Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars, Volume 1

Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars Praeger Security International Advisory Board Board Cochairs Loch K...

Author: Anthony H. Cordesman | Khalid R. Al-Rodhan

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Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars

Praeger Security International Advisory Board Board Cochairs Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia (U.S.A.) Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Advisory Board, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews (U.K.) Members Eliot A. Cohen, Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies and Director, Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University (U.S.A.) Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.A.) The´re`se Delpech, Director of Strategic Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission, and Senior Research Fellow, CERI (Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques), Paris (France) Sir Michael Howard, former Professor of History of War, Oxford University, and Professor of Military and Naval History, Yale University (U.K.) Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, Department of the Army (U.S.A.) Paul M. Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director, International Security Studies, Yale University (U.S.A.) Robert J. O’Neill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, Oxford University (Australia) Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland (U.S.A.) Jusuf Wanandi, co-founder and member, Board of Trustees, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Indonesia) Fareed Zakaria, Editor, Newsweek International (U.S.A.)

Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars Volume 1

Anthony H. Cordesman Khalid R. Al-Rodhan

Published in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.

Praeger Security International Westport, Connecticut • London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Cordesman, Anthony H. Gulf military forces in an era of asymmetric wars / Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0–275–99250–0 (set : alk. paper) — ISBN 0–275–99399–X (vol 1 : alk. paper) — ISBN 0–275–99400–7 (vol 2 : alk. paper) 1. Middle East—Armed Forces. 2. Asymmetric warfare—Middle East. 3. National security—Persian Gulf States. 4. Persian Gulf States—Military relations. 5. Armed Forces. 6. Balance of power. 7. Military readiness. I. Al-Rodhan, Khalid R. II. Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C.) III. Title. UA832.C67028 2007 355’.0330536—dc22 2006031049 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2007 by Center for Strategic and International Studies All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2006031049 ISBN: 0–275–99250–0 (set) 0–275–99399–X (vol. 1) 0–275–99400–7 (vol. 2) First published in 2007 Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

FIGURES

xvii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

xxi

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: THE NEW BALANCING ACT IN THE GULF KEY FACTORS CHANGING GULF SECURITY DYNAMICS THE ENDURING DYNAMICS OF GULF (IN)SECURITY A Southern Gulf Divided against Itself The Self-Destructive North The Destabilizing Outside Stabilizers A FUTURE OF DISCORD AND DEPENDENCE? A Hollow Gulf Cooperation Council and De Facto Reliance on the ‘‘Fifth Corner’’ Islamic Extremism, Terrorism, and Insurgency The Iranian Problem Iraq as a Power Vacuum Yemen at the Margins Squaring the Fifth Corner? SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOUTHERN GULF Going Hollow at Great Cost The Key Factors Shaping Southern Gulf Forces Key Issues in Force Development MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTHERN GULF ‘‘SNAPSHOTS’’ OF COMPARATIVE FORCE STRENGTH Broad Trends Affecting the Balance

1 2 4 4 5 8 10 11 11 12 12 12 13 13 14 14 18 23 24 24

vi

CONTENTS

Trends Affecting Military Manpower Trends Affecting Land Forces Trends Affecting Air and Air Defense Forces Trends Affecting Naval Forces ADAPTING TO THE CHANGING NATURE OF MILITARY POWER Force Quality over Force Quantity: The Revolution in Military Affairs The Vulnerabilities of Less Advanced Powers The Threat of Asymmetric Warfare and Nonstate Actors The Vulnerability of Conventional Military Power Nonstate Actors as a Transnational Threat

25 26 29 31 32 34 48 56 61 63

CHAPTER 2: BAHRAIN MILITARY SPENDING AND ARMS IMPORTS MILITARY MANPOWER THE BAHRAINI ARMY Armor and Antiarmor Weapons Artillery Antiaircraft Weapons Overall Assessment THE BAHRAINI AIR FORCE Combat Air Strength Other Helicopters and Transport Aircraft Overall Assessment THE BAHRAINI NAVY Surface Combat Forces Overall Assessment PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE FORCES Main Security and Paramilitary Forces Overall Assessment BAHRAIN’S CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES Socioeconomic Challenges Relations with Neighboring States Political Unrest Bahrain’s Struggle against Terrorism Ongoing Internal Stability Balancing Internal Security and Conventional Military Needs

65 68 68 71 71 72 72 73 73 73 75 75 75 76 77 77 78 80 80 80 81 83 83 84 86

CHAPTER 3: KUWAIT MILITARY SPENDING AND ARMS IMPORTS MILITARY MANPOWER THE KUWAITI ARMY Force Structure Armor and Antiarmor Weapons Artillery

87 89 91 92 92 94 95

CONTENTS

Overall Assessment THE KUWAITI AIR FORCE Combat Air Strength Helicopters and Transport Aircraft Overall Assessment THE KUWAITI AIR DEFENSE Major Air Defense Missiles Other Air Defense Systems Overall Assessment THE KUWAITI NAVY Surface Combat Forces Amphibious and Support Boats Coast Guard Overall Assessment PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE FORCES Main Security and Paramilitary Forces Kuwait’s Struggle against Terrorism KUWAIT ’S CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES Political Challenges Socioeconomic Challenges Relations with Neighboring States CHAPTER 4: OMAN OMAN’S EMERGENCE AS A STRATEGIC PLAYER IN THE GULF Internal Politics and Stability Economic Reform, Diversification, and Stability MILITARY SPENDING AND ARMS IMPORTS MILITARY MANPOWER THE OMANI ARMY Force Organization Armor and Antiarmor Weapons Artillery Antiaircraft Weapons Overall Assessment OMANI AIR FORCE Combat Air Strength Helicopters and Transport Aircraft Overall Assessment THE OMANI NAVY Surface Combat Forces Amphibious Forces Overall Assessment OMAN ROYAL GUARDS FORCES OMANI PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

vii 96 96 98 98 98 99 99 100 100 100 101 102 102 103 103 103 106 110 111 113 116 119 121 122 123 124 125 126 126 126 129 129 129 130 130 130 130 132 132 132 133 134 134

viii

CONTENTS

Trends in Force Structure Main Security and Paramilitary Forces Oman’s Struggle against Terrorism Political Uncertainty OMAN’S CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES Economic Challenges and Diversification Oil and Stability The ‘‘Demographic Time Bomb’’ Relations with Neighboring States Ongoing Internal Stability Balancing Internal Security and Conventional Military Needs

136 136 138 139 139 139 140 141 141 142 143

CHAPTER 5: QATAR MILITARY SPENDING AND ARMS IMPORTS MILITARY MANPOWER THE QATARI ARMY THE QATARI AIR FORCE QATAR AIR DEFENSE THE QATARI NAVY PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES Qatar, the GCC, and the Broader Middle East Qatar, Iran, and the North Field Qatar’s Uncertain Domestic Environment Qatar and Terrorism The Youth Explosion and the Radicalization of Qatar’s Youth

145 146 147 148 150 152 152 154 154 155 155 156 157 159

CHAPTER 6: SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI STRATEGIC DYNAMICS THE SAUDI NATIONAL SECURITY APPARATUS The Search for Jointness Slow Improvement in Jointness in the Regular Services Establishing Broader Jointness for Counterterrorism The Importance of Consensus and Consultation The Role of the Saudi National Security Council SAUDI MILITARY AND SECURITY SPENDING Finding the Proper Level of Expenditure SAUDI ARMS IMPORTS The Impact of the Gulf War Arms Imports since the Late 1990s MANPOWER THE SAUDI ARMY Force Strength and Structure Saudi Armored Forces

163 165 168 168 169 170 171 173 173 174 176 178 179 181 181 184 185

CONTENTS

Saudi Antitank Weapons Saudi Artillery Saudi Light and Medium Air Defense Weapons Saudi Army Aviation Facilities and Infrastructure Overall Capabilities THE SAUDI NATIONAL GUARD Strength and Organization Major Combat Equipment Modernization and New Mission Requirements Overall Capabilities THE SAUDI NAVY Strength and Organization Main Surface Combatants Smaller Combat Ships, Mine Warfare, and Support Forces Submarines? Marine and Amphibious Forces Naval Aviation Saudi Border Guard Roles, Missions, and Capability THE SAUDI AIR FORCE Strength and Structure Combat Aircraft Possible Upgrades to RSAF Combat Aircraft Upgrading the RSAF Tornados? Purchasing the Rafael? The Eurofighter Typhoon Reconnaissance and Early Warning Training Aircraft Refueling, Transport, and Support Munitions and Spares Support, Training, Logistics, and Sustainment Overall Capabilities SAUDI LAND-BASED AIR DEFENSES The Saudi Air Defense Force The Patriot and the I-Hawk Other Land-Based Air Defenses Overall Capabilities SAUDI MISSILE FORCES AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SAUDI WMD Modernizing the CSS-2 What Comes Next? NBC Defense Capabilities SAUDI PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES Saudi Arabia’s Main Internal Security Forces

ix 187 188 188 189 191 193 194 195 197 197 198 199 199 199 202 203 203 203 204 205 206 207 207 211 212 213 213 214 215 215 216 216 216 217 218 219 220 220 221 222 225 227 227 228

x

CONTENTS

The Pivotal Role of the Ministry of Interior The Police and Security Services General Security Service The General Intelligence Presidency The Changing Role of the GIP Changes in the GIP Leadership The Future Role and Capabilities of the GIP Border and Coastal Security The Role of the Border Guard The Option of a Border Surveillance and Defense System Saudi Border Guard Development Program The Expanding Mission of the Border Guard Security and the Role of the Judicial System The Judicial System and Internal Security The ‘‘Mutawwa’in’’ or Religious Police An Effective Internal Security Force? SAUDI ARABIA’S CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES Terrorism and Counterterrorism Saudi Internal Security before 9/11 Saudi Response to 9/11 The Impact of May 2003 Saudi Counterterrorism Efforts since May 2003 Al Qa’ida in Saudi Arabia Saudi Petroleum Security Apparatus Asymmetric Threat to Energy Security Assessing the Saudi Security Forces’ Performance at Abqaiq The Uncertain Future of Iraq Iraq as a Conventional Military Threat to Its Neighbors? The Creation of a ‘‘Shi’ite Block’’ in the Gulf? Saudi Views on Iran’s Role in Iraq’s Internal Affairs Regional Insurgency: The Potential Spillover Effect The Threat from Foreign Fighters The Threat of a Fragmented Iraq? The Threat from Iran Key Iranian Threat Saudi Reaction to Iran’s Nuclear Program Collective Security and Relations with the GCC Counterterrorism Cooperation Military Cooperation Socioeconomic Challenges Economic Reforms Addressing the Demographic Pressures and Unemployment Prospects for Saudi Stability

228 230 233 233 234 235 235 236 236 238 238 239 240 240 241 242 243 247 248 249 251 251 253 254 255 256 259 260 261 263 265 265 267 269 270 271 272 273 275 275 276 278 281

CONTENTS

xi

CHAPTER 7: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES COMMAND STRUCTURE OF ARMED FORCES MILITARY SPENDING MILITARY MANPOWER THE UAE ARMY Force Structure Armor Antiarmor Artillery Air Defense Holdings Other Recent Developments and Acquisitions Overall Assessment THE UAE AIR FORCE Fixed-Wing Air Strength Helicopters Uncertain Strength and Capabilities Recent Developments and Acquisitions Summary Assessment UAE LAND-BASED AIR DEFENSE The Pantsir-SIE Ballistic and Cruise Missile Defense The Façade of Integration Summary Assessment THE UAE NAVY Ship Strength Naval Aviation Naval Modernization Summary Assessment PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES’ CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES Political Uncertainty Iran and the United Arab Emirates The GCC and the United Arab Emirates Territorial Dispute with Saudi Arabia Economic Challenges Demographic Challenges

283 285 285 287 287 290 290 291 291 292 293 293 294 294 294 297 298 299 300 301 301 301 302 302 302 304 304 306 306 309 309 310 311 312 313 314

CHAPTER 8: IRAN IRAN’S CHANGING ROLE IN REGIONAL SECURITY MILITARY SPENDING AND ARMS IMPORTS MILITARY MANPOWER THE IRANIAN ARMY Iranian Tank Strength Other Iranian Armor

317 317 320 322 322 323 329

xii

CONTENTS

Iranian Antiarmor Weapons Iranian Artillery Strength Iranian Army Air Defense Systems Iranian Army Aviation Iranian Army’s Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) Other Aspects of Iranian Army Capability THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CORPS (PASDARAN) IRGC Land Forces The IRGC Air Force The IRGC Naval Forces Proxy and Covert CBRN Operations The Quds (Qods) Forces Role in Iran’s Industries The Basij and Other Paramilitary Forces THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE Iranian Air Strength Iranian Aircraft Development Iranian Air Force Readiness and Effectiveness Iranian Land-Based Air Defense THE IRANIAN NAVY Iranian Antiship Missiles and Missile Craft Iranian Mine Warfare Capabilities Iranian Amphibious Assets Iranian Naval Air Iran’s Submarine Forces The Role of the Naval Branch of the IRGC Naval Force Deployments Overall Naval Capabilities IRAN’S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) PROGRAM Chemical Weapons Official Estimates of Iranian Capability Arms Control Estimates of Iranian Capability NGO Estimates of Iranian Capability Biological Weapons Possible Early Indicators That Iran Might Have a BW Program The Uncertain Nature of Iran’s BW Program Since the Mid-1990s Continuing Alarms and Excursions The Possible Role of Outside Suppliers Possible CBW War-Fighting Capability Possible Nuclear Weapons Programs Problems in Analyzing Iran’s WMD Program: A Case Study Uncertainty and Credibility of Sources Key Uncertainties in Iran’s Nuclear Developments

330 331 334 335 335 335 336 336 337 337 338 338 339 340 340 343 344 345 347 350 352 355 356 356 357 359 359 360 360 361 361 363 363 364 365 366 366 367 368 371 372 374 376

CONTENTS

Plutonium Production Uranium Enrichment A Continuing Process of Discovery IRAN’S LONG-RANGE MISSILE ARSENAL Shahab-1/SCUD-B Shahab-2/SCUD-C CCS-8 or Tondar 69 Shahab-3 Missile Development Uncertain Performance Mobility and Deployment Shahab-3A/3M/3D/IRIS Shahab-4 Shahab-5 and Shahab-6 Ghadr 101 and Ghadr 110 Raduga KH-55 Granat/Kh-55/AS-15 Kent PARAMILITARY, INTERNAL SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE FORCES The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) The IRGC Intelligence Branch The Basij Resistance Force The Uncertain Role of the Ministry of Interior IRAN’S CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES Iran’s Nuclear Program and Its Strategic Consequences Economic Sanctions Military Strikes Iranian Defense against U.S. Strikes Iranian Retaliation against U.S. Strikes The Strategic Implications of a Military Strike against Iran The Future of Iraq Other Challenges CHAPTER 9: IRAQ A PATTERN OF EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL VIOLENCE IRAQ’S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE IRAQI MILITARY DEVELOPMENT Military Spending and Arms Imports Iraqi Military Manpower THE IRAQI ARMY Equipment Holdings and Issues Support Forces THE IRAQI AIR FORCE THE IRAQI NAVY PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, POLICE, AND INTELLIGENCE FORCES The Ministry of Interior as a ‘‘Threat’’

xiii 376 377 385 387 389 391 393 393 393 395 398 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 405 406 406 410 410 413 414 416 419 419 423 425 425 428 430 434 438 440 443 445 446 448 450 451

xiv

CONTENTS

Real vs. Authorized Strength The Status of Special Security Forces Force Size and Readiness Steps toward Reform The Regular Police Increases in Police Strength The ‘‘Year of the Police’’ Ongoing Reform Equipment and Training Dealing with Divided Loyalties Facility Construction Department of Border Enforcement Coalition Border Transition Teams Border Forces Equipment and Training Uncertain Progress in Facilities Other Developments in Border Enforcement Facilities Protection Forces, Private Security Personnel, and ‘‘Ministry Armies’’ The Facilities Protection Services The Infrastructure Protection Forces and Other Non-MOD/MOI Paramilitary Elements Intelligence IRAQ’S CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES The Growing Level of Violence in Iraq The Dangers of Strategic Uncertainty Socioeconomic Challenges An Aging Energy Sector Political Conciliation vs. Civil War Insurgent Attacks Push Iraq toward More Intense Civil War The Future of the Insurgency and the Prospect of Large-Scale Civil War The ‘‘Nationalist’’ Need for Compromise The ‘‘Islamist’’ Need for Civil War The Threat from Shi’ite Death Squads and Militias Links to the Iraqi Police and Special Security Forces Questionable Loyalties The Kurdish Question Kurdish Parties and the Kurdish Militias Tensions between the Kurds and Other Iraqis Uncertain Kurdish Unity The Problem of Resources and Oil The Turkish Question Relationship with Neighboring States Creating a ‘‘Shi’ite Crescent’’?

453 454 455 456 457 458 458 459 460 461 461 462 462 463 463 464 464 464 465 467 467 467 469 472 476 479 482 484 484 485 486 487 489 492 493 493 496 497 498 498 498

CONTENTS

The Arab Gulf States Jordan Turkey Iran Syria

xv 499 499 501 502 508

CHAPTER 10: YEMEN MILITARY SPENDING AND ARMS IMPORTS MILITARY MANPOWER THE YEMENI ARMY Armor and Antiarmor Weapons Artillery Antiaircraft Weapons Ballistic Missiles and Rockets Overall Assessment THE YEMENI AIR FORCE Combat Air Strength Helicopters and Transport Aircraft Overall Assessment YEMENI AIR DEFENSE FORCES THE YEMENI NAVY Surface Combat Forces Amphibious Forces Overall Assessment PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE FORCES Main Security and Paramilitary Forces Yemen’s Struggle against Terrorism Pattern of Attacks Political Unrest YEMEN’S CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES Socioeconomic Challenges The Bab al-Mandeb Relations with Neighboring States Ongoing Internal Instability Balancing Internal Security and Conventional Military Needs

513 515 517 518 518 522 522 523 523 523 525 525 526 526 526 526 529 529 530 530 531 534 536 537 537 539 539 540 543

CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION: THE NEW BALANCING ACT IN THE GULF THE NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE SECURITY STRUCTURES MEETING THE ISLAMIST EXTREMIST CHALLENGE TAKING RESPONSIBILITY VS. CONTINUING EXERCISES IN FUTILITY

545

NOTES

551

546 548 548

Figures

FIGURE 1.1: THE IRANIAN-IRAQI ARMS RACE DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, 1981–1988 FIGURE 1.2: GULF MILITARY SPENDING, 1997–2005 FIGURE 1.3: THE GULF ARMS RACE IN ARMS IMPORTS, 1997–2004 (IN MILLIONS OF CURRENT U.S. DOLLARS) FIGURE 1.4: GULF MILITARY FORCES, 2006 FIGURE 1.5: A TRIGGER FOR MAJOR INCREASE IN MILITARY SPENDING AND ARMS TRANSFERS? THE RISE IN GULF OIL EXPORT EARNINGS, 1971–2007 FIGURE 1.6: POPULATION GROWTH IN THE GULF, 1950–2050 FIGURE 1.7: MAJOR MEASURES OF KEY COMBAT EQUIPMENT STRENGTH IN 2006 FIGURE 1.8: COMPARATIVE TRENDS IN GULF TOTAL ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER, 1979–2006 FIGURE 1.9: TOTAL ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER IN ALL GULF FORCES, 1990–2006 FIGURE 1.10: TOTAL GULF MILITARY MANPOWER BY SERVICE, 2006 FIGURE 1.11: TOTAL GULF OPERATIONAL ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES, 2006 FIGURE 1.12: TOTAL OPERATIONAL MAIN BATTLE TANKS IN ALL GULF FORCES, 1979–2006 FIGURE 1.13: MEDIUM- TO HIGH-QUALITY MAIN BATTLE TANKS BY TYPE, 2006 FIGURE 1.14: TOTAL OPERATIONAL OTHER ARMORED VEHICLES (LT. TANKS, LAVS, AIFVS, APCS, AND RECCE) IN GULF FORCES, 1990–2006 FIGURE 1.15: GULF OTHER ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES BY CATEGORY, 2006 FIGURE 1.16: ARMORED INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLES, RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLES, LAVS, AND LIGHT TANKS BY TYPE, 2006 FIGURE 1.17: ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS IN GULF ARMIES, 2006

6 15 16 19 22 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

xviii

FIGURES

FIGURE 1.18: TOTAL OPERATIONAL SELF-PROPELLED AND TOWED TUBE ARTILLERY AND MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS IN GULF FORCES, 1990–2006 FIGURE 1.19: TOTAL OPERATIONAL GULF ARTILLERY WEAPONS, 2006 FIGURE 1.20: GULF INVENTORY OF MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS BY CALIBER, 2006 FIGURE 1.21: TOTAL OPERATIONAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN ALL GULF FORCES, 1990–2006 FIGURE 1.22: TOTAL GULF HOLDINGS OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT, 2006 FIGURE 1.23: GULF HIGH- AND MEDIUM-QUALITY FIXED-WING FIGHTER, FIGHTER ATTACK, ATTACK, STRIKE, AND MULTIROLE COMBAT AIRCRAFT BY TYPE, 2006 FIGURE 1.24: GULF RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, 2006 FIGURE 1.25: SENSOR, AWACS, C4I, EW, AND ELINT AIRCRAFT, 2006 FIGURE 1.26: GULF ATTACK, ANTISHIP, AND ASW HELICOPTERS, 2006 FIGURE 1.27: GULF LAND-BASED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS, 2006 FIGURE 1.28: GULF NAVAL SHIPS BY CATEGORY, 2006 FIGURE 1.29: GULF WARSHIPS WITH ANTISHIP MISSILES, 2006 FIGURE 1.30: GULF MINE WARFARE SHIPS, 2006 FIGURE 1.31: GULF AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS, 2006 FIGURE 1.32: GULF NAVAL AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTER AIRCRAFT, 2006 MAP 2.1: BAHRAIN FIGURE 2.1: BAHRAIN’S ARMS DELIVERIES BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 2.2: BAHRAIN’S NEW ARMS AGREEMENTS BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 2.3: BAHRAINI ARMY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 2.4: BAHRAINI AIR FORCE’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 2.5: BAHRAINI NAVY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 2.6: BAHRAINI PARAMILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 2.7: BAHRAIN’S DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION, 2006 MAP 3.1: KUWAIT FIGURE 3.1: KUWAIT’S ARMS DELIVERIES BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 3.2: KUWAIT’S NEW ARMS AGREEMENTS BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 3.3: KUWAITI ARMY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 3.4: KUWAITI AIR FORCE’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 3.5: KUWAITI AIR DEFENSE’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 3.6: KUWAITI NAVY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 3.7: KUWAITI COAST GUARD: FORCE STRUCTURE FIGURE 3.8: KUWAITI PARAMILITARY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 3.9: KUWAIT’S DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION, 2006 MAP 4.1: OMAN FIGURE 4.1: OMAN’S ARMS DELIVERIES BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 4.2: OMAN’S NEW ARMS AGREEMENTS BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 4.3: OMANI ARMY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 4.4: OMANI AIR FORCE’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 4.5: OMANI NAVY’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006

37 38 39 40 41 42

43 44 45 46 48 49 50 51 52 66 69 69 70 74 76 78 82 88 90 91 93 97 99 101 102 104 114 120 124 125 127 131 133

FIGURES

xix

FIGURE 4.6: OMANI ROYAL GUARD’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 4.7: OMANI ROYAL YACHT SQUADRON’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 4.8: OMANI ROYAL FLIGHT ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 4.9: OMANI PARAMILITARY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 4.10: OMAN’S DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION, 2006 MAP 5.1: QATAR FIGURE 5.1: QATARI ARMY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 5.2: QATARI AIR FORCE’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 5.3: QATARI AIR DEFENSE’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 5.4: QATARI NAVY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 5.5: QATAR’S DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION, 2006 MAP 6.1: SAUDI ARABIA FIGURE 6.1: SAUDI ARABIA’S ARMS DELIVERIES BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 6.2: SAUDI ARABIA’S NEW ARMS AGREEMENTS BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 6.3: SAUDI ARMY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 6.4: SAUDI NATIONAL GUARD’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 6.5: SAUDI NAVY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 6.6: SAUDI AIR FORCE’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 6.7: SAUDI AIR DEFENSE’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 6.8: THE SAUDI INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMUNITY FIGURE 6.9: SAUDI MINISTRY OF INTERIOR MANPOWER, 2006 FIGURE 6.10: BORDER GUARDS APPREHENSION OF WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES, 1995–2003 FIGURE 6.11: SAUDI ARABIAN BUDGET BALANCE, 1994–2006 FIGURE 6.12: SAUDI’S DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION, 2006 MAP 7.1: THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES FIGURE 7.1: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES’ ARMS DELIVERIES BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 7.2: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES’ NEW ARMS AGREEMENTS BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 7.3: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 7.4: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AIR FORCE’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 7.5: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AIR DEFENSE’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 7.6: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES NAVY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 7.7: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES INTERNAL SECURITY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 MAP 8.1: IRAN FIGURE 8.1: IRAN’S ARMS DELIVERIES BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 8.2: IRAN’S NEW ARMS AGREEMENTS BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 8.3: IRANIAN ARMY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE TRENDS, 1990–2006 FIGURE 8.4: IRANIAN AIR FORCE’S FORCE STRUCTURE TRENDS, 1990–2006 FIGURE 8.5: IRANIAN NAVY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE TRENDS, 1990–2006 FIGURE 8.6: ESTIMATED IRANIAN MISSILE PROFILES, 2006

135 135 136 137 141 146 149 151 152 153 160 164 177 177 182 196 200 208 218 229 231 237 277 280 284 286 287 288 295 300 303 307 318 321 321 324 341 351 388

xx

FIGURES

FIGURE 8.7: IRAN’S PARAMILITARY FORCES’ FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 MAP 9.1: IRAQ FIGURE 9.1: IRAQ BEFORE THE GULF AND IRAQ WARS VS. MID-2006 FIGURE 9.2: IRAQ’S MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FORCES’ ASSESSED CAPABILITIES FIGURE 9.3: ESTIMATED MOD FORCE CAPABILITIES BY SERVICE: COMPARISON OF JUNE 2005 AND AUGUST 2006 FIGURE 9.4: IRAQI ARMY BATTALIONS IN COMBAT: AUGUST 2004 TO AUGUST 2006 FIGURE 9.5: GROWTH IN INDEPENDENT AND COMBINED COMBAT OPERATIONS (COMPANY LEVEL AND ABOVE) FIGURE 9.6: IRAQI AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES AS OF AUGUST 2006 FIGURE 9.7: IRAQI NAVAL CAPABILITIES AS OF AUGUST 2006 FIGURE 9.8: THE MANPOWER OF IRAQ’S MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FORCES BEFORE THEIR MID-2006 REORGANIZATION FIGURE 9.9: MOI AND MOD FORCE LEVELS AS OF AUGUST 2006 FIGURE 9.10: IRAQ’S ESTIMATED MOI NATIONAL POLICE FORCE CAPABILITIES BEFORE THE SPRING 2006 REORGANIZATION FIGURE 9.11: IRAQ’S DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION, 2006 MAP 10.1: YEMEN FIGURE 10.1: YEMEN’S ARMS DELIVERIES BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 10.2: YEMEN’S NEW ARMS AGREEMENTS BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 10.3: YEMENI ARMY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE TRENDS, 1990–2006 FIGURE 10.4: YEMENI AIR FORCE’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 10.5: YEMENI AIR DEFENSE’S FORCE STRUCTURE TRENDS, 1990–2006 FIGURE 10.6: YEMENI NAVY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE TRENDS, 1990–2006 FIGURE 10.7: YEMENI PARAMILITARY’S FORCE STRUCTURE TRENDS, 1990–2006 FIGURE 10.8: YEMEN’S DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION, 2006

403 429 431 441 442 442 443 448 450 453 454 455 474 514 516 517 519 524 527 528 530 537

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to so many people who have contributed in so many ways to this book. We want to thank many regional, U.S., and European officials, who cannot be mentioned by name, for offering their time, comments, suggestions, and data to earlier versions of this book. We are also grateful to so many research assistants who have contributed to the drafting and research of this book, including William D. Sullivan, Paul S. Frederiksen, Nikos Tsafos, and William Elliott. The analysis in this book relied heavily on the work of many governmental and nongovernmental agencies, particularly the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Jane’s, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), GlobalSecurity.org, the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Defense, and many other defense and energy agencies. In addition, the analysis relied heavily on the work of many regional, military, and security experts. The analysis of the Saudi internal security forces drew heavily on the work by Dr. Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid’s work on the Saudi National Security in late 2005.

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Introduction: The New Balancing Act in the Gulf

For most of the modern era, the internal security structure of the Gulf has been dominated by a ‘‘four cornered’’ balancing act between Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the southern Gulf States. Iran and Iraq have dominated the regional arms race, competing and sometimes fighting with each other. Saudi Arabia has sought to become a major regional military power in its own right, sometimes allied with the smaller Gulf States and sometimes divided from them by historical rivalries, Saudi ambitions, and various border disputes and claims. The southern Gulf States have sometimes been the target of Iranian and Iraqi ambitions, but have often concentrated on feuding with both Saudi Arabia and each other. Two outside powers, Britain and the United States, have been the ‘‘fifth corner’’ in this security structure. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar all host U.S. bases and power projection facilities, and Oman has close ties to Britain. The United States, in particular, has effectively dominated the regional security structure whenever it chose to directly intervene. These interventions included aiding North Yemen against South Yemen, intervening in the Iran-Iraq War by reflagging Kuwaiti tankers in 1987–1988, leading the liberation of Kuwait in 1990–1991, and invading Iraq in 2003. In the process, the United States has gone from being ‘‘over the horizon’’ to ‘‘constantly in sight.’’ In spite of the creation of regional institutions like the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981, Gulf ‘‘security’’ has been the product of largely uncoordinated national efforts. Iran and Iraq have always acted as independent powers. Each of the southern Gulf States has pursued its own path to national security, and the smaller Gulf countries have relied on the power projection forces of the United Kingdom and the United States for security and as a counterbalance to their neighbors.

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GULF MILITARY FORCES IN AN ERA OF ASYMMETRIC WARS

KEY FACTORS CHANGING GULF SECURITY DYNAMICS This balance began to change sharply after Iran’s defeat in the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 and Iraq’s defeat in the Gulf War in 1991. The Al Qa’ida attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, sharply weakened U.S. and Saudi security ties. At the same time, Islamist extremism and sectarian divisions began to force the Gulf States to look inward and make hard trade-offs between conventional military spending, strengthening their internal security capabilities, and funding the kind of economic and social reforms that are another way of defeating Islamist threats. Transnational threats like Al Qa’ida and other neo-Salafi Islamist extremist movements have become active threats in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and they have cells and elements in all of the other southern Gulf States. The U.S.–led invasion of Iraq in 2003 effectively destroyed Iraq’s military and security forces and left it dependent on outside aid and military support. Iraq’s unity is at risk; it may split or devolve into civil war. It also created a power vacuum in Iraq that leaves Iraq unable to provide for its own defense. The invasion has also created new levels of popular anger against the United States in all of the Arab states in the Gulf. It has also created a split between Iraq’s new dominant Shi’ite majority and its once dominant Sunni minority that may spill over into the rest of the region. This split is fueled by both neo-Salafis who feel Shi’ites and other sects are not legitimate Muslims and the inevitable reaction from Shi’ites in Iran, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and other states in the region. Iran is emerging out of the relatively defensive mode it adopted after its defeat in the Iran-Iraq War in the summer of 1988, and it now has a hard-line regime that is taking a more aggressive stance toward both Israel and its neighbors. Iran has responded to the continuing weakness of its conventional forces, and its inability to challenge American preeminence in conventional war fighting, by developing new types of forces for asymmetric warfare, long-range strike systems, and seemingly nuclear weapons. Although such reactions may be exaggerated, senior Arab leaders like King Abdullah of Jordan, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, and Prince Saud Al Faisal of Saudi Arabia have all warned that something like a new ‘‘Shi’ite crescent’’ could emerge out of Iran, a Shi’ite dominated Iraq, Syria’s Alawiis, and Lebanon’s Shi’ites. The situation is further complicated by new pressures from outside the region. Islamic extremism ‘‘surrounds’’ the Gulf region. Extremist groups like Al Qa’ida and its affiliates have a power base in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. They continue to fight governments in key nations like Egypt and Algeria and present a threat in all of the Arab states on the borders of the Gulf. Since 2000, a new Israeli-Palestinian conflict has again made Israel, and U.S. ties to Israel, a major issue in the Gulf. A Palestinian government led by Hamas has been elected that opposes Israel’s very existence. A new Israeli government has been elected that seems committed to creating major security barriers to divide the two peoples along boundaries it selects on a unilateral basis.

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The U.S. reactions to ‘‘9/11’’—the Al Qa’ida attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001—have led to U.S. approaches to counterterrorism that have convinced many in the region that the United States is anti-Arab and anti-Islam. At the same time, European reactions to immigration from the Middle East, North Africa, and other Islamic areas have led to rising cultural and political tensions and helped fuel major riots near Paris. Changes in military tactics, training, and technology interact with other changes in the threat. The Gulf War and the Iraq War have provided tangible demonstrations that all the Gulf States must make major changes in the nature of military and national security forces if they are to be effective. At the same time, they must cope with the rising priority for improved internal security forces. Each state must choose whether to try to modernize its military forces in ways that will allow them to match some of the advances in conventional forces that make up the ‘‘revolution in military affairs,’’ a challenge that requires both massive new investments and major improvements in training and manpower quality. At the same time, they must deal with the risk of Iranian proliferation and the need to strengthen their counterterrorism capabilities and the ability to defend against asymmetric attacks. The changes in the very nature of warfare that were demonstrated in the Gulf War of 1990–1991, and demonstrated even more clearly in Iraq’s defeat in 2003, force a rate of military change that goes far beyond the traditional arms races in the region. The following chapters show that each state faces different problems in making such choices. They also show that even the wealthiest states must consider how much to invest in military and internal security forces vs. how much to invest in social and economic reform. The trade-offs go far beyond each state’s national security structure. They mean making choices between activities like military modernization and investing in education and economic diversification. No state can ignore the problem of proliferation. Iraq’s missile forces and weapons of mass destruction no longer exist, and Iran is only a potential nuclear and missile power. If Iran persists in creating significant nuclear forces, however, the other Gulf States, the United States, and Britain must react. This may take the form of attacks on Iran’s facilities. It may take the form of containment, or it may take the form of creating new Gulf deterrent and defensive capabilities and lead other Gulf powers to acquire nuclear weapons. More broadly, it may lead Israel to become a meaningful player in the Gulf balance as Israel adapts its nuclear forces to deter and target Iran. Furthermore, at some point transnational actors like Al Qa’ida may be able to acquire at least crude chemical, biological, and radiological weapons—adding a new kind of proliferation to the region. Finally, the balance of energy dependence is changing on a global level. Asia is becoming a major, if not a leading gas, oil, and product importer. This not only is reshaping the nature of outside strategic interest in the Gulf, it is pushing world demand to the limits of supply. One result is a massive new transfer of oil export revenues to the region. As measured in constant 2005 U.S. dollars, Gulf oil export revenues (including a war-damaged Iraq) have approached or exceeded their peak levels of $380 billion in the 1980s. They have risen from near record lows of $106 billion

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in 1995, to $182 billion in 2000, $143 billion in 2001, $139 billion in 2002, $176 billion in 2003, $241 billion in 2004, $303 billion in 2005, and an estimated $351 billion in 2006. Another result is potential global competition to secure future energy exports coupled to a steadily rising dependence on the Gulf to provide increased imports at a time when there is little or no surplus production capacity. It is also clear that the reliability of near-real-time export supply, and every aspect of Gulf security, will become steadily more important to the global economy for at least several decades to come. THE ENDURING DYNAMICS OF GULF (IN)SECURITY The changes are being imposed on a regional security structure that has never been able to establish either a stable base of deterrence or institutions that create effective collective security efforts. The southern Gulf States have clashed and sometimes fought and have been the target of outside powers. The northern Gulf States have wallowed in self-destructive internal political struggles, a mutual arms race, and covert and open warfare. Outside intervention by the United States and Britain has had mixed impacts at best: sometimes helping to bring stability and sometimes making things worse. A Southern Gulf Divided against Itself There has been real progress in achieving border settlements and some forms of interstate cooperation in the southern Gulf. The postwar history of the Gulf, however, is also filled with interstate tensions and clashes. Saudi Arabia attempted to seize the Buraimi Oasis while Britain still controlled the Trucial States along the coast of the southern Gulf. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates narrowly avoided a major dispute over their relative borders in the Gulf and toward the Buraimi area.1 Small border clashes between Qatar and Saudi Arabia occurred in spite of this settlement, and the United Arab Emirates has recently shown signs of reviving the issue. Saudi Arabia and Oman also disputed their border during the 1960s and 1970s, although this issue now does seem to have been settled. A serious war took place in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula in the 1960s when Egypt attempted to dominate North Yemen by intervening in its civil war. Egypt left in 1967 and did so then only because its defeat by Israel in another conflict made it unable to resist Saudi pressure to leave. This was the first war to introduce the use of poison gas since the British had used it against Iraqi rebels in the 1920s. It was not to be the last. The war also led Saudi Arabia to intervene in internal Yemeni affairs, and it led to border clashes between Saudi Arabia and Yemen that did not end until the two states reached what seems to be a lasting agreement on their borders in 2000–2001. Kuwait has long been a tempting target. Iraq moved its forces toward the Kuwaiti border after British ‘‘withdrawal’’ from the Gulf in 1961 and threatened to invade. It halted only after Britain rushed troops back to Kuwait. Both Iraq and Iran threatened Kuwait during the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988. Iraq launched a full-scale

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invasion in 1990 and attempted to annex Kuwait as a ‘‘19th province.’’ It took a fullscale war by a U.S.– and Saudi-led Coalition, acting under a UN mandate, to liberate Kuwait in 1991, and Iraq still continued to posture and make threatening troop movements in the 1990s. Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates became the target of the Shah of Iran’s ambitions after British withdrawal. The Shah gave up Iran’s claims to Bahrain under pressure from the United States and Britain, although they resurfaced in the form of Iranian interference in Bahrain’s internal affairs once the Shah fell. The Shah took more tangible action in the case of several islands in the middle of the key shipping lanes near the Strait of Hormuz. British efforts to forge the small Trucial States into a single entity had only mixed success. In 1971, six of the ten Trucial States—Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Fujairah, Sharjah, Dubai, and Umm Al-Qaiwain— merged to form the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Ra’s al Khaymah stood aside, and the Shah took advantage of its weakness to seize Abu Musa and the Tunbs. His prime minister delivered a speech stating they were an integral part of Iran and always would be—an action that led Ra’s al Khaymah to join the United Arab Emirates in 1972. A compromise followed that gave Sharjah and the United Arab Emirates a role in their government, but Iran effectively drove the United Arab Emirates out in 1971, and they have been a source of contention ever since. South Yemen supported Marxists rebels in Oman in the 1970s in what came to be called the ‘‘Dhofar Rebellion.’’ The war lasted from 1964 to 1975, and the rebels were defeated only by major British and Iranian intervention. South Yemen was torn apart by civil wars and violent internal power struggles virtually from the time rebels forced the British out in 1967. It became involved in assassinations of North Yemeni officials and border clashes with North Yemen that ended only when yet another internal civil war in South Yemen in 1990 led to the collapse of the country and a forced unification with North Yemen. The resulting tensions led to a civil war in the united Yemen in 1994 and helped contribute to a climate of division and extremist and terrorist presence that still presents problems. Disputes and minor clashes between Bahrain and Qatar over the reefs and islands that divide them took place until 2001. These seem to have been resolved by a series of negotiating efforts, actions by the World Court, and border agreements between Qatar and Bahrain and Qatar and Saudi Arabia in 2001. Nothing in the Gulf ever, however, seems to be truly settled. The death of Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi, the unifying leader of the United Arab Emirates, led his successor to open up a border dispute with Saudi Arabia that affects Qatar as well. The United Arab Emirates Yearbook for 2006 published a map and text rescinding the 1974 boundary with Saudi Arabia, as stipulated in a treaty filed with the UN in 1993, on the grounds that the agreement was not formally ratified.2 The Self-Destructive North The most serious problems in the region, however, have come from the two rival northern Gulf powers. Iran and Iraq have dominated both regional conflicts and

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the regional arms race since the 1960s. This rivalry led the Shah to use Iraq’s Kurds as a proxy during the early 1970s and support an Iraqi Kurdish uprising as a means of forcing Iraq to accept a border and navigable waterway solution favorable to Iraq in the form of the Algiers Accord of 1975. This proxy war accelerated the arms race between the two countries, with the United States and western European powers supplying Iran, and Iraq obtaining arms from the Soviet bloc and China. The fall of the Shah in 1979 limited Iran’s access to Western arms. It also created an aggressive theocratic regime in Iran that attempted to export its religious revolution to Iraq’s Shi’ites. Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath regime in Iraq saw this as both a threat and an opportunity and invaded what they saw as a weak and divided Iran, probably with the intent of seizing at least some of Iran’s oil-producing areas in its southwest. This led to a bloody war between the two states during 1980–1988, as well as the arms race shown in Figure 1.1. The conflict proved to be one of the bloodiest in the history of the Middle East and one that made extensive use of chemical weapons. While Iran was able to go on the counteroffensive after 1982 and invade Iraq, this led to a war of attrition where Iraq was able to get access to advanced weapons from both the West and the Soviet bloc, and Iran had only limited access to Russian, Chinese, North Korean, and some Vietnamese weapons. Iran’s reliance on infantry and human waves led to immense bloodshed, but could not counter Iraq’s advantage in military technology. Eight years of struggle ended in an Iraqi victory that deprived Iran of some 40– 60 percent of its inventory of land force weapons and made Iraq the Gulf ’s preeminent military power. The Iraqi victories in the spring and summer of 1988

Figure 1.1 The Iranian-Iraqi Arms Race during the Iran-Iraq War, 1981–1988 Supplier

New Arms Agreements Iran Iraq

Soviet Union China All Other Communist

240 3,970 5,740

20,650 5,520 6,030

370 2,750 4,550

21,370 4,380 6,300

Total Communist

9,950

32,200

7,670

32,050

European Non-Communist United States All Other Non-Communist

5,340 * 1,410

9,790 † 5,260

4,170 * 1,970

10,710 † 3,900

6,750 17,480

14,960 47,250

6,140 13,810

14,610 46,660

Total Non-Communist TOTAL

Actual Deliveries Iran Iraq

* Does not include covert U.S. arms sales during Iran Contra. † Value less than $50 million. Source: Richard F. Grimmett, Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Supplier, Washington, Congressional Research Service (CRS), CRS 89-434F, July 31, 1989.

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destroyed or captured between 40 and 60 percent of the Iranian armor inventory and up to 50 percent of Iran’s armored personnel carrier (APC) artillery.3 Despite the losses Iraq had suffered during the war, its victories in 1988 made it the dominant military power in the Gulf. In fact, a combination of this power and the problems Iraq faced in repaying its wartime debts helped trigger Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the Gulf War that followed. The result was to weaken Iraq to virtually the same extent Iran had been weakened a few years earlier. The UN imposed sanctions on any Iraqi import of arms in 1990 that lasted until 2003, and Iraq lost some 30–40 percent of its military inventory in the Gulf War. Iraq’s military development remained crippled from the end of the Gulf War in 1991 until the fall of Saddam Hussein in April 2003. While Iraq did smuggle in some arms during 1992–2003, such efforts were limited as were its efforts to create the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction. Iran had a greater ability to import arms after the end of the Gulf War than Iraq did, but Iran faced major financial problems and could not obtain resupply or new weapons from most Western states. It was able to rebuild some of its conventional capabilities during 1988–2003 and make progress toward acquiring weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles. In practice, however, the Iranian armed forces had far less war-fighting capabilities in 2004 than they did in 1979. In the process, Iraq not only imported massive amounts of conventional arms, it built up a major long-range missile force and a wide range of covert programs to develop and manufacture chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Both Iran and Iraq conducted Scud missile attacks on each other in what became known as the ‘‘war of the cities.’’ Iraq, however, was able to make active use of chemical weapons and had reached the point of being able to deploy biological weapons by the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. Its nuclear programs were also maturing, although it was at least several years away from being able to deploy a nuclear device. Iraq’s status as the dominant power, however, was short-lived. In 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait and triggered a war with a UN Coalition that not only destroyed much of Iraq’s military power, but which led to more than a decade of UN sanctions and confrontation with the United States and its allies. Iraq at best could smuggle in limited numbers of spare parts and small conventional weapons. It could not rebuild, repair, or modernize most of the military equipment that survived the Gulf War, and its forces sharply deteriorated over time. It locked down its forces in garrison duty on the Iranian border and border of the Kurdish security zone, fought low-level wars against Shi’ite resistance in the south, and constantly purged its armed forces to ensure their loyalty. By 2000, Iraq’s forces had steadily decayed for a decade and were largely a hollow shell. In 2003, a U.S.– and British-led Coalition invaded Iraq, removed the regime of Saddam Hussein, effectively destroyed Iraq’s armed forces, security services, and police and broke up its central government. As has been touched upon earlier, the end result was to create a major power vacuum in the Gulf whose future impact and implications are now far from clear.

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One clear shift in the Gulf balance of power, however, is that Iran has emerged as the dominant conventional military power in the northern Gulf, more as a result of Iraq’s defeats than Iran’s actions. Iran has never rebuilt the level of conventional military strength it had before its catastrophic defeats in 1988, and much of its current force posture is worn and obsolete. It has, however, imported some advanced weaponry from Russia and sought to create a modern defense industry within Iran. What is far more destabilizing is that Iran has followed in Iraq’s footsteps, at least to the point of developing chemical weapons and long-range missile forces. Its efforts in biological weapons are suspect, but their character is unknown. Iran also has almost certainly restarted the nuclear weapons development effort begun by the Shah, probably in the mid-1980s, although detailed indicators are available only for the time since 2000. Iran now has all of the basic technology to produce fission weapons and has made major progress in developing centrifuge, reactor, plutonium separation, and heavy water production technology. Iran has also developed major capabilities for asymmetric warfare in the form of a massive Revolutionary Guards force, a popular mobilization and guard force in the form of the Basiij, purchases of weapons systems designed for asymmetric and covert warfare, and the creation of a mix of intelligence services and Revolutionary Guards units that can supply training and equipment to nonstate actors like Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shi’ite parties and militia in Iraq, and Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The end result is a serious asymmetric threat to shipping traffic and facilities in the Gulf and the potential ability to conduct proxy wars against Israel, in Iraq, or in Afghanistan. Like Sunni Islamist extremism, Iran is already a transnational threat. The Destabilizing Outside Stabilizers The Gulf has been a transit route for outside powers throughout recorded history. In modern times, it became part of the ‘‘great game’’ between Britain, Turkey, and Russia and the ‘‘western approach’’ to India. It was the subject of German and British rivalry before and during World War II and a focal point in the Cold War in the decades that followed. Since that time, first Britain and then the United States have acted as ‘‘stabilizing’’ forces in counterbalancing the power of both Iran and Iraq. Whether Britain and the United States manipulated the southern Gulf countries in the process, or were manipulated by them, is a false choice. The reality has always been that such manipulation is an open contest in which both outside powers and Gulf nations seek to win. Britain effectively guaranteed the security of the southern Gulf States until it abandoned its dominant military role in the region between 1966 and 1968. The United States then turned to Iran as a ‘‘pillar’’ of regional security until the fall of the Shah in 1979—which led to the Iranian seizure of U.S. diplomats as hostages and a crisis in U.S.–Iranian relations. Efforts to counter Nasserism and Soviet ambitions inevitably also increased local arms races and tensions. British and U.S. efforts to end the Dhofar Rebellion were

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largely successful and brought considerable stability to Oman. They did not, however, bring stability to the Yemens and helped increase the level of conflict between them. Britain’s partial success in creating the United Arab Emirates, and much greater success in bringing all of its former Trucial States to some form of statehood, helped create a new balance of power in the Gulf, but also inevitably created new tensions and rivalries. The U.S. search for Iranian and Saudi ‘‘pillars’’ to compensate for British withdrawal from the Gulf acted to limit Soviet intervention and the threat from Iraq, but also created new rivalries and tensions. While the United States and Britain are sometimes blamed for the Shah’s fall, the ambitions of Iran and Iraq drove much of the tension in the region before the Shah’s fall, and the Shah’s ego and failures to govern largely led to his fall. The emergence of Ayatollah Khomeini and the conflicts between the new Iranian regime and the United States still have a major impact in shaping regional security, but this was an Iranian and not an American choice. The Iran-Iraq War was triggered by Iranian and Iraqi actions, not outside powers. The United States and Europe initially called for Iraq to withdraw, but were then pressured into supporting Iraq when Iran went on the offensive and threatened to dominate Iraq and the Gulf. It was Kuwait that pressured the United States into ‘‘reflagging’’ its tankers in 1987 to protect them from Iranian attacks, and Kuwaiti and southern Gulf action led to the brief ‘‘tanker war’’ between the United States and Iran during 1987–1988 that crippled part of the Iranian Navy. The United States and Britain, however, are only two of the actors that have intervened in the region. The former Soviet Union was a key force in supporting the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen and creating decades of tension in the southeastern Arabian Peninsula. As Figure 1.1 has shown, many powers have used arms sales as weapons of influence. The United States and Britain did not fuel the Iran-Iraq War or build up Iraq’s military machine to the point where it became the new threat in the Gulf after Iran’s defeat. Iraq got its modern arms largely from France and Russia and the money to survive from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Outside support of Iraq did, however, help create the situation where a supposedly ‘‘moderate’’ Iraq invaded Kuwait. The United States, Britain, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt led a Coalition that liberated Kuwait in 1991 and removed this Iraqi threat, but also helped trigger the rise of neoSalafi Islamic extremism as a reaction. It also left a strategic situation so ambiguous that the end result was more than a decade of sanctions and the U.S.–led Coalition that invaded Iraq and overthrew the regime of Saddam Hussein. These events also changed the nature of the U.S. military presence in the Gulf. The British military presence diminished sharply after 1971 when Britain withdrew from positions ‘‘East of Suez.’’ Britain still deploys naval forces, and it has fought in both the Gulf War of 1990–1991 and the U.S.–led invasion of Iraq in 2003. It normally, however, deploys only a few ships in the region and has a limited advisory presence in Oman. The United States initially sought to rely on regional powers to replace the British presence in the Gulf, but gradually emerged as the major power in the region.

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During the period from 1971 to 1986, the United States kept a largely over-thehorizon posture and, until the Shah’s fall in 1979, tried to create regional pillars out of Iranian and Saudi forces. It avoided a significant military presence during the first six years of the Iran-Iraq War, but limited deployments the United States made from 1971 to 1986 were replaced by a major naval presence during the tanker war with Iran from 1987–1988 and became a major presence during the first Gulf War. The ‘‘dual containment’’ of Iran and Iraq that followed created a mix of major bases and prepositioning facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. From 1991 to 2003, the United States maintained air combat and surface-to-air missile units in Saudi Arabia, and a major battle management center collocated with Saudi forces. At the same time it built up prepositioning for one brigade each in Kuwait and Qatar, a 5th Fleet headquarters and naval base in Bahrain, improved facilities in Oman, and closer ties to the United Arab Emirates. Growing tensions with Saudi Arabia led the United States to expand its facilities in Qatar during the preparation for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The destruction of Saddam’s forces removed the need for U.S. air and surface-to-air missiles in March of that year, and the United States withdrew its forces from Saudi Arabia. It also, however, found itself involved in a ‘‘long war’’ in Iraq that led to the creation of two major bases in Kuwait and the creation of major facilities in Iraq, as well as the deployment of some 130,000 troops. At no point have British and/or U.S. action been able to bring lasting stability to the Gulf, although they have often helped to avoid conflicts becoming far more serious and turning into worse cases. The reality is that Gulf security tends to operate according to the laws of Newtonian physics, and every action has tended to have an equal and opposite reaction that triggers new problems and sources of instability. This history is not an argument against outside powers trying to play a stabilizing role or Gulf powers seeking external aid and security guarantees. Passivity is a dangerous approach to a region with more than 60 percent of the world’s proven conventional oil reserves and some 40 percent of its gas. Leaving a local power vacuum in a region that has become steadily more critical to the world’s economy for half a century is not an answer to either the Gulf’s needs or those of the world economy. At the same time, the sheer complexity of Gulf security and the uncertainties surrounding it almost ensure that stability will remain an elusive and unstable goal. A FUTURE OF DISCORD AND DEPENDENCE? This history of the region is a grim demonstration of the fact that states in the region are slow to learn from their own history. The more one examines the current state of Gulf security, the more it is clear that it is driven by national considerations and not by regional trends or efforts at collective security. There is some cooperation between nations, but it is easy to exaggerate and most claimed cooperation is little more than a façade. Today, as in the past, national rivalries keep the Gulf divided and threaten to plunge it into future wars. Countries focus on their own narrow self-interest, and

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the development of their own forces, even when this is counterproductive and dangerous. The end result is not a classic military balance, or emerging pattern of stability, but rather a constantly changing mix of forces that often leads to clashes and war. A Hollow Gulf Cooperation Council and De Facto Reliance on the ‘‘Fifth Corner’’ The creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981 seemed to be a sign that at least part of the Gulf could achieve some degree of unity and a more cohesive local Gulf security structure. The practice has been largely hollow. Saudi Arabia effectively disbanded the GCC force based near Hafr al Batin at the time of the first Gulf War in 1990. It organized the Arab side of the UN Coalition force under its own leadership, and without regard to the existence of the GCC command structure. In 2005, the GCC rapid deployment force was formally disbanded, leaving no real GCC military structure other than an impressive headquarters in Riyadh and some elements of a secure air force communications system. Saudi Arabia and smaller southern Gulf States like Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates continue to feud, and no border settlement ever seems totally final. The revival of petty disputes between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates is simply the latest example. Iraq is dependent on the U.S.–led Coalition now deployed in Iraq for the development and equipment of the military and security forces that collapsed after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. At least for several years to come, the country will either collapse into civil war, divide, or need a major U.S. combat and advisory presence. There are, as yet, no detailed plans for developing the mix of heavier land forces, air forces, and naval forces that will allow Iraq to deter and defend against its neighbors, particularly Turkey and Iran. Saudi Arabia saw U.S. forces depart after the U.S.–led invasion of Iraq in 2003, but secretly allowed U.S. troops to use its soil as a springboard during the invasion and still relies heavily on U.S. advisors and contractors. Military cooperation with the United States and Britain has also increasingly been supplemented by cooperation in internal security and counterterrorism as neo-Salafi Islamist extremist groups like Al Qa’ida have emerged as a common threat. Islamic Extremism, Terrorism, and Insurgency Islamic extremism now affects virtually every aspect of Gulf security. It is both a national and transnational threat, and one that threatens every moderate and secular regime to some degree. The U.S.–led invasion of Iraq has not brought stability, but a state of near civil war mixed with a growing threat from both outside and Iraqi Islamist extremists. Saudi Arabia has been actively under attack by affiliates of Al Qa’ida since May 2003 and has had to recast its entire internal security structure. NeoSalafi Islamist extremist elements operate in all of the smaller Gulf States and have attempted serious attacks in Kuwait and Qatar.

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Many of these neo-Salafi Sunni extremist groups treat Shi’ites and other sects as non-Muslims, nonbelievers, or polytheists. This has tended to create a new source of splits within the region and internal conflicts along sectarian lines. The problem has been made worse by divisions between Arab Sunnis and Arab Shi’ites in Iraq, Shi’ite vs. Sunni tensions in Bahrain, Iran’s status as a Shi’ite theocracy, Sunni vs. Shi’ite tensions in Yemen, and the fact Oman has a strong Ibadhi majority. Saudi Arabia is having to redefine its form of Sunni Puritanism to keep extremists from exploiting its version of Islam, and religious divisions inevitably lead to tensions with secularists, less polarized believers, and Christians and Jews. The Iranian Problem Iran’s status as a Persian and Shi’ite state and its strong ties to Central Asia have always tended to separate it from its neighbors and make it a rival for dominance in the Gulf. It now faces a far more serious set of religious tensions—some of its own making because of its support of Shi’ites in Iraq, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Yemen and Alawites in Syria. Iran also is much more actively pursuing the acquisition of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. These developments have led King Abdullah of Jordan, President Mubarak of Egypt, and Prince Saud of Saudi Arabia to warn of the potential emergence of Iran as the leader of a Shi’ite ‘‘crescent’’ or ‘‘axis’’ in the region. While such a development now seems uncertain at best, it does highlight the fact that Iran is now seen as much more of a regional threat than in the past and one that may drag the United States and/or Israel into a new set of conflicts if it insists on developing and deploying nuclear weapons. Iraq as a Power Vacuum Iraq may or may not remain a near power vacuum in the Gulf. There is no question, however, that the destruction of its conventional military power during the 2003 invasion meant it no longer acts as a military counterbalance to Iran. Coupled to rising sectarian and ethnic tension and fighting, Iraq has become a major source of instability and one that seems unlikely to achieve real unity for at least several years. A divided Iraq could easily lead to a de facto split of the country into an Arab Sunni minority backed by outside Arab Sunni states, an Arab Shi’ite majority backed by Iran, and an isolated Kurdish enclave defended by the United States but seen as an internal threat by Turkey, Iran, and Syria. Even an effective Iraqi unity government would face major security problems. At best, it will be after 2010 before Iraq’s military forces can be rebuilt into a national force with serious capability to deter and defend against Iraq’s neighbors. Yemen at the Margins Yemen has only limited military power and technically is outside the Gulf. It is, however, a de facto Gulf State and a significant factor in regional security because of

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its large population, its common borders with Oman and Saudi Arabia, and its strategic position at the entrance to the Red Sea. Yemen is also an economic basket case —a power with limited internal stability, no clear future, and significant extremist and terrorist elements. It is a further source of instability. Squaring the Fifth Corner? The U.S. invasion of Iraq, and its failure to carry out effective stability and nationbuilding efforts before a major insurgency and terrorist threat developed in the country, has sharply reduced U.S. popularity and freedom of action in the region. This has been compounded by the widespread popular perception that the United States has reacted to the events of September 11, 2001, by becoming anti-Arab and antIslam and that the United States invaded Iraq without real cause and in defiance of many of the members of the UN. There is a serious risk that the United States will fail to help Iraq hold together and be forced to ‘‘exit’’ to Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar. If so, the resulting partnership between the United States and the southern Gulf States will be an awkward one at best, and one where southern Gulf regimes will act out of necessity in the face of broad opposition from their peoples. Any U.S. military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would make this situation much worse, and so would any Israeli attack on Iran or explosion of Israeli-Palestinian tension at a time the peace process nears collapse. Aside from a limited British presence, however, no other outside power can play a stabilizing role or help deter and defend against Iran. Europe has neither the means nor the will; it can sell arms but cannot play a major role in power projection. There is no UN force, and other power blocs like Russia and China at most are a card that the Gulf States play in trying to pressure the United States. They are played, rather than being players. SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOUTHERN GULF The country-by-country analysis of Gulf security developments that follows shows that the way in which individual Gulf States have shaped their national security policies, and military and security forces, has also had a major impact in enhancing national strength at the expense of overall regional stability. The military buildup in the southern Gulf has lacked cooperation and cohesion, and cooperation in internal security and counterterrorism is only marginally better. Although the southern Gulf States created the GCC in 1981—largely as a reaction to the perceived threat from a revolutionary Iran—the GCC never resulted in more than token military cooperation. The southern Gulf States—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—have each built up their military and security forces largely in isolation from each other. This effort has been led by a massive military investment by Saudi Arabia, the only southern Gulf State large and wealthy enough to play such a role. Unlike Iran and Iraq, however, the military efforts of the southern Gulf States were carried out with the knowledge that the United States and its allies could

14


provide power projection forces to protect them and that such protection would almost certainly be forthcoming because of the role the Gulf played in the world’s oil exports and the fact it had more than 60 percent of the world proven oil reserves. Going Hollow at Great Cost The southern Gulf States spend immense amounts on their military forces and arms purchases. The recent patterns in Gulf defense spending and arms transfers are shown in Figures 1.2 and 1.3. In some ways, they reflect typical cycles in Gulf spending. Figure 1.2 reflects a shift in the nature of the Gulf military buildup that began to emerge before Iran’s defeat in the Iran-Iraq War and Iraq’s defeat in the Gulf War, but which has accelerated ever since. The southern Gulf leads the regional arms race that the northern Gulf States began. Figure 1.2 shows that Saudi Arabia has by far been the largest spender in the Gulf, although several small southern Gulf States—notably Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates—have been very large spenders in proportion to their size. In some years, one or more of the small southern Gulf States have nearly equaled the expenditures of much larger northern Gulf States. As Figure 1.3 shows, somewhat similar patterns have emerged in southern Gulf imports, with Saudi Arabia gradually declining in recent years and the United Arab Emirates making major new imports. As is the case with military expenditures, the southern Gulf States have massively outspent the northern Gulf States. For Iran, this is partly a matter of choice and partly a matter of economic weakness. For Iraq, it has been forced upon Iraq by a UN arms embargo from September 1990 to the fall of Saddam Hussein in April 2003 and by its massive defeat in the U.S.–led invasion that drove Saddam from power. As the following chapters show, the practical problem for the southern Gulf States is that they have not transformed their spending into forces whose effectiveness is proportionate to their cost. The potential desirability of regional cooperation, standardization and interoperability, and training and organization for joint operations on a GCC-wide level is obvious. In practice, each of the southern Gulf States pursued its own path in creating military forces, often emphasizing the purchase of modern major weapons systems that were perceived to provide prestige and a ‘‘glitter factor’’ in terms of regional status. Rivalries and past tensions among the southern Gulf States prevented serious efforts at developing joint capabilities and interoperability. At the same time, a number of states limited their military efforts because of the fear of coups. The end result was that the southern Gulf States largely preferred de facto dependence on U.S. and British power projection forces over effective regional and national military efforts. The Key Factors Shaping Southern Gulf Forces One paradox of southern Gulf force development is that the Iraq War, the war on terrorism, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may have made the United States and

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Figure 1.2 Gulf Military Spending, 1997–2005

outside forces unpopular, but this has done little to push Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates toward finding any collective alternative to the United States. They are all members of the GCC, but the GCC is a myth in war fighting and force development terms. The GCC has proposed a wide range of useful projects to improve military interoperability and cooperation since its founding in 1981, but has made only token progress: • The one joint combat force the GCC has created—the GCC rapid deployment force— has always been a hollow, token force. It had no clear mission after the fall of Saddam

16


Figure 1.3 The Gulf Arms Race in Arms Imports, 1997–2004 (in Millions of Current U.S. Dollars) Supplier

New Arms Agreements 1997–2000 2001–2004

Actual Deliveries 1997–2000 2001–2004

Southern Gulf Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE

600 800 300 * 4,900 13,300

500 2,300 2,200 * 5,600 1,700

600 2,900 200 1,800 37,000 4,800

300 1,500 300 * 19,000 6,000

Subtotal

19,900

12,300

47,300

27,100

Northern Gulf Iran Iraq

1,500 200

700 800

1,900 *

500 200

Subtotal

1,700

1,500

1,900

700

400

900

400

700

22,000

14,700

49,600

28,500

Yemen TOTAL

* Value less than $50 million. Source: Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, Washington, Congressional Research Service, RL33051, August 29, 2005.

Hussein in 2003 and the end of Iraq as a serious threat. It was effectively disbanded in 2005. • Its members have resisted the standardization of weapons and equipment throughout the GCC’s existence. Nothing is changing. • There is little or no focus on developing truly effective, interoperable forces that are integrated or shaped around common missions. • An air defense integration contract offers some hope for the future, but has few of the features needed to actually integrate land-based and fighter aid defense operations in a real-world combat environment. • Some cooperation has developed in naval exercises, and in areas like mine warfare, but Gulf navies and naval air operations would have little real-world effectiveness without U.S. or British support.

As is discussed in detail in each of the chapters that follows, all of the southern Gulf States still have some degree of tension with their neighbors. The southern Gulf States do seem to have resolved many past border and territorial disputes, but there are several sources of remaining tension. These include Qatari, Omani, and the UAE fear of Saudi ‘‘dominance.’’ They also include Omani concerns over Yemen and tensions with the United Arab Emirates over the role Omani manpower should

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play in UAE forces. There are lingering tensions between Bahrain and Qatar, although these seem to be rapidly diminishing. Kuwait has its own concerns over Saudi ambitions and the development of oil and gas resources offshore and in the neutral zone it shares with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is also concerned over smuggling of arms and explosives across the Yemeni border and the risk that Yemen could become a future threat. The end result is that the southern Gulf States continue to have closer real-world military cooperation with the United States than with each other. Saudi–U.S. military cooperation was a key to the quick Coalition victory in the Gulf War. Some aspects of Saudi–U.S. cooperation have been curtailed as a result of the events of 9/11 and tensions over the war on terrorism. U.S. and Saudi cooperation was much closer in the Iraq War in 2003, however, than is generally apparent. Saudi Arabia provided substantial aid to U.S. operations and allowed U.S. Special Forces to stage out of Arar on the Iraqi border. Active U.S. combat forces left Saudi Arabia in 2003, following the Iraq War, but a strong U.S. advisory presence remains. Saudi Arabia and the United States have also steadily improved their cooperation in counterterrorism since 9/11, and particularly since Saudi Arabia came under Al Qa’ida attack in May 2003. The United States has shifted the focus of its prepositioning and operations as a result of both the need to leave Saudi Arabia and the U.S. need to support large forces in Iraq: • Kuwait provides major air and staging bases for U.S. forces in Iraq, as well as critical port facilities. • Bahrain is the base for the U.S. 5th Fleet, and a key staging point for both U.S. naval and air operations. • Qatar provides a major headquarters and air operations center, air base facilities, port facilities, and prepositioning facilities for a reinforced U.S. brigade. • The United Arab Emirates provides extensive port facilities, ship repair facilities, and intelligence cooperation in dealing with Iran. • Oman provides air and naval staging facilities, and prepositioning facilities at Masirah. Oman also cooperates closely with British forces.

This cooperation involves far more than simply hosting U.S. forces. A wide range of U.S. advisory, training, and exercise activity takes place with southern Gulf States, as well as British and sometimes French forces, at the multilateral level. The United States has also tried to encourage the southern Gulf States to strengthen the GCC as part of this effort. For example, Operation ‘‘Eagle Resolve 2005’’ was a joint U.S.–GCC cooperative exercise to reduce the Gulf States’ vulnerability to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The operation included a series of seminars and exercises designed to promote cooperation among the GCC states.4 In Operation ‘‘Eagle Resolve 2004’’ hosted by the United Arab Emirates, Iran was depicted as a possible aggressor.

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Key Issues in Force Development It will take the southern Gulf States several years to adjust their national force plans to take account of the disappearance of Iraq as a major regional threat— provided that the power vacuum in Iraq does not become a threat of a different kind or give Iran so much influence or potential military strength that they must react to an Iraq dominated by a nuclear-armed Iran. Figure 1.4 shows that most of the southern Gulf States have acquired large inventories of military equipment for nations of their size, and Saudi Arabia has become a comparatively large military force relative to other powers in the region. In practice, however, all of the southern Gulf States have limited real-world war-fighting capabilities. Far too often, readiness and training are poor to mediocre, and there is more emphasis on buying the most modern military equipment—the glitter factor in military procurement—than on creating effective and sustainable forces. This emphasis on acquiring the shell of military capability, rather than the reality, is partly a result of de facto reliance on the power projection capabilities of the United States and Britain, partly a result of a tendency to treat military forces as royal playgrounds or status symbols, partly a lack of expertise and effective military leadership, and partly a result of the fear that effective military forces might lead to a coup. The end result, however, is that southern Gulf forces have far less national and collective military capability than their vast investment in arms military expenditures and imports would otherwise imply. The southern Gulf States also need to focus more on dealing with internal divisions and stability, and particularly the threat of Islamic extremism and terrorism, than on the creation of more or better military forces. This focus on internal security is already the new driving force behind Saudi security planning. The wild card in their force development is proliferation. While the fall of Saddam’s regime had decreased the threat from Iraq’s WMD program, Iran is clearly developing long-range missiles like the Shahab-3 and may well have a nuclear weapons program. Iran now has a regime that many Gulf States see as more threatening than the previous Mohammad Khatami regime, and as more likely to use its forces and capabilities to threaten and pressure its neighbors. The risk of Iranian intervention in Iraq and interference in Bahrain and Shi’ite affairs in the rest of the Gulf is seen as a factor that offsets some of the improvements in relations that took place when Khatami was President from 1997 to 2005. Iran’s acquisition of long-range missiles and probable efforts to acquire nuclear weapons are also seen as a growing threat. The power vacuum in Iraq, the potential for civil war or a new and more hostile Iraqi regime, and the rebirth of internal quarrels discussed earlier is also a factor. It is far from clear how the southern Gulf States will deal with these pressures, and the chapters that follow do more to reflect a lack of effective and coherent force planning and budgeting than examples of well-planned response. Figure 1.2 does show that the southern Gulf States have recently begun to raise their military expenditures.

Figure 1.4 Gulf Military Forces, 2006

Manpower Total Active Regular National Guard & Other Reserve Paramilitary Army and Guard Manpower Regular Army Manpower Reserve Total Main Battle Tanks§ Active Main Battle Tanks Active AIFV/RECCE, Lt. Tanks Total APCs Active APCs ATGM Launchers Self-Propelled Artillery Towed Artillery MRLs Mortars SSM Launchers Light SAM Launchers AA Guns Air Force Manpower

Saudi Arabia†

Iran

Iraq*

Bahrain

Kuwait

Oman

Qatar

545,000 420,000 125,000 350,000 40,000

424,000 375,000 0 650,000 42,000+

11,200 11,200 0 0 10,160

15,500 15,500 0 23,700 6,600

41,700 41,700 6,400 0 4,400

12,400 12,400 0 0 0

199,500 124,500 75,000

540,000‡ 350,000 350,000 1,613 1,300 725+

375,000 375,000 650,000 2,200 1,900 1,300

8,500 8,500 0 180 120 71

11,000 11,000 0 368 293 450

31,400 25,000 0 117 100 182

8,500 8,500 0 30 25 108

150,000 75,000

640 540 75 310+ 2,010 876+ 5,000 42+ Some 1,700 52,000

2,400 1,800 100+ 150 1,900 200 2,000+ 56 1,100 6,000 20,000

235 205 15 13 26 9 21 0 78 27 1,500

321 281 118+ 113 0 27 78 0 48 Some 2,500

191 185 50 24 108 ? 101 0 54+ 26 4,100

226 162 148 28 12 4 45 0 66 0 2,100

UAE

Yemen

50,500 50,500 0 0 0

66,700 66,700 0 40,000 70,000

1,055 710 1,270+

50,500 50,500 0 469 330 579(40)**

60,000 60,000 40,000 790 650 330

3,190 2,630 2000+ 170 238(48) 60 400 10+ 1,000+ 0 18,000

860 570 305 181 93 72(48) 155 6 40+ 62 4,000

710 240 71 25 310 294 502 28 800 530 5,000

15,500+

Air Defense Manpower Total Combat Capable Aircraft Bombers Fighter Ground Attack Fighter/Interceptor RECCE/FGA RECCE AEW C4I/BM MR/MPA† OCU/COIN/CCT Other Combat Trainers Transport Aircraft†† Tanker Aircraft Total Helicopters Armed Helicopters†† Other Helicopters†† Major SAM Launchers Light SAM Launchers AA Guns Total Naval Manpower Regular Navy Naval Guards Marines Major Surface Combattants Missile Other Patrol Craft

15,000 281 0 186+ 74 6+ 1 5 0 35 82+ 4 311 104 524 295 2,500+ Some 38,000‡ 18,000 20,000 5,000

17,000 316 6 130 180 5 0 0 0 157 12 2 375 100 275 400 1,100 6,000 2,000 2,000 0 –

0 33 0 12 21 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 47 40 7 15 78 – 1,200 1,200 0 –

0 50 0 39 14 0 0 0 19 0 4 0 45 20 8 36 48 Some 2,000 2,000 500 –

0 48 0 12 0 12 0 0 16 0 16 0 41 0 41 40 54+ 26 4,200 4,200 0 –

0 18 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 25 19 6 9 66 – 1,800 1,800 0 –

16,000 291 0 171 106 15 5 0 14 50 45 11 127 22 156 429§§ 3,287§§ 1,140 15,500 12,500 0 3,000

0 146 0 20 22 7 0 0 11 0 23 0 107+ 55 52 Some 40+ – 2,500 2,500 0 –

2,000 75(40) 0 41 30 0

5 0

0 0

3 0

0 0

2 0

0 0

11 0

4 0

0 0

0 0 6 18 0 20 8 12 57 120 – 1,700 1,700 0 –

Missile (Revolutionary Guards) Other Revolutionary Guards (Boats) Submarines Mine Vessels Amphibious Ships Landing Craft Support Ships Naval Air Naval Aircraft Fixed Wing Combat MR/MPA Armed Helicopters‡‡ SAR Helicopters‡‡ Mine Warfare Helicopters‡‡ Other Helicopters‡‡

10 10 44 40+ 3 5 12 9 25 2,600

1 – 5 – 0 3 0 – 2 –

4 – 4 – 0 0 0 4 4 –

10 – 0 – 0 0 0 2 4 –

4 – 7 – 0 0 1 4 4 –

7 – – – 0 0 0 0 – –

9 – 57 – 0 7 0 8 7 –

8 – 6 – 0 0 0 5 2 –

8 – 5 – 0 6 1 6 2 –

5 10 19 – 3 19

0 0 0 0 0 –

0 0 0 0 0 1

0 0 0 13 0 –

0 (7) 0 0 0 –

0 0 0 0 0 –

0 0 21 4 0 19

0 0 14 4 0 –

0 0 0 0 0 –

* The figures for Iraq are for March 2003, before the Iraq War. † Saudi totals for reserve include National Guard Tribal Levies. The total for land forces includes active National Guard equipment. These additions total 450 AIFVs, 730 (1,540) APCs, and 70 towed artillery weapons. As for the National Guard, some estimates put the manpower at 95,000–100,000. ‡ Iranian total includes roughly 120,000 Revolutionary Guard actives in land forces with 20,000 in naval forces. § Total tanks include tanks in storage or conversion. ** Equipment in storage is shown in the higher figure in parentheses or in range. †† Includes navy, army, National Guard, and royal flights, but not paramilitary. ‡‡ Air Force totals include all helicopters, including army operated weapons, and all heavy surface-to-air missile launchers. §§ Included in Saudi Air Defense Command. Source: Adapted from interviews, International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance, 2005–2006; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, Periscope; and Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance in the Middle East.

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This may well, however, be more a reaction to a major increase in oil wealth than good force plans. Figure 1.5 shows that southern Gulf oil export earnings have risen from a near low in the 1990s to near record levels, even measured in constant U.S. dollars. Historically, military expenditures and new arms agreements rise with income, especially in times of tension. Such spending may be limited by the need to spend on internal

Figure 1.5 A Trigger for Major Increase in Military Spending and Arms Transfers? The Rise in Gulf Oil Export Earnings, 1971–2007

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security to counter Islamic extremism and other internal threats. These trends have forced some southern Gulf governments to spend more money on social programs, economic development, and paying down the public debt.5 Saudi Arabia, for example, in the fiscal year of 2004, spent half of its budget surplus ($26.1 billion), as a result of the high oil prices, on new projects and the other half to reduce the public debt.6 MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTHERN GULF As has been discussed earlier, the virtual destruction of Iraq’s military forces and its capability to deploy or acquire weapons of mass destruction in 2003 has fundamentally changed the Gulf military balance. Yet the longer-term trends described earlier have also had a major effect. While some southern Gulf States have faced recent problems in recapitalizing their forces, these problems have been far more severe in the case of Iran and Iraq and have affected their military development far longer. Figure 1.4 shows northern Gulf as well as southern Gulf forces. It shows how Iranian forces compared with those of the southern Gulf States in 2006. The current numbers for Iraq, however, are so low that the Iraqi numbers shown are those that existed under Saddam Hussein before April 2003. Iraqi force development now consists of Coalition aid in creating a mix of regular military, internal security, and police forces designed to defeat internal insurgency and outside volunteers and terrorists. It is dependent on the United States and other aid to provide its emerging ten-division arm with equipment, support, facilities, and training and to create a force that can stand on its own. This effort cannot succeed unless Iraq’s political process succeeds in unifying the country and avoiding civil war. It also is so focused on internal security that it has not yet produced any clear Iraqi concept for developing the kind of forces that can defend or deter against Iraq’s neighbors. This is a serious potential problem given Iran’s ambitions, Turkish concern over the Kurdish issue, and Syria’s willingness to allow infiltrators and allow various Islamist extremist and insurgent groups to operate on its soil. Iran never sought to regain the relative level of conventional strength it had before its defeats in the final year of the Iran-Iraq War. Since 1988, it has carried out some rebuilding and modernization of its forces, but it has focused more on acquiring asymmetric and paramilitary forces, weapons of mass destruction, and long-range strike systems than trying to be the major conventional power in the region. The future of these Iranian efforts remains unclear. Iran is evidently deploying its Shahab-3 missiles, but it is far from clear what the final configuration of its longrange missiles will be or how their warheads will be armed. Iran continues to develop its capabilities for asymmetric war both on land and at sea, as well as its ability to train and support potential proxies like various Iraqi militias, the Lebanese Hezbollah, and movements like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. As Chapter 8 shows, Iran is also attempting to solve some of its force development problems by creating a major domestic defense industry and by designing and

24


producing its own advanced weapons systems. Given Iran’s past problems in these areas, along with the difficulties encountered by more advanced nations like China and India, it is not clear how far Iran can advance along these lines. It already, however, has made some progress. Iran has also shown that it can obtain some advanced weapons and technology from China, North Korea, and Russia. It has already shown that it can use such purchases to help increase its capabilities for asymmetric warfare by buying systems like submarines, various air and antiship missiles, more advanced air defense missiles, and a wide range of other systems. It has also bought some modern aircraft and more modern tanks from Russia. Iran must do a great deal to overcome the limits of its largely worn and obsolescent conventional forces, but may be able to accomplish a great deal over time. ‘‘SNAPSHOTS’’ OF COMPARATIVE FORCE STRENGTH Military strength is only one aspect of the trends in Gulf security, but it is important to understand how Gulf forces now compare and the mix of quantitative and qualitative strength that shapes national forces. Later chapters show in depth why comparisons of Gulf conventional military forces disguise major problems in military capability. They also describe the internal security issues, and political divisions, that make counts of military forces a steadily less important measure of security. This does not, however, make comparisons of the military balance unimportant. The following figures describe military capabilities that history has shown may become involved in conflicts with little or no warning. At the same time, comparisons of the strength of the conventional forces, and the military buildup of the various Gulf States, provide important insights into the military strengths and weaknesses of each state and the problems they face in modernizing and restructuring their forces. Broad Trends Affecting the Balance • Figure 1.6 shows the radical shifts taking place in Gulf demographics and that high population growth is greatly reducing the problems the southern Gulf States have had in manning their forces. At the same time, it shows that Iranian, Iraqi, Saudi, and Yemeni population growth is so high that it is placing a massive strain on their respective economies and the ability to fund military forces. In any case, the problem all the Gulf States face is manpower quality and not manpower quantity. • Figure 1.7 provides a count of comparative major equipment strength. The fact that Iraq’s 2,600 main battle tanks and 316 combat aircraft are no longer part of the count illustrates just how much the regional balance has changed as a result of the Iraq War. At the same time, it is clear that weapons strength is in no way proportionate to the comparative size of arms imports—reflecting the tendency to keep large amounts of obsolescent and low-grade equipment in service even if it contributes little to military effectiveness.

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Figure 1.6 Population Growth in the Gulf, 1950–2050

Trends Affecting Military Manpower • Figure 1.8 shows the historical trend in military manpower. It is clear that Iran and Iraq long had far larger forces than those of the southern Gulf States. Once again, the elimination of Iraq makes a critical difference. Iran continues to have far more military manpower than Saudi Arabia, but the effectiveness of this manpower is severely limited by the problems in Iran’s pool of military equipment. • Figure 1.9 provides a similar comparison, but with the actual manpower numbers for each country. It is clear that Saudi manpower has increased sharply relative to that of Iran over time and that the southern Gulf States have the cumulative manpower to support effective collective defense. In practice, however, coordination and interoperability remains extremely limited, robbing the smaller Gulf States of much of their potential military effectiveness. • Figure 1.10 shows military manpower by service. It illustrates a relatively heavy emphasis on air force and air defense manpower for most countries and naval manning

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Figure 1.7 Major Measures of Key Combat Equipment Strength in 2006

that is too small to support effective navies without extensive foreign civilian support. If the data on land forces are compared to the later figures on land force equipment, it is also clear that the manpower pool of most smaller southern Gulf countries is too small to properly crew and support the pool of weaponry in their land forces.

Trends Affecting Land Forces Figures 1.11 through 1.20 display the trends in armor, tanks, and artillery. • Figure 1.11 again shows that Iran and Iraq had a far larger pool of equipment than their recent arms imports could possibly maintain and modernize. It is also again clear how much the destruction of Iraq’s forces has affected the conventional balance. • Figure 1.12 shows the trends in main battle tanks and the impacts that the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War had on the respective holdings of Iran and Iraq. It also shows the cumulative growth in the holdings of the southern Gulf States, although Saudi strength has been relatively static since the early 1990s. • Figure 1.13 shows that the trends in high-quality tanks are radically different from those in the previous figure and that Saudi numbers have near parity with Iran (whose

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Figure 1.8 Comparative Trends in Gulf Total Active Military Manpower, 1979–2006

tanks are generally still sharply inferior to those of Saudi Arabia and the tanks in most of the smaller southern Gulf States). • Figure 1.14 shows that Iran does not have anything like the number of other armored fighting vehicles necessary to support its strength in main battle tanks; it also shows how much the destruction of Iraq’s land forces have changed this aspect of the balance. In general, the smaller southern Gulf States have also developed a good balance of tanks and other armored vehicles. • Figure 1.15 shows the distribution of current holdings of other armored vehicles by kind. It reflects that lack of armored mobility in Iran’s forces. At the same time, it is clear that each southern Gulf State has developed a different force mix with little regard to interoperability. • Figure 1.16 provides a breakout of current holdings of other armored vehicles by specific type (although it does not attempt to show the submodels). The lack of standardization is even more apparent. So is the tendency to retain and rely on older and obsolescent types in a number of Gulf armies.

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Figure 1.9 Total Active Military Manpower in All Gulf Forces, 1990–2006

• Figure 1.17 compares total numbers of APCs—a measure of infantry mobility and maneuver capability. The lack of Iranian capability is particularly striking, although Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates are the only southern Gulf States with a proper balance of such mobility. • Figure 1.18 compares artillery strength. Iran’s massive buildup of such weapons during the Iran-Iraq War is still a major factor in the Gulf balance. This is the area where Iran has its greatest lead over the southern Gulf States. It is also clear, however, that almost all of the Iranian lead is in towed weapons, and its artillery maneuver strength is severely limited.

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Figure 1.10 Total Gulf Military Manpower by Service, 2006

• Figures 1.19 and 1.20 show the comparative strength of multiple rocket launchers. Once again, Iran has a major lead. Yemen also has comparatively large numbers of such weapons. Multiple rocket launchers provide a partial substitute for air power and can deliver large amounts of area fire, although generally with limited accuracy.

Trends Affecting Air and Air Defense Forces Figures 1.21 through Figures 1.27 display data on combat aircraft, armed helicopters, and electronic warfare aircraft. • Figure 1.21 shows total operational combat air strength. Iran has slowly built up much of the strength it lost after the fall of the Shah and in the Iran-Iraq War. The Iraqi Air Force lost roughly half of its strength during the Gulf War in 1991 and effectively ceased to exist in 2003. Saudi Arabia has good strength figures, but limited training, readiness, and sustainability. The United Arab Emirates has good numbers for a country its size, but limited real-world effectiveness. The Yemeni Air Force lost much of its forces because of civil war and funding reasons. • Figure 1.22 compares total fixed-wing and armed helicopter strength. The growing importance of armed helicopters in the southern Gulf is apparent. The Iranian holdings are largely worn and obsolescent and the Iraqi armed helicopter forces no longer exist.

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Figure 1.11 Total Gulf Operational Armored Fighting Vehicles, 2006

• Figure 1.23 shows Saudi Arabia’s advantage over Iran in terms of high-quality aircraft. At the same time, it again shows the lack of standardization and the interoperability problems of the southern Gulf States. • Figure 1.24 reflects the limited emphasis on reconnaissance aircraft capability in the Gulf region and the limitations to situation awareness and targeting. The problems for the southern Gulf States will, however, be of limited importance if they operate in a coalition with the United States. • Figure 1.25 shows that Saudi Arabia has a monopoly on airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) and that its AWACS aircraft give it a major advantage in battle management, some forms of intelligence collection, and air force maritime patrol capability—although Iran still operates aging U.S.–supplied maritime patrol aircraft. • Figure 1.26 shows the balance of combat helicopters. Saudi Arabia has been relatively slow to build up its forces, but those of Iran are worn and obsolescent and Iraq’s forces have effectively ceased to exist.

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Figure 1.12 Total Operational Main Battle Tanks in All Gulf Forces, 1979–2006

• Figure 1.27 shows that Saudi Arabia has the only modern mix of advanced land-based defenses in the Gulf, Iran has extensive assets, but many are obsolete or obsolescent, and they are poorly netted and vulnerable to electronic warfare. Iraq’s assets have effectively ceased to exist. The smaller southern Gulf States have a wide mix of assets, purchased with little attention to interoperability and which generally would have limited effectiveness because of a lack of effective long-range sensors, battle management systems training and readiness, and strategic depth.

Trends Affecting Naval Forces Figures 1.28, 1.29, 1.30, 1.31 and 1.32 compare various aspects of naval strength. The qualitative issues affecting the forces have been described earlier. Iran is the only significant Gulf navy. Saudi Arabia has significant total ship strength, and better and more modern ships, but limited readiness and proficiency. The lack of interoperability, specialization, and orientation around key missions leaves most southern Gulf navies with only limited ability to cooperate. So does a lack of effective airborne surveillance, modern mine warfare ships, and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities.

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Figure 1.13 Medium- to High-Quality Main Battle Tanks by Type, 2006

ADAPTING TO THE CHANGING NATURE OF MILITARY POWER The chapters that follow take a far broader approach to measuring Gulf security than comparisons of military forces. They touch upon each of the new factors that are changing each nation’s security position, including transnational threats,

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33

Figure 1.14 Total Operational Other Armored Vehicles (Lt. Tanks, LAVs, AIFVs, APCs, and RECCE) in Gulf Forces, 1990–2006

proliferation, internal security considerations, local tensions and rivalries, the role and expansion of internal security forces, and each nation’s efforts to find the right trade-offs among military development, internal security, and economic and social development. Any introduction to the changing dynamics of Gulf security must also recognize, however, that both the current and future nature of military power in the Gulf is changing radically. The contrast between the previous comparisons of military forces that emphasize force quantity and those that emphasis force quality highlights some of these changes, but they are far deeper than such comparisons can show. All of the actors in the region must react to the impact of a global ‘‘revolution’’ in military affairs that ranges from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to the transformation of conventional military power, the use of precision warfare and near-real-time battle management and new forms of information warfare, and asymmetric warfare at both the ideological and military levels.

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Figure 1.15 Gulf Other Armored Fighting Vehicles by Category, 2006

Force Quality over Force Quantity: The Revolution in Military Affairs As the chapters that follow explain in far more detail, numerical strength and military ‘‘mass’’ have lost much of theiri value. Shifts in military quality—what some call the revolution in military affairs or ‘‘RMA’’—have begun to transform military power. These shifts consist of changes in tactics, training, and technology that can give highly professional military forces massive qualitative advantages over conventional forces and potential nuclear warfare over forces that cannot modernize or ‘‘transform.’’ This power is currently exemplified in U.S. military forces and has been a key factor in the rapid U.S.–led defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War in 1991 and in its invasion of Iraq in 2003. While the shifts involved are again controversial and difficult to summarize, they involve the following factors—which all affect every military force in the Gulf:

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Figure 1.16 Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles, Reconnaissance Vehicles, LAVs, and Light Tanks by Type, 2006

• Unity of command: The level of unity of command, and ‘‘fusion,’’ achieved during the Gulf War was scarcely perfect, but it was far more effective than that possible in most states. Advanced powers have improved their unity of command and ability to conduct joint operations. • Jointness, combined operations, combined arms, and the ‘‘AirLand Battle’’: Advanced powers can use technology to train and integrate in ways that allow far more

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Figure 1.17 Armored Personnel Carriers in Gulf Armies, 2006

effective approaches to jointness, combined arms, and combined operations. They have developed tactics that closely integrate air and land operations. • Emphasis on maneuver: The United States had firepower and attrition warfare until the end of the Vietnam War. In the years that followed, it converted its force structure to place an equal emphasis on maneuver and deception. This emphasis has been adopted by Britain and France and other advanced states. • Emphasis on deception and strategic/tactical innovation: No country has a monopoly on the use of deception and strategic/tactical innovation. High-technology

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Figure 1.18 Total Operational Self-Propelled and Towed Tube Artillery and Multiple Rocket Launchers in Gulf Forces, 1990–2006

powers with advanced battle management and information systems will, however, be able to penetrate the enemy’s decision-making system and react so quickly that the opponent cannot compete. • ‘‘24-hour war’’—Superior night, all-weather, and beyond-visual-range warfare: ‘‘Visibility’’ is always relative in combat. There is no such thing as a perfect night-vision or all-weather combat system or way of acquiring perfect information at long ranges.

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Figure 1.19 Total Operational Gulf Artillery Weapons, 2006

Advanced technology air and land forces, however, have far better training and technology for such combat than they ever had in the past and are designed to wage warfare continuously at night and in poor weather. Equally important, they are far more capable of taking advantage of the margin of extra range and tactical information provided by superior technology. • Near-Real-Time Integration of C4I/BM/T/BDA: New C4I/BM/T/BDA organization, technology, and software systems make it possible to integrate various aspects of

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Figure 1.20 Gulf Inventory of Multiple Rocket Launchers by Caliber, 2006

command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I); battle management (BM); targeting (T); and battle damage assessment (BDA) to achieve a near-realtime integration and decision making–execution cycle. • A new tempo of operations: Superiority in virtually every aspect of targeting, intelligence gathering and dissemination, integration of combined arms, multiservice forces, and night and all-weather warfare make it possible to achieve both a new tempo of operations and one far superior to that of the enemy.

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Figure 1.21 Total Operational Combat Aircraft in All Gulf Forces, 1990–2006

• A new tempo of sustainability: Advanced forces will have maintainability, reliability, reparability, and the speed and overall mobility of logistic, service support, and combat support force activity that broadly match their maneuver and firepower capabilities. The benefits of these new capabilities are already reflected in such critical areas as the extraordinarily high operational availability and sortie rates of Western combat aircraft and the ability to support the movement of heliborne and armored forces. • Rapidly moving, armed, computerized supply and logistics: Rather than steadily occupy and secure rear areas and create large logistic and rear-area supply forces, focus

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Figure 1.22 Total Gulf Holdings of Combat Aircraft, 2006

on creating computerized logistic systems capable of tracing the location of supplies and the needs of forward combat units. Send supplies and service support units forward to meet demand on a near-real-time basis. Send supply, logistics, maintenance, and recovery units forward to meet demand using airpower and long-range firepower to secure the lines of communication and flanks of land forces. Arm and train logistic and service support units to defend themselves against insurgents and light attacking forces.

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Figure 1.23 Gulf High- and Medium-Quality Fixed-Wing Fighter, Fighter Attack, Attack, Strike, and Multirole Combat Aircraft by Type, 2006

Ensure that armor, rotary-wing, and fixed-wing combat units can move forward as quickly as possible. • Beyond-visual-range air combat, air defense suppression, air base attacks, and airborne C4I/BM: The Coalition in the Gulf had a decisive advantage in air combat training, beyond-visual-range air combat capability, antiradiation missiles, electronic warfare, air base and shelter and kill capability, stealth and unmanned long-range strike

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Figure 1.24 Gulf Reconnaissance Aircraft, 2006

systems, identification of friend or foe and air-control capability, and airborne C4I/BM systems like the E-3 and the ABCCC (Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center Capsules). These advantages allowed the Coalition to win early and decisive air supremacy in the Gulf and Kosovo conflicts and paralyze the Iraqi Air Force in the Iraq War. Advanced forces will steadily improve the individual capability of these systems and their integration into ‘‘net-centric’’ warfare.

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Figure 1.25 Sensor, AWACS, C4I, EW, and ELINT Aircraft, 2006

• Focused and effective interdiction bombing: Advanced forces organize effectively to use deep strike capabilities to carry out a rapid and effective pattern of focused strategic bombing where planning is sufficiently well coupled to intelligence and meaningful strategic objectives so that such strikes achieve the major military objectives that the planner sets. At the same time, targeting, force allocation, and precision-kill capabilities

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Figure 1.26 Gulf Attack, Antiship, and ASW Helicopters, 2006

have advanced to the point where interdiction bombing and strikes are far more lethal and strategically useful than in previous conflicts. • Expansion of the battlefield—‘‘Deep Strike’’: As part of its effort to offset the Warsaw Pact’s numerical superiority, U.S. tactics and technology emphasized using AirLand battle capabilities to extend the battlefield far beyond the immediate forward ‘‘edge’’ of the battle area (FEBA) using advanced near-real-time targeting systems,

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Figure 1.27 Gulf Land-Based Air Defense Systems, 2006 Country

Major SAM

Light SAM

AA Guns

Bahrain

8 I-Hawk

60 RBS-70 18 Stinger 7 Crotale

15 Oerlikon 35 mm 12 L/70 40 mm

Iran

2,400 I-HAWK MIM23B 10 SA-5 45 HQ-2J (SA-2) SA-2 15 TigercatFIM-92A Stinger

SA-7/14/16, HQ-7 HN-5 30 Rapier FM-80 (Ch Crotale) Oerlikon SA-7 Grail

1,700 Guns ZU-23, ZSU-23-4, ZSU-57-2, KS-19, ZPU-2/4, M-1939

Iraq

SA-2 SA-3 SA-6

Roland 1,500 SA-7 850 (SA-8 SA-9 SA-13 SA-14, SA-16)

6,000 Guns ZSU-23-4 23 mm, M-1939 37 mm, ZSU-57-2 SP, 57 mm, 85 mm, 100 mm, 130 mm

Kuwait

24 I-Hawk Phase III MIM-23B 5/40 Patriot

12 Aspede 48 Starburst

35-mm Oerlikon

Oman

None

Mistral 2 SP 34 SA-7 Grail 34 Javelin 40 Rapier

10 GDF-005 35 mm (with Skyguard) 4 ZU-23-2 23 mm 12 L/60 40 mm

Qatar

None

10 Blowpipe 12 FIM-92A Stinger 9 Roland II 20 SA-7 24 Mistral

Saudi Arabia

16/128 (2,048) I-Hawk 4-6/16-24 (640) PAC-2 17/68 (1,156) Shahine 2-4/160 PAC-2 launchers 17 ANA/FPS-117 radar

40+ Crotale 500 Stinger (ARMY) 500 Mistral (ADF) 500 Redeye (ARMY) 500 Redeye (ADF) 73-141 Shahine static 50 AMX-30SA 30 mm 500 Stinger (ADF) 92 M-163 Vulcan 20 mm 400 FIM-92A Avenger 70 L-70 40 mm (in store) 850 AMX-30SA

UAE

5/30 I-Hawk Bty.

20+ Blowpipe 20 Mistral 12 Rapier 9 Crotale 13 RBS-70 Igla (SA-16)

42 M-3VDA 20 mm SP 20 GCF-BM2 30 mm

Javelin

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Some SA-2, SA3, SA-6, SA-7, SA-9, SA-13, SA-14

Some SA-7, SA-9, SA13, SA-14 800 SA-7/9/13/14

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50 M-167 20 mm 20 M-163 Vulcan 20 mm 50 ZSU-23-4 23 mm 100 ZU-23-2 23 mm 150 M-1939 23 mm 120 S-60 37 mm 40 KS-12 85 mm

Source: International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance, 2005–2006; Periscope; JCSS, Middle East Military Balance; Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment; and Jane’s Defense Weekly. Some data were adjusted or estimated by the authors.

precision weapons, and area munitions. The UN Coalition exploited the resulting mix of targeting capability, improved air strike capabilities, and land force capabilities in ways during the Gulf War that played an important role in degrading Iraqi ground forces during the air phase of the war, and which helped the Coalition break through Iraqi defenses and exploit the breakthrough. In Kosovo, the United States and NATO began to employ more advanced deep-strike targeting technologies and precision strike systems. These capabilities made striking further advances in the Iraq War, and far more advanced systems are in development. • Technological superiority in many critical areas of weaponry: The West and some moderate regional states have a critical edge in key weapons like tanks, other armored fighting vehicles, artillery systems, long-range strike systems, attack aircraft, air defense aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, space, attack helicopters, naval systems, sensors, battle management, and a host of other areas. This superiority goes far beyond the technical edge revealed by ‘‘weapon on weapon’’ comparisons. Coalition forces exploited technology in ‘‘systems’’ that integrated mixes of different weapons into other aspects of force capability and into the overall force structure. • Integration of precision-guided weapons into tactics and force structures: Advanced forces exploit a technical edge in the ability to use precision-guided weapons coupled to far more realistic training in using such weapons and the ability to link their employment to far superior reconnaissance and targeting capability. • Realistic combat training and use of technology and simulation: During the Gulf and Iraq wars, the United States and Britain took advantage of training methods based on realistic combined arms and AirLand training, large-scale training, and adversary training. These efforts proved far superior to previous methods and were coupled to a far more realistic and demanding system for ensuring the readiness of the forces involved. They show the value of the kinds of training that allow forces to rapidly adapt to the special and changing conditions of war. • Emphasis on forward leadership and delegation: Technology, tactics, and training all support aggressive and innovative leadership. • Heavy reliance on NCOs and highly skilled enlisted personnel: Advanced forces place heavy reliance on the technical skills, leadership quality, and initiative of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and experienced enlisted personnel. • High degree of overall readiness: Military readiness is a difficult term to define since it involves so many aspects of force capability. RMA forces, however, will have more

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Figure 1.28 Gulf Naval Ships by Category, 2006

realistic standards for measuring readiness and ensuring proper reporting and will have adequate funding over a sustained period of time.

The Vulnerabilities of Less Advanced Powers Put differently, the United States has shown the world it is able to exploit weaknesses in the conventional war-fighting capabilities of less advanced powers. These

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Figure 1.29 Gulf Warships with Antiship Missiles, 2006

weaknesses are largely the mirror image of the strengths inherent in U.S. force transformation, and they are weaknesses every Gulf State that maintains conventional forces must try to overcome: • Authoritarianism and overcentralization of the effective command structure: The high command of many countries is dependent on compartmentalized, overcentralized

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Figure 1.30 Gulf Mine Warfare Ships, 2006

C4I/BM systems that do not support high tempo warfare, combined arms, or combined operations and lack tactical and technical sophistication. Many forces or force elements report through a separate chain of command. C4I/BM systems often are structured to separate the activity of regular forces from elite, regime security, and ideological forces. Systems often ensure that major sectors and corps commanders report to the political leadership, and separations occur within the branches of a given

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Figure 1.31 Gulf Amphibious Warfare Ships, 2006

service. Intelligence is compartmentalized and poorly disseminated. Air force command systems are small, unit oriented, and unsuited for large-scale force management. Coordination of land-based air defense and strike systems is poorly integrated, vulnerable, and/or limited in volume handling capability. Combined operations and combined arms coordination are poor, and command interference at the political level is common.

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Figure 1.32 Gulf Naval Aircraft and Helicopter Aircraft, 2006

• Lack of strategic assessment capability: Many nations lack sufficient understanding of Western war-fighting capabilities to understand the impact of the revolution in military affairs, the role of high-technology systems, and the impact of the new tempo of war. Other countries have important gaps in their assessment capabilities reflecting national traditions or prejudices.

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• Major weaknesses in battle management, command, control, communications, intelligence, targeting, and battle damage assessment: No Middle Eastern country except Israel has meaningful access to space-based systems or advanced theater reconnaissance and intelligence systems unless data are provided by states outside the region. Most lack sophisticated reconnaissance, intelligence, and targeting assets at the national level or in their individual military services. Beyond-visual-range imagery and targeting is restricted to largely vulnerable and easily detectable reconnaissance aircraft or low performance unmanned aerial vehicles. Many rely on photo data for imagery and have cumbersome download and analysis cycles in interpreting intelligence. Many have exploitable vulnerabilities to information warfare. Most are limited in the sophistication of their electronic warfare, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and communications intelligence (COMINT) systems. Their communications security is little better, or worse, than commercial communications security. They have severe communications interconnectivity, volume handling, and dissemination problems. Additionally, they cannot provide the software and connectivity necessary to fully exploit even commercial or ordinary military systems. They lack the C4I/BM capability to manage complex deep strikes, complex large-scale armor and artillery operations, effective electronic intelligence, and rapid cycles of reaction in decision making. • Lack of cohesive force quality: Most countries’ forces have major land combat units and squadrons with very different levels of proficiency. Political, historical, and equipment supply factors often mean that most units have much lower levels of realworld combat effectiveness than the best units. Further, imbalances in combat support, service support, and logistic support create significant additional imbalances in sustainability and operational effectiveness. Many states add to these problems, as well as lack of force cohesion, by creating politicized or ideological divisions within their forces. • Shallow offensive battlefields: Most states face severe limits in extending the depth of the battlefield because they lack the survivable platforms and sensors, communications, and data processing to do so. These problems are particularly severe in wars of maneuver, in wars involving the extensive use of strike aircraft, and in battles where a growing strain is placed on force cohesion. • Manpower quality: Many states rely on the mass use of poorly trained conscripts. They fail to provide adequate status, pay, training, and career management for NCOs and technicians. Many forces fail to provide professional career development for officers and joint and combined arms training. Promotion often occurs for political reasons or out of nepotism and favoritism. • Slow tempo of operations: Most military forces have not fought a high-intensity air or armored battle. They are at best capable of medium tempo operations, and their pace of operations is often dependent on the survival of some critical mix of facilities or capabilities. • Lack of Sustainability, Recovery, and Repair: These initial problems in the tempo of operations are often exacerbated by a failure to provide for sustained air operations and high sortie rates, long-range sustained maneuver, and battlefield/combat unit recovery and repair. Most forces are heavily dependent on resupply to deal with combat attrition, whereas Western forces can use field recovery, maintenance, and repair. • Inability to prevent air superiority: Many states have far greater air defense capability on paper than they do in practice. Most have not fought in any kind of meaningful air

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action in the last decade, and many have never fought any significant air action in their history. C4I/BM problems are critical in this near-real-time environment. Most countries lack sophisticated air combat and land-based air defense simulation and training systems and do not conduct effective aggressor and large-scale operations training. Efforts to transfer technology, organization, and training methods from other nations on a patchwork basis often leave critical gaps in national capability, even where other capabilities are effective. • Problems in air-to-air combat: Air combat training levels are often low and the training is unrealistic. Pilot and other crew training standards are insufficient, or initial training is not followed up with sustained training. There is little effective aggressor training. AWACS and ABCCC capabilities are lacking. EW capabilities are modified commercial-grade capabilities. Most aircraft lack effective air battle management systems and have limited beyond-visual-range and look-down/shoot-down capability. Most air forces supplied primarily by Russia or eastern European states depend heavily on obsolete ground-controlled vectoring for intercepts. Key radar and control centers are static and vulnerable to corridor blasting. • Problems in land-based air defense: Many states lack anything approaching an integrated land-based air defense system and rely on outdated or obsolete radars, missile units, and other equipment. Other states must borrow or adapt air defense battle management capabilities from supplier states and have limited independent capability for systems integration—particularly at the software level. They lack the mix of heavy surface-to-air missile systems to cover broad areas or must rely on obsolete systems that can be killed, countered by EW, and/or bypassed. Most Middle Eastern short-range air defense systems do not protect against attacks with standoff precision weapons or using stealth. • Lack of effective survivable long-range strike systems: Many nations have the capability to launch long-range effective air and missile strikes, but have severe operational problems in using them. Refueling capabilities do not exist or are in such small numbers as to be highly vulnerable. Long-range targeting and battle damage assessment capabilities are lacking. Training is limited and unrealistic in terms of penetrating effective air defenses. Platforms are export systems without the full range of supplier avionics or missile warheads. Assets are not survivable or lose much of their effective strike capability once dispersed. • Combined (joint) operations, combined arms, and interoperability: Many states fail to emphasize the key advances in the integration of war-fighting capabilities from the last decade. They have not developed combined arms capabilities within each service, much less interservice joint warfare capabilities. When they do emphasize combined arms and joint operations, they usually leave serious gaps in some aspects of national war-fighting capability. There is little or no emphasis on interoperability with neighboring powers. • Rough/special terrain warfare: Although many forces have armed helicopters, large numbers of tracked vehicles, and can create effective rough terrain defenses if given time, they have problems in conducting high-tempo operations. Many tend to be road bound for critical support and combined arms functions and lack training for longrange, high-intensity engagements in rough terrain. Many are not properly trained to exploit the potential advantages of their own region. They are either garrison forces or

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forces that rely on relatively static operations in predetermined field positions. These problems are often compounded by a lack of combat engineering and barrier crossing equipment. • Night and all-weather warfare: Most forces lack adequate equipment for night and poor-weather warfare, and particularly for long-range direct and indirect fire engagement, and cohesive, sustainable, large-scale maneuver. • Armored operations: Most countries have sharply different levels of armored warfare proficiency within their armored and mechanized forces. Few units have advanced training and simulation facilities. Most land forces have interoperability and standardization problems within their force structure—particularly in the case of other armored fighting vehicles where they often deploy a very wide range of types. Many are very tank heavy, without the mix of other land force capabilities necessary to deploy infantry, supporting artillery, and antitank capabilities at the same speed and maneuver proficiency as tank units. Most forces have poor training in conducting rapid, largescale armored and combined operations at night and in poor weather. Effective battle management declines sharply at the force-wide level—as distinguished from the major combat unit level—and sometimes even in coordinating brigade- or division-sized operations. • Artillery operations: Many states have large numbers of artillery weapons, but have serious problems in training and tactics. They lack long-range targeting capability and the ability to rapidly shift and effectively allocate fire. Many rely on towed weapons with limited mobility or lack off-road support vehicles. Combined arms capabilities are limited. Many units are effective in using mass fire only against enemies that maneuver more slowly than they do. • Attack and combat helicopter units: Some countries do have elite elements, but many do not properly train their helicopter units or integrate them into combined or joint operations. • Commando, paratroop, and Special Forces: Many countries have elite combat units that are high-quality forces at the individual combat unit level. In many cases, however, they are not trained or organized for effective combined and joint warfare or for sustained combat. This seriously weakens their effectiveness in anything but limited combat missions. • Combat training: Training generally has serious problems and gaps, which vary by country. Units or force elements differ sharply in training quality. Training problems are complicated by conversion and expansion, conscript turnover, and a lack of advanced technical support for realistic armored, artillery, air-to-air, surface-to-air, and offensive air training. Mass sometimes compensates, but major weaknesses remain. • Inability to use weapons of mass destruction effectively: Any state can use weapons of mass destruction to threaten or intimidate another or to attack population centers and fixed area targets. At the same time, this is not the same as having an effective capability and doctrine to obtain maximum use of such weapons, or to manage attacks in ways that result in effective tactical outcomes and conflict termination. Many states are acquiring long-range missiles and weapons of mass destruction with very limited exercise and test and evaluation capabilities. This does not deny them the ability to target large populated areas, economic centers, and fixed military targets, potentially inflicting massive damage. At the same time, it does present problems in more

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sophisticated military operations. Many will have to improvise deployments, doctrine, and war-fighting capabilities. In many cases, weaknesses and vulnerabilities will persist, and they will be able to exploit only a limited amount of the potential lethality of such systems.

The Threat of Asymmetric Warfare and Nonstate Actors At the same time, the aftermath to Saddam’s fall from power in Iraq, and the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan, is a warning that Gulf nations and nonstate actors can also respond to conventional military power by adopting strategies for asymmetric warfare and creating ways of fighting that offset the advantages offered by the new tactics, training, and technology that makes up the RMA. The last few years have provided a power set of warnings about the limits to U.S. military power in facing such threats, but these lessons apply to all the forces in the Gulf, whether states or transnational threats. Both state and nonstate actors have steadily improved their abilities to exploit asymmetric warfare since the Gulf War in 1991. These improvements are still developing, but recent wars have shown that they include the following kinds of efforts—all of which can be applied in somewhat different forms to Gulf regimes and nations as well as to the United States: • Attack the structures of governance and security by ideological, political, and violent means: Use ideological and political means to attack the legitimacy of the government and the nation-building process. Intimidate and subvert the military and security forces. Intimidate and attack government officials and institutions at the national, regional, and local levels. Strike at infrastructure, utilities, and services in ways that appear to show the government cannot provide essential economic services or personal security. • Create alliances of convenience and informal networks with other groups to attack the United States, moderate regional governments, or efforts at nation building: The informal common fronts operate on the principle that the ‘‘enemy of my enemy’’ is my temporary friend. At the same time, movements ‘‘franchise’’ to create individual cells and independent units, creating diverse mixes of enemies that are difficult to attack. • Link asymmetric warfare to crime and looting; exploit poverty and economic desperation: Use criminals to support attacks on infrastructure and nation-building activity; raise funds and undermine security. Exploit unemployment to strengthen dedicated insurgent and terrorist cells. Blur the lines between threat forces, criminal elements, and part-time forces. • Co-opt the middle; create links to more moderate and popular causes: Linking extremist action to popular causes, like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has become a more common tactic in large part because the conflict has continued to escalate and has had such visibility. Many movements, however, have found additional ways to broaden their base. These include creating humanitarian and political wings, claiming to be prodemocracy and reform, attacking failed governance and corruption, calling opponents anti-Islamic, or invoking terms like Crusader, Zionist, imperialist, and so on.

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• Maintain a strategy of constant attrition, but strike hard according to a calendar of turning points and/or at targets with high political, social, and economic impact: Insurgents and Islamists in Afghanistan and Iraq (and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and other regional struggles) have learned the importance of a constant lowlevel body count and creating a steady climate of violence. This forces the United States into a constant, large-scale security effort and ensures constant media coverage.At the same time, insurgents and Islamists have shown a steadily more sophisticated capability to exploit holidays, elections and other political events, and sensitive targets both inside the countries that are the scene of their primary operations and in the United States and the West. Attacks on Kurdish and Shi’ite religious festivals and the Madrid bombings are cases in point.Terrorists and insurgents know that such targeted and well-timed attacks can successfully undermine the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and can help drive the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A handful of terrorists in Hamas and the PIJ, and the Israeli who killed Rabin, effectively defeated both Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Dramatic incidents of violence in Beirut and Somalia have also created political and psychological conditions that have helped catalyze U.S. withdrawal. • Push ‘‘hot buttons’’; try to find forms of attack that provoke disproportionate fear and ‘‘terror’’ and that force the United States and its allies into costly, drastic, and sometimes provocative responses: Terrorists and insurgents have found that attacks planned for maximum political and psychological effects often have the additional benefit of provoking overreaction. Hamas and the PIJ exploited such tactics throughout the peace process.The U.S. response to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon led to U.S. overreactions—particularly at the media and Congressional levels —that helped alienate the Arab and Islamic worlds from the United States. At a different level, a limited anthrax attack had a massive psychological impact in the United States, inflicted direct and indirect costs exceeding a billion dollars, drew immense publicity, and affected the operations of a key element of the U.S. government for several weeks. • Use media as an intelligence and communication system and for information warfare: Islamist movements, Palestinian groups, and many others have learned how to capture maximum exposure in regional media, use the Internet, and above all exploit the new Arab satellite news channels. In contrast, U.S. officials often confuse their occasional presence with successful impact. • ‘‘Game’’ and manipulate regional, Western, and other outside media: Use interview access, tapes, journalist hostage takings and killings, politically led and motivated crowds, drivers and assistants to journalists, and timed and targeted attacks to attempt to manipulate Western and outside media. Manipulate U.S. official briefings with planted questions. • Externalize the struggle: Bring the struggle home to the United States and its allies as in the cases of the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and Madrid. Get maximum media and political impact. Encourage a ‘‘clash between civilizations.’’ Avoid killing fellow Muslims and collateral damage. Appear to be attacking Israel indirectly. Undermine U.S. ties to friendly Arab states. • Use Americans and other foreigners as proxies: There is nothing new about using Americans and other foreigners as proxies for local regimes or attacking them to win support for ideological positions and causes. There has, however, been steadily growing

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sophistication in the timing and nature of such attacks and in exploiting softer targets such as American businessmen in the country of operations, in striking at U.S. and allied targets in other countries, or in striking at targets in the United States. It is also clear that such attacks receive maximum political and media attention in the United States. • Attack UN, nongovernmental organization, embassies, aid personnel, and foreign contractor business operations: Attacking such targets greatly reduces the ability to carry out nation building and stability operations to win hearts and minds. Attacking the ‘‘innocent’’ and curtailing their operations or driving organizations out of a country has become an important focus of insurgents and Islamist extremist attacks. • Use ‘‘horror’’ attacks, atrocities, and alienation: Whether or not the tactics were initially deliberate, insurgents in Iraq have found that atrocities like desecrating corpses and beheadings are effective political and psychological weapons for those Islamist extremists whose goal is to divide the West from the Islamic world and to create an unbridgeable ‘‘clash of civilizations.’’Experts have long pointed out that one of the key differences between Islamist extremist terrorism and previous forms of terrorism is that they are not seeking to negotiate with those they terrorize, but rather to create conditions that can drive the West away, undermine secular and moderate regimes in the Arab and Islamic worlds, and create the conditions under which they can create ‘‘Islamic’’ states according to their own ideas of ‘‘Puritanism.’’ This is why it serves the purposes of Islamist extremists, as well as some of the more focused opponents of the United States and the West, to create massive casualties and carry out major strikes, or carry out executions and beheadings, even if the result is to provoke hostility and anger. The goal of bin Laden and those like him is not to persuade the United States or the West; it is rather to so alienate them from the Islamic and Arab worlds that the forces of secularism in the region will be sharply undermined, and Western secular influence can be controlled or eliminated. The goal of most Iraqi insurgents is narrower—drive the United States and its allies out of Iraq—but involves many of the same methods. Seen in this context, the more horrifying the attack, or incident, the better. Simple casualties do not receive the same media attention. They are a reality of war. Killing (or sometimes releasing) innocent hostages does grab the attention of the world media. Large bombs in crowds do the same, as does picking targets whose innocence or media impact grabs headlines. Desecrating corpses, beheadings, and similar acts of violence get even more media attention—at least for a while. Such actions also breed anger and alienation in the United States and the West and provoke excessive political and media reactions, more stringent security measures, violent responses, and all of the other actions that help provoke a clash of civilizations. The United States and the West are often provoked into playing into the hands of such attackers. At the same time, any attack or incident that provokes massive media coverage and political reactions appears to be a ‘‘victory’’ to those who support Islamist extremism or those who are truly angry at the United States—even though the actual body count is often low, and victory does not mean creating stronger forces or winning political control. Each such incident can be used to damage the U.S. and Western view of the Arab and Islamic worlds. • Keep ‘‘failed states’’ failed and/or deprive local governments and nation-building efforts of legitimacy; attack nation-building and stability targets: There is nothing new about attacking key economic targets, infrastructure, and aspects of governance critical to the functioning of the state in an effort to disrupt its economy, undermine

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law enforcement and security, and encourage instability. The Al Qa’ida and Taliban attacks on road works and aid workers; Iraqi insurgent and Islamist attacks on aid workers and projects; and their role in encouraging looting, sabotage, and theft does, however, demonstrate a growing sophistication in attacking stability efforts and tangible progress in aid and governance. These tactics also interact synergistically with the above tactics. • Confuse the identity of the attacker; exploit conspiracy theories: Insurgents and Islamists have learned that a mix of silence, multiple claims to be the attacker, new names for attacking organizations, and uncertain levels of affiliation all make it harder for the United States to respond. They also produce more media coverage and speculation.As of yet, the number of true false-flag operations has been limited. However, in Iraq and elsewhere, attacks have often been accompanied by what seem to be deliberate efforts to advance conspiracy theories to confuse the identity of the attacker or to find ways to blame defenders of the United States for being attacked. In addition, conspiracy theories charging the United States with deliberately or carelessly failing to provide an adequate defense have been particularly effective. • Shelter in mosques, shrines, high-value targets, and targets with high cultural impact: Again, exploiting facilities of religious, cultural, and political sensitivity is not a new tactic. However, as operations against Shi’ite cleric Sadr and in Fallujah have shown, the tactics raise the media profile, create a defensive deterrent, and can be exploited to make the United States seem anti-Islamic or to be attacking a culture and not a movement. • Exploit, exaggerate, and falsify U.S. attacks that cause civilian casualties and collateral damage, friendly fire against local allies, and incidents where the United States can be blamed for being anti-Arab and anti-Islam: Terrorists and insurgents have found they can use the media, rumor, and conspiracy theories to exploit the fact the United States often fights a military battle without proper regard to the fact it is also fighting a political, ideological, and psychological war. Real incidents of U.S. misconduct, such as the careless treatment of detainees and prisoners and the careless and excessive security measures, are cases in point. So too are careless political and media rhetoric by U.S. officials and military officers. Bin Laden, the Iraqi insurgents, and so on all benefit from every Western action that unnecessarily angers or frustrates the Arab and Islamic worlds. They are not fighting to influence Western or world opinion; they are fighting a political and psychological war to dominate Iraq and the Arab and Islamic worlds. • Mix crude and sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IEDs): Hezbollah should be given credit for having first perfected the use of explosives in well-structured ambushes, although there is nothing new about such tactics—the Afghans used them extensively against the Soviets. Iraq has, however, provided a unique opportunity for insurgents and Islamist extremists to make extensive use of IEDs by exploiting its mass stocks of arms. The Iraqi attackers have also learned to combine the extensive use of low-grade IEDs, more carefully targeted sophisticated IEDs, and very large car bombs and other devices to create a mix of threats and methods that is much more difficult to counter than reliance on more consistent types of bombs and target sets. • Use suicide bombs, car bombs, and mass bombings: The use of such tactics has increased steadily since 1999, in part due to the high success rate relative to alternative

60


methods of attack. It is not always clear that suicide bombing techniques are tactically necessary outside struggles like the Israel-Palestinian conflict, where one side can enforce a very tight area and perimeter, and point target security. In many cases, timed devices might produce the same damage.Events in Iraq have shown, however, that suicide bombers still have a major psychological impact and gain exceptional media attention. They also serve as symbols of dedication and commitment, can be portrayed as a form of Islamic martyrdom, and attract more political support and attention among those sympathetic to the cause involved.At the same time, regional experts must be very careful about perceiving such methods of attack as either a recent development or as Islamic in character. For instance, Hezbollah used suicide bombings in the 1980s, with an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in 1981, and in six attacks in 1983 killing 384 people—including 241 U.S. Marines. Moreover, Hindu terrorists and the Tamil Tigers made extensive use of suicide bombings long before the Palestinians. In fact, Hindu terrorists still lead in the amount of suicide bombings committed by a particular group. The Tamil Tigers have carried out 168 such attacks since 1987 vs. 16 for Hezbollah vs. Israel (1983–1985), 44 for the Palestinians (1999–2004), and 28 for Al Qa’ida (1999–2004). A profiling of the attackers in some 168 attacks also found that only a comparative few could in any sense be called religious fanatics rather than believers in a cause.7 • Attack lines of communication, rear area, and support activity: Iran and Afghanistan have shown that dispersed attacks on logistics and support forces often offer a higher chance of success than attacks on combat forces and defended sites and makes their enemy fight wars based on ‘‘deep support’’ rather than on ‘‘deep strikes’’ beyond the FEBA. • Make better use of light weapons and more advanced types; attack from remote locations or use timed devices: While much will depend on the level of insurgent and Islamist extremist access to arms, Iraq and Afghanistan have seen a steady improvement in the use of systems like mortars and antitank weapons, and they have made efforts to acquire Manpads, Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGMs), mortars, rockets, and timed explosives. The quality of urban and road ambushes has improved strikingly in Iraq, as has the ability to set up rapid attacks and exploit the vulnerability of soft-skinned vehicles. • Create informal distributed networks for command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence/battle management (C4I/BM), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (IS&R)—deliberately or accidentally: Like drug dealers before them, Islamist extremists and insurgents have learned enough about COMINT and SIGINT to stop using most vulnerable communications assets and to bypass many—if not most—of the efforts to control cash flow and money transfers. The use of messengers, direct human contact, and more random methods of electronic communication are all cases in point. At the broader level, however, insurgents in Iraq seem to have adapted to having cells and elements operate with considerable autonomy, and loosely linking their operations and using the media’s reports on the overall pattern of attacks helps them determine the best methods and targets. Smuggling, drug sales, theft and looting, and direct fund transfers also largely bypass efforts to limit operations through controls on banking systems, charities, and so on. Under these conditions, a lack of central control and cohesive structure may actually be an asset, allowing highly flexible operations with minimal vulnerability to roll up and attack. The existence of

INTRODUCTION

61

parallel, and not conflicting, groups of hostile nonstate actors provides similar advantages and has the same impact. The fact that insurgent and Islamist extremist groups operate largely independently, and use different tactics and target sets, greatly complicates U.S. operations and probably actually increases overall effectiveness.

The Vulnerability of Conventional Military Power It is one of the ironies of the War in Iraq that it has shown that conventional powers—even putative conventional ‘‘superpowers’’ like the United States—have vulnerabilities of their own that offset many of their strengths. Once again, the list of such vulnerabilities is still evolving, but the last half-decade has shown that virtually every state and nonstate actor in the Gulf and the region knows that they include the following: • Sudden or surprise attack: Power projection is dependent on strategic warning, timely decision making, and effective mobilization and redeployment for much of its military effectiveness. • Saturation and the use of mass to create a defensive or deterrent morass: There is no precise way to determine the point at which mass, or force quantity, overcomes superior effectiveness, or force quality—historically, efforts to emphasize mass have been far less successful than military experts predicted at the time. Even the best force, however, reaches the point where it cannot maintain its edge in C4I/BM (command, control, communication, and computer/battle management), air combat, or maneuver warfare in the face of superior numbers or multiple threats. Further, saturation may produce a sudden catalytic collapse of effectiveness, rather than a gradual degeneration. This affects forward deployment, reliance on mobilization, and reliance on defensive land tactics vs. preemption and ‘‘offensive defense.’’ • Limited capability to take casualties: War fighting is not measured simply in terms of whether a given side can win a battle or conflict, but how well it can absorb the damage inflicted upon it. Many powers are highly sensitive to casualties and losses. This sensitivity may limit its operational flexibility in taking risks and in sustaining some kinds of combat if casualties become serious relative to the apparent value of the immediate objective. • Limited ability to inflict casualties and collateral damage: Dependence on world opinion and outside support means some nations increasingly must plan to fight at least low- and mid-intensity conflicts in ways that limit enemy casualties and collateral damage to its opponents. • Low-intensity and infantry/insurgent dominated combat: Low-intensity conflict makes it much harder to utilize most technical advantages in combat—because lowintensity wars are largely fought against people, not things. Low-intensity wars are also highly political. The battle for public opinion is as much a condition of victory as killing the enemy. The outcome of such a battle will be highly dependent on the specific political conditions under which it is fought, rather than RMA-like capabilities. • Hostage taking, kidnapping, executions, and terrorism: Like low-intensity warfare, hostage taking, kidnapping, executions, and terrorism present the problem that

62


advanced technology powers cannot exploit their conventional strengths and must fight a low-level battle primarily on the basis of infantry combat. Human intelligence (HUMINT) is more important than conventional military intelligence, and much of the fight against terrorism may take place in urban or heavily populated areas. • Urban and built-up area warfare: Advanced military powers are still challenged by the problems of urban warfare. In spite of the performance of U.S. forces in the Iraq War, cases like Fallujah and Sadr’s urban operations have shown that truly pacifying a hostile city or built-up area can be extremely difficult. It also is not clear what would happen if a more popular regime—such as the government of Iran—tried to create an urban redoubt. Moreover, most Western forces are not trained or equipped to deal with sustained urban warfare in populated areas during regional combat—particularly when the fighting may affect large civilian populations on friendly soil. • Extended conflict and occupation warfare: Not all wars can be quickly terminated, and many forms of warfare—particularly those involving peacekeeping and peace enforcement—require prolonged military occupations. The result imposes major strains on the United States politically, economically, and militarily. • Weapons of mass destruction: The threat or actual use of such weapons can compensate for conventional weakness in some cases and deter military action in others. • Proxy warfare and false flags: As the Lockerbie case demonstrated, states can successfully carry out major acts of terrorism through proxies without having their identity quickly established or suffering major military retaliation. Al-Khobar is a more recent case where Iran’s full role still remains uncertain and no retaliation has occurred. Similarly, the various charges that Iraq was the source of the first World Trade Center attack, and the conspiracy theories that follow, indicate that false-flag operations are feasible. So do the number of terrorist incidents where unknown groups or multiple groups have claimed responsibility, but the true cause has never been firmly established. • HUMINT, area expertise, and language skills: U.S. and Western capabilities to conduct operations requiring extensive area knowledge and language skills are inherently limited. Similarly, high-technology IS&R assets have not proved to be a substitute for HUMINT sources and analytic skills, although they can often aid HUMINT at both the operational and analytic levels. • Attack rear areas and lines of communication: The United States talks about ‘‘swarm theory’’ and discontinuous battlefields, but Iraqi regular and irregular forces quickly learned—as Iraqi insurgents did later—that U.S. rear area, support, and logistic forces are far more vulnerable than U.S. combat elements. Such ‘‘swarming’’ may be slow, if irregular forces are not in place, but potential opponents understand this and can fight discontinuous battles of their own. • Political, ideological, and psychological warfare: As has been discussed earlier, the United States is vulnerable to such attacks on the grounds of ethnicity, religion, its status as a superpower active in the region, and its ties to Israel, Ironically, some can exploit its ties to moderate and conservative regimes on the grounds it fails to support reform, while others can exploit its efforts to advance secular political and economic reforms on the grounds they are anti-Islamic.

INTRODUCTION

63

Nonstate Actors as a Transnational Threat This new focus on asymmetric warfare explains much of Iran’s recent force development, as well as its search for long-range strike capabilities. At the same time, it is giving new power to transnational threats such as Al Qa’ida, and such movements will be a lasting force. In fact, U.S. strategy in the Gulf region is now based on the thesis that there will be a ‘‘long war’’ against a loose and changing informal network of such threats, dominated by neo-Salafi Islamist extremists, but there are major uncertainties as to whether this will be the case. The United States defines this aspect of the impact of ‘‘globalization’’ on security as follows in its 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review:8 ‘‘[G]lobalization’’ enables many positive developments such as the free movement of capital, goods and services, information, people and technology, but it is also accelerating the transmission of disease, the transfer of advanced weapons, the spread of extremist ideologies, the movement of terrorists and the vulnerability of major economic segments. The U.S. populace, territory and infrastructure, as well as its assets in space, may be increasingly vulnerable to these and a variety of other threats, including weapons of mass destruction, missile and other air threats, and electronic or cyber-attacks. ‘‘[G]lobalization’’ also empowers small groups and individuals. Nation-states no longer have a monopoly over the catastrophic use of violence. Today, small teams or even single individuals can weaponize chemical, biological and even crude radiological or nuclear devices and use them to murder hundreds of thousands of people. Loosely organized and with few assets of their own to protect, non-state enemies are considerably more difficult than nation-states to deter through traditional military means. Non-state enemies could attempt to attack a wide range of targets including government facilities; commercial and financial systems; cultural and historical landmarks; food, water, and power supplies; and information, transport, and energy networks. They will employ unconventional means to penetrate homeland defenses and exploit the very nature of western societies—their openness—to attack their citizens, economic institutions, physical infrastructure and social fabric. The threat to the U.S. homeland, however, is broader than that posed by terrorists. Hostile states could also attack the United States using WMD delivered by missiles or by less familiar means such as commercial shipping or general aviation. They could attack surreptitiously through surrogates. Some hostile states are pursuing advanced weapons of mass destruction, including genetically engineered biological warfare agents that can overcome today’s defenses. There is also a danger that the WMD capabilities of some states could fall into the hands of, or be given to, terrorists who could use them to attack the United States.

Insurgency and terrorism are not the only problem that Gulf States and outside powers face in dealing with these threats. There is no doubt that transnational ideologies and forces now cut across national, regional, and global lines at a civil as well as a military level. The Internet and satellite television are two obvious tools that radicals and extremists have learned to manipulate on a global basis. The same is true of some aspects of the international financial structure and charities.

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The key question is whether extremists can continue to capitalize on these tools and the vulnerabilities of various nations and political systems or if they will provoke so much reaction that they are defeated by their own extremism. The West tends to assume that there will be a continuing global struggle with neo-Salafi Islamist extremism and constantly mutating informal networks of nonstate actors. The new U.S. national strategy makes this a central focus of U.S. policy. This assumption is based on the thesis, however, that Islamic states like those in the Gulf, and Islam as a religion, are too fragile and cannot respond effectively on a political and an ideological level and that enough state actors will provide covert and/or overt support and sanctuary to nonstate actors to allow them to function. In practice, both the Gulf States and Islam may prove to be less vulnerable than the United States now estimates.

2

Bahrain

Bahrain is a small Gulf country of some 655 square kilometers. It is becoming the first ‘‘post-petroleum’’ state in the Gulf. Although Bahrain still gets about 60 percent of its export receipts from petroleum production and refining—as well as some 60 percent of government revenues, and 30 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP)—it has largely exhausted its oil and gas resources.1 It can operate its refinery and provide limited exports only because Saudi Arabia has given Bahrain an added share of the oil from their common Abu Saafa field. At the same time, Bahrain is a strategically important island in the middle of the southern Gulf, with a major port and significant air facilities. Map 2.1 shows just how strategic this position is. Saudi Arabia’s main oil fields and ports are to Bahrain’s southwest; Qatar’s gas fields are to its southeast. It is within some seven to nine minutes of flying time of Iraq and Kuwait, and it has Iran to its north. Its access to the Gulf and its proximity to Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq all combine to make Bahrain a strategically important country for the region and for the United States. Bahrain had a total population of about 695,000 in 2006, of which 235,000 are estimated to be non-nationals.2 It had a GDP of $11.2 billion in 2005 at the market exchange rate and a national budget of some $3.4 billion. Because of its small size, economy, and native population, it cannot support large military forces of its own or defend itself against its larger Gulf neighbors. Bahrain’s military forces had a total strength of only some 11,200 men in 2006, although it had another 10,600 men in its security forces. Bahrain does not, however, need to rely on its own force for defense. The United States provides de facto security guarantees to Bahrain against any foreign threat. Its strategic location has long made it a base for U.S. forces, however, and it is the headquarters and home port for the U.S. 5th Fleet. At present, the United States stations some 5,000 troops in Bahrain and has a 60-acre facility in Manama, Bahrain’s

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Map 2.1 Bahrain

capital. Bahrain provided major basing facilities and support to U.S. forces during the ‘‘tanker war’’ with Iran in 1987–1998, the Gulf War of 1990–1991, and the Iraq War in 2003. In addition, in 2002, President George W. Bush called Bahrain a major non-NATO ally.3 Bahrain also can rely on assistance from Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia not only provides economic aid, it can rapidly reinforce Bahrain’s internal security forces. Reports that Saudi security forces have deployed to aid Bahrain in the past seem incorrect and based on confusion regarding the appearance of the uniforms of some of Bahrain’s security forces, but there is little doubt Saudi Arabia could deploy by air, sea, or using the long causeway that connects Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Bahrain’s government has had considerable continuity, although it has a history of sectarian tension. Bahrain was ruled by the Amir Shaikh Isa al-Khalifa from 1971 until he died in March 1999. His son, Shaikh Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, then peacefully succeeded his father as Amir. He has been seen by many as representing the ‘‘young’’ reform-oriented generation of the Gulf States. Following his

BAHRAIN

67

accession to the throne, he established a committee to study and implement internal political reforms. The committee issued a ‘‘National Action Charter,’’ which was presented to the Bahraini public in a referendum in February 2001 and was endorsed by 94.8 percent of voters. Subsequently, the Amir proclaimed that Bahrain was a constitutional monarchy, and he changed his title to King on February 14, 2002. These moves toward reform have not prevented Bahrain from having growing internal security problems. Bahrain is a nation with a strong Shi’ite majority ruled by a Sunni minority. There are no reliable figures on the percentages of Shi’ite vs. Sunni in Bahrain’s native population, and accurate census data on foreigners seem to date back to 2001. It seems likely, however, that some 75–80 percent of Bahrain’s native population, and 70 percent of all Muslims in Bahrain, are Shi’ites.4 This split led to problems at the time the British withdrew from the Gulf in 1971 and helped provoke a political crisis that led Shaikh Isa to suspend the operations of the national assembly. It led to new tensions during the Iran-Iraq War, and Shaikh Hamad’s political and social reforms have led to new Shi’ite efforts to seek a large degree of the nation’s wealth and political power. Bahrain’s relations with its neighbors have generally been good, but there have been tensions—particularly with Iran and Qatar. Saudi Arabia provides Bahrain with protection and a supply of oil, and Saudi Arabia has not presented a threat to Bahrain. Bahrain’s relations with Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates have also been cordial. Bahrain had a long territorial dispute over reefs and islands with Qatar that sometimes led to bad relations and even low-level clashes. This situation seems to have been resolved by the International Court of Justice in The Hague on March 6, 2001, but there may still be some lingering tension. Bahrain’s most serious problems, however, have come from Iran, which is a Shi’ite state that has sometimes exploited Bahrain’s sectarian divisions and made historical claims to the island. Bahrain was a former garrison of the Persian Empire until the Al Khalifa family took over the islands from modern-day Kuwait. Bahrain has been ruled by the Al Khalifa dynasty since the eighteenth century. The Al Khalifa family signed a treaty with Britain making Bahrain a British protectorate in the 1830s, which lasted until Bahrain gained its independence from Great Britain in 1971.5 The Shah attempted to renew Iran’s claims to Bahrain after Britain ‘‘withdrew’’ from the Gulf in 1971, but came under intense political pressure from the United States and the United Kingdom and relinquished his claims. Iran made a limited attempt to reassert its claims when the Shah fell from power in 1979, but its new revolutionary government appeared to give up these claims in 1980.6 Iran then sponsored Bahrain Shi’ite radicals and seems to have provided some arms and support for a coup attempt in the early 1980s. Iran has recently supported Bahraini Shi’ite dissidents. There are also some small neo-Salafi Sunni Islamist extremist elements active in Bahrain, but they have not presented a significant threat to either the regime or U.S. forces.

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MILITARY SPENDING AND ARMS IMPORTS Bahrain does not have large oil reserves like many of its neighbors in the Gulf, it is not a wealthy state, and it has not been a large military spender in absolute terms. Bahrain has, however, slowly built up a mix of regular, paramilitary, and internal security forces that have a significant capability to deal with internal threats. It also reacted to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait by making increases in its military manpower and arms holding by the mid-1990s.7 Since the 1980s, Bahrain has spent 4–5 percent of its GDP on defense. Bahrain’s defense budget was $202 million (or 5 percent of its GDP) in 1990, $253 million (6.9 percent) in 1995, $315 million (4.6 percent) in 2000, $315 million (4.3 percent) in 2001, $331 million (4.3 percent) in 2002, $460 million (4.9 percent) in 2003, $473 million (4.4 percent) in 2004, and $526 billion (3.5 percent) in 2005.8 In recent years, its military expenditures have been closely monitored by the newly established Parliament. The first deputy chairman of the National Assembly has stated that Bahraini defense spending should be minimal, given the amicable relations it has in the region.9 Bahrain’s largest military partner is the United States. Figure 2.1 reveals that the United States was the only state to deliver arms to Bahrain between 1993 and 2004, delivering a total of $1.1 billion. Bahrain has selectively modernized its military forces along defensive lines and in ways that have enhanced the interoperability of its forces and those of the United States. For example, it bought six to eight I-Hawk surface-to-air missile batteries in the 1990s and ordered ten F-16C/D with advanced air combat munitions like the advanced medium-range air-to-air missile in 2000. (It also bought 30 army tactical missile (ATACM) launchers more to give it long-range artillery capability in its dispute with Qatar than to deal with Iran or other outside threats.) Figure 2.2 shows that the United States was also the only state Bahrain made arms agreements with between 1993 and 2001, agreeing to $300 million during 1993– 1996 and $600 million during 1997–2000. The increase of $300 million between 1997 and 2000 is explained by the purchase of the Oliver Perry–class frigate. The 1997–2000 period was the peak of Bahrain’s arms importing, and arms deliveries to Bahrain have decreased since the year 2000.

MILITARY MANPOWER The combined manpower of all of Bahrain’s military, paramilitary, and security forces totals only 21,360 men, a relatively small number compared to other states in the region. This total includes Bahrain’s 8,500-man army, its 1,200-man navy, 1,500 men in its air force, and an estimated 10,160 internal security personnel. The security forces are comprised of three groups: 9,000 nationally controlled police, 260 Coast Guard personnel, and 900 National Guard soldiers. The combined number of Bahraini troops has remained approximately the same for the past six years. As Figures 2.3 through 2.7 show, the largest increase in troops

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Figure 2.1 Bahrain’s Arms Deliveries by Supplier, 1993–2004

came during the 1990s. Bahrain more than quadrupled the size of its police force from 2,000 to 9,000. Bahrain also increased its army manpower from 5,000 to 8,500 during the 1990s, its navy manpower from 600 to 1,000, and its air force from 450 to 1,500. For its size, the Bahraini military is well equipped, but it is dependent on foreigners to handle complicated technical jobs, especially in the navy.10

Figure 2.2 Bahrain’s New Arms Agreements by Supplier, 1993–2004

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Figure 2.3 Bahraini Army’s Force Structure, 1990–2006 1990

2000

2005

2006

5,000

8,500

8,500

8,500

5,000

8,500

8,500

8,500

Armored Brigade

1

1

1

1

Infantry Brigade

2

1

1

1

Special Forces Battalion

1

1

1

1

Artillery Brigade

2

1

1

1

Emiri Guard Battalion

0

1

1

1

Air Defense Battalion

0

1

1

1

54

131

180

180

54

106

180

180

0

25

25

25

0

25

25

25

Manpower Active Combat Units

Tanks M-60A3 Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles YPR-765 Reconnaissance

38

46

46

46

Aml-90

22

22

22

22

Ferret

8

8

8

8

S52 Shorland

0

8

8

8

Saladin

8

8

8

8

103

340

235

235+*

M-113A2

0

220

115

115

AT105 Saxon

10

10

10

10+

M-3 Panhard

93

110

110

110

53

101

43

43

SP 203-mm M-110

0

62

13

13

MRL 22-7mm MLRS

0

9

9

9

MOR 81 mm

9

18

12

12

MOR 120 mm

0

12

9

9

TOWED 105 mm

8

8

8

8

TOWED 155 mm M-198

14

28

18

18

0

51

46

46

TOW -2A/TOW-2B

0

15

15

15

RCL 106-mm M-40A1

30

30

25

25

Armored Personnel Carriers

Artillery

Antitank Weapons

BAHRAIN

120-mm Mobat

6

6

6

6

60

73+

93

93

0

7

7

7

I-HAWK MIM23-B

100+

8

8

8

FIM 92-A Stinger

60+

18

18

18

RBS-70

40+

40+

60

60

0

27

27

27

35-mm TOWED Oerlikon

0

15

15

15

40-mm TOWED L/70

0

12

12

12

Surface-to-Air Missiles SP Cotale

Guns

71

* ‘‘+’’ indicates the numbers listed may be slightly less than the actual units or weapons in stock. Source: International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance, various editions including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), only 6,000 young men became old enough to be eligible for military service in 2005. The number of eligible men will increase over the next decade, as Bahrain has a young population—28 percent of which are below the age of 14.11 THE BAHRAINI ARMY Bahrain’s small army has 8,500 men and its combat units include one armored brigade, one infantry brigade, one artillery brigade, one Special Forces battalion, one Emiri Guard battalion, and one air defense battalion with two missiles and an antiaircraft (AA) gun battery. Figure 2.3 shows that the Bahraini Army reached its current level of strength by 2000. Since that time, it has not increased its manpower, due to improved relations with Qatar, which settled its territorial dispute with Bahrain over the Hawar Islands in 2001, and with Iran, which had been accused of inciting the Shi’ite majority to rebel.12 Over the past 16 years, Bahrain has modernized its army with modern American battle tanks, increasing its amount of M-60 A3’s from 54 to 180. Figure 2.3 also shows that Bahrain has focused the modernization of its army on buying systems like main battle tanks and long-range guided artillery rockets while reducing the number of artillery and armored personnel carriers (APCs). Bahrain cut its total artillery weapons from 101 in 2000 to 43 in 2006, and its APCs from 340 in 2000 to 235 in 2006. Armor and Antiarmor Weapons According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Bahrain’s major combat equipment includes 140–180 M-60A3 main battle tanks; 22 AML90 and 8 Saladin, 8 Ferret, and 8 Shorland armored reconnaissance vehicles;

72


25 Dutch YPR-765 armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs), and 235 APCs: 115 M-113s, 110 Panhard M-3, 10 AT-105 Saxons, 3 M577 armored command vehicles, and 2 M578 armored recovery vehicles.13 This is a difficult mix of armor to support, and its 8 Saladin, 8 Ferret, and 8 Shorland armored reconnaissance vehicles and its 110 Panhard M-3s are obsolete to obsolescent. Its tanks do, however, give it armored mobility to deal with a small amphibious threat. Bahrain’s major holding of antitank missiles and other antitank weapons include 15 TOW-2s, 25–30 RCL 106-mm M-40A1s, and 6 120-mm Mobats.14 Artillery Bahrain is one of the few Gulf countries that has radically modernized some aspects of its artillery strength. It still has a significant amount of conventional artillery for a power its size. It has between 13 and 62 Sp 203-mm 110A2s, 12 81-mm mortars and 9 120-mm mortars, 8 105-mm towed artillery, and between 14 and 18 155-mm M198 towed artillery.15 Bahrain also has 9 227-mm MRLS (multiple rocket launch systems) and 30 ATACM tactical missiles.16 While Bahrain may have bought this system because of the dispute it then had with Qatar, it is a highly effective system for dealing with a small invasion or amphibious landing. The ATACMS is fired from a modified M270 MRLS launcher, and its maximum range is about 165 kilometers (100 miles).17 Its range and lethality depend on the generation of the missile involved. The first missiles supplied had a single-stage, solid-fuel rocket motor and were guided to the target by a ring-laser gyro-based inertial system. The warhead section consisted of 950 M74 antipersonnel/antimateriel bomblets that the warhead could distribute over an area of 33,000 square meters. It is not clear whether Bahrain has modernized and expanded its ATACM inventory. An improved version of the missile is available that is designated the MGM140B ATACMS Block IA. It has a global positioning system (GPS) in its guidance system that provides a major increase in accuracy. Its warhead carries 275 M74 bomblets, rather than 950, but its range increases to 300 kilometers (185 miles). The MGM-140B entered service in 1998. A still more modern version carries the brilliant antitank guided submunition and has been designated the MGM-164A. There is also a version that substitutes a 500-pound unitary HE warhead for the M74 bomblets. Antiaircraft Weapons Bahrain has also strengthened its air defenses. Figure 2.3 shows that Bahrain has increased its SAM (surface-to-air missile) count from 60 fire units in 1990 to 73 in 2000, and 93 in 2006. Air raids on major cities are a more realistic threat for Bahrain, and it has focused its limited resources on a key threat. Bahrain’s antiaircraft weaponry includes 6–8 I-Hawk MIM 23 B SAM launchers, and 18–20 portable Stinger missiles. They also possess 60 RBS-70 portable SAMs,

BAHRAIN

73

7 Crotale low-level SAM launchers, 12–15 Oerlikon 35-mm guns, and 12 Bofors L/70 40 mm.18 In spite of various planning efforts, Bahrain still does not have a fully integrated air defense system with any of its Gulf neighbors, although it does have some data links. Overall Assessment Bahrain’s total army forces are roughly the equivalent of one heavy brigade. It is well equipped for its size, but it has to maintain so many diverse types of equipment that this is difficult to sustain and support. It has moderate levels of combat readiness and training and is largely suited to service as a local deterrent against neighbors such as Iran and Qatar, with whom Bahrain has had poor relations in the past. The army has very limited ability to deploy outside Bahrain.

THE BAHRAINI AIR FORCE Bahrain realizes that its best lines of defense lie in airpower and seapower and has resisted the temptation to rely solely on the United States and Saudi Arabia for its security. The Bahraini Air Force has 1,500 men, at least 33 combat aircraft, 30 armed helicopters, and a total of 7 squadrons.19 Figure 2.4 shows the recent growth of the Bahraini Air Force. After the Gulf War, Bahrain tripled its air force manpower from 450 to 1,500 over a period of ten years. It more than doubled its number of squadrons from 3 to 7, and it increased its number of F-16 fighters by 10 between 1990 and 2000. It is reported that Bahrain is procuring a new combat trainer, the Hawk 129 (a variant of the Australian Hawk 127), which should be ready for manufacture and delivery by the end of 2006.20 In regard to its other training craft, as part of its military expansion after the first Gulf War, Bahrain acquired the 3 Firefly training craft. It also created its helicopter force during the 1990s. In 1990, Bahrain had 16 utility helicopters, but since the year 2000, it has maintained a steady fleet of 46, which includes 24 attack helicopters. Combat Air Strength The Bahraini Air Force had one fighter attack squadron in 2006, with 8 F-5Es and 4 F-5Fs. These are aging systems, but are still capable in the close support role. Its main combat strength consisted of two fighter squadrons with 17–18 F-16C and 4 F-16D fighters. It had 24 AH-1Es and 6 TAH-1Ps attack helicopters.21 Ten of the 12 AB-212 helicopters are attack helicopters. 22 Combat helicopters again give it range and mobility and an advantage in defending against any threat coming in from the sea. If properly employed, they allow Bahrain to support both its navy in coastal actions

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Figure 2.4 Bahraini Air Force’s Force Structure, 1990–2006

Manpower Active Total Number of Squadrons

1990

2000

2005

2006

450

1,500

1,500

1,500

450

1,500

1,500

1,500

3

7

7

7

Total Combat Aircraft

2/24*

3/34

3/33

3/33

Fighter Interceptor

1/12

2/22

2/21

2/21

1/8

2/18

2/17

2/17

F-16C Fighting Falcons F-16D Fighting Falcons

4

4

4

4

Fighter Ground Attack

1/12

1/12

1/12

1/12

F-5E Tiger II

1/8

1/8

1/8

1/8

F-5F Tiger II

4

4

4

4

Other Jets/Aircraft

2

3

7

7

Boeing-727

0

1

1

1

Gulfstream II

1

1

1

1

Gulfstream III

1

1

1

1

RJ-85

0

0

1

1

Trg 3 T67M Firefly/Slingsby

0

0

3

3

1/16

4/47

4/47

4/47

Helicopters Attack Helicopter

0

24

24

24

AH-1E Cobra

0

3/24

3/24

3/24

TRG Helicopter

0

6

6

6

TAH 1P-Cobra

0

6

6

6

Utility Helicopters

1/16

1/16

1/16

1/16

AB-212

1/12

1/12

1/12

1/12

BO-105

4

3

3

3

UH-60L Black Hawk

0

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

Missiles/Tactical/Air-to-Surface Missiles

†

?

?

?

?

AGM-65D/AGM-65G Maverick

0

?

?

?

?

?

?

?

Support Helicopters VIP S-70A Black Hawk

AS-12 Kegler

BAHRAIN

AAM AIM-7 Sparrow

0

?

?

75

?

AAM AIM-9P Sidewinder

?

?

?

?

ATGW BGM-71 TOW

0

?

?

?

* Numbers listed with a slash mark indicate how many squadrons the craft are broken into. † All ‘‘?’’ refer to weapons that Bahrain is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in its possession are unknown. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

and its ground forces in the case of an invasion. They can also be used for internal security purposes. Bahrain has Sidewinder, Kegler, Sparrow, and Maverick missiles, but their exact number is elusive. Neither the IISS nor Jane’s Security Sentinel Assessments is certain of how many tactical or air-to-surface missiles Bahrain has. Other Helicopters and Transport Aircraft Bahrain has 3 T67M200 Firefly training craft, a Boeing 727 supply ship, an Avro RJ85 communications plane (Jane’s claims there are two), and a Gulfstream II and III for royal flights.23 Bahrain also has 2 Boeing 747 communications craft.24 In addition to its combat helicopters, Bahrain has 3 scout BO-105s, 1 UH-60L Black Hawk communications ship, and the aforementioned 12 AB-212 support helicopters.25 Jane’s Security Sentinel mentions that Bahrain has helicopters not reported by the IISS Military Balance, including 1 UH-60A Black Hawk and 1 Bell 430 communications ship.26 Overall Assessment Bahrain has made a well-planned transition to advanced combat aircraft, and pilot training standards are moderate to good. Bahrain has lost only one plane since 2000, an F-16C. Readiness is acceptable, and Bahrain has stocks of modern air munitions. A new contract with the United States will help it maintain its air force. Bahrain is dependent on the United States for assistance in battle management, air control and warning, and targeting and battle damage assistance. In July 2005, Bahrain requested a U.S. Foreign Military Sales package of $159 million for repairs and maintenance of its F-16 fighters.27 THE BAHRAINI NAVY The Bahraini Navy has 1,200 men, which is a relatively large force for a small country. Figure 2.5 shows Bahrain steadily increased the size of its navy during the 1990s, buying the four Ajeera supply ships and its Oliver Perry–class frigate. Bahrain has also not lost or decommissioned a ship over the past 15 years. It increased its navy personnel between 1990 and 2000 from 450 sailors to 1,000, and then it added an additional 200 sailors between 2000 and 2005.

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Figure 2.5 Bahraini Navy’s Force Structure, 1990–2006 1990*

2000

2005

2006

600

1,000

1,200

1,200

600

1,000

1,200

1,200

Principal Sea Combatants

2

3

3

3

Sabah Frigate, carries Hel and SAM

0

1

1

1

Al Maanama Corvette with SAM

2

2

2

2

Patrol and Coastal Combatants

11

8

8

8

PCI Swift Al Jarim

0

2

2

2

PFC Al Riffa

2

2

2

2

PFM Ahmed el Fateh

4

4

4

4

PFI

5

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

4

4

4

0

4

4

4

Manpower Active

Amphibious Craft/ACV/ Utility Craft Air Cushion Tiger Logistics and Support SPT Ajeera

* The year 1990 combines Bahrain’s unknown PFI class with its patrol class. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

Surface Combat Forces The Bahraini Navy is based at Mina Salman and has a combat strength of one frigate, two corvettes, four missile patrol craft, and four inshore patrol craft.28 It has four Ajeera utility craft.29 The frigate, the Sabha, is an ex–Oliver Hazard Perry–class ship with Harpoon ship-to-ship missiles and standard antiaircraft missiles. It is equipped with torpedoes, a 76-mm gun, and modern radars and fire-control systems. The ship entered Bahraini service in 1997. It is active, but does not have helicopters and cannot adequately perform its antisubmarine weapon (ASW) mission without them. Bahrain’s two Al Manama–class corvettes are 632-ton ships with two twin MM-40 Exocet launchers, and a 76-mm gun. They have 40-mm AA guns and can carry a helicopter, but are not equipped with any. They have moderate radar and combat electronics capabilities and entered service in the late 1980s. The four Ahmad El Fateh–class missile patrol boats are 259-ton vessels equipped with two twin MM40 Exocet launchers and a 76-mm gun. Bahrain has four gun-equipped patrol boats: two of 205 tons and two of 33 tons. Its four Ajeera-class supply ships carry a 420ton load. According to Jane’s, it also has three landing craft utility (LCU) landing

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craft.30 Its small coast guard has 21 light patrol boats, a support craft, and a landing craft mechanized (LCM).31 Overall Assessment The navy is not capable of independent operations against a power like Iran, but is capable of defending the state against piracy and smuggling.32 Bahrain has reasonable manpower quality, readiness, and sustainability and good training and at sea rates by regional standards, but for communications and technical jobs it relies on expatriates and foreign experts.33 It has continued to train native sailors in technical tasks and does not wish to stay dependent on foreign nationals.34 Furthermore, unlike the fleets of some neighboring states, most of Bahrain’s ships are fully combat capable and have the necessary equipment to use their missile systems. PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE FORCES Bahrain’s most pressing threat is internal, not external. Bahrain can rely on close defense cooperation among the United States, Britain, and regional military powers such as Saudi Arabia. In contrast, Bahrain’s internal sectarian divisions make its internal paramilitary and security services critical to ensuring internal stability. Accordingly, Bahrain’s monarchy has created a police force larger than its army. There are currently 9,000 police controlled by the Bahrain Police and Public Security Department.35 The Ministry of Interior controls the coast guard, which has 250 personnel.36 The National Guard was formed in 1998, and it is a lightly armed elite group of three battalions, trained to defend key facilities such as power plants.37 Their current number is 900, but Bahrain is planning on increasing the number to 2,000 within the next few years.38 The paramilitary forces of Bahrain also possess 1 BO-105 scout helicopter, 2–3 Bell 412 Hueys, and 2 Hughes 500 public security helicopters.39 In the coast guard, Bahrain has 20 patrol craft under 100 tons of various caliber and speed, 1 PCI, a Tiger Hovercraft, and 2 maintenance support ships.40 Figure 2.6 shows that Bahrain has maintained the same number of craft since 1990, with the exception of the 20 small patrol boats. The Bahraini Coast Guard became faster and more mobile in the 1990s in an attempt to prevent smuggling and piracy off Bahrain’s shores. Aside from the creation of the National Guard in 1998, the most notable increase over the past 16 years is the rise in Bahrain’s police force. In 1990, there were 2,000 police for the whole state. By the year 2000, this number increased to 9,000. It has stayed at the same level since 2000, but the Bahraini government has announced that it is going to increase the police force further after 2006.41 The increase in police personnel noted in Figure 2.6 occurred because of the political turbulence in the 1990s. In 1994, there were nationwide demonstrations following the arrest of popular Shi’ite cleric Ali Salman. The ruler at the time, Sheikh

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Figure 2.6 Bahraini Paramilitary Force Structure, 1990–2006

Manpower Police Coast Guard

1990

2000

2005

2006

2,250

10,150

10,160

10,160

2,000

9,000

9,000

9,000

250

250

260

260

0

900

900

900–2,000*

5

5

5

5

BO-105

1

1

1

1

Bell 412 Twin Huey

2

2

2

2

Hughes 500

2

2

2

2

6

21+

21+

21+

National Guard Utility Helicopters


†

PCI

6

1

1

1

20 vessels less than 100 tons

0

20+

20+

20+

1

1

1

1

Amphibious Craft/ACV/ Utility Craft Air Cushion Tiger Logistics and Support/ Landing Craft

1

1

1

1

3

2

2

2

* The National Guard manpower is estimated to expand to 2,000. † ‘‘+’’ indicates the numbers listed may be slightly less than the actual units or weapons in stock. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa (father of King Hamad), attempted modest ethnic tolerance reforms in 1996, but opposition groups dismissed them as inadequate.42 There were also a series of arson attacks and demonstrations in 1998.43 This turbulence forced the monarchy to rely on its police force, and the police manpower rose until the ascension of King Hamad in 1999. Main Security and Paramilitary Forces Bahrain has a broad mix of municipally and nationally run agencies, some of which share the responsibility for the same forces, or servicing of Bahrain’s security forces. While the nature of some of these forces is classified, Jane’s has developed the following analysis of Bahrain’s internal security apparatus:44 • Police and Public Security Department: Founded in 1926, this branch handles Bahrain’s 9,000 police troops. These troops are supplemented with elite security training and intelligence and counterintelligence units. They also have an emergency squad to handle various disasters. The police are equipped with standard police gear,

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armored personnel carriers, and Bahrain’s 2–3 Bell 412 Twin Hueys. The Director General of Police and the Director of Security and Intelligence Services head the branch. • Bahrain Security and Intelligence Service: This organization helps to run the police, but it also gathers intelligence on domestic groups. It helps control public dissent, and it is run with foreign assistance. It is run with the aid of British, Pakistani, Saudi, Palestinian, and Jordanian contract officers, in addition to Bahraini officials. • Bahraini Coast Guard: This branch is small compared to the police, with 260 personnel. It is run directly by the Ministry of Interior, and it handles Bahrain’s 21 small patrol craft, as well as its generic support vehicles. • National Guard: Created in 1998, this is a new addition to Bahrain’s forces. Its current number is 900, but there are plans to expand it to 2,000 members shortly. The National Guard is trained by British forces, and its purpose is to deter attacks from foreign groups. The foreign forces that Bahrain fears are Al Qa’ida and Iran. It fears that Al Qa’ida may attack industrial centers, and Bahrain has accused Iran of encouraging violence among the Shi’ite population during the 1990s. At first, the National Guard was sharing the same equipment as the Defense Forces, but moves have been made to import equipment just for them. • National Emergency Control Center (NECC): The NECC was established in March 2003 and was built around the possibility that Iraq might use chemical weapons before the United States began its invasion. It is designed to handle biological and chemical attacks, as well as natural disasters. • Mukhtars (Mayors): In August 1999, the Ministry of Interior appointed 18 Mukhtars, local officials who all observe a section of the capital, Manama. Their duties are to handle security within the capital, but they also assess the loyalty of the citizens within their assigned area.

All of these groups are intended to cooperate in handling Bahrain’s security and paramilitary detail together. The Police and Public Security Department dates back to the colonial era, while others, such as the National Guard, the Mukhtars, and the NECC were created within the last decade. Other agencies, like the Intelligence and Security Service, operate with heavy foreign support. Like virtually all internal security forces in the region, Bahrain’s police and its internal security apparatus have been accused of human rights abuses. The U.S. Department of State Annual Human Rights Report summarized the role of Bahrain’s internal security services and the Ministry of Interior as follows:45 The MOI is responsible for public security. It controls the Public Security Force and the extensive security service, which are responsible for maintaining internal order. The Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) is responsible for defending against external threats and also monitors internal security. There were no reports of corruption within the MOI and the BDF, although corruption was difficult to assess given the lack of transparency in activities and budgets. There continued to be no known instances of police officers being punished for human rights abuses committed during the year or in any previous year. . . .In May 2004, King Hamad ordered an investigation into police conduct during a demonstration the previous day in which two civilians were injured by rubber bullets.

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Results of the investigation were not issued by the end of the year. . .There were no reports of investigations of reported police misconduct during demonstrations in June, July, and November in which demonstrators were reportedly beaten. According to the MOI, its Disciplinary Court convicted three police officers in 2004 for criminal activities of property theft and disobedience. The press reported on a number of cases of police officers facing charges for various crimes, including theft, during the year.

Overall Assessment Bahrain has faced internal stability threats ever since it gained its independence from the British. The recent threat from Al Qa’ida has not been a major threat to Bahrain per se, but that does not preclude the prospects of future attacks. The capabilities of Bahrain’s paramilitary and internal security apparatuses are evolving and adapting to the changing nature of threat. Bahrain is expected to more than double its National Guard manpower from 900 to 2,000. While numbers may not give the true nature of capabilities of Bahrain’s overall internal security apparatus, it does indicate the Bahraini security community’s adaptability to potential terrorist threat, to protect its important infrastructure, and to ensure stability. Internal security forces cannot, however, replace effective political, social, and economic reform. The tensions between Bahrain’s ruling Sunnis and Shi’ite majority can be dealt with only by creating more and better jobs for its youth, by opening up its political system to more Shi’ite participation, and by other national reforms that benefit all of its population. One key step may be to reduce Bahrain’s dependence on foreign labor and thus create more jobs for its own citizens. BAHRAIN’S CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES While external threats from Iran, and the possibility of hostile posturing by other Gulf States, cannot be discounted, Bahrain’s most urgent and most important challenge is ensuring internal stability. Bahrain’s King is reform minded, and its economy is diversifying to avoid a crisis as oil reserves dry up. However, its Shi’ite majority is tired of being underrepresented in the government. Bahrain also faces external threats from Al Qa’ida and Iranian subversion, but it has no conventional enemies seeking open war. As a result, Bahrain not only needs a strong internal security apparatus, but internal economic, social, and political reforms. Socioeconomic Challenges Bahrain’s economy has grown in the past few years, with a real GPD growth rate of 5.9 percent in 2005, up from a growth rate of 5.4 percent in 2004.46 Bahrain has also diversified its economy. It has put an emphasis on non-oil-based industries such as

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aluminum manufacturing, tourism, and banking. Bahrain has more offshore banks than any other Gulf State. For example, Bahrain is turning its smelter at Alba into the largest aluminum smelter outside the former USSR. Still, Bahrain’s largest source of revenue is its oil, which accounts for 60 percent of its income, and 20 percent of its GDP.47 The key problem is to find jobs for Bahrain’s youth, particularly its Shi’ite poor and lower middle class, and to sustain the growth and diversification of Bahrain’s economy. Bahrain’s small oil reserves are depleting at high rates. Bahrain’s oil production was 188,300 barrels per day in 2005, down from 208,000 barrels per day in 2004.48 Bahrain produces 47,100 barrels per day of petroleum, and it receives approximately 150,000 barrels per day from Saudi Arabia’s Abu Saafa oil field.49 Bahrain’s oil reserves are estimated at 125 million barrels, all of which are located in the Awali oil field. The Awali was the first oil field to be discovered in the Gulf (1932), but it hit its peak production of 75,000 barrels per day in the 1970s and has been declining ever since. In early 2006, it was producing 35,000 barrels per day.50 Curbing the problem of unemployment will be a serious strategic challenge. A report carried out by the Crown Prince’s Court and the Economic Development Board in 2004 stated that if Bahrain’s economic growth remained the same, then there would be an unemployment rate of 35 percent by the year 2013.51 Bahrain’s industries have grown, and while unemployment is still at 15 percent, Bahrain’s overall economic growth has been seen as a positive sign.52 Like the other Gulf States, and practically all of the Middle Eastern and North African countries, Bahrain is facing a ‘‘youth explosion.’’ Bahrain has a disproportionate amount of young people coming of age within the next ten years. This is nowhere as large as a state like Yemen, which has 47 percent in the 0–14 age group.53 As Figure 2.7 shows, however, 28 percent of Bahrain’s population is between the age of 1 and 14. Still, the category of 0–14 is the second largest demographic group. It is important, however, to note that more than half of the population is under the age of 29, while 45 percent of the population is between the age of 30 and 64. The population between the age of 30 and 64 largely represents people who would be considered part of the labor force, while the population between the age of 0 and 24 (44 percent of the total) are those who would be considered coming of age and entering the labor market. Employing these youth largely depends on Bahrain’s ability to diversify its economy and privatize key sectors that have been run by the government. The importance of dealing with the demographic and unemployment challenges go beyond their economic value. A large and unemployed youth population represents a fertile recruitment pool for both sectarian tension and conflict and extremist recruiting. Relations with Neighboring States Bahrain had an unsettled dispute with Qatar over the Hawar Islands, and the neighboring waters, until 2001. In March of that year, however, the International

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Figure 2.7 Bahrain’s Demographic Distribution, 2006

Court of Justice in The Hague awarded the Hawar Islands to Bahrain. Qatar accepted the decision and acknowledged settlement.54 The main source of hostilities between the two states was then removed. In October 2005, Qatar agreed to supply Bahrain with natural gas from its North Field. This should help alleviate the problems caused by Bahrain’s diminishing oil reserves. The two states also reached an agreement on joint anticrime prevention on November 16, 2005.55 Relations with neighboring Saudi Arabia have long been good, as Saudi Arabia has provided Bahrain with $50 million in aid every year since 1992.56 Relations did sour slightly in 2004 when Saudi Arabia increased its oil revenue from the Abu Saafa oil field, but refused to give Bahrain an increased share in the profits. Bahrain still receives some of the field’s original production, but was irritated not to share in the enhanced profit.57 The one neighbor with whom Bahrain has relatively poor relations is Iran. As has been mentioned earlier, Iran relinquished its claims to Bahrain back in 1980, but Bahraini security officials fear that Iran still attempts to incite the impoverished Shi’ite population.58 In addition to the tensions that occurred during the time of the Shah and the Iran-Iraq War, Bahraini officials accused Iran of backing a Shi’ite rebellion to overthrow the government in 1996. Bahrain announced that its service uncovered an Iranian plot to destabilize Bahrain, acting through a local Shi’ite group called the Bahraini Hezbollah.59 Relations improved slightly under the tenure of Iranian President Mohammed Khatami.60 The current President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has soured relations, however, by appointing military officers to senior positions in his Cabinet who were allegedly responsible for supporting the Shi’ite rebellions.61 Bahrain maintains positive and nonconfrontational relations with the rest of its neighbors. It is not militarily strong enough to force its will on any state, and its dependence on Qatari natural gas provides a strong incentive for Bahrain to maintain peace.

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Political Unrest The reform movement led by King Hamad in 1999 has helped reduce tensions with the nation’s Shi’ite majority, which has sought greater representation in the government since Bahrain’s independence in 1971. The new constitution created in 2001 called for a constitutional monarchy. A year later in 2002 Bahrain held its first parliamentary elections in 30 years.62 The elections scarcely, however, ended Bahrain’s political quarrels. Political parties are illegal, but its four opposition ‘‘societies’’—Al-Wefaq National Islamic Society (the largest political party in Bahrain), the National Democratic Society, the National Democratic Action Association, and the Islamic Action Society—all boycotted the parliamentary election.63 The groups who boycotted claimed that the Al Khalifa dynasty had gerrymandered districts by giving sparsely populated Sunni areas too many seats in the Parliament. They also claimed that the government let non-Bahraini Sunni’s vote.64 The incomplete promises of better Shi’ite representation, combined with a period of high unemployment for native Bahrainis (unemployment is 15 percent nationwide), led to a protest in the city of Eisa on November 28, 2005.65 The police mishandled the demonstration, apparently by assaulting a protestor. The demonstration became a riot shortly thereafter, and the police put down the mob.66 Although such violence has been comparatively rare, it was a sign of frustration at the lack of the government’s effective reforms. Shi’ite Muslims are still viewed as suspect by the ruling Sunni, and there are worries that they have ties and loyalties to Iran, which gives them spiritual leadership.67 The Sunni minority and foreigners still corner the more lucrative aspects of the job market, the latter accounting for 64 percent of Bahrain’s total workforce.68 Opposition groups have also been disappointed by the lack of follow-through in reform.69 In January 2005, even after King Hamad had made new appointments to his Cabinet, the royal family still controlled almost half of the 21 seats, including most of the power issues such as energy, foreign policy, Islamic affairs, and the Interior Ministry. The unrest caused by the lack of reform, and the 15-percent unemployment rate (most of which is Shi’ite), has made the continued use of police necessary. The Ministry of Information, which handles intelligence, has also taken the action of registering all Web sites operating out of Bahrain in order to prevent the spread of antigovernment information.70

Bahrain’s Struggle against Terrorism As yet, there have been no Al Qa’ida terrorist attacks committed on Bahraini territory, and Bahrain has not had a major terrorist attack occur in nine years.71 In 2005, however, gunmen killed Bahrain’s top envoy to Iraq, Hassan Malallah alAnsari, in Baghdad. Even though this act of violence occurred outside of Bahrain, security personnel believe Bahrain could be vulnerable to attacks, and government

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officials have two primary concerns.72 First, officials fear that Iranian provocateurs will compel members of the Bahraini Shi’ite community to form violent terror cells. Second, they fear attacks by Al Qa’ida on industrial centers and U.S. Naval facilities. The scheduled increase in the National Guard’s numbers to 2,000 is designed to deal with these external threats. The National Guard was created to prevent foreign sponsored militant groups, especially Al Qa’ida from attacking vulnerable facilities. Bahrain’s alliance with the United States and the presence of the U.S. 5th Fleet make Bahrain more susceptible to terror attacks. Fears of Al Qa’ida attacks were heightened in 2003 by the discovery of an alleged Al Qa’ida cell within Bahrain’s security forces. The cell was discovered with the aid of the Syrians in February 2003, and two of the five arrested suspects were native Bahrainis.73 Bahrain has done more to counter this threat than increase the size of the National Guard. In April 2005, King Hamad announced that he would create a ‘‘Terror Law.’’ This law was designed to severely punish the people behind any terrorist act that was initiated outside the country. King Hamad also increased the salaries of the police force to encourage officers to stay in their posts. Bahrain has actively cooperated with Saudi Arabia, other regional powers, the United States, and various international organizations in fighting terrorism. Bahrain sent Crown Prince Salman to Jordan in November 2005 in response to the suicide bombing that occurred there. That month, it hosted a meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Interior Ministry Undersecretaries to make proposals for joint GCC counterterror measures. For its own part, Bahrain has increased security around the King Fahd Causeway, which links the island to Saudi Arabia.74

Ongoing Internal Stability The dominant issue facing Bahrain’s internal security is the sectarian tension between its Shi’ite majority and its ruling Sunni minority. King Hamad’s commitment to his economic, social, and political reforms have been hailed as important first steps in the efforts to ease the tensions. While historically the tensions have turned into violent encounters between Bahrain’s security services and the Shi’ites, currently the issues lie in the government’s ability to balance between security and increasing the political and economic participation of the Shi’ites. The Shi’ite population is underrepresented in the government and impoverished. The King’s reformation of Bahrain’s constitution offers a permanent and nonviolent solution to the troubles of the Shi’ites. The test of these reforms will be the 2006 parliamentary elections. Unlike the 2002 election, where four political societies boycotted, all the major political societies are registered for the election. The issue of segregation is a societal problem, where areas such as the island of Riffa forbid Shi’ites from living.75 In terms of greater representation, Shi’ite political societies like AlWefaq complain that the government has gerrymandered districts in favor of the Sunni minority.76

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One example of this tampering is the southern governorate. This area is sparsely populated with Sunnis (398 represented by a nominee), but it receives six seats, while the densely populated Shi’ite northern governorate (13,655 represented by a nominee) receives nine seats. 77 Shi’ite societies also allege that in the 2002 election, Saudi-based members of the Sunni Al-Dawasir tribe were allowed to vote. The Shi’ites saw this as another move to undercut their influence.78 Assuming the Shi’ite political societies can increase their influence in the Parliament, King Hamad will be pressed to resolve this discrepancy sooner than later. In addition to political reforms, Bahrain’s unemployment will continue to result in demonstrations like those that occurred at Eisa in November 2005.79 Bahrain’s economy is growing, but until Shi’ites have job opportunities, there will likely continue to be unrest. Foreign Shi’ite movements inspired by Iran and Iraq will also press Bahrain. The War in Iraq has created strong sentiments against the U.S. forces stationed in Bahrain. The Shi’ite population of Bahrain has also been empowered by the rise of Iraq’s Shi’ite majority.80 As stated before, King Hamad’s commitment to reform will be the key factor in determining how many of Bahrain’s religious and ethnic issues are addressed. One of the handicaps impeding his efforts is his uncle, Sheikh Khalifa, who serves as Prime Minister. Khalifa is firmly entrenched politically, and his faction is very reluctant to yield power to the Shi’ites.81 The challenge to King Hamad will be allowing enough necessary reforms to balance the needs of the population, implement the necessary reforms, but keep the social cohesion of his country. The following list summarizes what Bahrain will likely face in the foreseeable future: • Continued internal reform: King Hamad is under considerable pressure from his own citizens to address the inequalities in the Bahraini political system. Thus far, he has proven himself willing to make necessary reforms to prevent his nation from becoming overcome with conflict. To prevent unrest, however, King Hamad may have to address the issue of gerrymandering. The Shi’ite political ‘‘parties’’ have demonstrated a strong resolve to pressure the King for reform, and the 2006 parliament elections could give them a large public mandate. • Demographic time bomb: Like all other states in the region, Bahrain is facing explosive demographic dynamics. Its population is young, 28 percent of which exist within the 0–14 age category. All of these young people will become eligible for work within the next few years. If these young people do not find work, they may become restless and ferment instability. This will be a dilemma that King Hamad may have to face if his population continues to feel resentment toward the U.S. presence and religious persecution. • Continued economic growth and diversification: The Bahraini economy is growing, but at its current rate it will not grow fast enough to provide its youth with jobs. Bahrain will likely continue to move away from an oil-based economy by strengthening its aluminum and banking industries. Bahrain’s economy also employs a large number of non-nationals. For the sake of employing his own population, Bahrain must find a meaningful solution to its dependence on a non-national labor force.

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• Counterterrorism: The antiterror legislation created by King Hamad in 2005 is a preventive step against foreign militant groups such as Al Qa’ida. Bahrain has already announced that it will increase its police force and National Guard in anticipation of possible attacks. Additional security measures will likely follow. Bahrain will also continue to shield its Shi’ite population from any future Iranian attempts to increase religious tension.

Balancing Internal Security and Conventional Military Needs Bahrain must balance its conventional military needs and internal security problems in order to deal with these shifting priorities. Although its forces and military spending are limited in comparison with its neighbors, Bahrain is one of the larger regional military spenders in the Middle East in terms of military spending as a percentage of its GDP. Between 2000 and 2004, Bahrain used an average of 34 percent of its current expenditures on defense and security.82 As noted earlier, Bahrain has attempted to curb its military spending, but with planned increases in both the National Guard and the police force, decreasing spending will be difficult.83 But these areas are necessary to improve the capabilities of Bahrain’s internal security apparatuses to deal with these ‘‘new’’ threats. Bahrain is vulnerable to attacks from Al Qa’ida and other militant groups. This, along with general unrest in the Shi’ite population, makes domestic security a primary concern for Bahrain. Qatar no longer threatens the Hawar Islands, and Iran has made no efforts to reestablish territorial claims to Bahrain. This means that if King Hamad wishes to decrease military spending, Bahrain could reduce spending on conventional forces in order to sustain increased spending on security forces. Still, with Bahrain purchasing new aircraft and maintenance packages from the United States, it may prove impossible to reduce defense spending.84 Bahrain also must consider the potential implications of a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and the resulting Iraqi instability and Iran’s growing asymmetric warfare capabilities and potential status as a nuclear power.

