who have a need to know. The plan can take many forms and contain much information. In its basic sense, it is a description of the protection system and its components. Detail can be as much or as little as desired by the security director. For use as a building document, however, it should be quite detailed. Much information can be deleted after implementation, but if the facility is regulated by an agency that requires safeguards, the plan may require many details. If this is the case, the document should be treated as sensitive. The security plan should contain, but not necessarily be limited to, the following information: 1. A description of the facility and its organizational structure 2. The security organization of the facility 3. A discussion of the physical barriers used in the system 4. A discussion of the alarm system used 5. A description of access controls used to restrict access to or within the facility 6. A discussion of security lighting at the facility 7. A description of the communications capability 8. A description of the CCTV capability and its use 9. A breakdown of the security force, its organization, training, equipment, capabilities, resources, and procedures 10. A discussion of outside resources including LLEA and others as appropriate 11. Annual assessments. Depending on the nature of the facility and its commitment to regulatory agencies, or if the security director so desires, certain other plans can be developed, such as contingency, training, and qualifications plans.

Justification When it finally comes down to selling a security design or upgrade to the people who have to pay for it, the job can be made somewhat easier by following a few basic principles.


Few security directors have not heard that, “Security contributes nothing to production, is an overhead item, and a necessary evil,” Dealing with the “necessary evil syndrome” has been the subject of much discussion since the business of assets protection started. Good security holds losses to a minimum and keeps down costs, resulting in increased profits. Fulfillment of the security mission can be called negative profit, compared with the positive profit generated by production. Accordingly, security management personnel must justify many, if not all, systems, expenditures, programs, personnel, approaches, and at times, their own existence. Most facilities cut costs for security before anything else; therefore a planned, systematic approach is necessary to keep this practice to a minimum and secure the resources necessary for efficient security operation. Justification should be based on the following steps: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Convincing oneself that a proposal is justified Convincing others it is justified Formulating the approach Presenting the approach

Convincing Oneself a Proposal Is Justified It has been said that a good salesperson believes in the product. So, too, must the security director believe in the proposal. Before it can be justified to anyone, it has to be justified in her or his mind. In some cases, this takes only a few minutes and consists of a mental evaluation of the issue. In others, it is a lengthy, detailed examination of alternatives. As a first step, it is necessary to define the issue— just what is wanted: personnel, equipment, policy, and the like. Then, consider the pros and cons: Do the results justify the expense? Is there a cheaper way to accomplish the same thing? Is it really necessary, and what happens if it is not done? Is there enough money available to finance it? Next, consider the benefit to the company: Will this increase profits? Not likely. Will this reduce overhead? Possibly. Will this make the job easier? Probably. Turnaround time must be considered; that is, the time it will take to gain a return or realize a benefit from the expenditure or approach. The security director must rely somewhat on gut feeling. If it is felt that the proposal is logical and rational but there is a negative gut feeling, set the proposal aside and reconsider it at a later date. Circumstances could change and the whole proposal could become moot.

145

Convincing Others It Is Justified Once the proposal is sound, it has to be sold to others, who may see everything involving security printed in red ink. Generally, any money that can be saved, no matter what the percentage, is a plus when justifying a proposal. Money saved is negative profit and should be sold as such. Before an attempt is made to convince others of the soundness of an approach, the security director must research the whole issue, investing the time and effort proportional to the expense and importance of the issue. Research is based on the company’s past experience, personal experience, supporting documentation, and others’ perceptions.

Company’s Experience The company may have encountered problems in this area in the past and therefore could be receptive to the idea. An existent policy could support the proposal or eliminate if from the start. The security director should consider any adverse publicity that could result from implementation of, or failure to implement, the approach. Tarnished company image is perhaps one of the most overlooked areas of corporate concern. If a company is in the midst of a problem that threatens its image, its executives and public relations officers often go to great lengths to preserve its image; however, the inclination to spend money to counter bad press diminishes as time goes by. The tendency to prevent recurrence of an unfavorable situation diminishes as more time elapses. An idea is best promoted hard on the heels of a situation it would have prevented.

Personal Experience A security director has probably dealt with the same issue before or is familiar with others’ handling of a similar issue. Draw on previous experience to define and analyze possible short- and long-term ramifications and positive and negative results. It is advisable to pay particular attention to idiosyncrasies that could provide necessary direction to the approach and, if possible, capitalize on them. For example, if the approving authority has a liking for gadgets and the approach calls for the use of gadgetry, this affinity could be parlayed into a successful acquisition.

146


Formulating the Approach Armed with the raw data accumulated up to this point, it is necessary to adopt a strategy for communicating arguments in a convincing manner. Formulation of the approach is based on personal knowledge of and experience with the approving authority. If charts and transparencies are generally well received, they should be used; however, the amount of time spent should be in proportion to the magnitude of the project. If personal experience shows that a concise approach is best, the security director should formulate accordingly. Decide on the format, written or verbal, and prepare for both. Consistency is important; the odds increase in favor of subsequent approvals if credibility has been established. Make a list of areas to be covered by priority (Figure 8-3). Certain basic information must be communicated regardless of the format: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Definition of the problem Ramifications Alternatives Elimination of each alternative (except the one proposed) 5. The solution 6. Support for the solution

Presenting the Approach Once the issue has been researched and an approach formulated, it must be presented. (It is always a good idea to send a memo regarding the issue beforehand.) If a formal presentation is required, it is recommended that the presentation be tested on affected individuals, who should be encouraged to offer their critiques. The first consideration in this report should be timing. Once the presentation commences, the approach should be presented as formulated and include the basic information already discussed. The security director must be concise and consistent, anticipate any questions, and be prepared to answer them. Depending on time and importance, audiovisual aids can be effective, as can handouts; it may be no more than a single-page outline but it helps to leave something for later reference.Above all, do not oversell. If, after this effort, the proposal is not approved and you wish to protect yourself, do so with memos to file and other such correspondence, so that if prob-

Figure 8-3. The justification process. (Courtesy of Security Management.)

lems result from the proposal’s disapproval, it can be shown that you tried.6

Conclusion This chapter was updated and reviewed in 2003. The theory and concepts laid out apply generically across the board. The approaches to physical security are based on the physical protection required to meet the need. Through the use of the risk equation, various proposed upgrades in physical protection at a facility can be compared. The options that give the best cost/benefit to the facility can be implemented. The risk is normalized to the consequence of loss of the asset and thus the allocation of scare physical protection resources is appropriately applied to keep all risks at an acceptable level.7


References 1. Richard J. Gigliotti, Ronald C. Jason, and Nancy J. Cogan.“What Is Your Level of Physical Security?” Security Management: 46 © 1980. Copyright by the American Society for Industrial Security, 1655 N. Fort Drive, Suite 1200, Arlington, VA 22209. Reprinted with permission from the August 1980 issue of Security Management magazine. 2. Ibid., pp. 46–50. 3. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Generic Adversary Characteristics Summary Report (Washington, DC: The Commission, 1979), pp. 11–12.

147

4. United States Code of Federal Regulation, title 10, part 73.1, 1982. 5. Ibid. 6. Richard J. Gigliotti.“The Fine Art of Justification,” Security Management, © 1980. Copyright by the American Society for Industrial Security, 1655 N. Fort Drive, Suite 1200, Arlington, VA 22209. Reprinted with permission from the November 1980 issue of Security Management magazine, pp. 30–34. 7. Mary Lynn Garcia. The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection of Systems. Boston: Butterworth– Heinnemann, 2001, p. 277.

Chapter 9 Physical Barriers* RICHARD GIGLIOTTI and RONALD JASON

When we speak of physical barriers, most people tend to think in terms of reinforced concrete walls, chain link fences topped with barbed wire, modern bank vaults, and other such apparent applications of maximum security. We can think back, however, to the Roman empire, whose power and influence extended over what was then almost all of the known world. The continuance of this power was guaranteed by the establishment of outposts throughout the conquered territories controlled by powerful Roman legions. These outposts were actually fortified garrisons, an example of using physical barriers for protection of a base of operations. This same principle has been used throughout recorded history: the British and Colonial fortresses during the Revolutionary War, the U.S. Army forts in the Indian territories during the last half of the 19th century, the French Maginot Line in World War II, and even the protected base camps established by American forces in Vietnam. It is interesting to note that the last were actually a variation of the system of forts used during the Revolutionary War to which forces could retire with a relative degree of safety for rest and reequipping. The concept of physical barriers is not unique to homo sapiens. When a monkey climbs a tree, it takes advantage of a natural barrier in its environment, which provides a form of physical security. While in the tree, it is out of danger from the carnivores that prowl the jungle floor, although not completely safe from attach by other natural enemies. * Originally from Security Design for Maximum Protection, by Richard Gigliotti and Ronald Jason (Stoneham, MA: Butterworths, 1984). Updated by the editor, 2003.

148

People have used barriers to enhance physical security throughout history. Our earliest forebears had the instinctive need for physical security in its most primitive form: the cave and the tree. Certainly, the need for some edge in the game of survival was crucial to our continued existence. We could not outrun the saber-toothed tiger and giant wolf; we had no protective shell like that of the giant tortoise; we could not intimidate our enemies by sheer size like the mastodon; and our reproductive capacity was limited. Only by using the security provided by climbing the nearest tree or taking shelter in a handy cave were we allowed the necessary time to continue progress along the evolutionary path. As intelligence increased over the centuries, we understood that certain changes and improvements could be made to the natural shelter available. There was not much to do to a tree, but by dragging rocks, boulders, and fallen trees across the mouth of his cave, a person could erect rudimentary walls and fences, physical barriers that enhanced the natural protection. The eventual addition of animal skins to cover the openings in cave dwellings was another sign of the march toward civilization and another component in developing physical security.

Doors The modern equivalent to the cave dweller’s animal skin is the door. The function of a door in physical security is to provide a barrier at a point of entry or exit. The function of a door in maximum security is still to provide such a barrier; however, the barrier must also be impenetrable by ordinary means and

Physical Barriers

149

offer the maximum delay time before penetration by extraordinary means (i.e., by the use of cutting tools, hand-carried tools, and some explosives). During construction of a maximum security facility, it is necessary to define the function of all doors and their relationship to the total protection system. When an existing door is evaluated, the function must again be defined and include the area or material protected. It is not necessary to make all doors maximum security—only those that are essential to the effective functioning of the total security system. Once a particular door is designated to be incorporated into the overall system, it must be upgraded to provide maximum security. There are two options in this respect: One can replace the door with a commercially available, penetration-resistant model or upgrade it to provide the necessary resistance. Obvious areas of concern when dealing with maximum security doors are door hinges and hardware. This chapter discusses hinges and other door hardware; locks and locking mechanisms are covered in detail in the next chapter.

Personnel Doors The average industrial personnel door is a hollow steel composite door with 18-gauge metal facing. It is usually hung on butt hinges with nonremovable pins and may open in either direction. It may have ventilation louvers or glass panels. According to the Barrier Penetration Database,1 the hollow steel door can be penetrated in 1 minute or less by various methods, including 1. Defeat of the locking mechanism, if a knob is accessible, by using a half-pound pipe wrench to break it (0.4 ± 0.08 minutes) 2. Prying the door open using a 15-pound pry bar (0.2 ± 0.04 minutes) 3. Penetration using a 10-pound fire axe (3.8 ± 0.08 minutes) Hollow steel doors can be made more penetrationresistant by a variety of methods: 1. Bolting or welding a steel plate to the inside or outside of the door (especially if louvers or glass is present) 2. Installation of several deadbolts that go into all four sides of the door frame2 3. After removing the metal back, welding quarterinch steel louvers on the inside of the front panel of the door, 3–4 inches apart from top to bottom, and replacing the back door panel (Figure 9-1)

Figure 9-1. Hardened door. (Courtesy of U.S. Army Material Systems Analysis Activity.)

4. Replacing hardware with more penetrationresistant types or upgrading existing hardware3 By upgrading the hollow steel door, additional weight is added and this is a consideration when evaluating hinges and hardware. In most cases, hinges have to be reinforced to compensate for the added weight. Substantial steel doors or security-class doors are commercially available, made of 3/4-inch steel on one side and 1/8-inch steel on the other and filled with 3 inches of fiberglass or similar material. Ten pounds of bulk explosives take 1.5 ± 0.3 minutes to penetrate this type of door.4 In addition to the door-hardening techniques mentioned already, ready-made security panels have been marketed under the name DELIGNITR® by Blomberger Holzindustrie of Blomberg, West Germany. This product is constructed from highly tempered plate material consisting mainly of hardwood veneers (primarily beech) cross-laminated and bonded under pressure with phenolic resins. The material is available in thicknesses of 20, 30, 40, and 50 mm in variety of standard sizes, as well as specially ordered sizes and thicknesses, and is suitable for construction of bullet-resistant and burglar-impeding doors, partition walls, and so on.

150


Figure 9-2. Hardening door jamb seam, hinges, and locking devices. (Courtesy of U.S. Army Material Systems Analysis Activity.)

Tests conducted by official agencies in West Germany and Great Britain indicate successful resistance of a sample 30-mm panel to a limited variety of small arms fire up to and including .357caliber magnum and 12-gauge shotgun. In addition, a test was conducted in which two 30-mm sections of DELIGNIT® panel spaced 150 mm apart were subjected to fire from a military rifle firing the 7.62 NATO standard round. The result of a series of five shots was that no bullet penetrated the inner of the two panels. While the manufacturer does not provide a finished door, it can provide the names of door fabricators that have experience with its material. The manufacturer claims that it can be worked by any carpentry shop equipped to handle hardwood veneers, although use of carbide-tipped cutting tools is recommended. Frames for maximum security doors should be anchored to the wall in such a manner that penetration resistance is at least equal to that of the door itself. If at all possible, hinges should be inaccessible from the side of the door that would face the likely threat. As an alternative, individual hinges should be case-hardened or replaced with a heavy-duty, casehardened piano hinge and the hinge pins made unremovable by welding or pinning (Figure 9-2). Additionally, some consideration should be given to installing 1/4-inch steel plates over exposed hinges,

which offer an additional barrier to cutting and require somewhat more explosives to defeat. Another way to increase the resistance of hinges is to mortise them into the door jamb and door, thus exposing little if any of the hinge pin. The installation of a piano hinge on the outside of the door and jamb would provide a barrier to the support hinges. A simple yet effective application of the deadbolt principle previously mentioned is to install 1/2-inch steel rods, equidistant between support hinges, on the inside of the door. On the inside door jamb, install a 1/4-inch steel plate that has been drilled to accept the rod. If the hinges are defeated, the arms continue to hold the door secure. An existing security-class door can be hardened to increase penetration time from 1–2 minutes to 20–30 minutes by welding heavy angle iron or small structural I-beam to form a 14-inch or smaller grid on the inside of the front door panel (without interfering with the locking mechanism)5 (Figure 9-3). No high-security door should have its hardware and hinges accessible from the side from which a threat is likely. Doors should open toward the likely threat direction. In addition to the solid maximum security doors discussed thus far, several companies make turnstile-type doors. These are useful for controlling access; however, they have no use as high-security barriers.

Physical Barriers

Figure 9-3. Hardening fire-class or improving securityclass doors. (Courtesy of U.S. Army Material Systems Analysis Activity.)

151

Experiments were conducted at the Navy Construction Battalion Civil Engineering Laboratory6 in the use of 9-gauge low-alloy, high-strength steel sheet and 3/4-inch plywood to build up a laminated veneer for retrofit hardening. A 2-inch laminated panel consisting of exterior steel layers, one central steel layer, and two plywood layers (S-P-S-P-S) was found to have the added merit of stopping all calibers of pistol fire and high-powered rifle fire up to and including .30–.06 military ball rounds. A door constructed on this system has the merits of both attack and bullet resistance. With retrofit cladding, it is necessary to take into account the effects of the door fit due to the additional thickness and the problem of additional weight. To install this heavy door it is necessary to provide for mounting with heavy-duty hinges and protect against hinge-pin removal and hinge destruction if resistance against attack is to be accomplished. The door recommended for this application is a hollow door with a skin of 12-gauge cold-rolled steel reinforced by internal channel stiffeners of 22-gauge or thicker steel. The hollow spaces between the stiffeners may be filled with suitable material as needed for thermal insulation.

Retrofit Upgrading of Existing Doors To harden an existing door against tool attack, the customary practice is to clad the attack side with heavy-gauge sheet metal or steel plate. This solution has as its principal merit the fact that it can be implemented quickly with materials purchased locally. Cladding should be applied only to solid or laminated wood or substantial hollow metal doors. The thinnest recommended cladding material is 12-gauge steel sheet. It must be securely fastened to the door using carriage bolts with the nuts applied from the protected side.The nuts should be tack-welded to the bolts to prevent removal or, alternatively, the ends of the bolts can be peened to serve the same function. Bolts should be no less than 5/16 inch in diameter and should be spaced from 6 to 10 inches apart and as close to the edge as the door frame allows, preferably no more than 1 or 2 inches. If the cladding is applied to an outward-opening door, it will probably be necessary to provide protection to the free edge of the cladding to prevent it being pried up and peeled off the substrate. This can be accomplished by forming the sheet metal cover so that it wraps around the door edges, or it may be practical to build up the outside face of the door frame with a steel guard that denies access to the edge of the cladding.

Door Frames The high-security door system does not present full resistance to attack and penetration unless the frame is hardened to a level similar to that of the door itself. Similarly, the attack resistance of the frame means little without commensurate strength of its attachment to the surrounding wall and the door. In fact, to be effective, the doors, frames, and wall attachments must be designed as attackresistant assemblies. The frame should be fabricated of 16-gauge or thicker steel. To strengthen and support it against being spread apart or crushed by hydraulic jacks or other tools, the frame (jambs and head) must be filled with a suitable cement grouting and bonded to and backed by the wall structure surrounding the door system.

Hinge Vulnerability and Common Countermeasures Door installations in which the hinges are located on the exterior side of the frames are vulnerable to unauthorized entry through attack on the hinges. It is frequently possible to use a drift punch and

152


hammer to drive out the hinge pin and open the door from the hinge side. Alternatively, the hinge knuckle can be cut off with a hacksaw, cold chisel, or torch and entry made. The most common countermeasures to that threat are to inhibit or prevent the removal of the hinge pins. This is most frequently done by peening over or tack-welding the ends of the pins. Another approach is to install a set screw in the knuckle so that it locks the pin in place. Peened and welded hinge pins can be freed by filing off their ends and driving them out. Set screws are seldom effective in resisting an attack with a drift pin and hammer. Still another technique is to use a continuously interlocking hinge system running the full length of the door (piano hinge). Some manufacturers make hinges in which the knuckles completely cover the ends of the hinge pins and thus prevent their being driven out with a drift pin. Regardless of how the pin is protected, if the knuckle is exposed on the outside, it is generally possible to saw off or otherwise remove or destroy the assembly and thus gain entry by prying open the door from the hinge side.

Door and Frame Interlocking Various countermeasures have been used to prevent entry through destruction or removal of the hinge pin or knuckle assembly. The most common of these is to install a substantial protruding steel dowel pin in the hinge edge of the door or frame and a mating socket or hole in the frame or door so that the pin engages in the socket when the door is closed. In this manner the door and frame are interlocked automatically whenever closed, and removal of the hinge does not allow opening the hinge side. Using this basic approach, one can devise a variety of pin-insocket, tongue-in-groove, or other similar devices to provide interlocking on the hinge side of the door. In the case of large fabricated steel doors, it is simple to orient the channel-iron framing member (on the hinge side) so that it creates a cavity (groove) into which a corresponding angle iron (tongue), which is welded to the door frame, can engage. In view of the relatively simple nature of the design and installation of positive interlocking hardware (i.e., internal steel dowel, pin in socket, or tongue in groove) for coupling the hinge sides of the door to the frame, it is recommended that this practice be used wherever highly valuable, critical, or sensitive assets are secured. The following is quoted from the Sandia Laboratories’ Barrier Technology Handbook7

Doors, due to their functional requirements and associated hardware, impose design restrictions and are in many cases, one of the weakest links in a structure. For barrier purposes, the principle of balanced design requires that doors with associated frames, hinges bolts, and locking mechanisms be strengthened to afford the same penetration delay as is provided by the floors, walls, and ceilings of the parent structure. Conversely, if the door structure cannot be enhanced, it may not be cost-effective to upgrade the existing structure. No currently available standard or commercial doors or hardware provide significant resistance against determined adversaries.

Hinges Appropriate for Door Weight In designing the hinge system, the weight of the door must be considered. For example, a door designed for resistance against tool attack only might weigh 10–15 pounds per square foot and could be hung on butt hinges, particularity if the door is used infrequently.

Vehicle Doors The standard security vehicle overhead door found in many facilities is usually of the corrugated steel, roll-up variety. These doors are ordinarily constructed of 16-gauge steel with a stiffness required to withstand 20 pounds per square foot of wind pressure and can be easily penetrated. Using a 6-foot pry bar and a 2 ¥ 4 plank weighing 20–25 pounds, penetration time is 0.8 ± 0.2 minutes. Hardening this type of door is difficult; therefore its use in a maximumsecurity environment should be kept to a minimum. Specifically designed vehicle doors are usually constructed of at least 1/4-inch steel plate and are more penetration resistant.8 Table 9-1 shows estimated penetration times for standard vehicle doors. Corrugated roll-up and hollow steel panel doors offer little resistance to explosive attack; delay time is governed by the setup, retreat, return, and crawl-through times. Thermal cutting by torch or oxy-lance (burn bar) affords the same delays as for a personnel door. The material thickness of the panel door requires more time than the corrugated door material.9 Hand-carried tools, for example, jimmy bars and axes, can be used to penetrate a vehicle door. A vehicle itself may be used to effect penetration quickly when the noise associated with such an attack is not a major consideration. Where there is any large door opening, the threat of vehicular attack is always present. Certain techniques exist for hardening and thus upgrading vehicle doors. Rubber tiers could be

Physical Barriers

153

Table 9-1. Estimated Penetration Times for Standard Vehicle Doors Barrier Corrugated steel Hollow steel

Countermeasure

Countermeasure Weight (pounds)

Penetration Time (minutes)

Jet Axe, JA-I Pry bar and 2 ¥ 4 plank Pry bar Fire axe Bulk explosives

20 23 15 10 10

0.8 ± 0.2 0.9 ± 0.2 0.2 ± 0.4 3.8 ± 0.8 About 1

Source: From the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

installed directly behind the outer vehicular door (with a portion below ground level) for greater penetration resistance, or a door clad with sheet metal could be used to resist vehicular penetration. Redwood could be inserted into a panel door to increase resistance to penetration by thermal tools. In this case, however, the increased weight necessitates the use of correspondingly upgraded hardware, which, as an added benefit, enhances protection of the door against tool and vehicular attack. Alternately laid steel channels welded together and covered by sheet metal could be used as a door and could provide significant penetration resistance.10 Where lateral wall space is not a consideration, the use of a manual or mechanically actuated sliding door should be considered. The door should be constructed (or hardened) to the same standards and by the same methods as specified for personnel doors. In addition, the top runner track must be reinforced and a substantial, well-anchored channel must be provided for the bottom of the door to travel in. The sliding door presents definite security advantages over those offered by the corrugated steel roll-up door. For example, the structural steel members needed to support a roll-up door adequately are of greater bulk and complexity than those required by the sliding door. The joints necessary in the corrugated steel roll-up door present a weakness in overall structure and are vulnerable to attack. By its very nature, the sliding door is a single, solid entity. Because of its method of mounting, it is almost impervious to forced entry by use of a pry bar especially when the top track rail is hardened. Aside from being rammed with a vehicle, the main vulnerability of the sliding door would be to prying against its opening edge. This method of attack can be forestalled by installation of several manually activated drop-pins similar to the familiar barrel bolt, although of much larger and sturdier construction. These drop into receiver holes drilled into the inner rail of the bottom track or into the floor. An intruder attempting to cut through these drop-pins

would have to make a lateral cut the entire width of the door (unless able to determine the approximate location of the pins by either spotting the heads of their mounting bolts that protrude through to the outer door surface, or by simply estimating that the pins have been situated on and equidistant from the door’s center line). To prevent this, drop-pins must remain undetectable from the outside of the door and spaced at random intervals along the lower door. While the upper track anchoring points ordinarily are subject to tool attack, their protection by a steel plate or apron on the outside, or attack side, of the door would discourage anyone concerned with effecting a stealthy entry. The third type of vehicle door that may be encountered in a high-security installation is very similar to that used in the average homeowner’s garage. This consists of a series of rigid panels joined together along their horizontal edges by hinges so that when the door is raised, it rolls up along a track and usually stores itself under spring tension, parallel to, but approximately 8 feet off the floor. There is similarity between these doors only in a generic sense. The home garage door usually has panels constructed of tempered Masonite® or similar product set into wooden framing, with each panel joined to those adjacent by three hinges and usually with a series of glass panes replacing one of the lateral panels. This door can be defeated with nothing more sophisticated than a rock or a shoe. Even without the glass, the panels can be quickly broken out of their support framing. The high-security articulated vehicle door, however, is usually constructed of panels composed of a corrugated metal stiffener sandwiched between aluminum plate or special steel alloy panels. The hinges are often of the continuous or piano type and the track is reinforced to resist external force and carry the door’s extra weight when in the retracted or stored position. As previously stated, however, this type of door is susceptible to vehicle attack or forced entry by lifting with a pry bar.

154


Vault Doors By their purely functional design and often massive construction, vault doors instantly discourage attempts at forced entry by all but the most determined adversaries. This is probably the ultimate application of the psychology of maximum security as a deterrent. Prior to opting for the construction of a vault, however, careful consideration must be given to the following questions: 1. What is expected maximum period vault protection will be required? 2. Do federal, state, or local government regulations require vault protection of these assets? 3. Are the assets being protected of a size and configuration that makes their unauthorized removal extremely difficult without the use of heavy or special equipment not generally available in the area? 4. Can the asset being protected be rendered unusable by removal of key components? (Separate storage of these components would be required; however, the size of the resultant security system could be reduced with appropriate corresponding dollar savings.) 5. Will movement of the assets being protected be kept at a minimum? 6. Do large numbers of persons require daily access to these assets during the course of their duties? 7. Would theft of these assets have an adverse effect on a. The company’s continued ability to remain in business (a trade secret of nonpatented process, material, machine, etc.)? b. The health and welfare of the general public? c. The environment? d. National security? 8. Will construction of a vault lower insurance premiums? 9. Can a vault be constructed within the existing facility without extensive renovation or reinforcement? 10. In the event of company growth, would the present facilities be sufficient to accept this growth and provide the room for expansion or would a move elsewhere be necessary?

Strong Room Doors If, after considering the pros and cons of vault acquisition, it is decided that the cost of protection would be prohibitive in comparison to the benefits, serious

consideration should be given to construction of a vault-type room or strong room. A strong room is an interior space enclosed by or separated from other similar spaces by walls, ceiling, and floor constructed of solid building materials, with no windows and only one entrance. Strong room doors should be of heavy-gauge metal construction or of solid hardwood reinforced with a metal plate on the inside. Door louvers and baffle plates (if used) should be reinforced with 9-gauge, 2-inch-square wire mesh fastened on the interior side of the door. Heavy-duty hardware should be used in constructing a strong room door; and all screws, nuts, bolts, hasps, hinges, pins, and the like should be securely fastened. The door should be set into a suitable frame in the same manner as previously described for installation of personnel doors. Where air-conditioning or heating ducts pass over or through the strong room or where sewers or tunnels may pass under this space (and they are of a size and shape large enough to accommodate a small person), they should be equipped with personnel barriers. Duct barriers should be constructed of heavy-gauge wire mesh securely fastened to the duct by welding. For sewers and utilities tunnels, effective barriers can be constructed of steel bars or rods, 1/4-inch in diameter, extending across the width of the pipe or tunnel with a maximum spacing of 6 inches between the bars.The ends of these bars or rods should be firmly anchored to prevent removal and, where the vertical and horizontal bars or rods meet, they should be welded together. In effect, this forms a very substantial grillwork that cannot be easily defeated.

Emergency Doors While some may argue that emergency doors have no place in a maximum security setting, their use is mandated most of the time. If a facility is of a certain size or employs a certain number of people, it must by statute provide a specific number of emergency exits. In the maximum security environment, these should be kept to the minimum required by law. Their number and location depend on many variables, such as the type of work being performed in the building and the work space configuration (or partitioning) within the building. To ensure that emergency exits do not diminish the effectiveness of the maximum security measures in place, the following questions must be answered: 1. Where are the emergency exits located with respect to the assets being protected?

Physical Barriers

2. What type of emergency exit door (including hinges, locking mechanism, frame, anchoring, etc.) are installed? 3. Into what areas do the emergency exits allow personnel to pass? 4. Do the doors have alarms? If particularly valuable or strategic material is processed or ordinarily handled near an emergency exit, the possibility of diversion of this material through the door is very real. It is relatively easy for a dishonest employee to hide quantities of the material during an emergency evacuation or drill and cache it outside the facility for later retrieval. The possibility must be considered. There are no hard and fast rules relative to the construction of emergency doors and hinges and methods of mounting. The obvious choice would be doors, hinges, and frames of construction and quality equal to the other security doors in use at a facility. It naturally follows that, if a high-security door is procured, the method of mounting should not negate the money spent on its purchase. The only element of an emergency exit over which there is little if any control is its locking mechanism. Most ordinances covering the use of emergency exits and devices are fairly specific in requiring the use of a panic bar locking mechanism. The type of panic bar usually encountered on emergency exit doors is most susceptible to defeat by an adversary using a simple wire hook or coat hanger. To maintain security of the exit, some people have chained or otherwise locked (from both sides) emergency exits. This can have disastrous consequences such as those experienced during the fire at the Coconut Grove nightclub in Boston, where nearly 500 lives were lost because the exit doors were locked. Methods are available, however, to ensure that exit doors keep people out but allow the safe exit of those inside. One system provides overlapping sections fastened to stiles that meet and overlap when the door closes. The stiles close the gaps around the door so that prying tools cannot be forced through to trip the panic bar. None of the equipment is exposed, so would-be intruders cannot push it out of the way. When the panic bar is depressed, however, the barrier springs free and the door opens easily. As added security, the hinges are tamper resistant, which makes defeat by removing them quite difficult. Another type of panic bar emergency device eliminates the bar that can be easily tripped and replaces it with a rim device that is not as likely to be snagged by a coat hanger.

155

At most facilities, emergency exits allow personnel to exit into parking lots, alleyways, or city streets. When evacuation is necessary, however, people should be channeled by physical barriers to a central assembly area that is under the control of the security department. Personnel should not be allowed to exit into a parking lot, alley, or street. To allow this could facilitate employee theft or diversion of the assets being protected or could lead to a breach in the security system by an insider who would allow accomplices to enter the facility and plunder it. In addition to employing physical barriers to move evacuating employees to a controlled safe area, the security department should be organized to provide some sort of monitoring of the evacuation process and routes to ensure that stolen or diverted material is not passed through or thrown over a fence to an accomplice or for later retrieval. Alarms on emergency exit doors should be mandatory. Not only should the door have a locally annunciating alarm, but it must be tied into the facility’s central alarm station. In this way, each alarm system backs up the others. To ensure positive performance, these alarm systems must be periodically checked. It is suggested that a check at least twice a day of both systems be implemented. In addition, each emergency exit door be affixed with a tamperindicating seal (or seals) (Figure 9-4) and these should be checked each time the alarm system is checked.

Roofs In arriving at a design for a maximum-security roof (or ceiling), the most obvious and simplest solution would appear to be to use the same specifications and technology employed in construction of the high-security walls in this space or building. However, some considerations must be made that are not instrumental in wall design: 1. How much loading will this roof or ceiling be subjected to? 2. If this is a ceiling in a multistory facility, will the space directly above the protected area be covered by a trained and suitably equipped member of the security force or by a sophisticated alarm system that annunciates locally and at a remote monitoring station staffed around the clock? 3. Will the integrity of the roof or ceiling be broken by piping, ductwork, or access hatches? 4. Will any portion of the roof be accessible from outside the protected area or, conversely,

156


Figure 9-4. Tamper-indicating door seals: (a) serially numbered tape type, (b) serially numbered heavy wire and plastic type, (c) serially numbered plastic strip type.

grant access outside the protected area from inside it? 5. Will the roof or ceiling have alarms, monitored by security officers or CCTV, equipped with adequate lighting to permit proper assessment, and not provide places of concealment for intruders, such as air-conditioning units, exhaust fan hoods, or smoke pipes? These and many more site-specific questions must be worked out between the building architect or room designer and the person responsible for ensuring the degree of security necessary. Officials involved in the preliminary planning stages of the construction of a new facility or upgrading of an existing one into the maximum security class must include the company security director. This individual should be prepared to discuss these matters with the staff and obtain input of the personnel who have day-to-day responsibility for being sure that the system works. If the facility is part of a corporation that may have installations of this type in other locations, a visit to one or more of these sites by the security staff pays handsome dividends in avoiding mistakes that may plague others. Careful and imaginative planning eliminates costly (and embarrassing) oversights that may require considerable time, effort, and expense to rectify. The prime requisite of any roof in a maximum security setting is its ability to withstand or defeat attempts at forced entry. The roof most commonly selected is usually constructed of poured concrete, approximately 51/2 inches thick with steel reinforcing rods on 8 ¥ 12-inch centers embedded in the center of the concrete slab. In tests of resistance to forced entry, it was found that 4 pounds of bulk explosives

and 20-pound bolt cutters required only 2.8 ± 0.4 minutes to effect penetration.11 Another type of roof construction often found in industry and government buildings consists of 16-gauge sheet metal placed on ribbed steel decking, covered by 2 inches of insulation followed by a final covering of a 1/2 inch of asphalt and gravel. Using a 10-pound fire axe and a 5-pound shovel, penetration was achieved in 2.3 ± 0.7 minutes. In a test of this same type of roof construction, 20 pounds of Jet-Axe JA-I charge and equipment affected penetration in 0.8 ± 0.2 minutes.12 The conclusion reached in the study from which these results are drawn is that, despite quite a few variations in the types of materials and the manner in which they may be assembled, all can be defeated in about a minute with a few pounds of appropriate explosive. The obvious answer, therefore, is to construct the best roof possible but prevent anyone from reaching it by establishing a protected area around the building, then providing adequate assessment capabilities, alarms, and the like to detect anyone who may manage to penetrate the protected area. If the construction of a strong room is being considered within an existing maximum security setting, there are several combinations of commonly available materials from which to fabricate a homogeneous roof or ceiling that provides significant resistance to forcible entry. The creation of this roof or ceiling is well within the capabilities of any commercial carpenter with assistance from a sheet metal shop. In tests conducted by the Civil Engineering Laboratory of the Navy Construction Battalion Center, the best composite material consists of 0.10-inch sheets of 6061T6 aluminum over 1/2-inch plywood on both sides of an 19-gauge 304 stainless steel sheet. In laboratory

Physical Barriers

tests,13 a panel constructed in this manner was subjected to attack by a 71/4-inch circular saw equipped with a metal cutting blade and an oxy-acetylene torch; the average rate of linear progression was 3.06 inches per minute. Switching over to the circular saw with metal cutting blade, 22 seconds passed without complete penetration. In all cases, large quantities of smoke were generated, as the saw blades and stainless steel sheet became extremely hot. Subsequent tests indicated that an abrasive blade on the saw was ineffective. To defeat attempts simply to disassemble the roof when the composite is assembled into standard-sized panels and then used as conventional building materials, the substrate should be laid in a random pattern to avoid the neat layering of edges through all the various materials. The components can be bonded together through the use of nuts and bolts, screws, tempered screw-nails, or ringed nails; however, the nuts and bolts should be peened to prevent removal and the heads of the screws should be ground for the same purpose. Although someone could shear off the nail heads, the holding action of the nail shanks would still present a formidable task to anyone inclined to attempt to peel the roof. If this type of composite is used, it must be remembered that it would be covered by insulation and probably several different layers of weatherproof roofing. This additional material would add substantially to the penetration resistance of such a roof. Its use is not recommended, however, in the construction of a roof that has no alarm, is not easily visible to the guard force or well lighted, or is close to or part of the protected area perimeter. As previously indicated, this material would be suitable inside an already protected installation or could be used in small, low buildings located well within a protected area.

Upgrading Existing Roofs When the company security department is faced with the task of upgrading an in-place facility, the task becomes many times harder. The installation of alarms, lights, doors, walls, gates, and many other security responsibilities must be considered. Before upgrading the roof of an existing facility, the security director must climb up there and have a firsthand look. What can be seen? Do fire escapes allow access to the roof? Are there roof hatches, skylights, ducts, piping, air-conditioning units, strong and firmly attached downspouts, coamings (which could anchor a grappling hook)?

157

Once you have made an assessment of the roof’s liabilities, consult the individual responsible for maintaining plant services (usually the chief of maintenance or of the physical plant) and ascertain which of these potential access points are essential to plant operations. If the plant site is an old building, many of these potential problems can be eliminated as the elements are nonfunctional, having been replaced by more modern equipment, but remain in place simply because they plug a hole that would be left in the roof by their removal. Once a decision is made as to which appurtenances can be removed, the subsequent hole should be rehabilitated so that the physical integrity and strength of the repair is no less than that of any other part of the original and undamaged roof structure. Low, flat roofs that might be susceptible to scaling through use of a grappling hook should have shielding installed behind the coaming to prevent the hook from finding a secure anchor. This need not be anything more exotic than panels of heavy-gauge sheet metal. These can be anchored to the lip of the coaming and roof and angled back toward the roof to form an inclined plane up which the hook rides right back over the edge (Figure 9-5). Another possibility that may be worthy of consideration, especially for facilities situated in remote areas, is attack by helicopter. If the roof of the main building or the building that would be the attackers’ objective is flat, and thus suitable for landing a helicopter, or even if it is not flat but is suitable for landing an attack force from a hovering helicopter, consideration should be given to installing one or more tall, lightweight metal light poles to the roof. These prevent the helicopter from landing or coming close enough to the roof to discharge personnel. These poles could also support area floodlights that would light the protected area and rooftop. In addition, flagpoles, radio communications antennas, tall chimneys and exhaust stacks, or guy wires prevent attack by such a strategem.

Floors In most buildings, the floor is probably the least thought of part of the total security package. It exists to provide a smooth, dry working surface and as a base on which the building may be erected floor by floor. True? Ordinarily, this would be a good thumbnail description of the purposes of flooring; however, in a maximum security installation, the same amount of thought devoted to design of the walls and roof must be allotted to the floor. A typical floor is usually

158


Figure 9-5. Grappling hook shielding.

constructed of poured concrete, 6–8 inches thick, reinforced with rebar steel rods or 6-inch square mesh of no. 10 wire. Floors constructed in this manner are adequate for most facilities; however, penetration time by one or two adversaries using explosives, sledgehammers, and bolt cutters in any combination averages 2–4 minutes.14 This penetration time does not take into account the time spent in arriving at the site, setting up for the penetration, retreat time (if explosives are to be used), and crawl-through. If the target is located in a multistory building, the attempted penetration may come from above or below, and therefore the floor in the space above the target site must provide an amount of resistance equivalent to that of the other security features. How can existing floors similar to those described be afforded an additional measure of penetration resistance? The most obvious answer would be to increase the floor’s thickness by adding additional layers of rebar, reinforcing wire, and poured concrete. This simplistic solution should not be implemented lightly, as the addition of what may amount to quite a number of tons of weight to a structure that was not originally designed for this additional weight could present a very real personnel safety hazard. If this is the only feasible solution, a competent engineering firm should analyze the situation and design the necessary additional supporting columns or beams to ensure an adequate margin of safety. If the cost of accomplishing a complicated building redesign and renovation as briefly described here is not possible, an alternative may be to relocate the objective to a ground floor or perhaps even into a below-ground location. If the target is relocated to ground level, it should be placed away from exterior walls, preferably toward the center of the structure with several intervening walls between it and any exte-

Figure 9-6. I-beam application to floors. (Courtesy of U.S. Army Material Systems Analysis Activity.)

rior wall (that is, layered; see Figure 9-2). If a basement or utility space is under the site selected for relocation, it should be sealed off or provided with sophisticated alarms to preclude entry from that point. An interesting method of tremendously increasing the penetration resistance of a wall that is adaptable to floors (and ceilings) would be to anchor steel I-beams into the concrete walls, interlocking as many additional beams as necessary across the width of the floor (or ceiling). These beams are covered with a simple overlaid wooden floor, which are tiled or carpeted as required. Figure 9-6 shows how this hardening method would appear in cross section.15 Properly installed, the I-beams would increase the penetration resistance time to approximately 2–4 hours. The additional weight, however, restricts the use of such a hardening or protection method to new construction or a facility in which the proper steps have been taken to ensure that the total system has been properly engineered.

Fences Fences are used to 1. Define a particular area 2. Preclude inadvertent or accidental entry into the area

Physical Barriers

159

Table 9-2. Penetration Aids Item Canvas sheet Cutters Steps Wire hooks Long hooks Ladder Extension ladder Pry bar Plywood Carpet Plank

Description

How Used

6 ¥ 8-foot folded sheet Bolt cutters, wire cutters, tin snips 18-inch iron rods bent into step form 6–12-inch lengths of stiff wire bent into hooks 3-inch rods bent into hooks 7-foot stepladder 20-foot ladder hinged in the middle to form an A 10-foot 2 ¥ 4 or piece of 2-inch pipe 4 ¥ 8-foot sheet of 3/8-inch plywood 4 ¥ 15-foot heavy carpet rolled up on a 5-foot 4 ¥ 4 Two 8-foot 2 ¥ 2 planks with a nail in one end

Thrown over top of fence to aid climbing To cut fence fabric, barbed wire, or tape Hooked into fence fabric and used as climbing aids To hold barbed tape to fence to aid climbing To pull down barbed tape topping to aid climbing To jump over fence To cross over combination barbed tape-fence barriers To lift fence fabric to aid crawling underneath fence To put over barbed tape to aid crossing To throw over fence to aid climbing To lift caret roll over fence

Source: From the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Bureau of Standards.

3. Prevent or delay unauthorized entry 4. Control (or channel) pedestrian and vehicular traffic In a maximum security setting, fences are not the ideal barrier (Table 9-2); walls of solid construction should be used for these purposes. It is recognized, however, that walls are often undesirable or impractical, and fences are the most viable alternative. The type of fence used in a maximum security setting should be chosen after careful analysis of many factors. Based on determination of the objectives it will serve, additional questions should be answered: 1. Will one fence be enough or will two or more in a series be required? 2. Will there be vehicle barriers in conjunction with the fence? 3. How far will the fence be from the area of chief concern? 4. What will be the closest area of concealment to the fence? 5. Will the fence have alarms? Environmental conditions certainly affect the design of a fence system and should be considered; for example, 1. Will erosion under the fence be a problem? 2. Will corrosion of the fence be a problem? 3. What natural features or vegetation around the fence might interfere with detection or assessment of activity in the area? Selection of the kind of fence does not stop at a choice of fabric; decisions must be made as to height,

the means of anchoring the posts and bottom, and the type of topping. If two or more fences are to be installed, what, if anything, will be placed between them and what will be the distance between them? Finally, considering the kinds of tools likely to be required for penetration, what will be the total penetration time for all fences and obstacles? Once these questions are answered, planning can commence. The type most frequently encountered is no. 11 American wire gauge or heavier, with 2-inch mesh openings, 7 feet in height, topped by 3 strands of barbwire or -tape evenly spaced 6 inches apart and angled outward 30–45° from the vertical. This type of fence can be breached in 4.3 ± 0.3 seconds using no material aids, but with the assistance of one person not crossing.16 To increase the penetration time of this fence to 8.4 ± 1 seconds, it is necessary to install V-shaped overhangs with concertina barbwire or -tape inside the V.17 The types of fences described can be driven through in a light pickup truck in 2 ± 1 seconds with no significant damage to the truck.18 Less frequently encountered fences include the Vfence, which consists of 3-inch posts set at an angle of 60° in 30-inch diameter by 24-inch high concrete footings 12 inches below grade. The posts are in 10foot centers and staggered 5 feet front to back. The chain link mesh is 10 feet high with a cable installed at the top. A corrugated steel sheet is placed on the outside posts to prevent crawling under. Nine rolls of GPBTO (general purpose barbed tape obstacle) are used inside the V to delay crawl-through. All rolls are secured to the chain link mesh with wire ties. Cutting through this fence takes about 4

160


minutes. Climb-over takes only 40 seconds, using ladders and bridges as breaching aids.19 This fence can be equipped with razor ribbon instead of GPBTO, with a second sheet of corrugated steel attached to the inside posts to form a V-shaped trough filled with 2- to 5-inch rocks and 9-inch diameter telephone poles, and with 6 rolls of barbed tape concertina. Thus outfitted, it offers penetration resistance of 10 minutes for digging and crawling under. Climb-over times are similar to those of the V-fence previously described. While personnel penetration cannot be prevented, breaching by a vehicle is almost impossible for the latter type of V-fence.20 Regardless of how elaborate fences may be, they still offer only a modicum of security. Fences are necessary, but investment in this area should be kept to a minimum as the money can be better used on other components of the total system. In a maximum security environment, certain things must be kept in mind regarding the use of fences. Height should be a preliminary consideration. The higher the fence, the better is the chance of defeating a climb-over by personnel using the most simple breaching aids. Whenever a fence is used in a maximum security system, the method of anchoring it is very important. No matter how sophisticated the fence may be, if the fabric can be pried from ground level using a 2 ¥ 4 or similar breaching aid, it is nearly useless. According to the Barrier Technology Handbook,21

(about 3–6 inches) in concrete would virtually preclude crawl-under. Another alternative would be to anchor the bottom of the fence fabric with 3-inch reinforcing rods to precast concrete sills 81/2 feet long, 10 inches high, and 3 inches wide. Each still is buried under the fence fabric, between posts, with 3 inches of sill above ground and the reinforcing rods from the sill bent around the fence fabric. This method is effective in that it takes less time to cut through or climb over the fence that it does to separate the fabric from the reinforcing rods.23 Topping a fence with barbwire or -tape is another consideration, The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requires protected area fences to be topped with at least three strands of barbwire angled outward at a 30–45° angle. As previously mentioned, this particular topping does very little to preclude climb-overs. A somewhat better topping is GPBTO, often called razor ribbon. It is intimidating in appearance and thus offers a psychological deterrent to less than determined adversaries. In actuality, however, the use of breaching aids generally improves penetration times for barbed-tape-topped fences. The Barrier Technology Handbook states:24

The time required to go under a fence is only slightly longer than the time required to climb a fence without a barbed tape topping but is significantly shorter than the time required to climb a fence with a barbed tape topping when only limited aids are used.

Generally, the addition of any barbwire or barbed-tape topping does not significantly increase penetration resistance. An intruder who is discouraged from climbing over and crawling under will probably choose to go through the fence. Cutting through the fence generally takes more time than climbing over or crawling under. Once again, the fact that the bottom portion of the fabric is securely anchored increases penetration time. If the bottom is not anchored, “it takes only a single row of approximately 12 to 15 cuts to make a man-sized opening. Anchoring the fence in

Penetration time can be doubled by the addition of a bottom rail (Figure 9-7).22 Many fences are constructed so that the bottom of the fabric either touches the ground or is no more than 2 inches above ground level. Without some method of anchoring this fabric, crawl-under is quite simple. If cost is no obstacle, burying the lower portion of the fabric

The fastest penetration times for barbed tape–topped fences were achieved when a piece of carpeting was thrown over the fence. The carpet was made by nailing the end of 4 feet wide by 15 feet long heavy carpet to a 5 feet long 4 ¥ 4 and then rolling the carpet around the 4 ¥ 4.

Figure 9-7. Bottom fence rail.

Physical Barriers

161

concrete doubles the cutting time.”25 To double the cutting time through chain link fence, it is necessary to fasten another layer of fabric to the inside of the fence.26 Yet another way of increasing cut-through time would be to interlace metal or wood lattice in the fabric. This technique, however, significantly reduces visibility and should not be used when the fence is the single component of a perimeter protection system. (Fences should never be the single component of a perimeter protection system in a maximum security environment.)

Entry and Exit Points Entry and exit must be considered when erecting a security fence. The first criterion should be that the integrity of all gates and doors be the same as or better than that of the fence in which they are installed. Entry and exit points should be kept to the minimum number necessary to maintain compliance with governmental or company mandates. Gates should open out if at all possible. Many swing in and out and should be modified accordingly. They should be equipped with a jamb or frame to strengthen the integrity of the opening. The most common types are swing gates and sliding gates with variations. Most vehicular gates have access roads aimed directly at them, thus facilitating vehicle intrusions. Penetration resistance of most fabric-type gates is equivalent to that of the fence in which they are installed. Vehicle drive-through is easier at a gate than at any other part of the fence. The use of metal doors set in jambs rather than gates offers a somewhat higher degree of penetration resistance but the cost is usually not worth it, although for emergency fence doors this should be mandatory. For any emergency door in a perimeter fence, opening should be facilitated by a panic bar on the inside. Emergency doors should be locked and the panic bars installed so that an intruder cannot use the bar to open the door from the outside. Although access controls are discussed in Chapter 10, it should be noted that any opening of perimeter fence doors or gates should be controlled and monitored. Another method of controlling pedestrian traffic through fences is by use of turnstile gates. Penetration time (by deactivating electrical controls or forcible entry) is approximately 1 minute. When installed in a common chain link fence, an adversary would probably choose to breach the fence rather than the turnstile gate.

Figure 9-8. Bridle.

The weak link in a gate is usually the hardware: hinges and locks. Fence gate locks should be accessible only from the inside. Built-in locks depend on fence alignment for effectiveness and should be supplemented with a piece of case-hardened or stainless steel chain and padlock. The chain should be wrapped around the fencepost and gatepost until it is as tight as possible, and padlocked; no slack should be left in the chain. Where possible, stainless steel cable should be used, as it tends to flatten out when attacked with bolt cutters and is somewhat difficult to defeat. A bridle can be made from 3/8- to 1/2inch stranded stainless steel cable, looped on both ends using NiccoPress fasteners (Figure 9-8). Bridles can be used in conjunction with case-hardened padlocks for a variety of purposes. A double-leaf swing gate should be securely anchored where both leaves meet by a solid foot bolt, several feet long, on each leaf that is dropped into a steel anchoring hole in the ground (Figure 99). The addition of a chain or cable and padlock enhances the gate’s security. Because fences are not the ideal physical barriers in a maximum security environment, their usefulness is limited. Their primary function should be to simply define a particular area.

Walls and Moats In designing a maximum security perimeter barrier system where cost is no object, the most penetrationresistant structure is a thick, high wall. Walls, however, do not allow free visual access to the area outside. A possible alternative is the modern equivalent of the medieval moat. It completely surrounds

162


Figure 9-9. Double-leaf gate drop bolts.

the protected area, and all entry and exit points are bridged with either fixed or movable structures. These points can be kept to the absolute minimum and controlled around the clock. They can also be equipped with methods of preventing breach by ramming with a vehicle. The moat would be of the dry type and equipped with a suitable drainage system. It would be at least 8 feet deep and measure a minimum of 10 feet from edge to edge. To increase protection, a standard chain link fence topped with an outrigger equipped with three strands of GPBTO would be positioned at the inner edge. This would be attached in such a way that there would be little or no lip that could be used to support a ladder or serve as a working platform for someone attempting to cut through the fence fabric. The fence posts would be a minimum of 3 inches in diameter and concrete filled. Top rails would not be used. The strong fence posts would maintain the longitudinal rigidity required, but by omitting the top rail stiffener, a degree of instability is introduced that would increase protection by making it difficult for someone to secure a good anchor point for a bridge or from which to work to penetrate the area. The bottom edge of the fence fabric would be embedded in the concrete at the time the moat lining is poured, to prevent entry by prying up the fabric and crawling under. The specification of moat depth and width can be reached only when integrated into the total barrier design. A minimum depth of 8 feet is recommended as this would require a larger ladder to reach from the moat bottom to the top of the fence. Such a

ladder would be bulky and difficult to maneuver and could not easily be hidden if it must be brought to the planned penetration site on foot. An 8-foot depth also serves as a definite deterrent to anyone contemplating penetration by crashing through the fence with a vehicle. Any commonly available tracked vehicle, including a bulldozer, would be unable to climb out of the moat due to this depth and the 90° wall angle. A minimum width of 10 feet is recommended, as this would preclude the use of uncomplicated bridges such as a 4 ¥ 8-foot sheet of 3 /4-inch plywood. To prevent a ladder (modified by the addition of hooks or steel rods to one end) from being used as a bridge by hooking or inserting the modified end into the fence, an aluminum or galvanized steel sheet would be attached to the outside of the fence to a height of 3 feet. This ladder could still be used as a bridge by hooking it into the fence fabric above this plate, but the angle and the unsteadiness would provide a very unstable work platform. The easiest way to bridge this type of perimeter barrier would be with a 20-foot extension ladder modified so that the upper end has a hook attached to the end of each leg. To use it, the ladder would be extended to its full height then allowed to fall across the moat so that the hooks would fall behind the top of the fence fabric. Once the hooks were in position, the ladder would form an inclined plane over which the adversaries could climb or crawl and drop to the ground inside the protected area. This type of entry can, however, be defeated by a double moat system, which is nothing more than a second 8-foot ¥ 10-foot (or larger) moat immediately adjacent to the first with the previously specified fence installed between them on a 12to 15-inch-thick reinforced concrete wall. The fence would be topped with a Y-type of barbed tape standoff with concertina tape installed in the center of the Y as well as on either side of the outrigger arms. On either fence, a motion detection system would be required, as would a detection system located between 10 and 15 feet beyond and parallel to the second moat. To prevent the inadvertent entry of personnel and wildlife, an outer-perimeter chain link fence 8 feet high and topped with three strands of GPBTO could be installed. Depending on the amount of property available, this fence would be located a minimum of 25 feet from the outer edge of the first moat. In our example, cost is not a factor; the objective is to use fencing and other physical as a first line of defense. As previously mentioned, our preference is the use of walls rather than fences.

Physical Barriers

Topography The natural deterrence offered by topography, while of often limited value, should be taken into consideration when designing or upgrading a facility to the maximum security level. Rivers and other large bodies of water, swamps, escarpments, deserts, and so forth are all examples of natural obstacles that may be used in various ways. Probably the most famous examples of the optimal use of natural barriers were the prisons on Alcatraz Island in California and the French penal colony on Devil’s Island located off the coast of (then) French Guiana. The physical barriers used to contain the prisoners in these facilities were usually enough to discourage escape attempts. Even if they might be defeated, however, the escapee was still left with no way off the island except by using materials at hand or (in the case of Alcatraz) attempting to swim to freedom. Although both prisons were in operation for many years, only a very few escapes were ever successful. When a facility has a river or other large body of water as a boundary, the natural obstacle may be used in conjunction with more traditional fences as a deterrent. The clear view of the approach route across these areas would discourage an adversary from attempting an approach from that direction, especially if faced with sophisticated alarms and barriers around the objective. In a remote or isolated area, a river or large body of water abutting the site could also serve as adversary approach or escape routes, turning these nominal topographic barriers into liabilities against which additional protection means or procedures must be provided. The advantage offered by a desert environment is similar to that provided by a natural water barrier. As with water obstacles, the possibility of an unseen approach across a barren landscape is very slim. The advantages of isolation and early detection are outweighed by the fact that approach or escape might be accomplished across the very feature that seems to offer some degree of protection, from any direction. Swamps, while not usually a consideration in a maximum security setting, could conceivably be encountered. The principal advantage offered by marshy terrain is its impenetrability to usual forms of ground transportation. The most practical setting for a facility in a swampy area would be at the center of the swamp with only one access road. In the event of successful penetration of the facility, this access road could be blocked to contain the adversaries until outside assistance arrives at the scene.

163

The security offered by a deep forest should also be considered. When a facility is located in a remote area of dense forest, with very limited and controlled access routes, this remoteness discourages all but the most determined adversaries. As with the natural barriers provided by swamps, forest locations require adversaries to forego the usual methods of transportation when access routes are limited and controlled. This might mean they have to walk in, carrying all the equipment and arms they believe necessary for the successful completion of their mission. In addition, their escape plan must be structured to require, as the last resort, escape by foot. Depending on the remoteness of the objectives, the terrain to be encountered, and the climatic conditions prevailing, these difficulties, when considered above and beyond the resistance to be expected from the on-site security personnel, could force the adversaries to choose another course of action and shift their attention to a more vulnerable target. In summary, natural barriers may be efficiently incorporated into a total security system only when effective, round-the-clock monitoring of these approach areas by a security guard or CCTV system is provided.

References 1. Barrier Penetration Database, Revision 1 (Upton, NY: Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1978), p. 17. 2. Ibid., p. 18. 3. Hardening Existing SSNM Storage Facilities, Preliminary Report (Aberdeen, MD: U.S. Army Material Systems Analysis Activity, 1979), p. 33. 4. Barrier Penetration Database, p. 15. 5. Hardening Existing SSNM Storage Facilities, p. 31. 6. Technical Memorandum No. 61-78-9. (Port Hueneme, CA: Civil Engineering Laboratory, Naval Construction Battalion Center). 7. Barrier Technology Handbook, 77-0777 (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia Laboratories, 1978). 8. Barrier Penetration Database, p. 17. 9. Barrier Technology Handbook. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. Technical Memorandum No. 51-78-04 (Port Hueneme, CA: Civil Engineering Laboratory, Naval Construction Battalion Center, 1977). 14. Hardening Existing SSNM Storage Facilities, p. A-6.

164

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.


Ibid., diagram 5. Barrier Penetration Database, p. 8. Ibid., p. 9. Ibid., p. 8. Barrier Technology Handbook, paragraph 3.5.4. Ibid., paragraph 3.7.4.3.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

Ibid., pp. 78–79. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 77. Ibid., p. 79. Ibid., p. 80.

Chapter 10 The Use of Locks in Physical Crime Prevention* JAMES M. EDGAR and WILLIAM D. MCINERNEY, AHC, CPP

Lock Terminology and Components The effectiveness of any locking system depends on a combination of interrelated factors involved in the design, manufacture, installation, and maintenance of the system. A prevention specialist needs to understand the weaknesses and strengths of the various systems, and know how each must be used to achieve maximum benefit from its application. This requires a thorough understanding of the inner workings of the various types of locks. It is not sufficient to know what in someone’s opinion is a good lock. A good lock today may not be as good tomorrow as technology improves and manufactures alter their designs and production techniques. A lock that is excellent in some applications may be undesirable in others. A knowledge of the basic principles of locking systems will enable a preventions specialist to evaluate any lock and determine its quality and its effectiveness in a particular application.

Key-Operated Mechanisms A key-operated mechanical lock uses some sort of arrangement of internal physical barriers (wards, tumblers) which prevent the lock from operating

* Permission obtained from National Crime Prevention Institute, School of Justice Administration, University of Louisville.

unless they are properly aligned. The key is the device used to align these internal barriers so that the lock may be operated. The lock itself is ordinarily permanently installed. The key is a separate piece which is designed to be removed from the lock to prevent unauthorized use. Three types of key-operated locks will be introduced in this section: disc or wafer tumbler, pin tumbler, and lever.

Tumbler Mechanisms A tumbler mechanism is any lock mechanism having movable, variable elements (the tumblers) which depend on the proper key (or keys) to arrange these tumblers into a straight line, permitting the lock to operate. The tumbler, which may be a disc, a lever or a pin is the lock barrier element which provides security against improper keys or manipulation. The specific key which operates the mechanism (which is called the change key) has a particular combination of cuts, or bittings, which match the arrangement of the tumblers in the lock. The combination of tumblers usually can be changed periodically by inserting a new tumbler arrangement in the lock and cutting a new key to fit this changed combination. This capability provides additional security by protecting against lost or stolen keys. Tumbler mechanisms and the keys that operate them are produced to specifications which vary with 165

166


Figure 10-1. The spacing or position of each cut on the key is a fixed dimension corresponding to the position of each tumbler in the lock.

Figure 10-2. The depth interval (increment) of the steps of each cut or bitting is a fixed dimension.

each manufacturer and among the different models produced by each manufacturer. These specifications are known as the code of the lock mechanism. The coding for each mechanism provides specifications for both the fixed and variable elements of the lock assembly. Fixed specifications include: 䊉

䊉

䊉

The dimensions of each of the component parts of the lock and the established clearance between each part (e.g., the size and length of the key must match the size and depth of the keyway) The spacing of each tumbler position and their relation to each other (Figure 10-1) The depth intervals or increments in the steps of each cut or bitting (Figure 10-2)

The relationship between the dimensions of the tumblers and the bitting on the key is shown for a typical pin tumbler mechanism in Figure 10-3. These codes provide a locksmith with dimensions and specifications to produce a specific key to operate a particular lock or to key additional locks to the combination of a particular key. The different arrangements of the tumblers permitted in a lock series are its combinations. The theoretical or mathematical number of possible combinations available in a specific model or type of lock depends on the number of tumblers used and the number of depth intervals or steps possible for each tumbler. If the lock had only one tumbler which could be any of 10 lengths, the lock would have a total of 10 combinations. If it had two tumblers, it would have a possible total of 100 (10 ¥ 10) combi-

Figure 10-3. The depth of each cut corresponds to the length of each tumbler in the lock.

nations. With three tumblers, 1000 (10 ¥ 10 ¥ 10) combinations are possible. If all five tumblers were used, the lock would have a possible 100,000 combinations. The number of mathematically possible combinations for any lock can be determined by this method. Due to a number of mechanical and design factors, however, not all of these theoretically possible (implied) combinations can actually be used. Some combinations allow the key to be removed from the lock before the tumblers are properly aligned (shedding combinations)—something that should not be possible with a properly combinated tumbler lock. Others, such as equal depth combinations, are avoided by the manufacturers. Some

The Use of Locks in Physical Crime Prevention

167

Figure 10-4. The key slots in the discs correspond to the cuts, or bittings, cut in the key. Note how each cut in the key will align its corresponding disc in a straight line with the others.

combinations result in a weakened key which is prone to break off in the lock. Others are excluded because the space from one cut in the key erodes the space or positioning of adjacent cuts. The combinations which remain after all of these possibilities have been removed are called useful combinations. The useful combinations which are actually employed in the manufacture of the lock series are the basis for the bitting chart which lists the total combinations used in a particular type of model or lock. When other factors are equal, the more combinations that can actually be used in a lock, the greater its security. Total useful combinations range from one for certain types of warded locks to millions for a few high-security tumbler key mechanisms.

Disc or Wafer Tumbler Mechanisms Disc tumbler mechanisms consist of three separate parts; the keys, the cylinder plug, and the cylinder shell (or housing) (Figure 10-4). The plug contains the tumblers, which are usually spring-loaded flat plates that move up and down in slots cut through the diameter of the plug. Variably dimensioned key slots are cut into each tumbler. When no key is inserted or an improper key is used, one or more tumblers will extend through the sides of the plug into either the top or bottom locking grooves cut into the cylinder shell, firmly locking the plug to the shell. This prevents the plug from rotating in the shell to

operate the lock. The proper change key has cuts or bittings to match the variations of the tumblers. When inserted, the key aligns all of the tumblers in a straight line at the edge of the cylinder plug (the shear line) so that no tumbler extends into the shell. This permits the plug to rotate. Disc mechanisms generally provide only moderate security with limited key changes or combinations. Depth intervals commonly used are from 0.015 to 0.030 inches, which permit no more than four or five depths for each tumbler position. Some models used as many as six tumblers. The more commonly found five-tumbler mechanism which allows five depth increments for each tumbler position would have a maximum of 3125 implied combinations. The number of useful combinations would, of course, be considerably fewer for the reasons indicated earlier. Some added security is provided by the common, although not universal, use of warded and paracentric keyways which help protect against incorrect keys and manipulation. Nevertheless, most of these locks may be manipulated or picked fairly easily by a person with limited skills. In addition, the variations cut into the tumblers can be sight read with some practice while the lock is installed. Sight reading involves manipulating the tumblers with a thin wire and noting the relative positions of each tumbler in the keyway. Since each lock has only a limited number of possible tumbler increments, the correct arrangement of these increments can be

168


Figure 10-5. Basic pin tumbler cylinder lock mechanism.

estimated with fair accuracy, permitting a key to be filed or cut on the spot to operate the lock.

Pin Tumbler Mechanisms The pin tumbler mechanism is the most common type of key-operated mechanism used in architectural or builders’ (door) hardware in the United States. The security afforded by this mechanism ranges from fair in certain inexpensive cylinders with wide tolerances and a minimum of tumblers to excellent with several makes of high-security cylinders, including those that are listed by Underwriters Laboratories as manipulation- and pick-resistant. The lock operates very much like disc tumbler mechanisms (see Figure 10-5). The locking system itself consists of a key, a cylinder plug, and a cylinder shell or housing. Rather than using discs, the mechanism uses pins as the basis interior barrier. Each lock contains an equal number of upper tumbler pins (drivers) and lower tumbler pins (key pins). The proper key has cuts or bittings to match the length of the lower pins. When it is inserted, the tops of the key pins are aligned flush with the top of the cylinder plug at the shear line. The plug may then rotate to lock or unlock the mechanism. When the key is withdrawn, the drivers are pushed by springs into the cylinder plus, pushing the key pins ahead of them until the key pins are seated at the bottom of the pin chamber.The drivers extending into the plug prevent it from rotating (Figure 10-6). If an improper key is inserted, at least one key pin will be pushed into the shell, or one driver will extend into the plug. In either case, the pin extending past the shear line binds the plug to the shell. One or more key pins may be aligned at the shear line by

an incorrect key, but all will be aligned only when the proper key is used. Depth intervals commonly used for pin tumbler cylinders vary from 0.0125 to 0.020 inches. These intervals allow between 5 and 10 depths for each tumbler position. The number of pins used ranges from three to eight—five or six being the most common number. Maximum useful combinations for most standard pin tumbler cylinders (assuming eight tumbler depth increments) are as follows: three pin tumblers approximately four pin tumblers approximately five pin tumblers approximately six pin tumblers approximately

130 combinations 1025 combinations 8200 combinations 65500 combinations

These estimates assume that the useful combinations amount to no more than 23% of the mathematically possible combinations. Many common pin tumbler locks use fewer than eight increments, so the number of useful combinations for a specific lock may be much lower than the figures given above. Master keying will also greater reduce the number of useful combinations. Pin tumbler mechanisms vary greatly in their resistance to manipulation. Poorly constructed, inexpensive cylinders with wide tolerances, a minimum number of pins, and poor pin chamber alignment may be manipulated quickly by persons of limited ability. Precision-made cylinders with close tolerances, a maximum number of pins, and accurate pin chamber alignment may resist picking attempts even by experts for a considerable time.


169

Figure 10-6. Operation of a pin tumbler cylinder mechanism. (a) When the correct key is inserted, the bittings in the key align the tops of the lower tumblers (key pins) with the top of the cylinder plug at the shear line. The plug may then be rotated in the shell to operate the lock. (b) When the key is withdrawn, the springs push the upper tumblers (drivers) into the cylinder plug. With the pins in this position, the plug obviously cannot be turned. (c) When an incorrect key is used, the bittings will not match the length of the key pins. The key will allow some of the drivers to extend into the plug, and some of the key pins will be pushed into the shell by high cuts. In either case, the plug cannot be rotated. With an improper key, some of the pins may align at the shear line, but only with the proper key will all five align so that the plug can turn.

Most pin tumbler lock mechanisms use warded keyways for additional security against incorrect keys and manipulation.The wards projecting into the keyway must correspond to grooves cut into the side of the key, or the key cannot enter the lock. When the wards on one side of the keyway extend past the center line of the key, and wards on the other side also extend past the center line, this is known as a paracentric keyway (Figure 10-7). While warded keyways are commonly used on most pin tumbler mechanisms, paracentric keyways are usually restricted to the better locks. They severely hinder the insertion of lockpicks into the mechanisms and the ability of the manipulator to maneuver the pick once it is inserted. Modifications have been made to the drives in better locks to provide increased security against picking (see Figure 10-8). The usual modified shapes are the mushroom and the spool. Both of these shapes have a tendency to bind in the pin chamber when picking is attempted, making it more difficult to maneuver them to the shear line. To be consistently successful in picking pin tumbler cylinders with either type of modified driver, special techniques must be used. There are a number of variations of the pin tumbler cylinder on the market. One which is seeing increasingly widespread use is the removable core cylinder (Figure 10-9). These were originally produced by the Best Universal Lock Company whose initial patents have now expired. Most major archi-

Figure 10-7. Milled, warded, and paracentric keys.

tectural hardware manufacturers now have them available in their commercial lock lines. This type of cylinder uses a special key called the control key to remove the entire pin tumbler mechanism (called the core) from the shell. This makes it possible to quickly replace one core with another having a different combination and requiring a different key to operate. Because of this feature, removable core cylinders are becoming increasingly popular for

170


institutional use, and use in large commercial enterprises where locks must be changed often. Removable core cylinders do not provide more than moderate security. Most systems operate on a common control key, and possession of this key will allow entry through any lock in the system. It is not difficult to have an unauthorized duplicate of the control key made. If this is not possible, any lock, particularly a padlock, of the series may be borrowed

Figure 10-8. Pin tumbler modification.

and an unauthorized control key made. Once the core is removed from a lock, a screwdriver or other flat tool is all that is necessary to operate the mechanism. Additionally, the added control pins increase the number of shear points in each chamber, thus increasing the mechanism’s vulnerability to manipulation. Another variation that has been in widespread use for many years is master keying. Almost any pin tumbler cylinder can easily be master-keyed. This involves merely the insertion of additional tumblers called master pins between the drivers and key pins. These master pins enable a second key, the master key, to operate the same lock (see Figure 10-10). Generally, an entire series of locks is combinated to be operated by the same master key. There may also be levels of master keys, including submasters which open a portion, but not all, of a series; master keys which open a larger part; and grand masters which open the entire series. In very involved installations,

Figure 10-9. Removable core, pin tumbler, cylinder mechanism.

Figure 10-10. Master-keyed pin tumbler cylinder mechanism. (a) This is a simple masterkeyed system using master pins in the first and second tumbler positions. When the change key is inserted, note that the top of the first master pin aligns with the top of the cylinder plug. The remaining positions show the key pins aligned with the top of the plug. This arrangement permits the plug to turn. (b) With the master key inserted, the first position aligns the top of the key pin with the cylinder plug. The master pin is pushed further up the pin cylinder. The second position shows the master pin aligning at the top of the plug. The master pin has dropped further down the pin hole in the plug. The remaining three positions are unchanged. This arrangement also allows the plug to rotate.


there may even be a fourth level (great grand master key). There are a number of security problems with master keys. The most obvious one is that an unauthorized master key will permit access through any lock of the series. Less obvious is the fact that master keying reduces the number of useful combinations that can be employed since any combination used must not only be compatible with the change key, but with the second, master key. If a submaster is used in the series, the number of combinations is further reduced to those which are compatible with all three keys. If four levels of master keys are used, it should be obvious that the number of useful combinations becomes extremely small. If a large number of locks are involved, the number of locks may exceed the number of available combinations. When this occurs, it may be necessary to use the same combination in several locks, which permits one change key to operate more than one lock (cross keying). This creates an additional security hazard. One way of increasing the number of usable combinations and decreasing the risk of cross keying is to use a master sleeve or ring. This sleeve fits around the plug, providing an additional shear line similar to the slide shear line in a removable core system. Some of the keys can be cut to lift tumblers to sleeve shear line, and some to the plug shear line. This system, however, requires the use of more master pins. Any increase in master pins raises the susceptibility of the lock to manipulation, since the master pins create more than one shear point in each pin chamber, increasing the facility with which the lock can be picked. Thus, while master-keyed and removable-core systems are necessary for a number of very practical reasons, you should be aware that they create additional security problems of their own. The basic pin tumbler mechanism has been extensively modified by a number of manufacturers to improve its security. The common features of highsecurity pin tumbler cylinder mechanisms are that they are produced with extremely close tolerances and that they provide a very high number of usable combinations. Additional security features include the use of very hard metals in their construction to frustrate attacks by drilling and punching.

Lever Tumbler Mechanisms Although the lever lock operates on the same principles as the pin or disc tumbler mechanism, its appearance is very different. Figure 10-11 illustrates a typical lever mechanism. Unlike pin or disc

171

Figure 10-11. Lever tumbler mechanism.

tumbler devices, the lever lock does not use a rotating core or plug, and the bolt is usually an integral part of the basic mechanism thrown directly by the key. The only other type of mechanism in which the key directly engages the bolt is the warded mechanism. You will recall that the bolt in pin or disc tumbler systems is usually directly operated by the cylinder plug, not the key. The key is used to rotate the plug, but never comes into direct contact with the bolt. Despite these somewhat deceptive appearances, the lever lock operates very much like the other tumbler mechanisms. Each lever is hinged on one side by the post which is a fixed part of the case. The leaf springs attached to the levers hold them down in a position which overlaps the bolt notch as shown in Figure 10-12. In this position, the bolt is prevented from moving back into a retracted position by its fence which is trapped by the front edges (shoulder) of the levers. When the key is inserted and slightly rotated, the bittings on the key engage the saddle of the lever, raising it to a position where the fence aligns with the slot in the lever (called the gate). In this position, the fence no longer obstructs the movement of the bolt to the rear, and the bolt can be retracted. The retraction is accomplished by the key engaging the shoulder of the bolt notch. While the bittings

172


Figure 10-12. Operation of a typical lever tumbler mechanism. (a) The bolt is in the fully extended locked position and the key has been withdrawn from the keyway. In this position, the spring forces the lever down toward the bolt notch, trapping the fence against the forward edge (shoulder) of the lever. This prevents the bolt from being forced back. (b) The key has been inserted and the bitting on the key has lifted the lever against the spring tension, aligning the gate with the fence. The bolt can now be moved back into the retracted position. (c) The key has begun to force the bolt back into a retracted position by engaging a shoulder of the bolt notch at the same time it is keeping the lever suspended at the correct height to allow the fence to pass into the gate. (d) The bolt is now fully retracted and the key can be withdrawn. (e) If an improper key is inserted the bitting either will not lift the lever high enough for the fence to pass through the gate or the lever will be raised too high and the fence will be trapped in front of the lower forward shoulder of the lever. From this position, the bolt cannot be forced back into the retracted position.

of the key are still holding the levers in an aligned position, the key contacts the rear shoulder of the bolt notch, forcing the bolt to retract as the key is rotated. As the bolt is retracted, the fence moves along the gate until the bolt is fully withdrawn. When the key has rotated fully, completely retracting the bolt, it can be withdrawn. If an improperly cut key is inserted and rotated in the lock, either the levers will not be raised far enough to align all of the gates with the fence, or one or more levers will be raised too high, so that the bottom edge of the lever obstructs the fence (as in

Figure 10-12). In either case, the bolt is prevented from being forced to the rear, thus opening the lock. Figure 10-13(a) shows one version of the basic lever. A number of variations are on the market. Some levers are made with projections built into the gate designed to trap the fence in various positions [Figure 10-13(b)]. The front and rear traps prevent the fence from being forced through the gate when the bolt is in either the fully extended or fully retracted position. Figure 10-13(c) shows another variation: serrated (saw-tooth) front edges. These serrations are designed to bind against the fence


173

Figure 10-13. Lever tumblers. To operate the lock, the key contacts the lever at the saddle, lifting it until the fence is aligned with the gate. The saddles on the various tumblers are milled to different depths to correspond to different cuts on the key.

when an attempt is made to pick the lock. They are commonly found on high-security lever tumbler mechanisms. Lever mechanisms provide moderate to high security depending on the number of levers used, their configuration, and the degree of care used in the construction of the lock mechanism. Any mechanisms using six or more tumblers can safely be considered a high security lock. Some mechanisms use a double set of levers, requiring a double-bitted key. The levers are located on both sides of the keyway. This configuration makes the lock very difficult to pick or manipulate. Lever locks are commonly found in applications where moderate to high security is a requirement, including safe deposit boxes, strong boxes, post office boxes, and lockers. The lever mechanisms available in the United States, because of the integrated, short-throw bolt, are not ordinarily used as builders’ hardware. But they are commonly used in that application in Europe and some of these locks have found their way into the United States.

Combination Locks In principle, a combination lock works in much the same way as a lever mechanism. When the tumblers are aligned, the slots in the tumblers permit a fence to retract which releases the bolt so that the bolt can be opened. The difference is that where the lever mechanism uses a key to align the tumblers, the combination mechanism uses numbers, letters, or other symbols as reference points which enable an operator to align them manually. Figure 10-14 shows a simplified view of a typical three-tumbler combination lock mechanism. The tumblers are usually called

wheels. Each wheel has a slot milled into its edge which is designed to engage the fence when the slot has been properly aligned. This slot is called a gate. The fence is part of the lever which retracts the bolt. The gates are aligned with the fence by referring to letter, numbers, or other symbols on the dial. The sequence of symbols which permits the lock to operate is its combination. A typical combination sequences using numbers is 10–35–75. The fact that three numbers are used in the combination indicates that the lock contains three tumblers. The number of tumblers in a lock always corresponds to the number of symbols used in its combination. Few modern combination locks use more than four tumblers because combinations of five or more symbols are unwieldy and hard to remember. Older models, however, used as many as six. Both drive cam and dial are fixed to the spindle so that as the dial is rotated, the drive cam will also rotate in an identical fashion. The drive cam has two functions. It is the means by which motion of the dial is transferred to the wheels, and when all wheels are properly aligned and the fence retracted, it is the mechanism by which the bolt lever is pulled to retract the bolt. The wheels are not fixed to the spindle, but ride on a wheel post which fits over the spindle. These wheels are free-floating and will not rotate when the dial is turned unless the flies are engaged. The flies are designed to engage pins on the wheels at predetermined points (determined by the combination of that particular lock). When the flies engage these pins, the wheels pick up the rotating motion of the dial. When the flies are not engaged, the wheels will remain in place when the dial is rotated. To operate a typical three-wheel combination lock, the dial is first turned four times in one

174


Figure 10-14. Three-tumbler combination.

direction to allow all of the flies to engage their respective wheels so that as the dial is being turned, all of the wheels are rotating with it. At this point the wheels are said to be nested. The object is to disengage each wheel at the spot where its gate will be aligned with the fence. To do this, the operator stops the dial when the first number of the combination reaches the index mark on the dial ring.This first stop aligns the gate of wheel 1 with the fence. The operator then reverses direction to disengage wheel 1, which remains stationary, and rotates the dial three turns to the second number in the combination. When this number is under the index mark, wheel 2 is aligned. Again reversing direction to disengage wheel 2, the operator makes two turns to the last number of the combination. This aligns wheel 3. At this point all of the gates are aligned with the fence. The operator then reverses direction once again and turns the dial until it stops. This last operation has two functions. It aligns the gate on the drive cam with the fence, which permits the fence to retract into the space provided by the three gates in the wheels and the fourth gate in the drive cam. The bolt lever is now engaged with the wheels and drive cam. As the operator continues rotating the dial, the drive cam pulls the bolt lever to retract the bolt. When the dial will no longer rotate, the bolt is fully retracted, and the lock is open. The security afforded by combination mechanisms varies widely. The critical elements are the number of tumblers used in the lock, the number of positions on the tumbler where the gate can be

located, and the tolerances in the width of the gate and fence. Wide tolerances allow the fence to enter the gates even when they are not quite completely aligned, so that, although the proper combination may be 10–35–75, the lock may also operate at 11–37–77. Until the 1940s it was often possible to open many combination locks by using the sound of the movement of the tumblers and feeling the friction of the fence moving over the tumblers as indicators of tumbler position. (Tumblers in combination locks do not click despite Hollywood’s contentions to the contrary.) Skilled operators were often able to use sound and feel to determine when each tumbler came into alignment. Modern technology has all but eliminated these possibilities, however, through the introduction of sound baffling devices, nylon tumblers, improved lubricants to eliminate friction, false fences, and cams which suspend the fence over the tumblers so that they do not make contact until after the gates are already aligned (see Figure 10-14). Another manipulation technique of recent vintage utilized the fact that the tumblers wheels with gates cut into them are unbalanced: more weight is on the uncut side than on the cut side. By oscillating the dial, these cut and uncut sides could be determined, and the location of the gates estimated. The introduction of counterbalanced tumblers has virtually eliminated this approach to the better mechanisms. Radiology has also been used to defeat combination locks. A piece of radioactive material placed near the lock can produce ghost images of the


175

Figure 10-15. Basic types of bolts.

tumblers on sensitive plates, showing the location of the gates. Nylon and Teflon tumblers and shielding material which are opaque to radiation are used to defeat this technique.

Lock Bodies Most lever tumbler and warded mechanisms contain an integrated bolt as a part of the mechanism. The key operates directly to throw the bolt, thereby opening and locking the lock. This is not true of pin and disc tumbler locks. These consist of two major components. The cylinder plug, the shell, the tumblers, and springs are contained in an assembly known as the cylinder. The other major component is the lock body which consists of the bolt assembly and case or housing. The bolt assembly consists of the bolt itself, a rollback, and a refractor. This assembly translates the rotating motion of the cylinder plug to the back-and-forth motion that actually operates the bolt. When the cylinder is inserted into the lock body, it is typically connected to the bolt assembly by a tail piece or cam. A cylinder can be used in a number of different lock bodies. Here we will be primarily concerned with the types of bodies used on standard residential and light commercial doors. The pin tumbler is the usual mechanism used in these locks, although some manufacturers offer door locks using disc tumbler cylinders (such as the Schlage Cylindrical Lock introduced earlier).

Bolts There are two types of bolts used for most door applications; the latch bolt and the deadbolt. Examples of these are illustrated in Figure 10-15. They are easily distinguished from each other. A latch bolt always has a beveled face, while the face on a standard deadbolt is square.

Latch Bolt This bolt, which is sometimes called simply a latch, a locking latch (to distinguish it from nonlocking latches), or a spring bolt is always spring-loaded. When the door on which it is mounted is in the process of closing, the latch bolt is designed to automatically retract when its beveled face contacts the lip of the strike. Once the door is fully closed, the latch springs back to extend into the hole of the strike, securing the door. A latch bolt has the single advantage of convenience. A door equipped with a locking latch will automatically lock when it is closed. No additional effort with a key is required. It does not, however, provide very much security. The throw on a latch bolt is usually 3/8 inch but seldom more than 5/8 inch. Because it must be able to retract into the door on contact with the lip of the strike, it is difficult to make the throw much longer. But, because there is always some space between the door and the frame, this means that a latch may project into the strike no more than 1/4 inch (often as little as 1/8 inch on poorly hung doors). Most door jambs can be spread at least 1/2 inch with little effort, permitting an intruder to quickly circumvent the lock. Another undesirable feature of the latch bolt is that it can easily be forced back by any thin shim (such as a plastic credit card or thin knife) inserted between the face plate of the lock and the strike. Antishim devices have been added to the basic latch bolt to defeat this type of attack. They are designed to prevent the latch bolt from being depressed once the door is closed. Figure 10-16 shows a latch bolt with antishim device. These are often called deadlocking latches, a term which is mildly deceptive since these latches do not actually deadlock and they are not nearly as resistant to jimmying as deadlocks. Often a thin screwdriver blade can be inserted between the face plate and the strike, and pressure

176


Figure 10-16. Modified latch bolts. (a) Latch bolt with antishim device. (b) Antifriction latch bolt with antishim device.

applied to break the antishim mechanism and force the latch to retract. Another type of latch bolt is shown in Figure 1016. This is an antifriction latch bolt. The antifriction device is designed to reduce the closing pressure required to force the latch bolt to retract. This permits a heavier spring to be used in the mechanism. Most modern antifriction latches also incorporate an antishim device. Without it, the antifriction latch is extremely simple to shim.

ing movement of the bolt allows it to project deeply into the frame—at least 1 inch, usually more. A minimum of 1 inch is recommended. When used with a reinforced strike, this bolt can provide good protection against efforts to spread or peel the frame. Increased security against jamb spreading is provided by a number of different types of deadbolts that collectively are known as interlocking deadbolts. These are specifically designed to interlock the door and the strike so that the door jamb cannot be spread. The most common of these is the vertical-throw deadbolt shown in Figure 10-17b. This is usually a rim-mounted device. The other two devices shown in Figure 10-17 (the expanding bolt deadbolt and the rotating deadbolt) are meant to be mounted inside the door. These locks require a securely mounted strike or they are rendered ineffective.

Door Lock Types Five basic lock types are used on most doors in the United States: mortise, rim-mounted, tubular, cylindrical, and unit. Each of these has a number of advantages and disadvantages from the point of view of the protection offered. Each, however, with the single exception of the cylindrical lockset, can offer sound security when a good lock is properly installed.

Deadbolt Mortise The deadbolt is a square-faced solid bolt which is not spring-loaded and must be turned by hand into either the locked or unlocked position. When a deadbolt is incorporated into a locking mechanism, the result is usually known as deadlock. The throw on a standard deadbolt is also about 1/2 inch, which provides only minimal protection against jamb spreading. A long-throw deadbolt, however, has a throw of 1 inch or longer. One inch is considered the minimum for adequate protection. Properly installed in a good door using a secure strike, this bolt provides reasonably good protection against efforts to spread or peel the jamb. The ordinary deadbolt is thrown horizontally. On some narrow-stile doors, such as aluminumframed glass doors, the space provided for the lock is too narrow to permit a long horizontal throw. The pivoting deadbolt is used in this situation to get the needed longer throw (Figure 10-17a). The pivot-

It was but a few years ago that almost all residential and light commercial locks were mortise locks. A mortise lock, or lockset, is installed by hollowing out a portion of the door along the front or leading edge and inserting the mechanism into this cavity. Suitable holes are then drilled into the side of the door in the appropriate spot for the cylinders and door knob spindle (where the door knob is part of the unit, as is usually the case). Figure 10-18 shows a typical mortise lockset. These mechanisms require a door which is thick enough to be hollowed out without losing a great deal of its strength in the process. One of the major weaknesses of mortise locks is that the cylinder is usually held in the lock with a set screw which provides very little defense against pulling or twisting the cylinder out of the lock with a suitable tool. Cylinder guard plates can be used to strengthen the lock’s resistance to this threat.


177

Figure 10-17. Modified deadbolts. Note the difference in penetration into the jamb. The deeper penetration afforded by the pivoting bolt increases protection against jamb spreading.

On some mortise locks, the trim plate acts as a cylinder guard.

Rim-Mounted A rim-mounted mechanism is very simply a lock which is installed on the surface (rim) of the door (Figure 10-18). Most are used on the inside surface, since outside installation requires a lock that is reinforced against direct attacks on the case itself. Commonly these are supplementary locks installed where the primary lock is not considered enough protection. These may or may not be designed for key operation from the outside. If they are, a cylinder extends through the door to the outside where it can be reached by a key.

Tubular This lock (sometimes called a bore-in) is installed by drilling a hole through the door to accommodate the cylinder (or cylinders) and a hole drilled from the front edge of the door to the cylinder for the bolt assembly (Figure 10-18). This type of installation has virtually replaced the mortise lock in most residential and light commercial applications because it can be installed quickly and by persons of limited skill.

Cylindrical Lockset The cylindrical lockset ordinarily uses a locking latch as its sole fastening element (Figure 10-18). It is installed like the tubular lock by drilling two holes in

Figure 10-18. Lock types. (a) Mortise deadlock. (b) Rim deadlock with rim strike. (c) Tubular deadlock. (d) Cylindrical (lock-in-knob) lockset. (e) Unit lock. (f) Ideal Superguard Lock II—Note washers must be used for additional protection against cylinder pulling. These are not supplied with the lock.


179

Figure 10-19. Mortise lock cylinder installation. (a) With set screw. (b) With interlock screws.

the door. The cylinders are mounted in the door knobs, rather than in a case or inside the door, which makes them vulnerable to just about any attack (hammering, wrenching, etc.) which can knock or twist the knob off the door. Unfortunately, because it is inexpensive and simple to install, about 85% of all residential locks currently being used in new construction in the United States are of this type. It provides virtually no security whatsoever. There is perhaps no harder or faster rule in lock security than the rule that all cylindrical locks should be supplemented by a secure, long-throw deadbolt. Or, better yet, they should be replaced. A number of more secure locks designed to replace the cylindrical lock are now on the market. One of these is illustrated in Figure 10-18.

Unit Locks A unit lock is installed by making a U-shaped cutout in the front edge of the door and slipping the lock into this cutout. This type of lock usually has the advantage of having no exposed screws or bolts. It is ordinarily used in place of mortise locks where the door is too narrow to mortise without considerable loss of strength. A good unit lock properly installed on a solid door provides excellent protection against attempts to remove the cylinder, or to pry or twist the lock off the doors.

Cylinders Cylinders are mounted in the lock body in a number of ways. Most mortise cylinders are threaded into the

lock and secured with a small set screw (Figure 1019). Tubular and rim locks use cylinder interlock screws inserted from the back of the lock. Better mechanisms use 1/4 inch or larger diameter hardened steel screws for maximum resistance to pulling and wrenching attacks (Figure 10-19). Better cylinders incorporate hardened inserts to resist drilling. Two basic cylinder configurations are available. Single cylinder locks use a key-operated cylinder on the outside, and a thumb-turn or blank plate on the inside (Figure 10-20). Double cylinder locks use a key-operated cylinder on both sides of the door (Figure 10-20). This prevents an intruder from breaking a window near the door, or punching a hole through the door, reaching in, and turning the lock from the inside. The disadvantage of double cylinders is that rapid exit is made difficult since the key must first be located to operate the inside cylinder. If a fire or other emergency makes rapid evacuation necessary, a double cylinder lock could pose a considerable hazard.

Padlocks The distinguishing feature of padlocks is that they use a shackle rather than a bolt as the device which fastens two or more objects together (Figure 10-21). The shackle is placed through a hasp which is permanently affixed to the items to be fastened. Three methods are commonly used to secure the shackle inside the lock body. The simplest and least secure method is to press a piece of flat spring steel against an indentation in the shackle. When the key is inserted, it rotates to spread

180


Figure 10-20. (a) Single cylinder deadlock with interior thumb turn. (b) Double cylinder deadlock with interior key cylinder.

Figure 10-21. (a) Warded padlock. (b) High-security padlock. (c) Shackleless padlock.

the spring releasing the shackle (Figure 10-22). This is a locking method commonly found on warded padlocks. It is found more rarely on tumbler-type locks, but it is found occasionally on the less expensive models. A slightly more secure method uses a locking dog. The dog is spring-loaded and fits into a notch cut into the shackle (Figure 10-22). The key is used to retract the dog, permitting the shackle to be withdrawn. Both of these spring-loaded mechanisms are vulnerable to attacks that take advantage of the fact that the locking device can be forced back against the spring by a suitable tool. Shimming and rapping are common techniques used to open them. Often a stiff wire can be pushed down the shackle hole to engage

and force back the spring or locking dog. Springloaded padlocks should not be used where reasonable security is required. Positive locking techniques do much to reduce the vulnerability of padlocks to these types of attacks. The most common positive locking method uses steel balls inserted between the cylinder and the shackle. In the locked position, the ball rests half in a groove in the cylinder, and half in a notch cut into the shackle. In this position the shackle cannot be forced past the steel ball. When the cylinder is turned to the unlocked position, the groove deepens, permitting the ball to retract into the cylinder when pressure is put on the shackle. This releases the shackle and opens the lock. These locks are designed


181

Figure 10-22. Three methods of securing the shackle inside the lock body. (a) Warded padlock with locking spring (heel locking). (b) Padlock with locking dog (toe locking). (c) Positive locking padlock (heel and toe locking).

so that the key cannot be removed unless the lock is in the locked position. Padlocks are vulnerable to attacks at several points. The shackle can be pried out of the lock by a crowbar or jimmy, or it can be sawed or cut by bolt cutters. The casing can be crushed or distorted by hammering. Modifications have been incorporated into better padlocks to reduce their vulnerability to

these approaches. Heavy, hardened steel cases and shackles are used to defeat cutting and crushing. Rotating inserts and special hardened materials are used to prevent the sawing of shackles. Toe and heel locking is used to prevent prying (Figure 10-22). High-security padlocks are large and heavy, using hardened metals in the case, and a thick, hardened, and protected shackle. Positive locking methods are

182


Figure 10-23. High-security strikes. (a) Security strike with reinforced lip to prevent jimmying and shimming. (b) Security strike for wood frames with offset screws. (c) Normal strike. (d) Proper installation of a strike on a wood frame.

always used. As little of the shackle is exposed to attack as possible in the locked position. A typical high-security padlock is shown in Figure 10-21.This is the shackleless padlock, which is designed so that a locking bar which is contained entirely inside the case is used in the place of an exposed shackle. This is sometimes called a hasp lock rather than a padlock. A padlock is, however, no better than the hasp it engages.Hasps offering reasonable security are themselves made of hardened metals. They must be properly mounted on solid materials so that they cannot be pried off. In the locked position, no mounting screw or bolt should be accessible. Padlocks and hasps should always be considered as a unit. There is no point in mounting a high-security padlock on an inferior hasp. The hasp and lock should always be of approximately the same quality. Where they are not, the complete device is only as good as its weakest member.

Strikes Strikes are an often overlooked but essential part of a good lock. A deadbolt must engage a solid, correctly installed strike, or its effectiveness is signifi-

cantly reduced. The ordinary strike for residential use is mounted with two or three short (usually less than 1 inch) wood screws on a soft wood door frame. It can be easily pried off with a screwdriver. Highsecurity strikes are wider, longer, and often incorporate a lip which wraps around the door for added protection against jimmying and shimming (Figure 10-23). Three or more offset wood screws at least 31/2 inches long are used to mount the strike. These screws must extend through the jamb and into the studs of the door frame. This provides added protection against prying attacks. Additionally, none of the fastening screws should be in line. In-line screws tend to split soft wood when they are screwed in. Strikes designed for installation on wood frames should always use offset screws as fasteners. Reinforced steel should be used on metal-framed doors, especially aluminum frames. Aluminum is extremely soft metal and, unless a reinforced strike is used, the jamb can be peeled away from the strike area exposing the bolt to a number of attacks, or allowing it to clear the jamb thereby freeing the door to open. Bolts should be used to mount strikes in metal frames. If the bolt does not penetrate a substantial steel framing member, then a steel plate


should be used to back the bolt (very large steel washers may be an acceptable substitute). This presents the strike from being pried out of aluminum or thin steel frames.

Attacks and Countermeasures There are two basic methods of attacking locks themselves: surreptitious techniques and force.There are also a number of ways of circumventing a lock by assaulting the objects to which it is fastened. This chapter will be concerned only with techniques used to defeat locks themselves and the measures that can be used to forestall those techniques. No lock is completely invulnerable to attack. A lock’s effectiveness is determined by how long it will resist the best effort of an intruder. An expert can pick an average pin tumbler cylinder in seconds, and no lock can survive strong force applied for a sufficient length of time. The sole object of using any lock at all is to delay an intruder. A good lock makes entry riskier or more trouble than it is worth, and that is the objective. Fortunately, most potential intruders are not experts, thus most moderately secure locks can survive for a reasonable amount of time against common attack techniques. The proper use of countermeasures will significantly reduce a locking system’s vulnerability to breaching by an unauthorized person. Not all of the countermeasures suggested in the following sections will be appropriate for every application, however. There is always the necessity of striking a suitable compromise between the expense and inconvenience of a locking system and the value of the items it is designed to protect. Complex and expensive very high-security systems are simply not appropriate for most residential applications. On the other hand, a cheap padlock on a warehouse containing valuable merchandise is an open invitation for someone to break in and steal it. The objective should always be to ensure reasonable protection in the circumstances surrounding a particular application. With locks, overprotection is often more harmful than insufficient protection. If the user is faced with a more complex security system than really necessary, she or he simply will not use it. A great many unlawful entries are still made through unlocked doors and windows. The temptation to avoid the inconvenience of constantly locking and unlocking barriers seems to be insurmountable in some people. Contributing to this temptation by insisting on more protection than the user actually needs simply aggravates the problem.

183

Surreptitious Attacks Four basic surreptitious approaches are used to breach locking devices: illicit keys, circumvention of the internal barriers of the lock, manipulation of the internal barriers, and shimming. The susceptibility of any locking device to these approaches cannot be eliminated but can be minimized through the use of commonsense countermeasures.

Illicit Keys The easiest way of gaining entry through any lock is by using the proper key for that lock. Thousands of keys are lost and stolen every year. A potential intruder who can determine which lock a lost or stolen key fits has a simple and quick means of illicit entry. If an intruder cannot get hold of the owner’s key, quite often he or she can make a duplicate. The casual habit of leaving house keys on the key-ring when a car is left in a commercial parking lot or for servicing provides a potential intruder with a golden opportunity to duplicate the house keys for later use. One can also find out the owner’s address very quickly by examining the repair bill or tracing the automobile license number. The risk of lost, stolen, or duplicated keys cannot be eliminated entirely, but certain steps can be taken to minimize it. Maintain Reasonable Key Security 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Under some circumstances, it is almost impossible to avoid leaving at least the ignition key with a parked car, or one to be serviced. But all other keys should be removed. When keys are being duplicated, the owner should ensure that no extra duplicates are made. Many locks, particularly older locks, have their key code stamped on the front of the case or cylinder. This permits anyone to look up the code in a locksmith’s manual and find the proper combination for that lock (or for that combination lock). Codebooks are readily available for most makes of lock, so if the code appears anywhere on the lock where it can be read after the lock is installed and locked, it should be removed by grinding or overstamping. If removal is not possible, the lock or its combination should be changed. Managers and owners of commercial enterprises should maintain strict control over master keys and control keys for removable-core cylinders. The loss of these keys can compromise the entire system, necessitating an extensive and expensive,

184


system-wide recombination. Too often in large institutions, just about everyone can justify a need for a master key. This is nothing more than a demand for convenience that subverts the requirements of good security. The distribution of master keys should be restricted to those who literally cannot function without them. Since it is impossible to prevent people from losing keys no matter how careful they are, the next precaution is to ensure that the lost key cannot be linked to the lock it operates. 䊉

䊉

The owner’s name, address, telephone number, or car license number should never appear anywhere on a key ring. This has become common practice to ensure the return of lost keys, but if they fall into the wrong hands, the address provides a quick link between the keys and the locks they fit. The proper protection against lost keys is to always have a duplicate set in a secure place. For the same reasons, keys which are stamped with information that identifies the location of the lock should not be carried around. This used to be a common practice on locker keys, safety deposit box keys, and some apartment building keys. It is no longer as common as it once was, but it still exists. If the keys must be carried, all identifying information should be obliterated, or they should be duplicated on a clean, unmarked key blank.

Recombinate or Replace Compromised Locks. If all these precautions fail and the owner reasonably believes that someone has obtained keys to her or his locks, the combinations of these locks should be changed immediately. Where this is not possible, the locks may have to be replaced. When only a few locks are involved, recombinating cylinders is a fairly quick and inexpensive operation well within the competence of any qualified locksmith. Another common attack method using a key against which there is less direct protection is the tryout key. Try-out key sets are a common locksmith’s tool and can be purchased through locksmith supply houses, often by mail. These sets replicate the common variations used in the combination of a particular lock series. In operation, they are inserted into the lock one at a time until one is found that will operate the lock. Try-out keys are commercially available only for automotive locks. There is nothing, however, to prevent a would-be intruder from building a set for other locks. In areas where one contractor has built extensive residential and commercial developments,

most of the buildings will often be fitted with the same lock series. If it is an inexpensive series with a limited number of useful combinations, a homemade try-out key set which replicates the common variations of this particular lock series could be very useful to the potential intruder. The defense against try-out keys is simply to use a lock with a moderate to high number of available combinations. Any lock worth using has at least several thousand useful combinations. No intruder can carry that many try-out keys, so the risk that he or she will have the proper key is minimal.

Circumvention of the Internal Barriers of the Lock This is a technique used to directly operate the bolt completely bypassing the locking mechanism which, generally, remains in the locked position throughout this operation. A long, thin, stiff tool is inserted into the keyway to bypass the internal barriers and reach the bolt assembly. The tool (often a piece of stiff wire) is then used to maneuver the bolt into the retracted, unlocked position. Warded locks are particularly vulnerable to this method (as was indicated earlier), but some tumbler mechanisms which have an open passageway from the keyway to the bolt assembly are also susceptible. Some older padlocks and cylindrical mechanisms had an open passageway of this sort. Few of these are manufactured anymore, but some of the older models are still in use. Any lock which has such an opening should be replaced with a better device if reasonable security is a requirement.

Manipulation The term manipulation covers a large number of types of attacks. At least 50 discrete techniques of manipulating the mechanism of a lock without the proper key have been identified. Fortunately, however, they all fall rather neatly into four general categories: picking, impressioning, decoding, and rapping. Regardless of the specific technique used, its purpose is to maneuver the internal barriers of a tumbler mechanism into a position where they will permit the bolt to be retracted. In a disc or pin tumbler mechanism, this means that the cylinder plug must be freed to rotate; in a lever lock, the levers must be aligned with the fence. The basic countermeasures against all forms of manipulation are the use of close tolerances in the manufacture of the mechanism, and increasing the number of pins, discs, or levers. Close tolerances and


185

Figure 10-24. Lock picks. (a) Standard pick. (b) Rake pick. (c) Tension tool. (d) Special pick for tubular mechanisms. (e) Pick and tension tool in use.

a large number of tumblers make manipulation a time-consuming process. A number of specific defenses to the various forms of manipulation have also been developed.These will be presented in some detail below. Picking. Lock picking is undoubtedly the best known method of manipulation. It requires skill developed by dedicated practice, the proper tools, time, and often a small dose of good luck. No lock is proof against picking, but the high-security locks are so difficult to pick that it takes even an expert a long time to open them. One definition of a high-security mechanism, in fact, is one that cannot be picked by an expert in less than half a minute. The techniques involved in picking the three basic types of tumbler mechanisms are very similar—so similar, in fact, that an example using the pin tumbler cylinder will serve to illustrate the rest.

All picking techniques depend on the slight clearances that must necessarily exist in a mechanism for it to function. The basic technique requires slight tension to be placed on the part of the mechanism that retracts the bolt (which is the cylinder plug in pin tumbler mechanisms) by a special tension tool designed for that purpose (Figure 10-24). The result of this tension is shown in Figure 10-25. The pin chamber in the plug has moved slightly out of alignment with the pin chamber in the cylinder shell, creating two lips at points A and B. When the key pin is pushed up by the pick, it tends to catch at the shear line because the lip at point A permits it to go no farther. This pushes the driver above the shear line where the lip at point B prevents it from falling down into the cylinder plug once more. As long as tension is maintained, it will stay above the shear line. This operation is facilitated by the fact that, as shown in Figure 10-26, the pin chambers in a

186


Figure 10-25. Illustration of the misalignment caused in a pin tumble cylinder when tension is applied.

Figure 10-26. Pin chamber misalignment. Pin chambers on even the best cylinders are not in a perfectly straight line. The misalignment in this illustration is highly exaggerated for clarity.

cylinder plug are seldom in a perfectly straight line. Consequently, the pin closest to the direction of tension will be more tightly bound than the rest of the pins when tension is applied. It can easily be located because it will offer the most resistance to being maneuvered by the pick. Each pin is tested by lifting it with the pick. The pin that is most resistant is picked first. When this pin reaches the shear line, often the cylinder plug will move slightly. The picker receives two important benefits from this very small movement: first it indicates that the pin has indeed been lifted to the shear line, and second, the movement of the cylinder increases the misalignment between the pin chamber in the plug and the one in the shell, making it even less likely that the driver will drop down into the plug (Figure 10-27). Once this pin has been picked, the pin next nearest the direction of tension will be the most tightly bound. It is located and picked next. The cylinder plug will again move a very small amount. This operation continues until all of the pins are picked above the shear line, and the cylinder plug is free to rotate. There are endless variations of this basic picking technique. One of the most common is the use of a

Figure 10-27. Increased misalignment occurs as each pin is picked.

rake pick. When this pick is used, very slight tension is applied to the plug, then the rake is run along the tumblers lifting them slightly each time until all of them reach the shear line. Raking increases the chance that one or more key pins will inadvertently be pushed up into the cylinder shell, which will not allow the plug to rotate. It is often necessary to release the tension applied to the plug, and start over again several times. Nevertheless, it is a very fast technique, and very popular. With luck, an expert using a rake can pick an average pin tumbler in a few seconds. Most of the improvements in lock technology made over the last few thousand years have been devoted to increasing the resistance of locks to picking. The major defense is the use of very close tolerances in the mechanism during manufacture. This makes the forced misalignment between the plug and shell necessary for successful picking more difficult to achieve. The addition of more tumblers is also some protection against picking, since it takes the operator more time to pick all of the tumblers in the mechanism. The Sargent Keso mechanism and the Duo disc tumbler use this basic approach. The 12 pins in the former, and 14 (soon to be 17) discs in the high-security (Underwriters Laboratories listed) Duo take a reasonably long time to pick successfully. In addition, the unusual configurations of these tumblers makes picking even more difficult. The unusual arrangement of tumblers is also a basic security feature of Ace (tubular) mechanisms. These cannot be picked using ordinary picks. But there are special tools available which facilitate picking this lock. The Ace lock also requires special skills, but these are not too difficult to achieve once basic picking techniques have been mastered. Modifications of pin design for increased resistance to picking (and other forms of manipulation) are becoming increasingly important as a basic means of precluding this form of attack. As shown in


Figure 10-28. Mushroom and spool tumblers tend to bind in the pin hole when manipulation is attempted.

Figure 10-28, mushroom, spool, and huck pins tend to bind in the pin chamber when tension is applied to the cylinder plug, preventing the key pin from reaching the shear line. The use of these pins does not provide an absolute defense against picking attempts, but a steady hand a great deal of skill are required to pick them successfully. Pins which must be rotated provide what is perhaps the maximum currently available protection against picking. The Medeco and the new Emhart interlocking mechanism both require pins to be lifted to the shear line and rotated to a certain position before the lock will operate. It is very, very difficult to consistently rotate these pins into the correct position. The interlocking pins on the Emhart also make it extremely difficult to pick the key pin to the shear line, since, when interlocked, the two pins act as if they were one solid pin. The key pin and driver will not split at the shear line unless the pins are first rotated to the correct position. Fewer such embellishments are possible with discs and levers. Most high-security lever locks, however, do use levers which have a front edge cut in a sawtooth design (serrated). These serrations tend to catch on the fence as it is pushed back to provide pressure on the levers. This often makes it necessary for the operator to release tension and start over again, increasing the time spent picking the lock. The use of two sets of levers with two corresponding fences also increases a lever mechanism’s resistance to picking attempts. Impressioning. Impressioning is a technique used to make a key that will operate the lock. It cannot ordinarily be used against high-security mechanisms, but against the average lock it can be very successful.

187

To make a key by impressioning, a correct key blank is inserted into the lock. It is then securely gripped by a wrench or pliers (there are also special tools available for this purpose) and a strong rotational tension is applied to the plug. While this tension is applied, the key is moved up and down in the keyway. Since the tumblers are tightly bound in the lock by the tension applied to the plug, they will leave marks on the blank. The longest key pin will leave the strongest impression. The key is then removed and slight cut is filed in the blank at this point. The top of the key is smoothed down with a file or abrasive paper, and the key is again inserted to pick up the impression of the next longest pin. As long as the pin leaves an impression, the cut is deepened. When the pin will no longer leave a mark, the cut is at the right depth. When all of the cuts are to the right depth, the key will operate the lock and permit entry. Certain types of lock mechanisms are more susceptible to impressioning than others. Warded locks are easily defeated by this method since the fixed wards can be made to leave strong impressions, and, as previously stated, the depth of the cut on a warded key is not critical. Lever locks are probably the most immune to this technique, since it is difficult to bind the levers in such a manner that they will leave true impressions on the key blank. The use of serrated levers greatly increases this difficulty. The average pin and disc tumbler mechanism is vulnerable to this approach, but some of the better high-security mechanisms, because of their unusual keys, are not. The Medeco and Emhart interlocking mechanisms are highly resistant. The correct angles of the slant cuts necessary on these keys cannot be determined by impressioning. The special design of the pins in the BHI Huck-Pin cylinder makes the pins bind almost anywhere in the pin hole except at the shear line. All the impressions which appear on the key blank are, therefore, likely to be false impressions. So, although this mechanism uses a fairly standard paracentric key, it is still very difficult to defeat by impressioning. Modified spool and mushroom tumblers in any pin tumbler mechanism also tend to increase the difficulty of getting good impression marks. Decoding. Another method of making a key for a particular lock is through decoding. It was mentioned earlier that most disc tumbler mechanisms can be sight read fairly easily. Sight reading involves the manipulation of the tumblers with a thin wire while noting their relative positions in the keyway. Since each mechanism has only a limited number of

188


Figure 10-29. Decoding using a marked key blank.

possible tumbler increments, the correct alignment of these increments can be estimated with fair accuracy, permitting a key to be filed or cut on the spot to rotate the lock. This is one method of decoding. A more common method is to insert a decoding tool or a specially marked key blank for a short distance into the keyway of a pin or disc tumbler mechanism. Using the key, rotational tension is applied to the plug which causes misalignment between the pin chambers in the plug and shell.The key is then slowly inserted into the keyway until it has forced the first tumbler to the shear line (Figure 10-29). The length of this first key pin is determined by the distance the blank (or special tool) enters the keyway. The blank is then moved to the second tumbler, and so on until the length of all of the tumblers is determined and a key can be cut. Pin tumbler cylinders having wide tolerances are the mechanisms which are most susceptible to this particular decoding method. Disc tumblers are less so, although most can easily be sight read. (The Duo, however, is very resistant to sight reading.) Lever locks require special equipment to decode. The special features offered on some highsecurity pin tumbler systems dramatically increase their resistance to this technique. Some are almost immune. The Ace can be decoded, but it usually requires special tools. The use of mushroom or spool tumblers in almost any mechanism increases its resistance to decoding. And, of course, the close tolerances of any of the better mechanisms are a basic defense against decoding as well as impressioning and picking. Rapping. This approach relies on the fact that pins in a tumbler mechanism can move freely in the pin chambers. Tension is applied to the plug, resulting in the usual misalignment between the core and shell pin bores. The lock is then struck with a sharp tap just above the tumblers. This causes the pins to jump in their bores. As each key pin reaches its shear line, it pushes the driver before it into the shell where it tends to bind, unable to drop back down into the

plug because of the lip caused by the misalignment. Not all of the drivers will be pushed over the shear line by one rap. Several may be required. Theoretically, almost any lock may be defeated by rapping, but in practice it is a method that is used primarily on padlocks. Since padlocks are not encased in a door, they respond more freely to rapping. Modified, manipulation-resistant pins make rapping very difficult, but not impossible; it is, nevertheless, not a practical approach to high-security padlocks which use close tolerances and modified pins.

Shimming Any part of a locking mechanism which relies on spring pressure to hold it in place is vulnerable to shimming unless it is protected. Spring-loaded latch bolts can be shimmed by a thin plastic or metal tool unless they are protected by antishim devices. The locking dogs in padlocks are susceptible to a shim inserted into the shackle hole. The shim acts to force the dog back against the spring pressure releasing the shackle. Padlocks which use heel and toe locking are more difficult to shim, but the safest course to use is a nonsprung, positive locking system which cannot be threatened by shimming at all.

Forceful Attacks If a potential intruder does not have the skills necessary to decode, impression, or pick a lock, the only course is to either find a key or use force against the lock to disable and breach it. Comparatively few intruders have developed manipulative skills, so it is not surprising that the large majority of attacks on locks employ force of one kind or another. Locks can be punched, hammered, wrenched, twisted, burned, pulled, cut, exploded, and pried. Given the right tools and a sufficient amount of time, any lock can be defeated by force. But the nature of forceful attacks entails a number of real disadvantages to an intruder who is trying to gain entry without being discovered in the process. Large and cumbersome tools which are difficult to carry and conceal are often required. This is especially true if one of the better-protected locks is being attacked. Secondly, forceful attacks usually make a considerable amount of noise. Noise, especially unusual noise, tends to prompt people to investigate. Third, it is always immediately evident to even a causal observer that the lock has been attacked. When surreptitious techniques are used, the lock can be opened without damage, and relocked, and no one will be able to tell that an


unlawful entry has taken place. This often permits the intruder to thoroughly cover tracks even before an investigation is started. The object of countermeasures against forceful attacks is to increase these hazards. Generally more force will have to be applied to stronger, betterprotected locks, requiring larger and more sophisticated tools, taking more time, making more noise, and leaving more evidence that the lock has been defeated. While it is sometimes possible to wrench, pry, or pull an entire lock out of a door, most attacks are directed at either the bolt or the cylinder. If the bolt can be defeated, the door is open. If the cylinder can be defeated, the bolt can be maneuvered into an unlocked position. The more common of these attacks will be presented below, along with measures that can be taken to strengthen a lock against them. It bears repeating that no lock is absolutely immune to forceful attacks. The object is to make its defeat more difficult, noisier, and more time consuming, thereby increasing the chances that an intruder will be detected or simply give up before successfully breaching the lock.

Attacks on Bolts Bolts can be pried, punched, and sawed. The object of these attacks is to disengage the bolt from the strike. Jimmying and Prying. A jimmy is by definition a short prying tool used by burglars. It is a traditional and well-known burglary tool, but other, more lawful, prying tools will work just as well if not better. These include: prybars, crowbars, nail pullers, and large screwdrivers. The easiest prying attack is against latch bolts with antishim devices. A screwdriver or similar tool with a flat blade is inserted between the strike and latch bolt. Pressure is applied until the antishim mechanism inside the lock breaks. The latch is then easily pushed into the retracted position, and the door is open. A supplementary long-throw or interlocking deadbolt is the best defense against this attack. Noninterlocking, long-throw deadbolts are theoretically vulnerable to jimmying, but it takes a much larger tool, more time, and the destruction or spreading of part of the door jamb so that the end of the dead bolt can be reached with the prying tool. Even then, a great deal of force is required to push the bolt back into the lock and free the door. These combined disadvantages make direct jimmying attacks against long-throw deadbolts very impracti-

189

Figure 10-30. Jamb spreading by prying with two large screwdrivers.

cal. They are even more impractical against interlocking deadbolts. If the lock and strike are properly installed, the whole strike would have to be pried loose. This would ordinarily entail the destruction of a considerable portion of the jamb around the strike. A deadbolt also can be attacked indirectly by prying. An attempt is made to spread the door frame so that the bolt is no longer engaging the strike (Figure 10-30). An average man can apply about 600 inch-pounds of force using a pry bar 30 inches long. This is usually more than enough to spread a door jamb to clear the normal 1/2-inch bolt, but a 1-inch (or longer) bolt is more difficult to clear. Interlocking bolts are almost impossible to defeat with this method since they, in effect, anchor the door to the door frame. In order to spread the frame, the entire strike would have to be pried out. A properly installed security strike is very difficult to remove. Interlocking deadbolts were designed to resist just this type of attack. By and large, they are successful. When properly installed they are, as a practical matter, virtually immune. Automobile bumper jacks (or similar tools) can also be used to spread a door jamb and release the bolt (Figure 10-31). Most American jacks are rated at 1 ton. It is probably safe to say that most wooden door frames will succumb to that much force. Reinforced metal frames are more resistant. Long-throw and interlocking deadbolts provide some protection. They may even provide enough protection in most circumstances, since a jamb can only be spread so far by the jack before it buckles outward releasing the jack. The best defense against jamb spreading,

190


Figure 10-31. Use of an automobile bumper jack to spread the door frame. Standard bumper jacks are rated to 2000 pounds. The force of the jack can be applied between the two jambs of a door to spread them and overcome, by deflection, the length of the latch throw.

Figure 10-32. Forcing the deadbolt with a drift punch and hammer.

however, is a properly constructed and reinforced door frame. Fortunately, this type of attack is fairly rare. An automobile jack is an awkward tool, hard to carry and conceal, and it requires some time to set up and operate.

defense are free-wheeling rollers placed inside the bolt. When the saw reaches these rollers, the sawing action rolls them back and forth but will not cut them. Modified bolts are present in almost all relatively secure locks. They are virtually immune to sawing attacks.

Punching. The California Crime Technological Research Foundation (CCTRF) identified punching as a possible direct attack on a deadbolt (Figure 1032). The attacker would have to punch through the wall and framing members to reach the bolt. It would be fairly easy to miss the bolt on the first few tries, so several attempts may be necessary. In essence, the punch and hammer are used to force the bolt back into the body of the lock, allowing it to clear the strike. CCTRF determined that an average man can apply a force of 125 inch-pounds with a 1-pound hammer. Most bolts will probably succumb to a determined punching attack. But it is a noisy approach, and rather hit or miss since it is somewhat difficult to tell if the punch is actually engaging the bolt, and the punch has a tendency to be a serious disadvantage to an intruder, making this an attack of last resort.

Peeling. Another way to expose the bolt in metalframed doors is by peeling. Thin sheet steel and aluminum can be easily peeled. The normal countermeasure against this attack is to use a reinforced strike. Peeling may also be used with prying in an attempt to force the bolt back into the lock.

Sawing. Bolts can be sawed by inserting a hacksaw or hacksaw blade between the face plate and the strike. (A portion of the jamb will usually be removed or the jamb spread to allow easy access.) Better locks now use hardened bolts or hardened inserts inside the bolt to resist sawing.An even better

Attacks on Cylinders Like bolts, cylinders can be pried and punched. They also can be drilled, pulled, wrenched, or twisted. The usual objective of such attacks is to completely remove the cylinder from the lock. Once it has been removed, a tool can be inserted into the lock to quickly retract the bolt. Cylinder Pulling. The tool usually used for cylinder pulling is a slam hammer or dent puller—a common automobile body shop tool ordinarily used to remove dents from car bodies. The hardened selftapping screw at the end of the puller is screwed into the keyway as far as it will go. The hammer is then slammed back against the handle. More often than not, an unprotected cylinder will be yanked entirely out of the lock with one or two slams. CCTRF deter-


191

be pried off without virtually destroying the entire door. Cylindrical (lock-in-knob) locksets are extremely vulnerable to pulling. Often the door knob will be pulled off with the cylinder, exposing the entire internal mechanism to manipulation. There is no method of reinforcing a cylindrical lockset against the threat of pulling. The best measure is to replace it or add a good supplementary deadlock with a cylinder guard.

Figure 10-33. Bolt-on cylinder guard with backplate. This commercially available plate is of heavy aluminum and is mounted from the inside of the door with hardened steel bolts that enter threaded holes in the guard. It combines good protection with good appearance.

mined that 200 inch-pounds of force could be applied to a cylinder by a dent puller using a 21/2-pound hammer having an 8-inch throw. Many cylinders are vulnerable to this kind of attack because they are poorly anchored in the lock. Mortise cylinders, for example, are ordinarily threaded into the housing and held in place with a small set screw. The threads are usually soft brass or cast iron. A good yank shears both these threads and the set screw. Most tubular and rim cylinders are held in place by two (or more) bolts inserted from the rear of the lock. This is a much more secure method of retaining the cylinder and one which resists pulling. Retaining bolts of at least 1/4 inch in diameter made of hardened steel are good protection against most pulling attempts. The threat of pulling can be significantly reduced by the addition of a cylinder guard. Some better lock assemblies are offered with built-in guards. Locks that do not have a built-in guard can be protected with a bolt-on guard. These are bolted over the cylinder using carriage bolts that extend completely through the door (Figure 10-33). They offer the maximum available resistance to pulling. The cylinder guard when correctly mounted cannot

Lug Pulling. If the cylinder itself is protected against pulling, an attacker may turn to the cylinder plug. The plug is much harder to pull, and requires a special tool that looks something like a gear puller. A hardened self-tapping screw is engaged in the keyway and pressure is slowly exerted on the plug until the tumblers snap and the plug can be pulled from the cylinder shell. The bolt mechanism can then be operated by a tool inserted through the shell. The ordinary cylinder guard is no protection against this attack. A special guard is available, however, which is designed to prevent the plug from being pulled (see Figure 10-34). Wrenching, Twisting, and Nipping. Most cylinders project from the surface of the door sufficiently to be gripped by a pipe wrench or pliers. Twisting force is applied to the cylinder by the wrench which is often sufficient to snap or shear the set-screws or bolts that hold the cylinder in the lock. If the cylinder does not project enough for a wrench to be used, a grounddown screwdriver can be inserted in the keyway and twisting force applied to the screwdriver with a wrench. CCTRF found that an 18-inch long pipe wrench could apply a maximum torque of 3300 inchpounds to a protruding cylinder housing, and a screwdriver turned with a wrench could produce 600 inch-pounds. The proper protection against this threat once again is a cylinder guard. Some of the built-in guards are free-wheeling, which prevents a twisting force from being successfully applied. Those that are not free-wheeling are still made of hardened steel which does not allow the wrench to get a good bite, but more importantly, prevents the wrench from reaching the actual cylinder. If a screwdriver and wrench are used, the cylinder might be twisted loose, but it cannot be pulled out. So, although the lock might be damaged, it will not be defeated. Bolt nippers also can be used to remove protruding cylinders by prying and pulling. Cylinder guards also forestall this type of attack. Cylindrical locksets are very susceptible to wrenching, twisting, and nipping attacks. Some of the

192


Figure 10-34. Cylinder guard with rotating plug protector.

Figure 10-35. Drilling.

better cylindrical devices have free-wheeling door knobs which provide some protection against wrenching and twisting. Some incorporate breakaway knobs which do not expose the internal mechanism of the lock when the knob is twisted off. Nevertheless, combinations of twisting, pulling, and hammering attacks usually quickly defeat these devices. The best remedy is to replace cylindrical mechanisms or supplement them with guarded deadlocks. Drilling. Cylinder plugs can be drilled out using a fairly large drill bit, but the most common drilling attack is centered on the shear line between the plug and shell (Figure 10-35). A smaller bit is used to drill through the pins, creating a new shear line and releasing the plug which can then be rotated using a screwdriver or key blank in the keyway. Most of the better locks incorporate hardened inserts to frustrate drilling. Any lock receiving Underwriters Laboratories approval incorporates these features. Hardened materials do not prevent drilling, but drilling through

tempered steel is a long and slow process which greatly increases the chances of detection. BHI’s Huck-Pin cylinder has an added protection against drilling. When most cylinders are drilled at the shear line, the drivers will fall out of the shell into the plug, releasing the plug to rotate. BHI’s drivers are flanged, which prevents them from falling out, so they still effectively lock the mechanism after it is drilled. This does not prevent the entire cylinder from being drilled out, but this is an even longer and slower process than drilling along the shear line. Punching. Rim-mounted deadlocks are particularly vulnerable to punching. These are ordinarily mounted on the back of a door with wood screws. But, since most of the currently available doors are made with particle board cores under a thin veneer overlay, screws are seldom able to take much pressure. Several good blows with a hammer and punch on the face of the cylinder will often drive it through the door, pulling the screws out, so the entire lock body is dislodged.


Correctly mounting the lock using bolts which extend through the door and engage an escutcheon plate (or even large washers) on the front side generally frustrates punching attacks. Cylindrical locksets are vulnerable to combination punching and hammering attacks. The knob is first broken off, then the spindle is punched through the lock, exposing the latch bolt assembly to manipulation. Hammering. Hammering, as well as pulling, wrenching, and twisting, is a quick and very effective way of disabling cylindrical locksets. It is not as effective against cylinders, particularly those that are protected by cylinder guards. Ordinarily the knob on a cylindrical mechanism can be quickly broken off by one or two strong blows. There is no direct defense against this type of attack. Again, the only viable solution is a supplementary guarded deadlock, or replacement of the cylindrical lockset with a more secure lock.

Locks and the Systems Approach to Security Locks are an essential part of most security systems. They are, however, only one part. The effectiveness of a lock cannot be considered apart from the effectiveness of the entire system. A lock is no better than the door it is on, or the frame in which the door is mounted. The strongest lock available on a substandard door does not prevent the door from being defeated, even though the lock cannot be.

193

The degree of protection required from any security system reflects the value of the items to be protected. Most residences require only a modest degree of security—sufficient to thwart the casual or opportunistic intruder. Jewelry stores, banks, and other establishments which must necessarily keep valuable items on the premises attract a more determined attacker. The degree of protection for these places must, therefore, necessarily be greater. But whatever the degree of protection required, the actual protection offered by any system is no greater than the vulnerability of its weakest member. A good lock on a poor door provides no more protection than the strength of the door. A good lock on a solid door in a substandard wall is as vulnerable as the wall is weak. The locks employed in any protection system must complement the system. If a moderate degree of security is required (as in a residential application), a good cylinder properly installed in a secure lock body must be correctly mounted on a good, solid door. The door itself must be correctly hung, using good hardware, on a properly constructed door frame. The frame must be strongly braced, and secured to the wall. The wall itself must be at least as strong as the door system installed in it. If the lock, the door, the frame or the wall is significantly weaker than the rest of the system, it is the point most likely to be successfully attacked. A good lock is essential to a good security system. It is often the point at which an intruder will focus an attack. But good locks are not synonymous with good security.Always examine the system as a whole.

Key Control* EUGENE D. FINNERAN

Before an effective key control system can be established, every key to every lock that is being used in the protection of the facility and property must be accounted for. Chances are good that it will not even * From Security Supervision: A Handbook for Supervisors and Managers, by Eugene D. Finneran (Stoneham, MA: Butterworths, 1981).

be possible to account for the most critical keys or to be certain that they have not been copied or compromised. If this is the case, there is but one alternative—to rekey the entire facility. Once an effective locking system has been installed, positive control of all keys must be gained and maintained. This can be accomplished only if an effective key record is kept. When not issued or used,

194


keys must be adequately secured. A good, effective key control system is simple to initiate, particularly if it is established in conjunction with the installation of new locking devices. One of the methods which can be used to gain and maintain effective key control follows: 1. Key cabinet—a well-constructed cabinet will have to be procured. The cabinet will have to be of sufficient size to hold the original key to every lock in the system. It should also be capable of holding any additional keys which are in use in the facility but which are not a part of the security locking system. The cabinet should be installed in such a manner so as to be difficult, if not impossible, to remove from the property. It should be secured at all times when the person designated to control the keys is not actually issuing or replacing a key. The key to the key cabinet must receive special handling, and when not in use it should be maintained in a locked compartment inside a combination-type safe. 2. Key record—some administrative means must be set up to record key code numbers and indicate to whom keys to specific locks have been issued. This record may take the form of a ledger book or a card file. 3. Key blanks—blanks which are to be used to cut keys for issue to authorized personnel must be distinctively marked for identification to insure that no employees have cut their own keys. Blanks will be kept within a combination-type safe and issued only to the person authorized to cut keys and then only in the amount that has been authorized by the person responsible for key control. Such authorization should always be in writing, and records should be maintained on each issue which will be matched with the returned key. Keys which are damaged in the cutting process must be returned for accountability. 4. Inventories—periodic inventories will have to be made of all key blanks, original keys, and all duplicate keys in the hands of the employees to whom they have been issued. This cannot be permitted to take the form of a phone call to an employee, supervisor, or executive asking if they still have their key. It must be a personal inspection of each key made by the person who has been assigned responsibility for key control. 5. Audits—in addition to the periodic inventory, an unannounced audit should be made of all key control records and procedures by a member of management. During the course of these audits a joint inventory of all keys should be conducted.

6. Daily report—a daily report should be made to the person responsible for key control from the personnel department, indicating all persons who have left or will be leaving the employ of the company in the near future. A check should be made, upon receipt of this report, to determine whether the person named has been issued a key to any lock in the system. In the event a key has been issued, steps should be initiated to insure that the key is recovered. Security force personnel will normally be issued master keys, when such a system is in effect, or they will be issued a ring of keys permitting them to enter any part of the guarded facility. Keys issued to the security force should never be permitted to leave the facility. They should be passed from shift to shift and must be receipted for each time they change hands. The supervisor must insure that all security personnel understand the importance of not permitting keys to be compromised. A lost master key compromises the entire system and results in the breakdown of the security screen. Such compromise will necessitate the rekeying of the entire complex, sometimes at a cost of thousands of dollars. If rekeying becomes necessary, it can most economically be accomplished by installing new locking devices in the most critical points of the locking system and moving the locks removed from these points to less sensitive areas. Of course, it will be necessary to eventually replace all the locks in the system, but by using the procedure just described the cost can be spread over several budgeting periods.

A. New Standard Set for Exit Devices, Locks, and Alarms1 The Builders’ Hardware Manufacturer’s Association (BHMA) has announced a new American National Standard for exit locks and exit alarms for the safety and security of building occupants. Developed by BHMA, the new standard was recently approved by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). In effect, the new standard recognizes the increased importance of locks, alarms, and other devices that control egress from a building. The standard establishes general requirements as well as operational tests and finish tests for these products. In addition, it gives descriptions and type numbers of exit locks and exit alarms. Revisions include increased performance requirements with respect to the recommended tests and a


slam test not part of the earlier standards has been added. Testing of products in accordance with this standard allows for certification to the ANSI/BHMA standard to be established by third party testing laboratories. For more information, or to purchase copies of the ANSI/BHMA A156.29 Standard, please visit http://www.buildershardware.com.

195

Reference 1. Security Beat [weekly newsletter by publisher of Access Control and Security Systems] 2, no. 7 (February 19, 2002).

Appendix 10.A Key Control and Lock Security Checklist* JOHN E. HUNTER

1. Has a key control officer been appointed? 2. Are locks and keys to all buildings and entrances supervised and controlled by the key control officer? 3. Does the key control officer have overall authority and responsibility for issuance and replacement of locks and keys? 4. What is the basis for the issuance of keys, especially master keys? 5. Are keys issued only to authorized personnel? Who determines who is authorized? Is the authorization in writing? 6. Are keys issued to other than installation personnel? If so, on what basis? Is it out of necessity or merely for convenience? 7. Are keys not in use secured in a locked, fireproof cabinet? Are these keys tagged and accounted for? 8. Is the cabinet for duplicate keys regarded as an area of high security? 9. Is the key or combination to this cabinet maintained under appropriate security or secrecy? If the combination is recorded, is it secured? 10. Are the key locker and record files in order and current?

* Prepared by John E. Hunter, U.S. National Park Service.

11. Are issued keys cross-referenced? 12. Are current records maintained indicating: a. Buildings and/or entrances for which keys are issued? b. Number and identification of keys issued? c. Location and number of duplicate keys? d. Issue and turn-in of key? e. Location of locks and keys held in reserve? 13. Is an audit ever made, asking holders to actually produce keys, to ensure that they have not been loaned or lost? 14. Who is responsible for ascertaining the possession of key? 15. Is a current key control directive in effect? 16. Are inventories and inspections conducted by the key control officer to ensure compliance with directives? How often? 17. Are keys turned in during vacation periods? 18. Are keys turned in when employees resign, are transferred, or are fired? 19. Is the removal of keys from the premises prohibited when they are not needed elsewhere? 20. Are locks and combinations changed immediately upon loss or theft of keys or transfer or resignation of employees? 21. Are locks changed or rotated within the installation at least annually regardless of transfers or known violations of key security?

196


22. Are current records kept of combinations to safes and the dates when these combinations are changed? Are these records adequately protected? 23. Has a system been set up to provide submasters to supervisors and officials on a need basis, with facilities divided into different zones or areas? 24. If master keys are used, are they devoid of marking identifying them as master keys? 25. Are master keys controlled more closely than change keys? 26. Must all requests for reproduction or duplication of keys be approved by the key control officer? 27. Are key holders ever allowed to duplicate keys? If so, under what circumstances? 28. Where the manufacturer’s serial number on combination locks and padlocks might be visible to unauthorized persons, has this number been recorded and then obliterated? 29. Are locks on inactive gates and storage facilities under seal? Are seals checked regularly by supervisory or key control personnel?

30. Are measures in effect to prevent the unauthorized removal of locks on open cabinets, gates, or buildings? 31. Are losses or thefts of keys and padlocks promptly reported by personnel and promptly investigated by key control personnel? 32. If the building was recently constructed, did the contractor retain keys during the period when construction was being completed? Were locks changed since that time? Did the contractor relinquish all keys after the building was completed? 33. If removable-core locks are in use, are unused cores and core change keys given maximum security against theft, loss, or inspection? 34. Are combination lock, key, and key control records safeguarded separately (i.e., in a separate safe or file) from keys, locks, cores, and other such hardware? 35. Are all locks of a type that offer adequate protection for the purpose for which they are used?

