Greek Political Oratory (Penguin Classics)

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CONTENTS Innoduction

7

T H U c y D I D E s :p E R I c L E s ' F U N E R A Ls p E E c H LYSIAS:

AGAINST

DRATOSTHENES

ANDOCIDES: ON THE MYSTERIES ISOCRATTS: PANEGYRICUS PHILIP

DEMosrHErunsII]: For Megalopolis On the Liberty of Rhodes Philippic I

3r 39 6t 99 t37 fis r 8o r 88

Olynthiac I

r99

Olynrhiac II

205

Olynthiac III

2r2

Irrf: On the Peace Pltilippic II

221 zz8

On the Chersonese

235

Philippic III

249

GlossaryoJ'technicalterms

264

Map

268

Chronologicultable of eaentsbetween5ro and,g6 e.c.

270

Bibliographjt

272

INTRODUCTION

I . T H E G R O W T HO F A T T I C O R A T O R Y WntN we speakof political oratory, we think first in terms of the great British orators of the eighteenthand later centuries, and of speechesin the House of Lords or House of Commons ratherthan of speeches in a court of law. It is thereforeimportant to begin a discussionof Greek political oratory by emphasizing the. fact that only a -small proportion of the extant work of ancientoratorswas of this kind, consisting,that is, of speeches madein a constituentassemblyand intendeddirectly to influence political policy. In fact almost the only speechesof this kind which we still possessin Greek are the shorter speechesof Demosthenes,most of which are included in this volume, and a few ascribedto him, but now regardedas of doubtful authenticity. The great majority of extant Greek speechesare not deliberative,but forensic,that is to say that they were delivered in a court of law and aimed to securethe condemnationor the acquittal of an individual, as were Lysias' prosecution of Eratosthenes and Andocides'defenceof himself againstprosecution for impiety, which are both included here. This ielection also includes two discoursesof Isocrates, 'speeches' rvhich were never actually delivered, but were published pamphlets employingan oratoricalform and style. Greek prose liteiature sometimesadopted a convention of appearingin the form of speeches,like those of Isocrates,or of dialogues,like those of Plato. Finally, the speechesin this selectionare precededby a translation of the celebrated Funeral Speech, nominally of Pericles,which servesto representa further division of Greek oratory, the epideictic,speechesmade for public occasions.It is most unlikely ever to have been deliveredat all as it stands, sinceit is part of the Historlt of Thucydides.All these,however, share a markedly political content, and are closely associated with important political eventsor trends, and provide matter of importancefor undersrandingpolitical history.

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All Greek oratory known to us is in the Attic dialect and was deliveredor publishedin Athens. This of courseis true of the great majoriry of Greek literature of the fifth and fourth centuries s.c. and is a fact which inevitably colours the views we hold of Greek life and politics. That oratory, like poetry, flourished in Athens can readily be understood. Athenian quicknessof wit and tongueensuredit. It is not only in art, but in philosophy that Athens excelled.Nonetheless,there must hly" been speechesmade by Spartans,Thebans or Argives, which are not preservedexceptfor one or two which arg given, changed,if not improvised,in the pagesof Thucydides.But it must be rememberedalsothat Athenian pre-eminencein speech must havebeenreflectedin the choiceof passages for reprbduction by later centuries.The actualselectionmay havedepended a lot on chance,or the requirementsof rhetoricalteaching,but it constitutesa judgemenrof posteritywhich, while it may have allowedsomethings of value to perish, did not preservemuch of what wasworthless.And the speeches which were so selected are entirely Athenian. Nor is any Greek speechextant which belongsto an earlier date than about 4r7 8.c., the probable date of Antiphon's speech On the Murder oJ'Herodes.This is in part due to the circumstancesregardingpublication, which will be mentioned below (p. tg). Addicted as they were to self-expression,rhe Greeksseemnot to have begun till then to write and record the speecheswhich were made, despitethe enormousimportance attachedto the power to speakwell. This is manifestfrom the Homeric poemsonwards.Not only do we find speechesgiven to historicalpersonsin the work of Herodotusand rhucydides, but they appear as forensic, not merely dramatic, as early as the Eumenides of Aeschylus(458 n.c.), while the tragediesof Euripides,rh9* frequentsignsof familiarity with speech-making both as a habit and as an organizedart. Herodotusand Thucydides, indeed, used speechesin an original fashion, but it'is unlikely that any of their readerssupposedthat the speechesin questionhad been deliveredas they stood. They do, however, presuppose the habit of speech-making. The Herodoteanspeech, and after it the Thucydidean, presentedideas dramatically,in 8

INTRODUCTION

the words of an orator who made or might have made such a speechon suchan occasion.Such is Thucydides'FuneralSpeech. Of a similar kind, too, is Plato'sApologt, which purports to be Socrates'defenceat his trial. Plato was probably present on that occasion,and in any case the general lines of Socrates' defencewere no doubt well known. But Plato, as the great dramatizerof Socrates)may with equal certainty be supposed to have worded his defencein keeping with the rest of the picture he painted of him. This last instanceat any rate belongsto the fourth century n.C., but the true beginnings of Greek oratory are earlier. Prose is always later in the field than verse, but the rise of political freedom, especiallyin Athens, in the fifth century led to the realizationthat proseas well as versecould be developed as a literary form, and that human needsof expressioncovered wider ground in the pursuit of knowledgeand the maintenance of civic rights. From this needarosewhat is calledthe Sophistic movement: the intellectualferment of the fifth century had by the latter half of it been systematizedin the hands of profesof the sional men of learning. They were in a sensesuccessors early philosophers,such as Heracleitusor Pythagoras,and they milieuof Athens.Menlike Protagoras, metin theeagerintellectual Hippias, Prodicus and Gorgias professedamong other things to teach and stimulate the art of speaking,both as one of a number of cultural subjects(Plato makesSocratesdiscusswith Protagoraswhether virtue can be taught)I and as a practical technique of its own. Either part of this programmewas expectedto be of value both in politics and in litigation, to which Greekswere prone, and also to offer an inherent value in the improvementof education.It was perhapsmost desiredfor its utility in a litigious community, and it is in this context that therearosethe claim parodiedby Aristophanesin the Cloudsthat the Sophistic training would 'make the weaker argument the stronger', while Gorgias in Plato's dialogue of that name is made to contend that the subject which he professesis the (greatest and best of human concerns'.zThese statementsinvolve a claim to improve the citizen'sability to pleada caseand r. Plato, Protagorasr324 seqq.

z. Plato, Gorgias, 45 r d.

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win it, but they were used as materialfor detractors,and can be seen behind Aristophanes'satire in the Cloud,s,and in Plato's many dialoguescriticizing the Sophisticmovement.T'he Sophists took feesfor the tuition they gave,and in due coursebegan to specializein speechtraining. Someformed schoolsand composeda 'techne',a rhetoricalhandbook,as Antiphon did. Jebb declaress that Greek oratory beginswith Gorgias,Attic oratory with Antiphon. Gorgiasof Leontini in Sicily was born, like Protagoras,about 485 n.c., and is known not simply as a rhetorician.He led an important delegation to Athens in 427 to ask for Athenian for his city. But it was probably his fame as a speaker assistance which led to his nominationasa leader,as in the caseof Teisias, who accompaniedhim. He is also known to have been chosen to speakat the Olympic festival of 4o8. He is in the sequence of Sicilian rhetoricians together with Teisias, the teacher of Lysias,and the reputed headof the movement,a certainKorax. Gorgias' claim to fame as an orator seemsto have rested on skill in expressionrather than on expositionor treatmentof his matter. His influenceis said to have extendedin particular to Thucydides and Isocrates.The only continuouspassageof his which survives is itself part of a funeral oration. It must be granted that it is tiresomelyoverloadedwith symmetricalantitheses,and does not suggestgreat oratory. Nonethelessit can readily be understoodthat this style explainssomeof the peculiarities of the speecheswhich Thucydidesincludesin his narrative, and alsothe smootherantitheticalmethodof Isocrates.And it was to Gorgias more than to any other, as we seein Plato's dialogue, that most early Greek orators of whatever origin lookedup. Born a little after Gorgias, Antiphon played a prominent part in the oligarchicrevolution of the Four Hundred in Athens in 4rr 8.c., which is his claim to political fame (a fame, like that of Gorgias,due to rhetorical skill) and to which he owed his execution.But his extant speechesare not political in this sense.He was perhapsthe first to do in Athens what Gorgias hadnot done(thoughTeisiasdid in Syracuse):that is, to organ3. The Attic Orotors (introd. p. cviii).

INTRODUCTION

ize a school and composea manual of oratory. He was also the first professionalwriter of speeches,and thus the precursorof all the great Athenian orators. Greek orators did not deliver speechesfor others, as Cicero did, but wrote them for others to deliver. Thucydides says that Antiphon never appearedin court exceptin his own defencein 4rr, with a speechextolled for its excellence,but in the event unsuccessful.His extant work is confined to casesof homicide, in which he seems to have specialized,and includes his four Tetralogies,sets of speechesin imaginary cases,two each for the prosecutionand the defence.These bridge the gap betweentheoreticalaccounts of the needsof oratory and actual speechesin court. He was a pioneerin the practiceand in the style of Attic oratory,writing, as did Thucydides, at a time which lacked a prose tradition. He is creditedwith many of the samecharacteristicsof style as Gorgias,but his work seldomreminds one of Gorgias' existing remnants.Both are said to have played a part in the teaching of Thucydides, but except for occasionalphrases Antiphon does not provide a strong resemblanceto the speechesin Thucydides' history, though he too is given to brevity, syffimetry and antithesis.These are characteristicswhich probably seemedto both writers to offer a method of bringing proseto the literary level of poetry. From thesebcginnings,socialand stylistic,Attic oratory rose and soon flourished.Of courseAthenianshad made speeches earlier than this, but they were probably extemporized.It is said that Pericles was the first to deliver a written speechin court, and it must be assumedthat written speechesin the Assemblywere a later habit. Periclesis describedby the comic poets, Eupolis and Aristophanes,who refer to his lightning speed and persuasiveness.a But we have no record of his speechesexcept Thucydides' versions,nor of speechesby the famous demagogues,Cleon, Hyperbolus and Cleophon. In the extant speechesforensic oratory appearsfirst, and most of the early exampleswere written for delivery in court. Two of thesewhich are particularly concernedwith political eventsare translated here, those of Lysias, Against Eratosthenes,and 4. Aristophanes, Acharnians, 53r.

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Andocides,On theMlsteries.The oratoricalantecedents of these two oratorsare very different. Lysias learnt oratory from Teisias of Syracusebefore coming to Athens. As an alien, however,he was not entitled to speak in court except during the brief amnestyafter the fall of the Thirty in 4o4,when he delivered the speechagainst Eratosthenes.(See the introduction to the speech,p. 39.) Most of the rest of his work consistedof speeches written for others. He was, however, distinguishedenough to be chosento deliver the Funeral Oration at Athens (probably 3gz B.c.) and a Panegyric Oration at Olympia (388 n.c.). Andocides,on the other hand, spent much of his life in exile, and there are but three of his known ll'orks of oratory, two deliveredin his own behalf, and one in the Assemblyafter his acquittal. Jebb s calls him an amateur,rvhich is not surprising sincewe know nothing of professionalstudy in his instance.It is the occasionof his most important speechwhich makes it noteworthy. Indeed it concernsan earlier event than that of Lysias, though it was deliveredlater. Both, though politically important, are forensic in form. But the majority of speeches by Greek oratorswere on narrowerand more personalsubjects, like those of Isaeus, who enjoyed a special reputation as an expert in the composition of law-court speeches,particularly in casesof inheritance. Perhapsit is partly becauseof such narrow and individual aims that Plato regardsoratory with such evident distasteand disparagesit in a number of places.He calls it an art of spell-binding, and criticized its lengthy irrelevancer6naming Pericles the greatestof orators, because he learnt from Anaxagoras,and could fortify his art with philosophy. There are also examplesof epideictic speeches(the Greek word meansspeechesof display) deliveredfor particular occasionsof importance.Mention has alreadybeen made of funeral speeches by Pericles,by Gorgiasand by Lysias. The Panegyricus of Isocratesis in form of this kind. But with the exceptionof Andocides' speech On tlte Peacewith Sparta, we have no defrom the Assemblytill thoseof Demosthenes, liberativespeeches the earliestof which rvasdeliveredin 354 B.c. It may be in part 5. The Attic Orators,p,88.

6. Plato, Phaedrus,z7oa,z7rd'e, z7z. t2

INTRODUCTION

his eminence that secured his speechesfrom oblivion, but in fact the practice of publishing deliberative speechesdoes not seemto hive begun much beforehis time and that of Isocrates. The speechesof litigants were commonly written from the later yearsof the fifth century 8.c., when oratory developedin theory and practice owing to the habit of making handbooks of rhetoricaltheory,and the habit of 'speech-writers'Q,oy6ypacpot) composingspeechesfor clients to deliver. The publication of political speechesmay, it is suggested,zhave been begun by aliens, like Lysias, who were interested in politics, but not admitted to the Assembly,or due to private circumstanceslike those of Andocides, who seemsto have published his On the Peacewith Sparta by way of self-justification. These and the like may have led to the practiceof Isocratesand Demosthenes. Demosthenes,indeed, may well have been the first to publish deliberativespeechesalready deliveredin the Assembly. Such speeches may on occasionhave been subjectto alterationin the interval, This is suggested,for instance,by some passagesin Plrilippic11/ whosegenuinenesshas been doubted (seep. 249) as well as by the statementof Plutarch that comparisonswere drawn between Demosthenes' extempore speechesand his written ones. In any case it appears that Demosthenesdid publish speechesin his lifetime, perhapsto substantiatetheir political importance. 2 . I S O C R A T EA SN D D E M O S T H E N E S Within these limits stand most of the Greek orators of whom we have knowledge, the Ten Orators, known to the first century A.D.in a list which becamean establishedcanon and thus ensured its survival. The list includes Antiphon, Andocides, Lysias and Isaeus,whom we have mentioned, the two great names to whom we now go, and in addition Aeschines,the great opponent of Demosthenes,Hypereides, Lycurgus and Deinarchus. One, however, Isocrates,made still another use of oratory. He was full of talent, as Plato makesSocratesdescribehim in 7. See George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasionin Greece,p. r74 seqq.

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a celebratedpassageat the end of the Phaedrus,sand,had wide views about the Greek world and particularly his native Athens. But he lackedthe voice and the robust temperamentneededfor active oratory. He thereforefound his own niche as a teacher, and communicatedhis ideasas written pamphlets.But he did not practiseeither activity on the samelines as his predecessors. He was a teacherof rhetoric, yet one who was neither a mere theorist nor a mere exponent of technique, and therefore departed from the practice of writing speechesfor imaginary situations,like Antiphon, becausehe regardedcontactwith real and vital questionsas important. Yet he did not seekto achieve it by speaking.He was a sophist, as a man who took fees for teachingoratory. But in an early discourseehe makesa strong protest against sophists for making extravagantclaims which they can never fulfil, for being oblivious of practical aims and for bringing discreclit on genuine teachers - charges little different from Plato's. What he sought to instil into his pupils he called 'philosophy'; but it was not what Plato meant by the word. He regarded the Platonic pursuit of truth as too unpractical,indeed as humanly unattainable,while Plato grouped him with the Sophists,regarding them as tampererswith the truth rather than seekersof it. Finally he was a passionate admirer of Athens, but took no narrowly partisan view of her position in Greece, desiring to see her lead a united Greece againstthe Persianenemy whoseattack had united her before. Isocrateswas in fact a great liberal when liberalismwas not the languageof the day, and his political ideaswere in advanceof As suchhe may be calleddoctrinaire thoseof his contemporaries. or idealistic,and as such he differs from the greatspeakerof the day, Demosthenes. Isocrates'pursuit of rhetoric made it into a generalculture, almost a liberal education.He did not go quite as far as Cicero was to do Io in depicting the orator as the ideally cultivated individual. But he did regardrhetoric not solelyas a meansto a practical end, successat law, but as a developmentof human 8. See George Kennedy, The Art of Persaasion in Greece, p. z7g. g. Against the Sophists, rz. ro. In De Oratore, passim,

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INTRODUCTION

powers by the study of the written or spoken word, the logos, which would enablelearnersto improve their judgement of all kinds of activities,specializedor otherwise.This was an educational system very different from Plato's and it is not wholly surprisingif the two menwerealienatedfrom eachother.Whether the tale of their enmity is true cannot be certainly determined. Opposite views are entertained.Il In any casewe may imagine that they differed considerablyin temperament,as they did in outlook. Plato scorned rhetoric, Isocratesbelieved in it, and hoped to find in it a meansto recoverfor Athens and for Greece some of their old life and vigour. This was to be achievedby teaching,and, no doubt, inspiring the young with the feelings which he wanted to disseminate.This is the purposewhich the in particular was designed to serve, and in some Panegyricu..s degreeachieved.At least it greatly enhancedhis reputation, increasedthe demandfor his servicesasa teacher,and launched, if unsuccessfully,his campaign for the sinking of differences and the solidarity of Greece. This wasnot a themewhich was due to his unaidedinvention. In particular it had been put forward by his master, Gorgias, on the occasionof his Olympic speechin 4o8 n.c., which has been mentionecl.llut this Pan-Hellenism was suited to Isocrates'outlookand to the aims he was settinghimself,to bring his pupils to the highest attainments by means of' the logos, and to affect the trend of politics by exerting an influenceon the leading men. In the aim of Pan-Hellenismhe showed an exceptionalinsight into the needsof the age.t"It may seemto have neededno unusual penetration to realize the difference betrveenthe atmosphereand the attitude maintained by the Greeksin the defeatof Persiain 49o and 48o e.c. and after the collapseof Athens during the Spartanhegemony.But in times of decliningcommunity of spirit it is easierto confineattention to narrow aims and the securing of narrow gains, than to go rr. cp. L. Robin in Phaedrus(Bud6) and Laistner's edition of Isocrates' Philip. One editor even takes the famous compliments on Isocrates in the Phaedrus as a slight. The passageof course relates to a time when Socrates was adult and distinguished. rz. Seep. 28.

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against the common view and seek a genuine broadeningof outlook. To have a real effect on public opinion and alter the attitude of the Greek statesproved more than Isocratescould achieve. In the Panegyicu.she had rcalized the need to unite them in attack on a common enemy, the sameenemy, Persia, whose attack had united them in the great days of the past. With the stimulus of that aim he hopesthat they will overcome jealousiesabout leadershipand agreeto acceptthat of Athens. This may haveseemedsomewhatnaive. If so, the feeling- that it wasnaive- waspart of the spirit which neededto be overcome. But it wasnot oveicome.Andwhether or not he madeoverrures to other rulers (it is said that he approachedboth Dionysius of Syracuseand Jasonof Pherae,but this is disputed)" th. Philip showshim sufficientlydisappointedof his previoushopesto feel that the only chance lay in finding a single champion who could rally the Greekstatesround his standard.For this purpose he sawa suitablefigure in Philip of Macedon,clearlythe leading single ruler in the Greek world after 35o n.c., and sufficiently integratedin it to appearacceptable.r+ Yet never,or never until it wastoo late,tsdo Isocrates'aspirations appearto have been taken seriously.This was not principally becausethey did not appealenoughto Philip, nor because of the rise of Demosthenes,who took a different view. Better t9 say that it was due to the political state of fourth-century Greece,to which we shall revert, and to somethingin the chaiacter of Isocrateshimself, which must have been partly realized by his contemporaries,and which makesus temper praiseof a man who was aheadof his rime, by calling him too little of a realist. The philosophers,according to Plato, must be the rulers, but they will neverwish to rule. This appliedto his ideal state. In the real world it seemsdoubtful whether they can ever rule, not mgre.lythrough unwillingness,but through inability to make sufficient compromisewith the actual. It is a chargL made by Isocrates against the sophistic philosophers, and perhapsagainstPlato himself,as we haveseen.Now it rebounds r3. See, for instance, Norlin, fsocrates (Loeb). 14. On Philip's ancestry see fsocrates, philip,3z 15. i.e. after Chaeronea(seebelow, p.2il.

r6

and note.

INTRODUCTION

- on Isocrates; and we may speculatewhy exactly we feel it to be just, not only in relation to his ideas, but to his smooth, unvarying style, so that we prefer Demosthenes,sensing that greatnessdependsin part upon success. Not that Demostheneswas $eatly successful.Indeed he is generally regarded as the patriot who could never induce a declining state to surmount self-seekingand revert to action. This is not wholly true. He was too great an orator to be always unsuccessful,even though the times were against him too. He is the culmination of this line of orators, the exponent of political oratory in our original senserr6 using his powersto s\,vay a political assemblyand influenceactual legislation.He saw the truth, perhaps with a limited view, but without distortion or wishful thinking, unless it was indeed unrealistic to hope for any Athenian revival. If so, he was optimistic, where Isocrates was doctrinaire or academic.In one sensethe two men were at one, in anotherfar apaft.Isocrates,Iike Demosthenes,had been prepaled to castigate Athens for her unwillingness to face unpleasantfacts. Demosthenes,like Isocrates,was inspired by the past greafilessof Athens, but he longed for her to recover it in the world as it actually was, not as it might become.To Demosthenes,Isocrates(strangelyenough we seemto have no record of contact berweenthem) must have seemedto lack all commonsensein expectingconcordamongGreekstateswithout a strong motive for it, or Philip's unselfish abandonmentof the quest for power in Greece. But we can hardly fail to answer the question which of them rvasright, and it will be askedagain at a later point. Meanwhile we may make some assessment of Demosthenes himself and of the claim of greatnessthat is made for him by later Greek and Latin writers. Great oratory is not solely a matter of style, but also of character. Whatever else Dernosthenes was, he was a man of courage.He must have felt at his best when he was wrestling with difficulty: with his own temperamentand physique,with his financialtroublesafter the early death of his father, with acquainranceswho found him 16. Here I omit reference to the numerous forensic speeches of Demosthenes, which do not appear in this volume.

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tiresome,pompous.and selGrighteous(which he probably was) as well as with an inert-a_ndcomplacentAssembly.what-qualities has his oratory yhich are lacking in the others of his day? critics of the time of cicero and later credit him with numerous stylistic features.Cicero himself dwells on his variety, subtlety, dignity.'z But we have to wait for the writer wrongly kno*n ri Longinusto comengafel, with 'rugged sublimityl:intensiry', (stature'.t8 and finally He was single-mindedln his foreign policy, howeverdouble-mindedhe may have beencalled by his o-pponent, Aeschines,-and showed,asperhapsno one elseamong the ancientscould, the ability both to give lofty expressiont6 a high causeand to make that contact with his audiencewhich is the essenceof practical oratory, and which cicero describes under the word 'flectere', the power to influence hearers.We are not here much concernedwith his private habits, exceptas they affect our view of him as an orator and a statesman.He may be accusedof disingenuous,even dishonourabledealing on occasion;the personalrivalries which coloured his pub6 relationswith, for example,Aeschines,were sometimesiordid and his expressionof them, worded in the normal fashion of the time, displeasing.we shall find this tendencyin a personal speech,such as on_the crown, a forensic speech,but political in that it includes Demosthenes'assessment of his bwn career. It is too long fo1 inclusion here, but it will reinforcethe impression given by his speechesto the Assemblyof an orator who can be called great for discarding popularity in a lofty cause.on the issueof successwe must, in his casetoo, look more closelyat the history of his time. 3 . S T Y L EO F T H E A T T I C O R A T O R S In introducing a translation not much need be said of style. But some attempt has been made in this one to differentiate t7. Orator, tto. t8. on the Sublime, 34. The Greek word here translated 'stature' simply means 'size'. This treatise, previously attributed to an author tt"-ed Longinus of the third century A.D., is now thought to berong tb the first centurv A.D.

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INTRODUCTION

betweenindividual characteristics,though it cannot be hoped that a translation will by itself make style or manner clear. Nor can style be entirely detached from character and conduct. Some mention has already been made of it in discussingthe authors referred to. And style was of great moment to the ancients,particularly in the Ciceronianperiod and later, when analysisof the great treasureof Greek literature was prevalent. But, as with other critical study, the first to systematizeit was Aristcitle, and Cicero's own works on oratory and later the treatisesOn the Sublimeand On Stjtlele can still be reckonedas indebtedto him. The Ciceronian age made much of a controversy on the relative merits of th"eAttic style as representedby" the best Athenian oratorsof the fifth and fourth centuriess.c., and the more florid Asian style, so called, which had developedsince that time. We need not spendtime in consideringthis, though Cicero devotesa little spaceto it.zoBut it is to Attic that he pays most attention, and to the differenceswithin it. In this connexion Thucydidesis mentioned,to distinguish his style from that of Lysias.2lCicero specificallysays that Thucydides has no part in oratory, but that the speecheshe includes'contain so many remote and obscure passagesas to make them barely intelligible'. The translatorcan only attempt a faint suggestion of this Thucydidean style, which is perhaps due to intense feeling packedinto an antithetical style derived from Gorgias. It is as far as possibleremoved from the manner of Lysias. Ancient criticism of Lysias was no doubt basedlargely on the he wrote for others to use in court, so that Cicero, for speeches instance, denies him full grandeur of style, and Dionysius comments on his power of character-drawin1.,2The speech Against Eratostltenesis in fact fuller than most of Lysias, and showsthat his plain and natural narrative could give place on occasionto more swellingoratory.But his most markedcharac19. Ascribed to Demetrius of Phalerum (c. 3oo n.c.) this work is now thought to belong to the first century A.n. zo. Orator,25,26. zr. ibid., 3o. zz. Dionysius of Halicarnassus,4r.

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teristic is his straightforward easeof statement, and the essay On Stjtle follows Cicero in stressinghis 'charm'.rs The earlier orators were more practical in aim than Gorgias, and found that such an easy flow met their largely forensicneeds.Andocideshas it too, but his style suggestswhat is in fact true, that he was not at first a professionalspeaker;the presentversion has been composed with the feeling that ordinary speech touched with the colloquial might be nearestto the manner of the amateur. Isocratesis a different matter. His methodswere much more self-conscious.The author of On tlte Sublime,who was apparently no strong admirer of Isocrates, quotes Caecilius'2+ referenceto Alexanderas 'one who subduedthe whole of Asia in fewer years than Isocratestook to write his Panegltricwging war on Persia', and later criticizes the Panegltricu.ritself for a long-winded passagesufficient to spoil Isocrates'point.zsBut Cicero points out, and we should remember, that Isocrates 'thrust and parry of the courts, wrote with a view not to the give pleasure ear'.26 It is a polishedstyle in which to the but to the antithesishe had learnt from Gorgiasis ironed out, though and in which period succeeds it is still at times perceptible,2T period 'with no less regularity than the hexametersin the poetry of Homer','8 avoiding even hiatus as an undesirable It is thus a style of more beauty than strength, roughness.ze reflectingperhapsIsocrates'personalityand his own praise of a style which is as artistic as that of poetry.:o wasuniversallyupheld by Greco-Romanauthors Demosthenes as the prince of orators, and has maintained that reputation t 23. venustas'r' Xaprcvrrcpdq'. 24. A Sicilian rhetorician who taught at Rome in the time of Augustus. 25. iv, z, and xxxviii, 2, on Isoc, Panegyricus, 8. But see Norlin ad loc. 26. Orator,38. 27. SeePanegyricus,8o, 84, for a passagewhich reminds us now of Gorgias, now ofPlato's parody ofProdicus in the Protagoras. 28. On Style,tr. Fyfe. rz. zg. ibid.,68. Hiatus is the gap or absenceof a consonant, when one word ends in a vowel and the next begins with one. 3o. Antidosis,46.

INTRODUCTION

since. cicero speaksof 'one man's astonishing eminence in oratory),3l and though he finds some deficiency when he comparesDemosthenesto his imagined ideal ('he does not always fill the measuremy ear demands')t, hr finds in him 'all the subtlety of Lysias, the brilliance of Hypereidesand the vivid vocabularyof Aeschines',33 noting whole speechesthat are marked by subtlety, others by weightinesslike some of the Ph,ili.ppics, others by variety. cicero follows rvell-known stories like that referredto in the introductionto Demosthenes (r) below, when he speaksof Demosthenes'stress on delivery,3a and thoueh "of he too avoided hiatus as harsh,:shis is not the smoothness Isocrates,but that of a practisedand practising speaker.pre, eminently this is what Demosthenesis, and even if there are passages in his work which are no more than practicaland may even have dissatisfiedCicero, he can rise to oratorical heights, for instancein parts of Ofunthioc II or in the phitippic-III which justify the ianguageof the writer on The Sublime. 4 . O R A T O R YA N D P O L I T T C S Though oratory is an art particularly connectedwith politics, its rise in Greececoincideswith a political decline.And this is 'rhe no mere coincidencc. samefactors at least contributed to both. To saythis makesit necessaryto attempt someassessment of the nature of this political declineancl to justify the phrase, if we are to understandour orators themselvesand to estimate them in the context to which they belong. We can therefore hardly avoid some brief historical summary. Here referenceis made from time to time to the sectionalintroductions below, but inevitably there is someoverlapping. The Pericleanage of the greatnessof Greek, especiallyof Athenian, civilization ended with the outbreakof war between Athens and the Spartan alliancein 43r s.c. Pericles himself did not long survive. And, though there was an interval in the fighting, war continued till the collapseof Athens after the battle of Aegospotami in 4o5. This war, which in Gilbert 3t. Orator,6. 34. ibid., 56.

32.ibid., ro4. 35.ibid., r5o. 2t

33.ibid., rro.

GREEK POLITICAL

ORATORY

Murray's words 'destroyed the hope of Hellenism',r6 was fought to prevent the commercialexpansionand imperialismof Athens from having full scopeand leading to the enlargement of Athenian power. Ever since the Athenian assumptionof the leading role after the defeatof Persiain 479B.c. the power of Athens had shown this tendencyto expand,when she changed a Confederacyof Aegean states,organizedfor defenceagainst Persia, into an Empire geared to her own advancement- a gradual change which coincided with her developmentas a democraticand maritime community. During the war Athens' resourcesand Athenian popularity underwent seriousvicissitudes, but shedid not refrain from further imperialism,notably in the attack on Sicily between4r5 and 4r3. This grandiose schemeended in disaster,and the superstitiouscould look back on the sacrilegecommitted as it sailed(seethe introduction to Andocides,p. 6r). Signs of strain began to appear,when a cou,pd,'itaf put the city for a time in the handsof an oligarchic rdgime,in which the orator, Antiphon, took a leading part. But Athens was not brought down till 4o4. By then Persia,almost forgottenfor over forty years,had beeninvited back into Greek affairs by Sparta to combat the Athenian fleet. With her resourcesnow at art end Athens had to submit to Sparta and to oligarchic control. There was a reign of terror under the socalled Thirty Tyrants (see the introduction to Lysias, p. 39), and though it wasnot long beforeAthens revertedto democratic ways, she did not regain her old wealth. Then began the supremacy of Sparta, as the liberator of Greecefrom Athens. The Spartansinspired even deeperhatred than most liberators. The extraordinary Spartan community did not know how to govern except by rigid control. Within a few years Sparta was again at enmity with Persiaand at war with an alliancein which Athens, now recovered,though not financially,was joined by Thebes, Corinth and Argos. Having brought Athens down lessthan twenty yearsbefore,Persianow helped her to a naval revival, and then, growing nervous, in 'King's Peace',whereby, with 386 agreedto the much vilified she dictatedterms to the Greek states.After Spartanassistance, Stud.ies, LXW. 36.Journalof Hellenic

INTRODUCTION

t Spartan exploitation continued, and resentment against Sparta increased.It was vain at this time for Isocratesto write of unity (see the introduction to the Panegtr.i,cus of Isocrates, p. gg), to praise the greatnessof Athens and urge her leadership, evenin partnershipwith Sparta.It wasjust at this time, in 379, that-Spaftacausedthe disruption of the rising confederacy of Olynthus, an act subversiveof unity. Howev-er, dislike of sparta did stimulate Athens, perhapsinfluenced by Isocrates, to form a new confederacyof her own, with altruistii intentions. Eventually in 37r a conferenceof the Greek states took place at Sparta, by which Athens and Sparta agreed to abandon empire in a pact of non-aggression. But Thebes, in the person of Epaminondas,claimed to sign on behalf of Boeotia.To this sparta took exceptionand, in contraventionof the treaty just made, attacked Thebes and, against the military genius of Epaminondas,suffereda severedefeat at Leuctra. Now it was the turn of Thebes to liberate the world from Sparta.The processcontinued for nine years- just so long as Epaminondasremained alive to conduct it. It included attacks on the Peloponnese,the reconstitution of Messene,which was 'liberated', and, as a further counterpoiseto Sparta,the foundation of Megalopolisas a new city in the heart of Arcadia. But Theban self-seekingand intransigencealienatedfucadia as well as other states,and brought Athens into the arms of sparta. They were alliesin the campaignof Mantinea (362),when they met the force of rhebes. Although successfulin the battle, Epaminondaslost his own life; this was fatal for Theber, .rrd the Theban supremacycollapsed. If we cannot quite talk of liberation from Thebes, whose dominance was less complete and more short-lived than Sparta's,yet she raisednumerous opponentsamong the Greek states,two in particular at different times. Athenian power had been regainedin part, as has been seen, first in rlaction to lparta, when Persiaallowed the repair of the fortifications(the L_9ngWalls of Athens) and Conon revived her naval strength. Then, after the King's Peace,Athens returned to vigour inlhe SecondConfederacyof 378, which startedas a genuineattempt to avoid the exploitation of her fifth-century Empire. Aftir 23

GREEK POLITICAL

ORATORY

37o this confederacywas directed against Theban power in alliancewith Sparta. But Athens suffered from continual lack of funds, and could not long maintain power in the Aegean without resorting to some methods which did not live up to the aims of the Second Confederacy.The reappearanceof cleruchies3T and the exactionsof the mercenaryforces which fought for Athens, but subsistedon plunder, causedalarm and discontent. Itt 357 the important islands of Chios, Cos and Rhodesrevolted under the influenceof the ambitious tyrant of Caia, Mausolus (seeintroduction to Demosthenes(r), p. r7o). Peacewas made in 354, but by then Athens had lost several valued possessions to the rising power of Philip of Macedon. The other, and later, opponent of Thebes was Phocis. Her rise in responseto Theban attempts to use the weaponof the Amphictyonic League:8 against her, and the onset of the SacredWar, are referred to in the introduction to Isocrates' Philip (p. t:8), and the rise of Philip of Macedon in rhar to Demosthenes(r) (p. r7o). These need not be describedin detail here. Peace between Philip and the Athenian alliance (excludingPhocis)wasmadein 346and known as the Peaceof Philocrates.For the last time Isocrateshoped to securea leader and generalsupport for his campaignfor unity, and to induce Philip to assumethis role. But the peace,which began with Philip's destructionof Phocis, only lasted as long as it suited him, and ended in 34o, when the insistenceof Demosthenes raisedan allianceagainsthim. In 338 Demosthenes'fearswere rcalized,and Philip, himself making use of an Amphictyonic dispute, marched south through the passof Thermopylae,and overwhelmedthe Greek forcesat Chaeronea.At last there had been a rally in support of the view Demostheneshad voiced since 35r, but the Greeks could not match Philip's trained troops and superiortactics. Philip turned on Thebes,but sparedAthens. Not for the last time the past greatnessof Athens savedher from destruction by a conqueror who appreciatedit, and saw a chanceto gain her assistanceby leniency. By the terms of peaceAthens rvas 37. See note on fsocrates,Panegyricus,to7rp. rzo, 38. See note on fsocrates,Philip,74, p. r5z.

24

INTRODUCTION

compelled to abandon her existing confederacyand join the new Pan-Hellenicunion proposedby Philip. The hegemonyof Greecenow restedwith Macedon,a monarchyoutsidethe circle of the Greek statesof the past. The first assemblyof the new congresswas summoned at Corinth, though it was not till a year later, 337, that Philip announceda new campaignagainst Persia, and the arrangementsfor it were organized.Isocrates wrote to Philip to expresshis delight that his aim had at last beenaccomplished.One enactment)however,the establishment of three Macedonian garrisonsat strategicpoints in southern Greeceto maintain control of it, might have made him wonder if he was right. 5 . T H E D E C L I N EO F G R E E C E Having made our summary,we must return to the suggestion that in the fourth century in Greece the rise of oratory is connected with a political declind, and to the question of whether the oratorscould make any contribution to combat it. We may see this decline in several different ways; we may regardit as a political failure of the city state,the failure of the Greeksto achievethe unity which might have preservedtheir continued development in a political world to match their economicdevelopment.We may seeit as a socialfailure of the middle class to maintain and extend democracy becauseit sought to remain exclusive; or as the cultural failure of a community which kept to slavelabour insteadof pursuing the curiosity which leadsto fresh scientificdevelopments.3e Finally we may think of it as a psychologicalfailure, a lossof confidence on the part of a world clinging to its own past. In any caseit involves, as two interacting factors, a tendency to particularism in which narrower interestsare preferred to broader ones,and a tendencyto the static in which the enjoymentof what already exists takesthe place of the pursuit of what is new. In a discussionof political oratory we shall be more concernedwith the breakdown of the city state than with the other factors, though all are facetsof a singlesituation. inJHS,LXry. 39.SeeF. W. Walbank 25

GRIEK POLITICAL

ORATORY

This political disruption or particularization is due to individual or sectional self-seeking,which wished to establish its own desires at no matter what cost to the community. The grimmest chaptersof Thucydides+odescribethe spreadof this evil, which he calls by the name of ' stasis', division in the state pursued with violence in quest of sectional ends, usually of a kind which we should call ideological.Thucydides specifies the symptoms in a horrifying analysis.This is the positive side of the disease,the virulent pursuit of private aims.The negative side is the reluctanceto be active for public ones.This can be seen in lighter, but no less telling lines in the comediesof ot (3g3 B.c.), or earlier in the Aristophanes,in the Ecclesiazusoe Aclrarnians(4zSB.c.),in the picture of an Assemblyreluctanrly giving itself to public business,or in the Cloud; in that of the effect of Sophistic teaching in reversing traditional moral ideas.+2 Such changesof feeling,connectedby commonopinion, if that is what Aristophanesrepresents,with sophistic teaching, were changesin the direction of individual selGseeking.And common opinion certainly took oratory, like sophistic training, asdetrimentalin tendencyto the soundoutlook of conservatism. It is true at any rate rhat the practiceof oratory arosein direct connexionwith the Sophistic movement,and wasobviously conducive to exploiting private advantage. The Greeks themselveswere not oblivious of the diseasein its political aspect.Attempts were made to break new ground and achievea new basisfor the organizationof societyeiiher by means of allianceon new terms or by actual federation. But thl new was undermined or obliterated by the final efforts of the 4o.III,8z, 83.

4r. Eccl., 2os-2o7. (The title of the play might be modernized as 'Women in Parliament'.) It's your fault, people of Athens, who live On public money, but all you think about Is private gain, every man for himself. .42. Acharnian.s, opening lines; Clouds, passim. cf. Andocides, Against (the encouragement given to unconcealed bre*aches Alcibiades, zz:'That of morals) is why the younger generation spend their time in the law courts instead of in the gymnasium, and while the old serve in the forces, the young ' orate, with the example of Alcibiades in front of them. '

z6

INTRODUCTION

old. The Olynthian or Chalcidic Confederacy,for instanca, datesback to the fifth century. In 432n.c. Olynthus, together with other states,secededfrom the Athenian Empire, largely becausethe old Confederacyof Delos, as it was originally called,had beenturned by Athenian exploitationinto an empire over unwilling subjects. During the grear struggle of the War and after it the ChalcidicConfederacybegan Peloponnesian to rival Macedonasa fringe power of the Greekworld. Macedon was largelydisorderedand inefficientbetween4oo and 35g B.c., when Philip rose to power, and the Chalcidic Confederacy seemedto promisebetter than others.One new featureof note appearedin it, a principle of dual citizenship,by which citizens of eachmemberstatewere citizensalsoof the Confederacyas a whole, and all laws and rights were to be shared equally. Olynthus was the nominal head of the Confederacy, but assumedno privilegesapart from the others. At first confined to a single promontory, the movement gathered adherents fast, but two cities which were unwilling to be brought in appealedto Sparta, who forcibly dissolvedthe League in 37g B.c. The nerv grorvth had proved inadequate to resist the old. Two other instancesshow the contemporarytendencyto try the confederateprinciple to sccure ends which were out of reach of single cities. The SecondAthenian Confederacywas conceivedin a spirit of altruismand of unity againstthe detested power of Sparta.The confederatestateswere to havetheir own assemblydistinct from that of Athens,and no measureaffecting both was to be valid till passedby both. There were to be no cleruchies,Do 'tribute', none of the hated featuresof the old Empire of the fifth century. Yet perhapsthis was a negative approachwith a limited aim. It failed eventually,as has been said,becauseAthens,perpetuallyshort of funds, failed to avoid exploitation; cleruchiesand the old abusesbeganto reappear, and in the SocialWar she was againinvolved againsther allies. The Arcadian League,which was virtually createdby Thebes after Leuctrato curb Spartanpower,and involvedthe foundation of the new city of Megalopolisas a federal capital to replace villages in the neighbourhood,is a third insrance,however 27

GREEK POLITICAL

ORATORY

specialized,of the attempt to supersedesmall units of organization in favour of larger ones. These attempts to do what was necessaryfor Greek civilization by broadeningits basiswere altogethertoo weak for their purpose. They had not enough support to convince a world accustomed to warfare within itself. 'fhinkers ancl orators alike failed to seea solution, even if they envisageda need for it. Plato, if he may represent the thinkers, exemplifies two opposedreactionsto the problem, that of withdrawal and that of compulsion.To imagine a Utopia (as he did) is to make too little contact with the actual. This is a withdruwal into the spiritual realm different from, but comparablewith the later withdrawal of Stoicism. But the Republic alsosuggeststhe way of compulsionwith its arbitrary division of classesand its strong flavour of Spartancontrol. Compulsion is often enoughusedto end disagreement.The orators,too, had little to offer exceptto revert to the past and urge its virtues on the present.Isocrates alonehad a senseof the needsof the time and an idea, however inadequate,of a remedy for them. In the letter to Archidamus he enlargeson the disordersof Greeceas he doesin the Philip,+t and urges co-operationand unity. In the Peacehe had urged the abandonmentof empire and the making of a peacewhich should not merely rest on ad hoc pfinciples to end the Social War, but should be permanent and embrace all the Greeks. Seventeenyearslater in the Philip he had decided,whether or not for the first time, that unity could only be achievedunder the leadershipof a single king or general.But throughout he saw the need of good will and some compelling principle of unity. When Pan-Hellenismcame with Philip, and when the Stoic homonoia(concord)was prefigured by the ideasof Alexander, both father and son might have beenconsciousof a debt to Isocrates.Yet he failed for lack of a principle that r,vas compellingenough.By the majority he went unheeded.It was easierto stimulate an unwilling community to energy than to concord.The stirring oratory of Demosthenescould animatea last stand for the aspirationsof an earlier century, even if his hopes did not survive Chaeronea. By this achievement he 167. 43.Philip,96,rzt, d. panegyricus, z8

INTRODUCTION

rendered Isocrates'hopes as vain as his own. After that any peaceor agreementwas one imposedon the Greek world, not generatedby it, and any new deal would not arise from a settlementof differences,but from the enactmentof a conqueror. So the splendid patriotism of Demosthenesreduced to ineffectiveness the idealsof Isocrates.It becomesvain to speculate whether either could ultimately have succeeded.We must probably agreethat the Greek civilization which rose at last to the support of Demosthenes'efforts againstPhilip could never have risen to the pleasof Isocratesfor concord and agreement with him. TRANSLATOR's NorE

The introduction and the sectionalintroductionsand notes are intendedto cover ground necessaryto the understandingof the speechesthemselves.They do not take the place of a history of Greece,and matter not immediatelyrelevantto the speechesis generally omitted. The text principally used has been the Oxford ClassicalText fbr Thucydides, Lysias and Demosthenes,the Teubner text for the others. I have made considerable use of Mr D. M. Macdowell's edition of the d,eMysteriis and of Prof. M. 1,. W. Laistner'sof the Philipltus.I am greatly indebtedto Dr W. Hamilton for invaluableassistance with the translation,to I)r M. I. Finley for readingand criticisingthe Introduction, and to Dr T. T. B. Ryder for similar help with the sectionalintroductionsand notes.The shortcomingswhich remain are, of course,mine and not theirs.

T H U C Y D I D E S : P E R I C L E S ,F U N E R A L S P E E C H

I N T R O D U CITO N Thefuneral oration phich.Thurydidesputs in the mouthof Pericles (Tltuc. II, 35-46) is one of the acknowledgetlmasterpiecesof liternture. It is stateclto haae beend,eliaered, d,uringth,ewinter of 4Jr-4Jo 8.c., 0n th.eoccasionof the publicfuneral of the deatl in. battle. It is not to be supposetlgenuinein the senseof gioing the ipsissima verba of Pericles. There haae beeneditors who hape claimedto find in it an indioid,ualitydistinctfrom other speeches in the work. But tltis is probabljtwisltfal th,inking.The momentnus, impressioe st1le,and,the torhtoussentences, are thoseof Thu.rydides. He must hazseknown that Peri.clesmad,esuch a speeclt,on this occasion,and he would probabfuhaae heard,how he treated the subject,ezseny''he pas not himself tltere to hear it. It ma1 haae beenPericleswho saw this os an occosionto pra,isetlte Atltenian wajt of hfe. If so,it was Thucydideswho later sap it as a subject admirabll suited to a point in his History wherethat wa1 of ltfe was tlreatenedby rpar, 0r eaent0 a time after the war phen it h,ad beenouertltrorDn.On an1 assurnptionit ma1 seemto go tol far in idealizinga statepltich rpass00tr. t0 pa,Jthe penalty, as Thucldides himself unfailingly points out, for self-seekingand, ruthless intperialism. But whetlterit is to beput dopn as history 0r lratzrJ) it is, witlt, the possibleexceptionof the Apology of Somates,b1 Plato, the bestknown speech, in Greek, and it remainsone oJ'the great statementsof humanachieaement in the spiritual fieltl.

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6t. fpn'rodwax aaaqporyrytltle tuogtat 4Etw&qo aqtto aruan{w ary 0t paqulnttns[1u aap'uu,n4noalfi luun uotloa,mls lo aru$ o $uao&u mo Suaploqfitto : suatlt4 ot aSatsptul'.tapuusrCT',to1nauolndg aqt 'Sof aunf u1 twrtodsoSav w n$t)s?p uptuall7 ary ndy 'uounl oaa spo t a ruan.t, ar0r.u, sI saF3ns (' t a t of -f oh) rCq t n uy .{o 4o !. d ,wat ya11ut-os atpto uotldutsapse pua,fiuoutru ruapla oto lo,ttuot atq,tapuna7n7s ato tunzrtn pal.twapry ,totaputou st tltaadsary1 z'a glt upr(tt1fuanao.{o a7uatlt ru palp aH 'ggt u! aadrutlO uoxruronil&aun1 o puo 'Ta e6t ur.rQqaqotd ru (suatltf tlnadg tr paqsm7 lonun[ axfihaqap ol uesoqtaqot qSnoua 4t!ts!.psoe aH "I.uautaaatrytu tt4 stqt taadat,rca plnzt at1'sfins alnaud.lo,tapoaQ pao ruanbat!puuueaa2l-lla&o aantaqat1t1&nory 'gtaaollanpsu& suatlo,ro.{ ary'patora"t. [11nt dr,r.1suaz1ry tr1&tt. 11nt.{o sudr[bn.ttlruapat7 xtaryl4'1nfssatnsuaaqaanLlot ,martrdo Na saopry 'tstgf's1t7 so stwnlr ytut.f1anurry praaqep aooq or plos s! aq elt.lqe rltaadsn ut 'suatltr/ut ?auxrwarotl(r ,Q.qt11atlt .Zuoa r ou arylo 'dn1suaz1ry auo'sauatltsott).t7 0I aJul pasn pt In fl rytaa(un Tsun sae ax!suatflv 01u,tnp,t,s!r/ uo 'srynq[sa,tq1u?un saluca ?ap,tt)(210 atg par,ro(dns'(13uo.t7s pan '(tou pry snqrruwapd t13not7t) padotsa 'suaqt7.{o suTsrCT atp ngfa naod a.tae zLle spanCl wd ttot ry tt,qr11 atp fq t!ruapor rud aq ol aaslLlt7s4[atg &uorunaqot tlSnoua snoudsotdana [atp fiob u7 'su/.to{o a.m|ntnuow arytuo patr"tut rCaqtantla'snauna4 atq u! Qquqod paaq puo'rrb m suaqlf soe ?!&tlJ to [t,tud rttrr,rrlw,ap u pau,twats#tqorq aap'paqsruoq arfi uar!fu1'asntonCg lo sols?altuo,ttnto1aul,tturoal aaoq u paw$ s1aq 'p.tnt11tp san&ot.o,r.4 lo aruang[utatp wol,! pat{o.rd atl pa r0 nryaqful 't's tff w papunq{aaaqpaq tltlqe 'tlwl unxlmos 'nr1rut,tqrarua sltl u? lryntlJ.{o tCuolotatp u! 'snt1t,wrua1o4 ryqe atuu alqotaprsu,ot u tutds arl qruap ,srynr1da7n{o wtlt uezuq 'utalne 'r\qndaA s?q nxq aqt rcu s! ryru.q,so1srC7 {o alnp arlJ u! ltold [q ytauouuatu pur)'rytayyn (suatpVM ruaptsatutffitanl o su xteluq 17aa'asntailg .{o sryaryda7louosn&unof atp sna sn1st7 NO I JSNCOUINI

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in controlfiftee?tJea,rsbefore.Now, as then, tlte most trusted of He was them, as a moderateof stronginfluence)was Theramenes. Dereprolonged inaited to negotiatewith. Sparto, but negotiati,ons and Athens suruiuedonll at the price of demoand unsuccessful, Iishing the 'Long Walls',, surrenderingall but twelae ships,and allowingthe return of exiles.Theselast pere largell oligarchic,and, their return helpedthe changeof constitutionpltich was uirtualll demanded. The changewas initi.atedfut the so-calledclubs(see4j below), who, using tlte Spartan title, appointedfiae Ephors to exercise control of the Ecclesia.Tlteramenesis not mentionedarnzngtltern, though.Critias and Eratosthenesare. But Therameneswos tlte leaderin a meetingwith. Lysander,who claimed,that Athens had forfehed, the agreementb1tdelay in pulling down the nalls. This meeting inauguroted tlte glaernrnent of the Thirl, wlto were nominatedfrom circlesfouonrable to tlte oligarclry, in accordance pith. termsd,rapn u! b one of their number,Dracontides.Thel against antibeganpith, claims of a reformati,on,and proceetled, oligarchicinformers,but soonwent 0n to eliminateall whn opposed, their aiews, using informers of their own. Their confdencewas based,on th,ellresenceof a Spartan garrisonfor which,they lrad asked,.The moderotesamzng the Thirtl disapproaed,of these supported,it was claimed.b1 Eratosmeth,ods,and Therarnenes, thenes,opposedCritias and th,eextremists,both in their production of a 'Catalogue' of Tltree Th.ousondpriaileged people who were to be exemptfrom persecution,and,in measurestaken against t/te classof resident aliens, rpltoseonly crime was their wealth. The attack beganon aliensand on nn1 otlterswho werethoughtideonature is logtcally unsound.Tltere ensuedo reign of terror wh,ose illustrateclin Llsias' narratiae. Thc death of Theramenes, which. resu,lted from his opposition,freed,the Thirty from all restraint. In tlte pinter of that jteor (+o+) Thrasybulusledfrom Thebesa smallforce of men nho ltad been, forced,into exile by the zsiolence the d the Thirty, and,held 0, strongpoint at Ph.yle,comrnand,ing pass oaer Mt Parnes.Tlte Thirry failed to dislodgehim, and,his th,eplain with oaera thousantl force steadilygrev. He later crossed, men,and madeo night attack on the Peiraeus,occup1ingthe high part callerlMurychia and,f,ghting a successful engagement. Most .

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o/'the Th,irty retired, to a prearrangedretreat at Eleusis. The Tlree Thousanddeposed, th.em,and appointeda new commission of ten, whicltincludedEratosthenes and Pheidon,t0 treat pith. Thraslbulus. Tltese,h,oweaer, sltowedno spirit oJ'compromi,se, and,were soonbesieged lry the growingforcesof demotacJ/.When Llsonder wa; superseded, at Sparta, the uncompromisingsuppnrtfor the oligarcltywas abandonedand thegarrison pithdrawn. A newpact was made, ffirding an a,rnnestJl to eaeryoneexceptthe Tyants th,emselaes.

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Tsenn is no difficulty in opening this prosecution,gentlemen. The difficulry will be to bring it to an end. The nature and the number of the chargesare due to the characterand the quantity of the facts.Invention could neverexaggerate their heinousness, nor veracity reach the end of the list. The prosecutorwould collapse,or the time run short. We seemlikely to find in this casethe reverseof the normal experience.Normally the prosecution needsto explain the grounds for hostility to the defendants. But in this caseit is the defendantswhose hostility to Athens needsexplaining, and the ground for such outrageous conduct towards the state. I do not claim that I am free of personalreasonsfor animosity,but that everyonehas abundant cause for it on private and public grounds alike. Personally, gentlemen,I have never before conducteda casefor myself or for anyoneelse,but I have beenforced by the circumstancesto prosecuteEratosthenes.In fact I have beenfrequently troubled by the fear that inexperience may render inadequate and incompetentmy presentationof the casefor my brother and myself. I will try, however,to explain it from the beginningas best I can. My father, Cephalus,was incluced by Pericles to come to Athens, and lived here for thirty ycars, during which time neither he himself nor my brother nor I took any part in legal proceedingseither as plaintiffs or as defendants.Under the democracy we lived without giving or receiving offence from anyone.When the Thirty begantheir governmentof wrong and intrigue, they declared that they must clear Athens of its worseelements,and set the rest on the path of right and virtue. They had not the courageto live up to their declarations,as I shall recall in regard to my own caseand attempt to remind you in yours. At a meeting of the Thirty, Theognis and Peisonl made a r. Two of the list of the Thirty given by Xenophon (Hellenica, II, 3, z). They are not mentioned elsewhere.

