Greece and the American Embrace: Greek Foreign Policy Towards Turkey, the US and the Western Alliance (Library of International Relations)

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Christos Kassimeris is Assistant Professor in Political Science and Head of the Department of Social and Behavioural Sciences at the European University Cyprus in Nicosia. Before joining the European University Cyprus, he taught at the University of Reading. He is the author of European Football in Black and White: Tackling Racism in Football and has published in journals such as Democracy and Security and the Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis. He holds a PhD in political science from the University of Reading and his research interests concern the process of European Union integration, Euro-Mediterranean relations and the external dimension of the European Union.

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GREECE AND THE AMERICAN EMBRACE Greek Foreign Policy Towards Turkey, the US and the Western Alliance CHRISTOS KASSIMERIS

TAURIS ACADEMIC STUDIES an imprint of

I.B.Tauris Publishers LONDON • NEW YORK

Published in 2010 by Tauris Academic Studies An imprint of I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd. 6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 www.ibtauris.com Distributed in the United States and Canada Exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 Copyright © 2010 Christos Kassimeris The right of Christos Kassimeris to be identified as editor of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Library of International Relations 42 ISBN 978 1 84511 876 1 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record for this book is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress catalog card: available Printed and bound in India by Replika Press Pvt Ltd Camera-ready copy edited and supplied by the author

In memory of Gregorio Varela Moreno

Contents

Acknowledgements

ix

1 Introduction

1

2 Foreign Policy Theory

7

3 A History of Intervention

33

4 Greek Relations with the US and NATO

89

5 Greek Relations with the EEC

137

6 Internationalizing the Disputes

169

7 Conclusion

211

Notes

233

Bibliography

245

Index

279

Acknowledgements

The completion of this study was a heavy and demanding task, hence, it is appropriate that I express my sincere gratitude to all those that contributed toward this achievement. I would like to thank my two doctoral supervisors, Professor Barry Jones and Dr Robert McKeever, for their competent supervision and valuable guidance, the University of Reading for allocating me a grant from the University Hardship Fund, the staff members of the Graduate Institute of Political and International Studies and Professor Colin Gray and his Centre for Strategic Studies for the financial contribution to my research. Special thanks to the Research Committee of European University Cyprus for their decision to fund the present project. Last, but certainly not least, I wish to thank my parents, Panagiotis and Henriette, for their endless patience and constant support. Their contribution to all academic achievements of mine has been overwhelming and is definitely worth mentioning. At this point, the present author must note that certain parts of this volume were first published, in no particular order, in Orbis, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Defence and Security Analysis, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, Democracy and Security and International Politics. It suffices to say that the constructive comments of the pertinent editors in chief and assistant editors alike cannot be emphasised enough. For their valuable contribution and guidance I feel obliged to thank them all.

1 Introduction

The subject of Greek-Turkish relations has attracted the interest of a multitude of scholars and researchers because of its particular significance in the regional affairs of the Eastern Mediterranean. The numerous studies on Greek-Turkish relations that already exist in the field of International Relations predominantly discuss the evolution of the various disputes between these two states, and merely illustrate that continuous antagonism and intense rivalry have always dominated, almost habitually, their interstate affairs. In short, these studies provide valuable information to the student of foreign policy with a particular interest in Greek politics, as well as different interpretations of the nature of the Greek-Turkish dispute; however, they are limited to the examination of those events and factors that brought about and maintain their conflict. Although a significant number of these studies either imply or clearly support the potential of foreign interference in Greece’s domestic political environment and external affairs—for the most part authors of Greek origin—and the related ‘conspiracy theories’, only a few have focused exclusively on these allegations. Even then, these sporadic studies have failed to reach a satisfactory conclusion either due to the lack of access to relevant official documentation or because of the partiality of the respective authors. It is possible to argue, therefore, that although the topic of Greek-Turkish relations has been thoroughly studied, the significance of foreign intervention has not been thoroughly assessed.

2

GREECE AND THE AMERICAN EMBRACE

Often considered the ‘troubled partnership’ of the Western alliance, this interstate conflict is usually discussed within the context of foreign intervention that ultimately resulted in the dependence of Greece upon her allies. It is precisely this ‘interference’ that is the subject of our examination. Thus, the present study attempts to analyse the Greek-Turkish conflict through a focus on the hypothesis of ‘foreign intervention’. Further, it aims to identify the degree of foreign influence and, of course, its impact on the formation of Greek foreign policy, especially as directed toward Turkey. The historical period that is subject to examination concerns the two terms (1974-81) that the conservative party of Nea Dimokratia (New Democracy) was in power, since that period proved quite decisive for Greece’s external affairs and subsequent domestic political developments. As it happens, the Nea Dimokratia administrations were instrumental in the country’s swift return to democracy, since they were faced with the unenviable tasks of overcoming the internal political crisis resulting from a seven-year period of dictatorial rule and its eventual collapse; confronting Turkey’s expansionist policies, realised through the invasion of Cyprus and the Aegean disputes; and, finally, reviewing the overall position of Greece within the Western alliance. All three tasks were interrelated and had to be dealt with as such by the Greek state. The primary objectives of the conservative party concerned both the restoration and consolidation of democracy, the attempt to bring about stability and order to the domestic scene, as well as the important need to ease Greek public opinion regarding the attitude of Greece’s allies towards the aggressive behaviour of Turkey. Not surprisingly, Turkey was perceived as the main threat to Greek national interests—regardless of the ongoing Cold War and the heated rivalry between the two superpowers, namely, the United States and the Soviet Union—and soon became the epicentre of Greek policy-makers’ policies and objectives. Having said that, the Nea Dimokratia governments had to reconsider Greece’s ties with the Western camp, taking into account at all times the fact that Turkey was, paradoxically, an ally of Greece within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). As one might expect, Greece needed much room for political ma-

INTRODUCTION

3

noeuvre—in order to achieve her objectives and preserve her national interests—and, therefore, would before long argue for an ‘independent foreign policy’ and against ‘foreign intervention’, two core principles of Greek foreign policy that are central to this study. Our initial approach to these issues, as outlined in Chapter One, concentrates on establishing a clear understanding of the main concepts of Foreign Policy theory, focusing particularly on the type of states that reflected at that time the status and position of Greece within the international environment. Once Greece is classified within a certain category of states, it will then become feasible to categorise her foreign policy objectives, as well as to consider the policies expected to safeguard her national interests. To conduct such an examination, however, it is imperative that we make reference to events in Modern Greek history that precede the historical period that is the subject of our examination. It is essential to first analyse Greece’s historical background dating to the end of the Second World War, when Greece officially became an integral part of the Western sphere of influence. Such a retrospective examination will provide the necessary grounds for effectively exploring the possibility of ‘foreign intervention’, as well as its origins, in Greek politics (should this hypothesis be substantiated), or else indicate the presence of other equally significant factors that brought about political instability in Greece. Likewise, the main goal of Chapter Two is to reveal the actual causes of political turmoil that eventually led to the imposition of the colonels’ dictatorship and, most importantly, to examine the role of Greece’s allied countries during the same period and their attitude towards the military regime. Equally essential, nonetheless, is the response of the Western alliance to the events instigated by the installation, and particularly the collapse, of the dictatorial regime in Athens, namely, the diplomatic isolation of the country, the invasion of Cyprus and the Aegean disputes. It should then be possible, in the chapters that follow, to verify whether such ‘interference’ continued to torment Greek politics immediately after the restoration of democracy and even succeeded in challenging the credibility of Greece’s claims for political ‘independence’.

4


In Chapter Three, Greece’s relations with the US and NATO are examined, focusing on the military and strategic aspects of their partnership, the main purpose being to demonstrate Greece’s alleged attempts to disengage from and exert pressure on the Western alliance. We shall approach the issue of ‘foreign policy independence’ by making reference to the objectives of the US and NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean area, the US arms embargo on Turkey, Greece’s withdrawal from NATO and the Cyprus issue. Consequently, it becomes evident that the Nea Dimokratia governments truly aimed at lessening the ties with the Western alliance and endeavoured to achieve independence. Similarly, Chapter Four explores the possibility that Greece might achieve ‘independence’ through membership in the European Economic Community (EEC). Hence, it is necessary to examine the role and contribution of the EEC in the Greek-Turkish rivalry, alongside that of the US and NATO, in an attempt to investigate whether the attempts of the EEC—as a political and economic entity—were sufficient to counter-balance the influence of the Western alliance. The final chapter provides a discussion of the Greek-Turkish disputes, namely the issues of territorial waters, airspace, the Aegean islands’ fortification and Cyprus, followed by an analysis of Greece’s appeals to the International Court of Justice and the United Nations with regard to the just and peaceful settlement of all relevant matters in dispute. As with previous chapters, this chapter also examines the impact of the Western alliance on the formation of Greek foreign policy with regard to the disputes that engrossed the two conflicting parties, in an attempt to reveal the necessary evidence that support allegations of ‘foreign intervention’. All in all, the present study provides an empirical analysis of the most significant issues addressed above; hence, the material necessary for this examination consists of primary and secondary sources in the form of official documentation, archives and other texts and journals. The primary sources utilized here, primarily in chapters two and three, concern bi-lateral agreements between the US and Greece; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports; (US) Congressional reports, bills and resolutions; (US) State Department and National Security Council (NSC) declassified documents; the Trea-

INTRODUCTION

5

ties on Cyprus’s independence; and the British Foreign Office archives. Chapter Four makes reference to agreements between the EEC and Greece, issued by the European Commission and Council, whereas the last chapter primarily examines United Nations resolutions and International Court of Justice documents. Other primary sources used in this study include the writings of those directly involved in the various matters of our examination, such as Konstantinos Karamanlis, Henry Kissinger, Glafkos Cleridis, Andreas Papandreou, Georgios Rallis and Georgios Papadopoulos. Equally significant are the Greek Parliamentary Proceedings and back issues of Kathimerini, a leading Greek daily. These sources reveal facts and information critical to the examination of our main hypotheses and will, therefore, provide us with a better understanding of the issues that are discussed hereinafter. As already noted, these issues constitute colourful events in Greece’s contemporary history that grew to become determining factors in the formation of Greek foreign policy. In fact, the assumption that the role of certain external powers was highly influential granted all the omnipresent advocates of conspiracy theories a unique opportunity to call for Greece’s disengagement from the Western camp. The examination of such material challenges these allegations and establishes the originality of this project, given that the foreign policy of smaller powers has been inadequately examined, if not entirely disregarded. It is noteworthy, however, that the primary sources relevant to this study are certainly not limited to those examined here. On the contrary, certain US agencies and departments such as the State Department, the CIA and the NSC, as well as the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence of Greece, along with other intelligence services, are known to be withholding documents considered highly confidential and thus, not available to the public. Beyond any shadow of doubt, this lack of access to governmental records and the persistent objections of the governmental bodies involved to release classified information are serious obstacles that limit our efforts to conduct a thorough examination and arrive at a satisfactory conclusion. On the other hand, the secondary sources offer much valuable information that contributes to the clarification of

6


the main issues discussed in the book. The examination of this material also indicates that Greek foreign policy was, indeed, subject to external influence in order to ensure that the interests of the Western alliance were well served. It suffices to say that the examination of all relevant sources, primary and otherwise, is crucial to challenging the notion of ‘foreign intervention’ that widely encouraged inappropriate conspiracy theories and the condemnation of all—but the Greeks—for any national tragedy.

2 Foreign Policy Theory

Prior to proceeding with an analysis of Greek foreign policy—as formulated and exercised by the conservative party of Nea Dimokratia—it is essential to understand the theoretical framework of foreign policy. Thus, the main goal of this chapter is to produce an account of foreign policy theory. However, considering the fact that it is equally important to attempt and classify Greece within a certain category of states’ type, a distinct theoretical approach needs to be adopted. This chapter, therefore, provides an examination of the more basic theory of foreign policy that applies to all states and then focuses on that part of theory concerning powers such as Greece. In the final section of the chapter, the primary aims of the conservative Greek governments that came to power after the restoration of democracy are identified, clearly because defining the position and aims of Greece, with regard to the international environment, provides us with the opportunity to examine in the subsequent chapters whether the Greek state had the potential to maintain, or even improve, its international status and achieve its objectives. At this point, it is important briefly to note the problems linked to the examination of a state’s foreign policy that researchers often encounter. Primarily, these concern the apparent lack of necessary data, such as confidential reports, and the difficulty to approach and seek information from those directly involved in the foreign policy process. Further problems of foreign policy theory analysis consist of distinguishing foreign policy from domestic poli-

8


tics and understanding the formulation of the former by examining the external relations and domestic structures of the state in question. Still, the most intricate part of such an examination is to produce credible definitions, a rather significant element that precedes any well-established analysis. Definition of Foreign Policy It is somewhat difficult to approach the concept of foreign policy, as well as to produce a concrete definition. The main obstacles are differences among states, such as their structures, interests and external problems. Normally, to overcome such problems a comparative approach would be required. However, this would result in further problems related to the subject of our assessment. Should such an analysis be concerned with ends or means, decisions or outcomes, attributes or behaviour, groups or individuals, resources or strategies, as the major determinant factors in the formation of foreign policy? Thus, it would be sensible, prior to any analysis regarding these particularly conflicting issues, to provide a number of definitions of the term ‘foreign policy’ so to attain a better understanding of the issue. Moreover, in order to produce a complete definition of the term, it is imperative that we take into account the various types of states (e.g. developed/non-developed, democratic/non-democratic, great/small, their aims (political power, economic gains, security), the actors responsible for the formulation of foreign policy (individuals/groups, states/agencies) and the relationship of foreign policy with domestic politics. Nevertheless, these issues tend to be rather controversial and we will, therefore, proceed with the definitions as such and explore the above stated highly influential factors at a latter stage. According to William Wallace, the concept of foreign policy reveals the link between a state and the international system, considering that the former constitutes an integral part of the latter, while it also describes the activities of any given government towards other states. Moreover, foreign policy pertains to the policies of a state with regard to the preservation of its national interests and promotes communication with other nations as well. National interests usually concern the territorial integrity of the state, the

FOREIGN POLICY THEORY

9

safeguarding of its authority, economic development and political stability, while communication implies the maintenance of good diplomatic relations with foreign countries. It is noteworthy that, despite the differences of characteristics among states, perhaps, the only common objective that states have is ‘national interest’. Nevertheless, the concept of ‘national interest’ remains rather controversial, and widely debated, within International Relations scholarship, therefore, we will limit our discussion on this particular issue to the aforementioned, albeit brief, definition. Likewise, Ronald Barston argues that foreign policy concerns the policies adopted by a government to achieve its aims. These policies are formed under internal or external pressure and need to be purposeful in order to meet the objective of fulfilling a state’s aims. Roy Jones seems to agree by stating that foreign policy is a ‘collection of measures, by no means intrinsically coherent, utilised by governments to meet problem.’1 In the same sense, George Reid provides an interesting definition by stating that ‘Foreign policy is viewed as a purposeful activity directed at an external target by the political leaders of national societies.’2 Two key features thus define the term ‘foreign policy’. The first characteristic is that foreign policy is goal directed and has to have a seemingly assertive nature. This, in turn, requires a state to apply certain measures that will enable it to achieve its aims. Regardless of the degree of power that the state possesses and the extent of pressure it can exert or sustain, the foreign policy of any given state has to be formed in such a way so to produce suitable results. Whether the outcome reflects the need of a state to gain advantage from its external environment or to ensure its national sovereignty within its boundaries, foreign policy has to be effective for a state to survive. The second characteristic is based on the fact that foreign policy is always directed towards the external environment. It concerns, and later on it may also affect, the diplomatic relations of a state with a certain part of the international community. Once formed, foreign policy will either become the cause of rivalry and dispute, resulting in further communication between the parties in conflict, or contribute to the sustenance of the general values of the international community, namely stability, peace and order.

10


The international system What is central to the study of foreign policy is to understand and provide an analysis of the concept of the ‘international system’. By ‘international system’ we mean the external environment of a state which subsequently includes all other states, the international organisations and alliances, the state as the foreign policy making unit, the relationships among states and the rules and values of the system towards which states must behave appropriately. The international system is complex due to the vast diversity of states that constitute it. This complexity derives from the differences among states and the manifold policies that states pursue in order to serve their national interests. The same can be argued about the degree of a state’s participation in international affairs and the interventionist policies of various international organisations. They all affect the nature of the external environment, however, such influence is regulated when states adopt, or at least consider, certain international norms and values so to maintain the status quo. However, the most significant feature of the international system that creates even more controversies is its constantly changing nature. Certainly, the various differences among states, the kinds of relations they have, their location and domestic situation, all influence the international system itself, since the latter eventually absorbs these changes and is, therefore, in a constant stage of flux, as changes are then channelled back to the states. The environment thus has a dual role, by both affecting and being affected by the states. As a result, ‘there is no deterministic relationship between the environment, the foreign policy process, and the outcome of that process,’3 because of the complex nature of the subject matter. From the complexity of the external environment, further problems arise for the policy-maker. These consist of the geographical position, the power of other states (population, military capabilities and economic strength), the balance of national power in the international system and the foreign policy of other states. Moreover, foreign policy is often constrained by the rules, laws and values of the international system itself, as well as by the state’s participation in coalitions and commitment to international treaties, since international law encourages world order and the peaceful


11

resolution of conflicts among states. The international system then defines the limits within which a state may act, since it provides opportunities, while at the same time it imposes constraints. It then depends on how the state perceives its external environment, as to how far the system affects the forming of foreign policy. With no doubt, the interrelationship of the external and domestic environment alike determines the foreign policy behaviour of the state. Nevertheless, the significance of the international system stems from the fact that the pressure it can exert through events and factors that are external to a state also affect the formulation of foreign policy. In fact, it is the structures of the international system that influence foreign policy during the process of its formation by restraining it. According to Chris Farrands, there are four types of environment that influence the process of foreign policy, however, these are not analysed at present, as they are not central to our subject matter. In any case, these types consist of the security environment (balance of power, military security), the economic environment (trade, production), knowledge and ideological structures that also influence foreign policy and the domestic structure (political system, culture) and may interact with each other, as well as with the foreign policy process. The international system must thus always be considered when making foreign policy decisions, particularly so, in the contemporary era. Nowadays, the number of actors within the international system has increased, their foreign policy has become more interdependent and international organisations appear far more active and important, thus further affecting the external environment. However, when the international system becomes more complex so do relations among states, which may suggest that a wholly independent foreign policy would be difficult to sustain. The foreign policy of small powers Prior to any analysis, it is imperative to stress that the majority of scholars prefer to use the term ‘small states’ while making reference to a certain group of countries, whereas a few call them ‘small powers’, particularly, when denoting military capabilities. Evidently,

12


The available case studies in IR heavily concentrate on great powers, and thus look at only one particular sample of states. Small states started life as a residual category and under a different name. Until well into the twentieth century, in all European languages states were routinely referred to as “powers” (French puissance, German Macht, Russian derzhava, Spanish/Portuguese poder, etc.). While this noun is still used for a different category of states, namely “great powers” (and, more rarely, also for “middle powers”), “small powers” are nowadays simply referred to as “small states”. This usage certainly further underlines their presumed lack of power in a quantitative sense. Following the Napoleonic Wars, “the powers” met at the Congress of Vienna. Those powers that made up the winning quadruple alliance—Great Britain, Prussia, Russia and the Habsburg Empire—were soon convinced by the spokesman of vanquished France, Talleyrand, that questions of importance would have to be settled between these five powers. In today’s parlance, we would say that they were to be settled “at five”. However, some of the questions that were to be settled would directly concern powers that were deemed too important to be left out entirely. These powers were given access to certain meetings that were held “at six” or “at seven”. As the century wore on, these powers sometimes came to be known, through processes that still await their researcher, as “middle powers”. Those powers that were deemed too inconsequential to be so included came to be known as “small states”.4 By contrast, it is our intention to re-establish the term ‘small power’ and to demonstrate that it is not power per se that these states lack, it is the opportunity to display it. Given that a large number of them have membership with certain regional and international organisations, such as the European Union, the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation, to name a few, their weight is magnified yet their role in the international environment remains underestimated. Hence, the present study will proceed with the ex-


13

amination of these states’ foreign policy by making use of both nouns concurrently. Historically, the study of small states/powers appealed for the most part to German scholars until the mid-nineteenth century, when the concept of nation-building made them ‘unattractive’. Their study grew in significance after the end of WWII, particularly, during the 1960s and 1970s, when their numbers also grew as a result of the process of de-colonisation. However, the 1980s and 1990s was a period of stagnation for the study of the foreign policy of small states/powers, thus offering relatively little to the understanding of International Relations (IR). The end of the Cold War era epitomised this apparent gap in IR literature, since the international system witnessed the emergence of many more small states/powers. Nonetheless, the cessation of the superpower struggle also improved the prospects of studying the foreign policy formation of this category of states and emphasised that it ‘is still a relatively young discipline, occupying a niche position in IR.’5 Beyond any shadow of doubt, this is an important topic, not least because the actions of small states/powers do make an impact on world politics, and so understanding all the variables that factor into the decisions of governments of small states/powers would, indeed, be a contribution to the core IR literature on foreign policy. Understandably, to approach the issue of foreign policy from the perspective of a small state/power is not an easy task. The main difficulty, according to Miriam Elman, is the lack of information about this very type of state in the literature of international relations. It seems that this area has been neglected and that the few studies that exist are sporadic. Even then, scholars, more often than not, focus on the states’ external environment, not so much on domestic issues. The prime reason scholars put much emphasis on the small states/powers’ external environment, presumably, relates to the fact that their key objective is to ensure security, since it is this type of state that may face credible external threats, therefore, leading to the precarious assumption that their foreign policy is less constrained by domestic factors. In any case, Ronald Barston mentioned the lack of research in this field of international relations too; however, the fact that his analysis precedes Elman’s publica-

14


tion by two decades, exceeding 30 years at the time of writing, emphasises the absence of relevant studies in this field of foreign policy—a view also maintained by Iver Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöll (2004). Although it is difficult to explain why this occurs, we may assume that the role that these states play in the international system, probably, accounts for the lack of interest in exploring their foreign policies. Neumann and Gstöll offered similar clarifications and stressed that IR is a ‘great power’ discipline that attracts the interest of scholars from great powers, whereas scholars from small states/powers publish material in their own language, rather than in English, which is usually overlooked. Moreover, those scholars possessed by the prominence of Realism clearly expressed an interest in the political affairs of superpowers and large powers, thus rendering the study of small states/powers’ external affairs uninspiring. Consequently, a large section of the literature available is dedicated to what appears to be a far more fascinating category of states, therefore, recording the victors’ historical and political perspective. Another reason is the fact that certain ‘inherent difficulties’ make the study of small states/powers’ foreign policy problematic, thus discouraging potential researchers. Most importantly, the ‘reason why IR as a discipline is paying insufficient attention to the study of small states is the discipline’s empirical slant. The idea seems to hold sway that, regardless of its theoretical worth, at least writings on great-power politics have a certain inherent interest due to the importance of the subject, whereas writings on small states do not. In empirical terms, the study of small states may only be apposite if small states have pertinence for outcomes.’6 Small states/powers, on the other hand, intrigued scholars in the 1960s and 1970s—a period of time that coincided with the resurgence of nationalism in former colonies—when the principle of self-determination, as promoted by the United Nations, culminated in the emergence of a multitude of small states/powers. As a matter of fact, the 1960 ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’ of the United Nations provided the necessary grounds, the impetus, for independence struggles in nations that had long witnessed foreign occupation. A similar proc-


15

ess took place in the aftermath of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, following the disintegration of both the former Soviet Union and Yugoslav Federation. Interestingly, what seems to have enhanced the prospects of survival for the newly formed small states/powers in the Cold War times denotes to the atypical conditions that dominated the period in question. Hedley Bull (1973) in his ‘The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Society’ asserted that deterrence and the balance of power brought about a sense of stability that served the small states/powers’ interests for survival well. Furthermore, the genuine commitment of these states to the preservation of International Law, while promoting the notion of collective security via UN-sponsored channels of communication, is anything but surprising, since the much celebrated international organisation has repeatedly championed concepts pertaining to territorial integrity and independence. As one might expect, small states/powers nowadays remain equally loyal to the very same principles. Nevertheless, research related to the subject under examination revealed a certain corpus of recent work on the topic, including general theoretical articles by Dag Anckar (2004), Paul Sutton (2001), and Nicola Smith et al. (2005). In particular, European enlargement and integration literature, such as Lee Moosung (2004), Paul Magnette and Kalypso Nikolaidis (2005), Roderick Pace (2002), Clive Archer and Neil Nugent (2006), Laurent Goetschel (1998 and 2000) and Olav Knudsen (2002), has focused on the strategies used by small states/powers in the European Union to leverage their external position in world affairs. Despite the valuable contribution of these authors to the study of small states/powers’ foreign policy, the ‘under-representation’ of these type of states in IR literature persists; therefore, it is essential that IR scholars be more concerned with this subject. ‘Great power’ studies are well represented in the literature of IR, but there needs to be more consideration of the contributions of small states/powers to provide political scientists with more and fresh empirical data, for these states are also an integral part of the international system no matter how awkward their roles may be.

16


Some of the authors mentioned above focus exclusively on the behaviour of small states/powers with regard to European affairs, which probably pertains to unconventional practices, taking into account that the whole structure of the European Union reflects a novel politico-economic experiment. Given that small states/powers ‘usually never attain the degree of real sovereignty that larger and more powerful states realize . . . these states [ought] to give special attention to the implications which international agreements might have on their autonomy’ and, therefore, must design their policies accordingly so as to survive the competition, maintain their independence and serve their interests.7 As it happens, European Union politics dictate that member-states with a population less than 40 million are considered small. So, from the European Union’s dimension, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia are all small states. Certainly, this sort of state classification is fundamental for the proper functioning of the European Union, since in the Euro-language ‘population’ is a synonym for ‘votes’. In fact, these small European Union member-states, to borrow the European terminology, are over-represented in the European Parliament and whenever the Qualified Majority Voting pattern is put into effect during sessions of the Council of Ministers; arguably, the most powerful institution at European level. In other words, the size of population is extremely meaningful when serving the purpose of European politics, as size reflects, and is directly associated with, political power. From a similar standpoint, Neill Nugent concurs that Cyprus is a small state, since the existing micro-states in Europe are a great deal smaller than Cyprus—in terms of population—even though he admits Cyprus into the relevant club as a very [original emphasis] small state. Although it is common practice among academics to advise their students against raising questions in an essay, particularly when there is no answer, here we feel compelled to ask just one—‘How small is Cyprus?’. Using ‘power’ as the main criterion in asserting a state’s classification, Handel identified five distinct types of states, namely, superpowers, great powers, middle powers, small


17

powers and micro-states. Classifying Cyprus as a very small state fails to satisfy our academic curiosity, since Cyprus would clearly not be a micro-state, while at the same time the east Mediterranean island would hardly constitute a firm case of a small state/power. In contrast, it appears that Cyprus would be more inclined to micro-states, thus confusing us all the more. On the other hand, assigning Cyprus the status of a small state/power would definitely perplex the situation further, given that states that, conventionally, fit in this category would probably claim ‘promotion’ to the higher echelons of state classification. Hence, it is of critical importance that we dismiss Cyprus’ small, and even very small, state/power status, simply because the above argument is wrong all along the line. Evidently, different researchers make use of equally different approaches to the matter of size or else ‘smallness’, to be more precise, which suggests a broad variety of results that, as you might expect, lack reliability as they are not always based on objective criteria. In particular, Nugent names two authors that apply numerically distinct models for the examination of small states/powers, as the first concedes a ten million population as the maximum a small state/power may have, while the other limits them to just three million. Obviously, the issue of ‘smallness’ is central to the definition of a small state/power and is usually described in terms of the state’s capabilities, which is more often than not problematic. Baldur Thorhallson, for one, defines small states as actors with limited capabilities and influence. In other words, he describes political entities that struggle to preserve their interests and territorial integrity. At the turn of the century, however, the international system— upon which a state’s ‘smallness’ depends—had already been transformed into a new environment that ‘has renewed and increased interest in small states research. Whereas in earlier times, small states were typically seen as suffering from power inferiority and dependence, today the size of a state is a less important factor for its security than ever before.’8 Obviously, small states, on a number of occasions, cannot afford mistakes or waste time and may even ‘feel the effects of anarchy to a greater extent;’9 nonetheless, ‘small-

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ness’ remains the major determinant in the response of these states to external events and, thus, deserves further attention. Michael Handel applied different terms to approach this issue, such as ‘small state’ that actually appears as a more territorial concept or else a state constrained by its very own size; ‘weak state’, which reflects a certain degree of powerlessness to exert any influence; and ‘small power’, a small political entity, powerful enough to influence world politics. Thus, we choose to drop the excess luggage and employ the term ‘small power’, based on the belief that this term does not simply portray geographic size or relative political weakness. Still, it is imperative that we produce an account of the characteristics of this type of states, as well as a working definition. As Hakan Wiberg put it, ‘the notion of “small state” or “small nation” is rather old and established,’ nevertheless, there is ‘little consensus on how to conceptualize and operationalise it.’10 The element of smallness in definitions Taking into account the complex nature of the subject under examination, the lack of empirical studies and, particularly, the diverse views of modern scholars regarding the very essence of a small power, the relevant studies available, undisputedly, provide researchers with more flexibility and may even help alleviate some of our concerns. The following oddly dated sources never fail to expand our knowledge, particularly, when contrasted to more recent publications. They also offer consistency to the process of developing our arguments, as they still form the very basis of analysis concerning the latest studies in this field and thus, are a good starting point. The literature cited is, indeed, old; however, it will enable us to argue for the need to examine the foreign policy of small powers afresh. To East, a small power’s foreign policy has five main features and appears much different to that of a great power. A small power is characterised by its limited interaction with other states, becomes involved with great enthusiasm in international organisations, supports international laws, has a minimum use of force and, finally, its foreign policy is often concentrated on regional matters. Thus, East draws the conclusion that we are dealing with a reactive, if not inac-


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tive political entity. Small powers are not expected to participate extensively in international affairs and conflicts, since it would require a higher level of diplomacy and the initiation of relevant events. As a matter of fact, a usual phenomenon would be for a small power to become involved in a joint event/operation, unlike great powers that initiate more events. Consequently, small powers make more use of verbal statements, rather than non-verbal, take fewer risks due to their limited capabilities and thus, are vulnerable to external events. Furthermore, small powers are also characterised by limited natural resources, a small economy and a population of ten to 15 millions of inhabitants. Hence, the size of a state is, perhaps, a rather important variable to the discussion of foreign policy, which only further complicates matters when a definition of the small power is demanded. ‘Size’ appears to be a rather controversial matter, since certain theorists, like Barston for instance, argue for the essence of this particular notion when a definition of the small power needs to be given, whereas others believe that size is of not much relevance to the issue. Rothstein, for example, believes that size is merely a matter of perception. Instead, Fox and Vital stressed that it is the state’s behaviour that defines the small power and which also distinguishes it from other types of states. Another approach would be that of Raimo Vayrynen, who attempts to produce a rather different classification of small powers, based on a low level of world ranking, high levels of foreign intervention and the specific interests of the state along with its behaviour and role in the international system. Considering such divergent views, it would be sensible to attempt an analysis of the concept of ‘size’ and its essence to our study before we provide any definitions of the small power. It appears that ‘size’ is a key element in determining the classification of a state within the international community, but its own questionable interpretation has limited all efforts for producing a more complete definition. The uncertainty as to which features should be granted significance in identifying a small power should not be disregarded, since size may reflect limited military capabilities and natural resources as well as a small economy. Yet again, it has been proved that such criteria are not entirely adequate to fulfil

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our aim. If anything, the military capacity of a small power would be necessary in an extremely anarchic, violent, international system, whereas a small economy incorporated into a much larger market, like the European Union for example, would curb economicrelated deficiencies. Moreover, were these features satisfactory for defining the small power, it would still be essential to elucidate under what circumstances these features need to be taken into account. Otherwise, the division between a small power and a microstate, or even a medium power, would not be clear enough. Thus, prior to reaching any sort of definition of the small power, one should first exhaust the subject of ‘size’ along with the attributes that compose this particular term. Then, perhaps, one should efface any comparison between countries that belong to the same type of state, simply because the result would not always reflect reality. In other words, one should not regard the notion of ‘size’ as the only feature that could produce a definition for the small power. As already mentioned, size is nowadays less significant, given the opportunities available to small powers for expanding their previously limited sphere of influence. David Vital defined small powers as the kind of states that depend on great powers. Consequently, the small power loses, to a degree, its autonomy and becomes a client or satellite state regardless of its short-term value. Although a multitude of such states would prove Vital’s argument correct, it is quite a controversial definition considering that during the Cold War many Western great powers such as Britain, France and West Germany were, at least from a military viewpoint, dependent upon the United States. Nevertheless, none of those three states were ever classified as ‘small powers’, despite the evident exigency to align with the United States for the cause of preserving their national interests. Handel offers the following two definitions of the small power to which, ‘a small state is any state in the international system that does not belong to the category of the powers,’ while Paul Herre argued that ‘within the European historical development one should treat as Small State all those states which in the prevailing political system do not belong to the Great Powers.’11 Both definitions appear to be as vague as the term ‘power’ itself, while it seems that to Handel


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and Herre there are no middle powers. However, the existence of middle powers is certain, which might enable us to, at least, draw a dividing line between ‘great’ and ‘small’ powers. Olav Knudsen’s earlier approach seems to be equally problematic, according to which there are no small powers. Rather, it is the relationship between any two states that distinguishes the great from the small power, a view also posed by Erling Bjøl. Barston’s teleological approach suggested four possible approaches that, on the whole, could define a small power, first, by putting a limit to the size of population; secondly, by measuring the state’s capabilities; thirdly, by considering the degree of its influence; and finally, through the identification of the characteristics that differentiate these states from others. The collective use of these four approaches could produce sufficient evidence for comparison, but probably not a sufficient definition. Only Trygve Mathisen handled the issue of ‘small power’ delicately enough to argue that ‘great power and small power are terms reflecting political power and not size of territory and population.’12 Still, what is missing is a clear definition to distinguish the small power from other types of state, since its possible misinterpretation, as a territorial concept, could lead to a poor definition. It is fundamental that we make explicitly clear that the term ‘small power’ has political connotations and does not merely reflect size of territory. The main obstacle of earlier studies in reaching a comprehensive definition was their apparent obsession with ‘size’, as it clearly dominated mainstream definitions. Thus far, the theorists mentioned above fail to understand that ‘smallness’ should not be described simply in terms of autonomy, degree of independence, territorial size and population, since ‘smallness’ is almost impossible to define. After all, Vital suggested that ‘Whether . . . small states . . . can be described as fully sovereign and politically independent is largely a matter of definition and opinion.’13 These criteria merely provide sufficient evidence to regulate a statistical analysis. Instead, it is necessary to measure the degree of their power, as it derives from the state of economy and the political infrastructure. Such elements make a key contribution to the role and influence of small powers in the international environment, which may suggest that it is the degree of participation in

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the international affairs that should be examined, even though they may ‘lack the resources for extensive international interactions’ and thus ‘concentrate on regional issues of immediate security.’14 All in all, small powers and their status within the international system are often misinterpreted. Although it is necessary to consider size, for example, as a much valued attribute, its significance is usually exaggerated. Apart from the matter of population, which is only emphasised in terms of votes within the scope of certain regional and international organisations like the European Union, size should be dismissed altogether from the list of potential features that define a small power. For instance, were California an independent state, it would have to have a place among the ten wealthiest countries in the world, no doubt an extraordinary achievement, yet she would only qualify as a small power had size played such a key role. The dynamics of today’s environment suggest that small powers are far more influential than the old-fashioned Cold War definitions suggest. Regardless of the degree of power that a small power possesses and the extent of pressure it can exert or sustain, the foreign policy of any such state has to be formed in a manner that produces suitable results, though much depends on the prevailing type of the international system. The foreign policy of small powers, particularly within the European Union, has become even more purposeful, as they relish considerably more power than ever before. Small powers in the international system The international community, an element less emphasised by most of the above theorists, is more significant than size, simply because the external environment alone defines the position of a state within its boundaries and places the latter into a category of states that share similar characteristics. Moreover, since a small power often demonstrates a certain level of participation in global affairs—primarily through membership in international organisations—it is the relationship between a state and its external environment that should have an equally decisive role in the classification of the state within the international system. Therefore, the type of state that characterises a particular country should not be indif-


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ferent to the country’s status within the international community. Considering that the international environment is in a constant stage of flux, as well as the fact that any given small power may be valued on a short-term basis, small powers need to make sure that their integrity and national interests are not in jeopardy. Therefore, a balance of power and a degree of interaction with other states is required, particularly, when a small power becomes the ‘apple of discord’ between two greater powers, thus facing the threat of becoming partitioned. Hence, it is essential for small powers to participate in international affairs in order to maintain the status quo and prolong stability in their region. Nevertheless, ‘because small powers lack the capacity to influence greatly their environment, they are more likely to adapt their policies to its dictates.’15 Handel argued that there are two types of international system, the ‘competitive’ and the ‘hegemonic’. In a competitive system, a small power is expected to enjoy more room for political manoeuvring because of the ‘competition’ among states, whereas the hegemonic pattern dictates that a small power is constrained within the sphere of influence of a great power. Within a hegemonic system, the small power has to co-ordinate its policies with those of the great power, particularly, in a tight bipolar system (e.g. the Cold War) where the high degree of competitiveness requires any small power, aligned with a great power, to support its powerful ally. Nevertheless, regardless of the type of international system, a state’s foreign policy is unlikely to be formed independently of the external environment, due to restraints such as its economic, political, military and cultural ties with other states. Precisely, because a state’s policies are expected to be of a certain context similar to those formed and applied in the past. With no doubt, a hegemonic system will cause the dependence of a small power on a more powerful one. However, the small power may also benefit from such a relationship, if it succeeds in signing a treaty that would commit the great power to providing support to the former, even during a military confrontation. The greater the dependence of a small power on a dominant one, the more will the latter be able to prevent regional conflicts that could jeopardise the territorial integrity of the former. Although such an

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agreement would satisfy both sides, it could endanger the small power’s sovereignty, since the great power may exploit a weaker side even in times of peace and stability; merely because great powers tend to ignore the effects of their decisions upon the interests of smaller powers. In which case, the small power would then have to provide its territory for the installation of the military bases of its protector and even support the great power in the event of a dispute with a third party. Hence, dependence may not only occur in terms of military support, but could also imply the decline of the small power’s political capabilities. The above situation is known as the ‘patron-client’ relationship and has four characteristics. A well-known characteristic is that (1) the patron will provide the client with the necessary assurances, as to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the small power, in return of other services (e.g. military facilities). Although the small power may prove quite demanding in negotiations with its patron, (2) the patron usually enjoys more bargaining power; however, (3) their relationship is not based on coercion. Finally, (4) the client state is expected to remain under the wing of its patron because of the ‘shield’ it provides. In a relationship that is determined by such features, it is only sensible to suggest that the client state will have to behave according to the demands of the patron and adjust its policies respectively. In such a scenario, one could further suggest that the patron-state would then penetrate the domestic political system and the military apparatus of the small power. Nevertheless, a patron-client relationship may not only be based on the mutual exchange of services, particularly when the patron’s aim is to maintain its influence over the smaller power, let alone to exert further pressure if needed. Therefore, coercion should not be easily discarded from the agenda, as was the case with Germany’s protectorates in the Second World War, or the satellite countries of the Soviet Union during the Cold War period. It is noteworthy that this form of relationship can also be established between a weak state and a state of even less power, like Egypt and the Arab world, and be equally relentless, as was the recent case of Iraq’s expansionist policy at the expense of Kuwait. Sadly, it is difficult to study such relationships, because they appear to operate against the core values


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of the International Relations theory and, thus, remain absolutely informal. Furthermore, the role of institutions that are part of the external environment, such as international organisations, should not be neglected since they may also affect a state’s foreign policy. Within these organisations, states share information and are encouraged to co-operate with each other in terms of conflict resolution and other security issues. These organisations influence the states’ foreign policy, as well as their domestic structures. Certainly, the opposite takes place too, and international organisations are then used as instruments of foreign policy for a state to achieve its aims. The degree of influence of these organisations depends on the political structures of the state, their national attributes and diplomatic efficiency as well as the level of development. In general, international organisations may exert pressure on a state through various channels. The rules of the international system with which a state has to comply, the organisations’ supervisory decisions over a matter of dispute and the certain patterns that need to be considered when forming foreign policy and as required for a state to achieve participation in such inter-governmental organisations, may all affect the policy-making of a state. Therefore, international organisations, in which many small powers enjoy membership, have a significant role in foreign policy since they often function as a limiting factor to the interests of the latter. Small powers tend to join such organisations and coalitions with the prospect of promoting their national interests. However, on certain occasions they are restrained from forming a wholly independent foreign policy when, for example, they are not in line with the interests of their allies. In such instances, the pressure exerted on the small power could be immense, if it fails to comply with the expectations of the organisation/coalition. Normally, at this stage the small power should realise the degree of its dependence on other more powerful states. Still, it remains incapable of gaining more independence in the field of foreign policy because of the restrictions imposed by these organisations/coalitions, as well as the obligations of every single member-state towards them. In other words, a small state often becomes entrapped within the mechanics of the politics of these

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organisations/coalitions, having to face the respective consequences that entail. It seems that when small powers encounter security problems they may then (1) seek protection from a great power, join either (2) an alliance of other small powers or (3) an international organisation where great powers take part, or (4) remain non-aligned. The first and third options provide the benefit of great power support; the fourth does not imply protection by a great power, but is a measure to avoid conflicts; while the second approach suggests limited support from the side of a great power, but has other advantages. All things considered, small powers can certainly be deeply affected by the dynamics of the international system; therefore, the latter is central to the examination of their foreign policy, perhaps, more to great powers. With no shadow of doubt, this clearly contradicts all research that merely emphasises the essence of ‘smallness’. Today, small powers relish more influence, particularly, when members of an organisation of the calibre of the European Union. The gigantic proportions of the European Union institutions, as well as the degree of influence that small powers enjoy within them, simply expand the potential power of these states. For example, even though the European Union is not a de jure member of the World Trade Organisation, the European Commission represents, de facto, all member-states. Obviously, under this scheme, small powers are more influential, as their negotiating power is suddenly multiplied by the number of member-states that comprise the European Community. In an ever-globalised international community the role of small powers has been magnified to an extent where their number alone may come to signify powerful coalitions capable of resisting and even curbing the influence of what are traditionally perceived as larger powers. The fact that both the European Union and NATO comprise a large number of small powers has certainly renewed scholars’ interest in these type of states. Small powers are ardent supporters of international organisations for the latter provide effective channels of communication, thus the voice of small powers today echoes the faintest political remark fittingly displaying power and antithesis to large power interests. Within the context of the