Appendix 10.B Terms and Definitions for Door and Window Security* Access Control. A method of providing security by restricting the movement of persons into or within a protected area. Accessible Window. (1) Residential—any window located within 3.7 meters (12 feet) of grade or a building projection. (2) Commercial—any window located within 4.6 meters (18 feet) of grade or within 3 meters (10 feet) of any fire escape or other structure accessible from public or semipublic areas. Accordion Gate. See Sliding Metal Gate. Ace Lock. A type of pin tumbler lock in which the pins are installed in a circle around the axis of the cylinder, and move perpendicularly to the face of the cylinder. The shear line of the driver and bottom tumblers is a plane * Reprinted courtesy of United States Department of Commerce, National Bureau of Standards.

parallel to the face of the cylinder. This type of lock is operated with a push key. Active Door (or Leaf). The leaf of a double door that must be opened first and which is used in normal pedestrian traffic. This leaf is usually the one in which a lock is installed. Anchor. A device used to secure a buildings part or component to adjoining construction or to a supporting member. See also Floor Anchor, Jamb Anchor, and Stud Anchor. Antifriction Latch. A latch bolt that incorporates any device which reduces the closing friction between the latch and the strike. Applied Trim. A separately applied molding used as the finishing face trim of a frame. Apron. The flat member of a window trim placed against the wall immediately beneath the windowsill.


Architectural Hardware. See Finish Builders’ Hardware. Areaway. An open subsurface space adjacent to a building which is used to admit light or to provide a means of access to the building. Armored Front. A plate or plates secured to the lock front of a mortised lock by machine screws in order to provide protection against tampering with the cylinder set screws. Also called armored face plate. Astragal. A member fixed to, or a projection of, an edge of a door or window to cover the joint between the meeting of stiles; usually fixed to one of a pair of swinging doors to provide a seal against the passage of weather, light, noise, or smoke. Auxilliary Lock. A lock installed on a door or window to supplement a previously installed primary lock. Also called a secondary lock. It can be a mortised, bored, or rim lock. Back Plate. A metal plate on the inside of a door which is used to clamp a pin or disc tumbler rim lock cylinder to the door by means of retaining screws. The tail piece of the cylinder extends through a hole in the back plate. Backset, Flush Bolt. The distance from the vertical centerline of the lock edge of a door to the centerline of the bolt. Backset, Hinge. On a door, the distance from the stop face to the edge of the hinge cutout. On a frame, the distance from the stop to the edge of the hinge cutout. Backset, Lock. The horizontal distance from the vertical centerline of the face plate to the center of the lock cylinder keyway or knob spindle. Backset, Strike. The distance from the door stop to the edge of the strike cutout. Baffle. See Guard Plate. Balanced Door. A door equipped with double-pivoted hardware so designed as to cause a semicounter-balanced swing action when it is opened. Barrel Key. A key with a bit projecting from a round, hollow key shank which fits on a post in the lock. Barricade Bolt. A massive metal bar that engages large strikes on both sides of a door. Barricade bolts are available with locking devices, and are completely removed from the door when not in use. Bead. See Glazing Bead. Bevel (of a door). The angle of the lock edge of the door in relation to its face. The standard bevel is 0.32 cm in 5.1 cm (1/8≤ in 2≤). Bevel (of a latch bolt). A term used to indicate the direction in which a latch bolt is inclined: regular bevel for doors opening in, reverse bevel for doors opening out. Bevel (of lock front). The angle of a lock front when not at a right angle to the lock case, allowing the front to be applied flush with the edge of a beveled door. Bicentric Pin Tumbler Cylinder. A cylinder having two cores and two sets of pins, each having different combinations. This cylinder requires two separate keys, used simultaneously, to operate it. The cam or tail piece is gear operated. Bit. A blade projecting from a key shank which engages with and actuates the bolt or level tumblers of a lock.

197

Bit Key. A key with a bit projecting from a round shank. Similar to the barrel key but with a solid rather than hollow shank. Bitting. See Cut. Blank. An uncut key or an unfinished key as it comes from the manufacturer, before any cuts have been made on it. Blind Stop. A rectangular molding, located between the outside trim and outside sashes, used in the assembly of a window frame. Serves as a stop for storm, screen, or combination windows and to resist air infiltration. Bolt. That part of a lock which, when actuated, is projected (or “thrown”) from the lock into a retaining member, such as a strike plate, to prevent a door or window from moving or opening. See also Deadbolt, Flush Bolt, and Latch. Bolt Attack. A category of burglary attack in which force, with or without the aid of tools, is directed against the bolt in an attempt to disengage it from the strike or to break it. Bolt Projection (Bolt Throw). The distance from the edge of the door, at the bolt centerline, to the furthest point on the bolt in the projected position. Bored Lock (or Latch). A lock or latch whose parts are intended for installation in holes bored in a door. See also Key-in-Knob Lock. Bottom Pin. One of pin tumblers which determines the combination of a pin tumbler cylinder and is directly contacted by the key. These are varied in length and usually tapered at one end, enabling them to fit into the “V” cuts made in a key. When the proper key is inserted, the bottom pins level off at the cylinder core shear line, allowing the core to turn and actuate the lock. Bottom Rail. The horizontal rail at the bottom of a door or window connecting the vertical edge members (stiles). Box Strike. A strike plate that has a metal box or housing to fully enclose the projected bolt and/or latch. Breakaway Strike. See Electric Strike. Buck. See Rough Buck. Builders’ Hardware. All hardware used in building construction, but particularly that used on or in connection with doors, windows, cabinets, and other moving members. Bumping. A method of opening a pin tumbler lock by means of vibration produced by a wooden or rubber mallet. Burglar-Resistant Glazing. Any glazing which is more difficult to break through than the common window or plate glass, designed to resist burglary attacks of the hit-and-run type. Butt Hinge. A type of hinge which has matching rectangular leaves and multiple bearing contacts, and is designed to be mounted in mortises in the door edge and in the frame. Buttress Lock. A lock which secures a door by wedging a bar between the door and the floor. Some incorporate a movable steel rod which fits into metal receiving slots on the door and in the floor. Also called police bolt/brace.

198


Cabinet Jamb. A door frame in three or more pieces, usually shipped knocked down for field assembly over a rough buck. Cam. The part of a lock or cylinder which rotates to actuate the bolt or latch as the key is turned. The cam may also act as the bolt. Cam, Lazy. A cam which moves less than the rotation of the cylinder core. Cam Lock. See Crescent Sash Lock. Cane Bolt. A heavy cane-shaped bolt with the top bent at right angles; used on the bottom of doors. Case. The housing in which a lock mechanism is mounted and enclosed. Casement Hinge. A hinge for swinging a casement window. Casement Window. A type of window which is hinged on the vertical edge. Casing. Molding of various widths and thicknesses used to trim door and window openings at the jambs. Center-Hung Door. A door hung on center pivots. Center Rail. The horizontal rail in a door, usually located at lock height to separate the upper and lower panels of a recessed panel type door. Chain Bolt. A vertical spring-loaded bolt mounted at the top of door. It is manually actuated by a chain. Chain Door Interviewer. An auxiliary locking device which allows a door to be opened slightly, but restrains it from being fully opened. It consists of chain with one end attached to the door jamb and the other attached to a keyed metal piece which slides in a slotted metal plate attached to the door. Some chain door interviewers incorporate a keyed lock operated from the inside. Change Key. A key that will operate only one lock or a group of keyed-alike locks, as distinguished from a master key. See also Keyed-Alike Cylinders and Master Key System. Changes. The number of possible key changes or combination changes to a lock cylinder. Checkrails. The meeting rails of double-hung windows. They are usually beveled, and thick enough to fill the space between the top and bottom sash due to the parting stop in the window frame. Clearance. A space intentionally provided between components, either to facilitate operation or installation, to insure proper separation, to accommodate dimensional variations, or for other reasons. See also Door Clearance. Clevis. A metal link used to attach a chain to a padlock. Code. An arrangement of numbers or letters which is used to specify a combination for the bitting of a key or the pins of a cylinder core. Combination. (1) The sequence and depth of cuts on a key. (2) The sequence of numbers to which a combination lock is set. Combination Doors or Windows. Storm doors or windows permanently installed over the primary doors or windows. They provide insulation and summer ventilation and often have self-storing or removable glass and screen inserts.

Common Entry Door (of a multiple dwelling). Any door in a multiple dwelling which provides access between the semi-public, interior areas of the building and the outof-doors areas surrounding the building. Communicating Frame. A double rabbeted frame with both rabbets prepared for single-swing doors that open in opposite directions. Doors may be of the same or opposite hand. Component. A subassembly which is combined with other components to make an entire system. Door assembly components include the door, lock hinges, jamb/strike, and jamb/wall. Composite Door. A door constructed of a solid core material with facing and edges of different materials. Connecting Bar. A flat metal bar attached to the core of a cylinder lock to operate the bolt mechanism. Construction Master Keying. A keying system used to allow the use of a single key for all locks during the construction of large housing projects. In one such system, the cylinder cores of all locks contain an insert that permits the use of a special master key. When the dwelling unit is completed, the insert is removed and the lock then accepts its own change key and no longer accepts the construction master key. Continuous Hinge. A hinge designed to be the same length as the edge of the moving part to which it is applied. Also called a piano hinge. Coordinator. A mechanism which controls the order of closing of a pair of swing doors, used with overlapping astragals and certain panic hardware which require that one door close ahead of the other. Core. See Cylinder Core. Crash Bar. The cross bar or level of a panic exit device which serves as push bar to actuate the lock. See also Panic Hardware. Cremone Bolt. A surface-mounted device that locks a door or sash into the frame at both the top and bottom when a knob or lever is turned. Crescent Sash Lock. A simple cam-shaped latch, not requiring a key for its operation, usually used to secure double-hung windows. Also called a cam lock. Cut. An indentation made in a key to make it fit a pin tumbler of a lock. Any notch made in a key is known as a cut, whether it is square, round, or V-shaped. Also called bitting. Cylinder. The cylindrical subassembly of a lock, including the cylinder housing, the cylinder core, the tumbler mechanism, and the keyway. Cylinder Collar. See Cylinder Guard Ring. Cylinder Core (or Plug). The central part of a cylinder, containing the keyway, which is rotated to operate the lock bolt. Cylinder Guard Ring. A hardened metal ring, surrounding the exposed portion of a lock cylinder, which protects the cylinder from being wrenched, turned, pried, cut, or pulled with attack tools. Cylinder Housing. The external case of a lock cylinder. Also called the cylinder shell.


Cylinder Lock. A lock in which the locking mechanism is controlled by a cylinder. A double cylinder lock has a cylinder on both the interior and exterior of the door. Cylinder, Mortise Type. A lock cylinder that has a threaded housing which screws directly into the lock case, with a cam or other mechanism engaging the locking mechanism. Cylinder, Removable Core. A cylinder whose core may be removed by the use of a special key. Cylinder, Rim Type. A lock cylinder that is held in place by tension against its rim, applied by screws from the interior face of the door. Cylinder Ring. See Cylinder Guard Ring. Cylinder Screw. A set screw that holds a mortise cylinder in place and prevents it from being turned after installation. Cylindrical Lock (or Latch). See Bored Lock. Deadbolt. A lock bolt which does not have an automatic spring action and a bevelled end as opposed to a latch bolt, which does. The bolt must be actuated to a projected position by a key or thumb turn and when projected is locked against return by end pressure. Deadlatch. A spring-actuated latch bolt having a bevelled end and incorporating a feature that automatically locks the projected latch bolt against return by end pressure. Deadlock. A lock equipped with a dealt bolt. Deadlocking Latch Bolt. See Deadlatch. Disc Tumbler. A spring-loaded, flat plate that slides in a slot which runs through the diameter of the cylinder. Inserting the proper key lines up the disc tumblers with the lock’s shear line and enables the core to be turned. Dogging Device. A mechanism which fastens the cross bar of a panic exit device in the fully depressed position, and retains the latch bolt or bolts in the retracted position to permit free operation of the door from either side. Dogging Key. A key-type wrench used to lock down, in the open position, the cross bar of a panic exit device. Door Assembly. A unit composed of parts or components which make up a closure for a passageway through a wall. It consists of the door, hinges, locking device or devices, operational contacts (such as handles, knobs, push plates), miscellaneous hardware and closure, the frame including the head and jambs, the anchorage devices to the surrounding wall, and the surrounding wall. Door Bolt. A rod or bar manually operated without a key, attached to a door to provide a means of securing it. Door Check/Closer. A device used to control the closing of a door by means of a spring and either hydraulic or air pressure, or by electrical means. Door Clearance. The space between a door and either its frame or the finished floor or threshold, or between the two doors of a double door. See also Clearance. Door Frame. An assembly of members surrounding and supporting a door or doors, and perhaps also one or more transom lights and/or sidelights. See also Integral Frame. Door Jambs. The two vertical components of a door frame called the hinge jamb and the lock jamb.

199

Door Light. See Light. Door Opening. The size of a doorway, measured from jamb to jamb and from floor line or sill to head of frame. The opening size is usually the nominal door size, and is equal to the actual door size plus clearances and threshold height. Door Stop. The projections along the top and sides of a door frame against which a one-way swinging door closes. See also Rabbeted Jamb. Double-Acting Door. A swinging door equipped with hardware which permits it to open in either direction. Double-Bitted Key. A key having cuts on two sides. Double Cylinder Lock. See Cylinder Lock. Double Door. A pair of doors mounted together in a single opening. See also Active Door and Inactive Door. Double Egress Frame. A door frame prepared to receive two single-acting doors swinging in opposite directions, both doors being of the same hand. Double Glazing. Two thicknesses of glass, separated by an air space and framed in an opening, designed to reduce heat transfer or sound transmission. In factory-made double glazing units, referred to as insulating glass, the air space between the glass sheets is desiccated and sealed airtight. Double-Hung Window. A type of window, composed of upper and lower sashes which slide vertically. Double-Throw Bolt. A bolt that can be projected beyond its first position, into a second, or fully extended one. Double-Throw Lock. A lock incorporating a double-throw bolt. Driver Pin. One of the pin tumblers in pin tumbler cylinder lock, usually flat on both ends, which are in line with and push against the flat ends of the bottom pins. They are projected by individual coil springs into the cylinder core until they are forced from the core by the bottom pins when the proper key is inserted into the keyway. Drop Ring. A ring handle attached to the spindle which operates a lock or latch. The ring is pivoted to remain in a dropped position when not in use. Dry Glazing. A method of securing glass in a frame by use of a performed resilient gasket. Drywall Frame. A knocked down (KD) door frame for installation in a wall constructed with studs and gypsum board or other drywall facing material after the wall is erected. Dummy Cylinder. A mock cylinder without an operating mechanism, used for appearance only. Dummy Trim. Trim only, without lock; usually used on the inactive door in a double door. Dutch Door. A door consisting of two separate leaves, one above the other, which may be operated either independently or together. The lower leaf usually has a service shelf. Dutch Door Bolt. A device for locking together the upper and lower leaves of a Dutch door. Dwelling Unit Entry Door. Any door giving access to a private dwelling unit. Electric Strike. An electrically operated device that replaces a conventional strike plate and allows a door

200


to be opened by using electric switches at remote locations. Escutcheon Plate. A surface-mounted cover plate, either protective or ornamental, containing openings for any or all of the controlling members of a lock such as the knob, handle, cylinder, or keyhole. Exit Device. See Panic Hardware. Expanded Metal. An open mesh formed by slitting and drawing metal sheet. It is made in various patterns and metal thicknesses, with either a flat or an irregular surface. Exterior Private Area. The ground area outside a single family house, or a ground floor apartment in the case of a multiple dwelling, which is fenced off by a real barrier, which is available for the use of one family and is accessible only from the interior of that family’s unit. Exterior Public Area. The ground area outside a multiple dwelling which is not defined as being associated with the building or building entry in any real or symbolic fashion. Exterior Semiprivate Area. The ground area outside a multiple dwelling which is fenced off by a real barrier, and is accessible only from the private or semiprivate zones within the building. Exterior Semipublic Area. The ground area outside a single family house or multiple dwelling, which is accessible from public zones, but is defined as belonging to the house or building by symbolic barriers only. Face (of a lock). See Face Plate. Face Glazing. A method of glazing in which the glass is set in an L-shaped or rabbeted frame, the glazing compound is finished off in the form of a triangular bead, and no lose stops are employed. Face Plate. The part of a mortise lock through which the bolt protrudes and by which the lock is fastened to the door. Fast Pin Hinge. A hinge in which the pin is fastened permanently in place. Fatigue. Structural failure of a material caused by repeated or fluctuating application of stresses, none of which is individually sufficient to cause failure. Fence. A metal pin that extends from the bolt of a lever lock and prevents retraction of the bolt unless it is aligned with the gates of the lever tumblers. Fidelity Loss. A property loss resulting from a theft in which the thief leaves no evidence of entry. Filler Plate. A metal plate used to fill unwanted mortise cutouts in a door or frame. Finish Builders’ Hardware. Hardware that has a finished appearance as well as a functional purpose and which may be considered as part of the decorative treatment of a room or building. Also called finish hardware and builders’ finish hardware. Fire Stair. Any enclosed stairway which is part of a fireresistant exitway. Fire Stair Door. A door forming part of the fire-resistant fire stair enclosure, and providing access from common corridors to fire stair landings within an exitway.

Floor Anchor. A metal device attached to the wall side of a jamb at its base to secure the frame to the floor. Floor Clearance. The width of the space between the bottom of a door and the rough or finished floor or threshold. Flush Bolt. A door bolt so designed that, when installed, the operating handle is flush with the face or edge of the door. Usually installed at the top and bottom of the inactive door of a double door. Flush Door. A smooth-surface door having faces which are plane and which conceal its rails and stiles or other structure. Foot Bolt. A type of bolt applied at the bottom of a door and arranged for foot operation. Generally the bolt head is held up by a spring when the door is unbolted. Forced Entry. An unauthorized entry accomplished by the use of force upon the physical components of the premises. Frame. The component that forms the opening of and provides support for a door, windows, skylight, or hatchway. See also Door Frame. Frame Gasket. Resilient material in strip form attached to frame stops to provide tight closure of a door or window. Front (of a lock). See Face Plate. Gate. A notch in the end of a lever tumbler, which when aligned with the fence of the lock bolt allows the bolt to be withdrawn from the strike. General Circulation Stair. An interior stairway in a building without elevators which provides access to upper floors. Glass Door. A door made from thick glass, usually heat tempered, and having no structural metal stiles. Glass Stop. See Glazing Bead. Glazing. Any transparent or translucent material used in windows or doors to admit light. Glazing Bead. A strip of trim or a sealant such as caulking or glazing compound, which is placed around the perimeter of a pane of glass or other glazing to secure it to a frame. Glazing Compound. A soft, dough-like material used for filling and sealing the spaces between a pane of glass and its surrounding frame and/or stops. Grand Master Key. A key designed to operate all locks under several master keys in a system. Grating, Bar Type. An open grip assembly of metal bars in which the bearing bars, running in one direction, are spaced by rigid attachment to cross bars running perpendicular to them or by bent connecting bars extending between them. Grout. Mortar of such consistency that it will just flow into the joints and cavities of masonry work and fill them solid. Grouted Frame. A frame in which all voids between it and the surrounding wall are completely filled with the cement or plaster used in the wall construction. Guard Bar. A series of two or more cross bars, generally fastened to a common back plate, to protect the glass or screen in a door.


Guard Plate. A piece of metal attached to a door frame, door edge, or over the lock cylinder for the purpose of reinforcing the locking system against burglary attacks. Hand (of a door). The opening direction of the door. A right-handed (RH) door is hinged on the right and swings inward when viewed from the outside. A lefthanded (LH) door is hinged on the left and swings inward when viewed from the outside. If either of these doors swings outward, it is referred to as a right-hand reverse (RHR) door or a left-hand reverse (LHR) door, respectively. Handle. Any grip-type door pull. See also Lever Handle. Hasp. A fastening device which consists of a hinged plate with a slot in it that fits over a fixed D-shaped ring, or eye. Hatchway. An opening in a ceiling, roof, or floor of a building which is large enough to allow human access. Head. Top horizontal member of a door or window frame. Head Stiffener. A heavy-gauge metal angle or channel section placed inside, and attached to, the head of a wide door frame to maintain its alignment; not a loadcarrying member. Heel of a Padlock. That end of the shackle on a padlock which is not removable from the case. Hinge. A device generally consisting of two metal plates having loops formed along one edge of each to engage and rotate about a common pivot rod or “pin,” used to suspend a swinging door or window in its frame. Hinge Backset. The distance from the edge of a hinge to the stop at the side of a door or window. Hinge Edge or Hinge Stile. The vertical edge or stile of a door or window to which hinges or pivots are attached. Hinge Reinforcement. A metal plate attached to a door or frame to receive a hinge. Hold-Back Feature. A mechanism on a latch which serves to hold the latch bolt in the retracted position. Hollow Core Door. A door constructed so that the space (core) between the two facing sheets is not completely filled. Various spacing and reinforcing material are used to separate the facing sheets; some interior hollow-core doors have nothing except perimeter stiles and rails separating the facing sheets. Hollow Metal. Hollow items such as doors, frames, partitions, and enclosures which are usually fabricated from cold-formed metal sheet, usually carbon steel. Horizontal Sliding Window. A type of window composed of two sections, one or both of which slide horizontally past the other. Impression System. A technique to produce keys for certain types of locks without taking the lock apart. Inactive Door (or Leaf). The leaf of a double door that is bolted when closed; the strike plate is attached to this leaf to receive the latch and bolt of the active leaf. Integral Frame. A metal door frame in which the jambs and head have stops, trim, and backbends all formed from one piece of material. Integral Lock (or Latch). See Preassembled Lock.

201

Interior Common-Circulation Area. An area within a multiple dwelling which is outside the private zones of individual units and is used in common by all residents and the maintenance staff of the building. Interior Private Area. The interior of a single family house; the interior of an apartment in a multiple dwelling; or the interior of a separate unit within commercial, public, or institutional building. Interior Public Area. An interior common-circulation area or common resident-use room within a multiple dwelling to which access is unrestricted. Interior Semipublic Area. An interior common-circulation area or common resident-use room within a multiple dwelling to which access is possible only with a key or on the approval of a resident via an intercom, buzzerreply system. Invisible Hinge. A hinge so constructed that no parts are exposed when the door is closed. Jalousie Window. See Louvered Window. Jamb. The exposed vertical member of either side of a door or window opening. See also Door Jambs. Jamb Anchor. A metal device inserted in or attached to the wall side of a jamb to secure the frame to the wall. A masonry jamb anchor secures a jamb to a masonry wall. Jamb Depth. The width of the jamb, measured perpendicular to the door or wall face at the edge of the opening. Jamb Extension. The section of a jamb which extends below the level of the flush floor for attachment to the rough door. Jamb Peeling. A technique used in forced entry to deform or remove portions of the jamb to disengage the bolt from the strike. See Jimmying. Jamb/Strike. That component of a door assembly which receives and holds the extended lock bolt.The strike and jamb are considered a unit. Jamb/Wall. That component of a door assembly to which a door is attached and secured by means of the hinges.The wall and jamb are considered a unit. Jimmying. A technique used in forced entry to pry the jamb away from the lock edge of the door a sufficient distance to disengage the bolt from the strike. Jimmy-Pin. A sturdy projecting screw, which is installed in the hinge edge of a door near a hinge, fits into a hole in the door jamb, and prevents removal of the door if the hinge pins are removed. Keeper. See Strike. Key. An implement used to actuate a lock both or latch into the locked or unlocked position. Key Changes. The different combinations that are available or that can be used in a specific cylinder. Keyed-Alike Cylinders. Cylinders which are designed to be operated by the same key. (Not to be confused with master-keyed cylinders.) Keyed-Different Cylinders. Cylinders requiring different keys for their operation. Keyhole. The opening in a lock designed to receive the key.

202


Key-in-Knob Lock. A lock having the key cylinder and the other lock mechanism, such as a push or turn button, contained in the knobs. Key Plate. A plate or escutcheon having only a keyhole. Keyway. The longitudinal cut in the cylinder core, being an opening or space with millings in the sides identical to those on the proper key, thus allowing the key to enter the full distance of the blade. See also Warded Lock. Knifing. See Loiding. Knob. An ornamental or functional round handle on a door; may be designed to actuate a lock or latch. Knob Latch. A securing device having a spring bolt operated by a knob only. Knob Shank. The projecting stem of a knob into which the spindle is fastened. Knocked Down (KD). Disassembled; designed for assembly at the point of use. Knuckle. The enlarged part of a hinge into which the pin is inserted. Laminate. A product made by bonding together two or more layers of material. Laminated Glass. A type of glass fabricated from two layers of glass with a transparent bonding layer between them. Also called safety glass. Laminated Padlock. A padlock, the body of which consists of a number of flat plates, all or most of which are of the same contour, superimposed and riveted or brazed together. Holes in the plates provide spaces for the lock mechanism and the ends of the shackle. Latch (or Latch Bolt). A beveled, spring-actuated bolt which may or may not include a deadlocking feature. Leading Edge. See Lock Edge. Leaf, Door. An individual door, used either singly or in multiples. Leaf Hinge. The most common type of hinge, characterized by two flat metal plates or leaves, which pivot about a metal hinge pin. A leaf hinge can be surface mounted, or installed in a mortise. See also Butt Hinge and Surface Hinge. Lever Handle. A bar-like grip which is rotated in a vertical plane about a horizontal axis at one of its ends, designed to operate a latch. Lever Lock. A key operated lock that incorporates one or more lever tumblers, which must be raised to a specific level so that the fence of the bolt is aligned with the gate of the tumbler in order to withdraw the bolt. Lever locks are commonly used in storage lockers, and safety deposit boxes. Lever Tumbler. A flat metal arm, pivoted on one end with a gate in the opposite end.The top edge is spring-loaded. The bitting of the key rotates against the bottom edge, raising the lever tumbler to align the gate with the bolt fence. Both the position of the gate and the curvature of the bottom edge of the lever tumbler can be varied to establish the key code. Light. A space in a window or door for a single pane of glazing. Also, a pane of glass or other glazing material. Lintel. A horizontal structural member that supports the load over an opening such as a door or window.

Lip (of a strike). The curved projecting part of a strike plate which guides the spring bolt to the latch point. Lobby. That portion of the interior common area of a building which is reached from an entry door and which provides access to the general circulation areas, elevators, and fire stairs and from these to other areas of the building. Lock. A fastener which secures a door or window assembly against unauthorized entry. A door lock is usually key-operated and includes the keyed device (cylinder or combination), bolt, strike plate, knobs or levers, trim items, etc. A window lock is usually hand-operated rather than key-operated. Lock Clip. A flexible metal part attached to the inside of a door face to position a mortise lock. Lock Edge. The vertical edge or stile of a door in which a lock may be installed. Also called the leading edge, the lock stile, and strike edge. Lock Edge Door (or Lock Seam Door). A door which has its face sheets secured in place by an exposed mechanical interlock seam on each of its two vertical edges. See also Lock Seam. Lock Face Plate. See Face Plate. Locking Dog (of a padlock). The part of a padlock mechanism which engages the shackle and holds it in the locked position. Lock-in-Knob. See Key-in-Knob Lock. Lockpick. A tool or instrument, other than the specifically designed key, made for the purpose of manipulating a lock into a locked or unlocked condition. Lock Rail. The horizontal member of a door intended to receive the lock case. Lock Reinforcement. A reinforcing plate attached inside of the lock stile of a door to receive a lock. Lock Seam. A joint in sheet metal work, formed by doubly folding the edges of adjoining sheets in such a manner that they interlock. Lock Set. See Lock. Lock Stile. See Lock Edge. Loiding. A burglary attack method in which a thin, flat, flexible object such as a stiff piece of plastic is inserted between the strike and the latch bolt to depress the latch bolt and release it from the strike. The loiding of windows is accomplished by inserting a thin stiff object between the meeting rails or stiles to move the latch to the open position, or by inserting a thin stiff wire through openings between the stile or rail and the frame to manipulate the sash operator of pivoting windows. Derived from the word “celluloid.” Also called knifing and slip-knifing. Loose Joint Hinge. A hinge with two knuckles. The pin is fastened permanently to one and the other contains the pinhole. The two parts of the hinge can be disengaged by lifting. Lose Pin Hinge. A hinge having a removable pin to permit the two leaves of the hinge to be separated. Louver. An opening with a series of horizontal slats so arranged as to permit ventilation but to exclude rain, sunlight, or vision.


Louvered Window. A type of window in which the glazing consists of parallel, horizontal, movable glass slats. Also called a jalousie window. Main Entry Door. The most important common entry door in a building, which provides access to the building’s lobby. Maison Keying. A specialized keying system, used in apartment houses and other large complexes, that enables all individual unit keys to operate common-use locks such as main entry, laundry room, etc. Masonry. Stone, brick, concrete, hollow tiles, concrete blocks, or other similar materials, bonded together with mortar to form a wall, pier, buttress, or similar member. Master Disc Tumbler. A disc tumbler that will operate with a master key in addition to its own change key. Master Key System. A method of keying locks which allows a single key to operate multiple locks, each of which will also operate with an individual change key. Several levels of master keying are possible: a single master key is one which will operate all locks of a group of locks with individual change keys; a grand master key will operate all locks of two or more master key systems; a great grand master key will operate all locks of two or more grand master key systems. Master key systems are used primarily with pin and disc tumbler locks, and to a limited extent with lever or warded locks. Master Pin. A segmented pin, used to enable a pin tumbler to be operated by more than one key cut. Meeting Stile. The vertical edge member of a door or horizontal sliding window, in a pair of doors or windows, which meets with adjacent edge member when closed. See also Checkrails. Metal-Mesh Grille. A grille of expanded metal or welded metal wires permanently installed across a window or other opening in order to prevent entry through the opening. Mill Finish. The original surface finish produced on a metal mill product by cold rolling, extruding, or drawing. Millwork. Generally, all building components made of finished wood and manufactured in millwork plants and planing mills. It includes such items as inside and outside doors, window and door frames, cabinets, porch-work, mantels, panelwork, stairways, moldings, and interior trim. It normally does not include flooring, ceiling, or siding. Molding. A wood strip used for decorative purposes. Mono Lock. See Preassembled Lock. Mortise. A rectangular cavity made to receive a lock or other hardware; also, the act of making such a cavity. Mortise Bolt. A bolt designed to be installed in a mortise rather than on the surface. The bolt is operated by a knob, lever, or equivalent. Mortise Cylinder. See Cylinder, Mortise Type. Mortise Lock. A lock designed for installation in a mortise, as distinguished from a bored lock and a rim lock. Mullion. (1) A movable or fixed center post used on double door openings, usually for locking purposes. (2) A vertical or horizontal bar or divider in a frame between windows, doors, or other openings.

203

Multiple Dwelling. A building or portion of a building designed or used for occupancy by three or more tenants or families living independently of each other (includes hotels and motels). Muntin. A small member which divides the glass or openings of sash or doors. Mushroom Tumbler. A type of tumbler used in pin tumbler locks to add security against picking.The diameter of the driver pin behind the end in contact with the bottom pin is reduced so that the mushroom head will catch the edge of the cylinder body at the shear line when it is at a slight to its cavity. See also Spool Tumbler. Night Latch. An auxiliary lock having a spring latch bolt and functioning independently of the regular lock of the door. Nonremovable Hinge Pin. A type of hinge pin that has been constructed or modified to make its removal from the hinge difficult or impossible. Offset Pivot (or Hinge). A pin-and-socket hardware device with a single bearing contact, by means of which a door is suspended in its frame and allowed to swing about an axis which normally is located about 1.9 cm (3/4≤) out from the door face. One-Way Screw. A screw specifically designed to resist being removed, once installed. See also TamperResistant Hardware. Opening Size. See Door Opening. Operator (of a window sash). The mechanism, including a crank handle and gear box, attached to an operating arm or arms for the purpose of opening and closing a window. Usually found on casement and awning type windows. Overhead Door. A door which is stored overhead when in the open position. Padlock. A detachable and portable lock with a hinged or sliding shackle or bolt, normally used with a hasp and eye or staple system. Panel Door. A door fabricated from one or more panels surrounded by and held in position by rails and stiles. Panic Bar. See Crash Bar. Panic Hardware. An exterior locking mechanism which is always operable from inside the building by pressure on a crash bar or lever. Patio-Type Sliding Door. A sliding door that is essentially a single, large transparent panel in a frame (a type commonly used to give access to patios or yards of private dwellings); “single” doors have one fixed and one movable panel; “double” doors have two movable panels. Peeling. See Jamb Peeling. Picking. See Lockpick. Pin (of a hinge). The metal rod that serves as the axis of a hinge and thereby allows the hinge (and attached door or window) to rotate between the open and closed positions. Pin Tumbler. One of the essential, distinguishing components of a pin tumbler lock cylinder, more precisely called a bottom pin, master pin, or driver pin. The pin tumblers, used in varying lengths and arrangements,

204


determine the combination of the cylinder. See also Bottom Pin, Driver Pin, and Master Pin. Pin Tumbler Lock Cylinder. A lock cylinder employing metal pins (tumblers) to prevent the rotation of the core until the correct key is inserted into the keyway. Small coil compression springs hold the pins in the locked position until the key is inserted. Pivoted Door. A door hung on pivots rather than hinges. Pivoted Window. A window which opens by pivoting about a horizontal or vertical axis. Plug Retainer. The part often fixed to the rear of the core in a lock cylinder to retain or hold the core firmly in the cylinder. Preassembled Lock. A lock that has all the parts assembled into a unit at the factory and, when installed in a rectangular section cut out of the door at the lock edge, requires little or no assembly. Also called integral lock, mono lock, and unit lock. Pressed Padlock. A padlock whose outer case is pressed into shape from sheet metal and then riveted together. Pressure-Locked Grating. A grating in which the cross bars are mechanically locked to the bearing bars at their intersections by deforming or swaging the metal. Privacy Lock. A lock, usually for an interior door, secured by a button, thumb-turn, etc., and not designed for key operation. Projection. See Bolt Projection. Push Key. A key that operates the Ace type of lock. Quadrant. See Dutch Door Bolt. Rabbet. A cut, slot, or groove made on the edge or surface of a board to receive the end or edge of another piece of wood made to fit it. Rabbeted Jamb. A door jamb in which the projection portion of the jamb which forms the door stop is either part of the same piece as the rest of the jamb or securely set into a deep groove in the jamb. Rail. A horizontal framing member of a door or window sash which extends the full width between the sites. Removable Mullion. A mullion separating two adjacent door openings which is required for the normal operation of the doors but is designed to permit its temporary removal. Restricted Keyway. A special keyway and key blank for high-security locks, with a configuration which is not freely available and which must be specifically requested from the manufacturer. Reversible Local. A lock which may be used for either hand of a door. Rim Cylinder. A pin or disc tumbler cylinder used with a rim lock. Rim Hardware. Hardware designed to be installed on the surface of a door or window. Rim Latch. A latch installed on the surface of a door. Rim Lock. A lock designed to be mounted on the surface of a door. Rose. The part of a lock which functions as an ornament or bearing surface for a knob, and is normally placed against the surface of the door.

Rotary Interlocking Deadbolt Lock. A type of rim lock in which the extended deadbolt is rotated to engage with the strike. Rough Buck. A subframe, usually made of wood or steel, which is set in a wall opening and to which the frame is attached. Rough Opening. The wall opening into which a frame is to be installed. Usually, the rough opening is measured inside the rough buck. Sash. A frame containing one or more lights. Sash Fast. A fastener attached to the meeting rails of a window. Sash Lock. A sash fast with a locking device controlled by a key. Screwless Knob. A knob attached to a spindle by means of a special wrench, as distinguished from the more commonly used side-screw knob. Screwless Rose. A rose with a concealed method of attachment. Seamless Door. A door having no visible seams on its faces or edges. Secondary Lock. See Auxiliary Lock. Security Glass (or Glazing). See Burglar-Resistant Glazing. Setback. See Backset. Shackle. The hinged or sliding part of a padlock that does the fastening. Shear Line. The joint between the shell and the core of a lock cylinder; the line at which the pins or discs of a lock cylinder must be aligned in order to permit rotation of the core. Sheathing. The structural exterior covering, usually wood boards or plywood, used over the framing studs and rafters of a structure. Shell. A lock cylinder, exclusive of the core. Also called housing. Shutter. A movable screen or cover used to protect an opening, especially a window. Side Light. A fixed light located adjacent to a door within the same frame assembly. Signal Sash Fastener. A sash-fastening device designed to lock windows which are beyond reach from the floor. It has a ring for a sash pole hook. When locked, the ring lever is down; when the ring lever is up, it signals by its upright position that the window is unlocked. Sill. The lower horizontal member of a door or window opening. Single-Acting Door. A door mounted to swing to only one side of the plane of its frame. Skylight. A glazed opening located in the roof of a building. Slide Bolt. A simple lock which is operated directly by hand without using a key, a turnpiece, or other actuating mechanism, Slide bolts can normally only be operated from the inside. Sliding Door. Any door that slides open sideways. Sliding Metal Gate. An assembly of metal bars, jointed so that it can be moved to and locked in position across a window or other opening, in order to prevent unauthorized entry through the opening.


Slip-Knifing. See Loiding. Solid-Core Door. A door constructed so that the space (core) between the two facing sheets is completely filled with wood blocks or other rigid material. Spindle. The shaft that fits into the shank of a door knob or handle, and that serves as its axis of rotation. Split Astragal. A two-piece astragal, one piece of which is surface mounted on each door of a double door and is provided with a means of adjustment to mate with the other piece and provide a seal. See also Astragal. Spool Tumbler. A type of tumbler used in pin tumbler locks to add security against picking. Operates on the same principle as the mushroom tumbler. Spring Bolt. See Latch. Spring Bolt with Antiloiding Device. See Deadlatch. Stile. One of the vertical edge members of a paneled door or window sash. Stool. A flat molding fitted over the window sill between the jambs and contacting the bottom rail of the lower sash. Stop (of a door or window frame). The projecting part of a door or window frame against which a swinging door or window closes, or in which a sliding door or window moves. Stop (of a lock). A button or other device that serves to lock and unlock a latch bolt against actuation by the outside knob or thumb piece. Another type holds the bolt retracted. Stop Side. That face of a door which contacts the door stop. Store Front Sash. An assembly of light metal members forming a continuous frame for a fixed glass store front. Storm Sash, Window, or Door. An extra window or door, usually placed on the outside of an existing one as additional protection against cold or hot weather. Strap Hinge. A surface hinge of which one or both leaves are of considerable length. Strike. A metal plate attached to or mortised into a door jamb to receive and hold a projected latch bolt and/or dead bolt in order to secure the door to the jamb. Strike, Box. See Box Strikes. Strike, Dustproof. A strike which is placed in the threshold or sill of an opening, or in the floor, to receive a flush bolt, and is equipped with a spring-loaded follower to cover the recess and keep out dirt. Strike, Interlocking. A strike which receives and holds a vertical, rotary, or hook deadbolt. Strike Plate. See Strike. Strike Reinforcement. A metal plate attached to a door or frame to receive a strike. Strike, Roller. A strike for latch bolts, having a roller mounted on the lip to reduce friction. Stud. A slender wood or metal post used as a supporting element in a wall or partition. Stud Anchor. A device used to secure a stud to the floor. Subbuck (or Subframe). See Rough Buck. Surface Hinge. A hinge having both leaves attached to the surface and thus fully visible. Swing. See Hand.

205

Swinging Bolt. A bolt that is hinged to a lock front and is projected and retracted with a swinging rather than a sliding action. Also called hinged or pivot bolt. Tail Piece. The unit on the core of a cylinder lock which actuates the bolt or latch. Tamper-Resistant Hardware. Builders’ hardware with screws or nut-and-bolt connections that are hidden or cannot be removed with conventional tools. Template. A precise detailed pattern used as a guide in the mortising, drilling, etc., of a door or frame to receive hardware. Template Hardware. Hardware manufactured within template tolerances. Tension Wrench. An instrument used in picking a lock. It is used to apply torsion to the cylinder core. Three-Point Lock. A locking device required on “A-label” fire double doors to lock the active door at three points—the normal position plus top and bottom. Threshold. A wood or metal plate forming the bottom of a doorway. Throw. See Bolt Projection. Thumb Piece (of a door handle). The small pivoted part above the grip of a door handle, which is pressed by the thumb to operate a latch bolt. Thumb Turn. A unit which is gripped between the thumb and forefinger, and turned to project or retract a bolt. Tolerance. The permissible deviation from a nominal or specified dimension or value. Transom. An opening window immediately above a door. Transom Bar. The horizontal frame member which separates the door opening from the transom. Transom Catch. A latch bolt fastener on a transom, having a ring by which the latch bolt is retracted. Transom Chain. A short chain used to limit the opening of a transom; usually provided with a plate at each end for attachment. Transom Lift. A device attached to a door frame and transom by means of which the transom may be opened or closed. Trim Hardware. See Finish Builders’ Hardware. Tryout Keys. A set of keys which includes many commonly used bittings. They are used one at a time in an attempt to unlock a door. Tumbler. A movable obstruction in a lock which must be adjusted to a particular position, as by a key, before the bolt can be thrown. Turn Piece. See Thumb Turn. Unit Lock. See Preassembled Lock. Vertical Bolt Lock. A lock having two deadbolts which move vertically into two circular receivers in the strike portion of the lock attached to the door jamb. Vision Panel. A fixed transparent panel of glazing material set into an otherwise opaque wall, partition, or door; a nonopening window. See also Light. Ward. An obstruction which prevents the wrong key from entering or turning in a lock. Warded Lock. A lock containing internal obstacles which block the entrance or rotation of all but the correct key.

206


Weatherstripping. Narrow or jamb-width sections of flexible material which prevent the passage of air and moisture around windows and doors. Compression weather-stripping also acts as frictional counterbalance in double-hung windows. Wet Glazing. The sealing of glass or other transparent material in a frame by the use of a glazing compound or sealant.

Window Frame. See Frame. Window Guard. A strong metal gridlike assembly which can be installed on a window or other opening; types of window guards include metal bars, metal-mesh grilles, and sliding metal gates. Wire Glass. Glass manufactured with a layer of wire mesh approximately in the center of the sheet.

Chapter 11 Safes, Vaults, and Accessories KENNETH DUNCKEL

Choose the Right Container A safe or vault ideally should occupy the innermost ring of concentric protective rings around a secured premise. Other security equipment (fences, gates, vehicle barriers, doors, and access controls) selected for the outer protective rings is usually specifically designed for its function, but the security vault at center often is not. The value and physical nature of a vault container’s contents should dictate the type of container and degree of protection sought; but people tend to categorize all combination-locked security containers as “safes” because of one common denominator—combination locks. This is a mistake. There are fire-resistant safes, burglary-resistant chests, safes for EDP media, and insulated filing cabinets. Each can be combination locked but to regard any combination-locked container as a safe is to disregard the fact that different types and levels of protection exist. Such disregard invites losses. High-value items stored in a fire-resistant safe or insulated filing cabinet are vulnerable to burglary— the average insulated container can quickly be forced open with a few simple, accessible hand tools. Similarly, important documents stored in a burglary chest are much more secure from burglars than in an insulated container, but are also more likely to be incinerated in a fire. Underwriters Laboratories (UL) systematically tests the fire- and burglary-resistant qualities of representative security containers submitted by their manufacturers (see Appendix 11.A). Makers of those containers that meet specific test requirements may affix a UL rating label to their products. The

presence of a UL label signifies that a comparable unit of the same design successfully passed systematic tests performed by Underwriters Laboratories for resistance to burglary or fire. The label denotes the type and severity of test conditions. Possibly the best protection are those safes that bears UL labeling for both fire and burglary protection. Such containers are simply burglary chests housed inside insulated containers. Similar protection can be obtained by buying a burglary chest and a fire safe separately, then placing the burglaryresistant chest inside the fire safe, thus establishing separate storage areas for documents and high-value items. Because UL ratings are recognized by the American insurance industry as reliable rating standards for security containers, comprehensive insurance policies often specify or otherwise require minimum UL security container ratings. Reduced mercantile insurance rates may be applicable if a selected security container has the recommended minimum rating. Whether or not a security container provides fire or burglary protection, its inherent security can be increased with special-function locks. Very often, the purchaser of a fire safe or money chest is not told of all the optional equipment available with the security container being considered. Salespeople often prefer not to risk confusing their clients with too many options. Optional equipment boosts the sale price and thus can jeopardize a sale. People who buy security containers should nevertheless be aware of what is available and decide for themselves. If unwisely chosen, the security container itself can cause new operational and logistical problems, 207

208


which could be solved by the use of special-function equipment. For instance, the presence of a quality burglaryresistant chest on the premises of a cash-handling business means that a bank deposit does not necessarily have to be made daily, even if daily deposits are supposed to be the usual procedure. An attitude of “nothing to worry about—just put in the safe overnight” can easily develop. But an after-hours visit by a dishonest employee with the combination can double the loss potential. So, too, can a properly timed holdup. The situations that can be prevented or alleviated by wisely chosen security equipment are numerous, and safe buyers should be aware of them. The following pages describe a few such possibilities and the security equipment that is presently available for prevention.

UL-Rated Combination Locks A good-quality combination lock is a basic need. On well-made containers, the most commonly encountered combination locks are those certified in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories standards (UL 768). Combination locks can earn a Group 1, 1R, or 2 classification. A lock bearing a UL label has met or exceeded detailed criteria for quality, security, and durability. The UL testing procedure for combination locks involves ascertaining that the lock can be set to various combinations and operated within specified tolerances. According to Section 11.10 of UL 768, “A three-tumbler wheel lock shall not open with the dial turned more than 11/4 dial gradations on either side of the proper gradation on either side of the proper gradation for each tumbler.A four-tumbler lock shall not open with the dial turned more than 11/2 dial gradations on either side of the proper gradation for each number.” Other sections of UL 768 describe tests for mechanical strength, impact resistance, manufacturing tolerance, product endurance, and operability after prolonged exposure to adverse conditions. The testing for UL Group 1 (manipulation resistant) and Group 1R (manipulation and radiographic resistant) labels includes all tests performed on Group 2 rated locks plus the requirement that the lock tested must, by virtue of its design and construction, resist skilled surreptitious attempts to learn the combination numbers by manipulation, the use of instruments, or radioactive isotopes (Group 1R test only) for 20 worker-hours of net working time.

In most instances, a Group 2 combination lock provides adequate security. Although many legitimate safe and vault technicians are trained in combination lock manipulation techniques, criminals with the skill and knowledge necessary to surreptitiously open a Group 2 lock by manipulation are few in number. Most safe burglars use forceful methods. High-security installations, however, such as jewelry safes or containers protecting extremely sensitive or classified information, should be outfitted with manipulation-resistant Group 1 locks to block every possible avenue of criminal approach. Defense contractors who deal with classified information are required to protect such information in security containers that meet certain government specifications. One such specification, MIL-L-15596, defines the type of combination lock that is acceptable. This specification covers much the same territory as the UL standard regarding Group 1 and 1R manipulation- and radiation-resistant locks.

Relocking Devices A relocking device, or relocker, is an auxiliary bolt or bolt-blocking mechanism for which there is no control from outside the container. Relockers protect security containers against torch, drill, and punching attacks. The relocker is an especially important feature on burglary-resistant units, because these containers are designed to protect items of high dollar value and are therefore more attractive to skilled burglars. Relockers are important enough in preserving a container’s security to warrant a separate standard for rating them, UL 140. Known in bygone days as dynamite triggers, relockers can be simple in design; often they are no more than spring-driven bolts held in a cocked (loaded) position until activated by a burglar’s attack. With normal usage of a relock-equipped container, the relocker’s presence is undetectable to the user. When activated, through, the relocker blocks the retraction of the door bolts, combination bolt, or both, even if the correct combination for the lock is known. Relocking devices are often held cocked by a piece of metal attached by screws to the combination lock’s back cover. When thus situated, relockers protect against spindle or dial punching, the most common (and in earlier times one of the most effective) forms of forceful burglary attack. In a typical punching attack the burglar first knocks the dial off the safe to expose the end of the spindle, a threaded shaft that connects the numbered

Safes, Vaults, and Accessories

safe dial to the combination lock’s wheels. The spindle end is then punched inward with a hand sledge and drift punch. When the spindle is driven inward in this manner, one or more of the lock’s wheels are slammed against or even through the back cover of the lock A punching attach may completely dislodge all the wheels (or tumblers) in the lock. Most currently manufactured combination lock back covers are purposely designed to be dislodged by a punching attach. Because the relock checking device is either fastened to the lock cover or located very near it, dislodging the cover also dislodges the relock check. A spring (or in some cases gravity) then takes over, moving the relock to its triggered position. After spindle punching, the burglar can insert tools through the spindle hole and fish the combination bolt to a retracted position. If not for relockers the safe door could be opened. A triggered relocker, however, is neither easily located nor easily released from outside the container. Containers incorporating some form of relocking device now outnumber older, nonrelock-equipped containers; an unsuccessful punching attempt on a recently built container signifies a lack of knowledge and skill. Although makers of fire-resistant containers are not required to include a relocking device in the container design, many do so to thwart the type of punching attack just described. Safe makers realize that, because the cost per cubic inch of space in a fireresistant container is appreciably less than that of a burglary-resistant container of the same size, many clients store high-value items in fire-resistant containers instead of burglary chests, even after being advised not to. Thermal relocking devices hinder skilled burglars who use cutting torches or other burning tools. A thermal relock activates when that part of the mechanism which holds the relock cocked (usually a fusible link made from a metal with an extremely low melting point) heats to its melting point, at which time a spring can activate a bolt-blocking mechanism. A thermal relock is not necessarily part of the combination lock but is usually nearby, because torching burglars tend to burn in an area fairly close to the combination lock. Current Group 1, 1R, and 2 combination locks have simple but effective built-in relocking devices, designed to be activated by spindle-punching attacks. Some also incorporate thermal protection. Many safe makers, however, do not rely totally on the protection provided by these built-in relockers,

209

preferring to include relockers of their own design, situated outside the combination lock. Some safe makers use a sophisticated type of relocking device that simultaneously guards against punching, drilling, and burning attaches. A nerve plate of tempered glass is mounted between the combination lock and the inner surface of the container door. Taut wires or cords are strung from one or more spring-driven relocking devices and fastened to the glass. The placement of such nerve plates ensures that most unskilled and semiskilled burglary attacks will severely shock and thus shatter the glass nerve plate. Similarly, a skilled operator who attempts to drill into the lock case and manipulate the combination wheels will encounter the nerve plate before penetrating the lock. Any attempt to penetrate further will shatter the glass and release the tension on the wires that hold the relocks cocked. Glass nerve plates have been popular with foreign safe makers for some time. They are an extremely efficient way to hinder even highly skilled burglars. Some makers of high-security units string the relock wires around a series of posts before attaching them to the nerve plate in front of the combination lock. Relockers and the wires can be placed randomly within a production run of like models, defeating those burglars armed with blueprints made by taking exact measurements from a comparable model. Underwriters Laboratories tests and certifies relocking devices under the standard UL 140. Safe makers whose relocking devices are successfully tested under the conditions described in UL 140 are entitled to affix labels to that effect on their containers.

Locking Dials Locking combination dials are used to ensure that no one person has control of a security container’s contents. Companies whose employees handle large amounts of cash or other valuables use locking dials to satisfy dual custody requirements. Typically, one person is assigned the key that unlocks the dial and another is assigned the combination. A locked dial will not turn to allow the combination to be dialed until the keyholder unlocks it. The keyholder can lock or unlock the dial but cannot open the container without the combination. A typical application of dual custody is for a supermarket safe. Usually, notice is posted to the effect that two people are required to open the safe; the store manager has only the combination, and the

210


armored car guard has the dial key. When this procedure is used, such arrangements deter or complicate holdups. When used according to strictly observed procedures, locking dials also help reduce the opportunity for a lone dishonest person to abuse a position of trust and can help protect innocent persons from unwarranted suspicion when mysterious losses are noted.

Lockable Handles Lockable bolt control handles perform much the same function as lockable dials. A locking handle allows the combination to be dialed, but the bolt control handle does not retract the door bolts until it is unlocked. Again, this arrangement allows dual custody of the container’s contents. Users of walk-in vaults often leave the combination dialed and the door bolts retracted during business hours. Hold-up gangs have used this fact to advantage, herding their victims into the vault and then simply turning the bolt handle and spinning the combination dial to lock them in, to ensure a clean getaway. When installed on the door of a walk-in vault, locking bolt control handles helps to prevent this tactic, because the door bolts can be immobilized during the business day.

Time Locks Time locks are considered standard equipment on bank vault doors but may also be used on any security container whose door has enough usable surface area to permit installation. A time lock ensures that, once closed and locked, the safe or vault door remains so for a predetermined amount of time. Time locks were hailed by 19th century bankers as devices that would discourage the kidnapping of bank officials and their family members to force disclosure of vault combinations. Before time locks, this was a commonly used tactic of holdup and burglary gangs, who did not balk at committing brutal crimes to learn vault combinations. The most common time locks are mechanical windup mechanisms; their internal design and operation is quite similar to that of ordinary timepieces, but their mainsprings perform additional duties besides powering the clockworks. When a mechanical time lock is wound, a shutter in its case closes. Usually, a rod or projection extends from the door bolts; when the bolts move, the rod

moves. During bolt retraction (i.e., opening the safe door), this rod would normally enter the time lock case via the shutter hole, but the closed shutter blocks the rod’s passage, which translates itself to a door bolt blockage. As the time lock’s movements wind down, the mainspring’s energy is harnessed to open the shutter. The shutter reopens fully when the first movement has wound down. A typical time lock relies on at least two, but as many as three or four, separate windup movements in a single case. It can be used on safes as well as vaults. The presence of at least two movements gives reasonable assurance that a single movement’s failure does not cause a lockout; the more movements used, the more the chance for lockout is reduced. Only one movement must wind down for the container to open.

Time-Delay Combination Locks No lock can prevent an armed robber from forcing another person to disclose a combination. This type of robbery is often committed against restaurant or store employees in the hours before or after closing. Such crimes often net rich hauls for criminals and can easily involve injury to the victims. The robbers gain entry to the premises by various methods: by capturing an employee while entering or exiting, by using a seemingly legitimate pretext, or sometimes by breaking into the premises and lying in wait for the holder of the safe combination. Once identified, that person is forced to open the safe. Time-delay combination locks, also known as delayed action timers (DATs), are one solution to the problem, because such locks can foil or deter robberies. A time-delay lock is a combination lock with one or more timer movements attached. The action of dialing the safe combination winds a timer. The operator must wait for a predetermined period after dialing before the delay mechanism permits the combination lock bolt to retract. Delay times range from as a few as 3 minutes to as many as 45 minutes and in some cases are changeable. The most sophisticated time-delay combination locks boast alarm compatibility. A store manager ordered by a robber to open the safe can discreetly dial a special combination and activate a holdup alarm. Alarm-compatible time-delay combination locks give police a better chance of arriving in time to make an arrest. Time-delay locks reduce both robbery losses and the incidence of robbery. Businesses using time-delay locks usually post conspicuous notices to this effect,


causing prospective robbers to take their business elsewhere. Robbers rely on speed of execution— even the hint of a delay reduces a target’s appeal.

Alarmed Combination Locks Alarmed combination locks incorporate microswitches capable of shunting alarms and signaling unauthorized opening attempts or openings made under duress. Perhaps the most generally useful are the switches designed to send duress alarm signals. They are designed to discreetly send an alarm signal when a special duress combination is dialed. Like the regularly used combination, the duress combination also opens the safe, so that a robber does not realize an alarm is being sent. The typical robber orders the victim not to set off an alarm, and things can get ugly if the robber suspects otherwise. Because the alarm is set off by a seemingly innocent dialing procedure performed in accord with the robber’s demands, combination locks with duress or ambush features could be categorized as compliance alarms. Tamper switches help protect combination-locked containers during those hours when no persons, not even authorized combination holders, are allowed access to the contents. The dial is set at a predetermined number and sometimes locked in place, then alarm protection is turned on. Any attempt to dial the combination while the protection is on causes an alarm. Another switch arrangement can be used to monitor the status of the container or as an alarm shunt. This switch is placed in such a way that, when the combination lock bolt is retracted to the open position, the switch is actuated. This lets remote monitors track the container’s openings and closings. A shunt switch allows the burglary alarm circuit to remain active 24 hours a day while still allowing combination holders access to the contents.

Vision-Restricting and Shielded Dials Standard combination dials are known as frontreading, meaning that their numbers are visible from a horizontal line of sight. It is possible for prying eyes to see the numbers that are dialed when a front-reading dial is used, which of course makes the safe’s protection ineffective. If a combination must be dialed while persons not authorized to know the numbers are nearby, a front-reading dial

211

is best replaced with a vision-restricting, or spyproof, dial. Various types of vision-restricting dials are available, and each safe lock manufacturer has its own version. One of the most common is the top-reading dial, whose numbers are etched into an outer rim perpendicular to the safe door. To effectively see the combination numbers, the dialer must stand squarely in front of the dial and look down at the numbers while dialing. A raised flange guards the sides of the dial from view; only a small portion of the dial’s numbered area can be seen at any given time. Other vision-restricting designs incorporate covered dials with louvered windows or tinted and polarized lenses at the index area. Covering the entire dial except the turning knob shields the dial face from finger marks. People who dial safe combinations tend to place one finger on the dial face as a brake. This leaves smudges on the safe dial at fairly regular distances from the actual combination numbers, thus making it possible to learn a safe’s combination by composing test combinations as suggested by the smudges’ locations.

Combination Changing A positive aspect of combination locks is user changeability. Although many companies leave this task to service vendors as a matter of policy, some have policies which dictate that company personnel do the changing to absolutely ensure exclusive knowledge of combination numbers. New safes, chests, and insulated files, if combination locked, usually come with detailed instructions for changing and special change keys. Safe dealers often remove the changing instructions and changing keys before delivery, and with good reason. The customer’s first suspicion might be that the safe dealer would much rather profit from future service calls to change combinations than let the clients do it themselves. This is partly true, but there is a valid reason for withholding changing tools and instructions. Safe buyers who have changing instructions and try to change keys often fall victim to a common syndrome. They attempt combination changes before having fully read or understood the instructions and thus cause a lockout. The client calls the dealer for help and, because the lockout is attributable to error rather than a defective product, is charged for the work. Not wishing to pay a service fee, the client does not admit the error, claiming instead that the unit is defective

212


and that the work should be covered by warranty. The dealer’s representative knows better: combination-changing errors are glaringly obvious to a technically experienced person. The dealer’s subsequent refusal to write the work off as a warranty job incurs the client’s wrath and creates bad will. Combination changing is a relatively simple task, but mistakes can be costly in terms of both lost time and dollars. Safes are unforgiving—a lockout resulting from a combination-changing error may dictate that the container be forced open. Lockouts can be avoided by exercising a high degree of care when working with the combination lock components and always trying new combinations several times with the safe door open. This is probably the most important yet most ignored part of combination changing.

and prepare for those situations in which they have a fair chance of getting into some of the safes they may encounter. These individuals find enough opportunities and enjoy enough success within the parameters of their limited skills that they usually do not make the effort to become more technically proficient. They pose a real threat, though, because part of their expertise is in the exploitation of human error and complacency, failings to which even users of high-security containers are subject. The only defense against the semiskilled opportunistic safe burglar is knowledge, awareness, and strict adherence to proper security procedures. the following are some of the ways these individuals gain access to safe contents and suggestions for defeating them.

Safe Burglaries

Hidden Combinations

At a time in the not-so-distant past, gangs of skilled safe burglars operated in America; pickings were easy and plentiful. In today’s world, where the need for instant gratification often supersedes reason, fewer criminals spend the time necessary to learn safe burglary skills and properly plan and execute safe burglaries. Contemporary criminals tend to prefer crimes that require much less time or technical skill; a fast exchange of drugs and money in a motel parking lot can easily net more than a weekend of work with a cutting torch. Highly skilled, knowledgeable safecrackers are by no means extinct in America, but there are a lot fewer of them today. The remaining safe-crackers with sufficient skill to breach a well-built jeweler’s chest or bank vault do not need to work as often as other thieves; consequently, their exploits do not get the continual press coverage that more prolific criminals receive. The burglar most likely to visit a business or residential premises is fairly average in terms of technical skill. Such individuals work fast and often. While very good at defeating or circumventing door and window locks, this type of burglar is usually stumped when confronted by even a thin-walled insulated safe—quite often his or her best effort will be an unsuccessful attempt at prying or dial punching, after which the container may be locked more securely than before. In addition to technical ignorance, the would-be safecracker usually suffers from a faint heart and would rather leave than invest much time in the effort. Some burglars, however, inhabit a middle ground with respect to skill. They have learned to recognize

Many people, fearful of forgetting the safe combination, write down the numbers and dialing sequences and secrete them somewhere near the safe or in a wallet or address book. Smart burglars know more places to look for combination numbers than the average person can dream of and systematically search for and discover them, no matter how well hidden the safe user may think they are. Combination numbers can be memorized, a fact that makes combination locks more secure than the majority of key-operated mechanisms. Writing out the combination is a real help for burglars and can complicate police investigations. Safe users who write down combinations often do so in violation of company security policies. Therefore, they are reluctant to admit it, forcing investigators to guess at the facts. Prevention is simple: Memorize the numbers.

Using Birthdays, Phone Numbers, Addresses, and the Like Such numbers are appealing because they are already committed to the user’s memory, but smart burglars have been known to take the time to do some research on their victims, learning the same numbers and composing test combinations with them. Similarly, many safe users tend to select combination numbers ending in 5 or 0, like 10–20–50 or 25–35–45, because such numbers are more clearly marked on the safe dial. Doing so greatly limits the combination possibilities. A safe combination should ideally be a random set of numbers with no special significance to the user.


Failing to Fully Scramble the Combination When Locking This is especially common in cases where the safe is outfitted with a locking dial. For daytime convenience the combination numbers are left dialed, then the bolt is left extended and the dial locked with the key. The safe door can be opened by merely turning the dial key and moving the dial just a few numbers’ worth of travel, rather than having to redial completely. Safe users mistakenly think the dial lock and combination lock afford equal protection, but they do not. The combination lock is protected inside the safe door while the dial lock is exposed on the outside. Safes without locking dials can also be locked but not fully scrambled and thus afford opportunities for patient thieves to walk the dial a number at a time in hope of finding the last number of the combination. Whenever a safe is closed it is a good practice to turn the dial at least four full revolutions before considering it locked. Smart burglars confronted with a locking dial can sometimes make a big score by merely clamping a heavy pair of pliers on the dial and twisting, because people who hate to dial safe combinations can easily slip into the habit of using the dial lock for nighttime locking as well as daytime convenience. Daytime robbers have also been known to give the same treatment to safes secured only by locking dials during business hours. Simply stated, the dial lock protects the dial, and the combination lock protects the safe.

Punching The majority of burglary-resistant safes are protected in some way against punching; relocking devices and punch-resistant spindles are the most popular methods. Many insulated safes built in the last 20–30 years also feature relocking devices. Punching is generally a sign of technical ignorance. The safe dial is pried or knocked off and a punch or lineup tool is used in conjunction with a hand sledge to drive the spindle inward. The intent is to knock the lock components completely out of position so they no longer block the retraction of the door bolts. In safes not equipped with relocking devices or other protective measures, punching is usually effective. The best defense against punching attacks is to buy a safe equipped with a UL-listed relocking device. While protection against burglary is not an absolute necessity in a fire-resistant container, many

213

makers of such containers realize that safe users often treat their products as if they were burglaryresistant chests and store high-value items in them. With this in mind, the safe makers usually include relocking protection of some sort, if only by being certain to use a combination lock with built-in relock protection.

Peeling Insulated containers can often be peeled open in much the same way as a sardine can. Often the burglar will pound with a sledge near one of the door’s corners in an effort to buckle it inward, thus permitting the insertion of wedging and prying tools. The door is then peeled back by virtue of sheer force until the contents can be removed. In another type of peeling attack, a chisel separates the outer metal skin from the door. This outer skin of older fire safes was in many cases merely spot-welded in several locations along the door’s edge. When the initial separation has been achieved, a larger chisel (fire axes and heavy prying tools have been used) continues the process of breaking the remaining spot welds all the way down the door’s edge, until the outer skin can be bent or peeled out of the way. The intent in such attacks is to dig or chop through the door insulation and inner skin, eventually expose the combination lock or door bolts and overcome them with heavy tools and brute force. More recently made insulated containers have seam-welded door skins to make this type of attack extremely difficult, if not unfeasible. Although fire safes can be peeled by both semiskilled and skilled criminals, the neatness and efficiency of the work gives an indication of the criminal’s skill and experience. A sturdily built money or jewelry chest cannot be peeled.

Ripping or Chopping These forms of attack are most often successful when carried out against insulated containers. The burglar may be unskilled, semiskilled, or professional. Heavy metal-cutting tools cut a hole in the container’s door, side, or bottom. When the hole is made, the burglar simply reaches in and removes the contents. Defeating the peelers and rippers of the world requires only that the safe purchased be a burglary chest rather than an insulated container. If both fire and burglary protection are necessary, a burglary-resistant container can be installed inside an insulated container.

214


Carting Off

Overcoming Safe-Opening Problems

Also known by burglary investigators as a kidnap or pack-off, this is the simplest but perhaps the nerviest safe defeat. If the container can be moved and transported easily enough, the burglar or burglars simply steal the entire container and open it at their leisure in a secure location. The majority of existing insulated containers are wheeled, making this task even easier than it should be. Often a bolt-down kit is available, which enables the safe owner to attach the safe to the floor of the premises and hinder burglars who might try stealing it.At the very least, the wheels of a fire safe should be removed after delivery. To protect a smaller burglary-resistant chest, install it inside a box or metal jacket bolted or anchored to the floor and filled with concrete. The concrete jacket adds appreciably to the weight of the unit and severely complicates its unauthorized removal as well as side attacks by skilled and semiskilled safecrackers.

Safe users often experience difficulty when trying to open a safe. The combination just does not seem to catch when it is dialed. This problem, on the surface, is an operational inconvenience, but there are security implications as well. Safe users often learn to live with balky safes and combination locks, either the money for repair and adjustment just is not in the budget or they may wonder if the fault is entirely the safe’s. Many people hesitate to make an issue of a dialing problem for fear of exhibiting ignorance or inability to perform what, on the surface, is a simple rote task. Consequently, they accept that they must dial and redial to open the safe each day, breathe a sigh of relief when the combination finally takes, then do something that may constitute a breach of their employers’ security policy. Rather than opening the safe, removing what is needed, closing the door, throwing the door bolts and rescrambling the combination, the irritated safe user leaves the combination dialed to avoid the added irritation of the dial-redial routine several more times during the business day. This usually works nicely until the day when everybody goes out for lunch and forgets that a turn of the door handle is all that is necessary to open the safe door. A lunchtime office prowler finds it hard to resist trying the safe handle and is rewarded for this small expenditure of energy. The scenario varies, but is generally the same: People who use safes and combination locks often adapt to the inconveniences caused by malfunctioning locks, improper dialing procedures, or maintenance-starved mechanisms by shortchanging their own security procedures. Another all-too-possible situation, the robbery, presents more grave considerations. The same person who must routinely make several tries at opening the safe is ordered by armed robbers to open the safe immediately, then the criminals interpret fumbling as a delaying tactic and react violently. These are only a few reasons why it is in the best interests of all concerned to have a properly maintained security container and well-trained users of that container. The following information helps safe users open those balky safes with fewer tries. But, these guidelines should not be interpreted as another set of adaptive measures to forestall necessary maintenance.

Skilled Attacks The skilled safecracker is relatively rare in America, but a few are in business. Their skills and specialties vary, and they have a wide variety of easily available equipment to choose from: high-speed drills, low-rpm/high-torque drills, core-drills, Carborundum cutters, saber saws, cutting torches, oxy-arc lances, burning bars, and explosives. The only way to defeat safe burglars who work with such effective gear is to ensure that the actual attack is time consuming and fraught with the danger of discovery or capture. The less appealing the target, the more likely the professional is to seek easier pickings. If there is genuine concern about the possibility of skilled attack, the first and most obvious thing to do is to buy a burglary-resistant container with a rating equal to or exceeding the recommendation of a knowledgeable insurance agent. Today, safes are designed to put up a staunch fight against even the well-equipped, highly skilled professional safecrackers of the world. A reliable intrusion detection system is necessary; it should protect both the premises’ perimeter and the safe itself. If the safe is to be used commercially, a security policy should be established and rigorously adhered to. A security policy should define and expressly prohibit breaches of security such as those described earlier (i.e., writing down combination numbers or leaving the combination partially dialed): All such actions should be expressly forbidden.

䊉

When dialing a safe combination, stand squarely in front of the safe and look directly at the numbers. Viewing them from an angle causes improper dial settings.


䊉

䊉

䊉

Align the dial numbers exactly with the index mark at the top of the dial. Follow the safe maker’s dialing instructions exactly. If the safe used has no factory-supplied dialing instructions, contact the factory or a local safe dealer for some. Usually, they will be supplied at no charge. Do not spin the dial—this accelerates wear and can cause breakage.

When the safe does not open after the combination has been correctly dialed, a few dialing techniques usually get results. The first is to add one number to each of the combination numbers and dial as if this were the actual combination. For example, if the combination numbers are 20–60–40, try 21– 61–41 using the same dialing procedure as usual. If adding 1 to each of the combination numbers does not help, subtract 1 from each of the actual combination numbers. For example, with an actual combination of 20–60–40, the next combination to try would be 19–59–39. One these two procedures works surprisingly often.

215

If neither of these procedures is successful, the next procedure is to progressively add 1 to each setting and dial the other numbers as usual, again using the normal dialing procedure. For example, if the correct combination is 20–60–40, the progression would be to dial 21–60–40, 20–61–40, then 20–60–41. If this procedure is unsuccessful, the next procedure is to progressively subtract from each combination setting. For example, if the original combination is 20–60–40, dial 19–60–40, 20–59–40, 20–60–39. These procedures overcome lock wear and dialing errors—users may habitually and unconsciously misalign combination numbers at the dialing index mark. Interpret the success of any of these procedures as a signal that the mechanism needs inspection and service. It is a mistake to simply continue using the safe without correcting the condition that required using a set of numbers other than those actually set. If the condition that necessitated these dialing procedures was caused by a need for service or adjustment, a future lockout is a strong possibility if service is not obtained.

Appendix 11.A Rating Files, Safes, and Vaults* GION GREEN

The final line of defense at any facility is at the highsecurity storage areas where papers, records, plans or cashable instruments, precious metals, or other especially valuable assets are protected. These security containers will be of a size and quantity which the nature of the business dictates. The choice of the proper security container for specific applications is influenced largely by the value and the vulnerability of the items to be stored

* From Introduction to Security, 6th ed., by Robert J. Fischer and Gion Green (Boston: Butterworth–Heinemann, 1998).

in them. Irreplaceable papers or original documents may not have any intrinsic or marketable value, so they may not be a likely target for a thief; but since they do have great value to the owners, they must be protected against fire. On the other hand, uncut precious stones, or even recorded negotiable papers which can be replaced, may not be in danger from fire, but they would surely be attractive to a thief; they must therefore be protected. In protecting property, it is essential to recognize that, generally speaking, protective containers are designed to secure against burglary or fire. Each type of equipment has a specialized function, and each

216


Table 11-1. Fire-Resistant Containers: UL Record Safe Class

Resistance to Attack

Attack Time

Description

Fire 350–* 150–* 125–*

Not tested Not tested Not tested

N/A N/A N/A

For paper and document storage For storage of magnetic computer tapes and photographic film For storage of flexible disks

Burglary TL-15

Door and body

15 min. 30 min.

Tool, torch, and explosive resistant

60 min.

Resists against entry by common mechanical and electrical tools Door and entire body must resist attack with tools and torches listed above plus electric impact hammers and oxy-fuel gas cutting or welding torches Weight: At least 1000 pounds. Door and entire safe body must resist attack with tools and torches listed above plus 8 ounces nitroglycerine or equal

TXTL-60

type provides only minimal protection against the other risk. There are containers designed with a burglary-resistant chest within a fire-resistant container which are useful in many instances; but these, too, must be evaluated in terms of the mission. Whatever the equipment, the staff must be educated and reminded of the different roles played by the two types of container. It is all too common for company personnel to assume that the fire-resistant safe is also burglary-resistant, and vice versa.

Files Burglary-resistant files are secure against most surreptitious attach. On the other hand, they can be pried open in less than half an hour if the burglar is permitted to work undisturbed and is not concerned with the noise created in the operation. Such files are suitable for nonnegotiable papers or even proprietary information, since these items are normally only targeted by surreptitious assault. Filing cabinets, with fire-rating of 1 hour, and further fitted with a combination lock, would probably be suitable for all uses but the storage of government classified documents.

Safes Safes are expensive, but if they are selected wisely they can be one of the most important investments in security. Safes are not simply safes. They are each designed to perform a particular job to a particular level of protection. To use fire-resistant safes for the storage of valuables—an all too common practice— is to invite disaster. At the same time, it would be

equally careless to use a burglary-resistant safe for the storage of valuable papers or records, since, if a fire were to occur, the contents of such a safe would be reduced to ashes.

Ratings Safes are rated to describe the degree of protection they afford. Naturally, the more protection provided, the more expensive the safe will be. In selecting the best one for the requirements of the facility an estimate of the maximum exposure of valuables or irreplaceable records will have to be examined along with a realistic appraisal of their vulnerability. Only then can a reasonable permissible capital outlay for their protection be achieved. Fire-resistant containers are classified according to the maximum internal temperature permitted after exposure to heat for varying periods (Table 111). A record safe rated 350–4 (formerly designated “A”) can withstand exterior temperatures building to 2000°F for 4 hours without permitting the interior temperature to rise above 350°F. The Underwriters Laboratories (UL) tests which result in the various classifications are conducted in such a way as to simulate a major fire with its gradual build-up of heat to 2000°F and where the safe might fall several stories through the fire damaged building. Additionally, an explosion test simulates a cold safe dropping into a fire which has already reached 2000°F. The actual procedure for the 350–4 rating involves the safe staying 4 hours in a furnace that reaches 2000°F. The furnace is turned off after 4 hours, but the safe remains inside until it is cool. The interior temperature must remain below 350°F during the


heating and cooling-out period. This interior temperature is determined by sensors sealed inside the safe in six specified locations to provide a continuous record of the temperatures during the test. Papers are also placed in the safe to simulate records. The explosion impact test is conducted with another safe of the same model which is placed for one halfhour in a furnace preheated to 2000°F. If no explosion occurs, the furnace is set at 1550°F and raised to 1700°F over a half-hour period. After this hour in the explosion test, the safe is removed and dropped 30 feet onto rubble. The safe is then returned to the furnace and reheated for 1 hour at 1700°F. The furnace and safe are allowed to cool; the papers inside must be legible and uncharred. 350–2 record safes protect against exposure up to 1850°F for 2 hours. The explosion/impact tests are conducted at slightly less time and heat. 350–1 gives 1 hour of protection up to 1700°F and a slightly less vigorous explosion/impact test. Computer media storage classifications are for containers which do not allow the internal temperature to go above 150°F.

217

Insulated vault door classifications are much the same as for safes except that they are not subject to the explosion/impact test. UL testing for burglary resistance in safes does not include the use of diamond core drills, thermic lance, or other devices yet to be developed by the safecracker. In some businesses, a combination consisting of a fire-resistant safe with a burglary-resistant safe welded inside may serve as a double protection for different assets, but in no event must the purposes of these two kinds of safes be confused if there is one of each on the premises. Most record safes have combination locks, relocking devices, and hardened steel lock plates to provide a measure of burglar resistance, but it must be reemphasized that record safes are designed to protect documents and other similar flammables against destruction by fire. They provide only slight deterrence to the attack of even unskilled burglars. Similarly, burglar resistance is powerless to protect the contents in a fire of any significance.

Chapter 12 Security Lighting PHILIP P. PURPURA, CPP, LAWRENCE J. FENNELLY, CPO, CSS, GERARD HONEY, and JAMES F. BRODER, CPP

From a business perspective, lighting can be justified because it improves sales by making a business and merchandise more attractive, promotes safety and prevents lawsuits, improves employee morale and productivity, and enhances the value of real estate. From a security perspective, two major purposes of lighting are to create a psychological deterrent to intrusion and to enable detection. Good lighting is considered such an effective crime control method that the law, in many locales, requires buildings to maintain adequate lighting. One way to analyze lighting deficiencies is to go to the building at night and study the possible methods of entry and areas where inadequate lighting aids a burglar. Before the visit, contract local police as a precaution against mistaken identity and recruit their assistance in spotting weak points in lighting. What lighting level aids an intruder? Most people believe that, under conditions of darkness, a criminal can safely commit a crime. But this view may be faulty, in that one generally cannot work in the dark. Three possible levels of light are bright light, darkness, and dim light. Bright light affords an offender plenty of light to work but enables easy observation by others; it deters crime. Without light, in darkness, a burglar finds that he or she cannot see to jimmy a good lock, release a latch, or do whatever work is necessary to gain access. However, dim light provides just enough light to break and enter while hindering observation by authorities. Support for this view was shown in a study of crimes during full-moon phases, when dim light was produced. This study examined the records of 972 police shifts at three police agencies over a 2-year period, 218

to compare nine different crimes during full-moon and nonfull-moon phases. Only one crime, breaking and entering, was greater during full-moon phases.1 Although much case law supports lighting as an indicator of efforts to provide a safe environment, security specialists are questioning conventional wisdom about lighting.2 Because so much nighttime lighting goes unused, should it be reduced or turned off? Does an offender look more suspicious under a light or in the dark with a flashlight? Should greater use be made of motion-activated lighting? How would these approaches affect safety and costeffectiveness? These questions are ripe for research.

Illumination3 Lumens (of light output) per watt (of power input) is a measure of lamp efficiency. Initial lumensper-watt data are based on the light output of lamps when new; however, light output declines with use. Illuminance is the intensity of light falling on a surface, measured in foot-candles (English units) or lux (metric units). The foot-candle (FC) is a measure of how bright the light is when it reaches 1 foot from the source. One lux equals 0.0929 FC. The light provided by direct sunlight on a clear day is about 10,000 FC, an overcast day would yield about 100 FC, and a full moon about 0.01 FC. A sample of outdoor lighting illuminances recommended by the Illuminating Engineering Society of North America are as follows: self-parking area, 1 FC; attendant parking area, 2 FC; covered parking area, 5 FC; active pedestrian entrance, 5 FC; building surroundings, 1 FC. It

Security Lighting

generally is recommended that gates and doors, where identification of persons and things takes place, should have at least 2 FC. An office should have a light level of about 50 FC. Care should be exercised when studying FC. Are they horizontal or vertical? Horizontal illuminance may not aid in the visibility of vertical objects such as signs and keyholes. (The preceding FC are horizontal.) The FC vary depending on the distance from the lamp and the angle. If you hold a light meter horizontally, it often gives a different reading that if you hold it vertically. Are the FC initial or maintained? Maintenance and bulb replacement ensure highquality lighting.

Lamps4 The following lamps are applied outdoors: 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Incandescent lamps are commonly found at residences. Passing electrical current through a tungsten wire that becomes white-hot produces light. These lamps produce 10–20 lumens per watt, are the least efficient and most expensive to operate, and have a short lifetime of 1000–2000 hours. Halogen and quartz halogen lamps are incandescent bulbs filled with halogen gas (like sealedbeam auto headlights) and provide about 25% better efficiency and life than ordinary incandescent bulbs. Fluorescent lamps pass electricity through a gas enclosed in a glass tube to produce light, yielding 40–80 lumens per watt. They create twice the light and less than half the heat of an incandescent bulb of equal wattage and cost 5–10 times as much. Fluorescent lamps do not provide high levels of light output. The lifetime is 10,000–15,000 hours. They are not used extensively outdoors, except for signs. Mercury vapor lamps also pass electricity through a gas. The yield is 30–60 lumens per watt and the life is about 20,000 hours. Metal halide lamps are also of the gaseous type. The yield is 80–100 lumens per watt, and the life is about 10,000 hours. They often are used at sports stadiums because they imitate daylight conditions and colors appear natural. Consequently, these lamps complement CCTV systems, but they are the most expensive light to install and maintain. High-pressure sodium lamps are gaseous, yield about 100 lumens per watt, have a life of about 20,000 hours, and are energy efficient. These lamps are often applied on streets and parking lots, and through fog are designed to allow the eyes to see more detail at greater distances.

䊉

219

Low-pressure sodium lamps are gaseous, produce 150 lumens per watt, have a life of about 15,000 hours, and are even more efficient than highpressure sodium. These lamps are expensive to maintain.

Each type of lamp has a different color rendition, which is the way a lamp’s output affects human perceptions of color. Incandescent, fluorescent, and certain types of metal halide lamps provide excellent color rendition. Mercury vapor lamps provide good color rendition but are heavy on the blue. Highpressure sodium lamps, which are used extensively outdoors, provide poor color rendition, making things look yellow. Low-pressure sodium lamps make color unrecognizable and produce a yellowgray color on objects. People find they produce a strange yellow haze. Claims are made that this lighting conflicts with aesthetic values and affects sleeping habits. In many instances, when people park their vehicles in a parking lot during the day and return to find their vehicle at night, they are often unable to locate it because of poor color rendition from sodium lamps; some report their vehicles as being stolen. Another problem is the inability of witnesses to describe offenders accurately. Mercury vapor, metal halide, and high-pressure sodium take several minutes to produce full light output. If they are turned off, even more time is required to reach full output because they first have to cool down. This may not be acceptable for certain security applications. Incandescent, halogen, and quartz halogen have the advantage of instant light once electricity is turned on. Manufacturers can provide information on a host of lamp characteristics including the “strike” and “restrike” time. The following three sources provide additional information on lighting: 䊉

䊉

䊉

National Lighting Bureau (http://www.nlb.org): Publications. Illuminating Engineering Society of North America (http://www.iesna.org):Technical materials and services; recommended practices and standards; many members are engineers. International Association of Lighting Management Companies (http://www.nalmco.org): Seminars, training, and certification programs.

Lighting Equipment Incandescent or gaseous discharge lamps are used in streetlights. Fresnel lights have a wide flat beam that is directed outward to protect a perimeter. Glaring

220


in the faces of those approaching. A floodlight “floods” an area with a beam of light, resulting in considerable glare. Floodlights are stationary, although the light beams can be aimed to select positions. The following strategies reinforce good lighting: 1. Locate perimeter lighting to allow illumination of both sides of the barrier. 2. Direct lights down and away from a facility to create glare for an intruder. Make sure the directed lighting does not hinder observation by patrolling officer. 3. Do not leave dark spaces between lighted areas for burglars to move in. Design lighting to permit overlapping illumination. 4. Protect the lighting system: Locate lighting inside the barrier, install protective covers over lamps, mount lamps on high poles, bury power lines, and protect switch boxes. 5. Photoelectric cells enable light to go on and off automatically in response to natural light. Manual operation is helpful as a backup. 6. Consider motion-activated lighting for external and internal areas. 7. If lighting is required in the vicinity of navigable waters, contact the U.S. Coast Guard. 8. Try not to disturb neighbors by intense lighting. 9. Maintain a supply of portable, emergency lights and auxiliary power in the event of a power failure. 10. Good interior lighting also deters burglars. Locating lights over safes, expensive merchandise, and other valuables and having large clear windows (especially in retail establishments) lets passing patrol officers see in. 11. If necessary, join other business owners to petition local government to install improved street lighting.

Twenty-Five Things You Need to Know about Lighting5 1. Foot-candle is out. Lux is in. 2. Foot-candle is a measure of light on a surface 1 square foot in area on which one unit of light (lumen) is distributed. 3. Lumen is a unit of light output from a lamp. 4. Lamp is a term that refers to light sources that are called bulbs. 5. Lux is the measurement of illumination. 6. Illuminare is the intensity of light that falls on an object.

7. Brightness is the intensity of the sensation from which light as seen by the eye. 8. Foot-lambert is a measure of brightness. 9. Glare is excessive brightness. 10. Luminare is a complete lighting unit. Consists of one or more lamps joined with other parts that distributes light, protects the lamp, positions or directs it, and connects it to a power source. 11. Ballast is a device used with fluorescent and high-intensity discharge lamps to obtain voltage and current to operate the lamps. 12. High-intensity discharge (HID) is the term used to identify four types of lamps: mercury vapor, metal halide, and high- and low-pressure sodium, 13. Coefficient of utilization is the ratio of the light delivered from a luminare to a surface compared to the total light output from a lamp. 14. Contrast is the relationship between the brightness of an object and its immediate background. 15. Diffuser is a device on the bottom or sides of a luminare to redirect or spread light from a source. 16. Fixture is a luminare 17. Lens is a glass or plastic shield that covers the bottom of a luminare to control the direction and brightness of the light as it comes out of the fixture or luminare. 18. Louvers are a series of baffles arranged in a geometric pattern. They shield a lamp from direct view to avoid glare. 19. Uniform lighting refers to a system of lighting that directs the light specifically on the work or job rather than on the surrounding areas. 20. Reflector is a device used to redirect light from a lamp. 21. Task or work lighting is the amount of light that falls on an object of work. 22. Veiling reflection is the reflection of light from an object that obscures the detail to be observed by reducing the contrast between the object and its background. 23. Incandescent lamps produce light by passing an electric current through a tungsten filament in a glass bulb. They are the least efficient type of bulb. 24. Fluorescent lamps are the second most-common source of light. They draw an electric arc along the length of a tube. The ultraviolet light produced by the arc activates a phosphor coating on the walls of the tube, which causes light. 25. Of all of the HID lamps (mercury vapor, metal halide, high- and low-pressure sodium), the lowpressure sodium is the most efficient.

Security Lighting

Energy Management The efficiency and management of lighting is becoming a high-priority in commissioning new buildings and upgrading existing systems. Indeed, the subject of energy management is expected to become one of the most-important considerations within the building regulation documents and have a tremendous impact on the way that the construction industry looks at energy. It is apparent that serious measures must now be taken to reduce energy use and waste. This will have an impact on security lighting and the way that it is applied. Lighting experts show an increasing urge to work alongside electrical contractors and installers to help them increase their business opportunities by identifying the roles and applications in which energy-efficient lighting should be installed. Electrical contractors are being better educated in lighting design that is effective and energy efficient. The needs are therefore to equip personnel to 䊉䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Recognize inefficient installations. Appreciate the environmental, cost, and associated benefits of energy-efficient lighting schemes. Estimate energy cost savings and calculate the payback period. Recognize the situations in which expert and specialist knowledge is needed in the design of management systems. Think in terms of increasing business but while accepting the need to save the environment.

At certain points in time, it was said that lighting any system brighter proved an advantage. However, we are now seeing a trend away from large floodlights illuminating the night sky with a strong white glare, as exterior lighting is becoming much more focused on the minimum lux levels required. We are also seeing a move toward directional beams. The lighting industry wants to remove itself from a proliferation of public and private external lighting schemes to counter the light pollution problem and become more energy and cost conscious in its makeup. There must be a mechanism to tackle the problem of countless floodlights, up lighters, spotlights, decorative installations and an array of security lighting forms that are badly installed and specified, create light pollution, and use high energy levels. Lighting pollution is now at the forefront of debates for two main reasons: 䊉

Light pollution spoils the natural effect of the night skies.

䊉

221

The greater is the light pollution, the greater the power consumption.

Unfortunately, a certain degree of light pollution is needed to satisfy safety and security applications. Equally, there is always the desire to have purely decorative lighting installations, so the answer lies in a compromise. Systems must be designed with a degree of thought given to the avoidance of light pollution and energy waste. External lighting must provide minimal light pollution, a safe environment, and an attractive feature. For attractive features, we can see a greater use of fiber optic solutions with color changing effects and lighting engineered to direct the illumination downward. Bollards or recessed ground luminaries can be set into walkways so there is no spill into the night sky. Intelligently designed schemes can ensure that lighting is reflected only in a downward direction, so that pedestrians are better guided and the lighting has a pleasing effect with little overspill. Therefore, within the lighting industry, the need is recognized to raise standards in all aspects associated with light and lighting, in particular when it comes to energy management and light pollution.We need to define and harness the pleasures of lighting but at the same time promote the benefits of welldesigned energy efficient schemes among the public at large. There must also be miniaturization and increased lamp life. Energy management must therefore be a part of security lighting.

Lighting Checklist 1. Is all of the perimeter lighted? 2. Is there a strip of light on both sides of fence? 3. Is the illumination sufficient to detect human movement easily at 100 yards? 4. Are lights checked for operation daily prior to darkness? 5. Is extra lighting available at entry points and points of possible intrusion? 6. Are lighting repairs made promptly? 7. Is the power supply for lights easily accessible (for tampering)? 8. Are lighting circuit drawings available to facilitate quick repairs? 9. Switches and controls—are they a. Protected? b. Weatherproof and tamper resistant? c. Accessible to security personnel? d. Inaccessible from outside the perimeter barrier?

222

10. 11. 12. 13.


e. Equipped with centrally located master switch(es)? Is the illumination good for guards on all routes inside the perimeter? Are the materials and equipment in receiving, shipping, and storage areas adequately lighted? Are bodies of water on perimeter adequately lighted? Is an auxiliary source of power available for protective lighting?

Protective Lighting Checklist 1. Is protective lighting adequate on perimeter? 2. What type of lighting is it? 3. Is the lighting of open areas within perimeter adequate? 4. Do shadowed areas exist? 5. Are outside storage areas adequately lighted? 6. Are inside areas adequately lighted? 7. Is the guard protected or exposed by the lighting? 8. Are gates adequately lighted? 9. Do lights at the gates illuminate the interior of vehicles? 10. Are critical and vulnerable areas well illuminated? 11. Is protective lighting operated manually or automatically? 12. Do cones of light on perimeter overlap? 13. Are perimeter lights wired in series? 14. Is the lighting at shipping and receiving docks or piers adequate? 15. Is the lighting in the parking lots adequate? 16. Is an auxiliary power source available? 17. Is the interior of buildings adequately lighted? 18. Are top secret and secret activities adequately lighted? 19. Are guards equipped with powerful flashlights? 20. How many more and what type of lights are needed to provide adequate illumination? In what locations?

21. Do security personnel report light outages? 22. How soon are burned-out lights replaced? 23. Are open areas of a campus sufficiently lighted to discourage illegal or criminal acts against pedestrians? 24. Are any areas covered with high-growing shrubs or woods where the light is insufficient? 25. Are the outsides of buildings holding valuable or critical activities or materials lighted? 26. Are interiors of hallways and entrances lighted when buildings are open at night? 27. Are areas surrounding women’s dormitories well lighted? Within a college setting? 28. Are campus parking lots lighted sufficiently to discourage tampering with parked cars or other illegal activities? 29. Are areas where materials of high value are stored well lighted? Safes, libraries, bookstores, food storage areas, etc.?

References 1. Philip Purpura. “Police Activity and the Full Moon.” Journal of Police Science and Administration 7, no. 3 (September 1979), p. 350. 2. Henri Berube. “New Notions of Night Light.” Security Management (December 1994), pp. 29–33. 3. National Lighting Bureau, Lighting for Safety and Security (Washington, DC: National Lighting Bureau, n.d.), pp. 1–36; Mary S. Smith, Crime Prevention through Environmental Design in Parking Facilities (Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, April 1996), pp. 1–4; Dan M. Bowers, “Let There Be Light,” Security Management (September 1995), pp. 103–111; Douglas R. Kunze and John Schiefer, “An Illuminating Look at Light,” Security Management (September 1995), pp. 113–116. 4. Ibid. 5. Louis A. Tyska and Lawrence J. Fennelly. Physical Security, 150 Things You Should Know. Boston: Butterworth–Heinemann, 2000, pp. 155–156.

Chapter 13 Alarms: Intrusion Detection Systems MIKE ROLF and JAMES CULLITY

Burglary is a big business. Moreover, crime figures show a staggering rate of increase for burglaries of private homes. It is no wonder then that many homeowners and businesspeople are giving serious consideration to electronic alarm protection. These operators are in the market to make a fast dollar and the unwary customer who buys what seems to be a bargain too often ends up being cheated. The selection of a proper alarm system is not a simple matter, because the needs of each homeowner or businessperson are different, like a set of fingerprints. Some factors that determine the requirements of an individual alarm system and the questions that must be answered when selecting a system include 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

The threat or risk—what is the system to protect against? The type of sensors needed—what will be protected? What methods are available to provide the level of protection needed? The method of alarm signal transmission—how is the signal to be sent and who will respond?

Most of the confusion regarding intrusion detection systems is a result of the variety of methods available to provide the protection needed. The combinations of detection methods range into the thousands. An intrusion detection system may deter a would-be intruder. However, the primary function of the alarm system is to signal the presence of an intruder. An intrusion detection system can be just a portion of the overall protection needed. Many large business supplement them with security guards and other security personnel. The successful operation of

any type of an alarm system depends on its proper installation and maintenance by the alarm installing company and the proper use of the system by the customer.

Components of Alarm Systems Sensing devices are used in the actual detection of an intruder (see Figures 13-1 and 13-2). Each has a specific purpose and can be divided into three categories: perimeter protection, area/space protection, and object/spot protection.

Perimeter Protection Perimeter protection is the first line in the defense to detect an intruder. The most common points equipped with sensing devices for premise perimeter protection are doors, windows, vents, skylights, or any opening to a business or home. Since over 80% of all break-ins occur through these openings, most alarm systems provide this type of protection. The major advantage of perimeter protection is its simple design. The major disadvantage is that is protects only the openings. If the burglar bursts through a wall, comes through the ventilation system, or stays behind after closing perimeter protection is useless. 1. Door switches. These are installed on a door or window in such a way that opening the door or window causes a magnet to move away a contact switch, which activates the alarm. They can be 223

224


Figure 13-1. Typical application of the use of magnetic contacts, window foil, switch mats, motion detection, and photoelectric beam. (Courtesy of Aritech Corporation.)

surface mounted or recessed into the door and frame. A variety of types of switches are manufactured for all types of doors or windows. 2. Metallic foil (window tape). Although it is rarely used today, this method is widely used to detect glass breakage in show windows, doors, and transoms. When the glass cracks and breaks the foil, it interrupts the low-voltage electrical circuit and activates the alarm. 3. Glass break detectors. These detectors are attached to the glass and sense the breakage of the glass by shock or sound. 4. Wooden screens. These devices are made of wooden dowel sticks assembled in a cagelike fashion no more than 4 inches from each other. A very fine, brittle wire runs in the wooden dowels and frame. The burglar must break the doweling to gain entry and thus break the low voltage electrical circuit, causing the alarm. These devices are used primarily in commercial applications.

5. Window screens. These devices are similar to regular wire window screens in a home except that a fine, coated wire is a part of the screen. When the burglar cuts the screen to gain entry, the flow of low-voltage electricity is interrupted and cause the alarm. These devices are used primarily in residential applications. 6. Lace and panels. The surfaces of door panels and safes are protected against entry by installing a close lacelike pattern of metallic foil or a fine brittle wire on the surface. Entry cannot be made without first breaking the foil or wire, thus activating the alarm. A panel of wood is placed over the lacing to protect it.

Area/Space Protection Area/space protection devices (Table 13-1) protect the interior spaces in a business or home. They

Alarms: Intrusion Detection Systems

225

Figure 13-2. Sensors: (A) Ultrasonic doubler—back-to-back ultrasonic transceivers provide virtually double the coverage of single detectors at almost the same wiring and equipment cost. With more than 50 ¥ 25 feet of coverage, the doubler is the best value in space protection. (B) Ultrasonic sensors—easy to install, no brackets needed. Can be mounted horizontally, vertically, or in a corner; surface, flush, or with mounting feet on a shelf. Each UL listed sensor protects a three-dimensional volume up to 30 feet wide and high. (C) Passive infrared—for those zones where the lower-cost ultrasonic sensor is inappropriate, there is no need to buy a complete passive infrared system, both ultrasonic and passive infrared can be used in the same system. (D) Magnetic contacts, foil, glass breakage sensors—the building’s perimeter protection detectors can be wired into the system via universal interface sensor. There is no need for running a separate perimeter loop. (E) Flush ceiling-mounted sensors—only the two small 2-inch diameter transducer caps are visible below the ceiling tiles. Designed for where minimum visibility is needed for aesthetic or security purposes. (F) Photoelectric beam—the universal interface sensor allows the connection of any NO or NC alarm device into the system for zoned annunciation. It can be used with photoelectric beams, switch matting, microwave motion detectors, and many other intrusion detectors. (G) Ultrasonic range expander—adding an ultrasonic range expander can increase the coverage of an ultrasonic sensor by 50–90%, depending on where it is positioned and the surrounding environment. (Courtesy of Aritech Corporation.)

protect against intrusion whether or not the perimeter protection was violated. It is particularly effective against a stay-behind intruder or the burglar who cuts through the roof or breaks through a block wall. Space protection devices are only a part of the complete alarm system. They should always be supplemented with perimeter protection. The major advantage of space protection devices is that they

provide a highly sensitive, invisible means of detection. The major disadvantage is that improper application and installation by the alarm company can result in frequent false alarms. The types of area/space protection are 1. Photoelectric eyes (beams). These devices transmit a beam across a protected area. When an

226


Table 13-1. Motion Sensor Survey Checklist Environmental and Other Factors Affecting Sensor Usage

Effect on Sensor Circle one

Ultrasonics

Microwave

Passive IR

Recommendation and Notes

1. If the areas to be protected are enclosed by thin walls or contain windows, will there be movement close to the outside of this area? 2. Will protection pattern see sun, moving headlamps, or other sources of infrared energy passing through windows? 3. Does area to be protected contain HVAC ducts?

Yes No

None

Major

None

Avoid using a microwave sensor unless it can be aimed away from thin walls, glass, etc., which can pass an amount of microwave energy

Yes No

None

None

Major

Avoid using a passive IR sensor unless pattern can be positioned to avoid rapidly changing levels of infrared energy

Yes No

None

Moderate

None

4. Will two or more sensors of the same type be used to protect a common area? 5. Does area to be protected contain fluorescent or neon lights that are on during protection-on period? 6. Are incandescent lamps cycled on and off during protection-on period included in the protection pattern?

Yes No

None

None (see note)

None

Ducts can channel microwave energy to other areas; if using a microwave sensor, aim it away from duct openings Note: Adjacent units must operate on different frequencies

Yes No

None

Major

None

Microwave sensor, if used, must be aimed away from any fluorescent or neon light within 20 feet

Yes No

None

None

Major

7. Must protection pattern be projected from a ceiling?

Yes No

None, but only for ceiling heights up to 15 feet

Major

Major

8. Is the overall structure of flimsy construction (corrugated metal, thin plywood, etc.)?

Yes No

Minor

Major

Minor

If considering use of passive IR sensor, make a trial installation and, if necessary, redirect protection pattern away from incandescent lamps Only ultrasonic sensors can be used on a ceiling, but height is limited to 15 feet; at greater ceiling heights, use either rigid ceiling brackets to suspend sensor to maintain 15-foot limitation or, in large open areas, try a microwave sensor mounted high on a wall and aimed downward Do not use a microwave sensor; where considerable structural movement can be expected, use a rigid mounting surface for ultrasonic or passive IR sensor


227

Table 13-1. Continued Environmental and Other Factors Affecting Sensor Usage


9. Will protection pattern Yes No include large metal objects or wall surfaces?

Ultrasonics

Microwave

Passive IR


Minor

Major

Use ultrasonic sensor or use passive IR sensor

Major when radar is close and sensor is aimed at it None

Minor (major if metal is highly polished) Minor

Major when rapid changes in air temperature are involved

Use ultrasonic sensor, but aim it away from sources of air turbulence (desirable to have heaters, etc., turned off during protection-on period) or use microwave sensor Try muffling noise source and use an ultrasonic sensor, use a microwave sensor, or use passive infrared sensor Use ultrasonic sensor if some reduction in range can be tolerated or use microwave sensor Use an ultrasonic sensor unless changes in temperature and humidity are severe or use a microwave sensor If noise is substantial, try correcting faulty valves and use an ultrasonic sensor; use a microwave sensor, or use a passive IR sensor Have machinery, fans, and the like turned off during protection-on period, carefully place ultrasonic sensor, or use passive infrared sensor If protection pattern can be aimed away from air movement or air movement can be stopped during protection-on period, use an ultrasonic sensor, use a microwave sensor, or use a passive IR sensor If protection pattern can be aimed away from such doors, use an ultrasonic sensor or use a passive IR sensor

10. Are any radar installations nearby?

Yes No

Minor

11. Will protection pattern include heaters, radiators, air conditioners, or the like?

Yes No

Moderate

12. Will area to be protected be subjected to ultrasonic noise (bells, hissing sounds)?

Yes No

None

None

13. Will protection pattern include drapes, carpet, racks of clothing, or the like? 14. Is the area to be protected subject to changes in temperature and humidity?

Yes No

Moderate, can cause problems in severe cases Moderate, reduction in range

None

Minor

Moderate

None

Major

15. Is there water noise Yes No from faulty valves in the area to be protected?

Moderate, can be a problem

None

None

16. Will protection pattern see moving machinery, fan blades, or the like?

Yes No

Major

Major

Minor

17. Will drafts or other air movement pass through protection pattern?

Yes No

Major

None

None, unless rapid temperature changes are involved

18. Will protection pattern see overhead doors that can be rattled by wind?

Yes No

Major

Major

Minor

Yes No

Avoid using a microwave sensor

228


Table 13-1. Continued Environmental and Other Factors Affecting Sensor Usage 19. Are there hanging signs, calendar pages, or the like that can be moved by air currents during protection-on period? 20. Are adjacent railroad tracks used during protection-on period? 21. Can small animals (or birds) enter protection pattern? 22. Does area to be protected contain a corrosive atmosphere? 23. Approximate ADT cost per square foot of coverage


Ultrasonics

Microwave

Passive IR


Yes No

Major

Major

Moderate, can be a problem

Yes No

Major

Minor

Minor

Yes No

Major

Major

Yes No

Major

Major

Major (particularly rodents) Major

Use ultrasonic sensor, but aim pattern away from objects that can move or remove such objects or use passive infrared sensor A trial installation is required if using an ultrasonic sensor Install a physical barrier to prevent intrusion by animals or birds None of these sensors can be used

0.3

0.4

0.6

intruder interrupts the beam, the beam circuit is disrupted and the alarm initiated. Photoelectric devices use a pulsed infrared beam that is invisible to the naked eye. Some units have a range of over 1000 feet and can be used outdoors, although they are rarely used today. 2. Ultrasonics. Ultrasonics (although rarely used today) works on a low-frequency sound wave projected from the unit. The frequency is in kilohertz (23–26) and its area of coverage can be anywhere from 5 to 40 feet in length. The pattern is volumetric and cannot be aimed, although the pattern may be directed by the use of deflectors. Deflectors come in 90 or 45° angles. A doubler type uses two 45° angles back to back. Ultrasonics work on a change in frequency, called the Doppler effect. A motion detector has two transducers; the transmitter sends out a signal that is bounced back to the receiver by immobile objects in the protected area. If an intruder moves toward or away from the unit, the change in its reflected frequency, signals an alarm. Ultrasonics may be found as stand-alone units or part of what is called a master system. The stand-alone units compare the reflected signal within the unit itself and trip the control panel by opening or closing a relay contact. Master systems work slightly differently, by sending the signal back to a main processing unit.The main processing unit compares the signal and trips the relay contacts of the processor. False alarms result from three types of sources:

Motion. Objects that move in the path of protection and air turbulence are seen as motion because of the frequency of the unit. 䊉 Noise. Ultrasonic noise is present when audible noises are heard; hissing (such as from high-pressure air leaking or steam radiators) or bells ringing can be a source of these noises. 䊉 Radio or electrical interference. Induced electrical signals or RF interference from radio transmitters can cause false alarms. Grounding and shielding are both very important in a master system. If an earth ground is required, it should be a cold water pipe. The length of the ground wire should be as short as possible and with a minimum number of bends. Potential problems include 䊉 Turbulence and draft, hanging displays, moving draperies, small pets. 䊉 Noise caused by air hissing, bells, telephones. 䊉 Temperature or humidity can affect range of the ultrasonic unit. Carpets, furniture, and draperies may absorb some of the signal, decreasing the unit’s sensitivity. Ultrasonic energy does not penetrate most objects. The signal may be reflected off some smooth surfaces. 3. Microwave. Microwave detectors are a volumetric type of space protection. They detect intruders by the use of a radiated radio frequency (RF) electromagnetic field. The unit operates by 䊉


sensing a disturbance in the generated RF field, the Doppler effect. The frequency range is between 0.3 and 300 gigahertz (1 gigahertz = 1 billion cps). Any type of motion in the protected area creates a change in frequency, causing an alarm condition. Because the power output from the unit is relatively low, the field radiated is harmless. Microwave energy penetrates most objects except metal: It totally reflects off metal. One of the most important considerations in placement of these units is vibration. The microwave must be mounted on a firm surface: Cinder block, brick, or main support beams are ideal mounting locations. Never mount two microwave units with identical frequencies in the same room or area where the patterns may overlap. This could cause crosstalk between the units, causing false alarms. Microwave units draw excessive current, so the proper gauge of wire should be used and the length of the wire run should also be taken into consideration. Current readings should be taken at the end of an installation or while troubleshooting units to ensure that the maximum current of the control panel has not been exceeded. Fluorescent lights may be a problem because the radiated ionization from the lights may be looked at as motion by the detector. Potential problems include 䊉 Vibrations or movement of mounting surface, a major problem. 䊉 Reflection of pattern or movement of metal objects in protected area, such as moving fan blades or movement or overhead doors. 䊉 Penetration of thin walls or glass, a potential problem if motion or large metal objects, such as trains or cars, are present. 䊉 Radio frequency interference (RFI), radar, or AC line transients in severe cases can be a problem. 䊉 Water movement in plastic or PVC storm drains, a potential interference if located close to the unit. Most microwave units provide a test point, where the amplifier output voltage can be read. By following the manufacturer’s recommended voltage settings the microwave can be set up properly and the unit environment examined. 4. Infrared Detectors. These detectors are passive sensors, because they do not transmit a signal for an intruder to disturb. Rather, a source of moving infrared radiation (the intruder) is detected against the normal radiation/temperature environment of the room. Passive infrared detectors

229

(PIRs) sense the radiation from a human body moving through the optical field of view of the detector. The field of view of an infrared unit must terminate on an object to ensure its proper operation and stability. An infrared unit should never be set up to look out into mid-air. Potential problems include 䊉 Turbulence and drafts, a problem if the air is blowing directly on the unit or causes a rapid change in temperature of objects in the path of protection. 䊉 Stray motion (i.e., drapes blowing, hanging objects or displays, small animals). 䊉 Changing temperatures (i.e., hot spots in machinery, sunlight), which may cause false alarms. The temperature of the background IR level may also affect the unit’s sensitivity: PIRs become less sensitive as the temperature increases. 䊉 Lightning or bright lights, such as halogen headlights. The IR radiation pattern is blocked by solid objects as it is unable to penetrate most objects. The pattern of protection may also be affected by reflection off smooth surfaces. 5. Pressure Mats. These mats are basically mechanical switches. Pressure mats are most frequently used as a backup system to perimeter protection. When used as traps they can be hidden under the carpet in front of a likely target or in hallways where an intruder would travel. 6. Sound sensors. Sound sensors detect intrusion by picking up the noise created by a burglar during an attempt to break into a protected area. These sensors consist of a microphone and an electronic amplifier/processor. When the sound level increases beyond the limit normally encountered, the unit signals an alarm. Some units have pulsecounting and time-interval features. Other types can actually listen to the protected premises from a central monitoring station. 7. Dual-techs. Dual-technology units, commonly referred to as dual-techs, are made up as a combination of two types of space-protection devices. The principle of the unit is that both sections of the detectors must be tripped at the same time to cause an alarm. A dual-tech unit could be a combination passive/microwave or a combination passive/ultrasonic. By using a dual-technology device, an installer can provide space protection in areas that may have presented potential false alarm problems when a single-technology unit was used. Repair people can replace units sending false signals because of environment or place-

230


ment. Dual-techs are not the solution to all false alarm problems, and unless careful consideration is used in installing or replacing a device, the false alarm problems may persist. Since these contain two different types of devices, there is much more to consider. Dual-techs draw much more current than conventional detectors. Current readings are essential and additional power supplies may be necessary to provide enough operating current and standby power. Until recently, if one section of the unit stopped working or was blocked off in some way by the end user, the unit was rendered inoperable. Manufacturers are only now working on supervising the microwave section of these units. If the unit is located or adjusted so that one section of the unit is continuously in an alarm condition, the dual-technology principle is worthless.

Application For all practical purposes, the reason we use space protection is as a backup to the perimeter system. It is not necessary to cover every inch of the premises being protected. The best placement is as a trap in a high-traffic area or spot protection for high-value areas. The worst thing an installer can do is overextend the area being protected by an individual unit (e.g., trying to cover more than one room with a detector or trying to compensate for placement or environment by overadjusting the sensitivity). By using a little common sense and checking for all possible hazards, you can ensure a trouble-free installation. Make sure that the units have adequate power going to each head and the standby batteries are working and charging properly. Be sure to adjust for pets and brief customers and any problems they may create, such as leaving fans or machinery on, and not to open windows in the path of protection. Before leaving an installation, make sure that all units have been walk tested and the areas in question have been masked out. One of the most important considerations in setting up a number of space protection devices is zoning. Never put more than two interior devices in one zone if at all possible. The majority of false alarms are caused by interior devices. Breaking up the interior protective circuits as much as possible gives the service person a better chance of solving a false alarm problem (even with two heads in one zone you have a 50/50 chance of finding the trouble unit). Zoning a system correctly helps in troubleshooting, makes the police department feel better about the company and the company feel

better about the installer, and ensures good relations with the customer.

Object/Spot Detection Object/spot detection is used to detect the activity or presence of an intruder at a single location. It provides direct security for things. Such a detection method is the final stage of an in-depth system for protection. The objects most frequently protected include safes, filing cabinets, desks, art objects, models, statues, and expensive equipment. The types of object/spot protection are 1. Capacitance/proximity detectors. The object being protected becomes an antenna, electronically linked to the alarm control. When an intruder approaches or touches the object/antenna, an electrostatic field is unbalanced and the alarm is initiated. Only metal objects can be protected in this manner. 2. Vibration detectors. These devices utilize a highly sensitive, specialized microphone called an electronic vibration detector (EVD). The EVD is attached directly to the object to be protected. It can be adjusted to detect a sledge hammer attack on a concrete wall or a delicate penetration of a glass surface. It sends an alarm only when the object is moved, whereas capacitance devices detect when the intruder is close to the protected object. Other types of vibration detectors are similar to tilt switches used in pinball machines.

Alarm Control All sensing devices are wired into the alarm control panel that receives their signals and processes them. Some of the most severe burglary losses are caused not by a failure in equipment but simply by someone turning off the alarm system. The type of control panel needed depends on the sophistication of the overall intrusion alarm system. Some control panels provide zoning capabilities for separate annunciation of the sensing devices. Others provide the lowvoltage electrical power for the sensing devices. Included in the control panel is the backup or standby power in the event of an electrical power failure. Batteries are used for standby power. Some equipment uses rechargeable batteries; the control has a low-power charging unit (a trickle charger) and maintains the batteries in a fully charged condition.


Modern control panels use one or more microprocessors. This allows the control panel to send and receive digital information to the alarm station. An alphanumeric pad can display zone information as well as supervisory conditions. Each user can also have a unique code, allowing restriction during specified times or limiting access into certain areas. By using individual code numbers, the alarm control panel can track activity as well as transmit this information off-site. If the alarm control panel is connected to a central monitoring station, the times that the system is turned on and off are recorded and logged. When the owner enters the building in the morning, a signal is sent. If this happens at a time prearranged with the central station, it is considered a normal opening. If it happens at any other time, the police are dispatched. The owner or other authorized persons can enter the building during the closed times. The person entering must first call the central station company and identify him- or herself by a special coding procedure. Records are kept at the central station company for these irregular openings and closings. Tamper protection is a feature that generates an alarm signal when the system is compromised in any way. Tamper protection can be designed into any or all portions of the alarm system (control panel, sensing devices, loop wiring, alarm transmission facilities).

Alarm Transmission/Signaling The type of alarm transmission/signaling system used in a particular application depends on the location of the business or residence, the frequency of police patrols, and the ability of the customer to afford the cost. Remember that, after deterrence, the purpose of an alarm is to summon the proper authorities to stop a crime during its commission or lead to the apprehension of the intruder. It is very important that the response by proper authorities to the alarm comes in the shortest possible time. Two types of alarm signaling systems are in general use: 䊉

Local alarm. A bell or light indicates that an attempted or successful intrusion has taken place. The success of the system relies on someone hearing or seeing the signal and calling the responsible authorities. The local alarm also notifes burglars that they have been detected.This may be advantageous in frightening off the less experienced intruder.

䊉

231

Central station system. The alarm signal is transmitted over telephone lines to a specially constructed building called the central station. Here, trained operators are on duty 24 hours a day to supervise, record, and maintain alarms. On receipt of an alarm, the police are dispatched and, in some cases, the alarm company guard or runner. The record keeping function and guard response assure thorough documentation of any alarm signal. Alarm transmissions to the central station are of seven types. Each type of transmission has certain advantages and disadvantages that must be considered in determining the risk. Transmission of an alarm signal to the Underwriters Laboratories–listed central station is generally regarded as the most reliable method for reducing the burglary losses.

1. Direct wire systems. High-risk locations (banks, jewelers, furriers) are generally protected with a direct wire system. A single dedicated telephone line is run from the protected premises to the central station or police station, where a separate receiver supervises only that alarm. A fixed DC current is sent from the central station to the protected premises and read on a meter at the central station. The advantage of a direct wire system is that problems can be traced very quickly to a specific alarm system. This makes compromising the alarm signal by a professional burglar more difficult. The disadvantage of such a system is the higher cost of leased telephone lines. This becomes a more serious economic factor as the distance from the central station to the protected premises increases. Proper transmission of the alarm signal to the central station is essential. Problems can result on these telephone lines from shorts and broken wires. Most central stations expect these problems and are well equipped to rapidly make repairs. However, some of today’s burglars are more sophisticated. They know they can prevent the transmission of the alarm signal to the central system by shunting or jumpering out the leased telephone line. Special methods are used by the alarm company to protect against jumpering of the alarm signal. Alarm systems having this special line security are classified as AA Grade Central Station alarms by Underwriters Laboratories. 2. Circuit (party line) systems. Alarm signals transmitted over circuit transmission systems can be compared to a party line where several alarm customers defray the cost of the telephone line by sharing it. With a circuit transmission system, as

232

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.


many as 15 alarm transmitters may send alarm signals to a single receiving panel at the central station over the same line or loop. The alarm signals at the central station are received on strips of paper. Each alarm has a distinct code to identify it from others. The advantage of a circuit-loop alarm transmission system is the lower telephone line cost. Thus, a central station can make its services available to more customers by subdividing the cost of the telephone line among different users. The disadvantage of circuit-loop alarm transmission systems is that problems on a leased telephone line are more difficult to locate than with a direct wire system. Multiplex systems. The multiplex system is designed to reduce leased telephone line charges while providing a higher degree of line security than circuit-loop alarms. Multiplex systems introduced data processing (computer-based techniques) to the alarm industry. Digital communicators. This computer-based type of alarm transmission equipment sends its signal through the regular switch line telephone network. The alarm signal transmitted is a series of coded electronic pulses that can be received only on a computer terminal at the central station. Telephone dialer. The dialer delivers a prerecorded verbal message to a central station, answering service, or police department when an alarm is activated. Many of the earlier tape dialers were a source of constant problems to police departments, because of their lack of sophistication. Basically, they were relabeled tape recorders. It was not uncommon for the tape dialer to play most of the message before the police could answer the phone. The police knew that an alarm signal had been sent, but did not know its location. The newer, modern tape dialers have solved these problems. Radio signal transmission. This method takes the alarm signal from the protected premises and sends it via radio or cellular phone to either a central station or police dispatch center. Additionally, the alarm signal can be received in a police patrol car. Video verification. Along with standard alarm transmissions, video images are sent to the central station. This provides for a higher level of protection while helping eliminate false alarms by allowing central station operators to see what is happening inside the protected area. With the increase of the false police dispatches, video verification is playing a major role in the battle against false alarms.

Alarms Deter Crime False alarms waste police resources. They also waste alarm company resources. The police and alarm industry are acutely aware of this, and both have initiated efforts across the country to relieve the dilemma. The National Crime Prevention Institute has long endorsed alarm systems as the best available crime deterrent. This education institution realizes that most criminals fear alarm systems. They much prefer to break into an unprotected building rather than risk capture by a hidden sensor. Problem deterrence is the alarm business, a field that, in fact, extends far beyond protecting premises from burglary. The crisis prevention duties of alarm firms range from monitoring sprinkler systems and fire sensors and watching temperature levels in buildings to supervising industrial processes such as nuclear fission and the manufacturing of dangerous chemicals. To alarm companies, deterrence is a sophisticated, specialized art. In the area of crime prevention, companies take pride in spotting potential weaknesses in a building and designing an alarm system that confounds the most intelligent criminals. Crime prevention, in fact, is the area where police need the most help. The rise in burglary and other crimes has often put police officers in a response posture.

False Alarms The full crime prevention potential in alarm systems has yet to be realized. Relatively speaking, the number of premises not protected by alarms is great, although those businesses and residences holding the most valuable goods are thoroughly guarded by the most sophisticated sensor systems. Yet the main drag on the potential of alarms, as industry leaders and police are aware, remains the false alarm problem. A modern instance of the boy who cried “wolf,” false alarms erode alarm systems’ effectiveness. They are costly to alarm companies and police agencies. It is a fact that alarm systems prevent crime. These electronic and electrical systems deter burglars, arsonists, vandals, and other criminals. They are both the most effective and most economical crime prevention tool available. Police budgets have been reduced in most locales and frozen in others, while private investment in alarm security is growing yearly.


The National Burglary and Fire Alarm Association (NBFAA) asked its members to rank their priorities on association activities. The outstanding response asked for a comprehensive program to help member companies reduce false alarms. Moreover, while researching possible programs, the NBFAA learned that many members had already embarked on significant reduction efforts. Some police departments initiated a written letter program from the police chief to those who have an excessive number of alarm runs. Others have the crime prevention officer make a follow-up visit to the business or residence; after the other steps have failed, many police departments are assessing false alarm fines. By protecting such places as hospitals, office buildings, and schools, alarm systems free up police resources and enable patrol officers to spend more time in areas with high crime rates and fewer premises protected by alarm systems. Police may also dedicate more officers to apprehending criminals. In this manner, police and alarm companies work together, complementing one another and waging a mutual war on crime.

Alarm Equipment Overhaul A California alarm station undertook a major overhaul. The effort began with a false alarm inventory, in which subscribers whose systems produced four or more false alarms per week were weeded out. Service workers then replaced, virtually reinstalled, the alarm systems for those subscribers. New sensors, new batteries, new wiring, and new soldering jobs were required in many instances. The process was costly, but it paid off in the long run. The office then had fewer service calls and an improved relationship with the local police that increased business. Many NBFAA member companies instituted training programs for their sales, installation, and service personnel. Also, subscribers are educated on the operation of their systems three times, by salespeople, by installers, and by supervisors when they inspect newly installed systems. One member company weeded out and entirely rebuilt its problem systems. This approach is the most feasible way for smaller firms to attach the problem. Lacking sufficient capital to initiate a comprehensive program, such companies can nevertheless cut down the number of false alarms by renovating the relatively few systems that cause the majority of problems. Police chiefs and crime prevention officers working in areas troubled by false alarms should meet

233

with the heads of the firms in their areas and discuss reduction programs like these.

Additional Resources NBFAA members have a guide in the form of a comprehensive quality control manual outlining measures they can undertake to alleviate false alarms. To provide an idea of this False Alarm Handbook, an outline of it follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Determine false alarm rate and causes. Form an alarm equipment evaluation committee. Institute equipment testing procedures. Develop equipment training facilities. Know how to plan and make alarm installations. Be familiar with sensor zoning procedures. Inspect installations. Educate the subscriber. Cooperate with local law enforcement officers.

The theory behind the handbook is evident in the section titles. Companies are encouraged to begin with a series of statistical studies, from the general false alarm rate per total alarms and systems to causes distinguishing among equipment, user, telephone line, and environmental problems. A separate study helps companies determine how much money false alarms cost them. The results of these studies should then be reviewed by the company’s alarm equipment evaluation committee. That committee, made up of the chief engineer and plant, sales, and general managers, next decides which systems to keep, which to drop, and which to study further. Sections 3 and 4 are self-explanatory, both aimed at eliminating equipment-related problems through further testing and by education of all personnel on equipment operations. Note that salespeople particularly are urged to go through the training process. The next two parts cover installation procedures. Service workers are warned about environmental hazards that can affect different sensors. Such hazards include heat, static electricity, vibration, and electromagnetic interference from radio waves. The zoning section tells companies how they may set up their installations to isolate faults in different sensors and pieces of equipment. Under subscriber education, firms are urged to inundate their customers with training films, brochures, seminars, and whatever else it takes to teach them how to operate their alarm systems properly. The NBFAA also developed a separate booklet to educate alarm subscribers. It incorporates a dis-

234


cussion of alarm system fundamentals along with procedures that customers may undertake to reduce mistakes by their employees who operate the systems. Last, the False Alarm Handbook asks alarm companies to work closely with the local police on this problem. Here, the NBFAA endorses companywide research and forming a local private security advisory council to oversee efforts. Both the alarm company and the police must recognize that they need the other. Like surgeons and other medical specialists who need sophisticated drugs and instruments to prevent diseases, the law enforcement community needs the alarm industry. Prevention, the reason for alarm protection, must lead the war on crime. At the same time, the alarm industry must remove from its ranks the flimflam-selling of placebos and faulty systems. Users must be taught to care for their security. Police should take action against such companies and customers when they aggravate the false alarm problem. If some friendly arm-twisting fails to stop

such practices, then police should meet with responsible alarm firms, and together they should develop programs and, if necessary, ordinances to penalize negligent subscribers and deceitful companies.

Conclusion As we enter the 21st century and look back, we have seen a lot of changes occur, many changes for the better. Passive infrared units are widely used and ultrasonic motion detectors rarely used. Foil is no longer placed on glass windows, replaced by the placement of a properly placed PIR. Home and commercial applications of PIR units come in all shapes and sizes as well as all necessary patterns for proper coverage. Smoke detectors come with remote maintenance reporting to reduce false alarms (two-wire detectors only). Keypads are now hardware, two-way voice module and wireless and control panels (UL listed) are in single- and multizone panels. The growth in technology will continue as will the need for updated technology.

Appendix 13.A Smoke Detectors The following was extracted from 3/6/2002: GE Interlogix eCommunity message addresses a common question regarding smoke sensors. For information on ESL fire and safety products, visit http://www.sentrol.com/products/firesafety.asp. The question and answer provided courtesy of the Moore-Wilson Signaling Report (vol. 9, no. 5), a publication of Hughes Associates, Inc. For subscription information, e-mail [email protected]. Q. I have heard a lot of controversial comments about the use of ionization-type smoke detectors versus photoelectric-type smoke detectors. Where would one specifically choose to use ionization-type smoke detectors? A. Proper selection of a type of detector begins with an understanding of the operating principles of each type of detector. NFPA72-1999, National Fire Alarm Code, describes the operating principles of both ionization and photoelectric light-scattering

spot-type detectors in Chapter 1-4, “Definitions.” These definitions are further expanded in Appendix A to give more information to the user. In an ionization smoke detector, “a small amount of radioactive material is used to ionize the air between two differently charged electrodes to sense the presence of particles. Smoke particles entering the ionization volume decrease the conductance of the air by reducing ion mobility. The reduced conductance signal is processed and used to convey an alarm condition when it meets present criteria.” In a photoelectric light-scattering detector, “a light source and photosensitive sensor arranged so that the rays from the light source do not normally fall onto the photosensitive sensor. Then smoke particles enter the light path; some of the light is scattered reflection and refraction onto the sensor. The light signal is processed and used to convey an alarm condition when it meets preset criteria.”


The appendix further explains that photoelectric light-scattering detectors respond more to visible particles, larger than 1 micron in size, produced by most smoldering fires. They respond somewhat less to the smaller particles typically produced by flaming fires. They also respond less to fires yielding black or darker smoke, such as fires involving plastics and rubber tires. Ionization detectors tend to exhibit somewhat opposite characteristics. In a fire yielding “invisible” particles of a size less than 1 micron, an ionization detector will more likely respond than will a photoelectric light-scattering detector. Particles of this size tend to more readily result from flaming fires. Fuel in flaming fires burns “cleaner,” producing smaller particles.

235

Thus, the answer to whether you should use one type of detector over another lies in understanding the burning characteristics of the particular fuel. An ionization-type smoke detector will likely detect a fire more quickly that produces flaming combustion. A photoelectric-type detector will likely detect a low energy fire more quickly that produces larger particles during combustion. Finally, keep in mind that both types of smoke detectors successfully pass the same battery of tests at the nationally recognized testing laboratories. For example, UL-listed ionization smoke detectors and UL-listed photoelectric smoke detectors pass the same tests under UL 268, Standard for Safety for Smoke Detectors for Fire Protection Signaling Systems.

Chapter 14 CCTV Surveillance HERMAN KRUEGLE

Protection of Assets: An Overview The application and integration of closed circuit television (CCTV) to safety and security application has come of age. CCTV is a reliable, cost-effective deterrent and a means for the apprehension and prosecution of offenders. Most safety and security applications require several different types of equipment (e.g., alarm, fire, intrusion, access control) with CCTV most often being included as one of them. In today’s complex society, security personnel are responsible for the many factors required to produce an effective security and safety system. CCTV plays an important role in these systems. With today’s spiraling labor costs, CCTV more than ever before has earned its place as a cost-effective means for expanding security and safety while reducing security budgets. Loss of assets and time due to theft is a growing cancer in our society that eats away at the profits of every organization or business, be it government, retail, service, or manufacturing. The size of the organization makes no difference to the thief. The larger the company, the larger is the theft and the greater the opportunity for losses.The more valuable the product is, the easier it is to dispose of and therefore the greater the temptation to steal it. The implementation of a CCTV system, properly designed and applied, can be an extremely profitable investment to the institution. The main objective of the CCTV system should not be in the apprehension of thieves but rather in increasing deterrence through security so as to prevent thievery. A successful thief needs privacy in which to operate, and the television system prevents this. If an organization 236

or company can deter an incident from occurring in the first place, the problem has been solved. As a security by-product, CCTV has emerged as an effective training tool for management and security personnel. The use of CCTV systems has improved employee efficiency, with a resultant rise in productivity. Use of CCTV systems in public and industrial facilities has been accepted by the public at large, and resistance by workers to its presence and use is steadily decreasing. With present business economics getting worse, people begin looking for other ways to increase their income and means for paying the bills. CCTV is being applied to counteract these losses and increase corporate profits. In many case histories, CCTV is installed and shoplifting and employee thefts drop sharply. The number of thefts cannot be counted exactly, but the reduction in shrinkage can be measured, and it has been shown that CCTV is an effective psychological deterrent to crime. Theft takes the form of removing valuable property from premises, as well as removing information in the form of computer software, magnetic tape and disks, optical disks, microfilm, and data on paper. CCTV surveillance systems provide a means for successfully deterring such thievery and detecting or apprehending offenders.Another form of loss CCTV prevents is the willful destruction of property. Such crimes include vandalizing buildings, defacing elevator interiors, painting graffiti on priceless art objects and facilities, demolishing furniture or other valuable equipment, and destroying computer rooms. The greatest potential for CCTV is its integration with other sensing systems (alarms) and its use to

CCTV Surveillance

view remote areas having potential security and safety problems or fire hazards. CCTV, combined with smoke detectors where the cameras are located in inaccessible areas, can be used to give advance warning of a fire. CCTV is an important technology that must be a link in the overall security of a facility. It is important that the organization recognize that it needs to develop a complete plan instead of adopting protection measures in bits and pieces and reacting to problems as they occur. The practitioner and end user must understand all aspects of CCTV technology to make best use of the technology. This ranges from the lighting sources needed to illuminate the scene to the video monitors that display them. The capabilities and limitations of CCTV during daytime and nighttime operation must be understood. The protection of assets is a management function. Three key factors that govern the planning of an assets protection program are (1) an adequate plan designed to prevent losses from occurring, (2) adequate countermeasures to limit the losses and limit unpreventable losses, and (3) support of the protection plan by top management.

History Above all else, people value their own life and the lives of their loved ones. Next in importance, people have always valued property throughout history. Over the centuries, many techniques have been developed to protect property against invaders or aggressors threatening to take or destroy it. More recently, manufacturing, industrial, and government organizations have hired “watchmen” to protect their facilities. These private police were dressed in uniforms and provided with equipment similar to the police for preventing crime, primarily theft on the protected premises. The founding and spread of contract protection organizations typified by Pinkertons and Burns provided a new and usually less expensive guard force, and industrial employers began wide use of such guard services. World War II supplied the single most important impetus to the growth of protecting industrial premises. This protection was obtained by private corporations through contract agencies to protect classified facilities and work. As technology advanced, alarm systems and eventually CCTV were introduced in the early 1960s with companies such as the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) and others introducing vacuum-tube television cameras. Today’s security system includes CCTV as a key

237

component. There are many applications for equipment and locations for general surveillance, security, and safety purposes. The CCTV industry, which began in the 1960s, experienced a rapid growth throughout the 1970s because of the increased reliability and improvements in technology of the tube-type camera. In the 1980s, the growth continued at a more modest level, with further improvements in functions and other accessories required to complete the television security system. During the 1980s, the introduction of the solid-state CCTV camera was the most significant advance; by the early 1990s, it had replaced most of the tube cameras used over the past 30 years. The most significant driving factor causing this CCTV explosion has been the worldwide increase in theft and terrorism and the commensurate need to more adequately protect personnel and assets. The second factor contributing to the proliferation of CCTV security equipment has been the rapid increase in equipment capability at affordable prices. This is a result of the widespread use of solid-state CCTV for consumer use (made possible through technological breakthroughs) and the resulting availability of low-cost video cassette recorders (VCRs) and associated camera equipment. These two driving functions have been responsible for the accelerated development and implementation of the excellent CCTV equipment available today. In the past the camera and, in particular, the vidicon sensor tube were the critical items in the system design. The camera determined the overall performance, quantity, and quality of visual intelligence obtainable from the security system, because the camera’s image tube was the weakest link in the system and subject to degradation with age and usage. The complexity and variability of the image tube and its analog electrical nature made it less reliable than the other, solid-state components. Performance varied considerably among camera models and camera manufacturers and as a function of temperature and age. Today, the situation is considerably different, with the availability of the solid-state charged-coupled device (CCD) and metal oxide semiconductor (MOS) cameras. While the various solid-state cameras from different manufacturers have different features, the cameras are reliable and the performance from the different manufacturers is similar, with modest variations in sensitivity and resolution rather than inherent generic differences as in tube cameras. Systems are more reliable and stable because the remaining wearout mechanism, the vacuum tube, has been displaced by a solid-state device.

238


Figure 14-1. CCTV security system.

This innovation and the widespread consumer use of camcorders has resulted in the widespread use of solid-state monochrome and color cameras in security applications.

Role of CCTV in Asset Protection CCTV plays an important role in the protection of assets. In one phase, CCTV is used to detect unwanted entry into a facility, beginning at the perimeter location, and continuing by following the intruder throughout the facility (Figure 14-1). In a perimeter protection role, CCTV can be used with intrusion detection devices to alert the guard at the security console that an intrusion has occurred. If an intrusion occurs, multiple CCTV cameras located throughout the facility follow the intruder so that there is a proper response by guard personnel or designated employees. Management must determine whether specific guard reaction is required and what the response will be. It is obvious that CCTV is advantageous in that is allows the guard to be more effective, but in addition it improves security by permitting the camera scene to be documented via a VCR or printed out on a hard copy video printer. In

the relatively short history of CCTV, great innovations in the permanent recording of video images for later use have been brought about primarily by the consumer demand and availability of video camcorders and VCRs. The ability to record video provides CCTV security with a new dimension, going beyond real-time camera surveillance. The specialized time-lapse recorders and video printers as well as storage of video images on magnetic and optical hard disks now gives management the opportunity to present hard evidence for prosecution against criminals. This ability of CCTV is of prime importance to those protecting assets, since it permits permanent identification of wrongdoing. Most CCTV security is accomplished with monochrome equipment, but the solid-state camera has now made color security practical. The tube-type color cameras were unreliable, had a short life and high maintenance costs, and the color balance could not be maintained over even short periods of time. The development of color CCD cameras for the consumer VCR market accelerated the availability of these reliable, stable, long-life cameras for the security industry. Likewise, the availability of the VCR technology resulting from consumer demand made possible the excellent time-lapse VCR providing the

CCTV Surveillance

permanent documentation required for CCTV security applications. While monochrome and not color is the camera specified in major security applications, the trend is toward the use of color in security. As the sensitivity and resolution of the color camera increases and the cost decreases, color cameras will replace most monochrome types. Along with the introduction of solid-state camera has come the decrease in size of ancillary equipment (lenses, housings, pan/tilt mechanisms, and brackets), which decreases cost and provides more aesthetic installations. Likewise, for covert CCTV applications, the small cameras and lenses are easier to conceal. The potential importance of color in surveillance applications can be illustrated very clearly looking at a color television scene on a television monitor, be it surveillance or other, then turning off the color to make it a monochrome scene. It becomes quite obvious how much information is lost when the colors in the scene change to shades of gray. Objects easily identified in the color scene become difficult to identify in the monochrome scene. It is much easier to pick out a person with an article of clothing of particular color in the color scene than in the monochrome scene. Many other examples of the additional ease of identification when color is available are present in the security application. Part of the reason we can identify better with color than with monochrome is that we are used to seeing color, both visually and on our own home television systems. Therefore, when we see a monochrome scene, it takes an additional effort to recognize certain information, in addition to the actual colors being missing from the picture, thereby decreasing the intelligence available. Providing more accurate identification of personnel and objects leads to a higher degree of apprehension and conviction for crimes. The security industry has long recognized the value of color to enhance personnel and article identification in video surveillance and access control.