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statement that some of the Metics were disaffected,and they saw this as an excellent pretext for action which would be punitive in appearance,but lucrative in reality. In any case Athens was poverty-stricken,they said, and the Empire needed funds as well. They had no difficulty in persuading their fellows, to whom killing was nothing, while money was of great importance. They therefore decided to arrest ten people, including two of the poorer class,to enable them to claim that their object was not money, but the good of Athens, as in any other respectableenterprise. They divided up the Metics' housesbetweenthem, and visited them. I personallywas giving a dinner party when they called. They turned out my guests and handed me over to Peison,while the rest went into the factory and took an inventory of the slaves.I askedPeisonif he would let me go for a consideration.He said he would if it were a large one. I said I would give him a talent, and he agreed.I knew him to be a man without regard for right or reason,but in the circumstancesit seemedabsolutelynecessaryto exactan undertakingfrom him. He gave an oath involving himself and his children that he would get me off for a talent, so I went to my room and opened*y chest. Peisonsaw what I was doing and camein. When he saw what was in it, he called two of his men and told them to take the contents.Insteadof the amounr agreed, gentlemen, it contained three talents of silver, four hundredCyzikenestaters,a hundred daricsand four silver cups. So I askedfor somethingfor my journey, to which he replied that I ought to be thankful to get away with my life. I went out with Peison,and we were met by Melobius and Mnesitheideson their way from the factory. They met us actually at the doorway and asked where we were going. They were on the way to my brother's, Peison said, to have a look at things there as well. So they told him to go there, while I was to go with them to Damnippus'house.Peisoncameup to me and urged me to saynothing. It would be all right, he said, he would be along there. We ran into Theognis with some others in his charge, and they handed me over to him and went off. At this point it seemedto me that I was in great danger and my death warrant already sealed.So I called Damnippus and said, 'You are a 44

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friend of mine. I've beento your house.I've donenothing wrong, I'm simply being done to death for my money. That's what is happening,so pleaseusewhat influenceyou haveto protect me.' He saidhe would, but he thought it betterto mentionit to Theognis,who, he reckoned,would do anything for money.While he was talking to him, as I knew the houseand realizedthat it had two doors,I thought I might try and escapethat way. I reflected that if I werenot caught,I shouldescape,and if I were, I should still getqwayif DamnippuspersuadedTheognisto accepta bribe, and anywaynothing worse could happenthan death. With this idea I made off. They had the front door guarded,but though there were three doors I had to pass,they were all open. I made my way to Archeneos,'theshipowner,and induced him to go to the ciry and find out about my brother. He came back with the news that Eratostheneshad caught him in the street and put him in prison. After this news I went by sea next day to Megara. Polemarchuswas given the usual sentenceby the Thirty, the hemlock,without any indication of the reasonfor his execution,let alone any trial or defence.After his death, when he was taken from the prison, it was not permitted to for his funeral. They use any of the three houseswe possessed hired a shed and used that for it. There were also plenty of clothes, but all requestswere refuscd, and one of his friends lent a garment, another a pillolv or anything else they could offer for his burial. They had sevenhundred shieldsbelonging to us, they had a mass of gold and silver, bronze, ornaments, furniture and women's clothing to an altogether unexpected extent, they had a hundred and twenty slaves,the best of which they appropriated,handing the rest to the public stock. Yet they made a demonstrationof their self-seekingand dishonesty, and of their character.Polemarchus'wife happenedto have somegold earrings,which she had had sinceshe first cameinto the family. These Melobius removed from her ears. They showedus no mercy in respectof the smallestitem of property. Becauseof our money they behavedto us as if they were filled with resentmentfor the most seriousdelinquencies,though in fact we had been entirely innocent of anything of the kind. We had carried out all our public obligations, we had made 45

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numerouscontributionsof money,we had beenexemplaryin our behaviour,.we had. perfoi'med every instrucqionwe had been given. We had never made any enemies,but-bn ttre contrary had on severaloccasionsprovided ransomfor Athenian citizens. This was the treatment they thought reasonablefor people whose behaviouras aliens had been very different from theirs as citizens.They had frequently beenguilty of driving Athenian citizens into enemy hands, of executions without burial, of deprivation of citizen rights and of prevention of intended marriages.They are now brazen enough to appearin defence of their caservith the plea that they have done nothing wrong or objectionable.I wish this were true ! It is a benefit which I should very largely share.As it is, it is not true of their conduct either towards the state or towards me. As I have said, my brother was done to death by Eratostheneswithout any private provocation or any causeof public complaint against him. It wassolelyto satisfyhis own lawlessdesires.But now, gentlemen of the jury, I proposeto put him in the witnessbox and question him. Go into the box, please,and answermy questions. LysIAs Did youarrestPolemarchus or not? ERATosrHrNrsI carriedoutthegovernment's commands because I wasafraid. LysIAs Were you in the Councilwhen our affairswereunder discussion ? ER ATo s r HnNps I was . LysIAs Did yougiveyour votein favourof the execution or against ? ERATosrHrNrsAgainstit. LysIAs In the opinionthat we werenot guilty? ER ATo s r HnNrYses . LysIAs In otherwordsyou wereoutrageous enought<jvotefor his releaseand then take part in his execution.When you had a majorityin favourof release,you claimto haveopposedthe execution, but whenPolemarchus' safetylay in your handsalone,you rushedhim into prison.Do you supposethat the claimyou sayyou madewithoutsuccess deserves to be calledcreditable, andyet that your actualviolenceshouldgo unpunished despitemy demandand the jury's? Nor, indeed, if his statementof opposition is true, can one fairly credit his claim that he was obeying orders. Presumably 46

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they were not exacting a guaranteefrom him in regard to the Metics. So who could have been lesslikely to be given the order than a man who had opposedthe project and made his opinion clear? Who could have been a less promising agent than an opponent of their aimsI To the maiority of Athenians it seems an adequateaccount of what happenedto attribute it to the Thirty. But if the Thirty attribute it to themselves,how can it be acceptedas an accounti Ifthere existeda strongerpower in Athens by which the order for homicide in defianceof right were given, one might see it as an extenuation.But in this casewherecan responsibilitybe placedif it is opento the Thirty to plead the orders of the Thirty I In addition the arrest was not carried out in my brother's house,but in the street, which means that Eratosthenescould have combined lenience with obedienceto instructions. But he still seizedand imprisoned Polemarchus.Everyone is enragedwith people who enter their housesto demand possessionof themselvesor their relatives. Yet if the destruction of others for one's own safety deserves any considerationat all, such marauders deserveit more than Eratosthenes. It was dangerous for them not to fulfil their mission, or to deny it when they had found someone.Eratosthenescould have denied meeting or seeinghis victim. There wasno form of proof or examinationwhich could haveconvicted him if his opponentshad wanted to. Had you been a man of high character,Eratosthenes, you should havegiven information to likely victims of injustice rather than collaboratein their arrest. Actually your attitude is manifest from your actions.It is not that of antagonism,but of satisfactionat theseproceedings, and the jury should basetheir decisionon your actions,not on your words, and use known facts to judge what statementswere made at the time, where eye-witnessesare not obtainable.It was impossiblefor us to be on the spot, or even in our own homes, so that they were in a position to do all the harm they could to the public interest while they artributed all the good to themselves.However, your denial is something I will not contest but acquiescein, if you so desire. I only wonder what you would have done as a supporter of the Thirty, when as a so-calledopponentyou did Polemarchusto death. 47

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Tell me this, gentlemen.Supposeyou had beenPolemarchus' brothers or sons. Would you have acquitted him ? You see, gentlemenof the jury, that Eratosthenesis committed to one of two statements,either that he did not arrest Polemarchus or that he wasright to do so. He hasadmitted to havingwrongfully arrestedhim, so he hasmade the choiceof verdict easyfor you. And in fact numbers of Athenians and aliens alike have come here to learn your view. Either they will come to the conclusion that misdeedswill get punished,or elsethis: that if they achieve their aims they will haveabsolutepower, while if they fail, they will be on an equality with everyoneelse.Aliens in Athens will know whether they are justified in proclaimingthe banishment of the.Thirty from their citiesor not. If the sufferersthemselves are going to let them go when they have them in their power, the alienswill certainlyregardit as superfluousto trouble about them. Surely it must be thought outrageousthat the victorious generalsat Arginusae should have incurred the death penalty for refusing to pick up the casualtiesat se\2 on the score that retribution should be exactedfor the death of patriots,and not men like this, who as private individuals did all in their power to causea defeat on that occasion,and on accessionto power admit to having deliberately caused the death of numerous Athenians. Should not they and theirs be subjected ro the extremepenalty at the handsof this court ? I regardedthe chargesas sufficient at this stage.I consider that a limit can be set at the point at which it appearsthat the defendant merits the death penalty, this being the severest penalty that can be exacted.I am therefore uncertain of the relevanceof repeatedaccusationsin the caseof men who, even if it could be doubly inflicted, would not be adequatelypunished for their actions.It is not legitimatefor a man like this to adopt the frequent practiceofabandoning any defenceto the charges, and pursuing irrelevant personaltopics. Such men are sometimes successfulin deceptionby describingtheir military valour, the ships they have captured at sea or the towns they have brought into friendly relations. Make Eratosthenestell you when they have brought about the death of as many enemiesas z. In 4o6u.c. 48

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they have of their own fellow-countrymen, when they have captured as many ships as they have surrendered,when they have securedthe friendship of any city to comparewith our own which they have enslaved.Let us hear of the enemy arms seizedthat will match what were taken from Athenians,of the fortifications destroyedto equal the wreck of their own city's. They even pulled down the armed posts round Attica, and provedthat eventhe Peiraeuswasnot dismantledat the instance of Sparta,but becausethey thought this would strengthentheir own r6gime. I have often felt astonishedat the audacityof any defenceof such people,till I reflect that to stick at nothing oneselfis of a piece with upholding men like this. This is not the first time the defendanthas acted in oppositionto the Athenian people. At the time of the Four Hundred he took part in the oligarchical revolution in the fleet, after which he abandonedhis ship when in command of it and fled from the Hellespont with Iatrocles and others, whose names I need not give. On his arrival in Athens he was engagedin opposition to the democraticparty. I now put forward evidenceof this. (Eaidenceof witnesses) To omit the interveningperiod, when disastercame to Athens at Aegospotami,during the existenceof the democracyfrom which the coup d'itat cmerged, a body of five Ephors was appointedby their fellow-membersof the so-calledClubs,3to the peopleand to leadthe conspiracyin actionagainst assemble the democracy.Eratosthenesand Critias \\'ere among their number. They nominatedleadersfor the Tribes, gave instructions on proposalsfor decisionand personsto hold office, and 3. The political clubs were associations developed in the 5th century mainly for the propagation of oligarchic ideas. We hear of them particularly in Thucydides' account of faction as a feature of the politics of the latter part of the century, and again in connexion rvith the oligarchic movement in Athens (Thucydides, iii, 8z and viii, 54). They are idealized by Isocrates in the Panegyricus(7g), though elsewhere he joins the majority vierv in Athens by condemning them. The Aristotelian Constitution of Athens (34) dissociates Theramenes from them, but this is probably because it is largely concerned to voice Theramenes' views.

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assumedauthority for any other measuresthey chose. There thus came into being a conspiracyagainst the siate not merely on the part of the enemy, but also among these Athenian citizens,to preventgood decisionsand securewidespreadwant. They were well aware that the only condition of thiir survival was calamity in Athens. They supposedthat in your anxiety to be rid of immediatedisastersyou would not give a thoughi to the future. That Eratostheneswas one of these Ephors I will provide evidence, not from his associates,whicl would be impossible,but from his own hearers.Had these been wise, their evidencewould have beenusedfor his condemnation,and they would have taken severemeasuresagainst the authors of their presenttroubles.Had they beenwise,they would not have held to their oaths when the result was injury to individual Athenians, and yet lightly discarded them when the stare might have been the gainer. That concludeswhat I have to sav on this subject.Call the wirnessesto the platform, please. (EuidenceoJ witnesses) You have heard the evidence. Now, finally, after attaining to office Eratosthenesh19 nothing good to his name, but plinty that-is the opposite.Had he been a man of integrity, hii auty would have required him to avoid illegal proceedings,and tb make represenrations to the Council about the falsitr. of all the indictments, about the untrue statementsof Batrachus and Aeschylides,+which were mere figmenrs concocted by the Thirty for the detriment of Athenian citizens. Indeed, glntlemen, the antagonistsof democracydid not suffer by holding their tongues.There were plentv of other tonguesand handst6 achievethe greatestconceivabledisastersfor Athens. But good will towardsher could surely havebeenmadefully clearby [ood senseand oppositionto wrong. -Perhapshe could maintain that he was frightened,and some of you will find that adequate.But he muit not let his plea prove him in open oppositionto the Thirty. If he does,it will be clear that he agreedto their proceedingsand had enough

power to avoid Buthe i:tx*::',miJnru';:position' 5o

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should maintain that it was the general interest he was concerned for, not that of Theramenes,who did much to injure Athens. But EratosthenesregardedAthens as his enemy and her enemiesas his friends. I have plenty of proof to establish this, also that the differenceswhich arose arnong the Thirty did not concernthe interestsof Athens, but their own, and the decisionwhich party should carry out this plan of action and control the state.Had the dispute beento securethe interestof Athens, what finer moment for a man in power to display his patriotism than at the seizure of Phyle by ThrasybulusI Yet insteadof making any declarationor taking action in support of the group at Phyle, he joined his colleaguesin a journey to Salamisand Eleusis,where they threw three hundred Athenian citizensinto prison and sentencedthem to death in a body. When the scenechangedto the Peiraeusand the disturbances there, and discussionsbeganabout a settlement,each side had high hopesof its success,as both showed.The Peiraeusparty had won the day and allowed the others to leave. They then retired to the city and expelled the Thirty with the exception of Pheidon and Eratosthenes,and chosea governmentof their bitterestopponents,taking the view that it would be reasonable for opponentsof the Thirty to be supportersof the Peiraeus party. This body included Pheidon, Hippocles, Epicharis of Lamptra and others thought to be most opposedto Charicles, Critias and their club. As soon as they assumedpower themselves,they gaverise to still more violent dissensionin Athens, against the Peiraeus.This clearly proved that their violence had not been directed to the support of the Peiraeusparty or that of the victims of injustice, and that it was not feeling for the dead or for probable victims that stirred them, but the existence of greater power than theirs, or a quicker wa / to wealth. On assumingcontrol of the governmentand the city, they made common causeagainstthe Thirty who had been the cause,and the people'sparty who had been the victims of all the trouble. But it was made universallyclear that if the expulsion of the Thirty was just, yours was unjust, and if yours was right, that of the Thirty was wrong. The courseof eventswhich led to their accusationand expulsionwas in no way different 5r

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from these.So there is causefor deepresentmentthat Pheidon, who was elected to secure a reconciliation and the recall of Athenian citizens, should have pursued the same course as Eratosthenes,adoptingthe samepoint of view, and should have been prepared to use the popular party to attack their own superiorsamong the Thirty, while they refused to hand over the control of Athens to the parry who had been deprivedof it unwarrantably. Instead Pheidon went to Sparta and tried to engineeran attack on Athens on the pretext that the city would fall into Boeotian hands, with other statementsdesignedas inducements.s As this failed, either owing to religiousopposition or Spartan antagonism, he borrowed a hundred talents to securea mercenaryforce and petitioned for Lysander to act as commander.Lysander was strongly in favour of the oligarchy and againsta free Athens, and most strongly of all againstthe Peiraeusparty. T'hey hired all kinds of peoplein an attempt to destroyAthens, they broughtwhole cities into action,eventually including Sparta and any of her allies they could, and made their preparations,not for reconciliation, but destruction had it not been for certain true patriots, to whom you must make it clear by punishing their enemiesthat you intend to show your gratitude. All this you alreadyknow, and I am not sure there is any need to provide evidence,However I will provide it. I need a rest myself, and some of you prefer to hear the samething repeated. (Eaidenceof witnesses) Well, now I proposeto tell the story of Theramenes,asshortlv as I can. And I must beg for your ind.tlgencefor the cityis benefitaswell asfor my own. I hopeit will not appearto anyone that in a caseagainstEratosthenesaccusationof Theramenesis out of court; becauseI gather that Eratosthenesintends to make use of the claim that he was an associateof rheramenes and a partner in his actions.He would have had a strong claim to have partneredThemistoclesin building the walls, one may 5' Many exiled democrats had been given asylum in Boeotia, and it was rumoured that Thebes had assisted rhrasybulus. This prediction was calculated to induce Sparta to act.

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suppose,if he claims to have assistedTheramenesin pulling them down! But I hardly think the caseis parallel.Themistocles built them in defianceof Sparta,Theramenespulled them down by a fraud upon Athens.The result to Athens is the oppositeof what might have been expected.If the friends of Theramenes had perishedwith him, unless they had adopted the opposite courseto his, it would have been no more than they deserved. Insteadof this rve find a defencemade of him, and attemptsby his associates to take credit as the authorsof numerousbenefits insteadof untold detriment. In the first place,he was the prime cause of the first oligarchy, when his influence caused the electionof the Four Hundred. His father \ryasone of the Commissioners,and furthered the samemovement,while he himself was held to be one of its firmest supporrers,which led to his own electionasStrategus.So long ashis stockwas high he maintained good faith rvith Athens. But when he found that Pei6 and others were gaining ground on him, sander,Callaeschrus while the citizen body were no longer in their favour, he yielded to his jealousyof them and his fearsof the populace,and joined the faction of Aristocrates.He wanted to appearto be in with the popular party still, so he accusedand securedthe death of his great friends, Antiphonz and Archeptolemus.His dastardly conduct allowed him to sacrificeboth the freedom of Athens for his adherenceto the oligarchs,and the life of his friends for his adherenceto the populaceof Athens. But when he was in a position of the highest honour and estimationrt h. announcedhis intention to save Athens, and then promptly caused its destruction, on the speciousclaim that he had deviseda schemeof greatimportanceand enormous value. He promised to securepeacewithout the surrender of 6. Peisanderplayed a considerablepart in the oligarchic revolution of the Four Hundred (seeThucydides, viii, 54, 3 and 67,3). Of Callaeschrusit is only known that he was one of the Four Hundred on that occasion, while Aristocriates is mentioned by Lysias, but nor by Thucydides, as a leader of the moderates among them. 7. See General Introduction p. ro, rr above. 8. There is an abrupt changehere, and we passfrom the account ofTheramenes in the revolution of 4rr 8.c., to refer now to his conduct after the battle of Aegospotami.

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hostages,the destructionof the walls or the forfeiture of the navy. He refusedto revealhis scheme,urging that he shouldbe trusted. The Council of the Areopaguso was in charge of measures for the protection of'Athens, and there was much opposition to Theramenes.They knew that normally secretsare preserved in dealingwith an enemy,whereasTheramenesin the presence of his own peoplerefusedto revealwhat he intendedto tell the enemy. And yet the people trusted him with the safety of their wives and children and themselves.He broke all his promises. So obsessedwas he with the need to make Athens small and weak that he led her to a proceeding as far removed from the proposalsof the enemy as from the expectation of Athens. He was under no compulsionfrom Sparta. It was he himself who put forward the proposal to pull down the walls of the Peiraeus and abolishthe existingconstitution.This was becausehe fully realized that unless every hope Athens had was speedily removed, instant retaliation would be taken upon himself. Finally, gentlemen of the jury, he did not allow a meeting of the Assembly until the moment laid down by Spartahad beenfaithfully observedby him, and he had summonedLysander'sfleet and the enemyforce had taken up its position in the country. Then, with this position established,with Lysander, Philocharesand Miltiades on the spot, they held an assembly, to forestall oppositionor threats from any speaker,and to prevent a right choice by Athenian citizens, who were compelled to vote for the measuresthey had decidedon. Theramenesnow rose and ordered the city to be pur into the hands of thirty individuals, and the constitution in preparation by Dracontides to be adopted.Even as things were, there was a violent outburst in refusal. It was rcalizedthat the issueof the meeting was slavery or freedom.Theramenes,asmembersof the jury can themselves testify, declaredthat he cared nothing for this outburst, as he knew that a large number of Athenians were in favour of the same measuresas himself, and he was voicing the decisions approvedby Sparta and Lysander.After him Lysander spoke, g. The Areopagus had been deprived of political functions in 462 s.c. It is not known whether any enactment gave it a general power of supervision at this time of trouble.

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and among other statementspronouncedthat he held Athens under penalty for failing to carry out the terms of the truce, and that the questionwould not be one of her constitution,but of her continued existence,if Theramenes'orders were disobeyed.lfrue and loyal membersof the Assemblyrealizedthe degreeto which the position had beenpreparedand compulsion laid on thern, and either stood still in silenceor left, rvith their conscienceclear at any rate of having voted the ruin of Athens. A few despicablecharacterswhose deliberateintentions were traitorous held up their hands to vote as they were told. Instructionshad been given to eiect ten men secretlynominated ty Theramenes,ten laid down by the establishedEphors, and ten frorn the company present. -their They saw the weaknessof the Athenian position and o*n siretrgth so well that they realizedbeforehandwhat would happen in the Assembly.You need not take this from me, but from Therarnenes.All I have said he himself included in his Defence in the Council,,o with his reproach to the exiles that they owed their return to him while Sparta had never thought of them, and to his associates in power that everything that happened,as I have described, had been due to him, and this was his reward for it - when in fact he had given every sort of pledge and exacted oaths of fidelity from them. All this and more, great and small, late and soon, standsto his name in defianceof morality and right. And yet people are brazen enough to call themselves his friends, though it was not for the welfare of Athens that he met his death, but for his own outrageousconduct. It was a penalty that would have been as just uncler the oligarchy he had dissolved as under democracy.He had trvice enslavedAthens in his contempt for her existing r6gime and his desirefor revolution. He made constant claim to the finest of titles, when he had instigatedthe foulest treason. ro. In the Council, i.e. in Theramenes' defence against the attack made on him by the party of Critias, to which he orved his death. Lysias' account of Theramenes is understandably coloured by strong feeling against a champion of oligarchy, but even nowadays it is hard to assessTheramen€s. (See for the earlier period Thucydides, viii, 68 and 9o94, for the later Xenophon, Hellenica II and III.) 55

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On Theramenesthe indictment is now complete.You have realized,the need to exclude sympathy and pity from your view, and exact from Eratosthenesand his associatesin power the punishment they deserve.You have worsted your enemiesin the field. You must not submit to your opponentsin this court. You must not let gratitude for their professedintentions outweigh your indignation at their actual conduct. You must not conspire against them in their absence,and then, when you havethem, let them go. When fortune has surrenderedthem to Athens,you must not fall short of her lead. This completesthe indictment of Eratosthenes and the friends to whom he will refer in his defence,as they were his assistants in malpractice.But his positionis nor a true parallelwith that of Athens. He dealt with his victims as accuserand judge in one; we resort to accusationand def-ence. His party put the innocent to death without trial; you insist on fair trial for men who were the ruin of Athens, whose penalty, however illegal, could never match their misdeeds.what treatmentcould bring upon them fair retriburion for their actions? could their own death and their children's atone for fathers,sons and brothers put to death untried I Could the confiscationof their properry gompensatefor their many depredationsfrom the city, or for individual citizens whose housesthey sacked? Since, rhen, no actionof any kind could match their deserts,it must be held unjustifiableto omit any penaltythat could be inflicted upon them. But it seemsto me that a man who can appearbeforea jury not of neutrals, but of the very people he has victimized, to put up a defencebefore the very witnessesof his evil actions, has set no limits either to his contempt of this court or to his confidence in outside support. Both these factors deserve consideringin the realizationthat the defendants'past conduct would have been impossible without assistance,and their present appearancecould not have been made without the prospectof support from the samequarter, from people who, without intending to aid the Thirty, yet hope to seiure immunity themselvesfor pastand future actionsalike,if you acquit the ultimate engineersof wickednesswhen you have them in your hands.one may alsofeel surpriseat any intention to plead 56

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for them. Will such a plea be made in the guise of respectable citizenswho expecttheir own merits to outweigh the defendants' guilt I I wish they had shown as much concernfor the welfare of Athens as these did for her destruction.Or will they adopt the defenceof sophistry and claim specialindulgencefor the acts of the Thirty ? Remember that for the rights of Athens they never set out to claim even bare justice. It is also worth observingthe witnesseswhosetestimonyfor the Thirty is their own condemnation.They must think very poorly of your memory and intelligence,if they expect a free acquittal for the Thirty at the handsof Athenian citizens,when Eratosthenesand his associates madeit dangerousfor them even to conducta funeral.Yet the defendants,by their release,could regain the power to bring Athens down. Their victims by their death have passedbeyond retribution on their enemies.And it is a scandalthat men who were unjustly done to death should have had none who lived to show their friendship, while the absolute destroyersof Athens should have crowds to attend their funeral, to judge by the hundreds preparing to defend them. But I regardit as easierto stand alonein defenceof your sufferingsthan to defend the actions of the Thirty. Yet it is claimed that of the Thirty the least harm of all was done by Eratosthenes,and they make this a reasonto defend him. But it was greater than was inflicted by all the rest of Greece.Is this not to be made a reasonto condemnhim ? You must show your clear opinion. A verdict of guilty for Eratostheneswill make clear your indignation at his actions. An acquittal will prove that you desirea repetition of them. Nor will you be in a positionto saythat you actedon the instructionsof the Thirty. There is no one now to make you repudiate your opinion. I urge you therefore not to condemn yourselvesby acquitting him. Nor must you imaginethat your vote will be secret.IrYou will makeyour own decisionmanifestto Athens. r r. The ballot in Athenian legal caseswas kept secret, as the final guarantee of good faith, by the practice of having two voting discs for each iuryman, one marked for acquittal, the other for condemnation, and two boxes, one for operative, the other for rejected votes. It was then impossible for anyone to seewhich disc was put into which box. Lysias'point, of course, is that the total vote will show the general attitude of the jury.

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There are a few points which, before I close,I want to bring before the parties both of the city and of the Peiraeus,so rhat you can keep the disastersthey brought on Athens in your mind when you give your vote. First I addressmembersfrom the city. Rememberthat your domination at the hands of the Thirty was so absolutethat you were compelledto fight a war against your own brothers and sons and your own fellowcitizens,a war in rvhich defeathas set you on an equality with the successful,but victory would have meant slavery at the hands of the Thirty. As to private houses,the Thirty would have extendedtheirs owing to their position, while civil war has reducedyours. They did not reckon to sharetheir benefits with you, but they compelledyou to share in their ill name, and adopted an attitude so overbearing that they were not preparedto be generousto gain your loyalty, but expectedyou to take on their unpopularity and keep your good will ro them. Since,then, you are now in the position of security,it is for you to do your utmost on your own behalf and that of the Peiraeus party in exacting retribution. Reflect first that you were once in the power of the most reprehensibleelementsin Athens, then that you now stand amongthe highestof her citizens,that you fight her enemiesand deliberateon her problems.Remember too the foreign soldiersthen establishedon the Acropolis to preservetheir dominationand your slavery. There is much more I could sayto you, but this must suffice. I now turn to the party of the Peiraeus.First I urge you to recall the matter of your arms. You fought many engagements on foreign soil, yet you were never disarmedby an enemy, but only by the Thirty, and in time of peace.rzRemember,then, that you were proclaimed exiles from Athens, the heritageof your fathers,and even in exile your extradition was demanded.Let this rousein you the indignationyou felt at your expulsion,and remind you as well of the other barbarity inflicted on you, of men seizedfrom the market and the temple and done to death, of men draggedaway from children, from parents and wives and forced to suicide, and not even allowed the burial which rz. After the formation of the catalogue of rhree Thousand the rest of the citizens were deprived of their arms by a trick on the part of the Thirty.

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customsanctions,becausethere were others who thought their own power stronger than the retribution which heaven lays upon the wicked. Those of you who escapeddeathwere subject to dangersin many lands to which you wandered,invariably proclaimed as exiles, starved of the needs of life, some with children left behind in the hostile country which had been your own, some elsewhereabroad. Yet against all opposition you returned to the Peiraeus.Many and great were your perils, but you behavedas men should, and set your people free or brought them back to their country. Had misfortune caused you to fail, you would have fled in fear of the same fate as before: that the cruelty of the Thirty would have denied their victims any of the rights of religion or sanctuarywhich served to protect even the perpetratorsof it, that your children in Athens would have been left to their barbarity, while those abroadwould now be in slaveryfor default on small loans,and there would be none to preservethem. However, I do not intend to talk of what might have been when it is beyond me to describe the truth of what was perpetrated,which would be beyond the scopeof any number of accusers.But there has beenno slackeningin my eagerregard for our temples, which they sold or desecrated,for our city, which they brought low, for our shipyards, which they destroyed, or for the cleacl,whom they failed to protect in their life and whom you must avengeafter their cleath.I believethese dead are listening to what we say, and will knorv that you are making your vote, and feel that every vote of not guilty will be a vote for their ou'n condemnation,every vote of guiliy one of retribution on their behalf. I will bring the chargeto a close.You who have heard and seenand suffered,yours is the power. Cast your vote.

ANDOCIDES: ON THE MYSTERIES

I N T R O D U CITO N Andocidesis best knopn for his connexionpith the mJ/sterinus incidentsphich occurred.in Athens in the summerof 4r5 n.c., just beforethe great expedition.to Sicill set sail. Th,efleet rnas0n. the point of deparnu'e,mhenit wns leornedthat d,uringthe night the imngesoJ-Hermes in, the streetshntl beendefaced.,A further report saitl tlrat a party o_l'people, including one of the leadersof tlte expeditiort,, Alcibiades,ltacl conducted, parodl performancesof tlrc Mlsteries, the sacredrituals of Demeter and,Persephoneat Eleusis, wltose secrecJ/tpas prztected lry oatlts of the greotest solenmity.Tltis pro/a.natiznma1 haaebeeno sopltisticatetl Ttossible rebellion ttgainst canaention,but b7 the &ccnantgiaen in th.is speechit seerns to ltaaebeencarried out with surprisingrecklessness,, in tlte pres€flceof mtinitiated sloaes.As regardstlte mutilation of tlre Herms.e,it has beensuggested that it may lta.aebeendoneeithir in an' ilttempt to postponethe expeditionby the d,eliberatecreation oJ'u batl zme?t,0r as o,_firststep topnrds an oligarclticconspiracy phich pould crerte tlte needto linit the control of tlte state t0 a select.few.lt is rutt c/earhop it n,ou/tlhozteserz,ed theseends,and eun' if me allontfor Atheniurt srtperstition,the incidentsremain ltartl to understand.But the netpscu,used widespreadconsternation at sttchactsof horrtflins socrilege,antl led to an intmediateattack on Alciltiades.Honteaer, he rpasallorpedto sai.lon the expedition, sincehis enemies felt that if the caseDere brought up at once,h.is greilt populari4t rpouhlsaaeltinr..wlten.he had,gnne,tltey recalled, kinr.to stand,his trial, but he tltought it prutlent to leaueAthens far Sparta. Andocides, a mem,berof o, oLl, disti,guislted and wealtlryt fit,mil1, with political, perltaps oligarchic,interests,Dos ernunga glossary,p- 266. Thucydides' account of the incident, ofthe charge _ r. see that Alcibiades was involved in it, of his demand to be tried before sailinc Jn the expedition, and of his final escapeto Thurii in s. Italy areinBook-vl, 27-29,53,6r. 6t

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numberdenou,nced as irnplicatedin theseffiirs. He is said to haoe escupedconvictionand punisltmentb1 admitting his ownguilt and i,ncriminatingzthers.In his speech. he deniesthis. But soonafterwardsthe so-ttt,lleddecreeo/'Isotimidesforbadeall rpltoweregtiltlt o/-sacrilege and had admitterlit, to enter the templesor tlte Agora again. Tltis mqt haae been.direct$t aimed ot Andocitles.In any casehe went into exile in C-yprus.Healsot,isitedotherparts of the Greek world, und acquired some considerablewealth.He rnnde severalattemptsto return to ,4thens,but tpitltotttsu,6cess, unt,ilthe general.il,nxnestJa/ier tlte expulsionoJ the Thirty in 4oj n.c. ullowed ltint. to rlo so.Ile nom took part in pfulic life, and held somentinor offices.But in iloo B.c. he pas accu;edby Cephisius, promptedby tlte riclt and cultureil Callias, oJ'aiolatingthe decree of Isotimidesb1 attending the celebrationo./'the Mlsteries. His d,efenceon tltis churge i,nvolaeshim in two rnain questions,(i) wlretherlte was in foct guiltl on the cltargescoaeretlb7 Isotirnidel decreein 415 8.c., and (ii) whetherit is not itself inaalitl sincethe omnestJoJ-,to7s.c. Wlxatererrna)/be thought of the legal issues, Andocidespon his case,ond conti,nuedin Athens as a politician, beingsent 0n an embasytto Sparta in jgz n.c., which led,to his speech,, On the Peace.But mith the rest o/'the embass1 he was prosecuted for bribery4alnzngother charges,ond to aaoid,trial he returned,onc€moreto exile.

['-s] ANDOCIDES:

ON THE MYSTERIE,S

Tun preparation my opponentsundertook and the eagerness they showedto injure me in everyrespect,right or wronf, from the first moment I arrived in this city, is somethingyou-realize for the most part, and I need go to no length about it.r What I shall ask of you,_gentlemen,is my rights, which are as easyfor you to grant as they are valuable for me ro receive:And the first thing I want you to keep in mind is that I am here under no compulsion either in the form of bail or of physical force. I trusted in justice and in your integrity to determinerightly and not allow me to be wrongfully done to death by -y aniagonists, but to preserveme in accordancewith justice, with Aihenian law, and with the oathsyou swore before embarking on the vote you are going to make. It would be reasonablefor you to hold the sameview about peoplewho voluntarily submit to the risk of the courts,as they hold themselves.Any who were unwilling to abide by the court's decisionand are self-condemnedwrongl doerszmay reasonablybe accordedthe same decisionas thev have themselvesimplied. But those who are confident of theii innocenceand havestood by it may alsoreasonablyexpectfrom you the sameopinion as their own, and not bc cor-rdemned out of hand. I am myself'a caseirr poirt. I reccivednews from severalsourcesthat my enemieswere saying that I would not stand firm, but would be offand away. 'why woulclAndocides want to facea suit of such a vital naturei If he left, he would haveall he needs.He hasonly to sail to cyprus, where he came from, and there rvill be plenty of land and a presentof money all ready for him. Do you supposea man in his position is going to stand trial for his life ? what would be the idear He must realizethe attitude of Athens towards him.' personally, gentlemen,I hold the oppositeview. To live elsewherein perfeci comfort and be deprived of my counrry is somethingI would r. Parts of the early chapters are derived from rhetorical stock-in-trade and also appear in Lysias. z. i.e. by their failure to appear.

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never accept,and even if Athens is in the condition my opponents declare,I would far rather be her citizen than belong to any of the other states,prosperousthough they may be at the presenttime. This being my view, I left it to you to decideon my life. I thereforebeg you, gentlemen,to show greatergood will to me in my defencethan to the prosecution.You must realize that, however fair you may be, it is the defendant who is the worst off. The plaintiffs have thought the whole case through at length and madetheir accusationwithout any danger to themselves.I have fears and dangersand adverseprejutlice to contendwith in making my defence.so it is reasonablethat you should be more favourableto me than to my accusers.you should bear in mind also the number of instancesthere are of accusations which havebeenshownup at onceas such manifest lies that it would be much more welcometo you to punish the accusersthan the accused.others again,after telling lies which have brought people to undeservedexecution,have been convicted of perjury too late to benefittheir victims. After numerous instancesof this kind you may reasonablydisbelievethe statements of the prosecution.Whether their accusationsare serious or not the prosecutor'sstatementwill show. whether they are true or false will only becomeclear after you have heard -y defbnce. I therefore wonder, gentlemen,at what point to begin my defence.Should I start with the mosr recenf item, the iliegality of the information laid againstme, or rvith the decreeof Isotimides,rwhich is obsolete,or with the laws and the sworn agreeTent-s1nade,or should I begin my account at the very beginning ? I will tell you what givesme the grearesrdifficuity. it is that you do not all feel equally strongly about all the .irr.g.r, but each has his own particular poini which he wourd iike replied to first. Bur ro mention them all at once is impossible; so it seemsto me bestto tell the whole story from the beginning without omitting anything. If you hear a Cortectversion of th6 facts, you will easily grasp what lies my opponentshave told againstme. I think you personallyare prepaied to make a just 3. For this decree see introduction to the speech. It may even have been passed to force Andocides himself out of the iity, despite his acquittal.

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decision (which is what induced me to stand my ground), in the realization that in private and public affairs alike your first concern is to give your vote in accordancewith the oaths you have sworn. And this is the savingof the state, despitecertain opponentsof this view. Here is my requestto you; show a good understandingin listening to my case, do not be adverse to me nor suspiciousof what I say,nor seizeon individual words, but hear my defenceright through before giving your vote, as seemsto you most equitable or most in accordancewith the oathsyou have sworn. As I said before,I will make my defence from the beginning, first of all on the actual charge that gave rise to the information laid againstme, which is the reasonfor my submitting to this case:namely on the subject of the mysteries; on this I shall plead Not Guilty, either of impiety, or of informing, or of any admission,and shall disclaim knowlcdge of the truth or falsehoodof the information brought beforc you. This is the first point I shall establish. An Assemblywasheld for the generalsfur thc Siciliancxpcclition, Nicias,Lamachusand Alcibiades.Lanrachtrs'flagshipharl alreadyset sail,when Pythonicusrose:rnd nrrrdcthis annognccment to the people:'Athenians,you arc scnclingout :r lirrcc on a largescale,and are preparedto takethis risk rvirilconc ol'thc generals,Alcibiades,has been holding a privatc pcrform:rncc of the mysteriesin his house with certain others. If you rvill grant immunity to the man I name,a servantof one of the men involved,who hasnot beeninitiated, he will recitethe mysteries to you. In any caseyou can do what you like to me, if this is untrue.' Alcibiades made strong expostulationsof denial, and the prytaneis+decided to order the uninitiated to withdraw, rvhilethey themselveswent in searchof the young man Pythonicus named.They came back with Polemarchus'servant,whose name was Andromachus.They passeda vote of immunity; he then said that mysteries were being celebratedat Pulytion's house,and Alcibiades,Niciades and Meletuss lvere the actual 4. See glossary. 5. There were several persons called Meletus. This one is not to be confused with the accuser of socrates. Phaedrus, however, whose name appears among those denounced by Teucros, is the friend of Socrates.

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celebrants.He was among the people there, and saw it. There were slavesthere too, himself and his brother and Hicesius,the flute player, and Meletus' servant.He was the first to give this information, and provided the following names. Of these Polystratuswas arrestedand put to death, while the rest went off over the border and were officially condemnedto death. Take the list, please,and read the names. (Thelist is read,.\DenouncedbyAndromachus : Alcibiades, Niciades, Meletus, Archebiades,Archippus,Diogenes,Polystratus,Aristomenes,Oionias,Panaitius. This was the first information, gentlemen, given by Andromachusagainstthe men cited. Now call Diognetus. (Diognetus replies to And,o cid,e s' questi ons.) Wereyou Commissioner of Inquiries,Diognetus,whenpythonicus reportedAlcibiadesin the Assembly? I was. Are you awareof the informationlaid by Andromachus of eventsat the houseof Pulytion? Yes. Are these,then, the namesof the men againstwhom the information waslaid? That is so. Now camea secondlot of information. Teucros was an alien in Athens who had gone secretly to Megara, and from there gavenotice to the Council that, if he were given immunity; he would lay information about rhe mysteriesin which he had takenpart, and give the namesof his associates in it, and report what he knew of the mutilation of the Hermae. The council (which had full powers) passeda vote and sent for him from Megara. When he arrived, he was given immunity, and gave the namesof his associates. Thesefled from Athens on Teucros' information. Now read the list of their names,please. (Thelist is read'.)Denounced by Teucros:phaedrus,Gniphonides, rsonomus,Hephaestodorus,cephisodorus,himseld Diognet.rs, Smindurides,Philocrates, Antiphon,Tisarchus,pantocles. Remember,gentlemen,that all this is agreedby you too. Then there was a third lot of information. The wife of Alc66

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maeonides,who had previously been the wife of Damon * her name was Agariste - gave information that at the house of Charmidesnear the Temple of Zeus, mysterieswere conducted by Alcibiades,Axiochus and Adeimantus.These also fled on this information. There wasone further sourceof information. Lydus. the slave of Phereclesof Themacus,gave information of mysteriesconcluctedat the house of his master, Pherecles,at Themacus. Arnong othersrvhom he denouricedwas my father, who he said had been there, but rvas asleepwith his cloak over his head. Speusippus,rvho was a member of the Council, passedthe nameson to the court. Then my father provided sureties,and prosecutedSpeusippusfor illegality. The casecame before a jury of six thousand,6and Speusippusonly got rwo hundred votes. The personwho persuadedand begged*y father to stay was myself, together with the rest of the family. Now call Calliaszand Stephanus,and also Philippus and Alexippus,who are relations of Acumenus and Autocrator, who were exiled after the information of Lydus. The first is a nephew of Autocrator, and the second uncle to Acumenus. They must be presumedto have had no liking for the man who causedthe exile of their relatives,and they must haveknown who this was. Pleasefacethe jury and give your evidenceas to whether my statementsare true. (Eaidencegiaen) You have heard the facts, gendeman, and they have been attested.Now recall what my accusershave had the audacity 6. 6ooo was the total number of jury empanelled at one time (see glossary), and it appearsthat this is the only known insranceof the rvhole body sitting as a single court. This must be taken as indicating the degree of feeling caused by the affair. 7. callias is here probably the son of relocles and brother-in-law to Andocides-(see42 below). He must be distinguished from callias, the son of Hipponicus, Andocides' opponent in the case,rvho is referred to in the latter part of this speech,and who is also the Callias of Plato's Protagoras.It rvas his grandfather, also Callias the son of Hipponicus, whose name was given to the Peace between Athens and Persia in 448 e.c. yet another cattias appearsin the decree (77 below), Callias of Angele.

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to say.This is the right procedure:to listen to the prosecution and refute it. They stated that I gave information about the mysteries,denouncedmy own father as having beenthere, and was in fact an informer againsthim, which is a horrifying and outrageousstatement.The informer against him was Lydus, the slave of Pherecles,while it was I who urged him, indeed lvent on my kneesand beggedhim to stand his ground and not run a\r'ay abroad. What could have been the object of my giving information againstmy father, as they claim, and then begginghim to stay and be victimizedby my actioni Did I persuadehim to facea trial in which he was bound to undergo one of two appalling results? Because,if so, either I would be thought to have given true information againsthim, in which caseI should be the causeof his death, or he would survive and causemine. As the law stood, a true information earned immunity, a false one was punished by death. But you knorv that my father and I both survived, rvhich lvas impossibleon the assumptionthat I informed againsthim. One or other of us must have been executed.Well, then, even if my father had wanted to stand firm, do you supposehis friends would have allowed him to stay or gone bail for him, instead of begging and beseechinghim to go somewherewhere he could expectto survive rvithout causingmy deathI But in fact even when he u,as bringing a suit for illegality against Speusippus,he continued to makethis declaration:that he neverwent to Pherecles' house at Themacus. He demanded the torture of his own slaves,without any questionof passingover owners who offered it, and compelling the unwilling.s When my father said this, rvhat was there left for Speusippusto say, if this story is true, except, 'Leogoras, what is the point of talking about slavesI 8. To us the practice of torturing slavesseemsboth barbarous and useless. But it is often mentioned by Greek authors, usually in instances which imply that the master invited or allowed the torture of slaves, because this would elicit the truth and so improve his case(cf. Aristophanes,Frogs,6rg-zo, rvhere 'all the regular tortures' is a list of added with comic intent). The implication also follows that torture was not carried out except with the permission of the master. This case of the Hermae, however, seems to have been thought so important as to justify special instructions for the use of torture in some cases without such permission.

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Has not your own son given information against you to the effect that you were at ThemacusI Cross-examineyour father, Andocides, or else your immunity is forfeit.' Is this what Speusippuswould have said, or not ? I should say it is. So if I did go into court, or if there was a story about me, or any information againstme or any declaration,not by me against anyoneelse,but by someoneelseagainstme, I invite anyoneto stand up here and refute me. But in fact I have never heard of a more outrageousor misleadingargument.All they thought necessarywasto havethe nerveto makean accusation.Whether it would be proved false,they couldn't careless.If their charges againstme had been true, you would have been enragedand thought no penalty bad enough for me. Accordingly I claim that you should concludethat they are liars, and regard them asabominable,and takeit asprovedby the fact that, if the worst of their accusationsare shown to be manifest lies, it is quite certain that it will be perfectly easy to prove it of the others, which arc far lessserious. These, then, are the setsof information that were laid about the mysteries:four of them. The namesof the men who were exiled after eachof them have beenread out in my defence,and duly vouched for. But I will add a further proof, to make assurancedoubly sure. Of the men who were exiled over the case of the mysteries some died in exile, while others have returned,and are here in court at my request.I thereforeinvite q to raisean objectionand claim anyoneto usemy time allowance that I wasresponsiblefor the exileof any of them, or that I laid information againstthem, and that their exile was not due to the information I have mentioned. If I am proved wrong, I acceptany penalty. I now pauseand make way for anyonewho wishesto say anything. Well, then, gentlemen,what happenednext I After all this information had been laid, a questionaroseabout the reward. by the decree of CleoThis had beenfixed at rooo drach,mae and therewasa dispute nymus,andat ro,oodby that of Peisander, between the informers and Pythonicus, who claimed to have 9. The maximum length of speechesmade in a law-suit rvaslaid down, and they were timed with a water-clock.

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been the first to bring an indictment, while Androcles put in a claim on behalf of the Council'0 itself. It was thereforedecided in the court .of the Thesmothetae,that judgement should be given by the initiated, when they had heard the information given by eachclaimant.They voted the rewardsfirst to Andromachus, secondlyto Teucros; and they receivedthem at the Panathenaic Festival, Andromachus ro,ooo dracltmue and Teucros rooo. Pleasecall the witnessesto this. (Eaidencegiaen) As regardsthe mysteries,gentlemen,about which the information was laid, and about which you who are initiates havecome into court, it has been proved that I committed no sacrilege, laid no information against anyone, and made no admission about it, nor was there any singlemisdemeanour,largeor small, on my part againstthe two goddesses.And this is what it is most important to me to convinceyou of. The statementof my accusers,who let loose all these frightful outcries and made tiradesabout how others in the past had done acts of sacrilege, and what punishmentshad been inflicted on them - what has all this to do with me i I am all the more inclined to makethese accusations againsttltem,and take this asmy reasonfor claiming that they deserve death for their impiety, while I deserve acquittal for having committed none. It would be unconscionable if I were to be pilloried for other people'soffences,while in the knowledgethat theselies were uttered againstme by my enemies,you regardedthem as more convincingthan the truth. It is obvious that for such offencesas this there existsno such defenceas mere denial.A stringenttest is needed,when people know the facts.In my casethe investigationis pleasantenough, becauseI do not needto beg and beseechyou for mercy to save myself on a chargeof this sort. All I needdo is to cross-examine the prosecutionand remind you of the facts.You will give your ro. i.e. for distribution of the reward to the Council as being responsible for getting the information. The reward seems to have been rooo drachmae in the first place, rvith the larger figure added when the other seemed inadequate. Cleonymus and Peisander are both made the target of Aristophanes' wit in several places (e.g. Cloudsr 6T3 seqq., Cleonymus).

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vote under stringent oaths. You invoked tremendousimprecations on yourselvesand your offspring,and sworeto vote justly on my case,and besidesyou have beeninitiated, you have witnessedthe ritual of the two goddesses,which will make you punish impiety and preservethe innocent. You must regard it as just as sacrilegiousto condemnthe innocent for sacrilegeas to fail to punish the guilty. So with much girearerforce than my accusersI lay on you the charge,in the name of the trvo goddessesand for the honour of the rites you have witnessecl,and of all the Greeksu,ho come here for the festival,that if I have committed anv sacrilege,or if I have made any adrrissions,or laid information againstany human being, or if anyoneelsehas doneso aboutme)you put me to death,and I makeno defbnce. On the other hand, if I havecommittedno fault, and prove it to you with certainty, I request you to make it clear to all the Greeksthat I was unjustifiably brought to trial. If rny accuser, Cephisius,fails to gaina fifth of the votes and is disfranchised, he will not be allowedto enter the precinct of the two goddesses on pain of death.So if you think my defenceadequateon these charges,pleaseindicate it, to encourageme in continuing it. As regardsthe mutilation of the Hermae and the information laid about it, I will fulfil my promise ro you, and recount all that happenedfrom the beginning.On Teucros' arrival from Megaraand the grantof immunity to him he told what he knew aboutthe mysteriesand alsoabout the mutilation of the Hermae, and denouncedeighteenpeople.Some of those denouncedfled the country, while others were arrestedand put to death on Teucros' information. Pleaseread me the names. (Thelist is read.)Denouncedby Teucrosin the caseof the Hermae: Euctemon,Glaucippus,Eurymachus,Polyeuctus,Platorrr Antidorus, Charippus,Theodorus,Alcisthenes,Menestratus,Eryximachus,Euphiletus,Eurydamas,Pherecles,Meletus, Timanthes, Archidamus, Telenicus. Some of thesehave returned to Athens and are here now, and there are alsoa number of relativesof thosewho were executed; I invite any of them to stand up in my time allowanceand rr. Plato here is not the philosopher. Meletus is the same as in note 5.

7r

A N D o c rD Es [S S -9] chargeme with responsibilityfor the banishmentor death of anyonenamedhere. After this Peisanderand Charicles, who were among the Commissionersof Inquiry, but seemedmost inclined at that time to favour the popular party, declaredthat what had been done was the work of a number of people, and was a plot to overthrow the democracy,t2 which should be investigatedwithout remission.Popular feeling was such that the moment the proclamationwas made for the Council to assemblein their Hall, and the signalwasdown, the two eventsweresimultaneous, the arrival of the Council and a flight from the Agora in a general dread of arrest.This public disasterinducedDiocleidesto lay information to the Council to the effect that he knew the men responsiblefor the mutilation of the Hermae, who were about three hundred altogether,and to state that he had witnessed the affair and how he had come acrossit. Now gentlemen,I ask you to give this your attention and recall whether my statementis true, and discussthe matter. He said he had a slaveat Laurium and had to take his earnings to him. He got up and started early, becausehe had mistaken the time owing to the full moon. When he got to the entrance of the Theatre of Dionysus,he saw the figuresof a lot of men going down from the Odeurnl: into the Orchestra. He was frightened at this, so he sat down in the shadow betweenthe pillar and the slab on which stands the bronze statue of the Strategus.The men'he saw were about three hundred in number, standingin a circle in groups of fifteen or twenty. He saw their facesin the moonlight and recognizedmost of them. His first idea, gentlemen,and an outrageousone, in my view, rz. It is not easyto understand why this should have been supposed,why such alarm should have beer. roused, or why Peisander,who took part four years later in the oligarchic revolution of 4rr u.c., should have thought it called for a witch hunt of this kind. The parody of the mysteries may have had no political basis,the mutilation of the Hermae was perhaps designed as an omen to prevent the sailing of the expedition to Sicily and to discredit Alcibiades, but there is little to connect anything that happened with any serious attempt to overthrow the constitution. The nature of the 'signal' referred to is unknown. 13. The Odeum was next to the Theatre. There were bronze statues of Mitiades and Themistocles in the Theatre. It is not clear which is meant. 72

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was that he was in a position to say that any Athenian he chose was among their nurnber, and to den| the presenceof anyone he chose.After seeingthis sight he went to Laurium; next day he heard of the mutilation of the Hermae,and at once realized that this rvaswhat thesepeople had been doing. When he got back to town, he found Commissionersalreadyappointed,and the informer's fee set at roo minae.Then he sawEuphemus(the son of Callias,son of Telocles)sitting at the blacksmith's,and took him over to the temple of Hephaestus,and told him what I have told you, horv he had seenus that night. He said he'd just as soontake money from us as from the state,so as to keep on terms tvith us. Euphemussaid it was decentof him, and told him to come rvith him to Leogoras'house,'so as to meet Andocidesthere with him, and someothersconcerned'.So he camenext day and knockedat the door, when as it happened my fatherwasjust goingout, and saidto him, 'Are you the person they are waiting for ? Well, a friend like you is not to be lightly clismissed.'With thar my father went off. This u'as the rvay he tried to get at my father rvith the claim that he was in the plot.r+What u.e said, accordingto him, was that lve had dccidedto give him tu.o talentsof silver insteadof the official rao minae,anclif wc succccclecl in our plot, hc shoulclbc in on 'Iir it, and we gaveall clucgulrantccs. this hc sairlhis rcply rvrs that he would think it ovcr, anclthat u'c thcn tokl hinr ro corl1c to the houseof Callias,son of Telocles,so as to havc him thcrc too. This was his way of trying to incriminate my brother-inlaw. Then, he said,he went to Callias',wherehe reachedagreement lvith us and swore an oath on the Acropolis, while we agreedto give him the money the following month, but we let him down and didn't produceit. So he cameforward with his informrtion. These were the circumstancesof his indictment, gentlemen, and the men denouncedwere thosehe said he knew, forty-two in number. The first he specifiedwere Mantitheus and Apsephion, who were members of the Council in session,and the 14. Leogoras' remark might have implied the knowledge either that the club were about to offer Diocleides money, or rhat Diocleides could divulge the plot. Either implication could suggestthat Leogoras was involved. IJ

A N D o c rD Es

[S S -9] chargeme with responsibilityfor the banishmenror death of anyonenamedhere. After this Peisanderand Charicles, who were among the Commissionersof Inquiry, but seemedmost inclined at that time to favour the popular party, declaredthat what had been done was the work of a number of people, and was a plot to overthrow the democracy,,r2 which should be investigatedwithout remission.Popular feeling was such that the moment the proclamationwas made for the Council to assemblein their Hall, and the signalwasdown, the two eventsweresimultaneous, the arrival of the Council and a flight from the Agora in a general dread of arrest.This public disasterinducedDiocleidesto lay information to the Council to the effect that he knew the men responsiblefor the mutilation of the Hermae,who were about three hundred altogether,and to state that he had witnessed the affair and how he had come acrossit. Now gentlemen,I ask you to give this your attention and recall whether my statementis true. and discussthe matter. He saidhe had r ilru. at Laurium and had to take his earnings to him. He got up and startedearly, becausehe had mistaken the time owing to the full moon. When he got to the entrance of the Theatre of Dionysus, he saw the figuresof a lot of men going down from the Odeuml: into the Orchestra. He was frightened at this, so he sat down in the shadow betweenthe pillar and the slab on which stands the bronze statue of the Strategus.The men'he saw were about three hundred in number, standingin a circle in groups of fifteen or twenty. He saw their facesin the moonlight and recognizedmost of them. His first idea, gentlemen,and an outrageousone, in my view, rz. It is not easyto understand why this should have been supposed,rvhy such alarm should have beer, roused, or why Peisander,who took part four years later in the oligarchic revolution of 4n n.c., should have thought it called for a witch hunt of this kind. The parody of the mysteries may have had no political basis, the mutilation of the Hermae was perhaps designed as an omen to prevent the sailing of the expedition to Sicily and to discredit Alcibiades, but there is little to connect anything that happened with any serious attempt to overthrow the constitution. The nature of the'signal'referred to is unknown. 13. The Od,:um was next to the Theatre. There were bronze statues of Mitiades and Themistocles in the Theatre. It is not clear which is meant.

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was that he was in a position to say that any Athenian he chose was among their nurnber, and to deny the presenceof anyone he chose.After seeingthis sight he went to Laurium; next day he heard of the mutilation of the Hermae,and at once realized that this rvaswhat these people had been doing. When he got back to town) he found Commissionersalreadyappointed,and the informer's fee set at too minae.Then he sawEuphemus(the son of Callias,son of Telocles)sitting at the blacksmith's,and took him over to the temple of Hephaestus,and told him what I have told you, horv he had seenus that night. He said he'd just as soontake money from us as from the state,so as to keep on terms with us. Euphemussaid it was decentof him, and told him to come with him to Leogoras'house,'so as to meet Andocidesthere with him, and someothersconcerned'.So he camenext day and knockedat the door, when as it happened my father rvasjust going out, and said to him, 'Are you the person they are waiting for ? Well, a friend like you is not to be lightly dismissed.'With that my father went off. This u,asthe rvay he tried to get at my father with the claim that he was in the plot.I+What r,vesaid, accordingto him, rvasthat we had decidedto give him two talents of silver insteadof the official in our plot, he should be in on too minae,and if we succeecled To this he saidhis reply was it, and we gaveall due guarantees. that he woulclthink it over, and that we then told him to come to the houseof Callias,son of Telocles,so as to havehim there too. This was his way of trying to incriminatemy brother-inlarv.Then, he said,he went to Callias',lr.herehe reachedagreement with us and swore an oath on the Acropolis,while we agreedto give him the money the following month, but we let him down and didn't produceit. So he cameforward with his information. These were the circumstancesof his indictment, gentlemen, and the men denouncedwere thosehe said he knew, forty-two in number. The first he specifiedrvere Mantitheus and Apsephion, who were members of the Council in session,and the 14. Leogoras' remark might have implied the knowledge either that the club were about to offer Diocleides money, or that Diocleides could divulge the plot. Either implication could suggest that Leogoras was involved. IJ

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rest followed. Peisanderthen rose and proposedthe repeal of the statutepassedunder Scamandrius,so as to subjectthe men to torture and not let a night passwithout the discoveryof all the names.This wasreceivedwith applause.At this Mantitheus and Apsephion took refuge at the altar, begging to be spared the rack and to standfor trial on baiX.This they were reluctantly granted, but the moment bail rvaslaid down, they jumped on their horsesand desertedto the enerny,leavingtheir guarantors high and dry, and faced with the same punishment as rhe friends they had gone bail for. The Council took stepsin secret and arrestedus and put us in the stocks.They called out the Strategiand instructedthem to give ordersfor Atheniansliving in Athens to arm and go to the Agora, firr the guard on the Long Walls to go to the Theseum, and residentsin Peiraeu6to the market placeof Hippodamus,and for the trumpet to sound for 'fhe the Knights to go to the Anakeion.Is Council were to go to the Acropolis and sleep there, the prytaneis in the Tholos. Meanwhile Thebes got wind of the business,and mounted guard on the frontier. But the causeof all the trouble, Diocleides,washailedasthe saviourof the country, and led crowned in a chariot, to the Prytaneum,where he was given a dinner. This is the first thing I want you to recall, those of you who were there, and to pass on to the rest. Next pleasecall the prytaneis who were then on duty, Philocratesand the others. (Exidenceis giaen) Very well, now I will read you the namesof those who were denounced,to show you the number of my relations he tried to incriminate, first my father, then my brother-in-law. My father he put down as being in the plot, my brother-in-law as providing the house where the meeting was held. You shall hear the rest of the names.Readthem, please. (Th,enamesareread,whileAndocides comments) Charmides,son of Aristoteles. (This is a cousinof mine.NIy fatherand his motherwerebrotherand sister.) 15. The mobilization must have been ordered in fear of a Peloponnesian attack which might accompany the supposed conspiracy. For Anakeion, see glossary.

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Taureas. (A cousinof my father's.) Nisaeus. (Taureas'son.) Callias,sonof Alcmaeon. (My father'scousin.) Euphemus. (The brotherof Callias,sonof Telocles.) Phrynichus,the ex-dancer. (Anothercousin.) Eucrates,brotherof Nicias. (Callias'brother-in-law.) Critias.r6 (Yet anothercousinof my father's- their two mothers weresisters.) These were all among the forty-two denounced. We were imprisoned all together. Night fell, the prison was locked up, and relatives had arrived, a mother or sister or a wife and children, and there was a miserablenoise of weeping and wailing at the situation. Charmides,who was my cousin and my own age,and had beenbrought up with me in the same housefrom childhood, said to me, 'Andocides,you seewhat a terrible situation this is. I've never had occasionin the past to say anything to worry you. But in the presenrstate of things I must. The people you've gone about with and been friends with outside the family, they're the oneswho have been charged with the things people are using to incriminate us, and they havebeenexecutedfor it or elsefled the country self-condemned. So if you have heard anything about this business,say so, and you'll first of all saveyourself, then your father, who may be supposedto be your first consideration,and your brother-inlaw, husbandof your only sister,and all the rest of your relations and friends, myself included. I've never really done you any harm in my life, and I've been your enthusiasticsupporter at all times of need.' When Charmidessaid this, and every one of them beggedand prayed me in the sameterms, I thought to myself, 'I am really in the most terrible situation possible.Am I to see my own relationsruined unjustly and done to death, and their property confiscated,and allow them to be recorded publicly as guilty of unspeakablesacrilege,when they are completelyinnocent, to let three hundred other Athenians be unjustifiablyvictimized, and disastrousmutual suspicionspread all over the country - or tell Athens what I heard from Euphiletus, the real culprit ?' There was this further considerationin 16. This is the Critias of the Thirtv.