3

Kuwait

Kuwait is a small nation of only 17,820 square kilometers. Its strategic position makes it uniquely vulnerable, and its recent history has been anything but peaceful. As Map 3.1 shows, Kuwait has common borders with Saudi Arabia (222 kilometers) and Iraq (240 kilometers) and is within a few kilometers of Iran. It is within easy missile and artillery range of its three large neighbors, its large oil reserve and wealth make it a tempting target, and it has no secure route to export its oil except through vulnerable tanker shipping lanes that run the entire length of the Gulf. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are still negotiating a joint maritime boundary with Iran; Kuwait claims territorial waters 12 miles from the shore.1 While Kuwaiti-Saudi relations have been peaceful ever since World War II, Saudi Arabia nearly invaded Kuwait during the rise of King Abdul Aziz Al Saud (also known as Ibn Saud) and was deterred only by the fact Britain controlled Kuwait’s foreign relations and defense and demanded that Saudi forces halt.2 Kuwait and Saudi Arabia still have a neutral zone on their border. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the Neutral Zone (or ‘‘Divided Zone’’) is a 6,200square-mile area divided equally between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia under a 1992 agreement. It has an estimated 5 billion barrels of oil and 1 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Oil production in the Neutral Zone is shared equally with Saudi Arabia and currently averages close to 600,000 barrels per day (around half offshore and half onshore). The Neutral Zone onshore oil fields include Humma, South Fawaris, South Umm Gudair, and Wafra. The two offshore fields are called Hout and Khafji.3 During the Iran-Iraq War, Kuwait’s support of Iraq led to constant threats by Iran, several Iranian sponsored terrorist attacks, and occasion penetrations by Iranian aircraft. These threats helped lead to the ‘‘tanker war’’ of 1987–1988, during which Kuwaiti ships were reflagged with U.S. flags to escape Iranian attack, and the U.S. Navy was forced into several major clashes with the Iranian Navy.

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Map 3.1 Kuwait

Kuwait has also been threatened and invaded by Iraq. Iraqi threats and troop movements forced Britain to redeploy troops shortly after Kuwait’s independence from the British in 1961. Saddam Hussein’s forces invaded Kuwait in August 1990 and occupied it until it was liberated by a UN Coalition in 1991. Iraq officially recognized Kuwait’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, as well as its borders as defined by the United Nations, in November 1994. Potential disputes still exist over the sharing of oil fields that extend across the borders of both countries, however, and Kuwait and Iraq have not agreed on a maritime boundary that affects Iraq’s access to its main port at Umm Qasr.4 If location is one liability, Kuwait’s oil wealth is another. Kuwait sits atop some 99 billion barrels of oil, the fourth largest reserve in the world after Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq. It has oil fields that are shared with Iraq (Ratqa/Rumaila) and Saudi Arabia (in the Neutral Zone); there is also a natural gas reservoir shared with Saudi Arabia and claimed by Iran (Dorra field). This geography creates the possibility for border disputes or conflict, although relations are relatively amicable with Saudi Arabia, in abeyance with Iraq, and improving with Iran. Kuwait has bilateral defense agreements with all five permanent members of the UN Security Council and has used its procurement program to strengthen ties with

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them. Kuwait is also a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council. In practice, however, Kuwait relies on the protection of the United States: on April 2, 2004, Kuwait was granted major non-NATO ally (MNNA) status. Members of MNNA receive $3.0 million per year from the United States in counterterrorism financial assistance and are provided with help in procurement in explosive detection and R&D projects in counterterrorism.5 Kuwait was and remains the main logistical base for the U.S. military’s activities in Iraq. MILITARY SPENDING AND ARMS IMPORTS Following the Gulf War, Kuwait began a ten-year $11.7–$12.0-billion overhaul of its armed forces. Its focus was to strengthen the army and air force, with the navy as a secondary priority. The operational doctrine produced by the Defense Review Group before the 1991 Gulf War aimed at ensuring the armed forces could withstand an attack for 48–72 hours until international reinforcements came to Kuwait’s aid. The doctrine has not changed, although Kuwait’s tactical approach has evolved to protecting key areas as opposed to trying to defend the whole country. Military spending is an issue. Kuwait gets some 90–95 percent of its total export earnings and around two-fifths of its gross domestic product (GDP) from oil and must plan for the day when its reserves decline. Kuwait puts some 10 percent of its oil revenues into the ‘‘Future Generations Fund’’ in preparation for the time its production begins to decline.6 Kuwait faces far more immediate pressure, however, from the fact that it has a comparatively larger native population for such a small country, and some 65 percent of the population is under the age of 25. Kuwait has also become a rentier state and roughly 90 percent of the employees in the private sector are non-Kuwaiti citizens. As a result, the government must either find ways of hiring young Kuwaitis or of using its revenues to invest directly in economic diversification or attract additional foreign investment.7 At present, over 90 percent of the native Kuwaiti work force is employed mostly by state-owned enterprises and the government. Kuwait’s National Assembly passed a ‘‘Foreign Direct Investment Act’’ in March 2001 to try to attract foreign investment and has sought to privatize state-owned businesses (outside the oil sector). In practice, however, military spending is seen as competing with the government’s ability to provide jobs, money, and subsidies for Kuwaiti citizens.8 Kuwait’s economy has benefited from the recent surge in oil prices. The economy grew by about 5.2 percent in 2003 and 5.7 percent in 2004, and real GDP growth for 2005 and 2006 was estimated at 5.8 percent and 4.7 percent, respectively. The Kuwaiti budget has run consistent surpluses for six straight years to FY2004/2005. The Future Generations Fund, which is a fund set up to save part of Kuwait’s current oil wealth for the future, holds around $80 billion (2004) and receives 15 percent of all oil revenues.9 Military spending in Kuwait’s military expenditures has been increasing steadily since the 1980s. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS),

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Kuwait’s defense budget was $1.63 billion in 1985, $1.53 billion in 1990, $2.91 billion in 1995, $2.31 billion in 2000, $5.1 billion in 2001, $3.5 billion in 2002, $3.8 billion in 2003, $4.0 billion in 2004, and $4.27 billion in 2005. Defense spending as a percentage of GDP has fluctuated over the years based on the perceived threat to Kuwait, but has remained comparatively high in spite of growing debates in the National Assembly and Kuwait’s domestic politics. Kuwait’s defense budget was estimated to be 7.6 percent of GDP in 1985, 5.9 percent in 1990, 10.9 percent in 1995, 6.9 percent in 2000, 12.1 percent in 2001, 10.1 percent in 2002, 9.4 percent in 2003, 7.9 percent in 2004, and 7.5 percent in 2005. The decline since 2003 is partly due to the fact that the threat from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq disappeared, and partly due to an increase in internal security spending. Like other states in the Gulf, Kuwait has been a major arms importer. Figure 3.1 shows new arms deliveries and new arms agreements by supplier between 1993 and 2004. After the Gulf War, Kuwait spent a considerable amount—approximately $4.6 billion—in new arms deliveries, from the United States, Russia, and western Europe. Between 1997 and 2000, Kuwait’s arms deliveries declined dramatically to $800 million—largely due to the ‘‘oil crash’’ of the late 1990s and the subsequent decline in oil revenues. Since the attacks of ‘‘9/11,’’ Kuwait’s arms deliveries, however, have started to climb up again. During the period between 2001 and 2004, Kuwait’s arms deliveries jumped up again to a total of $2.3 billion, the vast majority of which came from the United States. It is equally important, however, to note that Kuwait has not spent enough to fully recapitalize its forces since the late 1990s. Its arms agreements are declining at a faster rate than its arms deliveries. Figure 3.2 shows the clear downward trend in new arms

Figure 3.1 Kuwait’s Arms Deliveries by Supplier, 1993–2004

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Figure 3.2 Kuwait’s New Arms Agreements by Supplier, 1993–2004

agreements between 1993 and 2004. During this period, Kuwait’s new arms agreements declined by 72 percent from $5.3 billion between 1993 and 1996 to $2.9 billion between 1997 and 2000 and $1.5 billion between 2001 and 2004. Western Europe and the United States remained Kuwait’s major suppliers, with occasional purchases from China (self-propelled howitzers) and Russia [BMP-3 armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs)]. Kuwait’s arms purchases also involve more than symbolic purchases. Although Kuwait’s forces remain small, Kuwait’s military readiness and training levels have improved to moderate in recent years, and its training is now effective at the brigade and squadron levels. Unfortunately, its tendency to politicize its arms imports has prevented it from buying the best and most interoperable systems to meet its needs. Recent major purchases include AH-64 attack helicopters. However, Kuwait has sought to purchase several modern command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems, but its Parliament has blocked the move, claiming that the Ministry of Defense had improperly negotiated a specific C4I contract. It is unclear if an investigation is under way into the allegations, and it is equally uncertain whether Kuwait will continue to pursue the systems in question.10 MILITARY MANPOWER Kuwait may have problems in employing its youth in civil jobs, but it also has a comparatively small pool of men to draw upon for military purposes. (Kuwait does allow women in its police force.) In 2006, it had some 864,745 males of military age (18–49), and some 737,292 men ‘‘fit’’ for military service, but only 18,743 native males reached military age that year.11

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National service lasts for two years and all men are supposed to receive a 30-day training annually, though few actually do. Total Kuwaiti active military manpower is estimated to be between 15,500 and 16,200 in 2006. Kuwait is also estimated to have an additional 23,700 personnel as reserves, though there is no breakdown of where these reservists belong. In addition, Kuwait has an estimated 6,000–7,000 strong paramilitary force that is charged with internal security. Kuwait has largely maintained a similar level of manpower since the Gulf War in 1990. The only key difference is a decrease in its active army personnel from 16,000 in 1990 to 11,000 in 2000, and it has maintained the same level to 2006. Its air force manpower grew modestly from 2,200 in 1990 to 2,500 in 2000 and 2006, and it added around 500 coast guardsmen in 2000. Kuwait holds regular joint training exercises with the United States. Generally, while Kuwait may have well-trained junior officers and noncommissioned officers, it lacks effective professional training programs to keep up with its advanced weapon systems and build manpower quality. It is equally clear, however, that officers in Kuwait’s armed services are receiving far more professional training than they were before the Gulf War in 1990. But the focus of its training centers is around delaying incursions for 48 hours before enforcement arrives.12 THE KUWAITI ARMY The Kuwaiti Army is small relative to those of its larger neighbors, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Kuwait’s active army force is estimated to be around 11,000. This includes an estimated 1,600–3,700 foreign personnel.13 As noted earlier, Kuwait is also estimated to have 23,700 reservists. It is, however, unclear how many of them serve in its army. Kuwait has three army bases. The army’s headquarters is based in Kuwait City. In addition, Kuwait has two more bases located at Al-Jabah and Mina Abdullah. Force Structure As Figure 3.3 shows, the Kuwaiti Army’s force structure is organized into three armored brigades, one mechanized reconnaissance brigade, two mechanized infantry brigades, one commando battalion, one artillery brigade, one engineer brigade, and one Emiri Guard brigade. In addition, Kuwait is forming a new Special Forces unit. In practice, Kuwait’s brigades are small by Western standards, roughly the equivalent of small regiments or large battalions. They are also ‘‘cadre forces,’’ kept up to 80 percent of full strength with the balance made up by reserves in case of war.14 Kuwait did, however, react to Iraq’s invasion the 1991 Gulf War by increasing its army manning between 1990 and 2006. The manpower increased from 20,300 in 1990 to 34,700 in 2000. Between 1990 and 2000, Kuwait added a mechanized reconnaissance brigade, a mechanized infantry brigade, a commando battalion, an engineer brigade, and an Emiri Guard brigade.

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Figure 3.3 Kuwaiti Army’s Force Structure, 1990–2006


1990

2000

2005

2006

16,000

11,000

11,000

11,000

16,000

11,000

11,000

11,000*

6

11

12

13

Army Reserve Brigade†

1

1

1

1

Armored Brigade

3

3

3

3

Mechanized RECCE

0

1

1

1

Mechanized Infantry

1

2

2

2

Special Forces Unit

0

0

0

1

Commando Battalion

0

1

1

1

Artillery Brigade

1

1

1

1

Engineer Brigade

0

1

1

1

Guard (Emiri) Brigade

0

1

1

1

Air Defense Command

0

0

1

1

251

385

368

368

Main Battle Tanks M1-A2 Abrams

0

218

218

218

M-84

6

150 (75)‡

150 (75)

150 (75)

Chieftain

165

(17)

0

0

Vickers MK

(70)

0

0

0

10

0

0

0

190

0

0

0

(100)

0

0

0

Centurion Reconnaissance Saladin Ferret

90

0

0

0

245

355

450

450

BMP-2

245

46

76

76

BMP-3

0

55

120

120

Desert Warrior (incl. Variants)

0

254

254

254

430

140

321

321

200

60

230

230

Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles

Armored Personnel Carriers M-113A2 M-577

0

40

40

40

TH 390 Fahd

100

(40)

(40)

(40)

TPz-1 Fuchs

0

0

11

11

130

0

0

0

Saracen

94


Artillery

112

148

218

218

SP AU-F-1

0

(18)

(18)

(18)

SP M-109A3

0

23

23

23

SP Mk F3

20

18

18

18

SP PLZ45

0

0

54

54

SP M-109A2

36

0

0

0

MRL 300-mm 9A52 Smerch

0

27

27

27

MOR 81 mm

?§

44

60

60

MOR 107-mm M-30

0

6

6

6

MOR 120-mm RT-F1

40

12

12

12

TOWED 105-mm M101

16

0

0

0

208

118

318

318

TOW-2/TOW –MSl

0

44

44

44

Antitank Weapons TOW M-901

56

8

8

8

TOW HMMWV

0

66

66

66

RCL 84-mm Carl Gustav

?

0

200

200

FROG-7

12

0

0

0

AT-4 Spigot

120

0

0

0

HOT

20

0

0

0

* Of the 11,000 manpower, 3,700 are estimated as foreign. † Reserve manpower includes the terms of service obligation to age 40 (one month annually). ‡ Numbers in parentheses indicate storage. § All question marks refer to weapons that Kuwait is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in their possession are unknown. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

Armor and Antiarmor Weapons Kuwait’s fleet of main battle tanks (MBTs) increased from 251 in 1990, to 385 in 2000, and 368 in 2006. Its AIFVs increased from 245 in 1990, to 355 in 2000, and 450 in 2006. Its artillery weapons increased from 112 in 1990, to 148 in 2000, and 218 in 2006. Its antitank arsenal increased mostly after 2000, and only its armored personnel carrier (APC) fleet decreased during this period, from 430 in 1990 to 321 in 2006. Kuwait’s MBTs consist of 218 M1-A2 Abrams and 150 M-84 tanks (half of which, an estimated 75 tanks, are in storage). It is unclear how many of its M1-A2 Abrams are fully operational. In 2000, according to the IISS, Kuwait was estimated to have 17 Chieftains that were in storage, but it remains uncertain if those tanks

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are operational, remain in storage, or if they have been decommissioned out of service.15 The army’s AIFV fleet includes up to 76 BMP-2s, up to 120–126 BMP-3s, and 254 Desert Warriors (including variants). As noted earlier, Kuwait also has an estimated 350 APCs. This force includes 230 M-113A2s, 40 M-577s, 11 TPz-1 Fuchs, and an estimated 40 TH-390-Fahds, which are believed to be in storage. In addition, Kuwait is estimated to have 20 Vehicle Blinde Leger (VBL) reconnaissance vehicles, but the IISS estimates that these vehicles may have been shifted to Kuwait’s paramilitary forces. Kuwait is also reequipping its forces to deal with infiltrators and the threat of terrorism. In November 2004, the Kuwaiti National Guard received 8 German Rheinmetall Landsystem Condor 2 4x4 APCs. They are equipped with variable function insert run-flat tires, an air conditioning system, a one-man turret armed with 12.7mm heavy and 7.62-mm medium machine guns, and can go as fast as 95 kilometers per hour. They will also have vision devices that allow the occupants of the APC to fire the weapons from inside the vehicle. Each car can carry as many as ten people.16 Kuwait has shown interest to purchase 62 8x8 APCs for the Emiri Guard. In early 2006, it was evaluating two bids for ‘‘BAE Systems Land Systems/Mowag Piranha III fitted with General Dynamics Land Systems LAV-25 turret armed with an ATK 25mm M242 cannon; [and for] Finland’s Patria Vehicles Armoured Modular Vehicle fitted with an Oto Melara HITFIST 30 turret armed with an ATK 30-mm MK44 cannon.’’17 According to Jane’s, Kuwait may expand to more than 123 8x8 APCs for the Emiri Guard and 60 APCs for the National Guard. Kuwait is seeking to purchase 60 heavy equipment transporters to increase the mobility of its M-1A2s. The three vehicles under consideration are the T8166VWN9T 8x8, the MAN 40.633 6x6 DFAETX, and the Actros 4160AS 8x8.18 Kuwait’s antitank missiles include some M47 Dragons, 44 TOW MSL/TOW-2s, 66 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), 8 M-901s, and an estimated 200 Carl Gustavs; Jane’s reports that Kuwait has 1,743 TOW-2BI antitank guided missiles. Kuwait has requested the purchase of up to 436 antiarmor guided missiles from the United States, in a deal valued at about $19 million. The precise breakdown is as follows: 288 TOW-2A missiles, 4 TOW-2A ‘‘Fly-to-Buy’’ missiles, 140 TOW2BH missiles, and 4 TOW-2B Fly-to-Buy missiles. The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) presented the Kuwaiti request to the U.S. Congress in August 2005.19 Artillery Army artillery equipment includes 18 AU-F-1s (in storage), 23 M-109A3s, 18 MkF3s, 54 PLZ45s, and 27 9A52 Smerch rockets. Mortar holdings include 60 81 mm, 6 M-30s, and 12 RT-F1s. This is a reasonable pool of modern artillery for a small force, and the Smerch 300-mm rockets give it a long-range weapon with a range of 20 to 70 kilometers

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and which have either a warhead with 72 HE-FRAG (high explosive fragmentation) submunitions or HE-FRAG separable unitary warhead. According to armytechnology.com, the rockets can also be fitted with a warhead containing five Bazalt MOTIV-3F antiarmor submunitions. These ‘‘smart’’ submunitions have dual-color infrared sensors for terminal guidance and kinetic energy fragment warheads which are said to be able to penetrate 70 mm of armor at an angle of 30° to the normal. Kuwait may purchase an improvement rocket with a maximum range of 90 kilometers and an improved warhead carrying 25 antitank mines.20 Overall Assessment At least two of Kuwait’s brigades now seem capable of deploying with their full equipment strength, although their maintenance and sustenance needs can be met only while operating in Kuwait and within a relatively short range of their bases. As noted earlier, however, Kuwait relies heavily on the United States for protection. Its armed forces have been trained at holding their positions for 48–72 hours before reinforcements from the United States, NATO, or regional powers arrive. Whether the current strength and training level prepares the Kuwaiti Army for its mission, however, remains uncertain. More generally, even more than the other Gulf States, Kuwait must now adapt its force posture to the fact that Iraq no longer is a major threat, but terrorism and Islamist extremism are creating new sources of regional instability. It must also adapt to the potential spillover of sectarian and ethnic tensions if Iraq should escalate to a major civil war or divide in ways that would put a largely Shi’ite dominated part of Iraq—possibly tied to Iran—on Kuwait’s northern border. The threat from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq has been replaced by the threat of asymmetric attacks by terrorist organizations such as Al Qa’ida, an evolving insurgency in Iraq, and the ongoing uncertainty regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Its force structure has been largely static since 2000, and there has been little evidence of improved interoperability and jointness between its military services, internal security forces, and neighboring states. THE KUWAITI AIR FORCE The Kuwaiti Air Force has 2,500 personnel and is headquartered in Kuwait City, with bases at Ahmed Al Jaber, Ali Al Salem, and Kuwait International Airport. The operational doctrine of the air force is to provide air support to ground forces. Like Kuwait’s Army, it is not designed to fight a major neighbor alone, but rather to provide a deterrent forward shield, buy time for reinforcement, and then fight as part of a coalition. Like the army, it also faces the reality that it is allied with the United States in de facto terms, regardless of the fact that Kuwait is part of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The GCC has never developed a meaningful concept of integrated air operations, and even the upper Gulf part of the GCC—Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia—still effectively fights as independent forces.

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Figure 3.4 shows the recent trends in the force structure, manning, and equipment of the Kuwaiti Air Force. The main changes since the Gulf War in 1990–1991 are the addition of 40 F-18 Hornets, 16 Tucano T-MK-52 combat-capable trainers, and 16 AH-64D Apache helicopters, which have the capability to defeat the battlefield air defense systems employed by Iran and pre-2003 Iraq.21 This is a major modernization effort, although manning problems, dependence on contract support, and poor maintenance have led to the gradual inoperability of certain systems. The air force is believed to be organized into the following squadrons: 9 Squadron (Ahmed Al Jaber base) with F-18C/D Hornets in an air defense/attack role, 12 Squadron (Ali Al Salem) with Hawk MK64s in an attack/training role, 18 Squadron (Ali Al Salem) with Mirage F-1-CK2s in an air defense/attack role (nonoperational), Figure 3.4 Kuwaiti Air Force’s Force Structure, 1990–2006 1990

2000

2005

2006

2,200

2,500

2,500

2,500

2,200

2,500

2,500

2,500

2/18

14

(14)

(14)

2/18

14

(14)

(14)

0

40

39

39

F/A-18C Hornet

0

32

31

31

F/A-18D Hornet

0

8

8

8

1/12

1/28

1/19

1/19

1/12

1/12

1/11

1/11

Manpower

*

Active Fighter Interceptor F-ICK Mirage Fighter Ground Attack

Combat-Capable Trainer Hawk MK64 Tucano T-MK-52

†

‡

0

16

16 (8)

8

8

4

4

4

L-100-30

4

3

3

3

DHC-4

2

0

0

0

Transport Planes

DC-9

2

1

1

1

33

28

29

45

Anti-Tank AH-64D Apache

0

0

0

16

Assault SA-342 Gazelle with HOT

17

16

16

16

Support AS-332 Super Puma

6

4

4

4

Support SA-330 Puma

10

8

9

9

Helicopters

* Reserve manpower includes the terms of service obligation to age 40. † Numbers listed with a slash mark indicate how many squadrons the craft are broken into. ‡ Numbers in parentheses imply inoperative/in storage. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

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19 Squadron (Ali Al Salem) with Tucano T-MK-52 in a training role, 25 Squadron (Ahmed Al Jaber) with F-18C/D Hornets in an air defense/attack role, 32 Squadron (Ali Al Salem) with SA 330F Pumas in a transport role, 33 Squadron (Ali Al Salem) with SA 342L Gazelles in an attack/scout role, 41 Squadron (Kuwait IAP) with L-100-30 Hercules in a transport role, and 62 Squadron (Ali Al Salem) with AS 532SC Cougars in an antiship attack/SAR role. Combat Air Strength Figure 3.4 shows the trends in Kuwait’s force structure since the Gulf War. The figure shows the shift of Kuwait’s air force toward supporting ground troops. Since 1990, Kuwait added 39 fighter ground attack aircraft. Its fighter intercepts declined from a 2 squadron/18 aircraft capable force to a force that has all of its interceptors in storage, with no clear command and structure. In 2006, the Kuwaiti Air Force had 31–32 F/A-18C Hornets and 8 F/A-18D Hornets. In addition, the Kuwaiti Air Force has 14–15 F-1CK2 Mirages in storage, which are flown by senior Kuwaiti Air Force officers.22 In addition, Kuwait’s Air Force has 1 squadron/19 aircraft combat-capable trainers. This force includes 11– 12 Hawk MK64s and 8 Tucano T-MK-52s. Kuwait has ‘‘shown interest in purchasing an undisclosed number—a package of 20 has been mentioned—of Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet multirole fighter aircraft to upgrade its fleet of 39 F/A-18C/Ds acquired from 1992 under a $1.8 billion contract.’’23 Reports speculate that the purchase of new aircraft ‘‘could involve a part-exchange deal with some of the current Hornets being returned to Boeing for refurbishment and resale.’’24 At the same time, Kuwait has signaled its intent for a contract to provide logistics support, contractor maintenance, and technical services for the country’s F/A-18 aircraft up to 2011, a contract valued at about $295 million.25 Helicopters and Transport Aircraft Its transport fleet includes 3 L-100-30 Hercules and 2 DC-9s, of which one is operational. Its helicopters include 16 AH-64D Apaches, 24 SA-342 Gazelles with HOT, with 16 operational, 6 AS-332 Super Pumas, with 3–4 operational, and 12 SA-330 Pumas, 9 of which are in service.26 Attack helicopters offer Kuwait a way of providing rapid forward defense, as well as some capability to compensate for its lack of strategic depth. They also offer a way of dealing with infiltration across its borders. It is not clear, however, how well Kuwait has trained its forces or can sustain them, or whether it has effective plans for joint operations with the land forces and security forces. The level of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support is also an issue. Overall Assessment Kuwait’s Air Force has a large array of equipment and has done a better job of managing its arms purchases than the United Arab Emirates. However, it has serious

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manpower limitations, even though its professional training and readiness are steadily getting better. The air force also would badly need U.S. support in terms of airborne air control and warning platforms, intelligence, targeting, and electronic warfare. The GCC and Kuwait’s neighbors have not organized to provide such support with any real effectiveness, and Kuwait is too exposed for its air force to operate efficiently without it. The air force may be capable of meeting its broad operational objective, giving air support to ground forces until international aid arrives, but has serious limitations that a small, exposed nation cannot overcome on its own.

THE KUWAITI AIR DEFENSE Kuwaiti land-based air defense is under the operational control of the air force, although its forces appear both in the army and air force sections of force structure analyses. Figure 3.5 shows the recent trend it is force structure. It is important that there are no independent estimates of the Kuwaiti Air Defense manpower. Major Air Defense Missiles The force has a range of air defense surface-to-air missiles, including some very modern systems. The most advanced is the Patriot system, which includes five batteries and an inventory of 210 missiles, though some have been fired. These batteries and missiles have been integrated into the command, control, communications, and

Figure 3.5 Kuwaiti Air Defense’s Force Structure, 1990–2006

Air Defense/Surface-to-Air Missiles PAC-2 SA-7/-14

1990

2000

2005

2006

?*

96

84+†

84+

0

5/210‡

5/210

5/210

?

0

0

0

0

24

24

24

STATIC Aspide

0

12

12

12

MANPAD Starburst

0

48

48

48

TOWED 35-mm Oerlikon

0

12

?

?

TOWED I-HAWK Phase III MIM-23B

* All ‘‘?’’ refer to weapons that Kuwait is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in its possession are unknown. † ‘‘+’’ indicates the numbers listed may be slightly less than the actual units or weapons in stock. ‡ Numbers listed with a slash mark indicate how many squadrons the craft are broken into. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

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intelligence system that Hughes Aircraft developed for Kuwait, as have the HAWK batteries (four batteries with six launchers). According to GlobalSecurity.org, the Patriot system has advanced phased array radar that electronically searches a new area every few microseconds and which is very resistant to electronic countermeasures. The control station is highly automatic, and the computer can assist in target identification and prioritization or carrying out fully automatic operations. The Launcher can be located up to 1 kilometer away from the command center to reduce vulnerability to air attack and can receive commands from a microwave data link. The missile reaches supersonic speed almost immediately after leaving the launcher and is then continuously updated by the computer in the command unit. It has a maximum range in excess of 100 kilometers.27 The version of Patriot deployed in Kuwait is far superior to the system deployed during the Gulf War in 1990–1991, and the system seems to have been further improved in terms of identification of friend or foe and low-altitude capabilities as a result of lessons learned during the Iraq War in 2003. It successfully engaged nine Iraqi tactical missiles during the fighting in 2003.28 The Patriot has some ballistic missile defense capability against Scud-like and other systems, but would be largely a point defense system against incoming missiles with very high closing velocities. Other Air Defense Systems Kuwait Air Defense also seems to have had 48 Starburst launchers with 250 missiles in 2006. There are six Amoun batteries, and each includes one Skyguard radar, two Aspide launchers, and two twin Oerlikon 35-mm AA (antiaircraft) guns. It is uncertain how many Oerlikon AA guns Kuwait has. Overall Assessment Kuwait put heavy emphasis on its air defense capabilities following the 1991 Gulf War and its force posture has improved significantly, with the majority of weapons systems acquired after the war with Iraq. Its overall readiness and sustainability is unclear, but the Patriot units seem properly trained and to have acquired good capability by regional standards. They deployed to defensive positions around Kuwait City during the war with Iraq, and at least one battery had seven out of eight launchers operational.29

THE KUWAITI NAVY The Kuwaiti Navy has about 2,000 men, including 500 Coast Guardsmen. Its naval forces are small and limited largely to the coastal defense of Kuwait’s 499-kilometer long coastline and supporting customs and carrying out anti-infiltration missions. Kuwait maintains several naval bases. Its main base is at Ras al-Qalaya, and it has facilities at Um Qasr Port on the Gulf (which was handed over to Kuwait by

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the UN Border Commission), as well as at Shuwaikh, Umm al-Hainan, and Al-Bida on its coastline.30 The naval forces suffered greatly during the Gulf War, as is clear from the analysis of force trends shown in Figure 3.6. Since 1990, however, Kuwait rebuilt and maintained a relatively similar naval force structure, with only one major vessel being part of both the 1990 and the 2000 force posture. Surface Combat Forces Kuwait’s Navy includes eight French-made Um Almaradin–class fast attack craft—missiles were delivered between mid-1999 and mid-2000. The vessels are 245 tons, armed with four Sea Skua missiles and a 40-mm gun, and are fitted for launchers for six Sadaral air-to-surface missiles. The crews are French-trained and Kuwait has tried to develop ten crews to keep the ships at sea. The navy also has one Istiqlal-class (Lurssen FPB-57) missile patrol boat, armed with two twin MM-40 Exocet launchers. The ship was extensively refitted in 1995. Kuwait also has one Al Sanbouk–class (Lurssen TNC-45) missile patrol boat, armed with two twin MM-40 Exocet launchers. This boat escaped to Bahrain in 1990, during Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. It has been sidelined since 1997, awaiting a major refit or decommissioning. The Kuwaiti Navy is trying to enhance its inshore interceptor capability with 12 Mk V-C-class fast interceptor craft with a Rheinmetall Waffe Minition 27-mm MLG 27 lightweight naval gun system. The U.S. DSCA notified the U.S. Congress of a potential $175-million Foreign Military Sales deal to supply such craft to Figure 3.6 Kuwaiti Navy’s Force Structure, 1990–2006 1990

2000

2005

2006

2,100

1,800

2,000

2,000

2,100

1,800

2,000

2,000

8

8

10

10

Al Sanbouk

0

1

1

1

Istiqal

2

1

1

1

Um Almaradim

0

6

8

8

Al Boom

6

0

0

0

4

2

2

2

Manpower

*

Active PFM

Amphibious Craft LCM Logistics and Support Support Craft

4

2

2

2

3

4

4

4

3

4

4

4

* Manpower includes Coast Guard. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

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Kuwait. These vessels are adaptations of one built for the U.S. Marine Corps and Seals and are capable of speeds of 40 knots and a cruise range of over 500 nautical miles at 35 knots. Their primary mission will be to protect offshore oil facilities and perform an interdiction mission.31 The Kuwaitis have committed to significantly upgrading their communication and surveillance capabilities. Kuwait will spend $50 million to acquire the Advanced Tactical Communications System VHF radio.32 The Kuwaiti Defense Ministry has procured an aerostat, along with the necessary components, that will provide lowaltitude airborne surveillance.33 Amphibious and Support Boats Kuwait has two landing craft mechanized (LCM) boats and four support craft. It is, however, uncertain whether these boats are operational. Coast Guard The coast guard belongs to the Ministry of Interior and has bases in Shuwaikh, Umm al-Hainan, and Al-Bida. Its manpower is estimated at 500, as is shown in Figure 3.7. Kuwait has four Inttisar 150-ton gun patrol boats and one 104-ton Al Shaheed–class gun patrol boats in its coast guard, with plans to buy nine more. It has 12 Manta-class inshore patrol boats that are inoperable due to design defects, and 23 operational light inshore patrol craft and plans to buy three more. It has three landing craft utilities (LCU) 215-ton. The coast guard has also ordered 16 P46s fast patrol boats from Dubai’s Victory Team under a contract signed in April 2004. The first of the boats was revealed in the February 2005 International Defence Exhibition.34 Figure 3.7 Kuwaiti Coast Guard: Force Structure

Manpower Active

1990

2000

2005

2006

0

400

500

500

400

500

500

36+

35+

35+

0


15+

PCC Al Shaheed

0

2

1

1

Inttisar

0

4

4

4

15+

30+

30+

30+

0

3

3

3

0

3

3

3

Misc. Boats and Craft Amphibious Craft LCU

*

* ‘‘+’’ indicates the numbers listed may be slightly less than the actual units or weapons in stock. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

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The coast guard force structure increased between 1990 and 2000 with the addition of two PCC Al Shaheed patrol boats, four Inttisar patrol boats, and a number of small boats and craft. Kuwait also added amphibious craft in the decade after the Gulf War. Overall Assessment The Kuwaiti Navy has limited capability, but may be able to deal with low-level infiltration by forces like terrorists or Iran’s Naval Guards. It would need support from the U.S. Navy, or some other larger force, in any serious confrontation with Iran. PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE FORCES As is the case with the other Gulf States, the threat from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq disappeared, but has been replaced with the threat from terrorism, asymmetric warfare, and the spillover threat of the Iraqi insurgency. The changing nature of threat has forced the Gulf States to start rethinking their internal security apparatuses, and Kuwait is no exception. It is, however, equally important to note that Kuwait’s paramilitary and internal security apparatus largely has the same force structure that it had in 1990, as is shown in Figure 3.8. Kuwait’s paramilitary force manpower declined from a total of 7,000 in 1990 to 6,600 in 2006. This force is comprised of a national police force (4,000 strong), a National Guard (6,000), and a Civil Defense Force (2,000). Main Security and Paramilitary Forces Kuwait’s internal stability largely depends on the effectiveness of its police and internal intelligence apparatus. Its National Guard is largely organized to put down political uprisings, but its counterterrorism capabilities remain uncertain. The driving force in Kuwait’s internal security, however, remains the Ministry of Interior (MOI). Reports by the United States Department of State argue that the administration of civil and security law under the MOI is divided and can be inefficient as well as present human rights problems:35 The constitution provides for some judicial independence; however, the emir appoints all judges, and the Ministry of Justice must approve the renewal of most judicial appointments. While civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces, there were some instances in which elements of the security forces acted independently of government authority. . .. There was one reported arbitrary or unlawful killing. On February 8, Amer Khlaif alEnezi, the 30-year-old leader of the Peninsula Lions militant group responsible for January confrontations with security forces, died in a military hospital. Although there were

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Figure 3.8 Kuwaiti Paramilitary’s Force Structure, 1990–2006 1990

2000

2005

2006

7,000

5,000

6,600

6,600

7,000

5,000

6,600

6,600

?

*

6

6

6

Armored Battalion

?

1

1

1

Special Forces Battalion

?

1

1

1

?

3

3

3

?

1

1

1

0

20

20

20

0

20

20

20


Paramilitary/National Guard Battalion Military Police Battalion Reconnaissance VBL Armored Personnel Carriers

82

70

92

92

V-150

20

0

0

0

V-300 Commando

62

0

0

0

Pandur

0

70

70

70

S600

0

0

22

22

* All ‘‘?’’ refer to weapons that Kuwait is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in its possession are unknown. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

allegations of torture, the government denied detainee abuse, and the hospital attributed the death to heart failure. National Assembly members called for an investigation. At year’s end an investigation was not conducted. The Ministry of Interior’s (MOI) forensics office produced a medical report that, Amnesty International (AI) and other critics claimed, was not impartial. On January 31, one civilian was killed during security force battles with Islamic militants. . .. The law prohibits such practices; however, some police and members of the security forces reportedly abused detainees, and there were allegations of torture during interrogation. Police and security forces were more likely to inflict such abuse on noncitizens, particularly non-Gulf Arabs and Asians, than on citizens. The government stated that it investigated all allegations of abuse and punished at least some of the offenders; however, in most cases the government did not make either the findings of its investigations or punishments it imposed public.. . . In February a citizen journalist claimed security officers beat him with sticks after he was arrested January 5 on charges of spreading news that harmed the national interest. . . .On May 24, six Islamic militants, whose leader died in custody. . .suspected of engaging in deadly gun battles with security forces in January alleged they had been tortured, including beatings to their backs and on their feet, while in police custody. On September 6, a court-appointed, independent medical commission confirmed that the

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suspects had scars from beatings; however, it did not indicate the presumed cause or estimated date of the injuries. There were reports of police raping detainees. In August 2004 three policemen were arrested for allegedly raping a female domestic employee of Asian origin at a police station and at another location. Officials from the victim’s embassy reported the incident to the police, who launched an investigation. There were no public developments at year’s end. Defendants have the right to present evidence in court that they were mistreated during interrogation; however, the courts frequently dismissed abuse complaints because defendants were unable to provide physical evidence of abuse. Members of the security forces routinely concealed their identities during interrogation, complicating confirmation of abuse.

According to Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, the Kuwaiti national police is a ‘‘semi-military organisation, equipped with small arms, light weapons and allterrain vehicles, and is capable of dealing with violent disorder as well as performing normal police duties.’’36 As for the role of the police in Kuwait’s internal security, the U.S. State Department described their role as follows:37 The police, responsible for law enforcement and nonnational security-related crimes, constitute a single national force. The Kuwait State Security oversees intelligence and national security-related matters. Both are under the purview of civilian authorities of the MOI. The military is responsible for external security. During the year there were credible reports of police corruption and abuse of detainees during interrogation. . .In September the criminal court sentenced two prison guards for smuggling cell phones to prisoners in exchange for bribes. However, unlike in the past, no security officials were relieved of their duties as a result of credible allegations of abuse of detainees during interrogation. In cases of alleged police abuse, the district chief investigator examines abuse allegations and refers worthy cases to the courts for trial. There were no reported government efforts during the year to reform the police or security forces. . . ..According to the penal code, suspected criminals may be held at a police station for up to four days without charge, during which time security officers may prevent lawyers and family members from visiting them. In such cases lawyers are permitted to attend legal proceedings but are not allowed to have direct contact with their clients. If charges are filed, prosecutors may remand a suspect to detention for an additional 21 days. Prosecutors also may obtain court orders for further detention pending trial. There is a functioning bail system for defendants awaiting trial. Detainees were allowed prompt access to a lawyer of their choice. There were no reports of political detainees. Of the approximately 3,500 persons serving sentences or detained pending trial, approximately 150 were held in the ‘‘state security ward’’ on security grounds, including some held for collaborating with Iraq during the 1990–91 occupation. The government did not return deportees to their countries of origin forcibly, allowing those who objected to remain in detention. Arbitrarily lengthy detention before trial was a problem, and approximately 10 percent of the prison population consisted of pretrial detainees.

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The national police force is estimated to have a strength of around 4,000 that is based in all major urban centers. Its chain of command goes through the MOI directly to the Emir of Kuwait. In addition, it is estimated that 90 percent of the head of departments in the MOI are police officers. The national police responsibilities include criminal investigation, logistics, traffic and rescue, immigration affairs, and airport security.38 The National Guard is organized into three battalions, an armored vehicle unit, a Special Forces unit, and a military police battalion. As Figure 3.8 shows, there are 20 VBL reconnaissance (RECCE) vehicles and 70 Pandur 6x6 light APCs and 22 Shorthand S600 series APCs. The National Guard has several missions. These include protecting the Kuwaiti royal family. The specific mission is ‘‘providing assistance to the military and security forces, in addition to the execution of any assignment entrusted to it by the Higher Defense Council, such as safeguarding establishments and utilities of a sensitive nature and importance.’’39 During the 1990s, the National Guard boosted its ability to withstand chemical attack and ordered, in 1998, 12,000 M-95 gas masks and filters from Finland’s Kemira Safety. The Civil Defense Force was formed before the Gulf War to cope with the threat of Iranian bombing. Its role has been to deal with the effects of an invasion, as well as to prepare to handle events such as national disasters. Before the 2003 invasion against Iraq, the Civil Defense Force focused on conducting exercises on how to deal with the possibility that Iraq might attack Kuwait’s oil facilities with chemical or biological weapons.40 Over time, the Force has been relatively stable. The APC fleet has also increased from 82 to 92, though the composition of the forces changed: 70 Pandur 6x6 light APCs and 22 Shorthand S600 series APCs instead of the V-150 and V-300 Commando APCs. Kuwait’s Struggle against Terrorism The insurgency in Iraq poses a growing security threat to Kuwait. In the shortterm, the infiltration of militants through Kuwait into Iraq risks destabilizing the Emirate, as militants who await deployment to Iraq can wreak havoc in Kuwait in the meantime. In the long-term, the return of Kuwaitis who fought in Iraq can have the same effect as the return of Afghan-war veterans had in Saudi Arabia: radicalized war veterans who return to a country and use their skills and energy to challenge internal stability. There are a number of reasons Kuwait might become a terrorist target. There are about 22,000 Western expatriates. Kuwait’s oil industry is, of course, a major potential target, though the country’s plans to develop its nonoil sector also depends on a degree of confidence by foreign investors that can be shaken by a terrorist attack in the country. Kuwait is also the main logistics node supporting the U.S. presence in Iraq. At any given point, there are about 20,000 U.S. military personnel in the country, along with a smaller number of non-U.S. soldiers from Coalition countries.41

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Kuwait also has elements that could provide a base for Islamist extremists. It is a society with a deeply conservative tribal and religious base making recruitment possible. There are about 120 Soviet-era Afghan-war veterans living in Kuwait, but they are under tight surveillance and there is no proof that they are actively involved in terrorist activities. By November 2005, there were 11 Kuwaitis held in Guantańamo Bay.42 Kuwait has been spared the organizational emphasis that Al Qa’ida has placed on countries such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The efforts to extend the organization’s reach to the Gulf ‘‘have been haphazard and have been seen of secondary importance compared to the struggle to organise and escalate operations in Saudi Arabia itself.’’43 As a result, the Al Qa’ida presence in Kuwait, although hard to establish with precision, does not seem very large. Western security sources estimate that Osama bin Laden may have up to 20 operatives in Kuwait.44 On January 17, 2005, an extremist Web site featured a posting celebrating the October 2002 attacks on U.S. Marines (see the chronology of terrorist attacks in the bulleted list below). It was signed by a group calling itself ‘‘Al Qa’ida.’’ Some of the attackers have been identified as Saudi or Kuwaiti fugitives who fought in Fallujah, Iraq.45 Former Information and Oil Minister Sheikh Saud Nasser Al Sabah has warned of sleeper cells in Kuwait’s security services.46 Although these claims have not been verified, this is a serious warning given that military personnel in Kuwait’s armed services have been arrested and sentenced for plotting attacks against U.S. targets. There are two terrorist groups operating in Kuwait: the ‘‘Mujahideen of Kuwait’’ and the ‘‘Peninsula Lions.’’ According to Jane’s Intelligence Review, there seems to be a division of labor, with the ‘‘Kuwait Mujahideen’’ being responsible for transferring terrorists to Iraq through Syria and the Peninsula Lions having the responsibility for attacks inside Kuwait. At the same time, the Mujahideen of Kuwait claimed responsibility for a January 2005 incident against a U.S. military base in Kuwait, implying that whatever division exists, it is not too rigid.47 Members of the Peninsula Lions seem to have fought in Iraq. Their tactics involved roadside improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and ambushes to capture and execute U.S. personnel. The plan included videotaping these activities to boost recruitment. The Peninsula Lions have been linked, according to the Kuwaiti Ministry of Interior, to the Saudi-based al-Haramain Brigade. The Kuwaiti Minister of Interior, Sheikh Nawaf Al Ahmad Al Sabah, said, ‘‘Initial investigations have proved that the financing of the terrorist elements came from outside the country, specifically from one of the brotherly neighbouring countries.’’48 The link to Saudi Arabia is existent but hard to prove completely since the linkages are mostly anecdotal. According to Jane’s Intelligence Review,49 The recovery of residual Al-Qaeda affiliate cells in Kuwait will likely centre on the relatively intact segments associated with suspected insurgent leader Khalid al-Dosari and Ahmad al-Mutairi. According to a Western journalist who met al-Dosari in September 2003, he is a former non-commissioned officer from the Kuwaiti Air Force whose

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journey from peaceful Salafist to militant jihadist may have began when he was allegedly detained and tortured by the Moroccan and Kuwaiti security establishments in 2002. AlMutairi is one of the three associates originally arrested by the Kuwaiti Security Services along with al-Fadhli in November 2002. Both the al-Dosari and al-Fadhli tribes have wings in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and both clans have contributed numerous highprofile members to terrorist attacks in the Arabian Peninsula and a range of jihadist causes outside the region. As a result, the ties between Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti terrorist cells are likely to continue, linking the fortunes of the security campaigns in the two countries. Indeed, the close interplay between the Kuwaiti Security Services and Saudi general security service is one of the reasons that Kuwait’s terror cells fell in such quick succession in early 2005.

Regardless of these ties, the overall internal threat to Kuwait’s internal security since the 9/11 attacks continues to be a concern to the Kuwaiti leadership. The following detailed chronology of events shows the extent of the threat that Kuwait has faced: • October 11, 2001: A Canadian contractor was shot dead during a drive-by shooting in Kuwait City.50 • October 8, 2002: Two Kuwaitis attacked U.S. Marines training on Faylakah Island. One Marine was killed and another was wounded. U.S. forces killed the assailants. Seven Kuwaitis were put in prison in connection to the attacks.51 • November 2002: A Kuwaiti policeman shot and seriously wounded two U.S. soldiers on a highway south of Kuwait City. He was later arrested and sentenced to 15 years in prison. Three Kuwaiti Afghan-war veterans were arrested for channeling money to Yemen to finance attacks on Western targets, including the French oil tanker Limburg.52 • January 21, 2003: A civil servant was arrested after a shooting incident near the U.S. military’s Camp Doha in which one U.S. military contractor was killed and another wounded. Kuwaiti officials arrested a Kuwaiti soldier suspected of spying for Iraq and planning to attack U.S. targets in Kuwait and even to poison U.S. troops.53 • March 2003: There were reports of shots fired at U.S. troops training in the Kuwaiti desert before the Iraq invasion.54 • December 2003: A number of letter bombs were sent to Kuwaiti journalists from Lebanon. The Ministry of Communications intercepted all of them.55 • December 2003: Four U.S. soldiers were wounded in two separate attacks on military convoys. One person was arrested as a result.56 • December 15, 2003:: Gunmen attacked a bus that they believed carried U.S. servicemen. Three Indian and two Egyptian workers were wounded as a result. Four Kuwaitis were arrested and found to possess many weapons, including rocket-propelled grenades.57 No connection to other terrorist groups was established.58 • April 2004: The case was dropped against Mohsen al-Fadhli and three associates who were arrested in connection to the October 2002 attack. Al-Fadhli had served both in Chechnya and Afghanistan and was believed to be a prote´ge´ of Kuwaiti Suleiman Abu Ghaith and Chechen insurgent leader Ami ibn al-Khattab. He was also suspected of maintaining ties to clerics in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. (In early 2005, al-Fadhli was

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added to the U.S. Treasury list of specially designated global terrorists. He was recaptured on January 8, 2005.)59 • June 2004: Four Kuwaitis were expatriated from Syria for trying to cross over to Iraq and fight with the insurgents.60 • July 2004: Fourteen people were arrested for connection to extremist groups. According to officials, maps and arms, found in their possession, indicated plans to attack U.S. forces in both Iraq and Kuwait.61 • December 15, 2004: The U.S. Embassy in Kuwait warned that, according to credible sources, an attack was imminent in the country.62 • January 3, 2005: The Kuwaiti Army arrested a number of soldiers planning attacks against friendly forces in the country. Fifteen men, four officers among them, were questioned, and four men were detained. The men would be court-martialed.63 • January 8, 2005: Mohsen al-Fadhli was recaptured. • January 10, 2005: Kuwaiti security forces fatally wounded a wanted militant Fawaz al-Qtaibi in the Hawalli suburb of Kuwait City. Two policemen were killed during the raid.64 • January 15, 2005: The Kuwaiti Security Services raided a rural property at Umm alHaiman (near the Saudi border) and killed one suspect and arrested 13 others, including two clerics. Six suspects escaped.65 • January 16, 2005: One Saudi gunman was killed and two police officers were wounded in a gun battle in the town of Umm al-Haiman. A Kuwaiti militant was also arrested.66 • January 17, 2005: The Kuwaiti Security Services captured 350 mortars and explosives in the Al-Sabahiyya area close to Umm al-Haiman and the Abdullah al-Salem part of Kuwait City.67 • January 19, 2005: The Kuwaiti Security Services rumbled another cell in Abdullah alSalem, and they also found a bomb-making workshop in the Jaber al-Ali Jaber. Ten suspects were captured. Grenades and mortar shells (probably remnants of the 1991 Gulf War) were found. They had been converted into nine IEDs and packed into bags.68 • January 30, 2005: Kuwaiti forces engaged with suspected terrorists in a building in a residential part of the capital. Five people were killed, three militants, one security officer, and a Bahraini student. Among those killed was Nasser Khlaif al-Enezi, the leader of Peninsula Lions.69 • January 31, 2005: Security forces killed five more suspects and numerous others, including the Peninsula Lion’s spiritual leader, Amer Khlaif al-Enezi.70 • February 5, 2005: Three Saudi and two Jordanian suspected terrorists were arrested in Kuwait. According to officials, they were planning to kidnap and execute U.S. soldiers and other Westerners.71 • February 8, 2005: Amer Khlaif al-Enezi died in prison. The Interior Ministry announced it was due to a heart attack.72 • February 13, 2005: Arab Times, a Kuwaiti newspaper, reported that Abu Musab AlZarqawi instructed some terrorism cells to move operations and attack the U.S. supply line in Kuwait.73

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• March 2005: The Kuwaiti Minister of Justice, Ahmad Baqer, announced that Kuwait had a total of 32 suspects connected to the January attacks. According to the Ministry, 17 were Kuwaitis and 15 were foreigners. Other sources, including Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, wrote that there were 37 captives, of which 32 were Kuwaiti. Two soldiers accused of plotting to overthrow the government were released.74 • May 12, 2005: A criminal court in Kuwait sentenced 18 men, most of them Kuwaitis, to three years in prison. Five were accused of intending to go to Iraq to fight U.S. forces. The rest were charged with training other militants to use weapons.75 • May 13, 2005: The public prosecutor announced he would seek the death penalty for 20 of those who were arrested in connection to the January 2005 attacks.76

The counterterrorism methods of the Kuwaiti Security Forces changed after January 2005. Prior to the upsurge in attacks, ‘‘the Kuwaiti government’s first instinct was to adopt the Egyptian approach to counterterrorism, emphasizing hard security tools such as surveillance, direct action, key point security and censorship.’’77 Following the intensified attacks, however, Kuwait changed course to deal with the root causes of terrorism. According to Michael Knights of Jane’s Intelligence Review:78 Since February, the government has announced a raft of measures to attack the ideological and logistical base of violent extremism. Stricter monitoring of preachers is the coercive end of the spectrum. In other fields, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour sent warning letters to a range of charity foundations, threatening fines if these organisations continue to skirt around government oversight on money-raising.

The Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs has ‘‘convened a special commission to deal with the issues and questions considered important to Kuwaiti youth, bringing together sociologists, psychologists, clerics and educational experts to create initiatives to ‘combat extremism and terrorism that have reached a dangerous level.’’’79 The Kuwaiti government has also focused on gathering the surplus firearms and explosives that have been around the country since the end of the 1991 Gulf War. Following the January 2005 attacks, Parliament reactivated a 1992–1994 law allowing local prosecutors to authorize warranted searches to allow police to enter Kuwaiti homes to search for illegal arms. Intensifying the crackdown on drug smuggling is another part of Kuwait’s strategy, aimed both at reducing the drug problem facing Kuwait, but also draining the financial link between the drug trade and terrorism.80 KUWAIT’S CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES In addition to the threat of terrorism, Kuwait’s internal stability is facing social, political, and demographic dynamics. The following list outlines key areas of uncertainty that Kuwait is facing presently and is likely to face in the foreseeable future: • Political rivalry: Kuwait’s ruling family has suffered from internal divisions for many years, but recent developments have brought these tensions front and center. The royal

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family, Al Sabah, has two branches—Al Jaber and Al Salem—and has traditionally alternated in ruling Kuwait. This tradition, however, has changed following the death of Jaber Al Sabah, and internal political tensions remain a key area of uncertainty in Kuwait. • Divisions in the National Assembly: Kuwait’s National Assembly is relatively free from the control of the central government. Divisions along ideological lines, however, have limited the Parliament’s ability to influence key policies such as foreign investment, oil production capacity expansion plans, and defense planning. One key uncertainty that remains, however, is the balance between the National Assembly and the central government on issues such as succession, the presence of foreign troops, and the real foreign policy including Kuwait’s relations with its neighbors. • Sectarian tensions: The majority of Kuwait’s population is Sunni, but 30 percent of its population is estimated to be Shi’ites. Following the Iranian Revolution and during the Iran-Iraq War, Sunni-Shi’ite tension was at its highest point. At times the tension turned into violent frictions between the two sects. After the Gulf War, however, it was thought that national sentiments united Kuwaitis and lowered the importance of their sectarian differences. But, the ongoing insurgency in Iraq and the struggle between Sunnis and Shi’ites in the region have caused many to ask about internal stability in Kuwait. • The demographic problem: As is the case with other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, Kuwait faces a ‘‘youth explosion.’’ It is estimated that 61 percent of its population is under the age of 30. This reflects the need to integrate many young and unemployed Kuwaitis into the economy, reform its outdated entitlement program, and deal with Kuwait’s reliance on foreign workers. • Brewing radicalism: Another difficulty that the demographic dynamics present is the potential of youth radicalization. In the case of Kuwait, there have been some elements of radicalization, as mentioned above, including signs of ‘‘sleeper cells’’ and connections to transnational terrorist organizations such as Al Qa’ida. The attacks by Al Qa’ida against Kuwaiti targets have been largely limited in scope and impact. Kuwait’s internal security apparatus has not been challenged, and it remains a key area of uncertainty.

In addition to Kuwait’s internal stability problem, Kuwait’s international challenge rests on the ability to maintain good relations with its three major neighbors: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Kuwait’s strong alliance with the United States and its gradual discussion about opening ties with Israel are other important aspects of foreign policy. The greatest uncertainty remains terrorism—indigenous, related to Kuwait’s radicalizing youth, and extraterritorial, linked to the explosive developments in neighboring Iraq. The following sections explore these uncertainties in detail. Political Challenges Kuwait faced a succession crisis following the death of Sheikh Jaber Al Sabah in January 2006. The crisis revolved around whether Prime Minister Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmad Al Sabah or Crown Prince Sheikh Saad Al Abdullah would become Emir. The latter was nominally next in line, but was sick and unable to even take the oath

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of office in Parliament; at the same time, naming Sheikh Sabah of the Al Jaber branch of the family as Emir would violate the traditional alteration in power between the two branches of the Al Sabah family. The intervention by Parliament complicated this conundrum. On January 24, 2006, the Parliament voted to oust Sheikh Saad, exercising an unprecedented level of influence into the issue of succession. Although Parliament is supposed to endorse a new Emir, this power is nominal. It was on January 24 that, for the first time in the country’s history, it became real. The hold to power of the Al Jaber branch was consolidated further by the appointment of Sheikh Sabah’s brother, Sheikh Nawaf Al Ahmad Al Sabah, as Crown Prince and of his nephew, Sheikh Nasser Muhammad Al Ahmad Al Sabah, as Prime Minister. In January 2006, the 16-member Cabinet included one Al Salem and six Al Jabers, underlying the disparity in power between the two families.81 It is too soon to fully know the impact of this change in the leadership of the royal family, but two issues stand out: the first is the relative balance of power between the two branches of the Al Sabah family and the extent to which the Al Salem branch will acquiesce to the power drive engineered by Sheikh Sabah. The second is the relative power between Parliament and the ruling family; having succeeded in intervening into what was hitherto a family business, parliamentarians may turn more ambitious. How these two power struggles develop remains a big unknown in Kuwait’s political future. Putting aside the issue of succession, there are other political difficulties that Kuwait is facing, revolving primarily around the composition and relative influence of various elements in the National Assembly. The ‘‘elected members broadly form five blocs: conservative tribal leaders, young technocrats, radical Arab nationalists, Sunni Islamic fundamentalists, and representatives of Kuwait’s Shi’ite Muslim minority.’’82 Kuwait’s National Assembly is rather conservative and has often blocked reforms brought by the ruling family. There are no political parties in Kuwait; they are neither allowed nor permitted by law to exist. Efforts to organize politically, however, have been stymied. According to the U.S. State Department,83 On January 29, Salafi Islamist leaders, an opposition faction, held a press conference announcing the establishment of a political party, Hizb Al-Ummah (Nation’s Party), to confirm the right of political pluralism, transfer power through peaceful means, adopt Shari’a, and reject all forms of foreign occupation. On February 1, in response to the group’s pronouncement, the public prosecutor charged nine of the Salafi leaders with plotting to overthrow the government and violating association and press laws, crimes carrying a maximum sentence of 15 years in prison. They were released on $1,026 (300 dinars) bail after a 10-hour interrogation. The case never came to trial.

The power of Islamist parties, however, remains strong:84 Of the 50 seats contested [in the June 2003 elections], only about 10 of the elected members of parliament could be described as secular, liberal or progressive. Between 17 and 21 of the successful candidates came from parties that describe themselves as Islamists,

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including nine seats held by representatives associated with political groupings such as the Salafi Movement, the Scientific Salafi Group or the ICM (the renamed Muslim Brotherhood). The balance of members of parliament are now independent tribal leaders, most of whom have strong traditional and Islamist tendencies.

On May 16, 2005, Kuwait granted women the right to vote, driven by a softened conservative vote and by a rapidity that prevented the emergence of strong opposition by the Islamic parties. The amendment passed by 35 to 23 and was initiated by then Prime Minister and current Emir Sheikh Sabah. The efforts to elevate the political status of women and to integrate them better into society were furthered on June 5, 2005, when two Kuwaiti women were appointed to the municipal council. Women have traditionally done better in school and are better educated than men. The cause of women’s rights was also buttressed by the valor that Kuwaiti women showed during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.85 Under the new law, about 200,000 women were eligible to vote, compared to approximately 140,000 registered male voters.86 Given this electoral arithmetic, the impact of women on the political system can be substantial. At the same time, the potential backlash against that role should not be underestimated. The period to and following the 2007 parliamentary elections will be crucial and one that could alter the political landscape in the country, for better or worse. Another high-profile debate in Kuwaiti politics is that of education reform. Altering the school curriculum is one of the government’s main tools in combating extremism. The perception is that the current school curriculum incites extremism having undue focus on the ‘‘jihad and war verses’’ of the Koran; it also brings an overtly religious message even in classes where it is hardly needed (for example, Arabic grammar classes). The Ministry of Education is full of Islamist ideologues who came to Kuwait from Egypt to take advantage of the favorable climate following the disbandment of the Kuwaiti Parliament in 1976. At the same time, these efforts are controversial; senior education officials doubt whether a topic that is as central to Islam as jihad ought to be removed from school texts.87 The first real test of these issues occurred on June 29, 2006. Although elections were originally scheduled for 2007, a dispute over redistricting and vote buying led to elections nearly a year earlier than originally planned. Reformers sought to reduce the number of constituencies from 25 to either 10 or 5, largely to limit vote buying and service politics. Woman ran for office and voted for the first time. The opposition rose from some 29 seats out of 50 to 33 to 35, depending on the count. Liberal oppositionists remained constant and Islamists gained, showing little immediate impact from granting votes to women.88 Socioeconomic Challenges As noted earlier, demography is another challenge facing Kuwait, whose population went from 0.74 million in 1970 to 2.7 million in 2005 and is projected to

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Figure 3.9 Kuwait’s Demographic Distribution, 2006

increase to 4.3 million by 2030 and 5.28 million by 2050.89 The age structure, according to the IISS, shown in Figure 3.9, is 35 percent under 20, and only 3 percent over 65 years old. Kuwait has an unbalanced sex ratio: 1.52 males/females (total), with 1.04 males/females at birth and 1.77 males/females for the 15–64 age group. The IISS estimates Kuwait’s population to be 2.3 million, with 35 percent nationals, 35 percent other Arabs, 9 percent South Asian, 4 percent Iranian, and 17 percent other. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Fact Book 2006 offers a different estimate, putting the native Kuwaiti population at 45 percent and the ‘‘other’’ category at 7 percent (all other percentages remain the same).90 Kuwait’s foreign population remains large, but has decreased as a percentage of total population: 66 percent in 1975, 72 percent in 1985, 59 percent in 1995, and 49 percent in 2003.91 Andrzej Kapiszweski estimates the foreign population by origin as follows: Indians, 295,000; Pakistanis, 100,000; Egyptians, 275,000; Bangladeshis, 160,000; Sri Lankans, 160,000; Filipinos, 60,000; Jordanians/Palestinians, 50,000; Syrians, 95,000; and Iranians, 80,000.92 The legal status of the bidoon, estimated in 2004 at 107,000, also remains unresolved. The bidoon ‘‘are Arabs who have residency ties to the country, some persisting for generations and other for briefer periods, but who either lack or conceal documentation of their true nationality.’’93 The resolution of their legal status is complicated: ‘‘the political, economic, and long-term budgetary implications associated with extending citizenship, and the general welfare benefits that come with it, to the equivalent of roughly 5 percent of the population have rendered the issue highly divisive.’’94 The Sunni-Shi’ite split is among the country’s more serious fault lines. In 1985, a Shi’ite Muslim extremist tried to assassinate Sheikh Jaber Al Sabah, underlying the energizing effect that regional politics, in that case Iran’s Revolution, could have on sectarian violence in Kuwait. The Sunni-Shi’ite split is 70/30, with Muslims

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comprising 85 percent of the total population. According to the United States Department of State, the Shi’ite population consists of 287,000 citizens and 100,000 noncitizens.95 Shi’ites, however, are underrepresented: there are 36 Shi’ite mosques compared to 1,070 Sunni mosques in the country, and there are no facilities to train Shi’ite imams. High school textbooks refer to Shi’ites as nonbelievers, references that Shi’ite leaders have called on the Ministry of Education to eliminate.96 The Shi’ite representation in government is also limited. In the June 2003 elections, five Shi’ites were elected in the 50-member National Assembly, down from six in the previous one. The 2003 Cabinet included one Shi’ite, as Minister of Information, but he resigned on January 2, 2005, pending a parliamentary questioning by Salafist elements in the assembly, who ‘‘were outraged by what they termed his ‘failure to keep Western ways out of Kuwait’ by his issuing licenses to hold musical evenings or permitting singers to hold entertainment soireés on the occasion of Id al-Fitr.’’97 In the June 2005 elections, no Shi’ite was either elected or appointed by the government. This disenfranchisement produced a reaction by Mohammad Baqer Al-Mutri, the head of the Shi’ite Clerics Congregation in Kuwait, who said that this underrepresentation was threatening the country’s national unity and risked fragmenting the country. As a result, the government appointed Massouma al-Mubarak, on June 15, 2005, as Minister for Planning and Minister of State for Administrative Development Affairs.98 On October 7, 2005, a mob of 50 youths set fire to a vehicle and threw stones at Shia worshipers and at a mosque in Jahra, a town 40 kilometers west of Kuwait City. This came a week after prosecutors asked for the highest penalty for members of Peninsula Lion suspected of attacking security forces in Maidan Hawalli, Umm alHaiman, Salmiya, and Mubarak Al Kabir in January 2005. This event underscored the linkage between Sunni militarism in general and the Sunni-Shi’ite split in particular.99 The economic challenges facing Kuwait are also substantial—particularly in its labor market. It is estimated that 15,000 Kuwaitis enter the job market annually; official unemployment numbers are 8 percent (the CIA World Fact Book estimated this number to be as low as 2.2 percent), though only 16,000 of a total Kuwaiti labor force of 297,000 work in the private sector, burdening the Kuwaiti budget with having to sustain so many people. In 2004, ‘‘a parliamentary report [which] indicated that 75 per cent of all Kuwaiti job seekers are unqualified led the head of the Employment and Job Opportunities Affairs Committee to state that there exists a ‘serious imbalance between actual unemployment and availability of jobs.’’’100 The oil windfall has also generated large increases in the Kuwait stock market. From June 2001 to October 2005, the Kuwait stock exchange rose by roughly 560 percent. 101 The political implications of a reversal are acute, however: in March 2006, investors staged a protest outside Kuwait’s Parliament, following the largest single-day loss and after the stock exchange reached a six-month low.

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At the same time, it was down only 16.6 percent from its all-time high, signifying both the potential for further losses as well as for angrier and more substantial protests.102 Relations with Neighboring States Kuwait’s relations with Saudi Arabia are probably the most cordial among Kuwait’s neighbors, though the unresolved border issues between the two countries in the offshore Dorra gas field could prove problematic, especially since Iran, too, is laying claim to the reservoir. Saudi Arabia’s hostility toward Qatar is also problematic as it is hindering closer ties between Qatar and Kuwait. This is particularly manifest in the Saudi opposition to a $2-billion 600-kilometer natural gas pipeline running from Qatar’s North Field to Mina Al Ahmadi in Kuwait.103 Kuwait’s relations with Iran are improving: in March 2006, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding for enhanced security cooperation and communication. At the same time, Kuwait remains particularly concerned about Iran’s nuclear programs and regional ambitions, both of which have the prospect of threatening Kuwait.104 Kuwait’s relations with Iraq are obviously better since Saddam Hussein’s regime was toppled, but there remain underlying issues that may flare up in the future. Iraq’s territorial grudge toward Kuwait is part historical, part territorial. Kuwait was part of the Ottoman province of Basra, and hence it is considered by many Iraqi politicians (including Saddam Hussein) as a natural part of Iraq. Ever since independence in 1961, Kuwait has relied on a foreign protector to guarantee its security, first the United Kingdom, then the United States. The territorial side of Iraqi-Kuwaiti tensions emerges from Iraq’s narrow access to the open seas. Iraq’s only port is Umm Qasr on the southeast of the country and the northwest of the Persian Gulf. Access to that port passes through Kuwaiti territorial waters, potentially compromising both Iraq’s commerce and security. This reality creates a great sense of strategic vulnerability for Iraq and lies at the root of many problems between the two states. The shared oil field of Ratqa/Rumaila is another territorial issue that may create tension. Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait of drilling horizontally into Iraqi reservoirs as part of his justification to invade Kuwait in August 1990. The settlement of a similarly stranded oil field with Saudi Arabia (in the Neutral Zone) offers comfort that a shared field need not lead to conflict, but this remains an issue that could flare up, particularly if relations between the two countries are poor. Terrorism remains the thorniest issue between the two countries, as many extremists who fight in Iraq go through Kuwait first. The attempt to improve cross-border security has been impeded by the fact that no clear and agreed-upon borders exist between the two countries. The result has been occasional clashes between Iraqi and Kuwaiti Security Forces. Kuwait’s relations with Israel are also undergoing reevaluation, albeit at nonofficial levels (primarily in the media). Kuwait is negotiating a Free Trade Agreement (FTA)

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with America, and one of America’s conditions for agreeing to the FTA is for Kuwait to dismantle the economic boycott against Israel and permit trading with Israeli companies (currently banned); Bahrain, for example, accepted this provision when it signed its FTA with America, and it is possible that Kuwait will have to do the same.105

4

Oman

Oman is a significant military power by Gulf standards, although its strength lies more in the quality of its military manpower and training than in its equipment strength and quality. It also occupies a unique strategic location in the lower Gulf. As Map 4.1 shows, Oman controls the Musandam Peninsula, and its waters include the main shipping and tanker routes that move in and out of the Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz. Its base at Goat Island is almost directly opposite of Iran’s base and port at Bandar Abbas. Oman would almost certainly play a major role in any confrontation or clash between Iran and the southern Gulf States. The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s most important oil chokepoint, and the U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA) reports that some 17 million barrels of oil per day (bbl/d) move through its shipping channels. These consist of two-mile wide channels for inbound and outbound tanker traffic, as well as a two-mile wide buffer zone. If the Strait of Hormuz was closed, or tanker routes could not be used freely, there are only limited alternatives. These include the 5-million-bbl/d capacity Petroline (East-West Pipeline) from Saudi Arabia’s oil fields near the Red Sea and the 290,000-bbl/d Abqaiq-Yanbu natural gas liquids line. Under some conditions, the 1.65-million-bbl/d Iraqi Pipeline across Saudi Arabia might be reopened, the 0.5million-bbl/d Tapline to Lebanon could be reactivated, and more oil could be pumped north to Ceyhan (Turkey) from Iraq. All of these measures, however, would take time and are dependent on political and security conditions. As a result, successful total interdiction of shipping through the Strait could cut world oil supplies by some 10 million barrels a day.1 More broadly, Oman has a nearly 2,000-kilometer coastline on the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. It is the only member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) with meaningful ports on the Indian Ocean and which might offer relatively secure pipeline routes to the east that would bypass the chokepoint at the Strait of Hormuz.

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Map 4.1 Oman

Oman is a comparatively large country by southern Gulf standards, with a total area of over 309,500 square kilometers. It shares borders with several other southern Gulf States: Saudi Arabia (658 kilometers), United Arab Emirates (603 kilometers), and Yemen (293 kilometers).2 Oman has no long-standing geographic enemies and maintains peaceful relations with neighboring states. For example, Oman encouraged the GCC to permit Yemen to seek entry, despite South Yemen’s aiding of the Dhofar Rebellion in the 1960s and 1970s.3 Oman’s own oil and gas resources are limited. The EIA estimates that Oman has proven recoverable oil reserves of 5.5 billion barrels, located largely in the country’s northern and central regions. Oman is more important as a gas power. The Oil and Gas Journal estimates that exploration raised Oman’s proven natural gas reserves

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from only 12.3 trillion cubic feet (Tcf ) in 1992 to 29 Tcf in 2005, and gas exploration continues to be a major priority. In spite of Oman’s limited resources, petroleum still accounts for around 75 percent of the country’s export earnings and almost 40 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP).4 Oman also has no pressing border disputes. It has demarcated its borders with all neighboring states.5 Oman has, however, had a history of tension and rivalry with Saudi Arabia, which once made substantial claims to western Oman, but the two nations signed an agreement to demarcate their borders on March 21, 1990, and the demarcation was completed on July 10, 1995.6 Oman has a more serious history of tension with Yemen, and South Yemen (then the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen or PDRY) not only made claims to Yemeni territory, but sponsored and armed a rebellion in Oman’s Dhofar Province. There has been some tension with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over border issues and the UAE’s willingness to hire Omanis as members of its armed forces. These tensions have not prevented Oman from playing a major role in the Gulf Cooperation Council and in seeking to strengthen its military role and capability. Oman was one of the first states to propose the creation of strong GCC rapid reaction forces and common force building efforts. Saudi Arabia, however, saw such efforts as an Omani effort to obtain military aid from the other Gulf States, and the resulting tensions were yet another factor limiting the GCC’s real-world role in collective security. Oman’s most serious current potential threat is Iran. Oman has sought to build stable ties to Iran and had some success in military contacts and dialogue. Iran’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD), missile, and asymmetric capabilities are potential threats to Oman and the other Gulf States. Yemen, too, is a potential threat, due to its political instability and the large numbers of militants who reside there. Like most southern Gulf States, Oman has sought to deal with these threats by establishing close ties to Britain and the United States. It has allowed the United States to stage out of Omani airfields and air bases on a number of occasions and has granted the U.S. military extensive prepositioning facilities on the island of Masirah. It is the only southern Gulf State to maintain close ties to the British military and security forces, which play a major advisory and training role in Oman.

OMAN’S EMERGENCE AS A STRATEGIC PLAYER IN THE GULF Oman was not a serious strategic factor in the Middle East until after 1970, when the ruling Sultan Qabus bin Said Al Bu-Said deposed his father in a bloodless coup. The British organized the coup, and it ushered Oman into a new era of international significance.7 Qabus improved Oman’s relations with the United States and Britain, while trying to balance internal opposition to these close times at home. These partnerships were tested during the Afghan War in 2001, when Oman’s Thumrait Air Base was the primary base for British aircraft fighters.8 In addition, the Sultan later

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provided the United States and Britain with staging bases in Oman for the 2003 invasion of Iraq.9 Oman has faced its share of internal instability. Oman’s religious breakdown is unique to the Middle East. It is the only state where the majority, 75 percent, is Ibadhi Muslims. Ibadhis are distinct from either Shi’ites or Sunnis. Because of Ibadhism’s long history in Oman, Sunni and Shi’ite militant groups have not been able to gain as much ground in Oman as they have in other states.10 Several large-scale rebellions occurred in Oman during the mid-twentieth century. The first was the Imam rebellion. The Imam was the spiritual leader of Oman, and since 1920 he had ruled the interior portion of the Sultanate, while acknowledging the sovereignty of the Sultan elsewhere. Once oil was discovered in 1954, however, the Imam refused to share his control of the interior with the Sultan, and a rebellion began. The British helped the Sultan expel the Imam in 1959, and the Sultan abolished the position that year.11 The most serious rebellion that Oman has had to face in the modern era was the Marxist Dhofar Rebellion, which lasted from 1964 to 1975. The Dhofar Rebellion was incited by Communist elements from what became the PDRY or South Yemen, the only Marxist state in the Gulf region.12 When Sultan Qabus took power in 1970, the rebellion had already been raging for six years. To fight more effectively, he sought support from Britain, Iran, and Jordan. He then rearmed and updated the Omani military, which had declined under his father’s rule. He offered amnesty to all rebels who surrendered, but aggressively engaged those who did not. By early 1975, the armed portion of the rebellion was crushed, but its political apparatus, the Popular Front for the Political Liberation of Oman, would exist until the end of the Cold War.13 Internal Politics and Stability In terms of internal political stability, Sultan Qabus is one of the most absolute monarchs in the Middle East. He is Head of State, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, Minister of Finance, Commander of the Armed Forces, and Chairman of the Central Bank. There is no opposition to his rule within the royal family that is strong enough to defer his policies, and at present, Sultan Qabus does not have a chosen successor. The succession issue is one of the key internal stability uncertainties Oman faces. Qabus is in his late 60s. He has stated that he has two names of possible successors written in a secret envelope that will be opened after his death and that the royal family will choose which of the candidates is most acceptable. Qabus does not have a son, and many fear a power vacuum after his death. Qabus increased the bureaucracy of the state after his ascension in 1970. He created Oman’s first criminal code in 1974, and in 1991, he created the Majlis alShura (Consultative Council) to help govern the state. The Majlis al-Shura has little power to propose legislation, and it serves primarily as an advisory board. Oman’s 59 local caucuses have had universal suffrage for anyone over the age of 21 since 2002, and they elect a total of 83 members to serve on the Majlis al-Shura. Despite

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its limited powers, the Majlis system does at least give community leaders the opportunity to participate, even though the Majlis functions are mainly administrative.14 The Sultan appoints both his Cabinet and the upper legislative branch, the Majlis al-Dawla (State Council with 58 seats).15 In terms of judicial processes, Oman has taken steps to legitimize its courts system. In 1996, the Sultan created the ‘‘Basic Law,’’ which separated the judiciary as a body. In 1999, all the courts were placed under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice, a ministry not headed by the Sultan. To guarantee further court independence, the Sultan removed the Office of Public Prosecutor from the Royal Omani Police, and he has created an independent Supreme Court.16 Economic Reform, Diversification, and Stability As has been touched upon earlier, Oman’s economy is heavily oil dependent, as oil contributes 40 percent of the GDP. Oman is attempting to shift from this dependence by developing its gas fields, aluminum smelters, producing petrochemicals, and by becoming a nexus of trade between the GCC and Asia.17 These efforts focus heavily on ‘‘Omanization,’’ a government program designed to increase the percentage of Omani citizens working in the private sector. At present, Omani nationals constitute only about 15 percent of private sector employment.18 This effort has so far had only limited success. Programs to develop a domestic manufacturing base in the 1980s largely failed. Oman now is focusing on developing industries tied to its natural gas reserves, and mineral and metal deposits of silica, dolomite, copper, and gold. Oman announced in September 2003 that it was reviving a five-year-old plan to build a $2.5-billion aluminum smelter, which is to begin operation in 2007. Oman has also sought to create jobs through foreign investment in light industry, tourism, and electric power generation. It has a wide range of foreign investment incentives such as a five-year tax holiday for companies in certain industries, an income tax reduction for publicly held companies with at least 51 percent Omani ownership, and soft loans to finance new and existing projects. A decree issued in July 2004 allows foreign ownership up to 100 percent in power generation and water. Oman became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in October 2000 and has made further efforts to reduce barriers to foreign investment. It also supports an eventual customs union among the GCC states. Oman is also seeking to become an energy port and downstream production center for other southern Gulf States. It is a partner in the participants in the $3.5billion Dolphin Pipeline Project being led by Dolphin Energy Limited (DEL), a joint venture among the UAE government, Total, and Occidental Petroleum. The project’s goal is to create a pipeline system to link the gas networks of Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. Under a deal reached in March 2003, Oman started supplying gas to DEL in the fourth quarter of 2003. Plans call for the pipeline to reverse direction in 2008, and Oman would then import 200 million cubic feet per day from DEL. Oman has also developed much more ambitious plans for oil

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pipelines from the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia to an oil port in southern Oman.19 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates that Oman’s GDP in purchasing power parity terms is $40 billion, and its per capita income is $13,400. Approximately 57 percent of their population is employed in services, 40 percent in industry, and only about 3 percent in agriculture.20 MILITARY SPENDING AND ARMS IMPORTS Oman is the largest military spender in the Gulf in proportion to its GDP. Its military budgets have steadily increased since 1990. It is estimated that in 1990, Oman’s defense budget was $1.39 billion (or 13.1 percent of its GDP), then $1.59 billion by 1995 (13.0 percent), $1.75 billion by 2000 (13.0 percent), $2.4 billion in 2001 (12.0 percent), $2.5 billion in 2002 (12.5 percent), $2.46 billion in 2003 (11.3 percent), $2.56 billion in 2004 (10.6 percent), and $3.02 billion in 2005 (7.3 percent).21 Arms deliveries to Oman, however, have declined since the early 1990s. It is estimated that Oman received a total of $1.2 billion between 1993 and 1996, $200 milllion between 1997 and 2000, and $300 million between 2001 and 2004. It is important, however, to note that Oman’s new arms agreements have increased from their low levels of the 1990s. Between 1993 and 1996, Iran signed $700 million worth of new arms agreements. This decreased to $300 million between 1997 and 2000, but climbed up to $2.2 billion between 2001 and 2004. Oman’s greatest supplier of military hardware is Great Britain.22 Figure 4.1 shows that between 1993 and 1996, major western European powers—largely Britain—

Figure 4.1 Oman’s Arms Deliveries by Supplier, 1993–2004

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Figure 4.2 Oman’s New Arms Agreements by Supplier, 1993–2004

delivered $1 billion in arms to Oman. This dwarfs the $100 million provided by the other European and other categories. Many of the weapons provided by western Europe likely came from previous agreements, as Figure 4.2 shows that there were only $500 million in agreements designated in the 1993–1996 period. The 1997–2000 period marks a noticeable reduction relative to 1993–1996. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show that Oman received only $200 million in weapons and signed $300 million in new arms agreements. All of the weapons during the 1997–2000 period were provided by western European nations. The 2001–2004 period marks yet another major shift for Oman for two reasons: first, the increase in weapons agreements and, second, the emergence of the United States as a provider of weapons to Oman. MILITARY MANPOWER As noted earlier, Sultan Qabus began diverting resources into the military after his ascension in 1970, and most critics agree that the results have been impressive.23 Oman’s armed forces are described by Jane’s Security Sentinel Assessment as ‘‘one of the most impressive [militaries] in the Gulf region.’’ The troops are well equipped, well disciplined, and well trained.24 Oman’s military manpower totaled 44,100 in 2006. Oman had a 25,000-man army. The navy had 4,200 sailors, and the air force had 4,100 personnel. The Royal Household maintained 5,000 Guards, 1,000 in Special Forces, 150 sailors in the Royal Yacht fleet, and 250 pilots and ground personnel in the Royal Flight squadrons.25

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The CIA estimated in 2005 that Oman had 581,444 young men capable of military service and that, on average, 26,391 young men become eligible for military service every year. Oman could clearly expand the size of its military if it wanted, but part of its economic reform includes a reduction on military spending, so a drastic increase is not likely.26 Oman also maintains a moderately sized paramilitary force of 4,400 men.27 This force is small compared to states such as Yemen and Bahrain, whose paramilitaries are similar to their armies in terms of numbers. This reflects Oman’s higher level of internal stability, although Oman is scarcely without problems. THE OMANI ARMY Oman’s Army now has 25,000 actives, plus a small contingent of Royal Household troops. It is important to remember that Oman has maintained relatively large armed forces ever since the Dhofar Rebellion. It also has exported military manpower to other southern Gulf States like the United Arab Emirates. In spite of a comparatively large military spending effort, however, it has been relatively slow to modernize its forces. Force Organization In 2006, Oman’s Army was organized into one armored and two infantry brigades, two armored regiments, one armored reconnaissance regiment, one infantry reconnaissance regiment, one airborne regiment, two field artillery regiments, one medium artillery regiment, two rifle brigades, an air defense regiment, two reconnaissance companies, and a field engineer regiment. These regiments are small and are largely battalion equivalents. It has a number of independent company-sized formations, including the Musandam Security Force. Figure 4.3 shows that Oman’s only major recent increase in manpower occurred between 1990 and 2000. Since 2000, the army’s size has remained at levels of 25,000. Oman has, however, created two new Rifle brigades over the past six years, and it reduced its reconnaissance companies from three to two between 2000 and 2005. The Omani Army has focused on making its existing forces more effective and mission relevant, rather than emphasizing force size. Armor and Antiarmor Weapons Oman has a relatively limited number of tanks, drawn from both U.S. and British sources. The army’s equipment includes 6 M-60A1s, 73 M-60A3s, and 38 Challenger 2 main battle tanks, as well as 37 aging Scorpion light tanks. Readiness and training are moderate, but Oman faces a larger threat from light asymmetric forces than from heavy armor. Oman relies more on lighter armored vehicles. Figure 4.3 reflects a trend by the Army to increase its numbers of armored personnel carriers (APCs) and armored

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Figure 4.3 Omani Army’s Force Structure, 1990–2006 1990

2000

2005

2006

20,000

25,000

25,000

25,000

20,000

25,000

25,000

25,000

Rifle Company

0

0

1

2

Infantry Brigade

3

2

2

2

Armored Brigade

0

1

1

1

Armored RECCE Regiment

1

1

1

1

RECCE Company

0

3

2

2

1

1

1

1

1, 2 coy

1, 2 coy

1

1

Medium Artillery Regiment

0

1

1

1

Air Defense Regiment

1

1

1

1

Field Engineer Regiment

1

1

1

1

Field Artillery Regiment

2

2

2

2


Airborne Regiment Infantry RECCE Regiment

*

Main Battle Tanks

69

154

154

154

Chieftain

33

0

0

0

CR2 Challenger 2

0

38

38

38

M-60A1

6

6

6

6

M-60A3

0

73

73

73

Scorpian

30

37

37

37

0

54

145

145

Sultan

0

13

13

13

VBL

0

41

132

132

2

170

191

191

VAB PC

2

0

0

0

FV 103 Spartan

0

6

6

6

FV4333 Stormer

0

4

10

10

Piranha

0

160

175

175

Artillery

87

209

233

233

Reconnaissance


TOWED 105-mm ROF lt

39

42

42

42

TOWED 122-mm D-30

0

30

30

30

TOWED 130-mm M-46

12

12

12

12

TOWED 130-mm 59I

0

12

12

12

128


TOWED 155-mm FH-70

12

0

12

12

SP 155-mm M-109A2

12

0

0

0

SP 155-mm G-6

0

24

24

24

MOR 81 mm

0

69

69

69

MOR 107-mm M-30

12

20

20

20

MOR 120-mm Brandt

0

0

12

12

60

68

50+†

50+

MSL Milan

50

50

32

32

TOW TOW-2A

10

18

18

18

‡

?

Antitank Weapons

RL 73-mm RPG-7 Knout

0

0

?

RL 94-mm LAW-80

0

0

?

?

?

?

?

?

28

?

?

?

SAM Mistral 2

?

?

?

?

SAM SA-7 Grail

?

?

?

?

GUN 23-mm TOWED ZU-32

4

4

4

4

GUN 35-mm TOWED GDF005

0

10

10

10

12

12

12

12

Air Defense SAM Javelin

GUN 40-mm L/60 Bofors *

For the 1990 and 2000 Infantry RECCE category, the two coys represent two independent infantry companies. † ‘‘+’’ indicates the numbers listed may be slightly less than the actual units or weapons in stock. ‡ All ‘‘?’’ refer to weapons that Oman is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in its possession are unknown. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

reconnaissance vehicles. In 1990, Oman had no armored reconnaissance vehicles. By the year 2000, it had 54, and by 2005 it had 145. A similar trend exists in APCs. In 1990, Oman had two armored personnel carriers. This increased to 170 in 2000 and 191 in 2005. Oman now has 132 Vehicle Blinde Leger (VBL) armored reconnaissance vehicles, 13 Sultan armored reconnaissance vehicles, and more than 204 APCs, including 175 variants of the Piranha, 6 Spartans, 13 Sultans, and 10 Stormers. Readiness and training in using such systems is again moderate, but Oman has a steadily improving roadnet and can deploy and use such systems relatively well. Oman has a number of antitank guided weapons and light antitank weapons. It has 18 TOW-2A, some of which are on armored vehicles, 32 Milan man-portable antitank guided weapons, and a mix of RPG-73-mm and LAW-80 94-mm rocket launchers.28 Oman purchased 100 Javelin antitank missiles from the United States

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in 2004. It was reported in 2006 that Oman had purchased an additional 250 missiles and 30 Javelin command launch units plus simulators and logistic support. These missiles have yet to be integrated into Oman’s force structure.29 Artillery Oman has made a considerable increase in its artillery strength over the past 15 years. Figure 4.3 shows that Oman’s artillery count went from 87 guns in 1990, to 209 by 2000, and 233 by 2005. The increase occurred largely in the lighter mortar caliber (Oman acquired 69 81 mms between 1990 and 2000) and in TOWED artillery. Oman also switched its self-propelled artillery to the more advanced 155-mm G-6. Oman now has 24 G-6 155-mm self-propelled artillery weapons and 108 towed weapons, including 42 ROF 105 mm, 30 D-30 122 mm, 12 M-46 130 mm, and 12 Type 59-1 155 mm plus 12 FH-70s. It has 101 mortars of various calibers, including 69 81-mm, 12–20 107-mm, and 12 120-mm mortars.30 Training and readiness are adequate to good in the direct fire mode, but limited in terms of artillery targeting, fire-control capabilities, and training for joint maneuver warfare. Antiaircraft Weapons Unlike other aspects of the Omani Army, Figure 4.3 shows Oman’s antiaircraft (AA) weapons have shown little growth over the past 16 years, though this is difficult to track definitively due to the disagreement between sources on the number of surface to air missiles (SAMs) Oman possesses. The exact count of Oman’s Air Defense missiles is somewhat uncertain. It seems to have 1,420 Javelins, 34 SA-7s, and an unknown amount of vehicle-mounted Mistral 2s.31 Oman has 4 23-mm ZU-3-2s, 10 GDF-005 35 mm with Skyguard, and 12 Bofors 40-mm AA guns.32 Oman is the only Gulf country that has never deployed medium or heavy surfaceto-air missile defenses like the I-Hawk, Patriot, SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, S-300, or S-400. Overall Assessment Oman’s Army is relatively well trained and organized for the most probable missions it faces, which are far more likely to be limited clashes and incursions than any major outside attack and invasion. In coordination with Oman’s air and naval forces, it should have sufficient strength to deter hostile attacks from a nation like Yemen or the kind of light amphibious attack Iran could carry out with its current forces. It should have ample capability to crush any organized rebellions (although no such threat has ever replaced the Dhofar rebels) and prevent outside states from intimidating it with military superiority. The Omani Army has not fought in any serious clash for several decades, but it is still regarded as one of the most professional forces in the Gulf region.33

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OMANI AIR FORCE Oman’s Air Force is well organized and relatively well trained for the kind of missions it can perform, but Oman has never been able to afford and maintain a large, modern air force by Gulf standards. The Omani Air Force has approximately 4,100 men, with only 36 combat aircraft and no armed helicopters. Its force structure has remained roughly the same since the Gulf War, and some of its aircraft are aging and have limited mission capability, although some are being upgraded. As Figure 4.4 shows, however, Oman has taken steps to improve its air force, however, as it acquired 12 advanced F-16 fighters in August 2005.34 It has a total of ten squadrons altogether. Combat Air Strength Oman has five fighter-ground attack squadrons, but it has only a total of 36 combat-capable aircraft vs. the 60–90 aircraft that would be normal for a fivesquadron force. These combat aircraft include 20 aging Jaguars that are being upgraded to the GR-3 standard. It has two lighter squadrons. One is a fighterattack, reconnaissance unit with a total of 12 Hawk MK-203s. Another is a dual-capable training squadron with 4 MK-103 aging Hawk 103s, and 12 PC-9 turboprop trainers with a limited combat capability. It has one squadron of 12 newly acquired F-16C/D aircraft. Oman has no units dedicated to the fighter/interceptor role, although its F-16s have a high capability in this mission. Two of the F-16s are to be fitted with F-9120 Advanced Airborne Reconnaissance Systems, or AARS.35 The air force will upgrade seven of its attack aircraft with Precision Attack Navigation and Targeting for Extended Range Acquisition, or PANTERA pods, enhancing their strike capabilities.36 Given the importance of Oman’s airfields to the United States, it can almost certainly count on effective training and support for these aircraft. Oman also has four AS-202-18 Bravos and 8 MFI-17B Mushshaqs.37 Helicopters and Transport Aircraft Oman has three fixed-wing transport squadrons, with 3 BAC-11s, 3 C-130Hs, and 10 Skyvans. In terms of helicopters, Oman has 2 medium transport helicopter squadrons with 30 aircraft: 19 AB-205s, 3 AB-206s, and 3 AB-2123s. Oman also has 6–16 Super Lynx 300 utility helicopters.38 Overall Assessment Oman has a modest air force, although its F-16C/Ds have significantly improved its capability and can outperform any aircraft in service in Iran and Yemen. It works closely with the British and U.S. air forces and receives material and training from the United Kingdom and the United States. Oman’s aircraft depend on contractor

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Figure 4.4 Omani Air Force’s Force Structure, 1990–2006

Manpower Active Total Number of Squadrons

1990

2000

2005

2006

3,000

4,100

4,100

4,100

3,000

4,100

4,100

4,100

7

7

9

10

2/38*

2/8

4/16

5/36

GR 1

1

0

0

0

Hunter FGA-73

13

0

0

0

Hunter FGA-67

3

0

0

0

F-16C/D Fighting Falcon

0

0

0

1/12

Jaguar T-MK-2

4

4

2/4

2/4

2/17

2/8

2/8

2/16

Fighter Ground Assault

Jaguar S(O)-MK-1 Hawk MK-103

0

4

4

4

Transport

3/21

3/21

3/16

3/16

BAC-111

1/3

1/3

1/3

1/3

C-130H Hercules

3

3

3

3

SC7 3M Skyvan

2/15

2/15

2/10

2/10

2

23

1/35

1/36

AS-202-18 Bravo

2

4

4

4

Hawk MK-203

0

12

12

12

MFI-17B Mushshaq

0

7

7

8

PC-9

0

0

1/12

1/12

2/26

2/30

2/52

2/41

Training Craft

Helicopter UTL Bell 205

2/20

2/19

2/19

2/19

UTL Bell 206 Jet Ranger

3

3

3

3

UTL Bell 212

3

3

3

3

UTL Bell 214

0

5

5

0

Lynx Srs 300 Super Lynx

0

0

0

16

?†

40

40

40

ASM Exocet Am-39

?

0

0

0

SAM Rapier

0

28

40

40

Radar/Land

0

?

6

6

MSL AAM AIM-9M Sidewinder

?

?

?

?

Air Defense

* Numbers listed with a slash mark indicate how many squadrons the craft are broken into. † All ‘‘?’’ refer to weapons that Oman is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in its possession are unknown. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

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maintenance, and its pilots receive training from the United Kingdom and the United States. Given Oman’s strategic importance, and the near certainty of British and U.S. support in any crisis, the Omani Air Force seems well sized for its realworld mission needs. THE OMANI NAVY Oman was once one of the world’s major sea powers, and its strategic location and proximity to the Strait of Hormuz have given its navy a high priority. So has its long coast and ports on the Indian Ocean. The force structure of Oman’s Navy has largely remained the same since 1990. Figure 4.5 shows that manpower increased from 2,500 men in 1990 to 4,200 men in 2000 and has stayed the same since then. Oman, however, has not acquired new ships since the year 2000, and its equipment has been the same for the past decade. Its 4,200-man naval force is headquartered at Seeb. It has bases at Ahwi, Ghanam Island, Musandam on the Musandam Peninsula, and Salalah on Oman’s south coast. Surface Combat Forces In 2006, Oman had ten surface combat vessels. These included two 1,450-ton Qahir-class corvettes, each armed with eight MM-40 II Exocets, Crotale air-tosurface missiles, and one 76-mm gun. They had a helicopter platform and could be fitted with antisubmarine warfare (ASW) gear. The ships are nearly new and were delivered in 1996 and 1997. Oman had eight oceangoing patrol boats. These included four Dhofar-class missile patrol boats, armed with twin three or four MM-40 Exocet missiles and one 76-mm gun, which the United States delivered in the early and mid-1980s. They also included three 475-ton Al Bushra class, armed with 76-mm guns and delivered in the mid-1990s. These boats had no ASW capability. Oman had 4 Seeb 74-ton coastal patrol craft, plus 15 light inshore patrol boats in its police force.39 The navy has placed an order for 12 9.5-m high-speed rigid assault boats, though the date of delivery is unclear.40 Oman is acquring three Project Khareef–class ocean patrol vessels (OPVs). They will have modern antiship missiles, fire-control directors, and electronic warfare systems. They will also have SMART-S E/F-band multibeam 3D surveillance radars with a 250-kilometer range. It is buying MICA vertical launch, point defense, missile systems for these ships. These 12-cell air defense systems will have either dual-wave band imaging seeker infrared guidance or Thales AD4A pulse Doppler seekers. They have a range of up to 10 kilometers.41 Amphibious Forces The Omani Navy had one 2,500-ton Nasr al Bahr–class LSL (240 troops, 7 tanks) with a helicopter deck. It underwent a limited refit in 1997 and is fully operational.

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Figure 4.5 Omani Navy’s Force Structure, 1990–2006 1990

2000

2005

2006

2,500

4,200

4,200

4,200

Active

2,500

4,200

4,200

4,200

Frigates/ Corvettes

0

2

2

2

0

2

2

2


12

11

11

11

PCC Wafi

4

0

0

0

PCC Al Bushra

0

3

3

3

PCI Seeb

4

4

4

4

PFM Dhofar

4

4

4

4

Amphibious

5

5

5

5

LCT Nasr el Bahr

1

1

1

1

LST Al Munassir

1

0

0

0

LCU

0

1

1

1

LCM

3

3

3

3

1

4

4

4

AGHS

0

1

1

1

Al Sultana

0

1

1

1

Al Mabrukah

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Manpower

Qahir Al Amwaj

Logistics and Support

Unspecified Supply

Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

Oman also had at least four landing craft: three 230-ton landing craft mechanized (LCMs) and one 85-ton landing craft utility (LCU), as well as a number of support ships and survey craft. Overall Assessment Protecting the Strait of Hormuz is Oman’s greatest naval objective. Its navy is trained for this mission as well as coast defense. Oman cannot, however, directly challenge Iranian forces. It has limited naval strength, no real naval air capability,

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and must rely on the United States and Britain for antimine and ASW warfare, and in any major confrontation with Iran. It has shown, however, that it will confront Iran over any infringement of its waters. The Omani Navy has some difficulty in operating and maintaining advanced weapons, sensors, and fire-control systems. It is generally well trained, however, and maintains relatively high readiness by Gulf standards. Oman also can count on a British and American presence to prevent any larger navy, like that of Iran, from interfering with shipping through the Strait. OMAN ROYAL GUARDS FORCES In addition to its conventional services—army, air force, and navy—Oman has a large Royal Guards Force with naval, ground, and air branches. The Royal Household has 6,400 troops that include two Special Forces Regiments (1,000 men) and a 5,000-man Royal Guard Brigade. The Royal Forces are responsible for the protection of the Sultan, but they also serve a ceremonial purpose. The two Special Forces Regiments are elite squads who serve as counterterrorism units.42 The Royal Guards have an additional 9 VBC-90 armored fighting vehicles, 14 VAB-VCIs, 50 Chinese-made WZ-551s, and 9 VAB-DDAs. The Guards have 6 Type 90A multiple rocket launchers, Milan antitank guided weapons, and 14 Javelin light surface-to-air missiles.43 There is a small 150-man Royal Yacht squadron and a 250-man Royal Flight. The Royal Yacht squadron is comprised of just three ships, the Royal Yacht itself, a combat Zinat Al Bihaar, and one Fulk Al Salameh support ship, which can carry two AS332C Super Pumas. The Royal Flight squadrons have two B-747s, one DC-8, and two Gulfstream IV transports. They also have a helicopter fleet of three AS-330s, two AS-332Cs, and one AS-332L. Figures 4.6 through 4.8 show that the Royal Guard has grown considerably over the past 16 years. Much like the army, their APC numbers have grown from almost nothing (6 in 1990) to 73 by 2006. Manpower has also grown, as Figure 4.6 shows that the Royal Guard has raised from 3,600 in 1990 to 6,000 in 2006. Figure 4.7 reveals that the Yacht fleet has lost only one ship since 1990, the Royal Yacht Support ship, and gained the Fulk Al Salameh attack vessel. Figure 4.8 also shows almost no growth in the Royal Flight squadron. It could be deduced from these figures that only the Royal Guard serves a true purpose in state security and that the Royal Flight and Yacht squadrons serve transportation and ceremonial purposes. OMANI PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES Oman’s paramilitary force is relatively small. While its army has 25,000 troops, Oman’s Paramilitary has only 4,400, which includes a small coast guard. Many other Gulf States have paramilitaries nearly the same size as their armies, but clearly this is not the case with Oman. The smaller size is explained in part by the paramilitary’s shared responsibility of policing the state with the Royal Guards.

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Figure 4.6 Omani Royal Guard’s Force Structure, 1990–2006 1990

2000

2005

2006

3,600

6,000

6,000

6,000

Active Royal Guard

3,100

5,000

5,000

5,000

Active Special Forces

500

1,000

1,000

1,000

1

2

2

2

6

9

9

9

Manpower

Combat Units Special Forces Regiment Tanks VBC-90

6

9

9

9

6

23

73

73

PRC WZ-551

0

0

50

50

VAB VCI

6

14

14

14


VAB VDAA

0

9

9

9

0

0

6

6

0

0

6

6

0

0

?

?

MSL Milan

0

0

?

?

Air Defense

0

?

14

14

0

?

14

14

Artillery MRL 122-mm Type-90A Antitank

SAM/MANPAD Javelin

*

* All ‘‘?’’ refer to weapons that Oman is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in its possession are unknown. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

Figure 4.7 Omani Royal Yacht Squadron’s Force Structure, 1990–2006

Manpower Patrol and Coastal Combatants/Misc. Craft Zinat Al Bihaar

1990

2000

2005

2006

150

150

150

150

0

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

2

2

2

2

Royal Yacht Support Ship

1

0

0

0

Royal Yacht

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

Logistics and Support

Fulk Al Salameh (carries two 332C Super Pumas)


136


While Oman has faced serious insurgencies in the past, Oman has not had a serious terrorist threat.44

Trends in Force Structure Oman has made few overt changes to its security forces over the past 16 years. Figure 4.9 shows that Oman’s Tribal Guard has increased its manpower by 500 troops since 1990, a small increase compared to its increases in Royal Guards and army forces. In addition, Figure 4.9 shows that Oman has decreased the size of its coast guard fleet, eliminating all of its 15 AT-105 APCs between 1990 and 2000. In April 2006, however, Oman began concluding talks with VT, a British shipbuilding company, to create three new offshore patrol boats for the coast guard.45 Figure 4.9 shows that Oman has also decreased the size of it Police Air Wing, going from 17 aircraft in 1990 to 9 by 2006. The decreases in the security forces and the increases in the Royal Guard could indicate that the Royal Guard is taking a more active role in policing the Sultanate. It is also possible that, in light of no large terrorist attacks, Oman decided it could afford to downsize aspects of its security forces.46

Main Security and Paramilitary Forces Oman’s security apparatus is not as complex or as large as other Gulf States. The following bullet points show how Oman organizes its security forces:47

Figure 4.8 Omani Royal Flight’s Force Structure, 1990–2006 1990

2000

2005

2006

Manpower

250

250

250

250

Transport

5

5

5

5

Falcon 20 ac

1

0

0

0

B-747SP

1

2

2

2

DC-8-73CF

1

1

1

1

Gulfstream IV

2

2

2

2

6

6

6

6

SPT AS-330 Puma

4

3

3

3

SPT AS-332F Super Puma

2

2

2

2

SPT AS-332L Super Puma

0

1

1

1

Helicopter


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Figure 4.9 Omani Paramilitary’s Force Structure, 1990–2006 1990

2000

2005

2006

3,900

4,400

4,400

4,400

Tribal Home Guard Manpower

3,500

4,000

4,000

4,000

Police Coast Guard Manpower

400

400

400

400

26

17

17

17

AT-105 APC

15

0

0

0

Misc. Boats/Craft

11

14

14

14

PCI 3 CG less than 100 tons

0

3

3

3

17

13

9

9

Boeing 727

1

0

0

0

DHC-5D

3

0

0

0

Learjet 25B

1

0

0

0

Learjet 35A

1

0

0

0

Merlin IVA

2

0

0

0

BN-2T Turbine Islander

0

1

1

1

CN-235M

0

2

2

2

Do-228

2

1

1

1

Bell 205A

0

3

2

2

AB-214ST

6

6

3

3

Hughes 369

1

0

0

0

Manpower


Police Air Wing


• Tribal Home Guard: This group is responsible for maintaining the Sultanate and functions as a regional paramilitary and security force. It is managed locally and at tribal levels, which allows the Sultan to induct numerous tribes into his service throughout his kingdom. The Tribal Home Guard also has a smaller component in the Dhofar region called the ‘‘Firqats.’’ The Firqats are Dhofari tribesmen who serve the Sultan in the region that rebelled between 1964 and 1975. They form lightly armed companies of 50–100 troops, and their creation marked another move by Sultan Qabus to enlist the support of local tribesmen. • Coast Guard: The small Omani Coast Guard patrols ports and gives support to the navy and the Royal Yacht fleet. It guards against piracy and any possible suicide boats that might threaten British or American ships in the region. It is too small, however, to guard the vitally important Strait of Hormuz. • Border Guard: Oman has no separate border guard force. This point could be worrisome in future years, as Oman borders Yemen, which has numerous militant groups and no separate border guard either.

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• Royal Guard: The Royal Guard is under the direct control of the Sultan and is not part of Oman’s security apparatus exclusively. Nonetheless, in addition to its conventional and ceremonial roles, the Royal Guard also polices the state against potential militants and dissidents.

The role of its internal security and intelligence services, and their interaction with Oman’s conventional military services, is uncertain. At times, the internal security forces have been accused of using a heavy hand and violating human rights. According to the U.S. Department of State, Oman’s internal security forces operate as follows:48 The Royal Office, whose head holds cabinet status, controls internal and external security and coordinates all intelligence and security policies. Under the Royal Office, the Internal Security Service investigates all matters related to internal security, and the Sultan’s Special Force has limited border security and antismuggling responsibility. The Royal Oman Police (ROP), whose head also holds cabinet status, performs regular police duties, provides security at airports, serves as the country’s immigration agency, and operates the coast guard. The Ministry of Defense, and in particular the Royal Army of Oman, also has limited domestic security responsibilities. Corruption and impunity were not perceived to be widespread problems. There were no instances in which the police failed to respond to societal violence. The ROP’s Directorate General of Inquiries and Criminal Investigation is charged with investigating allegations of police abuse, and its findings are turned over to the Director General of Human Resources for disciplinary action.

Oman’s Struggle against Terrorism As noted earlier, Oman has had no major recent terrorist attacks occur on its soil.49 It did arrest two Al Qa’ida suspects in 2002, but Al Qa’ida has not been recorded as having a large following in the Sultanate.50 This is due in part to Oman’s Ibadhi religion. Oman is over 75 percent Ibhadi, and the moderate nature of Ibhadism may make it more difficult for Al Qa’ida to recruit religious militants.51 According to the U.S. State Department Country Report on Terrorism, Oman’s counterterrorism efforts have been strengthened, particularly on preventing terrorism financing. The 2005 report stated that52 Oman implemented a stringent anti-money laundering regime, including surveillance systems designed to identify unusual transactions over the last four years. The government announced new statutes to block money laundering, and the Central Bank announced plans to require financial institutions to verify customer identities using sophisticated biometrics technology. Of note, Oman required moneychangers to report all transactions over $260. The Omani Government continued to issue public and private statements condemning international acts of terrorism.

Oman remains vigilant against Al Qa’ida nonetheless, and it considers the possibility of suicide boat attacks (like the one against the USS Cole) as a real threat. It has increased its patrols at its harbors and has sought GCC cooperation in passing

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counterterrorism measures. The Sultan has also strongly supported U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the Gulf.53 Political Uncertainty Aside from the Dhofar Rebellion, which ended in 1975, Sultan Qabus has faced only one serious conspiracy, which took place in 1994. That year, there was an alleged plot by Islamic militants (many of whom were living in Dhofar) to overthrow the Sultan. Teachers and government employees led the conspiracy, and most of them were released or pardoned by the Sultan in 1995. The alleged 1994 conspiracy was the last serious attempt to remove the Sultan from power.54 This does not mean that there is not political unrest and a desire for political liberalization. Many sources indicate that there is a growing desire to obtain increased freedom of expression. Sultan Qabus has been willing to appease some dissidents with a few reforms. For example, in 2002 the Sultan changed the voting age to 21 years and declared universal suffrage for the Majlis al-Shura elections.55 The Sultan has not, however, offered to truncate his real power, and he remains firmly in control of the Sultanate. The electoral changes did not significantly alter the makeup of the Majlis al-Shura (two women were elected), and the Sultan still appoints the members of the Majlis al-Dawla. The Majlis al-Shura also has limited power to propose new legislation, and the Majlis al-Dawla is strictly an advisory board.56 In addition to the limited impact of elections, political parties are still illegal in Oman. Some of the Sultan’s political opponents were also arrested in 2005, demonstrating that there is a limit to Qabus’s willingness to reform.57 While these uncertainties have not translated into security threats, the uncertainty in Oman’s succession process has made many to wonder about internal stability in Oman. Sultan Qabus, while young by regional leader standards, does not have an obvious successor. He does not have any sons and claims that he has named is his successor in a closed envelope. This is also important since Qabus has total control of Oman’s security services and armed forces, and it remains to be seen how this control will be transferred and to whom. OMAN’S CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES Oman is a relatively stable Gulf State with a diversifying and growing economy. It has maintained a pragmatic policy of keeping good relations with its neighbors, and it has not fallen victim to terrorist attacks and internal instability. Oman’s diminishing oil reserves as well as a host of socioeconomic challenges do, however, remain Oman’s most urgent internal strategic challenges and are likely to remain in the near term. Economic Challenges and Diversification Increased oil prices and efforts to diversify the economy helped the Omani economy to grow by almost 14 percent in 2004, and it has become the sixth largest

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economy in the Gulf region.58 As has been touched upon earlier, Oman’s current oil sales account for approximately 40 percent of its GDP and 78 percent of its total export revenues. So long as oil prices remain high, Oman will continue to experience economic growth.59 Oman’s oil reserves are depleting, however, and its oil production capacity has been static. It also has had problems in obtaining maximum production from its fields and is in the process of trying to adopt more advanced techniques to deal with oil field management and issues like water flooding. As has been mentioned earlier, Oman is increasing its diversification efforts. Oman’s efforts at diversification have helped the economy grow, but Oman is still heavily dependent upon its oil exports. In 1995, Oman created an economic diversification plan called ‘‘Vision 2020,’’ the first economic diversification plan in the Arab world.60 Its design was to reduce Oman’s dependence on oil to 9 percent by the year 2020 and to strengthen alternative aspects of the Omani economy, all the while growing its GDP by 25 percent.61 The plan has succeeded in diversifying the economy, but not in reducing Oman’s dependence on oil. The Omani economy has developed methods of tapping its 25 Tcf of natural gas. It has increased the productivity of its $2.2-billion aluminum smelter in Sohar, it has entered into the fertilizing industry with India, and it manufactures petrochemicals like ethanol.62 Oman is also capable of expanding fishing near its deep-water ports, as well as agriculture.63 Oman’s stock market can benefit from improved management, as it has suffered since 1999 after being one of the most robust in the Middle East.64 Oman has also become an active trader with other Asian and Gulf States, and its volume of trade has increased since it joined the WTO in 2000.65 The United Arab Emirates was Oman’s biggest trading partner as of 2006, and Oman maintains a trade surplus.66 Still, all these endeavors are still in the early stages of development and have not filled their intended role of replacing oil as Oman’s primary source of revenue. Oil and Stability Oil is still critical even though ‘‘Vision 2020’’ entered into its 11th year in 2006. Oil has increased from 35 percent of Oman’s GDP in 1995 to 40 percent in 2005. Oman’s oil revenues have almost quadrupled over the past eight years: in 1998, they were $3.71 billion; in 1999, $5.38 billion; in 2000, $8.73 billion; in 2001, $7.63 billion; in 2002, $7.43 billion; in 2003, $7.76 billion; in 2004, $9.08 billion; and in 2005, $13.23 billion.67 These increases in revenue, however, are the result of the surging price of oil, not increased oil production or newly found reserves. In fact, Oman’s oil production fell from 0.972 million barrels per day in 2000 to 0.754 million barrels per day in 2004. Production rose for the first time since 2000 in the year 2005, when it reached 0.780 million barrels per day.68 Should the price of oil decrease, Oman’s economy would lose significant percentages of its revenue.

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Oman’s continued dependence on oil is troubling because Oman’s reserves are moving toward near- to midterm depletion. In 2005, Oman had 4.0 billion barrels of proven reserves remaining, and no large undiscovered deposits of oil are believed to exist within the Sultanate. At current production levels, Oman will exhaust these reserves in approximately 15 years.69 This knowledge has put additional pressure on Oman to make Vision 2020 a reality. The ‘‘Demographic Time Bomb’’ Oman also faces its own version of the ‘‘demographic time bomb’’ that threatens nearly all the Gulf States. Oman has a disproportionately large number of young people. Figure 4.10 reveals that 43 percent of Oman’s population is between the ages of 0 and 14. This percentage is the largest demographic group in the state, larger even than the much more inclusive age category of 30–64, which makes up only 30 percent of the population. Oman’s young people will need jobs, and it will be up to Oman’s economy to continue to grow and provide them with work. This is a serious challenge. Oman’s real GDP growth rate was 2 percent in 2005, and its unemployment rate was 15 percent. Omanization also has had little success. The reduction of expatriate workers in Oman’s economy, and increased employment among native Omanis, has been a key component of Vision 2020. Nevertheless, expatriates make up approximately 25 percent of Oman’s population. Reducing their role in the economy will be critical in avoiding massive unemployment among Oman’s youth.70 Relations with Neighboring States Oman has maintained a pragmatic policy of trying to maintain friendly relations with its neighboring states. It settled its borders with Yemen in 1992 and with the

Figure 4.10 Oman’s Demographic Distribution, 2006

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United Arab Emirates in 2003. As was mentioned earlier, Saudi Arabia is the only state Oman does not have a finalized border with, but this issue has remained relatively dormant.71 Oman has no independent border patrol, which poses a problem with states like Yemen, where militant groups roam near the border regions to evade capture by Yemeni paramilitary forces. Oman is not a part of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, but it is in the Arab League and the GCC, and it uses its membership to take leadership roles in the Middle East. It encouraged Yemen to seek GCC membership, and it was the only Arab state not to sever ties with Egypt after the Camp David Accords in 1979.72 Oman attempted to normalize relations with Israel during the 1990s, but the stagnation of the peace process caused the Sultan’s support for normalization to waver. Sultan Qabus has expressed repeated willingness to take counterterrorism measures within the GCC, especially in cracking down on terrorist money laundering. 73 Oman also attempted to secure a rapprochement between Kuwait and Iraq at the Arab League summit in March 2001.74 Oman has also tried to pioneer improved relations with Iran by encouraging dialogue between it and the GCC, with limited success.75 Ongoing Internal Stability Far too much of the internal stability of Oman seems to depend on the health and the reign of Sultan Qabus. The Sultan controls the policy and the vision of the state to such an extent that his demise will certainly leave a power vacuum. The Sultan does not have an announced successor. He has stated that he has a secret envelope with the names of two probable successors and that the royal family will have to decide which of them will become the next ruler.76 The royal family has sworn to carry out the Sultan’s succession wishes, and it is likely that Qabus’s final wishes will be honored. The problem is that whoever succeeds Qabus will inherit his highly personalized style of rule. After 36 years on the thrown, the Sultan governs through a series of long-standing personal relationships.77 Many of these will disappear with the Sultan’s death, and state efficiency will decrease. It is also unclear how the internal balance of power will change in the case of either a successful or turbulent succession process, or how neighboring states will react. In addition to the uncertainty surrounding the succession process, however, Oman’s leaders must show they can deal with the other challenges described earlier. This includes the ability to accelerate the slow progress of Vision 2020, diversify its economy and dependence on oil, deal with youth unemployment, and resolve tribal and internal security issues. The following is a checklist of obstacles that Oman will likely face as the Sultan ages and its oil reserves run out: • Economic Diversification: If Oman’s oil were to run out while it still accounted for 40 percent of its GDP, the state would fall into a state of economic crisis. Oman will be

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challenged to use its increased oil revenues to expand its newly developing light industry and agriculture. This will cushion the blow that Oman will receive when its reserves are depleted. Oman’s supply of natural gas reserves and its manufacturing of petrochemicals is another key aspect of economic diversification. It helps ensure that Oman can remain a key energy provider for the world and use its other natural resources wisely toward diversification and development. • Demographic Time Bomb: The disproportionate amount of young people in Oman could destabilize the state in two ways. The first is that the demand for work could be so high that unemployment rates would skyrocket. The second is that the young people could demand serious political reforms of the aging Sultan Qabus or his successor. It is not unlikely that both these scenarios could come true, and Oman would face a large number of unemployed young people who join the cause of political activism simply because they have nothing else to occupy their time. • Succession Issues: Whoever succeeds Sultan Qabus will inherit a state in economic and demographic flux. But as noted earlier, the succession process is seen by many as one of the greatest uncertainties in Oman’s future. The importance of the succession is not only a political matter, it is of internal security, economic, and regional strategic significance. Oman’s stability will largely depend on Qabus’s ability to reassure the Oman public as well as Oman’s allies and neighbors. The argument that he has chosen a successor that will not be announced until his death does not reassure either foreign investment or domestic confidence in Oman’s political system. • Counterterrorism: Oman has not experienced any major terrorist attacks. The U.S. and British military presence at Omani ports, however, makes Oman a target for suicide boat attacks and increased backlash against the government for hosting U.S. forces. The Omani Navy and Coast Guard are wary of attacks that could hurt traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, and they have agreed to work with the U.S. and British navies to secure this chokepoint. Oman has also proposed information exchanges within the GCC and is vigilant against terror cells laundering money in Omani banks. In the past decade, the Sultan’s Royal Guard and paramilitary have proven capable of arresting militants within the Sultanate (the 1994 arrests), but it is unknown how many radicals exist within Oman’s small Shi’ite and Sunni minorities.

Balancing Internal Security and Conventional Military Needs So far, Oman has emphasized military security over internal security forces. According to Figures 4.1 through 4.9, during the past 16 years, Oman has chosen to strengthen its conventional and Royal Guard forces in both numbers and equipment. On the other hand, its paramilitary forces increased only slightly, and some of their equipment was never updated or replaced. This choice may have been based as much on prestige as deterrence. Oman does not face serious conventional enemies as long as it maintains ties to Britain and the United States, and its military has not been directly challenged since the Dhofar Rebellion. Its Royal and conventional forces, however, are seen as a model of efficiency throughout the Gulf, and this source of national pride may be enough to justify their expenditures.78

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Oman differs from most other Gulf States, however, in the nature of the interaction between its internal security forces, its royal guards, and its conventional services. All deal with both internal and external threats. The ‘‘jointness’’ between its internal and external security services is at a better level than in other Gulf States. In any case, internal stability depends on far more than security operations. In the case of Oman—as in the case of all other Gulf States—internal economic, social, and especially political reforms are as important as any counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and internal intelligence capability. Oman must deal with the ‘‘youth explosion,’’ continue its Omanization plans, diversify its economy, rebuild its aging infrastructure, and find a balance between its alliances with the West and its population demand for severing those ties due to anger over the Palestinian-Israeli issue, Iraq, and terrorism.

5

Qatar

Qatar may be a small country, with a total population of only 863,000 in mid-2005, and territory of only 11,437 square kilometers, but it has a strategic location in the southern Gulf. As Map 5.1 shows, Qatar is a peninsula in the middle of the southern Gulf that shares a 60-kilometer border with Saudi Arabia and is directly opposite Iran. Qatar has been ruled by the Al Thani family since the mid-1800s. Its current ruler, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, gained power when he overthrew his father, when, as Crown Prince, he ousted his father, Emir Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani, in a bloodless coup on June 27, 1995. While Qatar is a monarchy, it has held municipal elections and is converting its appointed Majlis as-Shura to a body that will be elected. While Iran is the primary potential threat to Qatar, and Qatar shares a massive offshore natural gas formation with Iran, there have been no serious recent tensions between the two countries. Qatar’s main entanglements have instead been with other southern Gulf States. Qatar accused several of its southern Gulf neighbors of supporting a failed coup attempt by the present Emir’s father, who tried to return to power in 1996. Qatar had a long-standing border dispute with Bahrain that was resolved in 2001. And Qatar had several clashes with Saudi Arabia before the two countries finally agreed on a border settlement in 2001. Qatar makes no pretense to be a major Gulf military power, but maintains just enough forces to provide minimal border defense against Saudi Arabia and some deterrent to Iran. Qatar’s military forces have only a total of 12,400 men, plus reserves. Qatar derives its security primarily from the fact that it is the site of the main U.S. air base and headquarters in the Gulf and of the equipment for one U.S. prepositioned brigade. The country also hosts about 6,540 U.S. personnel. For all intents and purposes, Qatar is under de facto U.S. protection.

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Map 5.1 Qatar

MILITARY SPENDING AND ARMS IMPORTS In spite of its small forces, Qatar has comparatively large defense expenditures. Its spending averaged well over $1 billion a year during the mid to late 1990s and rose to $2 billion a year in the early 2000s.1 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimates that Qatar spent $1.2 billion in 2000, $1.3 billion in 2001, $1.9 billion in 2002, $1.92 billion in 2003, $2.06 billion in 2004, and $2.91 billion in 2005. If the IISS estimates are correct, Qatar spends a great deal on military forces for such a small power. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment asserted that ‘‘between 2000– 2004, Qatar allocated an average of 32.5 percent of its current expenditure to defense and security, the third highest in the Arab world after Oman and Bahrain.’’2 Qatar is, however, a wealthy oil and gas power. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates that earnings from these sources accounted for more than 60 percent

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of its $22.47 billion gross domestic product (GDP) in 2005 and that they were roughly 85 percent of export earnings and 70 percent of government revenues.3 They gave Qatar exports worth $29.4 billion vs. imports of $6.7 billion. Government revenues were $17.1 billion vs. expenditures of $11.3 billion.4 Oil and gas have also given Qatar a per capita GDP of $26,000—about 80 percent of that of the leading western European industrial countries. The CIA also estimates that Qatar’s proven oil reserves of 16 billion barrels will allow output at current levels for another 23 years. The CIA also estimates that its proven natural gas reserves exceed 14 trillion cubic meters, more than 5 percent of the world total and the third largest in the world. Qatar has never been a major arms importer by Gulf standards. Its recent arms imports and new agreements have averaged under $50 million dollars a year in recent years. New arms agreements totaled less than $50 million during 1997–2000, and less than $50 million during 2001–2004. Arms deliveries totaled $1.8 billion during 1997–2000, and less than $50 million during 2001–2004.5 They did, however, reach much higher levels during peak years in the 1990s: $1.4 billion in 1992, $1.3 billion in 1994, $625 million in 1997, and $1.0 billion in 1998.6 Jane’s Defence Weekly described Qatar’s procurement program as follows in 2005:7 Qatar’s big-ticket procurement programme has been largely in abeyance for some time. Giat has been trying to sell Qatar 30 Leclerc MBTs for some time but financial problems have apparently blocked that effort. The air force is looking for 20 multirole helicopters to replace its ageing Westland Commandos. Bell Helicopter and AgustaWestland are offering the AB139, while Sikorsky is pushing the UH-60L Black Hawk. Eurocopter is also in the running, reportedly with the EC 725.

Qatar’s main foreign supplier is France, which has provided some 80 percent of the country’s military requirements,8 although the country has deepened ties with both the United Kingdom and the United States. The United Kingdom is trying to secure a contract for supplying Hawk training/fighter aircraft and has already supplied the Qatari Army with Piranha armored personnel carriers (APCs) and the navy with ‘‘Vita’’ fast patrol craft. Its company, Vickers, is also thought to want to sell the Challenger II main battle tanks (MBTs) to replace the aging AMX-30s. The United States, meanwhile, has sought to sell Qatar F-16s and the Patriot air defense system.9 MILITARY MANPOWER Qatar’s armed forces are organized into three branches: Qatari Emiri Land Force, Qatari Emiri Navy, and Qatari Emiri Air Force. Like most southern Gulf States, high command is held by members of the royal family and their supporters. Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani also holds the positions of Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Brigadier General Hamad bin Ali alAttiyah is Chief of General Staff, Colonel Saif Ali al-Hajiri is Commander of Ground Forces, and General Ali Said al-Hawal al-Marri is Commander of the Air Force.10

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Qatar had a total military age manpower pool only of 238,566 in 2005, including foreigners (fit males, ages 18–49). At least 70 percent of this pool is non-Qatari, and large elements are non-Arab. The CIA estimates that the total population is Arab, 40 percent; Pakistani, 18 percent; Indian, 18 percent; Iranian, 10 percent; and other, 14 percent. Only about 7,800 native Qatari males a year reach 18 years of age. Under these conditions, it is not surprising that most enlisted personnel are largely nonprofessional foreign nationals (2005).11 Total military manpower has never significantly exceeded 12,000 and has varied by year according to Qatar’s policy in accepting foreign enlistments. Manning levels were as low as 8,000 in the early 1990s, but rose to today’s levels by 1999.

THE QATARI ARMY The Qatari Army has only 8,500 personnel and Qatar’s entire army is a fraction of other Gulf armies. The majority of its forces are located at the North Camp and Barzan Camp military areas. In 2006, its force structure consisted of a tank battalion, four mechanized infantry battalions, a Special Forces company, a field artillery regiment, a mortar battalion, an antitank battalion, and a Royal Guard regiment divided into three subunits. These formations are very small. Figure 5.1 provides a detailed analysis of the trends in the army’s manpower, force structure, and equipment from 1990 to 2006. Present equipment holdings are small and of limited quality. Qatar has 30 obsolescent AMX-30 MBTs and 40 AMX-10P armored infantry fighting vehicles. Its reconnaissance forces are composed of 16 VBLs, 12 AMX-10RCs, 8 V-150 Chaimites, 20 EE-9 Cascavels, and 12 obsolete Ferrets. It has 36 Piranha light armored vehicles, as well as 160 VABs and 30 training AMX-VCI APCs. The IISS Military Balance estimated that Qatar has 48 HOT antitank missiles (24 on VABs), while Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment puts that figure at 40; the IISS Military Balance reports that Qatar has 40 84-mm Carl Gustav recoilless rifles, with Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment offering no number estimate for these rifles. Both sources agree that Qatar has 100 Milan antitank guided weapons. Land-based air defense weapons are under the operational control of the air force. Qatar’s artillery force consists of 28 self-propelled 155-mm Mk F3, 12 towed G-5 155 mm, 4 ASTROS II multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), 30 81-mm L16 mortars (MOR) (some on vehicles), and 15 120-mm Brandts. Qatar has improved its force strength over the years. It added a mechanized infantry battalion and a mortar battalion in the 1990s. Between 2000 and 2005, Qatar added an antitank battalion. The number of Qatari tanks rose from 24 in 1990 to 44 in 2000, but then dropped to 30 in 2006. The armored infantry fighting vehicle (AIFV) fleet also increased, though the additions took place in the 1990s. The armored reconnaissance vehicle fleet also rose from 10 in 1990 to 68 in 2006, due to the addition of AMX-10RCs, EE-9 Cascavels, V-150 Chaimites, and VBLs; most of the AFVs are post-1990. Its artillery force also increased after 1990, going

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Figure 5.1 Qatari Army’s Force Structure, 1990–2006*

Manpower Active Reserve

1990

2000

2005

2006

6,000

8,500

8,500

8,500

6,000

8,500

8,500

8,500

0

0

0

0

5

7

8

8

Mechanized Infantry Battalion

3

4

4

4

Special Forces Company

1

1

1

1

Tank Battalion

1

1

1

1

Mortar Battalion

0

1

1

1

Antitank Battalion

0

0

1

1

Combat Units (Regiments)

2

2

2

2

Fortified Artillery Regiment

1

1

1

1

Royal Guard Regiment

1

1

1

1

24

44

30

30

Combat Units (Battalions)

Main Battle Tanks AMX-30 Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles AMX-10P Reconnaissance

24

44

30

30

30

40

40

40

30

40

40

40

10

36

68

68

AMX-10RC

0

12

12

12

EE-9 Cascavel

0

0

20

20

(10)

0

12

12

Ferret V-150 Chaimite

0

8

8

8

VBL

0

16

16

16

168

208

226

226

0

12

30

30

Armored Personnel Carriers AMX-VCI VAB

160

160

160

160

LAV Piranha II

0

36

36

36

V-150 Commando

8

0

0

0

14

83

89

89

Artillery TOWED 88-mm 25 pdr

8

0

0

0

TOWED 155-mm G-5

0

12

12

12

SP 155-mm Mk F3

6

28

28

28

MRL ASTROS II

0

4

4

4

150


81-mm MOR L16

?†

24

30

30

120-mm Brandt

0

15

15

15

Antitank Weapons

100+‡

100+

188

188

HOT MSL

?

?

48

48

Milan MSL

100

100

100

100

?

?

40

40

84-mm RCL Carl Gustav

Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment often offers a different estimate—these differences are shown in the text. † All ‘‘?’’ refer to weapons that Qatar is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in its possession are unknown. ‡ ‘‘+’’ indicates the numbers listed may be slightly less than the actual units or weapons in stock. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

*

from 14 in 1990 to 89 in 2006. Qatar has also expanded its antitank arsenal to 188 in 2006 from 100+ in 1990. Qatari training and readiness are good for such a small force, but the army is capable of operating largely at the battalion level, with limited combined arms capability and negligible capability for maneuver warfare and combined arms. It also has so many types of major weapons that it presents support and sustenance problems, even when based near its peacetime casernes. The Qatari Army can project small forces and played a small role in the Gulf War. It is, however, incapable of engaging any significant Iranian, Saudi, or other regional land force. THE QATARI AIR FORCE Qatar’s Air Force had 2,100 personnel in 2006. Qatar based its air force squadrons at Al-Udeid Air Base, though operations were also conducted from Doha International Airport. Figure 5.2 shows the structure of the Qatari Air Force in 2006. The air force had one squadron with 9 M-2000ED Mirages, one squadron with 3 M-2000D Mirages, and one squadron with 6 Alpha Jets.12 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, however, described Qatar’s Air Force structure as follows: ‘‘1 Fighter Wing has two squadrons, 7 (Air Superiority) Squadron with Mirage 2000-5 fighters used in interdiction and ground attack roles and 11 (Close Support) Squadron deploying Alpha Jet in an attack role.’’13 Qatar has reportedly signed a deal to sell India its 12 Mirage 2000-5 multirole aircraft. According to reports, Qatar may buy F-16s, though no deal has been announced yet.14 Qatar has French Magic R-550s and some MICA air-to-air missiles. It also can load its fixed-wing combat aircraft with AM-39 Exocet antiship missiles. Qatar’s helicopter fleet consists of 10–11 SA342L Gazelles with HOT air-tosurface missiles and 8 Commando Mark 3s armed with Exocet AM-39 antiship missiles.15 Two of these helicopters have been fitted for Exocet AM-38.16

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Figure 5.2 Qatari Air Force’s Force Structure, 1990–2006


1990

2000

2005

2006

800

2,100

2,100

2,100

800

2,100

2,100

2,100

0

0

0

0

12

12

12

12

M-2000D Mirage

1

3

3

3

M-2000ED Mirage

11

9

9

9

Training Craft

6

6

6

6

Alpha Jet 1E

6

6

6

6

3

6

6

6

Airbus-340

0

1

1

1

Boeing-707

2

2

2

2

Boeing-727

1

1

1

1

Falcon 900

0

2

2

2

Helicopters

26

23

23

25

ASUW Commando MK 3 with Exocet

8

8

8

8

ATK SA-342L Gazelle with HOT

12

11

11

11

SPT Commando MK 2A

3

3

3

3

SPT Commando MK 2C VIP

1

1

1

1

SPT SA-341 Gazelle

2

?

?

2


Transport


There are no advanced sensor, battle management, reconnaissance, and maritime surveillance aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles. Qatar’s transport fleet consists of two B-707s, one B-727, two Falcon 900s, and one Airbus-340. The Qatari Emiri Flight, which is geared to VIP transport, operates four Airbus aircraft in civilian markings.17 Qatar’s Air Force also has three Commando MK-2As, one Commando MK 2C, and two SA-341 Gazelle support helicopters, which are classified as training helicopters. The air force structure has remained relatively constant since 1990, with small changes in the transport (from 3 in 1990 to 6 in 2006) and the helicopter fleet (from 26 in 1990 to 25 in 2006). The air force’s small air units have low to moderate readiness, with reasonable to good pilot training for basic missions. The air force must rely on foreign support for most ground activities.

152


Figure 5.3 Qatari Air Defense’s Force Structure, 1990–2006 1990

2000

2005

2006

30

65

75

75

Mistral

0

24

24

24

Roland II

6

9

9

9

Blowpipe

0

0

10

10

FIM-92A Stinger

12

12

12

12

SA-7 Grail

0

20

20

20

Rapier

12

0

0

0

Surface-to-Air Missiles


QATAR AIR DEFENSE Battlefield and tactical air defense is undertaken by army personnel, but is under the operational control of the air force.18 Figure 5.3 shows the equipment holding in Qatari land-based air defenses. Qatar has no medium or major surface-to-air missiles or advanced air defense ground environment assets. In 2006, it had a total of 75 lighter surface-to-air missile fire units, including 24 Mistrals, 9 Roland IIs, 10 Blowpipes, 12 FIM-92A Stingers, and 20 SA-7 Grails. A significant number of these systems, particularly the MANPADS, may have limited or no operational capability. Qatar has made some additions to its air defense posture since 1990, although Qatar’s overall force structure has not changed during the last decade or so. Most increases in its air defense systems, however, came in the 1990s, as the total weapons went from 30 in 1990 to 65 in 2000, then increasing to 75 in 2006. Between 1990 and 2006, Qatar added 20 SA-7 Grails, 10 Blowpipes, 3 Roland IIs, and 24 Mistrals, but lost/decommissioned 12 Rapiers. THE QATARI NAVY Qatar has a small 1,800-man navy, including its marine police force and coastal defense artillery. Since 1990, the Qatari Navy has increased its manpower from 700 in 1990 to 1,800 in 2006. It has added some patrol and coastal combatants, though the overall force posture has remained relatively stable with a reduction in PFM from 9 in 1990 to 7 in 2006. The navy is headquartered at Doha and has a base at Halul Island. Given that Qatar has only a small land border with Saudi Arabia, the rest of the country is surrounded by sea, and Qatar depends on energy exports by ship, the Qatari Navy plays an important role in the country’s defense. Much of the sea around the coast is unnavigable or uncharted, however, complicating the deployment of the country’s naval forces.19

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Figure 5.4 Qatari Navy’s Force Structure, 1990–2006


1990

2000

2005

2006

700

1,730

1,800

1,800

700

1,730

1,800

1,800

0

0

0

0

9

7

7

7

Barzan with Exocet SAM

6

4

4

4

Damash

3

3

PFM

Patrol and Coastal Combatants Misc. and Small Craft Amphibious LCT Coastal Defense MM-40 SSM bty with 3 quad

3

3

0

40+

*

20+

20+

0

40+

20+

20+

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

‘‘+’’ indicates the numbers listed may be slightly less than the actual units or weapons in stock. Source: IISS, Military Balance,, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

Figure 5.4 shows the trends in Qatar’s naval manning, force structure, and major weapons. In 2006, it included three 396-ton Damash-class (Combattante III) missile patrol boats. Each is equipped with eight MM-40 missiles and one 76-mm gun. The vessels were delivered in the early 1980s, but were refitted in 1997–1998. All are operational. The Qatari Navy also had four relatively modern and capable 376-ton Barzanclass (British Vita) vessels. Each is equipped with eight Exocet MM-40s, a 76-mm gun, a six-round Matral Sandral launcher carrying Mistral surface-to-air missiles, and four torpedo tubes. They have modern electronics and radars and were delivered in the mid-1990s. These ships are operational, but some sources indicate that Qatar is still training some crew and bringing its crews to full readiness. The navy recently purchased four DV 15 fast interceptor craft, armed with machine guns, from a French shipbuilder.20 Qatar has 20+ small craft, which are operated by the marine police. These forces include 6 Damen Polycat 1450s (of which at least one is reported nonoperational), 15 Fairey Marine Spear coastal patrol craft, and one Rabha landing craft tank.21 Its coastal defense forces have four batteries with three quad Exocet MM-40 missile launchers. These are small forces with limited readiness for naval combat, but are suitable for patrol, antismuggling, and antiterrorism missions. Like the other services, the Qatari Navy benefits from U.S. basing on Qatari soil and implicit U.S. security guarantees.

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PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES Like the other Gulf States, Qatar faces a challenge from Islamist extremists and terrorists, although terrorist activity has so far been relatively limited. It also faces problems with tribal elements and at least some Qataris who oppose Qatar’s relatively progressive moves toward reform. Qatar is a Wahhabi country and even some members of the royal family feel that Qatar is moving away from its Islamic roots. The Qatari police force is estimated at about 8,000-strong with its headquarters in Doha and territorial commands around the country and is under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. There is also a secret police force charged with espionage and sedition, while the army’s intelligence is charged with terrorism and surveillance of political dissidents.22 There are three Special Force–type units under army command: Oil Well Guard Units, located in the Dukhan and Umm Bab areas, are charged with securing pipelines; a Border Guards Regiment is deployed to protect the borders; and a Static Guard Regiment is stationed throughout the country. Each of these units is at company strength (between 300 and 400 personnel).23 The Qatari police also operate three Halmatic M160s, four Crestitalia MV-45s, and three Watercraft P1200s. As is discussed shortly, a series of terrorist attacks in March 2005 led Qatar to tighten its security at the border and at key installations. It has passed a law according to which all nationals and expatriates will be required to have national identification cards.24 Qatar is also cooperating with other countries to develop crisis management, civil defense, and crowd-control capabilities for the Asian Games in 2006. The country’s tourism infrastructure will also be the first in the world to be developed with post–September 11, 2001, counterterrorist features incorporated at the design level.25

CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES Qatar is a country of opposites—it is home to Al-Jazeera and to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); its population is conservative, while its leaders are some of the most modernizing in the region; it has close ties to Israel, while acting as a safe haven for religious extremists deemed too radical and expelled from other Middle Eastern countries; it exerts soft power through Al-Jazeera, but receives the virility of the neighborly governments that Al-Jazeera criticizes. Qatar has outsourced its defense to the United States, counting on CENTCOM to provide de facto protection against external predators. But Qatar’s position remains precarious because its strategy depends on the careful balancing of many competing forces—religious extremism, the West, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Iran, and its own population. Qatar’s future trajectory is a function of how well it manages to chart its own course without allowing any of these forces to get in the way. How well Qatar can maintain these contradictions without any of them getting beyond control, however, remains an outstanding uncertainty.

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Qatar, the GCC, and the Broader Middle East Relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar are strained. This is attributable to ‘‘the alleged anti-Riyadh stance of the Qatari Al-Jazeera TV channel, the growing Qatari role as a US ally, the expulsion of thousands of Qatari tribesmen of Saudi origin over the past two years [from Qatar] and Qatar’s growing anger at Saudi Arabia’s hegemony and domination in the GCC.’’26 This deterioration in relations has been manifested in several ways: Saudi Arabia blocked a proposed $2-billion 600-kilometer natural gas pipeline running from Qatar’s North Field to Mina Al Ahmadi in Kuwait. The pipeline would be built in international waters off the coast of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, but the approval of these two countries would be required given the proximity to their shores.27 In July 2005, Saudi Arabia also rejected the building of a causeway between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates: ‘‘A few days after a GCC summit in December 2004, the UAE and Qatar unveiled plans to construct the world’s longest causeway that will link their capitals and save travelers from having to take a risky 125 km drive through Saudi territory.’’28 Prince Nayef, Saudi Minister of Interior, said, ‘‘regarding the bridge, Saudi Arabia had to deliver a protest note to the governments of Qatar and the UAE because this is not acceptable, as this bridge would pass through Saudi territorial waters.’’29 In late 2005 the GCC decided to abolish its joint military unit, Dir’ Al-Jazeera or Peninsula Shield, 20 years after it was created.30 The main reason cited for this action was the growing rift between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as well as the reality that the force had not proven as effective as was initially hoped. Many in the region believe that dismantling the force was a Saudi initiative that was based on the Saudi view that the other Gulf States were not contributing to the forces and that it was largely a Saudi operation, which the Kingdom could do on its own. Qatar has also had territorial disputes with other Gulf States. The most noticeable one was the dispute with Bahrain over the Hawar Islands and several other territories. These islands are located west of the Qatari coast, but they have been controlled by Bahrain. The dispute is not new—it is, in fact, 200 years old—but this came to the surface in 1986 when the two nations nearly went to war. Qatar then submitted this dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. In March 2001, the ICJ ruled against Qatar and awarded the control of the Hawar Islands to Bahrain, while ruling in favor of Qatar for another disputed area. People who see Qatar as having tried to provoke ‘‘generational’’ quarrels with its GCC neighbors have argued that the worsening of relations between Qatar and the GCC is threatening to substantially weaken the GCC as an effective forum,31 particularly given the threat the six members face from Iran, instability in Iraq, and the ongoing struggle against terrorism. Qatar, Iran, and the North Field Qatar’s economic development plans center around natural gas exports. Qatar has proven reserves of 910 trillion cubic feet (Tcf ) natural gas resources, ranking

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third in size behind Russia and Iran. Almost all of Qatar’s natural gas, however, is located in the offshore North Field, which is the largest known nonassociated natural gas field in the world. Qatar’s onshore Dukhan field contains only an estimated 5 Tcf of associated and 0.5 Tcf of nonassociated gas. The gas reserves in the Id al-Shargi, Maydan Mahzam, Bul Hanine, and al-Rayyan offshore oil fields are relatively small.32 Qatar now plans to develop the North Field to provide major additional trains for exporting natural gas liquids, pipeline gas to other southern Gulf States, and gas to liquids. The North Field, however, is connected to an Iranian gas formation, and the two countries share what is to some extent a common resource. Qatari and Iranian claims have never been fully resolved and potential tensions exist between Qatar and Iran: ‘‘in 2004, Iran warned Qatar to slow down its exploration of the North Field and South Pars gas reserves that the two countries share or Iran would ‘find other ways and means of resolving the issue.’’’33 Although there has not been outright hostility between the two countries, and Qatar is closer to Iran than the other GCC states are, the potential for conflict is ever present. Qatar’s Uncertain Domestic Environment In June 1995, Sheikh Hamad orchestrated a coup against his father, Sheikh Khalifah, and became Emir of Qatar. The agenda Sheikh Hamad has pursued is modernizing, trying to open up Qatar’s politics, diversify its economy, and chart an independent foreign policy. Here is how Emir Hamad summarized, in 2000, the challenges facing Qatar: ‘‘We have simply got to reform ourselves. We’re living in a modern age. People log on to the Internet. They watch cable TV. You cannot isolate yourself in today’s world. And our reforms are progressing well. In a tribal country like Qatar, however, it could take time for everyone to accept what we’ve done. But change, more change, is coming.’’34 The reforms that Sheikh Hamad has undertaken are multifaceted. The local elections in 1999 were the first in the GCC to allow women to run for office or to vote. Sheikh Hamad put forth a draft constitution that called for the establishment of a 45-member unicameral Parliament (Majlis al-Shura) in July 2002, and 96.6 percent of the voters approved it in a referendum in April 2003. The new constitution provides for freedom of expression, freedom of religious practice, and freedom of association. The first elections for the Majlis al-Shura are expected in 2006.35 In August 2003, Sheikh Hamad also clarified the line of succession, appointing his fourth son Sheikh Tamim as heir apparent. The Emir’s third son, Sheikh Jasim, apparently resigned his position, though it is possible that Sheikh Hamad replaced him because he was not satisfied with his performance.36 Sheikh Hamad has spoken out on the need for other Arab governments to introduce reform in their countries. In a July 2005 visit to Italy, he stated that corruption, lack of vision, and the absence of democracy were causing underdevelopment and violence in the Arab world; he also stressed that Arab leaders should not blame Israel for their problems. In August 2005, Qatar established a Human Rights Department,

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in part to quell criticism about human trafficking in the country, but also to support its reform program.37 Qatar’s boldest move was to found and host Al-Jazeera. The television channel started broadcasting in 1996, after an alliance between Saudi Arabia and the BBC collapsed and freed a large number of journalists—Sheikh Hamad took them in and gave them money to start Al-Jazeera. The lack of editorial censorship, which is otherwise prevalent in the region, has made Al-Jazeera a vocal opponent of Middle Eastern governments, while stopping short of criticizing the Qatari government, which finances Al-Jazeera. By 2000, all of the Arab League member states, save Lebanon, had issued protests against Al-Jazeera’s programming or panelists. Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco even withdrew their ambassadors from Doha.38 Saudi Arabia has constantly expressed its displeasure with Al-Jazeera, primarily because the Kingdom is a frequent target of the station’s journalism. There is an unofficial but total ban on Saudi advertising on the channel, a great financial impediment given that Saudi Arabia accounts for four-fifths of the Arab advertising budget.39 In 2005, Saudi Arabia refused entry to more than 1,250 Al-Jazeera employees to travel to Mecca for the Hajj.40 The greatest unknown for Qatar is whether the population will accept the Emir’s modernization program. Jane’s Intelligence Review summarized this dilemma as follows in November 2005:41 Although Qatar is generally a tolerant, multicultural society, the rapid advance of religious freedom has caused dissent among Islamic conservatives as construction has begun on Qatar’s first Christian, Hindu, Buddhist and Bahai churches. Qatar’s annual interfaith conference brushed up against a ‘‘red line’’ when its organisers suggested the inclusion of Jewish participants at future conference sessions. Political reform has also led to disagreements between conservatives and modernisers. The Commission for the Constitutional Draft continues to clash over the question of whether Sharia law would be the sole source of jurisprudence in Qatar’s new constitution. Conservative Islamists are periodically imprisoned for their opposition to reform efforts.

Sheikh Hamad withstood a coup attempt in 1996 and one again in October 2002.42 In general, the Emir is perceived as popular with the people, who have seen their standard of living increase dramatically during his reign. GDP has doubled between 1999 and 2004, and per capita GDP is estimated at more than $43,000 in 2005, the highest in the Arab world and one of the highest in the region. Qatar and Terrorism Qatar offers potent targets for terrorist attack. It has about 18,000 Western expatriates, many of whom are employed in the country’s natural gas sector. While the physical infrastructure of natural gas may be hard to hit because it is narrowly concentrated, the foreign labor on which it depends is an easier target.43 The country’s nonenergy investment plans also depend on a stable security environment. Sheikh Mohammed bin Ahmad Al Thani, the Minister of Trade and

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Finance, announced the holding of a conference in April 2006 meant to attract $130 billion in investment over five years: ‘‘the new investment plan is believed to allocate $80 billion for the gas sector, $20 billion for tourism, $10 billion for infrastructure and $10 billion in property projects, according to officials in Doha.’’44 These plans make both the attraction as well as the impact of a terrorist attack that much greater. The clerical establishment is relatively moderate, and officials and intellectuals have often spoken out against certain extreme actions committed by insurgents in Iraq—for example, kidnappings, civilian bombings, and attacks on churches.45 After September 11, 2001, Emir Hamad tried to minimize the influence of religious extremists in his government, including his sons. It has been reported that the Emir of Qatar has removed two of his sons, Sheikh Fahad bin Hamad and Sheikh Jassim bin Hamad, from the position of Crown Prince out of fear of their affiliation with Arab Afghan veterans.46 Despite these efforts, Qatar has, however, acted as a safe haven for religious extremists expelled by other countries. For example, Qatar hosts the radical Egyptian cleric Yousef al-Qaradhawi.47 Traditionally, Qatar has harbored religious fugitives from Saudi Arabia, a trend accentuated after the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. In the past, it has also been accused of hosting neo-Salafi militants with ties to Al Qa’ida. According to Jane’s,48 In addition to fugitives from many Palestinian, Algerian and Sudanese factions, Qatar hosted increasing numbers of individuals who would later be linked to Al-Qaeda.. . . Although Qatar sent almost none of its own sons to fight in Afghanistan in the 1980s, it was a crossroads for militant leaders and a critical fundraising node for many Arab, Afghan and Pakistani terrorist entrepreneurs such as Al-Qaeda operatives Ayman alZawahiri and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Numerous reports suggest the use of Qatar as a waypoint for senior Salafist terrorists transiting to or from Afghanistan, utilising the homes of Qatari notables as safehouses. Conservative Qataris also provided a haven for the Taliban consul to Abu Dhabi and his family during Operation ‘‘Enduring Freedom.’’

The wave of extremist militant Islamism that has rippled through the Arab World has not spared Qatar. In November 2001, a man who was later identified as belonging to the Qatari military, Abdullah Mubarak Tashal al-Hajiri, fired an assault rifle at the Al Udeid Air Base; he later shot and wounded two U.S. contractors near the base. In February 2002, an unnamed attacker rammed the main gate at the Al Udeid Air Base, though he did not penetrate the facility and was stopped and killed in the attack. In October 2002, a Saudi citizen who wanted to hijack a plane headed to Jeddah was stopped in Khartoum; the investigations showed he intended to crash the plane on the Al Udeid Air Base.49 Qatar experienced its first major attack in March 19, 2005, when a suicide bomber, Omar Ahmed Abdallah, used an improvised explosive device to destroy the Doha Players Theatre. Although only one person was killed and a dozen were injured, the attack could have caused more deaths had the device been detonated at

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a more opportune time. Omar Ahmed Abdallah was an Egyptian who found shelter in Qatar after not being permitted to return; his two collaborators were also expatriates. This reality underscores the potential danger from radicals to whom the Qatari government has chosen to offer safe haven.50 The attack was condemned in Qatar in a demonstration attended by 5,000 people including Emir Hamad, his sons, and the influential Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, who condemned the suicide bombing. At the same time, the attack underscores the potential for disruption that the terrorists pose to Qatar. The Youth Explosion and the Radicalization of Qatar’s Youth The country’s demographics could pose another problem. As is the case with most countries in the Middle East and North Africa, Qatar faces a demographic time bomb. In 2005, Qatar’s population was estimated to be 810,000 people. This is estimated to grow to 1.4 million in 2020, 1.26 million in 2040, and 1.33 million in 2050. This means that Qatar’s population is estimated to grow at 64 percent in the next four decades.51 It is equally important, however, to note that Qatar is facing a youth explosion— albeit at a lesser extent than the other Gulf States. It is estimated that the Qatari population’s median age in 2005 was 30.9 and is estimated to reach 40.4 by 2050.52 The importance of this goes to the heart of internal stability. Qatar is estimated to have a 2.7-percent ‘‘direct’’ unemployment rate,53 but many of its jobs can be considered ‘‘disguised’’ unemployment that can reach 15.0 percent.54 Qatar’s total labor force is estimated at 140,000, which is growing by an estimated 6,471 people every year. Most of this labor force is foreign, and this adds another element of uncertainty and risk for Qatar’s internal stability. Estimates of the composition of Qatar’s population do, however, differ. For example, in 2005, Jane’s estimated that Qatar’s indigenous population was approximately 150,000 (17 percent);55 the IISS Military Balance estimated the number of nationals at 250,000 (29 percent).56 It is estimated that 40 percent of Qatar’s population are Qatari or other Arabs, 18 percent are Indians, 18 percent are Pakistanis, and 10 percent are Iranians.57 Regardless of the source, it is clear that the vast majority of the population are non-nationals with diverse religious and ethnic backgrounds. While diversity may be desirable, it remains uncertain whether Qatar’s social cohesion can be impacted by this composition. Qatar’s efforts to reduce the foreign population have been only partly successful, as the private sector continues to rely on expatriate labor, which is largely low skilled. These demographics are not entirely encouraging, although the country’s fastpaced economic growth has prevented, up to now, the emergence of any domestic challenges. In addition to the economic challenge, Qatar’s reliance on foreign labor presents a security risk. While its foreign workers have not yet presented a security challenge to Qatar’s internal security apparatus, a concerted terrorist campaign that threatened Qatar’s most important sectors, oil and gas, where most of the foreign labor work, could drive many of these workers to flee the country.

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The demographic dynamics also present a problem in dealing with its own population. In addition to the unemployment problem Qatar may face due to its reliance on foreign labor and its high population growth, Qatar is experiencing a youth explosion. As shown in Figure 5.5, nearly half of Qatar’s population is under the age of 30. In the next two decades, this population will enter the job market, and Qatar’s economy will have to deal with such a large influx of job applicants. This presents a risk of radicalization. As is the case with the other Gulf States, Qatar has been a welfare state. Its population expects jobs, free heath care, and free education. Given the lack of economic diversification in its economy, Qatar may face an unemployment problem. While its oil/gas wealth may provide for its small population, the overall trend in its demographics is one area where radical groups can exploit given the regional dynamics in Iraq, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the overall struggle against extremism. In addition, there are many elements in Qatar’s domestic and foreign policy that many believe might drive some of Qatar’s youth to become a target of recruitment by terrorist organizations such as Al Qa’ida. These forces include the following: • The presence of the U.S. military on Qatari soil: One of the key complaints that Osama bin Laden had against Saudi Arabia was the existence of U.S. forces in the Arabian Peninsula. Qatar now houses the United States Central Command at its Al Udeid Air Base, which was built at the cost of $1.0 billion. The United States conducted its air campaign for the Afghan and the Iraq War from Qatar. It is important, however, to note that unlike other Gulf States, Qatar does not hide the fact that CENTCOM is based in Doha, partly to send a message to its more powerful neighbors. While Qatar’s close association with the United States may protect her from conventional threats from Iran or Saudi Arabia, it may force extremist organizations to target Qatar for its association with the United States. As noted earlier, it is important, however, to note that Qatar’s internal security forces are largely untested. It remains

Figure 5.5 Qatar’s Demographic Distribution, 2006

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uncertain how well its paramilitary and intelligence forces can handle a concerted effort and a recruitment campaign by groups such as Al Qa’ida. • The Israeli-Palestinian conflict: As mentioned in an earlier chapter, the Arab-Israeli conflict remains a key determinant of regional attitudes toward the West and the people-government relations, particularly those governments that are considered allies of the United States. In addition to the general regional attitudes, Qatar has made steps toward ‘‘normalizing’’ diplomatic as well as commercial relations with Israel. Qatar has maintained a low-profile Israeli Consulate in Qatar, hosted Michael Melchior, Israel’s Deputy Minister of Education, in February 2005, and asked Israel to support Qatar’s candidacy for a rotating seat on the UN Security Council.58 These moves have angered many in the region, who consider Qatar’s move as undermining the Arab Peace initiative of 2002. While there are no reliable polls showing how the Qatari population thinks about its government’s policies toward the Palestinians, such moves may turn many in Qatar against the government—even in a violent way. • The Iraq War and insurgency: The impact of the conflict in Iraq to the Gulf is hard to predict. The ongoing insurgency in Iraq, however, may become a threat to Qatar in three different ways. First, it could spill over to neighboring states and impact domestic stability. Second, the ‘‘foreign fighters’’ component of the insurgency, while limited in percentage compared to the overall insurgency, has a sizable number of fighters from the Gulf States—including Qatar. No one knows the exact number of the precise composition, but Qatar—and the rest of the Gulf—faces the challenge of those fighters when they return home. The return of the Afghan Arabs presented a problem to their home countries; it remains uncertain, however, whether the alumni from the Iraq conflict will assimilate in the population or continue their struggle at home. Finally, the Iraq War is also radicalizing the Arab street. Many associate the U.S. occupation with that of Israel’s occupation of Palestine. Extremists have also attempted to link those conflicts and use this rhetoric as a calling for fighters to join against ‘‘corrupt rulers.’’ This adds one area of risk for which Qatar and the rest of the Gulf States have to plan. • The local religious establishment: Qatar’s religious establishment has been largely silent on Qatar’s domestic and foreign policies. It is equally uncertain how powerful such an establishment is, but, as noted earlier, Qatar has hosted radical clerics that have been expelled by other Arab governments. In addition, they have given a platform to radical religious figures such as Yousef al-Qaradhawi. While Qatar’s establishment has not played a major role in domestic politics, the speed of domestic reforms and Qatar’s regional policies could alienate such an establishment and push it toward extremisms. The Qatari government has taken some steps toward easing the influence of extremism in its government, but it is a key area of uncertainty in the near future.

Even if Qatar’s domestic religious establishment remains supportive of the Emir’s domestic and foreign policies, the possibility exists that radicals in neighboring states may be part of networks that could threaten Qatar. Michael Knights argued in an article in Jane’s Intelligence Review that Qatar may face more challenges from extremists groups in the Gulf and noted the actions and words of the head of Al Qa’ida in Saudi Arabia, Saleh Al-Oufi, before the attacks of March 19, 2005, against the theater in Doha:59

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Circumstantial evidence hints at a wider connection. Days before the attack, Saleh Mohammed Al-Oufi, an operational leader of one terrorist faction in Saudi Arabia, called on ‘‘the brothers of Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and the Emirates, and all the lions of the jihad in the countries neighbouring Iraq’’ to attack whatever targets are available. Al-Oufi’s ordering of the Gulf states is a strange coincidence, apparently intimating advanced notice of action in Qatar. Alternately, the 19 March execution date may have been chosen by a local cell of individuals ‘‘disconnected’’ from the broader jihad simply because it was the second anniversary of the commencement of Operation ‘‘Iraqi Freedom.’’ Aspects of the recent travel history of the attackers (comprising visits to Egypt, and possibly Saudi Arabia or Pakistan) may eventually provide future clues concerning the possibility of outside influence. Although an internet claim was posted by the relatively unknown Tanzim Jund al-Shaam (The Army of the Levant), it was not widely credited due to various unconvincing features of the communique´ and the group’s previous statements. Since the attack, there has been little in open-source literature or in the chatter of regional and Western security personnel to suggest the collapse of a broader network within Qatar or directly attached in Saudi Arabia.

Such relations have angered Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain in addition to other Arab countries. The question, however, remains: What impact will they have on Qatar’s internal stability? The answer to this question largely depends on Qatar’s ability to balance its reform efforts without rattling its long-term internal and regional stability.

6

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia has the largest oil reserves in the world, the largest oil production capacity, and one of the largest gas reserves in the world. However, the importance of Saudi Arabia goes beyond oil. Saudi Arabia dominates the southern Gulf, and the security of the smaller southern Gulf States is in many ways dependent on the security of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is the location of the two holiest places in Islam and the Center of the Pilgrimage. In an era where Islamist extremism and terrorism struggle against modernization and social change for the soul of Islam, Saudi stability and progress affect the future of the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia also has important strategic geography. It is the biggest country in the Gulf and one of the largest in the Middle East; it is shown in Map 6.1. It has a total of 1,960,582 square kilometers compared to Iran’s 1,648,000 square kilometers, and Iraq’s 437,072 square kilometers. Saudi Arabia has borders with every country in the Gulf, except Iran: Iraq, 814 kilometers; Kuwait, 222 kilometers; Oman, 676 kilometers; Qatar, 60 kilometers; United Arab Emirates, 457 kilometers; Yemen, 1,458 kilometers; and Jordan, 744 kilometers.1 Strategically, the Kingdom also has a coastline of 2,640 kilometers with access to the two most important sea-lanes in the Middle East: 1,840 kilometers on the Red Sea and 700 kilometers on the Gulf. Extensive coastlines on the Gulf and the Red Sea provide Saudi Arabia great leverage on shipping of international trade (especially oil and gas), as well as on military ships through the Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, and Bab el-Mandeb. The Saudi armed forces dominate the strength of southern Gulf and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) forces. This makes Saudi military capabilities critical to the security of some 60 percent of the world’s oil reserves and over 35 percent of its gas. It also makes the balance of power in the Gulf a balance of the forces that Saudi Arabia and the GCC states can deploy against the force of Iran, and the power projection forces available from the United States and Britain.

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Map 6.1 Saudi Arabia

In summary, the Kingdom’s strategic importance stems from the following factors: • A leader in the Islamic and Arab worlds: The Kingdom is the custodian of the two most important shrines in Islam, Mecca and Madinah. Compounded with the Kingdom’s oil wealth, Saudi’s leadership in the Muslim and Arab worlds has played a moderating player between Islam and the West. It is a member of important ‘‘organizations’’ that set the tone for regional policies and attitudes, including the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Conference, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the GCC. • The largest oil reserves in the world: Regardless of whether Saudi Arabia has 25 percent of the world’s known reserves (260 billion barrels), Saudi Arabia will still dominate much of the world supply. Most oil-producing countries use the same methodology to calculate reserves. In broad terms, the uncertainties affecting Saudi resources

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affect all other major producers, particularly in the Middle Eastern North African (MENA) region. • The largest oil producer in the world: Saudi Arabia has produced 12.5 percent of world total production for the last decade and has been the only oil producer that has consistently sought to maintain surplus oil production. In addition, the Kingdom still seems to have approximately 1.5–2.0 million barrels per day of spare capacity. It claims to be ‘‘easily capable’’ of producing 15 million barrels per day in the next 15 years. • An influential member of OPEC: Saudi Arabia continues to play a central role in the decisions of OPEC. Due to its immense reserves and influence over the other member states, especially the Gulf countries, the Kingdom has weight with the organization and the ability to change production hikes or cuts. • Central to Gulf security: Saudi Arabia has the largest and most modern military and internal security apparatuses in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia continues to play an important role in the stability of the other GCC states and in securing oil facilities from asymmetric attacks from extremists or conventional or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks from Iran. With close coordination with the U.S. military, the Kingdom has been able to ensure security in the Gulf and secure oil and gas trading lanes. In addition, the Kingdom has played a moderating role between other Gulf States and has ensured Bahrain’s stability for the past several decades.

SAUDI STRATEGIC DYNAMICS Like the other southern Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia has both benefited from the strategic shield provided by the U.S. and British presence in the Gulf, and, like its neighbors, it has had to deal with the political and military backlash from some American and British actions. Saudi Arabia has always been too large, however, to face a serious threat from any other southern Gulf States. While tensions remain with several fellow members of the GCC, Saudi Arabia has seemingly resolved all of its significant border disputes, and its political tensions with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates do not present a risk of war. It does not face a threat from the southern Red Sea states or from Syria and Jordan. Israel poses a threat only if it feels Saudi Arabia is likely to intervene massively in some future Arab-Israeli conflict or is acquiring WMD that could threaten Israel. For all of its rhetoric, Israel does not see Saudi Arabia as a significant threat or plan to fight it. Saudi forces must, however, deal with the major uncertainties in its strategic position caused by the insurgency in Iraq and its uncertain political and military future. It must also deal with two potential regional threats—Iran and Yemen. Iran is acquiring long-range missiles and may become a nuclear power. Yemen is a weak military power, but its political instability, poverty, large population, insecure borders, and constant illegal Yemeni emigration into Saudi Arabia mean that Saudi Arabia cannot ignore the risk of some Yemeni internal conflict affecting Saudi Arabia or that a new Yemeni regime might pose a future threat. Yemen has also been the source of most of the Al Qa’ida attacks in the Peninsula and of the infiltration of terrorists, arms, and explosives into Saudi Arabia.

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Saudi Arabia must also deploy forces to cover its borders with Iraq, Jordan, and Syria and defend both its Gulf and Red Sea coasts. This means Saudi Arabia’s regular military services must defend a territory roughly the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River. The mix of potential threats Saudi Arabia faces also means that Saudi Arabia cannot concentrate its forces to meet a single threat and must normally disperse its forces over much of the Kingdom. At the same time, the Kingdom’s primary active threat comes from internal and external Islamist extremists and not from regular armies, navies, and air forces. It has always had problems with religious extremists who deviate from its accepted Wahhabi practices, but the rise of neo-Salafi extremism and Al Qa’ida have created a transnational threat that calls for the destruction of the Saudi Kingdom, new and far more extreme versions of Puritanism, and Saudi territory to be the core of a new theocracy or ‘‘Caliphate.’’ The attacks by Al Qa’ida in the Peninsula that began in May 2003 have been limited in scale, and there is little evidence such movements have any serious following, but they have been threatening enough to force Saudi Arabia to shift some of its military forces to antiterrorism missions and greatly strengthen the capability of its Ministry of Interior to fighting the threat from Al Qa’ida and independent extremist groups. Its National Guard, police, intelligence services, and facility protection forces have all had to develop new counterterrorism capabilities and prepare for the threat of low-level counterinsurgency warfare. These security dynamics are complicated by several factors. One is the rise of an insurgency in Iraq that has come to be dominated by neo-Salafi Sunni extremists, which recruits young Saudis and gives movements like Al Qa’ida new strength. This same insurgency is helping to divide Iraq’s Sunnis and Shi’ites and drive them toward civil war. It is polarizing Iran to support Shi’ite causes outside Iran, affecting the Alawites in Syria, raising tensions with Shi’ites in Saudi Arabia and every Gulf country, and affecting Shi’ites in Lebanon and Yemen. Sectarianism has always been a problem in Saudi Arabia, but it now risks becoming a transnational threat that cuts across national boundaries to a very different degree. The ongoing war of attrition between Israel and the Palestinians—and election of Hamas, another Islamist extremist group, to power in Gaza and the West Bank—creates another source of tension to the West and one that could spill over into Jordan. More generally, Al Qa’ida and other Islamist extremist groups now operate in some 80 countries. Iraq is scarcely the only source of problems. Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Pakistan also have some Saudi volunteers, and so do armed Islamist extremists in several Central Asian countries. The numbers are small, but the interaction between movements is important. Saudi Arabia also still faces tensions and problems with the United States. U.S. ties to Israel and Saudi ties to the Palestinians have long been a source of tension between the two countries, and the Israeli-Palestinian war of attrition that began in 2000 made these problems worse. The U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia from 1990 to 2003 created serious political and religious problems within Saudi

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Arabia, where many religious Saudis objected to such a foreign and non-Islamic presence. The withdrawal of U.S. combat forces completed in 2004 eased this situation, but Saudi public resentment of the U.S.–led invasion of Iraq remains a major issue. Many members of the U.S. Congress and media reacted to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, by blaming Saudi Arabia for tolerating and financing the rise of Al Qa’ida. The end result was that many in the United States saw Saudi Arabia as a source of Islamist extremism and terrorism while many Saudis saw the U.S. reaction as unfairly focused on Saudi Arabia, and broadly anti-Arab and anti-Islamic. The events of ‘‘9/11’’ also made Americans far more sensitive to Saudi conservative religious and cultural practices and publicized the fact that much of the Saudi religious and educational establishment used writings to attack Christians, Jews, and other Muslims who did not follow Saudi practices. At the same time, many Saudis came to feel the United States was intolerant of their faith and culture. The fact that both nations now face a common threat from Al Qa’ida and similar groups has eased this situation, and governmentto-government cooperation in counterterrorism is close and steadily improving, but the legacy of 9/11 remains. The massive rise in energy prices that began in 2004, and the fact the world entered what may be a prolonged period where demand puts heavy pressure on supply, has made oil a major security issue. The world’s attention is focused on Saudi ability to exploit its oil reserves, Saudi willingness and ability to expand oil and gas production, and Saudi ability to secure all its petroleum facilities. The worldwide fragility of global oil and gas exports has also made Saudi energy facilities a steadily more attractive target for Al Qa’ida and Osama bin Laden. Finally, in the last half century, Saudi Arabia has expanded from a population of 3.20 million in 1950 to 24.57 million in 2005, 2 including 5.6 million nonnationals.3 In the process, Saudi Arabia has gone from a large pastoral and village society with a per capita income of several hundred dollars a year to one with a current per capita income of over $13,000 a year. Young Saudi men and women are now highly educated by global standards, and there is a virtual youth explosion in the country. At least 38 percent of the population is 14 years of age or younger (and the figure for native Saudis may be much higher), and some 482,000 native Saudi men and women enter the labor force a year. They are accustomed to high living standards, but often poorly educated to work and have little work experience or work ethic. Official unemployment is 13 percent, but disguised unemployment (men and women working at jobs with no useful economic output) is almost certainly at least twice that rate. The need for political, religious, and cultural reform may be a subject for debate. There can be no debate over the fact that the mid- and long-term stability of Saudi Arabia depends on the ability to give these men and women productive jobs—and the education, motivation, and training to perform them.

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THE SAUDI NATIONAL SECURITY APPARATUS The current Saudi security apparatus that must deal with this mix of strategic threats and pressures is a complex mix of regular military forces in the Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA), a separate Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), and various internal security and intelligence services in the Ministry of Interior (MOI). Saudi Arabia’s military forces are only one element of the Saudi security structure and are currently divided into five major branches: the army, the national guard, the navy, the air force, and the air defense force. Saudi Arabia also has large paramilitary and internal security forces and a small strategic missile force. Saudi Arabia has made significant progress in creating modern and effective military forces, but it still faces major problems in the leadership and organization of its armed forces. These include the traditional problems all states face in organizing and commanding large military forces and in shaping and funding the future structure of its armed forces. At the same time, the Kingdom’s newer problems are in dealing with significant problems in manpower quality, advanced military technology, readiness, sustainability, and managing an advanced force structure that must have the option of being interoperable with both region allies and those from outside the Gulf. Saudi Arabia is also working on recasting the mission of many elements of it forces to focus on ‘‘jointness.’’ The Kingdom must adopt many of the advances in joint warfare pioneered by the United States and other Western nations and improve cooperation among the army, navy, air force, and air defense force. It must also redefine the mission of jointness to link the regular services, the national guard, and the internal security and police forces under the Ministry of Security into a coherent structure that can prevent and respond to terrorism. Saudi Arabia has made major advances in internal security and counterterrorism since it came under more intense terrorist attack in May 2003. It has given the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Interior the interagency lead in this role. Nevertheless, it will be several years before Saudi Arabia can plan and implement all of the measures required.