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European Union, in particular, small powers have the capacity to exert considerable influence, since (1) their voting power (with QMV clearly misrepresenting their size of population); (2) the rotating Presidency; (3) their continuous support for an ever-stronger Commission (capable of counter-balancing the dominant position of larger power in the Council); and, of course, (4) their apparent overrepresentation in the European Parliament obviously favour small power interests. It is noteworthy that the European Union has been habitually drawing the attention of small powers ever since its very inception. In light of this evidence, it is quite likely that the significance of small powers will continue to increase under conditions of globalisation. Domestic attributes The type of state, along with certain significant internal features, could affect foreign policy to an extent comparable to that of the external environment. The state type is definitely important to foreign policy, since, for example, it tends to be more constrained by domestic politics in democratic states rather than in authoritarian regimes. In a democracy, when a government is under political pressure that could cause its removal from power, foreign policy may come under pressure as well, whereas authoritarian states usually confront far fewer challenges from their domestic environment. Another pattern for comparing democratic and non-democratic states is the comparison between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ societies. From one perspective, ‘openness’ may suggest a certain degree of vulnerability in the case of a small power, but it may also imply more interaction with other states and participation in international affairs. This means that the pressure of the external environment may affect the domestic issues of a small power, since any greater power would then have the opportunity to penetrate the internal system of the former and exert control over the political, military and economic sectors of the country. In a sense, this would not be entirely catastrophic to the small power, though it would limit its ability to form an independent foreign policy, since it would benefit from a subordinate relationship by acquiring external support. Such

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support could come in terms of financial aid, military supplies and the propping of the small power’s political system. On the contrary, an authoritarian state, or ‘closed’ society, would probably be less exposed to external threats and receive less pressure from its external environment. Unless, of course, such a state is significant to the interests of a greater power, in which case it is probable that eventually pressure will be exerted upon the authoritarian regime. Otherwise, the above argument suggests that the foreign policy of an authoritarian state would not be influenced by another power, though such a type of state would neither enjoy a high degree of participation in the international affairs. Hence, it is more likely that an authoritarian regime would eventually become isolated and, in case of an oppressive government, bear the sanctions of the international community. Immediately, this would imply that the state would suddenly become vulnerable, due to the lack of support from the external environment and, perhaps, cause the compromising of its sovereignty. However, a state may secure its power through possession of an important source of raw materials, such as oil, or due to its strategic location. Generally speaking, a small power that is of interest to a great power may increase its capabilities by exerting influence on the latter with the intention to fulfilling its own interests. Such pressure may concern ‘threats’ from the side of the small power to align with some other great power. Once attained, power will then affect the formation and exercise of foreign policy by simplifying the respective procedures required for policy-making. This occurs because the structures of a small power are less complex, when compared to those of a great power, and thus, a small power may prove to be more effective in terms of foreign policy. Two additional factors that are interrelated with a state’s power are membership in international organisations and support from the bordering states. Finally, another related element is the level of development that may indicate, if highly developed, that the state possesses sufficient levels of power to become more active in international affairs. Moreover, the issue of ‘smallness’ does not only create obstacles to the foreign policy of a small power, it also has positive aspects. On the governmental level, ‘smallness’ may suggest more integration


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and centralisation, thus a small power can be more flexible and focus on the most important issues that affect its external affairs. Since the interests of the small powers are more often of a narrow range and regional scope, they are able to concentrate on a few core issues, in contrast with the greater powers, and become more successful. In this sense, small powers may well be in a position to influence regional politics, which, subsequently, means that small powers may be more effective and even more aware of the problems that are generated by their external environment. Domestic issues play a key role on the foreign policy of small powers. As illustrated above, the type of state and its particular internal features have a rather significant impact upon the policymaking process as well as the effectiveness of a state’s foreign policy. Therefore, the efficacy of a state’s foreign policy could stem from domestic politics, the degree of internal stability, its level of development and the potential for prosperity. Hence, domestic policy is not entirely irrelevant to foreign policy and the process of policy-making. On the contrary, it appears that they are interrelated and quite affected by the other. Conclusion The primary aim of this chapter was to provide an analytical framework of how states conduct their foreign policy, focusing on the type of small powers. The discussion concerned the causes of foreign policy, the significance of policy-making and the different types of states, along with their domestic attributes. Nevertheless, and regardless of the material presented in the foregoing pages, the controversial nature of the issue does not leave room to produce an adequate and complete conclusion. In an attempt to interpret the concept of ‘small power’, various theorists have adopted different approaches and produced a range of conclusions. However, to reach a single definition has proved an arduous task, due to the numerous variables in this study and their particular interpretation under certain conditions. When examined alone these variables produce different results, than when considered in interaction with others. For instance, the domestic environment has its distinct role in the conduct of a small power’s for-

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eign policy, as does the external. Hence, given the degree of interrelationship between the two, small powers’ foreign policies are then affected in a different manner because of the twofold pressure exerted upon a given state. Furthermore, these particular determinants constitute the most crucial factors in assessing a small power’s foreign policy. The variables to characterise the small powers are quite similar to those of greater powers, although of a smaller scale, but have proved more perplexing when part of our examination. The whole concept now becomes even more intricate, since the degree of ‘smallness’ and the meaning of the term itself generate further problems. As stated, small powers often face obstacles when forming foreign policy, inasmuch as their political, economic and military power is somewhat impeded by extraneous factors, causing serious difficulties to the interpretation of their policies. Therefore, internal stability, a flexible administration and the formation of alliances are central to the success of small powers’ foreign policy. The influence of the international system too has a great impact on the conduct of foreign policy because the already complex nature of the international environment exerts its own pressure on the internal structures of the states. Simply enough, the concept of the ‘international system’ may, yet again, provide ground for debate. The various differences among the states that constitute it almost make it impossible to provide a credible analysis of the issue. This diversity amongst states, along with the perplexing characteristics of the international system, is then reflected upon the different theories and definitions provided by the previously examined scholars. In any case, the term ‘small power’ should preside over ‘small state’ in the relevant literature so to deliver a more accurate description of the states in question, not to mention the need to escape from the rather archaic and problematic Cold War definitions. All things considered, the complex, yet fascinating, nature of small powers does not warrant the comparative lack of literature that epitomises the IR scholars’ interest in these particular type of states. Whether because small powers have been ‘misplaced’ within the international system or simply under-estimated and, thus, overlooked, primarily due to inaccurate definitions, there is no doubt


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that these states are worthy of attention. In addition, to neglect their posture not only reflects negatively on the relevant discipline, it seriously undermines the dynamics of the international system and the kind of hierarchy that describes it. Unless, of course, the literature of International Relations is as ‘anarchic’ as the very subject of its focus appears to be. Similarly confusing is the area of policy-making. In a small power the leader of the state often occupies a dominant role in the country’s foreign policy, bypassing the relevant ministries, agencies and other institutions. This should not necessary imply that those responsible for forming foreign policy lack the expertise. Instead, it appears to be a matter of recognised status, within the scope of the international community, that only the leader possesses. Nevertheless, the policy-making process of a small power often reflects mere reactions to external events usually due to their limited capabilities that act as a restraint to the relations of a small power with its external environment. The variables analysed above are significant limitations upon the expectations of a state. Therefore, the only means for a small power to ensure its viability are internal stability, a flexible administration and the formation of alliances. Some other alternatives could also be the adoption of a non-aligned or neutral policy, though these may result in the state’s isolation. Identifying the process of formation as well as the aims of Greek foreign policy, is certainly yet another arduous task, since one needs take into account the fact that Greece—during the historical period that is the subject of this study—constituted a small power that was part of NATO, strategically located, developed enough to apply for membership in the EEC, but also vulnerable to her external environment. Greece should be considered as a Western-orientated state that was always under the protective wings of the great powers, as her history indicates; however, the cruel experience of the dictatorship caused her isolation and made Greece feel somewhat bitter toward her allies due to their attitude concerning the imposition of the military regime and the tragic events that followed in Cyprus. Until then, Greece’s relationship with the great powers had always aimed at enhancing her internal stability and ensuring territorial integrity, but when her patrons failed to make

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good on these guarantees, Greece redirected her policies with the aim of more independence in the conduct of her external affairs. Hence, it is hardly surprising that Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis concentrated his attention on the external affairs of the Greek state. The seven-year period of military rule had severe consequences and Karamanlis was expected to rectify the situation. Apart from restoring democracy, Greece had to re-establish herself within the international community and form an independent foreign policy too. However, considering the internal problems of Greece, the conflict with Turkey over the issues of the Aegean and Cyprus and her questionable position within the Western alliance, then, one would assume that Greece, as a small power, would have to struggle to keep her interests intact. During the 1974–1981 period Greek foreign policy decisions can be categorised under three headings. These concern decisions in times of a military crisis (e.g. Greece’s withdrawal from NATO); long-term programmatic decisions (e.g. Greece’s candidacy for membership with the EEC) and, finally, short-term tactical decisions (e.g. the Carter Administration’s decision to lift the Turkish embargo). Whether Greece was successful in achieving her aims, is a subject examined in the succeeding chapters.

3 A History of Intervention

To understand the political conditions under which Greek foreign policy of the Nea Dimokratia governments was formed and applied, we must look further back to identify the origins of the problems that the conservative party had to deal with in the postdictatorial era. It is thus necessary to provide an account of the seven-year period of military rule in Greece, since it had a great impact on Greek foreign affairs, eventually resulting in an extremely strained relationship with Turkey. Moreover, during the dictatorship, Greece faced international antipathy and condemnation that led to the diplomatic isolation and domestic instability of the country, the consequences of which is the subject of our examination. However, the actual causes of the coup remain contested, though it has often been implied that it was the aftermath of foreign intervention. To examine this particular hypothesis, this chapter provides an analysis of both the domestic situation and the degree of external interference in Greece. The analysis thus focuses on Greece’s relations with the Western powers, namely Britain, the United States and NATO, since they were the main actors exerting influence on Greek foreign policy. At the time, the European Economic Community (EEC) had not yet experienced any significant political or military development that would qualify it as a potential protagonist in the respective crises that took place in the Eastern Mediterranean, therefore our reference to the EEC will be exceptionally limited. The issues that the

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present chapter addresses concern Greece’s admittance to the Western camp along with the relevant implications of foreign intervention, the Cyprus struggle for independence that dominated Greece’s relations with her allies and the dictatorship itself, which prepared the grounds for an ever lasting rivalry between Greece and Turkey. Finally, the objectives of Greece, following her longawaited return to democracy, are discussed. Foreign intervention in post-war Greece Prior to any analysis, it is imperative to produce some historical facts that concern Greece during the first half of the 20th Century so as to understand the degree of the political crisis that emerged in the post-war period. During that time Greece had to endure the consequences of five military regimes (1909-1936),1 as well as two failed attempts to impose a dictatorship (1933, 1935), while she also became engaged in six wars2 (1912-1949). Other significant historical facts concern two military coups (1862, 1922) that succeeded in the dethronement of the Monarch, three referenda (1920, 1935 and 1946) that pronounced the return to Monarchy—out of which the first two were false—and another referendum on the issue of democracy in Greece (1924). The same degree of political instability characterised Greece’s internal affairs from the end of Second World War onwards, particularly, when considering the fact that the Greek people were called to vote in national elections nine times3 (1946-1964). Interestingly, even though the Greek national liberation movement of 1821 succeeded in bringing Ottoman rule to an end, independence had been achieved with the support and assistance of France, Britain and Russia. In view of the fact that the great powers helped determine the destiny of Greece, true independence was never accomplished, since the Greeks would have to please new patrons before long. In fact, following the end of the Second World War, the future of Greece became clear at a meeting in Moscow (1944), between Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill, where it was decided that Greece would join the Western camp within the British sphere of influence. Britain’s patronage did not last long, however, since, on February 1947, the British government informed the United States that it could no longer support Greece,

A HISTORY OF INTERVENTION

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because of the Civil War that had erupted a year earlier between the Greek Conservative government and the communist party. Due to the strategic significance of Greece, the United States took the decision to intervene and apply the Truman Doctrine on 12 March 1947, which brought Greece under the United States wing, in an attempt to battle the spread of communism in the Balkan Peninsula. The Truman Doctrine affected deeply the political orientation of Greece, as she was then considered part of the Western alliance. The possible effects of the Greek Civil War convinced the United States to support the Conservative government in Athens and become actively involved in Greek politics so as to ensure that power would not fall into communist hands. In July 1947, George Marshall, the United States Secretary of State, informed Dwight Griswold, Chief of American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG), that ‘we [the United States] desire to see in Greece a government whose members are . . . primarily interested in keeping their country from falling under Communist control or Soviet domination. Ideally, members of the government should be drawn from the political parties of the left, the centre, and the right, but not so far to the left that they are disposed to make concessions to, or deals with, the Communist or so far to the right that they would refuse to cooperate with non-Communists.’4 Thus, the United States became seriously engaged in Greek domestic affairs, as they attempted to thwart the ambitions of the Greek Left, while supporting the political activities of the non-communist parties. The United States position was strengthened when a National Security Council report (12 February 1948) stated that Greece would need foreign assistance from 1 July 1948 onwards to fight the communist guerrilla forces. The report stressed the point that ‘the Greek Government rests on a weak foundation and Greece is in a deplorable economic state.’5 The extent to which the United States was prepared to interfere in Greek domestic politics is indicated in a State Department directive and becomes far more clear when considering the fact that the intervention in the Greek Civil War was its first ever involvement in guerrilla warfare. According to the directive, the United States ambassador in Athens had a rather influential, if not dominant, role in making decisions regarding ‘(a)

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Any action by United States representatives in connection with a change in the Greek cabinet; (b) Any action by United States representatives to bring about or prevent a change in the high command of the Greek armed forces; (c) Any substantial increase or decrease in the size of the Greek armed forces; (d) Any disengagement arising with the Greek or British authorities which, regardless of its source, may impair cooperation between American officials in Greece and Greek and British officials; (e) Any major question involving the relations of Greece with the United Nations or any foreign nation other than the United States; (f) Any major question involving the policies of the Greek Government toward Greek political parties, trade unions, subversive elements, rebel armed forces, etc., including questions of punishment, amnesties and the like; (g) Any question involving the holding of elections in Greece.’ The directive elevated the role of the United States ambassador, allowing him to act as the sole representative of the United States in the capacity of the chief decision-maker—whenever necessary— regarding a vast array of Greek domestic issues. In essence, the ambassador acquired significant powers pertaining to ministerial appointments, the hierarchy and size of the armed forces, and other more sensitive areas such as the relationship of the Greek state with other segments of the political spectrum, as well as its policies toward potential elements of insurgency. Most certainly, the ambassador’s authority was not limited to domestic matters, but was also extended to Greek foreign affairs. The focal point of the directive, nevertheless, is its particular reference to ‘the holding of elections in Greece.’ Elections in Greece served a particular purpose, as will be indicated in the pages to follow, and would soon clarify United States intentions concerning the political environment of Greece. The military and financial aid that Greece received from the United States (Greece received $1.7b in economic aid and $1.3b in military aid between 1947 and the 1960s) was seen both as an embrace of the country by her new powerful patron and a crucial step to becoming part of the Western—democratic—world. Having ensured a degree of favourable political stability in Greece, the government in Washington only needed to secure Greek admission to NATO. Greece applied on April 1950 for membership, but met the


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objections of other member-states. However, the Greek application enjoyed United States support to a great extent, due to the Iranian crisis, the situation in the Middle East and, particularly, Greece’s engagement in the Korean War. As soon as Greece joined NATO in 1952, the Greek government issued agreements with the United States (1953) to facilitate United States bases on Greek soil and agreed to having the Greek armed forces restructured by the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group. Other than providing obvious strategic benefits for the United States, Greek membership in NATO rallied the non-communist parties, the primary reason that explains why the Plastiras–Venizelos government ratified the agreement with considerable ease, and inspired loyalty to the Western alliance. It is important to note, however, that the prospect of NATO membership never faced serious domestic opposition because of the absence of influential leftists in Greek politics. Elections in post-war Greece The 1946 elections The first post-war elections took place on 31 March 1946 and saw Konstantinos Tsaldaris’ Laikon Komma (People’s Party) coming to power. Although Leftist parties did not take part in those elections, United States officials stated that the result was legitimate and representative. This, however, did not satisfy the government in Washington since the winning party was in fact inclined toward the crown whereas the Greek public was hardly in favour of the Monarchy. More precisely, in the 1946 elections the Greek Left was conspicuous by its absence, parties of the Centre were characterised by division, while the Greek Right had formed an alliance called Inomeni Parataxi Ethnikofronon (United Camp of the Nationally Minded). The elections were held under the system of proportional representation and the Right emerged victorious with 55 per cent of the votes and 58 per cent of the seats (206 seats in a 354-seat parliament). The royalist Laikon Komma, with 156 seats, was the party with a relative majority. Once it assumed power, United States suspicions were verified when the royalists took the decision to hold a referendum on September 1946 regarding the institution of

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the Monarchy that resulted in the return of King George II to Greece. The result of the referendum—68 per cent in favour of and 32 per cent against the institution of Monarchy—was viewed with suspicion, as the Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Elections (AMFOGE) claimed that the royalists probably exerted pressure to secure the King’s return. To prevent any political instability, the United States requested Tsaldaris’ removal from power and the appointment of Themistocles Sofoulis6 in his place. Amid the confusion, the Kommounistiko Komma Elladas (Greek Communist Party–KKE) announced the formation of the Dimokratikos Stratos tis Elladas (Democratic Army of Greece)—which caused the party to be banned until 1974—as it disapproved of the King’s reappointment and, eventually, brought about the Greek Civil War. During the Civil War, the United States supported the SofoulisTsaldaris coalition government in their attempt to contain the leftist parties and counter the guerrilla forces. With the end of the Civil War (1949) Greece pursued political stability and survival by maintaining close ties with the United States. Greece was entering a period of dependence, during which the political elite of the state had to put up with a considerable degree of external interference in their government’s decisions, with the Greeks being keen to please the great powers and ‘produce the regime they consider most acceptable.’7 For example, following United States suggestions the government in Athens established a security agency similar to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which was named Kentriki Ypiresia Pliroforion (Central Intelligence Service). The Kentriki Ypiresia Pliroforion worked closely with the CIA station in Athens—notably the third biggest in the world—and became engaged in ‘political surveillance’8 activities that undoubtedly served the cause of the United States mission in Greece as much as it did Greek domestic security concerns. Soon, the government in Washington too became involved in Greek domestic affairs by supporting the removal of certain Greek governments and their succession by others of a more preferable centreright political orientation.


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5 March 1950 The elections of 1950, the first since the end of the Civil War, were held under a proportional electoral system and reflected the whole political spectrum with the Laikon Komma and the Komma Phileleftheron just two of the 44 parties that contested the elections. Nicolaos Plastiras’ newly-found Komma Proodeftikon Philelefteron Kentrou (Progressive Liberal Centre Party) and Emmanouil Tsouderos’ Dimokratikon Proodeftikon Komma (Democratic Progressive Party) formed an alliance called the Ethniki Proodeftiki Enosis Kentrou (National Progressive Centre Union), whereas the Left was represented by the Dimokratiki Parataxis (Democratic Camp), an alliance consisting of the Enosis Dimokratikon Aristeron (Union of Democratic Leftists), the Komma Aristeron Phileleftheron (Party of Leftist Liberals) and the Sosialistikon KommaEnosis Laikis Dimokratias (Socialist Party-Union of Popular Democracy). The elections produced a Centrist coalition government headed by Nicolaos Plastiras (Premier) and Sophoclis Venizelos (Vice Premier), while the Left only managed some 9.7 per cent of the votes. Plastiras’ radicalism during his campaign met with opposition from the palace to his appointment and even attempted to replace him with Venizelos, but this was opposed by the United States ambassador, Henry Grady, who feared political instability. Despite Grady’s endorsement of Plastiras, George McGhee (Greek-Turkish Aid Program Co-ordinator) considered Plastiras unreliable due to his ‘lax and sometimes rash policy towards the communists.’9 Ignoring Grady’s recommendations not to oppose the popular will, the palace proceeded with the installation of Venizelos’ government; however, it was short-lived and Plastiras eventually replaced Venizelos as Grady declared that any sign of disorder could affect the continuation of American aid. However, Plastiras resigned and was replaced by an administration under Venizelos, responding to pressure from the Greek Right. 9 September 1951 Due to the anomalies of the 1950 elections, the Greeks were asked to vote once more in the following year. In the new reinforced

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proportional electoral system, the recently formed Ellinikos Sinagermos (Greek Rally), headed by Alexandros Papagos, emerged victorious, but did not form a government as it only managed 36 per cent of the popular vote and 114 seats in a 258-seat parliament. It is noteworthy that the Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera (United Democratic Left) replaced the Dimokratiki Parataxis, but only managed to attract the same percentage as its predecessor (10.6 per cent), though fewer seats (ten seats in a 258-seat parliament, whereas the Dimokratiki Parataxis got hold of 18 seats out of 250). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the system of the 1951 elections served the purpose of limiting the prospects of smaller parties to achieve parliamentary representation unless they secured 17 per cent of the votes. Although Papagos asked for new elections, the palace did not grant his request. Instead, the parties that occupied second and third place in the elections, the Ethniki Proodeftiki Enosis Kentrou and the Komma Phileleftheron respectively formed a coalition government. This was headed first by Plastiras and then by Venizelos; nevertheless, the political tensions of 1951 had not subsided and the United States Embassy decided to intervene yet again. In March 1952, the new United States ambassador, John Peurifoy, condemned, the proportional representation system for its propensity to produce weak governments, and threatened to cut off American aid unless the electoral law was amended to endorse a majority system for the new elections. According to Peurifoy, new elections were deemed necessary, as the majority system would provide a more stable government that would utilise American aid more effectively. Obviously, Peurifoy overstepped the bounds of his authority and took actions more appropriate for the prime minister. Despite the fact that the United States promoted democracy and openly favoured anything but communist rule in Greece, the measures adopted to produce a western-type political environment were certainly not democratic. The intervention of the United States in the national elections that followed the Civil War clearly demonstrated its intention to appoint a government that would promote US foreign policy goals in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as secure internal stability in Greece.


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16 November 1952 The new electoral law was passed in October 1952 and elections were set for the following month. The majority system produced a solid Greek Rally government, under the leadership of Alexandros Papagos, who secured 49.2 per cent of the popular vote and a disproportionate 82 per cent of the seats (247 seats in a 300-seat parliament). The Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera, again, secured a percentage similar to the previous elections, but due to the uniqueness of the electoral system it failed to secure any seats in the parliament. Papagos was the beneficiary of United States policy as the government in Washington expressed a clear preference to provide support for single-party strong governments, since its main aim remained the containment of communism. Papagos, a former Field Marshal, not only was strongly opposed to communism, but also enjoyed the support of the military. This means that Centrist and Leftist parties could not succeed to power, since they could not attain the desired number of votes to form a stable government, neither were they committed to NATO and the King. Papagos’ speech before the new parliament, on 17 December 1952, confirmed his pro-American position, as it was a clear indication that the interests of the West would be adequately served. However, Papagos died soon after his election (September 1955) and was succeeded by Konstantinos Karamanlis, therefore, bypassing Panagiotis Kanellopoulos and Stephanos Stephanopoulos (both vice-premiers of Ellinikos Sinagermos). Despite rumours of favouritism, Karamanlis denied being supported by either the crown or the United States. Immediately after his appointment as prime minister, Karamanlis replaced the Ellinikos Sinagermos with his Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis (National Radical Union Party) and called for new elections. The result of those elections was subject to a unique electoral system that combined elements of the majority and proportional systems, with the majority part being applied in rural areas where the conservatives were strong and the proportional in urban areas where the opposition was stronger. Such was the will of Karamanlis when he exploited his significant Ellinikos Sinagermos support in the parliament to pass the new electoral law. Evidently, the Ellinikos Sinagermos represented the interests of the

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Americans, the palace, the armed forces and the Greek Right in a profound manner, considering the support it enjoyed within parliament. The size of the Ellinikos Sinagermos’ electoral success marked a new era of right-wing governments, all enjoying the support of the United States. The 1956 elections As a result, in the elections of 19 February 1956, Karamanlis’ newly established Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis consolidated 47.4 per cent of the votes, therefore, securing the majority of seats in the parliament (165 seats in a 300-seat parliament); whereas the Dimokratiki Enosis (Democratic Union)—comprising almost all remaining parties—won 48.2 per cent of the popular vote, but only 44 per cent of the parliament’s 132 seats. Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis also gained the vast majority (77 per cent) of the military personnel and civil servants who voted separately. The Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera, too, was part of the Dimokratiki Enosis, securing 18 seats in the new parliament. When a dispute within the ranks of Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis’ members took place in February 1956 regarding the alteration of the electoral system, King Paul called for new elections. The 1958 elections Similar irregularities were identified in the 1958 elections when Karamanlis introduced a new reinforced proportional representation system, in an attempt to restrain party coalitions and limit the representation of smaller parties. Karamanlis’ proposals resulted in the withdrawal of many significant members of the Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis party, such as Georgios Rallis, who simply disagreed with the intentions of the former. The political tension that emerged created anxiety among United States governmental circles that feared that the Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis’ disunity could have a serious impact upon the outcome of the elections. Hence the plan to influence the electoral result by employing their secret services to fund parties and candidates, a plan conceived by CIA Director Allen Dulles. In fact, the operation was put into practice, according to


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a CIA report entitled ‘Covert Operations’, without, however, revealing either the amount of money supplied or its recipients. As expected, Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis emerged victorious once again (41.2 per cent), but what was significant about these elections was the rise of leftist voters (24.4 per cent) with Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera becoming the opposition party. To a great extent, Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera owes its remarkable success to the anti-American sentiments generated by Cyrpus’ struggle for independence. Those to suffer the most from Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera’s rise in votes were the parties of the Centre that witnessed further division, causing the fragmentation of Komma Phileleftheron into three parties; Phileleftheron Dimokratikon Komma (Liberal Democratic Party), Nea Politiki Kinisis (New Political Movement) and one continuing under the same name. An equally significant issue to both Greek external affairs and the inability of the Centre to contest the elections on a common front is the economic situation that Greece found herself in during the mid-1950s. Despite the relative economic prosperity, the countryside suffered from unemployment and low wage rates, thus widening the gap between rural and urban areas that, in turn, caused increased rates of migration. The overall economic situation, coupled with the division of the Centre, prompted the Greeks voters to deliver a powerful message to the elites by voting for a leftist party. The turn of events, as presented above, became a major concern to the United States such that the government in Washington decided to explore the possibility of limiting the Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera’s influence. According to a State Department confidential report, the obvious solution was to continue providing support to Karamanlis and his government. This report further suggested that another alternative could be the creation of a centre-left party that would become the country’s main opposition party and thus displace Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera, though it was not certain whether such a party could adequately preserve the United States interests.

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The 1961 elections Although the degree of United States intervention was somewhat reduced during the 1960s, elections in Greece had yet to become representative and legitimate. In the elections of 29 October 1961, Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis was again the winning party, but the electoral result was seriously questioned. The 1961 elections are often referred to as ‘an electoral coup d’état,’10 with Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis being accused of ‘intimidation and falsification,’11 as the new electoral system was designed to re-establish Karamanlis control of the government, produce a marginal representation of the Centre parties within parliaments and limit the participation of the leftist parties. Indeed, Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis accumulated 50.8 per cent of the popular vote and 58.7 per cent of the seats (176 seats in a 300-seat parliament). Georgios Papandreou’s newly established Enosis Kentrou (Centre Union) gained 33.7 per cent of the votes and 100 seats—replacing Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera as the new opposition party—the latter only managing 14.6 per cent of the votes and 24 seats. Papandreou’s Enosis Kentrou was the result of a process of fusion of centrist elements with the sole aim of producing a more influential segment of the Greek political spectrum, indirectly, supported by State Department officials ‘who had implied that the new Kennedy administration would not be ill-disposed towards a centrist government if it showed unity and resolution.’12 The United States government encouraged the creation of Enosis Kentrou to contain the influence of Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera and create a two-party system. Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis’ dominant position inspired Papandreou to initiate the so-called ‘unyielding struggle’ against Karamanlis’ party, while Venizelos, deputy leader of Enosis Kentrou, argued that the government apparatus together with ‘the General Staff of the Army, Kentriki Ypiresia Pliroforion, the gendarmerie, the National Security Battalions and other dark forces’ had seriously affected the outcome of the elections.13 Arios Pagos (the Supreme Court) and its Dimokratikoi Antiprosopoi (Judicial Representatives), responsible for observing the conduct of the elections, supported those allegations as well. Evidently, Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis faced the fierce opposition of Papandreou, the


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first serious challenge in the six-year rule of Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis, whose party openly questioned the legitimacy of Karamanlis’ government. Further problems occurred when, in 1963, Karamanlis attempted to make the Crown and the army subject to the government, but his plan was not treated with enthusiasm and the Crown forced him to resign. Queen Frederica openly questioned Karamanlis’ loyalty to the Crown and did not hesitate to suggest to Lock Campbell, Chief of the CIA Station in Athens, that it was time for another party to govern Greece and added that in case of a crisis the Crown would not hesitate to turn to the army for the purpose of serving its interests. It is noteworthy that Karamanlis’ resignation followed the assassination of Grigorios Lambrakis, a prominent member of Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera, in Thessaloniki (May 1963). Although Karamanlis was never directly connected to this event, leftists argued that it was imperative to take apart the apparatus that sustained the Right in power by employing extraparliamentary measures. Panagiotis Pipinelis was appointed by the King to lead the caretaker government that adopted a new electoral system, similar to that of 1958, even though only Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis’ members took part in the vote as the other parties were against the reinforced proportional system and in favour of the simple proportional one. The 1963 and 1964 elections Queen Frederica’s hopes were, eventually, realised when on 3 November 1963 Enosis Kentrou won the elections, although by a narrow margin that did not enable Papandreou to form government. Enosis Kentrou won 42.1 per cent of the votes and 138 seats in parliament, whereas Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis gained 39.4 per cent of the votes and got hold of 132 seats. Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera managed a lower share of the vote, but managed to get more seats (28) in the parliament. Papandreou’s narrow majority could only mean that he would either form a coalition government with Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis or co-operate with Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera, but when either scenario proved rather difficult to implement the King appointed Ioannis Paraskevopoulos to lead a

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caretaker government and prepare the grounds for new elections under the same electoral system. What is surprising about the new elections is that Enosis Kentrou was in favour of the reinforced proportional system, whereas Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis preferred a simple majority, in view of the radical change of the popular will. Papandreou only needed to wait for the elections of 16 February 1964, when Enosis Kentrou won by an unprecedented percentage (52.7 per cent) and 171 seats in parliament. Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis, in alliance with Proodeftikon Komma (Progressive Party) only managed a 35.2 per cent share of vote and 107 seats, whereas Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera garnered 11.8 per cent of the votes and just 22 seats. The outcome of those elections was a remarkable event that marked the electoral system of Greece in the post-war years and is believed to be the result of Papandreou’s ‘unyielding struggle’. Apparently, the public had reached a point of saturation, having been ruled by the conservatives for more than ten years. During those years, and despite Greece’s relative economic prosperity, the growing urbanised population did not enjoy an equal share of the state’s development, either politically or financially. Thus, it demanded further political participation and improved living standards. The response of Enosis Kentrou to those demands was rewarded with great success, as it emerged triumphant from the elections. Despite Papandreou’s absolute majority in the parliament, his intention to gain control over the army and hold the Ministry of Defence only met with King Konstantinos’ objections, eventually, causing the resignation of the former on 15 July 1964. The conflicting interests of Papandreou and the Crown were based on Enosis Kentrou leader’s wish to remove from the army those officers considered to be obstructing his government’s policies. The officers belonged to Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon (Holy Bond of Greek Officers–IDEA), a group of men from which the future dictators emerged. Papandreou’s withdrawal from power brought about such massive demonstrations, with the support of Eniaia Dimikratiki Aristera and the communists, that the protests seriously threatened the institution of the Monarchy.


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The 1967 dictatorship These events had a tremendous impact on Greece’s political stability, particularly, after five successive caretaker governments failed to prepare the grounds for new elections, thus preparing the grounds for the imposition of a military regime instead. In fact, new elections were set for 28 May 1967, however, when the King received a report that revealed a significant rise in the number of leftist voters, he approved of a royal coup, which would be led by General Grigorios Spantidakis, with the aim of handing over power to the King. It seems that CIA officials were also anxious about the forthcoming elections, since they suggested to Phillips Talbot (the United States ambassador in Athens) that he try to ‘influence’ the outcome of the elections, a plan rejected by Washington. Even so, Jack Maury, Chief of the CIA station in Athens, later stated in an article in the Washington Post that had the United States government approved of the plan, perhaps the coup would have been prevented. The inability of both the Crown, and the several caretaker governments it installed following Papandreou’s resignation, to ease the situation gave the military the opening it needed to intervene. Had the King acted as the constitution dictated and granted authority to the leader of the majority party (Georgios Papandreou) to form a government and hold elections, the coup could have been prevented. Greece’s ideological quest Although the Civil War is not part of the subject of our examination, nevertheless, it is an essential part of Modern Greek history that cannot be ignored. The reason is that ever since the internal strife in Greece between the legitimate Conservative government and the Communist Party came to an end, the bitter memories of the majority of the Greek people would soon define the political orientation of the country. The ideological conflict between democracy and communism, which resulted from a ruthless fratricidal war at a time when Greece was still suffering from the consequences of the Second World War, introduced the Greek society to an unparalleled antipathy towards communism, even before the Cold War dominated global affairs.

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The Civil War revealed one of the greatest anomalies in Greek history. Both ends of the political spectrum recognised that resistance, during Nazi occupation, depended primarily upon the efforts of the communists, however, in the event of the Civil War, the communists became ‘enemies of the state and those collaborating with the Nazis heroes.’14 Considering that the principal cause accounting for the political division of Greece was the very system of government, democracy or monarchy, when the communists declared their opposition to monarchy those divisions became deeper. What defined the relationship between the Crown and the communists was mutual resentment, as from 1946 to 1956 the institution of Monarchy in Greece did not favour leftist formations and ‘loyalty to the monarch was frequently equated with anti-communism and patriotism, especially in the armed forces.’15 Beyond any shadow of doubt, the institution of Monarchy was rather influential, even though it was never ‘a legitimate symbol of national unity,’ since it never had any ‘strong roots in the country.’ On the contrary, ‘instead of promoting national unity, [Monarchy] has caused fundamental cleavage in the society,’ therefore, becoming either the ‘focus of loyalty or hostility.’16 Although authority should be vested in the people, it was the Crown and the conservative elite that held power in Greece with the support of the United States. In essence, the political system of Greece had strong similarities to oligarchy. It appears that anti-communism was not the cause, but the effect of the manifest polarisation of the Greek public and the concentration of power in the hands of the palace and the conservatives. Instead, the cause of the political schism may well be the lack of a fundamental feature of any ruling party regardless of its background. Simply put, Greek political parties were short of an ideology. With the notable exception of both Kommounistiko Komma Elladas and Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera, the remaining parties lacked any ideological perspective and were entirely depended upon the charismatic personality of their leaders. Clearly, leaders of the so-called ‘nationally minded’ (ethnikofronon) parties put a lot of emphasis on their patriotism and appealed to the national sentiments of their supporters, merely because of the inability to develop an ideology. Consequently, the concept of ‘ethnikofronon’


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was distorted to an extent where it undermined the political institutions of Greece, as well as that of democracy, and created a unique system of clientage (eunoiokratia), since the relationship between voters and politicians was based on their common interests and not on party ideology. Obviously, the banning of Kommounistiko Komma Elladas removed all traces of any ideological facet that could possibly oppose the Greek Right. As the Right lacked any ideological perspective, the issue of anti-communism dominated their political standpoint and predisposed the entire Greek society. In other words, those in office simply prolonged their power by adopting the opposite views of those defeated in the Civil War. This lack of ideology might have served the interests of the government in Washington, as Greek political figures proved more enthusiastic in pleasing their new patron, rather than serving their country’s interests, and often turned to the United States for directions. Greek dependence on the United States was relatively new at this point, but would dominate Greek domestic affairs for decades to come. Gradually, the United States became a major factor in Greek politics and, soon enough, openly expressed its preference towards a particular electoral system and proceeded with the installation of governments favourable to Washington. This implies that the occasional party that emerged victorious from the elections and subsequently formed a government, though legitimate, was not necessarily representative of the Greek public opinion due to both the peculiarities of the respective electoral methods and the need for the United States to preserve its interests. The only exception was 1964, when Enosis Kentrou came to power only to be removed by the Monarch and, eventually, replaced by authoritarian rule. This pattern of government encourages speculation over Greece’s actual political inclination during the post-war period. The successive conservative governments that ruled Greece until 1963 were strongly supported by the respective government in Washington, with any leftist movements being overwhelmed by the Monarchy, the occasional conservative government and the military. However, it remains difficult to challenge the legitimacy of the post-war Greek governments, as each and every one of them was installed after nation-wide elections were lawfully held.

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Hence, it is probable that the ‘threat of communism’—as used by the Greek colonels in 1967 to justify the imposition of the dictatorial regime—may not be far from reality, despite the fact that the communist party was banned and its followers forced to expatriate. The antipathy towards communism was more evident within military circles, in other words, those who had fought the communist guerrillas during the Civil War. Therefore, although the communist factor was officially absent from the Greek political arena, the various conspiracy theories that existed were sufficient to generate confusion among the Greek public, affect their electoral behaviour and, of course, grant the colonels the opportunity to prevent yet another victory for Georgios Papandreou’s Enosis Kentrou by imposing their dictatorship. Considering the above events, one is unlikely to argue that stability characterised the internal situation in Greece, particularly, if one takes into consideration the fact that within a period of nearly 20 years some 24 different political parties and party coalitions participated in Greek elections. Further, one may not only speculate about the role of the Monarchy with reference to Greece’s political instability, but also suggest that a significant part of the Greek population was, possibly, not in favour of monarchic rule. It is then essential not to ignore these events when one attempts to examine the causes of the 1967 Greek dictatorship. As far as the Greek Monarchy is concerned, it was never ‘a legitimate symbol of national unity,’ since the Monarch never had any ‘strong roots in the country.’ At times, the Monarch had either held significant power or been used as a pawn, while the Monarchy itself had become either the ‘focus of loyalty or hostility.’17 It has also been argued that ‘instead of promoting national unity, [the Monarchy] has caused fundamental cleavage in the society.’18 Clearly, from 1946 to 1956 the institution of Monarchy in Greece did not favour leftist formations and ‘loyalty to the monarch was frequently equated with anticommunism and patriotism, especially in the armed forces.’19 Likewise, the Greek army was penetrated by the United States and organised by the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG). Subsequently, Greece, and Turkey, applied on April 1950 for membership in NATO, only to be met with objec-


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tions from other member-states. However, their applications enjoyed United States support to a great extent, due to the Iranian crisis and the situation in the Middle East, particularly after Greece and Turkey provided troops for the Korean War. Furthermore, having ensured a degree of favourable political stability in Greece, the United States only needed to secure Greek, and Turkish, membership in NATO, to the advantage of all sides. Therefore, after Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952, they both signed agreements with the United States, in 1953 and 1954 respectively, to accommodate United States bases on Greek and Turkish soil. It seems that the issue of United States intervention in Greek politics is not fictitious. The essence of Greece to the Western alliance became obvious in the early stages of the Cold War era. Her geographical position proved a significant factor that would soon become the major determinant of Greece’s future within the Western camp. Therefore, the internal instability that had characterised Greece since the end of the Second World War could not be ignored. For the Western powers to ensure the position of Greece in the Western sphere of influence, interference in Greek domestic affairs seemed inevitable, as well as necessary, to preserve their interests. Neither the political situation in, or the economy of, Greece could be perceived as a safeguard to Western objectives and, regarding the military, it was usually pre-occupied either in taking an active part in the numerous crises in which Greece was involved, or in installing military regimes. Thus, with the outbreak of the Greek Civil War, at a time when the British were already deeply concerned about their presence in the Middle East region, the United States government had no other alternative than to become directly involved in this intrastate conflict. Once the Civil War ended it found Greece in a catastrophic state, while ‘communism’ was emerging as a major threat that Greece had to repulse. Hence, the United States, by applying the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, replaced Britain as Greece’s new patron and eventually penetrated the political arena, the economy and the armed forces of Greece. Although Greece was in need of strengthening the economy— her financial resources exhausted after nearly a decade of chronic warfare—it was imperative that she consolidated democracy.