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my mind, that I reckonedthat the wrong-doerswho were really responsiblehad some of them been executed on Teucros' information, while others had fled and been condemned to death,and therewereonly four left who had not had information laid against them by Teucros for their offences- Panaetius, Chaeredemus,Diocritus and Lysistratus, who were the most likely of all Diocleides' victims to be thought guilty, as they were friends of some who had lost their lives already. These four could ill rely on survival in any case,while my relations had certain death beforethem, unlesssomeonetold the government the truth. I thereforethought it better to causefo"urmen the lossof their rights with good reason(and they are still alive now and back here in possessionof their property) than to allow the othersto perish without justification.So if any of you gentlemen,or any other citizens, imagined previously that I gave information against my own friends to procure their destructionand my own safety,which was the libelloustale my enemiestold againstme, I ask you to judge the matter in the light of the facts.For at presentI have got to render a truthful accountof my actionsin the presenceof the very men who were guilty and fled the country for being so, and have the clearest knowledgeof the truth or falsehoodof my statemenrs.Indeed, it is open to them to refute me in my own time. I give my permission.You, meanwhile,have to discoverthe truth. The most important thing for me in this caseis to be acquittedand clearmy reputation,and that first of all you yourselves,and then everyoneelse,should understandthat there wasnothing vicious or cowardly in anything I have done. It all came oi a misfortune to the country and to us, and when I said what I was told by Euphiletus, I was thinking as much for the country as for my family and friends, and for good reasons,not for any reprehensibleones, in my opinion. And if that is so, I claim acquittal and exoneration.Now I ask you, gentlemen,because you ought to take a human approachin your reckonings,as though you were actuallyinvolved in this trouble - what would you have done? If you had a direct choice betweena noble death and ignoble survival, one or the other, you might justifiably take a low view of what I did, though a good many people 76

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rvould have chosenas I did and preferredlife to a noble death. But when the exactoppositewastrue, silencewould havemeant my dying a disgracefuldeath myself, when I hadn't committed sacrilegeat all, and letting my father go to his death, and my brother-in-law and all those relationsand cousins,whose onlv danger was my refusal to reveal that others were to blame. Diocleidesperjured himself to imprison them, and they had no chanceof escapeunless the whole truth were made public. I wason the way to becomingtheir murderer,if I hadn'f told you rvhat I heard,a'd I'd have brought three hundred Atheniani to their death, and it would have been utterly calamitousto the city. That would have been the result of not speaking.But as I did speak,I was in a position to survive myself and rescuemy father ut9 -y family, and save the city a lot of anxiety ani trouble. Four men were due for banishmenton my account, and they rtrere guilty. of the others previously denouncedby Teucrosthosewho were executeddidn't owe their deathto me, nor the others their exile. with all this in mind I came to the conclusionthat the least of the necessaryevils was to tell the truth at once,convict Diocleidesof perjury, and secureour own safetyand his punishment for an unjustifiableattempt to ruin us and deceivethe authorities- and gain the reputation of a benefactorand make money into the bargari'. I iherefore informed the council that I knerv lvho the culprits were, and made known the facts, namely that the suggeition had been made at a party by Euphilerus,but I had opposedit, and that on that occasionit was due to me that it aia not take place. Later I went up to cynosargesafter a pony of mine, had-afall and broke my collar-bone,and was carried home on a stretcher. Euphiletussaw the stateI was in; he told the othersI had been persuadedto come in on the scheme,and had agreedto take part and to defacethe Hermes at the shrine of phorbas. This statementwas untrue, and that is the reasonwhy the Hermes by our family house,which was ereced by the Aegeis tribe, was the only one in Athens not to be damaged,on thi ground, accordingto Euphiletus,that I intendedto defaceit. whin thev discoveredthis, there-wasan outcry that I had knowledgeof the affair, but had not kept my promise.Meletus and Euphi-letus tl

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'We've donethis job, Andocides, cameto me next day,and said, quiet, we'll be friends as before. to keep you fit see and if Otherwiseyou'll get more trouble from us than any good you get on our accountfrom others.' I told them the affair mademe think Euphiletus a crook, but the danger to them wasn't the fact that I knew of it, but what they had actuallydone. In proof of this I provided my slave'sevidenceunder torture that I was ill and unable to get up, and the Prytaneisseizedthe servants of the housewhich had beenthe starting-placefor their actions. The commissionersand the Council investigatingthe affair and finding my account substantiatedand universally admitted to be true, next called for Diocleides.Not much questioningwas neededbeforehe admitted he was lying and beggedfbr mercy, giving the namesof the men who had urged him to tell the tale, namelyAlcibiadesof Phegustzand Amiantus of Aegina.These two took fright and fled the country. On hearing this you put Diocleidesin court and condemnedhim to death, and on my account releasedmy relations,who had been imprisoned and were in dangerof death,took back the fwo exiles,and returned home yourselvesand disarmed,well rid of your troubles and dangers.In all this I deservepity all round for what I went through, but in regard to my responsibilityfor what happened I should be accordedthe highestpossiblecredit. When Euphiletussuggestedthat I should put my trust in a pledgewhich could not have been more treacherous,I opposedhim and refused, and gave him the abuse he deserved;though after they had committed the wrong, I joined in concealingit, and it was on the informationof Teucrosthat they were put to deathor exiled, before we were imprisoned by Diocleidesand were in danger of our lives. Then I denouncedthe four, Panaetius,Diocritus, Lysistratus and Chaeredemus.They owed their exile to me, I admit. But my father, my brother-in-law, three cousins and seven other relations were saved unjustified execution.Is That-they are all still in the light of day is due to me, as they r7. Not the famous Alcibiades, but a cousin. The'exiles'mentioned below must be Mantitheus and Apsephion. 18. The numbers do not tally with the names given in Andocides' list of relatives above. There are various possible remedies.

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admit, while the disturber of the whole city and the causeof extremedangerto it, was convicted,and you escapedconsiderable risk and mutual suspicion.Again, I want you to recall the truth of this, gentlemen,or to enlightenany who don't know it. \9*, please,call the men who were releasedby my action. They know the facts and will havethe most certain evidenceto give the jury. This is the trurh, gentlemen,and they will go on the platform and tell you so for as long as you want their to. After which I will continue with the rest of my defence. (Eaid,ence graen)'o well, in regard to what happenedon that occasionyou have heardthe whole story, and my defencehas beencompiete,I am convinced.But if there zi anyonewho wants to ask anything or thinks it inadequateor that I've left anything out, let Lim sta_nd up and say so, and I will add to my defenceaccordingly. I will now proceed to the legal aspect.cephisius here"informed against me according to the law tto* in force, but his accusationbelongedto an earlier law proposedby Isotimides, which does not concern me. His proposalwas that those who were guilty of saqilege and admitted it should be excluded from religious rites. But I was guilty of neither. I committed no sacrilegeand madeno admission.Also the decreeis obsolete and not valid, as I will clemonstrate. Florn,ever, I will pur up a defenceon the point, in which, if I fail to convinc. you, it will be my own loss,while if I succeed,I shallprovidea iefencefor my opponents.zo The truth shall be told. After the destruction of the fleet and the siegeof Athens you debatedthe subject of unity, and decided to restore the franchiseto those who had lost it, and the proposalwas made by Patrocleicles.who were the disfranchised,and rvhat were the circumstancesin each case? I will tell you. First, people who owed money to the treasury: who had held offices, but not had their accounts passed,or were in debt for wrongful possession of property, or rg. This rubric is omitted in the text, but must be assumed. zo. rf he proves the decree of Isotimides invalid for events before 4o3 8.c., he will be giving his opponents a defence for their own offences "o-*itt"d before that date.

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in consequenceof the failure of public suits or fines imposed by a court, or failure to make good the rent for a public lease or suretiesto the state. All these were permitted to pay at or before the ninth prytany, and in case of non-payment they were to be fined double and their possessionssold for the benefit of the state.And there were examplesof conviction for embezzlementor bribery, whoseoffspring sharedtheir deprivation.2l This was one kind of deprivationof rights, but there was anotherkind, where the personwas deprived,but the property retainedand held in possession. These were casesof desertion or of avoiding military serviceor keeping a ship out of action or of abandoningarms, or of wrongful summonson three occasions,or of injury to parents; these were all punished by loss of personalrights, but not of property. Others retained rights with some limitations, being not wholly deprived, but in part, like the army; who for remainingin the ciry under the fyrants2z retained their rights in other respects,but were not permitted to speak in the Assembly or be members of the Council. Of these rights they were deprived, and this was the limitation imposedon them. Others were restrainedfrom bringing actions or from laying information,othersfrom sailingto the Hellespont or to lonia, others from entering the Agora. Well, you voted to eraseall such decreesin their official form and in all copies, and to give a generalpledge of unity on the Acropolis. Please read the decreeof Patrocleidesdealingwith these.events. DecreeProposed by Patrocleides: Inasmuchasthepeopleof Athens decreed an indemnityin respectof the disfranchised andof debtors, to movemeasures in orderto makeit possible anddiscuss them,the Peopleshallpassthe samedecreepassed at the time of the Persian war,whichprovedin the interestof the People.In regardto those registered asdebtorsrvith the Collectorsor with the Treasurers of Athenaandthe otherGods,or with the Basileus, the Goddess or to any whosenamehasnot beenincludedin the list up to the last zr. I follow D. M. Macdowell's text, which makesa necessaryalteration in 'ninth prytany' means the list of debtors to the state. The the ninth of the ten divisions of the year. 'tyrants ' meant are apparently the oligarchy of the four hundred zz. The in 4rr n.c.

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Council in the archonship of Callias, those who were deprived of citizenship or were debtors, and all those who have had accounts condemned in the Auditors' office, by the Auditors or their assessors, or in whose casea prosecution on the audit had not been taken, or who have had imposed on them limitations or the fulfilment of guaranteesup to the relevant time, or any of the Four Hundred whose names are still registered or any in respect of whom enactment of the oligarchy remains on the books, except such names as are officially recorded as not having remained in Athens, or who have been condemned either by the Areopagus or the Ephetae or the Prytaneum or the Delphinium or the Basileus,or have been exiled for murder or sentencedto death either as homicides or as tyrants; all others shall be obliterated by the Collectors and the and all existing duplicate copies shdl be Council in all instances,23 handed in by the Thesmothetae and other magistrates, the operation to be completed u'ithin three days on the decision of the People. Such copies as have been ordered to be obliterated must not be privately retained, nor used for retrospective complaints. Any breach of this enactment shall render liability to the same penalties as those convicted or charged before the Areopagus,to ensure the highest trust among Athenians in the present and in the future. This was the decree which restored the disfranchised to their rights. But the return of the exiles was not proposed by Patrocleides nor decreed by you. After the peace with Sparta, the destruction of the Long Walls, the return of the exiles and the 'fhirty, and then afterwards with the establishment of the holding of Phyle and the capture of Munychia, and all the miseries which I do not care to remember or to recall to you,2a when, in fact, you returned from the Peiraeus, you were in a position to impose penalties, but you decided to let bygones be bygones, and preferred the preservation of Athens to private revenges, resolving to wipe the slate clean all round. On this decision you elected a board of twenty to administer the city till legislation could be passed. Meanwhile the code of Solon and the enactments of Draco were to hold. But after drawing lots for a Council and electing a legislative committee you found that a good many of Solon's and Draco's enactments left a 23. Deletingthe unintelligibleiv rrD \qpooicp. SeeMacdowell. p. 40. 24. Seeintroductionto Lysias,AgainstErotosthenes, 8r

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number of citizens liable to penalties for former acivities. At an assembly on the point you passed a measure to make an examination of all the laws and inscribe in the stoa such as were approved. Now read the decree. Demee. It is enacted by the people on the proposal of reisamenus that_thecity conduct its affairs according to thj ordinance anciently established,follow the laws of solon and his weights and measures, follow also the enactments of Draco as observed-in time past: thai any further legislation which may be needed this committee elected by the council shall inscribe upon boards and exhibit before the Eponymizs-for public inspection, and set them before the magistrates within one month. Laws so set before them shall first be examined by the council and also the legislative committee of 5oo chosenby the demesunder oath. It shall be permitted to any priiate citizen who so desiresto enter the council and make recommendation for any improvement in the laws. when the laws are laid down, the council of the Areopagusshall be charged with superintendence of the laws, and their maintenanceby the magistrates.Lr*, ratified shall be posted on the wall where ihey were previously inscribed for public inspection. The laws were therefore examined in accordance with this decree, and those ratified were posted in the stoa. This being done, we passed a law by which you all a.t. Read the lar{ please. Law. No unwrimen law26shall be put into operation on any subject whatever. Is there anything omitted here which could occasion a magistrate bringing a case or any ofyou taking any action except in iccordance with the written laws I Where therefore the iivocation of an unwritten law is forbidden, it must be impossible to invoke an unwritten decree.27since, then, we reaEed that a lot of 25. The heroes after rvhom cleisthenes named the ten tribes. Their statuesstoodin the Agora.For the complicatedprovisionsof the decreesof Teisamenus seeMacdowell,pp. t 95seqq.In particularthereisdoubtaboutthe clausecommittingthe_guardianship of theia*s to the Areopagus, and how this privilege is relatedto that removedfrom the Areopagusi i 462v.c. 'unwritten 26. laws' in this passage are thosenot oth"Irily inscribed:the phraseis not usedin our familiar senseof practicesaccept.auy convention. 27. A decteeis a more temporarym""sure than a law. 8z

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ON THE MYSTERIES

Athenian citizens were in positions of misfortune as the effect of laws or decreespreviously passed,we laid down the code I have referred to for the precisecircumstanceswhich now hold, to prevent anything of this kind happening,or the possibility of vexatiousprosecutionof anyone.Read the laws in question. Laws.No unwrittenlaw shallbe put in operationon any subject whatever.No decreeeitherof the Councilor of the Peopleshallhave superiorvalidity to that of a lalv. And no law shallbe laid down to apply to a singleindividual,unlessit appliesalso to the whole Peopleof Athens,if it is not decidedby six thousandvotersby secretballot. What remains?This law. Read it please. Lnn. The judgementsand arbitrationsmadein Athensunderthe democracy shallbe valid.And the lawsshallbe in forceasfrom the Archonshipof Eucleides.2s You enacted that the judgements and arbitrations made in Athens under the democracyshould be valid to prevent the cancellationof debts or the repetition of suits, and to maintain the validity of private agreements.But in the case of public offenceswhich admit of public prosecutionsor indictments or information ,or summary processes,for these purposes you decreedthat the laws dating from the Archonship of Eucleides should hold good. When it was decided to examine the laws, and after examinationto post them, and that no unwritten law shouldbe brought into operationabout anything,that no decree either of the Council or the Peopleshould havesuperiorvalidity to a law, that no law should be passedto apply to a single individual, if it did not apply to all Athenian citizens,and that the lawspassedin the Archonshipof Eucleidesshould be valid, then is there any possibilitythat any of the decreesmadebefore the Archonship of Eucleides can have any validity at all ? I think not. But considerfor yourselves. Well, then, what about your oaths? The one which holds good for the whole city, and which you haveall sworn sincethe generalreconciliation,is this: 'And I will bearno ill will against 28. To the Archonship of Eucleides in 4o3 B.c. belongs the revision of the laws which followed the expulsion of the Thirty.

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any citizen except the Thirty and the Eleven, and not even against one of these if he is willing to render account of his conduct of office.' Where, then, you have sworn an oath not to bear ill will even to the Thirty (who were responsiblefor the greatestmiseriesof all), if they renderedaccountof their office, you could scarcelyhave thought fit to do so againstany other citizens.Again, what is the oath of the council in power ar any time ? 'I will not accept any information or summary process -eiiles.'rq !n respect of previous events except against the Finally what is your own oath, beforeyou becamemembersof this court I 'And I will bear no ill will nor induce anotherto do 9o, b-u1I-will give my vote in accordancewith the existing laws.'And you must considerwhetherI seemright in claimin[ to speakon your own behalf and that of the laws. Now, gentlemen,considerboth the laws and the accusersin court,. and ask yourselveswhat basis there is which justifies them in making accusation.cephisius here leaseda taxro from the treasury,collectedthe profits from farmers on the land to the tune of 9o minae, but instead of paying it in absconded. Had he appeared,he would have been put in the stocks.The law provided that the Council should have the power, in the case of non-payment of dues, to put the delinquent in the stocks.So in view of the enactmentin favour of the lawspassed under EucleidesCephisiusclaims nor to repay lvhat he appropriated, and the outlaw has now recoveredhis citizenship,and the disfranchised citizen has turned informer becauseyou are o-peratingthe laws at present in vogue. Meletus again, as you all know,3l arrestedLeon under the Thirty, whicli resultedin Leon's deathwithout trial. Yet this law was previouslyin force, and has been retainedin operationas desirable:that the instigator of an action is liable to the samepunishmentas the actual perpetratorof it. Now Meletus is out of dangerof a prosecution for homicidefrom Leon's heirs,becausethe laws to be enforced whofledto Eleusisin 4o3.seeintroduction to Lysias, _ 29.the oligarchs

Eratosthenes, above. 3o. See notes 34 and 4z below. 3r. On the celebrated occasion when Socrates, ordered by the Thirty to accompany Meletus on this assignment, refused.

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are those in operation under Eucleides. That he arrested Leon, he himself cannot deny. Epichares is another instance. A man of the lowest character and intentionally so, who directs his ill will against himself, he was in the Council under the Thirty, but what is the wording of the law inscribed over the Council 'Anyone chamber ? who served on the Council after the dissolution of the democracy, roy be put to death with impunity, and his killer is without stain on his character, and can take the property of the dead man.' In that case,Epichares, is not anyone who kills you regarded as being without a stain according to Solon's law ? Read me the law on the stone. Lap. Decreed by the Council and People. Prytanis, the tribe Aeantis: Secretary, Cleigenes: Chairman, Boethus: drafted by Demophantus.The commencementof this decreeis to date from the year of the Council of five hundred appointed by lot for which Cleigeneswas the first secretary. If any man overthrow the democracy at Athens, or if any man hold officeafter the democracyis overthrown, he shall be an enemy of the Athenians and be killed without penalty to his killer, and his property shall be confiscatedto the state, and a tenth part of it given to the Goddess.And whoever shall kill such a man or shall take counsel for his killing, shall be without stain and without guilt. And all Athenians shall swear upon unblemished victims, tribe by tribe and derneby dente,to kill any man 'who has done so. 'I And the oath shall bc this: will kill by 'wordand by deedand with my vote and with my hand, if I am able, rvhosoevcrshall overthrow the democracyin Athens or whosocvcr shall hold any office after the democracyhas becn ovcrtluown, or rvhosoevershall set himself up to be a tyrant, or take part in setting up a tyrant. And if any other man kill such a one, I 'rvill hold him sinlessbefore gods and spirits for that he killed an enemy of the Athenians, and I will sell all the property of the man so killed, and rvill give one half of it to the killer, and I will not hold back any of his share.And if any man in killing such a one or in seekingto do so be himself killed, I will do good for him and his offspring just as for Harmodius and Aristogeiton and their descendants.And all oathsthat are sworn in Athens or in the camp or anywhere else which are adverse to the PeopleofAthens, I canceland renounce.'Thesethings all Athenians shall swear upon unblemished victims as the customary oath before the Dionysia, and they shall call down many blessings on all such

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as keepthis oath, but upon him that shallbreakit destructionfor him and his offspring. I ask you, as a practitioner of deceit and misrepresentation,is this law valid or not valid ? The reasonwhy it has suddenly becomeinvalid, I suppose,is that the laws in force have to be those of the time of Eucleides.As for you, though you carty on your existenceand go about Athens, you are not entitled to. Under the democracyyou lived by informing, and under the oligarchy you avoided being made to disgorgerhe profits of your informingrz by bootlicking the Thirty. And you talk to me about 'association'and taking people'scharactersawayl It wasn't a single individual you'associated'with - it's a pity it wasn't - you got a little from anyonewho caredto, as everyone here knows, and lived a life of immoral practices,despiteyour squalid appearance.Yet he had the temerity to accuseother people,when by the laws of Athens he cannotevenmakea case for himself. As a matter of fact, gentlemen,sitting as defendant during his prosecutionof me I felt, as I looked at him, exactly as I would after arrest by the Thirty. If I had been pleading my case then, who would have been my accuser? He would have been ready for the job, if I didn't offer him his price. So it is now. Who would have been my interrogatorbut Charicles, with his question,'Tell me, Andocides,did you Bo to Decelea* and fortify it againstyour countryi''No, I didn't.''Well, did you raid Athenian territory and carry off property, either on land or sea, at the expenseof your felloli.-citizens?' 'No.' 'You didn't fight againstyour country at seaeither, or help in pulling down the walls, or in abolishingthe democracv,or force your way backto Athensl' 'No, I didn't do any of thesethings.' 'Do you expect to get away with it, then, and not die lihe so many others?' Do you imagine,gentlemen,that I should have 32. On informers under the Thirty see introduction to Lysias, p. 40. Greek orators not infrequently resorted to abuse,even when it was irrelevant, if they thought it likely to produce an effect on the jury. Charicles here appears as a member of the Thirty associatedrvith Critias, and is imagined as a presiding magistrateopening a prosecution and accusing Andocides of failure to take part in the disloyal proceedings of the oligarchs. 33. Decelea in North Attica was fortified by the Spartans, as a base for attacks on Athens, in 4r3 8.c., and many oligarchs fled there.

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met any other fate on your account, if I had been caught by the Thirty ? And don't you think it appalling that, considering that I would have been done to death by them for doing no harm to Athens, as happenedto others, I should not be acquitted now that I am on trial before you, whom I have never harmed? If any human being can be acquitted,I must be. As a matter of fact the information againstme was given in accordance with establishedlaw,:+ but the accusationrests on the decree made previously about others. So if you propose to condemn me, have a care that it may not be my special businessto give an accountof what happenedin the past, and a good many other people's businesseven more, either opponents in the fighting with whom you have had a reconciliation, or exiles you have allowed back, or disfranchisedcitizens you have restored.For their benefit you have published proclamations or cancelledlaws or deleteddecrees,and they now remain in Athens and trust you. If they realizethat you are accepting the accusationsof the accusersof the past, what do you think they will supposein their own cases? Which of them do you imagine rvill want to enter a suit on the events of the past? Rows of enemiesand malicious prosecutorswill appear who will be eagerto contend with them. Both classesare here now to listen, but not with the samepoint of view. One lot will want to know whether they can trust existing laws and the sworn agreementsbetween you, and the other to test your attitude and seewhether they are going to be free to make falseaccusations and indictments with impunity, and to inform against people and even get them imprisoned. This is the position, gentlemen.My life is on trial in this business,and your vote will give public demonstrationwhether your enactmentsare to be trusted, or whether one needseither to squarethe informers or to run away from them and leave Athens with all possible speed. But to show that your proceedingsin aid of union are not a failure, but that what you have done is indeed to your credit and your advantage,I want to say just a little about this. 34. That of Isotimides. If this is regarded as still valid, then so are other measures under which Andocides' accusers are guilty of other offences.

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During the time of greatdisastersto Athens,when the tyrants3s held the city and the popular party were in exile,your ancestors defeatedthe tyrants in battle at Palleniumunder the command and Charias,rvhosedaughter of Leogoras,Dy great-grandfather, my grandfathermarried, and killed or condemnedthe tyrants to exile or else let them stay, but not as citizens.Later, when Persia invaded Greece, your ancestorsrealized the extent of the threateneddisastersand the size of the Persianarmament, and they decided to accept their exiles back and restore their citizen rights, and let the successand the dangerbe the same for all. After this they made mutual undertakingsunder the most solemnoaths,and claimedthe right to take the front line of the Greek force and meet the enemy at Marathon, on the assumptionthat their own valour would be found sufficientto battle with the greatnumbers of the enemy. They fought and conquered,and set Greecefree and savedtheir country. After so tremendousan achievementthey did not think it right to harbour ill will. This was the reasonrvhy, when they found their city devastated,their sacredplacesburnt and their walls and housesfallen to the ground, their unity of spirit enabled them to acquirethe sovereigntyof Greeceand hand down a city as great and splendidas ours. Later on, in a time of no less disasterthan that, you yourselveswith the noble spirit of a noble race displayedthe generositythat was in you, when you thought it proper to receivethe exileshome, and restoretheir rights to the disfranchised.What remainsin you of their nobility I The refusal to harbour ill will, in the remembrancethat our city rose from a small beginningin time past to greatness and success.Such it could still be, if we, its citizens,could keep good senseand unity together. But these people even accusedme on the scoreof the olive branch which they said I depositedin the Eleusinium,36when the traditionallaw saidthat to offer supplicationat the mysteries 35. This refers to the tyranny of Peisistratus and his sons. The battle to which Andocides refers is hard to identify, but perhaps belongs to the time of the expulsion of Hippias with the aid of Cleomenesin 5ro n.c. 36. A sign of supplication forbidden on religious grounds during the celebration of the mysteries.

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was punishable with death. They arc brazen enough, in an arrangementthey themselvesconcerted,to be dissatisfiedwith failing to succeed,and they raise an accusationagainstme as the person guilty. When we returned from Eleusis, and the information had been laid, the Basileusappeared,to report on the performanceat the festival at Eleusis in accordancewith custom.The Prytaneissaid they would take him to the Council, and ordered him to notify me and Cephisiusto attend at the Eleusinium, becausethe Council intended to hold its session there accordingto Solon's law, which lays down a sessionin the Eleusiniumthe day following the mysteries.So we appeared in accordancewith instructions. When the Council were all present,Callias,son of Hipponicus, in his official garb, stated that there was a suppliant branch on the akar, and displayedit. The Herald then proclaimed the question, who laid it there, and there was no answer.But we were there and Cephisiussaw me. As no one answered,and Eucles here, after making rhe inquiry, had gone in again - but call him, please.First of all, Eucles,witnessto the truth of this statementof mine. (Eaidenceof witness) As to the truth of my statement,evidencehas norv been given. But it seemsto me very different from what my accuserssaid. themselves They said,if you remember,that the two goddesses misled me into depositingthe branch in ignoranceof the law, so as to get me punished.But my contention,gentlemen,even if my accusers'statementis as true as you like, is that I was If I depositedthe branch,but failed to savedby the goddesses. answer,wasn't I working on my own destructionin placing it, and owed my survival to the chanceof failing to answer,which I Had they wished to was obviously due to the goddesses destroy me, I'd have been bound to say I'd deposited the branch, even if I hadn't. But in fact I didn't answerbecauseI didn't depositit. When Eucles declaredin the Council that no one had answered,Callias stood up again and declared that there was an ancient law that anyone depositing a branch in the Eleusinium should be put to death without trial, and that Hipponicus, his father, had once expoundedthis to the 8q

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Athenians,and he heardthat I had laid the branchthere.At this 'Callias, you point up jumped our friend, Cephalus,and said, are the most unprincipled crook in existence.F irst of all you give explanationswhen you're one of the Heralds and are not allowed to, and secondlyyou call it an ancient law when the tablet you're sitting by ordersa fine of a thousanddracltmaefor placing a branch in the Eleusinium. Then again,who told you Andocides placed it theret Call him, if you like, and we can hear too.' Then when the inscription was read, Callias himself couldn't say where he got the information, and it was obvious to the Council that he'd put it there himself. Well, now, gentlemen,- perhapsthis is what you'd like to knolv yourselves- what was Callias' idea in placing the branch there? I'll tell you the point of this plot againstme. Epilycus, son of Teisander,was my uncle, my mother's brother. He died in Sicily without sons,but he left two daughterswho came to the charge of Leagros and myself. At home his position was none too good. The property he left was worth less than two talents, and the debts were more than five. However, I called on Leagros,and said in front of our family that the right thing ( to do in the circumstanceswas to honour our relationship.3TJn 'it's not right to put other money affairs our position,' I said, or personalconsiderationsin front of Epilycus' daughters.If he had lived, or had died worth a lot of money, we should have expected,as the nearestrelations,to take his daughters.In that case it would have been our regard for Epilycus or for his money. Now it'll be our regard for what is right. So you put in a claim for one, and I'll have the other.' He agreed,and we took them, as we'd agreedto do. Now it so happenedthat the one I claimed as my bride took ill and died. Her sister's still alive, and Callias induced Leagros, with the promise of a 37.If a man died intestate and left a daughter, but no male heir, his property and his daughter passed to the next of kin, who could claim to marry the daughter, or else provide a dowry for her to marry someone else. In the caseof the poorest class, to which Epilycus may have belonged, he was obliged to do one or the other. The complication of this incident is due to the fact that Epilycus was also related to Callias, but not so closely as to Andocides and his cousin, Leogoras. The only way in which Callias could forestall Andocides' claim, therefore, was by causing him to leave the country.

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present,to let him have her. When I got word of this, I at once paid the depositand brought a suit, first againstLeagros,saying in effect, 'If you want to put in a claim for her, good luck to it, but otherwiseI will.' Hearing this Calliasenteredan action for his own son to marry the heiress,on the tenth of the month, to prevent me making my claim. On the twentieth - this was the time of the mysteries - he paid Cephisius a thousand drachmae,and informed against me and entered this suit. Seeingthat I washolding my ground,he placedthe branchwith the object of securing my death without trial, or getting rid of me and offering an inducement to Leagros, so as to live with Epilycus' daughter himself. But as he saw that even so he couldnlt get his own way without a fight, he then approached Lysistratus, Hegemon and Epichares, who he realized were friends of mine and went about with me, and was so lacking in respectfor law or decencyas to say to them that if I were at last prepared to give up Epilycus' daughter, he was prepared to stop molesting me and to take Cephisius off and give me compensation,according to my friends' estimate,for what had been done to me. I told him he could go on accusingand framing me, and if I could get an acquittal, and Athens got to know the truth about my case,I thought he in his turn would be in dangerof his life. And I'll be as good as my word, if you gentlemenwill agree.Call the evidenceto the truth of my statement. (Euidenceof mitnesse s) After all, think of the son for whom he wantedto makea match with Epilycus' daughter.Considerhow he was born, and how Caliias acknowledgedhim. It is another point you ought to know of. He married the daughter of Ischomachus,and he hadn't been living with her a year before he took up with her mother and started living with her - mother and daughter at once, of all unspeakablethings for a priest of the Mother and Daughter to do,ts keepingthem both in the house.He had no shame or scrupie in regard to the goddesses.Ischomachus' daughter felt that death was better than going on as she was, 38. i.e. Demeter and Persephone.

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and tried to hang herself, but was found before she succeeded. When she recovered, she ran away, so the mother drove the daughterout. But she did no better, becauseas soon as he was tired of her he threw her out too, though she said she was pregnant by him. So when she gave birth to a son, he denied that it was his. The wife's relationstook the baby and came to the altar at the Apaturia with a victim, and told Calliasto begin the ceremony. He asked who the father was, and they said, 'Callias, the son of Hipponicus.''That's me!' 'Yes, it's your son.' He put his hand on the altar, and solemnlysworethat he had no son exceptHipponicus, whosemother was the daughter of Glaucon. He called down complete destruction on himself and his whole family, if this wasnot so. And so it will indeedbe. Later he fell in love with the old war-horse3eagain, took her home and brought the boy, who was by now quite big, to the Keryces, and declared that he was his son. Callicles spoke againstacceptinghim, but the Kerycesvoted accordingto their rules, that when the father swore on oath that it was his own son he was introducing, he should introduce him. Then he touchedthe altar and again solemnlyswore that it was his own son, the true-born child of Chrysilla, whom he had previously disowned.Now pleasecall witnessesof all this. (Eaidence of witnes ses) Now just consider,gentlemen,whether such a thing has ever happenedin the Greek world before,that a man married a wife, then married her mother to follow the daughter, and the mother drove the daughter out. Now, while he is living with her, he wants to g€t Epilycus' daughter,so that grand-daughter can drive out grandmother,though what name we are to give to the son, I can't think. I defy anyone,however ingenious,to work out a name for him. As there are three women his father will have lived with, he is the reputed son of one of them, the brother of another and the uncle of a third. Who would he be himselfl Oedipus or Aegisthus,or whatl But there is still a small matter connecredwith Calliaswhich I want to remind you of. Cast your minds back to the time 39.'Battle-axe' I Macdowell. 92

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when Athens was supremein Greeceand at the height of her prosperity,and Hipponicus was the wealthiestman in Greece. Then was the time, you well know, when there was a saying among the women and small children which ran through the whole city, that Hipponicus was bringing up an evil genius who upset the balance of his affairs.+oYou remember that, gentlemen.Well, how do you think the story of that period came out ? Hipponicus thought he was producing a son, but it was his evil genius,who turned his estateupsidedown, and his good sense,and his whole existence.That is the conclusionwe must come to about him, that he was Hipponicus' evil genius. But, gentlemen,why was it that people who are assisting Calliasin this attackon me, and helping to rig this actionagainst me and contributing money for it, did not think me guilty of sacrilegein the three years since I came back from Cyprus, though I initiated A*x+' from Delphi and other friends from abroad,rvhen I enteredthe Eleusinium and did sacrifice,as I think myself entitled to do. On the contrary,they kept nominating me for public services,first as Gymnasiarchat the festival of Hephaestus,then to lead the Athenian representatives at the Isthmian and Olympic games,and then I was to be a controller of the sacredtreasuryon the Acropolis.But now apparentlyit is impiousand wrongof me that I appearat religiousceremonies. I will tell you why thesepeopletakcthis line. Our distinguished friend, Agyrrhius, becamechief collector of the two-per-cent for two years,4zand bought the tax for thirty talents, with the assistanceof these associateswho met by the poplar, and you are awareof their character.It seemsto me that they held this gatheringtherefor two reasons,to receivemoneyfor not bidding higher, and to get sharesin the businessat a cheaprate. They made three talents, and then, rcalizing the sort of businessit 4o. I owe to Mr Macdowell this rendering of a pun in the Greek. 4r. A name is lost from the text here (unless it is concealedin the words pev d\il"rpov). 42. This was a tax on exports and imports. Athens, like Rome later, made use of tax farmers for purposes of collection. In this instance they worked in syndicate, and Agyrrhius and his friends bought the contract twice in succession for a lower rate than was necessary, making a profit which Andocides prevented on the next occasion.

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was,and how valuable,they all clubbed togetherand sharedit out to the rest, and then offered thirty talents again the next year. As no one was offering more, I came forward and put a higher bid to the Council, till I got rhe contract for thirty-six. I thus got rid of them, arrangedguarantorsfor myself,collected the money and paid it over to the treasury.Nor did I loseby it. Our companymade a small profit. And I preventedthe other lot from appropriatingsix talents.They rcalizedthis and hacla little discussion,'This chap isn't going to get anything out of the public funds, or let us do so either. He's setting up to mount guard against any profit-making there. And besides, any of us he seesdeparting from the straight and narrow he'll havein court, and it'll be the end of us. We'd better put him out of the way by hook or by crook.' This was the job they had beforethem, while yours was the opposite.BecauseI'd like you to haveas many like me as possible,then for choicepeoplelike them could be eliminated,but failing that there shouldbe a force to prevent their activities, consistingof men of good, honest characterin dealingswith the peopleas a whole. Then, if they want to, they will be able to be of serviceto you. I promiseyou either to put a stop to suchpractices,and makethem mend their ways,or bring the culprits to court and punish them. They also accused me in connexion with my sea-going commercialundertakings,as if the reasonwhy the gods saved me from dangerwas, apparently,to come here and be done to death by Cephisius.But I don't believe the gods could hold such a view as not to punish me when they had me in such terrible danger,if they thought I had done them wrong. What greaterdangercould a man undergo than going on voyagesin the winter I When they had me physicallyexposedto this, and were in control of my life and property, did they let me off in spite of it I Couldn't they have gone further and had my body deprived of burial ? Or again there was a war on, there were warshipsconstantlyat sea,and pirates,and many were captured by them and lost all their properry and ended their lives in slavery; there was alien territory, and many were stranded there and subjectedto the most terrible hardship, and died of personal,physicalinjury - and then are we to supposethe gods 9+

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preservedme from all this, only to put their vengeancein the hands of the most unprincipled man in Athens, who claims to be an Athenian citizen when he is not, a man no one among you in the jury, who know his character,would trust with any of your personalaffairsI No, I think we ought to regard this sort of risk as under the control of men, and those at sea as the province of the gods. Then, if one can be permitted to make a guessabout the nature of the gods,I think they would be filled with anger and resentmentif they saw people they had preservedbeing done to death by human beings. There is a further considerationworth keeping in mind, gentlemen,that you now have the reputation throughout Greece of outstandinggood characterand wisdom by not turning to retaliation for the past, but towards the preservationof our city and unity amongits citizens.Many others havesuffereddisasters as great as ours. But the settlement of existing differencesin hrppy reconciliation is rightly thought a sign of goodnessand wisdom. So, since it is universally admitted thar you have this character towards friend and foe alike, do not change your minds, or agree to the loss of this distinction, or to a vote on your own part which appears based on chance rather than on thought. So I ask you all to hold the same opinion of me as of my forerunners, so that I may be enabled to follow their lead. Recall that they have resembledthe city's grearesrand most extensivebenefactorsfor numerousreasons,but principally out of good will towards you, and the desire that, should they or any of their descendants be in dangeror trouble, they might be preservedby the fellow-feelingyou would have for them. And you would havegood reasonto rememberthem. The whole city experiencedthe value of the characterof previous generations in Athens. When the fleet was destroyed,and there were plenty who wanted to plunge Athens into irreparabledisaster,it was the Spartanswho, enemiesas they were, then determined to preservethe city becauseof the valour of the men who were the foundersof freedom for all Greece.Since,then, the city as a whole owed its preservationto the valour of your ancestors, I claim that the qualities of my ancestorsmay be the causeof 95

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my own preservation.To the deedswhich then led to the safety of Athens,my ancestorsmadeno small contribution. It is therefore just that I should shareat your hands in the preservation you yourselveswere accordedby the Greeks. Considertoo the characteryou will find in me, if you acquit me. First of all, after possessionof an income of which you know, I was brought, through no fault of mine, but through the misfortunesof Athens, to the depth of want and poverty. After that I made a fresh livelihood for myself by honourable means,by *y own wits and my own hands.I knew what it was to be a citizen of such a city, and what it was to be an alien resident in a foreign country, and I understoodthe nature of sound and wise thinking, and the nature of error and adversity. I had experienceof many people and many different circumstances,which have brought me hospitalityand friendship with kings and cities, and private friends as well, who rvill be yours too, if you acquit me, and you will be ableto makeuseof them whenever occasionoffers. In fact, gentlemen, this is how it standswith you. If you put an end to me, there is no one left of my family, which is destroyedroot and branch. Yet you have incurred no disgracefrom the house of Andocides and Leogoras,since it has been ours. There was much more to be ashamedof when I was in exile, and Cleophon,a3the lyremaker,lived in it. There hasnever beena time when any of you passedthis houseof ours with the memory of any ill treatment at our hands. My family held countlesscommandsand can show numeroustrophies won from the enemy by land and by sea,held endlessother offices,handled your financeswithout ever failing in the examinationof accounts,and without any offence committed on either side. It was a house of great antiquify and great liberality to anyonein need. Nor was there a single occasionwhen any of them was involved in a suit and askedany return for these services.Do not, becausethey are dead, forget what they achieved.Remembertheir deeds,and believe that you see their figures before you begging you for my acquittal. Whom can I bring before you to plead for me ? 43. From the revolution of 4r r s.c. till the end of the war Cleophon was the leader of the democratic party in Athens.

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My fatherI He is dead.Brothers? I havenone. Children ? They are not yet born. You must take the place of father, brothers and children. In you is my onerefuge,and to you my prayersand supplications are addressed.B.g for me from yourselves, and spareme. Do not consentto createcitizens from Thessaly and Andros becauseof your shortageof manpower,'{4and at the sametime destroymen who are true citizens,and who have a duty, and the desire,and the power) to be good ones.Do not, I beg you. And I ask this, too. I havedone well by you. Honour me for it in return. Then if you grant my wish, you will not be deprived of the further good I have it in my power to do. But if you accedeto my enemies,then, if you later regret it, you will not be able to do anything. So do not depriveyourselvesof your hopes in me, nor me of mine in you. And I ask these friends, who have always given proof of nobility towards the peopleof Athens, to stand here and give you testimonyof their opinion of me. Come forward, Anytus,asCephalus, and rny fellow-tribesmenwho have beenchosento act as my advocates. 44. A number of measureswere taken between 4o6 and 4or B.c. to increase the citizen body by enfranchising various classesof men. 45. Anytus had been a leading politician since being associatedwith Alcibiades and later Thrasybulus. Still later he appears as the prosecutor of Socrates.

I S O C R A T ES : P A N E G Y R I C U S

I N T R O D U CITO N Isocrateswasbornin 4SSa.c., and diedat the ageof ninery-eight. IIe wasrpelleducuted,tr,ndeurljt in his hfe catneu,nderthe influence of the leoding intellectuals of ilte period o/ the early Sophists, itt. partinilar oJ Gorgins,and lte is mentionedin the Phaedrus oJ-Plato (tfgo) as a fallower oJ' Socrutes and a Jlrtng lnan of aerl greatpromise.F'nancial dfficu,ltiesduringthePeloponnesian War ntade it necessary fbr ltim t0 enrn kis liaing, and afier a period of writing speeches Jitr use bjt litigants in the czurts, he tonnedto teoching,first in Chios,but after aboutJgo 8.c., in Athens. He rpasextremefitsuccessful, and after the publication of ltis clientlle outsideAthens througlqthe the Panegyficusexlended, Greek world. His airnsand rnethodsare reJbrredto in the General Introduction(see1t.r 3 serlq).He published, a numbero/'workswhich wereoratorical in -fonn,,but rperenot intendetlto be deliaered,, but to bereod.He clescribes in the Philip (Br) his reusons for giaing up practical ora,toryund prqfbrrhryIo u/Jict the courseo/'theTtolitical world partlJ by his teucltingund ltortly b.ysuch essaysas these. Tno oJ'thernappearin tltis book, the Panegyricus,in Jitrm an oration fo, n Pon-Hellenic gathering, and, tke Philip, a letter addressed to Pltilip oJ'tVlacedon whenIsocrateswas a,h'ead1 ninety yars old. The Panegyricus,publishedin or after j8o n.c., was ostensibll rleaoteclt0 zne o/' Isocrates'main th.emes, the unificationof' the Greek world. For this he looks t0 & recznciliationoJ-Athensand, Sparto. But tnuchaf'the treatiseczncerns th,efitness of Athensfor the leadershipo/'Greece,and its generalpraise of Athens ffirds someinterestingcornpurisons witlt the Funerul Oration af Pericles Athens, thouglt.in Q. SS se(l(l.).It is the nxzrerenxorkablebecause part recorteredfrom hercollapse in 4o48.c., wasstillfar/iorn herold, wealtlx and, ,qreatnessin a rporkl d,ominated, by Sparta, whose disastrouspolicjt is muchemphasized,. The Panegyricusthus refers for the mzil part to eaentsafter tlte PeloponnesianWar and,

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beforetheriseofThebesat the battle of Leuctra in j7r s.c. It deols ond unpopularity of Sparta (rrZ) in particular with the method,s during the period,,with the careerof Conon and rpith the King's Peace. Left xr,premeoaerGreeceafter 4o4B.c. Sqartl, earnetlunioersal ltatredfor the rigid, control she exerted,.Democroticconstitutions were thrown asideond a garri,soninstalled in each,citl under a Spartan glrernlr called,a harmost (rt) and a board' of ten proaedsounpopular (decurch,y) to goaern.Eten whenilte decarcl'ries that tlrey were discarded,their place was taken by oligorckies, to main' while tribute was leaiedb7former Ath.enian.depentlencies tain o fleet. But in spite of unpopularity Sparta ntaintainedher ltegemony, and ffier the rebellionof Cyrusbeganto rnakeottacksuponPersio for the recoptureof Greek statesin Asia, eaentltoughfaced with dfficulties at ltorneand,a confederacyof opponentsin tJteso-called Corintltian War. Oneof the lteroesof theseerentspas the Athenian adtniral, Conon, who, haaing escnped from Aegospotomiburning with hatredof Sparta,ma.d,e his wal to Eaagoras,thepro-Atltenian the naaal ruler of Salamis in Clprus. Togetlterthey reinaigorated, power of Persia,and it was Cononwho brouglttaboutthe defeatof Sparta at Cnidus in 391 s,c. This was ilte main eaentof wltot Isocratescalls the Rh,odianwar Q4z) ltecausethe main bottle was notfar from Rhodes,whosereaoltfrom Sparta Cononh.adsecured. This battle, with its militarl coanterportat Coroneojust afterwards, so reducedSportan pzner as t0 czm.pelan accomrnodation with. Persio. Sparta sacceeded in turning the Persian King ogainst his Greek allies, and in j87186 s.c. imposedon the Greekworld theKing's Peoce,deaised by Sparta andapproaed, anddictatedb7the K*g. The only recalcitrant wos Eaagoros,wh,odespitethe fact that the PeaceassumedPersian control of Clprus, stootl against Persiauntilforced to suefor peacein j8r. It wasin thisperiod tltat Ionianforces rnereusedagainstlritn by Persia Qz4 and r34). Eaents betweenthe foll of tlre Tltirty in Ath,ens(seeLlsias, Eratosthenes)and the publicotion of tlte Panegyricuss,recouered, by Xenophon'sHellenica (tr. Rex Warner in Penguin Classicsas A History of My Times), BooksIII, il/, V. roo

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Tnn institution of festivalsrwhich include athleticcompetitions has often led me to feel surpriseat the largerewardsofferedfor mere physicalsuccesses, while the unselfishendeavourof men who have set their whole being to work for the benefit of others receivesno recognition,though they merit the greaterconsideration. Athletic physiquemight be doubledwithout any benefitto others,while the public spirit of a single individual may bring profit to all who care to participate in it. NonethelessI have not been discouragedor reducedto inactivity. In the assurance that the repute my words will rvin me is sufficient reward I come here to advocatea policy of war outside the bounds of Greece,and unity within. f am awarethat many who claim to be men of intelligencehavecomeforward to dealwith this subject. But I makea doubleclaim to it, first in the hopeof establishing such a distinction from them that mine will be thought the first word on the subject,and secondlyin the initial belief that the best oratory is that which deals with the greatestthemes and combinesa display of the speaker'spowers with the interests of his audience,as this does. In addition, favourable circumstancesstill hold, so that the subjecthas not yet become obsolete.A theme should be brought to a closewhen the circumstances which gaverise to it are over and with them the need to consider it, or when the discussioncan be seen to have reachedits conclusionand nothing further is left for others to add. When the position remainsunalteredand the ideasoffered areinadequate,thereis surelyneedto considerin a philosophical spirit a view whose successfulpresentationwill rid us of the presentinternecinewar and dissensionwith its unequalledevils. Again, if there were but a single way in which to present the samematerial,the reply might be madethat it is a wasteof time to weary an audienceby repeatingit. But as the nature of the theme is such as to allow numerousvariationsof treatment,to r. The Panegltricus was written as though for a Pan-Hellenic festival, though it was never delivered at one. IOI

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make it possible to increaseor diminish the prominence of different aspects,to use a novel approach to early instancesor seethe new in the light of the old, there is no causeto avoid ground alreadyexplored,but rather to attempt to improve on previous approachesto it. Past history is indeed a common legacy.But to makeappropriateuseof it, to take a right attitude to its details and document it fully requires real soundnessof thought. And this, I think, is where the greatestadvancecan be made in any art, not least in the culture which comesthrough oratory.It demandsthat we shallvalueand givecredit,not to the first in the field, but to the best performance,not to an original choiceof subject, but to the ability to outdistanceall rivals. There is some tendency to criticize speecheswhich are too highly elaboratedfor the ordinary man. Such critics make the great mistakeof viewing a very elaboratediscoursein the same light asa speechin a privatesuit, asthough both shouldhavethe same character. They do not rcalize that one kind aims at accuracy,the other at display,that their own eye is on simplicity, but that the power to commandperfectionin oratory would be incompatiblewith a simple style.There is no difficulty in seeing that they give their approval within their own familiar understanding. I am not concernedwith them so much as with the view that will rejectany looseness of expressionand will irritably demandqualitiesin my work which will not appearin any other. To this I will speaka bold word in self-defencebeforeembarking on my theme. In general, opening passagesare designed to mollify the audienceand makeexcusefor the discoursewhich is to follow, by claiming either hasty preparationor the difficulty of finding words to match the greatnessof the subject. I take the oppositeapproach,and declarethat, if I fail to do justice to my subject,to my reputation and to the length, not only of the time now occupiedby it, but of my whole life, I ask for no sympathy,but ridicule and contempt. I deserveit in the fullest measure)if I have no more than ordinary qualificationsfor so lofty an undertaking. So much, then, by way of preambleon personalgrounds. If I now turn to public concerns,the claims made at the outset, that we should sink our own enmitiesand divert them outside t02

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Greece,and the lengthyaccountsof the disastersof war between Greek states and the benefitsof an expedition against Persia, aretrue enough.But they do not beginat the bestpoint to secure their ends.The Greek statesare divided berweenAthenian and Spartan spheresof influence,the division being in most cases ideological.Any idea, therefore, of doing common service to Greek stateswithout reconciling the leadersis naive and unrealistic. Any attempt to go further than demonstrationsand achieve something practical requires arguments to persuade theset\vo statesto divide the leadershipon a basisof equality, and to turn the selfishdemandswhich they now makeon Greek statesinto expectationof gain from Persia.It is easy to lead Athens to this view, but Spartais still hard to influence,having taken upon herselfthe falseidea of supremacyas her heritage. But a demonstrationthat this priority is ours of right rather than theirs may induce them to pursue the generaladvantage insteadof standingon preciselegal claims. This shouldhavebeenthe startingpoint for the other speakers, who should not have introduced discussionof points of agreement beforedealingwith controversialissues.At any rate there are two aims which justify me in devotingconsiderabletime to this subject.I hope, preferably,to effectsomethingof value, to see an exchangeof internal disputesfor external war. Failing this, it is my purposeto demonstratelvhich are the stateswhich standin the way of the bestinterestsof Greece,and to showthat, while our previous maritime supremacywas just, our present claim to leadershipis no less so. In the first place, if in every field experienceand influence are to be the qualification for honour,we havean indisputableclaim to recoverthe supremacy which was once ours. It is impossibleto point to a state which can boast as overwhelminga superiority in land warfare as is ours at sea.Secondly,if the justice of this criterion is denied, and stressis laid on the frequencyof political changeand the ephemeralcharacterof political power,if it is urged that leadership, iike any other distinction,should go whereeither priority of possession or serviceto Greeceafford a claim, then it is my unalteredopinion that that claim is ours. A full historicalscrutiny of both qualificationswill only serve to show our superiority r03

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over our rivals. Our claim to be the most ancient, the greatest and the most universally famed of all cities is admitted. But distinguishedas is the basiswhich underliesit, there is closely connectedwith it an even clearerground for honour. Our title to possessionis not basedupon the eviction of others or the acquisitionof an untenantedrvilderness,nor on forming a mixed collectionof races.zThe distinctionand purity of our line has of the land of our enabledus to remain in unalteredpossession birth. We sprangfrom its soil, and can use the samenamesfor it as for our own blood. We are the only Greek statewhich can properly call our land by the names of nurse, fatherland and mother. Any justifiable pride, ilny reasonableclaim to leadership, any memories of ancestralgreatness,must shorv some such racial origins to support it. Such, then, is the extent of our original gifts which were bestowedon us by fortune. The total of the benefitswe have conferred on others can most properly be reckonedby a systematic account of the history of Athens from the beginning. To her, it will be found, the debt is almostentirely due, not only for the uncertaintiesof war, but for all the organizationwhich forms the milieuof daily existence,the basisof political activity, and the meansof life itself. But we are bound to set in the forefront, not those benefitswhose insignificancemakesthem forgotten and neglected,but those others whosegreat importance in the past, as now, setsthem everywherehigh in the memory and in the recordsof all mankind. First, then, it was by meansof our country that the first need of man's nature was provided. Even though the story may be legendary,it is still right that it should be recounted here.: When Demeter arrived in this district in her wanderingsafter the rape of Persephone,she showedfavour to our forbearsfor benefitsreceivedwhich can only be mentionedto the initiated, and conferredtwo gifts which surpassall others,the cultivation 'synoecism of Attica', a z. This seems to refer to the semi-legendary voluntary merger of small sovereignties in Attica which in historical times was celebrated by the feast of the Synoikia. The inhabitants of Attica were commonly supposed to have been autochthonous. 3. See note 7 below.

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of crops, which brought a higher form of life than that of the animals, and the mysteries, which gave their initiates more enviablehopes both for the conclusionof this life and for all eternity. It has come about that this city of ours was endowed not merelywith the love of the gods,but with love for mankind, and consequently,having such wonderful things in her control, did not grudgethem to others, but allowed all to participatein them. We still perform thesemysteriesannually, and the state gave instruction about the practicesconveyedto man and their developmentand value. These are facts which, rvith a little informationadded,no one could call in question. First of all, the very reasonwhich might be given for disregard of thesestories,namely their antiquity, provides a valid argument for belief in their truth. Their frequent repetition and universalcurrencyare goodcausefor regardingthem as reliable, though not recent. Secondly,we need not merely resort to the claim that the story and the tradition of it come from a remote period. We can bring stronger evidertce.Most of the cities retain a memorial of the original benefit conferredon them in the form of first fruits sent annually to ourselves,and those which omit the practice have frequently been enjoined by the Pythian oracleto bring the amount due and perform the ritual hereditaryin our community. Indeed there is nothing which more clearly commandsbelief than words of divine enactment and wide agreementamong Greek peoples,rvhich claim the lvitnessof ancientmyth and presentpracticealike, and are subscribed to by current custom as well as by past records.In addition,if we setall this asideand beginour investigationfrom the beginning,rveshall find that the first inhabitantsof the earth did not at once come upon a form of life like the present,but graduallyjoined togetherto bring it into being. So there is no one who could be thought to have a better claim to have been divinely provided with it, or elseto have searchedand found it themselves,than men who are universallyadmittedto havebeen the first inhabitants,the most talentedcraftsmenand the greatest devoteesof religion. To dilate on the degreeof honour due to men who brought such benefitsis time wasted.No one could devisea reward to equal such achievementsas theirs. r05

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So much is to be said about this greatestand first and most universalof benefactionsto mankind. About the sameperiod+ it was Athens who observedthat most of the world was in the handsof non-Greekpeople,while the Greekstateswereconfined to a small territory, and led by shortageof living spaceinto conspiracyand internal strife, and decimatedby starvationor war. Sherefusedto acquiescein thesecircumstances, and despatched leadersinto the Greek cities, who took over the most povertystricken,establishedthemselvesin commandof them, fought and defeatedthe non-Greek inhabitantsand founded communities on all the islands,securingthe preservationof their followersand the remaining population alike. They left these with enough room for survival,and affordedthe colonistsmore than they had before,sincethey took in all the territory which, as Greek states, we now own. Thus they also rendered easy later attempts at to face colonizationon Athenian lines,by making it unnecessary the risks of acquiring territory for it, when colonistscould go and live within the limits we had laid down. It is impossibleto point to any title to leadershipmore our own than that which was establishedbefore most Greek communities were first noncolonized,or more suitable than that which dispossessed Greek peopleand brought such prosperity to the Greeks. But the part she played in thesegreat achievementsdid not makeAthensneglectthe restof her duty. This wasthe beginning to the needy, of her servicesto others,the provisionof sustenance which is a necessityfor men who intend to order the rest of their lives well. But taking the view that a life that dependedsolelyon this did not offer enoughmotive for the desireto live, she gave enoughcareto the rest to ensurethat the good things of human existencewhich are not the gift of providence,but the result of our own thought, should in no casebe outsidethe provision of this city, and in most instancesbe due to it. When she took chargeof the Greeks,they lived a lawlesslife in scatteredcommunities under the violent control of arbitrary power, or at the mercy of anarchy.She freed them of thesedistressesby means 4. Already in Herodotus' time the ancients spoke of a migration to Ionia led by Athenians, and perhaps caused by the pressure of the Dorians into north-western Greece and the Peloponnese(seeHerodotus, I, r47).

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either of her own governmentor of her example,by being the first state to establishlaw and organizea constitution. This is proved by the fact that in the earliestcasesof homicide, plaintiffs who desiredto decidethe issueby the useof reasoninstead of force brought their suits under Athenian law.s Indeed it is true of the craftsaswell, that thosewhich concernthe necessities of life, and those directed to its well-being,were discoveredor approvedbyAthens,and sopassedon to otherpeoplefortheiruse. The generalorganizationof Athens was contrived in a spirit of such universalfriendlinessand considerationas to be suited both to impecuniouscommunities and to wealthy ones with rising prosperity,to be of value alike to the successfuland the unsuccessfulin their home affairs. Both classesderive benefit from us, and gain either pleasantassociationor a refuge of the utmost security. Again, as statesin this region do not enjoy individual selGsufficiency,but production is inadequateor excessivein different respects,and conditions are such that it is very difficult to securemarkets, in somecasesfor exports,in othersfor imports,Athens brought assistance in thesedifficulties as well, by establishingin the Piraeusa central market of overwhelming value, in which commoditieswhich others found it hard to securepiecemealelsewhere,could all be obtained. The institution of festivals,then, has earned proper commendationfor numerousreasons:it promotesamongthe Greek statesthe custom of a generaltruce,6at which ingraineddifferencesare settledand there is a meetingtogether,and then after the performancetogether of religious ceremoniesthe relationship of blood which existsbetweenus is recalled,and improved relationsmaintainedwith eachother, renervingold associations and making new ones. ln thesefestivalsthe time is not wasted either for private individuals or for outstandingleaders.They allow a generalgatheringof the Greeks,and there is an opporand for the tunity for the latter to demonstratetheir successes, former to watch the competition of the great. Neither group 5. Traditionally the first court for homicide was the Areopagus, whose foundation derived from the trial of Orestes by Athena, which is the subject of Aeschylus' Eumenides. 6. The so-called 'sacred month' at Olympia.