The Search for Jointness Saudi Arabia has become steadily more aggressive in its efforts to create true jointness in the operations of all four of its regular military services. It found during the preparation and execution of its operations in the first Gulf War that its army, navy, air force, and air defense force had little joint training and doctrine and that many of their command and information systems could not properly communicate. The Saudi Air Force was also not properly prepared to support the army with close air support (CAS), airlift, reconnaissance, and information transfer. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia established a National Defense Operations Center to coordinate command activity, intelligence, and information. It began joint training at its air base at Khamis Mushayt in the south, where it brought together army and

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air force instructors. Forward Air Controllers (FACs) trained with the army. Midlevel commanders were given training in joint operations and a continuous course program was set up, and suitable training programs and equipment began to be put in place. Slow Improvement in Jointness in the Regular Services This, however, was only a start, and it was clear at higher levels at the MODA that more had to be done. At the same time, it was apparent that Saudi Arabia could not simply adopt a U.S. doctrine and concept of operations that emphasize global power projection and preparation for all kinds of warfare. As a result, Saudi Arabia surveyed the doctrine of countries, including France, Egypt, and Israel. It also began to develop a set of joint doctrine plans and documents based largely on a defensive approach to operations. Saudi Arabia established a formal joint doctrine in 2001 and is steadily reevaluating its doctrine and ways to improve joint operations. It has begun to exercise joint operations in exercises like the Peace Sword series and to use such exercises to test and review what needs to be done. It conducted exercises of this kind with outside observers in 2004. The Saudi forces have taken other tangible steps like providing FACs to all brigades, more air-land training, and more training between the air force and the navy. They have improved the ‘‘connectivity’’ and data transfer between the air force’s E3A airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) and the land forces and the navy. The navy now takes much more advantage of the maritime surveillance capabilities of the E-3A, and both the navy and the army can fully communicate with the Saudi E-3A. During the first Gulf War, technical interface problems meant that the Saudi ground and air forces often found it easier to communicate through the U.S. Air Force (USAF) E-3As. The Saudi Army has established an educational institute to examine ways to improve joint and combined warfare activity and is seeking to create a fully computerized joint training center established with many of the features of the U.S. Army Center at Fort Irwin. Saudi Arabia has found that a joint interservice presence at command centers is the key to effective jointness in actual operations and is establishing joint command links between the regular forces and the national guard. It plans to create a new command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C 4I) battle management (BM) system and architecture to fully implement such capabilities in the future. Saudi officers recognize, however, that progress has been slow, the scale of joint exercise training remains far too small, and that the Saudi forces must scale up its exercises, training, and doctrine to the brigade and major air formation level to be effective. Jointness must be adapted to both the defensive character of Saudi planning and the need to be able to deal with different mission needs in different areas. In addition to adapting to the counterterrorism missions discussed shortly, jointness must develop air-land battle concepts that call for rapid redeployment of air power from bases in forward areas throughout the Kingdom to support air-land operations on any given border and make up for the inability to rapidly redeploy

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land forces from the ‘‘corners’’ of a country the size of the United States east of the Mississippi. Air-navy operations must adjust to the different conditions in the Gulf and the Red Sea. The Gulf is a dense, congested area, with many countries operating near Saudi Arabia and critical flows of commerce and oil. The Red Sea is a large area where Saudi Arabia has a very long coast, there is far less traffic, and maritime surveillance presents different problems from the Gulf. It also presents different coastal security problems because of the influx of illegal immigrants from Eritrea and Ethiopia seeking jobs in the Kingdom. Air-land-sea operations must also be capable of counterinfiltration and smuggling activity in any region, particularly the Iraqi border, the Yemeni border, and the Gulf and Red Sea coasts. All of these measures require a degree of integrated command and control capability that is still in development. This includes the ability to handle near-real-time operations far more efficiently and provide better integration of intelligence, targeting, battle damage, and ‘‘joint situational’’ awareness data. In many of these areas, Saudi Arabia must still transform concepts into operational capabilities. Like most countries other than the United States, Saudi Arabia must also find solutions to the problem of ‘‘net-centric’’ warfare that are affordable, easy to maintain and operate, and place as much emphasis on the skill of ‘‘human-centric’’ operators as complex intelligence systems. Much also depends on Saudi capability to work with U.S., British, and outside reinforcements in an emergency and to be capable of joint interoperability on an international level. They face the problem that while Saudi Arabia provided the United States with significant support in the attack on Saddam Hussein in 2003, coordination with the United States has suffered badly since 9/11. Establishing Broader Jointness for Counterterrorism As has been mentioned earlier, the Saudi forces, the National Guard, and Ministry of Interior security and police forces have become more effective in working together in counterterrorism operations. Saudi Arabia had sought to establish an integrated approach to civil defense during the first Gulf War, but Iraq never provided any meaningful test of the system, and its few Scud strikes were little more than an irritant. The scattered acts of terrorism between 1995 and 2001 did little to test the coordination between the Saudi regular forces, the National Guard, and Ministry of Interior security and police forces. Serious problems existed in the training, readiness, coordination, interoperability, and jointness of the various forces in the Ministry of Interior. The police forces had little preparation, training, and equipment for counterterrorism. The security forces had never had to deal with a serious threat, intelligence was compartmentalized, and the border guard and coast guard forces were not really trained and equipped for such missions and operated virtually independently of each other, the security services, and regular forces. These problems were compounded by the fact that the national guard was trained largely as a light mechanized force to deal with foreign

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threats rather than force area defense, counterterrorism, and to supplement the various security forces protecting critical facilities. As a result, Saudi counterterrorism efforts exhibited serious coordination problems following the first major attacks in May 2003. Saudi forces did not coordinate in dealing with a hostage situation, and untrained forces had elementary problems in exiting from helicopters. This experience led to the creation of a Joint Counterterrorism Center in the Ministry of Interior. A separate Counterterrorism Operations Center was also created in MODA to strengthen, better train, and equip the different services of the armed forces involved in the on-going war against terrorism, such as the Defense Facilities Protection Forces. Furthermore, a National Joint Counterterrorism Command (NJCC) was also established to enhance the cooperation and command and control capabilities among MODA, SANG, and MOI, The NJCC is headed by the Assistant Minister of Interior for Security Affairs, Prince Muhammed bin Nayef. The regular services, the National Guard, and Ministry of Interior redefined their internal security missions to allow more cooperation while reducing overlapping responsibility or dual command. Each element has been given a more clearly defined new set of responsibilities with the Ministry of Interior retaining the primary responsibility for security in all populated areas and the regular services and the National Guard taking on well-defined responsibilities for area defense and to back up the protection of critical infrastructure facilities and energy facilities. The regular services have better-defined roles in supporting the Ministry of Interior security forces and clear guidance on key missions like providing helicopter support. The Special Security Forces and the Special Emergency Forces have also been retrained to deploy more rapidly and with more flexibility, operate better with other force elements like the Saudi Border Guard and the General Security Service in counterterrorism operations, and be better prepared for independent counterterrorism missions. The end result was much better performance during the attacks on the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah in December 2004, the attack against the Ministry of Interior on December 29, 2004, and the attempted attack against the Abqaiq oil facility in February 2006. Saudi officers acknowledge, however, that much still needs to be done. As was the case in the United States after 9/11, creating fully effective coordination and jointness among so many force elements in three major different ministerial equivalents, as well as other civil ministries with critical facilities to protect, will take years. Just as creating a fully effective Homeland Defense function in the United States will take a minimum of half a decade, Saudi officers and officials fully understand that Saudi Arabia still has a long way to go before it can develop an optimal level of efficiency and coordination. The Importance of Consensus and Consultation While separate royal chains of command divide some aspects of the control of the Saudi security apparatus by senior princes, it is important to understand that the

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cooperation between them has steadily improved since the Gulf War in 1990–1991, and particularly since the series of terrorist attacks that began in May 2003. Moreover, the senior leaders of the royal family normally operate by a consensus reached at a number of levels. It is rare for a major decision not to be discussed informally by the most senior princes. This discussion generally includes consultation and advice from all of the relevant princes at the ministerial level, supported by a mix of outside advisors and technocrats within the key security ministries. Interviews indicate that there is nothing rigid about this process, however, and that senior ministers can act quickly and with minimal amounts of technical advice. Such actions are rare, however, and the senior princes often staff their decision-making process with analyses of options, budget implications, and advice on the internal political, social, and religious impacts of their decisions. A lack of administrative structure and clear and well-established procedures for collective planning and review do, however, present problems. This is particularly true when decisions cut across the lines of responsibility from one senior prince to another, when they are not part of the normal flow of annual decision making, and when hard choices have to be made in analyzing the effectiveness and cost of given decisions and options. The coordination of all counterterrorism efforts under the MOI since 2004 is an important start, but Saudi leaders and officers recognize that more must be done. At the operational level, they recognize that there is a need for joint commands that include all of the regular military services, the National Guard, and the key elements of the security services under the Ministry of Interior. There is also a need for a joint approach to creating a national C4I system and joint battle management capabilities. Plans to begin this process by creating a suitable joint command and control system may help create such capabilities. At the planning level, there is a need for a coordination planning, programming, and budgeting level. The need to put major new resources into internal security is having an impact on procurement and modernization in the military services, and the Kingdom has long needed a longer-term and more integrated approach to shaping and funding its force development. Similar jointness is needed in intelligence, in acquiring suitable military and information technology, and in creating a national intelligence system. Preventing and responding to terrorist attacks makes the ‘‘fusion’’ of various intelligence efforts even more time sensitive. Consultation at the top also is not a substitute for systematic coordination throughout the security apparatus, and the coordination between planning, policy, and budget decisions for the regular armed forces, the National Guard, internal security services, and intelligence branches is inadequate and sometimes tenuous. The Kingdom has talked about creating a national security council for decades and even once built a building for such a body, but has neither a staff that integrates all of its security efforts nor something approaching an adequate interagency process. The remaining problems in interagency cooperation have been compounded by other aspects of the terrorist threat. Coordination must now be far more effective at levels that go beyond the MODA, SANG, and MOI. Other princes act as governors and

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play a major role in shaping internal security at the regional level. Equally important, dealing with Islamic extremism involves a wide range of other ministries and religious leaders and requires a coordinated approach to issues like education and countering the attacks extremists like Osama bin Laden make on Islam. The Role of the Saudi National Security Council In order to deal with these challenges as well as integrating the national security apparatus in the Kingdom, King Abdullah upgraded the National Security Council (NSC) to deal with all facets impacting Saudi Arabia’s national security. In October 2005, a royal decree revamped the council—which has been in place since the reign of King Faisal under the command of royal court, to ‘‘. . .focus on social, political, economic, military, security, media, and international affairs in order to guarantee the country’s comprehensive national security.’’4 If this decree is fully implemented, the NSC will become one of the top decisionmaking bodies in the Kingdom. The King (Abdullah) is the Chairman of the Council, the Crown Prince (Sultan) is the Deputy Chairman, and Prince Bandar bin Sultan was appointed as the Secretary General. Its members include the Minister of Defense and Civil Aviation, the Commander of the National Guard, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Head of the General Intelligence Presidency, and the NSC Secretary General.5 Press reports about the actual role of the NSC are contradictory, but what is clear is the council has been given wider powers, including the power to declare emergencies and wars. In addition, ‘‘the NSC will have right to investigate and monitor all security agencies if they commit major violations or demonstrate negligence in duties or become involved in acts which threaten public security. The NSC will have the political powers such as withdrawing ambassadors, reducing diplomatic representation and severing diplomatic relations. It will approve military strategies required for dealing with foreign threats.’’6 In practice, however, the real-world importance and effectiveness of the NSC may not be apparent for years to come. Interagency integration takes time and trial and error at the best of times and in every country, including the developed world. In the case of the Kingdom, these changes are taking place amid internal threat from extremists, the uncertain nature of Iran’s WMD and missiles program, the insurgency in Iraq, the surge in global oil demand and the pressure on the Saudi oil infrastructure, and the pressure for further economic, security, social, and political reforms in the Kingdom. SAUDI MILITARY AND SECURITY SPENDING There are a number of different estimates of Saudi expenditures and of the burden they impose on the Saudi economy. Almost all agree to the extent they report extremely high levels of spending. The United States Department of Defense estimates show that Saudi spending peaked during the Gulf War, then dropped in the mid to late 1990s as Saudi Arabia came under increasing financial pressure because

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of comparatively low oil revenues and increased civil spending burdens caused by major population increases. In fact, 1995 was a year of Saudi fiscal crisis and led to cuts that reduced Saudi spending by 33 percent between 1990 and 2000. Other Department of Defense sources indicate, however, that Saudi security expenditures leaped back up in 2001 as a result of a sudden ‘‘boom’’ in oil expenditures and continued to increase through 2006. Reporting by the U.S. Department of State indicates that Saudi Arabia spent $8.3 billion on defense between January 1 and December 31, 1999. It notes, however, that the Saudi government data drawn upon did not provide separate line item budgets for defense and national security. As a result, such estimates of defense spending include Ministry of Interior expenditures and are therefore somewhat misleading. According to this estimate, Saudi Arabia spent 13 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) and 41.65 percent of its national budget on military forces during this period.7 The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) uses Saudi budget data to calculate the total Saudi security budget, including internal security, using data provided by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA). According to the IISS, this spending totaled $18.4 billion (69 billion riyals) in 1999, $20.0 billion (74.9 billion riyals) in 2000, $24.7 billion (92.7 billion riyals) in 2001, and $22.2 billion (83.2 billion riyals) in 2002. The Saudi budget generally fell well below the level of actual spending. According to the IISS, the budget called for spending levels of $21.1 billion (78.9 billion riyals) in 2001, $18.5 billion (69.4 billion riyals) in 2002, $18.4 billion (68.9 billion riyals) in 2003, $19.3 billion (72.3 billion riyals) in 2004, and $21.3 billion (79.9 billion riyals) in 2005.8 These figures indicate that Saudi Arabia spent 40 percent of its total budget on national security in 2000, 37 percent in 2001, 34 percent in 2002, 33 percent in 2003, and 36 percent in 2004. A detailed examination of the Saudi budget data indicates that national security spending is kept relatively high even in low budget years, but that Saudi Arabia is slowing increasing the percent of its budget going to the civil sector. It is impossible to assess how Saudi military and security expenditures are spent in any detail using unclassified data. The Saudi budget provides only an undefined ‘‘top line’’ total. Furthermore, it does not include all purchases of military equipment, construction, and services. Saudi Arabia does not report all of the relevant costs in its budget documents—particularly costs of defense relating to the purchase of foreign defense goods and services. Saudi Arabia has often increased its defense expenditures after the budget was issued without reporting them and has never publicly reported the actual cash flow it has spent on arms imports or on the value of the oil it has sometimes used in complex barter deals. Finding the Proper Level of Expenditure Some things are clear. The total cost of Saudi military efforts since the early 1970s has exceeded several hundred billion dollars, even if one excludes the cost of the Gulf

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War. The Kingdom spent from $14 billion to $24 billion a year on defense during the latter 1970s and the 1980s; its full-time active military manpower increased from 79,000 in the 1970s to 199,500 in 2005.9 Much of this expenditure—probably on the order of 60–65 percent—was spent on infrastructure, foreign services and maintenance, and basic manpower training. Saudi Arabia had to create entire military cities, new ports, and major road networks. It had to create modern military bases in the middle of its deserts and pay for far more extensive training than most of the military manpower in the Third World receives. There were good reasons for many of these expenditures during the period Saudi Arabia had to create a modern military force. Saudi Arabia had to buy a pool of equipment and munitions large and modern enough to give it the ability to deter Iran and Iraq. Since the mid-1980s, Saudi Arabia has been able to shift from creating basic military capabilities and infrastructure to a slower and less expensive buildup of combat capabilities. The cost of the Gulf War placed a massive new burden on the Kingdom, however, and such expenses had to take place at the cost of ‘‘butter’’ and helped lead to chronic Saudi budget deficits.10 In fact, the Gulf War pushed Saudi military and security expenditures to the crisis level. Saudi security expenditures rose from 36 percent of the total national budget in 1988, and 39 percent in 1989, to nearly 60 percent in 1990. Although any such estimates are highly dependent on exactly what aspects of the cost of Saudi support to allied military forces during the Gulf War should be included, the percentage rose to around 70 percent in 1991–1992—including the cost of aid to allied governments during Desert Storm. What is not clear is why Saudi military expenditures remained so high for so long after the Gulf War. One explanation is the need to pay for the long pipeline of arms deliveries ordered in reaction to the war. However, the data available indicate that such costs should have tapered off more rapidly by the mid-1990s than the figures shown indicate and should have bought more major combat systems, readiness, and sustainability for the money. In fact, both the size of Saudi arms deliveries after 1995 and the ratio of deliveries to new agreements after 1995 are higher than can easily be explained by either the volume of actual deliveries of major weapons or Saudi needs. Saudi military expenditures have consumed a very high percentage of GDP and as a percent of total government expenditures and have put a serious strain on the Saudi budget and pressure on the Saudi economy. The U.S. State Department estimates indicate that Saudi Arabia spent about 20 percent of its GDP on defense during 1983–1986. They ranged from 16 to 23 percent of the gross national product (GNP) during the 1980s, peaked at 27–29 percent in 1990–1992, and have since dropped to around 14 percent. The percentage was only about 8.5 percent in 1996, however, if GDP is measured in purchasing power parity.11 The Department of Defense has somewhat different estimates. As a percentage of GDP, the defense spending is as follows: 1990, 25.9 percent; 1995, 13.5 percent; 1996, 13.9 percent; 1997, 11.0 percent; 1998, 14.3 percent; 1999, 13.4 percent; 2000, 11.7 percent; 2001, 13.3 percent; 2002, 13.3 percent; and 2003, 11.54 percent.12

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Saudi military expenditures averaged around 40 percent of all central government expenditures (CGEs) before the Gulf War and rose to a peak of 60–73 percent during the Gulf War. As the previous data have shown, they then dropped back to around 35–40 percent. U.S. officials estimate that Saudi military expenditures accounted for approximately 35–40 percent of all CGEs, and 12.9 percent of the GNP, in 2000.13 Even so, this is still an exceptionally high percentage for a Saudi government that must fund so large a mix of welfare, entitlement, and civil investment expenditures. There is no way to establish a ‘‘golden rule’’ as to what share Saudi military and security expenditures should consume of the GNP or total budget in the future. It is clear, however, that past levels of spending placed a strain on the Saudi budget and economy. At the same time, military spending is not easy to cut. The past history of Saudi spending indicates that Saudi Arabia must spend about $13 billion to $15 billion a year, in 2002 dollars, if it is to maintain its present forces and rate of modernization. It should be noted that the military is making an effort to save some money by taking such steps as increasing its repair capabilities, which would reduce the number of spares normally required to be stockpiled while systems are en route for overseas repair.14 SAUDI ARMS IMPORTS Saudi Arabia has long been dependent on other nations for virtually all of its arms and military technology. Saudi Arabia is making some limited slow progress in developing an indigenous arms industry. Saudi Arabia has made progress in the support, supply, operations, and maintenance areas. It can produce some small arms, automatic weapons, and munitions, but much of the Saudi portion of the work consists of assembling imported parts rather than real manufactures. A number of other programs consist of efforts where a foreign arms supplier has agreed to set up defense-related industrial efforts in Saudi Arabia to ‘‘offset’’ Saudi spending on arms imports. Some of these offset efforts have been useful in reducing the need to import technology, services, and parts, but many others are more symbolic efforts to employ Saudis than substantive efforts to aid the Saudi military or industrial base. It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that Saudi Arabia’s military buildup and modernization have led to massive expenditures on military imports.15 Saudi Arabia has no reason to try to build major weapons systems, particularly when it can now buy some of the most advanced military technology available from diverse suppliers in the United States, Europe, and Russia. Saudi Arabia’s recent arms purchases reflect this fact. Figure 6.1 shows Saudi actual arms deliveries between 1993 and 2004. The general trends reflect the declining arms deliveries during the 1990s due to the ‘‘oil crash’’ of the 1990s. For example, it is estimated that Saudi Arabia imported $31.9 billion between 1993 and 1996, $35.7 billion between 1997 and 2000, and $19.0 billion between 2001 and 2004. In addition, the figure shows that the United States and western European nations dominated as the major arms suppliers to the

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Figure 6.1 Saudi Arabia’s Arms Deliveries by Supplier, 1993–2004

Kingdom during this period. Saudi Arabia’s new arms agreements have, however, been declining at a rate higher than actual arms deliveries. Figure 6.2 shows Saudi Arabia’s new arms agreements between 1993 and 2004, and it shows that between 1993 and 1996, the Kingdom imported $18.8 billion worth of arms. But the Kingdom signed only $4.9 billion worth of new arms

Figure 6.2 Saudi Arabia’s New Arms Agreements by Supplier, 1993–2004

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agreements between 1997 and 2000, and an estimated $5.6 billion between 2001 and 2004. These numbers, however, do not reflect the increase in oil revenues and defense spending in 2005 and 2006, including the deal Saudi Arabia signed with Britain to purchase 72 Eurofighter aircraft, which is estimated to be worth $19 billion.16 Saudi spending on arms imports also helps explain why Saudi Arabia ranked as one of the world’s ten largest military importers in every year for much of the last two decades. It ranked first in both new arms agreements and in actual arms deliveries during 1989–1992 and 1993–1996. It ranked first in arms deliveries during 1996–1999, although it ranked third in terms of new orders—behind the United Arab Emirates and India and only marginally above Egypt.17 This situation has changed strikingly, however, since the mid-1990s. Saudi Arabia ranked seventh in terms of new agreements during 2000–2003, although it stayed first in arms deliveries during the same period because deliveries lag years behind orders. Saudi new orders during 2000–2003 were half of what they were during 1996–1999, and only 14 percent of what they were during 1991–1994.18 Saudi Arabia no longer is one of the top ten arms importers.19 Saudi Arabia has a great deal to gain from rationalizing its military industries and equipping them to produce more spares and handle major equipment upgrades and overhauls. This would reduce Saudi life cycle costs, help sustainability, and ensure that the Kingdom could afford major upgrades and extend the life cycle of its weapons. It is also clear that this is the best way to ensure Saudi Arabia’s independence from any one supplier of key weapons. Simply diversifying the sources of weapons and technology to reduce dependence on any one country is expensive, reduces interoperability, raises training and readiness costs, and still leaves Saudi Arabia dependent on a given supplier for a critical part of its arsenal in any sustained or high-intensity conflict. The Impact of the Gulf War Saudi Arabia took delivery on $48.1 billion worth of arms during 1983–1989 and purchased 14.1 percent of all Third World military import agreements during 1982– 1989.20 The Gulf War did, however, lead Saudi Arabia to make major additional purchases of military imports. Saudi Arabia ordered $18.6 billion worth of military imports in 1990 and took delivery on $6.749 billion worth. Saudi Arabia cut its new orders to $7.8 billion in 1991, but deliveries rose to $7.1 billion as its backlog of increased orders began to raise deliveries. Both new orders and deliveries dropped to $4.5 billion in 1992. Saudi military imports then began to rise again because of the perceived threat from Iran and Iraq. Saudi Arabia ordered $9.6 billion worth of arms in 1993 and took delivery on $6.4 billion. In 1994, it ordered $9.5 billion worth of military imports and took delivery on $5.2 billion. The end result of these orders was a bill that strained Saudi Arabia’s financial capabilities at a time its oil revenues were declining and a massive ‘‘pipeline’’ of ongoing arms deliveries that Saudi Arabia could not effectively absorb. The Kingdom had

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problems with meeting its payment schedules for several ongoing arms deals. Saudi Arabia had signed a multistage deal with Britain called Al-Yamama that cost the Kingdom up to $3 billion per year, but which was not integrated into its normal budget process. A similar agreement for the upgrade of the Saudi Navy, Sawari, was penned with France. While the Kingdom could meet some of its obligation with oil, these deals still imposed a major financial burden. The United States had to be paid in cash, which imposed even more of a burden. There were reasons to diversify the Kingdom’s arms purchases. Saudi Arabia found it could not rely on the United States because of U.S. ties to Israel and internal political pressure from Israel’s supporters. It made sense for the Kingdom not to become too dependent on one supplier. Second, major arms purchases were a diplomatic tool in ensuring support from supplier nations. Finally, arms imports were a way of ‘‘recycling’’ oil export revenues and preserving market share. However, the Kingdom failed to pay proper attention to interoperability and standardization. Like most Gulf countries, it often focused on buying the most effective or advanced system and paid little attention to the practical problems of integrating weapons from different suppliers into overall force structures that minimized the problems in operating systems designed by different countries, the maintenance problems involved, and the difficulties in supplying and sustaining systems with different maintenance and ammunition needs in combat. Aside from the National Guard, Saudi Arabia paid too little attention to the training burden involved, problems in combined arms and joint operations, and difficulties in command and control. It also underestimated the inevitable rivalry between foreign military advisory teams and the natural competitive bias of foreign contract support teams toward favoring systems made by their companies or countries. Saudi Arabia also underestimated the tendency of supplier countries to focus on sales per se and ignore the Kingdom’s strategic interests, even though most supplier countries were dependent on the security of Saudi oil exports. Excessive arms spending also led to a budget crisis in the mid-1990s. The Kingdom’s problems in paying for its existing arms orders in 1994 led it to make much more modest new purchases after that time. The Kingdom ordered $2.1 billion worth of arms in 1995 and took delivery on $2.1 billion. New orders totaled $1.9 billion in 1996, and deliveries totaled $6.3 billion. Saudi Arabia placed $2.7 billion in new orders in 1997 and took $11.0 billion worth of deliveries.21 Arms Imports since the Late 1990s The oil crash in late 1997 reinforced Saudi Arabia’s need to limit its new arms imports. As a result, it placed $2.9 billion in new orders in 1998 and took $8.7 billion worth of deliveries; it placed $1.6 billion in new orders in 1999 and took $6.9 billion worth of deliveries.22 The scale of the decline in new Saudi arms import agreements is indicated by the fact that new orders during 1991–1994 were only about two-thirds of the total during 1987–1990. Saudi new orders for the fouryear period from 1994 to 1997 were substantially less than half the new orders Saudi

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Arabia placed during the four-year period before the Gulf War, even measured in current dollars.23 The Kingdom’s new arms orders also suffered from planning management problems that reinforced the problems in Saudi military sustainment and modernization. • First, the Kingdom focused on major new arms purchases during the period immediately after the Gulf War, rather than sustainment and then did not shift its purchases to focus on sustainment when it had to make major cutbacks after the mid1990s. As a result, Saudi Arabia was flooded with weapons, but seriously underfunded in terms of the investment in maintenance and sustainment that was necessary to keep its existing weapons effective and properly absorb its new ones. • Second, the flood of new deliveries during the 1990s added to the Kingdom’s problems in effectively recapitalizing and maintaining its overall force posture. As a rough rule of thumb every major weapons system costs at least as much in terms of the arms imports needed to maintain and upgrade it during its life cycle as it does to buy, and often twice as much. The Kingdom now faces a major future cost problem in making and in keeping its new weapons effective that will add to the problem of sustaining its existing weapons. While no precise figures are available, some U.S. advisors estimate that the Kingdom needed to restructure its arms import program to focus on sustainment half a decade ago and needs to spend three to four times more on support equipment, training systems, etc., than it does today, even if this means major additional cuts in spending on new arms. • Third, the Kingdom never really developed a clear strategy for both improving interoperability and setting affordable long-term force goals. It went from year to year, solving its payment problems as they occurred. It did not develop effective future year plans, and the spending fixes it adopted for any one year tended to compound its overall problems in standardization and interoperability.

The patterns of Saudi arms imports since its funding crunch in the mid-1990s have been different. Saudi Arabia imported $37.2 billion worth of arms during 1996–1999, and $23.9 billion during 2000–2003. In contrast, it signed only $6.0 billion worth of new arms agreements during 1996–1999, and only $3.4 billion in new arms agreements per year during 2000–2003.24 New orders were less than one-sixth of deliveries during 1996–1999, and roughly one-seventh during 2000– 2003.25 There are indications that this situation may reverse itself in the near future, as the flood of oil export revenues Saudi Arabia has received since 2004 led to new arms purchases. There are as yet, however, too few actual contracts to even begin to speculate on the future size of Saudi arms buys. There are, however, early indications of future trends. For example, Saudi Arabia signed a 25-year agreement with the United Kingdom to purchase 72 Eurofighter aircraft to replace the Saudi Airforce Tornado fleet. The deal is estimated to cost $19 billion and is expected to include maintenance and spare parts.26 In addition, there have been speculations about possible Saudi purchase of Russian, Chinese, and U.S. weapons. Western diplomats, for example, have been quoted as saying that

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Russian military experts have been discussing the possible sale of T-95 main battle tanks and Mi-17 helicopters to the Kingdom. No details were given, however, about the size of the deal or whether Saudi officials have agreed to such a sale.27 MANPOWER Saudi military forces are modern, high-technology forces by regional standards, but manpower is a problem. The Saudi manpower base has expanded to the point where Saudi Arabia could theoretically support much larger forces. Some 6.6 million men are fit for military service, and some 247,000 males a year reach the age of 18.28 Motivation, education, and training are, however, serious problems. It is hard to obtain the mix of manpower quality and quantity needed to man Saudi forces properly, and the Saudi services are still adapting to the fact that modern military training and promotion must be ruthlessly based on performance and merit, not birth, family, politics, or social custom. Saudi regular forces now total some 124,500 men, plus some 95,000–100,000 actives in the National Guard and another estimated 130,000 men in the various paramilitary forces (excluding the different police forces): some 30,000 in the Border Guard, 20,000 in the Drug Enforcement Agency, 25,000 in the Civil Defense Administration, 30,000 in the Special Emergency Forces, 5,000 in the Mujahideen, 10,000 in the Petroleum Installation Security Force, and some 10,000 in the Special Security Forces. These totals do not include the internal intelligence service, the General Security Service, and the different police forces in the Ministry of Interior. Moreover, the Royal Guard and the General Intelligence Presidency are also not included in the above tally. THE SAUDI ARMY The Saudi Army has about 75,000–100,000 actives, an inventory of some 1,055 medium tanks, plus over 3,000 other armored vehicles, and 500 major artillery weapons. It is headquartered in Riyadh and has five staff branches: G1, Personnel; G2, Intelligence and Security; G3, Operations and Training; G4, Logistics; and G5, Civil and Military Affairs. It also has field commands organized into six area commands under Military Zone Commanders, and they are located at Riyadh, King Khalid Military City, Tabuk, Khamis Mushayt, Dhahran, and Jeddah. Since the Gulf War, the Saudi Army has developed, modernized, and increased in size. It has nearly doubled its manpower, battle tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), transport helicopters, and surface-to-air (SAM) launchers. Figure 6.3 provides the details of the development of the force structure in the Saudi Army since the end of the Gulf War in 1990, levels of manpower, and numbers and types of major weapons. It is clear from Figure 6.3 that the Saudi Army has expanded significantly in manpower. It is also clear that it has increased combat unit strength and has modernized

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Figure 6.3 Saudi Army’s Force Structure, 1990–2006 1990

2000

2005

2006

40,000

75,000

75,000

75,000

40,000

75,000

75,000

75,000

0

0

0

0

Armored Brigade

2

3

3

3

Mechanized Brigade

4

5

5

5

Airborne Brigade

1

1

1

1

Royal Guard Brigade

1

1

1

1

Artillery Battalion

5

8

8

8

Army Aviation Command

0

1

1

1

Manpower Active Reserves Combat Units

Infantry Brigade

1

0

0

0

Main Battle Tanks

550

1,055

1,055

1,055

0

315(200)*

315(200)

315(200)

AMX-30

300

290(145)

290(145)

290(145)

M-60A3

200

450

450

450

M-60A1

50

0

0

0

740

1,270+

1,270+

1,270+

AML-60/-90

240

300

300

300

AMX-10P

500+

570+

570+

570+

M-1A2 Abrams

Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles/Reconnaissance/Lt. Tanks

M-2 Bradley

†

0

400

400

400

1,280

1,900

3,190

3,190

1,100

1,750

3,000

3,000

Panhard M-3

150

150

150

150

EE-11 Urutu

30

0

0

0

Al-Fahad

0

0

40

40

134(110)+

248(58)+

238(148)

238(150)

24+

0

0

0

Armored Personnel Carriers M-133

TOWED Artillery 105 mm: Model 56 105 mm: M-101/-102

40(40)

100

100(100)

100(102)

155 mm: FH-70

70(70)

50(50)

40(40)

40(40)

155 mm: M-198

66

90

40

40

155 mm: M-114

0

?

‡

50

50

203 mm: M-115

0

8(8)

8(8)

8(8)

SAUDI ARABIA

Self-Propelled Artillery

183

275

200

170

170

155 mm: M-109A1B/A2

224

110

110

110

155 mm: GCT

51

90

60

60

14

60

60

60

ASTROS II

14

60

60

60

MOR

330

400

400

400

81 mm

0

?

70+

70+

330

?

150+

150+

0

110

110

110

30

10

10

10

30

10

10

10

290+

1,300+

2,000+

2,050

Multiple Rocket Launchers

107 mm: 4.2-in. M30 120 mm: Brandt Surface-to-Surface Missile Launchers CSS-2 Antitank Guided Weapon BGM-71A TOW

200+

0

0

0

TOW/-2A

0

200+

900

950

M-47 Dragon

?

1,000

1,000

1,000

HOT

90+

100+

100+

100

450+

1,550

650

650

?

0

0

0

450

300

300

300

90 mm: M-67

?

100

100

100

106 mm: M-40A1

?

50

50

50

112 mm: APILAS

0

0

200

200

Attack Helicopters

0

12

12

12

Rocket Launchers & RCL 75 mm: M-20 84 mm: Carl Gustav

AH-64

0

12

12

12

34

55

55

55

S-70A-1

0

12

12

12

UH-60A

12

22

22

22

SA365N

22

6

6

6

Bell 406CS

0

15

15

15

500+

500+

1,000+

1,000+

Transport Helicopters

Surface-to-Air Missile Launchers Stinger/FIM-92A

?

?

500

500

Redeye

500

500

500

500

Crotale

?

?

?

?

SURV

0

?

?

?

184


Air Defense Guns

15+

0

0

0

40 mm: M-42 SP

?

0

0

?

90 mm: 15 M-117

15

0

0

?

* Numbers in parentheses refer to weapons that are in storage. † ‘‘+’’ means that the service is believed to possess at least that number. ‡ ‘‘?’’ refers to weapons that the service is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in its possession are unknown. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

many categories of key weapons. At the same time, the number of different equipment types compounds its interoperability problems, and the army retains significant numbers of older or obsolescent systems. Army readiness and maintenance have improved since the late 1990s, but the Saudi Army’s diversity of weapons also contributes to the fact that it has serious maintenance and sustainability problems if its forces have to operate away from the their main bases or military cities. Much of the Saudi Army is now deployed in military cities at least 500 miles from the Kingdom’s main oil facilities in the Eastern Province, although a brigade is stationed in the new King Fahd Military City in the Eastern Province, and combat elements of another brigade were deployed to the new Saudi Army Base at King Khalid Military City, near Hafr al-Batin, in 1984. For the foreseeable future, the Saudi Army will be dispersed so that much of its strength will be deployed near Saudi Arabia’s borders with bases located at Tabuk, Hafr al-Batin, and Sharurah-Khamis Mushayt. Force Strength and Structure The combat strength of the Saudi Army consists of four armored brigades, five mechanized infantry brigades, three light motorized rifle brigades, and one airborne brigade. It also has five independent artillery brigades and an aviation command. The Saudi Army deployed the 12th Armored Brigade and the 6th Mechanized Brigade at King Faisal Military City in the Tabuk area. It deployed the 4th Armored Brigade and the 11th Mechanized Brigade at King Abdul Aziz Military City in the Khamis Mushayt area. It deployed the 20th Mechanized Brigade and the 8th Mechanized Brigade at King Khalid Military City near Hafr al Batin. The 10th Mechanized Brigade is deployed at Sharawrah, which is near the border with Yemen and about 150 kilometers from Zamak. A typical Saudi armored brigade has an armored reconnaissance (RECCE) company, three tank battalions with 42 tanks each, two tank companies with a total of 30 tanks, three tank troops with a total of 12 tanks, a mechanized infantry battalion with 54 armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs)/APCs, and an artillery battalion with 18 self-propelled guns. It also has an army aviation company, an engineer company, a logistic battalion, a field workshop, and a medical company.

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A typical Saudi mechanized brigade has an armored RECCE company, one tank battalion with 37–42 tanks, three mechanized infantry battalions with 54 AIFVs/ APCs each, two infantry companies with a total of 33 APCs, three infantry platoons with a total of 12 APCs, and an artillery battalion with 18 self-propelled guns. It also has an army aviation company, an engineer company, a logistic battalion, a field workshop, and a medical company. It has 24 antitank guided weapons launchers and four mortar sections with a total of eight 81-mm mortars. The Airborne Brigade is normally deployed near Tabuk. The Airborne Brigade has two parachute battalions and three Special Forces companies. The three light motorized brigades include the 17th, the 18th, and the 19th. Saudi Arabia is expanding its Special Forces and improving their equipment and training to help deal with the threat of terrorism. The Special Forces have been turned into independent fighting units to help deal with terrorists; they report directly to Prince Sultan. The army also has an Army Aviation Command, which was formed in 1986, and operates Saudi Arabia’s Bell 406 armed helicopters and AH-64s. There are also security garrisons at most major Saudi cities, including Dhahran, Jeddah, and Riyadh. There are also Royal Guards, which is an independent force located near Riyadh. The Royal Guard Brigade has three battalions and is equipped with light armored vehicles. It reports directly to the King and is recruited from loyal tribes in the Najd. This is an impressive land force order of battle for a country the size of Saudi Arabia, but the Saudi Army has only around 75,000–100,000 full-time actives for a force structure and equipment holdings that require up to at least twice as many men. The current level of Saudi active army manpower is adequate to man about two to three U.S. division ‘‘slices,’’ with minimal manning for combat, combat support, and service support units. In the U.S. Army, it could support a total force with a maximum of around 600 tanks and 1,000 other armored vehicles. In practice, however, the Saudi Army’s manpower must be divided into force structure that has an order of battle equivalent to around three heavy divisions, and with an equipment pool at least that size. This requires more manpower than Saudi Arabia has available. The Saudi Army’s problems in expansion, planning, manpower, organization, and deployment have been compounded by the need to absorb the massive equipment buildup that took place before and after the Gulf War. As has been noted earlier, the army faces the need to operate a complex mix of equipment supplied by many nations and then to be able to operate effectively with the equipment mixes in the forces of regional allies, the United States, and Britain. The diversification of the Saudi Army’s sources of army equipment has reduced its dependence on the United States, but it has also increased its training and support burden and has raised its operations and maintenance costs. Saudi Armored Forces Saudi Army weapons and equipment numbers are more than adequate now that Iraq has ceased to be a threat. Saudi Arabia has an inventory of 1,055 main battle

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tanks and more than 300 tank transporters. Its tanks included 315 M-1A2s, 450 M-60A3s, and 290 obsolete French-made AMX-30s. The Saudi Army now concentrates on maintaining, training, and operating its M-60s and M-1A2s and regularly upgrades them as the U.S. Army develops modifications and improvements. It has shifted its lightly armored and aging AMX-30s to its light brigades. Some experts think that half of its AMX-30s are in storage, however, and only about 700–765 of Saudi Arabia’s main battle tanks are fully operational. Saudi Arabia had solved many of the problems it had faced in converting to the M-1A1 tanks, and this still left it with a core strength of around 380 well-manned M-60A3s, about 200–275 M-1A2s that were combat ready with good crew proficiency, and a residual force of around 160–170 AMX-30s. Saudi Arabia was also considering upgrading its M-1A2s to the M-1A2S configuration, with advanced digital systems and fire control, and buying 58 M-1A1s.29 All would be rebuilt to ‘‘as new’’ condition, and the M-1A1s would be upgraded to M-1A2S status. Saudi Arabia is also considering buying Le Clercs to replace its AMX-30s. Saudi Arabia has a large inventory of other mechanized armored equipment. It has roughly 2,600 armored vehicles in addition to its tanks (300 reconnaissance, 970 armored infantry fighting vehicles, and 1,900 armored personnel carriers) and has a ratio of about 27 actives per other armored vehicle. In contrast, Iran has 1,455 other armored vehicles for 325,000 actives (450,000 if the Revolutionary Guards are included). The Saudi Army also has large numbers of French and U.S.– made armored recovery vehicles, armored bridging units, and large numbers of special purpose armored vehicles. It is not possible to separate all of the Saudi Army’s holdings of other armored fighting vehicles (OAFVs) from those of the National Guard, Border Guard, and other paramilitary forces. According to the IISS Military Balance, the Saudi Army’s holdings of armored infantry fighting and command vehicles seem to have included 400 M-2A2 Bradleys, 150 M-577A1s, and 570+ AMX-10Ps as of late 2004. 30 According to Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, Saudi Arabia has 110 AML-60s and 190 AML-90s.31 In terms of armored personnel carriers, various sources indicate that the Saudi Army had up to 3,000 M-113s in various configurations (the operational inventory may be closer to 1,750–2,000). Saudi Arabia is experimenting with upgrading its M-113s and is studying the upgrades developed by the Turkish Army. It also had 150 Panhard M-3s, 40 Al-Fahads, 440 Piranhas, and 290 V150s (810 more in store) in 2006. It is obvious from these totals that the Saudi Army’s holdings of OAFVs include enough U.S.–supplied equipment to provide reasonable levels of standardization for all of the Saudi Army’s full-time active manpower, as well as a high degree of interoperability with U.S. forces. The Piranha has also proved to be effective in Saudi exercises and trials. At the same time, the Saudi Army’s total inventory of armored weapons not only presents problems in interoperability, standardization, and modernization, there are many variants with the various types of armor listed above that are highly specialized and difficult to properly integrate into Saudi forces in small numbers. Some

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purchases are also the result of past political efforts to give foreign suppliers a share of the Saudi market, regardless of military needs. The end result also further complicates the problems the army would have in moving forces from their widely dispersed peacetime locations in military cities near the Kingdom’s different borders to concentrate them to defend against a given enemy. Saudi Arabia still exercises almost exclusively at the battalion level and does not conduct long-distance brigade-sized exercises. Its armored training is largely firing range and daytime training, and not maneuver and night warfare training. The Saudi Army did learn during the Gulf War that it can draw on its civilian fleet of transporters to move tanks, and trucks for logistic supply, but has little meaningful practice in such operations and does not seem to have detailed contingency plans for such operations. Saudi officers note that the destruction of the Iraqi Army, Iran’s lack of major amphibious lift, and Yemen’s steadily declining military capabilities reduce the potential need to concentrate the Kingdom’s heavy armor. They feel there is now more emphasis on moving lighter and easier to move formations for missions like border security against infiltration and to support the Ministry of Interior in fighting terrorists. Nevertheless, the combination of a lack of interoperability, maintenance and sustainment problems, a lack of large-scale exercise training, and reliance on civilian lift for rapid long-distance armored movement is a significant force limitation. Whether there also is a requirement for Saudi Arabia to develop urban warfare capabilities for its heavy forces is an open question. Saudi officers note that Saudi Army missions are defensive and that any security operations in Saudi cities are the function of the Ministry of Interior security forces. They do not see a potential threat requiring such training and preparation. Saudi Antitank Weapons The Saudi Army has a good mix of small arms, light weaponry, and antitank weapons. These include massive stocks of mobile, crew-portable, and man-portable TOW, HOT, and Dragon antitank guided missiles. Saudi Arabia has a total of some 950 TOW launchers with some 200 TOW launchers mounted on VCC-1 armored fighting vehicles, and an additional 300 mounted on M-113A1s or other U.S.– supplied armored vehicles. It had 100 HOT launchers mounted on AMX-10P armored fighting vehicles. The Saudi Army also has large numbers of TOW crew-portable and roughly 1,000 Dragon man-portable antitank guided weapons systems. It also has 300 Carl Gustav rocket launchers, 400 M-20 3.5’’ rocket launchers, thousands of M-72 LAWs, and extensive numbers of 75-mm, 84-mm, 90-mm (100), and 106-mm (300) rocket launchers and recoilless rifles. Saudi Arabia is replacing its light attack weapons (LAWs) with more effective antiarmor rockets. It is replacing its TOW-1A antitank guided missiles with TOW-2As. Unlike the older antitank guided weapons in some Gulf armies, the Saudi Army

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TOW-2A missiles are very effective in killing T-72A, T-72M1, T-80, and other modern tanks. It is seeking to replace its Dragons with the more modern Javelin. Saudi Artillery The Saudi Army has large numbers of modern artillery weapons. The Saudi Army inventory includes 60 Astros II multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), and it has 110 M109A1B/A2s and 60 GCT 155-mm self-propelled howitzers.32 The Saudi Army had 24 Model 56s and 90–100 M-101/M-102 105-mm towed howitzers and 40 FH-70 155-mm towed howitzers, in storage. It had 40 M-198 and 50 M-114 155-mm towed howitzers in service and 5–10 M-115 203-mm towed howitzers and some other older towed weapons in storage. Its total mortar strength included over 400 120-mm and 4.2´´ weapons, over 1,000 81-mm weapons, and large numbers of light 60-mm weapons. It had 70 81 mm, 150 M-30 4.2´´ mortars on M-106 and M-125A1 armored vehicles, and roughly 200 81-mm–120-mm towed mortars. Saudi artillery units are being equipped with better targeting, command and control, and battle management capabilities, but they do suffer from training, mobility, and support problems. Training is range oriented, and some experts report that many units shoot in serious training exercises only every 1-1/2 years. The Saudi Army needs more and better ballistic computers, mobile fire-control and ammunitionsupply equipment, and desperately needs new target acquisition radars—such as the AN/PPS-15A, MSTAR, or Rasit 3190B. It also needs a modern and fully integrated mix of counterbattery radars and fire-control systems to rapidly mass and shift fires, and to practice night operations in combination with the armored and light forces. In spite of these problems, the Saudi Army has more effective artillery than most Middle Eastern and developing armies do. It has the advantage that the Saudi Air Force is much better equipped to provide firepower for the army in joint operations than most regional air forces, and it is seeking to develop more advanced concepts for combined arms, joint, and maneuver warfare that most regional armies still ignore. Nevertheless, the Saudi Army presently has limited-to-moderate ability to use artillery in maneuver and combined arms warfare, to target effectively in counterbattery fire or at targets beyond visual range, and to shift and concentrate fires. Unless the Kingdom takes combined arms and maneuver warfare more seriously in terms of brigade-size maneuvers and joint warfare exercises, Saudi artillery units will have significant limitation in maneuver warfare. Saudi Light and Medium Air Defense Weapons Saudi Arabia has relatively large numbers of modern air defense weapons by Gulf standards. It is not easy to separate the Saudi Army’s air defense assets from those in the Saudi Air Defense Force, and sources disagree over which force operates given systems. The Saudi Army seems to have 33 SAM batteries and 17 AM/FPS-117

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radars and is organized and equipped to protect its maneuver forces in combat. Total Saudi holdings of short-range air defenses include 73 Crotale (Shahine) radar-guided missiles on tracked armored vehicles and 17 with 68 Shahine firing units, some mounted on AMX-30 tank bodies. Saudi Arabia also has man-portable SAMs. Its current holdings include 500 Mistrals. It is upgrading its Mistrals with better rocket motors and possibly better sensors and countermeasures. It once had around 500 Stingers, which it destroyed in 2002 because of maintenance and security issues; it had previously destroyed holdings of 500 obsolescent Redeye man-portable surface-to-air missiles. Saudi Arabia may have an unknown number of Kolomna KBM Igla (SA-16 Gimlet) weapons. Saudi Arabia bought 50 Stinger launchers and 200 Stinger missiles on an emergency basis in August 1990 and ordered additional Crotales and 700 French Mistral launchers and 1,500 missiles. It is equally difficult to separate the Army’s air defense gun holdings from those of the National Guard, but Saudi Arabia’s total holdings of light antiaircraft weapons seem to include 10 M-42 40-mm and 92 Vulcan M-163 20-mm antiaircraft guns. It also seems to have 150 Bofors L-60/L-70 40-mm and 128 Oerlikon 35-mm towed guns, and possibly 15 M-117 90-mm towed antiaircraft guns. This is a reasonable mix of air defense assets, but training and readiness levels are moderate to low. The separate Saudi Air Defense Force—which controls Saudi Arabia heavy surface-to-air missiles and fixed air defenses—is also a relatively static force that cannot easily support the army in mobile operations. The army’s air defense units consist largely of independent fire units, rather than an integrated system of netted C4I/BM capabilities, although Saudi officers indicate such capabilities are planned. A broader question affects the future of this force, as it does the future of most short-range air defense units (SHORADS). The Afghan and Iraq Wars have shown that a truly modern air force can strike land units with extraordinary lethality using weapons like laser and global positioning system (GPS)-guided weapons at standoff ranges that SHORADS cannot target, that radar-guided air defense systems are easy to locate and bypass or strike with antiradiation missiles, and that optical and infared systems are subject to countermeasure and tracking problems. This does not mean that disperse systems that conceal their presence and ‘‘pop up’’ cannot be effective, that dense or ‘‘curtain’’ fire will not occasionally hit an aircraft with a lucky or ‘‘magic’’ bullet, or that the very existence of such a force does not force aircraft to operate at much longer strike ranges and degrade their effectiveness. It does, however, raise issues about the kind of air defense forces the Saudi Army must plan for in the future. Saudi Army Aviation Saudi Army helicopter forces are important areas for future force improvement, and the Saudi Army has developed a comprehensive army aviation modernization plan that it will seek to implement as funds become available.

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As has been noted earlier, the Saudi Army is highly dispersed, and much of its strength is deployed near Saudi Arabia’s borders at Tabuk, Hafr al-Batin, and Sharurah-Khamis Mushayt. Helicopters offer a partial solution to providing rapid concentration of force and help Saudi Arabia to make up for its lack of experience in large-scale maneuver. They also allow the army to support the Ministry of Interior security forces in counterterrorism missions, and the National Guard, throughout the Kingdom by providing both lift and firepower. These factors first led the Saudi Army to seek attack helicopters in the early 1980s. Saudi Arabia initially experienced political problems in obtaining such helicopters from the United States, and this led the Saudi Army to obtain an option to buy 88 Sikorsky-designed S-70 Black Hawk helicopters from Westland in Britain. Roughly, 80 of these Westlands were to be attack helicopters equipped with TOW2. The rest were to be configured for SAR missions. The order was divided into batches of 40 and 48 aircraft. The Gulf War changed this situation and created the political conditions in which Saudi Arabia could buy the AH-64 from the United States. The AH-64s began to enter Saudi service in 1993. Saudi Arabia eventually took delivery of 12 AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, 155 Hellfire missiles, 24 spare Hellfire launchers, 6 spare engines, and associated equipment from the United States. In 2005, the Saudi Army had a helicopter strength that included 12 AH-64 attack helicopters, 15 Bell 406CS armed helicopters, 12 S-70A-1 Sikorsky Blackhawk transport helicopters, 6 SA-365N medical evacuation helicopters, 10 UL-60 Blackhawk medical evacuation helicopters, and 12 UH-60A transport helicopters. Saudi Arabia announced in 2006 that it was seeking to upgrade its AH-64As to the much more advanced AH-64D configuration, with a fire and forget missile capability for the Hellfire II missile, the AN/APG-78 Longbow fire-control radar, and updated avionics and possibly upgraded engines and night vision systems.33 The Saudi Army has had maintenance problems with its helicopter fleet, although standards seem to be much higher than in Iran and Iraq. It also tends to use helicopters more for search and rescue, light transport, and service and medical evacuation functions than to achieve tactical mobility. This could present problems in terms of training and readiness to compensate for the dispersal of the Saudi Army and in deploying forward defenses. The army would like to buy more attack helicopters, and it sees them as a key future system for both regular and military counterterrorism operations. It has expressed an interest in buying 24 U.S.–supplied UH-60L Blackhawk assault helicopters and possibly 10 NH90 transport helicopters and 20 Cougar search and rescue helicopters. (The latter might be operated by the Royal Saudi Air Force).34 It is studying the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for reconnaissance and targeting missions, as are all of the Saudi military services. It also is working with the Saudi Air Force and Air Defense Force to develop better plans for joint operations, deconflicting fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft in combat operations, and improved airspace control—which is managed by the Saudi Air Force.

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Facilities and Infrastructure The Saudi Army has all the facilities, infrastructure, and equipment necessary to support its forces in peacetime. It has a full series of training facilities for officers and other ranks, and most of its combat forces are in large, self-contained, military cities. These cities have modern housing, good equipment facilities, and adequate maintenance and support facilities for peacetime and limited combat operations near base. There is ongoing construction of facilities near Yemen. This latter effort now seems oriented largely toward border control and the prevention of infiltration or operations by terrorists, although low-level tribal violence still takes place sporadically in the area. The Saudi Army has excellent support facilities, although it underfunded logistic and support vehicles and equipment between the mid-1990s and 2001. Nevertheless, the Saudi Army has made major purchases of support equipment, along with the purchase of its M-1A2s and M-2A2s. It is improving its field support vehicle strength and ordered 10,000 support vehicles from the United States on September 27, 1990, including 1,200 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles. The Saudi Army still has extensive foreign support in spite of cutbacks in foreign manpower and support contracts. The Saudi Army has not, however, created the sustainment and support capabilities necessary to support mobile combat operations in the field. While it did make progress toward converting to maneuver warfare during the Gulf War, it then reverted to a largely static and caserne-oriented pattern of peacetime behavior. As a result, it has failed to give sustainability the same priority as firepower and mobility. The lack of standardization within the Saudi Army adds to these problems, as does excessive dependence on base facilities and foreign civilian support. So would the lack of progress in these areas in the rest of the southern Gulf, in any joint warfare involving regional allies. There are exceptions like attack helicopters, but the Saudi Army now needs the specialized training, organization, and manpower necessary to improve its support structure, and the ability to sustain its existing forces in combat, far more than it needs more weapons. The Saudi Army is still an army that normally operates near its peacetime casernes and will experience serious problems in redeploying its major combat forces unless it has extensive strategic warning. While Saudi Arabia can move a brigade set of armor relatively rapidly, it would take the Saudi Army a minimum of seven to ten days to redeploy a combat sustainable brigade to a new front. Interoperability within the Saudi Army would then be an even broader problem than the previous discussion of armor indicates. Saudi Arabia operates three types of tanks and five different types of major armored fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, with an inventory of more than 20 subtypes. It has major artillery holdings from five different countries, antitank weapons from four, and helicopters from two. This equipment is broadly interoperable, and there is no reason not to buy from a variety of foreign suppliers. However, Saudi Arabia’s unique weather, terrain, and desert warfare conditions create special demands in terms of support and

192


sustainability, and each additional type of weapon increases any army’s training and sustainability problems. Much of the equipment the Saudi Army has purchased has required modification, or extensive changes to its original technical and logistic support plan, before it could be operated in large numbers. New problems may arise the moment the Saudi Army is forced to operate away from its bases, conduct sustained maneuvers, and deal with combat damage. Contractor support is not a substitute for uniformed Saudi combat support and service support capabilities that can deploy and fight in the field, and the Saudi Army’s standardization and interoperability problems are compounded by the need to support equipment in remote and widely dispersed locations. The Saudi Army has tried to reduce such problems by creating an advanced logistics system, but some experts feel this effort has been overly ambitious and has lacked proper advisory management. Military advisory teams generally provide relatively unbiased advice, but do tend to push their own nation’s manufactures. Contract teams—Saudi or foreign—are profit- and sales-oriented groups. The Kingdom should use advice, not rely on it, carefully carrying out its own independent assessment and seek to Saudize contract efforts wherever cost-effective. Saudi planners should examine what Western countries do, compare the systems, and select the best elements tailored to Saudi needs —seeking competitive bids for what must be bought from the outside. ‘‘Trust, but verify’’ applies to more than arms control. Foreign contractors are also expensive, and noncombatants may not be willing to support military operations in the field. The Kingdom now has the manpower pool and skills to create its own major overhaul and maintenance facilities, provide the necessary maintenance and sustainment capabilities in the field, and provide recovery, service, and repair units that will enable it to maneuver in the field. It also has developed to the point where it can still benefit from foreign advice on such issues, but does not need to rely on it. It should be able to create its own plans and make its own choices about logistics, sustainment, and repair systems. It may be initially more expensive to create Saudi-managed and Saudi-manned capabilities, but they will employ Saudis and develop essential skills and military capabilities. Recent wars have shown that field repair and sustainment is as important as initial combat strength and critical to rapid and effective maneuver. Moreover, one of Israel’s advantages over Arab troops in past wars has been that it concentrated on the recovery of damaged equipment in combat and rapidly brought weapons like tanks back into service, while Arab forces tend to abandon equipment with limited combat damage or field repairable maintenance problems. The creation of Saudi-manned major maintenance and overhaul facilities might offer several other advantages. Buying from different suppliers does not by itself guarantee independence or sustainability. Dependence on foreign suppliers is not an issue after the equipment and weapons are delivered if Saudi Arabia has the capability to repair and refit equipment and has bought the necessary stocks of parts and specialized equipment. Turnaround and repair times are shorter and can be

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peaked in preparation for war and sustaining operations without political issues and delays for delivery from the supplier country. Field exercises become far more realistic if emergency repair can be made part of the exercise without adding to foreign contractor costs. Commanders come to see repair and sustainability as an integral part of combat operations and not a task contracted out to foreigners. Developing such capabilities also creates an enhanced ability to modify and modernize equipment and make modifications tailored to Saudi needs that can be bought from a range of foreign suppliers. These are the issues the Saudi Army must now address in light of the fact Iraq has ceased to be a threat. Lighter and more mobile forces may be needed to deal with the problems of infiltration and terrorism. It should be possible to consolidate Saudi forces around the mission of defending against any incursions by Iran or Yemen, cut major equipment purchases, eliminate older and less capable equipment, and stress training and readiness. The Saudi Army also fully recognizes that it needs to focus on developing additional light and heavily mobile forces. Special Forces and counterterrorism units will require new forms of support at every level. Saudi Arabia should make its own choices and create its own operations research and test and evaluation teams, focusing on interoperability, joint warfare performance, and sustainability—and not simply technical specifications and individual equipment performance. It should buy independent sustainability with its weapons in terms of stocks of in-Kingdom service and repair facilities to minimize dependency. Iraq’s defeat and the slow rate of Iranian improvement give the Kingdom time in which to adopt a slower rate of modernization based on its own choices as to what equipment best meets its needs.

Overall Capabilities The preceding comments judge the Saudi Army by a very demanding standard: How it compares with U.S., British, Israeli, and other advanced land forces. Three points need to be stressed in summarizing such judgments for the Saudi Army. First, Saudi Arabia has made immense progress in the last 30 years and has regained the momentum it lost during the 1990s since Prince Khalid bin Sultan became Assistant Minister of Defense in 2001. Second, such standards are absolute and do not take account of the destruction of the Iraqi threat and acute limitations of potential threats like Iran and Yemen. Third, global military standards for readiness are relatively low and the Saudi armed forces not only compare favorably to those of regional powers, but to those of many NATO countries—many of which have not fought a meaningful military action in well over half a century. That said, the Saudi Army does need to press ahead with a focus on readiness, training, and sustainability focused on maneuver warfare, night combat operations, combined arms, and joint warfare. No force can afford to stand still or not seek excellence regardless of today’s known threats and mission requirements. The risk of becoming a ‘‘garrison force’’ is too great; forces that do not progress, regress.

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One key concept that the Saudi Army is examining is to create its own equivalent of the advanced training facilities the U.S. Army has developed at Fort Irwin, to create a similar mix of automated capabilities for large unit joint warfare training, and to demand ‘‘red-blue’’ exercises with highly capable ‘‘threat forces.’’ This is almost certainly the best investment the Saudi Army could make at this time. It is also seeking to expand to brigade-sized exercises with the U.S. Army. This kind of exercise training with friendly and allied forces has equally high priority. THE SAUDI NATIONAL GUARD Saudi Arabia divides its land force manpower between the Saudi Army and the Saudi Arabian National Guard. The National Guard is the successor of the Ikhwan or White Army. It is still largely a tribal force forged out of tribal elements loyal to the Saud family. It was created in 1955 and was originally administered directly by the King until King Faisal appointed the current King, Abdullah, its Commander in 1962. A year later, Abdullah requested a British Military Mission to help modernize the Guard. Since the late 1970s, however, the U.S.–Saudi Arabian National Guard Program and U.S. contractors have provided most of the SANG’s advisory functions.35 In fact, in 1973, Prince Abdullah signed an agreement with the U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia to set up the office of the Program Manager–Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization Program (OPM-SANG). Since then, there have been shifts in the organization, the manpower, and the equipment strength of the Saudi National Guard. The National Guard is sometimes viewed as a counterweight to the regular military forces, where reliance on recruiting from loyal tribes creates a force the regime could count on to checkmate a coup by the regular forces. In practice, however, it has served more to ensure the continued loyalty of various tribes and has evolved steadily toward becoming a more modern force in its own right. Over time, it has become a steadily more effective internal security force, as well as a force that can provide rear-area security for the army and can help defend the major urban areas and critical petroleum infrastructure. The five major current missions of the Guard are as follows: • Maintain security and stability within the Kingdom, • Defend vital facilities (religious sites, oil fields, etc.), • Provide security and a screening force for the Kingdom’s borders, • Provide a combat-ready internal security force for operations throughout the Kingdom, and • Provide security for King Abdullah and the senior members of the royal family.

Since May 2003, the Saudi National Guard has focused on counterterrorism and support of the Ministry of Interior’s security, facilities protection, counterinfiltration in border areas, and counterterrorism operations in built-up areas.

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Strength and Organization The National Guard got its first real modern combat experience during the Gulf War in 1991. It has since steadily improved its readiness and training and has grown into a 95,000-man force. While it retains tribal elements, its modern combat elements have added 730 APCs, 1,117 light armored vehicles (LAVs), more than 73 mortars, and more than 111 antitank guided weapons to its arsenal. The manpower and equipment developments in the Saudi National Guard are shown in Figure 6.4. Estimates of the current full-time strength of the National Guard differ sharply. The IISS reports that SANG had 95,000 actives and 25,000 tribal levies in 2006. A senior U.S. expert quoted a strength of 105,000 in February 2001. Some estimates put the range at 100,000 actives and 30,000 tribal levies. Regardless of the exact numbers, it is clear that the Guard is now far larger than it was at the time of the Gulf War and that it has a full-time active strength approaching that of the Saudi Army. In 2006, the Guard was organized into three mechanized brigades and five infantry brigades. These brigades had modern LAVs and each brigade had some 800 men each and some 360 vehicles. There were also five light infantry brigades, equipped primarily with V-150s. These forces were deployed so that there were two mechanized brigades, and another forming, near Riyadh, plus one light infantry brigade. The Western Sector had three light infantry brigades, and the Eastern Sector had one mechanized and one light infantry brigade. There is one major headquarters located in Riyadh, which controls the units in the central region of the Kingdom. There are two regional headquarters (HQs) located in Dammam and Jeddah. The following order of battle is reported by Jane’s Sentinel Security Estimates:36 • Riyadh Regional Headquarters, which is located in Riyadh, controls the following: • Imam Muhammad bin Saud Mechanized Brigade (IMBS), which controls four battalions (1st–4th) as well as the first artillery battalion, and is based in Riyadh. • Prince Saad Abdulrahman Mechanized Brigade (PSAR), which controls four combined-armed battalions, and is based in Riyadh. • Turki Mechanized Brigade was reported to be in formation in 2002. As of 2006, it remains uncertain as to how developed this unit is. • King Khalid Light Infantry Brigade’s strength is unknown. • Ceremonial Calvary Squadron. • King Khalid Military College. • Military Police battalion. • Irregular Fowj tribal forces. • Eastern Regional Headquarter, which is located in Dammam, controls the following: • King Abdulaziz Mechanized Brigade, was in information in 2002, but its strength and organization is still unknown.

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Figure 6.4 Saudi National Guard’s Force Structure, 1990–2006 1990

2000

2005

2006

55,000

95,000

110,000

120,000

Active

35,000

75,000

95,000

95,000

Reserve

20,000

20,000

20,000

25,000

Mechanized Infantry Brigade

2

3

3

3

Infantry Brigade

2

5

5

5

Manpower

Combat Units

Ceremonial Cavalry

1

1

1

1

0

1,117

1,117

1,117

LAV-25

0

384

384

384

LAV-CP

0

182

182

182

LAV-AG

0

130

130

130

LAV-AT

0

111

111

111

LAV-M

0

73

73

73

Light Armored Vehicle

LAV

0

47

47

47

0

190

190

190

1,100

730 (810)*

730 (810)

730 (810)

1,100

290 (810)

290 (810)

290 (810)

0

440

440

440

TOWED Artillery

68

70

70

70

105 mm: M-102

50

40

40

40

155 mm: M-198

18

30

30

30

0

73+†

73+

73+

81 mm:?

0

?‡

?

?

120 mm:?

0

73+

73+

73+

RL & RCL

?

?

?

?

106 mm: M-40A1

?

?

?

?

?

111+

111+

111+

?

111+

111+

111+

Support Vehicle Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) LA V-150 Commando Piranha

MOR

Antitank Guided Weapon TOW-2A

* Numbers in parentheses refer to weapons that are in storage. † ‘‘+’’ means that the service is believed to possess at least that number. ‡ ‘‘?’’ refers to weapons that the service is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in its possession are unknown. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

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• Prince Mohammad bin Abdulrahman Al Saud Light Infantry Brigade. • Irregular Fowj tribal forces. • Western Regional Headquarter, which is located in Jeddah, controls the following: • One light infantry brigade based in Jeddah. • One light infantry brigade based in Medina. • Omar bin Kattab light infantry brigade based in Taif. • Independent Battalions: In addition to the battalions under the control of the three regional HQs, SANG has four independent light infantry battalions, which appear to be dedicated to protecting facilities and installations.

Major Combat Equipment The Guard does not have a complex or sophisticated mix of equipment and has chosen to standardize on some of the best-wheeled armored weapons available. The Guard’s operational forces are equipped with about 1,117 LAVs in its mechanized units. According to the IISS, these include 384–394 LAV-25s, 182–184 LAV-CPs, 130 LAV-AGs, 111 LAV-ATs, 73 LAV-M 120-mm mortar vehicles, 47 LAVs, plus 190 LAV support vehicles. Its artillery includes 30 U.S.–supplied M198 155-mm howitzers and 40 M102 105-mm howitzers. It also has 290 V-150 Commando armored vehicles in active service in its light infantry forces, plus 810 more V-150s in storage, and 440 Piranha. The Guard prefers wheeled vehicles because of their superior speed, endurance, and ease of maintenance. The Guard also had a significant number of towed artillery weapons. Modernization and New Mission Requirements The Guard is still modernizing, but continues to improve its support and sustainability. Saudi Arabia has agreed to a contract to supply the Guard with replacement parts for its LAVs and APCs, as well as additional vehicles, artillery pieces, and training. The contract, according to Jane’s Defense Weekly, would include a support service for the period January 1, 2004–December 31, 2008, and be a joint venture with Vinnell Cooperation. Its value could total over $900 million. According to some reports, the Guard is considering a potential U.S. foreign military sales (FMS) contract worth some $5.8 billion that would buy 724 General Dynamics Land Systems—including Canada GDLS-C 8x8 light armored vehicles. It has expressed interest in buying some 2,100 AN/AVS-70 and AN-PVS-14 night vision goggles, 630 AN/PAS-13 thermal weapon sights, and handheld, manportable, and vehicle-mounted Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINGARS). It is also reported to be considering the purchase of 76-truck-mounted French CAESAR 155-mm howitzers, new Harris high frequency radios, 162 84-mm recoilless rifles, and a range of other U.S.–supplied equipment.37 The Guard’s present goal is to become a modern, 100,000-man force. The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s statement on November 22, 2003, describes this goal as follows: ‘‘The [SANG] Modernization Program ensures necessary

198


training, logistics, support, doctrine, development and force integration for the continuing expansion and uses of their weapons systems. These services will remain the cornerstone of an effort to upgrade and enhance the future infrastructure of the SANG organization.’’38

Overall Capabilities Just as the regular military services need to comprehensively revise their future plans to take account of the fall of Saddam Hussein and the destruction of Iraq’s armed forces, reexamine the potential threat from Iran, and develop better capabilities for asymmetric warfare, the National Guard needs to reexamine its roles and missions. It has evolved more as a result of history rather than to meet a clear national need. That need has now emerged with the rise of the terrorist threat inside Saudi Arabia. The National Guard must now adapt to more demanding security missions, to counterterrorism, and internal security operations on a far more demanding level than in the past. The defeat of Iraq means there is little point in building up the Guard as a supplement to the regular army. At the same time, the growth of a serious terrorist threat, the critical importance of Saudi petroleum facilities and civil infrastructure, and the problem of securing the Iraqi and Yemeni borders create a clear set of new and more demanding mission priorities for the Guard. This means the Guard needs better training for counterinsurgency, urban warfare, and counterterrorism to protect Saudi Arabia’s critical infrastructure and to protect its petroleum facilities. It needs better ability to protect borders against infiltration by elements too well armed for normal border guards and to reinforce Ministry of Interior forces when they need light mechanized forces. This also means adopting tactics for using its LAVs suited to such missions, which may involve dealing with rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), improvised explosive devices, and even ATGMs in the hands of terrorists and insurgents. At the same time, the Saudi Army has the heavy armor for the kind of urban fighting described above, and may—as did the U.S. Army—need retraining and organizational changes for missions of this kind. The military balance in the Gulf has changed fundamentally over the period since Iran’s defeat in 1988, and the Kingdom may need to make the same shifts toward force transformation as U.S. and British forces. Finally, while some steps have been taken to improve jointness, and create a central command for counterterrorism under the MOI, joint operations are still a problem. The National Guard may send officers for training in the Armed Forces Command and Staff College, but there is still little joint exercise training and coordination. One oddity of the visa problems that have developed between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia since 9/11 is that the Guard has taken advantage of the slots given up by the regular armed services to send more and more officers and personnel to the United States for training. This has obvious advantages, but it is also helping to maintain the gap between the Guard and regular forces.

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Furthermore, efforts to integrate the Guard into the overall C4I/battle management system of the regular forces are waiting on the creation of a new Saudi C4I/battle management system for all the services that will, even if funded, take years to implement. THE SAUDI NAVY The Saudi Navy has slowly improved its readiness and effectiveness, but still has major problems. Only its fleet on the Gulf coast is regarded as having made significant progress as a war-fighting force. Its force on the Red Sea is seen more as a work in progress than a war-fighting force. Joint warfare capabilities are still in development, and the Saudi Navy is not integrated into either a GGC or Saudi–U.S.– U.K. concept of operations. The Saudi Navy must restructure its plans and capabilities to focus on Iran, now that Iraq has ceased to be a threat, and on defense of the Red Sea. It still has a potential surface warfare, antimine warfare, and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) threat from nations like Iran. In practice, however, its immediate threats are potential terrorist attacks, infiltration, and asymmetric warfare. Strength and Organization The manpower strength of the Saudi Navy and other Gulf navies is shown in Figure 6.5. The Saudi Navy has a nominal strength of 15,500–17,000 men, including 3,000–4,500 Marines. It has added more than 6,000 men to its naval power in the past decade. The Saudi Navy is headquartered in Riyadh and has major bases in Jeddah, Jizan, and Al Wajh in the Red Sea, and in Jubail, Dammam, Ras al-Mishab, and Ras al Ghar in the Gulf. Main Surface Combatants Its combat strength includes four Madina-class (F-2000) frigates, three AlRiyadh–class (F-3000S) guided-missile frigates, four Badr-class missile corvettes, and nine Al Siddiq–class guided-missile ships.39 The Madina class has already been refitted and modernized. The Saudi Navy has commissioned three multipurpose antiair warfare frigates, which were scheduled to enter the service between 2004 and 2006. The three frigates are Makkah, commissioned in July 2001; Al-Riyadh, commissioned in July 2002; and Al-Dammam, commissioned in September 2002. Al-Riyadh and Makkah were delivered to the Kingdom on November 7, 2004, and Al-Dammam was scheduled to be delivered later in 2005. The Sawari II accord between France and Saudi Arabia, signed in 1994, includes logistics, training, and infrastructure development. The training mission involves as many as 200 personnel to train Saudi naval forces at the King Faisal Naval Base in Jeddah. The first of their training

200


Figure 6.5 Saudi Navy’s Force Structure, 1990–2006 1990

2000

2005

2006

9,500

15,500

15,500

15,500

Navy

8,000

12,500

12,500

12,500

Marines

1,500

3,000

3,000

3,000

4

4

6(1)*

7

4

4

4

4

Makkah: Mod La Fayette F300S

0

0

1

?/0†

Al-Riyadh: Mod La Fayette F3000S

0

0

1

3

Al-Dammam: Mod La Fayette F3000S

0

0

(1)

?/0

Corvettes

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

9

9

9

9

Al-Siddiq: U.S. 58m PFM

9

9

9

9

Torpedo Craft

3

0

0

0

Jubail: FRG Jaguar

3

0

0

0

Manpower

Frigates Madina: Fr F-2000

Badr: U.S. Tacoma FSG Missile Craft

Patrol Craft

0

17

17

17

U.S. Halter Marine PCI

0

17

17

17

Mine Countermeasures

5

7

7

7

1

3

3

3

Addriyadh: U.S. MSC-322 MCC

4

4

4

4

Amphibious

16

8

8

8

LCU

4

4

4

4

LCM

Al-Jawf: U.K. Sandown MHO

12

4

4

4

Support & Miscellaneous

3

7

7

7

Boraida: Mod Fr Durance

2

2

2

2

AT/F

0

3

3

3

ARS

0

1

1

1

Royal Yacht

0

1

1

1

Ocean Tugs

1

0

0

0

Helicopters

24

31

44

44

4

4

4

4

AS-565 SAR

SAUDI ARABIA

AS-565 AS-15TT ASM

20

15

15

15

AS-323B/F: Transport

0

6

6

6

0

6

6

6

0

0

13

13

140

140

140

140

AS-332B/F: AM-39 Super Puma Bell 406CS BMR-600P

201

* Numbers in parentheses refer to weapons that are in storage. † ‘‘?’’ refers to weapons that the service is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in its possession are unknown. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

missions will start with a nine-week course, including 30 sea days for the Al-Riyadh– class frigate.40 The Sawari II frigates will be 25 percent larger than the French La Fayette class with enhanced antiair warfare and antisubmarine capabilities. They will have the design of DCN’s stealth frigates with highly automated combat management systems based on the Thales Tavitac 2000.41 They are shaped to decrease radar cross section. Furthermore, to reduce vulnerability, the frigates will be designed with double bulkheads, armor around sensitive parts, fire-fighting capabilities, ventilation structure, and redundancy in the systems.42 The Sawari II systems will include the following:43 • Eight antiship missiles, Exocet MM40 Block II SSM, with a 165-kg shaped, charged warhead and a range of 70 km (kilometers), which travel at approximately 0.95 Mach. • The guidance system on the SAM is equipped with data uplink and active radar terminal homing. For increased maneuverability in the terminal phase, the missile uses a ‘‘PIF-PAF’’ direct thrust control system with gas jets. • Two eight-cell Sylver vertical launch systems for Aster 15 SAM, which is effective from 1.7 km to 30 km and to an altitude of 15,000 m (meters). • Guns: an Oto Melara 76/62 and two Giat 15B guns. The Oto Melara 76/72 can fire up to 120 rounds per minute with a range of 20 km. A heavyweight antisubmarine torpedo. • Sonar: a sonar suite is the Thales Underwater Systems CAPTAS 20 towed array sonar. • Radars: The round radome of the Thales Arabel 3D I-band surveillance and firecontrol radar. Thales long-range air search radar, DRBV 26D Jupiter operating at Dband, is forward of the main radar mast. Two Sperry Marine Decca navigation and helicopter control radars are also fitted. • Electronic Warfare (EW): DR 3000 electronic support measures, Altesse communications intercept system, Salamander B2 radar jammer, and TRC 281 communications jammer. Two EADS Dagaie decoy launchers are also fitted. • The deck at the stern has a single landing spot for a medium-size helicopter and has a fully equipped hangar to accommodate one helicopter.

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• Engines: The diesel engines drive two shafts with Rolls-Royce Kamewa controllable pitch propellers.

One of the frigates ran aground in the Jeddah area and has proved difficult to free. It may require a major refit by the manufacturer, and the future status of its vertical launch system is unclear.44 The Saudi Navy’s major surface ships are still a developing force. Actual at-sea performance is increasing, as is exercise activity. It is still low by Western standards, however, particularly in the Red Sea area. Modernization plans are uncertain and no major surface ship purchases seem to be planned in the near future. Some Saudi experts feel the future emphasis should be on smaller ships with less detectable superstructures, high levels of firepower, and ‘‘a compact, AEGIS-like’’ sensor and battle management capability. According to some reports, Saudi Arabia is examining a future buy of a new type of U.S. vessel with AEGIS capabilities. These would be variations of the new U.S. Navy littoral combat ship or LCS. They would provide a potential coastal ballistic missile defense capability, plus very advanced sea-based air, cruise missile, and antiship missile surveillance and defense. The configuration and size is still under study, but could potentially include a 57-mm gun, two quad-pack Harpoon antiship missile launchers, two triple Mark 32 torpedo launchers, and two Mark 41 eight-cell vertical missile launchers for 16 Standard or 64 Evolved Sea Sparrow missile and air defense missiles.45 Smaller Combat Ships, Mine Warfare, and Support Forces The Saudi Navy also has 3 Dammam-class (German Jaguar) torpedo boats, 20 Naja 12 inshore fast craft, 17 Halter-type coastal patrol craft (some in the Coast Guard), 3 Al-Jawf (British Sandown), and 4 Safwa (Addriyah)-class (ex-U.S. MSC322 Bluebird) mine warfare ships.46 The mine warfare mission is potentially critical. It also presents major problems. Libya once laid mines covertly in the Red Sea using a commercial vessel. Iran showed in 1987–1988 that it could disrupt some aspects of Gulf shipping simply by releasing free-floating mines; a wide range of Iranian Navy and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) naval branch forces practice minelaying, including laying freefloating mines. This kind of minelaying can be done by any ship, from a tanker to small craft, and virtually any type of mine from the oldest contact mine to the most modern influence mine can be used. The Saudi mine warfare force is far too small to practice defense against this kind of random threat, and the limited GCC cooperation in mine warfare is hampered by the small size of mine warfare forces in other navies. Although the Saudi Navy does have relatively modern mine vessels, there are also significant technical challenges. The U.S. and British navies could not initially detect an Iraqi minefield during the first Gulf War relying on very similar vessels. U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (IS&R) assets also failed to detect the fact

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the field was being laid. This is a warning that structured minefields could present as much of a threat as random minelaying. Auxiliary ships include three Radhwa-class ocean-going tugs, three Radhwa-class coastal tugs, two Buraida-class replenishment oilers (French Durance class), one Al Riyadh royal yacht, and the Al Azizah hydrofoil yacht tender. The royal yachts are based at Dammam. Submarines? Saudi naval planners differ over the need for a submarine force. Some feel this mission should be left to other forces and that the U.S. and British navies can deal with the ASW threats in the Gulf, Red Sea, and other nearby waters. They note the Saudi Navy already has maintenance and readiness problems and needs forces that are simple and easy to maintain. They view submarines as expensive and very difficult to operate, and as a misuse of money. Nevertheless, other officers disagree—as much for prestige reasons as because of validated mission requirements. Reports indicate that Saudi Arabia is considering acquiring up to four diesel-electric submarines. Reportedly, the Saudis are looking into the Swedish Kockums Type 471, the German IKL 200, and an undetermined French submarine.47 Marine and Amphibious Forces The Saudi Navy has doubled its Marine force in the past decade. The 3,000 to 4,500-man force is organized into a brigade with six battalions. There are now three battalions deployed in the west and three more in the east, deployed near Jeddah and Ras al-Ghar, respectively. The Marines are now being organized and trained for counterterrorism missions as well as asymmetric warfare. Saudi Special Forces have a small SEAL (sea-air-land) component. King Faisal’s great-grandson commands this force. The Marine force was initially equipped with 140 BTR-60Ps. It is now equipped with 140 panish Santa Barbara SBB BMR-600 6x6 amphibious APCs. It seems to have received nearly 100 Al Fahd 8x8 APCs during 2001. The Saudi Navy has 4 Afif-class landing craft utility (LCU) amphibious craft, 4 landing craft mechanized (LCMs), 2 other amphibious craft, 2 10,500-ton Boraida-class (French Durance) support ships, 4 smaller support vessels, 14 tug boats, and large numbers of small patrol boats, including 40 Simmoneau Type 51 inshore patrol boats. While the Navy has lost 8 of its LCM amphibious vessels in recent years, it has kept its 4 Badr Corvettes and added 17 U.S.–made Halter Marine FCI patrol crafts. Saudi Arabia is considering buying more modern LCUs and/or LCMs. Naval Aviation Saudi naval aviation is based at Al Jubail. Various sources report different holdings for Saudi naval aviation. It seems to have included 15 operational SA-565F Dauphin

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ASW and antiship missile helicopters with AS-15TTmissiles, and SA-565s equipped for the search and rescue mission. The SA-365Fs have only limited ASW capability and are configured primarily for the surface search and attack roles. Each combat-equipped SA-365F carries four missiles and has an Agrion search/attack system. They have Crouzet MAD systems and can carry two Mark 46 torpedoes. The Saudi Navy also has 3 Westland Sea King Mark 47 ASW helicopters, 12 landbased AS-332(B/F) Super Puma helicopters, and 13 Bell 406CSs. Some reports indicate the AS-332s included 12 aircraft with Omera search radars, 9 with Giat 20-mm cannons, and 12 with Exocet or Sea Eagle air-to-ship missiles. Other reports indicate the AS-332s included only 6 transport aircraft, plus another 6 with Exocet air-toship missiles.48 Reports that NH-90 helicopters are being purchased for Saudi frigates are not confirmed and may be only a contingency study.49 Saudi Border Guard The Saudi Border Guard is a branch of the Ministry of Interior, and its mission is to defend Saudi Arabia’s land borders. It has an estimated 30,000 men and has its main base at Azizam. Its main equipment includes 2 large Yarmouk-class patrol boats, 2 fast missile attack craft with AS-15TT missiles, 4 large Al-Jouf–class patrol boats, 2 large Al Jubaiel–class patrol boats, 25 Skorpion-class patrol boats, 13 other coastal patrol boats, 4 SRN-6, Model 4 Hovercrafts, 16 Slingsby SAH 2200 Hovercrafts, large numbers of inshore patrol craft, 3 royal yachts, 3 small tankers, fire-fighting craft, and 3 tugs. Saudi Arabia is buying new, very fast patrol craft from the Philippines with 14.5mm guns. These seem to be for the Border Guard. Consideration is being given to either giving the Border Guard helicopters with suitable sensors to extend its range and coverage or to supporting it with Saudi Navy helicopters. The Border Guard’s primary mission has been antismuggling in the past, but it has shifted to internal security, counterinfiltration, counterterrorism, and the defense of critical coastal facilities against terrorism and covert strikes.50 In theory, the Border Guard can draw upon the Saudi Navy and the Saudi Air Force for support, as well as the National Guard and other land services in dealing with serious threats. The Ministry of Interior has the authority to request such support and maintains a joint command and control committee to coordinate such efforts. Saudi naval officers indicate that the Saudi Navy already supplements the Border Guard in patrolling the Red Sea area. In practice, the Border Guard’s real-world surveillance and combat capabilities against such threats are unclear. It is an untested force and while it is reorganizing to meet new threats, there is no way to judge its actual progress. The adequacy of the mission tasking of the Border Guard and the Saudi Navy is unclear as is the interface they have with other security forces in defending critical targets like desalination

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plants, ports, oil facilities, and offshore facilities. It is easy to claim that suitable capabilities and plans for coordination and joint operations exist. It is less clear that such claims can be made good in practice. Roles, Missions, and Capability The Saudi Navy has substantial amounts of modern, expensive ships and equipment, but lacks a clearly defined set of roles and missions, and it needs improved training and readiness. It also needs to develop a clear picture of what its role is as an independent force, in support of outside powers, and as the core of a potential GCC force. It the past, the Saudi Navy has been overshadowed by the dominant role the U.S. and British navies have played in the Gulf, particularly since the ‘‘tanker war’’ against Iran in 1987–1988. Like other southern Gulf navies, the Saudi Navy has never had to develop the level of effectiveness and coordination that would be vital if it could not depend on the navies of other powers. The Red Sea has also been a ‘‘quiet zone,’’ except for a low-level Libyan mine warfare attack, now long in the past, and limited clashes between Yemen and Eritrea over several islands. A force as large, well-equipped, and expensive as the Saudi Navy, however, must be able to perform important roles and missions, and its effectiveness is the key to any future serious effort to create effective GCC forces that are not almost totally dependent on the U.S. Navy in dealing with a potential threat the size of Iran. Several obvious areas where changes could take place to enhance the value of the Saudi Navy and justify its present strength and cost follow: • Protection of critical facilities: The Saudi Navy may never need to directly engage the Iranian Navy, but sabotage or sudden strikes on offshore oil facilities, ports, and critical shoreline facilities like desalination plants are possible and are a form of asymmetric warfare that could do serious damage to the Kingdom. • Mine warfare: Both the tanker war and Gulf War showed the danger mines pose, even if laid in covert operations or as free-floating mines. This is an important mission in conventional war and asymmetric conflicts. • Ship protection and escort: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard is well equipped to launch strikes against tankers and commercial shipping, and terrorists in Yemen have already shown that terrorists can attack in ports and other facilities. • Joint land/air operations: Saudi Arabia has never fully exploited the maritime reconnaissance capabilities of its E-3A, and there is little jointness in Saudi Navy, Saudi Air Force, and Saudi Air Defense Force operations. The Saudi Navy would be far more effective as part of a joint team, able to use direct intervention with seapower when needed, relying on air strikes when more desirable, and carrying out maritime surveillance against both combat ships and potential covert and unconventional infiltration and operations. • A maritime role in air and missile defense: Saudi E-3As have limits to their lowaltitude coverage and endurance. The ability to provide a forward screen of pickets and

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radar coverage could help provide warning of air and cruise missile attacks, particularly if netted into the Saudi Air Force and Saudi Air Defense Force warning and control system. • Antiamphibious raid and operations capability: Iran has limited amphibious lift, but extensive ferry and Revolutionary Guard raid capabilities. These can attack offshore facilities, raid shoreline areas, and potentially transfer forces to a port in the event of a coup or upheaval in a southern Gulf country.

It should be noted that in all these missions, the Saudi Navy would benefit from a force multiplier effect if there was far closer and more realistic cooperation among all of the southern Gulf navies and if the Saudi Navy participated in more demanding and realistic exercises with the U.S. and British navies, such as an expansion of the Red Reef exercise series. It is equally clear that jointness with the Saudi Air Force, Saudi Border Guard, and possibly the Saudi Air Defense Force is critical to both conventional warfare and to meeting the threat of infiltration, terrorism, and asymmetric warfare. THE SAUDI AIR FORCE The Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) is one of the most technically advanced air forces in the Middle East. It also has the potential to be the most decisive single element of both Saudi forces and the military forces of the Gulf Cooperation Council. However, it developed significant shortcomings during the 1990s that it is now struggling to overcome. Between 1994 and 2001, the air force suffered from poor leadership that mishandled overall training and readiness, underfunded readiness, and mismanaged procurement. The resulting shortcomings included the following: • A lack of overall readiness, and poor aircrew and maintenance to aircraft ratios, severely reduced the effectiveness of its F-15s and Tornados. Monthly training hours for the F-15, for example, dropped to 6 hours. They have since risen back to 9 hours, but need to be 12–18 hours. Long-range mission and refueling training also dropped sharply, but is slowly being brought up to standard. • Mistakes in managing the Saudization of contract maintenance and support personnel led high-quality personnel to leave. This and poor contractor management helped bring readiness to the point of near crisis and led to an increase in the air force’s accident rate. • An overemphasis on air defense at the expense of offensive air capabilities occurred, particularly in capabilities designed to deal with advancing Iraqi armor or the naval threat from Iran. • There was a failure to develop effective joint warfare capabilities, realistic joint warfare training capabilities, and to transform joint warfare doctrine into fully effective warfighting plans to support the land-based Air Defense Force, and the Saudi Army, the National Guard, and the Saudi Navy. • There was a failure to develop a truly integrated air defense and war-fighting capability with other southern Gulf states.

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• There was a failure to rapidly modernize the RSAF C4I/SR (command, control, communication, computer, surveillance, and reconnaissance) and battle management system, to develop high capacity secure communications, and to expand the role of sensor, electronic warfare, and intelligence aircraft to support offensive and joint warfare missions. • There was a failure to modernize training to support realistic offensive and joint warfare missions.

This situation is being corrected. Since 2001, the Royal Saudi Air Force has seen a significant new emphasis on readiness, combat effectiveness, and joint warfare and has improved its cooperation with the other services. It takes time to recover an ‘‘edge,’’ however, and it will be at least several years before RSAF readiness, training, and maintenance can be increased to the point where the Royal Saudi Air Force can exploit its equipment and technology effectively. The RSAF still needs to set more demanding standards at every level in terms of meeting training qualifications and performance, and particularly to eliminate pilots who cannot fly demanding flight profiles and meet the required number of training hours and either to force contract maintenance to meet high standards or find a new source of contract support. Strength and Structure The trends in the strength, organization, and modernization of the Saudi Air Force are summarized in Figure 6.6. The RSAF has about 18,000 men, not including another 16,000 men in the Air Defense Force. According to one source, the RSAF’s combat forces were organized into six wings with a total of 15 combat squadrons and about 256–259 operational first-line, fixedwing combat aircraft and 39 combat-capable trainers. The IISS estimates that Saudi Arabia, in 2006, maintains a total inventory of about 291 active combat aircraft. The Saudi Army operates an additional force of 12 AH-64 attack helicopters, and the Saudi Navy has 21 more armed helicopters. These armed naval helicopters include 19 AS-56 helicopters, of which 4 are equipped for the search and rescue mission, and 15 AS-15TT antiship missiles, 6 AS-332B transports, and 6 AS-332Bs equipped with Exocet antiship missiles.51 Combat Aircraft Saudi Arabia’s total inventory of major combat aircraft in 2005 is estimated to include 68–71 F-15Ss, 66 F-15Cs, 18 F-15Ds, 85 Tornado IDSs (10 Tornado GR.1 RECCE-attack equipped), 22 Tornado Air Defense Variants (ADVs), and 5 E-3A AWACS. The RSAF also has 56 F-5Es, 21 F-5Fs, and 15 F-5Bs that it has been trying to sell for several years. By early 2001, most of its F-5s were grounded and in storage, including 53 F-5Es. The RSAF has 10–15 RF-5Es and continues to fly these as its

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Figure 6.6 Saudi Air Force’s Force Structure, 1990–2006 1990

2000

2005

2006

Manpower

22,000

36,000

34,000

34,000

Air Force

18,000

20,000

18,000

18,000

Air Defense

4,000

16,000

16,000

16,000


189

417

291

291

Fighter-Ground Attack

5/99

7/225

4/224

4/171

F-5B/F/RF

21

21

15

15

F-5E

53

56

53

?†

Tornado IDS

25

76

85

85

F-15S

0

72

71

71

5/76

9/118

9/106

9/106

Fighter-Interceptor

*

Tornado ADV

19

24

22

22

F15C

42

70

66

66

F15D

15

24

18

18

Reconnaissance

1/10

1/10

1/10

1/25

Tornado IDS

0

0

10

10

RF-5E

10

10

0

15

1/5

1/5

1/5

1/5

Airborne Early Warning E-3A/B

5

5

5

5

1/16

1/16

1/165

1/11

KE-3A

8

8

7

3

KC-130H

8

8

8

8

2/14

2/14

2/14

2/14

14

14

14

14

3/70

3/39

3/45

3/45

Tanker Aircraft

Operational Conversion Units F-5B Transport Aircraft C-130

30

36

38

38

L-100-30HS

5

3

3

3

CN-235

0

0

4

4

C-212

35

0

0

0

Utility Helicopters

2/48

2/104

2/78

2/78

AB-205

8

22

22

22

AB-206A

13

13

13

13

AB-212

27

17

17

17

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AB-412

0

40

16

16

AS-532A2

0

12

10

10

KV-107

7

0

0

0

?/60

7/114

7/122

7/122

Hawk

29

50

43

43

Training Aircraft PC-9

30

50

45

45

Jetstream

1

1

1

1

Cessna 172

0

13

13

13

Super Mushshaq

0

0

20

20

BAC-167

35

0

0

0

?

?

?

?

AGM Maverick

?

?

?

?

Sea Eagle

0

?

?

?

ALARM

0

?

?

?

AS-15

?

0

0

0

?

?

?

?

AIM-9J/L/L/M/P Sidewinder

?

?

?

?

AIM-7F Sparrow

?

?

?

?

Skyflash

0

?

?

?

420

420

340

1,140

Air-to-Surface Missiles

Air-to-Air Missiles

Air Defense Guns 20 mm: M-163 Vulcan

92

92

92

92

30 mm: AMX-30SA

50

50

50

850

35 mm

128

128

128

128

40 mm: L/70

150

150

70

70


269

309

1,709

5,284

Shahine

141

141

141

1,156

MIM-23B

128

128

128

2,048

0

40

40

40

Crotale Stinger/FIM-92A Avenger

0

0

400

400

Redeye

0

0

500

500

Mistral

0

0

500

500

PAC-2/Patriot

0

0

0

640

* Numbers listed with a slash mark indicate how many squadrons the craft are broken into. † ‘‘?’’ refers to weapons that the service is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in its possession are unknown. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

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main reconnaissance aircraft. The RF-5Es flying out of Taif play a critical role in providing surveillance over the Yemeni border area. Another 14–15 F-5Bs still seem to be operational in a combat-capable training unit.52 In theory, there are still three squadrons with up to 53 F-5Es, but virtually all of these aircraft were grounded in 2005. This explains the drop in the RSAF’s holding of Fighter-Ground Attack from 224 to 171 between 2005 and 2006, which is shown in Figure 6.6. There are four fighter-attack squadrons, three with Tornado IDSs, and one with 15 F-15Bs. The IDS squadrons had dual-capable trainer aircraft, and 10 had a dual-mission capability in the reconnaissance role, although it is unclear whether they are actually used in this role. These squadrons were equipped with a wide range of attack munitions, including laser and GPS-guided bombs, and the AS-15, AS-30, AGM-45 Shrike, and AGM-65 Maverick air-to-surface missiles. There is a large inventory of dumb bombs and cluster munitions. The Sea Eagle and the Alarm air-to-ground weapons are aging and proved expensive to support and have been withdrawn from service, and Saudi Arabia is seeking more advanced air-to-surface weapons like the Joint Direct Attack Munition. The Tornado IDS squadrons provide much of the potential offensive strength of the Saudi Air Force. The Tornado is used in both low-altitude and mediumaltitude attack missions. The Tornado does have superior low-altitude flight performance in attack missions to the F-15S because the F-15S is subject to buffeting because of its large wing area. The RSAF has largely abandoned training in this mission profile, however, and now relies almost exclusively on using the IDS in mediumaltitude strike profiles. The F-15S has accordingly become the most important offensive aircraft in Saudi inventory, although it is also dual capable in the air-to-air role. It has notably more power and lift capability than the F-15C/D and much more modern avionics and flat panel displays. Saudi pilots feel it is far superior to the IDS in practice in terms of standoff precision strike capability at medium and high altitudes—mission profiles, which now offer more precision and survivability than low-altitude strike profiles. Both the F-15S and IDS aircraft can deliver laser-guided and GPS-guided bombs and self-illuminate their targets, and the F-15S is again superior in this role. Both aircraft are being steadily improved as the USAF and the U.K. Royal Air Force (RAF) implement multistage improvement plans (MSIPs). The RSAF has nine interceptor squadrons for defensive missions. There are five squadrons with a total of 84 F-15C/Ds (66 F-15Cs and 18 F-15Ds) and more squadrons with 71 F-15Ss. F-15Ds were deployed to each F-15 squadron to perform both training and operational missions. There was one Tornado ADV squadron with 22 aircraft, which also included dual-capable trainer aircraft. Saudi pilots feel the ADV is not a successful air combat design (which has also been the experience of the RAF), and this aircraft has been deployed to Khamis Mushayt, which the RSAF feels is an area with a relatively low air combat threat, when Saudi F-15C/Ds replaced phased out F-5s at Taif and Tabuk. Saudi fighters are equipped with modern air-to-air missiles, including AIM-9L and AIM-9P infrared-guided missiles and AIM-7F Sparrow and Sky flash radar-

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guided missiles. The RSAF is taking delivery on the Advanced Medium-Range Airto-Air Missile, which is giving it substantial beyond visual range all-weather air combat capability. Saudi F-15 fighter units are capable in the air defense role, but most aircrews now lack adequate advanced fighter combat training. As has been noted earlier, the training of Saudi aircrews became weak to the point during the mid- and late-1990s where it presented serious safety problems in advanced mission profiles and led to a number of fatal accidents. The level of accidents no longer is high relative to force numbers, but is still high in terms of hours flown. Mission training is also slowly becoming more demanding, and more advanced training efforts are under way at King Khalid and Prince Sultan bases. Saudi Arabia also needs to examine ways to speed up the tempo of its offensive air operations. It relies largely on the relatively slow reacting cycle of target-acquisitionsortie allocation-mission execution-battle damage assessment used during the Gulf War. This air traffic order system was vastly speeded up during the Iraq War, and both the Afghan and Iraq conflicts have shown the value of near-real time and in-flight mission tasking and retasking and have used on-call strike airpower ready to respond to ground force needs and target illumination. Both Saudi Air Force and Army officers see a shift to near-real-time strike operations as being of major importance. Dropping the F-5E presented special problems that led Saudi Arabia to obtain U.S. permission to deploy some of its F-15s to Tabuk in western Saudi Arabia in 2003, although it had previously agreed not to do so because of Israeli security concerns. This deployment has little, if any, practical impact on Israel’s security, but has significantly improved the RSAF’s ability to cover Saudi Arabia’s western border. Possible Upgrades to RSAF Combat Aircraft The RSAF has talked about upgrading its combat aircraft for several years. The increases in oil prices and Saudi export revenues have enabled the Kingdom to think of possible ‘‘options’’ to enhance its RSAF capabilities. Saudi officials have talked about upgrading current aircraft, such as the Tornados, or purchasing new planes, such as the Rafael, the Eurofighter Typhoon, or a U.S.–made aircraft. As is the case with any procurement or offset program, the Kingdom must focus on how such a deal does or does not serve its overall strategic interests. It is far from clear that the Saudi Air Force needs any new aircraft at this time or what the threat is given the disappearance of the Iraqi Air Force and the lack of modernization and growth in the Iranian and Yemeni Air Forces. If an arms deal is seen as important to the Kingdom’s national defense, the contract must include proper training, munitions, and logistic support to ensure against waste and the ‘‘glitter factor.’’ Saudi Arabia’s prestige is enhanced not by adding another weapon system to its arsenal, but rather by developing the necessary jointness, interoperability, and sustainment in its armed forces. In addition, the Kingdom must improve its manpower training program, enhance its integrated C4I and IS&R, and focus on building

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jointness and interoperability between the Saudi services, among its Gulf allies, and with a power-projection partner such as the United States and the United Kingdom. Upgrading the RSAF Tornados? In early 2005, the RSAF had 85 Tornado IDSs (10 Tornado GR1 RECCE-attack equipped) and 22 Tornado ADVs. It was reported that in April 2005, three of the RSAF’s Tornado IDS strike/attack aircraft were seen at a BAE Systems’ facility in England. BAE said that the aircraft were in their Warton facility as part of the Al-Yamamah support contract.53 Other experts, however, have argued that the Tornados’ arrival in England is a prelude to an upgrade contract for the RSAF GR1 fleet. The three aircraft, they said, were prototypes for the upcoming upgrade. The British Royal Air Forces adapted some modification to its fleet in 2003. The upgrades, while believed to be more extensive than what the RSAF may adapt, may give a good benchmark of any possible upgrade.54 The Tornado mid-life upgrade, the GR4 configuration, which is an update from the GR1 model, based on lessons learned from the Tornado’s performance in the Gulf War, includes the following:55 • New avionics to improve navigation and flight performance, including more advanced GPS equipment; • FLIR (Forward Looking InfraRed), NVG (Night Vision Goggle capabilities), and Laser Designation facilities to allow for precision bombing; • A multifunctional pilot head-up display and head-down display of flight, navigation, attack, or other information such as thermal imaging projected on the pilot’s forward field of view; • Improved reconnaissance capabilities; • Defensive aids subsystems to protect the aircraft from SAMs and radar-directed antiaircraft (AA) guns; • Equipped with Sea Eagle antishipping missiles; • A 1760 weapons bus controlling the release of new advanced missiles like Brimstone; • Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missiles; and • Storm Shadow standoff cruise missiles.

The GR4 was used by the British Air Force in Southern Watch and in the Iraq War. All indications are that the aircraft performed well. Its main role was ground medium- and low-level precision strikes. The upgraded Tornado aircraft are more stealthy planes. They have the capabilities to see in the dark using their FLIRs and NVGs, fly in close formation, and at terrain-following height. These characteristics give the GR4 higher abilities of deep covert incursions.56 It is uncertain whether the Kingdom has agreed to upgrade it fleet, what type of updates it has agreed to, or the cost of the contract. If the rumors are true and the

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upgrades include most if not all the GR4 configurations, it might well be a cost-effective way of enhancing the RSAF stealth capabilities and give the Kingdom an edge. Purchasing the Rafael? Following then Crown Prince Abdullah’s trip to Paris in April 2005, it was rumored that the Kingdom has been in discussion with France’s Dassault Aviation for the purchase of 96 Rafael combat aircraft. According to press reports, the Kingdom and France have agreed ‘‘in principle’’ to finalize Saudi Arabia’s purchase of 48 aircraft with an option to buy 48 more for 6.0 billion.57 Later reports provide similar details and indicate that the RSAF might buy French helicopters and Airbus transport/tankers as well. These could include two A-330-200 multirole tanker-transporters, 10 NH90 medium transport helicopters, and 30 AS/550/555 light utility helicopters, with a potential follow-on buy of 40 more NH90s and 20 AS532s. If the buy actually takes place, some of the helicopters could be operated by the Saudi Army or SANG.58 Dassault played down the report and said that the aviation company has been in discussions with the Kingdom for years about the Rafael. It was reported that the Rafael A prototype was presented to Saudi Arabia in 1986. 59 The Kingdom unequivocally denied any discussions over the Rafael. The Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud Al Faisal, was quoted as saying, ‘‘Prince Abdullah’s visit was more significant than concluding commercial deals.’’ When asked about any aircraft deal with France, Al Faisal said, ‘‘No decisions have been taken on these issues and thus we were not able to sign deals during this visit.’’60 The Rafael is a twin-jet aircraft designed for short- and long-term missions. It is equipped for land and sea attacks, air defense, and air superiority. It can also be used for high-accuracy strikes and nuclear-strike deterrence. The Rafael has three models: the Rafale M is a single seat and is made for the navy, the Rafale B is a two-seat plane and is made for the air force, and the Rafale C is a two-seat aircraft made for the air force. It is unclear if a deal was made on the Rafael or which model the Kingdom may purchase. Some experts have argued that this ‘‘agreement’’ with France is a reminder by the Saudis to the ‘‘British and US governments that there are other options out there when it comes to buying combat aircraft. It reminds their allies how important they are. However, I don’t believe there is the political will or funding to purchase new aircraft at this time.’’61 The Eurofighter Typhoon The discussions about upgrading the Tornados or purchasing the Rafael jet were denied by the Kingdom as settled by the announcement that Saudi Arabia was signing a $19-billion deal with Britain to purchase 72 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft. In addition, the deal to purchase the Eurofighters, reportedly, would also include maintenance, spares, weapons, and training for the next 25 years.62

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These jets would replace RSAF’s aging Tornados, which were purchased from Britain in the 1980s. In addition, part of the deal is that the United Kingdom would take the RSAF used planes. Crown Prince Sultan, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Defense, was quoted as saying, ‘‘Britain. . .has agreed to take away from us all our used aircraft whether they are American- or British-built, and they number about 200 planes.’’ This move to require sellers to take old planes, according to Saudi military officials, has been the policy of Saudi Arabia.63 However, it has also been reported that the deal is also expected to include an upgrade of 84 Panavia Tornado interdictor strike aircraft, which are already in service with the RSAF. Saudi Arabia, however, is reportedly eager to replace 22 Tornado ADVs that have been in service since the 1980s.64 While few details about the deals are actually known, press reports have quoted both Saudi and British officials as saying that the deliveries of the Typhoons will start in 2008 and that Saudi Arabia plans to establish closer ties with the United Kingdom, modernizing the RSAF through joint exercises and training. Saudi Typhoon pilots and ground crews are expected to be trained by the U.K. Royal Air Force’s Typhoon conversion unit at Coningsby in Lincolnshire. In the future, a team from the U.K. RAF and BAE Systems (the manufacturer of the Typhoon) is expected to move to Saudi Arabia to help the Saudis establish their own training and support facilities for the aircraft.65 Reconnaissance and Early Warning Saudi Arabia has been the only southern Gulf air force with meaningful numbers of reconnaissance aircraft. The RSAF must, however, rely heavily on two aging reconnaissance squadrons with 10–15 RF-5Es. These aircraft have reached obsolescence in terms of their sensors and survivability, however, and most are now deadlined or in storage. It is seeking to replace them by adding advanced reconnaissance packages to its F-15s, including reconnaissance and electronic warfare pods. The 10 Tornado IDS-Rs in the fighter-ground attack force can perform some missions, but their current role and capability is unclear. The RSAF has an airborne early warning squadron with four E-3As and one E-3B communications intelligence aircraft. These aircraft now have Saudi crews, but the crews are still acquiring all of the training and mission capability necessary to manage complex air battles, and the RSAF must rely on the USAF for help in such missions. The Saudi E-3As need better secure communications and data links, although this may come along with the upgrading of their software and improved electronic support measures. The Saudis have improved the connectivity of their E-3As with the air defense command center as well as with the Saudi Navy. During the Gulf War in 1991, these connectivity problems forced the Saudi Navy to rely on USAF E-3As. The departure of the United States from the command center at Prince Sultan Air Force Base after the Iraq War did, however, leave the RSAF without a truly advanced air command center and overall C4I battle management center and system and one that allows it

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to shift effectively from preplanned to near-real-time mission planning. Acquiring such a capability is a high priority for the RSAF for both the air defense and offensive missions. As has been mentioned earlier, it was reported that the Kingdom was discussing the purchase of 14 Airborne Early Warning & Control planes. One key candidate is based on Sweden’s Saab 2000, equipped with the Erieye radar and sensor suite by Ericsson Microwave Systems. Saudi Arabia has MQM-74C Chukar II and Banshee remotely piloted vehicles for training, reconnaissance, and target acquisition. It does not have modern UAVs or use its drones in this role. Training Aircraft The remaining multipurpose squadron with 14 F-5Bs has both training and combat missions, but had little real operational capability in combat. The RSAF has roughly 25 armed Hawk Mark 65 jet trainers and 20 armed Hawk Mark 65A jet trainers. Saudi holdings of 36 BAC-167 turboprop COIN and training aircraft were phased out of service in the late 1990s. The Hawk units are technically capable of performing COIN and light attack functions with machine guns, cannons, and rockets, in addition to training missions, but the limited combat mission training of the Hawk aircrews prevents the RSAF from using them in that role. The RSAF also has 13 Cessna 172s, 1 Jetstream, and 50 PC-9 aircraft in training units that were not armed for combat. The RSAF has purchased Super Mushshaqs from Pakistan, and the IISS estimates that the RSAF has received the first 20. Refueling, Transport, and Support The RSAF is the only Gulf air force with an effective midair refueling capability. Its support units include a tanker squadron with eight KE-3A tanker/transports and eight KC-130H tankers. Along with the extremely high mission support capacity of Saudi air bases, tanker refueling capability is critical to the RSAF’s ability to rapidly deploy its forces from one end of the Kingdom to another and mass airpower from different bases over the same area of operations. Tanker upgrades and modernization are a high priority for the RSAF. The Saudi Air Force has three transport squadrons with 38 C-130 cargo transports (7 Es, 29 Hs, and 2 H-30s), 1 KE-3B (EW), 3 L-100-30HS hospital aircraft, and 4 CN-235s. The C-130 is the workhorse of the RSAF, and it is of increasing value in providing mobility for light forces to fight terrorism. Upgrading the C-130 fleet is a high priority. There are also two helicopter squadrons with 22 AB-205s, 13 AB-206s, 17 AB212s, 40 AB-41EP (SAR), and 10 AS-5323A2 (SAR). Three AS-532A2 Cougar search and rescue helicopters were ordered from France in September 1996, at a cost of $590 million.66 The Royal Flight provided substantial additional airlift assets, including 2 B-747SPs, 1 B-737-200, 4 BAE 125-800s, 2 Gulfstream IIIs, 2 Learjet 35s, 4 VC-130Hs, and 5 utility helicopters.

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Munitions and Spares Saudi Arabia has moderate but aging inventories of air munitions and spares—a marked decline from the large inventories of cutting-edge munitions and high inventories it had at the time of the Gulf War. The Kingdom has not continued to properly maintain and modernize its munitions inventory, however, and has not procured all of the air-to-ground and antiship ordnance necessary for joint warfare. Support, Training, Logistics, and Sustainment Saudi Air Force facilities remain excellent. No U.S. or NATO base has sheltering or hardening equal to the Saudi bases at Dhahran and Khamis Mushayt, and similar facilities are being built at all of Saudi Arabia’s main operating bases. Saudi bases also have significant modern maintenance and service facilities, including advanced F-15 services facilities at Khamis Mushayt. As has been noted earlier, however, maintenance and sustainment still present problems. Up until the mid-1990s, the Saudi Air Force had excellent foreign support. The Kingdom did, however, face growing financing and payment problems after the mid-1990s, and these problems worsened after the oil crash of late 1997. This created a climate where readiness and sustainment were not properly funded. Efforts to force the rate of Saudization in contractor maintenance and support without adequate resources and standards have not helped. Foreign contractors have often been replaced with Saudis selected more for their contacts than for their skills, and training programs for Saudis have not enforced the proper qualification standards. Some U.S. experts and Saudis blame the main maintenance contractor for these problems, but several Saudi unit commanders feel the problem has been the funding and flow of spare parts and equipment orders. They note that the flow of parts and equipment has become much slower since 9/11, that it is much harder to maintain readiness with long lead times for orders, that reexport of serviced equipment experiences serious delays, and that the United States and U.S. manufacturers refuse to license key service and maintenance activities. The RSAF has failed to make adequate use of its offset programs. These have some important successes, but they have not developed the level of maintenance, major repair, and other capabilities the RASF needs to support sustained operations and maintain readiness. Overall Capabilities Training and readiness are the most serious problems the RSAF faces at several different levels. As has been discussed earlier, Saudi flight hours per aircrew have improved strikingly over the last few years from an average monthly low of only 6 hours to 12–14 hours, but still need to be raised, and the realism of the training missions flown remains a problem.

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Above all, the RSAF must move forward to ensure that all of the pilots it trains, retains, and promotes actually fly suitable numbers of hours. Moreover, flight hours must be spent in truly demanding training profiles for the use of precision weapons in interdiction and close support missions and include integrated air defense training using large numbers of fighters, its E-3As, and Air Defense Forces in demanding ‘‘aggressor’’ exercises. The RSAF and other Saudi services, especially the Air Defense Force and the Saudi Navy, also need a modern C4I/battle management system to replace the one the United States withdrew from Prince Sultan Air Force Base south of Riyadh after the Iraq War. No U.S. facilities remain other than the office furniture, and Saudi Arabia badly needs an advanced system to replace it that is both tailored to Saudi needs and interoperable with the relocated U.S. capabilities now located in Qatar. This is also a key modernization priority for the GCC, but there seems to be little chance the GCC can agree on an effective system and a very good chance it could waste more money on efforts of little more than symbolic value for actual war fighting. The Gulf War, Kosovo conflict, and Iraq War all demonstrate the fact that integrated, joint air operations can be decisive, but are extraordinarily difficult to conduct. They require extensive preconflict training between all elements of the armed forces, and particularly in air-land battle exercises. These wars also show that meaningful air training must be conducted primarily on a task force basis and integrate all elements of targeting, strike planning, damage assessment, and jointness with the land forces. Put differently, the RSAF must ask itself why the Iraqi Air Force collapsed after a few days in 1991 and failed to fight in 2003. It must ask why the Syrian Air Force has become something of a military joke, and why Israel has acquired such an edge. The answer is that effective C4I/BM and IS&R integration of the air force is the key to modern air warfare. Without it, military spending can produce only a third rate or ineffective force. Once again, the destruction of the Iraqi threat and the slow pace of Iranian modernization give Saudi Arabia a window of opportunity in which it can concentrate on effectiveness rather than modernization and force building. The Saudi Air Force’s most important challenges are the improvement of its readiness, training, and capability for joint operations. As a result, Saudi Arabia has no immediate need for replacement of its F-5Es or for any other major procurement. It can consolidate around its most advanced aircraft, creating a smaller and more effective force.

SAUDI LAND-BASED AIR DEFENSES Saudi Arabia has extensive land-based air defenses, some under a separate Air Defense Force and some integrated into other services. The recent trends in the strength, organization, equipment holdings, and modernization of this force are shown in Figure 6.7. It is equally important, however, to note that before 2006, most

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Figure 6.7 Saudi Air Defense’s Force Structure, 1990–2006 1990

2000

2005

2006

4,000

16,000

16,000

16,000

33

33

33

33

With 128 I-Hawk

16

16

16

16

With 68 Shahine Fire units

17

17

17

17

With 160 PAC-2 Launchers

0

0

2–4

2–4

Shahine Fire Units as Static Defense

73

73

73

73

Air Defense Guns

?*

?

?

1,140

?

?

?

92

Manpower Surface-to-Air Missile Batteries

20 mm: M-63 Vulcan 30 mm: AMX-30SA

?

?

?

850

35-mm Oerlikon

?

?

?

128

(150)†

(150)

(70)

(70)

269

309

1,709

5,284

Shahine

141

141

141

1,156

MIM-23B I-Hawk

128

128

128

2,048

Crotale

0

40

40

40

Stinger/Avenger FIM 92-A

0

0

400

400

Redeye

0

0

500

500

Mistral

0

0

500

500

40 mm: L/70 Surface-to-Air Missile Launchers

PAC-2/Patriot

0

0

0

640

RADAR/AD RADAR

?

?

?

0

AN/FPS-117

?

?

?

17

* ‘‘?’’ refers to weapons that the service is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in its possession are unknown. † Numbers in parentheses refer to weapons that are in storage. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

of the Saudi Air Defense equipment was reported under the RSAF and not under its air defense force. The Saudi Air Defense Force The Saudi Air Defense Force (ADF) had a nominal strength of 16,000 men in 2005 and some 33 surface-to-air missile batteries. Some reports indicated its total major surface-to-air missile strength included 16 Improved Hawk batteries with

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128 fixed and mobile fire units, 9 Crotale batteries with 48 Crotale fire units (currently being modernized), 16 air defense batteries with 72 Shahine fire units, and 50 AMX-30SA 30-mm self-propelled guns. The IISS reported a strength of 16 Improved Hawk batteries with 128 fire units, 17 air defense batteries with 68 Shahine fire units and AMX-30SA 30-mm selfpropelled guns, 73 Crotale and Shahine fire units in static positions, and 2–4 with 640 PAC-2 launchers. It also reported a total inventory of 50 AMX-30SAs, 141 Shahine launchers, and 40 Crotale launchers. It also reported 92 M-163 20mm Vulcan antiaircraft guns and 50 AMX-30SA antiaircraft guns, plus 70 L/70 40-mm antiaircraft guns in storage. The Saudi ADF has also added 400 Stingers, 500 Redeyes, and 500 Mistrals to its arsenal. The ADF structure development, since the Gulf War, can be seen in more detail in Figure 6.7. Most of Saudi Arabia’s Shahine units were deployed in fixed locations for the defense of air bases and key targets. All of the Shahine systems have been upgraded as the result of an agreement with France signed in 1991. These units provide short-range defense capability for virtually all of Saudi Arabia’s major cities, ports, oil facilities, and military bases. The Patriot and the I-Hawk While the I-Hawk still plays a major role in Saudi air defense, it is an aging system, and the Patriot has become Saudi Arabia’s main land-based air defense system. Saudi Arabia now has five major operational MIM-104 Patriot fire units and brought the fifth unit on-line in 2004. A sixth unit has been procured and is in storage while suitable manpower is trained. The United States deployed an additional Patriot battalion near Riyadh in 2001, but withdrew it after Iraq ceased to be a threat in 2003. The Patriot was bought after the Gulf War, but has taken some years to come online. Live fire exercises began to take place in the fall of 2000, and mobile operations took some years to develop. The first mobile deployment approaching a combat exercise was a road march from Dhahran to a site near King Khalid Military City in the fall of 2000. Both Patriot and I-HAWK defenses are concentrated along the Gulf coast with some point defense of major cities and Red Sea ports and facilities. Saudi Arabia has continued to buy MSIP improvement programs for both the Patriot and the I-Hawk, but a number of experts feel the I-Hawk is beginning to move toward obsolescence. Efforts to integrate the air defense command and control and information technology system for the Patriot and I-Hawk have not been successful, and some experts feel such contracts are an expensive waste. The option of modifying the C4I/battle management systems to integrate the Patriot and the Shahine seems to be under study, but there is no way to evaluate its practicality with the data available. Saudi officers indicate that the Air Defense Force plans to buy the PAC-3 variant of the Patriot. This provides a major upgrade of its ballistic and cruise missile defense capabilities and the ability to deal with the emerging threat from UAVs and unmanned combat aerial vehicles. The PAC-3 does have area coverage limitations,

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however, which make it usable only as a point defense system against long-range ballistic missiles with very high closing velocities like the Iranian Shahab. Other Land-Based Air Defenses Total Saudi Army holdings of man-portable surface-to-air missiles, as estimated by the IISS, include 500 Mistrals, 400 Stingers, and 500 Redeyes. U.S. experts indicate that the Stingers and Redeyes are no longer in active service. The number and type of antiaircraft guns currently operational is uncertain. Some reports state that Saudi Arabia has 35 35-mm Oerlikon-Contraves twin AA guns with Skyguard fire-control systems, 72 40-mm L-70 AA guns, 53 30-mm AMX-30 DCA twin antiaircraft guns, and an unknown number of 20-mm Vulcan M163 guns. Other reports indicate it had 92 M-163 Vulcan 20-mm antiaircraft guns, 30 V-150s with Vulcan 20-mm guns, 30 towed 20-mm Vulcans, 128 35-mm AA guns, and 150 L/70 40-mm guns (most in storage). Overall Capabilities The end of an Iraqi threat, the slow modernization of the Iranian Air Force, and the steady decline of the Yemeni Air Force have all combined to greatly ease the potential near-term air defense burden on the Saudi Air Force and the Saudi Army. At the same time, the Air Defense Force’s Patriot units have improved Saudi Arabia’s low- to high-level air defense capability along the Gulf coast, while providing some defense against medium-range and theater ballistic missiles. The Saudi Air Defense Force has also made important progress in developing an air defense doctrine and plan developed to Saudi needs and in learning how to use Saudi Arabia’s radar net and existing C4I system more effectively. It now has a limited capability to develop and modify its air defense software and has its own programming and support center. It has a modified Mark IV identification of friend or foe (IFF) that also offers the Saudi Air Force and the Air Defense Force considerable security against electronic warfare. Nevertheless, the Saudi Air Defense Force needs to improve its capability for joint operations with the Saudi Air Force and the Saudi Army. The fact that active U.S. air forces and army forces have left Saudi Arabia requires that Saudi Arabia develop far more effective Air Defense Force and Air Force capabilities, and C4IS&R assets, to net all of their air defense assets and use them more effectively. Both air-defense and air-land battle training should be joint as a rule, not an exception, and based on more demanding standards in peacetime. Joint command and operation centers should be the major focus of all command activity. Growing questions also exist regarding Saudi Arabia’s mix of SHORADS and how to integrate them into a common concept of joint operations. The Afghan and Iraq Wars both illustrated how effective an advanced air force can be in launching medium-range laser and GPS-guided bombs from altitudes over 16,000 feet and outside the range of most SHORADS. At the same time, fixed- and rotary-wing attack aircraft operated at much more intense tempos and closer to ground forces.

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Potential regional threats like Iran and Yemen currently lack the sophistication and equipment to operate effectively outside the range of most Saudi SHORADS and the target acquisition and command and control systems necessary to locate Saudi SHORADS dynamically in combat. This may, however, change in the future. Saudi fixed- and rotary-wing attack aircraft already need to be able to operate in close support with ground forces and defended facilities covered by SHORADS as well as Patriots and I-Hawks. If there are major uncertainties regarding Saudi mission requirements and capabilities, they lie in two areas. One is the continuing lack of any meaningful integration of GCC and southern Gulf air defense systems. Officers in the GCC recognized this mission need during the time it was being formed in 1980. So far, however, progress consists of a wasteful technological farce. The need for real-time netting of air and ground systems, backed by region-wide deployment of AWACS and electronic intelligence aircraft and assets, is almost totally ignored. The same is true of forceon-force aggressor and red-blue training, secure communications and IFF, and integrating ground- and ship-based sensors. The defense of offshore and island facilities, naval forces, coastal cities, and critical petroleum and infrastructure facilities cannot be conducted on a national basis. There is no strategic depth, and flight times out of Iran and Iraq at best give a few minutes warning. The second is the prospect of Iran acquiring long-range ballistic and cruise missiles. Iran is already deploying the Shahab-3, presumably with conventional warheads. It does, however, have chemical weapons and seems to have designed its missiles to eventually carry nuclear warheads. It has acquired some long-range cruise missiles and is attempting to develop its own. Even the Patriot PAC 3 has very limited area coverage against missiles with the high apogee and closing velocity of the Shahab. Questions also arise as to whether Iranian cruise missiles will have the range and ‘‘zigzag’’ capability to bypass Saudi cruise missile defense capability. Saudi Arabia must now consider both its options for eventually buying more advanced ballistic missile defenses, or having the United States deploy a land- or sea-based system, and its options (and GCC options) for more advanced cruise missile defenses.

SAUDI MISSILE FORCES AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SAUDI WMD The Saudi interest in weapons of mass destruction has been the subject of far more rumor than fact. For example, many reports of Saudi nuclear activities from various Saudi opposition groups have never been confirmed, and many of their reports of visits of senior Saudi officials to Pakistan and other potential nuclear suppliers have either not occurred in the way reported or have not occurred at all. Some relevant visits and discussions do, however, seem to have taken place with China and Pakistan. The Saudi Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Saleh Mohaya, and Prince Khalid Bin Sultan, also seem to have begun discussing replacement of the CSS-2 with China in 1995.67 Similarly, in 1999 after Pakistan’s nuclear tests, Prince Sultan and other Saudi military officials toured Pakistan’s nuclear weapons

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facilities. There was no firm evidence, however, that they ever considered buying any form of ‘‘Islamic bomb.’’ While there have been reports of a much more extensive Saudi nuclear program, the ‘‘evidence’’ advanced to date has been tenuous at best and the charges involved seem to be more political in character and directed at trying to break up the U.S.– Saudi military relationship than inspired by any facts or actual knowledge. The most disturbing aspect of Saudi talks with Pakistan has had nothing to do with the Kingdom, but has resulted from the fact that some estimates indicate that Pakistan’s production of fissile material will begin to exceed its domestic military requirements at some point around 2005–2006. Similarly, there is no convincing data available on whether Saudi Arabia has had any discussions with China about the possible purchase of weapons of mass destruction or replacing its aging CSS-2s —which are now operated under the supervision of the Saudi Air Defense Force. Saudi Arabia has never had any illusions about the problems Saudi proliferation would create in terms of its relations with the United States or the extent to which they would suddenly make the Kingdom a key target for Israel’s nuclear forces. Saudi Arabia, however, has continued to study such options along with missile defense. Ironically, it also now faces a growing risk from Iran at a time that the potential threat from Iraq has disappeared. Saudi Arabia cannot possibly develop and build its own weapons of mass destruction for the foreseeable future. If it did try to obtain such weapons, its options would be to acquire a nuclear weapon from nations like China or Pakistan. Buying weapons from either country would create a host of political difficulties, even if either one consented. One ‘‘wild card’’ option is the idea of buying Pakistani nuclear weapons that could be rapidly deployed on Saudi missiles. This would not be an overt violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).68 However, Saudi Arabia cannot count on Pakistan. The Pakistani government is not stable; recent revelations about Pakistani involvement in the Iranian program raise additional questions; and Pakistan might well not risk the tensions with the United States that would arise if such an arrangement became public. In making its choices, Saudi Arabia has two important additional options. One is to buy missile defenses. The other is to seek some form of ‘‘extended deterrence’’ from the United States against any threat by Iran. These options could be combined, and such extended deterrence could be part of a broader, Gulf-wide, U.S. security guarantee. These options would not necessarily require a new, formal agreement with the United States. Modernizing the CSS-2 The Kingdom does, however, have to make hard choices at some point in the future about the future of its CSS-2 missiles, and the U.S. State Department published a report in August 2002 that stated that Saudi Arabia held ‘‘discussions’’ with Pakistan regarding nuclear cooperation.69 Some high-level visits did take place by Saudi leaders to Pakistan and China in 1999 and 2000, and the Chinese Premier,

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Jiang Zemin, visited the Kingdom in 2000. Some have speculated that the Chinese approached the Kingdom with offers to modernize their CSS-2 that was purchased in 1988.70 The growing Chinese demand for oil, the visit by King Abdullah to China in January 2006, and the visit by Chinese Premier Hu Jintao three months later in April 2006 have all raised the speculation about Saudi Arabia’s relations with China and the possibility of forging an ‘‘oil for missiles’’ deal with China.71 Saudi Arabia claimed that it bought the CSS-2s to ‘‘propagate peace,’’ but it actually bought them for a number of other reasons. Its efforts to buy arms from the United States had reached a low point when the purchase was made, and Saudi Arabia felt the purchase would be a major demonstration of its independence. Equally, Saudi Arabia felt threatened by the fact that Iran and Iraq had long-range surface-to-surface missiles, Yemen then had the SS-21, and Saudi Arabia did not. Saudi Arabia was particularly interested in acquiring systems that could hit Tehran, while being deployed outside the range of Iranian surface-to-surface missiles.72 Today, however, Saudi Arabia’s present CSS-2 missiles are not a meaningful response to the Iranian chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) and missiles threat, and they have only token war-fighting capability. The CSS-2 has limitations that led Saudi Arabia to examine possible replacements beginning in the mid-1990s. It is an obsolete missile that was first designed in 1971. While an improved version has been deployed, most experts still estimate that the missile has a circular error probable of nearly two to four kilometers and lacks the accuracy to hit anything other than large area targets like cities or industrial facilities. Even with the improved warhead, each missile would still have the effective lethality only of a single 2,000-pound bomb. It requires large amounts of technical support and ground equipment and takes hours to make ready for firing.73 It is also far from clear that the CSS-2 missile can be properly calibrated for targeting purposes, and be kept truly operational, without more frequent test firings and without test firings conducted at long ranges along the axis it would have to be fired in an actual strike. Saudi Arabia has never conducted a meaningful operational test of the CSS-8 and is incapable of conducting the tests necessary to refine the missile’s targeting using the derived aim point method.74 The CSS-2 missiles are extremely large 70-ton systems and have a special, large conventional warhead. They are nearly 70-ton missile/launcher systems, but they are semimobile, and one-third are supposed to be kept armed and near-launch-ready on transporters, one-third are kept half fueled, and one-third are normally empty and being serviced. Saudi sources indicate that actual readiness rates are normally far lower. The missiles are deployed in two battalions. One is located at the As-Sulayyil Oasis, roughly 475 kilometers south to southwest of Riyadh. As-Sulayyil will also be the site of one of Saudi Arabia’s new air bases for its Tornado fighter-bombers. A second battalion is located at Al-Juaifer near the Al-Kharj Air Base south of Riyadh. A further training facility that may have a launch capability seems to exist in southwestern Saudi Arabia at al-Liddam.75

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Commercial satellite photos of the site at As-Sulayyil show a very large headquarters and transportation complex with 60 buildings or tents, a transportation center, a command and control complex with roughly 40 buildings and tents, a secure area, a construction area, a bunker that may be a fixed launcher site, other launch areas with bunkers for missile storage, an additional launch area, and three 150-meter-long white buildings that may be missile assembly facilities.76 Saudi Arabia has only a limited technological base to support such programs, although it has begun to experiment with short-range artillery systems. It is unclear whether the Saudi Air Defense Force can maintain or fire its CSS-2 missiles without Chinese technical support, and Chinese technicians are operating the missiles under Saudi supervision. Ballast Nedam, a subsidiary of British Aerospace, has recently extended the runway at the As-Sulayyil Air Base to 3,000 meters. There are some signs that Saudi Arabia may be deploying surface-to-air missiles to defend the facility.77 None of the Saudi missiles are now armed with weapons of mass destruction. Saudi Arabia is a signatory of the NPT, and Saudi Arabia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have provided U.S. officials with assurances that the missiles will remain conventional. The Saudi government has issued a written statement that ‘‘nuclear and chemical warheads would not be obtained or used with the missiles.’’ U.S. experts believe that Saudi Arabia has largely kept its word, although the Saudis have refused a U.S. request to inspect the missile sites in Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabia’s visits to nations like China and Pakistan do raise questions about their future intention.78 There are good reasons to question the military value of such missiles, as long as they are equipped only with conventional warheads.79 The CSS-2s deployed in the PRC are all nuclear-armed missiles. Each can carry one to three megaton warheads. They have a maximum range of about 2,200 miles (3,500 kilometers), an inertial guidance system, and a single-stage, refrigerated liquid fuel rocket motor. The version of the CSS-2 that the PRC has sold to Saudi Arabia is very different. It is heavily modified and has a special large conventional warhead, which weighs up to 3,500 to 4,000 pounds. This added warhead weight cuts the maximum range of the missile to anywhere from 1,550 nautical miles (2,400 kilometers) to 1,950 nautical miles (3,100 kilometers). A conventional warhead of this size is more effective than the warhead on a Scud, but is hardly a weapon of mass destruction, or even an effective conventional weapon. Assuming an optimal ratio of high explosive (HE) to total weight, the warhead of the CSS-2 could destroy buildings out to a radius of 200–250 feet, seriously damage buildings out to a radius of 300–350 feet, and kill or injure people with projectiles to distances of up to 1,000 feet.80 This is the damage equivalent of three to four 2,000-pound bombs, or about the same destructive power as a single sortie by a modern strike fighter. The CSS-2s have aged to the point where they need to be replaced, and the need to find a new system is becoming steadily more pressing. Saudi Arabia does not, however, have any good short-term options for acquiring its own missile capabilities.

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Saudi Arabia has no capability to produce its own long-range ballistic missiles or weapons of mass destruction. The most it has done is develop an unguided rocket. In July 1997, Saudi Arabia test-fired its first domestically produced surface-to-surface artillery rocket or missile at the Al-Kharj complex. Defense Minister Prince Sultan stated that the missile has a range of between 35 and 62 kilometers.81 Pakistan’s missile programs are still in development, as are those of North Korea. As a result, the Kingdom has three major choices in dealing with the CSS-2: (1) establish a program with China to extend the life of the CSS-2, (2) get a new medium range ballistic missle (MRBM), preferably a solid-fuel system like the CSS-5, which would eliminate all of the problems in using liquid fuels and the need for Chinese operators, and (3) use Pakistan as a source of another missile. Yet, China cannot make new sales of long-range missiles without openly violating its agreements relating to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and Russia and the other former Soviet Union states are bound by both the MTCR and the limits of the Intermediate Range Balllistic Missile (IRBM) Treaty. The Saudi holdings of the CSS-2 thus raise serious issues on several grounds: • A costly weapons system is deployed in small numbers with relatively low lethality. • As now configured, the missile system may do more to provoke attack or escalation than to deter attack or provide retaliatory capability. This point became clear to the Saudis during the Gulf War. King Fahd rejected advice to retaliate against Iraqi strikes because he felt that strikes that simply killed civilians would have a provocative rather than a deterrent effect. • On the other hand, Saudi acquisition of chemical or nuclear warheads would radically improve the value of the system as a deterrent or retaliatory weapon.

What Comes Next? At best, the CSS-2 now acts as a low-level deterrent and a symbol of Saudi Arabia’s willingness to retaliate against Iranian strikes. At worst, the missiles are a potential excuse for Iranian missile strikes, and their use could trigger a process of retaliation against which Saudi Arabia would have little real defense capability. Israel, which initially showed concern about the system, no longer seems to perceive it as a direct threat. Israel has the capability to launch air strikes against the Saudi missile sites, but is unlikely to consider preemptive strikes unless radical changes take place in Saudi Arabia’s political posture or regime. The CSS-2 does, however, symbolize the risk that Saudi Arabia will buy a more capable missile and seek weapons of mass destruction. While nations like India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and Syria are the major proliferators in the region, Saudi possession of the CSS-2 does give other countries an added incentive and excuse to join the missile arms race, acquire weapons of mass destruction, or preempt in a conflict. At some point, Saudi Arabia has to make hard choices as to whether it should invest in a symbolic and ineffective deterrent, buy new missiles armed with weapons

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of mass destruction, trust in extended deterrence by the United States, and/or invest in areas like theater missile defense, civil defense, and counterterrorism. A few Saudi analysts outside the government do advocate buying modern missiles and arming them with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. They believe that buying long-range missiles without such weapons has little purpose. It is unclear, however, that such thinkers as yet have any broad support or that Saudi Arabia really does have better options to acquire weapons of mass destruction than it does to buy missiles. It does not have the industrial base to produce biological and nuclear weapons or to compete in producing chemical weapons. It is very difficult to purchase ‘‘turnkey’’ production capabilities and/or finished weapons abroad, and such purchases might well cut off Saudi Arabia from U.S. and other Western supplies of conventional arms. As has been noted earlier, any missile purchase or development of weapons of mass destruction would certainly seriously jeopardize U.S.–Saudi security arrangements and could make Saudi Arabia a target for Israel. Even if Saudi Arabia could find ways to join Iran and Israel in proliferating, it is not clear whether it would reduce its vulnerability or simply raise the threshold of any attack on the Kingdom. Mere possession of weapons of mass destruction may be adequate for the purposes of prestige in peacetime, but they must be carefully structured to avoid encouraging preemption and escalation in wartime and accelerating the efforts of neighboring states to acquire even more chemical, biological, and nuclear arms. Saudi Arabia, however, can scarcely privately ignore such a major shift in the balance of power in the Gulf in its strategic planning, and measures like buying improved theater missile defense, civil defense, and counterterrorism may well not be enough to deal with the creeping proliferation in Iran. The United States has agreed to share missile early warning data with Saudi Arabia and other friendly Arab states, but it is unclear what this warning is worth. The U.S. Patriot missiles deployed in Saudi Arabia have only limited missile intercept capability against advanced Scud missiles. While the Patriot 3 should provide more effective defense against such missiles—when and if the Patriot 3 becomes available—it has only limited effectiveness against more advanced missiles with higher closure speeds. Iran is already testing such missiles, and Iraq is almost certain to develop them if it can break out of sanctions. Developmental antitheater ballistic missile (ATBM) U.S. systems like the Navy Standard and U.S. Army ATBM systems are designed to provide such defense capabilities—as are additional boost-phase intercept weapons—but these programs are lagging and deeply troubled. The United States currently has no ability to tell Saudi Arabia when it will be able to sell such weapons and what their cost, effectiveness, and delivery dates will be. Furthermore, U.S. efforts like the agreement to provide early warning of enemy missile launchers and discussing the potential sale of theater missile defense systems offer little midterm to long-term security. Warning at best can have limited benefits in improving civil defense if it is not backed by active missile and air defense or retaliation in kind. The United States will not possess wide-area theater missile

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defenses until well after 2010, and their future cost, effectiveness, and delivery schedule is unclear. At least, at present, a determined proliferator is likely to acquire major offensive capabilities that outstrip any near-term options for defense. As a result, Saudi Arabia may begin to believe that it needs a stronger form of deterrence, as do the other southern Gulf States. If so, the main options for Saudi Arabia would likely be to create a major long-range strike capability that combines the assets of the Saudi Air Force with modern strike systems like cruise missiles— systems Saudi Arabia might arm with either conventional warheads or some imported weapon of mass destruction—and Saudi de facto or formal reliance on U.S. extended deterrence and counterproliferation capabilities. As has been discussed earlier, the first option raises serious questions as to whether the Kingdom can either create conventional strike capabilities that are a credible deterrent to weapons of mass destruction or obtain weapons of mass destruction on its own. The second option requires a major rethinking of U.S. strategy as well as that of Saudi Arabia. Extended deterrence is not a casual affair, and it cannot be separated from efforts to develop some form of regional arms control and develop integrated missile defense, civil defense, and counterterrorism defenses for the southern Gulf. NBC Defense Capabilities At a different level, Saudi Arabia does face the potential threat of nuclear, chemical, and/or biological (NBC) attacks. Attacks could come in direct or covert form from a power like Iran or from terrorist movements. They could range from tiny attacks designed largely to produce media impact and temporary panic to the actual use of nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia developed some elements of a civil defense force during the Iran-Iraq War and expanded it during the Gulf War. It now, however, is beginning to think how it must provide NBC protection for its military and security forces and some kind of detection, defense, and response capability against terrorism and overt or covert attack. As is the case in most countries, these are issues that Saudi Arabia is only beginning to address. SAUDI PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES Saudi Arabia’s security apparatus consists of a complex mix of paramilitary and internal security forces and an equally complex legal system for dealing with civil and security cases. This is a truly massive effort. The total internal security budget —including security, intelligence, and energy security—for 2003 topped $7 billion, in 2004 is estimated at $8–$8.5 billion, and an estimated $10 billion on in 2005. A number of civil ministries like the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Guidance play an indirect role in internal security because of their political impact. Others include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Communications, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Culture and Information, the Ministry of Education, the

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Ministry of Higher Education, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, and the Ministry of Pilgrimage and Islamic Trusts. This kind of indirect role in internal security is typical of similar ministries in virtually every country in the developing world, as well as a number of countries in Europe. In addition, Saudi security forces involve a mix of elements in the regular armed forces, and the National Guard, and a range of internal security and intelligence services most of which are under the Ministry of Interior. Saudi Arabia’s Main Internal Security Forces Figure 6.8 shows the command structure of the Saudi internal security and the intelligence apparatus is multifaceted and connected to the Kingdom’s conventional military forces. The National Guard—with its more than 100,000 troops—provides internal security under a different chain of command using both its regular forces and tribal levies. It protects the territory of the Kingdom and the approaches to its cities and critical facilities, acts as reinforcements for the regular forces, and can serve as an urban security force in an emergency. It does, however, have an Intelligence Directorate that focuses on counterintelligence within the National Guard itself and plays a limited role in counterterrorism operations. As of yet, it has no foreign intelligence operations capability. The Pivotal Role of the Ministry of Interior The key to the Saudi security apparatus is the Ministry of Interior. The internal security forces are centralized under Prince Nayef Bin Abdul Aziz, the Minister of Interior.82 Prince Nayef is a major political power in the Kingdom. He is one of the strongest figures in the royal family and has long played a critical role in Saudi security. His Vice-Minister is Prince Ahmad bin Abdul Aziz, whose main function is to deal with the different provinces of the Kingdom and who also plays a major role as the main force behind the General Security Service; Prince Mohammad bin Nayef is the Assistant Minister for Security Affairs and handles all the uniformed services that fall under the Ministry of Interior. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments outlines Saudi Arabia’s main internal security services and agencies under the command of the Ministry of Interior as follows:83 • The Public Security Directorate (PSD): This directorate controls the regular police forces, which carry out security in the Kingdom’s cities and villages. The control of the PSD is under the director-general of the PSD in the Ministry of Interior, but it is also true the governors exercise considerable control over the PSD in their provinces. • The Special Emergency Force (SEF): This was created after the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979, and it is under the control of the PSD. The SEF has been a leading force in the Saudi counterterrorism strategy since May 2003. It is estimated to have a total strength of 10,000 men (although other estimates put it as high as 30,000),

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Figure 6.8 The Saudi Intelligence and Security Community

and it controls a fleet of helicopters. This force is considered to be one of the most mobile and capable of deploying throughout the Kingdom to lead the fight against terrorism. • The General Directorate of Investigation (GDI): This directorate controls the Saudi domestic intelligence the General Security Service (GSS), Mabahit. It is in charge of domestic intelligence gathering and analysis, counterintelligence operations, criminal

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investigations, and lately as a counterterrorism force that tracks Al Qa’ida and other affiliated groups. • National Information Center: This center is considered to have one of the most sophisticated systems in the world. This agency was created by the Ministry of Interior in Riyadh, and the MOI is estimated to have a separate budget of approximately $500 billion to conduct its own military intelligence. The center links more than 1,000 terminals and maintains comprehensive information on Saudi citizens and residents of the Kingdom. It also tracks intelligence provided by intelligence agents, informants, as well as electronic intercepts. • Mujahideen: This is an independent force based in Riyadh and is under the control of the Assistant Minster of Interior for Security Affairs. It is estimated to have 3,000– 5,000 men, which conduct patrols (largely at night), and lately it has been employed as part of the Saudi counterterrorism forces apparatus. The training levels and professionalism of this force are unknown. • Other agencies under MOI: The MOI also has several other agencies that are indirectly responsible for maintaining internal security, including the Special Security Forces, the Coast Guard, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the General Prisons Service, the Petroleum Installation Security Forces, and the Civil Defense Force. In addition, the MOI also has established a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) that is part of the Security and Drug Control Department, which also coordinates with the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), the Saudi central bank.

As is clear throughout this book, unclassified estimates of total strengths of the Gulf States internal security services differ significantly, and no open source can know exactly the total operational strength of sensitive security services. For example, the total number for the Saudi GSS is not known, and many experts have speculated about its actual size. Figure 6.9 does provide a rough estimate of Saudi MOI forces manpower in 2006. These numbers show the heavy reliance the MOI places on its police, Special Forces, and emergency troops for internal security purposes, but it also shows the importance of the Border Guard, which represents 12 percent of the MOI total work force. The Police and Security Services The police and security forces are still somewhat traditional in character, but have been steadily modernized. Over the past two years, under the strong leadership of Prince Mohammad bin Nayef, there has been a major reorganization and development of these forces financed by huge budget increases. Early in Saudi Arabia’s history there were no formal police, and local and tribal authorities administered justice. During the reign of King Abdul Aziz, more modern police, justice, and internal security organizations were developed. In 1950, he created a ‘‘general directorate’’ to supervise all police functions. He established the Ministry of Interior in 1951, which has since controlled police matters. Saudi Arabia has received substantial technical advice from British, French, German, Jordanian, Pakistani, and U.S. experts. Substantial numbers of British and

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Figure 6.9 Saudi Ministry of Interior Manpower, 2006

French advisors served in Saudi Arabia in the past, including seconded exgovernment and military personnel, but it is unclear how many have continued to serve since the early 1990s. The police security forces are now divided into regular police (which fall under public security) and special investigative and intelligence police of the GSS, which are called the Mabahith (domestic intelligence). The GSS performs the domestic security and counterintelligence functions of the Ministry of Interior. The GSS has a large special investigation force. There are approximately 135,000 paramilitary policemen in the Public Security Administration equipped with the latest weaponry. They are assigned to Provincial Governors and are under the Minister of Interior. Public Security Forces train at the King Fahd College for Security Studies located in Riyadh, which has the capacity for about 2,000 students. The Public Security Administration forces have a police college in Mecca. Police uniforms are similar to the khaki and olive drab worn by the army except for the distinctive black beret. Policemen usually wear side arms while on duty. The Public Security’s Special Emergency Forces have taken the lead in combating the Al Qa’ida networks in the Kingdom. They have similar specialized training as the Special Security Forces in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. Because of their mobility, they act as a rapid deployment security force in case of an unexpected security threat. They number around 30,000 and are in the process of a large-scale modernization and development program. They operate basically as the defensive Special Security Force and antiterrorist service of the Kingdom. The

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Special Security Force is the Saudi equivalent of a special weapons assault team (SWAT) and acts as the offensive force in the Kingdom. It reports directly to the Minister of Interior, but its operational head is the Assistant Minister for Security Affairs. It was organized in response to the poor performance of the National Guard during the revolt in 1979 at the Grand Mosque in Mecca. The force is equipped with the latest light armored vehicles, automatic weapons, and nonlethal chemical weapons. Although its number of core personnel has been raised to 10,000, its total final strength remains unclear as the threat level varies. Its antiterrorism units have been steadily expanded since 1990. In the past few years, enormous sums have been spent to reorganize and modernize this force. It is designed to deal with terrorism and hijacking and has SWAT capabilities and detachments in every major Saudi city and province. The Public Security Forces are recruited from all areas of the country and maintain police directorates at provincial and local levels. These forces, particularly the centralized Public Security Police, can be reinforced by the National Guard in an emergency or can get support from the regular armed forces. The Director General for Public Security retains responsibility for police units but, in practice, provincial governors exercise considerable autonomy. The focus of police and security activity has also changed over the years. Saudi Arabia is now a highly urbanized society, and these formal state institutions carry out most internal security and criminal justice activity in urban areas. This has helped drive the effort to modernize the police and security forces. For example, state-of-the-art command and control systems have been acquired and deployed, and new vehicles and radio communications equipment have enabled police directorates to operate sophisticated mobile units, particularly in the principal cities. The Special Security Forces and the Special Emergency Forces have acquired a sizable fleet of helicopters for use in urban areas and have been utilized against various terrorist cells operating in the Kingdom. The Ministry of Interior now maintains one of the most sophisticated centralized computer systems in the world at the National Information Center in Riyadh. This computer network links some 1,100 terminals and maintains records on citizens’ identity numbers and passports, foreigners’ residences and work permits, hajj visas, vehicle registrations, and criminal records. Reports from agents and from the large number of informants employed by the security services are also entered. Officials of the GSS and the General Intelligence Presidency (GIP) have the authority to carry out wiretaps and mail surveillance. The Ministry of Interior also has a large electronic intelligence operation with a separate budget that is estimated at over $500 million per year. Some security activities do, however, continue to be enforced on a tribal level in tribal areas. The King provides payments or subsidies to key Sheiks, and they are largely in charge of tribal affairs. Offenses and many crimes are still punished by the responsible Sheik. The National Guard acts as a support force to deal with problems that cannot be settled or controlled by the tribal authorities.

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General Security Service The General Security Service, or ‘‘Mabahith’’ as it is known in Arabic, is the domestic intelligence service of the Ministry of Interior. It is the most important and sensitive service in the Kingdom. Although exact figures pertaining to the GSS are classified, informed estimates show that it has by far the largest budget of any domestic intelligence service in the Middle East. The numbers of its staff are likewise confidential. Cooperation between the U.S. and Saudi intelligence communities has increased since the attacks in May 2003. Shortly thereafter, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began to work with the GSS in earnest, and a close working relationship has developed. Although shortcomings on both sides remain, their joint efforts have contributed to major successes in the war on terrorism in the Kingdom and abroad. Under the strong leadership of Prince Ahmad and Prince Mohammad bin Nayef, the GSS has been successful at thwarting many plots and pressuring many Saudis not to join the militants. On August 30, 2004, Prince Nayef said he ‘‘can say, confidently, that what happened does not exceed five or six per cent of what was foiled.’’84 The GSS has remarkably improved the quality of its information gathering, the assessment of these data, and most importantly, its dissemination to troops on the ground. GSS operations have been streamlined in order to adapt to new threats. In addition, budget increases have allowed for highly specialized training programs and acquisitions of the latest equipment, making the GSS one of the most professional intelligence services in the region and the world. Furthermore, its interrogation methods have yielded actionable intelligence that has thwarted numerous attacks in the Kingdom and abroad. Due to this success, the senior officers of the service have become prime targets of the terrorists. There were at least two instances when they attempted assassinations against top security officials. First, in December 2003, Lieutenant-Colonel Ibrahim al-Dhaleh, of the GSS, was attacked by a car bomb. Second, there have been other attempts against Major-General Abdul Aziz al-Huweirini, the Assistant Director for Interrogations at the GSS, and the senior officer in charge of debriefing captured Al Qa’ida terrorists in the Kingdom. He was shot and injured on December 4, 2003.85 He has since recovered and returned to his post.

The General Intelligence Presidency Saudi Arabia’s main foreign intelligence service is the General Intelligence Presidency. Among its many responsibilities, it has foreign security functions, antiterrorism functions, foreign liaison functions, strategic analytical assessments, coordination of the foreign covert networks of the Kingdom, and ultimately foreign covert operations if need be. The President of the GIP reports directly to the Prime Minister (the King). Although the budget of the GIP is classified, it is roughly estimated at a minimum

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of $500 million per year. That would make it the most funded intelligence service in the Middle East. In theory, the head of the General Intelligence Presidency is responsible for intelligence collection and analysis and for the coordination of intelligence tasks and reporting by all intelligence agencies, including those of the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense and Civil Aviation, and the National Guard. In practice, at the operational level, there now is no real Saudi intelligence ‘‘community.’’ One is in the process of being formed, however, and a real effort is being made to ensure that the various services can function in a unified manner. Since 9/11, the senior Saudi leadership has realized that intelligence sharing—or ‘‘fusion’’—is weak, coordination is poor, and the different services are filled with personal and bureaucratic rivalries and tensions. The problems are compounded by the fact that the research departments of the services—especially those at the GIP—are weak, and that, in general, Saudi intelligence collection relies too heavily on personal contacts and briefings, rather than on systematic and structured analysis. A pure Saudi intelligence community would be comprised of the GIP, GSS, Border Guard, National Information Center, the three intelligence branches of the military (army, navy, and air force), the National Guard Intelligence Directorate, the Interior Minister’s Bureau of Analysis and Studies, the Foreign Ministry’s Information and Studies Center, and the National Guard’s Specialized Studies Center.

The Changing Role of the GIP Under Prince Turki Al Faisal’s leadership, the GIP was successful in dealing with many internal and foreign threats that posed a direct menace to the Kingdom. It had a long history of cooperation with U.S. intelligence although it has (along with its sister agency, the GSS) generally opposed any Western efforts to introduce law enforcement organizations like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the FBI into Saudi security issues in ways that could embarrass the Saudi government. This led to acute tensions between the two main Saudi services and their American counterparts over investigations such as the Al-Khobar bombing and helped lead to the charges that the Saudi government covered up Iranian involvement in the bombing. In fairness to Saudi Arabia, however, the United States, Britain, and other Western countries failed to cooperate with Saudi intelligence in a number of past cases because they felt that this might violate the rights of legitimate opposition movements or raise human rights issues. The U.S. and other Western intelligence services also turned a blind eye, or at least tolerated, Islamic extremist activity when it seemed to serve their interests in Afghanistan and Bosnia or acted as a counterbalance to Russian influence in Central Asia and paid little attention to the potential threat posed by funds and manpower coming out of the Kingdom. If Saudi Arabia was slow to see the threat of extremism and terrorism and sometimes ‘‘exported’’ its problems, the U.S., British, and other European intelligence and security services made equally serious mistakes in monitoring and characterizing ‘‘Islamic’’ movements.

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Changes in the GIP Leadership Major developments have taken place within the GIP since September 11. Prince Turki Al Faisal, the current Saudi Ambassador to the United States, was replaced in August 2001 by Prince Nawaf bin Abdul Aziz. Prince Turki Al Faisal had forged the GIP into a modern intelligence service and had spent some 30 years in intelligence and had built a solid reputation for professionalism and effectiveness. He began his career as Deputy Director in the Office of Foreign Liaison at the age of 23. Over the years, he reorganized and consolidated the office into a full-fledged intelligence service. He became Director of Intelligence in 1977, and it was at that time that the move toward a professional intelligence service began in earnest. Prince Turki had long been the main contact point for the U.S., British, French, and other main Western and Arab services among others. He was also responsible for dealing with operations in Afghanistan and Central Asia since the Soviet invasion in 1979. He was also the main point of contact with the U.S.–Saudi backed Mujahideen and the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) service, with the various warring Afghan factions after the Soviet withdrawal, and with the Taliban and Osama bin Laden (along with other Arab Mujahideen).86 On January 26, 2005, then Crown Prince Abdullah relieved Prince Nawaf of his duty and the head of GIP. The agency remained without a minister until October 2005, following King Abdullah’s accession to the thrown, when he appointed Prince Muqrin bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, the King’s half brother and a former governor of Madina and Hail, to head the GIP. In addition, King Abdullah relieved Prince Saud bin Fahd of his duties as Vice President of the GIP.87 Prince Faisal bin Abdullah bin Mohammad was appointed as a new Assistant President of the GIP in charge of administratively reorganizing the agency. He was a former Deputy Commander of the National Guard for the Western Region and brings a new administrative focus to the service, that along with the personal dynamism of Prince Abdul Aziz bin Bandar, the other co-Assistant President in charge of revamping the vitally important analysis and research directorate, has led some to hope that they can put back the GIP at the center of the Kingdom’s international security relationships. The Future Role and Capabilities of the GIP The future of Saudi internal security will not be shaped by the leadership of the General Intelligence Presidency alone, but rather by the overall effectiveness of the government and the royal family in dealing with the broader mix of political, economic, social, and demographic issues that threaten Saudi Arabia’s internal security. An important fact that has been missed by most foreign assessments is that the GIP, in its bylaws, does not have the right to make arrests; rather, it can track and monitor individuals in Saudi Arabia. At the same time, the General Security Service carries out any recommendations for arrests. Hence, its role is one of an early warning advisory service, which, depending on the effectiveness of its

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head, can be extremely influential in Saudi security planning, or irrelevant, as is the case today. Saudi Arabia clearly needs to do more to expand and modernize some aspects of its intelligence operations. In the past, Saudi intelligence has tended to rely heavily on interpersonal relations and human intelligence, supplemented by limited usage of surveillance equipment and computerized records. It worked closely with the major Western and Arab intelligence services in some areas and had some access to more advanced imagery and signal intelligence through such sources. Saudi intelligence did not, however, establish and organize for the kind of sophisticated domestic and foreign surveillance networks necessary to provide adequate coverage of small, dispersed Islamic terrorist groups and individual movements. It has tended to rely on information from traditional elites and to have limited data on urbanized Saudis and Saudi young males that become affiliated with extremist movements inside and especially outside of Saudi Arabia. Surveillance of financial transfers, charitable organizations, and activities like money laundering has been particularly weak, as no such body within the GIP was set up to deal with those issues. Most of the sophisticated networks that had been established over many years have deteriorated, and hence the GIP’s role in the global war on terrorism has been marginal at best. Thus, the Kingdom has had to rely heavily on only one truly professional security service, the GSS. Border and Coastal Security Border and coastline control is the responsibility of the Border Guard and has long been an important aspect of security operations. Smuggling is endemic, even across the Saudi border with Iraq. Saudi Border Guards arrested 777 smugglers crossing the border during 2001 and seized nearly three tons of hashish, more than 5,700 bottles of alcohol, more than 450 weapons, and 43,680 rounds of ammunition.88 Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, smuggling across this border has dropped drastically. While Saudi Arabia does not announce the fact publicly, it regularly had to deal with Iraqi patrols that crossed into Saudi territory, and it is now clear that some Iraqi intelligence officers had been operating in the Kingdom prior to the Iraq War. Saudi Arabia has taken diplomatic steps to greatly reduce its problems and tensions with Iran and Yemen, and particularly, to reduce Iranian efforts to exploit Saudi Arabia’s problems with its Shi’ites and use the Hajj as a propaganda forum. The Kingdom has also, however, taken strong steps to improve its counterterrorism efforts in dealing with border and coastal security. It has improved its monitoring of foreign nationals and its ability to track their movements and activities and has steadily improved coverage of its borders with Iraq and Yemen.

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The Role of the Border Guard The 30,000-man Border Guard covers Saudi Arabia’s land and sea borders. It performs a host of patrol and surveillance missions and can act as a light defensive screen. It is equipped with four-wheel-drive vehicles and automatic weapons as well as a sizable fleet of helicopters. The Border Guard did much of the fighting with Yemen in the past and took casualties in doing so. It still must deal with the problem of smuggling and infiltration across the Saudi borders with Yemen, Jordan, and Iraq. Some members of the Border Guard have been implicated in smuggling by sea, but this activity is severely punished and does not seem to be any more common than in other countries. Similar problems exist along the border with Yemen, although the border clashes that used to take place between Yemeni and Saudi security forces seem to have largely ended following the settlement of the Saudi-Yemeni border in June 2000. The main problems are now smuggling and intertribal violence, which are still endemic. The Yemeni border has been the main source of the weapons and explosives used in the recent terrorist attacks against the Kingdom. This border is still the main conduit by which militants from Afghanistan enter the country. The Saudi borders with Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman are stable and secure except for smuggling. The movement of alcohol and narcotics is still a problem. The Kingdom’s strategic location and large territories make its borders vulnerable to smuggling of arms and drugs. The various rugged terrains make surveillance difficult and provide hiding places for smugglers. Furthermore, the vastness of the borders makes it easier for terrorists and smugglers to train without being noticed by Figure 6.10 Border Guards Apprehension of Weapons and Explosives, 1995–2003

Weapons

Ammunition

Cases

Quantity

Cases

Quantity

1995

135

1,777

168

9,323

1996

168

379

206

309,620

1997

172

522

253

99,837

1998

123

290

166

43,489

1999

128

450

171

242,637

2000

149

333

203

636,771

2001

182

299

250

202,346

2002

194

260

261

91,745

2003

123

340

206

326,326

Source: Ministry of Interior Annual Yearbook and the Border Guard Annual Statistical Report. Adapted by the authors from Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s Experience in Fighting Drug and Arms Smuggling and the Relationship between Terrorism and Arms, Tables 5 and 6, a working paper submitted at the CounterTerrorism International Conference, Riyadh, 5–8/2/2005.

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the authorities. The Kingdom has always been concerned with weapons and ammunition smuggling, especially since the May 2003 attacks. Figure 6.10 provides the quantity of weapons and explosives the Saudi Border Guard confiscated every year. The MOI reported that the number of cases declined in 2004 due to the use of surveillance systems at borders and coasts.89 In the same paper, the MOI provided a breakdown of weapons and explosives that were confiscated in the last five years. They totaled 16,389 weapons, 14,816,111 ammunitions, 240 bombs, 1,282 materials, 355,191 digits, and 343,292 wire connections.90 The Option of a Border Surveillance and Defense System Saudi Arabia began considering major changes in its border security apparatus in the 1990s. Saudi Arabia considered building a border surveillance system that would use patrol aircraft, remotely piloted vehicles, and early warning systems to detect intruders and border crossings. This would have involved a 12-kilometer-deep security zone around all 6,500 kilometers of the land and sea borders, with a mix of acoustic, seismic, radar, magnetic, and infrared sensors to detect movements of men and vehicles in the border area. It would have been supported by small manned patrol aircraft, and unmanned remotely piloted vehicles, wherever some threat from an intruder might exist. Thomson CSF completed a $5-million feasibility study for this system in early 1990, and two consortiums—one led by E Systems and the other by Thomson CSF—submitted bids to Saudi Arabia in May 1991. The system was not funded in part because of its cost, and in part because of the ease with which given sections could be penetrated before an effective response would be possible. Its estimated cost was around $3 billion, and it would have taken several years to complete.91 Actually buying and deploying such a system have been put on hold at the request of the Yemeni government. If the government does put such a system in place, it is now likely to be through the installation of a much more technically sophisticated system. Saudi Border Guard Development Program In 2006, the Kingdom had a 30,000-strong Border Guard force patrolling the borders against smugglers and infiltrators. The force is equipped with light arms, four-wheel-drive vehicles, helicopters, and an extensive range of surveillance equipment. In October 2002, it was reported that the force added to its arsenal thermal cameras, radars, and other detection systems.92 The Kingdom, however, has also announced plans to upgrade its border surveillance, especially on the Saudi-Yemeni borders. Ministry of Interior Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (MIKSA) is a contract to build C4I and IS&R systems on the SaudiYemeni border. It is also known as the Saudi Border Guard Development Program, and negotiations have been under way since 1994 following the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Prince Nayef, the Saudi Minister of

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Interior, and his French counterpart, Charles Pasqua. It was reported that French President Jacques Chirac personally discussed MIKSA with the Crown Prince during his state visit to France in May 2004.93 According to press reports, President Chirac himself took ‘‘charge’’ of the negotiations away from the Minister of Interior, Nicholas Sarkozy, because he felt the process was taking too long and put his diplomatic advisor, Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, in charge of the negotiations.94 According to the French press, Mr. Sarkozy was ‘‘sidelined’’ because under his leadership, the French Ministry of Interior did not provide the necessary transparency and legal framework for the contract. Crown Prince Abdullah, according to the same press reports, voiced his opposition to the ‘‘payment of any commission,’’ demanded more transparency, and asked that the contract be signed ‘‘state to state’’ by the ‘‘highest authority’’ in France.95 Under the insistence of the Elysee, the consortium bidding has been taken away from Thales, and the French Advanced Systems Export Company, SOFRESA, which has close ties to President Chirac, has taken the lead in the negotiations.96 MIKSA is estimated to take up to 12 years and cost between $5 billion and $9 billion to complete. If finalized the program would include the following: • Build a 3,000-mile electronic surveillance and detection system; • Install ACROPOLE, a Communication System that was created for the French police. The system has databanks on wanted persons, stolen vehicles, etc.; • Install 400 frontier posts and barracks to house 20,000 troops; • Train the 20,000 Border Guards; • Provide 20 reconnaissance aircraft and helicopters; • Build 225 radar stations and link them by satellite to a central command center; and97 • Use UAVs.98

During then Crown Prince Abdullah’s visit to Paris in April 2005, an Elysee spokesman said that ‘‘Jacques Chirac and Prince Abdullah raised these two projects (Thales and Dassault) within the framework of a wide-ranging conversation.’’ The Elysee reiterated that nothing was signed with regard to MIKSA.99 However, it was reported that Thales’s CEO hinted in late April 2005 that the program is on a fast track.100 In addition, the Kingdom has intensified security on its border with Iraq. It has been reported that Saudi Arabia plans to spend up to $7 billion to build ‘‘a partly virtual fense.’’ Saudi and U.S. officials were quoted as saying that this ‘‘virtual’’ fence, in addition to the fence, would also include sand berms, electronic surveillance, and sensors. The main goal for this fence, Saudi officials say, is to stop weapons and drug smuggling across the border, but they also assert that the fear of a spillover of the Iraqi insurgency into neighboring states is also another reason. Few details, however, were available in September 2006, but officials reported that Saudi Arabia has asked for bids from defense contractors.101

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The Expanding Mission of the Border Guard The Boarder Guard has been historically concerned with smuggling, but now has a growing internal security mission.102 It is being expanded and given better equipment like very fast patrol boats. The Saudi Air Force and Saudi Navy are providing the Border Guard more surveillance and patrol support, and some consideration is being given to giving the Border Guard surveillance helicopters while the Saudi Navy is seeking suitable maritime patrol aircraft. It is virtually impossible, however, for Saudi Arabia to fully secure its Gulf or Red Sea coasts against smuggling and infiltration by small craft. Traffic in the Gulf and Red Sea is simply too high, the coasts are too long, and sensors cannot track movements by dhows and small craft. The Saudi Navy, Border Guard, and National Guard are able to provide adequate security screening for key ports, desalination facilities, and petroleum export facilities with roughly two weeks of warning. Coverage is generally limited in peacetime.

Security and the Role of the Judicial System The Saudi civil and criminal legal system is another key aspect of the Saudi security apparatus. It has slowly been modernized, but presents problems both in terms of both efficient internal security operations and human rights. It is traditional, religious in character, and is based on Shari’a as interpreted by Islamic practice under the Wahhabi order, which adheres to the Hanbali School of the Sunni branch of Islam. The Shari’a courts exercise jurisdiction over common criminal cases and civil suits regarding marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. These courts base judgments largely on the Quran and on the Sunna, another Islamic text. Cases involving relatively small penalties are tried in Shari’a summary courts; more serious crimes are adjudicated in Shari’a courts of common pleas. Appeals from Shari’a courts are made to the courts of appeal. The Saudi government permits Shi’ite Muslims to use their own legal tradition to adjudicate noncriminal cases within their community. Other civil proceedings, including those involving claims against the government and enforcement of foreign judgments, are held before specialized administrative tribunals, such as the Commission for the Settlement of Labor Disputes and the Board of Grievances.103 The Judicial System and Internal Security The judicial system works differently when it deals with internal security issues. The Saudi government is still deeply concerned about the security of the military forces—although there have been no recent cases of active opposition within either the regular military forces or the paramilitary and security forces. The military justice system has jurisdiction over uniformed personnel and civil servants that are charged with violations of military regulations. The King, the Crown Prince, and the Minister of Defense and Civil Aviation review the decisions of courts-martial, and it is clear that serious cases get the direct attention of the senior leadership. Similarly, the

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Saudi government conducts closed trials for persons who may be political prisoners and in other cases has detained persons incommunicado for long periods while under investigation. The U.S. State Department reports that there are several bodies that perform higher legal review functions: • The Supreme Judicial Council is not a court and may not reverse decisions made by a court of appeals. However, the Council may review lower court decisions and refer them back to the lower court for reconsideration. Only the Supreme Judicial Council may discipline or remove a judge. The King appoints the members of the Council. • The Council of Senior Religious Scholars is an autonomous body of 20 senior religious jurists, including the Minister of Justice. It establishes the legal principles to guide lower-court judges in deciding cases. • Provincial governors have the authority to exercise leniency and reduce a judge’s sentence. • The King reviews cases involving capital punishment. The King has the authority to commute death sentences and grant pardons, except for capital crimes committed against individuals. In such cases, he may request the victim’s next of kin to pardon the murderer—usually in return for compensation from the family or the King.

The ‘‘Mutawwa’in’’ or Religious Police Saudi Arabia has a religious police called the ‘‘Mutawwa’in,’’ which is a force organized under the King in conjunction with the Islamic ‘‘clergy’’ or Ulema. It is known in English as the Organization to Prevent Vice and Promote Virtue or Committees for Public Morality and is part of the government’s Department of Virtue Propagation and Vice Prevention. It is primarily responsible for ensuring compliance with the precepts of Islam, but performs some security functions in dealing with religious extremists.104 The Mutawwa’in enforce the public observances of religious practices, such as the closure of public establishments during prayer times. They have been known to exceed their authority with both Saudi and expatriates alike by undue harassment of both men and women in public places and trespassing into private homes. The U.S. Department of State reported the following:105 The Mutawaa’in have the authority to detain persons for no more than 24 hours for violations of the strict standards of proper dress and behavior. However, they sometimes exceed this limit before delivering detainees to the police. Current procedures require a police officer to accompany the Mutawaa’in at the time of an arrest. The Mutawaa’in generally comply with this requirement. In the more conservative Riyadh district, however, there are continuing reports received of Mutawaa’in accosting, abusing, arresting, and detaining persons alleged to have violated dress and behavior standards. Mutawaa’in practices and incidents of abuse varied widely in different regions of the country, but were most numerous in the central Nejd region. In certain areas, both the Mutawaa’in and religious vigilantes acting on their own harassed, assaulted, battered, arrested, and

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detained citizens and foreigners. The Government requires the Mutawaa’in to follow established procedures and to offer instruction in a polite manner; however, Mutawaa’in did not always comply with the requirements. The Government has not publicly criticized abuses by Mutawaa’in and religious vigilantes, but has sought to curtail these abuses.

It also reports that the Mutawaa’in enforce strict standards of social behavior, including the closing of commercial establishments during the five daily prayer observances, insisting upon compliance with strict norms of public dress, and dispersing gatherings of women in public places. The Mutawaa’in frequently reproach Saudi and foreign women for failure to observe strict dress codes, and arrested men and women found together who were not married or closely related. In November 1998, several Mutawaa’in attacked and killed an elderly Shi’ite prayer leader in Hofuf for calling the prayer according to the Shi’ite tradition. Mutawaa’in attempts to cover up the killing were unsuccessful. The State Department reports that the government reportedly investigated the incident, but does not make public the results of any investigations involving Mutawaa’in personnel.106 The level of Mutawwa’in activity has varied over time and is difficult to predict. The government appointed a new and more compliant leader of the religious police after a series of raids on rich and influential Saudis in 1990, but their power grew strikingly after the Gulf War, as Saudi traditionalists reacted to the presence of U.S. and other Western forces, but seems to have peaked in the mid-1990s. The number of reports of harassment by the Mutawaa’in during the late 1990s remained relatively low in comparison with previous years, but the Mutawaa’in continues to intimidate, abuse, and detain citizens and foreigners of both sexes. Some Saudi officials go so far as to describe the Mutawwa’in as a form of disguised unemployment for religious Saudis and state it is sharply overstaffed in some areas. One senior Saudi official went so far as to refer to the Mutawwa’in as a ‘‘religious labor union more interested in their benefits than anything else.’’ Other Saudis are more divided in their reaction. Some feel the Mutawwa’in perform a useful function in limiting the secularization of the Kingdom. Others see it as an outdated and overconservative annoyance.107 Serious questions also remain about the degree to which the attitudes of organizations like the Mutawwa’in affected the safety of Saudi girls’ schools and did or did not interfere in a school fire that killed 15 Saudi girls in March 2002.108 An Effective Internal Security Force? In general, the Mutawwa’in seem to be more of a Saudi internal security problem than part of the solution. Saudis do not seem to be able to cite any examples of cases where the Mutawwa’in have played a role in limiting the activities of Islamic extremists and defending the core values of Islam against extremism. They cannot cite cases in which the Mutawwa’in played a role in defending religious values while aiding modernization and reform. They have carried out rote enforcement of Saudi religious practices while acting as a tacit endorsement of efforts to force compliance with

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Islam rather than persuade. As such, they often at least indirectly endorse Islamic extremism while lacking the intellectual depth, training, and experience to truly defend one of the world’s great religions. In late November 2002, Prince Nayef was sufficiently disturbed over continuing problems with the Mutawwa’in so that he publicly took action to try to improve the conduct of the Department of Virtue Propagation and Vice Prevention. He called upon the Department to ‘‘hire well qualified people and not people of limited qualifications who act recklessly’’ to ‘‘gently deal with the people and avoid harshness, especially with young people.’’ He announced a training institute was being set up and that the Mutawwa’in would operate with better training and discipline.109 Prince Nayef followed through and announced a policy of curbing the authorities of the Mutawwa’in and removed their ability to interrogate suspects. In May 2006, the Minister of Interior sent a directive to the provincial governors that the role of the virtue commission will be restricted to arresting suspects and handing them over to police. Saudi officials were quoted as saying that the decision would put more coordination between the Mutawwa’in members and the police and announced that the organization is ‘‘a religious’’ one, not a police department.110 Prince Nayef promised further improvements in September 2006, although he defended the existence of the force and previous improvement efforts. It should be noted, however, that there is another force called the ‘‘Mujahideen,’’ whose operations are centered in Riyadh and largely patrol it at night as a kind of religious vice squad. It has taken part in counterterrorism operations. This force is much more professional than the Mutawwa’in and is rarely seen or talked about. It is staffed by around 5,000 and is an independent service that reports administratively to Prince Nayef, the Minister of Interior, and operationally to the Assistant Minister for Security Affairs. SAUDI ARABIA’S CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES The Kingdom exists in the heart of the Middle East and has to deal with the same nature of external and internal threats that the other Gulf States face. While Iraq as a conventional and a WMD threat has disappeared, Saudi Arabia faces the prospects of civil war in Iraq, a potentially nuclear Iran, and the ongoing threat of terrorism inside the Kingdom. As has been touched upon earlier, Saudi Arabia also faces a set of socioeconomic challenges that indirectly impact the Kingdom’s prospects of stability in the coming decades. The major risks and uncertainties the Kingdom must deal with include the following: • Counterterrorism: The most urgent threat facing the Kingdom is that from terrorist organizations such as Al Qa’ida and other affiliated groups. Since May 2003, the Kingdom has faced an onslaught of attacks that caused many deaths and forced some to question the Kingdom’s internal stability. Since the end of 2004, the Saudi security forces have won many battles against Al Qa’ida, stopped many attacks, and have put

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Al Qa’ida on the defensive. The threat from these groups, however, is far from over. The Saudi internal security forces are steadily improving, but the Kingdom also faces the socioeconomic, political, and regional issues that are considered the main motivators and recruiting cries for such groups. In addition, while jointness is an endless pursuit, the Kingdom must continue to improve jointness and interoperability not only between its conventional military services, but also between its conventional services and internal security apparatus, between its own military and the GCC, and between its own counterterrorism forces and other neighboring states. • Dealing with Iraq’s future: Instability in Iraq poses several key threats to the Kingdom’s national security. First, an unstable Iraq can be a safe haven for terrorists that requires further spending on the Kingdom’s part to control its border and divert assets away from its internal security needs. Second, while estimates differ, Saudi fighters have gone to fight in Iraq. The challenge to the Kingdom is to deal with these fighters on their return and avoid repeating the mistakes of dealing with those who fought in the Afghan conflict against the Soviets during the 1980s. Third, the Kingdom must deal with the potential of disintegration in Iraq. Sectarian violence among Shi’ites, Sunnis, and Kurds can force a civil war in Iraq, which could push each side to demand autonomy. Three Iraq’s can be damaging to the Kingdom and its neighboring GCC countries’ stability. Fourth, Iran has been accused by the Kingdom, Iraqi officials, and the United States of aiding both sides of the conflict in Iraq. Iran is accused of using both its military and intelligence assets to support militias such as the al-Mahdi Army and the Bader Brigade, as well as its ‘‘soft power’’ among the Shi’ites in the South to influence the future of Iraq. Saudi Arabia has a stake in curbing Iran’s influence and the creation of a ‘‘Shi’ite crescent’’ between Iran and Iraq that can result in further Sunni-Shi’ite conflict in the Gulf and beyond. • The risk of Iranian proliferation: Iran’s WMD and missile programs pose a different type of threat to the Kingdom. As noted in the chapter on Iran, there are major uncertainties about Iran’s nuclear intentions, war-fighting capabilities, and the strategic implications of a nuclear Iran in the Gulf. A nuclear Iran, however, will likely tilt the balance of power in the region to Iran’s favor. If Iran does acquire nuclear capabilities, the Kingdom has several options: acquire its own WMD and long-range strike capabilities, build a missile defense shield, or ask for a nuclear power (United States, Pakistan, NATO, or China) to extend its nuclear deterrence over the Gulf. But the Kingdom has always expressed its hope that Iran’s nuclear program is solved diplomatically. Saudi officials have privately pressured Iran to accept the demands of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the EU-3 (Germany, France, and United Kingdom). In addition, Saudi officials have publicly expressed that dealing with Iran’s nuclear program must be discussed in a larger context that includes proliferation of WMD in the Middle East—which includes Israel’s nuclear program. • Yemeni instability: Yemen has had a history of instability and internal strife since the early 1960s. This instability forced the Kingdom to get involved in Yemen’s civil war during the 1960s as well as fortify its border with Yemen to curb the inflow of weapons and drugs. Given the threat from terrorism, the Saudi-Yemeni border has been a source of terrorists, weapons, and explosives to Al Qa’ida. Instability in Yemen, however, is not only a question of border control. The Kingdom does not want a hostile regime in Yemen that threatens the Kingdom’s national security or other Gulf States. In addition, Yemen overlooks the strategically important Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and instability in

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Yemen’s government can disturb the flow of trade between the Arabian and the Red Seas. Currently, Yemen’s stability is tenuous, but not chaotic. There have been efforts by the Kingdom to bring Yemen into the GCC fold, help it with its internal security and intelligence need, and give it generous economic aid. These efforts are likely to continue for the foreseeable future. • The GCC and collective security: Saudi Arabia’s relations with other neighbors, the GCC states, have always been marked by political rivalries, but not conflict. These rivalries have taken many shapes and forms, including border disputes, diplomatic punitive measures, and at times fire exchanges across borders. Currently, the country that causes the most headache to Saudi Arabia is Qatar through its support of the AlJazeera TV network that gives a platform to Osama bin Laden and other groups that oppose the Saudi royal family. In addition, Saudi Arabia is now facing the potential of restarting border disputes with the United Arab Emirates over the Shaybah oil field and Bureim. The Kingdom’s relations with Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman have been cordial since the end of the Gulf War in 1991. These disagreements have largely been the result of the perception by the other Gulf States of Saudi ‘‘hegemonic’’ ambitions over the Gulf. Saudi Arabia has little choice but to defend the smaller neighbors against Iranian aggressions and be prepared to ensure internal stability through counterterrorism cooperation and joint security arrangements, as well as being willing to mobilize its armed forces to deter any attack against the GCC states. • Relations with the United States: One of the results of the 9/11 attacks has been the souring of the Saudi–U.S. relations. The U.S. media and key members of Congress have accused the Kingdom of supporting terrorism and repeated the question, is Saudi Arabia a friend or foe? In Saudi Arabia, the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the U.S. support of Israel, and the treatment of Arabs and Muslims since 9/11 have caused many in Saudi Arabia to ask whether Saudi Arabia should reconsider its close strategic partnership with the United States. To deal with these difficult questions, Saudi Arabia and the United States inaugurated ‘‘a strategic dialogue,’’ which is being headed by the Saudi Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State. This dialogue has several working groups, including Counterterrorism Working Group; Military Affairs Working Group; Energy Working Group; Partnership, Education, Exchange, and Human Development Working Group; Consular Affairs Working Group; and Economic and Financial Affairs Working Group. This dialogue is a good first start, and it deals with the pillars of the U.S.–Saudi relations, but there is much to be done, particularly on reengaging the human-to-human interaction. In this context, both countries’ ambassadors (Prince Turki Al Faisal, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, and James C. Oberwetter, the U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia) have been actively involved in communicating the importance of this relationship. Disagreements over Iraq, Iran, and the Arab-Israeli conflict are likely to continue, and both nations must find a way to work together to bridge the gap and find areas where they can cooperate. • Internal security vs. conventional military spending: While the Kingdom’s main urgent threat is that of Al Qa’ida, Saudi Arabia is not without conventional threats in the region. The main two conventional threats the Kingdom could face are Iran and Yemen. Despite their aging military weapons and lack of meaningful military modernization program in the last two decades, the two nations cannot win a war against a modern Saudi military, but they can pose a threat and preoccupy the Kingdom. In addition to settling outstanding issues, the Kingdom’s military

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modernization has to reflect two key goals: protecting the Kingdom and the GCC states’ national security and avoiding future conflicts. The Saudi military weapons systems are one of the most advanced in the region and even the world, but the challenge to the Kingdom’s armed forces is to create the ‘‘right’’ type of force rather than a ‘‘prestigious’’ force, and that requires eliminating the glitter factor in military spending and focusing on force effectiveness, sustainability, jointness, and interoperability. • Reforms vs. stability: Saudi Arabia faces an internal dilemma that most of the other countries in the region face: balancing public demands for reforms and the need to deal with conservative elements in the society. Saudi Arabia has embarked on a reform package that started in the mid-1990s. These include economic, educational, social, and political reforms. In recent years, Saudi Arabia held municipal elections, relaxed media censorship, modernized its educational curricula, and curbed the power of its virtue commission (Mutawwa’in). The challenge for the Saudi government is to balance between the demands for realistic reforms without breaking the social cohesion of the Saudi society. This can be achieved though the implementation of ‘‘evolutionary’’ change that ensures stability and modernization at the same time. While the pace may not be what is demanded, it is the required pace to achieve the desirable results. • Managing oil wealth: The high oil prices provided the Kingdom with a surge of oil revenues and inflow of capital that has resulted in record high budget surpluses, a boom in the Saudi stock market, and new military spending. Saudi officials have expressed their desires not to repeat the mistake of the 1980s, when overspending caused mismanagement and resulted in wasteful spending. As noted earlier, the Kingdom’s ability to channel this capital into areas to ensure and improve Saudi internal and external stability will be one of the Kingdom’s key challenges in the coming years. Efforts in the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Oil, and the Ministry of Defense to provide transparency and educate both officials as well as the Saudi public about the challenges ahead have started, and the challenge is to ensure such efforts continue. • Energy security: Saudi security foiled an attack against one of its largest oil facilities at Abqaiq on February 24, 2006. The news caused oil prices to jump more than $2 a barrel. Terrorists present a new kind of threat in terms of their willingness to suddenly change strategies and tactics to attack energy facilities. This threat not only presents a threat to the physical security of key oil facilities, but it also adds to the ‘‘security premium’’ in the global oil market. There are no ‘‘bulletproof ’’ security systems for energy facilities. Perhaps the weakest link in the Kingdom’s energy infrastructure is its estimated 11,092 miles of pipeline. The Kingdom, therefore, faces the challenge of dealing with the changing nature of threat and any future covert or overt attacks against its oil facilities. • Meeting the global energy demands: Saudi Arabia faces also another type of challenge that impacts not only the security of its own energy facilities, but global energy security. The surge in the global oil demand caused by high demand in Asia and the ongoing refining bottlenecks in the United States pose another type of challenge: Saudi Arabia must provide a cushion to a tight global oil market. In 2006, Saudi Arabia’s oil production capacity was estimated to be near 11.0 million barrels a day, and the Kingdom has announced plans to increase it to 12.5 million barrels per day by 2009

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and eventually to 15 million barrels per day. In early 2006, the only meaningful spare capacity was that of Saudi Arabia—1.5 million barrels a day. None of the other large oil producers have the capability to increase their production capacity in the near term, and that makes the Kingdom the guarantor of the global oil supply in case of supply disruption in other parts of the world. This challenge requires massive investment in Saudi energy infrastructure, adapting the latest technological capabilities and ensuring the safe flow of energy supply through the Strait of Hormuz. • Demographic time bomb: Saudi Arabia is facing a youth explosion coupled with high unemployment and a struggling Saudization program. Saudi Arabia is providing the incentives and the job training to Saudi citizens to become more competitive in the job market and has been pursuing an aggressive nationalization program since the early 1990s. Yet, progress does not match the need. Estimates for Saudi unemployment range from 8 to 25 percent, and given the youth explosion forecast for Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom is adding hundred of thousands of new job seekers every year. • Economic diversification: The Saudi economy has been dominated by its oil and petrochemical industry for the past three decades. Since the 1980s, and more aggressively since the mid-1990s, the Kingdom has attempted to diversify its sources of income and employment. Most of these efforts involved partial privatization of key industries such as electricity, telecommunications, and the petrochemicals. While most of these efforts have started, it is too early to know their full impact. • The impact of an emerging Saudi private sector: Historically, the majority of the Saudi economy has been controlled by the government or largely depended on oil revenues. In 2006, it is estimated that only 40 percent of GDP came from the private sector while the rest came from the public sector. In addition, it is estimated that the petroleum sector accounts for roughly 75 percent of budget revenues, 45 percent of the GDP, and 90 percent of export earnings. The Kingdom is trying to build a private sector that helps in the spread of wealth and improves the standard of living of the Saudi population. Some of these efforts include privatization campaigns, the liberalization of sectors such as tourism and the financial market, and building a Saudi stock market. Some of these efforts are not without problems. For example, the Saudi stock market reached an all-time high at the end of 2005 only to face a 40-percent correction in early 2006—causing many in the middle class to lose their money and demand for further control by the government over the capital market.