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Greece entered the Second World War under a dictatorship and while the governments that followed during the Civil War might have been democratic in theory, they were authoritarian in practise. Simply put, the conservatives—often encouraged by either the British or the Americans—never hesitated to adopt rigorous measures to eliminate the so-called ‘communist threat’ that jeopardised their interests. Communism was an obsession with the Greek Right that dictated the political convictions of all successive governments in the post-war period. In fact, communism in Greece was perceived as a threat so grave that, eventually, anti-communism surpassed democracy in appeal. Hence, the opportunity to vest the Greek people with absolute authority. It was crucial to the noncommunists that the ‘appropriate’ governments come to power, in order to serve the interests of the nation. That was exactly the intention of the ‘nationally minded’ (ethnikofronon), when they either designed imperfect electoral systems, or manipulated electoral results so as to advance their chances of coming to power. Without doubt, the cradle of democracy sat on weak foundations caused by excessive measures. With the exception of the 1946 elections, when the number of seats of the parties that contested the elections reflected their share of votes, the elections of the 1950s were so deficient that the winning parties often enjoyed a rather strong majority in the parliament without having popular support. Of course, we should not ignore the fact that in the elections of 1946 no Leftist parties participated, whereas in all other occasions they made their presence felt, particularly in the 1958 elections when a quarter of the electorate openly supported Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera. Apparently, the impact of the Civil War and the divisions it brought about were sufficient to dominate Greek political scheming. The Greek Right was so terrified at the prospect of having the communists run the country that they not only banned Kommounistiko Komma Elladas, forcing its followers to exile, but became increasingly concerned with the elimination of all communist elements. With the support of the United States, the containment of communism in Greece—as envisaged by the Truman Doctrine— was not a difficult task. What mattered was the adoption of a ‘suit-


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able’ electoral system that would bring to power the ‘proper’ parties, while limiting the participation of the Left. Even though free elections were always held, thus respecting certain forms of democracy, the outcome was not representative. To avoid any confusion, this lack of representation did not stem from the manipulation of the electoral result, although coercion was indeed effective. The outcome of those elections, regardless of the peculiarities of the various electoral systems, must be respected and considered legitimate. It is when the share of votes was then translated into seats in the parliament that representation was inadequate. The political will of the Greek public was never reflected in parliament and its interests were often under-represented. Most elections were not representative as the proportion of a party’s votes did not quite correspond to the number of seats in parliament, thus producing strong governments and weak oppositions. It is remarkable, however, that the Greek Right, despite its success in elections, lacked any ideological perspective. Although perceived as strong advocates of democracy, conservative parties were clearly more orientated toward anti-communism. Obviously, anticommunism being more of a political movement, the Greek Right managed to prolong its stay in power by emphasising the pertinent divisions of the political spectrum, with the ‘threat of communism’ becoming a point of reference. In an attempt to limit the participation of the Left in politics, democracy was often sacrificed, as the Greek Right did not hesitate to resort to extreme measures. Certainly, this fixation on communism served American interests well. The United States, besides appointing or toppling governments and declaring their preference to, if not dictating, particular electoral systems, was also concerned with the spread of communism and willing to preserve its interests at any cost. This may explain the emergence of conspiracy theories alleging United States interference in Greek politics, not to mention its likely involvement in the installation in the 1967 military regime. Nevertheless, conclusive evidence that the United States government, or its intelligence services, had an active role in Greek politics is, indeed, lacking. Therefore, it is only possible to speculate about how the course of events could have served the foreign pol-

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icy objectives of the Western superpower and compose a probable scenario that, admittedly, would lack firm substantiation. The various ‘conspiracy theories’ that imply United States intervention in Greece thus remain unsubstantial contentions, until the related documentation is declassified. Such theories may, however, ultimately prove not far from reality, given that the government in Washington would not hesitate to adopt drastic measures to safeguard her interests considering the United States military predominance in the region. Whether this proves United States interference remains an open question, but the fact that their strategic interests were never threatened due to the installation of favourable governments in Greece certainly encourages some belief in the established allegations. Rather, it seems more probable that Greek politics, since the onset of the Civil War onwards, suffered mainly from domestic instability. The continuous struggle for power amongst the Monarchy, the government and the Armed Forces dominated Greek politics to an extent where dependence on external powers became essential for the country’s survival. Again, it could be argued that United States financial and military aid could have enabled Washington to influence any one of the above three centres of power in ways that would promote its interests. However, it is possible that the course of events in Greece was serving the interests of the US government in any case, thus rendering any form of interference unnecessary and rendering any conspiracy theories moot. Greek politics in turmoil At this point, it is necessary to take into consideration the political crisis that took place in Greece in the early 1960’s due to both internal and external problems. What follows is an elaboration of the causes and the factors that are believed to have led to the Greek military coup as well as a brief account of two significant organisations that were formed within the Greek armed forces. An illustrative depiction of the Greek political scene can be constructed from the work of Spyros Sakellaropouloss, which provides a review of the literature of two distinct schools of thought and their respective views on the issue of the dictatorship, one arguing that it was a re-


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sult of the domestic situation while the second supports the theory of foreign interference. The first view introduces us to the political upheavals of that decade, the rise of the electoral power of the leftwing parties and the ‘threat of communism,’ whereas the second raises questions about the role of the United States and, particularly, the CIA. In the view of Konstantinos Danopoulos, the army intervened to protect its interests and preserve its autonomy. According to this interpretation, when the army’s core principles are under threat, for example, at times when the state aims at lessening its powers, the former is likely to respond in an aggressive manner. In the Greek case, Danopoulos argues, the state attempted to penetrate the army and expand its control. Consequently, the army’s response was to impose a military coup. Dimitrios Haralambis shares the same view and concentrates on the struggle between the government, the Crown and the army to seize power. Along the same lines, Samuel Edward Finer argues that the military may intervene to preserve ‘the material interest of the individual officers,’20 as well as its very own as a whole. Apparently, what facilitated the Colonels’ plot was the fact that none of the Greek civil institutions and organisations were either powerful enough or sufficiently respected. Finally, Finer believes that the Greek coup ‘is the product of a premeditated programme for military or military-dominated rule,’ admittedly, quite a rare phenomenon. This is proved by the fact that the second military coup of 1973 was staged merely to replace Georgios Papadopoulos with Dimitrios Ioannides.21 The same author also stressed that the Greek case is a good example of a regime that wished to maintain its power, even if a return to democracy occurred, as stated in the 1968 constitution. From a different perspective, Christos Vernardakis and Georgios Mavris argue that the dictatorship was the result of the struggle between the upper and lower classes, as represented by, the conservatives and the populists, since the continuous ruling of Greece, from 1949 to 1963, by the former strengthened the demand for a left-wing government. However, when Georgios Papandreou’s EK party came to power in 1963, it faced the strong resistance of the Crown, which eventually forced him to resign, thus causing the

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massive demonstrations of July 1965. The two authors claim that the imposition of the military regime was a response of the upper classes to the events of July 1965 and their wish to preserve their power and interests through the existing political system. To Vernardakis and Mavris, the army acted as the protector of the establishment simply because they shared the ideas of the political elite against their common enemy, the EK. To argue that the army officials were operating in favour of the existing political system, nonetheless, does not explain the fact that major political figures, among others, were the first to be arrested. Perhaps, the military officers feared an active response by the latter, based on the belief that their plot would not be approved. Were that true, it merely indicates that there was no co-operation between the army and the political elite, since the plot itself was entirely planned and executed by the colonels alone. The coup was imposed within a purely anti-civilian and anti-political context. Another interesting view is that of Edward Feit. According to Feit, the causes of the coup can be found in the political instability that characterised Greece and the insufficient power of the respective parliaments. What must also be considered is the high level of the army’s involvement in politics, along with their strong anti-communist ideology, as it emerged after the civil war. The last, but certainly not least, of the advocates of the first school of thought could be no other than the colonels themselves. The colonels claimed that their intervention occurred because of the continuous political crisis and the emerging ‘threat of communism’. According to Papadopoulos’ own writings, the purpose of the ‘revolution’ was not to establish an authoritarian regime, but to eliminate all those weaknesses that threatened democracy and which, subsequently, led to the imposition of the dictatorship. Most definitely, the argument of the ‘communist danger’ can easily be dismissed, since the KKE was banned from all political activities and its leaders had fled into exile right after the Civil War. Instead, it appears that the communist threat was an excuse to justify intervention. In fact, according to a speech given by Papadopoulos himself, the communists did not reflect a real threat to Greece. Therefore, one could argue that the colonels were in search of a political


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ideology that would justify their interference, while the alleged ‘communist threat’ was nothing but a red herring. The first thing which supports the theory of a military coup imposed due to the internal situation can be linked to the end of the Second World War. From the end of the Civil War in 1949 until 1952, there were only two poles of power, the American military mission and the Greek army. However, the 1952-1967 period was marked by the contrasting interests and power of the Crown, the government and the army, following the strengthening of the first two. At this point, it is useful to review the most significant political events of the period following the end of the Greek Civil War. With the rise to power of the first sovereign government under the leadership of General Papagos in 1952, who clearly was Western orientated, there was no need for the United States mission to remain in Greece, since the new constitution of 1952 had strengthened the government. The Crown, too, became more powerful in 1955 when, after the death of Papagos and despite the objections of most politicians, it authorised Konstantinos Karamanlis to form a government. Karamanlis dissolved Ellinikos Synagermos, established Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosi and held elections to strengthen his position. Having won the elections, Karamanlis brought about stability and prosperity to the country. However, in the elections of 1961 the Karamanlis government was accused of influencing the electoral result, although the Crown should bear full responsibility for the outcome. This led to the beginning of the ‘unyielding struggle’ of the EK against the ERE and the monarchy, as already noted. Further problems were created when, in 1963, Karamanlis attempted to subjugate both the Crown and the army to his government an action clearly not greeted with enthusiasm by either the Crown or the army and it eventually brought about his resignation. The elections of 1963 did not produce an autonomous government, despite EK’s relative majority at the polls. The new elections of 1964 witnessed an increase in votes for the EK from 42 per cent to 52 per cent in just three months, quite a remarkable event. This unparalleled increase was believed to be the result of Papandreou’s ‘unyielding struggle’, although an additional cause could be that the public had reached a saturation point, after being

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ruled by the conservatives for more than ten years. During those years, despite Greece’s economic prosperity, the growing urbanised population did not enjoy an equal share of the state’s development, either politically, or financially. Thus, it demanded further political participation and improved living standards. The response of the EK to those demands was rewarded with great electoral success. In 1964, Papandreou also sought to lessen the influence of the Crown and the army and consolidate the powers of the parliament. The conflicting interests of Papandreou and the Crown were based on the formers’ wish to remove from the army those officers considered to be obstructing his government’s policies, namely, those who belonged to Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon. Like his predecessor, Papandreou was also forced to resign. The inability of both the Crown and the caretaker governments that it installed to ease the situation provided the army with the opportunity to intervene. Perhaps, if the king had followed the constitution and granted authority to form a government and hold elections to the leader of the majority party (Georgios Papandreou), the coup could have been prevented. That was the turning point from democracy to dictatorship. For Richard Clogg, another EK landslide could have resulted in the purge of the army of all officers members who belonged to IDEA, an action that would possibly jeopardise the authority and powers of the Crown and the army. Therefore, it becomes evident from the 1961 elections onwards that the triangle of power—Crown, government and army—was threatened for the first time in Greek political history. Thus, it was caused by the attempts of both Karamanlis and Papandreou to create a stronger government with greater autonomy from the other two centres of power. All this evidence supports the argument that the dictatorship occurred as a result of the political instability that characterised Greece at that particular period of time. Andreas Papandreou also believed that the clash between the EK and the establishment provided the colonels with a good reason to interfere, particularly after the vast victory of the EK that enabled the colonels to claim that only a dictatorship could save the country from the ‘communist threat’. Papandreou, however, took things farther by suggesting that the CIA supported the colonels


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and that Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos was himself a CIA agent. In fact, Andreas Papandreou, in his testimony during the trial of the dictators, stated that the conspirators were receiving orders from ‘abroad’, presumably a reference to the United States and their intelligence services. Likewise, Ioannis Katris argues that the Crown, following orders from Washington, initiated the incidents of July 1965 and claims that the United States imposed the military coup to avoid another EK victory in the elections of May 1967, since an EK government would probably not serve their interests. Still, Katris acknowledges the fact that there are no documents to prove this, but stresses the fact that Papadopoulos was connected with the CIA. Nevertheless, Katris questions the reasons for which the United States, a strong supporter of democracy, would support a totalitarian regime. The answer, that he provides, could be that NATO’s integrity was of primary essence. From a similar viewpoint, Nikos Psiroukis argues that the United States encouraged the coup, due to the negative attitude of the Greek public toward United States policies on the Cyprus issue. Since the EK favoured union with the island, the colonels interfered to preserve the United States interests, which favoured the double union of Cyprus with Greece and Turkey. However, United States interests in the region could be served by either outcome, because the United States only wanted Cyprus to become part of the NATO alliance. In other words, the United States did not favour a particular settlement in Cyprus; therefore, Psiroukis’ arguments lack credibility. Tasos Vournas is yet another who argues that the military coup was produced and supported by the government in Washington. To support his theory, he presents the statements of Senator William Fulbright during a Congress meeting (911 June 1970). According to the latter, in March 1969 there were fewer than 100 United States military officers in Greece (Joint United States Military Assistance Group in Greece–JUSMAGG), who within a short period of time became 8,000. To Vournas, this is clear evidence of United States penetration of Greek domestic affairs. However, Vournas seems to have neglected the significance of the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict (between Israel and Syria) and the rising tension in the region. This could be an important factor,

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enough for the United States to increase the manpower of their military forces in the region. The Kommounistiko Komma Ellados, during the 11th plenary session of the party in June 1967, took a different position on the issue. The KKE argued that the coup reflected nothing more than United States imperialism. The existence of NATO bases on Greek soil, a NATO-proposed solution to the Cyprus issue and the imposition of similar totalitarian regimes in other European countries aimed at the prevention of further European co-operation seem to be the basis of the party’s arguments. Nikos Poulantzas provides a different interpretation. He argues that Greek association with the European Economic Community would replace United States hegemony over Greece, therefore, endangering the interests of the United States and making the idea of a dictatorial government ruling over Greece more attractive for it would be easier to manipulate. Nonetheless, this argument does not seem sufficient to justify the claim that the United States was likely to impose a military coup in Greece. Taking into account the fact that the United States was presenting itself as the defender of moral values, supporting the coup would certainly contradict the principle of preserving democracy. To Poulantzas, another factor that has to be considered is the imperialist world context, within which Greece was dependent on the United States. Focussing on the degree of dependence, with regard to the dictatorship, he argues that the United States ‘played a major role in its installation,’2 the reason being the attempt to achieve the union of Cyprus with Greece. In addition to external factors, Poulantzas also produces an extensive analysis of the class system in Greece. He suggests that the influence of all pertinent external actors was, eventually, internalised and absorbed by Greek society. As a result, the dominant classes, unlike the popular ones, supported the regime; however, in their struggle for power an unexpected factor surfaces: the army. Obviously, the spectre of foreign intervention emerges with the end of the Second World War. The threat of Nazism was replaced by the threat of communist expansion, as the international community had more or less been divided into two camps -- the democratic states and the communist bloc. Greece, being the only democracy in the Balkans, soon found herself part of the Western


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alliance. The military and financial aid provided by the Truman Doctrine and Marshal Plan, respectively, gave to the United States the opportunity to interfere in Greek domestic issues. The primary interest of the United States was to stabilise Greek political life and this was accomplished in 1952 following the electoral victory of Ellinikos Synagermos under the leadership of General Papagos. Although the degree of United States intervention in Greek domestic affairs had been somewhat reduced due to other concerns like the breakout of the Korean War, the KKE, and Papandreou, Katris and Psiroukis suggest that United States influence was never curbed, while they further speculate about the role of the CIA and the issue of Cyprus. Nevertheless, it is evident that their arguments lack the necessary credentials to justify their consideration. Finally, to interpret the reasons of the imposition of the military coup proper, a brief look at the recent history of the Greek army is useful. What is of particular interest is the existence of two groups within the military: IDEA and ASPIDA (Axiomatiki Sozoun Patrida Idees Dimokratia Axiokratia–Officers Save the Country, Ideas, Democracy and Meritocracy). The role of these two groups was of great significance in the evolution of events that led to the imposition of the 1974 dictatorship. It is noteworthy that the initials of the first create the word IDEA (Idea) and the second of the word ASPIDA (Shield), an attempt to consolidate a number of objectives in one single word. Although both appeared to operate in favour of the army’s interests, the two groups had ideological differences, since IDEA was a rather conservative group, whereas members of ASPIDA held socialist views. These ideological differences would soon give IDEA an opportunity to attribute a communist threat posed by ASPIDA. The organisation of IDEA emerged from the integration of Enosi Ellinon Neon Axiomatikon (Union of Greek Young Officers–EENA) and other military groups in Greece and was created right after the Dekembriana events of 1944 that caused the communist uprising and the Greek Civil War. IDEA’s principles and aims are found in its manifesto of 1952, where the group was presented as the saviour of the country, which also states that, were its attempts to prove unsuccessful, what would save the country would

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be the imposition of a dictatorial regime. This very statement became prescient when Papadopoulos declared in 1957 that he would be ruling Greece in twelve years time, as eventually happened in 1967. ASPIDA, on the other hand, was formed in the summer of 1964 and favoured the creation of a ‘Great Greece’. It was established to counter-balance the conservatives’ influence over the army through the IDEA. ASPIDA was the cause of a dispute between the Crown and Georg Papandreou when certain members of that group attempted to embrace Papandreou’s son, Andreas, to attain political power and also because the group was operating in Cyprus as a paramilitary organisation. Despite the fact that the evidence incriminating Andreas Papandreou remains obscure, ASPIDA grew significantly in power and later on granted Papadopoulos the opportunity to argue that the organisation constituted a national threat. Hence, Danopoulos asks whether the ASPIDA issue was fabricated to create a political crisis during the Papandreou regime. Presumably not, though it provided the colonels with the opportunity to encourage belief in the communist danger and, subsequently, impose their dictatorship. The intentions of the Greek colonels were well known to JUSMAGG and the CIA station in Athens. In early 1966 certain reports were sent to the United States State Department concerning a group of colonels under the leadership of Papadopoulos and claiming that the imposition of a military coup was probable were Georgios Papandreou to align with the pro-Communist party of Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera. These reports were usually quite detailed, revealing meetings and discussions of the conspirators, as well as their concerns and connections. However, no reports were sent after January 1967, only a few months before the imposition of the dictatorship. On 21 April 1967, at 2:00 a.m., the colonels initiated their plans, as Colonel George Papadopoulos, together with Colonel Nicholas Makarezos and Brigadier General Stylianos Pattakos, the leading figures of the dictatorship, took power in their hands by bringing the army onto the streets of Athens. The powerful troika had successfully executed its plot, at a time when the political spectrum of Greece was incapable of striking back due to the


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prevailing tumultuous situation. The causes of the ‘revolution’ were said to be to protect Greece from external threats, ‘cure’ her weaknesses and achieve union with Cyprus. Once Greece’s wounds were healed, Papadopoulos argued, elections would be held to restore parliamentary rule. However, the regime never met such objectives in spite of Papadopoulos twice declaring (on 31 December 1968 and again on 6 March 1969) that the nation was no longer insecure and its enemies eliminated. Therefore, it is possible to argue that Greece’s return to democracy was delayed only if Papadopoulos’ statements were accurate and his intentions sincere. Instead, it seems that there was more truth in another statement of Papadopoulos, where the most powerful figure of the troika declared that ‘no one can overthrow the regime,’ as to Papadopoulos’ own writings.23 Certainly, the ambitious dictator could not have foreseen the tragic events of Cyprus that, eventually, brought about the collapse of the military regime and the restoration of democracy in Greece. The Western response to the Greek coup Once the military regime was installed the United States adopted a neutral policy by neither recognising, nor condemning the regime. As a Congressional report reveals, the United States had ‘pursued a faulty policy since 1967,’24 due to their military objectives clearly prevailing over political issues relating to the preservation of democracy in Greece. It appears that there was no pressing need for the United States administration to break diplomatic relations with Greece, given that the United States ambassador in Athens—who remained in office—was appointed to the King, not the government, and thus never officially compromised their moral values while also distancing himself from the instigators of the regime. Nevertheless, it is quite possible that the United States refrained from condemning the regime because of the all-important Greek membership in NATO, even though their reluctance to interfere encouraged further conspiracy theories with regard to foreign intervention. What is rather interesting, however, is that Moscow remained neutral as well, despite the strong anti-communist sentiments that characterised the Greek military regime.

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In fact, the only response of the United States was the shortlived embargo of May 1967 that, in any case, only concerned heavy armaments, even though Greece received more arms overall than ever before. This means that light arms, like firearms and tanks, were still being deployed regardless of being considered as the necessary means for the regime to prolong its stay in power. Interestingly, the State Department had proposed to cut 90 per cent of the arms’ supplies, whereas the Pentagon insisted on a mere 50 per cent cut. To settle the argument between the two most significant proponents of US foreign policy matters, a ‘selective embargo’ was put on heavy arms, but following an investigation conducted by Congress it was made clear that the Pentagon had broken the deal soon after by deploying more weapons than was initially affirmed. Ultimately, the embargo was terminated in the autumn of 1969, when the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research revealed that Greece was acquiring arms from various other allied countries, namely, Britain, France and West Germany. In addition, the embargo had severely affected the interests of the alliance in the region, especially after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The administration of Richard Nixon, responsible for lifting the controversial arms embargo, however, also had to take into account additional international developments. Colonel Moammar Khadafi—who came to power in Libya in September 1969—and Anwar Sadat—who replaced Abdel Gammal Nasser in Egypt— were anti-American and pro-Soviet respectively, while in Turkey student demonstrations against ‘American imperialism’ created further political tension between the governments in Ankara and Washington. Moreover, Dom Mintoff, the new Prime Minister of Malta, stated in June 1971 that docking facilities would no longer be provided to NATO’s naval forces, at a time when the Soviet Union was reinforcing its Mediterranean fleet, the Fifth Eskadra. Under these circumstances, on 23 January 1968, the United States decided to re-establish relations with Greece, followed by most of the West European countries. Turkey had already adopted a similar position and recognised the military regime three days earlier. According to the same Congressional report, it is evident that ‘the Cold War resulted in a military-dominated foreign policy’25 and since the Greek


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‘problem’ was more of a political nature the United States and NATO decided to remain impartial during the early stages of the dictatorship and recognise it later. More precisely, NATO refused to condemn the military regime and, instead, maintained indifference, for the reason that the alliance was not authorised to intervene in the domestic affairs of its members. Besides, the alliance’s perception was that the regime would preserve its interests better than any other civilian government, since the colonels had succeeded in establishing ‘control’ and ‘order’ in Greece, therefore, contributing to both NATO’s Southern Flank cohesion and to stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. Needless to say, NATO’s policy and overall response toward the dictators was much aligned with, if not dictated by, the policies of the United States. The very same Congressional report states that ‘the unity of NATO is seriously disrupted when the United States insists that NATO continue to support a dictatorial regime in Greece when the original purpose of NATO membership for Greece was to preserve her democratic government. The United States stands alone in NATO in insisting on this close relationship with a military Greek government.’26 Only the EEC appeared adamant towards the military regime when, in 1969, most of its members, particularly the Scandinavian countries, were pressing for the expulsion of Greece from the Council of Europe, particularly the Scandinavian countries. The EEC, under Article 237, reiterated the significance of the rule of democracy, but as far as its members were concerned, Greece was only an associate member and since the relevant association doctrine of the EEC did not foresee the handling of issues such as the Greek coup, the Community decided on ‘freezing’ the Greek association. The diplomatic humiliation of Greece, sadly, encouraged the regime to withdraw from the Council of Europe on 12 December 1969. It is important to note that the United States had pressed the EEC to apply a more moderate policy, based on the belief that expulsion from the Council of Europe would probably lead to expulsion from NATO as well. The United States feared that such a hard-line policy could cause the collapse of the regime and create a

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far more chaotic political situation in Greece that would probably hand power over to the communists. Hence, taking into account the causes and factors that led to the imposition of the military regime, it is difficult to accept the possibility of United States involvement. To date, little evidence has surfaced to suggest that the United States government and its agencies imposed or supported the regime. The patron-client relationship between the two countries, the financial and military aid that was provided from the side of the United States to support various Greek governments in the past and the extent of United States penetration in Greek domestic affairs do not prove such allegations. ‘Tolerance’ may be the best term to describe the United States policy towards the Greek dictatorship, therefore, to reach such a conclusion it is necessary to deal with each of the three suppositions independently. The existing evidence proves that the United States and its agencies had full knowledge of the coming dictatorship— information that was shared with the Greek authorities—thus, perhaps, suggesting that the coup might have been prevented. Although the dictatorship was established with a high degree of political forbearance from all sides; nevertheless, the fact that the United States did not respond vigorously is not proof of a United States imposed coup. Likewise, it is unwarranted to argue that the United States supported the regime. The fact that the arms embargo on Greece was soon lifted does not imply United States support of the regime per se, particularly, when taking into consideration that Greece was essential to NATO because of her strategic location. Therefore, any type of condemnation, or, even worse, expulsion from the military alliance, might have reduced the effectiveness of the alliance in the region, as well as its influence over the regime, thus crippling any plans for the swift return of Greece to democracy. Moreover, scenarios suggesting Soviet intervention in the Eastern Mediterranean cannot, alone, support the argument that the government in Washington conceived the idea of a military regime in Greece for the purpose of taking over the island of Cyprus, although it did fear Soviet intervention in the Cyprus issue.


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On the contrary, only the issue of tolerance appears plausible, in spite of being seemingly controversial too. One could argue that ‘tolerance’—as an interpretation of United States foreign policy—is not acceptable either, because political values like democracy and the issue of human rights were often infringed by the dictators, at the same time as the United States government presented itself as an ardent supporter of such principles. Even the fact that the United States, eventually, recognised the regime is not sufficient to imply United States tolerance or support, simply because had the United States condemned the regime, it would not only create tension between the two governments but also have tremendous consequences for the former, since the United States would probably be ineligible to use the military bases they maintained on Greek soil. Moreover, the United States had no reason to further interfere in Greece’s internal affairs inasmuch as the regime in Athens seemed keen on performing its role as a NATO member. Therefore, one may suggest that the United States was left with no alternatives, other than tolerating the regime. Once again, it appears that the United States government concentrated its attention on the preservation of its military, rather than its political, interests. Considering the facts revealed in a Congressional report entitled ‘Controlling the Damage: U.S. Policy Options for Greece,’ it becomes evident that the United States tolerated the military regime that was installed in Athens for the sole purpose of safeguarding its foreign policy objectives as well as the interests of NATO. Consequently, ‘tolerance’ seems to have been a crucial factor that characterised United States foreign policy toward the Greek dictators. Regarding the response of NATO and the EEC, not much needs to be stressed. NATO adopted a similar policy to the United States since they were more interested in whether Greece would continue to function normally as part of the alliance, whereas the domestic situation in Greece and the abolition of democracy in particular seemed to be less significant. In fact, NATO perceived the imposition of a military regime in Greece as a possible solution to the political instability of the country that could also ensure, if not confirm, Greece’s commitment to the Western alliance. Only the EEC denounced the Greek colonels and decided to apply dras-

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tic measures, urging the dictators to restore democracy by expelling Greece from the Council of Europe. The EEC, on the other hand, had no immediate strategic interests in Greece, apart from Greece’s trading ties with the Arab world and her geopolitical ties with countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, facts that enabled the Community to respond more decisively and maintain its apparent impartiality. Even then, it seems that either the EEC was a sincere advocate of democracy or merely not pragmatic enough—unlike NATO and the United States—to disregard an associate member’s internal conditions for the cause of its own interests. Instead, it seems more likely that the dictatorship was a consequence of the political instability within Greece. Since the Civil War, except for some short periods of stability and prosperity, Greek politics can only be characterised as dysfunctional. All three elements in the power equation, namely, the Monarchy, parliament and military, attempted to attain absolute control at the expense of the other two. The Monarchy wished to remain the absolute ruler of the state; the parliament aimed to increase its power and, subsequently, its effectiveness; while the military establishment hoped to influence politics in order to gain more respect and avoid political penetration. It seems as if parliament was in the middle, in an attempt to maintain some sort of balance with the other two institutions. Thus, the clash of interests between the parliament and the remaining centres of power was inevitable. In the case of the Monarchy, most certainly, no Greek monarch would have been willing to sacrifice power in favour of a stronger parliament. However, the situation was different when it involved the military. The military establishment had a strong anti-communist ideology and would not allow political involvement in purely military issues, particularly from a leftist government. In addition, the two major parties themselves (ERE and EK) were engaged in a continuous struggle for power, eventually, causing instability in the Greek political system. Hence, the political crisis that ensued, either through class struggles or due to the conflicting interests of all the different forms of power, brought the whole framework into doubt. These issues combined with the considerable rise of the EDA’s power provided the military with a unique opportunity to act as the country’s sav-


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iour, thus justifying their intervention by making claims about a potential communist take-over. During that period the political elite seemed to be so pre-occupied with challenging the Monarchy that it failed to take notice of the apparent threat to their interests. The undeniable fact that both the King and the Greek authorities had information of a coup plot supports the latter argument. To claim the opposite would be nothing short of stating that the Monarchy and parliament respectively were either overconfident of the power they possessed or too naive to predict the destiny of the Greek nation. Nevertheless, what the various authors have not suggested so far is the possibility that the dictatorship was imposed to fulfil Papadopoulos’ personal ambitions. As already stated, the manifesto of IDEA presented a likely military intervention as the only feasible solution to the internal instability of Greece. However, taking into account the fact that when the manifesto was printed Karamanlis’ conservative government had brought about relative stability and prosperity, it appears that the conspirators’ arguments lack justification and reason. As a matter of fact, there was no evidence to suggest that there would be another communist uprising despite the rise of power of the EDA. Therefore, claiming that communism posed a serious threat to the country’s values and principles is certainly unsubstantiated. By contrast, the only threat that Greece was facing stemmed from the conflicting interests of all three entities (the Monarchy, parliament and military) that were engaged in a struggle to attain power and rule the country. The real threat to democracy Recently declassified documents of the US Department of State, concerning the execution of the 1967 military coup in Greece, reveal that Andreas Papandreou was regarded as a grave threat to US national interests, serious enough to cause anxiety among US government officials to the extent that intervention in the elections of 1967—similar to the tactics adopted in post-War Greece—was considered as a potential measure to prevent him from coming to power. It was questionable whether Papandreou would keep Greece in the democratic world as a truly Western oriented coun-

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try, or jeopardise US foreign policy objectives in the eastern Mediterranean region by lessening Greece’s ties to the western camp, thus disturbing the effectiveness and cohesion of NATO’s southern flank. The King of Greece, Konstantinos II, was also fearful of the prospect of Papandreou emerging victorious from the forthcoming elections—as the latter was expected openly to challenge the Monarch’s authority—and seemed willing to resort to extraparliamentary measures to evade such an unpleasant political scenario. However, since a measure as drastic as the Monarch’s unconstitutional intervention would probably only result in Papandreou growing stronger, thus gaining further public support, the US promptly advised the King to abort any such plans. The political instability that characterised Greece in the 1960s prepared the grounds for the division of the country’s political spectrum into two rival camps. The Monarchy, right-wing politicians and the military’s leadership were strongly opposed to centrist and leftist elements that were clearly challenging their power—their ideological differences making them all too reluctant to resolve the 21-month political impasse. The prospect of a military coup was then becoming more tangible—were the conservatives to be defeated in the coming elections—and would have had a great impact on the US government, which would then have to bear the pressure of domestic public opinion. The image of the US abroad, as a servant of democracy, would have been deeply affected by any kind of assistance toward any regime installed by unconstitutional means. Despite the fact that Andreas Papandreou was, indeed, considered as a serious threat to US interests, any claims to suggest possible US intervention in the events of April 1967 seem to be unsubstantiated. The potential of such intervention would not be a new phenomenon in modern Greek history as both the government in Washington and the Monarch had often exerted pressure in order to install more favourable governments. Nevertheless, had the King resorted to constitutional deviation to safeguard his authority, the US government would then have to re-adjust its foreign policy objectives accordingly, perhaps, at the expense of democracy. In fact, the above argument is nothing but a mere hypothesis as it reflects the US response to the military dictatorship that ultimately followed


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the tragic events of April 1967 because, while Greek politics were in turmoil, the administration in Washington was already preoccupied with far more serious issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict (Six Day War) and the decision of the French to withdraw from NATO’s military wing. Hence, considering that Andreas Papandreou should not rule Greece, were the King and the US government to preserve their interests, the electoral result could have been decisive for Greece’s destiny; even so, the Greek people were never asked to exercise their right to vote. To Greece’s misfortune, the coming dictatorship was never prevented. The dictators were soon regarded by the US government as ‘pro-US, pro-NATO, rigorously if not fanatically antiCommunist,’ while the regime saw ‘itself as revolutionary with a mission of cleansing and reorienting Greek economic, political and social life on new and wholesome basis,’ unlikely to fulfil its aims within a short period of time.27 In addition, US intelligence information indicated ‘that coup group existed in some form or other since 1957 under the aegis of Papadopoulos;’ the group considering itself a ‘reformist element whose objectives were to seize power and revitalize Greek institutions generally in line with principles, which governed IDEA.’28,29 Nonetheless, the US Ambassador to Athens, Phillips Talbot, believed that had the Junta leaders failed the consequences would have been far greater. Having had ‘similar anxieties about strong leftist trends in Greece’ with the King and the conservatives, any failure of the dictators would have had a serious impact upon the Monarchy and the right-wing politicians. Talbot thought that the ‘only beneficiaries would then have surely gone where rightists fear Andreas Papandreou was taking it’ and did not hesitate to point towards Andreas Papandreou as the prime reason that Greece came under dictatorship.30 It would be sensible to predict that a strong and solid EK party—reflecting the magnitude of the 1964 electoral outcome— would have severely challenged the Crown’s powers as well as sideline the conservative elite. However, the Monarch and the conservatives would not be the only ones to suffer the repercussions of a disastrous attempt to enforce a military regime in Greece. Talbot, in his reports to the State Department, failed to account for the po-

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tential effects on US foreign policy objectives, unless such material remains classified; whereas to charge Papandreou with the instigation of the dictatorship seems too far exaggerated an argument. Regardless of whether the Greeks would have granted support to Papandreou, instead of the conservatives’ party, one issue remains certain. The Greek political framework, in any case, would have been vigorously challenged, since the coup was primed within a purely anti-civilian and anti-political context. As for the ruthless conspirators themselves, they would all stand accused of treason, thus giving an inglorious end to their ambitious plans, while the military’s role in Greek internal affairs would also become critically questioned. Once the dictatorship had been installed, the US government was unsure whether to ‘express regret—even if softly—that democratic process been suspended.’31 It is clear that the US did not wish to overtly condemn the military regime and alienate Greece from the Western camp, particularly after the dictators decided a month later to revise the Greek Constitution, which was then interpreted as a sign that restoration of democracy would follow suit. As a result, Dean Rusk, the US Secretary of State, asked Talbot to make clear to Konstantinos Kollias, the Greek prime minister, that the US government was encouraged by the decision to revise the Constitution and then hold a plebiscite for the Greek people to approve it. This is an indication that the US was determined to pursue a rather soft policy towards the Greek dictators, since the rushed adoption of any harsh measures could only prove detrimental to their regional interests. In fact, the US government proceeded by relaxing certain restrictions on the provision of military equipment that was intended for NATO purposes, but unlikely to be utilised as means of further suppressing civil liberties in Greece. According to a memorandum from Rusk to Lyndon Johnson, the US President, this decision— although not compatible with Congressional concerns—was vital for preserving US national interests. Possible reaction from Congress would have been overcome after stressing that it was a minimum step and that Greece (1) was strategically significant; (2) had to remain an active and functioning member of NATO; and (3)


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avoid becoming adverse to US policies as France had.32 Evidently, the US government had vested interests in normalising relations with Greece, since the regime had strengthened its power and the US had to safeguard its foreign policy objectives. Paradoxically, the US government, at the time, had not publicly announced the above stated decisions or the recognition of the military regime in Athens, but persisted in pressing the Junta leaders to return to democracy. Furthermore, Talbot revealed his views in a telegram33 to the Department of State stating that in the early stages of the military coup in Greece there was no realistic alternative to the situation in Athens as neither the King, nor any former political leader could resume their roles and overthrow the dictators. An additional problem that US officials encountered was the fact that the Greek political figures were not willing to blacken their status by cooperating with the regime. Hence, were the US to withdraw their support of the regime, the latter would not necessarily collapse—as anticipated by Andreas Papandreou—but could become even more authoritarian and oppressive, thus generating further anxiety among NATO circles and jeopardising US military facilities in Greece. Even so, the possibility of the regime misleading the US should be seriously considered as continuing frustration over the Military Assistance Program (MAP) would have irreparable consequences for both Greece (reinforced authoritarianism) and the US (facilities’ rights). On the other hand, the ‘adoption of even an imperfect constitution would be more likely to initiate the process of return to greater measure of representative rule.’ In the event of the regime either objecting to putting the new Constitution in effect within a reasonable period of up to 18 months after being adopted by plebiscite, or postponing its application for an extensive period of time while pursuing ‘unrealistic or unacceptable revolutionary goals, government would run risk of its rejection.’ Under such conditions, only the US government was in a position to affect Greece’s future. Hence, it would be best for Greece to remain within NATO in order to preserve the US facilities’ status, improve relations with Turkey and possibly find a settlement to the Cyprus issue. Only then would it be possible to exert political influence and allow room for Greece’s swift return to democracy.

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However, as the Junta leaders celebrated a year’s stay in power with no clear sign that democracy would soon be restored, it became evident that drastic action should still be contemplated. According to a Memorandum of Conversations34 between State Department officials and the US President, Talbot suggested that the US should consider the possibility of a Greek attempt to overthrow the regime either through ‘a take-over by junior military,’ or ‘a countercoup by senior military with possible participation of former politicians.’ In such a scenario the US would then have to take into consideration ‘the composition of the group which was supporting the coup and those who were carrying it out, . . . weigh carefully its chances of success, and its general acceptability to the Greek people.’ According to Talbot, there were three groups capable of achieving a transitional changeover. The first group comprised Konstantinos Karamanlis and members of the ERE party, the ‘apostate group’ led by Stephanos Stephanopoulos (former prime minister) and moderate EK elements. Another group could include ‘non-political establishment’ types, such as Professor Zenophone Zolotas (former head of the Bank of Greece), Christos Lambrakis (newspaper owner) and ‘a variety of younger men including some former politicians.’ The last group, however, could well be a ‘left-of-centre group including from Andreas Papandreou to the far left.’ When asked, ‘whether a release of selected MAP items would deflect anti-junta planning by any of the political leaders,’ Ambassador Talbot was positive that the Greeks ‘recognized that the resumption of the shipment of selected MAP items was designed by the US government to press the Greek regime back to Constitutionalism.’ Nevertheless, conditions in Greece never improved, as indicated in Talbot’s telegram35 to the US Department of State, which reveals that the wording of the revised Greek Constitution (Article 138) allowed the regime ‘to control the pace of return to full constitutionality.’ Its rejection would simply destroy any hope for an early return to democratic rule, whereas acceptance would be interpreted as approval of the regime to be the ‘sole arbiter of dates when Greeks can once more have constitutionally-protected civil rights, political parties and elections,’ thus prolonging the presence of the


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regime in power until deemed necessary. As a result, it was decided that the US government should make clear that the referendum would not be regarded as a genuine step towards parliamentary democracy, although such a statement would not be popular among the coup leaders. Hence, Talbot ‘informed [Greek Foreign Minister] Pipinelis that the resumption of US military aid was dependent on the wording of a plebiscite proposal that permitted a free expression of will to the Greek people.’ Beyond all expectations, however, the US government eventually resumed military assistance to Greece, as ‘the time had come to separate NATO relationship from disapproval of domestic Greek politics’ and since ‘the colonels have had their constitutional referendum, but [would not] hold elections under it until they are ready.’36 Taking into account Finer’s arguments, it is probable that the dictatorship was only imposed to fulfil Papadopoulos’ personal ambition. As already mentioned, the manifesto of IDEA, issued in 1952, presented dictatorship as the only feasible solution to Greece’s political instability, astoundingly, at a time when Greece was relishing a period of relative prosperity. The Civil War had just come to an end and, with the Greek Communist party banned and its leading members forced to exile, there was no evidence to suggest that there would be another communist revolution. In other words, there never was a ‘communist danger’ posing a threat to the country’s values and principles, other than Greece sharing borders with three communist bloc countries. Hence, the fact that the plot existed since 1952, along with Papadopoulos’ infamous statement of 1957 that he would be ruling Greece within twelve years, imply that the coup was imposed not to safeguard Greece from the communists, but rather to see Papadopoulos and his trusted colleagues coming to power. To achieve such an unenviable task, the conspirators had full access to military equipment, but also to a NATO-designed Internal Security Plan (codenamed IERAX II) that was effectively revised by IDEA members ‘for military control of Greece contingent upon occurrence of another political crisis.’37 The above hypothesis becomes more credible taking into account that even when Papadopoulos stated that all dangers threatening the nation were eliminated—the cause of the revolution be-

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ing to protect Greece from external threats, ‘cure’ its internal weaknesses and achieve union with Cyprus—democracy was yet to be restored. Certain incidents that took place during the dictatorship suggest that the dictators’ sense of patriotism was replaced by their personal ambitions. The removal of Greek troops from Cyprus (December 1967) was, perhaps, not due to pressure from Turkey, but rather an attempt either to strengthen the regime in Athens, or prevent the commanding officers of the Greek forces in Cyprus from rallying against them. As a matter of fact, both Papadopoulos and Dimitrios Ioannides—his successor in power—were more inclined to protect the regime, rather than their country. Subsequently, the allegations that Ioannides did not overthrow Papadopoulos, but merely succeeded him in power, are now more credible. Most probably, it was nothing but an act to ease the tension caused by internal events (Athens Polytechnic–November 1973) and the frustration of the Europeans; a well-conceived plan to suggest that the dictators were eager to reinstate civilian rule when, in essence, the regime was only seeking to prolong its existence and deceive its opponents. Hence, to presume that the Greek dictatorship could have lasted longer, had the invasion of Cyprus (1974) not occurred, may not be far from reality. The Cyprus issue The strategic significance of Greece to Western powers was realised in the early stages of the First World War. When hostilities in the Balkan Peninsula became widespread, Great Britain attempted to engage Greece in the conflict by proposing to the latter the annexation of Cyprus. Against all expectations, Greece twice rejected the proposition when Eleftherios Venizelos and, then, Alexandros Zaimis were in power, in 1914 and 1915 respectively. Ever since, the future of Cyprus remained uncertain. Immediately at the end of the war and during the negotiations in Lausanne (1923), Turkey officially waived any claims on Cyprus, thus making Britain consider Greece as the only lawful successor. Although both Britain and Greece had sovereign rights over Cyprus, the British aimed at firmly establishing their control over the island to discourage any possible claims of the Greek-Cypriots for independence or union


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with Greece and, therefore, the Turkish-Cypriot community was granted almost equal rights to those of the Greek-speaking community. It suffices to say that Britain’s intention was to thwart the will and deny the right of an ethnic group to self-determination merely because Cyprus provided access to the Middle East region and was thus strategically invaluable to the British. Once the Turkish-Cypriots were equipped with more than adequate civil rights, any attempt of the Greek-Cypriot community to achieve independence or union with Greece would meet the objections of the former, particularly in the event of the second scenario materialising, as they would definitely become an insignificant minority in an enlarged Greek state, limiting at the same time Turkey’s access to the Mediterranean. The significance and controversy surrounding the Turkish-Cypriot community’s rights notwithstanding, the main concern of the Greek-Cypriot government was the potentially great influence of the former in both the domestic and foreign affairs of the state, not to mention the use of the right of veto. Greece’s importance to the Western alliance was further enhanced by her relationship to Cyprus, the strategic significance of which was outlined in a British governmental document of 1950.38 The island of Cyprus was significant due to the access it provided to the oil resources of the Middle East, while it also enabled Britain to support Turkey, on the basis of the Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of 1939. Cyprus was also important to the 1950 tripartite declaration to which Britain, France and the United States agreed to maintain an arms balance between Arabs and Israelis. However, the referendum of 1950, organised by the Church of Cyprus, indicated that a staggering 95.7 per cent of the Greek-Cypriot population clearly favoured the island’s union with Greece. The impressive outcome of the referendum made Archbishop Makarios believe that the union of Cyprus with Greece was imminent, particularly since Britain had previously offered the island to Greece twice. While the referendum energised the unionists across the island, nevertheless, it caused anxiety for the Turks, the Turkish-Cypriot community and Britain, as they would all have to give up considerable privileges were Cyprus to unite with Greece. At the time, Greece was supporting the Greek-Cypriot people’s aspirations and

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in November 1951 Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff ‘offered Britain four bases in Greece and any facilities she wanted in Cyprus to hand over the island.’39 The British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, however, rejected the offer due to ‘the Greek government being too weak to be entrusted with Britain’s long-term defence.’40 The gradually diminishing influence of British rule in Cyprus and the election of Archbishop Makarios as President of Cyprus in 1954 provided the necessary grounds for Cyprus to appeal to the United Nations for independence. Beyond any doubt, an independent Cyprus could jeopardise the interests of the Western alliance in the area, thus NATO exerted pressure on both Greece and Turkey to urge the respective communities on the island to oppose independence. NATO’s strategy proved successful and Cyprus’ attempt for independence met with failure; nonetheless, the demand for self-determination remained strong and the British decided to ‘invite’ Turkey into the dispute to neutralise the Greek-Cypriots’ demands. The British attempted to maintain their interests through a policy of ‘divide and rule’. However, the fact that the British government considered that its counterpart in Ankara had equal rights and responsibilities over Cyprus only further complicated the relationship between the two Mediterranean states. Apparently, the way that Britain handled the Cyprus issue disturbed the geo-political interests of the United States, as Dwight Eisenhower, the US President, informed Churchill about ‘the effects of Britain’s policy on the American public, who believed Greece was being “reasonable and conciliatory”.’41 Britain then realised that its foreign policy was a drag on the settlement of the Cyprus issue and decided to free Makarios42 on 29 March 1954, although the Cypriot leader was not allowed to return to the island. President Eisenhower played a key role in Makarios’ release, at a time when the need to resolve the Cyprus issue had become urgent, since the conflicting interests of Greece and Turkey were reaching their height. In fact, Turkey feared that union of Cyprus with Greece would grant to the government in Athens control over the entire eastern Mediterranean region, an act Ankara considered a casus belli. At this stage, Britain seemed unable to respond effectively to the situation and on April 1957 the new British Prime Minister,