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need feel discontented,but both have some ground for pride, either as they see the endeavoursof the athletes for their gratification,or as they reflect that everyonehas come to enjoy watching them. Such are the benefitswhich arise from these festivals,and here too Athens has not failed to shine. She has provided numerousdisplaysof the highestquality, outstanding for their lavish expenditureor artistic excellenceor both, while the vast number of our visitors has ensured that any benefit derivedfrom associationtogetheris alsoincludedin hei bounty. A further gift of Athens is the chanceto encounterthe most sure of friendships, the most varied of associations,and to witnesscontestsnot only in the field of speedand strength,but of word and wit, and of all sorts of other activities,for which high prizes are awarded.In addition to the prizesAthens actually offersshe incitesotherselsewhere,becauseawardsmade by Athens are held in such esteemas to be the object of universal admiration. Finally, festivalselsewhereare periodic gatherings which soon disperse,while the city of Athens is a standing festivalfor its visitors which will last to the end of time. Philosophytook a part in the discoveryand developmentof all these,and gaveus educationin the field of affairsand civilized relationswith eachother, drawing the distinction betweenmisfortunesdue to ignoranceand othersdue to necessity,and teaching us to guard againstthe former and bear the latter bravely. Our city showedthe way to it, and also gavehonour to skill in words, which is the desireand the envy of all. She realizedthat this alone is the particular and natural possessionof man, and that its developmenthas led to all other superioritiesas well. She saw that other activitiesshowedsuch confusionin practice that wisdom was often the way to failure in them, and folly to success)while good and skilled powers of speechwere outside the scopeof the ordinary people,but were the province of the well-orderedmind: and that in this respectwisdom and ignoranceare furthest apart,and the birthright of a liberal education is marked not by courage,wealth and similar distinctions,but most clearly of all by speech,the sign which presentsthe most reliableproof of education,so that a fine use of words givesnot merely ability at home, but honour abroad.Athens has so far ro8

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outrun the rest of mankind in thought and speechthat her disciplesare the mastersof the rest, and it is due to her that the word'Greek'is not so much a term of birth as of mentality, and is applied to a common culture rather than a common descent. But I do not wish to dwell on the parts when I have undertaken to deal with the whole, nor do I make thesethe grounds for myeulogyofAthensforlack of the ability to turn to thebattlefield for it. This must suffice.therefore,for the claim to honour in thesefields.I think our ancestorsdeserveno lessglory for the dangersthey have faced than for their other benefactions.The strugglesthey endured were not slight, nor few, nor undistinguished.They were many, they were severeand they were tremendous.They fought sometimesfor their country, sometimes for the freedomof the world; for they continuedalwaysto make their city the common possessionof the Greeksand the defenderof the victims of oppression.This leads to some accusations of wrong policy, becauseof our habit of support for the weaker,as though such ideaswere not consistentwith the desire to eulogizeus. It was not failure to realize how much saferlarge alliancesare that led us to this policy, but, despitea much keenerrealizationof the consequencethan others show, we still preferred to support the weaker even againstour advantage rather than join the aggressionof the stronger to secureit. An indication of the characterand power of Athens can be seenin someof the appealsthat have been made to her. I omit recent or trivial instances,but long before the Trojan wars, which must provide evidencein a dispute about ancestralcustom) rve were visited by the children of Heracles,and a little earlier by Adrastus, son of Talaus, king of Argos.TAdrastus 7. Throughout these treatisesof fsocrates, as elsewherein ancient prose, the modern reader may feel surprise at the naivetd of reference to stories to which we now deny historicity. Sometimes, as in the case of the Heraclidae, we may rationalize them on a basis of greater knowledge. What are called the Dorian invasions, tribal movements in a southerly direction into the Greek peninsula, were seen as the return of the children of Heracles (Heraclidae), who were driven out by his great persecutor, Eurystheus, and at one time

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cameafter the disastrousexpeditionagainstThebes becausehe found himself unable to recoverthe dead at the Cadmeia,.and askedAthensto assisthim in a calamitywhich affectedeveryone, and to refuseto seethe deadin battle left unburied, or ancient customand establishedlaw set aside.The children of Heracles, in flight from the malice of Eurystheus)turned their face away from other cities as unable to help them in their plight, and assumedthat ours alonervascapableof gratitudefor the benefits their father had conferredon all mankind. This gives a clear indication that even at that time At'hens showedthe quality of leadership.No one would deign to askaid from an inferior or a subjectstate to the exclusionof the more powerful, especiallyin an issue which was not private, but common to all, and which was unlikely to find any champion exceptthe aspiring leadersof Greece.Secondly,they were not deludedof the hopeswhich had led them to seektheir refuge with our ancestors,who took up arms againstThebeson behalf of the dead in battle and againstthe power of Eurystheuson behalfof the children of Heracles.In the first casethey mounted an expeditionand compelledthe surrenderof the deadto their relations,in the secondthey made a counter-attackagainstthe Peloponnesiantroops which had invaded our territory with They had Eurystheus,and defeatedhim andhaltedhis aggression. earnedadmirationfor other actions,but theseexploitsaddedto but madeso their high repute.Thesewere no narrow successes, great a changein the fortunes of each of the suppliantsthat Adrastus went home rewarded for his mission to us by the complete successof his request, despite his enemies,while Eurystheus,who had expectedto force his demands,found himself a prisonerand compelledto make supplicationin his turn. His adversaryhad beenmore than human, born of the blood of Zeus, a mortal, though with divine strength, and Eurystheus had subjectedhim to servitudeand hardship without a pause. But when he treated Athens wrongly, his pride was reversed, given refuge in Athens (seeBury, Hiuory ofGreece,p. 8o). Adrastus, defeated in the attack of the Seven against Thebes, is said to have fled to Athens and been given refuge and support. IIO

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and he wasmadesubjectto his victim's children and brought to a contemptible death. There are many benefitsto Spartawhich stand to our credit, but that of the Heraclidaeis the only one which it hasoccurred to me to mention.My point is this; after the openingof relations with them by our rescueof them, the ancestorsof the present of Heracles,descencied on kings of Sparta,that is the successors capturedArgos,Lacedaemonand Messeneand the Peloponnese, were the foundersof Sparta, and so initiated all their present prosperity.This should haveremainedin their minds, and they ought never to have invadeda country which showedthem the way to such high fortune. They ought not to have brought danger to a city which had itself risked dangerfor the sonsof Heracles, or to have first offered a kingship to his descendants and then tried to bring slaveryupon the statewhich preserved them. But if we set asidequestionsof gratitudeand fair dealing, and return to the original thesisin the accuratepursuit of truth, it is not the tradition of Greek statesthat leadershipshould go to the invader against the native, to the recipient against the giver of benefits,or to suppliantsagainsttheir preservers. There is an even briefer proof. Of the Greek cities, apaft from our own, the greatestwere,as they are still, Argos, Thebes and Sparta. But it is clear that our ancestorsso far surpassed them all, that it was we who, when Argos was worsted, gave orders to Thebes at the height of her pride, and who in aid of the Heraclidae defeatedArgos and the other Peloponnesians,and brought safetyto the foundersand leadersof Lacedaemon,when they were in dangerfrom Eurystheus.Thus, as far asconcernsthe premier power in GreeceI do not know what clearerproof could be given. I think I shouldalsosaysomethingof Athenian actionoutside Greece,especiallyas the thesis I have set myself concernsthe leadershipagainstnon-Greekpeoples.A completeaccountof all would take too long, but I will try to describe theseemergencies the greatestof thern in the samefashionasjust now. Of all these racesthe highest capacity for rule and the strongestpower is in the handsof Scythia,Thrace and Persia;all thesehaveactually harboureddesignsagainstAthens, and she has been in conflict III

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with them all. In fact what argument remains valid for any opposingview, if it is provedthat everyGreek statewhich could not secureher rights turned to us for aid, and every non-Greek statewhich soughtto enslaveGreeksmadeher first attackon us ? The most famousof these.warswas that with Persia,but in a dispute about ancestralprecedenceequally valuable evidence can be derived from ancient times. When Greecewas still inconspicuous, Athenianterritory wasinvadedby Thraciansunder Eumolpus,the son of Poseidon,and by Scythianstogetherwith the Amazons,sthe daughtersof Ares, not simultaneouslybut during the time when both peopleswere trying to gain power over Europe. They hated the whole Greek race, but they made particular complaintsagainstAthens, and thought that by this meansconflict with a singlestatervould lead them to the control of all. They did not succeed,but though our ancestorswere their only opponents,they suffereddefeaton a scalethat might have suggesteda war againstthe whole of mankind. Evidence of the extent of the disasterthey incurred is to be seenin the length of time through which its story endured, which would not be true of any but a most outstandingcalamity. In the case of the Amazonsit is recordedthat not one of the invading force returned, and the remainderwere driven from their country as a result of their defeat here. In the case of the Thracians, though they had previously been neighbours of Athens, the distancebetweenthem was greatly increasedby the battle in question,which allowed the establishmentof numerousraces, tribes of all lands,and large cities in the interveningspace. These rvere splendid feats, exploits fitting for claimants to leadership.Akin to thesewhich I have described,and credible in their descendants) were the great achievementsof the wars againstDarius and Xerxes.They were the greatestof wars, and brought more perils than ever occurred at any one time. The enemysupposedthemselvesinvincible from their numbers,and our allies thought their own courage incomparable,yet the Athenians surpassedthem, in each case,in their appropriate respect,showedtheir superiorityin the faceof everydanger,and 8. These mythical wars appear in Greek authors of the great period, as the prototype of wars between Athens and Eastern peoples. tt2

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on the field wereawardedthe palm of honour,soonafterwardsto assumethe sovereigntyof the seaby the gift of the other Greeks without disputefrom thestateswhichnowwishto seizeit from us.e Let no one supposeme ignorant of the many servicesperformed by Sparta for the Greek causein those great days.But this is a reaslonto give still greaterpraiseto Athens: that with such rivals to emulatesheyet outdid them. But I desireto speak at somewhatgreaterlength of thesetwo cities,and not passthem too quickly by, so that we may have a memorial of both, of the courageof their ancestorsand their hostility to the enemiesof Greece.Yet I do not forget how hard it is for one who comes late in time to speakof subjectswhich an earlier generationhas madeits own in words spokenby the leadersof the stateon days of public funeral.'o It cannot but be that the greatestof these themes have been used before, and only those of lesser note remain.However,sinceit is of valueto my discourse,I must not hesitateto recall someof what is left. The most numerousof good servicesand the highest praise belong, I think, to the men who risked their lives for Greece. Nonetheless,the generationswhich held power in the two cities before that cannot properly be forgotten. It was they who gave their first training, who first urged the peopleto their successors the pursuit of courage,and madethem fierce antagonistsof the invader. They did not neglect the common good, nor exploit their own gain in it to the disregardof others. They made it their care, becauseit was theirs, but rightly kept their hands from what was not. They did not reckon value by monetary 9. fsocrates refers several times to this general acknowledgement which accorded to Athens the meed of valour in the Persian wars, but it does not 'Thalassocracy' or sovereignty of the seas,rvhich appear in Herodotus. The bilore 487 n.c. was held to belong to Aegina (and previously to other states) went to Athens as the result of war with Aegina in 487 in which Themistocles is credited with persuading the Athenians to build ships, thus leading to her supremacy at sea. At Salamis Aegina was given the first ptize for bravery, but after this the superior force of Athens and the desire of Sparta to confine herself to the defence of her own land territory gave Athens a natural supremacy. io. Notable occasionsof this sort, besides the Funeral Oration of Pericles translated above, had included one such speech by Gorgias and one attributed to Lysias on the dead in the Corinthian war in 394 u.c. II3

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gain, but believedthe safestwealth, and the most honourable, to lie in a life conduciveto present honour and to the glory of generationsto come. They did not competewith each other in daring, nor promote rash conduct of set purpose,but they were more afraid to tre dishonouredby fellorv-citizensthan to die nobly for their city, more ashamedat public wrong than now we arc at personalmisconduct. The reasor;for this rvastheir concern for the precision and right intent of the laws, not so much thoseof private commerce as thoseof commonpracticein the life of every day. They knew that for men of high breedingthere is no need of many written words, since agreementin a few principles will bring accordin private and in public alike. So deep-setin their thought was the community, that even their dissensionsarose,not in dispute as to which party should destroy the other and control the state, but which should be first to bring benefit to the whole. Their clubs were associated,not for individual advantage,but for the good of the nation.II The sameinterestgovernedtheir approach to the affairs of other states. They treated the Greeks with courtesy,not insolence,laid claim to command, not despotism over them, and desired to be called their leaders, not their masters,for their protection, not their injury, winning their cities to friendship by good treatment, not subduing them by force. They made their worcl more sure than an oath is in our time, and expectedto abide by an agreementas binding beyond avoidance.They did not take pride in power so much as credit for restraint, demanding in themselvesthe same attitude towards inferiors as they received from superiors, since they thought of their individual towns as their own abode, but of Greeceas the fatherlandof all. It was by adopting ideas such as this, and by training rhe young in these habits of thought, that they raised so fine a generationin thosewho fought againstthe invaders'fromAsia, that neither thinker nor poet could reachthe height of what they And this may well be pardoned.It is as hard to accomplished. praise men of outstandingmerit as men of none. If these last haveno actionsworthy of praise,the first can engenderno fitting rr. On the political clubs see Lysias, Eratosthenesr43,p.49, and note.

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praise to match their actions. What praise could be of eQual measurewith the statureof men who far surpassedthe warriors at Troy, in so much as while the latter took ten years over a single city, thesein a short time beat down the whole strength of Asia and not merely gave safetyto their own countries,but freedom to the whole of Greece? How should they shirk any effort, any toil, any danger,to gain fame in life, when for the glory they were to acquire at its ending they were so prepared to die ? Indeed, I think the war itself was divinely inspiredin admiraticlnof their high courage,to ensurethat such character should not go unobservedor come to death without renown, but should be accordedthe samehonour as the sonsof the gods, who are called demi-gods.For while their bodiesbowed to the necessityof their mortal nature, heaven made immortal the memorialof their virtue. Continuously,then, our ancestorsand thoseof Spartawere in contentionwith each other, but at that time it was contention for the prize of honour, and they held themselvesnot in enmity but rivalry. They did not seekthe enslavementof Greece,to court the outsidelvorld, but about the safetyof all they were of one mind, and contention arose only for the decision lvhich should further it. They madethe first displayof their couragein facingthe force sentby Darius. When the Persiansmadetheir descenton Attica, the Atheniansdid not wait for their allies, but made their own a war which rvas universal,and met an army which had disdained the whole force of Greecewith their own force alone. That little army met their tens of thousandsas though the dangerbelongedto other lives than theirs. The Spartans,without a moment'sdelayafter the report of the war in Attica let all else go and came to our aid, with all the eager haste which would greet the ravaging of their own country. And here is proof of their speedin matching us. It is said of our ancestors that within one day after they heardof the Persianlanding they were there to resiston the boundariesof their soil, and won the battle and set up their trophy in token of victory, while the Spartanswithin three days and nights coveredtwelve hundred with their army on the march. Such greathastetherewas, stad,es II5

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in the one army to take their part in meeting danger, in the other to meet it before assistancereachedthem. Later comes anotherexample,when the secondexpeditionl2came,under the leadershipof Xerxes,who left his royal domain and venturedto makehimself a general,collectingthe whole of Asia in his army. About him everyonehas used extravagantlanguage,only to find it came short of the truth. He showed such overbearing arroganceas to think it a slight thing to subdue the land of Greece,and to desire to leave a meriorial higher than human pride can reach.He did not give way unril he had plannedand helped to force into being a design which is the common talk of the world, how with his army he sailed over the mainland and marched on foot across the sea, when he bridged the Hellespontand drove a canal through Athos. Against the pride and the achievementsof Xerxes and the host of which he was master, the Greeks marched out. They divided the responsibility,and the Spartansmoved to Thermo.-,pylaeagainstthe land army with a thousandpicked men and a few of their allies,to hold the passand prevent further advance there. Our own peoplewent to Artemisium, with a citizenforce of sixty triremes to meet the whole enemy fleet. Their courage was not inspired by contempt of the enemy so much as by desperaterivalry among themselves.Sparta envied Athens the victory at Marathon, and hoped to set themselveson equal terms, in the fear that twice successivelyour city might be the saviour of Greece. For Athens, the main desire was to preservethe glory she had won, and to makeit universallyclear that courage,and not chance,had won that victory, while her secondaim was to induce the Greeksto fight at sea,to demonstrate that in battle at seaas well as on land courageis more than numbers. But equal though their daring rvas, their fortunes were unequal. The Spartans were destroyed, and for victory in spirit they laid down their lives. It would be wicked to say that they suffered defeat, when not one of them deigned to seek escape.Our navy defeated the Persian advance guard, but rz. i.e. the Second Persian War of 48o 8.c., as distinct from the campaign of Marathon in 4go. r16

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hearing that the enemy held the pass, they sailed back, and employed such strategy th-ereafter,that, great as had been their achievementsbefore, in the later fighting they rverestill more outstanding.The allies were one and all in despondency.The wereengagedin fortifying the Isthmus statesof the Peloponnese and looking to their personalsafety.The others were under the subjectionof the Persians,and co-operatingwith them, except such small cities as had been left out of consideration.Twelve hundred Persianships were on the sea, and numberlessland forcesthreatenedAthens. Without a glimpseof safety,her allies lost to her and every hope dispelled,she might not only have escapedthe dangers that faced her, but acceptedthe signal honourswhich the king held out to her in the hope that, if he could join the Athenian fleet to his, he would at once subdue the Peloponneseas well. Yet they refused his gift, and would not let angerat their betrayalby the Greeksrush them willingly into compromisewith Persia.They preparedto fight for their own survival, yet they pardoned the rest who had preferred slavery.They held that humbler statesshould seektheir safety as they might, but the claim to the leadershipof Greecewasnot consistentwith escapefrom danger. A man of nobility, they felt, preferred a glorious death to a life of dishonour; and in the sameway, for a state that stood among the greatestit was more profitableto be blotted out of the sight of men than to be seen in slavery. It is obvious that this was their belief, since, being unable to match themselvesagainstboth forces at once, they took with them their whole people and sailed to the neighbouringisland,t3to make it possibleto encountereach in turn. Indeed, it would be impossibleto point to any greater lovers of their country or of the Greek peoplethan men who, to avoid bringing slaveryon the rest, could endure to seetheir city desolateand their land devastated,their sacred places pillagedand their templesset on fire, and the whole war centred on their own country. Even this was not enough for them: against twelve hundred warships their intention was to sail alone. They were not left to carry it out. The Peloponnesians 13. Most, according to Herodotus, moved to Troezen on the mainland, but some to Aegina and Salamis. t17

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were filled with shame at such courage,and reflectedthat, if our force were first destroyed they would never survive, and if we succeeded,their cities would be dishonoured.They were thus compelledto take their share of the danger.The uproar which took placein the action, the shoutingand cheeringwhich are generalin seabattles,I do not think it worth taking time to describe.I am concernedwith what is particular and relevant to leadershipand in accord with my previous argument. So outstandingwas Athens, with her force unimpaired, that after the city was sackedshe contributed more ships to combat the perils of Greecethan all the otherswho fought at Salamis,and there is not a man so much at enmity lvith us as not to agree that it was due to this battle at seathat we were successfulin the war, and that it was a victory which should be put down to Athens. Indeed, when a campaign is intended against Persia, who ought to be given the leadershipof it ? Surely it should go to the winnersof the greatestdistinctionin the previousencounter, who have many times stood alone in the forefront, and in the ranks of the allied force have been given the highest award of valour. Surely it should go to the country which abandonedits own land for the safety of the rest, which in ancient times founded most other states, and later rescued them from the most signal disasters.It would be outrageoustreatmentif, after shoulderingthe greatestburden of hardship, w€ were expected to receiveless than our share of honour, if, after standing in the front line, we were compelledto follow in the rear of other states. Up to this point I am sure that it would be universallyagreed that the credit of Athens for benefactionsto the Greek state stood the highest of all, and the leadershipwould rightly be accordedto her. Afterwards, however)we are alreadyfaced by the accusationthat after assuming the naval supremacy,we have been guilty of a great deal of harm to Greece,including the enslavementof Melos and the destructionof Scione.t+My 14. Scione and Melos, both reduced by Athens and the population massacredor enslaved, were not parallel cases.Scione had been a full member ofthe Athenian Confederacy, but had revolted and asked aid ofthe Spartan

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own view is, first, that it is no proof of bad rule that some opposingstatesare shown to have been severelydealt with. It is a much more certain proof of good administration of our allies' affairs that none of the states under our control was involved in such troubles. Secondly,had any other statesdealt more leniently with the samesituation, they might have reason for criticizing us. On the other hand, if this is not true and if in fact it is impossibleto control so largea number of stateswithout punishing offenders, we are surely to be commended for successfullymaintaining our empire for the longest possible period with the fewestinstancesof harsh treatment. I supposethere would be general agreementthat the best leaders to represent the Greek world are the people under whom their subjectsare happiest.Under Athenian supremacy we shall find that individual households progressed most rapidly towards happiness,and cities increasedin size. This is becausewith us there was no envy of advancement,no artificial creationof disturbanceby promoting dissident parties so that both shouldcourt Athenian influence.Our belief was that amity betweenallies meant thb successof the empire as a whole, and we organizedall stateson the samelegal system.We thought of them not on the basisof despotism,but of alliance,in which rve maintainedcontrol of the whole, but allowed freedom to individual members; though rve lent assistanceto democracyand opposedautocraticpowers)becausewe held it to be unjustifiable that the majority should be subjectto the minority, that a class suffering from economic, but no other inferiority should be ousted from political control, that in a country which belongs to all there should be a distinction befweenrtheconstitutionally privileged and unprivileged, or that when nature has made men fellow-citizens,law should disfranchisethem. Such amongotherswere the objectionsto oligarchywhich led us to establishfor other statesthe sameconstitutionas our own, and I hardly think it needsjustifying at greaterlength, especially Brasidas and his army which had marched to Northern Greece. Melos had never joined Athens at any time, but was attacked for her obduracy in refusing. Both incidents, however, were held reprehensible,and fsocrates is clearly in some difficulty to make a defence.

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when it can be done in brief. Athenianslived with it for sevenry yearsrsuntouchedby tyran.ny,free from external domination, untroubled by civil disasterand at peacewith all the world. Good sensedemandsgratitudefor this far rnore than obloquy for the cleruchies,r6rvhich we sent to depopulatedstates for local protection, not out of self-interest.As evidenceof this I point out that we held very little territory in relation to our numbers,but a large empire; that our warshipswere twice as many as all the rest together, and fit to contend with twice as many again; that Euboea, lying close to Attica, was naturally rvell sited to assistour naval empire, while her other assets made her superior to any of the other islands,and we could control her better than our own territory. I add further that we knew from the experienceof Greek and non-Greek alike that the greatestprestigewent to stateswhich by devastationof their neighbourssecuredfor themselvesa life of idlenessand plenty; yet nonethelessnone of these facts could induce us to maltreatthe peopleof Euboea.We were alone among the great powers to tolerate a lower standardof living than people who \\rereaccusedof subservience to us. Indeed, had we pursued our own interest we should presumably not have conceir.'eda desire for Scione,which, as is common knowledge,we handed over to our refugeesfrom Plataea,leaving untouclredthe large territory of Euboea, which would greatly have increasedthe prosperityof us all. Such has been our character,and such the proofs we have given of our freedom from rapacity. Yet \ve are unjustifiably accttsedby participantsin the decarchies,rT lvho cliclviolence to their o\vn countries,made the atrocitiesof their predecessors look trivial and left no room {br further extremesin the history of rvickedness- men who on the pretext of Spartan principles pursued exactly the opposite practices, who lamented the 15. A rough estimate of the period between the Persian wars and the fall of Athens. r6. The'cleruchies'were a device whereby Athens allotted land in conquered Greek territory to Athenian citizens, who becamethe olvners. These settlements formed a major grievance against the Athenian Empire in the Peloponnesian War. 17. On the decarchiesand harmosts see r17 and sectional introduction. t20

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miseriesof Melos but inflicted irreparableinjury on their own people. There is nothing in the realms of wrong and cruelty which they haveleft unexplored.They set their trust in defiance of law, they cultivated treacheryas right conduct, they chose subjectionto one of their own Helotsts in order to outragetheir own countries,they did more honour to murderers who shed the blood of their peoplethan to their own fathers,and reduced us all to such inhumanity that, while in the previous htppy period even small misfortunesfound numerous sympathizers, in the time of the decarchies the multitude of personaldistresses made us give up all pity for each other. No one had time for sympathi with others. There was no limit to their cruelty, no one was remoteenoughfrom politics not to be forced into contact with the sufferingto which men of that characterdrove us. Can they be unashamed,when they treatedtheir own citieswithout regardto law, and accusedours without thought of justice, can they, in addition,dareto criticizethe public and privatecases we conducted,when they put more to death without trial in threemonthsthan wereever brought to trial under the Athenian empireI As to banishment,civil strife, disruption of law, denial of rights, violenceagainstchildren, indecencyagainstwomen, seizureof property, there is no end to the list. I have this to add of the whole subject, that the wrong-doing of which we were guilty could easily have been ended by a single decree, but the murders and the lawlessnessof that period 'would be beyondany remedy. And indeed the presentpeaceand the autonomy,which does not exist in Greek states,though it appearsin the terms of peace,are neither of them to be preferred to Athenian rule. It would hardly be possible to be enthusiasticabout a state of affairsin which the seais commandedby piratesand the cities taken over by fighting men; when instead of war taking place between cities about territorial claims it is carried on inside the walls betweenfellow-citizens;when more cities are reduced to subjection than before peace was made; and when the frequency of revolution makes the inhabitants of cities more despairingthan the victims of exile, becausethey live in dread 18. Lysander rvasborn of a Helot (i.e. serf) mother.

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of the future, while the others alwaysexpect to return. So far are the peopleremovedfrom freedom or autonomy that in fact they are either under tyrannies, or under the power of the harmosts,or in somecasesdepopulatedor subjectto Persiandespotism. Yet, when the Persianshad the daring and the unjustifiable insolenceto cross into Europe, we dealt with them to the extent of not merely ending their invasion but forcing them to undergo the devastationof their territory, and submitting the fleet of twelve hundred shipsto the humiliation of being prevented from launchinga singlewarshipwest of the Phaselis.'sThey were compelledto keep the peaceand wait for events instead 'fhat of feeling confidencein their existing force. this situation was due to the great qualities of our ancestorsis clearly proved by the disastersof Athens. The declineof our empire coincided with the beginning of troubles for the Greek states.After the defeatat the Hellespont,zowhen the leadershipof Greecepassed to others,Persiagaineda naval victory and securedthe control of the sea,won the supremacyover most of the islands,made a descenton Laconia, stormed Cythera and sailed round the Peloponnese, raiding the country. The clearestcompleteview of the transformationis given by a parallelreadingof the terms of peacein our time and now.zr It rvill be clear that then it was we who laid down the boundariesof Persianterritory, andin somecasesstatedtribute to be paid, and barred her from accessto the sea.Now it is the King who directs the affairs of the Greek rvorld, gives orders for individual states, and almost establishesa governor in each citv. There is little else lacking. It was he who took control of the war and presided over the peace,and he who remainsas a supervisorof the present political situation. r9. The reference is to the mysterious Treaty of Callias in 448 e.c. which concluded hostilities between Greece and Persia. zo. The defeat at the Hellespont is the battle of Aegospotami, and the naval victory over the Greeks is that of Cnidus in 394 u.c. under the Athenian Conon, once a commander at Aegospotami, who later joined Persia to serve against Sparta. zr. The treaty referred to is the King's Peaceor Treaty of Antalcidas, in which Persian terms were imposed on Greece by Sparta. See sectional introduction. t22

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He is a despot to whose court we sail to accuseeach other. We call him the Great King, as though we were subject prisoners of war, and if we engagein war with each other, it is on him that our hopes are set, though he would destroy both sides without compunction. We should be ready to reflect on this, to resent the present position,and to desireto regainour placeas leaders.We should cast blame on Sparta for beginning the war with the aim of liberating the Greeksand in the end reducing so many of them to subjection,for causing the revolt of the Ionian statesfrom Athens - which had been the sourceof their foundation and, so often, their salvation - and putting them at the mercy of Persia,the enemy of their very existenceand their unceasing opponent in war. At that time they were incensedat our perfectly legal claim to control some of the cities, but now that these have been reduced to such slavery they feel no more concernfor them. For theseunfortunatecities it is not enough that they should be subject to tribute and see their strong placesin the grip of their enemies;their communal troubles are intensifiedby personalsuffering greaterthan under the tax collectorsof Athens. No Athenian inflicts such cruelty on his slavesas the Persianpunishment of free men. But the greatest misery of their subjectsis the compulsionto join in the fight for slavery against the causeof freedom,zzand to endure the prospectof defeatrvhich will causetheir instant destructionor a successwhich will plunge them further into slavery in the future. At whosedoors but Sparta'scan we lay the blame for this I Despite their great power they stand aside and watch the pitiable plight of people once their allies, and the consrruction of a Persianempire out of the strength of Greece.In the past their habit was to expel tyrants and to give their support to the people,but now they have so changedas to make war on free statesand throw in their lot with despotism.The city of Mantinea, at any rate, is an instance.After peacehad been made, the Spartansrazedit to the ground. They capturedthe Cadmeia zz. On the war between Artaxerxes and Evagorassee r34, r4r below, and sectional introductions p. roo.

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at Thebes.They have now laid siegeto Olynthus23and Phlius, and they are giving assistanceto Amyntas, king of Macedon, Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuseand the Persianpower in Asia, to help them to supremacy.Indeed, it is surely a paradoxthat the leading power in Greeceshould make one man master of such countlessnumbers, and not allow the greatestof cities to be autonomous,but drive it to an alternativeof slaveryor utter disaster.The final degradationis to see the claimants to the leadershipof Greeceat war day after day with Greek statesand in permanentalliancewith a non-Greekpeople. Let it not be supposedto be due to ill will that I make a somewhatbrusque referenceto these subjects after a prelude promising reconciliation.My intention in speakingin this way is not to defameSpartain the eyesof others so much as to put a checkon her, in so far as my discourseis able,and to put an end to her present attitude. It is impossibleto prevent wrong aims or inspire better rvithout strong denunciationof the old ones.But one should put dorvn damagingattacksas accusation, but beneficentcriticism as admonition.The samewords should be taken in different ways accordingto the intention. A further criticism could be made of the Spartans,that they reducetheir neighboursto serfdomfor the benefitof their own country, but they refuseto do the samein dealingwith the commoltinterests of the allied states,when they could settle diflerenceswith us and make the rvholenon-Greek world subsidiaryto the Greek. Yet for men whose pride springs from nature rather than circumstances this is much more the right pursuit than collecting tribute from islanderswho deserveour pity, when we seethem farming the rocky hills for lack of good soil, while the mainland'+ is so productive that most of the land can be left idle and great wealth comesfrom the only part rvhich is cultivated. It seemsto me that an outsideobserverof the presentpolitical situation would condemnit as utter insanity on both sidesthat 23. Olynthus capitulated to Sparta in 3Zg n.c. (seegeneral introduction to Demosthenes (r)). Phlius in the Peloponnesewas also reduced by Sparta in 37g.On Dionysius see note 35 below. 24. i.e. inhabitants of Asia Minor under Persian power as a result of the Peace.

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we risk disasteron such slendergrounds,when we might enrich ourselvesin a moment: we tear our own land to piecesand neglect the harvest we could reap in Asia. Nothing is more profitablefor Persiathan to ensureour continuing to fight each other for ever. But we never think of interferencewith Persian affairsor of raising insurrection.When chancedisturbancesdo arise, we help to allay them. Now that there are two armies engagedin Cypruszswe allow Persiato make use of one, and besiegethe other, though both are Greek. The rebels are friendly to Athens and subordinateto Sparta,while in the case of Tiribazus' force, the most valuable section of his infantry comesfrom Greek districts, and the greater part of his naval force was commissionedin Ionia and would be much readier to sharein a raid on Asia than to fight againsteach other for little profit. We never give any thought to this. We enter into disputesabout the Cyclades26when there are theseimportant cities which rve have gratuitously presented to Persia, and which she holds, or will hold, or on which she has designs,and while she shows justifiable contempt for all the Greek states. The King has indeed achievedsomethingwhich is beyond the achievementsof all his ancestors.He has securedthe admission from both Athens and Spartathat Asia belongsto him, and has assumedsuch authoritativecontrol of the Greek cities there as either to raze them to the ground, or build fortifications in them. And all this is due to our folly, not to his power. Yet there exists a sense of the impressivenessof Persian dominion, and an idea of it as invincible becauseof the great impressionit hasmadeon Greekhistory.My own opinion is that this is no deterrent, but an incentive to the proposedexpedition. If we haveachievedagreementwhile Persiais in difficulties, and yet arestill goingto find it hard to faceher, theremust surely be a great deal to fear, should there come a time when Persian affairs are secureand Persianopinions united, while we are in our presentcondition of mutual hostility. Nonetheless,even if such critics do agreewith my contentions,they still do not give a correct view of the power of Persia.If they could show that the King has in the past proved superior to the fwo principal zt. See note 22 above.

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cities together,they might justifiably try to rouse some alarm. But as this is not the case,as Spartaand Athens were in opposition when he simply added his weight to one side and caused its prestige to rise, this is no evidJnce of his power. In such circumstancesas this it often happens that a comparatively small power may turn the scale.I could use this argument in the caseof Chios, and say that rvhicheverparty it joins becomes the leading naval power. But it is not a sound criterion of the power of Persiato ask what have been the results of her accession to one side or the other. What have they been from her own unaided engagements ? First of all, after the revolt of Egypt, what stepshave beentaken againstits inhabitants? The King sent his most distinguishedgenerals,Abrocomas,Tithraustesand Pharnabazus, to the scene.z7 They waited threeyears) during which they did more harm than good, and concluded with so dismal a failure that the rebels, not content with freedom, are now trying to securecontrol over their neighbours. Next there is the operationagainstEvagoras.He holds a single city, which, however,is surrenderedto Persiaby the terms of the peace.His kingdom is an island and he has had an initial setbackat sea,and can only musterthree thousandlight infantry for the defenceof his land. Yet this modestforce is beyond the power of the King of Persiato overcome.He hasalreadywasted six years,and if the past is evidencefor the future there is more probability of a new revolt than of the suppressionof this one by the siege;suchare the delayswhich are endemicin the King's affairs. In the Rhodian War28he had the good will of Sparta's alliesbecauseof the severityof the conditionsimposedon them, while he madeuseof Athenian crewsand enjoyedthe leadership of Conon, who was both outstanding as a general and unequalledin Greek opinion for reliability and experienceof the hazardsof war. Yet despitethe assistanceof so redoubtablean ally the King allowedthe power which stood for the defenceof Asia to remain under siegeby a hundred ships, during which time he kept his men short of pay for fifteen months. So as far asthe King wasconcernedthe force would havebeendisbanded 27. This occasionis not known except from this passage. 28. On the Rhodian War. see sectional introduction.

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two or three times, though owing to its commander and the alliance made with Corinth they contiirued till at last they won a victory. This is the truly royal and impressiveaspectof his proceedingswhich is so unceasinglyemplrasizedby the advertisersof the King of Persia'sgreatness. Thus it cannot be claimed that the examplesI quote are not apt, nor that I pursuethe trivial at the expenseof the important. It is to avoid such a chargethat I have madethe greatestevents in Persianhistory my subject, without forgetting other items, such as Dercyllidas'rqsuccessagainstAeolis with a thousand men, or Dracon's capture of Atarneus and his devastationof the Mysian lowlands with three thousand light troops, or Thimbron's action in crossingand ravagingthe whole of Lydia with only a few more, or Agesilaus'conquestwith the army of Cyrus of virtually the whole district beyond the Halys. The army which wandersabout with the King givesno more ground for anxiety than Persian bravery. The former werc given clear proof by the army which marchedin with Cyrus:o that they were no better than the coastalforces. I omit their earlier def'eats,assumingthem to have been divided in their views and unwilling to contend whole-heartedlyagainst the King's brother. But in circumstancessuch as after the death of Cyrus, when all the people of Asia were united, their conduct wasso ingloriousas to leaveno room for the customaryeulogies of Persian courage. They faced six thousand Greeks,:t not zg. Dercyllidas was Spartan commander it 399 e.c., having succeeded Thimbron. Draco was a harmost appointed by Dercyllidas. The campaignof Agesilaus is that of 395 n.c. (see Xen., Hellenica III,4 seqq.) 3o. The rebellion of, Cyrus is referred to here for its indication of weakness in Persia and for Cyrus' instigation to the Greeks in Asia to revolt. This is Cyrus II, not Cyrus the Great. He made an attempt against his elder brother, Artaxerxes II, to securethe Persianthrone in 4or n.c., marching on Babylon with an army of mercenaries, many of them Greek, including ro,ooo hoplites, among them the writer, Xenophon. At the battle of Cunaxa close to Babylon Cyrus was killed owing to his own impetuosity. The Greek leaders were betrayed and put to death by the Persians, and the remainder marched back to Trapezus (Trebizond) on the Black Sea, and so home. (See Xenophon's The Persian Expedition, tr. Rex Warner - Penguin Classics.See also Isoc., Plrilipr Sg 2o77, p. r55 below.) 3r. Xenophon says 86oo.

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picked for their quality, but whosepoor circumstancesmade it impossiblefor them to makea living at home,who wereignorant of the country, devoid of allies, betrayedby their associates in the march and deprived of the leader they had followed. Yet the Persiansproved so inferior to them that the King was in despairat the positionand, having no opinion of his own forces, resortedto seizureof the mercenaryleaders,despitethe truce, in the hope that this illegality would throw their army into chaos,preferring sacrilegeto open fighting with them. His plot failed, becausethe army did not dissolve,but nobly weathered the storm. As they departed,the King sent Tissaphernesand the cavalry with them. The Greeks were the victims of their machinationsthroughout this march, but still carried it through as though they were under escort, despite their fear of uninhabited districts and the feeling that their best hope rvas contact with the enemy in strength. To conclude the subject, this force had not been conductinga raid to take booty or sack a town, but had been in direct warfare againstthe King; yet they returned to the coastin greatersafetythan his representatives in a mission of friendship. It thus seemsto me that the Persiansgavea clear demonstrationof their own lack of spirit. They have been defeatedfrequently in the coastalregion, and when they crossedinto Europe they met with retribution in either a miserabledeathor a dishonourableescapetill eventually they made themselvesridiculous at the very doors of the Royal domain.g2 None of this is extraordinary; it is entirely natural. It is impossiblefor peoplewith an upbringing and political habits of this kind either to know what courageis in general,or to record victories over their enemies.There could never arise either an outstanding general or a good soldier in a r6gime like this, where the bulk of the populationis utterly incapableof sustaining disciplineor facing danger,and lacks the toughnessneeded for war after an upbringing more suited to servility than that of servantswith us. Men of the highestdistinction there live a life 32. This appears to refer merely to the battle of Cunaxa, rvhen after the death of Cyrus the victorious Greeks waited a long time close to the King's palace, and then could not be kept from marching home.

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which exists on a single level, not one of shared outlook or free institutions. They spend their time showing arrogance towards one class and subserviencetowards another, in the fashion most calculated to demoralize humanity. Physically their wealth has made them over self-indulgent,while psychologically their monarchicalconstitution makes them degraded and cringing, sincethey are subjectto constantregimentationat the palaceitself, falling to the ground and practisingall sorts of self-humiliation, and prostrating themselvesin adoration of a man whom they addressas a god, while it is gods rather than men whom they treat with disdain.Hence the so-calledsatraps, who go down to the coast, do not demean their upbringing there, but continue in the samehabits; they are untrustworthy with friends and unmanly with foes, and live a life of servility or arrogance,contemptuousof their associates and subservient to their enemies.They certainly maintainedAgesilaus'army for eight months at their o\vn expense,while the forces on their own side were deprived of their pay for an equivalent time. They allotted a hundred talents to the captors of Cisthene,rr but their own men from the expeditionto Cyprus were treated with greaterinsolencethan prisonersof rvar. Think of Conon, who after commanding the forces of Asia and shattering the empire of Sparta was outrageouslyseizedfor execution.Think of Themistocles, who defeated Persia at sea in defence of Greece,and was then handsomelyrewarded by them. Indeed how can one accept friendship from men who punish their benefactorsand show such blatant flattery of their attackersI There is no one in Greece they have not treated wrongfully. There has been no cessationof their conspiracyagainst the Greek people. There is nothing in the Greek rvorld which is not at enmity with the men who in that earlier war did not scruple to pillage the sacredplacesand the temples,and burn them. For this reasonone may praisethe peopleof Ionia, who pronounceda curse upon anyone who should disturb or seek to restorethe sacredplaceswhich were burnt - not for lack of the meansto achieveit, but to securefor later generationsa memorialof the impiety of Persia,a token of everlastingdistrust 33. Captured by Agesilaus. r29

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against the perpetratorsof this sacrilege,and of warning to avoid and dread them, since they are seento have done battle, not merely against ourselves,but against our worship of the gods. I could say something similar of my own fellow-citizens. With all other stateswith which they have been at war they accept reconciliation and forget their differences.But to the peoplesof the mainland they do not even offer gratitude for benefitsreceived,so unrelenting is the anger they feel against them. There were many whom our ancestorscondemned.to death for joining the Persian enemy, and even now at public meetings,before any businessis done, cursesare pronounced againstany citizen who proposesagreementwith Persia.And at the celebrationof the Mysteries the Eumolpidaeand Kerykes, by reasonof this hatred, proclaim the segregationfrom the rite of all non-Greekpeoplesas they do of homicides.So ingrained in us is this hostility that in the realm of myth we most enjoy dwelling on the Trojan and Persianwars, in which we can read of their disasters.It will be found that it is the wars between Greeksand Persianswhich have given rise to the composition of triumphal odes, while wars between Greeks have inspired laments,and that the first are sung at feasts,the secondrecalled in mourning for disaster.And I think eventhe poetry of Homer gainedprestigefrom its magnificenteulogy of the warriors who fought againstthe non-Greek world, and that was the reason why our ancestorsdesired his art to be celebratedin musical competitionsand in the education of the young, so that our frequent hearingof the epicsshould enableus to learn by heart the hostility which was ingrained there, and so that emulation of the prowessof the men who fought there should lead to a desirefor similar achievements. It seemsto me, therefore,that there is an overwhelmingnumber of inducementsin favour of this war, and chief amongthem the present opportunity, which ought not to be let pass. It would be contemptibleto neglectit when it is here and regret it when it has gone by. There is nothing more that we could need for an attack on Persia beyond what is ours already. Egypt and Cyprus are in revolt againsther. Phoeniciaand Syria r30

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have been devastatedby the war. Tyre,3awhich they had set greatstoreby, hasbeencapturedby their enemies.The majority of the Cilician towns are in the handsof our allies,and the rest can easily be acquired. Lycia has never been subdued by any Persian.Hecatomnus,the governorof Caria, has actually been for some time in secessionfrom Persia, and he will take his stand with us openly when we choose.From Cnidus to Sinope there are Greek settlementsin Persian territory, which will need no persuasionto go to war) only the lifting of the ban againstit. Indeed,with such basesas theseat hand and a war of such magnitude already besettingAsia, what need is there for too precise a calculation of probabilitiesI When rhey are being worsted by small parts of our forces,there can be no uncertainty about their prospectsif they are compelledto face the u'hole. This is the situation. If Persiatakesa strongerconrrol of the seaboardtowns, by stationing larger garrisons in them ttran before, perhapsthe islands round the coast, such as Rhodes, Samosand Chios, Day incline to support her. But if we take prior possessionof them, the probability is that clistrictslike Lydia, Phrygiaand the rest of the inland regionwill comeunder the power of our expeditionin that quarter. For this reasor we need to hurry and not waste time, to avoid the fate of our predecessors, who appearedlater than the Persians,lost some of their allies, and were compelled to fight at a numerical disadvantage,when they could have made their crossingwith the combinedforcesof Greeceand subduedeachof the regions in turn. It has beenproved that in casesof war againsta mixed force of varying origins one should not wait for them to attack, but try conclusionswith them rvhile they are still dispersed. Our predecessors made this initial mistake,though they set it right afterwards, when they engaged in those tremendous battles.But, if we are wise, rve shall take precautionsfrom the start, and try to effecta surpriseby establishingan army against Lydia and lonia, in the knowledgethat even the King finds unwilling subjects in the continental Greeks, and raises a greaterforce to surround him than any of theirs. And when we 34. Phoenicia, Syria and Tyre were attacked by Evagoras. I3I

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transport a force stronger than that, which we could easily do if we tried, we shall be able without danger to harvest the produceof all Asia. It is far more distinguishedto fight him for his kingdom than to wranglewith eachother for the leadership. It would be better to make the expeditionduring the present period, so that our generation,which has had the losses,can enjoy the gainsas well, and not spendall their daysin suffering. The past has had enough of that, and every sort of misery appearedin it, There are many ills that fall to the lot of human kind, but we added to the list more than our necessaryshare of them in the wars, foreign and civil, which we brought upon ourselves,with their consequenceseither of violent death at home, or lvandering abroad, men, women and children as refugees,or mercenaryservicefor lack of other subsistence,and death in battles fought for enemiesagainst our own kith and kin. Of these ills no complaint has ever been uttered. The sufferings in the poetical realm of fantasy are thought to be matter for grief, but the actual severesufferingswhich can be seenas due to war are so far from rousing pity that the sufferers are more prone to rejoiceat the ills of othersthan at their own good fortune. Possibly *y orvn simplicity may come in for ridicule, if I lament the sorrowsof men in the circumstancesof the present,u'hen Italy has been devastated,Sicily enslaved,rs so many cities surrenderedto non-Greekcaptors,and when the remainingparts of the Greek world lie in the utmost danger. I am surprised that leading statesmenin the Greek cities think a lofty attitude suitable, though they have always been incapable of either speech or reflection to mitigate such a situation.If they deservedtheir reputationthey should abandon all else,and introduce and discussthe subjectof the expedition againstPersia.They might have helped to achievesomething of value, and if they did give up before successcame, at least they rvould have left their oracular utterancesfor the future. But men of the highest reputation spend their interest on concernsof no importance,and haveleft it to men like me, who 35. f)ionysius I, tyrant ofSyracuse, invaded Southern Italyin l9r n.c. and succeedingyears, after being successfulagainst the Carthaginians, who had conquered much of Sicily a few years before. r32

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haveabandonedpolitics, to adviseon suchvital issues.Nonetheless,the more our leadersconfine themselvesto trivialities, the more vigorous should be the precautionsu'hich the rest of us take to avoid these besetting differences,At present peace agreementsare vain. We make no settlement,only postponement of our wars, while we rvait for the opportunity to do irreparabledamageto each other. However, we must put these internecine conspiraciesaside, and set ourselvesto activities which will enablethe cities to live in greatersecurityand mutual confidence.There is a simple and easyapproachto this. It is impossible to reach a secure peace without sharing in war againstPersia,or to find agreementamong Greek states,until we derive our assetsfrorn the samesourcesand engagein war againstthe sameopponents.With this achieved,and with the removal of economic anxiety - which dissolvesfriendships, changesassociationinto enmity and plungeshuman beingsinto war and dissension- we shall not fail to reach unity and enjoy good will towards each other. With this aim we should regard it as essentialto loseno time in transferringthis expedition into Asia, in the certainty that we shall never derive any benefit from our own internal warfare until we decide to use the experiencewe have acquiredfrom it againstPersia. Perhapsit may be thought that the treaty makesit desirable to wait and avoidhasteor precipitateactionaboutthe expedition. The treaty meansthat statesset free are grateful to the King, as the author of this freedom, while those which have been surrenderedto Persiaare making bitter complaints,first against Sparta, and then againstothers who took part in the negotiations, as being responsiblefor their being forced into slavery. However,we shouldsurelyabolishtheseagreements, which have given rise to an opinion that Persiais the protectorof the Greek statesand the guardian of peace,while some of ourselvesare concernedto injure and impair it. Most ridiculous of all, it is only the worst of the items agreedin the treaty that we continue to observe. The clauseswhich confer independenceon the islands and the Greek cities in Europe have been long in abeyance,and, though they remain inscribedon the pillars, are invalid. On the other hand those which are to our discredit and r33

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involved the surrender of a number of our allies are still in existence,and we ensure their validity. These we ought to deleteand not allow to exist for a singleday longer,becausethey are orders given to us, and not agreements.It is universally understood that agreementsare made on a basis of mutual equality for both parties, while orders are designedto reduce the status of one side unfairly. We are therefore justified in accusingthe delegateswho negotiatedthe peaceon the ground that they were sent by the Greeks,but acted for Persia.They should have agreedeither that each side should hold its own original territory, or that eachshould hold its own new acquisitions, or should hold what it held when peacewas made. One of theseprinciplesshouldhavebeenestablishedand madea basis of unbiasednegotiation,and finally so drafted. In the event no considerationwas allowed to Athens or Sparta,and Persiawas given completemastery over Asia, as though it had been the King we had been fighting for, or the Persian empire which had been long establishedand we recent settlers, though in fact this position was a late acquisition of theirs, while we had long beenthe leadingpowersamong the Greeks. However, I think a different approachwill show more clearly the dishonour we have undergoneand the rapacity of Persia. The whole world beneaththe starsconsistsof two parts, called Asia and Europe,and the King hasappropriatedhalf of it under the treaty, as though he were making a division with Zeus instead of a settlementwith men. He has compelledus to have this inscribedon stoneand erectedin public temples,where it forms a far finer trophy to him than any he has won in battles. but The latter rvere in honour of small and isolatedsuccesses, this records one which covers the entire war, and has been gained at the expenseof all Greece. For this our anger is justified, and we must take means to secure retribution and order things properly in the future. It is a disgraceto expect in private to think of foreignersas servants,and in public to allow so many of our alliesto be slavesto them; a disgracethat at the rape of a single woman the Greeks of the Trojan wars should join the victims of wrong in such universalindignation as to refuse any compromisetill they had ruzed the presumpr34

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tuous offender'scity to the ground, while we exact no combined retribution for the insult to the whole Greek race, though we have the power to make our very dreamsrealities.This ls the only war which is in fact preferableto peace.It is more like a religious mission than a campaign,and desirablefor the advocatesboth of peaceand of war, the former of whom would be enabledto harvesttheir gains in security, the latter to acquire great wealth from the possessions of others. There are numerous respectsin which these activities wilr be found valuableto us. What nation ought to be the object of attack from a country which has no selfishgain to seek,but is concernedsolely with sheer justice? Surely it should be the one with a history of pastactivity and presentconspiracyagainst Greece,with a permanentrelation towardsus of the samekind. Against what nation is envy justified for men who, while not exactly lacking in spirit, havc yet tempered courage with moderationI Surely against a people who have been invested with superhuman power, but have deserved less than the meanestamongourselves.Upon whom ought a campaignto be launchedby men who havealwaysset their facestorvardspiety, though they have a thought also for advantageI Surely upon a peoplervho by nature and heredity alike are their enemies,who of the highest wealth and the smallestpower to are possessed defendit. In all thesepoints it is Persiawhich is vulnerable. In addition we shall not even trouble the statesby levying soldiers,the greatestburden to them in our internai *rir. i think there will be far fewer who wish to sray at home than those who desire to be on the march. Who is there, young or old, who rvill be so inert as not to desire a paft in this army, led by Athens and Sparta and gatheredfor the freedom of the allied Greeks,sent out by all Greecefor retribution on Persia? How great is the renown, the memory, the glory one must supposethose who show the highest valour in such stirring deedswill enjoy in their lives or leave behind them in death! Since the men who fought against Trojan Paris earned such glory by the.capture of a single ciry, what must we think will be the eulogiesbestowedon the conquerorsof all Asia ? There will not be a man in the realms of action or speechwho will r35

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not strive with all his power or all his thought to create a memorial of his conception and of their couragewhich will live through all eternity. By now I no longer feel the sameas at the beginningof my oration. I was then of opinion that I should be able to find words to fit my subject. But I cannot attain to its magnitude. Much of my intention has escapedme. So you must yourselves sharemy imaginationof the good fortune which would be ours, if we could changethe present war among ourselvesto a war againstthe mainland,and transferthe wealth of Asia to Europe. You must go home not merely in the capacityof hearers:any who are strong in the sphereof action should raise eachother's spirit to reconcileour city with Sparta; any who lay claim to oratory should abandon their futile disquisitions on subjects like money deposits,36and turn their competitive instincts towards the answer to the question what improvementscan be made in my presentationof the subject. You must reflect that great promises preclude petty considerationsand arguments which are unproductive for the audience who accept them, and demand those whosefulfilment will free them from their present impotence,and convince their hearersthat they have found the road to high success. 'deposit theme' 36. Norlin (Loeb edition) quotes the suggestion that the became a recognized phrase for a hackneyed exercise in the schools of rhetoric.

I S O C R A T E S :P H I L I P

INTRODUCTION Tlte addressto Philip of MacedonDas composed when Isocrates was luer ninetl, and its tone dffirs fro* the prid,e and,optimism of the Panegyricus. Between 38o ond j46, phen the Philip appeared,therehad beenmanl changes.The decli,nein thefortunes of the new Athenian Leagueand the eclipseof Sparta by Thebes ma1 haaeled Isocratesb1 about37o t0 the belief tltat unitjt could, onljt be establishedunder an indi.aidualleader.He is supposed, to h.aaesent addresses about that time to both Jason of Pherae(see rtg) and Dionysiusof Syacuse. If so, the deathsof both z)erJls00n afterwards/iustrated his hopes.But this tradition is d,isputed,and the letter which.has beenthought to make a similar approachto Arclridamus, King of Spartq ca,n hardly haae had the same intention. A dffirent kind of changeis the i,ncreasing useof mercenariesbl Greekstl,tes(see96),pltosecitizensbecamelessread.ltto take part in pars suchas that which,Isocrateswas ad,aocating. On the other hand this rnadeit easierto th.ink in termsof aryt arrnl under o singlegreat lead,er,a situation phich.would,also seraeto emplol them. The rise of Thebeswas the outcomeof the battle of Leuctra, phiclt,followed o Spartan inaasionof Boeotia in 37r. Tlaetables Dere turned on Sparta in the battle, which,pas the first of the triumphs of Epaminondas,the general on phose brillionce the Theban su?rernacJrested. With. this disaster the rule of Sparta endedfor tlte time, and,Thebestook stepsto makesureit shouldnot return. Apart rto* ilte expulsionof the Spartan harmosts(see introduction to the Panegyricus) more constructiaeaction rpas taken in theformation of an Arcadian League,in the foandation of the new city of fuIegalopolisas hs caphal, the rebuilding of Mantinea 0,sa counterpoiseto Sporta and the recnnstitutionof Messene.In addition, Boeotian inaasionsof Spartan territorjt followed; a Boeotian general, Pelopidas, made inroads into IttrorthernThessafit,andfreedsomeof its statesfromthe monarchical r37

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rale it had sufered underjason, in fazsour of a Thessalianleague; and_in{6 a Th,eban force seizedOropusfrom Athens(5). Iy tlris processThebesacquiredsomeof the unpopuliritjt which ltad oncebeenSparta's. Atltens nnv beganto sid,ewith Sparta (seeDemostltenes, For Megalopolis), mure resentmentwas iaused. by Thebon attempts to orercomeAchaea and, in j6j,-earied by the redaction of all Thessaly,phile a J/ear earlier Thebis as deepltatred as otherGreekstatesin th.eirtimesby the total aboli,tion of a neigltbourstate, orchomenus,an old riaal in Boeotia. wittx the deatlr,of Epaminondasin j6z at the otherwisesuccessful battle a-gainstsportg, at Mantinea, Thebes'dominationbeganio decrine, haaing roused,as muchhatred as Sparta's. But ThebesDas still g, poner in th,eGreekworld, as is sh.ownby lter part in wltat is called the Sacred,War (5$. In j56 ph,ocis,in centrol Greece, haai.ng abandoned,the norD peakened Theban alliance into which shehad beenforcedfound, herselfa targetfor Tlrebes,wh.oresentedthe independence of a former subordinite. Phocis inclwdedthe sanctuarj,tof Delphi (which is th.ereasonfor the title_gioento this war) and,tlte centreof the so-calledAmphictjtonic League(74 and note). Thi,sancientbodjt,formed,t0 prntect the sacredsite, sffired, the fate of other simi,lar instituiions in ffiri,ng a frequent preter$for manipulation and exploitation b1 its mostpgr,nerfulmembers.By meansof it Thebesimposedheaij, fines 9n Plrocisfor alleged,sacrilege,with the implied threat if qnagk t1 defoub oJ'payment.Phocis,h.oweaer, under the aigorois Igadlrsltip of Philontelusand onoruarclrus,resp,ndedb7 ieizing Delphi itself and its treasure, and, sent appealsto anti-Theban stoteslike Sparta. The resultingwar lastedlong, and b1 i,t phocis was raised to a temporary suprelnocJander onomarcltus.Philip was broughtinto the conflict b1 Thessaly,and was at frst defeatid fut Onomarcltus.But his part in the war bri,ngsus to the speeches of Demosthenes, ond must be includedin the introduction to thent (pp. r7o-7r).