These challenges are not new and are not mutually exclusive to Saudi Arabia. In fact, most of the Middle East and, for that matter, most of the developing world, is struggling with the same challenges. The strategic importance of the Kingdom, however, amplifies these challenges. During the past several years, Saudi Arabia has started to deal with these challenges. The accession of King Abdullah to the throne in August 2005 settled one key uncertainty that Western scholars have argued about for several years: the succession process in Saudi Arabia. The peaceful succession has shown the economic, social, and security risks in the Kingdom far outweigh political reforms.

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Terrorism and Counterterrorism Al Qa’ida is scarcely the first internal threat that Saudi Arabia has faced. The Saudi monarchy has had to deal with a long series of internal challenges from Islamic extremists since the time of the Ikhwan in the 1920s, as well as from secular movements supported by other Arab states. These struggles were particularly serious during the peak of Nasserism and Pan-Arabism in the 1950s and during the first major Islamic backlash from oil wealth and modernization in the late 1970s. These internal security challenges decreased during 1980–1990 (following the Grand Mosque takeover in 1979 until the Gulf War in 1990), largely because of the Kingdom’s oil wealth, rapid growth, and a focus on internal development. They became a resurgent problem after the Gulf War because of the rise of new extremist movements hostile to any U.S. or Western military presence on Saudi soil. After the mid-1990s, the Saudi government increasingly came under direct and indirect attacks by such Islamic extremist groups. As a result, the Saudi government slowly strengthened its internal security and counterterrorist programs. It also cooperated with the United States in a number of investigations, including the bombing of the Al-Khobar Towers, the attack on the Saudi National Guard Headquarters, and the attack on the USS Cole. Saudi Internal Security before 9/11 The Saudi reaction to Islamic extremist or ‘‘deviant’’ threats was relatively limited, however, until the events of 9/11. The senior leadership quietly put pressure on the Ulema. It arrested a wide range of extremists and publicly condemned terrorism. It exploited the fact that the Saudi clergy is funded by the government and that there are no madrassas in the Kingdom that provide religious education separate from the state educational system. The Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs (MOIA) was first organized for the purpose of religious administration, but it has always had an internal security element as well. It has been used to provide both carrots and sticks for internal security purposes. In fact, MOIA was created after the Gulf War, when it became apparent that many hard-line Islamists opposed any Western presence on Saudi soil, and it was slowly stepped up in the 1990s when Islamic extremists became more active. The Ministry of Interior and the General Intelligence Presidency took steps to strengthen their counterterrorist and security operations. They arrested extremists within the Kingdom and continued to monitor the activities of outside-based opposition and pressure from foreign governments. After Osama bin Laden emerged as an open opponent of the monarchy in the mid-1990s, Saudi intelligence stepped up its fight against these extremists. The security services increased their monitoring of the activities of hard-line Saudi opposition groups overseas that attacked the government, exploiting divisions in their ranks, co-opting or bribing elements within them, and putting pressure on foreign governments to end their activities. Saudi security did not focus on Al Qa’ida and bin Laden alone. It dealt with two main groups that threatened the internal security in the Kingdom: first,

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Sunni extremists led by the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, its affiliated groups, and what is left of the Muslim Brotherhood; second, Shi’ite groups, supported by Iran, that were angry at the perceived mistreatment of their fellow Shi’ites in the Eastern Province, but they also resented the fact that Mecca and Medina were under Sunni control. The disagreement with the presence of U.S. forces on Saudi soil was only that—a disagreement. However, it was taken a step further on November 13, 1995, when the American mission to train the Saudi National Guard was bombed leaving 6 dead and 60 injured. Then on June 25, 1996, a truck bomb ripped the Al-Khobar Towers, where U.S. military personnel were staying, killing 19 and injuring 500. Saudi Response to 9/11 On one level, the events of 9/11 served as a wake-up call to the Saudi government. On another, Saudi society and some officials reacted by going into a state of denial. The royal family, most of the Ulema, and business leaders in Saudi Arabia condemned the attacks of September 11. Saudis, like everyone in the world, were horrified, and it was brought home by the fact that there were many Saudis on those planes, and that bin Laden himself was a Saudi. The Saudi government issued a statement condemning the ‘‘regrettable and inhuman bombings and attacks. . .’’ that ‘‘contravene all religious values and human civilized concepts; and extended sincere condolences to the families of the victims, to U.S. President George W. Bush and to the U.S. people in general.’’ The Saudi statement reiterated the Kingdom’s position condemning all forms of terrorism and its ongoing cooperation with the international community to combat it. Many senior members of the royal family also issued their own statements condemning the attacks. For example, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Saud Al Faisal, argued during the Islamic Conference meeting, on October 11, 2001, that terrorism harms the Islamic world, impairs just Islamic causes, and cited that terrorism and violence never advanced the Palestinian cause. Senior Saudi religious and legal figures condemned the attacks with equal speed. Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al-Sheikh, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia and Chairman of the Senior Council of Ulema, stated on September 15, 2001, ‘‘The recent developments in the United States constitute a form of injustice that is not tolerated by Islam, which views them as gross crimes and sinful acts.’’ In addition, the Chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council, Sheikh Salih Al-Luhaidan, stated on September 14, ‘‘as a human community we must be vigilant and careful to oppose these pernicious and shameless evils, which are not justified by any sane logic, nor by the religion of Islam.’’ Since that time, leading Saudi officials and clerics have repeatedly condemned the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and other terrorist activities.111 Yet, a considerable portion of the Saudi public remained in denial. They either did not accept the fact that so many Saudis were involved in the 9/11 atrocities or they found conspiracy theories to put the causes and blame outside Saudi Arabia. They became preoccupied with trying to counter charges in the Western media about their

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‘‘sect of Islam,’’ their society, and their schools that led young Saudis to become extremists without objectively examining what was actually happening. The government was less worried about internal terrorism than external threats. Its focus was mainly political and diplomatic and little was done to boost internal security. This attitude changed a year and a half later—when the first major terrorist attack on Saudi soil occurred. While the priority for Saudi internal security activity changed after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the Saudi government initially did more to try to improve relations with the United States, deal with terrorism outside the Kingdom, and counter the damage to its image than it did to strengthen the operations of the Saudi security apparatus. What Saudi Arabia was still slow to understand, until major terrorist attacks began to occur in the Kingdom in May 2003, was that Saudi Arabia faced truly serious internal security issues as well as the need to deal with terrorism inside the country. The apparent lack of a significant number of terrorist cells and the comparatively low levels of activity in Saudi Arabia led the Kingdom to focus on such terrorism largely in terms of external, rather than internal, threats. Saudi intelligence and security services paid too little attention to the growing and highly visible ties between hard-line Pakistani extremists in the Pakistani ISI and religious schools and the impact of Saudi-financed activities in Pakistan and Central Asia and the number of young Saudi men associated with Osama bin Laden and Al Qa’ida. Discussions with Saudi officials indicate that they had surprisingly little understanding of the difference between legitimate Islamic organizations in Central Asia, China, and the Far East and highly political action groups that used Islam as an ideological cry. They paid too little attention to the fact that such groups were committed to the violent overthrow of governments in their region, which strongly opposed both modernization and reform, and which were broadly anti-Western in character. They also failed to monitor Islamist extremist ‘‘missionary’’ and charity groups operating in Europe. Even though such extremist groups, particularly the neo-Salafi ones, showed little of the pragmatic tolerance and moderation common to mainstream Wahhabi practices in the Kingdom, they often took on an extremist character particularly in the United Kingdom and Germany. The Saudi security services failed to fully appreciate the threat posed by the flow of Saudi money to Palestinian groups like Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other hard-line or violent Islamic elements in countries like Egypt, and they failed to detect a significant flow of arms, explosives, and terrorist supplies into Saudi Arabia from neighboring countries like Yemen. That the Saudi government was slow to understand the fact that so many young Saudis were directly involved in 9/11, as well as in the overall membership of Osama bin Laden’s Al Qa’ida, reflected the fact that Saudi security efforts had failed to come firmly to grips with its Islamic extremists at many levels. One key problem was that the Saudi intelligence community relied too much on human contacts and informers and signals intelligence rather than on active

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counterterrorism efforts in the field. It also remained weak in dealing with the financial aspects of intelligence and internal security, which helps explain why it failed to properly monitor of the flow of money to Saudi charities, religious organizations, and individuals in financing extremist groups—other than those that posed a direct threat to the rule of the Saudi royal family. In fairness, such monitoring is not easy. Saudi banking rules are relatively strict in terms of tracking and identifying individual accounts, but little effort was made before September 11 to track the flow of money inside or outside the country to extremist causes and factions. It should be noted, however, that Saudi organizations and individuals have hundreds of billions of dollars of privately held money in Western and other foreign banks. Effective surveillance of such holdings is difficult, if not impossible. The problem is further compounded by easy access to the financial institutions of other GCC countries, like the United Arab Emirates. Many Gulf countries have financial institutions that make cash transfers extremely easy, which tolerate high levels of money laundering, smuggling, and narco-trafficking, and which have often been far more careless in allowing the flow of money to extremist causes than Saudi Arabia has. The leaders and citizens of countries like Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates have also been as careless in their donations to ‘‘charities’’ as Saudis. The Impact of May 2003 As was the case in the United States before September 2001, it was not until the threat of terrorism truly came home to Saudi Arabia that the Kingdom fully understood the seriousness of the threat and the nature of the challenges it faced. As the chronology below—which is largely adapted from the work by the National Council on U.S.–Arab Relations—shows, Saudi Arabia should have seen what was coming. Nevertheless, it failed to do so until terrorists carried out a brutal attack on several housing compounds in Riyadh on May 12, 2003. The attackers carried out four suicide bombings on compounds housing many Western residents. The bombing resulted in 34 dead, including 7 Americans and 7 Saudis, plus 200 wounded. From that point onward, Saudi Arabia found itself fighting a repeated series of terrorist attacks on its own soil and having to deal with more terrorist cells with far larger stocks of arms and explosives than it had previously estimated. The Saudi government also found that it was dealing with serious infiltration problems, particularly across the Yemeni border.112 This time, the Saudi authorities took the challenge seriously and implemented many steps to fix their internal security apparatus, reform parts of their educational system, and develop a system of tracking and regulating charities. Saudi Counterterrorism Efforts since May 2003 Since May 12, 2003, attacks in Saudi Arabia by the terrorist organization have caused the death of 144 Saudi nationals and foreign residents and 120 militants.113 Saudi officials have argued that the attacks that have occurred account for only a

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fraction of the attempted attacks inside the Kingdom. For example, the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud Al Faisal, claimed that the Saudi security forces have prevented 52 terrorist attacks in the country since the May 2003 attacks. Al Faisal also added that the Saudi counterterrorism forces killed 120 terrorists and arrested more than 800 suspects between May 12, 2003, and January 2006.114 The attempted attack on Abqaiq Oil Facility in the Eastern Province in February 2006 was the first major terrorist assault in the Kingdom since December 29, 2004 —more than a year before, which is seen by many as evidence to the fact that Saudi counterterrorism efforts have been steadily improving. Others see the delay as Al Qa’ida waiting for more ‘‘spectacular’’ targets. Like all security efforts, the Saudi counterterrorism forces have made improvements in many areas. But the enemy is adapting its tactics and so must the Saudis adapt the strategy against them. Saudi Arabia issued two most-wanted lists. In December 2003, it published a list of 26 wanted terrorists, of which the Kingdom killed or captured all but one. The second list of 36 wanted terrorists was issued in June 2005. The Al Qa’ida statement following the attempted attack against Abqaiq in February 2006 identified the attackers as Mohammed Saleh al-Ghaith and Abdullah Abdulaziz al-Tweijri. This was subsequently confirmed by DNA tests by the Saudi authorities. While most-wanted lists are hardly the best metric for measuring counterterrorism strategy success, the Saudi security forces have been successful at both identifying dangerous elements of Al Qa’ida and killing or capturing them. According to the Ministry of Interior spokesman, Mansour Al-Turki, there were only two terror suspects at large from the second most-wanted list that was released June 2005 of known suspected terrorists believed to have been in the Kingdom, which implies that the rest (20) have either fled the Kingdom or that they have been captured or killed by the Kingdom.115 While ‘‘Al Qa’ida in the Arab Peninsula’’ may well be on the defensive, the asymmetric and terrorist threat to the Kingdom is certainly not over. The Al Qa’ida statement that claimed responsibility for the attack against Abqaiq also threatened more attacks against other Saudi oil facilities. On Monday, February 27, 2006, Saudi security forces shot five militants and arrested one in a shootout with members of Al Qa’ida who were suspected of being involved in the Abqaiq attack. Western counterterrorism officials claim that the Kingdom’s strategy against Al Qa’ida has been effective, and many counterterrorism experts believe that the Saudi efforts deserve recognition. For example, the Spanish Counterterrorism Prosecutor, Baltasar Garzon, said of the Kingdom’s strategy: ‘‘The Saudi anti-terrorism program is the best in the world right now.’’ Jean Louis Bruggiere, the French Counterterrorism official also said, ‘‘I must say, it appears to be impressive what [the Saudis are] doing—yes.’’116 Saudi officials have expressed hope and confidence about their strategy against terrorism. They have also shown realism about the nature of the threat and the fact that they may face it for many years to come. In November 2005, Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al Saud was quoted as saying, ‘‘Can we wipe out (terrorism) 100 percent? No, but I confirm to you that with the vigilance of security forces,

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intelligence agents and especially the Saudi people we might be able to end terrorism, God willing, within the next two years in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia . . .. But (to end it) completely with all its meanings, no one in the world can prevent deviants.’’117 Some experts have argued that given the failure of Al Qa’ida to destabilize Saudi Arabia, members may turn their attention to ‘‘softer targets,’’ not necessarily in the Kingdom, but against oil installations of neighboring Gulf States. As upcoming chapters show, it is unclear if the Gulf countries’ internal security and intelligence capabilities can withstand the type of assaults and intensity level that the Kingdom has experienced since May 2003. Al Qa’ida in Saudi Arabia The Al Qa’ida Organization in Saudi Arabia has done some damage to the Kingdom’s economy and has killed many innocent people. It has scored a kind of victory in that it has forced the government to make massive expenditures on internal security and has created a general climate of insecurity in the Kingdom. This has had little impact on the day-to-day life of ordinary Saudis. It has, however, made many foreign workers leave, has forced foreign diplomats and businessmen to spend much of their time in secure compounds, and has reduced foreign investment. Almost inevitably, the end result has also fueled exaggerated fears about the Kingdom’s internal instability. While the Al Qa’ida attacks have brought Saudi and U.S. officials together in cooperating in counterterrorism measures in the many areas, the resulting fears have helped to widen the distance between ordinary Saudis and Americans created by 9/11. Nevertheless, Al Qa’ida has been ineffective in achieving its main goals for a number of reasons. First, it was unsuccessful in its recruitment efforts; second; it failed to articulate a viable alternative to the existing government; and third, it lacked funding and was forced to channel resources into the one existing cell—thus unable to establish other independent cells. Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, the British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, was quoted as saying, ‘‘the good news is they’ve conducted a really pretty effective counterterrorist campaign. They’ve disrupted the Al Qa’ida network here. They’ve taken it down, and the terrorists are on the back foot.’’118 Despite the popular notion of Al Qa’ida as a hydra that can constantly grow new heads, there are indications that the organization has not been able to recover from government attacks. At its peak, Saudi Al Qa’ida claimed between 500–600 members scattered among the cells. Of these, roughly 250 were diehards. By the end of 2004, between 400–500 militants had been captured or killed, including all of the leaders—this is in addition to the thousands of sympathizers who were arrested and interrogated, most of whom have been freed. Al Qa’ida underestimated the efficacy of Saudi intelligence and security forces and their ability to adapt to new types of threat and attack. While ordinary police were not equipped to deal with the new threat, Saudi intelligence was able to accurately identify those militants who comprised the original 26 most-wanted list as leaders

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of Al Qa’ida relatively quickly, and the security services were able to hunt many down and disrupt most of the cells they headed. Most importantly, the organization could not win popular support. While it was able to exploit popular feeling and anger on some issues such as the Arab-Israeli issue, it could not win significant support for its actual activities from either Saudi people or the Saudi clergy. Above all, its emphasis on violence failed to resonate with the people. Saudis were shocked by the initial attacks, and those that targeted Muslims and Arabs further alienated and diminished support for the organization. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia is at a critical juncture in its fight against terrorism. The threat is unlikely to disappear for years to come. Al Qa’ida can draw on Saudis in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Central Asia, as well as other members of Al Qa’ida who may be able to enter Saudi Arabia. The Iraqi and Yemeni borders present serious problems in terms of infiltration. Saudi Arabia has hundreds of miles of porous border. In the last year, Saudi Border Guards have detained nearly a million people attempting to gain illegal entry into the Kingdom and seized more than 10 tons of drugs and 2,000 weapons. Some 30,000 men were detained in the Yemeni border area in July 2004 alone. In all, 19,000 smuggling attempts were foiled and 8,000 smugglers were arrested.119 The Yemeni border is particularly hard to secure. Much of it is in mountain areas or open desert that is very difficult to secure. Some tribes exist across the border and some towns straddle it without any barriers. Smuggling not only is a way of life, it is sometimes the key economic activity. Saudi security officers speculate that much of the more than 1.3 tons of explosives used in the attacks on the Ministry of Interior in late December 2004 came from across the Yemeni border. As has been touched upon earlier, the Iraq War has also posed new security challenges for Saudi Arabia, and while relatively few Saudi young men who have joined the Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq are not clearly tied to recruitment by Al Qa’ida, most have been recruited by Islamist extremists. Saudi Petroleum Security Apparatus The Kingdom has taken precautions in securing pipelines, oil fields, and other energy terminals. As noted earlier, the Saudi security budget for 2005 was $10 billion, including $1.5 billion on energy security (in 2004, the total security budget was estimated to be $8 billion, including $1.2 billion for energy security). Surveillance from helicopters and F-15 patrols operate around the clock, as do heavily equipped National Guard battalions on the perimeter.120 Oil fields and processing plants, however, are large-area targets, and redundant facilities ensure that an attack on one would not cause a serious disruption in the entire production system. At any given time, there are an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 troops protecting the Kingdom’s infrastructure. Each terminal and platform has its own specialized security unit, comprised of 5,000 Saudi Aramco security forces and an unknown number of specialized units of the National Guard and Ministry of Interior. The Coast Guard and components of the Saudi Navy protect the installations from the sea.121

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Ministry of Interior security units guarding Saudi energy infrastructure include representatives from the Special Security Forces, Special Emergency Forces, the General Security Service (domestic intelligence), regular forces of the Public Security Administration (police and fire fighters), the Petroleum Installation Security Force, and specialized brigades of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), Saudi Royal Navy, and the Coast Guard. Saudi Aramco also has built advanced communication centers to manage emergency and supply disruptions in its pipelines and processing hubs. For example, in November 2002, Aramco inaugurated a new Abqaiq Area Emergency Control Center (ECC). According to Aramco, the ECC houses 14 workstations, which control radio and telephone communication systems as well as link the ECC to the Shaybah field, export stations, and pipeline control hubs.122 Asymmetric Threat to Energy Security Terrorists present a new kind of threat in terms of their willingness to suddenly change strategies and tactics to attack energy facilities. This threat not only presents a threat to the physical security of key oil facilities, but it also adds to the security premium in the global oil market. Until recently, extremist groups had generally avoided energy targets, or had not made them critical priorities. This changed dramatically when the insurgency became serious in Iraq; since then, key Al Qa’ida leaders such as bin Laden have threatened attacks on oil facilities. In a tape that was posted on an extremist Web site, bin Laden asserted, ‘‘Targeting America in Iraq in terms of economy and loss of life is a golden and unique opportunity. . .Be active and prevent them from reaching the oil, and mount your operations accordingly, particularly in Iraq and the Gulf.’’123 Bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, also urged similar attacks. On December 7, 2005, a statement attributed to Al-Zawahiri called on the ‘‘mujahideen to concentrate their attacks on Muslims’ stolen oil, from which most of the revenues go to the enemies of Islam while most of what they leave is seized by the thieves who rule our countries.’’124 Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qa’ida in Iraq, made similar statements urging attacks against energy facilities in the Gulf and in Iraq. Insurgents in Iraq have made oil facilities one of their targets. The Institute for the Analysis of Global Security estimates that there have been 299 attacks on Iraqi oil infrastructure and personnel between June 2003 and February 12, 2006. 125 These attacks continue to constitute a threat, and some of them have caused a complete shutdown of oil exports from Iraq. Rebel groups in Nigeria have also attacked energy installations and disrupted oil exports. Four days before the attack on Abqaiq, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) claimed responsibility for attacking an oil facility and a naval vessel, and for kidnapping oil workers. This caused Shell to shut down its operations and production of a fifth of Nigerian oil output, approximately 0.45 million barrels a day. Interestingly, rebel leaders used rhetoric similar to that of Al Qa’ida.

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MEND claimed that it was fighting a ‘‘total war’’ to control the oil wealth of the Niger Delta.126 Attempts against Saudi oil facilities continue to worry the global energy market and the Saudi leadership. Following a siege and a raid against extremists in Dammam, Saudi security forces discovered more than 60 hand grenades and pipe bombs, pistols, machine guns, RPGs, two barrelsful of explosives, and video equipment. The Saudi Minister of Interior, Prince Nayef Al Saud, was quoted as saying that the Al Qa’ida cell had planned to attack Saudi oil and gas infrastructure, but Prince Nayef added, ‘‘There isn’t a place that they could reach that they didn’t think about,’’ and insisted that Al Qa’ida’s ultimate goal has been to cripple the global economy.127 Shortly after the attacks against Abqaiq, Al Qa’ida claimed responsibility. In a statement posted on its Web site, Al Qa’ida in the Arab Peninsula said that the attack was ‘‘part of a series of operations that Al Qa’ida is carrying out against the crusaders and the Jews to stop their plundering of Muslim wealth.’’ Al Qa’ida dubbed the attack ‘‘Operation Bin Laden Conquest’’ and claimed that the attackers managed to storm the compound.128 U.S. and Saudi officials, however, confirmed that the attackers were stopped from entering the compound and praised the Saudi security forces for foiling the attack. The U.S. Ambassador in Riyadh, James C. Oberwetter, said in a statement, ‘‘The Saudi government and Saudi Aramco deserve considerable credit for what they have done in recent years to enhance the security of oil facilities throughout the kingdom . . .I know firsthand the robust security systems that are in place there. When they were needed, those systems worked, and the facility at Abqaiq was fully protected.’’129 Assessing the Saudi Security Forces’ Performance at Abqaiq While early reports are often unreliable, the Saudi counterterrorism and petroleum security forces seem to have largely contained the attack against the facilities at Abqaiq and minimized the damage. Tactically, the operation and the Saudi response had a number of characteristics and lessons: • Two suicide bombers tried to drive two cars packed with explosives into the Abqaiq compound on Friday, February 24, 2006, at 3:10 P.M. Saudi time. The time is significant given that most Al Qa’ida attacks in the Kingdom have happened during the night to keep an element of surprise, prevent detection, and delay the response by Saudi forces • The tactic of using vehicle-borne suicide bombers is also significant. It has certainly been used by Al Qa’ida in the past to attack targets in the Kingdom. For example, the attack against three compounds on May 12, 2003, demonstrated similar tactics. The attackers used four cars that were packed with explosives and had heavy assault rifles. After spraying gunfire and killing the guards at the gates, they drove an explosive rigged car inside the compound where it was detonated. • In the case of Abqaiq, the facility was far more protected than the residential compounds in Riyadh were. Abqaiq reportedly had at least three layers of security. The

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goal of such frontal assaults is to weaken the first layer of defenses, penetrate it, and get closer to the center of the area. The Saudi security forces engaged the two approaching cars when they approached the first gate. The first car, reportedly, slammed into the gates, exploding, and injuring the guards, who eventually died in the hospital. • The second car used the hole in the fence to enter the compound. It was then engaged by Saudi forces at the second tier of the security perimeter, approximately one mile away from the closest facility. This was probably done through firing directly at the car with large caliber machine guns mounted on the armored personal carriers of the SANG unit at the gate or by an elite counterterrorism squad from the Special Emergency Forces. The explosives in the car detonated and caused damage to facilities near the gate, but the damage was largely outside and impacted only pumping and processing stations adjacent to the pipeline. This may have been prevented by strengthening the first layer of the security perimeter to prevent the breach, but Abqaiq covers approximately one square mile. This would have meant that the second layer of security was very close to the first and that even if the first perimeter was breached, the damage to the facility would be limited given the distance from the center of Abqaiq. • Press reports have claimed that the attackers wore Saudi Aramco uniforms and used cars painted in the company’s colors. This does not, however, imply that the cars were actually those of Aramco. Al Qa’ida previously used cars in attacks similar in appearance to those used by Saudi internal security forces. Subsequent investigations have shown that the cars were painted by the terrorists in order to breach security checkpoints. • The terrorists were killed before they could get out of the cars and cause further damage. It is unclear if the Saudi security forces directly killed the assailants or if the explosions of the cars actually killed them. Regardless, the important fact is that the attackers were stopped from using automatic weapons, grenades, or suicide belts to kill workers or attack facilities inside the compounds. While such assaults may have little lasting damage to the facilities, it could have caused far more to the security premium in the global oil market than a $2 per barrel jump in the oil price if the attackers had been successful at breaching the security at Abqaiq. • The attempted attack most likely happened after surveillance by the attackers. One of the hallmarks of Al Qa’ida is its surveillance capabilities. In addition, early reporting from the Kingdom indicated that the Saudi security forces were expecting an attack in the Eastern Province, which may have come from Saudi counterintelligence monitoring of Al Qa’ida. Preparation, enhanced by warning, also explains the success of Saudi forces in foiling the attack. • As noted earlier, most large attacks by Al Qa’ida took place during the night. The fact that the attack against Abqaiq happened on a Friday afternoon (the Muslim day of prayer) may signal that Al Qa’ida was changing tactics, but it also shows that the Saudi security forces were on alert, adapted to this shift, and responded accordingly. • Saudi Arabia issued two most-wanted lists. In December 2003, it published a list of 26 wanted terrorists, of which the Kingdom killed or captured all but one. The second list was issued in June 2005. The Al Qa’ida statement following the attempted attack against Abqaiq identified the attackers as Mohammed Saleh al-Ghaith and Abdullah Abdulaziz al-Tweijri. This was subsequently confirmed by DNA tests by the Saudi authorities. This shows that the Saudi authorities have been successful both at

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identifying the most dangerous elements of Al Qa’ida and at tracking them, but it also shows that these two could have been far more dangerous if they had been successful at storming the compound. In addition, while the success rate of capturing or killing those who are on the most-wanted lists is impressive, the death of the two attackers at Abqaiq leaves six terrorists from both most-wanted lists at large. • According to the Saudi MOI, the cars carried two tons of ammonium nitrate (one ton in each car) as well as unspecified quantities of high explosives, including RDX, PETN, and nitroglycerin. These large quantities of explosives were most likely smuggled into the Kingdom either through the Saudi-Yemeni (906 miles) or the Saudi-Iraqi (506 miles) border. This highlights the importance of border security. Saudi Arabia has spent billion of dollars on securing its border with Iraq and Yemen with thermal imaging, Border Guards, 20-foot-tall berms, and barbed wires. These precautions, however, cannot stop every infiltrator. Cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the Iraqi and Yemeni authorities, however, can limit penetration of terrorists, explosives, and weapons. • If the attackers had not been stopped and had managed to storm the gate, they could have reached major facilities and the damage may have been more severe. The extent of the damage is not yet fully known. The MOI claimed that the damage was ‘‘limited to a small fire which was brought under control.’’ Other reports have claimed that the explosion set fire to a segment of the pipeline, but that it was easily restored and returned to operation shortly thereafter. • Another equally important lesson is that while oil fields are large areas, they are hard targets and the damage from a car or a suicide bomb is limited to the vicinity of the attack, particularly given that there is much redundant infrastructure. While fires can be set in many areas of a working field, including at oil wells, fires do not produce critical or lasting damage. Unless wells are attacked with explosives deep enough in the wellhead to result in permanent damage to the well, most facilities can be repaired rapidly.

It is important, however, to distinguish between attacking the Abqaiq oil field and the Abqaiq facilities. The attackers did not reach the Abqaiq oil field and were not successful at attacking key processing facilities. They were, however, successful at adding more uncertainty and risk to an already volatile global oil market. It is equally important to note that the attack against Abqaiq should not be seen as a turning point in either Saudi stability or the global energy market. Rather, it is evidence that Al Qa’ida and other extremist groups will stop at nothing to disturb the global economy and international peace. It also signals that Al Qa’ida is changing tactics to attack an area that will garner the most attention and inflict the most damage on the Saudi leadership, the United States, and the international community. Some have claimed that the attack on Abqaiq was an act of ‘‘desperation’’ by Al Qa’ida, while others questioned the Saudi ability to protect its energy infrastructure. It is, however, all too clear that the Saudi counterterrorism strategy, intelligence, and internal security forces are getting progressively more effective. The Saudi response to the attempted attack against Abqaiq was a victory for the Saudi

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counterterrorism forces. They were successful in both limiting the damage and containing the impact of the attack. The Uncertain Future of Iraq While no one can fully predict the future of Iraq or quantify the likelihood of each outcome, Saudi defense and strategic planners must be prepared to deal with the following set of scenarios for the future of Iraq: • Scenario 1: A stable Iraq that is friendly to its neighbors: The hope is that Iraq emerges as a stable country with a representative government to all the Iraqi groups. In this case, Iraq can reestablish its place as a powerful member of the Arab League and become an asset in the region economically, politically, and militarily. Iraq could also regain its place as a balance to Iran or as an intermediary with Iran’s Shi’ite leadership. At best, this can be an example for the region. This would be considered the ‘‘bestcase’’ scenario for Saudi Arabia’s national security. • Scenario 2: Stable Iraq with a conventional threat: If Iraq emerges out of this conflict as a stable country with a moderate government, it still could present a conventional military threat to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States if it builds its armed forces. This could restart the arms races in the Gulf. Given the internal dynamics in the Kingdom, this could divert money from being spent on internal security, energy infrastructure modernization, and social programs. At best, Iraq can become a military power that balances the power of Iran. At worst, Iraq can become an aggressor conventional military power that threatens its neighbors. • Scenario 3: Iraq-Iran Shi’ite block: Iraq can also develop into a Shi’ite-Islamist dominated republic that is allied with Iran against its Sunni neighbors and divide the Arab and Islamic worlds into Shi’ite vs. Sunni blocks. With Iran’s nuclear ambitions, it may present a strategic threat that can have lasting instability in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait. It can also have ramifications beyond the Gulf. This can pull Lebanon, Syria, and Pakistan into this split and the ‘‘clash within a civilization’’ may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. At best, this can develop into a low-intensity conflict in many of these countries. At worst, it could develop into a regional war with no certain outcome. • Scenario 4: Emboldened regional insurgency: Insurgents in Iraq are of diverse groups, and assessment of their total strength and composition is unclear. Judging from recent attacks, they are becoming more emboldened and lethal. Groups such as that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi have out carried attacks in Jordan. Some of the attackers in Saudi Arabia have also been traced to Iraq. The attacks have been limited, but a prolonged insurgency—that expands its base of fighters and tactics—can spill over into neighboring states and threaten their stability. At best, this can create a class of the Iraq conflict’s alumni that are integrated into their societies. At worst, these alumni can return to lead the same level of insurgency into their home countries. • Scenario 5: Disintegration in Iraq into ministates: Attacks by Sunni groups against Shi’ites, Shi’ites revenge attacks, the allegation of torture by the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, Kurdish ambition of autonomy, and Iran’s involvement with radical Shi’ite groups are some of the forces that are pulling Iraq’s cohesion apart. If Shi’ites in the

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south or Kurds in the north do demand autonomy, it may become difficult to sustain the union and sovereignty of Iraq. This could draw Iran in to defend the Shi’ites, Saudi and Jordan to stand by the Sunnis, and Turkey to stop the creation of Kurdistan. At best, Iraq disintegrates into three states that are peaceful and not a threat to their neighbors. At worst, it could develop into a long civil war that draws Iraq’s neighbors into the conflict.

The hope for Iraq, its neighbors, and the United States is that the first scenario best describes the future of Iraq—a stable Iraq that is able to overcome the insurgency, develops its economy, and becomes a vibrant member of the region that can have a lasting influence on the region. Iraq may develop into a stable democracy that can lead other Middle Eastern countries into developing representative governments and instill the sense of economic, political, and social reforms that are much needed in the region. This is, however, wishful thinking and more of a hope than a strategy upon which contingency plans must be based. This is the type of best-case scenario that rarely happens, and when it does, there is little that can be done. The same is true with worst-case scenarios; they are meaningless because there is little that can be done to prepare for them. The level of uncertainty in the conflict, the lethal effectiveness of the insurgency, and the failure of Iraq’s factions to truly unite are diminishing the possibility of this best-case scenario from becoming a viable option in the near future. Neighboring states cannot base their defense and strategic and diplomatic planning on a remote possibility with little consequence. Iraq as a Conventional Military Threat to Its Neighbors? If the government in Baghdad develops into a moderate and peaceful entity in peace with its neighbors, Iraq can return to its role as a balancing power to Iran without the threat of WMD. Furthermore, the conventional threat can be deterred by strong Saudi-Jordanian-GCC relations and good Iraqi-neighboring countries relations. The Iraqi security forces are becoming more effective, but they lack the heavy weaponry and the manpower that Iraq had during the Gulf War. It may take many years for Iraq to rebuild a conventional army that can threaten the neighboring states. It will take five to ten years to train an army that can reach beyond its borders, that can sustain a long war, and that has the command and control to be an effective fighting force. The armed forces of Jordan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia are certainly capable of deterring a conventional threat from Iraq in the short- to midterm. Furthermore, high oil prices can give the Gulf States the ability to increase their defense spending and build their military forces to deal with this threat. Iraq’s civil needs are greater, and the Iraqi oil sector is far behind the developments needed to increase its oil export revenues for the government to afford high defense spending. If an arms race does occur, Iraq may have a hard time reestablishing important civil projects, especially in the energy and physical infrastructure that it will not have

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much spare money to spend on procurement and defense needs. The last three scenarios are medium- to worst-case scenarios that could have wider implications on the regional balance of power and on important strategic sectors such as energy. They raise many serious questions that have no obvious answers, but they deserve careful attention. These questions are driving neighboring countries to be more vocal, anxious, and possibly active at least in preparing for those worstcase scenarios. Most of their planning and adjustments are just occurring, and it may take years before any meaningful analysis can take place of this change. The Creation of a ‘‘Shi’ite Block’’ in the Gulf ? The first of these ‘‘worst-case’’ scenarios is a widening of the Shi’ite-Sunni sectarian divisions beyond Iraq and the creation of a new Shi’ite block with Iran, Iraq, and other Shi-ite-dominated countries to alter the balance of power in the Middle East. The Shi’ite-Sunni rift has been a major pillar in determining the balance of power in the region since the Shi’ite spilt from Sunni Islam in A.D. 680. Scholars of Islamic theology have often argued about the religious differences of the two sects. From a strategic and a security point of view, it is a question of demographics. As has been all too clear in the case of Iraq, the sectarian compositions of countries determine alliances, influence the political dynamics of each country, and impact internal stability. It is worth noting that the majority of Shi’ites are not Arabs. Scholars differ on the reasons behind this, but the one most often used is that early Persian converts to Islam felt marginalized for not being Arabs by the Umayyad Caliph and that they found a hospitable environment in Shi’ite Islam for their hatred of the Umayyad. Regardless of the reason, the majority of Shi’ites are non-Arabs and the majority of Arabs are Sunnis. Globally, Shi’ites are roughly 15 percent of the world total of 1.2 billion Muslims.130 Shi’ites represent 89–90 percent of Iran’s population, 60–65 percent of Iraq’s population, 60–70 percent of Bahrain’s population, 30 percent of Yemen’s populationi, 25–30 percent of Kuwait’s population, 15 percent of the UAE population, 10–15 percent of Saudia Arabia’s population, and 12 percent of the total GCC native population.131 The only countries with a majority Shi’ite population are Bahrain, Iraq, and Lebanon. The majority of Bahraini Shi’ites are seen as emigrants from Iran or as Persians. Iraq and Lebanon are slightly different. The Shi’ites in those two countries are mixed between Arabs and Persian emigrants. It is also equally important to note that Iraq is the birthplace of Shi’ite Islam, more specifically the Battle of Karbalah in A. D. 680. Iran also became central in the history of Shi’ite Islam through battles with the Sunni-dominated Abbasid Empire and the Ottoman Turks. This was especially true following the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The Islamic Republic of Iran under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini saw itself as the defender of Shi’ite Islam and attempted to spread its ‘‘Shi’ite revolution’’ to the rest of the Middle East, especially the southern Gulf. Iran’s declared goal was to remake the Gulf in its own image and then spread the influence throughout the Middle East.

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This made Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait the major players in limiting the Iranian influence in the Gulf. Historically, the Iranian efforts to destabilize the Gulf can be summarized as follows: • Support violent proxy groups: Iran has been a major supporter of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad. It also supported indigenous groups such as Saudi Hezbollah. This group claimed responsibility for the bombing of Saudi petrochemical plants in 1988 and the assassination of Saudi diplomats in 1989. In addition, it has been accused of the Al-Khobar Towers bombing in 1996 that killed 19 U.S. personnel. • Delegitimize the governments of the Gulf: The Iranian leadership made concerted efforts to convince the Muslim world that Saudi Arabia was not fit to control the Saudi holy lands of Mecca and Medina. In July 1987, Iranian pilgrims rioted in the holy city of Mecca causing the death of 400 people. In addition, in 1989, two bombs exploded in Mecca in an apparent retaliation against the Saudi systems of quotas that restricted the number of Iranian pilgrims. One person was killed and 16 were injured.132 • Support Shi’ite minorities: Following the Iranian Revolution, the Shi’ite population in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait, to mention a few, became more vocal in demanding equality. For example, in December 1979, Saudi Shi’ites rioted in the city of al-Qatif demanding a share of the oil revenues. These riots developed into violent clashes in which the Saudi National Guard was mobilized. Five people were killed in the clashes.133 Iran has also supported Bahraini Shi’ite groups such as the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB), based in Tehran. The IFLB is seen as having been behind the attempts to topple the Bahraini government in 1982. The IFLB and other Shi’ite groups were accused of riots during the 1980s and 1990s that developed into violent clashes with the Bahraini security forces.134

These efforts were rebuffed by Arab efforts to curb the growth of the Iranian influence in the Middle East. This was in part what led to the Iran-Iraq War (1980– 1988), the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the military buildup of the Gulf States. While the Gulf was the center of the Iranian efforts, Lebanon and Syria were also influenced by Iran through the support of proxy groups. For example, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard established Hezbollah in 1982 in Lebanon, which was seen as part of the Iranian efforts to export the Shi’ite revolution.135 The Iranian efforts to export the Shi’ite revolution, however, largely subsided following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 and the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. During the 1990s, Iran reestablished diplomatic relations with other Gulf countries, generally restrained from supporting violence (with the exception of its alleged involvement in the 1996 Al-Khobar bombing), and settled many of it border disputes with its neighbors. This was also due to the fact that the military threat to Iran from Iraq largely disappeared following the end of the Gulf War in 1991. Iraq was largely contained in the southern and northern no-fly zones, the sanction regime was containing Saddam Hussein, and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait stopped supporting Iraq militarily and financially.

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Saudi Views on Iran’s Role in Iraq’s Internal Affairs The main anxiety of Iraq’s neighbors in recent months has centered on Iran’s influence in Iraq’s internal affairs and on the disenfranchisement of Iraqi Sunnis. Their fear centers on a shift in the balance of power in the region. In the words of Hassan Barai, a Jordanian analyst, ‘‘the Shiite majority in Iraq constitutes a Trojan horse to carry Iranian influence across the region.’’136 As noted earlier, an important pillar in the balance of power in the region has been the Sunni-Shi’ite divide. The Arab countries fought a war to stop Iran from gaining strong influence in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia led the fight to contain the Shi’ite revolution from spreading into the Gulf. The toppling of Saddam Hussein not only removed another major deterrent to Iranian influence, but it may have given Iran more support to expand its influence and shift the balance of power in the region. Iraq will become the first major Arab country that is ruled by Shi’ites. The first regional leader to articulate Iraq’s neighbors’ concerns was King Abdullah II of Jordan. In December 2004 he said that there is a Shiite crescent forming between Iran and Iraq, that it could extend to include Syria and Lebanon, and that Iran is working for a Shi’ite dominated ‘‘Islamic republic in Iraq.’’ The King has also said that Iran’s Revolutionary Guards were helping the militant groups fighting the United States in Iraq. He was quoted as saying the following:137 It is in Iran’s vested interest to have an Islamic republic of Iraq. If Iraq goes Islamic republic, then, yes, we’ve opened ourselves to a whole set of new problems that will not be limited to the borders of Iraq. I’m looking at the glass half-full, and let’s hope that’s not the case. But strategic planners around the world have got to be aware that is a possibility. Even Saudi Arabia is not immune from this. It would be a major problem. And then that would propel the possibility of a Shiite-Sunni conflict even more, as you’re taking it out of the borders of Iraq.

Saudi Arabia has always made its position clear of preserving Iraq’s sovereignty. The Kingdom, however, has not been openly critical of the U.S. policy in the postwar Iraq, at least not at the Foreign Minister level, but this changed. The Saudis expressed their concerns about Iran’s role in a Shi’ite-dominated Iraq when Prince Saud Al Faisal said, ‘‘We fought a war (the Gulf War) together to keep Iran out of Iraq after Iraq was driven out of Kuwait. Now we are handing the whole country over to Iran without reason.’’138 Iraqi Shi’ites also objected to Prince Saudi Al Faisal’s comments and accused the Kingdom of interfering in Iraq’s internal affairs. On October 2, 2005, Iraq’s Interior Minister and a member of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Bayan Jabr, said that Iraqis are not going to wait for a ‘‘bedouin riding a camel’’ to tell them how to rule themselves. He also went on to say that the Kingdom should fix its own internal sectarian problems. ‘‘There are problems within the kingdom of Saudi Arabia . . .there are more than four million Shiites in the kingdom who are

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considered as third-class citizens,’’ Jabr added.139 Bayan Jabr later retracted his statements by saying that his comments were taken out of context. Much of the analysis has focused on how the Iraq War has strengthened the aspiration of Saudi Shi’ites. This is only part of the issue. While Saudi Shi’ites have historically objected to government actions curtailing their religious freedom, the national dialogue started by King Abdullah has worked in making Shi’ites part of his efforts to bolster National Dialogue, and many Shi’ite leaders have expressed their satisfaction of the efforts by King Abdullah for more inclusive Saudi society. While Saudi Shi’ites have always said that they deserve more rights in the Kingdom, since the early 1990s, they have expressed their demand in a peaceful way. According to the Crisis Group, ‘‘While sectarian tensions arguably are higher than at any time since 1979, there appears little risk today of violent sectarian confrontation, but that is no reason for complacency.’’140 Most experts believe that Saudi Shi’ites feel Saudi first and Shi’ite second, so while the Kingdom cannot afford to be complacent about the role of Shi’ites in its society, their concern is hardly focused on internal issues. It is, however, concerned with the larger balance of power in the Gulf. The Saudi leadership has focused its concern with the shifting dynamics of Iraqi internal politics and the role Iran plays in it. The Saudi Foreign Minister also added that ‘‘Iraqis are complaining of interference by Iran. If there is indeed such interference, especially in provinces neighboring Iran, that would be quite serious.’’ These comments prompted the Iranian Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, to cancel a planned visit to the Kingdom on October 5, 2005. In addition, the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman responded by saying, ‘‘The Islamic Republic of Iran does not expect such remarks from its friends at such a sensitive time in the region and considers them surprising and irrational.’’141 Saudi Arabia and Iraq’s other Sunni neighbors were less concerned with the interim government of Iyad Allawi. Prime Minister Allawi has distanced himself from Iran, and he has been seen as a secular nationalist who would not tolerate Iranian influence. To many experts, this is not the case of the government of Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, who is seen as closely allied with the Iranian regime. Ibrahim al-Jaafari is the head of the pro-Tehran Islamic Dawa Party; he spent two decades in exile, mainly in Iran. During the 1980s, the Dawa Party was accused of cross-border suicide attacks in Baghdad. It has also been reported that Ibrahim alJaafari was behind an assassination attempt against the Emir of Kuwait. Prime Minister al-Jaafari has denied any involvement.142 In spite of these serious allegations, the al-Jaafari government is not the problem in itself, but regional powers are concerned with the trend in Iraqi politics. Religious Shi’ites are becoming more prominent in Iraqi politics, and regional powers are concerned with another Shi’ite theocracy in an Arab country. A Saudi official was quoted as saying, ‘‘The constitution will give Iranians or pro-Iranian Iraqis an open hand in seven provinces in the south, to bring them together into an autonomy which will create a Shiite republic. . .There are Iraqis who see the Iranians as their leaders.’’143 Iraqi Shi’ites, however, have expressed concerns over how other Arabs have treated them as Shi’ites first and as Iraqis second. Iraqi Shi’ites argue that they are not

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following Iran, that they are proud of their Arabism, and that they are Iraqis first and Shi’ites second. Iraqi Shi’ites have complained about the silence of Sunni leaders in the Arab world when attacks have occurred against the Shi’ites, and they have complained about Sunni leaders accusing Iraqi Shi’ites as having their main loyalty to Iran and not to Iraq’s future. Bayan Jabr was quoted as asking, ‘‘Why do the Arabs not embrace us and open the doors for us instead of circulating these rumors?’’144 Regional Insurgency: The Potential Spillover Effect Another worst-case scenario is if the Iraq insurgency spills over into neighboring states. This depends largely on knowing the true current nature of the insurgency and potential developments in its strength and composition. The likelihood of this scenario also depends on the motivation of insurgents, their capabilities of carrying attacks outside of Iraq, and the neighboring states’ abilities to stop the spillover. In addition to the threat from the Iraqi insurgency, there is also the radicalization of the region’s youth to join the fight in Iraq or become easy recruits for transnational terrorist organizations such as Al Qa’ida. The main strategic implication to Saudi Arabia is the threat to its internal stability. The impact on internal stability can occur either from a strengthened Iraqi insurgency that takes its fight to other Middle Eastern countries, an increase in recruits for existing terrorist organizations, or a combination of both can increase the terrorist threat by manyfold. As noted earlier, Saudi Arabia has been fighting Al Qa’ida since the attacks of May 2003. Its internal security apparatuses have been adapting to this change in the nature of threat, but the uncertainty surrounding the Iraqi insurgency compounds this problem. There have been many studies on the composition, strength, and effectiveness of the Iraqi insurgency. No one fully knows the exact strength, the composition, or the affiliation of each insurgent group. There is, however, a general categorization that describes the overall nature of the insurgency. On the Sunni side, there are Iraqi Sunni nationalists, former Ba’ath Party elements, foreign volunteers, and Al Qa’ida and its affiliated groups in Iraq. There are also Kurdish and Shi’ite militias that at times have played minor parts in the insurgency.145 While all of the Iraqi insurgency is a threat in its own right, the most urgent threat for Saudi Arabia is the foreign fighters, especially those who come from Saudi Arabia. The Threat from Foreign Fighters While the exact strength of foreign fighters is a debatable topic, their lethality is not disputed. They are committed to violence, they are well trained, and they have shown their danger through their tactics. As Major General Rick Lynch, a spokesman for the Multi-National Forces–Iraq said, ‘‘[T]he foreign fighter element tends to be the most ruthless. They’re the ones that are willing to participate in horrendous acts of violence against innocent civilians. So even though the number of foreign fighters may indeed be small, their impact is very, very large.’’146 Lynch also added that while

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the Iraqi nationalists were behind the improvised explosive devices, 96 percent of suicide bombers are foreign volunteers.147 Estimates on the number of foreign fighters in Iraq range widely and are the subject of much debate in the United States, Iraq, and the neighboring states. Bayan Jabr, the Iraqi Minister of Interior, said in an interview with Asharq Alawsat, ‘‘The number of Arab terrorists was between 2,500 and 3,000 three months ago (in August 2005), but they are no more than 900 now (October 2005).’’ According to Bayan Jabr, the numbers declined because some fighters were killed while others decided to go home.148 This number largely tracks with estimates done by Nawaf Obaid in September 2005. ‘‘The Saudi National Security Assessment Project has made its own estimate, and concludes there are approximately 3,000 foreign fighters in Iraq.’’149 This also tracks closely with other U.S. estimates, which put the fraction of foreign fighters at 4–10 percent of insurgents in Iraq, which are estimated to be 30,000. Another important area of debate is the composition and the national origin of these foreign volunteers. There are at least five different estimates of the breakdown of the foreign fighters in Iraq: • According to the Multi-National Forces–raq, the U.S. military detained 376 foreign volunteers between April and October 2005. Major General Rick Lynch reported the following breakdown: 78 (20.7 percent) Egyptians, 66 (17.6 percent) Syrians, 41 (10.9 percent) Sudanese, 32 (8.5 percent) Saudis, 17 (4.5 percent) Jordanians, 13 (3.5 percent) Iranians, 2 (0.5 percent) British, 2 (0.5 percent) Indians, 1 (0.3 percent) French, 1 (0.3 percent) Israeli, 1 (0.3 percent) Danish, 1 (0.3 percent) Irish, 1 (0.3 percent) American, and 120 (31.9 percent) from other states.150 • The Iraqi Human Rights Minister, Bakhtiyar Amin, said that in July 2004, there were 99 foreign fighters in Iraqi prisons. He said that 26 (26 percent) were Syrians, 14 (14 percent) were Saudis, 14 (14 percent) were Iranians, 12 (12 percent) were Egyptians, 9 (9 percent) were Sudanese, 5 (5 percent) were Yemenis, 5 (5 percent) were Palestinians, 5 (5 percent) were Jordanians, 5 (5 percent) were Tunisians, 1 (1 percent) was Lebanese, 1 (1 percent) was Moroccan, 1 (1 percent) was Turkish, and 1 (1 percent) was Afghani.151 • Nawaf Obaid of the Saudi National Security Net Assessment Project estimated the breakdown of the 3,000 foreign volunteers in September 2005 as follows: 600 (20 percent) were Algerians, 540 (18 percent) were Syrians, 510 (17 percent) were Yemenis, 450 (15 percent) were Sudanese, 390 (13 percent) were Egyptians, 350 (12 percent) were Saudis, and 150 (5 percent) were from other states.152 • Reuvan Paz examined the national origin of 154 fighters in Iraq who were killed in March 2005 and found that 94 (61 percent) were Saudis, 16 (10.4 percent) were Syrians, 13 (8.4 percent) were Iraqis, 11 (7.1 percent) were Kuwaitis, 4 (2.5 percent) were Jordanians, 3 (1.9 percent) were Lebanese, 2 (1.2 percent) were Libyans, 2 (1.2 percent) were Algerians, 2 (1.2 percent) were Moroccans, 2 (1.2 percent) were Yemenis, 2 (1.2 percent) were Tunisians, 1 (0.6 percent) was Palestinian, 1 (0.6 percent) was from the United Arab Emirates, and 1 (0.6 percent) was Sudanese.153

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• Murad Al-Shishani examined the ‘‘Salafi-Jihadist’’ structure in Iraq in December 2005. He concluded that 200 (53 percent) were Saudis, 49 (13 percent) were Syrians, 30 (8.0 percent) were North Africans, 30 (8 percent) were Iraqis, 23 (6 percent) were Jordanians, 15 (4 percent) were Kuwaitis, 8 (2 percent) were Yemenis, 4 (1 percent) were Egyptians, 4 (1 percent) were Palestinians, and 15 (4 percent) were from other states.154

These studies have different methodologies, sample sizes, and time frames. The first two are official estimates that based their numbers on the people who have been detained, and so there is a selection bias and a small sample size. The Saudi National Security Net Assessment Project estimate is the most comprehensive and has the largest sample size. In addition, according to its authors, it was based on regional intelligence reports, but it also bases its assessment on ‘‘interrogation’’ reports. The last two studies were based on analyzing extremists’ Web sites, and there is an obvious selection bias and a small sample size. The Paz and Al-Shishani studies depended on the names of people who died being posted on these Web sites. Another obvious problem is that they also underestimated the number of Iraqis. The first two do not include the number of Iraqis, and as noted earlier, the United States estimates that nearly 90 percent of the insurgents are Iraqis. Regardless of the shortcomings of these estimates, the studies present a good benchmark of the breakdown of foreign fighters and the diversity of the Iraqi insurgency. In addition, regardless of the total number of foreign fighters and their breakdown, the majority of countries in the region have some nationals in Iraq. Then Iraqi Minister of Interior, Bayan Jabr, said in October 2005 that Iraqi intelligence found a letter from one of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s lieutenants, Abu Azzam. ‘‘In it, he called on al-Zarqawi to start sending fighters back to their countries after having gained experience in booby traps, explosions, assassinations, killings, preparation of explosive charges, kidnapping, and other crimes.’’155 Many experts believe that foreign volunteers in Iraq are a real threat to their home countries. They are being trained in asymmetric warfare, suicide bombing, and explosives building. Countries in the region have expressed their concerns about the ‘‘homecoming’’ of these fighters and have said that they are preparing for the worst. For example, the Saudi Minister of Interior, Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, said that the Saudi fighters in Iraq can be more dangerous than those who came back from Afghanistan. Prince Nayef was quoted as saying, ‘‘We expect the worst from those who went to Iraq . . .They will be worse and we will be ready for them.’’156 The Threat of a Fragmented Iraq? Perhaps the most threatening outcome in Iraq is disintegration of the country into ministates following a bloody civil war. The implications to stability in the Gulf of a civil war and disintegration in Iraq are enormous. The Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud Al Faisal, said that if the conflict does inflame into a civil war, ‘‘I don’t see how the Arab countries will be left out of the conflict in one way or another.’’157

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Besides the security implications of an Iraq in the image of Iran, Saudi Arabia has expressed its concerns about the plight of Sunnis in Iraq. Recently, the Kingdom has expressed its concerns about disintegration in Iraq. During a visit to Washington, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal was quoted by the New York Times as saying, ‘‘There is no dynamic now pulling the nation together. . .All the dynamics are pulling the country apart.’’158 These comments reflect wide fear in the region of the instability in Iraq and the possibility of the conflict spilling over into neighboring countries. Saud Al Faisal said he served on a council of Iraq’s neighboring countries—Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Iran, and Kuwait, as well as Saudi Arabia—‘‘and the main worry of all the neighbors’’ was that the potential disintegration of Iraq into Sunni, Shi’ite, and Kurdish states would ‘‘bring other countries in the region into the conflict.’’159 The most comprehensive study on this subject and the Saudi prospective on this issue was done by Nawaf Obaid of the Saudi Arabia National Security Net Assessment Project in April 2006. In the study, Obaid summarizes the stakes for Saudi Arabia as follows:160 Iraq is at a crossroads and faces a myriad of challenges, including economic, social and most importantly, security issues. The 2003 US invasion opened a Pandora’s Box of deep-rooted sectarian tensions as well as rival communal interests. It also ignited a tinderbox of violence brought on by an insurgency that is proving difficult to contain and even harder to eradicate. . . .the country has seen no respite from violence, which has targeted US and Iraqi forces and terrorized civilians with almost daily bombings, drive-by shootings, kidnappings and assassinations. A civil war may well be inevitable. Such a development would have the gravest implications for the entire region, especially Saudi Arabia, which shares its longest international border with Iraq. The importance of a stable and cohesive Iraq to Saudi Arabia cannot be overstated. Saudi Arabia has a vested interest in preserving the integrity of Iraq and safeguarding the rights of Sunnis in a country dominated by Shi’ites. Although the recent elections represent a milestone in the country’s move towards democracy, they have done little to foster a sense of unity among Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi’ites, the three principal communities in Iraq. On the contrary, they have served to emphasize communal differences. . . .the election results fell primarily along ethnic lines. . . .The new government appears to be unable or unwilling to resolve these disparities, but this situation must be addressed if the political process is to move forward with any legitimacy. Whether the new government can meet the test is still uncertain. The Kurds, who have long enjoyed the privileges of living in a semi-autonomous state, are unlikely to be willing partners in a government that, when fully functional, might offer them considerably less. Since the US invasion, the Kurds have demonstrated a tendency to use their dominance in the provinces that comprise the Kurdish area in a manner that gives them a distinct advantage over other ethnic groups in the region. The soft ethnic cleansing now underway in Kirkuk is a prime example of this. Pervasive interference from Iran further complicates the situation. Iran’s influence over the post-Saddam government in Iraq has been significant, and the most

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predominant Shi’ite parties in Iraqi politics have long enjoyed the sponsorship of Tehran. Iranian levers of influence include a broad network of informants, military and logistical support of armed groups, and social welfare campaigns. Most importantly, Tehran has sought to influence Iraq’s political process by giving support [to] various parties, in particular, to the SCIRI. For their part, the Sunnis, who occupied positions of power under Ba’athist rule, may find it difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile their now subordinate status in the new Iraq. Basic issues of governance, such as the nature of the central government and the role of Islam, will be points of contention for many years to come. Finally, although they constitute only a fraction of the insurgency, foreign fighters will continue to remain a seriously destabilizing force in the country. There may, however, be several policies that may assist in mitigating the grave situation that has been created in the country. These include: The development of a comprehensive national strategy which takes into account the possibility of a civil war; improving communications between Saudi Arabia, the Arab world, and the United States regarding the extent and strength of the insurgency; and neutralizing Iranian interference. When the security situation allows, the Saudi leadership should also work to strengthen its diplomatic ties with Iraq and cultivate relationships with its religious and political leaders.. . .

The Threat from Iran Iran is a nation with a mixed record in terms of Gulf and regional security. It no longer actively seeks to export its religious revolution to other Islamic states. It reached a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and the other southern Gulf States in the late 1990s. It has since avoided further efforts to try to use the Pilgrimage to attack the Kingdom or to exploit Shi’ite versus Sunni tensions in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries like Bahrain. Iran maintains an active presence in the Gulf, conducts large-scale exercises, and maintains an active intelligence and surveillance presence in both the Gulf and neighboring states. It has avoided provocative military action, however, and there is no evidence of active hostile attacks on southern Gulf targets or U.S. targets since the Al-Khobar bombings. On the other hand, Iran no longer seems to be evolving toward a more moderate regime. It deals at least at low levels with outside terrorist groups. It actively supports Hezbollah in Lebanon and hard-line groups like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in attacking Israel. Iran is also well aware that Sunni and Shi’ite tensions are rising throughout the Islamic world, driven in part by neo-Salafist extremist and terrorist groups like Al Qa’ida. Iran is a far less modern military power in comparative terms than it was during the time of the Shah, or during the Iran-Iraq War. Nevertheless, it is slowly improving its conventional forces and is now the only regional military power that poses a serious conventional military threat to Gulf stability. Iran has significant capabilities for asymmetric warfare and poses the additional threat of proliferation. There is considerable evidence that it is developing both a long-range missile force and a range of weapons of mass destruction. It has never properly declared its holdings of chemical

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weapons, and the status of its biological weapons programs is unknown. The disclosures made by the IAEA since 2002 indicate that it is likely that Iran will continue to covertly seek nuclear weapons. Iran could deliver chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons on any of its fighterbombers, use covert delivery means, or use its missiles. It could use its Scuds and some types of antiship missiles to deliver such warheads relatively short distances. Its Shahab-3 missiles could probably reach virtually all of the targets in Gulf countries, including many Saudi cities on the Red Sea coast and in western Saudi Arabia. As has been discussed earlier, Iran’s Shahab-3s are probably too inaccurate and payload limited to be effective in delivering conventional weapons. This does not mean that conventionally armed Shahab missiles could not be used as terror weapons, or weapons of intimidation, but they could have only a major military impact —even against area targets—if they were armed with warheads carrying weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, Saudi Arabia faces the possibility of an Iranian transfer of weapons of mass destruction to some anti-Saudi extremist group or proxy. These currently do not seem to be probable scenarios, but Saudi Arabia is worried. Key Iranian Threat In addition to the direct security threat Iran’s WMD program poses to the Kingdom, potentially, Iran can also use its nuclear capabilities to alter the strategic balance in the Gulf in the following key strategic areas: • The UAE islands: Following Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, Iran gained controlled over three islands: the Greater Tunbs, the Lesser Tunbs, and Abu Musa. Since then, the United Arab Emirates and Iran have argued over the ownership of the islands. The GCC has supported the UAE position, but since the Iranian-GCC relations improved in the late 1990s, the Gulf countries have avoided confrontation. These islands are enormously important to the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf at large. While no military confrontation has taken place, the United Arab Emirates has increased its demands. A military intervention by the GCC is unlikely, but if Iran does attempt to gain control over the three islands, the Arab League will have little option but to back the Emirates. A nuclear Iran and an Iraqi-Iranian block may complicate this even further. An Iraq that is allied with Iran will complicate an Arab League response diplomatically. Furthermore, a nuclear Iran will limit the effectiveness of any conventional response. • Shi’ites in the Gulf: As noted earlier, since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Iran has demanded more freedom and political participation of Shi’ites in the Gulf States. Iranian support emboldened Shi’ites in the Gulf. At times, it developed into violent protests and clashes with security forces. Iranian support to Shi’ites in the Gulf, and their support of proxy groups such as Saudi Hezbollah and Bahraini militant groups, subsided following the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 1997. A nuclear Iran can have far more power and fewer constraints against supporting such proxy groups. There is always the danger that WMD can get in the hands of terrorist organizations. A smuggled dirty bomb or a nuclear weapon into one of the Gulf countries can inflict a

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lot of human and economic damage. It can destabilize key energy producers and disrupt energy exports for days if not months. • Oil policy and OPEC quota: An Iran-Iraq block can create a block within OPEC. This can have important implications on the supply of oil. The cartel already suffers from the incentives of its members to overproduce, but a new block that is hostile to other OPEC members can cause OPEC quotas to go either way. In December 2005, Iran had a production capacity of 3.95 million barrels a day (11.5 percent of OPEC’s total production) and Iraq had approximately 1.7 million barrels a day (4.9 percent of OPEC’s total production). Iran and Iraq together represent nearly 15 percent of OPEC’s total production (capacity), and their potential block within OPEC would mean that they would have the second largest weight after Saudi Arabia.OPEC influence on the global oil market can diminish, and with the tightness of the oil market, this can have implications on the international energy market and the health of the global economy. An oil embargo by the two countries together can take off the market 15 percent of the world oil supply in addition to Iran’s gas production. This could send oil prices even higher and put a lot of strain on the global oil production. • Restart an arms race: The Middle East is the largest arms importing region in the world. Following the Iranian Revolution, the Gulf was the center of an arms race between Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States. Much of the money that was spent on defense could have been spent on internal investments that are much needed to upgrade infrastructure, reform educational systems, and modernize health care. The impact of defense overspending was felt most during the 1990s when oil prices were at an all-time low. Currently, oil prices are high and countries in the Gulf can afford to spare some of their surplus oil revenues to spend on procurement and arms purchases, but this will also take away money from important civil and energy projects and internal security spending to deal with the threat of Al Qa’ida.

Iran and Iraq have always been the wild card in the Gulf, and these areas of uncertainties are hardly new to the region, but they are compounded by a potential Iranian-Iraqi Shi’ite alliance. This can increase the odds of escalation of these uncertainties into diplomatic nightmares or even military conflicts. These risks cannot be separated from the threat of extremism—the main threat facing many of the countries in the Middle East and North Africa. The alliance, in itself, does not exacerbate the terrorist threat, but it compounds the uncertainty and makes trade-offs between internal security and conventional defense spending harder. Saudi Reaction to Iran’s Nuclear Program The Saudi leadership has been clear about the consequences of a nuclear Iran. The Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud Al Faisal, was quoted as saying that a nuclear Iran ‘‘threatens disaster in the region.’’ The Kingdom, however, has stressed that the problem of proliferation goes beyond Iran’s ambition. The Saudi Minister of Interior, Prince Nayef Al Saud, argued that Iran’s nuclear program ‘‘has peaceful aims.’’ Prince Nayef added that the problem is not with Iran’s ambition, but with the double standard in the West’s position toward Israeli nuclear capabilities. He

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said, ‘‘This puts a question mark not only before the Arabs but also before the whole world . . .and this gives justification for every country to think of having nuclear weapons.’’161 Saudi leaders have also stressed the need for a more comprehensive counterproliferation strategy that must include Israel’s nuclear arsenal and the overall problem of WMD proliferation. For example, the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud Al Faisal, argued that ‘‘Iran is always mentioned but no one mentions Israel, which has [nuclear] weapons already. . .We wish the international community would enforce the movement to make the Middle East a nuclear-free zone.’’162 Senior Saudi officials have said that Saudi Arabia has examined its options for responding to the Iranian nuclear threat, including an effort to acquire its own nuclear weapons, but has rejected such an option. Experts, however, argue that a nuclear Iran would lead the Kingdom to reexamine its strategic and military postures in the region to deal with a shift in the balance of power in the Gulf and protect its neighboring GCC states. As for their response to a nuclear-armed Iran in the Gulf, they have three options: acquire their own WMD and missile capabilities to deter Iran, develop a missile defense shield, or ask the United States or Pakistan to extend their nuclear deterrence to include them. Saudi Arabia and Iran’s smaller Gulf neighbors can respond with accelerated efforts to deploy theater missile defenses—although such systems seem more likely to be ‘‘confidence builders’’ than leakproof solutions. It would almost certainly lead the United States to consider counterproliferation strikes on Iran and to work with its southern Gulf allies in developing an adequate deterrent. Given the U.S. rejection of biological and chemical weapons, this raises the possibility of creating a major U.S. theater nuclear deterrent, although such a deterrent could be sea and air based and be deployed outside the Gulf. If the United States failed to provide such a deterrent and/or missile defenses, it seems likely that the southern Gulf States would be forced to accommodate Iran or seek weapons of mass destruction of their own. Collective Security and Relations with the GCC The GCC was formed to strengthen coordination operation among its six member states in all fields. The GCC was created to meet collective security threats from an aggressive Iran and to respond to strategic threats from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Since its inception in 1981, the GCC countries have faced grave challenges: the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990), and the U.S.–led invasion of Iraq (2003). These problems were compounded by political rivalries, border disputes, high economic volatilities, and external players such as the United States, Iraq, and Iran. While the nature of threat in 2005 is different from what it was in the 1980s and 1990s, the significance of the GCC has only increased. Now more than ever, member states are facing monumental challenges, and the GCC is an important venue to

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tackle them. Iraq is the most obvious of these challenges and one that requires immediate attention. The 1990s proved to be a difficult period for the Council and its member states due to low oil prices, high defense spending, constant border disputes, and diplomatic wars over third-party alliances. In recent years, disputes among the GCC members reached an all-time high. The disputes tended to focus on two areas, namely, territorial disputes and foreign policy. Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have voiced their concerns over Saudi hegemonic ambitions over the Gulf, and Saudi Arabia has accused other GCC states of weakening the union by signing defense and economic deals with outside powers such Bahrain’s Free Trade Agreement with the United States. The United Arab Emirates has recently raised long-standing border issues against Saudi Arabia. The issue revolves around a border settlement that dates back to 1974, when an opaque agreement settled a border dispute between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The agreement settled a dispute over a 25-kilometer strip of land that connected the United Arab Emirates to Qatar, as well as the ownership of the Shaybah oil field. With the passing of Sheikh Zayed of the United Arab Emirates, who believed it would be dishonorable to revisit the 1974 agreement,163 the UAE leaders have become increasingly assertive over this issue, signaling their intent to address this topic anew. A map published in the 2006 edition of the official UAE Yearbook ‘‘shows the UAE extending westward as far as Qatar, across territory currently controlled by Saudi Arabia.’’164 This development comes amid the growing rift between Saudi Arabia and Qatar mentioned above. The fear that closer ties between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates may undermine Saudi Arabia’s strategic preeminence in the GCC is widespread. The Dolphin Project, which seeks to connect Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman in a natural gas grid, is another example where closer ties between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates may be made at the expense of Saudi Arabia. This territorial revisionism, which would bring the UAE borders up to Qatar’s, could form the cornerstone for a closer association between the two countries and take Saudi influence out of the picture. Despite past disagreements and while each state faces different obstacles and may require different approaches to solving such problems, in broad terms the members face the same strategic challenges. Member states face a real choice: reform the Council or become irrelevant. The challenge in Iraq provides an opportunity to overcome past disputes and fragmentations. The Council has to speak with one voice, and, most importantly, it must act as one body in the economic, military, counterterrorism, and foreign policy realms. Counterterrorism Cooperation It is clear that the number one threat to the Gulf is of Islamic extremism and asymmetric warfare. Saudi Arabia has been battling terrorists within the Kingdom since

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the May 2003 bombing in Riyadh. Saudi counterterrorism capabilities and intelligence are getting stronger. Saudi officers from the special security and other Ministry of Interior forces have had a lot of experience in fighting terrorism and urban warfare. Saudi forces have proven to be effective and adaptive to the threat. While the terrorist threat is anything but over, the Kingdom seems to have been able to contain the damage terrorists could inflict on the Kingdom’s nationals, residents, and infrastructure. Al Qa’ida has made its strategy clear. It needs to gain control of a state with modern financial and military capabilities to continue its struggle against other Arab governments in the region. Its attempt to do this in the Kingdom has proven to be a failure. The Gulf States seem to be the obvious choice. They are oil rich and have modern military weapons and are in close proximity to their number one target, Saudi Arabia. As is discussed in detail in other chapters, there have been some indications of extremists in countries such Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. There have, however, been limited terrorists’ attempts and attacks in these countries. If Al Qa’ida does turn its attention toward the Gulf States, the question is, can the Gulf States deal with the same level of violence in their own countries? The Gulf States have cooperated on bilateral levels for many years. Due to political reasons and rivalries, in the past, there was limited multilateral cooperation and sharing of intelligence. In recent years, the Gulf States increased cooperation in the areas of intelligence sharing, joint exercises, and training missions. On October 3, 2005, the Saudi Council of Ministers endorsed the GCC counterterrorism pact. The agreement urged members to integrate their counterterrorism efforts.165 Bahrain has also expressed interest in creating a Joint Gulf Counterterrorism Center. The center will act to formalize the sharing of intelligence, coordination of counterterrorism activities, and the exchange of expertise. Saudi Arabia also proposed the creation of a similar center, but at the international level. At the International Counterterrorism Conference held in Riyadh in February 2005, King Abdullah recommended the creation of an international center to coordinate counterterrorism efforts. The Kingdom made the proposal to the UN General Assembly in September 2005.166 These are important tactical and intelligence reforms that will help the Gulf States fight terrorists and stop attacks before they occur. Counterterrorism efforts, however, have to adapt a comprehensive strategy that involves economic, political, and social reforms. Part of this comprehensive strategy is an educational and media campaign to counter the extremists’ messages. This involves training programs for clerics and improving the dialogue with religious minorities. In addition, economic reforms are as important as any counterterrorism effort. For all the talk of political reform, economic progress and dealing with the unemployment problems are more important than any election or ‘‘democratic’’ movements. The goal is to limit the pool of recruits for extremists. The ‘‘youth explosion’’ caused by large population growth is complicating labor policies and counterterrorism

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efforts. Creating wealth and a productive private sector can employ many young men and take them off the list of possible recruits. Military Cooperation The best way of dealing with these challenges is not reforming the internal structure of the Saudi armed forces alone, but rather doing so in the context of more effective efforts to develop collective security. The lack of effective military cooperation between the Kingdom, other moderate Gulf States, and its Arab neighbors outside the Gulf presents major problems for Saudi Arabia that are not easy to solve. Saudi Arabia cannot turn to the rest of the Arab world for meaningful military support. The failure of the Damascus Declaration, 1992, to give Saudi Arabia any credible guarantee of Egyptian and Syrian reinforcements was the result of far more than Arab politics and Egyptian and Syrian demands for money. Neither Egypt nor Syria is organized to project effective combat forces. They lack most of the technological advantages of U.S. and Saudi forces, and they are not equipped and trained to provide the Saudi Air Force and Saudi Army with the mix of interoperable capabilities Saudi forces need. Although they are Arab and Muslim, they also are states with separate interests, regional ambitions, and strategic objectives that often differ from those of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia badly needs to strengthen its cooperation with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. So far, however, there has been more progress in political and economic areas than in military areas. Efforts to create a GCC-wide C4I system for air defenses are making progress, but they are still in the early stages of development, and the GCC has made serious progress only in a few areas of military exercise training like air combat and mine warfare. The GCC’s long-standing failure to agree on effective plans for cooperation, interoperability, and integration has left the military role of the GCC a largely symbolic one. The GCC will play a major role in regional security only once it can develop integrated air defenses, integrated mine warfare and maritime surveillance capabilities, an ability to deal with Iranian surface and ASW forces, rapid reaction forces that can actually fight, and the ability to defend Kuwait and eastern Saudi Arabia against land attack. Saudi Arabia needs to look beyond its own military modernization program and take tangible steps to expand military cooperation with the GCC. Even if this is not possible on a GCC-wide basis, Saudi Arabia must focus on finding ways to strengthen the defense of its northern border area and Kuwait. The Kingdom needs to deter attacks on smaller Gulf powers like Bahrain and be able to help it safeguard its internal security. It needs to be able to show it can aid any GCC state in an emergency. Its current force levels are adequate for this mission, but need readiness, mobility, and sustainability. Socioeconomic Challenges In addition to these external challenges and threats, the Kingdom faces another type of internal challenge. The health of the Saudi economy and coming to grips

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with the Kingdom’s problems with education, Saudization, youth employment, and demographics are the true keys to security. So is a level of political progress that expands the role ordinary Saudis can play in government, and making further reductions in sources of social unrest. Even the best counterterrorist operations can deal only with the small fraction of the Saudi population that is violent extremists. True stability is based upon popular support. As has been discussed in virtually every chapter, however, Gulf security also requires a broad process of continuing evolutionary reform of each country’s political, economic, and social systems, not just reform of their militaries, internal security, and intelligence services. In his first speech to the Shura Council, King Abdullah asserted, ‘‘We can’t remain rigid and the world around us is changing.’’ King Abdullah, however, reiterated in the same speech that the shape of reforms should be debated through national dialogue so that the Kingdom can ‘‘meet the desires of society and be in harmony with Islamic sharia (law).’’167 There is little evidence of any serious split between members of the royal family and Saudi ministers over the broad need to move forward on socioeconomics. There have been many debates and disagreements over how fast to move and in what areas. There is a clear need to find a better balance between moving too slowly, the risk of revolutionary or destabilizing change, and the clear need to evolve. Economic Reforms The Saudi economy is experiencing an economic boom that it has not seen since the oil boom of the 1970s. Saudi Arabia joined the World Trade Organization, saw massive investment flow into its energy sector, and experienced a stock market bubble. At its peak during February 2006, Saudi Arabia’s stock market capitalization reached over $800 billion. Despite a massive correction, which shed more than $300 billion, it still represents approximately 45 percent of the region’s market capitalization. This unprecedented growth has been welcomed by the Saudi government and the public. But the Kingdom’s economic situation is not without challenges. Between 1982 and 2000, the Kingdom was running high budget deficits due to low oil prices, mismanagement, and high defense spending. Figure 6.11 shows that the year 2000 was the first year Saudi Arabia enjoyed a surplus, and since that year, with the exception of 2001, the Saudi budget has enjoyed surpluses. The largest contributors to the budget surpluses the Kingdom is enjoying are high oil prices coupled with increased Saudi oil production. For example, between 2001 and 2004, the price per barrel of oil increased by roughly 108 percent. In addition to high oil prices, according to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), global demand for oil increased from 78.0 million barrels per day (MMBD) in 2001 to 82.4 MMBD in 2004, which also pushed Saudi production to increase from 8.7 MMBD in 2001 to 10.37 MMBD in order to meet this surge in demand. Due to these market forces, the EIA estimates that Saudi oil export revenues, in constant

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Figure 6.11 Saudi Arabian Budget Balance, 1994–2006

2005 dollars, were $65 billion in 2001 compared to $117.8 billion in 2004, representing roughly an 81-percent increase.168 These trends are projected to continue through 2006 and 2007. As Figure 6.11 shows, Saudi Arabia is projected to have a budget surplus of approximately $19.7 billion. Although these projections were based on an estimated oil price of $35/barrel and an estimated Saudi oil production of only 9.5 million barrels per day. In fact, the EIA estimates Saudi oil production to increase from 10.97 MMBD in 2005 to 11.28 MMBD in 2006. This increase in production would result in an increase in Saudi oil export earnings from $150 billion in 2005 to $159 billion in 2006 and a projected $145 billion in 2007, which would result in much higher budget surpluses—assuming there are no major increases in government expenditures. These budget surpluses have been used in two key areas: paying down the debt and investing in key areas that were underfunded during the 1990s. Saudi domestic debt reached an all-time high in 1999 when it reached 119 percent of GDP ($116 billion). It has since declined to 51 percent of GDP ($161 billion) in 2005 and an estimated 41 percent of GDP in 2006 ($126 billion). The Saudi American Bank estimated that the Saudi government used $37 billion of its 2005 budget surplus to pay down its domestic debt.

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In addition to paying its public debt, the Kingdom has announced preliminary plans on how it will spend the rest of its budget surplus. The following are key projects that have been announced by the Saudi government:169 • $8 billion to increase the salary of government employees (15-percent raise). • $10 billion allocated for development and maintenance of services and infrastructure, including the following: • $2.13 billion for the building of public housing projects, • $1.86 billion for construction of new desalination plants, • $1.33 billion for construction of new highways and roads, • $1.2 billion for street maintenance and drainage systems, • $1.06 billion for construction of new schools, • $1 billion for the construction of a university campus, • $800 million for the construction of primary health care facilities, and • $666 million for the construction of new vocational training institutes. • $4 billion allocated for Saudi Export Program Initiative. • $3.46 billion to increase the capital of the Saudi Industrial Development Fund. • $1.2 billion to increase the capital of the Saudi Real Estate Fund. • $800 million to increase the capital of the Saudi Credit Bank. • $4 billion to increase the minimum social security payment.

Many of these projects will finance areas that were underfunded for extended periods of time during the periods of high budget deficits throughout the 1980s and 1990s. While it is too early to tell how these projects will be implemented, it is clear that this level of increase in government spending is likely to spur further economic growth in the Kingdom. Despite these promising trends, the Saudi economy remains highly dependent on oil. There already has been considerable diversification in the Saudi economy. The oil sector provided 35 percent of the GDP in 2004 compared to 65 percent of the GDP in 1974, although these figures are misleading because petrochemicals and other petroleum-related products are not included in the petroleum sector and the growth of the service and manufacturing sectors is heavily linked to petroleum products and revenues. In addition, the Kingdom must deal with the consequence of its stock market correction, deal with realistic reforms to encourage private sector growth, and must deal with the overarching problem of unemployment. Economic reforms and citizen participation in the boom are as important as any counterterrorism or security measure that the Kingdom can take to ensure the Saudi public supports the Kingdom’s reform plans.

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Addressing the Demographic Pressures and Unemployment Demographics have already made employment a critical issue, and the problem will grow steadily for at least the next quarter century because of existing population momentum. During the period 1980–2000, the Saudi population increased from 12 million to 20 million. In 2002, the Saudi labor force was 3.15 million people, and the official unemployment figure is 9.6 percent. The latest census of 2004 found that the population is 22,673,538 people. Of those people, 16,529,302 are Saudis and 6,144,236 are expatriates. The number of foreign labor is approximately 2 million less than earlier expected. Furthermore, only 15 percent of foreign workers fall in the category of skilled workers. Most of them work in agriculture, cleaning, and domestic service.170 The official unemployment estimate severely undercounts the number of Saudis who need jobs and does not attempt to estimate nonproductive jobs or disguised unemployment. The real unemployment figure is probably as high as 25 percent and probably is distinctly higher among Saudi young men. This figure also makes no serious allowance for the number of women who would seek work if the opportunity was provided, and whose productivity is needed at a time when more women graduate from secondary school and universities than men and do so in more practical subjects. The truth is that the Kingdom has a major unemployment problem even in a time of booming oil revenues, and it is growing more rapidly when as many as 350,000 workers enter the work force every year.171 In January 2005, following an employment campaign in the Kingdom, the Ministry of Labor announced that the number of Saudi males who did not have a job and were seeking one totaled 180,500. While the Minister of Labor argued that this number should be adapted as the official unemployment number, its not very reliable. It is unclear what methodology the employment campaign used. Further, such campaigns tend to have a self-selection bias, which makes any deductive conclusion about the actual number of unemployed invalid.172 Saudi Arabia has enacted some reforms in its approach to this problem that include job training, Saudization, job creation, employment of women, and the creation of a fund to help Saudi citizens achieve economic independence. The Kingdom’s efforts in economic liberalization, diversification, and privatization are also seen as key steps in creating more private sector jobs for young Saudis. The Kingdom has augmented these reforms with the creation of the National Program for Training and Employment to prepare Saudis entering the job market to be more competitive, especially against a cheap foreign labor force. In addition, on July 8, 2004, Saudi Arabia announced the creation of a ‘‘Centennial Fund’’ to help Saudi workers—men and women—set up small and medium business enterprises. The fund was also paired with the Saudi General Investment Authority in order to assist entrepreneurs to translate their ideas into viable businesses. Saudi Arabia has also invested in increasing women’s participation in the work force. An estimate by the Work Bank put the increase in women’s participation in the work force at 640 percent since the 1960s.173 In 2002, 15 percent of the Saudi

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labor force, 465,000, were Saudi women, who were part owners in 22,000 businesses, including accounting, banking, computer training, automotive, and many high-tech sectors. The fact remains, however, that the majority of private-sector jobs are filled by a cheap foreign labor force in the Kingdom. Saudi nationals compromise 65 percent of the 7-million-man labor force—but only 5 percent of the private-sector jobs. The Kingdom has set a goal to increase the share of Saudi nationals in the work force to 70 percent by 2010. To increase the share of nationals in the labor force, the Ministry of Labor chairs the board of the General Organization for Technical Education and Vocational Training and Manpower Development Fund. The Fund aims at preparing Saudi youths to compete against cheap foreign labor through covering the expenses of job training. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has set specific goals for Saudiizing many sectors, including the retail sector, taxi drivers, jewelry shops, etc., in addition to opening new sectors such as tourism. By 2006, the Kingdom hopes to restrict commercial activities in up to 25 sectors, and a study is under way to add at least 10 more categories, Ghazi Al-Gosaibi, the Minister of Labor, said. According to the Kingdom’s official statistics, 80 percent of accounting and translating jobs have been Saudiized, as of early 2005. Once a sector is Saudiized, new foreign labor is prohibited from entering the Kingdom, but those who are on the job stay until their visas expire and they train those who are taking their places.174 The demographic challenge to the Kingdom, however, is just starting. Figure 6.12 shows the age distribution of the Saudi population in 2006. Several characteristics are striking. More than a third of the Saudi population is of an employment age (29–64). What is concerning, however, is that another third of the population is also at an age to enter the job market. Even more concerning is that 38 percent of the Saudi population is under the age of 14. This means that in the next two decades,

Figure 6.12 Saudi’s Demographic Distribution, 2006

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the Kingdom will see a large inflow into the job market. As is all too clear in the other chapters, all the countries in the Gulf and, for that matter, in the Middle East and the developing world face the same general demographic trends represented by a youth explosion. The importance of demographics for Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States, however, go beyond the need for demographic controls. A young and unemployed citizen of the Gulf is a prime target for recruiting by extremist organizations such as Al Qa’ida.

Prospects for Saudi Stability These challenges seem insurmountable for any nation to deal with. But it is also true that most nations in the region and the world deal with similar challenges. The strategic importance of Saudi Arabia, however, makes dealing with these challenges all the more important. Some uncertainties are hard to control. For example, while the Kingdom can peripherally influence the outcome in Iraq through forgiving Iraq’s debt, encouraging national reconciliation in Iraq, pressuring the Sunnis, and strengthening its border security, the future of Iraq will be shaped by security on the ground and by the Iraqi government and public. The Kingdom, however, must prepare to deal with all contingencies to ensure its national security. Another uncertainty that the Kingdom has little control over is the threat from Iran’s nuclear program. In this case, once again, the Kingdom must prepare for all possibilities, ensure that it has the military capabilities to defend against the potential of a shift in power in the Gulf, and defend its friends in the Gulf. It must seriously consider its ‘‘potential’’ response to a declared nuclear Iran, a ‘‘bomb in the basement,’’ or even a ‘‘bomb in the fog.’’ These regional challenges require the Kingdom to reconsider its defense posture in the region and address deficiencies in its force structures. This must also involve limiting or eliminating the glitter factor in its defense spending and focusing on improving jointness and interoperability between its conventional military services and, most importantly, with its internal security services. In addition, the Kingdom must also work to improve jointness and interoperability with its neighboring GCC states. Despite petty political rivalries and insecurity complexes by the other Gulf States, the Kingdom has little choice but to keep the GCC together. Instability in any of the smaller Gulf States cannot only invite Iran’s interference, but now the possibility of a safe haven in the Gulf for Al Qa’ida might be too close for comfort for Saudi Arabia. The GCC must be strengthened to deal with real-world challenges facing the Council in the areas of counterterrorism and military transformation. In addition to the regional challenges, the fight against Al Qa’ida in the Kingdom is not over. The attempted attack against Abqaiq in February 2006 and the Saudi security forces’ performance made it all too clear that the Kingdom must take the threat seriously and that Al Qa’ida is on the defensive. But it also made it all too clear

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that terrorist organizations will stop at nothing to disturb Saudi stability and the global economy. The Saudi counterterrorism strategy, however, must also be comprehensive. Dealing with youth dissatisfaction, implementing meaningful economic diversifications and social reforms, and addressing the demographic and unemployment pressures are as important as any tactical victory against Al Qa’ida. Finally, despite Western analyses about the prospects of Saudi stability, the Kingdom has proven to be capable of dealing with these challenges. The peaceful succession of King Abdullah to the throne in August 2005 opened a new page. Many changes are taking place in Saudi Arabia’s foreign, economic, trade, oil, and defense policies. It is too early to predict the results of these changes. But since 9/11 and, more particularly, since the attacks of May 2003, the Saudi leadership has expressed to its citizens and to the West that it understands what needs to be done on its part to deal with these challenges.

7

United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a composed of the seven Emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ahman, Umm Al-Qaiwain, Ras Al-Khaimah, and Fujairah.1 Although the cohesion of the confederation has improved over time, there remain questions about its unity and stability. Its armed forces remain divided by Emirate, and low-level rivalries still exist between the two main Emirates: Abu Dhabi and Dubai. The United Arab Emirates also raises questions about nationhood. Like Qatar and Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates has become a largely expatriate nation. It had an estimated population of around 4.5 million in 2006, but only 19 to 21 percent were Emirati and citizens. Some 74 percent of the 2.6 million labor force in the 15–64 age group was non-national. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates are dated, but still seem roughly accurate in indicating that another 23 percent of the population was Arab and Iranian, 50 percent was South Asian, and 8 percent was other expatriates (includes Westerners and East Asians). Some 96 percent of the population was Sunnis (16 percent of which was Shi’ite), and Christian, Hindu, and ‘‘other’’ made up the remaining 4 percent.2 The United Arab Emirates has become one of the most successful economies in the Middle East, and it has developed from a series of small coastal ports and oasis towns into major cities, ports, and trading facilities. Its wealth comes mainly from its oil and gas exports [30 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP)] and its trading position in the lower Gulf. In 2005, it had a GDP of $74.67 billion and a per capita income of $29,100. The United Arab Emirates is a medium-sized country by Gulf standards with a total of 82,880 square kilometers. It occupies a strategic position in the southern Gulf and has borders with Saudi Arabia (457 kilometers) and Oman (410 kilometers); see Map 7.1. It has a 1,318-kilometer coastline on the Gulf of Oman as well as the Gulf. Its islands put it near Iran, and it has long-standing

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Map 7.1 The United Arab Emirates

disputes with Iran over the control of several islands in the Gulf that are near the main shipping channels. Like Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman, the United Arab Emirates has close military ties with the United States and Britain. It provided prepositioning facilities for a U.S. brigade before the Iraq War and assisted the United States and Britain during the war, even though Sheikh Zayed and most of the UAE leaders personally opposed the conflict. These links accord the United Arab Emirates some de facto protection against hostile Iranian action or any invasion. But this does not mean that the United Arab Emirates will receive military support in the event of a conflict with Iran over three islands whose control is disputed between the two countries. U.S. relations with the United Arab Emirates are also mixed in other areas. The CIA notes in its description of the United Arab Emirates that ‘‘the UAE is a drug transshipment point for traffickers given its proximity to Southwest Asian drug producing countries; the UAE’s position as a major financial center makes it vulnerable to money laundering; anti-money-laundering controls improving, but informal banking remains unregulated.’’3 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have usually supported the United Arab Emirates against Iran, but this is no proof that they would offer military support in case there is war. The United Arab Emirates also has a history of low-level tension with Oman and Qatar, although tensions have largely faded. The United Arab Emirates has pursued its military development despite tension among its member Emirates. The United Arab Emirates has a small native population and has encountered political problems in its attempts to retain foreign

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manpower in its military. It claims to have 50,500 actives, about 30 percent of which are expatriates. In practice, its active manpower is significantly smaller. This is typical of UAE military behavior. It has some effective elements, and some well-trained officers, but only limited real-world military capabilities. Its large cash resources allow it to buy the shell of an impressive military capability, but one it cannot man, sustain, or transform into an effective overall war-fighting capability. COMMAND STRUCTURE OF ARMED FORCES The command structure in the United Arab Emirates is complex because of its complex political structure. Power is divided by Emirate, and largely between the two wealthiest Emirates: Abu Dhabi and Dubai. The President is Khalifa bin Zayid Al Nuhayyan (since November 3, 2004), who became the ruler of Abu Dhabi at the same time and succeeded his father. The Vice President and Prime Minister is Muhammed bin Rashid Al Maktum of Dubai (since January 5, 2006). The Deputy Prime Minister is Hamdan bin Zayid Al Nuhayyan of Abu Dhabi (since October 20, 2003).4 The Cabinet consists of a Council of Ministers appointed by the President, which mixes technocrats with various Emiri representatives of the ruling families. The real ruling body consists of a Federal Supreme Council that consists of each of the rulers of the seven Emirates. This body is the highest constitutional authority in the United Arab Emirates; it establishes general policies and sanctions federal legislation, and it meets four times a year. The rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai have effective veto power. In theory, the United Arab Emirates has unified forces under a central command. In practice, the United Arab Emirates is divided into three commands. The Northern and Western Command fall under the responsibility of the army commander; supported by the Abu Dhabi Air Force. The Central Military Command (Dubai) is commanded by the Minister of Defense and is supported by the Dubai Air Force. Operations during peacetime are fragmented, and there are still three separate military organizations in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Ras al-Khaimah. In case of war, coordination comes under the General Headquarters in Abu Dhabi, and the Dubai Army would be integrated with the Federal Armed Forces.5 MILITARY SPENDING The United Arab Emirates’ high national income has allowed it to become one of the largest defense spenders in the Arab world, and one of the world’s largest spenders per man in uniform.6 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimates that the UAE defense budget was $9.23 billion in 2003, $9.74 billion in 2004,7 and $9.74 billion in 2005. This is a substantial amount for a country that the IISS estimates had a GDP of $78.2 billion in 2003 and $89.6 billion in 2004. It is a substantial amount for a country that spent under $3 billion a year on military

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forces in the 1990s, and which the CIA estimates had a GDP that was still only $101.6 billion in 2005, even when measured by the favorable official exchange rate, and whose national budget totaled $34.93 billion in revenues and $29.41 billion in expenditures, including capital expenditures of $3.4 billion.8 The United Arab Emirates has also been a major and an ambitious arms importer in spite of the fact it possesses too little manpower to make full use of all its equipment. It has little ability to organize its forces into an effective and combat-ready structure or to project and sustain them at any distance. During the 1990s, the United Arab Emirates took $1 billion a year worth of deliveries on average.9 Figure 7.1 shows the trend in new arms deliveries by supplier from 1993 to 2004. In the 1993–1996 period, the sum of new arms deliveries was $3.7 billion, in 1997– 2000 it was $4.2 billion, and in 2001–2004 it was $6.8 billion. New arms agreements are shown in Figure 7.2, also increased, though they peaked with the purchase of 80 F-16C/D Block 60s in 2000. This explains the drop in total new agreements between 2001 and 2004. The United Arab Emirates’ major suppliers have been from western Europe, though the F-16s boosted American sales to the country. Russia is also a supplier, albeit a smaller one compared to the West. Recent purchases include 32 Funchs 2 nuclear, chemical, and/or biological (NBC) 6x6 vehicles, 500 Nimr high-mobility tactical vehicles, 390 Leclerc main battle tanks (MBTs), nearly 150 other armored vehicles, 2 Corvettes, 2 Type 332 mine-hunters, 80 F-16C/D Block 60s with advanced air and air-to-surface munitions, 10 AH-64s and the upgrade of 30 to the Apache-Longbow, 8 AB139 helicopters, plans for upgrading 12 CH47C Chinooks, and what may come to total over 90 Mirage 2000 fighters.

Figure 7.1 United Arab Emirates’ Arms Deliveries by Supplier, 1993–2004


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Figure 7.2 United Arab Emirates’ New Arms Agreements by Supplier, 1993–2004

MILITARY MANPOWER The United Arab Emirates has no draft and can draw upon only a limited manpower pool of citizens. The total manpower pool in ages 18–49 was only 653,181 in 2005, including foreign nationals. The manpower fit for military service totaled 526,671. Even including foreigners, only 30,706 males reached the military service age of 18.10 The United Arab Emirates has had higher manpower totals in the past, reporting peaks of 66,000 in the 1990s. Many were Omanis and other nationals, however, and the United Arab Emirates cut the numbers of such personnel for political reasons.11 It had a total reported military manpower pool of 50,500 in 2006, with 44,000 in the army, 2,500 in the navy, and 4,000 in the air force. Dubai’s portion of the army totaled 15,000. Similar data are not available for the other Emirates. Manning data were not available for security forces and other paramilitary units. Much of this manpower was foreign, and these numbers were probably ‘‘rounded upward.’’12

THE UAE ARMY Figure 7.3 shows the trends in the manpower, force structure, and equipment of the UAE Army. The army has an estimated strength of 44,000 personnel, which makes it large by southern Gulf standards. This number includes 15,000 personnel in the Dubai independent forces, which are not fully integrated into the UAE force

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Figure 7.3 United Arab Emirates Army Force Structure, 1990–2006 1990

2000

2005

2006

40,000

59,000

44,000

44,000

Active

34,000

44,000

29,000

29,000

Dubai Forces

6,000

15,000

15,000

15,000

0

0

0

0

Armored Brigade

1

2

2

2

Mechanized Infantry Brigade

1

3

3

3

Infantry Brigade

2

2

2

2

Artillery Brigade

1

1

1

1

Royal Guard Brigade

1

1

1

1

Manpower

Reserve Combat Units

Dubai Mechanized Infantry Main Battle Tanks Leclerc

1

2

2

2

207

407

545

545

0

250

388

388

OF-40 Mk2 (Lion)

36

36

36

36

AMX-30

95

45

45

45

Scorpion

76

76

76

76

30

433

430

430

AMX-10P

30

18

15

15

BMP-3

0

415

415

415

220

69

113

113

Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles

Reconnaissance AML-90

90

49

49

49

Ferret

60

0

(20)*

(20)

Saladin

70

(20)

(20)

(20)

VBL

0

0

(24)

(24)


513

620

860

860

AMX-VCI

30

0

0

0

VAB

20

0

0

0

Saracen

(12)

0

0

0

AAPC

0

50

136

136

BTR 3u Guardian

0

0

90

90

EE-11 Urutu

66

120

120

120

M-3 Panhard

300

370

370

370


TPz-1 Fuchs

0

0

64

289

64

VCR

85

80

80

80

Artillery

256

470

501+†

501+

M-56 Pack

18

0

0

0

TOWED 105-mm ROF It

59

73

73

73

TOWED 130-mm 59-I

0

20

20

20

SP 155-mm G-6

0

72

78

78

SP M-109 A3

0

87

85

85

SP Mk F3

20

18

18

18

MRL 122-mm Firos-25

40

48

48+

48+

MRL 300-mm 9A52 Smerch

0

0

6

6

MRL 70-mm 18 LAU-97

18

18

18

18

MOR 81-mm Brandt

0

0

20

20

MOR 81-mm L16

80

114

114

114

MOR 120-mm Brandt

21

20

21

21

Antitank Weapons

70+

567+

567+

567+

MSL HOT

‡

?

30

30

30

MSL HOT SP

?

20

20

20

MSL Milan

45

230

230

230

MSL TOW

25

25

25

25

MSL Vigilant

?

?

(?)

(?)

RCL 106-mm M-40

0

12

12

12

RCL 84-mm Carl Gustav

?

250

250

250

Air Defense Missiles/Guns

60+

82+

102

102

SAM Blowpipe

0

20

20

20

SAM Mistral

0

?

20

20

GUN/SP 20-mm M3 VDAA

48

42

42

42

GUN/TOWED GCF-BM2

12

20

20

20

Tactical Missiles/Surface-toSurface Missile

0

6

6

6

SCUD-B

0

6

6

6

* Numbers in parentheses imply storage. † ‘‘+’’ indicates the numbers listed may be slightly less than the actual units or weapons in stock. ‡ All ‘‘?’’ refer to weapons that the United Arab Emirates is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in its possession are unknown. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

290


structure. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment offers a different estimate, putting army forces at 59,000. Force Structure The ‘‘integrated army’’ is dominated by Abu Dhabi and includes a Royal Guard brigade, two armored brigades, three mechanized infantry brigades, two infantry brigades, and an artillery brigade. Two mechanized infantry brigades belong to the Dubai Independent force. The UAE Army has eight known bases at Tarif Camp, Al-Ain Camp, Masafi Camp, Manama Camp, Madina Zayed, Fujairah Camp, Infantry Command School (Al-Ain), and Al-Maqam Camp. A number of the UAE combat units and support units used to be badly underdeveloped, but acquisitions and equipment development since 2002 have made progress, and the UAE Army is creating a more balanced force posture. Nevertheless, the United Arab Emirates has only about 50–60 percent of the manpower it needs to fully man and sustain its forces in maneuver combat outside the range of their peacetime bases. The army’s support problems are compounded by the fact that the army has set out to avoid dependence on one source for military equipment and tends to retain equipment after it has aged to the point where it should be withdrawn from service. Armor Figure 7.3 shows that the UAE tank fleet increased from 207 in 1990 to 545 in 2006, largely as a result of the Leclerc acquisition from France. Its armored infantry fighting vehicle (AIFV) fleet increased almost tenfold, from 30 in 1990 to 430 in 2006. Its reconnaissance (RECCE) fleet has decreased, as more and more vehicles are put in storage or become nonoperational. Its armored personnel carrier (APC) total went from 513 in 1990 to 860 in 2006, and unlike the other increases that can be explained by a wave of arms purchase made in reaction to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, major increases in APCs took place after 2000. The UAE Army’s armored assets now include too many types of equipment and a number of obsolescent systems. In 2006, it had 545 MBTs, which included 388 Leclerc (Jane’s reports a total of 436 due to the inclusion of 46 armored recovery vehicles (ARVs) and two training Leclercs), 36 OF-40 Mk2 Lions, 45 aging and worn AMX-30s (Jane’s number is 95), and 76 Scorpion light tanks. The United Arab Emirates would like to acquire 120 heavy equipment transporters to boost the mobility of the LeClercs.13 In May 2004, the army received the last of 388 tropicalized Leclerc MBTs ordered in 1993 from France’s Giat Industries. In addition, the army ordered 46 ARVs in a $35-billion contract with the United States and can now equip two armored brigades. The army’s AIFV fleet included 15 AMX-10Ps and 415 BMP-3s, though Jane’s estimates that number at 330. The reconnaissance fleet included 49 AML-90s (Jane’s


291

writes 90), 20 Saladins (in storage), 20 Ferrets (in storage), and 24 Vehicle Blinde Leger (VBL) armored reconnaissance vehicles. The figures for the UAE holdings of APCs are uncertain. They seem to include 136 AAPCs, 64 Tpz-1 Fuchs, and 80 VCRs; it also has 120 EE-11 Urutus (Jane’s estimate is 100), 370 M-3 Panhards (Jane’s estimate is 240), and 90 BTR 3U Guardians (which Jane’s reports are deployed with the UAE Marines). Jane’s also reports that the United Arab Emirates has 20 VAB, a number unreported by the IISS Military Balance. A total of 24 of the French Panhard VBL 4x4 scout cars were delivered in 2004. Ninety Guardian 8x8 amphibious APCs based on the Russian BTR-80 (powered in the water by a single waterjet) were delivered and equipped the UAE Marines. Although these APCs are produced in the Ukraine, they are detailed by ADCOM Military Industries based in Abu Dhabi. Within Abu Dhabi, these carriers are fitted with a 30-mm cannon and a 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun and antitank missiles.14 The Russians will upgrade part of the UAE fleet of 415 BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). Some of the BMPs have already had upgrades and modifications from Russia, including new Russian explosive reactive armor panels capable of defeating 100-mm HEAT (high-exposives antitanks) rounds on the front and sides along with improved ballistic protection. France’s Giat Industries FINDERS (Fast Information, Navigation Decision, and Reporting System) has also been installed on MBP-3 IFVs.15 Armored training is limited and focuses on the small unit level. Serious tank firing training, armored maneuver training, and repair/recovery/sustainment training was limited. The United Arab Emirates does, however, continue to seek improved capabilities. Antiarmor The UAE antitank missiles include 50 MSL HOTs (20 self-propelled), 230 Milans, 25 MSL TOWs, some MSL Vigilants, 12 RCL 106-mm M-40s, and 250 RCL 84-mm Carl Gustavs. Realistic live-firing training is very limited. The United Arab Emirates is seeking to replace the Euromissile MILAN antitank guided weapon (ATGW) system and the 84-mm Carl Gustaf recoilless rifle systems.16 It is developing a possible acquisitions deal with Raytheon/Lockheed Martin to acquire 1,000 Javelin 127-mm medium-range antitank missiles and 100 command launch units complete with support systems. The Javelins could replace the Euromissile Milan ATGW that has a range of 2,000 meters. The contract is estimated at around $135 million.17 Artillery The artillery force also increased, partly in reaction to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Total holdings of major artillery steadily increased after 1990, although they have remained stable since 2000.

292


In 2006, the artillery strength of the UAE Army consisted of 73 towed 105-mm ROF Its (Jane’s estimate is 62) and 20 Towed 130-mm 59-1s. The strength of its self-propelled (SP) weapons included 78 SP 155-mm G-6s (Jane’s estimate is 72), 85 SP M-109 A3s (which Jane’s reports as M109 L47), and 18 SP Mk F3s. Its inventory of multiple rocket launchers included 48 122-mm Firos-25s (24 inoperative), 6 300-mm 9A52 Smerches, and 18 70-mm LAU-97s. The Smerch is one of the few long-range artillery rockets deployed in southern Gulf forces. It is mounted on a Russian truck body with a 12-tube launcher. According to Global Security, it can be used in either single or salvo firing and is deployed with six launchers and six transloaders. The transloader is another wheeled truck and carries 12 rockets and reloads the launcher using a hydraulic crane. The weapon is a 300mm 9M55K solid propellant rocket with a range of 20–70 kilometers. It either has a separable unitary warhead, a warhead containing 72 HE-FRAG (High Explosive Fragmentation) submunitions, or a warhead containing five Bazalt MOTIV-3F antiarmor ‘‘smart’’ submunitions.18 Its holdings of mortars included 20 81-mm Brandts, 114 81-mm L16s, and 21 120-mm Brandts. Finally, the United Arab Emirates had 6 R-300 9K72 Elbrus/SS-1C/Scud Bs with a capability of up to 20 missiles. These are aging systems with conventional warheads. They have a maximum range of 300 kilometers and a payload of 770–950 kilograms.19 They have a nominal circular error probable (CEP) of 900 meters, but operational accuracy is closer to 3 kilometers at best. This makes them too inaccurate to use against any target smaller than cities or the largest area targets like airfields, and they are too lacking in lethality to have more than a minor tactical effect in a city-block-sized area even if they are equipped with an improved submunition warhead. (The normal warhead is unitary.) As such they are at best a ‘‘terror’’ weapon that may well do more to provoke than act as a deterrent or terror system. These are large holdings for a small force, many are modern and relatively effective, and the United Arab Emirates has to have at least adequate holdings of artillery support equipment. In November 2004, for example, it was reported that Germany and the United Arab Emirates were in talks regarding the Emirates’ acquisition of Germany’s Cobra wheeled counterbattery active-array radar system. There are, however, too many types of weapons, exercise training is too static, and command and control and maneuver capabilities are uncertain. Air Defense Holdings The air defense holdings were composed of 20+ surface-to-air missile (SAM) Blowpipes, 20 SAM Mistrals, 42 GUN/SP 20-mm M3 VDAAs, and 20 GUN/ TOWED GCF BM2s. According to Jane’s, the army also has 10 Igla-1 (SA-16 ‘‘Gimlet’’) and 3 Crotale units (with 9 launcher units.) These assets are aging and overall training and readiness is limited to moderate. Modernization is under way. In November 2004 the army received the first batch from its $734-million deal with Russia for Russian KBP Instrument design Bureau


293

Pantsir-S1 SP air-defense (AD) systems (NATO designation SA-19). The United Arab Emirates is the first customer of the Pantsir-S1 that is replacing the ZSU23-4 and is an advancement of the KBP 2S6M Tungkusa AD system.20 As in some other deals that the United Arab Emirates has been involved in over the past few years, the United Arab Emirates funded the development of the Pantsir-S1 project and had it tailored to its needs. The Pantsir-S1 has been designed so that it has an all-weather system that is capable of tracking and engaging aircraft, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), as well as a system of surveillance radars and an advanced electro-optical sensor pod with a total of eight missiles (four on either side) in the ready-to-launch position and two twin 30-mm 2A38M rapidfire cannons. A typical Pantsir battery has six fire units supported by two transporters based on 8x8 chassis and fitted cranes. The Pantsir order is comprised of 24 units based on fully tracked armored chassis and 26 on 8x8 cross-country wheeled chassis for added mobility.21

Other Recent Developments and Acquisitions In 2005, the UAE Army placed several weapons orders: • In February, the United Arab Emirates placed an order for 500 Nimr 4x4 highmobility tactical vehicles, which would come in a mix of several variants: soft skinned, two-door, four-door, single-cab and double-cab options.22 • In November, the United Arab Emirates signed a Euro160-million contract to purchase 32 Fuchs 2 NBC 6x6 vehicles from Germany’s Rheinmetall.23 • In November, the United Arab Emirates placed an order with BAE Systems Land Systems OMC (South Africa) for an undisclosed number of RG-31 4x4 mine-protected APCs to be delivered in the first half of 2006.24 • The United Arab Emirates is also considering converting 18 Leclerc ARVs into specialized armored engineering vehicles; the upgrade would focus mainly on minebreaching capabilities.25

Finally, the UAE Army is interested in acquiring simulators along with training, logistical, and spare parts support. The request will be under the U.S. government’s Foreign Military Sales program.

Overall Assessment The United Arab Emirates is steadily improving its equipment holdings and slowly improving training at the individual solider and small unit level. It is, however, a divided force with too many types of diverse equipment best suited to garrison operations and static defense. Its readiness, manpower, sustainability, and maneuver capabilities cannot keep up with its arms purchases.

294


THE UAE AIR FORCE The UAE Air Force (UAEAF) has an estimated strength of 4,000 men, including the police air wing. The facilities used by the air force are Al-Dhafra Air Base (military-civil joint use), Al-Ain International Airport (military-civil joint use) in Abu Dhabi, Dubai International Airport (civil airport) and Mindhat Military Base (military) in Dubai, and Sharjah International Airport (military-civil joint use) in Sharjah.26 Fixed-Wing Air Strength The UAE Air Force has 146 combat-capable aircraft, though the details of its force structure are somewhat opaque. Figure 7.4 shows the IISS Military Balance numbers that report there is one fighter squadron with 20 M-2000 EAD (M-2000E) Mirage planes; three fighter ground attack squadrons, the first of which has 57 F-16E/F Desert Falcon Block 60s, 18 M-2000 DAD (M-2000DE) Mirages, and 44 M-2000 RAD Mirages; the second has 17 Hawk MK63A/Hawk MK63C/Hawk MK63 trainers; and the third has 13 Hawk MK102s. There is also a reconnaissance squadron with 7 Mirage 2000 RADs. According to Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, the UAE Air Force has received 7 of 55 F-16E Desert Falcons and 3 of 25 F-16F Desert Falcons (report was published in October 2005); the report also estimated that the United Arab Emirates has 46 Dassault Mirage 2000-9s, without details about their specifications, though Jane’s suggests that a contract for upgrading existing aircraft and for procuring new ones would bring the United Arab Emirates close to the target of 63 Mirage 2000-9s in service by the end of 2005. Jane’s also estimated the reconnaissance-capable Mirage fleet at 8 and put the number of Hawks (63A/B/C) at 20, with 19 of those in service. There is a light training attack squadron and a mixed combat unit with 5 Hawk Mk 61 trainers. Other training aircraft include 12 Grob 115TAs, 30 PC-7 Turbo Trainers, as well as Hawk Mk63s, which operate in other squadrons as well. A transport squadron has 23 fixed-wing aircraft, including 1–24 Condors, 2 Beech 350 Super King Airs, 7 CN-235Ms, 1 DHC-6-300 Twin Otter, 4 C-130Hs, 2 C-130H-30 Hercules, 2 L-100-30s, and 4 leased IL-76s. UAE air force weapons include AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, AS-15 Kents, Hydra70s, PGM-1 Hakeem 1s, and PGM-2 Hakeem 2s. There are also AMRAAM, AIM-9L Sidewinders, and R-550 Magic air-to-air missiles. There are no precise figures for these weapons. Helicopters The UAE helicopter fleet consists of 30 AH-64A Apaches, which the United Arab Emirates is planning to upgrade to AH-64Ds with Longbow radars, upgrade engines and avionics, and Hellfire II fire-and-forget missiles.27 It has some AS-550C3 Fennecs, 10 SA-342K assault helicopters with HOT, and 12 CH-47C Chinook


295

Figure 7.4 United Arab Emirates Air Force’s Force Structure, 1990–2006 1990

2000

2005

2006

2,500

4,000

4,000

4,000

Active

2,500

4,000

4,000

4,000

Reserve

0

0

0

0

1/27

1/22

1/22

1/20

M-2000EAD Mirage

27

1/22

1/22

1/20


12

2/26

2/31

3/149

F-16E Falcon Block 60

0

0

0

57

M-2000E Mirage

0

1/9

1/9

0

M-2000-9 Mirage

0

0

5

0

12

0

0

18

M-2000 RAD Mirage

0

0

0

44

Hawk MK102

0

1/17

1/17

1/13

Hawk MK 63

1/15

1/17

1/17

1/17

11

11

0

0

MB 326 KD

2

2

0

0

MB 326 LD

4

4

0

0

MB-339A

5

5

0

0

1/11

1/8

1/8

1/7

1/11

1/8

1/8

1/7

Transport

8

24

19

23

G-222

1

0

0

0

BN-2

1

1

1

0

An-124 Candor

0

0

0

1

Beech 350 Super King Air

0

2

2

2

C-130H

4

4

4

4

C-130H-30 Hercules

0

0

0

2

C-212

0

4

0

0

CASA-235M-100/CN –235M

0

7

7

7

DHC-6-300

0

0

0

1

0

†

†

4†

Manpower (includes Police Wing)

Fighter Interceptor

M-2000DAD Mirage (M2000 DE)

Combat Capable Trainer

Reconnaissance M-2000 RAD Mirage

Il-76 Candid L-100-30 Training Aircraft

*

4

4

2

2

1

2

21

64

59

64

296


GROB 115TA

0

12

12

12

SF-260

6

5

0

0

Hawk MK 61

0

0

5

5

PC-7 Turbo Trainer

24

30

30

56

83

123+

ATK AH-64A Apache

0

20

30

30

AS-550C3

0

0

0

?

ATK AS-332 F ASW

§

?

?

5

?

ASLT SA-316

7

7

7

0

10

10

10

10

IAR-330 SOCAT Puma ASLT

0

0

10

10

SPT CH-47C Chinook

0

0

12

12

Helicopters

ASLT SA-342K Gazelle with HOT

30 ‡

104+

Bo-105

0

3

3

8

UTL SA-330

11

10

10

5

UTL A-109K2

0

3

3

3

UTL AB-139

0

0

0

8

UTL AS 332 (VIP)

8

2

2

2

UTL AS 350

8

1

1

0

UTL AS-365F Dauphin 2 (VIP)

0

0

0

4

UTL Bell 205

2

8

8

0

UTL Bell 206L

5

5

5

0

UTL Bell 206 Jet Ranger

1

9

9

9

UTL Bell 214

4

4

4

3

UTL Bell 407

0

1

1

1

UTL Bell 412 Twin Huey

0

0

3

9

* † ‡ §

Numbers listed with a slash mark indicate how many squadrons the craft are broken into. Refers to weapons that are on lease. ‘‘+’’ indicates the numbers listed may be slightly less than the actual units or weapons in stock. All question marks refer to weapons that the United Arab Emirates is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in its possession are unknown. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

helicopters purchased from Libya in 2003. Its utility helicopters consist of 3 A109K2s, 8 AB-139s (of which 2 are used for VIP transport), 4 AS-365F Dauphin 2s (for VIPs), 9 training Bell 206 Jet Rangers, 3 Bell 214s, 1 Bell 407, and 9 Bell 412 Twin Hueys.


297

Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment breaks down the forces according to Emirates; Abu Dhabi has 12 SA-342L ASLT helicopters, 10 of which are in service, 2 AS 532SC Cougars for antisubmarine warfare (ASW), 7 AS565SB Panthers for antiship warfare, 4 AS 532 UC Cougar utility helicopters, 5 BO105 CBS utility helicopters, 2 AS 332L Super Pumas, and 14 AS 350B Ecureuil trainers. Dubai’s communications helicopters include one AS365N1 Dauphin 2, one EC155B, five Bell 206B JetRangers, two Bell 206L-1 LongRangers, and one Bell 407. Its utility helicopters include six AB205A-1s, two B-212s, four B-214Bs, six AB412s, three BO 105 CBSs, and three A109 light utility helicopters. Sharjah has two AB and three BK117 B1 communications helicopters. Umm Al-Qaiwain has three B-222 communications helicopters. Ras Al-Khaimah is reported to possess Mi-2 and W-3 Sokol helicopters for police functions, though precise numbers are unknown. Uncertain Strength and Capabilities The following trends and discrepancies from Figure 7.4 are worth mentioning: • The Mirage numbers are not easily comparable because so many planes have undergone renovations and upgrades, and hence they do not appear in the same type of aircraft across the years. • The overall trend for the helicopter fleet has been upward, though with the exception of the Apache helicopters, most acquisitions have been for support and utility functions. The latest drop from 2005 to 2006 underlines the obscurity of the data on the helicopter fleet. • Five AS-332F helicopters in an antiship role (with Exocet AM-39 missiles) appear in the 2005 version of the IISS Military Balance, but not in the 2006 version. Jane’s does not report on these either. • There are seven ASLT SA-316 helicopters that appeared in the 2005 IISS Military Balance, but not in the 2006 version. Jane’s does not report on these helicopters either. • The number of Bo-105 utility helicopters varies; the 2005 IISS Military Balance reported three Bo-105s, while the 2006 version reports none. Jane’s reports that Abu Dhabi has six (five in service) and Dubai has three, probably as part of the Police Air Wing. • The number of SA-330 utility helicopters dropped because Jane’s estimates that only five of the ten are in service. • The IISS Military Balance estimates the number of AB-139 utility helicopters at eight, two of which are for VIP transport. This number does not appear either in the 2005 version or in Jane’s reports. • One AS350 utility helicopter is not reported in the 2006 IISS Military Balance, though it was in the 2005 version. According to Jane’s, Abu Dhabi has 14 AS 350B Ecureuil trainers. • Four AS-365F Dauphin 2 helicopters are reported in the 2006 IISS Military Balance, though not in the 2005 version. Jane’s reports that Dubai has one AS 365N1 Dauphin 2 utility helicopter.

298


• Eight Bell205 helicopters are reported in the 2005 IISS Military Balance, but none in the 2006 version. Jane’s reports that Dubai has six AB205A-1s. • Five Bell206L helicopters in 2005 IISS Military Balance are not reported in the 2006 version, while Jane’s estimates that Dubai has two Bell206L-1 LongRangers.

Recent Developments and Acquisitions As of 2006, the United Arab Emirates’ most recent major orders were reported to be an additional 33 Mirage 2000-9s and 80 F-16 Block 60s. The first F-16s and Mirages were to be delivered by mid-2005 with final deliveries expected in 2007 (the IISS Military Balance estimates that the United Arab Emirates has received 57 of the 80). The United Arab Emirates may immediately experience problems with the F-16s as the supplying company has demanded a new contract before any upgrades will be made available.28 To complement this influx of new aircraft, the air force is looking to purchase approximately 12 jet aircraft trainers to replace its older Hawk trainers. The United Arab Emirates’ 30 Pilatus PC-7 turboprop trainers are also earmarked for retirement, with the Swiss PC-21 the likely successor.29 The UAEAF believed that its Hawk trainers were old and wanted to purchase a training aircraft that would prepare its pilots for more complicated aircraft such as the F-16 Block 60 jets.30 The $6.4–$6.8 billion acquisition of F-16E/F Block 60s enhances the UAE weapons systems and specifically the air force’s over-the-horizon capabilities and provides interoperability with U.S. forces in the region, and they are likely to stay in operation beyond 2030. The F-16s will be outfitted with two Ratheon air-to-surface weapons systems; one system is the medium-range AGM-65 Maverick infrared guided missile, and the second system is the AGM-84 Harpoon antiship missile. Once these aircraft have been fitted with conformal fuel tanks that carry an additional 2,271 liters, they will be able to fly long-range sorties. Sorties can be lengthened even more with additional drop tanks on the wings that can hold another 4,450 liters.31 The F-16s will also be outfitted with Northrop Grumman APG-80 Agile Bean fire-control radar and a forward-looking infrared targeting system, with Agile Beam being less detectable and more accurate than what the F-16s are currently fitted with. These F-16s also carry devices that can jam enemy radar systems and electronic systems. These aircraft are more advanced than the aircraft that the U.S. and European air forces currently have; this is partially due to the fact that the United Arab Emirates assisted the United States in development costs, amounting to around $2 billion worth of UAE money spent solely on development.32 The air force wanted to acquire up to three E-2C Hawkeye 2000s for electronic warfare and warning purposes.33 However, the UAEAF has canceled the E-2C Hawkeye deal because the U.S. Navy refused to allow an advanced radio system within the UAE aircraft.34 The UAEAF is in the process of opening the bidding for an early warning system. Furthermore, the United Arab Emirates is also looking for a tanker aircraft, and it was reported that the list was narrowed to the Boeing 767


299

tanker transport and Airbus A330 Multi Roler tanker transport. Both Airbus and Boeing were scheduled to submit their proposals in mid-2005.35 In June 2005, the United Arab Emirates disclosed that it had awarded contracts to AgustaWestland and Piaggio Aero Industries to upgrade 12 CH-47Cs to CH-47C+s, similar to those in service by the Italian Army. These helicopters, which will be used by the Special Forces, are in dire need of overhaul and will not be operational for some time.36 In addition, the United Arab Emirates signed a $10.2-million contract with South Africa’s Avitronics for a Helicopter Self-Protection System, ‘‘similar to that which the UAE has for its SA-330 fleet.’’37 The United Arab Emirates placed an order, in February 2005, for eight AB139 helicopters; six of them will be geared to search-andrescue operations, while the other two will be configured for VIP transport.38 The United Arab Emirates is also looking, though has yet to commit, for UAVs.39 Summary Assessment According to Jane’s International Defense Review, the United Arab Emirates is ‘‘one of the best-equipped air forces in the Middle East’’ partly due to its acquisition over the past decade of an estimated 140 advanced strike aircraft. This is an impressive total and a focus on airpower is the United Arab Emirates’ best option in deterring Iran or its neighbors and defending its territory. Pilot training is still a work in progress, but individual aircrew and ‘‘squadron leader’’ capabilities are often good, and training programs set a high standard. As is the case with all UAE training, and promotion, however, nepotism, favoritism, and a failure to enforce training standards and requirements for personnel with good family contacts are occasional problems. The most serious problem with the UAE air force, however, is typical of most southern Gulf air forces. It has a ‘‘knights of the air’’ character, rather than acting as a modern, netted, and cohesive force. It lacks airborne air control and warning (AC&W) and battle management assets. There is limited training for jointness or force-wide air-to-air and air-to-ground combat. Real-world systems capability for managing integrated air- and land-based air defense is very limited. The same is true of air-navy joint operations. Emphasis is placed on the pilot, aircraft, and its weapons and not on sustainability and maintaining high sortie rates, and many key maintenance tasks are left to contract personnel. These problems are compounded by the problems in southern Gulf air defense integration. The United Arab Emirates lacks strategic depth and ‘‘mass.’’ It should be part of a fully integrated GCC air defense system. In practice, the GCC has invested in what is little more than an expensive façade, and internal rivalries preclude the development of well-trained and integrated forces. This makes the UAE Air Force heavily dependent on the United States for any large-scale operation against Iran. The United Arab Emirates does, however, continue to make progress, has some excellent planners, and improvements are expected in pilot training, transport

300


aircraft, and attack helicopters. The acquisition of in-flight refueling aircraft and three aerial tankers would also improve the UAE Air Force’s standing, as would the acquisition of AC&W/battle management aircraft.40 The recently built Air Warfare Center at the Al-Dhafra Air Base could have a major impact in improving operations. Built by France, the United States, and Britain, the facility could become the center of Coalition operations for the Gulf countries, Egypt, and Britain. However, such missions would be limited in scope as the three countries that helped build the center would have to take part.41

UAE LAND-BASED AIR DEFENSE The manpower of the UAE Air Defense is spread between the army and the navy. Figure 7.5 shows the overall trends in these forces, though information on the precise Figure 7.5 United Arab Emirates Air Defense’s Force Structure, 1990–2006


1990

2000

2005

2006

Unlisted

Unlisted

Unlisted

Unlisted

Unlisted

Unlisted

Unlisted

Unlisted

0

0

0

0

Air Defense Brigade

0

1

2

2

I-HAWK-MIM-23B Battalions

5

5

3

3

Surface-to-Air Missile Battalions

0

?*

3

3


20

121

?

?

8

9

?

?

Mistral

0

100

?

?

Rapier

12

12

?

?

140

13

?

?

140

13

?

?

TOWED/MIM23

5

?

?

?

I-HAWK MIM-23B

?

?

?

?

MANPAD

0

0

?

?

Javelin

0

0

?

?

SA-18 Grouse/Igla 9KB

0

0

?

?

Crotale

Self-Propelled RBS-70

* All question marks refer to weapons that the United Arab Emirates is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in its possession are unknown. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.


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numbers of each weapons system is sometimes sparse to nonexistent. There are two air defense brigades with three battalions each. Three battalions have I-HAWK MIM-23Bs, and three battalions are equipped with Crotales, Mistrals, Rapiers, RBS-70s, Javelins, and SA-18 Grouses (Igla 9 KB). Precise numbers are unavailable, though Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment estimates that the Hawk systems are low- to medium-altitude SAMs, with 30 launchers in five batteries. The Pantsir-SIE The United Arab Emirates is in the process of acquiring a newly developed Pantsir-SIE self-propelled hybrid air-defense gun-missile system. In October 2002, the United Arab Emirates and Russia signed a deal whereby Russia would develop and design a new, fifth-generation integrated advanced antiballistic air-defense missile and the United Arab Emirates would fund the development. The missile would then be used first by the two countries and Russia would be barred from exporting it to other countries for between five to seven years of the initial deployment to the Emirates. The new GM-352M1E vehicle will have an unmanned turret and all crew members will be in the front section of the chassis. Some of the vehicles will be mounted on track and others on wheels.42 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Defense Reportedly, the UAE Air Defense Commander stated that the United Arab Emirates, along with the rest of the GCC, had been studying the possible deployment of both a low- and a high-level ballistic missile interception system. The potential provider and other specifics remain unknown. A study that was due by the end of 2003 was interrupted by the Iraq War. Some believe that the expenses incurred by such a system would be prohibitive despite the GCC’s oil revenues.43 The more serious issue may be that current offthe-shelf systems like the Patriot and variants of the Russian S-300/S400 have a very limited ‘‘footprint’’ in terms of area coverage even against Scud time missiles and little real-world capability against the higher closing velocities of new, longer-range Iranian missiles like the Shahab-3. Improved systems are in development, but it seems likely that an investment in current systems could be wasteful and only of limited effectiveness. The Façade of Integration There have been limited improvements in command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence/battle management capabilities. On February 25, 2001, the development of a joint air-defense system, named Hizam Al-Tawaun, was commissioned. This system, which is linked to the GCC air-defense structure, includes tracking capabilities that enable the Council countries to track any airplane

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in their airspace to help them synchronize defensive actions. Unfortunately, it lacks the overall netting and integration with air- and surface-based fire units and many other capabilities necessary to produce true, modern, real-time integration. It is a first step, but is now more a façade than a capability. The United Arab Emirates is, however, making improvements in other areas. It plans to boost the capabilities of 11 air surveillance radar systems at the cost of $23.8 million.44 The head of the UAE Air Force, Brigadier General Khalid Abu Ainnain, has introduced a proposal to improve warning of attack by missile through the deployment of S-band radars on three fronts: northern Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman.45 Summary Assessment Only limited data are available on combat readiness and proficiency. The data that are available indicate that alert and sustained operational readiness standards are limited, but that I-Hawk crew training is generally adequate. The readiness of shorterrange air defense units is uncertain. Realistic fire training, maneuver training, and joint warfare training with air and land units seem to be limited. THE UAE NAVY The UAE Navy is based at Abu Dhabi with facilities at Dalma and Mina Zayed. There are also facilities at Mina Rashid, Mina Khalid, and Mina Jabal Ali in Dubai, Mina Sakr in Ras al-Khaimah, and Mina Khalid and Khor Fakkan in Sharjah. The United Arab Emirates has approximately 2,500 men according to the IISS. According to Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, the UAE Navy is composed of 2,400 personnel, including 200 officers. In both cases, the manning is barely adequate to crew and support the navy’s ships and equipment, and the navy is heavily dependent on contract support. Ship Strength Figure 7.6 shows key trends in the UAE Navy’s force structure since the Gulf War. In 2006, the UAE Navy’s combat strength consisted of two frigates, two corvettes, eight missile patrol craft, six coastal patrol craft, five amphibious craft, and two support ships. The two NL Kortenaer-class frigates are 3,630-ton Dutch vessels recommissioned and refitted in the late 1990s. They each have two AS-565 assault helicopters, one Mk 29 Sea Sparrow octuple with 24 RIM-7F/M SAMs, 5 Mk 141 Harpoon quad (eight effective with no weapons embarked), each with one AGM-84A Harpoon tactical air-to-surface missile (ASM), two Twin 324-mm TTs (4 effective) each with A244/Mk46, and a 76-mm gun. Their radars, fire-control, and battle management systems are relatively modern. The crews were trained in the Netherlands and the ships are active and participate in exercises.


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Figure 7.6 United Arab Emirates Navy’s Force Structure, 1990–2006

Manpower Active

1990

2000

2005

2006

1,500

2,000

2,500

2,500

1,500

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2,500

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NL Kortenaer Corvettes Muray Jip

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Ardhana (UK Vosper 33m)

6

6

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Ban Yas (TNC-45)

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Mubarraz

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Unspecified PFI

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LCT Al Feyi Logistics and Support

1

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SPT unspecified

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1

1

1

AT unspecified

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1

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1

Naval Aviation

2

11

18

20

Learjet 35A

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2

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ASLT AS-585 Panther

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7

7

7

ASUW AS-332F Super Puma

2

0

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UTL SA-316 Alouette III

0

4

4

4

Naval Helicopter


The two Muray Jib- (German Lurssen 62m) class corvettes are 630-ton ships commissioned in the early 1990s. They each have one SA-316 Alouette III utility helicopter, 2 quad each with 1 MM-40 Exocet tactical surface-to-surface missile (SSM). The corvettes are well-equipped modern ships, although they lack ASW capability. Both are active. There are also two 260-ton Mubarraz-class and six 2350-ton Ban Yas–class missile patrol boats, with four MM-40 Exocet missiles each.

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They were delivered in the early 1980s and are operational. The Ban Yas vessels are being modernized. There are six 175-ton gunned patrol craft, and 20 light 4-ton patrol craft. The United Arab Emirates has four 850-ton landing craft tank (LCTs) and is considering buying three more. It has three 650-ton landing craft utility (LCUs) and, according to Jane’s, a L6401 and a L6402 LCT, and two Serna LCUs (IISS Military Balance classified the landing craft as ‘‘other’’). The navy is also buying 12 Transportbat 43ton ships. Support ships include one dividing tender and one tug boat, though Jane’s reports that the navy has one D 1051 diving tender, 12 Al-Shaali small transports, and 8 Arctic 28 rigid inflatable boats. Naval Aviation The navy’s aviation branch has four SA-316 Alouettes, seven AS-585 Panthers, seven AS-332F Super Pumas in ASuW role helicopters (Jane’s writes that the Super Pumas are AS-535s), and two Learjet 35A transport aircraft. As the comparative statistics show, the AS-332E Super Pumas are recent acquisitions, presumably to counter the threat posed by the Iranian purchase of three Kilo submarines from Russia. Indeed, with the exception of the two corvettes, the naval aviation branch is the one that has experienced the greatest change from a total of two aircraft in 1990 to 20 in 2006 (both fixed and rotary wing). Otherwise, the numbers are relatively stable between 1990 and 2006. Naval Modernization The United Arab Emirates is acquiring six Bayunah-class missile patrol boats, or corvettes, with Harpoon or MM40 ship-to-ship missiles and RAM or Sigma surface-to-air missiles. One is to be built in France and five in the United Arab Emirates. The keel of the first UAE-built Bayunah-class ship was laid in Abu Dhabi in July 2006. They will displace 630 tons fully loaded.46 The Abu Dhabi Shipyards are supplying the navy with 12 Ghannatha-class amphibious troop transports. The transports can carry up to 42 personnel or can be used to deliver mines. Additionally, Abu Dhabi will deliver three landing craft and will upgrade the Ban Yas missile boats with Block 3 Exocet 2 missiles.47 The United Arab Emirates has reportedly finished the selection of four new 70mm Baynunah-class corvettes to be built by Construction Mecaniques de Normandie (CMN), a French company, and all will be delivered in 2008. The goals for these corvettes are to provide the UAE Navy with the capability of patrolling its shores, intelligence gathering, antisurface operations, maritime interdiction, and mine laying.48 The corvettes, which have a range of 2,400 miles at 15 knots, along with two former Royal Netherlands Navy Kortenaer-class frigates armed with U.S. Harpoon surface-to-surface missiles, commissioned in 1997 and 1998, respectively, give the Emirate’s forces unprecedented reach. (The sale of 12 RGM-84L Block II Harpoons was approved to be sold by the U.S. Department of Defense in late 2001.)


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The keel of the first corvette was laid in September 2005 in the CMN shipyard.49 The United Arab Emirates is now trying to acquire the remaining two Royal Netherlands Navy Kortenaer frigates, but of late that option does not look promising.50 The Baynunah program will consist of CMN working with Abu Dhabi Shipbuilding (ADSB) as a prime contractor to build a high-speed, missile-armed corvette based on the CMN’s Combattante BP67 hullform. This will be the first time a vessel is constructed in the Gulf region. The implications of this deal are very meaningful for the Emirates; this contract clearly puts the ADSB ahead of other industries in the region because it advances ADSB in the field of technological advancement, staff training, and export possibilities. The first vessel is currently being built in CMN’s Cherbourg facility and is expected to arrive in the Gulf in 2008, followed by the next two vessels that will be produced at ADSB, along with another possible three to be ordered in the future.51 The ships will be able to accommodate up to 45 personnel and will afford to give support for medium-sized helicopters such as the AS565 currently operated by the UAE Navy. Each will be equipped with N-25XM (a fire-control radar) and Sea Giraffe Agile Multiple Beam (a 3D surveillance radar), while the local and point area defense will be provided by Raytheon’s RIM-162 Evolve SeaSparrow Missile, and the infrared search function will be performed by Sagem’s VIGY-EOMS electro-optical system. It is still uncertain the kind of guided surface-to-surface weapon or mine avoidance and detection sonar the vessels will have, but space has been reserved for each system.52 A radar-band electronic support measures system and a Naval Laser Warning System, NLWS310, will be provided by South Africa’s Avitronics for $1.73 million on the four new corvettes. Jane’s Defense Weekly reported the following:53 The system provides full hemispherical coverage using 90° LAS310 laser detectors for over-lapping azimuth coverage and LWS500 laser detector for vertical coverage and reflection cancellation. It detects direct laser energy incidence from dazzlers, designators, range finders and command guidance pulse trains, and uses pulse-width filtering techniques to discriminate between laser sources and non-coherent sources of radiation to minimize their risk of a false alarm.

In February 2006, The UAE reached an agreement with the German Ministry of Defence for the purchase of two Type 332 mine hunters, the FGS Frankenthal and FGS Weiden, which would join the UAE fleet in mid-2006. The vessels are made of magnetic steel and usually embark the sonar and TV-camera equipped Pinguin B3 drones, though it is not clear whether this specific sale would include this equipment.54 The United Arab Emirates is also in talks about the purchase of antisubmarine warfare/maritime patrol aircraft. In November 2005, Alenia Aeronautica submitted a revised bid for supplying the UAE Navy in an effort to win out on a contract currently held by Turkey. There is little indication, however, that a deal is imminent since it has been almost ten years that the United Arab Emirates has been working

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on enhancing its capability, and there has been no concrete progress on this issue.55 There has been talk of the Emirates’ interest in submarines and looking at the retired Italian Toti-class boats that would suit the shallow waters of the Gulf. Should this talk come to bear fruit the United Arab Emirates would be the first country within the Gulf Cooperation Council to integrate submarines into its naval inventory.56 Summary Assessment The UAE Navy is not capable of fleet operations without British or U.S. support and has little joint warfare training or readiness. It has improved over the past few years with training programs and weapons systems’ acquisitions. The UAE Navy’s goal is to upgrade itself from a coastal defense force to a blue-water capable one by Gulf standards. The procurement program, which just passed its midpoint in 2006, is designed so that the UAE Naval Forces can conduct and sustain operations throughout the Gulf region, the Arabian Ocean, and as far as the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. In theory, together with Saudi and Omani capabilities, the GCC can deploy quite a sizable naval force to the region.57 The key problem the United Arab Emirates faces is manpower. Its expansion plans are highly ambitious, and it already has serious manpower and support problems. Moreover, expanding to the size of a serious fleet requires the ability to fully integrate operations with the air force and raises issues about the level of interoperability that can be achieved with the U.S. 5th Fleet and various GCC navies. Unfortunately, real-world contingency planning and exercise activity may be far easier with outside navies than with other southern Gulf forces. PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES UAE security involves a number of elements, and public reporting on the trends in these forces is shown in Figure 7.7. The national police organization is believed to be about 6,000-men strong and belongs, operationally, to the Ministry of Interior. In that force, 2,500 come from Dubai and are supported by about 500 civilians. The UAE customs force, estimated at 1,000 people, is regarded as one of the most efficient customs services in the Middle East and is particularly effective in curbing drug smuggling. Reporting by the U.S. State Department notes that some aspects of the UAE operations remain divided by Emirate, including the police:58 The federal Ministry of Interior oversees Police General Directorates in each of the seven emirates; however, each emirate, via its corresponding Police General Directorate, maintains its own police force and supervises the police stations therein. While all emirate police forces theoretically are branches of the ministry, in practice they operate with


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Figure 7.7 United Arab Emirates Internal Security’s Force Structure, 1990–2006 1990

2000

2005

2006

Manpower

*

?

?

?

10,000

Coast Guard

35

38

68

68

Camcraft 77 ft

5

5

5

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Camcraft 65 ft

16

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Baglietto GC 23 Type

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Baglieto 59 ft

0

3

3

3

Watercraft 45 ft

8

8

8

8

Assault Boat 9.5 m

0

0

30

30

* All ‘‘?’’ refer to weapons that the United Arab Emirates is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in its possession are unknown. Source: ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: United Arab Emirates,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—Gulf States, October 21, 2005; ‘‘Navy: United Arab Emirates,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—Gulf States, October 21, 2005.

considerable autonomy. Police stations take complaints from the public, make arrests, and forward all cases to the public prosecutor. These cases are then transferred to the courts. All cases are filed with the Ministry of Interior. While reported incidents of police corruption are uncommon, the ministry intervened several times in criminal cases to keep local police actions in harmony with federal law and policy. The government has taken measures to upgrade police capability to enforce antitrafficking standards. In May, the government created a 70-person anti-trafficking section within the Ministry of Interior, and in October Dubai Police established a special Human Trafficking section that works in conjunction with the Human Rights Care Department.’’ . . .There were reports of government corruption at the administrative level. An Abu Dhabi Police study published in February cited a problem of ‘‘rampant’’ bribery, nepotism, embezzlement, and abuse of power throughout local administrations. Subsequently, special anti-corruption sections were established to investigate and prosecute violators. In December the Penal Code was amended to increase penalties for corruption-related offenses, including mandatory prison time (minimum of one year) for any government official accepting a bribe, up to five years for attempting to bribe an official, and various prison terms for embezzlement. These measures were taken by government officials in response to the problem of corruption.

The administration of civil and security law is also divided and can be slow and present human rights problems:59 The constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, its decisions are subject to review by the political leadership. The judiciary, composed largely of contracted foreign nationals potentially subject to deportation, was not generally considered independent.. . .

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There is a dual court system. Shari’a (Islamic law) courts adjudicate criminal and family law matters based on each emirate’s interpretation of Islamic law; civil courts adjudicate civil law matters. Civil courts generally are part of the federal system, except in the Dubai and Ras alKhaimah emirates, and are accountable to the Federal Supreme Court, which has the power of judicial review as well as original jurisdiction in disputes between emirates or between the federal government and individual emirates. The emirates of Dubai and Ras al-Khaimah have their own local and appellate courts, which have jurisdiction over matters within their territories that the constitution and federal legislation do not specifically reserve for the federal system. The emirates of Dubai and Ras al-Khaimah do not refer cases in their courts to the Federal Supreme Court for judicial review, although they maintain a liaison with the federal Ministry of Justice, Islamic Affairs, and Endowments. Each emirate administers Shari’a courts. In some emirates, these courts consider all types of civil and commercial cases as well as criminal cases and family matters. They act in accordance with their interpretation of Islamic law, but also are required to answer to the Federal Supreme Court, with the exception of the emirates of Dubai and Ras alKhaimah. In criminal cases, Shari’a is applied first and, if evidence required by Shari’a is found insufficient, the Penal Code is used. Dubai has a special Shi’a council to act on matters pertaining to Shi’a family law. . . .Trials can last more than a year, depending on the seriousness of the charges, number of witnesses, and availability of judges. In Abu Dhabi Emirate, review of criminal cases by the local ruler’s court, or diwan, as well as an extralegal requirement that the diwan approve the release of every prisoner whose sentence has been completed, resulted in bureaucratic delays in processing or releasing prisoners, and some prisoners served time beyond their original sentences. Approximately 50 percent of federal judges were noncitizen Arabs, whose mandates were subject to periodic renewal by the government. In contrast, judicial positions held by citizens are permanent and are subject to termination only for specific reasons set out in the Judicial Authority law. The percentage of citizens serving as public prosecutors ...

The United Arab Emirates has spent money on improving its mine-breaching capabilities, motivated in part by a desire to improve border control and antiterrorism capabilities. The recent purchases are listed in the army section of this chapter, but these moves are ultimately connected to the need to buttress the country’s capacity to defend its borders more effectively. There is a police special unit trained in counterterrorism based at Abu Dhabi Airport, and there is also a 50-men strong SWAT-type police force in Dubai, specializing in counterterrorism and having received British and American training. Although the United Arab Emirates has not faced a significant indigenous terrorist threat, it seems unlikely that these forces would be sufficient to counter any decision by terrorists to focus their attention on the United Arab Emirates. The Border and Coast Guard Directorate (BCGD) has its headquarters in Abu Dhabi; its role is in search and rescue and curbing illegal immigration and smuggling of arms and drugs. It monitors about 30 fishing ports and is responsible


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for dealing with oil spills. The BCGD used to belong to the Ministry of Interior but has, since 2001, been transferred to the operational authority of the UAE Armed Forces Command. There are no reliable estimates on its size, though the UAE government announced a $144-million contract for the supply of M3SR software radios for Coast Guard vessels along with some M3TR tactical radios in order to achieve interoperability with land forces.60 Figure 7.7 shows the evolution of the Coast Guard force structure. The main change since 1990 has been the acquisition of 3 Baglieto 59-foot coastal patrol craft and the purchase of 30 Assault 9.5-m boats which are being delivered starting in 2003. The detailed structure of the UAE intelligence apparatus is largely unknown. The United Arab Emirates has reasonably effective security forces, but they tend to operate on the basis that extremist elements and possible threats with foreign ties come under tight surveillance and control only if they directly threaten internal UAE security. It is more tolerant of groups that potentially threaten other Gulf states. Control of the drug trade, money laundering, and the transfer of military equipment and dual-use items to third parties is sometimes lax. Trafficking in human beings remains a serious issue. THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES’ CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES The chief strategic challenge for the United Arab Emirates comes from Iran’s regional ambitions and from the persistence of terrorism in the region, even though the United Arab Emirates itself does not yet have a significant terrorism problem with Islamist extremists or foreign workers. The strategic predicament that emerges from this nexus is complicated by the weakening of the GCC, the insurgency in Iraq, and the future of Iran’s nuclear weapons. At the same time, UAE territorial revisionism, directed against Saudi Arabia, may complicate regional relations or, worse, lead to serious tensions within the GCC. The United Arab Emirates also faces two major internal challenges. One is the country’s fast-paced development—‘‘its futuristic tourism developments, proliferating skyscrapers and liberal use of superlatives to market each project.’’61 This economic growth may be encouraging, but it may also preface an economic slowdown. The second challenge is demographic, emerging largely from the excessive reliance on expatriate labor. Political Uncertainty Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi, founder of the United Arab Emirates, died on November 2, 2004, and was succeeded by his son Khalifah. While the transition has been smooth, it is still unclear if Khalifah has the ability to keep the AlNahayan family together without losing the support of the other six families ruling

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the Emirates. Zayed left behind 19 sons from many wives, and the competition for power among them might threaten the stability of Abu Dhabi, the largest Emirate, as well as the union. Some experts have argued that Khalifah lacks the leadership skills of his father and that he will be overshadowed by his younger half-brother, Mohammad, whom his father named as Deputy Crown Prince in 2003.62 Mohammad bin Zayed is also the Chief of Staff of the UAE Armed Forces and competes in this area with the Emir of Dubai, Mohammad bin Rashed Al-Maktoom, who acceded to this position after the ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Maktum bin Rashid al Malkum, died in January 2006. While the friction had been kept civil during Zayed’s life, it is unclear whether this will remain so in the future. Other analysts believe that Khalifah is ‘‘far more than a figurehead ruler for his crown prince.’’63 Although Khalifah lacks the charisma of Zayed, his rise to power had the backing of important constituencies in the United Arab Emirates. During his time in power, Khalifah has tried to ‘‘install a number of safety checks on the power of [Mohammad bin Zayed].’’64 Hard as it may be to ascertain with any precision the internal dynamic in the echelons of power of the United Arab Emirates, it is clear that a power struggle is not beyond the realm of possibility. Another incident that highlighted the competition within and among the families was the June 2003 replacement of Crown Prince Khalid of Ras Al-Khaimah, who opposed the U.S.–led War in Iraq, with Khalid’s younger half-brother Shaykh Saud. Supporters of Crown Prince Khalid took to the streets, and the situation was brought under control only after the government in Abu Dhabi sent armored vehicles to Ras Al-Khaimah.65 Iran and the United Arab Emirates At the core of Iran-UAE relations lies a territorial dispute over three islands on the Persian Gulf, Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, which are controlled by Iran but claimed by the United Arab Emirates. The dispute dates back to 1971, when Iran took over the islands. The United Arab Emirates has tried to resolve this issue either by holding bilateral talks with Iran or by submitting the dispute to international arbitration, but Iran has rejected both possibilities. The strategic importance of the islands rests with their location near the Strait of Hormuz, a vital shipping lane for world trade through which 17.4 million barrels of oil pass every day.66 Despite their significance, the islands remain little militarized; following the revelation of satellite images of the Abu Musa island, Jane’s concluded in March 2000 that ‘‘the most remarkable aspect about Abu Musa is its lack of major military infrastructure and fortification, despite the fact that it has been under Iranian occupation for 29 years.’’67 This has not prevented the United Arab Emirates from building its military capability vis-a`-vis Iran on the issue of the three islands: ‘‘The UAE has been upgrading its naval forces for some years, building up the UAE Naval Forces from a coastal defence force to one with blue-water capabilities and reach.’’68 The United Arab


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Emirates is also ‘‘expanding its amphibious naval force, although it is unlikely to be in a position to challenge Iran militarily for several years until its procurement cycle has been completed.’’69 Iran’s nuclear program is another source of friction. On one level, there is concern that the fallout from an accident at the Bushehr nuclear reactor would have grave repercussions for the region. Rashid Abdullah, the UAE Foreign Minister, has said that the United Arab Emirates and the other Gulf States are alarmed by Iran’s nuclear program because Iran does not have enough experience to deal with a nuclear emergency.70 These fears notwithstanding, it is Iran’s strategic ambitions that most worry regional leaders. Iran’s new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has attracted plenty of international attention by calling for the destruction of Israel and by pursuing Iran’s nuclear program more openly and aggressively. The region’s leaders fear that Iran may act as a destabilizing force either by prompting an arms and even nuclear race or by energizing Shi’ite populations in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, or Bahrain. This increased anxiety about Iran’s ambitions is reflected in the regional efforts to contain it. As theNew York Times reported, ‘‘Saudi officials and other Gulf state leaders have called for Iran to abandon its nuclear research, without demanding that Israel disarm first. Separating those two demands is a major policy change, and many experts see the shift as a sign that Iran’s Arab neighbors may even back United Nations sanctions against Iran.’’71 The GCC, however, continues to call for a Middle East WMD-free zone that includes Israel. There is no doubt that as the United Arab Emirates configures its strategic dogma and selects the appropriate force posture for its needs, the fear of Iran will loom largely in the minds of its leaders.

The GCC and the United Arab Emirates As is the case with the other southern Gulf States, there are two countervailing trends toward security cooperation and the Gulf Cooperation Council: one toward cooperation, the other toward discord. The former emerges from the perception of a common enemy in Iran; the latter reflects the deteriorating relations between Saudi Arabia and its allies in the Gulf. The strategic challenge for the United Arab Emirates is to ensure that the GCC remains a force multiplier while, at the same time, preventing intra-alliance problems from degenerating into confrontation or conflict. The centripetal dynamic for the GCC is the idea that Iran forms a common threat to the region—a threat that is best confronted in unison. The formation of a missile defense system is the most obvious way in which the GCC can deal collectively with Iran, given Iran’s Shahab-3 intermediate range ballistic missiles that could be deployed against Gulf countries. The United States has encouraged and the United Arab Emirates has supported the creation of a missile defense system, though little has come of it yet.72

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Despite this rationale for unity, however, there remain strong centrifugal forces that push the GCC countries apart from one another. Oman and Qatar, for example, maintain closer ties to Tehran than does the rest of the GCC; it was pressure from these two countries that diluted a strongly worded communique´ against Iran’s nuclear program at the GCC summit meeting at the end of 2005.73 The GCC is dismantling its joint military unit, Dira Al-Jazeera or Peninsula Shield, 20 years after it was created. The force has never been as effective as the GCC had hoped; the decision to disband it also reflects a widening rift between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, a growing U.S. presence in the region, and the preference of member states to switch the emphasis to economic development, internal security, and bolstering their indigenous militaries. Although the fear of Iran may bring the GCC countries together, the trajectory so far does not bode well for increased or deepened cooperation among the six GCC states. Relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar have worsened because of ‘‘the alleged anti-Riyadh stance of the Qatari Al-Jazeera TV channel, the growing Qatari role as a US ally, the expulsion of thousands of Qatari tribesmen of Saudi origin over the past two years [from Qatar] and Qatar’s growing anger at Saudi Arabia’s hegemony and domination in the GCC.’’74 The proliferation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) between GCC countries and the United States is another concern, particularly for Saudi Arabia. The United States has an FTA with Bahrain and is negotiating with the other GCC members. In addition, the talks with the United Arab Emirates have reached such an advanced stage that a signature is expected soon. In 2001, the GCC signed an Economic Agreement, which stated that ‘‘no member states may grant to a non-member state any preferential treatment exceeding that granted herein to member states, nor conclude any agreement that violated provisions of this agreement.’’75 FTAs contradict the spirit of this agreement. The Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud Al Faisal, said it was ‘‘alarming’’ that GCC countries would enter into FTAs since they ‘‘diminish the collective power and weaken not only the solidarity of the GCC as a whole, but also each of its members.’’76 The most evident example of the deteriorating GCC relations is in the military field, where ‘‘pledges to create a fully integrated GCC-wide early-warning system and command-and-control centre have proved to be rather empty, despite a longdelayed joint defence pact agreed in Bahrain in December 2000.’’77 In late 2005, the GCC decided to abolish its joint military unit.78 Territorial Dispute with Saudi Arabia The United Arab Emirates has recently raised long-standing border issues against Saudi Arabia. The issue revolves around a border settlement that dates back to 1974, when an opaque agreement settled a border dispute between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The agreement settled a dispute over a 25-kilometer


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strip of land that connected the United Arab Emirates to Qatar, as well as the ownership of the Shaybah oil field.With the passing of Sheikh Zayed of the United Arab Emirates, who believed it would be dishonorable to revisit the 1974 agreement,79 the UAE leaders have become increasingly assertive over this issue, signaling their intent to address this topic anew. A map published in the 2006 edition of the official UAE Yearbook ‘‘shows the UAE extending westward as far as Qatar, across territory currently controlled by Saudi Arabia.’’80 This development comes amid the growing rift between Saudi Arabia and Qatar mentioned above. The fear that closer ties between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates may undermine Saudi Arabia’s strategic preeminence in the GCC is widespread. The Dolphin Project, which seeks to connect Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman in a natural gas grid, is another example where closer ties between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates may be made at the expense of Saudi Arabia. This territorial revisionism, which would bring the UAE borders up to Qatar’s, could form the cornerstone for a closer association between the two countries and take Saudi influence out of the picture. The potential for conflict should not be overstated. Both countries have an interest in resolving the dispute amicably. As a former UAE diplomat put it, ‘‘while such statements [that the 1974 treaty is no longer in force] were strong, I do not think this means the two countries are bracing for war.’’81 After all, Saudi Arabia’s border deal with Kuwait over the Neutral Zone between the two countries, which also provided for joint exploitation of the oil in the area, is an encouraging precedent. All the same, the United Arab Emirates has focused during 2005 on boosting its antimine warfare land forces with purchases or upgrades of vehicles that have mine-breaching capabilities. Although this amounts to little more than speculation about the connection between the border issue and this force posture choice, it should be noted that the one country in the region with a reservoir of land mines is Saudi Arabia.82 Economic Challenges The United Arab Emirates has made some efforts to diversify its economy away from oil, driven in part by low reserves in all the Emirates except Abu Dhabi. As the Financial Times put it, ‘‘In four decades [Dubai] has gone from being a pearl fishing and trading outpost to a regional centre for commerce, transport, tourism—and increasingly finance.’’83 This fast-paced economic development, centering upon Dubai and fueled by oil revenues in the Emirates and around the Middle East, has allowed the United Arab Emirates to reposition itself as a ‘‘modern’’ country in the region. The United Arab Emirates has benefited greatly from the recent boom in oil prices and revenues. Much of the oil wealth that has come to the region has found its way to the United Arab Emirates. From 2003 to 2005, the Abu Dhabi stock market increased 77 percent, and the Dubai stock market 123 percent. Although this influx has enriched many people and has helped avoid some of the spending excesses that

314


accompanied previous windfalls, there is still cause for concern. This concern emerges, on the one hand, from the unsustainability of this financial boom and, on the other, from the political repercussions that will accompany a stock market slowdown or crash. The speedy increase in stock market indices is the initial indicator that a financial bubble may be brewing. And a closer look at the numbers confirms this intuitive hypothesis. The price-earning ratio for the Dubai stock market is 47 (in contrast, it is about 20 for the Dow Jones). This means that stocks are greatly overvalued against the price that their earnings would normally justify. The Abu Dhabi stock market capitalization makes up 38 percent of the UAE GDP, and the Dubai stock market makes up 18 percent. This figure may not seem excessive, but the former lists 35 companies and the latter 18. That so few companies would constitute such a percentage of GDP is more evidence to suggest that the index is driven by excess liquidity rather than by an underlying improvement in commercial and financial fundamentals. The political consequences of any drastic crash could be severe. The desire to buy stock has spread widely, and more people own stock, both in the United Arab Emirates and in other Gulf countries, than ever before. The consequence of this dispersal is that a stock market crash will translate into a wealth loss for a great number of people. It also means that the various policy efforts that could be mustered to cool down the market might prove politically difficult to implement. Demographic Challenges Another key challenge is the UAE dependence on so many foreigners. As has been discussed earlier, the United Arab Emirates has a population of 2.5 million, 60 to 80 percent of which are estimated to be non-nationals.84 The influx of foreign labor has caused the population of the United Arab Emirates to triple since 1970, and now the country boasts the second largest expatriate population in the GCC after Saudi Arabia. The population growth rate between 1970 and 1980 was estimated at 343 percent; by 2005 it was 38 percent, and by 2050 it will decline to 10 percent. These estimates are conservative, but they underscore the country’s demographic dynamics.85 The CIAWorld Factbook estimates that 25.3 percent of the population is in the 0–14 years age bracket, 71.1 percent between 15 and 64, and 3.6 percent is 65 and over. The median age is expected to increase from 29 in 2005 to 40 in 2050. 86 The sex ratio is 1.05 males/females at birth, and at 1.44 male/females for the entire population.87 There are various nationalities that find their way to the United Arab Emirates, but most come from South Asia, and a smaller percentage from East Asia and the Greater Middle East region. The CIA World Factbook estimates are largely outdated (1982 numbers) when it comes to the composition of the UAE population. Estimates by Andrzej Kapiszweski suggest that there are about 1 million Indians in the United Arab Emirates, 450,000 Pakistanis, 160,000 Sri Lankans, 135,000


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Egyptians, 120,000 Filipinos, 110,000 Jordanians and Palestinians, 100,000 Bangladeshis, and smaller amounts of Iranians and Yemenis.88 The implications for internal stability are many. A diverse population is hard to manage, and the consequences of an economic downturn may be more severe in the absence of a national bond among the various ethnicities that make up the United Arab Emirates. The efforts to ‘‘naturalize’’ have been less than successful—a reality that does not bode well for the future. In the military sphere, the fact that 30 percent of the total active military personnel is expatriate underlines both the management challenge of integrating this diverse force as much as it underscores the probability that in the event of a war, the cohesion and unity of the military might turn out to be less than stellar.

Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars

Praeger Security International Advisory Board Board Cochairs Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia (U.S.A.) Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Advisory Board, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews (U.K.) Members Eliot A. Cohen, Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies and Director, Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University (U.S.A.) Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.A.) The´re`se Delpech, Director of Strategic Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission, and Senior Research Fellow, CERI (Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques), Paris (France) Sir Michael Howard, former Professor of History of War, Oxford University, and Professor of Military and Naval History, Yale University (U.K.) Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, Department of the Army (U.S.A.) Paul M. Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director, International Security Studies, Yale University (U.S.A.) Robert J. O’Neill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, Oxford University (Australia) Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland (U.S.A.) Jusuf Wanandi, co-founder and member, Board of Trustees, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Indonesia) Fareed Zakaria, Editor, Newsweek International (U.S.A.)

Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars Volume 2

Anthony H. Cordesman Khalid R. Al-Rodhan

Published in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.

Praeger Security International Westport, Connecticut • London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Cordesman, Anthony H. Gulf military forces in an era of asymmetric wars / Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0–275–99250–0 (set : alk. paper) — ISBN 0–275–99399–X (vol 1 : alk. paper) — ISBN 0–275–99400–7 (vol 2 : alk. paper) 1. Middle East—Armed Forces. 2. Asymmetric warfare—Middle East. 3. National security—Persian Gulf States. 4. Persian Gulf States—Military relations. 5. Armed Forces. 6. Balance of power. 7. Military readiness. I. Al-Rodhan, Khalid R. II. Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C.) III. Title. UA832.C67028 2007 355’.0330536—dc22 2006031049 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2007 by Center for Strategic and International Studies All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2006031049 ISBN: 0–275–99250–0 (set) 0–275–99399–X (vol. 1) 0–275–99400–7 (vol. 2) First published in 2007 Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

FIGURES

xvii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

xxi

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: THE NEW BALANCING ACT IN THE GULF KEY FACTORS CHANGING GULF SECURITY DYNAMICS THE ENDURING DYNAMICS OF GULF (IN)SECURITY A Southern Gulf Divided against Itself The Self-Destructive North The Destabilizing Outside Stabilizers A FUTURE OF DISCORD AND DEPENDENCE? A Hollow Gulf Cooperation Council and De Facto Reliance on the ‘‘Fifth Corner’’ Islamic Extremism, Terrorism, and Insurgency The Iranian Problem Iraq as a Power Vacuum Yemen at the Margins Squaring the Fifth Corner? SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOUTHERN GULF Going Hollow at Great Cost The Key Factors Shaping Southern Gulf Forces Key Issues in Force Development MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTHERN GULF ‘‘SNAPSHOTS’’ OF COMPARATIVE FORCE STRENGTH Broad Trends Affecting the Balance

1 2 4 4 5 8 10 11 11 12 12 12 13 13 14 14 18 23 24 24

vi

CONTENTS

Trends Affecting Military Manpower Trends Affecting Land Forces Trends Affecting Air and Air Defense Forces Trends Affecting Naval Forces ADAPTING TO THE CHANGING NATURE OF MILITARY POWER Force Quality over Force Quantity: The Revolution in Military Affairs The Vulnerabilities of Less Advanced Powers The Threat of Asymmetric Warfare and Nonstate Actors The Vulnerability of Conventional Military Power Nonstate Actors as a Transnational Threat

25 26 29 31 32 34 48 56 61 63

CHAPTER 2: BAHRAIN MILITARY SPENDING AND ARMS IMPORTS MILITARY MANPOWER THE BAHRAINI ARMY Armor and Antiarmor Weapons Artillery Antiaircraft Weapons Overall Assessment THE BAHRAINI AIR FORCE Combat Air Strength Other Helicopters and Transport Aircraft Overall Assessment THE BAHRAINI NAVY Surface Combat Forces Overall Assessment PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE FORCES Main Security and Paramilitary Forces Overall Assessment BAHRAIN’S CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES Socioeconomic Challenges Relations with Neighboring States Political Unrest Bahrain’s Struggle against Terrorism Ongoing Internal Stability Balancing Internal Security and Conventional Military Needs

65 68 68 71 71 72 72 73 73 73 75 75 75 76 77 77 78 80 80 80 81 83 83 84 86

CHAPTER 3: KUWAIT MILITARY SPENDING AND ARMS IMPORTS MILITARY MANPOWER THE KUWAITI ARMY Force Structure Armor and Antiarmor Weapons Artillery

87 89 91 92 92 94 95

CONTENTS

Overall Assessment THE KUWAITI AIR FORCE Combat Air Strength Helicopters and Transport Aircraft Overall Assessment THE KUWAITI AIR DEFENSE Major Air Defense Missiles Other Air Defense Systems Overall Assessment THE KUWAITI NAVY Surface Combat Forces Amphibious and Support Boats Coast Guard Overall Assessment PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE FORCES Main Security and Paramilitary Forces Kuwait’s Struggle against Terrorism KUWAIT ’S CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES Political Challenges Socioeconomic Challenges Relations with Neighboring States CHAPTER 4: OMAN OMAN’S EMERGENCE AS A STRATEGIC PLAYER IN THE GULF Internal Politics and Stability Economic Reform, Diversification, and Stability MILITARY SPENDING AND ARMS IMPORTS MILITARY MANPOWER THE OMANI ARMY Force Organization Armor and Antiarmor Weapons Artillery Antiaircraft Weapons Overall Assessment OMANI AIR FORCE Combat Air Strength Helicopters and Transport Aircraft Overall Assessment THE OMANI NAVY Surface Combat Forces Amphibious Forces Overall Assessment OMAN ROYAL GUARDS FORCES OMANI PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

vii 96 96 98 98 98 99 99 100 100 100 101 102 102 103 103 103 106 110 111 113 116 119 121 122 123 124 125 126 126 126 129 129 129 130 130 130 130 132 132 132 133 134 134

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CONTENTS

Trends in Force Structure Main Security and Paramilitary Forces Oman’s Struggle against Terrorism Political Uncertainty OMAN’S CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES Economic Challenges and Diversification Oil and Stability The ‘‘Demographic Time Bomb’’ Relations with Neighboring States Ongoing Internal Stability Balancing Internal Security and Conventional Military Needs

136 136 138 139 139 139 140 141 141 142 143

CHAPTER 5: QATAR MILITARY SPENDING AND ARMS IMPORTS MILITARY MANPOWER THE QATARI ARMY THE QATARI AIR FORCE QATAR AIR DEFENSE THE QATARI NAVY PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES Qatar, the GCC, and the Broader Middle East Qatar, Iran, and the North Field Qatar’s Uncertain Domestic Environment Qatar and Terrorism The Youth Explosion and the Radicalization of Qatar’s Youth

145 146 147 148 150 152 152 154 154 155 155 156 157 159

CHAPTER 6: SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI STRATEGIC DYNAMICS THE SAUDI NATIONAL SECURITY APPARATUS The Search for Jointness Slow Improvement in Jointness in the Regular Services Establishing Broader Jointness for Counterterrorism The Importance of Consensus and Consultation The Role of the Saudi National Security Council SAUDI MILITARY AND SECURITY SPENDING Finding the Proper Level of Expenditure SAUDI ARMS IMPORTS The Impact of the Gulf War Arms Imports since the Late 1990s MANPOWER THE SAUDI ARMY Force Strength and Structure Saudi Armored Forces

163 165 168 168 169 170 171 173 173 174 176 178 179 181 181 184 185

CONTENTS

Saudi Antitank Weapons Saudi Artillery Saudi Light and Medium Air Defense Weapons Saudi Army Aviation Facilities and Infrastructure Overall Capabilities THE SAUDI NATIONAL GUARD Strength and Organization Major Combat Equipment Modernization and New Mission Requirements Overall Capabilities THE SAUDI NAVY Strength and Organization Main Surface Combatants Smaller Combat Ships, Mine Warfare, and Support Forces Submarines? Marine and Amphibious Forces Naval Aviation Saudi Border Guard Roles, Missions, and Capability THE SAUDI AIR FORCE Strength and Structure Combat Aircraft Possible Upgrades to RSAF Combat Aircraft Upgrading the RSAF Tornados? Purchasing the Rafael? The Eurofighter Typhoon Reconnaissance and Early Warning Training Aircraft Refueling, Transport, and Support Munitions and Spares Support, Training, Logistics, and Sustainment Overall Capabilities SAUDI LAND-BASED AIR DEFENSES The Saudi Air Defense Force The Patriot and the I-Hawk Other Land-Based Air Defenses Overall Capabilities SAUDI MISSILE FORCES AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SAUDI WMD Modernizing the CSS-2 What Comes Next? NBC Defense Capabilities SAUDI PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES Saudi Arabia’s Main Internal Security Forces

ix 187 188 188 189 191 193 194 195 197 197 198 199 199 199 202 203 203 203 204 205 206 207 207 211 212 213 213 214 215 215 216 216 216 217 218 219 220 220 221 222 225 227 227 228

x

CONTENTS

The Pivotal Role of the Ministry of Interior The Police and Security Services General Security Service The General Intelligence Presidency The Changing Role of the GIP Changes in the GIP Leadership The Future Role and Capabilities of the GIP Border and Coastal Security The Role of the Border Guard The Option of a Border Surveillance and Defense System Saudi Border Guard Development Program The Expanding Mission of the Border Guard Security and the Role of the Judicial System The Judicial System and Internal Security The ‘‘Mutawwa’in’’ or Religious Police An Effective Internal Security Force? SAUDI ARABIA’S CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES Terrorism and Counterterrorism Saudi Internal Security before 9/11 Saudi Response to 9/11 The Impact of May 2003 Saudi Counterterrorism Efforts since May 2003 Al Qa’ida in Saudi Arabia Saudi Petroleum Security Apparatus Asymmetric Threat to Energy Security Assessing the Saudi Security Forces’ Performance at Abqaiq The Uncertain Future of Iraq Iraq as a Conventional Military Threat to Its Neighbors? The Creation of a ‘‘Shi’ite Block’’ in the Gulf? Saudi Views on Iran’s Role in Iraq’s Internal Affairs Regional Insurgency: The Potential Spillover Effect The Threat from Foreign Fighters The Threat of a Fragmented Iraq? The Threat from Iran Key Iranian Threat Saudi Reaction to Iran’s Nuclear Program Collective Security and Relations with the GCC Counterterrorism Cooperation Military Cooperation Socioeconomic Challenges Economic Reforms Addressing the Demographic Pressures and Unemployment Prospects for Saudi Stability

228 230 233 233 234 235 235 236 236 238 238 239 240 240 241 242 243 247 248 249 251 251 253 254 255 256 259 260 261 263 265 265 267 269 270 271 272 273 275 275 276 278 281

CONTENTS

xi

CHAPTER 7: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES COMMAND STRUCTURE OF ARMED FORCES MILITARY SPENDING MILITARY MANPOWER THE UAE ARMY Force Structure Armor Antiarmor Artillery Air Defense Holdings Other Recent Developments and Acquisitions Overall Assessment THE UAE AIR FORCE Fixed-Wing Air Strength Helicopters Uncertain Strength and Capabilities Recent Developments and Acquisitions Summary Assessment UAE LAND-BASED AIR DEFENSE The Pantsir-SIE Ballistic and Cruise Missile Defense The Façade of Integration Summary Assessment THE UAE NAVY Ship Strength Naval Aviation Naval Modernization Summary Assessment PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES’ CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES Political Uncertainty Iran and the United Arab Emirates The GCC and the United Arab Emirates Territorial Dispute with Saudi Arabia Economic Challenges Demographic Challenges

283 285 285 287 287 290 290 291 291 292 293 293 294 294 294 297 298 299 300 301 301 301 302 302 302 304 304 306 306 309 309 310 311 312 313 314

CHAPTER 8: IRAN IRAN’S CHANGING ROLE IN REGIONAL SECURITY MILITARY SPENDING AND ARMS IMPORTS MILITARY MANPOWER THE IRANIAN ARMY Iranian Tank Strength Other Iranian Armor

317 317 320 322 322 323 329

xii

CONTENTS

Iranian Antiarmor Weapons Iranian Artillery Strength Iranian Army Air Defense Systems Iranian Army Aviation Iranian Army’s Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) Other Aspects of Iranian Army Capability THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CORPS (PASDARAN) IRGC Land Forces The IRGC Air Force The IRGC Naval Forces Proxy and Covert CBRN Operations The Quds (Qods) Forces Role in Iran’s Industries The Basij and Other Paramilitary Forces THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE Iranian Air Strength Iranian Aircraft Development Iranian Air Force Readiness and Effectiveness Iranian Land-Based Air Defense THE IRANIAN NAVY Iranian Antiship Missiles and Missile Craft Iranian Mine Warfare Capabilities Iranian Amphibious Assets Iranian Naval Air Iran’s Submarine Forces The Role of the Naval Branch of the IRGC Naval Force Deployments Overall Naval Capabilities IRAN’S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) PROGRAM Chemical Weapons Official Estimates of Iranian Capability Arms Control Estimates of Iranian Capability NGO Estimates of Iranian Capability Biological Weapons Possible Early Indicators That Iran Might Have a BW Program The Uncertain Nature of Iran’s BW Program Since the Mid-1990s Continuing Alarms and Excursions The Possible Role of Outside Suppliers Possible CBW War-Fighting Capability Possible Nuclear Weapons Programs Problems in Analyzing Iran’s WMD Program: A Case Study Uncertainty and Credibility of Sources Key Uncertainties in Iran’s Nuclear Developments

330 331 334 335 335 335 336 336 337 337 338 338 339 340 340 343 344 345 347 350 352 355 356 356 357 359 359 360 360 361 361 363 363 364 365 366 366 367 368 371 372 374 376

CONTENTS

Plutonium Production Uranium Enrichment A Continuing Process of Discovery IRAN’S LONG-RANGE MISSILE ARSENAL Shahab-1/SCUD-B Shahab-2/SCUD-C CCS-8 or Tondar 69 Shahab-3 Missile Development Uncertain Performance Mobility and Deployment Shahab-3A/3M/3D/IRIS Shahab-4 Shahab-5 and Shahab-6 Ghadr 101 and Ghadr 110 Raduga KH-55 Granat/Kh-55/AS-15 Kent PARAMILITARY, INTERNAL SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE FORCES The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) The IRGC Intelligence Branch The Basij Resistance Force The Uncertain Role of the Ministry of Interior IRAN’S CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES Iran’s Nuclear Program and Its Strategic Consequences Economic Sanctions Military Strikes Iranian Defense against U.S. Strikes Iranian Retaliation against U.S. Strikes The Strategic Implications of a Military Strike against Iran The Future of Iraq Other Challenges CHAPTER 9: IRAQ A PATTERN OF EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL VIOLENCE IRAQ’S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE IRAQI MILITARY DEVELOPMENT Military Spending and Arms Imports Iraqi Military Manpower THE IRAQI ARMY Equipment Holdings and Issues Support Forces THE IRAQI AIR FORCE THE IRAQI NAVY PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, POLICE, AND INTELLIGENCE FORCES The Ministry of Interior as a ‘‘Threat’’

xiii 376 377 385 387 389 391 393 393 393 395 398 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 405 406 406 410 410 413 414 416 419 419 423 425 425 428 430 434 438 440 443 445 446 448 450 451

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CONTENTS

Real vs. Authorized Strength The Status of Special Security Forces Force Size and Readiness Steps toward Reform The Regular Police Increases in Police Strength The ‘‘Year of the Police’’ Ongoing Reform Equipment and Training Dealing with Divided Loyalties Facility Construction Department of Border Enforcement Coalition Border Transition Teams Border Forces Equipment and Training Uncertain Progress in Facilities Other Developments in Border Enforcement Facilities Protection Forces, Private Security Personnel, and ‘‘Ministry Armies’’ The Facilities Protection Services The Infrastructure Protection Forces and Other Non-MOD/MOI Paramilitary Elements Intelligence IRAQ’S CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES The Growing Level of Violence in Iraq The Dangers of Strategic Uncertainty Socioeconomic Challenges An Aging Energy Sector Political Conciliation vs. Civil War Insurgent Attacks Push Iraq toward More Intense Civil War The Future of the Insurgency and the Prospect of Large-Scale Civil War The ‘‘Nationalist’’ Need for Compromise The ‘‘Islamist’’ Need for Civil War The Threat from Shi’ite Death Squads and Militias Links to the Iraqi Police and Special Security Forces Questionable Loyalties The Kurdish Question Kurdish Parties and the Kurdish Militias Tensions between the Kurds and Other Iraqis Uncertain Kurdish Unity The Problem of Resources and Oil The Turkish Question Relationship with Neighboring States Creating a ‘‘Shi’ite Crescent’’?