CCTV as Part of the Emergency and Disaster Plan Every organization regardless of size should have an emergency and disaster control plan, which should include CCTV as a critical component. Included in this plan should be a procedure for the succession of personnel in the event one or more members of top management are unavailable when the disaster strikes. In large organizations, the plan should include the designation of alternate headquarters if

239

possible, a safe document storage facility, and remote CCTV operations capability. The plan must include providing for medical aid and assuring the welfare of all employees. Using CCTV as a source of information, there should be a method to alert employees in the event of a dangerous condition and a plan to provide for quick police and emergency response. There should be an emergency shutdown plan and restoration procedures with designated employees acting as leaders. CCTV cameras should be stationed along evacuation routes and instructions given for practice tests. The evacuation plan should be thought out in advance and tested. A logical and effective disaster control plan includes at least the following aspects: 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

It defines emergencies and disasters that could occur as they relate to the particular organization. It establishes an organization and specific tasks with personnel designated to carry out the plan immediately before, during, and immediately following a disaster. It establishes a method for utilizing the resources, in particular CCTV, to analyze the disaster situation and bring to bear all resources available at the time. It recognizes a plan to change from normal operation into and back out of the disaster emergency mode as soon as possible.

CCTV plays a very important role in any emergency and disaster plan: 1. CCTV aids in protecting human life by enabling security or safety officials to see remote locations via CCTV and to view firsthand what is happening, where it is happening, what is most critical, and what areas must be attended to first. 2. CCTV aids in minimizing personal injury by permitting “remote eyes” to get to those people who require the attention first, send personnel to the area being hit hardest to remove them from the area, or bring in equipment to protect them. 3. CCTV reduces the exposure of physical assets to oncoming disaster (fire, flood, etc.) or helps prevent or at least assess and document removal (of assets) by intruders or any unauthorized personnel. 4. CCTV documents equipment and assets in place prior to the disaster, recording them on VCR, hard disk, or the like, to be compared to the remaining assets after the disaster has occurred and allowing assessment of loss to be made. It documents personnel and their activities prior to, during, and after an incident.

240


5. CCTV is useful in restoring an organization to normal operation by determining that no additional emergencies are in progress and that normal procedures and traffic flow are occurring in those restored areas. CCTV, probably more than any other part of a security system, aids management and the security force in minimizing any disaster or emergency and restoring the organization to normal conditions more effectively.

Protection of Life and Minimization of Injury Using the intelligence gathered from CCTV, security and disaster control personnel should move all personnel to places of safety and shelter. Personnel assigned to disaster control and remaining in a threatened area should be protected by use of CCTV to monitor access to these locations as well as the safety of the personnel involved. With such monitoring, advance notice is available if a means of support and assistance for those persons is required or if injured personnel must be rescued or relieved.

Reduce Exposure of Physical Assets and Optimize Loss Control Assets should be stored or secured properly in advance so that, in an emergency or disaster, they are less vulnerable to theft or loss. CCTV is an important tool, which can be used to continually monitor such areas during and after a disaster to ensure that material is not removed. If an emergency or disaster occurs, the well-documented plan dispatches specific personnel to locations of highly valued assets to secure them and evacuate personnel.

Restore Normal Operations Quickly After the emergency situation has been brought under control, CCTV and security personnel can monitor and maintain the security of assets and aid in determining that employees returned to normal work and are safe.

emergency can save an organization considerable money. Documentation provided by CCTV recordings of assets lost or stolen or personnel injuries or deaths can support the contention that the company was not negligent and that a prudent emergency and disaster plan was in effect prior to the event. While CCTV plays a very important part in the documentation of an event, it is important to supplement it with high-resolution photographs of specific instances or events. As part of the CCTV documentation, in the event fences and walls are destroyed or damaged in the disaster, it is likely that interested spectators and other outsiders will be attracted to the scene. Looting by employees as well as outsiders is a hazard and must be guarded against, with CCTV playing an important part in preventing and documenting such events.

Emergency Shutdown and Restoration In the overall disaster threat plan, consideration must be given to the shutdown of equipment such as machinery, utilities, processes, so forth, so that such equipment does not increase the hazard of the situation. Furnaces, gas generators, electrical power equipment, boilers, high-pressure air or oil systems, chemical equipment, or rapidly rotating machinery that could cause damage if left unattended should be shut down as soon as possible. CCTV can aid in determining whether this equipment has been shut down and shut down properly, whether personnel must enter the area to do so, or whether other means must be taken to take it off line.

Testing the Plan While a good emergency disaster plan is essential, it should not be tested for the first time in an actual disaster situation. Regardless of how well the planning has been, various deficiencies will be discovered while testing the plan as well as serving to train the personnel who would carry it out. CCTV can play a critical part in evaluating the plan to identify shortcomings and illustrate to the personnel carrying out the plan what they did right and wrong.Through such peer review, a practical and efficient plan can be put in place to minimize losses to the organization.

Documentation of the Emergency Standby Power and Communications For future planning purposes, insurance purposes, and critique by management and security, CCTV coverage of critical areas and operations during an

It is likely that, during any emergency or disaster, primary power and communications from one loca-

CCTV Surveillance

tion to another will be disrupted. Therefore, a standby power generation system should be provided to replace the primary power for emergency monitoring and response equipment. This standby power keeps emergency lighting, communications, and strategic CCTV equipment online as needed during the emergency. Most installations use a power-sensing device, which monitors the normal supply of power at various locations to sense when power is lost. When such an alert is received, the various backup equipment automatically switches to the emergency power source comprising a backup gas powered generator or an uninterruptable power supply (UPS), with DC batteries to extend backup operation time. A prudent security plan anticipating an emergency will include a means to power vital CCTV, audio, and other sensor equipment to ensure its operation during the event. Since CCTV and audio communications must be maintained over remote distances during such an occurrence, an alternate means of such communication from one location to another should be supplied either in the form of auxiliary hard-wired cable of a wireless (RF, microwave, infrared) system. Since it is usually impractical to provide a backup path to all CCTV camera locations, only critical cameras will have this auxiliary communication path. It is necessary to properly size the standby generator supplying power to the CCTV, safety, and emergency equipment. In the case of batteries supplying the secondary power, if equipment operates from 120 volt AC, inverters are used to convert the low voltage from the DC batteries (typically 12 or 24 volt DC) to the required 120 volt AC.

241

Safety CCTV equipment is not always installed for security reasons alone. Its use and value is often for safety purposes. Many security personnel can observe situations in which unsafe practices are being followed or in which an accident occurs and needs immediate attention. By means of CCTV cameras distributed throughout a facility, in stairwells and loading docks, around machinery, such safety violations or accidents can be observed and documented immediately by an alert guard.

The Security Officer’s Role Historically, security officers are used primarily for plant protection. Now they are used for protection of assets. Management is now more aware that guards are only one element of an organization’s complete security plan. As such, the security officers duties are compared to other security plan functions in terms of ability to protect as well as cost to management. CCTV in this respect has much to contribute in terms of increased security provided by relatively low capital investment, and low operating cost as compared to a security officer. Through the use of CCTV, security officers can increase the security coverage or protection of a facility. Alternatively, security officers count can be reduced by installing new CCTV equipment. Security officers can monitor remote sites, thereby reducing guard and security costs significantly.

Training and Education of Employees Security Investigations CCTV has been used very successfully in security investigations pertaining to company assets and theft, negligence, outside intrusion, and so on. Using covert CCTV, where the camera and lens are hidden from view by any personnel in the area, positive identification and documentation of an event of person is easily made. Many advances in the quality of the video image obtained, the reduction in size of lens and camera, and ease of installation and removal of such equipment has led to this high success. At present, many lenses and cameras can be hidden in rooms, hallways, and specific objects in the environment. Equipment is available for indoor or outdoor locations operating under bright sunlight or no-light conditions to provide such surveillance.

CCTV is a powerful training tool. CCTV is in widespread use in education because it can demonstrate so vividly and conveniently to the trainee what is to be learned and demonstrate examples of the procedure used to implement a function or desired result. Examples of all types can be demonstrated conveniently in a short time with instructions during the presentation. Real life situations (not rehearsed or performed) are available to demonstrate to the trainee what can happen when procedures are not followed and the improved results obtained when plans are properly carried out by trained and knowledgeable personnel. Every organization can supplement live training either with professional training videos or by showing actual scenes from their own video system, demonstrating good and poor practices with real situations of intrusion, unacceptable employee behavior, and proper guard reaction to such incidents. Such internal

242


Figure 14-2. Integrated security system.

videos can also be used to train the person or trainee by having that person takes part in the exercise and later having the video sequence critiqued by his or her supervisor. In this way, trainees observe their own actions to determine how they can improve and become more effective. The use of such an internal video is very important in carrying out rehearsals or tests of an emergency or disaster plan in which all members of the team observe their response and are critiqued by management or other professionals to improve such performance.

Synergy through Integration CCTV equipment is most effective when integrated with other security hardware and procedures to form a coherent security system and team that can protect and be responsible for the assets and safety of personnel in an organization. Such an integrated security system is more than a combination or accumulation of sensing security equipment. The hardware used in synergy with CCTV is electronic access control, fire and safety alarms, intrusion detection alarms, communication, and security personnel (Figure 14-2). Functionally, the integrated security system can be regarded as a design-coordinated combination of equipment, personnel, and procedures that utilizes each component in such a way as to enhance the use of every other component for the optimum achievement of the system’s stated objective.

In designing a security system, any element chosen should be analyzed to determine how it will contribute to prevent loss or how it will protect assets and personnel. As an example, if an intrusion occurs, at what point should it be detected, what should the response be? And if there has been violation of some form of barrier or fence, the intrusion detection system should be able to determine that a person has passed through the barrier and not an animal, bird, insect, leaves, debris, or the like (false alarms). CCTV proves the most positive means for making this determination. The next step is to have a means for communicating this information to the security personnel reaction force with enough information to permit a guard to initiate a response directed to the intrusion location. As another example, if materials are being removed from a location by an unauthorized person in an interior area, a CCTV surveillance system activated by a video motion detector alarm should alert the guard and transmit the video information to security personnel for appropriate action. In both cases, there would be a guard response or some other response and the event would be recorded on VCR or printed out on hard copy for efficient response, documentation, and prosecution. In these examples and many others, the combination of different sensors, intelligence communication devices, and the use of guard and documentation equipment provide a synergy that maximizes the security function.The synergistic integration of CCTV, access control, alarms,

CCTV Surveillance

intrusion detection, and security guards into a system increases the overall security of the facility and maximizes assets protection and employee safety. It is important for management to recognize that a complete CCTV system may be assembled from components manufactured by different companies, and it is important that all equipment be compatible. CCTV equipment can be specified, installed, and maintained individually by consulting firms, architects or engineers, small and large security dealers, to complete a security system. The equipment and service should be purchased through a single dealer/installer or general contractor. It is generally advantageous to purchase the CCTV equipment and services from one major supplier, who provides a turnkey system including all equipment, training, and maintenance, instead of purchasing the system from several sources. This places the responsibility of system operation on one vendor, which is easier to control. Buying from one source permits management to go back to the installer or general contractor if there are any problems. Choosing a single supplier obviously requires a judicious choice following a thorough analysis to determine that the supplier (1) provides a good system, (2) is available for maintenance when required, and (3) will still be in existence 5–10 years down the road. Presently, multiple sources handle the pan/tilt mechanisms, lenses, time-lapse recorders, housings, and so forth, required in a sophisticated CCTV system. In the 1970s and mid-1980s, there was not this duplication in component manufacturers. While this gives the user a choice in each component required, it can have the disadvantage that not all the equipment is compatible, and the system designer and installer integrating the system must be aware of the differences and capable of interfacing them to permit proper use and produce a successful security system. A security plan starting with a simple system, with the anticipation of expanding the security equipment at a future time, should be designed so that the equipment is built in modular form and can be expanded to accept new technology as it becomes available. Many of the larger security equipment manufacturing companies anticipate this integration and expansion and design their equipment accordingly. Many manufacturers now have comparable equipment, but system integrators must take the responsibility of choosing compatible equipment. In a system where equipment is supplied by several manufacturers, someone must take responsibility for system integration and maintenance. Service is a key ingredient to the successful operation of a security system. If one component fails, it

243

is necessary to have it repaired or replaced quickly so that the system is not shut down and out of service. Near-continuous operation is accomplished by the direct replacement method: (1) immediate maintenance by an in-house service organization or (2) quick-response service calls from the installer/contractor. An important consideration in any security system is to decide during the planning and initial design stages how service will be accomplished. Most vendors use the replacement technique to maintain and service equipment. If part of the equipment fails, the company replaces the defective equipment and sends it to the factory for repair. This service policy decreases the security system downtime. If a single vendor supplies the integrated system and there is a problem with the system, there is only one contractor to contend with. When a security system assembled from equipment supplied by several manufacturers has a problem, there is unproductive finger-pointing as to whose fault it is, and the customer becomes a negotiator/arbitrator. The key to a successful security plan is to choose the right or best equipment/service company, one that is customer oriented and acquainted with reliable, technologically superior products that satisfy the customer’s needs.

CCTV’s Role and Applications In its broadest sense, the purpose of CCTV in any security plan is to provide remote eyes for a security operator: to provide live action displays from a distance. The CCTV system should have means of recording (either a VCR or other storage media) to maintain permanent records of what the camera sees, to be used for future training or as evidence in prosecution. Some of the applications for which CCTV provides an effective solution include the following situations: 1. Overt visual observation of a scene or activity is required from a remote location, for security purposes. 2. The scene to be observed is in a hazardous area or presents the potential of life-threatening or injurious action to personnel. These areas may include toxic, radioactive, high fire or explosion potential, x-ray radiation, or other nuclear radiation. 3. Visual observation of a scene must be covert (hidden) or clandestine. It is much easier to hide a small camera and lens in a concealable location than station a person in the area.

244


4. There is little activity to watch, as in an intrusion detection location or some storage area, but significant events must be recorded when they occur. Integration of CCTV with alarm sensors and a time-lapse/real-time VCR provides an extremely powerful solution for this requirement. 5. Many locations must be observed simultaneously by one person from a central security location. An example of this situation is tracing the entry and path of a person or vehicle through a facility and watching as the person or vehicle progresses from the entry point to final destination in the facility and is interdicted by the security force. There are many instances when a guard or security officer must only review the activity or inactivity in a scene periodically. The use of CCTV eliminates the guard who would have to make rounds to these remote locations, which would result in inefficient use of the guard’s time and unlikely detection of the unauthorized trespasser. 6. When a crime has been committed it is important to have a hard-copy printout of the activity and event. This requires a hard-copy printout from either a television or a photographic system. The proliferation of high-quality printed images from VCR equipment has clearly made the case for using CCTV for a permanent record, be it from VCR or video hard-copy printer.

Problems Solved by CCTV The most effective way to determine that a theft has occurred, when it occurred, where it occurred, and by whom is to use CCTV for detection and recording. Using CCTV, the record of the event can be identified, stored, and later reproduced for display or hardcopy. Personnel can be identified on monochrome or color CCTV monitors. Most security installations to date use monochrome CCTV cameras, which provide sufficient information to document the activity and event or identify personnel or articles. Many newer installations use color CCTV, which permits easier identification of personnel or objects. If there is an emergency or disaster and security personnel must determine the presence or absence of personnel in a particular location, CCTV provides an instantaneous assessment of the personnel location and availability. In many examples, CCTV is used to ensure the safety of personnel in facilities and ensure that personnel have not entered them or that they have exited them at the proper time. These relate to job function, working with dangerous equipment,

working in hazardous environments, monitoring dangerous areas, and so on. The synergistic combination of audio and CCTV information from a remote site provides an effective source for security. Several camera manufacturers and installers combine video and audio (one-way or duplex) to enhance the intelligence received from the remote site using an external microphone or one installed directly in the camera. The video and audio signals are transmitted over the same coaxial shielded two-wire or fiber optic cable to the security monitoring location, where video and audio are monitored live or recorded on a VCR. When there is activity in the camera area, the video and audio signal is switched onto the monitor, and the guard hears the voice or sound communication from that camera and initiates the appropriate response.

Choice of Overt of Covert CCTV Most CCTV installations use both overt and covert CCTV cameras, with more cameras overt than covert. The overt installations are designed to deter crime and provide general surveillance of remote areas such as parking lots, perimeter fence lines, warehouses, entrance lobbies, hallways, production areas, and the like. When the CCTV cameras and lenses are exposed and in view, all management, employees, and visitors realize that the premises are under constant television surveillance for the protection of personnel and assets. When the need arises, covert installations are used so that clandestine activity can be observed and detected that would otherwise not be detectable by overt CCTV. Overt video equipment is often large and no effort is made to conceal it; it acts as a deterrent to crime. Covert equipment is usually small and designed to be concealed in various objects in the environment or behind a ceiling or wall, viewing through a small opening in a ceiling tile or wallboard. Overt CCTV is often permanently installed, whereas covert is often designed to be put into place quickly; left in place for a few hours, days, or weeks; then removed. Since minimizing installation time is desirable when installing the covert CCTV, transmission of the video signal is often accomplished using wireless means.

Security Surveillance Applications CCTV applications can be broadly classified into either indoor or outdoor. This is a logical division since it sets a natural boundary on equipment types:

CCTV Surveillance

those suitable for controlled-environment indoor applications and those suitable for harsher outdoor environments. The two primary parameters characterizing this division of indoor versus outdoor are environmental and lighting factors. The indoor location requires the use of artificial lighting, which may or may not be augmented by daylight entering the viewing area and is subjected to only mild indoor temperature and humidity variations, dirt, dust, and smoke. In the outdoor location, precipitation (fog, rain, snow), wind loading, dirt, dust, sand, and smoke must be considered.

Safety Applications In public, government, industrial, and other facilities, a safety, security, and personnel protection plan must protect personnel from harm whether caused by accident, human error, sabotage, or terrorism. The security forces are expected to have knowledge about the conditions at all locations in the facility through the use of CCTV. In a hospital room/hallway environment, the television cameras may serve a dual function; they monitor hospital patients while also determining the status and location of employees, visitors, and others in the facility. The guard can monitor entrance and exit doors, hallways, operating room, drug dispensary, and other vital areas. CCTV is used in safety applications for the evacuation of an area and to determine if all personnel have left the area and are safe. Security personnel can use CCTV for remote traffic monitoring and control and to determine high-traffic locations and how to best control them. CCTV plays a critical role in public safety in monitoring vehicular traffic on highways and city streets, truck and bus depots, public rail and subway facilities, and airports.

CCTV Access Control As security systems become more complex and important in their function of protecting assets and personnel, CCTV access control and electronic access control equipment are being combined to work synergistically with each other. For medium- to low-level access control security, electronic card reading systems are adequate after a person has first been identified at some exterior perimeter location. When it is necessary to provide higher security than a simple ID card and electronic card reading system, it becomes necessary to combine the electronic card

245

reader with either biometric descriptors of a person, or CCTV identification, or both. The video identification can be accomplished by having a guard view the person and photo ID card in real time to make a judgment and either allow or deny entry. For the highest level of access control security, the video image of the person and other pertinent information is stored in a video image file and then retrieved and used as part of the identification process. CCTV surveillance is often used with electronic or CCTV access control equipment. At present, different companies manufacture the CCTV and the electronic access control equipment and there is no single supplier for all the equipment. CCTV access control uses television to remotely identify a person requesting access, whether as a pedestrian or in a vehicle. Identification is accomplished by comparing the person’s face with a photo on an ID card carried by the person or by a picture (image) of the person stored and retrieved by a video image data bank. The live and replicated facial images are displayed side by side on a split-screen monitor. If the two images match, the security guard unlocks the door and allows entry. The CCTV access control system can be combined with an electronic access control system to increase security and provide a means of tracking all attempted entries. CCTV access control is an important aspect of security and is covered briefly with a description of equipment available and applications. A complete description of specific techniques, equipment, and applications integrating the CCTV access control function with electronic access control is covered in a companion book, CCTV Access Control.

The Bottom Line The synergy of a CCTV security system implies the following functional scenario: 1. An unauthorized intrusion or entry or attempted removal of equipment will be detected at the time of the event by some alarm sensor. 2. A CCTV camera located somewhere in the alarm area will be fixed on the location or may be pointed manually or automatically (from the guard site) to view the alarm area. 3. The information from the alarm sensor and CCTV camera is transmitted immediately to the security console and monitored by personnel or recorded for permanent documentation. 4. The security operator receiving the alarm information has a plan to dispatch personnel to

246


the location or to take some other appropriate action. 5. After dispatching a security person to the alarm area, the guard resumes normal security duties to view any future event. 6. If, after reasonable time, the person dispatched does not neutralize the intrusion or other event, the security guard resumes monitoring that situation to bring it to a successful conclusion. Use of CCTV plays a crucial role in the overall system plan. During an intrusion or theft, the CCTV system provides information (when signaled by the intrusion alarm) to the guard, who must make some identification of the perpetrator, assess the problem, and provide an appropriate response. An installation containing suitable and sufficient alarm sensors and CCTV cameras permits the guard to follow the progress of the event and assist the response team in countering the attack. The use of CCTV to track the intruder is most effective. With an intrusion alarm and visual CCTV information, all the elements are in place for a reliable transfer of information to the security offices in a timely fashion. For proper effectiveness, all parts of the security system must work properly and each relies on the other to provide total success. If an intrusion alarm fails, the command post cannot see the CCTV image at the right location and the right time. If the CCTV fails, the guard cannot identify the perpetrator despite knowing that an intrusion occurred. If a security officer is not alert or improperly interprets the alarm and CCTV input, the data from either or both is not processed and acted on, and the system fails. In the case of an emergency, such as fire, flood, machinery out of control, or autility pipeline burst, the operation of CCTV, safety sensors, and human response at the console are all required. The use of CCTV is an inexpensive investment for preventing accidents and minimizing damage when an accident occurs. In the case of a fire, CCTV acts as real-time eyes at the emergency location, permitting security and safety personnel to send the appropriate reaction force with adequate equipment to provide optimum response. Since the reaction time to a fire or other disaster is critical, having various cameras on the location before personnel arrive is very important. In the case of a fire, while a sprinkler may activate or a fire sensor produce an alarm, a CCTV camera can quickly ascertain whether the event is a false alarm, a minor alarm, or a major event. The automatic sprinkler and fire alarm system might alert the guard to the event, but the CCTV “eye” viewing

the actual scene prior to sending the emergency team often saves lives and reduces asset losses. CCTV permits more effective use of security personnel and ensures that they are not diverted to false alarms unnecessarily. In the case of a security violation, if an intrusion sensor detects an intrusion, the guard monitoring the CCTV camera can determine whether or not the intrusion requires the dispatch of personnel or some other response. In the event of a major, well-planned attack on a facility by a terrorist organization or other intruder, a diversionary tactic such as a false alarm of some type can quickly be determined through the use of CCTV, thereby preventing the inappropriate response to the false alarm. The motivation for an organization to justify expenditures on security and safety equipment is that there must be a positive return on investment; that is, the value of assets not lost must be greater than spent on security, and the security system must adequately protect personnel and visitors at the facility. By utilizing an effective security system, property and asset thefts are reduced and money is saved. Likewise public and employee safety is increased under all conditions. A well-planned security and safety system has the potential to reduce thefts, protect assets, and save lives. In the extreme case, the organization has in place a system well prepared for an emergency or disaster and the ability to recover from it in the best possible way. CCTV has been shown to play a crucial role in the success of such a plan. Here is a 21-point checklist. 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉䊉

䊉䊉䊉

䊉䊉

Where should the camera be located so that the entire scene to be viewed is covered by the television camera? In what direction should the camera be pointed so that the sun, bright lights, or other variable lighting has a minimal effect on picture quality? Should the camera have a 2/3-inch or 1-inch diameter vidicon tube? What field of view should the camera cover? Should a fixed focus (constant field of view) or zoom lens (variable field of view) be used? What focal length is best? Is sufficient lighting available? Is daytime or nighttime operation required? Should the camera be mounted with brackets, recessed in the walls or ceiling, or installed in a housing? Is a covert (hidden) camera and lens required? Should the camera voltage be 117 volts AC, 24 volts AC, or 12 volts DC?

CCTV Surveillance

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉䊉

Should it be powered via the coaxial cable (vidiplexed)? What is the distance between the camera and the monitor? What coaxial cable type should be used: RG 59 or RG 11? Should wireless microwave or other wireless transmission be considered? What size monitor screen should be used? How should the monitor be connected and terminated?

䊉䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

247

Is the monitor to be desktop or rack mounted? Should the video recorder use reel-to-reel or tape cassette or digital? What is the maximum recording time on the reel or cassette or disc? Is a time-lapse mode necessary for extending record time? Should frames of video be stored on hard disk for later, rapid retrieval?

Appendix 14.A Glossary Alarming Sequential Switcher. An automatic switcher activated by a variety of sensing devices, including magnetic door or window locks and switches, pressure-sensitive floor mats, window stripping, or motion sensors. Once activated, the switcher connects the camera in the included area onto the monitor or recorder. AM (amplitude modulation). The system of transmission based on varying the amplitude of the power output while the frequency remains the same. Automatic Gain Control (AGC). A circuit for automatically controlling amplifier gain to maintain a constant output voltage with a varying input voltage. Automatic Light Control (ALC). An electro-optical system that maintains near-constant output levels when input light levels change over wide ranges. It usually comprises an optical attenuator (iris or filter) and an electrical servo system. Aperture Stop. An optical opening or hold that defines or limits the amount of light passing through a lens system. It takes the form of the front lens diameter in a pinhole lens, an iris diaphragm, neutral density filter, or spot filter. Automatic Iris. This device optically (by filters and mechanical iris) adjusts automatically to light level changes via the video signal from the television camera. Typical compensation ranges are 390,000 to 1. They are used on Newvicon, Silicon, SIT, and ISIT cameras. Balanced Cable. Balanced cables consist of a pair of inner conductors, often twisted as in audio cable, with each insulated from the other and having identical diameters. These are surrounded by additional insulation, a coaxial-type shield, and an outer insulative/protective coating. They offer many advantages for long cable runs,

primarily in eliminating grounding or hum problems. The cables have an impedance of 124 ohms. Bandpass. A specific range of frequencies passed through a device. For example, an audio system passes 20 Hz to 20 kHz; a video system passes 30 Hz to 6 MHz. Beta Format. A 1/2-inch video cassette format found on all Sony VCR equipment. It is not compatible with VHS or other formats. Bifocal Lens. A lens systems having two different focal length lenses that image the same or two different scenes onto a single television camera. The two scenes appear as a split image on the monitor. Bridging Sequential Switcher. A sequential switcher with separate outputs for two monitors, one for programmed sequence and the second for extended display of a single area. Camera Format. Standard C mount television cameras are made with nominal 2/3-inch and 1-inch vidicon formats. The actual target area used (scanned) on the tubes are 8.8 mm horizontal ¥ 6.6 mm vertical ¥ 11 mm diagonal for the 2/3-inch, and 12.8 mm horizontal ¥ 9.6 mm vertical ¥ 16 mm diagonal for the 1-inch. Camera Tube. An electron tube that converts an optical image into an electrical current by a scanning process, also called a pickup tube or a television camera tube. Cathode Ray Tube (CRT). The video display tube used in video monitors and receivers, radar displays, and video computer terminals. Charge-Coupled Device (CCD). A solid-state silicon imaging sensor in which the television scanning function is accomplished by moving the electrical video picture signal (charge) along paths on the silicon chip. It has no electron beam scanning like the vidicon tube and is

248


therefore very small. It has lower resolution than a vidicon and lower sensitivity than a standard silicon vidicon. Charge Injection Device (CID). A solid-state silicon imaging sensor similar to the CCD sensor, manufactured by General Electric Company. Readout of the signal is different from the CCD. Charge Transfer Device (CTD). The generic name for CCD, CID, and similar devices. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV). A distribution system that limits reception of an image to those receivers or monitors directly connected to the origination point by coaxial cable or microwave link. Close-up Lens. A low-power accessory lens that permits focusing on objects closer to the lens than it has been designed for. C Mount. An industry standard for lens mounting. Has a 1-inch diameter threaded barrel with 32 threads per inch. The focused image is located 0.69 inches behind the C mount mounting surface. Coaxial Cable. See also Balanced Cable, Unbalanced Cables. A type of cable capable of passing a wide range of frequencies with very low signal loss. It usually consists of a stranded metallic shield with a single wire accurately placed along the center of the shield and isolated from the shield with an insulator. Almost all CCTV coaxial cables have a 75 ohm impedance. Composite Video. The combined video picture signal, including vertical and horizontal blanking and synchronizing signals, with a 1-volt amplitude. CPS (cycles per second). See Hertz. Depth of Field. The depth of field of a lens is the area along the line of sight in which objects are in reasonable focus. The depth of field increases with smaller lens apertures (higher f/stop numbers), shorter focal lengths, and greater distances from the lens. Diopter. A term describing the power of a lens. It is the reciprocal of the focal length in meters. For example, a lens with a focal length of 25 cm has a power of 4 diopters. Electronic Focus. An electrical adjustment available on most television cameras, monitors, and receivers for sharpening the picture image. Electronic Splitter (Combiner). An electronic module that takes the video signals from two (or more) cameras and combines them so that a part of each appears on the final monitor picture. The part of each camera picture used is usually chosen via front panel controls. Fiber Optic Bundle. This optical device is an assembly of many thousands of hairlike fibers, coherently assembled so that an image is transferred from one end of the bundle to the other. Field of View (FOV). The field of view is the width and height of scene to be monitored, determined by the lens focal length, the lens-to-subject distance, and the camera format size. FM (frequency modulation). A system of signal transmission based on varying the frequency to transmit information rather than amplitude. FM has better

signal-to-noise and noise immunity characteristics than AM. F Number (f/#). The speed of a lens is determined by the amount of light it transmits. This is the relationship between lens opening (controlled by the iris) and the focal length, expressed as a fraction referred to as the f/number; for example, an f/4.0 lens is one having an aperture 1/4 of the focal length. The markings (f/stops) on lenses are arbitrarily chosen ratios of aperture to focal length, such as f/1.10, 1.4, 2.0, 2.8, 4.0, 5.6, 8, 11, 16, 22. The smaller is the f/stop number, the faster the lens speed. The light passing through a lens varies as (1/f#)2. Therefore, an f/2 lens is four times as fast as an f/4 lens. Focal Length (FL). The distance from the lens center to the focal plane (vidicon target) is the lens focal length, expressed in inches or millimeters. Foot-Candle (FC). A unit of illuminance on a surface 1 square foot in area on which there is an incident light of 1 lumen. The illuminance of a surface placed one foot from a light source that has a luminous intensity of one candle. Frame. The total picture area scanned while the picture signal is not blanked, 1/30th of a second (525 lines) in standard NTSC CCTV systems. Front Surface Mirror. A mirror in which the reflective surface is on the front. All common glass mirrors have the reflective surface on the rear of the glass. A front surface mirror does not produce a ghost or secondary image like a rear surface mirror. Since the reflecting coating on front surface mirrors is on the front, these mirrors should be handled carefully and not touched on the front surface. Hertz (Hz). Number of oscillations per second in a signal. Named after the scientist Heinrich Hertz. Formerly designated as cycles per second (cps). Homing Sequential Switcher. A switcher in which (1) the outputs of multiple cameras can be switched sequentially onto a monitor, (2) one or more cameras can be bypassed (not displayed), or (3) any one of the cameras can be selected for continuous display on the monitor (homing). The length of time each camera output is displayed is selected independently by the operator. Horizontal Resolution. The maximum number of individual picture elements that can be distinguished in a single horizontal scanning line, also called horizontal definition. Five hundred lines is typical with 4 MHz bandwidth. Impedance. The input or output electrical characteristic of a system component (camera, etc.) that determines the type of transmission cable to be used. The cable used must have the same characteristic impedance as the component, expressed in ohms. Video distribution has standardized on 75-ohm coaxial and 124-ohm balanced cable. Interlace. The relationship between the two scanned fields in a television system. In a 2 : 1 interlaced system, the two fields are synchronized exactly. See Random Interlace for unsynchronized fields.

CCTV Surveillance

Iris Diaphragm. The iris is a device for mechanically closing the lens aperture, thus controlling the amount of light transmitted through a lens. In this way the iris adjusts the f/stop of a lens. ISIT (intensified silicon intensified target). The ISIT tube is essentially the same as a SIT, the only difference being the use of double intensifier. This means that two intensifiers are stacked in series to yield a gain of about 2000 over a standard vidicon. The typical sensitivity of an ISIT tube is about one millionth of a foot-candle of faceplate illumination. Lens. A transparent optical component consisting of one or more pieces of glass with surfaces so curved (usually spherical) that they converge or diverge the transmitted rays of an object, thus forming an image of that object onto a focal plane or target. Lens Speed. See F/Number. Line Amplifier. A video amplifier used to amplify the camera video signal and compensate for the loss of signal level caused by the cable attenuation. It is put in series with the camera and monitor, at the camera or along the cable run. Magnification. Magnification is usually expressed with a 1-inch focal length lens as a reference. For example, a lens with a 2-inch (50 mm) focal length is said to have a magnification of 2. Manual Switcher. An electronic module that has multiple front panel switches to permit connection of one of a number of camera outputs into a single CCTV monitor or videotape recorder. The simplest is a passive switcher that contains no active (transistor or integrated circuit elements). The active switcher contains transistors or IC parts. Monitor. A video display that shows the images detected and transmitted by a television camera or the face of a CRT. Newvicon Tube (trade name of Matsushita). The Newvicon tube has a cadmium and zinc telluride target and provides sensitivity about 20 times that of a sulfide target. Spectral response is somewhat narrower than a silicon diode tube, 470–850 nm. The Newvicon operates much like the silicon tube, in that in uses a fixed target voltage and must use an auto iris lens system. NTSC (National Television Systems Committee) Standard Format. Standards for the present-day United States color television system by the committee working with the FCC, commonly used in the United States and Japan. It uses 525 horizontal scan lines, 30 frames per second. Optical Splitter. An optical lens, prism, or mirror system that combines two or more scenes and images them onto one television or film camera. No electronics are used to combine the scenes. PAL (phase alternating line) Format. The format used in Western Europe, Australia, parts of Africa, and the Middle East. It uses 625 horizontal scan lines, 25 frames per second. Pan-Tilt Mechanism. An electromechanical platform that has provisions to change the pointing direction of a

249

camera and housing along a horizontal and vertical plane, from a remotely located controller. Pinhole Camera. An integral television or film camera having a small front lens to permit easy concealment. The lens and camera are a single unit. Pinhole Lens. A special lens designed to have a small (0.1 inch to 0.25 inch) front lens diameter to permit its use in covert (hidden) camera applications. Plumbicon. Trade name of N.V. Philips special tube, more sensitive than a Vidicon. It is used in some color video cameras and television x-ray inspection systems. It has very low picture lag particularly at low light levels. Random Interlace. The two scanned fields are not synchronized. See Interlace. Raster. The geometrical pattern scanned on the camera or monitor tube by the electron beam. In standard CCTV, the first field is scanned from the top left corner of the tube to the lower right corner. The second field starts in the top left corner in between the first two lines of the first field. Resolution. See Horizontal Resolution, Vertical Resolution. SECAM (sequential color and memory). With 625 horizontal scan lines and 25 frames per second, it is similar to PAL but differs greatly in method of producing color signals. SECAM is used in Saudi Arabia, the former Soviet Union, and France. Signal-to-Noise Ratio. The ratio between the useful television picture signal and the scene, equipment, and interfering noise (snow). Mathematically equal to signal voltage/total noise voltage. Silicon Tube. The silicon target is made up of a mosaic of light-sensitive silicon material and, depending on light source, is between 10 and 50 times as sensitive as a sulfide vidicon. Other advantages include a very broad spectral response (380–1100 nm) and high resistance to vidicon burn. The silicon tube does not permit automatic sensitivity control by means of signal electrode voltage regulation; therefore, an automatic iris must be used. Slow-Scan Television. An electronic video system that transmits single frames of television scenes from a standard CCTV camera via ordinary telephone or twisted pair lines. Each picture is stored in the form of picture elements: an array of 64 ¥ 64 elements to 256 ¥ 256 elements (or more). Every 8, 16, or 32 seconds, all the picture elements are transmitted and received, put into memory, and displayed on a standard monitor. Since the signal bandwidth is from 300 to 3000 Hz, the television pictures can be stored on an ordinary audio recorder. The picture is not in real time. Switcher. See Manual Switcher, Homing Sequential Switcher, Alarming Sequential Switcher. Target. The light-sensitive material in the television camera pickup tube or silicon chip sensor. The standard vidicon tube target material is antimony trisulfide (Sb2S3). UHF (ultra high frequency). In television transmission, a term used to designate channels 14 through 83 (470– 890 MHz). Unbalanced Cable. The term unbalanced refers to the single-conductor shielded coaxial cable commonly used

250


in television installations (RG-11/U and RG-59/U are of this type). It is manufactured in several impedances; however, for purposes of unbalanced video transmission, only the 75-ohm impedance is used. The shielding may be standard braid or double braid or solid aluminum. The dielectric used may be foam, solid plastic, or even air. Vehicle Control Facility (VCF). A television system containing cameras, lighting system for daytime and nighttime operation, and two-way audio communication. The system should move vertically to permit identification of the person and ID document for drivers of cars, vans, and trucks. Vertical Resolution. The number of horizontal lines that can be seen in the reproduced image of a television pattern, 350 lines maximum with the 525 NTSC system. VHF (very high frequency). In television transmission, a term used to designate channels 2 through 13 (54– 216 MHz). VHS (Victor home system). A 1/2-inch tape videocassette format in widespread use. Not compatible with Sony and U-Matic. Videocassette Recorder (VCR). A magnetic recorder that records live television pictures in black and white or

color, with sound, onto a small cassette containing magnetic tape. Available systems can record continuously from 1/2 hour to 6 hours on one cassette. Time-lapse recorders record up to 200 hours on one cassette. Standard formats are VHS, Beta, U-Matic—all incompatible. Video Hard Disk File. A magnetic hard disk recording system that records many (thousands) of individual CCTV pictures which can be retrieved rapidly (0.2 seconds) and displayed on a monitor. Videotape Recorder (VTR). A device that accepts signals from a video camera and a microphone and records images and sound on video magnetic tape in the form of a reel. It can then play back the recorded program for viewing on a television monitor or receiver. Vignetting. Vignetting refers to the loss of light through a lens system occurring at the edges due to lens design or obstruction. Lenses are usually designed to eliminate vignetting internal to the lens. Zoom Lens. A zoom lens is a variable focal length compound lens. The lens components in these assemblies are moved to change their relative physical positions, thereby varying the focal length and angle of view through a specified range of magnifications.

Appendix 14.B Designing Effective CCTV Systems MICHAEL SROBERGER, CPO, CSS, CPOI, CLSD, CPP

Why is the camera facing there? A common question, for those whose experience with the field of protective services is limited. Despite this, it brings to mind a litany of questions, related to the design and installation of a closed-circuit television system. In designing new systems or revising existing systems, there are certain essential considerations and methods of developing the best possible system, given a specific set of operational and financial limitations. When developing the placement plan, one must first identify possible coverage locations. Some good starting locations include

䊉

䊉

Access points. Any location where the shell of the building or the perimeter of the property is designed to allow entry and egress. Possible locations include primary doors, fire exists, traffic gates, traffic drives, and similar areas. Interface points.Any location that serves as a transition from a general access area to a limited access area. A good example is the door leading from a meeting room into a service hall. It is reasonable to expect guests to be present in the meeting room, but entrance into the service hall is not expected.

CCTV Surveillance

䊉

䊉

䊉

Cash handling locations. Positions such as registers, accounting vaults, count rooms, and similar areas. Critical function areas. Could include such traditionally high-risk areas as loading docks, parking structures, high-value storage rooms, freezers, and other areas, determined by the specific function of the business or structure. High-traffic areas. This could be employee areas in service corridors or guest/invitee traffic areas.

Once a listing of possible coverage locations is completed, the next step is to determine the order of importance with regard to each coverage location. That is, rank each location by how important it is relative to all other possible locations. I often find it most useful to place the locations into three categories: 䊉

䊉

䊉

Primary locations. Those that, for function or liability purposes, should be continuously monitored. Secondary locations. Those locations that provide, if the site survey is correct, consistently useful information, in the overall operation of the system. Tertiary locations. Those that might provide valuable information, although not with any anticipated frequency.

In considering the classification of a given location, take into account the average use and high-risk use situations. For instance, I redesigned the existing camera system at a facility that often hosted very high-profile meetings and events. In one service hall, a series of access doors did not have effective camera coverage, even though it was the point of entry for VIP speakers and attendees during some of those events. A simple shifting of an existing camera involving a change in viewing angle and physical relocation of 20 feet allowed effective placement for viewing of all six access points and an adjacent service area. The original placement allowed observation of only the service area at the closer end of the hall. This was a daily use area and had high employee traffic but was not believed to be a hightheft or high-incident area. The access doors, while utilized infrequently, represented high-risk points. In the end, executive protection units assigned to the high-profile attendees often posted one of their agents in the monitor room due to the prime fields of view that the camera system commanded. With the locations broken down into these or similar groups, the task then shifts. At this point, one must determine the type of camera to be used. For most exterior positions, the newer pan-tilt-zoom

251

(PTZ) units provide an amazing amount of flexibility.Vast areas can be monitored with a single unit and most can be programmed to perform “patrols” of the given area, to document activity, even when not being directly controlled. These units can also find use in indoor areas, where large amount of space must be observable and structural supports are not present to degrade the field of view. When considering each actual camera location, it is essential that the level of recognition required is identified and factored into the placement and lens selection. For instance, if the intention is to be able to identify a possible trespasser, the viewing image must be close and tight enough to allow for facial recognition. If the purpose is to document vehicular traffic flow into and out of a garage, a wider field of view is acceptance. This permits the overall recognition of movement and flow but not the identification of an individual in the field of view. Again, this is one area where a PTZ camera can prove very useful, as it allows for a quick transition from a wide field of view, with the recognition of large-scale movement to a narrow field of view where facial recognition is possible. Another point of consideration is the lighting levels in the locations selected. Color cameras tend to have lower tolerance for dimly lighted scenes. Consideration should be given to black and white units in such locations as a result of this. Some newer cameras can switch between color, which greatly improves facial recognition in viewed images, and black and white once a certain cut-off level of light is reached. A word on the topic of economics: It is often possible, especially through the use of PTZ cameras, to monitor more than one coverage location with a single camera. This can save the cost of an extra camera, the wiring and labor to connect an extra camera to the system, and the additional monitor/ multiplexer slot. I do not recommend doing this when a primary location is involved, as the process of covering multiple locations with a PTZ camera requires that certain areas not be in view at any given time. Primary locations should be covered by fixed cameras or PTZs that do not have preset tours of patrol (this option allows for the ability to track suspicious persons or activity, once it has been initially observed) if the location is particularly high threat or high value. Once the camera locations and types have been determined, the next task is to determine the amount and type of equipment required at the head of each system. This could include monitors, multiplexers, control panels, and recorders. These components

252


take up space and must be positioned where they are available to the operator, comfortable to use, and do not consume all the available space. Another important consideration is the ergonomics of the placement. Care must be taken to place the monitors in a position that does not heighten eye, neck, or back strain. This also must be a consideration in the placement of the controller units and their relative distance from and angle to the monitors. Several companies offer racking units and command center modules designed to aid in the proper placement and housing of such equipment. Give consideration to digital storage systems. In some instances, the digital system can act as both the multiplexer and the recording unit. Determine the amount of storage time the system requires prior to pricing such systems. Cameras in primary locations could be set to record only when activity is observed,

saving recording time, which equates to disk space in a digital system. Unfortunately, cameras on preset patrols, often designed to simply monitor and record activity levels in areas of continuous traffic, have to record continuously. This rapidly consumes disk space on a digital system. Involved in this decision is the consideration of how long to retain the recordings. Keep in mind, digital systems provide much higher clarity and ease of locating a specific event within retained recordings. Have a detailed listing of what you want, where you want it, and how you want it prior to obtaining the assistance of potential bidders on the project. Through some research and a little reliance on colleagues, the initial plan can be mapped out well in advance. Once the bidders come on board, they can have a solid understanding of your needs and expectations.

Chapter 15 Guard Service in the Twenty-First Century JOSEPH G. WYLLIE

Ever since September 11, 2001, security has had a whole different meaning. Security officers must be more proactive and responsible for the scope of work to which they are assigned.

Liabilities Connected with Guard Force Various legal aspects of industrial security and plant protection must be fully understood by the security guard. A guard force is not engaged in law enforcement as such; therefore, the guard is not a law enforcement officer, like a police officer or sheriff. Guards are engaged in the protection of goods and services. The plant management makes the rules regarding the conduct of persons engaged in production. The final objective is a smooth flow of production—not law enforcement. Rules and regulations do not have the same force as law. An employee cannot be deprived of freedom to help production because of breaking a rule or regulation. The most that can be done is to dismiss the employee. Violation of law by someone working the plant brings the same repercussions as breaking the law elsewhere: The case is under the jurisdiction of law enforcement agencies, local, state, or federal. The work performed by a security guard is not related to police work. Execution of the job and training are different. The security guard must leave law enforcement to the responsible agency. In special situations, a security guard may make arrests. A security guard, peace officer, or any other person may arrest an offender without a warrant if the offense is a felony or an offense against public peace. A felony is ordinarily an offense punishable

by confinement in a penitentiary for a period of more than 1 year. Arrests such as these should be made only with the consent of a superior, except in an emergency situation, and only on company property. False arrests and searches can result in civil and criminal suits. A security guard has no authority in a civil case, and if required to testify in any civil case, the security guard should report the facts to the supervisor of the force and in turn demand a subpoena to testify. Before making the arrest, the security guard should know that the law has actually been violated, that the violation is a crime, and that information proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the person committed the crime. No arrest is legal until after the actual violation of the law. No person may be arrested on a charge of suspicion. The arrest is made by actual restraint of the person or by the guard saying, “You are under arrest.” Actual touching of the person is unnecessary, it is enough if the person submits to your custody. The guard has no authority beyond the company property line other than that of a private citizen. No person is to be transported as a prisoner off company property by a security guard. The guard must notify the local law enforcement agency and turn the prisoner over to that agency on the company property. Crimes that may occur on company premises include murder, arson, assault, burglary, larceny, intoxication, and violation of sabotage and espionage laws. When a crime is committed on company property, the guard on duty must take prompt measures to afford protection of the crime scene. In the event of a serious crime, the security guard does not investigate the area. The guard should refrain from touching any evidence at the crime scene and prevent unauthorized persons from 253

254


handling such evidence. The nature of the crime and the type of evidence in the area require that the security guard be extremely careful in moving about so as not to obliterate or otherwise destroy crime evidence. The security guards rope off or isolate the area and avenue of entry or escape believed to have been used. No one should be allowed to enter or leave the area pending the arrival of representatives of the law enforcement agency having primary investigative jurisdiction. The guard should then obtain the names and addresses of any possible witnesses to be furnished to the law enforcement agency.

years, a number of states have mandated requirements for security officers and most states have mandated requirements for weapons training.

Report Writing Very few people like paperwork, yet it seems that paperwork is required in all occupations. For the security officer, the paperwork is in the form of reports. There are four basis reasons for completing so many reports.

The accentuation of professionalism in the ranks of law enforcement in the United States has filtered down to the ranks of the contract security guard. Although some of the duties of the security guard are similar to the duties of the police officer, their overall powers are entirely different. Recent court decisions have found the security guard is not encumbered by these so-called Miranda warnings of rights. The security guard is not a law enforcement officer. Some recent State of Missouri Supreme Court decisions have made the arrest powers of a security guard easier to understand in the current wave of lawlessness. As you can see from the following information, the security guard in today’s society must of necessity receive a basic training in the rules and regulations governing the guard’s power and authority.

1. To inform. Written communications reduce the chance of misunderstanding or errors. Verbal communication, however, is highly prone to misunderstanding and errors in reproduction and can be easily ignored. 2. To record. Never trust memory. No memory is perfect. Exact amounts, costs, dates, times, and similar data are easily forgotten unless recorded. 3. To demonstrate alertness. By recording incidents, the security officer makes both supervisor and client aware of the job being done. It is very easy for people to get the impression that security officers do little but stand around. One way of avoiding this type of image is to conscientiously document all incidents. 4. To protect yourself. There may come a time when it becomes necessary for a security officer to prove to have witnessed an event, accomplished a certain action, or notified the proper authorities of an incident. Reports accomplish all four of these goals.

Training

The report should be clear and concise. A good report answers five basic questions.

Power and Authority of the Security Guard

In view of the demands of industry for fully trained security guards, a new phase of the guard industry has come into being. To provide the training required for the basic guard who could be working at a oneguard site up to the basic guard at a nuclear power plant, a new look has been given to guard training. Training today must be organized to provide the initial or basic training as well as the follow-up programs necessary to maintain quality standards for the personnel. Most professional security agencies offer at least a basic security officer’s program. These programs can run as long as 24 hours and cover subjects ranging from laws of arrest to weapons safety. The present system attempts to package the training in a practical delivery system and keep quality high in terms of testing. Many of the basic training courses are tailored to individual client’s needs. In recent

1. What? The report must state what happened as accurately as possible. 2. Where? The exact location of an occurrence can have great bearing in establishing guilt, innocence, or liability. 3. Who? When writing a report, the officer should answer as many who questions as possible; for example, who did it and who was notified? 4. When? The time of an incident may establish an alibi or help to prevent damage, theft, or injury. 5. Why? The why involves judgment and opinion and may not be easily proven, but it may be very important in judgment of guilt or liability. In addition to answering these questions, there are simple guidelines to follow when preparing a report to ensure that the final result is clearly written and well organized:

Guard Service in the Twenty-First Century

1. Use simple language that anyone can understand. When using technical words and phrases, be sure the meaning is clear. Avoid using slang terms or words that have multiple meanings. 2. Be sure that you use the proper spelling and addresses of the individuals involved in the report. 3. Prepare the report in such a manner that the happenings are in logical sequence and, when possible, show the approximate time of the occurrence. 4. Do not ramble. It is preferable to use short paragraphs, with each covering one particular point. 5. Do not use vague descriptions. Write only specific observations. 6. When descriptions of individuals are obtained, list all the usual manners of description such as height, weight, and color of hair, but also include unusual details such as presence of a mustache, sideburns, eyeglasses, and any peculiarity of walk or speech. Notice and report all information possible on types and color of dress. 7. Avoid contradictory statements that would tend to discredit the overall information. 8. Facts, not opinion, are important. If you include your opinion, label it as your opinion, not as a fact. Any problem, from a missing light bulb to a major safety hazard, should be reported. The security officer should continue to provide written reports on any incident until appropriate action is taken to correct the situations. In this way, you can demonstrate your importance to the client.

255

Wearing a Firearm When the officer is on duty, his or her weapon must be readily available for immediate use. It should be worn in a manner that permits swift access while offering maximum safety.To satisfy this requirement, the weapon should be worn at the belt line and on the same side as the strong shooting hand. The weapon should always be carried in its holster. Any other method, such as tucked in the belt, is hazardous and has contributed to self-inflicted gunshot wounds. The holster strap or flap should be kept securely snapped over the gun. This prevents the weapon from accidentally falling or being jarred out of the holster. It also prevents someone from grabbing the revolver. When the shifts change and the revolver must be transferred from one officer to the relief, the weapon should be empty. Never transfer a loaded weapon. More accidents occur at this time than at any other time of duty. When transferring a weapon, unload the gun and hand it to the person receiving it with the breach open. The cartridges should be transferred separately. An additional benefit is derived from this procedure: the relief officer must check and load the weapon prior to assuming the duties of the post.

Storing a Weapon Common sense demands that all firearms be kept out of the reach of children and irresponsible adults. Unloaded weapons should be locked up at all times and cartridges should be secured separate from the weapon. Never store a loaded weapon.

Weapons Safety No part of the training of a security officer is more critical than firearms training. Your life, as well as the lives of others, depends on your skill with a revolver and knowledge of its proper and safe use. Safety is the basic reason for the existence of security personnel. They are employed to assure the safety of persons and property and should always reflect this concept. Weapons safety, unlike any other aspect of a security officer’s job, places a great demand on skill, knowledge, and the judgment necessary to best use both. Judgment can be exercised only when the factual basis for making such judgment is present. In this case, the principles of firearms safety must be well understood by security officers before any judgment can be made. The first principle of weapons safety is control. The officer must control the firearm when wearing, storing, and firing it.

Firing a Weapon The security officer must keep the weapon under control while firing it. This statement may seem obvious, but it is often misunderstood. Control, in this case, refers to the mental discipline required to know when not to fire as well as the physical control necessary to hit the target. Consider these situations: 䊉

䊉

䊉

An armed intruder is firing at you. There is a crowd of bystanders behind the intruder. Do you return fire? A saboteur is on a four-story rooftop in a crowded facility, well silhouetted against the sky. Do you shoot? An arsonist is standing in front of a light frame building. You do not know if anyone is inside. Do you shoot?

256


The answer to all three questions is no. In the first situation, returning fire would most assuredly endanger the bystanders. In the second case, the path of a bullet, after passing the target, could injure or kill a person several blocks away. In the third instance, the bullet could penetrate the frame building and kill an occupant, even after passing through the target. Never underestimate the penetrating power of a gun. Control in firing also means having the mental discipline to never draw a weapon unless there is the intention to kill the target to protect life itself.

The Guard and the Weapon No publication can describe all the cases in which a guard should and should not use a firearm. It is possible, however, to present some general guidelines and specific examples. The guard who considers these carefully and discusses them with the supervisor and fellow guards should be able to develop good judgment in the use of a firearm. The first thing an armed security officer should keep in mind is that an error in the use of a firearm will probably have a long-lasting, perhaps permanent, effect. It is necessary therefore to give long and careful consideration to the answers to the questions: “Why do I have a firearm?” “When should I use it?” “When should I not use it?” While a private security officer, like a police officer, is armed, do not confuse the guard’s rights and responsibilities concerning firearms with those of a public counterpart. Specific and definite laws govern the police officer and the use of a firearm. Laws just as specific and just as definite are there regarding a private officer’s use of a weapon. A firearm is a symbol of a guard’s authority and duty to carry out specific tasks as ordered by the employer. The police officer’s duties and responsibilities are obviously much broader. The police officer can arrest suspects, a security guard cannot. A police officer can use a gun to stop a speeding automobile, a guard cannot. A police officer can use a weapon to protect property and, again, a guard cannot. To simplify matters a bit, the security officer may use a firearm to protect a life and only to protect a life. That life may be the guard’s own or that of a bystander. In any case, the guard can use the gun to protect a life.When not to use a firearm? Fortunately, there are many more of these instances. Do not use a weapon. 䊉䊉䊉

To prevent a theft To stop a fleeing suspect To stop a speeding automobile

䊉䊉

䊉䊉

To stop someone from bothering or harassing On someone who would like to harm you but cannot, for example, a knife wielder or club wielder restrained by a fence, gate, or other people To fire warning shots at a fleeing criminal To attempt to frighten people

Safety Accident prevention is said to be everybody’s job, but as everybody’s job, no one does too much about it. It does, however, fall well within the domain of security personnel. The security officer is responsible for observing all unsafe conditions and warning people of potential hazards. Also, the guard is responsible for reporting violations of safety rules and setting a good example by his or her own behavior. Far too many accidents happen due to unsafe conditions that were not noted, reported, or corrected. After finding an unsafe condition, the officer must either correct the condition or report it to someone who can make the correction. If a storm blows down a power line, the security officer should report it. If, on the other hand, a guard who finds a bag of oily rags in a corner would simply place them in a metal-covered container and report it later. Safety is purely a matter of common sense. Corrective action should be taken when possible or the proper authority called to handle the situation. It is important that the security officer undertake the sometimes thankless task of safety. It is important both to the client and the people being protected from injuries due to careless safety practices.

Safety Checklist 1. Are the floors kept clean and free of dirt and debris? 2. Are rough, splintered, uneven, or otherwise defective floors repaired or the hazards suitably marked? 3. Are nonskid waxes used to polish floors? 4. During bad weather, are storm mats placed near entrances and floors mopped frequently? 5. Are stairways equipped with handrails? 6. Are steps equipped with handrails? 7. Are stairways well lighted? 8. Are electric fan or heater extension cords tripping hazards? 9. Are cords of electric fans or heaters disconnected from the power source when not in use and at the end of each working day?


10. Are electric fans or heaters adequately grounded? 11. Are cigarette or cigar stubs placed in suitable ashtrays or containers? 12. Are grounds free of debris and the like? 13. Are sufficient containers provided for trash, ashes, and so forth? 14. Are floors free of oil spills, grease, or other substances that create a slipping hazard? 15. Are windows clean? 16. Is broken glass in evidence? 17. Are the aisles clearly defined and free of obstruction? 18. Is material neatly stacked and readily reached? 19. Does piled material project into aisles or passageways? 20. Are tools left on overhead ledges or platforms? 21. Is the lighting adequate? 22. Are materials stored under or piled against buildings, doors, exits, or stairways? 23. Are walks kept clear of obstruction, slipping and tripping hazards, broken glass, and snow and ice?

Bomb Threats Bomb threats are a serious concern to all security personnel. Fortunately, most bomb threats turn out to be false alarms, but the next encounter with such a threat may turn out to be real, so none should be taken lightly.All bomb threats should be treated with quick, calm, steady professional action. Normally, local police authorities are notified by client management when a bomb threat occurs. On receiving a bomb threat, a security officer’s first duty is to notify the client immediately and take the action ordered. If ordered to call the police, do so, then evacuate anyone in or near the facility. The handling of bombs and bomb disposal are police duties. The security force’s job is to assist the police in finding the bomb and evacuation proceedings. The security officer should not attempt to examine a bomb, regardless of any previous experience in the world of explosives. Many bombs are extremely complicated and designed to explode when any attempt is made at deactivation. Only trained demolition experts are qualified to safely handle a bomb.

257

most facilities have areas that are generally more vulnerable than others and should be checked first. The following points should be kept in mind when searching for a bomb: 1. Do not touch anything that need not be disturbed. If lights are off, do not turn them on. If fuse panels are turned off, do not activate them. These may be wired to detonate explosives. 2. Most bombs actually found were of the timemechanism variety. The timing devices are usually cheap alarm clocks, which can be heard ticking at surprising distances. Be on the alert for ticking sounds. 3. Bombs found in searches were usually found near an exit. Look closely in areas near doorways. 4. Be alert for objects that look out of place or are of unusual size or shape. 5. Thoroughly check any areas accessible to the public. Restrooms and janitor’s closets are frequently used as hiding places. 6. A bomb search should be conducted for a period of 20–30 minutes. This should provide ample time for a reasonable search, without creating unnecessary danger to the searchers. 7. A methodical search technique is necessary to ensure that no areas are overlooked. An orderly investigation of all rooms within the facility is mandatory. It is wise to prepare in advance a checklist of places to be searched so that a thorough search can be conducted. 8. As you search, be alert to Freshly plastered or painted places Disturbed dirt in potted plants Pictures or other hanging objects not straight Ceiling tiles that have been disturbed Torn furniture coverings Broken cabinets or objects recently moved Trash cans, air conditioning ducts, water fountains Elevator shafts, phone booths

Precautions A security officer can assist police by observing the following precautions. Do not 䊉䊉

Bomb Search

䊉

The locations where a bomb may be hidden are innumerable, and only the most obvious places can be searched in a reasonable amount of time. However,

䊉

Touch a bomb. Smoke in the immediate vicinity of a suspected bomb. Expose the bomb to sun. Direct rays of the sun or light of any kind may cause detonation. Accept identification markup as legitimate. Do not take for granted the identification markings on packages and boxes, as they may be forged.

258

䊉

䊉

䊉


Keep in mind that bombs are usually camouflaged to throw the recipient off guard. Do not take for granted that the package is bona fide because it was sent through the mail. Many bombs are forwarded in this manner. Others are sent through express agencies, while some are delivered by individual messengers. Take for granted that it is a high-explosive bomb. Be prepared in the event that it is of the incendiary type. Have sand and an extinguisher on hand. Use two-way radios, as transmitting could detonate a bomb. Have unnecessary personnel in the immediate area of the suspected bomb or explosive.

Do 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Evacuate the building or area around the suspected bomb, only if the client orders it. In large cities, this function is usually performed by the fire department. Only vital and necessary personnel should be allowed within 100 yards of the package. Remove all valuable equipment, important files, computer tapes, and the like, at least 100 yards away from the package. Open all windows and doors in the immediate vicinity of the suspected devices. This allows the blast to escape, reducing pressure on the walls and interiors. It also reduces window breakage and the hazards caused by flying glass and debris. Shut off all power services to the area immediately. This reduces the possibility of gas explosion or electrical fires.

Types of Explosives Blasting caps and detonators. These are metallic cylinders approximately 2 inches long, 3/16 inch in diameter (may be larger or smaller) and closed at one end. They are partially filled with a small amount of relatively easily fired or detonated compound. When fired, the resultant shock or blow is sufficient to detonate explosives. They are very dangerous to handle, as they can be detonated by heat, friction, or a relatively slight blow. Nitroglycerin. This is a colorless to yellow liquid with a heavy, oily consistency. It is highly dangerous: extremely sensitive to heat, flame, shock, or friction. Dynamite. Dynamite is a high explosive, usually cylindrical in shape, 11/4 inches in diameter and approximately 8 inches long (may be up to 12 inches diameter and 30 inches long). The outer wrapper is often covered in paraffin and usually

marked “DANGEROUS—HIGH EXPLOSIVE.” It is shock sensitive and needs a blasting cap for detonation.

Fire Protection Of the many jobs a security officer performs, one of the most important is that of fire protection. To do the job effectively, the guard must be familiar with fire fighting equipment and know how and when to use it. Fire is comprised of three elements: heat, fuel, and oxygen. Remove any of these three and the fire goes out. If a fire should break out, the following directions most effectively safeguard persons and property against harm and damage: 1. Call the fire department first. 2. Direct all employees out of the burning building and keep them out after evacuation. 3. Notify and enlist the help of the company fire brigade if one exists. 4. Check and close fire doors. 5. Shut off machinery, power, and gas. 6. Check to see if gate valves are in working condition, if a sprinkler system exists. 7. Now and only now, attempt to control the fire by means of an extinguisher. 8. Post someone to direct the firefighters to the fire. 9. Remove motor vehicles from the area. 10. Once the fire is contained, keep a close watch on the area to see that the fire does not start again. 11. Be sure all extinguishers used are immediately recharged. 12. Complete a written report covering all of the information about the fire.

Fire Prevention The best way to fight a fire is to prevent a fire from starting. The following is a list of things to be alert for while on patrol to eliminate sources of fire and obstructions that might lead to fire spreading: 1. Look for violations of no-smoking regulations. 2. Investigate any unusual odors, especially smoke and gas. Do not be satisfied until the cause is found and action taken. 3. Check for obstructed passageways and fire doors. 4. Look for obstructions in front of fire-alarm boxes, extinguishers, and fire hydrants. 5. On every patrol, check all gas or electric heaters and coal and kerosene stoves to see that they do not overheat.


6. Check that boxes, rubbish, or hazardous materials are not left close to stoves, boilers, or steam or smoke pipes. 7. Check that all gas or electric appliances not in use are disconnected. 8. Check that all discarded and disposable materials have been placed in their proper containers.

4.

5.

6.

Emergency Medical Assistance A security officer might be present when someone needs medical assistance. The first reaction should be to summon help. If this is not possible, the officer should be prepared to assist the victim. Guards should be trained in emergency medical assistance (EMA) procedures in the event a severe accident occurs. Someone’s life may depend on your knowledge of EMA.

7. 8.

9.

259

blankets or coats, but do not overheat or apply external heat. Work with medical help. The doctor should be told the nature of the emergency and asked what should be done. Examine the patient gently. Cut clothing, if necessary, to avoid movement or added pain. Do not pull clothing away from burns. Reassure the patient, and try to remain calm. Calmness convinces the patient that everything is under control. Always be prepared to treat shock. Do not force fluids on an unconscious or semiconscious person. Fluids may enter the windpipe and cause asphyxiation. Do not try to arouse an unconscious person by slapping, shaking, or shouting. Do not give alcohol to any victim. Following any incident where EMA would be rendered, a detailed written report should be made covering all of the circumstances. Be sure to include the treatment given.

At the Scene People at the scene of an accident are excited. A security officer must remain calm, dealing with the most serious injury or condition first. The most urgent medical emergencies that require prompt action to save a life are severe bleeding, stoppage of breathing, and poisoning. Shock may accompany any of these, depending on the body functions and keeping the heart, lungs, and other organs from functioning normally.

What to Do after Calling for Help and Assistance If First on the Scene 1. Do not move an injured person, unless it is absolutely necessary to save the victim from danger. If victims have been injured internally or the spine is broken, unnecessary movement may kill or cripple the victim. 2. Act fast if the victim is bleeding severely, swallowed poison, or stopped breathing because of drowning, gas poisoning, or electric shock. Every second counts. A person may, for example, die within 3 minutes of the time breathing stops, unless given artificial respiration. 3. Because life-and-death emergencies are rare, in most cases a guard can start EMA with these steps: Keep the patient lying down quietly. If she or he has vomited and there is no danger that the neck is broken, turn the head to one side to prevent choking. Keep the victim warm with

Controlling Bleeding The adult human body contains approximately 6 quarts of blood. Although an adult can readily withstand the loss of a pint, the amount usually taken for transfusion purposes, that same loss by a child may have disastrous results. In an adult, lack of consciousness may occur from the rapid loss of as little as a quart of blood. Because a victim can bleed to death in a very short period of time, immediate stoppage of any large, rapid loss of blood is necessary. The preferred method for control of severe bleeding is direct pressure by pressing a hand over a dressing. This method prevents loss of blood from the body without interfering with normal circulation. Apply direct pressure by placing the palm of the hand on a dressing directly over the entire area of an open wound on any surface part of the body. In the absence of compresses, the fingers or bare hand may be used, but only until a compress can be obtained and applied. Do not disturb blood clots after they have formed within the cloth. If blood soaks through the entire compress without clotting, do not remove, but add additional layers of padding and continue direct hand pressure, even more firmly. On most parts of the body, a pressure bandage can be placed to hold pads of cloth over a wound. Properly applied, the bandage frees the hands for other EMA. To apply the bandage, place and hold the center directly over the pad on the wound. Maintain a steady pull on the bandage to keep the pad firmly in place while

260


wrapping the ends around the body part. Finish by tying a knot over the pad.

Elevation If there is no evidence of a fracture, a severely bleeding hand, arm, or leg should be elevated above the level of the victim’s heart. Once elevated, the force of gravity reduces blood pressure at the site of the wound and slows the loss of blood. Elevation is used in addition to direct pressure. The combination of pressure and elevation stops severe bleeding in most cases; however, sometimes additional techniques are required. One additional technique is pressure on the supplying artery. If severe bleeding from an open wound of the arm or leg does not stop after the application of direct pressure plus elevation, the use of pressure points may be required. Use of the pressure point technique temporarily compresses the main artery that supplies blood to the affected limb against the underlying bone and tissues. If the use of a pressure point is necessary, do not substitute its use for direct pressure and elevation, but use the pressure point in addition to those techniques. Do not use a pressure point in conjunction with direct pressure any longer than necessary to stop the bleeding. However, if bleeding recurs, reapply pressure at a pressure point.

Pressure Point: Open Arm Wound Apply pressure over the brachial artery, forcing it against the arm bone. The pressure point is located on the inside of the arm in the groove between the biceps and the triceps, about midway between the armpit and the elbow. To apply pressure on the brachial artery, grasp the middle of the victim’s upper arm, the caregiver’s thumb on the outside of the victim’s arm and the caregiver’s other fingers on the inside. Press your fingers toward your thumb to create an inward force from opposite sides of the arm. The inward pressure holds and closes the artery by compressing it against the arm bone.

ble, and place the heel of the caregiver’s hand directly over the pressure point. Then lean forward over the straightened arm to apply the small amount of pressure needed to close the artery. To prevent arm tension and muscular strain, keep the arm straight while applying the technique.

Call for Assistance Whenever possible, get medical assistance as soon as the victim is comfortable and not in immediate danger. Often, someone can do more harm than good by not summoning proper help immediately. If in doubt as to a victim’s well-being, keep the person quiet, preferably lying down and covered. Sometimes, a concussion victim appears perfectly normal and insists on returning to work, only to collapse later. In any case, do not allow the victim to move around. Remember, the greatest contribution to a victim’s well-being may be to restrain efforts to move the person in a mistaken belief that such efforts are helpful. It is usually best to let the victim remain calm and relaxed before transporting to the medical station. Obtain professional help whenever possible.

Reporting a Medical Case When reporting a medical case, the following information must be given clearly so that the necessary equipment and medical assistance can reach the victim in the shortest possible time: 䊉

䊉䊉䊉䊉

䊉

Exact location and phone number from which the report is being made Type of injury, if evident Seriousness of injury Number of persons involved Visible symptoms, such as heavy bleeding, poison stains, and so forth Cause of injury, if known, so that adequate personnel may be sent to the area to handle such dangerous conditions as leaking gas, flowing chemicals, or the like

Pressure Point: Open Leg Wound Apply pressure on the femoral artery by forcing the artery against the pelvic bone. The pressure point is located on the front center part of the diagonally slanted hinge of the leg, in the crease of the groin area, where the artery crosses the pelvic bone on its way to the leg. To apply pressure to the femoral artery, position the victim flat on the back, if possi-

Guard Supervision In every business organization, different management levels are responsible for various tasks. At the top of the structure are people who must decide the organizational goals and policies. At the people end of the operational spectrum are those immediately


responsible for the accomplishment of established goals. Between top management and these workers are the people who must explain managements objectives to all employees. These people give guidance and leadership. They represent top management to the workers by setting standards, developing work schedules, training employees, and exercising necessary controls to ensure high-quality performance. A guard supervisor is one of these important people.

261

be overlooked. The people who handle the day-today situations are in the best position to suggest changes in the organization’s policies and operations. The best way to get more suggestions from the staff is to simply ask for them. Whenever a problem arises, the supervisor should discuss the situation with the people involved to further encourage input. By offering them the chance to do some of the thinking, the manager is openly demonstrating interest in their ideas. Most employees would love to do some brainwork.

The Supervisor Keep Communications Open A supervisor, the person in the middle, is the key to success. The greater is the ability to carry out such responsibilities, the more efficiently the company operates. In addition to job skills, a modern supervisor must be familiar with up-to-date personnel practices and the legal requirements that affect the jobs of the personnel. He or she must also know how to deal with the day-to-day problems of a security department. One of the most important ways a supervisor can get the best results from the people is to let them know they have his or her full support. The supervisor can reinforce this knowledge by giving employees the necessary authority to do their jobs and seeing that this authority is respected. Step in to share responsibilities and, if things go wrong, help clear up the problem without condemnation. As happens on occasion, a good worker may run into controversy. When this occurs, it is comforting to know that the boss will stand by. This does not mean insisting someone is right when clearly he or she is not but rather accepting some of the responsibility for a poor plan and helping someone to carry the blame. All these steps demonstrate a supervisor’s support of the crew, and people support a leader who supports them. Another important trait of a good supervisor is willingness to accept suggestions from the workers. In fact, encourage such comments. It is natural for people to offer suggestions. If, as a supervisor, you make it clear that you are not interested in such input, you cut off an important flow of communication between supervisor and staff. Once the employees realize their supervisor is not interested in their ideas, maybe even resent him or her they will not take the time to devise a better system of doing things. Making the mistake of ignoring the thoughts and ideas of others hinders working relationships within the company. One person cannot think of everything. Those employees most knowledgeable in a specific area could be of assistance and should not

While not every idea submitted is a workable one, no suggestion deserves the 15-second brush-off. The supervisor appreciate all suggestions, regardless of caliber. Every idea merits consideration. The employee should be thanked for the time and interest and encouraged to keep trying, on the premise that the next idea could be a winner.

Leadership The guard supervisor sets the example of professional quality for the staff. The subordinates are a mirror of the management.If a guard appears sloppy,unshaven, in need of a haircut and a shoeshine, the supervisor probably needs to take a good look at his or her own appearance. If a guard speaks sharply to the client’s customers or employees, it may be a reflection of the person who is in charge. Perhaps the supervisor should pay careful attention to his or her own manner. The guard force reflects the company’s image and the supervisor should ensure that the proper appearance is being projected.

Techniques for Setting the Example 1. Be physically fit, well groomed, and correctly dressed. 2. Master your emotions. Erratic behavior, ranging from anger to depression, is ineffective. 3. Maintain an optimistic outlook. Excel in difficult situations by learning to capitalize on your own capabilities. 4. Conduct yourself so that you own personal habits are not open to censure. 5. Exercise initiative and promote the spirit of initiative in your subordinates. 6. Be loyal to those with whom you work and those who work with you. Loyalty is a two-way street.

262


7. Avoid playing favorites. 8. Be morally courageous. Establish principles and stand by them. 9. Share hardships with your people to demonstrate your willingness to assume your share of the difficulties.

fore, the leader must maintain a professional code of ethics. Professionalism is vital to any position of authority, and this is no less true for the security supervisor.

Train Personnel Effectively The Professional Security Supervisor Today’s security work requires a person with an exceptionally high degree of skill, training, and information.The person who demonstrates these qualities is recognized by others as a professional. Professionals exude the confidence and skill to enable the rest of the community to have faith in their ability to act in the public’s interest. The security officer who meets these standards is a professional in the fullest meaning of the word and respected as such.

The responsibilities of a guard supervisor include providing sound, effective training to the staff. An understanding of every operational requirement of the security officers gives the supervisor more awareness of the difficult facets of their work, areas where he or she may be able to offer assistance when and where it is needed. The supervisor can facilitate this aspect of the job by determining the duties of each security officer and establishing a master training plan to teach new employees their respective tasks. This plan also serves as refresher training for personnel who have been on the force for a long period of time.

Education By virtue of having completed certain education programs and having passed official examinations, professional people are recognized as possessing distinctive kinds and degrees of knowledge and skill. These are types of knowledge and skill in which the average citizen feels different and therefore turns to professionally trained people for help in the form of advice or other services.

Standards of Performance Professional people are expected to be dedicated to high ideals. They are assumed to operate under a superior code of ethics. To this end, the professional organizations establish standards of ethical performance as well as standards of competence. Professional people take pride in these standards and expect members of their profession to meet them. Because of the continuous flow of social and economic change in our world, training and the improvement of standards is a continuing problem for every security authority. The understanding of fundamental principles distinguishes the competent professional person from the mere technician. This is as true in security work as it is in medicine, law, and other professional fields. A security supervisor is person judged by the general public. The client, as well, looks on him or her as the contact with the organization and measures the company by the supervisor. The security personnel also look to the supervisor to set an example.As in other areas, there-

Treat Employees Courteously Mutual respect is essential to an efficient working relationship. Employees should not be treated as natural enemies or made to feel inferior. The supervisor must in turn report to higher bosses and should treat the staff in the same courteous manner expected from his or her superiors. Consideration is a key word. A demand should be accompanied by an explanation. Advance notice of any situations that might alter an employee’s plans, such as overtime, post reassignments, or special orders, is a simple courtesy that prevents unnecessary ill will. Making reprimands or criticisms private, away from the watchful eyes of one’s peers, precludes humiliation of a staff member.

Develop Loyalty An effective supervisor is loyal to the employees, the company, and the client. Constant criticism of the company and management is destructive to employee morale. While criticism is a necessary and unavoidable part of any activity, it must be offered constructively to resolve a problem, improve a system, lower costs, or for other worthwhile purposes. Criticism for the sake of criticism has no worth and no place in business. A responsible supervisor does not indulge in or pass on gossip or rumors about other employees. A supervisor who is loyal to the


personnel is usually repaid with loyalty from the unit.

When Criticism Is Necessary “To err is mortal; to forgive, divine.” The supervisor sits on the semicolon of this statement. Not only must supervisors recognize errors, see that they are corrected, and discourage further mistakes, they are also expected to maintain composure while doing so. Most people resent being told that they have done something wrong, especially if the person criticizing is tactless and forceful. Harsh criticism can hurt a person’s morale, damage the ego, and create lasting antagonisms. When faced with the job of criticizing an employee, the supervisor should try to follow these seven simple rules: 1. Be sure of the facts. Ask the right people the right questions, and do so objectively. Only when sufficiently satisfied that an error has been made should the supervisor call in the employee. If being criticized for something one did can cause resentment, being criticized for something one did not do really breeds antagonism. 2. If the mistake is important and upsetting, cool off before talking to the employee. When angry, a person is more likely to say something personal. Avoid personal criticism, address comments to correcting the mistake, not to punishing the security officer. 3. Discuss the situation in private. Nothing embarrasses a person more than being reprimanded before his or her peers or, worse yet, subordinates. Take time to move away from inquisitive eyes and ears. The criticism will be better and lasting resentment may be avoided. 4. Ask questions first—do not accuse. This fits in neatly with the “Be sure of the facts” rule. Do not come into the discussion with the mind made up. Ask for the employee’s side of the story. Everyone appreciates being heard, especially when a mistake has been made. 5. Before you criticize, let your worker know that you appreciate the good work produced. Medicine is easier to swallow if you mix it with sugar. 6. When the situation dictates an oral reprimand, explain to the employee the reasoning behind such actions. An employee deserves to know why there is criticism and how this will affect the future. For example, if a security officer is being criticized for the first tardiness, the officer should not be made to feel that the job is in jeopardy. However, if the

263

reprimand is for continual absences or lateness and the job is on the line, the employee should know this as well. 7. If at all possible, leave a good impression with the employee at the end of the discussion. This does not mean you should make light of mistakes. Rather, it removes some of the tension and embarrassment if, when the employee returns to work, you pat the person on the back or say something like, “At least we know you’re human.” These seven rules help a supervisor deal tactfully with the situation when criticism is needed. Remember that the goal of criticism is to leave the person with the feeling of having been helped.

Personnel Counseling Every supervisor must be prepared to discuss an employee’s personal problems when asked to do so, but only to the extent that the individual desires and within limits carefully set by the supervisor. The biggest problem for the manager, in a counseling situation, is to steer a proper course of giving practical and constructive advice and staying clear of amateur psychiatry in particular. When an employee seeks personal counseling, the supervisor should consider these guidelines: 1. Watch the general attitude. Always show a continuing sincere interest in staff members as individuals with homes and families and not simply subordinates. If there is sickness at home, remember to ask about progress. If someone’s daughter is graduating from high school, show some interest in that also. 2. Be available. If someone indicates a desire to talk about a matter that has come up, answer by saying that, if it is important to the employee, you will be glad to take whatever time is necessary. The employee will probably agree to have the interview after hours, when nobody else is around. In any case, it is obvious that you should make it possible to have the employee talk in private. Hold the meeting as soon as possible after the request. 3. The supervisor must initiate some meetings. This can occur, for example, when a usually competent and reliable person shows a marked falling-off in interest or quality of work or is unusually tardy or frequently absent—all indicating some personal situation is interfering with efficiency. Do not keep putting the meeting off—it will never be any easier than at the present moment.

264


4. Be as prepared as possible. If you have initiated the meeting, be sure of your facts, with specific examples of the kinds of behavior that gives you concern. If the employee has asked for the meeting, refresh your memory about any personal situations that may previously have come to light about the employee. 5. Put the employee at ease. The supervisor already achieves part of this by arranging for a private meeting. Maybe a cup of coffee or a soft drink is indicated. 6. Be a good listener. Whether the problem is real or imagined, give the employee a chance to explain the situation without interruption. 7. Be wary of advice on personal matters. On emotional and personal problems, your best contribution is to serve as a sounding board. The supervisor can, of course, give advice on any company policy that may be involved, avenues of financial assistance available through the company, and other matters where you are sure of the ground. But with a personal problem, the main function as a counselor should be to help the individual recognize what the problem is and explore possible alternate solutions, with final decisions left to the individual. Always remember, when dealing with personal and emotional problems, the supervisor rarely is in possession of enough facts to take the responsibility for recommending specific solutions. 8. Avoid assuming the psychiatrist’s function. If there is reason to believe that the employee has more than the normal kinds of anxiety, suggest professional counsel.

Expanded Security Officer Training Program Some of the larger guard agencies have developed training institutes to actually train in-house guard forces as well as contract guards for small agencies. The guards can be trained at the site of operation where the in-house force is operating, or the guards can travel to the institute where the training is given away from their regular facility. The following is a break down of a training program.

Section I. General Training and qualification of security officers is necessary to ensure a thorough knowledge and understanding as to exactly what is expected of each officer. The legal responsibilities and limitations involved in the execution of their duties must be

made clear to those employed to protect persons and property of private and public industry. Special emphasis must be placed on the skills necessary to perform this responsibility of protection.

Section II. Objectives 1. To provide the student with a basic understanding of the responsibilities of a security officer 2. To teach the student those basic skills that will enable that individual to attain an acceptable level of performance 3. To identify to the student the restrictions placed on a security officer while serving, in a limited capacity, to protect persons and property 4. To administer to the student a written examination, sampling the material presented during the program and designed to measure the retention of knowledge of basic skills with 70% accuracy

Section III. Specific Subject Areas and Hours Subject

Hours

Ethics and professionalism Legal authority of a security officer Human relations Public relations Patrol procedures Report writing Field note taking Ingress and egress control Emergency medical assistance Firefighting Self-defense/security baton Firearms safety and range firing Law—criminal and civil Review, final exam, and critique

1 1 1

2 1 21/2 10 4 1

Total

28

1

/2

2 1 1 1

/2 /2

Section IV. Synopsis Ethics and professionalism (1 hour). Professional behavior and attitudes, security officer code of ethics, use and care of clothing and equipment Legal authority of a security officer (1 hour). Legal rules, practices, and procedures, including arrests, self-incrimination, and the concept of deadly force Human relations (1 hour). Security officers’ relationship with client, employees, and visitors to the site Public relations (1/2 hour). Effects of adverse publicity, a policy of responding to press and public Patrol procedures (2 hours). Characteristics and advantages of the patrol, the concepts of observa-


tion and knowledge, the various hazards to life and property, and the various methods and techniques of patrolling Report writing and field note taking (11/2 hours). The value of accurate field notes and client/company reports: techniques and methods, with practical application in filling out reports Ingress and egress control (1/2 hour). Personnel, vehicle, and package control while entering and exiting facility, physical security measures Emergency medical assistance (2 hours). Treatment for shock, respiratory arrest, severe bleeding, open wounds Firefighting (1 hour). The security officers’ responsibilities in preventing and fighting fires, classes of fire and types of extinguishers Self-defense/security baton (21/2 hours). Methods of defending oneself, either armed or unarmed, demonstration and practical application in defensive holds, throws, and come-along holds Firearms safety and range firing (10 hours). Weapons familiarization, weapons safety and revolver range firing, qualification score for weapon Review, written final examination, and critique (1 hour). Review of material, final examination, and critique of examination

Conclusion Over the last fifty years, the security guard industry has grown at a rapid rate, and as we move into the

265

21st century, it appears that this growth will continue at this astronomical pace. In the early 1990s, as many as 10,000 security firms were in the United States. The rapid growth is duplicated in Canada, Europe, the Near East, and the Far East. The guard industry has found its place in the sun. What once was a lower bottom of the scale type of employment is now a good-paying, desirable position that offers a fine future. Many universities in the United States offer a degree in Criminal Justice, and many who graduate find their why into management in the security guard business. As we move into the 21st century, we find the requirements for the security guard increasing in many areas. Local, state, and federal police departments are reaching out to the security industry to take over many of the responsibilities that unarmed security officers can handle. In the decade of the 1990s, the security industry was involved in building prisons and maintaining the entire facility, including feeding, clothing, and protecting. Security companies work with U.S. Immigration and Naturalization supplying the holding areas of transients with visas at airports and ship ports. Some are involved in setting up training academies for nuclear programs for the United States government. This industry now offers our society a diversified activity that does not end with but actually starts with the security guard.

Chapter 16 Bomb and Physical Security Planning* STEPHEN E. HIGGINS

Bombing and the threat of being bombed are harsh realities in today’s world. The public is becoming more aware of violent incidents perpetrated by vicious, nefarious segments of our society through the illegal use of explosives. Law enforcement agencies are charged with protecting life and property; but law enforcement alone is not enough. Every citizen must do his or her part to ensure a safe environment. The information contained here is designed to help both the public and private sectors prepare for the potential threat of explosive-related violence. While the ideas set forth are applicable in most cases, they are intended only as a guide. The information provided is compiled from a wide range of sources, including actual reports from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF). If there is one point that must be emphasized, it is the value of preparedness. Do not allow a bomb incident to catch you by surprise. By developing a bomb incident plan and considering possible bomb incidents in your physical security plan, you can reduce the potential for personal injury and property damage. By making this information available to you, we hope to help you better prepare for bomb threats and the illegal use of explosives.

Bombs Bombs can be constructed to look like almost anything and can be placed or delivered in any number * Prepared by Stephen E. Higgins, Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, ATF P 7550.2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987).

266

of ways. The probability of finding a bomb that looks like the stereotypical bomb is almost nonexistent. The only common denominator among bombs is that they are designed to explode. Most bombs are homemade and are limited in their design only by the imagination of and resources available to the bomber. Remember, when searching for a bomb, suspect anything that looks unusual. Let a trained bomb technician determine what is or is not a bomb.

Bomb Threats Bomb threats are delivered in a variety of ways. The majority of threats are called in to the target. Occasionally these calls are made through a third party. Sometimes a threat is communicated in writing or by a recording. There are two logical reasons for reporting a bomb threat. Sometimes, the caller has definite knowledge or believes that an explosive or incendiary bomb has been or will be placed and he or she wants to minimize personal injury or property damage. The caller may be the person who has placed the device or someone who has become aware of such information. The other type of caller wants to create an atmosphere of anxiety and panic that will, in turn, result in a disruption of the normal activities at the facility where the device is purportedly placed. Whatever the reason for the call, there will certainly be a reaction to it. Through proper planning, the wide variety of potentially uncontrollable reactions can be greatly reduced.

Bomb and Physical Security Planning

Why Prepare? Through proper preparation, you can reduce the accessibility of your business or building and can identify those areas that can be “hardened” against the potential bomber. This will limit the amount of time lost due to searching, if you determine a search is necessary. If a bomb incident occurs, proper planning will instill confidence in your leadership, reinforce the notion that those in charge do care, and reduce the potential for personal injury and property loss. Proper planning can also reduce the threat of panic, the most contagious of all human emotions. Panic is sudden, excessive, unreasoning, infectious terror. Once a state of panic has been reached, the potential for injury and property damage is greatly increased. In the context of a bomb threat, panic is the ultimate attainment of the caller. Be prepared! There is no excuse for not taking every step necessary to meet the threat.

How to Prepare In preparing to cope with a bomb incident, it is necessary to develop two separate but interdependent plans—namely a physical security plan and a bomb incident plan. Physical security provides for the protection of property, personnel, facilities, and material against unauthorized entry, trespass, damage, sabotage, or other illegal or criminal acts. The physical security plan deals with prevention and access control to the building. In most instances, some form of physical security may already be in existence, although not necessarily intended to prevent a bomb attack. The bomb incident plan provides detailed procedures to be implemented when a bombing attack is executed or threatened. In planning for the bomb incident, a definite chain of command or line of authority must be established. Only by using an established organization and procedures can the bomb incident be handled with the least risk to all concerned. A clearly defined line of authority will instill confidence and avoid panic. Establishing a chain of command is easy if there is a simple office structure, one business, one building. However, if a complex situation exists, a multioccupant building for example, a representative from each business should attend the planning conference. A leader should be appointed and a clear line of succession delineated. This chain of command should be printed and circulated to all concerned parties.

267

In planning, you should designate a command center to be located in the switchboard room or other focal point of telephone or radio communications. Management personnel assigned to operate the center should have the authority to decide whatever action should be taken during the threat. Only those with assigned duties should be permitted in the center. Make some provision for alternates in the event someone is absent when a threat is received. Obtain an updated blueprint of floor plan of your building and maintain it in the command center. Contact the police department, fire department, or local government agencies to determine if any assistance is available to you for developing your physical security plan or bomb incident plan. If possible, have police and fire department representatives and members of your staff inspect the building for areas where explosives are likely to be concealed. (Make a checklist of these areas for inclusion in command center materials.) Determine whether there is a bomb disposal unit available, how to contact the unit, and under what conditions it is activated. In developing your bomb incident plan, you must also ascertain whether the bomb disposal unit, in addition to disarming and removing the explosives, will assist in searching the building in the event of a threat. Training is essential to deal properly with a bomb threat. Instruct all personnel, especially those at the switchboard, in what to do if a bomb threat is received. Be absolutely certain that all personnel assigned to the command center are aware of their duties. The positive aspects of planning will be lost if the leadership is not apparent. It is also critical to organize and train an evacuation until that will be responsive to the command center and has a clear understanding of the importance of its role. We have suggested that the command center be located near the switchboard or focal point of communications. It is critical that lines of communication be established between the command center and the search or evacuation teams.The center must have the flexibility to keep up with the search team’s progress. In a large facility, if the teams go beyond the communications network, the command center must have the mobility to maintain contact with and track search or evacuation efforts.

Security against Bomb Incidents In dealing with bomb incidents or potential bomb incidents, two interrelated plans must be developed—the bomb incident plan and the physical secu-

268


rity plan. Until this point, we have primarily addressed the bomb incident plan. Before continuing with that plan, we will discuss security measures as they apply to defending against the bomb attack. Most commercial structures and individual residences already have some security in place, planned or unplanned, realized or not. Locks on windows and doors, outside lights, and similar devices are all designed and installed to contribute toward the security of a facility and the protection of its occupants. In considering measures to increase the security of your building or office, it is highly recommended that you contact your local police department for guidance regarding a specific plan for your facility. There is no single security plan that works in all situations. The exterior configuration of a building or facility is very important. Unfortunately, in most instances, the architect has given little or no consideration to security, particularly forward thwarting or discouraging a bomb attack. However, by the addition of fencing and lighting, and by controlling access, the vulnerability of a facility to a bomb attack can be reduced significantly. Bombs being delivered by car or left in a car are a grave reality. Parking should be restricted, if possible, to 300 feet from your building or any building in a complex. If restricted parking is not feasible, properly identified employee vehicles should be parked closest to your facility and visitor vehicles parked at a distance. Heavy shrubs and vines should be kept close to the ground to reduce their potential to conceal criminals or bombs. Windows boxes and planters are perfect receptacles for a bomb. Unless there is an absolute requirement for such ornamentation, window boxes and planters are better removed. If they must remain, a security patrol should be employed to check them regularly. A highly visible security patrol can be a significant deterrent. Even if this patrol is only one person, he or she is optimally utilized outside the building. If an interior guard is utilized, consider the installation of closed-circuit television cameras that cover exterior building perimeters. Have an adequate burglar alarm system installed by a reputable company that can service and properly maintain the equipment. Post signs indicating that such a system is in place. Entrance and exit doors with hinges and hinge pins on the inside to prevent removal should be installed. Solid wood or sheet-metal-faced doors provide extra integrity that a hollow-core wooden door cannot provide. A steel door frame that prop-

erly fits the doors is as important as the construction of the door. The ideal security situation is a building with no windows. However, bars, grates, heavy mesh screens, or steel shutters over windows offer good protection from otherwise unwanted entry. It is important that the openings in the protective coverings are not too large, otherwise a bomb may be planted in the building while the bomber remains outside. Floor vents, transoms, and skylights should also be covered. Please note that fire safety considerations preclude the use of certain window coverings. Municipal ordinances should be researched and occupant safety considered before any of these renovations are undertaken. Controls should be established for positively identifying personnel who are authorized to access critical areas and for denying access to unauthorized personnel. These controls should extend to the inspection of all packages and materials being taken into critical areas. Security and maintenance personnel should be alert for people who act in a suspicious manner, as well as objects, items, or parcels which look out of place or suspicious. Surveillance should be established to include potential hiding places such as stairwells, restrooms, and any vacant office space for dubious individuals or items. Doors or accessways to such areas as boiler rooms, mail rooms, computer areas, switchboards, and elevator control rooms should remain locked when not in use. Good housekeeping is also vital. Trash or dumpster areas should remain free of debris. A bomb or device can easily be concealed in the trash. Combustible materials should be properly disposed of, or protected if further use is anticipated. Install detection devices at all entrances and closed-circuit television in those areas previously identified as likely places where a bomb may be placed. Coupled with the posting of signs indicating such measures are in place, these are good deterrents. It is necessary for businesses to maintain good public relations with their clients. Corporate responsibility, however, also involves the safety and protection of the public. The threatened use of explosives means that, in the interest of safety and security, some inconvenience may have to be imposed on visitors to public buildings. The public is becoming more accustomed to routine security checks and will readily accept these minor inconveniences. Perhaps entrances and exits can be modified with minimal expenditure to channel all visitors through


a reception area. Individuals entering the building could be required to sign a register indicating the name and room number of the person they wish to visit. A system for signing out when the individual departs could be integrated into this procedure. Such a procedure may result in complaints from the public. If the reception desk clerk explains to visitors that these procedures were implemented with their best interests and safety in mind, the complaints will be reduced. The placement of a sign at the reception desk informing visitors of the need for safety is another option.

Responding to Bomb Threats Instruct all personnel, especially those at the switchboard, in what to do if a bomb threat call is received. It is always preferable that more than one person listen in on the call. To do this, a covert signaling system should be implemented, perhaps by using a coded buzzer signal to a second reception point. A calm response to the bomb threat caller could result in obtaining additional information. This is especially true if the caller wishes to avoid injuries or deaths. If told that the building is occupied or cannot be evacuated in time, the bomber may be willing to give more specific information on the bomb’s location, components, or method of initiation. The bomb threat caller is the best source of information about the bomb. When a bomb threat is called in: 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Keep the caller on the line as long as possible. Ask the person to repeat the message. Record every word spoken by the caller. If the caller does not indicate the location of the bomb or the time of possible detonation, ask for this information. Inform the caller that the building is occupied and the detonation of a bomb could result in death or serious injury to many innocent people. Pay particular attention to background noises, such as motors, music, and any other noise which may give a clue as to the location of the caller. Listen closely to the voice (male or female?), voice quality (calm or excited?), accents, and speech impediments. Immediately after the caller hangs up, report the threat to the person designated by management to receive such information. Also report the information immediately to the police department, fire department, ATF, FBI, and

䊉

269

other appropriate agencies. The sequence of notification should be established in your bomb incident plan. Remain available; law enforcement personnel will want to interview you.

When a written threat is received, save all materials, including any envelope or container. Once the message is recognized as a bomb threat, further handling should be avoided. Every possible effort should be made to retain evidence such as fingerprints, handwriting or typewriting, paper, and postal marks. These will prove essential in tracing the threat and identifying the writer. While written messages are usually associated with generalized threats and extortion attempts, a written warning of a specific device may occasionally be received. It should never be ignored.

Decision Time The most serious of all decisions to be made by management in the event of a bomb threat is whether to evacuate the building. In many cases, this decision may have already been made during the development of the bomb incident plan. Management may provide a carte blanche policy that, in the event of a bomb threat, total evacuation will be effective immediately. This decision circumvents the calculated risk and demonstrates a deep concern for the safety of personnel in the building. However, such a decision can result in costly loss of time. Essentially, there are three alternatives when faced with a bomb threat: (1) ignore the threat; (2) evacuate immediately; (3) search and evacuate if warranted. Ignoring the threat completely can result in some problems. While a statistical argument can be made that very few bomb threats are real, it cannot be overlooked that sometimes bombs have been located in connection with threats. If employees learn that bomb threats have been received and ignored, it could result in morale problems and have a long-term adverse effect on your business. Also, there is the possibility that if the bomb threat callers feel that they are being ignored, they may go beyond the threat and actually plant a bomb. Evacuating immediately on every bomb threat is an alternative that on face value appears to be the preferred approach. However, the negative factors inherent in this approach must be considered. The obvious result of immediate evacuation is the disruptive effect on your business. If the bomb threat

270


callers know that your policy is to evacuate each time a call is made, they can continually call and bring your business to a standstill. An employee, knowing that the policy is to evacuate immediately, may make a threat in order to get out of work. A student may use a bomb threat to avoid a class or miss a test. Also, a bomber wishing to cause personal injuries could place a bomb near an evacuation exit and then call in the threat. Initiating a search after a threat is received and evacuating a building after a suspicious package or device is found is the third, and perhaps the most desired, approach. It is certainly not as disruptive as an immediate evacuation and will satisfy the requirement to do something when a threat is received. If a device is found, the evacuation can be accomplished expeditiously while simultaneously avoiding the potential danger areas of the bomb.

Evacuation An evacuation unit consisting of management personnel should be organized and trained in conjunction with the development of the bomb incident plan, as well as with the cooperation of all tenants of a building. The unit should be trained in how to evacuate the building during a bomb threat. Evacuation priorities should be considered, such as areas above and below the bomb site in order to remove those persons from danger as quickly as possible. Training in this type of evacuation is usually available from police, fire, or other safety departments within the community. You may also train the evacuation unit in search techniques, or you may prefer a separate search unit. Volunteer personnel should be solicited for this function.Assignment of search wardens and team leaders can be made. To completely search the building, personnel must be thoroughly familiar with all highways, restrooms, false ceiling areas, and every location where an explosive or incendiary device may be concealed. When police officers or firefighters arrive at the building, the contents and the floor plan will be unfamiliar to them if they have not previously surveyed the facility. Therefore, it is extremely important that the evacuation or search unit be thoroughly trained and familiar with the floor plan of the building and immediate outside areas. When a room or particular area is searched, it should be marked or sealed with a piece of tape and reported to the supervisor of that area. The evacuation or search unit should be trained only in evacuation and search techniques. If a device

is located, it should not be disturbed. Its location should be well marked, however, and a route back to the device noted.

Search Teams It is advisable to use more than one individual to search any area or room, no matter how small. Searches can be conducted by supervisory personnel, area occupants, or trained explosives search teams. There are advantages and disadvantages to each method of staffing the search teams. Using supervisory personnel to search is a rapid approach and causes little disturbance. There will be little loss of employee working time, but a morale problem may develop if it is discovered that a bomb threat was received and workers were not told. Using supervisors to search will usually not be as effective because of their unfamiliarity with many areas and their desire to get on with business. Using area occupants to search their own areas is the best method for a rapid search. Furthermore, area personnel are familiar with what does or does not belong in their area. Using occupants to search will result in a shorter loss of work time than if all were evacuated prior to search by trained teams. Using the occupants to search can have a positive effect on morale, given a good training program to develop confidence. Of course, this would require the training of an entire workforce, and ideally the performance of several practical training drills. One drawback of this search method is the increased danger to unevacuated workers. The search conducted by a trained team is the best for safety, morale, and thoroughness, though it does take the most time. Using a trained team will result in a significant loss of production time. It is a slow operation that requires comprehensive training and practice. The decision as to who should conduct searches ultimately lies with management, and should be considered and incorporated into the bomb incident plan.

Search Technique The following room search technique is based on the use of a two-person search team. There are many minor variations possible in searching a room. The following discussion, however, contains only the basic techniques.


When a two-person search team enters a room, they should first move to various parts of the room and stand quietly with their eyes closed to listen for a clockwork device. A clockwork mechanism can be quickly detected without use of special equipment. Even if no clockwork mechanism is detected, the team is now aware of the background noise level within the room itself. Background noise or transferred sound is always disturbed during a building search. If a ticking sound is heard but cannot be located, one might become unnerved. The ticking sound may come from an unbalanced air-conditioner fan several floors away or from a dripping sink down the hall. Sound will transfer through air-conditioning ducts, along water pipes, and through walls. One of the most difficult types of buildings to search is one that has a steam or hot water heating system. These buildings constantly thump, crack, chatter, and tick due to the movement of the steam or hot water and the expansion and contraction of the pipes. Background noise may also originate from traffic outside, rain, and wind. The individual in charge of the room search team should look around the room and determine how the room is to be divided for searching and to what height the first sweep should extend. You should divide the room into two equal parts. The division is based on the number and type of objects in the room, not its size. An imaginary line is then drawn between two objects in the room; for example, the edge of the window on the north wall to the floor lamp on the south wall.

271

room up to the selected height, including the floor under the rugs. This first searching sweep should also include those items which may be mounted on or in the walls, such as air-conditioning ducts, baseboard heaters, and built-in cupboards if these fixtures are below hip height. The first search sweep usually takes the most time and effort. During all the sweeps, use an electronic or medical stethoscope on walls, furniture items, and floors.

Second Room-Search Sweep The team leader again looks at the furniture or objects in the room and determines the height of the second sweep. This height is usually from the desk tops to the chin or top of the head. The two persons return to the starting point and repeat the searching technique at the second selected search height. This sweep usually covers pictures hanging on the walls, built-in bookcases, and tall table lamps.

Third Room-Search Sweep When the second sweep is completed, the person in charge again determines the next searching height, usually from the chin or the top of the head up to the ceiling. The third sweep usually covers high mounted air-conditioning ducts and hanging light fixtures.

Fourth Room-Search Sweep First Room-Search Sweep Look at the furniture or objects in the room and determine the average height of the majority of items resting on the floor. In an average rooms, this height usually includes table or desk tops and chair backs. The first searching height usually covers the items in the room up to hip height. After the room has been divided and a searching height has been selected, both individuals go to one end of the room division line and start from a backto-back position. This is the starting point, and the same point will be used on each successive sweep. Each person now starts searching around the room, working toward the other person, checking all items resting on the floor around the wall area of the room. When the two individuals meet, they will have completed a “wall sweep.” They should then work together and check all items in the middle of the

If the room has a false or suspended ceiling, the fourth sweep involves this area. Check flush or ceiling-mounted light fixtures, air-conditioning or ventilation ducts, sound or speaker systems, electrical writing, and structural frames. Post a conspicuous sign or marker in the area indicating “Search Completed.” Place a piece of colored Scotch tape across the door and door jamb approximately 2 feet above floor level if the use of signs is not practical. The same basic technique can be expanded and applied to search any enclosed area. Encourage the use of common sense or logic in searching. If a guest speaker at a convention has been threatened, common sense would indicate searching the speakers’ platform and microphones first, but always return to the search technique. Do not rely on random or spot checking of only logical target areas.

272


The bomber may not be a logical person. In summary the following steps should be taken in order to search a room: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Divide the area and select a search height. Start from the bottom and work up. Start back-to-back and work toward each other. Go around the walls and proceed toward the center of the room.

When a Suspicious Object Is Located It is imperative that personnel involved in a search be instructed that their only mission is to search for and report suspicious objects. Under no circumstances should anyone move, jar, or touch a suspicious object or anything attached to it. The removal or disarming of a bomb must be left to explosives disposal professionals. When a suspicious object is discovered, the following procedures are recommended: 1. Report the location and an accurate description of the object to the appropriate supervisor. Relay this information immediately to the command center, which will notify the police and fire departments, and rescue squad. These officers should be met and escorted to the scene. 2. If absolutely necessary place sandbags or mattresses (never metal shields) around the suspicious object. Do not attempt to cover the object. 3. Identify the danger area, and block it off with a clearance zone of at least 300 feet, including the floors above and below. 4. Make sure that all doors and windows are opened to minimize primary damage from a blast and secondary damage from fragmentation. 5. Evacuate the building. 6. Do not permit reentry into the building until the device has been removed or disarmed, and the building declared safe.

Handling the News Media It is of paramount importance that all inquiries from the news media be directed to one appointed spokesperson. All other persons should be instructed not to discuss the situation with outsiders, especially the news media. The purpose of this provision is to furnish the news media with accurate information and ensure that additional bomb threats are not precipitated by irresponsible statements from uninformed sources.

Summary This chapter serves only as a guide and is not intended to be anything more. The ultimate determination of how to handle a bomb threat must be made by the individual responsible for the threatened facility. Develop a bomb incident plan. Draw upon any expertise that is available to you from police departments, government agencies, and security specialists. Don’t leave anything to chance. Be prepared!

Bomb Incident Plan 1. Designate a chain of command. 2. Establish a command center. 3. Decide what primary and alternate communications will be used. 4. Establish clearly how and by whom a bomb threat will be evaluated. 5. Decide what procedures will be followed when a bomb threat is received or device discovered. 6. Determine to what extent the available bomb squad will assist and at what point the squad will respond. 7. Provide an evacuation plan with enough flexibility to avoid a suspected danger area. 8. Designate search teams and areas to be searched. 9. Establish techniques to be utilized during the search. 10. Establish a procedure to report and track progress of the search and a method to lead qualified bomb technicians to a suspicious package. 11. Have a contingency plan available if a bomb should go off. 12. Establish a simple-to-follow procedure for the person receiving the bomb threat. 13. Review your physical security plan in conjunction with the development of your bomb incident plan.

Command Center 1. Designate primary and alternate locations. 2. Assign personnel and designate the decisionmaking authority. 3. Establish a method for tracking search teams. 4. Maintain a list of likely target areas. 5. Maintain a blueprint of floor diagrams.


6. Establish primary and secondary methods of communication. (Caution: The use of two-way radios during a search can cause premature detonation of an electric blasting cap.)

273

7. Formulate a plan for establishing a command center if a threat is received after normal working hours. 8. Maintain a roster of all pertinent telephone numbers.

Appendix 16.A Suspect Package Alert* The following items are some things to watch for if a letter or package bomb is suspected. (If the addressee is expecting a package or letter, the contents should be verified.) 䊉

䊉䊉

䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉

䊉

䊉

The addressee is unfamiliar with name and address of sender. The package or letter has no return address. Improper or incorrect title, address, or spelling of addressee. Title, but no name. Wrong title with name. Handwritten or poorly typed address. Misspellings of common words. Return address and postmark are not from same area. Stamps (sometimes excessive postage or unusual stamps) versus metered mail. Special handling instructions on package (i.e., special delivery open by addressee only, foreign mail, and air mail).

* Prepared by Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.

䊉

䊉

䊉䊉

䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉

Restrictive markings such as confidential, personal, etc. Overwrapping, excessive securing material such as masking tape, string or paper wrappings. Oddly shaped or unevenly weighted packages. Lumpy or rigid envelopes (stiffer or heavier than normal). Lopsided or uneven envelopes. Oily stains or discolorations. Strange odors. Protruding wires or tinfoil. Visual distractions (drawings, unusual statements, and hand-drawn postage).

Please be aware that this is only a general checklist. The best protection is personal contact with the sender of the package or letter.

274


Appendix 16.B Bomb Threat Checklist* The following is a checklist of some general questions to ask a bomb threat caller to help keep him or her on the line and to ascertain as much information as possible about the bomb allegedly in the building. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

When is the bomb going to explode? Where is the bomb right now? What does the bomb look like? What kind of bomb is it? What will cause the bomb to explode? Did you place the bomb? Why? What is your address? What is your name?

Exact wording of bomb threat: _________ Sex of caller: _________ Race: _________ Age: ________ Length of call: _________ Telephone number where call was received: _______ Time call was received: ________ Date call was received: ________ CALLER’S VOICE: Calm____ Angry____ Excited____ Slow____ Rapid____ Nasal____ Stutter____ Lisp____

* Prepared by Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.

Raspy____ Deep____ Soft____ Loud____ Laughter____ Crying____ Normal____ Distinct____ Ragged____ Cracking voice____ Slurred____ Clearing throat____ Disguised____ Familiar____ Whispered____ Deep breathing____ Accent____ If the voice is familiar, what did it sound like? _____ ______________________________________________ BACKGROUND SOUNDS: Street noises____ Kitchen sounds____ PA system____ House noises____ Motor____ Factory machinery____ Animal noises____ Static____ Long distance____ Office machinery____ Voices____ Clear____ Music____ Local____ Booth____ Other________________________________________ BOMB THREAT LANGUAGE: Well spoken (education level)____ Message read by threat maker____ Incoherent____ Taped____ Foul____ Irrational REMARKS: Call reported immediately to: ________ Your name: ________ Your position: ________ Your telephone number: ________ Date checklist completed: ________


275

Appendix 16.C Mail Handlers and Suspicious Mail Procedures Recent news reports concerning anthrax have raised questions concerning how mail should be handled. Although corporate security has no reason to believe that any location will be subject to contaminated mail, provided below is information concerning the proper handling of suspicious letters or packages.

䊉

What Constitutes a Suspicious Letter or Package?

䊉

Some typical characteristics which should trigger suspicion includes letters or packages that:

䊉

䊉䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉䊉

䊉䊉䊉

Have any powdery substance on the outside Are unexpected or from someone unfamiliar to you Have excessive postage, handwritten or poorly typed address, incorrect titles or titles with no name, or misspellings of common words Are addressed to someone no longer with your organization or are otherwise outdated Are of unusual weight, given their size, or are lopsided or oddly shaped Have an unusual amount of tape Are marked with restrictive endorsements, such as “Personal” or “Confidential” Have strange odors or stains Have visual distractions Shows a city or state in the postmark that does not match the return address

What Should I Do If I Receive a Suspicious Letter or Package? 䊉䊉

Do not handle the mail piece If above is not possible, handle with care, don’t shake or bump

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Do not open, smell, touch or taste the suspected mail piece Carefully cover the mail piece with anything (e.g., clothing, paper, trash can, etc.) and do not remove this cover Make sure that the suspicious mail piece is isolated and the immediate area cordoned off Turn off local fans or ventilation units in the area Contact the local police or security department, where available Ensure that all persons who have come in contact with the suspect mail piece wash their hands with soap and water List all persons who have touched the mail piece, include contact information and have this information available for the authorities Wait for appropriate law enforcement response before resuming duties

What Should I Do If Powder Spills onto a Surface? 䊉

䊉䊉䊉

䊉

䊉䊉䊉

Do not clean up the powder, cover the spilled contents immediately with anything (e.g., clothing, paper, trash can, etc.) and do not remove this cover Turn off local fans or ventilation units in the area Contact the local police or security department Leave the room and close the door, or section off the area to prevent others from entering Remove heavily contaminated clothing as soon as possible and place in a plastic bag or some other container that can be sealed Wash hands Put on emergency clothing supplied by site Wait for appropriate law enforcement response

276


What Not to Do!*

䊉䊉

䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉

Don’t ignore bomb threats Don’t touch suspect explosives Don’t touch suspect bombs Don’t move suspect packages Don’t open suspect packages Don’t place in water Don’t shake or move Don’t cut or pull wires/strings

* Boston Police Department Bomb Squad, 2003.

䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉

Don’t pull or stamp out fuses Don’t undo glued packages Don’t release hooks Don’t smoke near suspicious packages Don’t carry bombs outside Don’t place near heat or cold Don’t place near vital equipment DON’T MOVE BOMBS! MOVE PEOPLE STAY AWAY FROM BOMBS EMERGENCY, CALL 911

FOUR SECURITY AND CRIME PREVENTION APPLICATIONS


Chapter 17 Cargo Security: Intermodal Logistics— The Complete Overview LOUIS A. TYSKA, CPP

Since September 11, 2001, and with the continuing threats of terrorism to the United States by use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and chemicalbiological, nuclear, and environmental (CBNE) weapons, concerns for cargo security and the importation of goods have escalated. The use of border crossings by trucks and containers as well as the seaport entries of containerization cargo have been identified as major concerns of the Office of Homeland Security.The use of technology to track, safeguard, and seal these containers has been emphasized. While the priority is high to implement such technology, the schedule to do so remains questionable. This has been due to two reasons. Technology, such as satellite tracking, is not completely dependable for waterborne transportation. The greater limitation is centered on the cost of the hardware and the monitoring/response protocols. A variety of federal government agencies have been diligently working to form partnerships with industry and public law enforcement. Suggestions have been made that several major federal departments be merged. This has not come to finality at this writing. Hence, the emphasis in this chapter is on individual private sector companies and service providers and their commitment to security concerns. Therefore, the asset protection and security controls outlined in this chapter have proven to be effective and are still recommended for use in the logistics industry. Finished goods, components, and raw materials are most attractive and vulnerable to theft or mis-

appropriation when in storage, in inventory, or in transit. This is precisely where they are under the least amount of control. Manufacturing and marketing departments may go to extremes to plan, produce, and sell goods, but then frequently turn off the lights and go home once the finished goods are in the inventory or transit system. Industry provides control over these goods, but much more should be done to prevent theft or misappropriation. The accountability for safeguarding goods in transit or storage lies completely with management of both the manufacturers and transporters of products. As goods pass through various modes of transportation and distribution, legal accountability changes hands and is frequently difficult to identify. Precisely during these times do the thieves who prey upon the transportation systems take advantage of the weakness within the network of distribution. The ultimate consumer pays the cost of transportation and distribution loss. These increased costs are based on the need to file, process, and dispose of claims resulting from loss or damage in transit or storage. In addition, costs are involved in all reorders and reshipments as well as any dollar factors that may be directly charged to inconvenience and loss of timeliness in the marketplace. Surveys show that the greatest loss a company can suffer is through the actions of its employees (up to 80% according to various governmental reports). Internal thefts are committed by employees who have direct access to and control of goods in transit. 279

280

SECURITY AND CRIME PREVENTION APPLICATIONS

Adequate physical security is required, but improper employee screening and control lead to significantly greater losses. Effective control can be obtained by developing appropriate company procedures and implementing them. The attitude that management assumes concerning security dictates the success of the loss prevention program and its acceptance. Transportation and distribution management assumes accountability for goods in transit and responsibility for establishing standards of adequate physical security for the prevention of theft or damage. The appointment of a security professional does not relieve management from its responsibility. The role of security is related to the prevention of unauthorized entry, circulation, and exit of personnel and vehicles; perimeter fences and entrance areas; protective lighting and alarm systems; pass, badge, and identification systems; and the prevention and detection of crime. The establishment of physical security controls is difficult. Goods in transit of every type and size move through the intermodal system constantly. Each shipment must be identified and accounted for throughout its journey. The size and complexity of large transportation facilities has made it vital that physical security depend on a comprehensive and continuing evaluation of protective measures and an aggressive program of auditing. The appropriate degree of protection for any specific facility is based on two factors: relative criticality and relative vulnerability. If a facility is both highly critical and highly vulnerable, then an extensive physical security program is required. Every facility is vulnerable in some degree to pilferage and theft. To determine the degree of vulnerability, the volume and value of goods handled and the past history of theft must be evaluated. If these factors rate high, then the relative criticality is high. To determine relative vulnerability, the susceptibility of the facility to theft must be estimated. The degree depends on such variables as the type of facility involved, the value and volume of goods handled, accessibility to the stolen goods market, physical layout and construction, and the loss prevention program in place, if any. If the facility can be easily penetrated and confused by high volumes of rapidly moving goods, and the marketplace is highly motivated toward illegal practices, then the relative vulnerability is high. Another complication is the multiplicity of managements using various parts of the specific facility simultaneously, for example, at a large metropolitan airport. Such facilities usually present a high

degree of criticality as well as vulnerability. All tenants using a facility of this nature must coordinate and cooperate closely with the specific facility management. Conditions that greatly influence the scope of the physical and procedural security necessary for a specific facility include 䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉

䊉

Size Volume and value of the goods in transit Geographic location Economic and political conditions in the area Ability of public law enforcement agencies to respond Sophistication of the criminal element in the local area

The nature of physical and procedural security program to be implemented in any facility should be no more involved than is called for by an analysis of the following: 䊉䊉䊉

䊉

䊉

Criticality Vulnerability Impact of physical security measures on efficiency of operations Limitations imposed by the physical characteristics of the facility Cost required to implement a program versus losses

The security professionals at each facility, along with management, must continually evaluate and analyze these on a periodic basis. They must devise physical security measures consistent with continuing needs. The criticality and the vulnerability of a specific facility may vary from time to time as circumstances change.

Prevention Plan Prevention of theft and pilferage demands commitment and determination on the parts of all employees and in particular security personnel. Physical security measures and an extensive security awareness program for every employee of the facility are essential. Theft prevention is an ongoing process, which must be given dedicated attention, especially to high-value and highly vulnerable goods. The prevention plan begins with defining the three types of crimes committed against goods and materials in transit—pilferage, theft, and organized crime—and their influence on cargo loss from the intermodal transportation and distribution systems.

Cargo Security: Intermodal Logistics—The Complete Overview

Pilferage The protection of goods and materials while they are in the transportation system is a responsibility of employees at all levels. Pilferage is one of the most annoying and costly causes of cargo theft. Prevention of pilferage is one of the primary functions of the physical and procedural security program. It is difficult to detect, hard to prove, and becomes costly if ignored. Cargo movements are made in all kinds of packaging, some is even moved without packaging, merely tagged and labeled. Small packages are more susceptible to pilferage, since they are more easily concealed and not as readily detected. Actual losses depend on such variables as volume, accessibility, waiting and loading times, storage areas between carriers or modes of transportation, and a variety of elements that contribute to confusion. Since these factors vary among facilities as well as during different times of day, each must be considered separately in the physical security plan. A pilferer steals primarily by giving into the temptation of an unexpected, or sometimes arranged, opportunity and has little fear of being caught. Usually, little or no planning or premeditation is involved in pilferage. Pilferers generally act alone. They may take items for which they have no immediate need or use. They may take items for family or friends or for use in the home. The degree of risk involved in pilferage is slight unless very large numbers of persons engage in pilferage at the same time. Pilferage occurs whenever an individual feels the need or desire for a certain article and the opportunity to take it is provided by inadequate security measures. Although it involves unsystematic theft of small articles, pilferage is nevertheless very serious and may have a great cumulative effect if the stolen items have a high cash or potential resale value.There is always the possibility that casual pilferers, encouraged by successful theft, may turn to systematic theft. Pilferers are normally employees of a large transportation facility or employees of other transportation segments whose interface requires them to be in the area. These persons are the most difficult to detect and apprehend. Pilferage may occur anywhere in the transportation system where goods are being moved within a facility. Goods and materials left unprotected on carts, dollies, or other intraterminal vehicles for any period of time while awaiting the next move are extremely vulnerable. Such situations require adequate physical security measures, since cargo accountability may become confused and difficult to determine.

281

One means of discouraging casual pilferage is to establish a parcel check system at all entry and exit points to a facility. Parcels carried into a facility have to be logged in at an entry post on entrance to the facility. Those leaving the facility must submit all parcels for inspection prior to departure. This brings it to everyone’s attention that they may be detected if they attempt the unauthorized removal of merchandise. Care must be taken to ensure that personnel are not demoralized and that their rights are not violated by oppressive physical controls or unethical security practices. An aggressive security awareness program can train employees to be diligent and to report pilferage. All employees must understand that pilferage is morally wrong, no matter how insignificant the value of the item taken. Supervisory personnel should set a proper example and maintain a desirable moral climate for employees by establishing an air of concern for the merchandise in their care and custody. In establishing any deterrent to pilferage, security personnel must not lose sight of the fact that most employees are honest and disapprove of thievery of any kind. Mutual respect between security personnel and employees of the particular facility must be accomplished if the facility is to be pilferage free. Any security measures that infringe on the human rights or dignity of others jeopardizes, rather than enhances, the overall protection of the facility.

Theft Theft in the transportation system challenges both management and security personnel. The transportation system management holds the responsibility, working with local law enforcement agencies through its security professionals, to reduce or eliminate cargo theft where possible. It is not an easy task to pinpoint the actual amount of loss occurring at any given facility. Cargo accountability records and methods are generally designed to single out thefts by category. Details of such losses may not be disclosed until some time later, usually on receipt by the ultimate consignee or customer. The specific location may be far removed from the actual point of theft and the management accountable for the delivery may not have been the accountable management at the time of the loss. Facilities located in and around large metropolitan centers are the most vulnerable for thievery. More goods and materials are being moved, terminals are more crowded, and more people are

282


involved, adding to confusion. Markets for criminal redistribution are more readily available. Thieves differ from pilferers in that they steal for profit. Thieves steal according to preconceived plans, and they steal any and all goods in transit. They are selective only according to their fence requests. A thief can work alone but generally has accomplices. It is not unusual to find an accomplice who is an employee of the facility and in a good position to give relevant information to the thief. Some accomplices may even be in an advantageous position to locate or administratively control targeted goods or cause them to be removed from high-security areas. The specific theft may be a one-time occurrence based on inside information pertaining to a particular shipment or extend over long periods, even years. Like pilferage, theft occurs anywhere, but unlike pilferage, theft is planned and organized. It can occur in more unsuspected places, involving switching trailers, misrouting railroad cars, or taking possession of a cargo in the name of a legitimate freight forwarder. The opportunity for theft in the transportation system begins in the shipper’s installation and continues throughout the system and into the warehouse of the consignee after receipt. Employees of a shipper or a consignee may be working to defraud. They may be part of an organized theft group. Dishonest documentation can result in the transportation system getting blamed for the loss when actually the goods were never sent or were stolen after delivery. One common practice is called shortloading. Control of goods in transit is one of the greatest challenges to the transportation industry. Thieves can infiltrate into transportation ranks as legitimate employees. They can strike at a time of their choosing. Management can do none of these. Management can be ready, however, and take measures to prevent theft and make it unprofitable and unappealing. Management protects goods by realizing that they are vulnerable and by studying and knowing the opportunities facing thieves and counteracting them. Thieves’ first problem is to identify and locate the cargo to be stolen. Then they must learn the system. They most assuredly have to check storage areas and documentation. Countermeasures should include the control and movement of personnel and sensitive information through awareness programs. People have a tendency to talk too much and to the wrong people. If losses occur in a facility or at a certain place in a facility, management should carefully observe the behavior of employees; unthinking or

disloyal employees may give away goods in transit, sometimes unknowingly. Thieves, after locating the desired goods, must gain access to them, then take possession. To gain possession, they may be required to survey such security factors as physical safeguards or guard procedures for weaknesses, attempt to bride guards, alter or forge shipping documents or passes, or create a disturbance to divert the attention of security personnel while the actual theft is taking place. The next problem is the removal of the cargo. Thieves may have to remove it to a vehicle or vehicles, falsify documents, or alter the vehicle’s exterior by painting one for this purpose. The final problem is to dispose of the stolen goods. Thieves need an outlet for stolen goods and must divert them back into the legitimate market for profit.They most probably sell the goods through fences, pawnbrokers, flea markets, and discount houses. Frequently, thieves steal on order and know in advance who will receive the stolen goods. The knowledge that the thief has the problem of locating, taking possession of, moving, and selling stolen goods offers management the opportunity for constructive preventive measures. Thorough investigation and discovery of the means used to accomplish a theft offers a chance to prevent it from recurring. In addition, thieves must work with other people to disposes of their loot. The primary concern of thieves in selecting a target is its monetary value. Since they steal for profit, thieves look for items from which they can quickly realize the greatest financial gain. This means that they must already have or be able to quickly find a ready market for the stolen merchandise, such items of high value as pharmaceuticals, metals, or electronic components. A thief may, if the profit is substantial, select a target of great size and weight. Stolen cargo or items may be removed from transportation facilities in many ways: 䊉

Terminal operations are extremely vulnerable to systematic theft. This is where facility personnel and truck drivers have direct contact with each other and a readily available means of conveyance, which offers opportunity for collusion. Although most truck drivers and employees are honest, some become victim to the temptation presented by poorly controlled goods in transit. For instance, a receiving clerk might certify the receipt of property that the truck driver actually disposed of prior to arrival at the facility or, in some instances, at the consignee’s location. A


䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

facility employee or a thief acting as an employee can provide a truck driver with cargo and assist in concealing it aboard the truck for unauthorized removal from the facility. Employees can assist a truck driver in removing property by executing a false invoice, which may appear to be legitimate when inspected by security personnel. The driver’s responsibility starts when the truck is loaded and the cargo receipted for; it ceases when the truck is unloaded at destination and the receipt is signed. The distribution and security of the load on the truck are also the responsibility of the driver and the management in custody of the cargo. Railway employees assigned to switching duties at a facility can operate in a similar manner. Since a railway car normally cannot be directed to a desired location so that stolen cargo can be removed, additional confederates usually are required to transfer the stolen goods from the railway car, at some point or siding outside the facility, into some other means of transportation for removal to the ultimate destination. This increase in the number of persons involved reduces profits and increases the chances for discovery and apprehension. The carrier’s responsibility commences when the loaded and sealed railroad car is coupled to the engine. The carrier’s responsibility ceases when the railroad car is spotted in the consignee’s yard or unloaded at destination. Trash disposal and salvage activities offer excellent opportunities to the thief to gain access to valuable material. Property may be hidden in waste material to be removed by a confederate who has the duty to remove trash from the facility. Many other methods may be employed by a thief to remove cargo from transportation facilities, such as moving items to a wrong location within the facility to be picked up by a confederate, intentionally misrouting cargo to a location where it can be picked up by a confederate, collusion with security personnel, failing to keep goods under surveillance, or removal by custodial or vendor vehicles. Thieves need not be employees or to be in collusion with employees; they can pose as employees or have false credentials from a nonexistent transportation company. Thieves use many methods to pass themselves off as legitimate persons employed by legitimate companies in the transportation field. This is particularly true in the

283

overcrowded terminal facilities in the large metropolitan areas.

Organized Crime Just how much theft of goods from the transportation modes can be attributed to individual thieves and how much to organized crime is not accurately known. The U.S. Department of Justice believes that the vast majority of thefts, both in quantity and in dollar value, are the result of organized crime. Just as the bookie operates within the framework of organized crime, so does the thief of goods in transit. Since organized crime provides a major network for the disposal of stolen goods, in effect, organized crime has become a theft-to-order operation with the transportation system as the victim. Some complaints have been registered but usually are settled with claims being paid, unhappy consignees, and large shipments of stolen merchandise being offered for sale as unbelievable bargains hundreds of miles from the scene of the actual thefts. Someone must pay for these costs, and it is usually passed on to the public. Legitimate businesses must pay the very large bill for such indirect costs as 䊉

䊉

䊉

Spiraling insurance costs or growing deductible coverage that stems from organized crime’s unique competitive methods. Increased tax burdens resulting from nonexistent records in organized crime enterprises. Customer drop-off when legitimate enterprises are forced to raise prices to compensate for theft harassment.

Organized crime is a real and costly hazard to the security of goods in the transportation system. In comparison to the hazards of the pilferer and the unorganized thief, organized crime presents infinitely more complicated problems. These problems are varied and involve every way that the human mind can conceive of to steal, swindle, defraud, and separate a rightful owner from his or her property, particularly while it is in the custody of others. Some recommended preventive measures for assisting in reducing the risks associated with organized crime thefts follow: 䊉

䊉

Engage a trustworthy security professional who works directly for the senior manager of a transportation facility or other levels of management, as appropriate. Know the supervisors and make them aware of the need for consistent security awareness.

284

䊉

䊉

䊉


Investigate all losses promptly and thoroughly and report to the appropriate authorities. When losses occur and tend to portray a pattern, maintain extra vigilance of employees and, if the situation dictates, make appropriate personnel changes. Provide periodic detailed inspections of the security measures in effect and the transportation operation procedures.

Organized crime activities consist of highly organized, tightly controlled management that takes advantage of any weakness in the transportation system. Can you answer these basic questions? 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

What type of organization is required to systematically pinpoint the location of goods and set them up for theft? How is a shipment of merchandise found on the shelves of a retail store thousands of miles from the location where the theft occurred? What organization structure is required to transport and ship stolen goods? What organizational patterns are used to effect the sale of such stolen goods in many locations after a theft?

While pondering these questions, remember that when one person is apprehended, the organization continues without interruption. Dishonest employees, whether working alone or in collusion with other employees or nonemployees, are restricted in their methods of operation only by their own imagination and the existing opportunities to avoid detection. To minimize the opportunity to commit thefts while avoiding detection, the following must be evaluated: 1. Losses experienced (total, including cost of dispositions) 2. Distribution of losses by type: Pilferage (concealable on person or in vehicle) Theft (bypassing existing controls) Damage (accidental, deliberate, elements) Error (over, short, missing documents) Unexplained (no evidence to substantiate method causing loss)

Cargo Package and Movement Controls The responsibilities of the shipper, the carrier, and the consignee must be clearly established if cargo is to be adequately protected in transit. Custody varies according to the size of the shipment and the means of transportation.

For shipments of less than the total capacity of a truck, railroad car, aircraft, or ship, the carrier assumes responsibility when the agent acknowledges receipt at the shipping point and is relieved when delivery is made to the consignee. The responsibility of the carrier for large shipments depends on the mode of transportation used. If transportation is by truck, the carrier assumes custody when the vehicle is loaded. The truck carrier’s responsibility ceases when the truck is unloaded at its destination. The railroad carrier’s responsibility begins when the loaded and sealed car is coupled to a locomotive. He or she relinquishes custody when the car is spotted in the consignee’s yard or unloaded at its destination. Air and water carriers assume responsibility when an agent takes possession of the cargo from a shipper. This responsibility ends when the cargo is removed from the vessel or aircraft and delivered to a freight forwarder, another carrier for transshipment, the consignee, or the agent. A shipper load and count (SL&C) movement in any of these modes relieves the carrier of liability for shortages, provided an accurate seal record is maintained.

Trucking Operations Inclement weather and the possibility of accident are ever-present dangers to cargo in transit. It is incumbent on the security officer to develop preplanned procedures for real operation, which should be part of the security plan. The integrity of those responsible for line haul should be unquestionable. Only responsible, screened employees should be assigned as drivers and helpers to transport high-value cargo. The equipment used must be in excellent condition to avoid breakdowns that require emergency security protection. This is often difficult, sometimes impossible, and always expensive to provide. Modifications to equipment are often desirable. They can include additional locking and alarm devices, removal of outside door hardware, and installation of oversize fuel tanks (where permissible). Employees should receive strict instructions concerning procedures to be followed during rest periods or meal stops while in transit. The vehicle should be locked and parked where it can be observed. The nature of the cargo carried should not be discussed with anyone. The driver should not deviate from the preplanned route. In the event of equipment failure, the driver should notify the


nearest terminal immediately. If it is necessary to move high-value cargo over a weekend or on a holiday, it should be delivered to a terminal where maximum security can be provided. To further protect vehicles on the road, large, brilliant-hued numerals should be painted on the roof and sides. This will help identify the equipment if it is stolen or hijacked and a helicopter search is initiated. The threat or vulnerability to hijacking exists, making the need for rooftop markings a deterrent and prevention tool. In states where the use of double bottoms is permitted, the most valuable cargo should be loaded in the lead van.

In-Transit Storage While cargo is in the custody of the transportation system, it must frequently be stored for varying periods of time. During these intervals it is highly susceptible to loss, theft, or damage. A few elementary precautions help reduce the claims filed against the responsible carrier: 䊉

䊉

Seals Seals are invaluable to the protection of cargo in transit, but they are only as effective as the controls maintained over them. The responsibility for seal control must be vested in a specific individual, who maintains a record of all seals issued and to whom. Unissued seals should be stored in a locked container with limited access. All cargo under seal entering a facility should be checked and the seal numbers recorded. If a seal is found to be broken or removed or if the number does not agree with the one on the shipping document, an immediate item-by-item inventory of the shipment must be made.

Transfer Points Transfer points, where cargo is transshipped from one mode of transportation to another or between two carriers of the same mode, are frequently areas where large losses can be expected. Cargo is often left unprotected, particularly in remote parts of the facility or yard. Shipping documents are apt to be carelessly handled at these points and shipments can be intentionally misrouted into the hands of the criminal. To reduce loss by theft or misrouting at a transfer point, management must maintain strict accountability of all cargo and demand that a carrier which receives cargo from another accept custody for it in its original condition. Shipping documents must be examined carefully to guard against falsification or tampering. Employees of carriers using the facility must be able to prove their identity.

285

䊉

Individual shipments of cargo should be kept intact and stacked as a unit. This prevents accidental separation and loss of a portion of a shipment. Fixed position lights in a storage area should be diffused to eliminate deep shadows. Each guard should be equipped with a strong, high-beam flashlight. Stacks should be arranged in accord with existing lighting to avoid creation of deep shadows. Greater emphasis should be placed on personnel control than structural or mechanical protection in those areas where cargo is stored for short periods of time. The increased traffic generated in this situation and consequent increased vulnerability of cargo to pilferage and theft require more alertness by guard patrols and more careful checking of the credentials of all individuals given access to the area. If possible, the storage area should be broken into subareas, with cargo handlers and truckers limited to the one subarea, compatible with their credentials and business purpose.