['-6] ISOCRATES: PHILIP

You must not be surprised,Philip, if I do not begin u'ith the thesiswhich is to be put beforeyou and will follow immediately, but with one in which I discussedAmphipolis. r I wish to saya little about this first, to makeclearthat it is not due to ignorance or failure to realizemy presentphysicaldeclinethat I have set myself the task of addressingyou, but that it is a well-advised, deliberateintention. Realizingthe many ill effectsof the recent war betlveenyou and Athens over Amphipolis, I set out to discussthis country and the surrounding district in terms unlike any put forward either by your supportersor by Athenian speakers,and as far removedas can be from the ideasof either. Each party uttered an incitementto war, to accordwith your respectiveaims in it. I gaveno opinion on controversialsubjects,but confinedmyself to what seemedthe line most conducive to peace.I declared that you were both mistakenin your view of affairs, and that you yourself were really fighting in support of the interestsof Athens, and she of the kingdom of Macedon. It was to your advantagethat this territory should be in our hands, and to ours that no attempt at all should be made to secureit. The impressionof this discourseon my audiencewas such that none of them gave the conventionaleulogy of its precision of form and purity of diction, but they admired its rruth to reality. They concludedthat the only way to bring competitionbetween you to an end was, on your side,a belief that friendshipwith Athens was worth more than the revenuesof Amphipolis, and on hers the lessonthat she should avoid coloniesof the sort which have four or five times been the ruin of their settlers, and look for districtsfurther removedfrom the possibledemands of empire and nearerto peoplewith habits of subservience,like the region of Cyrene colonized by Sparta. In addition, you would rcalizethat although nominally ceding the district you would actuallykeep control of it as well as retaining good relar. On Amphipolis, seesectionalintoduction to Demosthenes(I) (p. rZo).

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tions with Athens(you will havehostagesfor our goodbehaviour in everycolonistwho goesinto your territory), while our people would be brought to understandthat their control of Amphipolis would compel them to the same good relations with Macedon as they were led to maintain with Amadocus, in the past by the presenceof the settlersin the Chersonese. This long discussionled my hearersto hope that the vierv could be disseminated,and that you would both admit your error and arrive at a beneficial compromise. Whether their idea was senseor nonsense,they must have the responsibility of deciding.But while I was engagedon this business,and before its conclusion,you made peace,and this vl.assensible. Any form of settlementwas to be preferredto a continuanceof the miseries of the war. I felt the same satisfactionat the decisionsof the peace,and I thought it would be beneficialnot merely to us, but to yourself and the Greek states.Yet I coulcl not disengagemy mind from the implications of the subject, but turned at once to the problem of securing the settlement and preventing my country from the quest for new enemies after a short interval. I turned the matter over in my mind, and concludedthat the only way to prolong peacefor Athens was a decisionby the leadingstatesto relax their own tensions by carrying the war into Asia, and to agreeto merge the conflicting self-interestsof different states in an attempt upon Persia,a policy which I did in fact recommendin the Panegltricus.With this idea in mind and with the belief that it would be impossibleto arrive at a basiswhich would be more attractive I was or havebroaderapplicationor greatergeneraladvantages, fired to write againabout it. I havenot forgotten my own situation, and I rcalizethat this proposaldoesnot presupposea man of my age,but one irr the full flower of life and of quite exceptional character.I am also awareof the difficulty of expressing the same thesis trvice with tolerable results, especiallyif the earlier publication was of a kind to give even its critics more to imitate and admire than its fervent sugiporters.However, I set z. Amadocus shared with Cersobleptesthe rule of Thrace from 359 n.c., and favoured Athens. According to Demosthenes (Aristorates, r83) his resistance to Philip saved Athens from'war with Cersobleptes in 353.

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aside these difficulties, and was ambitious enough in my old age to hope to combine what I had to say to you with a conclusivedemonstrationto my own pupils that to disturb general assemblieswith addressespresented to the entire crowd of participants is in fact to addressno one. Such disquisitions have as little effect as the legal and constitutional enactments of a degreethesis.If one is to avoid an idle wasteof words and achievesomethingof value,and if one clairnsto havesomething of generalinterest to say, one must leaveconferencesto others and secure a figure of high reputation in the fields of both thought and action to representone's views, if anyoneis to be expectedto attend to them. It was in this determinationthat I formed the plan of discussion with you, not for personal reasons;although I should set great store by your enjoyment of such a discussion,this was not my real intention. I observed that other men of distinction lived under the control of their state and of law, and were not in a position to exceedinstructions, and in addition were quite inadequatefor the ideasto be put forward. You were alone in being privileged by fortune to enter into diplomatic relationswith any stateyou liked, and to say anything you thought fit, and alsoin being better equipped than anv other Greek state with money and power, which are towardspersuasion the only naturalassets or compulsion.Indeed I regard even my project as likely to need both these,because I intend to urge you to take the lead in a movementfor Greek unity and in the campaignagainstthe non-Greek world. Persuasion u'ill be desirable in dealing with the Greeks, and compulsionof practicaluse againstthe others.This aim covers the whole discourse. I shall not hesitateto mention the trouble I have been given by someof my pupils, becauseI think it may be useful to hear it. When I revealedto them my intention to addressa discourse to you, not for the purpose of display or as an encomium on your military successes, which will be done by others, but in an attempt to urge you to a more fitting, noble and valuable courseof actionthan that on which you havelately beenengaged, they lvere so terrified that old age might have driven me out of my wits, as to give me an unprecedentedreproof: it would be I4T

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an intolerable folly to contemplate a messageof advice to Philip, who might in the past have thought himself less of a diplomat than some, but after his recent noteworthy achievements must think himself more so than most. 'Furthermore,' I was told, 'his entourageincludes the keenestintelligencesin Macedonia,who, even if they are inexperiencedin most other matters, know better than you do where his advantagelies. You will find a number of Greekswho have settledthere, men who are by no means without distinction or ability, and his associationwith them has not at all dimmed the greatnessof Macedon. The position he has achievedis ideal. There are no weak points in it. Why, the previouscontrollersof Macedonia, Thessaly,have been brought to such close relationswith him that any sectionof them feelsgreaterconfidencein Philip than in other groups of their own fellow-citizens.The statesin that district he has either brought into his own orbit by the benefits he has conferred,or liquidated the really troublesome.He has reduced Magnesia, Perrhaebiaand Paeonia and made them subject states.He has secured his power, official as well as actual, over the great bulk of Illyria, except for the Adriatic coast.3With all this behind him do you not supposehe rvill think it pure stupidity to addressdiscoursesto him, and conclude that you havea very distortedidea of the power of words and of his own intelligence?' I will omit my initial dismay on hearing this, and my subsequentrecovery and reply to it in detail, for fear of appearing complacent at making t neat defence.But having, I thought, given a moderaterebuff to the critics who had ventured to attack me, I ended with an undertaking that they should be the only peoplein Athens to rvhom I would disclosethe discourse,and that I would accept their decisionwhat to do about it. What their frame of mind was when they left, I cannot tell. But after a few days, when the text wascompletedand I showedit to them, they changedtheir attitude enough to feel ashamedof their outspoken tone, to regret what they had said and own that they had never made a greater mistake.They showedmore enthusiasmthan my own 3. Before meddling in Greek politics Philip established his control of Macedonia itself, of which these are divisions. (See DemosthenesOl. r. r3.) r42

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for sending the speechto you, and added their hopes that I should be receivedwith gratitude for it not only by yourself and by Athens, but by the Greek statesin general. The reasonfor this narrative is to prevbnt anything in my initial argument,which'may appearunreliableor impossibleor unsuitable,from giving you a distastefor the rest and making you reject it or feel the same as my friends. I hope you will keep an open mind till you have heard the whole, becauseI think I shall have somethingto say which is both neededand valuable.At the sametime I rcalizehow much differencethere is betweenthe spokenand the written rvord, and how generally it is assumedthat discussionof seriousand urgent subjectsis spoken,while a speechwhich is under contract and intended for display is written. This is not an unreasonabledistinction. When oratory is shorn of the appearanceand the voice of the speaker,and of the rhetorical transitionsof a set speech,when it lacks the immediacy and intensity of a practical aim and there is no feeling of participation in actual persuasion,when the speakeris denudedof this and readsa mere list of items with an unconvincinglack of telling intonation,I think it is reasonable if his hearersfind him dull. This presentdiscoursemay suffer from some such appearanceof dullness, becauseI have not endowedit with the felicities of rhythm and decorationwhich I used myself in my earlier days, and demonstratedas contributing to enjoymentand conviction alike. My age precludesall this, and nowadaysI am satisfiedif I can achieve a simple presentationof the actual matter. In your casetoo I think it will be better to neglect inessentialsand confine yourself to this. It will enable you to form the best and most accurate judgement as to whether there is force in my contentionsif you discountthe distasteconnectedwith academicdissertations, and take eachitem as it is intended,rvithout regardingthem as incidentalsto be treated idly, but giving each the philosophic thought of which it is saidthatyou arealsocapable.Such deliberation is to be preferred to common opinion as a basisfor your view. This, then, completesthe preambleto what I haveto say. I shall now turn to the actualsubject.I maintain that without disregardingany of your own interestsyou should attempt to r43

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reconcile the states of Argos, Sparta, Thebes and Athens. If you succeedin bringing these four together, there will be no difficulty in securingagreementbetweenthe rest, which are all subordinateto these,go to one or other of them for protection at any time of alarm, and derive assistancefrom them. Thus you have only to persuadefour statesto a reasonableattitude to relieveall the rest of a multitude of troubles. You should know that it would be inappropriate for you to treat any of these states with indifference, if you view their history in relation to your own ancestors.You will find in each casea story of great good will and substantialbenefitstowards your people. Argos is your country of origin, and justice demandsthat the sameprecedenceshall be accordedher as to your own parents.4Thebes is the patron town of the founder of your race, to whom she renders particular offerings and sacrifices.Sparta has conferred on his descendantspermanent kingship and primacy, while Athens is credited by reliable tradition with contributing to the immortaliry of Heraclesin a manner which is easily ascertainedbut would be irrelevant here, and with the preservationof his descendants.s Unaided, she withstood tremendousdangersin the strugglewith Eurystheus, whoseviolenceshe curbed,to rid the Heraclidaeof their recurrent perils. For this the survivors, not merely on that occasion, but at all times, can feel justifiable gratitude to Athens, to whom they owe their lives and the benefits they enjoy. But for the survival of the Heraclids they could never have come into being. In view of the characterof all these statesyou should have no disagreementwith any of them. But unfortunately we are all by nature more prone to be wrong than right. So rve should take joint responsibility for the past, and for the future take care to avoid repeatingit. You should keepin mind the question 4. See Panegyricus, note 7. The Greeks r\rerevery conscious of parentage and descent.Perdiccas I, from whom Philip was descended,was said to have been himself descended from an Argive hero (see Hetodotus Y, zz), and perhaps belongs to the seventh century u.c. 5. Apparently because Athens was supposed to have offered the first sacrifices to Heracles.

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what benefit you can confer, to prove clearly that your conduct doeshonour to yourself and to their past achievements. The moment is now yours. If you pay your debts in gratitude, they will considerafter this long interval of time that you are conferring an initial benefaction.And it is fine to feel that you are a benefactorto the greatestof states,and at once to make the benefit as truly yours as theirs. Apart from this you will dissolveany ill feeling that may exist betweenyou. In the light of immediate good offices the disharmoniesof the past are forgotten. Indeed it is also an obvious truth that in all human affairs nothing is so keenly rememberedas assistancein misfortune. You seethe misery that war has brought thesestates, and the parallelbetweenthem and individuals in a quarrel,who are irreconcilablewhile their angeris rising, though after inflicting injury on eachother they part of their own accordwithout out further mediation. This I think thesestateswill do, unless you give them your attention. It may be possibleto venture obiection to my proposalson the scorethat I am trying to persuadeyou to an attempt which is not feasible,becausefriendship betweenArgos and Sparta, or betweenSpartaand Thebes,is impossible,nor could a balance of power ever take the place of long habits of competition. When Athens held the principal power among the Greeks, and similarly when Sparta did, I do not think anything of the sort could have been attained, becauseeach side could easily have frustrated the attempt. Now, however, I no longer take this view. All the stateshave, I know, been reduced by misfortune to one level, and I think they will be much more inclined to acceptthe benefitsof unanimity than the old competitiveness.Further I agree that there would be no other figure capableof effectingthis reconciliation.For you, however, these difficulties would not exist. It can be observedthat you havealreadyachievedmuch that seemedbeyondhope or reason, which makesit not unbelievablethat this may be a further union which you alonecould bring about.High idealsand greatability should not confinethemselvesto the scopeof ordinary men, but attemptwhatis only opento a characterand a powersuchasyours. I am surprised at the view that any of these proposalsis r45

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impracticable,and I wonder that those rvho hold it should not be aware from their own knowledge or that of others that history recordsnumerouswarsof importancervhosetermination 'Ilhere has has brought great mutual benefit to the contestants. never been more violent enmity than that of the Greek states against Xerxes. Yet the friendship which follorved6 was one which, as everyone knows, A.thens and Sparta valued more than that of the states which helped to secure the poiver of each. There is no need to go far back in history or outside Greeceitself. A full considerationof the disastersof the Greek stateswill show that they were a mere fraction of the misery brought to Athens by the Theban and Spartan hegemonies. Nonetheless,at the time of the Spartan campaign against Thebes and their attempt to disrupt Boeotia and disestablish its communities,zAthens led a force to obstruct their intentions. Then, when fortune changed,and Thebes combined x,ith all the Peloponnesian statesin a drive for the eradicationof Sparta, Athens was again the only state to join in alliancewith Sparta, and was in fact responsiblefor her survival. In view of such changesof attitude, and in the realizationthat the stateshave little thought of fixed hostility or sworn declarationsor anything elseexceptwhat they think is in their own interest,and that this it is what they foster and preservewith the utmost eagerness, would be sheerstupidity to supposethat this tendencyrvill not persist, especially when they will have you to superintend better relations, as well as the impelling force of their own interest and the compulsionof their presentmiseries.My own opinion is that with these factors to help you everything will contribute to a satisfactoryresult. 6. A very hard statement to understand. As the text stands we should read 'whose friendship'. I translate to render the apparent intention. We should take Xerxes to stand for any Persian monarch and the passageto refer to the end of the Peloponnesian War or the late years of the fourth century when both Athens and Sparta turned to Persia for financial support. (See note on the passagein M. L. W. Laistner's edition of'the speech.) 7. The history of Thebes constantly depends on whether the city was at any given time to be regarded as the overlord of the rest of Boeotia, or merely one among the many separate cities included in it. Thebes itself naturally tended to seek the former position, her rivals to desire the latter.

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I think you can best discover whether the attitude of the statesto each other is peaceableor the reverse,if we discuss, not too superficially,but not in too great detail either, the most in-rportantfeaturesof their presentposition. First consider Sparta, not long ago the military and naval leadersof Greece.They have undergonesuch a changesince the battle of Leuctra as to have been deprived of the supreme power in Greeceand lose a valuablesection of their Spartiate citizens,swho preferredto die rather than survive defeatby the previousvictims of their own autocracy.In addition, they went ol1 to see all the Peloponnesianstates who had previously followed their standardagainstothers now siding with Thebes in an invasionof their territory; they were faced with extreme dangernot rnerelyto their crops in the open, but to their wives and children in the very city and in the centre of government.o It was a crisis in which failure meant instant destruction,and even successbrought no releasefrom trouble. They have been under attack frclm the surrounding inhabitants of their own district,Io distrustedby everyonein the Peloponnese,hated by the bulk of the Greek states,harried night and day by their own underlings.They havenot a moment'sfreedomfrom campaigns, from fighting or from support of their own people in distress. lVorst of all, they live in continuous fear of a reconciliation between Phocis and Thebes, who might return and subject them to greater ruin than before. In fact one cannot fail to supposethat people with this attitude would be overjoyed to seein chargeof peacenegotiationsa man of importancecapable of bringing existing warfareto a close. Next Argos can be seen to be either in a similar caseor a worse. Since the foundation of their state they have been like 8. On the true Spartiates the whole strength of Sparta depended. records that Epaminondas actually 9. Xenophon (Hellenica, VII, v.) 'whether by divine agency or desperaentered Sparta on one occasion, but tion' the Spartans repulsed him and his army. ro. Laistner thinks this phraserefers to the state of Messeniaas refounded by Epaminondas in 369 (after Leuctra) by recalling and enfranchising Helots from the region, or others expelled by Sparta from Naupactus, where they had been settled by Athens. Sparta hoped to regain this reconstituted Messenia during the SacredWar (seeDemosthenes,For ilLegalopolis,p.ry4),

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Sparta, in a condition of warfare with their neighbours,with this difference: that Sparta has operated against weaker, and Argos againststronger,opponents,which would be universally owned to be the most disastrousposition. Their misfortunesin war have been such that almost every year they have had to seetheir country ravagedand ruined. Worst of all, when their enemiesgive them an interval from attacktheyput the wealthiest and most distinguishedof their own peopleto death,and derive more satisfactionfrom it than others do from killing their enemies.IlThe reasonfor their disorderedhistory is simply war, and if you can bring it to an end, you will not merely rid them of their own troubles, but enable them to initiate better relationswith others. The position of Thebes you know. After their magnificent victory and the prestige they earned from it, their misuse of their successbrought them to a level with the defeatedand frustrated. They had no sooner overpoweredtheir opponents than they cast consideratibnaside and began to harass the Peloponnesianstates, made unwarrantable inroads on the freedom of ltaly, threatenedtheir neighbours at Megara and made encroachmentson Athenian territory,Iz rvhile they sacked Euboea,and sent a naval force to Byzantium, as though seaand land alike were to come under their domination. Finally they enteredupon war with Phocis in the hope of a rapid defeatof the Phociantowns and an extensionof their rule over the whole surrounding district by gaining control of the Delphic treasure at the expenseof their private funds. None of these hopes materialized.Insteadof capturing the towns of Phocisthey have lost their own, while their invasionof enemy territory doesless damagethan they undergo in returning to their own. In Phocis they kill a few mercenaries,who are better dead than alive, while on their retreat they lose the most distinguished and daring patriots they possess.Their affairs have taken such a turn that after cherishing hopes of universal domination they r r . An oligarchic conspiracy at Argos in 37 r is said to have led to the death of tzoo citizens. rz. On Theban history of this time see sectional introduction. The Athenian territory mentioned is Oropus (seeDemosthenes, For Megalopolis).

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norv depend on you for their hopes of survival. I therefore believethat they too will soon fall in with your instructionsand advice. So it would only remain for us to deal with the state of Athens, were it not that she had the good senseto make peace before the others.tsAs it is, I think she will make a positive contribution to the project, particularly if she can grasp that your arrangementsare designeclfor the campaign against Persia. That it is not impossiblefor you to unite thesestatesI think has been proved by rvhat I have said. I go further and say that I think I shall be able to give numerousexamplesto show that it ivill be easy.If it is shown that others in the past have made attempts which, though no more distinguishedand lofty than my proposals,haveyet beenharderand more troublesomeand have succeeded,what further argument can there be against expecting you to be quicker to achieve an easy task than a hard onei First considerthe caseof Alcibiades.He r,vasbanishedfrom Athens,t+and found that previous victims lay down under disasterbecausethe great name of Athens overawedthem. But he refusedto adopt their attitude. He thought he should attempt to force a return, and decided to rnake war on Athens. It rvould be impossibleto deal in detail with every event of that time, and at this moment it would perhapsbe tiresome.But he causedconfusionalike to Athens and to Sparta and the rest of Greece,which brought upon ourselvesthe consequences which are common knowledge, while the others ryere involved in disastersbringing calamitieswhosehorrors have not yet faded, and Sparta,after her apparentsuccess, tracesher presenttroubles to Alcibiades.It was at his instancethat they were lured into naval ambitions,only to lose their military supremacyas well. Thus were one to date the rise of their present disastersfrom their rise as a navalpower, it could not be written off as untrue. Alcibiades,then, had all theseresponsibilitieson his headwhen r3. Peaceof Philocrates,346 n.c. 14. In 4r5 B.c. (see introduction to Andocides, On the Mysteries, p. 6r). He returned in 4o7.

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he returned to Athens, covered with glory, though not greeted with universalapplause. Conon'scareerIs a few yearslater was the converseof Alcibiades'. Defeated in the naval battle at the Hellespont,not by his own fault, but that of his fellow-commanders,he was ashamedto return home. He sailedto Cyprus, where he spent some time on his private affairs, after which he learnt that Agesilaus had crossed to Asia with a large force, and was devastatingthe district. Being a man of great spirit, though devoidof all assetsexcepthis own personand his determination, Corron,conceivedthe idea of a military and naval defeat of Sparta,then the leading state in Greece,and sent word to the Persiancommanderswith a promise to bring it about. There is no need to go further. He was joined by a fleet near Rhodes, and won a battle which overturned the Spartan empire, and brought freedom to Greece. He thus not merely led to the rebuilding of his country''swalls, but to the resuscitationof her fallen glories. There could have been little expectationthat a man who had acted with such humility would reverse the entire affairs of Greece,and bring their statesto dishonour or to power. Next I mention Dionysiust6 - I want to offer severalinstances to convinceyou of the easeof the proceedingsI urge. He rvas of no great distinction in Syracuseeither in birth, reputationor anything else.He indulged an unthinking, phrenetic desirefor despoticpower, and was preparedto do anything which could lead to it. He securedcontrol of Syracuse,reducedall the other Greek statesin Sicily, and surroundedhimself with naval and military strength unequalledin his day. Cyrus17again, to pass to a non-Greek instance,was exposedby the roadsideby his mother, but rescuedby a Persianwoman, and lived to change the world by becominglord of all Asia. Thus, sinceAlcibiades in spite of exile, Conon of misfortune, Dionysius of undistinguishedorigins and Cyrus of the misery of his initial story went 15. On the career ofConon, seePanegyricus, trg) p. rz2, note 20, and sectional introduction. 16. On Dionysius of Syracuse, seePaneglricus, t6g, p. r32, note 35. 17. This refers to Cyrus the Great.

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as far and achievedas much as they did, it must clearly be expectedthat a man like yourself, of sirnilar birth, but with the kingship of Macedon and this widespreadpower to your name, will find it easyto bring about the unity of which I havespoken. You may well reflect how valuable it is to engagein enterpriseswhosesuccesswill set your reputationto rival the highest in history, while, even if your hopesare unrealized,you will at leastearn good will from the Greek states,which is a far finer achievement thanthe stormingofany numberofGreekcities.Such successes give occasionfor resentment,hostility and ili feeling, none of which attachesto such a course as I am suggesting. If the gods granted you a choice of the pursuit or activity in which you would spend your life, there is no other, in my submission,which you could prefer to this. You will not merely win the world's emulation, you will be able to congratulate yourself. It will surely be the acme of this kind of satisfaction when the most distinguishedrepresentativesfrom the Greek statescome in deferenceto your power; when you join them in deliberationsfor the common welfare,for which it will be clear no one else has such deep concern as yourself; and when you realizethat all Greece is agog with expectationof your aims, that no one is neglectfulof your arbitration) some inquiring its trend, othersexpressingthe hope that you may not fail in your intention, or afraid that you may be preventedby somefatality from bringing it to its consummation.You could hardly fail to be uplifted at such a situation,or to enjoy lasting felicity in the knowledgeof your position as leader of such a world. And no one of even moderateintelligencecould fail to urge you to a plan of actionwhich would bring a doubleharvestof outstanding pleasureand inextinguishablehonour. What I havesaidon this subjectmight haveseemedsufficient, had I not omitted one argument, not out of forgetfulness,but out of hesitation.Now I think I should put it forward. I believe it is in your interestto hearit, and my duty to maintainmy usual candourand discussit. I realizethat you are niisrepresentedby peoplewho are jealousof you 18and are apt to incite their own 18. Perhaps Demosthenes and the 'war party', though the reference is not confined to Athenians. 15I

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statesto disorder, and who supposethat generalpeacemeans war against their own individual interests.They leave everything elseasideand concentrateon the subject of your power, whose rise they maintain is not in the interest of Greece,but againstit. They declarethat you have long harboureddesigns againstus all; that an ostensibleaim to befriendMessenia,Io if you arrange the position in Phocis, concealsthe ambition to control the Peloponnese;that initially Thessaly,Thebesand all the adherentsof the Amphictyonic confederacyare preparedto follow you, while Argos, Messene,Megalopolis and numerous others are ready to join the campaign and reduce Sparta to ruin; and that once you achievethat you will find it easy to reduceall the rest of the Greekstates.This is without substance, though they claim it as certain knowledgeand their imaginary subjectionof the world to you wins them much support; primarily among people who hold the same pernicious aims as these purveyors of rumour themselves,secondly in circles which give no real thought to international affairs, but in an entirely unperceptiveattitude sympathizewith any who claim to feel apprehensionand misgivings about them, and again among others who do not reject the idea of your having conspired againstthe Greeks,but regardthe chargeas one to merit emulation.They are so remotefrom common senseas to fail to seethat the sameargument can be used to do damageor bring support alike. At the presentjuncture, for instance,the statement that the King of Persia had designsagainst the Greeks and was prepared for an expedition against us would not amount to any criticism againsthim, but would show him in a more courageousand more estimable light. But if preferred againsta descendantof Heracles,who was the benefactorof all Greece,this chargewould be a matter of the deepestshame.It could not fail to be a reasonfor resentmentand hatred to be proved a conspiratoragainstcausesfor whosesakeone's ances19. On Messene see note ro above. The Amphictyonic League \yas an ancient association for the protection of the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi. Athens and Sparta were members, but it was formed largely of states in Central Greece,notably Thebes and Thessaly, until Macedon gained membership in place of Phocis after the Sacred War.

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tor had elected to risk his life, and to make no attempt to preservethe good will which his achievementsleft behind, but insteadto neglectit for the pursuit of despicableand shameful ends. You should realize and not discount the growth of this view of you, in which your enemies desire to involve you, though every friend of yours would confidently deny it. Yet in these two opinions you will find the truest inclicationof your interests. Perhapsyou regard it as petty-minded to pay any attention to slanderousnonsenseand its followers,particularly when your conscience is entirely clear.But one should not be contemptuous of the massesor think little of high reputation in any quarter. The time when you can regard your public figure as high and distinguished,and in keeping with yourself, your ancestryand your achievements,is when you have imparted the same attitude in the Greek statestowardsyou asyou seeSpartaholds towards her Kings, and your Companionszotowardsyourself. It is not difficult to achieve this, if you are prepared to be impartial towards all, to ceaseto be friendly towards one state and distant towards another, and if you pursue a policy which will makeyou trusted in Greeceand fearedabroad. I hope you will not be surprised, as I also pointed out to Dionysius rvhen he becameTyrant, at an addressof unusual freedom from one who is not a military leader nor a political speakernor otherwisea power in the land. Nature left me less well equippedfor politics than anyone.I have neither the voice nor the confidenceto deal with crowds, or to drag mvself in the dust and abuseand hurly-burly of the public platform. But for sound and educatedthinking, though it may be thought somewhatlacking in good tasteto say so, I stakemy claim and would set myself not among those who are left behind in the race, but among the leaders.This is the reasonwhy I attempt to offer advice,of the kind which is within my natural powers, to Athens, to the rest of Greeceand to the leadersof mankind. You haveheard fairly fully of my own theme,and of the way in which you should deal with the Greek states.As regardsthe zo. The Greek word'companions'was used to refer to the Macedonian cavalry, and then officially for the King's bodyguard and advisers.

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expeditioninto Persia,we will approachthe statesI calledupon you to reconcile and urge them towards it, when we can be sure of their agreement. I shall now address arguments to yourself on the subject, but not in the same senseas at the periodwhen I waspreviouslywriting about it. On that occasionI calledupon my audienceto hold me in ridicule and contemptif I did not show myself capableof a discussionworthy of my subject,my own reputationand the length of time the discussion occupied.'I Now I am afraid that I may have offered a clisquisition which is inadequateto all I said before. For apart from other things thePanegltricus,which enrichedother devotees of philosophy, has impoverishedme. I do not wish to repeat what I wrote there, but I am not capableof producing fresh ideas.However I must not abandon my task, but go through with my undertaking to say whatever occurs to my mind as likely to persuadeyou. If I make omissionsand prove unable to recapturethe manner of my earlier work, at least I think I shall provide a pleasant outline for others to elaborate and complete. I think I have establishedthis as the basisof my argument, which is essentialto a plan for a campaignagainstAsia. One must do nothing till one has secured from the Greek states either collaborationor considerablesympathy with the project. This was neglected by Agesilaus, who appeared the most intelligentof the Spartans,from ambition rather than incapacity. He had two aims, both laudable,but inconsistentand incompatible. His designwas both to conduct war with Persiaand to 22to their cities and give them control over recall his associates proceedings.The result of his arrangementswith his associates was a seriesof difficulties and dangersfor the Greeks, rvhile that of the confusion which reigned at home was that he had no time or power for war abroad.Thus his failure to graspthe problemof that period affordsa clearlessonthat a correctdesign zr. See Panegyicus, t4, zz. The same Greek rvord as appearsin 8o above, here refers to Agesilaus' friends, unless it has its semi-technical senseto refer to the political clubs, which existed throughout the Greek states (see on Lysias, Eratosthenes,43), in which case Jebb thinks that Isocrates is confusing the rigid oligarchical aims of Lysander with the much more accommodating ones of Agesilaus.

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rvill not include war with Persia without reconciliationof the Greek statesand an end of the insanity which now afflictsthem. This is the advice I have in fact given. About this no thinking man would be rash enough to disagree.But if it occurredto anyoneelseto give adviceabout the expeditionagainstAsia, I think he might have recourseto the claim that it rvas the experienceof all who attempted war againstPersiathat they rise from obscurity to distinction, from poverty to rvealth, from unimportanceto the control of large territoriesand dominions.But it is not from suchpeopleas this that I draw my plea to convinceyou, but from the classwhich appearsto have been unsuccessful,I mean the men who took part in the army of Cyrus and Clearchus.z:They are admitted to have overcomein battle the entire force of Persia as completely as if they had had only their women to conrend with, but when they still appearedto havethe situation in their grasp they r,verebrought to disasterby the rash behaviourof Cyrus, rvhoseexcessiveexultation led him to pursue the action far beyond the rest into the middle of the enemy, where he was killed. Nonetheless,afrer a disasterof this magnitudethe King had so little confidencein the force under his command as to summon Clearchusand the other leadersto a conference,at which he promisedthem largepresentsof moneyand undertook to send the rest of the army home rvith full pay. After leading them on with such hopes as this, and after giving the most solemn assurances normal in that country, he seizedthem and put them to death. He preferred to violate the sanctionsof religion rather than engage in battle against those deserted soldiers.What plea, then, could have a bemerjustification or carry a surer guaranteei Even that army would cleariy have overcomethe power of Persia,had it not been for Cyrus. But in your casethe catastropheof that time is easyto forestall,and the force which overcamethe strength of Persiacan easily be far surpassed. And if provisionis madefor both thesedemands, one can surely feel confidentin undertakingthe campaign. I hope it will not be supposedthat I want to elude the fact 4. On the story of the Ten Thousand see on Paneglricus, r44, and, sectional introduction.

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that I have put some of this in the samefashion as before. As I have embarkedupon the same ideas, I preferred not to cause myself uouble by insisting on a secondsatisfactoryexpression of what has already been said. Were I engagedin a rhetorical display, I should attempt to avoid all such repetition, but in a discourseof recommendationto you it would be stupid of me to attend more to diction than to matter, or when othersappropriate my style, to be alone in avoiding expressionsof my own previous devising. Indeed I should make a successfuluse of any phrase of my own which meets an urgent need and is pertinent, while I would not accepta borrowed one any more than I did in the past. So far, then, so good. Next I think I had better considerthe force you will have in comparisonwith that of the previous expedition.Most important of all, you will havethe goodwill of the Greekstates,if you arepreparedto abideby my adviceabout them, whereasyour predecessors wereled to extremehostility by the Spartandecarchies.Indeed the Greeksthought that if Cyrus and Clearchuswere successful,their orvn enslavementto Sparta rvould be intensified, while successfor the King would free them from duress.And this is what happened.Secondly,as regardsinfantry, you will have a ready source from which to draw as many men as you like. Greeceis now a land in which it is easierto raisean army, and a strongerone, from displaced exiles2+than from activecitizens.But at that time there was no permanentmercenaryforce. They had to collect men from the cities, and found it cost more in donativesto the collectorsthan in pay for the fighting force. Furthermore, if we set out to draw a comparisonbetweenyou, the intended commanderand chief of staffof the presentarmy, and Clearchus,who wasin command on the previousoccasion,we shall find that he had neverpreviously had chargeof a force, naval or otherwise.He owed his fame to the disaster that befell him on the continent, while your own achievementsamount to an enormoustotal, which it 24.'The employment of mercenaries in Greece on a considerable scale began in the Corinthian War (fq+-Sqo) and gradually became more and more firmly established' (Laistner). Indeed it became a difficult problem, on which see r2o, rzr below.

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would be well to elaborateif I were addressingother states, but in a discussionconfinedto yourself a catalogueof your own successes would appearsuperfluousand foolish. It is worth while to make somemention of the two Kings of Persia,one whom I am proposingthat you should face,and the other whom Clearchusmet, to give you someknowledgeof the characterof each.The fatherzsof the presentKing conducted successfulwars againstAthens, and again against Sparta, but the present one has never been successfulagainst any of the forces which have ruined his country. The first acquired the whole of Asia from Greeceby the treaty he made, the second is so far from control of others that he cannot even control cities madeover to him. An observerwoulcl be in doubt whether he had abandonedthem or whether they had adopted a lordly contempt for the power of Persia. An accountof the country itself and its condition would fill anyone with enthusiasmfor attack. Egypt was in revolt about the sametime as the attempt of Cyrus,z6but rvasafraid that the King might raisehis own force and overcomethe difficultiesof the Nile delta and all their orher defenceworks. However, he relieved them of this apprehension.He gathered the largest force he could and marched againstthem. But he retired, not merely defeated,but a figure of derision, incapableof being a king or commanding an army. The district which includes Cyprus, Phoeniciaand Cilicia, the sourceof Persianfleets,then belongedto the King, but has now either secededor is in a state of warfare or other trouble to an extent which precludes his deriving any benefit from the peoples of that district, though they will be convenientlyplacedfor you, if you conduct this expeditionagainsthim. In addition ldrieus,zzthe wealthiest potentateon the mainland,is likely to be a strongeropponentof the King than the enemiesnow ar war with him. At least it 25. Artaxerxes II came to the throne in 4o5 s.c. He was not responsiblefor Persian successesin the Peloponnesian war, though he was, with conon's assistance,for the battle ofCnidus. Arraxerxes III succeededin 359. _ 26. Egypt revolted from Persia at the end of the fifth century, and was not finally recovered till 344. (See on Demosthenes, Rhod.es,norei z and 4) 27. Idrieus became King of Caria on the death of Artemisia in 35r n.c. (See on Demosthenes,Rhodes,note r.)

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would be most perverseof him if he were not eager for the dissolution of a kingdom which maltreated his brother and made war on himself, and was continually conspiring to gain control of his personand his wealth.This apprehensioncompels him to show deferenceto the King at present,and to pay him a large annual tribute. But if you crossedto the mainland, he would welcomeyour appearancewith the feeling that you were comingto his aid, while you will gainthe adherence of numerous other satraps if you promise them freedom and disseminate through Asia a word whose currency in Greece has been the downfall of the empiresof Athens and Sparta alike. I would try to go to greaterlength in describingthe tacics which would enableyou to overcomethe King's power in the shortesttime, were it not that I am afraid I might be subject to criticism if without previousmilitary experienceI attempted to advise a soldier of such great achievementsas yours. So I think I had better say no more of that. As regardsthe rest of the subject, however,I think your father, and the founder of your dynasty and the originator of your race, if there were no divine or human impediment to make it impossible,would give the sameadvice as I do myself. I take their own achievements as evidence.Your father maintained friendship with all the countries I am advising l/ou to keep in consideration.The founder of your dynasty had loftier aims than his fellows and desired kingship, but his designsdiffered from those of most aspirantsto similar ambitions,who acquired the distinction by fostering party disputes,violence and bloodshedin their orvn left the areaof the Greekworld severelyalone, states.Perdiccas28 and sethis eyeson kingshipin Macedonia.He knew that Greek statesdo not usually tolerate monarchy, though other peoples are incapableof organizing their own existencewithout some such personalpower. In fact it was his knowledgeof this that gavehis kingdom its personalcharacter,which differed greatly from others.He was aloneamongthe Greeksin not claiming to rule a racially unified kingdom, and therefore also in escaping the dangerswhich monarchicalrule incurs. We shall find that rulers who haveachievedthis amongGreek stateshavenot only 28. Perdiccasof Argos (seenote 4 above). Philip's father was Amyntas II.

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themselvesbeen extirpated,but their race has been obliterated from the sight of men, while Perdiccasboth lived out a life of prosperity himself, and bequeathedto his descendantsthe distinction which had been his own. As to Heracles,zsothers have always sung the praises of his bravery and cataloguedhis achievements,but his other attributes, which are qualities of mind, will prove to have had no fame accordedto them either in poetry or prose. I seethis as a distinct and entirely unworked field, neither small nor barren, but abounding in fair fruit for praise and admiration, yer in need of a pen to give it adequateexpression.Had I cometo the task at a youltger age, I should have found it easierto point to your ancestor as displaying greater pre-eminence over his predecessors in intelligence,honour and justice than in physical strength. As it is, when I turn to him and rcalize the great quantity of material which needs to be included, I find my presentstrengthinadequateto the task,as I seethat therewould be twice as much as you have now to read. I have therefore refrainedfrom mentioning most of it, choosingto keep a single episode,which, besidesbeing a relatedand appropriateaddition to my earlier argument,providesan opporrunity very much in keepingwith my presentconcern. Heracles rcalized that Greece was obsessedby war, foreign and civil alike, and he brought this to an end, secured the reconciliationof the cities, and gave a demonstrationto succeedinggenerationsof their proper alliesand their proper opponents in war. He carried out an expedition to Troy, then the most powerful state in Asia, and the superiority of his generalship to that of later invadersof Troy is shown by the fact that whereasthey laid siegeto it with the whole strengrhof Greece and barely reducedit after ten years,he took lessthan as many days with only a small force and srormed the city with ease. After this he put to death the tribal kings on the coaston either side of the Greek continent, whom he could never have extirpated had he not overcome their power. It was after these 29. On Heracles and the Fleraclids see on Panegyricusnote 7, p. rog above. But Isocrates here does seem to show some originality, if it is not too sophistic a rationalization.

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achievementsthat he erectedthe so-calledPillars of Heracles,so as a trophy to signalizehis victory over statesoutsideGreece,a memorial of his own prowessand triumphs, and a boundary stoneto mark the limit of Greek territory. The reasonwhy I have dealt with this subjectis to make you understandthat this essayis designedto urge you to action of the kind which your forbearsjudged the finest there could be. All thinking men should set the highest models before themselvesand try to live by them,,'andyou most of all. The fact that there is no need to point to external examples,because there existsone in your own ancestry,must presumablf stimulate you to emulationof your ancestor.I do not imply that you will be able to match all the achievementsof Heracles,which would be beyond the power even of some of the gods. But in respectof the spirit that was in him, of his good will and kindly feeling towards the Greek people,you would be able to model yourself on his aims. It is in your power, if you follow the suggestionsI have made, to rise to any distinction you will. The path from your present achievement to the greatest heights in the world is easier to travel than that from your original position to where you now stand. But reflect that I am calling upon you for an attempt which meansthat you will be conducting your campaign, not in unjustifiable alliance with non-Greek peoplesagainst Greeks,but in alliancewith Greek againstnon-Greek,which is the right battle for descendantsof Heracles to fight. Do not be surprised that I have tried throughout my argument to urge you to work for the Greek people in a spirit of kindnessand good will. I realizethat strainedrelationsare alike painful to initiate and to endure,while good relationsare found acceptablenot only among human beings and animals; those gods who are the givers of good gifts to us are addressedwith the title of Olympian, while the others who are invoked to deal with disaster and punishment have less attractive appellations.It is the former in whose honour temples and altars are consecratedby both individuals and communities, 3o. The title was commonly applied to the two big rocks on the Straits of Gibraltar, Calpe (Gibraltar) and Abyle (Ceura).

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while the latter receive no honour either in ritual or sacrifice, but are exorcizedby the human race. With this in mind you should make it your custom and persistentpractice to ensure that the right view shallbe universallyheld of you. The ambition for greaterfame than othersenjoy must imply an understanding graspof action,which must meet practicaldemandsand aspirations too, and the attempt to carry it out as opportunity offers. Among plenty of examplesto show that this is the right practicethat of Jasoprt is outstanding.He had no achievements comparablewith yours, yet he attained great fame, not for his actions, but for his claims. He made statementsbasedon the intention to crossto the mainland for a war againstPersia.But since Jason made such capital out of mere words, the opinion which you may expectto win must be high indeed if you carry words into action, and attempt if possiblethe destruction of the whole Persiankingdom: or, failing that, the annexationof as much territory as possible, the division of Asia, as sorne suggest, on a line from Cilicia to Sinope, and thirdly the foundation of statesin this area,and the permanentsettlement of those vagrants who lack subsistenceand are a danger to all they meetJz If we do not prevent these from congregatingby making sufficient provision for them, before we realize it they will reach numbers which will be a menaceto the Greek world as much as abroad.We take no thought of them, but are content to ignore,a reasonfor generalanxiety and a danger to all. It remainsfor a man of high aspirations,an admirer of the Greek world who can see further than his fellows, to make use of these people against Persia, to cut off a large range of territory such as hasbeensuggested,to liberatethesehordesof displaced people from the hardships they both undergo and inflict on others, organize communities of them, and make them a boundarybuffer statefor our generalprotection. If you do this, 3r. Jason of Pherae was a vigorous and ambitious Thessalian king, rvho united Thessaly before 37o B.c. and aimed at the hegemony of Greece, and even at a Greek expedition against Persia. He marched to join the Thebans in 37r, but arriving after the battle, induced them to make a truce. He had farreaching schemesto seize the rights of the Amphictyonic Council and preside ovef the Pythian Games, but rvas assassinatedin 37o. 32. See note 24, p. 156 above.

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you will ensure both their satisfactionand the safety of us all. If, however, you fail to achieve it, there is in any case one thing that will be easy,the liberation of Greek cities in Asia. Whateverpart of this programmeyou can carry out, or even attempt, you cannot fail to gain greater clistinction than the rest of, the world, and rightly, if you yourself make the first rnove in this direction and urge it on the Greek states.As things are it would be reasonablefor anyoneto feel surpriseat what has occurredand somecontempt of the Greeks,when in the non-Greekworld - which we have alwaystaken to be soft, unaddicted to war and eaten up with self-inclulgence- there have appearedmen who claimed the control of Greece,while no one in Greece has the spirit to try to secure for her the control of Asia. We are so far behind them, in fact, that while they had no hesitationeven in taking the initiative in hostility to Athens, we have not the determinationto meet injury rvith retaliation. They admit that in all their wars they possess neither men, commandersnor any other valuableassetsfor an emergency,but send for everything from us. Yet we carry so far our eagernessto do ourselvesinjury that when we could hold securepossessionof what is theirs we find petfy reasons for war among ourselves,or join in the reduction of Persian rebels. Sometimeswithout realizing it we side with our traditional enemiesin attempting the destruction of our own kith and kin. I thereforethink it is alsoin your interest,as the rest have so little spirit, to take the lead in the suggestedcampaignagainst Persia.But it is the duty of all others in the line of Heracles, and all who remain under the restraint of constitution or law, to retain their affectionfor the statein which they actuallylive, while you yourself, as being in a position to range at will, should look on all Greece as your country, as your ancestor did, and regard her dangersas yours and her needs as your dearestconcern. There may be criticism of me from peoplecapableof nothing else, for calling you to this campaign against the non-Greek world and to the care of the Greek world, without referenceto my own city. Had I been taking the initial step in putting t6z

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forward this argument to any other country than my own, which has three times been the saviour of Greece,twice against Persiaand once againstSparta, I would agreethat I had been at fault. But it will be clear that she was in fact the first which I approachedwith this exhortation,with the greatestardour I could command. But I realized that she had less concern for what I had to say than for the ravingsof platform oratory. So I left her alone,though I did not abandonmy business.I therefore deserveuniversalcommendationfor using what power I possess in continuing unbroken hostility towards Persia,in criticizing any whose view differed from mine, and in trying to urge ail who seemedlikely to have the power, to confer any benefit they could on the Greek states,and to seizefrom Persiaher existing prosperity. This is the reasonwhy I now make my addressto you, becauseI know that, while my argumentswill be liable to widespreadjealousy,the same actions carried on by you will be received with general satisfaction.Words meet with no agreement,but benefits proposed in action will seem within everyone'sreach. Consider further what a disgraceit would be to allow Asia to be more successfulthan Europe,non-Greeksmore prosperous than Greeks,to let the dynastyof Cyrus, the child exposedby his mother, win the title of the Great King, while that of Heracles, raised to the gods by his father for his virtues, is given a humbler style. None of this can be permitted. It needs to be alteredto the exactopposite. You must understandthat I would have made no attempt to persuadeyou of any of this, had power and wealth appeared the only advantagelikely to come of it. I believeyou have more than enoughof thesealready,and it is only insatiategreedwhich prefersto risk life for the hope of them. These are nor the gains which fill my view when I addressyou, but the prospect of winning you the greatestand most gloriousreputation.Remember that man's body is mortal, and it is upon the fair fame, the high repute, the renown and the memorial which time brings in its train, that his share of immortality depends,which it is worth any suffering, any endeavourto win. You will observe that for the noblest even of private individuals there is no fi3

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other gain for which they will risk life itself, but for the sakeof high repute they will accept death in battle; and in general that the desire to win ever fairer and fairer fame is universally extolled,while any other uncontrolled desireis held to show a regrettablelack of restraint. But most important of all is the fact that wealth and power may fall into the hands of enemies, whereasgeneral good will and the other blessingsI have mentioned know no legateeexceptour heirs by blood. So I should be ashamednot to adviseyou for these reasonsto make this campaignand to do or die. On this you will be best resolved,if you believethat it is not merely by this discoursethat you are called to action, but by your ancestors, by Persian effeminacy, by the famous men, true heroes,who fought againstPersia,and most of all by the fitting hour rvhich finds you in possessionof greater srrength than any previous European, and your adversary in deeper hatred and wider contempt than any monarch in history. I would have given a great deal for the power to blend together all the discoursesI have made on this subject. Then this one might have been a worthier representationof the theme. However, you must attend to those parts of all of them whose trend and purpose is towards this war, and then you will be best advisedabout it. I do not forget that many in Greeceregard the King's power as invincible. It is surprisingthat a power set under the rule of a monarch without the blood or the understandingof a Greek, and basedupon slavery, should be thought indissolubleby a Greek and a practisedsoldier in the ranks of freedom,when we know that constructionis alwayshard, but destructioneasy. Rememberthat the highest honour and admiration goes in generalto men who are capableboth as statesmenand soldiers. So when you see the distinction which is accordedeven in a single state to men who have both these qualities, what must you expect will be the praisessung of you, when it is realized that in the political field you have been the benefactorof alt the Greek states,and in the military the conqueror of Persia? I myself regardthis as unsurpassable. No achievementcan ever be greater than to bring us all out of such warfare to unity of fi4

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spirit, nor is it probable that any other such force could exist in the non-Greek world if you destroy their presentestablishment. No leader in future generations,however outstanding, can ever accomplishas much. Indeed, as regardspast generations, I can cap their achievementswith those which already 91andto your name, without any pretenceand in all honesty. when the nations you have reduced are more than the cities defeatedby any other Greek state, it is obvious by a direct comparison of single instances that your achievementsare greater than any of theirs. However, I preferred to keep from such an approachfor two reasons:first becauseof the misuse that may be made of it, and secondlybecauseI am unwilling to representthe presentgenerationas more distinguishedthan the heroesof old. You should reflect - to refer to ancient myth - that though the wealth of Tantalus, the kingdom of Pelops,the power of Eurystheuswould never be applaudedin prose or poetry, yet next to the outstandingcharacterof Heraclesand thb valoui of Theseusthe army that fought at Troy and their like would win eulogiesthe world over. Yet we know that the most famousand the finestwarriors amongthem held rule in tiny citiesand small islands.Nonetheless,rhey left throughout the world a fame ro ffanscend human glory. This is becauseall men eive their highest esteemnot to the winners of the greatestiower for themselves,but to the authorsof the greatestbenefitlo the rest of Greece. It is not only in regard to legend thar you will find this opinion is held, but universally.Even our own city of Athens would be given no praise for her maritime .-pir., for the enormouswealth exactedfrom allied statesand depositedin the Acropolis, or for the numerous instancesin which she assumedrights over other states- the right to destroythem, to increasetheir porver or make what organizationshe chose.It was in her power to do all this, but the result of it has been a seriesof accusationsagainsther. But the battles of Marathon and salamis,and most of all her evacuationof her own countrv for the safety of Greece,have won her universarpraise. ThL same opinion is held of sparta. she earns greater admiration t6 s

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for her defeat at Thermopylae than for all her victories, and the sceneof the triumph of Persiaagainsther is one for satisfaction and contemplation,while Spartan triumphs over other statesare no matter of praise, but of displeasure,becausethe first is regardedas a memorial of valour, the secondof selfseeking. I hope you will go through and examineall I have written, and if you find any weaknessor inadequacvin it, you will put the blame on my age,which may reasonablybe excused.But if it is the equal of my previous publications,you will, I hope, supposethat it is the product, not of my old age,but of the will of heaven,which has no thought for me, but for the good of Greece,which it seeksto deliver from her presentills, while it endows you with more than your present glory. I think you understand how the gods deal with human affairs. They do not directly bestow either the good or the evil which befalls mankind, but impart a disposition to each community which ensuresthat it is through eachother's agencythat we meet with either. This may actually be an instanceof it: they have given me the province of speech,and you of action, in the view that this would be your best sphere of control, while in my case speechwould be the faculty to give leasttrouble to hearers.Yet I fbncy that even in action you would not have succeededin so large a degree,had you not had some divine aid, not merely with the aim of continuing your wars against the non-Greek inhabitants of Europe, but in the intention that you should benefit by that early training, gain experience,make your characterknown, and then proceedto thoseambitionsto which I have urged you. I think you should respectall who speakwell of your achievements, but see the finest compliment of all in the belief that your characterwarrantsstill greatersuccesses, and in the desire to go beyond laudatory remarks about the present and make future generationsfeel for what you have done an admiration unparalleledin the past. I wish I could continue in this vein ro greater length, but I cannot for the reasonwhich I have too often given already.It remainsto summarizethis essayand to give you the substanceof it as shortly as may be. I maintain ft6

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that you should be the benefactorof Greece, and King of Macedoq, and gain to the greatestpossibleextent the empire of the non-Greek world. If you accomplishthis, you will win universalgratitude: from the Greeksfor the benefitsthey gain, from Macedoniaif your tule of them is kingly and not tyrannical, and from the rest of the world if it is through you that they are liberated from Persian despotismand exchangeit for Greek protection. The writing that has gone to this essay,its relevanceand precision,I cannot but leave to the judgement of my readers. I think I can say this with certainty,that no one could give you better or more suitableadvice.

D E , M O S T H E N E S[ I ]

INTRODUCTION Demosthenesrna,sltorn in 384 n.c., th.e son of Demosthenes of Paeania, an Attic deme.He was taught fut an earlier speaker, Isaeus,pho pas a lead,ingacloocatein prioate suits, and,Demostheneshirnselffrst carneto thefore in 364, when he cond,ucted, a prosecutiont0 preserTre his own prlperryl. Thus the man wh.ois unhsersalll acclaimed,as the greatest of Greek nratnrs beganhis coreerat an earll age. Yet he Das nlt pltlsically robust,and,was thought unsociable,puritanical and,perhapsself+ighteous.If so, he ouercamethe d,ffid,ence which,this reputationimpliesbjt a strong determination,which ntust have beencharacteristicof a man roho is said to haae irnprlved his aocal delioerl by declai,mingon tlte shorewi.thpebblesin his mouth.A writer of speeches and,teacherof rhetori.cin his early day, hefrst madehis namewith priaate, i.e. forensic, speeches irum JSZ olnwards,and thefurther ie went',tlte more he seemsto haae mooed towards politics. His first public speechin 354 was th.aton the'slmmories' (seeOlynthiac II, z9). Afto that we haae two speeches beforethe seriesfor whiclt he is most famous, wltich, czncern tlte relations betweenAthens and, Philip of Maced,on. These two speecltessuggesttlrat, though.Philip was alreadlt conspicuous in the affairs ofNorthern Greeceas a,n opponentof At/tenian interests,Demosthenes lpesnzt J/et aliae to the d,angerlte representetl. (r) Thefu* (For Megalopolis)dealswith.the internal politics of tloeGreek stotesand with. questionsof the balanceo.f power betweentltem,whiclt Philip rDass00n to render obsolete. After the battle of Manti,nea (j6z n.c.) Sparta, nzw aidetl lry Atltens, ltaclregained,sorneo/'her old power, antl in an attempt t0 reclaer Messenialtad suggested a retatrnto old ltound,ari.es, which, if agreed,pould haaejustifed her own airns.Megalopolis,feeling herself tltreatened,b1 Sparta, hatl asked,Athensfor an alliance. Demosthenes is speakingon.this request.Hisattitude mql appear forced and h,ispredictions unlikely, but there still remai,nsszme r69

D E M O S T H E N IEr S ] importance in the balancebetweenthe stronger states, and tlte political integrity of the speakeris clear. (z) Th.espeech,On the Demosthenes' Liberty of Rhodes,in 35r, again sh,ows concep'tion of Athens 0,sthe prltectzr of the weak. Rhod,es,with Chios, Cos and Byzantium, had,reaoltedfrom tlte secontlAthenian Leogue i,n the so-called Social War in j57. Afterward,s Rhod,eswas brought under an oligarcfut backed by Mausolus, the satrap of Caria. Aftu his death Rhod,esappealedto Ath,ensfor liberation. BJ JS, s.c. Demosth,enes beginsto deal witlt, the subject oJ' fulaced,bn.He found,h,imselfin oppositionto the alreaQyestablished pursueda policy of peaceand prosperiqt. Eubulus,wh,osuccessfulljt The speeclres which appearin th.isbookmay be conaenientfittaken in two d,ioisions,thosebeforeand thoseafter the Peaceof Ph,iloAthens'first war with, Maced,on.In the crates,phich, conclud,ed of tltese two d,ivisions the topicswh,ich,most needanollsis are fust the ri,seof Philip himself,the Sacred War and the rise andfall of Olltnthui. Q) Philip was maderegentof fuIacedonin j5g v.c., threeJeo,rs after the battle of Mantinea, which brought a hah to the war betweenThebes u kingd,ont and Sporta. His ambitionreaolutionized, which h.ad,net:erplayd, a lead,ingpart in the politics oJ'theGreek st&tes.He soonsecuredltis succession fut th,eliquidation of possible riaals,,and his army b1 a thoroughreorgonization.Henext mad,e sure of h,isfinancesb1 a rnoaeto ocquirethe rich, sour;e o/'gold,, Mount Pangaeusin Thrace, and the town of Amphipolis, whiclt comrnandedthe district. Amphipolis h,odreoolted,from Athens in 424, and in 357 Pltilip madea secretpoct to cznquerantl restore it to Athens i,n exchange for Pytlna, a free town under Athenian control. But the undertakingDas nzt fulfilled by Philip. Athens continuerlto talk ubout Am.phipolis,while Philip, finding Ath,ens occupiedwith the reaolt of her dependencies in the Social War, allied improaedhis positionby gaining control of other Atheni,an. cities in tlre north, Pydna itself os well as Potid,oeaand,Metlrone, and,later Pagasoe,o voluableport in Thessall. (z) The originsof the SocredWar hatseolread,Tbeenrecounted (introduction to Isocrates'Philip). Philip's entrJ/into the war had beendue to dissid,ent factions in Tkessalysincei,tsunifcation atnder r70

DE M OST H EN ES Ir] jason (seenote on Isocrates,Philip rrg). At first defeotedin JSJ by Onomarchusof Phocis,Philip soonregained, strength,and,it was in 352 that thefear of a moaetlrough the pass of Thermopylae led Athens to obstruct h,im th.ere,perhaps the onljt time wh,en Eubulusfeh that hostile action was needed.The Sacred, War draggedon untler new Pkocion leod,ers,Ph.afllus and Phalaecus, and it was nrt till 347 tltat a further requestcamefrom Thebes that Pkilip shouldreturn and crushPhocis,with the und,erstand,ing thut ke sltouldbea memberof the Amphi,ctlonicLeagorc in Phocil place. Termswerenegotiatedbetweenhim and Athensfor a trealr q/ Eubuhtsin th,eAthenian wlticlt carriesthe nameo/-a colleague peacepartJ. Philip was enabled, to sentretro great objectswh.en lte turned upon Phocis and forced her to sr,rrend,er,and,himself celelsrated, the Pythion gamesat Delphi. (j) Tlte importunceof Olyntltus dotesfrom tke ffth. centurl, when cities in Cholcidicein reztoltfrom Atlrensformed,a league underthe leadershipof Olynthus,rphiclt.was then too tlte principol town in the district. To this referenceis mod,ein the General Introd.uction(p. 2il. The league Dos suppressed b1 Sparta in j7g, but Oljtnthusrernainedan importont town, which, at first o memberoJ'thenew Athenian confederacl,brokeaDaJfro* it and was still strzng enoughto be tlte objecto/ an Athenian attack in j64, and,remainedot th,eheadof tlte grnup of neighbouringtowns. In JSZ, alarmedby Philip's advance,Olynthus proposed, alliance and,instead,it wos Philip who, to with,Athens,but it wos rejected,, flatter Ofitntltus,made an alliance which he d,id,not mean to maintain. In j5z Philip had a hold on Thessa$tas well as Amph.ipolis,pas increasingh,isfleet, wh.ichattacked,Athenian corn supplies comingfrom the Hellespont,and had actualll acquireda footi.ngin Thrace and odrsanced to the Propontis. Th,enext objectof attacb roasclea,rll the peninsulaof Chalcidiceand,the power of Olynthus at the headof it. Philip had sffired from an illness,but recoaered, bJ JSr, antl after securinglri,slllyrianfrontiers turned,to Ollnthus with a newand,hostileapprooch.This was appreciatetlb1 Demosthenesin his Philippic I in j5r, but the.full immediacyof the need, for actioni,snot apparenttill j4g, whenPhi,lipreolly turned,against Olynthus. The Olynthiac oratizns Dere d,eliaered, while Philip wos engogedagainstthe other confederate townsof Chalcid,i,ce. But 17r

D E M o s T H E N EI rS] Dernosthenes d,id,not attain his object,and Oljtnthusitself eventaally succumbed in j48, zntng to a reaolt against Athens in Euboea, which prooed a fatal distractionfrorn theforce phich was raised to saveOljtnthus.Athensltud,beenroused,by Demostltenes, but not to the extentrerluiredfor trDl exped,itions a,t nnce,and,Euboeapat closeat ltand and,a,ntnreurgentproblem.