453 454 455 456 457 458 458 459 460 461 461 462 462 463 463 464 464 464 465 467 467 467 469 472 476 479 482 484 484 485 486 487 489 492 493 493 496 497 498 498 498

CONTENTS

The Arab Gulf States Jordan Turkey Iran Syria

xv 499 499 501 502 508

CHAPTER 10: YEMEN MILITARY SPENDING AND ARMS IMPORTS MILITARY MANPOWER THE YEMENI ARMY Armor and Antiarmor Weapons Artillery Antiaircraft Weapons Ballistic Missiles and Rockets Overall Assessment THE YEMENI AIR FORCE Combat Air Strength Helicopters and Transport Aircraft Overall Assessment YEMENI AIR DEFENSE FORCES THE YEMENI NAVY Surface Combat Forces Amphibious Forces Overall Assessment PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE FORCES Main Security and Paramilitary Forces Yemen’s Struggle against Terrorism Pattern of Attacks Political Unrest YEMEN’S CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES Socioeconomic Challenges The Bab al-Mandeb Relations with Neighboring States Ongoing Internal Instability Balancing Internal Security and Conventional Military Needs

513 515 517 518 518 522 522 523 523 523 525 525 526 526 526 526 529 529 530 530 531 534 536 537 537 539 539 540 543

CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION: THE NEW BALANCING ACT IN THE GULF THE NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE SECURITY STRUCTURES MEETING THE ISLAMIST EXTREMIST CHALLENGE TAKING RESPONSIBILITY VS. CONTINUING EXERCISES IN FUTILITY

545

NOTES

551

546 548 548

Figures

FIGURE 1.1: THE IRANIAN-IRAQI ARMS RACE DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, 1981–1988 FIGURE 1.2: GULF MILITARY SPENDING, 1997–2005 FIGURE 1.3: THE GULF ARMS RACE IN ARMS IMPORTS, 1997–2004 (IN MILLIONS OF CURRENT U.S. DOLLARS) FIGURE 1.4: GULF MILITARY FORCES, 2006 FIGURE 1.5: A TRIGGER FOR MAJOR INCREASE IN MILITARY SPENDING AND ARMS TRANSFERS? THE RISE IN GULF OIL EXPORT EARNINGS, 1971–2007 FIGURE 1.6: POPULATION GROWTH IN THE GULF, 1950–2050 FIGURE 1.7: MAJOR MEASURES OF KEY COMBAT EQUIPMENT STRENGTH IN 2006 FIGURE 1.8: COMPARATIVE TRENDS IN GULF TOTAL ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER, 1979–2006 FIGURE 1.9: TOTAL ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER IN ALL GULF FORCES, 1990–2006 FIGURE 1.10: TOTAL GULF MILITARY MANPOWER BY SERVICE, 2006 FIGURE 1.11: TOTAL GULF OPERATIONAL ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES, 2006 FIGURE 1.12: TOTAL OPERATIONAL MAIN BATTLE TANKS IN ALL GULF FORCES, 1979–2006 FIGURE 1.13: MEDIUM- TO HIGH-QUALITY MAIN BATTLE TANKS BY TYPE, 2006 FIGURE 1.14: TOTAL OPERATIONAL OTHER ARMORED VEHICLES (LT. TANKS, LAVS, AIFVS, APCS, AND RECCE) IN GULF FORCES, 1990–2006 FIGURE 1.15: GULF OTHER ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES BY CATEGORY, 2006 FIGURE 1.16: ARMORED INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLES, RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLES, LAVS, AND LIGHT TANKS BY TYPE, 2006 FIGURE 1.17: ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS IN GULF ARMIES, 2006

6 15 16 19 22 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

xviii

FIGURES

FIGURE 1.18: TOTAL OPERATIONAL SELF-PROPELLED AND TOWED TUBE ARTILLERY AND MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS IN GULF FORCES, 1990–2006 FIGURE 1.19: TOTAL OPERATIONAL GULF ARTILLERY WEAPONS, 2006 FIGURE 1.20: GULF INVENTORY OF MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS BY CALIBER, 2006 FIGURE 1.21: TOTAL OPERATIONAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN ALL GULF FORCES, 1990–2006 FIGURE 1.22: TOTAL GULF HOLDINGS OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT, 2006 FIGURE 1.23: GULF HIGH- AND MEDIUM-QUALITY FIXED-WING FIGHTER, FIGHTER ATTACK, ATTACK, STRIKE, AND MULTIROLE COMBAT AIRCRAFT BY TYPE, 2006 FIGURE 1.24: GULF RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, 2006 FIGURE 1.25: SENSOR, AWACS, C4I, EW, AND ELINT AIRCRAFT, 2006 FIGURE 1.26: GULF ATTACK, ANTISHIP, AND ASW HELICOPTERS, 2006 FIGURE 1.27: GULF LAND-BASED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS, 2006 FIGURE 1.28: GULF NAVAL SHIPS BY CATEGORY, 2006 FIGURE 1.29: GULF WARSHIPS WITH ANTISHIP MISSILES, 2006 FIGURE 1.30: GULF MINE WARFARE SHIPS, 2006 FIGURE 1.31: GULF AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS, 2006 FIGURE 1.32: GULF NAVAL AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTER AIRCRAFT, 2006 MAP 2.1: BAHRAIN FIGURE 2.1: BAHRAIN’S ARMS DELIVERIES BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 2.2: BAHRAIN’S NEW ARMS AGREEMENTS BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 2.3: BAHRAINI ARMY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 2.4: BAHRAINI AIR FORCE’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 2.5: BAHRAINI NAVY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 2.6: BAHRAINI PARAMILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 2.7: BAHRAIN’S DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION, 2006 MAP 3.1: KUWAIT FIGURE 3.1: KUWAIT’S ARMS DELIVERIES BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 3.2: KUWAIT’S NEW ARMS AGREEMENTS BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 3.3: KUWAITI ARMY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 3.4: KUWAITI AIR FORCE’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 3.5: KUWAITI AIR DEFENSE’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 3.6: KUWAITI NAVY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 3.7: KUWAITI COAST GUARD: FORCE STRUCTURE FIGURE 3.8: KUWAITI PARAMILITARY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 3.9: KUWAIT’S DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION, 2006 MAP 4.1: OMAN FIGURE 4.1: OMAN’S ARMS DELIVERIES BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 4.2: OMAN’S NEW ARMS AGREEMENTS BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 4.3: OMANI ARMY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 4.4: OMANI AIR FORCE’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 4.5: OMANI NAVY’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006

37 38 39 40 41 42

43 44 45 46 48 49 50 51 52 66 69 69 70 74 76 78 82 88 90 91 93 97 99 101 102 104 114 120 124 125 127 131 133

FIGURES

xix

FIGURE 4.6: OMANI ROYAL GUARD’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 4.7: OMANI ROYAL YACHT SQUADRON’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 4.8: OMANI ROYAL FLIGHT ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 4.9: OMANI PARAMILITARY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 4.10: OMAN’S DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION, 2006 MAP 5.1: QATAR FIGURE 5.1: QATARI ARMY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 5.2: QATARI AIR FORCE’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 5.3: QATARI AIR DEFENSE’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 5.4: QATARI NAVY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 5.5: QATAR’S DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION, 2006 MAP 6.1: SAUDI ARABIA FIGURE 6.1: SAUDI ARABIA’S ARMS DELIVERIES BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 6.2: SAUDI ARABIA’S NEW ARMS AGREEMENTS BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 6.3: SAUDI ARMY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 6.4: SAUDI NATIONAL GUARD’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 6.5: SAUDI NAVY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 6.6: SAUDI AIR FORCE’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 6.7: SAUDI AIR DEFENSE’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 6.8: THE SAUDI INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMUNITY FIGURE 6.9: SAUDI MINISTRY OF INTERIOR MANPOWER, 2006 FIGURE 6.10: BORDER GUARDS APPREHENSION OF WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES, 1995–2003 FIGURE 6.11: SAUDI ARABIAN BUDGET BALANCE, 1994–2006 FIGURE 6.12: SAUDI’S DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION, 2006 MAP 7.1: THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES FIGURE 7.1: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES’ ARMS DELIVERIES BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 7.2: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES’ NEW ARMS AGREEMENTS BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 7.3: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 7.4: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AIR FORCE’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 7.5: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AIR DEFENSE’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 7.6: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES NAVY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 7.7: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES INTERNAL SECURITY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 MAP 8.1: IRAN FIGURE 8.1: IRAN’S ARMS DELIVERIES BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 8.2: IRAN’S NEW ARMS AGREEMENTS BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 8.3: IRANIAN ARMY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE TRENDS, 1990–2006 FIGURE 8.4: IRANIAN AIR FORCE’S FORCE STRUCTURE TRENDS, 1990–2006 FIGURE 8.5: IRANIAN NAVY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE TRENDS, 1990–2006 FIGURE 8.6: ESTIMATED IRANIAN MISSILE PROFILES, 2006

135 135 136 137 141 146 149 151 152 153 160 164 177 177 182 196 200 208 218 229 231 237 277 280 284 286 287 288 295 300 303 307 318 321 321 324 341 351 388

xx

FIGURES

FIGURE 8.7: IRAN’S PARAMILITARY FORCES’ FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 MAP 9.1: IRAQ FIGURE 9.1: IRAQ BEFORE THE GULF AND IRAQ WARS VS. MID-2006 FIGURE 9.2: IRAQ’S MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FORCES’ ASSESSED CAPABILITIES FIGURE 9.3: ESTIMATED MOD FORCE CAPABILITIES BY SERVICE: COMPARISON OF JUNE 2005 AND AUGUST 2006 FIGURE 9.4: IRAQI ARMY BATTALIONS IN COMBAT: AUGUST 2004 TO AUGUST 2006 FIGURE 9.5: GROWTH IN INDEPENDENT AND COMBINED COMBAT OPERATIONS (COMPANY LEVEL AND ABOVE) FIGURE 9.6: IRAQI AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES AS OF AUGUST 2006 FIGURE 9.7: IRAQI NAVAL CAPABILITIES AS OF AUGUST 2006 FIGURE 9.8: THE MANPOWER OF IRAQ’S MINISTRY OF INTERIOR FORCES BEFORE THEIR MID-2006 REORGANIZATION FIGURE 9.9: MOI AND MOD FORCE LEVELS AS OF AUGUST 2006 FIGURE 9.10: IRAQ’S ESTIMATED MOI NATIONAL POLICE FORCE CAPABILITIES BEFORE THE SPRING 2006 REORGANIZATION FIGURE 9.11: IRAQ’S DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION, 2006 MAP 10.1: YEMEN FIGURE 10.1: YEMEN’S ARMS DELIVERIES BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 10.2: YEMEN’S NEW ARMS AGREEMENTS BY SUPPLIER, 1993–2004 FIGURE 10.3: YEMENI ARMY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE TRENDS, 1990–2006 FIGURE 10.4: YEMENI AIR FORCE’S FORCE STRUCTURE, 1990–2006 FIGURE 10.5: YEMENI AIR DEFENSE’S FORCE STRUCTURE TRENDS, 1990–2006 FIGURE 10.6: YEMENI NAVY ’S FORCE STRUCTURE TRENDS, 1990–2006 FIGURE 10.7: YEMENI PARAMILITARY’S FORCE STRUCTURE TRENDS, 1990–2006 FIGURE 10.8: YEMEN’S DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION, 2006

403 429 431 441 442 442 443 448 450 453 454 455 474 514 516 517 519 524 527 528 530 537

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to so many people who have contributed in so many ways to this book. We want to thank many regional, U.S., and European officials, who cannot be mentioned by name, for offering their time, comments, suggestions, and data to earlier versions of this book. We are also grateful to so many research assistants who have contributed to the drafting and research of this book, including William D. Sullivan, Paul S. Frederiksen, Nikos Tsafos, and William Elliott. The analysis in this book relied heavily on the work of many governmental and nongovernmental agencies, particularly the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Jane’s, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), GlobalSecurity.org, the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Defense, and many other defense and energy agencies. In addition, the analysis relied heavily on the work of many regional, military, and security experts. The analysis of the Saudi internal security forces drew heavily on the work by Dr. Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid’s work on the Saudi National Security in late 2005.

8

Iran

Iran plays a critical strategic role in the Gulf. It is the region’s most populous country with 68.7 million people. It is the one Gulf country that is not Arab, and it has a unique Persian character. It has its own Shi’ite Islamist fundamentalism at a time when Sunni neo-Salafi fundamentalism is seeking control of the Gulf and the Arab world. Its opposition to Israel and its ties to Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon give it broad importance both inside and outside the Gulf. Its strategic geography not only dominates the northern Gulf but also the shipping lines both inside and outside the Strait of Hormuz. As Map 8.1 shows, Iran’s territory extends from the Caspian Sea to the Gulf. It is the second largest country in the Gulf, and one of the largest in the Middle East, with an estimated area of 1.648 million square kilometers. It has land borders with Afghanistan (936 kilometers), Armenia (35 kilometers), Azerbaijan-proper (432 kilometers), Azerbaijan-Naxcivan enclave (179 kilometers), Iraq (1,458 kilometers), Pakistan (909 kilometers), Turkey (499 kilometers), and Turkmenistan (992 kilometers).1 Iran’s importance as a strategic player in the Gulf is compounded by the importance of its energy resources. Iran is estimated to hold 11.1 percent of the world oil reserves (132.0 billion barrels of oil) and 15.3 percent of the world’s natural gas reserves (970.8 trillion cubic feet).2 In addition, it is strategically located near the Strait of Hormuz where most of the Gulf oil passes through every day. Iran’s conventional and asymmetric military capabilities near the Strait of Hormuz make Iran all the more important to global energy security. IRAN’S CHANGING ROLE IN REGIONAL SECURITY Iran has always been a key player in regional security and has long been a destabilizing one. The Revolution that deposed the Shah in 1979 brought radical clerical leaders like Ayatollah Khomeini to power. It was followed by the seizure of American

318


Map 8.1 Iran

diplomats as hostages, and Iranian efforts to export its ‘‘Islamic Revolution’’ to other Gulf States like Bahrain and to the Islamic world. Since that time, the United States and several European nations have consistently accused Iran of supporting terrorism. This usually took the shape of supporting proxy groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad. In addition, neighboring states such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have accused Iran of supporting local Shi’ite groups that carried out attacks against Saudi and Bahraini targets, including the 1996 Al-Khobar bombing and several attacks during the 1970s. Several issues have given Iran added strategic visibility. Iran is the region’s leading Shi’ite state at a time of growing sectarian tension. While Iran’s relations with its neighboring states improved during President Mohammad Khatami’s presidency in

IRAN

319

the 1990s, they are increasingly uncertain. Iran continues to have at least one major active territorial dispute with its neighbors. The most serious is control of the three islands: the Greater Tunbs, the Lesser Tunbs, and Abu Musa. Since the withdrawal of Britain from the Gulf in the 1970s, the United Arab Emirates and Iran have argued over the ownership of the islands, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has supported the UAE position. The GCC countries have avoided confrontation, but Iran again refused the UAE offer of arbitration by the International Court of Justice in September 2006, and the risk of a future clash or conflict remains. In addition, Iran and Qatar have claimed ownership of the North field (where most of Qatar’s gas reserves are), and the issue has never been fully resolved. Iran has said it has abandoned its goal of spreading its Shi’ite power to the southern Gulf States, but this is now being quietly questioned by many strategic and defense planners in the Gulf. The election of Mahmud Ahmadinejad as Iran’s President on August 3, 2005, made a radical populist Iran’s leading civil leader. His loyalty to hard-line views, his rhetoric about the return of the hidden Imam, as well as Iran’s aggressive meddling in Iraq’s internal affairs and aid to Shi’ite militias in gaining more power have raised growing concerns among Iran’s Sunni neighbors. Leaders in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan have accused Iran of wanting to create a ‘‘Shi’ite crescent’’ that includes Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. Iran’s power and influence have also been increased by several external developments. Two of Iran’s main enemies, the Taliban regime and Saddam Hussein, have been toppled by the United States since the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. Iran no longer faces a threat from either neighbor and may acquire an ally in Iraq, where a Shi’ite majority has come to power. Hezbollah’s success in fighting Israel in the summer of 2006 has been credited in part to Iranian investment, advisory efforts, and arms transfers. This has enhanced the credibility of Iran’s ability to use nonstate actors and asymmetric warfare. The same has been true of Iran’s support of Shi’ite militias in Iraq, and support of Palestinian rejectionist movements like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. At the same time the same invasions that toppled these two regimes have led to a major U.S. military presence in both states and a much larger U.S. air and naval presence in the Gulf. This has increased U.S. and Iranian tension and Iran’s pressure on its neighbors. Iran has long used the U.S. presence in the region as a reason to condemn countries such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for their close alliance with the United States. In 2006, there were more than 130,000 U.S. troops in the countries on two of Iran’s borders. In addition, the U.S. traditional presence in the Gulf, especially in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar, has not changed. The most destabilizing issue affecting Iran’s role in regional security is proliferation. Iran’s nuclear program has been under growing scrutiny by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the EU-3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom), the United States, and most of Iran’s neighboring states. So has the fact that it is developing a family of long-range missiles like the Shahab-3. There is increasing concern that Iran is seeking long-range nuclear strike capabilities that would be a

320


destabilizing force in the region. The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the presidency of Iran compounded these concerns on August 3, 2005. His statements about the Holocaust and his rhetoric about the end of times have made Iran’s nuclear program an existential threat to Israel and most of Iran’s ‘‘one city’’ states. The other side of the story is that Iran has been more conservative in modernizing its conventional military forces. Iran has never rebuilt the level of conventional forces it had before its defeat in its war with Iraq in 1988. Iran’s conventional military readiness, effectiveness, and capabilities have declined since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, and Iran has not been able to find a meaningful way to restore its conventional edge in the region. As is discussed in detail, Iran was able to order only $2.3 billion worth of new arms agreements during 1997–2004. Saudi Arabia ordered $10.5 billion, Kuwait $3.1 billion, and the United Arab Emirates ordered $12.0 billion. Even a small nation like Oman spent $2.5 billion. This inability to modernize its conventional forces is seen by many experts as one of the reasons for Iran’s ‘‘nuclear ambitions’’ and its focus on building its asymmetric capabilities.

MILITARY SPENDING AND ARMS IMPORTS Iran has faced major problems in modernizing and financing its military forces ever since the Revolution in 1979. The United States and other Western powers ceased to sell Iran both weapons and parts and munitions for its existing weapons shortly after the Revolution. Iran built up major supplies of Chinese, Russian, and other Eastern bloc weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, but its defeat in that war in 1988 resulted in the loss of some 40 to 50 percent of its land order of battle. It has faced serious financial problems in funding its force modernization, compounded by the systematic mismanagement of its economy. These problems have been eased in recent years by major increases in its oil revenues. Iran’s oil export revenues rose from $11.2 billion in 1998, in constant 2005 U.S. dollars, to an estimated $49.2 billion in 2006.3 Even so, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates Iran’s government revenues in 2005 were only $48.82 billion vs. expenditures of $60.4 billion.4 Iran has, however, used its rising oil revenues to finance higher military spending. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Iran’s military budget has been steadily increasing over the past few years, rising from $2.3 billion in 2000, to $3.36 billion in 2003, and to $6.2 billion in 2006, which represents a 170-percent increase in Iran’s military budget since 2000.5 This has not, however, yet led to a major increase in Iran’s arms imports. Figure 8.1 shows the trend in new Iranian arms deliveries by supplier from 1993 to 2004. There has been a steady contraction in new arms deliveries from $2.6 billion during 1993– 1996, to $1.9 billion during 1997–2000, and to $0.5 billion during 2001–2004. Russia and China, Iran’s two major suppliers, have experienced sharp declines in their exports to Iran. For example, Russia’s arms exports to Iran declined from $1.3 billion during 1993–1996 to $0.1 billion during 2001–2004, while China’s

IRAN

321

Figure 8.1 Iran’s Arms Deliveries by Supplier, 1993–2004

arms deliveries to Iran declined from $0.9 billion during 1993–1996 to $0.1 billion during 2001–2004. Iran’s new arms agreements have had a more mixed trend. As shown in Figure 8.2, the combined value of new agreements over arms purchases increased from $1.2 billion between 1993 and 1996, to $1.5 billion between 1997 and 2000, and then

Figure 8.2 Iran’s New Arms Agreements by Supplier, 1993–2004

322


decreased to $0.8 billion between 2001 and 2004. Russia’s share in the total value of arms imports rose from $0.2 billion between 1993 and 1996 to $0.4 billion between 1997 and 2000, and then remained the same at $0.4 billion between 1997 and 2004. China’s new arms agreements with Iran increased from $0.4 billion during 1993– 1996 to $0.60 billion during 1997–2000, and then dropped to $0.20 billion during 2001–2004. Western European countries had no new arms agreements during 2001–2004, and the amount coming from ‘‘All Others’’ decreased from $400 million during 1997–2000 to $100 million during 2001–2004. As is discussed later, these expenditures have led to some carefully focused purchases that have increased Iran’s military capabilities in several important areas. They have not, however, been large enough to offset the steady aging of most of Iran’s military inventory, its inability to obtain parts and upgrades for much of its Westernsupplied equipment, and anything close to parity with the level of weapons and technology in U.S., British, and many other Gulf forces. Iran has tried to compensate by creating its own military industries, but such efforts have as yet had only limited impact. MILITARY MANPOWER Iran maintained active armed forces with some 545,000 men in 2006, although some 220,000 of this total are 18-month conscripts who receive limited training and have marginal military effectiveness. It also has an army reserve of some 350,000 men, although these reserves receive negligible training and Iran lacks the equipment, supplies, and leadership cadres to make effective use of such reserves without months of reorganization and training. Iran’s military manpower problems are shaped by a number of factors. Iran divided its armed forces into regular and revolutionary components following the Revolution in 1979, creating a split between the regular forces that existed under the Shah and the Revolutionary Guards installed during the rule of the Ayatollah Khomeini. This split has been reinforced by a highly compartmented or ‘‘stovepiped’’ military forces force, which have only made limited progress in joint warfare. Military training is often subject to political problems, and many large-scale exercises do more to ‘‘posture’’ to Iran’s neighbors than create effective forces. The combat-trained military personnel Iran developed during the Iran-Iraq War have virtually all left service. Iran is now a largely conscript force with limited military training and little combat experience. The deep divisions between ‘‘moderates’’ and ‘‘hard-liners’’ in Iran’s government have inevitably politicized the armed forces, which remain under the command of the supreme religious leader, the Ayatollah Khomeini. THE IRANIAN ARMY The Iranian Army is large compared to other countries in the Gulf region. It has some 350,000 men (220,000 conscripts), organized into four corps, with four

IRAN

323

armored divisions, six infantry divisions, six artillery groups, two commando divisions, an airborne division, aviation groups, and other smaller independent formations. These latter units include independent armored, infantry, and commando brigades. See Figure 8.3. In practice, each Iranian division has a somewhat different organization. For example, only one Iranian division (the 92nd) is well enough equipped to be considered a true armored division and two of the armored divisions are notably larger than the others. Two of the infantry divisions (28th and 84th) are more heavily mechanized than the others.6 The lighter and smaller formations in the regular army include the 23rd Special Forces Division, which was formed in 1993–1994, and the 55th paratroop division. According to one source, the 23rd Special Forces Division has 5,000 full-time regulars and is one of the most professional units in the Iranian Army. The airborne division and the Special Forces are trained at a facility in Shiraz.7 The regular army also has a number of independent brigades and groups. These include some small armored units, one infantry brigade, one airborne and two to three Special Forces brigades, coastal defense units, a growing number of air defense groups, five artillery brigades/regiments, four to six army aviation units, and a growing number of logistic and supply formations. The land forces have six major garrisons and 13 major casernes. There is a military academy at Tehran, and a signal-training center in Shiraz.8 Iranian Tank Strength Iran has steadily rebuilt its armored strength since the Iran-Iraq War, although its forces are still significantly smaller than under the Shah. It had some 1,613 main battle tanks in 2006, and the number has risen steadily in recent years. Iran had a total of 1,145 in 2000, 1,565 in 2003, and 1,613 in 2006. The IISS estimates that Iran’s inventory of main battle tanks now includes some 168 M-47/M-48s and 150 M-60A1s, 100 Chieftain Mark 3/5s, 540 T-54/T-55s/Type-59s, 75 T-62s, 480 T-72/T-72Ss, and 100 Zulfiqars. Its T-72 strength has increased from its level in the 1990s to it current strength of 480. (Other estimates indicate that Iran may have as many as 300 Type 59s and/or 150–250 Type-69IIs.) Only 480–580 of Iran’s main battle tanks can be described as ‘‘modern’’ by common standards. Iran has some 865 other armored fighting vehicles, 550–640 armored personnel carriers (APCs), 2,010 towed artillery weapons, 310 self-propelled artillery weapons, more than 870 multiple rocket launchers, some 1,700 air defense guns and large numbers of light antiaircraft (AA) missiles, large numbers of antitank weapons and guided missiles, and some 50 attack helicopters. This is a large inventory of major weapons, although many are worn and obsolete. Only part of Iran’s tank inventory is operational. It is uncertain how many of Iran’s Chieftains and M-47/M-48s are operational, since the total number of Chieftains includes the remainder of 187 improved FV4030/1 versions of the Mark 5 Chieftain that were delivered to the country before the fall of the Shah. Smaller problems seem

324


Figure 8.3 Iranian Army’s Force Structure Trends, 1990–2006 1990

2000

2005

2006

305,000

350,000

350,000

350,000

Active

305,000

350,000

350,000

350,000

Conscripts

250,000

220,000

220,000

220,000

52

26–28

26–28

28–29

Army Headquarters

3

4

4

4

Armored Division

0

4

4

4

Mechanized Division

4

0

0

0

Infantry Division

6

6

6

6

Airborne Division

1

1

1

1

Special Operations Division

1

1

1

1

Commando Division

0

1

2

2

Armored Brigade

Some

0

0

0

Mechanized Brigade

Manpower

Combat Units

Some

1

1

0

Artillery Battalion

0

4–5

4–5

4–5

Artillery Battalion

0

4–5

4–5

6

Mechanized Battalion

28

0

0

0

500

1,345

1,613

1,613+*

T-54

Some

400

540

540

T-59

Some

0

0

0

T-62

Some

75

75

75+

T-72

Some

480

480

480

Chieftain Mk 3/5

Some

140

100

100

M-47/-48

Some

150

168

168

M-60A1

Some

100

150

150

Zulfiqar

0

0

100

100

30

80

80+

80+

30

80

80

80

Main Battle Tanks

Light Tanks Scorpion Towsan

0

0

Some

Some

Reconnaissance

130

35

35

35

EE-9 Cascavel

130

35

35

35

100+

440

610

610

100+

300

210

210

Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles BMP-1

IRAN

BMP-2

0

140

400

400

500

550

640

640

BTR-50/-60

Some

300

300

300

M-113

Some

250

200

200


Boragh

0

0

140

140

TOWED

Some

2,170

2,010

2,010

105 mm: M-101A1

339+

130

130

130

105 mm: Oto Melara

36

0

0

0

122 mm: D-30

0

600

540

540

122 mm: PRC type-54

0

100

100

100

125

1,100

985

985

152 mm: D-20

0

30

30

30

155 mm: WAC-21

0

20

15

15

155 mm: M-71

50

0

0

0

155 mm: M-114

0

70

70

70

130 mm: M-46/Type-59

155 mm: FH-77B

18

0

0

0

155 mm: GHN-45

130

100

120

120

203 mm: M-115

30

20

20

20

Self-Propelled

140

290

310+

310+

122 mm: 2S1

0

60

60

60

122 mm: Thunder 1

0

0

Some

Some

100

60

180

180

155 mm: M-109

325

155 mm: Thunder 2

0

0

Some

Some

170 mm: M-1978

0

10

10

10

175 mm: M-107

30

30

30

30

203 mm: M-110

10

30

30

30

Some

764+

876+

876+

Some

600

700

700

107 mm: Haseb

0

0

Some

Some

107 mm: Fadjr 1

0

0

Some

SOME

Multiple Rocket Launchers 107 mm: PRC Type-63

122 mm: Hadid/Arash/Noor

0

50

50

50

122 mm: BM-21

65

100

100

100

122 mm: BM-11

Some

5

7

7

240 mm: M-1985

0

9

9

9

240 mm: Fadjr 3

0

0

10

10

326


333 mm: Fadjr 5

0

0

Some

Some

3,000+

6,500

5,000

5,000

60 mm:

0

Some

Some

Some

81 mm:

Some

Some

Some

Some

Mortars

82 mm:

0

Some

Some

Some

107 mm: 4.2in M-30

Some

Some

Some

Some

120 mm: M-65

3,000

Some

Some

Some

Surface-to-Surface Missiles

Some

Some

Some

42+

Scud-B/-C Launchers, est. 300 MSLS

Some

10

12–18

12–18

Some

Some

Some

Some

Shahab-3 CSS-8

0

25

30

30

Oghab

Some

Some

Some

Some

Shaheen 1/-2

Some

Some

Some

Some

Nazeat

Some

Some

Some

Some


Some

Some

Some

Some

SA-7

Some

Some

Some

0

SA-14

Some

Some

Some

0

SA-16

Some

Some

Some

0

HQ-7

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

75

75

ENTAC

Some

0

0

0

SS-11/-12

Some

0

0

0

Dragon

Some

0

0

0

AT-3 Sagger

0

0

Some

Some

AT-4 Spigot

0

Some

Some

Some

Antitank Guided Weapons

AT-5 Spandrel

0

0

Some

Some

Saeqhe

0

0

Some

Some

Toophan

0

0

Some

Some

0

Some

Some

Some

Rocket Launchers 73 mm: RPG-7

0

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

57 mm

Some

0

0

0

75 mm: M-20

Some

Some

Some

Some

82 mm: B-10

0

Some

Some

Some

Recoilless Launchers

IRAN

106 mm: M-40

Some

Some

200

200

107 mm: B-11

0

Some

Some

Some

Air Defense Guns

1,500

1,700

1,700

1,700

14.5 mm: ZPU-2/-4

Some

Some

Some

Some

23 mm: ZU-23 Towed

Some

Some

Some

Some

23 mm: ZSU-23-4 SP

Some

Some

Some

Some

35 mm

Some

Some

Some

Some

37 mm: M-1939

Some

Some

Some

Some

37 mm: PRC Type-55

Some

Some

Some

Some

57 mm: ZSU-57-2-Sp

Some

Some

Some

Some

57 mm: S-60

Some

Some

Some

Some


230

Some

Some

Some

I-Hawk

30

0

0

0

RBS-70

200

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

Some

0

Some

Some

Some

0

Some

Some

Some

0

Some

Some

Some

49+

77

36

17

40+

50

10

10

2

19

2

2

SA-7/-14/-16 HQ-7 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Mohajer II/III/IV Aircraft Cessna 185 F-27 Falcon 20

2

8

20

1

Turbo Commander 690

5

0

4

4

410

556

223

223

100

100

50

50

Helicopters AH-1J Attack CH-47C Heavy Transport

10

40

20

20

Bell 214A/C

250

165

50

50

Bell 204

0

30

0

0

AB-205A

35

40

68

68

AB-206

15

90

10

10

AB-12

0

12

0

0

Mi-8/-17

0

0

25

25

Hughes 300C

0

5

0

0

RH-53D

0

9

0

0

327

328


SH-53D

0

10

0

0

SA-319

0

10

0

0

UH-1H

0

45

0

0

* ‘‘+’’ indicates the numbers listed may be slightly less than the actual units or weapons in stock. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

to exist throughout the rest of the force, and some experts estimate that Iran’s sustainable operational tank strength may be fewer than 1,000 tanks. Furthermore, Iran’s Chieftains and M-60s are at least 16–20 years old, and the T-72 and Zulfiqar are Iran’s only tanks with advanced fire-control systems, sights, and armor-piercing ammunition. Iran’s T-72Ss are export versions of the Soviet T-72B. Some have been built under license in Iran and are armed with a 125-mm 2A46M smoothbore gun. They have a relatively modern IA40-1 fire-control system and computer, a laser range finder, and a night and day image intensifying sighting system. The T-72S is powered by an 840-horsepower V-84MS diesel engine, has upgraded suspension and mine protection capabilities, and a combat weight of 44.5 tons. Russian sources indicate that Iran has ordered 1,000 T-72s from Russia. As mentioned earlier, Iran has developed a main battle tank called the Zulfiqar, with a 125-mm smoothbore gun and welded steel turret of Iranian design. According to one report, the Zulfiqar is powered by a V-46-6-12 V-12 diesel engine with 780 horsepower and uses a SPAT 1200 automatic transmission. This engine is used in the Soviet T-72, but the tank transmission design seems to be closer to that of the U.S. M-60. The Zulfiqar seems to have a relatively modern fire-control system, and Iran may have improved its T-72s with a similar upgrade. The Zulfiqar’s combat weight is reported to be 36 tons, and its maximum speed supposedly reaches 65 kilometers per hour at a power-to-weight ratio of 21.7 horsepower per ton. The tank is equipped has a 7.62-mm coaxial and a 12.7-mm roof-mounted machine gun. It uses the modern Slovenia Fontana EFCS-3 computerized fire-control system to provide a fully stabilized fire on the move capability. It may have a roof-mounted laser-warning device, and it could use the same reactive armor system discussed earlier. Roughly 100 Zulifqars are thought to be in service. Iran has extended the service life of some of its T-54s, T-55s, and T-59s by improving their armor and fire-control systems, and by arming them with an Iranian-made M-68 rifled 105-mm gun similar to the one used in the M-60A1. Reportedly, the Armament Industries Division of the Iranian Defense Industries Organization produces this gun. The Revolutionary Guard is reported to have a special variant of the T-54 called the Safir-74. Iran has developed explosive reactive armor add-ons for its tanks, although the effectiveness of such armor remains unclear. Some of Iran’s 168 M-47/M-48s include an upgraded version of the M-47M. The American firm of Bowen-McLaughlin York, which also built a vehicle manufacturing

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plant in Iran, upgraded these tanks between 1970 and 1972. The M-47s have many of the components of the M-60A1, including the diesel engine, automatic transmission, suspension, gun control system, and fire components. The upgrade resulted in an extended operating range of the M-47 from 130 to 600 kilometers, as compared to 130 kilometers before, and increased storage space to hold 79 rounds by eliminating the bow mounted machine gun thereby reducing the crew to four. An estimated 150 conversions have been delivered to Iran. In spite of its tank imports and production since the Iran-Iraq War, Iran’s total operational main battle tank holdings are sufficient only to fully equip five to seven of its divisions by Western standards. Iran can sustain only about half the number of its main battle tanks for any period of extended maneuver warfare. At present, however, Iran’s tanks are dispersed in relatively small lots among all of its regular army and some of its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) combat units— all of the IRGC units generally have only small tank force cadres, and it is unclear to what extent these forces will be armored in the future. The 92nd Armored Division is the only Iranian division that has enough tanks to realistically be considered an armored division, even by regional comparisons.

Other Iranian Armor Iran seems to have possessed about 1,000–1,360 armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs) and armored personnel carriers (APCs) in its operational inventory in 2006, although counts are contradictory, and it is difficult to estimate what parts of Iran’s holdings are fully operational and/or sustainable for any length of time in combat. The IISS, for example, estimates an inventory of 690 light tanks and armored infantry fighting vehicles and 640 APCs. Virtually all estimates indicate, however, that Iran has only about half of the equipment it would need to fully mechanize its forces at its disposal.9 Iran appears to have retained 70–80 British-supplied Scorpions out of the 250 it received before the fall of the Shah. These light tanks are tracked weapon systems equipped with 76-mm guns. However, the Scorpion is more than 20 years old, and as few as 30 may be fully operational. Iran has developed a new light tank called the Towsan (‘‘Wild Horse’’ or ‘‘Fury’’) with a 90-mm gun, some of which may already be in service. As far as other armored fighting vehicles are concerned, Iran had some 210 BMP1s and 400 BMP-2 equivalents in service. The BMPs are Soviet-designed systems, but have serious ergonomic and weapons-suite problems. They are hard to fight from, hard to exit, and too slow to keep pace with modern tanks. They also lack thermal vision systems and modern long-range fire-control systems, and their main weapons are difficult to operate in combat even from static positions. Further, Iran has at least 35 EE-9 Cascavel armored reconnaissance vehicles, and one estimate indicates an inventory of 100. The Cascavel is an acceptable design for Third World combat, although it lacks modern sensors and weapons.

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Iran’s Army had some 200 M-113s and other Western APCs, and a mix of BTR40s, BTR-50s, and BTR-60s, numbering 300 in total. Iran is producing an armored fighting vehicle called the Boragh (Boraq) and a lighter APC called the Cobra or BMT-2, of which some 140 are in service. The Boragh seems to be a copy of a Chinese version of the BMP-1. It is fully tracked and amphibious and has a combat weight of 13 tons. It can carry 8–12 people, plus 2 crew members. Reports differ as to its armament—perhaps reflecting different variants. Initial reports indicate that it has a turret armed with a 73-mm smoothbore gun and antitank guided missile (ATGM) launcher. It may, however, lack the commander’s position that exists in the BMP-1, and it may be armed with a 12.7-mm machine gun. Iran has developed an armor package designed to fit over the hull of the Boragh to provide protection against 30-mm armor-piercing ammunition. 10 Variants with 120-mm mortars, one-man turrets with Iranian-made Toophan ATGMs, and AT-4 ATGMs and others with 73-mm BMP-2 turret guns also seem to be deployed. The Cobra or BMT-2 is a low-profile, wheeled troop carrier, which can hold seven personnel. Some of its versions may have twin 23-mm AA guns. Iran had an unknown number of British Chieftain bridge laying tanks and a wide range of specialized armored vehicles as well as some heavy equipment transporters. Iran is steadily improving its ability to support armored operations in the field and to provide recovery and field repair capability. However, its exercises reveal that these capabilities still remain limited relative to those of U.S. forces as they lack recovery and field repair capability in combination with poor interoperability. Most likely, these problems will seriously limit the cohesion, speed, and sustainability of Iranian armored operations. Iran’s armored warfare doctrine seems to be borrowed from U.S., British, and Russian sources without achieving any coherent concept of operations. Even so, Iran’s armored doctrine is improving more quickly than its organization and exercise performance. Iran’s armored forces are very poorly structured, and the country’s equipment pool is dissipated between far too many regular and IRGC units. As mentioned before, Iran has only one armored division—the 92nd Armored Division— with enough tanks and other armor to be considered a true armored unit. Iranian Antiarmor Weapons Iran had large holdings of antitank guided weapons and has been manufacturing copies of Soviet systems, while buying missiles from China, Russia, and the Ukraine. It has approximately 50–75 Tube-Launched Optically Tracked Wire-Guided Missiles (TOW) and 20–30 Dragon antitank guided missile launchers that were originally supplied by the United States, although the operational status of such systems is uncertain. It has Soviet and Asian versions of the AT-2, the AT-3, and the AT-5. Iran seems to have at least 100–200 AT-4 (9K111) launchers, but it is impossible to make an accurate estimate because Iran is producing its own copies of the AT-3. Iran also has some 750 RPG-7V, RPG-11, and 3.5´´ rocket launchers, roughly 150 M-18

IRAN

331

57-mm, 200 M-20 75-mm and B-10 82-mm, and 200 M-40 106-mm and B-11 107-mm recoilless guns. Iran produces various antitank weapons. These include an improved version of the man-portable RPG-7 antitank rocket with an 80-mm tandem HEAT warhead instead of the standard 30-mm design, the NAFEZ antitank rocket, and a copy of the Soviet SPG-9 73-mm recoilless antitank gun. Iran also makes a copy of the Russian AT-3 9M14M (Sagger or Ra’ad) antitank guided missile. This system is a crew-operable system with a guidance system that can be linked to a launcher holding up to four missiles. It has a maximum range of 3,000 meters, a minimum range of 500 meters, and a flight speed of 120 meters per second. Iran is also seeking more advanced technology from Russia. The United States maintains that a Russian company sold Iran Krasnopol artillery shells while the company denies any connection with Iran.11 Prospective sanctions are likely to deter arms manufacturers from filling the many needs of the Iranian military. The Iranian copy of the AT-3 is made by the Shahid Shah Abaday Industrial Group in Tehran, and it seems to be an early version that lacks semiautomatic guidance. Hence, the operator must sight the target, rather than use a joystick, to guide the missile to the target by using the light from the missile. The Iranian version of the AT-3 also seems to have a maximum armored penetration capability of 500 millimeters, which is not enough to penetrate the forward armor of the latest Western and Russian main battle tanks. Russia has, however, refitted most of its systems to the semiautomatic line of sight guidance and warheads capable of penetrating 800 millimeters. Iran may have or be acquiring such capability, and it would significantly improve the lethality of its antiarmor forces. Iran also makes an improved copy of the TOW missile, which it has reverse engineered from the missiles it received from the United States. Iranian Artillery Strength Iran had some 3,200 operational medium and heavy artillery weapons and multiple rocket launchers, and some 5,000 mortars. Its towed artillery consisted largely of Soviet designs. Self-propelled artillery included 60 2S1122-mm howitzers, and some Iranian copies. There were some 180 aging M-109 155-mm weapon systems of which Iran is seeking to produce its own weapons as part of the ‘‘Thunder’’ series. It had some 70 aging 170-mm, 165-mm, and 203-mm weapon systems. Iran also had large numbers of multiple rocket launchers, including some 700 107-mm weapons, 150–200 122-mm weapons, 20-odd 240-mm weapons, and some 333-mm weapons. It manufactures its own multiple rocket launchers, including the longrange Fajr series. This total is very high compared to the artillery strength of most regional powers, and it reflects Iran’s continuing effort to build up artillery strength that began during the Iran-Iraq War. Iran had to use artillery as a substitute for armor and airpower during much of the Iran-Iraq War and generally used relatively static fire. However, Iran’s reliance on towed artillery and slow-moving multiple rocket launchers limits

332


Iran’s combined arms maneuver capabilities, and Iran has failed to develop effective night and beyond-visual-range targeting capability. Some 2,100 of Iran’s weapons were towed tube artillery weapons, vs. 310 selfpropelled tube weapons, and 700–900 were vehicle-mounted or towed multiple rocket launchers. Iran’s holdings of self-propelled weapons still appeared to include a substantial number of U.S.–supplied systems, including 25–30 M-110 203-mm howitzers, 20–30 M-107 175-mm guns, and 130–150 M-109 155-mm howitzers. These weapons were worn, have not been modernized in over 15 years, and lack modern fire-control systems and artillery radars. Many also lacked sustainability, and a considerable number may not be operational. Iran understands that it has less than a quarter of the self-propelled artillery it needs to properly support its present force structure and that maneuverable artillery is critical to success in dealing with Iraqi and other maneuver forces. It is attempting to compensate for the resulting lack of modern artillery and artillery mobility by replacing its U.S.–made self-propelled weapons with other self-propelled systems. Iran has purchased 60–80 Soviet 2S1 122-mm self-propelled howitzers, and it has developed an indigenous version called Raad (Thunder 1/Thunder 2). The Thunder 1 is a 122-mm weapon similar to Russian designs. The Thunder 2 is a ‘‘rapid fire’’ 155-mm self-propelled weapon. Both systems are now in deployment. Iran had some 5,000 mortars. These include 107-mm and 120-mm heavy mortars and 800–900 81-mm and 82-mm mortars. The Iranian Army has at least several hundred of its heavy mortars mounted on armored vehicles. The 700–900 multiple rocket launchers in Iran’s inventory were evidence of its tactical emphasis on massed, static firepower. It is difficult to estimate Iran’s inventory, but its holdings include roughly 10 M-1989 240-mm multiple rocket launchers, 500–700 Chinese Type 63 and Iranian Haseb and Fadjir-1 107-mm multiple rocket launchers, and 100+ Soviet BM-21 and Soviet BM-11 122-mm launchers, as well as some Fadjir-5 333-mm weapon systems. Iran has produced its own multiple rocket launchers. These include some 50 122mm, 40-round Hadid rocket launcher systems. In addition, Iran produces variants of Chinese and Russian 122-mm rockets called the Arash and Noor. Iran has transferred large numbers of its shorter-range rockets to Hezbollah in Lebanon.12 It supplied most of the extended range versions of the Kaytushas that Hezbollah used in the fighting against Israel in 2006. The Iranian state television announced the production of the DM-3b seeker for the Noor. The DM-3b is an active radar sensor that is used in the final stages of flight to acquire and home in on ship targets. A joint program between Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization and the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation developed the Noor.13 The Falaq 1 and 2 series are examples of vehicle-mounted unguided rocket systems in the Iranian arsenal. The Falaq 1 fires a 240-mm rocket with 50 kilograms of explosives and can reach a target up to ten kilometers away. The Falaq 2 is slightly larger, carries ten more kilograms of explosives, and flies almost a full kilometer farther.14

IRAN

333

Iran’s land forces operate a number of Iranian-made long-range unguided rockets, including the Shahin 1 and 2, Oghab, and Nazeat. They also include some ten large 240-mm artillery rockets with a range of up to 40–43 kilometers called the Fadjr 3. Some of these systems played a major role in triggering Israel’s war against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006, and the key longer-range systems seem to include the following:15 • The Shahin 1 (sometimes called the Fadjr 4) is a trailer-launched 333-mm caliber unguided artillery rocket. Two rockets are normally mounted on each trailer, and they have a solid propelled rocket motor, a maximum range of 75 kilometers and a 175kilogram conventional or chemical warhead. The Shahin evidently can be equipped with three types of warheads: a 180-kilogram high-explosive warhead, a warhead using high-explosive submunitions, and a warhead that uses chemical weapons. There is a truck-mounted version, called the Fajr 5, with a rack of four rockets. A larger Shanin 2, with a range of 20 kilometers, is also deployed. • The Fadjr 3 is a truck-mounted system with a 12-round launcher for 240-mm rockets. It has a maximum range of 43 kilometers and a 45-kilogram payload in its warhead. • The Fadjr 5 is a truck-mounted 333-mm caliber unguided artillery rocket with a solid propelled rocket motor, a maximum range of 75 kilometers, and a 175kilogram conventional or chemical warhead. It carries four rockets, and they can evidently be equipped with three types of warheads: a kilogram high-explosive warhead, a warhead using high-explosive submunitions, and a warhead that uses chemical weapons. • The Oghab is a 320-mm caliber unguided artillery rocket that is spin stabilized in flight, has a maximum range of 34 kilometers, and has a 70-kilogram high explosives (HE) fragmentation warhead—although chemical warheads may be available. While it may have a chemical warhead, it has an operational circular error probable (CEP) that has proven to be in excess of 500 meters at maximum range. Further, Iran has no ability to target accurately the Oghab or any other long-range missile against mobile or point targets at long ranges, other than a limited ability to use remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs). • The Nazeat is a Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) launched system with conventional and possibly chemical and biological warheads. The full details of this system remain unclear, but it seems to be based on Chinese technology and uses a solid fuel rocket, with a simple inertial guidance system. Nazeat units are equipped with communications vans, meteorological vans, and a global positioning system (GPS) for surveying the launch site. Some reports indicate there are two variants of the Nazeat solid-fueled rocket system—a 355.6-mm caliber rocket with a 105-kilogram range and a 150-kilogram warhead, and a 450-mm caliber rocket with a reported range of 130– 150 kilometers and a 250-kilogram warhead. Both systems have maximum closing velocities of Mach 4–5, but both also appear to suffer from poor reliability and accuracy. Other reports indicate all Nazeats are 335.6 mm and there are four versions of progressively larger size, with ranges from 80 to 120 kilometers. It is claimed to have a CEP within 5 percent of its range.

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• The Zelzal 2 is a 610-mm long-range rocket, with a warhead with a 600-kilogram payload and a maximum range of up to 210 kilometers. A single rocket is mounted on a launcher on a truck. It is unguided, but is spin stabilized and is claimed to have a CEP within 5 percent of its range. • The Fateh A-110 is a developmental system believed to be similar to the Chinese CSS-8, which is a surface-to-surface system derived from the Russian SA-2 surface-toair missile.

Iran has made limited progress in deploying artillery fire-control and battle management systems, counterbattery radar capability, and long-range target acquisition capability, but its capability is improving steadily and it makes increasing use of RPVs to support its self-propelled weapons. Iran has actively sought more modern fire-control and targeting systems since the mid-1980s, and the equipment it supplied to Hezbollah forces in Lebanon—while not the state of the art in Iran—showed Iran has made growing progress in developing effective planning, fire-control, targeting, and damage assessment systems. Iranian Army Air Defense Systems Iranian land forces had a total of some 1,700 antiaircraft guns, including 14.5-mm ZPU-2/-4s, 23-mm ZSU-23-4s and ZU-23s, 35-mm M-1939s, 37-mm Type 55s, and 57-mm ZSU-57-2s. Iran also had 100–180 Bofors L/70 40-mm guns, and moderate numbers of Skyguard 35-mm twin antiaircraft guns (many of which may not be operational). Its largest holdings consisted of unguided ZU-23-2s (which it can manufacture) and M-1939s. It is unclear how many of these systems are really operational as air defense weapons and most would have to be used to provide very short-range ‘‘curtain fire’’ defense of small point targets. They would not be effective against a modern aircraft using an air-to-ground missile or laser-guided weapon. The only notable exception is the ZSU-23-4 radar-guided antiaircraft gun. Iran has 50–100 fully operational ZSU23-4s. The weapon is short ranged and is vulnerable to electronic countermeasures, but is far more lethal than Iran’s unguided guns. Iran had large numbers of SA-7 (Strela 2M) and SA-14 (Strela) man-portable surface-to-air missiles, and some more modern SA-16s and HN-5/HQ-5s as well as Misaq man-portable surface-to-air missiles. It may also have some SA-18s. It had some U.S.–made Stinger man-portable surface-to-air missiles it bought from Afghan rebels, but these may no longer be operational or may have been used for reverseengineering purposes. Iran also has some RBS-70 low-level surface-to-air missiles. Iran seems to be producing some version of the SA-7, perhaps with Chinese assistance. It is not clear whether Iran can do this in any large number. Iran’s land-based air defense forces are also acquiring growing numbers of Chinese FM-80s, a Chinese variant of the French-designed Crotale. Some reports indicate that it has some SA-8s, but these may be token transfers obtained for reverse-engineering purposes.

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Iranian Army Aviation Iran pioneered its use of army aviation and attack helicopters during the time of the Shah, but built up its holdings of helicopters far more quickly than it expanded its training and maintenance capability. As a result, it had an ineffective and unsustainable force at the time the Shah fell. Its inability since that time to obtain adequate spare parts to help in modernizing the aircraft has long made Iranian operational helicopter holdings uncertain. The Iranian Army seems to retain 50 AH-1J Sea Cobra attack helicopters, 20 CH47Cs, 50 Bell-214A/Cs, 68 AB-205As, 10 AB-206s, and 25 Mi-8/Mi-17 transport and utility helicopters. There are also reports that Iran signed orders for 4 Mi-17s in 1999 and 30 Mi-8s in 2001. These Western-supplied transport and support helicopters have low operational readiness, and they have little sustained sortie capability. They are, however, regularly used in Iranian military exercises. Iran is also seeking to create a significant RPV force that borrows in many ways from Israeli technical developments and doctrine. It has produced some such RPVs, such as the Mohajer series—and several exercise reports refer to their use. It has sold some of these systems to Hezbollah, but insufficient data are available to assess this aspect of Iranian capabilities. Iranian Army’s Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) Iranian Army communications have improved, as have Iranian battle management and communications exercises. They are now capable of better coordination between branches, the density of communications equipment has improved, and the functional lines of communication and command now place more emphasis on maneuver, quick reaction, and combined arms. Iran has also improved its electronic intelligence (ELINT), communications intelligence (COMINT), jamming, and countermeasure capability, and it has been aided by Syria since the two countries signed a new defense cooperation agreement on November 14, 2005, and ratified in January 2006.16 However, Iranian battle management and communications capabilities seem to remain relatively limited. Iran’s holdings still consist largely of aging VHF radio with some HF and UHF capability. This equipment cannot handle high traffic densities, and secure communications are poor. Iran still relies heavily on analog data handling and manually switched telephone systems. It is, however, acquiring a steadily growing number of Chinese and Western encryption systems and some digital voice, fax, and telex encryption capabilities. Other Aspects of Iranian Army Capability Iran’s Army has improved its organization, doctrine, training, and equipment for land force operations. Iran still, however, is a slow-moving force with limited

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armored maneuver capability and artillery forces better suited for static defense and the use of mass fire than the efficient use of rapidly switched and well-targeted fire. Sustainability is limited, as is field recovery and repair capability. Overall manpower quality is mediocre because of a lack of adequate realistic training and a heavy reliance on conscripts. The army has some capability for power projection and armored maneuver warfare, but does not train seriously for long-range maneuver and does little training for amphibious warfare or deployment by sea. Its logistics, maintenance, and sustainment systems are largely defensive and designed to support Iranian forces in defending Iran out of local bases. It does not practice difficult amphibious operations, particularly ‘‘across the beach’’ operations. It could, however, deploy into Kuwait and cross the border into Iraq. It can also move at least brigade-sized mechanized units across the Gulf by amphibious ship and ferry if it does not meet significant naval and air opposition to any such movement. It lacks the air strength and naval air and missile defense capabilities to be able to defend such an operation. THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CORPS (PASDARAN) The IRGC has contributed some 125,000 men to Iran’s forces in recent years and has substantial capabilities for asymmetric warfare and covert operations. The IRGC operates most of Iran’s surface-to-surface missiles and is believed to have custody over potentially deployed nuclear weapons, most or all other chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, and to operate Iran’s nuclear-armed missile forces if they are deployed. IRGC Land Forces The IRGC has small elements equipped with armor and has the equivalent of conventional army units, and some units are trained for covert missions and asymmetric warfare, but most if its forces are lightly equipped infantry trained and equipped for internal security missions. These forces are reported to have between 120,000 and 130,000 men, but such totals are uncertain. They also include conscripts recruited from the same pool as regular army conscripts, and training and retention levels are low. The IRGC land forces do, however, control the Basij (Mobilization of the Oppressed) and other paramilitary forces if they are mobilized for war. Some sources, like the IISS, report a force structure with 20 ‘‘divisions,’’ but most units seem to be battalion-sized elements. The total manpower pool of the IRGC could support only about five to six light infantry divisions. There is supposed to be one airborne brigade. The IRGC often claims to conduct very large exercises, sometimes with 100,000 men or more. The exact size of such exercises is unclear, but they are generally a small fraction of IRGC claims. With the exception of small elite elements, training is very limited and largely suitable for internal security purposes. Most forces would require substantial refresher training to act in any mission other that static infantry defense.

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The IRGC remains the center of Iran’s hard-line security forces, but has become steadily more bureaucratic and less effective as a conventional fighting force since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. Corruption and careerism are growing problems, and the IRGC’s role in the defense industry has led to financial abuses. At this point in time, it is the elite elements of the IRGC that give it real meaning beyond serving the regime’s need to control its population. The IRGC Air Force The air force of the IRGC is believed to operate Iran’s three Shahab-3 intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) units (whose true operational status remains uncertain) and may have had custody of its chemical weapons and any biological weapons. While the actual operational status of the Shahab-3 remains uncertain, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, announced in 2003 that Shahab-3 missiles had been delivered to the IRGC. In addition, six Shahab-3s were displayed in Tehran during a military parade in September 2003.17 It is not clear what combat formations exist within the IRGC, but the IRGC may operate Iran’s ten EMB-312 Tucanos.18 It seems to operate many of Iran’s 45 PC-7 training aircraft, as well as some Pakistani-made trainers at a training school near Mushshak, but this school may be run by the regular air force. It has also claimed to manufacture gliders for use in unconventional warfare. These are unsuitable delivery platforms, but could carry a small number of weapons.19 The IRGC Naval Forces The IRGC also has a naval branch with some 20,000 men, including marine units of some 5,000 men. Other sources show this force subordinated to the regular naval forces. Such a force could deliver small nuclear weapons or other CBRN weapons into ports and oil and desalination facilities and could be felt in operational areas in the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. The naval branch has bases in the Gulf, many near key shipping channels and some near the Strait of Hormuz. These include facilities at Al-Farsiyah, Halul (an oil platform), Sirri, Abu Musa, Bandaer-e Abbas, Khorramshahr, and Larak. It also controls Iran’s coastal defense forces, including naval guns and an HY-3 Seersucker land-based antiship missile unit deployed in five to seven sites along the Gulf coast. Its forces can carry out extensive raids against Gulf shipping, carry out regular amphibious exercises with the land branch of the IRGC against objectives like the islands in the Gulf, and could conduct raids against Saudi Arabia or other countries on the southern Gulf coast. They give Iran a major capability for asymmetric warfare. The Guards also seem to work closely with Iranian intelligence and appear to be represented unofficially in some embassies, Iranian businesses and purchasing offices, and other foreign fronts. The IRGC naval forces have at least 40 light patrol boats, 10 Houdong guided missile patrol boats armed with C-802 antiship missiles, and a battery of

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HY-2 Seersucker land-based antiship missiles. Some of these systems could be modified to carry a small CBRN weapon, but hardly are optimal delivery platforms because of their limited-range payload and sensor/guidance platforms unsuited for the mission. Proxy and Covert CBRN Operations The IRGC has a complex structure that includes both political and military units. It has separate organizational elements for its land, naval, and air units, which include both military and paramilitary units. The Basij and the tribal units of the Pasdaran are subordinated to its land unit command, although the commander of the Basij often seems to report directly to the Commander-in-Chief and Minister of the Pasdaran and through him to the Leader of the Islamic Revolution. The IRGC has close ties to the foreign operations branch of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), particularly through the IRGC’s Qods force. The Ministry of Intelligence and Security was established in 1983 and has an extensive network of offices in Iranian embassies. It is often difficult to separate the activities of the IRGC, the Vezarat-e Ettela’ at va Aminat-e Keshvar (VEVAK), and the Foreign Ministry, and many seem to be integrated operations managed by a ministerial committee called the ‘‘Special Operations Council’’ that includes the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, President, Minister of Intelligence and Security, and other members of the Supreme Council for National Defense.20 Other elements of the IRGC can support proxy or covert use of CBRN weapons. They run some training camps inside Iran for outside ‘‘volunteers.’’ Some IRGC still seem to be deployed in Lebanon and actively involved in training and arming Hezbollah, other anti-Israeli groups, and other elements.21 The IRGC has been responsible for major arms shipments to Hezbollah, including large numbers of AT-3 antitank guided missiles, long-range rockets, and some Iranian-made Mohajer UAVs.22 Some reports indicate Iran has exported thousands of 122-mm rockets and Fajr 4 and Fajr 5 long-range rockets, including the ARASH with a range of 21–29 kilometers. These reports give the Fajr 5 a range of 75 kilometers with a payload of 200 kilograms. Iran seems to have sent such arms to Hezbollah and some various Palestinian movements, including some shiploads of arms to the Palestinian Authority.23 The Quds (Qods) Forces The IRGC has a large intelligence operation and unconventional warfare component. Roughly 5,000 of the men in the IRGC are assigned to the unconventional warfare mission. The IRGC has the equivalent of one Special Forces division, plus additional smaller formations, and these forces are given special priority in terms of training and equipment. In addition, the IRGC has a special Quds force that plays a major role in giving Iran the ability to conduct unconventional warfare overseas

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using various foreign movements as proxies.24 These forces have supported nonstate actors like Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and the Shi’ite militias in Iraq. The budget for the Quds forces is a classified budget directly controlled by Khamenei and is not reflected in the Iranian general budget. It operates primarily outside Iran’s borders, although it has bases inside and outside of Iran. The Quds troops are divided into specific groups or ‘‘corps’’ for each country or area in which they operate. There are Directorates for Iraq; Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan; Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India; Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula; Asian countries of the former Soviet Union; Western Nations (Europe and North America); and North Africa (Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Sudan, and Morocco). The Quds has offices or ‘‘sections’’ in many Iranian embassies, which are closed to most embassy staff. It is not clear whether these are integrated with Iranian intelligence operations or that the ambassador in each embassy has control of, or a detailed knowledge of, operations by the Quds staff. However, there are indications that most operations are coordinated between the IRGC and offices within the Iranian Foreign Ministry and MOIS. There are separate operational organizations in Lebanon, Turkey, Pakistan, and several North African countries. There are also indications that such elements may have participated in the bombings of the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992 and the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires in 1994— although Iran has strongly denied this.25 The Quds force seems to control many of Iran’s training camps for unconventional warfare, extremists, and terrorists in Iran and countries like the Sudan and Lebanon. It has at least four major training facilities in Iran. The Quds forces have a main training center at Imam Ali University that is based in the Sa’dabad Palace in northern Tehran. Troops are trained to carry out military and terrorist operations and are indoctrinated in ideology. There are other training camps in the Qom, Tabriz, and Mashhad governates and in Lebanon and the Sudan. These include the Al Nasr camp for training Iraqi Shi’ites and Iraqi and Turkish Kurds in northwest Iran and a camp near Mashhad for training Afghan and Tajik revolutionaries. The Quds seems to help operate the Manzariyah training center near Qom, which recruits foreign students in the religious seminary and which seems to have trained some Bahraini extremists. Some foreigners are reported to have received training in demolition and sabotage at an IRGC facility near Isfahan, in airport infiltration at a facility near Mashad and Shiraz, and in underwater warfare at an IRGC facility at Bandar Abbas.26 Role in Iran’s Industries The IRGC plays a major role in Iran’s military industries. Its lead role in Iran’s efforts to acquire surface-to-surface missiles and weapons of mass destruction gives it growing experience with advanced military technology. As a result, the IRGC is believed to be the branch of Iran’s forces that plays the largest role in Iran’s military industries.27 It also operates all of Iran’s Scuds, controls most of its chemical and

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biological weapons, and provides the military leadership for missile production and the production of all weapons of mass destruction. The Basij and Other Paramilitary Forces The rest of Iran’s paramilitary and internal security forces seem to have relatively little capability in such missions. The Basij is a popular reserve force of about 90,000 men with an active and reserve strength of up to 300,000 and a mobilization capacity of nearly 1,000,000 men. It is controlled by the IRGC and consists largely of youths, men who have completed military service, and the elderly. Iran also has 45,000–60,000 men in the Ministry of Interior serving as police and border guards, with light utility vehicles, light patrol aircraft (Cessna 185/310s and AB-205s and AB-206s), 90 coastal patrol craft, and 40 harbor patrol craft. THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE The Iranian Air Force still is numerically strong, but most of its equipment is aging, worn, and has limited mission capability. It had some 52,000 men: 37,000 in the air force in 2006, and 15,000 in the air defense force, which operates Iran’s land-based air defenses. It had over 300 combat aircraft in its inventory (the IISS estimates 281). See Figure 8.4. Many of these aircraft are either not operational or cannot be sustained in extended air combat. This includes 50–60 percent of Iran’s U.S.– and Frenchsupplied aircraft and some 20–30 percent of its Russian- and Chinese-supplied aircraft. It has nine fighter-ground attack squadrons with 162–186 aircraft; seven fighter squadrons, with 70–74 aircraft, a reconnaissance unit with 4–8 aircraft, and a number of transport aircraft, helicopters, and special purpose aircraft. It operates most of Iraq’s land-based air defenses, including some 150 I-Hawks, 45 HQ-21s, 10 SA-5s, 30 Rapiers, 15 Tigercats, and additional forces equipped with light surface-to-air missiles. The Iranian Air Force is headquartered in Tehran with training, administration, and logistics branches, as well as a major central Air Defense Operations Center. It has a political directorate and a small naval coordination staff. It has three major regional headquarters: Northern Zone (Badl Sar), Central Zone (Hamaden), and Southern Zone (Bushehr). Each regional zone seems to control a major air defense sector with subordinate air bases and facilities. The key air defense subzones and related bases in the Northern Zone are at Badl Sar, Mashhad, and Shahabad Kord. The subzones and bases in the Central Zone are at Hamadan and Dezful, and the subzones and bases in the Southern Zone are at Bushehr, Bandar Abbas, and Jask. Iran has large combat air bases at Mehrabad, Tabriz, Hamadan, Dezful, Bushehr, Shiraz, Isfahan, and Bandar Abbas. It has smaller bases at least at 11 other locations. Shiraz provides interceptor training and is the main base for transport aircraft.

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Figure 8.4 Iranian Air Force’s Force Structure Trends, 1990–2006 1990

2000

2005

2006

35,000

50,000

52,000

52,000

35,000

50,000

52,000

52,000

0

0

0

0

15

114

74

74

F-7

0

24

24

24

F-14

15

60

25

25

MiG-29

0

30

25

25

104

140

186

186+*

F-4D/E

35

50

65

65+

F-5E/F

45

60

60

60+

Ch J-6

24

0

0

0

Su-24

0

30

30

30

Su-25K

0

0

7

7

Mirage F1-E

0

0

24

24

2

5

3

5

P-3F

2

0

0

0

P-3MP

0

0

3

5

C-130H-MP

0

5

0

0

Reconnaissance

8

15

6

6+

5

0

0

0

Manpower Active Conscripts Fighter


Maritime Reconnaissance

F-5 RF-4E

3

15

6

6+

Transport

59

63

64+

65+

Boeing 707

14

3

3

3

Boeing 747F

9

7

5

5

Boeing 727

0

1

1

1

C-130E/H

20

18

18

17

F-27

9

15

10

10

Commander 690

3

3

3

3

Falcon

3

4

1

1

PC-6B

0

10

10

10

Y-7

0

2

2

9

Y-12(II)

0

0

9

3

Jetstar

0

0

2

2

342


Il-76

0

0

Some

1+

Utility

0

0

0

12

TB-21

0

0

0

8

TB-200

0

0

0

4

55 (0 armed)

53 (0 armed)

34 (0 armed)

34+

2

2

2

2

Helicopters AB-206 Bell 214C

39

39

30

30

CH-47

10

5

2

2+

S-61A

2

0

0

0

Shabaviz 2-75

0

0

0

Some

Shabaviz2061

0

0

0

Some

84

132

151

119

F-33A/V

26

26

20

?†

T-33

7

7

7

7

Training

PC-7

46

40

40

40

EMB-312

5–6

15

15

?

MiG-29B

0

5

0

?

FT-7

0

5

15

?

F-5B

0

20

20

?

TB-21

0

8

8

?

TB-200

0

4

4

?

MFI-17 Mushshaq

0

0

22

?

105

190+

220+

2,500+

I-Hawk

0

100

150

2,400

Rapier

30

30

30

30


Tigercat

25

15

15

15

SA-2/HQ-2J

50

45

15

45

SA-5

0

0

10

10

SA-7

0

Some

Some

Some

FM-80 (Crotale)

0

Some

Some

Some

Air-to-Air Missiles

Some

Some

Some

Some

AIM-7 Sparrow

Some

Some

Some

Some

AIM-9 Sidewinder

Some

Some

Some

Some

AIM-54 Phoenix

Some

Some

Some

Some

IRAN

AA-8

0

Some

Some

Some

AA-10

0

Some

Some

Some

AA-11

0

Some

Some

Some

PL-2A

0

0

some

0

PL-7

0

Some

Some

0

Some

Some

Some

Some

0

Some

Some

Some

AS-11

0

Some

Some

Some

AS-12

Some

0

0

0

AS-14

0

Some

Some

Some

C-801

0

0

Some

Some

Air-to-Surface Missiles AS-10

AGM-65A AGM-84 Harpoon Air Defense Guns 23 mm

0

Some

3,000

Some

Some

0

0

0

0

0

Some

Some

0

0

Some

Some

ZSU-23

0

0

Some

Some

37 mm

0

0

Some

Some

Oerlikon

0

0

Some

Some

343

* ‘‘+’’ indicates the numbers listed may be slightly less than the actual units or weapons in stock. † All ‘‘?’’ refer to weapons that Iran is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in its possession are unknown. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

Iranian Air Strength As is the case with most aspects of Iranian military forces, estimates of Iran’s exact air strength differ by source. The IISS estimates the air force has 14 main combat squadrons. These include nine fighter ground-attack squadrons, four with 55–65 U.S.–supplied F-4D/Es, four with 55–65 F-5E/Fs, and one with 27–30 Sovietsupplied Su-24s. Iran has 7 Su-25Ks and 24 Mirage F-1 Iraqi aircraft it seized during the Gulf War, and some may be operational. Some reports indicate that Iran has ordered an unknown number of TU-22M-3 ‘‘Backfire C’’ long-range strategic bombers from either Russia or the Ukraine.28 While such discussions do seem to have taken place, no purchases or deliveries can be confirmed. Iran had five air defense squadrons, two with 20–25 F-5Bs and 60 U.S.–supplied F-14s, two with 25–30 Russian/Iraqi-supplied MiG-29s, and one with 25–35 Chinese supplied F-7Ms.29 The Iranian Air Force had a small reconnaissance squadron with 3–8 RF-4Es. It has 1 RC-130, and other intelligence/reconnaissance aircraft, together with large numbers of transports and helicopters.

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Most Iranian squadrons can perform both air defense and attack missions, regardless of their principal mission—although this is not true of Iran’s F-14 (air defense) and Su-24 (strike/attack) units. Iran’s F-14s were, however, designed as dual-capable aircraft, and it has not been able to use its Phoenix air-to-air missiles since the early 1980s. Iran has claimed that it is modernizing its F-14s by equipping them with Improved Hawk (I-Hawk) missiles adapted to the airto-air role, but it is far from clear that this is the case or that such adaptations can have more than limited effectiveness. In practice, this means that Iran might well use the F-14s in nuclear strike missions. They are capable of long-range, high payload missions and would require minimal adaptation to carry and release a nuclear weapon.30 As a result, Iran has a large number of attack and air defense aircraft that could carry a small- to medium-sized nuclear weapon long distances, particularly since such strikes are likely to be low-altitude one-way missions. (These were the mission profiles in both NATO and Warsaw Pact theater nuclear strike plans.) Several might conceivably be modified as drones or the equivalent of ‘‘cruise missiles’’ using autopilots, on-board computers, and an add-on GPS. Iran has moderate airlift capabilities for a regional power. The Iranian Air Force’s air transport assets included 3 B-707 and 1 B-747 tanker transports and 5 transport squadrons with 4 B-747Fs, 1 B-727, 18C-130E/Hs, 3 Commander 690s, 10 F-27s, 1 Falcon 20A, and 2 Jetstars. Iran will have 14 Xian Y-7 transports by 2006. 31 Its helicopter strength includes 2 AB-206As, 27–30 Bell 214Cs, and 2 CH-47s, and 30 Mi-17 and Iranian-made Shabaviz 206-1 and 2-75 transport helicopters. The IRGC also has some air elements. It is not clear what combat formations exist within the IRGC, but the IRGC may operate Iran’s 10 EMB-312s.32 It seems to operate many of Iran’s 45 PC-7 trainers, as well as some Pakistani-made trainers at a training school near Mushhak, but this school may be run by the regular air force. It has also claimed to manufacture gliders for use in unconventional warfare. The IRGC has not recently expanded its air combat capabilities.33

Iranian Aircraft Development Iran has made more ambitious claims about aircraft production that it cannot yet back up. Russian firms and the Iranian government tried to reach an agreement over license production of the MiG-29, but repeated attempts have failed. Likely due to the difficulty the regime has had in procuring new aircraft, Iran has been developing three new attack aircraft. The indigenous design and specifics of one of the fighters in development, the Shafagh, were unveiled at the Iran Airshow in 2002. Engineers hope to have a prototype by 2008, though it is unclear what the production numbers will be and what the real-world timetable for deployment may be.34 Little is known about the other two fighters in development, the Saeghe and the Azarakhsh, other than they have been reportedly derived from the F-5F. Claims have

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been made that the Azarakhsh is in low-rate production and has had operational weapons tests. There are also some indications that Iran is experimenting with composites in the Azarakhsh and is seeking to give it a locally modified beyond-visualrange radar for air-to-air combat.35 In practice, Iran is making light turboprop aircraft and a light utility helicopter. It is making enough progress so that it will probably be able to produce a jet trainer and heavier helicopters, but it is unclear how effective it can be in producing modern combat aircraft.36 Iran also has some indigenous capability to produce combat aircraft and drones.

Iranian Air Force Readiness and Effectiveness In spite of Iran’s efforts, readiness and force quality remain major issues. The Iranian Air Force still has many qualitative weaknesses, and it is far from clear that its current rate of modernization can offset the aging of its Western-supplied aircraft and the qualitative improvements in U.S. and southern Gulf forces. The air force also faces serious problems in terms of sustainability, command and control, and training. Iran has a pilot quality problem. Many of its U.S.–trained pilots were purged at some point during the Revolution. Its other U.S.–trained pilots and ground-crew technicians are aging to the point where many should soon retire from service, and they have not had advanced air-to-air combat and air attack training for more than 15 years. Iran has only token numbers of advanced strike aircraft, and these consist of export versions of the SU-24 and dual-capable MiG-29s that do not compete with modern U.S. aircraft or the most modern aircraft in southern Gulf forces. Exercises like the Holy Prophet and the Force of Zolfaghar that Iran held in 2006 show that it is slowly improving its capability for joint land-air and air-sea operations. Iranian exercises and statements provide strong indications that Iran would like to develop an advanced air defense system, the ability to operate effectively in long-range maritime patrol and attack missions, effective joint warfare capabilities, and strike/attack forces with the ability to penetrate deep into Iraq, the southern Gulf States, and other neighboring powers. Iran’s exercises, military literature, and procurement efforts also make it clear that its air planners understand the value of airborne early warning and C4I systems, the value of airborne intelligence and electronic warfare platforms, the value of RPVs, and the value of airborne refueling. As is the case with its army, the Iranian Air Force and land-based air defense forces have also benefited by Iran’s cooperation with Syria and Syrian transfers of Russian methods, tactics, and technology in areas like SIGINT, ELINT, COMINT, and command and control.37 Iran has even sought to create its own satellite program.38 Israel and other sources claim that Iran has several joint SIGINT bases in Syria and that Iran and Syria established a joint intelligence center with Hezbollah during the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict in the summer of 2006.

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Further, the air force’s efforts at sheltering and dispersal indicate that it understands the vulnerability of modern air facilities and the standoff attack capabilities of advanced air forces like those of the United States. The Iranian Air Force must also deal with the fact that its primary challenge now consists of the U.S., British, and Saudi air forces. They are high-technology air forces that operate the airborne warning and control system, have some of the most advanced electronic warfare and targeting systems in the world, and have full refueling capability. They use sophisticated, computer-aided aggressor training and have all of the range and training facilities for beyond-visual-range combat and standoff attacks with air-to-surface munitions. Iran has no airborne control system, although it may be able to use the radars on its F-14s to support other aircraft from the rear. Its overall C4I system is a totally inadequate mix of different sensors, communications, and data processing systems. It has limited electronic warfare capabilities by U.S. standards, although it may be seeking to acquire two Beriev A-50 Mainstay Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft, and has converted some aircraft to provide a limited ELINT/SIGINT capability. Iran’s air defense aircraft consist of a maximum operational strength of two squadrons of 25 export versions of the MiG-29A and two squadrons of 25–30 F-14As. The export version of the MiG-29A has significant avionics limitations and vulnerability to countermeasures, and it is not clear Iran has any operation Phoenix airto-air missiles for its F-14As or has successfully modified its I-Hawk missiles for air-to-air combat. The AWG-9 radar on the F-14 has significant long-distance sensor capability in a permissive environment, but is a U.S.–made system in a nearly 30year-old configuration that is now vulnerable to countermeasures. Iran might risk using its fighters and AEW aircraft against an Israeli strike. It seems doubtful that Israel could support a long-range attack unit with the air defense and electronic assets necessary to provide anything like the air defense and air defense suppression assets that would support a U.S. strike. A U.S. strike could almost certainly destroy any Iranian effort to use fighters, however, and destroy enough Iranian surface-to-air missile defenses to create a secure corridor for penetrating into Iran and against key Iranian installations. The United States could then maintain such a corridor indefinitely with restrikes. While Iran practices realistic individual intercept training, it fails to practice effective unit or force-wide tactics and has shown only a limited capability to fly large numbers of sorties with its U.S.–supplied aircraft on even a surge basis. It has limited refueling capabilities—although it has four B-707 tanker/transports and may have converted other transports. The Iranian Air Force lacks advanced training facilities and has only limited capability to conduct realistic training for beyond-visual-range combat and standoff attacks with air-to-surface munitions. Ground-crew training and proficiency generally seem mediocre—although the layout of Iranian air bases, aircraft storage and parking, the deployment of equipment for maintenance cycles, and the other physical signs of air unit activity are generally better organized than those of most Middle Eastern air forces.

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Iranian Land-Based Air Defense If one looks at Iran’s overall air defense capability, Iran has ‘‘quantity,’’ but its air defenses have limited ‘‘quality.’’ Iran seems to have assigned about 12,000–15,000 men in its air force to land-based air defense functions, including at least 8,000 regulars and 4,000 IRGC personnel. It is not possible to distinguish clearly between the major air defense weapons holdings of the regular air force and of the IRGC, but the air force appeared to operate most major surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. Total holdings seem to include 30 Improved Hawk fire units (12 battalions/150+ launchers), 45–55 SA-2 and HQ-2J/23 (CSA-1) launchers (Chinese-made equivalents of the SA-2), and possibly 25 SA-6 launchers. The air force also had three Soviet-made long-range SA-5 units with a total of 10–15 launchers—enough for six sites. Iran has developed and deployed its own domestically manufactured SAM dubbed the Shahab Thaqeb. The SAM requires a four-wheeled trailer for deployment and closely resembles the R440 SAM.39 Iran’s holdings of lighter air defense weapons include 5 Rapier squadrons with 30 Rapier fire units, 5–10 Chinese FM-80 launchers, 10–15 Tigercat fire units, and a few RBS-70s. Iran also holds large numbers of man-portable SA-7s, HN-5s, and SA-14s, plus about 2,000 antiaircraft guns—including some Vulcans and 50– 60 radar-guided and self-propelled ZSU-23-4 weapons.40 It is not clear which of these lighter air defense weapons were operated by the army, the IRGC, or the air force. The IRGC clearly had larger numbers of man-portable surface-to-air launchers, including some Stingers that it had obtained from Afghanistan. It almost certainly had a number of other light air defense guns as well. In addition to its fighter defenses, Iran has assigned some 12,000–15,000 men in its air force to land-based air defense functions, including at least 8,000 regulars and 4,000 IRGC personnel. It is not possible to distinguish clearly between the major air defense weapons holdings of the regular air force and IRGC, but the air force appeared to operate most major surface-to-air missile systems. There are no authoritative data on how Iran now deploys its land-based air defenses, but Iran seems to have deployed its new SA-5s to cover its major ports, oil facilities, and Tehran. It seems to have concentrated its Improved Hawks and Soviet- and Chinese-made SA-2s around Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz, Bandar Abbas, Kharg Island, Bushehr, Bandar Khomeini, Ahwaz, Dezful, Kermanshah, Hamadan, and Tabriz. Although Iran has made some progress in improving and updating its weapons, sensors, and electronic warfare capability—and has learned much from Iraq’s efforts to defeat U.S. enforcement of the ‘‘no-fly zones’’ during 1992–2003, its current defenses are outdated and poorly integrated. All of its major systems are based on technology that is now more than 35 years old, and all are vulnerable to U.S. use of active and passive countermeasures. Iran is trying to reduce this vulnerability by improving its C4I systems, jamming, tactics, and radars, but faces major limitations on what it can do without major new transfers of modern, advanced weapons and technology from a source like Russia.

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Iran’s air defense forces are too widely spaced to provide more than limited air defense for key bases and facilities, and many lack the missile launcher strength to be fully effective. This is particularly true of Iran’s SA-5 (S-200) sites, which provide long-range, medium-to-high altitude coverage of key coastal installations. These units seem to have been upgraded to the S-200VE ‘‘Vega-E’’ by Belorussian specialists.41 However, too few launchers are scattered over too wide an area to prevent relatively rapid suppression. Iran also lacks the low-altitude radar coverage, overall radar net, command and control assets, sensors, resistance to sophisticated jamming and electronic countermeasures, and systems integration capability necessary to create an effective air defense net. Its land-based air defenses must operate largely in the point defense mode. Iran lacks the battle management systems, and its data links are not fast and effective enough to allow it to take maximum advantage of the overlapping coverage of some of its missile systems—a problem further complicated by the problems in trying to net different systems supplied by Britain, China, Russia, and the United States. Iran’s missiles and sensors are most effective at high-to-medium altitudes against aircraft with limited penetrating and jamming capability. Iran also lacks the low-altitude radar coverage, overall radar net, command and control assets, sensors, resistance to sophisticated jamming and electronic countermeasures, and systems integration capability necessary to create an effective air defense net. This situation may, however, change in the future, and improvements in Iran’s land-based air defenses could be a factor in the timing of any U.S. or Israeli strikes. Iran purchased 20 Russian 9K331 Tor-M-1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) self-propelled surface-to-air missiles in December 2005.42 Global Security indicates that this is a modern short-range missile that has the capability to simultaneously attack two targets using a relatively high powered and jam-resistant radar, and it has ‘‘electronic beam control and vertically launched missiles able to maintain high speed and manoeuvrability inside an entire engagement envelope; the high degree of automation of combat operation provided by the electronic equipment suite.’’ It is said to be capable of detecting targets at a distance of 25 kilometers and attack them at a maximum distance of 12 kilometers. For what it is worth, Russian sources claim that Tor is much more efficient than similar systems like France’s Crotale and Britain’s Rapier. The basic combat formation is a firing battery consisting of four TLARs and the Rangir battery command post. The TLAR carries eight ready missiles stored in two containers holding four missiles each. It is claimed to have an effective range of 1,500 to 12,000 meters against targets flying at altitudes between 10 and 6,000 meters. The maximum maneuvering load factor limit on the weapon is said to be 30 ‘‘Gs’’.43 It should be noted that Russian manufacturer claims are no less exaggerated than those of European and U.S. manufacturers. Delivery dates ranging from 2006–2009 have been reported, but the Tor is too range limited to have a major impact on U.S. stealth attack capability, although its real-world performance against cruise missiles still has yet to be determined. It might

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have more point defense lethality against regular Israeli and U.S. strike fighters like the F-15 and the F-16 using precision-guided bombs, but would be lethal against such aircraft with standoff air-to-surface missiles only if it could be deployed in the flight path in ways which were not detected before the attack profile was determined. Iran also announced in February 2006 (along with several other weapons and military exercise announcements that seemed timed to try to deter U.S. or Israeli military action) that it was mass producing a new man-portable, low-altitude, short-range air defense missile called the Mithaq-2.44 It was said to be electronic warfare and IRflare resistant, and it seemed to be based on the Chinese QW-1 Vanguard. If it is the QW-1, it is an IR-homing missile introduced in the mid-1990s. It may, however, be a variant of the QW-2 with an improved IR seeker. China claims it has an effective range of 500–5,000 meters at target altitudes of 30–4,000 meters. The maximum maneuvering load factor limit on the weapon is said to be 30 Gs. In spite of Iranian claims, it does not seem superior to the Russian SA-14s already in Iranian inventory and is too short-ranged to have more than a minimal deterrent effect.45 Some reports indicate that Iran is seeking more modern Soviet SA-300 missiles and to use Russian systems to modernize its entire air defense system. If Iran could acquire, deploy, and bring such systems to a high degree of readiness, they would substantially improve Iranian capabilities. A report in Jane’s claims that Iran is building surface-to-air missile defense zones around its nuclear facilities that will use a single battery of S-300PMU (SA-10) missiles to defend the Bushehr reactor and will deploy the S-300V (SA-12b) to provide wide area defense coverage of other targets which it will mix with the TOR-M1 to provide low-altitude point defense. This is a logical Iranian approach to improving its defenses, and Iran has sought to purchase the S-300 in the past. It seems to have advanced electronic warfare capabilities, sensors, computer systems, and software. The SA-10 is reported to be able to intercept aircraft at a maximum slant range of 32,000 to 43,200 meters, and a maximum effective defense perimeter of 150 kilometers (90 miles). The minimum effective interception altitude is claimed to be 10 meters. One variant of the missile is reported to have some BMD capability and be able to engage ballistic missile targets at ranges of up to 40 kilometers (25 miles). Each battery is said to have a load of 32 missile rounds on its launchers, a battery deployment time as low as five minutes, and the ability to fire three missiles per second. A standard battery consists of an 83M6E2 command post (CP), up to six 90Zh6E2 air defense missile complexes, 48N6E2 air defense missiles, and technical support facilities.46 If Iran were to get the SV-300 (SA-12a and SA-12b), it would get a system with far more advanced sensors, electronic warfare capabilities, and significant point defense capabilities against ballistic missiles. A Russian S-300V brigade has the following components: 9M82 SA-12b Giant missiles (2 per launcher) and TELAR, 9M83 SA-12a Gladiator missiles (4 per launcher) and TELAR, Giant and Gladiator launcher/loader vehicles, 9S15 Bill Board Surveillance Radar system, 9S19 High Screen Sector Radar system, 9S32 Grill Pan Guidance Radar system, and 9S457 Command Station. The SA-12a is a dual-role antimissile and antiaircraft missile with a maximum range between 75 and 90 kilometers. The SA-12b GIANT missile

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is configured as an ATBM role with a longer maximum range of between 100 and 200 kilometers. Each unit can detect up to 200 targets, track as many as 70 targets, and designate 24 of the targets to the brigade’s four GRILL PAN radar systems for engagement.47 It seems doubtful, however, that Iran has operational S-300PMU systems, has taken delivery on such units, or has even been able to buy them from Russia. It is also unclear that Russia has sold Iran SV-300 systems or plans to. The Russian Minister of Defense flatly denied any such sales had taken place in February 2006.48 Even if such systems are delivered, their real-world performance will be uncertain. In the past, Russia has also been careful to control some critical aspects of its weapons exports and sell degraded export versions. Iran’s air forces are only marginally better able to survive in air-to-air combat than Iraq’s were before 2003. Iran’s command and control system has serious limitations in terms of secure communications, vulnerability to advanced electronic warfare, netting, and digital data transfer. According to the IISS, Iran does still have five operational P-3MP Orions and may have made its captured Iraqi IL-76 Candid AEW aircraft operational. These assets would give it airborne warning and command and control capability, but these are obsolescent to obsolete systems and are likely to be highly vulnerable to electronic warfare and countermeasures, and long-range attack, even with Iranian modifications and updates. There are some reports Iran may be seeking to make a version of the Russian AN-140 AEW aircraft, but these could not be deployed much before 2015.49 THE IRANIAN NAVY The Iranian Navy had some 18,000 men in 2006. According to the IISS, this total included a two-brigade marine force of some 2,600 men and a 2,000-man naval aviation force. It had bases at Bandar-e Abbas, Bushehr, Kharg Island, Bander-e Anzelli, Chah Bahar, Bander-e Mahshahar, and Bander-e Khomeini, most of them opposing the Saudi coast. See Figure 8.5. The naval forces had 3 submarines, 3 frigates, 2 corvettes, 10 missile patrol craft, 5 mine warfare ships, 52 coastal and inshore patrol craft, and 10 amphibious ships. Its naval aviation branch is one of the few air elements in any Gulf navy, having 5 maritime patrol aircraft and 19 armed helicopters. When combined with the IRGC naval branch, this brought the total maritime strength of Iran to 38,000 men, with significant capabilities for both regular naval and asymmetric naval warfare. Iran has given the modernization of its naval forces some priority, although its major surface ships are all old vessels with limited refits and aging weapons and fire-control systems. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran has obtained new antiship missiles and missile patrol craft from China, midget submarines from North Korea, submarines from Russia, and modern mines. Iran has expanded the capabilities of the naval branch of the IRGC, acquired additional mine warfare capability, and upgraded some of its older surface ships. Iran’s exercises have included

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Figure 8.5 Iranian Navy’s Force Structure Trends, 1990–2006

Manpower Active

1990

2000

2005

2006

14,500

20,600

18,000

18,000

14,500

20,600

18,000

18,000

Conscripts

0

0

0

0

Submarines

0

5

3

3

SSK (RF Type 877)

0

3

3

3

SSI

0

2

0

0

3

0

0

0

Damavand (U.K. Battle)

1

0

0

0

Babr (U.S. Sumner)

2

0

0

0

5

3

5

5

Alvand (U.K. Vosper)

3

3

3

3

Bayandor (U.S. PF-103)

2

0

2

2


34

64

56

250+*

Patrol Missile Craft

10

20

10

10

Kaman (Fr Combattante II)

10

10

10

10

Destroyers

Frigates

Houdong

0

10

0

0

24

42

35+

85

Kaivan

3

Some

0

0

Parvin

3

3

3

3

Chaho

3

Some

0

0

Zafar

0

3

3

3

Bogomol

0

1

0

0

Patrol Inshore

China Cat

0

0

3

6

Hovercraft

15

9

14

?†

3

7

7

5

Sharokh (MSC)

2

1

1

1

Riazi (U.S. Cape)

0

1

2

2

Harischi (MSI)

1

1

0

0

Hejaz (Minelayer)

0

2

2

0

292 MSC

0

2

2

2

Amphibious

7

9

10

10

4

4

4

4

Mine Warfare

Hengam (LST)

352


Iran Hormuz (LST)

3

3

3

3

Foque (LSL)

0

2

3

3

Landing craft

4+

9+

200+

6

Support

8

25

25

27

Maritime Reconnaissance

0

8

10

8

P-3F

0

3

5

5

Do-228

0

5

5

5

Antisubmarine Weapons

9

9

20

10

SH-3D Sea King

3

3

10

10

AB-212

6

6

10

0

2

2

3

3

Mine Countermeasures RH-53D

2

2

3

3

Transport

29

29

18

13

Commander

4

4

4

4

Falcon

1

1

3

3

F-27

4

4

4

4

AB-205 (Heli)

Some

Some

5

5

AB-206 (Heli)

Some

Some

2

2

0

0

0

10

AB-212

* ‘‘+’’ indicates the numbers listed may be slightly less than the actual units or weapons in stock. † All ‘‘?’’ refer to weapons that Iran is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in its possession are unknown. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

a growing number of joint and combined arms exercises with the land forces and air force. Iran has also improved its ports and strengthened its air defenses, while obtaining some logistic and technical support from nations like India and Pakistan. In August 2000, the Islamic Republic announced that it had launched its first domestically produced light submarine, which is called the Al-Sabiha 15. It can be used for reconnaissance and laying mines.50

Iranian Antiship Missiles and Missile Craft Iran’s depends heavily on its ability to use antiship missiles to make up for its lack of airpower and modern major surface vessels. Iran’s Western-supplied missiles are now all beyond their shelf life, and their operational status is uncertain. Iranian forces are now operating the following four systems that Iran has obtained from China:

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• The Seersucker is a long-range, mobile antiship missile, which is designated the HY-2 or Sea Eagle-2 by the People’s Republic of China. It is a large missile with a 0.76-meter diameter and a weight of 3,000 kilograms. It has an 80–90-kilometer range and a 450kilogram warhead. There are two variants. One uses radar active homing at ranges from the target of 8 kilometers (4.5 nautical miles). The other is set to use passive infrared (IR) homing and a radar altimeter to keep it at a constant height over the water. • The CS-801 antiship missile, also called the Yinji (Hawk) missile, is a solid fueled missile. It can be launched from land and ships. It has a range of approximately 74 kilometers in the surface-to-surface mode and uses J-Band active radar guidance. It has a 512-kilogram warhead and cruises at an altitude of 20–30 meters. • The CS-802 is an upgraded CS-801. It uses a turbojet propulsion system with a rocket booster instead of the solid fueled booster in the CS-801. It has a range of 70–75 miles, has a warhead of up to 363 pounds, and can be targeted by a radar deployed on a smaller ship or aircraft operating over the radar horizon of the launching vessel.51 • The CS-801K is a Chinese-supplied, air-launched antiship missile and variant of the CS-801. It too is a sea-skimming, high-subsonic cruise missile and has a range in excess of 20 nautical miles. It has been test-fired by Iran’s F-4Es, but Iran may be able to use other launch aircraft. This air delivery capability gives Iran what some analysts have called a ‘‘360 degree’’ attack capability, since aircraft can rapidly maneuver to far less predictable launch points than Iranian combat ships.52

Iran has sought to buy advanced antiship missiles from Russia, North Korea, and China, to buy antiship missile production facilities, and possibly even Chinese-made missile armed frigates. Some sources have claimed that Iran has bought eight Sovietmade SS-N-22 ‘‘Sunburn’’ or ‘‘Sunburst’’ antiship missile launch units from Ukraine and has deployed them near the Straits of Hormuz. However, U.S. experts have not seen firm evidence of such a purchase and doubt that Iran has any operational holdings of such systems. The ‘‘SS-N-22’’ is a title that actually applies to two different modern long-range supersonic sea skimming systems—the P-270 Moskit (also called the Kh-15 or 3M80) and the P80 or P-100 Zubi/Onika. Iran’s main launch platforms for antiship missiles include three British-supplied Vosper Mark 5 Sa’am-class frigates—called the Alvand, the Alborz, and the Sabalan. These ships date back to the time of the Shah, and each is a 1,100-ton frigate with a crew of 125–146 and maximum speeds of 39 knots. Each was originally armed with one five-missile Sea Killer Mark II surface-to-surface missile launcher and one Mark 8 4.5´´ gun mount. They have since had their Sea Killer’s replaced with C-802 antiship missiles and new fire-control radars. The Sea Killer has a relatively effective beamriding missile with radio command or optical guidance, and a maximum range of 25 kilometers. All three ships are active, but the Sabalan took serious damage from the U.S. Navy during the Tanker War of 1987–1988, and the ships have not had a total refit since the early 1990s. The antisubmarine weapons (ASW) capabilities of these ships seem to be limited or nonfunctioning. Iran has two U.S. PF-103 (Bayandor-class) corvettes called the Bayandor and the Naghdi. These ships are 900-ton vessels, with

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crews of 140, two 76-mm guns, and a maximum speed of 18 knots. They were laid down in 1962 and delivered in 1964. The Bayandor and the Naghdi are probably the most active large surface ships in the Iranian Navy. However, neither is equipped with antiship and antiair missiles, sophisticated weapons systems, sonars, or advanced electronic warfare equipment and sensors.53 The rest of Iran’s major surface vessels consist of missile patrol boats. These include ten 68-ton Chinese-built Thondor (Hudong)-class fast attack craft or missile patrol boats. The Hudong-class fast attack craft are equipped with I-band search and navigation radars, but do not have a major antiair missile system. Iran ordered these ships for the naval branch of its Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps in 1992, and all ten were delivered to Iran by March 1996. The vessels have a crew of 28. They carry four antiship missiles and are armed with the CS-801 and CS-802 missiles. Iran now has at least 100 CS-801s and CS-802s. Iran’s missile patrol boats also include 10 275-ton French-made Combattante II (Kaman-class) fast attack boats, out of an original total of 12. These boats are armed with antiship missiles, one 76-mm gun, and have maximum speeds of 37.5 knots. They were originally armed with four U.S. Harpoon missiles, but their Harpoons may no longer be operational. At least 5 had been successfully converted with launchers that can carry 2–4 CS-801/CS-802s. Iran supplied the CS-802s that Hezbollah successfully used against one of Israel’s most modern Sa’ar Class 5 missile ships during the fighting in 2006. Iran has a number of large patrol craft and fast attack craft. The operational ships of this type include three North Korean–supplied 82-ton Zafar-class (Chahoclass) fast attack craft with I-band search radars and armed with 23-mm guns and a BM-21 multiple rocket launcher, two Kavian-class (U.S. Cape-class) 148-ton patrol craft armed with 40-mm and 23-mm guns, and three Improved PGM-71 Parvinclass 98-ton patrol craft supplied in the late 1960s, armed with 40-mm and 20-mm guns. There are more than 35 other small patrol boats plus large numbers of small boats operated by the IRGC. Most of these craft are operational and can be effective in patrol missions. They lack, however, sophisticated weapons systems or air defenses, other than machine guns and SA-7s and SA-14s. Iran has 5–6 BH-7s and 7–8 SRN-6 Hovercrafst, believed to be operated by the IRGC. About half of these Hovercrafts may be operational. They are capable of speeds of up to 60–70 knots. They are lightly armed and vulnerable, but their high speed makes them useful for many reconnaissance and unconventional warfare missions, and they can rapidly land troops on suitable beaches. In the early fall of 2006, Iran also demonstrated new naval missile capabilities during its Force of Zolfaghar exercises. These included submarine launched missiles that Iran called the Sagheb, but which seem to have been Chinese YJ-8s.54 Iran also demonstrated a new missile that it called the Qassed or ‘‘Messenger’’ that its F-4Es could carry in pairs and which Iran said was a 2,000-pound, rocket-assisted, precisionguided standoff weapon that could be used to attack both land and naval targets.

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Iranian Mine Warfare Capabilities Mine warfare, amphibious warfare, antiship missiles, and unconventional warfare offer Iran ways of compensating for the weakness of its conventional air and naval forces. Iran’s mine warfare vessels included two to three operational Shahrock-class MSC-292/268 coastal minesweepers (one used for training in the Caspian Sea). Two of these three ships, the Shahrock and the Karkas, were known to be operational. They are 378-ton sweepers that can be used to lay mines as well as sweep, but their radars and sonars date back to the late 1950s and are obsolete in sweeping and countermeasure activity against modern mines. Iran had one to two operational Cape-class (Riazzi-class) 239-ton inshore minesweepers and seems to have converted two of its indigenously produced Ajar-class landing ship tanks (LSTs) for mine warfare purposes. Many of its small boats and craft can also lay mines. Both the Iranian Navy and the naval branch of the IRGC are expanding their capability for mine warfare. While Iran has only a limited number of specialized mine vessels, it can also use small craft, LSTs, Boghammers, helicopters, and submarines to lay mines. As a result, it is impossible to determine how many ships Iran would employ to plant or lay mines in a given contingency, and some of its mines might be air dropped or laid by commercial vessels, including dhows. Iran has a range of Soviet-, Western-, and Iranian-made moored and drifting contact mines, and U.S. experts estimate that Iran has at least 2,000 mines. Iran has significant stocks of antiship mines and has bought Chinese-made and North Korean– made versions of the Soviet mines. It has claimed to be making its own nonmagnetic, acoustic, free-floating, and remote-controlled mines and has had Chinese assistance in developing the production facilities for such mines. It may have acquired significant stocks of nonmagnetic mines, influence mines, and mines with sophisticated timing devices from other countries.55 There also are reports that Iran has negotiated with China to buy the EM-52 or MN-52 rocket-propelled mine. The EM-52 is a mine that rests on the bottom until it senses a ship passing over it, and then it uses a rocket to hit the target. The maximum depth of the Straits of Hormuz is 80 meters (264 feet), although currents are strong enough to displace all but firmly moored mines.56 Combined with modern submarine laid mines and antiship missile systems like the CS-801/802 and the SS-N-22, the EM-52 would give Iran considerable capability to harass Gulf shipping and even the potential capability to close the Gulf until U.S. naval and airpower could clear the mines and destroy the missile launchers and submarines. Even obsolete moored mines have proven difficult to detect and sweep when intelligence does not detect the original laying and size of the minefield, and free-floating mines can be used to present a constant hazard to shipping. Bottom-influence mines can use acoustic, magnetic, or pressure sensors to detect ships passing overhead. They can use multiple types of sensor/actuators to make it hard to deceive the mines and force them to release, can be set to release only after a given number of ships pass, and some can be set to attack ships only of a given size or noise profile. Such mines

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are extremely difficult to detect and sweep, particularly when they are spaced at wide intervals in shipping lanes. Iranian Amphibious Assets Iran has significant amphibious assets compared to other Gulf countries, and the regular navy and the naval branch of the IRGC operate independent marine forces. These assets are large enough to move a battalion-sized force relatively rapidly; they include three Hengam-class (Larak-class) LST amphibious support ships (displacement of 2,940 tons loaded) that can carry up to six tanks, 600 tons of cargo, and 227 troops; three Iran Hormuz–class (South Korean) LSTs (2,014 tons loaded) that can carry up to nine tanks and berth 140 troops; and three Hormuz-21–class 1, 80-ton LSTs and three Fouque-class 176-ton landing ship logistics (LSLs). These capabilities are not large enough, however, to sustain large-scale operations across the Gulf. Iran’s amphibious ships give it the capability to deploy about 1,000 troops and, theoretically, about 30–40 tanks in an amphibious assault—but Iran has never demonstrated that it has an effective over-the-shore capability. Iran might use commercial ferries and roll-on–roll-off ships if it felt they could survive. Iran has also built up its capability to hide or shelter small ships in facilities on its islands and coastline along the Gulf and has the ability to provide them with defensive cover from antiair and antiship missiles. Iran has support ships, but these are generally insufficient to sustain ‘‘blue-water’’ operations and support an amphibious task force. It has one Kharg-class 33,014-ton replenishment ship, two Bandar Abbas–class 4,673-ton fleet supply ships and oilers, one 14,410-ton repair ship, two 12,000-ton water tankers, seven 1,300-ton Delvaclass support ships, five to six Hendijan-class support vessels, two floating dry docks, and 20 tugs, tenders, and utility craft to help support a large naval or amphibious operation. Iran’s training to date has focused on amphibious raiding, however, and not on operations using heavy weapons or larger operations. Iran lacks the air and surface power to move its amphibious forces across the Gulf in the face of significant air/ sea defenses or to support a landing in a defended area. Iranian Naval Air The Iranian Navy’s air capability consists of two to three operational P-3F Orion maritime patrol aircraft out of an original inventory of five. According to reports from the Gulf, none of the surviving P-3Fs have fully operational radars, and their crews often use binoculars. It also has up to ten Sikorsky SH-3D ASW helicopters, three RH-53D mine-laying helicopters, and seven Agusta-Bell AB-212 helicopters. Iran uses air force AH-1J attack helicopters, equipped with French AS-12 missiles, in naval missions, and has adapted Hercules C-130 and Fokker Friendship aircraft for mine-laying and patrol missions. The most significant recent development in Iran’s capabilities to use airpower to attack naval targets has been the acquisition of the CS-801K for its regular air force.

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Iran’s Submarine Forces Iran has attempted to offset the weakness of its major surface forces by obtaining three Type 877EKM Kilo-class submarines. The Kilo is a relatively modern and quiet submarine that first became operational in 1980. The Iranian Kilos are Type 877EKM export versions that are about 10 meters longer than the original Kilos and are equipped with advanced command and control systems. Each Type 877EKM has a teardrop hull coated with anechoic tiles to reduce noise. It displaces approximately 3,076 tons when submerged and 2,325 tons when surfaced. It is 72.6 meters long, 9.9 meters in beam, has a draught of 6.6 meters, and is powered by three 1,895-horsepower (HP) generator sets, one 5,900 shaft horsepower (SHP) electric motor, and one six-bladed propeller. It has a complement of 52 men and an endurance of 45 days. Its maximum submerged speed is 17 knots, and its maximum surface speed is 10 knots. Each Kilo has six 530-mm torpedo tubes, including two wire-guided torpedo tubes. Only one torpedo can be wire guided at a time. The Kilo can carry a mix of 18 homing and wire-guided torpedoes or 24 mines. Russian torpedoes are available with ranges of 15–19 kilometers, speeds of 29–40 knots, and warheads with 100-, 205-, and 305-kilogram weights. Their guidance systems include active sonar homing, passive homing, wire guidance, and active homing. Some reports indicate that Iran bought over 1,000 modern Soviet mines with the Kilos and that the mines were equipped with modern magnetic, acoustic, and pressure sensors. The Kilo has a remote antiaircraft launcher with one preloaded missile in the sail, and Soviet versions have six SA-N-5 (Igla/SA-16) surface-to-air missiles stored inside. However, Russia supplied Iran only with the SA-14 (Strela). It can be modernized to carry Chinese YJ-1 or Russian Novator Alfa surface-to-surface missiles.57 The Kilo has a maximum surface speed of 10 knots, a maximum submerged speed of about 17 knots, a minimum submerged operating depth of about 30 meters, an operational diving depth of 240 meters, and a maximum diving depth of 300 meters. The submarine also has a surface cruise range of 3,000–6,000 nautical miles and a submerged cruise range of 400 nautical miles—depending on speed and combat conditions.58 Iran’s ability to use its submarines to deliver mines and fire long-range wakehoming torpedoes gives it a potential capability to strike in ways that make it difficult to detect or attack the submarine. Mines can be laid covertly in critical areas before a conflict, and the mines can be set to activate and deactivate at predetermined intervals in ways that make mining difficult to detect and sweep. Long-range homing torpedoes can be used against tanker-sized targets at ranges in excess of 10 kilometers and to attack slow-moving combat ships that are not on alert and/or that lack sonars and countermeasures. At the same time, many Third World countries have found submarines to be difficult to operate. For example, Russia delivered the first two Kilos with two 120-cell batteries designed for rapid power surges, rather than power over long periods. They proved to last only one to two years in warm waters vs. five to seven years for similar

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batteries from India and the United Kingdom. Iran had to turn to India for help in developing batteries that are reliable in the warm waters of the Gulf. Iran has also had problems with the air conditioning in the ships, and their serviceability has been erratic. There are serious questions about crew capability and readiness, and all three submarines already need significant refits. Iran faces significant operational problems in using its submarines in local waters. Many areas of the Gulf do not favor submarine operations. The Gulf is about 241,000 square kilometers in area and stretches 990 kilometers from the Shatt alArab to the Straits of Hormuz. It is about 340 kilometers wide at its maximum width and about 225 kilometers wide for most of its length. While heat patterns disturb surface sonars, they also disturb submarine sonars, and the advantage seems to be slightly in favor of sophisticated surface ships and maritime patrol aircraft. The deeper parts of the Gulf are noisy enough to make ASW operations difficult, but large parts of the Gulf—including much of the southern Gulf on a line from Al Jubail across the tip of Qatar to about half way up the United Arab Emirates— are less than 20 meters deep. The water is deeper on the Iranian side, but the maximum depth of the Gulf—located about 30 kilometers south of Qeys Island—is still only 88 meters. This means that no point in the Gulf is deeper than the length of an SN-688 nuclear submarine. The keel to tower height of such a submarine alone is 16 meters. Even smaller coastal submarines have maneuver and bottom suction problems, cannot hide in thermoclines, or take advantage of diving for concealment or self-protection. This may explain why Iran is planning to relocate its submarines from Bandar Abbas, inside the Gulf, to Chah Bahar in the Gulf of Oman and is deepening the navy facility at Chah Bahar.59 The Strait of Hormuz at the entrance to the Gulf is about 180 kilometers long, but has a minimum width of 39 kilometers, and only the two deep-water channels are suitable for major surface ship or submarine operations. Further, a limited flow of fresh water and high evaporation makes the Gulf extremely salty. This creates complex underwater currents in the main channels at the Straits of Hormuz and complicates both submarine operations and submarine detection. There are some areas with considerable noise, but not of a type that masks submarine noise from sophisticated ASW detection systems of the kind operated by the United States and the United Kingdom. Further, the minimum operating depth of the Kilo is 45 meters, and the limited depth of the area around the Straits can make submarine operations difficult. Submarines are easier to operate in the Gulf of Oman, which is noisy enough to make ASW operations difficult, but such deployments would expose the Kilos to operations by U.S. and British nuclear attack submarines. It is unlikely that Iran’s Kilos could survive for any length of time if hunted by a U.S. or British navy airsurface-SSN (nuclear submarine) hunter-killer team.60 In any case, the effectiveness of Iran’s submarines is likely to depend heavily on the degree of Western involvement in any ASW operation. If the Kilos did not face the U.S. or British ASW forces, the Iranian Kilos could operate in or near the Gulf with considerable impunity. If they did face U.S. and British forces, they might be able to attack a few tankers or conduct some mining efforts, but are unlikely to survive

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extended combat. This makes the Kilos a weapon that may be more effective in threatening Gulf shipping, or as a remote minelayer, than in naval combat. Certainly, Iran’s purchase of the Kilos has already received close attention from the southern Gulf States and convinced them that they must take Iran more seriously. The Role of the Naval Branch of the IRGC Iran’s unconventional warfare capabilities include the naval branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps that operates Iran’s land-based antiship missiles and coastal defense artillery. In addition to its land- and sea-based antiship missile forces, the naval guards can use large numbers of small patrol boats equipped with heavy machine guns, grenade launchers, antitank guided weapons, man-portable surfaceto-air missiles, and 106-mm recoilless rifles. The IRGC also uses small launches, and at least 30 Zodiak rubber dinghies, to practice rocket, small arms, and recoilless rifle attacks. Its other small craft were armed with a mix of machine guns, recoilless rifles, and man- and crew-portable antitank guided missiles. These vessels are difficult to detect by radar in anything but the calmest seas. Iran bases them at a number of offshore islands and oil platforms, and they can strike quickly and with limited warning. The Naval Branch of the IRGC also has naval artillery, divers, and mine-laying units. It had extensive stocks of scuba equipment and an underwater combat center at Bandar Abbas.61 Iran is also improving the defenses and port capabilities of its islands in the Gulf, adding covered moorings, more advanced sensors, and better air defenses. Iran can use IRGC forces to conduct the kind of low-intensity/guerrilla warfare that can be defeated only by direct engagement with land forces and can filter substantial reinforcements into a coastal area on foot or with light vehicles, making such reinforcement difficult to attack. Iran can use virtually any surviving small craft to lay mines and to place unmoored mines in shipping lanes. Its IRGC forces can use small craft to attack offshore facilities and raid coastal targets. Finally, it is important to note the United States did not successfully destroy a single land-based Iraqi antiship missile launcher during the Gulf War, and the IRGC now has many dispersal launch sites and storage areas over a much longer coast. It also has a growing number of caves, shelters, and small hardened facilities. Such targets are sometimes difficult to detect until they are used, and they present added problems because they usually are too small and too numerous to attack with high cost ordnance until it is clear they have valuable enough contents to merit such an attack. Naval Force Deployments The main forces of the Iranian Navy are concentrated in the Gulf. Iran gives more importance to the security of its territorial sea in the Gulf area since in this direction it has highly complicated relations with various Arab nations, the United States, and Israel. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, Iran’s policy toward the Caspian Sea area has changed. According to the contracts between the Soviet Union and

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Iran, Tehran was not allowed to station its navy in the Caspian Sea. After the disintegration of the USSR, however, the fourth naval regional forces started representing the Iranian Navy in the Caspian.62 The Islamic Republic has almost 3,000 personnel in the Caspian. The forces include up to 50 fighting ships and support vessels, the Marine Corps, coastal guard forces, and the sea aircraft. There are also training vessels in the fleet, including one Shahrokh MSC minesweeper, two Hamzeh ships, and others. Currently, Iran has the second largest fleet in the Caspian after Russia. The fleet, however, is outdated. This is why Tehran has been trying to strengthen its naval forces in the Caspian through various programs. It is reported that the government has numerous plans to modernize its fleet. According to these projects, the future fleet will include several divisions and separate battalions of ships and submarines.63

Overall Naval Capabilities Iran’s efforts have steadily improved its capabilities to threaten Gulf shipping and offshore oil facilities, its capability to support unconventional warfare, and its ability to defend its offshore facilities, islands, and coastline. They have not, however, done much to help Iran to act as an effective blue-water navy. At the same time, the military capability of Iranian naval forces should not be measured in terms of the ability to win a battle for sea control against U.S. and British naval forces or any combination of southern Gulf States supported by U.S. and British forces. For the near future, Iran’s forces are likely to lose any such battle in a matter of days. As a result, it is Iran’s ability to conduct limited or unconventional warfare, or to threaten traffic through the Gulf, that gives Iran the potential ability to threaten or intimidate its neighbors.

IRAN’S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) PROGRAM There is no simple or reliable way to characterize Iran’s ability to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. Iran is clearly attempting to acquire long-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, but it has never indicated that such weapons would have CBRN warheads. Iran has never properly declared its holdings of chemical weapons, and the status of its biological weapons programs is unknown. There have been strong indications of an active Iranian interest in acquiring nuclear weapons since the time of the Shah and that Khomeini revived such efforts after Iraq invaded Iran and began to use chemical weapons. There is, however, no reliable history of such efforts or ‘‘smoking gun’’ that conclusively proves their existence. The Iranian leadership has consistently argued that its nuclear research efforts are designed for peaceful purposes, although various Iranian leaders have made ambiguous statements about acquiring weapons of mass destruction and Iranian actions

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strongly suggest that Iran is trying to acquire nuclear weapons. Whether such Iranian deniability is plausible or not is highly questionable, but Iran has been able to find some alternative explanation for even its most suspect activities, and there is no present way to disprove its claims with open source material. Chemical Weapons The various claims and counterassertions about Iran’s current chemical weapons capabilities are as hard to substantiate as they are to rebut. Open sources are limited and conflicting, and Iranian claims go unchecked. Outside governments have provided some useful summary assessments of Iranian chemical weapons program, but few details. Official Estimates of Iranian Capability The CIA has reported that Chinese entities were still trying to supply Iran with chemical warfare (CW)-related chemicals between 1997 and 1998. The U.S. sanctions imposed in May 1997 on seven Chinese entities for knowingly and materially contributing to Iran’s CW program remain in effect. In addition, the CIA estimated in January 1999 that Iran obtained material related to chemical warfare from various sources during the first half of 1998. It already has manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons, including blister, blood, and choking agents and the bombs and artillery shells for delivering them. However, Tehran is seeking foreign equipment and expertise to create a more advanced and self-sufficient CW infrastructure. The last unclassified U.S. formal assessment of this aspect of Iranian proliferation was released in 2001, and it provided only a broad summary:64 Iran has acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and in a May 1998 session of the CWC Conference of the States Parties, Tehran, for the first time, acknowledged the existence of a past chemical weapons program. Iran admitted developing a chemical warfare program during the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq war as a ‘‘deterrent’’ against Iraq’s use of chemical agents against Iran. Moreover, Tehran claimed that after the 1988 cease-fire, it ‘‘terminated’’ its program. However, Iran has yet to acknowledge that it, too, used chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. Nevertheless, Iran has continued its efforts to seek production technology, expertise and precursor chemicals from entities in Russia and China that could be used to create a more advanced and self-sufficient chemical warfare infrastructure. As Iran’s program moves closer to self-sufficiency, the potential will increase for Iran to export dual-use chemicals and related equipment and technologies to other countries of proliferation concern. In the past, Tehran has manufactured and stockpiled blister, blood and choking chemical agents, and weaponized some of these agents into artillery shells, mortars, rockets, and aerial bombs. It also is believed to be conducting research on nerve agents. Iran could employ these agents during a future conflict in the region. Lastly, Iran’s training, especially for its naval and ground forces, indicates that it is planning to operate in a contaminated environment.

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In mid-May 2003, the Bush administration released a statement to the Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in which the United States accused Iran of continuing to pursue production technology, training, and expertise from abroad. The statement asserted that Iran was continuing to stockpile blister, blood, choking, and some nerve agents. This was followed by an unclassified report the CIA released in November 2003 that stated that ‘‘Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Nevertheless, during the reporting period it continued to seek production technology, training, and expertise from Chinese entities that could further Tehran’s efforts to achieve an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents. Iran likely has already stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and probably nerve agents— and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them—which it previously had manufactured.’’65 John R. Bolton, then Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the U.S. Department of State, reported on Iran’s chemical program in testimony to the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia in 2005. He reported, however, only in summary terms:66 We believe Iran has a covert program to develop and stockpile chemical weapons. The U.S. Intelligence Community reported in its recent unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, also known as the ‘‘721 Report,’’ that Iran continues to seek production technology, training, and expertise that could further its efforts to achieve an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents. A forthcoming edition of the 721 report is expected to state that, ‘‘Iran may have already stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and nerve agents—and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them—which it previously had manufactured.’’ Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The CWC’s central obligation is simple: no stockpiling, no development, no production, and no use of chemical weapons. The overwhelming majority of States Parties abide by this obligation. Iran is not, and we have made this abundantly clear to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Although Iran has declared a portion of its CW program to the OPCW, it is time for Iran to declare the remainder and make arrangements for its dismantlement and for the destruction of its chemical weapons.

European assessments seem to agree with those of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and the CIA, but there have been only limited public reports. The German Federal Customs Administration published a report in November 2004 that stated, ‘‘Iran has an emerging chemical industry. Its CW program obtains support, according to accounts received, from China and India. It probably possesses chemical agents such as sulphur mustards, Tabun, and hydrogen cyanide, possibly also sarin and VC. Iran is attempting to acquire chemical installations and parts thereof, as well as technology and chemical precursors.’’67

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Arms Control Estimates of Iranian Capability Arms control efforts have not provided meaningful transparency, and ratifying the CWC has not guaranteed the end of Tehran’s CW programs; it has only meant that if Iran is violating the treaty, it is an ‘‘illegal’’ activity. Unfortunately, there have been no meaningful inspections or independent analysis of Iran’s chemical weapons program. Iran did submit a statement in Farsi to the CWC secretariat in 1998, but this statement consisted only of questions as to the nature of the required compliance. It has not provided the CWC with detailed data on its chemical weapons program. Iran also stridently asserted its right to withdraw from the Convention at any time.

NGO Estimates of Iranian Capability Some nongovernmental organization (NGO) reporting does provide more detail. A study by the Monterey Institute indicates there are a number of sites in Iran that may be related to Iran’s chemical warfare effort:68 • Abu Musa Island: Iran holds a large number of chemical weapons, principally 155-mm artillery shells, in addition to some weaponized biological agents. • Bandar Khomeini: Allegedly the location of a chemical weapons facility, run by the Razi Chemical Corporation, established during the Iran-Iraq war to manufacture chemical weapons. • Damghan: Either a chemical weapons plant or warhead assembly facility. Primarily involved in 155-mm artillery shells and SCUD warheads. • Isfahan: Suspected location of a chemical weapons facility, possibly operated by the Poly-Acryl Corporation. • Karaj: Located about 14 kilometers from Tehran, this is the site of an alleged storage and manufacturing facility for chemical weapons. Reports suggest that this facility was built with Chinese assistance. • Marvdasht: The Chemical Fertilizers Company is suspected to have been a manufacturing facility for mustard agents during the Iran-Iraq War. • Parchin: The location of at least one munitions factory and is suspected of being a major chemical weapons production facility. Reports of uncertain reliability indicate that the plant was in operation no later than March 1988. In April 1997, a German newspaper reported that, according to the German Federal Intelligence Service, the factories at Parchin were producing primary products for chemical warfare agents. • Qazvin: A large pesticide plant at this location is widely believed to produce nerve gas. • Mashar: Iranian opposition groups have made allegations, of uncertain reliability, that a warhead filling facility is operated at this location.

The Nuclear Threat Initiative summarized what is and is not known about the status of Iran’s chemical weapons as follows in January 2006:69

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Despite its acquisition of precursors from abroad, Iran is allegedly working to develop an indigenous CW production capability. The CIA believes that ‘‘Teheran is rapidly approaching self-sufficiency and could become a supplier of CW-related materials to other nations.’’ As of 1996, the Department of Defense claimed that Iran had stockpiled almost 2000 tons of toxic chemical agents and was continuously working on expanding its CW program. Iran has several advanced research institutions employing various chemicals for a variety of reasons, including pesticide production, pharmaceutical research, and other medical studies. Iran has also conducted several military exercises to date that have included defensive chemical and biological weapons maneuvers. Iran continues to deny any allegations that it is actively pursuing an offensive CW program. In 1996, it held the first regional seminar on the national implementation of the CWC in Tehran so that government authorities could familiarize themselves with their duties and obligations under the treaty. It also held a mock ‘‘trial inspection’’ at the Shahid Razkani chemical factory to allow inspectors to see how such a procedure was conducted. Iran submitted a declaration on its chemical facilities and its past CW stockpile, it has destroyed chemical weapons production equipment in the presence of OPCW inspectors, and it has undergone a number of OPCW inspections of its chemical industrial facilities. Iran continues to play an active role at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), is recognized as a member in good standing, and currently serves on its executive council. Although US and Israeli intelligence agencies continue to insist Iran maintains a stockpile of chemical weapons, no challenge inspections of Iranian facilities have been requested, and none of the allegations made regarding the stockpiling of CW can be verified in the unclassified domain. However, Iran continues to retain a strong incentive for developing a defensive CW program.

Biological Weapons Any analysis of Iran’s biological weapons effort must be even more speculative. In 1997, the U.S. DOD asserted that the Iranian biological warfare (BW) program ‘‘is in the research and development [R&D] stage, [but] the Iranians have considerable expertise with pharmaceuticals, as well as the commercial and military infrastructure needed to produce basic biological warfare agents.’’70 The Department updated its findings in 2001 as follows:71 Iran has a growing biotechnology industry, significant pharmaceutical experience and the overall infrastructure to support its biological warfare program. Tehran has expanded its efforts to seek considerable dual-use biotechnical materials and expertise from entities in Russia and elsewhere, ostensibly for civilian reasons. Outside assistance is important for Iran, and it is also difficult to prevent because of the dual-use nature of the materials and equipment being sought by Iran and the many legitimate end uses for these items. Iran’s biological warfare program began during the Iran-Iraq war. Iran is believed to be pursuing offensive biological warfare capabilities and its effort may have evolved beyond agent research and development to the capability to produce small quantities of agent. Iran has ratified the BWC [Biological Weapons Convention].

Since that time, the United States has not significantly updated its unclassified estimates, except to state that such Iranian R&D efforts continue. The problem is

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whether such statements are a suspicion, a strong probability, or a fact. Iran does have extensive laboratory and research capability and steadily improving industrial facilities with dual-use production capabilities. Whether it has an active weapons development program, however, is a controversial matter. The reality is that many nations now have the biotechnology, industrial base, and technical expertise to acquire biological weapons. Not only does most civil technology have ‘‘dual use’’ in building weapons, but the global dissemination of biological equipment has made control by supplier nations extremely difficult. Even when such controls do still apply to original sellers, they have little or no impact on the sellers of used equipment, and a wide range of sensitive equipment is now available for sale to any buyer on the Internet. This makes it almost impossible to disprove a nation’s interest in biological weapons. Moreover, there is little meaningful distinction between a ‘‘defensive’’ and an ‘‘offensive’’ capability. Nations can claim to be conducting defensive research, acquiring key gear for defensive purposes, and practicing defensive training and maneuvers. So far, Iran has not demonstrated any such defensive activities, but there is an active debate over whether it has a biological weapons program. Possible Early Indicators That Iran Might Have a BW Program There is a long history of indicators that Iran might have some form of BW program. Reports first surfaced in 1982—during the Iran-Iraq War—that Iran had imported suitable type cultures from Europe and was working on the production of mycotoxins—a relatively simple family of biological agents that require only limited laboratory facilities for small-scale production. Many experts believe that the Iranian biological weapons effort was placed under the control of the IRGC, which is known to have tried to purchase suitable production equipment for such weapons. U.S. intelligence sources reported in August 1989 that Iran was trying to buy two new strains of fungus from Canada and the Netherlands that can be used to produce mycotoxins. German sources indicated that Iran had successfully purchased such cultures several years earlier. Some universities and research centers may be linked to the biological weapons program. The Imam Reza Medical Center at Mashhad University of Medical Sciences and the Iranian Research Organization for Science and Technology were identified as the end users for this purchasing effort, but it is likely that the true end user was an Iranian government agency specializing in biological warfare. Since the Iran-Iraq War, various reports have surfaced that Iran may have conducted research on more lethal active agents like anthrax, hoof-and-mouth disease, and biotoxins. Iranian groups have repeatedly approached various European firms for equipment and technology that could be used to work with these diseases and toxins. Unclassified sources of uncertain reliability have identified a facility at Damghan as working on both biological and chemical weapons research and production and believe that Iran may be producing biological weapons at a pesticide facility near Tehran.

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Reports also surfaced in the spring of 1993 that Iran had succeeded in obtaining advanced biological weapons technology in Switzerland and containment equipment and technology from Germany. According to these reports, this led to serious damage to computer facilities in a Swiss biological research facility by unidentified agents. Similar reports indicated that agents had destroyed German biocontainment equipment destined for Iran. More credible reports by U.S. experts indicate that Iran might have begun to stockpile anthrax and botulinum in a facility near Tabriz, can now mass manufacture such agents, and has them in an aerosol form. None of these reports, however, can be verified.

The Uncertain Nature of Iran’s BW Program Since the Mid-1990s The CIA reported in 1996, ‘‘We believe that Iran holds some stocks of biological agents and weapons. Tehran probably has investigated both toxins and live organisms as biological warfare agents. Iran has the technical infrastructure to support a significant biological weapons program with little foreign assistance.’’ It also reported that Iran has ‘‘sought dual-use biotech equipment from Europe and Asia, ostensibly for civilian use,’’ and that Iran might be ready to deploy biological weapons. Beyond this point, little unclassified information exists regarding the details of Iran’s effort to ‘‘weaponize’’ and produce biological weapons. Continuing Alarms and Excursions Iran announced in June 1997 that it would not produce or employ chemical weapons including biological toxins. However, the CIA reported in June 1997 that Iran had obtained new dual-use technology from China and India during 1996. Furthermore, the CIA reported in January 1999 that Iran continued to pursue dual-use biotechnical equipment from Russia and other countries, ostensibly for civilian uses. Its BW program began during the Iran-Iraq War, and Iran may have some limited capability for BW deployment. Outside assistance is both important and difficult to prevent, given the dual-use nature of the materials and equipment being sought and the many legitimate end uses for these items. In 2001, an allegation from the former director of research and development at the Cuban Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology surfaced that claimed Cuba had assisted the Iranian bioweapons program from 1995 to 1998. The authenticity of the director’s claims has not been established.72 A report produced by an Iranian insurgent group, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) Organization, asserted in 2003 that Iran had started producing weaponized anthrax and was actively working with at least five other pathogens, including small pox. The MEK was the same organization that produced early evidence of Iran’s noncompliance with the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran issued a vehement denial of these charges in a May 16, 2003, press release. The accuracy of either set of statements remains uncertain.

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The Possible Role of Outside Suppliers Russia has been a key source of biotechnology for Iran. Russia’s world-leading expertise in biological weapons also makes it an attractive target for Iranians seeking technical information and training on BW agent production processes. This has led to speculation that Iran may have the production technology to make dry storable and aerosol weapons. This would allow it to develop suitable missile warheads, bombs, and covert devices. In testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, John A. Lauder, the Director of the Nonproliferation Center at the CIA, asserted the following in 2000:73 Iran is seeking expertise and technology from Russia that could advance Tehran’s biological warfare effort. Russia has several government-to-government agreements with Iran in a variety of scientific and technical fields. —Because of the dual-use nature of much of this technology, Tehran can exploit these agreements to procure equipment and expertise that could be diverted to its BW effort. —Iran’s BW program could make rapid and significant advances if it has unfettered access to BW expertise resident in Russia.

The CIA reported in November 2003, ‘‘Even though Iran is part of the BWC, Tehran probably maintained an offensive BW program. Iran continued to seek dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise. While such materials had legitimate uses, Iran’s biological warfare (BW) program also could have benefited from them. It is likely that Iran has capabilities to produce small quantities of BW agents, but has a limited ability to weaponize them.’’74 John R. Bolton, then Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the U.S. Department of State, testified the following to the House International Relations Committee in 2004:75 The U.S. Intelligence Community stated in its recent 721 Report that, ‘‘Tehran probably maintains an offensive BW program. Iran continued to seek dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise. While such materials had legitimate uses, Iran’s biological warfare (BW) program also could have benefited from them. It is likely that Iran has capabilities to produce small quantities of BW agents, but has a limited ability to weaponize them.’’ Because BW programs are easily concealed, I cannot say that the United States can prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that Iran has an offensive BW program. The intelligence I have seen suggests that this is the case, and, as a policy matter therefore, I believe we have to act on that assumption. The risks to international peace and security from such programs are too great to wait for irrefutable proof of illicit activity: responsible members of the international community should act to head off such threats and demand transparency and accountability from suspected violators while these threats are still emerging. It would be folly indeed to wait for the threat fully to mature before trying to stop it.

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Iran is a party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Like the CWC, the central obligation of the BWC is simple: no possession, no development no production and, together with the 1925 Protocol, no use of biological weapons. The overwhelming majority of States Parties abide by these obligations. We believe Iran is not abiding by its BWC obligations, however, and we have made this abundantly clear to the parties of this treaty. It is time for Iran to declare its biological weapons program and make arrangements for its dismantlement.

Possible CBW War-Fighting Capability These factors make it almost impossible to know how Iran may use any capabilities it does possess. It does not overtly train its forces for offensive chemical warfare, and its current and future war-fighting capabilities are unknown. Iran has stated its objection to the use of CBW in war on religious grounds— based on Khomeini’s statements in the 1980s—and legal obligation under international conventions. Most experts do, however, believe that Iran at least used confiscated Iraqi chemical shells against Iraqi forces. It had definitely instituted its own program to produce chemical weapons and may have used its weapons. The IISS pointed out in its 2005 study of Iran’s weapons that ‘‘[d]espite a similar record with respect to nuclear weapons and the NPT, Iran conducted undeclared nuclear activities in violation of the treaty for over 20 years. Whether Iran has carried similar activities in violation of its CWC and BWC obligations cannot be determined definitively from the available public information.’’76 It does seem likely that Iran at least retains some capability to make chemical weapons, and it may have inactive or mothballed facilities. There have been no public reports of active production, but this is possible. Iraq produced small lots of mustard gas weapons at the laboratory level before its major production facilities came on-line and showed that it could produce at the batch level with relatively small and easy to conceal facilities. Iran’s purchases also indicate that it could have a significant stock of precursors; and some less lethal weapons can be made out of refinery and petrochemical by-products. Any assessment of Iranian capabilities must also take account of the fact that Iraq began to use chemical weapons against Iran in the early 1980s and that Iran has had at least a quarter of a century in which to react to a real-world threat, six years of which were spent dealing with a nation seeking to acquire chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons to destroy it. Iranian military literature also has extensively reprinted Western and other literature on CBRN weapons, and Iran actively collects such literature on a global basis. It seems clear that Iran has the technology base to produce mustard gas and nonpersistent nerve agents—including reasonable stable agents and binary weapons— and may have the technology to produce persistent nerve agents as well. It probably has technical knowledge of ‘‘third generation’’ and ‘‘dusty’’ agents. It has had the

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opportunity to reverse engineer captured Iraqi weapons and may have received aid in weapons design from Russian, Chinese, and North Korean sources. It certainly has monitored UN reporting on the Iraqi chemical and biological programs and may have acquired considerable detail on these programs, their strengths and weaknesses, and Iraq’s sources abroad. Iran almost certainly has the ability to make effective chemical artillery shells and bombs and unitary rocket and missile warheads. It can probably design effective cluster bombs and warheads. It may have sprayers for use by aircraft, helicopters, and UAVs. Iran’s ability to develop lethal missile warheads is far more problematic. The timing and dissemination problems are far more difficult and may be beyond Iran’s current technical skills. The past history of Iranian efforts at complex program management and systems integration, however, has shown that Iran has serious problems in translating its technical expertise into practice. The knowledge of how to do things rarely leads to similar capability to actually do them, particularly when programs remain concealed and are largely ‘‘mothballed’’ or have low levels of activity. Testing chemical weapons presents serious problems when the test goes beyond static tests or relative crude measurements of how well given weapons disseminate the agent. It is particularly difficult in the case of missile warheads. It is possible to determine lethality in rough terms from residues, but this requires repeated testing using actual weapons in a variety of real-world conditions. There are no reports of such testing, but it is more than possible that they could be successfully concealed. Unlike most biological weapons, the operational lethality of chemical weapons can be safely tested against live animals. Again, there are no reports of such testing, but it is more than possible that they could be successfully concealed. The history of actual chemical warfare, however, indicates that the results of such tests can be extremely unrealistic and that operational lethality has rarely approached anything like engineering and test predictions. The ‘‘scale-up’’ of individual weapons results into predictions of real-world results from using large numbers of weapons has produced particularly misleading results. Moreover, as is the case with biological weapons, temperature, weather, sunlight, wind, surface conditions, and a number of external factors can have a major impact on lethality. These factors, coupled with the difficulty in measuring incapacity or deaths in less than hours to days, also means Iran and other users would have to carry out any chemical campaign with little ability to predict its actual lethality or carry out effective battle damage assessment. Such considerations might not be important, however, when the goal was terror, panic, area denial, forcing an enemy to don protection gear and decontaminate, or accept casualties in addition to other casualties from military operations. At the same time, all of these factors combine to indicate that even if Iran does have plans and doctrine for using chemical weapons and has made serious efforts to estimate their lethality and effectiveness, such plans are unlikely to survive engagement with reality. Iran’s past reports on its military exercises may be propaganda driven, but some of Iran’s conventional war-fighting exercises do have a strong

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element of ideology and wishful thinking and a lack of demanding realism. This could lead military officers and civilian decision makers to make serious miscalculations based on the war they want to fight rather than the war they can fight. Such considerations would have less impact if Iran chose to use proxies or covert means of attack to strike at high-value targets or for the purposes of terrorism and intimidation. The IRGC has conducted the kind of conventional exercise that could be adapted to such ends, and Iran has long supplied conventional weapons to movements like Hezbollah and Hamas. Any broader Iran military use of chemical weapons would present a number of problems: • Chemical weapons are not individually lethal enough to have a major impact on ground battles and take time to be effective. They are best suited to relatively static battles, dominated by ground forces that do not have armored and protected vehicles and which cannot mass airpower effectively. This describes Iran and Iraq in 1980– 1988. It does not describe the United States or most of Iran’s opponents today. Airpower and sea power are largely immune to the kind of chemical attack Iran could launch, with the possible exception of fixed, targetable area targets—many of which could be denied for any significant time only by large numbers of accurate attacks. Rapidly maneuvering ground forces would be a difficult target for Iran’s much more static forces. Nations like the United States would have extensive amounts of detection, protection, and decontamination gear. They also would not have large, static, rear area and support operations near the forward edge of the battle area. • Iranian artillery tends to be slow moving and lacks the ability to rapidly target and switch fires. It relies heavily on static massed fires. This requires relatively short-range engagement against an equally slow moving or static opponent. In reality, Iran will probably face opponents that maneuver more quickly and have superior intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (IS&R) assets. A repetition of the battlefield conditions of the Iran-Iraq War seems unlikely. • Chemical weapons could be more effective as area weapons that forced enemy forces to abandon positions, denied the ability to use rear areas, or acted as a barrier to movement. The tactical and maneuver effects were more important in the Iran-Iraq War than using CW as a killing mechanism. They again, however, tend to be most useful against relatively static opponents that do not have air superiority or supremacy. • Iran has a number of potential long-range artillery rockets and missiles. A single chemical warhead, however, is more a terror weapon than a killing mechanism. Such systems have limited accuracies, and Iran has limited long-range targeting capability against mobile targets. The use of a few chemical rounds would be highly provocative and justify massive escalation by an enemy. As such, it might do more to provoke than terrify, intimidate, or damage. Iran might, however, be able to use persistent nerve and mustard agents to deny the use of a key facility like an air base, key supply facility, mobilization center, oil export facility, or desalination or power plant. • Effective air strikes require high confidence in the ability to penetrate enemy air defenses and good IS&R assets. In many cases, a chemical weapon would have only marginally greater lethality than a conventional precision-guided weapon or

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cluster weapon. Again, such use might do more to provoke than terrify, intimidate, or damage. • The use of chemical weapons against targets at sea presents significant targeting and meteorological problems. These are certainly solvable, but do require exceptional planning and skill. Similarly, firing against coastal targets requires high volumes of CW fire or good meteorological data. • Covert or proxy use presents serious problems in wartime. Plausible deniability is doubtful, and an opponent simply may not care if it can prove Iran is responsible for any given use of CW. • Operation lethality is dependent on an opponent’s CW defense and decontamination facilities, level of depth, and speed of maneuver. Iran may be dealing with much more sophisticated opponents than the Iraq of the 1980s.

None of these problems and issues mean that Iran could not use chemical weapons effectively under some conditions. They might, however, deter Iran from stockpiling such weapons or using them except under the most drastic conditions. Iran has to understand that their use would tend to make Iran lose the political and information battle and act as a license to its opponent to escalate. While such concerns might well deter Iran under most circumstances, it is also important to understand that wars and drastic crises are not ‘‘most circumstances.’’ One inherent problem in any such analysis is that even the most prudent decision maker in peacetime can panic, overreact, or drastically miscalculate in war. Possible Nuclear Weapons Programs There is more information available on Iran’s nuclear programs than on its chemical and biological programs, but this scarcely eliminates major areas of uncertainty. Estimating Iranian nuclear capabilities is complicated by three key factors: • First, the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations all agree that Iran has the right to acquire a full nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful purposes under the NPT, but there is no clear way to distinguish many of the efforts needed to acquire a nuclear weapon from such ‘‘legitimate’’ activities or pure research. • Second, Iran has never denied that it carries out a very diverse range of nuclear research efforts. In fact, it has openly claimed that it is pursuing nuclear technology and has a ‘‘national’’ right to get access to nuclear energy. This has given it a rationale for rejecting Russia’s offer to provide Iran nuclear fuel without giving Tehran the technology and the expertise needed to use it for weaponization purposes, and the United States agrees with this position. • Third, it has never been clear whether Iran does have a ‘‘military’’ nuclear program that is separate from its ‘‘civilian’’ nuclear research. American and French officials have argued that they believe that Iran’s nuclear program would make sense only if it had military purposes. Both governments have yet to provide evidence to prove these claims.

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If Iran is a proliferator, it has shown that it is a skilled one that is highly capable of hiding many aspects of its programs, sending confusing and contradictory signals, exploiting both deception and the international inspection process, rapidly changing the character of given facilities, and pausing and retreating when this is expedient. It has also shown that denial can be a weapon; by consistently finding an alternative explanation for all its actions, including concealment and actions that are limited violations of the NPT, it can maintain some degree of ‘‘plausible deniability’’ for a long chain of ambiguous actions and events. Problems in Analyzing Iran’s WMD Program: A Case Study Iran also presents major problems in intelligence collection and analysis. The details of U.S., British, and other intelligence efforts to cover Iran remain classified. At the same time, studies of U.S. and British intelligence failures in covering Iraq have provided considerable insights into the difficulties in covering a nation like Iran, and background discussions with intelligence analysts and users reveal the following general problems in analyzing the WMD threat: • The uncertainties surrounding collection on virtually all proliferation and weapons of mass destruction programs are so great that it is impossible to produce meaningful point estimates. As the CIA has shown in some of its past public estimates of missile proliferation, the intelligence community must first develop a matrix of what is and is not known about a given aspect of proliferation in a given country, with careful footnoting or qualification of the problems in each key source. It must then deal with uncertainty by creating estimates that show a range of possible current and projected capabilities—carefully qualifying each case. In general, at least three scenarios or cases need to be analyzed for each major aspect of proliferation in each country—something approaching a ‘‘best,’’ ‘‘most likely,’’ and ‘‘worst case.’’77 • Even under these conditions, the resulting analytic effort faces serious problems. Security compartmentation within each major aspect of collection and analysis severely limits the flow of data to working analysts. The expansion of analytic staffs has sharply increased the barriers to the flow of data and has brought large numbers of junior analysts into the process who can do little more than update past analyses and judgments. Far too little analysis is subjected to technical review by those who have actually worked on weapons development, and the analysis of delivery programs, warheads and weapons, and chemical, biological, and nuclear proliferation tends to be compartmented. Instead of the free flow of data and exchange of analytic conclusions, or ‘‘fusion’’ of intelligence, analysis is ‘‘stovepiped’’ into separate areas of activity. Moreover, the larger staffs get, the more stovepiping tends to occur. • Analysis tends to focus on technical capability and not on the problems in management and systems integration that often are the real-world limiting factors in proliferation. This tends to push analysis toward exaggerating the probable level of proliferation, particularly because technical capability is often assumed if collection cannot provide all the necessary information. • Where data are available on past holdings of weapons and the capability to produce such weapons—such as data on chemical weapons feedstocks and biological growth

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material—the intelligence effort tends to produce estimates of the maximum size of the possible current holding of weapons and WMD materials. While ranges are often shown, and estimates are usually qualified with uncertainty, this tends to focus users on the worst case in terms of actual current capability. In the case of Iraq, this was compounded by some 12 years of constant lies and a disbelief that a dictatorship obsessed with record keeping could not have records if it had destroyed weapons and materials. The end result, however, was to assume that little or no destruction had occurred whenever the United Nations Special Commission, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, and the IAEA reported that major issues still affected Iraqi claims. • Intelligence analysis has long been oriented more toward arms control and counterproliferation rather than war fighting, although the Defense Intelligence Agency and the military services have attempted to shift the focus of analysis. Dealing with broad national trends and assuming capability is not generally a major problem in seeking to push nations toward obeying arms control agreements or in pressuring possible suppliers. It also is not a major problem in analyzing broad military counterproliferation risks and programs. The situation is very different in dealing with war-fighting choices, particularly issues like preemption and targeting. Assumptions of capability can lead to preemption that is not necessary, overtargeting, inability to prioritize, and a failure to create the detailed collection and analysis necessary to support war fighters down to the battalion level. This, in turn, often forces field commanders to rely on field teams with limited capability and expertise and to overreact to any potential threat or warning indicator. • The intelligence community does bring outside experts into the process, but often simply to provide advice in general terms rather than cleared review of the intelligence product. The result is often less than helpful. The use of other cleared personnel in U.S. laboratories and other areas of expertise is inadequate and often presents major problems because those consulted are not brought fully into the intelligence analysis process and given all of the necessary data. • The intelligence community does tend to try to avoid explicit statements of the shortcomings in collection and methods in much of its analysis and to repeat past agreed judgments on a lowest common denominator level—particularly in the form of the intelligence products that get broad circulation to consumers. Attempts at independent outside analysis or ‘‘B-Teams,’’ however, are not subject to the review and controls enforced on intelligence analysis, and the teams, collection data, and methods used are generally selected to prove given points rather than to provide an objective counterpoint to finished analysis.78

Few of these problems have been explicitly addressed in open source reporting on Iran, and it is uncertain from the reporting on past intelligence failures in the intelligence analysis of Iraq before the 2003 invasion that the intelligence community has covered them at the classified level. Part of the problem lies with the user. Policy-level and other senior users of intelligence tend to be intolerant of analysis that consists of a wide range of qualifications and uncertainties even at the best of times, and the best of times do not exist when urgent policy and war-fighting decisions need to be made. Users inevitably either

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force the intelligence process to reach something approaching a definitive set of conclusions or else they make such estimates themselves. Intelligence analysts and managers are all too aware of this fact. Experience has taught them that complex intelligence analysis—filled with alternative cases, probability estimates, and qualifications about uncertainty—generally go unused or make policy makers and commanders impatient with the entire intelligence process. In the real world, hard choices have to be made to provide an estimate that can actually be used and acted upon, and these choices must be made either by the intelligence community or by the user.79 Uncertainty and Credibility of Sources If one looks at other sources of reporting on Iran, there have been many claims from many corners. First, one source is from opposition groups that are largely associated with MEK. Their information has proven to be useful at times, yet some of the data they provided has been ‘‘too good to be true.’’ The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) revelations about Iran’s secret nuclear program did prove to be the trigger point in inviting the IAEA into Tehran for inspections, but their claims about ‘‘5,000 centrifuges’’ were seen by many as an exaggeration or at least an unconfirmed allegation.80 The source of such claims must be taken into account. Mr. Alireza Jafarzadeh is the former President of NCRI, which is associated with MEK—an organization that is considered by the U.S. State Department as a terrorist organization. Its motives are well known, and its information must be considered with a certain level of skepticism. As a former CIA counterintelligence official said, ‘‘I would take anything from them with a grain of salt.’’81 NCRI claimed that it relied on human sources, including scientists and civilians working in the facilities or locals who live near the sites. In addition, the NCRI claimed at times that its sources are inside the Iranian regime and added, ‘‘Our sources were 100 percent sure about their intelligence.’’82 The NCRI did not provide any confirmation about their sources, and their information is considered by some in the U.S. and European governments as less than credible. Another example was NCRI’s claim in September 2004 that Tehran allocated $16 billion to build a nuclear bomb by mid-2005. This again was proven to be inaccurate.83 Second, U.S. officials have cited ‘‘walk-in’’ sources to prove the existence of an Iranian nuclear program. It is unclear who those sources are, but the United States insisted that they were not associated with the NCRI. In November 2004, U.S. officials claimed that a source provided U.S. intelligence with more than 1,000 pages worth of technical documents on Iranian ‘‘nuclear warhead design’’ and missile modifications to deliver an atomic warhead. In addition, it was reported that the documents also included ‘‘specific’’ warhead design based on implosion and adjustments, which was thought to be an attempt at fitting a warhead to Iranian ballistic missiles.84

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According to the Washington Post, the walk-in source that provided the documents was not previously known to U.S. intelligence. In addition, it was not clear if this source was connected to an exile group. The same source was, apparently, the basis for the comments by then Secretary of State Colin Powell on November 17, 2004, when he said, ‘‘I have seen some information that would suggest that they have been actively working on delivery systems . . .You don’t have a weapon until you put it in something that can deliver a weapon. . .I’m not talking about uranium or fissile material or the warhead; I’m talking about what one does with a warhead.’’85 Press reports indicate that walk-in documents came from one source and were without independent verifications. The uncertainty about this source, reportedly, stopped many in the U.S. government from using the information, and some expressed their surprise when Secretary Powell expressed confidence in the information provided. Some saw it as a reminder of the problems in his presentation to the UN regarding Iraqi WMD and hoped that he had not made those remarks before they were confirmed. Some U.S. officials even went as far as saying that Powell ‘‘misspoke’’ when he was talking about the information.86 Other U.S. officials described the intelligence as ‘‘weak.’’87 Other press reports claimed that the source, who was ‘‘solicited with German help,’’ provided valuable intelligence that referred to a ‘‘black box,’’ which U.S. officials claim was a metaphor to refer to nuclear warhead design. One U.S. official was quoted by the Wall Street Journal as saying the documents represented ‘‘nearly a smoking gun,’’ yet the same official claimed that this was not a definitive proof.88 Third, there are sources within Iran who have cooperated with the IAEA. According to IAEA reports, Iranian nuclear scientists were interviewed on specific questions. For example, in November 2003, the Agency requested clarification on the bismuth irradiation. The IAEA reported that in January 2004, it ‘‘was able to interview two Iranian scientists involved in the bismuth irradiation. According to the scientists, two bismuth targets had been irradiated, and an attempt had been made, unsuccessfully, to extract polonium from one of them.’’89 The credibility of these scientists depends on how much freedom they have to talk about specific issues, their level of involvement, and the nature of the questions posed to them. The nature of access and the type of information provided to the IAEA by Iranian scientists remain uncertain. Fourth, independent intelligence gathered by the United States, the European Union, and regional powers have no obvious substitute. The IAEA and the UN do not have their own intelligence and have to rely on member states to provide them with the necessary information. These include satellite images, electronic intercepts, human intelligence, and various forms of information gathering and intelligence analysis. The history of the U.S. and the U.K. intelligence provided to UN inspectors in Iraq, however, showed the limited ability of many intelligence agencies to get a full picture of a country’s nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile programs.

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Key Uncertainties in Iran’s Nuclear Developments While Iran and Iraq are very different cases, much the same level of uncertainty exists. Almost no one believes that Iran has nuclear weapons, is so close to acquiring them, or presents a time-urgent threat. Many believe, however, that it is a matter of when rather than if before Tehran acquires nuclear weapons. That is, once Iran gets the capability to produce the materials necessary to producing a nuclear cycle, Iran would acquire the capabilities to produce a full nuclear weapon. The previous history has also revealed Iran’s attempts to acquire nuclear technology long before the 1979 Revolution. It is also clear from IAEA discoveries that Iran has pursued two key tracks: uranium enrichment and production of plutonium.90 Both of these tracks can produce the materials that can be used for nuclear reactors and for nuclear weapons. The IAEA, however, does not believe that Iran has yet been successful in achieving either goal. Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director General of the IAEA, was quoted saying, ‘‘To develop a nuclear weapon, you need a significant quantity of highly enriched uranium or plutonium, and no one has seen that in Iran.’’91 Plutonium Production Tehran has followed two different tracks to achieve the capacity to produce plutonium. First, it is building heavy-water production plants, which U.S. officials claim that their only purpose is to supply heavy water that is optimal for producing weapons-grade plutonium. The Iranian government, on the other hand, has claimed that their purpose is for isotope production for its civilian nuclear energy program.92 The second track followed the production of light-water power reactors. The main reactor is at Bushehr, which is designed to produce civilian nuclear technology. Bushehr is also the reactor that Russia agreed to supply its fuel and recover the spent fuel from the reactor. The U.S. Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, John R. Bolton, claimed that Bushehr would produce enough plutonium per year to manufacture nearly 30 nuclear weapons.93 The following chronology by the IAEA shows the history of Iran’s plutonium separation experiments:94 • 1987–1988: The separation process was simulated using imported unirradiated UO2 (DU); dissolution and purification took place in the Shariaty Building at TNRC [Tehran Nuclear Research Center]; pressed and sintered pellets were manufactured using imported UO2 (DU) at FFL; the UO2 pellets were further manipulated into aluminum and stainless steel capsules at FFL. • 1988–1993: The capsules (containing a total of 7 kilograms of UO2 in the form of powder, pressed pellets, and sintered pellets) were irradiated in TRR. • 1991–1993: Plutonium was separated from some of the irradiated UO2 targets in the capsules (about 3 kilograms of the 7 kilograms of UO2) and plutonium solutions produced; these activities were carried out at the Shariaty Building and, after the activities were transferred in October/November 1992, at the Chamaran Building at

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TNRC; the research and development related irradiation and separation of plutonium were terminated in 1993. • 1993–1994: The unprocessed irradiated UO2 was initially stored in capsules in the spent fuel pond of TRR and was later transferred into four containers and buried behind the Chamaran Building. • 1995: In July, purification of the plutonium solution from the 1988–1993 period was carried out in the Chamaran Building; a planchet (disk) was prepared from the solution for analysis. • 1998: In August, additional purification of plutonium from the 1988–1993 period was carried out in the Chamaran Building; another planchet (disk) was prepared from the solution for analysis. • 2000: The glove boxes from the Chamaran Building were dismantled and sent to ENTC [Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center] for storage; one glove box was moved to the Molybdenum Iodine Xenon Facility. • 2003: Due to construction work being carried out behind the Chamaran Building, two containers holding the unprocessed irradiated UO2 were dug up, moved, and reburied.

In September 2005, the IAEA analysis of Iran’s plutonium separation experiments concluded that the solutions that were tested were 12–16 years old, which seemed to corroborate Iran’s claims. In addition, the IAEA carried out verification tests for unprocessed irradiated UO2 targets stored in four containers, and these results also conformed to Iranian claims, although the IAEA argued that the number of targets provided by Iran was much lower than the actual ones it has. The IAEA reported in September 2005, ‘‘A final assessment of Iran’s plutonium research activities must await the results of the destructive analysis of the disks and targets.’’95 Uranium Enrichment Many weapons experts believe that the Iranian uranium enrichment program is much more advanced and does not rely on Iran’s nuclear reactors. Former Chief UN weapons inspector in Iraq, Hans Blix, has said that Tehran’s plans to build a 40-megawatt research reactor at Bushehr, which is considered Iran’s main plutonium production facility, should not be the main concern. He argued that the light-water reactor was not ideal for plutonium production. He added, ‘‘What is uncomfortable and dangerous is that they have acquired the capacity to enrich uranium of their own uranium that they dig out of the ground. . .If you can enrich to five percent you can enrich it to 85 percent.’’96 These concerns were further exacerbated following Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s announcement on April 11, 2006, that Iran was successful at enriching uranium. ‘‘At this historic moment, with the blessings of God almighty and the efforts made by our scientists, I declare here that the laboratory-scale nuclear fuel cycle has been completed and young scientists produced enriched uranium needed to the degree for nuclear power plants [on April 9].’’ The head of the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran (AEOI) and Iran’s Vice President, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, and Iranian nuclear scientists stated Iran’s accomplishments and/or goals as follows:97

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• Started enriching uranium to a level—3.5 percent—needed for fuel on a research scale using 164 centrifuges, but not enriched enough to build a nuclear bomb; • Produced 110 tons of uranium hexafluoride (UF6)—this amount is nearly double the amount that Iran claimed to have enriched in 2005; • Aim[s] to produce a gas high with an increased percentage of U-235, the isotope needed for nuclear fission, which is much rarer than the more prevalent isotope U-238; and • Plan[s] to expand its enrichment program to be able to use 3,000 centrifuges at the nuclear center at Natanz by the end of 2006.

Mohammad Saeedi, Iran’s Deputy Nuclear Chief, reiterated that Iran aimed to expand uranium enrichment to industrial scale at Natanz. In addition to installing 3,000 centrifuges at Natanz by 2006, Saeedi claimed that Iran aims at expanding the total number of centrifuges to 54,000, which would be used to fuel a 1,000megawatt nuclear power plant.98 While some believe that Iran’s claims are credible, others speculated that Iran made the announcement to send a message that military strikes or sanctions would not deter Iran from achieving a full nuclear cycle. Much depends on what the announcement really meant. Iran had previously obtained at least 2-percent enrichment from the experimental use of centrifuges and possibly significantly higher levels. The IAEA had previously made it clear that it lacked the data to determine how far Iran had actually progressed. Iran also had reached enrichment levels as high as 8 percent making experimental use of laser isotope separation, although it seemed far from being able to scale such efforts up beyond laboratory tests. The Iranian claims also said nothing about how efficient the claimed use of a small 164-centrifuge chain was, what its life cycle and reliability was, and about the ability to engineer a system that could approach weapons-grade material. It is at best possible to speculate on how many centrifuges of the P1-type centrifuge derivative involved Iran would need to get a nuclear device and then move on to develop a significant weapons-production capability. It would, however, probably be in the thousands in terms of continuously operating machine equivalents to slowly get the fissile material for a single device or ‘‘bomb in the basement,’’ and tens of thousands to support a serious nuclear weapons delivery capability. One thing was already clear long before these Iranian claims. There was nothing the UN or the United States could do to deny Iran the technology to build a nuclear weapon. The IAEA’s discoveries had made it clear Iran already had functioning centrifuge designs, reactor development capability, and plutonium separation capability. It had experimented with polonium in ways that showed it could make a neutron initiator, had the technology to produce high explosive lenses and beryllium reflectors, could machine fissile material, and had long had a technology base capable of performing the same nonfissile of actual weapons designs used by Pakistan in its nuclear weapons design efforts. It also seemed highly likely that it had acquired P2 centrifuge designs and the same basic Chinese design data for a fissile weapon suitable for mounting on a ballistic missile that North Korea had sold to Libya.

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As a result, both the claims of the Iranian President that Iran had made a major breakthrough, and President Bush’s responding statement that Iran would not be allowed to acquire the technology to build a nuclear weapon, seemed to be little more than vacuous political posturing. Ahmadinejad’s statement seemed to be an effort to show the UN that it could not take meaningful action and exploit Iranian nationalism. The Bush statement was a combination of basic technical ignorance on the part of his speech writers and an effort to push the UN toward action and to convince Iran that it could face the threat of both serious sanctions and military action if diplomacy and sanctions failed. It effectively ignored the fact that Iran not only already had the technology, but could disperse it to the point where it was extremely unlikely that any UN inspection effort could find it, even if Iran allowed this, or any military option could seriously affect Iran’s technology base—as distinguished from its ability to create survivable large-scale production facilities and openly deploy nuclear-armed delivery systems. In reality, such developments were at most evolutionary and had been expected. Diplomats and officials from the IAEA were quick to point out that the announcement by Iran should not be a sign of concern and that Iran may face many technical hurdles before it can enrich enough quantities of uranium at high levels to produce a nuclear weapon. One European official said that while the 164-machine centrifuges were more industrial, ‘‘. . .it’s not like they haven’t come close to achieving this in the past.’’ This assessment has been reflected in reports by the IAEA, which argue that Iran has used centrifuges and laser to enrich uranium throughout the 1990s and even before.99 To put such rhetoric in context, most of Tehran’s uranium conversion experiments took place between 1981 and 1993 at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) and at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC). In this case, however, it is clear that some of these activities continued throughout 2002. According to the IAEA, Iran’s uranium enrichment activities also received some foreign help in 1991. The IAEA outlined its findings regarding Tehran’s uranium enrichment as follows:100 In 1991, Iran entered into discussions with a foreign supplier for the construction at Esfahan of an industrial scale conversion facility. Construction on the facility, UCF, was begun in the late 1990s. UCF consists of several conversion lines, principal among which is the line for the conversion of UOC to UF6 with an annual design production capacity of 200 t uranium as UF6. The UF6 is to be sent to the uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz, where it will be enriched up to 5% U-235 and the product and tails returned to UCF for conversion into low enriched UO2 and depleted uranium metal. The design information for UCF provided by Iran indicates that conversion lines are also foreseen for the production of natural and enriched (19.7%) uranium metal, and natural UO2. The natural and enriched (5% U-235) UO2 are to be sent to the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) at Esfahan, where Iran has said it will be processed into fuel for a research reactor and power reactors.. . . In March 2004, Iran began testing the process lines involving the conversion of UOC into UO2 and UF4, and UF4 into UF6. As of June 2004, 40 to 45 kg of UF6 had been

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produced. A larger test, involving the conversion of 37 t of yellowcake into UF4, was initiated in August 2004. According to Iran’s declaration of 14 October 2004, 22.5 t of the 37 t of yellowcake had been fed into the process and that approximately 2 t of UF4, and 17.5 t of uranium as intermediate products and waste, had been produced. There was no indication as of that date of UF6 having been produced during this later campaign.

The IAEA inspections found traces of contamination from advanced enrichment effects at Natanz. Iran claimed that these contaminations were from equipment it purchased in the 1980s from abroad (presumably from Pakistan). Reports by the IAEA, however, showed that Iran may have started its enrichment program in the 1970s and that the Iranians were already partially successful at uranium conversion. Iran has tried two different methods to enrich uranium ever since the time of the Shah. First, Iran’s nuclear research has facilities that are dedicated to manufacturing and testing centrifuges. This includes its ultimate goal of producing 50,000 centrifuges in Natanz. Second, Iran also pursued enriching uranium through laser enrichment. According to Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director General of the IAEA, Iran was able to enrich up to 1.2 percent using centrifuges and up to 15 percent using lasers.101 Some of Iran’s gas centrifuge program depended on help Tehran got from Pakistan. Although reports by the Director General of the IAEA do not mention Pakistan by name, Iran’s gas centrifuges could be traced back to the mid-1990s when A.Q. Khan approached an Iranian company and offered it P-1 documentation and components for 500 centrifuges. Iran claimed that it received only the P-1 and not the P-2 design (the P-1 and P-2 refer to two designs for centrifuges by Pakistan). Both Iran and Pakistan would later admit to this transaction and provide the documents to support these allegations.102 According to the IAEA, Tehran received P-1 components and documentation in January 1994. Tehran, however, claimed that it did not receive the first of these components until October 1994. Regardless of the month of delivery, there is one more important element that remains unresolved. The IAEA refers to this as the ‘‘1987 offer,’’ which reportedly provided Iran with a sample machine, drawings, descriptions, and specifications for production and material for 2,000 centrifuge machines.103 In addition, Iran received the P-2 design in 1994/1995 from Pakistan, but all of its components were designed and manufactured in Iran. Furthermore, Iran claimed that it did not pursue any work on the P-2 design between 1995 and 2002 due to shortages in staff and resources at the AEOI and that Tehran focused on resolving outstanding issues regarding the P-1 design. The IAEA, however, was not convinced that Iran did not pursue further development of the P-2 design and called on Iran in September 2005 to provide more information on the history of its P-2 development.104 This helps explain why experts have argued that Iran’s goal of producing 50,000 centrifuges in Natanz should be considered a sign of serious concern for the international community. For example, David Albright and Corey Hinderstein of

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the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) argued that Iran planned in January 2006 to install centrifuges in modules of 3,000 machines that were designed to produce low enriched uranium for civilian power reactors. If half of these machines, however, were to be used to create highly enriched uranium (HEU), they could produce enough HEU for one nuclear weapon a year. Furthermore, if the Iranians do achieve their ultimate goal of 50,000 centrifuges, Albright and Hinderstein argued, ‘‘At 15–20 kilograms per weapon, that would be enough for 25–30 nuclear weapons per year.’’105 A much smaller facility might, however, be adequate. A study by Frank Barnaby for the Oxford Research Group estimates Iran’s current centrifuges could produce about 2.5 separative work units (SWUs) a year, with a range of 1.9–2.7 SWUs. If Iran had the P-2, each centrifuge would produce roughly 5 SWUs a year. A fully operational 3,000-centrifuge facility could then produce some 7,500 SWUs or about 40 kilograms of HEU a year, and it would probably take a total capacity of 5,000 machines to keep 3,000 on-line at all times.106 As is discussed later, the 1,500-centrifuge pilot facility that Iran is now seeking to operate could conceivably produce a single weapon in two to three years. As for the other enrichment route, Iran acknowledged it had started a laser enrichment program in the 1970s. Iran claimed that it used two different tracks in using laser enrichment: (1) atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) and (2) molecular isotope separation (MLIS). Iran, however, depended on key contracts with four (unnamed) different countries to build its laser enrichment program. The following chronology was presented by the IAEA:107 • 1975: Iran signed a contract for the establishment of a laboratory to study the spectroscopic behavior of uranium metal; this project had been abandoned in the 1980s as the laboratory had not functioned properly. • Late 1970s: Iran signed a contract with a second supplier to study MLIS, under which four carbon monoxide (CO) lasers and vacuum chambers were delivered, but the project had ultimately been terminated due to the political situation before major development work had begun. • 1991: Iran signed a contract with a third supplier for the establishment of a ‘‘Laser Spectroscopy Laboratory ‘‘ (LSL) and a ‘‘Comprehensive Separation Laboratory’’ (CSL), where uranium enrichment would be carried out on a milligram scale based on the AVLIS process. The contract also provided for the supply of 50 kilograms of natural uranium metal. • 1998: Iran signed a contract with a fourth supplier to obtain information related to laser enrichment, and the supply of relevant equipment. However, due to the inability of the supplier to secure export licenses, only some of the equipment was delivered (to Lashkar Ab’ad).

The IAEA seems to be more confident about its findings regarding Iran’s laser enrichment developments than gas centrifuges. This is largely due to Iranian cooperation, but it also stems from the fact that Iran had nothing to hide since its

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foreign contractors failed to deliver on the four contracts Tehran signed between the 1970s and the 1990s. According to the IAEA, Iran claimed that the laser spectroscopy laboratory and the MLIS laboratory (the first two contracts) were never fully operational. As for the third contract, the IAEA estimated the contract was finished in 1994, but that CSL and LSL had technical problems and were unsuccessful between 1994 and 2000. Iran responded by claiming that the two labs were dismantled in 2000. In addition, the IAEA concluded, ‘‘As confirmed in an analysis, provided to the Agency, that had been carried out by the foreign laboratory involved in the project, the highest average enrichment achieved was 8%, but with a peak enrichment of 13%.’’ Finally, the fourth contract was signed in 1998, but failed due to the supplier’s inability to obtain export licenses. Tehran claimed that it attempted to procure these equipment and parts, but it was unsuccessful.108 These failures almost certainly did strain Tehran’s ability to effectively use the laser enrichment track to advance its uranium enrichment activities. This may explain why Iran did less to try to conceal its laser enrichment program than conceal the details of its centrifuge program. According to the IAEA, Tehran’s declarations largely tracked with the IAEA inspectors’ findings. For example, Iran claimed that its enrichment level was 0.8 percent U235, and the IAEA concluded that Iran reached an enrichment level of 0.99 percent ± 0.24 percent U235.109 The IAEA findings regarding this aspect of Tehran’s enrichment program are summarized in the following two paragraphs:110 The Agency has completed its review of Iran’s atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS) program and has concluded that Iran’s descriptions of the levels of enrichment achieved using AVLIS at the Comprehensive Separation Laboratory (CSL) and Lashkar Ab’ad and the amounts of material used in its past activities are consistent with information available to the Agency to date. Iran has presented all known key equipment, which has been verified by the Agency. For the reasons described in the Annex to this report, however, detailed nuclear material accountancy is not possible. It is the view of the Agency’s AVLIS experts that, while the contract for the AVLIS facility at Lashkar Ab’ad was specifically written for the delivery of a system that could achieve 5 kg of product within the first year with enrichment levels of 3.5% to 7%, the facility as designed and reflected in the contract would, given some specific features of the equipment, have been capable of limited HEU production had the entire package of equipment been delivered. The Iranian AVLIS experts have stated that they were not aware of the significance of these features when they negotiated and contracted for the supply and delivery of the Lashkar Ab’ad AVLIS facility. They have also provided information demonstrating the very limited capabilities of the equipment delivered to Iran under this contract to produce HEU (i.e. only in gram quantities).

The accuracy of such findings is critical because isotope separation is far more efficient than centrifuge separation, much less costly once mature, uses far less power, and is much harder to detect.111

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Other aspects of Iranian activity were less reassuring. Following Iran’s announcement that it converted 37 tons of yellowcake into UF4 in May 2005, experts believed that this amount of uranium could ‘‘theoretically’’ produce more than 200 pounds of weapons-grade uranium, which would be enough to produce five to six crude nuclear weapons. The head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Hasan Rowhani, was quoted in 1995 saying, ‘‘Last year, we could not produce UF4 and UF6. We didn’t have materials to inject into centrifuges to carry out enrichment, meaning we didn’t have UF6 . . .But within the past year, we completed the Isfahan facility and reached UF4 and UF6 stage. So we made great progress.’’112 In February 2006, ahead of the IAEA board meeting, it was reported in the press that a report was circulated to IAEA member states regarding what press reports called ‘‘the Green Salt Project.’’ The report largely used information provided by U.S. intelligence. The project name was derived from ‘‘green salt,’’ or uranium tetrafluoride. The materials are considered intermediate materials in uranium conversion ore into uranium hexafluoride, UF4, which is central to producing nuclear fuel.113 This project was reportedly started in the spring of 2001 by an Iranian firm, Kimeya Madon, under the auspices of the IRGC. U.S. officials believe that Kimyea Madon completed drawings and technical specifications for a small uranium conversion facility (UCF), and they argue that the drawings provide ‘‘pretty compelling evidence’’ for Iran’s clandestine uranium conversion program. In addition, there was evidence that the Iranians envisioned a second UCF. It remains uncertain why the operation of Kimeya Mado stopped in 2003. Some speculated that this was a plan to replace Esfahan in case of a military strike against it. Another view is that Iran scratched the plan after it was revealed that the new UCF was not ‘‘as good as what they had’’ at Esfahan.114 Another important development in Iranian activities was the IAEA’s discovery of ‘‘a document related to the procedural requirements for the reduction of UF6 to metal in small quantities, and on the casting and machining of enriched, natural and depleted uranium metal into hemispherical forms,’’ as the IAEA February 4, 2006, resolution emphasized.115 The description of this document first appeared in the IAEA November 15, 2005, reports. This ‘‘one-page document’’ apparently was related to the Pakistani offer in 1987, and the IAEA made the following assessment:116 As previously reported to the Board, in January 2005 Iran showed to the Agency a copy of a hand-written one-page document reflecting an offer said to have been made to Iran in 1987 by a foreign intermediary for certain components and equipment. Iran stated that only some components of one or two disassembled centrifuges, and supporting drawings and specifications, were delivered by the procurement network, and that a number of other items of equipment referred to in the document were purchased directly from other suppliers. Most of these components and items were included in the October 2003 declaration by Iran to the Agency. The documents recently made available to the Agency related mainly to the 1987 offer; many of them dated from the late 1970s and early to mid-1980s. The documents

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included: detailed drawings of the P-1 centrifuge components and assemblies; technical specifications supporting component manufacture and centrifuge assembly; and technical documents relating to centrifuge operational performance. In addition, they included cascade schematic drawings for various sizes of research and development (R&D) cascades, together with the equipment needed for cascade operation (e.g. cooling water circuit needs and special valve consoles). The documents also included a drawing showing a cascade layout for 6 cascades of 168 machines each and a small plant of 2000 centrifuges arranged in the same hall. Also among the documents was one related to the procedural requirements for the reduction of UF6 to metal in small quantities, and on the casting and machining of enriched, natural and depleted uranium metal into hemispherical forms, with respect to which Iran stated that it had been provided on the initiative of the procurement network, and not at the request of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).