Protected cargo, a term common to shippers of Department of Defense material, consists of items that require special handling because of their value or sensitive nature. The Department of Defense places protected cargo in three categories: 1. Sensitive. Small arms, ammunition, and explosives that have a ready use during civil disturbances, terrorist acts, and other types of domestic unrest and that, if in the hands of militant or revolutionary organizations, present a definite threat to public safety. 2. Pilferable. Items vulnerable to theft and having a ready sale potential in illicit markets, such as alcoholic beverages. 3. Controlled. Items that require additional control and security in accordance with published regulations and statutes, including money, negotiable instruments, narcotics, registered mail, precious metal alloys, ethyl alcohol, and drug abuse items. High-value pilferable (protected) cargo should be kept separate from other material and provided a

286


greater degree of security.This material is best stored in a crib or security cage. High-value, low-volume cargo, such as fissile radioactive materials, jewelry, furs, and securities require special handling and special security measures during storage. Cargo of this nature should pass from accountable officer to accountable officer. It should kept be under close surveillance constantly and always be stored in an exclusion area. When placed in an exclusion area it should be registered, including time, date, accountable party, and witness. The same procedure should be followed when the cargo departs from the facility.

Controlled Areas A controlled area is any area whose access is governed by special restrictions and controls. In establishing controlled areas, consideration must be given to preserving the facility’s cargo-moving goals as well as its past loss and theft record. All high-value cargo should be under surveillance or in a controlled area unless it is locked or sealed in the vehicle that transports it. Carrier vehicles containing high-value cargo, particularly trucks, trailers, and railway cars, must be guarded or protected in a controlled area until they are released to authorized personnel for movement. To be fully effective, a controlled area should be under surveillance by physical or electronic methods and movement within the area controlled. A barricade providing limited access does not, in itself, constitute a controlled area. The transportation industry provides a public service. As a result, some of its operations must be open to the general public. The general offices, personnel office, and freight receiving offices may need to be outside the controlled area. Where practical, consideration should be given to the installation of convex mirrors in warehouse storage areas so that supervisory and guard personnel can have additional surveillance capability. A controlled area can extend over many acres and include vehicle marshalling yards, docks, warehouses, and service or supply buildings. Such an area is a first line of defense for the protection of cargo in the transportation system.

rity. A different pass, issued to fewer people, should be necessary for entry to a limited area. Sorting, recoopering of crates, and storage may be accomplished here.

Exclusion Area An exclusion area can be located inside the limited area. Again, a different pass should be required and the number of people granted access strictly limited. The exclusion area is used only for handling highvalue, low-volume cargo.The crib, vault, or cargo that makes up the exclusion area should be kept locked or under surveillance at all times. Access points to any controlled area, regardless of the degree of security involved, should be locked at all times or under physical or electronic surveillance. Strict control of the keys or combinations to locks is essential. Management should make periodic checks to determine the integrity of controlled areas in addition to any checks conducted by security representatives.

Package Control A good package control system is an invaluable aid in preventing or minimizing pilferage and theft. No packages, except those with proper authorization, should be permitted into controlled areas without inspection or accountability. A simple system should be established to control movement of packages, materials, and property into and out of the facility. Limitations as to types of property authorized, persons allowed to move authorized property, and approved points of entrance and exit should be included in the facility physical security plan. A standard package checking system may be used with an entrance pass to a controlled area for the convenience of employees and visitors. When practicable, all outgoing packages should be inspected except those properly authorized for removal. When 100% inspection is impracticable, frequent unannounced checks should be conducted at random times.

Vehicle Control Limited Area A limited area can be established within the controlled area. This provides a higher degree of secu-

Strict control of all vehicles entering or leaving a controlled area should be maintained. Parking lots should be located outside of all cargo exchange and controlled areas. The only vehicles entering or


leaving a controlled area should be bona fide cargocarrying or -handling equipment or emergency vehicles. Generally, three types of vehicles work within the controlled areas: facility vehicles, primarily small trucks, cargo-handling vehicles, cargo-loading vehicles, and the like; cargo pickup and delivery and freight forwarder vehicles; and the in-house cargocarrier vehicles. Of primary concern to the security staff are the cargo pickup and delivery vehicles and freight forwarder vehicles. These vehicles should be both checked in and checked out, with adequate records being maintained to ensure that they are the vehicles authorized for specific cargo movements. The facility vehicles generally remain on the facility but should be properly recorded if they are required to leave the facility. The cargo carrier vehicles should be inspected and documented when arriving or departing. It is essential to maintain accurate records of all cargo-carrying vehicles entering or leaving controlled areas. A close inspection of all trucks entering or leaving a facility should be a general requirement. An orderly system should be established to limit and control the movement of trucks and other conveyances within controlled areas. All trucks and conveyances entering a controlled area should be required to pass through a control gate guarded by security. Truck drivers, helpers, passengers, and vehicle contents should be carefully screened. The security check at truck entrances should cover both incoming and outgoing trucks and should include the following: 䊉

䊉

䊉䊉

Appropriate entries on a truck register, including vehicle registration, name of truck firm, description of load, and date and time of entrance and departure. Identification of driver and helper, including proof of affiliation with the company owning the truck or conveyance. A license check of the vehicle operator. Examination of the truck or conveyance.

Passes or some form of documentation should be issued to truck drivers and helpers who have been identified and registered. This documentation should permit only limited access to specific loading and unloading areas. Incoming traffic should be kept to the minimum essential for the efficient operation of the facility, and escorts should be provided if vehicles are permitted access to controlled or restricted areas. For trucks with loads that are impractical to examine, door seals may be used at the entrance gate. These seals are opened by a designated repre-

287

sentative at the receiving end. Likewise, the truck doors may be resealed for exit or for other stops within the facility. Loading and unloading operations should be strictly supervised to assure that unauthorized materials or persons do not enter or leave the facility via trucks or other conveyances. This also applies to all service and support vehicles that, under most circumstances, have regular access to a given facility.

Warehousing and Storage Storage is not a normal function of the transportation system for goods in transit. It does, however, become necessary at times to provide at least temporary warehousing. The necessary storage of goods and materials is more applicable to the manufacturers or shippers as well as the variety of consignees who receive the goods. It is management’s responsibility in all instances to assure adequate protection for goods at all times. This includes terminal storage at either end of the route or, in some instances, en route. Storage areas may include a warehouse, shed, open areas, or any portion of a facility designated for holding purposes. All the security considerations and principles that apply to the prevention of loss and theft of goods in the transportation system apply equally to warehouse areas.

Open Storage Open storage is normally used only for those goods not subject to damage by weather conditions and bulky, nonperishable items that are not easily pilfered. It should never include high-value, low-volume items. When property is stored in open areas, it should be properly stacked and placed within but not near fenced-in areas. All off-loaded cargos must be properly stacked or stored regardless of the time of receipt. It is imperative that complete individual shipments of cargo be kept intact. This helps prevent the inadvertent separation and eventual loss of a portion of one shipment in the system of accountability. Stacks of goods in storage should be a minimum of 50 feet from the perimeter fencing. They should be as symmetrical as possible, and the aisles between stacks or lines should be wide and straight. These arrangements not only provide for visibility by the

288


security staff but allow for the proper movement of vehicles and cargo hauling equipment. Fixed-position lights in a storage area should be of a diffused type to eliminate deep shadows.

Covered Storage The same principles of even stacking and adequate aisle space recommended for use in open storage are applicable to covered storage. Goods in storage should be placed to conform with existing lighting to keep deeply shadowed areas to a minimum. In areas where goods and materials are constantly being moved in and out or otherwise stored for very short periods, more emphasis should be placed on personnel movement control and security than structural or mechanical protection. This is especially so during working hours to prevent pilferage or theft by unauthorized personnel or workers. Highly theft-prone types of goods and material in storage should be kept separate from other cargoes and given a greater degree of security. Sensitive items are those that can be pilfered or stolen and disposed of quickly. Such items should be placed in a separate high-value storage area to provide a much higher degree of physical and procedural security protection. In instances where a separate building is not available or warranted by the requirement for sensitive storage, areas that have previously been described as limited or exclusive areas should be designated and utilized.

High-Value, Low-Volume Storage All high-value, low-volume items, like jewelry, gems, furs, and securities require special handling and special security measures when in storage. Goods of this nature should pass from one accountable person to another. They should be held under close observation at all times and always stored in an exclusion area. All goods placed in the exclusion area should be registered and logged for time, date, and recipient. The goods should also be logged out on removal, with similar notations made. It is essential to maintain accurate records of all persons who enter and leave an exclusion area.

Shipping and Receiving Areas and Personnel Control of shipping and receiving areas and personnel at a plant, warehouse, or distribution center can do much to prevent cargo theft. A number of practi-

cal measures are available to shippers and receivers to improve the security of cargo-handling areas and -controlling personnel to minimize opportunities for theft. To provide better physical security, shippers and receivers may find it to their advantage to adopt the following precautions in areas where cargo is moved to or from carrier equipment. 1. Maintain perimeter controls. Mark off a perimeter area a suitable distance, at least 20 feet, from the dock edge and from the wall of the office where carrier personnel report. Place signs reading “Restricted Area—Authorized Personnel Only” along the perimeter line facing the dock and office. Make sure that shipping and receiving areas are well lighted. Use lighting with a power level of 50–60 foot-candles, if possible. Include floodlights to light the interior of railcars and truck vans. 2. Keep all cargo doors closed when not loading or unloading. 3. Do not allow cargo being loaded or unloaded to remain in the operating area between dock front and perimeter line or, generally, in close proximity to railcars or trucks. 4. Provide a secure room in the shipping and receiving area for control of sensitive or high-risk cargo during the shipping or receiving process. Limit access to this room and exercise tight control over movement of such cargo to the carrier or from the carrier to storage. 5. Maintain strict control and accountability for all keys to locked areas, security rooms, and containers. 6. Store seals securely within the office area. Limit issuance of seals to a select few employees. Maintain accurate records of all seals issued. Strong measures of physical security are essential, and shippers and receivers run serious risk of cargo theft if they neglect them (see Appendix 17.A). Close personnel control and supervision are even more important. They provide the key to high-level security for shipping and receiving operations. Good personnel control begins with preemployment screening. Employers should make the screening process as thorough as possible. It should include a check with previous employers and other available sources. After hiring, employers may find it advisable to take the following precautions: 1. Require identification badges with photographs for every employee. 2. Maintain an up-to-date signature file or other verification system for all employees authorized to sign receipts and other shipping documents.


3. Require employees to enter and leave the premises through a single personnel door or gate. Prohibit access of employees’ vehicles to the cargo area. 4. Maintain controls such as special passes for employees who leave the facility during duty hours. 5. Limit to a select few the employees authorized to process receipts for shipments of sensitive and high-value items. 6. Require identification badges for all persons visiting the facility. 7. Indoctrinate all personnel to challenge persons moving about the facility who are not accompanied by an employee. 8. Remind all employees periodically of the penalties for theft, including loss of job, and the possible impact of serious theft from the company. Good supervision does much to improve cargo security at the shipper’s and receiver’s premises (see Appendix 17.B). The shipper and receiver may find it useful to instruct company supervisors to observe the following practices: 1. Make their presence conspicuous in the shipping and receiving area, continually overseeing cargo handling operations. 2. Make frequent checks of the quantities of inbound and outbound cargo being handled. Make occasional unannounced spot audits, especially of loading operations. 3. Rotate cargo-handling personnel among different carriers, where feasible. 4. Rotate cargo checkers and handlers on different work cycles, where possible. 5. Prevent nonemployees from assisting in shipping and receiving operations. 6. Report any suspicious activity to the security office.

Documentation Much cargo loss can be traced to poor documentation practices attributable to the volume of paperwork necessary to control both large and small shipments. Nevertheless, documentation is one of management’s most important methods for controlling cargo handling and combating the increasing sophistication of thieves and pilferers. To reduce cargo theft, shippers and receivers should be familiar with the security hazards associated with documentation and the ways in which documentation practices can be improved to increase cargo security.

289

The purpose of documentation is simple. Documentation gives the characteristics of the cargo; tells how, when, and where a shipment is to move; provides accountability; and forms a basis for carrying out the financing of individual shipments. Documentation, while essential to the movement of cargo, tends by its very nature to expose cargo to risk of theft. If creates serious security hazards, which can be minimized only by stringent control measures.

Accessibility Many persons have almost unlimited access to the detailed information required to document cargo shipments. The origin, carrier, route, destination, description of commodities, weight cube, value, and time of shipment can be obtained from various shipping documents. The large number of documentprocessing points associated with each shipment magnifies the problem. Because of easy access to detailed information, shipments can easily be set up for theft and pilferage by company or carrier employees or even outsiders.

Errors Errors in documentation constitute a security hazard because they lead to cargo theft. The large number of subsidiary documents that duplicate data found on source documents repeatedly contain errors in transcription. Consequently, shipments are misrouted, delayed, or frustrated. The cargo often ends up lying unattended and unaccounted for in terminals, piers, or warehouses, where it becomes a target for thieves, because the longer cargo is delayed at any given point along its route the more susceptible it is to theft.

Late Submission Failure of shippers and receivers to forward documents promptly to the necessary parties delays the processing of cargo, and cargo delayed in transit is extremely vulnerable to theft. Shippers and receivers may find it advisable to take a number of practical measures if they wish to reduce theft and pilferage caused by poor documentation practices: 1. Maintain a continuing review of the company’s documentation procedures and change them where necessary to improve cargo security. 2. Analyze records of incidents and losses to determine causes and direct necessary corrective action.

290


3. Limit access to documentation. Maintain strict controls over the storage and distribution of invoices, shipping orders, manifests, and other vital materials. 4. Avoid wide dissemination of documents. Do not make excess copies of documents. Discourage transmission of information by telephone, telegram, fax, or modem, particularly concerning high-value items. 5. Transcribe information carefully from source documents to subsidiary documents, and check the transcription closely. 6. Forward shipping documents promptly, especially those needed at foreign destinations. 7. Limit the number of persons having knowledge of cargo shipments. 8. Maintain strict control of information on the shipment’s routing, time of dispatch, time of arrival, and carrier. 9. Give security personnel advance notice of cargo requiring surveillance and protection. Inform the carrier when special protective services are required on its part. 10. Ensure that documentation procedures provide a clear audit trail of all cargo shipped and received. Require cargo checkers to use selfinking identification stamps to facilitate audit by overcoming the problem of illegible signatures on receipts. Maintain close control of such stamps. 11. Inspect cargo immediately on receipt. Note shortages on receipt documents and notify carrier. If theft is suspected, notify the proper law enforcement authorities. 12. Enclose a packing list in each shipping container or package, if practicable, to facilitate prompt and complete survey if pilferage occurs. Do not put the packing list on the outside of the container or package. 13. Select documentation employees carefully; ensure thorough training, including instruction in the security hazards of documentation; and require close supervision.

Receipt of Shipments The warehouse is particularly vulnerable to theft and pilferage. In addition to security of the physical area and effective control of personnel, however, other safeguards can improve security.An inbound register should be maintained, recording carrier name; commodity; quantity; time of arrival; time of departure; driver’s name; the truck, van, or railcar number; and

any note of discrepancies. In addition to the inbound register, the receiver may find it advantageous to maintain special control procedures for trucks: 1. Refuse to spot a truck at the dock until receiving personnel are available.A receiving clerk or warehouse worker should meet the driver and request the bills of lading or waybills. The clerk should examine these documents against the purchase order to assure legibility, authenticity, and completeness. All discrepancies should be corrected immediately or the cargo refused. 2. Check that driver has a valid gate pass and retain it until ready to sign the release. Note the date and hour of release on the pass so that gate security personnel can ascertain normal time lags in travel from the receiving area to the gate. 3. Examine door seals, if called for by the documentation. If the numbers of the seals are at variance with those on the documents, notify the supervisor immediately so that she or he can notify the shipper and the receiver’s security office. 4. Ensure that the receiving clerk safeguards the documents through the checking, unloading, and storage process, taking care not to deface or lose them. Require the receiving clerk’s signature on the documentation, with date and time information. 5. If a full truckload of the same cargo is moved to a location other than the receiving dock for unloading, do not break the seals until the truck is ready for unloading. Have an employee of the receiver facility accompany the truck while moving from the receiving area to the unloading point. 6. If a truck cannot be fully unloaded before the close of business, close all doors with suitable locking devices until the next work day. 7. Ensure that the supervisor checks the interior of the truck after unloading and before the receiving clerk goes to the next vehicle.Then require the driver to depart immediately. Similarly, the receiver may wish to maintain special control procedures for railcars: 1. Ensure that the documents are legible, complete, and authentic before issuing the cargo receipt. Require immediate correction of any discrepancies. 2. Inspect the seals on loaded railcars and check against the numbers recorded on the documents. Where possible, assign an employee of the traffic section to check the seals as the cars are spotted by the rail carrier. Immediately notify the carrier of discrepancies.


3. Where discrepancies are found in the seals, make a physical check of the contents of the railcar, with a representative of the rail carrier present. Notify the receiver’s security office. 4. If a railcar is spotted in a holding area within the facility and later moved to the unloading area by the receiver’s equipment, lock the railcar while in the holding area, using the receiver’s locking devices. 5. Ensure that the supervisor checks the interior of the railcar after unloading and before the receiving clerk goes to the next railcar. Then close the railcar doors immediately. The security of sensitive or high-value cargo or other goods requiring storage in security rooms calls for additional safeguards. They should be moved directly from truck or railcar to the security room, and the receiving clerk should require a signed receipt from the security room employees who receive the cargo. The thief or pilferer gains opportunity through lack of supervision, control, and checks during the cargo receiving process. A large receiving facility is a complex and active place with much movement of merchandise, personnel, and equipment. Unless the devices of the thief are known and adequate controls are maintained, theft is bound to occur. An informed knowledge of the methods of the thief helps the receiver adopt and apply more-effective controls. Some examples follow.

The Partially Emptied Carton Opening a carton, removing part of the contents, filling the void with some type of waste material, and resealing the carton hides a theft unless someone handling the carton notices the weight differential. The carton, however, is not always resealed. Therefore, the receiving clerk should immediately check the contents and reseal any open cartons. A strange sound from a carton should also alert the receiving clerk. Substitutes such as rocks and bottles that can create sound have been found. If possible, make frequent spot checks at receiving platforms by opening a small percentage of cartons not otherwise subject to loss or damage notations. Remember that an open carton quickly becomes an empty carton.

Lunch and Break Periods Leaving the receiving area unguarded and cargo doors open during lunch and break periods is an invitation to the thief to load checked cargo back on the

291

truck. Cargo doors should be closed and at least one employee should remain on duty in the receiving are during these periods.

Pallet Patterns After pallet pattern and count have been established, a thief who knows pallet patterns can easily change the pattern by putting one fewer carton per layer on the pallet. Visible evidence of this change is minimal, and several cartons can be extracted from a full truck or carload. These cartons are difficult to see when slipped into dark confines of the truck, van, or railcar. The receiver should periodically check the pallet load count and inspect the inside of the van or railcar before signing the gate pass or closing the car doors.

The Falsified Document Large quantities of cargo are lost through theft in receiving activities by employees who falsify the quantity received and leave merchandise in the truck or railcar to be hauled out of the terminal. A receiving clerk in collusion with a driver or a rail employee can steal much cargo simply by leaving the quantity desired in the truck or railcar and certifying on the documentation that the full quantity was received. Two simple procedures do much to control this problem: 1. Require each receiving employee to call the supervisor for a final check of the truck or railcar to ensure that no merchandise is left in the vehicle. If dock lights are insufficient to illuminate the interior of vans and railcars, the supervisor should use a flashlight or lantern. He or she should ensure that merchandise is not concealed under trash or in the cab of the truck. In damagefree railcars, the supervisor should check behind the bulkhead doors. 2. Take a 100% inventory periodically of the stored receipt counts of each receiving clerk for one day’s receipts.

Trash Dropping valuable items into trash bins and later retrieving them from the dump is a common practice. In some cases, the employee has an agreement with the dump attendants. Alert observations of employees by supervisors do much to prevent this type of theft, but also it is desirable to apply trash collection and removal controls, such as establishing

292


timetables for placing trash in bins. Crushing or shredding the contents of trash receptacles prior to removal from the premises discourages thieves from depositing stolen items in refuse.

Trailers Unattended trailers and trailers remaining overnight at a receiving point offer an excellent means for the illegal removal of merchandise. Failure of supervisors to make at least one check of each trailer (during unloading and when empty before releasing it) can result in the loss of an entire trailer load. Simply by signing the documents and the cargo receipt, a receiving employee may be able to steal an entire trailer without bringing it to the receiving area. When supervisors insist on checking each carrier vehicle before release, this type of theft can be prevented. When trailers are left unattended by receiving personnel, the driver has a blank check for loading cargo. Lock or seal empty and unattended trailers remaining overnight, weekends, or holidays to prevent them from being filled with stolen goods.

Pallet Exchange If collusion exists between the receiving employee and the driver, empty pallets can be quickly loaded into the van to conceal cargo. Falsifying the cargo receipt showing that the entire quantity was received covers up the theft. Close supervision is the only answer.

Serious Oversight A few cartons used to support the end of an unloading conveyor can be conveniently left on the truck. If noticed by receiving personnel, the driver claims that it was an oversight. Checking carrier vehicles before release can prevent this type of theft.

Seal Switches If seals are left in a readily accessible place, carrier personnel can steal them, break the existing seal, and substitute a stolen one after going to another area and loading illicit cargo before going to the perimeter gate. In some cases, a receiving employee has furnished to the driver in collusion a second seal, the number of which was entered on the gate pass. This seal is placed on the door of the vehicle after illicit cargo was loaded elsewhere.

Packaging, Pallets, and Containers Shipping goods in the right kind of package or container is essential to good cargo security. Good shipping practice requires that packaging be suitable to protect cargo against all hazards of transportation, and theft has become a serious hazard. Not only is inadequate packaging a major reason why shipments arrive damaged, but weak or damaged packaging invites pilferage by making it easy to steal the goods. Most often goods are stolen from broken packing cases in small quantities either in the warehouse or during cargo-handling operations. Shippers and receivers may take a number of precautions to curb losses by increasing the difficulty and risk for the thief or pilferer: 1. Select shipping containers strong enough to protect the load from damage and hold together without breaking open under stress or rough handling. 2. Select shipping containers that are so difficult to breach and close so tightly that the thief must destroy the case to get at its contents. 3. Ensure that the shipping container has effective closing devices. Make sure that all flaps of fiberboard containers are fully closed and reinforced with 3-inch paper tape. 4. Reinforce heavy shipments with strapping, normally applied girthwise. 5. Examine wooden containers to ensure that all nails are driven home and reinforced strapping is used. 6. Avoid using secondhand packaging materials where possible. Marks of previous nails and straps and obliterated addresses make it difficult to determine on inspection whether pilferage has occurred. 7. Adopt the unitized load principle through use of pallets and van containers to the greatest extent feasible. The object of the unit load principle is to give greater speed, security, flexibility, and economy to cargo movement by consolidating small packages into unitized loads of optimum size for the use of mechanical cargo-handling equipment. The main applications of the unit load principle are the pallet and the van container. The pallet affords security to cargo by assembling small packages in units held to the pallet by heavy strapping and various forms of covering. Consolidation into a palletized unit reduces the danger of loss or pilferage of individual packages. To reach a package, the thief ordinarily must cut the strapping,


slash the covering, or otherwise leave visible evidence of having disturbed the load. There are several variant forms of palletization: 䊉

䊉

䊉

Consolidation of packages on a standard wood, plastic, or fiberboard pallet, secured by strapping. Consolidation of packages into a fiberboard container sealed and strapped to a skid. Consolidation of packages onto a standard pallet, with the load secured by transparent shrink wrapping, a heavy plastic coating formed to the shape of the load by application of heat and consequent shrinkage on cooling.

The van container normally offers an even greater measure of security to cargo. Its security attributes are substantial because 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

It is usually constructed of steel, aluminum, or plywood; it is difficult to breach without leaving visible marks. It can be padlocked and sealed, affording security equal to that of truck trailers and railcars. If seals of good quality and design are used, their removal is difficult without signs of tampering. Entire pallets can be accommodated in the van container. This materially increases the degree of protection against pilferage afforded to the goods. Containers are adopted to intermodal movement and can be transported door-to-door with a minimum of delay and opening for inspection of the contents. Each opening thus eliminated reduces opportunities for theft.

Experience has shown that theft or pilferage is most likely when containers are open at the shipping and receiving dock. This calls for the same security procedures regarding personnel, documentation, and physical controls as in the case of trucks. Pilferage while containers are en route is most likely if the container has been damaged or is not properly maintained. Proper attention to sealing, with use of reliable, tamperproof seals, and maintenance of accurate seal records, including noting seal numbers and the reasons for any breaking of seals, do much to reduce the incidence of pilferage en route. Good maintenance practices are the first line of defense against such pilferage, and the shipper should be careful to reject a damaged or defective container if it is offered for the transportation of cargo.

Liability and Claims In arranging for the movement of cargo, the shipper or receiver must be prepared to accept that, on occa-

293

sion, even good security measures may fail and theft or pilferage may occur. At this point, after the harm is done, liability and claims procedures come into play. Knowledge of the rules of carrier liability and claim procedures prove indispensable to the shipper or receiver that wishes to obtain indemnity. The fact of loss, however, should give shippers and receivers an incentive to go beyond indemnification and consider how to prevent recurrence. From the standpoint of cargo security, the most important aspect of liability and claims is claims prevention. Every safeguard the shipper or receiver adopts is an act of claims prevention. Moreover, the shipper or receiver can obtain professional help in taking preventive measures on a systematic basis. Many insurance companies have claims prevention specialists who can survey a shipper or receiver’s operations and recommend ways in which greater security can be attained. Use of consultative services of this kind is a prudent course of action even for the shipper or receiver with relatively good loss experience.

Carrier Liability for Loss of Cargo When loss occurs through theft or pilferage, liability of the shipper or receiver depends on various elements. Since there are no uniform rules of carrier liability, the presence and amount of the shipper’s indemnity depends in large measure on the mode of transport used to ship cargo. Each mode of transport operates under different rules, with wide variations in the limits of liability and the defenses available to the carrier. For the informed shipper or receiver, these variations among modes of transport determine whether the receiver relies on the carrier’s liability or obtains additional protection through cargo insurance. The present monetary limits of carrier liability should be known by the user and confirmed with the particular carrier or modes of transportation to be used. Surface transportation in foreign countries usually is subject to local law. Most countries in Western Europe, however, are parties to international conventions that limit the liability of highway carriers. In air transportation, the shipper may obtain an increase in the carrier’s limit of liability by paying an additional charge. The same is usually possible in water transportation by agreement between the shipper and carrier. These monetary limits on carrier liability offer only partial assurance of indemnity to the shipper in

294


view of the numerous defenses available to the carrier. Commonly, the fault of the shipper or owner of the goods is a valid defense. Therefore, for example, defective packing frequently exonerates the carrier. The low limits of carrier liability and uncertainty as to recovery have led shippers as a common practice to obtain cargo insurance on goods they ship by air or water carrier. For shipments moving by rail or motor carrier, the need to obtain such insurance may be less compelling, but the shipper may find it prudent to consult an underwriter, especially if the shipment is of high value or would be unduly exposed to theft or pilferage. Additional assistance may be obtained from the carrier’s claims prevention section.

Claims Procedures When loss from theft or pilferage occurs, the shipper or receiver should take care to observe the requisite claims procedures, especially as to notification of loss to the carrier, the formal filing of claims, and if need be, the institution of suit. As a matter of law or under the contract of carriage, these actions ordinarily must be taken within specified time limits (see Appendix 17.A). Failure to comply may foreclose the shipper or receiver’s right to indemnity, regardless of the merits of his claim (C.F.R. 49 Part 1005 Appendix 21-1a).

variety of individual shipments step by step. Another might be a concentrated examination of each element, such as documentation or physical security. Some shippers or receivers can make such surveys with their own staff. If a shipper or receiver lacks this capability or wishes the objectivity of an outsider, professional help is available through an insurance underwriter or broker. Many underwriters or brokers conduct security surveys with their own staff. Others call in specialists from the particular insurance company or association with which they are affiliated. A single survey, while useful, probably would not suffice in most instances. The prudent course might be to repeat at suitable intervals. In this respect, the shipper or receiver could be guided by loss experience. It would be sound practice, however, to order a security survey whenever an important new operation is being set up, as, for example, when a firm is entering the export business for the first time. In addition to such surveys, shippers and receivers may find it useful to review their claim files periodically to see if there is a pattern with respect to the number and types of claims resulting from the operations of other shippers and receivers with whom they do business. Examples would be repeated instances of faulty packing or count discrepancies.

Cargo Security Prevention Standards

Claims Prevention Buildings From a practical standpoint, claims prevention is the most important element of liability and claims. The shipper or receiver must have a reasonable assurance of indemnity if goods are pilfered or stolen, but it is much more beneficial to reduce theft or pilferage to a minimum. The best way is through systematic claims prevention measures. Many of the measures recommended elsewhere in this chapter are in actuality basic claims prevention measures, for they aim to remove opportunities for theft or pilferage and thus reduce the incidence of claims. These recommendations deserve the most serious consideration. It is desirable to go about a claims prevention program in a systematic way. Even if loss experience is relatively low, the shipper or receiver usually finds it advantageous to make a thorough survey of the operation from beginning to end with the specific objective of locating weak spots. Such a survey should cover all parts of the operation: documentation, communications, procedures, personnel, and physical facilities. One method could be to trace a

All terminal buildings housing cargo should be constructed of a material that deters unlawful entry. Ground floor windows should be steel barred. Bars should be spaced at intervals of no more than 6 inches and set in a steel frame securely affixed to the structure. All windows of buildings that adjoin other structures should also be barred. Delivery and receiving doors should be constructed of a material that deters unlawful entry and equipped with a self-locking device that engages immediately when the door is closed. All delivery and receiving doors should remain closed and locked when not actually in use. Pedestrian doors should be capable of being locked with a substantial lock. Workforce facilities such as restrooms, locker rooms, and eating or lounging areas should be separated from the area in which cargo is stored. Maximum security cribs, constructed of a substantial material that deters entry on all four sides, overhead, and from the floor and provides adequate


space for storage of high-value cargo should be incorporated in each terminal building. They should be constructed in an area visible to management or security personnel or under frequent surveillance by the security patrol. (Only designated personnel should be allowed to enter this area; it may be desirable to secure it with a double lock requiring keys held by two different persons.) Only authorized personnel should have access to the office in which delivery and pickup orders are processed. Room arrangements should be such that documents being processed are not available to or observable by unauthorized persons.

295

features and contents of incoming and outgoing vehicles can be examined by the guard. The area around the gatehouse should be free of encumbrances that restrict the guard’s line of vision. Procedural signs advising drivers and visitors of the conditions of entry should be prominently displayed on the exterior of all entry gatehouses, preferably where they can be read by drivers before turning off the public street or road into the approach to the gate. When warranted, photo recorders should be installed in gatehouses to provide a photo record of persons and their documents entering the terminal facility.

Fencing and Gates Whenever possible, perimeter fencing should be provided around terminals in which merchandise is stored. The number of entrances and exits should be held to a minimum. Fencing should normally be of the chain-link type, maximum 2-inch mesh, at 9 gauge, and no less than 6 feet in height surmounted by an additional 2 feet of barbwire. Where installed in soft earth, the bottom of the fencing should be anchored below grade then backfilled. Where installed over concrete, the bottom of the fence should be no more than 2 inches above the surface, but high enough that, when sagging, it does not touch the surface. The top of the fence should be surmounted by at least three strands of barbwire occupying no less than 2 feet vertically and positioned at a 45° angle to the vertical. Gates should be constructed of the same chain link fence material, surmounted by an additional 2 feet of barbwire, within 2 inches of hard ground or paving, and capable of being locked. The fence line should be maintained in good condition and provisions made to avoid bumping and distortion of the fence by motor vehicles and other equipment. Fence lines should be kept free of shrubbery and other objects impeding the line of sight.

Gatehouses Gatehouses should be self-contained units, equipped with at least two modes of communications for assured redundancy. These may be commercial telephone, radio, private telephone, or alarms. The exit gatehouse should be set back from the gate so that existing vehicles can be stopped and examined on terminal property without the gate being opened. Adequate lighting must be provided in the area of the gatehouse so that documents and identifying

Locks and Key Control All padlocks should be of a single standard type for control purposes. The use of other than the approved type is then easily determined. When possible, the base of the padlock should indicate the company name. These padlocks should have multiple pin tumblers (at least six), interchangeable cores, a minimum tension pull resistance of 6000 pounds on the shank portion, and a shrouded shackle. The use of nonstandard padlocks should be prohibited. All lockers, gear boxes, and cooper or carpenter shanties should be locked only with padlocks as just described. No gates or exit areas should be secured by padlocks with the use of chains. All gates and exits should have proper latches secured to the surface with nonexposed bolts. The area surrounding the lock, particularly on the exposed side, should have metal backing to prevent accessibility. The use of electrical switch locks is recommended in gate and exit areas. These permit use of a microswitch to record and indicate the opening of a given lock on a panel or central control indicator. Key control should be rigid. For every key given out, a signature should be required and a card file maintained that indicates the history of each key. Duplicate keys should be secured under absolute control. The distribution of submaster, master, or grandmaster keys should be highly restricted. The key control of all equipment, particularly that which could be used in the commission of a theft, such as hi-los, stackers, and yard tractors, should be very strict. No keys should be left in any equipment overnight or when not assigned. This also should apply to equipment held in the maintenance or repair shops.

296


Table 17-1. Lighting Area Coverage Width of Lighted Strip (feet) Type of area Isolated perimeter Isolated perimeter Semi-isolated perimeter Nonisolated perimeter

Type of Lighting

Inside Fence

Outside Fence

Glare Controlled Controlled Controlled

25 10 10 20–30

200 70 70 30–40

Total Width from Structure Vehicle entrance Pedestrian entrance Railroad entrances Vital structures

Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled

Alarm and Communications Systems All terminal buildings in which merchandise in the transportation scheme moves should be equipped with an intrusion detection system. However, alarm systems should be considered as an adjunct to fencing, lighting, or guard forces, not in lieu of them. Circuit boards, lines, and control panels for alarm systems should be placed in such locations and constructed in such a manner that they are protected from vandalism or deliberate attempts to disrupt or destroy their usefulness. There are various recognized alarm systems; the type that meets the needs of a particular facility can best be determined by a qualified security specialist. The three most popular alarm systems are 1. The audible alarm, which, when activated, draws attention to the facility or a portion thereof. 2. The silent alarm, which is designed to alert private guard forces or municipal police departments. When considering this system, managers should determine the time required for the guard force to respond to the alert. 3. The visible alarm, which increases light intensity in a given area by utilizing additional lights, explosive flares, or rockets.

Lighting Adequate lighting should be provided between dusk and dawn at all entrances and exits, along all boundary lines, around all storage structures, and in all parking areas. The primary power source at a facility is usually a local public utility. However, to protect against a

Inside Fence

Outside Fence

50 25 50 50

50 25 50

Table 17-2. Lighting Intensity Location Vehicular and pedestrian entrances Vital structure and other sensitive areas Unattended outdoor parking area

Intensity 2.0 2.0 1.0

Intensity is in foot-candles on a horizontal plane at ground level.

public power failure, an alternate source of power adequate to provide lights at key control points should be provided. A gasoline-driven generator that starts automatically on the failure of outside power is the preferred alternate, although battery power may also be used. Tables 17-1 and 17-2 provide standards for area coverage and lighting intensity.

Guard Requirements Standards for the guard force should include complete background investigations and physical and mental examinations to meet established standards. The guards should be physically capable of vigorous physical training in self-defense. Uniforms should be distinctive and complete. Uniforms and equipment should meet high standards of cleanliness and maintenance. Prior to any duty assignment, basic training must be given all guards. Training should include such techniques as patrol (both mounted and dismounted), report writing, log and record keeping, use of security equipment, fire and safety regulations, self-defense, crowd and riot control, and use of firearms.


Under most conditions connected with transportation and distribution systems, guards should not be allowed to remain too long in a given post; they should be rotated periodically. However, under certain conditions, keeping the guard at one post could be an asset, especially when personal recognition of people is desired. Examples are personnel entrances to an office building, trades workers’ gates, monitoring stations, areas where recognition and protocol are required, and administrative posts.

Vehicle Control Movements of all vehicles within the terminal should be strictly controlled. The controls must be a standard operating procedure and prominently posted. All trucks and conveyances entering the facility should be examined by gate guards. Guard checks should include registration of truck, name of driver and helper, and license check of vehicle operator. If possible, a photo record of the driver and documents should be made before entering the terminal. Strict supervision of loading and unloading operations should be incorporated into procedures. No vehicle should be opened except when actually being loaded, unloaded, or inspected. Other procedures for vehicle control and operations should include a record of all inbound and outbound trailers and containers and, when not being moved, their storage locations, and a report of any seal discrepancies noted. Parking lots for personal vehicles of employees and visitors should be located outside and separate from freight handling areas. Only cargo-carrying or -handling vehicles should be permitted in controlled areas. It is advisable to separate entry and exit roadways and gates if the facility permits. Flow of traffic, then, is essentially one way.

297

Special Problems: High-Value Cargo Transportation of merchandise such as fissile radioactive materials, jewelry, furs, optical goods, cameras, electronic articles, whisky, and ammunition presents special security considerations. Precautions include scheduling the arrival of goods at hours that permit prompt pickup, use of secure areas, continuous guards, selection of reliable drivers, delivery in vehicles with two-way radio equipment, a checkpoint system, convoying and shotgun guards, use of antihijack equipment (looked doors, no steps, high cab), and coordination with federal and local police agencies. All protective measures for movement of highvalue merchandise must be set out in a standard operating procedure. Only that equipment which is sound should be utilized in transport of high-value cargo. When regular accounts requiring regular handling of high-value cargo are acquired, modifications to equipment should be made. This could include removal of running boards and addition of extra locking devices, alarm equipment, and oversize gas tanks (where permissible). Routing of vehicles should vary continuously where practicable. Key control for all equipment undergoing maintenance should be stressed. Often, a breakdown in key control takes place when equipment is turned over to the maintenance department for service. When equipment breaks down while on the road, a preplanned procedure should be effected to safeguard high-value cargo. The shipper can be advised how to avoid security pitfalls, whether in packaging or advertising. The shipper must carefully control information regarding shipments—destinations, times of arrival and departure, and routes to be traveled—among employees and on labels and packaging. Further, the consignee must plan for immediate pickup at destinations to avoid high-value cargo being needlessly exposed.

298


Appendix 17.A Cargo Security Checklist The checklist that follows may be used for many different types of facilities. It permits each facility manager to select those elements pertaining to the establishment and location in making a site-specific security survey.

Barriers 1. Is the perimeter of the facility or activity defined by a fence or other type of physical barrier? 2. If a fence or gate is used, does it meet the minimum specifications? a. Is the top guard strung with barbed wire and angled outward and upward at a 45° angle? b. Is it at least 8 feet in total height? 3. If building walls, floors, and roofs form a part of the perimeter barrier, do they provide security equivalent to at least that provided by chain link fence? Are all openings properly secured? 4. If a masonry wall or building forms a part of the perimeter barrier, does it meet minimum specifications of perimeter fencing? 5. If a river, lake, or other body of water forms any part of the perimeter barrier, are security measures equal to the deterrence of the 8-foot fence provided? 6. Are openings such as culverts, tunnels, manholes for sewers and utility access, and sidewalk elevators that permit access to the facility properly secured? 7. List the number, location, and physical characteristics of perimeter entrances. 8. Are all portals in perimeter barriers guarded, secured, or under constant surveillance? 9. Are all perimeter entrances equipped with secure locking devices and are they always locked when not in active use?

10. Are gate and other perimeter entrances not in active use frequently inspected by guards or management personnel? 11. Is the security officer responsible for security of keys to perimeter entrances? If not, which individual is responsible? 12. Are keys to perimeter entrances issued to other than facility personnel, such as clearing, trash removal, and vending machine service personnel? 13. Are all normally used pedestrian and vehicle gates effectively and adequately lighted to ensure a. Proper identification of individuals and examination of credentials? b. That interiors of vehicles are clearly lighted? c. That glare from luminaries is not in the guard’s eyes? 14. Are appropriate signs setting forth the provisions for entry conspicuously posted at all principal entrances? 15. Are clear zones maintained for the largest vehicles on both sides of the perimeter barrier? If clear zone requirements cannot be met, what additional security measures have been implemented? 16. Are automobiles permitted to park against or too close to the perimeter barrier? 17. What is the frequency of checks made by maintenance crews of the condition of perimeter barriers? 18. Do guards patrol perimeter areas? 19. Are reports of inadequate perimeter security immediately acted on and the necessary repairs effected? 20. Are perimeters protected by intrusion alarm devices? 21. Does any new construction require installation of additional perimeter barriers or additional perimeter lighting?


Lighting 1. Is the perimeter of the installation protected by adequate lighting? 2. Are the cones of illumination from lamps directed downward and away from the facility proper and away from guard personnel? 3. Are lights mounted to provide a strip of light both inside and outside the fence? 4. Are lights checked periodically for proper operation and inoperative lamps replaced immediately? 5. Do light beams overlap to provide coverage in case a bulb burns out? 6. Is additional lighting provided at vulnerable or sensitive areas? 7. Are gate guard boxes provided proper illumination? 8. Are light finishes or stripes used on lower parts of buildings and structures to aid guard observation? 9. Does the facility have a dependable auxiliary source of power? 10. Is there power for the lighting system independent of the plant lighting or the power system? 11. Is the power supply for lights adequately protected? How? 12. Is the standby or emergency equipment tested periodically? 13. Is emergency equipment designed to go into operation automatically when needed? 14. Is wiring tested and inspected periodically to ensure proper operation? 15. Are multiple circuits used? If so, are proper switching arrangements provided? 16. Is wiring for protective lighting securely mounted? a. Is it in tamper-resistant conduits? b. Is it mounted underground? c. If above ground, is it high enough to reduce possibility of tampering? 17. Are switches and controls properly located, controlled, and protected? a. Are they weatherproof and tamper resistant? b. Are they readily accessible to security personnel? c. Are they located to be inaccessible from outside the perimeter barrier? d. Is there a centrally located switch to control protective lighting? Is it vulnerable? 18. Are the lighting system design and location recorded so that repairs can be made rapidly in an emergency? 19. Is adequate lighting for guard use provided on indoor routes?

299

20. Are materials and equipment in shipping and storage areas properly arranged to permit adequate lighting? 21. If bodies of water form a part of the perimeter, does the lighting conform to other perimeter lighting standards?

Alarms 1. Is an alarm system used in the facility? a. Does the system indicate an alert only within the facility? b. Does it signal in a central station outside the facility? c. Is it connected to facility guard headquarters? d. Is it connected directly to an enforcement headquarters outside the facility proper? Private protection service? Police station? Fire station? 2. Is there any inherent weakness in the system itself? 3. Is the system supported by properly trained, alert guards? 4. Is the alarm system for operating areas turned off during working hours? 5. Is the system tested prior to activating it for nonoperational periods? 6. Is the alarm system inspected regularly? 7. Is the system tamper resistant? Weatherproof? 8. Is an alternate alarm system provided for use in the event of failure of the primary system? 9. Is an alternate or independent source of power available for use in the event of power failure? 10. Does the emergency power source designed to cut in operate automatically? 11. Is the alarm system properly maintained by trained personnel? 12. Are periodic tests conducted frequently to determine the adequacy of response to alarm signals? 13. Are records kept of all alarm signals received to include time, date, location, action taken, and cause for alarm?

Communications 1. Is the security communication system adequate? 2. What means of communications are used? a. Telephone (1) Is it a commercial switchboard system? Independent switchboard? (2) Is it restricted for guard use only?

300

3.

4.

5.

6. 7.


(3) Are switchboards adequately guarded? (4) Are there enough call boxes and are they conveniently located? (5) Are open wires, terminal boxes, and cables frequently inspected for damage, wear, sabotage, and wiretapping? (6) Are personnel cautioned about discussing cargo movements over the telephone? b. Radio (7) Is proper radio procedure practiced? (8) Is an effective routine code being used? (9) Is proper authentication required? (10) Is the equipment maintained properly? c. Messenger—Is the messenger always available? d. Teletype—Is an operator available at all times? e. Public address—Does it work? Can it be seen? f. Visual signals—Do all guards know the signals? Can they be seen? Can the security communications equipment in use transmit instructions to all key posts simultaneously? Does the equipment in use allow a guard to communicate with guard headquarters with minimum delay? Is more than one system of security communications available for exclusive use of security personnel? Does one of these systems have an alternate or independent source of power? Has the communications center been provided adequate physical security safeguards?

4.

5.

6.

7.

Personnel Identification and Control 1. Is an identification card or badge used to identify all personnel within the confines of the controlled areas? 2. Is the identification medium designed to provide the desired degree of security? 3. Does the identification and control system include arrangements for the following? a. Protection of the meaning of coded or printed components of badges and passes b. Designation of the various areas requiring special control measures to which the badge holder may be authorized entrance c. Strict control of identification data d. Clear explanation and description of the identification data used e. A clear statement of the authorization and limitations placed on the bearer

8. 9. 10.

11. 12.

13.

f. Details of where, when, and how badges shall be worn g. Procedures to be followed in case of loss or damage to identification media h. Procedure for recovery and invalidation If a badge exchange system is used for any restricted area, does the system provide for the following? a. Comparison of badge, pass, and personnel b. Physical exchange of restricted area badge for general authorization badge at time of entrance and exit c. Logging a record of each badge exchanged d. Inventory of badges issued by security personnel at the start and completion of tours of duty e. Location of personnel who have not checked out of the area at the close of each tour of duty f. Security of badges not in use Are messengers who are required to traverse areas of varying degrees of security provided with special identification? Are the prescribed standards for access to exclusion areas supplemented with arrangements for the following: a. At least one representative of management or security is in the area at all times when work is in progress b. No other persons are permitted to enter the area until one representative of management of security has entered c. A representative of management or security remains until all others have departed Are personnel who require infrequent access to a critical area and have not been issued regular security identification for the area treated as visitors and issued either a visitor’s badge or pass or a special pass? Are all personnel required to wear the security identification badge while on duty? Do guards at control points compare badges to bearers on both entry and exit? Is supervision of personnel charged with checking identification badges sufficient to ensure continuing effectiveness of identification and control system? Are badges recorded and controlled by rigid accountability procedures? Are lost badges replaced with one bearing a different number or one otherwise not identical to the lost one? Are procedures relating to lost, damaged, and forgotten badges adequate?


14. Are temporary badges used? 15. Are lists of lost badges posted at guard control points? 16. Are badges of such design and appearance as to enable guards and other personnel to recognize quickly and positively the authorizations and limitations applicable to the bearers? 17. How long ago were currently used badges issued? 18. Do existing procedures ensure the return of identification badges on termination of employment? 19. Are badges similar or identical to employee badges issued to outside contractor employees working within the installation? 20. Have local regulations governing identification and control been revised in any material respect since first established? 21. Are all phases of the system under supervision and control of a security officer? 22. Is an effective visitor escort procedure established? 23. Are visitors required to conspicuously display identification on outer garments at all items while on installation? 24. When visitors leave the installation, are they required to turn in their identification badges and is the departure time in each recorded on the visitor’s register? 25. What procedures are invoked when visitor identification badges are not turned in prior to departure of the visitor? 26. Is there a central receptionist? a. If yes, specify functions b. Are functions performed under the supervision of a security officer? 27. Are receptionists (or guards) stationed at different focal points to maintain visitor control? 28. Are there special procedures applicable to visitors requiring access to cargo-handling documents? 29. Are special visitors, such as vendors, trades workers, utility workers, or special equipment workers, issued a special, distinctive type of visitor badge? 30. What measures are employed, other than the issuance of identification badges, to control the movement of personnel from other transportation companies working within the perimeter of the facility? 31. Does the system used for identification of truck drivers and helpers conform with security regulations?

301

32. Is the security officer the single responsible official for all aspects of visitor control?

Package and Material Control 1. Is there standard procedure on control of packages and materials? 2. Are all guards conversant with the package control measures? 3. Are notices on restriction and control procedures prominently displayed at each active entrance and exit? 4. Is there a checkroom where employees and visitors can leave their packages? a. Is an adequate receipt system in effect? b. Are packages inspected in the owner’s presence before a receipt is issued? c. Is access to the checkroom restricted to authorized personnel? d. Is a policy established for disposition of items left beyond a specified period? 5. Are spot checks of persons and vehicles conducted and, if so, are the frequency and scope indicated? a. Regular search b. Spot search c. Special search 6. Are detection devices used? a. X-ray or other similar device b. Metal detector c. Other; evaluate effectiveness 7. Is a property removal slip, signed by an authorizing official, required when property is removed from the facility? 8. Are removal slips available in the security office for signature by officials authorizing property removal? 9. Are property removal slips surrendered to guards at exit points? 10. Are special rules established for package and material handling? a. Is a package and material pass used to exempt bearer from search? (1) Are time, date, bearer’s name, using agency, and description of the contents properly recorded on it? (2) Are preparation and issue rigidly controlled? (3) Are the passes serially numbered? (4) Does it provide for the signature of validating officials? (5) Is a signature card readily available to guards for comparison?

302

11.

12.

13.

14.


b. Is a trustworthy and identified courier used at all times? Is special clothing issued for wear in the facility to prevent the introduction or removal of unauthorized items? Is an effective procedure used for control and search of special vehicles? a. Emergency vehicles b. VIP vehicles c. Special courier vehicles d. Vendor’s vehicles e. Vehicles with loads that are impracticable to search Is there close coordination between security headquarters and the activities that handle cargo movements? Are new employees given appropriate instructions relating to the handling and safeguarding of cargo?

11. 12.

13.

14.

15.

Vehicle Control 16. 1. Are vehicles allowed regular access to the facility registered with the security officer? 2. Have definite procedures been established for the registration of private cars, and are they issued in writing? 3. Do the vehicle registration requirements apply also to motor vehicles owned or operated by employees of any individual, firm, corporation, or contractor whose business activities require frequent use of vehicles on the facility? 4. Is annual or more-frequent registration required? 5. What information is incorporated in registration application forms? 6. Do the prescribed prerequisites for registration include a valid state registration for the vehicle and a valid state operator’s license? 7. Is mechanical inspection of vehicles and proof of financial responsibility required as a prerequisite of authority to operate a vehicle within the facility? 8. Are decalcomania or metal permit tags affixed to all vehicles authorized to operate within the facility? 9. Do registration permits bear a permanently affixed serial number and numerical designation of year of registration? 10. Do the regulatory control criteria for registration include the following: a. Prohibition against transfer of registration permit tags for use with a vehicle other than the one for which originally issued

17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

28. 29. 30.

b. Replacement of lost permit tags at the registrant’s expense c. Return of tags to the security officer when the vehicle is no longer authorized entry into facility d. Destruction of invalidated decalcomania or metal tags What is the nature and scope of registration records maintained by the security officer? Do the gate guards make periodic checks to ensure that vehicles are operated on the premises only by properly licensed persons? Is a specified system used to control the movement of commercial trucks and other goods conveyances into and out of the installation area? Are loading and unloading platforms located outside the operating areas, separated one from the other, and controlled by guard-supervised entrances? Are all trucks and other conveyances required to enter through service gates staffed by guards? If trucks are permitted direct access to operating areas, are truck drivers and vehicle contents carefully examined? Does the check at entrances cover both incoming and outgoing vehicles? Are truck registers maintained? Are registers maintained on all company vehicles entering and leaving the facility? Are escorts provided when vehicles are permitted access to operating or controlled areas? Does the supervision of loading and unloading operations ensure that unauthorized goods and people do not enter or leave the installation via trucks or other conveyances? Are company trip tickets examined? Is a temporary tag issued to visitor’s vehicles? Are automobiles allowed to be parked within operating or controlled areas? Are parking lots provided? Are interior parking areas located away from sensitive points? Are interior parking areas fenced so that occupants of automobiles must pass through a pedestrian gate when entering or leaving the working area? Are separate parking areas provided for visitors’ vehicles? What is the extent of guard surveillance over interior parking areas? Are there restrictions against employees entering private vehicle parking areas during duty hours?


31. Are automobiles allowed to park so close to buildings or structures that they would be a fire hazard or obstruct fire fighters? 32. Are automobiles permitted to be parked close to controlled area fences? 33. Are parking facilities adequate?

9. 10.

Lock Security 1. Has a key control officer been appointed? 2. Are the locks and keys to all buildings and entrances controlled by a key control officer? 3. Does the key control officer have overall responsibility for issuance and replacement of locks and keys? 4. Are keys issued only to authorized personnel? 5. Are keys issued to other than facility personnel? 6. Is the removal of keys from the premises prohibited? 7. Are keys not in use secured in a locked, fireproof cabinet? 8. Are current records maintained, indicating a. Clear record of person to whom key is issued? b. Time of issue and return of keys? c. Buildings and entrances for which keys are issued?

11.

12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18.

303

d. Number and identification of keys issued? e. Location and number of master keys? f. Location and number of duplicate keys? g. Location of locks and keys held in reserve? Is a current key control directive in effect and understood? Are locks changed immediately on loss or theft of keys? Are inventories and inspections conducted by the key control officer to ensure compliance with directives? How often? If master keys are used, are they devoid of markings identifying them as such? Are losses or thefts of keys promptly investigated by the key control personnel? Must all requests for reproduction or duplication of keys be approved by the key control officer? Are locks on inactive gates and storage facilities under seal? Are they checked periodically by guard personnel? Are locks rotated within the installation at least semi-annually? Where applicable, is the manufacturer’s serial number on combination locks obliterated? Are measures in effect to prevent the unauthorized removal of locks on open cabinets, gates, or buildings?

Appendix 17.B Personnel Security Checklist This checklist has been prepared as an action guide for transportation industry management to use in upgrading personnel security measures. The dos and don’ts contained here should not be considered allinclusive but should be viewed as steps from which to build a more effective personnel security program.

Management Policy and Response Dos 1. Recognize that employees are participants in a substantial majority of theft and pilferage losses.

2. Promulgate company security measures: a. Assign authority and responsibility for execution of the personnel security program to an official within the organization. b. Involve personnel security considerations in the decision-making process of the organization. c. Provide support and cooperation of all levels of management of the personnel security program. 3. Integrate personnel security measures into the existing employment system, including a firm commitment by management to elements of the program.

304


a. Identify the weaknesses inherent in the present employment process that might allow employment of applicants with questionable backgrounds b. Examine procedures being used by securityconscious employers for screening and investigating their applicants c. Implement procedures designed to upgrade employment practices regarding personnel security (specific managerial prerogatives are discussed later) d. Adopt measures to ensure periodic review of the personnel security program

Don’ts 1. Don’t evade the problem of employee theft and pilferage. 2. Don’t respond to the problem with lip service and ineffective procedures. 3. Don’t ignore the economic advantages of incorporating effective but relatively inexpensive personnel security measures into the existing employment process through the exercise of certain management prerogatives.

Employment Application Forms Dos 1. Require submission of a detailed employment application by all prospective employees, including applicants for clerical and maintenance positions as well as applicants for cargo-handling positions. 2. Design the application form to include information helpful in judging the applicant in terms of honesty, integrity, and reliability. The following information should be required by the application forms: a. Gaps in employment continuity b. Frequent job shifts c. Complete employment history, including (1) Reasons for leaving (2) Sufficient data with which to contact former employers and supervisors (3) Salary information (4) Brief statement of duties and responsibilities d. Educational background, including specific information regarding schools attended, dates, and the like e. All names used by the applicant

f. Type of military discharge g. Citizenship h. Present residence and prior residence information for the past 10 years i. Affiliations and organizations j. Selective Service classification k. Personal references l. Bonding history m. Criminal history, when permitted by law, indictments, arrest and conviction data should be obtained n. Conditions to which applicant agrees by signing the application form, including (1) Misrepresentations on the form shall be considered acts of dishonesty (2) Permission to the employer or agent to investigate the applicant’s background, including a credit check (3) Agreement that the application for employment in no way obligates the employer to hire the applicant 3. Carefully review the employment application form for accuracy and completeness prior to consideration for processing. 4. Consider the use of a separate form for obtaining security-related information, e.g., fingerprints, driving record, criminal history. Such a procedure makes the applicant aware of the organization’s interest in employing personnel with a high degree of honesty, integrity, and reliability.

Don’ts 1. Don’t employ applicants prior to submission of a detailed employment application form. 2. Don’t use a standard type of application form that makes little or no provision for obtaining securityrelated information. 3. Don’t accept applications that are inaccurate or incomplete.

Fingerprinting and Photographing Applicants Dos 1. Include the fingerprinting of applicants and taking identification photographs in the preemployment process. 2. Make arrangements with the local police department for fingerprinting and a local photographer for taking applicant ID photos if in-house facilities for such procedures are not feasible.


Don’t Don’t fail to recognize the discouragement to undesirables and the deterrence to thieves or criminals provided by fingerprinting and photographing requirements.

Interviews Dos 1. Make provisions for a personal interview of all applicants to be conducted by trained interviewers. 2. Design the interview session to ensure that the following security-related elements are completed: a. Verification of information submitted on the employment applicable form. b. Clarification of details regarding questionable or derogatory information detected on the application form or during the initial preemployment background investigation. c. Obtaining additional information not contained in the application. d. Obtaining information from the applicant that will help to appraise personality, character, motivation, honesty, integrity, and reliability— and judging appearance and personal characteristics face to face. e. Informing the applicant about the company, including security policies and procedures.

Don’ts 1. Don’t allow interviews to be conducted solely by department managers or line supervisors. 2. Don’t expose the applicant to a brief, noncomprehensive interview that is void of security considerations.

Confirmation of Personnel Data Dos 1. Confirm significant data contained on the employee application form and contact references. 2. Conduct thorough background investigations— go beyond the basic confirmation of factual data, include searches for information regarding the applicant’s character, integrity, honesty, and relia-

305

bility. Such information should include but not be limited to a. Any deliberate misrepresentation, falsification, or omission of material facts b. Any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, habitual use of intoxicants to excess, or drug addiction c. Conviction of crimes of violence, including assault with a deadly weapon d. Any facts furnishing reason to believe that the individual may be subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure that may cause her or him to act contrary to the best interests of the company e. Any previous dismissal from employment for delinquency or misconduct, theft, or embezzlement 3. Select the most effective method of conducting background investigations within the existing capabilities of the organization. Methods available include a. Mail verification b. Telephone interviews c. Contract with outside firms, ranging in cost from $10 to $70 each, depending on the service required 4. Search applications being processed against local security or trade association indexes to ascertain whether any derogatory information is on file regarding a. The applicant b. The names of applicant’s references c. The name of applicant’s spouse d. The identity of applicant’s friends or relatives working in the industry 5. Organize local trade indexes to minimize the chances of hiring applications already determined to possess undesirable characteristics by another member of the transportation industry.

Don’ts 1. Don’t adopt procedures that allow the employment of applicants without completion of a thorough background investigation. 2. Don’t let the cost or the time required to conduct background investigations be the sole factor in rejecting such procedures. 3. Don’t restrict background investigation to mere verifications of factual data. 4. Don’t limit the scope of background investigations by subscribing to only one method. Tailor procedures to the need and resources available locally.

306


Appendix 17.C Physical Security Checklist

1. Do you have a written security plan that is updated at least once a year? 2. Are the functions of security clearly defined? 3. Do you have a preplanned procedure for internal and external notification in case of theft or emergency? 4. Do you have fixed management responsibility for theft or pilferage? 5. Are your records stored and safeguarded properly? 6. Does your shipping and receiving facility have adequate lighting? 7. Is your entire shipping and receiving area fenced or enclosed? 8. Are your entrance and exit gates secured properly or are they secured only by the use of chains and padlocks? 9. Do you have a sufficient number of competent checkers for your needs? 10. Do you have a sufficient number of supervisors? 11. Do you check your facility during the evening and early morning hours to determine the caliber of supervision during those times? 12. Is there a pass system for logging vehicles in and out? 13. Do you have a security crib for placement of high-value cargo? 14. Where called for, are interior or exterior alarms used? 15. Is the monitoring of your alarms provided on a continual basis? 16. Do you issue padlocks to equipment operators for use when vehicles are left unattended? 17. When assigning keys to individuals, are signatures obtained? 18. Do you issue master keys only where operationally essential?

19. Are periodic checks conducted on key control and locking devices? 20. Are spare keys and locking devices kept under tight controls? 21. Do you check if equipment parked or left unattended is left with keys in the ignition? 22. Is there a predesignated, high-value holding area for cargo held in shipping and receiving areas? 23. Do you periodically examine the refuse removal and cleaning service equipment and personnel when they leave your facility? 24. Have you screened the vendor companies with which you do business? 25. Are you conducting a preemployment investigation on all prospective applicants? 26. Are you taking fingerprints or photographs of all new employees? 27. Are casual employees included in your preemployment screening process? 28. Is there a probationary period for new employees? 29. Are your personnel records safeguarded? 30. Have you displayed reward posters with proper wording and considerations? 31. Are you engaged in a security education program? 32. Is your total management team security conscious? 33. Are you providing any type of in-service training for dealing with security problems? 34. Is your paper documentation controlled? 35. Are you tallying cargo properly as it goes on and off equipment? 36. Are you using seals and recording the numbers? 37. Are seal numbers verified at the destination? 38. Do you keep your seals under tight security controls?


39. Are seals being affixed by responsible management personnel? 40. Is a report made to security for trailer or container seal discrepancies, if found? 41. Are files maintained that indicate the number of times an employee is involved in a theft or shortage? 42. If dealing with interline activities, are controls maintained on their movements and is equipment checked? 43. Do you restrict your employees, including management, from parking near cargo operations?

307

44. Are controlled parking areas provided for employees’ cars? 45. Do you prevent unauthorized employee access to areas where cargo or paper flow dealing with cargo is handled? 46. Are unauthorized personnel and unidentified visitors allowed in your shipping and receiving areas? 47. Are employees prohibited from visiting their vehicles during working hours?

Appendix 17.D Inspection Report Forms The following form, developed during the Cargo Theft Program at the National Crime Prevention Institute, Louisville, Kentucky, by consultant Sarlan Flinner, is an excellent tool for a complete security plan and training program. The thoughtful security director needs to constantly monitor all areas of the overall security plan. This means setting up a checklist of possible problem areas, which may become troublesome. As a result of such forethought, many security directors have a tendency of developing a form of tunnel vision and often miss problems developing in so-called safe areas. A checklist of the type we suggest is of great importance to pick up on areas too easily overlooked. Setting a regular schedule to cover this checklist is all that is necessary; everything else follows logically. Potential problem areas are routinely covered. If vigilance is the watchword of all security, this checklist is an excellent systematic method of maintaining that vigilance.

Terminal Security Inspection Report _____________________________________ Terminal _____________________________________ Date _____________________________________ Inspector

Purpose A periodic security check should be made of each terminal to determine whether or not standard security and operating procedures are being followed to check the handling of freight, the vulnerability of the terminal to theft by outsiders, the condition of the fencing and lighting, and as a vehicle for evaluating the overall security of the terminal and make possible specific recommendations. 1. Terminal building (exterior) a. Condition of the building b. Outside doors c. Windows clean and in good repair? d. Lighting e. Company identification sign f. Condition of parking area g. Employee and guard cars parked in proper parking area 2. Terminal building (interior) a. Reception area for visitors? b. Condition of offices c. Condition of store rooms and supply rooms d. Arrangements for janitorial/cleaning services e. Condition of restrooms

308


3. Terminal office a. What are bank deposit arrangements and are they satisfactory? b. How are paychecks distributed? c. Are checks and drafts secured at all times? d. Is petty cash locked up? e. Is a safe available? In use? f. Are keys assigned? g. Are keys redeemed if key personnel leave? h. Are locks changed as warranted? i. D/R file (Dock/Receipt file) j. Term 64 file k. Term 51 file l. Pud (pick up and delivery) manifest file m. Summary manifest file n. Photo file o. Fingerprinting equipment p. Fingerprinting policy compliance q. Polaroid camera r. Photographic policy compliance 4. City drive check-in a. Is a nondelivery report used properly? b. Is an over/damage report being used properly? c. Do bills of lading include the driver’s signature and number of pieces picked up? d. Is a tally sheet attached to bills in the morning? e. Is a tally sheet attached to bills when they are turned in? f. Are all exceptions listed in accordance with company policy? 5. OS&D (over short and damage) records a. Are shortage files properly maintained? b. Are all “short” bills filed in the pretax file? c. Are all “short” bills reported on the control report? d. Are security reports made to regional security chief? e. Is overfreight processed per policy? f. Are any bills over 30 days old on the control list? Why? g. Are refused shipments properly safeguarded? 6. Dock area a. What is general appearances of dock? b. Is the dock striped? c. Are doors and bays clearly identified? d. Is there adequate storage for OS&D freight? e. Is a hot room (or cage) available and in use? f. Are any dock lights burning during daylight hours? g. Are dock door locks in good condition? h. Are fire extinguishers available? Inspected? i. Is recooping equipment available?

j. Are any damaged shipments on the dock? k. Are OBF (out-board freight) shipments written up promptly and placed on an OS&D bay? l. Seal procedures: (1) Are seal procedures followed? (2) Are seals adequately controlled? (3) Discrepancies reported to supervisors? m. What was the general condition of trailers and loads during this inspection? n. Are trash receptacles available? In use? Need emptying? o. Are reward posters displayed on the bulletin board? p. Are locks assigned to city units? Is the policy followed? 7. Freight bill procedures a. Are bill boxes available on the dock? b. Are freight bills handled in accordance with established procedures? c. Does break-out man account for all bills given him or her? d. Are security shipments given proper treatment (firearms, clothing, etc.)? e. Are shortages, overages, and damaged freight brought to foreperson’s attention? 8. Guard service a. What are the hours of service? b. Are written reports submitted by guard? c. Are there written instructions for the guard? d. Is the service adequate? What are specific problem areas? e. Is the guard performing other than securityrelated duties? f. Is supervision by the guard company adequate? g. Are complaints processed to a satisfactory and speedy solution? h. Are emergency phone numbers available? 9. Yard area a. Is the yard fenced? b. What is the condition of the fence? c. Is grass kept cut on either side of fence? d. Are gates locked at night? e. Are high-value loads protected? f. Signs posted on or near gates prohibiting cars from entry? g. Is employee access controlled? h. Lighting (1) Is it adequate? (2) Is it controlled by a timer? (3) Are any lights burned out? (4) Would additional lights help? i. What is the general condition of the yard?


10. Maintenance area a. Are gas pumps locked when the terminal is shut down? b. Are fire extinguishers available? Are they inspected? c. Is the maintenance work orderly? d. Does area appear well organized? e. Are parts and tools properly secured? f. What inventory method is used? This report was discussed with ____ by ____ at ____ on ____ 19 ____.

309

Security Inspection Report Master Log Year: ______________________________________________ Terminal ____________ ____________ ____________

Region ____________ ____________ ____________

Date of Inspection _________________ _________________ _________________

Appendix 17.E Documentation Numerous items of documentation are necessary to move goods in transit and storage from one point to another as well as through the various modes of the modern intermodal transportation systems. Various forms involve financing, transfer of ownership, taxes, export laws, and many other factors. The listing that follows represents the major portion of the types of documentation one is likely to encounter. It is essential to remember that much of this data are computer driven; however, a hardcopy does accompany the movement of goods in transit.

Types of Commercial Documents 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Forwarder’s invoice Manufacturer’s inspection certificate Advance shipping notice and insurance data Certificate of documents forwarded Shipping order Inland freight invoice Acknowledgment of order Letter of transmittal Shipment notifications to consignee Insurance bordereau Forwarders acknowledgment Shipment lineup sheet Consolidated car manifest Overseas inland waybill

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

Cargo on-board report Out port booking confirmation Document master Order mat Shipping release Importer’s purchase order Confirmation of purchase order Exporter’s purchase order Commercial invoice Packing list Inland bill of lading Shipper’s letter of institutions Certificate of insurance Ocean bill of lading International air waybill Delivery receipts Dock receipt Arrival notice to consignee Warehouse receipt Commodity sheet release—nonvehicle material Delivery instruction for local cartage agent Transportation agreement Due bill (international freight) Pro forma invoice Importer’s purchase order Delivery instructions to inland carrier Shipping instructions to plant Importer’s letter of instruction Import broker’s invoice Forwarder’s specification sheet

310

45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82.


Warehouse receiving order Recapitulation of invoice for packages received Forwarder’s space release confirmation Freight bill release—import broker Exporter’s transmittal to import broker Receipt for registered mail Terminal charge bill for handling Pier release Exporter’s space release Ocean bill of landing worksheet Warehouse invoice Delivery instruction—overseas inland carrier Application for letter of credit amendments Letter of confirmation Letter of credit—import Application and special permit for immediate delivery Analysis delivery Shipper’s export declaration for in-transit goods C.F. 7513 Invoice abstract Public voucher Controller’s letters Invoice information commercial invoice AID18-24 Invoice information insurance Certificate req: commission and service payments Carrier’s certificate Import license Consular invoice In-bond release certificate Import document packet Import duty exemption application Authority for exemption of duties Poliza de consumo Weight list Supplier’s certificate Dangerous cargo manifest Certificate and list of measurement (and/or weight) Blacklist certificate Certificate of origin

Documents Regularly Used 1. Acknowledgement of order 2. AID (torch emblem) affixed to each package 3. Application and special permit for immediate delivery, U.S. Customs—3461 4. Arrival notice to consignee 5. Bank drafts 6. Bank draft—letters of instructions and transmittal 7. Buyer’s purchase order

8. Carrier’s certificate of release order, U.S. Customs—7529 9. Certificate of analysis 10. Certificate of insurance 11. Certificate of origin 12. Certifications to AID and request to opening bank, AID—283 13. Consumption entry, U.S. Customs—7501 14. Delivery instruction to inland carrier 15. Delivery instructions for local cartage agent 16. Delivery order 17. Export license 18. Forwarder’s acknowledgment 19. Forwarder’s invoice 20. Inland freight invoice 21. International freight bill 22. Invoice-and-contract abstract, AID 282 23. Invoice information—bill of lading, AID 18-24 24. Invoice information—commercial invoice, AID 18-24 25. Invoice information—insurance, AID 18-24 26. Letter of application for water of transportation 27. Letter of transmittal—consignee 28. Letter of transmittal—to import broker 29. Letter of transmittal—insurance 30. Letter of transmittal—sales agents 31. License application—O.E.C. 32. Outward foreign manifest—U.S. Customs—1374 33. Overseas representative’s purchase order 34. Pro forma invoice 35. Proof of consular fees 36. Shipping instructions to plant 37. Shipper’s manifest 38. South African customs invoice 39. Special customs invoice, U.S. Customs—5515 40. Supplier’s invoice 41. Supplier’s letter of transmittal to exporter and forwarder

Maritime Industry Documents and Reports 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

Shipping documents Bills of lading Exception reports OS&D report Claims report Cross-dock reports Shipping report Receiving report Transfer report Salvage report Disposal report Unexplained loss report Waybill


311

Appendix 17.F The Role of Private Security1 ROBERT J. FISCHER

Since, according to an analysis made by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), 85% of goods and material stolen go out the front gates on persons and vehicles authorized to be in cargo-handling areas of transportation facilities, it would appear that by far the greatest burden falls on the security apparatuses of the private concerns involved.2 It is true that public law enforcement agencies must make a greater effort to break up organized fencing and hijacking operations, and they must find a way to cut through their jurisdictional confusion and establish more effective means of exchanging information. But the bulk of the problem lies in the systems now employed to secure goods in transit. There is no universally applicable solution to this problem. Every warehouse, terminal, and means of shipment has its own particular peculiarities. Each has weaknesses somewhere, but certain principles of cargo security, when they are thoughtfully applied and vigorously administered, can substantially reduce the enormous losses so prevalent in today’s beleaguered transport industry. A good loss-prevention manager must recognize that the key to good cargo security is a well-organized cargo-handling system. As Louis Tyska and Lawrence Fennelly note, cargo loss exists whenever the “three C’s of cargo theft” are present.2 The three Cs are confusion, conspiracy, and the common denominator (the dishonest employee). Confusion is a primary ingredient and represents the lossprevention specialist’s opportunity to reduce theft.

Confusion arises when an adequate policy does not exist or, if it does exist, when it is not followed. Tyska and Fennelly identify the following activities as great contributors to the confusion variable: 1. Personnel entering and exiting the specific facility. These people include everyone from repair people to regular employees. 2. Movement of various types of equipment, for example, trucks, rail cars, and lift trucks. 3. The proliferation of various forms of paper— freight bills, bills of lading, manifests, and so on. Conspiracy builds on confusion. Two or more people take advantage of their positions and the confusion to steal. Many cargo security losses would not occur, however, without the common denominator, the dishonest employee. When the security manager is dealing with more than cargo pilferage, monitoring the employee is essential. The manager must be aware of the preceding variables. By eliminating any one variable, opportunities for theft are reduced.

References 1. Robert J. Fischer and Gion Green. Introduction to Security, 6th ed. Boston: Butterworth–Heinemann, 1998, p. 394. 2. Louis Tyska and Lawrence Fennelly. Controlling Cargo Theft. Boston: Butterworth–Heinemann, 1983.

Chapter 18 Lodging (Hotel/Motel) Security MARK BEAUDRY, CPP and SKIP BRANDT, CPP

The lodging industry has become a very lucrative business in today’s society. The owners of hotels are also becoming very aware that they need to protect their guests as well as their assets. Owners and management companies are also aware of the costs associated with operating a security department. Although most often looked on as a “cost center,” it is job one of the director of security to provide programs that can reduce loss and with that, show it can operate as a “profit center.” The primary emphasis must always be on the protection of life, and the secondary focus on the protection of property for hotels to stay in business.

Security Department Structure The structure, size, and reporting level of a security department differ widely by hotel chain and company, because no standards presently state what structures are the norm for certain size hotels as well as have an affect on a department’s efficiency and success within a hotel. Despite the lack of published standards for security department size, consideration should be given to “community standards.” Community standards look at what properties of similar size, function, location, and geographic crime reporting area provide for security. A typical department structure consists of the security manager, assistant manager, shift supervisors, and security officers. The structure ideally would coincide with the size of the property, which mostly are categorized by number of rooms 312

and square footage of hotel based on convention center space, bars, restaurants, ballrooms, casinos, entertainment rooms, theme parks, garages, or event areas: 1. Hotels with 300 rooms or fewer (2–5 staff members, a security manager is usually assigned, some hotels assign security duties to front desk and engineering staff). 2. Hotels with 301–500 rooms (5–10 staff members, a security manager, shift supervisor positions are usually lacking). 3. Hotels with 501–800 rooms (10–20 staff members, a security manager with an assistant and shift supervisors). 4. Hotels with 801–1200 rooms (20–30 staff members, a security manager with an assistant, shift supervisors, and possibly an investigator). 5. Hotels with 1200 or more rooms (30 or more staff members, a security manager with an assistant, supervisors, an investigator, and possibly additional specialized security persons handling other job functions such as fire/life safety, gambling fraud or monitoring, etc.). These staffing levels are merely suggestions. A trend within the hospitality industry is to decentralize the security function to other operating departments, such as engineering, housekeeping and the front office. This is a double-edged sword, and as you will see later in this chapter, although all employees are responsible for security, it is in our opinion, best option is to have a trained security professional manage the day-to-day needs of security operations.

Lodging (Hotel/Motel) Security

Security Director or Manager In most hotels, the department head more than likely is called the security manager or director. Commonly, the title director of security is used to denote multiple property responsibility or multijob function responsibility (other titles currently used include director of safety and security, director of loss prevention, director of security and risk management, and director of loss control and security) and should report to a member of senior management, either an operations manager (resident manager) or directly to the managing director (general manager), whereas a security manager is usually responsible for a single property or solely has the job function of security and reports to varied levels of management depending on the company. The term security chief is an older term currently becoming obsolete in the lodging industry.

Assistant Director of Security or Assistant Security Manager In an ideal situation, it is desirable for the department head to have an assistant who fills the role and can substitute when the manager is not present. The person must be able to manage the department operationally on a daily basis. A security department encounters difficulties operating effectively with only a single person in charge. Situations always arise that the department head cannot attend to due to the usual limitations of a regular work schedule. A hotel should not have to depend on the availability of a single individual. The position of the assistant security manager should be just that, assist the director or manager by shared job tasks such as scheduling, payroll, training, hiring and firing, and coordinating department meetings. The assistant in most hotels must be capable of working flexible hours and on varied days.

Security Supervisor Additionally, the management structure of a security department should include shift supervisors, individuals designated as responsible for the officers working a given shift. The supervisor is the vital link between employee and security management. The supervisor represents management’s needs and views to the officers and, at the same time, represents the needs and views of the officers to management. Without a knowledgeable supervisor available, the

313

line officers are left to make decisions in haphazard ways. A lack of structure could lead to an increase in poor decisions. In lieu of actual supervisory personnel, some system of supervision must be in place. Some options that enhance control over line employees include but are not limited to 1. Unannounced spot checks on staff at varying times and days 2. Post orders that require mandatory activity reports indicating times and patrols made 3. Calls for service (opening doors, returning found property, etc.) 4. Security rounds using an electronic or automated device that records the time and location of designated checkpoints

Security Officer The line officer or security officer is an integral part of the security department. The Educational Institute of the American Hospitality and Lodging Association provides training programs designed specifically for the security officer. These are the people who define the security operation in the eyes of the hotel employees and guests. Confident, welltrained security officers are a necessary component of a successful security department. Security officers must be diligent in their observations during patrol or standing post. They must have knowledge of the property house rules, local ordinances, state and federal laws applicable to the hospitality industry and be able to enforce them. They must also be made aware that their visibility is an important deterrent to crime by both outsiders and fellow employees alike.

Size of the Department In addition to the number of rooms in a given hotel, the size of a security staff required generally is proportional to size of the facility, also expressed in terms of square footage or acreage and the number of employees on the hotel payroll. It also depends on a number of factors, all of which must be considered simultaneously. In a preexisting hotel, it is somewhat easier to determine staffing needs by reviewing the history of problems (crime statistics) and guestrelated issues addressed by security. If records are available for review, a workload analysis can be conducted to indicate the types of calls for service and

314


their distribution according to times and days of the week. One rule of thumb that deserves mention concerns the number of staff required to cover a single post around the clock, providing coverage for three 8-hour shifts. The number is not three, but four and a half or five persons, to allow for days off, vacation, sick time, training, and other administrative tasks. The design of the property is a factor to be considered. The location of the property relative to both the neighborhood and the type of setting is another important factor. An urban hotel in a high crime district should anticipate overflow problems from the neighborhood, such as streetwalkers, vagrants, and trespassers. In contrast, a hotel in a suburban location, accessed only by motor vehicles and surrounded by a residential community, is less likely to experience the problems of the urban property. Crime rates, economic growth or decline, climate conditions, and the availability of public safety resources such as police, fire, and ambulance services must all be taken into account when planning staff size and distribution.

Reporting Level in the Organization The level at which security reports in an organization greatly affects the ability of the department to achieve desired results. Lodging security departments have been known to report to a wide variety of managers, including the managing director, general manager, operations manager, human resources manager, building superintendent, and perhaps most commonly, the rooms division manager. Ideally, however, the security department should report to the highest level as possible, such as the operations manager, if practical. If the property is operated in such a way that the general manager is accessible to the security manager, then this is where security should report. A general manager’s schedule is often so busy that it precludes regular accessibility except to a few senior managers. The security manager needs to be able to communicate routinely with the senior manager, who oversees the security department. Problems are caused by having security report to middle- or lower-level managers or one who represents only one area of the company’s operation. First, security must penetrate more layers of management to reach the general manager, who must be acutely and accurately aware of the problems. The extra layers increase the chance of miscommunication. Second, not everyone in an organization is an

advocate for the security and prevention needs of the hotel. It is clearly possible for a middle-level manager who oversees the security department to lack the enthusiasm needed to both sell and utilize security successfully. And third, it is critical for the security manager, individually, to be aware of all aspects of the hotel’s operation including sales, accounting, human resources, and so forth if a “global” perspective is to be kept. Some security professionals lack a broad, companywide perspective on the role of security, suffering from a narrow view that does not take into consideration how the entire operation is affected by the department. Security solutions must be consistent with the overall operation of the hotel. Closing the general storeroom at night, for example, may reduce losses in inventory, but such a loss prevention decision also has adverse effect on the rest of the hotel, such as banquets and food and beverages, which need the items immediately.

Qualifications of Security Personnel The selection of security personnel must receive 100% attention by the manager or assistant to hire high-quality staff members. It is very important that all security personnel be hired directly by the security department managers and not the human resources department. In most cases, hotels hire personnel based on their timely need, forcing themselves to hire the next applicant. It has been a common practice for hotels to hire retired police officers and would-be police officers, who for some reason have not been accepted, so they work in security. The clear pros and cons to this approach are discussed in two parts, first managers and then supervisors or officers.

Security’s Reputation A hotel’s reputation as a safe, well-run, clean, and comfortable establishment is essential for its success. The same argument can be made for the reputation of the security department, and certainly, the hotel’s reputation depends in good measure on the success of the security program. That program’s success is tied directly to the reputation and image the department holds in the opinion of the hotels employees, guests, and the general public. How does one establish a good reputation for the security department and its program of prevention? To be considered capable and effective from the employees’ perspective, the members of the security


department and the manager, in particular, must project a positive image. Image is affected by a variety of factors, including outward appearance (grooming, demeanor, and attire), personality (friendly and caring but professional at all times), consistency in treatment of employees in situations requiring security intervention, and emphasis on the positive aspect of services provided fellow employees. It is a popular trend, for example, to eliminate the traditional security uniform and replace it with business attire. The security manager sets the tone for the organization and should maintain positive interaction with all levels of employees, never using authority as a means of exerting influence or pressure on the employee. From the guest’s point of view, image and reputation are determined primarily by the nature of the guest’s contact, if any, with security while staying at the hotel. One way to make a good first impression with guests is to attend “pre-cons” or preconvention meetings. These meetings are held prior to conventions or programs with the meeting planner and the group contacts. Attending these meetings and introducing the department and services of the department create a positive impression. Most often guests do have no direct contact with security, and those who do generally have such contact under adverse conditions, such as a theft of property, assault, medical emergency, or some other negative situation. Therefore, the reputation of security depends on the outward appearance, as discussed, and the way in which the security officer assists the guest in an adverse situation. Any victim, regardless of the seriousness of the loss or inconvenience, will behave in a fairly predictable manner, frequently blaming the security officer for not doing his or her job. It is essential that security personnel recognize that the guest response is a normal reaction to stress. Furthermore, most victims know that it is unlikely that the harm they suffered cannot be undone and, therefore, really look to the officer only for some compassion and information. Most victims simply want someone to listen to their plight, which suggests that the security officers must have developed good listening skills. To the outside world, the public at large, the reputation of a hotel’s security department depends on all the factors cited already and the relationship that the department and its members, especially the manager, have established in the community. That community includes other hotels, the local police, the courts, and criminals themselves (who have been known to have their own information system), the general public, and visiting travelers. Prostitutes, for example, know which hotels are easy to work in and

315

which ones are not. The security manager should make every effort to become involved in community activities related to crime and the hotel’s business.As mentioned, relations with local police are extremely important, especially in terms of limited resources, both in capital and worker hours available to police departments. Problems of crime occasionally are so serious that police assistance becomes necessary. A poor relationship with the local law enforcement authorities impedes solving such problems. The security function must be considered to be thorough and competent by the general public or the rent-a-cop image attaches itself to the reputation of the hotels security department.

Role of Security Patrolling The most basic of functions for the security personnel in any hotel is to perform regular patrols of the property, both inside and outside. Three different types of security patrolling have been utilized in hotels for decades and continue to serve the needs of guests, employees, and the property in general: random routine patrols, lobby patrol, and basic rounds (usually referred to as a fire watch, such as patrolling guest floors to prevent theft and ensuring no fires are in progress). The first type of patrol, random routine patrol, is as simple as it sounds. The security officer walks, or in some cases drives, around the property on a random basis to check for irregularities, suspicious circumstances, and intruders. Two objectives are achieved by this type of patrol. First, any irregularity or suspicious circumstance ideally is discovered before a major problem develops; for example, a leaking roof, broken pipes, dark hallway or stairway, or any other unsafe conditions that may cause injury to a guest or employee. The second objective is crime prevention. By patrolling in a randomized fashion, potential assailants or other wrongdoers can be detected or deterred from committing their acts. It is essential that this form of patrol not become too methodical or predictable. The officer should never patrol a site in a fixed schedule or pattern; however, it is critical to have key checkpoints throughout the patrol. For example, if the officer routinely patrolled the exterior of the building at quarter past the hour, it would not take very long before a person with criminal intent discovered the pattern and used it to predict when the officer would return. The problem of predictable behavior may also arise if it is the

316


practice of security to patrol a selected location every day at a specified time. An example of this occurs when the officer is instructed to stand by the employee entrance every afternoon at 4:00 P.M. until the department employees have all left for the day. Someone casually studying a hotel for obvious vulnerabilities would surely spot this pattern. The second form of security patrol commonly employed is lobby duty or surveillance. The lobby or any area of the hotel open to the general public (e.g., function areas, restaurants, shops) requires a different type of patrol. The officer assigned to a public area, such as the lobby, must stay in one general location for extended periods of time to fulfill the three purposes sought: observance of undesirable persons or behavior, assisting guests or others and as a visible presence, and deterring crime. Although the appearance of security is discussed in this text, it is important that the lobby security officer have a high visibility unless some form of plain clothes surveillance is being conducted. The third and most traditional form of security patrols is the safety patrol. The safety patrol differs from randomized patrol, although both may be accomplished simultaneously. On a safety patrol, the officer patrols every floor and section of the building, including locked areas to discover any potential fire hazard, smoke, or actual fire. It is common practice to utilize checklists or some type of electronic tour clock to record the items or areas checked and at what time. Caution should be taken by security managers to control the keys and disks imprinted from this equipment to prevent tampering and destruction. It should also be noted that these records should be maintained with the daily log books and incident reports, mostly for insurance purposes but for legal purposes as well. A more contemporary version of the tour clock is the electronic device that reads bar codes similar to those used in grocery stores. The officer carries the device, which is about the size of a handheld calculator, and passes it by a code placed on a tag at a location to be checked. At the end of the shift, the officer can insert the device into a recorder that reads all rounds made, critical areas missed, and so forth and generates a hardcopy printout and saves the report to a computer disk. Either measure is helpful to enhance the level of suspicion necessary during late night hours.

Security Reports Documentation is essential to the proper operation of a security department in any environment. The

kinds of reports usually generated by a hotel security department include incident reports, activity or shift reports, safety rules violations, and so on. Many computer programs are available to make this type of record keeping easy. Programs such as PPM 2000 Act-Track® and Dispatch Log® automate calls for service logs. They provide a variety of reports and statistics that are very useful in planning, budgeting, and spotting trends. PPM 2000 IRIMS® is a program designed for creating incident reports. Using database technology, incident reports are uniform in appearance and the program can provide valuable statistics, including loss amounts, time, and date on incident and annual reports. With computer-based incident tracking, a security manager can easily review the previous years or more of reports and identify patterns of activity, which helps direct available resources in the security program. Supervisors and security managers should review all incident reports for accuracy, grammar, and legal issues. Changes made to any report must be completed by or with the permission of the author only. Although security reports are important as records for insurance or prosecution purposes, they should be thought of as an important management tool, not to be locked away in a storage room or discarded. It is always advisable to keep a hardcopy of any computer-generated incident report as well as back up the files to a hard media such a floppy disk or CD-ROM. These records should be stored off site or in a fire-rated storage container with computer media generated by the MIS department. I also recommend checking the state statute of limitation for civil action suits and keep all records for the required time and all pending cases until the cases are completely settled. Check with the hotel’s legal department.

Lost and Found “Finder keepers, losers weepers” cannot be tolerated when dealing with items left behind by guests of the hotel. A strong policy must be in place with regard to lost and found. The policy should clearly define how the property is handled and returned to the owner, time limits on holding the property, and if the property is returned to the finder if not claimed. Hotels offer a wide variety of services to guests; like most other businesses they also maintain a lost and found department. The number of found items that a hotel can accumulate varies on the size of the hotel and the volume of business within the hotel. Property turned into security can also potentially belong


to a guest, patron, employee, or someone passing by the hotel. For ethical reasons as well as ensuring that all found property is secure, all lost and found items should be turned into the security department daily. The property should be logged in and given only to its rightful owner on request. Lost and found sheets are critical as well as a lost and found logbook tracking the property chronologically each day. Another logbook should be maintained, titled “returned property,” for property mailed back to a guest who has departed already and lives out of state. The log could track all mailing as well as inform security of the carrier chosen to deliver the package, date and time, and tracking numbers. UPS®, Federal Express®, and Airborne Express® all have Internetbased shipping programs, which can create and maintain shipping logs automatically. The age-old question of who is responsible for shipping charges should be decided by the general manager, controller, or the Executive Committee. Depending on the size of the hotel and the number of items returned, this can be an expensive proposition. Most hotels ship an item the least expensive route at the hotel’s expense. If the guest requires next day or expedited delivery, it would be at his or her expense.

Training Some basic aspects of a security department are absolutely critical to its success. One aspect is to ensure adequate training for all employees to establish the necessary framework for professionalism within the department. Every security department, regardless of the lodging facility size, number of employees, or even number of security staff members must have some form of training. Training programs for security employees fall into two categories: a program for newly hired staff and regularly scheduled training or ongoing training for staff members. To develop a program for newly hired security officers, these are some important steps to follow: 䊉

䊉

Examine the job description and analyze tasks performed by surveying the officers. Ask questions of the security officers about the nature of the tasks performed, amount of time spent on each, and discuss management concerns, all of which need to be answered to develop a profile of the actual job. Identify the company and department philosophy about the role to be played by security.

䊉䊉

䊉

317

Determine the available budget. Decide how training is to be conducted (e.g., using in-house staff, guest lecturers). Design a curriculum that addresses actual and perceived needs and covers the basic skills necessary to perform the job.

From a potential liability perspective, it is essential that all security employees be trained before they handle calls on their own and, further, that a training program reflect the actual job. The development and implementation of an effective training program for lodging security personnel needs three characteristics: it must be a well-rounded program; it must continuous; and proper documentation of all training must be maintained. In most facilities, training is tailored around management concerns. Well-thought-out programs reduce the inadequate training opportunities and can be an important aspect of strategic security planning. Inadequate training has been a major downfall of lodging security for years. This is also an area that receives the most criticism whenever legal issues arise about an incident. Inadequate training claims are based on either an insufficient amount of time spent on a topic or not addressing issues encountered on the job. For example, a security officer routinely receives a call for medical assistance; it would be unreasonable not to provide some training in basic first aid. The present need for improved training is at is highest ever because the pressure from the public (guests and patrons) has been compounded by the recent recognition of crime rates. Most people today are measured by the amount of education and training they received, which qualifies them to perform a job function. Both proficiency and success for lodging security professionals is based on experience and training. Keeping abreast of the current lodging security issues is another factor. The recommendation of the Task Force on Private Security includes a minimum of 8 hours of formal reassignment training and basic training of a minimum of 32 hours within 3 months of assignment, of which a maximum of 16 hours can be supervised on-the-job training.1 The questions most asked by management is why this type of training is needed (i.e., is it required?) and how much is it going to cost? The benefits of a well-rounded training program are measured in the security department personnel by an enthusiastic attitude and performance, improved morale, and increased incentive to do high-quality work. A key factor to keep in mind when training personnel is

318


that, to retain high-quality personnel and assist them in their career development, the training must be continuous. It provides an opportunity for advancement as well as a better understanding of the required task and its importance; for example, a fire inspection checklist ensures fire code compliance as well as self-confidence in the staff if, by ensuring that the extinguisher was operational, a potential major disaster is averted. One of the biggest fallacies made by lodging industry management is that a person coming from another security field (e.g., hospitals, campus) or law enforcement need not be trained. Again, all lodging security professionals should receive training, and the training should vary only according to the job function of that person within the organization. For example, an investigator needs special training that a security officer may not receive. One critical subject usually neglected in training is documentation. Every course or program used should be documented in a file with a copy of the lesson plan, handouts, and the like; a class roster of who attended; a copy of the exam and each individual’s completed exam; and a copy of the certificate issued each person. It is recommended that you use the “three part filing theory” when maintaining certificates of training. The original certificate goes to the employee; one copy is entered in the employee’s human resources file; and one copy is maintained in the security-training file.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

Handling disturbances Back care techniques Health hazards in the workplace First aid and CPR Guest relations Tips Crisis prevention program Hazcom Bloodborne pathogens Techniques of observation and patrolling Two-way radio procedures City and state liquor laws

Security Supervisor The supervisor training program obviously entails leadership courses beyond the basic courses listed for the officer: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

City licensing regulations Interaction management Diversity training Time management Security supervisor seminar Investigations First responder or EMT Fire prevention regulations Elevator regulations Sprinkler and shutoff valve system Court procedures (testifying)

Security Manager Security Training by Position First and foremost, all lodging security personnel should receive the same initial orientation and policy handbook as every other employee. Then, when the security staff enters the department, the training program is outlined in respect to their position.

Security Officer The following is a partial list of training subjects that may be found in a typical security officer training manual: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Introduction to law Tort Law Report writing Hotel fire alarm Using fire extinguishers Evacuation procedures Security awareness and prevention Key control and guest privacy

Security managers are responsible for planning, control, organizing a department, hiring and firing personnel, and ultimately the training program for the department. Once a security manager has been given guidance by senior management regarding the philosophy of the hotel, the essential training expressing policy and procedure for that facility can begin. It is equally important that those training requirements be presented in a professional manner that encourages security personnel to be cheerful, cooperative, and tolerant in their dealings within the company as employees. The two distinct traits for a security officer are good listening skills and patience. If a security manager is patient, tactful, professional, and knowledgeable, the hotel employees will learn to respect him or her and be willing to seek the manager’s assistance. When employees can trust security, they are more apt to cooperate in the security function, which is vital to both the hotel and security department’s success. The security manager’s attitude about training and its importance


set the climate for the department. A manager who is aggressive and structures the training program to keep the security staff moving forward and progressing upward will get support from both senior management and the staff. Finally, a security manager should develop a 5-year plan to meet overall needs. Realistically, the manager will revise many procedures and methods as the department develops. This is essential to fine-tune both the operational and administrative roles within the department. Remember that change is important. It ensures both continuous improvement and personal growth for all security members.

Theft Theft occurs in a variety of forms, representing the single greatest challenge for security in the lodging industry. Almost all the items found in a hotel used by the guest can also be used at home. Guests usually travel with cash, credit cards, jewelry, cameras, laptop computers, personal digital assistants (PDAs), cell phones, and other valuables, which may be appealing to a thief. Large urban hotels employ several hundred employees, because the lodging industry is a labor-intensive business. Yet, at the same time, it creates many opportunities for a thief to steal the employees’ personal property, guest property, and hotel property.Although every type of theft situation occurs—hotel property, guest property, or employee property—each requires different response or prevention measures by security. All are forms of theft and, as such, should be a major concern.

Hotel Property Hotels generally “build in” a certain dollar amount in their budget for anticipated losses.These losses are due to normal wear and tear on soft goods such as towels, sheets, and robes and hard goods such as furniture and fixtures. Loss from theft of items is difficult to budget and usually not done so by management. Losses are not acceptable nor are they part of the operating costs of a business to be offset by increased room rates. However, certain types of losses are tolerated to some extent due to the sensitive nature of the circumstances surrounding the theft. An example of such a sensitive problem is the theft of a terry cloth robe and other items from a guestroom by the guest. Hotels are often reluctant to question a guest suspected of removing towels or other objects. The risk of liability for slander or ill

319

will affecting future business is usually seen as far outweighing the benefit of recovering the items believed to have been stolen. The security manager’s first task is to determine the hotels assets as well as which of the hotel’s assets are vulnerable to theft and devise a program to reduce the risk. One helpful tool is to instruct the human resources department, while conducting employee exit interviews to ask questions regarding employee theft, use of drugs, and the like. This technique usually assists with information narrowing areas needing further investigation. However, the usual approach is to conduct a risk analysis of the property and its assets. This entails identifying the likelihood of the risk of loss and determining what measures may be employed to reduce or eliminate that risk. In addition to the actual physical survey, the security manager should review all reports of loss for the previous year to assess where and, possibly, how items were stolen. This approach helps identify the most vulnerable areas of the hotel. This survey is conducted as often as possible, most are done annually, however, quarterly or even monthly would lead to the best results. The key to the protection of all assets is to obtain cooperation and assistance from all hotel employees. The security manager who thinks that she or he can do the job alone is making a dreadful mistake. Security is everyone’s job. In fact, this slogan should be emphasized during an employee’s initial orientation program as well as monthly departmental meetings. Successful prevention measures depend on a welldesigned program, which involves input from all employees. Therefore, the security manager’s objective is to get cooperation from all employees. This is done by working with them in a variety of ways. First, the security manager should educate employees about the seriousness of theft and how it affects them. Second, she or he should attempt to develop their understanding of the problem in terms that members of the organization can relate to and appreciate. For example, if it is made clear that all losses cut into the profitability of the property and reduced profits may result in lower wages or even laying off employees if severe enough, the employees may realize that they, too, have a financial stake in the prevention of losses. Third, assistance from employees may be elicited by encouraging them to report suspicious people or circumstances and at least make an extra effort to secure valuables when leaving a work area (e.g., securing tools in storage rooms). Fourth, it is essential that the security department maintain a good working relationship with all employees, avoiding morale problems created by

320


poor communication and a lack of understanding. Employees suffering from poor morale are not going to be very concerned about protecting the assets of the employer. Fifth, the security manager must work with all other department managers to get their input on a variety of solutions to the problem of losses. Some security personnel may think that the solution to the loss problem is locking up and limiting access to the hotel’s assets, but if a measure interferes with the normal operation of a hotel, it will be resisted and is a guaranteed failure. In fact, the security function will be viewed as less effective unless the solution recommended included input from those departments affected. Program design is only half of the task of crime prevention. The other half, which is equally important, is continuous improvement. The security manager should repeat the risk survey at least quarterly, if possible, to ensure compliance with the program and to discover any changes in the physical structure or the hotel operation that may negate the original plan. The program must always remain flexible to meet the needs of the business. New and better methods should always be sought for improved preventive measures. When losses occur, as they will, evaluate the loss and adjust the program accordingly.

Guest Property One reason why hotel operations are concerned about the theft of guest property is the potential impact on future business. As discussed in the section on legal issues, most states limit an innkeeper’s liability to a fixed amount and, generally, that amount is not very high. A history of serious guest losses, however, may drastically affect the hotel’s reputation and be indicative of other weaknesses in the security program, which could lead to more serious crimes. For example, if poor key control is to blame for a number of guest losses, that same lack of key control can increase the chances of a more serious crime, such as assault of a guest. Such criminal activity is a common area for lawsuits against hotels. Two aspects of guest room thefts are appropriate for discussion, investigation, and prevention. Investigation of such losses should include, first, an examination of the locking hardware on the room to ensure that it is working properly, since guests frequently may not close their door tightly when leaving or when running down the hall for ice or soda. Most hotels now use electronic locks to secure guest rooms. An examination of the lock should be con-

ducted to see if there was an unauthorized entry in to the room using a hotel-issued key. Second, determine which employees have access to the room under investigation (the lock examination will provide this information) and note this for follow-up. If good records are kept, after a short while the same employee’s name will begin to appear. Once that information is discovered, the investigation could be focused more on that individual. Third, find out when the locks were last changed or rekeyed. There may be an overall problem with key control. Guest rooms equipped with electronic locks invalidate the previous users key on the guest level. It is important to note that many older electronic locks in use today do not have time and date expiration and require the use of an inhibit key. Fourth, check for missing room or master keys, which anyone could use to gain access to guest rooms. Prevention of guest room theft depends primarily on two forms of cooperation, employee and guest. Employee cooperation and assistance, as discussed previously, applies to guest losses as well. Guest cooperation is more difficult to obtain due to its transient nature but can be achieved to some reasonable extent. The type of cooperation sought is generally limited to two areas, use of existing risk reducing equipment such as safe deposit boxes as well as inroom safes, if they exist, and making sure that guests close and properly lock their room doors either when they leave or go to sleep. Some properties put small signs or fliers in the guest rooms advertising the availability of safe deposit boxes and the in-room safe, if available, as well as how to properly secure the guest room door. Other hotels use the cable system on the room television to promote safety and security measures.

Employee Property An employee’s personal property, uniforms, and hotel equipment are subject to theft in locker rooms and work areas. Although the theft of such property is not generally seen as a liability problem, it is or should be of concern from the standpoint of employee morale. It is well known that poor employee morale reduces productivity and fails to promote the kind of cooperation needed by the security department to prevent other losses. The theft of any employee valuable should be treated with the same level of concern and priority as any other loss.


321

The two most common areas for losses are locker rooms and office areas. In locker rooms, the lockers must be equipped with adequate locks and a sound key control system. (It has been noted that combination lockers with one master key maintained by security works well in the event of a forgotten combination or the need for a locker search.) Security should also check locker rooms frequently during patrols; this should be done randomly whenever in the immediate area or intentionally as part of the routine patrol. Checking each locker to ensure it is secure should be conducted when time permits as well as maintenance and bringing problems to the security managers attention of abuse. (In some areas, it is common to put push-button locks on the locker room entrance door to ensure added safety and security to those employees changing in the locker room.) Such inspections also reveal health problems (e.g., pest control) and problems such as stockpiling of uniforms or other hotel equipment (banquet utensils, housekeeping amenities, etc.). Consistent with this approach is the need for a hotel policy on what may be kept in employees’ lockers and the hotel’s right to search them periodically. When conducting random inspections of employee lockers, opening as part of an investigation or for pest control purposes, it is necessary to have proper management representation. In the case of employees being part of a labor union, it may be necessary, and advisable, to have a shop steward or other union official present when opening a union member’s locker. Locker inspections may be subject to the union contract or a violation of a binding arbitration agreement. In office areas, the most frequent loss occurs when the employees leave handbags, wallets, backpacks, briefcases, and gym bags unattended in one of the unlocked drawers or on top of the desk itself. The security manager needs to be sure that the desks are capable of being locked, and to encourage employees to utilize those locks to protect their personal property. Another common practice is for employees to leave an office door wide open to give a false impression that they are still working when, in fact, they have left for the day, yet their personal effects are left in plain view for anyone to easily take.

became injured as a result of falling down a stairway, it is important to determine the cause of the fall. In such a case, the fall could be caused by torn or worn carpeting, poor lighting, lack of handrails (check diameter to ensure bar is in compliance with the ADA), wet or slippery surfaces, or some factor indigenous to the guest. Some possible reasons for the guest to fall include intoxication (liquor liability is discussed later), improper footwear, bifocals, or mobility problems. The same issues are present when an employee is injured on the job, security must determine the root cause of the injury. The second reason calling for a thorough investigation is prevention. By discovering the cause of an incident such as a theft, security can determine how the article was stolen and develop preventive measures to avoid similar losses in the future. Consider the theft of food from the kitchen storage areas, which is common to hotels and restaurants of all sizes. If the investigation results indicate that methods of inventory control are deficient, then recommendations can be generated to implement better control and reduce further losses. The security manager who analyzes all incidents and implements proactive procedures prevents incidents of theft; however, employees constantly develop new methods of stealing, which when discovered should be used as a learning tool for security. New methods of theft are usually brought into a facility by a new employee, who introduces that method to other employees. The third benefit gained from an investigation is also related loss prevention. In the case of stolen property or drug dealing, for example, the simple process of questioning witnesses and suspects creates a deterrence to future crime. Routinely interviewing potential suspects helps establish an atmosphere of intolerance for crime. Employees who may be guilty of wrongdoing or considered it could be deterred from future activity if the impression is that the hotel does not tolerate misconduct. A timely, thorough investigation of every incident requiring more than an initial incident report enhances the department’s image and helps develop an effective security program.

Investigations

Arrest and Prosecution of Offenders

Anytime someone is injured in the hotel or property is lost, some form of an investigation should be conducted by security.There are at least three advantages of a thorough investigation. First, the root cause of the problem may be discovered. If, for example, a guest

Most security programs have moved away from chasing suspects and making arrests to being good witnesses and providing adequate visibility to prevent such crimes against persons. For many hotels chasing suspects and arresting them are often a last

322


resort when attempting to address the problem of crime and its losses. Although arrests may not be the preferred option of many hotels, they may be necessary and occur in even the safest of properties. Security managers, therefore, need to be prepared to deal with the problems generated by making arrests and prosecuting offenders. In the event that the hotel uses special police powers or licenses, it is essential that the security staff receive the training mandated by the issuing authority in arrest, use of force, and civil and criminal law, including the limits of their authority, use of weapons, and the rights of the accused. In addition to training, security personnel need direction in the form of written policies and procedures. It is important that the laws of the jurisdiction where the hotel is located be reviewed to determine what restrictions exist. For example, a state may limit the time someone is detained by a security officer to a specific period of time. Most states extend arrest authority of security officers who have been licensed as special police or deputized police to include offenses for which an unlicensed officer may not arrest. An arrest made without the legal authority is invalid and likely to subject the officer and the hotel to civil liability. If handcuffs or weapons are authorized, additional training and policies help ensure that proper practices are followed. A track record of successful arrests and convictions can enhance the security program in the hotel. However, improper arrests, mishandled suspects, and unprepared testimony surely result in acquittals and lawsuits. Juveniles need to be handled differently in some states, check the laws of detainment and arrests for juveniles. Most important, both internal and external theft must be prevented if a hotel is to survive. Many of companies, including hotels, go out of business due to employee or guest theft. In fact, a city or town that feels that a hotel cannot protect its employees or guests and their belongings may choose to fine or suspend a hotel’s license. Thorough investigations are necessary if a hotel security manager wants to ensure the prevention of loss from theft. Finally, most hotels have a corporate policy in reference to arrests and prosecution. If the hotel is insured, then it is recommended to consult with the corporate or local legal advisor.

Opportunities and Trends Prostitution It is probably safe to say that prostitution has been around as long as the concept of inns for travelers.

Some of the comments frequently heard about prostitution are that it is a victimless crime and society should not care what consenting adults do in privacy. Prostitution is a problem that, if not controlled, can ruin a hotel’s reputation. The word controlled is used intentionally, for prostitution cannot and will not ever be eliminated. The security objective, however, should be to reduce such activity to an absolute minimum. A hotel’s reputation is, without doubt, its single most important asset. No matter how professional the services may be or how good a value may be offered, no one respectable will stay at the hotel. Prostitutes (both men and women) are not in and of themselves a concern, but rather the peripheral activity that frequently accompanies prostitution. Theft of the guest’s property, assaults on the guest, and drugs are but a sample of the problems associated with this problem. It is in the best interest of the hotel operator and guest alike that prostitution be controlled. A hotel can employ a number of simple methods of control. First, guest registration procedures must be established and followed closely. All guests must be required to show valid photo identification such as a driver’s license and preferably a credit card when checking in, even if paying cash in advance for the stay. In many jurisdictions, it is a crime to enter or cause to be entered a false name into the guest registry. Valid identification is a must in the registration process. The reason for the tight registration process is that most streetwalkers do not carry identification. The more sophisticated “call girl” prostitute has identification, but she also represents less of a threat to the innkeeper. The second method of control can be utilized in those properties that have computerized front desk procedures and can print out a complete list of all guests by room as well as list the number of occupants registered in a particular room. Once given that list, the security officer, particularly at night when guests are returning to their rooms with a visitor they may have just met in the local bar, can screen all incoming guests at the front door (this works very well when hotel policy regarding visitor access after a certain hour should be implemented). The method has two benefits: the innkeeper is entitled as a matter of law to know who is staying in the hotel and for additional revenue if a second person is staying in the room; and, if the visitor is a streetwalker, he or she will not have identification, as noted, or the guest may not want to risk having a second person listed on the registration folio. The final two methods of prevention include employee cooperation. The housekeeping department knows if a certain guest room has heavy traffic


going to and from it and can alert security. The hotel operator can also be helpful by identifying increased telephone traffic to a particular guestroom. And, hotel managers must maintain a no-tolerance attitude toward prostitution, while supporting security in its efforts to deal with the problem. Common meeting places for prostitutes are lobby pay telephones, bars, and easily recognized hotel fixtures.

Check and Credit Card Fraud Two general types of problems are associated with bars, restaurants, stores, and the front desk in a hotel: check and credit card fraud and theft of merchandise, as well as food and beverage items. Incidents involving “walkouts” are common when nonpaying customers who enjoyed a meal or drinks in a hotel leave without offering to pay for the items consumed. Unfortunately, this type of crime is only a misdemeanor in most states, and the innkeeper is limited in what it can do after the fact. Frequently, a patron who is caught leaving can be confronted and, if he or she refuses to pay, be held long enough for security or the public police to arrive so that the thief can be identified for future reference or prosecution. The amount of the loss is usually not worth the time required to prosecute, so it is recommended that the name and description of the individual be recorded and distributed to all outlets in the hotel. Alternate means of payment (e.g., having a family member pay, another form of payment like cash) may be tried. If the person tries to obtain food or drink again, he or she can be refused until the previous bill is paid. Credit cards are used very often as a means of payment by patrons, due to their convenience and the generation of tax records for business customers. This convenience, however, causes some problems for the hotel operator, particularly in the food and beverage outlets as well as stores. Problems ranging from use of stolen cards, cards over their allowable limit, and the inflating of gratuities or even writing in gratuities by dishonest employees are just some concerns facing hotel security. The best means of avoiding these and other scams is to develop detailed policies and procedures for authorization of use and the like and training employees to follow the procedures. Charging store merchandise to a guest room must some how be verified first. With the advent of Internet shopping, theft of credit card numbers is a growing problem. Hotels that utilize “paperless” check-in are less susceptible, but problems of dishonest employees stealing credit card numbers remains. Limiting exposure of the credit numbers to

323

employees and others is necessary. Programming software to display only the last four digits of a credit card number is a good method to reduce exposure. Night audit reports that list credit card numbers must be kept in a secure location. When it is time to dispose of night audit reports, they should be shredded. Make certain that the guest credit card number does not show on the express checkout receipt delivered overnight to the guest room. Criminals have been know to follow the hotel employee delivering the receipts and retrieve them from under the door. Management must then follow up to ensure compliance with the rules, and violators should be dealt with appropriately. When security is called upon to investigate alleged wrongdoing by employees, if proven, swift and severe disciplinary action, including termination of employment, should be considered.

Drugs The sale and use of illegal drugs are a major issue in any industry but appears more complicated in the lodging industry. The innkeeper must be concerned with employees, guests, and patrons who become involved with the use and selling of drugs. The use of drugs by employees, on or off the job, presents some serious consequences affecting both performance and safety. With the rising cost of workers compensation insurance and representing one of the largest line expenses for liability, employers must address the increased use of drugs by employees. Only recently have employers begun to consider the possibility that some employee accidents are directly related to drug use on or off the job. Even employees who do not use drugs but are aware of others who do are affected. Morale problems are likely to arise among those employees who want to do their jobs well but see others not performing because of drug use. Furthermore, a work environment that allows employees to sell drugs to other employees creates the impression that management does not care or is incompetent. Many hotels now conduct preemployment drug testing. Many methods and companies will, for a fee, analyze either a hair or urine sample for the presence of a selected list of illegal substances. The best defense is a good offense and stopping a user of illegal drugs or an abuser of legal drugs prior to hiring can reduce the need for a prolonged investigation and termination process. If preemployment drug testing is used, it is advisable to write a policy allowing “probable cause” testing for drugs and alcohol when an accident or injury is

324


caused by an employee who may be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Legal counsel should be consulted before this action is considered. A number of legislative reforms on intoxication on the job have been enacted recently, including denying benefits in cases in which accidents are alcohol or drug related; talk to legal counsel regarding your states legislation. The ways to effectively deal with substance abuse problems are complicated with problems. The longterm solution is education and awareness, not policing the employees. The hotel should have an employee assistance program (EAP), which may or may not reduce the incidents and cost of alcoholism and other abuse at work. But, we must be realistic that both alcohol and drug abuse exist in the lodging industry. Most hotels unfortunately wait until drug dealing is rampant before they act on tips of drug usage. This does more harm, because by the time they react to a problem, more employees are involved and affected, which may result in having to remove more staff members from the hotel. Security managers can also consider the use of undercover investigators as employees to determine who are the dealer and buyers, as evidence for termination. Drug use or sale by guests is not an unusual problem, but is one that hotel operators should be prepared to resolve. It is very unlikely that a hotel manager can prevent a guest from using drugs in the privacy of his or her room. If, however, the manager becomes aware of such use, action should be taken. Limited use (e.g., smoking a marijuana cigarette) may best be dealt with by warning the guest that repeated activity will result in removal from the hotel; while evidence of more serious use (e.g., large parties with cocaine left out in the open) may require assistance from the local police. It is common for drug dealers to use large urban hotels to conduct their drug deals, for the largeness of the hotel almost ensures their anonymity. Certainly, no hotel operator wants to see the hotel aired on the evening news as a result of a major drug bust. Liaison with local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies is vitally important. Most law enforcement arrests involving drugs occur off property; however, the actual case may be developed around the actual activity taken place while on hotel property.

Protection of Public Figures Depending on the size and location of a hotel, certain types of public figures are likely to stay as guests on occasion. In larger, convention-class hotels, political figures are often in attendance for some social

events. Public figures, whether politicians or others of notoriety such as rock stars or sport teams, often draw crowds. These crowds may be admirers or demonstrators protesting the appearance of the individual. In either instance, security is faced with the difficult task of controlling the crowd while protecting the public figure. Do not assume that the local police always take care or even are aware of these problems. Instead, the security manager should be prepared to work with the authorities in planning for the person’s arrival, stay, and departure. Planning is the key, and occasionally, hotel security receives no advance notice of the person’s arrival. However, if the hotel security procedures include how to handle this type of scenario, coordinating this process should not take very long. Generally, though, there are varying amounts of lead time available before the upcoming event. With adequate lead time, detailed planning averts the risk with minimal difficulty. The following are issues for consideration during the planning stage: 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Communications systems. Be sure all equipment is operating or rent additional radios if needed. Transportation. Prepare for transportation of the celebrity between the hotel and airport, with alternate routes worked out and alternate escape routes from within the hotel in conjunction with the dignitary’s protection staff or secret service. Emergency equipment. Medical equipment and an ambulance, if needed, should be standing by. Access control. Limit access, by both bystanders and other hotel employees, to the areas where this person will be located and work out provisions for crowd control by roping off areas or using barriers. Intelligence. If the public figure has been at other hotels or events recently, contact the security or police in that area for any information that might be helpful in planning for the upcoming event (e.g., were there demonstrators, who were they, any violence).

Guest Eviction The hotel may make reasonable regulations governing the conduct of its guests, provided that such regulations are applied to all persons without discrimination. These regulations can be designed to prevent immorality, drunkenness, or any form of willful misconduct that may offend other guests, bring the hotel into disrepute, or be inconsistent with the generally recognized proprieties of life. The hotel


has the right to evict any guest who willfully violates these rules. (Be sure the person is a “guest” and not a “tenant.”) Obviously, the eviction must be done in a reasonable manner. If a guest refuses to leave the hotel after his or her attention has been called to the violation and he or she has been requested to leave and given a reasonable opportunity to do so, the hotel may forcibly evict the guest. In doing so, the hotel may use only such force as is reasonably necessary to accomplish this goal. Management personnel and security officers should be carefully instructed on this point and the assistance of the local police obtained. When a hotel guest is taken ill with a contagious disease, the hotel, after notifying the guest to leave, has the right to remove such guest in a careful manner and at an appropriate hour to some hospital or other place of safety, provided this does not imperil the guest’s life. As a practical matter, however, it is preferable to consult with a local attorney and report these matters to the proper local authorities. Usually, the local authorities take charge and remove the sick guest. The illness of an indigent guest should be reported to the local department of welfare; communicable diseases should be reported to the local health authorities; and mental cases should be reported to the police.

Copycat Crimes Security managers must ensure that they are knowledgeable in many types of crime, with special attention to crimes that may occur at a hotel but would normally be unlikely to occur. For example, a hotel shuttle bus left the hotel en route to the airport with a group of Norwegian tourists and was hijacked. The hijackers posing as guests, boarded the bus and waited. As it pulled out of the airport, one of the men pulled a gun and ordered the driver to head in another direction while his accomplice robbed the tourists of jewelry and money at gunpoint.

Legal Issues A hotel may be liable in so many different circumstances that entire texts have been dedicated to discussion of such vulnerability. The reason is due to the myriad of services and general nature of the business that the lodging industry represents. In effect, hotel operators (innkeepers) are telling their prospective customers to stay with them overnight, bring their

325

families and cars, eat, drink, and use all the hotel’s facilities while they are guests. In essence, the guests are encouraged to entrust their valuables and personal safety with the hotel; the hotel operator has basically, implicitly or explicitly, assured the guests that they will have a safe overnight stay and the hotel shall be the guests’ humble abode for the duration of their stay. The issue explored in the context of this chapter is limited to the most common types of liability problems. In the traditional role of security in a hotel, concerns for involvement with a liability problem was more a result of coincidence. Management was often reluctant to involve security because they had questionable confidence in the staff and handled it in a public relations fashion. With the phenomenal growth in liability lawsuits throughout the country and in the lodging industry in particular, security has taken on major responsibilities to investigate, report, and develop prevention programs for many of these liability problems. Hence, it makes considerable sense, for example, that the contemporary security manager in a hotel have the responsibility for overseeing and managing most general liability problems, including the loss of guest property, claims of guest injury, damage to or loss of guest vehicles, and employee accidents (although the handling of workers compensation should be the responsibility of the human resources department, all injury reports need to be a shared investigative function with security). In view of the fact that the security department should be the first department to which losses and injuries are reported, the chances are better that information gathered by a security officer during the initial stages will be more reliable and the methods of data collection can be controlled with the greatest consistency.

Guest Property The most common claim against a hotel made by a guest is that some of his or her property has been stolen from the guest room. Security personnel must be cautioned not to assume that all reports of lost property necessarily mean that the property has been stolen. It may be simply misplaced or missing. It is common for victims of loss to blame someone else. Therefore, adequate information must be gathered to determine whether the item was in fact stolen or simply misplaced by the guest. The reason is fairly obvious—lost property requires one type of investigative approach, while stolen property involves another.

326


To determine whether a claim of stolen guest property is valid, a number of steps must be taken when filling out an incident report: 1. Gather all pertinent information on who, what, where, when, why, and how. 2. Search the room or scene for the property, sometimes a fresh pair of eyes searching helps (e.g., guest room, hallways, trash cans, closets, elevator foyers, plants). 3. Inspect all door frames, doors, locking mechanisms, floors, windows, walls, and ceilings for signs of forced entry; be sure to photograph all signs of entry and collect any loose material in evidence bags, ensuring a measurement tool is used in all photos depicting size of markings. 4. Investigate the door lock if hotel has electronic key system. 5. Obtain a copy of the guest folio and registration card. 6. Gather copies of all department schedules to determine who may have had access to area or room (housekeeping, room service, engineering, guest services). 7. Interview and interrogate all employees who had access to the guest room. 8. Inspect all employee lockers and baggage for guest property. 9. Have the victim file a police report. In most jurisdictions, only the victim can file a police report. The police report is also signed under the pain and penalty of perjury. This could be helpful if the victim is determined to have defrauded or is attempting to defraud the hotel or insurance company. 10. File a claim with the hotel’s insurance carrier. These prerequisites must be met before the security investigator can present to the security manager all the facts. Once all the information is gathered, the security manager can determine which action is to be taken by the hotel. Guest status must be established by showing that the individual was or is in fact a guest of the hotel at the time the loss occurred. Such status is important, for case law has been clear that, without the requisite status, the standard of care due an individual not a guest or a previous guest is not as great, and therefore liability is less likely to follow. The reporting of property left at a hotel after checkout should be logged chronologically for reference purposes, in case the guest’s property is recovered (such a log can be titled Nonliability Log). It is important that all departments refer these calls to security. Most guests have a tendency to contact

either the housekeeping department or the front desk. The reasoning for this guest status was tested in the 1957 case of Idelman-Danziger, Inc. v. Statler Mgmt., 136 A2nd 119. The court noted that “to establish the relationship of innkeeper and guest, the parties must intend to do so; the person accommodated must be received as guest and must procure accommodations in that capacity, although it is not essential that he/she register.” Another concern is whether the guest’s property alleged to be stolen was in the custody of the innkeeper at the time of its disappearance. The legal doctrine, infra hospitium, meaning “within the inn,” states that the property of a guest must either come within the walls of the inn or come under the innkeeper’s care; this is a rule of care and custody, Davidson v. Madison Corp., 247 NYS 789, 795 (1931). Care and custody more commonly arise under the concept of bailment, which is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed.) as, A delivery of goods or personal property, by one person to another, in trust for the execution of a special object upon or in relation to such goods, beneficial either to the bailor or bailee or both, and upon a contract, express or implied, to perform the trust and carry out such object, and thereupon to redeliver the goods to the bailor or otherwise dispose of the same in conformity with the purpose of the trust.

Basically, the nature of a bailment is the entrusting of property from one person to another.Traditionally, the courts have held innkeepers absolutely liable for any losses sustained by guests while at a hotel with the intent of protecting the guest or traveler from the dishonesty or negligence of the innkeeper or his or her employees. In response to what amounts to strict liability for guest property, innkeepers have been aided by most state legislatures, which have enacted legislation limiting innkeeper’s liability for guest property to a fixed amount. This amount varies from state to state (e.g., $300 in Massachusetts, $750 in Nevada), and determination of fault also varies, with some states requiring that the guest/claimant prove negligence on the innkeeper’s part, while other states simply require that a guest prove he or she was a guest at the time of the loss and that an item or items were missing. The innkeeper and security manager should be familiar with the governing statutes of the state, for in addition to amounts and issues of fault, generally there are requirements that a copy of the statute be posted for each guest to view and therefore be “put on notice,” or made aware, of such limitations if the


hotel is going to enjoy the benefit of the limited liability. For the most part, these have traditionally been posted within a guest room (e.g., on the back of a door or hung on the closet wall). The legislature’s reasons for passing such laws relates to the difficulty of innkeepers to prevent crimes involving personal property and the likelihood of fraudulent claims, Morris v. Hotel Riviera, Inc., 704 F.2nd 1113 (1983). Although the validity of these statutes has been challenged on numerous occasions, including the preceding case cited, the courts have consistently, and with little variation, upheld the statutory limits, even where the claims for losses were for thousands of dollars. A few precautions for the security manager are (1) be sure that the statute was in fact posted at the time of the loss, (2) determine if the claimant was a “guest” per the preceding discussion, and (3) determine if the property alleged to be stolen was “within the hotel,” to establish some degree of care, custody, and control by the innkeeper.

Guest Injury and Foodborne Illness Guest injuries are common occurrences and result from a variety of hazards including, but not limited to, wet floors, worn carpets, exposed carpet tacks, broken furniture, electrical wires improperly laid along a floor, broken glass not being vacuumed up, poor lighting, lack of directions for equipment use, and so on. We mention these because not all reports are legitimate and need to be thoroughly investigated and documented.

Inadequate Security The type of guest injury of greatest concern to security professionals is allegation of unsafe conditions based on the argument that the hotel had an inadequate level of security protection. With the publicity received by the so-called Connie Francis case, Garzilli v. Howard Johnson’s Motor Lodges., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1210 (1976), there has been a continuous string of similar cases against hotels for injuries received by guests as a result of attacks by thirdparty criminals. It is fair to say that this is a popular theory of liability now that the public is aware of the necessity for security protection in a hotel and there is a lack of tolerance by the public and juries to perceived inadequate levels of protection. An innkeeper has the duty to exercise reasonable care for the guests. If a hotel is experiencing an

327

increase in crime or if the surrounding neighborhood is having problems with crime in a way that could affect the hotels guests and the innkeeper fails to respond to that threat by improving or increasing security measures, the innkeeper may be liable for any injuries suffered by guests at the hands of a third-party criminal. (Note: These injuries can be in the form of both physical and mental anguish.) Even if the offender is not caught, providing that the injury occurred in or immediately adjacent to their hotel’s property, the hotel may be required to pay damages. Liability in these cases is predicated on the theory of negligence, in that it was reasonably foreseeable that the injury would occur if corrective action were not taken. If the innkeeper knew or should have known of the threat, the “reasonable care” rule applies, establishing that the innkeeper had a duty to protect the guests, failed to do so, and as a result the guest was harmed. Liability for criminal acts on hotel property usually evolves around two initial questions: Was the crime foreseeable and was there a perceived duty to protect? In other words, if the crime was foreseeable, then the hotel should have a duty to protect. The variable, however, in each of these questions is the term foreseeable. Some precedents are established and most of these cases focus on prior criminal conduct, totality of the circumstance, and reasonable risk: 1. Prior criminal conduct. To foresee the potential for crime, there must have been prior incidents on or near the premises. There is no liability where there is no evidence or history of criminal acts. Therefore, the importance of having a physical security risk assessment conducted that includes a study of criminal activity becomes critical in determining how a hotel should react to prior criminal conduct. If a study determines a basis or precedent for prior criminal activity, then courts could conclude that the evaluation substantiates a portion of the foreseeable issue. 2. Totality of circumstances. Totality of circumstance relates to a much broader definition than foreseeable. This theory proposes that foreseeable crime is not based solely on prior incidents but that one should look at the totality of the hotel’s premises and business circumstances. These might include such issues as the type and nature of the business, its geographic location, prior similar and dissimilar crimes, inadequate or improper lighting, proper key control, methods of controlling access or preventing unauthorized access to the hotel, poor architectural design of the hotel,

328


improper use of safety- or security-related systems and equipment, and so forth. 3. Reasonable risk. The reasonable risk theory looks at several additional areas. Is there foreseeable probability of harm or injury? What preventive measures were available to hotel owners and visitors? What methods were used to provide safety and security measures at the hotel site, such as controlled access, security officers, lighting. In other words, the legal system wants to look at and focus holistically on how the hotel has identified and reduced risk. Remember, the objective of security should be the protection of life and property, therefore, the focus should be on preventing a loss in the first place. In view of the preceding and considering the standards by which hotels are measured, it is necessary for the innkeeper, through the security department, to keep informed of recent trends or changes in crime patterns both within the hotel and in the surrounding neighborhood. Maintaining a positive working relationship with the local police is essential for a regular flow of information regarding crime in the neighborhood.The security department’s reporting system should include both monthly and semiannual reports that summarize all criminal activity for the time period and make everyone aware of emerging patterns of changes. What is adequate security? There is no acceptable answer to that question, due to the lack of any established industry standards. (Note: Through the American Society for Testing and Materials, a committee has been formed to draft standards for the lodging industry specific to security.) Presently, as a result of the lack of standards, the courts are making the determination of adequacy on a caseby-case basis. One rule of thumb is to look at other hotels situated similarly geographically and in size to try to assess what is acceptable within a given community. This comparison is referred to as the community standard and is also used by the courts to examine the property being sued. However, community standards can be misleading if it can be shown that the entire industry was below acceptable levels of protection in view of crime problems and the cost of preventive measures. It should be mentioned that inadequate security lawsuits against property owners and managers include a number of factors resulting in a finding for the plaintiff. These include a history of neighborhood crime; inadequate security of exterior areas, parking facilities, and common interior areas; lack of training of front desk employees; poor access control and lock and key control; inadequate

guest room security; negligent hiring practices; improper training and supervision of security personnel; and negligent management policies.

Alcohol Server Liability Alcohol server liability is a form of third-party liability that arises when the server of alcoholic beverages is held liable for the actions of an intoxicated person who consumed alcoholic beverages in the liquor serving establishment and, as a result of the intoxication, caused injury to him- or herself or another person. Alcohol liability problems do not generally involve security staff initially, for it is usually food and beverage department employees, such as bartenders, waitresses, and managers, who are directly in control and responsible for alcohol consumption. Security has a function to perform, however, in helping prevent intoxicated patrons from driving a vehicle or becoming injured while walking around the hotel property. Not all alcohol liability cases are limited to motor vehicle accidents. Guests can become injured by falling down in an otherwise safe area due to intoxication. The innkeeper is not in the position in such cases, unfortunately, of being able to claim the defense that the guest’s intoxication caused the injury when the innkeeper, in the first place, allowed an individual to get drunk. The type of situation that present the greatest risk of alcohol liability arises when the guest attempts to leave the hotel and drives a car. If a security officer is called for assistance in such circumstances, everything possible should be done to discourage the guest from driving. A hotel may even want to consider the extreme measure of refusing to return the guest’s keys or calling the local police department. This action may cause other problems regarding the inappropriateness of refusing to give a person back his or her property, but the hotel operator must weigh the risks and decide on the safest option.2 Security frequently receives calls from bartenders who need assistance discontinuing service to a guest that, in the bartender’s opinion, has had enough to drink. The security officer must respond promptly to such calls, for the situation is apt to get out of hand quickly. Once the security officer has arrived, he or she should obtain all relevant information from the bartender and, without question, back up the decision to discontinue service. Security should never try to overrule the server’s decision. The same rule applies to any member of management who is called in for assistance in such


circumstances. On the subsequent report and followup investigation, it is essential that all pertinent facts, names, and addresses of witnesses and documentation (e.g., bar tabs and statements) be obtained for future reference. All this information should be maintained in a file at the minimum for the time of the state statute of limitation.

The Future of Lodging Security Some hotel chains have gone through downsizing; however most hotels cannot afford to reduce their security staff or risk the legal ramifications as a result of a negative incident.3 Since the September, 11, 2001, disaster in New York security, especially in lodging places, has become a major concern for event planners, corporate travel services, and the public-at-large. Never has the industry seen such demand for security, and as a result, many hotels have chosen to increase staffing, improve training, and upgrade technology. All necessary, as terrorism, both foreign and domestic, has reached our front door. Hotel operators can no longer ignore the need for a well-trained, effective security operation. Twenty-four-hour command centers are becoming commonplace within large hotels. Guest’s are asking more questions and demand better security, and it is up to the owners, operators, and management companies to deliver the resources. Once the resources are in place, the security professional must be ready to execute a strong plan to protect the guests and a hotels most important assets, its employees and reputation. As stated earlier, hotel owners are intelligent people who realize that the protection of life and property is costly, however necessary. Any hotel, regardless of its size, has security measures and, at the very least, a security-minded staff. Furthermore, many guests today who are frequent flyers have become very savvy travelers and know about personal safety measures. Many hotels today complement their knowledge with travel tip cards and in-room video programs regarding security tips.

329

Today’s lodging security professionals are having a tremendous impact on the reduction of crime in many cities as well as assisting the criminal justice system realize the types of criminal activity within the travel and tourism industry. The continuous efforts of those visionaries in the lodging security profession have had a great impact on the perception of hotel security by others. If the positive outlook of hotel security continues, the profession will develop and be recognized as a vital contributor to the security profession on the whole. The two important factors that the lodging security professionals attribute this to are state-of-the-art technology and the traditional security or human presence. Finally, the future role of our technology is so vast that even we cannot imagine its potential. Given the methods of access control, surveillance, communication technology, and computers, our efforts will be complemented. The most important factor is the positive assurance for a safe and secure environment for guests and patrons. Criminals will have to go elsewhere to find softer targets of opportunity, and the lodging industry will not be haunted by the negative impact of crime on persons and hotel property. Security managers must take the time to develop strategic plans that will bring their hotels into the new century and beyond. The future in lodging security is very promising for the talented, contemporary person who wishes to bring the profession forward through education, training, and a vision.

References 1. Private Security Request of the Task Force on Private Security, National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice, Standards and Goals, Washington, D.C., 1976. Published IEAA Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1976, pp. 99–106. 2. Steve Kaufer and Jurg Mattman. Premises Security and Liability: A Comprehensive Guide from the Experts. Laguna Beach, CA: Workplace Violence Research Institute, 1997. 3. Mark H. Beaudry. Contemporary Lodging Security. Stoneham, MA: Butterworth Publishing, 1995.

Chapter 19 Retail Security: Lessons Learned from Convenience Store Research ROSEMARY J. ERICKSON and ARNIE STENSETH, CPP

New Challenges The new century brings new challenges for retail security, beginning with a long-predicted increase in crime. The drop in crime enjoyed in the 1990s leveled off and began to rise at the turn of the millennium. Nothing too bad or too good lasts for long. But the lessons learned these past decades can lead us into the future for planning retail security. Most of the scientific research on crime prevention in the retail setting, or any workplace setting for that matter, has been of convenience stores. For that reason, we look at that convenience store research to gain lessons that can be applied to other workplace settings. First, we discuss the increase in crime, then move to the research done on robbery and violence prevention in the retail setting, particularly in convenience stores, to help plan for preventing crime in the future.

people in the crime-committing age group of 18 to 24. There will be almost 20% more individuals in that age group in 2005 than in 1995. FBI figures for 2000 and the preliminary figures for 2001 show that crime is increasing. In 2000, crime had the lowest decrease since 1991, when the crime decline for a decade began. Crime increases in 2000 included the following: Overall crime was up in the Western region. Rape, one of the violent crime categories, was up by 0.9%. Murder in cities was up by 0.7%. Robbery volume was up in all geographic regions, except the Northeast. All categories of robbery were up, except street and commercial house robbery. Robbery in convenience stores, gas stations, banks, residences, and other miscellaneous locations was up.