['-s] DEMOSTHENES: F.OR MEGALOPOLIS

IN my opinion, gentlemen,both parties are wrong,r both the supportersof Arcadia and those of Sparta. Their accusations and misrepresentations make them appear actual members of the statesthey support insteadof Athenians.Such proceedings may be the proper function of the visiting delegations,but a balanceddiscussionof the factswith a reasonedview ofAthenian interestsand without bias is what is demandedin a discussion of policy by our own speakers.As it is, take away known personalitiesand Attic speech,and I think that most people would take one party to be Arcadian and the other Spartan. I realize the diffculties of choosing the right policy, because members share their delusionsand their opposed aims, and anyone who tries a middle course, if the Assembly does not wait to master it, will pleaseneither side and be pilloried by both. Nonetheless,if this happens,I shall prefer to be told my ideasare nonsenserather than to abandonmv view of Athenian interestsand allow the Assembly to be hoodwinkedby certain members.If you will allow me, I will leaveother rnuit.r, to " later stage,and begin with the common ground of agreement, which I regardas most valuableto discuss. No one, then, would dispute the value to Athens of a weak Sparta and on this side a weak Thebes. Now the present position, to judge by frequent utterancesin this assembly,is that with the disestablishmentof Orchomenus,Thespiae and Plataea,zThebes is weakened,while, if Sparta is to secure control of Arcadia and destroy Megalopolis,she will return to her old power. We therefore need to be careful not to allow Sparta to rise to a formidable power before the decline of Thebes,: not to allow the desired balance of power to alter r. For the circumstances see sectional introduction. Rival delegations have arrived from sparta and from Megalopolis (to which Demosthenes often refers as 'Arcadia') to invite Athenian support. z. See note 7 on fsocrates, Philip, 43, p. 146. 3. This obscure sentence seenx to be based on a fear of a return to spartan domination if a Theban decline is more than counterbalanced bv a

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unperceivedso that a Spartanrise exceedsthe Theban decline. We should not take the other line of wanting Spartarather than Thebes as opponents,which is not what we require, but that neither shall have the power to injure ourselves.This is what would give us the greatestsecurity. The view will be put forward that this is sound enough,but that it is scandalousif we are expectedto ally ourselveswith our opponentsat Mantineaand renderassistance to them against our previouscomradesin battle.+I agree,but we need a saving clauser'providedthe other statesmean to play fair'. If we all intend to maintain peace,we shall give no assistance to Megalopolis, becauseit will not be needed,and there will be norhing to set us againstour comradesin arms. We are in alliancewith one side already,accordingto their own account,and will now be so alsowith the other. What more'could be desired? On the other hand, if they intend to discard principle and embark on war, then, if the questionis solelyone of the sacrificeof Megalopolis to Sparta, this would be a contraventionof justice, but I concedethat we should allow it and avoid friction with our previous comrades.But if it is generallyknown that once in control of Megalopolis,Sparta will proceedagainstMessene,I ask any harsh critic of Megalopoliswhat his next advice is to be. There will be no answer. Indeed every man here knows that, with or without the consentof the party in question,we must opposeSparta on two counts, the sworn agreementwith Messeneand the value to Athens of her existenceas a srare. Now I ask you to consider where you will draw the line of resistanceto Spartan aggression,so as best to satisfy honour and good feeling. Will it be in accordancewith rhe interesrof Megalopolis or of MesseneI The first will show readinessto assistArcadia and confirm the peaceestablishedas a result of our efforts in war. The secondwill make it obvious that the motive for desiringthe existenceof Messeneis not principle so much as fear of Sparta.We need to observejustice in our con-

*/

new Spartan rise, and exemplifies the idea of balance of power which char acterizes this speech. 4. i.e. against Thebes.

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siderationsand our actions, but to combine it with an eye to our probableinterest. There is another argument from my opponentsto the effect that the recoveryof Oropuss is what we should first attempt, and if we gain the enmity of our potential supportersin the project, we shall have no one to help us. We must try to regain Oropus, I agree.But the idea that Sparta will be antagonistic if we make an alliancewith the elementswhich support us in Arcadia is the one argument which is not legitimate for the party which urged our assistanceto Sparta when she was in danger. This was not the kind of argument they used, when Athens was approachedby the whole Peloponnesewith the request to attack Sparta, to persuadeus to refuse (which is what madethe otherstakethe only alternativeand go to Thebes) and to pay our money and risk our lives to save Sparta. And we should probably not have been prepared to do so, had we been told that we would get no gratitude for it unless Sparta were givena free hand to do further damage.Certainlywhatever may be the effect of an Arcadian alliance in crarnping Sparta's plans, one must supposethat gratitude for their rescueat the last gaspshould outweigh resentmentat the injuries they were prevented from committing. How can they fail to assistus at Oropus, at the risk of the most extremedanger to their reputation ? It seemsto me impossible. I am alsoastonishedat the statementthat an Arcadianalliance, with the policy which it implies, will mean aolte-facefor Athens which will destroy all reliance on her. My own view is the opposite.I do not think there is a man in the world who would dispute the claim that Athens was the saviour of Sparta before she saved Thebes, and latterly the saviour of Euboea too,6 and that she enteredinto an alliancewith each,with one and the sameobject in every instance.What object? The rescue of the victims of aggression.If this is true, rhe reversalwould not be on the part of Athens, but of the party which refusedto 5. Oropus was captured by Thebes in 366 B.c. : seesectional introduction. 6, Athens championed Sparta against Theban atracks after Leuctra, Thebes by the alliance against Sparta in 378, and Euboea when she liberated it from Thebes in 352.

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abide by a just agreement.And it will be made clear that it is the pattern of events which changeswith variations of selfinterest, and not the city of Athens. It seemsto me that the part played by Sparta is a reprehensible one. They now say that someparts of Triphylia ought to be assignedto Elis, Tricaranum to Phlius, other parts of Arcadia to themselves;and Oropus to us. This is not with the aim of securingfor eachof us our own possessions. By no means.That would be a very late move towardsbenevolence.The aim is to give an impressionof allowingall the statestheir variousclaims to territory, So as to ensure that when Sparta moves against Messenethere shall be generalsupport and a readinessto join her, for fear that in view of the successful claims of each state with the specific agreementof Sparta they will be put in the wrong, if Sparta's own claim is refused.In my view it is possiblethat without any arrangementto cedeArcadian towns to Sparta Athens may regain Oropus with the co-operation of Sparta, if she is preparedto be reasonable,and of others who areagainstTheban appropriationof further territory. But should it appearobvious that without allowing Spartancontrol of the Peloponnesewe are not going to secureOropus, then it would be preferable,if this view is permissible,to let Oropus go rather than sacrificeMessene,and so the Peloponnese, to Sparta.I do not think this is the only issuebetweenus - however I will omit what I had in mind - but I think we have a number of dangers to consider. As regards supposedaction by Megalopolis taken in the Theban interest and againstour own, it is absurd to make this a ground for accusation,and then, when their aim is friendship towardsAthens and a return of mutual benefit,to start a policy of malignant frustration of this aim. This would be to fail to rcalize that their previous eager support of Thebes is the measureof the indignation thesecritics would earn for having taken such valuableallies from Athens, when they approached her in preferenceto Thebes. This, I dare say, reflectsfor the secondtime the desireto make Megalopolislook elsewherefor assistance.But I know that a calculatedjudgement will show what I think the rest of you rvill endorse,that once Sparta is 176

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in control of Megalopolis,Messeneis in danger.And once she holds Messene,we shall find ourselvesin alliancewith Thebes. It will be far more to our credit as well as to our advantageto accept alliance with Thebes ourselvesas a counterpoiseto Spartan ambition than to hesitatefor fear of assistingTheban alliesand sacrificeMegalopolis,and later haveto rescueThebes with an addeddangerto ourselves.I feel no securityfor Athens in a Spartanabsorptionof Megalopolisand renewalof power. I realizethat once again their leaning to war is not defensive, but is aimed at the recaptureof their old supremacy.Of their ambitions when they had it, you may have still greaterknowledgethan I to justify apprehension. I should very much like to ask speakerswho declaretheir dislike of Thebes or of Sparta whether it is a dislike basedin either caseon a liking for Athens and her interests,or on a liking for Spartaor Thebes,as the casemay be. If the latter, no support should be given to either. They are out of their senses. If they s&y,'forAthens', why enhancethe other two? I assure you that it is possibleto bring Thebes down without increasing the strengthof Sparta.Indeed it is far easier.How this is so, I will try to explain. It does not need stating that right conduct is something which everyone, even if they do not want to pursueit, is up to a point ashamedto abandon,while misconduct is openly opposed,especiallyby its victims. What we shall find to be the universal bane and the origin of all troubles, is the failure to stand squarely by the right. To prevent this from standingin the way of a reductionof Theban power, we should maintain the need to re-establishThespiae,Orchomenusand Plataea,and co-operatewith them, and expect it of others. This is after all the essenceof honour and justice, the refusal to countenancethe dissolution of ancient cities. At the same time rve must not abandonMegalopolisand Messeneto maltreatment) nor allow the example of Plataeaand Thebes to blind us to the destructionof already existing and established cities. If this becomesclear, the whole Greek world will desire Thebes to give up alien possessions. Otherrvise,first of all we shall naturally have to expectThebesto opposethe suggestion, when sherealizesthat the re-establishmentof thesecitiesmeans 177

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her own ruin; and secondlywe shall be involved in incessant trouble ourselves.What end can there be to it, if we constantly allow the destruction of existing cities and demand the re'instatement of the destroyedl The view which appearsmost constitutional demands the .destruction by Megalopolis of the record of their treaty with Thebes,if they are to be firm allies of Athens. But they declare that friendship is not createdby records,but by common inter' ests,and that what constitutesalliance,in their view, is assistance to themselves.Personally,howeverdeeply they fell this, I look at it rather in this way. I think we should both ask them to obliteratethe treaty and ask Sparta to remain at peace,and if either side refuses,we should side with the one which agrees. If while at peace,Megalopolisholds to the alliancewith Thebes, it will be universallyproved that Theban ambition rather than justice is what they seekto promote. If Megalopolisseeksalliancewith Athens in all good faith, and Spartarefusesto maintain peaceful relations, it rvill be universally obvious that it is not the reconstitution of Thespiae which excites Spartan enthusiasm,but the hope that Thebes will be engagedin war while they make themselvesmastersof the Peloponnese.But I . am surprisedthat there should be some who look with apprehensionat the idea that Sparta'senemiesshould be in alliance with Thebes,but feel no anxiety at the prospectof their reduction by Sparta - especially when history has now given a practical demonstrationthat while Thebes always uses such allies as a makeweightagainstSparta, Sparta usesthem, when she has them, againstAthens. My belief, then, is that we should also rememberthat, if we refuse Megalopolis,her destructionand dissolutionrvill mean the possibility of an instant accessof power to Sparta; while her survival - and there have been equally surprising occurrences- will with justificationmake her a firm ally of Thebes. If we accept her, Megalopoliswill secureher preservationat our hands,but the result must be vieweCin relationto Thebes and Sparta, with a changeof emphasisin the argument about risks. If Thebes is the loser, as she should be, it will not mean inordinate strength in Spartan hands, since there will be a r78

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counterpoise in their close neighbours in Arcadia. But if Thebesrecoversand survives,at leastthey will be the weakerfor our alliancewith Megalopolisand her gratitude to us for her rescue.So that it is in our intereston all counts not to abandon Megalopolis,nor to alloW her preservation(if it occurs) to be attributed to her own agency,nor to anyoneelse'sbut to ours. Personally,then, gentlemen,I strongly claim to havedeclared my own view of the merits of the casewithout partiality towards either side. I urge you not to abandonMegalopolis,nor indeed any other smallerpower to a greater.

['-s] DEMOSTHENES : ON THE LIBERTY OF.RHODES Ix a debate on so important a question, gentlemen,freedom must, I think, be extended to every participant. I personally have never considered it difficult to find the best ideas to presentto you - to be candid I think they are in your minds already. The difficulty is to induce you to carry them out. A motion voted and carried is still as far from executionas before. There is one advantagefor which you should thank heaven, that stateswhich openeda war on us not long ago now seein us their only hope of survival. And the presentoccasiongives you somecausefor satisfaction,becauseyou will be enabled,if you make the right decision,to take up the falseand slanderous accusationsmade against Athens and repel them in actual practice,and enhanceyour reputation by doing so. The charge of conspiracywas levelled at Athens by Chios, Byzantium and Rhodes,and this was the ground on which they engineeredthe subsequentwar againstus. But it will prove that the man lvho headedthe project and pushedit through on the plea of friendship with Rhodes* I mean Mausolusr - ended by depriving her of her liberty, while her self-styled associates,Chios and Byzantium,gaveher no support in her time of trouble; while this country, of whom shewas afuaid,provedher solesourceof assistance.The general realizationof this will lead to the universal assumptionthat the criterion of sound politics is friendshipwith Athens,and therecould be no greaterbenefitto this country than the fosteringof a stateof goodwill without suspicionon all sides. I am astonishedto find in the samespeakersan anti-Persian policy in the caseof Egypt,, combined with fear of Persia in r. Mausolus was King of Caria, but subject to Persia. He and his qucen, Artemisia, are perhaps best known to us from the great monument built in his honour after his death. The Mausoleum (the name is now familiar as an ordinary noun) included work by some of the great sculptors of the day, much of which is now in the British Museum, London. z. In 358 B.c. an Egyptian king, Nectanebos, was at war with Persia and assisted by Sparta, though it is doubtful how far Athens shared the policy, especially in view of her capture of an Eg:yptian ship, which was the reason for Demosthenes' case against Androtion in 35S.

r8o

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dealing with Rhodes.Yet the latter is a Greek state, as everyone knows, while the former is a part of the Persianempire. I think some of you rememberthat in a recent debateon PersiaI was the first speaker,and I think I had no more than one supporter, if any, in the view that it would be wise not to basewar preparations on hostility to Persia, but to direct them against your existing enemiesand be prepared for defenceagainst her as well in caseof attack.And it was not a caseof my expressinga view which was then rejected.The Assembly agreed.Now my presentspeechis a sequelto that one. If I servedthe King of Persia,and were asked to advise him, I would give the same advice as I do here, and urge defensive warfare against any Greek interferencein his concerns,but no territorial claims outsidehis own realm.Now if it is your settledintention, gentlemen, to acquiescein any accessions to Persianpower which his anticipationor chicanerycan achieve,it is a wrong intention in my judgement.If, however,you intend to stand for your rights through thick and thin, at the risk of war if needbe, first of all the strongeryour decision,the lessyou will be forcedto undergo,and secondly,you will enhanceyour reputationfor right judgement. To show that there is nothing revolutionary either in my demand for the liberation of Rhodesor in your action, if you agree with it, I will remind you of some past occasionswhen this policy proved successful.On one occasionTimotheus was sent to the aid of Ariobarzanes,with the added proviso 'that there shall be no breach of the peacewith Persia'. In view of the open revolt of Ariobarzuness from Persia,and the garrison on Samos under Cyprothemis, who was sent there by the satrap, Tigranes, Timotheus abandonedthe attempt to assist Ariobaruanes,but besiegedand liberated Samos.And right up to the presenttime this has not resultedin war. No one would regard offensive and defensiveoperations in the same light. Anyone will fight to the utmost againstdispossession, but not to secureaddedpossessions. They may aim at this in default of opposition, but if prevented, they feel no resentmentagainst their opponents. 3. Ariobananes was satrap of Phrygia. These are the disturbances sometimes referred to as the War of the Satraps.

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[r r-r 5]

Nor do I believethat even Artemisia would opposesuch action, if Athens is bent on it. I will go a little further into the subject, and then ask you to consider whether I am right or not. It is my view that if Persianactivities in Egypt were to proceed according to plan,+ Artemisia would make a strong attempt to securethe dependence of Rhodeson Persia,not from friendship for the King, but in the hope that, if he were a permanentneighbour, she could confer a major benefit rvhich would securefriendly relationswith her. If, however,things go as they are said to be going, and the Persianobjective is lost, she would rightly regard the island as having no further value for Persiaat present,but as a threat to her own power and as an obstruction to any movement there. It therefore seemsto me that she rvould prefer Rhodesto be in our power without any open surrender on her part than to be acquired by Persia. Indeed I do not think she will send a force, or, if she does,it will only be a poor and ill-mounted one. As regardsthe intentions of Persia,for that matter, I will not claim any knowledge, though I would maintain decidedly that Athenian interest demandsthat the King should make it clear whether he intends to lay claim to Rhodes or not. It is not only the benefit of Rhodesthat we shall have to consider when he does, but our own and that of Greeceas a whole. Yet even if the present holderss of Rhodes were in full control of their own city, I would not have recommended taking their part, for any undertakingsthey might havemade.I know that in the first place they incorporated some of the citizen body with them to dissolvethe democracy,and, when that was done, expelled them again. People who have not shown good faith with either party cannot be regarded as valuableallies of ours either. Nor would I ever have made this proposalout of considerationsolelyfor the populaceof Rhodes. I do not representthem, nor am I personallyacquaintedwith anyonethere. And indeed,even if I were, I would bnly make it with a view to the interest of Athens, becausethe position of 4. Though Persia succeededagainst the satraps, the revolt ofEgypt from Persia was not reduced till a good deal later. 5. i.e. the oligarchy establishedby Mausolus.

r8z \

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ON THE LIBERTY OF RHODES

Rhodes is one in which, if this is consistentwith support of them, I sympathizewith the Athenian view. It is from resentment at Athenian insistenceon her own rights that Rhodeshas lost her liberty. They could have maintainedallianceon terms of equality with Greekswho are their superiors,yet in fact they have become the slaves of foreign slaves, whom they have themselvesadmitted to their own inner fortifications.I would almost say, if we want to assistthem, that what has happened has been good for them. Had they enjoyed success,I am not surewhethera placelike Rhodeswould now havebeenprepared to learn good sense.But experienceand admonition having taught them the many ills that folly brings to mosr of mankind, they may, with luck, acquire wisdom for the future. This I rcgatd as no small benefit. In fact I maintain that we should try to savethem without feeling resentment,and remember the many occasionswhen we ourselveshave suffered from conspiracies,for none of which you would say we deserveto be penalized. Observea further point, gentlemen.Our country has been engagedin numerous wars, against democraciesas well as oligarchies.You know this well enough.But the morive of each of theseencountersis perhapsa thing on which no one reflects. What is that motive ? Against popular governmentsit haseither been a matter of private grievanceswhich could not be solved by public negotiation,or of partition of land, of boundaries,of community feeling or of leadership.Against oligarchiesnone of these considerationshas applied; it has been an ideological matter or a questionof liberty. Indeed, I would not hesitateto maintain that I think it better that all the Greeksshould be our enemiesunder democracythan our friends under oligarchy. In dealing with free states,in my vierv, there is no difficulty about regainingpeace,while with oligarchyevenfriendshipis precarious. There can be no good feeling between oligarchy and democracy,betu'eenthe desirefor power and the aim at a life of equality It is surprising that the idea should not be current that with the oligarchiesat Chios or Mytilene, or now at Rhodes,indeed I might sayin any instancein which men are induced to submit r83

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to this sort of subjection,the constitutionof Athens itself shares the danger, surprising that the inference should never be drawn that in a world organizedoligarchically Athenian democracy can never be allowed a place. Her enemiesrealize that there is no other state to bring freedom back into the world, and the origin of so much potential injury to themselves is what they will seek to destroy. In general, injury may be supposedto lead to the hostility of the injured party. But the subversionof a political way of life and its changeinto oligarchy should be regarded,I urge, as fatal to all aspirationto freedom. Besides,a democraticcommunity like ourselvesshould be seen to have the same feelings towards victimized peoplesas we should expectothers to have towards ourselvesin the event of our suffering a fate which we should all deplore.Even if the view is held that Rhodesdeservedits fate, this is not the moment for satisfactionat it. In the uncertainty of the future for anyone, the fortunate should always show considerationfor the welfare of the unfortunate. I hear frequent referenceto the fact that when disasterovertook our democracy6 in this country, we yet had sympathy from well-wishers.At present I intend to refer briefly tq one of them only, Argos. I should not wish this country, with its reputationfor aid to the unfortunate,to be shown lessforward in this respect than Argos. Living as neighbours to Sparta, rvho was in open commandof land and seaalike, Argos showed no fear or hesitation in declaring her friendship towards Athens, and 'when Spartan representativescame, we learn, to demand the extradition of Athenian refugees,the decree of Argos was that they should leavebeforesunseton pain of being treated as enemies.It would be a disgrace,gentlemen,that lvhen the peopleof Argos showedno fear of Spartanauthority and power at sucha time, \ile asAtheniansshouldbe intimidated by a non-Greek power, and a woman at that. Indeed Argos rvould agreethat she has been often worsted by Sparta, while we have had frequent victories over Persiaand never a defeat, either from his subordinatesor from the King himself. Or, if he has ever won successagainstAthens, it has been by bribery 6. During the rule of the Thirty at Athens.

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of the most despicableof Greek traitors and by no other means. Even that brought him no benefit. You will find that the period in which he used Spartan power to weaken Athens coincided with his own perils from Clearchuszand Cyrus. So there has never been either an open victory or a successful conspiracyagainstus. In some quarters I gather that Philip is often disregardedas unimportant, and Persiaheld in awe as a powerful opponent at any time. If the one is to be left unopposedas negligible,while we treat the other with universal deferenceasa danger,what enemiesare there for us to confront? There is a classof peoplein Athens, gentlemen,who excelat voicing the rights of others in this assembly.To them my recommendationwould be simply this; they should make it their aim to do justice to Athens when speaking to others. Then they will begin by doing their own duty. It is paradoxical to assertthe rights of others when one has failed to stand for one'sown. And it is not right for a citizento considerarguments againsthis own country and not for it. Why, I askyou, is there no one in Byzantium to speak against their appropriation of Chalcedon;which is the properfy of Persia, though it was in our hands, and has no connexionwith Byzantium? Or again, to forbid the transferenceof Selymbria,previouslyan Athenian ally, to becornea tributary of theirs, and the appropriation of this district in contravention of the sworn agreementwhich laid down the autonomy of these citiesI Again, there was no one to point out to Mausolus in his life-time, and after his death to Artemisia, that they should not appropriate Cos and Rhodesand other Greekstatesfrom which Persia,their previous master,withdrew in favour of Greeceby agreement,and which rverethe subject of many armed conflicts of distinction on the part of the Greeks. Or if there is anyone to point this out to these two, there is apparently no responseto it. PersonallyI regard it as right to restorethe Rhodian democracy.Nonetheless,even if it were not the right course,when I consider the conduct of the others I have mentioned,I think it expedientto 7. Clearchuswas the Spartan leaderof the Ten Thousand. Seethe sectional introduction and note 3o to Isocrates' Panegyriczs. The reserved reference to Philip here is somewhat surprising in the same year as Philippic I.

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do so. Why I If the world set its face rowardsright it would be a dishonour that Athens alone should stand apart. But when the rest of the world is preparingfor iniquity, that Athens alone should lay claim to right without any positive action, seemsto me not exemplary, but cowardly, becauseit is men's actual effectiveness which determinesthe validity of their claims.I can offer you an example known to everyone. There exists an agreementbetween Greece and Persia made by this country and universally commended,and a later one made by Sparta which met with condemnation.8The two pacts did not lay down the same rights. Private rights were defined by law for separatecommunitieson a basisof equal participation for weak or strong alike. But now the rights of Greek citiesare laid down for the weaker by the stronger. Since; then, you are primed already with the rights of the case,considerhow it is in your power to put them into practice. It is so, if we are understood as acceptedchampions of the freedom of mankind. But it is reasonableto supposethat our duty is very hard to achieve. other countries have in all cases a single issue to settle, between themselvesand their obvious adversaries,whose defeat leaves no obstacle to the attainment of their ends. For us in this country there are two, of which one is the same as for others, but there is an additional and greater issue. We need by our deliberationsto get the better of the party q which has set out to opposeour interests.When they make it impossible to do what is our duty without a struggle,it is natural that we may fail where we might succeed. The easewith which many take up this political position may be due to the assistanceof corrupt supporters, though some blame may with justification be laid at your door. You ought to adopt the sameview of political as of military loyalty. What view ? A man who abandonsthe post in which his commander placeshim is declaredto be a citizen no longer, nor have any of a citizen'srights. The sameview should be held of the man 8. The so-called Peaceof callias in 448 n.c. (seenote on Isocrates,panegyricus, r r8),'and the King's Peacein 387-6, when Greek stateswere dictated to by Persia and Sparta. g. i.e. the party of Eubulus.

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who betraysthe duty bequeathedto him by past example,and joins the ranks of oligarchy.He should be deprivedof the right to join your deliberations.As it is, in dealingwith alliesyou find the highest loyalty where the oath has been sworn to hold to the samefriends and the same foes, but in home politics it is the very men who are known to rank themselveswith our greatest enemies on whom is conferred the assumption of loyalty. Nonetheless,grounds for accusationof such people, or for reprimanding the rest of the country, are not hard to find. What is hard is to devisewords or actionsto put right what is wrong. Perhapsthis is not the moment to refer to everything that is relevant.But if you can set the sealon previousdecisions by someaction of value, there may well be a thorough advance. My own view is that a strong grip on the situation is needed, and action worthy of Athens. Rememberhow you enjoy praise of her past greatnessand the distinction and military achievements of previousgenerations.Reflectthat thesewere achieved and dedicatednot mereiy for your admiring contemplation,but for the imitation of the virtues they enshrine.

['-s] D E M O S T H E I \ T E S: P H I L I P P I C

I

Wnnn it a new question, gentlemen,which lay before us, I should wait until most of the regular speakershad made their contribution, and if I were satisfiedwith the views expressed, I should add nothing; if not, I should try to voice my own. But as it is the reconsiderationof a subject frequently discussedby speakersbefore, I hope I may be pardoned for speakingfirst. Had my opponents urged the right policy in the past, this discussionwould be superfluous. First, then, we must not be downhearted at the present situation, howeverregrettableit seems.The worst featureof it in the past is the best hope for the future. What featureI The fact that it is plain dereliction of dufy on our part which has brought us to this position. If it followed on a period of exemplary conduct by the peopleof Athens, there would be no hope of improvement.Next we should reflect upon what history or our own memory can tell us of the greatnessof Sparta not so long ago, and of the glorious and honourablepart played by Athens in maintaining the war against them in the cause of right.'Why mention thisl To set this fact firmly beforeyour minds, gentlemen,that if you are awake,you have nothing to fear, if you closeyour eyes,nothing to hope for. To prove this I point to two things, the past power of Sparta, which we defeatedby sheerattentionto business,and the presentaggression of Macedon,2which alarms us becauseour attitude is wrong. If the belief is held that Philip is-an enemyhard to face in view of the extent of his present strength and the loss to Athens of strategicpoints, it is a correct belief. But it must be rememberedthat at one time we had Pydna,Potidaea,Methone and the whole surrounding district on friendly terms, and that a number of communitiesnow on his side were then autonomous and unfettered,and would havepreferred our friendship to his. If Philip had then adoptedthis belief in the invincibility r. i.e.in theCorinthian War,394187. z. i.e. after the defeat of Onomarchus in the Sacred War.

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of Athens in view of her control of points commandingMacedonian territory, while he himself lacked support, he could not have achievedany of his present successesnor acquired the strength he has.As it was, he observedwith insight that these strategic points were the prizes of war, that they were open to the contestants,and it is a natural law that ownership passes from the absenteeto the first comer, from the negligent to the energeticand enterprising. This is the spirit which has won him the control of what he holds, in somecasesby the methods of military conquest,in others by those of friendship and alliance. Indeed alliance and universal attention are the rewards to be won by obvious preparednessand the will to take action. If, then, this country is prepared to adopt a similar outlook and to breakwith the past, if everyman is readyto take the post which his duty and his abilities demandin serviceto the state, and set pretencesaside,if financial contribution is forthcoming from the well-to'do, and personalservicefrom the appropriate group, in a word, if we are preparedto be ourselves,to abandon the hope to evadeour duty and get it done by our neighbours, we shall recover what is our own with God's will, we shall regain what inertia has lost us, and we shall inflict retribution upon Philip. You must not imagine that he is a super-human being whose successis unalterably fixed. He has enemiesto hate, fear and envy him, even in placesvery friendly to him. one must suppose,havethe samehuman feelings His associates, as anyoneelse.But now all this is beneaththe surface.It has nowhereto turn becauseof the slowness,the inactivity ofAthens. It is this that I urge you to lay aside.Considerthe facts,gentlemen) considerthe outrageouslengthsto which Philip has gone. He doesnot offer us a choice betweenaction and inaction. He utters threats, according to my information, in overbearing terms. He is not contentto rest on his laurels,but is continually adding to the haul he collectsin the net in which he ensnares our hesitant,inactive country. When are we to act? What is to be the signal? When compulsiondrives, I suppose.Then what are we to sayof the present? In my view the greatestcompulsion that can be laid upon free men is their shameat the circumstancesin which they find themselves.Do you needto go round r8 9

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and ask each other whether there is any startling news? What could be more startling than a Macedonianfighting a successful war againstAthens,and dictating the affairsof Greece? 'Philip is dead', comesone report.3'No, he is only ill', from another. What difference does it makeI Should anything happen to Philip, Athens, in her presentframe of mind, will soon create another Philip. This one's rise was due less to his own power than to Athenian apathy. But I might add that if anything did happen, if chance,which is always the best friend we have, could give us this added service,you may be certain that by being closeat hand in a position to control a disorderedsituation we could turn it to our advantage.As it is, even if circumstance offered it, we could not take over Amphipolis, detachedas we are both materially and mentally. As regards the need to be ready and willing to act I think my point is clear, and I passon from it. I shall now try to say something on the nature of the expedition which I think would rid us of our troubles, its size and how its financial requirements and other needs could best and most quickly be organizedin my view. But I have one initial requestto make. Wait to criticize till you have heard it all. Make no assumptions in advance.And if it appearsan unusualforce from the outset, do not supposethat I am attemptingto delayit. 'Here and now' is not alwaysthe best advice.What is done cannot be undone even by immediate measures.The best expedientis a precise account of the nature and size of the force neededto hold the position until we can end the war by arbitration or by the defeatof our opponents.That is the only meansof ending our disasters.I consider myself able to offer this, though without prejudice to any other proposalssuggested.My undertakingis as big as that. But the proof of the pudding is in the eating,and of that you shall yourselvesbe the judges. First, then, gentlemen,I declare the need to provide fifty triremes, and secondly to arouse a spirit in the men of this country which will recognizethat, if need be, they must serve in them in person. Further, transports and sufficient smaller craft for half the cavalry must be provided. This I maintain 3. This report of Philip's deathwascurrent in 352. r90

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should be a standing force to use for immediate moves away from home, to Thermopylae, the Chersonese,Olynthus or where you will. The idea must be implanted in Philip's mind that Athens has abandonedinaction, and may make a sudden rnove,as she did to Euboeaand earlier, we learn, to Haliartus and finally the other day to Thermopylae.+The idea is not altogethera matter for contempt, even if it were improbable that my proposalwould be carried out. He will either be too unnen'ed to take action in the knowledgeof our readiness(and he rnill know of it well enough- there are plenty to inform him, unfortunately) or if he ncglectsto act, he exposeshimself to surpriseattack,with nothing to withstand an Athenian landing in his territory, if he gives us the chance.This, then, is the decision which I maintain should be taken by the people of Athens, and this is the provision which is needed.But before that a further force needsto be equippedfor continuousservice in attackson Macedonianterritory. I am not askingfor mercenary forcesrunning into five figures,nor for the forcesof diplomatic correspondence. I demand an establishmentwhich shall be the possessionof Athens and obey the orders of whatever commanderis appointed,be there one or many, be he this man or that. I demandalso the funds to maintain it. What, then, is to be the nature and the size of this force, its meansof subsistence and the will to do its work I Let me take each of these points separately.I mean a mercenaryforce, but I do not make the mistake repeatedin the past, when nothing has seemed large enough, and enormous figures have been voted which in practice have gone completely unimplemented. We should beginon a smallscaleand then increaseit, if it seemsinadequate. My proposal is a matter of two thousand men in all, but it should include five hundred Athenians,of whateverage group you decide.They should serve a stated term, not a long one, 4. An Athenian expedition regained Euboea from Thebes in 357. Athens had previously helped Thebes at Haliartus in Boeotia ir 395, the occasion of the death of Lysander. The expedition to Thermopylae was in 352, when Philip threatened a descent through the pass into southern Greece, in connexion with his Thessalian campaign. But it does not seem sufficiendy clear at what point Athens took action and how on this occasion alone they were able t0 do it effectivelv. I9I

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[zz-6] 'rvhatever is decided, and on a basis of successiveshifts. but The rest should be mercenaries.They should be supportedby two hundred cavalry, again including fifty Athenians at least, and on the same system of service. They must have transport provided. What else? Ten warships. Philip has a war fleer, so Athens must match it, to ensure the safety of this force. And the sourceof suppliesfor them ? I will passto the elucidation of this point when I have made clear my reasonsfor advocatinga force of this size and a citizen contingentas part of it. As regardsnumbers, the reasonfor what I proposeis that it is not open to us now to provide a field force to stand up to Philip's. We must be content with a raiding force, and that in the first placemust be our strategy.It must not be of excessive size, for which we lack the funds, nor entirely contemptible. There must be a citizen contingent to accompanythe force for this reason.In the past I believeAthens maintaineda mercenary force at Corinth under the command of Polystratus,Iphicrates,Chabriasand others,and accompaniedby citizen troops. I understandthat a defeatwas inflicted on Sparta by this force together with its Athenian units.s But since our mercenary foices have been self-subsisting,it is our friends and allieswhb have suffered defeat while our enemies have regrettably increased.These forces take a passingglanceat the task Athens hasfor them, and then are offoverseasto Artabazusor anywhere else,with their commanderafter them. This is not unnatural. You cannot command without pay to offer. My demand therefore is to remove such pretexts from commanderand men alike, by issuingpay and providing the surveillanceof a parallel citizen force, our present conduct of affairs being ridiculous. Supposeyou were asked the question, 'Are you at peace?', 'No,'you would reply, 'lve are at war with Philip.' But surely ten Athenianswere appointedto command divisionsof various kinds, and two to commandcavalry. What are they all doing ? 5. This appearsto have been the first instance of the use of mercenariesin Greece (see Isocrates, Philip, 96). Polystratus is little known. Iphicrates earned distinction in 3go n.c. against Spartan hoplites, and Chabrias was his successor,and won a naval victory at Naxos against a Spartan fleet in 376.

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Except the individual you actually send to the theatre of war, with the Festival they are conductingthe ceremonialprocessions civilian appearfor voted figures Committee.They are like clay ance,6not for war. Shouldn't we havehad our own commanders of infantry and cavalrY,orl Athenian staff, to make it, our own force? But our own cavalry commanderhasto sail to Lemnos,z while the cavalry engagedin the fight for Athenian possessions are under Menelaus.I intend nothing againsthim personally, but his post, rvhoeverwas to hold it, should be occupiedby an Athenian appointment. This may appeartrue enough,but what you want to hear is the extent and the sourceof the money needed.Let me go on to this. First, finances.Maintenance,in the form of supplies alone, for this force will amount to upwards of ninety talents. Ten warships account for forty talents' at twenty minae per ship per month. Two thousand men need the same amount a month each ration money, and agJi", to allow ten drach,ma'e a month makes twelve two hundred cavalry at thirty d,rochmae talents.sIf this is thought a very small staft, to provide rations for the men serving,it is an incorrectview. I am quite sure that, given this, the force will provide itself with the rest in the field, without inflicting damageon other Greek states'and make up its pay in that way. I am preparedto sail as a volunteer,and to acceptany penalty if this doesnot prove true. Next, the source of the funds I proposeto raise. and'Meansis read') (A Bill of TVaYs That, gentlemen,is the extent of the money wes have been able to raise.When you vote it, if you decideto do so, you will 6. Literally'in the market place', through which processionspassed.They were in the charge of army officers, who, Demosthenes suggests, were like terrn cltta figures, intended for ornament rather than use. 7. A special officer was always appointed to command cavalry in Lemnos. 8. roo drachmae: r tnin&, 6o minae: r talent. These figures give z obols per day as the estimated pay for each man, which was normally doubled to provide ration money in addition, and may be compared with a figure of 3 or 4 obols as the pay of an unskilled labourer. Demosthenes expects pay to be supplemented by raids on the enemy country. 9. ffre plural indicates some kind of assistancein drawing up the details.

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be giving your vote for action against Philip, and. action not confinedto the words of manifestosand despatches. It seemsto me that your deliberationson the subject of war and its entire equipment would be renderedmore effectiveby considerationof the country in which it is to take place. You must recognizethat it is by careful attention to winds and seasonsthat Philip gains considerableadvantage.He waits for the Etesiansloor for winter before making moves by them beyondour reach.With this in mind we should avoid a war of singleexpeditions,which will alwaysbe too late for their effect, and resortto a standingforce.We can commandwinter harbourage at Lemnos, Thasos and Sciathosand other islands in the neighbourhood.There are harbours there and ready supplies and all necessitiesfor an army. And at the right time of year, when coastal operations are safe and winds not dangerous, there will be easyaccessto trading ports. The use that will be made of this force, and the moment to choose,will be settledas opportunity arisesby the commander appointed. What we need to provide is the subject of my proposal.Make this available,first the financesI haveproposed, then the rest, men, ships and cavalry,the whole force complete and clamped down to the businessof war, with the control of this assemblyover finance,and a generalrequired to submit a report, and you will be at an end of continuous debateson the same subject, unsupported by action.rr And in addition, Philip's greatestassetwill be lost to him. What is this assetI The fact that he makesuse of our own allies in the war against us by piratical raids on seatransport. What else? Athens will be clear of damage.It will not be like past occasions,when he made descentson Lemnos and Imbros and went off with Athenian citizens as prisoners, when he cut off Athenian shipping and appropriateduntold wealth, when finally he made himself of the stategalley,I2 a hnaing at Marathon and possessed ro. North-easterly winds regular in the Aegean in July and August (see On the Chersonese,r4). rr. Demosthenes' tone does not yet suggestimmediate urgency. lz. This was called the Paralus. Among official functions it conducted the sacred mission to the sanctuary of Apollo at Delos, in the course of which it touched at Marathon.

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which he removed from her station. It proved impossible for Athens to prevent thesedepredations,or to bring force to bear at the proposedmoment. Yet why is it, do you suppose,that the festivalsof the Panathenaeaand the Dionysia always take placeat the correct time, whether the task of managingthem is allotted to expertsor laymen - and theseare things which run into greaterexpensethan any military expedition,and probably demand greater trouble and preparationthan anything else at all - whereasour expeditionsare invariably too late, like the onesto Methone or Pagasaeor Potidaea?'sThe reasonis that the festivalsare regulatedby laiv. Everyoneknows long beforehand who is to head the tribe in the theatre or the gaines,and when he is to receivewhat from whom, and what he is to do. Nothing is left vagueand unspecifiedthere.raBut in the military field and in preparationfor it there is no order, no organization, no precisecontrol. The result is this. It is not till the news of the actual emergencycomesthat we appoint commanders.We considerationof waysand then proceedto property exchanges,'s means)later on to a decisionto use alien troops, later still to changeto citizen troops, then to adopt others after all. And in the time all this takes, the object of our expedition is lost before it is begun. The time for action is squanderedin preparation, and opportunities for action will not wait for procrastinationand pretence.Then resourceswhich we imagine we possessthroughout are proved inadequate at the critical moment. Meanwhile Philip's insolencegoes to the length ot a despatchof this sort to Euboea. (The text of a despatchis now read,\ Most of what has just been read, gentlemen,is unfortunately 13. See sectional introduction, p. r7o. r4. The Panathenaeawere in charge of special officials, chosen by lot, the Dionysia in the first place were under the archon, who had a staffof ten for the purpose. r5. The trierarchy (see glossary s.v. Leitourgia) was one of the public servicesundertaken by individuals. But if anyone nominated for one of them thought that a wealthier man had been passedover, he could claim to exchange property with him or else demand that the other should take over the task.

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true. Yet it doesnot, perhaps,makepleasanthearing.Norv if the omissionsmade by speakersto avoid unpleasantness are going to be repeatedin the actual courseof events,there is a casefor political ingratiation. If, on the other hand, ingratiation out of seasonbrings actual loss, then it is despicableto pursue selfdeception and postpone unpleasantnessat the expense of sacrificing realities. It is a failure to realize that the proper pursuit of warfaredoesnot meanfollowing in the trail of events, but being in front of them. One would claim that a commander should be aheadof his men, and so should statesmenbe ahead of events,and not be compelledto follow them. The citizens of Athens, however,possessed as they are of the greatestpo\yer of all in ships, fighting men, cavalry and monetary resources, have never to this day made a right use of any of them. The war againstPhilip exactlyresemblesthe methodsof an untaught foreignerin the boxing ring. If he is hit, he hugs the place,and if you hit him somewhereelse, there go his hands again. He has not learnt, and is not prepared,to defend himself or look to his front. So it is with the policy of Athens. If newscomesof Philip in the Chersonese, an expeditionthere is voted, if it is Thermopylae,it is sent there. Wherever he goes,lve hurry up and dou,n at his instance,controlled by his strategy without any constructivemilitary plan of our own, without foresightto anticipatenewsof what is happeningor has happened.If this rvas,perhaps,a possiblecoursein the past,that tirne is now at an end. There is no longer room for it. It must be some divine providence,gentlemen,rvhich is ashamedof the conduct of this country and has implantedthis busy spirit in Philip. Had he beencontentwith his initial capturesand goneno further, some people here would probably have been satisfieclwith circumstanceswhich brought the stigma of shame and disgraceon the rvhole nation. But his continual attempts to add to his gains may stir us to action, unlessall spirit is lost to us. It is astonishingthat there is not a man in Athens to reflect with indignation that a war which openedwith the aim of bringing deservedretribution upon Philip of Macedon should now be ending in an effort to escapedisasterat his hands. Yet it is certainly clear that he will not stand still unlesshis advanceis r96

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impeded.Is this what we are to wait for ? Are someunmanned ships and a few optimistic ideas enough to satisfy us that our ends are securedI Can we stop short of manning our own fleet, sendingout a force of Athenians,at least in part, now that the time has almost run out ? Can we stop short of an expedition overseas I The question is askedwhere we are to anchor. The war will of itself find out his weak points, if we presson with it. If we stay at home and listen to abuse and recrimination betweenspeakers,never shall we enjoy any success.I assure you, where part of our citizenarmy is sent overseas,even if not all of it, the favour of providenceand of fortune goeswith it. But when the expedition consistsonly of a commander, an unimplemented decision and the hopes which are expressed from this platform, nothing is achieved,our enemiesderide us, while our allies are frightened to death of such expeditions. It is impossible,quite impossible,for one man to accomplish our everyhope.Promisesand statementsand accusations against this person or that are only too possible,and the ruin of our affairs. When the commander is given a few miserable men without pay, when his every action can be misrepresentedwith easeat home and random decisionsare made on a basis of hearsay,what can be expected? How is this stateof things to be endedI It will end when this country givesits citizensa triple function, to servein her armies, to witnessthe conduct of the campaign,and, on their return, to judge the report, so that it is not a rnatter of hearingnewsof it, but of eyewitnessknowledge.In our presentshamefulstate every commanderrisks his life two or three times in court, but they none of them dare risk it in battle. They prefer to risk the lives of slaversand privateersthan perform their proper function. A criminal's true death is a sentenceexecuted,a general's is in battle againstthe enemy.But as for us, we go about saying that Philip is plotting with Spartafor the break-upof the Theban confederacl,t6or that he has sent representativesto Persia,or that he is engagedon fortifications in Illyria, or any other invention that anyonelikes to disseminate.I do not think this is likely. I think he may well be intoxicatedwith what he has 16. On the Theban confederacysee fsocrates,Philip, 43, and note Z.

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achieved, he may have many such dreams in the manifest absenceof any oppositionand in the exaltationof success,but I do not think it likely that he choosesto act so that the merest fools in Athens know his intentions. And the merest fools are the purveyorsof rumours. If we can say good-bye to all that and realize one thing, that this is our enemy, who is stealing from us our possessions and has long defied all right, if we see that every hope we have indulged of help from others has been proved to be the reverse,and that the future lies in our hands alone,if we realizethat to refuseto fight him on his own territory is perhapsto be compelledto do so on ours, then we shall have reached a proper decision, and be emancipatedfrom empty words. What we need is not speculationon the future, but the certainty that it will be disastrousif we lack the proper outlook and the will to action. I havenever electedto seekpublic favour by policieswhich I did not believeexpedient.On this occasiontoo I have spoken simply and bluntly without reservation.I wish I were sure it would benefitme to speakthe truth as much asyou to be told it. I should feel much happier if I were. As it is, I must rest in uncertainty of the effectit will bring on me, but the certainty that these cnnvictions are to the benefit of the nation, if they are carried out, is the basisupon which I chooseto speak.May the decisionbe one which will prove the best for us all.

['-6] DEMOSTHENES: OLYNTHIAC

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You would give a great deal, I fancy, gentlemen,for a clear understandingwhere your interest is likely to lie in the affairs under consideration.This being so, you should be ready to pay keen attention to such proposalsas are made.Not only can you secure the advantageof hearing any considered *gg"riion which may be offeredhere, but it may be your good fortune, I imagine,to find that valuableideasoccurimpromptu to speakers, which may make it easy,from the lvhole rangeopen to you, ro choosethe wisestpath. Gentlemen,this moment of history cries out to declarethat it is time to takea positivegrip of affairs,if we haveany thought for their security. Bur our attitude is one which I can scarclly describe.My own view callsfor an immediatevote for an expeditionary force, for the speediestpossibleprovision of the means to implement it (to avoid a reperition of the past), for the despatch of representativesto announce it and to maintain liaison on the spot. The greatestdanger is that concessionsor threats which may carry conviction, or misrepresentation of our absence,may enablean unscrupulousand cleveropportunist Iike Philip to secureimportant advantagesfor himself. Nonetheless,it is reasonablytrue that the hardestfeatureto contend with in Philip's position is also our greatestasset.His personal control of all activities,open or secret,his combined position in command of the army, state and exchequer,his invariable presencewith his forces,give him a real superiority in military speedand efficiency.But in regard to the exchangeshe would like_with Olynthus the reverseis true. It is clear to the people of Olynthus that it is no longer their own credit, no longei a territorial matter which is at issuein this war, but the destruction and enslavementof their country. They know what was the fate of the betrayersof the stateat Amphipolis, of Philip's sponsors at Pydna. It is a generaltruth that autocracyis suspectamong free states,especiallyif it appearson their boundaries. with this linowledgeat hiart, and with orher considerations r99

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in mind, we should in my submissionset our will and stir our spirit at this eleventhhour to war, rvith a readinessfor financial contribution and personal service without stint. We have no sort of excusenow for reluctance.Yesterdayit was common talk that Olynthus must be set to war againstMacedon.Toclay this has come about of itself, and in a most advantageous manner for this country. Had it been at our instance that Olynthus entered the war, she might have been an uncertain, not a whole-heartedally. But as her own complaints are the basis of her enmity, it should be a lasting hostility based on her own fears and grievances.An opportunity has fallen to us, and we must not let it slip, we must not succumb to the same fate as so often before. On the occasionof the aid we senr ro Euboea,I when Hierax and Stratoclesstood on this platform and urged us to move overseasand take over their city, had rve shown the sameenthusiasmin our own interest as we did for the safety of Euboea, we should have been in possessionof Amphipolis and have been savedall subsequenttrouble about it. Again, when news came of the siege of Pyclna,Potidaea, Methone, Pagasaez and the rest, to cut a long list short, had we then in one single instancetaken the field with proper spiritr, lve should now have a far humbler and easierPhilip to meet. As it is, our refusalto seizethe fleetingmoment,and our assumption that the future will look after itself, have effectivelyturned Philip into the greatestmonarchlvho haseverappearedin Macedonia. Now at last we have our opportunity in Olynthus. It has come to us unsought, and it is the greatestin our history. Indeed I think a faft reckoning of the favours of forrune ro Athens, even though much is not as it might be, should inspire deep feelings of gratitude. The many losseswar has brought may properly be attributed to our olvn neglect.Their occurrcnce recently instead of long ago, and the appearanceof an alliance to balancethem, if rve are ready to make use of it, can only be put down to her favour. This has a parallel in finance. Keep what you gain and you will feel a de'bt to fortune. Bur let it evaporate,and the gratitude disappearswith it. And in politics r. In 357.SeePhilippic I 17andnote. z. See sectional introduction.

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failure to make good use of opportunity meansthat fortune's favours too are forgotten. It is by the ultimate result that the initial assetsare estimated. It is therefore vitally necessaryto think of the future, to enableus to set our waySstraight and wipe out the discredit of past conduct. If we are to abandonOlynthus too, and Philip is to becomeits master,what is to prevent him, I should like to know, from moving whereverhe chooses? Do any of us reckon and fully realizethe methods which have brought Philip from initial weaknessto his present statureI First the capture of Amphipolis, then of Pydna, next Potidaea,then Methone, then the move into Thessaly. Next came Pherae, Pagasaeand Magnesia,and after securingthe whole position as he wanted it, he was away to Thrace, where he expelledor establishedthe princes of the district. Then came his illness, but when he recovered,there was no decline into inactivity. He at once attackedOlynthus. I say nothing of his excursionsinto Illyria and Paeonia,or againstArybbasaand the rest. Why point this out now ? It is to bring to your knowledge and rcalization two things: first the disaster of squandering your interests one by one, and secondly the restlessactivity which is Philip's life and which never allows him to rest on his laurels. If it is to be his motto that every move must be an advance,and ours that we are never to take a grip of reality, I urge you to contemplatewhat is the likely result. Indeed who could remain in blind ignorance,or fail to rcalizethat the war at Olynthus will be on our own territory if we neglect it ? If that is to happen, I am afraid we shall find ourselvesin the position of the easyborrower at high rates,who after a fleeting moment of prosperity has to surrender principal as well as interest.We may find that our inertia has been bought at high cost, that the unvaried quest for pleasuremay bring us to the necessityof much that is the opposite,to the jeopardy of our at home. very possessions Destructivecriticism, I shall be told, is easyand anyonecan makeit. It is particularand positiveproposalswhich demandthe 3. Arybbas was a king in Epirus, defeated probably in 352 at the time of Philip's third expedition against the Illyrians. 20r

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statesman.I am perfectly aware,gentlemen,that it is often on the last speakerthat your anger descends,and not rvhere the responsibility lies for what you find unsatisfactory.But I do not think one should allow considerationof personalsafety to make one hesitateto speakout. My declaredview is in favour of intervention to preserve the members of the Olynthian confederation by sending a force for that purpose, and by inflicting damageon Macedonianterritory with a secondnaval and military force. Neglect either of these,and I am afraid the campaignwill be ineffective.Confineit to attackson Macedonia, and Philip will reduce Olynthus and then have no difficulty in defendinghis own territory. Confineit to assistance to Olynthus, and he will realizethat there is no threat to Macedon,and lay siegeto Olynthus and maintain his threar ro the position till in time he gains control of the besiegedcities. Our force must be considerableand must be in two sections. That is my view about the expedition.As regardsthe finances of it, you are in possession,gentlemen,of a sourceof revenue unparalleledin the world.+You receiveit in the form you like. If you are preparedto use this for the expeditionaryforce, you haveno need to look further. But if not, you do needresources, indeed you have none at all. Is ir, then, my proposalthat this fund should be appropriated to military purposes? No,s it is not. My view is that a force must be equipped,and that a single organizationought to cover paymentsreceivedand expenditure required. The normal view favours money to spend at the festivalswithout any trouble in acquiringit. The only alternative is a universalsubscription,the amount dependingon the need. But the money is needed,and is indispensableto the performanceof the smallestpart of our duty. There are varioussuggestions for the meansto raise this fund. Choosewhich you like, 4. This refers to the so-calledTheoric Fund, a subject which Demosthenes clearly treats with some uneasiness.It had been created to provide the poor with the means of attending the festivals, and had gradually appropriated all the surplus revenue. It was jealously preserved by popular opinion, and an attempt made shortly before this speechto secure some of the fund for war purposes had been met by an indictment for illegality. 5. Demosthenesis caref'ulnot to call this a proposal, but merely a statement of opinion.

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so that while the opportunity is there,you keepyour grip on the situation. It is worth while to make a consideredjudgementof Philip's presentposition. It is not what it appears,it is not, as a casual glance might suggest,an easy or ideal situation for him. He would never haveprovokedthis war, had he thought that actual fighting would be neceSsary. FIis hope was that he had only to approach,to be masterof every situation.But his hope hasbeen vain. This is his first anxiety. It was unexpectedand is a great disappointment.His secondis Thessaly.oIt is by narure unreliableand it hasproved so to everyone.Philip is no exception. Thessaly has passed a resolution to demand the return of Pagasae and preventedthe fortification of Magnesia.I haveeven heard mentioned the proposalto deny him the benefit of open markets and ports, which should supply the generalneedsof Thessaly,and not be appropriatedto Macedon.And if he is to be kept from this sourceof supply, he will be in dire straits for the provisioning of his forces. One must indeed supposethar the peoplesof Paeoniaand Illyria and the rest would prefer autonomy and freedom to servitude. They are in no habit of submission,and Philip is a harsh master, it is understood, and it is not hard to believe.Undeservedsuccessis the road to folly in unbalancedminds, which makesit harder to keep than to win prosperity.For us then, gentlemen,his inopportuneacts must be our opportunitiesto join in the contest,by representations where necessary,by personal service, by incitement of others. If Philip had such a chanceagainstAthens, remember how ready he would be to attack us, if war came to Attica. Should we not then feel ashamedto lack the courage,when the opportunity is there, to do to him what he would do to us if he couldI One point more. You must not forget that your choice must be made now betweena war conductedby you on his territory 6. Philip occupied Magnesia, a district of Thessaly, in 352, after which he was granted the right to levy market dues there. But it was later restored to Magnesia (seeOlynthiac II,7,and Philippic II, zz).It must be admitted that this section and the last show an inclination to wishfui thinking on the |art of Demosthenes, which is perhaps a regular characteristic of democratic communities in their dealing with autocracy. 203

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and one conducted by him on yours. If Olynthus holds, you rvill be engagedon Macedonian territory and do damageto it while enjoying the fruits of your own in security. But if Philip capturesOlynthus, what will stand in the way of his advance against ourselves? Thebes? It may seem harsh to say it, but Thebes will join the invasion.Phocis then I She cannot prorect her own territory without help from us. Someother champion? No one will be preparedto do it. For Philip, on the other hand, it would be astonishingif the threats he gives vent to at the expenseof his reputation for sanityare not put into action when he has the power. Indeed, the differencebetweenfighting here and fighting there hardly needsemphasis.If an Athenian force had to spenda mere month in the field, and live on the country for all the needs of an army, without an enemy at all, your farmers would lose more than the expenseof the whole of the last war. If war comes here, what must be the extent of their lossest Add to that the violence,and last but not least the ignominy of our position, as great a loss as any on a balanced view. These are the facts we must focus, and so advanceto the attackand thrust the sceneof war into the territory of Macedon. We have our motives. The wealthy must seek to spend a little of the wealth they are lucky enough to possessso as to enjoy the rest in security. The young and strong should seekmilitary experienceon the soil of Macedon, and so make formidable protectors of their own. The politicians should hope to make it easyto face investigationof their political careersso that the experienceof the nation may colour its criticism of their conduct of office.And for every reasonmay it be for the best.