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Harold Macmillan, was about to ‘give up’ control over Cyprus. However, the significance of Cyprus to the alliance caused anxiety to the government in Washington, which feared that either union or partition of the island would lead to a Greek-Turkish war and thus opted for the independence of the island. In an attempt to prevent war between Greece and Turkey, Macmillan drew up a plan for trilateral rule over Cyprus in 1958. The Greek response to the plan was negative, as was Makarios’ who demanded, once more, full independence for Cyprus. The Cypriot leader’s request was eventually satisfied through the Zurich and London Agreements of 19589, as signed by Britain, Greece and Turkey. The tripartite Treaty43 stipulated that the three guarantor powers were responsible for stability and order on the island, along with its independence and territorial integrity. To be more effective, all three states had equal rights that enabled them to intervene and maintain forces in Cyprus. In a sense, the Western powers had succeeded in bringing Cyprus, albeit indirectly, into the NATO alliance. It is noteworthy, however, that during Karamanlis’ rule Greece no longer favoured union with Cyprus, thus the Cypriots’ turn from supporting enosis (union) to championing independence. According to a National Intelligence Estimate of 6 October 1959, the agreement of 1959 ‘established a most complicated framework and left many troublesome problems to be worked out before independence is achieved.’ What is more, ‘The settlement is replete with provisions which will tend to perpetuate divisions between Greek and Turkish Cypriots,’ while it ‘limits the Republic of Cyprus’ room for manoeuvre in international affairs.’44 The Treaty of Guarantee ‘provided a constitution that denied the government by an elected majority, denied them the freedom to change their own constitution, and guaranteed the NATO powers military influence and facilities on the island.’45 Another issue that questions the notion of Cyprus’s independence is the fact that the Treaty of Establishment conceded Britain the right to use other areas ‘without restriction or interference,’ thus restraining Cyprus’ ‘foreign policy and internal security matters.’46 Further, the British Colonial Office papers reveal that the United States too could make use of the British bases—in secret from the Cypriots—though the agreement

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stated clearly that the military bases in question were ‘prevented from being handed to Washington at a future date.’47 It is worthy of note that the Treaty of Establishment mainly concerned the degree of Britain’s control over Cyprus and much less the sovereignty of the newly independent Cypriot state. Finally, the agreements also made reference to the prevention of any ‘communist or pro-Soviet government’ from coming to power, by and large, guaranteed by ‘the military presence of three NATO powers on the island and the veto powers of the Turkish-Cypriot minority, which could be relied upon to side with Turkey in foreign affairs, and could veto economic policy’ as well.48 Prior to the Zurich and London Agreements, Greece and Turkey had come to a secret arrangement49 that was later included in the Zurich Agreement, according to which ‘the self-determination for the Cypriots’ was to be limited ‘in the interests of Western defence.’ The two states were also expected to exert pressure on Cyprus regarding integration into NATO and to ‘ban AKEL and all communist activities.’ To make certain that the two sides reached this appalling agreement, the government in Ankara was induced by an offer of the United States to plant missile sites on Turkish soil, while Greece was ‘persuaded’ following threats of a cut-off of economic aid, as well as British and French demands for the ‘payment of pre-war debt.’50 After the agreement, Greece also agreed to receive nuclear weapons from the United States. Unfortunately, the prospect for a new peaceful era among all sides was anything but promising. The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee revealed that Greece and the Greek-Cypriots made more concessions than Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot community, a result of United States and NATO pressure that would become the main source of future disputes. Most certainly, NATO benefited from the Treaty of Guarantee too, since there would be Greek and Turkish forces on the island, along with two British bases, although those bases were not operating within NATO’s framework. Still, what is really important is the fact that Cyprus was now in the Western sphere of influence, its strategic significance constantly increasing. In a National Security Council Report of 9 February 1960, Cyprus’ strategic significance was once again stressed. Cyprus was


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considered as a possible back-up installation for United States facilities in the Turkish city of Adana. Still, the United States had other important interests in Cyprus. The report stressed that ‘United States governmental facilities include a radio communications relay station, which is vital to official United States communications throughout the Middle East and foreign broadcast monitoring stations that are important to our collection of foreign intelligence. Any effort to relocate these facilities would be costly in terms of both time and money, and there is no other location in the area at which the assigned mission could be accomplished satisfactorily.’51 Moreover, the report stated that Georgios ‘Grivas is seen as a potential disruptive element in Cypriot politics,’52 while AKEL (Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou–Progressive Party of the Working People) was perceived as a communist threat. It also stated that the Greek and Turkish forces in Cyprus were not sufficient to protect the island from any likely aggressor. Instead, ‘if these forces were to be equipped as a constabulary or mobile guard they would be less expensive to maintain and could play a valuable role in coping with any communist threats to stability.’53 The report also suggested that the United States should ‘take no initiative to secure the admission of Cyprus into NATO but be prepared to consider such admission if the question is raised.’54 It then followed that the United States should ‘be prepared, as appropriate and feasible, to encourage the imposition of the ban on the Communist party of Cyprus.’55 The United States government should also ‘discreetly encourage the new Cyprus government to develop, maintain, and train its internal policy and security services to combat communist subversion,’56 however, the United States should not provide direct military aid to Cyprus, unless necessary to preserve the US foreign policy objectives. Finally, the report argued that were the communists ‘to gain control of the government,’ the United States should ‘support counteraction.’57 When Makarios’ demand, on November 1963, for constitutional reform met with objections from the United States, new fights broke out in Cyprus forcing Makarios to declare that the Treaty of Guarantee ‘was no longer valid.’58 In view of these events, and with Turkey prepared to take action in Cyprus, the United States decided to proceed with

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a plan that called for limited intervention—with the participation of Britain and Turkey—in order to secure their foothold on the island. Although the plan was never applied, the crisis reached its height when Ankara threatened to invade Cyprus, only to be dissuaded by the United States. In fact, from December 1963 to August 1964, the United States had to discourage five attempts by Turkey to invade the island. Unable to cope with the inter-communal struggles that occurred in Cyprus, Britain asked for United States assistance, as it had previously done during the Greek Civil War. The United States response was President Lyndon Johnson’s proposal for the deployment of a NATO force on the island, to preserve democracy and internal stability. Although both Greece and Turkey agreed to the plan, Makarios strongly objected it. The reason was that, since Cyprus was not an official member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the stationing of such a force in a newly established state would undermine its sovereignty and so Makarios appealed to Moscow for a just solution. As expected, the Soviet Union was also against the deployment of NATO peace-enforcement forces and, instead, proposed an international force under UN auspices. The end result was the creation of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), as deployed to the island in early 1964. The UN was not successful either and, in May 1964, Greece and Turkey reached the brink of war, but tension slightly eased after Johnson’s intervention. Later on, Robert MacNamara, the United States Secretary of Defense, in an attempt to exert further pressure, made it known to the Greek government that the United States would not intervene in any subsequent confrontation with Turkey, in an attempt to exert further pressure. A new proposal ensued, the Acheson Plan,59 aimed at the imposition of both partition and double union. The Greek Prime Minister, Georgios Papandreou, appeared hesitant to accept the plan and so was Makarios, who once more threatened to call in the Soviet Union. Thus, the Acheson Plan was abandoned for the time being, only to reappear in a revised form later on, this time to be rejected by Turkey. It is evident that the United States did not favour the independence of the island, particularly, if one takes into consideration the fact that the United States voted


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against UN Resolution 2077 of 18 December 1965, which called for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus. The United States then decided to employ NATO in their attempt to press the two Mediterranean allies and force them to overcome their ‘differences over the Acheson proposals and accept the result.’60 To persuade the Turks, the United States suggested that Turkey ‘occupy the Karpas peninsula, triggering instant enosis by the Greeks “with the consequent supersession of Makarios”.’61 Although events in Vietnam forced Washington to focus elsewhere, the United States was ‘considering [a plan] to divide the island by conspiracy.’62 According to a senior CIA official in Athens, the Papandreou government and, particularly, his son Andreas were endangering US interests in the area, fearing that Andreas would shut United States military bases in Greece and withdraw the country from NATO. However, the elections of 16 February 1964 that ended conservative rule and brought Papandreou’s Enosis Kentrou party to power, witnessed EK’s continuation of the conservatives’ foreign policy. Nonetheless, relations between Greece and the United States worsened due to the Cyprus issue, despite the fact that Papandreou’s government took the decision and sent a Greek brigade to Cyprus following the successive appeals of Makarios to Moscow for support, thus ensuring the predominance of the Western alliance over the island. The deployment of such a significant force could have been used as a deterrent to a possible Turkish armed intervention, though it lacked air support, but could also be interpreted as a sign of enosis and even as an attempt to overthrow Makarios. Either way, the interests of the West would have been preserved. At the time, the Cyprus issue seemed to dominate the agenda of Greek external affairs. The demand for independence soon brought Cyprus to the foreground of the Greek-Turkish rivalry and, apart from becoming the apple of discord between the two Eastern Mediterranean states, it also attracted attention from the international environment. Most certainly, the Western alliance aimed at settling the conflict and avoiding any Soviet interference, since Cyprus was too valuable to become the subject of conflict

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between the two superpowers. However, the very nature of the Cyprus issue, concerning the frequent clashes between its two communities and the non-alignment policy adopted by the Cypriot leadership, was only threatening the interests of the West. Therefore, the need to resolve the conflict before it engaged Greece and Turkey in a full-scale war became imminent, consequently leading to the Treaty of Guarantee. Nevertheless, the Treaty of Guarantee did not reflect any real attempts by the Western alliance to bring about a lasting settlement with stability, peace and order. On the contrary, the Treaty of Guarantee was only expected to preserve the interests of the West for a certain period of time, after which further intervention in Cyprus would be needed. In a sense, the purpose of the treaty in question was to ease temporarily the situation in the region, satisfy Cyprus’ demand for independence to a limited extent and prevent Soviet penetration in a rather sensitive area. Basically, the only thing the treaty could guarantee was that the interests of the West would remain intact. This stems from the fact that, once again, the treaty was more concerned with the status of the foreign installations on the island than the status of the island itself. The only conclusion we may deduce at this point is that Cyprus was a major concern of the Western alliance, but only from a strategic viewpoint, since it disregarded the aspirations of the Cypriot people. In short, one could argue that Cyprus was merely seen as an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ or ‘enlarged’ military base that had the potential of satisfying the needs of the West for maintaining a strong foothold in the Middle East, particularly, when we take into account the strong Soviet presence in the area. As a result, the Cyprus issue continued to be a source of ongoing conflict that reached its height with the 1974 invasion of the island. The return to democracy The day following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Greek army officials, including Ioannides and President Phaidon Gizikis, decided to call in the former political leaders and hand the power back to them, who then decided to appoint Karamanlis as Prime Minister, all sharing the belief that he would have more public support. Indeed, in the first hours of 24 July Karamanlis arrived in Athens and


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was sworn in as Prime Minister of Greece. With democracy restored in Greece, Karamanlis’ priority was to establish a new civilian government. Most certainly, the events of the time did not allow the privilege of holding elections, since an imminent response to the Cyprus situation was of great urgency. Hence, a temporary government was formed, consisting of politicians from all political sides, known as the government of ethniki enotita (national unity). Surely, this naming of the government cannot have been accidental. Rather, it served as a mere reminder to the Greek people that in times of crises unity was the most important element. Having witnessed a military regime and the occupation of Cyprus, the Greeks had to defend themselves against the Turkish threat. According to Karamanlis’ archives, Evangelos Averoff appears to have stated that the Turkish threat was so pragmatic that it almost relegated the potential of a Warsaw Pact offensive to an unimpressive matter that approached mere anxiety. This was the first shift concerning the strategic objectives of Greek foreign policy, a radical change that would define Greece’s external affairs in the ensuing years. Likewise, for Greece and Turkey, this interstate conflict would be far more important than the perceived Soviet threat. It is interesting to note that all Greek political parties identified Turkey as the major security threat to Greece, perhaps, a result of an imperfect United States foreign policy. The first official government of the political changeover (metapoliteusi) was elected on 17 November 1974. Emerging victorious from the elections was the Nea Dimokratia party formed by Karamanlis on 26 September. Interestingly, the key objective of the newly elected Greek government that took shape later that same year was encapsulated in the parliamentary proceedings and in a famous speech delivered by Karamanlis in December 1974. According to his statements, Greece was part of the West, since such a relationship would ensure order and stability throughout the country. At the same time, however, Greece aimed to reduce her dependence on the United States through her application for membership in the EEC, while Turkey had become a significant factor that all Greek policy-makers had to take into account. Regarding the Cyprus issue, the new administration simply declared its sup-

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port of the Cypriot people and stressed the need to promote a peaceful resolution. These objectives did not alter during the party’s second term in office, but neither did the problematic conditions characterising the Cyprus and Aegean issues. In sum, the parliamentary proceedings reveal that the government of Nea Dimokratia was expected to deal effectively with deteriorating GreekTurkish relations, promote the issue of EEC membership and reduce the dependence of Greece on the United States. What remains an ambivalent statement is Karamanlis’ historic declaration that ‘we [Greece] belong to the West.’ Conclusion To state that Greek domestic affairs were subject to foreign intervention, particularly from the end of the Second World War until the collapse of the dictatorship, is no longer a mere hypothesis but a matter of fact. The cause of this phenomenon lies entirely in the objectives of the West, particularly, the United States and their aim of containing the Soviet Union. Therefore, whether it was Greece’s strategic location or simply the anxiety of the Western powers—in view of the likelihood of the Soviet Union dominating the Balkans—that brought Greece into the Western camp is largely irrelevant. Instead, the critical issue is the fact that Greece had to become part of the West with all the consequences entailed. The fact that Greece was a rather unstable state, while as a nation it certainly lacked unity, made external support imperative for her survival. However, the essence of such support grew in significance and soon after took the form of intervention in every sense. From the end of the WWII and until the early 1960s the United States was undisputedly the dominant figure in all sectors of Greek society. During this period the United States government openly expressed its views in favour of or against its occasional Greek counterpart and it sometimes even dictated its will to the government in Athens. On the other side, the instability of Greece did not leave much room for political manoeuvre; neither did it enable the government in Athens to formulate its foreign policy independently from the United States objectives. Thus, when Cyprus emerged as a signifi-


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cant issue for the Western alliance, the influence exercised upon Greece increased immensely due to her ethnic ties with the former. Greece was perceived as an important ally, enough to ‘justify’ the fact that the United States was, more or less, appointing the Greek governments. Obviously, the primary aim of the United States was the creation of a stable political environment and the formation of a suitable government in Greece, preferably a conservative one, which would safeguard US interests in the region. Once the conservatives came to power under Karamanlis, Greece witnessed a period of political stability and economic prosperity, but in the field of external affairs the settling of the Cyprus issue remained a burden to Greek foreign policy. The reason that the Cyprus issue was a major concern to all sides is closely related to the fact that any settlement would have to satisfy the interests of the two Cypriot communities as well as those of Greece, Turkey and the Western alliance. Despite the fact that the Cyprus issue was temporarily resolved when it gained independence, Greece experienced no prosperity or stability due to Karamanlis’ clash with the Monarchy. Coupled with similar ambitions on the part of Papandreou to downgrade the Crown too, Greece soon returned to instability. Several caretaker governments ruled Greece for some three years, all with the aim of establishing a stable environment in order to hold elections. Sadly enough, this proved to be a rather critical period in which Greece had to resume control of her domestic affairs and restore order, while she was pressured from outside to settle the Cyprus issue. When a series of caretaker governments failed to attain a degree of autonomy sufficient to allow the installation of an elected government, the political infrastructure of Greece gave way to the aspirations of a group of military officers. The possible causes of the military coup have already been discussed; however, it is necessary to note at this point that apart from the alleged theory of ‘communist threat’, it is probable that the army violated democracy for the purpose of abolishing the institution of Monarchy. Although the continuous struggle for power and the quest for supreme authority between the King of Greece, on the one hand, and Karamanlis and Papandreou on the other, may suggest that the latter two sought to

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apply measures that would limit the authority of the former, this should not imply that the two premiers aimed at strengthening their authority as such. On the contrary, our view is that their attempts to diminish the role of the Monarch stemmed from the fact that the institution of the Monarchy was probably never considered an integral part of the Greek political spectrum, and indeed of Greek society, since it had been imposed by foreign powers after Greece gained her independence from the Ottoman Empire. Were this viewpoint correct, one could argue that the opportunity to abolish the Monarchy arose when no popular government was in place, thus enabling the colonels to emerge as the successful contenders for power. There is no doubt that during the dictatorship Greek foreign policy suffered several memorable diplomatic defeats, notably, the country’s expulsion from the Council of Europe and the forceful partition of Cyprus. Needless to say, such events were a massive blow to Greek foreign policy interests. Once democracy was restored, the government of ‘national unity’ took the decision to withdraw Greece from the military wing of NATO and focused all efforts on restraining Turkey’s expansionist policies. While the government of Nea Dimokratia would later declare its intention to lessen its dependence on the United States, question the legitimacy of United States bases on Greek soil, apply for membership in the EEC and enter a new era of Greek-Turkish rivalry that expanded over the Aegean and Cyprus issues. In an attempt to maintain her ties with the Western alliance, it also declared that Greece was still part of the West. Whether the aims of the Greek government were eventually fulfilled is a matter examined in subsequent chapters.

4 Greek Relations with the US and NATO

As with most patron-client relationships, dealings between Greece and the United States were, largely, dominated by differentiated interests and expectations. The United States became active in Greek internal affairs with the outbreak of the Greek Civil War in 1947, followed by the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine. Greek conservatives, having emerged victorious through the clashes with the communist guerrillas, sought closer ties with the Western superpower and in 1952 Greece became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Ever since, the United States has had a great impact on Greek domestic affairs, aiming to incorporate Greece in the Western camp and prolong the conservatives’ rule, which in turn would preserve US interests in the region. At first, American penetration was achieved through the Truman Doctrine and the establishment of the American Mission for Aid to Greece. As one might expect, the effect of both the Civil War and the United States intervention in Greek politics was immense. Greece adopted a strong anti-communist ideology and became Western orientated. However, issues like Cyprus’ plea for independence, the rise to power of Georgios Papandreou—strongly anti-American in many respects—and, later on, of the colonels, ultimately led to the deterioration of relations between the US and Greece. Particularly since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the Greek government’s aim was seemingly to reduce its dependence on the United Sates, as evident from its partial withdrawal from NATO and its application

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to join the European Economic Community (EEC). The threat posed by Turkey overwhelmed Greek foreign policy makers and even seemed to overshadow the apparent threat of communist expansion, thus prompting Greece to readjust her foreign policy objectives. At this point, it is necessary to note that ‘independence,’ to the Greeks, was a synonym for anti-Americanism, or at the very least a concept that argued for the disengagement of Greece from the United States and NATO. Along the same lines, an ‘independent’ Greek foreign policy could also be interpreted in terms of Greece decreasing her dependence on the United States. Likewise, Greece’s membership in NATO was also turbulent. Participating in such an alliance was regarded as extremely important, given the perception that membership in NATO epitomised Greece’s western identity, while also stressing her desire to become part of the West, but the Cyprus crisis revealed the disadvantages of being a small power in a strong organisation. The alliance’s interests and priorities, especially in the period of the dictatorship, did not always coincide with those of the Greek state, thus forcing the decision to withdraw. Greece’s relationships with the United States and NATO was never satisfactory, particularly, since the Greeks were always suspicious of the actual objectives of their patrons, not to mention disagreements with their policies and distrust regarding the allies’ activities. The Greek application and entry to the EEC was thus seen as a bargaining tool for Greece to gain more ‘independence,’ along with the all-important economic and political support that the Europeans could provide to her, According to a Congressional report entitled Controlling the Damage: U.S. Policy Options for Greece, ‘it would be highly unrealistic to think that the United States will ever be able to return to the comfortable patron-client state relationship it once enjoyed with Greece.’1 The Cyprus crisis had made both Greece and Turkey realise that the interests of the United States and NATO in the area were no longer the primary concern of the two Mediterranean states and they did little to prevent the conflict that continues to this day. Naturally, these events resulted in the weakening of both the United States’ and NATO’s positions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, the United States approach to

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the Cyprus situation, the arms embargo on Turkey and the negotiations concerning the future of Greece within the Western alliance are all issues that need to be carefully assessed in order to comprehend better the nature of Greece’s relations with both the United States and NATO. Strategic importance The significance of Greece and Turkey is clearly outlined in two congressional reports entitled United States Military Installations and Objectives in the Mediterranean2 and The Military Aspects of Banning Arms Aid to Turkey3 respectively. Strategically located at the southern part of the Balkans and having control over much of the Aegean Sea, Greece was important to the United States because she provided essential military facilities as well as access to the Middle East, while also helping prevent the expansion of the Soviet navy in the Mediterranean. It is worthy of note that the US bases4 in Greece were used for surveillance purposes and to monitor Soviet activities in the region. Hence, there is little doubt that the significance of Greece to the Western alliance was immense, perhaps, even surpassing that of Turkey, given that her neighbour only provided facilities for collecting information, whereas the bases in Greece could also accommodate the entire Sixth Fleet when necessary. In fact, Andreas Papandreou, leader of Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima (Panhellenic Socialist Movement–PASOK), claimed that apart from the Incirlik base in Turkey, which provided a forward position for US tactical fighter-bombers, the importance of the remaining US military installations was limited to telecommunications alone. Should Turkey be considered essential due to her links to the Middle East or the fact that she shared common borders with the Soviet Union, Greece remained equally, if not more, significant to the Western alliance because of her unique geopolitical position. In short, it would have been quite difficult for the United States and NATO to deploy weapons to Turkey or exploit, in general, her geographic location had Greece not been part of the alliance too, which clearly suggests that Greece was NATO’s important link to Turkey, something indicated in The Military Aspects of Banning Arms Aid to Turkey Congressional report.5 Interestingly, were Greece not

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a NATO member, the Turkish government would have been much more isolated, while the Warsaw Pact would not need to maintain significant forces in the Balkan Peninsula. The strategic importance of Greece became evident in the 1960’s, as her ideal geographical position enabled US nuclear submarines to reach the Soviet Union quickly, particularly during the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 when the Soviet fleet had a strong presence in the area. The nearly 3,000 Greek islands in the Aegean Sea provided support to any action in the Dardanelles and had the potential for cutting the access of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean. Of course, Turkey was also perceived as an important ally, clearly indicated in National Security Study Memorandum 227. According to this memorandum, the US President called for a ‘review of US security policy toward Turkey,’ concerning negotiations over US military installations, Turkey’s objectives towards the alliance, the issue of nuclear weapons and Turkey’s demands for financial and military aid.6 To appreciate the role of Greece in the Western alliance it is necessary to take into account the fact that this was the Cold War era. As with every other state, Greece had to align with one of the two superpowers or become neutral with regard to their conflicting interests. Destined to join the Western camp, Greece found herself involved in a rather peculiar situation. She was the only state in the Balkans aligned with the West, thus immediately labelling its northern neighbours as enemies. As a consequence, after the restoration of democracy, Greece only sought to cooperate with these countries since the military regime had left her isolated from the international environment. The paradox, however, was that Turkey, instead of being considered as an allied state, soon became the main adversary of Greece in the region. This rivalry had no precedent in NATO’s history, despite there being other member-states that shared an equally turbulent history, such as the troubled relationship amongst Britain, France and Germany. Reasonably enough, the rivalry between Greece and Turkey soon disturbed the cohesion of NATO, as the two Mediterranean states reached the brink of war during the Cyprus crisis. NATO’s southern flank became the Achilles heel of the alliance with the two involved members setting aside the organisation’s interests and


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concentrating on their regional conflict instead. Still, the two states in question were of immense value to NATO and, primarily, to the United States for reasons already indicated. Apparently, the value of their strategic locations was so important that neither NATO nor the United States was willing to take any radical measures that could have forced Greece and Turkey to conform to the alliance’s wishes, simply because such policies could alienate the two and thus endanger Western interests. Moreover, the United States also feared that the Soviet Union could intervene in the crisis and take the initiative to defuse it away from the West. Even when the US government decided to apply such drastic measures as the arms embargo on Turkey, it was soon realised that such an action compromised its geopolitical interests and so it was ended. Hence, the strategic importance of Greece and Turkey was fundamental to the Western alliance, to the extent that it decided to remain impartial to their conflict and even tolerate them at times even when the two were engaged in actions that might have threatened the cohesion of the alliance. The Cyprus crisis During the years of the Nixon Administration, relations between Greece and the United States improved, particularly after 22 September 1970, when the shipment of arms to Greece was resumed. It is noteworthy that the Nixon Administration aimed at reducing the US role in the Cyprus issue, while also opposing the annexation of the island by Greece. Although one could argue that the US leadership was expressing its support for the regime by lifting the embargo, the fact that it objected to Greek attempts to take over Cyprus proves the opposite. Nevertheless, Greece was still strategically significant to the United States as indicated in a study produced by Admiral Elmo Zumwalt—a former chief of naval operations—inasmuch as Athens provided ideal facilities for US naval forces, considering that the Soviet Union had made similar arrangements with Egypt, Syria and Algeria. Evidently, such facilities were badly needed after the 1970 crisis in Jordan when the ineptitude of the United States became apparent, especially compared to the actions of the Soviet Union naval forces in the area. At the

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same time, the United States had no reasons to jeopardise their good relations with the colonels and thus the respective agreement was signed on 8 January 1973, the implementation of which made Athens, and therefore the regime, exceptionally significant to the United States Navy. It is possible that the fact that there was an authoritarian regime in Greece played a key role in this decision. Nevertheless, a strong United States presence in the eastern Mediterranean, apart from limiting the Soviet Union’s influence over the Cyprus issue and advancing the US capabilities in the region, could have reduced tension between Greece and Turkey and brought about stability by exerting further pressure upon the two NATO rivals. Instead, stability in the area was yet again disturbed after elections were held in Cyprus in early 1971, which gave AKEL (Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou–Progressive Party of the Working People) 30 per cent of the voters. The rise of communism in Cyprus caused anxiety in NATO circles, prompting two NATO meetings in Lisbon and Paris respectively where it was suggested that only the double union of Cyprus with Greece and Turkey would serve the alliance. Makarios was then forced to appeal to Moscow for support, an act that caused frustration for Greece and NATO alike, further complicated by the decision of the Greek dictators to dispatch General Georgios Grivas to the island with the aim of overthrowing the Cypriot leader and effecting union with Greece. The situation did not change and the Turkish government, during a meeting in Vienna, suggested to the colonels that they settle the Cyprus issue and ‘hand territory’ to Turkey ‘or face the consequences.’ The Greeks felt they had to remove Makarios from power and ‘replace him with someone more amenable to their suggestions.’ The United States approved of the Greek ‘conciliatory attitude towards the Turkish government but discouraged any incidents that might lead to bloodshed and possibly a Graeco-Turkish confrontation.’7 Makarios, soon uncovered yet another plan of the Greek military regime to overthrow him, as well as evidence suggesting that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was financing the purchase of arms by his rivals in Cyprus.


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Although conditions hardly changed, a rather peculiar event took place in the beginning of July 1974, less than two weeks prior to the Greek coup in Cyprus. On 3 July the CIA reported that Ioannides had withdrawn his plans against Makarios and then repeated the same information on 14 July, a day before the coup. The first message was received by the government in Washington whereas the second came to the US National Security Council. Whether the CIA was intentionally misguiding Washington or Ioannides was trying to deceive both foreign intelligence services, as well as Makarios, remains unknown. However, the fact that the relevant information was then transmitted to the local Cypriot authorities in Nicosia must have affected Makarios’ response and, perhaps, the integrity of the island. Nevertheless, these are merely indications and no clear evidence exists as to whether the CIA or the US government was involved in the Greek coup in Cyprus. Furthermore, once the Greek parliament had concluded a review of all available evidence, there was no conclusive evidence regarding US interference in the Cyprus crisis. This is not surprising, however, given that the US leadership also had to cope with the embarrassment caused by the Watergate scandal and the impeachment of President Nixon. This, along with the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 diverted Washington’s attention from such issues as the crisis in Cyprus. Various conspiracy theories notwithstanding, the Cypriot National Guard pulled off a coup on 15 July and succeeded in overthrowing Makarios and installing Nikos Sampson, a former EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston–National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) member, as the new president of Cyprus, thus providing Turkey with the opportunity to intervene militarily under the London and Zurich treaties of guarantee. Prior to the invasion Bülent Ecevit, the Turkish Prime Minister, had asked Britain to take part in a joint intervention in Cyprus, but the British refused. Hence, the Turkish government took the decision to intervene unilaterally, since Ankara considered Greece exclusively responsible for the coup. The US Assistant Secretary of State, Joseph Sisco, was then sent to Athens and Ankara on 19 July with the aim of preventing an invasion. His entreaties failed and the invasion commenced

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in the small hours of 20 July. The Greek response was woefully inadequate, due to the chaotic situation of the Greek army at the time, despite the fact that KYP (Kentriki Ypiresia Pliroforion– Central Intelligence Service) had information that Turkish forces were preparing for an invasion on the night of 18 July. Interestingly, since 10 July, Greece had also had information regarding the concentration of a considerable landing force in Turkish ports close to Cyprus; however, it is now certain that the information available was either never considered seriously or simply withheld. Regardless, Turkey appears to have taken the decision to intervene forcefully because such an act was deemed necessary to prevent the union of Cyprus with Greece. The reasons for Turkey’s objection to such a union of Cyprus with Greece are well documented in the Karamanlis’ archives and could be summarised as follows. Firstly, Turkey would not have access to the Mediterranean Sea; secondly, Ankara would be in a difficult position regarding the protection of the Turkish-Cypriot community on the island; and thirdly, in the unlikely event of Greece acceding to the Warsaw Pact, Turkey would certainly find herself in quite a disadvantageous position. Hence, Turkey decided to proceed with its invasion, an action the government in Ankara perceived as wholly legitimate, based on Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee. According to Bülent Ecevit, following the Greek putsch in Cyprus, Turkey was left with no alternative other than military intervention. From Makarios’ point of view and in support of Ecevit’s statement, the fact that within five days of the Greek coup in Cyprus Turkey invaded the island should not suggest that the invasion was premeditated; it merely indicates that Turkey was prepared for such an occasion, ‘as it is natural.’8 Oddly enough, Makarios appeared to ignore, for reasons unknown, the fact that Turkey had already attempted to invade Cyprus in the past. It is noteworthy that authors like Alexandros Zaousis and Spyros Papageorgiou have argued that Turkey’s response to the Cyprus crisis was unjustified because the government in Ankara attempted to restore the status quo by resorting to violence, whereas the UN Charter does not encourage the use of force. It is also important to note, however, that the Treaty of Alliance clearly stipulates that


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‘The High Contracting Parties [Greece, Turkey and Cyprus] undertake to resist any attack or aggression, direct or indirect, directed against the independence or the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.’9 The fact that the Greek colonels had already violated Cyprus’ independence in their attempt to overthrow Makarios and achieve union with the island certainly justifies Turkey’s initiative to intervene with the intention, allegedly, of bringing about order and stability. Furthermore, Makarios’ removal from power and his subsequent replacement by Nikos Sampson seemed to pose a direct threat to the Turkish-Cypriot community for two reasons: 1) Cyprus was likely to become part of an enlarged Greek state that was under military rule and 2) Sampson’s anti-Turkish sentiments and record in the inter-communal fights. Thus, Turkey’s intervention was not only necessary for restoring order in Cyprus, but also motivated by the concern to protect the Turkish Cypriot population. Therefore, one may suggest that the invasion was inevitable inasmuch as Turkey was the only state to respond to the crisis. Had Britain accepted joint intervention, things might have been different. In fact, British failure to act during the Turkish invasion was strongly criticised by a Parliamentary Select Committee Report on Cyprus, in which it was pointed out that ‘Britain had a legal right to intervene, she had the moral obligation to intervene, she had the military capacity to intervene. She did not intervene for reasons which the Government refuses to give.’10 After a cease-fire was implemented, Britain, on 25 July, called for the sides in conflict to discuss future developments. The subsequent talks did not bear fruit and in the next few days Turkey deployed even more troops to Cyprus. Further negotiations took place during 8–14 August in Geneva, where Greece demanded the withdrawal of the Turkish forces to the cease-fire line of 30 June, only to meet with Turkey’s refusal to comply and her demand for the partition of the island. More specifically, Turkey wanted a twozone federation that would consist of six autonomous Turkish cantons comprising 34 per cent of Cypriot territory. When the Greek delegation requested time to consult with the government in Athens, Turkey refused and then mounted a second offensive, with its forces advancing to today’s ‘Attila line’. During this phase, the

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Turkish army forced 150,000 Greek-Cypriots to move out of the northern part of the island, therefore, achieving the ‘demographic change’ of Cyprus.11 Turkey thus accomplished the ‘invasion, partition and colonisation’ of the island,12 while Greece felt betrayed by her allies and decided to withdraw from NATO. Events in Cyprus aroused public feeling in Greece against Turkey and the Western alliance, not to mention the colonels, and instigated a series of events that brought about the fall of the dictatorship and the restoration of democracy. The apathy of the international community and, particularly, those considered as Greece’s allies greatly disappointed the Greeks and damaged her national interests. To blame the whole thing on the diplomatic isolation of Greece would ease the task of searching for the actual causes, but to suggest that the course of events served the interests of the Western alliance would reflect substantiated allegations. For the record, the inability of Greece to react to these events stemmed from the chaotic conditions that characterised her domestic environment; a combination of unexpected developments in domestic political affairs and confusion within military circles after their leadership was removed from power and placed under detention. The Cyprus issue, therefore, affected Greek foreign policy to a great extent and, consequently, forced the caretaker government of Karamanlis to proceed with such drastic measures as its withdrawal from NATO’s military wing. The National Unity government intended not only to appease public opinion and express its frustration with the Western alliance, but also to emphasise its determination to achieve ‘independence’ from the latter. However, to argue that the Cyprus tragedy was the sole reason for Greek antiWesternism is questionable since Greece’s anti-Western feelings originated in the seven-year period of the dictatorship and were only reinforced by the Cyprus crisis. Turkey and Cyprus Turkey and Cyprus are both important and influential factors when considering relations between the United States and Greece. The strategic significance of these two states, along with the hostility that often characterise relations between them, had resulted in a


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rather complicated situation, particularly after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Turkey was considered important to the Western alliance since it shared a long border with the Soviet Union, guarded the strategic Bosporus and Dardanelles and maintained good relations with most Middle Eastern countries. The fact that Turkey had full command over certain NATO forces is further evidence of her significance to the West. The strategic importance of her geographical position was largely responsible for the fact that Turkey had the full support of NATO. In fact, Turkey was viewed as an important buffer against Soviet interference in the Middle East during: a) the embargo years (1975-8) b) peace talks between Egypt and Israel (1978) c) the Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis of 1978-9 and d) the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Viewing the overall situation, the Greeks thought their country was not central to American strategic interests in the area and certainly not as critical as Turkey. Therefore, in their perception, Ankara was favoured, whereas the Turks felt that the government in Athens exerted more influence in the US through pressure brought by the Greek lobby on the Congress. In contrast, Eugene Rossides argued before Congress that: A myth propagated by Turkey and its several United States ‘agents of influence,’ registered as foreign agents with the Justice Department, portrays Turkey as a strategic and loyal ally, vital to the national security interests of the United States. The reality is otherwise. First of all, the assertion that Turkey is “vital” to the national security interests of the United States is false on its face. Turkey was of minimal national security value to the United States during the Cold War where the action was on the central front of Europe. US intelligence facilities in Turkey were for many years, unnecessary and duplicative of other superior listening posts and satellites.13 To emphasise his point, Rossides also cites some evidence that suggested that the Turks were not exactly model allies:

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1) During the 1973 Mid-East War, predating the Turkish invasion of Cyprus by one year, Turkey refused the United States military overflight rights to resupply Israel and granted the USSR overland military convoy rights to resupply Syria and Iraq, and military overflight permission to resupply Egypt. 2) In the 1977–1978 conflict in Ethiopia, Turkey granted the Soviets military overflight rights to supply the pro-Soviet Ethiopian communists under Col. Mengistu, who eventually prevailed. 3) Over NATO objections, Turkey allowed three Soviet aircraft carriers, the Kiev on July 18, 1976, the Minsk on February 25, 1979, and the Novorosiisk on May 16, 1976, passage rights through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits into the Mediterranean in violation of the Montreaux Convention of 1936. 4) In 1979 Turkey refused to allow the United States to send 69 marines and six helicopters to American military facilities at Incirlik in Turkey for possible use in evacuating Americans from Iran. 5) Again, in 1979 Turkey refused the United States request to allow U–2 intelligence flights (for Salt II verification) over Turkish airspace “unless Moscow agreed.” 6) In May 1989, Turkey rejected an American request to inspect an advanced MIG–29 Soviet fighter plane, flown by a Soviet defector to Turkey. New York Times, May 28, 1989, at A12, col. 1. 7) The Turkish government refused repeated American requests for the installation of antennas in Turkey concerning 11 transmitters whose broadcasts would have been directed primarily to the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites. The initiative by the United States Department of State sought to improve reception of programs broadcast by Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and the Voice of America. 8) Turkey further damaged NATO by vetoing NATO’s effort to put military bases on various Greek islands for defensive purposes against the Soviet navy.14 Despite efforts by the US administration to maintain a balanced relationship with the two Mediterranean allies, Turkey was always deemed more significant since it was believed that it could restrict Soviet access to the Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East and


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further forced Soviet military officials to maintain 24 divisions along their borders. On the other hand, Cyprus was also invaluable, regarded as the ‘unsinkable base’ in light of the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, the vulnerability of oil routes from the Middle East to Europe and the presence of the Soviet fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean. Cyprus was also seen as the key to averting a Greek-Turkish war that could weaken NATO and its southern flank. Simply put, an independent Cyprus, part of the non-aligned movement, would constitute a major problem for the United States and its interests in the area. According to US State Department papers, this view is further supported by the existence of a US-British contingency plan, dating to February 1964, which called for a limited and controlled Turkish invasion of Cyprus to protect the military facilities on the island. In any case, when Turkey threatened to take military action in 1964, President Lyndon Johnson conveyed to Turkish Premier İsmet İnönü a crude message making it explicitly clear that Turkey was constrained by their 1947 agreement regarding the use of military equipment supplied by the Americans and warned Turkey that any act of aggression could deny her NATO’s military assistance in case of a conflict with the Soviets, thus forcing Turkey to refrain from intervening. Johnson’s letter caused waves of demonstrations in Turkey demanding the withdrawal of United States forces and the country’s exit from NATO, as Turkish officials seriously doubted their allies’ commitment to Turkey’s security. Consequently, Turkey sought to reduce her dependence on the United States and began restoring good diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The already troubled partnership between Greece and Turkey reached a climax with the Greek instigated coup in Cyprus and subsequent Turkish invasion of the island. What appears to be even more confusing, however, is the fact that American authorities were aware of Greek plans to overthrow Archbishop Makarios, but obviously decided not to interfere. The US government did not respond effectively to the situation, either due to the internal political crises of the Watergate scandal and Nixon’s impeachment or simply because the turn of events, particularly a change in the Cyprus government, was actually viewed as being in the United States interest

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since Makarios was perceived as a threat to NATO. Furthermore, the United States had never condemned the Greek coup of 1967 that brought the Colonels to power. Had Washington expressed its disapproval of the Greek colonels, it is possible that Makarios would have remained in his post and Turkey would have had no justifiable reasons to intervene militarily. Instead, the only measure that the United States took was to threaten the government in Ankara with suspension of military aid when Turkish armed forces kept advancing in Cyprus, but only after Turkey had secured control of a significant portion of the island. Eventually, Turkey’s further advance was prevented when a number of US warships moved close to Cyprus. According to US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, the government in Washington found itself in a rather complex situation. To condemn Greece for her acts would be like giving Turkey permission to proceed with the invasion, thus endangering American military installations in Greece, whereas to prevent Turkey from invading Cyprus would be seen as a tilt towards Greece. Moreover, the administration at this time was pre-occupied with the Watergate scandal and, therefore, not capable of delivering convincing threats to either side in the conflict. Instead, Washington decided to remain indifferent toward the Turkish invasion of the island to prevent Cyprus’s new ruler, Nikos Sampson, from declaring the union (enosis) of Cyprus with Greece, which appears to have been the primary aim of the Greek colonels, although it was also a move to detract attention from their own crumbling regime. On the other side, it has been suggested that Kissinger’s tilt, first toward the Greek and then to the Turkish side, meant that American foreign policy formulators were changing tactics from supporting the union of Cyprus with Greece, to the partition of the island. Furthermore, there are reports that Kissinger appears to have told the Turkish Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, prior to the invasion, that Sampson was not acceptable to the Americans, although they did eventually recognise him as the new leader of Cyprus. Moreover, Kissinger seems to have approved of Turkey’s aspirations regarding Cyprus and is also reported to have encouraged Ecevit during the second phase of the invasion. Finally, the State Department had stated before the invasion that the Turkish-


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Cypriot minority was in need of more effective protection as well as a greater degree of autonomy. Thus US diplomatic manoeuvres may well have played a significant role in the disruption of law and order in Cyprus by appearing to ‘welcome’ the Turkish invasion. In fact, a Congressional report of 1975 stresses that ‘. . . an American “tilt” toward Turkey seemed to characterize American policy toward the Cyprus crisis.’15 Evidently, that same ‘tilt’ condemned Cyprus to partition. It is possible that Washington was only interested in maintaining the status quo on Cyprus, this being the reason for recognising the Sampson government and ‘welcoming’ the de facto partition of the island. This would, in a sense, have brought Cyprus into NATO. In contrast to what has been argued so far with regard to American interests, Kissinger suggests that Washington wanted Cyprus to maintain her independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty. To achieve this, the withdrawal of all forces was of great importance, as well as the need for the parties in dispute to increase their efforts to reach a solution. Certainly, the United States pursued policies on the Cyprus issue that contradicted those followed in other similar cases. It is noteworthy that Kissinger, immediately after the invasion of Cyprus, suggested to Karamanlis that he adopt a moderate approach to the whole issue since Turkey did not see herself as responsible for the tragic events, but a victim of them. As revealed in the Karamanlis Archives, Henry Tasca, a former US ambassador to Greece, told Karamanlis at the Geneva Convention that the ‘US do not have a solution, neither a preference for the president of Cyprus, simply enough the US will support any solution that will preserve their interests. The US wish during the meeting in Geneva to exchange views with Greece and for Greece not to make any hasty actions, critical to the US interests, but also to the relationship among the US, NATO and Greece.’16 Similar American indifference to the Cyprus issue is also illustrated in a telegram sent by Kissinger to his European counterparts in which it is clear that the United States was only interested in preserving its objectives and wished to avoid direct involvement. In addition, the last United States attempt to secure a settlement in Cyprus occurred in No-