Increase in Crime We begin with a discussion of the increase in crime, as shown by the most recent FBI statistics and the most recent data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).

The FBI Statistics We had predicted an increase in crime, beginning in 2000, based on the increase in the number of young 330

The Bureau of Labor Statistics There are other indicators, these from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, that crime is going up. According to the report and supplementary information from BLS,1 figures for 2000 show that homicide in the workplace is up: 䊉

Workplace homicides increased for the first time in 6 years.

Retail Security: Lessons Learned from Convenience Store Research

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Workplace homicides increased by 4%, from 651 in 1999 to 677 in 2000, a 37% decrease in workplace homicides since 1994, when the number was at the all time high of 1080. Retail homicides increased by 17%, from 264 in 1999 to 310 in 2000, but this is a 42% decrease since 1994, from 530 to 310. Grocery store homicides, which include convenience stores, increased by 42%, from 78 homicides in 1999 to 111 in 2000, but this is a decrease by 43% from a high of 196 in 1994. The number of robbery homicides in the workplace increased by 14%, from 255 in 1999 to 291 in 2000. Homicides increased at a greater rate in the workplace in 2000 than overall, where they remained essentially the same from 1999 to 2000.

331

so this statistic is based on the number of cases where motive could be ascertained.

Workplace Deaths Overall Transportation incidents continued to be the leading cause by far of death in the workplace in 2000, followed by contact with objects. Assaults and violent acts are the third leading cause. In 2000, 43% of all fatal work injuries were the result of transportation incidents (2571). Contact with objects accounted for 17% of all workplace fatalities, at 1005 incidents. Violent acts accounted for 16% of the fatalities with 929 cases. Of these, 677 (11%) were due to homicide.

Industry Differences Workplace Homicides in Selected Industries Table 19-1 shows the number of workplace homicides in selected industries with changes over one year. Total workplace homicide increased from 1999 to 2000 by 4%. Retail trade homicides increased at a greater rate of 17%. Within retail trade, grocery store homicides increased even more, by 42%. In 2000, workplace homicides decreased for eating/ drinking establishments, gas/service stations, and taxicabs. The number of murders at eating/drinking establishments decreased by 4%. Gas/service station and taxicab homicides both decreased by 18%.

Retail trade has more homicides than other industries, but it is not more dangerous overall for fatalities. The industries with larger numbers of fatalities relative to the number of employees are as follows, ranked with the most dangerous industry listed first, followed by the rates of death per 100,000 employees in the year 2000. The rate of death in the mining industry, for example, is 10 times that of retail trade. The construction industry accounted for the largest number of fatalities in 2000 with 1154 deaths, while retail had approximately half that number at 594.

As in years past, robbery was the primary motive for homicides in the workplace, accounting for 43% of all homicides. Violence by coworkers, customers, or clients was a distant second. Motive was not always able to be determined from the source documents,

Mining (30.0) Agriculture, forestry, and fishing (20.9) Construction (12.9) Transportation and public utilities (11.8) Wholesale trade (4.3) Manufacturing (3.3) Government (2.8) Retail trade (2.7) Services (2.0) Finance (0.9)

Table 19-1. Workplace Homicides in Selected Industries

Nature of the Fatalities

Motive

Industry

1999

2000

Percentage Change

Total workplace homicides Retail Grocery stores (includes convenience stores) Eating/drinking Gas/service stations Taxicab

651 264 78

677 310 111

+4 +17 +42

95 17 51

91 14 42

-4 -18 -18

The total number of fatalities in retail trade, not just those from homicide, also increased by 16% from 1999 to 2000. There were 513 fatalities in 1999 and 594 in 2000. If a retail worker is killed on the job, however, it is more likely to be from homicide than any other cause. About one-half of the deaths of retail workers (52%) on the job are due to homicide, and robbery is the primary motive. Of the 594 deaths in the retail trade in the year 2000, 310 were

332


homicides. Of all the homicides in the workplace, 46% are in retail. Industries with a large number of homicides are typically those that engage in cash transactions or have valuables on hand.

Men and Women Men make up 54% of the workforce, and women make up 46%. Men, however, accounted for 92% of the workplace deaths, and women for only 8% in 2000. Far more men than women die on the job— more than 10 times as many—because men are in the more dangerous occupations. There were 5467 fatalities for men and 448 for women. Transportation incidents were the leading cause of death for both men (43%) and women (45%) in 2000. The second leading cause of death on the job for men was contact with objects (18%). Of women killed on the job, the second leading cause of death was violence, at 34%. In 2000, men accounted for 80% of the victims of homicides, and women accounted for 20%; 543 men and 134 women were murdered on the job in 2000. The number of workplace fatalities declined by 2% from 1999 to 2000, but the number of job-related homicides increased for the first time in 6 years. The increase in workplace homicides may be a precursor with regard to homicide increasing overall in the United States. Indicators that may combine to increase crime in the future include 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉䊉䊉

䊉

More people in the crime-committing age group of 18–24 years. A large number of people being released from prison. Nearly one-third of the prison population of 2 million was released in 2001 (600,000). This trend is expected to continue. Two-thirds of the prison releasees are likely to commit crimes again and be returned to prison. Uncertain economy and job market. The impact of the terrorist events of 2001. Strained police resources because of attention to local counterterrorism efforts. A proposed shift for the FBI away from crime fighting to counterterrorism.

other locations. The history of the convenience store research began in the 1970s, when retail crime spiraled. Robbery in chain stores, not just convenience stores, had increased by 167% from 1968 to 1973.2 To study the problem, the Western Behavioral Sciences Institute (WBSI) under a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), National Institute of Justice (NIJ), and in cooperation with 7-Eleven Inc. undertook an experiment. The convenience store industry faced a combination of challenges at that time: 䊉䊉

䊉

䊉

The WBSI Research The WBSI team included social scientists and former armed robbers; the purpose of the research was to test new techniques to prevent robbery and violence. With innovative techniques, including behavioral changes, physical changes, and employee training, intervention measures were implemented in 60 experimental stores, which were closely matched on a stratified random basis, with 60 control stores. In a combined effort with industry and government, the stores selected for study were 7-Eleven stores. The 7-Elevens had been using former armed robbers in training seminars for management and employees. This project provided the opportunity to test deterrence methods through a classic experimental design in a field setting. It was, and remains, the only such large-scale experiment on the subject done to date. The approach included the unexplored strategy of emphasizing prevention by altering conditions at the scene of the crime, so that the robber would not attempt the robbery. Those physical changes, now somewhat common, were new at that time and included the following program components: 䊉

The Research

䊉䊉

Most of the published research on crime prevention in the workplace has been done on the convenience store industry, with very little scientific research on

An increase in robbery A reduction in other targets, since public transportation had moved to a “no-change” rule to reduce robberies Increased exposure due to having more convenience stores Increased exposure, due to increasing hours, from the original hours of 7 a.m. to 11 p.m. to being open 24 hours a day.

䊉䊉䊉

Reducing the amount of cash available Posting signs regarding low cash Clearing the windows to make the register visible Repositioning the cash register up front Increasing lighting, inside and out Eliminating escape routes


䊉

Training the employees in violence and robbery prevention techniques.

For the study, the rationale behind the procedures was to look at the stores from the robbers’ point of view and devise countermeasures to dissuade them.2 Some preliminary consideration on the part of the robber is, therefore, assumed. At the scene, the characteristics of the site and the behavior of the store personnel can lead the robber to reconsider, then proceed with the robbery, wait until conditions become favorable for the robbery, or give up the robbery and leave the site. The intent of the prevention procedures is to build into the site those characteristics possessed by stores that are seldom robbed and eliminate features found in stores that are frequently robbed. Certain procedures (good external lighting and clear windows) provide the store an external image that can discourage a potential robber. Other features (an alert clerk or a blocked escape route) are designed to further inhibit a robber’s plans. Still other features (signs posted in the store and direct verbal and nonverbal communication from the clerk) are designed to influence those who actually enter the store with the intention of robbing it. From the robber’s perspective, an ideal robbery in a convenience store would include the following considerations: 䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉

Be sure there is money available Optimize the take\risk ratio Be persuasive Avoid disruptions Get the money quickly Avoid being seen by anyone but the victim Avoid being recognized Get away quickly and easily

From the point of view of robbery prevention, the countermeasures were devised to address the following: 䊉䊉䊉

䊉䊉

Persuade the robber little money is available Maximize the perceived risks for the robber Maximize the probability of the robbery being witnessed Convince the robber he or she may be recognized Alter escape routes or provide obstacles to a quick and easy exit

The concept of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) or environmental design (ED)3 was not part of the original WBSI research. The WBSI study design was a separate development, unrelated to ED. Even though the

333

project would later be called the first test of CPTED, it was in fact coincidental with CPTED.4 The WBSI experiment, of instituting the robbery and violence prevention measures, resulted in a 30% reduction in robberies in experimental stores over control stores during the experimental period. Significantly fewer robberies took place in the experimental stores than in the control stores. The results supported the concepts that robbers in fact select their targets and physical and behavioral changes at the site can significantly reduce robberies.

7-Eleven Implementation While the experiment was successful, what remained to be seen was whether the results of the experiment could be applied with equal success on a large scale over time. The 7-Eleven stores in Houston were used in a 1-year follow-up, the most difficult geographic area at that time. After a year of implementation, 7Eleven decided to adopt the program companywide in its stores, numbering over 5000. Security managers were added to aid in the implementation and monitoring of the program, and computerized systems for tracking loss prevention data were instituted. After 12 years of implementing the robbery deterrence program in the field, 7-Eleven stores experienced a 65% decrease in robberies nationwide from 1975 to 1986.5 That decrease has held for over 20 years, even though robbery has gone up elsewhere during the time period.6 After the WBSI experiment and subsequent implementation in 7-Eleven stores, it was determined that the five most important factors for reducing robberies in convenience stores were money, escape route, anonymity, interference, and police patrols.

The Athena Studies Ten years after the original WBSI study was completed, the study was updated by conducting interviews with armed robbers to see if the same factors were still those most important to robbers when selecting a site to rob. Because armed robbers were used originally in the 1970s in selecting the components for the program, they were used again as a source of information for the updated research.5 With a grant from 7-Eleven to the Athena Research Corporation, interviews were conducted in five state prisons: Illinois, California, New Jersey, Louisiana, and Texas. In the 1985 survey, robbers were asked, among other items, to rate 11 factors as

334


to how important each factor was in the decision to rob. The results, which follow, revealed that the factors were ranked in this order, with the amount of money being the most important to the robbers and video recording systems the least important: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

Amount of money Escape routes Anonymity Interference Active police patrol Armed clerk Number of clerks Number of customers Camera system Alarm system Video recording system

Because the results showed the top factors to be essentially the same as at the time of the original study, no substantive changes were made to the original intervention program. In other words, the intervening decade had not appreciably changed what robbers looked for when robbing a store. In an effort to respond to the changes of the decade following the 1985 prison study, the study was repeated in 1995. With support from 7-Eleven, Athena again conducted a survey of robbers to determine what they look for when robbing a store. Armed robbers, recently incarcerated, were interviewed, as before, to obtain their most current thinking. This time, the study was conducted in 20 prisons in three states: Washington, Maryland, and Texas.7,8 In this study, 310 armed robbers, from street muggers to bank robbers, told why they do it, how they do it, and why people get hurt. Findings are compared with the earlier prison survey. Attention was given to how convenience store robbers differ from other robbers. Some of the primary differences between convenience store robbers and other robbers are that 䊉

䊉䊉䊉

Convenience store robbers commit more robberies (13 compared to 8 on average). They are more likely to live closer to the site. They are less likely to hurt someone. They are not as easily deterred.

The top two considerations for all of the robbers in 1995 in the survey, when they plan to rob a convenience store, were the escape route and the amount of money. These were the same top two considerations as in 1985, but in reverse order. Three new deterrence items were added to the survey list in 1995: armed guards, which were ranked third by

the robbers; bullet-resistant barriers, which were ranked eighth; and unarmed guards which were ranked last. One-half of the top deterrence measures that they consider important have to do with being armed (armed guard, police, or armed clerk), as shown on the ranked list that follows. The new items on the list are marked by an asterisk: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Escape routes Amount of money Armed guard* Anonymity Police Armed clerk Interference Bullet-resistant barrier* Number of clerks Alarm Number of customers Camera Video Unarmed guards*

Having two clerks ranked in the bottom half of the list, along with bullet-resistant barriers, cameras, alarms, and videos.The number of people in the store is apparently of little concern to the robbers, primarily because of their use of guns. With a gun, 81% of the robbers say that they would take on two or more people. With a partner and a gun, 86% say they would take on 2 or more people, or an average of 11 people. Findings from other research indicate that guns are used in at least three-fourths of the robbery/homicides in commercial robberies.9–11 An important difference between the 1985 and the 1995 robbers is that it takes more money now than 10 years earlier for a robber to be willing to rob a location. In 1985, 90% would rob for $150; in 1995, only 40% were willing to rob for that amount. The problem is that the robbers expect $200, on average, from a convenience store, so 45% would be willing to rob anyway, thinking they will get that much. Robbers rob primarily for the money, but they also rob for other reasons, including the thrill, power, anger, peer pressure, or being high. Their advice to victims included 䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉

Give up the money Keep your hands in sight Do not resist Do not make any sudden moves Do not talk Do not stare Do not try to be a hero


Long-term deterrence measures, such as being identified by cameras, appeared to have little impact on the robbers.Their concern,they said,is with getting caught, trapped or shot at the time of the robbery. Of those surveyed, 83% did not think they would be caught.This was even though they were in prison now, and almost half had been in prison before.This means that efforts to lengthen prison time or make the time harder has little deterrent value, because the robbers do not think they will be caught. In fact, only about 26% of robbers are caught.12 Since the amount of money is so important to the robbers, they have to believe that they will not get enough money to make it worth their while, and the risk has to be great enough to ensure that it is not worth their while. Implications of the research are that future efforts need to be focused on 䊉䊉

䊉䊉

Reducing the money Making sure the robber knows that there is less money before the robbery Blocking escape routes Increasing the risk to the robbers of getting caught

The WBSI and Athena research, as well as 7Eleven’s implementation of the measures, indicated the importance and success of these particular security measures in the stores. Selected research conducted by the government is summarized next.

The NIOSH/Virginia Study After the NIOSH epidemiologic researchers identified industries with a high risk of work-related homicide, NIOSH undertook a collaborative project with the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services and local police departments to evaluate the deterrent effect of crime prevention strategies in Virginia convenience stores.13 Using a case-control method, the study was based on robberies in 400 convenience stores in three metropolitan areas of Virginia (Alexandria, Richmond, and Norfolk) from February 1, 1995, through September 30, 1996. For each store robbed, three matched controls were selected randomly from all stores within a 2-mile radius. The study concludes that the interventions recognized for over 20 years as effective robbery deterrents are in fact significantly related to a reduced odds of robbery. The measures found to be most effective include cash control, visibility, training employees, and the elimination of escape routes.

335

Other security measures found to be significant included security systems and bullet-proof shields. Security systems included a variety of measures, including cameras, but were not separately analyzed for their effectiveness. Therefore, a conclusion cannot be drawn from these data about the effectiveness of cameras and videos as a robbery deterrent. Multiple staffing was not statistically significant in deterring robbery. One-half the stores had two clerks, so the numbers were large enough to find significance if there was significance to be found. Other characteristics that increased robbery were if a store was independent, rather than part of a chain, and if it was new (less than 2 years old). Being near commercial space that was open and operating decreased the chance of robbery. The chance of robbery was increased if the store was close to graffiti, a high percent of residents on public assistance, surrounded by older buildings, not located in a shopping center, having a high percent of single men nearby, a low median rent, and a low percent of high school graduates. These results suggest the importance of implementing the basic robbery prevention program adopted by the convenience store industry. Further research needs to be done on the issue of bulletresistant shields, however, since the numbers were so small. This also needs to be done to see if protecting the clerk in this way leads to displacement of injury to the customer. Two clerks apparently do not deter robbery. NIOSH’s previous research concluded that having two clerks did not reduce injury. This study finds they do not reduce robbery either.14,15 Most of the rest of the factors having to do with the neighborhood and community cannot be addressed by the business owner. They are society’s problems, and business needs to serve all communities. These findings confirm long-held sociological principles of the effect of neighborhood on crime.

Cal/OSHA Model Program California implemented a model program for retailers in 1995. The effort was not legislation but a model program recommended to employers. Cal\OSHA was particularly concerned about workplace homicide when, in 1993, homicide became the leading cause of workplace death in California, joining Alabama, Connecticut, Maryland, Michigan, South Carolina, and the District of Columbia.16 The most prevalent category of workplace homicide was retail store robberies.

336


The typology that Cal/OSHA developed guides much of the thinking on the subject nationwide today. Outlined in 1995 in the Cal/OSHA Model Injury and Illness Prevention Program for Workplace Security,17 the typology characterizes three types of workplace violence.To understand which category or type workers fall into, it is important to remember that workplace violence is of both an internal and external nature. This distinction is often overlooked by those studying or working to prevent violence in the workplace or media reporting of workplace violence. The three types, as developed by Cal/OSHA, are presented in Table 19-2. The incidents involving Type I violence are the most common type of workplace violence overall and the most common type of violence for retail workers, with estimates as high as three-fourths of the homicides occurring in this category. Type I is characterized by the outside actions of third parties, usually criminals, coming on the premises to commit a crime. Retail workers, however, are also at risk of Type II violence, such as attacks by customers. While relatively uncommon, such instances do occur with angry or drunk customers. Even though clerks are often trained to defuse the incident, such efforts are not always successful, and not all clerks are trained or willing to back down to what they may consider to be unreasonable requests, comments, or behavior. While retail workers are at greater risk for homicide from the Type I category, they are at less risk from Type II, as compared to public servants or hospital workers.18

Table 19-2. Types of Workplace Violence Type I. External: Assault or threat by outside third parties, usually criminals. No legitimate relationship with the affected workplace, which is commonly a retail establishment. (This category accounts for approximately 60% of workplace violence.) Examples: robbers, rapists, murderers. Type II. Service-related: Assault or threat by someone who is the recipient of a service provided by the affected workplace, such as health care providers and the public sector; that is, police, parole, welfare. (This category accounts for approximately 30% of workplace violence.) Examples: patients, clientele, customers. Type III. Internal: Assault or threat by an individual who has an employment-related involvement with the affected workplace. (This category accounts for approximately 10% of workplace violence.) Examples: disgruntled employees, troubled employees, management problems, coworker problems, acquaintance problems, domestic problems. Source: Adapted from Cal/OSHA, 2002.17

Retail workers are at a relatively low risk for Type III violence. Fewer than 15% of convenience store workers who were killed on the job were killed by someone known by them, according to the study of homicides in convenience stores.9 The recommendations provided by Cal/OSHA for preventing Type I violence include these physical changes:16 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Visibility Lighting Mirrors Cameras Cash handling and signs

Other recommendations include these work practices:16 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Keeping an eye outside Staying away from register when not busy Limiting cash Having a time-access safe Using only one register after dark Leaving unused registers open and empty Training employees in not resisting

The Cal/OSHA model program does not go beyond the measures tested, with the exception of cameras, which by 1995, had become fairly standard in much of the industry anyway. The Cal/OSHA model program makes no recommendations for the use of bullet-resistant barriers, multiple staffing, or closing at night.

Federal OSHA Guidelines Federal OSHA Recommendations for Workplace Violence Prevention Programs in Late-Night Retail Establishments was published in 1998.6 The federal guidelines, like Cal/OSHA, were not intended to be regulations. The OSHA recommendations are basically the same ones that form the robbery and violence deterrence program the convenience store industry utilizes and the National Association of Convenience Stores (NACS) recommends for its members. In fact, OSHA relied heavily on the convenience store industry information and experience in making its recommendations. It did not, however, wait for the results of the NIOSH/Virginia study, so it recommended the use of two clerks in some circumstances.

CPTED When planning a security program, the overall principles of crime prevention through environmental design can be useful.3,4 The three basic tenets


of CPTED are territoriality, access control, and surveillance.

337

Youth Prison Study and the NIOSH-funded UCLA Study.

Territoriality Athena Youth Prison Study Territoriality is the use of physical features to show ownership over the property. It discourages outsiders by defining private space, and it allows employees to see intruders. This way, those working in the store can tell if people are there to shop or to loiter. Define the territory with landscaping, fences, and signs. If graffiti shows up on the building or fence, report it to the police, take a picture of it for the police, and have it removed. Show that your store is well managed. Keep the store and parking lot neat, clean, and free of litter.

Access Control

In 2001, over 200 armed robbers, ages 13–18, incarcerated in Texas, were surveyed in a study supported by Athena and 7-Eleven. The study was designed to allow comparisons with the previous studies of adult prisoners, but additional questions were added to test the theory of what causes violence in the younger offenders. The results are forthcoming.

UCLA Study

Surveillance is the use of physical features, such as electrical and mechanical devices, to maximize visibility, but people can be your best form of crime deterrence. Surveillance creates a risk of detection for intruders and makes legitimate users feel safe. Use lighting and cameras, both inside and out. Remove signs from windows to provide clear lines of visibility to the cashier. Move displays that block visibility to the cashier from the outside. Make sure that security cameras are working. Keep video surveillance tapes for a sufficient amount of time because small details that may not mean anything at the time can be critical to the police after an event occurs. Remember that people are the best form of surveillance. Have those working in the store be alert to the surroundings and report any problems.

This 5-year Workplace Violence Prevention Project (WVPP), funded by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), is a collaborative effort with the California Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Southern California Injury Prevention Research Center (SCIPRC) at UCLA, and Athena Research Corporation. For the study, a population of southern California businesses were randomly allocated into intervention and comparison groups. The businesses include service stations, convenience stores, bars and restaurants, liquor stores, grocery stores, hotels and motels, and taxicabs. The WVPP has two objectives: to provide an intervention to reduce violence in over 500 Los Angeles city businesses at high risk of crimerelated workplace violence and to evaluate which measures or combinations of measures are most effective in reducing workplace violence in different business settings. The intervention includes employee training, cash control measures, lighting, visibility, escape routes, entry/exit control, floor design, and the use of security equipment, such as alarms, cameras, and timed safes. The evaluation will determine the effectiveness of the program overall as well as the individual components of the program. The differential effects among different types of business settings, such as type, size, and location, is also examined. The overall goal is to identify which businesses can benefit most from different combinations of prevention strategies, with consideration of the resources available to the business.

Research Underway

The Recommended Program

Two additional studies are underway to study the effectiveness of security measures: the Athena

Based on the research just described, the following program is recommended. All of the manuals,

Access control is a way of limiting the number of illegitimate people on the premises—people who should not be on the property. It is a way of denying offenders access and keeping them away. The property and store are designed for convenience to customers, but it should not be too convenient for criminals. Limit the number of entrances and exits to the store and the parking lot. Close off some parking lot entrances and doors at night. Install gates, locks, or turnstiles. Use guards, if necessary.

Surveillance

338


training video, posters, and decals are available from NACS, or they can be can be customized. Information on the NACS Robbery and Violence Prevention Training Program is available at the association’s website at: http://www.cstorecentral.com/register/ resource/resource/support.html.

The Robbery and Violence Deterrence Program The robbery and violence deterrence program includes these five factors: cash control and signs, lighting, visibility, escape routes, and employee training.

Cash Control and Signs The single most important step to prevent robbery and reduce losses is to control cash. 䊉䊉

䊉

Use a drop safe Post signs stating that the amount of cash on hand is limited Keep the cash in registers low

Lighting Maintain adequate lighting, within and outside the store, to make the store less appealing to a potential robber who would be more likely to be seen. (Over 90% of robberies are by men.)

Visibility Improving visibility is important in preventing robbery: 䊉

䊉

䊉䊉䊉

Employees should be able to see their surroundings. People outside the store, including police, should be able to see into the store. Keep windows clear of signs and merchandise. Keep shelving low. Mirrors can help, too.

Escape Routes Since escape routes are so important to robbers, try to make escape difficult, by fencing the property and limiting the number of entrances and exits.

Employee Training Employees need to be trained in 䊉䊉

Robbery deterrence measures How to avoid violence during a robbery

䊉䊉

What to do after a robbery What to do in other potentially dangerous situations

Suspicious Behavior Many steps can be taken to safeguard employees and customers. After the events of September 11, 2001, ethnic hostility increased. This, and other criminal activity, can jeopardize the security of both employees and customers. Follow this advice about suspicious behavior in any situation: Take every threat seriously. If something seems wrong, it probably is. Follow your instincts. Call management to report any suspicious activity. Call the police if necessary. Watch for suspicious behavior, not suspicious people. These are the signs of possibly suspicious behavior, someone Parks for an unusual length of time in or near the parking lot Comes into the store, but does not make a purchase Asks an employee’s nationality Returns to the store after having been in there earlier Seems agitated or raises his or her voice Makes inflammatory or derogatory remarks Verbally or physically threatens employees or customers. If a threatening note, sign, message, or recorded message is left at the location, save it and report it to the police. There is no guarantee of safety, but these steps have been shown to help increase security and reduce the risk of harm to employees and customers.

Conclusions The early identification of the risk to convenience store employees in the 1970s led to an overall reduction in robberies since that time. There may have been a reduction, as well, in homicides, due to the same measures. Because the greatest risk to retail workers is homicide caused by Type I violence (that perpetrated by criminals coming from the outside of the workplace), the concentration for the prevention of homicide for retail workers has been in the right place—robbery-related homicides. That is, the emphasis needs to be on prevention techniques that guard against the criminal actions of third parties, especially robbery, assault, and homicide.


It is heartening, in a review of the research done to date, to find remarkable agreement on the effectiveness of certain security measures in convenience stores.Amandus,19 in the proposal to study two clerks in Virginia, said that lighting, visibility, traffic, escape routes, and training appear to effectively deter robbery, but results were inconsistent with respect to multiple clerks, security systems (cameras, videos, alarms), and cash-handling procedures. In addition, he noted the need for further research on the relationship of previous robbery and neighborhood characteristics. With the exception of cash handling, these are still open questions, even after the completion of the Virginia study. Another issue in need of study for their effectiveness as a security measure in retail settings is guards. According to Baumer and Carrington,20 guards have not proven a deterrent in banks, and banks reduced the number of guards at that time to approximately 8% because they found that there was more violence if an event occurred and a guard was on duty.20,21 Recently, however, with the increasing use of guards and private security in general, retail settings appear to be increasingly using guards, either roving or stationary. Roving guards cover a number of locations, rather than remain at a stationary post.The use of personal alarms also seems to be increasing, which allows the person to carry an alarm. While alarms are not considered a deterrent for robbery, they may have utility as an assault or rape deterrent, although that effect remains untested as well.Also, research is needed on the effects of closing at night, because there is some evidence of displacement in time when closing has been tried; that is, that robbers are more likely to rob at opening and at closing if the retail setting is closed at night. Fast food outlets are an example. Robbers may just rob at different times: “Just as bank robbers keep banking hours, so convenience store robbers keep convenience store hours.”21 That is, the vulnerability to crime is a function of the time at which the places are open for business. A more complete analysis of the research described here is available from NACS in its publication Convenience Store Security at the Millennium.22 Because of the consensus on the basic robbery and violence prevention program, there needs to be a more widespread implementation of these validated measures in convenience stores and other retail locations: cash control, escape routes, lighting, visibility, and training. Cameras and video systems have also become more prevalent. The nonvalidated measures include two clerks, bullet-resistant barriers, guards, and closing at night.

339

Efforts need to be redoubled in implementing the validated measures. For additional information on designing customized robbery and violence deterrence programs and training and to see related publications and regular research updates, go to: http://www.AthenaResearch.com.

References 1. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries in 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, August 2001. 2. W. J. Crow and J. B. Bull. Robbery Deterrence: An Applied Behavioral Science Demonstration. La Jolla, CA: Western Behavioral Sciences Institute, 1975. 3. C. R. Jeffery. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1971. 4. R. D. Hunter and C. R. Jeffery. “Preventing Convenience Store Robbery through Environmental Design.” In Situational Crime Prevention, ed. Ronald V. Clarke. New York: Harrow and Heston, 1992. 5. W. J. Crow, R. J. Erickson, and L. Scott. “Set Your Sights on Preventing Retail Violence.” Security Management 31 (1987), pp. 60–64. 6. Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Recommendations for Workplace Violence Prevention Programs in Late-Night Retail Establishments. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, 1998. 7. R. J. Erickson. Armed Robbers and Their Crimes. Seattle, WA: Athena Research Corporation, 1996. 8. R. J. Erickson and A. Stenseth, A. “Crimes of Convenience.” Security Management (October 1996), pp. 60–64. 9. R. J. Erickson. “Convenience Store Homicide and Rape.” In Convenience Store Security: Report and Recommendations. Alexandria, VA: National Association of Convenience Stores, 1991. 10. R. J. Erickson. “Homicide in Convenience Stores.” Proceedings of the Third Annual Spring Symposium of the Homicide Research Working Group. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice Research Report, July 1995. 11. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. June, 1996. Violence in the Workplace: Risk Factors and Prevention Strategies. Current Intelligence Bulletin 57. June 1996. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office. 12. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Uniform Crime Reports. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2000. 13. S. A. Hendricks, D. P. Landsittle, H. E. Amandus, J. Malcan, and J. Bell. “A Matched Case-Control Study of Convenience Store Robbery Risk Factors.” Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine 41, no. 11 (November 1999), pp. 1995–1104.

340


14. H. E. Amandus, D. Zahm, R. Friedmann, R. B. Ruback, C. Block, J. Weiss, D. Rogan, W. Holmes, T. Bynum, D. Hoffman, R. McManus, J. Malcan, C. Wellford, and D. Kessler. “Employee Injuries and Convenience Store Robberies in Selected Metropolitan Areas.” Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine 38, no. 7 (1996), pp. 714–710. 15. H. E. Amandus, S. A. Hendricks, D. Zahm, R. Friedmann, C. Block, C. Wellford, D. Brensilber, T. Bynum, R. McManus, J. Malcan, J. C. Weiss, and D. Kessler. “Employee Injury in Convenience Store Robberies.” Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine. 39, no. 5 (May 1997). 16. J. D. Howard. “State and Local Regulatory Approaches to Preventing Workplace Violence.” In Occupational Medicine: State of the Art Reviews, Violence in the Workplace. Philadelphia: Hanley and Belfus, 1996. 17. Division of Occupational Safety and Health. Model Injury and Illness Prevention Program for Workplace Security. Sacramento, CA: California Department of Industrial Relations, 1995.

18. R. J. Erickson. “Retail Employees as a Group at Risk for Violence.” In Occupational Medicine: State of the Art Reviews, Workplace Violence. Philadelphia: Hanley and Belfus, 1996. 19. H. E. Amandus. Protocol for a Case-Control Study of the Deterrent Effect of Environmental Designs on Violent Crime in Virginia Convenience Stores. Morgantown, WV: Division of Safety Research. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, February 1993. 20. T. L. Baumer and M. D. Carrington. The Robbery of Financial Institutions: Brief Summary. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, U. S. Department of Justice, 1986. 21. W. J. Crow and R. J. Erickson. The Store Safety Issue. Alexandria, VA: National Association of Convenience Stores, 1989. 22. R. J. Erickson. Convenience Store Security at the Millennium. Alexandria, VA: National Association of Convenience Stores, February 1998.

Chapter 20 Putting an Extra “EYE/I” on CCTV: Managing Risk in Retail SCOTT GREENWALD

Old Tech to New Tech The commonplace world of cameras wired to a time lapsed recorder and a monitor leaves little to the imagination. The overall effectiveness is measured when an incident occurs and the images from the recorder need to be viewed by management and law enforcement. Many times the images are not sufficient for evidentiary purposes and the incident leaves the owner of the equipment unsatisfied, law enforcement frustrated, and the perpetrator free to arrive at the next scene undaunted. Closed circuit television (CCTV) has been a successful addition to a security provider’s menu for several years. Studies have shown CCTV to be effective in some environments and less effective in others. The common theme has been that cameras, without someone watching the images, do little in the long run to reduce risk. In a time when security is a necessity, interactive security (ICCTV) turns a reactive CCTV system into a proactive risk management tool. This emerging service, using CCTV, a video transmitter, two way-audio, and a qualified interactive monitoring station, will be the security standard for the future.

Rationale for Technology We begin with an understanding of the rationale for the technology. Many companies realize the need for security. Analyzing risk is an essential element in

the overall scheme of running a business. A security analysis would reveal the need for cameras to be strategically placed within the environment. If the need for recording the spot is to review historical activity (because the nature of the activity is such that it would not reveal itself sooner, e.g., check fraud), CCTV is a perfectly good and reasonable solution to the problem. On the other hand, the situation could be more dangerous and dynamic and an employee witnessing the event is unequipped to react properly. What if the video information shown on the site’s television monitor could be sent to someone not at the location (law enforcement, or an interactive monitoring station) to proactively reduce risk. (See Dr. John Lombardi’s Predatory Prevention matrix, “Phases of Attack,” in Chapter 27.)

Definition of Interactive Interactive monitoring is defined as having the ability to see, hear, and speak to a location in real time (while recording remotely) by a professional, with the ability to analyze the situation and respond accordingly. The response could initiate a verbal conversation between the monitoring professional and the suspect or to call the police because the monitoring professional does not want the situation to escalate. As you can imagine, the service varies tremendously depending on the service provider’s recruiting, training, support, and hardware application. One national provider of interactive services in 341

342


Irvine, California, studied the effects of interactive remote monitoring on convenience store locations and proved a reduction in theft and employee turnover while increasing in sales and gross profit.1 The results were achieved by having the monitoring professional look in the stores several times a day and publicly communicate with store personnel using speakers and microphones. Retailers were also provided software that allow them to see and speak to their sites from a laptop or PC. The CCTV from years past has been transformed into a modern day method to conduct business remotely. Clerks feel good about having a communication device that will not automatically send out the SWAT team and have the site incur costly false alarm charges. This “visual verification” of an alarm can virtually eliminate false alarms if the camera’s configuration and the monitoring professionals are able to see and hear the appropriate vulnerable areas. In fact, several cities are now requiring a verified event before they dispatch fire or police due to the high incidence of false alarms (Salt Lake City, Las Vegas, and Oklahoma City have false alarm ordinances). Law enforcement is becoming more involved in the decision process as well. Building permits sometimes require two clerks to be on duty to operate 24 hours a day (Florida has a two-clerk law).

out of the confrontation). Now you have a clerk who does not have to confront an uncomfortable situation. Another service does this for the clerk. Assuming expense and training by the monitoring professional is acceptable, the monitoring person redirects the confrontation from the clerk to the monitoring specialist, removing the clerk from the equation. Loiterers do not argue much when they are reminded they are being recorded and the police can be dispatched at any time. Four very important things just occurred. First, the clerk was not involved in confronting the loiterers (which makes it safer for the clerk). Second, the loiterers know they are being watched and recorded while they are being asked to leave the premises. Third, the suspects cannot retaliate against a voice (and so more potential violence is diminished). Fourth, a major cause in premises liability cases was just asked to leave the property.

How Interactive Monitoring Reduces Risk

1. How will the monitoring station know I have a problem (i.e., how will it get an alarm)? 2. Does the video automatically get sent on alarm or does the monitoring center need to dial into my location after getting the digital alarm? 3. What is the total time for all that to happen? 4. How good are the people working at the monitoring center? 5. What special training or skills do these people have to do the work? 6. What hardware is needed (e.g., video transmitter, alarm panel, audio equipment)? 7. Is full streaming video (25+ frames per second, per camera) provided? 8. What is the quality and speed of the images (examine this live)? 9. Is interactive monitoring the firm’s core competency or is this a sideline? 10. What is the percentage of residential alarm monitoring to interactive monitoring? 11. How good is the audio portion of the system (listen to a conversation between the clerk and the customer)? 12. What additional costs are involved in placing the system? Can my existing equipment be used?

Interactive monitoring manages risk by giving the person on site a communication platform to connect to a monitoring professional 24 hours a day everyday. This information-rich system allows the monitoring station to see, hear, and speak to those at the location and speak directly to the suspects, if warranted, with the ability to send images to law enforcement if needed. Thus, employees that feel uncomfortable (“foresees” potential harm, in this case evidenced by an uncomfortable feeling) can activate the system and know a security professional is there when law enforcement or guard services are not readily available. The real crux of the risk reduction is in training, expertise, and judgment. Clerks are not trained, nor do they have the experience or proper judgment, to handle a situation as simple as removing loiterers nor should they be required to do so without proper training. The simple act of walking up to a loiterer can escalate very quickly if the clerk were to handle the issue improperly. By having a third person respond remotely to the same situation, the dynamics are very different (the clerk has now been taken

How to Evaluate the Service Provider A handful of monitoring stations offer this service across the United States. The issue with this service is that it is not regulated by any set standards, and with so many variables to dictate the quality of service, it may be helpful to list a series of questions to ask while on the journey to upgrade to ICCTV.

Putting an Extra “EYE/I” on CCTV: Managing Risk in Retail

13. What about my existing alarm monitoring contract? 14. What is the client/dispatcher ratio? 15. What companies currently use the service? 16. How many years’ experience does the firm have in the field? 17. How big is the company (e.g., number clients, types of environments)? 18. Does the system have video storage? 19. Does the monitoring station store the information from the alarms remotely? 20. Does the monitoring station have the capability to send reports of incidents? 21. How good is the relationship between the monitoring company and law enforcement? 22. What does the monitoring company know about eavesdropping statutes and wiretapping laws?

Why Isn’t This Everywhere: Cost versus Availability? Cost Making the transition from a time-lapsed recorder to a digital recorder may be a smart business decision, if the digital recorder has more benefits (no degradation in image quality, no changing tapes, search capacity—to name a few) at approximately the same cost. But, if the upgrade does not save money or time or reduce risk, then why spend more money? The same is true for ICCTV. It is important to look at risk as a business decision. Costs can be attributed to various areas affected by failing to consider risk. Look at the potential for theft (cash, inventory, etc.), loss of property (vandalism), safety issues (employee injuries, false workers compensation claims), and employee concerns (workplace violence, harassment, etc.) to justify a return on the investment.

Connection The Internet, cable, wireless, and satellite technology exists at a cost most people are unable to afford or are simply unavailable for use (e.g., DSL is not available in remote areas and some retailers do not want employees to have access to the Internet). It will be important to make sure the video transmitter works over various communication paths. The reality is that the “early adopters” of technology usually pay more in the early stages of development than their counterparts that wait until the technology is more mainstream and less

343

costly.2 People usually point to the PC model as a benchmark (PCs double in power and reduce price points by 50% every 18 months).

Technology Video storage technology has as many as 160 digital video recorders on the market (only about 20 were on the market 4 years ago). This technology needs to be separated from video transmission technology. Just because the box is a digital video recorder does not mean it can transmit the signal over a telephone line, IP, or a network. The compression/decompression (CODECs) of the files (the file format, such as jpeg, mpeg, and proprietary compression) makes this aspect interesting and affects the speed in which one would receive the signal after it is transmitted. People expect full motion, broadcast-quality images (25+ frames per second, per camera) when the technology is not ready to deliver that quality at a palatable cost. The other aspect of technology is that the video transmitter may be able to be connected to a communication path (phone line, LAN, etc.), but will it take and react to an alarm condition or is the interactive monitoring station required to dial into the transmitter after receiving a regular digital alarm signal from an alarm panel? This simple nuance can make the difference in connectivity, making an alarm response much longer than having alarm outputs on the video transmitter. This difference is critical when attempting to manage risk in a dynamic situation that may last only 2 minutes.

How ICCTV Works Scenario 1. Opening and Closing a Location A retail establishment is most vulnerable when it opens and closes because of the obvious risk factors such as poor lighting, fewer witnesses, employees’ guard may be down due to fatigue, and the like. A suspect taking advantage of the situation rushes the manager in the location and commits the crime. An interactive site gives the perpetrator pause, based on the audible communication with the monitoring professional and the manager while the manager leaves the location (closing) or verifies all is normal (opening). Risk is reduced because ICCTV is a great witness and the camera sees very well in low light.

344


Scenario 2. Escorting Employees to Their Cars Parking lots make great targets because of the distance from the retail outlet to where employees actually park their cars. Poor lighting, odd hours, less traffic, and easy access to a vehicle make this a good target for crime. An interactive system would give the employees the same capabilities as Scenario 1. The monitoring professional could visually walk the employee to his or her car, assuming it is within camera view. Audio is also critical in this scenario to announce that the employee is being monitored for safety (and announces that the area is being recorded).

Scenario 3. Late at Night and All Alone Lone clerks working in remote locations during odd hours are vulnerable to a perpetrator wanting to avoid witnesses and commit crime, knowing no manager is around. There is nothing to suggest that two clerks would do much more for deterrence if they are armed.3 Interactive monitor of the location creates a “witnessed event in progress” of the scene as it unfolds. Law enforcement can be dispatched with a tremendous amount of information to start the apprehension process. It is also “safer for law enforcement to arrive on scene knowing who the victim and who the suspect is” (personal communication with Bill Rathburn, former chief of police, Dallas, Texas).

Scenario 4. Important Deliveries/Transactions Some items are sensitive in their delivery or handling. The product may be expensive, delivered at odd hours, or requires a third party to verify the transaction (watching high-end jewelry transactions). Interactive monitors can open a door remotely, watch the delivery, and ensure its safety. Risk is

reduced because the area is notified that the delivery is being recorded and the delivery person or suspect know the transaction is being monitored.

Scenario 5. Normal Business Settings The clerk at the retail outlet has an unruly customer making an unreasonable demand (selling alcohol to someone already intoxicated, an underage person attempting to purchase adult items, etc.). Interactive monitoring gives the clerk a resource in ridding the store of the unruly patron. The monitoring professional speaks directly to the customer and asks him or her to leave. It would not be too difficult to imagine unhappy customers getting bad customer service from an outside interactive company. Choose carefully.

CCTV versus ICCTV It is axiomatic that all risk cannot be eliminated. The ability to foresee risk revolves around reasonableness. Whether a particular incident was “foreseeable” is a question for those who try the fact. ICCTV has the capability to reduce risk (and the ensuing likelihood that the incident was foreseeable) by eliminating root premises liability issues, such as loitering and panhandling. This new service cannot claim that it cures all of society’s woes, but it gives the potential victim one last chance to deter crime at that location. CCTV works for reacting to an unfortunate incident. ICCTV is a proactive tool that works to prevent potential incidents prior to escalation.

References 1. Stores Magazine (January 2001), pp. •• 2. Crossing the Chasim. •• 3. Rosemary Erikson. Armed Robbers and Their Crimes. ••

Chapter 21 Perspectives on Safe School Administration G. EDWARD RICHARDS

Few issues have galvanized the attention of Americans as school crime and violence. Violence and deviance on K–12 campuses is a serious concern for parents and educators. The belief is widespread that children are frequently in danger while attending school. It is ironic these fears are fueled by inaccurate depictions of the extent of school crime and violence. This is in no small way the result of anecdotal media coverage. It should be noted there is no comprehensive picture of the extent of crime on school grounds due to limitations in data collection. Despite sensationalized media accounts of violence in schools, the extent of crime and deviance on campuses is likely not as widespread as commonly believed. Officers, teachers, and school administrators I have spoken have a general consensus that schools are among the safest places a child can be. This is not to be misconstrued that a school and school system can absolutely guarantee a student’s safety. A school is populated by people and is likely to suffer from the same problems endemic to the general human condition, crime and deviance included. To combat instances of violence and deviance, school systems have developed a myriad of strategies to diminish the potential of risk on campus. Among these are programs constructed to strengthen the family, involve the general community in school safety, and behavior modification. In addition, emphasis has been placed on programs that build self-esteem, resist peer pressure, develop character education, and instill an awareness of the dangers of drug and alcohol abuse. Complementing these are technical developments in the fields of security

and crime prevention that utilize mechanical and procedural devices to curb crime. A challenge to be overcome in addressing the issue of school safety is recognizing that “canned” programs cannot be depended on to address all security concerns for any facility, especially schools. Schools mirror the cities and towns in which they reside. Any pathology the community suffers surfaces on campus. To address the individuality of schools and the students and faculty that learn and work there, programs to increase the safety of personnel must be tailored to address site-specific safety and security concerns. What, then, is a “safe” school? Keeping in mind there are no guarantees against victimization on campus, schools that place safety and security at the forefront of the administrative agenda are more likely to have taken steps to reduce risk on campus. Characteristics of a safe school are demonstrated when 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Students and faculty are not preoccupied with issues pertaining to personal safety. There is a close working relationship between schools and public service agencies to reduce crime and deviance and promote safety. Members of the school community demonstrate a sense of ownership in their physical environment. There is support from the administration to allow faculty and site administrators to engage in novel approaches to the prevention of crime and deviance. A commitment to reducing the risk of personal and property victimization is demonstrated through the annual training of personnel in crime and deviance prevention. 345

346


The British Home Office and the National Crime Prevention Institute of the University of Louisville define crime prevention as the anticipation, recognition, and appraisal of a crime risk and the initiation of some action to remove or reduce it. This is not only an excellent description of the philosophy behind crime prevention but a workable definition of a risk assessment or a safety/security survey. However, when addressing the problems of unsafe schools, acts disruptive to education may include behavior not characterized as criminal but delinquent. Tailoring a definition of crime prevention to support the reduction of crime and delinquency in schools requires a broader approach. Therefore, a definition of school crime prevention should focus on the initiation of any action that improves the quality of life for a school and the community in which it resides. Educators and members of the public service community must caution against viewing the problems associated with school safety as driven by forces at work only on the campus. The following is a list of recommendations for parents, teachers, administrators, and law enforcement in reducing the risk of victimization on school campuses. While it is by no means all-inclusive, the implementation of these strategies can promote the commitment of schools and communities in maintaining learning environments where students can learn and faculty can teach without the debilitation of the fear of crime.

Emphasize Crime and Deviance Prevention during Teacher Education The primary task of a teacher is to educate. However, in light of recent concerns over school violence, teachers and administrators must be familiar with concepts such as character education, security, and conflict management. Periodic and cursory in-service training concerning these issues give educators only a basic awareness of these problems. Education curricula on the collegiate level should incorporate theoretical and applied considerations of how to reduce the risk of victimization on campuses.

Maintain a Sense of Ownership in School Grounds and the Surrounding Neighborhood In keeping with Wilson and Kelling’s “broken windows” thesis, run-down and unkempt property is an invitation for victimization and increased the

likelihood of a breakdown of community social controls. Trash and graffiti should be removed as soon as possible. Cosmetic improvements such as paint and landscaping demonstrate that members of the school community care about their environment and will not tolerate vandalism and wanton destruction.

Conduct Periodic Risk Assessments or Security Surveys To address the risk of victimization on campuses, educators and law enforcement must be aware of where the greatest risk is. Thorough security surveys can illustrate current security threats and future concerns.

Clearly State Rules and Regulations For students to behave as expected, they must be made aware of the institution’s code of conduct. In addition, parents should also receive a copy of the code of conduct to avoid possible confusion.

Conduct a Crime and Deviance Analysis With the advent of the personal computer and data analysis software programs, the once timeconsuming and mundane chore of data collection regarding criminal and deviant acts has been made much easier. Statistical analysis of crimes can illustrate the characteristics of the victim and perpetrator, the type of property victimized, and the modus operandi.

Develop an Incident Mapping System Closely correlated with crime and deviance analysis, incident mapping details where unwanted events occur. The significance of this for administrators is to determine where to place personnel to deter deviance and crime. Once likely perpetrators are forced to change from familiar environments to alien ones, the likelihood of success decreases.

Utilize Parent Volunteers as Monitors and Student Aides This is an inexpensive means of deterrence. It incorporates parents as partners in prevention. Students

Perspectives on Safe School Administration

347

may be less likely to misbehave when they are watched by someone they see on a regular basis.

trends regarding school crime and deviance could prove invaluable.

Institute After-School Programs

Value the Contributions of Custodial Personnel

With most families dependent on the income of both parents, there has been an increase in the number of latchkey children who are unsupervised between the time school lets out and the parents or guardians arrive home. The investment by school systems in programs that keep children occupied in positive activities during this time frame reduces the likelihood of deviance.

Security Considerations Should Be Incorporated from the “Ground Up” A frequent complaint of security professionals is that crime prevention concerns are not addressed during the initial planning and construction of new facilities. The design of schools should take into consideration concepts of natural surveillance and target hardening before and during construction. This commitment to security makes the tasks of faculty, administrators, and law enforcement easier during the years to come.

Establish In-Class Communication between Teachers and Administration Once the classroom door is closed and class begins, monitoring students becomes left primarily to the teacher. In the event of a crisis, it is necessary for teachers to be able to request assistance. Intercoms, cellular phones, and two-way radios are among the devices that can be utilized to maintain contact with administration or security.

Institute a Safety and Security Committee A means of involving the entire school community in safety planning is through the implementation of an ongoing committee to address safety and security concerns. Representatives from the student body, faculty, staff, administration, parents, and the general community should be included to receive as much input as possible regarding risk and risk prevention. In addition, members of the public safety community should be invited to serve. Their expertise in interdiction and knowledge of current

One of the most valuable, but often overlooked, assets regarding school crime prevention are custodians. I have heard them describe themselves as “invisible” people. They go about their business in the midst of students and staff and routinely observe the behaviors of others. I have had administrators scoff at this notion, because they contended people untrained in educational administration have little expertise and advice to offer. This irresponsible and dangerous notion fails to appreciate the wealth of common sense and experience these people often have. Seldom does anyone associated with an organization have any better understanding of the physical structure than custodians and maintenance personnel.

Train Personnel in Graffiti Interpretation Gangs in and out of school pose genuine risks to the safety of communities plagued by them. A chief indicator of gang activity is graffiti. However, there is considerable confusion as to what constitutes vandalism, tagging, and graffiti. Very simply stated, vandalism is usually considered the wanton destruction of property, generally by teenagers and adolescents. “Tagging” is perpetrated by “crews” utilizing a wide color scheme to construct what they consider art. Gang graffiti generally serves as a territorial markers. However, this eclectic collection of words, symbols, characters, and so forth is often mistaken for vandalism or tagging. Campus personnel should be trained in the basic characteristics of traditional gang graffiti. While it should be common practice to remove graffiti as soon as possible, photographs should be taken of the scene to share with local law enforcement.

Schools Need Central Office Support In talking with principals, vice-principals, and other school administrators, I have often found a certain reticence to implement crime prevention and security procedures. They want to act in a proactive manner. It is common to find, in smaller schools with fewer resources to draw on, administrators simply do

348


not know what to do. Considering the seriousness of providing a safe environment for students and staff, their reluctance is understood. The litigious nature of our society is one reason mentioned when the staff I interviewed has not implemented additional security precautions. This grows out of a desire to not do the wrong thing and increase, rather than decrease, risk. It is not enough that the central office of a school system broadly mandate schools implement crime and deviance prevention techniques. To assist those in the field, clear and concise directions must be issued. Ambiguity must be avoided.

Value Aesthetics Studies have shown that people learn better in an environment that is welcoming and comfortable. When crime prevention measures are taken to reduce risk in schools, particularly physical measures, this usually changes the appearance of the physical structure. It is important that students and staff do not undergo a “siege” mentality that affects how they learn and work.

Foster Students’ Beliefs They Are Connected to the School Students that view their campus as more than just a place to be endured are less likely to mistreat facilities. Efforts should be made to incorporate students in activities during and after school that they enjoy. Particular emphasis should be made to include those students that may feel marginalized. Traditionally, extracurricular programs have targeted those students talented in athletics, music, and drama. However, this does not take into consideration those who lack either the ability or interest to fully enjoy these. This should be considered when addressing budgetary allocations for extracurricular support.

Do Not Use Student Monitors Students should be consulted when planning for safe school designs. They are the primary group to be protected from victimization. Their knowledge and concerns are invaluable in addressing risk. However, their use in crime and deviance prevention should be limited. While fewer schools are using students as hall monitors and in other types of patrol capacities, all schools should abstain from their use in this manner. Students picked for this responsibility might

have their own agendas and not report a friend for a violation. Students also might not recognize what is a violation. It is almost certain they will not be familiar with the entire criminal code of the municipality in which the school resides. Another concern is the fear of retaliation from a student who has been reported. Revenge is easier to plot and carry out against a fellow student than a member of the staff.

The “Combustible Engine” Model of School Communities Drawing analogies to a community as diverse as what generally populates a school campus is challenging. However, one model that can demonstrate the variety of people that study and work in a school is that of a car engine. Each piece works in concert with the other to move the automobile from point A to point B. Although it is necessary for each part to work with the others to achieve the desired result, each retains its own identity and responsibility. A school works in much the same way. All personnel from students to staff to parents should have a vested interest in ensuring the system works to provide the best education possible. To ensure the smooth operation of a school each player should be aware of the part others play in obtaining that result. People are different. Everyone comes from a slightly or notably different background. All those who work and study on a campus should be made aware of these differences. An increased awareness of cultural variations among people can reduce the friction that may result when applied to a school “engine.”

Create a Crisis Management Plan While everyone hopes that his or her child’s school is safe and secure, it is a sound policy that plans should be made in the event of human-made or natural disaster. These plans should address education, preparedness, administration, and eventual resolution. Support agencies from within the school’s community should be identified and consulted when instituting preparedness plans. While crises, by their nature, are fluid and unpredictable, plans should be as unambiguous as possible to speed response times.

Train Personnel in Conflict Resolution When signs of interpersonal or group conflict occurs, it is essential that the situation be calmed before it

Perspectives on Safe School Administration

can escalate. Educators and support staff should be trained in conflict resolution techniques that focus on calming participants and fostering communication. Initially, the cause behind the problem is not the issue to address immediately. Upset students should be calmly persuaded to leave the area. After a “cooling-off” period, they should be encouraged to talk through the issues that angered them and discover ways to address conflict without resorting to violence.

349

instruction is that they move from class to class throughout the school day rather than stay in the same room with all instruction delivered by one teacher. In addition to being introduced to new teachers, students are exposed to students outside of the core group they know from elementary school. Programs that promote smaller groups of students familiar with each other foster greater peer support and flexibility in instructional techniques.

Avoid Peer-Group Counseling Implement Character Education Curricula Monitoring student behavior to dissuade deviance is key to creating a safe school environment. However, mere monitoring of students on school grounds does little to encourage compliance with community values while not on campus. Students who are not taught the basic values appreciated by society may have little chance to learn them, especially if they live in a toxic home environment. Values such as honesty, integrity, respect for others, and loyalty form the foundation for a person’s character and encourage citizenship.These moral and ethical principles should be taught to students early in their academic career and reinforced whenever possible.

Create Law-Related Education Modules to Be Incorporated in Social Studies Courses Law-related education is designed to familiarize students with local, state, and federal laws. In addition, students are taught the fundamentals of the American legal system, encouraged to participate in the political process, and shown how to develop analytical skills. A lack of knowledge about the law has been cited as a reason behind juvenile crime and delinquency.

Establish “Communities within Schools” As students mature and move out of elementary school to middle school, a significant change in

For high school students, the effects of peer-group counseling may be particularly harmful. Peer pressure to adopt socially desired attitudes is often felt by participants. In addition, youths in group counseling programs have been shown to demonstrate greater levels of delinquency, tardiness, and rebelliousness. Discussions of conditions within the child’s home during group sessions may also lead to a weakening of the parent/child relationship.

Instill an Awareness of the Dangers of Terrorism In the days following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, American teachers were encouraged to discuss these events with their classes. Throughout the Fall 2001 semester, I emphasized to my undergraduate classes that the wanton destruction of life and property perpetrated on that Fall morning, in all probability, constituted the seminal event of their lifetimes.Their lives would be affected by restrictions in travel, the curtailing of certain civil liberties, and an increased fear of victimization.Terrorism will be the preferred method of warfare in the future. Students should be prepared to understand the risks terrorism poses to their quality of life. At the core of any discussion of terrorism, it should be emphasized that terrorism is the modus operandi of extremists. While terrorists may be identified through political,social,or religious affiliation, instruction should stress that “blanket” judgment about people should be avoided.

Chapter 22 Campus Security and Crime Prevention BRONSON S. BIAS, CPP, CPO, CFE

An effective crime prevention program on a college or university campus is a community-based concept. The demographics of the occupants of the campus are evaluated by the crime prevention administrator for the institution in the same manner as with any community. The central theme of the campus crime prevention program is awareness and self-protection. The self-protection philosophy includes the full utilization of the campus law enforcement and security administration elements to encourage and enable this self-protection concept. Programs dealing with awareness are ongoing. The primary objective of the campus crime prevention program is to educate the campus occupants in how to protect themselves from harm and crime. The campus law enforcement (LE) and security department(s) are a tool—albeit a major one—in the self-protection concept. The campus protective service (LE or security) provides the basis for and the support of the crime prevention program.

Communication Effective communication is critical in providing campus crime prevention. The most important communication element for any campus law enforcement or security department is the telephone. Of course, on some campuses, this includes emergency “ring-down” telephones that call campus public safety immediately. The basic COMM-LINE numbers to contact the campus protective department should be advertised clearly and frequently. 350

There should be no doubt to anyone on the campus, even the casual visitor, of the method for contacting help. This can be accomplished through advertising the protective department’s services. It is important to display the emergency telephone contact number in a prominent space within any such advertisement. Without basic communication lines, most crime prevention programs, dependent on communicating with the protective service, fail. Campus occupants lose faith in campus protection quickly due to a less than reasonable response by protectors and caregivers.

Key Elements in a Campus Crime Prevention Program The basic campus crime prevention program consists of the following key elements: 1. Research. Study campus risks, with emphasis on personal safety. This includes evaluating the risks and assigning evaluative priorities for addressing the risks. 2. Schedule of implementation. Plan and schedule the crime prevention program implementation. 3. Formal program to train the trainers. Train crime prevention specialists in field protective services (law enforcement and security) and clerical and support staff the creation of an awareness program. 4. Theme. Create a flyer, brochure, or booklet with detailed information on crime prevention techniques. Themes can be developed to be tailored to

Campus Security and Crime Prevention

the institution’s identity, such as “Spartan Watch.” Generic program material, such as “Officer McGruff, Take a Bite Outta Crime,” can also be used. 䊉 Advertise: Judiciously “paper” the campus with these informative publications. Prominently display the emergency telephone contact number for the protective department. 䊉 Alert Decals: Develop adhesive stickers for building doors and exterior windows using an identical or related crime prevention theme with contact telephone numbers. 䊉 Telephone Alert Decals: Utilize smaller decal stickers with the emergency telephone contact number for the protective department. Place, or have campus occupants place these decals on the front base of each private and public telephone on campus. Everyone on campus will see the protective department’s name, logo, and telephone number several times a day. Product identity is assured. 5. Security surveys. Provide and promote security surveys to departments, centers, offices, and individuals. Use the security survey to “sell” the campus occupants a crime prevention lecture, seminar, or meeting. 6. Lectures. Provide basic and comprehensive crime prevention lectures at orientations and residential hall meetings. 7. Reassessment. Reassess the effectiveness of the crime prevention program at least once per year. The effectiveness of a successful crime prevention program is not necessarily measured in the number of surveys, lectures, and personal contacts completed. Other measurements are significant, such as crime statistics, crime event reduction in specific areas, protective department image, and departmental morale.

Commitment It is imperative that all members of the core protective service department be a part of the crime prevention program. Each, in his or her own way, contributes to the success of the overall program. To some degree—some greater, some lesser—everyone in the protective department must be aware of the philosophy and concepts of campus crime prevention and, more important, endorse and promote the crime prevention program. Effective crime prevention cannot be successful if the campus protective department has some of its own members working against the system.

351

Cycle of Activity Campus crime prevention involves a cycle of activity. The cycle includes planning, preparation, prevention, and reevaluation and reassessment.

Planning It is desirable and most effective to begin prevention programs by systemizing them during the planning phase of a facility or a function. Specific knowledge can be applied to supply the optimum schedule of environmental (CPTED), barrier, spatial, lighting, locking device, and procedural security applications. However, in reality, the vast majority of crime prevention applications follow construction. There is great value in evaluating a facility or a function as it is in place and working. The actual operation of the functional facility can be evaluated to determine true concerns and issues. Within reason, upgraded physical, procedural, and personnel security measures can be applied. Knowledge in the process should be recorded and applied to future projects.

Preparation Adequate funding and allocation of crime prevention programs and personnel is essential to the success of an effective program. All protective department personnel should be provided with basic crime prevention philosophy and concepts. Also, the simple techniques of crime prevention should be conveyed to these personnel so that they may not only utilize them to protect themselves but have a better understanding of the role of the crime prevention practitioners. Persons assigned to the prime responsibility of crime prevention program delivery should be exposed to formal instructional training whenever possible to build their own personal knowledge of the facts and concepts of the program. The betterformalized crime prevention training programs certify the courses by conducting examinations. Currently, independent certification is available for a crime prevention practitioner after specific courses of study. One of the most effective learning methods is networking with other campus protective service departments. Each of the contributing agencies can share its own experiences, techniques, and tactics.

352


National Crime Prevention Institute The National Crime Prevention Institute (NCPI), located on the campus of the University of Louisville, Kentucky, is a training and education center as well as a repository of general and specific information about all types of crime prevention programs. Throughout the year, various basic and advanced courses are provided to law enforcement and security personnel: National Crime Prevention Institute Brigman Hall University of Louisville Louisville, KY 40292

Prevention The prevention phase involves the delivery of crime prevention services: awareness, advertising, evaluations, lectures, and training. Prevention also includes conducting basic, progressive, and advanced security surveys on campus to determine the security risks of the facility or property. Although the campus as a whole fits under the crime prevention umbrella, to be more effective the crime prevention practitioner should evaluate the parts of campus as individual entities. Security surveys should be conducted by facility, by department, and by function. The assembled data can then be measured in more manageable amounts. This closer evaluation reveals more clearly the needs and application of the crime prevention services. Only rarely can a crime prevention practitioner have large groups of campus occupants to instruct. Usually the contacts are more informal and more personal. Crime prevention practitioners must be ready at any time to give advice and instruction to others, including members of their own department. Not surprisingly, the most opportune time to provide or schedule a security survey or lecture is during the reporting and investigative phase of a crime on campus. Campus crime victims are usually more apt to welcome crime prevention advice and departmental help during this critical period. This makes it imperative that an on-scene investigation be conducted after a crime, no matter how long it has gone unreported. Follow-up on crimes occurring on campus demonstrates to campus occupants that the protective department is concerned. This personal contact can pave the way for

initial or improved relationships with regard to crime prevention.

Reevaluation and Reassessment Crime prevention on a college or university campus is an ongoing activity. Primarily because of size, a campus community provides a closer relationship between the occupants and the protective service dedicated to law enforcement and crime prevention. This favorable index allows the crime prevention professional better opportunity to revisit security survey and lecture sites for assessment of crime prevention progress. The crime prevention authority can determine which programs are effective and which are not. Crime prevention techniques, methods, and ideas that work can be fostered. Those that are less than successful can be altered, eliminated, or replaced to provide updated productive crime prevention. If successful, municipal and county crime prevention units are exposed to massive demands for program implementation. This further stretches the resources of the crime prevention unit of the local law enforcement agency. The demand also reduces the opportunity for the agency to revisit previous crime prevention survey and lecture sites. In contrast, the crime prevention practitioner at a college or university usually has daily exposure to persons or departments under consideration. This improves basic communication and fosters the ability to reassess the effectiveness of programs. It is not unusual for a campus crime prevention practitioner to evaluate a facility or function through formal surveys more than once in a year. Ongoing crime prevention training and lectures are supplied as a matter of course. Updated crime prevention evaluation data obtained through survey methods should continue to be the basis for ongoing crime avoidance instruction.

Specific Programs The most important crime prevention programs are those that directly effect the prevention of crimes of violence against persons: murder, rape, assault (including aggravated), robbery, carjacking, threats and intimidation, gang-related violence, and stalking. Important as well are lesser crimes, such as auto theft, auto break-ins, bike theft, books and book-bag theft, residence hall room theft, purse theft, office-


related item theft, locker room theft, common theft, fraud, information (usually computer-related) theft, telephone use theft, shoplifting, vandalism (including graffiti), and “quality-of-life” crimes. Quality-of-life crimes include drunkenness and drug abuse; disorderly and noisy conduct; minor harassment; offensive acts, words, or deeds; panhandling, loitering, and vagrancy. Prevention of crime on campus employs a variety of methods. These methods are organized into three categories: physical methods, procedural methods, and personnel methods.

Physical Methods Physical methods include proper and useful campus lighting, effective (reasonable and acceptable) barriers, high-quality locking and security devices, and effective alarm systems.

The effectiveness of a campus crime prevention program depends on the application of all these methods of prevention.

The Campus Security Act of 1990 Disclosure Law The Campus Security Act of 2000 is actually a disclosure law. The law requires colleges and universities to make public some of their campus crime incident statistics. This crime incident awareness, as crime prevention practitioners know, helps in preventing crime by alerting potential victims to crime risks. Also, this awareness allows everyone on a school campus an opportunity to plan for crime prevention. The two statistical categories of the Campus Security Act of 2000 are 䊉

Procedural Methods 䊉

Procedural methods include effective campus rules and regulations; use of facility requirements; security and safety signs; crime prevention information, including surveys, awareness, and training.

Personnel Methods Personnel methods include campus law enforcement and security personnel, collateral law enforcement personnel (when the local law enforcement agency has the primary jurisdiction), parking control personnel, students assigned to security duties, facility and residence hall monitors, and any person who takes an active role in reporting and discouraging criminal acts. The protection of a campus involves the employment of tactics and techniques of physical, procedural, and personnel in a variety of methods. Sometimes, a crime prevention function is both physical and procedural, such as Operation ID, Neighborhood watch, which involves engraving a personalized identification on an item, such as a television. The act of engraving the owner’s driver’s license or social security number on the television is physical in nature. However, the use of the awareness of this crime prevention action is actually a procedural method because it is a sign to warn opportunistic thieves.

353

The institution must report to all members of the community statistics concerning the occurrence of crime on campus during the last 3 years. The institution must report statistics concerning the number of arrests for liquor law violations, drug abuse violations, and weapons possession.

Most campus administrators are aware of the criminal statistics portion of the Campus Security Act of 2000. However, as significant as the crime statistics are the crime prevention–related portions of the Campus Security Act. T Schools must report seven other categories in regard to their campus law enforcement and security elements and significant crime prevention issues: 1. A statement of current policies regarding procedures for students to report crime and emergencies. 2. A statement of current policies concerning security and access to campus facilities. 3. A statement of current policies concerning campus law enforcement. 4. A description of programs designed to inform students and employees about campus security. 5. A description of programs designed to inform students and employees about the prevention of crimes. 6. A statement of policy concerning the monitoring and recording through local police agencies of criminal activities at off-campus student organizations recognized by the institution. 7. A statement of policy regarding the possession, use, and sale of alcoholic beverages; the enforce-

354


ment of under-age drinking laws; the possession and the use of illegal drugs; and the enforcement of federal and state drug laws. This information must be made available to new students and employees on request. It is obvious to any crime prevention practitioner that these policies and programs identify the elements of a campus crime prevention program. This new campus crime disclosure act brought these policies, programs, and protective systems into close focus by campus administrators, who scrambled to ensure compliance with the law.

campus to spread crime risk awareness and crime prevention information. These notification programs include 䊉

䊉䊉䊉

䊉

䊉䊉

Impact of the Campus Security Act

䊉

The impact of the Campus Security Act of 2000 on campus crime prevention has been significant. Many institutions were committed to sound campus crime prevention programs prior to the enactment of this law. However, the majority of schools had not even considered publishing crime incident statistics or notifying students, faculty, and employees of criminal acts taking place on the campus. That all changed on September 1, 1992, when the original federal law, the Campus Security Act of 1990, came into effect. Educational institutions energized their security planners to develop law enforcement, security, and protective services policies to comply with the law.

䊉

Communication The Campus Security Act of 2000 is primarily a law mandating communication. The act does not order campuses to create, institute, and develop these crime responses and crime prevention systems and programs. This law only mandates that they “disclose” or report on the systems and programs.

Crime prevention and protective services booklets and handout materials Campus newspapers Bulletin board notices Video production presentations at cafeterias, in dormitories, and in gathering locations on campus Crime prevention lectures, workshops, and seminars Speaking engagement and awareness programs Instructive classes for residential life and student life management and staff “Instant” bulletins on campus in regard to special crime risks Other innovative and creative methods for dispersing crime prevention information and teaching techniques; for example, dissemination of information on programmable FAX machines.

Crime prevention representatives on campuses increased their networking with other educational institutions campus protective departments. The exchange of crime prevention methods, techniques, and activities reached an all-time high in the campus crime protection industry. Many new and innovative crime prevention methods were developed and shared by law enforcement and security personnel.

Positive Results of the Act The results of the impact of the Campus Security Act of 2000 are still being measured. However, it is obvious that the effectiveness of campus crime prevention has been enhanced immensely. Also, the outlook is excellent for even more campus crime prevention program action and interaction in the future. In this way, the Campus Security Act of 2000 is an unqualified success.

Compliance Creates Programs To comply with the Campus Security Act of 2000, schools enlisted their protective service management to create or enhance the crime information delivery system for students and staff. Some protective professionals created their “new” campus crime prevention programs using standard crime prevention information and techniques. To their delight, most campus crime prevention officers found that suddenly they had easier access to a multitude of information delivery services on

Neighborhood Watch on the College Campus A neighborhood watch is, generally speaking, not a program geared for the college community. However, the principles of the program can be applied. The objectives are 䊉

䊉䊉

To request individual cooperation and look out for one another’s property To report suspicious persons To report crime regardless of the amount stolen


䊉

To increase the community’s awareness through educational programs on how to reduce crime.

Phones on Campus Outside phones on campus, seem to be a trend left over from the 1970s. Phones strategically located on main footpaths throughout the campus provide an instant means of communication between the community and the police. This is part of the neighborhood watch program. The community should always be urged to report all crime and suspicious persons they may observe.

Thefts in the Library A recent survey among several colleges throughout the country showed that the biggest problem among officials was the theft of wallets while studying at the college library. This is attributed to negligence on the part of the victim. Frequently, the victim reports that he or she left a coat, backpack, or purse containing money on an unoccupied table while going to locate a book. On returning, belongings are found in disarray and the wallet or money is missing. One answer to this problem is to give out a flyer to everyone who enters the library advising of the crime problem.

Bicycle Theft Prevention A recent crime analysis study revealed that bikes with poor quality locks are stolen most frequently. To combat this crime problem, two flyers can be distributed. The first flyer alerts the owners to the problem and urges the owner of the bike to obtain a betterquality lock. It also highlights the following crime prevention tips on security bicycles: 1. Locks are worthless if not used properly. 2. When not in use, lock the bike to an immovable object such as a bike rack. 3. Lock the bike through both wheels and around the frame, and then secure it to an immovable object. 4. Bikes locked outside should be left in a welllighted and frequently traveled area. 5. Bikes brought inside should be locked in the dormitory room or area of high activity. The second flyer urges students to register their bicycles. If bikes are registered, there is a good chance they will be returned if stolen.

355

Administration Office Security Programs According to a survey conducted on five college campuses, the most common items stolen are wallets, cash and credit cards, calculators, IBM typewriters, petty cash, and computers. Wallets are generally taken because of carelessness, being left in an unsecured and unoccupied area. At times, the theft of a wallet goes beyond that of just cash, when credit cards and checks, which were inside the wallet, are used. Defensive measures for this type of larceny are to conduct meetings informing students and staff of the problem and seek their support, in addition to conducting a security survey. The theft of office equipment generally can be prevented by bolting down typewriters, calculators, and the like and utilizing the operation identification program, which is geared to deterring such thefts. Petty cash thefts for the past year should be analyzed as to why and how such thefts occurred. Members of the crime prevention unit should meet with members of the controller’s office where the crime prevention security tips can be passed on to those handling petty cash. These tips should include the following: 1. Do not maintain a petty cash fund in an amount larger than necessary. Most departments have found that a fund in the $25–50 range is adequate. 2. Keep the fund in a properly secured place. Avoid desk drawers or cabinets, which have locks that are easily opened by a common key. 3. As a matter of policy, the person designated on the controller’s records as the petty cash fund custodian should be the only person with access to the fund. 4. In no instance should the responsibility for a petty cash fund be given to a part-time employee or anyone hired on a contractual basis.

Operation Identification Operation Identification started in 1963 in Monterey Park, California, as a burglary prevention program. Probably, it is the most frequently discussed crime prevention program in the country. A unique identifier is placed on items to be used to link recovered property to a specific crime or criminal. The deterrent effects of operation identification rely upon the burglar’s assumed belief that operation identification items marked properly increase the risk of apprehension and lower the economic gain.

356


Intrusion Alarms Intrusion alarms are necessary equipment for proper security. Unfortunately, the installation of such a system is accompanied by numerous false alarms. Basically, there are five causes of false alarms: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Faulty installation of equipment Equipment failure Telephone line malfunction Subscriber’s error (human problem) Such natural acts as rain, high winds, or electrical storms

On a national scale, more than 90% of all false alarms are caused by these factors. Again on a national scale, more than 50% of all false alarms are caused by the subscriber’s error. Such simple matters as neglecting to properly secure doors or windows alarmed with magnetic contacts and permitting personnel to enter alarmed areas by an alarm key are a couple of common errors on the subscriber’s part. Again, let us look closer at the five causes of false alarms: 1. Faulty installation of equipment: Incapable installer or installer’s helpers Installation does not meet the requirements of Underwriters Laboratories’ standards Wrong equipment designed for intended job 2. Equipment failure: Dead batteries Breakdown in control panel, wires, relays or shunt-key cylinder Poorly designed equipment that has no UL listing 3. Telephone line malfunction: Telephone company causing an open circuit in the lines Telephone company repairman working in the general area of alarmed site 4. Subscriber’s error: Complex not properly secured and alarm turned on Operation of alarm never properly stated to subscriber by alarm company 5. Natural acts: Electrical storms and blackouts Heavy rain, winds, and floods affecting alarmed area or telephone wires What can be done to reduce false alarms? The existing alarm system can be modified. All control panels installed on campus should be of the finest quality, as listed by Underwriters Laboratories. Then, look carefully at other features: a locked panel to prevent unauthorized entry and possible

tampering with the alarm, an entrance/exit delay feature that allows the subscriber 30 seconds to enter or leave before the panel registers an intrusion, and the hookup of an audible horn. This feature allows the subscriber, if leaving the property and failing to observe the meter on the control panel, 30 seconds before the audible horn goes off and an additional 30 seconds for the subscriber to shut off the alarm before the signal is sent to the police station. On all construction or renovation projects, standards should be developed with the planning office regarding the installation of alarms. The intrusion alarm, then, should be installed by an Underwriters Laboratories–listed alarm vendor; however, if the general contractor has the responsibility for such installation, then options are to use a union or nonunion UL listed alarm vendor or to use the campus’s own electricians. If it is decided to use the latter, the system must be inspected by a UL-listed alarm vendor before being tied into the police board. In this way, it is certain the products and installation are done correctly. Additionally, it is helpful to educate users of the alarm system in the proper method of handling it to reduce the rate of false alarms.

Conclusion Except for random crime that occurs spontaneously, most crimes can be deterred, avoided, prevented, or thwarted. To deal with campus crime, the educational institution’s law enforcement or security agency must be able to adapt to increasingly difficult and different security risk challenges. The protective force must have an ongoing, progressive campus crime prevention program in place. The department must be able to continually develop meaningful programs. There are no perfect formulas for the application and implementation of a campus crime prevention program. There are systematized methods of identifying crime risks, measuring these risks, and identifying remedial solutions for planning and assessing priorities for the delivery of reasonable methods of crime prevention. Virtually every educational institution has committed to campus crime prevention in some form or another. Campus crime prevention is really a grassroots program. The most effective crime prevention programs succeed in enlightening campus occupants and enlisting them in using reasonable means to prevent criminal acts.

Chapter 23 Hospitals and the Health-Care Security Environment RUSSELL L. COLLING, CPP

The rapidly changing dynamics of our health-care delivery system are creating new and unique challenges for the health-care security administrator. Today’s hospital is vastly different from what it was just a few years ago. In many instances, the singleunit hospital has been transformed into a medical center with many freestanding buildings. It is not uncommon for medical centers and hospitals alike to find themselves parts of a large health-care system. These health-care systems may have dozens of facilities serving communities near the main facility, or they may be part of a system with facilities many states removed. Our health-care delivery system has moved from a simple process, in which both consumers and providers had choices, to a complex system, in which there is little choice for either consumers or providers. Cost and reimbursements have largely driven this change. The complex challenge for health-care professionals today is something known as managed care, which is further complicated by increasing government control. This challenge translates into drastic changes in the methods and philosophies regarding protection of our health-care organizations. The protection of the health-care organization cannot depend completely on the security department. Many aspects of protecting health-care organizations reach far beyond the control of the commonly accepted elements of a health-care security department. Today, to achieve a high level of security, managers, top executives, and boards of directors must be more involved, through appropriate funding levels and managing and supporting security issues. These

leaders must accept a greater responsibility and ownership for security in their day-to-day management obligations.

Categories of Health Care Direct clinical care of patients is being delivered in all kinds of organizations and in all types of facilities. This diversity of care is generally the result of a particular entity wanting a greater patient market share and creates environments with low overhead to maintain cost control. A basic concept is to bring the delivery of care geographically closer to the patient. Lower unit costs are also intended to provide greater patient accessibility to high-quality care. The geographical spread of organizational facilities is based on the great amount of outpatient procedures once done only in the hospital. Health care can be viewed on a continuum from assisted living (low acuity) to acute care (high acuity). This progression follows these basic steps: 䊉

䊉

䊉

Assisted living. Assisted living provides help with day-to-day living activities, often including transportation services to health-care delivery sites, some limited medical care presence in the living facility, and general staff watchfulness. Home care. In home care, health-care staff members generally visit, with a coordinated plan of treatment and services. Outpatient services. Outpatient services include surgery, clinic visits, physical therapy, psychological counseling, speech therapy, and dental care. 357

358

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉


Intermediate care. Intermediate care provides 24hour oversight and is often tied closely to geriatric care. Skilled care. Skilled care requires intervention skills by caregivers as opposed to caretakers. Short-term acute care. Short-term acute care is generally medically complex and includes postsurgical intensive rehabilitation, respirator care, and intensive oversight. Acute care. Acute care occurs when a patient is medically unstable and includes extensive use of invasive procedures, high level of staff skills, close monitoring, and complex care plans.

A current trend in senior care is to build facilities on a campus that provides independent living, assisted living, long-term care, and even a hospice. This arrangement is especially convenient for spouses who may have different medical needs. The arrangement is also helpful to families who visit or oversee parents or other close relatives.

Types of Hospitals Hospitals can be viewed according to their type of ownership and specialty in medical care. In terms of ownership, four different types of facilities exist: notfor-profit hospitals, investor-owned hospitals, federal government facilities, and state or local government facilities. In addition to the ownership of hospitals, the type of medical specialty is another way to differentiate facilities. Basic medical specialties include pediatric, medical/surgical, rehabilitative, long-term care, and psychiatric facilities. The teaching hospital generally has elements of these specialties in addition to research, education, and clinic activities. Each of these specialty care facilities presents unique security and safety challenges.

The Foundation of Health-Care Security: Risks and Areas of Vulnerability The protection of any organization requires the identification and risk assessment of areas of security vulnerability. The terms risk and vulnerability have often been used interchangeably. They are, in fact, different terms. In this section, the term vulnerability is used to describe the type of security threat, while the term risk is used to describe a degree of risk relative to each type of threat. As an example, all organizations face vulnerability to fire; however,

the risk of fire is somewhat different in different organizations. Risk refers not only to the probability of occurrence but the consequences (or damages) that can result from such an occurrence. In the health-care organization, basic areas of security vulnerability fall into several areas, including assaults on employees, patients, and visitors; disturbances; pilferage and theft of supplies and equipment; loss of patient and employee property; malicious destruction of property; civil disobedience; strikes; and terrorism. Additional areas of vulnerability may be more properly categorized as safety concerns. These include fire, accidents, and other internal and external emergencies that could disrupt the operation of the healthcare organization. Basically, all organizations apply some measure of management effort to security. Someone in the organization is responsible for managing missing property, fire control, accident reports, safety regulations, the approval of new locks, and other functions commonly associated with security. In extremely small organizations, these functions are often fragmented: the maintenance department takes care of the locks, keys, and fire equipment; the administrator or business manager reviews all claims and reports of missing property; and the human resources person is responsible for general safety. This system can work well in a small facility because of the daily interaction of the relatively small group of personnel. In larger organizations, where communication and coordination are more difficult, serious questions concerning the proper management of these responsibilities arise. As an organization grows, it finds that the workload is sufficient to warrant coordinating these responsibilities under one person or department. Through this process of assessment and evaluation, the protection system evolves and becomes formalized. A standard of the International Association for Healthcare Security and Safety (IAHSS) states that “each healthcare institution, regardless of size, should have a person at an administrative level responsible for the security function.”1 The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) has a similar requirement outlined in its environment of care standards.

Basic Health-Care Security Risk and Areas of Vulnerability All health-care facilities, regardless of size, are subject to basic areas of security vulnerability. These

Hospitals and the Health-Care Security Environment

Table 23-1. Health-Care Services Basic Areas of Security Vulnerability Assault on grounds* Simple Aggravated Assault in interior* Simple Aggravated Bomb threats, bombs Burglary (breaking and entering) Facilities Vehicles Civil disturbance Destruction of property (vandalism) Disturbances Internal External Drug abuse and loss Fire, explosion Fraud, kickbacks Gambling

Homicides and suicides Hostage taking Imposters Kidnappings Stranger Domestic Labor disputes Loss of information Patient elopement Robbery Armed Unarmed Stalking Terrorism Theft Patients Staff Organization

* Includes sexual assault.

areas are grouped into several major categories for the purposes of this text. The magnitude of the vulnerability, which varies to a considerable degree, determines the risk to the organization. The types of vulnerability, shown in Table 23-1, must be individually assessed by each facility. We touch on a few of these areas of concern in the following sections.

are also at risk. Hospital emergency departments and psychiatric treatment areas are frequently the scenes of assaults on staff members. Within the hospital, nurses and ancillary staff often work in remote areas alone at night. Facility grounds, parking facilities, and streets surrounding the facility also offer opportunities for assault to occur.

Civil Disturbance Medical care facilities themselves may be the target of civil disturbance or demonstration. Antiabortion and animal rights protesters create media and public relations problems for many facilities across the country, as well as inflicting major property damage and injuries. Protesters carrying signs and chanting slogans have become frequent images on our television screens, as they parade in and around lobbies, clinics, parking lots, and medical facilities. Security tactics in this situation include a large amount of preprotest planning by the public relations department, which generally has a liaison with members of the media, and interacting only when required to keep property secure and the public and staff safe; this usually involves keeping demonstrators out of buildings and on public property. The list of security concerns to be managed during a civil disturbance varies, depending to a large extent on whether the hospital is located within the disturbance area or outside it. Problems common to both situations include 䊉

Assault 䊉

All facilities face the multifaceted and extremely acute problem of assault on patients, staff, and visitors. The vulnerability of assault for the purposes of this text can be viewed in terms of simple assault and aggravated assault. Simple assault refers to the threatening of injury to another, while aggravated assault refers to the actual striking or touching of another with the intent to inflict serious injury or harm. Assaults can take place inside facilities and on the grounds, and incidents range from simple threats to rape. Serious assaults, which require immediate attention by administration, account for the majority of lawsuits against health-care facilities where a security issue is involved. Patients are particularly at risk to attack due to their physical and mental condition as well as to their accessibility. It is not always the patient who is the victim of assault, however. Employees and visitors

359

䊉

䊉

The separation of injured rioters and riot control personnel while they are being treated Strict visitor control, as injured rioters often are accompanied to the facility by friends or relatives who wish to continue their confrontation An areawide curfew, which can affect the reporting and releasing from duty of employees Housing personnel who cannot return home and people from the community who may seek refuge within the facility

In addition to these common factors, a facility that is the target of civil disturbance or located within the area of the disturbance must deal with the following: 䊉

䊉䊉

䊉䊉

Employees seeking access to a controlled area when attempting to report for work The safety of arriving and discharged patients The safety of personnel traveling within the controlled area Sniper fire at or around the facility Fires set within the facility

360

䊉

䊉䊉


Fire bombs thrown into the facility or onto low roofs Sabotage of the physical plant The acquisition of additional supplies and equipment and the general need for increased housing

Planning for civil disturbance activities can generally be viewed as an extension of, or an annex to, the management of the normal security vulnerabilities of the facility’s mass casualty disaster plan.

Drug Abuse and Loss An area of security vulnerability that seems to be more prevalent in recent years is that of drug abuse among health-care employees. Although drug abuse is not unique to employees in the health-care field, it is of great concern because patients may be placed in danger. It is well known among health-care security administrators that a great number of employees in health-care facilities have purposely selected the facility with the intent of diverting drugs. Narcotics addiction among doctors and nurses is a much more serious problem than is generally recognized. The ease with which these people can obtain narcotics contributes significantly to the problem. In fact, today’s health-care facilities are a major source of the nation’s drug traffic involving legally manufactured drugs.

labor cause. Protection problems encountered during a strike are similar to those encountered during a civil disturbance.

Stalking The health-care environment provides many opportunities for the stalker to operate. A stalker is someone who tracks his or her victim and generally attempts to make unwanted personal contact. While the contacts are usually in person, the stalker sometimes pursues the victim through telephone calls, FAX, letters, or even electronic mail. Stalking can be a precursor to escalating threats and physical confrontation.

Terrorism The terrorist act is actually a combination of other forms of vulnerability, including fire, bomb threats, destruction of property, and kidnapping (hostage taking). It is, however, considered a separate area of vulnerability due to the distinct motive that precipitates the act. As in strikes and civil disturbances, the primary safeguards to be applied are the expansion of the everyday protection elements in place; that is, increased security personnel, greater facility restricted access, and increased staff awareness and attention to good security practices.

Impostors

Theft

Impostors represent another security vulnerability that occurs with a high degree of frequency. Certified nurse assistants (CNAs) or licensed practical nurses (LPNs) with fraudulent identification indicating they are registered nurses (RNs) appear in all segments of the health-care industry. There have also been numerous accounts of people who claimed to be physicians, visited patients, gave care, and interacted in their assumed role for considerable lengths of time before their false identity was discovered.

The pilferage or theft of supplies, equipment, and personal property is a reality for all health-care organizations. There are as many estimates of the extent of theft in hospitals as there are estimators. A generally accepted estimate of loss for U.S. hospitals by industry experts is between $4000 and $4500 per bed per year. In terms of losses for all health-care organizations, a conservative estimate projects an annual cost exceeding $20 billion.

Employee Theft Labor Disputes Labor disputes can create a myriad of protection problems, including threats, harassment, destruction and damage to property, intimidation, sabotage, and injury to both the innocent person and the person who is either represented by a union, seeks representation, or is simply sympathetic to the organized

The most in-depth research into employee theft in hospitals was conducted by the Sociology Department at the University of Minnesota under a Law Enforcement Assistance Administration grant.2 Security practitioners agree that the majority of hospital losses from theft can be attributed to employees. The employee thief works every day, creating a constant drain on resources, as opposed to

Hospitals and the Health-Care Security Environment

people from outside the organization, who generally lack recurring opportunities to steal. Numerous ingenious employee theft schemes have been revealed. Indeed, theft by only one employee can lead to rather substantial losses. However, the biggest loss comes from the magnitude of employees who dip into supplies with only a slight chance of being caught. Job dissatisfaction also leads to higher theft, especially in the younger workforce. The most consistent source of employee dissatisfaction was found to be in the employee/supervisor relationship. The study also concluded that employees who frequently got together with coworkers after hours were in a higher theft level category. The most consistent predictor of theft found by the study was the employee’s perceived chance of being caught with the potential of being fired or arrested. When there was opposition to theft on the part of management and coworkers, the amount of theft decreased.

Patient Property Loss Loss of patient property is a continual concern for all health-care provider organizations. Although the value of most lost patient property is minimal when compared to the loss of facility property, most organizations place more emphasis and more effort on protecting patient property and investigating patient losses than on protecting their own assets. Missing patient property can seriously affect public relations, and the patient can interpret this problem as an indication that the medical care may also be inferior. In some instances, patients become so upset over a theft of their property that their medical condition is adversely affected.

Employee Property Loss The loss of employee property is another problem that confronts virtually all hospitals, clinics, and long-

361

term care facilities. This vulnerability can generally be correlated to the size of the organization. In a large facility, anonymity and the erosion of interpersonal relationships combine to create an environment that increases the theft of employee property. The application of safeguards can effectively manage this area of vulnerability, resulting in a good record of theft prevention.

Accidents All facilities must be concerned with employee, visitor, and patient safety. Safety in this regard refers principally to preventing injury caused by unsafe physical conditions or an inadvertent act. It is somewhat paradoxical that the safety record of some health-care facilities is inferior to those of the major industries that send accident victims to them for care. Because they treat a wide variety of accident cases, hospitals should be especially aware of the need to maintain an adequate safety program. However, many accidents involving health-care employees are similar in nature to those occurring in other industries. The courts have consistently ruled that all medical care facilities are required to maintain a safe premises. The costs of medical care, loss of services, malpractice and public insurance liability, loss of materials and equipment, human suffering, and loss of public goodwill are just some of the reasons why medical care facilities must constantly guard against accidents.

References 1. International Association for Healthcare Security and Safety. IAHAA Standards. Lombard, IL: IAHSS, 1998. 2. J. P. Clark and R. C. Hollinger. “Theft by Employees.” Security Management (September 1980).

Chapter 24 Library Security R. A. (RICK) DRAPER and SUSAN UROSEVIC

Synonyms used for library include archives, athenaeum, bibliotheca, and a collection of books. These words are clearly identified with the library collection. There is no doubt that, if we were to compare the composition of the collections from a fine arts library on a large city university campus with a primary school library in a remote location, we would see an enormous variation. And rightly so, since each library serves a different purpose, and aspects of the collection and facilities provided reflect that purpose. But, what is a library? In researching this chapter, many librarians responded to this question with dictionary definitions without consulting the reference. However, one respondent provided an insight into the concerns some library staff have as a result of the relative isolation with which they work, by describing a library as, “a captive group of passive females.” That definition, or at least the perception of the librarian giving it, dramatically demonstrates that the libraries in our communities, schools, colleges, and universities are far more than just a collection of books that need to be considered from a security perspective. The nature of the collections and the facilities in the majority of libraries is changing; it has been many years since books were the sole occupant of the shelves. Increasingly, we see the addition of new media, which reflects the technological age in which we live. Patrons do not go to the library just to borrow books. The library provides duplication facilities, it has computers and CD-ROMS, audio and video material that can be listened to and viewed, and access to large collections of data to aid research. Most public libraries now provide Internet access 362

and facilities that simply were not security considerations less than a decade ago. Libraries represent a unique security challenge. It has been said that security and inconvenience are synonymous and that the balance between the two, at best, is a compromise. If our goal is to protect the entire collection from theft or damage by users of the library, then the most obvious risk reduction strategy is to prevent access to it. This action, regardless of how attractive it may seem to librarians from time to time, is inappropriate in most circumstances. Public and private libraries and libraries in educational settings have security peculiarities unique to each. By way of example, university libraries have a problem with graffiti on furniture and within the library; however, minimal graffiti is found on the outside of the library buildings when compared with other buildings on campus. In contrast, public libraries suffer from graffiti outside, with only minor graffiti problems internally. On average, public libraries experience a higher proportion of unreturned items than libraries in educational settings. This disparity can be attributed to the different client populations and variations in penalties for offenders. Failing to fully appreciate the nature of the security related risks to be managed can lead to misdirected or wasted security expenditure or far worse, if an unforeseen event occurs. Effective security requires careful planning and a clear understanding of the range of contexts within which risks may exist in each setting. By taking a scientific approach to assessing security related risks, we have a defensible base on which to make security management decisions.

Library Security

363

Risk Assessment Terminology

Identifying Risks

The term risk is often used but equally as often misused. Frequently, the terms risk and threat are used interchangeably in a security context, and while it may seem like semantics, effective communication relies on a common understanding of the terms used. A number of international standards relate to risk assessment and risk management, and these provide a good source of information to gain a clearer understanding of the concept of risk. One such standard describes risk as “the chance of something happening that will have an impact upon objectives”; and it notes that risk “is measured in terms of consequences and likelihood.” In discussing security-related risks, the “risk event” is often described as the threat. In other words, the threat is a description of what could happen. For example, in a library the range of threats might include assault on staff, assault on patrons, robbery, theft of personal belongings, mutilation of books, inappropriate use of the Internet, and the list goes on. The “consequences” of a threat being realized essentially describe the affect that the event would have on particular resources. It needs to be remembered that consequences are contextually based, and there may be affects well beyond the local operational context. For example, the consequences arising from a staff member being assaulted may include industrial or political implications. As discussed here, to accurately define risks it is essential that the full range of consequences within all applicable contexts be identified and analyzed. Vulnerability is most often described as factors that increase the likelihood of a particular threat to a specific asset or resource being realized. For example, the orientation of lockers inhibiting surveillance of an area may increase the likelihood of theft from the lockers. However, vulnerability may also include aspects that increase the severity or range of consequences that may arise from an incident. For example, the absence of clearly defined policies and procedures for robbery safety may contribute to a staff member acting in a manner that aggravates an offender and, as a result, causes someone to be injured. So, then, risks need to be described in terms of the threat and the consequences. As discussed in this chapter, taking the likelihood that a threat will be realized and each of the consequences in context enables a reliable and effective communication of risks that form the foundation for defensible risk management decisions.

While it may seem like an oversimplification, risk assessment begins with accurate answers to four basic questions: 䊉䊉䊉

䊉

What is to be protected (resources)? From whom is it being protected (threat sources)? How might the resources be harmed (threats and methods)? What is the full range of consequences if the protection fails?

This risk identification process commences with an understanding of what is at risk. It is widely acknowledged that security risk management involves protecting people, physical assets, and information. However, it is also important to consider risks to reputation and day-to-day operations and activities, which may be targeted directly or may arise out of another incident. For example, a disgruntled employee may deliberately take action that harms the goodwill a library may have established with benefactors, resulting in substantial financial consequences. Security professionals working with libraries have a responsibility to consider the risks to all people associated with the library, including staff, patrons, visitors, vendors, and contractors. As noted previously, individual items of property to be protected vary from library to library but broadly speaking include the collections, audio visual equipment, office equipment, photocopiers, computers (software and hardware), the fabric of the building, furniture and fittings, personal items belonging to staff and patrons, stationery, and of course, cash. Libraries engaged in commercial activities such as information searches also need to consider the issue of protecting work-in-progress and completed projects. Those working in libraries will know that certain elements of the collection are targeted more frequently and face different types of threat. For example, experience suggests that, in some libraries, books featuring nude photography and impressionist paintings are likely to be subject of mutilation, whereas books on the subjects of martial arts, guns, and parenting are more likely to be stolen or not returned. The challenge in initially identifying risks is to accurately describe what can happen, how it can happen, and why it is likely to occur (however remote the likelihood). A range of sources of information may be used to assist in this process. These include past incident reports, victimization surveys, published literature, previous security surveys, and

364


the experience of library staff and security professionals. Once the risks have been clearly described, they may be accurately assessed in terms of both likelihood and consequence. This is done with due consideration of security strategies and other measures that may be in place to mitigate against the risks.

Assessing Likelihood In assessing the likelihood of a particular risk event, it is important to be able to describe the source of threat. All security-related incidents have a human threat source that should be described in terms that assist in understanding the true nature of the threat. Descriptions such as “disgruntled staff member,” “spouse in domestic violence situation,” “predatory criminal,” and the like can be used to assist in more accurately assessing the likelihood of a particular event. It is also important to consider the possible objectives of the threat source, as this has a bearing on the manner in which the “attack” may occur and the areas of vulnerability that may be exploited. For example, the mutilation of a book may be malicious or, in a university library, driven by competition for better grades and intended to disadvantage other students. Once the source of threat has been defined, the form of vulnerability can be identified, taking into account strategies already in place that reduce the opportunity for the threat to be realized. As an example, consider the risk of assault on a staff member walking between the library and her car parked some distance away, the source of threat could be described as a “predatory offender,” who may or may not work at the library or in the area. The factors of vulnerability that increase the likelihood of this risk being realized may include 䊉

䊉

䊉䊉

䊉

Distance between the staff parking lot and the library Layout of parking lot (e.g., no reserved spaces for late shift) Lighting below an acceptable standard Movement predictors and entrapment spots (pathway and vegetation) Limited resources to escort staff members

Armed with this detailed knowledge of the factors contributing to the likelihood of the event, it is much easier to qualify and describe the likelihood in appropriate terms. It is important that the terms used to describe the level of likelihood that a risk may be realized be consistent for each risk being assessed. Ultimately, the

choice of terminology rests with the assessor, with due consideration to those who must interpret the assessment. Some guidance in the appropriate use of descriptors is available from the international risk management standards. One such standard uses the following table to guide the description of likelihood:1(p. 34) Level

Descriptor

Description

A

Almost certain

B

Likely

C D E

Possible Unlikely Rare

It is expected to occur in most circumstances Will probably occur in most circumstances Might occur at some time Could occur at some time May occur in exceptional circumstances

It is important to remember that the assessment of likelihood relates to an identified source of threat targeting a specific asset or resource in a particular manner. If there is insufficient information on which to make an assessment, the only option is to treat the threat as “almost certain” until the information is available, as distinct from a situation where there is no identifiable threat source, in which case there is no likelihood of the event occurring in that manner.

Assessing Consequences As with assessing likelihood, many issues must be considered in assessing the consequences, in particular the contextual factors of the assessment come into play. For example, the consequences of the loss of $500 from the wallet of a staff member may be significant to the staff member but have little (if any) impact on the library itself. Also, strategies may be in place that reduce the level of exposure to particular risks. For example, many libraries insure assets against theft, so, if we are assessing the consequences of an item of equipment being stolen, we must consider the presence (or absence) of insurance in relation to the actual cost of the loss. If the insurer will replace the item, then the consequences of the loss is reduced. It is important to recognize that the consequences of any particular risk event may have an impact in different ways at different levels. In an assault, undoubtedly there are consequences for the individual, the work unit, and the library as a whole. It must be acknowledged in assessing those consequences that the likely degree of consequence is lessened the

Library Security

further away from the victim. The nature of the consequences also change within different contexts. The consequences arising from any one risk event most often fall into several categories. Direct financial costs are the easiest to identify; however, other factors such as personal harm (physical and psychological), legal consequences, and damage to reputation may result from a single incident. As with likelihood, the choice of terms to describe consequence are at the discretion of the assessor, but again it is important to use terms that are meaningful and consistent across risks being assessed. The five descriptors frequently used to indicate the level of consequence are1

365

Insignificant: Virtually no impact Minor: Credibility questioned Moderate: Damage control implemented Major: Confidence shaken but not totally lost Catastrophic: Total loss of confidence or major recovery action required to restore credibility As previously noted, it is important to describe the risk in terms of the threat and the specific consequences being assessed. For example, in “the risk of physical injury to staff arising from robbery,” physical injury is the consequence and robbery is the threat.

Qualifying Risks Level 1 2 3 4 5

Descriptor Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic

It is important that, in rating consequences, there is a satisfactory understanding of what each descriptor means in each context and with respect to each consequence category. For example, the descriptors that may be assigned in relation to harm to staff or patrons, as may relate to a particular risk event involving injury, may be drawn from descriptions such as Insignificant: No injuries, inconvenience arising from event Minor: First aid Moderate: Medical treatment required Major: Extensive injuries, hospitalization Catastrophic: Death Whereas descriptors that may be applicable to financial loss would be derived from different descriptions of the loss: Insignificant: Managed within functional budget Minor: Minor additional administration costs arising from risk event Moderate: Administration costs plus some rectification expenses Major: Significant impact on functional budget Catastrophic: Extensive financial loss or diversion of resources or no possible funding recovery for function As a further example, the descriptors applicable to harm goodwill or reputation could be derived thus:

Once the likelihood of a particular threat being realized and the full range of consequences have been identified, it is possible to qualify the level of risk as a product of these factors. Clearly, a threat that is “almost certain” with consequences that would be “catastrophic” would be rated highest, whereas a threat assessed as “rare” with “insignificant” consequences would be rated lowest. Students of probability and statistics may debate the allocations between these two extremes, but if we again turn to published standards, AS/NZS 4360: 1999 Risk Management provides the framework for consistent assessment and description of levels of risk.1(p. 35)

Managing the Risk Risk management strategies need to be considered with a clear understanding of the philosophical, operational, and financial constraints that may be applicable. Notwithstanding these considerations, it is generally accepted that five primary options are available and may be applied either individually or in combination: 䊉

䊉

Avoid the risk. For example, change opening hours if security problems occur at specific times. Reduce the risk. Lessen the likelihood or reduce the consequences. For example, security management strategies such as policies and procedures, physical security, and crime prevention through environmental design strategies may be used. Some strategies may reduce both the likelihood and consequences, such as the use of drop safes in cash handling areas. The reduced amount of available cash reduces the attractiveness of the area as a target; at the same time, if it were robbed, the level cash lost would also be lower.

366

䊉

䊉

䊉


Transfer the risk. Insurance is the most often quoted example of transferring the risk; however, specialist contractors may accept risk as part of their agreement. For example, photocopying facilities may be operated by an outside organization, transferring all or some of the security related risks to that organization. Redistribute the risk. In some cases it is possible to vary the operational environment so that a specific risk is not concentrated in one area; for example, multiple cash handling locations for payment of fines, change for the photocopier, and so forth. Accept the risk. It needs to be recognized that accepting a level of risk is a valid risk management option, but one that should be applied only in an informed manner. Factors such as the cost-effectiveness of available strategies to reduce the level of risk, as well as philosophical and operational constraints discussed previously, may influence the decision to accept a particular risk.

The Scope of Security Problems in Libraries Before moving into the area of selecting specific security strategies, it is appropriate to highlight some of the security problems encountered in libraries. This list is not meant to be exhaustive but may help to focus attention on some of the items likely to be uncovered in your risk assessment.

Events and Costs The most obvious loss event in a library is the theft of items from the collection. The item may be taken without being recorded as borrowed or be legally borrowed and simply not returned. The costs associated with such a loss may include the direct replacement cost of the item (if it is available), staff time in locating and purchasing the replacement, freight and delivery, and the replacement of barcodes and article surveillance tags. Other costs may not be as readily determined, such as the cost to another patron who may have required access to the item and the library’s reputation. Similarly, mutilation or other damage to items in the collection is a conspicuous source of loss. This may include page theft from books, journals, and magazines; erasure of or recording over audio or audiovisual items; “blacking out” or other censorship

of text; placing marks in books to indicate that they have been read; correcting grammar and spelling in books; or malicious destruction. Libraries can be regular targets for vandalism, both internal and external. Graffiti and willful damage to property are obvious sources of loss. Burglary is also relatively common, with the most likely targets being cash, computer hardware and software, office and audiovisual equipment, and more recently recorded media such as music and digital video disks. Occasionally vandalism and arson are associated with a burglary. Easily identified costs associated with these events may include the repair or replacement of items and overtime for staff. Less obvious may be a lowering of staff morale due to the nature of these incidents. Stress and absenteeism among staff members may increase and patrons of the library may develop concerns about their personal safety and security. There is considerable concern among library staff members in relation to harassment and physical assault. While the number of recorded incidents is low, the fear is very real and must be taken into consideration when assigning priorities to countermeasures. A key priority in security risk management is the protection of human life, and this must never be overlooked. The consequences associated with a fear of assault in the work environment can include reduced productivity and an increase in stressrelated illnesses and absenteeism. If these concerns are not addressed, fear can spread to other staff members and have a highly debilitating effect on the entire library. Other specific events identified in the research for this chapter included bomb threats, violence between patrons, theft of personal items from patrons and staff, attacks on after-hours book return facilities (arson and foreign substances being introduced to the chute), drug abuse by patrons and staff, deaths on the premises, fire and other emergencies, aggressive patrons, physical accidents, computer and information security breaches, misuse of Internet facilities, theft of stationery and catering supplies, and robbery. As previously discussed, the nature of the threats and the likelihood of occurrence vary from library to library. It is necessary to conduct a security risk assessment to determine the levels of risk to which each facility is exposed. For example, public libraries located in public parks in lower socioeconomic areas are more likely to be the subject of vandalism and external graffiti than those located in shopping centers.

Library Security

Security Risk Management Strategies Strategies for reducing security-related risks in libraries can be divided into four interrelated classifications: administrative, design and layout, human resources, and physical security. For any security risk management program to be effective, there must be no overreliance on any one classification. Success is derived from the interrelationship among strategies and aligning the risk management plan with the library’s goals and objectives.

Administrative Strategies The foundation elements for managing securityrelated risks are a well-written security management plan, a comprehensive set of clearly defined policies and procedures, a structured security awareness program, and reliable incident reporting and analysis. The security management plan guides the overall risk management process; policies and procedures define requirements and expectations; the awareness program is used to communicate requirements and facilitate participation in managing risks; and the incident reporting system provides valuable information on which further risk management decisions can be made. For example, the incidence of page theft from journals and vandalism increases in university libraries closer to examinations. This suggests that certain strategies need to be introduced for that period that might be cost prohibitive if they were required permanently. In this case, the base for managing this risk is to have a security management plan that recognizes the need for security strategies responsive to the dynamic nature of this particular threat, policies that support the implementation of temporary measures, and an incident reporting system the enables the correlation of time, incident, and external factors (exams), to ensure that resources are deployed at the optimum times to reduce the risk.

Design and Layout The design and layout of a library and its environs can make a significant difference to the likelihood that it will experience a range of security incidents. Design and layout can also have an affect on the consequences that may arise, such as injury to staff members during a confrontation with a patron. A

367

key aspect of design and layout in daily operations is the need to facilitate compliance with security policy and procedures. For example, if patrons are not permitted to bring bags into the library, the design needs to take into account not only the ease with which patrons may be supervised by staff as they enter the library, but also the supervision and protection of the bags left outside the library.

Human Resources It is rare to find dedicated security personnel working within a library. Libraries in educational settings and some private libraries can draw on the security personnel resources of the host organization, such as university security staff; and these may be used periodically and at specific times, such as closing. Most libraries assign security as the responsibility of the library manager, who may in turn delegate aspects of the job to others. People can be a very effective security risk management strategy, but are also one of the most costly if their sole task is security. All efforts should be taken, with appropriate training, to build security into the general duties of staff. This should be supplemented by security personnel to perform specific functions as defined in the security management plan, such as escort staff members to their cars late at night.

Physical Security Strategies This is perhaps the most recognizable of all the categories discussed. Locks, alarms, turnstiles, safes, security lighting, duress alarms, closed circuit television are all strategies with which we are familiar, but they are limited in effectiveness if not supported by policies and procedures. The two key points to note about using physical security strategies are that they must be cost effective and supported by the other classifications of security strategies; that is, there is no justification for spending $250,000 on an electronic article surveillance system if total losses (not just the cost of the books) amount to less than $10,000 per year. Similarly, an intruder alarm system functions as intended only if it is armed during the lock-up procedures. The effectiveness of any physical security strategy may be compromised by the manner in which it is applied. We already identified other classifications

368


that have an influence; however, many physical aspects must be considered as well.Take the example of lockers provided for patrons of the library. The lockers are a physical security measure against the theft of personal items not taken into the library, but they may be ineffective because of their location and the way in which they arranged. If the lockers are placed in rows (like the rows of shelves found in the library), little or no natural surveillance is likely to be possible (i.e., a person in one row cannot see what is happening in the next). If the same number of lockers are arranged around the walls, with the open space created being used as a thoroughfare, the opportunity for attack on the lockers is reduced.

Dealing with Specific Threats Given that the risk profile for each library is different, as are the security strategies used, it is not possible to provide a comprehensive insight into every situation. However, to assist in broadening the base for understanding the range of risks and possible risk reduction strategies, a number of common problems are discussed next.

Theft of Collection Items via Fire Exits Under the requirements of local building regulations and life safety codes, a library is obligated to meet certain requirements with respect to emergency egress from the building. For example, in some jurisdictions it is an offense to place padlocks on or barricade nominated exit doors. This free egress vulnerability is often exploited to facilitate the illegal removal of items from the collection. Some libraries attach sensors to the exit doors so that an alarm sounds whenever the door is opened. The effectiveness of this strategy depends on the time it takes for staff members to respond to the alarm and the available means of escape for the offender. Alarms can be complemented by CCTV, which can be configured to display a view of the doorway and record on activation of the door alarm, eliminating hours of unwanted footage, but this still does not prevent the theft. Electric locking systems have been available for many years and proven their value in electrically controlling exit doors for just this purpose. While safety risks other than fire need to be considered, options are available that meet life safety requirements while addressing the vulnerability exit doors represent from a security perspective.

Caution: If considering using electric locking for exit doors, it is important to consult the local authorities, as limitations may be applicable, depending on the category of building within which the library is accommodated, the floor area, and the “deemed” density of occupancy under building code definitions.

Mutilation of Items within the Library There are several underlying issues with respect to motives for mutilation of collection items. Page theft can be commonplace in libraries servicing a student population. Poor access to photocopying facilities and the cost of using photocopiers have been identified as contributing factors to page theft. The mutilation of a textbook may also be driven by competition for higher grades. The theft of pages from a journal may be intended to deprive other students of access to the material, thus, in the eyes of the offenders, improving their competitive position. Damage may be motivated by a sense of moral right to censor items the perpetrator deems offensive or apparently senseless vandalism. Mutilation of collection items does not frequently occur in the view of library staff. Secluded parts of the library and study corrals are the most likely areas where damage occurs. Strategies to reduce the incidence of mutilation may include 䊉䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Easy and inexpensive access to photocopiers Increased natural surveillance of previously secluded areas by rearranging furniture and fittings or relocating staff members Increased staff activity in problem areas, such as book sorting Closed circuit television monitoring problem areas, coupled with video recording, if appropriate Random page tagging with article surveillance threads

CCTV cameras concealed by translucent domes, coupled with appropriate signs may be particularly effective as a deterrent. The potential offender is aware that the area is under surveillance but cannot determine the field of view of the camera. However, it needs to be acknowledged that the deterrent effect does not come from the cameras themselves, but from the response to any incident (including identification and punishment of the offender).

Library Security

369

Aggressive Patrons at the Counter

Conclusion

There are psychological approaches to dealing with aggression in a library; however, the discussion here is limited to physical security strategies that may be employed. The counter area should be constructed to reduce the chance of an aggressive patron reaching or jumping over it to harm a staff member. Ideally, the floor level behind the counter should be raised so that the staff member is slightly elevated. A means of signaling for assistance should be available either under the counter or, preferably, worn by the staff member. Known as portable duress transmitters, these devices may also be useful when staff members work alone and during opening and lock-up procedures. CCTV is often used to monitor the service counter area when it is unattended. This has not generally been a security application, but simply a method of identifying from the work room that a borrower requires attention. However, with a variation to procedures and the possible addition of some hardware, the existing CCTV system may serve both purposes. The threat in a school situation may be considerably lower, and therefore a different approach may be more appropriate.

A proactive approach to security within the library ensures that scarce resources are spent on enhancing the service provided, rather than replacing the collection, repairing damaged items, and reacting to each new unexpected incident as it occurs. As a security professional once said, “Reactive security is like locking the barn door after the horse has bolted; the only thing we are protecting then, is what the horse left behind!”

Security Risk Management Resources 䊉

䊉

䊉

International Security Management and Crime Prevention Institute: www.ismcpi.org Amtac Professional Services Pty Ltd.: www.amtac.com.au International CPTED Association: www.cpted.net

References 1. Standards Australia. AS/NZS 4360:1999 Risk Management. Standards Australia, 1999. 2. Canadian Standards Association. CAN/CSA-Q850-97 Risk Management: Guideline for Decision-Makers. Canadian Standards Association, 1997.

Chapter 25 High-Rise Security and Fire Life Safety GEOFF CRAIGHEAD

High-Rise Assets Assets in the high-rise setting may be tangible or intangible. Tangible assets include the people using the facility, the building itself, its fittings, and its equipment. This equipment consists of the electrical, gas, mechanical, heating, ventilating, air conditioning, lighting, elevator, escalator, communication, security, and life safety systems. In addition, within offices there is equipment such as telephones, computers, word processors, printers, typewriters, FAX machines, photocopiers, audiovisual equipment, general-use items (coffee machines, vending machines, refrigerators, microwaves, ovens, furniture) and sometimes antiques and works of art, cash, and negotiable instruments. Also, vehicles parked in the building’s parking garage are tangible assets. Intangible assets include the livelihood of building users; intellectual property and information stored in paper files, reference books, photographs, microfilm, x-rays, and within computer systems and peripherals; and the reputation and status of the facility, including the ability of tenants to conduct business.

Threats to Security and Fire Life Safety For the purposes of discussion and to address issues in a systematic way, this chapter treats security and fire life safety in high-rise structures as two different disciplines. However, at times, these subjects are so closely interwoven that they appear to be one. Before identifying security and fire life safety threats to high-rise buildings, it is important to understand what these terms mean. 370

Security is a noun derived from the Latin word securus, which means, “free from danger” or “safe.” The New Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary defines security as “the state of being secure; confidence of safety; freedom from danger or risk; that which secures or makes safe; something that secures against pecuniary loss.” Fischer and Green write, “Security implies a stable, relatively predictable environment in which an individual or group may pursue its ends without disruption or harm and without fear of such disturbance or injury.”1(p. 3) Public security involves the protection of the lives, property, and general welfare of people living in the public community. This protection is largely achieved by the enforcement of laws by police funded by public money. Private security, on the other hand, involves the protection of the lives and property of people living and working within the private sector. The primary responsibility for achieving this rests on an individual, the proprietor of a business employing an individual, the owner or agent of the owner of the facility where a business is conducted, or an agent of the aforementioned who specializes in providing protective services. As Post and Kingsbury state, “In providing security for specific applications, the purpose of private security may be described as providing protection for materials, equipment, information, personnel, physical facilities, and preventing influences that are undesirable, unauthorized, or detrimental to the goals of the particular organization being secured.”2(p. 1) Safety is a noun derived from the Latin word salvus, which means “safe” (salvation is also from this root). The New Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary

High-Rise Security and Fire Life Safety

defines safety as “the state or quality of being safe; freedom from danger.” Obviously, there is very little distinction between the terms security and safety. Fire life safety, fire and life safety, fire safety, and life safety are four synonymous terms commonly in use in high-rise structures. A threat is any event that, if it occurs, may cause harm or destruction of assets.

Civil Rights Act), and commonly by state statutes. Lewd behavior relates to morally impure or wanton conduct; indecent exposure is included. Threats to property include 䊉

Security Threats In the high-rise setting, security threats come in many forms. Threats to people (according to Black’s Law Dictionary)* include 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Murder: The unlawful killing of a human by another with malice aforethought, either express or implied. Manslaughter: The unjustifiable, inexcusable, and intentional killing of a human without deliberation, premeditation, and malice. Robbery: Felonious taking of money, personal property, or any other article of value in the possession of another, from his or her person or immediate presence, and against his or her will, accomplished by means of force or fear. Assault: Any willful attempt or threat to inflict injury on the person of another. An assault may be committed without actually touching, striking, or doing bodily harm to another. Assault and battery: Any unlawful touching of another that is without justification or excuse. Mayhem: Webster’s College Dictionary defines mayhem as, “the crime of willfully inflicting an injury on another so as to cripple or mutilate. Random or deliberate violence or damage.” In many states the crime of mayhem is treated as aggravated assault. Sex offenses (including rape, sexual harassment, and lewd behavior): Rape is unlawful sexual intercourse with a female without her consent. Under some statutes, this crime may now include intercourse between two males. Sexual harassment is a type of employment discrimination that includes sexual advances, request for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature prohibited by federal law (Title VII of 1964

* The definitions of security and fire life safety threats were largely derived from Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed., by the Publisher’s Editorial Staff. Coauthors Joseph R. Nolan and Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley. (Used with permission of West Publishing, St. Paul, MN, 1990.)

371

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Vandalism: Willful or malicious acts intended to damage or destroy property. Included among these acts is the use of graffiti. Often a sharp instrument, such as a key or pocket knife, is used to scratch initials, logos, or drawings; or graffiti is written using color markers, crayons, pencils, lipstick, or spray paint. In buildings, graffiti is commonly found in restrooms, on lockers, and on walls of elevator lobbies (particularly those of service or freight elevators), elevator cars, rest areas, and walls immediately adjacent to public pay phones. Trespass: Any unauthorized intrusion or invasion of private premises or land of another. Criminal trespass is entering or remaining on or in any land, structure, or vehicle by one who knows he or she is not authorized or privileged to do so. This includes remaining on property after permission to do so has been revoked. Burglary: Entering a vehicle or building or occupied structure (or separately secured or occupied portion of one) with purpose to commit a crime there, at a time when the premises are not open to the public and the perpetrator is not licensed or privileged to enter. Larceny: The unlawful taking and carrying away of property of another with the intent to appropriate it to use inconsistently with the owner’s rights. Theft is a popular name for larceny. Larceny/theft includes offenses such as shoplifting, pocket picking, auto theft, and other types of stealing where no violence occurs. Sabotage: In commerce, sabotage includes the willful and malicious destruction of employer’s property or interfering with the employer’s normal operations such as during a labor dispute. This act could also be perpetrated by a disgruntled employee or former employee seeking revenge, or by a business competitor. Espionage: The crime of “gathering, transmitting or losing” information regarding the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to injure the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation; could also be perpetrated by a business competitor engaging in industrial espionage. Arson: The malicious burning of another’s house. This definition has been broadened by some state statutes and criminal codes to include starting a fire or causing an explosion with the purpose of

372

䊉


(1) destroying a building or occupied structure of another or (2) destroying or damaging any property, whether one’s own or another’s, to collect insurance for such loss. Other statutes include the destruction of property by other means (e.g., an explosion). Disorderly conduct: This can be considered a threat to people or property depending on the nature of the offense.

Security threats to both people and property include fire, bombs, riots, civil disorder, hazardous materials, chemical and biological weapons, nuclear attack, and natural disasters. Some of these threats may involve terrorism. An “act of terrorism” is an activity that involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life or the threat to commit any crime of violence with the purpose of terrorizing another or to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience.

Fire Life Safety Threats In the high-rise setting, life safety threats include 䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉

䊉䊉

䊉䊉

Fires Workplace violence Hostage and barricade situations Medical emergencies Trip-slip and falls Power failures Elevator malfunctions and entrapments Traffic accidents Labor disputes, demonstrations, riots, and civil disorder Bombs and bomb threats Hazardous materials, chemical and biological weapons, and nuclear attack Aircraft collisions Natural disasters

Again, some of these threats may involve terrorism. The September 11, 2001, attacks on the New York World Trade Center and the Pentagon using hijacked commercial aircraft and the subsequent mailing of anthrax-tainted envelopes on the United States East Coast were acts of terrorism, each using different means to carry out diabolical objectives. “The most critical exposures in high-rise structures include fire, explosion, and contamination of life-support systems such as the air and potable

water supply. These threats can be actuated accidentally or intentionally and can quickly develop into catastrophic proportions because of the rapid propagation of fire, smoke, and contaminants.”*3(pp. 19–101) In addition to these threats, an individual may exhibit aberrant behavior, such as that caused by substance abuse. Such conduct may be a threat not only to the personal safety of the individual involved but to others as well. Also, people may attempt to deliberately injure themselves or take their own lives. Because of their very height, the possibility exists that people may jump from a high-rise, particularly if they are successful in reaching the roof. High-rises, particularly major ones, may attract people who view them as a means to gain attention for themselves. For example, protestors may attempt to drape large banners promoting their raison d’être over the front of a building or daredevils perform outlandish feats to achieve notoriety.

Security of Modern High-Rise Buildings The changes in the design and construction of highrises since their first appearance have affected the security needs of these facilities. Modern high-rise buildings have inherent security hazards different from the earliest high-rises because of the following: 䊉

䊉

Open-style floors with little compartmentalization and fewer individual offices that can be secured have made it easier for a potential thief to gain access to business and personal property. The advent of modern telecommunications, with answering machines, portable phones, and services, has meant that the presence of a tenant receptionist to screen persons entering the office is now not always the standard. The open-style floor has also made it easier for an unauthorized person, having once gained access, to move unchallenged throughout the entire floor. The concealed space located above the suspended ceiling on each floor of many high-rises has provided a possible means of ingress to a tenant office. This space could also be used to hide unauthorized listening or viewing devices, such as microphones or cameras. The central heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) system has provided a similar means for unauthorized listening and viewing.

* Used with permission of POA Publishing, LLC, Los Angeles, CA, 323/663-4887. Original copyright from the Merritt Company, 1991.


䊉

䊉

The higher number of occupants per floor in a modern high-rise means a greater concentration of business equipment and personal items and therefore a more desirable target for a potential thief. The greater number of occupants per floor means the increased potential for these individuals to be perpetrators or targets of a crime and an increased likelihood that some of these people could be injured or killed, particularly by an incident occurring close to them.

In addition to these changes, other factors have added to the security risks of modern high-rise buildings. For one thing, the tenant offices in modern highrises are often the headquarters of highly successful corporations that have designed and furnished their places of business in a style to reflect their status.This has resulted in very high-quality furnishings, including, in some instances, expensive works of art, and state-of-the-art business systems. The tenant employees themselves are generally well paid, often carry cash and valuables, and tend to drive and park expensive vehicles in the building parking garage. Hence, these facilities are a potential target for criminal activity. Next, the computer revolution with its proliferation of compact business machines (such as personal data assistants and personal, laptop, and notebook computers) has resulted in equipment and proprietary information that can be carried away relatively easily by a potential thief. The computer, in itself, presents a unique set of risks because crimes can now be committed without the perpetrator ever setting foot on the premises where information is stored. Finally, the development in the mid-1950s of completely automatic control systems for the operation of elevators eliminated the need for elevator attendants and, in effect, did away with an important access control and screening measure for high-rise buildings. With the elevator attendant gone, it is often possible for people to travel unchecked throughout a structure once they have entered an elevator. Such unchecked travel can be curtailed by the use of other security measures such as security personnel, locking off certain “secured” floors from elevator access and the installation of modern electronic access control systems in elevator cars and lobbies. The technological advances that occurred in the security field, particularly over the past 40 years, have mitigated against some of these security risks. Centralized, microcomputer-based control of security and elevator systems has considerably extended and

373

improved the application of basic security measures, such as the following: 䊉䊉

䊉䊉

䊉

䊉䊉䊉

Locks and locking systems Access control devices: electronic keypads, card readers, and biometric readers Lighting systems Communication systems: intercoms, handheld radios, pagers, and portable telephones Closed-circuit television systems and audiovideo recording equipment Intrusion detection systems Patrol monitoring devices Better-trained security officers to oversee the operation of these systems and equipment

These changes have all contributed to improved and better-designed security programs.

Fire Safety of Modern High-Rise Buildings The following features often distinguish thirdgeneration buildings built since World War II: 䊉

䊉

Fireproofing insulation* is sprayed directly onto steel columns, floor beams, and girders to protect these structural members from distortion due to heat. It is applied in accordance with the requirements of the local building code. If the insulation is not correctly applied (for example, if the steel is rusted and the surface has not been properly prepared or if the insulation has not been applied at the specified thickness or density) or if the insulation has been dislodged during construction or high winds, heating an exposed steel floor beam to high temperatures can cause vertical deflection (because the secured beam has no space to move horizontally when it elongates) and failure of the connection used to secure the beam to other beams or to the main girders. In pre-1945 buildings, “structural steel components were encased in concrete.”5(pp. 5–17) Skin-type curtain walls that support none of the weight of the building are usually found on the outside of core construction high-rises. “They are like a shower curtain—designed to keep the rain

* “Unlike the earlier generation of skyscrapers, which used concrete and masonry to protect the structural steel, many of the newer buildings employed sheetrock [gypsum plasterboard between paper sheets] and spray-on fire protection. The spray-on protection generally consisted of either a cement-like material that resembles plaster or a mineral-fiber spray, such as the one used to protect the floor joists in the World Trade Center.”4(p. 67)

374

䊉

䊉

䊉


out.These curtain walls are usually glass and stone cladding supported on the structure by lightweight metal frames. Skin-type refers to a continuous wall that covers the surface like skin on a body.”6 In pre-1945 buildings, “exterior walls were of masonry construction.”5(pp. 5–17) Curtain walls are attached to the exterior wall columns, sometimes creating an empty space (of width varying from 6 to 12 inches) between the interior of these walls and the outer edges of the floors. If there is such a gap, it is usually filled with fire-resistant material to restrict the vertical spread of fire. However, according to Brannigan and Brannigan,7 “the reliability of much perimeter fire-stopping is open to serious question.” In pre-1945 buildings, “exterior walls were substantially tied to all floors.”5(pp. 5–17) Suspended ceilings, the most common type of ceiling in high-rise buildings, create a concealed space that often extends throughout an entire floor area. Apart from mandatory firewalls extending from a base floor slab to the floor slab of the floor above and in restrooms and corridors where fire-rated plasterboard ceilings are used for fire protection, these ceilings lack fire-stopping material. This uninterrupted space is about 30 inches in depth and consists of noncombustible acoustical ceiling tiles that are supported in a metal grid hung on metal hangers attached to the floor above. It often is used to house electrical, plumbing, and ducting systems, as well as telephone wiring conduits and computer wiring for that particular floor. In some buildings, it is also used as a return plenum for the heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning (HVAC) systems. “Hotels are one [type of] building that often do not have a suspended ceiling—the concrete floor slab above is the ceiling below and all the electrical is cast in the slab.”6 “Plenum type ceilings are generally not found in pre-1945 buildings.”5(pp. 5–17) Floor beams and girders are often covered with corrugated steel panels or plates and then covered with a layer of concrete to form the floor itself. The floors in most of the high-rise buildings erected since the sixties are much lighter in weight than the floors in the older buildings. In a typical high-rise office floor, 3 to 4 inches of concrete covers a corrugated-steel deck, whose weight is supported by I-beams or, in the case of the [World Trade Center] Twin Towers, by long “trusses”—lightweight strips of steel that are braced by crosshatched webs of square or cylindrical bars, creating a hollow space below each floor surface. This space allows builders to install heating and cooling ducts within the floors, rather than in a drop [suspended]

ceiling below them—an innovation that means the developer can increase the number of floors in the entire building.4(p. 67) 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Multiple stairwells provide primary and secondary means of egress and are often equipped with automatic stair-shaft pressurization and smoke evacuation systems. Because these stairwells are located in the central core area, they are less distant from each other than those in pre-World War II buildings, in which “stairways were remote from each other, located at the opposite ends of the building.”6(pp. 5–18) Stair and elevator shaft openings are equipped with protective assemblies and horizontal openings are protected. Floor areas tend to be larger and generally openplan design, with little compartmentalization using floor-to-ceiling walls and barriers. Aluminum-framed, cloth-covered foam partitioning is often used to construct cubicles to be used as individual offices. This partitioning is cheaper than the hardwood partitioning used in the past and just as effective as a sound barrier; however, it is more combustible. Pre-1945 buildings were “well compartmented with slab to slab partitions of at least 2 hour fire rating.”6(pp. 5–17) The number of occupants tends to be high, and this results in a high concentration of business and personal property, and hence high fire or fuel load. Much of this property (including office supplies, plastic wastepaper baskets, files, paper, floppy disks, compact discs, cartridges and the personal computer systems that now equip most workstations) is made of synthetic materials that are flammable and, in a fire, produce toxic gases that become components in the resulting smoke and gas.* As Bathurst writes, “Over the past several years, there have been many changes in the furnishings put into buildings. At one time, desks and chairs were routinely made of wood. Then metal became popular. Now, any combination of wood, metal, thermoplastics, and foamed plastics can be found. In addition, the increased use of computers has also added fuel load.”9(pp. 9–34) To mitigate against this threat to life safety, office furniture and interior furnishings in all offices, conference and waiting rooms, and reception and assembly areas should be of fire-resistive quality and treated to reduce combustibility.

* “Smoke is defined as the total airborne effluent from heating or burning a material. Thus, expressions such as ‘smoke and toxic gases’ are, by this definition, redundant.”8(pp. 4–8)


䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Heating and air conditioning is usually by a central heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning system that serves multiple floors. Pre-1945 buildings are “usually not centrally air conditioned . . . normally [they are] steam heated.”5(pp. 5–17) There is the potential during fires for the stack effect described earlier in this chapter. Brannigan notes of pre-World War II buildings: “Windows could be opened in buildings of this era. This provided local ventilation and relief from smoke migrating from the fire.The windows leaked, often like sieves, therefore there was no substantial stack effect.”10(p. 459) Modern high-rise building windows provide some resistance to heat and are often made of tempered safety glass; they usually cannot be opened and are well insulated. “There are no manual fire fighting techniques known to counter stack effect or to mitigate its effect during a fire.”11(pp. 9–18) Caldwell goes on to say that, due to building height and the temperature differential between areas, the only way to reduce the potential of stack effect is to change building design and construction techniques to those that minimize the effect. Automatic fire detection systems and automatic fire suppression systems are often incorporated into building design. As Brannigan and Brannigan state: Most new high-rise office buildings are sprinklered. The huge losses suffered in such fires as Philadelphia’s One Meridian Plaza and Los Angeles’ First Interstate Tower [First Interstate Bank Building] leave little room for argument. But there is still much opposition to any requirement for retroactive installation of sprinklers in existing buildings. While much of the opposition is financial, the specious argument that such requirements are unconstitutional has found some favor. This argument is without merit with respect to United States law. Much of the cost, particularly of a retroactive installation, is

375

caused by hiding the sprinkler system. If the argument of overall sprinkler cost is an issue, the opposing argument is that safety requires only the cost of a bare bones system. Aesthetic costs such as hiding the sprinklers and the piping are the option[s] of the owner, not a fire protection requirement.7

Summary High-rise buildings contain many valuable assets. The terms security and fire life safety are synonymous but can be addressed separately for the purposes of systematic analysis and discussion. There are many potential security and life safety threats to the people who use these facilities on a daily basis and to the businesses, property, and information contained within them.

References 1. Robert, J. Fischer and Gion Green. “Origins and Development of Security.” In Introduction to Security, 6th ed. Stoneham, MA: Butterworth–Heinemann, 1998. 2. Richard S. Post and Arthur A. Kingsbury. “What Is Security?” In Security Administration: An Introduction to the Protective Services, 4th ed. Boston: Butterworth–Heinemann, 1991. 3. POA. “High-Rise Structures, Section A, Life Safety Considerations.” Protection of Assets Manual, vol. 3, ed. Timothy J. Walsh. Los Angeles: POA Publishing, 1991. 4. [Seabrook 2000] 5. [Abbott 1994] 6. [Gorman 2002] 7. [Brannigan and Brannigan 1995] 8. [Clarke 1997] 9. [Bathurst 1997] 10. Brannigan 1992] 11. [Caldwell 1997]

Chapter 26 Multiresidential Security NORMAN R. BOTTOM, Ph.D., CPP, CPO, CST, CFCO

The deterioration of America’s cities favors multiresidential, controlled environments. As early as 1988, it was reported that one out of eight Americans lived in communities governed by community associations. The three basic types of community associations are condominiums, homeowners associations, and cooperatives. Although the single-family home, with all its advantages, taps a deep root, almost all people have some experience in multiresidential housing. Security is often a key marketing strategy for apartments and condominiums in today’s crime- and fear-ridden society. Newspapers, television, radio, flyers, and brochures are commonly used. Many announcements use security terms. Among those are “Access Control,” “24-Security,” and “State-of-theArt Security.” One Texas condominium used the term “superb security” in a radio spot. Marketing (including pitches by sales agents) sometimes stretches reality. Applicants or prospective buyers may be told that a police officer lives on the premises. The implication is that the officer is there to provide some tenant/owner protection. It may not be the case. A guard house may be prominent: It may never be staffed. The sales agent may point out a marked police car parked on the premises. The officer may be asleep or off the premises. Tenants and owners often feel a “false sense of security” when they hear security terms or see a gate house or police car. They may let down their guard. Other phrases that could mislead are “Luxury” and “Ideal for the Woman Professional.” It seems reasonable to assume that luxury facilities should have luxury-level security. An ideal site for the woman 376

professional should recognize her security needs. For example, rapists prey on condominiums and apartments. They know many female owners and tenants live alone. The same criminal activity that affects residents of condominiums and apartments affects residents of mobile home parks. Such locations are planned communities that provide a space to park the mobile home, a limited amount of “yard,” and some common recreational and utility areas (such as laundry facilities). Parks may cater to specific populations, such as the elderly, retired persons, or winter visitors. Access control and resident and visitor control are common challenges. If tenants are absent much of the year, burglary is a special problem. Adequate lighting, antitrespass signs, speed bumps, and low speed limits are a priority. Neighborhood Watch is especially important, considering the ease of illegal entry into mobile homes. After-dark patrol, in a golf car, is useful. Many living facilities are multiuse. Some have a few retail shops, a few have shopping centers, and most have recreational facilities. These include club houses, restaurants, golf courses, swimming pools, lakes, tennis courts, jogging paths, and more. There is an inherent conflict in the access control needs of purely residential properties and those retail establishments that welcome strangers. Poor maintenance may increase risk. Ladders left out have been use by criminals to break into apartments and condominiums. Furniture discards, allowed to accumulate, have been use as “steps” by burglars who placed such items under a window. Failure to crop vegetation around windows provides cover and concealment for the burglar’s illegal entry.