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GnNrrnunx, there have been many indicationsof the goodnessof ProvidencetowardsAthens, and our presentposition is one of the clearest.Potential enemiesof Macedon have appeared,neighbourspossessed of somepower and, most important of all, an attitude towards war which makesthem feel that their relations with Macedon have been first unreliable, then disastrousto themselves.IThis has all the appearanceof an interventionof Providenceon our behalf.So it is for us ourselves to ensurethat we do not lag behind circumstancein support of our own position. It is to our discredit,indeedto our deepest discredit,to surrenderour hold not merely on statesor districts rvhich were once ours, but on the assistance and the opportunities which fortune provides. A long accountof the power of Macedon as a meansto urge Atheniansto their duty I regard as a mistake, for this reason. Anything that can be said to this effect increasesMacedonian prestigeand damagesthis country. The more Philip's successes exceed his deserts, the greater his reputation as a world's rvonder. The more Athenian statesmanshipfalls short, the lower standsAthenian credit. I will sayno more of this. A proper estimate will show that here lies the reason for his rise to power, not in any resourceof his own. The debt he owed to his collaborators,for which Athens should demand justice, I am not disposedto discussnow. But there are subjectsapart from this which are of greatervalue to put beforethis assembly, and which on a true reckoning constitute a damagingcharge againsthim. These I shall try to present. Merely to decry his perfidious breachesof faith without factual evidencemay rightly be r,vrittendown as empty abuse. But an accountof his actionsup to the present,with a detailed examinationof the points against him, needs no great length and appearsdesirablefor two purposes:to displayhis true weak-

ness and'oo'ou: Trt':r*:lH:,:':il1;*.at 205

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strength that he has exhaustedthe whole catalogueof falsehood which has made him great and that his position is on the verge of ruin. I should emphaticallyagreethat Philip was an object for our fear and our wonder,if what I saw were a power based upon right. But long and full considerationshows the truth. His first successwas at the expenseof our own folly, when the Olynthian representativeswere denied the negotiation they wanted by the tale of Philip's intended transferof Amphipolis, and the much discussedsecret pact.zHe next securedthe adherenceof Olynthus by unjustifiabletreatmentof a former ally, in seizing Potidaeafrom us and transferring it to Olynthus. Finally Thessaly was persuaded by a promise to surrender Magnesiaand undertake a Phocian war for her own benefit.: There is not a statewhich has tried to make use of him without falling victim to his duplicity. In every casehe deceivedrhem, and exploitedtheir folly and ignorancefor his own advancement. He has risen on their shoulders,each time they have seen in him a meansto their own advantage.He should owe his destruction to the sameforces,now that his invariableselGinterest has beenproved againsthim. This is the point to which Philip's fortunes have been brought, and I challengeany speakerto prove to me, or rather to this assembly,either that my contention is false,or that anyonewho has once beentrapped is likely to trust him again,or that anyoneonce reducedto slaverywili not delight in the hope of freedom. If you suppose this is true, yer believe that the King of Macedon, by his capture of strategicpoints and harbours,will have power to dominate the world, it is an unsound belief. Unity based upon good will and common interest gives men the spirit to toil, to endure and to stand. But the power which like his is rooted in greedand violencewill fall in ruin at a word, at the first false step. Never, gentlemen,never can a lasting power be founded on broken promisesand lying words. Such z. Amphipolis was to be restored to Athens.in exchangefor Pydna. 3. On Thessaly see Olynthiac Irzz. Therc seems to be no inconsistency, such as has been suggeJted, between this and [h" pr.r.nt passage and, i4 below. The uncertainty of rhessalian politics is looked upon as a potential danger to Philip's position, and so an advantage to Athens.

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empires stand for one short hour. They may blossom with fair hopes, but time finds them out, and they fade and die. In a house, in a ship, in any sructure, it is the foundation which most needsstrength.So it is too with the actionsof men's lives, which must be founded on truth and justice. And this is not true of the achievementsof Macedon. My view is that we must assistOlynthus. The better and the speedierthe help that is suggested,the better I shall be pleased. Secondlywe must send to Thessalyto provide information and a spur to action. The presentdecisionthere is to demand the restorationof Pagasaeand negotiationsabout Magnesia.But it is essentialthat our representativesshall not be confined to words, but shall have someaction to point to in the shapeof an expeditionaryforce in keeping with Athenian prestige,and to show that we mean business.Words without actions are vain and empty, especiallyfrom Athens. The readier we seem to use them, the more we are distrusted.Great is the change,the altered attitude we need to show, by contributions of money and of service,and by generalreadiness,if we are to command attention. lf you are prepared to carry your obligations into actualreality, it will not only exposethe frailty and uncertainty of Philip's alliances.It will find out the weaknessof his whole power.andpositionat home. Broadly speaking,the power and the empire of Macedon,as a supplementaryforce, is no small asset,as indeed it was to Athens againstOlynthus at the time of Timotheus,4 or again to Olynthus againstPotidaeaas an addition to their strength; or recentlywhen they assisteda decadentand divided Thessaly againstthe royal house.Even a small added power is alwaysof value. But in itself it is weak and fraught with troubles. In fact all the activitiesin which Philip's greatnessmight be thought to lie, his rvars and expeditions,have made his position still more precariousthan nature made it. Do not imagine for a moment, that one and the same set of circumstancesbrings satisfactionboth to Philip and to his subjects. His aim and ambition is glory. His way is the way of action and accepted risk, his goal the greatestrenown in the history of the kings of 4. Timotheus took Torone and Potidaea for Athens in 364. 207

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Macedon.He prefersthat to safety.But they do not sharethese ambitions.They are torn by marching from end to end of the country, and reducedto misery and continuoushardship.They are kept from their own pursuits, their personal affairs, and even what opportunities chance allows cannot be organized, becauseports in the country are closedby the war. This affords clear indication of the relation of most of Macedoniatowards Philip. As to his paid soldiers and his corps d,'dlite, who have the reputation of being a superbly welded military force, I have it from an irreproachableinformant, who hasbeenin that country, that they are no more than ordinary.Men of military experience, I was told, are discardedby a selfishleader who wants all the credit himself, becausehis ambition is as outstandingas anything elseabout him. On the other hand men of restraint and integrity in other fields,who cannotendurea life of drunkenness and debaucheryand indecent dancing, are rejectedand passed over by a man like Philip. The rest of his entourageare bandits and flatterers, capable of taking part in drunken revelry which I hesitateto describe.This is clearly true, becausethe outcasts of our society, who were thought lower than mere streetentertainers, creatures like the slave, Callias, who do comic performancesand write low songsat the expenseof others to get a laugh, theseare the peoplehe likes and keepsaround him. This may seemlittle, but it is in fact a great proof of this contemptible characteron a right estimate.At present,no doubt, this is obscured by success.There is nothing like successto concealdishonour.But at any moment of failure it will be put to the test. And it will not be long, in my view, granted the consentof heavenand the determinationof this country, before it beginsto show signs. In physicalhealth a man who is strong may go for a time without noticing anything amiss,but in time of illness troubles extend everywhere,to any past fracture or strain or underlying weakness.It is the same with a state, whether democratic or monarchical. In time of external war weaknesses are not commonlyapparent.But war on its frontier brings them to light. If anyonehere observesPhilip's prosperityand supposeshim zo8

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a formidable opponent,it is the view of good sense.Fortune is a powerful force, indeecl it is everything, in all human affairs. Nonetheless,given the choice, I would prefer the fortune of Athens, grantedher will to follow the call of duty in detail, to that of Philip. There are many more ways open ro her than to him to commandthe favour of heaven.Yet here we sit inactive. He could not remain inactiveand still demandthe assistance of his own friends, let alone the good will of heaven.No wonder that with his expeditions,his energy, his personalcontrol of detail, his opportunism at every juncture, he gets the better of democratichesitation,deliberationand inquiry. I am not surprised.The oppositewould be surprising,if neglectof our duty in rvar brought successagainst his complete fulfilment of ii. What doessurpriseme is this. In the past, againstSparta,this country went to war for the rights of Greek states,sdeclined numerous opportunities of self-seekingand for the rights of others sacrificedher wealth in war expenseand her security in war service. Now she is slow to offer money and slow to serve in defenceof her own possessions.We saved others on many occasions collectively and singly, but the loss of our own possessions is somethingwe do not stir a finger to prevent. This is what surprisesme, this and one other fact, that there is not a man gapableof reckoningthe length of the war againstphilip, and.askingwhat this country has been doing in all this length of time. You know the answer.she has passedit in procrastination, in optimism, in recrimination, condemnationand yet more optimism. Is this assemblysenseless enoughto hope that the proceedingswhich turned the scale in the country's affairs for the worse will now have exactly the opposite effectI It is not in reason,it is not in nature. it is natural that it should be easierto preservethan to acquire possessions. Now however the war has left us nothing to preserve,and acquire we must. And this is for our own initiative to achieve.The essentialis enthusiasticcontribution to war funds, and war service,and a truce frorrl recrimination until control is ours. Then we can judge by realities,give honour wherehonour is due, and demand Wa4 3g4s.c.Seephilippic1,3. 5. In theCorinthian 209

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retribution for misconduct and an end to excusesand deficiencies. You cannot make bitter criticism of the part played by others except on the basis of unfailing integrity in your own. After all, if you want realities in connexion with your commanders,what do you supposeis the reasonwhy all thoseyou sendoverseashurry to abandontheir country'swar, and discover private wars of their own I It is that in that field the prizes of war belongto the country (if Amphipolis falls, it will soonreturn to Athens) while the risks are personaland rest on the commanders,and pay is non-existent.In their field the risks are less, while captured booty falls to the commandersand their men. Lampsacus,6Sigeum and the ships they capture are instances.They go where it pays them to go. fu for ourselves, when we take a look at the disastrousstate of our affairs, we put our commanderson trial. Then, when we invite their commentsand appreciatetheir overriding difdculties,we acquit them. Ultimately the result for us is dispute and division betweenthis view and that, in a deterioratingsituation. Some time ago the committees were the basis of war contributions. Now public affairs are on a committee basis.zEach party has its leaderin the orator, a military commanderto support him, and their claqueurs,who correspond to the rest of the three hundred.The rest havebeendistributed to one party or another. We must abandon this method, we must be ourselvesagain now at this eleventh hour, and unite for organization, speech and action alike. If you assign to one set of men an almost tyrannical control of the state, to another the compulsory task of naval commands, financial support and military service, while to a third is allotted merely that of criticism without 6. Occupied by Chares in 356, perhaps with the consent of the satrap, Artabazus. 7. One of Demosthenes' earliest public speeches(f S+ e.c.) had been concerned with the organization (initiated in 378) of syndicates of 3oo for the payment of war tax and later the financing of ship building. Here he compares the divisions and disunity between political parties with the disputes between these committees. Each committee had a chairman, the wealthiest of them, and a manager, who organized the raising of the money in the interest of the committee, as did the political parties with their orator, the general they favoured, and their supporters.

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participation,you will never havethe efficientcontrol you need. Any sectionthat is slighted will fail to play its part, and then you will have the satisfactionof punishing them insteadof the enemy. Let me summarizeciur requirements:universal money contribution accordingto means,universal servicein detachments till all have served,universalfreedom to speakand a choice of policy not confinedto that of one or two particular politicians. Carry this out, and insteadof immediate applausefor the last speaker,bestowit on yourselvesfor a generalimprovement in the whole position.

['-s] D E M O S T H E , N E , S :O L Y N T H I A C

III

I eu moved by different feelings,gentlemen,when I turn to the actual courseof events,from those which arise from what I hear said here. Speakers,I observe,are concernedwith retaliation on Philip, but the march of eventshascreatedthe prior need to forestall danger to our own country. Speechesof this kind appearto me to make the mistakeof suggestingthe wrong subject for your deliberations.There was a time when this country had it in her power to combine her own safety with retaliationon Philip. I know that well enough.Both possibilities existed within my own experiencehere. But I am now convinced that it is enoughto hope initially to securethe preservation of our allies.Once that is assured,we can begin to consider retaliation,and ways and meansto it. But until a sound beginning has been laid down, cliscussionof the end is useless. This present moment) beyond all others, demands deep consideration.It is not presentpolicy that I regard as the main difficulty. My problem is how to addressthis meeting. T'he evidenceof my orvn eyesand earsconvincesme that this lack of grip upon affairsis more a failure of rvill than of intelligence. I beg you therefore to tolerate directnesson my part. You must considerthe truth of rvhat I say with the aim of irnprovement in the future. You must realizethat it is the ingratiating methodof certainspeakersrvhichhasbrought our rvholeposition to so low an ebb. I must first, I believe, go back a little over the past. You remember rvhen the nervs came three or four years ago that Philip was besiegingHeraeon Teichos in Thrace.r It was the month of November.Amid an outburst of speechesand excitement the decisionwas taken to launch eighty ships manned by a citizenforce of the under-forty-fivesand raisea sum of sixty talents. The year ended.' July came, August and September, r. The occasion cannot be exactly determined. Presumably in 352, when the rumour of Philip's death was current. z. The Atheirian year began in June. The mysteries took place in early October.

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and then at long last ten ships were despatchedunder Charidemus,unmanned,and the sum of five talentswas voted. News had come of Philip's illness or death (both were reported) and therefore it was thought that there was no occasion for an expedition, and it was abandoned.Yet that was the decisive moment for it. Had we then carried out with energythe operation which was voted, Philip would not have survived to trouble us now. That occasionis now beyond recall. The present war has offered another opportunity, which has led me to mention the first, so as to avoid a repetition of it. What are we to makeof it i If we are not to go into action 'to the utmost of our strength' and 'with all power',a observe how our tactics will all have played into Philip's hands. There stood Olynthus with a certain strength, and the position was that neither she nor Philip viewed the other with confidence.Peacewas negotiated betweenus and Olynthus.+Here was a troublesomeobstacleto Philip, to havea considerablestatethreateninghis interests,and a state in good relationswith this country. It seemeddesirable on all scoresto engineera war berweenthem, and what was so often talked of before has now come about by one means or another. What course is therefore open but to take strong and enthusiasticaction in support of OlynthusI I seeno alternative. Even apart from the dishonour of any compromise,the dangerof it is considerable,in the presentposition of Thebes, the bankruptcyof Phocis,and with Philip, once he has control of the present situation, unhindered by any obstacle from turning in this direction. If anyonehere desiresto postponethe action we need,then it is his desireto witnesscalamity at home when he might hear of it elsewhere,to craveaid when he might offer it. That it will come to this if we neglectthe presentwe must surely all realize. I hear the rejoinder, 'Yes, the need for action is accepted, and it will be taken.' But how ? Do not be surprised if my answeris an unexpectedone. Establisha legislativecommittee. But pass no new enactment.You have plenty. Repeal what 3. The phrasesbelong to a formula used in treaties. 4. 352B.c.

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you have that are detrimental. I refer specificallyto that regarding the Theoric Funds and to somemilitary enactments,which either appropriate military funds to unmilitary purposes or establishimmunity for indiscipline, and so turn all patriotic feelingto despondency.It is by breakingthis barrier, by making the way safefor public-spiritedproposals,that you really initiate the questfor the universallyacknowledgedbenefitof the narion. Meanwhile do not keeplooking for men who will court destruction by making such proposals.None will be forthcoming, especiallyas the only likely outcomeof doing so is undeserved injury without any valuable result, and an increasedpremium on public spirit. The repeal of such enactmentstnust be demandedof the very men who passedthem. It is unrvarrantable that their proposersshould win popularity to the public detriment, while the unpopularity which can herald better things standsas an obstacleto the public-spirited proposer.Till you have set this position right, gentlemen,you musr not demand from anyonethe characterto break the law with impunity, or the insensibilityto put himself into manifestdanger. Nor must it escapeyou that a vote is valuelesswithout the will to carry it out whole-heartedly.If measurespassedhad power in themselvesto compel us to action, or to bring the substanceof them into reality, we should not have a history of numerous enactmentsand little or no action, nor would Philip so long have defied restraint. If enactmentsalone were enough, he would have been penalizedlong since. No, in the order of eventsaction follows speechand decision,but in effect it has the priority and the greatervalidity. We need this addition to what is already available. We have in plenty the capacity to speak,the perspicacityto judge the spokenword. We shall be able to add action to these,if we play our true part. There can be no time, no moment better than the present.When can we act as we should, if not now I Has not this Macedonianstolen a march on us and captured our possessions ?6 We are faced with the greatestignominy, if he proceedsto seizepower also over this territory of Chalcidice.The friends we promised to 5. On the Theoric Fund see on Olynthiac I, rg. 6. Contrast the way in which Isocratesrefers to Philip in Philipr 3, p. r39. 214

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preservein caseof war are at war now. He is our enemy, in possessionof our property. He is an uncivilized intruder, he deservesany appellation you give him. And yer we let it all paslt we virtually assistthe process,and then, I suppose,we shall demand to affix ihe responsibility.We shall not-lay it at our own door, I am sure. It is not only during the perils of war that runawaysfail to accusethemselves,but prefer to arraign the High Command, or their neighbours,or anyone else. But the failure has been due to the army which has run awav. The accusercould have stood firm, and if all had done so, ui"tory would have been theirs. Our case is the same. If one proposal is unsatisfactory, anothercan be offeredwithout attackingthe first. If a secondis preferable,put it into actionand goodluck to it. But perhapsthis is an unattractive proposal. If so, it is not the fault of the proposer, unless he has omitted the obligatory prayer. Prayer is easy, gentlemen.We can summarize in it our every wish. But choice, when we have political questionsbefore us, is not so easily made. It must be the choice of right policy, and not the easyroad, if the two cannot be combined. Yes, comesthe reply, but if it is possibleto leavethe Theoric Fund and provide another source for military expenses,surely that is better. I agree,if it is possible.But I doubt if it has ever beenor will be the fortune of anyone to spend his all unjustifiably, and then be financed out of th. deficit to do his duty. This'is wishful thinking, and self-deceptionis the easiestof pitfalls. Where the wish is father to the thought, rhe truth is often different. You must consider the problem in terms of an expedition that is practical, manageableand financially viable. Good senseand right feeling forbid us to makesomefinancialshortageaffecting the war an excusefor lightly acceptinga position of disgrace, forbid us to fly to arms againstCorinth and Megara,Tand, for lack of moncy to transport our forces, allow Philip to enslave Greek cities. 7. There is no need to look for a particular reference here. Demosthenes is contrasting the quick resentmenr which may be roused by immediate differences at home with reluctance to take an honourable path at a greater distance. 215

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I do not speakfrom an irresponsibledesireto give offence.I am not so senselessor ineffectual as to seek offence rvithout benefit. But I think the true citizen must put the reality of survival above the gratification of rhetoric. This was- the method,this wasthe characterof political dealing,I understand, as perhapsyou all do, practisedby the speakersof the past,who are extolled by membersof this assembly,but not imitated by them; the method of the greatAristides,of Nicias, of my namesakes and of Pericles. Since the appearanceof our modern speakers,who ask 'What are your wishesl What proposal would you like ? What can I do for your gratification?', Athenian strength has been squanderedfor immediate popularity. This is what happens,and as their stock rises, that of the nation sinks. Think, gentlemen, what summary could be given of affairs in the past and in your own time. The account will be short. You know it well enough. The exampleswhich could lead us in the path ofsuccessare not taken from foreign history, had no flattery from speakers, but your own. Your predecessors and no love from them, as you do. But for forty-five yearsthey were the acceptedleadersof the Greek states.eThey amassed over ten thousand talents on the Acropolis. Thc king of this district of Thrace was their subordinate,and stood in the right relation for a non-Greek to a Greek state.Many and greatwere the victories they won by land and seaas citizen fighters, and they were alone of mankind in leaving by their achievementsa reputation high above carping envy. Such they proved in the sphereof Hellenic affairs.Look nolv at the characterthey bore in our city itself, in public and private relations alike. In the first the architectural beauty they created in sacred buildings and their adornmentwas of a quality and at1extent unsurpassable by later generations.Their private lives were of such restraint, and so well in keeping with the character of the community, that if the type of house lived in by Aristides or Miltiades'o or any of the greatmen of that day is known nowa8. Presumably the Demosthenesrvho commanded in the north-west in the PeloponnesianWar and was executed at Syracuseafter the retreat. 9. i.e. between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars, though it seems doubtful how the reckoning is made. ro. Leaders of Athens during the period of the Persian Wars. zt6

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OLYNTHIAC III

days, it can be seento be no grander than its neighbours.I.[o one then made capital out of public affairs. It was felt that the community should be the gainer. But their integrity in the conduct of Hellenic affairs, their devotion in that of religion, their equity in that of private concerns,gainedthem the highest happiness.So stood the state in the past under the leadersI have mentioned.What is the position now under our present splendidadministratorsI Is there any similarity, any comparison rvith the pastI I cut short a long list of instances.You can all seethe degreeof helplessness to which we have come. Sparta is finished.Thebes is fully occupied.No other stateis'strong enoughto bid for the supremacy.We could retain our position in saf'etyand hold the scalesof justicefor the rest of the Hellenic world. And yet rve havelost territory of our own, we havespent over fifteen hundred talents to no purpor., the allies rve macle in the war have brought us down in the peace,Iland we have brought an adversaryof such magnitudeon the stageagainstus. I invite any man present to tell me here and now, what other sourcethere is of Philip's power than ourselves.'Well,' I am told, 'that may be very unfortunate, but at home, at least, we are better off.' What is the evidenceof this ? Plaster on the battlements,new streets,water supplies.These are trivialities. Turn your eyeson the pursuersof thesepolitical ends.They have risen from beggaryto riches,from obscurityto prominence,and in somecaseshave houseswhich outshinethe public buiidings thernselves,rvhile their consequencerises lvith the decline of the nation. What is the reasonfor all this ? Why rvasAthenian history then so gloriousI And nolv why is so much amissI Because then the people of Athens had the courageto act and to serve in person,the peoplewere the rnasterof the politiciansanclthe controller of all its assets.Then it was a matter of satisfaction to every man elsewhereto be admitted by the people to share its honour, its power and someof its benefits.Norv the reverse is true. It is the politicians who control assets,and through whoseagencyall action is taken. We, the people,are enervated t... in the period 378-362 n.c., during which the new Confecleracy "rjrt;

2r7

DEMOSTHENES

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and our revenuesand our allieswhittled away.We areincidental, subsidiary,contentto be alloweda little from the Theoric Fund and a processionat the Boedromia,rzand, our finest moment of all, to feel gratitude for what is our own. It is thesemen of our own city who keep us down to this level, who cossetus till we eat out of their hands. But never, I am sure, was a high and virile spirit attained through petty and contemptible practices. The characterof men's habits is reflected inevitably in their spirit. These are words which may well bring down greater detriment on my head for sayingthis than on othersfor Causing it. Free speakingis not permitted here on all subjects,and I am surprisedthat it has been allowed now. This is our last chance to rid ourselvesof such habits, to servethe nation, to act like Athenians,to usewhat is superfluous at home as a stepping-stoneto gainsabroad.If we can do this, perhaps,perhaps,gentlemen,we may makesomefinished,some great achievement,and say goodbyeto thesepetty doles.They resemble the diets imposed by doctors, which neither bring strength to the sick man nor let him die. The distributions we receive are not enough to bring any satisfying benefit, nor allow us to turn our back on them and look elsewhere.They merely serveto encourageindividual inaction. Do I imply their appropriationto the army ? Yes, I do, and at once on a single organizationfor all, so that every individual may have his share of public support and provide the servicesneededby the state. If the situation permits inactivity, a man is best at home where he is not driven by want to illicit action. Supposea situation like the present.Then he can servein personand draw his pay from the same source, as is only right for public service.Or take the caseof a man outside military age. The unorganized and unearnedpaymentshe now receiveshe will get under the new system for work of superintendenceand organization.In a word, without any more than slight addition or subtraction I bring Athensfrom a lack of systemto a systematicarrangement of universal application, under which are included payment, military and judicial service, the performanceof public tasks of all kinds accordingto capacityand circumstance.In no inre. It is doubtful which festival is here meant. z18

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stancedo I advocatepassingthe earningsof the active to the inactive.In no casewould I havecitizensin idlenessand leisure receivingnews of the successes of some general'smercenaries, as happensnow. I makeno criticism of any who are engagedin the necessaryservice of the state. I merely demand ihat the nation perform for itself the tasksfor which it now commends others,and not abandonthe lofty post securedand left for her by your predecessors in the ranks of nbbility and danger. I haveattemptedto speakas I think desirable.Let your choice be made in accordancewith the best interestsof our countrv and all her citizens.

DEMOSTHENES [II]

INTRODUCTION The interaal between. thefoll of Ollnthus in j4B s.c. and the last speeclt. whiclt,appearsin this book, Philippic III, in tlte summer o/'34r, includestpo main setsof eaents,tltosecentringrountl the Pea,ceof Philocratesin j46, and,th,oseof the periotl of indecision after it, phich,endedwlten Ph.ilipfinally attacketlAthens in jj8. aierpswere ffictiue Q) After thefall of Ollnthus Demostlrenes' in senrlinga delegationto Peloponnesian statesto stimulateffirts against Pltilip. But Eubulus and ltis associatesknerp tlrat peace wasfnancially necessary. Philip also pas readl for it, but-could, offord to insist on tpo demands,tlrat he shouldbefree to deal witlt Halus in Tlressaly,whosedisputewith PharsalusPhilip had been inaited to settle,and witlt Phocis.Theselt)erennt mentionedin the actual termsnegotiated.Atltenians trietl to pretendthat thelt knew of a'gentlemen'sagreement'to let Phocisli.ae.But Phitip-hadno suclt.idea, and at oncetlestrajtedit ; antlfollowed,this bjt realizing his other great desire,to presicleot tlte Pjtthian.gatnesat Detpti. Tltere was much, dispute and, recrinninationbetweenAtheiian representatit-es 0n tltepeacetlelegationwltich is the subjectof Demosthenes'long speecltogainstAescltines,which is not inclucled, in this aolunte.TJtecircumstances of the negotiationsos a whole, coupled with tlte feeling arousetlbjt Demosthenes oaer ofunth.us,olmost causedAtltens to repud'iutethe Peace, and, Demosthenes in the speeclt. On the Peacein j46 had to adaiseocquiescence in it. () After tlte Peace,despiteltrofessions offriendll feeting towards Atltens, Plti,lip'sdiplomatic airnspere infatsour of rhebis against Athens ond Sparta, and alreadl in 344, in Philippic II, Demospointsou.tthat this is merell an interaal beforeafinal struggte. tlrenes Meanwltile Euboea had been establish,ed as ind,ependent ifter the reuolt in j48, and Pltilip did little to encnuragehopesthit he intendedt0 return it to Athens.He expelledthe democratsfi.om Eretria, forcing them frorn the nearby Porthmus, and triated Oreussimilarfit, as Demostltenes describes in Philippic III.

DEMOSTHENES [rr]

Btrt the nelctsceneof Philip's operationswas Tltrace,whetherto preaent attacks on his territoryt bjt Th,racionprinces,,or to gain greoter control of the BosporusandHellespont.It wa,san area of greilt importanceto Athenian trade, and,was lorgell in tlte hands rnith wltom Atlrens Cersobleptes, of princes like tke undependable someinffictual negotiations in j56 for ilte control had,conducted In j5z Cersoltleptes had beensubjected, to the of the Chersonese. power of Maced,on'but reaoltedtrpr Jears later, and Philip was again engagedagainst lrim in j46 during and after the pea,ce (tlte tongueof land,in Tltracemore negotiations.In the Chersonese recentlJcalled the Gallipoli peninsu,la),Athens had,claimedsouereWtJ and set out cleruclties(see fsocrates, Panegyricus ro7 p. no). Thesemereunderthe cornmandof Diopeithes,and the aenture pes fnirU successfulapart frorn tlaetown of Cardia, wh.ich. had,always beenanti-Atkenion and, was claimed,as an ally and, garrisoned,bjt Philip. Diopeithesretoliated,bjt aarious irregular proceedingsagainst Maced,onianplssessionson the Proponti,s,but he wos not proaided witlt enough men or mlne1 to maintain ffictixe hostilities.Philip mrotea protestin threateningterms,and this was the situation in which Demosthenes'speechOn the Chersonesewo.sdelizteredi,n.34r. It was/bllowed,after a short interaalby Philippic III, with,war imminentonceagain. We haae of the tfttt of thisfine speeclt., no actual eaid,ence but from diplornatic actiuities0,m0ngthe Greekstatesit appearstltat the d,anger fro* Macedon Das nzw fulll realized, and the policy phiclt. representedregainedtlte ascendanclin Athens. In Demosthenes 34o &n alli.anceof Athens, Corinth, Megara and otlter statesDas formed, and the Dar wa,sresumed.Denl,osthenef fnal diplomatic to win oaerThebesin 339.But by nop it was too late. triumph rDa,s

['-6] DEMOSTHENES: ON THE PEACE

I nnellzE, gentlemen,the degreeof ill will and confusion aroused by the present situation, not merely from the extent of our losses,which oratory has nothing to offset, but from the lack of a generallyagreedpolicy in regard to what remains to us, about which there is varying opinion. The framing of policy is always a tiresome and difficult business, but the citizens of Athens have renderedit still more difficult. In the normal coursedeliberationcomesbefore action, but with us it comesafter it. Hencethe commendationand appiauseinvariably bestowed,in my experience,upon criticism of past mistakes, which fails to securethe real aim of debate.Yet despitethis I stand here in the firm conviction that we have only to abandon partisan demonstrations,as is demandedby the needs of the country and the importanceof the issuesbefore us, to find the ability to frame and advocatepolicies to improve the present and redeemthe past. I am perfectly aware that it is an outsrandingly profitable practice,if one has the face,to makeoneselfand one's previous utterancesthe main theme. But I regard it as so contemptible and tiresome a habit, that I hesitate to use it, even when I realize the need. But I think it will give you a better understandingof what I am going to say, if I remind you a little of what I have said in the past. First, then, at the time when, in view of disordersin Euboea,this country was induced to follow Plutarchusl in raising a war that was as expensiveas it was inglorious,I wasthe first and the only speakerto opposethe project. I was almost torn in piecesby the party which .rtg.d ot the country a number of seriouslossesin return for diminutive profit. After a very short interval,at the costalsoof disreputeand of treatment of their benefactorsunparalleledfor a generation, r. Philip's intrigues in Euboea, which distracted Athens from aiding Olynthus, are referred to in the sectional introduction , p, 17r. Plutarchus of Eretria appealed for Athenian aid, and was assistedby Eubulus and his party, but proved to be a turncoat. 223

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the lesson was learnt that the advocatesof this expedition were unprincipled, and that mine had been the right policy. Again, there was the caseof the actor, Neoptolemus.I became aware that under the pretext of official protection afforded by his art he was gravely damagingthe interests of Athens, by favouring Macedon in his conduct of proceedingsas your representative.I thereforeraised the subject in this assembly, without a semblanceof personalor other propaganda,as was proved by the result. I am not intending any reflectionon the supportersof Neoptolemus.There werenone. It is this assembly I blame.If it had beena performancein the Theatre which was under considerationinstead of the position and security of Athens, he would not have met with so lenient a reception,nor I with suchhostility. Yet I think this is universallyrealized,that, while his journey into enemy territory was nominally designed to securepayment of debts in that country, in order to honour his public obligationshere, actuallyhe made a great deal of the claim that it was outrageousto be blamed for bringing wealth from Macedon to Athens; yet no sooner did the Peacesecure his immunity, than he realized the property he had acquired here and abscondedto Macedon with it. These are two of the predictionsI made,which are evidence of honestaccuracyin the facts.There is one third example,and then I really will embark on my subject.After those of us who formed the delegation returned from the ratification of the Peace,there were numerous promisesin the wind, of a new foundation for Thespiae and Plataea,2of Philip's intention to preserve Phocis, if he secured control, and to disestablish Thebes;; that Oropus was to be awardedto Athens and Euboea exchangedfor Amphipolis, and other chimerical hopes,which led you to disregard both interest and equity by abandoning Phocis.But it will be clear that I did not mislead the counrry either positively or negatively.I said what I thought, as I am sure you remember,namely that I had neither knowledgenor z. Thespiae and Plataeahad been dispossessedor destroyed by Thebes in J /J.

3. SeeIsocrates,Philip,43.On Oropus seeDemosthenes,For Megalopolis, rr, and sectional introduction.

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expectationof anything of the kind, and I thought such sratements were nonsense. These instances,in which I clearly showed better foresight than others,are not to be put down to any superiorability that I can boast.I shall not claim that intelligent prediction is due to anything but the two causesI have put forward. The first, gentlemen,is good luck, which I realize has more power than all the ingenuity and wisdom of men. The secondis that my judgement and my reckoning are free of self-interest.No one can point to any gain to me attaching to any policy or any utteranceof mine. I can thereforetake an unbiasedview of the national interest,basedsolelyon the facts.Once financialprofit is put in the scale,the balanceis upset and intelligenceoutweighed,and there is no further hope of right or sound judgement about anything. The first prerequisite,in my view, is that any alliance or contribution which anyone wishesto securefor Athens shall be secured without brealing the peace. Not that it is anything remarkable,or in any way worthy of Athens. But whatevercan be said of it, better for our positionthat it had never beenmade, than made and then broken by this country. We have lost many assetswhose retention would have made war safer and easier then than it is now. Our secondneed is to avoid giving the assemblyof the so-calledAmphictyonic Council+ the need, or a common pretext for, war against us. Personally, in the event of a fresh war betweenus and Philip over Amphipolis or on any other private ground not shared by Thessaly, Argos or Thebes, I do not believeany of them would take part against Athens, least of all - pleasekeep your protests till you hear what I have to say - leastof all Thebes, not from any friendly feelingtowardsus, or from anti-Macedonianviews, but because they fully rcalize, for all their reputation for slownessof wit, that in a war againstAthens they will get all the kicks and none of the halfpence,which will be kept under someoneelse'sclose control. They will not let themselvesin for this without a general causeand occasionfor war. Again, in the event of a further war with Thebes on the score of Oropus or any other private bone 4. See fsocrates, Philip,74 and note. 225

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of contention, I do not think that Athens would have anything to lose. Supportersof either side would go to arms in defence againstan attack on their own territory, but would not support either in aggression.This is the way of alliancesof any significance,,ttd it is a natural way. Theie is no one whoserelations with Athensand Thebesare equallypoisedbetweendefenceand offence.All would sharea defensiveaim to maintainthe integrity of both, but not an offensiveaim to securethe successof one which involved a threat to themselves.What then do I regardas the dangerwe should guard against? The danger that a future war may provoke a generalpretext and a comrnon complaint against us. SupposeArgos, Messene,Megalopolis and other Peloponnesianstateswhich share their view, take exceptionto an ententebetween Sparta and ourselvesand the idea of our making some capital out of Spartan activity.s SupposeThebes increasesthe hostility shenormally shows,on the ground of our offering asylum to Theban fugitives and our generalill feeling towards her, and Thessalyfor our rescueof Phocianrefugees,and Philip for our exclusionof him from the Amphictyonic League, then I am afraid that individual resentmentsmay give occasion for a generalwar, on the claim of the Amphictyonic decrees. These may leadeveryonebeyondtheir own bestinterests,ashappenedin the Phocianwar. You must realizethat Thebes,Philip and Thessalydid not sharecommonaims,though their courseof action was in accord.Take the caseof Thebes.Philip's appearance and his control of the passwas somethingthey could not prevent,any more than his coming last in the field and stealing the credit of their labours. At the present time Thebes has madesometerritorial gains,but her prestige,her credit, is low, since but for Philip's arrival the gain would never have been made. This was not at all what she wanted, but her desire to acquireOrchomenusand Coronea,which she could not secure, compelled her to submit to it. As to Philip, there are people who go so far as to say that he was againstceding Orchomenus and Coroneato Thebes, but was compelledto. They can enjoy this notion if they like, but of one thing I am sure, that he was 5. See in general the speech on Megalopolis (p. r73 seqq.) seven years earlier.

zz6

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ON THE PEACE

not so concernedwith this as with his desireto control the pass, to securethe prestigeof making it appearthat the decision of the war had lain in his hands,and to put the Pythian gamesat his disposal.This was his particular aim. Finally, Thessalyhad no wish for an increaseof power on the part of either Thebes or Philip, either of which they regardedas damagingto themselves.They wanted a place at the Council and in the control of Delphi, two considerableassets.This aim meant furthering the other activities.You can see therefore that in each caseit was the pursuit of private gainswhich led on to the acceptance of losses.And that, exactly,is rvhat this country needsto forestall. 'So we must do as we are told in a dangeroussituation.Is that your contentioni' I am asked.Not at all. My contentionis that we should avoid reachinga position unworrhy of Athens, and also avoid the onset of war, that we should cultivate a reputation for good senseand a right view. But the unthinking acceptanceof every loss without any thought of war is the attitude I wish to consider. We are allowing Thebes to hold Oropus.And if we are askedwhat is our real and genuinereason for this, the answer is, to avoid war. And the reasonwhy we have ceded Amphipolis to Philip by the agreemenr,why we allow Cardia6to stand apaftfrom the rest of the Chersonese, and Cardia to include the islandsof Chios, Cos and Rhodes,zand Byzantium to enforce customsdues,8is clearly our belief that we can expect greaterbenefit from peaceand tranquillity than from conflict and self-interestin the fields I have mentioned.It is thereforean act of folly and downright perversity,when our relationswith individual statesas they bear on our closestinterestsare what they are, to try conclusionswith them all for the sakeof the shadowshow at Delphi. 6. Cardia had remained detached even afrer the Chersonese, at the northern end of which it stood, had been secured for Athens in 353, and in 346 Philip gained recognition of it as an ally. 7. On Chios and the other cities of the Social War see Demosthenes' speech On the Liberty of Rhodes,p. r8o. These srateswere still dependent on Cair, now under Idrieus (see Isocrates, Philip, rc3). 8, i.e. on Athenian corn ships from the Euxine.

['-6] DEMOSTHENE,S: PHILIPPIC II

GnNrI-nunx, when debatesare held on Philip's intriguesand deliberatebreachesof the Peace,the Athenian point of view is conspicuousfor its correct and humane attitude. Attacks made on Philip are invariably commendable,but there is nothing to commendin the action taken, nothing to justify the arguments used. Indeed the whole position for this country has reacheda point at which the more stronglyand openly Philip is convicted of breachesof the treaty with Athens, and of designsagainst the Greek statesin general,the harder it becomesto adviseon policy. The reasonis twofold. At a time when practicalmeasures, not words, are essentialto curb aggression,we, your advisers, avoid action, legislation and practical proposals,becausewe are aftaid of public resentment,and prefer tirades on Philip's unjustifiableproceedings.Our audiencehere on the other hand is better equippedthan Philip to impart and listen to justifiable argument,yet againsthis presentcourse of action oflers complete inertia. The result is inevitable, I suppose,and perhaps right. We eachsucceedbest in the field of our greatestactivity and interest, Philip in the field of action, Athens in that of words. If you are still contentmerely to haveright on your side, there is no difficulty. It will cost you no exertion.But if means are to be takento improve the position,to preventa still further unsuspecteddeterioration,and the rise of a force against us which we cannot begin to match, then our old approachneeds to be entirely changed.There must be a movementon the part of speakers and audience alike towards effective practical measures,and away from the path of easeand complacency. First, then, if any feeling of confidenceexists in the face of Philip's present power and the extent of his influence, any belief that this representsno danger to Athens and does not constitute a generalmenaceto this country, I am astonished, and I want first to ask everyonehere to listen to a brief account of the reasoningwhich leadsme to take the oppositeview and regard Philip as our enemy. After that, you can adhere to zz8

[Grr]

PHILIPPIC II

whichever view you prefer, the forecast which I offer, or the policy of confidenceand trust in Macedon. My inferencesare these.What was the first gain made by Philip after the Peace? The control of Thermopylaeand Phocis.What use did he make of it? He preferredthe interestsof Thebes to thoseof Athens.' Why t It was his own advantageand the control of all Greece which was the aim of his calculations,not peaceand quiet, and certainly not justice. He realized quite rightly that he could offer no inducement to the city of Athens or to men of your characterwhich could tempt you to secureyour own benefit at the cost of the betrayalof other statesto him, that you would take thought for right and shun the dishonour such a course involves, that you would take all proper regard for the future and opposeany attempt of his of this sort as strongly as if you were at war with him. His view of Thebes, on the other hand, which was borne out by events, was that in return for their own advantagethey would leave him a clear field for the rest, and not merely refrain from interferenceor opposition,but join in hostilities,if he gavethe word. It is on the sameassumption that he is now giving assistanceto Messeneand Argos. This indeed is a high compliment to this country, which is judged on this basisto be the only one which would acceptno profit for herselfto betray the common interestsof Greece,no private satisfactionor gain in exchangefor the good will of the Greek states.This was a reasonableassumptionin your case,as the oppositewas in the caseof Argos and Thebes, in the light of presentand pasthistory alike.His observationand his researches tell him that a previousgenerationof Athenianshad the power to be rulers of the rest of Greeceon condition of being themselvessubservientto the King of Persia.Not merely did they refuseto toleratesuch an idea,on the occasionwhen Alexander, the ancestorof these kings of Macedon, came to offer terms,2 but preferred to evacuatetheir territory and face any fate, and ultimately achievedglories which are the envy and the despair of everyorator - and I will myself omit what is beyondwords to r. i.e. in destroying Phocis, which was at enmity with Thebes and friendly to Athens. z. i.e. in 48o n.c., after the battle of Salamis.

229

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express.He knows, too, that that generation in Thebes and Argos either joined forces with the invader or did nothing to resist him. Hence he realizesthat both thesestateswill pursue their own advantage without any regard for the common interestsof Greece.He thereforesupposedthat if he choseto turn to Athens, he would secure her friendship on terms consistentwith justice, but if he joined the others,he would be acquiring accomplicesin his own self-seeking.That is why he set, and will set, his choiceon them rather than on us. It is not that he can look to a stronger navy there than here, or that he has discovereda land power that enableshim to turn away from naviesand harbours.Nor has he forgotten the terms and the promiseswhich gainedthe peacefor him. PerhapsI shall be told, on supposedinside knowledge,that his motive was not one of self-interestor anything of the kind I have criticized, but simply that he thought Thebes had a better casethan Athens. This is the one argument which it is impossible for him to use. The man who orders Sparta to relinquish Messene, can hardly surrender Orchomenus and Coroneato Thebes and pretend that his motive was equity.s The only plea that remains to him is that he was under compulsion, that he acted against his own wishes, but found himself caught betweenthe Thessaliancavalryand the infantry of Thebes,and wasthereforeled to makeconcessions. Excellent. So we are told he is likely to be suspiciousof Thebes, and the story is going round that he intends to fortify Elatea.+This may be his intention, and an intention it will remain in my opinion. But there is no question of intention about his link with Argos and MesseneagainstSparta.sHe is sendingtroops and money now, and is expectedin person with a large force. 3. For Sparta to relinquish Messene would be division of territory anciently undivided; to incorporate Orchomenus and Coronea would mean creating a united Boeotia. Compare, however, Demosthenes, For Megalopolis, and fsocrates, Philip, 43. 4. Elatea was a town in Phocis, whose walls had been pulled down in 346. It commanded the road between Phocis and Thebes, and if its walls were restored could block a Theban move into Phocis. Similarly its capture by Philip in :99 opened for him the way to the south. 5. See back On the Peace, 18.

230'

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Is it to be supposedthat he is out to undermine Thebes' actual enemy, Sparta, and at the same time preserve his own victims in Phocist This is quite beyond belief. I scarcelyimagine that even if Philip had been compelled in the first instanceto act againsthis wishes,or if he were now set on abandoningThebes, he would be in constantoppositionto her enemies.To judge by his present course,his previous actions were obviously just as much a matter of policy, and a true estimate of them shows that every movement has been directed against Athens. Just consider. His aim is empire, and he seesAthens as the only obstacleto this aim. He has been in the wrong for a long time, as he is perfectly aware. It is his seizure of our possessions which has won him the safetyof his other gains.Had he given up Amphipolis and Potidaea, he would never, he imagines, have been safe at home. He fully realizesboth that his designs are aimed at Athens, and that Athens knows they are. He sees us as intelligent peoplewhosehatred of him is justified, and he is on tenterhooksfor fear of damagein the event of a move on our part, if he fails to anticipate it. This is why he is so much on the alert, so much on the spot, why he cultivates antiAthenian support from Thebesor his Peloponnesianadherents, whoseself-interest is expectedto make them favour the present, while their stupidity prevents them from foreseeingthe future. Yet on a sensibleview there are fairly obvious indicationsto be seen,which it fell to me to point out to Messeneand Argos.6 But perhaps it is as well that they should be indicated here again. 'With what resentment,'I said to Messenianrepresentatives, 'do you supposeOlynthus would have receivedany criticism of Philip in the period when he let them hold Anthemus, which every former king of Macedon laid claim to, when he presented them with Potidaeaand expelledits Athenian colonists,making himself responsible for our hostility while he had given them the benefits of possession? Do you supposethey foresaw their ultimate fate, or would have believed any prediction of it ? Yet,' I pointed out, 'after a short spell of prosperity at others' expensethey have had a long run of deprivation themselves; 6. i.e. on a missionof propagandaagainstPhilip. 23t

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they havebeenignominiouslyexpelled,not merelyoverwhelmed, but betrayedand sold by eachother. There is no safety for free statesin such over-familiarity with dictators. And what about ThessalyI' I went on. 'Do you supposethey imaginedthat the Philip who abolishedtheir tyrannies and presentedthem with Nicaea and MagnesiaTwas the man to impose their present partition, and that the leader who gave them their seat on the Amphictyonic Council would be likely to curtail their own revenues? Of course not. Yet this is what happenedand is there for all to see.And you yourselves,'I warned them, 'as you observePhilip's presentsand promises,should pray, if you are wise, that you may not come to see him as a liar and a deceiver.There are numerous contrivancesfor the safety and protection of states, there are palisades,fortifications, field works and the rest. They are all the work of men's hands,and a drain on wealth.There is one safeguardalonewhich is afforded by the nature of human wisdom, and brings safetyand protection to all. What is this I Distrust. Keep it secureand clasp it to your hearts.For its preservationis your defenceagainstall harm. What,'I askedthem,'is your greatestdesirel Freedom? Then is it not obvious that Philip's very titles are diametrically opposedto it ? Every king and every tyrant is an enemy to freedom and an opponent of law. Take good care that in your eagerness to avoid war you do not acquire a despot.' They heardmy speechand applaudedit, as well as a number of other speeches from representatives, both in my presenceand, apparently,afterwards.But they are no more inclined to resist Philip's offer of friendship and his promises.Indeed, it is not surprising that Messenian and Peloponnesianstates should abandonin practicewhat reasontells them is in their interest. You are Athenians, who have your own intelligence besides the warnings of speakersto convinceyou that you are the victims of deceptionand strategy,that inactivity now will betray you into disaster.So true it is that immediateeaseand complacency 7. Magnesia: a district of Thessaly, not to be confused with either of the two well-known towns of the same name in Asia Minor. The translation (' partition ') neglects a reading (.6erca6apXiay- government by a board of ten) which is not precisely accountable, and may be wrong. See back on OI. I zz.

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presenta stronger inducement than thoughts of future advantage. Our best course for the future is a thing you will discuss further by yourselves,if you are wise. But the reply that will provide your best immediate decision, I will now suggestto you. (Th,ereply is read) It would be right, gentlemen,to call in evidencethe bearersof Philip's promises which induced you to accept the Peace.I rnyselfwould never have agreedto serveon the delegation,and I am quite sure your countrymenwould never have put an end to the war, if they had supposedPhilip would act as he did after securing peace. There was a wide discrepancyberween his rvord and his actions.There is also a secondclassof witnesses we should call. Who are these? The party who after the Peace and my return from the second delegationsent to ratif-y it, rvhen I rcalizedhow Athens had been misled and was loud in denunciationof the betrayalof Thermopylae and Phocis,then declaredthat I was a man who drank water instead of wine,B bound to be awkward and difficult, whereasPhilip, once past Thermopylae,would do everythingwe wanted,fortify Thespiae and Plataea,check Theban misdemeanours, dig a canal through the Chersoneseat his own expense,and grant us Euboea and Oropus in exchangefor Amphipolis. These were all statements made on the platform, as I am sure you remember,reluctant though you are to recall your own injuries. The most shameful thing of all was that in your optimism you voted that the same terms should be binding on a future generation.To such a degree was this country led astray. Why do I choose this moment to introduce this fact and demand testimony of it ? I rvill tell you the absolutelycandid truth without concealment. I have no wish to embark on abuseand acquire notoriefy in this assemblyat the price of giving my original opponents fresh scope for earning their fee from the enemy.eNor is it idle talk. No, it seemsto me that this country will have greater 8. See Demosthenes,De Fals . Leg., 46. 9. i.e. for their services in replying.

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causeto regret Philip than it has now. This is the thin end of the wedge.I hope my guessis wrong, but I am afraid we are alreadyregrettablycloseto the point of danger.When, therefore, it is no longeropen to you to disregardthe trend of events,when it is no longer a matter of hearing from me or someoneelseof the perils of Athens, but they are there for all to seeand know, I suspectthat you may incline to be angry and violent. I fear that membersof that delegationmay fail to reveal the corrupt practicesof which they are themselvesconscious,and then any attempt to set right what has been their responsibilitymay be visited by recrimination on your parr. For I realizethat there are often critics who vent their antagonism, not on those responsible,but on the nearestvictims. So while we are faced by a period of hesitationand delay,and listening ro speeches,I want to remind everyone of you, howeverwell he may know it, who it waswho urged the abandonmentof Phocisand Thermopylae, the command of which set Philip on the road to Attica and the Peloponnese,and made the issuesbefore this assembly not those of abstractjustice and of foreign affairs,,but of our own safetyand of war on Attic soil, which will bring misery to each of us when it comes,and is indeed upon us today. Had this country not been led astray, there would have been no problem. Philip would have securedno naval successor penetrated into Attica, nor passedThermopylaeanclPhocisby land. Either he would have kept to his legal rights, and adheredto the terms of peaceand remainedinactive, or else he would at once have been involved in a similar war to that which made him then desire peace.I have said enough to give a reminder. That this reminder should be put to the ultimate test, I pray may be avoided.I have no wish that anyone'spenalty, however deserved,should be exacted at the price of the peril of the community.

['-6.1 DEMOSTHENES: ON THE CHE,RSONESE

Oun situation,gentlemen,ought to ensurethat speakersdiscard all bias for or againstany party, and eachurge merely the view he regardsas soundest,particularly in a debateon public issues of the highest importance. But as some speechesare inspired by the spirit of competition,or other motivesof whateverkind, membersof this assemblyin generalshould set everythingelse aside,and vote and act as the national interest demands.The subjectof greatestconcernis the position in the Chersoneseand the campaign which Philip has now been conducting for ten months in Thrace. But most of the speechesdeal with the activitiesand intentions of Diopeithes.IAs regardsany accusations againstmembersof this force, who can be legally brought to book at any time, I regard this as open either now or later, and there is no need for me or anyoneelseto make statements about it. But it is Philip's hostility to this country, his presence in the neighbourhoodof the Hellespont with a considerable force, and his attempts to gain advantagesat our expense (advantageswhich we shall lose the chanceto recoverif we are too late) that is the subject, in my view, which requires instant discussionand action, and which must not be sidetrackedby irrelevant disputesand accusations. I am often surprisedat the choiceof topics in this assembly, but one of the most astonishingwas the claim I heard made a few daysago, that the dury of a statesmanwas to make a clearcut choiceeither of war or peace.But the fact is this. If Philip's proceedingsare peaceable,if he is not in possessionof our property in contraventionof the peace,if he is not engagedin wholesalepropagandaagainst us, then there is nothing to be said. We should maintain peace,and it is clear that Athenians are quite ready to do so. But if the terms of peaceto which we are sworn lie before us in black and white, and it has been manifest from the very beginning, before the expedition of

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responsibilityfor war, that Philip haswithout justificationappropriated a number of our possessions, which are the subject of resolutionsof protest passedby this assembly,that he has been continually guilty of depredationsfrom other Greek and foreign statesand of anti-Athenian activity, then what is the meaning of talk about clear distinction between war and peace? We haveno choice.We are left with the one most just and unavoidable course, which speakerslike this deliberately overlook. What is that ? Resistanceto aggression.Unless it is meant that if Philip holds off Attica and the Peiraeus,no wrong is being done, no act of war committed. If this is the boundarywhereby rights are laid down and peacedefined, it is universally clear how wrong, how intolerable,how dangerousan idea this is. At the sametime it standsin direct opposition to the accusations made againstDiopeithes. What is the logic of giving Philip a free hand outsideAttica, and refusingDiopeithesevenassistance to Thrace on pain of calling it an act of war I Or it is admitted that the casehere is disproved,but the action of the mercenary army in ravaging the district of the Hellespont, and of Diopeithesin imposing dues, was still unjustifiableand ought not to be tblerated.Very well. I won't dispute it. But I do think that if this opinion is really given in all good faith, the demand to disbandthe existini4force of Athens, which is sustainedby propagandaagainstits commanderand his provision of supplies, ought to be balancedby a proof that Philip's armamentswill be disbanded,if it is allowed. Otherwise it amounts,it should be observed, to a return for Athens to the position which proved so disastrousbefore. You are fully aware that nothing has done more to make Philip's successespossible than his commandof the initiative. With his standing army on the spot and his anticipationof his aims, he can attack where he likes in a moment. We have to get our information, and it is not till then that agitationand preparationbegin. The result is that he achieveshis objectswithout trouble, while we are too late and find that our expensehas been wasted.We presenta display of hostility and the desireto obstruct him, but we have the added senseof failure to act in time. It must not escapeyou, then, that now at this very time all 46

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elseis empty words and mere pretence,but this aim is real and is actually being put into operation,the aim that Athens shall remain inactive at home and undefendedabroad, while Philip secureshis every object without hindrance. Look first at the present.At this moment he has a considerableforce in waiting in Thrace, besidessending for large reinforcementsaccording to opinion there. Supposehe waits for the winds and then moves againstByzantium, first of all, do you imagine that the same absurd attitude will prevail in Byzantium as before, and that they will not expecteither to call us in or to maintain their own defence? Not they. They will introduce even troops they mistrust more than ours rather than surrender to Philip, unless he can steal a march on them. Then, if we cannot sail a force out, and there is none in readinessout there, there will be nothing between them and disaster.It may be that they are insanely improvident. All the same they must be preserved, becauseit is in the interest of Athens. Again, it is not certain To judge by the despatch that he will not attackthe Chersonese. sent to this country, he intends operationsagainstthe district. In that case,if a standing force is in existence,it can either operatein defenceof the district or in attackon the Macedonian position. But once it is disbanded,what can we do in face of I File a suit against Diopeithes! an attack on the Chersonese What good would that do ? Is it suggestedthat we should send 'Well,' an expeditionfrom here? Supposethe windsz prevent it. I am told,'it won't happen.'Who will give a guaranteeof that? Do you gentlemenrcalizeand reflect upon the time of year that is approaching,during which it is thought reasonableto leave the Chersoneseundefendedand hand it to Philip ? Then again, supposehe leavesThrace without moving againstthe Chersonese or Byzantium - you must reckon with this possibility too - and advanceson Chalcis and Megara in the same way as he did previously against Oreus,srvhich is our best policy then ? To I,3t. z. SeePhilippic 3. Chalcis and Oreus in Euboea had been among towns which were the object of Philip's intrigues, which distracted Athenian attention from activity in defence of Olynthus. See sectional introduction to Demosthenes (t), p. r7r. There was similar activity in connexion with Megara at the same time. See also 36 below, and Philippic III, tz, 17,27,74.

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defendourselvesagainsthim here and allow the war to come to Attica, or to create a diversion for him at homeI Surely the latter. We should all realize this, reckon with it and reverse our judgement,and insteadof depreciatingand seekingto disband the force Diopeithes is trying to raise for Athens, we should make a spontaneouseffort to add our own force to his, to help his financial stability and co-operatereadily in other activities. If Philip were askedwhether he would prefer that the rroops under Diopeithes,poor though they may admittedly be, should be in good trim and in good standingin Athens, and should be increasedby the collaborationof the state,or be decimatedand ruined by disparagementand accusation,his answer, surely, would be the latter. So Philip's most heartfelt prayersare being granted by the actions of some of us. If so, you cannot have far to seekfor the causeof Athenian disasters. I now wish to makea candid appraisalof the presentsituation of the country and our activitiesand our conduct of affairs.We are not willing to pay money contributions, not prepared to servein the forces,unable to keep from public spending.aWe refuse either to grant Diopeithes the League'sassessments or to approvehis own financial arrangements.We merely run him down and ask how and when he is going to act, and so on. And holding the attitude we do, we do not even cafty out our own duties. In debate we applaud eulogieson Athenian prestige, while in practice we assist the opposite view. Periodically speakersare askedthe question,what policy ought to be adopted. My question of members of the Assembly is what language ought to be adopted.If everythingalike, contributions,service, spendingrestrictions,the assessment, Diopeithes' financesand citizendutiesare to be refused.thereis nothinEleft to sav.When it comesto a free hand for adverseprop"guida, to th; extent that even his supposedintentions are condemnedin advance amid public agreement,what can one sayI 4. i.e. the Theoric Fund, on which seeOll,pll1iacI, rgand note. 5. The Greek word is used elsewhere in Demosthenes of the contributions of the allies under the second Delian League, and it seemsto be set in contrast to what Diopeithes raised unofficially.