As noted earlier, the foreign intermediary is believed to have been A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist. The United Kingdom argued that the document, on casting uranium into hemispheric form, had no other application other than nuclear weapons. Experts agreed with this assessment.117 IAEA officials, however, were more cautious. One senior IAEA official was quoted as saying that the document ‘‘is damaging,’’ but he argued that the handwritten document was not a blueprint for making nuclear weapons because it dealt with only one aspect of the process.118 Many experts believe that in order to understand Iran’s nuclear program, one must understand its gas centrifuge program—particularly whether Tehran’s ability to establish a test run of 1,500 centrifuges at Natanz would give Iran enough capacity to produce HEU. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein of the ISIS argued that Iran may well be on its way to achieving this capacity: Each P1 centrifuge has an output of about 3 separative work units (swu) per year according to senior IAEA officials. From the A.Q. Khan network, Iran acquired drawings of a modified variant of an early-generation Urenco centrifuge. Experts who saw these drawings assessed that, based on the design’s materials, dimensions, and tolerances, the P1 in Iran is based on an early version of the Dutch 4M centrifuge that was subsequently modified by Pakistan. The 4M was developed in the Netherlands in the mid-1970s and was more advanced than the earlier Dutch SNOR/CNOR machines. Its rotor assembly has four aluminum rotor tubes connected by three maraging steel bellows. With 1,500 centrifuges and a capacity of 4,500 swu per year, this facility could produce as much as 28 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium per year, assuming a tails assay of 0.5 percent, where tails assay is the fraction of uranium 235 in the waste stream. This is a relatively high tails assay, but such a tails assay is common in initial nuclear weapons programs. As a program matures and grows, it typically reduces the tails assay to about 0.4 percent and perhaps later to 0.3 percent to conserve uranium supplies. By spring 2004, Iran had already put together about 1,140 centrifuge rotor assemblies, a reasonable indicator of the number of complete centrifuges. However, only about 500 of these rotors were good enough to operate in cascades, according to knowledgeable senior IAEA officials. The November 2004 IAEA report stated that from the spring to October 10, 2004, Iran had assembled an additional 135 rotors, bringing the total

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number of rotors assembled to 1,275. As mentioned above, a large number of these rotors are not usable in an operating cascade. Iran is believed to have assembled more centrifuges prior to the suspension being reimposed on November 22, 2004. Without more specific information, it is assumed that Iran continued to assemble centrifuges at a constant rate, adding another 70 centrifuges, for a total of 1,345 centrifuges. However, the total number of good centrifuges is estimated at about 700.119

These developments also led some observers to question whether Iran received more help from Pakistan than it admitted. Some experts argued that the A.Q. Khan network tended to hand over the ‘‘whole package’’ as was the case with Libya, and they question whether Iran received only the few pages that it shared with the IAEA.120 These revelations showed how little is known about how advanced Iran’s uranium enrichment program is. Most experts, however, believe that Iran’s uranium enrichment program is far more dangerous and far more advanced than its plutonium production activities. They argue that the danger of the enrichment program is that regardless of how high Iran’s enrichment level of uranium is, if Iran were able to enrich it at a low level, Iran will have the know-how to enrich it at higher levels and produce the weapons-grade uranium to produce nuclear weapons.121 In addition, experts are concerned that Iran may acquire uranium from other nations. For example, during a visit by the Iranian Parliament Speaker, Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel, in early 2006, Iran and Venezuela signed a deal that allowed Iran to explore Venezuela’s strategic minerals. Venezuelan opposition figures to President Hugo Cha´vez claimed that the deal could involve the production and transfer of uranium from Venezuela to Iran. The United States, however, downplayed such reports. A State Department official was quoted as saying, ‘‘We are aware of reports of possible Iranian exploitation of Venezuelan uranium, but we see no commercial activities in Venezuela.’’122 A Continuing Process of Discovery It is also clear that there is still much more to learn. As noted earlier, in early 2006, the New York Times reported on new U.S. intelligence estimates that suggested Iran’s ‘‘peaceful’’ program included a ‘‘military-nuclear dimension.’’ This assessment was reportedly based on information provided by the United States to the IAEA and referred to a secret program called the Green Salt Project. This project was started to work on uranium enrichment, high explosives, and on adapting nuclear warheads to Iranian missiles. The report suggested that there was evidence of ‘‘administrative interconnections’’ between weaponization and nuclear experts in Iran’s nuclear program. Tehran argued that these claims were ‘‘baseless’’ and promised to provide further clarifications on the matter.123 The IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear activities in August 2006 made it clear, however, that Iran was not clarifying any major issues raised relating to its nuclear activities, and it raised new questions about Iran’s

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activities in highly enriching uranium that could not be linked to any contamination of centrifuges imported from Pakistan. Claims that there was a link between Iran’s civilian and military nuclear tracks seem to support the comments made by then Secretary of State Colin Powell in November 2004, yet it remains uncertain if the sources of intelligence were the same. Mr. Powell argued that the U.S. intelligence had information that showed Iranian efforts to adapt their nuclear research to fit their Shahab-3 missile. He argued that it made no sense that Iran would work on advancing its delivery systems unless it were also working on the warheads. Other U.S. officials, however, argued that the information Colin Powell used came from unconfirmed sources with uncertain information and should not be seen as a definitive proof.124 The source for this information seems to be a stolen laptop computer, which contained designs of a small-scale uranium gas production facility by Kimeya Madon, an Iranian company. In addition, the documents contained modification to the Shahab3 missile in a way, U.S. officials believe, to fit a nuclear warhead. U.S. intelligence experts, reportedly, believe that the files on the computer were authentic, but they argue that there was no way to prove it. They argue that while there was the possibility that the document was forged by Iranian opposition groups or fabricated by a third country like Israel, it was unlikely. In addition, the authenticity of the document also seemed to have been confirmed by British intelligence.125 What concerns U.S. officials is that, while nowhere on the laptop was there a mention of the word ‘‘nuclear,’’ the documents mentioned the names of military officers that were linked to Mohsen Fakrizadeh, who is believed to direct ‘‘Project 111.’’ U.S. intelligence believes that this project has been responsible for weaponizing Iran’s nuclear research efforts and missile developments. In addition, the United States believes that this project is the successor to Project 110, which used to be the military arm of Iran’s nuclear research program. These revelations, however, are ‘‘cloaked’’ with uncertainty, and the United States believes that the only way to know is if Fakrizadeh cooperates with IAEA inspectors.126 These concerns about Iranian weaponization efforts were exacerbated by the IAEA’s discovery of a document relating to the requirement of reducing UF6 to small quantities of metal as well as casting enriched and natural depleted uranium into hemispherical forms.127 This is believed to be the first link the IAEA has shown between Iran’s military and civilian nuclear program. Many argue that this discovery was the turning point in the IAEA negotiation efforts with Tehran and that the failure to disclose this document early in the inspections was a cause for concern for the Agency. Press reports have also claimed that there was further evidence of Iran’s effort to weaponize its nuclear research. A U.S. intelligence assessment was leaked to the Washington Post. According to U.S. officials, Iran’s nuclear researchers have completed the drawing of ‘‘a deep subterranean shaft.’’ The drawings outlined the plans for a 400-meter underground tunnel with remote-controlled sensors to measure pressures and temperatures. U.S. experts believed that the tunnel was being prepared for an underground nuclear test. One U.S. official was quoted saying, ‘‘The diagram

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is consistent with a nuclear test-site schematic.’’ This assessment was based on the fact that the drawings envisioned a test control team to be so far away— 10 kilometers—from the test site, but the United States believes that the tunnel was still in the drawing stage and no developments have taken place. The evidence for this tunnel and Iranian weaponization efforts were the closest thing to a smoking gun in proving an Iranian nuclear weapons program.128 This illustrates the point that Iran can gain as much from concealing and obfuscating its weaponization activities as from hiding or obfuscating the nature of its nuclear program. As long as Iran does not actually test a full nuclear explosion, it can develop and test potential weapons and warhead designs in a wide range of ways. It can also prepare for underground testing and test simulated weapons underground to validate many aspects of the test system—including venting—without exploding a bomb until it is ready for the international community to know it has actually tested a weapon. It can develop and deploy its missile program with conventional warheads and create considerable confusion over the nature of its warhead and bomb tests, concealing whether it has carried out extensive research on CBRN weaponization as part of what it claims is the testing of conventional weapons. Telemetry can be encrypted, avoided, and made deliberately misleading. The same is true of static explosive testing or the use of air-delivered warheads and bombs. So far, for example, the international community and outside experts have generally failed to explore the rationale for Iran’s missile efforts and other weaponization activities. The IAEA and CWC lack any clear mandate for inspection and analysis of such activities, and the BWC does not address the issue.

IRAN’S LONG-RANGE MISSILE ARSENAL Iran continues to deploy surface-to-surface missiles and has its own systems in development. The number assigned to the army vs. the IRGC is unclear, but the IRGC seems to hold and operate most long-range missiles rather than the army. As Figure 8.6, however, shows, Iran has a variety of short-, medium-, and long-range missiles and while many are based on other missiles such as the SCUD and the CSS, Iran has either developed them further or renamed them. The Iranian government stated as early as 1999 that it was developing a large missile body or launch vehicle for satellite launch purposes, however, and repeatedly denied that it is upgrading the Shahab series (especially the Shahab-3) for military purposes. Iran also continued to claim that the ‘‘Shahab-4’’ program is aimed at developing a booster rocket for launching satellites into space. In January 2004, Iran’s Defense Minister claimed that Iran would launch a domestically built satellite within 18 months. This had still not taken place in June 2006.129 In December 2005, the U.S. government announced its belief that Iran had built underground missile factories that were capable of producing Shahab-1s, Shahab-2s, and Shahab-3s, as well as testing new missile designs. It was also believed that Karimi

Figure 8.6 Estimated Iranian Missile Profiles, 2006 Stages

Progenitor Missiles

Propellant

Range (kilometers)

Payload (kilograms)

IOC (year)

Inventory

Fateh A-110

1

?

*

?

210

500

?

?

Ghadr-110

?

?

?

2,500–3,000

?

?

?

Designation

M-9 variant

1

CSS-6

?

800

320

?

?

M-11 variant

1

CSS-7

?

400

?

?

?

Mushak-120

1

CSS-8, SA-2

Solid

130

500

2001

200

Mushak-160

1

CSS-8, SA-2

Liquid

160

500

2002

?

Mushak-200

1

SA-2

Liquid

200

500

NA

0

Shahab-1

1

Soviet SSN-4, N. Korean SCUD B

Liquid

300

987–1,000

1995

250–300

Shahab-2

1

Soviet SSN-4, N. Korean SCUD C

Liquid

500

750–989

?

200–450

Shahab-3

1

N. Korean Nodong-1

Liquid

1,300

760–1,158

2002

25–100

Shahab-4

2

N. Korean Taep’o-dong-1

Liquid

3,000

1,040–1,500

NA

0

Ghadr 101

Multi

Pakistan Shaheen-1

Solid

2,500

NA

NA

0

Ghadr 110

multi

Pakistan Shaheen-2

Solid

3,000

NA

NA

0

IRIS

1

China M-18

Solid

3,000

760–1,158

2005

NA

Kh-55

1

Soviet AS-15 Kent, Ukraine

Jet engine

2,900–3,000

200 kgt nuclear

2001

12

Shahab-5

3


Liquid

5,500

390–1,000

NA

0

Shahab-6

3


Liquid

10,000

270–1,220

NA

0

Zelifal-1/2/3

?

?

?

?

?

?

?

* All ‘‘?’’ refer to weapons that Iran is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in its possession are unknown. Source: Adapted from GlobalSecurity.org, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/missile.htm; the Federation of American Scientists, available at http:// www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile; The Claremont Institute: Ballistic Missiles of the World, http://www.missilethreat.com/missiles/index.html. NA = not available.

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Industries was housed at one of the secret bases, which is where work is taking place on perfecting Iran’s nuclear warheads.130 U.S. officials insisted that this information did not come from Iranian opposition sources like the MEK and that it was reliable. They feel Iran has made significant strides in recent years using North Korean, Chinese, and Russian technology. If Iran begins work on the Shahab-5 and the Shahab-6 series, it may acquire delivery systems with the range to make it a global nuclear power, instead of merely a regional one. Shahab-1/SCUD-B The Soviet-designed SCUD-B (17E) guided missile currently forms the core of Iran’s ballistic missile forces. The missile was used heavily in the latter years of the Iran-Iraq War. In 2006, it was estimated that Iran had between 300 and 400 Shahab-1 and Shahab 2 variants of the Scud B and ‘‘Scud C’’ in its inventory.131 These seem to be deployed in three to four battalions in a Shahab brigade. Iran acquired its first Scuds in response to Iraq’s invasion. It obtained a limited number from Libya and subsequently a larger number from North Korea. Some 20 such missiles and two MAZ-543P transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) were delivered in early 1985.132 It deployed these units with a special Khatam ol-Anbya force attached to the air element of the Pasdaran. Iran fired its first Scuds in March 1985. It fired as many as 14 Scuds in 1985, 8 in 1986, 18 in 1987, and 77 in 1988. Iran fired 77 Scud missiles during a 52-day period in 1988, during what came to be known as the ‘‘war of the cities.’’ Sixty-one were fired at Baghdad, 9 at Mosul, 5 at Kirkuk, 1 at Tikrit, and 1 at Kuwait. Iran fired as many as five missiles on a single day, and once fired three missiles within 30 minutes. This still, however, worked out to an average of only about one missile a day, and Iran was down to only 10–20 Scuds when the war of the cities ended. Iran’s missile attacks were initially more effective than Iraq’s attacks. This was largely a matter of geography. Many of Iraq’s major cities were comparatively close to its border with Iran, but Tehran and most of Iran’s major cities that had not already been targets in the war were outside the range of Iraqi Scud attacks. Iran’s missiles, in contrast, could hit key Iraqi cities like Baghdad. This advantage ended when Iraq deployed extended-range Scuds. The SCUD-B is a relatively old Soviet design that first became operational in 1967, designated as the R-17E or R-300E. Its thrust is 13,160 Kg f, its burn time is between 62 and 64 seconds, and it has an Isp of 62-Sl due to vanes steering drag loss of 4–5 seconds. The SCUD-B possesses one thrust chamber and is a one-stage rocket (it does not break into smaller pieces). Its fuel is TM-185, and its oxidizer is the AK-27I.133 The SCUD-B has a range of 290–300 kilometers with its normal conventional payload. The export version of the missile is about 11 meters long, 85–90 centimeters in diameter, and weighs 6,300 kilograms. It has a nominal CEP of

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1,000 meters. The Russian versions can be equipped with conventional high explosives, fuel air explosives, runway penetrating submunitions, and chemical and nuclear warheads. Its basic design comes from the old German V-2 rocket design of World War II. It has moveable fins and is guided only during powered flight. The SCUD-B was introduced on the JS-3 tracked chassis in 1961 and appeared on the MAZ-543 wheeled chassis in 1965. The ‘‘SCUD-B’’ missile later appeared on the TEL based on the MAZ-543 (8x8) truck. The introduction of this new cross-country wheeled vehicle gave this missile system greater road mobility and reduces the number of support vehicles required. The export version of the SCUD-B comes with a conventional high explosive warhead weighing about 1,000 kilograms, of which 800 kilograms are the high explosive payload and 200 are the warhead structure and fusing system. It has a single stage storable liquid rocket engine and is usually deployed on the MAZ-543—an eightwheel TEL. It has a strap-down inertial guidance, using three gyros to correct its ballistic trajectory, and it uses internal graphite jet vane steering. The warhead hits at a velocity above Mach 1.5. The following timeline tracks the history of the Shahab-1 (SCUD-B) after it was first introduced in Iran in 1985: • 1985: Iran began acquiring SCUD-B (Shahab-1) missiles from Libya for use in the Iran-Iraq War.134 • 1986: Iran turned to Libya as a supplier of SCUD-Bs.135 • 1987: A watershed year. Iran attempted to produce its own SCUD-B missiles, but failed. Over the next five years, it purchased 200–300 SCUD-B missiles from North Korea.136 • 1988: Iran began producing its own SCUD-Bs, though not in large quantities.137 • 1991: It is estimated that at approximately the time of the Gulf War, Iran stopped producing its own SCUD-Bs and began purchasing the more advanced SCUD-Cs (Shahab-2). This is said to be a system with an 800-kilogram warhead and a 500-kilometer range vs. comparable profiles of 1,000 kilograms with a 300-kilometers range for the Scud B or Shahab 1.138 • 1993: Iran sent 21 missile specialists, led by Brigadier General Manteghi, to North Korea for training.139

Experts estimate Iran bought 200–300 SCUD-Bs (Shahab 1s) and SCUD-Cs (Shahab 2), or the suitable components for Iranian reverse-engineered systems, from North Korea between 1987 and 1992, and may have continued to buy such missiles after that time.140 Israeli experts estimated that Iran had at least 250–300 Scud-B missiles and at least 8–15 launchers on hand in 1997. Most current estimates indicate that Iran now has 6–12 SCUD launchers and up to 200 SCUD-B (R-17E) missiles with 230–310kilometer range. Some estimates give higher figures. The IISS estimated in 2006 that Tehran had 18 launchers and 300 SCUD missiles.141 It is, however, uncertain how many of those are SCUD-Bs and how many are SCUD-Cs.

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U.S. experts also believe that Iran can now manufacture virtually all of the SCUDB, with the possible exception of the most sophisticated components of its guidance system and rocket motors. This makes it difficult to estimate how many missiles Iran has in its inventory and how many it can acquire over time, as well as to estimate the precise performance characteristics of Iran’s missiles, since it can alter the weight of the warhead and adjust the burn time and improve the efficiency of the rocket motors. Shahab-2/SCUD-C Iran served as a transshipment point for North Korean missile deliveries during 1992 and 1993. Some of these transshipments took place using the same Iranian B-747s that brought missile parts to Iran. Others moved by sea. For example, a North Korean vessel called the Des Hung Ho, bringing missile parts for Syria, docked at Bandar Abbas in May 1992. Iran then flew these parts to Syria. An Iranian ship coming from North Korea and a second North Korean ship followed, carrying missiles and machine tools for both Syria and Iran. At least 20 of the North Korean missiles have gone to Syria from Iran, and production equipment seems to have been transferred to Iran and to Syrian plants near Hama and Aleppo. The SCUD-C is an improved version of the SCUD-B. With superior range and payload, it is another tactical missile first acquired by Iran in 1990. It has an approximate range between 500 and 700 miles, a CEP of 50 meters, and it carries a 700– 989-kilogram warhead. It has a diameter of 0.885 meters, a height of 11–12 meters, a launch weight of 6,370–6,500 kilograms, an unknown stage mass, an unknown dry mass, and an unknown propellant mass. In terms of propelling ability, its thrust is unknown, its burn time is unknown, and it has an effective Isp of 231. The SCUD-C possesses one thrust chamber and is a one-stage rocket (it does not break into smaller pieces). Its fuel is Tonka-250, and its oxidizer is the AK 20P.142 SCUD-C missile development was successfully completed and ready for production by 1987 (mainly by North Korea) and then distributed to Iran several years later. According to some reports, Iran has created shelters and tunnels in its coastal areas that it could use to store Scuds and other missiles in hardened sites to reduce their vulnerability to air attack. The missile is more advanced than the SCUD-B, although many aspects of its performance are unclear. North Korea seems to have completed development of the missile in 1987, after obtaining technical support from China. While it is often called a ‘‘SCUD-C,’’ it seems to differ substantially in detail from the original Soviet SCUD-B. It seems to be based more on the Chinese-made DF-61 than on a direct copy of the Soviet weapon. Experts estimate that the North Korean missiles have a range of around 310 miles (500 kilometers), a conventional warhead with a high explosive payload of 700 kilograms, and relatively good accuracy and reliability. While some experts feel the payload of its conventional warhead may be limited for the effective delivery of

392


chemical agents, Iran might modify the warhead to increase payload at the expense of range and restrict the use of chemical munitions to the most lethal agents such as persistent nerve gas. It might also concentrate its development efforts on arming its SCUD-C forces with more lethal biological agents. It is currently estimated that Iran has 50–150 SCUD-Cs in its inventory.143 While early development of the SCUB-C tracks closely with that of the SCUD-B, the following timeline tracks the development of Iranian SCUD-C missiles since the Gulf War: • 1994: By this year, Iran had purchased 150–200 SCUD-Cs from North Korea.144 • 1997: Iran began production of its own SCUD-C missiles. This is generally considered a technological leap for Iran, and it is believed that a large portion of its production capability and technology came from North Korea.145

In spite of the revelations during the 1990s about North Korean missile technology transfers to Tehran, Iran formally denied the fact that it had such systems long after the transfer of these missiles became a fact. Hassan Taherian, an Iranian foreign ministry official, stated in February 1995, ‘‘There is no missile cooperation between Iran and North Korea whatsoever. We deny this.’’146 A senior North Korean delegation did, however, travel to Tehran to close the deal on November 29, 1990, and met with Mohsen Rezaei, the former Commander of the IRGC. Iran either bought the missile then or placed its order shortly thereafter. North Korea then exported the missile through its Lyongaksan Import Corporation. Iran imported some of these North Korean missile assemblies using its B-747s and seems to have used ships to import others. Iran probably had more than 60 of the longer-range North Korean missiles by 1998, although other sources report 100, and one source reports 170. Iran may have five to ten SCUD-C launchers, each with several missiles. This total seems likely to include four North Korean TELs received in 1995. Iran is seeking to deploy enough missiles and launchers to make its missile force highly dispersed and difficult to attack. Iran began to test its new North Korean missiles. There are reports it fired them from mobile launchers at a test site near Qom to a target area about 310 miles (500 kilometers) away south of Shahroud. There are also reports that units equipped with such missiles have been deployed as part of Iranian exercises like the Saeqer-3 (Thunderbolt 3) exercise in late October 1993. In any case, such missiles are likely to have enough range-payload to give Iran the ability to strike all targets on the southern coast of the Gulf and all of the populated areas in Iraq, although not the West. Iran could also reach targets in part of eastern Syria, the eastern third of Turkey, and cover targets in the border area of the former Soviet Union, western Afghanistan, and western Pakistan. Accuracy and reliability do remain major uncertainties, as does the missile’s operational CEP. Much would depend on the precise level of technology Iran deployed in the warhead. Neither Russia nor the People’s Republic of China seems to have transferred the warhead technology for biological and chemical weapons to Iran or Iraq

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when they sold them the SCUD-B missile and CSS-8. However, North Korea may have sold Iran such technology as part of the SCUD-C sale. If it did so, such a technology transfer would save Iran years of development and testing in obtaining highly lethal biological and chemical warheads. In fact, Iran would probably be able to deploy far more effective biological and chemical warheads than Iraq had at the time of the Gulf War. Iran can now assemble SCUD-C missiles using foreign-made components. It may soon be able to make entire missile system and warhead packages in Iran. Iran may be working with Syria in such development efforts, although Middle Eastern nations rarely cooperate in such sensitive areas.

CCS-8 or Tondar 69 Jane’s reports that Iran may have some 200 Chinese CCS-8, or M-7/Project 8610 short-range missiles. These are Chinese modifications of the Sa-2 surfaceto-air missile for use as a surface-to-surface system. It has a 190-kilogram warhead and a 150-kilometer range. Up to 90 may have been delivered to Iran in 1992, and another 110 may have been delivered later. The system is reported to have poor accuracy.147

Shahab-3 Iran appears to have entered into a technological partnership with North Korea after years of trading with the North Koreans for SCUD-Cs throughout the 1990s. The visit to North Korea in 1993 by General Manteghi and his 21 specialists seems a possible date when Iran shifted from procurement to development. Iran did not have the strike capability to attack Israel with its limited range Scuds. As a result, the Iranians seem to have begun using some of the designs for the North Korean No Dong medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) in an attempt to manufacture their own version of the missile, the Shahab-3. Between 1997 and 1998, Iran began testing the Shahab-3. While Iran claimed Shahab-3’s purpose was to carry payloads of submunitions, it is more likely that Iran would use the Shahab-3’s superior range to carry a chemical, nuclear, or biological weapon. Missile Development Iran’s new Shahab-3 series is a larger missile that seems to be based on the design of the North Korean No Dong 1/A, and No Dong B missiles, which some analysts claim were developed with Iranian financial support. It also has strong similarities to the Ghauri. It is based on North Korean designs and technology, but is being developed and produced in Iran. This development effort is controlled and operated by the IRGC. Iranian officials, however, claimed that the production of the Shahab-3 missiles was entirely domestic. The Iranian Defense Minister, Ali Shamkhani, argued

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in May 2005 that the production was comprised of locally made parts and that the production was continuing.148 As the following timeline shows, the Shahab-3 is a relatively young and constantly evolving system, but it has been tested several times: • October 1997: Russia began training Iranian engineers on missile production for the Shahab-3.149 • 1998: Iran began testing its own Shahab-3s. Problems with finding or making an advanced guidance system hindered many of Iran’s tests, however. Meanwhile, Iran begins experimenting with the Shahab-4.150 • July 23, 1998: Iran launched its first test flight of the Shahab-3. The missile flew for approximately 100 seconds, after which time it was detonated. It is not known if it malfunctioned, because the Iranians did not want to risk discovery.151 • July 15, 2000: Iran had its first successful test of a Shahab-3, using a new North Korean engine.152 • Summer 2001: Iran began production of the Shahab-3.153 • July 7, 2003: Iran completes the final test of the Shahab-3. Allegations emerged that Chinese companies like Tai’an Foreign Trade General Corporation and China North Industries Corporation had been aiding the Iranians in overcoming the missile’s final technical glitches.154 The missile is seen in Iranian military parades and displayed openly. • August 11, 2004: Iran decreases the size of the Shahab-3 warhead, making a move toward being able to mount a nuclear warhead to a Shahab-3. At this point, the modified Shahab-3 is often referred to as the Shahab-3M.155 The missile had a new, smaller, and ‘‘bottleneck’’ warhead. This kind of warhead has a slower reentry than a cone-shaped warhead and has advantages using warheads containing chemical and biological agents. Some estimated that it had a range of 2,000 kilometers for a 700kilogram warhead, but this may be a confusion with another solid-fueled system. A second variant may exist with a larger fin, a meter less length, and less than a 1,500kilometer range.156 • September 19, 2004: Another test took place, and the missile was paraded on September 21 covered in banners saying ‘‘we will crush America under our feet’’ and ‘‘wipe Israel off the map.’’157 • May 31, 2005: Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani claimed that Iran successfully tested a new missile motor using solid-fuel technology with a range of 1,500–2,000 kilometers, and a 700-kilogram warhead. Shamkhani was quoted as saying ‘‘Using solid fuel would be more durable and increase the range of the missile.’’158 It remains uncertain if this referred to the Shahab-3 or the modified Shahab-3, the IRIS missile. • September 2005: Two new missiles tested, again with a triconic or baby-bottle warhead some 3 meters long. Some experts speculate that it can disperse chemical and biological weapons or is better suited to a nuclear warhead. Others feel it is an airburst warhead, capable of better dispersing chemical and/or biological weapons. • September 2006: Iran is reported to have more than 30 Shahab-3s and 10 TELs, but this is not confirmed.159

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As of early 2006, there had been some ten launches at a rate of only one to two per year. Roughly 30 percent had fully malfunctioned, and six launches had had some malfunction. Iran had also tested two major payload configurations.160 Uncertain Performance161 Discussions of the Shahab-3’s range-payload, accuracy, and reliability are uncertain and will remain speculative until the system is far more mature. A long-range ballistic missile requires at least 10–30 tests in its final configuration to establish its true payload and warhead type, actual range-payload, and accuracy. While highly detailed estimates of the Shahab-3’s performance are available, they at best are rough engineering estimates and are sometimes speculative to the point of being sheer guesswork using rounded numbers. Its real-world range will depend on both the final configuration of the missile and the weight of its warhead. Various sources now guess that the Shahab-3 has a range between 1,300 and 2,000 kilometers, but the longer-range estimate seems to be based on Iranian claims and assumptions about an improved version, not full-scale operational tests.162 U.S. experts believe that the original Shahab-3 missile had a nominal range of 1,100 to 1,300 kilometers, with a 1,200-kilogram payload. The basic system is said to have been 16.5 meters long, have a diameter of 1.58 meters, with a launch weight of 17,410 pounds. Iran has claimed that the Shahab-3 has a range of 2,000 kilometers. This may reflect different estimates of different versions of the missile. Nasser Maleki, the head of Iran’s aerospace industry, stated on October 7, 2004, ‘‘Very certainly we are going to improve our Shahab-3 and all of our other missiles.’’ Tehran then claimed in September that the Shahab-3 could now reach targets up to 2,000 kilometers away, presumably allowing the missiles to be deployed a greater distance away from Israel’s Air Force and Jericho-2 ballistic missiles.163 IRGC Political Bureau Chief Yadollah Javani stated in September 2004 that the modified Shahab—sometimes called the Shahab-3A or Shahab-3M—could be used to attack Israel’s Dimona nuclear reactor.164 Iran performed another test on October 20, 2004, and Iran’s Defense Minister, Ali Shamkani, claimed it was part of an operational exercise. On November 9, 2004, Iran’s Defense Minister also claimed that Iran was now capable of mass-producing the Shahab-3 and that Iran reserved the option of preemptive strikes in defense of its nuclear sites. Shamkani claimed shortly afterward that the Shahab-3 now had a range of more than 2,000 kilometers (1,250 miles).165 One leading German expert stresses the uncertainty of any current estimates and notes that range-payload trade-offs would be critical. He puts the range for the regular Shahab-3 at 820 kilometers with a 1.3-ton payload and 1,100 kilometers with a 0.7-ton payload. (An analysis by John Pike of GlobalSecurity.org also points out that missiles—like combat aircraft—can make trade-offs between range and payload. For example, the No Dong B has a range of 1,560 kilometers with a 760-kilogram

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warhead and 1,350 kilometers with a 1,158-kilogram warhead.166 He feels that an improved Shahab could use a combination of a lighter aluminum airframe, light weight guidance, reduced payload, increased propellant load, and increased burn time to increase range. He notes that little is really known about the improved Shahab-3, but estimates the maximum range of an improved Shahab-3 as still being 2,000 kilometers, that a 0.7–0.8-ton warhead would limit its range to 1,500 kilometers and that a 0.8–1.0-ton warhead would reduce it to 1,200 kilometers. A 1.2-ton warhead would limit it to around 850 kilometers. He feels Iran may have drawn on Russian technology from the R-21 and the R-27. Photos of the system also show progressive changes in cable duct position, fins, and length in 2004 and 2005.167 The difference in range estimates may be a matter of Iranian propaganda, but a number of experts believe that Iranian claims refer to the modified Shahab-3D or the Shahab-3M and not the regular Shahab-3. There are reports that such modified versions use solid fuel and could have a range of up to 2,000 kilometers. They also indicate that the standard Shahab-3 remains in production, but the improved Shahab is now called the Shahab-3M.168 Much also depends on the missile warhead. In 2004, then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell accused Iran of modifying its Shahab-3 to carry a nuclear warhead based on documents the U.S. government had received from a walk-in source. While experts argued that this information was yet to be confirmed, others claimed that Iran obtained ‘‘a new nosecone’’ for its Shahab-3 missile.169 In addition, other U.S. officials claimed that the source of the information provided ‘‘tens of thousands of pages of Farsi-language computer files’’ on Iranian attempts to modify the Shahab3 missile to deliver a ‘‘black box,’’ which U.S. officials believed ‘‘almost certainly’’ referred to a nuclear warhead. These documents were said to include diagrams and test results, weight, detonation height, and shape, but did not include warhead designs.170 Media reporting indicates that the United States was able to examine drawings on a stolen laptop from Iran and found that Iran had developed 18 different ways to adapt the size, weight, and diameter of the new nosecone on it Shahab-3 missile. It was also reported, however, that Iran’s effort to expand the nosecone would not work and that Iran did not have the technological capabilities to adapt nuclear weapons into its Shahab-3 missile. U.S. nuclear experts claimed that one reason for this failure was that the project ‘‘wasn’t done by the A-team of Iran’s program.’’171 Some experts believe that new bottleneck warhead tested in 2004 was for the Shahab-3M and makes it more accurate and capable of air-burst detonations, which could be used to more effectively spread chemical weapons. Others believe a smaller warhead has increased its range. As for other aspects of performance, it is again easy to be precise, but difficult to be correct. One source, for example, reports that the Shahab-3 has a CEP of 190 meters and carries a 750–989–1,158-kilogram warhead. The same source reports that the Shahab-3 has a height of 16 meters, a stage mass of 15,092 kilograms, a dry mass of 1,780–2,180 kilograms, and a propellant mass of 12,912 kilograms. In terms of

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propelling ability, its thrust is between 26,760–26,600 Kg f, its burn time is 110 seconds, and it has an effective Isp of 226 and a drag loss of 45 seconds. According to this source, the Shahab-3 possesses one thrust chamber. Its fuel is TM-185, and its oxidizer is the AK 27I.172 High levels of accuracy are possible, but this remains to be seen. If the system uses older guidance technology and warhead separation methods, its CEP could be anywhere from 1,000 to 4,000 meters. If it uses newer technology, such as some of the most advanced Chinese technology, it could have a CEP as low as 190–800 meters. In any case, such CEP data are engineering estimates based on the ratios from a perfectly located target. This means real-world missile accuracy and reliability cannot be measured using technical terms like CEP even if they apply to a fully mature and deployed missile. The definition of the term is based on the assumption the missile can be perfectly targeted at launch and performs perfectly through its final guidance phase, and then somewhat arbitrarily define CEP as the accuracy of 50 percent of the systems launched in terms of distance from a central point on the target. True performance can be derived only from observing reliability under operational conditions and by correlating actual point of impact to a known aim point. A German expert notes, for example, that the operational CEP of the improved Shahab-3 is likely to be around 3 kilometers, but the maximum deviation could be 11 kilometers.173 In short, unclassified estimates of the Shahab-3’s accuracy and reliability available from public sources are matters of speculation, and no unclassified source has credibility in describing its performance in real-world, war-fighting terms. This is not a casual problem, since actual weaponization of a warhead requires extraordinarily sophisticated systems to detonate a warhead at the desired height of burst and to reliably disseminate the munitions or agent. Even the most sophisticated conventional submunitions are little more than area weapons if the missile accuracy to target location has errors in excess of 250–500 meters, and a unitary conventional explosive warhead without terminal guidance is little more than a psychological or terror weapon almost regardless of its accuracy. The effective delivery of chemical agents by either spreading the agent or the use of submunitions generally requires accuracies less than 1,000 meters to achieve lethality against even large point targets. Systems with biological weapons are inherently area weapons, but a 1,000-kilogram nominal warhead can carry so little agent that accuracies less than 1,000 meters again become undesirable. Nuclear weapons require far less accuracy, particularly if a ‘‘dirty’’ ground burst can be targeted within a reliable fallout area. There are, however, limits. For example, a regular fission weapon of some 20 kilotons requires accuracies under 2,500–3,000 meters for some kinds of targets like sheltered airfields or large energy facilities. What is clear is that the Shahab could carry a well-designed nuclear weapon well over 1,000 kilometers, and Iran may have access to such designs. As noted earlier, the Shahab-3 missile was tested in its final stages in 2003 and in ways that indicate it has a range of 2,000 kilometers, which is enough to reach the Gulf and Israel. A.Q. Khan sold a Chinese nuclear warhead design to Libya with a mass of as little

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as 500 kilograms and a one meter diameter. It is highly probable such designs were sold to Iran as well. Mobility and Deployment The Shahab-3 is mobile, but requires numerous launching support vehicles for propellant transport and loading and power besides its TELs.174 The original version was slow in setting up, taking five hours to prepare for launch.175 Some five different TELs have been seen, however, and some experts believe the current reaction time is roughly an hour.176 The Shahab-3’s deployment status is highly uncertain. Some reports have claimed that the Shahab-3 was operational as early as 1999. Reports surfaced that development of the Shahab-3 was completed in June 2003 and that it underwent ‘‘final’’ tests on July 7, 2003. However, the Shahab-3 underwent a total of only nine tests from inception through late 2003, and only four of them could be considered successful in terms of basic system performance. The missile’s design characteristics also continued to evolve during these tests. A CIA report to Congress, dated November 10, 2003, indicated that upgrading of the Shahab-3 was still under way, and some sources indicated that Iran was now seeking a range of 1,600 kilometers. There is an argument among experts as to whether the system has been tested often enough to be truly operational. The CIA reported in 2004 that Iran had ‘‘some’’ operational Shahab-3s with a range of 1,300 kilometers. Some experts feel the missile has since become fully operational and Iran already possesses 25–100 Shahab-3’s in its inventory.177 Iranian opposition sources have claimed that Iran has 300 such missiles. According to other sources, the IRGC operated six batteries in the spring of 2006 and was redeploying them within a 35-kilometer radius of their main command and control center every 24 hours because of the risk of a U.S. or Israeli attack. The main operating forces were deployed in the west in the Kermanshah and Hamadan provinces with reserve batteries farther east in the Fars and Isfahan provinces.178 A substantial number of experts, however, believe the Shahab-3 may be in deployment, but only in ‘‘showpiece’’ or ‘‘test-bed’’ units using conventional warheads and with performance Iran cannot accurately predict.

Shahab-3A/3M/3D/IRIS In October 2004, the Mujahedin-e Khalq claimed that Iran was developing an improved version of the Shahab with a 2,400-kilometer range (1,500 miles). The MEK has an uncertain record of accuracy in making such claims, and such claims could not be confirmed. Mortezar Ramandi, an official in the Iranian delegation to the UN, denied that Iran was developing a missile with a range of more than 1,250 miles (2,000 kilometers).179 This new range for the Shahab-3 may have marked a significant move in Iranian technological capability, as some experts believe Iran switched the fuel source from

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liquid fuel to solid. The possible existence of a Shahab-3 with a solid fuel source created yet another variant of the Shahab-3 series, the Shahab-3D, or the IRIS missile. Such a development of a solid fuel source might enable the Shahab-3D to enter into space and serve as a potential satellite launch vehicle. Perfecting solid fuel technology would also move Iran’s missile systems a long way toward the successful creation of a limited range intercontinental ballistic missile (LRICBM), which is what the Shahab-5 and Shahab-6 are intended to accomplish.180 If there is an IRIS launch vehicle, it apparently consists of the No Dong/Shahab-3 first stage with a bulbous front section ultimately designed to carry the IRIS secondstage solid motor, as well as a communications satellite or scientific payload.181 The IRIS solid fuel missile itself may be the third-stage portion of the North Korean Taep’o-dong 1.182 The Shahab-3D alone is not capable of launching a large satellite probe into space, and it is possible that it is a test for the second- and third-stage portions of the upcoming IRBM Ghadr designs and the LRICBM Shahab-5 and Shahab-6.183 No test flights of the Shahab-3D have been recorded on video, but it is believed that they have taken place at a space launch facility.184 The following timeline shows the reported tests of the Shahab-3D/IRIS: • July 22, 1998: First test flight (explodes 100 seconds after takeoff ). • July 15, 2000: First successful test flight (range of 850 kilometers). • September 21, 2000: Unsuccessful test flight (explodes shortly after takeoff ). • May 23, 2002: Successful test flight. • July 2002: Unsuccessful test flight (missile did not function properly). • June 2003: Successful test flight. Iran declares this was the final test flight before deployment. • August 11, 2004: Successful test flight of Shahab-3M. The missile now has a bottleneck warhead. • October 20, 2004: Another successful test flight of Shahab-3M. Iran now claims the modified missile has a range of 2,000 kilometers.185

Shahab-4 Iran may also be developing larger designs with greater range-payload using a variety of local, North Korean, Chinese, and Russian technical inputs. These missiles have been called the Shahab-4, the Shahab-5, and the Shahab-6. As of September 2006, none of these missiles were being produced, and the exact nature of such programs remained speculative.186 Some experts believe the ‘‘Shahab-4’’ has an approximate range between 2,200 and 2,800 kilometers. Various experts have claimed that the Shahab-4 is based on the North Korean No Dong 2, the three-stage Taep’o-dong-1 missile, the Russian SS-N-6 SERB, or even some aspects of the Russian SS-4, but has a modern digital

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guidance package rather than the 2,000–3,000-meter CEP of early missiles like the SS-4. Russian firms are believed to have sold Iran special steel for missile development, test equipment, shielding for guidance packages, and other technology. Iran’s Shahid Hemmet Industrial Group is reported to have contracts with the Russian Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute, Rosvoorouzhenie, the Bauman Institute, and Polyus. It is also possible that Iran has obtained some technology from Pakistan. One source has provided a precise estimate of some performance characteristics. This estimate of ‘‘Shahab-4’’ gives it an estimated height of 25 meters, a diameter of 1.3 meters, and a launch weight of 22,000 kilograms. In terms of propelling ability, its thrust is estimated to be around 26,000 Kg f and its burn time around 293 seconds. It is said to be a 2/3-stage rocket that possesses three thrust chambers, one for each stage. Its fuel for the first stage is Heptyl, and its oxidizer is inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA).187 Iran has sent mixed signals about the missile development status. In October 2003, Iran claimed it was abandoning its Shahab-4 program, citing that the expected increase in range (2,200 to 3,000 kilometers) would cause too much global tension.188 Some speculate that Iran may have scrapped its Shahab-4 program because it either was not innovative and large enough and/or to avoid controversy. The reason announced by some Iranians for creating a missile like the Shahab-4 was for satellite launches. The IRIS/Shahab-3D, with its solid fuel source, however, has shown potential for space launches. The improved range and bottleneck warhead design offered by the Shahab-3M (which began testing in August 2004) may make the Shahab-4 simply not worth the effort or controversy.189 According to German press reports, however, Iran is moving ahead in its development of the Shahab-4. In February 2006, the German news agency cited ‘‘Western intelligence services’’ as saying that Iran successfully tested the Shahab-4 missile with a range of 2,200 kilometers on January 17, 2006, and the test was announced on Iranian television several days later by the Commander of the IRGC.190 These reports remain unverifiable. Shahab-5 and Shahab-6 Israeli intelligence has reported that Iran is attempting to create a Shahab-5 and a Shahab-6, with a 3,000–5,000-kilometer range. These missiles would be based on the North Korean Taep’o-dong-2 and would be three-stage rockets. If completed, the Shahab-5 and the Shahab-6 would take Iran into the realm of LRICBMs and enable Iran to target the U.S. eastern seaboard. The Shahab-5 and Shahab-6 would possess a solid fuel third stage for space entry and liquid fuel for the first stage take units. It is alleged that Russian aerospace engineers are aiding the Iranians in their efforts. It is believed that the engineers will employ a version of Russia’s storable liquid propellant RD-216 in the missile’s first stage. The RD-216 is an Energomash engine originally used on the Skean/SS-5/R-14, IRBM, Saddler/SS-7/R-16, ICBM, and Sasin/R-26 ICBM missiles used in the Cold War. These reports remain

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uncertain, and Israeli media and official sources have repeatedly exaggerated the nature and speed of Iranian efforts.191 Neither the Shahab-5 nor the Shahab-6 has been tested or constructed. While no description of the Shahab-6 is yet available, extrapolations for the Shahab-5 have been made based on the North Korean Taep’o-dong 2. The Shahab-5 has an approximate range between 4,000 and 4,300 kilometers. The Shahab-5 has an unknown CEP, and its warhead capacity is between 700 and 1,000 kilograms. It has a height of 32 meters, a diameter of 2.2 meters, and a launch weight of 80,000–85,000 kilograms. In terms of propelling ability, some experts estimate its thrust to be 31,260 Kg f and its burn time to be 330 seconds. The Shahab-5 is a three-stage rocket that possesses six thrust chambers, four for stage one, and one for the two remaining stages. The Shahab-5 and Shahab-6 would be considered long-range ICBMs.192 As of January 2006, Iran had not completed its plans for these missiles, and it had none in its inventory. In February 2006, German press reports, however, claimed that the Federal German Intelligence Service estimated that it was possible for Iran to acquire the Shahab-5 as early as 2007 with a range of 3,000–5,000 kilometers.193 These estimates, however, are speculative and remain unconfirmed.

Ghadr 101 and Ghadr 110 The uncertainties surrounding Iran’s solid fuel problem and the existence or nonexistence of the Shahab-3 are compounded by reports of a separate missile development program. The Iranian exile group, NCRI, claimed in December 2004 that the Ghadr 101 and the Ghadr 110 were new missile types that used solid fuel and were, in fact, IRBMs. Their existence has never been confirmed, and conflicting reports make an exact description difficult. At the time, U.S. experts indicated that the Ghadr is actually the same as the Shahab-3A/Shahab M/Shahab 4, which seemed to track with some Israel experts who felt that Iran was extending the range-payload of Shahab-3 and that reports of both the Gadr and the Shahab-4 were actually decribing the Shahab-3A/3M.194 In May 2005, Iran tested a solid fuel motor for what some experts call the Shahab3D, possibly increasing the range to 2,500 kilometers, making space entry possible, and setting the stage for the Shahab-5 and the Shahab-6 to be three-stage rockets resembling ICBMs.195 This test showed that Iran had developed some aspects of a successful long-range, solid fuel missile design, but did not show how Iran intended to use such capabilities. NCRI again claimed in March 2006 that Iran was moving forward with the Ghadr solid fuel IRBM. It also claimed that Iran had scrapped the Shahab-4 because of test failures and performance limitations. It reported that Iran had substantial North Korean technical support for the Ghadr, that it was 70 percent complete, and had a range of 3,000 kilometers. One Israeli expert felt that NCRI was confusing a solid-state, second stage for the liquid-fueled Shahab-4 with a separate missile.196

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Work by Dr. Robert Schmucker indicates that Iran is working on solid-fueled systems, building on its experience with solid fuel artillery rockets like its Fateh 110A1 and with Chinese support in developing solid fuel propulsion and guidance. The Fateh, however, is a relatively primitive system with strap-down gyro guidance that is not suited for a long-range ballistic missile.197 As is the case with longer-range variants of the Shahab, it is probably wise to assume that Iran is seeking to develop options for both solid- and liquid-fueled IRBMs and will seek high range-payloads to ensure it can deliver effective CBRN payloads even if it cannot produce efficient nuclear weapons. It is equally wise to wait for systems to reach maturity before reacting to vague possibilities, rather than realworld Iranian capabilities.

Raduga KH-55 Granat/Kh-55/AS-15 Kent The Raduga KH-55 Granat is a Ukrainian-/Soviet-made armed nuclear cruise missile first tested in 1978 and completed in 1984.198 The Russian missile carries a 200-kiloton nuclear warhead, and it has a range of 2,500–3,000 kilometers. It has a theoretical CEP of about 150 meters and a speed of Mach 0.48–0.77. Its guidance system is reported to combine inertial-Doppler navigation and position correction based on in-flight comparison of terrain in the assigned regions with images stored in the memory of an on-board computer. It was designed to deliver a high-yield nuclear weapon against fixed-area targets and has little value delivering conventional warheads. While it was originally designed to be carried by a large bomber, and its weight makes it a marginal payload for either Iran’s Su-24s or F-14As, it has land and ship launch capability. It can also be adapted to use a much larger nuclear or other CBRN warhead by cutting its range, and it may be a system that Iran can reverse engineer for production.199 Russian President Boris Yeltsin made further manufacture of the missile illegal in 1992.200 Still, the Ukraine had 1,612 of these missiles in stock at the end of 1991, and it agreed to give 575 of them to Russia and scrap the rest.201 The plans to give the missiles to Russia in the late 1990s proved troublesome, however, and an organization was able to forge the documents regarding 20 missiles and listed them as being sold to Russia, while in fact 12 seem to have been distributed to Iran and 6 to China (the other 2 are unaccounted for). 202 It was estimated that the missiles were smuggled to Iran in 2001.203 Ukrainian officials confirmed the illegal sale on March 18, 2005, but the Chinese and Iranian governments were silent regarding the matter. While some U.S. officials downplayed the transaction, the U.S. State Department expressed concern that the missiles could give each state a technological boost.204 The missiles did not contain warheads at the time of their sale, and they had passed their service life in 1995 and were in need of maintenance.205 It is, however, feared that Iran could learn from the cruise missiles technology to improve its own missile program and the missiles could be fitted to match Iran’s Su-24 strike aircraft.206

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PARAMILITARY, INTERNAL SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE FORCES Iran has not faced a meaningful threat from terrorism. Its internal security forces are focused on countering political opposition. Figure 8.7 shows the force structure of Iran’s paramilitary and internal security services. Since 1990, Iran has maintained the same force structure, and its key agencies have not changed since the early years of the Revolution. The U.S. Department of State described the role of Iran’s internal security apparatus as follows:207 Several agencies share responsibility for law enforcement and maintaining order, including the ministry of intelligence and security, the law enforcement forces under the interior ministry, and the IRGC. A paramilitary volunteer force known as the Basiji and various informal groups known as the Ansar-e Hizballah (Helpers of the Party of God) aligned with extreme conservative members of the leadership and acted as vigilantes. The size of the Basij is disputed, with officials citing anywhere from 11 to 20 million, and a recent Western study claiming there were 90 thousand active members and up to 300 thousand reservists. Civilian authorities did not maintain fully effective control of the security forces. The regular and paramilitary security forces both committed numerous, serious human rights abuses. According to HRW since 2000 the government’s use of plainclothes security agents to intimidate political critics became more

Figure 8.7 Iran’s Paramilitary Forces’ Force Structure, 1990–2006 1990

2000

2005

2006

1,045,000

1,040,000

1,040,000

1,040,000

45,000

40,000

40,000

40,000

1,000,000

1,000,000

1,000,000

136

130

130

130

Misc. Boats and Craft

40

40

40

40

PCI

96

90

90

90

?

?

?

?

Manpower Active (interior ministry officers)

Reserve (includes rev. conscripts, 1,000,000 BASU) Patrol and Coastal Combatants

Aircraft Cessna 185/Cessna 310 Helicopters UTL Bell/205/206

*

?

?

?

?

?

24

24

24

?

24

24

24

* All ‘‘?’’ refer to weapons that Iran is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in its possession are unknown. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

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institutionalized. They were increasingly armed, violent, and well equipped, and they engaged in assault, theft, and illegal seizures and detentions.

Iran maintains an extensive network of internal security and intelligence services. The main parts of the domestic security apparatus are made up of the MOIS, the Basij Resistance Force, the Intelligence unit of the IRGC, and the Law Enforcement forces within the Ministry of Interior that largely are responsible for providing police and border control. The leadership of each of these organizations appears to be fragmented and dispersed among several, often competing, political factions. Public information on all Iranian security and intelligence forces is extremely limited and subject to political manipulation. Key to most paramilitary and intelligence forces in Iran is the IRGC, as it holds control over several other organizations or parts thereof. All security organizations without exception report to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), as the highest body in the political chain of command. The phenomenon of the fragmented leadership of the security organizations is reflected in their relationship to the SNSC as different security organizations maintain special ties to certain elements of the SNSC. In addition, it has to be assumed that other state organizations, most notably the police services, exert varying control over internal security. As with virtually all other organizations, the IRGC is believed to have considerable leverage over these services.208 The effectiveness of the internal security organizations is unclear and the political will to use them is hard to predict. After local unrest in the Iranian province of Baluchistan in May 2006, police were unable to seize control of the situation against regional tribal forces.209 The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), or Vezarat-e Ettela’ at va Aminat-e Keshvar (VEVAK), was installed following the Revolution to replace the now-disbanded National Organization for Intelligence and Security (SAVAK), which in turn was created under the leadership of U.S. and Israeli officers in 1957. SAVAK fell victim to political leadership struggles with the intelligence service of the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq War. A compromise solution resulted in the creation of MOIS in 1984. In 2006, the MOIS employed about 15,000 civilian staff. Its major tasks included intelligence about the Middle East and Central Asia and domestic intelligence and monitoring of clerical and government officials210 as well as work on preventing conspiracies against the Islamic Republic.211 It can therefore be assumed that the ministry maintains an elaborate domestic service network. The MOIS staff is believed to maintain a professional service loyalty and therefore is not subject to easy mobilization by military, clergy, or other political forces. Some, however, believe that during President Khatami’s rule the MOIS actively sought to rid the organization of hard-line officials.212 Within Iran’s political system there is

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constant argument about limiting parliamentary control over MOIS, indicating that the control over MOIS can be used as a powerful political instrument. Recently, there were efforts in Iran to extract the counterintelligence unit of MOIS and make it a separate entity. This proposal seems to be favored by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and some hard-line legislators.213 Until recently, the organization has remained under very limited public disclosure. In the 1990s, ministry personnel were accused of killing political dissidents in Iran. Ensuing investigations have been covered up systematically. Apparently, MOIS has a comparatively large budget at its disposal and operates under the broader guidance of Ali Khamenei.214 And it seems likely that the details about the ministry’s resources are partly undisclosed even to Iranian political officials.

The IRGC Intelligence Branch As part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the roughly 2,000 staff members of its intelligence force are a largely politicized force with a political mission. According to Jane’s, their conformity and loyalty to the regime are unquestionable.215 The main task of the IRGC Intelligence Branch is to gather intelligence in the Muslim world. As far as domestic security is concerned, the organization targets the enemies of the Islamic Revolution and also participates in their prosecution and trials.216 In addition, it works closely with the IRGC’s Qods Corps, which also operates covertly outside Iran.

The Basij Resistance Force The IRGC oversaw the creation of a people’s militia, a volunteer group, named the Basij Resistance Force (which means Mobilization of the Oppressed), in 1980. Numbering over 1,000,000217 members, the Basij is a paramilitary force, mostly manned by elderly men, youths, and volunteers who have completed their military service. This force is organized in a regional and decentralized command structure. It has up to 740 regional battalions, each organized into three battalions or four platoons. Each battalion has 300–350 men. It maintains a relatively small active-duty staff of 90,000 and relies on mobilization in the case of any contingency.218 The Basij has a history of martyr-style suicide attacks dating back to the Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1988. Today, its main tasks are thought to assist locally against conventional military defense as well as quell civil uprisings. In addition, one of the force’s key roles has been to maintain internal security including monitoring internal threats from Iranian citizens and acting as ‘‘a static militia force.’’ The state of training and equipment readiness for the Basij is believed to be low. No major weapon systems have been reported for the inventory of the Basij. The Basij derives its legitimization from Article 151 of the Iranian Constitution, which calls upon the government to fulfill its duty according to the Quran to provide all citizens with the means to defend themselves.

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The IRGC maintains tight control over the leadership of the Basij and imposes strict Islamic rules on it members. Recent comments by Iranian leaders indicate that the mission of the Basij is shifting away from traditional territorial defense to ‘‘defending against Iranian security threats.’’ Furthermore, there are reports of an increased interest in improving the Basij under the leadership of President Ahmadinejad.219 At the same time, the IRGC leadership questions the effectiveness of the Basij and might loosen its ties to the organization.220 In 1993, the Ashura Brigades were created from IRGC and Basij militia units as a response to antigovernment riots. This unit is composed of roughly 17,000 men and women, and its primary purpose is to keep down civil unrest, although there has been some discontent expressed by senior leaders about using IRGC units for domestic contingencies.221 The Uncertain Role of the Ministry of Interior The police forces, which comprise about 40,000 police under the Ministry of Interior (MOI), participate in internal security as well as border protection. The Police-110 unit specializes in rapid-response activities in urban areas to disperse potentially dangerous public gatherings. The maritime police have 90 inshore patrol and 40 harbor boats. In 2003, some 400 women became the first female members of the police force since the 1978–1979 Revolution.222 The role of Iran’s MOI is unclear, and open source information regarding its structure and forces is limited. The same is true of other organizations in Iran’s internal security apparatus. The Ansar-e Hezbollah is a paramilitary force that has gained questionable notoriety. It remains unclear to what extent it is attached to government bodies. Reportedly, the political right in government has repeatedly made use of it to fight and intimidate liberal forces in society. The Ansar-e Hezbollah’s military level of training appears to be very poor.223 IRAN’S CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES Iran has experienced many serious strategic challenges over the past three decades, which continue to have repercussions until the present time. After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran was left without one of its formerly closest allies, the United States, which has considered Iran an adversarial power since the hostage taking in 1979. In addition to the domestic turmoil created by the Revolution, Iranian oil production and income dropped sharply. Iran went from earning some 17 percent of all OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) revenues in the late 1970s to an average of around 10 percent from 1980 to the present.224 It had to fight a bloody war against Iraq that lasted eight years and came at a great cost to Iran both in terms of human life, strategic prestige, military capability, and economic development. Following the Iran-Iraq War, the Iranian government failed to manage the nation’s finances effectively and implement even basic reforms to develop its economy.

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Moreover, Iran suffered from low oil prices during much of the 1990s. This caused Iran’s military readiness to decline and its economy to stagnate. While the Gulf War of 1990–1991, and the sanctions on Iraq that followed, greatly weakened a once victorious Iraq, it also triggered a major expansion in the U.S. presence in the Gulf. Iran faced a different threat from the Taliban, which drove millions of Afghanis into Iran as refugees and was violently anti-Shi’ite. While the American military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 largely eliminated such threats, they also led to a massive American military presence on two of Iran’s borders. The ‘‘nuclearization’’ of India and Pakistan did not create a direct threat to Iran, but did change the nature of the balance of power in the region. More significantly, the rise of neo-Salafi Islamic fundamentalism created a direct religious and political challenge to Iran and all Shi’ites. While movements like Al Qa’ida divide over how openly they attack Shi’ites, some key leaders like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi have called for a Sunni jihad against Shi’ites, and others have called Shi’ites polytheists and apostates. Iran increasingly faced a struggle for the future of Islam and one that affected all Shi’ites, including those in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria—where Iran had direct strategic interests. The failure of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and Israeli-Syrian negotiations made it impossible for Iranian ‘‘moderates’’ to back away from hostility to Israel and allowed hard-liners to make the Israeli-Palestinian war of attrition that began in 2000 a rallying call for support of Hezbollah in Lebanon and antipeace Palestinian groups like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). It was sometimes unclear how sincere Iran’s motives were and whether some of their attacks on Israel were posturing to defuse Arab hostility to Iran. Iran’s more extreme statements and actions, however, paralyzed efforts to restore relations with the United States and led President George W. Bush to label Iran part of the ‘‘axis of evil’’ and the United States to call Iran the leading terrorist nation. The election of Ahmadinejad as President in August 2005 made this situation much worse when he questioned the existence of the Holocaust and called for the end of Israel. Today, Iran faces several severe strategic challenges. Some of these challenges directly impact its internal stability, while others have an indirect impact on its overall strategic posture in the Gulf and beyond. The following list outlines key challenges that Iran faces today and may face in the foreseeable future: • Nuclear program, long-range missiles, and proliferation: Iran has faced growing international pressure to stop those aspects of its uranium enrichment program and other nuclear research and development activities that seem to be tied to the development of nuclear weapons. The difficulty of this challenge to Iran and the international community is that Iran claims that its nuclear program is aimed for peaceful purposes (nuclear energy). While the Islamic republic has the right to achieve a full nuclear cycle under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States, the IAEA, and the EU-3 (Britain, Germany, and France) have argued that there are many unknowns about Iran’s nuclear intentions. Iran’s nuclear program was referred to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in early 2006, and Iran was still refusing to comply with UN

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resolutions at the end of September 2006. Continued Iranian nuclear activity, coupled to its development of long-range missiles, could lead the international community to further isolate Iran through diplomatic or economic sanctions or could provoke preemptive military strikes by the United States or Israel. • Iran’s involvement in Iraq’s internal affairs in the face of a possible division of Iraq or major civil war: Like all neighboring states, Iran has stakes in ensuring Iraq’s stable future. Regional, U.S., and British officials have accused Iran of meddling in Iraq’s internal affairs, of supporting Shi’ite militias such as Al-Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigade through its intelligence and security services, and of aiming to create a Shi’ite crescent. From an Iranian perspective, the challenge is not only to answer these allegations, but it must be prepared to deal with Iraq. The threat from Saddam Hussein has been replaced with an insurgency that aims to start a civil war between Iraq’s sectarian factions. • The U.S. presence in the region: Many in the region feel that Iran is the clear winner in the case of Iraq, since the Shi’ite majority in Iraq came to power and they are more likely to be more sympathetic to Iran than to their Arab neighbors. While Iran is seen as the winner in the removing of two enemies on its borders (the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq), Iran has more than 100,000 U.S. troops on two of its borders (Iraq and Afghanistan). The presence of the U.S. troops in the Gulf is not new, and Iran has had to deal with U.S. support of the GCC states since the Revolution, but the U.S. power projection does act as a deterrent despite the difficulty the United States is facing with the postwar conflict in Iraq. • Iran’s policy toward neighboring states: While Iran has evidently ceased to attempt to export its Islamic revolution to neighboring states since the mid-1990s, many Arab Gulf states fear that Iran is seeking hegemony in the Gulf and/or that its expansion of its capabilities for asymmetric warfare in the Gulf and ability to threaten Gulf shipping and energy facilities is a serious threat. Bahrain is concerned over Iran’s relations with Bahrain’s restive Shi’ite population. Saudi Arabia is concerned over its Shi’ite in its oilrich Eastern Province. Qatar and Kuwait are concerned over Iranian energy claims, and the United Arab Emirates over the issue of Abu Musa and the Tumbs. • The threat from Al Qa’ida and other neo-Salafist extremist groups: The struggle between Sunnis and Shi’ites is not new in the Gulf, but statements and actions by Al Qa’ida leaders such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi have led many Shi’ites to see neoSalafist groups as a key threat. As noted earlier, Iran has not suffered from the threat of terrorism, but such groups can become a threat to Iran’s internal stability. The threat from such groups, however, does not have to be direct. An escalation of the attacks that took place in Iraq against Shi’ite holy sites, religious rituals, or leaders that spill over into neighboring states may force Iran to get involved to protect Shi’ites and their holy shrines against such attacks. This has led some Sunni states—notably Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia—to become steadily more concerned about a Shi’ite crescent of expanding Iranian influence that would include Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. • Support of proxy groups: The United States and Israel have accused Iran of supporting proxy groups beyond Iraq. Since the Revolution, Iran has had close relations with groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In the ‘‘Global War on Terror,’’ while Iran is happy to see the infrastructure of groups such as Al Qa’ida be destroyed, Iran sees Palestinian and Lebanese groups as freedom fighters.

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Iran played a major role in supporting Hezbollah before and during its war with Israel in August 2003, and in supporting antipeace Palestinian groups like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. This has been a key factor behind the U.S. designation of Iran as a terrorist state and U.S. sanctions against Iran. • Internal political uncertainty: Iran’s political dynamics have been characterized by several factions including reformist, hard-liners, the clerical establishment, and the youth movements. The two key factions, however, that are often talked about as the two rivals are the reformists vs. the hard-liners. The election of Mohammad Khatami as President of the republic in 1997 was seen by many as a turning point in Iran’s internal political trends. However, the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 was a wakeup call to many experts. His political platform had several themes, but the chief items among them were supporting Iran’s right to acquire nuclear technology, Persian nationalism, and populism that has not been seen in Iran since the time of Mohammad Mossadeq in the 1950s. It is too early to predict the result of this struggle between the reformists and the hard-liners, and it largely depends on Ahmadinejad’s ability to deal with the international scrutiny regarding Iran’s nuclear program and domestic economic prosperity. • Economic challenges: Despite high oil prices, Iran’s economy is not growing at its potential growth rate. There are several factors behind this. First, the government controls an estimated 80 percent of the economy, and this discourages the growth of a vibrant private sector, puts greater pressure on the government to support a welfare state, and prevents the growth of a business middle class that can demand further economic and political reforms. Iranian budget deficits are a chronic problem in spite of extraordinarily high oil revenues, driven by large-scale state subsidies on foodstuffs and gasoline. The Majlis did try in January 2005 to freeze domestic prices for gasoline and other fuels at 2003 levels, but in March 2006, it reduced the government’s gasoline subsidy allocation for FY2006/07 to $2.5 billion vs. a request of $4 billion for 2006, and costs of over $4 billion for imports last year. Iran offers only limited employment opportunities for the country’s young and rapidly growing population. The United States estimates that unemployment in Iran is around 11 percent, and it is significantly higher among young people. Inflation is high. Corruption is endemic in state-run, religious foundation, and quasistate monopoly activities which make up a large part of the economy.225 Iran is attempting to diversify its economy by investing some of its oil revenues in other areas, including petrochemicals production. In 2004, nonoil exports rose by a reported 9 percent. Iran also is hoping to attract billions of dollars worth of foreign investment to the country through creating a more favorable investment climate by reducing restrictions and duties on imports and creating free-trade zones. However, there has not been a great deal of progress in this area. Foreign investors appear to be cautious about Iran, due to uncertainties regarding its future direction under new leadership, as well as the ongoing international controversy over the country’s nuclear program. • Iran’s energy sector suffers from a lack of foreign investment: Years of sanctions, mismanagement by Iran’s government, the steadily declining planning and management capabilities of the National Iranian Oil Company, and rigid foreign investment laws, which tend to be nationalistic in nature, have limited the modernization of Iran’s energy sector since the fall of the Shah. This has helped lead to massive declines in its oil production capacity, which in 2006 was averaging around

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4.1 million barrels per day vs. 5.6 to over 6.1 million barrels a day during the late 1970s. Iran’s economy remains heavily dependent on oil and oil export revenues. While many people associate Iran with being an oil producer, it imports nearly 40 percent of its refined products, and this goes back to Iran’s inability and at times unwillingness to attract enough private domestic and foreign investment. The U.S. Energy Information Administration notes that ‘‘Iran’s existing oilfields have a natural decline rate estimated at 8 percent onshore and 10 percent per year offshore. The fields are in need of upgrading, modernization, and enhanced oil recovery (EOR) efforts such as gas reinjection. Current recovery rates are just 24–27 percent, compared to a world average of 35 percent. Iran also needs to increase its search for new oil, with only a few exploration wells being drilled in 2005.’’226 • Military reforms: As the previous sections have shown, Iran’s armed services have quantity in Gulf standards, but they do not have the quality. This is due to several reasons, including mismanagement, the arms embargo by the United States, and the lack of enough funds to maintain and purchase new weapons systems. Iran cannot hope to be a viable conventional military power if it continues with the same defense policies. Even smaller countries such as the United Arab Emirates have surpassed Iran in military spending.

This list is not exhaustive, and Iran faces many other internal and external challenges that do not have the same magnitude or strategic importance. The fact remains, however, that Iran now exists between two war theaters (Iraq and Afghanistan), that its politics has led to steadily more concern inside and outside the Gulf, and the United States and its neighbors see it as a potential threat to the security of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most important strategic waterways in the world and a region where 60 percent of world proven conventional oil reserves exist. Iran also faces two immediate strategic challenges that will preoccupy it for the next several years: dealing with the consequence of its nuclear ambitions and its role in Iraq’s future. Iran’s Nuclear Program and Its Strategic Consequences Iran faces major strategic problems because of an increasingly hostile international reaction to its nuclear enrichment program and failure to fully comply with IAEA inspections. Iran’s nuclear file had become a major issue in the UN Security Council by mid-2006, and there seemed to be three different options for international action against Iran: diplomatic, punitive sanctions, or military strikes. No one knows which option is more likely or if any of them will work, but Iran is likely to face this challenge for the next few years—if it does not end its nuclear program. Economic Sanctions Iran’s traditional economy (carpets, caviars, pistachios, etc.) is an unlikely area for sanctions, since the impact would largely affect farmers and small business without major implications on the Iranian government. Such sectors are also self-sustained, since they are not dependent on imports.

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Other sectors, however, are dependent on imports and would be more impacted by economic sanctions. Sectors such as industry, for example, play a major role in Iran’s economy. It is estimated that Iran’s gross domestic product is 11.8 percent dependent on agriculture, 43.3 percent on industry, and 44.9 percent on services.227 UNSC members would find it hard to justify the use of sanctions against agricultural products—except for dual-use technologies and fertilizers that can be used in the production of WMD—but industrial sanctions might be a different story. Iran’s heavier industries rely on refined products imports and would suffer from economic sanctions. Iran is an importer of refined products. Since 1982, Iran’s dependence on imports of gasoline surged due to the fact that the refineries were damaged by the Iran-Iraq War, the mismanagement of these refineries, and the lack of foreign investment in its refinery sector. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), Iran’s refining sector is inefficient. For example, only 13 percent of the refinery output is gasoline—which is estimated to be half of what European refineries produce.228 In 2004, Iran imported an estimated 0.160 million barrels a day (MMBD) of oil equivalent of gasoline (40 percent of its domestic consumption). Iran’s dependence on gasoline imports steadily increased in 2005 and 2006. Iran imported an estimated 0.170 MMBD of gasoline (41 percent of its domestic consumption) in 2005, and 0.196 MMBD (43 percent of its domestic consumption) in 2006. It is equally noteworthy that 60 percent of Iran’s gasoline is imported from Europe, 15 percent from India, and the rest from elsewhere (Middle East and Asia).229 These trends are likely to continue. Iran’s domestic demand for gasoline is estimated to increase at approximately 9 percent per year, and the costs of gasoline imports are also steadily increasing. For example, Iran paid an estimated $2.5– $3.0 billion for its gas imports in 2004 and is estimated to pay $4.5 billion in 2005.230 Other experts, however, estimate that the cost of importing refined products was as high a $10 billion in 2005.231 This is likely to include jet fuels, diesel, residual oil, kerosene, and other products. Iran’s dependence on gasoline imports is unlikely to change in the near future. It is estimated that Iran is planning to spend $16 billion between 2003 and 2030 to expand its refinery capacity from 1.5 MMBD in 2004 to 1.7 MMBD in 2010, 2.2 MMBD in 2020, and 2.6 MMBD in 2030. However, its total energy demand and consumption of refined products are also estimated to increase at higher rates.232 Sanctioning refined products exports to Iran would certainly have an impact on the Iranian economy, but the effectiveness of such a sanctions regimen would be uncertain. Iran can get around the imposed sanctions through unofficial deals and smuggling. In addition, Iran is enjoying high oil revenues and may well use them to fast-track its plans to expand refining capacity. Tehran might use such deals to attract foreign companies and to further complicate a UNSC resolution, since some of these contracts might go to Chinese, Russian, French, German, and British firms. Some have argued that the first round of sanctions against Iran should target Iranian officials directly. This would include restricting Iranian officials, including the

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President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, from traveling outside Iran, as well as other top officials and clerics. These sanctions would have little impact on the general population. They might affect the mobility of Iranian officials, but their impact would be limited. They are hard to enforce outside the European Union and the United States. This may be further complicated by stopping Iranian officials from attending UN meetings in the United States or in the European Union. Middle Eastern and Asian countries might find it hard to comply with these travel restrictions—given the fragile strategic situation in the region. If the goal is to send a message to the Iranian government and to the world that the world does not approve of Iran’s nuclear weapons, then such sanctions might do that. It is questionable, however, whether travel restrictions would change the attitudes or actions of the Iranian government or Iranian public attitudes toward acquiring nuclear technology. The Iranian nuclear research program does not depend on the ability of the Iranian President to visit Paris, and the impact of such sanctions will be only symbolic in the case of Iran. The historical precedents also are not reassuring. The European Union has maintained travel restrictions and financial sanctions against Zimbabwe. The European Union imposed targeted sanctions that included travel bans, oil embargo, and freezing of financial assets of President Robert Mugabe and 100 other senior Zimbabwean officials. The ban has been extended several times since its inception in February 2002, and it is expected to run out in February 2007. These extensions make either the point that these travel restrictions did not work or that they need a long time to work. Travel restrictions and financial sanctions combined are also an option that might have more impact. This may, in fact, be the set of sanctions that would arouse the least amount of resistance by UNSC members. Most of the financial assets held in the West belong to the government or the ruling elite of Iran. The combination of freezing assets held in Westerns banks and travel restrictions can have the least impact on the general population and the maximum amount of pressure on the ruling elites. While U.S. capital markets have been closed to the Iranian government since the Revolution, Iran had alternative sources. Iran relies on loans particularly from European and Asian banks to finance domestic projects in its energy sector.233 For examples, Iran’s shipbuilding and car making sectors are growing faster than Iranian domestic financial institutions. These industries have relied on European banks for investment loans. Some European banks stopped doing business with Tehran, but many other banks continue to finance projects in Iran, including major European banks such as HSBC, BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, Standard Chartered, and Royal Bank of Scotland. Observers have argued that targeting loans from European banks could have a major impact on the Iranian economy, particularly since the Iranian capital market in still small and key industries in Iran cannot survive without investment loans from the outside.234 Another option to target Iranian finances is to freeze Iranian assets in European and Asian banks. Iran’s financial assets in the United States have been frozen since

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the Revolution, but Tehran has significant amounts of financial assets in European financial institutions. There are no reliable estimates of how much Iran’s hard currency deposits are. It is, however, safe to assume that it is a large amount given the recent surge in oil prices. Some estimates put it at $36 billion in 2005. The significance of this can be seen through the reaction of the Iranian government following the IAEA referral of Iran’s case to the UNSC. In January 2006, the governor of Iran’s Central Bank announced that Iran had started transferring its assets out of European banks. It is unclear where the funds have been moved, but there are indications and an initial admission that they may have been transferred to Southeast Asia.235 It has also been reported that Iranian government figures have started to move their money from European financial institutions to Dubai, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Beirut, and Singapore. Iranian officials were quoted as saying that as high as $8 billion was moved out of Europe.236 Sanctions can reach beyond European financial institutions to include Asian banks and international NGOs such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. This would drain another key source of financial support to the Iranian government. For example, in May 2005, the World Bank approved a $344-million loan to Iran to support the Caspian provinces in managing scarce water resources, $200 million for rebuilding following the Bam earthquake in October 2004, and $359 million in loans to the Government of Iran in order to improve housing, sanitation, and access to clean water in Ahwaz and Shiraz.237 These loans, however, are focused toward humanitarian projects, but that does not mean that they could not be delayed to force Iran back to the bargaining table. It is important, however, to keep in mind that the global economy offers many options to Iran, and enforcing such sanctions is not perfect. Iran is not confined to European private and central banks or international organizations to finance its domestic projects. If Iran does build enough incentives for direct foreign investment, no amount of sanctions can stop the flow of money into the country, particularly in its energy sector. All of these scenarios are hypothetical at this point. It is unclear if the UNSC will actually agree to impose financial restrictions on Iran. In addition, no one can fully predict the response of the Iranian government, the ruling elite in Iran, or the Iranian general population. It is all too clear that freezing the money and restricting the travel of key regime figures is far less disagreeable than preventing investment in Iran’s energy sector and causing further tightness in the global energy market. It is also clear that the regime might be more impacted with these restrictions than any broad economic sanctions that have direct implications on the Iranian population. Military Strikes Official U.S. policy is to leave all options on the table and emphasize diplomatic activity through the EU3 and the UN. U.S. Vice President Richard B. Cheney reiterated the U.S. policy on March 7, 2006:238

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The Iranian regime needs to know that if it stays on its present course, the international community is prepared to impose meaningful consequences. For our part, the United States is keeping all options on the table in addressing the irresponsible conduct of the regime . . .And we join other nations in sending that regime a clear message: We will not allow Iran to have nuclear weapons.

Other U.S. officials also reiterated that preventive military options are still on the table. The U.S. National Security Advisor, Stephen J. Hadley, reiterated that Iran poses a grave threat to U.S. national security. During a presentation of the U.S. national security strategy in March 2006, he said, ‘‘We face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran.’’ Mr. Hadley added, ‘‘The doctrine of preemption remains sound. . .We do not rule out the use of force before an attack occurs.’’239 The U.S. estimates of timelines for Iran’s nuclear and missile efforts also leave at least several years in which to build an international consensus behind sanctions and diplomatic pressure and a consensus behind military options if diplomacy fails. The United States would also have the potential advantage of finding any Iranian smoking gun, improving its targeting and strike options, and being able to strike targets in which Iran had invested much larger assets. The fact Iran can exploit time as a weapon in which to proliferate does not mean that the United States cannot exploit time as a weapon with which to strike Iran. Iranian Defense against U.S. Strikes Iran would find it difficult to defend against U.S. forces using cruise missiles, stealth aircraft, standoff precision weapons, and equipped with a mix of vastly superior air combat assets and the IS&R assets necessary to strike and restrike Iranian targets in near real time. For example, each U.S. B-2A Spirit stealth bomber could carry eight 4,500-pound enhanced BLU-28 satellite-guided bunker-busting bombs— potentially enough to take out one hardened Iranian site per sortie. Such bombers could operate flying from Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire, United Kingdom, and Whiteman U.S. Air Force (USAF) Base in Missouri.240 The United States also has a wide range of other hard target killers, many of which are in development or classified. Systems that are known to be deployed include the BLU-109 Have Void ‘‘bunker busters,’’ a ‘‘dumb bomb’’ with a maximum penetration capability of 4 to 6 feet of reinforced concrete. An aircraft must overfly the target and launch the weapon with great precision to achieve serious penetration capability.241 It can be fitted with precision guidance and converted to a guided glide bomb. The Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) GBU-31 version has a nominal range of 15 kilometers with a CEP of 13 meters in the GPS-aided Inertial Navigation System (INS) modes of operation and 30 meters in the INS-only modes of operation.242 More advanced systems include the BLU-116 Advanced Unitary Penetrator (AUP), the GBU-24 C/B (USAF), or the GBU-24 D/B (U.S. Navy), which has about three times the penetration capability of the BLU-109.243 It is not clear whether the United States has deployed the AGM-130C with an advanced earth

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penetrating/hard target kill system. The AGM-130 Surface Attack Guided Munition was developed to be integrated into the F-15E, so it could carry two such missiles, one on each inboard store station. It is a retargetable, precision-guided standoff weapon using inertial navigation aided by GPS satellites and has a 15–40-NM range.244 The United States does, however, have a number of other new systems that are known to be in the developmental stage and can probably deploy systems capable of roughly twice the depth of penetration with twice the effectiveness of the systems known from its attacks on Iraq in 1991. It is not clear whether such weapons could destroy all of Iran’s most hardened underground sites, although it seems likely that the BLU-28 could do serious damage at a minimum. Much depends on the accuracy of reports that Iran has undertaken a massive tunneling project with some 10,000 square meters of underground halls and tunnels branching off for hundreds of meters from each hall. Iran is reported to be drawing on North Korean expertise and to have created a separate corporation (Shahid Rajaei Company) for such tunneling and hardening efforts under the IRGC, with extensive activity already under way in Natanz and Isfahan. The facilities are said to make extensive use of blast-proof doors, extensive divider walls, hardened ceilings, 20-centimeter-thick concrete walls, and double concrete ceilings with earth filled between layers to defeat earth penetrates.245 Such passive defenses could have a major impact, but reports of such activity are often premature, exaggerated, or report far higher construction standards than are actually executed. At the same time, the B-2A could be used to deliver large numbers of precisionguided 500-pound bombs against dispersed surface targets or a mix of light and heavy precision-guided weapons. Submarines and surface ships could deliver cruise missiles for such strikes, and conventional strike aircraft and bombers could deliver standoff weapons against most suspect Iranian facilities without suffering a high risk of serious attrition. The challenge would be to properly determine what targets and aim points were actually valuable, not to inflict high levels of damage. As has been discussed earlier, Iran’s air defenses have quantity, but little quality. This would help enable U.S. or Israeli attacks, but this situation could change over the next few years. Iran purchased 20 Russian 9K331 Tor-M-1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) self-propelled surface-to-air missiles in December 2005.246 Some reports also indicate that Iran is seeking more modern Soviet SA-300 missiles and to use Russian systems to modernize its entire air defense system. If Iran could acquire, deploy, and bring such systems to a high degree of readiness, they would substantially improve Iranian capabilities. Iran’s air forces are only marginally better able to survive in air-to-air combat than Iraq’s were before 2003. Iran’s command and control system has serious limitations in terms of secure communications, vulnerability to advanced electronic warfare, netting, and digital data transfer. According to the IISS, Iran does still have five operational P-3MP Orions and may have made its captured Iraqi IL-76 Candid AEW aircraft operational. These assets would give it airborne warning and command and control capability, but these are obsolescent to obsolete systems and are likely to be highly vulnerable to electronic warfare and countermeasures, and long-range

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attack, even with Iranian modifications and updates. There are some reports Iran may be seeking to make a version of the Russian AN-140 AEW aircraft, but these could not be deployed much before 2015.247 Iran’s air defense aircraft consist of a maximum operational strength of two squadrons of 25 export versions of the MiG-29A and two squadrons of 25–30 F-14As. The export version of the MiG-29A has significant avionics limitations and vulnerability to countermeasures, and it is not clear Iran has any operational Phoenix airto-air missiles for its F-14As or has successfully modified its I-Hawk missiles for air-to-air combat. The AWG-9 radar on the F-14 has significant long-distance sensor capability in a permissive environment, but is a U.S.–made system in a nearly 30year-old configuration that is now vulnerable to countermeasures. Iran might risk using its fighters and AEW aircraft against an Israeli strike. It seems doubtful that Israel could support a long-range attack unit with the air defense and electronic assets necessary to provide anything like the air defense and air defense suppression assets that would support a U.S. strike. A U.S. strike could almost certainly destroy any Iranian effort to use fighters, however, and destroy enough Iranian surface-to-air missile defenses to create a secure corridor for penetrating into Iran and against key Iranian installations. The United States could then maintain such a corridor indefinitely with restrikes. Iranian Retaliation against U.S. Strikes This does not mean it would be easy or desirable for the United States to exercise its military options. U.S. forces are preoccupied in Iraq, and the lack of security in Iraq makes a full military attack against Iran all too unlikely. U.S. military options are not risk-free, and the consequences of U.S. strikes are enormous. Tehran has several retaliatory options: • Retaliate against U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan overtly using Shahab-3 missiles armed with CBR warheads. • Use proxy groups, including those of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Moqtada Al-Sadr, in Iraq to intensify the insurgency and escalate the attacks against U.S. forces and Iraqi security forces. • Turn the Shi’ite majority in Iraq against the U.S. presence and demand U.S. forces to leave. • Attack the U.S. homeland with suicide bombs by proxy groups or deliver CBR weapons to Al Qa’ida to use against the United States. • Use its asymmetric capabilities to attack U.S. interests in the region, including soft targets: e.g., embassies, commercial centers, and American citizens. • Attack U.S. naval forces stationed in the Gulf with antiship missiles, asymmetric warfare, and mines. • Attack Israel with missile attacks possibly with CBR warheads. • Retaliate against energy targets in the Gulf and temporarily shut off the flow of oil from the Strait of Hormuz.

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• Stop all of its oil and gas shipments to increase the price of oil and inflict damage on the global and U.S. economies.

Many observers argue that a military strike against Iran could add to the chaos in Iraq and may further complicate the U.S. position in Iraq. While the consequences of U.S. military attacks against Iran remain unclear, the Shi’ite majority in Iraq can (1) ask the United States to leave Iraq, (2) influence Shi’ite militia groups to directly attack U.S. forces, and/or (3) turn the new Iraqi security and military forces against U.S. forces in Iraq.248 As has been discussed earlier, Iran has extensive forces suited to asymmetric warfare. These not only include the Revolutionary Guards and elements of the alQuds force under the Directorate of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, but elements of the foreign intelligence directorate in the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (Vezarat-e-Ettela’at va Amniat-e Keshvar or VEVAK).249 The Iranian surface navy is highly vulnerable, but Iran could position land-based antiship missiles where it could strike at tanker traffic, and mobile firing elements using systems like the HY-2/C-201 Silkworm or Seerseeker (Raad) have ranges of 90 to 100 kilometers and have proved difficult to detect and kill in the past.250 Iran is reported to have the capability to make or assemble such missiles, modify and upgrade them, have roughly 100 systems in stock, and have eight to ten mobile missile launchers. These are reported to be deployed near the Strait of Hormuz, but may actually be in a number of different locations.251 Iran also has three relatively effective Kilo-class submarines, which can use longrange wire-guided torpedoes or release mines. (Reports Iran has advanced ‘‘bottom’’ mines with sensors that release and activate them as they sense ships passing overhead are uncertain.) The naval branch of the IRGC is reported to have up to 20,000 men. They operate ten Hudong missile patrol boats with C-801K (42–120 kilometers) and C-802 (42–120 kilometers) sea-skimming antiship missiles.252 The Iranian Air Force has airborne variants of these systems. They have additional C-14 high-speed catamarans with C-701 antiship missiles and additional North Korean missile boats. They operate some 50 additional patrol boats, including 40 Boghammar Marine boats. Many are so small they are difficult to detect with ship-borne radars. These can be armed with recoilless rifles, RPGs, and small arms to attack or harass ships in or near the Gulf and raid or attack offshore facilities. They can conduct suicide attacks or release floating mines covertly in shipping lanes or near key facilities. Iran can use any commercial ship to release freefloating mines for the same purpose.253 Iran made claims in the spring of 2006 that it was testing more advanced weapons for such forces. These included a sonar-evading underwater missile (torpedo?) that IRGC Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi claimed no enemy warship could detect, and ‘‘no warship could escape because of its high velocity.’’ Iran also claimed to be testing a new missile called the Kowsar with a very large warhead and extremely high speed to attack ‘‘big ships and submarines’’ that it claimed could evade radar and antimissile

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missiles. While such tests may have been real, Iran has made so many grossly exaggerated claims about its weapon developments in the past that it seems they were designed more to try to deter U.S. military action and/or reassure the Iranian public than truly being serious real-world capabilities.254 It followed these actions up in the late summer of 2006 by testing new submarine launched antiship missiles. In any case, Iran could not close the Strait of Hormuz or halt tanker traffic, and its submarines and much of its IRGC forces would probably be destroyed in a matter of days if they become operational. It could, however, conduct a series of raids to threaten and disrupt Gulf traffic and/or strike at offshore and shore facilities in the southern Gulf or at Iraqi oil facilities in the Gulf. Even sporadic random strikes would create a high risk premium and potential panic in oil markets. Iran could potentially destabilize part of Afghanistan and use Hezbollah and Syria to threaten Israel. Iran can also use its IRGC asymmetric warfare assets to attack U.S. interests in the region. Iranian officials do not hide the fact that they would use asymmetric attacks against U.S. interests. For example, a Brigadier General in the IRGC and the Commander of the ‘‘Lovers of Martyrdom Garrison,’’ Mohammad-Reza Jaafari, threatened U.S. interests with suicide operations if the United States were to attack Iran:255 Now that America is after gaining allies against the righteous Islamic Republic and wants to attack our sanctities, members of the martyrdom-seeking garrisons across the world have been put on alert so that if the Islamic Republic of Iran receives the smallest threat, the American and Israeli strategic interests will be burnt down everywhere. The only tool against the enemy that we have with which we can become victorious are martyrdom-seeking operations and, God willing, our possession of faithful, brave, trained and zealous persons will give us the upper hand in the battlefield. . . Upon receiving their orders, our martyrdom-seeking forces will be uncontrollable and a guerrilla war may go on in various places for years to come. . . America and any other power cannot win in the unbalanced war against us.

Iran could seek to create an alliance with extremist movements like Al Qa’ida in spite of their hostility to Shi’ites. It can seek to exploit Arab and Muslim anger against U.S. ties to Israel and the invasion of Iraq on a global level, and it can seek to exploit European and other nations’ concerns that the United States might be repeating its miscalculation of the threat posed by Iraq and striking without adequate cause. Unless Iran is far more egregious in its noncompliance, or the United States can find a definitive smoking gun to prove Iran is proliferating, Iran would be certain to have some success in such efforts. Iran’s energy resources are another potential weapon. Shutting off exports would deeply hurt Iran, but would also have an impact on global markets. As Iraq found, energy deals can also sharply weaken support for even diplomatic options, and Russia and China might well oppose any kind of U.S. military strike, regardless of the level of justification the United States could advance at the time.

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The Strategic Implications of a Military Strike against Iran It may be years, or as much as a decade, before all of the implications surrounding Iran’s possible efforts to acquire nuclear weapons become clear. As the previous chapters have shown, the strategic implications of whether Iran has any nuclear device are only part of the story. There are many different ways in which Iran can proliferate, deploy nuclear-armed or other CBRN weapons, and use them to deter, intimidate, and strike against other nations. All have only one thing in common: they are all provocative and dangerous both to any nation Iran may choose to try to influence and target and to Iran. Iran’s options for war fighting, and the possible response, have already been described in detail. One final point does, however, need to be raised. Even Iranian ambiguity will probably lead Israel and the United States—and possibly India, Pakistan, and Russia—to develop nuclear options to deter or retaliate against Iran. Restraint does not have to stop at the first convincing Iranian threat to use nuclear or highly lethal biological weapons, but it could do so. Any actual Iranian use of such weapons is likely to provoke a nuclear response and may well provoke one targeted on Iranian cities and its population. Iran’s effort to limit or control the game will probably end at the first ground zero. Iranian ambiguity also may trigger Saudi and Egyptian efforts to become nuclear powers. They might show restraint if the United States could provide convincing ballistic and cruise missile defenses and the same form of extended deterrence it once provided to Germany during the Cold War. But these options are speculative and do not yet exist. Saudi Arabia has already said that it has examined nuclear options and rejected them, but this is no certainty and inevitably depends on Iranian action. The end result is the prospect of a far more threatening mix of CBRN capabilities in the Gulf region and the areas that most models project as the main source of continued world oil and gas exports beyond 2015. It is also the threat of more polarization between Sunni and Shi’ites and broader regional tensions and actions that spill over out of the confrontation over Iran’s nuclear activities. None of these prospects are pleasant.

The Future of Iraq Iran already plays a major role in the political stability (or instability) of Iraq and may take a more aggressive role in trying to shape Iraq’s political future and security position in the Gulf. Some believe that the Iranians have abandoned their efforts to export their ‘‘Shi’ite revolution’’ to the Gulf. This view has changed since the invasion of Iraq. Officials across the Arab world, especially in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, have expressed reservations over the lack of rights of Iraqi Sunnis, Kurdish and Shi’ite dominance over the Iraqi government, and a new ‘‘strategic’’ Shi’ite alliance between Iran and Iraq. Jordan’s King Abdullah has claimed that more than 1 million Iranians have moved into Iraq to influence the Iraqi election. The Iranians, King Abdullah argued, have

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been trying to build pro-Iranian attitudes in Iraq by providing salaries to the unemployed. The King has also said that Iran’s Revolutionary Guards are helping the militant groups fighting the United States in Iraq, and he warned in an interview with the Washington Post of a ‘‘Shi’ite Crescent’’ forming between Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. He was quoted as saying,256 It is in Iran’s vested interest to have an Islamic republic of Iraq. If Iraq goes Islamic republic, then, yes, we’ve opened ourselves to a whole set of new problems that will not be limited to the borders of Iraq. I’m looking at the glass half-full, and let’s hope that’s not the case. But strategic planners around the world have got to be aware that is a possibility. Even Saudi Arabia is not immune from this. It would be a major problem. And then that would propel the possibility of a Shi’ite-Sunni conflict even more, as you’re taking it out of the borders of Iraq.

The same sentiment has been echoed by the former interim Iraqi President, Ghazi Al-Yawar, a Sunni. ‘‘Unfortunately, time is proving, and the situation is proving, beyond any doubt that Iran has very obvious interference in our business—a lot of money, a lot of intelligence activities and almost interfering daily in business and many [provincial] governates, especially in the southeast side of Iraq.’’ Mr. AlYawar, however, asserted that Iraq should not go in the direction of Iran in creating a religious oriented government. He was quoted in a Washington Post interview as saying, ‘‘We cannot have a sectarian or religious government. . .We really will not accept a religious state in Iraq. We haven’t seen a model that succeeded.’’257 These comments were rejected by both Iran and Iraqi Shi’ites. Iran called King Abdullah’s comment ‘‘an insult’’ to Iraq. Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Hamid Reza Asefi, also called on Ghazi Al-Yawar to retract his statement and accused King Abdullah II and Al-Yawar of wanting to influence the election against Iraqi Shi’ites. Asefi said, ‘‘Unfortunately, some political currents in Iraq seek to tarnish the trend of election there and cause concern in the public opinion. . .We expect that Mr. al-Yawar takes the existing sensitive situation into consideration and avoids repeating such comments.’’258 What is clear is that Iran has close relations with many Iraqi Shi’ites, particularly Shi’ite political parties and militias. Some Iraqi groups have warned against U.S. military strikes against their neighbors. For example, Moqtada Al-Sadr pledged that he would come to the aid of Iran in the case of a military strike by the United States against Tehran. Al-Sadr pledged that his militia, Al-Mahdi Army, would come to the aid of Iran. According to Al-Sadr, Iran asked him about what his position would be if Iran was attacked by the United States, and he said he pledged that Al-Mahdi Army would help any Arab or neighboring country if it was attacked.259 The London Times in September 2005 identified at least a dozen active Islamic groups with ties to Tehran. Eight were singled out as having considerable crossborder influence:260

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• Badr Brigade: A Shi’ite militia force of 12,000 trained by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and blamed for a number of killings of Sunni Muslims. It is thought to control several cities in southern Iraq. • Islamic Dawaa Party: A Shi’ite party that has strong links to Iran. Its leader, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the present Prime Minister of Iraq, has vowed to improve ties between the two neighbors. • Al-Mahdi Army: Received arms and volunteers from Iran during its battle against U.S. and British troops last year. The group’s commander in Basra, Ahmed al-Fartusi, was arrested by British forces in mid-September 2005. • Mujahideen for Islamic Revolution in Iraq: A Tehran-backed militia blamed for the murder of six British Royal Military Police soldiers in Majar el-Kabir in 2003. • Thar Allah (Vengeance of God): An Iranian-backed terror group blamed for killing former members of the ruling Ba’ath Party in Iraq and enforcing strict Islamic law. • Jamaat al-Fudalah (Group of the Virtuous): A paramilitary group that imposes Islamic rules on Shi’ite areas and has attacked shops selling alcohol and music. • Al-Fadilah (Morality): A secret political movement financed by Iran. It is thought to have many members among provincial officials. • Al-Quawaid al-Islamiya (Islamic Bases): An Iranian-backed Islamic movement that uses force to impose Islamic law.

A number of experts believe that Tehran-backed militias have infiltrated Iraqi security forces. In September 2005, Iraq’s National Security Adviser, Mouwafak alRubaie, admitted that insurgents had penetrated Iraqi police forces in many parts of the country, but he refused to speculate about the extent of the infiltration.261 In addition, both the U.S. and the British Ministers of Defense have complained that Iran is actively supporting various militias in Iraq, has supplied advanced triggering and motion detector systems for improvised explosive devices, and is using elements of the al-Quds force to train death squads and militias. 262 Work by Nawaf Obaid and the Saudi National Security Assessment Project indicates the following:263 Iran is insinuating itself into Iraq. The first is through the activities of the al-Quds Forces, the special command division of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC). The second approach is by funding and arming Shi’ite militias, the most prominent of which is the SCIRI’s 25,000-strong armed wing, the Badr Organization of Reconstruction and Development. Senior members of the Badr Organization and the al-Quds Forces have a closely coordinated relationship. Intelligence reports have indicated that Iranian officers are directing operations under cover in units of the Badr Organization. The Mahdi Army also receives important Iranian assistance, but on a much smaller scale. The IRGC Commander is General Yahya Rahim-Safavi and the Deputy Commander is General Mohammad Bager Zulgadr. The al-Quds Forces Commander is General Qassem Soleimani. Generals Zulgadr and Soleimani are two most senior officers responsible for Iran’s large covert program in Iraq and have a direct link to the Office

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of the Leader. Additionally, intelligence estimates have identified four other IRGC generals and nine IRGC colonels that are directly responsible for covert operations in Iraq. The al-Quds Forces mainly functions as a large intelligence operation skilled in the art of unconventional warfare. Current intelligence estimates puts the strength of the force at 5,000. Most of these are highly trained officers. Within the al-Quds Forces, there is a small unit usually referred to as the ‘‘Special Quds Force’’ which consists of the finest case officers and operatives. The senior officers attached to this unit conduct foreign covert unconventional operations using various foreign national movements as proxies. The forces operate mainly outside Iranian territory, but maintain numerous training bases inside Iran as well. AlQuds international operations are divided into geographic areas of influence and various corps. The most important and largest cover Iraq, Saudi Arabia (and the Arabian Peninsula), and Syria / Lebanon. The smaller corps cover Afghanistan, Pakistan/India, Turkey, the Muslim Republics of the former Soviet Union, Europe/North America, and North Africa (Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Sudan, and Morocco). The goal of Iran is to infiltrate all Iraq-based militias by providing training and support to their members. For example, al-Sadr’s estimated 10,000-strong Mahdi Army, which gets logistical and financial support from al-Quds, also receives training in IRCG camps in Iran. Moreover, nearly all of the troops in the Badr Organization were trained in these camps as well. In addition, most senior officers acquired their skills in specialized camps under the control of the al-Quds Forces. Intelligence estimates that al-Quds currently operates six major training facilities in Iran, with the main facility located adjacent to Imam Ali University in Northern Tehran. The other most important training camps are located in the Qom, Tabriz, and Mashhad governorates. There are also two similar facilities operating on the Syrian-Lebanese border. According to a senior general in the Iraqi Defense Ministry and a critic of Iran, the Iranians have set up the most sophisticated intelligence-gathering network in the country, to the extent that they have infiltrated ‘‘every major Iraqi ministry and security service.’’ There is also an intelligence directorate that has been set up within the Revolutionary Guard that is under the command of the al-Quds Forces devoted exclusively to monitoring the movements of US and Allied forces in Iraq. Many members of the newly created police and Iraqi forces are controlled by Shi’ite officers who, in some form or another, previously belonged to SCIRI or other groups affiliated with Iran. Recent intelligence indicates that IRGC officers are currently operating in Iraq in certain Shi’ite militias and actual army and police units. The degree of penetration of these organizations is difficult to assess, and it is virtually impossible to distinguish between Iraqi Shi’ite militias and police units, both of which are profoundly influenced by Iran, and in some cases are under Iranian control. Iranian manipulation has filtered down to street level as well. Ordinary police and military officers now have a stronger allegiance to the Badr Organization or the Mahdi Army than to their own units. And of course, these organizations are deeply connected to Iran. According to the head of intelligence of an allied country that borders Iraq, ‘‘the Iranians have not just pulled off an infiltration, in certain regions in Baghdad and Basra, it’s been a complete takeover.’’

It is not clear just how much Iran is using its security and intelligence forces to destabilize the political situation in Iraq. Iran’s political objectives in Iraq remain

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obscure and partly contradictory. Tehran has stated repeatedly that it supports stability in Iraq. At the same time, several organizations with ties to the Iranian security apparatus are suspected of actively driving a wedge between rivaling factions in Iraq. The IRGC and its affiliates, out of any Iranian government organization, appear to be most strongly involved in assisting terrorist groups in neighboring Iraq. In December 2004, a group named the Committee for the Commemoration of Martyrs of the Global Islamic Campaign assembled more than 25,000 ‘‘martyrdom-seeking volunteers’’ to fuel the insurgency of Iraqi groups against American forces. The committee maintains close ties to the IRGC from which it probably receives considerable material support. According to Iranian dissident groups, the IRGC is also directly involved in instigating the Iraqi insurgency through its Qods commandos, particularly in southern Iraq. Their number and extent of involvement with Iraqi factions remains unclear, however. Since the beginning of the American military campaign in Iraq, more than 2,000 people—believed to be sponsored directly by Iran—have entered the country to promote militant Islam.264 Reports suggest that Iranian sources have tried to establish contact with Moqtada Al-Sadr’s organization in Iraq. Al-Sadr in the past spoke out against Iranian influence in Iraq. A relatively close connection between his organization and the Committee for the Commemoration of Martyrs of the Global Islamic Campaign with Iran suggests that destabilizing the political situation in Iraq is an important objective for the Iranian leadership. Apparently, Iranian forces try to gain leverage even over hostile forces in order to further Iraqi factionist politics. Iran has a strategic interest in a stable Iraqi government. However, at this time, it appears as if Tehran is mobilizing resources to tilt the political climate in its favor, although it understands that this is causing some degree of additional political instability. All of the above concerns could also suddenly become far more serious if Iraq plunges into full-scale civil war or divides along ethnic and sectarian lines. Iran might be virtually forced to intervene on the Shi’ite side, potentially triggering new tensions and conflicts with both Iraq’s Sunnis and Sunni states outside Iraq, and raising new issues regarding Iran’s attitudes towars Iraq’s Kurds, as well as its own Kurdish minority. Other Challenges This focus on Iran’s nuclear programs and relations with Iraq does not mean that its hostility to Israel, Sunni v.s Shi’ite religious tensions, or its other challenges could not suddenly become the most important issues Iran faces—or simultaneously complicate its other challenges. Iran is also becoming progressively more dependent on high oil prices and export revenues as years go by with governments that all have at least one thing in common—some of the worst economic policies and management in the world compounded by serious social and cultural repression. It is important to note, however, that many of Iran’s strategic challenges owe far more to history, ideology, and political extremism than grand strategic necessity. Iran

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has every reason to seek better relations with its neighbors and the United States, to reach out to the moderate Gulf and other Islamic regimes that are the natural enemies of neo-Salafi Sunni extremism, and to confine its opposition to Israel to the political support of the Palestinians. Iran has far more to gain from focusing on internal development and regional cooperation than from political or military adventures and would greatly reduce its strategic risks.

9

Iraq

Iraq’s strategic location, its access to water, it rivers, and its fertile soil have long given it strategic importance, and this importance has been vastly increased in the modern era by its status as an oil power. Like Iran, there has been no modern systematic exploration of Iraq’s oil and gas resources. The Oil and Gas Journal estimates that Iraq contains 115 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the third largest in the world (behind Saudi Arabia and Canada), concentrated overwhelmingly (65 percent or more) in southern Iraq. The U.S. Energy Information Agency reports that estimates of Iraq’s oil reserves and resources vary widely and that only about 10 percent of the country has been explored. It notes that some experts believe that deep oil-bearing formations located mainly in the vast Western Desert region could yield large additional oil resources (possibly another 100 billion barrels or more), but have not been explored. It cautions, however, that other analysts, such as the U.S. Geological Survey, are not as optimistic, with median estimates for additional oil reserves closer to 45 billion barrels. In August 2004, Iraqi Oil Minister Ghadban stated that Iraq had ‘‘unconfirmed or potential reserves’’ of 214 billion barrels.1 At present, Iraq is in the middle of an insurgency that may well lead to a major civil war. There is no way to predict whether Iraq’s government can achieve political conciliation, create the security forces it needs to control factional militias and defeat a Sunni insurgency, and move back toward stability and development. It is all too possible that the country may divide or become a group of somewhat hostile federations that separate its Kurds, Arab Sunnis, and Arab Shi’ites. A PATTERN OF EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL VIOLENCE Iraq is emerging from centuries of Ottoman control, its creation as an artificial state following World War I, and decades of monarchy and civil war. Modern Iraq

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was occupied by Britain during the course of World War I. In 1920, Britain carved it out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire and had it declared a League of Nations mandate under British administration. The result was a Sunni-dominated state with a Shi’ite majority and a Kurdish minority that wanted independence. The British mandate failed to cope with Iraqi nationalism and led to active rebellion. This rebellion failed in a military sense, in the face of British military action that included the use of poison gas, but it eventually forced Britain to give Iraq independence. A Hashemite monarchy was established that survived a series of coup attempts and a British invasion during World War II. Hashemite rule could not survive the rise of Arab nationalism, however, and was brutally overthrown in 1958. From that point onward, Iraq was ruled through a series of coups and military dictatorships until the Ba’ath Party seized power. Saddam Hussein consolidated his rule in a new series of bloody purges and executions in 1979 and ruled until he was overthrown in 2003 by the U.S.–led invasion. Iraq has repeatedly sought to dominate the region politically and militarily. It never, however, has succeeded in having a major political impact on its neighbors, and its Ba’ath Party has done far more to feud with its counterpart in Syria than to have an impact on others. Its long arms race with Iran failed to keep up with the Shah until the Shah fell from power in 1979. This appeared to leave Iraq the dominant power in the Gulf, but its invasion of Iran in 1980 quickly showed that force size was not a measure of military competence and effectiveness. Iraq was forced on the defensive in 1982 and survived only because of European and Russian arms sales and tens of billions of dollars worth of Kuwaiti, Saudi, and other aid. Iraq did achieve significant victories against an exhausted Iran in 1988, made successful use of mass attack with missiles and poison gas, shattered much of Iran’s ground forces, and made it accept a cease-fire largely on the basis of the prewar boundary. Iraq was so deeply in debt and under so much financial pressure, however, that it seized Kuwait in 1990. The resulting Gulf War cost Iraq roughly 40 percent of its forces and led to more than a dozen years of sanctions, a UN arms embargo, UN efforts to fully discover and rid Iraq of the weapons of mass destruction it had built up before the Gulf War, and political and economic struggles over sanctions. Iraq had to deal with more than outside conflicts. The British used divide and rule techniques that put a Sunni elite firmly in control of a Shi’ite majority that showed little desire for British rule. This Sunni elite remained in power until Saddam Hussein’s fall, often exploiting its position at the expense of Iraq’s Shi’ites and Kurds. The Kurds repeatedly sought independence and fought a nearly five-year rebellion against the Iraq regime until they lost the support of the Shah. Iraq was, however, forced to concede to many Iranian demands as the Shah’s price for abandoning the Kurds when Iraq signed the Algiers Accord in 1975. The Shi’ites remained largely loyal during the Iran-Iran War, although hundreds of thousands fled Iraq for Iran or deserted. The Kurds did not. Many rebelled and were put down in ruthless attacks using air and artillery strikes on civilians, the use of poison gas, and forced relocations. The aftermath was as violent as the fighting. Marsh Arabs were punished for harboring deserters by seeing their marshes drained

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and their way of life destroyed. Tribal groups and towns that showed any resistance to the regime were suppressed by force, often using mass executions. The situation grew worse after Iraq’s defeat in the Gulf War in 1991. UN inspectors discovered that Iraq had systematically lied about the nature of its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons efforts, and missile programs, virtually up to the time of the U.S.–led invasion. While the United States and Britain made almost totally inaccurate estimates of Iraqi activity at the time they struck, this came after more than a decade of constant Iraqi lies and obfuscation. The Shi’ite and Kurdish uprisings in Iraq following Iraq’s defeat were put down with savage force and left the Kurds isolated in their own U.S.–secured enclave in the north from 1992 onward. The Shi’ites were largely suppressed, but subject to constant military and security action, with occasional strikes against the regime from Shi’ite exiles based in Iran. Saddam retaliated by supporting the MEK (Mujahedin-e Khalq), a ruthless Iranian terrorist cult, in retaliation. Saddam also encouraged tribalism and Sunni religious action as ways of trying to cement his power. Iraq’s economy was crippled by a combination of massive state mismanagement, corruption, war, civil conflict, and UN sanctions from roughly 1982–2003, a period of over two decades. It was also severely distorted by nepotism and favoritism in ways that favored Sunni elites and compounded the nation’s economic problems. At the same time, Iraq had built up a massive military machine during the Iran-Iraq War that it could not afford to pay for or maintain by 1989, and then it lost virtually all military resupply and modernization as a result of the UN arms embargo imposed in the summer of 1990. Iraq’s military machine decayed steadily from wear, mismanagement, lack of parts and modernization, and internal security purges for some 13 years. The fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in March and April 2003 did not make things better. The victorious Coalition was unprepared for the stability and nationbuilding efforts necessary to offer Iraqis a better way of life, and it was slow to improvise the tools it needed. Iraq’s existing political system and governance imploded under the pressure of war and the ‘‘de-Ba’athification’’ of the Iraqi armed forces and government. Much of the secular core of the state was excluded from any meaningful position, even though the vast majority of those involved had simply gone along with Saddam and the Ba’ath Party to survive. Far too many of the exiles who returned and gained positions of power favored their own careers, Shi’ite parties, and religious factions, and a large number had links to Iran and Iranian-sponsored militias. The Kurds sought their own interests. The end result is not without hope, but there have been three years of growing insurgency, and sectarian and ethnic divisions by Arab Shi’ite, Arab Sunni, Kurd, and other minorities. There is an elected government with a mix of all of Iraq’s factions, an ongoing political process, and a serious effort to rebuild Iraqi military and police forces. At the same time, the insurgency is now dominated by Sunni neoSalafi Islamist extremists who sometimes call for jihad against Shi’ites, mixed with many more moderate Iraqi Sunnis who question whether there is a clear alternative to force in seeking a share of power and wealth. The Shi’ites at a minimum want a

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share of power that matches their dominant share of the population. Many want revenge for decades of inferiority, and some factions increasingly are using militias and other forces to attack Sunnis in retaliation for the insurgency. The Kurds want at least autonomy and control of Iraq’s northern oil fields as a source of wealth. As a result, Iraq is the most destabilizing single factor in the Gulf, outpacing any other source of national tension like Iranian proliferation and the transnational threat of Islamist extremism. This will disappear if Iraq finds a viable political compromise between its factions, reestablishes effective governance, creates national military and police forces, and can gradually move its economy forward. If it fails in these areas, however, it could divide into some form of federalism or sink into large-scale civil war—potentially dividing Sunni and Shi’ite in support of their respective faction inside Iraq in many other nations in the Gulf. A natural division along such lines between a Shi’ite Iran and the Sunni southern Gulf States, Jordan, and Egypt is just one case in point. These challenges make predicting the future of Iraq all the more difficult if not impossible. Some things do, however, seem clear. Even if the nation does not become involved in a major sectarian and ethnic civil war, creating a stable Iraq will largely depend on bringing Iraq’s factions together, dealing with outside interference, building viable economic and political institutions, and dealing with the presence of foreign troops for many years to come. Any meaningful analysis of Iraq’s prospects of stability will also mean successful efforts to build effective internal security and military forces that are free of sectarian manipulations. This would mean examining Iraq’s internal security, paramilitary, and military forces’ abilities to defeat the insurgency and to ensure security in Iraq’s major cities. IRAQ’S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE Iraq has strategic importance for reasons other than oil. Iraq’s history, size, and natural resources make it one of the most important nations in the Gulf. As Map 9.1 shows, Iraq borders all the key countries in the Gulf: Iran (1,458 kilometers), Saudi Arabia (814 kilometers), and Kuwait (240 kilometers). In addition, it borders two important countries in the Levant—Syria (605 kilometers) and Jordan (181 kilometers)—as well as Turkey (352 kilometers). In addition, Iraq has a 58kilometer coastline on the Gulf. These borders, and Iraq’s limited access to the Gulf, have helped lead to territorial disputes and conflicts with its neighbors. Iraq’s proxy struggle with Iran during 1970–1975 was largely a broad struggle and fight for control of the Shatt al-Arab on the part of the Shah. The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) not only involved an effort to win back what was lost in 1975, but an Iraqi effort to seize Iran’s oil rich areas in the southwest which Iraq claimed were Arab, followed by Iranian areas to take ‘‘Shi’ite’’ territory in Iraq’s south. Iraq first threatened to invade Kuwait shortly after British forces left in 1932. When it did invade in August 1990, Iraq annexed Kuwait as the ‘‘19th province of Iraq’’ based on claims that can be traced back to the Othman Empire, as well as territorial tensions over claims to oil fields on the

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Map 9.1 Iraq

border and Iraq’s desire to win secure access to the Gulf. This led to the Gulf War in 1991, when a UN-mandated Coalition forced Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait and imposed economic sanctions, the no-fly zones, and political and military isolation of Iraq. Iraq’s energy resources have also been both a curse and a blessing. Its proven oil reserves are estimated to be one of the largest in the world. In 2005, Iraq was estimated to have roughly 10 percent of the world’s total proven oil reserves (115 billion barrels of oil).2 In addition, Iraq was estimated to have approximately 45.01 billion barrels of undiscovered oil reserves. Despite these vast reserves, Iraq’s oil production capacity lags behind other countries. This is largely due to failures and mismanagement of Saddam Hussein’s regime to modernize Iraq’s oil sector, as well as economic

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sanctions and conflicts that have prevented much needed foreign investments from flowing in.3 As has already been touched upon, its sectarian divisions are a source of tension and conflict in the region. Iraq is unique in the sense that it is one of two Arab countries where the majority is actually Shi’ite. Iraq’s population is estimated to be 60– 65 percent Shi’ites and 32–37 percent Sunnis. Since the creation of the ‘‘modern’’ Iraq, it has, however, been ruled by Sunni government: a Sunni monarchy between 1932 and 1958 and the Ba’ath regime from 1958 until 2003. In addition to these sectarian divisions, Iraq has deep ethnic divisions—the most important of which is between Arabs and the Kurds who dominate northern Iraq and have sought autonomy or independence ever since World War I. The CIA estimates that Iraq’s population is Arab, 75–80 percent; Kurdish, 15–20 percent; and Turkoman, Assyrian, or other, 5 percent.4 This diversity has caused tensions internally as well as externally. Throughout Saddam Hussein’s reign, the Ba’ath government had to fight a war with Iran (a Shi’ite nation), while at the same time it had to pay close attention to the aspirations of its Kurdish and Shi’ite populations. These tensions led to the chemical attacks on the Kurds in Halabjah in 1988 as well as many attacks on the Shi’ites in the south, including following the Shi’ite uprising after the Gulf War in 1991. Following the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, the sectarian tensions are central in any debate over the future of Iraq. In addition to hundreds of mass graves of Shi’ites and Kurds, almost all of the key destabilizing forces go back to Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian divisions. Defeating the insurgency, the ability of Iraq to establish viable political institutions, and reconstruction efforts have been plagued by sectarian divisions. IRAQI MILITARY DEVELOPMENT Iraq has gone from being the Gulf’s preeminent military power before it invaded Kuwait, and still a major power before the Coalition invasion in 2003, to a power that is just beginning to rebuild its regular military forces. The details of this transition are summarized in Figure 9.1. Iraq is now concentrating on creating a mix of regular military forces in its Ministry of Defense, a National Police that really consists of security forces in its Ministry of Interior, and more conventional police forces that can defeat an ongoing insurgency and not on creating the heavier combat forces that are necessary to deter and defend against outside enemies. It will need to rebuild such forces in the future, but plans to create them are still highly tentative. Iraq is effectively dependent on the U.S.– and British-led Multinational Force–Iraq (MNF-I) for major armored, artillery, air combat, air mobility, naval, service, and logistic support. Iraqi security and stability is dependent on the success of these force-building efforts, but force building is equally dependent on Iraqi political conciliation. It is almost totally dependent on three factors for success. One is the success of its political process in uniting the country, bringing Sunnis back into the political fold and

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Figure 9.1 Iraq before the Gulf and Iraq Wars vs. Mid-2006 1990

2002

Mid-2006

Manpower Total Active

1,000,000

389,000

264,600

Regular

425,000

375,000

116,100

Reserve

850,000

650,000

0

Other Ministry of Interior Security Forces

0

0

43,800

40,000

44,000+*

–

NA

NA

104,700

955,000

350,000

114,700

–

375,000

–

480,000 (recalled)

650,000

–

Total Main Battle Tanks

5,500–6,700

2,200–2,600

77+

Active Main Battle Tanks

5,100

1,900–2,200

?‡

Active AIFV/Reconnaissance, Lt. Tanks

2,300

1,300–1,600

38+

7,100

2,400

120–200

Paramilitary Police & Highway Patrol Army and Guard

†

Manpower Regular Army Manpower Reserve

Total Armored Personnel Carriers Active APCs

6,800

1,800

?

Antitank Guided Missile Launchers

1,500

900+

?

Self-Propelled Artillery

500+

150–200

?

3,000+

1,900

?

Towed Artillery Multiple Rocket Launchers

300+

200

?

Mortars

5,000

2,000+

?

?

56

?

1,700?

1,100

?

?

6,000

200–300

Air Force Manpower

40,000

20,000

600

Air Defense Manpower

10,000

17,000

0


513

316

0

20

6

0

Fighter/Attack

284+

130

0

Fighter/Interceptor

223+

180

0

10

5

0

Surface-to-Surface Missile Launchers Light Surface-to-Air Launchers Antiaircraft Guns

Bombers

RRCCE/FGA RECCE

432


AEW C4I/BM

1

0

0

MR/MPA

0

0

0

OCU/COIN/CCT

0

0

0

157

73

0

Transport Aircraft

63

12

3

Tanker Aircraft

4?

2

0

584

375

10–25

160

100

0

424

275

10–25

Major Surface-to-Air Missile Launchers

600+

400

0

Light Surface-to-Air Missile Launchers

?

450

0

Other Combat Trainers §

Total Helicopters Armed Helicopters

§

Other Helicopters§

Antiaircraft Guns

–

3,000

0

5,000

2,000

800

Regular Navy

5,000

2,000

–

Naval Guards

0

0

–

Marines

–

–

–

Missile

4

0

0

Other

1

0

0

Missile

8

1

0

Other

6

5

3

Total Naval Manpower

Major Surface Combatants

Patrol Craft

Submarines

0

0

0

Mine Vessels

8

3

0

Amphibious Ships

6

0

0

Landing Craft

9

–

–

Support Ships

3

2

0

* ‘‘+’’ indicates the numbers listed may be slightly less than the actual units or weapons in stock. † No accurate counts exist of Iraqi Army equipment because some items are being recovered out of weapons dumps. NA = not available. ‡ All ‘‘?’’ refer to weapons that Iraq is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in its possession are unknown. § Includes navy, army, national guard, and royal flights, but not paramilitary. Source: Adapted by the authors from interviews, IISS, Military Balance; Jane’s Sentinel, Periscope; and Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Military Balance in the Middle East (JCSS, Tel Aviv); and U.S. State Department, ‘‘Weekly Status Report,’’ data as of June 14, 2006.

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undercutting political support for the insurgency. The second is creating a political system and pattern of government that will lead Shi’ite and Kurdish factions to stop using their various militias to attack Sunnis and challenge the authority of the central government. The third is the willingness of the Coalition, and the United States in particular, to keep providing the combat troops and support, military advisors, and money necessary to give Iraq’s new forces the time and resources they need to rebuild. It will, at best, be a close run thing. A report by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) makes it clear that even the most optimistic Coalition authorities recognized by mid-2006 that the threat to Iraqi stability had broadened to include a wide range of groups:5 • Sunni and Shi’a Rejectionists who use violence or coercion in an attempt to rid Iraq of Coalition forces. . .subvert emerging institutions and infiltrate and co-opt security and political organizations. Beyond this shared goal, Rejectionist groups diverge regarding long-term objectives. Rejectionists continue to employ a dual-track strategy in Iraq, attempting to leverage the political process to address their core concerns. Since the Samarra bombing, sectarian Rejectionist groups, including militant Shi’a militias, have increased attacks against rival sectarian groups and populations. Both Sunni and Shi’a Rejectionists have conducted reprisal ethno-sectarian attacks. • Former Regime Loyalists. Saddam loyalists are no longer considered a significant threat to the MNF-I end state and the Iraqi government. However, former regime members remain an important element involved in sustaining and enabling the violence in Iraq, using their former internal and external networks and military and intelligence expertise involving weapons and tactics. Saddamists are no longer relevant as a cohesive threat, having mostly splintered into Rejectionists or terrorist and foreign fighters. • Terrorists and Foreign Fighters. Terrorists and foreign fighters, although far fewer in number than the Rejectionists or former regime loyalists, conduct most of the highprofile, high-casualty attacks and kidnappings. Many foreign fighters continue to arrive in Iraq via Syria. . .Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) is currently the dominant terrorist group in Iraq. They continue efforts to spark a self-sustaining cycle of ethno-sectarian violence in Iraq. . .AQI pursues four broad lines of operation: anti-MNF-I, antigovernment, antiShi’a, and external operations. Ansar al Sunna (AS) is another significant, mostly indigenous, terrorist group that shares some goals with AQI. Because of similar agendas, AQI and AS tend to cooperate on the tactical and operational levels. Most recently, there have been indications of cooperation between AQI and Rejectionists as well. It is estimated that 90% of suicide attacks are carried out by AQI. . .The current positive effects of intolerance for Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) among Sunni Arabs may be limited if Sunnis perceive a lack of progress in reconciliation and government participation or if increased sectarian violence draws various Sunni insurgency elements closer. • Militia Groups. Militia groups help both to maintain and to undermine security in Iraq, as well as contribute to achieving the goals of their affiliated political parties. In many cases, these militias, whether authorized or not, provide protection for people and religious sites where the Iraqi police are perceived to be unable to provide adequate support. Sometimes they work with the Iraqi police. In some cases, they operate as a power base for militia leaders trying to advance their own agendas. Militia leaders influence the political process through intimidation and hope to gain influence with the

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Iraqi people through politically based social welfare programs. Militias often act extrajudicially via executions and political assassinations—primarily perpetrated by large, well-organized Shi’a militia groups and some small Sunni elements. Militias are also sometimes engaged in purely criminal activity, including extortion and kidnapping. . . Polling data indicate that most Iraqis agree that militias make Iraq a more dangerous place and should be disbanded... . .The most prominent militia groups are the Badr Organization—essentially the paramilitary wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, but technically its own political party now—and Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM). The Kurdish Peshmerga is technically an ‘‘authorized armed force,’’ rather than a militia. Shi’a militias have been involved in sectarian violence. Tactics employed by such militias have varied, including death squads, Sharia courts, and campaigns of intimidation. Shi’a militias, including the Badr Organization and Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), have been accused of committing abuses against Sunni civilians, exacerbating sectarian tensions. In addition, JAM is implicated in much of the unrest that followed the February 22 Samarra mosque bombing. The Shi’a militias receive arms and other support from Iran, reinforcing Sunni fears of Iranian domination and further elevating ethno-sectarian violence.

These outside threats are compounded by sectarian and ethnic divisions within the government and Iraqi forces—particularly the National Police and regular Iraqi police—which sometimes aid the Sunni insurgents and more often aid violent Shi’ite and Kurdish groups. Endemic corruption in the government and crime throughout civil society add a further mix of problems. Iraq has had some success in creating unified regular military army units and had 106 battalions in service in September 2006, and some 85 battalions were deployed in some role in counterinsurgency missions, security missions, and efforts to prevent civil war. It is doubtful, however, that the unity of the army, air force, and navy could survive a full-scale civil war. The National Police or internal security forces were being reorganized in 2006 and had 27 more battalions in active service. However, some elements continued to commit abuses and attacks against Sunnis and support Shi’ite militias in such attacks or support the Kurds in their efforts to take control of disputed areas in the north. The regular police were still weak, corrupt, and divided by sect and ethnic factions. Control often existed at the local and not national level, and actual security came from police recruited locally, other security forces, militias and insurgents— depending on the city and governorate. The MNF-I began a ‘‘year of the police’’ in 2006, but efforts to embed Coalition advisors in police stations and create partner units are still uncertain. Moreover, problems with corruption, crime, and ethnic and sectarian divisions are compounded by large numbers of facilities protection forces, armed security guards, and local security forces—almost all untrustworthy and as much a threat as an asset. Military Spending and Arms Imports There are no meaningful data on the cost of Iraqi forces and military imports since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003. They have clearly built back from

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nearly zero to several billion dollars a year, but neither the U.S. aid program nor the Iraqi budget provides detailed accountability, and much of the cost of Iraqi forces is now paid indirectly though U.S. and British support in virtually every aspect of Iraqi operations. To put the current state of effort in perspective, one must compare Iraqi defense expenditures and arms transfers before the conflict. Even by a conservative estimate, Iraq imported over $150 billion worth of arms and equipment to manufacture and deliver weapons of mass destruction between 1975 and 1991. It spent billions on fighting the Kurds during the early to mid-1970s. It spent over $100 billion more on the Iran-Iraq War, which Saddam Hussein started by invading Iran. It then lost as much as $50 billion more by invading Kuwait—both as the result of attacks on its military equipment, infrastructure, and production facilities by the UN Coalition and of lost economic opportunity costs. Military expenditures and wartime losses drained Iraq’s economy for nearly two decades. Iraq’s oil wealth is relative. Measured in constant 1988 dollars, Iraq’s gross national product (GNP) peaked during 1979 and 1980, with totals of $118 billion and $120 billion, respectively. The Iran-Iraq War rapidly cut its GNP to $70.4 billion in 1981, and a combination of wartime damage and lower oil prices then cut it to levels of $70 billion throughout the rest of the 1980s. Iraq’s GNP was $65.8 billion in 1988, about half of its GNP in 1980. Iraq kept its military expenditures as a percent of GNP at around 30 percent from 1978 to 1984 and could sustain these expenditures only through a combination of massive foreign borrowing and aid from southern Gulf States like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. After 1984, however, Iraq exhausted its borrowing capability, and the Iran-Iraq War grew more threatening. As a result, military spending rose to 52 percent of the GNP in 1985 and stayed near 50 percent for the rest of the 1980s.6 By 1989, the year that lay between the Iran-Iraq War and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Iraq’s economy was experiencing a serious economic crisis. Experts disagree over the economic statistics involved, but not over the seriousness of the crisis. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), for example, Iraq’s GNP was then $35 billion and its per capita income was only $1,940.7 This level of per capita income is not unusual by Third World standards, but it was low relative to Iraq’s economy in 1979 and to the wealth of a far less developed Saudi Arabia—which had a GNP of $79 billion and a per capita income of $4,800. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimates that Iraq spent $13,990 million in 1987, $12,870 million in 1988, and $8.61 billion in 1990— although there is no way to relate this figure to what Iraq had to spend on the Gulf War, when it had to devote much of its economy to the conflict.8 While any accurate estimates are impossible, Iraq probably spent over 40 percent of its gross domestic product on military forces during the six months before Desert Storm, and 60 percent on its central government expenditures—including wartime losses. No meaningful military spending data are available for 1991, 1992, and 1993.9 Iraq’s arms imports were a massive burden on its economy, driven by the arms race with Iran which began in the 1960s, and by the Iran-Iraq War during the period

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from 1980 to 1988. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) estimates that Iraq imported $2,400 million worth of arms in 1978, $3,200 million in 1979, $2,400 million in 1980, $4,200 million in 1981, $7,000 million in 1982, $6,800 million in 1983, $9,100 million in 1984, $4,600 million in 1985, $5,700 million in 1986, $5,400 million in 1987, $4,900 million in 1988, and $1,900 million in 1989.10 According to a conservative estimate, which ignores all expenditures on weapons of mass destruction and some deliveries of military related goods and services other than actual weapons, Iraq signed at least $30.5 billion worth of new arms agreements between 1983 and 1990.11 The high volume of new agreements during this period reflects the fact that Iraq established a broad network of suppliers during the 1980s. It shifted away from reliance on the Soviet bloc and bought an increasing number of weapons from Europe and the Third World. During 1979–1983, the period that covers the fall of the Shah of Iran and the first part of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq took delivery on $17.6 billion worth of new arms between 1979 and 1983, including $7.2 billion worth of arms from the USSR, $0.85 billion from Poland, $0.4 billion from Romania, $0.04 billion from Czechoslovakia, and $1.5 billion from the People’s Republic of China. It obtained $3.8 billion from France, $0.41 billion from Italy, $0.28 billion from the United Kingdom, $0.14 billion from West Germany, and $3.0 billion from other countries.12 During the latter half of the Iran-Iraq War, from 1984–1988, Iraq took delivery on $29.7 billion worth of new arms, including $15.4 billion worth of arms from the USSR, $0.75 billion from Poland, $0.65 billion from Bulgaria, $0.675 billion from Czechoslovakia, and $2.8 billion from the People’s Republic of China. Iraq obtained $3.1 billion from France, $0.37 billion from Italy, $0.03 billion from the United Kingdom, $0.675 billion from West Germany, and $5.2 billion from other countries.13 The United States did not transfer significant numbers of weapons to Iraq, but did provide help during the Iran-Iraq War in the form of credits and loans that helped buy weapons and also provided intelligence support.14 If one takes the period between 1988 and 1991—which covers the period from the end of the Iran War in August 1988 to the beginning of the embargo on arms shipments to Iraq in August 1990—Iraq ordered only $3.1 billion worth of arms. Some $400 million were ordered from the USSR, $700 million from the People’s Republic of China, $500 million from major western European states, $500 million from other European states, and $1.0 billion from other countries. This low rate of new orders was a product of (a) Iraq’s growing economic crisis, (b) the arms embargo on Iraq after August 1990, and (c) the fact Iraq was still receiving the backlog from the immense amount of orders Iraq already had placed during the Iran-Iraq War. Yet, Iraq took delivery on $8.9 billion worth of arms during this same period, including $4.1 billion worth of arms from the USSR, $1.0 billion from the People’s Republic of China, $1.1 billion from major western European states, $1.7 billion from other European states, and $1.0 billion from other countries.15 The overall burden of military spending and arms imports placed on Iraq’s economy unquestionably helped lead to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 1,

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1990, and to the Gulf War. Iraq had an annual military budget of $12.9 billion in 1990. According to some estimates, Iraq was spending an average of $721 per citizen on military forces, although it had an average per capita income of only $1,950. Although Iraq had cut its rate of new arms orders, it still took delivery on $1,435 million worth of arms and ordered $1,125 million more during the first six months of 1990. This level of expenditure raised Iraq’s international debt to at least $40 billion—and some experts feel in excess of $70 billion.16 These vast expenditures did not protect Iraq from the consequences of its invasion of Kuwait. The scale of the Iraqi defeat in the Gulf War is indicated by U.S. DOD estimates issued just after the conclusion of the fighting that stated UN Coalition forces had captured more than 50,000 prisoners of war (POWs), destroyed nearly 3,000 Iraqi tanks out of 4,030 in southern Iraq and Kuwait, destroyed about 1,000 out of 2,870 other armored vehicles, and destroyed nearly 1,005 artillery weapons out of 3,110.17 These estimates compare with Coalition combat losses of 4 tanks, 9 other armored vehicles, and 1 artillery weapon. While such estimates later proved uncertain, they are valid as a broad indication of the scale of the Iraqi defeat at the time of the cease-fire. In contrast, Iraq’s personnel losses were amazingly small compared to these equipment losses—and United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) raised its estimate of Iraqi POWs to 80,000 and Iraqi losses to 3,300 tanks, 2,100 other armored vehicles, and 2,200 artillery pieces on March 3, 1991.18 While the Defense Intelligence Agency initially gave an estimate of Iraqis killed as high as 100,000, it now seems likely that the total was only about 25,000 to 55,000.19 Total UN Coalition losses are difficult to estimate because of the unwillingness of several Arab states to provide accurate figures, but the United States lost 147 killed in action or who died later from combat wounds, 121 dead from nonhostile causes, 212 wounded in action, and had 44 missing in action at the time the war ended. According to one estimate, Britain lost 16 killed, 31 wounded in action, and 12 missing. Egypt had 9 killed and 75 wounded. France lost 2 killed and 28 wounded. Italy lost 1 killed. Saudi Arabia lost 29 killed, 53 wounded in action, and 9 missing. Senegal had 8 wounded, and the United Arab Emirates had 6 killed.20 It is far harder to provide any meaningful estimate of Iraqi military spending and arms imports after Iraq’s defeat. Iraq obviously spent a massive part of its national budget on armed forces and security after 1991, probably between 40 and 50 percent. It also succeeded in smuggling in some arms and spare parts in spite of the UN arms embargo and containment. Iraq had to spend several billion dollars a year to reconstitute and maintain its forces from 1991–2003. At the time the Coalition invaded, it had built its active military forces back up to some 389,000 men with 650,000 low-grade reserves. The army had some 2,600 main battle tanks, 400 armored reconnaissance vehicles, 1,200 armored infantry fighting vehicles, and some 1,800 armored personnel carriers. It had some 200 self-propelled artillery pieces, 1,900 towed artillery pieces, and some 200 multiple rocket launchers. It had some 164 helicopters in inventory, many armed, but their operational state is unclear.21 Virtually all were destroyed or

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damaged in the fighting that followed, by looting after the war, or poor handling and storage. Iraq faced a vastly superior force in qualitative terms and was the subject of attack by some 18,000 precision-guided weapons alone. There were some 42,000–44,000 men in a wide variety of paramilitary and security forces. Some, like elements of Saddam’s Fedayeen, fought well. Most played no role in combat. The air force had 20,000 men and some 316 combat aircraft. These included 6 bombers and some 130 fighter ground-attack aircraft, 180 fighters, and 5 reconnaissance aircraft, plus several hundred trainers, transport and service aircraft, and support helicopters. Virtually all were permanently damaged beyond repair when Saddam Hussein insisted they be buried to protect them from Coalition air strikes. The massive air defense command had some 17,000 men with 850 surfaceto-air missile weapons, many heavy launchers like the SA-2, the SA-3, and the SA6. It also had large numbers of sensors and command facilities. Almost all were lost due to fighting, looting, and mishandling. The small Iraqi Navy had some 2,000 men, three minesweepers, six patrol craft, and two support ships. It ceased to play any role early in the war. Like many intense conventional clashes with high-technology weapons, Iraqi casualties were limited during the main fighting, although the Iraqi body count from the insurgency that followed was so costly that an estimated total of 38,000–43,000 Iraqis had died by late June 2006.22 Iraqi Military Manpower The Iraqi regular military is still very much in formation, although significant numbers of combat elements are coming on-line. In late September 2006, it had a total manning of 130,100 that Coalition forces had trained and equipped with 128,230 in the army and Special Forces, around 740 in the air force, and around 1,130 in the navy. Another 51,910 men were in the Ministry of Interior (MOI) National Police and other security forces, many of which had training and equipment closer to that of Iraq’s regular army military forces than normal police forces. Iraq and the MNF-1 had also trained some 120,190 regular police, although an unknown number had deserted and their effectiveness was generally minimal. These figures, however, were authorized strength and did not take account of substantial numbers of temporary absentees. Manning levels were very much in transition and were climbing rapidly, As of end-2005, Iraqi forces still had only 62 percent of their authorized officers, and 61 percent of their noncommissioned officers (NCOs), but were overmanned with enlisted manpower at 120 percent, much of which was still of limited quality and would have to be cut or be allowed to desert, depending upon its performance in combat. The Iraqi regular military was at 92 percent of its authorized strength as of December 10, 2005. The sectarian and ethnic composition of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) was a serious issue by the fall of 2005. The debate over federation in drafting the new Constitution had raised the prospect of dividing the country along ethnic and

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sectarian lines. At the same time, the constant stream of bloody attacks on Shi’ites and Kurds, and horrific suicide bombings, led to increasing talk—and sometimes action—about revenge. The security services in the Ministry of Interior were increasingly found either to tolerate revenge attacks by Shi’ite militias like the Badr Organization or to conduct them. The new Iraqi Army did not take such reprisals against Sunnis, but the issue of ethnic representation in the army was an increasing concern to the MNF-I, U.S. commanders and officials, and the Iraqi leaders seeking to hold the country together. This prompted a major new recruiting drive targeting Sunni enlistment. Between August and October, 4,000 Sunnis were recruited and were undergoing training by late October, according to one U.S. military official in Baghdad.23 As of late December 2005, some U.S. commanders in Iraq claimed that the ranks of the Iraqi Army were roughly representative of the national population—about 60 percent Shi’ite, 20 percent Sunni, and 15 to 20 percent Kurdish. Few Iraqis, or U.S. officers directly within their advisory effort, agreed with this assessment. Major-General Salih Sarhan, a Shi’ite, said that the majority of the soldiers were coming from the south and were Shi’ite as of late December 2005. Nearly all of the Iraqi Army’s recent recruits had come from southern Shi’ite cities, including highly religious cities like Karbala and Najaf, where unemployment was high. The 8th and 10th divisions, for example, were almost completely Shi’ite. Meanwhile, the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th divisions in the north were overwhelmingly Kurdish. Sarhan said that the two army divisions in Baghdad were more evenly split.24 The elections that came toward the end of the year also seemed to reflect Shi’ite and Kurdish dominance of Iraqi forces. In contrast to the surge in Sunni participation in the political process that led to a high Sunni vote in the December 15, 2005, parliamentary election, Sunni Arab representation in the ISF remained proportionately low. A special tally that consisted mainly of ballots cast by security forces, but also included votes by hospital patients and prisoners, showed that only about 7 percent of votes were cast for the three main Sunni Arab parties. Because Iraqis were overwhelmingly thought to have voted along sectarian lines, many officials believed that this vote reflected low representation of Sunnis in the ISF. The Kurdish Pesh Merga militiamen seemed to have a disproportionately large representation in the ISF. The special tally revealed that 30 percent of the votes cast went to the principal Shi’ite political alliance and 45 percent of the votes went to the main Kurdish slate of candidates. Lieutenant Colonel Fred Wellman, a spokesman for the military command that oversaw training of Iraqi forces, said that he did not have detailed estimates on the ethnic composition of the ISF, yet admitted that Arab Sunni representation was lagging.25 Nevertheless, the May 2006 manning total of 263,400 for Iraqi forces was 14 percent higher than the total reported in February 2006 and 35 percent higher than the total of 171,300 reported in the first quarterly report to Congress, issued in July 2005. As of mid-September 2006, that number had grown to 302,200 total trained and equipped ISF, according to the Department of State’s weekly numbers.

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Meanwhile, as of August 7, 2006, Coalition forces had closed 48 of their 110 Forward Operating Bases, handing over 31 to the different Iraqi security forces, and 17 to the Ministry of Finance. Thirteen more Forward Operating Bases were scheduled for closure and handover by January 2007.26 On September 7, the Iraqi government started to formally take control of its armed forces, beginning with the 8th Army Division, the navy, and the air force. A U.S. military spokesman speculated that further control transfers could take place at a pace of about two divisions per month.27 The chain of command ran from the Prime Minister to the Defense Minister, to joint headquarters in Baghdad, and finally to the Iraqi ground-forces command. The United States said this selfsufficient line of authority was crucial for self-sufficient Iraqi security forces.28 As of late August, half of Iraq’s ten army divisions were de facto in charge of their own territories or in the process of taking over from Coalition forces.29 THE IRAQI ARMY The Iraqi Army effectively went from zero forces in 2003, and one battalion in July 2004, to substantial force deployments by mid-2006, and had completed generating the basic order of battle of a ten-division force. It was years away from fully manning this force with trained personnel and depended on the Coalition for armor, artillery, tactical mobility, air support, and high-technology command and control and intelligence. Nevertheless, Iraqi forces were active in the field. According to a DOD report to Congress in May 2006, there were two Iraqi divisions, 16 brigades, and 63 Army and National Police battalions with security lead in their areas of responsibility. These areas covered more than 30,000 square miles of Iraq. As of May 6, 2006, the Ministry of Defense (MOD), MOI, or Ministry of Finance had assumed control and responsibility for 34 Forward Operating Bases from Coalition forces. Figures 9.2 and 9.3 show the overall growth of Iraqi forces after the ouster of Saddam Hussein. Figure 9.4 shows the number of Iraqi Army battalions in combat and Figure 9.5 shows the number of Iraqi units conducting independent and combined operations as of August 2006. As of May 2006, Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) had built up to approximately 1,600 trained and equipped personnel organized into the Iraqi CounterTerrorism Task Force (ICTF), the Iraqi Commandos, a support battalion, and a special reconnaissance unit. The ISOF was to complete force generation by the summer of 2006, according to the DOD’s May 2006 Quarterly Report to Congress. The ICTF and Commandos continued to conduct counterinsurgency operations throughout the nation. The ISOF primarily used U.S. equipment, including the M4 carbine, M240 machine guns, M2 heavy machine guns, and up-armored highmobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs or Humvees). Coalition officials partnered with four divisions of the Iraqi Army in the north said that two of those divisions would be ready to take the lead in operations by the end of the summer (2006) and the other two by the end of the year. 32 In a video

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Figure 9.2 Iraq’s Ministry of Defense Forces’ Assessed Capabilities

conference with the Pentagon on May 20, 2006, Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli, Commander of Multi-National Corps–Iraq, said that the ISF was on pace to control about 75 percent of the country’s battle space by the end of the summer. That same month, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki said that the Iraqi Army

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Figure 9.3 Estimated MOD Force Capabilities by Service: Comparison of June 2005 and August 2006 Source: Adapted from U.S. Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, August 2006, Report to the Congress. Note: +/–5% margin of error.

and police would be able to assume responsibility for security across the entire country by late 2007. By August the Iraqi Army included approximately 115,000 trained and equipped combat soldiers, including SIB personnel and about 9,600 support forces.33 General

Figure 9.4 Iraqi Army Battalions in Combat: August 2004 to August 2006

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Figure 9.5 Growth in Independent and Combined Combat Operations (Company Level and Above*)

John Abizaid in early September attested that while Iraqi forces were fighting, they were not yet capable of ensuring their own security.34 Efforts to increase the independence of Iraqi Army units continued to focus on combat enablers at this time. The three planned Iraqi Training Battalions had been formed and allowed Iraqis to train soldiers independently in sufficient quantities. Army recruits attended a 13week program of basic instruction followed by military occupational training of a length varying from three to seven weeks, depending on specialty. Specialty schools included the Military Intelligence School, Signal School, Bomb Disposal School, Combat Arms Branch School, Engineer School, and Military Police School. These schools were intended both to contribute to professionalism in the Iraqi Army and to teach the necessary skills for fighting counterinsurgency campaigns. Although the Motorized Transportation Regiments (MTRs) were approaching full operational capability, a continued lack of competent maintenance personnel hindered their ability to reach full capability. As of August, approximately 80 percent of planned Headquarters and Service Companies (HSCs) had been formed, a third were operational, and the remaining HSCs were scheduled to be completed by December 2006.35 Meanwhile, training for service and support officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) was provided by the Iraqi Army Service and Supply Institute (IASSI) at Taji. By August 2006 the IASSI had trained more than 5,000 officers and NCOs.36 Iraqi Special Operations Forces at this time were composed of 1,600 soldiers making up the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Task Force, the Iraqi Commandos, a support battalion, and a special reconnaissance unit.37 Equipment Holdings and Issues At least through 2006, most Iraqi forces remained very lightly equipped by the standard of conventional military forces. The Special Inspector General for Iraq

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Reconstruction (SIGIR) Report to Congress issued in April 2006 covered Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF)-funded activities, as well as information on Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) activity. The following represent the highlights of the security and justice sector report:38 • More U.S. funds have been devoted to security and justice than any other reconstruction sector. A total of $11.6 billion has been allocated, combining funds from IRRF 2 and ISFF. • By the end of this quarter, 82 percent of the $6.35 billion IRRF allocation had been expended, and 31 percent of ISFF funds have been expended. • Approximately 250,500 military and police personnel have reportedly been trained and equipped. • More than 600 facilities have been completed—police stations, fire stations, courts, border forts, and army facilities.

According to Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC-I), the Iraqi Army had received a number of war zone essentials from Coalition forces by the end of 2005: more than 95,000 assault rifles, 4,400 machine guns, almost 95,000 sets of body armor, more than 3,500 vehicles, 83,000 batons, and more than 105,000 sets of handcuffs.39 According to Coalition planners, the Iraqi Armed Forces received equally light equipment between January 2006 and May 2006: • more than 25,000 AK-47s, • more than 6,200 9-mm pistols, • nearly 1,300 light and medium machine guns, • nearly 1,000 light and medium vehicles, • more than 17,000 sets of body armor, • more than 15,000 Kevlar helmets, and • 176 HMMWVs, which were distributed among the divisions and Motorized Transportation Regiments.

There were exceptions. During the same time period, the Iraqi Army’s 9th Mechanized Division received 77 Hungarian-donated T-72 tanks and 36 Greek-donated BMP-1 armored personnel carriers. These vehicles were integrated into the 2nd Brigade, comprised of two tank battalions and one mechanized battalion.40 The 9th Motorized Rifle Division had two mechanized brigades comprising nine maneuver battalions and was to include two battalions of T-72 tanks, two of T-55 tanks, and five of BMP-1 armored personnel carriers.41 The 1st Mechanized Brigade of this division took over battle space in the Taji area some 25 miles north of Baghdad in January 2006, less than a year after becoming fully operational. It was equipped with T-55s and MTLBs, and largely complete, except for some logistic and supply elements.42

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By December 2005, the 220,000-strong ISF, including the army and paramilitary police, had received a total of about 600 armored vehicles. They did, however, still have a requirement for nearly 3,000 more, including more than 1,500 armored Humvee utility vehicles.43 As a result, equipment deliveries and plans became a growing issue with Iraqi commanders during 2006, with complaints that a lack of proper equipment precluded decisive advantage over relative well-armed and equipped insurgent forces. One criticism was that corruption in the Iraqi Ministry of Defense was largely to blame for the problem. In 2005, the MOD misplaced $1.3 billion that had been allocated to arm the troops. Another complaint from field commanders was that U.S. and Coalition equipment deliveries did not contain the types of heavy equipment necessary to definitely crush the insurgents.44

Support Forces Progress was also being made in creating effective support forces. Combat support and combat service support units continued to be generated to provide critical combat enablers. As of May 2006, these included Operational Regional Support Units, Motor Transport Regiments, Logistics Support Battalions, and Headquarters and Service Companies. Strategic Infrastructure Battalions remain focused on securing critical oil pipelines. In the first quarter of 2006, the train-and-equip mission for these was increased from 4 to 11 battalions to reflect the adjusted Iraqi Army authorization. While Coalition forces continued to provide mate´riel movement, life support, and other combat support to the Iraqi Armed Forces, the MOD made progress in building Iraqi logistical capabilities during the first yearly quarter of 2006:45 The National Depot at Taji, which is managed by the civilian component of the ministry, provides strategic and some operational-level supply and maintenance support through its military, civilian, and contractor staff. It provides warehouse facilities for the receipt, storage, and issue of the Iraqi Army and Air Force’s national stockholding of most classes of supply and facilities for conducting vehicle overhauls and other 4thline (i.e. national-level) maintenance support. The National Depot feeds five Regional Support Units (RSUs) that provide maintenance and supply support to nearby units. Four of these RSUs are currently operational, and the fifth is being formed. The national Maintenance Contract, which extends through March 2007, continues to provide a limited interim solution for organizational and intermediate maintenance requirements of the Iraqi Armed forces at ten different locations throughout the country. The capability to provide some routine maintenance is being developed within the support units.

More than 65 percent of personnel in the Iraqi Army’s support forces had been trained and equipped, according to the May 2006 DOD Report to Congress, and logistics units continued to increase their capabilities. This number of 65 percent, however, had not changed as of the August 2006 report, raising questions about

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continued progress in building out the logistical enablers needed for the ISF to be a truly independent and operational force. THE IRAQI AIR FORCE The Iraqi Air Force also made progress, although it was scarcely the symbol of Iraqi strength that had existed under Saddam Hussein. It had been a formidable force by regional standards, but Iraqi airpower crumbled under the strain of the Gulf Wars, the U.S.–U.K. enforcement of no-fly zones, and the invasion. Iraq’s fighter and surface-to-air inventory had been effectively destroyed. Many fighters had been destroyed on the ground or in the air by Coalition forces. Many of Iraq’s more advanced aircraft, such as MiG-29s, were flown to Iran for safekeeping during the Gulf War and have never been returned. Its surface-to-air inventory had been largely destroyed during the interwar period and the invasion, and Iraq destroyed most of its remaining combat aircraft during the invasion by burying and dispersing them in ways that made them permanently inoperable.46 Like so much of Saddam Hussein’s military buildup, there was no reason that Iraqi forces should now seek anything like the force levels that existed before the invasion. Nevertheless, it was clear that a new Iraqi Air Force did need to emerge, one that eventually had the combat strength necessary to defend the country, as well as deal with country insurgency. Creating a new Iraqi Air Force, however, was anything but easy, and the new Iraqi Air Force still had serious problems even in operating small numbers of systems in late 2005. The air force was badly short of manning for its dedicated combat, service, and logistic support units. In early September 2005, the service grounded six of the eight surveillance aircraft that it acquired in September 2004. The planes were Jordan Aerospace Industries SAMA CH2000s, equipped with forwardlooking infrared sensors. The squadron was left with just two Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR)-equipped Seeker aircraft, acquired in 2004 from Jordan-based Seabird Aviation. The grounding, according to a U.S. military adviser to the squadron, was more the product of a contract dispute than the fault of the IAF. While the adviser declined to give specifics on the nature of the dispute, the performance of the aircraft seemed to be in question, with an industry expert citing possible problems related to the CH2000’s ability to operate effectively in the heat of the Iraqi summer.47 By December, however, the Iraqi Air Force was beginning to operate its C-130Es more effectively and was beginning to deploy the 23rd Transport Squadron from the U.S.–supported Ali Base in southern Iraq to a new permanent base called ‘‘New Al Muthana.’’ The Joint Headquarters Center of the Iraqi Headquarters had become more active in mission planning and assignments, the air force was beginning to use encrypted communications, and during one exercise, it flew nine C-130E missions with 117 passengers and 106,000 pounds of cargo during a five-day period.48 The IAF also resumed helicopter training in late 2005, after problems with spare parts shortages. These problems had sidelined the training squadrons fleet of Jet

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Rangers for several months. The 2nd and 12th squadrons, with UH-1s, were somewhat more active initially, but their UH-1Hs began to be sent back to the United States for reconfiguration into Huey IIs in January 2006. In early 2006, the Iraqi Air Force had nearly 500 trained and equipped personnel and was developing three airpower capabilities: reconnaissance, battlefield mobility, and air transport. Major assets for these capabilities included the following:49 • Aerial Reconnaissance Fleet • 2 Seabird Seekers • 2 SAMA CH-2000s • 6 AeroComp Comp Air 7SLs • Battlefield Mobility • 4 UH-1H helicopters • 5 Bell 206 Jet Ranger helicopters • Air Transport Capability • 3 C-130E aircraft

Development of air force personnel capabilities was under way, with the help of Coalition Advisory Support Teams. As of May 2006, the air force had approximately 600 trained and equipped personnel and continued to develop three airpower capabilities: reconnaissance, battlefield mobility, and air transport. The following advancements were also reported:50 Iraqi reconnaissance aircraft have a limited capability to perform oil infrastructure reconnaissance and surveillance support for nationwide counter-insurgency operations. The Iraqi Air Force (IAF) reconnaissance aircraft consist of single-engine airplanes used in civilian and commercial markets. One such IAF type, the CH-2000, has continued to experience issues with carbon monoxide presence, which has limited its effectiveness. A temporary fix has been designed, and full operational capability is expected by late May. Another IAF reconnaissance aircraft, the CompAir, awaits the arrival of a US Air Force team, scheduled to be in theater in May, to modify the fleet and return it to operational status. The IAF has three squadrons of helicopters (2nd Squadron, 4th Squadron, and 12th Squadron) in support battlefield mobility. Sixteen Uh-1H helicopters have returned to the United States for modifications and upgrades to the Huey II configuration. The first seven of these aircraft are scheduled to return to Iraq in January 2007, with the remainder following two to three months later. The 4th Squadron will initially operate 10 Mi17s procured by the Iraqi MOD. Eight of these 10 have been delivered, but they are awaiting additional armor, weapons mounts, and pilot training and proficiency. These aircraft are expected to be operational by the end of 2006. The 12th Squadron operates five Bell 206 Jet Ranger helicopters, which are used for training purposes. The 23rd Transport Squadron, with its three C-130E aircraft, completed its move to the new al-Muthanna Air Base early this quarter. This squadron has continued to perform transport, mobility, and humanitarian missions this quarter.

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As of August 2006, Iraq’s air force remained small with 750 personnel. Increasing the size of the force continued to be a problem because of the difficulty in finding qualified applicants. However, both the 7th Squadron—consisting of five CompAir 7SLs based at Kirkuk Air Base—and the 70th Squadron—consisting of two Seekers and six CH-2000s based at Basrah Air Base—were performing operational missions. These missions mostly consisted of patrolling oil pipeline infrastructure in their respective areas. By the end of January 2007 the 2nd Squadron based at Taji Air Base was expected to receive its first six Huey IIs and was expected to use them mostly for casualty evacuation. Finally the 23rd Squadron located at the new Al-Muthanna Air Base in Baghdad, consisted of three C-130Es.51 Overall the air force largely concentrated on reconnaissance, battlefield mobility, and air transport. The control of Iraqi airspace remained a U.S. responsibility, and the Ministry of Defense had not developed plans to procure its own combat aircraft. Figure 9.6 summarizes Iraqi Air Force capabilities as of August 2006.

THE IRAQI NAVY The Iraqi Navy was still in the process of becoming an effective light coastal defense force in the fall of 2005, although recruiting had improved after it adopted the Direct Recruit Replacement program started by the army. The first such naval Figure 9.6 Iraqi Air Force Capabilities as of August 2006

Number of aircraft

Role

C-130E Hercules Transport Aircraft

CH-2000 Observation Aircraft

SB7L-360 Seeker

3

6

2

Air transport Patrol oil pipelines and other critical infrastructure Troop facilities transport

Mil Mi-8 Battlefield Helicopters

Bell 206 Jet Ranger Helicopters

8 (more expected in 2007)

5

Bell UH-1 Helicopters

16 (upgraded during 2006 in United States to Huey II standard)

infrastructure Patrol oil facilities pipelines and other critical Basic rotary-wing training

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, August 2006 Report to Congress.

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training program had begun in May. Its naval infantry battalion was being trained for point defense of oil platforms—a key mission in securing oil exports. By September 2005, the Iraqi Navy was operating 5 Predator-class patrol boats (PB), 24 fast aluminum boats (dual outboard engines), and 10 rigid hull inflatable boats. The naval forces were further equipped with various small arms and Night Vision Devices. Plans called for the Iraqi Navy to be equipped with 3 Al Faw Class Patrol Boats by December 2005 and with an additional 3 by September 2006. However, design deficiencies (e.g., seawater strainers below the waterline) and construction shortcomings (e.g., poor welding) of one Al Faw boat delivered to date caused delays in fielding the patrol boats.52 Iraqi naval forces were also working with U.S. forces in defending Iraq’s two oil terminals in the Gulf—the Al Basra Oil Terminal and the Khawr Al Amaya Oil Terminal (KAAOT). The oil exports through these terminals were generating nearly 80 percent of Iraq’s revenue—less aid—in late 2005. Iraqi Marines had taken full control of the defense of KAAOT, supported by Coalition ships and naval forces in the area. A total of some 50 Iraqi Marines worked with a total of some 70 U.S. sailors.53 Iraqi Coast Guard activity was active enough to lead to a clash with Iranian forces in mid-January 2006. Guard members boarded an Iranian ship in the Shatt al-Arab waterway between Iraq and Iran, some 27 kilometers south of Basra, because they believed it was smuggling oil. Speedboats from the Iranian Navy attacked them, killing one and detaining nine.54 In the first months of 2006, the Iraqi Navy had 800 trained and equipped sailors and marines organized into an operational headquarters, two afloat squadrons, and six marine platoons. No significant asset deliveries were made to the Iraqi Navy since early 2005. The navy was operating 5 Predator-class patrol boats, 24 fast aluminum boats, and 10 rigid hull inflatable boats. While the size of the Iraqi Navy did not grow significantly through spring 2006, there were reports of increased command and control capabilities at operational headquarters. However, as with the other services at this time, institutional capacity to execute acquisitions, logistics, and personnel policies remained underdeveloped.55 As of May 2006, the Iraqi Navy had 800 trained and equipped sailors and marines organized into an operational headquarters, two afloat squadrons, and six marine platoons. The following advancements were also reported:56 The Iraqi Navy continues to develop capabilities for surface surveillance, maritime interdiction, oil terminal protection, and support operations. The Navy has shown improvement in the command and control capability of the Operational Headquarters as well as the capability to mount a Quick Response Force for board-and-search missions, while maintaining communications with the head-quarters and operating forces.

The Iraqi Navy order of battle included the Patrol Boat Squadron, composed of 5 Predator-class boats; the Assault Boat Squadron, composed of 10 rigid hull inflatable boats; and 24 fast assault boats. Force generation plans in early 2006 called for a total

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of 6 Al Faw-class patrol boats by September 2006, but the delivery of 3 Al Faw patrol boats continued to be delayed. The procurement of two off-shore support vessels had also been delayed by the MOD until the formation of the new government. The following advancements in training were also reported:57 Training of the Iraqi Navy continues to be conducted by the Iraqi Navy Training Department, with the assistance of the Coalition’s Navy Transition Team. Training remains focused on maintaining basic seamanship skills and conducting maritime operations. Afloat Forward Staging Base and visit board search and seizure training continues. Marine training continues to be supported by US Navy Mobile Security Detachments and includes regular marksmanship refresher training.

As of August 2006, Iraqi naval strength stood at around 1,000 sailors and marines, organized into two patrol and assault boat squadrons and a marine battalion. Iraqis regularly served on board U.S. and U.K. ships, and the Iraqi Marines and Navy boats were closely integrated into Coalition operations to protect oil infrastructure.58 The Iraqi Navy is examining purchasing larger ships. These could include four Italian 52.8-meter Diciotti patrol vessels. They displace a full load of 427 tons, have a crew of 30, and have an endurance of 1,800 nautical miles at 16 knots. They would have a 25-mm or 30-mm gun. The Iraqi Navy is also examining purchasing another 15 smaller patrol boats and two offshore support vessels.59 Figure 9.7 summarizes Iraqi naval capabilities as of August 2006. PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, POLICE, AND INTELLIGENCE FORCES The Iraqi police had a total of 148,500 men listed as trained and equipped as of June 14, 2006. These include 104,700 police and highway patrol forces, and 43,800 other MOI forces, including the former commando and special security forces. Unlike the regular military, however, these forces presented serious security issues. Militia infiltration into the Ministry of Interior security and police forces was a steadily growing problem in 2005 and early 2006. Substantial numbers of men from both the Badr Organization and Moqtada Al-Sadr’s Al-Mahdi Army joined the force. In the case of the roughly 65,000-strong mix of MOI and police forces in the greater Baghdad area, the men from the Badr Organization tended to go into the MOI special security units and those from Al-Mahdi Army tended to join the police.

Figure 9.7 Iraqi Naval Capabilities as of August 2006 Patrol Boats

Rigid Inflatable Boats

Fast Assault Boats

5

10

24

Offshore Patrol Support Vessels

Al Faw–Class Patrol Boats

Purchase planned Purchase planned

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, August 2006 Report to Congress.

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Both MNF-I and the Iraqi government were slow to react. The Iraqi government and the Coalition continued to claim the situation was improving during much of 2005, although a September 2005 report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) suggested that the process of drafting the Constitution had helped exacerbate the existing ethnic and sectarian divisions between Iraqis and serious problems continued through the formation of a new government in May and June of 2006.60 The Ministry of Interior as a ‘‘Threat’’ Much of the problem began at the top of the MOI. The appointment in May 2005 of Bayan Jabr as the interim head of the Interior Ministry—which oversaw the nation’s police and specialized security units—exacerbated all these problems. Jabr was a prominent member of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), with close ties to Iran and to the Badr Brigade. It is unclear how many of the growing problems with the special security forces, police, prisons, and militias were really Jabr’s fault—he had limited power and freedom of action—but it is clear that no decisive action took place without major pressure on the Minister by the U.S. Embassy and MNF-I. This situation was made worse by severe understaffing of the Coalition advisory effort to both the Ministry of Interior and the police, a problem that continued until at least early 2006. It was also made worse by the fact that control of the U.S. advisory effort to the MOI was placed under the State Department while control of the advisory effort to the MOD was placed under the Department of Defense. This situation was corrected in October 2005 by putting the MOI under the Department of Defense, but this scarcely meant adequate staffing of the advisory effort, and problems in getting qualified civilian advisors continued to be severe. Sunni politicians increasingly viewed Jabr’s position as particularly troubling and blamed the Ministry for a wave of Sunni-targeted kidnappings, tortures, and murders allegedly carried out by men wearing police uniforms. In late 2005, the Interior Ministry was found to be running secret detention centers in which more than 800 men and boys, mostly Sunnis, were held in horrific conditions. (The Iraqi Constitution authorizes only the Ministry of Justice to run prisons.)61 By late 2005, U.S. officials and military sources were complaining that the MOI and Minister Jabr were not informing them of some MOI and police operations and privately acknowledged that they had observed prisoner abuse. Commenting on the futility of filing reports against the incidents, one U.S. official equated it with ‘‘trying to put out a forest fire with a bucket of water.’’62 They expressed particular concern about the actions of the MOI’s Maghawir or Fearless Warrior special commando units, which were carrying out illegal raids and killings. This 12,000-man force had a number of Sunni officers and had originally been formed under the authority of former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. Since the new government was formed in April 2005, however, it had recruited larger numbers of new Shi’ite members. Its Commander, General Rashid Flaih Mohammed, was reported to have acknowledged that the unit had had some problems. Sunni police

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commanders like Brigadier General Mohammed Ezzawi Hussein Alwann, commander of the Farook Brigade, were also purged from the MOI forces, along with junior officers.63 The inability to distinguish clearly between different types of Iraqi forces, and imposters from real elements of Iraqi forces, became steadily more serious over time. During the winter of 2005 and 2006, body dumps became a favored tactic for both insurgents and militias. Although this trend existed long before the February 22, 2006, Askariya bombing, it increased thereafter and became part of the cyclical sectarian violence carried out by Shi’ites and Sunnis. It would be almost impossible to catalog all of the discoveries, but finding 10 to 20 corpses at one site was not uncommon, and each day usually resulted in at least one ‘‘body dump’’ being reported. For example, in the period from March 7 until March 21, over 191 bodies were found. On one day in May, it was reported that 51 bodies were found in Baghdad alone. A health official in Baghdad said that there were over 2,500 murders in the capital since the February bombing, excluding mass-casualty bombings.64 Efforts did go on, however, to improve the situation. By late spring of 2006, the Iraqi government and its Coalition partners had taken a number of steps to promote respect for human rights within the MOI:65 Iraqi police recruits receive 32 hours of human rights and rule of law training during the 10-week police basic training program. At the 3-week-long Transition Integration Program, in-service personnel receive 20 hours of human rights and rule of law training. National Police Forces receive 9–15 hours of human rights training during their 6-week courses. Additionally, throughout the country there are numerous programs to train existing MOI security forces in human rights standards, such as embedding civilian advisors and military police into Iraqi police stations.

The fact that many of the MOI forces had become associated with Shi’ite and Kurdish attacks on Sunnis during this period presented another kind of problem. In May 2006, Senior Iraqi leaders were preparing a major restructuring of Baghdad’s security brigades that would place all police officers and paramilitary soldiers under a single commander and in one uniform. The move came as part of a wider effort to contain the sectarian violence that was ravaging the city.66 The one reassuring note was that Sunni Muslims continued to join the security forces in large numbers, a possible sign of success in the effort to include people of Iraq’s various religious factions into the military.67 While the U.S. government helped the Iraqi government establish an abuse complaint process system that involved the Inspector General, Internal Affairs, and the Public Affairs Office, the MOI still did not have the ability to police itself and eradicate human rights abuses. Human rights violations were particularly egregious at detention centers where there are no places to shower, pray, or prepare food and where plumbing and electrical systems are substandard. The Joint Iraqi Inspection Committee, comprised of Iraqi Inspectors General from various Ministries with

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the support of the U.S. Embassy and MNF-I, continued its investigation of these detention centers as of spring 2006. Real vs. Authorized Strength Figure 9.8 shows the size of Ministry of Interior forces before the growing problems they present in terms of sectarian and ethnic violence led to their reorganization. The number of trained equipped men in the new MOI forces, as of mid2006, is shown in Figure 9.9. It should be stressed that many of these men had deserted or left. Estimating the actual strength of MOI forces was a major problem. U.S. and Iraqi commanders had long criticized the policy whereby Iraqi soldiers could leave their units whenever they want to. The Iraqi Army does not require its soldiers to sign contracts, so soldiers treat enlistments as temporary jobs. This policy was partially responsible for draining Iraqi ranks to confront the insurgency by as much as 30 to 50 percent.68

Figure 9.8 The Manpower of Iraq’s Ministry of Interior Forces before Their Mid-2006 Reorganization

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Figure 9.9 MOI and MOD Force Levels as of August 2006

Active recruiting by the militias presented a growing problem, although many who chose the militias over the national army and police scarcely did so out of religious conviction. In violence-prone areas where few jobs are available, young males often have reasons and incentives such as security, money, and general well-being to join the militias over the state-run forces. As one such recruit summed it up, the offer by the Al-Mahdi Army was ‘‘an attractive package.’’ Not only did it offer a greater salary, but the organization also promised to take care of his family if something were to happen to him. The Status of Special Security Forces The buildup of MOI special security and commando forces and units continued to be significant in 2006. The New York Times reported on January 16, 2006, that about 80,000 local police officers across Iraq were certified as being trained and equipped, more than halfway toward the goal of 135,000 by early 2007.69 As of February 20, 2006, Multi-National Force–Iraq spokesman Major General Rick Lynch said that Iraq’s growing security forces planned and carried out more than a quarter of all counterinsurgency operations in Iraq in January, a total of 490 Iraqirun missions, nearly a 50-percent increase over the September 2005 figure.70 The Coalition also worked with the Iraqi Public Order Special Police who serve as a bridge between local police and the Iraqi Army in handling terrorist and insurgency threats. Numbering about 9,000 as of February 2006, the Public Order Police operated primarily as a light urban infantry. As of May 2006, there were around 22,700 trained and equipped National Police (formerly known as ‘‘Special Forces’’ and ‘‘Commandos’’) personnel, an increase of 4,000 since the previous DOD report to Congress in February 2006:71 The 1st and 2nd National Police Divisions will reach 95% of equipping and authorized manning by June 2006 and will complete force generation by December 2006. The 1st

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National Police Mechanized Brigade continues to provide route security along Route Irish (from the International Zone to Baghdad International Airport), and is currently completing the fielding of 62 Armored Security Vehicles.

Force Size and Readiness The growing size and the readiness of the elite elements of these forces are shown in Figure 9.10. They presented the problem, however, that some elements were responsible for serious abuses of Shi’ites, and they became a de facto part of the problem rather than the solution. Colonel Gordon Davis stated in February 2006 that the composition of these forces was about 20 percent Sunni, many of whom are officers, and claimed this made it unlikely that the group could be infiltrated by vigilantes who carry out ethnic-based attacks. ‘‘There are a heck of a lot of strongly willed patriots amongst that group, and if they believed one of their own may be an insurgent or terrorist, then they would pick them out right away because that puts their own lives on the lines, as well as those of their families.’’72 In an April 6, 2006, report to Congress, the DOD addressed the overall progress in the force structure of Iraq’s Interior Ministry as follows:73 The end-strength force structure for all Ministry of Interior forces is 195,000 trained and equipped personnel manning two division headquarters, nine brigade headquarters, twelve Public Order battalions, twelve Commando battalions, three mechanized battalions, and one Emergency Response Unit. The force structure plan is designed to enable a stable civil-security environment in which a prosperous economy and a democratic and representative government that respects and promotes human rights can evolve. As of March 20, 130,700 Ministry of Interior security personnel, or 67 percent of the authorized end strength of 195,000, have been trained and equipped. This includes 89,000 IPS [Iraqi Police Service] personnel, as described in the next section, and 41,700 other

Figure 9.10 Iraq’s Estimated MOI National Police Force Capabilities before the Spring 2006 Reorganization

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Ministry of Interior forces, such as 27 National Police Force battalions and one Emergency Response Unit conducting operations with ten of these units ‘‘in the lead.’’ There is no specific threshold for the number of Iraqi special police units that must be judged capable of operating independently or in the lead before U.S. force levels can be reduced.

The report went on to outline the progress and the outlook for training and equipping the Iraqi police forces:74 The end-strength force structure of the IPS is 135,000 trained and equipped personnel. As of March 20, over 89,000 IPS, or 66 percent of the authorized end strength, have been trained and equipped, an increase of over 14,000 since the December 15, 2005 parliamentary election. These IPS personnel work alongside the 41,700 other Ministry of Interior forces described in the previous section. The IPS is the primary civilian police organization in Iraq. Their mission is to enforce the law, safeguard the public, and provide internal security at the local level. The IPS is organized into patrol, station, and traffic sections in all major cities and provinces in Iraq and is responsible for providing security in more than 130 districts and at nearly 780 stations throughout Iraq. The scope of their responsibility demonstrates the critical need to ensure the development of professional, capable police forces that utilize modern policing techniques, follow the rule of law, and respect human rights. The Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) works closely with the Ministry of Interior to improve the performance and professionalism of these forces. Police Transition Teams mentor and assist the IPS in a role similar to that of the Coalition Military Transition Teams, evaluating their progress and instituting the necessary procedures to continue development of a professional police force. There is no specific threshold for the number of IPS that must be trained and equipped to maintain law and order and thereby enable U.S. force levels to be reduced.

By August 2006, approximately 24,300 National Police personnel had been trained and equipped, an increase of 1,600 since May of that year. Training for the new recruits consisted of six weeks of training in the police academy in northern Baghdad. The equipment of the National Police consisted of small arms, medium machine guns, and RPGs, and light trucks, which were used for patrols. The mechanized battalions were equipped with Armored Security Vehicles and REVAs, a South African wheeled APC. By August the National Police had received 92 percent of their authorized equipment. They were expected to reach 96 percent by the end of November, falling short of the goal of reaching 100 percent by that time. They were expected to be fully equipped by the end of December 2006.75 Steps toward Reform By early 2006, Ministry of Interior forces presented a serious problem, particularly among Iraq’s Sunni population. So poor was the force’s reputation that after the bombing of the Askariya shrine in Samarra on February 22, many Sunnis actually claimed that the perpetrators of the act were MOI forces seeking a pretext for civil war.76 Among the forces that had gained the mixed reputation as among the most

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effective, but also the most feared, were the MOI’s special security forces and police commandos. In early 2006, the White House released a fact sheet highlighting the importance of revamping the image and the procedures of MOI forces and elite units: The Interior Ministry’s Special Police are the most capable Iraqi police force. . .Many are professional and diverse, but recently some have been accused of committing abuses against Iraqi civilians. To stop abuses and increase professionalism, the Coalition is working with the Iraqi government to make adjustments in the way these forces are trained. Human rights and rule of law training is being increased. A new Police Ethics and Leadership Institute is being established in Baghdad. To improve capabilities, Iraqi Special Police battalions will be partnered with Coalition battalions so that American forces can work with and train their Iraqi counterparts.

Indeed, much attention in the spring and summer of 2006 was placed on reorienting the special MOI forces toward being a more positive force and reducing divisive behavior and the interloping influences of sectarian actors.77 It was clear that major reforms were still needed. As a result, the Minister of the Interior merged the Police Commandos, the Public Order and Mechanized Police, and the Emergency Response Unit (ERU) to form the Iraqi National Police on April 1, 2006. Under the National Police Headquarters fall the 1st and 2nd National Police Divisions, the 1st National Police Mechanized Brigade, and the ERU. The two police divisions were formed from the Commando Division and the Public Order Division. The 1st National Police Mechanized Brigade remained a direct supporting unit, and the ERU, previously part of the MOI’s Supporting Forces organization, was reassigned as a direct reporting unit to the National Police Headquarters. Two police academies—Camp Solidarity and Camp Dublin—also fell under the National Police Headquarters and provide specialized training and professional development. In addition, the Headquarters was formally recognized to provide command and control, manning, equipping, training, and sustainment for the National Police Forces. The ERU now reported directly to the National Police Force Headquarters and had more than 400 trained and equipped personnel assigned to it. The goal was for the ERU to become a highly trained, national-level unit similar to the hostage rescue team of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). ERU training consisted of two four-week courses that included instruction in handling detainees, human rights, target reconnaissance, physical fitness, and mission planning. Selected personnel received training at the eight-week Explosive Ordnance Disposal course or the six-week Intelligence/Surveillance course. The Regular Police The primary organization for local civilian policing in the MOI was the Iraqi Police Service. MNSTC-I’s Civilian Police Assistance Training Team was working with the IPS to improve performance and professionalism, and Police Transition Teams were providing mentorship and development roles.

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By early 2006, over 80,000 IPS personnel had been trained and equipped, an increase of 13,000 since October 2005. As of early 2006, MNSTC-I was projecting to complete force generation by February 2007.78 Increases in Police Strength As of spring 2006, MOI forces included the IPS and national forces. The IPS consisted of patrol, traffic, station, and highway police assigned throughout Iraq’s 18 provinces. National forces consisted of the National Police, the Department of Border enforcement, and the Center for Dignitary Protection. As of March 2006, the MOI had integrated the former Iraqi Highway Patrol into the respective provincial police departments. This decreased the authorization of MOI forces to 188,000 trained and equipped personnel. The National Police had 28 battalions in the fight with 6 battalions having security lead for their areas of responsibility. The end result was that the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) had trained and equipped approximately 101,200 IPS personnel as of May 2006, an increase of 18,800 since the previous report. The IPS was organized into patrol, station, traffic, and highway patrol directorates across Iraq and was tasked with enforcing the law, safeguarding the public, and providing internal security at the local level. As of May 2006, the CPATT anticipated that it will have trained and equipped the total authorization of 135,000 personnel by December 2006. More than 225 Iraqi police stations had been constructed and refurbished, 80 more than in February 2006. The CPATT projected that another 225 police stations would be completed by December 2006. The ‘‘Year of the Police’’ All of this progress, however, did not affect the fact that problems in the police and other MOI forces were so severe that the Iraqi government and MNF-I not only agreed to the reorganization discussed earlier, but that a comprehensive new approach was needed for training. All elements of the MOI forces needed better training and organization, but the regular police were so large that retraining them was a key challenge to the MOI, the Iraqi government, and the MNF-I. The fact that the training and overall readiness of the Iraqi National Police remained behind the army, and the presence of militia members or ‘‘death squads’’ operating within or in association with the forces, caused the United States to elevate its efforts to make the police an effective fighting force and unofficially dub 2006 the ‘‘year of the police.’’ President Bush identified these problems in a March speech. He proposed three solutions: • First, to increase partnerships between U.S. and Iraqi battalions in order that Iraqi units cannot only learn tactical lessons but also that the U.S. forces can ‘‘teach them about

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the role of a professional police force in a democratic system’’ so that they can conduct their operations ‘‘without discrimination.’’79 • Second, he called for further efforts by Iraqi officials in conjunction with their U.S. partners to identify and remove leaders within the police ranks who demonstrate loyalty to a militia. He claimed one success story in this area already. In December 2005, after receiving reports of abuses, the MOI dismissed the Brigade Commander of the Second Public Order Brigade. His replacement subsequently removed more than 100 men with ties to militias.80 • Third, to recruit a greater number of Sunni Arabs into what is seen by many as a predominately Shi’ite police force. President Bush noted that a basic training class that graduated in October 2005 was less than 1 percent Sunni. Although it is unclear how much progress has been made in diluting the Shi’ite majority within the ranks, Bush subsequently remarked that the class graduating in April 2006 ‘‘will include many more Sunni Arabs.’’81

More than 200 police transition teams were established at the national, provincial, district, and local levels that provided Coalition oversight, mentorship, and training to the police forces. Moreover, the Iraqi Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border Patrol teams mentored MOI forces at points of entry, and the 38 National Police Transition Teams continue to support the development of the National Police units. Ongoing Reform The initiative led to the deployment of CPATTs, under MNSTC-I, to lead the MNF-I Year of the Police initiative, and partnering with MOI, to plan, coordinate, and execute the necessary measures to develop the Ministry. Training increasingly focused on leadership development with the Center for Ethics and Leadership initiative as well as efforts to change the Baghdad Police College from focusing on training basic police officers to developing Iraqi police officers. The MOI also improved its internal investigative capability with the Internal Affairs section graduating another group of students to bring the total number of trained Internal Affairs specialists to 25 as of May 2006. Following the April 1, 2006, reorganization, National Police recruits were to finish basic training programs at the National Police Force Training Academies. Training focused on leader development and ‘‘train the trainer’’ courses to facilitate the transition to Iraqi lead in all areas. The training academy in northern Baghdad accommodated 300–500 students for six weeks of intense training in weapons qualification, urban patrolling techniques, unarmed combat apprehension, use of force, human rights and ethics in policing, introduction to Iraqi law, vehicle checkpoints, and improvised explosive device characteristics and recognition. Also effective April 1, 2006, National Police Transition Teams (NPTTs) were reassigned to MNC-I to ensure an integrated approach to command and control for the transition teams. This was meant to help ensure a more synchronized effort between Iraqi forces and operational Coalition units. NPTTs provide daily mentorship to the

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National Police forces in the field to help develop leadership, plan and execute operations, and otherwise professionalize the force, while emphasizing the importance of human rights and the rule of law. Equipment and Training The IPS was equipped with AK-47s, PKCs, Glock pistols, individual body armor, high frequency radios, small pickup trucks, midsize SUVs, and medium pickup trucks. The IPS’s logistics capabilities, especially in regard to vehicle maintenance, continued to be a concern, although progress has been made in the effective distribution and improved accountability of supplies and equipment. Forces in the nine key cities are currently approaching 80 percent of their authorized key pacing items. Deliveries, however, were even lighter than for the regular forces. Equipment deliveries for all MOI forces in the final quarter of 2005 included the following:82 • More than 10,000 AK-47 rifles, • 16,000 pistols, • 800 light and medium machine guns, • 4,000 sets of individual body armor, • 700 Kevlar helmets, and • More than 65,000 cold weather jackets.