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vember 1978 with the Matthew Nimetz plan during the Carter administration and was rejected by both Cypriot communities, yet another sign of American indifference and impotence. Additional evidence is provided by the subsequent limited US involvement in any attempt to settle the Cyprus issue, although Congress, primarily the Senate, regarded resolution of the Cyprus issue to be important. This is consistent with the law. The reason it was difficult to reach a settlement in Cyprus lies almost entirely with the ambiguity of the United States role in this Mediterranean conflict. The American government had full knowledge of the planned intentions of the Greek dictators to instigate a coup in Cyprus, as well as of the Turkish plans to invade the island, but decided to remain mere observers of the situation. Simply stated, the United States tolerated all hostilities that took place between two of their allies and only decided to intervene when the possibility of a full-scale war between Greece and Turkey became a reality. Even though it is difficult to assume that the whole incident suited US interests perfectly, it is possible to argue, with some certainty, that it did not jeopardise them either. Had Cyprus remained a non-aligned country, it would not have served American interests due to Makarios’ good relations with the Soviet leadership and the high percentage of communist voters on the island whom the Soviets could manipulate to promote their own interests in the region. Thus, since Cyprus was not interested in joining the Western alliance, NATO would have to embrace the island by some other means to ensure that it remained within its scope. Soon enough, diplomatic measures, like the Acheson and Ball plans, to achieve Western aims were replaced by means of force as applied by Greece and Turkey. The result was the de facto partition of the island and, in the years to come, the increased influence of the two mother states regarding the future of Cyprus. In other words, not only were American interests preserved, but actually served, albeit unintentionally. The United States now did not need to be concerned further with the Cyprus issue, the only remaining task being the conclusion of a lasting settlement. It is still not perfectly clear, however, whether Washington wanted the Cyprus issue to be resolved or preferred to prolong the


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uncertainty of the situation. This question stems from the fact that the United States objected to the implementation of all United Nations Resolutions on Cyprus, rejected any Soviet proposals and made their last real contribution to resolve the conflict with the Nimetz plan of 1978. Nevertheless, given the location of Cyprus, the need to normalise Greek-Turkish affairs, avoid Soviet interference and strengthen NATO’s southeast flank, it was imperative to find a solution to the Cyprus problem even though it was necessary to address the interests of the Western alliance first. During the same period the United States encouraged the continuation of inter-communal talks between the two Cypriot communities and exhorted their European allies to commit themselves to a peaceful settlement of the dispute. Nevertheless, negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were highly unlikely to produce any positive outcome and most often ended in a deadlock, as Greece and Turkey competed for the title of the most hard-line. Similarly, the Americans managed quite efficiently to engage the Europeans in the already complex situation that, admittedly, lacked the potential to restore order in the Eastern Mediterranean. Hence, GreekTurkish relations maintained the character of an age-old rivalry that, miraculously, upheld Western interests instead of compromising them. It now seems easier to suggest that the Cyprus crisis actually suited American interests well, thus posing another knotty issue— the actual role of the United States in the whole conflict. To resolve this issue, however, it is necessary to have valid documentation, something woefully lacking as the vast majority of relevant documents are still classified and, presumably, will not be available to scholars and the public for a long time to come. Withholding this material encourages conspiracy theories and generates conflicting claims about the role of the US government. On the other hand, some disparate pieces of credible information do suggest that some of the conspiracy theories are not far from reality. Such material includes Karamanlis’s objections to trying the instigators of the Cyprus coup, to avoid ‘possible disturbance of the country’s international relations,’ 17 the refusal of the Ford administration to release classified documents to the House of

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Representatives Select Committee on Intelligence and the State Department’s unwillingness to declassify material requested by Laurence Stern, ‘on grounds that their release could damage the conduct of our [US] foreign relations.’18 Furthermore, there are the memoranda of Thomas Boyatt, the Cyprus desk officer in the State Department, which are still classified as their contents deal with the possibility of a Greek-staged coup in Cyprus and Turkey’s response to it. He was later called to testify before an ‘Executive Session’ of Congress from which staff, reporters and visitors were barred. In view of this evidence, it would be difficult to ignore the allusions suggested by the above. In fact, to the supporters of conspiracy theories, such information can only lead to the conclusion that foreign interference was the decisive cause of the Cyprus crisis and its inevitable consequences. Although this may appear to be a wellfounded hypothesis, it still lacks the support of reliable documentation. Turkey’s role in the Cyprus issue is not clear either. In the first wave of military operations in July 1974, Turkey claimed to have intervened in order to protect the minority Turkish-Cypriot community and restore order on the island. The second phase of Turkey’s intervention, however, was certainly unjustified since democracy had been restored in Greece and the new leadership was working on reaching a lasting settlement in Cyprus. Therefore, the question arises concerning the interests of Turkey in occupying the northern part of Cyprus, a move that resulted in the further escalation of tensions in the Aegean. Despite Cyprus being strategically located at the crossroads of three continents, it is hard to believe that Turkey had long-term ambitions to include Cyprus in its expansionist plans. Apart from being a country that was not among the most powerful, Turkey had to reckon with the fact that the reactions of the United States and neighbouring Soviet Union would have been quite unpredictable and thus would have been a restraining factor in Turkey’s foreign policy. Unless Turkey was serving the interests of such a power (most likely the United States), there was precious little reason to expand the invasion. Perhaps the Turkish invasion was not just a response to the Greek coup in Cyprus, but part of a joint operation plotted


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by the governments in Athens and Ankara. Although it might sound irrational to suggest the existence of a plan that involved such cynical cooperation between Athens and Ankara aimed at effecting the partition of Cyprus and the subsequent union of its two parts with Greece and Turkey, it could nevertheless be argued that such a plan definitely served American interests as well as those of the Greek dictators. What needs to be clarified, however, is Turkey’s interests and, in particular, the cause of the second military operation in August. It is noteworthy that Ankara simply took advantage of the transitional period between the presidencies of Nixon and Ford to carry out the second offensive and advance her territorial gains in line with what Turkey claimed during the Geneva talks. It would be unwise to claim that Turkey aimed to fulfil age-old territorial aspirations as part of a Turkish ‘Great Idea’ or that it sought to exploit the strategic significance of Cyprus, nor is there any evidence to support these ideas. The occupation of the northern part of the island alone could satisfy neither the need for territorial expansion nor the amelioration of Turkey’s defence by maintaining military installations and intelligence-surveillance units on the island, though the latter should not be dismissed entirely. The defence of Turkey’s underbelly was obviously dependent on the British sovereign bases in Cyprus and thus, was well served, unlike the instability that characterised her neighbours in the Balkans, central Asia and the Middle East. Therefore, there needs to be an equally important reason to justify Turkey’s actions but, perhaps, a more pragmatic one. Considering Turkey’s geographical position, her rivalry with Greece, and Cyprus’s non-alignment, it is possible to argue that at the worst of times Turkey could become isolated. On such an occasion, occupation of Cyprus could become a lever in the hands of Turkish diplomats. Turkey’s acts could also be interpreted as an attempt to ensure that Cyprus would never be incorporated into Greece. Were Cyprus to effect union with Greece and lose its independence, Turkey’s access to the Mediterranean would be geographically restricted as the Greek islands of the Aegean, together with Cyprus, would fully encircle Turkey’s Asia Minor coast. Thus, there is no doubt that the invasion of Cyprus

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served Turkey’s interests well from political, economic, and military viewpoints. As far as Cyprus is concerned, it is clear that its people were merely the victims of circumstances, sacrificed for the preservation of the interests of all but those of themselves. Furthermore, Cyprus not only lacked the necessary military capability to prevent the tragic event of the invasion, but also the means to influence the situation once its partition had become a reality. Even then, it sought assistance from Greece, depending on the latter’s ties with Europe and the Western alliance in general. Once it realised that Greece was not in a position to provide such assistance or to affect positively the situation, Cyprus was effectively abandoned to her fate. The case of Greece is even more complex and confusing. The government in Athens had to reassure the Greek public, support the demands of the Cypriot government, confront Turkey over the Aegean and Cyprus issues and prompt the United States to interfere. In general, the Greek government was expected to deal with the Cyprus issue in such a way as to avoid the de jure partition of the island while also dealing with Turkey’s claims in the Aegean. The situation was even more complex for the Greeks as they were simultaneously conducting negotiations on the issue of American military installations on Greek soil. The embargo issue From the late 1940s to the early 1960s, American foreign policy was based largely on the principles of the Truman Doctrine with a strong focus on the containment of communism. The NixonKissinger partnership detached American foreign policy from its ideological trappings and pursued a more pragmatic approach. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the Cyprus invasion, the government in Washington was forced to impose an arms embargo on Turkey. The reason this took precedence in Congress’ agenda is related to the fact that Congress plays a limited role in the formulation of foreign policy. The conflicting interests of the legislative and executive bodies came to a head during the Watergate scandal and ultimately resulted to the resignation of President Richard Nixon.


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This diminished the executive and made the entire administration appear weak. With Nixon unable to assume his duties, Henry Kissinger had virtually a free rein in the conduct of foreign affairs. At the time, and apart from the Cyprus crisis, the Americans had to deal with other equally problematic issues like Vietnam, China, and the issue of détente with the Soviet Union. In all of these cases, the administration had managed to bypass Congress in its formulation of foreign policy, but the invasion of Cyprus was treated differently and prompted certain members of Congress to try and put an end to the administration’s dominance in foreign affairs. The executive, on the other hand, and Kissinger in particular, thought that Congress and public opinion should not interfere in the formulation of foreign policy. But the use of American military supplies during Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus and Kissinger’s readiness to overlook Ankara’s violation were too much for some members of Congress and became the determining factors in the most significant rift between the American legislature and executive branches in the postwar period. Another thing that prompted Congress’s actions was the fact that the embargo was ‘intensely supported by the vocal and important Greek-American community.’19 Following the invasion of Cyprus, the Greek-American community became increasingly concerned with the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. The mobilisation of Greek-Americans resembled that of the Jewish lobby following the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 and their cause soon attracted the attention of prominent Congressmen like John Brademas, Benjamin Rosenthal and Paul Sarbanes from the House and Senator Thomas Eagleton, much to the dismay of Kissinger who was determined to persuade other leading members of Congress to curb the influence of their colleagues, but overlooked the fact that ‘none of these four members of Congress depended on Greek-American votes for their jobs.’20 Greek-Americans, according to a 1970 census, did not exceed half a million of the total United States population and were represented in the House of Representatives by only five members of Greek lineage, though some members of the two chambers had influential Greek-American citizens in their districts. Greek-

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Americans had limited influence over the electoral outcome in all congressional districts, but were extremely political and active. Moreover, they made up a solid ethnic group that was supported by two national organisations, the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association (AHEPA) and the American Hellenic Institute (AHI) whose main responsibility was the dissemination of information regarding Greece, Cyprus and Turkey among the members of the Greek-American community. AHEPA had the ability to mobilise and organise its members effectively as well as encourage them to contact their respective representatives in Congress in an attempt to maximise pressure and promote the interests of Greece. The role of AHEPA was evident whenever Kissinger invited its prominent members to take part in meetings also attended by members of Congress. AHI, founded by the energetic Eugene Rossides, was more concerned with lobbying Congress, particularly through its Public Affairs Committee. AHI also made good use of AHEPA’s channels and contacts in circulating information related to the Greek-Americans’ cause. Other institutions that defended Greek values and identity were the Greek Orthodox Church in North America, the spiritual force of Hellenism for the diaspora as well as the United Hellenic American Congress (UHAC), an organisation loosely affiliated with the Orthodox Church. Like AHEPA, UHAC focuses on mobilising its members to write letters and make telephone calls to their congressional representatives on issues relating to Greece. In an assessment of the impact of Greek-Americans on the voting behaviour of the Senators, Sally Hicks and Theodore Couloumbis concluded that there was no correlation and that particularly among Republicans in the House, the Greek lobby had relatively little influence. Democrats tended to support the arms embargo on Turkey, but it was not clear that this was related to the efforts of Greek-Americans. Thus, on the whole, the Greek lobby did play some role in congressional decision-making with respect to the embargo, but its impact was limited. The reaction of Congress to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus was immediate, resulting in the suspension of military aid to Turkey on grounds that it had violated certain bilateral agreements (Article


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4 of the Truman Doctrine), US laws (Article 505 of the Law for Foreign Assistance and Chapter 1 and Article 4 of the Foreign Military sales Act) and international treaties, as proved by a memorandum written by the Deputy Secretary of State, Carlyle Maw. In addition, Congress maintained a firm position against Ankara’s aggression and eventually requested the suspension of arms shipments to Turkey. It is noteworthy that American laws did not allow US-supplied military equipment to be used for aggressive purposes. Instead, such weapons were solely intended for internal security and national self-defence. If any violation did occur, then the president was held responsible for the termination of arms supply. Thus, it is possible to question the administration’s intentions to bypass existing legislation and Congress’s persistence regarding the enforcement of the law. Congress was firmly in favour of imposing an arms embargo while the executive, under both Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, was against such a radical action. Nevertheless, and despite the objections of the executive and its successive attempts to overturn the decision, the imposition of the arms embargo was effected on 5 February 1975. The enactment of that decision was delayed due to Turkey’s apparent willingness to make concessions, but even when, at the end of January, she announced the withdrawal of a certain number of troops from Cyprus as requested by Congress, Congress remained unimpressed and decided to proceed with the embargo. Kissinger attempted to reverse that decision on 26 February 1975 with the introduction of the S.846 Administration Bill, but this failed. Later on, the House of Representatives would state that the embargo would not be lifted unless the Turkish forces had withdrawn and a settlement reached. Turkey, at the time, had already suffered a succession of aid cut-offs relating to its failure to curb the cultivation of opium and its export to the United States. This occurred as a result of a vote in the House of Representatives on 6 August 1974 which called for the suspension of aid to Turkey. It is noteworthy that, prior to this decision, Kissinger himself had threatened the Turkish government with suspension of aid on 24 July 1974. National Security Decision Memorandum 267 reveals that President Nixon urged his admini-

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stration to ‘make clear to the Turkish Government that suspension of all US economic and military assistance to Turkey is required under Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act if it is determined that the Turkish Government has failed to take adequate steps to prevent narcotic drugs produced in Turkey from unlawfully entering the United States.’21 Taking this into account, it is possible to identify the inconsistency that characterised American foreign policy. In both instances—the aid ban related to opium cultivation and the arms embargo—the US Congress mandated the suspension of foreign aid, but the administration always held to its position against any suspension of aid to Turkey. Obviously, Turkey was deemed too important by the American executive branch for the United States to jeopardise its relations with the government in Ankara, but the executive was unable to overcome the sentiments of Congress represented by this statement: ‘Turkey’s strategic position and her armed forces are important for Western security interests . . . such considerations alone cannot obscure or condone her massive invasion and occupation of nearly half of Cyprus—in violation of US laws regarding the supply of military equipment—and which has turned a third of the population of that island into refugees.’22 For Kissinger, the legislature was an obstacle to the formulation and conduct of foreign policy that would eventually harm American interests in the wider region, particularly since such a forceful policy was never applied to either Israel or Greece, countries that almost certainly violated NATO regulations on the use of its armaments. Israel probably used NATO arms in its continuing conflict with the Arabs, and the Greeks very likely used NATO weaponry when they attempted a coup in Cyprus in 1974. To support his arguments, Kissinger stressed the importance of Turkey’s geographic location and the situation in Iran. He also stated, on 25 February 1975, that security in the Eastern Mediterranean was more important than the Cyprus issue and that the former would be endangered by an interruption of military aid to Turkey. Kissinger’s determination to lift the embargo is not surprising considering that, during a NATO Summit in Brussels on 12 December 1974, he told the Greek Foreign Minister that he would only intervene in Cyprus


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if the embargo issue were settled in Turkey’s favour. Eventually, after the executive had exerted a lot of pressure on Congress, it achieved a partial lifting of the embargo on 30 June 1976 when the Foreign Aid Act of 1976 was passed. Such developments created a sense of disappointment and even distrust on the Greek side toward the United States. The executive’s argument was that Turkey would be unlikely to conform as long as the embargo was in effect, thus obstructing any attempts for a settlement in Cyprus. Hence, the administration assured the Greek leadership that, were Greece to support the termination of the embargo, a solution would soon be found, as the United States would then have more ‘flexibility’ and it would also improve relations between the two Mediterranean rivals. In fact, Joseph Sisco (Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs), George Ball (former Under-Secretary of State), and Cyrus Vance (former Deputy Secretary of Defense and Special Representative of the President in Cyprus 1967) had all testified before Congress that the suspension of the Turkish arms embargo would improve Greek-Turkish relations to the extent that Turkey might make concessions on the Cyprus issue and NATO’s southern flank would thus be strengthened. Moreover, a Congressional report claimed that, by lifting the embargo, Turkey would have no valid reason to veto Greece’s reintegration into NATO. The administration’s subsequent proposal, however, as submitted to Congress on 9 July 1975, was rejected on the 24th of the same month, forcing Turkey to shut all American bases on her territory two days later. In the end, however, the most important factor influencing the fate of the embargo was Turkey’s response, which was as vigorous as that to the decision of the imposition itself. The government in Ankara did not make any concessions over the Cyprus issue and proceeded with the suspension of the operations of all American military installations on Turkish soil apart from those under NATO’s control. The Turks even threatened to reassess their country’s role in NATO. Furthermore, on 13 February 1975, Turkey announced the establishment of the ‘Federal Turkish-Cypriot State,’ an indication of its continuing intransigence on the Cyprus issue as well as a display of power, even though the government in Ankara

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was probably aiming more at a de jure rather than a de facto partition of the island. This act certainly complicated negotiations while it enhanced Turkey’s diplomatic position toward Greece. The government in Ankara was hoping that Greece would adopt a more compromising attitude to the Aegean dispute, while it might even have been trying to pressure the Greek state on the issue of the arms embargo itself. Greece, in turn, would then have to ask Washington to apply more moderate measures toward Turkey and lift the embargo. Subsequently, the United States, in order to maintain the cohesion of the alliance’s southern flank and satisfy both its Mediterranean allies, might have to comply with their requests. Most certainly, any compliance by the United States would reveal Washington as vulnerable to external influence with unknown repercussions for its foreign policy and national interests. Therefore, the hypothesis that Turkey’s intransigence was aimed at forcing Greece to request the lifting of the embargo appears to be absurd, though Turkey’s act was probably not impolitic. The strategic value of Turkey became evident when, six months after the embargo was put into effect, it was altered to permit the Turks to receive arms contracted for prior to the military cut-off, along with access to military sales. Specifically, on 2 October 1975, Congress approved legislation (Law S2230) by which Ankara was to receive arms ordered before the embargo was imposed. Previously, President Ford had underlined Turkey’s significance and argued for the need to restore military assistance and sales to the government in Ankara during a speech before Congress in which he stressed that the embargo undermined Turkey’s and NATO’s military capacity, brought about tension between Greece and Turkey and thus jeopardised United States interests. Nevertheless, a Congressional resolution stressed that the ban would not be lifted until ‘Turkish forces are withdrawn from Cyprus and there is a negotiated settlement in Cyprus.’23 Under those guidelines, the president was authorised to provide Turkey with military equipment ‘for which contracts were signed on or before 5 February 1975,’ in order to ‘enable Turkey to fulfill defense responsibilities as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.’24 At the same time, the US would strive for the restoration of rela-


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tions with Turkey, encourage the Cyprus negotiations, support the relief of refugees through cooperation with international humanitarian organisations, and support Greece financially and on security issues. Only military assistance grants remained prohibited and so the flow of military equipment had been little affected. Despite all these actions, throughout the embargo Turkey continued to receive weapons from Italy and Germany and even American military equipment through NATO’s Maintenance and Supply agency. Turkey also received military equipment from the Soviet Union which was not to be used against the Warsaw Pact countries, an additional factor that would later influence Congress to lift the embargo altogether. Obviously, if Turkey were to adopt a more radical approach to the embargo issue, it might find itself with better relations with the Soviet Union. This would bring further confusion to the NATO alliance and so President Ford pressed for more military aid to Turkey, a position later reversed by President Carter who sought positive developments in Cyprus first. The new Turkish government of Bülent Ecevit saw this as a tilt toward Greece and responded by promoting wider relations with the Soviet Union and Arab states. Ultimately, the possibility of Turkey leaving NATO forced Carter to ask for an end to the embargo despite the disapproval of both the Greek-American lobby and Congress’s pro-embargo supporters. Carter’s campaign for the presidency focused on human rights, but his views on foreign policy changed soon after the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The determining factor with regard to the Turkish arms embargo, however, was not so much related to external affairs as to domestic issues. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security Adviser and head of the National Security Council, was instrumental in convincing the president that the arms embargo endangered American interests in the eastern Mediterranean. Brzezinski was obsessed with the Soviet threat and concentrated his efforts on lifting the arms embargo in order to maintain Turkey’s military capacity vis-à-vis the Soviets. Brzezinski found support in Clark Clifford, Carter’s special envoy to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, who was also concerned with the Soviet threat, as were Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and

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General Alexander Haig, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. Even Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, once a supporter of the embargo, shaped the policies of his department in line with the White House staff and the national security bureaucracy. Unlike his predecessor, Carter was successful in lifting the embargo, both by playing the Soviet card and exploiting the Democrats’ majority in Congress. Despite its previous success, the Greek lobby found its influence diminished, given its lack of response ever since Carter announced his intention to lift the embargo in the spring of 1977. Whereas the Ford administration had clearly failed to convince the public and Congress of its credibility, particular after Vietnam, Carter proved that the achievement of Congress, with or without the support of the Greek-Americans, was shortlived. Eventually, since the United States and NATO could not afford to lose Turkey, particularly after the Greek withdrawal from NATO, the embargo was lifted on 13 September 1978. The formal lifting of the embargo took place only after certain amendments were made to the Law of Foreign Aid that had been in effect since 1961, as proposed by Karamanlis and forwarded to Congress. The new chapter that was included under the heading of ‘US Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean,’ Chapter (620(c)), provided certain guarantees to Greece concerning the termination of the embargo, along with assurances for a settlement of the Cyprus issue.25 The basis for this decision was the embargo’s ineffectiveness, the unpleasant course of US-Turkish relations and the weakening of NATO’s southern flank, as stated by the American ambassador to Greece, Robert McCloskey. The Turkish government thus held a strong bargaining position because of its strategic geopolitical position and the 26 US military installations for which it provided accommodation. Moreover, Turkey had a more balanced relationship with the United States, perhaps because the Americans had not penetrated Turkey’s decision-making structures and US objectives in the region were not expected to further specifically Turkish interests. Those who criticised the embargo argued that it was only harmful to United States and NATO interests in the eastern Mediterranean and that its imposition was simply a manifestation of


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Congress’ desire to resume control over the executive branch of government. On the other side, the embargo’s supporters argued that, as a means to constrain Turkey, it was never given an opportunity to bear fruit since the administration was continually reassuring Turkey that it would soon be lifted and Turkey continued to receive military supplies through third parties. Among the supporters were Thomas Eagleton of the Senate and Benjamin Rosenthal of the House of Representatives, both of whom favoured the suspension of military aid to Turkey and enjoyed support from the Greek-Americans and their respective national organisations, AHI and AHEPA. It is interesting to note, however, that although the embargo supporters were against its termination, particularly since there was no progress on the Cyprus issue, its opponents wished to lift the embargo on the very same pretext of its ineffectiveness. The embargo’s critics argued that it had proved ineffective as it alienated Turkey, resulted in the suspension of US bases, made Turkey less flexible over the Cyprus issue and even disappointed Greece since Athens perceived the administration’s opposition as a tilt towards Turkey. Moreover, Turkey managed to obtain most of the armaments it desired despite the embargo, further rendering it ineffective and even irrelevant. Overall, United States foreign policy towards Greece and Turkey was formulated ‘by career officials in the State and Defense Departments and on the staff of the National Security Council. This tragic foreign policy mistake was compounded by executive branch officials during this period when they failed to deal evenhandedly with Greece and Turkey and opted instead to favor Turkey over Greece to the severe detriment of American national interests.’26 According to Rossides, a number of disturbing incidents reveal the extent of Turkey’s preferential treatment: the failure of the State Department, on July 20, 1974 when Turkey invaded Cyprus, to halt immediately all military arms and equipment to Turkey as required by U.S. law, which prohibits the use of U.S. military aid for aggression. Henry Kissinger was Secretary of State at that time and bears the primary responsibility for this violation of American law. He is also re-

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sponsible for encouraging the criminal coup against President Makarios of Cyprus on July 15, 1974, and for encouraging the illegal Turkish invasion five days later on July 20, 1974. It is important to bear in mind that he had the support of key career officials, including Under Secretary Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State Arthur Hartman and others except for one lone voice, that of the Cyprus Desk officer, Tom Boyatt. Kissinger transferred Boyatt to Chile in September 1974 and replaced him with Nelson Ledsky, who worked to subvert the application of the rule of law to Turkey. Since then the career officials in State and Defense have covered up the U.S. involvement on Turkey’s side by creating the impression that the U.S. is acting as an “honest broker.” Nelson Ledsky was later appointed as U.S. Cyprus coordinator. That is like putting the fox in the chicken coop.27 Having established that, perhaps it could be argued that Greece should have adopted a tougher policy, one that would have enabled her to intervene in US domestic affairs and keep her interests intact. The government in Athens should have made use of various channels such as the Greek-American lobby or certain members of Congress who leaned toward Greece, to secure influence over the fate of the embargo. Specifically, it should have exploited the antipathy between the legislative and executive bodies and make a link between American interests and its own. For instance, Greece could have stressed the importance of Turkey’s successive violations of international treaties and bilateral agreements. At the same time, Athens should have attempted to persuade Washington that the issue of military installations in Greece was of parallel importance and that its neglect could threaten their permanence as well as greater American interests. Instead, Greece adopted a rather moderate attitude on the embargo issue and generally remained a passive witness to a matter that was of direct national concern. Unlike Greece, Turkey proved to be more independent and certainly more capable of influencing its own fate. The Turkish leadership did not hesitate to suspend the operations of American bases on her territory and even declared that it would review the


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county’s future within the Western alliance. Further, Turkey sought to establish better relations with the Soviet Union, interrupted negotiations on the Cyprus issue and even announced the creation of the Federal Turkish-Cypriot State. In contrast, Greece’s foreign policy never reflected such a degree of independence or vigour. Greece seems to have tailored its policies to suit American interests and commands. Even though Greece helped effect amendments to the US Law of Foreign Aid, the government’s overall attitude reflected a considerable degree of submissiveness to her patron. This was particularly evident during the decades of the 1950s and 1960s when Greece was almost totally dependent on the United States for its economic recovery, political reform and military reinforcement. Apparently, Greece did not realise that at the time of the Cyprus crisis the United States was more vulnerable than ever, having to deal with a number of significant domestic and international matters that threatened its interests, all of which required maintaining good relations with its strategic allies, among which was Turkey. NATO and the US bases The Greek withdrawal from NATO’s military scheme had a great impact on the cohesion and the effectiveness of the Western alliance due to Greece’s strategic significance. In fact, a report prepared for the Congress stated that the full withdrawal of Greece would have irreparable consequences for both the United States and NATO.28 Nevertheless, Greece was never considered vital for defending NATO’s central front. Instead, the contribution of Greece was deemed more valuable for the preservation of US interests in the Middle East; therefore, the report concluded that the withdrawal was, for the most part, endangering Greek interests rather than NATO’s security. In any case, the withdrawal from NATO took place in an attempt to underline the inability of the former to put pressure on Turkey and because of the apparent need to maintain command and control of all Greek military forces so as to confront Turkey’s aggression in the future more effectively and independently from NATO’s framework. However, it is more likely that Greece withdrew in order to please domestic public opinion and to avoid giving the opposition a valid reason to accuse the gov-

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ernment of foreign dependence. Besides, the withdrawal of Greece from NATO’s military wing only applied in times of peace, since in the event of an armed confrontation between the two superpowers Greek forces would become fully committed to the cause of the Western alliance. It is precisely for this reason that Greece continued to take part in NATO military exercises, despite having withdrawn from the military scheme of the alliance. It appears that Greece almost hoped that her withdrawal would threaten the cohesion of NATO’s southern flank and also force the United States to urge the Turkish leadership to withdraw its forces from Cyprus. By contrast, the Greek government inherited all the problems that would have otherwise surfaced had Greece settled on a full withdrawal. The main problem that ensued was that of the operational control of the Aegean within NATO’s context, particularly given that Turkey had been demanding greater responsibility and control over the Aegean Sea from 1964 onwards. Since the Aegean was important to the alliance due to its numerous islands, which were like choke points, its control gradually came under Turkey’s command, thus granting Ankara control over an area that extended from the Dardanelles to the Middle East and North Africa. Certainly, there were other alternatives29 that the Greek government could have decided to endorse, which actually threatened the alliance’s interests, rather than endangering those of Greece. For instance, the opposition suggested that Greece could have exploited the significance of the US bases in Crete as leverage to demand Cyprus’ sovereignty. Eventually, the Greek government realised that the decision to withdraw would not result in the settlement of the Aegean and Cyprus issues, thus it engaged in negotiations with NATO officials for the purpose of arranging the return of Greece to the Western alliance. The negotiations between Greece and NATO encountered various problems created by Greece, in search of a ‘special relationship,’30 and the Turkish leadership, which vetoed all Greek and NATO proposals. At the primary stages of the negotiations, the talks were based on mutual defensive interests with Greece seeking more control over the bases, even though the military installations concerned primarily served US strategic interests in the Middle


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East. However, the issue of ‘special relationship’ was soon bypassed, since the negotiations concentrated on the issue of ‘zones of control’ within NATO’s operational framework. When Greece realised that Turkey could become a great obstacle, she declared to the United States that were the negotiations to collapse due to Turkey’s objections, Greece would be forced to withdraw from the alliance as a whole. To strengthen its already hard stance, the Greek leadership stressed the point that the permanence of the military bases in Greece was legally associated with NATO membership exclusively31 and interrelated with the issue of the 7:10 ratio32 of military aid. Notably, Greek parliamentary proceedings reveal that Karamanlis’ point of view was that these negotiations did not reflect hostility towards the United States, but were held due to the need to harmonise the regime of the bases with the contemporary conditions and national interests of Greece. Most importantly, however, it becomes evident that the bases that would remain operational were those serving Greek defensive interests and were Greek sovereign bases that provided military facilities to the United States. Hence, Greece also became engaged in negotiations with the US government concerning the issue of its military installations on Greek soil. Evidently, those facilities were important to the United States, as revealed in National Security Decision Memorandum 291. That report states that ‘If concessions are necessary to obtain Greek agreement to these U.S. principal objectives [to regain full effective use of those U.S. facilities considered most important to U.S. security interests], the United States may agree to consolidation or reduction of facilities considered least essential to retain. In response to Greek initiative and in return for Greek support of principal U.S. objectives, the United States may agree to the termination of homeporting.’ Further on, it stresses the importance of ‘encouraging Greece’s return to full membership in NATO,’ because ‘the President recognises the interconnection between USGreek security relations and Greece’s NATO ties.’33 However, the course of events did not serve the interests of Greece as the negotiations were interrupted in early 1976 when the United States signed a new Defense and Economic Agreement (DECA) with Turkey, at a time when the arms embargo was still in

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effect. Greece decided to harden her stance and after negotiations were resumed the government in Athens achieved and signed, on 15 April 1976, the Principles to guide Future US-Greek Defense Cooperation agreement.34 The significance of that agreement, mainly, stemmed from the fact that it established the 7:10 ratio35 for aid to Greece and Turkey respectively—although the decision was actually formalised after the 1980 DECA36 was signed between the United States and Turkey—and provided the basis for more constructive negotiations. The equivalent US-Greek DECA, initialled on 28 July 1977, granted control of the US bases in Greece to the Greek authorities, provided guarantees for sustaining peace in the Aegean and clearly stated that the United States would exert pressure on Turkey to reach a settlement of the Cyprus issue. Nevertheless, while the initialling of the above agreement could have signalled a new era of partnership between Greece and the United States, the bases’ negotiations entered a period of stagnation and uncertainty for the Greek side, at the same time that the inauguration of the new Carter Administration was expected. Additional problems concerned the lifting of the Turkish arms embargo in 1978 and, later on, the signing of the new DECA between Turkey and the United States, which came into effect in 1980. In light of the above developments in US-Turkish relations, Karamanlis decided to exert pressure on the Western alliance and visited Moscow in October 1979 where he arranged with the Soviets for their vessels to be repaired in the shipyards of Syros. Subsequently, the Greek premier rejected US proposals for the use of air corridors above the Aegean and continental Greece and did not hesitate to stress that the United States would need to request permission for any military operations on Greek soil, with authorisation being subject to the nature of the relevant activities. Greece reiterated her hard-line policy when Georgios Rallis, Greece’s new Prime Minister, declared to the US government in 1980 that unless an agreement on Greece’s re-entry to NATO was reached by the end of that year, the US bases would have to be shut. Eventually, the situation improved when General Rogers succeeded in lifting Turkey’s NOTAM37 714 and Greek NOTAM 1157 on 23 February 1980. Relations among the three NATO allies


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gradually eased, just as the attempt to reach a lasting settlement was strengthened in view of the Iran-Iraq conflict, the situation in Afghanistan and the military coup in Turkey. Given the need to safeguard the interests of the Western alliance, Greece and NATO eventually came to an agreement on 18 October 1980, with Turkey unable to react due to a coup that had taken place there a month earlier. The agreement’s two key points made reference to NATO’s response to the Greek-Turkish conflict and to the nature of Greece’s re-integration into the alliance. More precisely, the agreement made it explicitly clear that NATO should not be held responsible for any mischievous developments in Greek-Turkish affairs; however, the same document could have endorsed a pact of friendship that would preclude the use of violence between Greece and Turkey, not to mention the significance of stressing at the same time their obligation to abstain from aggressive or provocative actions. With regard to the second point, the very basis concerning the re-entry of Greece into NATO’s military wing was, seemingly, the pre-existing regime, yet the agreement made no reference to the status quo of 1974, much unlike what was intended by the Greek government. Although the actual agreement was not made public, perhaps, due to its immense significance (and ambivalence), once the Greek press brought relevant information to light the evidence available, it was revealed that Greece failed to secure absolute control over naval jurisdiction in the Aegean. In this respect, Andreas Papandreou claimed that the accord in question was ‘conceding Greek sovereign rights to Turkey’38 and also expressed his dissatisfaction concerning Greece’s return to NATO by making reference to the alliance’s lack of response to earlier crises. Astoundingly, the Greek government was blamed for national underbidding,39 whilst the parliament had only just ratified, on 24 October 1980, the relevant agreement by which Greece was officially being re-integrated into NATO. The Greek government greeted the signing of the agreement with enthusiasm, nevertheless, because officials believed that the presence of the US bases, official or otherwise, could only have a positive effect on Greece.40 In due time, the controversy surrounding the issue of the US bases in Greece was settled be-

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tween the two governments on 8 September 1983, when Papandreou’s PASOK was in power. While Greece decided to withdraw from NATO on account of the alliance’s apathetic response to the Cyprus invasion, NATO officials reasoned that the alliance was limited to providing protection against external threats, in their attempt to rationalise its inept response to the crisis. Revealingly, Greek parliamentary proceedings prove those arguments groundless, since NATO’s charter argues for the exact opposite.41 Therefore, one may imply that the alliance’s indifference stemmed from other reasons, quite possibly the need to preserve its own interests in the area. NATO’s cohesion was in question and Ankara would perceive any form of interference as a tilt towards Athens, thus further disturbing relations with NATO. Consequently, NATO’s decision to remain neutral over the conflict was then interpreted by the Greek government as mere tolerance towards Turkey’s aggression and thus they made the decision to withdraw. However, Greece’s withdrawal from NATO soon proved ineffective as the situation in Cyprus hardly changed. Not surprisingly, one wonders whether other foreign policy options were available to Greece. There is little doubt that when the Turkish army was advancing in Cyprus during the second phase of its military operations, the government in Athens had no full discretion to act in an appropriate manner and probably lacked the necessary composure for making the relevant decisions. This, however, does not justify, in any sense, the hasty decision of withdrawal and the consequences that came in the wake of that action. On the contrary, Greece might have been better served by remaining in the alliance and persisting in her attempts to persuade NATO officials that some form of pressure be exerted on the Turkish government. Hypothetically, staying in NATO could have avoided the unpleasant course of events that followed and, perhaps, forced the alliance to reverse its impartial and tolerant attitude to interference and criticism. Had the Greek government pursued such a policy, it could have then adopted more drastic measures. For instance, to make the decision and shut the US bases in Greece would probably be the most effective tactic, judging from the US response when Turkey proceeded with the suspension of the operations at all US


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military installations on her territory after the arms embargo was put into effect. Another option could have been a Greek ultimatum demanding that the Turkish occupation forces withdrew from Cyprus or else Greece would review her position within the alliance and, as occasion served, either join the non-aligned group or the Warsaw Pact. Between these two choices, however, the latter seems more practical, since the first option could also undermine the interests of Greece, were Turkey to gain control of the Aegean; although both options could be considered rather extreme. Still, to opt for the second alternative, Greece would have to have better diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, though one should not ignore the Soviet interests in the region of the Eastern Mediterranean. Considering Greece’s strategic significance to NATO, such disengagement would have isolated Turkey and, yet again, jeopardised NATO’s cohesion as well as the interests of the United States in the area. Nevertheless, the argument that Greece could have joined the Warsaw Pact, as an alternative to the Western alliance, lacked credibility, considering the fact that Greece aimed at further integration in the Western camp through her application for membership in the EEC. Therefore, the ‘Warsaw Pact card’ would probably not have been of much use to Greek policy-makers. What necessitates further examination is the persistence of Greece in establishing a ‘special relationship’ and thus attaining full command and control over US bases on Greek soil. As far as the ‘special relationship’ is concerned, Greece obviously intended to establish a less committed partnership with the alliance, while also devoting a reduced number of her forces to NATO, in anticipation of further negative developments in the dispute with Turkey. The Greek government aimed at retaining as much control over its forces as possible in order to evade future situations similar to the events in Cyprus. As a matter of fact, when the issue of her return to NATO was raised in the Greek parliament it evoked reminiscences of the Cyprus tragedy, causing the opposition to object, thus the necessity for the Karamanlis administration to approach the issue with extreme caution and make every endeavour to satisfy the opposition as well as public opinion. The result was an attempt to reintegrate into NATO under conditions that would allow Greece

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more room for political manoeuvring, eventually, leading up to the idea of enacting a ‘special relationship’. This way, Athens would ensure the promotion of its interests, while pacifying the body politic and its public too. The controversy surrounding the US bases, on the other hand, suggests that Greek demands concerning full control and command over the military installations in Greece were far more serious than a mere attempt aimed at wiping out her passive-member status. Rather, her request to form a ‘special relationship’ with NATO was much related to the legal status of the US bases. As it happens, the leader of the opposition party, Andreas Papandreou, stated that the Greek constitution of 1952, as well as the one introduced by the Nea Dimokratia government (Art.28, par.3), prohibited the existence of foreign military forces on Greek soil, unless they served Greek national interests. No matter the actual cause of Greece’s policy, it remains questionable whether the government in Athens truly endeavoured to take independent actions. Then again, one may well question the significance of Greek constitutional acts, considering that US legislation had simply been bypassed to serve the interests of the administration in Washington. What matters is that Greece was finally reintegrated into NATO and almost restored her relations with the US government. Yet the relevant agreement only indicated the apparent indifference of the Western alliance, since NATO was not willing to become part of the Greek-Turkish dispute. Instead, the agreement stated clearly enough that NATO would remain impartial in the event of future aggression between the two Mediterranean states. Were this agreement intended to fulfil the aims of the Greek government, therefore, we may as well consider it a diplomatic defeat. Having already been humiliated on the Cyprus issue, Greece was expected to return to the same alliance that ignored her security concerns. Simply put, Greek interests had, once more, been utterly disregarded, even sacrificed, to ensure that those of the Western alliance were preserved. The Soviet Union The role of the Soviet Union in Greece’s relations with NATO and the United States should also be taken into consideration, given


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that country’s geo-strategic interests42 in the region. The Soviet Union wanted good relations with Greece and Turkey, while it wished for Cyprus to remain non-aligned, something it promoted by exploiting AKEL’s influence. For example, the Soviet Union was among the first states to recognise the Papadopoulos’ government, supported left-wing groups in Turkey that objected to the presence of the United States in the wider area and even sought military and financial co-operation with the two Mediterranean countries. Following the invasion of Cyprus the Soviet leadership only recognised the Greek-Cypriot government, though it acknowledged the existence of two distinct communities on the island. After the Greek coup in Cyprus, Moscow no longer had the ability to affect Cyprus’ politics, particularly since Makarios was forced to flee; nonetheless, the fact that relations between the United States and Turkey deteriorated after the invasion seemed to serve Soviet interests as the possibility of the likely ‘detachment of Turkey from NATO and undermining of the extensive American military installations in the neighbouring country’ loomed 43 It suffices to say that the Soviet Union had much to gain from maintaining good relations with the two Mediterranean states, even if in the form of exploiting their rivalry and tensions in the area. With regard to the Cyprus issue, the Soviet Union clearly favoured the implementation of UN Resolution 353, thus sharing the same views as Greece. Naturally, it objected to the Geneva Declaration, naturally so, since no reference was made to the withdrawal of all foreign forces—the key to resisting the ‘westernisation’ of the island. The government in Moscow perceived most other westerninspired plans as part of NATO’s attempts to promote partition and, subsequently, the incorporation of Cyprus into the Western alliance. As one might expect, the Soviet Union called for the withdrawal of all military forces, the termination of Cyprus’ occupation and the restoration of constitutional order; in other words, they openly supported the Greek arguments. In addition, on 26 August 1974, the Soviet government openly expressed the need to defend the Republic of Cyprus from external intervention and achieve the withdrawal of all foreign forces, while also guaranteeing the inviolability of Greece’s northern borders. The United States, Britain,

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Turkey and Greece all denounced the Soviet proposition, although the government in Athens had originally accepted it. Nevertheless, it would be naïve to argue that the Soviet Union was genuinely interested in ensuring Cyprus’ sovereignty and territorial integrity, given the strategic significance of the island. Besides, the partition of the island would bring, indirectly, Cyprus into the Western sphere of influence, therefore, threatening the Soviet Union’s interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Rallis’ visit in Moscow on September 1978, the first visit of a Greek politician since 1924, was for the purpose of restoring relations with the Soviet government and was also intended to please the Soviets. The epitome of the meeting was the signing of the agreement for the repair of Soviet vessels at the shipyards of Syros. Although NATO did not approve of the agreement, it seemed that Greece was determined to adopt an independent and much harder position when Karamanlis stated, on 23 December 1978, that Greece’s commitment and responsibilities to the alliance would not hinder her attempts to improve relations with the Soviets. During his own visit to Moscow, for the ratification of the ship repair agreement, Karamanlis made it clear to the Western alliance that Greece was willing to co-operate with the alliance’s rivals and thus exert pressure on NATO and the United States. Another indication of Greece’s good will towards the Soviet Union was a statement by Minister of Defence Evangelos Averrof concerning the potential extension of Greek territorial waters. Such an extension would threaten Soviet interests, since they maintained permanent anchorage seven-eight miles from the Greek shore. Obviously, were Greece to extend her territorial waters to 12 nautical miles, the Soviets would have either to withdraw their naval forces from the area or negotiate an agreement with the Greek government for an extension, although Averrof declared that Greece was nowhere close to taking such a decision. Apart from maintaining good relations with Greece, the Soviet Union also had a special relationship with Turkey, notably during the embargo years and even more so during the Arab-Israeli war when its aircraft and naval forces were allowed access to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. It is noteworthy