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What this policy amounts to is a thing some membersneed to realize.I shall give a candid accountof it. There is no other alternative.Every commanderwho has ever led an expedition from Athens - I will stake anything on this - exrractsmoney from Chios or Erythrde or anywhere he can on the Asiatic seaboard.It is exactedin different amounts according to the scaleof the expedition.Whatever the amount, statesthat grant it are not so insaneas to do so for nothing. They buy immunity for their traders, safe conduct, exemption from harbour dues and so on, under the headingof goodwill, rvhich is the word used to cover these exactions.It is the same in the case of Diopeithes.He hasan army, so obviouslyhe will be paid by all thesepeople.Where elsecan it be supposedthat troopscan be financedfrom, by a commanderwho gets nothing from Athens and hasno resourcesof his own to provide pay ? From the sky ? No, he subsistson lvhat he can collect, beg or borrorv. So all that is achievedby his accusershere is a generalwarning nor to give him anything, becausehe will be punished for his mere intentions, without referenceto any activity or exaction.What is assertedis that he is intending a siege,or that he is betraying Greek citizens. Is anyone so interestedin the Asiatic Greeks? If so, they evidently take better care of othersthan of their own country. The proposal to send a second commander to the Hellespont amounts to just this. If Diopeithes is acting unjustifiably and exactingdues,it needsno rnorethan the shortest of despatchesto prevent it. The law allows for indictment of such offenders,not for an expensiveexpedition with triremes to keep watch on them ourselves,which is sheermadness.It is againstour enemies,who are not touched by law, that we can and must maintain troops, despatchtriremes and contribute money,while againstourselveswe employ decreesor indictment or the official warship.6This is the method of sensibledealing, the other, now in vogue, of ruinous perversity.That examples of such an attitude should appearhere is bad, but not the worst. You yourselves,members of this assembly,adopt an attitude which meansthat speakershave only to declarethat Diopeithes 6. This ship, called the Paralus, was sent to bring back criminals from Athens.

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is the causeof all our ills - or Charesor Aristophonzor anyone members may mention, and there is a clamour of agreement. But if you are truthfully told, 'Nonsense,gentlemen,all our failures and troubles are due to Philip. If he were inactive, we shouldhavenone,'yor cannotdisputethe truth of the statement, but you appearresentfuland you feel deprived.The reasonis and I urge you most strongly that I must be allowedfreedomto say rvhat I want in defenceof our best interests- the reasonis this. A certain sectionof the nation has renderedthis assembly intimidating and intractablein debate,but in military preparation inert and contemptible.Consequently,if a culprit is named lvhom you know you will have power to indict, you agreeand acquiesce.But if it is one whose punishment depends on armed power alone,you have no answer,and are annoyedthat your position is exposed.The exact opposite ought to be the case.In political life it is in debate that a kindly forbearance should be shown. There you are dealing with yourseh'esand your allies.But military preparationis the field in which to inspire fear or stubbornness,where the issue lies between you and your enemiesand opponents.But the processof popular oratory, with its excessiveingratiation, has brought a spirit of self-satisfactionand complacencyin debate,where we are told nothing but what we want to hear, while the active world of public affairs has brought us to the extreme of peril. Imagine some of the Greek states whose interest our passiviry has neglected,demandingan accountof our activities.'Gentlemen of Athens,' they might say, 'you are alwayssendingus manifestosto the effectthat Philip hasdesignsagainstus and the rest of Greece,and is a person to guard against,and so forth.' We should have to agree.That eswhat we do. 'Then you are the most contemptible of supporters. Philip has been kept away for ten months by war or illness or winter, and cut off from home, and you have done nothing either to liberate Euboeaor He has been active,while you to recoveryour own possessions. were at home in idleness,though in perfect health (if such an 7. Chares, a vigorous Athenian admiral, first became noteworthy itt 352 by his capture of Sestos.He was supported by Aristophon, the orator, in a charge of bribery against his colleagues in the Social War in 355. 240

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attitude of mind can be called healthy), he has establishedtwo tyrants in Euboea,sone to provide a fortified post againstAttica, the other againstSciathus,while you have made no attempt to abolish these,if nothing else,but have simply acquiesced.You have obviously stood aside for him and made it perfectly clear that evenif he dies ten times over, you will never stir a muscle. In that casewhy bother us with delegationsand accusations I' What answershall we give to that, gentlemenI I seenone at all. Now there are certain people who think they can refute a speakerby the question,'What is our right courseI' I will give them the best answer both in justice and in truth, when I reply, 'Not your presentone.'However, I will speakin further detail. And I urge such claimantsto be preparedto act on the reply with as much vigour as they ask the question.First, then, my recommendationis that you take full cognizanceof the fact that Philip is at war with this country, that he has broken the peace- you may as well put an end to recrimination on this point - that he is an ill-wisher and an enemy to our whole city, to the ground on which it stands,and to every man in it, even those individuals who most imagine they gratify him. Look at Euthycrates and Lasthenes of Olynthus, who appeared his firmest friends when they betrayed their country to him, but cameto the worst end of all. This free country is the supreme object of his enmity and his designs,and its destruction is his dearestwish. This is not unnatural. He knows very well that even with complete control of all the rest he can have no security while democracy remains in Athens, that in the event of a single setback,which can often occur in human affairs, every element under the sway of force will come to Athens for refuge.You who are her peopleare not a peoplenaturally given to the selfishpursuit of power, but strong to prevent it in others or wrest it from them, a thorn in the flesh of despotism,and willing championsfor the liberation of mankind, Therefore he doesnot by any meansdesirethe freedom of Athens to mount guard over his interests.Nor is he guilty of false or careless thinking. Our first needis to assumethat he is an irreconcilable 8. See 18 above. The tyrants here referred to are the tyrants of Eretria and Oreus.

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enemy to free and democraticinstitutions. If we are not convinced in our hearts of this, we shall not be prepared to take action on it in reality. Secondly,we must clearly understand that his every practice and manipulation is a design upon this country, that every act of defenceagainsthim is a defenceof this country. No one is naive enough to supposethat dismal holesin Thrace- what elsecould onecall them ?- like Drongilus and Cabyleand Masteira,which he is now engagedin reducing, form an attraction whosecaptureis worth the effort, the winter campaignsand the hardships which he undergoes,while the harbours and dockyards and warships of Athens, her silver works and her income, are nothing to him; and that he will leave all this to us, while he winters in the trenchesto secure the millet and spelt in Thracian grain-pits.Of coursenot. That and everything else is aimed at the control of what is ours. What then is the reaction of sensiblepeopleI To realize this and make up our minds to it, and to abandon our excessive, our irreparableinactivity, to contribute funds and expect our allies to do the same, to ensure in actual practice that this standing army remains in being, so that his force, which is held in readinessfor the injury and enslavementof all Greece, may be countered by ours in equal readinessto preserveand assisther at every turn. Emergencyarmamentsnever succeed. It is essentialto organizea force and provision it, to appoint commissariatand subsidiarystaff who can take whateversteps are possible for accurate financial organization, and to exact responsibility for the finances from them, and for the action from the commander.If you do so, if you are really preparedto do so, you will compel Philip to maintain peacewith justice and to keepto his own territory, which would be an inestimable benefit,or elseyou will meet him in warfare on equal terms. If this appearsto anyoneto be a matter of great expenseand considerablelabour and perseverance,he is entirely right. But let him reflect on the future of Athens without it, and he will seethe benefit of a ready acceptanceof the way of duty. If there exists some divine guarantee - no human one could give sufficient security - that inactivity and general drift will not be followed eventually by a Macedonian attack on Athens itself, I 242

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most solemnlydeclarethat it is a disgraceand dishonourto our people,their traditions and the achievementsof the past, to let our personalinertia betray and enslavethe peoplesof Greece. I myself would rather forfeit life than so much as speakof it. Yet if there is anyonewho doesadvocatesuch conduit and can persuadeyou to it, so be it, abandonresistanceand let all our greatnessgo. But if there is not, if, on the contrary, every man of us can tell that the more we allow Philip to control, the more intractableand the stronger we shall find him, then why hold back,wlry wait ? When shall we be ready to do what is required of us ? I suppose,when necessitycompels us. What free men would call necessityis not merely upon us now, it is long past. And the necessityof slaveswe must hope may not come to us. What is the difference? The free man's greatestnecessityis his shameat what takes place around him. Greater than that probably doesnot exist. The slave'snecessityis the whip, and physical torture, which I hope may be as remote from our experienceas it is intolerablein imagination. I should have been glad to enlargeon the whole subject and demonstratethe way in which certain people are pursuing the political ruin of the country. But I will omit the bulk of it. When, however,the questionof relationswith Philip arises,the cry is at once heard of the benefits of peace and the difficulry of maintaining a large force. 'The revenuesare being plundered,' we are told, with arguments calculated to produce delays at home and freedomof action for Philip. In consequence we gain leisureand inaction, rvhich I fear you may think has been won at great cost, and our objectors win the resulting popularity and profit. In my view, first it is not in our competenceto urge peace.Here we sit, convincedalready.It is in that of the author of acts of war. Once he is convincedof it, your agreementis secured.Secondly,.whatwe ought to find intolerableis not the necessarymeasuresfor protection, but the results of failure to take them, and the plunder of the revenuesshould be halted by the provisionof a safeguardto preservethem, not by abstaining from the duty of a citizen. NonethelessI also feel resentment that such concernis felt at plunder of the revenues,when it is in your own power to preservethem and punish malversation, 243

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while none is arousedat Philip's wholesaleplundering of all Greece,which is done at your expense. What is the reason,then, why a leaderwho is openly in arms in contraventionof right, and seizingtowns, is never stated to be at war, while statesmenwho urge that he should not be given liberty to do so are accusedof making war I I will give it you. The object is that the resentmentwhich Athenian citizens are likely to feel,if they areinjured by the war, may be turned against speakerswhose desire is for her good, to causeindictment of them insteadof resistanceto Philip, while the culprits stand as accusersinsteadof submitting to justice. This is what is meant by their statementthat there is a party in the Assemblywhich wants war, and that this is the subject of their counter-claim. But I am fully aware that without any proposal of war from an Athenian citizen Philip holds numerousother possessions of ours, and has just sent an expedition to Cardia. Yet, if we are anxiousto pretend that he is not atwar,,he must be the greatest fool in the world, if he provesit untrue. What shall we saywhen he actuallyattacksus I He will sayhe is not at war, ashe declared to Oreus,when his men were actuallyin her territory, or earlier to Pherae,srvhenhe was engagedin an attack on their walls, or to Olynthus in the first place, until his army was there on Olynthian soil. Shall we go on even then with our claim that the policy of resistanceto him is a policy of war ? The only other policy is slavery. There is no other alternative,if selfdefenceand peaceare both denied us. Indeed the issueis not the same for us as it is for others. It is not the reduction of Athens that he desires,but its total destruction.He knows we shallrefuseslavery,and evenif we acceptit we shall be incapable of it becausewe are accustomedto supremacy, whereas we shall have greater power than anyone to causehim trouble, if we have the chance. We must take it that the ultimate issuesof our destiny are at stake,that men who have sold themselvesto Macedon deserve of us every degreeof hatred and of violence.It is impossibleto overcomeour enemiesoutside the state, till we have exacted 9. Pherae was the Thessalian city whose tyrants included Jason (see Isocrates, Philip, rrg, p. r6r).

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punishment from those who are here among us. What do you supposeis the reasonof his insolenceto us (I can call it nothing else),the reasonwhy he treats other stateswith consideration, even if it ends in deceit,while to us he offers plain threats? In 'for the case of Thessaly, instance,his many friendly actions ended by betraying them into their present enslavement.The miseriesinto which Olynthus was deludedafter being presented with Potidaeaand a good deal more, are beyond description. IVow Thebes is being led astray by being accordedthe control of Boeotia'oand freed of a troublesomervar.Thel' haveall been offered a bait for their personalsatisfaction,and have suflered a {ate which is cornmonknowledge,or will be faced with it in cluecourse.In our instanceI say nothing of lossesin the lvar, but in the actualcourseof the peaceconsiderthe extent to which we have been hoodwinked and deprived. Think of Phocis, Thermopylae,Thrace, Doriscus, Serrium, even Cersobleptes.rr Why did Philip choose one treatment for the others and a different one for ourselvesI Becausethis is the only state in rvhich licence is given to speak on his behalf, in which it is safeto acceptbribes from him and still addressyou, even after your many cleprivations.It would havebeen unsafein Olynthus to speakon Fhilip's behalf exceptwhen the bulk of the population had enjoyedthe benefitsof the possessionof Potidaea.It would have been unsafein Thessaly,exceptwhen the majority had enjoyedthe benefitof Philip's expulsionof the tyrants and his arvardof membershipof the Council.', It would have been unsafein Thebes, until he handedover Boeotiaand destroyed Phocis.But at Athens, despitePhilip's rape of Amphipolis and Cardia, despite the armed strong point he has established against her in Euboea, despite his immediate move against ro. See Isocrates,Philip,43, note 7, etc. rr. See sectional introduction. These are instances of Athenian setbacks due to dilatory methods, after the Peace of Philocrates. The position of cersobleptes at that time is not clear. His loyalty to Athens had never been dependable, and whether his reduction to a vassal state of Macedon in 346 could have been prevented does not seem certain. rz. The tyrants of Pherae are meant. on the Ampbictyonic council see Isocrates, Philip, 74, and note there. Also sectional introduction to this speech.

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Byzantium, it is still safe to speakfor Philip. Some who have doneso haverisen from povertyto riches,from remoteobscurity to fame and reputation, while this country herself has turned honour into dishonour and wealth into bankruptcy. For I maintain that a city's wealth lies in its allies,its credit, its good will, of all of which we are bankrupt. As a result of our feckless disregardof all theseit is he who wins the envy, respectand fear of Greek and non-Greek alike, while Athens is deprived and humiliated, outstandingin all that monev will buy, but, in the proper realm of wealth, contemptible. And some speakers,I notice, hardly adopt the same attitude towards fellow-citizens They urge you to rest inactive,even at as towardsthemselves.ts the cost of injury. But they are unable to acceptinaction themselves,though far from sufferinginjury. Then I am told by the next speaker,'You won't take the risk of positiveproposals,you haven'tthe courageto stand up to it.' A daredevilwithout shameor principle I sincerelyhope I am not, but I credit myself with greatercouragein this assembly than many of our action-party politicians. Gentlemen,when a man carrieson the processof judgements,confiscations,grants, indictments,without an eye to the probablebenefitof the country, suchaction is not a displayof courage.He holds a guarantee of indemnity in the popularity he securesby his politics and his expressionof them. He can be violent without danger.But the genuine pursuit of good policy, which may oppose the general desire, which involves no quest for popularity, but always for the highest ends, yet holds itself responsiblefor both, that is where real couragelies. This is the true citizen of his country, not the gentlemenwho will forfeit the highest interestsof the state for the sakeof a momentary popularity. So far am I from any admiration of such peopleor any belief in their worth as Athenians that if I r,vereaskedthe question what benefit I had ever conferred on the country, I would forgo the many claims I could make, from the financing of triremes and theatrical products, the furnishing of money for revenuesor ransom, and other acts of public spirit, in favour of the statementthat I pursueno such policy as that. I could do r3. i.e. they areactivesupportersof Philip. 246

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as others do, I could bring accusations,court popularity, secure confiscationsand the rest, but I have never lent myself to any such pursuits, nor been led to them by profit or ambition. I have persistedin a policy which has lessenedmy standing in the public eye, but would raisethat of the stateitself. So much I can perhapssay without offence.And I do not regard it as consistentwith true citizenship to seek a policy which might lead me straight to the highest place in the state, while it brought her to the lowest among her neighbours. The state should grow to successwith the wisdom of her best citizens, while all uphold the highest,not the easiestends. This will be the path of Nature herself, and along this path the words of true statesmanship should lead. I have even heard this said, that my speechesare indeed always admirable, but I offer nothing but words, while what the country needsis positiveaction. I will statemy position on this without reservation.I did not considerthat the statesmanis called upon for any action except the advocacyof good policy. The truth of this can easily be demonstrated.You know, no doubt, that Timotheus,Iaof recentfame, madean oration in this assembly,urging us to arms to saveEuboea from enslavement by Thebes. Words were his meansof expression,and to this effect. 'Are you holding a debate,when Theban ffoops are in Euboea,wondering how to deal with them, and what action to take? Will not your action be to fill the seawith your warships, to rise and march to the Peiraeus,to get the troopshipsafloat?' Timotheus producedthe words, and the citizensof Athens the actions. Both took part in the completed achievement.If he had spokento the greatestpossibleeffect, as he did, and they had been inert and unresponsive,nothing of what Athens achievedon that occasioncould havetaken place.It is the same now, in regardto the words which I or anyoneelseutters. The actionsmust be expectedfrom yourselves,the right policy, and the knowledgeto urge it from the speakers. Before I sit down, let me summarizemy position. I contend 14. Timotheus, son of Conon, a leader in establishing the second Athenian League. This episode belongs to 357, when Thebes was trying to secure power in Euboea. Demosthenes had himself served on that occasion.

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that money must be raised, our existing force maintainedand any faulty details rectified, but without injury to the whole on the scoreof chanceaccusations. We should sendrepresentatives to all statesfor information, exhortation and action. At the same time corruption in the state's affairs should be punished and universally condemned,to make it possible for moderatesof proved integrity to have the wisdom of their ideasapproved to themselvesand others. Pursue this policy and put an end to generalneglect,and perhaps,perhapsthere might be a change for the better. But if you merely sit in this assemblyand let valour go no further than shouting and applause,while you shrink from necessaryaction, I seeno suggestionwhich without the performanceof duty can ever savethis country.

It-:] D E M O S T H E N E S :P H I L I P P I C I I I In Philippic III thereare several passageswhich do not appear in the text of the best manuscripts, but in the margin only. It is uncertain whether they indicate an alternative version ofthe speech or are later additions to it. All these passagescan be cut without damage to the sense,and most, but perhaps not all, weaken rather than strengthen the urgency of a fine piece of oratory. But they are included here, because the additions, if they are not genuine, are at least early, and may actually have been in Demosthenes' text. These passagesare marked with the symbol [ ].

A NunasnR of speecheshave been delivered, gentlemen, at almost every meeting, about Philip's proceedingssince the peace,and his illegal actionsnot only againstthis country, but againstothers.And everyonewould join, if they are not already doing so, in the statement that words and action are alike neededto put an end to his unjustifiable conduct and inflict penalties.But, as I seeit, the whole situation has beentaken so far and left so uncontrolled, that, unpleasantas it may be to sayso, I fear it is true that, had everyspeechand every proposal been aimed to securethe worst possible result for Athens, it could not have been arranged to less advantage.This may perhaps be assignedto a variety of causes.It is more than a few isolatedreasonsthat have brought things to this pass.In particular a proper investigationwill show that it is due to a preferencefor popular over true values among speakers,in some casesto the protection by individuals of their own fields of distinction and power to the exclusion of forethought, fwhich they prefer the country to avoid.] In other casesunjustified attacksare made on responsibleofficials,which results merely in Athens penalizing herself and being occupied in doing so, while Philip has a free hand to do what he likes. This sort of governmentis in our bones,but it is also the causeof our troubles. And I do ask you, gentlemen,not to looseyour anger on me at the truth which my candour may reveal.Look at it in this way. Free speakingis something which in most fields is so generally expected in Athens, that it is allowed to foreigners and slaves, and one can often find servants here 249

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speaking their mind with more licence than citizens in some other countries.But in politicsit hasbeencompletelyextirpated. The consequence is complacencyand flattery in this assembly, where gratification is all we are offered, while in the actual world of affairs we are driven to desperatedanger.Now if this attirude persists,I haveno more to say.But if you are prepared to listen to sound policy without wishful thinking, I am ready to offer it. However desperatea condition affairsare in, whatever opportunities have been wasted, it is still possible,given the will to do our duty, to remedy it. One thing I can say, which may seemcontradictorybut it is true. The worst featureof the past is the best basisfor future hope.'What featureI The fact that it is complete and total dereliction of dury on our part which has brought us to this position. If it followed a period of exemplaryconduct by the peopleof Athens, there would be no hope of improvement.But in fact it is the neglectand inertia of Athens which Philip has worsted.She has'not beendefeated. She has never stirred a finger. [If it were universally admitted that Philip is at war with Athens and has contravenedthe terms of peace,the only course for speakersto urge or advise would be to take the easiestand most certain method of defenceagainsthim. But as the strange attitude existswhich, despitehis action in capturing towns, in holding Athenian possessions and in wholesaleunwarrantable conduct, yet toleratesfrequent statementsat meetingsof the Assemblythat it is a sectionof this country which is responsible for the war, it is necessaryto take precautionsand correct this position.The dangerexiststhat proposalsand recommendations of defencemay lead to an accusationof provoking war.r . . . ] If, then, it is open to this country to remain at peace,and this alternativeis in our power (to begin at this point) then I maintain that we should so do, and the author of such a proposal should promote legislationand act in this sensewithout deception. But if someoneelse is under arms, if there is someone elsewith a strong force at his command.whooffersthe pretence of peace to this country, while his actions are those of war, what is left us but resistanceto him t If a pretence of peaceis r. A further sentence is omitted bv the Oxford text.

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what you want, as he does,I will not arguewith you. But any idea that peaceis a situation in which Philip holds the resr of the Greek world with the intention of proceedingagainstAthens is first of all insaneand secondlymeanspeaceenjoyed by philip and not by Athens. And this is the situation purchasedwith all the money he has spent, the situation in which he makesrvar on Athens, but not Athens on him. Indeed,if we are goingto wait for the momentwhen he admits he is at war, we must be the greatestoptimists in existence.If he marcheson Attica or the Peiraeus,he will never make such an admission,to judge by his rrearmentof others. When he was forty stad,es from Olynthus, he proclaimed to her people the alternativethat either they must abandon olynthus or he Macedonia,when up till then any such accusationagainsthim had been greetedwith indignation and protesrationsof innocence.Again he marched to Phocis ostensiblyas to an allied power, and Phocianrepresentatives joined the march, while the majority here contended that his advance through the pass would do no good to Thebes.zYet again there wal the cas^e of Pheraethe other day. Philip enteredThessalyin the guiseof a friend and ally, and seizedPherae,which he now holds. The last instanceis that of the unfortunate city of Oreus.: Philip stated that he had sent his force as a benevolentmeasureof surveillance.He had heard that thel'were in a stateof trouble and dissension,and it was a mattei of genuine friendship on the part of an ally to assistat such a time. Can we then suppose that in the case of people who would never have taken the offensiveagainsthim, but defensivemeasuresat the most, he preferred deceptionto open force, and yet in ours he is likely to make an open declaration of war, particularly while we continue to invite deceptionI It is unthinkable. It would be unparalleled folly on his part if without any complaint from his victims, but an actual tendencyto blame somebf our own number, he were to dissolveinternal differencesand rivalries z' rn 946. Though Philip never agreed to any mercy towards her, phocis apparently expected it, even when Philip passed Thermopylae. 3. on oreus see the speech on the chersonese,and sectional introduction to this speech,p. 2zr.

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of ours and warn us againsthimself,and removeall pretext for his employeesro mislead us with the argument thai he is not at war. But I ask you, could anyonein his sensesjudge of war and peaceon a basisof words and not of actionsI of course not. Very well, then, from the first days after the signing of peace,a -of before the appointment of Diopeithes or the despatch the force now in the Chersonese, Philip was engagedin the caprure of Serrium and Doriscus, and the expulsion of the garrison placed by the Athenian commanderin serrium and the sacred Mount.s What did this action amounr to ? Peacehad been his sworn undertaking.Don't say, 'What cioesthat matterl, or 'How does that affectus?'Whether tlris was a minor marrer or one which did not concernus is perhapsa different question. But right and justice, be the breachof them small or great, are one and the same.Think of the Chersorrese, agreedas ours by Persia and all the Greek states.6when he sendsa force there and admits to running an expedition and gives orders for it, what is he doing I He assertsthat he is not at war. But I cannot for a moment agreethat such actionson his part are in accordance with the peacemade with Athens. tr declarethat even in interferencewith Megara, in the manipulation of a tyranny in Euboea,in his recent movementinto Thrace and his intrigues againstthe positionin the Peloponnese,T in all the designswhich his power activates,he is breakingthe peaceand is at war with Athens - unless you are prepared to say that to erect siege artillery is a peacefuloccupation,until it is set in action against the walls. No, no. A man whose actions and calculationsare designedfor my capture, is at war with me before he ever dischargesa weapon.What eventsare there whose occurrence would be a danger to this country ? The alienation of the Hellespont,the control of Megaraand Euboeaby an enemy,or 4. strictly speakingthese attacks of Philip's did not occur afrer the signing of peace, but during the negotiations for it, a period, however, during which he had undertaken not to attack the Chersonese. But he took characteristic advantage of sorhe uncertainty as to what was included in the Chersonese. 5. These were places in Thrace, but hardly in the Chersonese itself. 6. This statement is not supported by any known authority. 18 (Megara! 36 (Euboea), etc. 7. See On the Chersonese, 252

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a tendencyin the Peloponneseto side with Philip. This is the artillery aimed against Athens, and how can the man who erectsit be said to be at peace? The day of his destructionof Phocis is the day I lay down as the first of his war against Athens. Defend yourselvesagainst him, and I say you will show your good sense.Leave him alone,and you will be unable to do so when you want to. I am so far removedfrom your other advisers,gentlemen,that I do not advocateconsiderationof the Chersoneseand Byzantium. I advocateassistanceand prevention of harm to them, [and a vote of all necessaries to the troops now there]. Your deliberationsshould be about all the Greek states.They are in dire danger.But I want to make clear to you the causeof these fears about the present, to enable you, if I am right, to share my reasoningand exercisesome forethought for yourselves,if for no one else,and if you think it is nonsenseand moonshine)never again credit me with a singlesound idea. Philip's rise to power from small and humble beginnings,the distrust and division within the Greek states,the fact that such a rise on his part was much more extraordinarythen than the control of all the rest would be now that he hasso much already, and all elseof this kind which I could enlargeupon, I passover. But I canseethat everyone,beginningwith this country,hasconceded to him what has throughout the past been the bone of contention in all Greek wars. What is this ? The power to do what he likes, to encroach on and pillage the Greek states piecemeal,and to attack and enslavetheir cities. We have been the leadersof the Greeks for seventy-threeyears, and Sparta for twenty-nine.8Somepower hasalsolain with Thebesrecently after the battle of Leuctra. But never yet, gentlemen,has this country or Thebes or Sparta been granted this power by the cities of Greece,to do what they choose,never by a long way. In our case,or rather that of the Athenians of that day, when there was an opinion in some quarters that their conduct was beyond toleration, everyone, even states with no ground of complaint, thought it right to join in the war against them. There is no need to multiply instances.Athens and Sparta, 8. i.e.Athens477to 4o5,Sparta4o4to376n.c.(battleof Naxos). 253

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without needingany initial injusticeof eachother's to comp'rlain of, alwaysfelt an obligationto take arms in support of a victim of injustice. Yet all the offencescommitted by Sparta in those thirty years,or by our ancestorsin their seventy,are less than the acts of injustice against Greek statescommitted by Philip in lessthan thirteen yearsof his power. They are not a fraction of these, as it takes only a short time to demonstrate.I omit Olynthus, Methone, Apollonia and thirty-two towns in Thracee which he destroyedwith such virulence thar it is hard for a visitor there to be sure rhey were ever inhabited. I say nothing of the destruction of the large population of Phocis. But what about the people of Thessaly? They have had their constitution and their units of government taken from them and tetrarchiesestablished,to make their slavery extend not merely to cities, but to whole regions.roThe cities of Euboea are under a tyranny, a tyranny in an island closeto Thebes and Athens. In his letters he saysin so many words, 'I am at peace with all who are preparedto acceptwhat I say.' And he does not write this without carrying it out. He has marched to the Hellespont, as he did previously againstAmbracia,Il he is in possessionof the considerablecity of Elis in the Peloponnese, there has been a recent plot againstMegara; neither the Greek nor the non-Greek world is big enoughfor his rapacity.All the Greek statescan seeand hear this, and yet there are no deputations of protest sent out between us, no indignation. Our morale has been so underminedin individual cities, that to this moment we are incapableof any action for our advantageor our prestige, we cannot combine, we cannot do anything by way of support or mutual assistance. We look on, indifferent to his rise. Each of us has the idea of making a profit out of the moment of another'sdestruction,as far as I can see,insteadof taking thought or action to securethe survival of the Greeks.It 9. The 32 arc the cities of the Confederacy of Olynthus. But Apollonia was not one of them, nor is it certain in what circumstancesit fell to Philip. ro. See Philippic II,zz. rr. See below, 34, 72. Ambracia in the north west of Greece was one district in which Athens checked Philip's advance from Epirus in 343. In Elis an oligarchic faction declared for Philip.

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is like the periodic onset of fever or some other epidemic,and attacks even the apparently remote, as everyoneknows. There is anotherthing which is common knowledge:that any troubles inflicted on the Greek statesby Sparta or by ourselveswere at least injuries inflicted by genuine inhabitants of Greece,and one would look upon them in the sameway as on a true-born son, who had come into considerableproperty, but made some mistake or injustice in the administration of it. In itself this might deservecriticism or accusation,but it would be impossible to deny that it was a relative and the heir to the property who had done it. But had it been a slaveor an illegitimate claimant who had lost or damagedwhat did not belongto him, goodness knows how much more heinous,how much more resentedhis action would have been. There is no such feeling about Philip and his present proceedings.He not merely does not belong and is not so much asrelatedto the Greeks,but is not evenof respectableforeign descent;he comesof that Macedonianriff-raff which could not even offer a good slavefor salein days gone by. There is no limit to our degradation.He capshis destruction of towns by celebratingthe Pythian Games,Izthe festival of the Greeksalone, and if he is not there himself, he sendshis slavesto organizethe celebrations.[He commandsThermopylae and the gate to Greece, and his garrisons and mercenaries control these places.He holds the right of first accessto the oracle of Apollo,r3 and has brushed us aside as well as the Thessalianand Dorian peoplesand the rest of the Amphictyonic states,and debarredus from a right which is not even open to all Greek states.] He dictates to Thessaly her form of government. He sendsmercenariesto Porthmusto expelthe democracy of Eretria, and to Oreus to establishPhilistidesas tyrant. And the Greeks see all this and put up with it. They seem to me to regard it like a hailstorm, which everyoneprays to be spared, but no one takesstepsto prevent. It is not only the insults to Greece which are left unrequited, it is the injuries to themselves,and this is the final humiliation. He has encroachedon rz. PhilipwasPresident in 346and342. r3. This privilegewasconferred onPhilipat Delphiby theAmphictyons in place of Athens for his vigour against Phocis.

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Corinthian preservesat Ambracia and Leucas. The Achaean post at Naupactushe has sworn to deliver to Aetolia. Thebes owned Echinus, which he has now captured, and Byzantium, against which he is marching, is his own ally. This country itself has lost (to omit other places)the principal city of the Chersonese,Cardia. The samething happensto us all, but we hesitate,we arebenumbed,andturn our eyeson our neighboursin mutual disffust, insteadof on the author of all our injuries. Yet, when he has treatedthe whole body of us so outrageously,what canwe expectfrom himrwhenhe hasseparatecontrolofeachone? What is the causeof this I It is not withour any basis,not without good reason,that the Greekshad in the past a natural tendencytowardsfreedom, or now towardsservitude.There then existed something,an element in the spirit of the people, which today is there no more, but which in those days overcamethe wealth of Persia and led Greece to freedom, which was never defeated in battle by land or sea, but whose loss now has brought everything to ruin, and turned the affairs of Greece upside down. What is this ? [Nothing subtle or remore but the sheer fact that] bribery in the desirero rule or destroyGreece met with universal hatred, that a conviction for bribery was a matter for intense feeling and attended by the most severe punishment, [without any appeal or any lenience].Never was the critical decision, which chance often puts in the hands of the neglectful instead of the conscientious, open to a price offered by speakersor commanders, nor was their feeling of solidarity or their distrust of tyrants and foreigners,or indeed anything of that sort. But the presentprovidesa marker for the sale and export of everything, and the correspondingimports lead to the decay or contamination of Greece. What are theseI Envy of gain, ridicule of opennessfsympathy with wrong laid bare,] resentmentof criticism, and all the apparatusof corruption. Yet warshipsand men and suppliesof moneyand materials, and everything which would be judged tg contribure to the power of cities, are presentin greaternumbers and abundance now than then. But it is all rendered useless,ineffectiveand without value by venality. That this is true you can presumably seefor yourselves,and 256

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have no need of any evidenceof mine. That the past was the oppositeI will demonstrate,not by meansof any words of my own, but by the written recordsof your own ancestors,inscribed by them on a bronzetablet on the Acropolis,[not for their own benefit-. their true spirit wasthere without any inscription- but to provide you, their descendants,with a reminder and an exampleof the need to set the samevaluesin your hearts.The words are these]'Arthmiuq son of Pythonax,of Zeleais without rights and declaredan enemy of the peopleof Athens and their allies, together with his dependants."+ There follows the reason:'becausehe carriedPersianmoneyto the Peloponnese'. This is the inscription.And I beg you mosr earnesrlyto consider the attitude of the Atheniansof that time in doing this, and the claim they were making. Here was a man from Zelea called Arthmius, an underling of Persia(Zeleais in Asia), and because in the serviceof his master he carried money, not to Athens, but to the Peloponnese,the city of Athens declared him an enemy to themselvesand their allies, togetherwith his dependants, and without rights. This is not the ordinary way of disfranchisement.It has no applicationto our citizen-of Zelea, if he was to have no part in Athenian affairs.There is, however, a clausein the laws of homicide, that where a man is not permitted trial for homicide [and his killer is indemnified against penalty] he shall die without rights. T'he meaningof it is this, that the killer of such a man is free of guilt. The authorsof this enactmentthus took the view that they had a duty to protect all Greeks. Only on this assumption would they have been concernedwith a caseof bribery and corruption in the Peloponnese. But they imposed punishment and retribution on any suchinstancesthey knew, to the extentof inscribingtheir names. The result is naturally that the Greek world inspired respect outside it, and not the other way about. It is not so now. Our presentoutlook is not the samein theseor any other respects. What is this outlook? ["Yo,r know well enough yourselves. r4. The date and occasion of this decree, which is mentioned again by Demosthenes elsewhere, are not known. Nor can we be sure that his interpretation of it is correct, though presumably his hearers accepted it. r5. Some editors would exclude this passage,which at best must be a variant version.

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There is no point in generalaccusation.And similarly the rest of the Greeksknow it equally well, which is my reasonfor the claim that the present situation demands both eager activity and sound advice. What advice?] Do you want to be told detailsi And will you acceptthem without resentmentI (A list is read,) There existsa naive argument intended to offer consolationto Athens by urging that Philip is not yet what Sparta was when she held comrnandof the seaas well as all the land area,while Persiawas in alliancewith her, and there wasno power to stand against her. Nonetheless,this country stood up to her then lvithout being torn to pieces.In my view, while there has been considerableand virtually universal advance,so that nothing remains as it was in the past, there has been no advance,no revolution greaterthan that in rvarfare.First of all I learn that in those days Sparta,and the rest equally, for the four or five rnonths of full summer would invade ancl ravagethe country with heavy--armedtroops in a citizen army, and then return home. So old-fashionedwere proceedings,or rather so much on a citizen basis,that there was no bribery at ali, but warfare was regular and open. Nowadaysyou can see, of course, the extensiveruin causedby treachery,and the absenceof organization or set battles,and you learn that it is no close formation whose leadershipenablesPhilip to go where he will, but light troops, cavalry, archersand mercenaries,and this is the kind of army he puts together.But when on theselines he attacksa statewhich is rotten at the core and whosepower of resistance is sappedby distrust, he brings up his artillery and besiegesit. I say nothing about summer and winter, and the fact that no differenceis made b.t*."r, them, ,ro ,.rron set aside for an interval. But we should know all this and reckonon it, and not admit war into the counffy, nor be brought crashingby a regard for naive ideasof the Peloponnesian War in the old days. It is essentialto maintain a watch on affairsand on armamentsat as long a rangeas possible,to preventhis leavinghis own territory, and not to be involved in a war at closequarters.When it comes to warfare, gentlemen, we have many advantages,assuming 258

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that we are preparedto play our part, such as the nature of the country with its wide possibilities for raiding and guerrilla tactics,and many more. F or a pitched battle he is better trained than we are. But the decisionsyou need are not confined to this, nor to active measures of military defence. Your thoughts, your feelings should be feelings of detestationtowards speakersin this assemblywho take Philip's side. You must understand that it is impossibleto overcomethe enemiesof Athens till you have brought his supportersin your own city to book. And I most solemnly declare that you will never ichieve it. The insensibility,the insanity of this assembly- I don't know what to call it, I am sometimesled to believewe are under the malign influence of some evil power - is capableof allowing abuse, jealousy,satireor any other motive to makeus demanda hearing from men in the pay of the enemy, some of whom would not even deny this description,and show amusementat any abuse we may give vent to. Bad as it is, this is not the worst. You have made politics a saferthing for men like that than for true supportersof Athens. Observethe disastrousresultsof listening to such ideas.T'hey are eventswell known to you. Political circles in Olynthus containedone party of support for Philip and subservienceto him in every instance,and one of genuine support for their country and concern to avoid its enslavement.Which party was it that causedthe fall of Olynthus ? Which betrayed the cavalry whose loss led to the fall ? Philip's supporters,whose misrepresentationsof the patriotic party, while the city still stood, even induced the Olynthian peopleto banishApollonides.I6And this is not a singleisolated instancein which this practice has done endlessdamage.In Eretria after the eviction of Plutarchustzand his mercenaries and during the democratic control of the city itself and of Porthmus, there were two parties, one favouring Athenian influence,the other Macedonian.It was largely, if not solely, the latter who gainedthe ear of that wretched,unlucky people, 16. Democratic leader in Olynthus, later made a citizen of Athens. r7. On Plutarchus see back on The Peace, 5 and note, and sectional introduction here.

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who were eventuallyinduced to expel their own best advisers. Philip, their supposedally, sent a thousandmercenariesunder Hipponicus,pulled down the walls of Porthmus,and established an autocratic council of three, Hipponicus, Automedon and Cleitarchus.He has since twice suppressedattempts by Eretria to securefreedom,[first by sendingthe force under Eurylochus, then that commandedby Parmenio]. It is hardly necessary to go into all the instances.But at Oreus, as everyoneknew, Philip's supporterswere Philistides,Menippus, Socrates,Thoas and Agapaeus,who control the city now, while one individual named Euphraeus,who had lived here in Athens, stood for freedomand againstsubjectionto anyone.In his casethe abusiveand insulting treatment he receivedfrom the people throughout would make a long story. But a year before the capture of the town he exposedthe treachery of Philistides and his associates,whose activities he discovered. Whereupon a large gang under the production and general direction of Philip rushed Euphraeusoff to prison as a subversive influence. At this the democratsof Oreus, instead of rescuingEuphraeusand forcibly expelling the others, showed no resentmenttowards them, and stated with satisfactionthat Euphraeushad deservedwhat he got. After which the conspirators enjoyedcompletefreedomto securethe captureof the town, and proceededto set the plan on foot. Any of the populacewho realized the truth were terrified into silence by their memory of the fate of Euphraeus.They were reducedto such an abject condition that despitethe impending calamity not a man dared speak a word before the enemy had completed their designs a4d were at the gates.At that point there was someattempt at resistance,and also a movement towards surrender.After the shamefuland disastrouscaptureof the town theseconspirators exerciseddespoticcontrol over it, turned upon their previous preservers,who had been prepared for any measuresagainst Euphraeus,and exiled or executedthem. Euphraeus himself committed suicide,and so gaveactive proof of the honestyand of the stand he took againstPhilip. unselfishness You may wonder what is the reason why the people of Olynthus, Eretria and Oreus were more favourablyinclined to z6o

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speakersin Philip's interest than in in their own. It is the same reasonasarisesin our own case.Speakersin the genuineinterest of Athens, even if they lvish it, sometimesfind it impossibleto say a word to gratify popular opinion, becauseit is inconsistent with care for the city's welfare. For the others popularity is itself co-operationwith Macedon. On those occasionsthe first party kept asking for money, the others denied the necessity; the first demandedwar and distrust, the second peace,until the trap closed.Everything else,to omit furthqr details,seems to have run on the samelines. One party arguedwith an eye to popularity, the other as the meansof survival. But eventually for the most part it was not due to ingratiationnor in ignorance that the majority were led that way. They subsided,because they thought they had altogether the worst of the struggle. And I declare most emphatically my apprehensionthat this may happento our own country, when there comesthe calculation and the rcalization of being at the end of her resources. Heaven send that things may never reach this point. Death is many times more to be desiredthan subservienceto Philip [and the betrayalof someof your best advisers].It was a fine sort of reward the peopleof Oreus enjoyedwhen they entrustedthemselvesto Philip's friendsand rejectedEuphraeus,and the people of Eretria when they discardedAthenian representativesand surrenderedto Cleitarchus:to be subjectedto slavery,violence and massacre.It was a fine sort of forbearancethat was shown to Olynthus on the appointment of Lasthenesto the cavalry command and the expulsion of Apollonides. It rvas criminal stupidity to indulge such hopes, to pursue false policies and refuse the path of duty, to listen to the suggestionsof enemy agentsand imagine that the importanceof the city they lived 'fhis is in preservedthem from any kind of misadventure. rvhat is abject,to say'Who would have thought it? Of course we ought to have done this and not that.' There is a great deal that could be said in Olynthus now which it would have savedthem to foresee,a great deai in Oreus or Phocis,and in all the stateswhich have been lost. But that is no consolation to them. While the ship is still afloat, be she big or small, is the time for sailors, steersmenand every member of the crew z6t

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to do his utmost to prevent any design or any accident from capsizingher. Once the seaclosesover her, the effort is vain. So it is now, gentlemen,with this country. While we are still ourselvespreserved,while we still possessa great city with enormous resourcesand the highest honour, what action are we to take? Perhapsthis is a question many of this audience have long wanted to ask. I will answer it, and add a proposal which you can further if you like it. You must make your own defence,take your own measures.I mean this in terms of ships, money and men. Even if the whole world submits to slavery, Athens must fight for freedorn.This is what we must in our own personsbring to reality and to clear vision, and then we can call upon others, and send our representativesto point it out [everywhere,to the Peloponnese, to Rhodes,to Chios and I would add to Persia,whose interests are also concernedwith refusing to allow Philip to subdue the worldl. If they are convinced,there may be more to share any danger or expense that is needed,if not, at least events may be delayed.Since it is a single individual and not the combined strength of a community againstwhich this war is being fought, even delay has its value, as had last year's talks conducted by my good friend, Polyeuctus, Hegesippus and the others as well as myself, in our canvassof the Greek states,which causedPhilip to hesitateinsteadof moving againstAmbracia or towards the Peloponnese.I do not ask that we should call on others, if we are not preparedto do what is vital for ourselves.It would be naive to neglect ourselvesand claim concern for others, or to forget the presentand rousealarm about the future. This is not what tr want. I call for suppliesfor the force on the Chersonese and the fulfilment of their other requirements, for personal preparationon our own part and a summonsto all Greeks for their unification, instruction and incitement. This is the part a city with our reputation should play. The idea that Greecewill be rescued by Chalcis or Megara, while Athens eludes the issue,is wholly wrong. It will be enough if these cities themselvessurvive. It is we who must do it, we whose ancestors gainedthe glory and bequeathedit in the courseof great perils. And if each of us is to sit idle and press for his own requirez6z

hs-61

PHILIPPIC III

ments and his own exemption from duty, first of all he will never find anyoneto do it for him, and secondly,I fear that all that we seekto avoid will be forced upon us. That is my declarationand my proposal,which, in my belief, might yet set our house in order. If any speakercan offer a better, let him urge it, and may the decisionof this assembly, I most earnestlypray, secureour best interest.

GLOSSARY OF' TE,CHNICAL TERMS

L, A, I, D refer to the speeches,in this selection, oflysias, Andocides, fsocrates,Demosthenes. Numbers refer to sections. AccouNrs. (A ZZ) All holders of office had at the end of their year of duty to submit an account of their tenure of office, which was examined by auditors chosenby lot from the Council and subject to a legal casein the event of any question. Acone. The market place. Most frequently mentioned is that at Athens, where it was the centre both of business and of general intercourse. ANerrIoN. (A +S) The temple of the Dioscuri on the north side of the Acropolis at Athens. (A l:6) The festival celebrated by the members of Aparuntl. 'phratries' (brotherhoods) in Athens, at which the young were enrolled into the phratry. AncnoNs. (D, Philippic I, 36, note) In the earliest times the principal magistrates of Athens. There were originally three, the Basileusdealing with religious matters, the Polemarch with war and the Archon with administration. Later six iunior archons were added, called Thesmothetae.They had wide judicial and executive duties, but never dominated politics after the rise of the Srategi in 487u.c. with the decreeenacting the appointment of the archons by lot. Anropacus. (L 69) The oldest council in Athens, associatedwith the early powers, both political and judicial, of an aristocratic constitution, together with the archons (q.v.) who continued throughout to be members of it. But its importance declined with theirs from 487 v.c., and its general functions of supervision were formally removed n 462-46r. (But seeA 83 and note.) It remained a highly venerated body connected with jurisdiction for homicide, whose name and fame remained to the days of St Paul ('Mars'Hill') and of Milton's AreoPagitica. Asssrrnr.v. (passim) The Athenian Assembly (Ecclesia) was the meeting of all citizensto which were addresseddiscussionsof major issuesintroduced by the Council (Boule). Any citizen could attend and speak.The total number of citizens may have been as much as 4o,oooin about 43o 8.c., but the oligarchs in 4r r claimed that the 264

G L O S S A R YO F T E C H N I C A I -T E R M S attendaqce on the Pnyx hill, where the Assembly was held, never reachedmore than 5ooo. Bestrrus. (A n) See Archons. The Basileus presided over the Areopagus and had charge of religious ceremonies,his jurisdiction including casesof impiety and homicide. Ceouate. (I Panegyrical, 55) The citadel of Thebes. ro7) Seenote on p. r2o. ClnnucrrtEs. (I Panegyricu.s, (A 77) Officiils in charge of collecting money due to Correcrons. the State treasury. ConutssroNERs on' INqutny. (A 36) Members of a commission establishedfor the specialinvestigationof an incident or incidents (e.9. the caseof the Hermae). CouNcIt-. (passim)The Council (Boule) at Athens consistedof 5oo members, fifty from each tribe, electedby lot and serving for ayear, which formed an executive body of wide scope for day-to-day purposes. All citizens over thirty were eligible, but none could serve more than twice, and not in successiveyears. It provided its own presidents and also those of the Assembly, for whom it prepared business. See also Prytaneis. Cyt.ioseRcns. (A 6r) A gymnasium, i.e. t sports ground, east of Athens, sacred to Heracles. Dentc. (L rr) Persiangold coin equivalent in value to twenty Attic d,rachrnae. Dncencuv. Seesectionalintroduction to I, Panegyricasp. roo. (A 77) Temple of Apollo and Artemis in S.E. DrlpntxIutvt. Athens. Used for certain casesof homicide. DroNysre. (D Philippic I, 3) Athenian festival in honour of Dionysus held about April, and particularly associated with the dramatic competitions. Visitors attended it in large numbers. THr Er-nvrN. The body of police commissionersinstituted by the Thirty Tyrants. EpHprer. ( Zil A commissionof the Areopagusfor the judgement of minor casesof homicide. Though the name remained, regular members of the law-courts (dicasts) were substituted for them in the fifth century. EpHons. (L Z6) The leading magistratesat Sparta, five in number. They held the highest power in the state. ErnsreNs. (D) North-east winds regular in the Aegeanin July and August. Eurror.ptoar. (I Panegjtricus,r57) Ancient clan in which the office of the hierophant at the mysteries was hereditary. GyuNeslARcH. (A r3z) Official in chargeof a gymnasium,or sporrs

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G R E E KP O L I T I C A L O R A T O R Y ground, who employed professional trainers, etc., and prepared the runners for the torch race. Henlrosr. (I, Panegyricus,rr7) A garrison commander, of the kind sent out by Sparta after 4o4B.c.to govern stateswhich she had taken over. See sectional introduction to I Panegyricas. HnnMes. (A) Images of Hermes which stood in front of doors and elsewherethroughout Athens, and were regarded as symbols of the god's protection. Their mutilation was thought an act of terrible impiety and an omen of disaster. Junv. (A 18) The organization of Athenian citizens as juries was called the Heliaea (originally a particular court of appeal). In the fifth century 6ooo iurors (dicastae,dicasts)were chosenby lot, but in the fourth all eligible citizens (i.e. over thirty yearsold) who offered were enrolled and divided into ten sections' and the sections allotted to the courts as required, two or more sections being combined, if the casewarranted it (see note on A r8). Large numbers and the use of the lot in allocation made it hard to browbeat or bribe a iury, though it may have led to unfair decisions.On the ballot Panegyricu.rseenote on L 9r. KnnyrEs. (A, rz8 I, Panegyricus,r5T) An ancient clan in which the office of torch-bearer at the mysteries was hereditary. (liturgy, public service)See nore 15 on D philippic I. LrrrouRcre. Public services carried out at Athens by the richer citizens and metics, who were compulsorily nominated for the service.The most irnportant of these were the trierarchia (equipment of a ship) and the choregia (equipment of a chorus for the dramatic oi other competitions). Mnrrcs. (Metoeci) (L introduction and 6) Aliens, especialryin Athens, more or less permanently resident and given restricted rights and duties in the state. MoNny. (Athenian) (A 28, D, Philippic I, z8) Six obols wenrto one d,rachma, too d,rachma,e to one mina (mna), and 6o ninae to one talent. Penerus. (D, Philippic 1.,34, note) The Athenian state galley used for official missions, e.g. for a summons to return to Athens for trial. PaNernrxaee. (D, Philippic /,:s) An annual Athenian festival held near the end of July on the official birthday of Athena, to whom an embroidered robe was offered PR_vreNErs, PRvrrNpulr. In the council (q.v.) the fifty members from each tribe in turn served as a working committee for one tenth of the year, the order in which tribes served being chosen by lot, and the chairman again chosenby lot. Members ofsuch a committee 266

G L O S S A R YO F T E C H N I C A L T E R M S were called prytaneis (presidents or chairmen), i.e. of the presiding committee for the month. The Prytaneum, on the north side of the Acropolis, may have been the headquartersof the prytaneis before the Tholos was built for them. It was later.used for some homicide cases,but also for some public occasions,e.g. when a dinner was given to a benefactor. Cf. A a6. Srepr. (I, Panegjtricus,ST) A unit of distance,just over zoo yards, the length of the stadium at Olympia. SrerBn. (L rr) A gold coin from Cyzicus equivalent in value to twenty-eight Attic drachmae. Sto.t, or Sroe PoIrtrr. (A 8S) A colonnadein Athens decorated with paintings. Inscribed announcementswere posted in it. Srnernct. (L 6S,A :8) The highestmilitary officersin Athens, after the Polemarch ceasedto command the arm5 the Strategi became also the leading magistrates, military and political power being commonly combined. Outstanding Strategi like Pericleswere sometimes elected many times in successiveyears. They could sit with the Council, but had no special powers in either Council or Assembly. Svrtinonlrs. (Committees.)Seenote 7 on D, Olynthiac II, zg. Tnnsnult. (A +S) A temple east of the Agora and north of the Acropolis (not that now known as the Hephestiaeum but often still referred to as the Theseum). THnsuorHErAE. (A z8) The six junior members of the executive body of the nine Archons (q.v.). Their duties were mainly judicial. Tnr Tulnrv. See sectionalintroduction to Lysias' Eratosthenes. Tnlsrs (L U) were not normal tribal units, but artificially constructed by the constitution of Cleisthenes at the end of the sixth century r.c. for purposes of administration and to prevent the disunion rvhich had persisted in Athens between the ancient divisions of the Coast, the Hill and the Plain. TnInnnr. (D, Philippic I, fi) The normal Greek warship.

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF' EVENTS B ET W E E N 5 r o A N D 3 3 6 B .c . B.C.

5ro Fall of the tyrants (sonsof Peisistratus)in Athens. 507-6 Expulsion from Athens of Spartans u,nder Cleomenes.Democratic reforms of Cleisthenesbegun. 4go First Persian invasion of Greece. Battle of Marathon. 48o SecondPersian invasion, under Xerxes. Battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium. Athens abandoned.Battle of Salamis.Retreat of Xerxes, leaving a Persian force under Mardonius. 47g Battles of Plataeaand Mycale. Retreat of Persians.Ionian revolt from Persia 477 Confederacy of Delos founded. Fortification of Athens. 468 Defeat of Persian navy at battle of the Eurymedon. 462 Democratic predominance of Ephialtes and Pericles at Athens begins. 459-445 FirSt PeloponnesianWar. 454 Treasury of Delos transferred to Athens. 448 Peaceof Callias regulates relations of Athens and Persia. 438 Completion of the Parthenon. 43r Outbreak of second Peloponnesian War. Pericles' Funeral Speech. 42g Death of Pericles. 42r ' Peaceof Nicias. Athenian recapture of Scione. Greek states again at war. Battle of Mantinea. 4r8 416 Athenian destruction of Melos. 4rS Athenian expedition to Syracuse.Mutilation of the Hermae. 4r3 Defeat and destruction of the Syracusanexpedition. Treaty of Miletus between Sparta and Persia. Revolt of 4rz Athenian allies. Oligarchic coup d,'itat at Athens, constitution of the 4oo. 4rr Democracy restored within the year. 4o6 and 4o5 Athenian naval defeatsat Arginusae and Aegospotami. 4oS-4 Athens blockaded. 4o4 Surrenderof Athens. The LongWalls pulled do'wn.Rule of the Thirty. Thrasybulus at Phyle. 4o3 Thrasybulus seizes Peiraeus. Fall of the Thirty. Lysias' Against Eratosthenes. 4oo Andocides'trial and speech On the Mysteries. 270

TABLE CHRONOLOGICAL 3199 Death of Socrates. 397 Conon commander of Persian fleet. 3gS Agesilaus of Sparta at war in Persia. Death of Lysander. Athens rebuilding the Long Walls. 394 Confederation of Athens, Thebes, Corinth against Sparta. Corinthian War. Battles of Cnidus and Coronea. 18Z-6 The King's Peace(Peaceof Antalcidas). Formation of the Chalcidian Confederacy. l8+ 382 Spartan provocation of Thebes and Athens. 38o Isocrates' Panegltricus. 379 Spartan suppressionof the Chalcidian Confederacy. 378 Alliance of Athens and Thebes. 377 Second Athenian Confederacy founded. 374 and 37r Peacenegotiations,both abortive. 37r Battle of Leucffa. Foundation of Arcadian leagueand of Megalopolis. S6g Theban operations against Sparta. Messene refounded. Alliance of Athens and Sparta. 366 Thebes seizesOropus. 16+ Orchomenus destroyed by Thebes. 362 Battle of Mantinea. Death of Epaminondas. 359 Death of Perdiccas of Macedon. Philip securesthe succession. 358 First victories of Philip over lllyrians, etc. 357 Athens recovers the Chersonese. Philip takes Amphipolis. Revolt of Chios, Cos, Rhodes and Byzantium from Athens (Social War), 356 PhociansseizeDelphi. The SacredWar. Philip captur€s Pydna and Potidaea.; 355-4 Social War ended. 353 Philip takes Methone. Demosthenes' For Megalopolis and,On the Liberty of Rhodes. 35r Demosthenes' Pltilippic L 349 Philip reduces Chalcidice. Alliance of Athens with Olynthus. Demosthenes' Ofunthiacs. 348 Philip captures Olynthus. 346 Peaceof Philocrates. Philip destroys Phocis and presides over the Pythian Games at Delphi. Isocrates' Philip. Demosthenes' On the Peace. 344 Demosthenes' Philippic II. 342-r Philip in Thrace. Diopeithes sent to the Chersonese.Demosthenes' On the Chersoneseand Philippic III. 27t

1b?o G R E E KP O L I T I C A L O R A T O R Y 34o 339 338 337 $6

Philip besiegesPerinthus and Byzantium. Naval reforms urged by Demosthenes at Athens. Amphictyonic Council makes war on Amphissa at the instance of Athens. Philip invited into Greece by Amphictyons. Battle of Chaeronea. Pan-Hellenic Council at Corinth. Assassinationof Philip. Accession of Alexander.

BIBLIOGRAPHY History of Greece,J. B. Bury (London, Macmillan). A History of the Greek World, 479-323, M. L. W. Laistner (London, Methuen). A History of Greece,N. G. L. Hammond (Oxford). Tlte CambriilgeAncient History, esp. Vol. VI. AthenionDemocracy,A.H.M. Jones(Oxford, Blackwell). The Art o/'PersuasianinGreece,George Kennedy (London, Routledge). A History of Ed,ucationinAnti.qaity,H.I. Marrou, translator G. Lamb (London, Sheed and Ward). Paideia, Werner Jaeger (Oxford, Blackwell). Demostltenes,Pickard Cambridge (Putnam). Demosthenes, Werner Jaeger (University of California Press, Sather ClassicalLectures). Lysias and,the CorpusLysiacum (forthcoming), K.J. Dover (University of California Press, Sather ClassicalLectures).