Iraqi police training continued at the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC) and at the Baghdad Police College (BPC) while smaller regional academies complemented these training initiatives. The JIPTC accommodates around 1,500 students per class while the BPC accommodates around 1,000. The ten-week basic course covers the rule of law, human rights, and policing skills in a high-threat environment. Since the previous report, more than 20,000 police personnel have received specialized training on diverse subjects, including interrogation procedures and counterterrorism investigations. Leadership development remained on track to meet the December 2006 goal of having all required officers and NCOs trained. By July 24, 2006, 71,324 police recruits had passed through the ten-week basic course. Those recruits with prior experience attended the three-week Transitional Integration Program (TIP), in lieu of the longer program. Originally only officers trained during the Saddam regime were eligible for the TIP program, but in July it was extended to include those that lacked formal training, but had at least one year of experience on the force. In addition to the TIP program, the Officer Transitional Integration Program was designed to train officers for leadership and supervisory roles in the IPS. By August 2006, 41,051 officers had graduated from the TIP and OTIP programs. By August 2006 the CPATT had trained and equipped approximately 113,800 IPS personnel, increasing the force by 12,600 over the three months prior. Although the force was expected to reach the targeted strength of 135,000 by December 2006,

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it was expected that there would continue to be shortages in some areas and excesses in others. In an effort to ensure that MOI personnel were committed to the new regime, more than 230,000 MOI employees were screened by the Iraqi Police Screening Service. The process checked fingerprints against records of Ba’ath Party membership and Saddam-era criminal records. Of these checks there were 5,300 possible matches and 74 people were eventually dismissed. Unfortunately there was no test for checking on possible militia allegiance. In addition to the fingerprint checks, over 54,000 police candidates were tested for literacy. Of these candidates 73 percent passed and were enrolled in basic training. The IPS personnel were equipped with AK-47s, PKC light machine guns, Glock pistols, body armor, high-frequency radios, small and medium pickup trucks, and mid-sized SUVs. In Baghdad and the nine other key cities the IPS personnel were equipped at 99 percent of their authorized equipment by the end of June 2006 and were expected to be fully equipped by mid-August. Overall, however, in the 18 provinces the IPS was equipped only at a 66 percent rate by June and was not expected to be fully equipped until the end of the year.83 Dealing with Divided Loyalties Reorganization and retraining still left open the question of divided loyalties. By the spring of 2006, a recent background check by Iraqi police investigators found more than 5,000 police officers with records of crimes that included attacks on American troops. The results pointed to questions over the initial vetting process for creating the force, as well as continuing problems of quality. A 2006 internal police survey conducted northeast of Baghdad found that 75 percent of respondents did not trust the police enough to tip them off to insurgent activity. In response to these concerns, the Pentagon announced it was sending 3,000 police trainers across the country in 2006 in an attempt to remake the force and to have a competent functional force of 190,000 police officers by early 2007.84 According to U.S. Army Colonel Rob Barham, this goal was to follow on a shorter-term goal of 135,000 officers patrolling in all 18 Iraqi provinces by the end of 2006.85 Facility Construction As of spring 2006, work on the Baghdad Police College (formerly the Baghdad Public Safety Training Academy) continued. The project was 80 percent complete and was expected to be finished by July 2006. Renovations on the Al-Zab Courthouse in Kirkuk, which began in October 2005, were 52 percent complete by April, with an estimated completion date of mid-August 2006. Progress on the Nassriya correctional facility was 28 percent complete and had been hampered due to inadequate workforce levels and security concerns at the site. The facility was expected to be completed in August 2006 and was slated to have a capacity of at least 800 beds, with the possibility of an additional 400 beds.

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By April, construction was also completed on the following military facilities:86 • Camp India Base, which will support 2,500 Iraqi soldiers in the 4th Brigade of the 1st Division, • Samawah, which will support 750 Iraqi soldiers in the 2nd Brigade of the 10th Division, and • Naiad, which will support 250 Iraqi soldiers in the 1st Brigade Headquarters of the 8th Division.

Department of Border Enforcement Progress also occurred in creating an effective Border Police, a step that was hoped to help stem the infiltration of foreign fighters, smugglers, and Iranian agents. By early 2006, more than 18,500 Border Police had been trained and equipped, up by 1,500 since the last yearly quarter of 2005, but lagging the goal of 24,000 by the December 15, 2005, election. While three border force academies were operational, delays in construction at the Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) was blamed for the slow progress of bringing forces on-line. Construction had been delayed due to weather, remote location, restricted movement, and contractor delays. By May 2006, the DBE numbered approximately 21,000 trained and equipped personnel, an increase of 2,300 since February 2006. These forces were organized into 5 regions, 12 brigades, and 38 battalions. By August 2006, the DBE had 23,900 trained and equipped personnel. These personnel were organized into 5 regions, 12 brigades, 38 battalions and the staff for 258 border forts. The DBE forces were trained in three academies each with the capacity to train approximately 800 recruits at a time. Supplying the DBE and the Ports of Entry (POE) were given priority in receiving equipment and this, in addition to the cross-leveling of personnel, managed to raise most units to Level 2 readiness by August. Furthermore, of the 14 land POEs in Iraq, 13 were functional by August 2006. The DBE and POE were expected to have 28,360 trained and equipped personnel by November 2006.87 Coalition Border Transition Teams Members of the 10- to 11-man Coalition Border Transition Teams (BTTs) were trained in various specialties, including logistics and communications, and provided valuable mentorship and support for border force commanders in the areas of personnel management, intelligence, operations, budgeting equipment accountability, and maintenance. The number of BTTs was increased from 15 to more than 25 as part of the Year of the Police initiative. Three academies with a capacity of 800 students each were operational as well. Such efforts had limits. Although the lack of border control helped allow the passage of foreign fighters and supplies, many came through legal border crossings, and the insurgency was not dependent on smuggling or foreign volunteers. In fact,

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Iranian pilgrims were the most frequently intercepted trespassers. Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli stated, ‘‘There is still a lot going over the border. . .I don’t know if you can ever stop it completely.’’88 Border Forces Equipment and Training During a tour of 2 of the 258 border posts established by Coalition forces, Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli said that Iraqi border forces were getting ‘‘better and better every single day.’’ Yet, he noted that these forces needed better pay and equipment. Some forts lack radios and other standard communication equipment and a few do not have even enough gas on hand to conduct patrols.89 The border forces had a force generation and distribution plan calling for the delivery of 85 percent of the key equipment by summer 2006. Standard organization equipment includes small and medium pickup trucks; midsize SUVs, generators; and mobile, base, and handheld radios. Border forces also required personal equipment such as AK-47s, medium machine guns, and individual body armor. Three DBE academies in al-Kut, Basra, and Sulamaniyah, each with a capacity of approximately 800, were utilized for training border patrol students. Students in the Iraqi Border Patrol Basic Training Course received instruction in law enforcement, human relations, human rights, weapons qualification, combat life saving, vehicle searches, Iraqi border law, arrest and detainee procedures, and small unit patrolling. The curriculum was to be updated to include specialized instruction in first aid, communications, maintenance, and food preparation. After completing the three-week core curriculum, recruits were then tracked according to these four specialties. The DBE continued to make progress in designating standard organizations, delineating responsibilities, and developing detailed policies and procedures for land POE. As of May 2006, there were 14 land POEs, and 13 of these were functional. Making significant changes in the operation of POEs is difficult because multiple Ministries are involved. As of August 2006, the DBE and POE were equipped with AK-47s, medium machine guns, body armor, medium pickup trucks, mid-size SUVs, generators, and radios. The DBE had received 81 percent of its authorized equipment by August and was expected to be at 97 percent by the end of the month, falling short of the goal of being 100 percent equipped by this time. By the end of September the goal of being fully equipped was expected to be achieved. The POEs were expected to be fully equipped by the end of December 2006.90 Uncertain Progress in Facilities The border forces were to man 258 border forts. As of May 2006, 244 border posts and forts had been completed, an increase of 74 since February 2006. Layered security effort included border patrols by DBE units, Iraqi Army checkpoints, and Coalition forces. This progress was, however, sometimes more apparent than real. In spring 2006, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) conducted ground

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project surveys of 22 border forts located along the Iraq-Iran border. Progress on the completion of these projects was described as thus:91 At the time of the ground survey, 17 were complete or near complete and functional. However, only 7 of the 17 border forts had perimeter security systems, gates, berms, or walls installed. Concrete quality was sometimes poor, and inconsistent surfaces in concrete and plaster finishing were common in the buildings and other structures. Numerous sites lacked retaining walls to prevent degradation of the embankments created by site leveling. Based on discussions with local personnel at the border forts at the time of the site visits, SIGIR found that the day-to-day users—the border police—were unaware of a plan for maintenance and logistical support for the border posts, and received little if any training in maintaining the generator and septic systems. Logistical needs, such as fuel and water delivery, were lacking at some border posts. The generators lacked protection from drifting snow, and some outdoor electrical fixtures lacked proper insulation against rainwater. SIGIR requested copies of contract documents for the remaining five border forts included in our surveys; however, the MNSTC-I was unable to identify or locate the contract(s) for these projects. As a result, SIGIR was unable to determine the project objectives, SOW [Statement of Work], or design specifications. All five of these border forts were of poor quality construction and showed no signs of any recent maintenance. Although small generators were located at the five border forts, fuel storage was not available. Electrical and water systems were consistently either inoperable or needed repair.

Other Developments in Border Enforcement On May 27, 2006, on the second day of his visit to Iraq, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said that Iran and Iraq had agreed to form a joint commission to oversee border issues and that its primary task would be to ‘‘block saboteurs’’ from crossing the 700-mile border. Mottaki went on to say that improved border controls would be part of a wider effort to build close ties between the countries, including $1 billion in Iranian economic assistance to Shi’ite and Kurdish areas of Iraq.92

Facilities Protection Forces, Private Security Personnel, and ‘‘Ministry Armies’’ Iraq and the MNF-I also had problems with a wide range of lighter forces, many of which were corrupt, ineffective, and had elements that either supported the insurgency or rogue Shi’ite operations. The Facilities Protection Services L. Paul Bremer, former head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), established the Facilities Protection Service (FPS) in September 2003 to free American troops from guarding Iraqi government property and to prevent the kind of looting that erupted with the entry of U.S. forces and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

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Bremer’s order put the FPS under the command and pay of the Ministries they protected, not of the Interior and Defense Ministries, which handle the rest of Iraq’s security forces. The order also allowed private security firms to handle the contracting of FPS guards for the Ministries.93 U.S. and Interior Ministry officials increasingly described the FPS units as militias that answer only to the Ministry or private security firm that employs it. U.S. officials have acknowledged that they have no more control over the FPS than the Interior Ministry does. ‘‘Negative. None. Zero,’’ said Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Negard, a spokesman for the U.S. training of Iraqi forces. Even Interior Ministry Bayan Jabr said in April 2006 that the FPS was ‘‘out of control.’’94 In April 2006, Interior Minister Byan Jabr accused the FPS of carrying out some of the killings largely attributed to death squads operating within MOI forces.95 That same month, oversight of expansion and training of these forces raised further uncertainty. An Inspector General was assigned to audit the $147-million U.S.–overseen FPS program. The report reflected a lack of transparency:96 . . .the auditors were never able to determine basic facts like how many Iraqis were trained, how many weapons were purchased and where much of the equipment ended up. Of 21,000 guards who were supposed to be trained to protect oil equipment, for example, probably only about 11,000 received the training, the report said. And of 9,792 automatic rifles purchased for those guards, auditors were able to track just 3,015.

On May 14, 2006, Ellen Knickmeyer reported in the Washington Post that Iraq’s Interior Ministry had begun negotiations to bring central authority to the FPS, a unit of 4,000 building guards that U.S. officials say has become the new government’s largest paramilitary force, with 145,000 armed men and no central command, oversight, or paymaster. On May 6, 2006, the private security companies that employ the FPS members agreed to several Interior Ministry proposals intended to bring some measure of central control and oversight to the paramilitary units. The Ministry will issue badges and distinctive seals for FPS vehicles and supervise FPS weapons. Agents of the security companies and the Ministry clarified that FPS members were liable for prosecution for any crimes. The security companies also agreed to bring the FPS under Ministry supervision, but General Raad al-Tamimi of the Interior Ministry did not disclose any details.97 The Infrastructure Protection Forces and Other Non-MOD/MOI Paramilitary Elements The various infrastructure protection forces were placed under the MOD, but were much lower quality forces than the regular military, the MOI security forces, and many of the police. In many cases, they were corrupt, subject to insurgent penetration, and tied to various sects, ethnic groups, and tribes.

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While Prime Minister Maliki referred to such forces as having some 150,000 men in May 2006, many were phantom employees, deserters, or virtually inactive. Such units also often sold their uniforms, weapons, and equipment. They also generally reported in de facto terms to another Ministry, even when they were formally under the control of the Ministry of Defense. The two key entities responsible for the security of Iraq’s oil infrastructure in spring 2006 were the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs) and the Oil Protection Force (OPF). The electric infrastructure is protected by the Electric Power Security Service. • The SIBs fielded more than 3,400 trained personnel to guard Iraq’s critical oil infrastructure, particularly the vast network of pipelines, as of April. • The OPF, managed by the Ministry of Oil, was responsible for guarding all other Iraqi oil industry assets and facilities.

As reported by SIGIR’s April 2006 Report to Congress, the government formed the SIBs to improve infrastructure security. The SIBs were part of the Ministry of Defense, and four SIBs had completed basic training at the time of the report. They were currently conducting security operations to protect oil pipelines and facilities critical to the domestic market and export industry. MNSTC-I equipped the SIBs and helped the Ministry of Defense develop institutional expertise and tradecraft. Developments reported by SIGIR included the following: More than 3,400 soldiers have completed training in this area, and training for a second group has already begun. Attacks on Iraq’s infrastructure account for only a small portion of total attacks. According to DoD, attacks on infrastructure during this quarter are down by 60%. But, combined with other variables, attacks on critical infrastructure are still expected to have a significant impact on: – oil and fuel production – revenues derived from crude exports Additionally, although the number of infrastructure attacks has recently decreased, the complexity of the attacks has increased: insurgents have become more proficient at targeting critical infrastructure nodes, as well as intimidating personnel who deliver essential services.

These forces had serious problems, however, and were generally ineffective and could not be trusted. In early March 2006, DOD reported that Iraqi police had arrested several SIB guards on suspicion of aiding insurgents in targeting the oil pipeline system. This was the second recent incident in which SIB personnel were arrested in connection with insurgent plots against the oil pipeline infrastructure.98 The Oil Ministry, for example, maintained about 20,000 troops to protect refineries and other parts of the country’s oil infrastructure. Another example was the Facilities Protection Service, established in 2003 as a 4,000-man force charged with protecting crucial parts of Iraqi utilities, such as power plants and oil refineries.

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Between August 2004 and January 2005, that force expanded 15-fold to 60,000 personnel. A contributing factor to the expansion of the force was the U.S. need to free up U.S. troops for combat. Still, some cautioned that the expansion created only another competing militia, whose troops’ loyalties were only with the Ministry that paid them. Intelligence Iraqi intelligence was still in development at the military and civilian levels in mid2006. Some independent units were emerging, but most operations were under de facto Coalition tutelage or control. IRAQ’S CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES Iraq faces many strategic challenges, the most serious of which is the risk of division or civil war. Since 2003, the nation has been dealing with many forces that are pulling it apart. The discussion of stability in Iraq has largely focused on the insurgency and the insurgents’ ability to inflict death and destruction, but the violence is just one element of the puzzle—albeit an important element. Iraq is already in a state of civil war and risks break up, far more serious ethnic and sectarian conflict, or violent paralysis. Iraq needs to forge a lasting political compromise among its key factions—Arab-Shi’ites, Arab Sunnis, and Kurds—while protecting other minorities. Political conciliation must also address such critical issues as federalism and the relative powers of the central and regional governments, the role of religion in politics and law, control over petroleum resources and export revenues, the definition of human rights, and a host of other issues. Iraq must establish both effective governance and a rule of law; not simply deploy effective military, security, and police forces. Legitimacy does not consist of how governments are chosen, but in how well they serve the day-to-day needs of their peoples. Security cannot come through force alone. It must have the checks and balances that can come only when governments and courts are active in the field. Over time, Iraq must also address its economic and demographic challenges. A nation cannot convert from a corrupt, state-controlled ‘‘command kleptocracy’’ in mid-war. It cannot survive unless it makes such a conversion over time and puts an end to a hopelessly skewed and unfair distribution of income, ends full and partial unemployment levels of 30 to 60 percent, and becomes competitive on a regional and a global level. The Growing Level of Violence in Iraq It is not easy to put the level of conflict in Iraq in perspective, and the numbers and trends can easily change radically in the future. No reliable estimates exist of how many Iraqis are killed because many simply disappear, and there is nothing approaching an accurate estimate of wounded. All of the attack counts issued by

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the Iraqi government and MNF-I are extremely uncertain because many low-level attacks or individual attacks on individuals are never counted, and intimidation and forced moves are not counted. There is no way to separate murders, kidnappings, and violent crimes from insurgent actions and ethnic and sectarian violence. The kind of pressures that have led to more than 130,000 Iraqis (22,977 families) being displaced since the February 22, 2006, bombing of the Mosque in Samarra are largely unreflected in ‘‘attack’’ counts. Furthermore, efforts to count attacks have a heavy bias toward counting insurgent attacks in Baghdad and the three other provinces where Sunni insurgents are more active. Counts of Kurdish-Arab violence are very uncertain—which has a major impact on the numbers reported in Kirkuk and Mosul. So is intra-Sunni violence in the ‘‘Sunni triangle’’ and intra-Shi’ite violence, particularly in Basra. The Department of Defense does regularly issue numbers that at least have some value in indicating the rough intensity of the fighting. These numbers do differ in definition over time, which makes trend analysis difficult. It is also important to note that the number of attacks says nothing about the intensity of the attacks or the casualties that result. Some incidents are far more important than others. Given all these caveats, the data in the Department of Defense quarterly report issued on August 31, 2006, showed the following:99 • There had been a massive increase in the Sunni vs. Shi’ite sectarian violence that could trigger an all-out civil war, divide the country, and effectively force the United States to withdraw. Casualties from ‘‘Sectarian incidents’’ rose from less than 200 per month during May 2005 to January 2006, to some 1,200 in February, and averaged around 2,200 per month from March through September. Given the fact that such totals seriously undercount total ethnic and sectarian violence, this more than tenfold increase is a serious warning of the possibility of civil war. • U.S. reporting indicated that the number of significant attacks per week totaled around 470 per week during the period before the Constitution was signed (February–August 2005) and have risen steadily ever since. They averaged around 540 during the referendum and election period (29-8-05 to 10-2-06), rose to 625 per week during the transition to the new government (11-2-06 to 19-5-06), and reached about 790 per week during the period of government operation (20-5-06 to 11-8-06). • This was a rise of some 70 percent during the period during which a new Constitution and new government were supposed to bring stability. These attacks concentrated more and more on Iraqi targets and Iraqi civilians, particularly in the Baghdad area—which is the only area where counts of attacks on civilians have anything approaching minimal accuracy. The percentage of attacks on civilians in the Baghdad area rose from 15 percent in April to 22 percent in June, but such counts and percentages are so uncertain that they have limited value. • The United States reported that almost all attacks were concentrated in four provinces—Anbar, Baghdad, Salah ad Din, and Diyala—with only 37 percent of Iraq’s population. For example, this included 81 percent of U.S.–reported attacks during May 20 to August 4, 2006. The problem is that such counts focus heavily on the insurgency and reflect a systematic undercount of ethnic violence, intra-Shi’ite attacks,

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and attacks outside urban areas where the United States has at least limited confidence in its sources. It simply is not clear what such claims mean. • There was no correlation between the increase in the number of attacks during these periods and U.S. casualties. U.S. casualties actually dropped during the peak periods from April 1, 2004 to November 28, 2004, when they averaged some 22–24 per day. Since that time, they have consistently remained under 20 per day. The United States also has reported steady increases in improvised explosive device (IED) attacks that have not led to anything approaching proportionate increases in U.S. casualties. • In contrast, Iraqi government, security, and civilian casualties per day had risen very sharply. These totaled less than 40 per day until the election period began on November 27, 2004. They rose to 45 per day during the election period (27-11-04 to 11-2-05). They rose to around 50 per day during the period before the Constitution was signed (11-2-05 to 28-8-05). They averaged around 48 per day during the referendum and election period (29-8-05 to 10-2-06), rose to 81 per day during the transition to the new government (11-2-06 to 19-5-06), and reached about 118 per day during the period of government operation (20-5-06 to 11-8-06). This is a roughly threefold increase.

The number of attacks on Iraqi infrastructure had steadily gone down, but Iraqi oil facilities and exports continued to experience serious problems, and much of the economic aid effort has been paralyzed or had to be limited to ‘‘secure areas.’’ Infrastructure attacks averaged around 13 per week during April 1, 2004 to June 28, 2004. They dropped to 10 per week during June 29, 2004 to November 26, 2004. They dropped to 5 per week during the election period (November 27, 2004 to February 11, 2005), were 5 per week during the period before the Constitution was signed (February 11, 2005 to August 28, 2005. They dropped to 4 per week during the referendum and election period (August 29, 2005 to February 10, 2006), to 2 per week during the transition to the new government (February 11, 2006 to May 19, 2006), and to 1 per week during the period of government operation (May 20, 2006 to August 11, 2006). In practical terms, however, all aid and economic activity became steadily more dangerous in spite of this drop in attack numbers. Water and electric power distribution continued to present major problems, and oil exports stayed below 1.7 million barrels a day.100 The Dangers of Strategic Uncertainty Iraq’s success or failure in forging political consensus, creating an effective new government, and creating effective security forces will have a major impact on the Gulf and the world. Iraq is a nation with a complex history, which presides in the most strategically important region in the world. In an era when asymmetric warfare and terrorism is threatening international security, energy security, and the threat of a ‘‘clash of civilizations,’’ the future of Iraq will have large implications on regional stability and global security. Predicting these implications, however, is equally a useless exercise of imagination.

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Many have attempted to predict the future outcome of Iraq, wanted to preempt it through dividing Iraq into three states, or recommended an immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Iraq. In order, however, to understand Iraq and the prospect of stability in the foreseeable future, one must understand the forces at play and the strategic challenges facing Iraq in the short- to medium-term. The following issues must be dealt with in order to ensure that Iraq does not become involved in a major civil war and is stable in the coming years: • Conciliation versus civil war: Sectarian violence has been the driving force behind the risk of igniting a civil war among Iraq’s key factions. Most of the violence has been directed by neo-Salafist elements led by Al Qa’ida against Shi’ites. Iraq’s political leaders have urged calm in the face of violence, but emotions run high particularly when the violence is directed against religious gatherings and/or shrines. Shi’ite militia groups such as the Al-Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigade have also been accused of carrying out ‘‘revenge’’ killings against Sunnis. The most dangerous claims have been of the infiltration of Shi’ite militia leaders either at the political level in the Ministry of Interior or at the soldier level in Iraq’s security forces. Finally, the Kurdish question may have not spurred the same level of violence that the Sunni-Shi’ite tensions have, but it is all too clear that any attempt by the Kurds to demand autonomy will be met by resistance by both the Sunnis and the Shi’ites and can lead to further violence and enhance the threat of fragmentation in Iraq. • Defeating the insurgency and ethnic and sectarian violence: Characterizing the Iraqi insurgency or defining its composition is not easy. Violence in Iraq has steadily increased on ethnic and sectarian levels. Most estimates, however, show that the insurgency is largely fueled by Sunnis who are dissatisfied with losing power, the Shi’ites control of the government, the occupation by U.S. forces, and with the overall economic and political situation in Iraq. In addition, there are other elements in the insurgency—particularly those led by Al Qa’ida in Iraq—that have attacked and urged more attacks against Shi’ites’ holy sites, civilians, and political leaders. Finally, there are the former regime elements that are largely driven by loss of power and an aim for the return of the Ba’ath regime to power. These threats are compounded by a mix of Shi’ite and Kurdish militias and by a wide range of local Sunni, Shi’ite, and Kurdish forces growing out of the sectarian and ethnic fighting. All of these forces and movements must either be defeated or brought into the Iraqi political process on a peaceful basis if the nation is to become stable and secure. • Creating effective internal security and armed forces: For immediate tactical or strategic success against the insurgency, the United States must continue to build Iraq’s internal security, paramilitary, and military forces. The focus, however, must be on quality and not quantity. In addition to the usual criteria for ensuring force effectiveness, Iraqi security forces have suffered from the threat of infiltration by both Sunni insurgents as well as Shi’ite militias. This has driven many Iraqis, particularly Sunnis, to mistrust Iraq’s security forces and has been a contentious point at the political as well as at the tactical level across sectarian lines. Loyalty cannot be ensured in the best-trained forces, but abuses by Ministry of Interior forces of Sunnis go to the heart of the chance of building force cohesion. In addition, Iraqi security and armed forces have suffered from direct attacks by insurgent groups. Force protection is still a

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problem for many of the Iraqi units, and it may take time before they are able to act interdependently. • Relations with neighboring states: As noted earlier, Iraq fought two major wars with its neighbors, Iran and Kuwait, and has had hostile relations with two other Gulf States, Jordan and Syria. Since the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iraqis as well as Coalition officials have accused Iraq’s neighboring states of interfering in Iraq’s internal affairs. In the case of Iran, it has been accused of supporting Shi’ite militias as well as elements of the insurgency that are fighting against U.S. forces. This has prompted regional officials to accuse Iran of wanting to remake the new Iraq in its own image—a Shi’ite Islamic Republic. This has also forced many Sunnis to accuse Iraqi Shi’ites of working for Iran. However, in the case of Syria, U.S. and Iraqi officials have accused the Syrian government of facilitating the travel of foreign fighters into Iraq. Most of these fighters have joined neo-Salafist groups, namely, Al Qa’ida in Iraq, and have been accused of being behind most of the ‘‘spectacular’’ suicide bombings. • Establishing viable political institutions: Since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the political divisions have been drawn across sectarian lines. These divisions have delayed writing key provisions of the Constitution, particularly the role of religion, federalism, and the division of oil revenues. In addition, Sunnis boycotted the first election because they felt underrepresented, which resulted in a win to a religious Shi’ite and nationalist Kurdish groups to score major wins. While Sunnis voted in larger numbers in the proceeding two elections, the challenge for Iraq is not in holding elections, but in establishing sustainable political institutions that transcend sectarian divisions. This includes removing the sense of sectarian favoritism in key Ministries such as the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Oil. In addition, it means establishing an independent judicial system that is seen fair by all factions. Furthermore, with time, it requires nurturing a culture of citizen participation that is not based on ethnicity, but rather on political ideology that is based on what is best for the citizens of Iraq. Iraq, however, is far from that point, and the political challenge is as important to the future of Iraq as is any counterinsurgency strategy. • Building Iraq’s economy: Another important factor that is central to securing Iraq’s future is the challenge the Iraqi government is facing in building a free-market economy. Due to the importance of oil revenues to Iraq’s economy and the overcentralization policies of Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iraq has never had a viable private sector and has never had a real stable currency. Iraq has always dealt with unemployment and underemployment, but the impact of 12 years of economic sanctions and the mismanagement of the reconstruction and aid efforts by the United States have left a large fraction of the Iraqi population unemployed. Perhaps the most prominent among these groups are those who were employed by Iraq’s armed forces, who were fired due to the CPA’s de-Ba’athification efforts. There are also discrepancies in the levels of development across different regions of Iraq. Under Saddam Hussein, the Sunni area witnessed large investments in infrastructure, while the Kurdish and Shi’ite areas saw minimum investments. The Kurdish region, however, has benefited from the semiautonomy it enjoyed during the 1990s and experienced an inflow of investment and economic development. Following the invasion, due to the relative calmness of the southern and northern regions of Iraq, Shi’ite and Kurdish regions have seen more benefit from Iraq’s reconstruction compared to the Sunni regions—albeit on a low scale.

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• Upgrading Iraq’s energy infrastructure: Realistically speaking, no economic development or reform of Iraq can be complete without a large investment and upgrade in Iraq’s oil sector. Iraq has suffered from the lack of any meaningful investment since the early 1980s due to mismanagement by the regime, political uncertainties, security risks, and economic sanctions. Iraq’s oil fields are using technologies that are outdated, its oil workers have not been trained in industry best practices, and its downstream and upstream management as well as production facilities are worn out. U.S. reconstruction efforts have only begun to address these problems. Iraq’s economy will likely continue to depend on its oil revenues, but its production capacity has not kept up either with regional standards or with Iraq’s economic and fiscal needs. For the Iraqi government or the Coalition to have any success in dealing with Iraq’s economic development problems, these problems in its energy sector must be dealt with.

As this list makes all too clear, Iraq’s future largely depends on the Iraqi government’s ability to deal with the sectarian divisions, ensure the nation’s sovereignty, and ensure Iraq’s long-term stability. None of this, however, is possible without sound economic, political, and security policies that aim at dealing with the totality of Iraq’s strategic challenges.

Socioeconomic Challenges Iraq has a long history of economic stagnation despite its vast oil resources. The high oil revenues following the 1970s boom were mismanaged and directed toward defense spending by Saddam Hussein. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq’s military expenditures reached nearly half of its GNP. According to the U.S. Department of State, Iraq’s defense spending as a percentage of GNP was 41.2 percent in 1985, 54.8 percent in 1986, 54.5 percent in 1987, 57.5 percent in 1988, 41.1 percent in 1989, 61.3 percent in 1990, 12.5 percent in 1991, and approximately 4.9– 9.7 percent throughout the rest of the 1990s.101 In the years before the U.S. invasion in 2003, Iraq was estimated to have spent 10 percent of its GNP on defense.102 Iraq’s high levels of defense spending diverted much needed investment from social and economic development programs, which have suffered for many years from underinvestment. High defense spending is only one of the reasons behind Iraq’s economic stagnation. Iraq’s economy has also suffered from many years of fiscal mismanagement, oil crashes, economic sanctions, and two major wars, not to mention the U.S. invasion and the subsequent instability and security. The importance of dealing with these economic challenges, however, goes beyond their economic values. The insurgency in Iraq is partially fueled by the dissatisfaction of the Iraqi population—particularly in the Sunni areas. In addition, it is all too clear that communities that are well-off economically would not risk joining the insurgency since they have a lot to lose. On the other hand, insurgent groups—of all stripes—recruit from unemployed Iraqis who do not see any hope for the future, and who blame the lack of economic and job opportunities on the Iraqi government

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and the U.S. occupation forces and on the failure of the postconflict reconstruction efforts. Going forward, to understand the economic challenge Iraq faces, the following are the key areas that the Iraqi government must deal with in order to ensure economic growth and sustainable development: • High unemployment rates: The CIA estimates that Iraq’s unemployment rate is around 25–30 percent.103 This estimate, however, is not based on a survey but rather on a ‘‘guesstimate.’’ In fact, no one really knows the actual Iraqi labor force, and there are no meaningful ways to conduct accurate surveys of the labor force, given the security situation in Iraq. What is clear, however, is that estimates of how large the unemployment differ, but at least a third of Iraq’s labor force is considered unemployed and some estimate it as high as 60 percent. Regardless of the exact number, a large number of Iraqis are unemployed, and the Iraqi government must find ways to stimulate the labor market, provide job opportunities for its youth, and must deal with its former military personnel who were let go by the de-Bathification campaign. There are no simple ways to deal with it, and Iraq is not alone in the Middle East in suffering from high unemployment, but the Iraqi government has little choice but to find a meaningful and practical solution. • Reliance on oil revenues and the public sector: Part of the problem Iraq faces in creating employment opportunities is the lack of a vibrant private sector. Historically the number one employer in Iraq was the government, which heavily relied on oil revenues, which are estimated to be 95 percent of its export earnings. In addition, the government does not have any meaningful way to impose, reinforce, or collect tax revenues. Due to the volatility of the global oil market and the uncertainty regarding Iraq’s oil production levels, Iraq’s economic development has been inconsistent. The government must find alternatives to oil and must diversify its sources of revenues. But there is no replacement to a vibrant private sector that empowers the population and that acts as a natural distributor of wealth. • Budgetary transparencies: Most of the Gulf States and, for that matter, most of the developing world suffer from a lack of transparency in their budgetary processes. This has encouraged corruption or, at the very least, the perception thereof. Many Iraqi officials have complained about the plague of corruption in Iraq. The scrutiny has focused on many agencies in Iraq, but particularly on the Ministry of Oil. Part of instilling confidence in the government is reassuring the public that oil revenues are not misused and stolen. Once again, there are no easy answers to this problem, but an honest effort has to be made to provide reporting and to give the Iraqi Parliament the oversight of the use of the money. • Establishing a stable currency: The Iraqi Dinar has been volatile for decades. The sanctions caused a major devaluation of the currency, and ongoing inflationary pressures as well as massive current account deficits have caused the dinar’s future to be cloaked with uncertainty. This may be a minor problem in the short-term, but recent history is full of examples when minor inflations and currency devaluation have caused major economic meltdowns. A policy of repatriating Iraqi capital from the West, paying down foreign debt, inviting foreign investment, and curbing down inflationary

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tendencies can help to stop further currency crashes and to improve the standard of living in Iraq.

These economic challenges are compounded by other social demographic problems. As is the case with its other Gulf neighbors, Iraq faces a youth explosion. As Figure 9.11 shows, approximately 40 percent of Iraq’s population is under the age of 14, and more than half (52 percent) are under the age of 20. In addition, the figure shows that approximately 45 percent of Iraq’s population is of working age. This distribution does not show the problem Iraq faces in its labor market, but it shows the difficulty it will face in the foreseeable future. According to UN population estimates, Iraq has experienced major population growth since the 1950s. Iraq’s population was estimated to be 5.34 million in 1950, 7.33 million in 1960, 10.11 million in 1970, 14.09 million in 1980, 18.52 million in 1990, 25.08 million in 2000, and 28.81 million in 2005. The same trends are also expected to continue. The UN projects Iraq’s population to grow to 32.53 million in 2010, 40.52 million in 2020, 48.80 million in 2030, 56.69 million in 2040, and 63.69 million in 2050.104 The insurgents have continued to be successful in attacking the Iraqi economy and the Coalition aid effort, as well as human targets. They have often paralyzed aid efforts, particularly in Sunni or mixed areas where such efforts might win over current or potential insurgents. They have forced a massive reprogramming of aid into short-term, security-oriented activity, and well over 20 percent of aid spending now goes simply to providing security for aid activity. The attacks have done much to discourage or reduce investment and development even in the more secure governorates and have blocked or sharply limited efforts to renovate and improve Iraq’s infrastructure. They have largely prevented efforts to expand Iraq’s oil exports—its key source of government earnings.

Figure 9.11 Iraq’s Demographic Distribution, 2006

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Insurgents carried out more than 300 attacks on Iraqi oil facilities between March 2003 and January 2006. An estimate by Robert Mullen indicates that there were close to 500 and perhaps as many as 600–700. His breakdown of the number of attacks was as follows: pipelines, 398; refineries, 36; oil wells, 18; tanker trucks, 30; oil train, 1; storage tanks 4; tank farm, 1. In addition, there were at least 64 incidents in which the victims were related to Iraq’s petroleum sector, ranging from highranking persons in the Oil Ministry to oil workers at refineries, pipelines, and elsewhere in the sector, to contract, military, police, and tribal security people. The number killed in these directed attacks reached at least 100.105 The Department of Defense has since reported that a significant cut in attacks on infrastructure and oil facilities took place during February–May 2006, but past damage now combines with the steady deterioration of oil field production and distribution facilities, ongoing problems in security, and corruption and theft to have a major impact. Oil production dropped by 8 percent in 2005, and pipeline shipments through the Iraqi northern pipeline to Ceyan in Turkey dropped from 800,000 barrels per day before the war to an average of 40,000 barrels per day in 2005. In July 2005, Iraqi officials estimated that insurgent attacks had already cost Iraq some $11 billion. They had kept Iraqi oil production from approaching the 2005 3-million-barrel-aday goal that the Coalition had set after the fall of Saddam Hussein, and production had dropped from prewar levels of around 2.5 million barrels a day to an average of 1.83 million barrels a day in 2005, and a level of only 1.57 million barrels a day in December 2005.106 The impact of insurgent attacks has been compounded by the ability of insurgents —and Iraqi officials and civilians—to steal oil and fuel. The New York Times has quoted Ali Allawi, Iraq’s Finance Minister, as estimating that insurgents were taking some 40 to 50 percent of all oil-smuggling profits in the country and had infiltrated senior management positions at the major northern refinery in Baji: ‘‘It’s gone beyond Nigeria levels now where it really threatens national security. . .The insurgents are involved at all levels.’’ The Times also quoted an unidentified U.S. official as saying, ‘‘It’s clear that corruption funds the insurgency, so there you have a very real threat to the new state. . .Corruption really has the potential of undercutting the growth potential here.’’ The former Oil Minister, Ibrahim Bahr al-Ulum, had said earlier in 2005, ‘‘oil and fuel smuggling networks have grown into a dangerous mafia threatening the lives of those in charge of fighting corruption.’’107 For the quarter ending August 2006, the average number of weekly attacks, including attacks against Coalition forces, the ISF, the civilian population, and infrastructure, had increased 15 percent from the previous period. July 2006 achieved the highest weekly attack levels to that point. The majority (63 percent) of these attacks were directed against Coalition forces. Most attacks against Coalition forces did not involve close engagement, but rather consisted of IEDs, small arms fire, and indirect fire weapons. Despite attracting fewer attacks, the ISF and Iraqi civilians suffered the majority of casualties. Iraqi casualties increased by 51 percent over the previous quarters.108

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A September 11, 2006, GAO report noted the effect that increasing violence, insecurity, and instability continued to have on Iraqi energy production: • Iraq’s oil production stayed under target levels: during the August 16–22 week, Iraq produced 2.17 million barrels per day, while the Oil Ministry’s goal was 2.5 million barrels (the prewar level was about 2.6 million barrels per day). • Over the same time period, electricity availability averaged around 5.9 hours per day in Baghdad and 10.7 hours nationwide. Electricity output for the week was about 9 percent above the same period in 2005. Major electrical transmission lines have been repeatedly sabotaged. • Major oil pipelines continue to be sabotaged, shutting down exports. The focus of the U.S. response is to strengthen the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions.109

An Aging Energy Sector Iraqi oil fields have been damaged from overproduction and water encroachment at various times ever since the Iran-Iraq War. This was initially believed to be relatively simple to fix. Stemming Iraq’s waterflood problems could increase production by anywhere from 20 to 50 percent, and improved oil recovery techniques and enhanced oil recovery (EOR) methods have the ability to increase recoveries a further 10–15 percent beyond those due to waterflood. Using a conservative estimate of a 10–15-percent increase from waterflood recovery and a 1–6-percent increase from EOR methods, Iraq would still incur a total rise of 50 to 70 billion barrels of recoverable reserves.110 The UN found that Saddam Hussein demanded high production at a time that UN economic sanctions precluded Iraq from acquiring the sophisticated computermodeling equipment and technology required to manage older reservoirs properly. Oil experts working for the UN estimated that some reservoirs in southern Iraq ‘‘may only have ultimate recoveries of between 15 percent and 25 percent of the total oil’’ in the field, as compared with an industry norm of 35 to 60 percent. The New York Times reported the following views of three oil exports about the progress in Iraq’s oil industry and the uncertainty it is facing:111 • Maury Vasilev, Senior Vice President of PetroAlliance Services, a Russian oil-field company that held discussions with Iraq’s Oil Ministry in 2000, concluded that ‘‘Kirkuk was of particular concern and particular urgency because of the water content in the wells. . .there was a question of how much oil they could recover.’’ • Fadhil Chalabi, a former top Iraqi oil official, claimed in the summer of 2003 that Kirkuk’s expected recovery rate had dropped from 30 percent to 15 percent. The Times also quoted an unnamed American oil executive as saying in November 2003 that Iraqi engineers told him that they were now expecting recovery rates of 9 percent in Kirkuk and 12 percent in Rumaila without more advanced technology. • Issam al-Chalabi, Iraq’s former Oil Minister, stated in November 2003, ‘‘We are losing a lot of oil. . .[It] is the consensus of all the petroleum engineers involved in the Iraqi

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industry that maximizing oil production may be detrimental to the reservoirs.’’ An earlier United Nations report on the Kirkuk field issued in 2000 warned of ‘‘the possibility of irreversible damage to the reservoir of this supergiant field is now imminent.’’

The United States ignored these issues in its initial approach to nation building and failed to address them properly after the official end of major combat in Iraq in May 2003. According to the New York Times, senior Bush administration officials learned in September 2002, from the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group (EIPG), that Iraq was reinjecting crude oil to maintain pressure in the Kirkuk field. The EIPG was ‘‘unequivocal that that practice had to stop and right away.’’ In October 2003, however, Iraq was still reinjecting 0.150 to 0.250 MMBD, down from as much as 0.4 MMBD, and this continued through 2005 due to poor planning and a lack of adequate funding.112 In addition, the energy planning task force avoided the issue of reservoir development for political reasons, which included efforts to avoid accusations that the United States planned to steal Iraq’s oil, and also because the group had awarded a no-bid contract for fixing Iraq’s oil infrastructure to Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR), a unit of Halliburton, which had an existing Pentagon contract related to war planning and was previously run by Vice President Dick Cheney. It did so, without soliciting bids, making any reserve or reservoir development more controversial.113 The historical turbulence that has plagued the Iraqi oil industry was described by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) as follows:114 Historically, Iraqi production peaked in December 1979 at 3.7 million bbl/d, and then in July 1990, just prior to its invasion of Kuwait, at 3.5 million bbl/d. From 1991, when production crashed due to war, Iraqi oil output increased slowly, to 600,000 bbl/d in 1996. With Iraq’s acceptance in late 1996 of U.N. Resolution 986, which allowed limited Iraqi oil exports in exchange for food and other supplies (‘‘oil-for-food’’), the country’s oil output began increasing more rapidly, to 1.2 million bbl/d in 1997, 2.2 million bbl/d in 1998, and around 2.5 million bbl/d during 1999–2001. Iraqi monthly oil output increased in the last few months of 2002 and into early 2003, peaking at around 2.58 million bbl/d in January 2003, just before the war.. . . Throughout most of the 1990s, Iraq did not generally have access to the latest, stateof-the-art oil industry technology (3D seismic, directional or deep drilling, gas injection, etc.), sufficient spare parts, and investment. Instead, Iraq reportedly utilized substandard engineering techniques (i.e., overpumping), obsolete technology, and systems in various states of decay in order to sustain production. In the long run, reversal of all these practices and utilization of the most modern techniques, combined with development of both discovered fields as well as new ones, could result in Iraq’s oil output increasing by several million barrels per day. In spite of the fact that little damage was done to Iraq’s oil fields during the war itself, looting and sabotage after the war ended was highly destructive, accounting for perhaps 80 percent of total damage. Starting in mid-May 2003, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers—which had the lead in restoring Iraq’s oil output to pre-war levels—began a major effort to ramp up production in the country. On April 22, 2003, the first oil production since the start of the war began at the Rumaila field, with the restart of an important gas/

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oil separation plant (GOSP). As of November 2005 Iraq’s Qarmat Ali water injection facility reportedly was operating at only 70 percent of capacity, holding back production from Rumaila and other southern oil fields.

This uncertainty has not subsided following the United States handing sovereignty to the Iraqis, the writing of the Constitution, or the election of a new Iraqi government. The debate and the language of the Constitution may have exacerbated the divisions between Iraq’s religious and ethnic factions. Articles 108–111 of the Constitution addressed the Iraqi oil sector, but it left many important details uncertain, such as the control of oil reserves, the distribution of oil revenues, and the future of the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC). The United States and the interim Iraqi government have given a high priority to restoring Iraqi oil production and exports since the end of the Iraqi War. As of November 2003, Iraq’s Oil Ministry began to call for production levels to rise to 3.0 MMBD in 2004. The United States committed some $2.5 billion in aid to Iraqi oil field repair in fiscal year 2004 (FY2004) funds in 2003 through a contract awarded to KBR. The Congress appropriated another $1.701 billion in FY2004 aid funds in late 2003. By late March 2004, crude oil production was averaging around 2.4 MMBD and exports around 1.5 MMBD, almost reaching the prewar high of 2.67 MMBD.115 Both offshore oil export terminals were functioning, and Iraq’s pipeline through Turkey to the port of Ceyhan had been restored to limited production.116 However, an increasingly violent and destabilizing low-intensity conflict in the reconstruction period has caused oil production to fall. In 2005, production averaged only 1.9 MMBD.117 The EIA highlighted that the uncertainty surrounding the future of Iraq’s oil production capacity did not decrease after the handing over of sovereignty in June 2004, the writing of the Constitution in October 2005, or the election of a new government in December 2005. The EIA Country Analysis Brief: Iraq stated, ‘‘As of December 2005, Iraqi production (net of reinjection) was averaging around 1.9 [MMBD], with ‘gross’ production (including reinjection, water cut, and ‘unaccounted for’ oil due in part to problems with metering) of about 2.1 [MMBD]. Most analysts believe that there will be no major additions to Iraqi production capacity for at least 2–3 years, with Shell’s Vice President recently stating that any auction of Iraq’s oilfields was unlikely before 2007.’’118 The war in Iraq continues, along with sabotage and looting. There is also much more to be done than simply restore prewar production. Interim Iraqi Oil Minister Ibrahim Mohammed Bahr al-Uloum warned in November 2003 that it might cost $50 billion to reach production levels of 5.0 MMBD and to compensate for years of underinvestment and cannibalization. He noted this would also require a peaceful environment and several years of intensive work and investment.119 That same month, Edward C. Chow, a former Chevron executive and visiting scholar with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, estimated that it would cost $20 billion to restore Iraqi production to prewar levels.120

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In addition, the United States and the Iraqi Governing Council found that the cumulative impact of past mismanagement, the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, sanctions, fighting and looting in 2003, and the post–Iraq War insurgency will require billions of dollars in U.S. aid, although estimates of the ultimate cost of fully modernizing Iraq’s oil facilities, fixing past neglect, and dealing with reservoir problems are constantly being raised due to inefficient spending and the arising of unforeseen problems. Furthermore, funds initially appropriated by the United States to aid the Iraqi oil sector have been diverted to security efforts, as the violence has increased and the need for basic infrastructure outside the oil sector has proven to be more expensive than originally estimated. Stuart Bowen, U.S. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, noted in a September 2005 presentation to the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee that $5 billion that had initially been assigned to the infrastructure reconstruction had been shifted to allow for increased security. Consequently, more money would be required to complete minimum requirements for the project.121 Other reports criticize the United States for providing funds for much-needed water injection to the damaged southern fields, but neglecting to repair the leaky pipelines carrying the water to the fields. Additionally, delays in the repair of northern field pipelines have forced producers to reinject oil, harming the environment and slowing the whole process. The United States awarded many of these contracts to companies through a no-bid process during the rushed transition to the reconstruction period.122 The critical geological assessments have shown particular concern over Iraq’s large northern Kirkuk field, which suffers from water seeping into its oil deposits, as well as the major southern oil fields like Rumaila where similar problems are evident. Many of the deficiencies in pipelines and reservoirs stem from years of poor management under Saddam Hussein, rather than being caused by damage from the Iraq War. Barclays Capital also issued a report in 2005. The report concluded that ‘‘the general integrity of Iraqi oil infrastructure appears to us to be heading backwards rather than forwards.’’ Experts believe that attacks against oil facilities have made it difficult to attract foreign investment to rehabilitate Iraq’s aging oil infrastructure. In addition, the legal disputes between Iraq’s oil provinces and the central government have delayed exploration and production capacity expansion, and some experts contend that there are no visible improvements and that there are no meaningful indications to show that things may get better in the near future.123 Political Conciliation vs. Civil War What has changed since the transfer of power from the CPA to the interim government in June 2004 is the slow and steady evolution of the insurgency toward efforts by Sunni Islamist extremist groups to target Shi’ites, Kurds, and Sunnis in ways that provoke civil conflict.

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It is important to recognize that there has been political progress in spite of the violence. The final results for the December 15, 2005, elections gave the Sunnis significant representation, in spite of complaints about fraud. The new Council of Representatives had 275 seats, and the final results for the election, which were certified on February 9, 2006, gave the main parties the following number of seats: Iraq Alliance (Shi’ites), 128 seats; Kurdish coalition, 53 seats; The Iraqi List (Secular ‘‘Allawi list’’), 25 seats; Iraqi Accordance Front (Sunnis), 44 seats; Iraqi Front for National Dialogue (Sunni), 11 seats. The Shi’ite coalition won 47 percent of the 275 seats, the Kurdish coalition won 21 percent, the Sunni coalition won 21 percent, and Allawi’s secular nationalists (with significant Sunni support) won 9 percent.124 The final 1 percent of the seats went to other parties.125 As no party won a governing majority of the seats in the Parliament, a coalition government will have to be formed. More than 12 million Iraqi’s voted in the December 2005 election. Sunni turnout increased markedly from the January elections. In Nanawa and Salah ad Din, it grew from 17 percent and 19 percent, respectively, to 70 percent and 98 percent. In alAnbar Province it grew from 2 percent in January to 86 percent in December. Nationally, voter turnout was 77 percent, an increase from 58 percent in January.126 Of the 1,985 election complaints received by the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, only 3 percent were considered to have possibly affected the results. These complaints amounted to no more than 1 percent of the total vote, which was voided and excluded from the final count.127 In the nine months that followed up to September 2006, the Iraqi government took nearly six months to form, and then it could not take a single major step toward political conciliation, dealing with the deep divisions raised by drafting a new Constitution, or halt a steady rise in ethnic and sectarian violence. If the December 2005 election does eventually produce an inclusive national political structure that gives Iraq’s Sunnis incentives to join the government and political process, many current Iraqi Sunni insurgents are likely to end their participation in the insurgency and the more extreme elements will be defeated. No one can deny, however, that there is a serious risk that the political process will fail. The insurgency has found new targets and new opportunities to drive the nation toward a more intense civil war. Voting by sect and ethnic group did not unify the country as much as cement its deep divisions, and Shi’ite violence has come to match or exceed Sunni violence. The formation of a government gave the insurgency a strong incentive to do everything it can to prevent any meaningful unity between Arab Sunnis and Arab Shi’ites and to provoke counterviolence and attacks by Shi’ites that will drive Iraqi Sunnis to support the insurgency. It has often succeeded in exploiting divisions and fault lines within the dominant Shi’ite coalition and trying to provoke the Kurds toward increased separatism. As of this writing, civil violence has overtaken the insurgency as a threat to Iraqi stability, particularly escalating nationwide tension and violence between Arab Shi’ites and Arab Kurds. So far, the constitutional referendum and the election have not brought added security or stability. Neither have Prime Minister Maliki’s plans for national conciliation or calls to limit the powers of the various Arab Shi’ite, Arab Sunni, and Kurdish

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militias. Efforts at conciliation have led to dialog, but such dialog has also exposed the depth of the sectarian and ethnic divisions in Iraq and raised serious questions as to whether any form of unified or inclusive national government can be effective. The new government was able to delay an immediate and open confrontation over the issue of federation, and separation along sectarian and ethnic lines, but only deferred an issue that cannot be avoided. As of October 2006, it has not even begun the formal political struggle over some 55 enabling or implementing laws that are necessary to make the Constitution operative that should have already been completed and led to a new referendum. The key issues that must be dealt with to create a stable political structure and pattern of government in Iraq, and reduce popular support for the various types of insurgents and militias, include the following: • Whether the nation should be divided into federal components by province: If this happens, it would almost inevitably be along ethnic and sectarian lines although the ‘‘Kurdish’’ provinces have many non-Kurdish minority elements, the ‘‘Shi’ite’’ provinces often have large Sunni minorities, and the ‘‘Sunni’’ provinces lack oil and any economic viability. Soft ethnic cleansing has already begun in many parts of Iraq, including Baghdad. ‘‘Federalism’’ could lead to sweeping, violent struggles over given areas and population movements. • How the nation’s oil resources and revenues should be divided and how new areas should be controlled and developed: The Kurds lack oil reserves in their present areas and clearly want Kirkuk and the northern fields. Shi’ites in the south already talk about controlling the bulk of the nation’s proven reserves in central and southern Iraq. The Sunnis have potential reserves but no immediate assets, and the central government gets virtually all of its revenue from oil exports. • Related issues over how to tax and increase Iraq’s revenue base, and who should control its revenues: This includes major debates over the powers of the central government, any federal areas, the provinces, and local governments. • The future security structure of the country, who will really control the armed forces and security forces, and who will control provincial and local police forces: This is complicated by a major gap between the intent of the present Constitution and the reality of national and local militias. It is further complicated by the fact that the present forces are dominated by Shi’ite and Kurdish elements and could divide along ethnic and sectarian lines if the nation moved toward full-scale civil war. • Debates over the role of Islamic law in the government and every aspect of civil law: These issues not only have the potential to divide religious and secular Iraqis, but also could lead to struggles over whether Sunni or Shi’ite interpretations should dominate. Both Sunni and Shi’ite Islamist extremists could resort to violence if their views were not adopted. • Basic issues over governance: These issues include the resulting power of the central government and Ministries vs. provincial and local power. • Resolving the future of Baghdad, a deeply divided city exempt from being included in any federal area and where soft ethnic cleansing and the relocation of Shi’ites and Sunnis have already become a low-level civil conflict.

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• Deciding on how the coming and future budgets should be spent, and how economic aid and development resources should be allocated, in an era where the national budget already exceeds revenues, and massive outside foreign aid and pools of oil-for-food funds will have been expended. • Societal issues closely linked to religious differences and basic differences over the respective role of secular human rights and law and religious law and custom.

Such issues are explosive at the best of times, but the new government and Council of Representatives must act almost immediately to form a Constitution Review Committee that must try to resolve all of these issues in the middle of an ongoing insurgency and the risk of civil war looming within a four-month period of its formation. It must then win the support of whatever government and mix of the Council of Representatives that exists when it makes its recommendations, and if successful, hold a referendum 60 days later. Every element of this process offers new opportunities to the insurgency if Iraq’s political process divides and falters. Every milestone offers new incentives to attack, and every leader that moves toward progress and compromise will be a target. Insurgent Attacks Push Iraq toward More Intense Civil War Sunni insurgents intensified their attacks on Shi’ite targets during late 2005 and through 2006 and provoked a steadily escalating level of Shi’ite response. The number of violent sectarian incidents rose from an average of less than 40 per month during May 2005 to January 2006, to 270 in February, and averaged 400–500 during March–September 2006. The number of monthly casualties rose from around 200 per month during May 2005 to January 2006, to 1,200 in February, and over 2,200 during March–September 2006.128 Sunni insurgents scored a major victory by attacking the Askariya Shrine in Samarra, a Shi’ite holy landmark, on February 22, 2006, and destroyed its golden dome. The destruction of the shrine, which housed the graves of two revered Shi’ite imams, is a case study in how insurgent attacks helped escalate broader civil violence. The attack caused an unprecedented wave of sectarian violence in Iraq. In the five days that followed, some estimated that over 1,000 Iraqis were killed, that some 300 Sunni and Shi’ite mosques came under attack, and the country seemed to be on the brink of a large-scale civil war.129 The Iraqi government and MNF-I have put these totals at one-third to one-half these ‘‘worst case’’ estimates, but the fact is that no precise numbers exist, and sectarian attacks continued in the weeks that followed. Government leaders called for calm, and peaceful demonstrations were held across the Shi’ite dominated south and in ethnically mixed cities such as Kirkuk.130 At the same time, many statements by participants and average civilians indicate that Shi’ite patience may well be wearing thin. A Shi’ite employee of the Trade Ministry summed up such views as follows: ‘‘You have a TV, you follow the news. . .who is most often killed? Whose mosques are exploded? Whose society was destroyed?’’ Another Iraqi

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put it differently: ‘‘We didn’t know how to behave. Chaos was everywhere.’’ Even the more moderate Shi’ite newspaper, Al Bayyna al Jadidah, urged Shi’ites to assert themselves in the face of Sunni violence. Its editorial stated that it was ‘‘time to declare war against anyone who tries to conspire against us, who slaughters us every day. It is time to go to the streets and fight those outlaws.’’131 Shi’ite religious leaders also continued to call for calm, but their message was sometimes ambiguous both in words and actions. For example, Moqtada Al-Sadr ordered his Al-Mahdi Army to protect Shi’ite shrines across Iraq and blamed the United States and the Iraqi government for failing to protect the Askariya Shrine saying, ‘‘If the government had real sovereignty, then nothing like this would have happened.’’ In a speech from Basra, Al-Sadr also called for restraint and unity among Iraqi’s: ‘‘I call on Muslims, Sunnis and Shi’ites, to be brothers. . .Faith is the strongest weapons, not arms.’’ He also publicly ordered his listeners to not attack mosques in retaliation saying, ‘‘There is no Sunni mosques and Shi’ite mosques, mosques are for all Muslims. . .it is one Islam and one Iraq.’’132 Despite Al-Sadr’s rhetoric, it appeared that his militia was responsible for at least some of the violence. Amid demonstrations and condemnations from both Sunni and Shi’ite political leaders, Shi’ite militias such as Al-Mahdi Army sought revenge against Sunnis and carried out numerous killings and attacks on Sunni mosques. Sunni groups reciprocated. Sunni politicians have since made many charges that Sunni mosques in Baghdad and some southern cities were attacked or actively occupied by the Al-Mahdi Army in the days following the attacks.133 The Association of Muslim Scholars, a hardline Sunni clerical organization, alleged that 168 Sunni mosques were attacked, 10 imams killed, and 15 abducted.134 The association also made direct appeals to Al-Sadr to intervene and stop the violence, apparently suspecting he was a primary coordinator of the Shi’ite attacks. In early March, however, U.S. government estimates put the number of mosque attacks at 33, only 9 of which were destroyed or sustained significant damage.135 In some Sunni areas, residents, fearing attacks on their mosques, erected barricades and stood watch. In the Al Moalimin district, armed men patrolled the roof of the Sunni mosque Malik bin Anas.136 There is no doubt that the attack and its aftermath threatened progress in forming an inclusive government. Iraqi political figures called on the country to recognize that the attack was an attempt to create a civil war and urged Iraqis to be calm. President Jalal Talabani on the day of the attacks said, ‘‘We are facing a major conspiracy that is targeting Iraq’s unity. . .we should all stand hand in hand to prevent the danger of a civil war.’’ President George W. Bush echoed these sentiments saying, ‘‘The terrorists in Iraq have again proven that they are enemies of all faiths and of all humanity. . .the world must stand united against them, and steadfast behind the people of Iraq.’’137 The violence resulted in the announcement by the dominant Sunni party that it would suspend talks to form a coalition government and issued a list of demands. The immediate attention given to these demands by the Iraqi government, and a telephone call from President Bush to each of the leaders of the seven major political

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factions urging them to reinstitute talks, brought Sunnis back to a meeting with their Shi’ite and Kurdish counterparts. Later that evening, Prime Minister al-Jaafari, accompanied by the leaders of the other major coalitions, announced at a press conference that the country would not allow itself to engage in civil war and that this was a moment of ‘‘terrific political symbolism.’’138 The reaction of Iraqi security, military, and police units to the sectarian violence that followed the bombing of the Askariya Shrine was considered by some in the United States and Iraq to be a test of how well these forces could provide security for their own country in a crisis. Opinions differed greatly, however, over whether ISF forces passed this test. The MNF-I has claimed the armed forces played a major role in limiting and halting sectarian violence. Others have claimed they often allowed Shi’ite groups to attack Sunni mosques and that the security forces and police did little to calm the violence. The data that have emerged since the attack tend to support many of the MNF-I claims, but the risks of growing divisions in the Iraqi forces and a tilt toward the Shi’ite and Kurdish sides remain all too real. The Future of the Insurgency and the Prospect of Large-Scale Civil War Some claimed by the summer of 2006 that Iraq had already reached the precipice of civil war, seen the dire consequences, and soberly held itself back. For others, sectarian violence marked a trend toward deepening civil conflict. In balance, the risks of large-scale civil war have increased, but it was too soon for pessimistic predictions. Iraqis were drifting toward more intense civil conflict, but the levels of violence were still comparatively limited in most areas. Moreover, for all of the political risks, there are opportunities as well, and many Iraqis in every sectarian and ethnic faction understand the real possibility of further escalation and its potential consequence of dividing the country. The future of the Sunni insurgency now seems dependent on two factors: first, whether the Iraqi political process succeeds in becoming truly inclusive or whether it heightens the sectarian and ethnic tensions and conflicts that divide Iraq and creates a more intense state of civil war; second, how soon and how well the full range of Iraqi security forces can come on-line and be effective. Failure in both areas is quite clearly an option. The odds of Iraq drifting into a serious civil war are impossible to quantify, but the risk is clearly serious. At the same time, the insurgency may well divide between its more secular or ‘‘nationalist’’ elements and the Islamist extremist groups. The ‘‘Nationalist’’ Need for Compromise Given their present strength, the more nationalistic Sunni insurgents have good reason to seek a political compromise if the Shi’ites and Kurds offer them an inclusive government and acceptable terms. They at best seem capable of paralyzing progress, and fighting a long war of attrition, rather than defeating an Iraqi

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government that is dominated by a cohesive Shi’ite majority, and which maintains good relations with the Kurds. The Neo-Salafi insurgents’ capacity for extreme violence also does not mean that they dominate Sunni attitudes. Regardless of who is doing the counting, the total for active and passive native Iraqi Sunni insurgents still leaves them a small minority of Iraq’s population. Unless the Iraqi government divides or collapses, they cannot bring back Arab Sunni minority rule or the Ba’ath; they cannot regain the level of power, wealth, and influence they once had. They cannot reestablish the form of largely secular rule that existed under Saddam or reestablish Iraq as a country that most Arabs see as ‘‘Sunni.’’ An understanding of these same political and military realities may eventually drive most of the more moderate and pragmatic Sunni insurgents to join the nonviolent political process in Iraq if the Shi’ite and Kurdish elements that now dominate the government and political process act to include them and provide suitable incentives. Such shifts, however, are likely to be slow and uncertain. Historically, most insurgent groups have a much better vision of what they oppose than what they are for, and they have limited interest in pragmatic realpolitik. Most Sunni groups are still committed to doing everything—and sometimes anything—they can to drive the Coalition out and break up the peaceful political process almost regardless of the damage done to Iraq and to Sunni areas. Richard Armitage, the former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, commented on the insurgency and its lack of realistic political goals as follows: ‘‘In Algeria, the so-called insurgents, or in Vietnam, the so-called insurgents, they had. . .a program and a positive view. . .In Iraq that’s lacking. . .they only have fear to offer. They only have terror to offer. This is why they’re so brutal in their intimidation.’’139 The ‘‘Islamist’’ Need for Civil War The risk also exists that the Sunni Islamist extremists have become better trained and organized to the point where they are now able to establish themselves as the dominant political and military force within the Sunni community—particularly if Iraq’s Arab Shi’ites and Kurds mishandle the situation or react to the growing provocation of bloody suicide attacks and other killings by neo-Salafi extremists.140 The Sunni Islamist extremists can then try to present themselves as the only legitimate alternative to the occupation, even if they fail to provide a popular agenda. This means they can survive and endure as long as the government is too weak to occupy the insurgency dominated areas and as long as the large majority of Sunnis in given areas does not see a clear incentive to join the government and Iraq’s political process. Much will depend on just how willing Iraqi Shi’ites and Kurds are to forget the past, not to overreact to Sunni Islamist and other attacks designed to divide and splinter the country, and to continue to offer Iraqi Sunnis a fair share of wealth and power. The U.S. position is clear. The United States consistently supported a unified nation and inclusive government. U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, stated in an interview that the Ministries of Defense and Interior must be headed by those

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who have broad-based support: ‘‘The security ministries have to be run by people who are not associated with militias and who are not regarded as sectarian.’’141 Later, Ambassador Khalilzad went further and directly tied the future of U.S. economic and military support to the ability of Iraqi leaders to form an inclusive government saying, ‘‘We [the United States] are not going to invest the resources of the American people and build forces that are run by people who are sectarian.’’142 The Threat from Shi’ite Death Squads and Militias While the Islamists have made it one of their goals to ignite civil war between the Sunnis and the Shi’ites, there were more and more reports of revenge killing and anti-Sunni strikes by both the Shi’ite militias and Shi’ite elements in the security forces and police during the rest of 2005, and there were stronger indications that Shi’ite militias were playing a growing role in Iraq’s low-level civil war.143 There are credible reports that hundreds of Sunni bodies have been found in locations like rivers, desert roads, open desert, sewage disposal facilities, and garbage dumps since the new government was formed April 25, 2006. The Baghdad morgue reported growing numbers of corpses with their hands bound by police handcuffs and reported that it processed 7,553 corpses between January and September 2005, vs. only 5,239 for the same period in 2004. Sunni groups like the Association of Muslim Scholars have published pictures of such corpses and lists of the dead and have claimed there are Shi’ite death squadrons. Then Inspector General of the Ministry of the Interior, General Nori Nori said, ‘‘There are such groups operating—yes this is correct.’’ In November, a raid on a secret MOI detention facility in southeastern Baghdad, which was operated by former members of the Badr Brigade, was linked to the death of 18 detainees reported to have died under torture. Some 220 men were held in filthy conditions within this prison and many were subjected to torture.144 Minister of Interior Jabr denied any government involvement and claimed that if MOI security forces and police uniforms and cars have been seen, they were stolen. Other sources, however, confirmed that some of the killings of an estimated 700 Sunnis between August and November 2005 involved men who identified themselves as Ministry of Interior forces.145 This increased the risk that Iraqi forces could be divided by factions, decreasing their effectiveness and leading to the disintegration of Iraqi forces if Iraq were to descend into full-scale civil war. The killing of at least 14 Sunnis could be clearly traced to MOI arrest records several weeks earlier.146 U.S. sources also noted that a large number of members of the Badr Organization had joined the MOI forces, including the police and commando units, since the new government was formed in April 2006. The lines between some MOI units and the Badr Organization were becoming increasingly blurred. During the winter of 2005, and the course of 2006, body dumps became a favored tactic by insurgents and militias. Although this trend existed long before the February 22 Askariya bombing, it increased thereafter and became part of the cyclical

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sectarian violence carried out by Shi’ites and Sunnis. For example, in the period from March 7 until March 21, over 191 bodies were found. Common characteristics could be found within these ‘‘mystery killings.’’ Increasingly, the victims were relatively ordinary Shi’ites or Sunnis and were not directly working for the government or Coalition forces. Oftentimes, victims were taken from their homes or businesses in daylight by masked gunmen or men wearing police or security force uniforms and driving standard issue trucks. These attributes, and the fact that the bodies were almost always found in the same condition—blindfolded, handcuffed, and shot in the head showing signs of torture—lent credibility to the claim that many of the killings were perpetrated by Shi’ite militias themselves, or elements of security forces dominated by these militias. The frequency of ‘‘extrajudicial killings’’ was discussed in a UN Human Rights Report and linked to police forces: ‘‘A large number of extrajudicial killings, kidnappings and torture were reportedly perpetrated mainly by members of armed militias linked to political factions or criminal gangs. The same methods of execution-style killings are usually used: mass arrests without judicial warrant and extrajudicial executions with bodies found afterwards bearing signs of torture and killed by a shot to the head.’’ Baghdad, a mixed city, continued to be ‘‘ground zero’’ for much of this violence. More Iraqi civilians were killed in Baghdad during the first three months of 2006 than at any time since the end of the Saddam regime. Between January and March, 3,800 Iraqi civilians were killed, a significant number of which were found tied, shot in the head, and showing signs of torture.147 According to the Baghdad morgue in May 2006, it received on average 40 bodies a day. Anonymous U.S. officials disclosed that the targeted sectarian killings, or soft-sectarian cleansing, claim nine times more lives than car bombings and that execution killings increased by 86 percent in the nine weeks after the February mosque bombing.148 These numbers rose steadily though August, dipped only slowly in September, and rose again in October. The number of sectarian incidents and casualties increased more than tenfold between January and the end of August 2006. Sectarian militias did more than infiltrate the security forces. There have been numerous incidents of the Al-Mahdi Army installing its own members to head hospitals, dental offices, schools, trucking companies, and other private businesses. Rank employees are often fired for no reason. As a Baghdad University professor said, ‘‘We are all victims of this new thought police. No longer content to intimidate us with violence, these militias want to control our every move, so they appoint the administrators and managers while dissenters lose their jobs.’’149 Links to the Iraqi Police and Special Security Forces The number of men who were trained and equipped as regular police expanded from some 31,000 men in July 2004 to nearly 95,000 in July 2005, and 120,000 in September 2006. By that time the number of men ‘‘trained and equipped’’ in the National Police (the reorganized MOI security forces) totaled 24,400, and other

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MOI forces totaled 27,510. The reality, however, was very different from what these numbers imply. At least 20 percent—and probably over 20 percent—of the men trained and equipped deserted or were not active. Many were selected with only limited background checks, and large numbers were incapable of properly performing their duties, lacked proper equipment and facilities, and were not properly paid or supplied. Many of the MOI forces continued to serve Arab Shi’ite or Kurdish causes. Substantial numbers of men from both the Badr Organization and Moqtada Al-Sadr’s Al-Mahdi Army joined the forces. In the case of the roughly 65,000-strong mix of MOI and police forces in the greater Baghdad area, the men from the Badr Organization generally tended to go into the MOI special security units and those from Al-Mahdi Army tended to join the police. While both the Iraqi government and Coalition claimed the situation was improving, a September 2005 report by the ICG suggested that the process of drafting the Constitution had helped exacerbate the existing ethnic and sectarian divisions between Iraqis.150 While the revelations of large-scale abuses draw the greatest attention, less severe, day-to-day incidents are no less important and can be illustrative of the underlying sectarian tension in Iraq. For example, when several policemen arrived at an Iraqi police station with three suspected insurgents in plastic cuffs, U.S. Sergeant 1st Class Joel Perez had to cut the cuffs because they were too tight and causing the prisoners’ hands to swell and turn blue. Later, one of the Iraqi policeman involved confided in a reporter, ‘‘They [the insurgents] need to be beaten up. The Americans won’t let us. . . I want to have two cars and tie each hand to a different car and break them in half.’’151 This and previous incidents drew comments by both U.S. and Iraqi officials. U.S. military procedure and policy was clarified in a back-and-forth discussion between U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Peter Pace when Pace declared, ‘‘it’s absolutely the responsibility of every U.S. service member if they see inhumane treatment being conducted to intervene to stop it.’’ Secretary Rumsfeld countered, ‘‘I don’t think you mean they have an obligation to physically stop it; it’s to report it.’’ Pace respectfully reiterated, ‘‘If they are physically present when inhumane treatment is taking place, sir, they have an obligation to stop it.’’ Putting prisoner abuse in perspective, former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi commented to a British newspaper, ‘‘people are doing the same as [in] Saddam’s time and worse.’’152 In a February 2006 Department of Defense report to Congress, ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ police, military, and justice detention facilities were singled out as being ‘‘typically maintained at higher standards than those of the Ministry of Interior facilities.’’ The report also suggested that to correct the ‘‘imbalance,’’ joint U.S.–Iraqi ‘‘teams should continue to inspect Iraqi detention facilities, with appropriate remediation through Iraqi-led triage and follow-up logistical, security, public relations, and political support.’’153 The August 2006 report reflected little or no progress in these areas, or in MNF-I’s ability to count the number of police who were actually still active and assess their effectiveness.

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At the same time, Sunni Islamic insurgents and some Sunni political figures had every reason to try to implicate the security services. Some of the killings in late November involved key Sunni politicians like Ayad Alizi and Al Hussein, leading members of the Iraqi Islamic Party, a member of the Sunni coalition competing in the December 15, 2005, elections. Shi’ites seemed to have little reason to strike at such targets.154

Questionable Loyalties Regardless, the immediate problem for the Iraqi government became controlling elements of the ISF whose loyalties were clearly not with the national government and, moreover, trying to get these groups to uphold the law rather than engage in or tacitly allow violence. For example, after a public warning was issued on April 7, 2006, by the MOI telling Iraqis not to gather in crowded areas because of specific intelligence indicating that a series of car bombs were likely, it had to similarly warn ISF not to impede this order. The Ministry threatened legal action against ‘‘any security official who fails to take the necessary procedures to foil any terrorist attack in his area.’’155 In what may have been the largest incident at the time involving MOI security forces, in early March 2006, gunmen wearing MOI uniforms allegedly stormed a Sunni-owned security firm and abducted 50 of its employees.156 The Interior Ministry denied its involvement in the event. Later in the same month, investigators discovered and broke up a group of police who ran a kidnapping and extortion ring. Allegedly led by an Iraqi police major general, this group kidnapped individuals, sometimes killing them, and forced their families to pay ransoms that the group members then pocketed.157 In April, the bodies of three young men were recovered from a sewage ditch. According to co-workers, the three were last seen being arrested by MOI forces after their minibus had been pulled over.158 In May, two employees of the al-Nahrain television station were kidnapped on their way home by MOI forces according to witnesses. Their bodies were found the next day, along with six other Sunni men. All had been blindfolded, burned with cigarette butts, and severely beaten.159 Although the MOI continued to deny that it had any role in the increased sectarian violence since the February shrine bombing, accusations mounted and the accumulation of incidents made this denial more difficult. The consistency and continuation of body dumps, the corpses often exhibiting signs of torture and of being shot execution style, and strings of abductions in which the gunmen wore ISF uniforms furthered tension between Prime Minister al-Jaafari and the United States, which had been pressuring the Prime Minister to rein in the militias. The fear generated within the Sunni community by the merging of Shi’ite militias and the ISF was illustrated by an advisory on a Sunni-run television network, which told its viewers not to allow Iraqi police or soldiers into their homes unless U.S. troops were present.160

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For some Sunnis, the presence of U.S. forces provided a degree of assurance against abuses of power by Iraqi security forces. In Dora, local leaders agreed that Iraqi forces could conduct raids in mosques only if U.S. soldiers accompanied them. This same rule was later implemented in Baghdad as well. The fact that Sunnis requested the presence of U.S. troops in Islamic holy places during searches, something that earlier would have been inconceivable, was a testament to the depth of sectarian divisions and the genuine distrust between the Shi’ite dominated police forces and Sunni communities.161As Ali Hassan, a Sunni, bluntly stated, ‘‘We prefer to be detained by Americans instead of Iraqis. Second choice would be the Iraqi army. Last choice, Iraqi police.’’162 These events had an important impact on Iraqi politics and the selection of the new government. In late March 2006, the U.S. administration openly voiced its disapproval of al-Jaafari as the next Prime Minister. Ambassador Khalilzad added that due to his lack of leadership, Shi’ite-led militias were now killing more Iraqis than the Sunni insurgency.163 Al-Jaafari’s response, in which he warned the United States not to interfere with the democratic process in Iraq, addressed the issue of Shi’ite militias being incorporated in the security forces and his political alliance with Al-Sadr, whose support put him in office. He stated that he favored engaging with Al-Sadr and his followers instead of isolating him and that he viewed the militias as part of Iraq’s ‘‘de facto reality.’’ He continued to voice support for a government that looks past sectarian differences and works toward integrating the militias into the police and the army.164 In April, Iraq’s Interior Minister Jabr refused to deploy any of the thousands of police recruits trained by the joint U.S.–U.K. Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT). Although graduates of this program had been available for over three months, Jabr chose to hire those trained outside of the program because he claimed he had no control over CPATT’s selection process. The United States was concerned that this was an attempt by the Minister to sustain the sectarian makeup of the forces and continue to incorporate those with allegiance to the Badr Brigade into its ranks.165 The UN Assistance Mission for Iraq’s Human Rights Report specifically highlighted the threat of militias within the security forces and that it had received information ‘‘regarding the actions of some segments of the security forces, in particular the police and special forces, and their apparent collusion with militias in carrying out human rights violations.’’166 There were concerns that even Iraqi brigades that were touted as mixed, in that they struck a balance between Shi’ites and Sunnis within their ranks, were still overwhelmingly Shi’ite. There were reports of at least one soldier who was proudly wearing an Al-Sadr t-shirt under his army uniform. In interviews as well, many of the soldiers privately confided that if they were ever asked to fight Al-Mahdi Army, they would have to quit the Iraqi forces.167 Brigadier General Abdul Kareem Abdul Rahman al-Yusef, a Sunni, admitted that his brigade was 87 percent Shi’ite and included members of the Badr Organization. Despite this, he still believed that ‘‘it’s not the

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time to ask the militias to put down their arms,’’ given that the government cannot provide security to its citizens.168 As Lieutenant Colonel Chris Pease, Deputy Commander of the U.S. military’s police training programs in eastern Baghdad put it, ‘‘We’re not stupid. We know for a fact that they’re killing people. We dig the damn bodies out of the sewer all of the time. But there’s a difference between knowing something and proving something.’’ Captain Ryan Lawrence, an intelligence officer with the 2nd Brigade Special Police Transition Team, displayed similar feelings, ‘‘Training and equipping a force, while knowing that at least some element is infiltrated by militias, is a difficult situation.’’169 Pease also admitted that an Iraqi police officer had confided in him the reality and extent of the militia infiltration into ISF. ‘‘His assessment was that the militias are everywhere,’’ Pease said, ‘‘and his officers weren’t going to do anything about that because their units are infiltrated and they know what the cost would be for working against the militias.’’170 This situation did not improve after a new set of political compromises finally led to the selection of Nouri al-Maliki (a Shi’ite) as Prime Minister, and Mahmound Mashhadani (a Sunni) as Speaker, in May 2006. Along with President Jalal Talibani (a Kurd), all of the major factions were now represented, but a new Minister of Defense (Abd al-Qadr Muhammad Jassim al-Mufraji, a Sunni) and a new Minister of the Interior (Jawad al-Bulani, a Shi’ite) were not announced and confirmed until June 8, 2006. The government then remained too divided to function efficiently, Prime Minister Maliki’s conciliation plans remained words rather than actions, and internal divisions sharply limited progress in both the MOD and the MOI and in dealing with problems like the militias. U.S. troops did accompany developing Iraqi military, National Police, and other police units as embedded advisors in their operations. They sought to make them more effective, prevent them from joining in sectarian and ethnic fighting, and to make them treat the local populace and detainees properly. Far too often, however, it was not possible to stop units with Shi’ite and Kudish manpower from taking sides; various units and most of the police were corrupt, desertion rates remained high, and the line between counterinsurgency and revenge became blurred. After a joint U.S.–Iraqi raid in March in which ten Sunnis were rounded up, one U.S. colonel remembered thinking immediately after the action, ‘‘Wait a sec, were we just part of some sort of sectarian revenge?’’171 By October 2006, it was clear that progress in reforming the National and regular police still presented massive problems, and even some of the new army units supposedly ‘‘taking the lead’’ had desertion rates as high as 50 percent. Efforts to secure Baghdad with Iraqi forces in the late spring and summer of 2006 with Iraqi forces had largely failed, and U.S. forces not only had to take the lead, but do most of the actual security work. Indeed, many of the U.S. soldiers who were on their second tour in Iraq returned to a different war. Whereas before the focus was on the Sunni insurgency, it now was about containing the Shi’ite militias and preventing further infiltration into the security forces.172

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While details of many incidents remained uncertain, the course of a two-day fire fight in the Adhamiyah district, a Sunni neighborhood, in April 2006, illustrates the problems involved. A local Sunni militia took up arms against what it saw as an attack by a Shi’ite ‘‘death squad’’ disguised as a police force. In the process, some locals claimed that the Sunni-dominated army actually fired on the incoming police forces.173 The Iraqi government denied claims that Interior Ministry forces were involved. It suggested that insurgent groups, portraying themselves as police and security forces, provoked the violence. It specifically identified those groups as the Islamic Army of Iraq, the 1920 Revolution Brigades, and Al Qa’ida. 174 While such government claims could not be verified, Al Qa’ida in Iraq did issue a statement promising ‘‘a new raid to avenge the Sunnis at Adhamiyah and the other areas, and the raid will start with the dawn of Wednesday, if God wishes. . .The Shiite areas will be an open battlefield for us.’’175 While it was not fully clear if Shi’ite police forces were even present, or if the army was mistaken for a police force as suggested by U.S. claims, the event illustrated the growing distrust between Sunnis and Iraqi security forces that continued to intensify through the late fall of 2006. The threat from Shi’ite death squads, whether real or perceived, caused the townspeople to arm themselves, coordinate action, and attempt to repel the invading police forces. The Kurdish Question The January 2005 elections made the Kurds far more powerful relative to other Iraqi factions in military and security terms than their 15 percent of the population might indicate. Iraqi security and stability depends on finding a power-sharing arrangement that gives the Kurds incentives to be part of the political process just as much as it does on developing such arrangements for the Arab Sunnis. There is no basic political or economic reason such a compromise cannot be found. Unfortunately, however, Iraq has a long history of not finding such compromises on a lasting basis, and Saddam Hussein’s legacy left many areas where Kurds were forcibly expelled and Sunni Arabs and minorities were given their homes and property. Large numbers of Kurds favor independence over political inclusiveness. This helps explain why the Kurdish turnout in the October referendum on the Constitution varied widely. In predominantly Kurdish provinces, participation was much lower than in the January election. Some analysts have suggested the lower turnout was a result of increased voter apathy among a Kurdish population who felt assured the Constitution would pass. Others noted the increase in dissatisfaction with the central government and the idea of remaining in Iraq among Kurdish populations. Riots and demonstrations protesting the shortages of gas, fuel, and power have become more common in Kurdish cities.176 Some Kurds may also have felt let down by the Constitution, which did not specifically address the status of Kirkuk or lay out a clear path to secession.177

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Kurdish Parties and the Kurdish Militias The two major Kurdish parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), headed by Masoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), headed by Jalal Talabani, retain powerful militias, known collectively as the Peshmerga. Their current strength is difficult to estimate, and some elements are either operating in Iraqi forces or have been trained by U.S. advisors. The Iraqi Kurds could probably assemble a force in excess of 10,000 fighters—albeit of very different levels of training and equipment. The Kurdish Peshmerga trace their origins to the Iraqi civil wars of the 1920s. They fought against the Saddam Hussein regime during the Iran-Iraq War and supported U.S. and Coalition military action in 2003. The Peshmerga groups of the PUK and the KDP serve as the primary security force for the Kurdish regional government. The PUK and the KDP claim that there are 100,000 Peshmerga troops, and they have insisted on keeping the Peshmerga intact as guarantors of Kurdish security and political self-determination. Tensions between the Kurds and Other Iraqis There are serious tensions among the Kurds, the Turcomans, and the Assyrian Christians, as well as between Kurds and Arabs. At a local level, there are many small tribal elements, as well as numerous ‘‘bodyguards’’ and long histories of tensions and feuds. Even if Iraq never divides along national faction lines, some form of regional or local violence is all too possible. Insurgent activity in the Kurdish areas was particularly intense in the city of Irbil, which has been the site of several suicide bombings. In the summer of 2005, Kurdish security officials and the KDP intelligence service announced the arrest of approximately six insurgent suspects who, the authorities believe, came from six separate and previously unheard of militant organizations. The head of the Irbil security police, Abdulla Ali, stated that there was evidence that the groups had links to international terror groups, established extremist groups in Iraq like Ansar alSunna, and even had links to intelligence services from nearby countries.178 This evidence was not made public, but the Kurdish authorities stated that it appeared as though various groups were working together and, to the anger and disappointment of the Kurdish authorities, that local Kurds were assisting them. Tension between the Kurds and Iraqi Arabs and other minorities has also been critical in areas like Kirkuk and Mosul. The Kurds claim territory claimed by other Iraqi ethnic groups, and they demand the return of property they assert was seized by Saddam Hussein during his various efforts at ethnic cleansing from 1975 to 2003. The future of Kirkuk, and the northern oil fields around it, remains the subject of considerable local and national political controversy between the Kurds and other Iraqis. The Kurds claim that over 220,000 Kurds were driven out of their homes by Saddam in the 1970s and fighting in the Gulf War and that over 120,000 Arabs were imported into ‘‘Kurdish territory.’’ The Kurds see control of Kirkuk as their one chance to have territorial control over a major portion of Iraq’s oil reserves, but

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Kirkuk is now roughly 35 percent Kurd, 35 percent Arab, 26 percent Turcoman, and 4 percent other. This makes any such solution almost impossible unless it involves violent means. There has been armed violence among Kurds, Arabs, and Turcomans, as well as struggles over ‘‘soft’’ ethnic cleansing in the north, and there may well be more violence in the future. Many experts feel that the only reason Kirkuk has been relatively peaceful, and still has something approaching a representative government, is that the Kurds have not been strong enough relative to the other factions in the city to impose their will by intimidation or force. From August 2005 onward, various reports indicated that Kurdish-dominated government police and military forces in and near the Kurdish zones were using their power to intimidate Arabs through abductions and assassinations. Such activity poses the threat of deepening regional fissures. Likewise, the misuse of power by Coalitionsponsored forces could deepen resentment toward Coalition forces, particularly among the Sunni population.179 Other Kurdish actions exacerbated ethnic tension in a struggle for the control of Kirkuk during 2005 and 2006. There were reports that the KDP and PUK systematically kidnapped hundreds of Arabs and Turcomans from the city and transported them to prisons in established Kurdish territory in an apparent bid to create an overwhelming Kurdish majority.180 This activity allegedly spread to Mosul as well. While some of the abductions had occurred in 2004, reports indicated that there was a renewed effort following the January 30 elections that solidified the two parties’ primacy in the Kurdish areas. According to a leaked State Department cable in mid-June 2005, the abducted were taken to KDP and PUK intelligence-run prisons in Irbil and Sulaymaniyah without the knowledge of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of the Interior, but sometimes with U.S. knowledge. In fact, the Emergency Services Unit, a special Kirkuk force within the police, was both closely tied to the U.S. military and implicated in many of the abductions, along with the Asayesh Kurdish intelligence service.181 It should be noted that the head of the Emergency Services Unit is a former PUK fighter. Kirkuk province’s Kurdish governor, Abdul Rahman Mustafa, stated that the allegations were false. However, the State Department cable indicated that the U.S. 116th Brigade Combat Team had known about the activity and had asked the Kurdish parties to stop.182 According to Kirkuk’s Chief of Police, General Turhan Yusuf Abdel-Rahman, 40 percent of his 6,120 officers probably assisted in the abductions, disobeying his orders and following the directives of the KDP and PUK instead. Abdel-Rahman stated, ‘‘The main problem is that the loyalty of the police is to the parties and not the police force. They’ll obey the parties’ orders and disobey us.’’183 According to Abdel-Rahman, Provincial Police Director Sherko Shakir Hakim refused to retire as ordered by the government in Baghdad once he was assured that the KDP and the PUK would continue to pay him if he stayed on. The various factions in Kirkuk seem to have agreed on a compromised local government in June 2005, but the city continues to present a serious risk of future conflict.

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The issue of Kirkuk took on a new importance after the December 2005 elections. In the months prior, thousands of Kurds erected settlements in the city, often with financing from the two main Kurdish parties. In addition, violence began to rise, with 30 assassination-style killings from October through December. Kurdish political groups were increasingly open about their intent to incorporate Kirkuk into Iraqi Kurdistan and continue to repatriate Kurds into the city in an effort to tip the ethnic balance in their favor. They stated that they sought to accomplish this by the time of the popular referendum in 2007, which is to determine whether the Tamim province will be governed by the Kurdish regional government or from Baghdad.184 The future of Kirkuk became a central factor for Kurdish political groups with the new governing coalition after May 2006. So did Kurdish desire to implement Article 58 of the Constitution that stipulates that the question of the ‘‘normalization’’ of Kirkuk must take place by the end of 2007.185 In fact, the political alliance between Kurds and Shi’ites, once considered natural given their common grievances against the Sunni-dominated Ba’ath Party, was opening up to question.186 Kurdish views differ over the increased sectarian violence between Sunni and Shi’ite Arabs. One perspective has its roots in the historical animosity between Kurds and Arabs. A sectarian civil war could bring benefits to the Kurds if, as one individual said, ‘‘our enemies [are] killing each other.’’187 According to this theory, if civil war breaks out in Iraq, the Kurds will then be justified in breaking away to form an independent Kurdistan. In this situation, the international community would be forced to acquiesce to such a move.188 The opposite view is more hesitant and less optimistic. These Kurds worry that although civil war may initially begin in central and southern Iraq, it could spread northward, threatening the stability and relative security they have attained since the 2003 invasion. In fact, there were some reports in the first months of 2006 that Shi’ite militias were migrating north into cities like Kirkuk and moving into mosques in the area as a protection force.189 If civil war does reach the Kurds, some believe Iraqi Arabs, as well as Turkey, Syria, and Iran, would object to Kurdish separation and that countries, such as Turkey, that have sizable Kurdish populations may intervene militarily to prevent an independent Kurdish nation.190 Arab Iraqis have reacted to Kurdish pressure. In April 2006, Shi’ite militias began to deploy to Kirkuk in substantial numbers. According to U.S. embassy officials in the region, Al-Mahdi Army had sent two companies with 120 men each. The Badr Organization extended its reach into the city as well and opened several offices across the Kurdish region. The influx of Shi’ite militias began in the days following the February 22 Askariya bombing. The shift northward was justified by the organizations as a necessary step to protect Shi’ite mosques and families. Yet Shi’ites, many of whom were transferred to the area under Saddam’s rule, make up only about 5 percent of the population in the area.191 Although Iraqi security officials in Kirkuk maintain that the new militia arrivals have generally kept a low profile, the Kurdish Peshmerga responded by moving nearly 100 additional troops to the area. Moreover, an Al-Sadr associate in the

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region, Abdul Karim Khalifa, told U.S. officials that more men were on the way and that as many as 7,000 to 10,000 local residents loyal to the Al-Mahdi Army would join in a fight if one were to come.192 The Kurdish militias have not yet presented as many problems for Iraqi security and Iraqi force development as the Shi’ite militias, but the deployment of Shi’ite militias into the Kirkuk area makes it clear that this is no guarantee for the future. Kurdish separatism and claims to areas like Kirkuk and Iraq’s northern oil fields remain potentially explosive issues. Thousands of Kurdish Peshmerga soldiers were incorporated into the Iraqi Army during the formation of Iraqi forces.193 Kurdish army units could operate effectively in their relatively ethnically homogenous north; they were often perceived as outsiders in Arab areas. In the northern city of Balad, a 700-man Kurdish army battalion was confined to its base in March 2006 by an angry and hostile Sunni population. The battalion, sent from Sulaimaniyah to bolster the lone Shi’ite forces comprised of local residents, was resisted by the large Sunni minority in the area so much so that commanders were afraid to let their soldiers leave the base. U.S. officials in the city said that this was because the battalion was mostly former Peshmerga, the armed group that has become the de facto army of the regional government in Kurdistan.194 In May 2006, a Kurdish-dominated army unit openly clashed with its Shi’ite counterpart. The 1st Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 4th Division hit a roadside bomb in Duluiyah north of Baghdad. Although U.S. and Iraqi officials disagreed over the number of dead and wounded in the incident, the Kurdish division raced its wounded to the U.S. hospital in Balad. According to police reports, when the division arrived members began firing their weapons, ostensibly to clear the way, killing a Shi’ite civilian. As security forces arrived, the Kurdish army unit attempted to leave and take the wounded elsewhere. A Shi’ite army unit from the 3rd Battalion, 1st Brigade tried to stop them and shots were exchanged, killing a member of the 3rd Battalion. As the Kurdish division members attempted to leave in their vehicles, a third army unit attempted to establish a roadblock to stop them. U.S. forces, however, were at the scene to intervene and restore calm.195 Uncertain Kurdish Unity Kurdish unity is always problematic. The Kurds have a saying, ‘‘The Kurds have no friends.’’ History shows that this saying should be, ‘‘the Kurds have no friends including the Kurds.’’ The Barzani and Talibani factions have fought on several occasions, and there was a state of civil war between them during 1993–1995. PUK forces were able to take control of Irbil in 1994 and put an end to the first attempt to create a unified and elected government that began in 1992. Barzani’s KDP collaborated with Saddam Hussein in 1995, when Hussein sent a full corps of troops into Irbil and other parts of the area occupied by Talibani. Tens of thousands of Kurds and anti-Saddam activists fled the area, and the United States did not succeed in brokering a settlement between the two factions until 1998.196

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Despite the past, and potential future tensions and divisions between the PUK and the KDP, leaders from both parties signed an agreement in January 2006, which allotted 11 ministerial posts to each group. Minority parties were skeptical of KDPPUK promises to give remaining posts to political factions that did not win a majority and worried that this further isolated them from any future role in the political process.197 The present marriage of convenience between the KDP and the PUK has not unified the Kurdish controlled provinces in the north. There were minor clashes between their supporters in 1995, and these political divisions could create future problems for both Kurdish political unity and any agreement on some form of autonomy. Kurdish frustration with these political parties manifested itself in violent protests in 2006 during ceremonies marking the anniversary of the March 1988 poison gas attack by Hussein at Halabja. Protestors alleged that the PUK and the KDP had misappropriated millions of dollars in foreign aid given to the survivors of the attack.198 The protestors also complained about the shortage of water and electricity.199 The protests, which began at 9 A.M., slowly grew in number and groups began setting fire to tires and throwing rocks at the monument and museum dedicated to those killed under Saddam’s rule.200 The few dozen PUK guards in front of the monument, who attempted to disperse the crowd by firing into the air, were outnumbered and were forced to retreat. The protestors destroyed museum exhibits with rocks and then attempted to set it on fire. One protestor was killed by the gunfire from the guards and six others were wounded.201 A regional official, Shahu Mohammed Saed, who according to reports was one of the targets of the peoples’ frustration, blamed the riots on Ansar alIslam.202 However, there seems to be little indication that this assertion is true. The Problem of Resources and Oil The Kurds face the problem that, at present, they have no control over Iraq’s oil resources or revenues and no access to any port or lines of communication that are not subject to Iraqi, Turkish, or Iranian interdiction. They have an uncertain economic future since they have lost the guaranteed stream of revenue provided by the UN oil-for-food program; Iraq can now export oil through the Gulf and can potentially reopen pipelines to Syria as a substitute for pipelines through Turkey, and there is far less incentive to smuggle through Kurdish areas now that trade is open on Iraq’s borders. The Kurds also face the problem that Iran, Syria, and Turkey all have Kurdish minorities that have sought independence in the past, and any form of Iraqi Kurdish autonomy or independence is seen as a threat to these states. The Kurds have sought to deal with this problem by opening up the areas they control for independent oil exploration and seeking control of Iraq’s northern oil fields to the northwest and southeast of Kirkuk. The future of such efforts, however, remains uncertain.

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The Turkish Question All these problems are still further compounded by the rebirth of Kurdish insurgency in Turkey and by acute Turkish pressure on the Iraqi government, Iraqi Kurds, and MNSTC-I to deny Turkish Kurdish insurgents both a sanctuary and any example that would encourage Kurdish separatism in Turkey. The Turkish Kurdish Worker Party (PKK) is a movement that has often used northern Iraq as a sanctuary and which led to several major division-sized Turkish military movements in the area under Saddam Hussein. While estimates are uncertain, some 6,000 PKK forces seemed to be in Iraq in the spring of 2005, with another 2,000 across the border.203 These same factors help explain why Turkey has actively supported Iraq’s small Turcoman minority in its power struggles with Iraq’s Kurds. The February 2006 visit to Turkey by Prime Minister al-Jaafari created concern among Kurdish politicians and accusations that the trip was carried out in secret.204 Relationship with Neighboring States Many of these problems and difficulties concern the challenges to the prospects of stability in Iraq. If one, however, looks at the implications of an unstable Iraq, one must understand the consequences of the future of Iraq to the Gulf security and the ‘‘Global War on Terrorism.’’ All of the Gulf States now face a situation where they cannot predict Iraq’s future, whether it will be stable, and whether they will become involved directly or indirectly in a full-scale Iraqi civil war. The southern Gulf States also face the prospect of a new Iranian-Iraqi Shi’ite ‘‘axis,’’ real or imagined. These issues also involve outside states. Most Arab states have actively encouraged Iraqi political unity. Syria, however, has tolerated and supported Sunni neo-Salafi extremist operations on its territory in spite of its Alawite-controlled government. A broader and more intense civil conflict could lead other Arab states to take sides on behalf of the Sunnis—although Bahrain, Lebanon, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen are just a few of the states that have deep sectarian divisions of their own. Any major divisions within Iraq could reopen the Kurdish issue as it affects Turkey, and possibly Iran and Syria as well. Creating a ‘‘Shi’ite Crescent’’? The most serious wild card in Iraq’s immediate neighborhood is Iran. Iran already plays at least some role in the political instability in Iraq and may take a more aggressive role in trying to shape Iraq’s political future and security position in the Gulf. As noted in earlier chapters, regional officials have voiced their concerns about Iran’s interference in Iraq’s internal affairs. The most notable was King Abdullah of Jordan, when he accused Iran of wanting to create a ‘‘Shi’ite Crescent’’ forming between Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.205 Both Iranian and Iraqi Shi’ites rejected these comments. Jordan’s King Abdullah was asked to apologize by Iraqi Shi’ites. The Najaf Theological Center

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issued a statement, in which it accused the King of meddling in Iraq’s internal affairs:206 Distorting the truth and blatantly interfering in Iraqi affairs, provoking tribal sentiments in the region against Iraqi Shi’ites, provoking great powers against Iraqi Shi’ites, intimidating regional countries and accusing them of having links with Iran, displaying a great tendency for ensuring Israel’s security and expressing worries about the victory of Shi’ites in the upcoming elections tantamount to insulting millions of people in Iran, who have been insulted just because they follow a religion that the Jordan’s king is opposed. . . Najaf Theological Center is hopeful that the Jordanian monarch will apologize to the Shi’ites of the region and Iraq, and their religious authorities, because of the inaccurate remarks made against them.

The Arab Gulf States The Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, have sought to preserve the unity of Iraq and expressed their fear of Shi’ite dominance of an Arab country that allies itself with Iran. Saudi Arabia has pushed for more Sunni inclusiveness in the constitution-writing process, especially after their lack of participation in the January 2005 elections. When a draft constitution did not acknowledge Iraq’s Arab and Muslim identity, the General Secretary of the Gulf Cooperation Council called the Iraqi Constitution ‘‘a catastrophe.’’ The Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, also warned that if the Constitution did not accommodate the Iraqi Sunni community, it would result in sectarian disputes that might threaten the unity of Iraq.207 Prince Saud al-Faisal urged the United States to pressure Iraqi Shi’ites and Kurdish government leaders to work to bring the Iraqi people together. He said, ‘‘[Americans] talk now about Sunnis as if they were separate entity from the Shi’ite.’’ Prince Saud reiterated his fear of an Iraqi civil war saying, ‘‘If you allow civil war, Iraq is finished forever.’’208 Prince Saud also predicted that a civil war in Iraq could have dire consequences in the region and indicated the Kingdom feared an Iran-Iraq alliance. The Saudi Foreign Minister asserted, ‘‘We (US and Saudi Arabia) fought a war together to keep Iran out of Iraq after Iraq was driven out of Kuwait.’’ He added that the U.S. policy in Iraq is ‘‘handing the whole country over to Iran without reason.’’ Iranians have established their influence within Iraq, al-Faisal said, because they ‘‘pay money. . . install their own people (and) even establish police forces and arm the militias that are there.’’209 Jordan Some analysts believed that a limited number of insurgents were crossing into Iraq from the Iraq-Jordan border. Most Arab Jordanians strongly opposed the rise of a Shi’ite-dominated Iraq, although this did not mean support of neo-Salafi extremism. While Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was a Jordanian, the Jordanian government had

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sentenced Zarqawi to death in absentia on multiple occasions. Though some Jordanians were involved in the insurgency, Jordan has been very cooperative in its efforts to train Iraqi police and to monitor its borders. The Jordanian government trained many of the new Iraqi security forces and showed it was very much concerned with extreme Islamist elements within its own territory. King Abdullah pledged soon after the fall of Saddam Hussein to train over 30,000 Iraqi military and police within Jordan. On January 13, 2005, the 12th class graduated from its training, bringing the total to almost 10,000 Iraqi security forces trained in Jordan since efforts began.210 There have, however, been incidents involving insurgents and terrorists within Jordan’s borders. In spring 2004, a plot to create a massive chemical-laced explosion over Amman by radical Islamists was uncovered and disrupted by the Jordanian security forces. On August 19, 2005, Katyusha rockets were fired at two U.S. warships in Jordan’s Red Sea Aqaba port. None of the rockets struck the ship. One hit a warehouse, killing a Jordanian soldier; another exploded near a Jordanian hospital, resulting in no casualties; and the third landed outside of Eilat Airport in neighboring Israel, but failed to explode. The Iraqi branch of Al Qa’ida, linked to Jordanian Abu Masab al-Zarqawi, claimed responsibility for the attack. Four days later, Jordanian officials arrested a Syrian man, Mohammed Hassan Abdullah al-Sihly, whom they accused of carrying out the attack. Police said three accomplices slipped across the border into Iraq.211 Jordanian Interior Minister Awni Yirfas confirmed his government was working with Iraqi authorities in order to capture the militants.212 In summer 2005, Jordanian forces broke up an alleged recruitment ring in Amman. According to the main defendant, Zaid Horani, he and several other Jordanians crossed into Syria and boarded buses in Damascus, Syria, that were bound for Iraq as the Coalition forces invaded. Horani apparently returned home and helped to organize a recruitment pipeline for Jordanians interested in joining the insurgency in Iraq. A Syrian, Abu al-Janna, was allegedly the point of contact in Iraq for the Jordanians. Al-Janna reportedly was a central figure in the regional terror network.213 A Jordanian, Raad Mansour al-Banna, became the main suspect in the suicide bombing of a police recruitment site in Hilla in February 2005, killing more than 125.214 On August 21, 2005, Laith Kubba, spokesman for Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, accused Jordan of allowing the family of Saddam Hussein to finance the insurgent campaign in Iraq in an effort to reestablish the Ba’ath Party in that country.215 As already discussed, none of the bombers involved in the November 9 hotel bombings in Amman were Jordanian, but rather Iraqi nationals. Zarqawi did, however, draw on his connections in Jordan to carry out the attacks. There were over 400,000 Iraqis living in Jordan, some of whom had ties to neo-Salafi extremists in Iraq and were willing to help carry out operations in Jordan. Jordanian officials, including King Abdullah II, refused to rule out the possibility that Jordanians may have been involved in the attacks. In the days immediately following the bombings, Jordanian security officials arrested 12 suspects, mostly Jordanians and Iraqis.

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Turkey The Kurdish issue in northern Iraq has major implications for Turkey. First, Ankara is concerned about activities of Kurdish separatist groups in northern Iraq, whose chief objective is an independent Kurdistan in and around Turkey. Turkey is engaging in heavy diplomacy with both the U.S. and Iraqi administrations to crack down on these organizations and eliminate the Kurdish rebels which were launching attacks into Turkish territory. This long-standing concern is the primary reason for the presence of Turkish intelligence and military units in northern Iraq since the Gulf Operation. Second, Turkey has consistently opposed strong autonomy for a Kurdish zone within Iraq, out of fear that it would create unrest and aspirations for independence among Turkey’s own Kurdish population. Given the rich water supplies in the Kurdish populated regions of Turkey and the colossal irrigation project (the Southeast Anatolian Project) that Turkey has invested in for over four decades, an autonomous Turkish Kurdistan is out of the question for Turkish policy makers. In summer 2005, Kurdish PKK rebels launched a series of attacks on Turkish forces allegedly from bases in northern Iraq. In two months, more than 50 Turkish security forces were killed in attacks, mostly in the form of planted IEDs, a weapon utilized widely by Iraqi insurgents. In July 2005, the Turkish Prime Minister threatened cross-border action against the rebels if the attacks did not stop, though such action is generally regarded as extremely provocative and even illegal. Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated, however, ‘‘There are certain things that international law allows. When necessary, one can carry out cross border operations. I hope that such a need will not emerge.’’216 There were conflicting reports that the United States, which considers the PKK a terrorist organization, had ordered the Turkish military to capture the organization’s leaders. A member of the Turkish military claimed that the United States had agreed to seize the leaders while U.S. military spokesmen were unaware of such an agreement. The official U.S. position seemed to be that the United States opposed any crossborder action, viewing it as an infringement on sovereignty and likely to incite further violence between the Kurds and the various sects opposed to their independence or autonomy. Furthermore, the United States made it clear that any discussion over the PKK should center on the Iraqi government. U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers stated, ‘‘I think the difference now is that they [Turkey] are dealing with a sovereign Iraqi government, and a lot of these discussions will have to occur between Turkey and Iraq, not between Turkey and the United States.’’217 Despite the tension in U.S. and Turkish ties, and in Turkey’s relations with Iraq and its Kurds, Turkey became deeply involved in postwar reconstruction in Iraq. Turkey also offered to assist with the training of Iraqi police forces. The most recent example of Turkish effort to help the creation of a stable and unified Iraq was the meeting held in April 2005 in Istanbul where all Iraq’s neighbors and Egypt and

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Bahrain convened to address issues related with cross-border insurgency and terrorist infiltration. Iran The role Iran plays in the Iraqi insurgency is controversial. Some sources see Iran as being primarily concerned with having a stable nation on its borders that is Shi’ite dominated, but unified enough so it does not drag Iran into regional problems or force it to deal with an Iraqi civil war. Others feel Iran is seeking a far greater degree of direct influence or wants to use de facto control over Iraq to achieve regional hegemony. Virtually all sources agree Iran does not play a passive role and never planned to. Citing Iranian sources, a TIME magazine article stated that the Supreme National Security Council of Iran concluded in September 2002, before the U.S. invasion, ‘‘It is necessary to adopt an active policy in order to prevent long-term and short-term dangers to Iran.’’218 Iran has active ties to several key Shi’ite political parties. These include key elements in the Shi’ite-based United Iraqi Alliance that emerged as Iraq’s most important political coalition in the January and December 2005 elections: the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), Al-Da’wa, and Al-Da’wa–Tanzim al-Iraq. The Revolutionary Guard and Iranian intelligence have been active in southern Iraq, as well as other areas, since the early 1980s. They almost certainly have a network of active agents in Iraq at present. There are also some indications that Lebanese Hezbollah has established a presence in Iraq.219 Prime Minister Allawi repeatedly expressed his concern over Iran’s actions during 2004 and early 2005, as did other senior officials in the Interim Iraqi Government who see Iran as a direct and immediate threat. Iraqi Interim Defense Minister Hazem Sha’alan claimed in July 2004 that Iran remained his country’s ‘‘first enemy,’’ supporting ‘‘terrorism and bringing enemies into Iraq. . .I’ve seen clear interference in Iraqi issues by Iran. . .Iran interferes in order to kill democracy.’’ A few months later Sha’alan—a secular Shi’ite who is one of Iran’s most outspoken critics in Iraq—added that the Iranians ‘‘are fighting us because we want to build freedom and democracy, and they want to build an Islamic dictatorship and have turbaned clerics to rule in Iraq.’’220 Sha’alan made several points in a briefing on September 22, 2004: • Iranian intervention and support of Al-Sadr pose major threats; and some infiltration has taken place across the Syria border. • Iran is behind Al-Sadr. It uses Iranian pilgrims and sends arms, money, and drugs across the border. • Iraq must have strong border defense forces. ‘‘If doors and windows are empty, no amount of cleaning will ever get rid of the dust.’’

In a study of Iran’s role in Iraq, the International Crisis Group noted that an Iranian cleric and close associate of Ayatollah Sistani warned in November 2004, ‘‘Iran’s

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policy in Iraq is 100 per cent wrong. In trying to keep the Americans busy they have furthered the suffering of ordinary Iraqis . . .We are not asking them to help the Americans, but what they are doing is not in the interests of the Iraqi people; it is making things worse. We [Iranians] have lost the trust of the Iraqi people [Mardom-e Aragh az dast dadeem].’’221 In contrast, King Abdullah of Jordan has made a wide range of charges about Iranian interference in Iraq and went so far as to charge during the period before the Iraqi election that Iran was attempting to rig Iraq’s election with up to 1,000,000 false registrations. He has since talked about the risk of an Iraqi-Syrian-Lebanese Shi’ite axis or crescent. In an extraordinary interview aired on Iraqi TV on January 14, 2005, Muayed AlNasseri, commander of Saddam Hussein’s ‘‘Army of Muhammad,’’ claimed that his group regularly received arms and money from both Syria and Iran. ‘‘Many factions of the resistance are receiving aid from the neighboring countries,’’ he said. ‘‘We got aid primarily from Iran.’’222 On October 13, 2005, the Iraqi Interior Ministry announced that Iraqi security forces had arrested ten Iranian ‘‘infiltrators’’ trying to enter the country illegally. A total of 88 suspected insurgents were arrested in the raid, including one Somali citizen. Iraqi security forces also seized a number of weapons and ammunition caches.223 In a similar incident in July 2005, Iraqi Border Guards exchanged fire with gunmen crossing into Iraq from Iran. The Iraqi security forces also uncovered a cache of explosives, timers, and detonators.224 Such incidents, in addition to growing allegations of Iranian involvement by Baghdad and Washington, suggest that Iran may have moved from having the ability to create unrest and violence in Iraq to actively supporting insurgents. According to what several newspapers claim are classified intelligence reports, British intelligence officials suspect insurgents led by Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani are responsible for the deaths of at least 11 British soldiers in southern Iraq.225 An investigation of Iranian involvement in Iraq in August 2005 by TIME magazine identified al-Sheibani as the leader of the insurgency in the south. According to the magazine, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had been instrumental in creating the alSheibani group and providing it with weapons and training. U.S. intelligence officials also believe the group, estimated to number almost 300 militants, is responsible for at least 37 bombs against U.S. troops in 2005 alone.226 British officials accused a second Tehran-backed militia group, the Mujahedeen for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, of having killed six British Royal Military Police in Majar el-Kabir in 2003.227 In early October 2005, the British government publicly blamed Iran for the deaths of eight British soldiers in southern Iraq. Although British officials had complained to Tehran about ongoing arms smuggling across the porous Iran-Iraq border earlier in the year, this marked the first time London officially implicated Tehran in the deaths of Coalition troops. British officials accused Iran’s Revolutionary Guard of supplying advanced-technology ‘‘shaped charges’’ capable of penetrating even the toughest armor to insurgents in Iraq and of trying to further destabilize the country.228 Echoing British accusations, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld stated

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that some weapons found in Iraq have ‘‘clearly [and] unambiguously’’ originated from Iran.229 A number of experts believe that Tehran-backed militias have infiltrated Iraqi security forces. In September 2005, Iraq’s National Security Adviser, Mouwafak alRubaie, admitted that insurgents had penetrated Iraqi police forces in many parts of the country, but refused to speculate about the extent of this infiltration.230 MNF-I, U.S. Embassy, and British Embassy reporting continued to cite this as a problem through the fall of 2006, and Prime Minister Malikis’s new government repeatedly raised the issue in its discussions with Iran. Some reports suggest that between 70 and 90 percent of Basra’s police force has been infiltrated by religious and political factions. The Al-Mahdi Army, in particular, is believed to have almost de facto control over the police. Not surprisingly, corruption and violence is on the rise within the force. More than 1,300 murders were documented in Basra during the first nine months of 2005, many of them allegedly by men in police uniform.231 A second Tehran-backed group, the Badr Brigade, controlled the city’s Bureau of Internal Affairs up until spring 2005232—all in a city not considered an Al-Sadr stronghold, an individual frequently associated with these groups. There are numerous reports of Iranian-backed groups exerting influence over the lives of everyday Iraqis. Achieving a government job in Basra today is almost impossible without the sponsorship of one of these groups. Teaching posts in local schools and universities are increasingly filled only by those deemed ideologically loyal to Iran.233 Iranian goods flood local markets and Farsi is becoming the area’s second language.234 Some U.S. and British officials feel that Iran was backing the insurgency in southern Iraq. The exact level of Iranian influence over the Iraqi insurgency is still unknown, however. Whether the Tehran regime, or elements of it, is encouraging or merely allowing attacks against Coalition troops stationed in southern Iraq is unclear. It should be noted, however, that Iran has repeatedly denied these charges. Moreover, other American experts and some top U.S. officials and commanders are more concerned with the potential role Iran could play in any Iraqi civil conflict, or its influence over a Shi’ite political majority in office, than with direct Iranian support of a Shi’ite insurgency. As General George Casey put it, ‘‘I don’t see substantial Iranian influence on this particular government that will be elected in January. I see Iran as more of a longer-term threat to Iraqi security. . .a long-term threat to stability in Iraq. If you look on the other side, I think Syria is a short-term threat, because of the support they provide to Ba’athist leaders operating inside and outside of Iraq.’’235 In July 2005, Kurdish intelligence officials asserted that Ansar was based primarily in Iran and that attacks in the Kurdish areas could have occurred only with Iranian support. According to an Iraqi Kurdish reporter, the Iranian cities of Mahabad and Saqqiz are centers where Ansar recruited among the Iranian Kurds. Such claims cannot be independently verified.

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Iran has not been, and never will be, passive in dealing with Iraq. For example, it sent a top-level official, Kamal Kharrazi, to Iraq on May 17, 2005—only 48 hours after U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had left the country. Kharrazi met with Prime Minister al-Jaafari and Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari. He also met with other top officials and key members of the Shi’ite parties. His visit was at a minimum a demonstration of Iran’s influence in an Iraq governed by a Shi’ite majority, even though some key Iraqi Shi’a parties like Al Dawa have scarcely been strong supporters of Iran. Kharrazi also gave an important message at his press conference, ‘‘. . . the party that will leave Iraq is the United States because it will eventually withdraw . . .But the party that will live with the Iraqis is Iran because it is a neighbor to Iraq.’’236 In summer 2005, the Iraqi and Iranian Ministers of Defense, Sadoun Dulaimi and Admiral Ali Shamkhani, met and concluded a five-point military agreement. The meeting, however, produced conflicting statements as to what had been agreed upon. The Iranian Minister, Shamkhani, asserted that as part of the deal Iran would train a number of Iraqi troops. His counterpart, Dulaimi, however, stated that the Iraqi government was satisfied with the Coalition efforts and that Iran would not be training Iraqi troops. Iran would, however, be providing $1 billion in aide that would go toward reconstruction. Dulaimi conceded that some would go to the Ministry of Defense.237 Several high-level meetings between Iraqi and Iranian officials took place in the fall of 2005. Iraq’s Deputy Minister, Ahmed Chalabi, met with Iranian officials in Tehran only days before traveling to the United States to meet with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The timing was seen by many as odd given accusations in May 2004 by U.S. officials that Chalabi gave Iran classified information.238 In mid-November, Iraq’s National Security Adviser, Mouwafak al-Rubaie, traveled to Tehran. While there, he signed a memorandum of understanding with the Iranian government committing the two governments to cooperate on sensitive intelligencesharing matters, counterterrorism, and cross-border infiltration of Al Qa’ida figures. The agreement took Washington by surprise: U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad told reporters he found out about the agreement only afterward.239 Iraqi President Jalal Talabani traveled to Iran in late November, becoming the first Iraqi head of state to do so in almost four decades. Talabani spent three days in Iran and met with both Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Al-Rubaie, who accompanied Talabani on the trip, told reporters he asked the Iranians to use their influence with Damascus to secure Syrian cooperation in sealing off the Iraqi border to insurgents.240 In their meeting, Khamenei told Talabani that foreign troops were to blame for the ongoing violence and urged the Iraqi President to tell the occupiers to go: ‘‘The presence of foreign troops is damaging for the Iraqis, and the Iraqi government should ask for their departure by proposing a timetable. . .the US and Britain will eventually have to leave Iraq with a bitter experience.’’241 According to Talabani, Khamenei promised to support the Iraqi President’s efforts to end the insurgency. With regard to Iraq, Khamenei told the official IRNA news

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agency: ‘‘Your security is our own security and Iran honors Iraq’s independence and power . . .We will extend assistance to you in those fields.’’ But Khamenei made a point of denying any responsibility for the violence next door, saying: ‘‘Iran considers the United States to be responsible for all crimes and terrorist acts in Iraq and the suffering and misery of the Iraqi people.’’242 Another high-profile Iraqi visit to Tehran took place on November 27 by Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi. Abdul-Mahdi met with his Iranian counterpart, Vice President for Executive Affairs Ali Saeedlou to discuss the implementation of accords reached earlier in the month. Together, these visits seemed to mark a sign of improving relations between the two countries in late 2005. As mentioned above, Iran’s influence in Iraq is not just of a political or military nature, but economic as well. In addition to Iranian government aid allotted for reconstruction, Iranian businessmen have reportedly invested heavily in restoring their neighbor’s infrastructure. Nonprofit groups headquartered in Iran also helped to provide basic services to Iraqis during the chaos that followed the toppling of Saddam and the dissolution of the Ba’athist government. One nongovernmental organization established in Tehran with ties to the Iranian government, ‘‘Reconstruction of the Holy Shrines of Iraq,’’ claims that it has completed more than 300 construction, cultural, and religious projects in the country. Another group, the Organization of Ahl-ul-Bait, whose leadership is comprised of Iranian mullahs, has sent ambulances, doctors, and teachers into Iraq.243 New complaints regarding Iranian interference in Iraq were leveled again in March 2006 by Secretary Rumsfeld, who accused Iran of deploying its Revolutionary Guard to Iraq. He said that Iran was ‘‘putting people into Iraq to do things that are harmful to the future of Iraq,’’ and that it was something that Tehran would ‘‘look back on as having been an error in judgment.’’244 That same month, President Bush asserted that ‘‘Tehran has been responsible for at least some of the increasing lethality of anti-coalition attacks by providing Shi’a militia with the capabilities to build improvised explosive devices in Iraq.’’245 U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad made similar allegations. He accused Iran of publicly supporting Iraq’s political process while it clandestinely trained and aided Shi’ite militia groups as well as Sunni insurgent organizations such as Ansar al-Sunna. He stated, ‘‘Our judgment is that training and supplying, direct or indirect, takes place, and that there is also provision of financial resources to people, to militias, and that there is a presence of people associated with the Revolutionary Guard and with MOIS.’’246 Khalilzad’s comments came as the United States and Iran announced that they had agreed to hold direct talks for the first time on how to reduce the violence in Iraq. These talks, scheduled to take place in Iraq, were at the request of SCIRI leader, Abdul al-Hakim, who had solicited Iranian assistance in the past. Ambassador Khalilzad, who had also reached out to Tehran’s leaders, was to receive the Iranian negotiators when they arrived.247 Both sides came to the talks with minimal expectations. In addition, U.S. officials remained adamant that the discussions would be narrowly focused on Iraqi security

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issues and would not include the Iranian nuclear program. In statements leading up to the talks, it appeared Tehran saw them as an opportunity to change Washington’s behavior, while the United States indicated that Iran’s desire to meet was an indication that it was realizing that its defiant posture was not working. Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, made the announcement to the Iranian Parliament saying, ‘‘I think Iraq is a good testing ground for America to take a hard look at the way it acts. . .If there’s a determination in America to take that hard look, then we’re prepared to help.’’ He went on to indicate that Iran was willing to help the United States in Iraq, but only under the condition that the ‘‘United States should respect the vote of the people. Their Army must not provoke from behind the scenes.’’248 Yet, U.S. officials such as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice emphasized that the negotiations would focus only on Iraq. National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley added optimistically, however, that Iran was ‘‘finally beginning to listen.’’249 The announcement of these negotiations drew a strong condemnation from The Iraqi Consensus Front, Iraq’s dominant Sunni political party. In a statement it called the negotiations ‘‘an obvious unjustified interference,’’ and added, ‘‘It’s not up to the American ambassador to talk to Iran about Iraq.’’250 None of these pressures or issues faded during the course of 2006. It is also clear that Iran faces a dilemma. It benefits from U.S. support for Iraq to help it deal with the insurgency and provide economic aid. Yet, it fears being ‘‘encircled’’ by the U.S. presence in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Gulf. Iranian officials have threatened to destabilize Iraq if the United States brings military pressure against Iran because of its alleged nuclear weapons program. A split in Iraq’s government could lead some Shi’ite factions to actively turn to Iran for support, and the divisions in Iran’s government create the ongoing risk that hard-line elements might intervene in Iraq even if its government did not fully support such action. Iran also faces the reality that it is ‘‘Persian’’ while Iraq is ‘‘Arab,’’ and Iraqi and Iranian Shi’ites do not always share common values and interests. Many of the Iraqi exile groups and militia members who lived in Iran before the fall of Saddam Hussein were never particularly grateful to Iran during the time they had to remain in exile and are not pro-Iranian now. The Ayatollah Sistani, Iraq’s preeminent Shi’ite religious leader—as well as virtually all of the influential Iraqi clergy except Al-Sadr —is a ‘‘quietest,’’ who opposes the idea that religious figures should play a direct role in politics. Moreover, the Grand Ayatollah Sistani has rejected the religious legitimacy of a velayat-e faqih or supreme religious leader like Iran’s Khameni. The major Iraqi Shi’ite parties that did operate in Iran before Saddam’s fall did endorse the idea of a velayat-e faqih while they were dependent on Iran, but have since taken the position that Iraq should not be a theocratic state, much less under the control of an Ayatollah-like figure. Iran’s aims in Iraq may not be to secure a religious theocracy akin to its own, but merely to assure a Shi’ite-backed Baghdad government friendly to Tehran.

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While the evidence is unclear, there is no firm indication of the existence of any major Iranian effort to destabilize or control Iraq through September 2006.251 However, the present and future uncertainties surrounding Iran’s role can scarcely be ignored. Iran does seem to have tolerated an Al Qa’ida presence in Iran, or at least its transit through the country, as a means of putting pressure on the United States in spite of the organization’s hostility toward Shi’ites. Iran may have been active in supporting groups like Al Ansar in the past, or at least turning a blind eye, and may allow cross-border infiltration in Iraq’s Kurdish region. Syria Both senior U.S. and Iraqi officials feel that Syria may overtly have agreed to try to halt any support of the insurgency, but allows Islamic extremist groups to recruit young men, have them come to Syria, and then cross the border into Iraq—where substantial numbers have become suicide bombers. They also feel Syria has allowed senior ex-Ba’athist cadres to operate from Syria, helping to direct the Sunni insurgency. As has been touched upon earlier, these include top level officials under Saddam Hussein, such as Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, one of Saddam’s vice presidents. General George Casey, the commander of the Multi-National Force (MNF), has been careful not to exaggerate the threat of foreign interference. Nevertheless, Casey has warned that Syria has allowed Iraqi supporters of Saddam Hussein to provide money, supplies, and direction to Sunni insurgents and continues to be a serious source of infiltration by foreign volunteers.252 General Casey highlighted Syria’s complicity in this regard when testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 8, 2005:253 There are former regime leaders who come and go from Syria, who operate out of Syria, and they do planning, and they provide resources to the insurgency in Iraq. I have no hard evidence that the Syrian government is actually complicit with those people, but we certainly have evidence that people at low levels with the Syrian government know that they’re there and what they’re up to.

The U.S. State Department spokesman described Syria’s role as follows in the late spring of 2005:254 I think that what we’ve seen, again, are some efforts, but it certainly isn’t enough. We do believe the Syrians can do more. We do believe there’s more they can do along the border to tighten controls. We do believe that there’s more that they can do to deal with the regime elements that are operating out of Syria itself and are supporting or encouraging the insurgents there. And so, again, it’s not simply a matter of them not being able to take the actions, at least from our perspective. Part of it is an unwillingness to take the actions that we know are necessary and they know are necessary.

Syria has repeatedly and emphatically denied that it supports or harbors any persons involved in the insurgency in Iraq. After months of American pressure and

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accusations, however, Syrian authorities delivered a group suspected of supporting the insurgency from Syria to Iraqi officials in February 2005. Among the captives handed over was Sabawi Ibrahim Hassan, Saddam Hussein’s half-brother and a leading financier for the insurgency. Syria’s Foreign Minister, Farouk al-Sharaa, stated that Syria was doing all that it could, but it needed equipment tailored to policing the borders, such as night vision goggles.255 There have also been reports that Zarqawi obtained most of his new young volunteers through Syria and that they were recruited and transited in ways that had to be known to Syrian intelligence. There had also been media reports that Zarqawi’s top lieutenants, and perhaps Zarqawi himself, met in Syria for planning sessions.256 These reports were called into question by U.S. intelligence assessments in June 2005. U.S. officials and commanders, as well as Iraqi officials, acknowledge that Syria has made some efforts to improve its border security and reduce infiltration. In summer 2005, Syrian security forces fought suspected militants, possibly former bodyguards of Saddam Hussein, for two days near Qassioun Mountain, and a sweep of the border area with Lebanon led to the arrest of some 34 suspected militants. In a high-profile case, Syria arrested a man and his brother’s wife whom it accused of facilitating militants’ passage into Iraq. The woman admitted on Al Arabiya satellite television that the brothers had crossed into Iraq to join Saddam’s Fedayeen prior to the Coalition invasion.257 U.S. Central Command Director of Intelligence Brigadier General John Custer acknowledged in July 2005 that Syria had made efforts to improve the situation and faced problems in patrolling the border. Custer stated that Syria had bolstered the forces along the eastern border with units relocated from Lebanon. In comments that seemed to contradict what other intelligence officials had said, Custer stated the following:258 I think Syria is intent on assisting the US in Iraq.. . . [I have] no information, intelligence or anything credible [that Syria] is involved or facilitating in any way [the flow of insurgents into Iraq]. . .Could they do more? Yes. Are they doing more? Yes. They are working very hard. As troops have been pulled out of Lebanon, we’ve seen some of those troops go to the border. I am convinced that they are not only doing it along the border but are arresting people as they transit.

The British military attache´ in Damascus, Colonel Julian Lyne-Pirkis, inspected the Syrian efforts at the border and agreed with Custer’s assessment. Custer suggested that the security environment on the border was a combination of a tradition of lawlessness and lack of Syrian ability to police the area, creating a greater impression of Syrian complicity than there actually was. He stated, ‘‘It’s not a question of intent— it’s simply capacity and capability. You’ve got a 600-kilometer border there, some of the toughest desert, and you have a thousand-year-old culture of smuggling. Smuggling men now is no different than smuggling men a 1,000 years ago. It’s all a smuggling economy.’’259 Syria faces problems because its border forces are relatively weak,

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they lack training and equipment, and much of the border is demarcated only by an earthen beam. At the same time, they feel Syria deliberately turns a blind eye toward many operations and the large number of Islamist extremist volunteers crossing the border. Some analysts have suggested that the regime in Damascus may view the insurgency in Iraq as a means to ‘‘export’’ their own Islamist extremists who might otherwise take aim at Assad’s secular regime (led by an Alawite minority). However, such a view, analysts say, is extremely near-sighted as it is quite possible that extremists in Iraq could cross back into Syria, bringing practical guerrilla warfare experience with them much like the Mujahedeen who fought in the Afghan war brought back to their countries of origin. Such hardened and trained militants could then pose a very serious threat to the ruling regime. As one commentator stated, ‘‘They [militants and Syria] may have slept in the same bed to fight the Americans, but what’s important for al Qa’ida is that it has entered the bedroom [Syria] and secured a foothold there.’’260 Indeed, such views were supported by classified CIA and U.S. State Department studies in summer 2005. Analysts referred to the return of experienced and trained militants to their country of origin or third-party country as ‘‘bleed out’’ or ‘‘terrorist dispersal.’’ 261 The studies sought to compare the returning Mujahedeen from Afghanistan to those who fought in Iraq. Like Syria, those countries could be threatened by the fighters who return with advanced warfare skills.262 A Marine Corps spokesman pointed out that if nothing else, certain techniques such as the use of IEDs had already been transferred from Iraq to combat zones like Afghanistan. Experts, however, point to the fact that while the Afghan war attracted thousands of foreign fighters, Iraq has yet to do so, meaning that the potential number of returning veterans would be much less.263 Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef echoed the conclusions of the CIA and State Department studies, pointing out that many of the terrorists who operated in Saudi from May 2003 on were either veterans of the Soviet conflict in Afghanistan or had trained in the camps that operated until Operation Enduring Freedom eliminated them. Nayef and other Saudi officials believe that the Saudis who return from the conflict in Iraq will have skills that are even more lethal than those exhibited by the Afghan war veterans. Nayef stated, ‘‘We expect the worst from those who went to Iraq. They will be worse, and we will be ready for them.’’264 Washington’s warnings to Damascus over border security intensified during the fall of 2005. On October 7, Syrian President Bashar Assad told the pan-Arab newspaper Al Hayat, ‘‘They (Americans) have no patrols at the border, not a single American or Iraqi on their side of the border. . .We cannot control the border from one side.’’265 Assad’s comments came a day after President Bush and Prime Minister Blair both issued renewed warnings against continued Syrian and Iranian involvement in Iraqi affairs, specifically their roles in giving shelter to Islamic extremists. A senior U.S. official also suggested that the war might have spread beyond Iraq’s borders, telling the Financial Times, ‘‘We are concerned that Syria is allowing its territory to be part of the Iraqi battlefield. That’s a choice the Syrians made. We think

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that is an unwise choice.’’266 In his interview with Al Hayat, Assad said the absence of security along the border was hurting Syria and maintained that ‘‘controlling it will help Syria because the chaos in Iraq affects us.’’ Assad said his country had arrested more than 1,300 infiltrators from Iraq since the war began.267 The following day, Assistant Secretary of State David Welch responded by saying the United States was ‘‘ask[ing] the Syrian government not to interfere in such matters.’’ Welch went on to say, ‘‘It appears that they are not listening and it seems this behavior is not changing.’’ 268 The rhetorical exchanges, however, did not prevent the Syrian Airlines Company from flying its inaugural post-Saddam era flight between Damascus and Baghdad on October 11. It was the first regular flight to operate between the two capitals in a quarter of a century.269 The situation has remained roughly the same during the course of 2006, although Iraq is making efforts to create more effective border police. Virtually anyone can go in and out, moving money and small critical supplies, and volunteers can simply enter as ordinary visitors without equipment. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers are working to train their Iraqi counterparts and have had moderate success in detaining potential insurgents and arms suppliers, and in breaking up smuggling rings. Another U.S. CBP team of officers and border agents was deployed in Iraq on February 1, 2005, to assist further in the training of Iraqis. This may help, but Iraq’s border security forces have so far been some of its most ineffective units. Many of its new forts are abandoned and other units that have remained exhibit minimal activity. Yet, even if Iraq’s border forces were ready and its neighbors actively helped, border security would still be a problem, in part because they are often vast, uninhabited areas. This illustrates a general problem for both Iraq and its neighbors. Iraq’s borders total 3,650 kilometers in length. Its border with Iran is 1,458 kilometers; with Jordan, 181 kilometers; with Kuwait, 240 kilometers; with Saudi Arabia, 814 kilometers; with Syria, 605 kilometers; and with Turkey, 352 kilometers. Most of these borders are desert, desolate territory, easily navigable water barriers, or mountains. Even Iraq’s small 58-kilometer coastline is in an area with considerable small craft and shipping traffic, which presents security problems. Syria has an Alawite-led regime that is more Shi’ite than Sunni, and while it sees its support of Sunni insurgents as a way of weakening the potential threat from a U.S. presence in Syria, it also maintains ties to Shi’ite factions as well. While it may tolerate and encourage former Iraqi Ba’athist operations in Syria, and transit by Islamist extremists, Syria also maintains ties to elements of formerly Iranianbacked Iraqi Shi’ite groups like the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Al-Da’wa, and Al-Da’wa–Tanzim al-Iraq that it first developed during the Iran-Iraq War. Syria’s crackdown on fighters passing into Iraq through its borders, an effort praised by U.S. military officials, was likely the result of broader national security interests and concerns about regime stability.270 Indeed, despite speculation that the Syrian government was on the brink of reform, indications in early 2006 suggested quite the opposite.

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Far from opening the Ba’ath-dominated rule to a multiparty system, Syria implemented new oppressive measures against political opponents and sought methods to co-opt religious elements of society. Fearing the gathering momentum of Islamic political parties such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood—each of which had electoral victories in Palestine and Egypt, respectively—the Ba’ath Party of Syria attempted to head off similar challenges in its state by allowing religious figures a greater role in government and giving them a freer hand to conduct their business among their followers so long as it does not attempt to rival the Syrian government.271

10

Yemen

Yemen is not a Gulf country, but it is a major state on the Arabian Peninsula, and one that has long played a major strategic role in Gulf security. As is shown in Map 10.1, Yemen has coasts on and islands in the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea, and it occupies a strategic position at the Bab al-Mandeb—the narrow strait that controls the entrance to the Red Sea and which every ship passing through the Suez Canal must also traverse. Yemen shares borders with Oman and Saudi Arabia, and there has been a long history of clashes between Yemen [now a federation of the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) and People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY)], and Oman and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia won a border war with what became the YAR in the 1930s, taking control over the disputed territory—control which is still disputed by some Yemeni nationalists. Saudi Arabia and Egypt nearly came to war when both sides took part in a Yemeni civil war from 1962 to 1967.1 South Yemen became a violent Marxist regime when it achieved independence in 1967, and it clashed with Oman as well as North Yemen. South Yemen sponsored a violent Marxist insurgent movement in Oman and provided it with military support and sanctuary during the Dhofar Rebellion, which lasted from 1964 to 1975.2 Hundreds of thousands of Yemenis fled from the south to the north over the two decades after South Yemen became independent, and both states had several border wars and became involved in assassinations and covert operations. The regime in the PDRY was so extreme, however, that it provoked a civil war in the late 1980s that led to the collapse of the state and created a political climate that made unification with the YAR both popular and necessary. The two countries were unified as the Republic of Yemen in 1990. A civil war broke out between elements in the north and south in 1994, but the southern secessionist movement lacked broad support and was defeated within a year.3

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Map 10.1 Yemen

Yemen has resolved its border disputes with Oman and Saudi Arabia; Yemen and Saudi Arabia seem to have reached a stable border agreement in 2000. There still, however, are armed clashes at the tribal level between Yemenis and Saudi security forces. Smuggling from Yemen to Saudi Arabia—including the supply of arms, explosives, and drugs for terrorist organizations—is a continuing problem. So is the long legacy of radicalism in Yemen, tribal and political divisions that limit the central government’s internal security capabilities, and the presence of significant Islamist extremist elements including some linked to Al Qa’ida. The central government has made serious efforts to deal with these problems. Yemen signed a security pact with the United Arab Emirates in 2005, and it began to conduct joint exercises with Saudi Arabia. The security pact with the United Arab Emirates was designed to facilitate stronger anti–Al Qa’ida efforts between the two states, both of which have a long history of combating domestic militants.4 The first military exercises with the Saudis occurred on March 28, 2005. Though the exercises

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did not include large numbers of units, they are a symbolic effort to continue to improve relations.5 Infiltration of terrorists, illegal immigration, and weapons smuggling from Yemen to Saudi Arabia is, however, a source of tension.6 The same is true of the steady flow of illegal immigrants seeking jobs in Saudi Arabia. It explains why Saudi Arabia began constructing a security barrier along the Yemeni border in 2004 and why the Kingdom is examining proposals for a much more sophisticated border control system that could cost well in excess of $5 billion.7 Religious tensions are also an issue. The population is probably over 90 percent Muslim, with limited numbers of Jews, Christians, and Hindus. It is split, however, between Shaf ’i (Sunni) and Zaydi (Shi’ite) Muslims, and there do seem to have been some tribal clashes along sectarian lines. Internal stability remains a serious problem. Although Yemen is making some progress toward stability, it has a long history of civil war and violence. The central government has tenuous control over many tribal elements, and crimes like kidnappings of foreigners are endemic. Real unemployment, including disguised unemployment, is sometimes put as high as 40 percent, and it is unlikely that it is lower than 35 percent. The population in mid-2005 was 20.7 million, with an extremely high birthrate of 3.45 percent, and 46 percent of the population was under the age of 15 years. The Yemeni economy cannot support this rapidly growing population. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimates the gross domestic product (GDP) at between $11 and $13 billion.8 The CIA estimates the GDP at only $17.2 billion, even in purchasing power parity terms, the per capita income at only $800, and estimates that well over 40 percent of the population is below the poverty line. Most workers are employed in agriculture and herding in one of the least productive agricultural sectors in the world because its output is dominated by a lowgrade narcotic called Qat. The CIA estimates that services, construction, industry, and commerce account for less than one-fourth of the labor force, and the real figure may be less than 15 percent. Only remittances from workers overseas and foreign aid allow the nation to function. This economic and demographic instability, coupled with a long history of tolerating the presence of extremist and terrorist movements when they do not directly threaten the regime, makes Yemen a potential threat to both Oman and Saudi Arabia. MILITARY SPENDING AND ARMS IMPORTS The CIA estimates that the Yemeni national budget had $5.6 billion in revenues in 2005 and $5.7 billion in expenditures. This limits what Yemen can spend on security and military forces, and Yemen has not been able to benefit from the free or low-cost arms imports it received from the United States and the former Soviet Union (FSU) during the Cold War for well over a decade. According to the IISS, Yemen’s military budget has been steadily increasing over the past few years, rising from $482 million

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in 2001, to $809 million in 2003, $869 million in 2004, and $942 million in 2005.9 If correct, this represents a 96-percent increase of Yemen’s military spending in five years and is much higher than the $374 million to $539 million a year that Yemen spent in the 1990s.10 It represents a major burden on Yemen’s GDP and economy.11 As is the case with other countries in the region, Yemen is an arms importer. Figure 10.1 shows the trends in arms deliveries to Yemen by the supplier. It shows that, unlike other Gulf States, Yemen has not been a major recent importer of U.S. arms. At the same time, Figure 10.1 shows Yemen’s arms deliveries have nearly doubled from $400 million during 1993–1996 to $700 million during 2001–2004. It is equally important, however, to note that Yemen has relied on Europe, China, and recently Russia for its arms purchases. For example, China delivered $100 million worth of arms to Yemen between 1993 and 1996 and another $100 million between 2001 and 2004. Russia has also emerged as an arms exporter to Yemen. Between 2001 and 2004, Russia delivered $400 million worth of new arms to Yemen. Figure 10.2, on the other hand, shows the value of recent new arms agreements between Yemen and outside suppliers. The trend of Yemen’s new arms agreements is also on the rise. Between 2001 and 2004, Yemen signed several agreements, which the United States and the major western European countries were absent from. Russia signed $600 million worth of new agreements between 2001 and 2004. China signed $100 million, as well as $200 million worth of agreements with other nations during the same period, putting Yemen’s total new arms agreements at approximately $900 million. In spite of the upward trend in both deliveries and new arms agreements, however, Yemen is still not able to fund anything approaching large amounts of more

Figure 10.1 Yemen’s Arms Deliveries by Supplier, 1993–2004

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Figure 10.2 Yemen’s New Arms Agreements by Supplier, 1993–2004

advanced weapons or even recapitalize its existing force structure without significant force cuts or reliance on obsolete equipment. At this point in time, Yemen lacks any clear enemy. Nevertheless, it seems no more capable of making hard tradeoffs between force quality and force quantity and bringing force modernization into balance with resources than most other powers in the Middle East North Africa region. MILITARY MANPOWER Total Yemeni military manpower was around 66,700 in 2006, with slightly larger paramilitary forces totaling 70,000. These levels of total manning have been typical since the mid-1990s, although Yemen reached totals of 127,000 in the early 1990s. The army had some 60,000 men, the navy, 1,700; the air force, 5,000; and the air defense force, 2,000. There were some 50,000 men in paramilitary roles in the Ministry of the Interior, another 20,000 in tribal levies, and a small coast guard was being created. Two-year conscripts made up a significant part of the total, although they were a small part of Yemen’s potential pool. The CIA estimates that some 237,000 young men became eligible for conscription in 2005. In broad terms, Yemen paid little attention to effective military manpower, lacked effective schools and career development programs, and did not have an effective noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps or mix of technical personnel. As in all countries, there were some outstanding officers and NCOs, but Yemen did a poor overall job in developing suitable manpower quality.

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Yemen showed little interest in effective combined arms and joint warfare training and exercises. THE YEMENI ARMY The Yemeni Army has some effective battalion-sized elements, but is largely a hollow force better suited to internal security purposes than war fighting. It has a nominal strength of 60,000 men, many of whom are two-year conscripts. It has some 40,000 reserves, with little or no meaningful reserve training. Figure 10.3 confirms the decreasing trend in the overall manpower of Yemen’s conventional army since the consolidation of the state in 1990 and after the brief civil war of 1994. This manning is very limited relative to the total potential manpower pool provided by Yemen’s population. As has been noted earlier, Yemen’s population is young, 46.5 percent of the population is between ages 0–14.12 Yemen has approximately 2.8 million men between ages 18–49 who are capable of military service (roughly 13.5 percent of the population).13 On average, 236,517 men become eligible for military service every year.14 At the same time, Yemen faces only limited external conventional military threats. Improved relations with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Oman have lessened Yemen’s need for protection against external threats. Yemen’s poor economy has also crippled its military growth. Unlike most other ‘‘southern Gulf ’’ countries, the fall of Saddam Hussein did not remove a major conventional threat to Yemen. Iraq was too far away to be a threat, and Saddam and Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Salih had relatively good relations.15 The Yemeni Army’s force structure is large for its manpower pool. It includes 8 armored brigades, 16 infantry brigades, 6 mechanized brigades, 2 airborne and commando brigades, 1 Special Forces brigade, and a central guard force. Yemen has a number of major combat support units. They include 3 artillery brigades, and 6 air defense brigades with 4 antiaircraft (AA) guns and 1 surface-to-air missile battalion. It has 1 surface-to-surface missile (SSM) brigade with 12 Free Rockets Over Ground (FROGs), 10 SS-21s, and 6/33 SCUD missiles. The operational status of most of these missiles is uncertain. This order of battle is roughly equivalent to a seven-division force and would normally require about 30 to 50 percent more total manpower than the army possesses. Armor and Antiarmor Weapons The army has a mix of a wide variety of equipment types, many of which are obsolete or worn. Figure 10.3 shows that Yemen has 790 main battle tanks (MBTs), including 30 T-34s, 450 T-54/T-55s, 200 T-62s, 50 M-60A1s, and 60 T-72s.16 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, however, estimated that Yemen has 763 MBTs, which include 30 T-72s, 75 T-62s, and 106 upgraded T-54/T-55s.17 Regardless of the exact number, Yemen’s MBTs were dominated by older and obsolescent types. There has also been a significant downward trend in numbers. The

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Figure 10.3 Yemeni Army’s Force Structure Trends, 1990–2006 1990

2000

2005

2006

134,500

101,000

100,000

100,000

Active

64,500

61,000

60,000

60,000

Reserve

70,000

40,000

40,000

40,000

Manpower

Combat Units Armored Brigade

4

9

8

8

Mechanized Brigade

4

7

6

6

Infantry Brigade

18

18

16

16

Special Forces Brigade

1

1

1

1

Commando/Airborne

2

2

2

2

Artillery Brigade

8

3

3

3

1

3

1

1

Air Defense

2

4

6

6

Guard/Central Guard Force

1

1

1

1

1,195

990

790

790

0

30

60

60

Surface-to-Surface Missiles Brigades

Main Battle Tanks T-72 M-60A1

140

60

50

50

T-62

100

250

200

200

T-54/T-55

475

500

450

450

T-34 Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles

150–480

150

30

30

300

200

200

200

200

200

200

BMP-1/BMP-2

300

Reconnaissance

305+

200

130

130

50

0

0

0

†

0

0

0

125

100

80

80

Saladin Ferret AML-90 BRDM-2

*

?

130

100

50

50

720

440

710

710

M-113

70

60

60

60

BTR 40/60/152

650

380

650

650


Artillery

913+

1,645+

1,153+

1,153+

TOWED 76-mm M-1942

200

0

0

0

TOWED 105-mm M-101A1

90

35

25

25

520


TOWED 122-mm D-30

120

130

130

130

TOWED 122-mm M-1931/37

30

20

30

30

40

100

40

40

TOWED 130-mm M-46

65

75

60

60

TOWED 15-2mm D-20

0

10

10

10

TOWED 155-mm M-114

12

12

15

15

TOWED 122-mm M-30 M1938

SP 122-mm 2S1 Carnation

0

0

25

25

Coastal 130-mm SM-4-1

36

36

36

36

MRL 122-mm BM-21

205

184

280

280

MRL 14-0mm BM-14

15

?

14

14

MOR M-43

100

0

0

0

MOR 81-mm

?

600

200

200

MOR 82-mm M-93

?

200

90

90

MOR 107 mm

0

12

12

12

MOR 120 mm

?

100

100

100

MOR 160 mm

0

100

100

100

?

?

?

?

20

0

0

0

Antitank Weapons Vigiliant MSL AT-3 Sagger

36

35

35

35

MSL M47 Dragon

24

24

24

24

MSL TOW

12

12

12

12

RCL 107-mm B-11

0

?

?

?

RCL 75-mm M-20

?

?

?

?

RCL 82-mm B-10

?

?

?

?

RL 66-mm M-72 LAW

?

?

?

?

RL 73-mm RPG-7Knout

0

0

?

?

GUNS 100-mm M-1944

40

20

20

20

GUNS 100-mm SU-100

30

30

30

30

GUNS 85-mm D-44

30

?

?

?

Air Defense Missiles

?

?

1,358

1,358

SAM

?

?

800

800

SA-2

?

0

0

0

SA-13 Gopher

0

?

?

?

SA-14 Gremlin

0

?

?

?

YEMEN

SA-7 Grail

?

?

?

?

SA-9 Gaskin

?

?

?

?

372

470

530

530

20

20

20

20

52

40

50

50

23-mm ZSU-23

30

0

0

0

SP 23-mm ZSU-23-4

30

100

50

50

TOWED 23-mm 100ZSU-23-

0

0

100

100

TOWED 37-mm M-1939

150

150

150

150

TOWED 57-mm S-60

120

120

120

120

0

40

40

40

12

28

28

28

FROG-7

0

12

12

12

SS-21 Scarab

12

10

10

10

0

6

6

6

Air Defense Guns SP 20-mm M-163 Vulcan TOWED 20-mm M-167 Vulcan

521

2

TOWED 85-mm KS-12 Tactical Surface-to-Surface Missiles

SCUD B Launchers(33 missiles)

* ‘‘+’’ indicates the numbers listed may be slightly less than the actual units or weapons in stock. † All ‘‘?’’ refer to weapons Yemen is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in its possession are unknown. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

Yemeni Army had 1,195 MBTs in 1990. This declined to 990 in 2000 and 790 in 2005–2006. The downward trend also applied to Yemen’s armored reconnaissance (RECCE) vehicles. According to the IISS, Yemen’s Army had more than 305 vehicles in 1990. In 2006, Yemen had 130 reconnaissance vehicles (80 AML-90s and 50 BRDM). Yemen had 300 armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs) in 1990, which declined to 200 AIFVs (200 BMP-1/BMP-2s) between 2000 and 2006. Yemen is estimated to have had 710 armored personal carriers (APCs) in 2006, which is roughly the same number on hand in 1990. However, only around 210 out of the pool of 710 are operational. According to the IISS, this pool included 60 M-113s plus a mix of 150 BTR 40s, 60s, and 152s.18 According to Jane’s, Yemen had 70 AML-90s, 10 AML-60-7s, 48 Panhard armored cars, 100 BMP1/2s, 70 M113s, and 180 BTR 40s, 60s, and 152s.19 In 2006, Yemen had 12 Tube-Launched Optically Tracked Wire-Guided Missiles (TOWs), 24 Dragons (Jane’s reports 150 Dragons), and 35 AT-3 Sagger antitank

522


guided weapons. It also had large numbers of rocket launchers, and 75-mm, 82-mm, and 107-mm recoil rifles.20 Jane’s estimated that Yemen had 100 82-mm M43 and 450 40-mm M79 antitank weapons.21 Armor and antiarmor training is limited, while armored maneuver warfare capability and sustainability are low.

Artillery Yemen has a large pool of some 1,153 artillery weapons—a level that Yemen had maintained since 2000. However, this pool was dependent on towed weapons without modern fire-control systems, artillery radars, and other support equipment. Yemen had only 25 2S1 122-mm self-propelled artillery weapons, plus 30 worn and obsolescent SU100 100-mm assault guns and 20 100-mm 1944M guns.22 The IISS estimated that Yemen had 310 towed artillery weapons, including 25 M101a1 105-mm weapons; 30 M-1931/1937s, 40 M-1938s, and 130 D-30 122mm weapons; and 60 M-46 130-mm, 10 D-20 152-mm, and 15 M-114 155-mm weapons.23 Jane’s count was higher, estimating that Yemen had 535 towed weapons. Jane’s estimated that Yemen has 10 155-mm M114s, 90 122-mm M1938s, 28 122-mm M1931/7s, 92 85-mm D44s, and 70 76-mm 1942s.24 It also has 36 SM-4-1 coastal defense guns. It has roughly 160–170 operational multiple rocket launchers (MRL), including 150 operational BM-21122-mm weapons out of an inventory of 280, and 14 BM-14 140-mm weapons.25 Yemen also had some 502 mortars (81 mm, 82 mm, 107 mm, 120 mm, and 160 mm).26 While Yemen had a large inventory of artillery, its artillery forces were even less effective than most other regional forces. Yemen was capable of using artillery in static massed fires, but had very limited capability to maneuver its artillery, support it away from peacetime casernes, rapidly shift fires, or target effectively beyond visual range. It had little or no modern fire-control, counterbattery radar, and firemanagement capabilities. Live fire training was very limited.

Antiaircraft Weapons According to the IISS, Yemen had 530 AA guns. These guns included 50 M-167 and 20 M-163 20 mm, 100 ZSU-23-2 and 50 ZSU-23-4 23 mm, 150 M-1939 37 mm, 120 S-60 57 mm, and 40 KS-12 85 mm. Jane’s estimates, however, differ. Yemen had some 242 AA guns in 2006. These included 100 57-mm SZ-60s, 10 35-mm Oerlikons, 50 ZU-23-2s, 7 ZSU-234SPs, 35 14.5-mm ZPU-2 35s, 20 M167 Vulcan self-propelled systems, and 20 M163 Vulcans.27 It had large numbers of SA-7, SA-9, SA-13, and SA-14 light surface-to-air missiles. Air defense training and maneuver warfare capability is minimal to limited.28 Realistic live-fire training is virtually nonexistent.

YEMEN

523

Ballistic Missiles and Rockets Yemen has sought ballistic missiles since the 1970s. The Soviet Union was its traditional supplier, but North Korea has since become the primary source. It is believed that Yemen has bought missiles and related items from North Korea for the last ten years. Spain intercepted a North Korean ship on December 9, 2002, that was loaded with 15 complete Scud missiles (possibly SCUD-Cs) as well as fuel and additional warheads. The shipment did not break international law, and the vessel was released after officials stated that the missiles would not be transferred to a third party. Though it is unclear exactly how many and what type of ballistic missiles Yemen possesses due to the secretive nature of their procurement and the use of many in the 1994 civil war, it is believed that it maintains a variety of weapons. Its tactical SSM strength may have more than doubled between 1990 and 2006, from a total of 12 to 28 missiles. It is believed that Yemen has up to 12 9k21 FROG 7-TELs (Transporter-ErectorLaunchers), approximately 10 9P129 SS-21 Scarabs-TELs, and up to 6 SCUD B/C launchers with approximately 33 missiles.29 Some of these weapons were delivered in the 1970s, and their effectiveness, especially in light of their performance in the 1994 civil war, is uncertain. A Russian firm has inspected many of Yemen’s SS-21s, but both the results and Yemen’s upgrade plans remain unknown.30 While Yemen may have had some stocks of chemical weapons in the past, it is believed these are limited to token levels, if Yemen retains any at all. Poor training, a lack of live-fire training, lack of long-range targeting and damage assessment capability, and probably reliance on low-grade conventional warheads all seem to sharply limit the effectiveness of this force.

Overall Assessment The Yemeni Army does not face serious external threats and is probably capable of defeating any major insurrection. It is, however, a low-grade force in virtually every respect, with limited real-world combat capability. Its small number of elite combat units would, however, be somewhat more effective, and the Yemeni Army is large and capable enough to put up considerable resistance in defensive warfare that exploits Yemen’s terrain.

THE YEMENI AIR FORCE The Yemeni Air Force has a nominal strength of 3,000–3,500. It suffers badly from a lack of modernization and foreign support in recent years, although Figure 10.4 shows that Yemen has acquired a few more modern fighters over the past six years. In 2006, the Yemeni Air Force had 75 combat capable aircraft (Jane’s estimated that number to be 84), of which 40 were in storage. It had 31 fighter

524


Figure 10.4 Yemeni Air Force’s Force Structure, 1990–2006 1990

2000

2005

2006

3,500

3,500

3,000

3,000

Active

3,500

3,500

3,000

3,000

Reserve

0

0

0

0

66

16

26

31

J-7M

6

0

0

0

MiG-29SMT Fulcrum

0

5

8

14

MiG-21 Fishbed

60

11

16

15

MiG-29UBT Fulcrum

0

0

2

2


Manpower

Fighter Interceptor

81

27

40

40

Mig 17

35

0

0

0

Su-20/Su-17 Fitter

45

17

30

30

F5E Tiger II

11

10

10

10

Transport

14

18

18

18

An-12 Cub

3

2

2

2

An-24

9

0

0

0

An-26 Curl

4

6

6

6

C-130H Hercules

2

3

3

3

F-27

2

0

0

0

Skyvan 3M

2

0

0

0

Il-14 Crate

4

4

4

4

Il-76 Candid

0

3

3

3

Training Craft

15+

32

44

44

MiG 15UTI

3

0

0

0

Su-22

4

0

0

0

F-5B Freedom Fighter

2

2

2

2

L-39C

0

12

12

12

MiG 21 Mongol A

6

4

4

4

Yak-11 Moose

†

?

14

14

14

Z-242

0

0

12

12

76

25

20

20

Ka-26

2

0

0

0

AB-204

2

0

0

0

AB-206

6

0

0

0

Helicopters

*

YEMEN

Mi-4

5

0

0

0

SA-316

2

0

0

0

Mi-35 Hind

0

8

8

8

ATK AB-47 Bell

0

1

1

1

SPT Mi-8 Hip

53

14

9

9

UTL Bell 212

6

2

2

2

525

* ‘‘+’’ indicates the numbers listed may be slightly less than the actual units or weapons in stock. All ‘‘?’’ refer to weapons that Yemen is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in its possession are unknown. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

interceptors, 40 fighter ground attack (FGA) aircraft, 18 transport airplanes, and 44 training craft. Combat Air Strength The Yemeni Air Force has lost roughly half of its fighter interceptor strength since the early 1990s. In 1990, it had a total of 66 aircraft. This total dropped to 16 in 2000 and 26 in 2005. In late 2005, Yemen acquired 6 new Mig-29SMT Fulcrums, which brought Yemen’s fighter intercept total to 31, including 14 MiG-29SMT Fulcrums, 15 MiG-21 Fishbeds, and 2 Mig-29UBT Fulcrums. Yemen has also lost roughly half of its FGA aircraft during the last decade. Yemen’s FGA total was 81 in 1990, 27 in 2000, and 40 in 2005–2006. Much of the decline was due to the decommissioning of 35 MiG-17s in the early 1990s. In addition, 28 Su-20/Su-17 Fitters (out of a total of 45 in 1990) no longer are listed as operational. The Yemeni Air Force has, however, acquired 13 Su-20/Su-17s. This purchase brought Yemen’s total FGA strength in 2006 to 30 Su-20/Su-17s, 10 F5E Tiger IIs, and 2 F5B Freedom Fighters. (The latter may have become a training aircraft, but the IISS still listed them as part of Yemen’s combat capable aircraft in 2006.) Since 1990, Yemen’s total number of training aircraft has, however, increased from 15 to 44, the largest increase in Yemen’s Air Force structure. The most notable addition has been the purchase of Z-242s from the Czech Republic. Helicopters and Transport Aircraft The total number of helicopters operated by the Yemeni Air Force has also been on the decline. In 1990, Yemen reportedly had 76 helicopters, but by 2000 this number declined to 25, and in 2006 it reached 20. Most of the old helicopters that it had in 1990 (including Ka-26, AB-204, AB-206, Mi-4, and SA-316) were decommissioned or were inoperable in the mid-1990s. According to the IISS, in 2006, Yemen had 8 Mi-35 and 9 Mi-8 attack helicopters of unknown readiness and sustainability. In addition, Yemen had several transport aircraft, which are listed in Figure 10.4.31

526


Overall Assessment Yemen has some effective squadron elements, but cannot operate as a modern air force and has little sustainability. Pilot training is limited, and Yemen lacks anything approaching a modern command and control, battle management, and air control and warning system for its air units and land-based air defenses. Joint warfare capability is token at best. YEMENI AIR DEFENSE FORCES Yemen’s land-based air defense units have a nominal strength of some 1,500– 2,000 men. They are equipped with SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6 heavy surface-to-air missiles, but it is unclear how many are operational or sustainable in combat and few—if any—have been modernized to improve their resistance to jamming and detection. Yemen has large numbers of AA guns and lighter SA-7, SA-9, SA-13, and SA-14 man-portable and vehicle-mounted light surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), but their operational status is unknown. Figure 10.5 reflects the fact that few unclassified data are available on the Yemeni Air Defense system. Aside from manpower, the ISSS provides little data on most of Yemen’s SAM batteries and how many missiles Yemen actually has. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment asserts that Yemen has 100 SAM SA-7s and 12 SAM SA-9 batteries, but it lists all other SAM designations as ‘‘not available.’’ The bulk of Yemen’s systems are obsolete to obsolescent. Sensor and command control facilities are limited in modernization and technical effectiveness. Readiness and training are poor, as are most aspects of maintenance and sustainability. Electronic warfare capability is obsolete. THE YEMENI NAVY The Yemeni Navy has an important potential role. In addition to its location near the Bab al-Mandeb, Yemen has a 1,030-nautical-mile coastline and major ports at Aden and Al Hudaydah. It has important islands near major shipping channels, including Socottra, Kamaran, and Perim. In 2006, the Yemeni Navy had 1,700 men and was based on the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea at Aden, Al-Katib, and Al-Hadaidah, with smaller bases at Al Mukalla and on the islands of Perim (Barim) and Socotra (Suqutra). Figure 10.6 shows that the Yemeni Navy has had little modernization over the last decade. Between 2000 and 2005/2006, the fleet shrank in size, and manpower dropped slightly from 1,800 to 1,700. Surface Combat Forces Two of the navy’s missile patrol boats were Osa II–class vessels in disrepair. One may be decommissioned and the other’s SSM system may not function.32 A

YEMEN

527

Figure 10.5 Yemeni Air Defense’s Force Structure Trends, 1990–2006 1990

2000

2005

2006

*

?

2,000

2,000

2,000

Active

?

2,000

2,000

2,000

Reserve

?

0

0

0

22

0

?

?

Manpower

Air Defense Missiles SAM SA-2

10

0

0

0

SAM SA-3 Goa

6

?

?

?

SP SA-13 Gopher

0

0

?

?

SP SA-6 Gainful

5

?

?

?

SP SA-9 Gaskin

0

0

?

?

TOWED SA-2 Guideline

0

?

?

?

MANPAD SA-14 Gremlin

0

0

?

?

MANPAD SA-7 Grail

0

0

?

?

Tactical Missiles

0

0

?

?

AAM AA-2 Atoll

?

?

?

?

AIM-9 Sidewinder

0

?

?

?

* Note: All ‘‘?’’ refer to weapons that Yemen is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in its possession are unknown. In 1990, no figures were available regarding the manpower of the Yemeni Air Defense. At that time, Air Defense was maintained by the Yemeni Air Force, but one can extrapolate that it was near 2,000. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

385-ton Tarantu–class missile patrol boat was operational, but seems to lack all four of its Styx SS-N-2C antiship missiles. The navy has three 171-ton Huangfen-class missile patrol boats that should be equipped with relatively effective C-801 ship-to-ship missiles. However, one (the Huangfen 126) was not equipped with missiles, and the Huangfen 128 ran ashore some years ago and was still damaged, though functional. Smaller patrol boats include two to three 39-ton Zhuk class and six 12-ton Baklan class. There are two Sana’a-class patrol boats, but only one is functioning.33 A 804-ton Natya minesweeper is believed to have limited operational status.34 At least two of five 804-ton Yevgenya class mine-hunters are operational (though it is possible that all are functioning), but probably can be used only for minelaying purposes. Mine stocks seem to include relatively simple FSU and Chinese types. The navy is seeking to improve its capabilities through the purchase of ten fast Austal patrol boats, which could help Yemen combat the smuggling of weapons in

528


Figure 10.6 Yemeni Navy’s Force Structure Trends, 1990–2006 1990

2000

2005

2006

1,500

1,800

1,700

1,700

1,500

1,800

1,700

1,700

14

20

18

18

Misc. Boats and Crafts

0

6

6

6

PFI:

8

8

5

5

Sana’a

3

3

2

2*

Zhuk

5

5

3

3

6

6

7

8

0

3

3

3

0

0

0

1

Manpower Active Patrol and Coastal Combatants

PFM: Huangfen Huangfen with Sardine Tactical SSM Osa II

6

0

2

2

Tarantu l

0

2*

2*

2*

Mine Warfare

3

6

6

6

3

5

5

5

MHC Yevgenya MSO Natya

0

1

1

1

6

3

7

7

LSM Polnochy

4

0

0

0

LST Ropucha

1

1

1

1

LCU PI NS-717

0

0

4

4

LCU Ondatra

2

2

2

2

0

2

2

2

0

2

2

2

Amphibious Landing Crafts

Logistics and Support Toplivo

* One of these boats is inoperative. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

its harbors, as well as the entry of terrorist suspects into its country.35 These ten Austral patrol boats are reported to have sailed for Yemen on February 9, 2005. They have a maximum speed of 29 knots and carry two 12.7-mm machine guns and a twin 25-mm gun mounting.36 As part of a Yemeni security pact with the French regarding the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the French have agreed to provide support systems for the ten Austal-built patrol boats, as well as Yemen’s six Baklan patrol boats.37

YEMEN

529

Amphibious Forces Yemen has a number of amphibious ships. These include one NS-722-class LSM, three Deba-class (NS-717) LCUs, and two Ondatra-class (Project 1176) LCUs. The Ropucha-class LST is now a hulk and will be replaced by the NS-722 class. The NS-722 is 1,383-ton vessel that can carry five T-72 tanks and 111 troops or marines. It is a modern Polish-built ship delivered in May 2002, and it is capable of cadet training and disaster relief operations as well as amphibious missions. The two Ondatras are 145-ton ships capable of transport of squad-level forces and a major armored vehicle. The three Deba-class ships are modern 221-ton ships capable of lifting 16 tons of cargo and 50 troops. Yemen has possessed two Toplivo tankers whose operational capacity is unknown.38 Jane’s Fighting Ships reports that they may be decommissioned, while the IISS Military Balance makes no mention of this.39

Overall Assessment Yemen’s naval readiness, training, and war-fighting capabilities are minimal. The navy is not capable of independent operations against a regional naval power like Iran, Oman, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt, but could carry out limited asymmetric attacks by mining the Strait of Bab al-Mandeb or shipping routes in the Red Sea. It could also harass shipping traffic. The purchase of these fast patrol boats illustrates that Yemen is attempting to streamline its navy against threats such as piracy and smuggling, rather than against foreign conventional navies. Between 1990 and 2000, Yemen added six Baklan fast patrol boats and doubled the number of mine-warfare ships from three to six. The changes are designed to help Yemen use what naval resources it has to defend its islands and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait from unconventional threats. The Yemeni Navy will not be able to carry out the responsibilities inherent in Yemen’s geostrategic position along the Horn of Africa and near the Bab al-Mandeb. However, the Yemeni Navy shares the burden of policing this area with the U.S. Navy, which is now in control of the 1,100 strong Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTFHOA) in Djibouti. Together, the two navies attempt to curtail the activities of smugglers and terrorists.40 In addition to counterterrorism, CJTF-HOA also works closely with other Horn of Africa states on issues of economic development, attempting to stabilize the area.41 In addition to working with the U.S. Navy, Yemen signed a security pact with France on February 27, 2005, to monitor the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.42 The agreement primarily includes the French training of Yemeni units in coastal defense and mountain warfare, but it also provides for the sharing of intelligence and threat assessments to the Strait.43 In any case, conventional naval warfare is scarcely Yemen’s most urgent threat. Asymmetric attacks by groups such as Al Qa’ida are immediate and have been at the center of Yemen’s naval strategic planning. Following the attack on the USS Cole

530


and the French oil tanker, Yemen’s naval forces have worked closely with outside power projectors to improve its naval force structure to deal with this change in the nature of threat. Yemen is establishing a small coast guard, but it will be capable only of light patrol duties. PARAMILITARY, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE FORCES Yemen has large internal security forces, an almost inevitable development in a country with many internal divisions and tensions. The Ministry of the Interior has some 50,000 men, and there are at least 20,000 tribal levies. These troops have seen a great deal of combat during the last several years, as they have clashed with militant insurgents repeatedly as well as dealt with political unrest and violence. Main Security and Paramilitary Forces These threats explain Yemen’s need to maintain a security force that is almost twothirds the size of its army. Figure 10.7 shows a steady maintenance of 50,000 Ministry of Interior (MOI) forces for the past six years, with 20,000 tribal levies (reserves) available if needed. There has, however, been a change in these forces over time. Since the mid-1990s, Yemen has come to rely on trained paramilitary forces instead of levies to maintain order, a sign that its internal security has become more regulated. Yemen’s internal security apparatus has several services. Reporting by Jane’s indicates that they include the following elements:44 Figure 10.7 Yemeni Paramilitary’s Force Structure Trends, 1990–2006 1990*

2000

2005

2006

Manpower

75,000

70,000

70,000

70,000

Active/Ministry of Interior Forces

25,000

50,000

50,000

50,000

50,000

20,000

20,000

20,000

Coast Guard (still being established)

0

0

0

?†

PCI

0

5

5

5

French Interceptor (less100 tons)

0

5

5

5

Reserves/Tribal levies

*

The number of forces listed for 1990 is the combined figure of Paramilitary troops for North and South Yemen. † All ‘‘?’’ refer to weapons that Yemen is believed to possess, though the exact numbers in its possession are unknown. Source: IISS, Military Balance, various editions, including 1989–1990, 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2005–2006.

YEMEN

531

• Central Security Force (CSF): This is the main paramilitary internal security force in Yemen. It is under the Ministry of Interior and has an estimated strength of approximately 50,000. The CSF is equipped with medium and heavy machine guns as well as armored personnel carriers. • Terrorism Combating Department (TCD): This was established in March 2002. It has been reported that the TCD is under the auspices of the Yemeni Ministry of Interior and has technical and financial help from the United States. The force, reportedly, is equipped with surveillance cameras, electronic intercept capabilities, and a central command center in Sanaa that links terrorist information records to Yemen’s airports and seaports. Its total strength remains unknown. • Armed tribal levies: As noted earlier, these levies total 20,000 from tribes that are loyal to the government. They are not as well trained and are not equipped with any meaningful weapons. They act as reserves that can be called upon in case of political or civil insurrection. It is, however, unclear how useful such a force can be in counterterrorism. • Coast Guard: Yemen did not have a coast guard force. As part of its counterterrorism efforts, Yemen has announced that it was building a small coast guard force that will be under the command of the Ministry of Interior to guard its 1,491 miles of coastline. The fact that it is being built under the MOI highlights the focus of Yemen’s counterterrorism planning and the importance of its internal security apparatus. • Political Security Organization (PSO): The main purpose of the PSO is to protect Yemen’s political elites. It is used for counterintelligence, counterespionage, and also for gathering intelligence on threats against Yemen’s government. Its total strength is unknown.

Yemen’s internal security largely depends on domestic intelligence and counterintelligence services to deal with political strife and conduct counterterrorism operations. Most of the trained elements of these counterterrorism forces have been created since 2002. Both the counterterrorism forces and the new coast guard have been supported by outside powers such as the United States, France, and neighboring Saudi Arabia. Their force effectiveness is unknown, however, and it is unclear how well they would operate without foreign assistance. The absence of a dedicated and well-equipped border guard is a key problem in Yemen’s internal security apparatus. Yemen’s Army has the responsibility of controlling Yemen’s border, but Yemen’s Army is trained to deal with protecting Yemen against conventional armies crossing its borders from Saudi Arabia or Oman. This helps explain Saudi Arabia’s concern about Yemen’s border control, particularly against weapons smuggling and terrorist infiltration. Yemen’s Struggle against Terrorism Yemen’s most pressing threat is from terrorism organizations operating on its soil, and some estimates indicate Yemen had 5,000 nonstate armed combatants in 2005. 45 This includes tribes that are not under the control of the Yemeni government, but it also includes terrorist organizations with large memberships

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inside Yemen. Some of the more notable militant organizations that maintained a presence in Yemen include the following:46 • Gama’a al-Islamiyya: Its strength has been in decline since the late 1990s due to arrests by the Egyptian government (where it is primarily based) and a cease-fire that was signed with the Egyptian government in 1997. Most of its members, however, are believed to be Egyptian. • Yemen Islamic Jihad: This group has close association with Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Its membership is believed to be Yemenis, Egyptians, Algerians, and Saudis. Its leadership is largely composed of fighters from the Afghan war. Its leader, Tariq al-Fasdli, helped the current Yemeni government during the civil war. After the war, the failure of the Yemeni government to incorporate these fighters in the regular Yemeni Army is seen as one of the reasons that these fighters turned against the Yemeni government. Its total strength is unknown, but it is believed that the group enjoys support among the tribes in the south and even some political elite in the Yemeni government. • Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA): Its strength is unknown, and its membership is largely Yemeni. This group is believed to have been established in 1996 as a splinter group from Al-Jihad, but it first came to prominence in December 1998 by kidnapping 16 Western tourists and killing 4 of them. It is also believed to be behind the attack against the French oil tanker, Limburg, in October 2002. The Yemeni government has attempted to combat this group by closing some of its bases and pressuring its leadership. Its total strength in Yemen is unknown, but it is also believed to have international connections with extremist organizations such as Al Qa’ida and British extremist cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri. • Al Qa’ida: Yemen’s most troublesome terrorist group, however, has remained Al Qa’ida, even though its presence in Yemen has been reduced by post-9/11 countermeasures. As of February 2005, it was still believed to possess several thousand members worldwide, with potentially thousands of followers in Yemen of multiple nationalities. It has connections with local organizations, as noted earlier, including the AAIA. It is believed to have been behind the USS Cole bombing and was involved in helping the AAIA in the bombing against the French oil tanker. • Liwa al-Tawhid (Banner of Unity): This group is believed to be a splinter group, or a subunion between Al Qa’ida and Al-Jihad. It first came to prominence after the assassination of security officials in December 2003. As is the case with most of these splinter groups, determining their actual size given their association is highly uncertain.

As this list reveals, Yemen’s internal security is threatened by both the ‘‘usual suspects’’ and by Yemeni splinter groups that have association to transnational groups such as Al Qa’ida. In addition, Yemen’s counterterrorism efforts have escalated the tension caused by internal power struggles within Yemen’s government and by the brief Yemeni civil war that began in May 1994 and ended the following July. The Yemeni government has been fighting militants since the bombing of the USS Cole in October 2000, but these fighters have been a part of Yemen’s history since the early 1980s.

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Most of these groups have their origins—at least at the leadership level—to fighters in the Afghan war in the 1980s. In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Yemen began sending fighters to Afghanistan. When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1988, North Yemen welcomed many of them back. These fighters brought their militancy as well as their ties to groups such as Al Qa’ida and Osama bin Laden back to Yemen.47 In addition, bin Laden has strong ties to some of the tribes of Hadhramaut, a mountainous region of Yemen, where his father’s family is believed to have come from. Using these ties, bin Laden recruited Yemenis for his training camps and is believed to have used the nation as an additional training site starting in 1993.48 The operations in Yemen included using the Yemeni ports as sources of arms smuggling, an exercise that persists to this day. The suicide bombing on the USS Cole on October 22, 2000, put pressure on the Yemeni government to crack down on the militants. The U.S. government began actively working with Yemen on counterterrorism in an official capacity. Efforts to combat these militants, however, dated back to 1997, when the government acknowledged that the groups posed a serious threat to the state’s legitimacy.49 One of the most public results of the cooperation between the United States and Yemen was the elimination of six Al Qa’ida members, who were killed by a predator drone while driving in Yemen on November 6, 2002. It has been reported that U.S. forces were tipped off by Yemeni intelligence.50 Military assistance between the United States and Yemen has also occurred in the exchange of military equipment and spare parts. Yemen received $1.9 million in Foreign Military Financing in 2003. This number increased by 685 percent in 2004 to an estimated $14.9 million.51 Internal counterterrorism efforts were further enhanced in early 2005, as the government began enforcing its policy on cracking down on potential terrorist organizations and hotbeds. This included the use of mass arrests, prosecutions that resulted in jail time, and additional heavy guards on various government buildings and embassies.52 There were some gaps in the efforts of the Yemeni paramilitary, as two USS Cole suspects, Fahd al-Qasaa and Jamal al-Badawi, escaped custody and had to be recaptured in April 2004.53 Once recaptured, however, each was tried and convicted; Qasaa received 10 years, and Badawi’s sentence was reduced from death to 15 years. In addition to prosecuting terror suspects, in April 2005, the Yemeni government began threatening the underground radical schools with shutting them down. It is estimated that these radical schools have as many as 330,000 students.54 Yemeni authorities have also claimed that their security forces have thwarted major attacks against western and Yemeni targets. For example, a day before Yemen’s presidential election, on September 20, 2006, President Ali Abdullah Saleh announced that terrorist operations were foiled against some American targets and a hotel in Sanaa. These announcements, however, came after two suicide attacks took place on two oil installations in Yemen, causing minor damage and killing one guard.55

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Pattern of Attacks The threat from Al Qa’ida to Yemen’s internal stability is not over. While there have not been ‘‘spectacular’’ attacks on the scale of the one against the USS Cole, attacks against soft targets by extremists groups (Al Qa’ida included), however, continued to occur. The following timeline, based on information adapted from the U.S. National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) Knowledge Base, shows major attacks in Yemen between 2001 and 2006:56 • January 23, 2001: In Aden, a Yemeni, Mohammed Yehia Ali Sattar, hijacked a Yemeni plane carrying U.S. Ambassador Barbara Bodine and 90 other people. Sattar wished to show support for Saddam Hussein by flying to Baghdad airport to protest Iraq’s international isolation. He was armed with a gun and possibly a grenade. Sattar was subdued by the members of the crew and was hospitalized with self-inflicted injuries. There were no deaths and no injuries in the attack besides Sattar. • January 24, 2001: In Sanaa, a bomb exploded in front of the house of BrigadierGeneral Staff Ahmad Shamlan, Commander of the First Defense Brigade of the Presidential Guard. The bomb exploded when a guard opened the gate for the General’s car. The attempt is the first to be reported against such a high-ranking security official in the defense brigades of the President. • February 12, 2001: In Hijrat al-Dawagher, a convoy transporting Trade Minister Abdul al-Kumayem and Mahwit’s Provincial Governor Abdul Hamid Numan came under attack by gunfire in an ambush by unknown tribesmen. • May 19, 2001: In Radaa, a remote bomb exploded in a gun market, killing 32 and wounding 50. No group claimed responsibility for the explosion, and while terrorism was never ruled out as the cause of the attack, it is also possible the explosion was caused by carelessly stored weapons. • September 20, 2001: In Sanaa, an explosive device detonated near the Sheraton Hotel, where a group of FBI agents was staying. Four people were killed and an unknown number were injured. • October 14, 2001: In Sanaa, a bomb detonated in a garbage bin near the residence of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Salih. No one was killed or wounded. Police later arrested at least six people in connection with the attack. • March 3, 2002: In Sanaa, a university student tossed two concussion grenades at a wall of the U.S. Embassy the day after Vice President Dick Cheney visited Yemen. There were no injuries. • October 6, 2002: In Mina al Dubah, a Bulgarian was killed and 12 Bulgarians and Frenchmen were wounded in an attack on a French oil tanker, the Limburg. The attack was a carried out by a suicide bomber/bombers on a small boat, done in the same style as the USS Cole. The AAIA claimed responsibility, though the group admitted that its initial target was a U.S. Navy vessel, not the tanker. • December 28, 2002: In Sanaa, Jarullah Omar, the second ranking official of the Yemeni Socialist Party, was killed as a result of gunshot wounds that he received while attending a conference for the opposition Yemeni Reforms Party.