Multiresidential Security

377

Failure to replace burned-out lights provides concealment for criminals. Reduction of security by apartment or condominium management is like playing with a loaded gun. It is dangerous and foolish unless there is evidence that the reduction is justified or an equivalent substitution has been made. Professional and technical grounds for the reduction of personnel, procedures, and hardware may be hard to find. Cutting solely for the sake of cost reduction is slim justification.

Texas plaintiff attorneys do not appear convinced, however, that TAA has eroded owner/operator liability by these forms. Similar lease provisions are being used in other states. For example, a lease used in Arizona, says: “Guarded Gates. Regardless of whether the complex has a guarded entrance, Residents acknowledge and agree that Management does not provide any type of security for the deterrence of prevention of crime and that Tenants are responsible for their own safety.”

Apartments

Condominiums

Many states have apartment associations that provide security-related information. For example, the Texas Apartment Association (TAA) has long been advising its membership (apartment owner/operators) of tenant security needs. TAA created “Security Guidelines for Residents” (Form 87-M), to be attached to tenant leases. It provides 30 crime prevention tips. TAA also created a “red book.” The red book has an extensive section on security with useful security recommendations: educate tenants, check exterior lighting weekly, keep vacant units locked, install deadbolts and peepholes and strengthen striker plates, protect master keys, screen employees. TAA offered its members a sample lease (“Apartment Lease Contract”) with security provisions, as early as 1982. Tenants are supposed to initial paragraphs. One such paragraph attempts to deny any owner/operator liability for crimes against tenants, their persons, and/or property. More recently (1991), the lease also alerts tenants to their “security rights” under Section 92.151, and following sections, of the Texas Property Code. This code allows tenants to request repairs to locks and additional door locking devices and peepholes. The owner must comply with tenant requests. Failure to warn tenants of criminal activity is considered negligence in many jurisdictions. TAA provides a sample form for notifying Texas tenants of crime. This form calls for identification of the type of crime, such as rape, murder, robbery, or burglary. But, instead of identifying the crime site, on or off the premises, a TAA sample crime notice form (1989) uses the phrase “in the immediate area of the apartment[s]”. This notice concludes, “Please remember that your security is the responsibility of yourself [sic] and the local law enforcement agencies.”

Condominium associations seem to breed the most disagreeable persons on the earth. A small percentage of owners are childish, beyond reason, mean, vindictive dictatorial, and arrogant. Sometimes, the association officers have such traits. Condominium management companies often provide indifferent service, and there is frequent management turnover at many locations. These facts make the provision of security at a condominium challenging, to say the least. For many years, it was deemed impossible for an owner to sue the condominium association for failure to provide reasonable security, It was reasoned that the owner, a member of the association, could not sue him- or herself. All that has changed. Recent security verdicts in favor of owners and against their associations made it urgent to provide reasonable security at condominiums. The Community Associations Institute (CAI) is the major organization serving the condominium community. Located at 1423 Powhatan Street, Suite 7, Arlington, VA 22314, CAI has local chapters; produces a magazine, newsletters, and reports; holds educational seminars; and conducts annual meetings. CAI-GAP 13, released in 1984, “Association Security: Selecting the Contractor,” offers considerable detail to include bid items, a training-comparative matrix, and examples of how to compare security firms. Another security-related report, GAP1, released in 1977, is “Association Management.” Probably nothing causes more hostility in condominium projects than parking regulations. Parking spaces are assigned by unit. There are often few visitor spaces. Illegal parking is a special problem for condominiums adjacent to a public beach. Florida governs the right to tow in FL Statute 715.07. Proper signs must be posted to create a “Tow-Away Zone” in order to make a tow legal. There is an exception. If an officer of the condominium, or an employee of

378


the association, gives personal notice to the owner of an illegally parked vehicle, it can be towed legally. Identification cards (ID) are often issued by condominium associations, which may issue numbered bracelets, too, to be worn or carried in the common recreational area. Fences, walls and gates cannot keep all trespassers out. IDs are a good way to identify the resident and discover the trespasser. Resident IDs complement window stickers that authorize the entry, and parking, of authorized vehicles.

Levels of Security Broadly considered, three lines of possible defense should be considered in any multiresidential security program. The first is represented by all sides of the perimeter, including entrances. One side, or several, may border on developed property, undeveloped property, woods, water, or roadways. Special hazards of two, three, or four different types of property, located on various sides, may have to be taken into account. Common areas, including roadways, parking lots, marinas, lawns and walkways, and recreational areas form the second area of possible defense that requires some type of security. The third area is represented by building and unit entrances, as well as balconies and windows. The unit door and associated locking devices, as well as any unit windows and their locks, usually represents the last line of defense to the tenant/owner. There is a wide variety of security provided in multiresidential properties. Door and window locks may be almost worthless or true high-security items. Landscaping may be trimmed, to allow good natural surveillance. Vegetation may be allowed to grow and spread for aesthetic value, giving good cover and concealment for a criminal. Residents may cooperate with access control security measures or be careless in loaning keys and access cards and prop open lobby doors for convenience. Management may exercise care about who it accepts or strive only for full occupancy. Some take government money to house individuals with various social (and criminal) problems. Management may claim that security problems are minor, centering on noise, pets, children, and parking. Criminal intrusion is taken more seriously at other locations. Multiresidential security may be as simple as some outside lighting and some sort of door lock. It may involve special auto stickers or providing identification to a gate guard or being identified by a guard at the building entrance. Foyers and elevators

may be accessible to all or require a key, punching in code numbers, or an access control card. There may be a private police/security and fire department. Security may be on patrol day and night. A resident may patrol on a golf car in the evenings or a security car may roll through several times a day. Several guards or so-called courtesy officers (off-duty police residents) may be available on call. A computerized cable TV security system is available in some locations. Smoke and heat and passive infrared detectors or a laser-beam intruder detection system may be standard equipment in every unit. A central computer may contain information on residents and approved visitors and a complete medical history of every resident.

Personnel Courtesy Officers Courtesy officer is a strange term for security personnel that originated in Texas. It appears to define off-duty police, themselves tenants of apartment complexes, who agree to perform certain duties in exchange for pay or rent reduction. Courtesy officer duties often have little or nothing to do with tenant protection. Courtesy officers are normally expected to enforce apartment rules and protect the owner/ operator’s property. They often patrol in police uniforms and have take-home police cars. Other tenants frequently assume the officers are there to protect them and their own property. The following items are in a sample courtesy officer agreement: 1. To respond to problems such as emergencies, solicitors, lock-outs, etc. 2. To patrol the grounds while off-duty several times each day and night, sometimes on foot and sometimes in a vehicle. To patrol while on duty if possible. 3. To check outside lighting weekly. 4. To complete a report for each call for service. 5. To lock up the pool area and laundry at 11:00 p.m., to check recreational buildings and office doors after hours, and to reopen the laundry and pool at 8:00 a.m. 6. To monitor all parking areas, checking for expired licenses, abandoned vehicles, vehicles on blocks, etc. 7. To enforce policies that forbid car washing, car repair, double parking, violations of pool rules, etc.


8. To accompany office personnel serving eviction and/or warning notices. 9. To arrange for a substitute when on vacation.

Drive-Through Security Patrol Some contract guard companies offer daily drivethrough patrol service for apartment sites. Uniformed officers, sometimes armed, patrol in marked vehicles. The fee for such intermittent service is less than it would cost for an officer to remain on the site during a 12- or 24-hour shift. A property may be visited once or often in the specified 12 or 24 hours. Other properties may contract for additional duties and visits at specific hours. Additional, optional, duties for the drive-through patrol officer include responding to lock-outs, requests for tenant escort, property walk-through, and responding to suspicious activity and reports of crime. Some guard companies require their drivethrough patrol officers to respond to commercial alarms. Alarm responses, escorts, or reports of suspicious activity usually have higher priority than drivethrough patrol. Traffic and weather problems often interfere with the officer’s ability to complete the daily drive-through schedule. For example, lightning storms frequently cause multiple false alarms. Officers may start patrol with a backlog of reported alarms to which they must respond before beginning the drive-through schedule. Another problem is too many scheduled “hits” (property visits) on a particular route. This makes it impossible to complete scheduled duties during the shift, even if alarm response, optional duties, and weather do not hinder the officer. Drive-through patrol supervision is often sketchy during evening hours. The clients usually do not have the ability to check on the frequency or completeness of patrol activity. Guard companies often use supervisors to fill in for no-show officers. Some drivethrough report forms, left with the client, specify the officer’s arrival time(s) but not the departure time(s). The time spent on site remains unknown.

Job-Task Analysis The selection of security personnel is made easier by the job-task analysis (JTA). Ideally, the JTA is accomplished before interviewing, testing, or hiring contract or proprietary security or off-duty police personnel. It can, however, be done when security personnel are on the job. The JTA offers an addi-

379

tional benefit. It represents clear evidence that a reasonable effort has been made to provide wellselected, -trained, and -equipped personnel. There are three steps to the JTA. The job-task inventory comes first, a comprehensive list (inventory) of all duties expected to be accomplished, shift by shift. Time to complete each duty and the expected frequency of the duty should be calculated, too. Second, those duties believed critical must be closely tied into selection and training.Third, an evaluation process must occur periodically. Evaluation determines how closely actual work performance correlates to owner/operator expectations. Let us presume, for the sake of illustration, that a property previously employed some type of security personnel or is currently doing so. To complete the first step (job-task inventory), all mention of security responsibilities and duties should be culled from internal documents.The same is true for promotional material used to solicit tenants or buyers whether used in print, radio, or television media. Internal statements on security often can be located in policy documents, bulletins, operating manuals, newsletters, and the like. Contract guard manual, in-house security manuals, post orders, and special orders, as well as daily logs incident reports, should be analyzed for duties performed and their regularity. Lack of detail usually means more discretion for the officers; often, it is too much discretion. Serving security personnel should be asked to fill out a job-task inventory that describes what they do and when. Management should assign an employee to spend a shift or two with the officers to better understand how time is actually spent on the different shifts. Two scales can be used to evaluate security tasks. The significance scale rates importance and frequency. Each task should be rated separately: 1. Always critical, frequent need (daily, hourly, etc.) 2. Always critical, occasional need (weekly, seasonal, etc.) 3. Important, frequent need 4. Important, occasional need 5. Useful, frequent need 6. Useful, occasional need 7. No longer a need A second scale relates to ease of accomplishment and the need for training. Each task should be rated separately: 1. Full competence necessary prior to hiring 2. Full competence necessary prior to unsupervised work

380

3. 4. 5. 6. 7.


To be acquired on the job, within 2 months To be acquired on the job, within 2 weeks To be acquired on the job, within 2 days Little or no training required Not currently a required duty

Few apartments and condominium associations have any systematic and professional evaluation process directed toward security personnel. Lacking foresight, most hire a security company based solely on a low bid. Here are some telling examples of failure to evaluate from documents discovered after serious crimes: 䊉

䊉

䊉

Contract guard logs, kept at the guard shack at a Texas condominium, stated that no evening patrols were performed for two weeks because the flashlight had no batteries. Two south Florida condominium associations shared the cost for an off-duty police patrol using a police car. Officers completed a voucher at the end of each shift showing hours and mileage. Reported mileage varied from 12 miles to 65 miles per night. The reasonable average was 12 miles. Where were the officers on the 65-mile nights? A north Florida apartment decided to solve its security needs by offering several police officers rent-free units. No instructions were given. Availability and performance were not issues. One of the officers was actually living off the premises with a lady friend.

Involving Owners and Tenants Police resources seemed particularly stretched in the late 1990s. It is incumbent on all citizens to report problems, to be the “eyes and ears” for police. Trained crime prevention specialists are available in many cities. They provide free physical surveys; can supply information on prior crime in the immediate, adjoining, and adjacent areas; put on anti-rape seminars; organize block and neighborhood watch groups; help owners mark their property; teach how not to give off “victim” signals; and so forth. In some cases, citizens armed with CB radios are organized to patrol their territory, looking for suspicious persons, vehicles, and circumstances. Sun City Center is a Florida retirement community that uses such volunteers. Money is raised annually for a mostly volunteer security force. Contributions support patrol vehicles, radios, office staff, and liability insurance. Sun City Center began this security effort in 1982. Two persons per vehicle patrol 10 miles of property, for an average of 3 hours,

until relieved. The volunteers also provide courtesy transportation, perform a house watch for residents away, check community buildings after hours, and respond to various calls. They carry no weapons and contact the local sheriff’s department when necessary. In addition to the local police crime prevention officer, various organizations are willing to assist apartment and condominium dwellers to reduce crime vulnerability. For example, the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) provides volunteer consultants and prints useful literature. For more information about these services, write AARP Criminal Justice Services, Code GS, 1909 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20049.

Staff Personnel Most multiresidential facilities have employees in the office, in the grounds, or in the shop. Care should be taken in hiring and retaining each person. Parttime workers need the same attention. In one northern Virginia case, for example, a young man, who lived with his parents in their condominium, was paid for part-time maintenance. No attempt had been made by the management company to look into his background before he was hired. He later raped an owner, gaining access using keys kept by management for emergencies. After the incident, it was discovered that he had previously served federal prison time for felony convictions involving drugs. All regular employees should be required to wear an official identification card (picture type) while on duty. Nonoffice staff members should wear a distinctive uniform. Contract maintenance or landscaping personnel should be issued a temporary identification while on the premises. Each temporary worker should surrender some identification (such as a driver’s license). It should be held in the office until the temporary identification is returned. Emergency first-responder training is available from the Red Cross and many other sources. All security personnel should be qualified in dealing with medical emergencies, where immediate action is critical. During office hours, at least one staff member on duty should be qualified to provide cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and know how to deal with bleeding and shock. Some residential facilities have the luxury of nurses or doctors on the premises. Tenants/owners may include medical personnel and emergency medical technicians; a list of such persons should be kept handy but not given out. In


many areas, there is rapid response by medical and rescue personnel. In a disaster situation, the usual rapid response may not take place. Medical and safety equipment kept on site might well include several good first aid kits, placed in strategic locations; a portable oxygen unit; a wheelchair; a stretcher or two; and a pool hook and torpedo buoy. It is wise to consult a physician as to what supplies are appropriate considering the resident population.

Tenant Screening Managers and associations do not want problem tenants who fail to pay their rent or create security problems. A number of service companies are willing to check on applicants for a fee. Subscribers are urged to provide regular information on “tenant performance” and any lease violations. Reports may show evictions or skips (left while owing rent). Gang activity, drug selling, and prostitution are not limited to public housing sites. Condominiums and apartment projects frequently find they are infested with criminal residents. Some care in approving applications can go a long way to reducing these in-house problems. Many screening services retrieve information on an applicant in numerous states, using information provided by their subscribers and local court records. (The applicant’s name, drivers license, and/or social security number must be provided to the service company.) For an additional fee, services provide a criminal or credit check.

Physical Security and Hardware There are many choices in perimeter fencing. The best fencing for security is a see-through type, like chain-link fencing. Aesthetic values and security needs often conflict in this area. Walls and fences should enclose the perimeter, allowing limited vehicular access. They provide a psychological effect, establishing a sense of territoriality. They will not stop a determined intruder. Vehicular access can be controlled by gate attendants or some type of gate with a locking system. Pedestrian gates are often controlled by code locks, access control cards, or keys. The most common vehicle control gates used in residential communities are barrier arm, metal slide, metal swing, and pop-up gates. The barrier arm cycles the fastest but is the least secure. The wooden gate arm is easily broken. Pedestrians are not hindered. The metal slide gate looks

381

secure but cycles slowly (about 2 feet per second). This gate requires more maintenance and does not stop the tailgater. Metal swing gates are slightly faster but are the most expensive and prone to damage. Pop-up gates are often used in underground garages. They cycle fairly fast. Some entry ways combine two systems: metal gates and barrier arm gates. The metal gate keeps out the pedestrian trespasser; the barrier arm gate allows only one car at a time to enter. Alternatively, the barrier arm is used only during the day and the combination of gates is used after dark. Vehicular gates are often open in the daytime, due to numerous deliveries and the presence of employees, such as landscape or maintenance workers, to keep an eye on incoming traffic. Vehicular gates are usually secured after dark. They may or may not be guarded. Pedestrian gates are usually controlled 24 hours. Maintenance problems often cause gates to recycle slowly or be left open. Tailgating, one car following another before the gate closes, is a persistent problem due to the slowness of gate operation. In some jurisdictions, fire and police personnel are provided entry codes or a lock box near the gate provides a means of entry. Doors and locks in multiresidential units are mostly similar to what is found on single-family homes. Key-in-knob locks represent no challenge to the burglar. Deadbolt locks and peepholes are considered essential for outer doors. Night chains, sometimes called courtesy chains, do not provide intruder protection. Duress or panic alarms may be an amenity, although there is usually a price tag. An alarm device can be used to signal for medical, fire, or police response. Condominium owners often pay for intrusion detection systems. Alarm devices (bells and sirens) may be local, heard only at the intrusion site, or connected to a central alarm facility that contacts the authorities on receipt of an alarm signal. Many apartment projects have done away with master key systems, finding they are too difficult to secure in the absence of careful record keeping in a well-designed system. A master key system operates by the addition of extra pins in one or more lock cylinders. The more master pins in a given lock, the more it is vulnerable to picking and cross-keying. In a poor system, many keys open more than one unit. The loss, or misuse, of a master key destroys the security of every unit. The loss of a master key requires all units on that system to be rekeyed at once. The issuance of staff master keys often leaves much to be desired. There may be too many, records are poor, and for no good reason, the master keys are routinely carried off the premises.

382


An adequate key control system requires an overall plan and the proper selection of locks and key blanks, blind key codes, and comprehensive records. Locks should be changed or rekeyed when a new party moves in or if a door key is lost. Records of key changes or lock swaps, from one door to another, must be accurate and up to date. Key machines and blanks and key lockers require close control. If management requires an extra key to open units in an emergency, keys should be kept in a sealed packet or special one-time plastic key box. This way a key cannot be removed without clear evidence of the action. Sliding glass doors must be equipped with auxiliary locks. It is best to install sheet metal screws in upper tracks to reduce play and the opportunity for a burglar to lift the window out of the frame. An inside pin or bar should be installed to keep the door shut. Windows are also vulnerable. A burglar may make a small hole and release the latch. It is best to use auxiliary locks on all windows. Various auxiliary locks, pins, and bars are available in hardware and specialty stores. Most apartment tenants can request management install auxiliary door and window locks; however, the cost often must be borne by the tenant. Condominium owners must pay all costs. The majority of multiresidential locking systems are mechanical. Mechanical devices need maintenance. This may require lubrication, latch adjustment, or a replacement. Maintenance seldom takes place until a complaint is made. It is wiser to have regular inspection and maintenance. Visitor intercom systems may be audio (voice only) or audio and video. Audio systems have long been available. An electric door strike allows the resident to remotely release the door. A person wishing access to an audio-equipped building may push one, or more, unit buttons; someone usually releases the door. There is usually a postal-lock feature, allowing mail carriers to enter the building without having to signal a resident. A video intercom system, including a telephone for verbal communication, allows the resident to see who requests entry and to speak with that person. The camera is connected via cable to each resident’s television, set on a certain channel. Closed circuit television (CCTV) is frequently used in residential buildings and parking facilities. For effective threat recognition and response, someone must be watching a CCTV monitor. Often that person has other duties that interfere with observation. Newer (chip) CCTV digital cameras maintain their quality far longer than tube cameras. Monitors must be changed sooner, when resolution suffers. New construction

and vegetation or loss of light can interfere with CCTV surveillance.

Grills, Security Screens, and Bars First-floor locations are most vulnerable to illegal entry, especially if on the perimeter of the property or near woods or undeveloped land. One physical security measure, much used in south Florida, is the window and door security bar, grate, or screen. Condominium associations may not allow exterior use. Such devices, however, can be mounted on the interior. In apartment settings, they may be permitted if the tenant pays for materials and labor. Local fire codes may forbid installation or specify what kinds are acceptable. The threat of fire, and possible inability of residents to exit through such a protected opening, must be considered. In the case of large parking lots and garages, especially underground garages, there is a need for emergency call buttons that announce a problem at a monitored location. Many facilities couple the alarm with CCTV or a microphone to allow vision or twoway communication. Lighting is critical to security in any residential environment. All common areas, all parking areas, all perimeters should be well lit. Some locations employ incandescent lighting in globes on low (6 foot) poles. This is sometimes called romantic lighting. Adequate lighting is best achieved by using modern, costeffective high-intensity discharge (HID) lighting. High-pressure sodium and metal halide are common HID fixtures. HID is best mounted on tall poles for full benefit. Wall packs, or building mounted, HID lights, may be an acceptable substitute if light beams reach far enough. Fluorescent lighting is often found in older garages. It loses intensity and does not respond well to cold weather. Existing lighting can sometimes be improved. For example, wattage can be increased or clear bulbs and globes can replace frosted ones. In parking structures, walls and ceilings can be painted white. It may be possible to move some fixtures to provide better coverage. In any case, it is necessary to measure lighting against the local code and standards of the Illuminating Engineering Society (IES) of North America. Adequate lighting must provide ample light. It must be uniform, so that shadows do not allow easy trespass and loitering. Lighting should overlap so that the loss of one fixture does not create a large dark area. Speed bumps are often used to discourage drivethrough trespass and speeding. The best design


discourages speeding but minimizes vehicle damage. It is not necessary to use narrow, steep bumps. Those with a gradual slope and at least one foot width (at the top) work well. Local codes may set forth speed bump standards. Notice of their presence should be posted at each vehicular entrance. Speed bumps should be painted, or striped, in yellow or international orange, for safety. Openings for bicycles are recommended. If contract or in-house guards are hired to patrol the property, they need certain equipment. A uniform is essential, as is a large metal flashlight if there is night patrol. They should be furnished with pens, notebooks, log forms, and incident reports. Some type of two-way communication is vital. It may be a radio or cellular telephone. Unless the property is very small, vehicular transportation is needed. Often a golf car allows patrol where a normal vehicle cannot go. Weapons are carried by off-duty police. A residential location using guards can specify whether or not they are allowed to carry weapons. An employer must carefully consider the advantages and disadvantages of allowing security guards to carry handguns. Truly dangerous situations are best handled by trained police, on or off-duty.

Procedures Active tenants/owners can be the best resource for crime prevention. To tap this resource, there are many advantages to forming security committees in all multiresidential housing.A standing security committee should be part of each tenant’s association. Every condominium association also should create a standing security committee. The security committee can monitor and evaluate security hardware, personnel, and procedures with a view to eliminating loopholes for criminal activity. Resident complaints about crime can be funneled to this committee. The committee can investigate claims of guard services and equipment suppliers and recommend a security budget. A member of the security committee can serve as liaison to the local police and fire department. Periodic resident attitude surveys on crime and security are another useful committee function. The committee can design a disaster plan and coordinate installation and maintenance of fire suppression and detection equipment. Setting up a “buddy system” for checking on single elderly residents is another good committee task. If a security procedure, such as an escort service, is available to residents, they must be made aware of

383

how it works. This includes knowing who to contact, knowing how long it may take for an escort to be provided, and what hours it is available. An escort service is a good idea if there is a late-operating laundry facility. It is a good idea during hours of darkness, too. Newsletters are an excellent way to disseminate crime prevention information to the apartment tenant and condominium dweller. Many may be unable to attend meetings. Others will neglect bulletin boards. Such newsletters are too often full of fluff. Visitor identification procedures, such as a guest register form, are useful in discouraging criminal intrusion. If coupled with the visitor’s driver license number or vehicle tag, the results are even better. The same is true for service employees who must enter apartments or office areas to do work. Delivery personnel, unless known, should be identified, too. Security personnel, including off-duty police, need written instructions, easily accessed. These instructions typically include a security manual with policy statements and guidelines, such as dress standards, equipment, reporting, radio procedures, and the like. Separate post orders cover the dos and don’ts of a particular assignment, when certain tasks are to be done, and list emergency telephone contacts. Numbers should include police; fire; locksmiths; AAA and other emergency automobile services; 24-hour elevator repair; the power and gas companies; EMT and hospital services; 24hour plumbers; electricians, and air conditioning services; managers on call; maintenance on call; and so on. Post orders should also contain information on the location of vital controls (such as time clocks, water valves, and electric switches), the emergency procedure manual, and emergency equipment (such as fire and medical). Special orders often are issued to convey new and temporary instructions. Written instructions are an important criterion for evaluating the performance of security personnel. All security personnel should be instructed to report problems such as light outages, suspicious events and persons and vehicles, trespassers, criminal activity, and hazardous conditions of every sort. These items should be addressed the next day, if possible. A visual record of crime, updated daily, should be kept.The ideal method is to place a plastic overlay over a large map board, using colored dots to represent various types of activity. Successive plastic overlays, added yearly or more often, show concentrations of past problems.

384


The Elderly

Some Special Areas of Vulnerability

Many elderly persons live in apartments and condominiums in North America. They often live alone or with other elderly citizens. As the North American population becomes older (the so-called graying of America), this population group will have more security needs. The elderly, as a group, have special health problems. For example, they are less able to fight or flee in emergency situations. Hearing loss, especially in elderly men, tends to be significant. Limited vision or hearing increases vulnerability. The operation of access control equipment or fire suppression equipment (such as extinguishers) may create problems for the elderly. They may require more escort services and special parking consideration. Home deliveries may increase traffic and access control problems. One benefit to security is their attitude; they usually welcome security and do not resent the presence of security devices or personnel. Some congregate living locations, such as nursing homes and continuing care or retirement communities, provide daily living needs to residents, including nursing and medical care. An ongoing problem in such locations is the wandering patient. A common method of dealing with this hazard is equipping the resident with a special bracelet that causes an alarm at exits equipped with sensing devices (monitors). Emergency buttons or pull cords in bedrooms or bathrooms may trigger buzzer and light signals. Visitors represent a special problem in continuing care facilities. It is necessary to identify visitors and escort them to the guest/patient. The family of the guest/patient may employ an aide or companion. Such a facility should make an effort to check the background of such a person. The same is true of their own staff.The press has reported notorious incidents of employees who committed sexual assaults or theft in such settings. Fires are a real hazard when tenants may be unable to walk or need help in movement. There is a need for sprinkler systems, fire doors, extinguishers, smoke detectors, alarm-pull stations, fire wardens, and staff training. If there is a kitchen and cafeteria, they should have a fire suppression system that releases dry chemicals over the cooking area when a certain temperature is reached. Most local codes require adequate fire control systems. Storage locker rooms require inspection to reduce fire hazards. Pharmacies, if present, need high-grade locks and alarms. Certain employees should be certified in CPR.

Day Care Day-care centers are more present then ever. You can find them at hospitals, businesses, government facilities, and at some multiresidential facilities. At day-care centers, access control is critical as well as panic buttons in staff areas. No one should be able to walk into the facility without prior approval. Due to “parental kidnapping” problems, it is essential that children be released only to approved persons, no matter what excuse or story is offered. Fire suppression has a high priority, too.

Elevators and Elevator Lobbies Apartments and condominium buildings often have elevators. Elevator lobbies should be in plain view and not screened by vegetation. Elevators and lobbies should be well lit, day and night. Mirrors should be placed in each elevator so that a user can see if anyone suspicious is already in the elevator. Alarm buttons connected to the resident manager’s unit and an outside central station are necessary, as is a telephone. Some consideration should be given to limiting elevator service at late hours.

Laundry Room Laundry room rapes are a special problem in apartment settings. Too often laundry rooms are located in remote settings and lack access control. Laundry room locks should require a tenant key. The door should be equipped with a window. A panic button or telephone should be available. Interior lighting should be wired to stay on permanently during the hours of operation. If the location is difficult to protect, hours should be limited.

Lakes, Rivers, Streams, Canals, and Pools Many residential communities have swimming facilities. Others have access to navigable streams. Some have humanmade lakes for boating enthusiasts. In certain parts of the country, drainage canals run through or on the perimeter of the property. All outdoor water amenities are a hazard to those who choose to use them and especially children who might wander off and fall into them.


Local ordinances usually require that pools be fenced. Many residential facilities fence pools but provide no lifeguards. Lakes, rivers, and streams are usually open and not protected by a fence. All residents must be warned about water dangers. In the case of units adjacent to water, it is prudent to install a fence, at least around the back of such units.

Disasters Every area is subject to some type of natural disasters. For example, the hurricane season causes much concern in Florida and elsewhere. A hurricane is an intense low-pressure system, a giant whirlwind that rotates counterclockwise (in the Northern Hemisphere) and reaches winds that exceed 74 m.p.h. Some hurricanes exceed 150 m.p.h. and cause storm surges of 15 feet and higher. Hurricane Andrew, which struck south Florida on August 24, 1992, created immense property damage. Much more loss of life would have occurred had not the community been long aware that a hurricane was overdue. Still, many were unprepared. All multiresidential locations face the threat of a fire disaster. The National Fire Prevention Association (NFPA) and the local fire department can provide helpful information. Expensive litigation and negative publicity, following a serious criminal incident, is another disaster threat. Local trial lawyers, and security consultants who provide expert testimony, can assist in preparing documentation that becomes vital in a lawsuit after a serious criminal incident. Some areas face lightning problems or heavy winter storms and associated problems. In other areas, it may be tornadoes or earthquakes. Structural failure can take place anywhere. A written disaster plan must be prepared for each disaster conceived to be well within the realm of possibility. The plan must be tested before a disaster takes place. Almost every county has personnel assigned to disaster preparedness. Federal and state guidelines are useful as a baseline. The leading condominium association (CAI) produced a useful document in this regard: GAP Report 14, “Disaster Management for Community Associations.” The makeup of the resident population should already be known (to plan for crime prevention and deterrence). The elderly, and those without transportation, will need help with evacuation, if necessary. If elevators are vital and power fails, an evacuation team will be needed. The staff may not be able to get to work if local roads are damaged or

385

their own homes and families need help. Telephone failure makes cellular telephones important. Power failures incapacitate computers and make it impossible to recharge cellular batteries. An ordinary generator can be used to recharge batteries but cannot be used to operate computers. The possible inability to access computer databases mandates that all disaster-related plans and materials must be in hardcopy, regularly updated. If units are vacant, it may be necessary to enter them to shut off utilities. Keys and alarm codes may not be available without adequate planning. Residents or management may have outdoor furniture, lawn equipment, and potted plants that could become missiles in a high wind. Someone must be assigned to move these items to a specified storage area. In the case of high-rise properties, practice evacuation should take place. This practice is most critical when residents are elderly or not mobile. Residents should be encouraged to keep disaster supplies. These include flashlights and batteries, a battery-operated radio, bottled beverages including water, canned food, a camping or propane stove, a water purification kit or pump, first aid supplies, extra medicine, and so forth. Extra oil and gasoline for a generator or motor vehicle can be an excellent idea. All units should have smoke detectors. Fire extinguishers should be abundant. Many jurisdictions require electrically wired smoke detectors in new structures. Florida adopted a statewide Fire Safety Code (101). It directs that all buildings be converted to that standard.

Legislation Local ordinances, building codes, and state laws must be consulted in the design of a security program in a residential setting. For example, Florida Statute 83.51 requires landlords to provide locks and keys to doors and windows and to maintain the areas in a reasonably safe condition, including taking measures to secure against foreseeable criminal conduct. The South Florida Building Code gives specifics on locks and windows and doors. Dade County, Florida, adopted much of the language of the South Florida Building Code on physical security matters. Another political subdivision, Euclid, Ohio, began regulating aspects of apartment security in 1973. Chapter 763.10, “Security Guards at Apartments,” requires that apartments with more than one building and more than 400 dwelling units provide “at least one private policeman or security guard to patrol the buildings and private parking lot at all

386


hours of each day.” Properties with less than 400 units may be required to provide security if the director of public safety so orders. Properties with more than 700 units must have at least two guards between 8 p.m. and 4 a.m.

Basic Steps to Remember in Multiresidential Security 1. Physical security survey (including measurement of lighting) 2. Tenant attitude survey on security and crime 3. Recognition of vulnerable populations and places (such as women living alone and laundry rooms) 4. Analysis of area and on-site crime types and patterns 5. Analysis of tenant/owner complaints about crime and security

6. Honest reporting of crime problems and what security is provided tenants/owners 7. Honest reporting of crime and changes in provided security to tenants/owners 8. Design of a written security program, including use of personnel, physical (hardware), and procedures—perimeter and interior control 9. Scheduled regular evaluation of crime risks and the state of provided security (including all fences, gates, lights, unit door and window hardware, effectiveness of patrol) 10. Timely change (improvement) to security to reduce risk 11. Good local police liaison, including timely gathering of police reports for crime on the property and frequent drive-through patrol 12. Daily evaluation of security/courtesy logs and reports

Chapter 27 Workplace Violence: Anticipation through Process, Not Prediction of Results Revisited JOHN H. LOMBARDI, Ph.D., CPO, CST

The process of “taking care of business” has changed drastically from decade to decade.The reason for this is that crime has changed drastically from decade to decade. The official records tabulated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicate that in 1950 there were 3.2 police officers for each violent crime in the United States. Today, there are 4.2 violent crimes for each police officer in the United States. Since 1960, violent crimes have increased 1340% faster than the population of the United States. Since the 1960s, the murder rate of the general population has doubled— among 15–24 year olds it has tripled. Rape occurs seven times more frequently in the United States than in Europe.1 The incidence of workplace violence has increased at least 350% in the last 10 years. Women represent 43% of the workforce: 41% of deaths in the workplace result from the murder of women.2 Twenty-three percent of male workers use drugs on a regular basis: These people are likely to have a tardiness problem 300% higher than the norm, are 360% more likely to injure themselves or another in a workplace accident, and are 700% more likely to have garnishments against their wages. Their medical bills are 300% higher than those of nondrug-abusers, and they are 500% more likely to file for workers compensation.3 In 1991, more than 16% of job applicants were considered to be at high risk of committing a crime, compared to 21% in 1992. Twenty-five percent admitted to stealing from employers in the previous 3 years; 42% admitted that they could be tempted to

steal from their employers; 17% stated that they would ignore coworkers who were stealing.4 Sakis and Kennedy5 indicate that employees attacked on duty have traditionally turned to workers compensation for relief, but that an evolving body of law is providing a way around this predominately used remedy. From the research interviews I conducted since 2000 with industry security supervisor and human resource directors, it is common to have more than half of job applicants’ drug tests results turn up negative. Reaves’s research tells us that 80% of workers surveyed stated that employer drug testing efforts were “poor.”6 Walton states that substance abuse has been involved in the majority of incidents of workplace violence.7 Seger indicates that only the most dramatic workplace violence is reported in the media but that the incidents that occur most frequently in the workplace are threats of violence.8 According to the National Institute of Safety and Health 1993 study, workplace homicides were the second highest cause of occupational death in the United States during 1992.1 In 1993, the tabulations of employee benefits division of Northwestern National Life Insurance Company9 indicated that, in the workplace, 䊉

2 million (3%) workers were victims of physical attack (aggression resulting in the physical assault with or without the use of a weapon); 18% of these physical attacks were with a lethal weapon. 387

388

䊉

䊉


6 million (7%) were threatened (an expression of an intent to cause physical harm), 15% with lethal weapons. 16 million (19%) were harassed (the act of someone creating a hostile work environment through unwelcome words, actions, or physical contact not resulting in physical harm).

According to the Workplace Violence Research Institute, about 1000 workplace homicides, 16,400 threats, 723 worker attacks, and 43,800 cases of harassment take place in a given year.10 The majority of workplace victims did not report the offenses. The harassers were found to be coworkers and the attackers most often customers and clients. Overall, 25% of workers said they had experienced workplace violence from July 1993 to July 1994, with 15% of workers surveyed admitting they had been physically attacked at some time during their working life. Reduced productivity is clear-cut: Victims of violence or harassment were 20 times more likely to say that their productivity was reduced and were 10 times more likely to want to change jobs.

Causes and Avoidance of Claims of Inadequate Security The Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime Victimization Survey, 1993–1999 (2001) indicates that the average reported simple assaults occurred 4.0 times more than aggravated assaults, 18.6 times more then robberies, and 35.6 times more than sexual assaults. During this same time period, the type of workers victimized indicate that retail sales workers were victims 1.6 times more than teachers, 2.2 times more than medical workers, and 3.7 times more than transportation workers. According to the research of Bates and Dunnell,11 which is based on 10 years of premises security liability civil litigation, claims of inadequate security results from Rape and sexual assault, 44.5% Assault and battery, 24.9% Wrongful death, 18.5% Robbery (armed and unarmed), 8.7% The quantitative figures of businesses most often civilly sued, are ranked next, with multiunit residential properties at the head of the list: Multiunit residential properties, 37.6% Hotel and motels, 24.2% Retail establishments, including shopping malls, 8.4%

Restaurants, bars, and casinos, 6.7% Office buildings, 5.1% Colleges, 3.9% Hospitals, 2.8% A more recent study by Bates is described by Teresa Anderson, 12 senior editor of Security Management. In reviewing assault and batteries, the largest category involved bars, followed in order by apartment buildings and condos, restaurants, retail stores, and security companies. Regarding robbery, the top five categories of litigants were hotels and retail stores, followed by shopping malls, apartment buildings and condos, and restaurants. It should be noted that the range of assault and battery and robbery cases involved a wide range of business, with no one group dominating the field. Concerning rape and sexual assault, a wide range of businesses were also involved, with none considered a majority of such cases. Apartments and condos were the type of premises most often sued, followed by, in order, health-care facilities, hotels and management companies equal, and security companies and shopping malls equal. The later study indicates that apartment complexes topped the 1993 study as well, but that the 2002 study by Bates showed an increase in healthcare facilities, with many of the new cases happening in nursing homes and assisted living homes. Some differences between Bates’s study in 1993 contrasted to 2002 is that the earlier study found plaintiffs prevailing more frequently, compared to defendants prevailing more recently; more awards for plaintiffs are currently for lower amounts of money. The most recent study indicated that parking facilities (followed by apartments) are the sites of the largest category of crimes, while apartments (followed by parking lots) were the largest in the earlier study. Anderson notes that the significance of these changes is hard to decipher, due to the discrepancy in the number of cases reported each year. Nonetheless, premises security liability cases based on inadequate security are more likely to generate high jury awards and settlements than those based on the employee’s criminal behavior. A business owner must anticipate the security problem, just like any other potential risk to the operation’s assets. Traditionally, security has been concerned with threats from the outside; workplace violence is a threat from the inside. Violence cannot be predicted in any absolute fashion, but it should be recognized that violence is within anyone’s potential behavior. Anticipating who the attacker will be and who the victim may not be feasible, but several “red flags” indicate the probability of violence: substance

Workplace Violence: Anticipation through Process, Not Prediction of Results Revisited

abuse, lack of impulse control under pressure, paranoia, history of violent episodes or criminal acts, and narcissistic rage (becoming homicidal or suicidal when not in control or if rejected). From personal experience, if a first-line supervisor is not aware of what is going on around him or her, no amount of training will enable the person to implement solutions with authoritative awareness. If a supervisor has been given the information to produce a solution but does not use it, does not appreciate, or does not know how to implement it, what can be done? Job Applicant The first line of defense is the job application form: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Be aware that about 42% of all applicants lie. Look for gaps in time on the application. Verify previous employment. Check references.

Second, pay attention to interviews. Have openended questions by two separate interviewers; for example, 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Favorite boss versus worst boss (which one was described more enthusiastically?) Failures in their life: Did candidate accept responsibility for them? Were there things the previous employers could have done better? Did your applicant make any suggestions for them? What could the last employer have done to have kept the applicant from leaving?

Third, testing can be used to detect function versus dysfunction. How a person relates to others is important in their relationship to violence. Fourth, have a criminal history completed on any new employee. An employer has the right to do so and should feel obligated in situations where the potential employee will have access to apartments, to tenants’ stores, or to other units your tenants or customers may frequent. Several years ago I was retained by the plaintiff when an owner/manager of an apartment complex had hired a man as head of maintenance. The application was never examined, the man was hired immediately, and within 3 weeks he raped a young woman in her apartment. He had gained entrance to her apartment with his keys. It so happened that the new maintenance manager had been released from an Illinois prison where he served a sentence for rape. During my initial conversation with the attorney, I asked whether his case preparation had

389

included a criminal background check on the “new hire.” He said it had not: The parolees “rap” sheet (criminal history) had shown his prison terms, after the fact. For $25 I had my investigator do a simple criminal history workup on the rapist. The report history was included with my initial opinion report to the law firm—the same information that was available prior to the hiring. The case was settled for a relatively large sum of money: There was neither an expert deposition nor a trial. This is an example of negligent hiring resulting in premises securing litigation via workplace violence.

Narrowing the Focus of the Workplace Violator Profile A typical profile of the workplace violator includes the following characteristics: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9.

10.

11. 12. 13.

Disgruntled chronic complainer. Predominantly Caucasian. Age in late 30s to early 40s. Does not take responsibility for shortcomings. Is seen as a troublemaker and has been seen as a troublemaker for a while. Is very difficult to supervise. Is a marginal performer who sees the company and the job as very important to his or her self-esteem. Has an obsession with weapons. May identify with notorious violent incidents as a legitimate means of settling a grievance and verbalize this at work to management, other employees, or customers/clients. The violent behavior will usually center around a job change. Other employees indicate being intimidated by the person reinforces the behavior as functional at this company. Common denominators of workplace violence: It is planned. It is communicated to the victim that there would be violence. These communications have not been responded to by management. Because workplace violators appear to be overly aggressive, this profile can be even more closely focused. Defensive and suspicious, the violator has a fragile ego and needs to protect it. Chronically angry and is in constant turmoil. Typically has a prior history of workplace violence: Very unsuccessful at managing conflicts,empathizing with others, and finding ways to negotiate.

390


The more frightened, the more aggressive. When out of control, the person comes to believe that, by acting out in a strong way, he or she will be perceived as strong. 14. Violence is the last stop. Violence is the last act of a person who has run out of possibilities; 24% of workplace violators commit suicide after completing their workplace murders. 15. What little self-worth the workplace violator /potential murderer has is in his or her job: The person has migratory job history, sues the job as an anchor, and when the job is lost or threatened, “goes ballistic.”

parking lot, she accidentally had caught her left snugly with her seat belt. She was then dragged 9 miles. The top half of her body had disintegrated from the friction. The man went to trial on a homicide charge but was found not guilty. The bar’s owner/manager was civilly litigated for inadequate security supervision, no control of premises, and so forth. There was no indication that management had taken any steps to reduce the opportunity for a negative event from occurring. The case settled to plaintiff’s advantage.

Case 2. A Plaintiff’s Restaurant Case

Case Studies in Workplace Violence Because of 9/11, the increasing focus on workplace violence will dramatically increase and undoubtedly include more clearly defined terrorist activities than in the past, although I have seen many workplace violence crimes that were clearly terroristic in nature between employees. The following case studies illustrate typical examples of inappropriate behavior, intimidation and escalation to violence, and organizational dynamics.

Case 1. A Plaintiff’s Bar Case In a western state, an employee of a bar had his girlfriend visit after closing. He was not licensed to serve alcohol, only food, and did not have keys to the locked cabinets. He had been told not to invite people onto the bar’s premises after closing, since he had violated the bar’s security policy in the past. His boss left him to clean up after closing. The man and his girlfriend, both in their 30s, had several beers and shots of whiskey. They also did several lines of cocaine on the bar and had sex in the bar before leaving. Evidence of this was found by the police evidence technicians. They had a fierce verbal fight in the bar. When they left the bar, the man, who had his boss’s keys, was using his boss’s truck and about to drive his girlfriend home. Still fighting in the truck, the woman exited the truck from the passenger side. The man reached over in a rage and shut the door violently. He then drive 9 miles to his home. His wife was waiting for him when he pulled into the driveway. He lied to her about staying 2 hours later than usual. She asked him what the “lump” was dragging on the passenger side of the truck. The lump was what was left of the girl. As she had exited the truck in the bar’s

A restaurant, part of a food chain in the Midwest that was open 24 hours a day, was civilly sued after a man and his friend (both in their early 20s) were attacked at the restaurant after they finished their shift at about 3:30 a.m. They had not been to this location previously and were finishing their coffee and a sandwich when approached by four tough-looking young men, all teenagers. The two men had another cup of coffee, hoping the young toughs would leave. Things did not calm down and the younger men because more noisy and boisterous. A waitress was still serving the few people in the restaurant and had not asked anyone to leave or called the police. The two men left, followed by the four young toughs, who chased them down and stabbed each one several times. It was found that the company had a policy to cover such situations, but it was not implemented (no one called the police). There was proof that the company had spent no time covering policy with employees, per depositions. The manager had had several safety meetings, but no security had been covered per policy, fewer employees were used on duty on weekend nights than weekend days. No incident reports were ever filled out. No reports showed that any type of analysis had been made to create new management tools for policy and training development or enhancement. Local police department records indicated that it made some passes of the property periodically but was never asked to do so or assist with security policy. Police reports indicated that the store’s location was a magnet for “wannabe” gangbangers, drug sales, alcohol abuse, rival gang fights, and the like. There was no indication that the company had made any attempt to reduce the opportunity for a negative event to occur on the premises. The corporate director of security had no training in security nor had he had any plans for developing a relationship with local police or training the local


manager to do so. The case was settled to plaintiff’s advantage.

Case 3. A Defense of Hotel Shooting Case This case happened in the South. A man and his wife, vacationing from Germany, were driving through a medium-sized city. It was 9:00 p.m. and they stopped at a hotel. It was a warm summer night. They chose a very inexpensive motel, part of a chain. The man did not pull up to the front of the motel. He drove around to the back, left his wife in the car, then went to register and get a cart to move their luggage. He returned a few minutes later, and when opening the trunk, they were approached by a man with a gun. The robber grabbed the man’s wife. At this point the German man ran at the gunman and tried to knock the gun out of the robber’s hand. The robber ran along the back of the motel where lighting was very poor. The victim ran after the robber, during which time, the gunman fired two shots at the victim, who kept on chasing. The third time the gunman shot at the German, he was hit in the stomach. The motel had been robbed several times in the year prior to the shooting. There were no security guards, no security camera, no warning signs in the front office at registration. There was a warning sign in the parking lot. There were no incident reports. A year prior to the shooting, the motel had been sold to another company. No policy concerning security had been implemented by the new company taking over the premises. This case went to court. While a tremendous amount of documentation followed this case, the crux of the trial was this. The jury verdict went to the defense because the initial victim had chased the robber, even after the robber had shot and missed him twice. The third shot hit him. It was found by the jury that, regardless of security on the premises, there was no way to have stopped the victim from continually chasing the robber. A security guard would not be asked to chase an armed robber. Because the case situation was one of random violence (no opportunity to chase an armed robber was seen to have been in the parking lot immediately previous to the shooting), the jury finding favored the motel/defense. Several statements had been made by the plaintiff’s expert that were successfully countered by the defense expert. The plaintiff’s expert stated that the motel should at least have had a “dummy” security camera. The defense expert countered that there was no standard that stated that “dummy” security

391

cameras were adequate tools of security. The plaintiff received a jury award of several thousand dollars for “lack of consortium” between the couple. All three of these cases involved invitees (patrons or intimates) being invited onto the premises. All workplace violence need not take place between all employees/employers, but any combination of employee, employer, patron, vendor, or unrelated stranger or known person. All invitees were either killed as a result of negligence of an employee at a bar, stabbed as a result of inadequate security of a restaurant corporation, or shot due to the invitee at a hotel chasing an armed robber who had shot at him twice and missed, then being hit by the third shot. The result of these scenarios depends on many factors, but most often how the terms random violence and nonrandom violence are defined and how the facts of the cases fit into the matrix. For practical purposes, it is important to remember that random violence means that there was no opportunity for the defense to have intervened prior to an event. In other words, there was no opportunity for the defense to have removed any opportunity that would lead to the negative event. Nonrandom violence, conversely, means that opportunity existed for the defense to have removed it or at least attempted to remove it within realistic standards. Hence, the basis for a plaintiff’s case is best stated that the “opportunity” (risk) was not reduced prior to the negative event from occurring. Common threads run through these case studies, as well as many other examples of workplace violence.Will coworkers deny the behavior that they see in potential workplace violators? They will if they feel intimidated, out of control, and incompetent themselves. Supervision and management may do nothing for a long time. Then, when something is done, it may appear to be a sudden change. This sudden change contributes to “triggering” the violence by the violators, amplifying that person’s perception of unfair treatment within a conspiratorial environment. What should be learned from this? In companies that fail to prevent workplace violence, there is often foreseeable trouble. When evidence goes unheeded, particularly when workers are aware of its existence, the organization as a whole cannot recognize the impending threats, cannot understand the implications of these threats, or cannot come up with alternatives. The challenge of workplace violence is that (1) the potential workplace killer, once deciding to attack, considers him- or herself to be “on a mission,” and (2) intervention becomes much more difficult because of this mission directness.

392


Organizational Dynamics In focusing on the problem of workplace violence, management needs to consider the organizational dynamics if they are to solve the problem. People become the job that they occupy at their workplace and their options are reduced in responding to certain problems. This is the result of the limited authority of their workplace position and the fact that common sense does not preexist without planning and management skills: “When people in organizations focus only on their position, they have little sense of responsibility for the results produced when all positions interact.”13 This has several implications: 1. Workers see their responsibilities as restricted to the boundaries of their particular job position. Their tasks are primary, and the corporate mission is secondary, if it exists for them at all. They have no influence outside of their particular boundaries. 2. An extension of this is failing to take responsibility by recognizing their failure or negligence as internal: As far as they are concerned, their internal system cannot be wrong and it does not cause new problems. New problems are caused through external misperception and the external failure to use influence in corrective action. 3. Without management tools such as a security survey, policy, documented control, risk determination, training in or understanding, or foresight to rely on, a manager fails to reduce criminal opportunity because he or she has not planned for either problem definition or potential problem resolution. The unintended consequence is most likely to be increased liability. 4. There is a problematic perception of causation. We think that, for every event that occurs, there is a simultaneous cause, which is obviously a matter of common sense. This keeps workers and potential workplace violators from perceiving any long-range patterns beyond short-range goals. Primary threats to our survival come from slow, gradual processes, not sudden events. This creates problems for management and workers. In other words, for them to have an accurate definition of the security problems, they have to go outside their own experience to measure the impact by the result of surveys, interviews, policy development, evaluations of changes, liaison with police departments, and so on. 5. Such experience has to be benchmarked to harness control over the company’s assets—both

people and property—and reduce loss. It is important to document attempts to reduce criminal opportunity, since criminal opportunity is created by gradual change and lack of planning. 6. The inability to predict over the long range is less dangerous to the manager than neglecting to anticipate over a short range. To become more aware of security problems, private sector managers, supervisors, and workers need to develop and employ the same skills that the managers use in making and marking organizational profits.

The “Team” Concept and Shared Expectations as an Approach to Workplace Motivation The concept of “teams” has been suggested as a solution for workplace violence, both by providing an environment where workers are willing to take risks and responsibility in using their creativity for the organizational good and by the development of a strong performance ethic by organizational leaders, rather than by establishing a team-promoting environment alone. There is a misconception about the effect of teams on the organization. Many teams are unsuccessful because they are centered on turf protection, not the overall mission of the organization. This results in poor communication and inaccurate information. The immediate short-range goal is to “psyche up” team members in the belief that motivation will provide what the organization has been lacking— usually stability and consistency. However, human nature is not rearranged by what is thought to be “wishful thinking” nor does the faulty application of resources to a problem bring about the anticipated results. A firm is in business to make money. If the employees like their work, for whatever reason, they may be motivated. If not, the firm may still make a profit and the employees still make a living. My father drove a truck for 43 years. Did he like it? He liked being outside better than being attached to a desk inside. He used to say, “It is not how much money you make; its how much money you save.” What I am saying is this: If you have the potential to make more profit through excellent management practices, do not throw those profits away by failing to use the same excellent management practices and skills to solve security problems that “eat up” those profits. Do not expect employees to know what is expected of them if they have not been told. Without


the opportunity to learn what they are to do, why they are to do it, and how they should do it, employees are not motivated, however much a manager or supervisor expects it. If employees appreciate what the vision or corporate mission is, they can understand what they should be working toward and there is more probability of them successfully knowing what they need to know and why to follow policy. Motivation results from getting employees to understand and join in the company vision.

“Why Don’t Subordinates Do What They Are Supposed to Do?” This is the heart not only of workplace violence but also of poor performance in general. There is no perfect conformity, perfect equality, or perfect solution to loss prevention, be the loss due to workplace violation or flooding. When subordinates do not do what they are supposed to do, poor performance results. Fournies states that “Once you conclude that a subordinate’s nonperformance is occurring because of unchangeable limitations in him, you have closed the door to the pursuit of other alternatives to solving that problem.”14(p. 13) In a survey of 4000 managers, he found some answers to why subordinates do not do what they are supposed to do. The responses came from businesses across the board— retail, real estate, manufacturing, government— and represented every level of organization from foreman to president and every function of organization from research to operations to sales: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

They do not know what they are supposed to do. They do not know how to do it. They do not know why they should do it. There are obstacles beyond their control. They do not think it will work. They think their way is better. They are not motivated—poor attitude. They are personally incapable of doing it— personal limits. There is not enough time for them to do it. They are giving items the wrong priority. They think they are doing it (no feedback). Poor management. Personal problems.14(p. 77)

This research parallels my experience in organizations’ estate people, regardless of premises: apartments, offices, shopping centers, campuses, manufacturing facilities, and hotels. When managers

393

try to solve individual worker nonperformance problems, they rarely select number 1 in the list as a place to start. And number 1 is given as the first or second response 99% of the time. If this is the fault of the immediate supervisor and that immediate supervisor is responsible for evaluating the performance of the employee who is not sure what he or she should be doing, then the supervisor’s treatment of employees needs to be considered. This is especially true when considering the borderline employee. Why so many employees appear to be disgruntled at work may be directly related to how they are treated by supervisors, and perhaps to how the supervisors are treated by their managers.

Steps to Reduce the Opportunity for Workplace Violence The initial problem to consider in potential workplace violence is the lack of problem definition as a result of poor or inaccurate communication. This leads to conflict between supervisor and employee, with either inviting the eventual violence long before any confrontation or actual attack. As in other security problems, 1. Define the problem and contrast the differences between the employee’s expected performance and actual performance. 2. Determine necessary resources. Discuss differences in the impact of the expected behavior versus the actual behavior as well as the consequences to the employee’s position, both if corrective action is and is not implemented. 3. Gain the employee’s agreement to follow the expected policy, then discuss mutual expectations. 4. Document what has occurred: Has this problem always existed during the employee’s tenure? What particular opportunities have you taken to bring your dissatisfaction to the attention of the employee and to discuss corrective action? What was that corrective action? 5. Evaluate the followup and whether or not there has been the improvement agreed to. Then take the agreed action.

The Predatory Prevention Matrix How can the preceding ideas be applied to security of the operation without having to turn every employee into an expert, lawyer or highly trained criminologist?

394


Table 27-1. Predatory Prevention Matrix (benchmark cells ranked across columns and down rows) Four Key Factors Policy (static definition of problem) Control (necessary documentation of proposed resolution of defined problem) Risk (random or nonrandom, choice of person or premises) Phases of attack (spontaneous or nonspontaneous, against person or premises)

Primary

Secondary

Tertiary

Policy (what) Control

Objectives (why) Patrol

Procedures (how) Escort, etc.

Intent: 䊉 Take risk 䊉 Commit crime Invitation 䊉 To attack

Capacity: 䊉 Take risk 䊉 Commit crime Confrontation 䊉 Acceptance 䊉 Rejection

Opportunity: 䊉 Commit crime 䊉 Commit crime Attack 䊉 No attempt 䊉 Implemented 䊉 Incomplete 䊉 Complete

Cell stages defined: Primary. The major role of the organization is to show support for and participation in benchmark intervention; security awareness is a constant presence. An important first step in the accepted concept that “Security is everybody’s business” is to educate people to the consequences of their decision to act or not to act. Secondary. The goal is to intervene before an incident. It is different from primary in that it anticipates why employees need to follow the policy. It is different than tertiary in that secondary attempts at interface with people prior to actual crimes being attempted or perpetrated. Tertiary: The goal is to reduce the probability of a perpetrator attempting or completing a criminal act as long as the perpetrator and premises are controlled. Source: The Lombardi Predatory Prevention Matrix © Copyright 1993 by Dr. John H. Lombardi, Lombardi and Associates, Inc.

The technique of the Predatory Prevention Matrix (Table 27-1) can be used (1) to plan and promote a policy for the entire organization, (2) to promote proactivity through awareness of the problem and resources for its resolution, and (3) to implement policy into action with particular emphasis on prevention. It operationalizes sense that should be common to all employees as a result of learning through training, as well as control through documentation that allows employees to anticipate risk in terms of the foreseeability of violence against the person or property.The overall purpose of the matrix is to gain agreement with all employees as to the importance and common understanding of its four essential factors. This represents the mission statement for security, with all pertinent security agendas fitting into the matrix. Once it is agreed to, there is a consensus vision. Each functionary at each level within the operation should understand the basic matrix, with each level and function particularized to the extent that an employee at any specific level needs to know. In doing this, it is possible to create sense that is common to all employees, while further individualizing it to their individual positions. My research indicates that workplace violence starts at the level of first-line supervisors because of supervisory vested interest and management conflict. If policy is being ignored by a supervisor because of vested interests, other employees do not

deem corporate policy important and disregard it. Management is eroded and, with it, control over the organization, be it an apartment complex, shopping mall, office building, or industrial or other managed property. This process happens over a period of time and may lead to the creation of nonrandom risks that present criminal opportunities and invite nonopportunistic attacks and crimes stemming from recognizable but unreported warning signs over a period of time.15 This is in opposition to the ultimate product goal of the organization, which is to provide better service through improved quality of the process, reduced management conflict and supervisory selfinterest, and reduced criminal opportunity.

Process versus Output, or the Difference between “High Crime” and “High Profit” Workplace violence is seldom, if ever, due to abrupt or spontaneous threats to one’s existence or the existence of the organization. The threat of workplace violence is slow, even apathetic, at times. It may progress through a gradual buildup of hostility that may not be perceived as requiring a precautionary admonition of offending employees by supervisors, even when the supervisor is aware of an offense against company policy, which compounds the failure of policy implementation.


While workplace violence may appear as a spontaneous explosion, it is rather the result of allowing a slow process to continue without corrective action. Failure to anticipate the violence appears to condone a reactive rather than proactive stance. Using the same management tools involved in the pursuit of profits in the protection of assets increases the probability of success in reducing the opportunity for violence and preventing the opportunity for criminality in the first place. This requires control and understanding by the organization’s operational management, documenting security awareness, risk reduction strategies, and the place of security within the overall corporate structure, regardless of organizational philosophy that “security is everybody’s business” and getting employees to confirm the philosophy through proactive policy and written documentation. By placing security into the corporate structure, management confirms that “preventing loss is similar to increasing profits”; security is good business when security is everybody’s business.

Uses of the Predatory Prevention Matrix If followed properly, the matrix allows documentation of efforts to reduce criminal opportunity. Think of the potential loss from this perspective: If the organization is sued, inadequate documentation of attempts to prevent crime can suggest that property is placed before people, or even property first and people not at all. This is not how to be represented in court to a jury. The perceived goal should be to rank people and property as equally as is possible. The manager or supervisor can approach this equal basis by use of the matrix. Why is this important? Because if the interest in people (tenants, customers, and employees) is not documented, the company may be presented as considering the sacrifice of people for the sake of assets a reasonable management practice. No predictions are made about any future changes facing the organization using the matrix.The matrix is a guide to a continual definition of security strategy. Strategy results from continual planning as a process, and perceptions of dynamics and events are interactively changed by the process of using the matrix. The matrix is a common framework for allowing all employees at different organizational levels to participate in strategy development by analyzing new information. Use of the matrix can encourage resolution to conflict between supervision and management by giving them a common commitment to participation in learning a simple,

395

common new language and transmission of the concepts among levels and locations of the organization. Strategic planning, as a process, has affinity with and tolerance for change. These characteristics are needed for operation in environments that are less stable than in the past. For example, one manager in Portland, Maine, and another in Salt Lake City, Utah, who may have never met each other and may be at different levels of the organization, can use the matrix to provide a “common ground” or “commonsense language” based on its vocabulary: Security is everybody’s business; preventing loss and increasing product quality are everybody’s business; profits are everybody’s business; corporate assets are everybody’s business. The matrix can be utilized 1. As a starting point for policy development of security. 2. To train employees at different levels of the organization and in different geographic locations. 3. To analyze new information. 4. For needs assessments, security audits, critical incident evaluation, and debriefing. 5. For case preparation, deposition, and trial testimony preparation. 6. For authority and responsibility analysis or allocating and identifying new issues, threats, areas of vulnerability, and opportunities regarding security.

Implementing the Matrix The predatory prevention matrix comprises four key factors: policy, control, risk, and phases of attack. Each factor has three cells of its own: primary, secondary, and tertiary, each of which is ranked. For example, primary must exist before secondary and tertiary, and secondary must exist before tertiary if predatory prevention is to be effective. Likewise, the four key factors are also in order, from policy through phases of attack.

Policy Factor Starting with policy, it follows that policy is static during its first definition by definers of the problem. The primary policy is what the problem is believed to be; the secondary objective is the why the organization’s employees need to follow the policy; and the procedures are how employees are to carry out the policy.

396


Control Factor Once the static policy is developed, control follows. In other words, the initially static plan becomes dynamic via control through an organization responsive to the planes need to be continually redefined. Redefinition occurs through necessary documentation of proposed resolutions in response to impacts on policy. Once control is operationalized through documentation, policy is no longer static—as long as the organization is responsive to the problematic environment. If the organization returns to a static mode, there is no longer redefinition of the policy. Following in order, control is primary and requires necessary documentation in pursuit of consistency, certainty, and stability. Examples of primary control include security surveys and audits, employment background checks, performance evaluations, proactive attempts at problem definition and corresponding resolution and other benchmark variables and standards necessary to the maintenance of control of the particular premises. It is pointless for a manager or supervisor to reactively build a defense around a static policy without first establishing documented control. Without responsiveness to policy through control, the use of the secondary cell “patrol” as a defense is short-lived without a documented survey, incident reports, and justification—number of security officers, post orders, and so forth. In turn, a defense based on the tertiary “escort,” which is based on undocumented secondary patrol and primary control, is likely to be deemed spurious if control is lacking.

Risk Factor The three cells of risk are intent, capacity, and opportunity to commit crime or violence. Intent is desire to commit a criminal act. We are not psychics, and intent is seldom proven by direct evidence, so we may not know in advance someone’s intent. Capacity is the competence to take the risk, commit the act, and understand its consequences. The manager, supervisor, or employee may not need to know the intent and capacity of the person posing the threat if the opportunity has been reduced; the intent and capacity will have been controlled through effective documentation. Risk may be random or nonrandom. For a plaintiff to prevail in premises security litigation, the attacker has to have taken nonrandom risk. A random risk show little process of thought or evidence of information in the particular choice of victim. A perpetrator of violence might select a

person nonrandomly on premises randomly selected. Equally, he or she might attack a random person on nonrandomly chosen premises. If the premises are adequate controlled and chosen randomly with no prior notice and unforeseeably, the plaintiff has a weaker case than if a perpetrator attacked a random target on nonrandomly selected premises that had notices but no guardianship. It has to be asked whether the injured party in any way instigated or escalated the risk of criminal opportunity and whether it was foreseeable or any notice was given. For example, were alcohol, narcotics, or gangs involved? If opportunity is effectively reduced, it is more likely that unknown intent and capacity have been reduced, displaced, or frustrated. The matrix helps isolate these variables of the four key factors for easier explanation in defending the organizations proactive efforts.

The Phases of Attack Factor The phases of attack cells consider whether the attack was spontaneous or nonspontaneous, against particular person or premises. The phases of an attack are utilized to indicate foreseeability and notice by analyzing its three cells: invitation to an attack; confrontation—acceptance or rejection of invitation; and the attack, itself. Foreseeability is the reasonable anticipation or expectation that harm or injury can result from the commission or omission of certain acts. A defense against accusation of this negligence is found in the matrix in the form of documentation. Similarly, notice means communication of the knowledge of an existing fact. Actual notice is communicated by a person authorized to do so: The manager or supervisor to be affected by it consciously knows of the existence of the particular fact. Notice may also take the form of constructive notice: information, written warnings or advice intended to inform the employee that his or her interests are involved in the knowledge imparted. This knowledge could have been obtained proactively. 1. 2. 3. 4.

Knows the fact. Has reason to know the fact. Should know the fact. Has been notified of the fact.

What does this have to do with the matrix? If all three phases of the attack occur at the same time, the attack is, by definition, spontaneous. This is precisely what the defense needs to prevail against the allegations of a plaintiff in litigation concerning premises security liability. If control is documented properly through policy, survey, evaluation, police liaison, and


the like, it is unreasonable to expect a manager to have foreseen the possibility of a violent attack if the violence was unpredictable. It is possible there was a time gap between invitation, confrontation, and attack. Were there obvious warning signs (screams, prior attacks, documented notification) sufficiently long before the attack (how long depends on the nature of the warning sign) to have made it foreseeable? This time gap represents the element of foreseeability that supports a claim of nonspontaneous or planned attack on the plaintiff; the lack of such a time gap provides the support for the spontaneity of the event that the defense needs. To support the contention, obvious questions must be asked: Has the property manager kept accurate maintenance records? Are there incident reports? Do these control documents support the defense or the plaintiff? Has the manager used the control documentation as a management tool for planning? (Remember the difference between the plan and the act of planning—static versus dynamic/responsive.) Has the manager/supervisor been proactive or reactive?

An Apartment Case Study Let us go through a brief case study to exemplify and reinforce the successful implementation of the predatory prevention matrix and its application to the organization for improved security. An apartment owner who had several apartment buildings in an eastern city was civilly sued after two women were raped in one of the buildings. The rapes occurred 13 months apart. The same law firm represented both women. Both the plaintiff and defense law firms had nationally recognized experts. The rapes had happened at approximately the same time of night and time of year, and both were committed in garden apartments. The result was a settlement of over a million dollars. This was based on the expert’s report for the plaintiff, which outlined the facts of the case and supported his opinions. The report was also supported by association, business, and social science literature and experience in training and investigations in both public and private security.The case was settled out of court. No depositions were even taken of the experts after their reports had been submitted. The apartment building was rectangular with the width facing the street. It had approximately 30 units and was backed up against a wooded area and a major highway. A local police officer who headed crime prevention had been a tenant 4 years before the first rape.The garden apartments where the rapes

397

occurred were on the side of the building, about 100 feet from the street in front of the building. The house next door had a 6-foot fence and extensive shrubbery on the side of the house. This blocked the view of the side garden apartments from passing cars, such as patrol cars. Now let us analyze this case briefly by going through the matrix to see what would have reduced the opportunity for such crimes at this complex.

Matrix Analysis of the Case Study

Policy Consider the policy factors first. There was no written policy. The owner/property manager lived away from the complex and had no security people. He relied reactively on the local police and two parttime maintenance people to keep him informed, although he actively sought out neither. He had not anticipated security problems. As long as he did not hear about security problems, he felt that security was adequate and he was free from civil litigation due to negligence. His security was documented only in his own mind, and he felt that having driven past other apartment complexes and not having seen uniformed security was proof that he did not need security. His policy and plan were static. His planning was neither dynamic nor responsive. The former tenant who was still on the police force gave a statement that the property manager/owner has never formally asked for security services and recommendations from the local police: Other apartment property managers in the same neighborhood had asked and the police department had performed security surveys of the premises and presented a list of suggestions. The police considered the area to be a problem. The parking lot was big and many of the tenants were single women whose male friends visited late at night and made noise with fast cars in the parking lot. Many tenants gave statements that maintenance repair was slow in getting done. This was true of window repairs as well. The landlord’s undocumented defense was that he had always provided good maintenance and was unaware of any incidents except the rapes. He had not contacted the women after the rapes to inquire as to their state of health and well-being. Further, he stated in his deposition that he kept track of incidents by telling his tenants that they could call one of the part-time maintenance men who lived on the premises. Former tenants stated that, while the property manager/owner was

398


a gentleman, he neither sought out information regarding security nor talked with the tenants regarding their opinions of activities at night, when he was never on the premises. There was no policy, there were no objectives, and there were no procedures to follow as a guide.

Control What control did the properly manager/owner have? Basically, only his own word that he knew his building better than anyone did. He had never requested a free police survey or retained a private consultant to determine the premises’ security problems and make corrective recommendations; he never did background checks on part-time or full-time employees; he had no liaison with local police, not even with a police officer who had lived there; and the manager had taken no proactive steps to get the crime statistics from the police to see how his neighborhood compared to others in the small city. He felt that, although this apartment was outside a large metropolitan city, violent crime did not represent an overlapping threat to the small city his apartment was in. The few incident reports he had filled out were never used as a management tool to determine the security problem. He should have known there was a security problem—his tenants did, as did the police. The local newspaper had even run a number of stories of the growth of crime, as had the major newspapers only a few miles away. In essence, the property manager/owner had no documented control. He could not prove that what he had done, if anything, was effective; and he could not disprove the allegations from plaintiff’s counsel regarding his negligence. His lease addressed only two policy elements: (1) a late rent extra fee policy and (2) that the windows were not to be used to enter or exit the building or to move furniture in or out of the apartment units. Numerous tenant statements indicated that the latter provision was violated regularly, even in the owner’s presence, and that he had not voiced objections. There was no police or private security patrol, nor was there a documented request to the local police to make any extra patrol passes of the premises at night. The lighting was not adequately maintained, and there was no lighting at all of the back of the building next to the woods. After analyzing all the data, both quantitative and qualitative, it was determined that the risk was a nonrandom choice of premises. As in other properties, regardless of size, that do not determine their security problems, the opportunity for crime and violence

is not reduced. On the contrary, the lack of attention and response on management’s part allowed the property to develop into a generator of crime opportunity. Comparison with other apartments in the area found this particular property to have a higher rate of police calls. Statements from police officers indicated that the official incident police report did not always result from a response to the complex. The property manger/owner had stated that, while the premises had had numerous calls to the police for loud noise at night and car theft and break-ins, he had never heard any complaints about violence. However, the documentation, after the fact, showed the existence of information indicating foreseeability and notice. It should be stressed again that it is best for the defense if its control documents indicate that the premises were randomly chosen by a violator. Consequently, for the plaintiff to prevail, it has to be shown that the risks were nonrandom, that violators were attracted to the building. To reduce the opportunity for crime the property manager should attempt to make the properties as unattractive as possible to potential violators; the manager should increase control and proactivity decrease opportunity, risk, and liability. Information should be sought from Crime Stoppers, the Chamber of Commerce, the Rotary Club, and other formal and informal associations that are inexpensive to use and usually base their advice on the applied criminological research relied on in the private and public sectors for protection of assets. Given the facts of this case study, it seems that the property manager defined the property as his assets and devoted little attention to the tenants: people were ranked 2, if they were considered at all, because of his lack of documented control and even his lack of reactiveness to maintenance problems, let alone security problems. This case study also indicates that nonspontaneous attacks are more likely because of the nonrandom nature of the choice of premises that present opportunities and suffer risk. Foreseeability and notice were plentiful because of gaps in time between invitation, confrontation, and the eventual attacks. It cost this individual and his insurance company over a million dollars to learn what could be got inexpensively or free from public and private sector information resources. The property owner’s defense was unsustainable when it counted. There was no documented, consistent methodology. The lingering comment remembered is the owner having said that he did not have a security problem, that he had done the same as


other property managers (not documented), and that his security “program” was excellent (not documented). Keep in mind some of the things that can be done to better protect one’s assets and oneself: 1. Determine security problems. 2. Write down the policy to set benchmarks for attempts at problem identification and education or training. 3. Speak with local police and various associations for security recommendations. 4. Ask the insurance company for advice. 5. Call educational institutions and ask whether any workshops are being planned in the identified problem areas. 6. Document all preventive attempts. 7. Treat good security like good sales, as a money generator. 8. Regularly speak with tenants and employees and ask for their feedback and recommendations. 9. Hold short orientation sessions with employees and tenants and build a “vocabulary of common sense.” 10. Explain the matrix in terms to which the manager and employees can relate. 11. Invite the local police or sheriff crime prevention unit to the premise to discuss security, and advertise the invitation to all tenants, workers, and the like. 12. Let staff members and tenants know that attention is paid to their opinions and suggestions and they are being included in continuous policy realignment. 13. Make sure staff members and tenants see your support of policy. 14. Whatever is documented should be used as a management tool (e.g., incident reports tell you what, where, who, how, why, and when security breaches happened). 15. If advice is requested, be prepared to take it— you may be on notice. 16. Do not keep your head in the sand: A manager should know better. If sued, somebody who did know better can make damaging allegations. Do not disregard staff and tenant requests for information concerning security. 17. Make employees and tenants aware by putting fliers under their doors, asking their opinions, and warning them about information received from police and others. 18. Talk to other manager/supervisors to see if they have similar problems. Have they solved them? How?

399

19. Understand that security is good business: Prevention is good management. 20. Understand that, for each new employee and tenant who learns the conceptual commonsense language of the predatory prevention matrix, potentially two more aware eyes are looking to protect assets because open communication has created security awareness. 21. Remember that prevention does not work when the internal apparatus of the organization is unresponsive and shuts down. 22. Tell the story of the “magic chair” when employees and tenants ask what you are trying to do by making them more aware of preventive security.

The Magic Chair I often tell students, attorneys, and business people about the “magic chair” when discussing the key points of security awareness and good communications, and how important they are to crime prevention. I ask for a volunteer to come up to the front of the room and ask him or her to sit in a chair facing the blackboard, back to the audience. I then hold up something in my hand and show it to the audience but not to the person facing the blackboard. I ask the person facing the blackboard to tell me what I am showing the audience. The person usually uses “common sense” in “predicting” what a criminologist is likely to hold up in front of the audience. I have never had a person in the magic chair guess correctly. Pretend the person in the chair is a police officer. After a few wrong guesses, you now tell the audience to yell out what you have given them “notice”/awareness of. Then ask the police officer in the magic chair to repeat what he or she has just heard from the audience. Now, do you understand your accomplishment? Through practicing effective and simple communications and creating a limited commonsense language, you have created the opportunity to increase the probability of reducing risk by defining the problem and increasing awareness of it. The anticipation through process has had a positive impact on the output or the results.

Defense against Workplace Violence: Possible or Probable? 1. Did the predator have criminal opportunity to carry out the evil deed against the plaintiff because the defense did not take the management

400

2.

3.

4.

5.


opportunity to reduce the criminal opportunity (plaintiff’s position)? Did the defense not do anything to reduce the criminal opportunity to prevent the predator from doing his evil deed (plaintiff position)? Did the defense do something but not enough to reduce criminal opportunity for the predator to be prevented (plaintiff position)? Did the defense perform adequately to prevent a predator from carrying out the evil deed within an adequate standard? Was the predator’s evil deed beyond the range and scope of adequate standards used in managing crime off premises?

The defense may never know, document, or even be able to document cases where an adequate security program successfully prevented an attack against the premises, people, assets, or property assets. If defense control via documentation is adequate, some (not all) documentation is not lost and helps the definition of opportunity. It shortens the time needed to conceptualize actual and potential situations and cases when used in conjunction with the predatory prevention matrix. For example, policy and control are needed to determine risk. I have stated numerous times in court and disposition testimony, as well as training nationally and internationally, randomness and spontaneity are central issues in the determination of who did or did not do something that should have or should not have been done. The elusive term discretion becomes more concrete, more explainable and less academic, theoretical, and confusing. Discretion is defined as the decision to act or not to act. Not acting is, in itself, acting. Therefore, the defense “knew or should have known . . .”

Nonrandom and Nonspontaneous Cell This is clearly a plaintiff’s case. Opportunity was not reduced. Attempts may have been made by defense but did not prevent the rapes. Policy and control did present the “opportunity,” or if they did not, the defendant did not follow up to reduce that opportunity. There was enough time from the onset of the recognition of risk to have attempted to reduce it.

“control documentation,” or the defense’s prevention methodology was adequate in anticipating predatory behavior but not “predicting” it. Anticipation is a management concept. Security is meant to “manage” crime off from your premises. Security does not “guarantee” to take crime off the premises. If properly carried out, security can probably anticipate crime and manage it off the premises. The proper implementation of security does not predict but anticipates. Security is management. If we could predict, there would be no place in the dictionary or other documentation for the terms gamble, roll of the dice, sucker’s bet, or for that matter, Wall Street, stock market, war, nor loans requiring collateral. Jeffry, in Crime Prevention through Environmental Design,17 tells us that causation has never been shown in criminology. Causation is needed to provide absolutes for prediction. Anticipation is explained in the matrix. Prediction can be riddled with holes even by poor attorney cross examination of bright witnesses who misuse a term. Prediction is one of those terms (see Lombardi).16

Nonrandom/Spontaneous and Random/Nonspontaneous Cells These two cells are inconsistent but account for litigation cases resulting in errors made by defense attorneys, plaintiff’s attorneys, experts and other witnesses, judges, states’ attorneys, multicultural politics gone out of control, such as in the O. J. Simpson murder trial. Whatever combination of arguments or public griping about people’s beliefs, they can fit into these two cells. These may account for “luck,” “why the good guys lost and the bad guys won,” why too much preparation did no good, and possibly even add fuel to the fire of passionate statements of why bad things happen to good people even if God does exist. If we are religious, we know what “leap of faith” is required of us to worship—but not these two cells. And for good reason, they are standardless. They represent no or poor preparation or a shotgun approach. These are prediction without absolutes. They represent poor decision making, lack of methodology, inappropriate legal tactics, or just a combination of things that did not work.

Random and Spontaneous Cell This cell favors the defense, since either the evil deed was committed so quickly and in such a manner that the defense had no time or opportunity to have “anticipated” the criminal opportunity through

References 1. W. J. Bennett. The Index of Leading Cultural Indicators: Facts and Figures on the State of American Society. New York: Simon and Schuster/Touchstone, 1994.


2. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. Preventing Homicide in the Workplace. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1993. 3. J. A. Kinney and D. L. Johnson. Breaking Point: The Workplace Violence Epidemic and What to Do about It. Chicago: The National Safe Workplace Institute, 1993. 4. M. R. Doyle. “Admissions of Dishonesty.” Security Concepts 1, no. 6 (February 1994), p. 9. 5. J. R. Sakis and D. B. Kennedy.“Violence at Work.”Trial, Journal of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (December 2002), pp. 32–36. 6. J. Reaves. “Drug Crime in the Workplace: A Survey of Drug Use and Its Effect on Crime in the Workplace and a Small Study of Workplace Drug Abusers under Rehabilitation.” Security Journal 5, no. 1 (1994). 7. J. B. Walton. “Dealing with Dangerous Employees: Security Must Play an Active Role in Reducing Workplace Violence.” Security Management 37, no. 9 (1993). 8. K. A. Seger. “Violence in the Workplace: An Assessment of the Problem Based on Responses for 32 Large Corporations.” Security Journal 4, no. 3 (1993).

401

9. Northwestern National Life, Employees Benefits Division. “Fear and Violence in the Workplace.” Minneapolis, MN: Northwestern National Life Insurance Company, 1993. 10. D. Durfee. vol. 19, no.1 (January 2003), p. 18, CFO Magazine, “Improving Future Visibility.” www.cfo.com 11. N. D. Bates and S. J. Dunnell. Major Developments in Premises Security Liability. Framingham, MA: Liability Consultants, 1993. 12. T. Anderson. “Laying Down the Law: A Review of Trends in Liability Lawsuits.” Security Management (October 2002), pp. 43–51. 13. P. M. Senge. The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization. New York: Doubleday/Currency, 1990. 14. F. F. Fournies. Coaching for Improved Work Performance. Blue Ridge Summit, PA: Liberty Hall Press, 1987, p. 13. 15. J. Q. Wilson and G. L. Kelling. “Broken Windows.” Atlantic Monthly (March 1982). 16. J. H. Lombardi. “Not Guilty by Reason of Security.” Security Management (May 2001). 17. C. R. Jeffry. Crime Prevention through Environmental Design. Beverley Hills, CA: Sage, 1977.

Chapter 28 Domestic Violence: Everyone’s Problem INGEBORG SEBYAN, CPP, CFE, CFE

It has been eight years since I authored the chapter on this subject for third edition of this book, and now that most of us have heard of this issue, the greater concern is whether everyone understands and acknowledges that it affects every one of us. Domestic violence is a societal threat and it is everybody’s business. Closing our eyes to this tragedy would further threaten our culture. This chapter is written to better educate you on how the subject affects you and how the response we have will ultimately determine the future. To begin, it is necessary that you know that my perspective has broadened since I authored “Domestic Violence,” in the 3rd edition of this book. It was my own personal, unhealthy, and abusive marriage that subsequently ended a year later. This experience not only changed my perspective, but my life. What I didn’t realize while involved in my own crisis, the ones I loved were also victims. Being a security professional, having been trained as a police officer in two states in 1974 and again in 1997, researcher on the subject of domestic violence, having worked in a women’s shelter, being part of focus groups to study this subject, and being an author on the subject, the reality of this abusive relationship was terrible and utterly embarrassing. I can’t remember exactly why it took me almost a year to recognize the signs of escalation, but as my closest friends who were police officers will confess, I was in total denial. My ex-husbands jealousy, which, at first, was flattering, finally became a destructive force in our relationship. What I am sure of is what finally triggered my action to end the relationship. In the end, it was ultimately the fear for myself, and my children. 402

Until the victim comes to terms with the dynamics of the relationship and is well into recovery, they do not recognize the signs that the ones close to them need help. No matter how many people tell you to do something, the victim will never take action until they are ready. It may be one event or twenty events. It may be after one month or twenty years. Everyone’s ability to tolerate abuse is different and certainly the forms of abuse make a difference. Verbal abuse may be tolerated for years whereas other forms may not be as tolerable for as long. I understand how frustrating it is for those around the victim because you are the only one that doesn’t see it. I personally know that escalation grows and the danger increases each time. This is why coming to terms with what actions are necessary are critical for your safety and others. I understand why victims stay in denial, such as financial destruction, family breakup, emotional damage, embarrassment, fear of failure, and fear for your life. Couple counseling is not the answer. The only way to end the violence is to end the relationship.

What Is It Although the legal definition of battering varies from state to state, according to the law in various states it can be described as physical, sexual, and psychological abuses that may include one or all of the following: physical harm, bodily harm, assault (such as hitting, kicking, slapping, pushing, stabbing, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm), sexual abuse, manipulation, threats, emotional abuse, harassed, intimidation, isolation, using children,

Domestic Violence: Everyone’s Problem

using male privilege, ridiculed, minimizing and blaming, economic coercion, and a variety of behaviors used to maintain fear, intimidation, and power. The National Coalition Against Domestic Violence defines battering “as more than simply a measure of physical behavior, it is a pattern of behavior, with the effect of establishing power and control over their partners.” Some states, such as Minnesota, have broadened the scope of domestic violence by including roommates, brothers, aunts, uncles, and essentially anyone that lives together. This makes it easier for law enforcement to make an arrest on a domestic charge. What this chapter will not have time to cover is all the reasons, all the different victims or all the answers. My hope is to ultimately address the need to educate the public, police, probation officers, justice system, judges, and employers. My reason is that domestic violence is a threat to our culture both socially and economically speaking. The economic impact is serious when we take into account the children left behind, the psychological damage done, the prenatal injuries and death, the increased homelessness among women and children, costs related to education and response by the legal and law enforcement community, and the higher health care costs. I also hope to stimulate further in-depth studies and discussion into the nature and prevention of violence. I challenge people to open their minds to why it happens, who the victims are and who commit these crimes. What will our future response be? Will we ultimately be able to truly account for all the victims and change the thought behind the behavior? Will we be able to understand a lesbian, gay, grandparent, and man when they tell us of their fear and need our help? I certainly hope so. I will try not to strictly deal with men as abusers, as they often are the victims. Referral will be made to victims rather than sex.

Who Are the Victims It can be anyone, any age, any race, any income group, any religion, and from any sexual preference. Studies are somewhat inconclusive because victims in higher income groups and status sometimes have resources to deal with domestic violence privately. There are also factors such as cultural and religion that tend to deal with issues privately. Then there are victims that feel by reporting such a crime, would only cause them more personal harm. Aside from all these barriers, reports show that victims of battering

403

are disproportionately women. Every year, almost 1 million women, report being victimized by intimates (spouse, ex-spouse, boyfriend, or girlfriend) in comparison to 160,000 men. Since nonreport is high, some of the statistics would not be accurate. These statistics state that urban women and younger women are at higher risk. Domestic violence is also associated with unemployment and particular cultures. The fact that 50% of the women killed in this country are killed by their intimate, is to say at least, alarming. The FBI estimates that there is a less than 10% arrest rate for abusers and most men charged with assaulting their partners end up without consequences. Other victims besides the immediate ones are their children, parents, grandparents, employers, coworkers, and friends.

Why Abusers Abuse This is the subject of intense debate. In the previous edition of this book, I looked at the past history of men assuming ownership of their wives. In 2003, control and power are in some form still ownership. Professionals agree, that this problem is so complex that there is no single theory. Some feel that the gender analysis of power, back to the patriarchal organization of society, is the root of the problem. Critics claim that traits in the individual, such as growing up abused, personality disorders or early traumatic life experiences are symptomatic to underlying emotional problems; therefore, causing an individual to act out behaviors that we know to be unacceptable. Others feel that changes in our society such as the equal rights movement may have created hostility and rage acted out in their behavior toward others. Certainly our family system has changed but if you look carefully at the victims and perpetrators, I think you would agree, power and control are underlying factors and key to a majority of battering situations. Maybe it would be safe to say that there can certainly be more than one factor that contributes to someone hurting someone they are intimate with.

What We Do Know We do know that women of color, older women, women with a language barrier, disabled women, and lesbians often have no access to linguistically and culturally appropriate services. We also know that

404


violence knows no gender. Men endure violence with almost nonexistent shelters and resources. We know that violence breeds violence and that we have to consciously accept our own responsibility toward ending the cycle. We know that our attitude has to be one of acceptance. We need to take the lessons we have learned, coupled with all the new recommendations and starting with our children, teach respect, patience and values. It is up to us to change the cycle of violence. The real thing that has to change is our values in the way we treat each other.

Law Enforcement Response Law enforcement plays a key role in domestic abuse because the police responding to a domestic abuse call may be the victim’s first contact with a law enforcement agency. The manner in which the domestic call is handled will impact on how the victim views the system, in regard to seriousness on the part of the police and whether the victim receives adequate support at the time most critical and potentially life threatening. Law enforcement has historically been apprehensive about responding to such a call. This attitude comes from frustration. Frustration with the fact that oftentimes the victim turns on the police, after they arrive, siding with the spouse out of fear, guilt, and/or embarrassment. The victim may then become reluctant to file charges. Although state laws varies, in Minnesota, whether the victim wants to have anyone arrested or not, the police can make the decision to arrest if there is evidence of assault. In this particular state, it is mandatory to arrest if there is any sign of injury. This takes the decision out of the victim’s hands. Police find themselves struggling with their own conflicting attitudes on private family matters. They must learn to separate their values and opinions. They need to learn and sometimes be taught how to be objective. Their role must be to protect all parties without judging. Although there have been many changes in police policies and procedures, officers are still faced with an ambiguous situation. Several years ago, a government-funded study examined spousal abuse and determined that the police, when responding to misdemeanor abuse cases, would opt for one of three courses of action. Some abusers would be arrested; others would be removed from the home in order that all parties could cool off; and the third group was simply counseled. Among the group arrested, 19% had subsequent spousal abuse arrests within a 6-month

period. Of those who were spared arrest, 35%, almost double, committed spousal abuse within a 6month period. The effect of the arrest (at least short term) seems adequately demonstrated. Also only 2.2% of all those arrested, were actually convicted. In some cities, such as Duluth, Minnesota, a first-time offender may receive 30 days in jail and be put on probation pending completion of a 26-week batterer’s program. If he misses classes, he will usually be sent to jail. No one would argue with the fact that a police officer’s job is not marriage counseling or family therapy, nor are we suggesting they try to act as mediators. We do, however, suggest that they be trained specifically on family violence and how to diffuse potentially explosive situations. Having some knowledge on family dynamics can make a difference in what to say and how to say it. They must be able to stay neutral, keep their bias out of the situation, remain calm, be fair, assist the victim to a safe place, protect all parties and be a good listener. This may seem like a lot: however, there is a legal precedent requiring the judicial system to protect victims. Law enforcement, as well as the courts, must learn new ways to combat this violence. They must learn from cases such as Thurman v. City of Torrington, where Tracey Thurman continually called the police and the police ignored her calls and plea for help. Subsequently, on June 10, 1983, Tracey’s husband stabbed her repeatedly around the chest, neck, and throat. Twenty-five minutes later, the police officer arrived but did not arrest the husband. Not until he came at her again, while on a stretcher, was he arrested and taken into custody. Since 1983, many police agencies have revised their policy on handling domestic abuse calls. Those agencies that understand what the “equal protection” of the Fourteenth Amendment means realize that they must assume a portion of the responsibility to remain neutral and take appropriate measures to ensure everyone’s safety. Law enforcement and the courts, as well as social agencies, are and will be held accountable if they fail to protect. Law enforcement officers are being trained better today, than ever before, in dealing with the complex and dangerous conditions of domestic abuse. Increasingly, the job of a police officer is not so much of simple options, to enforce or not to enforce, but of complex resolutions of bad situations. This can only be accomplished with cooperation with other agencies within the community. The police must establish a clear protocol when local officers are friends of the local batterers. This may require

Domestic Violence: Everyone’s Problem

handing this situation over to a different officer, no matter what lengths you need to go to. A three-year statewide study found that inconsistent response is the major obstacle toward ending domestic violence. While statewide victim advocates praise the overall approach to domestic violence, they acknowledge that there are shortfalls. There are often differences, sometimes subtle, others glaring, between what a victim can expect from one community to the next. We must maintain consistency on a “must arrest” statute. It’s important that we send a message of hope and justice for all victims. It is the role of the police to enforce the ruling of a judge and protect the victim.

Options for Protection Whether it is a restraining order or an order for protection, depending on the particular state, for our purpose, we will call this protection an “order for protection,” or “order.” To obtain an order, you can go to the clerk’s office in the county courthouse or superior or probate court during normal business hours. You can obtain an order against a spouse, former spouse, a household member, a blood relative, minor child, parent of a minor child, or someone you have had a substantial dating relationship with. You can get protection whether or not you currently live with the abuser. It will be necessary to write a statement explaining the events leading up to this course of action. There is no cost nor do you need an attorney. The process of getting an order has been made easier, with more assistance and programs in place. For those cultures that in the past were not educated to what constituted abuse and what options were available, now those cultures, have also formed shelters and assistance. If the violence occurs after available hours, an emergency order may be obtained through your local police department. Several different requests can be made in regard to an order: 䊉

䊉

䊉

No abuse order: the abuser is ordered not to hurt you, not to attempt to hurt you, and not to threaten you. Vacate order: the abuser is ordered to move out of and stay away from your home, surrender keys, and stay away from your place of work. No contact order: the abuser is ordered to not contact you in person or by telephone, mail, or any other way.

䊉

䊉

䊉

405

Temporary custody/support order: this gives you, the victim, temporary custody of your children and the abuser is ordered to pay reasonable support. Money compensation order: the abuser may be ordered to repay you for expenses incurred as a result of the abuse, such as medical expenses or lost wages. A confiscation order: the abuser is ordered to surrender any weapons, such as guns, even if he has a license to carry a weapon.

After the judge hears your story, a temporary order will be issued; this order is usually good for 10 days. The police are then responsible for serving the order to your abuser, only after he is served is the order valid. It is necessary to inform the court of all the places the abuser may be, and to keep your copy of the order on you at all times. After the 10 days, you must return to the court to petition for a one-year order. The judge will then ask your abuser to tell his side of the story, and will then decide on the extension at that time. If the abuser does not show up in court, the court feels that the abuser has admitted his guilt, and will extend the order. Keep in mind that state laws may vary slightly; we have tried to give a sample of how this works. In no way have we spelled out the exact system as it pertains to every jurisdiction. A restraining order/order for protection is a civil document. Only after the order is violated or criminal charges are sought can a person be arrested. Police are mandated to arrest the abuser when an active order has been violated. Any changes to an order can be obtained by returning to court. If you are employed, you should also advise security and/or your supervisor that such an order exists and is active. The main reason victims seek help through the court system is to end the abuse. When the abuser is someone the victim is emotionally attached to, the issue of being safe in their home is often mixed with feeling of guilt, love, embarrassment, and fear. There are many feelings and pressures these victims have. Recognizing the pressures placed on the victim, the prosecuting attorney can help remove some of them by using the court system to place controls on your abuser. These vary from state to state and from county to county; however, the general idea applies in different specific terms: 䊉

The prosecuting attorney can sign the complaint. Therefore, it is the state, and not the victim, who is filing charges. This makes the victim a witness rather than a plaintiff. If the victim is being

406

䊉

䊉

䊉


pressured into dropping charges, they simply say they have no power to do so, and that since the victim did not file the charges, they cannot tell the prosecutor how to do his job. The prosecuting attorney can subpoena the victim as a witness for the state.This will shield the victim from pressure not to appear since they are now required by law to go to court. The prosecuting attorney can demand a court trial within 60 days (or in some states 30 days).This can relieve the victim of uncertainty about when the court date will be. If the victim suspects further violence while charges are pending, the attorney can refer them to the Clerk of Family Court or an advocate could help file a protection order. The court could also exclude the abuser from the place of residence.

Through the process of the system, there is a trial to determine whether the abuser violated the law. This decision can be made by a judge alone, or by a jury. Then there is sentencing, which is a legal proceeding in which the judge orders that the abuser be punished for the crime. The court has many options; imposing a fine of money, time in jail, probation with conditions (which often includes counseling), unsupervised probation, or no punishment.

Government Involvement The only true way to achieve our ultimate goal is to have all government agencies involved in making a difference. One great example is when the Minnesota State Legislature passed legislation in 1992 directing the Higher Education Coordinating Board to survey recent college graduates in the state and evaluate the adequacy of the professional education they had received about violence and abuse. A task force of higher education and licensing board representatives reviewed the survey results as well as an inventory of current courses on violence and abuse. I was lucky enough to participate in the outreach meeting and focus groups. Ultimately their recommendation to the State Legislature was to establish a Higher Education Center Against Violence and Abuse. The legislature recognized the critical role of professional education in preparing graduates to be part of the state’s strategy to reduce violence, abuse, and harassment by taking the task force’s recommendations.

Legislation and funding to establish the Higher Education Center Against Violence and Abuse was part of the 1993 Omnibus crime bill. A grant was awarded to the School of Social Work, in the College of Human Ecology, at the University of Minnesota to establish the Center. The Minnesota Higher Education Center Against Violence and Abuse works in cooperation with organizations statewide to develop higher education programs that prepare professionals to provide safety and services to victims of violence, hold perpetrators accountable for their actions, and address the root causes of violence. The Center also serves as a resource for all Minnesota higher education institutions and selected professional licensing agencies. This task force evaluates professionals within four professional areas: law, education, health services, and human services. The focus is on training and licensing of teachers, school administrators, guidance counselors, law enforcement officers, lawyers, physicians, nurses, psychologists, and social workers. They also assess and recommend changes in current programs. In addition to their focus on training, the Center has developed an electronic clearinghouse of information that can assist faculty and staff in developing higher education curricula on violence and abuse. This state effort demonstrates what can be accomplished when government agencies take a lead role in stopping the violence.

Conclusion This chapter does not begin to touch on the effects of domestic abuse or the factors involved, nor does it give all the options or answers to steps taken by the judicial system. The message being sent is that this problem is not a private family matter but everybody’s problem. Society is beginning to respond to the psychological needs of all parties involved, abuser, abused, and the children. There is so much more to do. Awareness is a start, education is essential, and understanding is critical. We will always struggle with the question of where a family argument ends and where abuse starts. It will be a long journey before people accept responsibility for their behavior toward others and realize what is acceptable behavior and what is aggressive, violent, destructive, and illegal behavior.

Chapter 29 Personal Safety and Self-Defense MELISSA SOALT

Introduction

Violent Crimes

Self-defense exists on many levels in life. Awareness and a continuum of action-oriented responses forms the foundation of our safety. Our self-defense toolbox includes a variety of skills: body language, deescalation, verbal and boundary setting, and physical fighting and the use of weapons, when all else fails. Our goal in self-defense is to be safe; target denial is our primary objective. Self-defense calls for a rigorous attention to details and an attitude of courage: the willingness to always see what is going on around us in life. Whether in our personal lives or on the streets, ignorance can lead to fatal injuries and even death. Self-defense is also about setting boundaries and not remaining in situations that are injurious, emotionally or physically. In addition to having our antennae out, we must be tuned-in to our inner selves. This helps us know when something does not “feel right.” Being tuned-in coupled with this ability to take action on our own behalf, even if it involves losses, is at the heart of self-defense. This includes perceiving when it is time to move away from a particular environment, change jobs, or confront the problems in our personal or professional relationships. Remaining in a harmful or unhealthy situation longer than we have to takes its toll on our physical and emotional well-being. Eventually, this wears down our spirit and can numb our alertness. Possessing a healthy spirit and remaining “awake” are two core ingredients for safety and for living life to the fullest.

In cases involving violent crimes, people often reflect in hindsight, “You know, I had a bad feeling about this person or that place,” or “Yeah, we all noticed that Bob was behaving more angrily, but no one wanted to confront him. I guess we were scared and hoped it would pass.” With hindsight we can rewind the tape and identify the earliest possible places where concrete actions or interventions on our part might have enabled us to steer a situation in a different direction or simply stay out of harm’s way. Instead of ignoring Bob’s inappropriate behavior, we could have alerted security or our neighborhood mental health center. Or that “bad feeling” about the person on Street A could have motivated us to turn around and take Street B or call a cab. “Gut feelings” count, just as much as tangible perceptions. So what if we appear silly because we suddenly do not get on the elevator when the door opens and we notice something that does not appear or feel right. As the cliché says, “Better safe than sorry.” Safety means using foresight—the ability to see where things are headed. To some extent it means predicting the consequences of actions or inactions. For example, if a workplace has weak security and anyone can get past reception, it will only be a matter of time until a bad guy gets inside the system. The same holds true if one fails to lock doors and windows. Staying abreast of current events—the social, economic, and political climate of a particular environment—puts one in a better position to foresee where violence may strike 407

408


Figure 29-1 Note how the “fighter” moves to the inside of the oncoming club where he simultaneously neutralizes the weapon hand and employs an elbow strike. His momentum and angling sweep the “assailant” off his feet. (Photo courtesy of Peyton Quinn.)

next. A series of killings or threats at abortion clinics in one part of the country alerts clinics and clinicians elsewhere to increase security. Similarly, in the business world, self-defense often depends on anticipating a rival’s next move and acting accordingly. To reduce violence, we must treat each other with more respect. Humans can be inhumane. Violence is often funded by a deep sense of pain or injustice. Showing compassion and empathy can make all the difference in the world. Terry Dobson, the deceased aikido master, wrote A Kind Word Turneth away Wrath, depicting a belligerent, smelly, and drunken man on a Japanese subway and people’s fearful and violent responses to him. The story resolves as a tiny, old Japanese gentleman shows interest and compassion toward the enraged, fist-swinging laborer.As the old man connects with him, his fists slowly unclench and his face begins to soften. By the end of the story the bad guy, now sobbing, rests his head in the old man’s lap: “The old gentleman was looking down at him kindly, a beatific mixture of delight and compassion beaming from his eyes, one hand softly stroking the filthy, matted head.” Of course, compassion needs to be tempered with smarts. Otherwise we are suckers, fodder for the bad guys’ manipulations. Tibetan Buddhism offers a delightful term for this, idiot compassion. As “good people,” we may even feel compassion for the very assailant we may have to destroy to be safe. I know this feeling well from my own life. As a late teen, I traveled and lived throughout Central Asia where I was manhandled and assaulted

Figure 29-2 From a front bear-hug, this woman employs a knee strike to the groin while simultaneously yelling, “No!” (Photo by Raymond A. Macias, courtesy RAM Photo.)

Personal Safety and Self-Defense

numerous times. Whether walking away, pushing people off me, or fighting back, I felt an unusual combination of simultaneous emotions. I was on fire with rage and felt a deep sense of sorrow and compassion for the very individuals violating me and their own sense of victimization. As my colleague Mark Morris says, “Assailants are like rabid dogs—they carry a disease. We don’t have to hate them, but we have to stop their behavior.” Demonstrating compassion and acknowledging the human condition can be simple: Smile warmly at people, hold the door open for strangers, offer to give up your seat on the subway, let a friend in pain bend your ear, call and check in on them. Check in and offer support to those dealing with extreme circumstances, particularly involving significant losses—be it job, home, relationship, or death. Intense rejection and loss are two of the most difficult emotions to deal with. When left unattended, particularly with someone who may be “unstable” or highly stressed, these feelings and their accompanying sense of helplessness or rage, can breed acts of destruction, either to others or oneself. Too often we think someone else is looking out for the stressed person. Or that someone else will call the police about that abandoned vehicle. Decide to be the one who takes action. Do not wait. Make it your responsibility. If you do not know what to do, then bring it to others’ attention. Asking for help and soliciting allies is an important concept in selfdefense. Do not be afraid to make a scene. If you see a crime in progress, yell. Pick up a rock and throw it through someone’s window. Honk on your car horn. Roll your window down and shout, “I’m calling the police!” Pull a fire alarm. We cannot always prevent violence. But not trying and not doing anything is, in itself, a criminal act.

Self-Defense Self-defense means being prepared. Part of being prepared means knowing ahead of time for what we are willing or unwilling to fight or die. Would you fight to the death for your hard-earned possessions, for your body’s integrity, for your loved ones, for a stranger? With these decisions, we must also face facts. The fact is that, in any physical altercation, there is a good chance that we will suffer injuries and could even lose our life. But we cannot wait for the crisis to ponder this decision. If firefighters waited until the heat of the moment (pun intended) to

409

decide whether they were willing to risk injury, many more fire victims would be dead. They made that decision a long time ago, and they are prepared. Another piece of preparation is learning how to fight. Seek out training from qualified instructors who teach practical, real-world skills. Preferably, seek out adrenaline-state training that will allow you to practice methods with full force in realistic assault simulations. Be a discriminating consumer and carefully check out different schools. Most martial arts and self-defense schools allow the public to observe their training. In terms of traditional martial arts schools, the expression “different strokes for different folks,” applies. See what inspires you, what is convenient, and what forms suit your body type. For example, a very tall man with a bad back and bad knees may not be a good candidate for aikido or judo, arts of throwing and falling. Women should be particularly careful when choosing self-defense schools. Many selfdefense systems that work well for men are not wellsuited for women’s bodies. If self-defense is your primary goal, avoid programs that teach fancy footwork. Good self-defense training should offer relatively simple, practical skills. If it is too complicated, you will never remember it. Whatever school or system you choose, practice as much as you can—the more you train, the better you will be. Many excellent martial arts and self-defense instructors also offer weekend seminars or camps. By reading martial arts magazines you can remain abreast of excellent training opportunities that will not eat up all your time. Self-defense is not a substitute for common sense: Dogs and cellular phones make excellent companions. If attacked, think smart and respond immediately. You may even have to do the unthinkable. At a seminar I recently taught in Florida, a participant shared this story: A business woman with large sums of money to deposit was in her car, when suddenly an assailant reached in, attempting to assault her and take her money. An obvious mistake on her part was that her window was open; he could help himself. But without batting an eyelash, she quickly rolled up the window and trapped a piece of his right arm, from the elbow down, inside the vehicle. Simultaneously, without ever looking away, she put the car in gear, hit the gas, and started driving towards the nearest telephone pole. Fortunately for him, he fell out before he got scraped off! The moral of this story is, “Give him a run for his money!”

Always remember this golden rule: Being afraid does not mean being helpless.

Chapter 30 Designing Crime Risk Management Systems* NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION INSTITUTE

This chapter examines the specific areas of knowledge and skill needed by the crime prevention practitioner. The first of these areas, designing crime risk management systems, involves the practitioner’s services to—and relationships with—individual clients. The ability to design cost-effective crime risk management systems which are also acceptable to a client is the single most important skill to be developed by the crime prevention practitioner. And it is the primary building block for all other practitioner skills. In this chapter we are concerned with defining risk management, discussing the client-practitioner relationship, and describing the tasks that the practitioner performs on behalf of the client.

Understanding Crime Risk Management The concept of risk management1 is exemplified by the old saying, “Nothing ventured, nothing gained.” If we wish to receive some benefit, we must take some risk. The risk can involve either cost or loss, or both. Risk management attempts to reduce the possibilities for cost or loss in order to derive the highest possible net benefit. For example, we might wish to operate a jewelry store in order to benefit financially from the sale of jewelry. There are numerous risks associated with attaining this benefit—the cost of our merchandise, * From Understanding Crime Prevention, 2nd ed., by the National Crime Prevention Institute (Boston: Butterworth– Heinemann, 2001).

410

the cost of operations, the possibility that we might not be able to sell the merchandise at a high enough price to cover our costs, and the possibility that we might lose the merchandise through robbery, burglary, or theft, to name a few. Through application of risk management techniques, we would seek to reduce these possibilities for cost and loss. Cost of merchandise might be with a wholesaler, which permit us to purchase and maintain a minimum inventory of jewelry. Also, the lower the inventory, the less the total loss potential in the event of criminal attack. On the other hand, low inventory levels might also cost us some sales from customers who do not want to wait a few days for delivery. We might install physical and electronic security devices to reduce the probability for loss in case of a criminal attack. Such installation would carry some cost. Yet that cost might be less than the cost of fully insuring the merchandise against criminal attack, or it might be offset by the reduced insurance premiums which would accompany installation of a security system. Thus, risk management in general and crime risk management in particular always involves a variety of specific cost or loss reduction actions taken in some appropriate relationship with each other so as to assure a maximum possibility for benefit. This can be a rather complex undertaking because, as the example suggests, each risk reduction action may involve a cost or loss in and of itself. Crime risk management, like crime prevention itself, must be understood as a thinking person’s game, and its essential basis is the idea of cost-effectiveness.

Designing Crime Risk Management Systems

Risk management refers to our efforts to exercise some control over each of the various dynamic and pure risks we face. NCPI defines risk management as the anticipation, recognition, and appraisal of a risk and the initiation of some action to remove the risk or reduce the potential loss from it to an acceptable level. (Note that this is also the basic definition for crime prevention.) A risk management system, however, implies that we are trying to control our risks in a systematic fashion, so that all related risks are controlled to about the same degree and our efforts to reduce one risk (or maximize its benefit) do not create, or increase, another. Any risk situation which carries the potential for both benefit and cost or loss is called a dynamic risk.2 The manufacturer faces dynamic risk in deciding whether or not to launch a new product line. The retail merchant faces dynamic risk in deciding how much stock to purchase in advance for the Christmas season. The family faces dynamic risk in deciding whether or not to purchase a more expensive home. Here, the decision is based on the relationship between benefit and cost or loss. A pure risk3 situation, on the other hand, is one in which there is no possibility for benefit, only for cost or loss. The risks of fire, flood, or other natural disaster and, in many cases, the risk of crime are all pure risks. Here, all we can do is minimize the potential for loss. The issue is simply how much we are willing to pay or sacrifice to reduce the risk and what method of risk reduction we prefer or can afford. It has been contended that all criminal activities represent pure risks.4 However, in a risk management systems approach, the countermeasures used against pure crime risks may improve overall benefit or profitability because the countermeasure (a cost item) both reduces potential loss and creates a potential benefit. For example, television surveillance cameras were installed in a New Jersey shoe store as an antishoplifting measure. To the owner’s surprise, the flow of customers and purchases actually increased following the installation. Interviews with customers convinced him that the cameras not only discouraged shoplifters, they made honest customers feel more secure against purse snatching or other personal attacks, and thus more interested in shopping at his store. In the above illustration, the benefit derived from the countermeasure was accidental. But the practitioner who understands both the client’s interest and the ways in which crime risk management systems are designed can often produce such benefits deliberately. One practitioner tells the story of a small grocery store in an urban neighborhood which was

411

plagued with shoplifting almost to the point of bankruptcy. At the practitioner’s suggestion, the store owner replaced much of his conventional food stock with open displays of inexpensive items preferred by the people who lived in the neighborhood. This attempt to cater to local tastes had the effect of increasing his business and reducing the incidence of shoplifting, with the added benefit of reducing his costs. In the case of a family living in a home or apartment, development of a cost-effective crime risk management system can not only reduce potential loss, it may also have a beneficial influence on lifestyle. If the family feels more secure, levels of crime-related fear and anxiety may be reduced accordingly. With the stress of fear and anxiety reduced, life may become more comfortable and relaxed, with associated benefits for the entire family. Thus, the practitioner must not only stress the reduction of potential loss but also (and at least as important) the use of security measures which translate potential losses into potential benefits or gains. Such a perspective allows the practitioner to truly serve the interests of the client and increases the likelihood that the client will comply with the practitioner’s recommendations. A crime risk management system, therefore, is a systematic effort to maintain a balanced level of control over all crime-related risks.

Who Is the Client? A crime risk management system can only be designed on behalf of an individual client, and a client must have the ability to manage the facilities and activities for which a crime risk management system is to be designed. A homeowner, a business manager, or an institutional administrator could be a client, but a group of homes in a neighborhood or stores in a commercial strip could not. The reason for this restricted definition of client is that the crime risk management system is but one consideration in overall management, and is closely related to the management of funds, staff, production, sales, facilities and even, in the case of a home, of lifestyle. In the absence of a central management focus, a crime risk management system cannot be considered, let alone designed. The practitioner can and should apply the principles of crime risk management throughout the practice of crime prevention. However, one can only perform the specific task of crime risk management

412


system design on behalf of an individual client, as defined above.

The Client-Practitioner Relationship Technical expertise alone is not a sufficient basis for a successful practitioner-client relationship. The practitioner must, first and foremost, be able to recognize that each potential client has a unique set of interests and will not knowingly violate those interests, nor tolerate advisors who press him to violate them. The practitioner will be ineffective if he insists on suggesting crime risk management approaches which, whatever their merits from a security viewpoint, violate the client’s interests. For example, putting all retail stock behind counters or in display cases might discourage shoplifting, but it would also eliminate the self-service feature which many merchants find to be very attractive to customers. To be accepted and trusted, and therefore to effectively render service, the practitioner must be perceived as a professional who understands and respects the client’s needs and wants. To be effective in serving clients, one must care about them, and caring means understanding and at least empathizing with (if not totally accepting) their needs, problems, and viewpoints. Does this mean that we should tell clients whatever they want to hear? Absolutely not. The doctor does us a disservice not to point out the health hazards associated with smoking and overeating. The accountant and lawyer may land us in jail if they condone our income tax cheating. But one must gain the client’s respect and trust before serving, and this may mean putting off the hard-to-follow or unwanted advice until a relationship of understanding has been built. On the other hand, there may be matters that cannot wait and force one, like the mule trainer, to lumber the client in order to get his attention. In general, however, the crime prevention practitioner should develop a professional relationship in which the client’s needs and desires, rather than the practitioner’s, are used as the building blocks in the relationship. The practitioner must also become familiar with the basics of the client’s operations. What kind of business is this? Who are the customers? How does the client prefer to conduct operations? In the case of a residence, what kind of lifestyle does the family prefer? In the case of a school or other institution, what methods of operation and client groups are required by policy, tradition, and law? Accurate answers to these questions are crucial to the practi-

tioner, because they help relate to the client’s unique situation in the crime risk management analysis. It is crucial for the practitioner to understand the client’s perceptions and attitudes toward crime, because the threat perceived by the client can be very different from the actual threat as determined by the practitioner through a crime pattern analysis. On the one hand, the client’s fear may be higher than is justified, in which case the practitioner may have to accommodate that fear in the crime risk management system design. On the other hand, the client’s concern may be less than the crime pattern analysis suggests is appropriate, in which case the client may be unwilling to accept the level of security recommended by the practitioner. In either case, the client’s perception of the crime threat will greatly influence all decision making in connection with crime risk management systems, and the practitioner must take this into account as he works with the client. As part of understanding the client’s perception of crime, the practitioner must also become aware of the client’s previous victimization experience, because this will be a significant factor in his perception of crime and will underlie whatever security precautions the client has already taken.

Crime Pattern Analysis Before being able to provide effective services to clients, the crime prevention practitioner must understand prevailing crime patterns. Given the type of client (home, jewelry store, bus depot, service station, etc.) and the client’s location, the practitioner must be able to determine what crimes may impact the client, who is likely to commit them, how they are likely to occur, and when they are likely to occur. This analysis provides the practitioner with a picture of the crime pressure to which the client is subject. A convenient way to understand crime pressure is the crime rate by opportunity, which compares the number of crimes of a particular type with the number of potential targets of that particular crime over a defined period of time. For example, if there were 1500 residential burglaries in a given jurisdiction last year, and the number of residences in that jurisdiction was 15,000, then the crime rate by opportunity for residential burglary was 0.1 (1500 divided by 15,000). This rate can also be expressed as the number of crimes per thousand targets (100 in this example) or as the probability that any given target would have been attacked (1 chance in 10, in this example).


413

Table 30-1. Crime in Minneapolis Type of Commercial Establishment Hotel or motel Gas station Drug store School Grocery Bar or restaurant Department store Factory Bank Office Other All Establishments

Number of Units in City

Number of Reported Victimizations

Rate per 1000 Units

Chances of Victimization

139

135

971

1 in 1

299 60 223 275 545 82 772 98 2,889 7,038 12,420

240 35 129 123 173 20 180 9 260 754 2,058

802 583 578 447 317 244 233 91 90 107 164

1 in 1 1 in 2 1 in 2 1 in 2 1 in 3 1 in 4 1 in 4 1 in 11 1 in 11 1 in 9 1 in 6

Source: Adapted from Frisbie, Crime in Minneapolis,5 Table 6.3, p. 101.

The crime rate by opportunity is thus usable in a very direct way to inform both the practitioner and the client as to the probability that the client will be victimized by particular kinds of crime this year. This rate can be calculated for each kind of crime for the jurisdiction as a whole (as in the above example) or for specific parts of the jurisdiction such as a residential neighborhood or a commercial strip. All that is required is knowledge of the number of incidents of each crime and the number of targets potentially exposed to each crime. As another example, the crime rate by opportunity for commercial burglary—by type of commercial establishment—in Minneapolis for the period July 1974 through June 1975 is shown in Table 30-1. One can easily see from this table that there may be a substantial difference at the jurisdiction-wide level among client types as to their chances of victimization from a particular type of criminal attack. A similar analysis performed at the neighborhood level would probably reveal an even wider variation in victimization chances. There are other dimensions of crime pressure which should not be ignored. For example, what specific attack methods are most commonly used? What is the likelihood that crimes in progress will be observed and reported? The practitioner’s understanding of crime pressure should include the following, at a minimum, for each client type and location and for each type of crime: 䊉䊉䊉

Crime rate by opportunity Typical and preferred attack methods Typical and preferred times of attack (day, week, month)

䊉䊉䊉

Suspect characteristics Crime reporting patterns Typical types and amounts of loss

Conducting the Security Survey Armed with knowledge of crime patterns, client perceptions of crime, and client interests, the practitioner is ready to undertake a security survey of the client’s premises. The purpose of the survey is to examine the client’s physical features, procedures, activities, and possible targets of criminal attack in order to recognize and appraise the specific risks which are present. The purpose of the security survey is to provide the practitioner with sufficient knowledge to map out crime risk management strategies for recommendation to the client. Note the use of the word strategies. Although the practitioner must be concerned with detail in the survey, his overall objective is to achieve a balanced crime risk management system design. For this reason, the method of approach to the survey should also be strategic in nature. The traditional approach to the security survey is to start with the exterior of the client’s premises and work inward. The reasoning behind this approach is that the practitioner thus puts himself in the place of the attacker and assesses the effectiveness of each layer of security from outside in. The strategic approach recommended by the National Crime Prevention Institute is exactly the opposite. NCPI holds that the practitioner should start at the very heart of the client’s operation by

414


identifying the specific targets of possible criminal attack, whether they be cash, property, or person. One’s first focus of concern then becomes the targets themselves, not the security devices and procedures which are being (or might be) used to generally secure the premises. For each specific target of criminal attack, the practitioner makes two impact-related determinations: 1. The possible maximum loss 2. The probable maximum loss 䊉

䊉

Possible maximum loss is the maximum loss that would be sustained if a given target or combination of targets were totally removed, destroyed, or both. In a retail store, for example, the possible maximum loss would be the store’s entire stock. Probable maximum loss, on the other hand, refers to the amount of loss a target would be likely to sustain. For example, a merchant might have equivalent value in inventory of toilet paper and transistor radios. But it is unlikely that a criminal would remove dozens of cases of toilet paper when it is possible to acquire merchandise of the same value by removing a single case of radios.

In this simplistic example, the possible maximum loss would be the combined value of paper and radios. The probable maximum loss would be the value of the radios alone. The importance of the probable maximum loss calculations is that they permit the practitioner to assign priorities to the targets at risk. They also permit the practitioner to establish realistic limits on the cost basis for the final crime risk management system design, because it is almost always uneconomical to secure a client beyond the probable maximum loss level.

involve only one ring of protection—the stock in a retail store which is only protected by the building shell. For each component in the existing security system, the practitioner estimates its effect on probable maximum loss. Upon completion of assessment of existing security levels, one is able to estimate the net probable maximum loss for each target. These estimates then become the driving force in the following efforts to design the crime risk management system.

Designing the System When all crime risks have been identified as to their probable maximum loss through the use of the security survey, the practitioner is ready to consider methods for managing those risks. One is always careful not to make the mistake of jumping to solutions before this time, because of the need to design a rational security system rather than a patchwork quilt of expedient security measures. Knowing the targets of attack and their probable maximum loss— both separately and together—makes it possible to apply the five methods of risk management: 䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉

Risk avoidance Risk reduction Risk spreading Risk transfer Risk acceptance

All crime risks can be managed to a desired level through application of one or more (and in some cases, all) of these methods.

Risk Avoidance

Determination of Probable Maximum Loss Starting with the identification of specific targets and their possible maximum loss, the practitioner systematically works toward the outside of the premises, examining each physical or procedural barrier to access to or removal of the target, and each feature that would permit observation or detection of the criminal in the act of approaching or removing the target.This may involve assessment of several rings of protection; for example, the safe, the room where the safe is kept, the surface of the building itself, intrusion detection systems near the safe and at the building’s surface, and any perimeter barriers (or multiple combinations of these). It may also

This is always the first alternative to be considered. If the target can be removed altogether, the risk can be completely avoided. For the homeowner, this might mean keeping a valuable coin collection in a safe deposit box. For the merchant, it might mean depositing cash in a bank. For a gun dealer, it might mean eliminating display stocks. Unfortunately, the application of the risk avoidance method may often create additional problems which prohibit its use. The gun dealer would soon lose customers by eliminating display stock. The merchant would be unable to conduct business if he completely eliminated the use of cash. The coin collector would probably be most unhappy if forced to work with the collection in a small cubicle near the bank’s safe deposit vault.


Thus, relatively few significant risks can be altogether avoided, because such avoidance is likely to be extremely incompatible with the client’s lifestyle or method of doing business. However, it is well worth the practitioner’s energy to conscientiously apply this method as far as it will go. For example, the merchant or homeowner may needlessly keep negotiable securities on the premises when a bank vault would be just as convenient. Also, risks involving personal injury (such as carrying large amounts of money) can be avoided by changing personal behavior, even if the risk of property loss remains.

Risk Reduction If a risk cannot be avoided without creating severe operational difficulties, the next step is to reduce it to the lowest level compatible with the client’s operations. For example, the merchant can reduce maximum probable loss by keeping only enough cash on hand for immediate business needs during the hours the store is open, and by removing all cash to a bank each night. The coin collector could work with the collection at home one evening each week, and keep the collection in the bank’s vault the rest of the time. The gun dealer could set up an inventory control system based on average sales rate for each type of weapon and on the time delay between ordering and receiving additional inventory, and thus have on hand at any given time only the minimum stock needed. Risk reduction is probably the most successful single method the practitioner can use. Most clients needlessly expose themselves to risk in some significant ways. Risk reduction is usually an easy and inexpensive way to take up the slack before applying the more costly and difficult measures. It is also the area in which the practitioner’s knowledge of the client’s interests and ways of doing things pays the biggest dividends. For example, the neighborhood grocery store owner referred to earlier in the chapter needlessly exposed himself to the risk of shoplifting by displaying expensive products that his clientele could seldom afford. By converting to a less expensive, more frequently used type of stock, he reduced his maximum probable loss and attracted more customers. Thus, risk reduction not only offers a good chance of reducing maximum probable loss at little or no cost, it also offers the practitioner a way to provide improved profits, feelings of personal security, or other benefits valued by the client.

415

Risk Spreading Probable maximum losses which remain after the fullest possible use of risk avoidance and risk reduction methods can be further reduced through risk spreading. This method involves the application of security devices and procedures in an attempt to deter possible criminal attacks, delay attackers so that they may be apprehended before completing the attack, and deny access to high-value targets. Security devices include barrier systems, surveillance systems, and intrusion detection systems. Security procedures include those to protect persons and assets, and those to prevent defeat of the security system itself, as well as a range of standard management techniques such as proper inventory control, training of supervisors, accountability for employees who deal with purchasing and receiving, and other procedures which should be used anyway if the establishment is to be managed properly.

Risk Transfer Once risks have been avoided, reduced as much as possible, and spread as much as feasible, the next step is to transfer risk to someone else. The most common kind of risk transfer is the purchase of insurance. Insurance typically does not become costeffective until the first three techniques have been applied. That is, before they have been applied, more insurance is required, and its unit cost is greater. The homeowner who has already reduced the risk of losing valuable jewelry by putting most of the collection in a bank safe deposit box and keeping only a few of the most used pieces in the house, and has spread the risk by good physical security and an alarm system, is now in a position to transfer much of the remaining risk by purchasing special insurance. The cost of insuring a few pieces would be much less than the cost of insuring a large collection, particularly in the presence of a risk-spreading security system. Insurance, however, can be very costly, particularly if it is purchased to cover a wide range of maximum probable losses. In some situations, insurance may not be available at all, or if it is, the premiums and the required deductibles are extremely high. More and more insurance companies, too, are demanding that applicants take reasonable risk avoidance and reduction and spreading measures as a condition of insurance. Still, insurance is a valid loss reduction technique if used selectively.

416


Another widely used risk transfer technique is to pass on crime losses to customers in the form of higher prices. Broad application of this technique is to be avoided, if possible, because it reduces the competitive position of the business. However, where this form of risk transfer costs less (or no more) than an equivalent amount of insurance, or where insurance is not available, it may be used in conjunction with avoidance, reduction, and spreading. Finally, risk can also be transferred to some degree through liability-limiting techniques such as incorporation and partnership arrangements.

Risk Acceptance Having used all other risk management methods to the extent possible, the practitioner finally turns to risk acceptance. In this technique, the businessperson or homeowner simply accepts residual maximum probable loss as a cost of doing business or a cost of living. A good example of risk acceptance is the deductible feature of the insurance policy.The holder of a policy essentially insures himself or herself to the extent of the deductible amount, thus limiting maximum out-of-pocket loss while covering with insurance any losses beyond one’s ability to sustain. The test of risk acceptance should usually be that level of loss which the client can handle without severely disrupting operations. Up to that level, risk acceptance (in conjunction with adequate risk avoidance and risk reduction measures) may be less expensive than risk spreading or risk transfer. The practitioner must therefore be knowledgeable as to each client’s practical loss limit.

Cost-Effectiveness The essence of risk management is cost-effectiveness. To the practitioner, this does not mean merely that it is important to keep the cost of security as low as possible (consistent with good security). It also means that one should apply knowledge of risk management in as creative a way as possible, looking for opportunities for profit, or other benefits, as well as ways to minimize loss. For example, insurance rates can be very costly if no other means are used to reduce crime risk. On the other hand, the use of Underwriters Laboratories– approved alarm systems can bring as much as a 70% reduction in commercial burglary insurance rates, and the savings may more than offset the cost of installing the alarm.

For another example, use of good procedural security practices may not carry any cost at all, yet can substantially reduce risk. In addition, improvements in management practices stemming from security concerns may increase the profitability of the enterprise as a whole (e.g., tighter inventory control, more effective purchasing procedures). It should be noted that only one of the five major risk reduction techniques described above involves security devices. This does not mean that physical and electronic security systems are unimportant, but it does suggest that the practitioner who thinks primarily in terms of hardware may be missing some excellent opportunities to serve the client in more cost-effective ways. One highly successful company in the labor productivity systems design field guarantees its work by offering to refund its fee to any client who does not, within the first year, realize a savings of at least three dollars for every dollar invested in the contract. As they have found, it is no more difficult to take the approach of maximizing profit than it is to take the approach of minimizing loss. And while we are not advocating here that the crime prevention practitioner recommend that one always keeps an eye on the goal of improving or expanding the client’s operation, rather than on merely reducing the harm that might befall the client.

Making Recommendations to Clients In the course of a survey, the alert practitioner will have taken advantage of every possible opportunity to develop further rapport with the client and to discuss methods of crime risk reduction. Thus, by the time the practitioner has finished work and submitted a report of findings and recommended actions (always prepared neatly and logically in writing), the client should have an emerging inclination to start complying with the recommendations. Like the crime risk management system that the practitioner has envisioned as the survey has proceeded, the recommendations to the client should be arranged systematically and logically, each with adequate justification (i.e., with each client expenditure there is a reduction of risk). To present a brief laundry list of miscellaneous recommendations is to virtually ensure that the time of both the practitioner and the client has been wasted. Ideally, the practitioner’s report should not simply be mailed to the client; it should be personally presented so that the practitioner has the opportunity to


fully explain and even to modify recommendations should discussion with the client produce new information or should more creative approaches suggest themselves. This meeting with the client also permits the practitioner to immediately reinforce the concept of crime risk management in the client’s mind, and increase the level of motivation to comply with the recommendations. But primarily, it provides the opportunity for both the practitioner and the client to reexamine the recommendations and fine-tune them as needed with respect to cost-effectiveness, order of priority, and applicability. It is usually wise for the practitioner to visit the client after some time has elapsed (30–60 days, for example) since the recommendations were made and discussed. During this visit, the practitioner can actually observe the extent to which recommendations have been carried out, and determine the reasons for any observed noncompliance. Second thoughts on the feasibility and desirability of the various security provisions can be discussed and modified again as needed, and the practitioner can once again motivate the client and reinforce the risk management idea. Thereafter, the practitioner should continue to visit the client periodically to perform routine checkups. During these visits one can not only continue to reinforce the client but provide new information on changing criminal attack patterns in the area and answer questions that may have arisen in the client’s mind. Perhaps most importantly, the practitioner can provide feedback to the client on the actual effectiveness of similar security programs in other homes or businesses around town. To perform this task properly, the practitioner must maintain good statistical records on crime incidence and attack patterns. Finally, the practitioner should always immediately visit any former client who is victimized. The purpose of this visit is to analyze the attack pattern used and the types of losses which occurred in order to yet again adjust the client’s risk management system as necessary, and to obtain full knowledge of

417

the reason for failure of that particular security system. The practitioner’s performance in the area of service to individual clients should always be measured by a batting average of client compliance with recommendations and by the subsequent victimization experience of clients who do comply. One should be concerned not only with compliance rate but with level of effectiveness of the crime risk management system as well.

Conclusion In summary, the design of crime risk management systems is concerned with serving the individual client so that the environment becomes secure and consistent with particular interests and lifestyle. This requires the practitioner to look systematically at targets of attack and existing security elements in relation to profit, in the case of business, and lifestyle, in the case of a residence. It also requires that the practitioner be as concerned with improving the profitability, comfort, and convenience of the client as with reducing crime risk. But reducing the vulnerability of individual clients is not the end-of-the-line for the practitioner, because the criminal may simply displace efforts to more attractive targets. Thus, the practitioner must also develop group action and public policy action approaches.

References 1. NCPI Class Notebook. See O. C. Foster’s presentation of “Crime Risk Management.” See also Richard B. Cole, Protection Management & Crime Prevention (Cincinnati, OH: W. H. Anderson Co., 1974), pp. 13–31. 2. Ibid., O. C. Foster. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Douglas W. Frisbie, Crime in Minneapolis, Proposals for Prevention (St. Paul, MN: Governor’s Commission on Crime Prevention and Control, May 1977), p. 101.

Chapter 31 Planning, Management, and Evaluation CHARLES M. GIRARD, Ph.D.

Every law enforcement and security official uses the tools of planning, management, and evaluation. For example, a patrol officer plans how to cover a beat, makes rounds or manages activities, and evaluates how he or she did at the end of the day. An officer plans what to do and how to do it before taking action. Unfortunately, this same approach is not consistently applied in police agencies and security operations as a whole. In fact, although a certain degree of planning is usually conducted by all prevention organizations, the major emphasis has traditionally been on the management and evaluation of an officer’s work; every sergeant knows to manage a police force in such a way that the commander will conclude that he or she is doing a good job. The major purpose of the discussion that follows is to provide crime prevention and security personnel information about planning, management, and evaluation so they can take advantage of these tools in performing their jobs.

The Concepts Defined

although a certain degree of planning is carried out in all police and security operations, neither the substance nor level of intensity of the process has been sufficiently systematized to realize its full potential. One possible reason for the limited application of planning as a management tool within such organizations is the false jargon that frequently surrounds the concept. As a means of avoiding this pitfall, therefore, planning for purposes of this discussion is defined as An activity concerned with proposals for the future, the evaluation of alternative proposals, and the methods to achieve such proposals.

It must be further noted that a good plan is considered one that, within the bounds of reason, best suits the situation. Defined in this sense, planning is rational, adaptive thought applied to the future and to matters over which crime prevention and security officers have a certain degree of control. Further, by using this definition, planning is placed in a framework of organizational reality so that it can be used as a tool to assist in program implementation.

Planning One of the most effective tools available to a crime prevention unit is planning. Police and security authorities across the country have come to recognize the importance of this tool as a critical factor on which the ultimate effectiveness of operations depend. Although total agreement does not exist as to the most-effective planning method, there is general agreement that planning should be regarded as an indispensable function. Unfortunately, 418

Management This somewhat hackneyed term is generally construed to mean planning, organizing, and controlling the work of oneself or others. There are, of course, a variety of approaches to management. One type has been termed the art of muddling through and is sometimes referred to as seat-of-the-pants management. An example of this type of management is the

Planning, Management, and Evaluation

crime prevention officer who comes into the office in the morning with no plan of action other than to respond to whoever or whatever makes the loudest noise first, whether that be a demand from the chief’s office, a request make a security survey, or a request from a police administration student to respond to a lengthy questionnaire on the modus operandi of the crime prevention bureau. Another approach to management is more systematic in nature and has been termed management by objectives and results. Through this technique, an organization’s intended results are defined in advance and the program steps required to achieve such results are clearly outlined. In reality, neither type of management approach is practiced consistently by any one individual or organization. Further, it is unrealistic to suggest that the day-to-day pressures of crime prevention and security programs can be put aside to accommodate a truly systematic and inflexible approach that calls for all actions to be based on well-thought-out strategies. Nonetheless, crime prevention and security units can be expected to draw from the management by objectives approach to improve the implementation of their programs and to design and execute their activities within a framework responsive to local and corporate needs.