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that, at the same time, Turkey had refused to grant the United States refuelling and reconnaissance facilities for an airlift to Israel. Although the Soviet Union never really had a pre-dominant role in the rivalry between Greece and Turkey or in the relations between the two Mediterranean states and the United States, it certainly was a determining factor. Considering the depth of Soviet interests in the region, the government in Moscow presumably could have played a far more critical part in affecting the status quo in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially given her good relations with both sides in the conflict. Surely, one cannot argue that the Soviet leadership did not grasp the opportunity to interfere in the Cyprus crisis and Greek-Turkish affairs as a whole. Still, to suggest that its activities could have been more decisive would not be inaccurate either. Despite the fact that the future of Cyprus was of major concern to the Soviets, their approach to the issue was limited to a call for the implementation of the respective United Nations resolutions. Although the dispute had taken place in a US dominated area, this does not mean that the Soviet Union lacked the ability to adopt more drastic measures. The fact that Moscow was against the partition of the island, as well as its incorporation to the Western alliance, soon resulted in the support of both Greece and Cyprus, as the interests of all three parties coincided. Therefore, had they all made a joint effort to affect the Geneva talks or promote the endorsement of the relevant resolutions, they could have probably influenced Cyprus’ destiny to their mutual benefit. Greece was not in a position, however, to exert pressure on Moscow or persuade her to prevent the island’s partition, merely because she had only recently come out of political isolation and therefore could hardly oppose the Western alliance. As a consequence, the incapacity of the Greek government to involve the Soviet Union could explain, to a certain extent, the protraction of Cyprus’ uncertain future. In any case, it would have been anything but an unusual phenomenon for a small power to exploit the rivalry between the two superpowers in order to preserve its own interests. Indeed, this is exactly what Turkey achieved during the arms embargo, when the government in Ankara sought the military and financial assistance of the Soviet Union. Likewise, Greece could have applied the same

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degree of pressure on the Western alliance both to indicate her willingness to resolve the Cyprus issue and lessen her dependence on the United States. At this point we need to note that Greece had the opportunity, on two occasions, to exert such pressure and make her demands clear to the United States and NATO. Considering that the possibility of extending Greek territorial waters would prove detrimental to Soviet interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, always taking into account the strong naval presence of the United States, the Greek government could have entered into negotiations with the Soviet Union for the purpose of issuing a joint declaration stating that Athens would not extend Greek waters from six to 12 nautical miles. In return, Moscow would have to adopt a more active policy towards the settlement of the Cyprus issue and perhaps, even provide guarantees of the island’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Such a gesture from the Greek side would not only improve the relations between the Greek and Soviet governments, it would also illustrate Greece’s determination to achieve more independence in the field of foreign affairs. In other words, Greece had the opportunity to manipulate Soviet interests to her own benefit, engage Moscow in the Greek-Turkish dispute and exert pressure on the Western alliance for the very same cause. Instead, Greece failed to appreciate the attempts of the Soviet leadership to affect the situation in Cyprus, presumably because the government in Athens feared that any such involvement would have had serious repercussions for the future of the island and even jeopardise Greek national interests by suggesting a decrease in Greece’s commitment to the Western alliance. All in all, the few exceptions where Greek foreign policy was not passive were in those areas related to the Soviet factor. When the 1979 negotiations on Greece’s return to NATO stagnated and the United States was exploring the prospects of a new defence agreement with Turkey, the Greek government expressed its disappointment and underlined its eagerness to throw off the mantle of a loyal and devoted ally by threatening to restore relations with the Soviet Union. Twice, Greek foreign minister Georgios Rallis visited Moscow, the second time accompanied by Prime Minister Kon-


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stantinos Karamanlis, to discuss and sign the agreement that allowed the Soviet navy to make use of the shipyards in Syros to repair its vessels. As already noted, the aforementioned agreement caused anxiety within circles of NATO officials, yet the Greek government was determined to strike an attitude of defiance. Eventually, the Greek government’s stance proved successful, as Greece returned to NATO the following year. Clearly, the attitude of the government in Athens had matured enough to enable the Greek leadership to release itself from the bonds of the alliance. Considering the Soviets’ engagement in the Mediterranean dispute, the only leverage that Greece possessed at the time was to play the Soviet card, particularly since the United States would not be inclined to waive its privilege of military dominance in the area, one may argue that Greek foreign policy had never been more effective. Conclusion Without doubt, the Greek response to the Cyprus issue was insufficient, if not improper, considering the special relationship between the two states. The interest of the Greek government in Cyprus was to keep the issue ‘alive’ within the framework of the United Nations and to use it as a lever for pressure on Turkey as occasion served. The aim of Athens was to neutralise the impact of the Cyprus issue on Greece’s relations with Europe and prevent it from becoming a factor that could jeopardise her accession to the EEC. This policy caused not only a lack of support by the Greek government for its Cypriot counterpart, but also the relative neglect of the issue as a whole. Inasmuch as the Cyprus issue could not possibly be settled by the initiatives of the United Nations alone, instability on Cyprus was prolonged, eventually leading to the de facto partition of the island, which privately seemed to please all sides except the Greek Cypriots. On the other hand, it could be argued that the complex nature of the issue itself was the main reason that Greece never appeared truly committed to the settlement of the Cyprus dispute, particularly given that the issue remains unresolved to the present. Most probably, any significant commitment would have had serious effects on Greek foreign policy since the Cyprus issue could have distracted the government in Athens from the

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core issues of its external affairs. This would have been detrimental to the national interests of Greece, despite the fact that Cyprus was supposed to be part of those interests due to her ‘special relationship’. Cyprus was an issue that the Greek policy-makers simply had to override in order to concentrate their efforts on other more vital foreign policy matters. Any union between Greece and Cyprus would, therefore, remain an unfulfilled aim as well as the attainment of a just and lasting peaceful settlement. Likewise, the imposition of the arms embargo on Turkey cannot be credited to Greek foreign policy, but to the Greek-American lobby and the determination of Congress to retain its power over foreign affairs. Congress’ interference in the Cyprus issue was not anticipated and, consequently, resulted in a conflict between the two governmental branches that also created confusion within administration circles. The antipathies that arose between the American executive and the legislature later formed the basis for the controversial attitude and approach of the two branches toward the embargo issue. It is noteworthy that although the legislative branch claimed to uphold American law, it is commonly believed that the main purpose of its insistence on the embargo was to re-assert itself in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. Kissinger was equally determined, however, to preserve American interests in the eastern Mediterranean at any cost, even if legislation had to be bypassed, sacrificed or simply amended. Although Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey, it was soon evident that such an embargo was contrary to larger American geopolitical interests and soon called for its termination. Despite the abrogation of Cyprus’ sovereignty and the violation of its territorial integrity, the invasion was not considered an offence serious enough to require a reprimand of the Turks, particularly since the partition of the island actually promoted the interests of the alliance in the region. Even though the government in Washington proclaimed its devotion to the preservation of peace, order and stability in the cause of strengthening the foundations of democracy throughout the world, the Cyprus issue did not benefit from these explicit but unsupported objectives of American foreign policy. Hence, the arms embargo on Turkey never produced the desired effects, al-


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though the security of NATO’s southern flank had been compromised by a conflict that could have seriously jeopardised its interests and threatened its cohesion. In sum, the ‘purposeful inconsistency’ of US foreign policy during the time of the Turkish arms embargo was more than just obvious, since foreign policy objectives took precedence over the principles of domestic laws and international treaties for the purpose of serving American national interests. Whether driven by antagonism or sheer commitment to their values, the competition between the executive and legislative branches was intense and highlighted the dynamics of the federal government, revealing the paradox of American foreign policy as much as the realism and idealism that dictated its guiding principles. Let us now turn to the issue of ‘independence’, which illustrates the pressure to which Greece was subjected during the foreign policy making process. The United States definitely influenced Greek foreign policy, although US interests were far from the only consideration in Athens’ decision making. In fact, how dependent Greek foreign policy was upon the United States is difficult to establish. The first problem in attempting to ascertain the importance of US influence on Greek foreign policy is the lack of access to official documents and governmental records. The second, more perplexing problem concerns the very meaning of ‘independence’. Did Greece really desire a more independent role in foreign affairs, or simply wish to avoid the perception that Greece was slavishly following the United States? The fact is, other than the open declaration by Karamanlis of his desire to incorporate Greece into the EEC, there is no other clear evidence that Greece sought ‘independence’ from the United States. Even such actions as Greece’s withdrawal from NATO’s military wing, its attempt to influence US Law of Foreign Aid and the negotiation of certain bilateral agreements do not signify such an intention. Likewise, the statement ‘we belong to the West,’ implies anything but independence. The fact is that rather than posing her demands directly to Washington, Athens merely negotiated an agreement with NATO concerning the manner in which Greece should be treated by the United States. Even the arms embargo was

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not considered an issue from which Greece could derive benefits, apart from maintaining a military balance in the Aegean. The Greek approach to foreign policy was generally passive, if not submissive, seeking to ensure protection from a single superpower. This attitude was largely a product of Greece’s diplomatic isolation during the dictatorship. Reasonably enough, the weaknesses resulting from dictatorial rule forced the Greek leadership to concentrate its efforts on defending the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Despite Greece’s weakness in the wake of the dictatorship, it seems clear that Athens should have been more proactive. Instead, Greece never applied drastic measures, nor did she adopt any harsh policies to preserve her interests, fearing that such a response would not please her patron. Certainly, these facts do not describe independence but the opposite. If we accept this view, it does not necessarily mean that the United States did not allow Greece to become more independent. On the contrary, one could argue that Greece feared losing her status as a devoted ally— unlikely to upset the alliance—and the benefits to which she was ‘entitled’. Of course, it is also true that the United States had an interest in keeping Greece dependent. At the time, the United States presented itself as protector of democracy and human rights. Unfortunately, the Cyprus crisis for some reason did not qualify under either of the two categories. The Nixon Administration and Henry Kissinger, in particular, considered the colonels’ regime as a means of safeguarding US interests. On the other side, the newly established Greek government had an uncertain future that could jeopardise US activities in the region. As a result, the government in Washington decided to tilt towards Turkey—although they always sought to maintain a balance of power—even if that necessitated the partition of Cyprus. Moreover, both Greece and Turkey were essential to the alliance. Therefore, to disappoint either of them could prove costly. Although the Greeks were eventually disappointed by the United States and NATO’s attitude towards their conflict with Turkey, the fact that Greece was perceived as an ally unlikely to undertake actions to harm Western interests gradually led the United States to take her for granted.


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Needless to say, Turkey was more independent than Greece, so the choice the US Administration was presented with was quite obvious. Turkey was seen as a more important ally, whose requests were reasonable. Turkey was a peripheral power in the Eastern Mediterranean that was solely concerned with her own national interests, which sometimes took precedence over the interests of the alliance. Thus Turkey managed to achieve an agreeable interdependent relationship with the United States and NATO. The fact that the United States remained impartial towards both the Aegean conflict and the Cyprus issue can only mean that the events from the summer of 1974 onwards served its interests quite well. While the Mediterranean rivalry concerned both the United States and NATO, relations among all parties eventually were restored. Although both client states were at times disappointed by the Western superpower, they remained under its protective umbrella while providing services as a quid pro quo. Turkey seems to have gained the most from this arrangement. After all, it emerged ‘victorious’ from the Aegean dispute having only suffered an arms embargo. Greece, on the other hand, was left militarily defeated and diplomatically humiliated. It would have been more reasonable for her to reconsider her position within the Western alliance. Instead, she seldom criticised the West’s policies and remained passive. Greece was, thus, unsuccessful in her attempt to disengage from the US sphere of influence. Whether because such a move was not considered beneficial, or due to US objections, Greece maintained her status as a Western state, committed to the NATO alliance and attached to the United States. However, to argue that Greece remained dependent, to a considerable extent, upon her Western allies and the United States in particular should not imply foreign influence and external pressure. As with most patron-client relationships, the former is usually able to affect the policies of the latter, unless the client state is of unusual importance to the patron, requiring the patron to act more carefully. In such a case, the client state may actually benefit from an interdependent partnership. Had Greece recognised her real importance to both the United States and NATO she could perhaps have leveraged her relationship with

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both. For whatever reason, Greece did not do so. In the end, Greece was not only committed to the western alliance, but also served it submissively—with the occasional outburst necessary to ease public opinion.

5 Greek Relations with the EEC

In view of Greece’s deteriorating relationship with the Western alliance, particularly her distrust of the US and her withdrawal from NATO following the 1974 invasion of Cyprus, Greek policymakers sought alternative means that could provide better and more effective guarantees for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Greek state. Their quest for a new ‘patron’ did not last long—the European Economic Community (EEC) prevailed upon the Greek government to be entrusted with the consolidation of its democratic institutions, the preservation of political stability and the economic prosperity of the country. From a Greek perspective, membership in the EEC would further promote the country’s integration within the European scheme, secure its position in the Western camp and contribute to the settlement of unresolved foreign affairs issues. This chapter concentrates on relations between Greece and the EEC and the impact of the latter on the Greek-Turkish dispute. First, we produce an historical account in order to describe the relations among the parties concerned; thus reference is made to the Greek Association Agreement and its subsequent ‘freezing’, since these were the most critical issues marking the period when Greece was ruled by the military regime. We then focus on the relations between the EEC and Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, respectively, and examine their political implications. The EEC, at the time, was more interested in economic issues; hence, the present chapter is

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also concerned with economic issues where absolutely necessary, since these were also significant in both shaping the relations and conducting foreign policy of the sides in question. Nevertheless, because of the very subject of our study, we emphasize that political factors were clearly far more significant. That said, this chapter offers an analysis of the EEC’s role in Greece’s bilateral relations, always considering the Turkish and Cypriot factors. The questions raised hereinafter primarily concern the potential disengagement of Greece from the United States and the settlement of critical issues that affected the formulation of her foreign policy. Other interrelated issues include the EEC’s relations with the western superpower, as well as its political authority over EEC member-states. Yet the most essential matter remains the evolution of Greece’s relations with the EEC per se. Greece’s European identity The Association Agreement Already a member of the NATO alliance, Greece’s position within the western camp was further enhanced, in 1959, when the ERE government, headed by Konstantinos Karamanlis, decided to strengthen the country’s western ties and apply for association1 with the EEC. The Treaty of Rome had only just been implemented in 1957 with the establishment of the EEC, and Greece was to follow suit her route to European unification, as to Article 238 of the above-mentioned treaty. Reflecting once again Greece’s differentiated Cold War sentiments, Verney suggests that Greece decided to join the EEC in order to counteract the influence of communism; nevertheless, the EEC was most probably seen ‘as the economic equivalent of NATO’2 and as such had the potential to significantly improve Greece’s economic status. Greece’s decision to apply for association was also possibly based on the perception that the Greek state should participate more fully in Europe’s political and economic evolution to solidify relations with her NATO allies. Not surprisingly perhaps, the United States strongly advocated Greek membership in the EEC, as Washington also desired the strengthening of Greece’s ties with other NATO members, even though Karamanlis’ archives reveal that the United States ac-

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tually had very little effect on the accession negotiations. Interestingly, while Greece had yet to identify the need to disengage from the Western alliance, George Weil argues—perhaps prematurely— that ‘it was clearly recognised both in Greece and in the Community that the economic purpose of the agreement was to move Greece away from its close relationship with the United States.’3 Weil further notes that ‘on the Community side, there was the natural desire to increase the economic strength and influence of Europe vis-à-vis the United States, and the Greek accord offered a tangible possibility to do so.’4 Taking into serious consideration the above remarks and the main argument of this book, there is little doubt that Weil’s intriguing account must have excited the academic curiosity of his contemporaries, particularly when the first democratic government that succeeded the colonels voiced similar concerns about Greece’s future in relation to the Western alliance. The Association Agreement (also known as the Athens Agreement) was signed on 9 July 1961 between the Greek government and the six EEC member-states and took effect on 1 November 1962; however, it was soon suspended due to the imposition of the military regime in Athens. Turkey’s association with the EEC, on the other hand, was signed in 1965, thus giving the EEC the opportunity to balance its relations with the two Mediterranean states. At this point it is important to note an argument put forward by Birand, who claimed that Turkey’s association with the EEC merely reflected Ankara’s desire to counterbalance Greece’s policy towards the Community. In fact, it appears that Ankara opted for further European integration essentially to prevent Athens from exploiting its relations with the Community, especially in regard to disputes with Turkey. Furthermore, Turkish officials believed that association with the EEC would not only reinforce Turkey’s European identity, but would also most certainly benefit her economic competition with Greece. It is also noteworthy that despite her geographical location Turkey was considered a European nation, as stressed by Walter Hallstein, former President of the Commission, when the association agreement was signed. Likewise, Greece decided to apply for association with the EEC in order to secure her position and status within the Western

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camp, improve her economy and contain communism. Among these three objectives, the first two seem to reflect the ambitions of Greek policy-makers, who found the idea of establishing closer ties with west European states, particularly a rising organisation like the EEC, very appealing, as were the eventual benefits of domestic stability and economic prosperity. Having suffered much during the first half of the twentieth century, the Greek government was obviously seeking to bring about internal stability and consolidate its political authority. Despite the fact that Greece was already financially and militarily dependent on the United States, it was a commonly held perception that such a partnership would be highly beneficial to the country, even though the Greek state had to sacrifice part of its sovereignty. This may well indicate that Greek politicians were fully aware of their country’s weaknesses and, therefore, aimed at cementing Greece’s relations with other democratic states that were far more developed and certainly more powerful. Yet the impact of the potential communist threat on Greece’s decision to establish an associate partnership with the EEC should not be ignored, particularly because of the recent civil war and the fact that Greece shared borders with three communist states. And while Greece was officially part of the Western alliance, many leftist Greeks were still sympathetic to Moscow and Soviet influence was palpable. Therefore, at a time when the Cold War was reaching its height, and with US foreign policy primarily focused on the containment of communism, it seems only natural that Greece would turn to her western allies and appeal for further integration into the western camp. Turkey’s interests were more or less similar to those of Greece; however, Turkey had an additional reason to apply for association. Quite simply, Turkish policy-makers aimed for a balanced relationship with their neighbour and dreaded failing to become part of the same ‘European dream’ or being passed over by the leading continental nations in favour of Greece. One may argue that Ankara’s decision to join the EEC was not really based on serious thought, since Turkey was facing far worse economic conditions and internal instability than Greece. Rather, it was more of a tactical move that reflected Ankara’s ambition to become fully integrated into the western camp, as well as the desire to attain identical


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status with Greece within the international community. Most certainly, to achieve economic prosperity and domestic stability were significant issues too, but the parity with Greece seems to be the determining factor. Nevertheless, another important factor with regard to the ‘Europeanization’ of the two Mediterranean states—the role of which was anything but clear—was the United States. In the case of both Greece and Turkey’s membership in NATO, the United States proved key; for despite the initial opposition from other members, clearly Washington was the leading force of the alliance and fully capable of affecting the organisation’s status. Notwithstanding her military dominance and her ability to exert economic pressure, the US seemed rather isolated before a ‘unified Europe’ and with much less leverage. Even though the United States could support or object to various policies of the EEC, European persistence in reducing their dependence on the US left the US little room to manoeuvre. Hence, it is likely that Europe was relatively indifferent to US views concerning Greek and Turkish membership in the EEC. Nevertheless, the United States may well have had some impact on the final acceptance of Greece and Turkey, solely based on their strategic interests in the region. Certainly, the two Mediterranean states’ membership in the EEC would have no serious repercussions on the United States economy, nor lessen the degree of their military dependence on the western superpower. It is possible that one could argue the same about political influence and the subjection of Greece and Turkey’s interests to those of the United States, since the EEC had only recently emerged and did not possess sufficient power to cause the political disengagement of the two states from the US government. That said, Greek and Turkish association with the EEC was likely never perceived as detrimental to US foreign policy objectives. On the contrary, it is more probable that the United States would benefit from their integration into the European scheme. Without a doubt, the domestic situation in both Greece and Turkey would gradually improve, eventually granting them the status of developed countries. And while not, perhaps, at the same level as other European states, the rapid development of Greece and Turkey would allow the US to seriously consider the

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two states as valuable allies. Considering that these two states formed NATO’s Southern Flank, a highly sensitive and significant area, any development would only better serve the strategic interests of the United States in the east Mediterranean region. Such a scenario would not only have pleased Washington, it would have been the main reason why the United States decided to support Greece’s application, especially considering that its intelligence services had already amassed information on the coming dictatorship and were already contemplating the likely political alienation of Greece and were concerned about NATO’s cohesion in the area. Freezing the Athens Agreement As noted earlier, the EEC never considered the military regime in Athens ‘as a “respectable” European government,’5 unlike the unethical response of the US, NATO and the Soviet Union. Since democracy in Greece had been violated, the European Parliament found it difficult to maintain relations, and so the European Commission decided to ‘freeze’ the Athens Agreement until democracy was restored. Although the EEC was established to produce economic ties among its members, the ‘EEC responded to political and not economic events within Greece,’6 and Schiller,7 President of the Commission, stated on 28 November 1967 that the association with Greece was economic inasmuch political in nature. Despite the fact that ‘the Community certainly had the power to unilaterally “freeze” the Greek association,’8 particularly considering that Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe had been violated, neither the Athens Agreement nor the Treaty of Rome comprised any clauses stipulating the Community’s likely policy towards issues such as the Greek coup, apart from the ‘democratic criterion’ of Article 237 that primarily concerned membership in the EEC. From a political perspective, therefore, the Greek association with the EEC, which was aiming at full membership, could no longer function properly, despite the colonels’ objections and assertion that the Community’s action was unjustified and a violation of the treaty. Regardless, the suspension of the association’s Financial Protocol meant that Greece was to be awarded no more than $56 million, as opposed to the pre-arranged $125 million.


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Subsequently, a Commission inquiry into the issue of human rights’9 and civil liberties’ violations in Greece found evidence that the colonels’ regime had severely breached the European Convention on Human Rights. Not surprisingly, Greece was asked to withdraw from the Council of Europe, since any further disruption between the two would force the latter to expel Greece. Under such pressure, the Greek response was to adhere to the Council’s guidelines, and, ultimately, to withdraw. However, the EEC feared that the imposition of any extreme measures could isolate Greece and prolong the existence of the dictatorial regime, thus affecting Greece’s relations with NATO. Therefore, they were forced to maintain diplomatic relations with Greece ‘at the level of its “current Administration”,’ in order to maintain pressure on the Greek colonels. The idea that such a relationship might be interpreted as recognition of the military regime, nevertheless, caused uncertainty among European Parliament officials and the Commission alike, who were concerned over the appropriate response. There is little doubt that the EEC truly wished that suspension of the Athens Agreement could have been somehow avoided, as they feared the further isolation of Greece—this despite the fact that the European Parliament had previously declared that it reserved the right to ‘revise or revoke’ the association. And in fact, on 5 February 1970 the Belgian Prime Minister, Vals,10 requested on behalf of the Socialist group in the European Parliament the abrogation of the Athens Agreement. The European Parliament requested a ruling on this from its Political and Legal Committees, who found that ‘there were no sufficient legal grounds to suspend the agreement.11 Thus it became clear that the Political Committee was no longer in a position ‘to propose to the Parliament the suspension of the Treaty.’12 As it is well known, the response of the European Community had absolutely no effect on the political conditions in Greece and few, if any, could possibly predict what would follow had the junta remained in power after the Cyprus crisis of 1974. This is also highlighted in European Parliament 1973 and 1974 discussions concerning the adoption of other measures since the military regime in Greece was still in power: simply ‘freezing’ the Athens Agreement was not adequate. However, further problems arose once it became

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clear that certain members of the Community were pursuing different policies towards Greece that benefited the NATO alliance, especially the continuous arms supply to the colonels’ regime, since the Council was ‘not qualified to take a position on the bilateral relations of its members.’13 Hence, the ‘freezing’ of the Association Agreement only impacted on Greece in an economic sense; yet the fact remains that ‘it was not economics that brought down the junta.’14 Obviously, suspending the operation of democratic institutions and violating human rights were not considered important enough to affect the economic relations of ‘supranational institutions,’ which proved ‘as reluctant as national governments’ with regard to ‘moral issues,’ when dealing with third parties.15 It suffices to say that once the decision to maintain the Athens Agreement at its ‘current Administration’ was reached, the possibility of exerting political pressure on Greece was significantly reduced, particularly since the Greek colonels were well aware of the Commission’s reluctance to abrogate the Association Treaty. In other words, the Europeans were not prepared to use the Association Agreement as an instrument of economic warfare against the Greek military regime. Clearly, during the period of dictatorship in Greece, the EEC took no further action until the Cyprus crisis, apart from condemning the regime. Even after the Greek coup in Cyprus, the European Community did nothing more than merely declare its support for the all-important territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus. From the moment that the Cyprus issue became a determining factor in Greek-Turkish relations, relations between the Community and the latter were also affected. As already stated, only the European Community responded effectively to the rise to power of a military regime in Greece by ‘freezing’ the Athens Agreement and threatening to expel her from the Council. The reaction of the EEC was predominantly based on the violation of democracy and related moral issues that certainly did not comply with the Community’s regulations on membership. Although initially the EEC response was viewed as a positive contribution to the international community’s appeal to the colonels for a return to democracy, eventually the various implications of


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this policy could have proved detrimental to Greece and the Western alliance. The EEC decision could have caused the isolation of Greece and was proved unsuccessful, while it also encouraged speculation as to whether there were other possible alternatives. On the other hand, the Community’s response was the only one from within the international community that actually condemned the violation of democracy in Greece and, therefore, the only one to deserve credit for adopting such an objective stance. Had the EEC responded in a similar manner to the United States and NATO, the military regime would have benefited from continued political, economic and military support—apart from gaining recognition—and might even have remained longer in power. Consequently, the criticisms that the colonels faced from the European Community must have had some impact on them and the power they possessed, in particular in reference to the issue of human rights. However, the fact that the EEC maintained some economic ties with Greece after the ‘freezing’ of the Athens Association was later perceived as a form of recognition by the dictators. This argument, coupled with the colonels’ understanding that the Community was not willing to abrogate the relevant agreement, reassured the regime in Athens that no further measures should be expected. One could argue that even such a minor and questionable type of recognition was sufficient for the colonels to remain in power, since they already enjoyed some support from the United States and NATO, which suggests that the policy adopted by the Community had only a limited effect. Ultimately, the EEC response to the Greek dictators had no substantial effect. The junta was not brought to its knees by the various economic sanctions it suffered, but because of an international incident, namely the invasion of Cyprus, which revealed the weaknesses of the military regime. It is worth considering, therefore, whether there were other, perhaps more effective, alternatives than the mere ‘freezing’ of the Athens Agreement. One measure that was discussed within EEC circles, including the European Parliament, was the abrogation of the Association Agreement. This means that Greece’s association with the Community could have been cancelled, with both sides having to suffer the consequences

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of such a policy. To Greece, it would probably have meant the complete isolation of the country and its disorientation from its initial objectives, whereas the EEC would have lost a prospective member that was strategically located and had the potential for rapid economic development. Obviously, such a situation would not serve the interests of either side and the idea was soon abandoned. It is clear that the imposition of any harsh measures would not only endanger the position of Greece in the western camp, but also the goals of the latter. However, no matter which policy the EEC followed, the Community members would still have to adjust their relations with Greece accordingly and not apply double standards, as was actually witnessed. It is noteworthy that were the Community’s policy to affect the interests of NATO, this would most probably have caused objections by its member-states. This would have placed the EEC in a rather awkward position, since failure to oblige its members to comply with its policies would have made the EEC appear quite powerless. The fact that the leading countries of the EEC provided the Greek regime with arms is a serious case that clearly illustrates the conflicting interests of NATO and the EEC, as well as the attitude of the states that were members of both organisations. Within the limits of the Community these states were expressing their disapproval of the events in Greece and demanding Greece’s expulsion from the Council. However, when they were operating on the behalf of NATO the very same states seemed to ignore the presence of a dictatorship in Greece and, continued on with the deployment of arms. This must have affected the cohesion and clarity of the policies of the EEC towards the colonels, making the Community seem rather indecisive. As a result, the ineffectiveness of the EEC’s policies could be justified, considering the illadvised stance of its members. Eventually, it took the Cyprus crisis to ‘ease’ the anxiety of the EEC with regard to the political scheming in Greece. At this point, civil order replaced the repressive military regime in Athens and the diplomatic relations between Greece and the Community were soon restored. The return of Karamanlis to Greece and his appointment as head of state, along with the consolidation of democ-


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racy and the need to reform foreign policy, encouraged the conservative government, which was elected soon after, to apply to the EEC for full membership. However, their relations were deeply affected by Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus and its subsequent claims over the Aegean issue. The Turkish factor and Greek and EEC relations with the government in Ankara would prove significant obstacles to the normalisation of affairs among all three parties, not to mention the status of the Greek application. Needless to say, the Cyprus issue was yet another factor that influenced relations between the Community and the two Mediterranean states. Greek considerations over EEC membership Following the restoration of democracy in Greece, it became essential16 for Greece to readjust her position within the international community. The decision of the Nea Dimokratia government to apply for full membership in the EEC is therefore not surprising. On the contrary, the Greek leader, Konstantinos Karamanlis, believed that participation in the Community would not only strengthen democracy and bring about political stability in Greece, but it would also support her developing economy. At the same time, Karamanlis hoped that EEC membership would lessen Greece’s dependence on the United States and NATO, particularly since Greece had decided to withdraw from NATO’s military wing in her search for alternative means to protect the country’s security interests. Hence, since the EEC was seen ‘as a potential counterbalance to the two superpowers,’ while US-Greek relations were in decline due to the Cyprus tragedy, Greece viewed strengthening her ties with Europe as the most obvious solution.17 In other words, it was this decline in US-Greek relations that made the strengthening of Greece’s European identity so important. However, this position was not universally held, and here it is important to note the argument of Ioannis Pesmatzoglu,18 who maintained that Greece’s turn to Europe was ‘no reflection of her attitude towards the United States, nor of her relationship with NATO.’19 Nevertheless, the Nea Dimokratia government believed that EEC membership would bring Greece out of her diplomatic isolation and enable her

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to participate in European affairs with other leading countries. Briefly, it would improve her position within the international community. Moreover, ‘a united Europe, with a role independent of the two superpowers has been seen as the obvious alternative. It is characteristic that political groups to the left of the ND [Nea Dimokratia] have expressed their support for a European defence community.’20 From a European perspective, Greek membership in the EEC was seen as a way to help normalise Greek-Turkish affairs, as well as provide the necessary basis for future negotiations between the two sides. Most certainly, a precarious relationship between two valuable allied states could jeopardise the geopolitical interests of the Western alliance in what was an already sensitive region, i.e., the Eastern Mediterranean. A certain degree of stability between Greece and Turkey was imperative, if the Cyprus and Aegean issues were to be resolved in a just and peaceful manner. However, the Turkish government feared that Greek membership in the EEC had the potential of seriously compromising its own interests, especially since Greece could exercise her right of veto to block a future Turkish application. Evidently, Ankara was quite worried about the potential sublimation of Turkey’s goals in the Community’s envisioned enlargement. The EEC seems to have had similar concerns over the issue of Greece’s potential membership in relation to the Greek-Turkish dispute, though from a rather different perspective. The Community feared that Greek membership could destabilise its relations with the two Eastern Mediterranean states, which had been kept in balance since the time they became associate partners. The EEC was increasingly concerned about the possibility of becoming part of the Greek-Turkish rivalry, once the negotiations for the entry of Greece to the Community commenced. Thus, the EEC aimed at maintaining a balanced relationship with Greece and Turkey, particularly since the two states held the same standing vis-à-vis the Community (both aimed at full membership). Subsequently, ‘the commission suggested that the Community should play an active role in helping Greece and Turkey resolve their differences in parallel with the preparatory work for Greek accession.’21 An additional


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implication of Greek membership in the EEC was the fact that the latter would have to become concerned with Balkan affairs too, which could possibly affect the Community’s foreign policy objectives in the area. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the impending enlargement of the EEC in the Balkan Peninsula would almost certainly contribute to stability in the Eastern Mediterranean region, even though Europe’s role in preserving security would have to change. As a result, on 24 January 1975, the European Council stated that the Greek application for full membership should not affect relations between the EEC and Turkey. The EEC had to treat the two states accordingly, due to the Cyprus issue and the fact that both states were members of NATO. Most certainly, GreekTurkish relations were an important factor in the potential success of the Greek application, although Greece assured the Council that, once a member of the EEC, she would not interfere in EECTurkish relations, especially since the potential of economic prosperity for Turkey would almost certainly ease the tension between the two neighbouring states. Nevertheless, Karamanlis voiced his concerns to the European Community for their relating the GreekTurkish issue to Greece’s application for membership. Interestingly, the EEC had stated, on 28 January 1976, that it would approve the Greek application for entry, as well as keep the same distance from Greece and Turkey. This led officials in Athens to believe that Turkey would eventually become an influential factor in her negotiations for entry. As it happens, once the European Council received the Greek application for membership it asked the Commission on 25 June 1975 ‘to prepare its opinion.’ The opinion was made public on 27 January 1976 and, revealingly, stated that the EEC should not become involved in the Greek-Turkish rivalry and that the Greek application should not affect EEC relations with Turkey. In fact, the only positive feature of the Commission’s opinion concerned the ‘consolidation of Greece’s democracy,’ as it was much ‘related to the evolution of Greece’s relationship with the Community.’22 In other words, the EEC would deal with the Greek application for membership in a way that did not disturb its relations with Turkey.

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Greece, however, was important to Europe because of her location. Greece could give the European Community access to the Middle East, necessary for maintaining good relations with the Arab world, while she also enjoyed relatively good relations with the other Balkan states. The positive Greek-Yugoslav relations, for instance, could improve the Community’s relationship with the Balkan countries and, therefore, contribute to stability and peace in the region. In general, Greek membership in the EEC would help the Community establish better relations with states in both southern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean. According to Karamanlis, Greece was the bridge between the west and the developing countries of the Middle East. It seems that because of the benefits the EEC would derive from Greek membership, the United States did not favour Greece’s membership. Further, it appears that the United States feared that the integration of Greece into the European Community could diminish its role in the Eastern Mediterranean area. The US was also concerned about the impending enlargement of the EEC (regarding the entry of Greece, as well as of Spain and Portugal to the Community) which could possibly affect the functioning of NATO. While membership in the EEC was significant to Greece, equally important was Turkey’s effect on Greek-EEC relations. Although the Greek perception was that membership in the Community would bring about internal stability and development, as well as reduce Greek dependence on the United States, this very argument could be considered as the understatement of the time. Simply put, stability and development in the region as a whole could not be achieved so long as Turkey remained intransigent over her disputes with Greece. Furthermore, the role of the United States in the area was unlikely to diminish even if one of its Mediterranean allies wished to disengage from the Western sphere of influence. In other words, despite Greece’s importance to the Community due to her strategic location and links with Arab states, Turkey and the United States were two formidable factors in Greek-EEC relations. Turkey’s stance on the Aegean and Cyprus issues was certainly a threat to Greek interests, particularly considering that the EEC


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had declared its impartiality in the Greek-Turkish disputes. The Europeans could not ignore Turkey’s importance; and while they denounced her aggressive behaviour, they were not prepared to become part of the Greek-Turkish rivalry to the detriment of their own interests. The Community aimed to strengthen its ties with Greece, following her application for full membership, and at the same time exerted economic pressure on Turkey in an attempt to force her to come to negotiations with Greece. Still, the EEC was not willing to satisfy Greek demands at the expense of Turkey and thus risk Turkey’s isolation. Apparently, the Community’s cautious approach had become frustrating to Turkish officials, as they attempted to jeopardise Greece’s application by initiating small-scale crises in the Aegean. Ankara’s foreign policy objective was to hold back Greece’s accession process and to establish favourable internal conditions that would allow Turkey to make up for her economic and political backwardness. Considering that Portugal and Spain had also expressed their desire to join the European Community, Turkey could not possibly afford to be left behind by European integration. If all the Mediterranean states became part of the EEC, with only Turkey excluded, there would be vast economic and political consequences for her people. For example, Turkey’s trading ties with the Community would certainly suffer if all other EuroMediterranean states belonged to the EEC, simply because of the increased competitiveness between members and non-members of the EEC, naturally, at the expense of Turkey. Likewise, Turkey would suffer politically, as the EEC would concentrate on consolidating the democratic institutions in those countries that had recently suffered under dictatorial regimes, thus neglecting Turkey’s need for domestic stability and order. Furthermore, those countries that had achieved EEC membership would enjoy far more favourable conditions within the Community and, most probably, see their status in the international system improve as well. Therefore, Ankara’s sole alternative seemed to be obstruction of the Greek application in an attempt to maintain a balance within the Community. Along the same lines, the United States also played an important role in Greek-EEC relations. The fact that neither the Com-

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munity nor the United Nations was able to resolve the GreekTurkish conflict implies that only the US government had enough influence to settle this regional conflict. The United States continued to play a significant role in both Greek and Turkish foreign affairs, despite bitter feelings on the part of the Greeks with regard to US policy during the dictatorship and the Cyprus crisis. The role of the United States becomes clear if we consider that all EEC members also belonged to NATO, which of course was led by the US. As we have already noted, the EEC countries adopted policies and made decisions according to whether they were acting on behalf of the Community or NATO. Thus, considering Greece and Turkey’s strategic significance to the West, it would not be politically very wise for any EEC member to disturb its relations with the two Mediterranean states. On the contrary, they attempted to maintain a neutral position in the Greek-Turkish dispute and an equal distance from the two countries. Thus because of NATO’s interest in the region, the Europeans could no longer be perceived as possible arbiters, despite their tendency for impartiality. As long as Greece and Turkey continued to engage in a rivalry, the United States would remain an important player in Mediterranean affairs, and in a way that could, at least indirectly, affect the two countries’ relations with continental Europe. Greek scepticism over EEC membership In addition to the above-stated difficulties related to Greek membership in the EEC, the Nea Dimokratia government also had to endure criticism from the opposition parties. On 13 December 1974, questioning whether Greece could ever be free from US foreign policy objectives, Andreas Papandreou stated that the EEC was controlled by the United States, at least financially, and dominated by US companies. Further, he said that Europe remained dependent on the United States in matters of military substance, which could have serious repercussions for Greece and the military balance in the Aegean. Then in 1975, still holding firm to his policy against entry to the EEC, Papandreou presented a report that was approved by the European Parliament on 12 November 1975, which provided a ‘definition’ of the Greek-Turkish rivalry. Accord-


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ing to the report, the Greek-Turkish dispute was a result of the fortification of the Aegean islands, the inter-related issues of territorial waters and exploitation of the seabed, aviation control over the Aegean Sea, the existence of national minorities in the two countries and, finally, the Cyprus issue. Nevertheless, advocates of EEC membership argued that Greece’s participation in such a political and economic entity would support and develop the Greek economy by strengthening its trading ties with other member-states. The Cyprus invasion had had a serious impact on the Greek economy, causing high inflation, a fall in the Gross Domestic Product and ‘a balance of payments deficit of over US $1 billion’—additional causes for Greece to opt for EEC membership.23 Eventually, these internal criticisms, combined with the rise in socialist voters in Greece after the November 1977 elections, had a tremendous impact on Greek relations with the Community. Therefore the EEC attempted to conclude negotiations with Greece while the Conservatives were still in power. So when Karamanlis asked that the procedures for entry be speeded up, the Community seemed willing to comply, even though association status was never fully applied due to the dictatorship. Those who habitually criticised Greece’s entry into the EEC expressed the views of leftist parties, which denounced further integration with the western camp, both because of NATO’s position on the Aegean and Cyprus issues, and because of their basic ideology. Although they also argued for Greece’s disengagement from the United States, they did not consider the European Community a wholly independent institution. They felt that the EEC would have to maintain close economic and military ties with the US, especially as many EEC member states belonged to NATO; thus the Western alliance would still play an important role in European affairs. This fact raised the issue of continued dependence on the United States and challenged the foreign policy goals of the conservative government. Although the need for Greece to loosen her ties with the United States was widely accepted by Greek politicians and the public alike, it was also seen as necessary to avoid complete alienation from the west, as this would only benefit Turkey. Any sort of isolation would have serious repercussions for the eco-

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nomic, political and military sectors of Greek society, with the only available alternatives being either the country’s links to the Arab world or the improvement of her relations with the east European bloc. At the time, however, neither option seemed credible—not to mention the fact that both would threaten Greece’s European identity. This suggests that the Greek government’s only real option was to identify a policy that would ensure its participation in the European Community while reducing its dependence on the United States—and satisfying public opinion at the same time. Greek membership in the EEC The Treaty of Accession was ratified by the Greek parliament on 28 June 1979, thus paving the way for Greece to become a member of the European Community on 1 January 1981. The responsibilities of Greece, as a member of the EEC, are defined in certain sections of the Accession Law, the most significant being Law No. 945/7-27.7.79, Law 1104/29.12.1980 and Law 1180/17-20.7.1981. For the record, these laws concerned Greece’s accession to the EEC, the role of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the elections for the European Parliament. It has been argued that, eventually, Greece’s EEC membership reduced her ‘political dependence on US’ and created new allies to ‘counter the US and NATO perceived support for Turkey.’24 Apparently, even though membership, by itself, in a large community would not necessarily settle the Greek-Turkish dispute, nor prevent an attack from Turkey or any other state, it was believed that it would at least improve Greece’s position in negotiations with Turkey. Relations between the two Mediterranean states and with the EEC eventually improved after the September 1980 coup in Turkey and the Greek return to NATO five weeks later. In general, the Greek perception of EEC membership—or more specifically, the opinion of Karamanlis himself—was that it would bring Greece out of the isolation that had caused these problems in the first place. The Greek government considered integration into the European Community as the most advantageous foreign policy option available and, despite the implications addressed above, EEC membership also appeared as the only solution to Greece’s domes-


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tic instability. Greece became an official member of the EEC out of the desire for economic support, political stability and ‘independence’ from the United States. The first two goals were seemingly within reach: economic support was achieved by strengthening trading ties with other member-states, and political stability was ensured through the EEC efforts for the consolidation of institutional democracy. However, the fulfilment of the third objective, Greek foreign policy, was not an easy task. The issue in question was certainly not straightforward and clearly was controversial. But here the real issue is not whether Greece managed to reduce her dependence on the United States; rather, the issue is whether or not the US was less involved with Greek affairs because it was more concerned with other issues, especially regarding the Soviet Union and other ongoing regional conflicts. However, we must first examine and contextualize Greek-EEC relations, as well as the impact of the ‘Turkey’ and ‘Cyprus’ factors before, we can proceed to analysis of the US role in Greek politics, as well as the contribution of the Community in the Greek-Turkish disputes. What follows then, is an analysis of Turkey’s role in the negotiations between Greece and the EEC, followed by a discussion of the EEC response to the Cyprus issue, as the Mediterranean island grew to become yet another important factor in the relations between the Community and the government in Athens. Turkey’s relations with the EEC Like Greece, Turkey was an important associate member of the EEC because of her geographical position. The access she provided to the Middle East and its oil resources, her significance to Europe’s defence and the potential of enlarging the European market were all highly important for the EEC. Moreover, Turkey was a member of NATO, meaning that any form of alienation from continental Europe would certainly not be beneficial to the Western alliance. As a matter of fact, Turkey was important to West Germany from a strategic and military viewpoint, because together with Norway she formed part of NATO’s front line, thus forcing the Soviet Union to maintain significant forces along their common borders. For this reason alone, West Germany might have felt re-

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sponsible for providing Turkey with both military and financial aid. However, following the Cyprus crisis, Turkey’s relations with the EEC gradually declined. Other factors that influenced EECTurkish relations were: the fact that Greece was engaged with the EEC in the negotiations concerning her accession to the Community; the recession of 1974 that affected the conditions upon which Turkey was to receive financial aid from the EEC. Therefore, when a meeting between EEC and Turkish representatives was postponed on 24 July 1976, five days later the Turkish government caused tension in the Aegean with the deployment of Sismik (see chapter six), in an attempt to alarm the EEC of the likely consequences were Greece to gain membership in the Community. Turkey feared that once a member of the EEC, Greece would exercise her right of veto and influence other EEC member-states to apply harsh measures on Turkey—such as the embargo already imposed by the United States. Ankara felt pressure to adjust its foreign policy, since the possibility of Greece becoming a full member of the EEC could have serious political and military repercussions for Turkey. The deteriorating relations with the EEC led Turkey to feel that eventually Europe would once again regard their country as an outsider, a perception that had its roots in the nineteenth century. Much of Turkish foreign policy can be seen as a reflection of her fear of losing influence in the region; however, with respect to the Cyprus invasion, if: ‘occupation of Cyprus was designed to provide Turkey with political leverage, their assumption has proved erroneous.’25 An additional problem for Turkey was the poor state of her economy which, considering that Greece was already engaged in negotiations for full membership, caused even more anxiety within the Turkish leadership. Although Turkey might have thought to accelerate the application procedure and start negotiations for entry with the EEC, this could well have irreparable consequences for the country due to its weak economy, as well as its political instability. Some of these economic problems existed before Turkey’s association with the EEC and had been created by the external environment; Turkey thought that improving her relations with the EEC would help to overcome them. The factors that seem to have


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caused such difficulties had their basis in the tense Greek-Turkish relations and the attitude of other EEC countries, the ambiguous attitude of the United States towards full EEC membership for Turkey and Turkey’s intention to improve her relations with Middle Eastern countries. These very factors played an immense role in Turkey’s negative relations with the EEC. Apart from the above factors, and as already suggested, Turkey’s application for association with the EEC was highly influenced by Greece’s decision to apply, based on the fact that Turkey did not wish ‘to be left behind Greece in the strengthening of political and economic relations with the West.’26 These ‘reasons were factors that led Turkey to sign the Ankara Agreement and to become an associate member of the European Economic Community.’27 Therefore, following Greece’s application for full membership in the EEC, certain political and economic factors led to further deterioration of TurkishEEC relations which, due to Turkey’s economic interests, needed to be repaired without delay. This was particularly true after the ‘freezing’ of the Turkish association with the Community, which took place after the September coup of 1980. The EEC regarded Turkey as a potential candidate of equal significance to Greece, again because of her links to the Middle East and the oil reserves and, in particular, for the large market she offered and of militarily strategic position. This last attribute was important to West Germany too, hence the support that Turkey received from her. However, it seems that these elements were not enough to counterbalance the Cyprus crisis and the Greek accession to the Community. Further negative features were Turkey’s weak economy and the indecisive attitude of the United States with regard to the prospect of Turkish membership in the EEC. Surely enough, the combination of factors mentioned above had a negative impact on Turkey’s relations with Europe, but we can still distinguish the particular roles of Greece and the United States. To Turkish officials, Greek membership in the Community was a potential danger to Ankara’s interests, considering the fact that Greece could exercise her right of veto and prematurely end Turkey’s aspirations, possibly a more important and influential determinant than the United States seemed to be. Surprisingly, instead of

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seeking ways to restore Greek-Turkish relations, Turkey sought to further destabilise them and remained intransigent. Obviously, Turkey wished to draw attention to the negative aspects of Greek membership. The fact that Europe remained indifferent to the Greek-Turkish rivalry was an important card in the hands of the Turkish policy makers. Turkey believed that if she exerted pressure on Greece and caused a deadlock in the negotiations over the Aegean and Cyprus issues, relations between Greece and the EEC would worsen, making conditions less favourable for Greece’s entry into the Community. Subsequently, Greece’s role within Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean would be diminished. The United States policy directives could also prove detrimental to Turkey’s foreign policy objectives. Having already imposed an arms embargo on Turkey, the United States influenced relations between Turkey and the EEC through their common membership in NATO. No matter the differentiated response that was generated via EEC channels, European dislike caused by Turkey’s aggressions in Cyprus did not alter. In a sense, Turkey’s deteriorating relations with the United States deeply affected her relations with the EEC as well. Although we previously stated that the alienation of Turkey would not benefit any of the sides involved, nonetheless, the course of events suggests that Turkey’s task to achieve European integration was further complicated. However, we must not ignore the impact of Turkey’s weak economy, destabilised political system and poor human rights record, including the Kurdish issue. These additional factors were important obstacles to Turkey’s fulfilling her European destiny. Clearly, Turkey was in great need of economic development and political stability, two crucial elements that could only be attained, through close co-operation with Europe and the harmonisation of Turkey’s objectives with the Community’s expectations. We can see then, that Turkey had to, first, normalise her relations with Greece—instead of prolonging the tension between them—and, then, deal with any internal destabilising elements, if she were to have any real hope of joining the EEC.