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• May 14, 2003: In Sanaa, a bomb exploded in a Yemeni court, injuring a judge and three others. The attack came four days after a different judge at the court sentenced suspected Al Qa’ida militant Abed Abdul Razzah Kamel, 30, to death for killing three Americans who worked at a Christian-run hospital in Jibla. • December 4, 2003: In Shabwa, the Governor of the region, Ali Ahmad al Rasas, was wounded in an ambush, and his brother, Rasas Ahmad, a top intelligence official, was killed by gunmen. The militant group Takfir wal Hijra was blamed for the attack. • June 18, 2004: In Sanna, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi began a rebellion bearing his name, desiring greater autonomy for his tribe and region. His forces inflicted a total of 400 casualties and almost captured the city before they were repelled by government forces.57 • January 31, 2005: In the Ma’rib region, armed tribesmen opened fire on Yemeni security forces, resulting in a one-day gun battle. Two soldiers and four attackers were killed, and 16 people were injured. No group claimed responsibility. • February 2, 2005: In Amran two gunmen attacked a Japanese-funded cement factory, wounding two guards. No group claimed responsibility. • March 27–28, 2005: In Nushur, assailants attacked a police patrol, killing between four and seven police officers. The attack was believed to be in retaliation for the killing of Sheikh al-Houthi by the army in late August 2004 and the over 400 civilians who were killed during the fighting. No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely understood that the Faithful Youth Organization, part of the rebellion led by al-Houthi Sr., was responsible. • April 3, 2005: In Sa’dah Governorate, unknown assailants attacked the Sa’dah Security Commander, killing one bodyguard. No group claimed responsibility. • April 3, 2005: In the Talh area, Sa’dah, gunmen fired on the Secretary-General of the Sa’dah local council as he was driving, but failed to kill him. No group claimed responsibility. • April 3, 2005: In Sanaa, an unidentified assailant lobbed a hand grenade out of the window of a passing car at the Central Customs Authority building, killing one civilian and wounding one other. No group claimed responsibility. • June 21, 2005: In Sanaa, one assailant detonated a bomb outside Sana’a University, wounding three civilians, destroying a car, and causing minor damage to the campus. No group claimed responsibility, although authorities have arrested one man, whom they believe was responsible. • June 22, 2005: In Sanaa, assailants armed with automatic weapons fired on the car of a Yemeni Parliament official, killing the official, and wounding two other passengers. No group claimed responsibility, although the Deputy Governor of Al-Baydha Governorate, Abdullah Al-Qawsi, claimed responsibility for the murder. • January 17, 2006: In Zumar, Yehya Mousa, the Yemeni Minister of Justice, was beaten by two masked men and shot in an assassination attempt. Mousa survived the attack, and the assailants are believed to be members of the al-Houthi rebellion. • September 14, 2006: Two nearly simultaneous attacks against two oil installations killed one guard and caused minor damage at those installations. The attack came only several days before Yemen’s Presidential elections (September 20, 2006).

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• September 16, 2006: Yemeni authorities arrested four suspected Al Qa’ida members following a seven-hour siege in Sanna of their holdout. Security forces announced that they found 1,200 pounds of explosives.58

What this timeline shows is that before the attacks of ‘‘9/11,’’ attacks on foreign diplomatic targets and the Yemeni government assets took place almost on a monthly basis. After 2002, Yemen began seeing major attacks on the government every six months, a noticeable decrease. Political unrest in 2004 and the downward turn of Yemen’s economy in 2005 have also brought a higher spurt of violent attacks in Yemen than had been seen since 2001. Political Unrest Al Qa’ida and other extremists have not been Yemen’s only internal security problem. President Ali Abdullah Salih began facing an internal rebellion led by Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, a political insider who wanted increased autonomy for his tribe and for his region of Yemen. Al-Houthi disliked President Salih’s connection to Washington and opposed U.S. involvement in Iraq. On June 18, 2004, the rebellion assaulted government forces near Sanaa and inflicted hundreds of casualties. The rebels nearly took control of the city.59 The rebellion saw a change in leadership when Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi was killed in September 2004. Badreddin al-Houthi, father of the slain Hussein, took over the rebellion in the name of his son. Since that time, al-Houthi Sr. has attempted to broaden his coalition base and has continued fighting.60 Between March 27 and March 28, 2005, al-Houthi rebels engaged Yemeni troops in a gun battle that killed 400 civilians. In April 2005, the rebels and paramilitary forces fought again, as the paramilitary troops attempted to arrest al-Houthi Sr. There were 250 casualties total.61 Groups that take hostages, kidnap, and hold people for ransom are another problem. The primary weapon of these groups, such as the AAIA, is the kidnapping and ransoming of Westerners. In 1998, the AAIA kidnapped 16 Westerners, and in 2005, another group kidnapped 65-year-old German diplomat Juergen Chrobog and his wife, as well as six Italian tourists in January 2006.62 These groups also attempted bombings of Anglican Churches and Western hotels.63 Such groups do not, however, confine themselves to such low-level operations. In October 2002, the AAIA attempted a suicide boat attack on the French oil tanker Limburg and killed a Bulgarian crew member and wounded 12 others. 64 The government has repeatedly vowed to crack down on these abductions by arresting and prosecuting the individuals performing the abductions, but the kidnappings have continued despite repeated convictions of offenders.65 Since this last incident, the AAIA has been relatively quiet, and since the execution of its leader, Zain alAbidin al-Midhar, in October 1999, it has not been as distinguishable from other Islamic militants.66 Yemen’s weak economy adds more pressure on internal security.67 On July 22, 2005, Yemeni troops and tanks dispersed protesters who were angry over the

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doubling of fuel prices. The protests lasted two days and claimed 36 lives by the time they were dispersed.68

YEMEN’S CONTINUING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES Yemen’s primary security needs are internal and are driven by its need for economic reform and social stability. As has been touched upon earlier, 45 percent of the population lives below the poverty line, and unemployment is at least 35 percent.69 This high unemployment poses a serious risk in light of Yemen’s demographic situation. Yemen’s population is young—46.5 percent of the population is between ages 0–14, and as the population grows into adulthood, the lack of work and economic opportunities will make the population fertile ground for Al Qa’ida recruitment campaigns and exploitation. Socioeconomic Challenges Yemen is an impoverished nation with a young society. The Yemeni economy can scarcely meet its current employment requirement, and if it its economy has not grown sufficiently to employ its youth as they come of age, there will be a demographic/socioeconomic ‘‘time bomb.’’70 Figure 10.8 shows the extreme disproportionate nature of Yemen’s demographic distribution. Nearly half the population, 47 percent, is between the ages of 0–14. No other groups come close to this percentage. Even the widest category of 30–64 years of age totals only 22 percent. When these young people enter into the workforce in the next decade, the current Yemeni economy will not be able to provide them with work, and they may become a fertile recruiting ground for Al Qa’ida and other militant groups.

Figure 10.8 Yemen’s Demographic Distribution, 2006

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Yemen’s economy also may face decreases in oil revenues due to the depletion of its oil reserves and production capacity. While Yemen is not a major producer compared to its neighbors, oil revenues play an important part in its economy. The depletion of Yemen’s oil reserves poses a serious threat to Yemen’s financial security, as oil income represenst 60–70 percent of the Yemeni government’s total revenue.71 Rises in oil prices have helped offset Yemen’s oil production plans. Oil revenues were $1.95 billion in 1997, $1.37 billion in 1998, $2.17 billion in 1999, $3.6 billion in 2000, $2.93 billion in 2001, $3.21 billion in 2002, $3.51 billion in 2003, $4.35 billion in 2004, and $5.92 billion in 2005. Yemen’s oil production has been falling since 2002. 72 In 2005, Yemen averaged 0.387 million barrels per day (MMBD), approximately 85 percent of what its production level was in 2002.73 In addition, a 2002 World Bank Survey estimated that by 2008 Yemen’s production would fall to less than half of its 2001 level.74 Yemen’s oil revenues have risen this past year because of rising global oil demand and oil prices, but as Yemen’s current oil reserves and production decline, prices will not be able to outpace the loss of production, and Yemen’s economic woes could become a crisis.75 Structural economic reform is difficult, and governmental corruption plagues Yemen’s efforts to receive aid and attract foreign direct investment. Foreign investors have been reluctant to give the large amounts of aid or invest in Yemen’s economy due to the lack of transparency and the weakness of its judicial system.76 These risks, however, are further compounded by Yemen’s internal insecurity. Foreign companies, including oil and gas multinationals, fear for their workers and investments from attacks by militant groups and the overall political uncertainty in Yemen. Yemen’s judicial system is in need of steady strengthening as well. Yemen is a decentralized state with lawless areas that exist beyond the control of the paramilitary. These regions often use local tribal laws and customs to punish offenders, rather than turn them over to national courts for prosecution.77 In addition, most of Yemen’s rural areas are impoverished. Yemen must continue to aid these rural areas by targeting foreign aid toward their economic development, which will in time strengthen the Republic’s influence over them.78 Yemen’s economy is inefficient, plagued by corruption, experiences slow growth, and has high double-digit inflation and unemployment. The World Bank proposed structural economic reforms on four levels for Yemen. It proposes better economic management, improved structural policies, greater social inclusion, and better public sector management. The economic management refers to monetary policies that can combat inflation and reduce budget deficits.79 It also recommends deregulating parts of Yemen’s economy to spark growth. The most important recommendation is the proposed reforms on public sector management, specifically corruption and budgetary transparency.80 It is estimated that Yemen averages $9 million a year in corruption, and this remains one of the largest issues that aid organizations have in funding Yemen’s programs.81 In addition, despite the fact that Yemen desperately needs to combat corruption, some scholars have noted very little desire within the Yemeni government to begin the reforms.82 Yemen’s economy is likely to continue to slide unless it gets serious about structural

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economic change, and thus far, the government has not taken steps to address all the World Bank’s recommendations. As noted earlier, the Yemeni economy is currently heavily dependent on oil. According to the World Bank, Yemen has the potential to mildly diversify its economy. Yemen has shown economic growth in sectors such as fisheries, tourism, and gasoline exports, and the World Bank believes that these areas can be developed further to diversify Yemen’s economy. The World Bank does report, however, that continued long-term growth will continue to be a challenge for Yemen, as it has no industry that can match its oil revenues.83 The Bab al-Mandeb The Bab al-Mandeb is a strategic issue because of its importance as a chokepoint affecting Gulf oil shipments through the Red Sea and shipping through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. It is situated between Eritrea and Djibouti and Yemen at the southern end of the Red Sea at the entrance to the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. It is the preferred route for tankers and shipping moving from the Gulf to Europe and the United States. The Energy Information Administration estimates that some 3.2–3.3 MMBD of oil moved through the Bab al-Mandeb in 2003, and recent peaks have brought this total to substantially higher levels.84 Any major disruption or closure of the Bab al-Mandeb could prevent tankers carrying Gulf oil from using the Red Sea and the Suez Canal/Sumed Pipeline complex and force them to go around the southern tip of Africa (the Cape of Good Hope), greatly increasing transit time and cost, limiting the tanker capacity now available on world markets. The one alternative is the East-West oil pipeline, which traverses Saudi Arabia and has a capacity of about 4.8 MMBD. There have not been recent threats to the Bab al-Mandeb or tanker traffic in the Red Sea. Libya did, however, scatter mines in the shipping lanes in the Red Sea in the past, during a period of peak tension with Egypt. While there were reports that South Yemen might try to close the Bab al-Mendab in the 1970s and early 1980s, these reports were largely speculation. The one tangible set of clashes that affected the security of shipping in the region occurred in December 1995 and August 1996. Yemen and Eritrea disputed control over the Hanish Islands, which are located just north of the Bab al-Mandeb. The issue was, however, resolved by diplomatic means. The two countries agreed to put their case before an international court of arbitration [Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)] in October 1996. In October 1998, the PCA ruled that the Hanish Islands are subject to the territorial sovereignty of Yemen. In December of 1999, the PCA issued its ruling on the maritime boundary. Both countries have since accepted these decisions. Relations with Neighboring States Relations with Yemen’s neighbors, including Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia have improved over the past several years and will likely continue

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to do so. As mentioned earlier, Yemen has been displeased with Saudi Arabia’s attempts to build a wall along parts of the Yemeni border where smuggling is prominent, but this dispute has been handled diplomatically and has not strained relations. Yemen’s borders and harbors are porous and scarcely guarded. This has allowed militants fleeing from the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, as well as weapons, drugs, and explosives smugglers, to move from Yemen into neighboring countries.85 Militants are also able to move into Oman and Saudi Arabia from Yemen, which makes an unguarded Yemen a potential threat to their internal security. The border treaty signed with Saudi Arabia in 2002 resolved the exact location of the border in contested areas, but the follow-through by Yemen to police its agreed borders has not been forthcoming. Yemen will face increased pressure from its neighbors to control its borders, and if it cannot, then the Saudis will likely continue building walls around the Yemeni border to restrict traffic between the two countries.86 The dominating issue for Yemen’s neighbors is Yemen’s internal security problems. Militants easily can slip into Saudi Arabia and Oman from Yemen, and aside from creating a stronger border guard, the best solution for curbing Yemen’s domestic troubles is to aid the Yemeni government’s security efforts. This will entail continued peaceful negotiations over issues for the preservation of overall goodwill. By keeping hostilities to a minimum, Saudi Arabia and Oman will allow Yemen to focus its military budget on internal security rather than on conventional forces designed to face external threats. Ongoing Internal Instability While Yemen’s external threats are minimal, its internal problems are serious and may increase over the coming years. Despite the countermeasures taken by Yemen since the year 2000, the violence caused by Yemen’s various factions has not stopped. President Salih is often described as a moderate whose power depends on his ability not to alienate too many groups at once.87 As noted earlier, Yemen had a previous history of allowing militants to return from foreign conflicts. Since the USS Cole bombing and 9/11, times have changed, and it is likely that President Salih’s security forces will attempt to apprehend many of the militants when they return from fighting. With Yemen’s unguarded borders, however, there will be large portions of militants that slip through undetected. These militants, having gained experience fighting American forces, can and will destabilize Yemen even further. Unless they are occupied in Iraq for a long period of time, it will be difficult for Yemen’s security forces to face even more opponents than already exist. Al Qa’ida remains strong in Yemen, with a membership that could be in the thousands. In addition, smaller groups also continue to play a key role in Yemen’s internal instability. The kidnapping of Westerners remains a problem, and al-Houthi Sr. has not been captured, making his rebellion a continued threat. The invasion of Iraq has stirred more of Yemen’s militants into action, making the job of Yemen’s security forces more difficult. In addition, some militants have gone to

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Iraq to fight American forces. In whatever way the war in Iraq ends, these militants will return to Yemen after its conclusion, and they could destabilize the state even further. In order to deal with these challenges, Yemen’s internal security forces need to adapt their strategy to deal with these threats. In addition, Yemen’s internal economic, social, and political dynamics are likely to adapt over time to lessen the level of poverty in its rural areas and limit Al Qa’ida’s ability at recruiting, particularly among its young male population. Internal stability will likely continue to be Yemen’s greatest challenge. Yemen will likely continue to increase its military budget to improve its naval patrolling abilities and to maintain its paramilitary. It is likely that Yemen will continue to need U.S. and French aid in guarding the Horn of Africa. It is even possible that if Yemen does not make a strong effort to eliminate corruption and diversify its economy, then foreign powers may have to take a larger role in ridding Yemen of hostile forces. The following is a summary or checklist of things Yemen will face in the upcoming years: • Demographic Time Bomb: Yemen is a poor country with a young society. Out of its population, 45 percent live below the poverty line, and 46.5 percent of its people are age 14 and below.88 If Yemen’s economy has not grown sufficiently to employ its youth as they come of age, there will be a demographic/socioeconomic crisis. With 35 percent unemployment, Yemen’s young and growing population has little hope of finding steady work. While unemployed, these youth become prey to militant groups looking for new members.89 The high unemployment rate will also likely lead to more protests like the ones that occurred over the loss of subsidies in July 2005.90 • Terrorism and Counterterrorism: As noted earlier, Yemen faces a threat from terrorist groups of varying size, strength, and organization. Most of them have proven capable of violence on some scale, and they remain a burden for the security forces.91 Al Qa’ida remains the largest terrorist group in Yemen, as its membership is estimated in the thousands. It has the greatest organizational capability of any militant group, and despite Yemeni antiterrorism efforts, Al Qa’ida is still capable of large-scale attacks.92 Among key concerns will remain protecting foreign ships from maritime attacks like those that occurred against the Cole and the Limburg.93 Yemeni forces will also continue to be concerned with militant groups kidnapping and ransoming Westerners. • Militants in Iraq: Many of the militant groups that reside within Yemen, including Al Qa’ida and the al-Houthi followers, oppose Yemeni cooperation with the United States and the occupation of Iraq.94 These militants will return to Yemen, and with Yemen’s unguarded borders, many can slip through undetected. These militants, having gained experience fighting American and Iraqi forces, can destabilize Yemen. • The al-Houthi Rebellion: The rebellion led by Baddredin al-Houthi has not been put down. The rebels have carried out attacks as recently as January 17, 2006, and alHouthi will likely remain a strategic challenge for the Yemeni government until he is either appeased or arrested. The rebellion has proven itself capable of launching largescale assaults when it engaged security forces in June 2004 and in March 2005. It has also shown that it can carry out small-scale attacks like the beating of Justice Minister

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Yehya Mousa in January 2006.95 Yemen will be pressed to resolve the al-Houthi Rebellion, as both the rebels and militant groups stretch the security forces. • Economic Reforms: Yemen’s economy is inefficient, plagued by corruption, experiences slow growth, and has high double-digit inflation and unemployment. The World Bank recommends that Yemen create new monetary policies that can combat inflation and shrink deficits. It also suggests that Yemen should deregulate parts of its economy to spark growth. The World Bank also acknowledges that Yemen will need to add greater transparency to its budgetary process in order to curb inflation.96 Yemen averages $9 million a year in corruption, and this gives pause to foreign investors who do not want to see their investments squandered.97 The Yemeni government has not taken serious steps to follow the World Bank’s proposed reforms. Without economic reform, it will be difficult for Yemen’s economy to grow or attract foreign investors. • Border Security: Yemen has extremely limited border checks and patrols. Smugglers and militants exploit this deficiency, and some of Yemen’s neighbors like Saudi Arabia fear that militants may migrate from Yemen and take refuge in their countries.98 The problem of Yemen’s inability to control its land borders is compounded by the challenge of controlling its harbors. Several Al Qa’ida suspects have fled Pakistan and Afghanistan and entered the Arabian Peninsula through Yemeni ports.99 Yemen will continue to face pressure to establish firmer control over who enters its country. In the end, however, Yemen’s resources are so limited that neighboring countries and the United States may have to guard the harbors and borders themselves.

In addition to these internal challenges, Yemen continues to suffer from the political uncertainties that plague much of the Middle East and the Gulf. Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s President, has ruled Yemen with an iron fist, but not without challenges. In September 2006, Saleh ran for reelection. His main challenger was Faisal bin Shalman, a former oil minister. Shamlan was part of an opposition umbrella group, the Common Forum, which included people of different ideological persuasions.100 While the Common Forum objected to early results that showed Saleh winning by a large margin, many believe that the election was one of the more open ones in Yemen’s history. As is the case with many of the countries in the region, elections are just a first step. In addition, regardless of the actual integrity of the procedures, no one believed that Salen would actually lose the election. The key question for Yemen’s immediate future, however, is whether allowing an opposition group to nominate a challenge to Saleh was a first step in an array of ‘‘internal reforms’’ or whether it is a one-time policy shift. Furthermore, many see the role of Ahmad, Saleh’s son, who is also the head of the Yemeni Republican Guards and Special Forces, as another key uncertainty in the next several years.101 It remains a major question whether Yemen will follow Syria (and many believe Egypt in the near future) to allow the transition from father to son and abandon its tradition of a ‘‘republic.’’ On the other hand, some experts argue that such transitions might be healthy to ensure internal stability and ‘‘evolutionary’’ reforms in the long run. Regardless, these questions add to the aura of uncertainty facing Yemen in the short-term.

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Balancing Internal Security and Conventional Military Needs Military spending is a serious internal security issue. As noted earlier, Yemen’s military budget has doubled over the past five years, rising from $482 million (U.S. dollars) in 2001, to $809 million in 2003, to $942 million in 2005.102 Most of this increase is believed to have gone toward Yemen’s Air Force (i.e., the purchase of the MiGs), to its Navy and the upgrading/purchasing of new patrol boats, and to Yemen’s security forces, which deal with Yemen’s numerous internal militant groups. The main purpose of Yemen’s conventional military forces now centers around protecting its harbors from illicit activities and attacks, as well as using a modern air force to put down rebellions like those led by Baddredin al-Houthi. However, Yemen desperately needs money for economic and social reform, and funding effective security forces limits Yemen’s ability to expand its conventional forces, which are out of date and far weaker than its neighbors. In addition to maintaining a streamlined and relevant conventional military, Yemen must also maintain and possibly expand its 70,000-man internal security force. Yemen has chosen to meet these demands by doubling its military spending between the years 2001 and 2005 (from $482 million to $942 million).103 This money has been used to purchase MiG-29 fighters, as well as ten new Austal-class fast patrol boats. Yemen has not expanded its security forces personnel in recent years, but as terrorist attacks have increased in 2005, and with the threat of insurgents returning from Iraq, Yemen may have to decide to halt further purchases of aircraft or boats for increased paramilitary equipment.104 It is equally important to note that while counterterrorism forces such as the TCD have been created, their effectiveness remains uncertain. Yemen’s internal security forces have been trained to put down political uprisings; the forces often rely on the use of too much force and informal intelligence sources. Yemen must find a way to maintain (or possibly increase) its internal security force without abandoning needed upgrades to its air force and navy. Not neglecting Yemen’s need for patrol craft is especially critical because it is one of Yemen’s only ways to counter the smuggling and maritime terrorist attacks that take place around its harbors. Given Yemen’s strategic location, maritime security is of paramount importance to both Yemen’s security and to international maritime trade. Control of the seas is something Yemen is attempting to achieve. The purchase of the ten fast Austal patrol boats will help Yemen arrest terror suspects who travel by boat to Saudi Arabia or up the Gulf Coast to Iraq.105 It is important to note, however, that the task of policing the geostrategic Horn of Africa and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait is beyond the capabilities of the Yemeni Navy. It would require Yemen’s cooperation with neighboring states such as Saudi Arabia as well as outside power projectors in the region such as the United States, France, and Britain. This has started by the signing of a security pact between France and Yemen. The United States Navy also maintains a permanent presence in Djibouti.

11

Conclusion: The New Balancing Act in the Gulf

It is always tempting to go beyond analysis and try to make policy recommendations. In broad terms, however, the country-by-country studies may do a better job of speaking about the relative need for change than any effort to provide yet another set of well-meaning and ineffective recommendations. There has been major progress in most of the countries analyzed in this book, and it is often clear that regimes not only recognize their problems, but also are working hard to solve at least some of them. There is a relatively high margin of mid- to long-term risk in the dynamics of Gulf security, but this is scarcely new. The key challenges lie in developments in Iran and Iraq: in the draft of Iranian politics toward hard-line radicalism and in the risks posed by Iranian efforts to proliferate and develop capabilities for asymmetric warfare. They are matched by the risk of the breakup of Iraq, a crippling level of civil war, or simply years of violent sectarian and ethnic tension and failed governance and development. Neo-Salafi extremism and terrorism are also important risks, and there is the risk of an emerging split between Sunni and Shi’ite and new forms of Shi’ite radicalism. The various divisions within the southern Gulf are important, but are unlikely to be critical to Gulf stability and security unless the United States should cease to be a stabilizing presence, Iraq should implode into division or civil war, or Iran should become far more reckless and adventurous than it is today. There are no broad regional polices that can change this situation. For all of the talk of the obsolescence of nation-sates, even transnational sources of instability like neo-Salafi extremism still play out on a country-by-country level. Complex security problems require complex (and time-consuming) solutions; they cannot be solved

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by slogans or the kind of policies or strategies that can be summarized in a fortune cookie. As long as Gulf security is driven by national differences and values, the list of security problems and issues discussed for each country is to all intents and purposes a list of the need for country-by-country solutions. There is nothing particularly complex or subtle about what needs to be done at the national level. If regimes react intelligently to these realities, their problems can be controlled. If not, they will lead to steadily growing risks of war and steadily more serious internal security problems. THE NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE SECURITY STRUCTURES It is easy to go call for more unity of effort and collective security structures in the Gulf. In fact, a number of strategic analysts inside and outside the Gulf have done so for decades. If one could only persuade regimes to look beyond their present rivalries and tensions, virtually all analysts agree that it would be desirable for the Gulf States to keep the United States and other outside powers ‘‘over the horizon,’’ to avoid proliferation, halt needless military spending, and seek to isolate the Gulf from other regional quarrels and tensions. Political, social, and economic development all offer higher rewards than strategic and military competition. Removing military tensions is a key step in improving the ability to cooperate against extremism and terrorism. From a purely rational viewpoint, the Gulf Cooperation Council should have become an instant success. There has long been good reason for the southern Gulf States to work with Iraq and every reason for them to find ways of eventually coopting Iran into a common security concept. If the southern Gulf States are ever to create truly effective forces, they need to look beyond the national level where there are truly petty tensions and make more effective and collective efforts to improve their conventional forces. The path to more effective security cooperation is also well understood by Gulf military planners. Obvious measures include efforts to do the following: • Create an effective planning system for collective defense and truly standardized and/or interoperable forces. • Integrate command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence and sensor nets for air and naval combat, including beyond visual range and night warfare capabilities. • Create joint air defense and air attack capabilities. • Establish effective cross-reinforcement and tactical mobility capabilities. • Set up joint training, support, and infrastructure facilities. • Create joint air and naval strike forces. • Deploy joint land defenses of the Kuwaiti/northwestern Saudi borders. • Prepare for outside or over-the-horizon reinforcement.

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• Create common advanced training systems. • Create improved urban and area security for unconventional warfare and low-intensity combat. • Emphasize both effective leadership and delegation. • Place a steadily higher emphasis on officer initiative and truly competitive career selection. Increase reliance on noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel. • Balance forces to achieve proper readiness. • Establish the ability to limit and manage collateral damage. • Plan for a common effort to deter and defend against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and covert or long-range delivery. • Integrate internal security and counterterrorism measures. • Adopt integrated immigration policies and efforts to reduce dependence on outside labor. • Accelerate efforts to create a common market, currency, and policies to encourage foreign investment. • Broaden security efforts for critical infrastructure to allow the ‘‘netting’’ of key national efforts and adopt an integrated approach to energy security, including facilities protection, transnational pipelines, and strategic reserves.

The divisions within the southern Gulf are so serious, and the political dynamics of Iran and Iraq are so unstable, that it makes little sense to talk about including them in a broader regional security structure. This does not, however, mean that the southern Gulf States should not make every effort to create stable diplomatic, security, and economic relations with both northern Gulf States. Iran and Iraq have clear options that they should pursue on a national basis, and until they do, including them in any meaningful regional structure will be impossible. History has made it all too clear that Iran and Iraq would also have profited far more from focusing on internal development than on an arms race and war, or seeking to dominate the region. Few nations have done as good a job of practicing sheer, self-destructive strategic stupidity so consistently over time. The benefits Iraq would now gain from moving toward national unity and development are immensely greater than the benefits any group of Iraqis can hope to gain from division, insurgency, or civil war. Iran’s efforts to create capabilities for asymmetric warfare and long-range nuclear missile forces do at least as much to threaten it with catastrophic future conflicts as to deter its enemies and strengthen its influence. As for the United States and Britain, neither thrusting into the Gulf nor being dragged into it has been cost-free. Dealing with the Iran-Iraq War and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait were acts of necessity. Invading Iraq, however, was an optional war and one that may prove to have been a serious strategic mistake. Containing and deterring conflict may be vital national interests for both countries, but intervention and efforts at regime change are a very different thing. It may not be practical to return

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to an over-the-horizon posture, but it is practical to emphasize cooperation with regional states, helping them build up their capabilities, and strategic restraint coupled to an emphasis on containment and negotiation. MEETING THE ISLAMIST EXTREMIST CHALLENGE All the powers in the Gulf confront the reality that transnational religious extremist threats, and violent Neo-Salafi movements like Al Qa’ida, present serious risks. They need to find every practical way they can to improve their cooperation in preventing Islamist extremism from dividing Islam and the region and blocking the political, economic, and social reforms that are critical to true internal and regional security. For all the reasons cited in this book, progress will be slow. Yet, cooperation in counterterrorism is a critical new priority, as is finding a new balance between regular military forces, the ability to defend against internal security threats and asymmetric warfare, and fund reform. Hard trade-offs need to be made at both the national and regional levels. At the same time, the preceding analysis is a warning that internal security efforts, and various internal reforms, are likely to be no substitute for a direct effort by the states in the region (and the Islamic world) to directly counter the challenge of Islamic extremism at the religious and political levels. The tendency to avoid such confrontation simply strengthens extremism and the risk of serious sectarian splits among Sunni, Shi’ite, and other Islamic threats. It is Islamic extremism—not some vague, generic form of global terrorism—that is the threat. This threat can be countered only by directly challenging it at the religious and ideological levels. Furthermore, the West has problems of its own. The efforts of Western nations like the United States to counter such extremism at the ideological level by promoting Western culture and democracy often do more harm than good. Reform needs to be encouraged at the local and national levels and by supporting domestic voices calling for the full mix of political, economic, and social reforms. The West needs to accept that the Gulf will ultimately move at its own pace and in its own way. Outside voices can influence, but not shape the results. TAKING RESPONSIBILITY VS. CONTINUING EXERCISES IN FUTILITY It is important to emphasize that all of these security problems do not mean that a great deal of progress is not currently under way in various Gulf states. Military forces are being reformed. Increased internal security efforts are mixed with reform, and there is less repression in the process. Countries are beginning to openly address the need for trade-offs between security forces and the kind of reforms that bring lasting security. A new round of oil wealth is being used with more wisdom than in the past, particularly in countries like Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

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That said, nothing about the history of the region, or its current behavior, fosters great faith that it will make more rapid progress than it is today or will evolve beyond the current level of national tensions that now shape the balance of security efforts in the region. Well-meant strategic rhetoric may pave the road to strategic studies with good intentions, but the reality is almost certain to be that nations will cooperate only in limited areas and when they perceive that immediate threats are so serious that they are forced to act. The Gulf is scarcely alone in exporting its problems. Every regime and nation finds blaming outside powers and movements irresistible. The extent to which nations focus on exporting their problems rather than solving them is, however, one major factor in shaping failed states. It is a certain indication of failed regimes and failed intellectuals. Unfortunately, the Gulf has far too many leaders and intellectuals who prefer exporting blame to taking responsibility and meaningful practical action. Its history of tension, conflict, and poorly structured national security efforts make it all too clear that far too few in the Gulf have learned that it is results, not rhetoric, that count.

Notes

CHAPTER 1 1. The CIA notes that boundary agreement was signed and ratified with Oman in 2003 for entire border, including Oman’s Musandam Peninsula and Al Madhah enclaves, but contents of the agreement and maps showing the alignment have not been published. CIA, ‘‘UAE,’’ The World Factbook, 2006, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html. 2. CIA, ‘‘UAE,’’ The World Factbook, 2006, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ factbook/index.html. 3. ‘‘Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1988,’’ Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ world/war/iran-iraq.htm01/03/2005. 4. The U.S. Department of Defense, ‘‘‘Eagle Resolve’ Focused on Reducing WMD Vulnerabilities,’’ Gulf Exercise, May 23, 2005. 5. Richard Nield, ‘‘Steady As She Goes,’’ Middle East Economic Digest 48, no. 48 (November 26, 2004): 4–6. 6. Brad Bourland, ‘‘Saudi Arabia’s 2005 Budget; 2004 Performance,’’ SAMBA Economy Watch (December 11, 2004). 7. See Col. Ernie Howard, ‘‘The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terror,’’ Air University Warfare Studies Institute, April 2004. 8. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, Department of Defense, February 6, 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/, p. 24.

CHAPTER 2 1. CIA, ‘‘Bahrain,’’ The World Factbook, 2006, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ factbook/index.html. 2. Ibid.

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NOTES

3. ‘‘Executive Summary, Bahrain,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments: The Gulf States (December 19, 2005): 3. 4. ‘‘Bahrain’s Sectarian Challenge,’’ International Crisis Group, Middle East Report no. 40 (May 6, 2005): 1. 5. ‘‘Executive Summary, Bahrain,’’ 1; and ‘‘Bahrain Background Note,’’ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, January 2006, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/ 26414.htm. 6. ‘‘Executive Summary, Bahrain,’’ 2. 7. ‘‘Executive Summary, Bahrain,’’ 3. 8. IISS, Military Balance (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), various editions. 9. Riad Kahwaji, ‘‘Bahrain to Scrutinize Future Defense Buys,’’ Defense News (February 2, 2004): 3; and IISS, Military Balance 2005–2006 (London: IISS). 10. ‘‘Navy, Bahrain,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments: The Gulf States (November 29, 2004): 1. 11. CIA, ‘‘Bahrain.’’ 12. ‘‘Security, Bahrain,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments: The Gulf States (November 29, 2004): 13; and ‘‘Bahrain Risk: Political Stability Risk,’’ The Economist Intelligence Unit (April 22, 2004): 13. 13. IISS, Military Balance 2005–2006; and ‘‘Army, Bahrain,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments: The Gulf States (November 16, 2005): 4. 14. IISS, Military Balance 2005–2006; and ‘‘Army, Bahrain,’’ 4. 15. IISS, Military Balance 2005–2006; and ‘‘Army, Bahrain,’’ 4. 16. ‘‘Army, Bahrain,’’ 4. 17. This description is adapted from the Encyclopedia Astronautica, available at http://www .astronautix.com/lvs/atacms.htm. 18. IISS, Military Balance 2005–2006; and ‘‘Army, Bahrain,’’ 5. 19. IISS, Military Balance 2006 (London: IISS). 20. Damian Kemp, ‘‘Bahrain Amiri Air Force Hawk 129 Makes Maiden Flight,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (September 7, 2006). 21. IISS, Military Balance 2005–2006; and ‘‘Air Force, Bahrain,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments: The Gulf States (November 29, 2004): 5. 22. ‘‘Air Force, Bahrain,’’ 5. 23. IISS, Military Balance 2005–2006. 24. ‘‘Air Force, Bahrain,’’ 5. 25. IISS, Military Balance 2005–2006. 26. ‘‘Air Force, Bahrain,’’ 5–6. 27. Robin Hughes, ‘‘Bahrain, Israel Request FMS Packages for Combat Aircraft,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (August 3, 2005). 28. IISS, Military Balance 2005–2006. 29. Ibid. 30. ‘‘Navy, Bahrain,’’ 3. 31. IISS, Military Balance 2006. 32. ‘‘Navy, Bahrain,’’ 1. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid.

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35. IISS, Military Balance 2006; and ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces, Bahrain,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments: The Gulf States (November 29, 2004): 1. 36. IISS, Military Balance 2006; and ‘‘Navy, Bahrain,’’ 2. 37. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces, Bahrain,’’ 3. 38. IISS, Military Balance 2004–2005 (London: IISS); and IISS, Military Balance 2005–2006. 39. IISS, Military Balance 2006; and ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces, Bahrain,’’ 3. 40. IISS, Military Balance 2005–2006. 41. ‘‘Security, Bahrain,’’ 2. 42. ‘‘Bahrain Risk: Political Stability Risk,’’ 4. 43. ‘‘Executive Summary, Bahrain,’’ 4. 44. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces, Bahrain,’’ 1–3. 45. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Bahrain: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices— 2005,’’ Washington, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, March 8, 2006, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61686.htm. 46. CIA, ‘‘Bahrain’’; and ‘‘Executive Summary, Bahrain,’’ 5. 47. ‘‘Security, Bahrain,’’ 7. 48. CIA, ‘‘Bahrain’’; and ‘‘Executive Summary, Bahrain,’’ 5. 49. Energy Information Association, ‘‘Country Analysis Briefs: Bahrain,’’ 1–3, http://www. eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Bahrain/pdf.pdf. 50. Ibid., 1. 51. ‘‘Reforming Bahrain’s Labour Market,’’ Crown Prince’s Court and the Economic Development Board, September 23, 2004, p. 4. 52. CIA, ‘‘Bahrain.’’ 53. IISS, Military Balance 2005–2006. 54. ‘‘Bahrain Risk: Political Stability Risk,’’ 7. 55. ‘‘Security, Bahrain,’’ 13. 56. CIA, ‘‘Bahrain.’’ 57. ‘‘Bahrain Economy: Fewer Barrels from Saudi Arabia,’’ The Economist Intelligence Unit (March 15, 2001): 1. 58. ‘‘Executive Summary, Bahrain,’’ 2; and ‘‘Bahrain Risk: Political Stability Risk,’’ 6. 59. Kenneth Katzman, ‘‘Bahrain: Key Issues for U.S. Policy,’’ Congressional Research Service (CRS), March 24, 2005, p. 6. 60. ‘‘Bahrain Risk: Political Stability Risk,’’ p. 6. 61. ‘‘Executive Summary, Bahrain,’’ 2. 62. ‘‘Bahrain’s Sectarian Challenge,’’ 1. 63. ‘‘Executive Summary, Bahrain,’’ 4. 64. ‘‘Bahrain’s Sectarian Challenge,’’ 7–8. 65. ‘‘Trouble in Bahrain: Symptoms of a Wider Malaise,’’ Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst (January 30, 2006): 1; and CIA, ‘‘Bahrain.’’ 66. ‘‘Trouble in Bahrain: Symptoms of a Wider Malaise,’’ 1. 67. ‘‘Bahrain Risk: Political Stability Risk,’’ 1. 68. ‘‘Bahrain’s Sectarian Challenge,’’ 1. 69. Associated Press, ‘‘Bahrain’s King Swears in New Cabinet, but Reformists Say Changes Don’t Go Far Enough,’’ January 15, 2005. 70. Associated Press, ‘‘Bahrain’s Decision to Register Web Sites Provokes Protest from Press Watchdog,’’ April 28, 2005.

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NOTES

71. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Database, http://www.tkb.org/MapModule.jsp. 72. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces, Bahrain,’’ 2. 73. ‘‘Security, Bahrain,’’ 2. 74. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces, Bahrain,’’ 2. 75. ‘‘Bahrain’s Sectarian Challenge,’’ 8. 76. Ibid., 7. 77. Ibid., 7. 78. ‘‘Executive Summary, Bahrain,’’ 1. 79. ‘‘Trouble in Bahrain: Symptoms of a Wider Malaise,’’ 1. 80. ‘‘Executive Summary, Bahrain,’’ 1. 81. ‘‘Bahrain Risk: Political Stability Risk,’’ 3. 82. ‘‘Executive Summary, Bahrain,’’ 3. 83. IISS, Military Balance 2005–2006; and Kahwaji, ‘‘Bahrain to Scrutinize Future Defense Buys,’’ 3. 84. Kemp, ‘‘Bahrain Amiri Air Force Hawk 129 Makes Maiden Flight’’; and Hughes; and ‘‘Bahrain, Israel Request FMS Packages for Combat Aircraft.’’

CHAPTER 3 1. CIA, ‘‘Kuwait,’’ The World Factbook, 2006, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html. 2. Britain took de facto control of Kuwait from 1899 until independence in 1961, although the al-Sabah family continued civil rule. 3. Energy Information Association (EIA), ‘‘Country Analysis Briefs: Kuwait,’’ http://www .eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/kuwait.html. 4. EIA, ‘‘Country Analysis Briefs: Kuwait’’; and CIA, ‘‘Kuwait.’’ 5. Joseph Rohe, ‘‘US Grants Kuwait ‘Major Non-NATO Ally’ Status,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (April 2, 2004). 6. EIA, ‘‘Country Analysis Briefs: Kuwait.’’ 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Riad Kahwaji, ‘‘Parliament-MoD Row Delays C4I Deal in Kuwait,’’ Defense News (December 1, 2003): 34. 11. CIA, ‘‘Kuwait.’’ 12. ‘‘Army, Kuwait,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States (October 24, 2005). 13. According to Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Gulf States, Kuwait has 1,600 foreign personnel in its army, whereas the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance, estimated the number is closer to 3,700. 14. ‘‘Army: Kuwait.’’ 15. IISS, Military Balance 2000–2001 (London: IISS). 16. Christopher Foss, ‘‘Kuwait Receives Latest Condor 2,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (November 25, 2004). 17. Christopher Foss, ‘‘Decision Time Looms for Kuwaiti APC Selection,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (January 25, 2006). 18. Jiri Kominek, ‘‘Two Gulf States Weigh Up Heavy Transporter Bids,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (July 2, 2003): 18.

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19. ‘‘Kuwait-TOW-2A/B Anti-Armor Guided Missiles,’’ Defense Security Cooperation Agency News Release, August 4, 2005, http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2005/ kuwait_05-38.pdf. 20. Smerch 9K58 multiple rocket system, http://www.army-technology.com/projects/ smerch/. 21. ‘‘Air Force: Kuwait,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Gulf States (October 24, 2005). 22. The lower estimates are from the IISS, Military Balance 2005–2006 (London: IISS), and the higher estimates are from Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States (December 19, 2005). 23. Ed Blanche, ‘‘Regional Briefing—Gulf States: Winds of Change,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (February 9, 2005). 24. Katy Glassborow, ‘‘General Electric Lands Hornet Engine Contract,’’ Jane’s Navy International (March 1, 2006). 25. James Murphy, ‘‘US Congress Notified of Possible F/A-18 Support Sale to Kuwait,’’ Jane’s Defence Industry (October 1, 2005). 26. Jane’s and IISS, Military Balance, mostly agree on the number of operational helicopters: the total number, including nonoperational, comes from Jane’s. For the AS-332 Super Puma, the lower estimate is from Jane’s and the higher one is from the IISS, Military Balance. 27. See http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/patriot.htm. 28. In a December 10, 2004, press release, The U.S. Army claimed, Patriot missile operations were conducted on an extremely dense and complex battlefield where more than 41,000 sorties were flown by coalition air forces. Forty-one active duty Army and 13 coalition Patriot batteries were deployed to OIF, serving in 8 countries. Two unfortunate incidents of fratricide or ‘‘friendly fire,’’ involving U.S. Navy F/A-18 and British Royal Air Force Tornado aircraft resulted in three fatalities. The U.S. Army regrets the loss of life and expresses condolences to the family members. In a third incident a U.S. Air Force F-16 fired on a Patriot battery but there were no deaths or injuries. United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) concluded their investigations into these incidents and results are posted on the CENTCOM web site at www.centcom.mil. Application of lessons learned in OIF has already improved upon Patriot’s performance and the system will be continuously refined. Improvements include combinations of hardware modifications, software changes and updates to tactics, techniques and procedures. Some changes include the integration of satellite radio technology at the Battalion Information Coordination Central which provides improved situational awareness through voice and data connectivity with higher headquarters Identification and Engagement Authority as well as enhanced command and control; and software improvements that enable better identification, classification and correlation of airborne objects. In addition the Army continues to explore and evaluate new opportunities to improve performance and reduce the risk of fratricide. 29. Voice of America, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/1998/ 980222b_voa.htm. 30. ‘‘Kuwait, Navy,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States (October 25, 2005). 31. Richard Scott and Robin Hughes, ‘‘Kuwait Seeks FMS Deal for Fast Interceptor Boats,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (December 14, 2005); Nick Brown, ‘‘Kuwait to Acquire New

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Guns for Navy Interceptors,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly (July 12, 2006): 20. 32. ‘‘Kuwait Selects SINCGARS,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (November 13, 2002). 33. ‘‘Kuwait Buys Aerostat,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (December 10, 2003). 34. ‘‘News in Brief: Patrol Boats for Kuwait,’’ Jane’s Navy International (March 1, 2005). 35. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Kuwait: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices— 2005,’’ Washington, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, March 8, 2006, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61692.htm. 36. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Gulf States (June 13, 2005). 37. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Kuwait.’’ 38. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Gulf States (June 13, 2005). 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 41. Michael Knights, ‘‘Northern Gulf Vulnerable to Infiltration by Terrorist Groups,’’ Jane’s Intelligence Review (October 1, 2005). 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 44. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Gulf States (June 13, 2005). 45. Stephen Ulph, ‘‘Gulf—Islamic Militancy Kicks off in Kuwait,’’ Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst (February 1, 2005). 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 48. Knights, ‘‘Northern Gulf Vulnerable to Infiltration.’’ 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid. 51. Knights, ‘‘Northern Gulf Vulnerable to Infiltration’’; and ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Gulf States (January 4, 2006). 52. Knights, ‘‘Northern Gulf Vulnerable to Infiltration’’; and ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Gulf States (January 4, 2006). 53. Knights, ‘‘Northern Gulf Vulnerable to Infiltration’’; and ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Gulf States (January 4, 2006). 54. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Gulf States (January 4, 2006). 55. Ibid. 56. Knights, ‘‘Northern Gulf Vulnerable to Infiltration.’’ 57. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Gulf States (January 4, 2006). 58. Ibid. 59. Knights, ‘‘Northern Gulf Vulnerable to Infiltration.’’ 60. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Gulf States (January 4, 2006). 61. Ibid. 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid.

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64. Ulph, ‘‘Gulf—Islamic Militancy Kicks off in Kuwait’’; and ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Gulf States (January 4, 2006). 65. Knights, ‘‘Northern Gulf Vulnerable to Infiltration.’’ 66. Ulph, ‘‘Gulf—Islamic Militancy Kicks off in Kuwait’’; and ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Gulf States (January 4, 2006). 67. Ulph, ‘‘Gulf—Islamic Militancy Kicks off in Kuwait.’’ 68. Ibid. 69. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Gulf States (January 4, 2006). 70. Ibid. 71. Ibid. 72. Ibid. 73. Ibid. 74. Ibid. 75. ‘‘Kuwait—Kuwaiti Court Sentenced 18 Men to Three Years’ Imprisonment,’’ Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor (May 18, 2005). 76. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Gulf States (January 4, 2006). 77. Knights, ‘‘Northern Gulf Vulnerable to Infiltration.’’ 78. Ibid. 79. Ibid. 80. Ibid. 81. ‘‘Sheikh-up,’’ The Economist (January 21, 2006). 82. Simon Henderson, ‘‘Kuwait’s Parliament Decides Who Rules,’’ PolicyWatch #1073, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 27, 2006. 83. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Kuwait.’’ 84. Knights, ‘‘Northern Gulf Vulnerable to Infiltration by Terrorist Groups.’’ 85. ‘‘Seismic Shock in Kuwait,’’ Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst (July 1, 2005). 86. According to Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst (‘‘Seismic Shock in Kuwait’’), there are just under 140,000 male voters in Kuwait. According to the U.S. Department of State (‘‘Kuwait’’), there are 143,000 male voters. 87. ‘‘Seismic Shock in Kuwait.’’ 88. ‘‘Kuwait’s Elections and Results,’’ The Estimate (July 3, 2006): 2. 89. Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp/. 90. CIA, The World Factbook, 2006, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ ku.html. 91. UN, World Population Policies 2003 (New York: United Nations, 2004). 92. Andrzej Kapiszweski, ‘‘Arab Labor Migration to the GCC States,’’ IOM (September 2003): 14. 93. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Kuwait.’’ 94. Ibid. 95. Ibid. 96. Ibid. 97. Ulph, ‘‘Gulf—Islamic Militancy Kicks off in Kuwait.’’ 98. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Gulf States (January 4, 2006).

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NOTES

99. ‘‘Kuwait’s Internal Divisions Exposed,’’ Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst (October 28, 2005). 100. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Kuwait,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Gulf States (January 4, 2006). 101. Khalid Al-Rodhan, ‘‘The Saudi and Gulf Stock Markets,’’ CSIS Report, October 25, 2005, http://www.csis.org/. 102. ‘‘Arab Stock Markets Hit by Losses,’’ Aljazeera.net, March 14, 2006, http://english .aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/140F02FE-0CEE-4785-B7A4-4DD1976B94D2.htm. 103. ‘‘Saudi Blocks Qatar Pipeline,’’ Jane’s Foreign Report (November 3, 2005). 104. ‘‘In Brief: Iran, Kuwait Sign Security MoU,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (March 29, 2006). 105. ‘‘Kuwait’s Internal Divisions Exposed,’’ Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst (October 28, 2005).

CHAPTER 4 1. This analysis draws heavily upon the Energy Information Agency (EIA) analysis of ‘‘World Oil Transit Chokepoints,’’ September 2005, ‘‘’’http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/ World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Hormuz.html. 2. An e-mail message to the authors from Omani officials, September 18, 2006. 3. ‘‘Executive Summary: Oman,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States (December 19, 2005): 3. 4. EIA, ‘‘Country Analysis Briefs: Oman,’’ March 2006, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ cabs/Oman/Full.html. 5. ‘‘Executive Summary: Oman,’’ 3. 6. An e-mail message to the authors from Omani officials, September 18, 2006. 7. ‘‘Executive Summary: Oman,’’ 1. 8. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Oman,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States (September 19, 2005): 2, 4; and IISS, Military Balance (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006). 9. ‘‘Executive Summary: Oman,’’ 4. 10. Ibid., 2. 11. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, ‘‘Background Note: Oman’’ February 2006, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26414.htm. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. CIA, The World Factbook, 2006, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index. html. 16. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Background Note: Oman.’’ 17. ‘‘Executive Summary: Oman,’’ 5. 18. This analysis draws heavily upon EIA, ‘‘Country Analysis Briefs: Oman’’; other sources include the Middle East Economic Digest; and CIA, The World Factbook. 19. This analysis draws heavily upon EIA, ‘‘Country Analysis Briefs: Oman.’’ 20. CIA, The World Factbook. 21. IISS, Military Balance (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), various years. The GDP data for 2005 are from CIA, The World Factbook, 2005. 22. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Background Note: Oman.’’

NOTES

559

23. ‘‘Armed Forces: Oman,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States (October 24, 2005): 3. 24. ‘‘Executive Summary: Oman,’’ 4. 25. IISS, Military Balance, 2006. 26. ‘‘Executive Summary: Oman,’’ 5. 27. IISS, Military Balance, 2006. 28. IISS, Military Balance, 2006; and ‘‘Army, Oman,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States (November 16, 2005): 7. 29. Robin Hughes, ‘‘Oman Selects Javelin ATGW,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (January 19, 2005); ‘‘Saudi Arabia Continues with Defense Push,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly (August 9, 2006): 18. 30. IISS, Military Balance, 2006; and ‘‘Army, Oman,’’ 7. 31. IISS, Military Balance, 2006; and ‘‘Army, Oman,’’ 7. 32. ‘‘Army, Oman,’’ 7. 33. ‘‘Executive Summary: Oman,’’ 3. 34. Robin Hughes, ‘‘Oman Receives First Block 50+ F-16,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (August 17, 2005). 35. Robin Hughes, ‘‘Omani F-16s to Get Reconnaissance Pods,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (February 11, 2004). 36. ‘‘PANTERA Pods for Oman and Poland,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (January 7, 2004). 37. IISS, Military Balance, 2006. 38. IISS, Military Balance, 2006; and ‘‘Air Force, Oman,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States (October 24, 2005): 4. 39. IISS, Military Balance, 2006; and ‘‘Navy: Oman,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States (October 24, 2005): 3. 40. Robin Hughes, ‘‘Oman and UAE Bolster Coastal Protection,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (February 11, 2004). 41. Richard Scott, ‘‘Oman Chooses VL MICA Missile for OPVs,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly (July 26, 2006): 19. 42. ‘‘Army: Oman,’’ 3. 43. IISS, Military Balance, 2006; and Christopher Foss, ‘‘Oman Gets Chinese Armoured Personnel Carriers,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (September 24, 2003). 44. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, http://www.tkb.org/MapModule.jsp. 45. James Boxell, ‘‘VT Poised to Land £400 Order to Supply Oman Order,’’ Financial Times Companies UK (April 14, 2006). 46. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. 47. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Oman,’’ 1–2. 48. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Oman: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices— 2005,’’ March 8, 2006, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61696.htm. 49. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. 50. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Oman,’’ 1. 51. ‘‘Executive Summary: Oman,’’ 2; and CIA, The World Factbook, 2006. 52. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2005,’’ April 2006, p. 141, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65462.pdf. 53. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Oman,’’ 2. 54. ‘‘Oman Risk: Political Stability Risk,’’ The Economist Intelligence Unit (April 22, 2004): 5.

560 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78.

NOTES

‘‘Executive Summary: Oman,’’ 4. Ibid. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Oman,’’ 7. Ibid. Ibid., 9. ‘‘Executive Summary: Oman,’’ 3. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Oman,’’ 8. ‘‘Executive Summary: Oman,’’ 5; and ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Oman,’’ 10. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Oman: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.’’ ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Oman,’’ 9–10. ‘‘Executive Summary: Oman,’’ 5. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Oman,’’ 11. Economist Intelligence Unit, Online Database, Country Data 2005, http://eiu.com. EIA, ‘‘Country Analysis Briefs: Oman.’’ ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Oman,’’ 9. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Oman,’’ 8. ‘‘Executive Summary: Oman,’’ 3; and ‘‘Oman Risk,’’ 5. ‘‘Executive Summary: Oman,’’ 3. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Oman,’’ 2. ‘‘Oman Risk,’’ 6. ‘‘Executive Summary: Oman,’’ 3. Ibid., 2. ‘‘Oman Risk,’’ 2. ‘‘Executive Summary: Oman,’’ 4.

CHAPTER 5 1. U.S. Department of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1999–2000 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, June 2002). 2. ‘‘Executive Summary: Qatar,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Gulf States (May 3, 2005). 3. CIA, The World Factbook, 2006, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index. html. 4. CIA, The World Factbook, 2006. 5. Richard F. Grimmett, ‘‘Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1997– 2004,’’ Congressional Research Service, RL33051, August 29, 2005. 6. U.S. Department of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1999–2000. 7. Ed Blanche, ‘‘Regional Briefing—Gulf States: Winds of Change,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (February 9, 2005). 8. Ibid. 9. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Qatar,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Gulf States (May 3, 2005). 10. ‘‘Armed Forces: Qatar,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Gulf States (May 3, 2004). 11. CIA The World Factbook, 2006. 12. IISS, Military Balance, 2005–2006 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies). 13. ‘‘Air Force: Qatar,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Gulf States (May 3, 2005).

NOTES

561

14. Vivek Raghuvanshi, ‘‘India to Buy Mirage 2000-5 Aircraft from Qatar,’’ Defense News (October 25, 2004): 24. 15. IISS, Military Balance, 2006. 16. ‘‘Air Force: Qatar.’’ 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. ‘‘Navy: Qatar,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Gulf States (May 3, 2005). 20. Richard Scott, ‘‘Qatar Orders Fast Interceptor Craft,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly (February 12, 2003). 21. ‘‘Navy: Qatar.’’ 22. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Qatar.’’ 23. ‘‘Executive Summary: Qatar.’’ 24. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Qatar.’’ 25. Michael Knights, ‘‘Southern Gulf Co-operation Council Countries Brace for Terrorist Attacks,’’ Jane’s Intelligence Review (November 1, 2005). 26. ‘‘GCC Dismantles Peninsula Shield,’’ Jane’s Foreign Report (January 19, 2006). 27. ‘‘Saudi Blocks Qatar Pipeline,’’ Jane’s Foreign Report (November 3, 2005). 28. ‘‘Bridge over Saudi’s Troubled Waters,’’ Jane’s Foreign Report (September 15, 2005). 29. Ibid. 30. ‘‘GCC Dismantles Peninsula Shield.’’ 31. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Qatar.’’ 32. Energy Information Association, Department of Energy, ‘‘Country Analysis Briefs: Qatar, March 2006, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/qatar.html#Reports. 33. Michael Knights, ‘‘Gulf States Face New Security Challenges,’’ Jane’s Intelligence Review (May 1, 2005). 34. Mary Anne Weaver, ‘‘Democracy by Decree: Can One Man Propel a Country into the Future?’’ The New Yorker, November 20, 2000. 35. ‘‘Executive Summary: Qatar.’’ 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Weaver, ‘‘Democracy by Decree.’’ 39. ‘‘All That Jazeera,’’ The Economist (June 21, 2003); also, ‘‘The World through Their Eyes—Arab Satellite Television,’’ The Economist (February 26, 2005). 40. ‘‘Saudi Blocks Qatar Pipeline.’’ 41. Knights, ‘‘Southern Gulf Co-operation Council Countries Brace.’’ 42. ‘‘Executive Summary: Qatar.’’ 43. Knights, ‘‘Southern Gulf Co-operation Council Countries Brace.’’ 44. ‘‘Qatar Economic Forum Eyes Billions,’’ Aljazeera.net, March 12, 2006, http://english .aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/725AFCF0-57F2-4EF7-8129-230D000C9CF5.htm. 45. Knights, ‘‘Southern Gulf Co-operation Council Countries Brace.’’ 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid. 51. Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp/.

562

NOTES

52. Ibid. 53. CIA, ‘‘Qatar,’’ The World Factbook, January 10, 2006, https://www.cia.gov/cia/ publications/factbook/index.html. 54. This was estimated by the authors. 55. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Qatar.’’ 56. IISS, The Military Balance 2005–2006, 206. 57. CIA, ‘‘Qatar,’’ The World Factbook. 58. Knights, ‘‘Southern Gulf Co-operation Council Countries Brace.’’ 59. Ibid.

CHAPTER 6 1. CIA, The World Factbook, 2006, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ index.html. 2. Population Division of the Department of Economic and social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariate, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp/. 3. Authors’ estimate based on the CIA, The World Factbook, 2006. 4. P.K. Abdul Ghafour, ‘‘Security Body to Draw Out Domestic, Foreign Policies,’’ Arab News, October 18, 2005, www.arabnews.com. 5. ‘‘NSC Given Wide Powers,’’ Arab News, October 19, 2005, www.arabnews.com. 6. Ibid. 7. U.S. Department of State, Annual Report on Military Expenditures, 1999, submitted to the Committee on Appropriations of the U.S. Senate and the Committee on Appropriations of the U.S. House of Representatives, July 27, 2000, in accordance with section 511(b) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1993. 8. IISS, Military Balance (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), various editions. 9. Ibid. This number includes the National Guard 10. The FY1988 budget was planned to have a $10 billion deficit, with $8 billion in foreign borrowing. It involved the first foreign borrowing in 25 years and the first increase in taxes in 8 years—all on foreign businesses. The actual budget reached a $15–17-billion deficit by the year’s end, with some $10 billion in financing. See Economist (January 16, 1988): 59; and Defense News (January 18, 1988): 4. 11. This is based on various editions of the CIA, The World Factbook. Some of the differences between these estimates may, however, reflect differences in the CIA definition of GDP and military expenditures. 12. Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense, March 2001, June 2002, July 2003, Report to the U.S. Congress by the Secretary of Defense, http://www.defenselink.mil/ pubs/allied.html. 13. Interview with an official of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2001. 14. Defense News (November 20–26, 1995): 27. 15. Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1985–1992, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-93-656F, July 19, 1993, 59, 69; Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1989–1996, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-97-778F, August 13, 1997, 53, 65; and Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1992–1996, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-RL30640, August 18, 2000, 47–49, 58–60.

NOTES

563

16. James Boxell, ‘‘Saudis in $19bn Eurofighter Deal,’’ Financial Times (August 18, 2006). 17. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1989–1996, 53, 65–66. 18. Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1996–2003, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-RL32547, August 26, 2004, 53, 51–61. 19. Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfer to Developing Nations, 1996–2000, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS RL32547, August 26, 2004, 50, 61. 20. See Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), ‘‘High Costs of the Persian Gulf War,’’ World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1988), 21–23; ACDA printout dated May 14, 1996; and Richard F. Grimmett, Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Supplier, 1982–1989, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, 90-298F, June 19, 1990. 21. Estimates based on data provided by Richard F. Grimmett of the Congressional Research Service. 22. ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1989 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1990), Table II; ACDA printout dated May 14, 1996; ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1996 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1997), Table II; and U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1998 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2000). 23. These data are all taken from the 1988–1996 editions of Richard F. Grimmett Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, Congressional Research Service. 24. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfer to Developing Nations, 1996-2000, 50, 61. 25. Ibid. 26. Boxell, ‘‘Saudis in $19bn Eurofighter Deal.’’ 27. ‘‘Saudi Arabia in Talks with Russia over Weapons Sales,’’ The Peninsula (September 10, 2006). 28. Authors’ estimate based on the CIA, The World Factbook, 2006. 29. Robin Hughes, ‘‘Saudi Arabia Continues with Defense Push,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly (August 9, 2006): 18. 30. IISS, Military Balance, various editions. 31. ‘‘Army, Saudi Arabia,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States (November 16, 2005). 32. The IISS reports 90 GCT-1s, but Giat reports the sale of only 51. 33. Hughes, ‘‘Saudi Arabia Continues with Defense Push,’’ 18. 34. Robin Hughes, ‘‘SANG to Expand Its Capabilities,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly (July 26, 2006), 7. 35. David Long, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997). 36. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces, Saudi Arabia,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States (August 8, 2005): 11–12. 37. Hughes, ‘‘SANG to Expand Its Capabilities,’’ 7. 38. Robin Hughes, ‘‘Modernization Drive for Saudi National Guard,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly (December 3, 2003). 39. Jane’s Defense Weekly (August 7, 2002): 16. 40. Richard Scott, ‘‘Sawari II Frigates Set Sail,’’ Jane’s Navy International (January 1, 2005). 41. See naval-technology.com, www.naval-technology.com/projects/al_riyadh/. 42. Scott, ‘‘Sawari II Frigates Set Sail.’’ 43. Ibid.

564

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44. Richard Scott, ‘‘New Saudi Frigates to Receive Oto Melara Guns,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (November 27, 2002). 45. Christopher Cavas, ‘‘Saudi Arabia Eyes Heavily Armed, Aegis LCS, Defense News (September 25, 2006): 1. 46. Scott, ‘‘New Saudi Frigates to Receive Oto Melara Guns.’’ 47. Periscope, ‘‘Nations/Alliances/Geographic Regions Middle/East/North Africa—Saudi Arabia.’’ 48. J.A.C. Lewis, ‘‘Saudis Move Closer to NH 90 Purchase for Navy,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (December 24, 2003). 49. Ibid. 50. Based on Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1996–1997, 1999–2000, and 2000–2001; IISS, Military Balance, 1996–1997, 1999–2000, and 2001–2002. 51. USCENTCOM, Atlas, 1996, MacDill Air Force Base, USCENTCOM, 1997; and the IISS, Military Balance, various editions. 52. USCENTCOM, Atlas, 1996, MacDill Air Force Base, USCENTCOM, 1997; IISS, Military Balance, various editions. 53. Andrew Chuter and Pierre Tran, ‘‘Saudi Aircraft Moves Prompt Speculation about Ties with UK,’’ Defense News (April 25, 2005): 4. 54. Ibid. 55. Chuter and Tran, ‘‘Saudi Aircraft Moves Prompt Speculation,’’ 4; see also http://www .answers.com/main/ntquery?method=4&dsid=2222&dekey=RAF+Tornado +GR4&gwp=8&curtab=2222_1; and http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/ tornado.htm (accessed May 6, 2005). 56. Chuter and Tran, ‘‘Saudi Aircraft Moves Prompt Speculation,’’ 4; see also http://www .answers.com/main/ntquery?method=4&dsid=2222&dekey=RAF+Tornado +GR4&gwp=8&curtab=2222_1; and http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/ tornado.htm (accessed May 6, 2005). 57. Jean-Pierre Neu, ‘‘Saudis Pledge to Buy French Jets in 6.0 Deal,’’ The Financial Times (April 15, 2005). 58. J. Lewus, ‘‘France, Saudi Arabia on Verge of Closing Major Arms Deal,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly (September 13, 2006): 5. 59. Neu, ‘‘Saudis Pledge to Buy French Jets.’’ 60. P.K. Abdul Ghafour, ‘‘No Arms Deals during French Visit, Says Saud,’’ Arab News (April 18, 2005). 61. Chuter and Tran, ‘‘Saudi Aircraft Moves Prompt Speculation,’’ 4. 62. Boxell, ‘‘Saudis in $19bn Eurofighter Deal.’’ 63. Riad Kahwaj, ‘‘Saudi Crown Prince Confirms Typhoon Deal with U.K.,’’ Defense News (December 28, 2005). 64. Tim Ripley, ‘‘Saudis Opt for Typhoon Buy,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly (January 4, 2006). 65. Ibid. 66. Defense News (September 9, 1996): 26. 67. Defense News (March 17, 1997): 3; Associated Press, May 12, 1997; Jane’s Defense Weekly (July 30, 1997): 17. 68. Patrick Clawson, ‘‘Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: Who Is Next after Iran?’’ The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 69. Ed Blanche, ‘‘Gulf-Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Footprint,’’ Jane’s Islamic Affair Analyst (September 1, 2003).

NOTES

565

70. See GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/saudi/. 71. ‘‘President Hu Arrives in Saudi Arabia for State Visit,’’ Xinhua (April 22, 2006), http:// www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-04/22/content_574220.htm; and Richard L. Russell, ‘‘Oil for Missiles,’’ Wall Street Journal (January 25, 2006), http://www.opinionjournal.com/ editorial/feature.html?id=110007866. 72. Associated Press, May 12, 1997, 0251. 73. U.S. experts have never monitored a test of the conventional version of the missile. CEP stands for circular error probable and is an indication of a missile’s accuracy. The figure represents the radius of a circle in which half the warheads are expected to fall. It should be noted, however, that the theoretical figures apply only to missiles that operate perfectly up to the point which the missile has left the launcher and at least iis first booster and guidance system are operating perfectly. Operational CEPs can be only ‘‘guesstimated,’’ but will be much lower. Missiles generally do not have fail-safe warheads. A substantial number will have partial failures and deliver their warheads far from their intended targets. Jane’s Defense Weekly (October 1, 1990): 744–46; Fred Donovan, ‘‘Mideast Missile Flexing’’, Arms Control Today (May 1990): 31; Shuey, Lenhart, Snyder, Donnelley, Mielke, and Moteff, Missile Proliferation: Survey of Emerging Missile Forces, Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, Report No. 88-642F, February 9, 1989. 74. Jane’s Defense Weekly (October 1, 1990): 744–46; Jane’s Defense Weekly (July 30, 1997): 17; Donovan, ‘‘Mideast Missile Flexing,’’ 31; Shuey, Lenhart, Snyder, Donnelley, Mielke, and Moteff, Missile Proliferation. 75. Associated Press, May 12, 1997, 0251; Jane’s Defense Weekly (July 30, 1997): 17. 76. Jane’s Defense Weekly (October 1, 1988): 744–55; Jane’s Defense Weekly (July 30, 1997): 17; Associated Press, May 12, 1997, 0251. 77. Jane’s Defense Weekly (October 1, 1990): 744–46. 78. Washington Times, October 4, 1988, A-2; Christian Science Monitor, October 8, 1988, 2. 79. Shuey, Lenhart, Snyder, Donnelley, Mielke, and Moteff, , Missile Proliferation, 64–65. 80. The warhead could also be enhanced with submunitions, a proximity fuse to detonate before impact to give an optimum burst pattern and widen the area covered by shrapnel, and a time delay fuse to allow the warhead to fully penetrate a building before exploding. Shuey, Lenhart, Snyder, Donnelley, Mielke, and Moteff, Missile Proliferation, 23–24. 81. Jane’s Defense Weekly (July 30, 1997): 17. 82. Prince Nayef is 68 years old. Like Fahd, Abdullah, and Nawaf, he is a son of King Abdul Aziz. 83. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces, Saudi Arabia.’’ 84. Gulf Daily News, August 30, 2004, http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/arc_Articles.asp ?Article=90497&Sn=WORL&IssueID=27163. 85. Ed Blanche, ‘‘Saudi Extremists Target Intelligence Chiefs,’’ Jane’s Intelligence Review (February 1, 2004). 86. See Simon Henderson, ‘‘The Saudis: Friend or Foe?,’’ Wall Street Journal, October 22, 2001, as provided by e-mail in [email protected]; also see The Estimate XIII, no. 16 (September 7, 2001): 1. 87. P.K. Abdul Ghafour, ‘‘Prince Muqrin New Intelligence Chief,’’ Arab News, October 23, 2005, www.arabnews.com. 88. Arab News, July 8, 2001, Jeddah, http://www.arabnews.com/article.asp?ID=3823.

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89. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s Experience in Fighting Drug and Arms Smuggling and the Relationship between Terrorism and Arms, Tables 5 and 6, a working paper submitted at the Counter-Terrorism International Conference, Riyadh, 5–8/2/2005. 90. Ibid. 91. Defense News (November 11, 1991): 36; Washington Technology (September 24, 1992): 1. 92. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces, Saudi Arabia,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States, posted December 23, 2004. 93. Jonathan Fenby, ‘‘Chirac Takes Charge to Clinch E7BN Franco-Saudi Arms Deal,’’ Sunday Business Group, May 2, 2004, 7. 94. Herve Gattegno, ‘‘The Saudi Contract that Pits Mr. Chirac against Mr. Sarkozy,’’ Le Monde, April 15, 2005. 95. Ibid. 96. Fenby, ‘‘Chirac Takes Charge,’’ 7. 97. Ibid. 98. Douglas Barrie, Michael A. Taverna, and Robert Wall, ‘‘ Singapore Sling: Eurofighter Typhoon Drops from Singaporean Short List, Faces Potential Competition in Saudi Arabia,’’ Aviation Week & Space Technology (April 25, 2005). 99. ‘‘Dassault Steps up Negotiating Sale of Rafale Airplanes to Riyadh,’’ Le Monde, April 16, 2005. 100. Barrie, Taverna, and Wall, ‘‘Singapore Sling.’’ 101. Timothy J. Burger, ‘‘The Great Wall of Arabia,’’ TIME, September 4, 2006. 102. This analysis draws heavily on interviews; various annual editions of the IISS, Military Balance; and Jane’s Sentinel: The Gulf States, 1997 (London: Jane’s Publishing, 1997). 103. This text is modified from text provided in the U.S. Department of State, ‘‘1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,’’http://www.state.gov/www/global/ human_rights/1999_hrp_report/saudiara.html; and U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Saudi Arabia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—1999,’’ released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, February 25, 2000. 104. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,’’ various editions, especially U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Saudi Arabia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—1999.’’ 105. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—1999,’’ http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/426.htm. 106. Ibid. 107. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs funds the Mutawaa’in, and the general president of the Mutawaa’in holds the rank of cabinet minister. The Ministry also pays the salaries of imams (prayer leaders) and others who work in the mosques. During 1999, foreign imams were barred from leading worship during the most heavily attended prayer times and prohibited from delivering sermons during Friday congregational prayers. The government claims that its actions were part of its Saudisation plan to replace foreign workers with citizens. 108. Associated Press, New York, March 18, 2002, 0650; Associated Press, March 25, 2002, 1225; Reuters, March 12, 2002, 0430. 109. These comments are based on an English transcript and summary provided in e-mail form by the Saudi Embassy in Washington on December 5, 2002. 110. Mahmoud Ahmad, ‘‘Prince Naif Curbs Power of Virtue Commission,’’ Arab News, May 25, 2006, www.arabnews.com.

NOTES

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111. Associated Press, New York, December 30, 2001, 1928; Reuters, December 29, 2001, 1802; Saudi Arabia 18, no. 10 (October 2001): 1–4. 112. Gulf News, February 19, 2004, http://www.gulf-news.com/Articles/news.asp ?ArticleID=111432. 113. Souhail Karam, ‘‘Al-Qaeda Vows More Attacks after Saudi Oil Raid,’’ Reuters, February 25, 2006. 114. ‘‘Five Al-Qaeda Militants Arrested in Riyadh Raid,’’ Arab News, January 18, 2006, www.arabnews.com. 115. Samir Al-Saadi, ‘‘40 Terror Suspects Held in Sweep,’’ Arab News, March 30, 2006, www.arabnews.com. 116. ‘‘Saudi Arabia’s Ambitious al-Qaida Fighter,’’ Dateline NBC, July 11, 2005, http:// msnbc.msn.com/id/8304825/. 117. ‘‘Saudi Arabia Says May Overcome Terrorism in 2 Years,’’ Reuters, November 20, 2005. 118. ‘‘Saudi Arabia’s Ambitious al-Qaida Fighter.’’ 119. ‘‘Saudi Says Stops Nearly One Mln at Borders,’’ Reuters, September 21, 2004. 120. Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, ‘‘Saudi Petroleum Security: Challenges and Responses,’’ CSIS, November 30, 2004. 121. Ibid. 122. Aramco, ‘‘Abqaiq Emergency Center Upgraded,’’ November 28, 2002. 123. ‘‘Bin Laden Tape Urges Oil Attack,’’ BBC News, December 16, 2004, http://news .bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4101021.stm. 124. Paul Marriott, ‘‘Oil Back above $60,’’ Reuters, December 7, 2005. 125. ‘‘Iraq Pipeline Watch,’’ February 25, 2006, http://www.iags.org/iraqpipelinewatch .htm. 126. ‘‘Nigerian Militants Claim Attacks,’’ BBC News, February 20, 2006, http://news.bbc .co.uk/2/hi/africa/4730754.stm. 127. Christopher Dickey, ‘‘Saudi Storms,’’ Newsweek, October 3, 2005. 128. Donna Abu Nasr, ‘‘Al-Qaeda Threatens More Saudi Attacks,’’ Associated Press, February 25, 2006. 129. Karam, ‘‘Al-Qaeda Vows More Attacks.’’ 130. Febe Armanios, ‘‘Islam: Sunnis and Shiite,’’ Congressional Research Service, February 23, 2005. 131. ‘‘Gulf Shiites Want Non-Sectarian Rule in Iraq,’’ Agence France-Presse, January 26, 2005; see also Armanios, ‘‘Islam: Sunnis and Shiite.’’ 132. Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, ‘‘Saudi Counterterrorism Efforts,’’ Center for Strategic and International Studies, Working Draft, Revised on February 2, 2005. 133. Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, ‘‘Saudi Counterterrorism Efforts,’’ Center for Strategic and International Studies, Working Draft, revised on February 2, 2005. 134. ‘‘Bahrain’s Sectarian Challenge,’’ The International Crisis Group, Middle East Report #40, May 6, 2005. 135. GlobalSecurity.org, ‘‘Hezbollah,’’ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ hizballah.htm.. 136. Assad Abboud, ‘‘Iraq Charter Rattles Nervous Arab Regimes,’’ Associated Press, October 11, 2005.

568

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137. Robin Wright and Peter Baker, ‘‘Iraq, Jordan See Threat To Election From Iran,’’ The Washington Post, December 8, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/ A43980-2004Dec7.html. 138. Robert Gibbons, ‘‘Saudi Says U.S. Policy Handing Iraq over to Iran,’’ Reuters, September 21, 2005, http://in.today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=worldNews& storyID=2005-09-21T030042Z_01_NOOTR_RTRJONC_0_India-216835-1.xml. 139. Suleiman al-Khalidi, ‘‘Iraq Blasts Saudi Arabia for Anti-Shiite Remarks,’’ Reuters, October 2, 2005. 140. ‘‘The Shiite Question in Saudi Arabia,’’ International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 45, September 19, 2005. 141. ‘‘Iran FM Puts off Visit to Saudi amid Iraq Row,’’ Agence France-Presse, October 5, 2005. 142. Todd Pitman, ‘‘A Wily Politician Known for Playing His Cards Close to His Chest,’’ Associated Press, February 22, 2005, http://www.newsobserver.com/24hour/world/story/ 2171685p-10260756c.html. 143. Dominic Evans, ‘‘Saudi Sees Iraq Constitution Tilting Power to Iran,’’ Reuters, October 13, 2005. 144. Ma’ad Fayad, ‘‘Q & A with Iraqi Interior Minister Bayan Jabr,’’ Asharq Alawsat, October 10, 2005, http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?id=2085§ion=3. 145. For detailed discussion on the evolving nature of the insurgency, see Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘‘Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency,’’ Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), December 9, 2005, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/051209_iraqiinsurg.pdf. 146. Transcript of Briefing with Major General Rick Lunch, MNFI, October 6, 2005, http://www.mnf-iraq.com/Transcripts/051005b.htm. 147. ‘‘Control of Iraq-Syria Border Re-established, Major General Says,’’ Press Release, The Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, December 1, 2005. 148. Fayad, ‘‘Q & A with Iraqi Interior Minister Bayan Jabr.’’ 149. Nawaf Obaid and Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘‘Saudi Militants in Iraq: Assessment and Kingdom’s Response,’’ Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 19, 2005, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/050919_saudimiltantsiraq.pdf. 150. Jonathan Finer, ‘‘Among Insurgents in Iraq, Few Foreigners Are Found,’’ The Washington Post, November 17, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 2005/11/16/AR2005111602519.html; ‘‘Israeli, Irishman Among Foreign Fighters in Iraq: US’’ Daily Times, October 21, 2005, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp ?page=2005%5c10%5c21%5cstory_21-10-2005_pg7_40. 151. ‘‘Aid Money Falls Short of Pledges,’’ The Seattle Times, July 13, 2004, http:// seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2001978174_iraqdig13.html. 152. Obaid and Cordesman, ‘‘Saudi Militants in Iraq.’’ 153. Reuven Paz, ‘‘Arab Volunteers Killed in Iraq: An Analysis,’’ PRISM Series of Global Jihad 3, No. 1/3 (March 2005), www.e-prism.org. 154. Murad Al-Shishani, ‘‘The Salafi-Jihadist Movement in Iraq: Recruitment Methods and Arab Volunteers,’’ Terrorism Monitor, 3, no. 23 (December 2, 2005), Figure 1, http:// www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369842. 155. Fayad, ‘‘Q & A with Iraqi Interior Minister Bayan Jabr.’’ 156. Dominic Evans, ‘‘Saudi Arabia Says Ready to Beat Militants from Iraq,’’ Reuters, July 10, 2005.

NOTES

569

157. Barbra Slavin, ‘‘Iraq Coming Apart, Saudi Official Warns,’’ USA Today, September 22, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-09-22-saudi-warning-iraq_x.htm. 158. Joel Brinkley, ‘‘Saudi Warns US Iraq May Face Disintegration,’’ New York Times, September 23, 2005. 159. Ibid. 160. Nawaf Obaid, ‘‘Meeting the Challenge of a Fragmented Iraq: A Saudi Perspective,’’ CSIS, April 6, 2006, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060406_iraqsaudi.pdf. 161. P.K. Abdul Ghafour, ‘‘Naif Raps West on N-Policy,’’ Arab News, February 2, 2006, http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1§ion=0&article=77201&d=2&m=2&y=2006. 162. Walter Pincus, ‘‘Push for Nuclear-Free Middle East Resurfaces,’’ Washington Post, March 6, 2005, A24. 163. Edmund O. Sullivan, ‘‘The UAE Flexes Its Regional Muscles,’’ Middle East Economic Digest (January 2006). 164. Simon Henderson, ‘‘Map Wars: The UAE Reclaims Lost Territory from Saudi Arabia,’’ The Washington Institute for Near East Studies, Policy Watch #1069, January 19, 2006, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2431. 165. P.K. Abdul Ghafour, ‘‘Cabinet OKs Anti-Terror Pact,’’ Arab News, October 4, 2005. 166. Final Report on the Counterterrorism International Conference,’’ Riyadh, February 5–8, 2005, http://www.ctic.org.sa/. 167. ‘‘Saudi King Abdullah Vows Gradual Reform,’’ Associated Press, April 1, 2006. 168. EIA, ‘‘OPEC Fact Sheet,’’ various editions, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/opec .html. 169. Saudi Arabia National Security Assessment Project. 170. P.K. Abdul Ghafour, ‘‘Census Finds Expat Numbers below Estimate,’’ Arab News, November 26, 2004. 171. The General Statistics Department announced new population statistics on November 26, 2004. It stated that preliminary results of this year’s general census estimate the total number of expatriates in the Kingdom at 6.14 million, the Saudi Press Agency reported. This figure is much lower than the 8.8 million official figures given earlier by the labor minister. The census, which started Sept. 15, put the Kingdom’s total population at more than 22 million. The department added that there are 8,285,662 male Saudis, who represent 50.1 percent of the total Saudi population, while the number of Saudi females is 8,243,640. According to the last census taken in 1992, the population of Saudi Arabia amounted to 12,304,000 Saudis and 4,625,000 foreigners. Riyadh and Jeddah had populations of more than 2 million each. 172. Abdul Wahab Bashir, ‘‘Jobless Figure Put at 180,433,’’ Arab News, January 13, 2005. 173. ‘‘Saudi Business Women to Participate in Dubai Conference,’’ Arab News, November 24, 2004. 174. Javid Hassan, ‘‘Move to Saudize Ten More Job Catgories,’’ Arab News, January 6, 2005.

CHAPTER 7 1. The United Arab Emirates was formed when the United Kingdom decided to leave its positions east of Suez and granted the Trucial States on the southern Gulf Coast control of their defense and foreign affairs that had been ceded to Britain in a series of nineteenth century

570

NOTES

treaties. Six of these states—Abu Zaby, ’Ajman, Al Fujayrah, Ash Shariqah, Dubayy, and Umm al Qaywayn—merged to form the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1971. They were joined by Ra’s al Khaymah in 1972, after Iran seized control of the Tumbs and Abu Musa from Ra’s al Khaymah. 2. U.S. Department of State, United Arab Emirates: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2005, Washington, DC: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, March 8, 2006, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61701.htm; and CIA, The World Factbook, 2006 https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html. 3. CIA, The World Factbook, 2006. 4. Data taken from CIA, The World Factbook, 2006. 5. ‘‘Armed Forces: United Arab Emirates,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Gulf States (October 21, 2005). 6. ‘‘Gulf States Indulge in Defence Spending Bonanza,’’ Jane’s Foreign Report (March 2, 2006). 7. IISS, Military Balance, 2005–2006 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies). 8. CIA, The World Factbook, 2006. 9. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘UAE,’’ World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1999–2000 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State). 10. CIA, The World Factbook, 2006. 11. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘UAE.’’ 12. IISS, Military Balance, 2005–2006. 13. Jiri Kominek, ‘‘Two Gulf States Weigh up Heavy Transporter Bids,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly (July 2, 2003): 18. 14. Ed Blanche, ‘‘United Arab Emirates Builds Armed Forces against a Volatile Backdrop,’’ Jane’s International Defense Review (January 11, 2005). 15. Ibid. 16. Robin Hughes, ‘‘UAE Requests Javeline ATGW Package,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly (December 1, 2004). 17. Blanche, ‘‘United Arab Emirates Builds Armed Forces.’’ 18. See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/9k58.htm. 19. See http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/theater/r-11.htm. 20. Blanche, ‘‘United Arab Emirates Builds Armed Forces.’’ 21. Ibid. 22. ‘‘IDEX: UAE Orders 500 High Mobility Tactical Vehicles,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (February 23, 2005). 23. Martin Bayer, ‘‘Schro¨ der Seals German Deals with UAE,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (March 16, 2005). 24. Helmoed-Romer Heitman, ‘‘UAE Orders RG-31 Mine-Protected 4x4 Armoured Personnel Carriers,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (November 16, 2005). 25. Christopher F. Foss, ‘‘UAE Considers ARV Upgrade,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (November 15, 2005). 26. ‘‘Air Force: United Arab Emirates,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Gulf States (October 21, 2005). 27. Robin Hughes, ‘‘UAE ‘Close’ to Apache Upgrade Signature,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (December 7, 2005); Robin Hughes, ‘‘UAE to Equip Apaches with Longbow FCRs,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly (August 16, 2006): 17.

NOTES

571

28. Riad Kahwaji, ‘‘UAE Doubles Mirage Orders, Halts Swiss Hawks Purchase,’’ Defense News (June 23, 2003): 1. 29. Andrew Chuter, ‘‘Trainer Aircraft Makers Court UAE Air Force,’’ DefenseNews.com, December 15, 2003. 30. Riad Kahwaji, ‘‘A Year of Decisions for UAE Air Force,’’ Defense News (February 21, 2005): 15. 31. Blanche, ‘‘United Arab Emirates Builds Armed Forces.’’ 32. Ibid. 33. Riad Kahwaji, ‘‘UAE Seeks E-20 Deal, Upgrade of Ex-Libyan CH-47s,’’ Defense News (December 1, 2003): 32. 34. Riad Kahwaji, ‘‘Unrealized Ambitions, Export Restrictions, Cost Put Net-Centric Systems beyond Reach of Most Mideast States,’’ Defense News (October 18, 2004): 30. 35. Kahwaji, ‘‘A Year of Decisions,’’ 15. 36. Kahwaji, ‘‘UAE Seeks E-20 Deal,’’ 32. 37. Robin Hughes, ‘‘UAE Upgrades ex-Libyan Chinooks,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (June 22, 2005). 38. ‘‘IDEX: UAE Places Order for Eight AB139 Helicopters,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (February 23, 2005). 39. Andrew Koch, ‘‘Emirates Look for New UAVs,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (May 18, 2005). 40. Blanche, ‘‘United Arab Emirates Builds Armed Forces.’’ 41. Sam Dagher, ‘‘UAE Military Air Flight Center Could Become Regional Force,’’ Defense News (December 9, 2003). 42. Miroslav Gyu¨ ro¨ si, ‘‘UAE Pantsir Chassis Displayed,’’ Jane’s Missiles and Rockets (August 1, 2005). 43. Riad Kahwaji, ‘‘Iraq War Stalls GCC Missile Defense Plans,’’ Defense News (December 1, 2003): 1. 44. ‘‘EADS to Upgrade UAE Radar Systems,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (December 17, 2003). 45. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States (August 27, 2004). 46. Nick Brown, ‘‘Keel Laid for Baynunah-Class Corvette in Abu Dhabi,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly (July 12, 2006): 20. 47. Riad Kahwaji, ‘‘Abu Dhabi Shipyard Raises Export Profile,’’ Defense News (March 3, 2003): 25. 48. Richard Scott, ‘‘Selection of Baynunah Corvette Equipment Confirmed,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly (November 4, 2004). 49. Nick Brown, ‘‘Steel Cutting for UAE Baynunah Corvette Begins,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (January 25, 2006). 50. Blanche, ‘‘United Arab Emirates Builds Armed Forces.’’ 51. Ibid. 52. Scott, ‘‘Selection of Baynunah Corvette.’’ 53. Helmoed-Romer Heitman, ‘‘Avitronics Laser Warner for UAE Corvette,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly (December 22, 2004). 54. Alex Pape, ‘‘Germany Agrees to UAE Minehunter Sale,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (February 15, 2006). 55. Damian Kemp, ‘‘Dubai Air Show: Alenia Revises Bid for UAE ASW Patrol Aircraft,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (November 30, 2005). 56. Blanche, ‘‘United Arab Emirates Builds Armed Forces.’’ 57. Ibid.

572

NOTES

58. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘United Arab Emirates: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2005.’’ 59. Ibid. 60. ‘‘UAE Orders Rohde & Schwarz Radios for Coast Guard,’’ Jane’s International Defence Review (April 1, 2005). 61. William Wallis, ‘‘Dubai Sees Future as Ally, Entrepoˆt, and Playground,’’ Financial Times (March 7, 2006). 62. Simon Henderson, ‘‘UAE after Sheikh Zayed: Tension between Tribe and State,’’ PolicyWatch #915, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 12, 2004. 63. This argument is drawn from Christopher M. Davidson, ‘‘After Shaikh Zayed: The Politics of Succession in Abu Dhabi and the UAE,’’ Middle East Policy XIII, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 55. 64. Davidson, ‘‘After Shaikh Zayed,’’ 55. 65. Simon Henderson, ‘‘Succession Politics in the Conservative Arab Gulf States: The Weekend’s Events in Ras Al-Khaimah,’’ PolicyWatch #769, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 17, 2003. 66. This estimate is drawn from the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2005, 263. 67. ‘‘Abu Musa Island: Iran Special Weapons Facilities,’’ GlobalSecurity.org, http://www .globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/abu-musa.htm. 68. Blanche, ‘‘United Arab Emirates Builds Armed Forces.’’ 69. Ed Blanche, ‘‘Country Briefing: United Arab Emirates—Packing a Bigger Punch,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (November 16, 2005). 70. ‘‘Gulf States at Odds with Iran,’’ Jane’s Foreign Report (January 12, 2006). 71. Hassan M. Fattah, ‘‘Gulf States Join Call for Tougher Action toward Tehran,’’ The New York Times, February 1, 2006. 72. Blanche, ‘‘United Arab Emirates Builds Armed Forces.’’ 73. ‘‘Gulf States at Odds with Iran.’’ 74. ‘‘GCC Dismantles Peninsula Shield,’’ Jane’s Foreign Report (January 19, 2006). 75. ‘‘Free Trade Ruffles Feathers in the Gulf,’’ Jane’s Foreign Report (January 12, 2006). 76. Ibid. 77. Blanche, ‘‘United Arab Emirates Builds Armed Forces.’’ 78. ‘‘GCC Dismantles Peninsula Shield.’’ 79. Edmund O. Sullivan, ‘‘The UAE Flexes Its Regional Muscles,’’ Middle East Economic Digest (January 2006). 80. Simon Henderson, ‘‘Map Wars: The UAE Reclaims Lost Territory from Saudi Arabia,’’ The Washington Institute for Near East Studies, Policy Watch #1069, January 19, 2006, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2431. 81. ‘‘Oil at Heart of Renewed UAE-Saudi Border Dispute,’’ Jane’s Foreign Report (August 4, 2005). 82. Landmine Monitor Report 2005, http://www.icbl.org/lm/2005/. 83. Wallis, ‘‘Dubai Sees Future.’’ 84. CIA, ‘‘United Arab Emirates,’’ The World Factbook, January 10, 2006, https://www.cia .gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html. 85. Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision. 86. Ibid.

NOTES

573

87. CIA, ‘‘United Arab Emirates.’’ 88. Andrzej Kapiszweski, ‘‘Arab Labor Migration to the GCC States,’’ IOM (September 2003): 14.

CHAPTER 8 1. CIA, ‘‘Iran,’’ The World Factbook, 2006, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ index.html. 2. BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2005. 3. Energy Information Agency (EIA), ‘‘OPEC Revenues Fact Sheet,’’ Department of Energy, Washington, January 2006, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/OPEC_Revenues/ OPEC.html. 4. CIA, ‘‘Iran.’’ 5. IISS, Military Balance, 2005–2006, 2006; CIA, ‘‘Iran.’’ 6. IISS, The Military Balance, various editions; ‘‘Iran,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments: The Gulf States, various editions. 7. There are reports that the lighter and smaller formations in the regular army include an Airmobile Forces group created since the Iran-Iraq War, and which includes the 29th Special Forces Division, which was formed in 1993–1994, and the 55th paratroop division. There are also reports that the regular army and IRGC commando forces are loosely integrated into a corps of up to 30,000 men with integrated helicopter lift and air assault capabilities. The airborne and Special Forces are trained at a facility in Shiraz. These reports are not correct. Note that detailed unit identifications for Iranian forces differ sharply from source to source. It is unclear that such identifications are accurate, and now dated wartime titles and numbers are often published, sometimes confusing brigade numbers with division numbers. 8. No reliable data exist on the size and number of Iran’s smaller independent formations. 9. The estimates of Iran’s AFV and APC strength are based on interviews with Israeli, British, and U.S. civilian experts; and the IISS, ‘‘Iran,’’ Military Balance; ‘‘Iran,’’ Jane’s Sentinel: The Gulf States. 10. Christopher Foss, ‘‘Iran Reveals Up-Armored Boraq Carrier,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (April 9, 2003), http://jdw.janes.com (accessed January 8, 2004). Labeled 42. 11. Lyubov Pronina, ‘‘U.S. Sanctions Russian Firm for Alleged Iran Sales,’’ Defense News (September 22, 2003): 12. Labeled 43. 12. Amir Taheir, ‘‘The Mullah’s Playground,’’ Wall Street Journal, December 7, 2004, A10. 13. Doug Richardson, ‘‘Iran’s Raad Cruise Missile Enters Production,’’ Jane’s Missiles and Rockets. 14. Jane’s Defence Weekly (January 15, 2003), http://jdw.janes.com (accessed January 8, 2004). Labeled 45. 15. International Defense Review, 7/1996, 23–26; Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, CSIS, April 1997. 16. Robin Hughes, ‘‘Iran and Syria Advance SIGINT Cooperation,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly (July 19, 2006): 41. 17. ‘‘Iran Enhances Existing Weaponry by Optimizing Shahab-3 Ballistic Missile,’’ Jane’s Missiles and Rockets (January 20, 2004). 18. Reports that the IRGC is operating F-7 fighters do not seem to be correct. 19. Reuters, June 12, 1996, 17:33.

574

NOTES

20. See TIME, March 21, 1994, 50–54; TIME, November 11, 1996, 78–82; also see Washington Post, November 21, 1993, A-1; Washington Post, August 22, 1994, A-17; Washington Post, October 28, 1994, A-17; Washington Post, November 27, 1994, A-30; Washington Post, April 11, 1997, A-1; Washington Post, April 14, 1997, A-1; Los Angeles Times, November 3, 1994, A-1, A-12; Deutsche Presse-Agentur, April 17, 1997, 11:02; Reuters, April 16, 1997, BC cycle; Reuters, April 17, 1997, BC cycle; The European, April 17, 1997, 13; The Guardian, October 30, 1993, 13; The Guardian, August 24, 1996, 16; The Guardian, April 16, 1997, 10; New York Times, April 11, 1997, A1; Associated Press, April 14, 1997, 18:37; Jane’s Defense Weekly (June 5, 1996): 15; Agence France-Presse, April 15, 1997, 15:13; BBC, April 14, 1997, ME/D2892/MED; Deustcher Depeschen via ADN, April 12, 1997, 0743; Washington Times, April 11, 1997, A22. 21. Riad Kahwaji and Barbara Opall-Rome, ‘‘Hizbollah: Iran’s Battle Lab,’’ Defense News (December 13, 2004): 1, 6. 22. Taheir, ‘‘The Mullah’s Playground,’’ A10. 23. The estimates of such holdings of rockets are now in the thousands, but the numbers are very uncertain. Dollar estimates of what are significant arms shipments are little more than analytic rubbish, based on cost methods that border on the absurd, but significant shipments are known to have taken place. 24. The reader should be aware that much of the information relating to the Quds is highly uncertain. Also, however, see the article from the Jordanian publication Al-Hadath in FBISNES-96-108, May 27, 1996, 9; and in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, FBIS-NES-96-110, June 5, 1996, 1, 4; A. J. Venter, ‘‘Iran Still Exporting Terrorism,’’ Jane’s Intelligence Review (November 1997): 511–516. 25. New York Times, May 17, 1998, A-15; Washington Times, May 17, 1998, A-13; Washington Post, May 21, 1998, A-29. 26. Venter, ‘‘Iran Still Exporting Terrorism,’’ 511–516. 27. For typical reporting by officers of the IRGC on this issue, see the comments of its acting commander in chief, Brigadier General Seyyed Rahim Safavi, speaking to reporters during IRGC week (December 20–26, 1995). FBIS-NES-95-250, December 25, 1995, IRNA 1406 GMT. 28. ‘‘Armed Forces, Iran,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States (October 7, 2004). 29. The range of aircraft numbers shown reflects the broad uncertainties affecting the number of Iran’s aircraft which are operational in any realistic sense. Many aircraft counted, however, cannot engage in sustained combat sorties in an extended air campaign. The numbers are drawn largely from interviews; Jane’s Intelligence Review, Special Report No. 6, May 1995; ‘‘Iran,’’ Jane’s Sentinel: The Gulf Staffs, various editions; the IISS, ‘‘Iran,’’ Military Balance, various editions; Andrew Rathmell, The Changing Balance in the Gulf (London, Royal United Services Institute, 1996), Whitehall Papers 38; Dr. Andrew Rathmell, ‘‘Iran’s Rearmament: How Great a Threat?,’’ Jane’s Intelligence Review (July 1994): 317–22; Jane’s World Air Forces (CD-ROM). 30. Wall Street Journal, February 10, 1995, 19; Washington Times, February 10, 1995, A-19. 31. Periscope, Nations/Alliances/Geographic Regions/Middle East/North Africa, Plans and Programs. Labeled 69. 32. Reports that the IRGC is operating F-7 fighters do not seem to be correct. 33. Reuters, June 12, 1996, 17:33.

NOTES

575

34. Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 2002–2003 (London: Jane’s Information Group), 259–63. 35. Robert Hewson, ‘‘Iran’s New Combat Aircraft Waits in the Wings,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (November 20, 2002): 15. Labeled 43; Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 2002–2003, 259–63. 36. Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 2002–2003, 259–63. 37. Hughes, ‘‘Iran and Syria Advance SIGINT Cooperation,’’ 41. 38. Jane’s Defense Weekly (September 4, 1996): 4. 39. ‘‘Iran Reveals Shahab Thaqeb SAM Details,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly (September 4, 2002), http://jdw.janes.com (accessed January 9, 2004). Labeled 44. 40. Based on interviews with British, Israeli, and U.S. experts; and Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran and Iraq: The Threat from the Northern Gulf (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994); Anthony H. Cordesman and Ahmed S. Hashim, Iran: the Dilemmas of Dual Containment (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997); IISS, ‘‘Iran,’’ Military Balance, various editions; ‘‘Iran,’’ Jane’s Sentinel: The Gulf States, various editions; USNI Data Base; Anoushiravan Ehteshami, ‘‘Iran’s National Strategy,’’ International Defense Review (April 1994): 29–37; ‘‘Military Technology,’’ World Defense Almanac: The Balance of Military Power, XVII, no. 1-1993, ISSN 0722-3226, pp. 139–42; and working data from the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies; Rathmell, ‘‘Iran’s Rearmament,’’ 317–22; Ahmed Hashim, ‘‘The Crisis of the Iranian State,’’ Adelphi Paper 296, London, IISS, Oxford, July 1995, 7–30, 50–70; Rathmell, The Changing Military Balance in the Gulf, 9–23; Michael Eisenstadt, Iranian Military Power, Capabilities and Intentions (Washington, DC: Washington Institute, 1996), 9–65; and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, ‘‘Iran Strives to Regain Military Might,’’ International Defense Review (July 1996): 22–26. 41. Robert Hewson, ‘‘Iran Stages Large-Scale Exercises to Underline Defense Capabilities,’’ Jane’s Defense Week (September 15, 2006): 5. 42. Alon Ben David, ‘‘Iran Launches New Surface to Air Missile Production,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly (February 15, 2006). 43. See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/sa-15.htm; ‘‘Russia May Deliver Iranian Tor-M1s Earlier than Expected,’’ Jane’s Missiles and Rockets February 1, 2006. 44. Lyubov Provina, ‘‘Russian Arms Sale to Iran Draws US Scrutiny,’’ DefenseNews.com, December 12, 2005; Ben David, ‘‘Iran Launches New Surface to Air Missile Production.’’ 45. For full details, see http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/qw-1.htm. 46. Reuters, January 5, 1997, 7:00:32 PST; http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ russia/s-300pmu2.htm; http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/s-300pmu.htm. 47. See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/s-300v.htm. 48. ‘‘No S-300 Deal with Iran, Says Russian Defense Minister,’’ Jane’s Missiles and Rockets (March 1, 2006). 49. Michael Knights, ‘‘Iran’s Conventional Forces Remain Key to Deterring Potential Threats,’’ Jane’s Intelligence Review (February 1, 2006). 50. ‘‘Iran’’, Jane’s (October 29, 2001). 51. World Missiles Briefing, Teal Group Corporation. 52. Jane’s Defense Weekly (June 25, 1997): 3; Associated Press, June 17, 1997, 1751; United Press, June 17, 1997, 0428; International Defense Review (June 1996): 17. 53. Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2002–2003 (London, Jane’s Information Group), 336–43. 54. Hewson, ‘‘Iran Stages Large-Scale Exercises,’’ 5; Ali Akbar Dareini, ‘‘Iran Test-fires Sub-to-Surface Missile in Persian Gulf,’’ Philadelphia Inquirer, August 28, 2006. 55. Washington Times, March 27, 1996, A-1.

576

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56. Defense News (January 17, 1994): 1, 29. 57. Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2002–2003, 336–43. 58. Only two torpedo tubes can fire wire-guided torpedoes. Defense News (January 17, 1994): 1, 29. 59. Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2002–2003, 336–43. 60. See David Miller, ‘‘Submarines in the Gulf,’’ Military Technology (June 1993): 42–45; David Markov, ‘‘More Details Surface of Rubin’s ‘Kilo’ Plans,’’ Jane’s Intelligence Review (May 1997): 209–15. 61. In addition to the sources listed at the start of this section, these assessments are based on various interviews, various editions of the IISS, Military Balance; the Jaffee Center Middle East Military Balance; ‘‘Iran,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments: The Gulf States; and Jane’s Defense Weekly (July 11, 1987): 15. 62. A. Kozhikhov and D. Kaliyeva, ‘‘The Military Political Situation in the Caspian Region,’’ Central Asia’s Affairs, No. 3. 63. Ibid. 64. U.S. Department of Defense, The Office of Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, 2001, 36, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf. 65. CIA, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, November 2003, http://www.cia .gov/cia/reports/721_reports/pdfs/721report_july_dec2003.pdf. 66. John R. Bolton, ‘‘Iran’s Continuing Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction,’’ Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, June 24, 2004, http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/33909.htm. 67. Quoted in the IISS, Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programs: A Net Assessment, IISS Strategic Dossier, 2005, 67. 68. Merav Zafary, ‘‘Iranian Biological and Chemical Weapons Profile Study,’’ Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, February 2001. 69. ‘‘Iran: Chemical Overview,’’ Nuclear Threat Initiative, revised in January 2006, http:// www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Chemical/#fnB15. 70. U.S. Department of Defense, The Office of Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, 1997, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/. 71. U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, 2001, 36. 72. ‘‘Iran,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States’ Armed Forces (October 7, 2004). 73. Statement by John A. Lauder, to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Russian Proliferation to Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Programs, October 5, 2000, http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2000/lauder_WMD_100500.html. 74. CIA, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, July–December 2003, http://www .cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/pdfs/721report_july_dec2003.pdf. 75. Bolton, ‘‘Iran’s Continuing Pursuit.’’ 76. IISS, Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programs, 82–83. 77. Earlier unclassified CIA reports on problems like the ballistic missile threat often projected alternative levels of current and future capability. The qualifications and possible futures are far less well defined in more recent reports. For example, see CIA, ‘‘Unclassified Summary of a National Intelligence Estimate, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile

NOTES

577

Threat Through 2015,’’ National Intelligence Council, December 2001, https://www.cia.gov/ cia/publications/factbook/index.html. 78. There is no way to determine just how much the Special Plans Office team set up within the office of the Secretary of Defense to analyze the threat in Iraq was designed to produce a given conclusion or politicized intelligence. The Department has denied this and stated that the team created within its policy office was not working Iraqi per se, but on global terrorist interconnections. It also stated that the Special Plans Office was never tied to the Intelligence Collection Program—a program to debrief Iraqi defectors—and relied on CIA inputs for its analysis. It states that it simply conducted a review, presented its findings in August 2002, and its members returned to other duties. See Jim Garamone, ‘‘Policy Chief Seeks to Clear Intelligence Record,’’ American Forces Information Service, June 3, 2003; and Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and William J. Luti, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Special Plans and Near East and South Asian Affairs, ‘‘DoD Briefing on Policy and Intelligence Matters,’’ June 4, 2003, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/ tr20030604-0248.html.Some intelligence experts dispute this view, however, and claim the team’s effort was used to put press on the intelligence community. Such ‘‘B-teams’’ also have a mixed history. They did help identify an intelligence community tendency to underestimate Soviet strategic nuclear efforts during the Cold War. The threat analysis of missile threats posed to the United States by the ‘‘Rumsfeld Commission,’’ however, was a heavily onesided assessment designed to justify national missile defense. Also see Greg Miller, ‘‘Pentagon Defends Role of Intelligence Unit on Iraq,’’ Los Angeles Times, June 5, 2003; and David S. Cloud, ‘‘The Case for War Relied on Selective Intelligence,’’ Wall Street Journal, June 5, 2003. 79. Some press sources cite what they claim is a deliberate effort to ignore a September 2002 DIA report on Iraqi chemical weapons capabilities called ‘‘Iraq-Key WMD FacilitiesAn Operational Support Study.’’ See James Risen, ‘‘Word that US Doubted Iraq Would Use Gas,’’ New York Times, June 18, 2003; and Tony Capaccio, ‘‘Pentagon 2002 Study Reported No Reliable Data on Iraq Weapons,’’ USA Today, June 6, 2003. In fact, the unclassified excerpts from the DIA report show that DIA was not stating that Iraq did not have chemical weapons, but rather that it had ‘‘[n]o reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has—or will— establish its chemical weapons facilities.’’ The report went on to say, ‘‘although we lack any direct information, Iraq probably possess CW agent in chemical munitions, possibly include artillery rockets, artillery shells, aerial bombs, and ballistic missile warheads. Baghdad also probably possess bulk chemical stockpiles, primarily containing precursors, but that also could consist of some mustard agent of stabilized VX.’’ If anything, the report is a classic example of what happens when intelligence reports do state uncertainty and of how the user misreads or misuses the result. 80. Alireza Jafarzadeh, ‘‘Iranian Regime’s Plan and Attempts to Start Uranium Enrichment at Natanz Site,’’ Statement at the National Press Club, Washington, DC, January 10, 2006. 81. ‘‘Iran Says It Will Resume Uranium Conversion Today,’’ Global Security Newswire, August 11, 2005, http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2005/8/1/ 6860ebe5-d0a1-428e-829d-6005c7b26698.html. 82. Dafna Linzer, ‘‘Powell Says Iran Is Pursuing Bomb,’’ Washington Post, November 18, 2004, A01. 83. ‘‘UN Atomic Agency Seeks to Visit Key Iranian Defense Site: Diplomats,’’ Agence France-Presse, September 10, 2004.

578

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84. Dafna Linzer, ‘‘Nuclear Disclosure on Iran Unverified,’’ Washington Post, November 19, 2004, A01. 85. Linzer, ‘‘Powell Says Iran Is Pursuing Bomb,’’ A01. 86. Linzer, ‘‘Nuclear Disclosure on Iran Unverified,’’ A01. 87. Sonni Efron, Tyler Marshall, and Bob Drogin, ‘‘Powell’s Talk of Arms Has Fallout,’’ Los Angeles Times, November 19, 2004. 88. Carla Anne Robbins, ‘‘As Evidence Grows Of Iran’s Program, US Hits Quandary,’’ Wall Street Journal, March 18, 2005, 1. 89. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General, November 15, 2004, 18, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-83_derestrict.pdf. 90. John R. Bolton, ‘‘Preventing Iran from Acquiring Nuclear Weapons,’’ Remarks to the Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, August 17, 2004. 91. Dafna Linzer, ‘‘Strong Leads and Dead Ends in Nuclear Case Against Iran,’’ Washington Post, February 8, 2006, A01. 92. Bolton, ‘‘Preventing Iran from Acquiring Nuclear Weapons.’’ 93. Ibid. 94. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General, September 2, 2005, Annex 1, p. 14, http://www.iaea.org/ Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-67.pdf. 95. Ibid., 7. 96. ‘‘Iran far from Nuclear Bomb-Making Capacity: Ex-UN Weapons Chief Blix,’’ Agence France-Presse, June 23, 2005. 97. Ali Akbar Dareini, ‘‘Iran Hits Milestone in Nuclear Technology,’’ Associated Press, April 11, 2006. 98. Ali Akbar Dareini, ‘‘Iran to Move to Large Scale Enrichment,’’ Associated Press, April 12, 2006. 99. Nazila Fathi and Christine Hauser, ‘‘Iran Marks Step in Nuclear Development,’’ New York Times, April 11, 2006. 100. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General, November 15, 2004. 101. Bolton, ‘‘Preventing Iran from Acquiring Nuclear Weapons.’’ 102. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General, September 2, 2005. 103. Ibid. 104. Ibid. 105. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, ‘‘Iran’s Next Steps: Final Tests and the Construction of a Uranium Enrichment Plant,’’ Institute for Science and International Security, Issue Brief, January 12, 2006, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/irancascade.pdf. 106. Dr. Frank Barnaby, ‘‘Iran’s Nuclear Activities,’’ Oxford Research Group, February 2006. 107. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General, September 1, 2004, Annex, p. 7, http://www.iaea.org/ Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-60.pdf. 108. Ibid. 109. Ibid.

NOTES

579

110. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General, September 1, 2004, p. 7. 111. Barnaby, ‘‘Iran’s Nuclear Activities.’’ 112. Ali Akbar Dareini, ‘‘Iran Confirms Uranium-to-Gas Conversion,’’ Associated Press, May 9, 2005. 113. Elaine Sciolino and William J. Broad, ‘‘Atomic Agency Sees Possible Link of Military to Iran Nuclear Work,’’ New York Times, February 1, 2006, 1. 114. Dafna Linzer, ‘‘Strong Leads and Dead Ends in Nuclear Case Against Iran,’’ Washington Post, February 8, 2006, A01. 115. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Resolution Adopted on 4 February 2006, February 4, 2006, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/ Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf. 116. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director General, November 18, 2005, 11, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/ Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-87.pdf. 117. Ian Traynor, ‘‘Papers Found in Iran Are Evidence of Plans for Nuclear Weapon Manufacture, Says UK,’’ The Guardian, November 25, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ iran/story/0,,1650423,00.html. 118. ‘‘Iran Hands over Suspected Atom Bomb Blueprint: IAEA,’’ Agence France-Presse, November 18, 2005. 119. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, ‘‘The Clock Is Ticking, But How Fast?,’’ Institute for Science and International Security, Issue Brief, March 27, 2006, http://www .isis-online.org/publications/iran/clockticking.pdf. 120. ‘‘Iran Hands Over Suspected Atom Bomb Blueprint.’’ 121. ‘‘Iran far from Nuclear Bomb-Making Capacity.’’ 122. Kelly Hearn, ‘‘Iranian Pact with Venezuela Stokes Fears of Uranium Sales,’’ Washington Times, March 13, 2006, 1. 123. Sciolino and Broad, ‘‘Atomic Agency Sees Possible Link,’’ 1. 124. Linzer, ‘‘Powell Says Iran Is Pursuing Bomb,’’ A01. 125. Linzer, ‘‘Strong Leads and Dead Ends,’’ A01. 126. Ibid. 127. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Resolution Adopted on 4 February 2006, February 4, 2006. 128. Linzer, ‘‘Strong Leads and Dead Ends,’’ A01. 129. ‘‘Iran Enhances Existing Weaponry.’’ 130. ‘‘US Consultancy Claims Iran Has Built Underground Missile Factories,’’ Jane’s Missiles and Rockets (December 8, 2005). 131. ‘‘Iran: Missiles’’ GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/ missile.htm. 132. Robin Hughes, ‘‘Long-Range Ambitions,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly (September 13, 2006): 22–27. 133. Federation of American Scientists, ‘‘SCUD-B/Shahab-1,’’ December 1, 2005, http:// www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/shahab-1.htm. 134. Kenneth Katzman, Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, 1998, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/1998/rumsfeld/pt2_katz.htm. 135. Ibid. 136. Ibid.

580

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137. Ibid. 138. Ibid. 139. Paul Beaver, ‘‘Iran’s Shahab-3 IRBM ‘Ready for Production,’’’ Jane’s Missiles and Rockets (June 1, 1998). 140. Hughes, ‘‘Long-Range Ambitions,’’ 22–27. 141. IISS, The Military Balance 2005–2006. 142. Federation of American Scientists, ‘‘Shahab-2,’’ December 1, 2005, http://www.fas .org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/shahab-2.htm. 143. ‘‘Iran: Missiles.’’ 144. Katzman, Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat. 145. Ibid. 146. ‘‘Flashpoints: Iran,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly (March 4, 1995): 18. 147. Hughes, ‘‘Long-Range Ambitions,’’ 22–27. 148. ‘‘Iran Says Shahab-3 Missile Entirely Iranian, Production Ongoing,’’ Agence FrancePresse, May 5, 2005. 149. Katzman, Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat. 150. Ibid. 151. ‘‘Iran Tests Shahab-3 Ballistic Missile,’’ Jane’s Missiles and Rockets (August 1, 1998). 152. ‘‘Shahab 3/Zelzal 3,’’ Global Security.org, www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/ shahab-3.htm. 153. David Isby, ‘‘Shahab-3 Enters Production,’’ Jane’s Missiles and Rockets (November 26, 2001). 154. Ed Blanche, ‘‘Shahab-3 Ready for Service, Says Iran,’’ Jane’s Missiles and Rockets (July 23, 2003). 155. ‘‘Shahab-3/Zelzal 3.’’ 156. Hughes, ‘‘Long-Range Ambitions,’’ 22–27. 157. Farhad Pouladi, ‘‘Iran Vows to Continue Nuclear Drive at all Costs,’’ Agence FrancePresse, September 22, 2004. 158. ‘‘Iran ‘Tests New Missile Engine,’’’ BBC News, May 31, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/middle_east/4596295.stm. 159. Hughes, ‘‘Long-Range Ambitions,’’ 22–27. 160. Dr. Robert H. Schmucker, ‘‘Iran and Its Regional Environment,’’ Schmucker Technologies, Pease Research Institute Frankfurt, March 27, 2006, www.hsfk.de and http://www .hsfk.de/static.php?id=3929&language=de. 161. For further details on the history and nature of the Shahab and Iran’s programs, see Andrew Feickert, ‘‘Missile Survey,: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Selected Foreign Countries,’’ Congressional Research Service, RL30427 (regularly updated); the work of Kenneth Katzman, also of the Congressional Research Service; the ‘‘Missile Overview’’ section of the Iran Profile of the NTI (http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missiles/); and the work of Global Security, including http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/shahab-3.htm. 162. Ed Blanche, ‘‘Iran Claims Shahab-3 Range Now 2,000km,’’Jane’s Missiles and Rockets (November 1, 2004). 163. ‘‘Iran Boasts Shahab-3 Is in Mass Production,’’Jane’s Missiles and Rockets (November 19, 2004). 164. ‘‘Iran Threatens to Abandon the NPT,’’ Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst (September 29, 2004).

NOTES

581

165. Douglas Jehl, ‘‘Iran Reportedly Hides Work on a Long-Range Missile,’’ New York Times, December 2, 2004. 166. ‘‘Iran: Missiles Development,’’ GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/ wmd/world/iran/missile-development.htm. 167. See the work of Dr. Robert H. Schmucker, ‘‘The Shahab Missile and Iran’s Delivery System Capabilities,’’ Briefing to the James Shasha Institute Conference on a Nuclear Iran, May 30–June 2, 2005; and Schmucker, ‘‘Iran and Its Regional Environment.’’ 168. IISS, Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programs, 102. 169. Efron, Marshall, and Drogin, ‘‘Powell’s Talk of Arms Has Fallout.’’ 170. Carla Anne Robbins, ‘‘US Gives Briefing on Iranian Missile to Nuclear Agency,’’ Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2005, 3. 171. Linzer, ‘‘Strong Leads and Dead Ends,’’ A01. 172. Federation of American Scientists, ‘‘Shahab-3,’’ December 1, 2005, http://www.fas .org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/shahab-3.htm. 173. See the work of Schmucker, ‘‘The Shahab Missile’’; and Schmucker, ‘‘Iran and Its Regional Environment.’’ 174. Federation of American Scientists, ‘‘Shahab-3D,’’ December 1, 2005, http://www.fas .org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/shahab-3d.htm. 175. Doug Richardson, ‘‘Iran Is Developing an IRBM, Claims Resistance Group,’’ Jane’s Rockets and Missiles (December 14, 2004). 176. Hughes, ‘‘Long-Range Ambitions,’’ 22–27. 177. ‘‘Iran: Missiles.’’ 178. ‘‘Iran Moves Its Shahab 3 Units,’’ Jane’s Missiles and Rockets (April 1, 2006). 179. Douglas Jehl, ‘‘Iran Is Said to Work on New Missile,’’ International Herald Tribune, December 2, 2004, 7. 180. ‘‘Iran: Missiles Development.’’ 181. Federation of American Scientists, ‘‘Shahab-3D.’’ 182. ‘‘Iran: Missiles Development.’’ 183. Federation of American Scientists, ‘‘Shahab-3D.’’ 184. Ibid. 185. IISS, Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programs, 102. 186. Hughes, ‘‘Long-Range Ambitions,’’ 22–27. 187. Federation of American Scientists, ‘‘Shahab-4,’’ December 1, 2005, http://www.fas .org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/shahab-4.htm. 188. Richardson, ‘‘Iran Is Developing an IRBM.’’ 189. Federation of American Scientists, ‘‘Shahab-4.’’ 190. ‘‘Western Intelligence Confirms Iranian Missile Developments—German Report,’’ BCC Monitoring International Report, February 6, 2006, available through Lexus Nexus. 191. Federation of American Scientists, ‘‘Shahab-5,’’ December 1, 2005, http://www.fas .org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/shahab-5.htm. 192. Federation of American Scientists, ‘‘Shahab-4.’’ 193. ‘‘Western Intelligence Confirms Iranian Missile Developments.’’ 194. Andrew Koch, ‘‘Tehran Altering Ballistic Missile,’’Jane’s Defense Weekly (December 8, 2004). 195. ‘‘Iran Tests Shahab-3 Motor,’’ Jane’s Missiles and Rockets (June 9, 2005). 196. Robin Hughes, ‘‘Iranian Resistance Group Alleges Tehran Is Developing New Medium Range Missile,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly (March 22, 2006).

582

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197. Schmucker, ‘‘Iran and Its Regional Environment.’’ 198. Federation of American Scientists, ‘‘KH-55 Granat,’’ www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/ bomber/as-15.htm. 199. Hughes, ‘‘Long-Range Ambitions,’’ 22–27; http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/ world/russia/as-15-specs.htm; http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/kh-55.htm; and http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/x-55.htm. 200. Federation of American Scientists, ‘‘KH-55 Granat.’’ 201. ‘‘Cruise Missile Row Rocks Ukraine,’’ BBC News, March 18, 2005, http://news.bbc .co.uk/2/hi/europe/4361505.stm. 202. Bill Gertz, ‘‘Missiles Sold to China and Iran,’’ Washington Times, April 6, 2005, http://washingtontimes.com/national/20050405-115803-7960r.htm. 203. Ibid. 204. Paul Kerr, ‘‘Ukraine Admits Missile Transfers,’’ Arms Control Association, May 2005, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_05/Ukraine.asp. 205. ‘‘Ukraine Investigates Supply of Missiles to China and Iran,’’ Jane’s Missiles and Rockets (May 1, 2005). 206. ‘‘18 Cruise Missiles Were Smuggled to Iran, China,’’ Associated Press, March 18, 2005. 207. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Iran: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices— 2005,’’ http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61688.htm. 208. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States: Armed Forces, Iran (October 21, 2005). 209. Alex Vatanka and Fatemeh Aman, ‘‘The Making of an Insurgency in Iran’s Baluchistan Province, Jane’s Intelligence Review (June 1, 2006). 210. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States: Armed Forces, Iran. 211. Daniel Byman, Shahram Chubin, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, and Jerrold D. Green, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era (Washington, DC: RAND, 2006), 32. 212. Ibid. 213. GlobalSecurity.org, [MOIS] Vezarat-e Ettela’at va Amniat-e Keshvar VEVAK, http:// www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/vevak.htm. 214. GlobalSecurity.org, Ministry of Intelligence and Security, http://www.globalsecurity .org/intell/world/iran/vevak.htm. 215. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States: Armed Forces, Iran. 216. GlobalSecurity.org, Qods (Jerusalem) Force Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC– Pasdaran-e Inqilab), http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/qods.htm. 217. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States: Armed Forces, Iran. 218. Ibid. 219. GlobalSecurity.org, Niruyeh Moghavemat Basij Mobilisation Resistance Force, http:// www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/basij.htm. 220. Byman et al., Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, 39. 221. Globalsecurity.org, Qods (Jerusalem) Force. 222. Congressional Research Service, Country Profile: Iran, March 2006. 223. GlobalSecurity.org, Ansar-i Hizbullah Followers of the Party of God, http://www .globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/ansar.htm. 224. EIA, ‘‘OPEC Revenue Fact Sheet, January 2006, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/ OPEC_Revenues/OPEC.html.

NOTES

583

225. EIA, ‘‘Iran Country Brief,’’ August 2006, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iran/ Background.html. 226. Ibid. 227. CIA, ‘‘Iran,’’ The World Fact Book, 2006. 228. IEA, World Energy Outlook 2005, Middle East and North Africa Insights, OECD/IEA, Paris, 2005, 361. 229. EIA, ‘‘Country Analysis Briefs: Iran,’’ January 2006, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ cabs/Iran/pdf.pdf. 230. Ibid. 231. Daniel Altman, ‘‘Quandary over Iran Sanctions,’’ International Herald Tribune, January 24, 2006. 232. IEA, World Energy Outlook 2005, Middle East and North Africa Insights, 568. 233. Christian Oliver and Alireza Ronaghi, ‘‘Iran’s Powerful Bazaar Braced for Atomic Storm,’’ Reuters, February 7, 2006. 234. Christian Oliver, ‘‘Iran Bravado on UN Sanctions May Ring Hallow,’’ Reuters, February 1, 2006. 235. Nazila Fathi and Andrew E. Kramer, ‘‘With Threat of Sanctions, Iran Protects Some Assets,’’ New York Times, January 21, 2006, 5. 236. ‘‘Iran Denies Shifting Assets in Europe,’’ Gulf Daily News, January 20, 2006, http:// www.gulf-daily-news.com/Story.asp?Article=133050&Sn=BUSI&IssueID=28306. 237. World Bank, ‘‘Iran,’’ http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/IRANEXTN/0,,menuPK:312962~pagePK:141159~piPK: 141110~theSitePK:312943,00.html. 238. Steven R. Weisman, ‘‘Cheney Warns of ‘Consequences’ For Iran on Nuclear Issue,’’ New York Times, March 8, 2006. 239. Peter S. Canellos, ‘‘As A Threat from Iran Increases, US May Lack Preemptive Options,’’ Boston Globe, March 21, 2006. 240. Global Security reports that the Guided Bomb Unit-28 (GBU-28) bomb was developed in 1991, and it can penetrate hardened targets before exploding, capable of penetrating 100 feet of earth or 20 feet of concrete. The GBU-28 is laser guided and uses an 8-inch artillery tube as the bomb body. It is fitted with GBU-27 LGB kits and is 14.5 inches in diameter and almost 19 feet long. The operator illuminates a target with a laser designator and then the munition guides to a spot of laser energy reflected from the target. Global Security notes that the bomb is nominally a 5,000-pound bomb, but may actually weigh 4,700 pounds. F-117s dropped two weapons during the Gulf War. The bomb was modified after the conflict, and F-15s used the weapon in Kosovo. It is not clear that the B-2 or U.S. aircraft would now use this weapon. The Hard and Deeply Buried Target Defeat System (HDBTDS) program has made major progress in recent years. The fuzing of the weapon is believed to have been improved and possibly some aspects of its penetration capability. It has been tested against rock as well as soil. Global Security indicates that Guided Bomb Unit-28C/B, also known as BLU-122 or Enhanced Paveway III, provides an improved aerial delivery capability for the BLU-113 P3I warhead and possesses a Global Positioning System aided laser guidance capability with improved lethality, survivability, and penetration over the 28B/B weapons system and is compatible with F-15E and B-2A aircraft platforms (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/gbu-28.htm). The B-2 Spirit bomber has also tested simulated nuclear earth penetrator modifications of the B61-11 (http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/usa/1998/n19980326_980417.html).

584

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241. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/blu-109-specs.htm. 242. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/jdam.htm. 243. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/blu-116.htm. 244. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/agm-130.htm. 245. Robin Hughes, ‘‘Tehran Takes Steps to Protect Nuclear Facilities,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly (January 25, 2006). 246. Ben David, ‘‘Iran Launches New Surface to Air Missile Production.’’ 247. Knights, ‘‘Iran’s Conventional Forces Remain Key.’’ 248. Ellen Knickmeyer and Omar Fekeiki, ‘‘Iraqi Shi’ite Cleric Pledges to Defend Iran,’’ Washington Post, January 24, 2006, A13. 249. Michael Knights, ‘‘Deterrence by Punishment Could Offer Last Resort Option for Iran, Jane’s Intelligence Review (April 1, 2006). 250. This would require remote targeting. Surface-radar coverage of a large ship from a ground-mounted radar is about 26–32 nautical miles. 251. It is unclear what version of the missile Iran has and what modifications it may have made. China made a wide range of variants of the system. Global Security describes them as follows (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/c-201.htm): • HY-2A terminal guidance radar of the prototype missile was modified into a passive infrared target seeker which effectively raised the concealment and antijamming capabilities of the missile. The interception performance of this missile within guidance range can realize omnidirectional attacks on ship targets at sea. • HY-2B conical scanning terminal guidance radar of the prototype missile was modified to an advanced monopulse system radar that improved its resistance sea waves interference and various forms of electronic jamming. • HY-2C terminal guidance radar of the prototype missile was modified into a televisionequipped target seeker which was able to effectively raise the concealment and antijamming capabilities of the missile as well as increase its hit probability. • HY-2G uses a high precision radio altimeter so that the level flight altitude of the missile can be lowered to 30–50 meters, raising penetration capabilities. The basic HY-2 uses active radar homing, while HY-2G adds a radio altimeter to permit a lower penetration altitude. 252. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/c-802.htm. 253. IISS, Military Balance, 2005–2006; Knights, ‘‘Deterrence by Punishment.’’ 254. Al Akbar Dareini, ‘‘Iran Rolls Out Yet Another Missile,’’ Chicago Tribune, April 4, 2006; ‘‘Iran Says Has Tested 2nd Missile,’’ CNN.com, April 4, 2006; Ali Ronaghi, ‘‘Iran Says Fires Sonar-Evading, Underwater Missile,’’ Washingtonpost.com, April 2, 2006, 1:03 P.M. 255. ‘‘Iran Suicide Bombers to ‘‘Burn Down’’ US Interest,’’ Iran Focus, February 13, 2006, http://www.iranfocus.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=5753. 256. Robin Wright and Peter Baker, ‘‘Iraq, Jordan See Threat to Election from Iran,’’ The Washington Post, December 8, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/ A43980-2004Dec7.html. 257. Ibid. 258. MEHR News, ‘‘Remarks of Jordanian King an Insult to Iraqi Nation: Iran,’’ December 11, 2004, http://www.mehrnews.ir/en/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=137699.

NOTES

585

259. Knickmeyer and Fekeiki, ‘‘Iraqi Shi’ite Cleric Pledges to Defend Iran,’’ A13. 260. Richard Beeston, ‘‘Two Years on, Iran Is the Only Clear Winner of War on Saddam,’’ Times (London), September 23, 2005. 261. ABC TV News, Baghdad e-mail, September 20, 2005. 262. Robin Hughes, ‘‘Rumsfeld Alleges IRGC Al Qods Infiltrating Iraq,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly March 15, 2006. 263. Nawaf Obaid, ‘‘Meeting the Challenge of a Fragmented Iraq: A Saudi Perspective,’’ CSIS, April 6, 2006, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060406_iraqsaudi.pdf. 264. Matthew Levitt, Statement before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia and the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, 109th Congress, 1st Session, February 16, 2005, wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/109/98810.PDF, 15.

CHAPTER 9 1. EIA, ‘‘Country Analysis Briefs: Iraq,’’ June 2006, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/ Iraq/Full.html. 2. BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2006, June 2006. 3. Ibid. 4. CIA, The World Fact Book, 2006, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ index.html. 5. ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ May 26, 2006, Report to Congress in Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2006, 30–35. 6. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1989 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1990), 51. 7. CIA, The World Factbook, 1991, 148–49. 8. IISS, Military Balance, 1990–1991 and 1991–1992 editions. 9. Estimate based on recent reporting and ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1989, Table I. 10. ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1990, Table II. 11. Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1983–1990, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-9 1-578F, August 2, 1991, p. CRS-54. 12. ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1985 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1985), 134. 13. ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1989, 117. 14. Los Angeles Times, February 24, 1992, A1; Los Angeles Times, February 24, 1992, p. A-1. 15. Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1984–1991, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-92-577F, July 20, 1991, pp. CRS-58, CRS-70; Kenneth Katzman, ‘‘Iraq’s Campaign to Acquire and Develop High Technology,’’ Congressional Research Service, CRS-92-611F, August 3, 1991. U.S. reporting on this subject is inconsistent. ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1990 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1992), 133, indicates that Iraq imported a total of $22,750 million worth of arms during 1985–1989, including $13,000 million from the Soviet Union, $1,700 million from France, $20 million from the United Kingdom, $1,600 million from the People’s Republic of China, $90 million from West Germany, $2,900 million from other Warsaw Pact countries,

586

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$1,500 million from other European countries, $420 million from other Middle Eastern countries, $20 million from other East Asian states, $1,300 million from Latin American, and $200 million from other countries in the world. 16. U.S. Air Force, ‘‘Reaching Globally, Reaching Powerfully: The United States Air Force in the Gulf War,’’ Washington, USAF, September, 1991, 3–4. 17. Department of Defense press release, February 28, 1991. USCENTCOM raised the number of Iraqi POWs to 80,000 and Iraqi losses to 3,300 tanks, 2,100 other armored vehicles, and 2,200 artillery pieces in a press release made on March 3, 1991. 18. USCENTCOM press release of March 3, 1991. The U.S. lost 182 killed to all causes during the war from January 16 to March 1, 1991; Department of Defense press release, March 3, 1991. 19. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimated on June 4, 1991, that 100,000 Iraqi soldiers died, 300,000 were wounded, 150,000 deserted, and 60,000 were taken prisoners of war. DIA noted, however, that these estimates could be 50 percent or more in error (Department of Defense press release, June 6, 1991). Later studies have steadily reduced the number of killed and wounded and increased the number of deserted. These estimates do not include losses in the Shi’ite and Kurdish uprisings that followed the cease-fire. 20. Reuters, March 4, 1991. 21. Estimates by author based on material in Jane’s and in the IISS, ‘‘Iraq,’’ Military Balance, 2003–2004. 22. Iraq Body Count, accessed June 23, 2006, http://www.iraqbodycount.net/. 23. Tom Lasseter, ‘‘Shiite Troops’ Thirst for Revenge Threatens Iraq,’’ Philadelphia Inquirer, October 13, 2005, 1. 24. Ann Scott Tyson, ‘‘Departing U.S. Commander Reports Progress in Baghdad,’’ Washington Post, December 31, 2005, 12. 25. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., ‘‘Iraq Vote Shows Sunnis Are Few in New Military,’’ New York Times, December 27, 2005, 1. 26. ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ August 2006, Report to Congress in Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2006 (Section 9010), 63. 27. ‘‘Iraqis to Begin Taking Control of Forces,’’ USA Today, September 7, 2006. 28. Rowan Scarborough, ‘‘U.S. Says Iraq Poised to Take Control of Its Ground Forces,’’ Washington Times, August 29, 2006, 5. 29. Solomon Moore, ‘‘Iraq Army Battles Shiites,’’ Los Angeles Times, August 29, 2006, 1. 30. ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ August 2006 (Section 9010), 52. 31. Ibid., 53. 32. David I. McKeeby, ‘‘Iraqi Army, Police Continue Denying Terrorists Safe Haven (Forces in Northern Iraq Will Lead Operations by 2007, Says U.S. Commander),’’ Washington file, U.S. Department of State, May 8, 2006. 33. ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ August 2006 (Section 9010), 52. 34. Richard Lardner, ‘‘Sobering Talk on Iraq War,’’ Tampa Tribune, September 7, 2006. 35. ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ August 2006 (Section 9010), 54. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, ‘‘April 2006 Report to Congress,’’ 21. 39. Gina Vavallaro, ‘‘Small Teams with Big Jobs,’’ Defense News (February 13, 2006): 48.

NOTES

587

40. U.S. Department of Defense, ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ February 2006 (Section 9010), 41–42. 41. Greg Grant, ‘‘T-72s to Bolster Iraqi Military,’’ Defense News (October 24, 2005): 34. 42. John J. Pistons, ‘‘Iraqi Mechanized Brigade Takes the Lead in Taji,’’ The Advisor (January 7, 2006): 3–4. 43. Rowan Scarborough, ‘‘Iraqi Army Needs Armored Vehicles,’’ Washington Times, December 27, 2005, 1. 44. Michael Hastings and Scott Johnson, ‘‘We Want Better Weapons,’’ Newsweek, February 20, 2006. 45. U.S. Department of Defense, ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ May 2006, Report to Congress in Accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2006 (Section 9010), 52. 46. ‘‘US Strives to Resurrect Iraq’s Broken Air Force,’’ Flight International (October 4, 2005). 47. Andrew Chuter, ‘‘New Surveillance Planes Grounded by Iraq Air Force,’’ Defense News (October 3, 2005): 4. 48. Lt. Colonel Herb Phillips, ‘‘Exercises Test Air Force,’’ The Advisor (December 17, 2005): 6. 49. U.S. Department of Defense, ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ February 2006 (Section 9010), 45–46. 50. US Department of Defense, ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ May 2006 (Section 9010), 56. 51. ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ August 2006 (Section 9010), 54. 52. U.S. Department of Defense, ‘‘Report to Congress Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ submitted to Congress pursuant to the section entitled ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq’’ of House Conference Report 109-72 accompanying H.R. 1268, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Public Law 109–13, October 2005. 53. Louis Hansen, ‘‘With the 5th Fleet, Iraq’s Crude Navy,’’ Virginian Pilot, December 6, 2005. 54. BBC News, January 17, 2006, 15:16. 55. U.S. Department of Defense, ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ February 2006 (Section 9010), 44–45. 56. U.S. Department of Defense, ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ May 2006 (Section 9010), 55–56. 57. Ibid., 56. 58. Tim Ripley, ‘‘Country Briefing Iraq,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (July 5, 2006): 28. 59. Niall Chorney, ‘‘Iraq, Italy Verge on Signing deal for Patrol Vessels,’’ Jane’s Defense Weekly (September 13, 2006): 18. 60. International Crisis Group, ‘‘Unmaking Iraq: A Constitutional Process Gone Awry,’’ Middle East Briefing No. 19, September 26, 2005. 61. Jonathan Steele, ‘‘Iraq’s Interior Ministry Refusing to Deploy US-Trained Police,’’ The Guardian, April 4, 2006. 62. Dan Murphy, ‘‘Abuse ‘Widespread’ In Iraqi Prisons; A US Military Doctor Says US Troops Intervene When They Can, but Iraqi’s Run the Jails,’’ Christian Science Monitor, December 7, 2005.

588

NOTES

63. Solomon Moore, ‘‘Killings Linked to Shi’ite Squads in the Iraqi Police Force,’’ Los Angeles Times, November 29, 2005, 1. 64. Dan Murphy, ‘‘Death Squads Deepen Division in Baghdad; Bombs Sunday Killed at Least 30; Some 45 Men Were Found Slain in the Capital,’’ Christian Science Monitor, May 8, 2006. 65. U.S. Department of Defense, ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ May 2006 (Section 9010), 58. 66. Dexter Filkins, ‘‘Iraq Set to Unify Security Forces to Battle Chaos,’’ New York Times, May 11, 2006, 1. 67. Rowan Scarborough, ‘‘General Says Iraq Army Is ‘Willing,’ But Not Ready,’’ Washington Times, May 3, 2006, 3. 68. ‘‘Commanders Protest Policy that Lets Iraqi Troops Quit,’’ Associated Press, April 14, 2006. 69. Eric Schmitt, ‘‘2,000 More M.P.’s Will Help Train the Iraqi Police,’’ New York Times, January 16, 2006. 70. Hastings and Johnson, ‘‘We Want Better Weapons.’’ 71. U.S. Department of Defense, ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ May 2006 (Section 9010), 59. 72. U.S. Department of State missive, February 17, 2006. 73. U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress, pursuant to U.S. Policy in Iraq Act, Section 1227 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006, April 6, 2006, 22. 74. Ibid., 22–23. 75. ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ August 2006 (Section 9010), 47. 76. Christopher Allbritton, ‘‘Why Iraq’s Police Are a Menace,’’ TIME, March 20, 2006. 77. ‘‘U.S. Military Warily Eyes Iraqi Forces,’’ NewsMax.com Wires, April 25, 2006. 78. U.S. Department of Defense, ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ February 2006 (Section 9010), 47–48. 79. ‘‘Strategy for Victory: Defeating the Terrorists and Training Iraqi Security Forces,’’ Office of the Press Secretary, White House, March 13, 2006. 80. Ibid. 81. Ibid. 82. U.S. Department of Defense, ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ February 2006 (Section 9010), 47. 83. ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ August 2006 (Section 9010), 45. 84. Michael Moss, ‘‘How Iraq Police Reform Became Casualty of War,’’ New York Times, May 22, 2006. 85. David I. McKeeby, ‘‘Iraqi Police Facing Challenges, Making Progress,’’ Washington File, U.S. Department of State, May 2, 2006. 86. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, ‘‘April 2006 Report to Congress,’’ 25. 87. ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ August 2006 (Section 9010), 47. 88. Borzou Daragahi and James Rainey, ‘‘Amid Iraq Violence, Kurds Unify Their Government,’’ Los Angeles Times, May 8, 2006. 89. Ibid. 90. ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ August 2006 (Section 9010), 48. 91. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, ‘‘April 2006 Report to Congress,’’ 173.

NOTES

589

92. John F. Burns, ‘‘Iran and Iraq to Join to Seal Border against Insurgents,’’ New York Times, May 28, 2006. 93. Ellen Knickmeyer, ‘‘Iraq Begins to Rein in Paramilitary Force,’’ Washington Post, May 14, 2006. 94. Ibid. 95. Ibid., A16. 96. Dexter Filkins, ‘‘Armed Groups Propel Iraq toward Chaos,’’ New York Times, May 23, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/24/world/middleeast/24security.html ?pagewanted=4&_r=1. 97. Knickmeyer ‘‘Iraq Begins to Rein in Paramilitary Force.’’ 98. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, ‘‘April 2006 Report to Congress,’’ 28–29. 99. U.S. Department of Defense, ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ August 2006, 30–37. 100. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Weekly Progress Report,’’ September 20, 2006, 22. 101. U.S. Department of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1999– 2000, June 2002, http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rpt/wmeat/1999_2000/. 102. IISS, Military Balance, various editions. 103. CIA, The World Factbook, 2006, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ index.html. 104. Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision. 105. Robert K. Mullen, The Energy Incident Data Base, February 2006. 106. Charles Kraul, ‘‘Decline in Oil Output Dims Iraqi Recovery,’’ Washington Post, January 25, 2006, 2. 107. Ellen Knickmeyer, ‘‘Graft Alleged in Oil Protection Effort,’’ Washington Post, February 5, 2006, A17; Robert F. Worth and James Glanz, ‘‘Oil Graft Fuels the Insurgency, Iraq and U.S. Say,’’ New York Times, February 5, 2006. 108. ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ August 2006 (Section 9010), 31. 109. General Accounting Office, ‘‘Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the Security Situation,’’ September 11, 2006, 9. 110. Mahendra K. Verma, Thomas S. Ahlbrandt, and Mohammad Al-Gailani, ‘‘Petroleum Reserves and Undiscovered Resources in the Total Petroleum Systems of Iraq: Reserve Growth and Production Implications,’’ GeoArabia 9, no. 3 (2004). 111. Jeff Gerth, ‘‘Oil Experts See Long-Term Risks to Reserves,’’ New York Times, November 30, 2003, A-1. 112. Ibid. 113. Ibid. 114. EIA, ‘‘Country Analysis Briefs: Iraq,’’ December 2005, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ cabs/iraq.html. 115. Robin Wright and Ellen Knickmeyer, ‘‘U.S. Lowers Sights on What Can Be Achieved in Iraq,’’ Washington Post, August 14, 2005, A01. 116. Wall Street Journal, March 15, 2004; U.S. Department of Defense, Draft Working Papers, Iraq Status, March 4, 2004, Washington. 117. EIA, ‘‘World Crude Oil Production (Including Lease Condensate), 1997–Present,’’ July 2005, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ipsr/t11a.xls. 118. EIA, ‘‘Country Analysis Briefs: Iraq,’’ December 2005.

590

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119. Glen C. Carey, interview with Iraqi Oil Minister Ibrahim Mohammed Bahr alUloum, ‘‘Iraq Keeps Eye on Goal of 3 Million Barrels a Day,’’ USA Today, November 20, 2003. 120. Gerth, ‘‘Oil Experts See Long-Term Risks,’’ A-1. 121. Reuters, September 7, 2005, 22:54, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/ N07207597.htm. 122. Christian T. Miller, ‘‘Missteps Hamper Iraqi Oil Recovery,’’ Los Angeles Times, September 26, 2005, 1. 123. Jim Krane, ‘‘Production Lags, Report Says,’’ Associated Press, December 9, 2005. 124. ABC TV News, February 10, 2006. 125. ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ February 2006, 9. 126. Ibid., 7. 127. Ibid., 8. 128. Background information provided by MNF-I source on September 29, 2006. 129. Ellen Knickmeyer and Bassam Sebti, ‘‘Toll in Iraq’s Deadly Surge: 1,300; Morgue Count Eclipses Other Tallies Since Shrine Attack,’’ The Washington Post, February 27, 2006, A1. 130. Jonathan Finer and Bassam Sebti, ‘‘Sectarian Violence Kills over 100 in Iraq; Shi’iteSunni Anger Flares Following Bombing of Shrine,’’ Washington Post, February 24, 2006, A1. 131. Sabrina Tavernise, ‘‘Violent Cycle of Revenge Stuns Iraqis,’’ New York Times, February 24, 2006. 132. ABC TV News, February 27, 2006. 133. Finer and Sebti, ‘‘Sectarian Violence Kills Over 100 in Iraq’’ A1. 134. Nelson Hernandez, ‘‘Diplomacy Helped to Calm the Chaos; U.S.-Kurdish Campaign Sought to Steer Sunnis, Shi’ites from Brink of Civil War,’’ The Washington Post, February 27, 2006, A11. 135. David I. McKeeby, ‘‘U.S. General Praises Iraqi Government’s Security Efforts (Insurgents Continue Targeting Civilians to Inflame Sectarian Violence),’’ U.S. State Department, March 2, 2006. 136. Tavernise, ‘‘Violent Cycle of Revenge Stuns Iraqis.’’ 137. Alexandra Zavis, ‘‘Dozens of Bodies Found, Sunni Bloc Suspends Talks with Rival Parties in Wake of Shrine Attack,’’ Associated Press, February 23, 2006. 138. Hernandez, ‘‘Diplomacy Helped to Calm the Chaos,’’ A11. 139. Richard L. Armitage, interview with Pan-Arab print reporters, December 21, 2005, www.state.gov. 140. Jeffrey White, ‘‘Resistance Strategy in the Trans-Election Period,’’ PolicyWatch #945, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 24, 2005. 141. David Ignatius, ‘‘America’s Message to Iraq,’’ The Washington Post, January 25, 2006, A19. 142. Hamza Hendawi, ‘‘U.S. Ambassador Warns Iraq against Creating a Sectarian Government; Attacks Kill 24,’’ Associated Press Worldstream, February 20, 2006. 143. For example, see Moore, ‘‘Killings Linked to Shi’ite Squads,’’ 1; Dexter Filkins, ‘‘Sunnis Accuse Iraqi Military of Kidnappings and Slayings,’’ New York Times, November 29, 2005, 1. 144. Murphy, ‘‘Abuse Widespread in Iraqi Prisons,’’ 1; Moore, ‘‘Killings Linked to Shi’ite Squads,’’ 1. 145. Filkins, ‘‘Sunnis Accuse Iraqi Military of Kidnappings and Slayings,’’ 1.

NOTES

591

146. Moore, ‘‘Killings Linked to Shi’ite Squads,’’ 1. 147. Louise Roug, ‘‘Targeted Killings Surge in Baghdad; Nearly 4,000 Civilian Deaths, Many of Them Sunni Arabs Slain Execution-Style, Were Recorded in the First Three Months of the Year,’’ Los Angeles Times, May 7, 2006, 1. 148. Ibid., 1. 149. Daniel McGrory. ‘‘Exodus of the Iraqi Middle Class.’’ Times (London), May 11, 2006. 150. International Crisis Group, ‘‘Unmaking Iraq.’’ 151. Jeremy Redmon, ‘‘Iraqi Police Fear Danger in Ranks: Recruits Learn the Basics as U.S. Soldiers Share Risks,’’ Atlanta Journal-Constitution, February 23, 2006, 1. 152. Murphy, ‘‘Abuse ‘Widespread’ In Iraqi Prisons.’’ 153. ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,’’ February 2006, 11. 154. Jonathan Finer and Nasser Nouri, ‘‘Sunni Politicians Killed, 4 Abductions Confirmed,’’ Washington Post, November 29, 2005, A-16. 155. Associated Press article e-mailed to author on April 7, 2006. 156. Sinan Salaheddin, ‘‘Iraqi Interior, Defense Ministers Agree to Conduct only Joint Raids,’’ Associated Press, March 12, 2006. 157. Rick Jervis, ‘‘General: Kidnap Ring Run by Cops; Iraqi Officers Held in Investigation,’’ USA Today, March 15, 2006, 1. 158. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., ‘‘Dozens of Security Force Recruits Are Killed by Iraqi Insurgents,’’ New York Times, April 25, 2006. 159. Leila Fadel, ‘‘Violence Tied to Iraqi Security Continues; Some Say Attackers Pose as Interior Forces. What is More Certain: Killings and Abductions Go On,’’ Philadelphia Inquirer, May 9, 2006. 160. Edward Wong and Kirk Semple, ‘‘Civilians in Iraq Flee Mixed Areas as Killings Rise,’’ New York Times, April 2, 2006. 161. Ellen Knickmeyer, ‘‘ On Baghdad Patrol, a Vigilant Eye on Iraqi Police; U.S.-Trained Allies Are Often Suspects,’’ Washington Post, May 15, 2006, A1. 162. Ibid. 163. Edward Wong, ‘‘Beleaguered Premier Warns U.S. to Stop Interfering in Iraq’s Politics,’’ New York Times, March 30, 2006, A14. 164. Ibid. 165. Steele, ‘‘Iraq’s Interior Ministry Refusing to Deploy US-Trained Police.’’ 166. UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, ‘‘Human Rights Report,’’ January 1–February 28, 2006, 1. 167. E-mail correspondence between Ben Gilbert and author. 168. Aamer Madhani, ‘‘On The Ground, It’s a Civil War; The debate over What to Call Iraq’s War Is Lost on Many Iraqis as Shadowy Shiite Militias and Sunni Insurgents Wage Their Deadly Conflict,’’ Chicago Tribune, April 14, 2006, 1. 169. Ibid. 170. Ibid. 171. Jeffrey Gettleman, ‘‘In Iraqi Divide, Echoes of Bosnia for U.S. Troops,’’ New York Times, April 16, 2006. 172. Ibid. 173. Bushra Juhi, ‘‘Baghdad District Calm after Gunbattles,’’ Associated Press, April 19, 2006; Nelson Hernandez and Bassam Sebti, ‘‘Mystery Hangs over Baghdad Battle; Conflicting Accounts Obscure Even Identity of Combatants in 2 Days of Street Fighting,’’ Washington

592

NOTES

Post, April 19, 2006, A10; Steve Negus, ‘‘Fears Grow over Sunni Backing for Insurgency,’’ Financial Times, April 19, 2006, 7; and Robert H. Reid, ‘‘Sunni Clerics Call for Calm amid Sectarian Clashes in Northern Baghdad,’’ Associated Press, April 19, 2006. 174. Qassim Abdul-Zahra, ‘‘Al-Jaafari Clear the Way for Shiites to Replace Him as Prime Minister,’’ Associated Press, April 20, 2006. 175. Hernandez and Sebti, ‘‘Mystery Hangs Over Baghdad Battle,’’ A10. 176. ‘‘Out of Bloodiness, a Certain Hope,’’ The Economist (October 20, 2005). 177. Adam Wolfe, ‘‘Iraq’s Future Still in Doubt as Elections Approach,’’ Power and Interest News Report, October 24, 2005. 178. James Glanz, ‘‘Kurdish Suspects Reveal International Links, Officials Say,’’ Washington Post, July 11, 2005. 179. Ibid. 180. Steve Fainaru and Anthony Shadid, ‘‘Kurdish Officials Sanction Abductions in Kirkuk,’’ Washington Post, June 15, 2005, A01. 181. Ibid. 182. Ibid. 183. Quoted in Fainaru and Shadid, ‘‘Kurdish Officials Sanction Abductions in Kirkuk,’’ A01. 184. Edward Young, ‘‘Kurds Are Flocking to Kirkuk, Laying Claim to Land and Oil,’’ New York Times, December 29, 2005. 185. Steve Negus, ‘‘Kirkuk Dispute Bedevils Iraq’s Political Crisis,’’ Financial Times, March 11, 2006. 186. Robert F. Worth, ‘‘In Placid Iraqi Kurdistan, Strife to the South Elicits Little Sympathy,’’ New York Times, March 23, 2006 187. Ibid. 188. Ibid. 189. Author’s e-mail correspondence with Kimberly Johnson of USA Today, April 4, 2006. 190. Worth, ‘‘In Placid Iraqi Kurdistan’’; and Patrick Cockburn, ‘‘Battle for Baghdad ‘Has Already Started,’’’ Independent, March 25, 2006. 191. Jonathan Finer, ‘‘Shiite Miltias Move into Oil-Rich Kirkuk, Even as Kurds Dig in; Control of Iraqi City Has Long Been in Dispute,’’ Washington Post, April 25, 2006, A16. 192. Ibid. 193. ‘‘Clashes Erupt between two Iraqi Army Battalions Following Insurgent Attack,’’ Associated Press, May 12, 2006. 194. David Axe, ‘‘Sunni Suspicions of Kurds, Shi’ites Undermine Army,’’ Washington Times, March 15, 2006, 11. 195. ‘‘Clashes Erupt between two Iraqi Army Battalions.’’ 196. Toby Dodge, Iraq’s Future: The Aftermath of Regime Change (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2005), 51–52, Adelphi Paper 372. 197. ‘‘Iraqi Kurdish Leaders Comment on Unification of Kurdish Region,’’ FRE/RL Iraq Report, vol. 9, no. 4, January 27, 2006. Translated by Petr Kubalek. 198. Aamer Madhani, ‘‘Offensive Targets Rebels; Airborne Assault Drops Troops on Insurgent Camps,’’ Chicago Tribune, March 17, 2006, C1. 199. Richard Boudreaux, ‘‘U.S.-Iraqi Offensive Targets Insurgents; The Major Assault near Samarra Occurs as the New Parliament Holds Its Inaugural Session,’’ Los Angeles Times, March 17, 2006, A1. 200. Madhani, ‘‘Offensive Targets Rebels,’’ C1.

NOTES

593

201. Madhani, ‘‘Offensive Targets Rebels,’’ C1; and Kirk Semple, ‘‘Sunni Leaders Say U.S.-Iran Talks Amount to Meddling,’’ New York Times, March 18, 2006, A3. 202. Boudreaux, ‘‘U.S.-Iraqi Offensive Targets Insurgents,’’ A1. 203. Karl Vick, ‘‘In Turkey, New Fears that Peace Has Passed,’’ Washington Post, May 10, 2005, A12. 204. Negus, ‘‘Kirkuk Dispute Bedevils Iraq’s Political Crisis.’’ 205. Robin Wright and Peter Baker, ‘‘Iraq, Jordan See Threat to Election from Iran,’’ The Washington Post, December 8, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/ A43980-2004Dec7.html. 206. Iran Daily, December 12, 2004, http://www.iran-daily.com/1383/2161/html/. 207. Salah Nasrawi, ‘‘Iraqi Constitution Angers Sunnis,’’ Associated Press, August 28, 2005. 208. Robert Gibbons, ‘‘Saudi Says, US Policy Handing Iraq over to Iran,’’ Reuters, September 21, 2005. 209. Ibid. 210. Alfred B. Prados, ‘‘Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues,’’ March 22, 2005, Congressional Research Service, 8. 211. Challis McDonough, ‘‘Jordanian Police Arrest Suspect in Aqaba Attack,’’ Voice of America, August 23, 2005, http://www.voanews.com/english/2005-08-23-voa23.cfm. 212. Dale Gavlak, ‘‘Jordan Seeks Arrest in Aqaba Rocket Attack,’’ Los Angeles Times, August 27, 2005, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/wire/ sns-ap-jordan-aqaba-attack,1,282074.story?coll=sns-ap-world-headlines. 213. James Glanz, ‘‘In Jordanian Case, Hints of Iraq Jihad Networks,’’ New York Times, July 29, 2005. 214. Ibid. 215. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., ‘‘Iraq Accuses Jordan of Allowing Financing of Insurgency,’’ New York Times, August 22, 2005. 216. Quoted in Umit Enginsov and Burak Ege Bekdil, ‘‘U.S. Warns Ankara against CrossBorder Raids on Kurds,’’ DefenseNews, July 25, 2005, 36. 217. Ibid. 218. Michael Ware, ‘‘Inside Iran’s Secret War for Iraq,’’ TIME, August 15, 2005. 219. Daniel Byman, ‘‘Iran, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction,’’ Congressional Testimony to the Subcommittee on the Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attacks of the Homeland Security Committee, September 8, 2005, 6. 220. See International Crisis Group, ‘‘Iran in Iraq: How Much Influence?’’ Crisis Group Middle East Report No. 38, March 21, 2005, 6; and Doug Struck, ‘‘Official Warns of Iranian Infiltration,’’ The Washington Post, July 26, 2004; Associated Press, December 15, 2004; and Annia Ciezadlo, Christian Science Monitor, December 16, 2004. 221. International Crisis Group, ‘‘Iran in Iraq: How Much Influence?’’ Crisis Group Middle East Report No. 38, March 21, 2005, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm ?id=3328&l=1. Text drawn from Crisis Group interview, Mashhad, November 2, 2004. 222. Translation of the Al Fayhaa TV interview by The Middle East Media Research Institute, Special Dispatch Series, No. 849, January 19, 2005. 223. Al-Sharqiyah TV News Report, ‘‘Iraqi Security Forces Arrest 10 Iranian ‘Infiltrators’; Six Car Bombs Defused,’’ BBC Monitoring Middle East, October 13, 2005. 224. Richard Beeston, ‘‘Two Years On, Iran Is the Only Clear Winner of War on Saddam,’’ Times (London), September 23, 2005.

594

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225. ‘‘Surge in Violence Linked to Iran,’’ Times (Australian), September 21, 2005, 10. 226. Ware, ‘‘Inside Iran’s Secret War For Iraq.’’ 227. Beeston, ‘‘Two Years On.’’ 228. Michael Evans and Richard Beeston, ‘‘Iran Blamed for Deaths of Eight Britons in South Iraq,’’ Times (London), October 6, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/ 0,,7374-1813246,00.html. 229. Ware, ‘‘Inside Iran’s Secret War for Iraq.’’ 230. ABC TV News Baghdad e-mail, September 20, 2005. 231. Adrian Blomfield, ‘‘UK Troops Left Isolated as Mahdi Army Weaves a Web of Official Corruption,’’ London Daily Telegraph, September 22, 2005. 232. Ibid. 233. Al-Sharq al-Awsat Web site, ‘‘Pan-Arab paper quotes Iraqi ‘‘figures’’ on role, aims of Iran, Syria,’’ BBC Monitoring Middle East, October 7, 2005. 234. Beeston, ‘‘Two Years On.’’ 235. Thomas E. Ricks, ‘‘General: Iraqi Insurgents Directed from Syria,’’ Washington Post, December 17, 2004, 29. 236. John F. Burns, ‘‘Registering New Influence, Iran Sends a Top Aide to Iraq,’’ New York Times, May 18, 2005. 237. Andy Mosher, ‘‘Iraqi Official Says Iran Will Not Train Troops,’’ Washington Post, July 12, 2005, A16. 238. ‘‘Iraq Deputy Prime Minister Visits Iran,’’ UPI, November 6, 2005. 239. ‘‘Administration Fears Weak Iraq Could Become ‘‘Tehran’s Playground,’’ The White House Bulletin, November 21, 2005. 240. ‘‘Iraqi President on Landmark Iran Visit,’’ Agence France-Presse, November 21, 2005. 241. ‘‘Iraq’s Talabani Says Iran Promises Support against Insurgents,’’ AFX International Focus, November 23, 2005. 242. ‘‘Iran’s Leader Urges Iraqis to Tell Occupiers to Go,’’ Reuters, November 22, 2005. 243. Jay Solomon, Farnaz Fassihi, and Philip Shishkin, ‘‘Iran Plays Growing Role in Iraq, Complicating Bush’s Strategy: Tehran’s Influence on Politics, Daily Life Could Give It Leverage in Nuclear Debate; Help for Shi’ite TV Stations,’’ Wall Street Journal, February 14, 2006, 1. 244. Robert Burns, ‘‘Rumsfeld Accuses Iran of Sending Paramilitary Forces into Iraq,’’ Associated Press, March 8, 2006. 245. Stephen Dinan, ‘‘Bush Says Iran Bmobs Used In Iraq; Seeks to Boost Support for Three-Year-Old War,’’ Washington Times, March 14, 2006, 1. 246. Jonathan Finer and Ellen Knickmeyer, ‘‘Envoy Accuses Iran of Duplicity on Iraq; Fighters Receive Support, Khalilzad Says,’’ Washington Post, March 24, 2006, A12. 247. Michael Slackman and David E. Sanger, ‘‘U.S. and Iranians Agree to Discuss Violence in Iraq,’’ New York Times, March 17, 2006, A1. 248. Ibid. 249. Ibid. 250. Semple, ‘‘Sunni Leaders Say U.S.-Iran Talks Amount to Meddling,’’ A8. 251. International Crisis Group, ‘‘Iran in Iraq: How Much Influence?’’ 252. Ricks, ‘‘General: Iraqi Insurgents Directed from Syria,’’ 29; Bill Gertz, ‘‘Commander Says Syria Must Curb Terrorist Support,’’ Washington Times, December 17, 2004.

NOTES

595

253. Quoted in Rowan Scarborough, ‘‘Bomb Makers’ Skills in Iraq Seen as Eroding,’’ Washington Times, March 9, 2005, 6. 254. Briefer Tom Casey, U.S. Department of State Daily Briefing, May 9, 2005. 255. Richard Beeston and James Hider, ‘‘Following the Trail of Death: How Foreigners Flock to Join Holy War,’’ Financial Times, June 25, 2005. 256. Jeffrey Flieshman, ‘‘Zarqawi Reportedly Called for a Shift in Strategy,’’ Los Angeles Times, May 19, 2005; Jonathan Finer, ‘‘Violence Blamed on Zarqawi Allies,’’ Washington Post, May 19, 2005, A24. 257. Hassan M. Fattah, ‘‘Syrians Clash with Fighters Linked to the Insurgency,’’ New York Times, July 5, 2005. 258. Quoted in Tony Capaccio, ‘‘Syria Increasing Efforts to Seal Border with Iraq,’’ Bloomberg.com, July 6, 2005. 259. Ibid. 260. Quoted in Albert Aji and Zeina Karam, ‘‘Syria May Have Its Own Terrorists,’’ Washington Times, July 7, 2005, 17. 261. Warren P. Strobel, ‘‘Iraq Is No. 1 Extremist Training Spot, Studies Say,’’ Philadelphia Inquirer, July 5, 2005. 262. Ibid. 263. Ibid. 264. Quoted in Dominic Evans, ‘‘Saudi Arabia Says Ready to Beat Militants from Iraq,’’ Reuters, July 10, 2005. 265. Associated Press, ‘‘Syria’s Assad Quoted as Accusing US of not Doing Anything to Control Iraqi Dorder,’’ October 7, 2005. 266. Christopher Adams, Edward Alden, and Guy Dinmore, ‘‘US and UK Warn Iran and Syria on Terror, Iraqi Affairs,’’ Financial Times, October 7, 2005, 7. 267. Associated Press, ‘‘Syria’s Assad.’’ 268. Salah Nasrawi, ‘‘Top US Diplomat Warns of Syria’s Behavior in Middle East,’’ Associated Press, October 9, 2005. 269. BBC Monitoring Middle East, ‘‘Iraqi TV Reports First Syrian Flight to Baghdad,’’ October 11, 2005. 270. Times Staff Writer, ‘‘U.S. General Praises Syria for Border Tightening,’’ Los Angeles Times, March 17, 2006. 271. Michael Slackman, ‘‘Syria Imposing Stronger Curbs on Opposition,’’ New York Times, April 5, 2006, A1.

CHAPTER 10 1. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Background Note: Yemen,’’ http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/ bgn/35836.htm. 2. U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Background Note: Oman,’’ http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/ bgn/35834.htm. 3. For more details, see the CIA country profile on Yemen, https://www.cia.gov/cia/ publications/factbook/index.html. 4. ‘‘Yemen Signed a Security Pact with the United Arab Emirates,’’ Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor (April 15, 2005). 5. ‘‘Saudi Arabia, Yemen in First Joint Exercises,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (April 6, 2005).

596

NOTES

6. Michael Knights, ‘‘Internal Politics Complicate Counterterrorism,’’ Jane’s Intelligence Review (February 1, 2006): 2. 7. Mohammed bin Sallam, ‘‘Yemen Tells Saudi It Defies Treaty: Wall Opposed by Waliyah Tribes,’’ Yemen Times, February 7, 2004, http://www.yementimes.com/article.shtml ?i=710&p=front&a=3. 8. IISS, Military Balance, 2005–2006; CIA, The World Factbook, 2006. 9. IISS, Military Balance, 2005–2006; CIA, The World Factbook, 2003. 10. These IISS estimates track in broad terms with CIA estimates. 11. This trend analysis is based on the declassified data base use for U.S. Department of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1999–2000, (Washington, DC: State Department, June 2002). 12. CIA, The World Factbook, 2006, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index. html. 13. CIA, The World Factbook, 2006 14. Ibid. 15. Knights, ‘‘Internal Politics Complicate Counterterrorism,’’ 6. 16. IISS, Military Balance, 1990, 2000, 2005, and 2006. 17. ‘‘Army: Yemen,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States, November 16, 2005, 5. 18. IISS, Military Balance, 1990, 2000, 2005, and 2006. 19. ‘‘Army, Yemen,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States, 5. 20. IISS, Military Balance, 1990, 2000, 2005, and 2006, ‘‘Army, Yemen,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States, 6. 21. ‘‘Army, Yemen,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States, 6. 22. IISS, Military Balance, 1990, 2000, 2005, and 2006. 23. Ibid. 24. ‘‘Army, Yemen,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States, 6. 25. IISS, Military Balance, 1990, 2000, 2005, and 2006. 26. Ibid. 27. ‘‘Army, Yemen,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States, 6. 28. IISS, Military Balance, 1990, 2000, 2005, and 2006. 29. Ibid. 30. Joseph Bermudez, ‘‘Yemen Continues Ballistic Missile Procurement Programme,’’ Jane’s Intelligence Review (April 1, 2003). 31. IISS, Military Balance, 1990, 2000, 2005, and 2006. 32. ‘‘Yemen Patrol Forces,’’ Jane’s Fighting Ships (April 12, 2005). 33. IISS, Military Balance, 1990, 2000, 2005, and 2006, ‘‘Navy: Yemen,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States, June 13, 2005, 3. 34. ‘‘Yemen Patrol Forces.’’ 35. Ian Bostock, ‘‘Yemen Orders Patrol Boats,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (June 18, 2003). 36. Richard Scott, ‘‘New Patrol Boats Headed for Yemen,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (February 23, 2005). 37. J.A.C. Lewis, ‘‘Yemen, France Sign Security Pact to Monitor Bab el Mandeb Strait,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly (March 9, 2005). 38. IISS, Military Balance, 1990, 2000, 2005, and 2006. 39. IISS, Military Balance, 1990, 2000, 2005, and 2006; and ‘‘Yemen Patrol Forces.’’

NOTES

597

40. Joshua Kucera, ‘‘US Navy to Take Over Horn of Africa Mission,’’ Jane’s Defence Weekly September 28, 2005; ‘‘General: Africa Task Force Model for Fighting ‘Long War’, Aerospace Daily and Defense Report (February 24, 2006). 41. United States Central Command, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, http:// www.hoa.centcom.mil/index.asp. 42. Lewis, ‘‘Yemen, France Sign Security Pact.’’ 43. Ibid. 44. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces: Yemen,’’ Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: The Gulf States, August 30, 2005, 2–3. 45. Ibid. 46. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/ 45394.htm; and ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces, Yemen,’’ 2–3. 47. Knights, ‘‘Internal Politics Complicate Counterterrorism,’’ 1. 48. Ibid., 2. 49. Deborah L. West, ‘‘Combating Terrorism in the Horn of Africa and Yemen,’’ Program on Interstate Conflict and Conflict Resolution, Belter Center for Science and International Affairs, The John Kennedy School of Government, 2005, 27. 50. Andrew Buncombe, ‘‘Silent Killer Changes Rules of Engagement,’’ The Independent, November 6, 2002, 1. 51. Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Yemen Relations, http:// www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35836.htm. 52. Ahmend Al-Haj, ‘‘Yemeni Forces on Alert, Facing Threats on Two Fronts,’’ Associated Press, April 20, 2005. 53. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces, Yemen,’’ 2–3; Knights, ‘‘Internal Politics Complicate Counterterrorism,’’ 5. 54. Al-Haj, ‘‘Yemeni Forces on Alert.’’ 55. Simon Henderson, ‘‘Yemeni President to Be Reelected as Terrorist Plot Revealed,’’ The Washington Institute for Near Policy, PolicyWatch #1151, September 20, 2006. 56. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, http://www.tkb.org/MapModule.jsp. 57. Knights, ‘‘Internal Politics Complicate Counterterrorism,’’ 5. 58. Henderson, ‘‘Yemeni President to Be Reelected.’’ 59. Knights, ‘‘Internal Politics Complicate Counterterrorism,’’ 5. 60. Ibid. 61. Ahmend, ‘‘Yemeni Forces on Alert.’’ 62. Ahmed Al-Haj, ‘‘Yemeni Kidnappers Released a Former German Diplomat,’’ Associated Press, December 31, 2005; Ahmend Al-Haj, ‘‘Six Men Peaded Guilty Wednesday to Kidnapping Five Italian Tourists,’’ Associated Press, January 19, 2006. 63. Knights, ‘‘Internal Politics Complicate Counterterrorism,’’ 3. 64. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces, Yemen,’’ 2–3; Knights, ‘‘Internal Politics Complicate Counterterrorism,’’ 4. 65. Al-Haj, ‘‘Yemeni Kidnappers Released a Former German Diplomat.’’ 66. ‘‘Security and Foreign Forces, Yemen,’’ 3. 67. Ahmed Al-Haj, ‘‘Yemeni Troops Disperse Protesters after Two Days of Economic Protests,’’ The Associated Press, July 22, 2005. 68. Ibid. 69. CIA, The World Factbook, 2006; West, ‘‘Combating Terrorism in the Horn of Africa and Yemen,’’ 29.

598

NOTES

70. Al-Haj, ‘‘Yemeni Troops Disperse Protesters.’’ 71. Energy Information Administration, ‘‘Country Analysis Brief: Yemen,’’ http://www .eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Yemen/Background.html. 72. ‘‘Country Data,’’ The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005. 73. ‘‘Economic Growth in the Republic of Yemen: Sources, Constraints and Potential,’’ The World Bank, October, 2002, 32; and CIA, The World Factbook, 2006. 74. ‘‘Economic Growth in the Republic of Yemen,’’ 32. 75. West, ‘‘Combating Terrorism in the Horn of Africa and Yemen,’’ 29. 76. Ibid., 28. 77. Ibid., 29. 78. International Crisis Group, ‘‘Yemen: Coping with Terrorism and Violence in Fragile State,’’ January 8, 2003, 3. 79. ‘‘Yemen Economic Update,’’ The World Bank, Spring 2005, 1. 80. Ibid. 81. Jane Novak, ‘‘Yemen: Failure of Democracy,’’ Worldpress.org, http://www.worldpress .org/print_article.cfm?article_id=2316&dont=yes. 82. West, ‘‘Combating Terrorism in the Horn of Africa and Yemen,’’ 28. 83. ‘‘Yemen Economic Update,’’ 2. 84. This analysis draws heavily on work performed by the Energy Information Agency of the Department of Energy. See http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_ Chokepoints/Background.html; and http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Yemen/Background. html. 85. M. Ansari, ‘‘Militant Sails at Sunset,’’ Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, April 1, 2004. 86. bin Sallam, ‘‘Yemen Tells Saudi It Defies Treaty.’’ 87. West, ‘‘Combating Terrorism in the Horn of Africa and Yemen,’’ 28. 88. CIA, The World Factbook, 2006. 89. Ibid. 90. Al-Haj, ‘‘Yemeni Troops Disperse Protesters.’’ 91. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, http://www.tkb.org/MapModule.jsp. 92. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/ rls/45394.htm. 93. West, ‘‘Combating Terrorism in the Horn of Africa and Yemen,’’ 27. 94. Knights, ‘‘Internal Politics Complicate Counterterrorism,’’ 6. 95. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. 96. ‘‘Yemen Economic Update,’’ 1. 97. Jane Novak, ‘‘Yemen: Failure of Democracy,’’ Worldpress.org, 5, http://www.worldpress. org/print_article.cfm?article_id=2316&dont=yes. 98. bin Sallam, ‘‘Yemen Tells Saudi It Defies Treaty.’’ 99. Ansari, ‘‘Militant Sails at Sunset.’’ 100. ‘‘Saleh Rivals Challenge Results in Yemen Poll,’’ Gulf Times, September 23, 2006. 101. Henderson, ‘‘Yemeni President To Be Reelected.’’ 102. IISS, Military Balance, 2005; CIA, The World Factbook, 2003, http://www.umsl.edu/ services/govdocs/wofact2003/geos/ym.html. 103. IISS, Military Balance, 2005; CIA, The World Factbook, 2003. 104. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Database. 105. Ansari, ‘‘Militant Sails at Sunset.’’

About the Authors

ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and is an analyst and commentator for ABC News. He has written extensively on energy and Middle Eastern politics, economics, demographics, and security. He has served in a number of senior positions in the U.S. government, including the Department of Energy, and several assignments in the Middle East. KHALID R. AL-RODHAN is a research fellow with the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). His research focuses on military strategy, energy security, and homeland security particularly in the Gulf countries. He has coauthored several books with Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman on these subjects.

Recent Titles by Anthony H. Cordesman 2006 Arab-Israeli Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars The Changing Dynamics of Energy in the Middle East, with Khalid R. Al-Rodhan Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars, with Khalid R. Al-Rodhan 2005 The Israeli-Palestinian War: Escalating to Nowhere, with Jennifer Moravitz National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses, and Challenges, with Nawaf Obaid Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for Success, with Patrick Baetjer 2004 The Military Balance in the Middle East Energy and Development in the Middle East 2003 The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: The Political, Foreign Policy, Economic, and Energy Dimensions Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: The Military and International Security Dimensions 2001 Peace and War: The Arab-Israeli Military Balance Enters the 21st Century A Tragedy of Arms: Military and Security Developments in the Maghreb The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo Cyber-threats, Information Warfare, and Critical Infrastructure Protection: Defending the U.S. Homeland, with Justin G. Cordesman Terrorism, Asymmetric Warfare, and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Defending the U.S. Homeland Strategic Threats and National Missile Defenses: Defending the U.S. Homeland 2000 Iran’s Military Forces in Transition: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction

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