Evaluation Police and security administrators have long felt a need to determine the effectiveness of operating activities. Each year, as fewer dollars become available, combined with increasing public outcries for more and better services and corporate demand for decreased shrinkage and loss, the desire to weed out programs that are deadwood continues to grow. To assist police officials to assess project effectiveness and develop information that can be used in the competition for dollars, the National Advisory Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Goals, in its report, A National Strategy to Reduce Crime, urged that evaluation be made an integral part of all projects. The commission further pointed out that the use of this concept would identify what works and does not work in dealing with crime problems. Unfortunately, although the guidelines, mandates, and directives as to how evaluation should be instituted and operated have been set forth at the highest levels of government and organization, implementation at the grassroots levels has been inconsistent and, in many cases, ineffective. As a result, evaluation has often been looked at from a negative stand-

419

point and serves as an audit of program activities, rather than a positive tool to improve and refocus ongoing project efforts. The discussion that follow emphasizes the latter perspective and couples evaluation with the planning and management approaches discussed previously. As such, the definition used to describe evaluation is The process of determining the value of the amount of success in achieving predetermined goals and objectives.

Planning, Management, and Evaluation— Associates in a Dynamic Process As pointed out earlier, planning can serve as the basis on which program directions are identified. If this is done, programs can subsequently be managed and evaluated in relation to stated targets. Figure 31-1 illustrates the component parts of the planning, management, and evaluation process. In embarking on this process, initial activities should focus on examining the situation for which solutions are being sought to determine the most appropriate strategies to deal with identified problems. When alternative program approaches are examined or tried and objectives set, with the least feasible or workable discarded, the evaluation process is in effect. Notably, nothing is wrong with altering a plan after evaluating its utility. In fact, that is the purpose of the entire process. When this approach is utilized, measurement strategies and monitoring approaches can be designed to consider whether a project or approach is having the desired affect on the targeted problem. It is important to remember that management, planning, and evaluation do not provide rules that dictate action or guarantee positive results. Their main purpose is to provide a sound base for decision making and program implementation. Intuition and experience are not enough to decide what course to follow. Moreover, planning, management, and evaluation within a security or crime prevention operation can be used to 䊉䊉

Clarify purposes Organize relevant information

Figure 31-1. The planning and evaluation cycle.

420

䊉䊉

䊉

䊉


Generate alternatives Offer early information on important positive and negative aspects of program so that appropriate action can be taken Provide direction and purpose to the security or crime prevention unit Ensure that the unit’s overall efforts are less crisis oriented

Statistical Information: The Backbone for Design of a Prevention Program Various types of data are used for similar as well as different purposes in the design, management, and evaluation of a crime prevention program. For example, crime statistics are essential to the design of a program, provide an ongoing perspective as to program accomplishments during a specified period, and are key indicators to judge the overall success of the program. Demographic data, however, are most valuable in the design and evaluation phases of the project. Fortunately, all data required need not be collected at the same time or at an identical level of detail. That is, the process of data collection and maintenance should parallel the overall implementation of a crime prevention or security program. For example, at the outset of the project, it will be necessary to gather as much crime data and demographic information as is reasonably accessible. Efforts to maintain such data over the project, however, fluctuate; that is, as work is undertaken, crime statistics have to be monitored, but demographic data no longer need be gathered and analyzed. Moreover, the discussion that follows provides insights as to such subjects regarding data as 䊉䊉䊉䊉

䊉

When to collect the information and why What information should be aggregated Where such data are generally available Time periods for which the information should be organized How to organize and maintain information to facilitate its use

To assist in the preparation and maintenance of the information, the discussion is organized in much the same manner as program implementation takes place. Program design is the first topic of consideration. The elements of program management and evaluation are then discussed. Two specific types of data are critical to the design of security and crime prevention programs: crime statistics and demographic data.

Crime Statistics Detailed information that pinpoints the types and locations of a justification’s or organization’s crime problems is key to the design of a prevention program. The following focuses on such statistics. Because burglary is becoming a crime of epidemic proportion in this country, the outline of data elements relates directly to that crime. In those instances where a jurisdiction or organization is also interested in robbery, shoplifting, and the like, similar types of data about those crime types have to be pulled together for program design purposes.

When to Collect Data and Why Crime statistics must be gathered as a first step in the design of a prevention program. In addition, they have to be maintained throughout the program. In fact, they should be maintained on a daily basis and summarized monthly. The information serves as a baseline for designing, managing, and evaluating the program. In addition, the data provide useful detail for inclusion in speeches, news stories, briefing memorandums, and so on.

What Data to Gather The following data elements should be considered essential in the design of a burglary prevention program. The degree to which a particular organization can gather such data, of course, depends on the nature of existing records systems. The essential elements include 䊉

䊉

Location of occurrence. Beats, districts, census tracts, and exact location of crimes being analyzed should be gathered. This information is valuable in identifying program target areas. Date of occurrence. The day, month, and year of incidents, or reporting dates if exact dates are not known, should be analyzed. These dates indicate whether particular crimes are related to seasonal patterns, weekly community habits, or the like; for example, shoplifting increases during the Christmas holidays and on weekends; on weekends large numbers of people might get out of town in some cites or plant operations might close down, thus enhancing burglar opportunities. This information is useful in formulating strategies to deal with the crime.


䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Time of occurrence. The exact time of occurrence, when known (or morning, afternoon, evening, when a range of time is given) should be analyzed. This information is helpful to the prevention unit in terms of making personnel allocation plans, for example. Category of premises. Information concerning whether residences, businesses, or other structural categories are being victimized should be aggregated. This data should further be broken down by the specific types of premise: single family, apartment, jewelry store, variety store, office complex, warehouse, and so on. This information is helpful in the design of public information, patrol and target hardening strategies. How entry was made. Record what was done to get inside the facility. This might include whether force was used, whether a door or window had been left open and was utilized, whether a lock or alarm system was defeated to gain entry, and so forth. These data are valuable to the formulation of public information and target hardening strategies. Type of property taken. Information on the types of items taken, such as money, sound equipment, or office equipment, should be developed. Keep such accountings general in nature. This information is helpful in the design of target hardening strategies; for example, it might be used to indicate what items need to be marked through the Operation Identification program. Property identification. Record whether property taken was identified with special markings, such as driver’s license number. In addition, note whether Operation Identification or alarm and security warning devices (stickers) were prominently displayed at various building entrances. This is valuable in terms of designing a program as well as evaluating its impact. Dollar amount taken. Record the total reported dollar loss of all items taken. These data can be used to help analyze the impact of the program; for example, dollar value loss before and after the implementation of a program. Property damage resulting from entry. Note the dollar losses in property damage resulting from the crime. This information can be utilized to evaluate the impact of the program; for example, dollar loss through property damage before and after implementation of a program. How the incident was reported. Gather data on who detected and reported the crime, such as a neighbor, employee, police, alarm, or victim. This is useful in designing a program: Crime pre-

421

vention programs are theoretically designed to increase citizen and employee participation and reporting/baseline statistics have to be developed to see if this actually happens. In addition to the preceding data elements, various other items may be useful in the design, monitoring, and evaluation of a program. However, they should be considered optional. They may, nonetheless, be gathered if time is available; if the reporting systems used by the organization include the items; if information is available through a computer/data processing system; and so on. As such, each unit has to consider its own situation to determine whether the following items should be gathered. Such items include 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Point of entry. Record where entry was made, such as door, window, or air vent. As appropriate, also note the location of the point of entry, such as rear door, or side window. Occupancy status. Record whether premises were occupied when the reported crime occurred. Instrument used to gain entry. Data on the kind of tool or instrument used, such as screwdriver, pry bar, or saw should be gathered. Street and exterior lights. In the case of crimes occurring at night, note the existence of street and exterior lights. Point of entry lighting. For nighttime crimes, record the existence of lights at point of entry. Visibility at points of entry. Record whether the point of entry was visible to patrolling units. Alarm systems. Record whether the alarm was activated, defeated, and so forth. When detected. Record whether the crime was detected while in progress, on the day of occurrence, next day, and the like.

Where Data Can Be Found A police prevention unit should not gather and tabulate raw data, except in specific short-term instances. Available resources simply do not allow for such an approach. Therefore, the unit must rely on others to provide information. The police divisions depicted in Figure 31-2 are among the more common suppliers of information that can be used by a prevention unit. Unfortunately, this might not be the case in private security operations. So, private sector security units may also have to gather and tabulate raw data to ensure the effectiveness of their program planning and design process. The nature of the reports that may be provided by such divisions and are important to the development

422


Figure 31-2. Crime prevention unit information sources within a traditional police agency.

Table 31-1. Example Source Reports by Division Division Communications

Patrol

Special units

Records Administration

Reports Supplied Complaint-dispatch report NCIC/state crime data Teletype reports and requests Initial crime report Follow-up crime report Crime against person report Crime against property report Stolen vehicle reports Any of the patrol or detective reports Special crime reports Crime intelligence reports Statistical data Special crime data Statistical data Special crime data

of a comprehensive crime database are presented in Table 31-1. Notably, the information to be extracted from such reports is not prepared primarily for analysis purposes. That is, the information is either an accounting of each agencies’ activity or is designed to aid in the apprehension and prosecution of violations. Nonetheless, it is necessary to make the best of what exists. To help with this task, a few comments as to the most-relevant records to use in pulling together the preceding data elements follow: 䊉

䊉

Initial Crime Reports (Offense Report). The basic written record that should be employed in gathering data is the offense report. This report contains a great deal of information valuable to a prevention unit. For example, data concerning location, victim, suspect, evidence, witness, modus operandi, and so forth, are included in such reports. Follow-up or Supplemental Reports. These reports are usually narrative in nature and add information to that collected during the initial investigation. Reports may come from either patrol,

䊉

detective, or special units. Such reports often consist of different categories and information, including changes in the crime classification, case disposition, and evidence information, from that which appeared in the initial crime report. They may also provide the crime prevention unit with data elements missing from the initial crime report. Complaint-Dispatch Reports and Operational Logs. In some instances, these reports are useful. Their utility, however, varies with the nature of the report form. For example, if a program is conceived to focus on bicycle theft and this item is accounted for on such reports, it will be necessary to review these documents at the outset of the project. In addition, they would have to be monitored throughout the project period unless a special arrangement is made. Moreover, the review of these documents should depend on the time and resources available and the specific nature of a program.

Time Period to Be Considered As noted, it is unlikely that data of this nature are readily available for any particular period. In fact, it is an unusual circumstance if this occurs in any agency. Hence, prevention staff members have to develop such information in relation to time periods meaningful to the design, management, and evaluation phases of the program. At a minimum, such data should be developed for the 1-year period preceding the calendar year during which the project is to be undertaken. If time permits, a 2-year breakdown should be developed.

How to Organize Data A variety of indicators or data elements can be employed to gain an understanding of crime within a community or corporation. Analyzing this information and developing conclusions relative to specific prevention programs is a more complicated matter. One acceptable method for breaking data into meaningful units for review and program design is geographical analysis. The basis of such an analysis is a graphic presentation of crime patterns within a community, for example, census tracts and beats, or corporate complex. Notably, prior to deciding what subarea breakdown to use, it would be advisable to determine how the demographic (census) data in the community are maintained. The crime information


should be maintained in relation to the geographic and socioeconomic databases available. The collection of crime data on this basis is important for a number of reasons: 1. It illustrates what the community’s crime profile looks like. 2. The data allow for contrasts to be made among various subsections of the community to identify the severity of the crime throughout the jurisdiction. 3. Subarea analysis points out the exact nature of the particular problem in each area; for example, burglary of apartments versus burglary of singlefamily residences may be a problem in a residential area. 4. Aggregating data in this manner helps determine whether a concentrated (narrow and focused) or general (broad and multifaceted) program should be implemented.

䊉

䊉

䊉

423

help identify portions of the community with groups of potential offenders (for example, young men). Median education levels for city and selected subareas. This information can provide a perspective on how sophisticated the techniques or materials to be used to describe or promote a program needs to be understood by potential users. Non-English-speaking persons by native language for city and selected subareas.This information can be used to help prepare public education materials if such items accompany the projects to be undertaken. Median rental costs for city and selected subareas. This information provides insight as to the type of security improvements that might be suggested in such units.

Where Data Can Be Found

Demographic Data Every prevention officer has a basic understanding of the nature of that particular community or organization and its physical, socioeconomic, and demographic characteristics. The nature and use of related data may, however, be a mystery. Some of the more significant data elements relating to the socioeconomic conditions of a community follow. A brief explanation of how each type of information might be used to develop a burglary prevention program is also presented.

When to Collect Data and Why Demographic information must be gathered at the outset of a project. Additional information of this nature need not be aggregated after the overall prevention program is designed. This information is used in the design of the overall prevention program from a number of perspectives. On the one hand, it is valuable to the development of the public information strategies to be designed for use in particular areas of the community. On the other hand, the data, when analyzed in conjunction with crime statistics, is useful in targeting program approaches within the community. As such, these factors relate to the impact the crime prevention program will have on the community: 䊉

Population for city and selected subdivisions by sex and age. This information can be used to

Census data are not traditionally maintained by law enforcement agencies or private corporations. In some instances, however, various divisions in these organizations may have gathered such information to develop a financial or marketing plan, design a personnel allocation plan, or the like. Therefore, efforts should be made to check with the chief administrator’s office, planning and research division, and the marketing division. If such information is not available in the detail needed, prevention staff members must go to other departments within the city government or outside the local government structure. For example, information concerning the physical, social, economic, and demographic environment of the community is available from the following agencies: city, county, or regional planning departments; libraries; school districts; colleges and universities; chambers of commerce; and civic organizations.

Time Period to Be Considered Data of this nature are available through the U.S. Census Department on the basis of 10-year intervals, that is, 1970–1980 or 1980–1990. For prevention program design, it will be advisable to get only the data for the 10 years preceding the most current date, such as 1990–2000. In addition, these various departments and agencies may have prepared special studies regarding such topics since the conduct of the national census.

424


How to Organize Data Information of the type noted is generally maintained in terms of geographic subsections of communities. The key point to remember when gathering such data is that areas selected for census data analysis should be identical to those for which crime data were gathered. (As suggested earlier, every effort should be made to develop crime data on a geographical basis to avoid problems in data comparison.)

䊉

䊉

䊉

commercial, rape, and the like, broken down by type) Crime prevention in-service training sessions held, number of officers or employees involved, and time spent Crime patterns identified through the analysis of data and time spent Special projects conducted that focus on the achievement of program goals and objectives, including number participating and time spent

How to Organize and Maintain Data

Efficiency Analysis: Measuring Activity Three types of data are important if prevention programs are to be monitored and evaluated. The first is efficiency analysis data. Measures of efficiency are used to judge and document the amount of prevention program activity that takes place in relation to stated goals, objectives, and strategies. As such, this measure represents an assessment of energy, regardless of impact.

When to Collect Data and Why Data regarding program activity should be gathered from the outset of a prevention effort. In addition, such information should be carefully maintained throughout the program on a daily basis. It should be summarized monthly. This information answers such questions as, “What did the prevention unit do?” and to a lesser extent, “How well was the work performed?” As such, it is valuable in managing and evaluating the program and reporting program results to various officials within and outside the organization.

What Data to Gather The exact nature of the data elements to be gathered and maintained depends on the thrust and focus of particular prevention programs. A few examples of data elements that reflect activity include the numbers of 䊉

䊉䊉

䊉

Crime prevention brochures distributed and time spent Security surveys conducted and time spent Generalized speeches given, number in attendance, and time spent Special presentations made, number in attendance, and time spent (neighborhood security,

The organization and maintenance of the information will be largely a matter of personal preference among prevention organizations. The following approaches, which focus on ensuring that the data is readily accessible and, therefore, useable, might be considered: 䊉

䊉

Time reports can be constructed to include information regarding time spent conducting security surveys, time spent preparing public speeches, time spent training employees, and so on. Tally sheets, activity logs, or card files can be used to document the number of each type of a specific activity (for example, 18 security surveys, 4 speeches, and 5 special presentations were conducted during November). Notably, other pertinent information, such as how many people attended, should be included in the record.

An additional means to organize and maintain data for ease of retrieval might also be considered. For illustrative purposes, a hypothetical prevention unit consisting of three officers is used. Because of this limited personnel, it becomes crucial to utilize an easily maintainable analysis system in relation to the various projects being implemented. One of these projects might focus on the conduct of security surveys to reduce burglary. The analysis form in Figure 31-3 may be used to summarize information the unit can develop to identify where burglaries are occurring, the time of occurrence, and method of entry. The tabulation sheet can also be used to indicate when a survey is offered to a particular resident, whether or not it was accepted, and if a repeat burglary occurred at that address or location. As is evident from a review of this form, the primary indexing technique is the street number/ name reference. Through this form, even a small unit can pinpoint where surveys are needed and whether additional violations have occurred at sites where


425

Figure 31-3. Illustrative residential burglary analysis form. During the daily review of offense reports, a prevention analyst can examine the initial crime reports, indexed by street name, to log new offenses and determine if repeat burglaries have occurred where surveys have been offered and either turned down or carried through. If a burglary has occurred where a survey was turned down, the victim can be recontacted for a survey. If the crime occurs where a survey was completed, the victim can also be recontacted to be offered additional advice provided in the security analysis. If, after a predetermined period (like 1 year), no report burglaries have occurred at survey sites, conclusions may be drawn about the target hardening values of this crime prevention approach.

such surveys have been provided. Thus, it can determine the success of this approach.

Effectiveness Analysis: Measuring Program Impact The second type of measure concerns program effectiveness. This measure is used to evaluate the impact of program activities on an identified problem. Indicators used should be end-oriented and relate to what is to be ultimately achieved as defined by program goals, objectives, and strategies, not the way in which things are to be achieved. As such, these measures assess the result of an effort rather than the effort itself.

When to Collect Data and Why The development and maintenance of impact statistics should be undertaken at two specific times. First, as part of the program design phase, a variety of crime statistics are documented that, in fact, serve as impact or effectiveness indicators—burglary rate, value of property stolen, and so on. Thus, a good portion of the work begins at the outset of any project. Monitoring the crime statistics selected as impact indicators in relation to program goals and objectives, of course, has to be continued on a systematic basis throughout the project, preferably daily, and summarized monthly. Second, due to the nature of the goals and objectives of a prevention program, new impact statistics might have to be developed. For example, if calls for

service in a particular area where a neighborhood awareness strategy is to be used provide one type of effectiveness indicator, the unit has a twofold responsibility. On the one hand, staff members must go back at least 1 calendar year prior to beginning the project and document the number of calls for service. On the other hand, as soon as the neighborhood program kicked off, they would have to begin monitoring and recording the calls for service in the area to draw some conclusion with regard to the work being performed; for example, whether the calls increased as a result of program implementation. In short, the degree to which additional data collection is required to evaluate the program impact depends on two factors: the scope of the crime statistics data gathered and the unique nature of the program or need to select specific indicators due to program goals, objectives, and strategies. Impact data has a number of uses throughout the implementation of the program: 䊉䊉䊉

䊉

Indicating program results Satisfying various reporting requirements Strengthening the public information program by documenting actual results Providing staff members an understanding of what their efforts actually produced

What Data to Gather The exact nature of the data elements to be gathered and maintained depends on the thrust and focus of particular prevention programs as defined in

426


program goals, objectives, and strategies. A few examples of data elements that reflect effectiveness follow. Remember, however, that the nature of a particular program may require that factors other than those presented. 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

An absolute reduction or alteration in the incidence of particular crimes prevention programs are designed to affect (burglary, shoplifting, etc.) An increase in the number of thwarted burglary attempts (resulting from the use of improved security hardware, posted signs, or sticker information about the existence of an alarm) Reduced victimization among persons participating in various crime prevention activities (e.g., property marketing programs, implementation of security survey recommendations, neighborhood watch programs) An increase in the return of stolen property among persons participating in property marking programs. A decrease in the dollar value of property lost due to selected crimes (e.g., burglary, stolen credit cards, bad checks) An increase in the calls for service in areas where concentrated citizen awareness efforts have been initiated

How to Organize and Maintain Data Generally, the organization of these data parallels that of the crime statistics, which is geographical in nature. Numerous methods may be used to maintain the data. The one selected should be a matter of personal preference. That is, it should be understood by all those involved with its use, it should be easy to maintain, and it should provide adequate detail with a minimum amount of effort. A number of appropriate methods are outlined already with regard to activity data—tally sheets, logs, special forms. In addition, a unit may wish to use these methods to keep track of the program’s impact: 䊉

䊉

Mapping analysis techniques. This approach uses a variety of maps, including pin maps, dot maps, or other means of depicting the actual geographic location of a particular criminal event. For example, a pin map displaying the actual location of day or night residential burglaries over a given period of time could be useful in designing and monitoring crime prevention efforts. Graphic analysis methods. Rather than employing maps of a particular jurisdiction, comparisons

based on statistical analysis of crimes may be presented on various types of graphs. For example, a bar graph representing percentage figures for a particular crime category, such as residential burglary, for different beats, districts, or census tracts within a given period of time provides a visual representation of reported crime by geographic area. Regardless of the method employed, it is important that it be easy to use, understand, and maintain. Methods that do not meet these requirements should be abandoned in favor of aids that are more functional. Remember, the goal is to implement crime prevention programs; do not get too involved in the preparation and maintenance of evaluation aids or they will become nuisances instead of tools.

Attitudinal Analysis: Gathering Opinions on the Program Impact The third type of evaluation indicators are opinion measures. These are measures of whether the unit is actually satisfying client/public expectations. In other words, they measure whether the program is doing the right thing according to those receiving services. This type of evaluation is based on the attitude of those who received services from or participated in a prevention program.

When to Collect Data and Why Such information should be collected during two specific time periods. Some attitude information should be gathered immediately following a crime prevention unit’s actions; for example, presentation of a speech or special program. In addition, the unit should collect this type of data after the public has been exposed to the program over time; for example, after radio spots or specialized information programs have been used for at least 3 months. This information is useful for at least two reasons. First, the information can be used by the unit to help judge whether its activities are meeting client needs. As such, the measures serve as a management tool. Second, findings of this nature serve as objective testimonials from the community on the impact of the program. Such findings can, thus, provide valuable input to the public information program as well as the evaluation element of a crime prevention project.


What Data to Gather The exact nature of the data to gather depends on the particular elements of the crime prevention being analyzed. A few examples of data that can be used as indicators of program effectiveness follow. Remember, however, specific factors have to be decided on when evaluating each unique program goal, objective, and strategy. Some examples of questions that produce effectiveness indicators from persons who have received direct crime prevention services from unit personnel (i.e., have received security surveys, utilized operation ID hardware, etc.) follow: 1. Has crime prevention actually reduced crime in your neighborhood or corporate facility? 2. Has crime prevention reduced the fear of crime or victimization? 3. Has crime prevention changed the image and acceptance of the police or security unit? 4. Has crime prevention changed your attitude as to the role of the citizen or employee in terms of protecting yourselves (as opposed to the police or security unit being the exclusive protectors of persons and property)? 5. Were the services provided or points covered by prevention staff what was needed? 6. Have the recommendations or suggestions provided by prevention staff been implemented? If not, why not? A number of questions that could be raised with persons not having direct involvement in a program (other than, for example, that which they might have picked up from the local newspaper, radio, and television presentations) and used as effectiveness indicators are 1. Are you aware of the city’s crime prevention program? 2. Do you think crime prevention can have any effect on the incidence or fear of victimization? 3. How would you explain what crime prevention is?

How to Organize and Maintain Data The methods for organizing this data should be based on the procedures used to gather the information. That is, because a prevention unit, in most cases, develops this information in-house, it should design data gathering tools and develop methods that lend themselves to easy organization and maintenance.

427

One tool that can be used is the questionnaire. Care should be taken, however, to contract questionnaires so that most, if not all, answers are of a yes or no nature. This tool can be used, for example, following speaking engagements or as the basis of a telephone survey. If the questionnaire is constructed as suggested, the answers to all inquires can be summarized and maintained on one original form.

A Strategy to Facilitate Implementation of the Evaluation Geographic Targeting In terms of how to evaluate crime prevention efforts, as noted earlier, program goals, objectives, and strategies provide the baseline for analysis. In addition, however, evaluation research methodologies can be employed to systematically judge program accomplishments and, thereby, provide valuable management information.Although a variety of such techniques are available, it is unlikely that a prevention unit has the time or budget to employ the more-sophisticated designs. One approach that can realistically be employed is the quasiexperimental design. The quasiexperimental design requires that two sectors of a community be involved. Briefly, conditions in each of the sectors selected should be documented before crime prevention efforts are undertaken. One of the areas should be exposed to the prevention program. After such exposure, the conditions the program was intended to affect should be measured in both areas. If data indicate that conditions were altered as hoped for in the area exposed to the prevention activities and no significant alterations were experienced in the sector where nothing was done, it can be concluded that the crime prevention efforts had a positive affect on the identified program. To further illustrate this process, an example of how a quasiexperimental design might be structured is presented. Obviously, it may be difficult to reach even the level of detail illustrated in the example; yet as the example shows, evaluation can be reduced to a straightforward and uncomplicated process. In addition, it can be used as an integral part of the ongoing implementation process to ensure that a unit has the best chance of getting its job done; that is, a small unit can more systematically perform its work in a limited area than in a jurisdiction as a whole. Importantly, these data elements serve as the

428


Figure 31-4. Geographic targeting of crime prevention efforts.

basis for the design and implementation of this evaluation approach. To illustrate how such a design might actually be used, a hypothetical example focusing on burglary is structured. For the example, assume that the following steps in the planning/evaluation process have been taken: 1. Burglary was selected as a target crime after analysis of community or organization crime problems. 2. A crime prevention database was developed and organized so burglary data could be isolated and analyzed in relation to various sectors of the community. 3. Specific goals, objectives, and strategies with regard to efficiency and effectiveness in the conduct of the burglary prevention program were detailed. 4. The security survey was one strategy chosen to deal with the problem. To implement this approach, a number of specific steps would have to be taken. Each step is summarized next: 1. Site selection. The first step to be taken in implementing this technique would be to select two noncontiguous areas (census tracts, beats, etc.) that have similar burglary rates and trends. In addition, the areas selected should have similar socioeconomic and demographic characteristics (i.e., population groupings, income, etc.). Figure 31-4 illustrates how such areas might appear on a map of any city. When considering the use of this approach, the following points with regard to site selection should be kept in mind: The implementation of any new program is bound to surface unforeseen problems. If initiated in a high-crime area, the program might be discontinued prematurely because of its lack of immediate success in mitigating the problem. If initiated in a low-incidence area, the kinks and bugs can be worked out at relative leisure while

consideration is given to further the implementation of the program in a high-crime area. 2. Program implementation. Following the selection of the two areas, the crime prevention unit should focus its efforts in only one area; for example, the security survey program should be conducted in one area and nothing should be done in the other section of the community (the control area). 3. Program monitoring and evaluation. As the program is implemented, crime statistics should be monitored. Further, after a predetermined time period, local attitudes and other indicators should be checked. If the indicators change in a positive sense in the experimental area and do not change markedly in the control area, it could be concluded that the survey program was successful in achieving the desired objective. Obviously, this also indicates that the unit has achieved what it set out to accomplish.

When to Report Evaluation Results How frequently a prevention unit should prepare formalized statements on its internal efficiency and external effectiveness depends on a variety of factors, such as implementation pressures, reporting requirements, and the need for information to support the program with the press, management, and the like. In any case, unit activities should be monitored and data maintained to document efficiency and effectiveness on an ongoing basis and summarized and reported at least quarterly, yearly, and when the project is terminated. Care should be exercised in deciding what intervals to select for analysis in relation to progress achieved. For example, during the first months of a program, materials, hardware, and so forth that will play an important role in implementation might not be available. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to evaluate the effectiveness or results of the program until the unit is totally geared up for operation. This


429

Figure 31-5. Evaluation outline. A separate form should be used for each strategy taken to accomplish the objective.

may require that a critical look at the external impact of a program be set aside for as long as 6 months so that appropriate data can be gathered. Evaluation of the efficiency of the unit in terms of implementation of various methods should be instituted in the first month of the program and continue throughout the project period.

Data to Gather The following data elements should be considered essential in the design of a program. The degree to which a particular agency can gather such data, of course, depends on the nature of available research. The essential elements include 䊉

How to Report Monitoring and Evaluation Findings As pointed out earlier, the organization and maintenance of the information and data used in the monitoring and evaluation of programs will be largely a matter of personal preference among prevention organizations. To aid prevention personnel in this process, the form entitled “Detailed Information Concerning Program Implementation and Evaluation” (Figure 31-5) is very useful. A copy of the form should be maintained for each program strategy used in implementing goals and objectives. The form should be used as a daily log sheet to report activity and the information can later be summarized at monthly and quarterly intervals.

䊉

䊉

Population of the city and selected subdivisions. The total population of the city and designated subareas, such as neighborhoods, census tracts, planning areas, or beat areas, should be noted. This information is useful in calculating crime rates per population area. Median value of houses or household income. Document the housing values or income levels for the total city and subareas. This information can be used as an estimate of property values and affluency to provide, for example, guidelines for magnitude and type of security improvements that are economically feasible. Housing units by type for the city and designated subareas. Determine the total number of housing units by type (such as single family or multifamily) for both the city and designated geographic subareas. These data serve as a base to compare

430

䊉


crime statistics. They also are useful in the design of the prevention approach. Number of commercial establishments by type. Document the number and type of commercial establishments in the city. It would be desirable to be able to block out the geographic location of principal commercial concentrations in the city by

type. This can be used to focus program activities and determine opportunity levels for criminal activity. In addition to these data elements, other information may also be useful to the design and implementation of a program.

Chapter 32 Financial Institution Security EDWARD F. MCDONOUGH, JR. and LINDA F. MIKITARIAN

The Bank Protection Act of 1968 History Public Law 90–389, The Bank Protection Act of 1968 (here referred to as the act or the BPA, also referred to as Reg. P) was the most meaningful federal legislation affecting bank security, in effect, establishing minimum guidelines for security policies, procedures, and equipment. It was enacted by Congress as a direct result of the increasing incident rate of bank robberies. The scope of the legislation targeted the four regulatory agencies responsible for financial institutions: the Federal Reserve System, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. The act gave authority to these agencies to create specific guidelines for banks to follow establishing minimum standards for security procedures and the installation, operation, and maintenance of security devices. The four federal agencies have jurisdiction as follows: 1. Comptroller of the Currency is responsible for national and District of Columbia banks 2. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is responsible for Federal Reserve Banks and state member banks of the Federal Reserve System 3. Office of Thrift Supervision is responsible for federal and savings and loan institutions 4. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is responsible for state savings associations and those banks

whose deposits are insured by the FDIC but are not members of the Federal Reserve System Regulations similar to those included in the BPA were later enacted by the Federal Credit Union Administration. While all regulatory agencies have their own versions of regulations that implement and enforce the Bank Protection Act, all these are similar in nature and content. The act was targeted to prevent only those crimes committed by outsiders and did not address the greatest source of loss for financial institutions, embezzlement or defalcation, discussed at length later in this section. It required the bank to appoint an employee as the “designated security officer,” but did not require any specific training or requirements for that individual. Also, the crimes of kidnapping and extortion, which usually result in a greater risk for loss of life than robbery, were not addressed by this legislation. Instead, the 1968 BPA focused primarily on training employees and specifying physical security devices (such as alarms and surveillance equipment) as a means to prevent crimes against the banks. It also required banks to keep records and report these crimes to the proper authorities and assist law enforcement with identification of those individuals responsible. The act contained two attachments, Appendix A and Appendix B, which addressed “Minimum Standards for Security Devices” and “Proper Employee Conduct During and After a Robbery,” respectively. Specific devices were required to be installed no later than January 1970, with technical details for the devices outlined in Appendix A. 431

432


The minimum required devices include 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Lighting systems to illuminate the vault areas if they are visible from outside the banking office Alarms to notify police of robberies and burglaries at the office Walk-up and drive-up teller windows protected with bullet-resistant material Tamper-resistant locks on exterior doors and windows Other devices that the security officer, after seeking the advice of law enforcement officers, determine to be appropriate

The physical security equipment specifications detailed in Appendix A may have been “state of the art” in 1968 but fall far short of what would be considered modern technology by current standards. Training guidelines detailed in Appendix B were, at best, the minimum training standards for bank employees and, although still applicable, would be considered less than adequate by most security professionals. The entire act, including both appendices, left title room for interpretation or improvement, and the penalties for noncompliance were stiff.

1991 Revision The Bank Protection Act was revised effective May 1, 1991, resulting in a shift from the traditional emphasis on security devices to more importance being placed on the administration and procedural aspects of the security program. Prior to this revision, it was debatable who was directly responsible for proper implementation of a written security program; however, with the revision, there is little doubt of the degree of the board of directors’ responsibilities, including the possibility of being named personally as defendants in security-related litigation. The designated bank security officer being required to report to the board of directors on an annual basis makes both the security officer and the board responsible for the “implementation, administration, and effectiveness of the security program” and implies a greater liability for all parties.The comments published in the CFR and the revision itself also reflected the acknowledgment of the security officer as a professional and not just as a bank employee with additional “security-related” responsibilities. Most banks interpreted this change as a need to appoint qualified security professionals as the designated security officer, most with a background in pre-

vious security-related positions or experience in law enforcement.This signals an encouraging trend to the security industry as a whole, as it proves the banking industry’s recognition of security as a professional career. Still, many community banks and smaller financial institutions continue to add the security responsibility to other duties of a bank officer. With the elimination of Appendix A, which detailed minimum standards for physical security devices, the revised BPA places the responsibility of determining which security devices best meet the needs of each branch office on the institution. Four specific standards must be met: 䊉

䊉䊉䊉

A secure place for storing cash and other valuables An illuminating system for the vault An alarm system Tamper-resistant locks

The “industry standard” is the measure used in security-related lawsuits; therefore, the minimum devices chosen should be equal to or more effective than those detailed in the deleted Appendix A. The ongoing debate of whether or not to use guards in addition to physical security devices is also subject to this regulation; however, the bank guard may become a casualty of technological advances, as many banks are finding it more cost effective to eliminate guards in favor of physical security improvements. With the ever-changing technology and numerous factors affecting the levels of risk involved, the elimination of Appendix A allows for the banking industry to keep pace with improving technology without having to constantly update the regulations. For this reason the changes are a twoedged sword: increased liability on the part of the board and the security officer but also the ability to make educated decisions concerning security equipment and procedures. The other most significant change to the revised BPA is the emphasis on the written security program and the training requirements placed on the security officer. This allows for increased scrutiny from both internal and external auditors, as well as documentation that may have to be defended in court in the event of a civil lawsuit. Also, based on recent litigation, it is likely that the training and qualifications of the individual designated as the security officer could be major factors in any litigation against the financial institution. As previously stated, the trend in bank security is moving toward hiring security professionals for this role, which is a change from the practice of just adding security duties to another bank employee’s job description.

Financial Institution Security

The Bank Secrecy Act In 1986, the “Bank Secrecy Act” or Money Laundering Control Act was implemented, requiring additional record keeping of large dollar currency transactions. Additionally, in 1988 the Anti-Drug Abuse Act amended the Bank Secrecy Act and imposed additional record keeping requirements on banks. In an effort to combat illegal proceeds from drug trafficking, any “suspicious transactions” must be reported and a criminal referral submitted on suspected violations of the Bank Secrecy Act. This in effect made the Bank Secrecy Act part of the Bank Protection Act requirements.

433

the security officer and to supervise the security program. In addition, the revised act requires the security officer to report to the board at least annually on the implementation, administration, and effectiveness of the security program. Given the board’s active role as mandated by the regulation, it is recommended that the security officer report to an executive of the bank who is a member of the board or to someone in a senior management position that reports to a member of the board. This ensures that the security function has the authority to implement its polices across all functional and operating departments of the institution.

Current Risks Affecting Financial Institutions The Role of the Security Department Robbery The Security Program

Generally, a financial institution’s security department has responsibility for physical security, investigations, loss prevention, and security awareness training. In some instances, it may have additional responsibilities including contingency planning information and data security, personnel screening, credit card security, and the like.

The increased incident rate of bank robberies (see Figure 32-1) was the primary motivation for the passage of the 1968 Bank Protection Act. Ironically, since that time the rate of robberies has been on a steady annual increase with 8578 reported incidents in 1993, and 12,347 in 2002. The largest percentage (40%) of all reported robberies are committed by a lone bandit with a weapon. Approximately one-third of all robberies are committed by a single robber who displays no weapon but usually passes a note or verbalizes some other threat. The most alarming trend is the increase in armed teams committing “takeovers,” which result in the largest median loss with the lowest rate of recovery. This is also the most traumatic type of incident for bank employees and the type of incident most likely to become violent. The nature of the crime of robbery ensures it will be reported, with the state or local authorities working together with the FBI. The most encouraging statistic is that consistently 75–80% of all robberies are eventually solved. Branch employees are trained to prepare for these incidents, including what actions to take during and after a robbery. Exposure of the financial institution is minimized by tellers keeping the minimum amount of cash in their teller drawers and using devices such as time locks to delay the opening of the vault.

The Department Structure and Authority

Burglary

As previously stated, it is the responsibility of a financial institution’s board of directors to designate

While most robberies are committed by amateurs, this is contrasted with the professional, organized

The Bank Protection Act of 1968 (as amended in 1991) requires every financial institution’s board of directors to designate an officer employee as the security officer. This individual is charged with the day-to-day responsibility for developing and administering a written security program. According to the act, this program shall contain the following: 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Procedures for opening and closing for business and for the safekeeping of currency, negotiable securities, and other similar valuables Procedures that assist in identifying persons committing crimes against the institution and preserve evidence that may aid in their apprehension and prosecution Initial and periodic training of officers and employees in their responsibilities under the security program and in proper employee conduct during and after a burglary, robbery, or larceny A process for selecting, testing, operating, and maintaining appropriate security devices

434


Figure 32-1. Bank robbery statute violations. (Source: FBI statistics.)

Figure 32-2. Bank burglary attacks. (Source: FBI statistics.)

groups that commit burglaries.Although the incident rate of burglaries since passage of the BPA in 1968 has declined (see Figure 32-2), the dollar amount of loss is greater than in the average robbery. The most recent trend is attacks against ATMs (automatic teller machines); in some instances, the machines are pulled out of the wall or enclosure using a fork lift or other heavy machinery. Attacks on night depositories are still the most common statistically, but with the addition of thousands of ATM machines, it is

anticipated the number of attacks against ATMs will continue to increase. With the current trends, it is important that the security officer be involved in the planning stages of installing new ATMs. A site survey should be conducted and documented, taking into consideration the crime statistics of the area, lighting, landscape and other environmental factors to ensure customer safety as well as discourage burglary attempts. ATMs themselves are nothing more than a simple computer


terminal with a card reader, sitting on top of a vault; therefore, the entire machine should be afforded the same protection as any other vault. ATMs are available with supplemental protection devices such as smoke and heat detectors, and tamperproof card readers. Surveillance equipment and enclosure are also becoming more sophisticated and will continue to incorporate new technology with the increased use of ATMs. The most serious object of attack remains the main vault. This is usually accomplished by compromising the alarm system and drilling or burning through the vault door or the vault walls. The liability to the bank is greater due to the presence of customer-leased safe deposit boxes located inside the vault.

Attacks on Customers Automatic teller machines and after-hours depositories (AHDs) have extended the services offered by banks to a 24-hour-a-day business. This creates different challenges for providing a safe and secure environment for customers to transact their business. Customers and employees are subject to mugging and personal robberies any time they leave a banking office, but the use of ATMs and AHDs creates the most risk for attacks on customers. As financial institutions continue to increase the numbers of ATMs and as customer transaction volumes at ATMs and AHDs grow, the threat of customer attacks will increase as well. Therefore, security officers must ensure that they are meeting the minimum industry, community, or statutory standards with respect to security considerations such as location, lighting, landscaping, consumer education, cameras, mirrors, and so forth. Many states and municipalities, in an attempt to legislate consumer safety, have passed regulations mandating minimum security standards for ATMs.

435

able for bank security departments to maintain confidential information on their employees, or at least their senior executives, who are the most likely targets. The information should include photographs and profiles of the employees and their immediate families, with the information updated annually, to assist law enforcement in the event of a kidnapping. Banks should include kidnapping/hostage-taking/ extortion response plans as part of their crisis management planning, including a corporate ransom payment policy. Failure to be prepared for this type of emergency works in the favor of the criminal. The American Bankers Association has an excellent publication on this topic, Personal and Family Security: A Handbook for Employees, Officers, Directors and Their Families.

Embezzlement Internal crimes committed by officers and employees, as with any type of defalcations, are often the most serious offenses against the institution. Internal crimes are usually detected by outside customers, auditors, or other employees. Since the coworkers of the dishonest employee may be the first to detect their wrongdoing, many banks provide a “hotline,” where anonymous tips can be left on an answering machine or provided to third-party services. The investigation should also include a thorough review of internal policies and procedures violated in conjunction with the criminal activity. On completion of the investigation, the security officer, auditors, affected department managers, and human resources and legal department representatives should be briefed to ensure that all interested parties are in agreement as to the possible outcomes and to review internal controls to prevent a recurrence of the fraud. In all cases of employee defalcation, a Criminal Referral Form must be filed with the federal law enforcement authorities and the appropriate regulatory agency.

Kidnap and Extortion “Hobbs Act crimes,” incidents of kidnapping and extortion, are the fewest in number but the most costly in terms of loss of life and the long-term emotional and psychological damage to the victims. These crimes affect not only the bank employees but their family members as well. In 1993, a total of 39 cases of extortion were reported to the FBI; however, incidents of attempts at extortion may go unreported for fear of retribution. It would be advis-

Check Fraud

New Accounts Fraudulent accounts are opened to defraud money from banks. Based on recent statistics, the use of fraudulent bank accounts is on the rise. Fraudulent accounts are often opened with fictitious identification by impostors. Most fraudulent accounts follow

436


similar patterns, and much of the time, red flags are present when the account was opened, such as 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉䊉

䊉䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉䊉

Primary identification issued within the previous 60 days Home or business address not in the same geographical location as the branch Current address different from the one listed on the identification Post office box given in lieu of a street address No home or business phone given or listed as the same Occupation listed as self-employed A small initial, opening deposit, usually under $100 An opening deposit that is a low number or starter check from another institution The customer hesitating or being unable to answer questions, or needing to refer to identification when giving personal information The customer appearing nervous or in a hurry The customer requesting to have check order sent to the branch

Many banks utilize third-party services to verify new accounts. Also, batch processing software is available that analyzes all new accounts for red flags and reports them the following day so that the account can be closed or appropriate holds can be placed on it.

Forgery The definition of a forgery for banking purposes is the authoring of the signature of another without their consent. This is usually done so that the individual committing the forgery can obtain some type of personal gain. The main type of forged items that may be handled on a regular basis are checks, where the personal or business check belonging to the bank’s customer is obtained through various means, the signature of the account holder is forged, and the check is then passed or “uttered” in exchange for goods, services, or cash. While it is the bank’s responsibility to verify the maker’s signature (that of the account holder) on checks as they are presented for payment, realistically this would be too costly in practice. The losses resulting from forgeries are considered a risk of doing business. Banks have also suffered substantial losses from negotiating items where the endorsement has been forged. Individuals committing acts of bank fraud obtain legitimately issued checks and forge the endorsement; these items are then negotiated across the teller counter for cash, split deposited, or

deposited into fraudulent accounts. Endorsement claims can be placed against the bank for up to 3 years after negotiation of the item. The longer is the time span between the negotiation of the check and receipt of the forged endorsement claim, the more difficult it is for the bank to make a recovery.

Counterfeit Documents Counterfeit documents include checks, bonds, securities, food stamps, postage stamps, and other similar negotiables. As technology improves with computer graphics and color printers, so does the quality of counterfeit documents. Checks are the easiest and most popular document being counterfeited, and with the use of home computers and other advanced technology, losses to banks continue to increase at a rapid rate. The quality of counterfeit checks range from obviously fraudulent, or “should never have been accepted” to very high quality and virtually impossible to detect. A majority of counterfeit checks can be detected by examining them for the presence of one or more of the following: 䊉

䊉

䊉

At least one perforated edge (except government checks which are printed on computer stock) High-quality paper stocks that employ the use of watermarks, safety paper, variable color patterns, void panographs, or the like. The magnetic numbers along the bottom edge of the check should have a flat, dull finish and the numbers should be raised from the paper, with almost a Braille-type feel

Identification Identification is an integral part of the banking industry. It is critical to curbing the use of fraudulent information when opening an account, applying for a loan, or negotiating a check. The most commonly accepted identification is a driver’s license, usually supplemented by a credit card, social security card, birth certificate, or passport. When falsified identification is used to negotiate a transaction, attempts to locate the person(s) involved are nearly impossible. Altered ID. Such identification was originally issued legitimately but has somehow found its way into the hands of individuals who desire to commit bank fraud. To alter the identification, the perpetrator may try to place his or her own photograph under the lamination or change the legitimate individual’s data recorded on the identification.


Fraudulent ID. This identification fits no standard format of types of identification accepted by banking institutions. Valid identification usually has some type of security associated with its issuance and control (such as holograms, background printing, state seals, serial numbers, etc.). Fraudulent identification usually has some form of qualifier such as an expired date, or the document itself appears to be unprofessional.

Kiting Kiting is a slang term for floating bad checks. In a kite scheme, checks are deposited into two or more banks and then the perpetrator writes checks that exceed the total amount of deposits. This cycle continues, inflating the balances by constantly depositing more checks before they have time to clear the depository bank. The time required to transfer the canceled checks affords the criminal an opportunity to substantially overdraw the account. This activity must be continued or the kite will “fall” as checks are returned or “bounced.” Kiting, while not a crime in itself, is a complex fraud scheme that can be prosecuted under the bank fraud statutes.

ATM Fraud The fraudulent use of a stolen ATM card and use of the ATM to further other fraud activity (e.g., depositing bad checks into an account through the ATM) is one of the fastest growing areas of fraud facing banks today. The Electronic Funds Transfer Act (Regulation E) provides little defense for financial institutions when dealing with consumers who claim unauthorized transactions were made against their bank account. By regulation, financial institutions have only 10 business days to investigate a claim and make a decision to honor or deny the request for reimbursement. Additionally, Reg. E makes no allowance for consumer negligence and still holds the bank liable for reimbursement even if the customers write their personal identification number (PIN) on their ATM card.

Credit Card Fraud Banks that issue credit cards face numerous areas of potential loss. It can start with a fraudulent application to obtain a card and extend to dishonest merchants, who may submit fictitious sales drafts for payment. Along the way, banks face the risk of stolen cards, counterfeit cards, and telemarketing scams using stolen account numbers.

437

Loan Fraud Providing fictitious or false information to obtain a loan from a bank is a federal crime and can lead to multimillion loan charge-offs for financial institutions. Many banks have tightened their credit and underwriting processes to spot fraudulent loans, and some institutions are also doing “character worthiness” background checks on new borrowers requesting large loans. Bank loan officers may also create fictitious loans as a means to embezzle funds from their institutions. Often, these schemes are very elaborate and complex and therefore difficult to uncover.

Wire Transfer Fraud The ability to transfer millions of dollars from one bank account to another through the wire transfer networks is a tempting invitation to bank employees and outsiders who try to beat the sophisticated fraud prevention systems. The wire room is generally off limits to anyone without a high security clearance and the internal checks and balances built into the computer programs make this crime very difficult. However, there are still those who try, and a few years ago one group almost succeeded in pulling off a multimillion dollar wire transfer fraud involving a United States bank and a bank in Switzerland.

Advance Fee Schemes Bank customers are often the victims in this scam; however, the reputation and good name of the bank is also damaged. In this scheme, a broker or middleman agrees to intercede with a financial institution to obtain a loan on behalf of a client (often one who could not qualify for a loan on his or her own merits). The broker takes a percentage of the loan proceeds “in advance” for his efforts and provides the borrower with genuine-looking loan documents and agreements from the financial institution. The unsuspecting client pays the advance fee and goes to the bank, only to discover there is no loan and the entire operation is a scam. Of course, the victim then blames the bank, threatens legal action, and generally demeans the reputation of the institution.

Criminal Reporting Based on the BPA, records are required to be kept on crimes against the institution and reported to the designated law enforcement authorities for prosecu-

438


tion as appropriate. Each of the regulatory agencies had its own procedures for reporting crimes against the institution until October 8, 1993, when changes to the reporting requirements were amended with a uniform multiagency criminal referral form. Release of the new form was delayed in anticipation of a computer shell that, when available, would further eliminate the amount of paperwork. The Interagency Criminal Referral Form was developed by a working group consisting of representatives of 12 federal agencies including the federal financial institution regulatory agencies, the FBI, the Secret Service, the Department of Justice, and the Treasury Department. It replaces the various long and short forms formerly in use. Reporting requirements have not changed with this revision; financial institutions must report the detection of a loss or suspected criminal violation on discovery of suspected insider abuse involving any amount, aggregate loss of $1000 or more where a subject can be identified, aggregate loss of $5000 or more regardless of potential suspects, and money laundering or violations of the Bank Secrecy Act. The new form and procedures were created to facilitate compliance with financial institutions’ criminal activity reporting requirements, to enhance law enforcement agencies’ ability to investigate and prosecute the matters reported in the criminal referrals, and to develop and maintain a new interagency database. At the time of this revision, neither the actual form nor the shell had been released for use.

Bank Security Devices Alarm Systems

Burglary The Bank Protection Act requires every financial institution to provide, “An alarm system or other appropriate device for promptly notifying the nearest responsible law enforcement officers of an attempted or perpetrated robbery or burglary.” While the 1991 revision to the act eliminated Appendix A and the specific alarm system standards it imposed, it is still industry practice to provide a burglary alarm system that protects the vault, the night depository, and the ATM. In many cases, banks are also providing motion detection and perimeter alarm devices as part of their burglary alarm systems. Another standard component is battery backup that will sustain the burglary system for a minimum of 80

hours (a long weekend) in the event of a power failure.

Robbery As stated already, financial institutions must also provide an alarm system to report robberies to law enforcement. In almost all cases, both the robbery alarm and the burglary alarm are part of the same alarm system; during the day, it functions as a robbery-reporting alarm and when placed in the night mode it becomes a burglary-reporting system. For robbery alarms, it is important that all tellers have access to the alarm activation devices and these can be activated without alerting the bank robber. In most cases, a bank’s robbery alarm system is also tied to the surveillance camera system so that activating the alarm also triggers the cameras. Other robbery deterrent systems also are used by many financial institutions to help prevent robbery and apprehend robbers. Two of the more popular systems involve devices that, when activated, help identify or track the robbery suspects. (Author’s note: Specific information about the operation of these systems is being withheld for security reasons.) Still another effective deterrent against bank robberies is bullet-resistant barriers at the teller line. These “shields” protect the bank personnel from direct threat and provide a high degree of security. Many studies have shown dramatic reduction in bank robberies after bullet-resistant barriers were installed. Finally, the use of guards or off-duty police officers in a banking office, while not part of an alarm system, can be an effective deterrent against bank robberies, mugging, and the like. This protection is expensive and generally not cost effective when compared to the dollars lost in an average bank robbery.

Proprietary versus Third-Party Monitoring Banks today are faced with the decision of how to monitor their alarm systems. In the past, many police departments and law enforcement agencies monitored commercial alarm systems, but today that is the exception and financial institutions are faced with deciding whether to do this monitoring for themselves (proprietary monitoring) or contract the responsibility to an outside company (third-party monitoring). Both alternatives offer pros and cons and each financial institution should make an informed, cost-effective decision as to what is the best method for it.


Camera Systems Camera systems are not required by the Bank Protection Act but most financial institutions in the United States employ some type of surveillance system.

Film Cameras Film cameras were the standard for many years in banks and have aided in the arrest of many bank robbers by providing high-quality photographs. Unfortunately, film cameras are normally activated only when the robbery alarm is tripped and therefore many other criminals are never photographed while they are passing bad checks, fraudulently opening new accounts, obtaining fictitious cash advances, and the like. Another drawback of film cameras is the expense of replacing film whenever the system is activated. For one false alarm, it can cost as much as $200–300 to replace the film in one branch office’s cameras.

Closed Circuit Television Today, most financial institutions utilize closed circuit television systems (CCTV) to provide surveillance protection for their banking offices, ATMs, and AHDs. It provides instantaneous review of the photographs (versus developing film), the tapes are reusable, the systems are much more flexible, and the cameras run constantly, providing photographic evidence of all activity that takes place. Another benefit is that, unlike the film cameras, in a robbery situation if a teller fails to activate the alarm system there is still evidence of the robbery. CCTV systems are generally more cost effective to install, maintain, and operate. They also provide the flexibility, as part of the same branch system, to place cameras at the ATM and the AHD, which can act as preventative measures against customer attacks and provide evidence in customer disputes regarding ATM transactions.

Vaults, Safes, Night Depositories, and ATMs The Bank Protection Act requires financial institutions to provide, “A means of protecting cash and other liquid assets, such as a vault, safe, or other secure space.” The 1991 revision to the act has had major impact with respect to vaults and safes. Prior to the revision and the elimination of Appendix A, there were very strict standards regarding the con-

439

struction of vaults, the thickness of the vault door, the types of combination locks, and so forth. Classifications for vaults and safes were based on the amount of time it would take to penetrate them. Today, technological enhancements in vault construction (modular panels, for example) have made the traditional poured-concrete bank vault almost obsolete. The protection of cash, customer property, and other liquid assets is still a very high priority for financial institutions; and they utilize high-quality vaults, vault doors, safes, and the like, in conjunction with sophisticated alarm systems, to secure them.

Security Training in Financial Institutions Security Awareness Bank employees should be trained on the various types of crime (such as robbery and larceny) and fraud (such as new accounts, check kiting, scams) perpetrated against the bank and other customers. Employees on the teller line are the “front line” of defense against fraud and, if properly trained, can prevent a large number of frauds before they start. Most new bank employees have no knowledge of this nature and, unless otherwise instructed, may feel they have no power or authority to assist in the fraud prevention effort; and if employees feel they are not part of the solution, then they can be part of the problem. An effective training program should be a cooperative effort by all employees, supported by all levels of management, incorporating good customer service with security awareness and crime prevention techniques. All employees, from the highest-level executives to the very lowest-level part-time clerks, benefit from security training.

Robbery Training Prior to elimination of Appendix B of the act in the 1990 revision, this appendix entitled, “Proper Employee Conduct during and after a Robbery,” outlined specific elements that should be incorporated into the robbery training program. Although the appendix was eliminated, the 10 items are still good training requirements. Employees should be instructed: 1. To avoid actions that might increase danger to themselves or others

440


2. To activate the robbery alarm system and the surveillance system during the robbery, if it appears that such activation can be accomplished safely 3. To observe the robber’s physical features, voice, accent, mannerisms, dress, the kind of weapon he or she has, and any other characteristics that would be useful for identification 4. If the robber leaves evidence (such as a note), to try to put it aside and out of sight, if it appears that this can be done safely to retain the evidence, not to handle it unnecessarily, and to give it to the police when they arrive; also to refrain from touching, and assist in preventing others from touching, articles or places the robber may have touched or evidence he or she may have left, so that fingerprints of the robber may be obtained 5. To give the robber no more money than the amount he demands and include “bait” money in the amount given 6. If it can be done safely, to observe the direction of the robber’s escape and the description and license plate number of the vehicle used, if any 7. To telephone the local police if they have not arrived, and the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or inform a designated officer or other employee who has this responsibility that a robbery has been committed 8. If the robber leaves before the police arrive, to ensure that a designated officer or other employee waits outside the office, if it is safe to do so, to inform the police when they arrive that the robber has left 9. To attempt to determine the names and addresses of other persons who witnessed the robbery or the escape and request them to record their observations or to assist a designated officer or other employee in recording their observations 10. To refrain from discussing the details of the robbery with others before recording their observations These standards should be utilized as a minimum and expanded for a complete robbery prevention and training program. Many companies specialize in training for bank employees and some excellent programs are commercially available. Additional robbery training conducted in-house may include 䊉

Conducting robbery scenarios as “practice,” including proper conduct after the robbery

䊉

䊉

䊉

Instructing employees to be alert to suspicious movements by customers and know what to do when they become aware of a robbery or attempt in progress Emphasizing that they never try to be a hero, fight back, or resist; instead give robbers exactly what they ask for without argument Proper handling and maintenance of “dye packs” if in use

The training should be tailored to the institution on the basis of crime statistics, degree of risk, and exposure to criminal attack, taking into consideration the physical security devices in use, such as bullet-resistant glass and different types of surveillance systems.

Fraud Prevention Bank losses through fraudulent means, such as check forgery, fraudulent accounts, counterfeit checks, and the like, are increasing and affect all financial institutions. A majority of the individuals who commit bank fraud are professionals who make their living defrauding banks, and they teach their profession to others. These “professionals” are not deterred from their trade by traditional methods. They can also be the most difficult to detect and have the potential for causing the largest injury.

Training Organizations Numerous commercial entities, and professional and trade organizations offer training programs tailored to meet the specific needs of financial institutions. A partial list of these resources follows: American Bankers Association American Society for Industrial Security, International Association of Certified Fraud Examiners Bank Administration Institute International Association of Chiefs of Police Most anticrime bureaus Many colleges and universities

Other Federal Regulations with an Impact on Banking Title 18 of the U.S. Code (selected sections) Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1968


Reg. CC Reg. E Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 (Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act) Right to Financial Privacy—Title XI

Critical Issues in Financial Institution Security The challenges facing the bank security officer today are much different from what they were in 1968, when the original Bank Protection Act was enacted. The threat of bank robberies and bank burglaries is still very real, and we continue to need to provide traditional physical countermeasures (vaults, safes, alarm systems, cameras, guards, etc.) to address these concerns. But, in terms of financial risk, the genuine issues lie in check frauds, liability for failing to provide a safe environment for our employees and customers, wire transfers and other electronic means of moving money, and the emerging technology that banks use to allow customers access to their accounts and a vast array of financial services through telebanking services, the Internet, and other online computer services such as CompuServe, Prodigy, and America Online. Today, customers can open an account; transfer balances; order checks, credit cards, and debit cards over the phone; make deposits and withdrawals through an ATM; and never have to come face to

441

face with their “banker.” The concept of “Know your customer” has a whole new meaning. Another issue is the lack of standard record keeping and reporting of crimes and losses affecting financial institutions. In fact, there is not even a standard definition for some types of criminal activity, such as ATM crime, and the FBI recently announced that it would no longer track bank robbery statistics. The industry needs to develop a standard methodology for tracking and reporting criminal activity and losses so that it can do trend analysis and benchmarking and have reliable, credible, and standardized statistics. Finally, we need to try to stay ahead of the technological advancements in the area of computerbased desktop publishing. The check fraud criminal today is much more sophisticated than in years past and is taking advantage of the ease of counterfeiting high-quality checks, money orders, traveler’s checks, and other negotiable items. A scanner, computer, color printer, and some software, along with stolen or counterfeit identification documents, are all the tools needed for a check cashing ring to operate. The banking industry needs to avail itself of new anticounterfeiting paper stocks that are being developed as well as online and batch-run fraud detection software programs. We need to cooperate with one another and be willing to share ideas that work in the battle against check fraud. Otherwise, the check fraud problem will continue to escalate and erode the profits of financial institutions.

Chapter 33 Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs) JERRY WRIGHT, CPP

Responsibility of an ATM Owner ATM Owner Risk While ATM crime statistics may be indicative of society in general, the size of the crime problem has not been documented. However, one study shows that there is only one crime per 3.5 million ATM transactions. Whether or not ATM crime is a real or perceived problem, there is still the question of liability and ATM safety. Many experts feel that incidents of crime at the ATM will continue to increase during the 1990s and beyond December 2002. A current picture of ATM crime shows that 49% of all incidents occur between 7:00 p.m. and midnight, with 43% occurring on a Sunday or Monday, 93% of the incidents occur at walk-up ATMs and 7% at drive-ups, and 95% occur on financial institution premises. Legislation has been introduced on both the state and national level which has considered several suggestions for regulating ATM crime. These suggestions include: 䊉䊉

䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉

Having armed guards at each ATM Hold-up buttons at the ATM to be activated by the cardholder Lighting standards for the ATM ATM video camera requirements Emergency phones at each ATM location ATM vestibule card access devices Ordering that ATMs be shut down during the night Consumer education on ATM safety

The most commonsense, cost-effective method to combat ATM crime is to educate the community. An 442

effective way to inform the community is to provide the ATM Safety Tips and ATM Fraud Tips supplied by Magic Line, Inc. A sample is included as Appendix 33.A. Before any new site is installed, a safety review should be performed as part of the original site selection. The following pages may be of value in helping review the major safety issues. Terminal owners have the responsibility to provide a safe ATM environment for the ATM users and personnel involved with the ATM.

Case Study from Ann Arbor Police Department: Law Enforcement and ATM Safety 1. Overview of why Ann Arbor Police Department became involved in the ATM issue: a. ATM robbery in late Fall of 1990 b. Planning Commission request for guidelines from police. c. California legislation d. Involvement with Magic Line Company/Jim Outland 2. ATM security in the 1990s report a. Perception versus reality: (1) One ATM crime of violence per 3.5 million transactions (2) Concerns of ATM crimes 20% of customers resisted when confronted 18% of customers injured during robbery 11% increase in lawsuits from injured customer (“foreseeability” and “negligent security”)

Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs)

b. Development of internal procedures: (1) ATM-related crime documented (2) Liaison developed with local law enforcement for crime analysis and crime prevention information (3) Consider protection alternatives (site design) (4) Set reasonable daily cash withdrawal (5) Customer education (6) Networking with order financial institutions (7) Development of newsletters, seminars on ATM crimes for financial institutions c. ATM design considerations: (1) Maximize visibility of ATM sites (2) Set adequate lighting standards (3) Ongoing ATM site surveys (4) Electronic surveillance of site (5) Limiting access to the ATM via a security enclosure (6) Closure of the ATM during high-risk hours (7) Risk too great, consider moving ATM 3. Law enforcement and ATM safety a. Law enforcement is underutilized in controlling ATM-related crimes: (1) 480,000 public law enforcement officers (2) Over 2 million private security officers (3) “Eyes and ears” for the financial community b. Law enforcement needs to know: (1) Types of ATM-related crimes (2) Characteristics of people engaged in these ATM-related crimes (modus operandi) (3) Security devices and procedures used at ATMs (4) How the electronic funds transfer system works (5) Development of “Law Enforcement Handbook of ATM-Related Crime and Security” c. What law enforcement can do for financial institutions: (1) Provide crime analysis information (2) Help conduct security surveys via the crime prevention staff (3) Help prepare a consumer education video for local cable or regular TV on ATM safety (4) Distribute ATM safety consumer education materials at crime prevention programs (5) Help from joint law enforcement/financial institutions committee, for ongoing discussions on ATM-related crimes and safety 4. Conclusion

443

Remember that the bottom line is consumer safety: Reduce the institution’s liability exposure and make sure that the institution is profitable. That is why these standards are being recommended.

Ann Arbor, Michigan’s Guidelines for Automated Teller Machines User Safety Purpose It is the intent of the following guidelines to enhance the safety of consumers using automated teller machines without discouraging the placing of automated teller machines in locations convenient to consumers’ homes and workplaces.

Definitions 1. Access area means any paved walkway or sidewalk which is within 50 feet of an automated teller machine. The term does not include publicly maintained sidewalks or roads. 2. Financial transaction device shall have the meaning as set forth in Federal Reserve Board Regulation E (12 CFR Part 205), promulgated pursuant to the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (15 USC 160 et seq.). 3. Automated teller machine means any electronic information processing device that accepts or dispenses cash in connection with a credit, deposit, or convenience account. The term does not include devices used solely to facilitate check guarantees or check authorizations or that are used in connection with the acceptance or dispensing of cash on a person-to-person basis, such as by a store cashier. 4. Foot-candle power means the light intensity of illumination in foot-candles on a horizontal plane at 36 inches above ground level and 5 feet in front of the area to be measured. 5. Control of an access area or defined parking area means having the present authority to determine how, when, and by whom it is to be used and how it is to be maintained, lighted, and landscaped. 6. Customer means a natural person to whom an access device has been issued for personal, family, or household use. 7. Defined parking area means that portion of any parking area open for customer parking that is (1) contiguous to an access area with respect to an automated teller machine; (2) regularly, principally, and lawfully used for parking by users of the

444


automated teller machine while conducting automated teller machine transactions during hours of darkness; and (3) owned or leased by the operator of the automated teller machine or owned or controlled by the party leasing the automated teller machine site to the operator. 8. Hours of darkness means the period that commences 30 minutes after sunset and ends 30 minutes before sunrise. 9. Operator means any bank, saving association, credit union, savings bank, or other business entity, or any person who operates an automated teller machine.

Location and Installation The operator shall adopt procedures for evaluating the safety of any automated teller machine. These procedures shall include consideration of the following: 1. The extent to which the lighting for the automated teller machine complies or will comply with the lighting standards required for the City of Ann Arbor, Michigan (which follow). 2. Each operator of an automated teller machine installed on or after April 1, 1991, shall have a closed circuit television installed with recording capability for the automated teller machine. 3. The presence of landscaping, vegetation, or other obstructions in the area of the automated teller machine, the access area, and the defined parking area. 4. The incidence of crimes of violence in the immediate neighborhoods of the automated teller machine of which the operator has actual knowledge. 5. It is not the intent of these guidelines to impose a duty to relocate or modify an automated teller on the occurrence of any particular events or circumstances but rather to establish a standard of good faith for the evaluation of all automated teller machines as provided here.

Lighting Each operator of an automated teller machine installed shall comply with lighting requirements.

1. If an access area or parking area is not controlled by the operator of the automated teller machine and if the person who leased the ATM site to the operator controls the access area or parking area, the person who controls the access area and parking area shall comply with all guidelines. 2. The operator, owner, or other person responsible, therefore, shall provide lighting during hours of darkness with respect to an open and operating automated teller machine and any defined parking area, access area, and the exterior of an enclosed automated teller machine installation according to the following standards. 3. There shall be a minimum of 2 foot-candle power at the face of the automated teller machine and extending in an unobstructed direction outward 5 feet. 4. There shall be a minimum of 1 foot-candle power within 50 feet from all unobstructed directions from the face of the automated teller machine. 5. There shall be a minimum of 0.6 foot-candle power in the defined parking area.

Consumer Education Customers receiving financial transaction devices shall be furnished by the respective issuers thereof with notices of basic safety precautions customers should employ while using an automated teller machine.

Exemptions The provisions of these guidelines shall not apply with respect to any automated teller machine that is 1. Located inside of a building, unless it is a free standing installation which exists for the sole purpose of providing an enclosure for the automated teller machine. 2. Located inside of a building, except to the extent a transaction can be conducted from outside the building. 3. Located in any area, including any access area, building, enclosed space, or parking area that is not controlled by the operator.

Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs)

445

Appendix 33.A* ATM Safety Tips

1. If you must use an ATM at night, choose a busy and well-lighted site with good visibility from the street. Take someone with you if you can. 2. Park close to the machine but avoid parking so that another vehicle can block your exit. Lock your car when you exit. 3. Don’t loiter around the machine. Complete your paperwork, such as deposit slips, in advance. 4. Be aware of anything suspicious. If you feel uneasy, cancel the transaction immediately and find another machine. 5. Don’t withdraw too much cash at one time, only what you need. Pocket it before leaving the machine area: count it later. 6. Never give out your personal identification number to anyone over the phone. Never make a withdrawal at the request of someone claiming to be an official of the police department or bank. 7. Remember—practice safety always, rather than become a victim of crime.

* Prepared by Magic Line, Inc., 1991, an ATM network provider.

8. Memorize your Personal Identification Number (PIN). Never write it on your ATM card or card envelope. 9. Don’t discuss your account or account balance with anyone or give information on your account or PIN over the phone. 10. Never allow anyone to use your card or PIN. 11. Don’t withdraw money for an “official” person. No bank representative, auditor, or law enforcement person will ever ask you to withdraw money from an ATM for any reason. 12. Keep your receipts and verify each transaction on your statement. If you have an unexplained transaction, contact your financial institution immediately. 13. Report a lost or stolen card to your financial institution immediately. 14. Carefully read the Electronic Funds Transfer agreement and disclosure sent by the financial institution issuing your card. Know your liability for failing to notify your financial institution in a timely manner of a lost or stolen card.

446


Appendix 33.B* ATM Safety Checklist

1. The security officer is involved in the ATM site selection. 2. The ATM is located in a secure, well-lighted area. 3. Parking spaces are conveniently located to minimize the distance a user must walk. 4. The ATM and the user are visible from the surrounding areas at all times. 5. No conditions exist that may be hazardous to the user. 6. ATM user enclosures 䊉 There are no blind spots, such as drapes or shades to block visibility. 䊉 The glass is clear or lightly tinted. 䊉 The enclosure extends from floor to ceiling. 䊉 Access is limited to users having valid cards. 䊉 An emergency latch release is provided for user exit. 7. Lighting 䊉 The ATM is well lit at night. 䊉 The area where users park and approach the ATM is well lit.

* Prepared by Magic Line, Inc., 1991, an ATM network provider.

Responsibility is assigned to an individual to ensure that appropriate lighting is maintained at each ATM site. 䊉 Lighting fixtures are of the tamper-resistant variety and light bulbs are replaced on a regular basis. 8. Telephone 䊉 A 24-hour phone number is provided for lost and stolen cards. 䊉 Operators who receive ATM member calls are trained on how to handle a robbery report. 䊉 The institution has established user safety awareness program. 䊉 If cameras are part of the security program, they are concealed behind one-way, tamperproof glass. 䊉 The user robbery incidents are documented and reported for tracking purposes. 䊉 ATM sites are reviewed following user incidents to determine what corrective action, if any, should be taken. 䊉

Chapter 34 Telecommunications Fraud MARK D. FARRELL

The rapid advancement of telecommunication technology has turned toll fraud into big business. Thieves have cost telecommunication companies as much as $2.5 billion annually. There are some security measures that security directors and technical service representatives can take to avoid the phone call from the company communications department to say that the phone system has been red flagged with a large telephone bill.

How Does It Happen? First, let us look at the factors contributing to toll fraud for an appreciation of the risk. These identify the areas where attention needs to be given to company’s phone systems: 1. “Free” access to internal systems through “800” service 2. Manipulation of PBX (switchboard) 3. Manipulation of voice mail systems 4. Absence of or failure to utilize call detail reports (CDR) or station message detail reports (SMDR) 5. Entry through maintenance ports (RMATS) 6. Remote access 7. Obtaining passwords or codes through deceit of system operator or other staff 8. Manipulating call forwarding systems 9. Failure to change the original default code in the equipment 10. Insecure automatic call distribution systems

There are some practical and inexpensive solutions to each of these areas of vulnerability. But before we explore those, let us look at how you might first learn that your system has been hit by toll fraud.

How to Find Out For years people were generally unaware of toll fraud, they first learned of it by receiving their phone bill and seeing the exorbitant long-distance charges. These bills were generally sent in very large envelopes or even boxes. Today, users are more universally aware that the problem exists and have taken some steps to manage their equipment. Also, today, the long-distance carriers are more active in monitoring lines and patterns of abuse and alert users when suspicious activity starts. Here are some other ways you may learn that your system is being abused: 䊉

䊉䊉䊉

䊉

䊉

Following investigation of problems with the lines (e.g., lines busy too often or at inappropriate times) A phone call from the long distance carrier Review of bills User analysis of call detail and station message detail reports generated by the company Equipment problems, excessive hang-ups, or alerts from staff A phone call from the local servicing phone company

Now let us explore some of the solutions and affirmative steps that can and should be used to eliminate the risk of toll fraud. 447

448


How to Reduce Vulnerability 1. Deactivate or disconnect the remote access features from all equipment. Do not allow the feature to remain inactive because hackers or dishonest insiders could activate it. If some or all of these features must be utilized, consider purchasing protective security add-ons the company’s carrier can advise about. 2. Make sure call forwarding, three-way calling, and voice mail system are “closed loops.” Reconfigure the system so as not to allow dial-through (dial tone) or the ability to connect with any trunk. 3. Deactivate or disconnect all maintenance ports in telecommunications equipment. Work with the vendor to allow access only when it is truly needed. 4. If practical, block all international calls. If circumstances do not permit, at least block calls to the following most popular toll fraud destinations: Dominican Republic and 809 area code Pakistan Lebanon India Iraq China Afghanistan Colombia Bangladesh Ghana Nigeria Yemen Armenia Moldova Guyana 5. Reconfigure all customer premise equipment (CPE) to prevent all direct “trunk to trunk” access or at least require a live operator intercept to access a different trunk. 6. Utilize the abilities of the most modern CPE to produce the CDR and SMDR. Review and analyze these records on a daily basis. 7. Activate the “kill software” features found in most sophisticated CPE, “locking out” a caller after three invalid attempts to access system features. 8. Adopt random, lengthy passwords or codes and require them to be changed frequently. 9. Routinely monitor voice mail systems for unused mailboxes, altered greetings, or unusual activity. Require all mailbox users to add personal greetings and change them often. 10. Block the ability to place “casual” calls through the system. This is the ability to use a code to connect directly with a particular long-distance network. An example of this is 1-0-288 (AT&T), 1-0-222 (MCI), or 1-0-333 (SPRINT). Once a criminal obtains a dial tone through your system,

all he or she need do is dial one of these codes for unrestricted international dialing. Studies have been done to pinpoint who are the culprits responsible for toll fraud, and law enforcement sources who conduct these investigations and make arrests confirm that the largest share of the blame belongs to a group known as hackers. They are very successful at randomly cracking codes and passwords on many systems. Significantly smaller are the groups of “insiders” who pass or sell codes, “shoulder surfers” or “dumpster drivers” who surreptitiously obtain codes or passwords, and technicians and installers who have access to them. What happens if, after taking all the possible steps to prevent fraud on the company’s phone system, it happens anyway? The first thing to know is that no system is 100% secure. There will always be new forms of fraud and any company can unknowingly get caught up in it. The following few steps should help stop the fraud and catch the culprits.

How to Stop It 1. Call the local and long-distance carriers and have a meeting with them. Discuss the possibility of the carrier putting up the trap and trace on the line and gathering the evidence essential for successful prosecution. 2. Discuss with the carrier the company’s willingness to allow the penetration of the system to continue until the important information can be gathered, but that it is unwilling to continue to sustain the charges for this. Ideally, in the interest of stopping and catching the perpetrators, the carrier will absorb this amount. 3. The agency to call for investigation and prosecution is the United States Secret Service. This action should be coordinated with the carrier and probably initiated after the trap and trace evidence starts to come in. Because this industry is growing so rapidly and changes occur overnight, it is best to contact the local and long-distance carriers and their security departments, along with the supplier of the premise equipment, to ensure the company has taken all possible steps to deter fraud on its lines and equipment. Vendors cannot fight the fraud battle alone. A company must take the time to learn about its system and the security features designed into it. Most fraud is preventable, but the company must take the first steps.

Chapter 35 Electronic Surveillance and Wiretapping PHILIP P. PURPURA, CPP

Electronic surveillance utilizes electronic devices to covertly listen to conversations, whereas wiretapping pertains to the interception of telephone communications. The prevalence of these often illegal activities probably is greater than one would expect. (The legality of such acts is supported by court orders.) Because detection is so difficult, the exact extent of electronic surveillance and wiretapping and what this theft of information costs businesses is impossible to gauge. Electronic eavesdropping technology is highly developed to the point where countermeasures (debugging) have not kept up with the art of bugging. Consequently, only the most expertly trained and experienced specialist can counter this threat. Surveillance equipment is easy to obtain. An electronically inclined person can simply enter a local electronics store and buy all the materials necessary to make a sophisticated bug. Prebuilt models are available by mail, or certain retailers will sell them if the buyer signs a statement that they will not be used for audio surveillance. Retail electronics stores sell FM transmitters or microphones that transmit sound without wires to an ordinary FM radio. Sound is broadcast over a radio several feet away after tuning to the right frequency. These FM transmitters are advertised to be used by public speakers who walk around as they talk and favor wireless microphones; the voice is transmitted and then broadcast over large speakers. They are also advertised to listen in on a baby from another room. Miniaturization has greatly aided spying. With the advance of the microchip, transmitters are apt to be so small that these devices can be enmeshed in thick

paper, as in a calendar, under a stamp, or within a nail in a wall. Bugs may be planted as a building is under construction, or a person may receive one hidden in a present or other item. Transmitters are capable of being operated by solar power (i.e., daylight) or local radio broadcast. Bugging techniques vary. Information from a microphone can be transmitted via a “wire run” or a radio transmitter. Bugs are concealed in a variety of objects or carried on a person. Transmitting devices can be controlled remotely with a radio signal to turn them on and off. This makes detection difficult. A device known as a carrier current transmitter is placed in wall plugs, light switches, or other electrically operated components. It obtains its power from the AC wire to which it is attached. Many spies use a dual system. One bug is placed so that it will be found, which in many instances satisfies security and management. A second bug is more cleverly concealed. Telephones are especially vulnerable. A “tap” occurs when a telephone conversation is intercepted. Telephone lines are available in so many places that taps are difficult to detect. A tap can be direct or wireless. With a direct tap, a pair of wires is spliced to the telephone line and connected to a tape recorder. An FM transmitter, similar to a room bug, is employed for a wireless tap. The transmitter is connected to the line and a receiver and tape recorder are concealed nearby. Wireless taps (and room bugs) are spotted by using special equipment. Direct taps are difficult to locate. A check of the entire line is necessary. Because telephone traffic travels over space in several modes—for example, cellular, microwave, 449

450


and satellite—the spy’s job is made much easier and safer since no on-premises tap is required. What is required is the proper equipment for each mode. In one case, a Mossad agent in Berne, Switzerland, was arrested after he tried to tap the telephone of a Hezbollah target. His technical system was a cellular telephone device that would be activated when the target telephone was put in use. The device would automatically call a second cellular telephone where the target’s telephone would be monitored.1 Another technique transforms the telephone into a listening device whether it is in use or not. A technique, known as a hookswitch bypass, short circuits (by changing wires) the telephone hookswitch (the switch that disconnects the microphone in the mouthpiece to the outside when a person hangs up) and transforms the ordinary telephone into a bug. This is easy to detect by hanging up the telephone, placing a radio nearby (for noise), tapping into the telephone line, and listening for the radio. When guarding against loss of sensitive information, consideration must be given to a host of methods that may be used by a spy. These include infrared transmitters that use light frequencies below the visible frequency spectrum to transmit information. This can be defeated through physical shielding (e.g., closing the drapes). Another method, a laser listening device, “bounces” a laser off of a window to receive audio from the room. Inexpensive noise masking systems can defeat this technique.2 Computer, e-mail, fax, and other transmissions are also subject to access by spies. A spy may conceal a tape recorder or pinhole-lens camera on the premises or wear a camera concealed in a jacket or tie. If drawings or designs are on walls or in sight through windows, a spy, for example, stationed in another skyscraper a few blocks away might use a telescope to obtain secret data. Or, a window washer might appear at a window for surveillance. Another method is a spy disguised as a janitor to be assigned to the particular site. All these methods by no means exhaust the skills of spies.

Countermeasures The physical characteristics of a building have a bearing on opportunities for surveillance. Some of these factors are poor access control designs, inadequate soundproofing, common or shared ducts, and space above false ceilings enabling access. Comprehensive security methods hinder spies. The in-house security team can begin countermeasures by conducting a physical search for planted devices. If a

decision is made to contact a specialist, only the most expertly trained and experienced consultant should be recruited.

The Countermeasures Consultant Organizations often recruit a countermeasures consultant to perform contract work. As a consumer, ask for copies of certificates of TSCM courses completed and a copy of the insurance policy for errors and omissions for TSCM services. What equipment is used? What techniques are employed for the cost? Are sweeps and meticulous physical inspections conducted for the quoted price? Watch for scare tactics. Is the consultant really a vendor trying to sell audio surveillance detection devices? Will the consultant protect confidentiality? The interviewer should request a review of past reports to clients. Were names deleted to protect confidentiality? These questions help to avoid hiring the unqualified “expert.” One practitioner offered clients debugging services and used an expensive piece of equipment to conduct sweeps. After several years and hundreds of sweeps, he decided to have the equipment serviced. A service person discovered that the device was not working because it had no battery. The surprised “expert” never realized a battery was needed. For a comprehensive countermeasures program, the competent consultant will be interested in sensitive information flow, storage, and retrieval. Extra cost will result from such an analysis, but it is often cost effective. The employer should use an outside public telephone to contact the consultant in order not to alert a spy to impending countermeasures.

Equipment Detection equipment is expensive (personal communication with Information Security Associates, Inc.). A firm should purchase its own equipment only if it is cost effective and many sweeps will be conducted. A sample of equipment includes the nonlinear junction detector, costing $15,000 and capable of detecting radio transmitters, microphones, infrared and ultrasonic transmitters, tape recorders, and other devices hidden, even when they are not working. The telephone analyzer is another tool, costing up to $6000 and designed for testing a variety of single- and multiline telephones and fax machines. Other types of specialized equipment are on the market.

Electronic Surveillance and Wiretapping

Some security personnel or executives plant a bug for the sole purpose of determining if the detection specialist and his or her equipment are effective. This “test” can be construed as a criminal offense. An alternative is specially designed test transmitters, commercially available, that have no microphone pickup and therefore can be used without liability. Another technique is to place a tape recorder with a microphone in a drawer. A tool kit and standard forms are two additional aids for the countermeasures specialist. The tool kit consists of the common tools (e.g., screwdrivers, pliers, electrical tape) used by an electrician. Standard forms facilitate good record keeping and serve as a checklist. What was checked? What tests were performed? What were the readings? Where? When? Who performed the tests? Why were the tests conducted? Over a period of time, records can be used to make comparisons while helping to answer questions. Who do you think has “the edge,” those who seek sensitive information or those who protect it? Another strategy to thwart listening devices is “shielding,” also called electronic soundproofing. Basically, copper foil or screening and carbon filament are applied throughout a room to prevent acoustical or electromagnetic emanations from leaving. Although this method is very expensive (costing more than $100,000), several organizations employ it to have at least one secure room or to protect information in computers. Equipment is available that may frustrate telephone taps and listening devices. Scramblers, attached to telephones, alter the voice as it travels through the line. But no device or system is foolproof. Often, simple countermeasures are useful. For instance, an executive can wait until everybody is present for an important meeting, then relocate it to a previously undisclosed location. Conversants can operate a radio at high volume during sensitive conversations and exercise caution during telephone and other conversations. It must be remembered that sensitive information can be collected in many different ways in addition to physical devices. Losses can occur through speeches and publications by employees, in company trash, and by unknowingly hiring a spy. Comprehensive, broad-based defenses are necessary.

Counterintelligence Another avenue to protect sensitive information is counterintelligence, which is a broad term referring

451

to activities that identify and counter threats by adversaries. The military and police agencies engage in counterintelligence activities. Examples include investigative and research units that collect and analyze intelligence on adversaries, internal awareness programs, and misinformation directed at adversaries. Although businesses have a different mission than the military and police, certain counterintelligence techniques, within legal guidelines, can be implemented by businesses.

Economic Espionage Act of 1996 Because intellectual property assets are often more valuable to businesses than tangible assets, Congress passed the Economic Espionage Act of 1996. This act makes it a federal crime for any person to convert a trade secret to his or her own benefit or the benefit of others with the intent or knowledge that the conversion will injure the owner of the trade secret. The penalties for any person are up to 10 years of imprisonment and a fine up to $250,000. Corporations can be fined up to $5 million. If a foreign government benefits from such a crime, the penalties are even greater. The act defines trade secret broadly as information that the owner has taken “reasonable measures” to keep secret because of the economic value from it. Case law has further defined the act; the greater the protection and value of the information and the fewer people who know about the information, the more likely the courts will recognize its status as a protectable trade secret.3 The act raises two major concerns for management: 䊉

䊉

Protecting trade secrets. This would include a comprehensive program. Hiring employees from competitors. Employers may violate the act if they hire employees from other firms who may bring with them trade secrets. Prevention includes a thorough interview of applicants, ascertaining whether the applicant signed contracts or agreements with others for the protection of sensitive information and use of a company form that signifies that the new employee understands the act’s legal requirements.4

The act also links the economic well-being of the nation to national security interests. And, it allows the FBI to investigate foreign intelligence services bent on acquiring sensitive information from U.S. companies. At some point, a company may have to decide whether to report a violation of the act to law

452


enforcement authorities. The disadvantages are lost time and money, unwanted publicity, and the fact that the defendant’s attorney may request secrets that could be revealed in court. Although the act offers some protection for proprietary information, this protection may depend on how a judge or attorneys in the case interpret the act. Discovery proceedings may result in information loss greater than the original loss. Also, the case may be lost in criminal and civil courts. Therefore, management must carefully weigh decisions on legal action. Another point to consider is that the act requires businesses to protect themselves from losses, which presents liability issues relevant to due diligence.5 Prevention is seen here, as with many other vulnerabilities, as the key avenue for protection.

References 1. Business Espionage Controls and Countermeasures Association. “News of Hostile Activity.” Available at: http://www.espionbusiness.com (June 6, 2001). 2. Tom Jones. Surveillance Countermeasures in the Business World. Cookeville, TN: Research Electronics International, 2000, pp. 1–17. 3. R. Mark Halligan. “Do Your Secrets Pass the Test?” Security Management 45 (March 2001), pp. 53–58. 4. Legal Alert Memo. Columbia, SC: Childs & Duff, May 20, 1997. 5. John A. Nolan. “Economic Espionage, Proprietary Information Protection: Difficult Times Ahead.” Security Technology and Design (January–February 1997), pp. 54–57.

Chapter 36 Safety Websites RICHARD A. PHELAN

Introduction Briefly, enough cannot be said about safety issues. Too little space is available in this chapter to cover all I would like to say on this subject. Therefore, I prepared a list of websites to explore and extract the information that might be needed, either now or in the future.

䊉

䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉

䊉

Safety Websites

䊉䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA): www.osha.gov. This site contains every safety standard and regulation ever passed. RHS Solutions is a web-based consulting service. A membership fee is required to get the full benefits of this website: www.rhsolutions.com. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH): www.cdc.gov/niosh. This agency is responsible for conducting research and the prevention of work-related disease and injury. National Conference of States on Building Codes and Standards, Inc. (NCSBCS), www.ncsbcs.org, promotes development of building regulations to ensure public safety in buildings. A paid membership is required for all benefits.

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉䊉

䊉

Building Owners and Managers Association (BOMA) International, www.boma.org, contains a lot of valuable information. http://www.oecd.org/ehs/ http://www.ansi.org http://www.osh.net/ http://www.orcinc.com/service/osh/oshindex.html http://chppm-www.apgea.army.mil/HMSM/ armyih/ http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ih/html http://hazard.com/msds/ American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine: http://www.acoem.org American Industrial Hygiene Association: http://www.aiha.org American Association of Occupational Health Nurses: http://www.aaohn.com American Society of Safety Engineers: http://www.asse.org International Safety Equipment Association: http://www.safetyequipment.org National Safety Council: http://www.nsc.org National Fire Protection Association International: http://www.nfpa.org Safety Equipment Institute: http://www.seinet.org

453

Chapter 37 Homeland Security LAWRENCE J. FENNELLY, CPO, CSS

The White House President George W. Bush For Immediate Release Office of the Secretary March 12, 2002

Gov. Ridge Announces Homeland Security Advisory System The Homeland Security Advisory System will provide a comprehensive and effective means to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist attacks to Federal, State, and local authorities and to the American people. As part of a series of initiatives to improve coordination and communication among all levels of government and the American public in the right against terrorism, President Bush signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3, creating the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS). The advisory system will be the foundation for building a comprehensive and effective structure for the dissemination of information regarding the risk of terrorist attacks to all levels of government and the American people. The Attorney General will be responsible for developing, implementing, and managing the system. In conjunction with the development of this new system, the Attorney General will open a 45-day comment period in order to seek the views of officials at all levels of government, law enforcement, and the American public. Ninety days after the conclusion of the comment period, the Attorney General, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Homeland Security, will present a final Homeland Security Advisory System to the President for approval. The Homeland Security Advisory System will provide the following: 454

National Framework for Federal, State, and Local Governments, Private Industry and the Public There are many federal alert systems in our country —each tailored and unique to different sectors of our society: transportation, defense, agriculture, and weather, for example. These alert systems fill vital and specific requirements for a variety of situations in both the commercial and government sectors. The Homeland Security Advisory System will provide a national framework for these systems, allowing government officials and citizens to communicate the nature and degree of terrorist threats. This advisory system characterizes appropriate levels of vigilance, preparedness, and readiness in a series of graduated Threat Conditions. The Protective Measures that correspond to each Threat Condition will help the government and citizens decide what action they take to help counter and respond to terrorist activity. Based on the threat level, Federal agencies will implement appropriate Protective Measures. States and localities will be encouraged to adopt compatible systems.

Factors for Assignment of Threat Conditions The Homeland Security Advisory System will provide a framework for the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Homeland Security, to assign Threat Conditions, which can apply nationally, regionally, by sector or to a potential target. Cabinet Secretaries and other members of the Homeland Security Council will be consulted as appropriate. A variety of factors may be used to assess the threat.Among these: 䊉䊉

Is the threat credible? Is the threat corroborated?

Homeland Security

䊉䊉

Is the threat specific and/or imminent? How grave is the threat?

Unified System for Public Announcements Public announcements of threat advisories and alerts help deter terrorist activity, notify law enforcement and State and local government officials of threats, inform the public about government preparations, and provide them with the information necessary to respond to the threat. State and local officials will be informed in advance of national threat advisories when possible. The Attorney General will help develop a system for conveying relevant information to Federal, State, and local officials and the private sector expeditiously. Heightened Threat Conditions can be declared for the entire nation, or for a specific geographic area, functional or industrial sector. Changes in assigned Threat Conditions will be made when necessary.

A Tool to Combat Terrorism Threat Conditions characterize the risk of terrorist attack. Protective Measures are the steps that will be taken by government and the private sector to reduce vulnerabilities. The HSAS establishes five Threat Conditions with associated suggestive protective measures; 1. Low Condition—Green Low risk of terrorist attacks. The following Protective Measures may be applied: 䊉 Refining and exercising preplanned Protective Measures 䊉 Ensuring personnel receive training on HSAS, departmental, or agency-specific Protective Measures 䊉 Regularly assessing facilities for vulnerabilities and taking measures to reduce them 2. Guarded Condition—Blue General risk of terrorist attack. In addition to the previously outlined Protective Measures, the following may be applied: 䊉 Checking communications with designated emergency response or command locations 䊉 Reviewing and updating emergency response procedures 䊉 Providing the public with necessary information 3. Elevated Condition—Yellow Significant risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the previously outlined Protective Measures, the following may be applied: 䊉 Increasing surveillance of critical locations 䊉 Coordinating emergency plans with nearby jurisdictions 䊉 Assessing further refinement of Protective Measures within the context of the current threat information

455

Implementing, as appropriate, contingency and emergency response plans 4. High Condition—Orange High risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the previously outlined Protective Measures, the following may be applied: 䊉 Coordinating necessary security efforts with armed forces or law enforcement agencies 䊉 Taking additional precaution at public events 䊉 Preparing to work at an alternate site or with a dispersed workforce and restricting access to essential personnel only 5. Severe Condition—Red Severe risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the previously outlined Protective Measures, the following may be applied: 䊉 Assigning emergency response personnel and prepositioning specially trained teams: monitoring, redirecting or constraining transportation systems 䊉 Closing public and government facilities 䊉 Increasing or redirecting personnel to address critical emergency needs 䊉

Homeland Security in 2002 What is Homeland Security, aside from briefly saying it is the overall protection of the United States? It is a coordinated effort to communicate with bureaucracies in Washington, DC, all forms of State and Governmental agencies like the CIA, FBI, Health and Human Services, FEMA, Aviation Security, ATF, DOT, Coast Guard, U. S. Customs, INS and reach into local areas as well. Some of the objectives of Homeland Security include: 1. Tighten security and increase awareness 2. Training of first responders for police, fire and medical personnel 3. Obtain the necessary equipment to deal with biological and chemical issues and terrorism 4. Hazmat training 5. To be proactive in our own defense There is no established blueprint for this huge undertaking. Every security principal and concept will apply. The security sector is also involved as are local law enforcement agencies to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats and attacks.1

HITS and IFPO Computer-Based and Wed-Based Security Officer Training High Impact Training Solutions (HITS) in partnership with the International Foundation for Protection Offi-

456


cers (IFPO) has developed a dual media, computerbased and web-based training approach to meet with industry’s training needs. By example, training is presented in 1-11/2 hour modules. The modules can be combined to form a variety of career specialty tracks. The Homeland Security Training Track addresses domestic terrorism and preparedness, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons of mass destruction, emerging threats, first aid, crisis management, electronic access systems and protective lighting. The HITS approach provides a multitude of benefits for security officers, and security managers. Computerbased and web-based (CBT/WBT) can be integrated into or used to supplement existing training programs, thus freeing training staff. CBT/WBT is an excellent training tool to simulate, facilitate and augment classroom programs, thus expanding current instruction. The program uses the computer to automate record-keeping functions by providing students and supervisors with printable completion and performance training reports. Students are also provided timely feedback through an “electronic report card.” This approach lets you choose the training pace; lets you choose the training place; and lets you choose the training time. For more information on CBT/WBT security training visit HITS at www.hits.astcorp.com or IFPO at www.ifpo.org. Sample of training provided: Homeland Security I: Homeland Security II: Homeland Security III: Homeland Security IV: Homeland Security V: Homeland Security VI:

Emerging Threats Weapons of Mass Destruction 1 Weapons of Mass Destruction 2 Weapons of Mass Destruction 3 Bombs and Bomb Threat Management Domestic Terrorism

Homeland Security VII: Crisis Management Homeland Security VIII: Infrastructure and Security Concepts Physical Security I: The Fundamentals

Final Comments Homeland Security is a complicated matter. However, it will take a minimum of 5 years to properly develop net results and to be somewhat effective. Dr. Phil Anderson, Homeland Security Program said, “Ridge has to be a bridge builder.” Whoever is in charge of the private sector will have to be involved. Any time you are proactive it is controversial and requires the involvement of many individuals as well as critics.

Reference 1. Securitymagazine.com, February 13, 2002. “Into the Fire by John Mesenbrienke.” Reference Homeland Security and Defense Newsletter, January 30, 2002. See www.aviationnow.com/hsd.

Websites www.homelandsecurity.org www.globalsecurity.org www.domesticpreparedness.com www.CIAO.gov www.tsa.gov www.bookings.edu

Chapter 38 Security of Information Systems JOSEPH C. NELSON

No one today can ignore the impact that computer systems, applications, and networks have made on our everyday lives. Both at work and at home, we clearly are immersed in the “information age,” enjoying the productivity and changes technology brings. Many futurists predict our current reliance on information systems and technology is in its infancy. Even today, in many businesses, the asset value and loss impact of these systems are difficult to calculate. As systems have grown in complexity and connectivity, they have become so vital to business success that protecting these assets now consumes a high degree of security expertise to manage the almost minuteto-minute changes in technology and associated risks. Perhaps the greatest challenges have come with the growth of the Internet and the World Wide Web. The very nature of this network provides opportunity for attacks on systems, information, and internal networks, but information systems can be compromised internally as well. Organizational changes are also a force for consideration in the new “information age,” as employees, contractors, business partners, and customers are seemingly moving far from the deeper connections made even a generation ago. For example, the dramatic rise in employee layoffs continues to change the relationships between employers and employees, specifically turnover rates for workers in the information systems industry (those closest to these important assets) may be considered some of highest among professions. Fortunately, the security industry has grown in knowledge and resources to meet the security management needs of these 21st century assets. What follows is an outline of the elements for an effective

information systems program and some basic loss prevention and security methodologies for protecting systems. 1. Asset valuation. When securing more tangible assets, the starting position is assessing value. This can appear daunting with information systems, however, it is an important first step to determining the corresponding costs reasonable to their protection. The value assigned should reflect not only replacement cost but clearly its present and future value to the business, its value to others, and of course, any liability if the asset is compromised. 2. Threat assessment. The next step is to develop a comprehensive list of all threats and risks to the asset. Threats to information systems can affect their confidentiality, integrity, and of course their availability. Simply put, risks can exists in three main areas: internal, external, and environmental. 3. Security countermeasures. Once the asset value(s) and a comprehensive view of the risks are generated, security countermeasures can be considered. The approach often favored is to set priority considerations for security countermeasures to the probability and loss potential of a threat. Although no one security solution can protect completely, there are solutions for general concerns that, when implemented, can greatly reduce risks across several areas. For an illustration, here are some general preconceived notions regarding security for Information Systems Security and the solutions for each in Table 38-1. Once an organization considers the risks and the potential security countermeasures for each asset, a 457

458


Table 38-1. Security Misconceptions and Solutions Misconception “No one can hack our systems we’re running all the latest stuff” Concern for only past risks, especially just external risks (i.e., little or no formal vulnerability assessment or broad consideration of risks) “The last thing we need is more policies or corporate programs.” This generalization automatically assumes business costs and loss impact are not worth specific communications efforts “That’s the IT staff’s job” Information systems security work is considered “other duties as required”; the technology knowledge demands along with the stakes involve require a comprehensive program “We use the longest passwords in the industry”

“We audit our systems all the time”

“Anything that happens triggers an alarm we can respond to”

“We cross that bridge when we come to it”

Issue(s)

Solution

The nature of software, hardware, networking systems, and people dictates constant attention and oversight for all risks associated with information systems; manufacturers are often “patching” system weaknesses With no formal process to outline expectations and requirements for managing systems security, it is unlikely an effective program will be created

Trained security staff working with internal subject experts, such as the information technology staff, should design comprehensive programs, which include monitoring risks, conducting periodic asset revaluations and threat assessments Several excellent outside services provide information systems security programs, including policy for clients; also through professional associations, base level policies can be tailored into a specific organizations security policy Establish as part of the security policy specific roles and responsibilities for owning security

Who owns information system security and what is the priority for maintaining it?

How many users have to write them down? Also “social engineering” is often overlooked as well, meaning employees might provide security information when put into a scenario that brings their authority or position into question Auditors are generally not trained to “test” the security of systems: Is the right expertise involved without conflict for results? Security detection methods must be established at the right sensitivity level to allow followup of every incident; if not, study after study shows they are ignored after a time Not having a basic planned response for incidents is very unwise; all responses should be considered as the consequences can effect many areas and departments

company can begin to make reasonable security decisions for the protection of their information security systems. What are acceptable risks to a company vary greatly by asset type, market timing, and tolerance for risk. An increasing factor in the analysis is the degree to which corporate reputations are at stake. For example, while a hacking incident

Reasonable and necessary methods along with strong awareness are the fabric of any successful program

Use internal contracts to bind security and IT to a formal audit or testing process; or use a professional outside service to perform this function Use firewalls and detection software that allows maximizing personnel response to appropriate incidents

Document formally when and how systems responses are managed; include clear escalation and decision-making steps

that could jeopardize customer data or availability of a sales fulfillment process with customers might be intolerable to an e-commerce site, the same hacker incident might be a reasonable risk to accept by a less dependent organization. Since no single security countermeasure guarantees the security of the information systems against

Security of Information Systems

all types of attack, a combination of components significantly reduces the possibility of a hacker successfully attacking the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of the systems and network. Effective security programs are often composed of combinations of the following possible components: 䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉䊉

Firewall(s) IDS (intrusion detection system) Integrity verification tool Content-checking tool Scanner Configuration checker Access control and authentication Virtual private network Covert security products Other miscellaneous tools

Even with these security countermeasures in place, some organizations fall into what is described by the SANS Institute and the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) as the top 10 most critical Internet security vulnerabilities. (Their mostcurrent top security concerns listing can be found on the website http://www.sans.org.) What follows is a small sample of the some of the more obvious but consistent pitfalls tracked by these organizations: 䊉

䊉

Default installations of operating systems and applications. The SANS/NIPC researchers found that most software, including operating systems and applications, comes with installation scripts or installation programs. The goal of these installation programs is to get the systems installed as quickly as possible, with the most useful functions enabled, with the least amount of work being performed by the administrator. To accomplish this goal, the scripts typically install more components than most users need. The vendor philosophy is that it is better to enable functions that are not needed than to make the user install additional functions when they are needed. This approach, although convenient for the user, creates many of the most dangerous security vulnerabilities because users do not actively maintain and patch software components they do not use. Furthermore, many users fail to realize what is actually installed, leaving dangerous samples on a system simply because users do not know they are there. Accounts with no passwords or weak passwords. Most systems are configured to use passwords as the first, and only, line of defense. User IDs are fairly easy to acquire, and most companies have dial-up access that bypasses the firewall. There-

䊉

䊉

䊉

459

fore, an attacker who can determine an account name and password can log on to the network. Easy-to-guess passwords and default passwords are a big problem; but an even bigger one is accounts with no passwords at all. In practice, all accounts with weak passwords, default passwords, and no passwords should be removed from the system Nonexistent or incomplete backups. Believe it or not, this is still a common problem in far too many organizations. Also, when backups are made, they are sometimes not protected to the degree the information contained on them requires. Large number of open ports. Both legitimate users and attackers connect to systems via open ports. The more ports that are open, the more possible ways someone can connect to the system. Therefore, it is important to keep the least number of ports open on a system necessary for it to function properly. All other ports must be closed Nonexistent or incomplete logging. No one can detect an attack without knowing what is occurring on the network. Logs provide the details of what is occurring, what systems are being attacked, and what systems have been compromised. Logging must be done on a regular basis on all key systems, and logs should be archived and backed up because they might be needed. Most experts recommend sending all of logs to a central log server that writes the data to a write once media, so that the attacker cannot overwrite the logs and avoid detection.

Conclusion Security of information systems is an increasing important and growing field, demanding expertise and professional vigilance, although challenging security solutions are meeting the growing demands of businesses who seek to use information technology in more and more ways integral to their revenue streams. Unfortunately, few security solutions are timeless. This is especially true for protecting information systems. Since the complexities and changes in technology provide great challenges for even the bestdesigned and -managed information systems security program to be effective, no system is completely secure from attacks. Table 38-1 lists some common security misconceptions and solutions. While some may seem humorous, complacency is often the most underestimated threat to security.

460


With the implementation of appropriate security measures, risks can be significantly reduced. Practitioners of information systems security must remain alert to new threats while security countermeasures and policies must be under as-needed revision to ensure that they address ever-changing security needs. In addition, all users should be educated about security issues and policies. Diligence in these areas is paramount to effective information security, and fortunately security practitioners have resources to keep them informed of many of the changes that might affect their organizations. Security practitioners should participate in a number of organizational forums to educate, share, and create new

successes as we all move further into the information age.

Security Organizations Information Systems Security Association (ISSA): http://www.issa.org/ System Administration, Networking, and Security (SANS): http://www.sans.org Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT): http://www.cert.org National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC): http://www.nipc.gov

Chapter 39 Counterespionage and Information Security Management NORMAN R. BOTTOM, Ph.D., CPP, CPO, CST, CFCO

The following definitions are from Organizing for Computer Crime Investigation and Prosecution, a National Institute of Justice (NIJ) publication, by Catherine H. Conly: Computer Abuse encompasses a broad range of intentional acts that may, or may not, be specifically prohibited by criminal statutes. Any intentional act involving knowledge of computer use, or technology, is computer abuse if one or more perpetrators made, or could have made, gain and/or one or more victims suffered, or could have suffered, loss. Computer Fraud is any crime in which a person may use the computer either directly, or as a vehicle, for deliberate misrepresentation, or deception, usually to cover up the embezzlement, or theft, of money, goods, services, or information. Computer Crime is any violation of a computer crime statute. Information Assurance is the term used by computer persons when speaking of protection of computer based data. Threat Gateways refers to vulnerabilities. A vulnerability plus a threat equals compromise of information. Protection involves minimizing threat gateways. Basic countermeasures involve threat assessment, good policy and procedures. Firewalls, Intrusion Detection software, anti-virus software, incident handling, and configuration management are included. Computer data protection, in the private sector, often involves protection, detection, and reaction. Computer Incident Response Teams (CIRT) use a six step model. It includes preparation, detection, containment, eradication, recovery, and lessons learned. The U.S.

Department of Defense (DoD) model includes protection, detection, reaction, defense, reconstitution, and recovery. Configuration Management (control) involves the management of security features and assurance by control of changes to hardware, software, firmware, documentation, and testing throughout the life of the system. More simply, it is a discipline of establishing baseline conditions and managing them. Configuration Control (management) is the process of controlling modifications to the hardware, firmware, software, and documentation that should provide assurance that the system is protected, against the introduction of improper modifications, prior to, during, and after system implementation. Defense in Depth includes perimeter protection, network, and host (PC) protection, Firewalls, intrusion detection software, network and host anti-virus software, basic auditing, and user education. File infection indicators are seen in systems that run slowly and/or there is disk drive noise. Running out of free space is another indicator. File size changes are an indicator. Unexplainable files are another indicator. Characters dropping from screens are an indicator. There are other signs, too.

Reasons for Attacking Computers Computers are attacked to steal information stored, or being processed, at the time of the theft; to conduct sabotage by destroying stored data; or to cause a disruption by distorting, or otherwise changing, data. 461

462


Methods of Attacking Computer Systems Through surreptitious entry to get access to specific computer terminals. Through use of malicious code, such as a virus, Trojan Horse, worm, or the like. Through the use of a computer terminal, within the targeted system, to gain access to data. By tapping a local area network (LAN) circuit or by monitoring signals on a wireless local area network (WLAN). By the theft of a computer (made to look like an ordinary burglary), hard drive, or storage medium such as Jazz, Zip, or floppies. By monitoring through TEMPEST radiation.

Methods of Defense Be suspicious and alert to changes, or oddities, in both the physical and logical (virtual) world. Train all line and staff employees to resist competitive intelligence elicitation and social engineering, especially road warriors (mobile executives). Road warriors should make sure there is insurance and protection for company hardware carried. Studies show 97% of stolen laptops and notebooks are not recovered. It is better to carry the database separately and arrange laptop rental at the destination. If the traveler must carry a laptop or notebook, do not put it in a case that identifies it. Use special cable locks and locking devices and alarm systems to protect it. Consider using fingerprint biometrics as part of the laptop. Without the proper finger, the device does not run. Various companies offer laptop protection: LapTrack, Computrace, Z-Trace, Stealth Signal, and Lucira. Always change system default passwords. Do not allow the sharing of user names and passwords. Use screen saver programs that activate after only few minutes of nonuse. Do not allow others to use someone else’s assigned workstation. Make sure all employees use a virus scanner on everything read, downloaded, or uploaded. Forbid distribution of illegal software and bringing in floppies or CDs from home. Look into file and printer sharing: Who is on the network? What ports are open? Who shares our cable modem line? Who is signed on to the network but is away? Control file copies. Ensure removal of originals from copy machines. Confirm that sensitive files are safeguarded.

Shred sensitive data. Thoroughly wipe diskettes, hard drives, CDs, and ZIP drives before discarding them. Control physical access to computer systems to protect them from attack through a surreptitious entry. Providing defense in depth (e.g., locks, lights, alarms, escorts, guards). Use strong authentication and encryption. Use security tokens instead of passwords. These function on two levels. Only the authorized user should possess the token and password, to unlock it. Second, tokens protect secret data, a shared secret or the public/private key pair, by performing cryptographic functions. These include key generation, negotiation, and authentication—all within the token’s circuitry. The end user and the OS cannot access the shared secret or public/private key. Two-factor authentication provides twice the assurance of a single password scheme. Use encryption to limit access to stored or transmitted data. Use end-to-end encryption to protect data broadcast over a wireless local area network. Firewalls, intrusion detection software, honey pots, and the like are the responsibility of the firewall administrator or system administrator. Protect the wiring of a local area network against tapping. Involves regular physical searches and Technical Security Countermeasures TSCM sweeps. Protect computer terminals from TEMPEST attacks. Combine HUMINT (human intelligence) with SIGNET (signals intelligence). Remember that all problems are people problems. Evaluate esprit de corps and morale. Consider the workforce. Do any workers seem deranged or disaffected? Vet (investigate) those in sensitive positions. Determining how many private electronic devices (palm pilots, PDAs, cell phones, notebooks, laptops, etc.) are on the premises. Could organized crime have an interest? What about foreign powers? Footprints in cyberspace are often forgotten. One sex site posted all those whose Internet addresses showed up in the logs.

Roots of Industrial Espionage Spying and eavesdropping are as old as humankind. Intelligence is the parent of espionage and its foe, counterintelligence or counterespionage. Intelligence is a method of providing the most accurate data available to decision makers. It involves col-

Counterespionage and Information Security Management

lecting information for later analysis. Publicly available information, often, is a mixture of lies, distortions, half-truths, and occasional facts. Such information is a poor basis for crucial decisions. Espionage activity seeks to uncover facts (unavailable from open sources) vital to the success of an organization, corporation, or nation-state. Industrial espionage seeks to penetrate the corporate protective shell. Industrial spies may try to blackmail employees. They may use competitive intelligence elicitation techniques. They may pay for information. Spies may covertly penetrate a facility to steal data or install electronic eavesdropping devices. External espionage may include surveillance, lip reading, use of parabolic (long-range) microphones, and other electronic devices. Espionage represents the dark side of information collection. Wacko groups, hackers, crackers, wackers, freaks, terrorists, competitive intelligence agents, spies, users of illegal bugs and taps, and organized crime families represent espionage threats to business, today. Political terrorists are not concerned merely with data; they want the blood and money of governments and commercial enterprises. Wacko groups commit terrorist acts and seek corporate information to assist their efforts. Organized crime seeks monetary gain through criminal activity, such as spying. Others want competitive advantage or information to sell.

Historic Attacks on Computers and Networks Three famous attacks on computers and networks include the Morris worm (1988), Kevin Mitnick’s attack on T. Shimomura (1994), and the Melissa virus (1999). In all three, one or more attacks on confidentiality, integrity, or availability took place. In all three cases, there was an absence of defense in depth. The Morris worm caused a denial of service. Many sites were completely disconnected from the Internet. (This is an availability attack.) Robert Morris, a graduate student at Cornell released a worm and injected it into the Internet. It is called a worm because it is self-replicating and self-propagating. This malicious code caused more damage than expected because it continued to infect machines already infected. (Later worms are mostly configured not to reinfect the same machines.) It cost from $200 to over $50,000 to clean infected sites. Of course, no malicious code can operate without a vulnerability. In this case, there was a hole in the debug mode of UNIX sendmail. There was another hole in the fingerd daemon.

463

Kevin Mitnick launched a confidentiality, integrity, and availability attack against Tsutomu Shimomura’s network on Christmas Eve, 1994.This network had no firewall or other perimeter defense. Mitnick probed the network to gather data (confidentiality attack) for his later actions. He learned there was a trust relationship between two systems. Mitnick, next, took advantage of an availability hole. He next launched a SYN Flood, silencing one-half of the trust relationship. Mitnick then spoofed the system, attacking its integrity by pretending to be the shut-down system. He stole large amounts of sensitive data. The Melissa virus, of March 1999, was an availability attack. It was released by desktop users who activated their Microsoft macro (very vulnerable). Melissa was originally posted on an “alt.sex” newsgroup and spread quickly over one weekend. Once opened, it attacked Microsoft Outlook address books. Melissa then e-mailed itself to the first 50 entries in each book. It did not steal, or alter, any files. But, Word documents were infected. Millions of dollars were spent removing this virus from desktop machines. Losses in productivity made this an availability attack. Remember, each case exploited a vulnerability in the system or host computer. Such vulnerabilities exist unless “patched.” Many, many sites do not keep up with “patches” or “hot fixes” and remain vulnerable. Almost every new item of software is discovered vulnerable at some time or other. It is usually the responsibility of the network administrator to make sure that these vulnerabilities are closed as quickly as they are found, with patches made available from the software manufacturer. Too often, network and firewall administrators are “too busy” or “too bushed” to keep up with noted vulnerabilities in firewalls, intrusion detection software, antivirus programs, host computer software, and the like. Vulnerabilities should be closed at the earliest possible moment, however. Systems attacked should Fail Safe or Fail Closed. These states defeat confidentiality and integrity attacks.

Recent Lawsuits 䊉

䊉

䊉

A class action discrimination suit was filed in a New York federal court due to racist e-mail. In Pennsylvania, female warehouse employees alleged a hostile work environment created in part by inappropriate e-mail. A software company paid a former employee $105,000 after she received sexually harassing messages on the company bulletin board.

464

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉


An oil company settled a sexual harassment suit for $2.2 million for e-mail postings such as “25 reason why beer is better than women.” A defense contractor sued 21 “John Doe” employees for posting confidential information on the Internet. A restaurant chain demands that Yahoo reveal the identity of 100 people who posted confidential information concerning closings and an alleged pending bankruptcy. A financial company sued a bulletin board for libelous statements. An insurance company was sued for circulating an e-mail accusing an employee of using her corporate credit card to defraud the company. Obviously, there is more to InfoSec than espionage and hacking.

Covert Action Espionage sometimes extends beyond theft. It may include covert action involving radical, often violent, attempts to harm an individual, business organization, or political structure. It is called covert because the offender seeks to disguise his or her motive, identity, or both. In one type of covert action, an agent provocateur is inserted to provoke others to commit illegal activity that they otherwise would not. Disinformation is a second type. It involves a propaganda attack based on lies, half-truths, false accusations, and doctored facts. This kind of covert action has led to demonstrations, riots, strikes, public outcry, legal action, and adverse media coverage. Sabotage is a third type of covert action. The term comes from the early years of the industrial revolution in France. Workers seeking to stop production would jam the line with a wooden shoe (sabot). Sabotage can involve fires, explosions, equipment breakdown, and other “accidents.” Terrorists, too, use covert action. They have been known to insert spies or to corrupt employees to gather information in planning assassination and kidnapping. Captured safe house documents verify the use of espionage by such groups.

Theft We lost 81 micros from our office in a Friday night raid. 72-pin SIMS were stolen and older machines with 30pin SIMS were just damaged. All the PCs were out of action for at least four days, some for two weeks. We just had not planned for such a major theft. Server data was

OK because we have a rigorous backup policy but inevitably many users had data on the C drive that was not backed up. The main problem, however, was that local administrators had no proper equipment records. They did not always know the precise type and location of the system, never mind how much memory was installed. (The Information Security Breaches 1996, NCC, Oxford House, Manchester, England.) [Note: High-tech theft is increasing and often involves violence.]

Other Causes of Information Loss Surveys indicate computer equipment failure and power failure are the most frequently reported problems. User error is the second highest cause of information loss. Natural and human-made disasters cause information loss. The “2001 Computer Crime and Security Survey” (see www.gocsi.com/prelea_ 000321.htm), confirms that the threat from computer crime and other information security exploits continues unabated and the financial cost is mounting. 䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

85% of respondents (corporations and government agencies) detected computer breaches in the last 12 months 64% acknowledged financial losses from computer breaches 40% detected system penetrations from the outside (only 25% in 2000) 38% detected DOS (denial of service) attacks (only 27% in 2000) 91% detected employee abuse of Internet access privileges, such as downloading pornography, pirated software, or inappropriate e-mail (only 79% in 2000) 94% detected computer viruses (85% in 2000)

The 2000 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey reported $10 million in losses due to laptop theft. Unauthorized web surfing cost three times that amount. Employees pose the biggest threat. Employees are known to take home Zip drives, to walk off with a notebook and even a server. Employees have been known to print out secret documents and remove them from the workplace. That same CSI/FBI Survey reported that some $66.7 million was lost due to theft of proprietary information. The infection of company equipment with viruses is often due to stupidity. Social engineering leads to employees giving passwords to the wrong party. The Love Bug used social engineering. The subject line “ILOVEYOU” enticed people to open it. What can be done? Policies, procedures, education, and reeducation help.


Think about these points: 1. Does the company restrict the personal use of any company communications devices in the workplace? 2. Do these restrictions apply to company employees, vendors, contract employees, and service personnel as well as visitors? 3. Does the company require that personal electronic gear, belonging to employee, vendors, service personnel and visitors, be checked in with the protective services department for safekeeping during working hours? 4. Are any PCs proxied, so that others, on remote PCs, can read and read/write the proxied data? 5. Is there evident hostility among any internal departments? (Attacks can be mounted internally, too.) 6. How often has the network been shut down due to attacks, from inside or outside, in the last 12 months? 7. How many office and home PCs have experienced virus attacks in the last 12 months? 8. Are employees educated and trained to resist social engineering and competitive intelligence elicitation methods? 9. Should security be a people-processing or peoplechanging activity?

Why People Steal Information Money usually comes first. At least in the case of competitive intelligence agents, undercover spies, and other mercenary types. A passage in the CIA Entrance Examination states, “Few spies who do it for money last very long” (Section 6, page 106). That is not true in the business sector. Ideologues and government spies may do their dirty work for other reasons. However, business operates for profit and so do most commercial spies. Fun, or because I can, is often touted as the reason for hacking and the like. Causes are a suspect rationale. Many hackers, crackers, wackers, and freaks claim “information should be free to all” to justify their criminal acts. This rationale is stressed by animal rights, enviro wackos, and other “earth-first” groups. Getting even is a common reason for information system sabotage. Disaffected employees are so motivated. This is the main reason for internal sabotage of information. Keep in mind that multiple reasons may be present in internal and external information theft.

465

Unless you know something about those with access to sensitive data, you may not be able to know their motivations, if any, for deviant behavior.

Types of Attacks Sensitive information, laptops, and other materials are often lost through theft or are given away, thrown away, or left unprotected.

Espionage Methods Espionage methods fall into four basic categories: 1. Human sources (informants and undercover operatives) 2. Technical means (bugs, taps, hackers, crackers, wackers, and freaks) 3. Sabotage (breaking, destroying, altering, stealing) 4. WAECUP (waste, accident, error, crime, and unethical practices) human factor threats Overt intelligence collection may be enough for the spy: Elicitation of employees using competitive intelligence methods A study of promotional material Reverse engineering of legally obtained products Examination of discarded materials (dumpster diving) An executive’s laptop is stolen to gain proprietary information. An intercepted e-mail reveals a price quote to a competitor. An elicitation technique causes a senior employee to reveal critical information. Dumpster diving reveals passwords to the enemy. Sabotage such as crashing a computer network, installing malicious code (viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and logic bombs) often takes place. These efforts may be to steal information for a business advantage, for personal profit, for revenge, or to damage a competitor’s profitability or reputation. Development of human sources (human factors) could include Proselytizing or paying an employee Inserting an undercover agent Social engineering Competitive intelligence Other means (technical) can include Using stolen keys, access cards, passwords, and access codes

466


Taping office conversations Interception of telephone calls Interception of cellular telephones and other wireless devices Interception of Fax communications Interception of e-mail Interception of computer radiated information (TEMPEST) Malicious code attacks on the host or network Confidentiality, integrity, and availability attacks (CIA) Spoofing, sabotage, or theft? Stealing property, physical or virtual Sabotage of operations, machinery, materials, processes, or other property Spoofing to create panic or disruption Here is the most likely order in which attack techniques are used: 1. Planning and executing a sophisticated competitive intelligence interview in person or on the telephone 2. Taking advantage of employees who feel little loyalty, are careless, or have weak or nonexistent work ethics 3. Breaking into a host computer or network (if the antivirus software is not up to date or the system lacks a firewall or intrusion detection software and no one reads the logs, it may be easy to break in) 4. Undercover spy operations that may go on for months, or even years, depending on the objectives of those involved 5. Electronic eavesdropping (hidden listening devices)

Rogue Use Certain programmers and others have been known to ignore network and security policies. They have installed unauthorized software, bringing it in from home or downloading it from the Internet. Sometimes, they even change the local administrator password. Draconian measures are necessary in these cases.A formal complaint should be sent to the appropriate manager, setting forth the violations of policy. No help should be given to such persons when their computers experience problems. It may be necessary to authorize an external audit, depending on the level of employee. The auditor can enumerate the risks and costs due to this policy violation. An outside voice is often listened to.

Here are some suggestions about Rogue use, offered on the Firewalls List (edited): Install a high encryption pack on the employee’s machine Change the administrator password to something like a@86_+ f,-(® If the employee tries password crackers like LOphtcrack, look at the data files and change the password to something already tried Install SMS on the machine; take control Calculate the expense incurred, project future costs, and send an internal bill to the empolyee’s department Punish his department as a whole Disable the machine’s ability to download anything from the Internet Block the employee’s high-speed access to the Internet until he or she complies with company policy; use the firewall to work both ways Disable the employee’s floppy and CD ports so that nothing can be installed without network permission Disallow access to production servers If the employee introduced a virus or something worse, terminate him or her

Competitive Intelligence “Take, v.t.—To acquire, frequently by force but preferably by stealth” (Ambrose Bierce). Few competitive intelligence techniques involve technical tools or computer expertise. Most are conversational and highly effective against the unwary. All represent psychological motivation. Social engineering, perhaps, is too weak a term for these sophisticated methods. Lowered ethical expectations are a current problem. People are often left to judge for themselves what is ethical or unethical. Some call this free-floating ethics. Old standards are sometimes lowered to fit what are perceived as new realities. Would you loan money or car keys to (or discuss confidential information with) a person whose ethics are questionable? Loyalty may be at an all-time low within corporations, today—that affects ethics, too.

Human Error Many people write passwords on Post-its or scraps of paper, taped to a monitor, desk, or drawer. These are easy to find by friend or foe. Even worse, they share sensitive data with virtual strangers, such as vendors.


Countermeasure A Take a few minutes to purge the office of posted passwords and any other operational data. Remember, too, that desk and filing cabinet locks are not secure, either.

Countermeasure B All employees should be taught to prescreen so-called sales representatives, graduate students, reporters, and others, who request insider information. They should ask questions before answering any of their questions. Employees should be wary of what appear to be spur-of-the-moment questions about the inner workings of ther company. Be wary of compliments, such as, “You are the expert, please help me.” Ask the requester, What type of information are you seeking? Who is it for? Who do you know that I know? Spell your name, provide your telephone, fax, snail mail, and e-mail addresses How will the information be used? Will you be recording the interview? Do I get a copy? Do I get a copy of your article or final report? When? “I regret often that I have spoken, never that I have been silent” (Cyrus, the Great).

The WAECUP Human Factors Protocol Most InfoSec (information security) consultants agree: “All problems are people problems.” Many business managers would rather stick with the technical stuff, ignoring the need to address human factors. Few managers, and fewer employees, realize just how many ways information can be compromised, by insiders and outsiders. However, some are looking for answers on this subject. Technical protocols are necessary for electronic information transmission. Major technical protocols used, today, include internet packet exchange (IPX), Internet protocol (IP), network basic input/output system (NetBIOS), and network basic extended user interface (NetBEUI). However, until now, there has been no protocol designed for human factor problems affecting InfoSec. Yet, it is shortsighted to neglect the human factor and to rely too much on

467

software, such as firewalls, intrusion detection, and DMZs. Some techies have stated that security vulnerability results only from features or errors in system software or configuration. That is truly “a head in the machine” approach. In the 1970s, information theft was rated almost 100% an insider activity. In the 1980s, the ratio became 80% internal and 20% external. In the 1990s, it became 50% internal and 50% external. The highest insider risk is said to come from auditing, accounting, financial analysis, marketing, inventory, and security. Insider threats are the most serious and the highest risk to any type of business. Throughout human history, people have had the same motivations, rationalizations, wants, needs, ambitions, and desires. Human nature does not change, no matter how much technology does. Therefore, neglect of human factor training is poor judgment, to say the least. WAECUP (“wake up”) is an acronym for five employee loss factors: waste, accident, error, crime, and unethical practices. These represent ways that people cause loss. Each WAECUP factor affects the integrity of sensitive information. Loss of sensitive information often occurs as the result of one or more WAECUP factors. Waste can occur when sensitive information (paper, diskettes, fax rolls, or other media) are thrown away or placed in unsecured containers. This can happen in offices, at home, in a hotel, in an airport waiting area, and so forth. Who picks up company trash and what does that firm do with it? Dumpster diving is not only an occupation of the homeless, but also commonly used by hackers, crackers, wackers, and freaks. Selling or dumping hard drives not properly wiped is a waste, too. Resource waste can be seen in failure to train employees on the dangers of discarding sensitive materials. Accidents, often called screw-ups, are due to careless practices or reckless behavior. A law office uses GroupWise, a Novell proxy program for intranet communication. Due to an accident, the result of poor instructions, proxies were created (read and read/write) on other computers, using all options. The lawyers who had been “proxied” had no clue their files, calendars, and e-mail were now an open book for users on remote PCs. The GroupWise instruction manual had been lost, accidentally, of course. Other accidents take place when sensitive cell phone conversations are overheard in public or semipublic places. The use of laptops in airports and on planes may display sensitive data, accidentally. Accidental disclosure can take place after too many drinks resulting in careless remarks to impress

468


someone. Flattery often invites accidental disclosure in person and on telephone lines. Error is often highlighted in the media. For example, former CIA Director John Deutch was found to have highly classified information on his home computer, without safeguards. How many employees think nothing of doing the same thing, installing sensitive information on personal PCs, laptops, notebooks, PDAs, palm pilots, and the like? Error is seen in careless e-mail and careless discussion of company business where it can be overheard by those who have no right to it, such as friends, acquaintances, telephone callers, and, outright strangers. Other examples include allowing vendor employees, such as service personnel, to go in and out or wander around without escort. Poor choice of passwords is an error often leading to disclosure, especially if written down and left around. Careless discussion of company business, overheard by those who have no right to it, such as friends, acquaintances, telephone callers, and, outright strangers is an error. Technical brilliance is no match for human carelessness or stupidity. In early January 2000, a team of bogus service employees, wearing Lucent shirts (such shirts can be bought.), were allowed into a Miami, Florida, company on the pretext of Y2K work. They were given unrestricted access by the receptionist and proceeded to dismantle and remove modules from the voice mail system This resulted in a $25,000 loss for new modules and labor, as well as the loss of saved, and unretrieved, voice mail messages. Of course, the company hired a guard to sit in the reception area, afterwards. Crime is defined by law. Not too long ago, the theft of information from electronic media was not considered a crime. It is now, and all employees should be aware of current state and federal laws dealing with criminal transmission of proprietary information and the applicable penalties. Unethical practices may be hard to define in this era of antiloyalty and floating ethics. Many people feel they have the right to define ethical and unethical behavior on a contingency basis. Every ethical decision hinges on whether or not the individual will be helped or harmed. (Remember, it is not wise to lend money or car keys to someone with floating ethics, who may decide it is in his or her best interest to keep them.) Many companies have codes of ethics; however, few employees are well acquainted with them. A major Florida hospital learned about unethical practices the hard way. The accounting department head asked IT to run some reports. The IT manager

said the department was too busy.A week later, there was an internal attack on the system, and it had to be shut down. The source of the attack was traced to a PC in accounting. The person assigned the PC had been off the day of the attack. Needless to say, hostility now abounds.

Human Factor Training Practices The best way to provide human factors training is to use a trainer who has prepared a WAECUP or similar presentation and is willing to use role playing training. Training must meet the audience, at its level of understanding, and be relevant to the company’s operation. Role playing is especially useful when dealing with WAECUP threats, including social engineering, coercion, trickery, flattery, implied threats, and other methods. Social engineering techniques need to be recognized. It is hard to avoid what you do not recognize.

Electronic Surveillance and Countermeasures The extent of industrial espionage has yet to be fully comprehended. We do know, however, that it exists everywhere in the world and that the United States is a particular target because of its large technological holdings. We also know that a common technique for stealing technology is electronic surveillance. The basic tool of the industrial espionage agent is the microphone, placed in such a fashion as to be undetectable to the unsuspecting. Microphone wiring, when it is used, is carefully hidden or disguised and run to the recording unit along the most direct route. The recording unit is also concealed, usually in a place entirely controlled by the espionage agent or a neutral area, which if discovered will not implicate the agent. When a microphone cannot be place within a room without detection, the espionage agent may set up in an adjacent room and place a contact microphones against the back side of the wall facing into the area to be examined. One such device is a suction cup that relies on the wall as a vibrating diaphragm for capturing sound. Another is the spike microphone, which is inserted with the point of the spike almost penetrating through the wall. Similar to the spike microphone is the pin-hole mike, a tubelike device inserted into a tiny, drilled hole in the wall. For direct listening into the ear (as opposed to direct recording by a recording unit), the espionage


agent may use a physician’s stethoscope. The espionage agent may also insert a noncontact microphone through the back side of an electrical wall plug. An espionage agent who cannot work in an adjacent room may set up in a nearby building. The microphone in this case would be the directional microphone. It is incredibly sensitive and can easily capture sounds through drapeless windows. It can also be applied in other settings, such as restaurants and parks. The directional microphone comes in three varieties: 1. The parabolic microphone that uses a small dish similar in shape to a satellite dish 2. The shotgun microphone, tube-shaped with the microphone assembly at the muzzle end 3. The machine gun microphone, with a bundle of tubes shaped somewhat in the form of a Gatling gun Of even greater sophistication are tiny batterypowered wireless microphones that are easily concealed inside everyday items like pens, jewelry, cigarette packs and lighters, or attaché cases. These miniaturized and micro-miniaturized devices work like a walkie-talkie, transmitting sound waves to a receiver/recording unit or a booster device that sends them to an even further location, where the espionage agent is safe from apprehension. When the advantage to be gained by spying is considerable, the cost of microphones is not a consideration. They are simply regarded as throwaway, expendable items. The life of a miniaturized microphone is relatively short because the size of the battery is necessarily small. The life span can be enhanced with an on/off switch that can be operated remotely. The on/off feature is also valuable when the espionage agent believes that an electronic surveillance countermeasures inspection is scheduled. In many cases, an electronic sweep of a premises is incapable of detecting nonoperating transmitters. Telephones and telephone lines are highly vulnerable to covert listening. An inexpensive device, called the drop-in, has been sold by the millions. It is put into the mouthpiece of the handset in place of the regular telephone microphone. Some activate when the handset is taken off the hook, while others are active all the time. The drop-in performs the function of the telephone’s microphone, but in addition operates like an FM radio, sending signals to the espionage agent’s recording unit. It requires no battery because it draws power from the telephone line. Telephones should be marked with labels that furl up if removed. Place them on a screw on the

469

bottom of the instrument. You can paint wires or paint over screws. Another telephone device is an induction coil attached to or secreted near the handset. Induction coils are often supplemented with amplifiers to ensure good reception. Drop-in microphones and coils are fairly easily detected by making either a good physical search of the instrument and its surrounding area or by measuring the current on the telephone line. The best defense may be to educate people about discussing sensitive information on the telephone. Almost all covert listening systems include a recording unit. The premise is that if the information is valuable enough to steal, it is valuable enough to record permanently. While the espionage agent may be a highly trained technician, he or she cannot be relied on to accurately report everything heard. Even the most determined effort to seek out surveillance devices can, at best, only reduce exposure. There are simply too many places where covert listening is possible. They start in the office or conference room where sensitive conversations are held, include the telephones, and extend along telephone lines to switching rooms and central telephone facilities. An electronic surveillance countermeasures inspection consists of two activities: a physical search and an electronic sweep. A complete physical search of every square inch should come first. Special attention should be paid to things out of place and scratch marks or dirty finger marks. The search is for hidden microphones and telltale wiring and involves looking and touching the four walls, ceiling, and floor and area contents. Electrical outlets, return air grates, and other openings on walls are examined; tiles on false ceilings are removed so that the crawl space, duct work, and conduits can be examined; rugs are lifted and carpets checked; and adjacent rooms are inspected. Furniture may be moved away from walls, turned upside down, and even disassembled; wall furnishings can be taken down and examined; lamps and electrical fixtures may be taken apart; and desk accessories and potted plants closely checked. The contents of desks, credenzas, and file cabinets are legitimate search items, as are portable items such as coffee carts. Intense focus is always on telephones. Cordless telephones and wireless intercoms are not secure. Wireless networks are not secure without end-to-end encryption. Citizens band and amateur radio transmissions are not secure. And, so it goes. The electronic sweep is much more technical. It involves use of devices such as a time domain reflectometer (TDR) to detect anomalies in telephone

470


equipment and wiring, a spectrum analyzer (SA) to detect audio signals suggestive of concealed devices, and a nonlinear junction detector (NLJD) that uses a low-power microwave beam to detect energy reflected from electronic components common to radio transmitters, tape recorders, nonoperating transmitters, and remotely controlled transmitters. Supplementary equipment can include audio amplifiers and tunable receivers. A sweep is applied to the physical areas where sensitive information is discussed, telephone terminals, and frame rooms. Remember, a thorough search and electronic sweep are not permanent protection.A bug or tap can be planted 5 minutes after the search and sweep are over. The real danger is someone bringing an electronic eavesdropping device into a sensitive meeting. It is best to leave a carrier current receiver in a briefcase in the room most susceptible to espionage. The receiver should be attached to a tape recorder.After a day or two, pick it up and see what you hear. After a sweep, return in a day or two in a vehicle equipped to check for RF signals. Search for RF transmission from your client or employer from outside the building. Have an auxiliary battery in the van and telescoping power antennas to find RF signals. Turn on the ignition for more power, if required. A fundamental principle of electronic sweeping is that every detected indication of covert surveillance must be resolved as either legitimate or suspect.