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The response of the EEC to the Cyprus issue The Cyprus crisis was the first crisis that the European Political Cooperation (EPC) unit had to deal with. The invasion affected both the economy of Cyprus and Cyprus’ Association Agreement with the EEC, which concerned the future ‘establishment of a customs union’28—two serious impediments to any EEC hopes for reaching a lasting settlement. Hence, the immediate response of the EEC was to exert pressure on the two parties in conflict to secure stability and peace on the island, but this response was limited to mere verbal statements. The difficulties facing the EEC at the time were numerous: first, the EEC was not among the protagonists of the dispute; second, it did not possess ‘the necessary instruments to implement its decisions’; third, ‘the EPC lacked the high degree of political cohesion that could permit it to act decisively during a crisis rather than only react.’29 Following the invasion, the EEC recognised Makarios’ government as the only legitimate form of authority and declared itself in support of Cyprus’ territorial integrity and sovereignty. The EEC twice denied independent status to the Turkish-occupied part of Cyprus. The first occasion took place when Rauf Denktash presented himself as President of the so-called Turkish Federated State of Cyprus during efforts to establish diplomatic relations with the Community, although the EEC accepted him as leader of the Turkish-Cypriot minority. In the second case, the EEC simply urged the Turkish government not to declare the occupied part of Cyprus independent, as it would affect their relations. The EEC thus appeared as the only impartial arbitrator between Greece and Turkey, given the particular interests of the two superpowers in the region and their unwillingness to take action. Still, for the EEC to resolve the conflict peacefully it had to: overcome Turkey’s intransigence over Cyprus; alter its incoherent policy towards Cyprus; and consider the Greek application for membership, while making sure that any pressure exerted on Turkey would not isolate her. Quite simply, the EEC had no leverage over Greece and Turkey—unlike the United States, which could exert pressure on the two states due to their dependence upon her. As revealed in the report, Controlling the Damage: U.S. Policy Options for Greece, ‘. . . the European partners of

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Greece were unable to act forcefully on their own. Even if they had, there is a serious question as to whether they could have successfully overcome the inertia of the United States.’30 As soon as the invasion of Cyprus took place, France—at the time holding the Presidency of the EEC—urged Turkey to end the hostilities on the island and suggested that Greece should not respond with military means. Once a cease-fire was secured the EEC promoted the issue of inter-communal negotiations under UN auspices. During that period, the leading members of the EEC adopted different policies concerning the Cyprus crisis. France supported Greece, West Germany was in support of Turkey and Britain remained impartial, primarily due to being a party to the Treaty of Guarantee. At this point we note that, Cyprus was not originally a matter of controversy among the members of the EEC and that the United States supported their actions, while the Soviet Union ‘did not oppose them.’31 However, since September 1974, EEC response to the crisis lacked any ‘permanence and continuity’, while its task became increasingly difficult when Turkey declared herself against any EEC involvement, preferring to hold talks between the two communities of Cyprus. The primary reasons for Turkey’s objection to Europe’s interference were based on the EEC’s failure to persuade the US Congress to lift the arms embargo and the fact that the EEC was not perceived as impartial due to Greece’s pending membership. Thus, the role of the EEC eventually decreased—although Greece and Cyprus favoured its involvement—due to the perceived bias toward the Greek and Greek-Cypriot claims. EEC policy evolved through various stages and took different forms and shapes. In the period between July and August 1974 the EEC applied a policy of ‘intensive intervention,’ which changed to ‘careful mediation’ from February 1975 to November 1976, only to become a policy of ‘preservative interest’ in the period November 1976–November 1977. Eventually, the EEC lost interest in the Cyprus issue after 1977. Then, until 1981, it supported intercommunal talks within the limits of the United Nations, when the ad hoc team of the EPC that was concerned with the Cyprus conflict was dissolved. The response of the EEC to the Cyprus crisis is


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thus quite clear. The Community had declared its favourable stance towards Cyprus’ independence, warned Turkey not to violate this very principle and urged the disputing parties to reach a settlement through the negotiations process. Apart from the United Nations, the EEC appeared as the only impartial arbiter, since it did not have any direct strategic and military interests in the region, its sole aim being stability and peace. However, the expectations of those involved, or rather those interested, in the conflict were impossible to achieve due to the lack of means to intervene. The fact that the Community was not an alliance of a military nature was a serious restraint that would hinder any attempts to resolve the dispute. That said, the Community’s response was limited to written declarations and verbal statements that were soon proved inadequate. Instead, the EEC could have adopted a more vigorous policy with regard to the Cyprus issue and contributed to a lasting resolution. Since the Greek Association Agreement was still ‘frozen’ for a short period after the restoration of democracy, the Community could have threatened Turkey with similar economic sanctions and political indictments. Because Turkey was already facing heavy criticism from the international community due to the invasion of Cyprus, and since her relations with the United States were in decline, further pressure on Turkey from the EEC might have persuaded her to comply with international law and negotiate over the Cyprus issue. However, no pressure was placed on Turkey because this could have led to her alienation from the western camp and, jeopardised the interests of the alliance in the area. Therefore, considering the differentiated interests of the EEC and the Western alliance, we can see that the EEC was in a quite powerless position, since any pressure on Turkey could have threatened the interests of the Western alliance in the region and led to NATO objections. The situation confronting the Community at the time was quite confusing. The two global superpowers were encouraging EEC attempts as both the United States and the Soviet Union, each from a different perspective, wished for stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. Neither superpower was willing to risk its interests by directly interfering in the Greek-Turkish dispute, thus their hopes were set on the Europeans. On the other hand, the Community’s

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leading member-states took varying positions: France supported Greece’s claims, because of their similar military ideology; West Germany favoured Turkey, due to her indirect strategic interests; whereas Britain decided to remain impartial, in order to safeguard her military privileges on the island. The fact that all three states were the major protagonists in the Council of Ministers may indicate the degree to which the policies of the EEC were affected. Most certainly, these conflicting interests, as well as those of the Community, only served to confuse the EEC response. At the same time, Greece and Cyprus were in favour of European diplomatic intervention due to their distrust of the Western alliance, especially the United States and NATO, only to face Turkey’s objections to any attempt for a European-based mediation scheme because of the Community’s alleged bias towards the Greek cause. The awkward position in which the EEC was thus placed affected the effectiveness of its response to a great extent. As a result, the Community gradually strayed from the subject—although it might also have lost interest in the Cyprus issue—consequently generating further uncertainty regarding the matter. That said, in the face of Greece’s manifest indifference and Turkey’s evident intransigence towards Cyprus, it could hardly be expected that EEC interference would provide the necessary grounds for constructive negotiations that would eventually lead to the settlement of the problem. In other words, the Europeans should not really be blamed for the prolongation of the situation in Cyprus, nor should they have been expected to be more effective in their peace-making diplomatic efforts, due to the complex nature of the issue, as presented above. Conclusion The primary reasons that Greece opted for association, and then full membership in the EEC centre on the notion of ‘European integration’ that was necessary for the acquisition of an inherently European identity, considering that Greece’s major foreign policy goal was to strengthen her ties with the West. From the time of association to the period when Greece applied for full membership with the Community, her external environment underwent radical


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changes that not only affected the objectives of the Greek state, but also its attitude towards the Western alliance as a whole. The decision to join the EEC was certainly related to the fact that following the Second World War the Greek economy was in ruins, the state was suffering from political instability—that soon led to a civil war—and the ‘communist threat’ was becoming more real. Since Greece was already a NATO member, a fact that placed her under the United States nuclear umbrella and allowed her to enjoy the military support of the West, Greek political parties aimed for further political integration in Europe, as well as financial backing. Greece believed that EEC association would solidify her ties with the Western alliance and serve as a symbol of her active participation in the Western camp. At the time, the Greek-Turkish rivalry had not yet reached its height, with the only issue under dispute being the matter of Cyprus’ independence and sovereignty. However, there were other ‘threats’—such as the three communist countries that shared borders with Greece and, subsequently, her proximity to the Warsaw Pact forces. Therefore, EEC association was viewed as the key element to both internal economic prosperity and political stability, as well as the achievement of Greek foreign policy aims. These goals were almost fulfilled once Greece became an associate member of the Community, but the imposition of a military regime in 1967 brought an inglorious end to Greece’s ambitions for rapid economic development and political consolidation. Greece thus returned to the years of backwardness during the period of the dictatorship and her external threats revived, in consequence of her isolation from the international environment. The only ties that the colonels maintained with other countries were of a military nature, whereas at the economic and political levels Greece would suffer for a seven-year period due to the ‘freezing’ of the Athens Agreement. As stated above, this particular response of the EEC did not prove effective, as the Greek colonels maintained their grip on power; nevertheless, it was the only pressure exerted on the regime by the international community, for reasons previously discussed. The Community thus gained full credit for its immediate response. With the Cyprus invasion the junta fell and relations were restored between Greece and the EEC, although those

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between Greece and the Western alliance were seriously damaged. In an attempt to end Greece’s isolation, a situation that could easily be prolonged after her ties with NATO and the United States respectively were disrupted, Greek officials sought for accession to the Community. The perception that participation in Europe would lessen Greece’s dependence on the US and provide support for her political and economic institutions was soon openly declared with Greece’s application for full membership in the EEC. In a sense, although Greece aimed at lessening her ties with the United States, she was in search of a new ‘patron’ capable of safeguarding her territorial integrity and national sovereignty, in view of Turkey’s hostilities in Cyprus and expansionist attitude over the Aegean. However, the Community’s response was constrained so as not to affect its relations with Turkey—although it should be noted that, once again, this was the only response of the international community. The restraints on the Community’s response, as suggested earlier, were factors that were external to both Greece and the EEC, namely, the United States, NATO, Cyprus and Turkey. The United States, being the predominant Western power, was in a position to exert pressure with respect to its own strategic interests and as a result of its strong position in the area. NATO, too, influenced the situation due to the fact that all the EEC members were also members of the Western alliance. Therefore, the member-states of the Community, on an individual basis, had the opportunity to conduct their foreign policies independently from the headquarters in Brussels and in a way that would serve both their national interests as well as those of NATO, hence the complexity of the issue. Along the same lines, Cyprus and Turkey had different interests—which had a substantial impact on the relations between Greece and the EEC— with the former aligning with the policies that Greece pursued and the latter maintaining an intransigent stance that limited the response of both Greece and the Community. As a consequence, none of the sides interested in developments of the GreekTurkish rivalry could claim that its aims were fulfilled—apart from Turkey, perhaps, who benefited from the prolongation of the situation. The only argument that can be stated with some degree of certainty is that the EEC found itself in the middle of a conflict that


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threatened its interests, since it lacked the means necessary for effective intervention. That said, it should not be surprising that European interest in the settlement of the various matters implicit in the Greek-Turkish dispute gradually declined until it reached a point of stagnation. Despite the, presumably, genuine interest of the EEC to settle matters between Greece and Turkey, the most crucial element that defined Greece’s relations with the other European states was the declaration of the Commission with regard to the application of Greece. The fact that it was clearly stated that the Community would not become part of the conflict, in order to maintain a balanced relationship with the two states of the Eastern Mediterranean, would prove a significant element. The argument that the EEC did not wish to disappoint either Greece or Turkey is well established, when one considers the significance of these two countries to the Community’s expansionist aspirations. Surely enough, were the EEC to become directly involved in such a complex situation, which involved a number of controversial issues, it would pose a serious threat to its geopolitical and economic interests. However, to declare itself impartial was not only a safeguard to its goals, but also an attempt to appear as a potential just mediator that could persuade the governments in Athens and Ankara to come to negotiations and reach a lasting settlement. Nevertheless, irrespective of its actual intentions, the EEC managed to damage its relations with both countries and this certainly did not serve its purpose. Moreover, at a time when Greece was trying to establish better relations with Europe, the above declaration, which implied that the Community was unlikely to support Greece’s national interests, definitely affected the Greek perception of European integration. Indeed, it resembled the United States and NATO’s negative response to all Greek appeals for active intervention during the Cyprus crisis. Once again, this particular declaration proved that Greek foreign policy aims would remain restrained by the Turkish factor, while Greece’s European dream seemed to be fading, due to Turkey’s interjection. The Commission’s opinion on the issue of Greek application for full membership could also be interpreted as an assurance to Turkey that the EEC would neither resort to harsh

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measures that would threaten Ankara’s regional interests, nor allow Greece to exploit membership to her own advantage. Hence, this declaration provided Turkey with the rationale to maintain her intransigence, while the Cyprus and Aegean issues remained unsettled. Therefore, the Community’s overall response to the GreekTurkish rivalry was quite ambiguous. Despite the fact that the EEC ought to have had better relations with Greece, due to Greece’s application for full membership, relations between them were not really any different than those the Community wished to maintain with Turkey. EEC interests could not possibly be ignored to support either of the two Mediterranean states. However, the Europeans should have attempted, to say the least, to establish better bilateral relations with Greece in light of the latter becoming a full member of their community. Then, again, even the individual member-states occasionally pursued different policies, which often did not comply with those of the Community as a whole. This implies that both the EEC and its member-states did not have a clear foreign policy agenda with regard to the Greek-Turkish dispute. Instead, the confusion that resulted from these diverse views eventually contributed to the continuation of the rivalry between Greece and Turkey. Hence, whereas the Greeks anticipated special treatment from the EEC and its member-states, particularly at a time when such ‘special attention’ was vital to Greece after it had quit the military scheme of NATO and with its diplomatic relations with the United States being in decline, what the Greek government received was simply inadequate. Certainly, the government in Athens aspired to establish close ties with the Europeans in an attempt to lessen its dependence on the United Sates, but the Community’s stance vis-à-vis the Greek-Turkish dispute was of critical significance to the subsequent formulation of Greek foreign policy and a great disappointment to Greece. Surely enough, the state of affairs between Greece and the EEC did not permit the government in Athens to achieve disengagement from the United States, at least to the degree that was desired in order to express its disenchantment with the latter. The failure of the EEC to respond effectively to the crisis left Greece


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with little room for political manoeuvre. The inability of the Community to deal with a dispute that concerned two of its associate members meant that the United States was still not only the most significant actor that could influence the Greek-Turkish rivalry, but also the only power that could guarantee their territorial integrity and national sovereignty. The fact that Greece had already returned to NATO and restored relations with the United States by the time she officially became an EEC member suggests that the issue of reducing dependence on the western superpower reflected anything but reality. The EEC was certainly not in a position to affect regional issues that were central to the interests of the two superpowers, particularly the United States, due to the lack of means necessary to initiate the application of an interventionist policy. Therefore, it would be absurd to claim that membership in the Community would ever enable Greece to loosen her ties with the United States. Instead, it seems that the United States remained a highly influential factor in Greek foreign policy. Although it would be difficult to suggest that it could influence the EEC—as an entity—as well, the United States exploited the ties of its NATO allies with the Community in order to preserve its geopolitical objectives. Therefore, the EEC might have influenced Greece’s external affairs to a certain degree; however, the United States retained its status as the dominant force in east Mediterranean affairs and thus the only effective mediator in the Greek-Turkish rivalry. Accordingly, the impact of the United States upon Greece remained unabated and ‘independence’ for Greece had yet to be attained.

6 Internationalizing the Disputes

Apart from the major issues of dispute that dominated GreekTurkish affairs, there were other equally problematic areas that caused further disruption in the relations between the two Eastern Mediterranean states. These issues concerned, primarily, the status of the Aegean Sea and referred to the territorial waters and airspace of Greece, as well as to the fortification of those Greek islands geographically located in the eastern part of the Aegean just across the Turkish coastline. Despite the fact that such matters were of military substance, the Western alliance, surprisingly, clearly failed to become involved and thus, settle the disputes in a manner that would benefit the US and NATO exclusively. Taking into account Turkey’s intransigence regarding any part of her rivalry with Greece, therefore, the Greek government was forced to seek alternative means that could possibly contribute to the successful resolution of these matters. To achieve this, the presence of a mediator was obviously highly desirable and quite necessary too. Thus, the United Nations soon acquired the status of the main arbiter, while the International Court of Justice played a significant role in Greece’s attempt to peacefully resolve the issue of the territorial waters. The remaining matters of airspace and the fortification of the Aegean islands drew the attention of other international organisations and necessitated a distinct approach given that they were subject to a number of certain international treaties.

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Maritime boundaries and International Law Maritime boundaries seem to amount to a rather significant issue, due to strategic and geopolitical reasons, often leading to territorial disputes. In particular, the Mediterranean Sea—a semi-enclosed sea according to the 1982 Convention of the Law of Sea (Article 122)—has attracted the interest of a multitude of scholars because of the continuous antagonism between Greece and Turkey over the legal status of the Aegean Sea. The various aspects of the dispute are the focal point of the present study and strongly related to international law, even though the conflicting sides have yet to reach a legally binding settlement of their affairs. Back in the 16th century, the preferred method for setting the limits of territorial waters was based on the notion of ‘range of vision,’ or else the ‘line of sight,’ but its application was not effective enough. Some three centuries later, the breadth of territorial waters was set by the cannot-shot rule to 3 nautical miles (nm), even though an actual cannon-shot did not exceed one and a half miles.1 Due to national interests, the range of territorial waters soon became a matter of dispute among various countries, as the United States and Britain supported the 3 nm range, Spain and France were in favour of 6 nm and the Scandinavian countries aimed at 4 nm. As a result, states attempted to codify the principle of territorial waters, in Hague (1889, 1907) and Havana (1928), but the meetings were an utter failure that reflected the states’ diverse interests. The significance of the subject matter was once more raised at yet another meeting in Hague (1930); nevertheless, the outcome was equally disappointing, since out of the 40 participants 20 were in favour of the 3 nm range, 12 opted for 6 nm and the others for 4 nm, while Greece argued for 3 nm. The inability of all pertinent actors to reach a tangible conclusion provided states the opportunity to adopt different policies, the most notable being that of some Latin American states (Peru, Chile and Ecuador) extending their waters to 200 nm. Although this diversity necessitated the normalisation of international law, the 1958 Geneva Convention did not bear fruit either, since the only remarkable achievement was that it underlined the sovereign rights of a state over both territorial waters and its continental shelf. Most

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western states still favoured the 3 nm range, the Soviet Union, Arab countries and some newly established African and Asian states aimed at 12 nm, while the Latin Americans maintained their extreme position. Similar constraints characterised the 1960 Geneva Convention, even though the 3 nm range was no longer an issue. The positions of the Soviet Union and the US were close, but not identical, since the former insisted on 12 nm, while the latter favoured 6 nm for territorial waters and 6 nm for fishing purposes. The situation altered in 1982 when the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOSIII) established the 12 nm limit (Art.3), as it gained the support of both superpowers, implying that those states that maintained territorial waters of less than 12 nm reserved the right to extend them further. Today, more than 125 states maintain a 12 nm zone of territorial waters, four states apply the same rule but in certain areas their territorial waters extend to less than 12 nm (Holland, Japan, Korea, Belize), two states exceed the 12 nm rule (Togo has 30 and Syria 35) and seven states have territorial waters less than 12 nm (Greenland, the Dominican Republic, Jordan, Norway, Singapore, Palau and Greece). According to UNCLOSIII (art. 2), states’ rights were extended to cover the seabed and the airspace over the territorial waters; however, sovereignty remained constrained by international law (par.3). Article 15 of the Law of Sea sets the issue of the delimitation of territorial waters, when the sea area in question involves more than one state and where the 12 nm range has no application due to the limited breadth of the sea area. As with the 1958 Geneva Convention (art. 12, par. 1), Article 15 makes reference to the principle of the equidistant line, not exceeding the median line, to settle related maritime disputes. Equally important is the ‘right of innocent passage’ with Article 18 defining ‘passage’ and Article 19 ‘innocent’. Though merchant ships are entitled to the right of innocent passage, no convention is clear on whether warships are subject to the same legal status, despite Article 20 arguing that warships must have their national flag raised and submarines ought to be surfaced throughout their transit passage. The relative ambiguity of the 1982 Convention has reportedly produced ‘more judgements and awards on maritime boundary dis-

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putes than on any other subject of international law.’2 A study undertook by the American Society of International Law demonstrated that the principle of equidistance has been repeatedly put into effect, since it often produces the necessary grounds for analysing a dispute, particularly, when opposite coastal states were involved. However, the International Court of Justice aimed at making clear that the equidistant line was neither ‘the preferred method of delimitation,’ nor ‘mandated by the law,’ which ‘has had its appropriate result in freeing the law from practice and any obligation or presumption favouring equidistance.’3 The issue of continental shelf too is complex, due to the distinct geographical features of each maritime boundary. As a matter of fact, the International Court of Justice stressed the difficulty to establish predetermined rules—concerning the settlement of maritime disputes—when it declared in the Tunisia-Libya case that ‘clearly each continental shelf case in dispute should be considered and judged on its own merits, having regard to its peculiar circumstance; therefore, no attempt should be made here to overconceptualise the application of the principles and rules relating to the continental shelf.’4 Despite the obvious merits that stem from the above statement, as laws would best be applied depending on the uniqueness of each case for justice to prevail, such a position does not come without criticism. Evidently, ‘an excessive individualisation of the rule of law, which changes from one case to another, would be incompatible with the very concept of law. Every legal rule presupposes a minimum of generality. A rule which is elaborated on a case by case basis rests on the discretionary power of the judge, on conciliation, on distributive justice.’5 Apparently, maritime boundary disputes are phenomenal, just as nature is, to an extent where the International Court of Justice and other arbitral tribunals have failed to approach the issue with effect, thus rendering this aspect of international law distinctive. With regard to the issue of continental shelf, the International Court of Justice declared in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases that ‘the rights of the coastal state in respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over


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the land, and as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural resources.’6 In Article 1 of the Geneva Convention the continental shelf is defined and coastal states are given sovereign rights over the exploration and exploitation of natural resources. These rights, as to Article 2, have to be compatible with the regulations of the convention, even though they stem from the coastal state’s legislation too. For example, despite the degree of sovereignty, Article 5 protects the interests of third parties as it relates to fishing, the passage of other states’ vessels and scientific research. Nevertheless, there are regulations that limit the extent of the continental shelf, particularly, when islands are located across the coast of opposite or adjacent states. In such a case, Article 6 stipulates that the continental shelf is set after an agreement is reached between the states of interest. Subsequently, the Montego Bay Convention of 1982 replaced the first two articles of the 1958 Geneva Convention as it set the continental shelf on ‘geological’ and ‘distance’ criteria, the first dealing with the seabed and the second with the legal right of all coastal states to a continental shelf. International law becomes further complicated when taking into account the fact that two out of the four 1958 Geneva Conventions, concerning the issues of territorial waters and continental shelf, make reference to the legal status of islands.7 Although it is beyond doubt that islands have continental shelves, islands have posed great problems to the issue of delimitation of continental shelf areas. This is, probably, the prime reason that islands were candidly neglected in Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention. Article 121 (par. 2) of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text stipulates that ‘the territorial sea . . . and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention applicable to other land territory.’8 Article 83 (par. 1) states that ‘the delimitation of the continental shelf between adjacent or opposite states shall be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, employing, where appropriate, the median or equidistance line, and taking account of all the relevant circumstances.’9 The usual case with opposite states is that the is-

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lands between them are fairly small and, therefore, should not be considered in the process of delimitation except for when their impact on the principle of equidistance is negligible. Such was the case in the delimitation of the Adriatic Sea between Italy and Yugoslavia, the Gulf of Finland between Finland and the Soviet Union and the Eastern Persian Gulf between Iran and Oman, where islands were located close to both other islands and the mainland. Unlike the cases mentioned above, Karl’s model—an attempt to address the problem of the continental shelf of the islands—has no effect in the case of the Aegean Sea, what he calls ‘the most complicated delimitation problems imaginable.’10 However, there is a distinctive kind of island with an equally distinctive feature that the 1982 Convention refers to as ‘rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own.’ Obviously, what is of particular significance is their impact on the delimitation of maritime boundaries. Although Article 121 (par. 3) stipulates that rocks do not have a continental shelf of their own, it is not certain whether they are entitled to territorial waters and the issue remains in doubt. No matter the ease with which a rock may be defined, pending its ability to sustain human habitation or economic life, the degree of a state’s sovereignty over a rock remains uncertain. In keeping with the Geneva Convention (Art.1) and the Montego Bay Convention (Art.2), territorial waters and the ensuing rights are an integral part of a country’s territory and jurisdiction respectively, as envisaged by international law. Unlike the Geneva Convention that was ambiguous enough to allow states the opportunity to interpret its articles in a manner that would serve their national interests, the Montego Bay Convention was far clearer. The Montego Bay Convention (Art.17) made reference to the sovereignty of the country over its territorial waters, as well as to the ‘innocent passage of ships,’ so to promote communication and trade. One of its key contributions to the resolution of maritime disputes was to relate the issue to international law and the socalled ‘equitable principle’ that allowed states to appeal to the Hague Tribunal, which would then assess their case and reach a decision based on the Montego Bay Convention.


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Furthermore, Part XV of the UNCLOSIII describes (art.279285) the means and procedures available for the peaceful settlement of maritime boundary disputes, as well as the limitations and exceptions in implementing the provisions of the convention. Article 279 makes reference to Article 2 (par.3) of the United Nations Charter—related to the obligation to settle disputes in a peaceful manner—instructing states to make use of the means mentioned in Article 33 (par.1) of the same document. The choice of means for resolving disputes rests with the states, unless they cannot reach an agreement, in which case the disputing parties will have to address an international tribunal for the Law of the Sea. On the contrary, Articles 286-296 refer to obligatory courses of action that entail binding decisions, since every right implies a duty. Every signatory of the convention can choose one or more of the suggested procedures for settling disputes that relate to the interpretation of the convention. The procedures available may employ the International Court of the Law of the Seas (Annex VI), the international court in Hague, an arbitration tribunal (Annex VII) and a special tribunal (Annex VIII). The convention then offers three distinct processes for choosing the means to settle the dispute. At first, there is the arbitration process (Annex VII); secondly, where the sides in dispute have accepted the same means, the dispute will only be settled through that particular procedure, unless they agree otherwise; and, thirdly, when states have failed to reach an agreement on the means, the dispute is submitted to arbitration process (Annex VII), unless states agree otherwise. The Aegean disputes Territorial waters and continental shelf The issue of territorial waters emerged as a matter of dispute after the Geneva Convention of 1958. The convention was based on the UN Law of Sea conference of 1958, which provided that all states have the right to extend their territorial waters to 12 nm. Greece ratified the convention in 1972, whereas Turkey was not a signatory and, ever since, the Aegean Sea consists of three sections, with Greece having 35 per cent of the waters, Turkey nine per cent, while the remaining 56 per cent are international waters. Were Greece

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and Turkey to exercise their vested rights, then the Greek waters would rise to a 64 per cent share, Turkey’s to ten per cent and international waters would decrease to 26 per cent. Since this would effectively make the Aegean a ‘Greek lake’, Turkey considered any possible extension of the Greek waters as a casus belli and argued that Greek claims over the Aegean could only produce problems, as it would seriously affect the principle of innocent passage. A possible extension of Greek territorial waters to 12 nm would certainly limit Turkey’s access to international waters and have vast economic consequences. It would also limit international waters, making the passage of other nations’ ships difficult. This it once did for the two superpowers and in particular for the former Soviet Union that used part of the Aegean, close to Greek territorial waters, as a permanent anchorage for its overseas fleet. Konstantinos Karamanlis argued that Greece never perceived the Aegean as a ‘Greek lake’ and accepted that there were international as well as Turkish waters. Greece officially declared that Turkey also had rights in respect of the Aegean Sea. On this basis, it may then be assumed that Greece did not aim at territorial expansion, even though it might have been justified under the provisions of the Geneva Convention. The sea has long created problems among countries with regard to the exploitation of the seabed and the airspace above, since states aim at extending their zone of control. For instance, similar cases to the Greek–Turkish issue are those of disputes between Germany, Denmark and Holland, between France and England, and one concerning the US and Canada—the more so today since the North West passage has become navigable as a result of the effects of climate change. The situation with regard to the Aegean Sea is different, however, because apart from the issue of economic exploitation, both sides perceive the other as intent on territorial expansion. The dispute over these territorial waters simply occurred because there was no agreed settlement between the two states, even though the Geneva Convention should have restrained Turkey because the relevant Sea Law became binding for all states and its regulations became part of customary law. Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the


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Geneva Convention had become part of international law and were accepted as such by the international community; Turkey was also bound by its conditions. It is noteworthy that Turkey’s territorial waters in the Aegean were extended to 12 nm in 1964 and consisted of two sub-zones: one the actual territorial waters (6 nm), and the other a continuation of Turkey’s continental shelf for fishing purposes (6 nm). Turkey was subject to the convention and worked it to its advantage. Although Turkey had not signed the respective convention and was therefore not legally obliged to conform to its provisions, Greece reserved the right of extending her territorial waters, even though the government would not be committed to declare ‘whether’ or ‘when’ it would exercise that right. The situation did not alter even after the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was signed in Montego Bay in 1982. UNCLOS clearly stipulated that, ‘Every state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding twelve nautical miles . . .’11 During the Third UN Conference, Turkey argued that the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case was subject to the enclosed or semi-enclosed seas regime—defined under Articles 122 and 123 of the Law of the Sea—that reflected a much narrower extent of territorial sea. When Turkey’s attempt proved unsuccessful, the government in Ankara voted against the Law of the Sea and ever since has ignored the fact that the convention is considered customary law. Although Turkey has implemented the Law of the Sea convention in the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean, Ankara claims that the semi-enclosed nature of the Aegean Sea dictates that the application of broad regulations is not appropriate. The issue of territorial waters was controversial and of importance to Turkey; this should not, however, suggest that Greece was indifferent. Turkey at the time was surrounded by age-old rival nations (the Soviet Union and Syria) and troubled neighbours (Iraq and Iran), and the fact that the only sea-route to continental Europe and the West in general was via the Mediterranean Sea, increased the strategic and political significance of the Aegean. Any extension of the Greek waters could seriously affect Turkey’s military and trading ties with the Western alliance and the European

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Economic Community (EEC), respectively. Since Greece already exercised control over a large area of the Aegean, any extension of her territorial waters would only further limit Turkey’s access to the Mediterranean region. This constituted a valid and justified reason for Turkey to oppose the application of the Geneva Convention in respect to her disputes with Greece. Conversely, Greece treated Turkey’s objections as a threat to her national interests and the exercise of her lawful rights; she further declared that such rights were not subject to foreign interests. In addition, the Greek government claimed that Turkey’s indifference threatened stability and order in the Aegean since the latter not only disregarded the legitimacy of the convention but also considered its application an act of war. Nevertheless, the fact that the Turkish government had applied the convention’s regulations in other areas of its territorial waters may only suggest that Turkey respected the status quo in the Aegean or, at least, did not wish its alteration, in contrast to Greece’s claims. This demonstrates that the convention had indeed become customary law. Turkey, however, having considered that its application would threaten her interests in the region, decided to differentiate her policy with regard to the Aegean. Taking into account that, on the one hand, Ankara never openly expressed her intention to apply the Geneva Convention, it could be inferred that Turkey had no interest in extending her territorial waters in the Aegean, even though access to the Mediterranean seemed to be a major concern. On the other hand, it could also be argued that the Turkish government was well aware of the consequences that such an action might have, risking a regional conflict with Greece that at the time could also possibly engage Warsaw Pact forces. Had Greece decided to apply the Geneva Convention fully and extend her territorial waters, it would have caused immediate response from Turkey, since the status quo in the Aegean would change in Greece’s favour. The possibility of Turkey resorting to violence can be questioned, as can NATO’s response. To this hypothesis, we first need to make clear that a military confrontation between Greece and Turkey would jeopardise the interests of the NATO Alliance in the area, as well as its unity and cohesion. Such a


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development would probably have triggered the Alliance’s intervention. Further, it would have been unlikely that Turkey would respond in a manner that would have disturbed either her relations with NATO or the balance of power between the two superpowers in the area. Nonetheless, irrespective of NATO’s response, Turkey also had to consider the possible reaction of the former Soviet Union. At that time, neither Greece nor Turkey seemed likely to put the Geneva Convention into effect. The application of the Geneva Convention would have served the interests of the Western alliance, since the Aegean would then have been considered as ‘NATO territory’. Taking into account the dominant position of the US in the area, NATO would have been at an advantage by gaining better access to Middle East oil resources and supporting its strategic interests in the eastern Mediterranean region. Nevertheless, given that such conditions would probably have damaged Turkey’s interests, one may be inclined to ask whether or not this could be a reasonable interpretation of NATO’s apparent indifference towards the dispute between Greece and Turkey over Aegean territorial waters—unless the probability of risking a full-scale regional conflict had, yet again, proved a serious restraint. Since only NATO and Greece would benefit from an extension of the Greek territorial waters, we need to identify the reasons why the alliance decided to remain neutral and stay at arm’s length from the dispute over the Aegean. One explanation could be that to support Greece in its ambition would be interpreted by Turkey as the alliance tilting in support of her rival. Were the NATO Allies to discourage the Greek government, the effect would be the opposite. An additional reason could be that were NATO to support either Greece or Turkey’s claims in the Aegean, such an action would have been met with strong objections from the former Soviet Union. It would be questionable to suggest that keeping both Greece and Turkey satisfied was more important to NATO than preserving its strategic interests, bearing in mind that NATO’s past policies towards the two Mediterranean states, as for example over Turkey’s invasion and subsequent occupation of Northern Cyprus. Instead,

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it would be more realistic to argue that NATO’s main intention had been to avoid a clash of interests. Where the distance in question is more than 12 nm, the remaining sea-zone becomes the area of international waters. There is no continuous line that would legally define Greek and Turkish waters, but if there were such a line—as with land borders—Turkey’s perception would be that Greece would consider the Aegean to be wholly Greek territory, even including the international waters. At this point it is important to note that the sea boundaries between Greece and Turkey have been in effect since 1932, when the area of the Dodecanese islands came under Greek sovereignty, and as dictated by the relevant agreement between Italy and Turkey. This suggests that Turkey’s subsequent claims over the Dodecanese islands were not justified, either. It appears that the Geneva Convention was imperfect, since it adopted the principle of equity—as opposed to the principle of equidistance—that is ambiguous. More precisely, the convention ‘rightfully abolished the unfair—for poor nations—criterion of exploitability,’ but ‘also abolished the rigorously fair rule of equidistance as a delimitation method for the continental shelf between two states with opposite or adjacent coasts.’12 Again, Turkey’s policy is controversial, as the government in Ankara opted for the principle of equidistance concerning its affairs with the former Soviet Union but preferred to apply the principle of equity in the case of the Aegean, despite not endorsing the convention. The reason that Turkey supports the principle of equity is closely related to Ankara’s argument that the Aegean islands were ‘special circumstances’, due to their proximity to the Turkish coastline and the complexity of implementing the appropriate regulations. With regard to the Montego Bay Convention, Turkey claimed that it allowed states to apply its regulations, as the occasion serves, depending on the particular characteristics of every sea that do not necessarily conform to the practices of international law. Ankara claimed Greek territorial waters for the first time on 1 November 1973, when Turkey questioned the sovereignty of Greece over an area of 11,000 square kilometres. These claims covered the area from the middle of the northern Aegean to the Turkish continental shelf, including parts of Limnos, Agios Efstratios,


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Lesvos and of Chios and Psara. Turkey’s claims did not just coincide with the first major world oil crisis, but was a result of it and at a time when the Greek military regime was weak and had no external support. When oil was found near Thasos in 1974, Turkey granted the Turkish State Petroleum Corporation exploration licences in an area considered Greek. Apparently, Turkey was willing to risk a regional conflict by challenging the status quo of the Aegean, aiming at the exploitation of its oil deposits. Greece then declared on 7 February 1974 that Turkey had no right to proceed with the explorations, citing Articles 1 and 6 of the Geneva Convention. Turkey refused to comply on the grounds that it was a signatory of the convention and because she considered the area to be a natural extension of Anatolia. Furthermore, Ankara regarded the middle line between the Greek and Turkish mainland coasts as their boundary. Turkey, therefore, proceeded with its plans and on 29 May 1974, the Turkish vessel Candarli was sent to the disputed area escorted by 32 warships. A similar event took place in March 1976 when Turkey claimed the Greek islands of the eastern Aegean and stated that the Dodecanese, in particular, should be under Turkish control. The Lausanne Treaty of 1923, however, which had been signed by Turkey, verified Greece’s sovereignty over all Aegean islands, apart from Imvros and Tenedos. As for the Dodecanese islands, their ceding from Italy to Greece was not only confirmed by the Paris Treaty of 1947 but was also never contested by Turkey. Turkey’s claims were unjustified, but this did not prevent Ankara from re-applying its hard-line policies. Soon after, it deployed the vessel Sismik for research purposes in the same area. On 5 August 1976, Sismik entered Greek waters to conduct seismological tests without permission from the Greek government, since the area was considered as ‘disputed’ by Ankara. The armed forces of the two countries were then placed on alert. Tension was reduced, however, when the Turkish vessel left the Greek territorial waters four days later. These events were perceived by the Greek government as breaches of international law. Treating it as a legal issue, Athens decided to appeal to international organisations; conversely, Turkey considered them a political issue, one that needed to be set-

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tled through bilateral negotiations. Since the Geneva Convention was not binding on Turkey, it meant that any Greek legal appeal would not restrict Ankara’s aggressive policies. On the contrary, such an appeal would not satisfy the Greek demands and, perhaps, might even have led to a loss of territory, since there was a possible likelihood of the Greek islands in the eastern Aegean becoming part of Turkey’s territorial waters. The case of the Greek–Turkish dispute was presented at the meeting of the Third Conference for the Law of Sea, in 1977, in New York. An Unofficial Uniform Negotiating Text, which made reference to the issues of covering the continental shelf, island zones, the behaviour of neighbouring countries with common seas and conflict resolution, also dealt with the dispute between Greece and Turkey and supported Greece’s arguments. It is important to note that at the same time Greece signed an agreement with Italy, on 24 May 1977, over the issue of territorial waters. The agreement was based on the principle of the ‘middle line’, even though Italy was not a signatory of the Treaty of the Law of Sea of 1958. This meant that Italy recognised the existence of UNCLOS, which was also an indication that the Geneva Convention had, indeed, become customary law. In spite of Turkey’s claims, the Aegean disputes remained unsettled, as were Greek–Turkish relations. A settlement of the Aegean issue was essential and could only be achieved through bilateral negotiations, arbitration, or an imposed unilateral decision. Further alternatives consisted of the joint exploitation of the Aegean seabed, the ‘middle line’ division of the Aegean and the ceding of parts of the Aegean seabed to Turkey. To put into effect any of these measures, however, the two conflicting sides had either to establish bilateral negotiations or make an appeal to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Even the application of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS III) was largely ineffective, despite Article 121 specifying that the ‘continental shelf of an island [determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.’13 As with the ‘territorial waters’ issue, the matter of the continental shelf demonstrated, once again, the significance of the Aegean