Telecommuting Telecommuting is done with portable databases, wireless application protocol, pagers, cell phones, PDAs, and the like. In 2000, Americans learned that the U.S. State Department “misplaced” three laptops containing sensitive information. (The actual number is “15 or so,” according to The Business Espionage Report, Becca Inc., June 2000.) A reward of $25,000 is offered for the return of one Dell laptop. Great Britain had two government laptops stolen in early 2000. One was returned. It contained top secret details on a fighter plane. Data was neither encrypted nor password protected. Our Los Alamos National Laboratory misplaced two sensitive hard drives, eventually found behind a copier. Private laptops are frequently stolen, too. Most thefts take place in airports and hotels. The FBI estimates that 90% are never recovered. Because of theft danger, many American hotels will not allow laptops to be checked with the bellman. (Basically you have to lug them around and worry about whether they will be stolen.) Loss of a laptop can

compromise information unless securely encrypted. Because you can connect a laptop to a workstation, sensitive information can be downloaded and removed, without notice. Here are some notebook, and laptop, security tips: Never leave a laptop unattended. Carry it in a gym bag not a laptop bag. Keep a record of the serial number. Etch your name (or company name) and telephone number on the laptop. Back up all data files before the trip. Use password security and encryption to guard file access. Finally, use a security device for lock and alarm protection. And, consider using a removable hard drive. It will be smaller and lighter than any laptop. PDAs (personal digital assistants) are available in two styles: screen based and keyboard based. Many people depend on a PDA to organize daily activity and to play with during boring periods, such as meetings. Some of these units can record one’s voice, play videos, or hold the full text of a book. They may have 32 megabytes of memory. PDAs can store thousands of numbers, calendar entries, lists, and notes. They can retrieve data from workstation computers. They can send and receive e-mail, through a PC or their own modem. Because you can connect a PDA to a workstation, sensitive information can be downloaded and removed without notice. Compact personal organizers in electronic form are a boon to busy people. They are used to keep track of meetings, telephone numbers, to store lists of clients, product data, bank account numbers, passport numbers and many other types of important information. Even a small electronic secretary may hold many sets of records and still be no larger than a pocket calculator. The information becomes indispensable, and the device is soon taken for granted. Losing electronic data from a pocket secretary can be worse than coming back to an office and finding an empty filing cabinet. Damage control can begin immediately when something has been stolen from files. Information leaks that go unsuspected are much more dangerous because the thief has a longer head start. Safeguard portable devices as though they were a personal diary. Lock it safely away from prying eyes when it is not in use. When carrying a laptop, PDA, notebook, pocket database, or similar personal organizer, Is it left unguarded while its battery is being charged, is being downloaded, or otherwise exposed to others? Does the device protect the data with a personal identification number or other code that limits access?


How are electronic diaries protected while the user is away from the office? Wireless application protocol (WAP) is in wide use, especially in Europe and Japan. It connects a mobile device (cell phone, pager, etc.) to POTS (plain old telephone system). Once out of WAP, the traffic is usually HTML. WAP has proven to be vulnerable to traffic interception and network intrusion.

Wireless Mike Dangers: An Example “We went to perform a post RF [radio frequency] inspection at a location where we conducted a sweep on the weekend. As I was thumbing through the ICOMM-7000, there pops out a conversation in one of the client’s offices. I contacted the security person in charge. He came out to the van and concluded it was their people. He ran inside, and came back out, and told me it was a presentation that did not contain any sensitive information, but the speakers were wearing wireless microphones.”This type of situation has been reported a lot over the years and illustrates a serious security vulnerability. There is an alternative to the use of wireless (radio) microphones. That is wireless microphone systems that use IR instead of RF as the transmission medium. Cell phones are becoming more sophisticated. They not only make and accept calls but offer voice mail, e-mail, and other options. Some can access websites. For example, Sprint PCS allows sending and receiving e-mail through various providers, including America Online (AOL). It has a built-in Web Browser, too. Motorola Cell Phones can be equipped to get AOL Instant Messaging. All this means danger as far as sensitive information transfer is concerned. Some pagers can send e-mail, too. Messages of up to 16K characters (five standard pages) can be sent and received. They can be sent to an e-mail address or to a Fax or voice mail site. How many pagers are in the workplace? Something to consider when you try to make a census of communication devices (public and private) on the premises. Bluetooth, a new wireless technology for voice and data, is a substitute for normal two-way radio traffic, which is subject to interception. It also takes the place of voice mail and pagers. Not only security but other departments can benefit. A wireless PBX (WPBX) works in conjunction with the regular telephone system. Some suggest Bluetooth resembles a low-power private cellular system. A system of antennas must be placed throughout the site. A scanning station, a control unit, and a number of base

471

stations are needed. Handsets are small and lightweight. They feature conference calling, call transfer, call hold, and speed dialing.

Computer Passwords Password theft usually results from human error or accident. An example would be writing down the password and leaving it easy to find. Other examples include shoulder surfing (peeking over someone’s shoulder) or dumpster diving (going through the trash). Password cracking is a brute force attempt (using special software) trying out various combinations with a view to finding yours. The Internet offers dozens of such programs (malware), free for the downloading. It may be wise to download one or two and see if you can crack the passwords on your system. Password guessing is facilitated by a poor choices of password. The use of dictionary words, common names, slang, or passwords of less than six characters, make the attack successful. This is very dangerous because the successful cracker may gain access to the entire file of encrypted passwords. Helping users select their own computer passwords is an important function. Left on their own, users often pick easily guessed passwords, or simply continue to use the default passwords supplied by the vendors. Social engineering is an attempt to trick an employee into revealing the desired password. This can be done by telephone or face to face. Two of the three password attack methods are due to human factors. Therefore, it is necessary to train all employees to resist waste, accident, error, crime, and unethical practices.

Current Security Issues Vulnerabilities remain from insider and outsider threats, which may be combined. Such combination is often due to a plant on the company payroll, such as an undercover agent (spy). Even worse, a competitive intelligence agent may elicit information from an unwise employee. Other times, blackmail or a payment may lead to insider and outsider cooperation in looting corporate secrets. All these possibilities can lead the counterespionage practitioner into extreme paranoia. Insider threats remain the most dangerous. It is necessary to limit access to sensitive information only to those who have a need to know. And, it is necessary to be able to track the insider who performed a deviant act.

472


The Y2K bug failed to bite. The federal government was moved, however, to create the National Plan for Critical Infrastructure Protection, making cybersecurity a national priority. The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) recently warned that tens of thousands of computer systems may have been polluted with “zombies” that hackers could use to remove owner control and then wreck the Internet. The NIPC further advises administrators to run the free “Find DDOS” utility. This utility is said to determine if Trojan horses are present, such as Tribal Flood Net, TrinOO, MStream, TFN2K, Stacheldraht, or Trinity v3. The NIPC further advises that virus-screening programs be kept up to date and contingency plans developed in case of attack. A practical NIPC suggestion is to enact a “lights-out” check to ensure all users have logged out of the system before they leave the office. Another useful suggestion concerns running full backups before a holiday weekend. Should systems be left running unattended, current security patches need to be in place. Here are some steps to take to reduce the threat of information loss: 1. Provide regular refresher training for all employees on security policies and procedures. 2. Ensure the use of wireless devices is covered, especially relating to connecting to the company’s infranet. 3. Improve authentication and access control (consider smart cards and biometrics). 4. Ensure compliance with the new Healthcare Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and other privacy restrictions. 5. Ensure secure business-to-business (B2B) exchanges. 6. Get involved in standards to simplify complexity in e-commerce. 7. Determine the company’s risk level, at least monthly, semi-annually, and annually.

Host-Based Perimeter Defense Vulnerability affects every host (PC) connected to the Internet, protected behind a firewall, networked with other hosts on a private network (whether connected to the Internet or not), or connected to the Internet via modem, cable modem, ISDN, ADSL, or the like. A computer connected to the Internet by a modem most likely will escape being pinged, probed, or flooded. However, if connected via broadband (cable modem, ADSL, SONET), it is a sitting duck

for hackers and crackers. Once a hacker has access to the company computer or network, he or she can run a virus, modify or delete files, or reformat the hard drive. The network should be protected as a first line of defense with firewalls, IDS, and so forth. Host perimeter defenses defend the borders of the computer. They complement network perimeter defense, providing an additional level of protection. In case of defensive failure at the network level, host-based perimeter defense becomes the first line of defense. Host-based defense is also important for home computers, notebooks, laptops, or other devices, carried by road warriors. Home computers with Internet access are often overlooked. Every home user who accesses the Internet via a service provider (ISP) is vulnerable. Personal computers are often wide open and easily accessible to most attackers. High-speed connections, always on, increase the vulnerability level. The number and type of attacks has increased further, increasing the threat level to home users. Sensitive information, such as financial records, account numbers, user names and passwords, if stored on a home computer, may be read or downloaded by attackers. Since many employees operate from home, there is more jeopardy to sensitive business records stored on a home computer. It is much easier for an attacker to break into a home computer and steal the userid and password that opens the business network to attack. Threats to home computers include social engineering, exploitation of known vulnerabilities, insertion of malicious code, and unauthorized connections—the same threats business networks face. Therefore, similar types of protection are needed on the home host. That includes firewalls and antivirus systems. Whatever firewall is used, it may fail. It should be programmed to fail closed, preventing access from outside. An intrusion detection system may be warranted, if the home commuter connects to the business network. IDS monitors network connections, detects deviant network behavior, provides alerts about common attacks in real time, and provides evidence if attackers are prosecuted. Some packet-filtering personal firewalls include BlackICE Defender (by Network Ice), PC Firewall (Conseal), NukeNabber (Dynamic Solutions, Inc.), PGP Desktop Security (Network Associates), BackOfficer Friendly (Network Flight Recorder), and Portsentry (Psionic Software). Some application-level personal firewalls are Zone Alarm and ZoneAlarm Pro (by Zone Labs),


McAfee Personal Firewall (McAfee), and Norton Personal Firewall (Symantec). Personal firewalls should be properly configured to block port scanners, be customized to cover the most commonly exploited ports, and be wary of creating denial of service. Logs must be checked frequently to locate suspicious activity. Firewall features to look for include ability to configure, logging options, triggers, investigative capacity, and responsiveness of the vendor that sold it. The ideal firewall provides procedural advice, checks the OS for configuration errors, combines application-level and datagram-level control, and has a heads-up vendor, quick to let the company know of new threats. Virus remedies for Windows include Dr. Solomon’s AntiVirus; McAfee Virus Scan; Norton Antivirus; and, PCcillin. Antivirus software for Macintosh include Dr. Solomon’s Virex and Norton Antivirus. If you wonder why there is more software for Windows, it is because Windows is much less secure than Macintosh.

E-Mail One of the earliest problems was due to sendmail software and the simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP), used to transfer messages between computers. Many, many SMTP exploits took place against UNIX platforms, equipped with sendmail. Hackers learned they could address any file on the system, including the password file. The vulnerability existed because sendmail ran in superuser mode. Hackers used this mode to take control of systems. At least 6000 networks were affected by this problem in 1999. Internal and external e-mail must be considered possible threats, even though the sendmail problem has been patched. The Melissa virus, the resume virus, Kak, Bubbleboy, IloveYou, Goner, and so on are today’s problems. Attachments must be filtered first and not opened by the recipient unless approved. Employees should not forward (Fwd) messages to other employees unless there is a business purpose. If Outlook, Outlook Express, or Eudora is in use, patches must be installed. They allow scripts, and that means a virus can be loaded without use of an attachment. Personal e-mail should be forbidden, in the strongest terms. Why? Because improper jokes, sexual innuendo, insults, and other negative things will be included in some internal e-mail. Once again, a hostile work environment draws hungry lawyers and eager government bureaucrats. There have been

473

recent mass firings of employees for sending e-mail that fostered “a hostile workplace.” Men are usually the guilty ones. Strangely, women can waste company time by accessing friends on some instant messenger program or to shop on e-Bay or other sites. Costly lawsuits and government investigations can crimp the bottom line. Defamatory, obscene, and hostile messages may lead to controversy and expense. All employees should be aware that e-mail is monitored. This awareness often fades and should be reinforced by a banner message of warning on all e-mail. On July 28, 2000, Dow Chemical announced the firing of 50 workers and the disciplining of 200 others. The problem was e-mail, including “mild to graphic pornography and seriously violent images.” The New York Times had earlier (1989) fired 22 employees for offensive e-mail. Here are points to use in making an e-mail survey: Is e-mail used in the survey area? Are company guidelines for e-mail use being followed? Are there rumors, or other indications, of e-mail misuse? What is the overall impression of e-mail confidentiality in the survey area? In addition to these points, it is necessary to monitor e-mail transmission for InfoSec threats. Key indicators may be words, phrases, or acronyms; for example, secret, R&D, and customer listing. Traffic activity and message size may cause an alert, too. If an employee is known to be a short timer, it is wise to watch that person’s messages. Many e-monitoring tools are available. Tens of millions of persons, worldwide, use e-mail with no controls of any kind. Some of them are bad guys. Nine billion e-mail messages are sent out each day? Any e-mail message may go through numerous routers where it can be copied and variously distributed. The message, itself, can be destroyed at any point before reaching its ultimate destination. And, e-mail does not go away. It can be recovered and used against the sender or employer, even if overwritten in the database. There are recovery techniques. Few seem aware of this, or there would not be so many careless comments in e-mail messages. E-mail attachments are particularly dangerous. Employees seem willing to open almost any attachment sent their way. More education and training is needed in this area. To combat this threat, bring a group of employees together, and read the following statements, one at a time.Ask for a show of hands, after reading each one. Ask whether the statement is known to be correct.

474


You will be surprised at the ignorance most folks have about e-mail. Ignorance about the hazards of email is not bliss. It is hurtful and should be eliminated, promptly. E-mail can almost always be recovered, even if supposedly deleted. E-mail may be forwarded to many people by the original and subsequent recipients. Idle remarks, made on e-mail, may result in charges of discrimination or harassment. E-mail sent on company equipment makes the communication official and may damage the company. So-called private e-mail is not private. Unless encrypted, e-mail is public. It is possible for someone to duplicate someone’s identity to send fraudulent e-mail. E-mail may be read, altered, or deleted at each server through which it passes. These same employees may be able to access their home e-mail at their workstations and send e-mail to anyone, using their home, or an alternative account? Many employees have Hotmail, Yahoo, Earthlink, and other e-mail accounts. (Does sensitive company information go out using these accounts?) Make sure a policy is in place about using company equipment for private account message transmission. If not, the policy should be drawn up and distributed before any discipline is invoked. By the way, any zero tolerance policy should be interpreted by a mature team of men and women, not by a so-called political correctness commissar. Many hoaxes are sent out via e-mail. Some are very disturbing. You can be sure your employees received one or two on their home computers. Tell your employees how they can check out questionable matters.

Local Area Network A local area network (LAN) connects various communications devices to facilitate productivity and enhance information management and communications among employees. All LAN systems have six components: transmission channel, network interface, servers, hub/switches, workstations, and peripherals. Transmission is accomplished by coaxial cable, twisted pair (copper wire), or fiber optic cable. In a hard-wired LAN, a network interface is used to connect the servers and workstations into a hub. To accomplish this interface, each workstation and server, has a removable electronic circuit board that

plugs into a connector. (Infrared light and RF are used in wireless LAN systems.) Three types of servers are used in LAN systems: communications server, file server, and print server. The communications server links workstations and other components to outside computers using a modem. A file server contains databases, programs, and other data that may, or may not, be available to all employees. The print server stores and process data to be printed. Multiple users can access any server at the same time. The danger to LAN information includes outside threats and inside threats. For example, watch out for a laptop, hidden in a closet, that is connected to the LAN. Are computers connected to the LAN and accessible when a user is on break, away from the workstation, or not in the office? Managers looking for inexpensive ways to link PCs and share peripherals find modular (telephone-type) wiring systems attractive. Once the telephone cord is installed, hooking up a LAN is as easy as plugging in a telephone. This easy hookup for computers and peripherals can provide a disgruntled employee or spy for hire an easy, unauthorized tap site almost anywhere, along what may be hundreds of feet of unprotected lines. A modular adapter kit is used to convert the connector on a central processing unit, terminal, or peripheral to modular use. This can be done for as little as $20. Modular wall jacks, snap surface mount jacks, and other telephone-type connectors are used throughout the systems. Most modular connectors and cords are readily available wherever telephone equipment is sold. A spy may purchase a double snap connector to replace the company’s single connector, or an extra connector can be installed almost anywhere on the line, even by a novice. This means that anyone who has ever installed an extension telephone probably has the expertise to tap into a computer system using modular wiring. We suggest inspection of the modular lines as part of every survey. Pay special attention to lines that cross above hallways, janitors closets, or other places accessible to outsiders. Use as few double jacks and other modular connectors as possible, so as not to leave easy, made-to-order taps for spies. Be sure security codes and encryption are used as needed. Low prices for modular systems mean few safeguards are built in. Is modular wiring used in LAN or other computer applications in the survey area? If so, visually inspect the modular wiring. List any unauthorized connectors and connections. What corrective action was taken?


Radio Links Radio links have been developed to interconnect individual computers within an office complex, for example. The radio systems employ spread spectrum modulation. From a technical point of view, this makes good sense because a number of transmitters can operate on the same frequency at the same time without interfering with each other. There are two significant factors where these systems are in use.The signals may be strong enough to be usable outside the confines of the office area and therefore vulnerable to interception. A spread spectrum signal (from an eavesdropping transmitter that is not part of the local area network) carrying room sounds out of the area might lurk among the other normal signals. It could be difficult to detect and identify under these circumstances. Spread spectrum eavesdropping transmitters specifically designed for eavesdropping on room sounds or that may be adapted to that use are increasingly available. They apparently use direct sequence spread spectrum modulation, which means that they have characteristics that are not difficult to identify if the detection device is in close proximity to the transmitting antenna. Professional TSCMTM (Technical Surveillance Countermeasures) practitioners should be careful to watch for them. This is a significant development in the security industry. Are radio links used with computers in the survey area? If so, have TSCMTM tests been performed to determine if the transmitted signals are strong enough to be usable outside the confines of the survey area? Have TSCMTM tests been performed to determine if a spread spectrum eavesdropping device is present inside the survey area? What corrective action was taken?

Encryption There are various methods of hiding information. In Edgar Allan Poe’s short story “The Purloined Letter,” a letter was transformed into a envelope and escaped detection during an intensive search. (Steganography often means hiding the message by writing in invisible ink, lemon juice, or urine.) Cryptography involves hiding the meaning of the message, rather than hiding the message, itself. A microdot involves both these methods. On November 20, 2001, the U.S. Commerce Department, through the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced the new

475

advanced encryption standard (AES) for use by the federal government. The new standard uses an algorithm called Rijndael, developed by two Belgian cryptographers. The selection of the new AES took about 5 years and included substantial input from the private sector worldwide. AES employs 128-, 192-, and 236-bit encryption to encrypt and decrypt data in blocks of 128 bits. AES is a symmetric block cipher. The AES algorithm may be implemented in software, firmware, hardware, or in a combination of these. The NIST standard became effective on May 26, 2002. Encryption provides no protection against stolen or lost keys, DOS (denial of service) exploits, traffic analysis, booby-trapped encryption programs (that modify the browser to always use the same key), or through bribing the key administrator. However, encryption has an important part to play in sensitive communication. Cryptography means “hidden writing.” Plain text is the message in original form. Cipher text is the message in encrypted form. Encryption plays a key part in defense in depth. For example, it secures Virtnal Private Network (VPN) traffic from prying eyes. When you buy things on the Net using SSL, there is encryption. In fact, encryption solves many security issues. Be aware that the bad guys use it as well as the good guys. The two basic types of key encryption use one key (symmetric) or two keys (assymmetic). Encryption, or an encryption algorithm, creates cyphertext. Key discipline means everything. Managing key creation and exchange, without compromise, are important issues. It is best to exchange keys in person creating a “web of trust.”This is not always practical. Key generation and management are often urgent issues. It is wise to remember that key negotiation is the weakest part of all encryption systems. Confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and nonrepudiation are the goals of encryption. Confidentiality means being unreadable by adversaries. Authentication means knowing, for sure, from whom the message came. Integrity means the message has not been tampered with. Nonrepudiation means it can be proved that the message actually came from the person whose name is on the message as the sender. Keep in mind that encryption algorithms are mathematical procedures, falling into several categories. They use keys, short strings or integers, to control scrambling of the plain text to produce encrypted text. Without the correct key, it is not possible to recover the plain text. Do not confuse encryption with steganography. Steganography, derived from a Greek word meaning

476


“covered writing,” tries to hide the message. The “invisible” message generated will not cause suspicion. An eavesdropper can view the message without recognizing that it hides an invisible message. Government authorities have always been heavy users of encryption in peace and war. For example, Enigma was used by Germany, while Purple was the Japanese cipher in WWII. Governments do not like being shut out of private communication. There is always tension between government agencies and civil libertarians on this issue. More and more businesses, terrorists, and organized crime organizations use encryption to secure e-mail, sign e-mail (to verify the sender), for secure VPN traffic, and to secure data in a file system. Popular protocols include TLS (SSL) for secure Web transactions, ssh for remote shell and file copy. PGP (pretty good privacy) is the most widely used e-mail encryption tool. IPSEC is widely used for encrypting network links to create VPNs. The three basic methods are substitution, permutation, and hybrid (combination). A cipher is a cryptographic substitution. Cryptoanalysis means unscrambling, or rather trying to unscramble, a message without use of the key. Remember, algorithms are used to scramble messages or data. A key contains the details of the algorithm used. Security does not depend on the algorithm but on the key, which, of course, should be memorized. Substitution uses a one-to-one substitution. For example, consider the letters A, B, C, D. In their place, we substitute J, R, Z, Q. Hence, ABC becomes JRZ. An alternate scheme is character shift. We shift each character two places. Therefore, A becomes C, and B becomes D, and so on. Both methods are easy to break. Julius Caesar used a substitution cipher for questionable jokes. Permutation keeps the same letters but changes their position within the test. For example, A, B, C becomes C, A, B. Numbers such as 1, 2, 3, 4 become 4, 1, 2, 3. These ciphers are easy to break, too. You can combine both substitution and permutation in one cipher. That becomes a hybrid cipher. Data are encrypted in one of two ways: The data are broken into blocks and each block is encrypted or the entire data steam is encrypted on a bit-by-bit basis. Block ciphers can be implemented as stream ciphers and vice versa. Block ciphers include the Caesar cipher, shift cipher, substitution cipher, Vigenere cipher, DES, and permutation (transposition) cipher. The autokey cipher is a stream cipher. VPN ciphers are streaming. The mightiest of all keys is the one-time pad. In this, the key is random. It is the same length as the message and used only once.

Crypto systems in use, today, are of three general kinds: Secret key, symmetric, private (or one key encryption—both parties have the same key). Secret key was the original approach to cryptography. This system is based on the strength of the algorithm and the length of the key. Symmetric key algorithms use the same key for encrypting and decrypting. DES, Triple-DES, AES, RC4, IDEA, and Blowfish are symmetric algorithms. Public key, or asymmetric, or dual encryption is the system in general use. PGP, RSA, ECC (error checking and correction), and SSL (secure socket layer) are asymmetric. Hash is a one-way transformation with no key encryption. As an example, we use RSA (standing for American inventors Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman). RSA was developed in 1977 and has become extremely influential in modern cryptography. It is an asymmetric cipher usually explained using three fictional characters (Alice, Bob, and Eve). Alice must create a public key. This is available to Bob and everyone else. It is used by Bob to send messages to Alice. Because it is a one-way function, it is highly secure. Alice requires a private key to decrypt messages sent to her. This private key allows her to reverse the public key and read the message in plain text. Remember, only Alice has this private key. Eve may intercept a message sent by Bob to Alice. However, Eve lacks the private key of Alice. Eve must, instead, try to use factoring to decrypt the message. Factoring is very time consuming. If Bob used large prime numbers,factoring is almost hopeless,even using computers. Someday, someone may come up with a fast way to factor RSA. It has not happened, yet. Another system is PKI (public key infrastructure). It uses two ciphers, common in cryptology. The first is a conventional, symmetric, or secret key cipher (all terms mean the same). The second is the asymmetric or public key. PKI allows the two keys to work in tandem. To use a public key requires a certification authority, a third-party stranger. A PKI system can cost several million dollars. Asymmetric, or public keys, help key distribution. Asymmetric algorithms are quite slow. Therefore, they are not used to handle bulk traffic. Asymmetric algorithms include previously mentioned RSA and Diffie-Hellman. For bulk traffic, random keys (session keys) are generated and encrypted with an asymmetric algorithms. Session keys are used, with another symmetric algorithm, to encrypt bulk traffic. Management problems often preclude the use of symmetric keys. Computers are used to store information and act as communication terminals, from which data are


transmitted to remote points. Encryption of both stored and transmitted data may be useful or even vital, if loss is to be avoided. Encryption makes communication unintelligible to uninvited listeners. It is available for most telephones (including cellular), Fax machines, computers, and video transmissions. One manufacturer even makes an encrypted Fax mailbox to protect regular transmissions from prying eyes. It works well for Faxes received at night or on weekends. Encryption is most practical when a particular communication is very sensitive, when the communication method used is very vulnerable, and when sensitive communication takes place regularly between the same points. Is encryption absolute protection? No. Encrypted transmissions can be decoded, given enough desire, time, and effort. Be sure the equipment purchased matches the company’s needs. Also, do not be lulled into a false sense of security. Other espionage methods still exist. Encryption is simply a powerful supplement in a regular InfoSec program. Some lessons to keep in mind are these: There are many possible attacks (consider them all). The adversary only needs one to work. Systems are never as secure in practice as in theory. Assumptions for effective security must not be static. No system is used properly all the time. Standardization is a two-edged sword. A security system is most vulnerable near the end of its lifetime. Security usually fails due to human error or weakness. People at the top do not understand security and often compromise it. The adversary may take control of the network, or probe it, to see what happens. The adversary knows what the company is doing and has all the tools. Do not underestimate the adversary. Are there any rules-of-thumb? Yes. Encryption should protect information only long enough for it to become stale. This may mean years to someone transmitting company formulas, months for marketing information, weeks for merger discussions, or minutes when making a stock trade. Encryption is available for all levels and priced accordingly. An encryption unit is needed at each end of the transmission, but not all such units are compatible. Varying degrees of protection are offered by different units. Finally, encryption does not protect against room eavesdropping devices or devices built into the telephones, Fax machines, or computers.

477

Some Useful Crypto Terms Authentication. Validating the identity of a person or entity Diffusion. Dissipated patterns and redundancy in the plain text Confidentiality. Prevention of eavesdropping Perfect forward security. The cipher text yields no information about the plain text Data integrity. Guarantee of no tampering Hash function. Any relationship between cipher text and plain text is obscured Nonrepudiation. It is technically impossible for a person or entity to claim nonparticipation in a cryptographically enabled transaction

Investigations “Every man has three lives—public, private, and secret” (Gabriel Garcia Marquez). The Civil Rights Acts of 1870, 1871, and 1866, must be taken into account, by other managers, and company lawyers. Relevant even today is a declaration of the 1871 act: every person who, under color of any statute . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the parties injured in an action at law.

It would be wise to discuss, with the legal staff, the following employment-related legislation: The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) of 1935 The Taft-Hartley Act (Labor-Management Act) of 1947 The Equal Pay Act of 1963 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1966 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970 The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) of 1970 Equal Opportunity Act of 1972 Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Privacy Act of 1974 Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Act of 1974 The Pregnancy Disability Amendment to Title VII of 1978 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 The Drug Free Workplace Act of 1988 The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990

478


Civil Rights Act of 1991 Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 Laws are passed by state legislators and the Congress annually; therefore, this list is not meant to be all inclusive. Be aware that those violating laws are liable to be named defendants in lawsuits.

Negligence and Employee Deviance These common law tort (a wrong) theories must be considered when an investigation is undertaken: Negligent hiring Negligent retention Negligent supervision Negligent investigation Invasion of privacy Constructive discharge Retaliatory discharge Defamation These issues affect morale and may increase turnover or cause other employees concern for their safety or ability to work. It would be wise to discuss all these issues with the legal staff before starting an internal investigation.

Tools and Techniques Employment investigations can include background checks, application verification, honesty testing, structured interviews, criminal history checks, civil litigation checks, federal or state tax lien checks, driver’s record checks, credit checks, social security number traces, education and certification verification, military record checks, medical examination, workers compensation claim history, workplace searches, surveillance, performance appraisals, computer monitoring, e-mail monitoring, and so forth. Invasion of privacy litigation may inhibit some of these tools. It depends on the policy and procedures of the employer and the rights assigned (by the employee to the employer) to check or verify information furnished. Should an employee leave, for whatever reason, an exit interview is recommended. Useful information is often obtained during such interviews. Tools and techniques do not avail unless you know where the secrets are kept. Here are some typical areas: scientific and research labs, libraries, office areas, lunch rooms, exercise spas, manufactur-

ing areas, on hard drives (in the office, on laptops, at home, and on the road), on backup tapes, on Zip drives, on Jaz drives, on USB token appliances, on CDs, in warehouses and distribution sites, in executive country, in secretarial pools, in shipping and receiving and ordering departments, and in maintenance, janitorial, and security departments. Better investigate to learn where secrets actually are kept. The multiple locations may be a surprise.

Liability The threat of employer liability affects the employer, the human resource manager, and the investigator (and, perhaps, others). Employees allege discrimination on the basis of disparate treatment (intentional discrimination) or disparate impact (unintentional discrimination). There are several areas of potential discrimination: National origin Religion Citizenship Pregnancy Race and color Age Sex Disability The penalties for discrimination may include whole or equitable relief, back pay for lost wages, attorney fees, punitive damages, and retroactive seniority or promotion. Methods of investigation must be fair, logical, and defensible, based on law. Testing must be directly related to the job. “Vision, not sight, is what makes us truly see. Honesty and an unconditional value system shape the noblest of purposes” (Jeff Kemp).

Interviewing Historically these methods have been used in varions places and times to obtain information. Trial by ordeal Trial by combat Trial by torture The third degree Hypnosis Psychotherapy Polygraph Truth serum


Voice stress analyzer (PSE) Honesty testing Some of these are seen only in movies about the Middle Ages. Due to legal and moral restrictions, American interviews must rely on the skill of an investigator to read body language and understand deceptive answers. (There are schools that teach these methods.) Vocal cues may be indications of deceit. The flow of speech may be an indicator. Audible pauses, silent pauses, sentence corrections, delays in response, and response length must be considered. Nonverbal cues include hand gestures, indirect gaze, broken eye contact, eye blinking, smile duration, leg and foot movements, and, posture changes. Deception may include masked smiles, blinking and pupil dilation, being eager to please, out of place gestures, controlled reactions, averted gaze and limited eye contact, slumped and protected posture, defensive gestures, nervousness, and changes in behavior (response). Truthfulness may include a happy smile, clear and confident gaze, appropriate gestures, direct eye contact, relaxed responses, and erect posture.

Trade Secrets Every company has trade secrets. If it holds a contract with the U.S. government, secrets can be easily lost through the Freedom of Information Act. Competitors use this act to steal secrets. If the company indicates that the information provided to the government, at its request, is confidential (Category 4), it will not be released under the act. Disaffected employees may steal secrets on the way out and start a competitive corporation. Competitors may steal secrets. Foreign governments may steal secrets. Overseas entities, used as partners, may have agents on staff. Therefore, domestic protection of secrets does not prevent international theft. Some countries are more vulnerable than others. In some countries, competitors socialize on a daily basis. That is one way secrets are lost. In the case of companies participating in the Department of Defense Industrial Security Program, classification rules and protective measures are spelled out. In the case of a company selling only to the public, there is the need to come up with a classification scheme and protective measures. The level of classification is not the job of security. The person who produces the file, or document, or widget should decide the level of secrecy. If that is not practical, his or her supervisor, or manager can

479

make the decision. Often, only those who work on the widget or file know its real value. Of course, if patent attorneys are on staff, they can speak to the classification. The classification scheme should indicate the dollar value. This aids in determining the need to investigate loss and what resources to allocate in the search. Reportable breaches in nongovernment work are often hidden, at great cost to the corporation. It may be months before security learns what happened, if ever. Engineers and others who find a secret item, document, or file missing often conduct their own search for 4 or 5 days before notifying security of the loss. This delay is very wrong. We must work to change such an attitude. The company should have an interpretive method of classification. (The U.S. government has used restricted, confidential, secret, top secret, and the like.) In case of information theft, the classification system and control aid in information recovery. It is not necessary to create a “Fort Knox” situation. It is necessary to take protective steps. Files and documents must be marked, on creation, to indicate the level of secrecy. All soft copies should be numbered and controlled. In case of a civil suit, policy, procedures, and documentation are key. If there is no attempt to protect secrets, courts do not consider them to be confidential. In the case of sensitive files, they should be encrypted. Just as farmers tend to use too much fertilizer, employees tend to make too many copies, just in case. This error can ruin a corporation or cost it millions of dollars. Investigate the copy policy. It may be necessary to relocate the copy machines and forbid the copying of sensitive documents. It is amazing how copy use goes up in cases of layoffs or mass firings. It seems that everyone leaving wants copies of whatever projects they have worked on for the last 20 years. That must not be allowed to happen. An overlay can be put on the copy machine plate indicating the corporate name and machine number. This provides a warning and allows documents to be identified. Alternatively, a slight cut, using a diamond, might be made, unobtrusively, on the glass. It will make a little mark on the paper. That will provide identification of the machine, too. Some companies arrange a red light above the machine to indicate use. Those who wish to make copies surreptitiously do not like that. A key block can protect the machine at night when most of the forbidden copying takes place. Investigate the company classification policy, and procedures to learn whether or not they are

480


followed. Look them over carefully. Perhaps, they should be rewritten. Some liaison with other security folks may help with ideas for protection. If someone offers a company stolen secrets, they should be returned and authorities notified.

“The curiosity to find out which means different regimes and empires were able to survive, often for centuries . . . led me to the conclusion that their survival was largely due to the efficient operation of their intelligence services” (Francis Dvornik).

Chapter 40 Emergency Management NORMAN BOTTOM, Ph.D., CPP, CPO, CST, CFCO

Crisis, Disaster, Catastrophe—Are You Ready? Natural Disasters include acts of God; injury, loss of life, or business interruption due to winter storms, fires, hurricanes, explosions, floods, dust storms, earth slides, lightning, tornadoes, falling aircraft and other objects, neighborhood hazards, utility outages, full or partial building collapse, and earthquakes. Human-made (technological) disasters include injury, loss of life, or business interruption due to waste, accident, error, crime, and unethical practices (WAECUP) from product contamination, fraud, loss of utilities, plane crashes, explosions, spills, full or partial building collapse, arson, environmental catastrophes, media exposure, fraud, strikes, bombs and bomb threats, sabotage, embezzlement, riots and civil disturbance, workplace violence, hackers, crackers, freaks, wackers, and various terrorist acts such as extortion, assassination, kidnapping, and hostage taking. Combined disasters reflect general incompetence and poor planning. Disasters are often classified as Level 1, Level 2, or Level 3. Level 1 is minor, lasting a day or so, with no health impact, no environmental damage of consequence, and no serious violation of state and local laws. Level 2 lasts more than a day, and affects people, wildlife, or the environment. Level 3 lasts more than several days or will be reported on for more than several days, due to human death or injury or harm to wildlife, as well as potential serious environmental impact.

Note that a government or media frenzy could cause an upgrade of the original classification. Disasters, large, medium, and small, are reported all the time. There is loss of data and proprietary information, loss of access to facilities and equipment, and often, loss of staff. Fires, floods, tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes, and terrorism are old problems. More recently, computer worms, Trojan horses, and viruses, as well as database destruction and failure of backup tapes, are increasingly common disasters. The less recovery preparation is in place, the harder it is to recover from any disaster. Yet, many corporations do not prepare. They may work for prevention; however, disasters still take place. There is said to be a high-rise building fire every week, mostly outside the United States. There is a major oil spill every few weeks. Rock concert and stadium deaths, due to uncontrolled crowd disorder, are all too frequent. Toxic waste and other environmental pollution continue to be revealed. Local flooding can be very destructive. Blizzards and whiteouts are common in some regions. Gas lines can cause explosions. These hazards can serve to cripple a business or put it in bankruptcy. Business, as usual, does not take place during a disaster affecting the corporation. Key personnel may be absent from the workplace, injured, or dead. Disorder characterizes the first response (chaos, maybe). This can last days or weeks. Cobbled together operations follow. They may operate for weeks or months before business as usual returns. If recovery plans involve relocation, many employees may be unable to go there. Five months after September 11, 2001, most companies remained unprepared, according to a survey released by Gartner Inc. and the Society for Infor481

482


mation Management. Only 13% of companies are prepared for major loss of life, but 36% have a plan in place for complete loss of physical assets and workspace. Only 28% reported having business continuity plans, while 38% said they were prepared for the loss of transportation infrastructure. The average time to construct an emergency plan is 2 months. In some cases, with multiple locations, it may take 6 months. That does not take into account drills or practices. Water is the most serious threat to computers. Fire and bad weather follow closely. While most enterprises lag behind on plans and procedures to deal with disasters that cause loss of life, most CIOs can deploy technologies to keep systems running. In the event of a power outage, 88% said they have a backup power supply. Some 70% said their organization has a backup plan. There is a severe shortage of information security personnel available for “disaster recovery and planning.” This is according to a 2001 report issued by Purdue University’s Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS). According to Purdue, only 111 IT professionals are certified in disaster planning and recovery. Leonard Eckhaus, chair of the American Federation of Computer Operations Managers (AFCOM), agrees with the Purdue assessment. The Data Center Institute (DCI) conducted a survey of 3100 data center managers after the 9/11 incidents. According to DCI, “backup and recovery plans were still not a priority.” Some important issues are the following: Does the corporation have a formal emergency plan? Is the plan enterprisewide? Is it updated annually? Are drills conducted regularly? Are there Internet, network, or local area network recovery plans? Is there a budget for disaster recovery? Is there a disaster recovery team? Is there a trained media spokesperson? A great need obviously exists for more persons qualified in emergency management. Forget hackers, the most serious threats are fire, water, and weather. Most computer claims are water related. Steam is not good either. The three main areas of emergency management are readiness, response, and recovery. Vulnerability to civil disturbances should be computed. This is contingent on primarily sociological, environmental, and geographic factors. Vulnerability

to sabotage, bombing, and arson may include criticality of the plant, the product stored or manufactured, and accessibility to the site. Disaster rcovery requires an up-to-date inventory of assets. Replacement costs must be determined. The vulnerability of each asset must be established according to type of disaster. From this point, it is necessary to determine if insurance is sufficient. Maps should be on hand showing the site and surrounding areas, including road and rail nets, the location of neighboring industrial facilities, power plants, pumping stations, and the like. The residence of key employees should be noted on the maps. Mark the distance most of the employees live from the site (e.g., 11–25 miles) or whether there is no general pattern. Note the mode of transportation used by key employees and others, for getting to and from work (e.g., 60% private vehicle, 30% bus, 10% other). A telephone tree should be established to alert employees in case of disaster. That assumes the system is operable. There must be an alternate method to reach employees, if telephone service is knocked out (including cellular traffic, which will be heavy). It, also, helps to decide what transportation medium should be used. Provisions must be made for various services, including feeding employees, emergency sleeping quarters, emergency transportation, emergency financial aid, and individual counseling services for employees. Communication equipment, a public address system (battery powered), emergency power (generators), blank forms, office supplies, and so forth need to be stockpiled. Staying in touch is a vital part of recovery. Coordination should be established with the local telephone company. Radios must be available to monitor fire department and local and state police communication. If possible, monitor hospital and ambulance radios. Communication should be set up with adjacent plants and businesses. Learn which employees are ham radio operators. Ham radio operates even when land lines and cell phones do not provide adequate service. You eat a steak, bite by bite, and you deal with an emergency the same way. Emergencies are a fact of life and require advance planning. Serious threats must be identified. Threats should be placed in categories: fatal, very serious, moderately serious, relatively unimportant, and seriousness unknown. Recovery priorities must be established (management input is necessary). The disaster team must have backups. Some team members could be injured or out of town. Assistance from other companies or public authorities should be nailed down by written agreement. Key staff

Emergency Management

members, and attendant skills, may be lost due to the emergency. Details are important. For example, how do employees exit the building if access points fail to remain secure? Who is the alternate corporate authority during disaster recovery? Are backup personnel available at all times of the day or night? Have arrangements been made for buying emergency needs (cash, purchase orders, checks)? When power goes, how will people communicate? Is there provision to remove disabled employees from the site? Are all safes fire or data rated? Are emergency supplies complete (cell phones, candles, matches, flashlights, radio, extra batteries, first aid supplies, etc.)? Is there a hot site off the premises? What happens when the security outsourcing company dies? Are there enough batteries to operate the communication system? If not, there goes voice mail, Fax capability, and voice communication. The emergency plan must be coordinated with all employees. This means contact with supervisors and managers. Depending on the type of emergency, one or more executives must have authority. This can raise hackles along the normal chain of command. The grant of authority must not come as a surprise. It should be covered in the emergency plan. Resources to deal with any emergency must be available. Little, or no, time is available once things get hectic and chaotic. The emergency plan must specify when to contact law enforcement, federal, state, or local. Each type of emergency necessitates a particular law enforcement contact. Customers and stockholders need to be advised before they see the emergency in their local paper. The plan should lay out how to make such contact and at what stage of the emergency. The designated media spokesperson must be on deck during the emergency. Planning minimizes decision making. However, an emergency management plan is only as good as the last drill (practice). The objective of planning is Prevent personal injury and loss of life. Prevent or reduce the loss of physical assets and property. Restore operations to normalcy. Emergency planning, fortunately, is generic in many respects. Critical elements to put in place include a comprehensive disaster plan; a crisis management team (CMT), a crisis management (operations) center (CMC), and a media spokesperson. The head, or chair, of the crisis management team should not be heavily involved in other responsibilities. It is a mistake to turn the design of the emergency plan over to one person. It should be a team effort.

483

Of course, it must be endorsed by senior management. CMT members should include executives from risk management, operations, financial, insurance, production and distribution, IT, facility management, lead employees, and security. In case of a disaster or catastrophe, public authorities, such as police and fire, may not be available. They will be concerned with schools, hospitals, residential areas, and their own families. It is likely that the company will be on its own for up to 72 hours. Communication is often a problem. Cell circuits may be overloaded in a disaster situation. CB units and ham radios can be very valuable assets to learn what is going on in the field. Scanners for police and fire calls are useful, too, in emergency situations. It is likely that alarm signals will be affected and circuits overloaded. Vital records must be preserved. Computer backups are important. The CMT is vitally important. The team must have frequent drills (simulations). Employees who do well should be rewarded. These drills may include table top exercises, testing of individuals, and team evaluations during mock disasters. Public authorities should be invited to participate in the drills.

The Emergency Management Plan Is Only as Good as the Last Drill The plan itself must be frequently updated. Surveys should be updated quarterly. Redundancy is important. This includes people, materials, vehicles, and other equipment. Following any disaster, there will be two intervals. Disorganization, helplessness, and bewilderment typify the first. Then recovery begins. It may be quite a while before full recovery is achieved. Recovery depends on preparation. Twelve planning elements to consider: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

Anticipate and plan for crises. Survey the situation. Design the plan. Name CMT members. Name a media spokesperson. Identify audiences to satisfy. Establish communication protocols. Train the CMT team. Train the media spokesperson. Ride out the storm. Evaluate how you responded. Rework the plan, as necessary.

Eight team training elements to consider: 1. Who will train? 2. Who will be trained?

484


3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

What type of training? How long should it be? What materials and equipment? Who will evaluate the training? What are the estimated training costs and budgets? 8. When will training be repeated? Climate, geographic location, proximity to transportation and communications systems, local press attitudes, and government attitudes to the site and its operations need to be considered. All employees should be trained in personal protection and home security. Evacuation material lists should be distributed. Community emergency plans should be handed out. It may be necessary to provide food, water, and shelter to employees’ families. Employees are much more likely to respond positively during a disaster if they feel their loved ones are safe. Waterproof covers for computer equipment is a good idea. Should it be necessary to relocate operations, some employees may be unable to go due to family responsibilities. Single parents are one group that may be unable to go, unless some provision for the children has been made. If important managers and executives are killed or hospitalized and there are no alternates, who runs things? Recovery involves accurate damage assessment and reporting. Agreements should exist with alternate supply sources. Essential raw materials, component parts, parts for machine tools and maintenance, and critical machinery should be on hand. Alternate production and distribution methods should be on hand. Subcontract agreements are useful. Salvage procedures should be established. Alternate transportation methods should be available. Recovery methods may include project management, environmental remedial measures, employee counseling, inventory, interior or exterior cleanup, demolition and debris removal, smoke or odor removal, dehumidification, electronics restoration, other equipment restoration, document restoration, data recovery, corrosion control, structural restoration, cleaning of air ducts, air quality testing, furniture and art restoration, and more. Obviously, emergency management is complex and requires a lot of thought. Human-made (commercial) disaster losses are rapidly catching up to natural disasters. There are more types, too. There have been so many humanmade disasters in recent years, they run the risk of becoming commonplace. Examples of human-made disasters that should be familiar include Three Mile Island (Pennsylvania)

nuclear leak, Bophal (India) chemical leak, Johnson & Johnson’s Tylenol cyanide deaths (United States), and Ashland Oil’s (Pennsylvania) oil tank collapse. Source Perrier (France) worldwide bottled water contamination, the Exxon Valdez (Alaska) oil spill, as well as the 1991 Sudafed capsule contamination (United States) also fit this classification. Other examples are the Sheffield (Great Britain) stadium crowd disaster and numerous mass shootings by crazed individuals (in various countries). Shooting incidents take place in schools, hospitals, and various commercial workplaces. Human-made disasters represent the third wave of disaster/crisis management. The first and second waves took place earlier in the 20th century. First, the world trembled over the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare. That followed World War II and the atomic explosions in Japan. This fear led to the first wave of disaster/crisis management. These threats were often referred to as NBC (nuclear/biological/chemical) or ABC (atomic/biological/chemical) warfare. Government agencies were created, all over the world, to provide “civil defense” for their populations. Most civil defense effort emphasized the protection of government resources and, to a lesser degree, the general population. End-of-theworld films suggested these efforts would not be good enough. The old, government civil defense agencies produced documents and stimulated production of emergency planning manuals, simulation exercises, special food and water containers, and bomb shelters. Governments seemed to accept responsibility for response to potential NBC disasters. Business relied on government to accomplish planning, direction, and resource allocation. The emergency manuals of this period are yellow with age. They are of little use in dealing with today’s human-made commercial disasters. In time, a different disaster threat began to overshadow the fear of nuclear/biological/chemical warfare. International terrorism accelerated in the 1970s. Sometimes it struck against government and its officials and sometimes against business facilities and their executives. This activity created the second wave of disaster/crisis management. Government was, and is, heavily involved in the fight against international terrorism, but it found an ally. Business began to look after its own in the face of this secondwave disaster threat. Kidnap insurance, bomb search procedures, executive protection teams, and sophisticated access control, at home and office, were typical business responses. In many parts of the world, terrorism continues to occupy attention and similar resources. Unfortunately, executive protec-

Emergency Management

tion materials and personnel are of little use in addressing the human-made disaster threat. The third wave of disaster/crisis management emerged in the 1980s. This is the main disaster threat of today. Third-wave disasters threaten environments as much as the NBC agents do. Third-wave disasters threaten life in scenarios remarkably similar to terrorism. The additional threat of the third-wave is to consumer confidence and profitability. The life of the corporation and the CEO’s future are at risk with human-made disasters. Effective response to the threat of human-made disaster is almost entirely in the hands of the business community. That is a shift from the first-wave, when government took the responsibility, and the second wave, when government and business shared responsibility. The third wave is a business responsibility (specifically the affected corporation or industry). Government has more or less opted out. Governments lack the resources and inclination to bail out corporations whose products cause harm to the ecology or who suffer from adverse publicity due to product contamination. To be unprepared is, often, the norm. The Tylenol (cyanide) experience is often mentioned as an example of successful disaster control. John Mallon, the security director for McNeil Consumer Products (maker of Tylenol for Johnson & Johnson), admitted publicly that his employer was not sufficiently prepared for this disaster. That was amply demonstrated in this case. Mallon saw very little of his family for 6 months, during 20-hour work days. He worked this hard because there was no disaster plan to follow and insufficient backup resources. Intuitive decision making and a good written policy on service to customers were a big help for this corporation. Oil spills are a particular, repetitive, disaster threat. The U.S. Office of Technology Assessment asserts that current technology can clean up about 15% of any oil spill. That means extra care should be taken in oil storage, handling, and transport. Is extra care in the handling of toxic materials the rule or the exception? American companies are not the only villains in disaster scenes. One Swiss company experienced a fire in a pesticide facility not so long ago. Water used to fight the fire became laced with pesticide. This spilled into a major river causing fish kills and pollution downstream, in several countries. The U.S. chemical industry made an effort to reduce its disaster problems. Community Awareness and Emergency Response (CAER) is a voluntary program sponsored by the Chemical Manufacturers Association, located in Washington, DC. Chemical

485

facilities in 46 states have implemented CAER over the past 5 years. This program is an attempt to integrate industry and community response to chemical disasters. Local fire and health care agencies in the United States are seldom aware of all chemical hazards present in local industry. And, few public authorities know what chemical or hazardous materials are in transit (by rail or road) through a community, on any given day. This ignorance hampers local agencies in controlling chemical disasters. Yet, few corporations can fight a major chemical problem with their own resources. Multiple investigations follow every human-made disaster. Government regulatory agencies want facts. Politicians hold hearings. Lawyers and environmental groups undertake investigation for their own ends. The mass media assigns investigative reporters, working under print and video deadlines. The corporation most directly affected by the disaster certainly needs to know as much as it can. Everybody’s investigation will consider corporate conduct before, during, and after the disaster. Since it is impossible to prepare for all contingencies, expressed as disasters, several crucial issues will arise in the investigation process: 1. Did the corporation recognize and make provision for this particular disaster or type of disaster? (Has planning served to cover a class of incidents, of which this is one?) 2. Were corporate disaster measures cosmetic or done well? (Were sufficient resources allocated? Did disaster planning have a high priority? Was it all show?) 3. Did the corporation carry out its disaster control plan well, to minimize damage to property and human life? This issue is often the hardest to investigate.The affected corporation as well as the affected federal, state, and local agencies (police, emergency, and regulatory) tend to mix efforts that cloud the corporate disaster response. Common points of investigation, following a disaster, include the following documents: the risk assessment/survey, emergency management manual, documented testing and evaluation of disaster control countermeasures, and associated training of personnel at various levels. The original dates and updates or revision dates of these documents may be as important as their contents.Too often, they are out of date. Consultants can be used to keep a disaster control plan current. Unless outside experts are utilized, it is soon likely to be outdated. Many disaster management types are most familiar with the management of information systems.

486


They are, in fact, computer people, not security people. Buzz words used today in IT work include emergency action levels, risk communication, and information protocols. The topics do not cover the universe of human-made disasters. IT has produced useful software to analyze threat levels and prepare for disasters that threaten information systems. Much of that work is general enough to assist in planning for other disaster scenarios. Disaster planning should always consider a worstcase scenario. That means worst weather, favorite holiday period, all utility service knocked out or unavailable, the need to evacuate everybody on the premises, and an obligation to aid the affected (local) community. Most multinational corporations face at least a dozen, end-of-the-world disaster possibilities today and everyday. These corporations cannot prepare for all contingencies. They should select the 10 (or 12) events most likely and prepare in some detail for each event. Disaster preparation means many hours of planning followed by practice and testing. Practice and testing should be documented and analyzed for weaknesses. All levels of the corporate operation, at every site, should be included. (When the Tylenol poisoning was announced, reporters camped on the doorstep of all Johnson & Johnson facilities, regardless of their connection to the contaminated product.) Popular testing methods include use of paper and sandbox exercises as well as the simulation of an actual disaster. Disaster plans are individual to each corporation, but some things should be included in every plan: Ethical credo Organization of disaster control group Choice of media spokesperson Business continuity objectives Priorities and limitations

Types of emergencies Warning and evacuation Off-site backup Alternative site(s) Resources to be stockpiled The first item on the list may be most important. The ethical credo of an affected corporation represents its policy. Policy affects public pronouncements and gives glimpses of the “corporate soul.” The character of a corporation is defined by its public statements following a human-made disaster.Ashland Oil, following the Pittsburgh oil tank spill, said, in effect: “We take responsibility.” Exxon, on the other hand, is popularly perceived as denying responsibility for the Exxon Valdez disaster. Many believe Exxon wiggled, and wiggled, and wiggled on the hook. Ashland Oil quickly settled most of the civil suits following the Pittsburgh spill; Exxon, on the other hand, saw little Alaska daylight in the lawsuit area. The greatest problem with disasters is the surprise. In almost every crisis, perception and reality differ in the early stages. There will be confusing information, uncertainty, stress, and fatigue. Often, there is little, or no, time to think, and consequences may be unanticipated. Preparation reduces surprise and makes it easier to arrange recovery. Mistakes are common during a disaster. Too often, it is assumed that land-line telephone service will continue to work normally, cell phones will work normally, alarm signals will be sent normally, and utilities, such as water and power, will continue to provide normal service. Other, wrong assumptions are that suppliers can deliver raw materials, and shipping can find trucks to ship company merchandise. A very stupid assumption is that most employees can and will to come to work. It is always best to consider the worst-case scenario in emergency planning.

Chapter 41 The Security Professional, Terrorism, Bio-Terrorism, and the Next Level* KARL J. LEGER

The Security Professional and Terrorism In preparing to write this chapter much thought was given to the perspective from which the material should be presented. Given the recent emphasis on understanding terrorism, this chapter examines the security professional’s key responsibilities in combating threats from terrorism through its corporate security and emergency strike team functions. This chapter is meant to be a guide to the security professional and should be used with this understanding. I hope that, in addition to providing positive instruction and guidance, the chapter prompts a rethinking and evaluation of how the security function reports to management as it directs, supports, consults, and works with other departments. Also, given the nature of threat associated with terrorism, the security professional can no longer focus exclusively on the security of the organization but must also consider its mutual aid relationships and its interfaces with and support of government at the local, state, and federal levels. Like professionals in other disciplines, the security professional requires a toolbox that contains a vast mixture of core competencies in terms of skills, knowledge, and abilities. And, these vary depending on each one’s specific career path and job responsibilities. As security professionals, we understand that * This material is copyrighted © 2003 by the author Karl J. Leger—all rights reserved.

our responsibilities and levels of authority is determined by how the security function is currently integrated within the organization and depends largely on the security needs defined by senior management. Typically, management establishes its security programs after defining the level of operating or commercial risk it is willing to take and has established the appropriate controls to either retain and manage or transfer those risks. Consequently, the expansion of security responsibilities to combating terrorism depends on many factors, including but not limited to how the company is organized, the geographic locations in which it operates, its employee base, the technology it employs to conduct business, what products or services it provides, its customers, and the significance it has in government, social, and economic conditions on domestic and international issues. As you read this material, keep in mind: 1. Terrorism is a crime with a purpose. These crimes are often violent and catastrophic by design and are well planned. Terrorists use violent crime as the principle tool to make us aware of their presence and purpose. Terrorists believe that, without violent crime, their presence and message would go unnoticed and not reach the level of public importance they seek. 2. Terrorism and efforts to combat terrorism is not new. What is new is the realization that every business, organization, geographic location, and 487

488

3.

4. 5.

6.

7.

8.


building poses some opportunity for terrorists to exploit their specific agenda. As organizations and individuals, we can no longer hold on to the belief that “acts of terrorism” cannot happen to us. We must understand that we always are part of the terrorist’s ultimate goal of undermining the fundamental feeling of security that we as Americans have always had. Attempting to profile a terrorist in terms of their attributes or traits is not an exact science and has mixed success.* Security is everyone’s business; terrorism only amplifies this basic truth. The security function cannot operate in a vacuum, nor can it limit its responsibility to the physical security aspect of its organization; it must be integrated into the organization with specific responsibilities in terms of a. Directing and implementing security functions within the organization. b. Supporting other departments during normal operations and during emergency responses. c. Consulting and training employees within the organization, mutual aid organizations, and local, state, and federal government bodies. d. Evaluating the organizations capacity to execute its plans successfully through audits, drills, and exercises. e. Providing continuous improvement to all aspects of the security function. In its purest form, combating terrorism falls under the broad category of risk management and is deeply rooted in an organization’s ability to accurately define the frequency and severity of any combination of events that could be used by a terrorist organization to achieve its goals. In theory, if the risk can be defined, then one can develop appropriate preventive or mitigating actions to eliminate or substantially inhibit the possibility of a potential threat becoming a reality. The tools available to defend against acts of terrorism are organized into distinct functional groups. Technical innovation and implementation are the catalyst for the changes we will see in the development and implementation of security measures designed to combat terrorism.

The following material is divided into three major subject groups. First, it provides an overview of ter* Prepared under an Interagency Agreement by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, September 1999. Rex A. Hudson, “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why.”

rorism and the terrorist. Second, it summarizes how to assess threats from terrorists and develop effective countermeasures. Third, it presents a responsibilities matrix for security professionals and summarizes the key responsibilities under each of the corporate functions identified in the matrix.

Terrorism and the Terrorist Defining Terrorism Terrorism is not new. What is new is that, for the first time in the history of America, the general public is aware that we, as individuals and as a nation, are vulnerable. Prior to 9/11, only a handful of organizations were including the potential for acts of terrorism in their safety and security programs. Consequently, much debate has ensued over our capabilities as a nation to prevent future acts of terrorism. As a democratic society, we struggle with the decision of what are we willing to give up to make our nation more secure against terrorist activities. Regardless of where this debate takes us or how much of our freedom we ultimately give up, we must develop a thorough understanding of what we are faced with. The definitions of terrorism that follow offer insight into our national perspective on terrorism.

United States Code of Federal Regulations No one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance. Since 1983, Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) has had the following definitions of terrorism and has employed these definitions of terrorism for statistical and analytical purposes: 䊉

䊉

䊉

Terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. International terrorism means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country. Terrorist group means any group practicing or that has significant subgroups that practice international terrorism.

Department of Defense The Department of Defense defines terrorism as the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.

The Security Professional, Terrorism, Bio-Terrorism, and the Next Level

489

Paul Pillar

Understanding Terrorism

Paul Pillar, former deputy chief of the CIA’s Counter Terrorist Center, defines terrorism based on the following four elements. Terrorism is

Make no mistake in understanding terrorism for what it is. Terrorism is a premeditated crime that embraces violent and forceful acts for the purpose of supporting a group’s political, religious, or ideological agenda by

1. Premeditated—planned in advance, rather than an impulsive act of rage. 2. Political—not criminal, like the violence that groups such as the Mafia use to get money, but designed to change the existing political order. 3. Aimed at civilians—not at military targets or combat-ready troops. 4. Carried out by subnational groups—not by the army of a country.

Federal Bureau of Investigation The FBI defines terrorism as the unlawful use of force against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in the furtherance of political or social objectives. This definition includes three elements: 1. Terrorist activities are illegal and involve the use of force. 2. The actions are intended to intimidate or coerce. 3. The actions are committed in support of political or social objectives.

A Security Professional’s Definition Given these definitions of terrorism, it is worthwhile to give consideration to the broad definition a security professional should use when discussing terrorism. As security professionals, our focus should be on defining terrorism in terms that best identify the vast number of “potential terrorist acts or scenarios” possible within our respective organizations. Given these parameters, the security professional should consider one definition of terrorism as a premeditated crime that embraces violent and forceful acts for the purpose of supporting a group’s political, religious, or ideological agenda by 1. Rapidly promoting fear and a lack of confidence in one’s personal security. 2. Creating sudden and unexpected social or economic hardships in as many private, commercial, and public sectors as possible from each act of violence. 3. Gaining and maintaining as much public attention as possible.

1. Rapidly promoting fear and a lack of confidence in one’s personal security. 2. Creating sudden and unexpected social and economic hardships in as many private, commercial, and government sectors as possible from each act of violence. 3. Maintaining as much public attention as possible, for as long as possible. Terrorism is so difficult for many to understand because it attacks at the very foundation of society. It challenges our fundamental sense of security and our belief that we can peaceably resolve our differences and learn to work and live together in spite of differences in our religious, social, or political beliefs. The terrorist is not necessarily concerned with the identity of the victims. In fact, in many cases, the actual victims are secondary or irrelevant to the terrorist’s objectives. This separation between the actual victim and the terrorist’s target or objective is considered to be the hallmark of terrorism.1 Consequently, the terrorist is not like the violent criminal we are used to identifying with. Today, terrorists do a great deal of planning. Once a target is selected, the terrorist endeavors to understand the whole organizational structure of the target and the opportunities for mass destruction, death, and economic hardship available, often spending months or years learning and understanding an organization’s management and control systems. What is similar between terrorism and violent crime is that each act of terrorism needs three things to occur. First, for any crime or act of terrorism there must be intent. Second, terrorists must have the capacity to execute their plan of attack. Third, there must be the opportunity for the “act of terrorism” to occur. Consequently, terrorist targets are fundamentally driven by the opportunity to take advantage of current or future conditions to select and execute a set of criminal actions on a selected target, whether it is a location, organization, industry, religious group, country, or political faction. Specifically, terrorists target their acts of violence to those locations, systems, or organizations that have the potential to create the maximum public exposure and opportunity for their success.

490


To manage “threats from terrorism” or an “act of terrorism,” one must first understand what motivates the terrorist and how he or she chooses to work. A great deal of work has been done to understand the psychology of the terrorist. I will not endeavor to make this section a study of the mind of the terrorist, but I do want to point out that the terrorist of today is changing and much different from his or her predecessors. In the past, terrorists have not been very innovative. For years, they have selected and utilized a limited tactical arsenal. These terrorists were a collection of individuals belonging to an identifiable organization that had a clear command and control organizational structure and whose purpose was well defined in terms of a political, social, or economic objective. In the recent past, terrorists were envisioned as a fanatical cell of individuals capable of car bombings, kidnappings, airline hijackings, and other similar acts of violence. Today, terrorist organizations demonstrate that they are becoming much more sophisticated in their organizational structure and have grown in their imagination, planning, and execution of violent criminal acts. While the number of terrorist incidents declined in the 1990s, the number of fatalities associated with terrorist acts has grown. In fact, many experts believe that the level of violence associated with terrorism will continue. While hijacking, kidnapping, and drive-by shootings will continue, it is believed that the terrorist will focus on more significant events in terms of number of lives lost for each attack. Significant evidence shows that terrorists believe increased violence is the only way to capture and hold the public’s attention.2 This increase in the level of violence and death associated with terrorism is no accident. There is strong evidence that at least some terrorists believe that the public attention to their “acts of terrorism” is not enough. Remember Timothy McVeigh. He told his attorney that a nonviolent means of drawing attention to his grievances against the U.S. government would not have gotten the point across. How well we remember his words, “We needed a body count to make our point.”1 In the RAND Report, Countering the New Terrorism,1 this relationship between violence and death as a mechanism to draw attention and promote a terrorist’s message or theme is further supported. This report points out that terrorists are beginning to believe that, for their message to be heard and felt, there must be dramatic and violent consequences. Further, this report considers that the strength of our research conducted on the national, state, and private levels may not be enough to provide the collective wisdom to predict the location,

timing, event consequences, and severity of terrorist actions. When we attempt to identify potential threats of terrorism we must take into consideration the emerging psychological shift and technical capability of the terrorist in terms of intent, capacity, and opportunity to conduct criminal acts of violence to achieve their objectives. This understanding of intent, capacity, and opportunity is critical to the process of developing effective antiterrorism or defensive measures and counterterrorism or offensive measures.

Terrorist Groups and Organizational Structure The proper classification or categorization of the terrorist group is important to understanding the mindset, motivation, and ultimately the goals of the terrorist group. Fundamentally, terrorist groups can be classified by their political, religious, or ideological views, with the principle motivating factors being categorized into three groups: rational, physiological, and cultural.2 In general, each terrorist group is defined by its objectives, its religious and ideological views, its political motivation, and the geographic location of origin. The rational terrorist identifies and evaluates his or her goals, then determines the best way to achieve them. Throughout this process, the rational terrorist evaluates the benefits and risks of his or her actions. Fundamentally, rational terrorists select a course of action based on the potential of success for reaching their goal. Physiological terrorists truly believe in the cause and do not consider that their views may be wrong. These terrorists have an overwhelming need to belong to a group. Their total belief in the cause helps them dehumanize their victims, promote their hate, and encourage repeated acts of violence to justify their existence. The cultural terrorist is defined in terms of ethnic purity and membership3 in a family, clan, tribe, or other form of well-defined ethnic group or heritage. These terrorists identify themselves in terms of the organization or group to which they belong. Their upbringing and tradition play a significant role in the development of their views. Consequently, they are willing to take the lives of others with little or no remorse. Organizationally, terrorist groups are like religious sects or cults. They require their members to be totally committed to the goals of the organization,


often prohibit any centralized or decentralized subgroups, and can be organized into three groups: chain, hub, and all-channel networks.1 Of these groups the most difficult to organize, manage, and trace is the all-channel network. In fact, terrorist groups are becoming more difficult to identify because of their decentralized organization. Decentralized groups can operate without knowing a great deal about other groups within the organization. In this way, their strategic plans and key leadership can experience greater security and operate more transparently, making their detection much more difficult.

Mechanism of Violence and Associated Risk Factors It is extremely important to understand the types of weapons available to the terrorist. Without this knowledge, it is more difficult to identify possible threat scenarios and properly assess the risks associated with a mechanism of violence to establish mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery measures. To date, any reasonable review of terrorist history and the weapons of choice clearly identify that bombs have been the weapon used most often. However, given the increased need for acquiring a high body count, the modern terrorist is capable of using a wide variety of weapons. Typically, these weapons are divided into three basic categories: high tech weapons of mass destruction (WMD), medium technology weapons, and conventional weapons. Generally speaking, the categorization of a weapon is based on its capacity for destruction, technical complexity, availability, cost, and difficulty of use. The most common distinction of weapons of mass destruction is the capacity to inflict mass casualties from a single event. These are chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. While the technological challenges in developing these weapons are significant, a determined terrorist group can overcome these challenges. Medium technology weapons are most often categorized by their relative cost, availability, and destructive power. Examples of these weapons include plastic explosives and precision-guided munitions (PGM). Conventional weapons round out the traditional arsenal available to the terrorist. Examples of these weapons include conventional military weapons, rifles, homemade bombs, and dynamite. Experts generally classify terrorist incidents into five categories: biological, nuclear, incendiary, chemical, and explosive. The acronym B-NICE is an easy way to remember these categories.4 Tables 41-1

491

through 41-6 provide brief, nontechnical overviews of the incident classes. The following sources have contributed heavily in the development of these figures: Federal Emergency Management Administration, National Fire Academy, U. S. Department of Justice, U. S. Department of Defense and the Environmental Protection Agency.4 These tables were developed to provide a quick reference summary for the individual wanting to develop a basic understanding of each terrorist incident class and the type of harm that can be delivered from it. The classification of harm is typically referred to as TRACEM, an acronym for each of the six classes of harm one would expect from a terrorist incident: thermal, radiological, asphyxiate, chemical, etiological and mechanical. Table 41-6 provides the basic definition for each of these classifications. It is important to recognize that these tables do not begin to fully explain TRACEM hazards nor do they fully specify the time, distance, and shielding measures that should be fully employed. Only qualified personnel with the specific training and academic background should be involved in evaluating these threat potentials and the establishment of safety, security, and emergency management and response measures to the threats.

Assessing Threats from Terrorism and Developing Effective Countermeasures Today, more than ever, the security professional must develop an understanding of what terrorism is as well as the actions terrorists engage in. This knowledge is essential to the security professional regardless of the role played in the organization’s efforts to protect people and property from an act of terrorism. Any attempt to prevent or mitigate against an “act of terrorism” in a free, democratic society is unquestionably monumental. Where do we begin? What are the most likely targets? More important, how do we prevent these acts? Remember, for efforts to be successful, “we have to be right all the time” but to be successful “the terrorist has to be right only once.” I believe that the concept of needing to be right only once puts the magnitude of the challenge that we face in perspective. To be successful in countering terrorism, we must rethink our traditional planning process. We must add to the security and disaster management arsenal significant efforts in the establishment of effective risk management tools. We must learn how to identify each potential act of terrorism in terms of intent, capacity, and opportunity. At the very core of this

492


Table 41-1. Biological Agents Incident Class Definition and description: The FBI WMD Incident Contingency Plan defines biological agents as microorganisms or toxins from living organisms that have infectious or noninfectious properties that produce lethal or serious effects in plants and animals. These agents may be found as liquid droplets, aerosols, or dry powders. These living organisms, or the materials derived from them, have the ability to cause diseases in, or harm, humans, animals, or plants; and cause deterioration of material. TRACEM hazards: Primary—Etiologic Characteristics: 䊉 Community public health emergencies, such as a cholera outbreak or an anthrax threat 䊉 Unusual numbers of sick or dying animals and humans 䊉 The discovery of a biological agent or its release, abandoned spray devices with no distinct odors, or the release of unscheduled and unusual sprays (outdoors or at night) TDS measures: Time: Minimum contact time. Some agents can be fatal very quickly and in small amounts (ricin) Distance: Maximum when unprotected, including distance from those contaminated or exposed casualties Shielding: Maximum appropriate to the agent, including respiratory protection and splash protection Primary route of exposure: Inhalation and ingestion Potential routes of exposure: Skin absorption and injection Subgroups Bacteria and Rickettsia Virus

Toxins

Definitions, Descriptions, and Examples Single-celled organisms that multiply by cell division and can cause disease in humans, plants, or animals; for example, anthrax, cholera, plague, tularemia, and Q fever The simplest type of microorganism; lacking a system for their own metabolism, they depend on living cells to multiply and cannot live long outside of a host; cause illnesses such as smallpox, Ebola, Marburg, and Lassa fevers Substances of natural origin produced by an animal, plant, or microbe, they differ from chemical substances in that they are not human-made; toxins can be more toxic than many chemical agents; four common toxins are botulism (botulinum), staphylococcus (SEB), ricin, and mycotoxins

process is the need to have a multidisciplined team capable of identifying threat potentials and developing effective measures to eliminate or mitigate against them. Simply stated, the security professional must be intimately involved in the identification, evaluation, and development of a corporate risk management program that includes threats from terrorism. Fundamentally, this involvement will include the following key steps.

be a direct target of terrorism, it may experience an act of terrorism as a secondary target or objective through random chance or be adversely affected as an innocent party. Regardless, surviving an act of terrorism may not be possible without implementing mitigation, response, and recovery plans into the management and operating structure of the organization. While such efforts may not stop an act of violence, they can make the difference in the degree and amount of personal injury, economic hardship, and even possibly the corporate survival of the organization.

Step 1. Develop an Understanding of Terrorism and the Terrorist It is difficult if not impossible to effectively develop measures to combat terrorism without a wellrounded understanding of the fundamentals of terrorism. All too often, the concept of “it cannot happen to me” prevails as the principal attitude throughout the organization. Developing this understanding of terrorism, at a minimum, broadens the organization’s understanding that, while it may never

Step 2. Be Active in the Risk Management Process The security professional must be capable of providing significant contributions to or leading the risk management functions within an organization. If the organization has a well-defined risk management program that is effective in mitigating against and managing operating risk, then security is more likely


493

Table 41-2. Nuclear and Radiological Agents Incident Class Definition and description: In “The Effects of Nuclear Weapons,”5 the Department of Energy defines nuclear weapons as weapons that release nuclear energy in an explosive manner as the result of nuclear chain reactions involving fission or fusion of atomic nuclei. The emission of radioactive material results in one of three main types of nuclear radiation: alpha, beta, and gamma. TRACEM hazards: Primary—Radiological; Secondary—Thermal, chemical, mechanical Characteristics: 䊉 Potential for radiological dispersal device (RDD) 䊉 Unlikely to experience a fission device 䊉 Observation of nuclear placards or labels 䊉 Physical measurement of radiation TDS measures: Time: Minimum to reduce exposure Distance: Maximum from hazard Shielding: Determined by type and strength of radiation; with dirty bombs, must consider the strength of the bomb as used to spread the radioactive material Primary route of exposure: Inhalation and ingestion Potential routes of exposure: Skin absorption and injection Subgroups Nuclear weapon Dirty bomb

Alpha

Beta

Gamma

Definitions, Descriptions, and Examples Defined by the Department of Energy5 as weapons that release nuclear energy in an explosive manner as the result of nuclear chain reactions involving fission or fusion of atomic nuclei The EPA refers to this as a device that spreads radioactive material by exploding a conventional (nonnuclear) explosive, such as dynamite; these are much simpler to make than a true nuclear bomb because they do not involve the sophisticated technology required to create a nuclear explosion The heaviest and most highly charged of the nuclear particles, the particles cannot travel more than a few inches and can be stopped with a sheet of paper; they can be an internal hazard if ingested Smaller and traveling faster than alpha particles, these can penetrate through tissue but typically cannot penetrate deep enough to reach vital organs: external exposure is usually considered to be a slight hazard unless exposed to large doses of beta radiation for extended periods of time; skin burns may result from these larger dose or time exposures, but the potential is reduced if the beta particles are removed from the skin shortly after exposure; an internal hazard to organs if ingested, inhaled, or absorbed through open wounds Traveling the farthest, penetrating most materials, and attacking all tissues and organs, gamma radiation has a distinctive set of short-term symptoms, including acute radiation sickness (skin irritation, nausea, vomiting, high fever, hair loss, or dermal burns)

to be a critical component of the risk management process rather than the lead department. Conversely, security may have to lead the development and implementation of the risk management program if senior management sees risk management as a pure legal or financial process and there is no companywide emergency management program. In either case, the security professional must be capable of using, modifying or developing a risk management program that embraces the whole organization, including its 䊉

䊉

Personnel and management (i.e., key personnel, legal, accounting, risk management, etc.). Facilities.

䊉䊉

䊉䊉䊉䊉

䊉

Information technology systems. Business units (i.e., manufacturing processes or products and services it provides). Clients and partners. Industry and professional associations. Mutual aid. Local, state, and federal government agencies (including critical infrastructure). Foreign governments.

The security professional’s responsibilities matrix (Table 41-7) shows how a security professional may be involved in the corporatewide risk management process. See the section on Security Managers Responsibilities for a better understanding of this

494


Table 41-3. Incendiary Agents Incident Class Definition and description: An event in which a mechanical, electrical, or chemical device is used to intentionally initiate combustion and start a fire. The incendiary materials burn with a hot flame for a designated period of time with the purpose of setting other materials and structures on fire. Each incendiary device consists of three basic components: an igniter or fuse, a container (body), and the incendiary material. TRACEM hazards: Primary—Thermal; Secondary—Asphyxiants, chemical, mechanical Characteristics: 䊉 Presence of multiple fires 䊉 Remains of incendiary devices or components 䊉 Odors of accelerants such as gasoline 䊉 Unusually heavy burning or high fire volume TDS measures: Time: Minimum exposure Distance: Maximum with personal protection equipment (PPE) Shielding: Appropriate PPE and avoid potential areas of structural collapse Subgroups

Definitions, Descriptions, and Examples

Igniter/fuse

The Department of Defense classifies igniters and fuses into general categories and more specific categories based on their construction; a basic definition is that an igniter is an article containing one or more explosive substances used to start deflagration in an explosive train; they may be actuated chemically, electrically or mechanically Typically constructed of glass, metal, plastic, or paper and in any shape or size, this device contains chemical materials typically in metal or other nonbreakable containers; a device that uses a liquid accelerator usually is in a breakable container such as glass Any mechanical, electrical, or chemical device used intentionally to initiate combustion and start a fire, they may be used individually or in any combination

Container

Incendiary device

matrix and the benefit it provides to organizations that fully understand what each level of management or department is responsible for and the level of authority to execute and enforce their specific decisions or actions. The selection of the right set of risk evaluation tools is essential to the development of threat scenarios, quality of the findings, and subsequent recommended courses of actions. Depending on the needs of the organization, it may be necessary to use multiple risk evaluation tools to completely identify and evaluate the potential threats from terrorism. Also, understand that both qualitative and quantitative assessment tools are beneficial when it comes to identifying and ranking threats from terrorism. In fact, sufficient professional experience and opinion support the use of both methods of evaluating potential threats from terrorism. The actual selection and use of the appropriate risk evaluation tools can be made only with a thorough understanding of the organization, its basic exposure potential, and its risk management goals. The purpose of conducting any type of hazards analysis is to identify the potential for a hazard event and qualify or quantify the risk associated with the event in terms of the probability for the event to occur, expected frequency of occurrence (likeli-

hood), and severity (impact). Many analysis tools are available to evaluate potential hazard events. The selection of the appropriate hazard analysis tool depends on the type of hazard event, its complexity, and the desired level of output in terms of qualifying or quantifying the identified vulnerability. Ultimately, the risk is typically measured in terms of frequency and severity and can be categorized in one of four categories: high frequency/high severity, high frequency/low severity, low frequency/high severity, or low frequency/low severity. The results of the hazard analysis must qualify or quantify the risk in terms of the possible outcome (consequence analysis), the likelihood of the outcome (threat assessment), and the severity of the outcome (impact analysis). At the end of the day, when the hazard analysis is complete, the results must either qualify the risk in terms of relative measurement of risk (i.e., significant, higher, normal, or low) or some quantitative measure, providing a value-based measure of frequency and severity (e.g., 98% probability that 40% of population X will sustain a loss of power for a minimum of 48 hours after event A occurs). In either case, the risk will be specified, evaluated, and to some measure, the frequency and severity of a given set of hazard event outcomes assessed.


495

Table 41-4. Chemical Agents Incident Class Definition and description: The FBI WMD Incident Contingency Plan defines chemical agents as solids, liquids, or gases that have chemical properties that produce lethal or serious effects in plants and animals. Chemical agent incidents fall into five classes: nerve, blister (vesicants), blood, choking, and irritating agents. TRACEM hazards: Primary—Chemical; Secondary—Thermal, asphyxiants, mechanical Characteristics: 䊉 Large population experiences similar symptoms within minutes 䊉 Mass casualties with no other signs of trauma 䊉 Clammy skin and pinpoint pupils are symptomatic indicators of nerve agent use 䊉 Numerous dead animals or fish or the absence of insects in a warm climate 䊉 Explosions dispersing chemicals, mists, or vapors or unscheduled release of an unusual spray TDS measures: Time: Minimum exposure time and contact with the product Distance: Maximum from the actual chemical remaining uphill and upwind as well as the contaminated areas and casualties unless personnel are properly protected Shielding: Maximum shielding is appropriate and must be selected based on the chemical(s) and its concentration; personal protection equipment must be selected based on the chemical or its mixture and concentration Subgroups Nerve agents

Blister agents

Blood agents

Choking agents

Irritating agents

Definitions, Descriptions, and Examples Interferes with the central nervous system; exposure is primarily through contact with the liquid (skin and eyes) and secondarily through inhalation of the vapor; three distinct symptoms are pinpoint pupils, an extreme headache, and severe tightness in the chest; examples include sarin, soman, tabun, and VX agent Also known as a vesicant or mustard agents, they cause severe blistering and burns to eyes, skin, and tissues of the respiratory tract; exposure is through liquid or vapor contact; examples include mustard gas and lewisite Interfering with the ability of the blood to transport oxygen and causing asphyxiation, injury results from the interference with cell respiration (the exchange of oxygen and carbon dioxide between the blood and tissues); examples are hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride Causes physical injury to the lungs; in extreme cases, membranes swell and lungs become filled with liquid, which can result in asphyxiation resembling drowning; death results from lack of oxygen, hence, the victim is “choked”; common examples are chlorine and phosgene Known as riot agents or tear gas, these cause respiratory distress, tearing, and intense pain to the skin; incapacitating agents include chloropicrin, MACE, tear gas, pepper spray, and dibenzoxazepine

Table 41-5. Explosive Agents Incident Class Definition and description: An explosive is defined by the U.S. Department of Transportation as “a substance fitting into one of these two categories: (1) any substance or article, including a device, designed to function by explosion; or (2) any substance or article, including a device, which by chemical reaction within itself, can function in a similar manner even if not designed to function by explosion.” An explosive incident is an event to which an explosives device is used as a terrorist weapon. TRACEM hazards: Primary—Mechanical; Secondary—Thermal, chemical, etiological, radiological Characteristics: 䊉 Obvious, large-scale damage to buildings or structures 䊉 Blown-out windows and widely scattered debris 䊉 Physical injury including shrapnel-induced trauma, shocklike symptoms, and damage to the eardrums TDS measures: Time: Shortest interval, explosions occur in hundredths of a second Distance: Maximum; consult the North American Emergency Response Guidebook (NAEGR) Shielding: Maximum; avoid line of sight and remember the potential for secondary devices and structural collapse Subgroups Explosive device Chemical reaction

Definitions, Descriptions, and Examples Any substance or article, including a device designed to function by explosion Any substance or article, including a device, which by chemical reaction within itself can function in a similar manner even if not designed to function by explosion

496


Table 41-6. TRACEM Definitions Thermal: Thermal harm is the result of exposure to the extreme heat or cold. Heat travels by one of four methods: conduction, convection, radiation, or direct flame contact. Radiological: Nuclear radiation that consists of one of three types of radiation. Alpha and beta radiation are found as particles, while gamma is found in the form of rays. Alpha radiation is the least penetrating of the three and not considered dangerous unless alphacontaminated particles enter the body. Expect damage to internal organs if alpha particles enter the body. Beta radiation is more penetrating than alpha radiation and can damage skin tissue. Beta particles may also harm internal organs if they enter the body. Gamma radiation is a high-energy, ionizing radiation that travels at the speed of light and has great penetrating power. Gamma rays can cause skin burns, severely injure internal organs, and have long-term physiological effects. Asphyxiation: Asphyxiants interfere with the flow of oxygen during normal breathing and may result in death. They are classified as either simple or chemical asphyxiants. Both simple and chemical asphyxiants effectively starve the body of oxygen by preventing its proper distribution. Generally speaking, a simple asphyxiant is an inert gas that displaces oxygen and dilutes the oxygen concentration level in the atmosphere below the level necessary to sustain life.

Chemical axphyxiants are also referred to as blood poisons and are far more serious. These asphyxiants are compounds that interrupt the flow of oxygen into the bloodstream or tissues and inhibit or prevent the oxygen distribution, ultimately starving the body’s cells of oxygen. Examples include carbon monoxide (CO), hydrogen sulfide (H2S), hydrogen cyanide (AC), cyanogen chloride (CR), phosgene, and aniline. Chemical: Toxic and corrosive materials are chemicals that may cause substantial harm. Both can exist as solids, liquids, or gases. Toxic materials produce harmful effects depending on the concentration of the material and the length of exposure to them. Both chronic and acute exposure to toxic materials are possible. Examples of toxic materials include nerve agents. Corrosive materials are liquids or solids that cause visible destruction or irreversible alterations to human skin tissue at the site of contact as well as have a severe corrosion rate on steel or aluminum. An example of a corrosive material is sulfuric acid. Note: Blister agents also behave like corrosives. Etiologic: This type of harm involves exposure to a living microorganism or its toxin, which causes or may cause human diseases. Mechanical: This is the most common hazard. It causes trauma from contact with either mechanical or physical hazards such as explosive devices (bombs).

Step 3. Prepare a Report of the Findings and Recommendations

technical detail. Regardless, each report should be organized in manner that facilitates the reader in understanding the objective or goal of the risk assessment, the method of analysis, a description of the system being evaluated, the identification of hazard event potentials, the findings of the hazards analysis team, the risk ranking and recommendations for corrective actions. Table 41-8 provides a generic outline for a risk assessment report.

How the results, recommendations, and corrective actions of a risk assessment are reported is a topic of great debate. Ultimately, how the report of findings is presented depends on the risk management and legal philosophy of an organization or government agency. Today more than ever, the results of a risk assessment can be a passport for unscrupulous individuals or terrorists to exploit an organization’s vulnerability. Remember, the risk assessment report not only identifies the hazard event potentials but also the resources, systems, and controls available to mitigate against, prevent, and ultimately prepare for and respond to a given hazard event. With this knowledge, the task of developing a plan to exploit a given set of vulnerabilities becomes easy. Consequently, there is an urgent need to publish the full report using a limited distribution list as based on each individual’s level of security clearance. This means that certain aspects of the report are classified and the risk assessment team is charged with preparing multiple reports with varying degrees of strategic and

Step 4. Develop the Programs and Procedures as Approved by Management Once the risk assessment is complete, the approved corrective actions must be fully developed so that employees can be educated and trained. This is where the real work begins. The value of the risk assessment is not just in the findings. Instead, it is what an organization does to eliminate or reduce its risk to a given hazard that makes the risk assessment valuable. Regardless of the action to be taken, some level of planning and preparation must be done before employees can be educated and trained and

Table 41-7. The Security Professional’s Responsibilities Matrix Plan Components

Corporate Function

B. Critical infrastructure support

C. Communication systems and procedures

C C, R A

C C, R C, S

SE C, R See 2J

C, S

C, S

R A S, D S, D

D. Emergency management response

G. Risk-based assessment

H. Asset protection

I. Cyber security

J. Executive, employee protection

E. Training

F. Drills, exercises

SE C, R A

C, R, D C, R, D S, D, A

S, D C, R, D S, D, A

S S S

SE C, R See 1H

SE C, R D

SE SE SE

SE C, R C, S, D

S, D

S, D

S, D, A

S, D, A

S, D

D

D

D

D

C, R

C, R C, D C, D

C, R A C, S, D C, S, D

C, S, D A C, S, D C, S, D

S S S S

C, R A SE SE

C, R A

C C

C, R A S, SE S, SE

C, R A SE SE

C, R A SE SE

C, S, D

C, S

C, S, D

C, S

C, S, D

C, S, D

S

S

C, S

C, S, D

C, S

C, S, D

C, S

C, S, D

C, S, D

S

S

C, S

C, S, D C, S, D

C, S C, S

S, SE SE

C, S, SE S, SE

C, S, D C, S, D

C, S, D C, S, D

S S

S, SE SE

S, SE SE

C, S SE

C, S S, SE

C = Consult: advise and assist in the decision-making process. D = Direct: execute one’s responsibilities within a predetermined level of authority. R = Report: report to the designated contact for advice and direction. S = Support: provide the equipment, services, or personnel as required to mitigate against, respond to, or recover from an act of terrorism. A = Accounting: provide accounting information for personnel records, billing, payroll, and the like. SE = Secure: provide the necessary management, personnel, services, and equipment needed to provide physical security for personnel, facilities, or systems.

K. Physical security


1. Facilities 2. Management 3. Personnel, human services 4. Use of intelligence, information systems 5. Legal 6. Finance 7. Operations 8. Operational support services 9. Government affairs 10. Community relations 11. Mutual aid 12. Emergency strike team

A. Protection program support

497

498


Table 41-8. Outline of Risk Assessment Report Introduction: Briefly describe the risk assessment team’s charter for conducting the investigation. The introduction should set the stage for further discussion but should not address specific findings or recommendations. Purpose and scope: Establish the need for conducting the risk assessment and authorized boundaries of the investigation (e.g., a geographical area, a specific operation or process). Risk assessment approach: Identify what risk assessment methods were selected and where, when, and how they will be used in the course of the assessment. Remember, the validation of any risk assessment hinges on the ability to determine if the proper evaluation tools were used to complete each part of the risk assessment. System specification or characterization: Describe the system to be evaluated and clearly specify where the risk assessment begins. For example, this risk assessment has been designed to determine the specific nature and level of vulnerabilities associated with the potential for senior management being targeted for acts of terrorism. The risk assessment will include an examination of the personal habits (item 1, item 2, . . . item x) and professional duties and responsibilities (item a, item b, . . . item xx). The description must be detailed enough to give the reader a mental picture of the boundaries of the risk

assessment as well as clearly delineate what the team may and may not investigate. Threat statement: Establishes and explains the existing threats as known and any potential consequences that may result from each identified threat. The threat statement helps the risk assessment team further present the system specifications in terms of known exposure potentials. Report of findings: The report of findings typically has three major components: 1. Describes the results of the risk assessment (qualitative or quantitative) in terms of the possible outcomes (consequence analysis), the likelihood of the outcome (threat assessment), and the severity of the outcome (impact analysis). 2. Identifies existing controls (policies, programs, procedures and systems) and to what extent each of these either mitigates against, prepares for, or supports response and recovery efforts for a given hazard potential. 3. Recommends corrective action for each of the hazard potentials. Remember, it is critical that adequate discussion be given to each of these topics. Appendixes: The appendixes should include maps, calculations, core data, procedures, and all other materials or investigative notes used to conduct the risk assessment.

the corrective actions or recommendations identified in the results of the risk assessment implemented. For the purpose of this discussion, we focus on the planning aspect of preparing plans to protect from hazards (including threats from terrorism). Typically, there is a difference between the planning conducted by a government agency and the planning conducted by a commercial business. Government agencies tend to follow an all hazards approach to planning as published by the Federal Emergency Management Administration to comply with the Disaster Management Act of 2000. A short list of the available support material for the preparation of these plans includes the following.

ment and teams, continuity of operations and family and community preparedness.

Introduction to State and Local Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) Planning Guidance5 The purpose of this guidance is to help state and local governments fine-tune their EOPs and address critical planning considerations, including interstate and intrastate mutual aid agreements, resource typing, resource standards, protection of critical infrastructure, inventory of critical response equip-

Managing the Emergency Consequences of Terrorist Incidents—Interim Guidelines6 The interim planning guidelines are designed to provide state and local emergency management planners with a framework for developing supplemental emergency operations plans that address the consequences of a terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction. They provide a consistent planning approach that encourages the efficient integration of state, local, and federal terrorism response activities and the most-current information regarding planning and operational challenges faced by communities that have dealt with terrorist events.

Tool Kit for Managing the Emergency Consequences of Terrorist Incidents7 This tool kit provides forms, checklists, and charts to facilitate state and local planning for a terrorist incident. It includes a capability assessment survey, a


checklist of functional responsibilities, and emergency public information activities as well as tools for direction and control, managing resources, and disseminating warnings.

State and Local Guide 101. Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning8 Published in 1996, this state and local guide (SLG) outlines the preparedness, response and short-term recovery planning components that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) recommends be included in state and local emergency operations plans. It offers FEMA’s best judgment and recommendation on how to handle the entire planning process. It also encourages emergency managers to address all the hazards that threaten their jurisdictions in a single operations plan rather than stand-alone plans.

Federal Response Plan9 The federal response plan is a signed agreement among 27 federal departments and agencies and the American Red Cross that provides the mechanism for coordinating delivery of federal assistance and resources to augment efforts of state and local governments overwhelmed by a major disaster or emergency.

Federal Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan10 The Federal Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN) provides overall guidance to federal, state, and local agencies concerning how the federal government would respond to a potential or actual terrorist threat or incident that occurs in the United States, particularly one involving weapons of mass destruction.

Hazardous Materials Planning Guide 2001 Update11 This 2001 update of the National Response Team’s Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide (NRT-1) provides guidance on developing state and local emergency response plans for hazardous materials events. It can be found under “New Publications.” The National Response Team is made up of 16 federal agencies, each with responsibilities and expertise in emergency response to hazardous chemical releases, oil discharges, and other toxic spills.

499

Comprehensive Hazardous Materials Emergency Response-Capability Assessment Program12 The Comprehensive Hazardous Materials Emergency Response-Capability Assessment Program (CHER-CAP) is a comprehensive preparedness program offered by FEMA to local communities and tribal governments to address hazardous materials (Hazmat) incidents. It is designed to help communities better understand Hazmat risks, identify planning deficiencies, update plans, train first responders, and identify systemic strengths and needed improvements.

Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program Planning Guidance13 The CSEPP Planning Guidance is the primary strategic document providing state, local and Army installation planners with guidelines for formulating and coordinating emergency plans and the associated emergency response systems for chemical events that may occur at the chemical agent stockpile storage locations in the continental United States. Commercial businesses tend to follow a somewhat different approach to planning. Their focus is on developing plans to minimize business interruption, protect the environment, protect corporate assets, protect employees in the workplace, support their local mutual aid organization, and assure that their business operations pose no serious threat to the health of their employees, contractors, visitors, or the general public. These organizations rely on federally mandated regulatory compliance requirements as defined by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard, Mine Safety and Health Administration, Department of Health, and their representative state agencies. This is not to say that lessons can not be learned from both commercial business and government agencies. Rather, much is to be learned from both planning perspectives. Whether government or commercial, the goal is to develop a plan that works in the real world. This may seem like an obvious statement; however, all too often plans, policies, and procedures give great detail to the administrative and communications aspect of planning and fall short in the ability to determine specific actions to be taken in the event of specific hazard event. Key considerations to developing a good plan include the following:

500

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉

䊉


Establish the planning team— Establish the level of authority the team has to make management, administrative, and operational decisions. Establish goals and a schedule of deliverables, including a time line. Establish a budget to support the team’s efforts. Identify legal and regulatory compliance requirements. Clearly establish management, administrative, and operational constraints. Assure there is an independent mechanism to resolve conflicts between the needs and expectations of the planning team and the needs and expectations of the potentially affected departments or business groups. Develop the plan from an operational perspective. Assure that all required elements or components of the plan are identified and incorporated into the plan development process. Look beyond the organization. Remember, developing a plan of this magnitude demands effective communication and teamwork with a multitude of private and public organizations and agencies. Recognize that federal and state agencies have the responsibility, duty, and authority to take a leading position in responding to certain emergencies. Consequently, business cannot establish any plan that does not fully understand who may have jurisdictional control and how it can work within that organizational and legal structure to achieve its goals. Develop the necessary policies, programs, and procedures that mitigate against, minimize, or manage the risks identified in the risk assessment corrective actions and recommendations. Write to a level of a qualified person and establish education and training criteria to assure entry-level personnel are properly educated and trained to a level where these individuals can use these procedures. Note: This basic training does not replace or eliminate the training that a qualified individual is required to successfully complete. Establish clear performance measures to evaluate the effectiveness of the plan. Establish clear performance measures to evaluate the effectiveness of the personnel responsible for managing, implementing, executing, maintaining, and updating the plan. These measures should include the review of the plan by recognized subject matter experts, table top drills, and fullscale exercises.

䊉

Determine the level of effectiveness of all associated education and training programs.

Step 5. Educate and Train Personnel As with any high-quality program, it is the performance that counts. The potential for fully capitalizing on the new or revised policies, programs, or procedures is lost without reeducating and training personnel. The driving factor for this step should be the understanding of the organization benefits in terms of plan implementation and productivity. However, under certain conditions there may also be a regulatory requirement to educate and train personnel. Educating and training personnel requires a significant investment in terms of time, organizational assets, and financial support. Remember, this does not mean that reinventing the wheel. Instead develop a training matrix of required training including a synopsis of each training program that identifies what is covered and to what level of competency. After this matrix is complete begin identifying the specific elements of training currently being offered and who is qualified under this training. The training that is not in place or does not adequately qualify personnel under the new or revised plan (as accepted by senior management) is then identified as the minimum level of training that needs to put in place for the plan to be operational. Remember, this audit or gap analysis may identify opportunities where minor changes to existing training programs can provide substantial benefits to the establishment of an effective and complete training program.

Step 6. Implement and Maintain the Plan The implementation of the plan is often the most difficult part of the process. Old habits can be hard to break. Without full management support, implementation efforts diminish over time and implementation may not be achieved. Ultimately, this means that the hazard event potentials identified may still exist and management may not recognize their existence. The current legal and regulatory philosophy for any program is continuous improvement. I cannot think of any situation where the need to be fully prepared could be any more important. Remember, the lessons learned through the evaluation of exercise, drills, and plan reviews are critical to the continuous improvement process, however, if these learned


lessons are not integrated into the plan, then there is no long-term improvement to the plan or the organizations ability to effectively execute the plan in times of need.

The Security Manager’s Responsibilities Typically the security manager operates at different levels of authority within an organization, based on the organization management and operating structure, its current risks or threats, and the identified security goals of management. Given the understanding that the security professional’s role has expanded greatly, it becomes evident that there needs to be a better way to identify levels of responsibility and corresponding authority. Regardless of the method, the goal is to establish a risk-based review that allows management to understand the specific nature of the problem and make clear command and control decisions as to levels of responsibility and corresponding authority for all levels of management and their staffs as it relates to the overall security of their organization. The steps that follow summarize the minimum components that should be included in the risk-based approach to identify the security professional’s responsibilities and corresponding level of authority: 1. Update the organization chart down to the supervisory level of every department within the organization. 2. Using the organization chart, identify those jobs responsible for corporate security, emergency management and response, and senior-level decision making. A list of those jobs might include a. Senior management. b. Personnel or human resources. c. Legal. d. Finance. e. Insurance. f. Information systems. g. Community relations. h. Facilities management. i. Operations. j. Logistics. k. Transportation. l. Travel, lodging, and temporary housing. m. Fire wardens. n. Facilities security. o. Mutual aid. p. Emergency management and response.

501

3. Define the specific responsibilities and level of corresponding authority for each of the identified jobs. Be very specific as to what each job is responsible for, the key points of contact with other departments, and what these departments are responsible for. For example, the senior vice president of operations is responsible for all security and emergency management and response operations for company X. He or she is responsible for the review of hazard events that pose a threat to the day-to-day operations as well as those natural disaster and technological catastrophic risks. Both internal and external risks will be identified and evaluated to establish mitigation controls and prepare for the response to and recovery from each hazard potential identified. He or she shall have the authority to cross all organizational lines of authority to accomplish this goal; however, he or she shall work with the senior-level manager for each business unit or department (that is not under his or her dayto-day control) in execution of these duties. Should a conflict arise between competing goals, available resources, or philosophies the executive vice president’s decision shall prevail. Clear departmental responsibilities shall be identified on the completion of the risk review, so that the necessary organizational and operational changes can be implemented; policies, programs, plans, and procedures can be developed; personnel can be educated and trained; and plans can be implemented and maintained. The specific goal of these actions is to maintain a ready status to prudently manage these hazard events. 4. Define each job as required in component 3. 5. Define the job requirements for the security management function of the organization in terms of existing security responsibilities, security needs as defined in the company’s risk review, and all emergency management, response and recovery functions, regardless of who is responsible for them. 6. List each plan component of the company security and emergency management, response, and recovery plans. Remember, many organizations have multiple plans to deal with specific hazard events. The plan components from each plan should be listed. A clear understanding of what is in each plan component is required to complete this list. 7. Build a matrix with the first column of the matrix reflecting the critical corporate functions and departments that have been defined within the

502

8.

9.

10.

11.


organization. The second column and all other subsequent columns should reflect each plan component or element that are in the plan. See Table 41-7 for an example of what the matrix may look like. Complete the matrix using the information gathered to establish the security manager’s and professionals level’s of responsibility in terms of a. Consulting, advising, and assisting in the decision making process. b. Directing operations within a specified level of responsibility and authority. c. Reporting to the designated contact for advice and direction. d. Supporting mitigation, response, and recovery efforts by providing the equipment, services, or personnel as required to recover from an act of terrorism. e. Providing accounting function information for personnel records, billing, payroll, and the like. f. Providing physical security for personnel, facilities or systems to management, personnel, and facilities and assets. Do not attempt to fill in every box of the matrix at this time. Complete only those sections where existing information clearly defines the specific level of responsibility and authority. The open boxes in the matrix represent areas where the security manager or professional should have some level of responsibility and authority. Senior management can now determine what additional responsibilities to assign the security manager or professional. Complete the matrix and write a detailed job description of the security manager’s responsibilities and level of authority. Write a detailed job description for all other jobs listed in the matrix.

This process clearly defines the security manager’s responsibilities and corresponding level of authority, given the updated understanding of the security and emergency management, response, and recovery needs of the organization. Understand that the ability to develop and implement operations and mitigation plans or develop response and recovery plans often fails due to the lack of clearly defined responsibilities and the authority to put plans into action. Further, in times of crisis, a lack of clear command and control can paralyze any real attempt to respond to, manage, and recover from a catastrophic event. This process

of defining the security manager’s responsibilities may seem unnecessarily complex to some. I ask those individuals how they would know what the security and emergency management response and recovery needs are if they have no clear understanding of the hazard events that may cause significant harm to 䊉

䊉䊉䊉䊉

Employees, contractors, visitors, and the general public The environment The business continuity Stakeholder, shareholder, or stockholder value The community’s economic health

as a result of the ability to remain a viable, fiscally healthy company. Furthermore, how do they plan and prepare to manage these risks in a cost-effective, proactive manner. This planning and preparation is critical to an organization’s ability to be there in times of great need; whether in the corporate world, part of a volunteer organization providing critical services to a community, or responsible for a community’s safety, health, and security. Table 41-7 provides an example of what the matrix may look like. The matrix provides an organization an effective visual tool for key decision makers as they establish clear levels of command and control for specific hazard event potentials. Remember, the matrix is one output of a risk-based approach to defining the specific levels of responsibility and corresponding authority assigned to a security professional. The purpose of the matrix is to summarize the specific corporate functions and identify the role and level of responsibility the security professional would have for each plan component. Recognize this matrix is not complete. It is merely an example of what some of the components of a matrix should have. Each matrix will vary, depending on the organizational structure, the plan components, and the results of the risk assessment.

Conclusion The issue of what roles and responsibilities any security professional or manager holds in today’s world is no longer a simple determination. Gone are the days where we can think linearly and determine that security is merely a subset or support function to a business or organization. Today, the security professional must be highly trained and multidisciplined. This person must possess skills, knowledge, and abilities in several disciplines, including, just to name a few,


1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

Traditional security. Public relations. Governmental affairs. Political science. Legal and regulatory requirements. Insurance. Communications. Risk management. Strategic planning. Information systems management. Electronic surveillance systems. Logistics control. Operations. Threats of terrorism. Critical infrastructure protection. Emergency management, response, recovery. Fire science. Bomb detection. Toxicology. Emergency care. Triage. Sheltering in place and safe havens. Executive protection. Adult education. Critical stress management.

and

At the end of the day our ultimate responsibility has not changed. Our first priority is still the protection of life and company assets (including intellectual property). What has changed is how the world works. Our world has become smaller as technological capabilities increased. The speed of information, its ready access to anyone with a computer, the ability to travel undetected across borders, and how terrorists have developed neural networks or cells has made our job increasingly difficult in spite of the technology available. The security measures we take today no longer are adequate for extended periods of time. The terrorist studies our habits, systems, and procedures to access our weaknesses. The same tools we use to protect ourselves can be used against us if our risk assessments and security procedures and controls were to be discovered. We must aggressively

503

establish controls that can be altered or changed frequently, without notice or extensive training requirements and in a manner that our business operations are not adversely affected. In an effort to keep things in perspective, recognize that this chapter on the security manager and understanding terrorism, at best, is a small overview with a limited number of topics. The amount of information available and the work necessary to do justice to this topic is enormous and requires input from professionals from many disciplines. Regardless of a person’s responsibilities or career path the use of risk-based evaluation, mitigation, response, and recovery tools are critical to the security of the organization. As with any plan, all of this work is lost if the plan is not tested, exercised, evaluated, and updated. Our job is clear and our responsibility is significant. After all, our peers, managers, and community depend on us. We can not let them down. I hope in some small way this chapter is helpful to you, the security professional; because without you, corporate America will not be able to reach the next level.

References 1. Ian O. Lesser. Countering the New Terrorism. RAND. 2. U.S. Army. “Combating Terrorism.” In Stability and Support Operations (Final Draft), Chapter 8. Field Manual 100-20. 3. James Brooke. “Newspaper Says McVeigh Described Role in Bombing.” New York Times (March 1, 1997). 4. U.S. Department of Justice. Emergency Response to Terrorism Self-Study. FEMA/USFA/NFA-ERT:SS. June 1999. 5. “The Effects of Nuclear Weapons.” Washington, DC: Department of Energy, 1977. 6. http://www.fema.gov/onp/introstate.shtm. 7. http://www.fema.gov/onp/managing.shtm. 8. http://www.fema.gov/onp/toolkit.shtm. 9. http://www.fema.gov/rrr/gaheop.shtm. 10. http://www.fema.gov/rrr/frp/. 11. http://www.fema.gov/rrr/conplan/. 12. http://www.fema.gov/cgi-shl/goodbye.pl? http://www.epa.gov/swercepp/er-docs.htm#nrt-1. 13. http://www.fema.gov/library/cher-cap.shtm.

Index A Access controls, 143, 196 Adversaries categories, 140 Alarms applications, 230 area/space protection, 224, 225–230 cargo security and, 296, 299 components, system, 223–230 control, 230–231 as crime deterrence, 232 equipment overhaul, 233 false, 232–233, 234 financial institutions, 440 intrusion detection systems, 223–225 maximum security system and, 143 motion sensor survey checklist, 226–228 object/spot detection, 230 perimeter protection, 223, 224 sensors, 225 standards for, 18 transmission/signaling, 231–232 Anticipation of crime risk checklist, 9–10 Apartments safety checklist, 69–70 security, 377 Attitudinal analysis, 426–427 Awareness, 66–81 apartment safety checklist, 69–70 automatic teller machines, 80–81 avoiding becoming victim of attacker, 68–69 children safety skills, 75–77 con artist, 78–79 knowledge strategies and, 66–67 neighborhood watch guidelines, 67–68 senior citizens, crime prevention tips for, 79 small business robbery/burglary prevention, 70–72 street smarts, 77 suspicious situations to report, 73 taking action, 80 telemarketing fraud, 80 vehicle theft, 73–75 504

ATMs. See Automatic teller machines Attacker, avoiding becoming victim of, 68–69 Automatic teller machines, 442–446 case study, 442–443 crime prevention tips at, 80–81 definitions, 443–444 drive-up, 80–81 fraud, 437 guidelines, sample, 443–444 lighting guidelines, 444 location and installation guidelines, 444 owner responsibility, 442 safety checklist, 446 safety tips, 445 walk-up, 81 B Bolts, 175–176, 177 attacks on, 189–190 deadbolt, 176, 177 jimmying and prying, 189–190 latch, 175–176 peeling, 190 punching, 190 sawing, 190 Bombs, 266–276 command center, 272–273 decision time, 269–270 evacuation, 270 explosion types, 258 guard service and, 257–258 incident report, 272 mail handlers and suspicious mail procedures, 275–276 news media handling and, 272 responding to bomb threats, 269 search teams, 270 search technique, 270–272 searching for, 257–258 security against incidents, 267–269 security preparation, 267 suspicious package alert checklist, 273 telephone threat checklist, 269 threat checklist, 274

threats, 257, 266 when suspicious object located, 272 Branch banks and CPTED, 109, 110, 111 Building access windows and glass, 12 Building design exterior access checklist, 11–12 interior checklist, 11 Building site security and contractors, 10–11 Burglar alarms, residential, 70 C Campus security, 350–356 administration office security programs, 355 bicycle theft prevention, 355 Campus Security Act (1990), 353–354 commitment, 351 communication, 350 crime prevention, 352 crime prevention program key elements, 350–351 intrusion alarms, 356 neighborhood watch, 354–355 Operation Identification, 355 planning, 351 preparation, 351–352 programs, specific, 352–353 reevaluation and reassessment of crime prevention, 352 telephones, 355 thefts in library, 355 Card access control checklist, 13–14 Cargo security, 279–311 alarm and communication systems, 296, 299–300 barriers checklist, 298 buildings, 294–295 checklist, 298–303 conditions influencing security, 280 controlled areas, 286 documentation, 289–292, 309–310 documents, commercial types of, 309–310 exclusion area, 286 falsified document, 291

Index

fences and gates, 295 gatehouses, 295 guard requirements, 296–297 high-value cargo problems, 297 inspection report forms, 307–309 in-transit storage, 285–286 liability and claims, 293–294 lighting, 296, 299 limited area, 286 locks and key control, 295, 303 lunch and break periods, 291 organized crime, 283 package and movement controls, 284, 286, 301–302 packaging, 292–293 pallet exchange, 292 pallet patterns, 291 palletization forms, 293 partially emptied carton, 291 personnel security checklists, 300–301, 303–305 physical security checklist, 306–307 pilferage, 281 prevention plan, 280 prevention standards, 294–297 private security role, 311 receipt of shipments, 290–291 seals, 285, 292 shipping and receiving areas and personnel, 288–289 stolen cargo methods, 282–283 theft, 281–283 trailers, 292 transfer points, 285 trash, 291–292 trucking operations, 284–285 vehicle control, 286–287, 297, 302–303 warehousing and storage, 287–288 CCTV. See Closed circuit television Children, safety skills for, 75–77 Citizen patrols, 28 Closed circuit television, 23, 144 access control, 245 applications, 244–245 asset protection and role of, 238–239 checklists, 13, 246–247 cost versus availability, 343 designing effective systems, 250–252 emergency and disaster plan with, 239–240 evaluation service provider, 342–343 financial institutions, 439 functional scenario for, 245–246 glossary for, 247–250 history, 237, 238

interactive monitoring, 341–344 interactive versus regular type of, 344 old technology versus new technology, 341 overt versus covert, 244 overview, 236–237 problems solved by, 244 rationale for, 341 retail security and, 336–337, 341–344 role and applications, 243–244 safety and, 241, 245 security investigations and, 241 security officer's role and, 241 shutdown and restoration and, emergency, 241, 242 standby power and communications, 240–241 summary, 245–247 surveillance, 236–252 synergy through integration, 242–243 testing, 240 for training and education of employees, 241, 242 Communications, 143–144 Communications cargo security checklist, 299–300 Con artist, 78–79 Condominiums security, 377–378 Convenience stores. See also Retail security advice for victims in, 334 CPTED and, 104, 107–109, 110 crime research on, 332–336 deterrents to robbers, 334, 335 Federal OSHA guidelines, 336 robbery considerations, 333, 334 Convention centers and CPTED, 130–131 Corridors and courtyards and CPTED, 124, 125, 126, 127 Cost-consciousness, 4 Counterespionage and information security management. See Information security management and counterespionage CPTED. See Crime prevention through environmental design Crime analysis, 22–23 Crime prevention through environmental design, 82–132 applications, 83 branch banks, 109, 110, 111 commercial environment objectives, 83, 84

505

convenience stores, 104, 107–109, 110 convention centers and stadiums, 130–132 downtown streets and pedestrian areas, 84–92 hallways and restrooms, 98, 99–100, 101, 102, 103 high school parking lots, 122, 123–124 malls and shopping centers, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105–106 office and industrial systems, 95–98 parking lots and structures, 92–94 residential environment objectives, 110, 112–120, 121 school environment objectives, 120, 121–122, 123 strategies Crime risk management. See Designing crime risk management systems Crime statistics, 420–423 organizing data, 422–423 time period considerations, 422 what to collect, 420–421 when to collect, 420 where data can be found, 421–422 why collect, 420 Cylinders, 179, 180 attacks on, 190–193 drilling, 192 hammering, 193 pulling, 190–191 punching, 192–193 wrenching, twisting, and nipping, 191, 192 D Demographic data, 423–424 Design-reference threat, 139, 140–142 Designing crime risk management systems, 410–417 client-practitioner relationship, 412 conclusion, 417 conducting security survey, 413–414 cost effectiveness, 416 crime pattern analysis, 412–413 determination of probably maximum loss, 414–416 identifying client, 411–412 methods of risk management, 414–416 recommendations to clients, making, 416–417 risk acceptance, 416 risk avoidance, 414–415 risk reduction, 415

506


Designing crime risk management systems (cont.) risk spreading, 415 risk transfer, 415–416 understanding, 410–411 Designing security with architects, 9–18 building access windows and glass checklist, 12 building design interior checklist, 11 building design exterior access checklist, 11–12 building site security and contractors, 10–11 card access control checklist, 13–14 CCTV checklist, 13 crime prevention awareness points, 15 doors, 13 intrusion alarm systems checklist, 13 layout of site, 10 lighting checklist, exterior, 14–15 lock and installation checklist, 12–13 model residential and commercial building security ordinance, 15–17 site security checklist, 10–11 standards, 17–18 storage rooms, safes, and vaults checklist, 14 Domestic violence, 402–408 abuse, 402–403 conclusion, 407 elderly and grandparent abuse, 406 facts about, 403–404 gay, lesbian, and bisexual abuse, 407 high cost of, 408 ignoring, 408 law enforcement response, 404 past and present, 402 protection options, 405–406 reasons women stay in abusive relationships, 405 statistics, 403 taking a stand, 408 violent relationships, 404–405 Doors, 13, 148–155, 156 defensive measures, residential security and, 25 emergency, 154–155 exterior, residential, 15–16 exterior security survey, 31–32 frames, 151–152 hardening, 149–150 hinges and weight of door, 152 hollow steel, 149

home security checklist, 39–40 interior security survey, 33 interlocking with frames, 152 personnel, 149–151 retrofit upgrading of existing doors, 151 standards for, 18 strong room, 154 terms and definitions, 196–206 vault, 154 vehicle, 152–153 Downtown streets and pedestrian areas and CPTED, 84–92 E Effectiveness analysis, 425–426 Efficiency analysis, 424–425 Electronic surveillance and wiretapping, 449–452 counterintelligence, 451 countermeasures, 450 countermeasures consultant, 450 definitions, 449 Economic Espionage Act (1996), 451–452 equipment, 450–451 miniaturization, 449 obtaining equipment, 449 shielding, 451 Emergency doors, 154–155 Emergency management, 481–486 disasters classification, 481 drills, 483–486 human-made disasters, 484, 485 investigation process issues, 485 issues, 482 plan elements, 486 planning elements, 483–484 planning objectives, 483 readiness, 481–483 recovery, 484 Emergency medical assistance, 259–260 Employees dishonest, 45–47 methods of theft by, 47 property loss of, 361 what they steal, 46–47 Entrances security checklist, residential, 26–27 Evaluation, planning, and management. See Planning, management, and evaluation Executive protection, 59–65 abduction occurrence, 64–65 awareness, every day, 63–64 family education, 63 formulating plan, 60 home and office survey, 60–61 home security suggestions, 63–64

in transit, 62–63 kidnapping, 59–60 physical vulnerability, 61 procedural vulnerability, 61 risk management analysis, 60 terrorism rise in United States, 59–60 threat assessment, 60 vehicle and, 62 F Fences, 158–161, 162 entry and exit points, 161 environmental conditions, 159 penetration aids, 159 users, 158, 159 Financial institution security, 431–441 alarm systems, 438 attacks on customers, 435 automatic teller machines fraud, 437 Bank Protection Act (1998), 431–432 Bank Protection Act Revision (1991), 432 Bank Security Act, 433 burglary, 433, 434–435 camera systems, 439 check fraud, 435–437 counterfeit documents, 436 credit card fraud, 437 criminal reporting, 437–438 critical issues, 441 embezzlement, 435 Federal regulations, 440–441 forgery, 436 fraud prevention, 440 kidnap and extortion, 435 kiting, 437 loan fraud, 437 risks affecting, current, 433–437 robbery, 433, 434 robbery training, 439–440 role of security department, 433 security awareness, 439–440 security devices, 438–439 security program, 433 security training, 439–440 training organizations, 440 wire transfer fraud, 437 Fire prevention, 258–259 Fire protection, 258 Fire safety inspection, 41–43 Floors, 157, 158 G Grounds security survey, 31 Guard security checklist, 37–38 Guard service in twenty-first century, 253–265

Index

bomb search, 257–258 bomb threats, 257 criticizing employee, 263 emergency medical assistance, 259–260 fire prevention, 258–259 fire protection, 258 liabilities connected with, 253–254 personnel counseling, 263–264 power and authority, 254 report writing, 254–255 reporting medical case, 260 safety, 256–257 supervision, 260–265 techniques for setting example, 261–262 training, 254, 264–265 weapons safety, 255–256 H Hallways and restrooms and CPTED, 98, 99–100 Health care security. See Hospitals and health care security environment High level security, 137 High-rise security and fire life safety, 370–377 assets, 370 building security, 372–373 fire safety, 373–375 summary, 377 threats, 370–372 threats, life safety, 372 threats to people, 371 threats to property, 371–372 High school parking lots and CPTED, 122, 123–124 Home security checklists, 26–27, 39–40 Homeland security, 454–456 computerized training, 455–456 factors for assignment of threat, 454–455 framework, 454 objectives, 455 public announcements system, 455 as tool to combat terrorism, 455 Honesty, 44–46 Hospital and health care security environment, 357–361 accidents, 361 assault, 359 categories of health care, 357–358 civil disturbance, 359–360 decision-reference threat in, 139–141 drug abuse and loss, 360 employee property loss, 361 employee theft, 360–361

impostors, 360 labor disputes, 360 patient property loss, 361 risks and areas of vulnerability, 358–361 stalking, 360 terrorism, 360 theft, 360–361 types of hospitals, 358 Hotel security. See Lodging security I Illumination. See Lighting Information security management and counterespionage, 461–480 causes of information loss, 464–465 competitive intelligence, 466 computer passwords, 471 covert action, 464 definitions, 461, 477 directional microphones, 469 e-mail, 473–474 electronic surveillance and countermeasures, 468–470 electronic sweep, 469–470 employment-related legislation, 477–478 encryption, 475–477 historic attacks on computers and networks, 463 host-based perimeter defense, 432–433 human error, 466–467 human factors protocol, 467–468 industrial espionage roots, 462–463 interviewing, 478–479 investigations, 477–479 issues, 471–472 lawsuits, 463–464 liability, 478 local area network, 474 methods of attacking computer systems, 462 methods of defense against attacks, 462 methods of espionage, 465–466 negligence and employee deviance, 478 radio links, 475 reason people steal information, 465 reasons for attacking computers, 461 rogue use, 466 telecommuting, 470–471 theft, 464 tools and techniques, 478 trade secrets, 479–480 wireless mike dangers, 471

507

Information systems security, 457–460 components, 459 conclusion, 459–460 elements for effective program, 457 hackers, 458, 459 misconceptions and solutions, 458 vulnerabilities, 459 Internal theft controls, 44–58 auditing assets, 50 case study, 57–58 continuing supervision, 49 dishonest employee, 45–47 failure, controls, 56–57 honesty, defining, 44–45 introduction, 44 mailroom, 55–56 management responsibility in loss prevention, 47–48 management support need, 49 payroll, 54 procedural controls, 50–56 program change, 49–50 program for security, 48–50 promotion and rotation, 51–52 purchasing, 53 separation of responsibility, 51 summary, 58 trash removal, 56 undercover investigation, 56 violations, 50 Intrusion alarms, 23–24 on campus, 356 systems checklist, 13 Intrusion detection systems. See Alarms Inventory control security survey, 34 Ironmongery, 12–13 K Key control, 23, 193–195 guidelines for, 23 security checklist, 195–196 Keys illicit, 183 security maintenance, 183–184 security survey, 33 Kidnapping, 59–60 L Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LLEA) coordination, 144 Library security, 362–369 administrative strategies, 367 aggressive patrons, 369 assessing consequences, 364–365 assessing likelihood of risk event, 364

508


Library security (cont.) conclusion, 369 defining library, 362 design and layout, 367 events and cost, 366 human resources, 367 identifying risks, 363–364 management strategies, 367–368 managing risk, 365–366 mutilation of items, 368 physical security strategies, 367–368 qualifying risks, 365 risk assessment terminology, 363 risk management resource, 369 scope of problems, 366 threats, dealing with specific, 368–369 Lighting at automatic teller machines, 444 cargo security and, 296, 299 checklist, 221–222 energy management, 220 equipment, 219–220 exterior checklist, 14–15 exterior security survey, 32 illumination, 218–219 interior security survey, 33 lamps, 219, 220 must know things about, 220 protective lighting checklist, 222 security, 24, 218–222 streetlights, 24 Locks, 143, 165–206. See also Keys alarmed combination, 211 attacks and countermeasures, 183–193 bodies, 175–176, 177 bolts, 175–176, 177, 189–190 cargo security checklist, 303 combination, 173–174, 175 cylinders, 179, 180, 190–193 cylindrical lockset, 177, 178, 179 decoding, 187–188 disc or wafer tumbler mechanisms, 167, 168 door types, 176, 177–181, 182 forceful attacks, 188–193 impressioning, 187 installation checklist, 12–13 key-operated mechanisms, 165–173 lever tumbler mechanisms, 171–173 manipulation of, 184, 185 mortise, 176, 177 padlocks, 179, 180–181, 182 picking, 185–187 pin tumbler mechanisms, 168–171 rapping, 188 rim-mounted, 177, 178

security checklist, 195–196 security survey, 33–34 shimming, 188 strikes, 182–183 systems approach to security and, 193 terminology and components, 165 time, 210 time-delay combination, 210–211 tubular, 177, 178 tumbler mechanisms, 165–173 UL rated, 208 unit, 179 Lodging security, 312–329 alcohol server liability, 328–329 arrest and prosecution of offenders, 321–322 check and credit card fraud, 323 copycat crimes, 325 department size, 313–314 drugs, 323–324 future, 329 guest eviction, 324–325 guest injury and foodborne illness, 327 guest property and legal issues, 325–327 inadequate security, legal issues and, 327–328 investigations of theft, 321 legal issues, 325–329 lost and found, 316–317 opportunities and trends, 322–325 patrolling, 315–316 property theft, employee, 320–321 property theft, guest, 320 property theft, hotel, 319–320 prostitution and, 322–323 protection of public figures, 324 qualifications of security personnel, 314 reporting level in organization, 314–315 reputation of security, 314–315 role of security, 315–317 security department structure, 312–313 security director as manager, 313 security manager, 318–319 security officer, 313, 318 security reports, 316 security supervisor, 313, 318 theft, 319–322 training, 317–319 training by position, 318–319 Low level security, 136

M Mail handlers and suspicious mail procedures, 275–276 Mall and shopping centers and CPTED, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105–106 Management, planning, and evaluation. See Planning, management, and evaluation Management responsibility in loss prevention, 47–48 Maritime industry documents and reports, 310 Maximum security, 20, 137–138 Medical assistance, emergency, 259–260 Medium security, 20, 136–137 Minimum security, 20, 135, 136 Motel security. See Lodging security Motion sensor survey checklist, 226–228 Multiresidential security, 376–386 apartments, 377 condominiums, 377–378 courtesy officers, 378–379 day care, 384 disasters, 385 drive-through security patrol, 379 elderly, 384 elevators and elevator lobbies, 384 grills, security screens, and bars, 382–383 hardware and physical security, 381–383 job task analysis, 379–380 lakes, rivers, streams, canals, and pools, 384–385 laundry room, 384 legislation, 385–386 levels of security, 378 marketing, 376 personnel, 378–381 procedures, 383 staff personnel, 380–381 steps in, basic, 386 tenant screening, 381 N National Crime Prevention Institute, 352 Neighborhood watch, 27–28 Neighborhood watch guidelines, 67–68 Nuclear fuel cycle facility and designreference threat, 141–142 O Office and industrial systems and CPTED, 95–98, 99

Index

Office security checklist, 38–39 Office security survey, 33 Operation Identification, 27, 355 Outdoor sitting areas and CPTED, 86, 88 P Parking lots and structures and CPTED, 92–94 Pedestrian areas and downtown streets and CPTED, 84–92 Pedestrian malls and CPTED, 88, 90–91, 92 Personal property, protecting, 27–28 Personal safety and self-defense, 407–409 introduction, 407 violent crimes, 407–408 Personality of complex, 22 Petty cash security survey, 34 Planning, management, and evaluation, 418–430 as associates in dynamic process, 419–420 attitudinal analysis, 426–427 crime statistics, 420–423 data to gather, 429–430 definitions, 418–419 demographics data, 423–424 effectiveness analysis, 425–426 efficiency analysis, 424–425 facilitating implementation strategy, 427–430 geographic targeting, 427–428 method of reporting findings, 429 statistical information as backbone for prevention program design, 420 timing of reporting evaluation results, 428, 429 uses, 419, 420 Plant security checklist, 35–37 Plazas and CPTED, 88, 89 Physical barriers, 142–144, 148–164 doors. See Doors fences. See Fences floor. See Floors objective, 142, 143 roofs. See Roofs walls and moats. See Walls and moats Physical security, 142, 143–144 approaches, 135–147 components, 139 design-reference threat, 139, 140–142 exterior characteristics surveys, 31–32

interior characteristics surveys, 32–34 levels, 135–138 plan, 144–146 planning, values of, 138–142 survey, 31–34 Picking a lock, 185–187 R Relocking devices, 208–209 Residential environment objectives, 110, 112–119, 120, 121 Residential security, 24–28 Residential streets recovery of grid systems, 119, 120, 121 Restrooms and hallways and CPTED, 98, 99–100 Retail security, 330–340; see also Convenience stores; Workplace violence access control, 337 challenges, new, 330 conclusions, 338–339 CPTED and, 336–337 crime increase, 330–332 fatalities, nature of, 331–332 managing risk, 341–344 recommended program, 337–338 research, 332–337 robbery and violence deterrence program, 338 surveillance, 337 suspicious behavior, 338 Risk analysis through risk management process, 5 Risk assessment and management, 3–5 Roofs, 155, 156–157, 158 consideration, 155, 156 upgrading, 157 S Safes. See also Security containers burglaries, 212–214 carting off, 214 checklist, 14 combination changing, 211–212 combination creation, 212 hidden combinations, 212 locking dials, 209–210 opening problems, overcoming, 214–215 punching, 212 rating, 216 security survey, 34 selecting, 207–208 skilled attacks, 214 Safety websites, 453

509

Schools. See also Campus security conducting risk assessments and security surveys, 346 conflict resolution, 348–349 crime and deviance analysis, 346 crisis management plan, 348 custodial personnel, 347 environmental objectives, 120, 121–122, 123 graffiti interpretation, 347 incident mapping system, 346 lunchtime hallway use, 125, 127–128 parking lots and CPTED, 122, 123–124 perspectives on safe administration of, 345–349 safe activities in unsafe locations, 128–130 safety and security committee, 347 student parking and driver education relationships and CPTED, 124, 125, 126 Security containers. See also Safes; Vaults alarm combination locks, 211 lockable handles, 210 locking dials, 209–210 peeling, 213 rating, 215–217 relocking devices, 208–209 ripping or chopping, 213 selecting, 207–208 time locks, 210 time-delay combination locks, 210–211 UL-rated combination locks, 208 vision-restricting and shielded dials, 211 Security plan, 144–146 components, 144 formulating approach, 146 justification, 144–145 presenting approach, 146 Security professional skills, knowledge, and abilities list, 505 Security surveys, 19–43 aspects of making recommendations, 22 CCTV, 23 classification of recommendations, 20 complex, personality of, 22 components, 19 conduction timing, 20 crime analysis, 22–23 definition, 19 developing security points, 20–21 fire safety inspection, 41–43

510


Security surveys (cont.) follow up, 24 guard security checklist, 37–38 home security checklist, 39–40 intrusion alarms, 23–24 key control, 23 lighting, 24 nine points of security concern, 21–22 office security checklist, 38–39 physical, 31–34 plant, 35–37 protecting personal property, 27–28 residential, 24–28 site survey and risk assessment, 29–30 steps, 24 types, 19–20 Self-defense and personal safety, 407–409 Senior citizens, crime prevention tips for, 79 Shopping centers and mails and CPTED, 101, 102, 104, 105–106 Site security and risk assessment, 29–30 Site security checklist, 10–11 Small business burglary prevention tips, 71–72 robbery prevention tips, 70–71 Smoke detectors, 234–235 Stadiums and CPTED, 131–132 Standards, 17–18 Storage rooms checklist, 14 Street smarts and how to protect oneself, 77 Streetlights, 24 Strong room doors, 154 Suspicious situations to report, 73

chemical agents incident class, 495 conclusions, 502–503 defining, 488–489 developing understanding of, 492 educate and train personnel, 500 explosive agents incident class, 495 groups and organizational structure of terrorists, 490–491 health care facilities and, 360 homeland security as tool to combat, 455 incendiary agents incident class, 494 mechanism of violence and associated risk factors, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495–496 nuclear and radiological agents incident class, 493 responsibility matrix for security professional, 497 rise in United States of, 59–60 risk assessment report outline, 498 risk of, 3–4 security managers responsibilities, 501–502 security professional and, 487–488 support material for security plan, 498, 499–500 terrorist and, 488–489 TRACEM definitions, 496 understanding, 489–490 violence of, 487 Theft triangle, 45–46

T Taking action to stop violence, 80 Telecommunications fraud, 447–448 Telemarketing fraud, 80 Terrorism assessing threats and countermeasures, 491, 492, 493, 494, 496–501 biological agents incident class, 492

V Vaults. See also Security containers checklist, 14 doors, 154 lockable handles, 210 selecting, 207–208 time locks, 210 Vehicles doors, 152–153

U UL. See Underwriters Laboratories Underwriters' Laboratories combination locks, rated, 208 safes rating, 216, 217

penetration time, estimated, 153 theft, 73–75 W Walls and moats, 161, 162–163 Websites, safety, 453 Western Behavioral Sciences Institute (WBSI) research, 332–333 Windows awning-type wood and metal, 17 defensive measures, residential security and, 25 double hung wood, 16 exterior, security survey for, 32 home security checklist, 40 security checklist, residential, 27 sliding glass, 17 standards for, 18 terms and definitions, 196–206 Wiretapping. See Electronic surveillance and wiretapping Workplace violence, 387–401 case studies, 390–391, 397–399 causes and avoidance of claims of inadequate security, 388–389 deaths, 331–332 defense against, 399–400 homicide figures, 330–331 homicide motives, 331 job applicant, 389 men versus women in, 332 organizational dynamics, 392 predatory prevention matrix, 393–394, 395–397 process versus output, 394–395 protecting oneself and assets list, 399 research, 332 statistics, 387–388 steps to reduce opportunity for, 393 subordinates views of superiors, 393 team concept for solution to, 392–393 types of, 336 violator profile, 389–390

Handbook of Loss Prevention and Crime Prevention, Fourth Edition

Handbook of crime prevention and community safety

Understanding Crime Prevention, Second Edition

Retail Security and Loss Prevention

Handbook of youth prevention science

ESMO Handbook of Cancer Prevention

Crime Prevention Through Housing Design

Retail Security and Loss Prevention Solutions

Handbook of Pollution Prevention Practices

Crime Prevention, Security and Community Safety Using the 5Is Framework (Crime Prevention and Security Management)

Assessing Deviance, Crime and Prevention in Europe

Handbook of Air Pollution Prevention and Control

Doing Security (Crime Prevention and Security Management)

Security and Loss Prevention: An Introduction, 4th Edition

Hearing Loss, Fourth Edition

Crime Prevention: Theory, Policy And Practice

Doing Security (Crime Prevention and Security Management)

Crime Prevention: Theory, Policy, and Politics

New Loss Prevention: Redefining Shrinkage Management

Handbook of Air Pollution Prevention and Control, First Edition

New Loss Prevention: Redefining Shrinkage Management

Crime Prevention in the Built Enviroment

Berries and cancer prevention

Cardiovascular Prevention and Rehabilitation

Cancer Epidemiology and Prevention

Injury Prevention and Control

Identity Theft Handbook Detection Prevention And Security

Identity Theft Handbook: Detection, Prevention, and Security

Slip and Fall Prevention: A Practical Handbook

Nutrition and disease prevention

Handbook of Loss Prevention and Crime Prevention, Fourth Edition

Handbook of crime prevention and community safety

Understanding Crime Prevention, Second Edition

Retail Security and Loss Prevention

Handbook of youth prevention science

ESMO Handbook of Cancer Prevention

Crime Prevention Through Housing Design

Retail Security and Loss Prevention Solutions

Handbook of Pollution Prevention Practices

Crime Prevention, Security and Community Safety Using the 5Is Framework (Crime Prevention and Security Management)

Assessing Deviance, Crime and Prevention in Europe

Handbook of Air Pollution Prevention and Control

Doing Security (Crime Prevention and Security Management)

Security and Loss Prevention: An Introduction, 4th Edition

Hearing Loss, Fourth Edition

Crime Prevention: Theory, Policy And Practice

Doing Security (Crime Prevention and Security Management)

Crime Prevention: Theory, Policy, and Politics

New Loss Prevention: Redefining Shrinkage Management

Handbook of Air Pollution Prevention and Control, First Edition

New Loss Prevention: Redefining Shrinkage Management

Crime Prevention in the Built Enviroment

Berries and cancer prevention

Cardiovascular Prevention and Rehabilitation

Cancer Epidemiology and Prevention

Injury Prevention and Control

Identity Theft Handbook Detection Prevention And Security

Identity Theft Handbook: Detection, Prevention, and Security

Slip and Fall Prevention: A Practical Handbook

Nutrition and disease prevention

Recommend Documents