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to Turkey. Ankara’s objection to the islands having their own continental shelf stems from her determination to exploit the Aegean seabed, particularly after oil had been discovered in the northern part of the area. That the Turkish government made its claims during a period when the colonels governed Greece indicates that Ankara aimed at exploiting the weakness of the Greek military government. The fact that Turkey also questioned the status quo of the Aegean at a time when democracy was restored in Greece has also been closely linked to the attempts of the Greek conservative government to gain full membership of the EEC. Apparently, the Turkish government aimed at making clear to the EEC that the Greek–Turkish dispute would soon become an important issue on the agenda of the Council of Europe. Airspace With regard to airspace, it was the Paris Convention (1919) that gave states full and exclusive sovereign rights over their national airspace covering the area over a state’s territory and its territorial waters, with free passage being offered only to non-military aircraft. The same principles dominated the Madrid (1926) and Havana (1928) Conventions. The former was never put into effect, however, while the latter only involved 21 signatories. The importance of all issues relating to aviation was stressed again at the Chicago Convention (1944), which replaced all previous, problematic conventions. Ever since it was implemented in 1947, the Chicago Convention remains the main institutional framework of international aviation. The Chicago Convention, too, recognises that states have full command and control over their airspace (Art. 9, paras. 2, 10 and 11) and highlights the significance of compatibility between states’ laws and the annexes of the International Civil Aviation Organisation. The Convention gives states adequate rights to protect their sovereignty, as Article 68 determines that third parties must provide information regarding the course of their aircraft in order to qualify for right of access into and away from the airspace. Furthermore, Annexes 2 and 11 of the Convention give states the right to intercept and even force down foreign aircraft that violate international

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and/or national regulations.14 Article 9 allows states to declare ‘nofly zones’ and Article 3 (Annex 2) stipulates that countries must submit a flight plan before entering another state’s airspace. It is noteworthy that no convention argues that airspace must be identical with territorial waters and its legal regime does not depend on the continental shelf either, as stressed in both the 1958 Geneva Convention (Article 3) and the 1982 Convention (Article 78, par. 1). Where there are disputes over the interpretation or implementation of the convention, states may settle their differences through the convention’s council or by appealing to the International Court in the Hague. In either case, the final decision is binding to all disputing parties and failure to comply would result in the states being denied the right to vote in ICAO’s general assembly. Laws pertaining to airspace seem to operate independently from Sea Laws. Some states have even opted to differentiate the extent of territorial waters and airspace without violating international law—unless the territory in question exceeds the 12 nm limit. Nevertheless, the international norm suggests that airspace should correspond to territorial waters. In this instance, Greece’s persistence is incompatible with international law, despite Athens’s claim to respect relevant treaties and laws on all other occasions. This particular issue of dispute becomes more complex when taking into account the Athens government reserving the right to extend Greek territorial waters in a manner that would then match the width of its airspace. The dispute over Aegean airspace appears to be essentially the same as that of the sea since Turkey questions Greek sovereignty over the issue of both the Athens Flight Information Region (FIR) and the area of the Greek airspace. After the establishment of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) in 1947—a result of the international conference for civilian air traffic that was held in 1944 in Chicago—the Paris and Geneva conferences, of 1952 and 1958 respectively, took place concerning the issue of FIR. Both Greece and Turkey participated in the two conferences, according to which the Athens FIR was extended up to the Turkish airspace. This meant that Greece controlled the airspace over both the Greek islands and the international waters. All aircraft flying west-


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wards from Turkey had to report to Athens as soon as they were leaving the Turkish coast. The FIR, however, existed only for technical flight safety and should not be confused with national airspace. The Greek FIR, more specifically the 28th Tactical Flight of the Greek Air Force, was responsible for ‘early warning, air defence and tactical operations in this airspace.’15 Since 1931, as a result of a presidential decree, Greece controls 10 nm of airspace beyond her land borders, though her territorial waters are limited to 6 nm. Turkey respected the extent of Greek airspace until 1975, since when she has been violating the 10 nm range, though never Greece’s 6 nm zone. The reason is that Turkey has argued, correctly, that the extent of the Greek airspace should be identical to that of her territorial waters, particularly since NATO regulations dictate that territorial waters and airspace must be identical. This has meant that Greece could not object to any violations when committed by other allies during NATO exercises. In any other case, all aircraft should be intercepted, no matter what nationality. To establish her claims, Turkey pursued a policy of repeated violations during military exercises, whether independent of, or within, NATO’s framework. The purpose of these violations, apart from establishing a new order in the Aegean, was to keep track of any Greek response, exert pressure on Greece, carry out photoreconnaissance missions, and as a means of displaying military power. Although Turkey’s claims could easily be overridden, were Greece to extend her waters to 12 nm, it seems that Turkey’s claims were justified, despite having violated rules of the ICAO. Following the invasion of Cyprus, Turkey issued NOTAM 714 on 6 August 1974 and informed the ICAO that the eastern Aegean was a dangerous flight zone. This NOTAM aimed at the identification of hostile aircraft and marked the first dispute between the two states over the issue of airspace. NOTAM 714 caused chaos to the Aegean air traffic zone because Greek internal flights from the mainland to the islands, and the Greek Air Force flying within the Greek airspace, would have to report to Istanbul. A procedure was instituted for all aircraft that were ‘crossing the central demarcation line.’16 The instruction set half of the Aegean as a Turkish area, since it included the part from Evros in the Northern Aegean,

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down to Limnos and Andros and to the south-eastern Aegean and the Dodecanese. It was evident that Ankara had broken both ICAO and NATO’s rules on ‘air safety and control system,’ and called their ‘structure into question.’17 As a result, Athens issued NOTAM 1066 and 1152 on 14 August 1974, which stated that all of the Aegean had become a dangerous zone and then informed the ICAO, on 13 September 1974, that she had no responsibility for flights over the area. The Turkish attitude could be perceived as rational if one considers the following two problems with which Ankara was faced. First, were Greece to launch an offensive, Turkey would not have enough time to respond effectively, since the extent to which Greek airspace covered the Aegean enabled the latter to reach the Turkish mainland, while the Turkish military infrastructure in Asia Minor would be exposed. The second problem was that Greece controlled the international airspace and thus all the air corridors above the Aegean. Turkey’s frustration is understandable, particularly when Greece had also set a number of air corridors that served no practical purpose other than limiting Turkey’s access to the Mediterranean. Greece was clearly abusing the right of controlling international airspace over the Aegean and forced Turkey to have to ask for concessions from her. Turkey asked for an area of the international airspace in order to conduct military exercises and also for the establishment of a Greek–Turkish committee that would be responsible for controlling the Athens FIR international airspace. In addition, Turkey requested the abolition of those air corridors that were obstructing her aircraft from exiting Turkish airspace. Turkey’s requests were justified and Greece eventually had to comply. At that time, the airspace issue had become critical to the Greek parliament. The Greek government was strongly criticised when the opposition claimed Greek airspace to have been reduced from 10 nm to 6 nm. NATO documents of 1960, however, specifically dictated that airspace and territorial waters were identical— though for NATO purposes only. Such arrangements would make it possible for NATO aircraft to use the airspace between 6 nm and 10 nm, without it affecting Greece’s dispute with Turkey. In other


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words, the Greek airspace remained at 10 nm in spite of Turkey’s valid objections that international law stipulated that airspace is defined by the vertical extension of mainland territory and the continental shelf. Nevertheless, Andreas Papandreou, the leader of the opposition party, accused the government of negotiating its airspace—he made particular reference to the FIR—at a time when Turkey had not withdrawn NOTAM 714. Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis replied that the FIR did not constitute Greek sovereign territory but just happened to coincide with Greece’s geographical boundaries. He then added that Greece only negotiated the issue of military flights for security reasons between the two countries and not the FIR as such. Evidently, the airspace issue had become a significant matter of dispute between Greece and Turkey. This stems from the fact that the one to control the airspace also controlled the respective territorial waters; thus the airspace issue was far more essential than that of the continental shelf. To Evangelos Averoff, Minister of National Defence, and Georgios Rallis, Minister of Foreign Affairs, the airspace issue was not that important because the FIR determined the flight control. This meant that any other state had to submit a flight plan, despite Article 1 of the ICAO stating that military aircraft were excluded from such notification. The normal procedure would be for a state to inform the Athens FIR that its aircraft would enter Greek airspace, which Athens had no right to refuse unless military exercises were being carried out or in case other aircraft were in Greece’s airspace. Nevertheless, the issue of flight notification was not the only requirement, since Greece had, first, to approve the flight plan, and then grant permission. In case the other state did not conform to the regulations of the ICAO, Greece reserved the right to force the other state’s aircraft out of her airspace or even shoot them down, were the latter not corresponding to the Greek request to leave the area. During Turkish exercises in the Aegean, however, and although Turkey informed Athens of the relevant dates and hours of these exercises, she did not submit the flight plans, thereby making difficult the efficient functioning of the Athens FIR. NATO’s regulations stated that in wartime, as well as during NATO exercises,

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the submission of flight plans was not needed. This was a rule that applied to all the members of the alliance when carrying out exercises in the Aegean. In other words, Turkey would only be violating Greek airspace during military exercises that were not held within a NATO context. Following Turkey’s withdrawal of NOTAM 714, Athens announced the settlement of the FIR through NOTAMs 392/81 and 393/81 on 6 March 1981. These notices involved the restriction of the Limnos Terminal Area from 3,000 square miles (sm) to 1,382 sm—Turkey’s claim since 1975—as it was an area close to the Straits. Subsequently, the Greek opposition party argued that the government had reduced Greek airspace and left it exposed to Turkish aircraft because of the widened gap between Lesvos and Limnos. This gap had enabled Turkey to penetrate the Greek airspace at its heart either during exercises or in case of an attack. The Greek islands in the eastern Aegean would therefore be rendered defenceless. Greece also changed the lower limits of the airspace in certain Air Traffic Service (ATS) routes. This meant that Turkish warplanes could fly higher, move faster due to less air density, and consume less fuel. These advantages would enable them to move further into Greek airspace and attack the mainland. Moreover, the Greek government lowered the upper limits and the periodical utilisation of certain ATS routes, thereby providing Turkey with more space into which to deploy her aircraft. The government stated that this change was in favour of Greece and that it was only applied to routes of limited traffic. Moreover, all the above concessions were established by the Greek government and could be recalled, if needed. The airspace issue had many similarities with that of the territorial waters, with the Turkish government aiming at ensuring access to the Mediterranean and reducing Greek airspace. Notably, with reference to the second Turkish objective, Ankara’s argument was entirely justified, since the territorial waters and airspace of a state have to be the same extent. One could also argue, however, that to achieve this, Greece would not need to reduce her airspace. Instead, Greece could increase her territorial waters, since she had the


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right to expand them to 12 nm, and thereby justifying an extension to her airspace. Again, considering that such an act would be perceived by Turkey as a casus belli, we could then assume that it would be unlikely for Greece to adopt that course of action. As to Ankara’s first objective, the aim was to challenge the sovereignty of Greek airspace, as evident from the various NOTAMs that were issued, while attempting to settle the issue of the FIR. What is not clear, though, is the reason why Turkey was at all interested in the FIR issue, particularly as it only involved the operational control of airspace. One explanation could be that Turkish aircraft had to report to the Athens FIR as soon as they left their own airspace. Were those aircraft of civil nature, Greece would not object their entry into Greek airspace. Difficulties would only appear if the aircraft concerned were military aircraft, whether conducting military exercises or launching an offensive. In the first case, if these exercises were held under NATO’s auspices, no problems would arise since Greece was expected to grant permission for use of her airspace. Problems would only occur if Turkey were to hold military exercises entirely on her own or embark on an offensive. In either of the last two cases, Turkey’s arguments would certainly not be justified, and would threaten the peace and stability in the area. In view of these arguments, it could be argued that the response of both the ICAO and NATO was ineffective. On the one hand, the ICAO, concerned with the proper functioning of airspace, remained indifferent to the dispute although it had full awareness of the probable repercussions. The Greek authorities could not enforce its regulations, even when the air traffic above the Aegean was called into question. On the other hand, NATO decided to remain impartial to yet another Greek–Turkish dispute, though a settlement should have been in its interest. Its impartiality also extended over the issue of Greek airspace and the fact that it did not coincide with the Greek territorial waters. The only suggestion to be made here, referring to NATO’s attitude, is that the situation probably suited its interests and justified its reluctance to become directly involved.

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Fortification of the islands Another consequence of the Turkish invasion in Cyprus was Greece’s decision to fortify the islands in the eastern Aegean, fearing further Turkish hostilities. This raised Turkey’s objections, claiming that the fortification of the Greek islands was contrary to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 and the Paris Treaty of 1947. The Lausanne Treaty (Article 4, par. 3) stated that Limnos, Samothrace, Imvros and Tenedos were not to be militarised. It authorised (Article 13) the defence of Lesvos, Chios, Samos and Ikaria, however, but with armed forces consisting only of local inhabitants. Along the same lines, the Paris Treaty (Article 14) did not allow for the militarisation of the Dodecanese islands. Turkey was not a signatory of this Treaty and could not, therefore, make a valid objection. Inevitably, Greece and Turkey became engaged in a dispute that was concerned about which treaty was in force and, therefore, valid. Turkey argued that the Lausanne Treaty was still in effect. Greece, conversely, emphasised that the treaty to surpass those signed at Lausanne and Paris was the Montreaux Treaty of 1936, which cancelled the demilitarisation of the above islands. Greece also called for Article 51 of the UN Charter that raised the issue of self-defence, a parameter that could only be applied when a state’s territorial integrity and sovereignty were threatened. Greece argued, however, that a state could not possibly await an attack and then react. What added to the dispute was the creation of the 4th Turkish Army, or the Aegean Army, on 20 July 1975 in Izmir. This was a force that was not under NATO command and control, and had as its main task amphibious operations. To Greece, this was an indication of Turkish intentions, particularly since it was the second largest landing force—in terms of military strength—in NATO. Turkey argued, conversely, that the Aegean Army was needed to reinforce Turkish forces in case of a war against the Warsaw Pact in eastern Thrace and not as a landing force against the Greek islands. At the same time, Greece proposed to Turkey an Agreement of NonAggression, which Turkey did not accept on the grounds that Greece was violating the above treaties by arming the Aegean islands.


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The fortification of the Eastern Aegean islands and its justification raised two highly controversial issues. Athens claimed that the territorial integrity of Greece was in jeopardy following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Her subsequent response concerned the military strengthening of those islands located close to the Turkish coastline. Greek fears of further Turkish hostilities were enhanced after Ankara’s decision to establish the Aegean Army. Despite Turkey’s argument that the Aegean Army was necessary to support her forces in Thrace, Greece perceived its creation as a threat to her sovereignty. This demonstrates, once more, that the two Mediterranean states were highly suspicious of each other and were much less concerned about the Soviet threat. It is possible to suggest that Greek claims about the fortification of her islands were therefore as justified as Turkey’s creation of the Aegean Army, particularly when making reference to the UN Charter and the right of self-defence. No matter how important those forces were to the interests of Greece and Turkey, both states seem to have operated beyond NATO’s remit if not actually violating international law. Both the fortification of the Aegean islands and the creation of an Aegean Army served NATO’s interests well since they affected the access of the Soviet Union’s naval forces to the Mediterranean and strengthened NATO’s position in the region. Neither Greece nor Turkey was directed by NATO to undertake such developments; instead, both Athens and Ankara aimed only at improving their military capabilities so as to be in a position to confront each other effectively. The significance of the alliance declined relative to their rivalry; similarly, the Warsaw Pact also declined as a major threat. From a legal perspective, Greece had violated the Lausanne and Paris Treaties. Only the Montreaux Treaty justified the fortification of the Aegean islands. The first two treaties made exact references as to which islands were to be militarised, but Greece appears to have disregarded them. More specifically, Greece stated that the Montreaux Treaty was already in effect since it succeeded the Treaty of Lausanne, but, to follow her rationale, the Dodecanese islands should have remained unfortified, as required by the Paris Treaty. The objectivity and justification of Greece’s claims, therefore, do not seem to comply with international law.

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The International Court of Justice To settle their disputes, Greece proposed to Turkey, on 27 January 1975, to appeal to the ICJ; however, Turkey accepted the Greek proposal on 6 February 1975, but stated that they should first hold negotiations on a bilateral level so as to prepare the grounds for the application to the ICJ. Nevertheless, bilateral negotiations, such as the ministerial meeting of May 1975 that was held in Rome between Dimitris Bitsios and Ihsan Sabri Tsaglayangil, the two foreign ministers, proved equally unfruitful. The two sides failed to come near the issue of dispute, let alone to agree on the elaboration of a joint appeal to the ICJ. When the August events of 1976 took place, concerning the explorations of Sismik, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 395/1976, which called the disputing parties to reduce tension in the area, engage themselves in further negotiations and appeal to the ICJ. Instead, the situation was further complicated when, on 22 September 1975, Turkey altered her policy and decided not to appeal to the ICJ, on the grounds that unilateral actions, such as those of the ICJ, could only create additional problems, rather than settling the existing ones. Turkey also made reference to the issue of continental shelf and noted that the Greek case was unjustified because, to Ankara’s view, the ‘continental shelf’ issue had no application to islands. As a consequence, the Greek government took the initiative and requested from the ICJ the prohibition of any research activities in disputed waters and a legal decision with regard to the issue of continental shelf. In view of Turkey’s aim to weaken the Greek proposal for committal to the organisation in Hague, Greece made a request for the indication of interim measures of protection concerning her sovereign rights over the Aegean Continental Shelf. Surely, the Turkish government had a clear preference for holding negotiations on a bilateral/political level rather than at international/legal level, since it had the obvious advantage of exerting pressure on Greece through the Cyprus issue. It is noteworthy that the Greek government also encountered pressure from its domestic environment when it was accused by the opposition of betrayal and underbidding with Papandreou stating that the government’s policy was leading to concessions, were the


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ICJ to decide in favour of Turkey. In an attempt to justify his government’s policy and to respond to the relevant accusations, Karamanlis made reference to the diplomatic success of Greece in the EEC and the Balkans. The Greek Prime Minister then added that 43 states had problems with regard to the issue of continental shelf, of which 21 reached a settlement through negotiations or arbitration and four by appealing to the ICJ, while the rest of them were still in the stage of negotiations. Revealingly, Georgios Mavros argued that none of those states were aiming at heavy armament to achieve their aims, much unlike Turkey’s case. As to the first matter of dispute, regarding the Turkish violations of the Greek continental shelf, the Court announced on 11 December 1976 that Turkey’s action posed no substantial threat to peace. Two years later, on 19 December 1978, the Court delivered its answer on the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case. The ICJ rejected the Greek request ‘on the grounds that Greece, in acceding to the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes of 1928, had explicitly excluded ‘disputes relating to its rights of sovereignty over its ports and lines of communication.’18 The Court declared itself incompetent in dealing with the issue by 12 to two votes, undoubtedly, a major diplomatic success to Turkey. In other words, both bilateral negotiations and the subsequent appeals to international organisations had limited effect, if any. It is noteworthy that only the Greek judge, Mihael Stassinopoulos, voted in favour of the Greek application, which clearly underlines the humiliation of the government in Athens. Nevertheless, according to judge Manfred Lachs, and although the ICJ produced a negative decision, the Court could have made a positive contribution to the dispute, had the ICJ stressed the need for Greece and Turkey to prevent the deterioration or extension of the conflict. There is little doubt that the complex nature of the above mentioned matters of dispute between Greece and Turkey was the driving force that led the former to appeal to the ICJ. Greece hoped that the ICJ would eventually settle the disputes with Turkey peacefully, so that Greek policy-makers could then focus on the issue of EEC membership, the negotiations with the US government over its military installations in Greece and the country’s return to NATO.

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Most probably, Greece was expecting the ICJ to declare Turkey’s claims unjustified and thus gain support from the international community in her attempt to safeguard her national integrity and sovereignty, in case the potential for a peaceful settlement of their disputes was not feasible. The ICJ, nevertheless, proved rather ineffective and disappointed the Greek government, which believed its claims to be justified based on international law. On the other hand, had the ICJ decision been favourable to Greece, it could have had serious repercussions for the alliance, considering that the ICJ is a Western-established institution and that it would be unlikely to compromise the interests of the alliance. To condemn Turkey for threatening peace and stability in the Aegean would, perhaps, force the alliance to apply sanctions against Turkey, under the pressure of the international community, while an arms embargo was already imposed on Turkey, thus causing further isolation of the country from the alliance. Needless to say, this would have seriously affected the geopolitical interests of the West in the region as well. In our view, this constitutes a sound explanation of the unexpected decision of the ICJ to remain impartial to the Aegean dispute. The Cyprus issue The de facto partition of Cyprus was among the major issues of dispute and had immense repercussions not only for the three Mediterranean states, but for the international environment too. What started as an interstate conflict was soon to become a matter of conflict for the two superpowers. As Mavros revealed in the Greek parliamentary proceedings, the Turkish occupation forces in Cyprus came up to 40,000, for the purpose of protecting a community that comprised some 120,000 Turkish-Cypriots. Moreover, the occupation of Cyprus with the use of NATO and US arms was a violation of international law, as well as of US legislation, and a serious threat to peace. Turkey, through the change of the ‘demographic character’ of Cyprus, as achieved through the settling of colonists on the island,19 proved that she had lost interest in any settlement not based on complete partition. In fact, Cyprus had proposed to Turkey the creation of an ‘independent sovereign Republic in the form of a bicommunal, multi-regional federation with a strong central


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government,’ where ‘purely Turkish administrative units would function in the North over a territorial extent of about 18%,’ but was rejected altogether.20 The political impasse that resulted forced the leaderships of Greece and Cyprus to meet on 14 February 1975, in Athens in an attempt to attain a just solution for the Cypriot people. Their first option was the creation of two separate zones of control that, however, could prompt the adverse reaction of the Greek-Cypriots. Karamanlis’ Archives reveal that the two delegations even made reference to double union, though they argued that Turkey was against it. From those discussions, it stems that the two delegations were promoting the idea of partition. In fact, Karamanlis asked, twice, whether the Cypriot leadership accepted responsibility, firstly, over the bizonal solution and, secondly, for the ceding of a 25 per cent of Cypriot territory to Turkey. The reason was that, to Karamanlis, Greece could not determine the solution for Cyprus; however, she favoured the bizonal solution, but would provide no further support for as long as they took into account Cypriot public opinion. This was considered as an unacceptable situation that should not be prolonged. The Cypriot delegation’s response to the propositions of Greece was surprisingly enthusiastic. According to Karamanlis’ Archives, the chairman of the Cypriot parliament, Glafkos Cleridis, said that the problem was not the bizonal solution, but the size of the territory that each side would have, whereas Spyros Kyprianou, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, made absolutely clear his preference was the double union instead of a bizonal solution. Nevertheless, the two sides seemed unable to make a decision and accept responsibility of any consequences; therefore, they all agreed to call for a potential meeting under UN auspices, either with the participation of the Contact Group or the nine member-states of the EEC. Evidently, the issues of Cyprus’ independence and territorial integrity had been put aside, while the Cypriot people had to be bypassed, for the Greek government to be able to impose its will upon the Cypriot leadership. Obviously, the Cypriot government needed to make a decision over the island’s future, therefore, on 1 April 1975, Cleridis stated that Cyprus would accept the bizonal solution, as long as the size of

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the Turkish-Cypriot zone was acceptable. Three days later, Ihsan Sabri Tsaglayangil, the Turkish foreign minister, responded to Cleridis by stating that Turkey was willing to cede an area of the occupied territory to Cyprus, were Greece to withdraw her claims of extending her territorial waters to 12 nm and reach an agreement over the joint exploitation of the Aegean Sea. This term was unacceptable to the government in Athens, thus, Turkey’s proposal was rejected, as was the possibility of Cyprus’ de jure partition following a meeting between Cleridis and Makarios. Instead, the Cypriot side was, then, calling for the creation of a federation, the demilitarisation of the island, the establishment of a central government and the return of the refugees to their homes. As a result, Cleridis informed Karamanlis that the Cypriot national council had rejected the bizonal solution and that it would propose to Turkey the creation of three cantons,21 despite Karamanlis’ argument that the European countries preferred the bizonal solution to a multi-regional settlement. The subsequent intercommunal talks, 17-21 February 1976, took place under UN auspices and in the presence of Kurt Waldheim, the General Secretary. Waldheim suggested the return of a certain number of people in three areas of the island. The first area was extending from Tymvou, in the west, to the southeast in the Nicosia-Ammohostos direction and to the Ammohostos bay. The second area was on the northern side of the above direction, including Trikomon and the surrounded plain of Mesaoria, while the third area was from Morfou in the west, to the southern part of the island. After Cyprus rejected the plan, Karamanlis argued that the government in Nicosia should have accepted it, since the plan implied that the Turkish forces would have to withdraw from those areas, which would then come under the protection of the UN, eventually promoting the issue of a multi-regional federation. Moreover, the application of such a plan would result to a 12 per cent reduction of the Turkish occupied area, thus reducing the size of area that Turkey had under control. However, Karamanlis was still arguing for the bizonal solution, which ‘apart from being inevitable was also advantageous,’ as long as Turkey controlled an area of less than 25 per cent of the island and on the northern part of Cyprus. Karamanlis’ Archives


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reveal that had the bizonal solution been adopted instead of the multi-regional settlement, the Greek side would then organise the Greek-Cypriot section appropriately, so as to make way for union with Greece, were Turkey to agree for double union as well.22 Karamanlis’ views soon produced anxiety among the Cypriot people who were openly accusing the Greek Prime Minister of promoting the idea of double union, rather than supporting Cyprus’ independence. That incident forced Karamanlis to send a letter to Makarios, on 22 July 1976, stating that the talks with the Cypriot delegation were nothing but an exchange of views. Still, that was the second time that Karamanlis suggested the possibility of double union, therefore, any ‘rumours’ concerning the double-union solution were certainly justified. Apparently, only Makarios was in favour of re-establishing the sovereign rights of the Cyprus government and the legal foundations of the island as a single political entity. The problems continued when, in February 1977, Makarios and Denktash signed a document on the creation of an ‘independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic.’ Makarios’ act was interpreted as an attempt to achieve federation for Cyprus as a whole, although Denktash aimed at confederation.23 Then, in June 1977, Makarios visited Karamanlis in Athens, with the aim of a maximum detachment of Cypriot territory from Turkey. Perhaps, that was a sign that Makarios was withdrawing from the issue of Cyprus’ independence, towards the partition of the island. Certainly, one has to consider all probabilities with regard to the settlement of the Cyprus issue and explore alternative options as well. In this sense, Karamanlis appears to have told Makarios that he should have introduced Cyprus to international organisations like the United Nations, the European Economic Community and NATO, for Cyprus to become more ‘powerful’ and then achieve union with Greece. Makarios subsequently admitted the mistake of his non-aligned policy and, as a result, Karamanlis suggested to Kyprianou, after he became President following Makarios’ death, to bring Cyprus into the EEC so that the two states could enjoy even more negotiating power.

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Regarding the Cyprus issue, it appears that Greece had three choices. Refuse negotiations with the Turkish-Cypriots, negotiate and reach a settlement that would terminate foreign occupation and negotiate with Turkey under UN auspices. The first option would eternalise partition, since the Turkish forces would not withdraw; a situation that could later on promote the independence of the Turkish-Cypriot part. The second option was not encouraging either, because it was unacceptable that the Turkish-Cypriot community would become arbiter of Cyprus’ future. Finally, the third option would be difficult to apply, because the UN could hardly provide a solution. However, the third option had the advantages of Greece enjoying more support from the international community than Turkey, thus a solution could be reached from a third party initiative, while the negotiations would become an obstacle to the expansionist plans of Turkey. On the other hand, Greece was only reluctant to assume a primary role in the Cyprus issue, probably, because the matter concerned the restoration of Cyprus’ independence, integrity and sovereignty, thus the government in Athens could not present itself as the patron of Cyprus. Moreover, were Greece to accept such a role, this would suggest that Athens would then be in a position to intervene in Cyprus’ internal affairs, which would create further problems since many Cypriot political parties had different views as to the handling of the issue. In addition, one has to consider that Greek-Turkish relations had already deteriorated and that any Greek intervention would only weaken the negotiating power of Greece, vis-à-vis Turkey’s position. That said, Ankara could then aim in compensating between the Aegean and Cyprus issues and possibly achieve territorial expansion. It is noteworthy, however, that it was Makarios’ own decision that Cyprus was to have the primary role in dealing with the issue as such, which eventually determined the manner of conduct of all relevant negotiations, as well as the island’s destiny. The Cyprus issue was, nevertheless, an integral part of the Greek-Turkish conflict and although distinct from the Aegean dispute, negotiations over the two issues could be held simultaneously. Further, the two mother-states could exert constructive influence and persuade the two communities to come to the


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negotiating table, instead of aiming to satisfy the demands of their respective communities on the island. In fact, a Congressional report stated that ‘There is an increasing tendency in many quarters to “link” the problem of Cyprus with negotiations over other problem areas in Greek-Turkish relations. However, there is a grave danger that in doing so, the issue of Cyprus—of people in need— will be lost in the rush of other concerns, both political and economic.’24 The complexity of the Cyprus issue also attracted the attention of the two superpowers, even though they remained apathetic. The Soviet Union favoured the independence of Cyprus, due to Makarios’ policy of non-alignment, while the US promoted the idea of partition, which could bring Cyprus, indirectly, into the Western alliance. Along similar lines, Greece was encouraging the Cypriot government to settle for partition as well, despite Karamanlis arguing that the government in Athens could not possibly impose a solution on Cyprus. In other words, Cyprus was to defend herself on her own against the Turkish demands and since Cyprus had no means to influence her external environment she would eventually be forced to accept partition. To an extent, this demonstrated the degree of dependence of the Greek government on the Western alliance, since Greece’s indifference over the Cyprus issue could be interpreted as an act that would satisfy her allies. Although it is evident that the Cyprus issue was essential— primarily due to the interests of the West that certainly favoured the partition of the island—it was, nevertheless, of secondary importance to Greece and, perhaps, to Turkey as well. Greece’s major concern was entry into the EEC, thus the Cyprus settlement was never among the main objectives of Greek foreign policy. This reflected the fact that the Greek government never adopted a primary role in the Cyprus negotiations, whereas it accepted, with no objections, Cyprus’ request for a ‘Cyprus decides, Greece supports’ policy. To Turkey, too, the Aegean issue was of primary importance, particularly since any settlement in favour of Ankara would mean unlimited access to the Mediterranean. We may then assume that, to Turkey, Cyprus was only an excuse, a situation that would enable

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the government in Ankara to exert pressure on Athens over the Aegean issues. Nevertheless, another important factor that certainly determined Cyprus’ destiny was Makarios’ policy of non-alignment. Were Cyprus part of the Western alliance, Turkey’s military operations would have probably been averted. If Cyprus was a member of NATO, the western alliance would neither have accepted any violations of the legal foundations of the island, nor allow Turkey to have such a decisive role in such a strategic area. Any threat against Cyprus would only threaten the stability and cohesion of the alliance; however, since Cyprus only achieved independence in 1960, membership with NATO would have undermined the sovereignty of Makarios’ government. Moreover, since Cyprus was a weak state, from a political and military dimension, such membership would have led to dependence and foreign intervention in her domestic affairs. Hence, Makarios’ decision that non-aligned policy would be more appropriate, particularly, since Cyprus had never— in contemporary history—relished the prospect of independence. However, that particular policy had immense implications for Cyprus’ independence and territorial integrity. The United Nations On 30 July 1974, Britain, Greece and Turkey agreed to the reestablishment of the constitutional order in Cyprus and recognised the existence of two separate commands. It was then agreed to set borders that should be respected by both sides, with the UN forces in Cyprus undertaking the responsibility to maintain order and stability. What was deemed necessary to ensure a peaceful environment was the gradual withdrawal of all foreign forces, as proclaimed by the UN Resolution 353. Although the Greek government seemed satisfied, the same cannot be argued for Makarios, since the agreement concerning the withdrawal of forces was unclear. Whereas the US was certainly against Resolution 353 of the Security Council, the Soviet Union supported the Greek cause, but to no avail. The Cyprus issue seemed to take a new direction when, on November 1974, UN Resolution 3212 was issued, arguing for the


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withdrawal of all foreign troops and the return of the refugees to their altars; a decree that was largely ignored by Turkey. On the occasion, the UN Assembly asked Turkey to respect the sovereignty and independence of Cyprus, withdraw her troops and initiate the procedures for the inter-communal talks, but Turkey only accepted the latter. These two resolutions were considered as important victories for Makarios and the Greek-Cypriot side, but despite the fact that Turkey had signed the above UN resolution the government in Ankara refused to comply with the respective decisions. Most probably, because the UN lacked US support as well as the political and military power to implement these resolutions. In fact, the US had not condemned the Greek coup in Cyprus and even vetoed the Security Council resolution that intended to do so; criticising, rather, the role of Greece in Cyprus. However, it is noteworthy that the US Congress supported the idea of removing all foreign forces from the island, as manifested in two Congressional Bills. Nevertheless, when the Security Council remained reluctant over the implementation of the resolutions, following General Assembly’s related requests, it became apparent that the Cyprus issue would prove difficult to settle. The first Greek appeals to the UN, five in total, took place in the July-August 1974 period; with the first four being acts of Greece and Cyprus, while the Soviet Union simply supported their last appeal. Whatever the decisions, they had no substantive effect, however, Andreas Zaimis, the Deputy Foreign Minister, claimed that Greece had been successful in so far as the mediation of international organisations was concerned. He made reference to four decisions of the UN General Assembly and 19 of the Security Council that were in favour of Greece and stated that the inability to apply them was not a mistake of Greece, but the result of Turkey’s intransigence. In our view, nevertheless, it was probably Greece’s passive policy that prevented the conservative government in Athens from exerting sufficient pressure on Turkey to ensure that the latter would comply with the regulations of international law and the respective UN decisions. Subsequently, the next appeal was put forward on 10 August 1976, when Resolution 391 was passed, which urged the two states to reduce tension and appeal to

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the International Court of Justice. Although this resolution was considered as a diplomatic success for Greece, the decision of the Security Council to produce ‘acceptable solutions’ within an international body such as the ICJ was in favour of Ankara, since only Turkey had claims over the Aegean and Cyprus issues. In general, Cyprus enjoyed the support of the UN, ever since the international organisation condemned Turkey’s invasion and her subsequent attempts to legitimise the partition of the island. The fact that the Turkish-Cypriot leadership was never given ‘official diplomatic status’25 and that the UN from 1964 to 1981 only recognised the Greek-Cypriot Administration as the legitimate government of Cyprus simply provided Makarios with further international support. Revealingly, Resolutions 353 and 367 made reference to a ‘Government of Cyprus,’ obviously implying the GreekCypriot Administrations, whereas the Turkish-Cypriot side was never represented in the UN sessions. Moreover, the UN ‘affirmed that the declaration of the Turkish Federated State did not “prejudge the final political settlement”’26 and the General Assembly’s Resolution 34/30 of November 20, 1979, implied that ‘Turkey’s intervention in 1974 was an act of territorial conquest.’27 Contrary to other matters of dispute between Greece and Turkey, the issue of Cyprus attracted the attention of the two superpowers and the UN. The intentions of Greece and Cyprus to achieve the independence of the island soon met Turkey’s objections that aimed directly at partition. The Greek and Cypriot leaderships, in view of Turkey’s unwillingness to co-operate and reach a just solution for the Cypriot people as a whole, gradually moved from the idea of Cyprus’ ‘independence’ to the ‘double union’ of the island and finally to the establishment of a ‘federation’. From one perspective, the governments in Athens and Nicosia could be blamed for lacking a firm and cohesive foreign policy that would promote a single settlement for Cyprus. Instead, in an attempt to reach and satisfy Turkey’s expectations, the two states continuously altered their policies, thus bringing about confusion to all sides of the dispute. To opt for either independence or federation, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus would be preserved, but


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to argue for double union Cyprus would simply be forced to partition. It is noteworthy that the US too supported the idea of partition, since it would safeguard the interests of the Western alliance in the region, whereas the Soviet Union aimed at the independence of the island and even openly supported the Greek government within the context of an UN-sponsored settlement. What the Greek policy-makers did not foresee was the opportunity to achieve their aims by gaining full support of the Soviet Union, a serious omission that could only be justified by the fact that Greece, since she was part of the Western alliance, had little room for diplomatic manoeuvre. Nevertheless, had Greece engaged the Soviet Union in her disputes with Turkey, she could have benefited by exerting additional pressure on the government in Ankara and, perhaps, its counterpart in Washington. Such a dynamic policy would probably promote the application of the UN resolutions related to Cyprus and particularly UN Resolution 353, since it would also preserve the strategic interests of the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, Resolution 353 was certainly a just solution, if not the ultimate settlement, of the Cyprus issue, but was never applied due to the objections of the US, even though Turkey had signed it. The cause of the Western alliance was more significant, rather than Cyprus independence. Again, had Athens been less reluctant to co-operate with Moscow and fully support the cause of the latter within the limits of the UN, perhaps, the final outcome would have been completely different. Still, these are mere hypotheses and the fact that Greek foreign policy was once more determined by the interests of the West can only prove Greece’s passive approach to her disputes with Turkey. Nevertheless, the most important elements that probably defined Cyprus’ future were beyond the issues of external pressure, foreign interests and Greek passive attitude. To a great extent, the responsibility lies with Makarios’ policy of non-alignment and the fact that Cyprus was not an issue of high standing on the Greek foreign policy agenda. Makarios’ choice to join the non-aligned movement could be perceived as a mistake, at a time when the conflict between the two superpowers was reaching its height. Given

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the strategic significance of the island, it was only a matter of time before Cyprus found herself in the epicentre of the superpowers’ interests. Therefore, we could probably suggest that Makarios was too naïve to believe that he could maintain absolute sovereignty for Cyprus, particularly, when one takes into account the fact that her two communities were almost always prone to conflict. In other words, Makarios found that he was in a difficult position, because although membership in NATO would, perhaps, guarantee the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus, still, it would mean that sovereignty would have to be sacrificed once NATO bases were established for the cause of the alliance. However, had Makarios foreseen the events to follow, he would certainly favour the cession of sovereign rights to NATO than to lead his country to partition. Then again, we could argue that it would be difficult for any newly born state to immediately enter a military alliance and cede its sovereign rights, the reason being that such a decision would certainly challenge the notion of ‘independence’ that had just been granted to the Republic of Cyprus. Makarios, probably, knew well enough that to join NATO would turn Cyprus into a US naval base for the accommodation of the 6th Fleet, thus giving Washington the opportunity to directly influence the domestic and external affairs of the country. Surely, for a weak state like Cyprus this could only be interpreted as subjection to foreign interests and Makarios could soon lose his position, as leader of state, to one more favourable to the US leadership. To add to the problematical situation that Makarios was facing, the fact that he was a man of the Church does not really qualify him as a strong leading personality, capable of making the right decisions, even though he was, indeed, a charismatic leader. This may prove very true, particularly, since the Greek government did not seem to support Cyprus’ cause. The government in Athens was also facing the consequences of the Turkish invasion and was much pre-occupied with the issues of effectively restoring democracy, EEC membership, its withdrawal from NATO and the Turkish threat. The Cyprus issue was thus not among the core subjects that concerned Greek foreign policy. Most probably, Cyprus was seen as a thorn that strained the relations of Greece with her


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Western allies. Had the Greek perception of the Cyprus issue been to reach an immediate settlement by any means, in order to enable the policy-makers of Greece to focus on other areas of her external affairs, the will of the Cyprus people for independence would certainly be ignored. Moreover, the support that Cyprus enjoyed from other non-aligned states was definitely not sufficient to crown her efforts with success, despite the fact that the Soviet Union appeared to support her cause as well, though for different reasons. In other words, Cyprus relied heavily on Greece for a just solution to her problems, but the attention of the latter was already drawn upon other more essential matters. At this point it is important to note an incident that could certainly be interpreted as lack of interest from the Greek side towards Cyprus’ tragedy. According to a memorandum of Archbishop Iakovos, after a meeting with Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger on 10 October 1974, Mavros and Karamanlis were reluctant to negotiate with the US leadership the possibility of Turkish concessions over Cyprus, since they feared that they would then be labelled as ‘friends of the US’, which could subsequently result to their parties’ defeat in the forthcoming elections. The validity of this evidence is undisputed and proves that Cyprus was not of primary importance to the Greek government. Over the years to come, it became apparent that the Cyprus issue was doomed to oblivion, since it lacked support by any side. Despite Cyprus’ non-aligned policy, the distinctive strategic interests of the US in the region, Greece’s indifference as well as Turkey’s intransigence towards the issue, it is indisputable that the UN prospects for settling the Cyprus issue effectively and in a just manner were seriously diminished. Due to a number of difficulties such as the lack of military capabilities and the successive objections of the US to the majority of its resolutions, with regard to the Greek-Turkish disputes, the UN became identified as an incompetent organisation. Apart from issuing numerous resolutions that concerned the termination of hostilities between Greece and Turkey and the future of Cyprus, the UN did not contribute to the settling of the Greek-Turkish rivalry. As with the ICJ, the UN was expected to bring about stability, peace and order by pressing the sides in conflict to reach a solution over the different issues of dis-

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pute. The least it could have produced would be to draw the attention of the international community over the conflict that had emerged between the three eastern Mediterranean states and, thus, increase the pressure exerted on them in an attempt to reduce the tension in the area. Instead, the only states interested in the conflict were those already involved in it, including the two superpowers. With the EEC being disappointingly ineffective, NATO appearing indifferent to all matters of dispute and the interest of the two superpowers limited to only safeguarding their objectives in the region, one could argue with almost every certainty that the potential of an ‘international community intervention’ had already been exhausted. Likewise, the possibility of settling the Cyprus issue faded away, since the governments in Athens, Ankara and Nicosia were unlikely to come to terms with each other. Moreover, the fact that the UN itself urged Greece and Turkey to appeal to the ICJ was a clear sign of deficiency that generated further confusion among the disputing parties. Therefore, Greek foreign policy was not destined to meet with success, her troublesome relations with Turkey did not improve and Cyprus was no longer the apple of discord, but merely a bête noire. Conclusion Turkey’s concerns over the Aegean issues and the Cyprus dispute were based on the possibility of her geopolitical isolation with all the political, economic and military implications that such a matter could raise. Assuming that Greece were to increase her territorial waters to 12 nm and the airspace respectively and that the Republic of Cyprus would also remain an independent and unitary state under a pre-dominant Greek-Cypriot administration would have had severe repercussions for Turkey from every aspect. Therefore, the Aegean and Cyprus issues are largely interrelated and must be examined concurrently. Considering Greece’s dominant position in the Aegean and her apparent reluctance to become deeply involved in the Cyprus issue, Turkey’s intransigence, particularly, over the latter matter of dispute appears reasonable. One could argue that, to Turkey, Cyprus was


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nothing but a strong negotiating card, which could force the Greek government to make concessions over the Aegean. The fact that both sides were more interested in ensuring territorial control in the Aegean, eventually leading them to negotiations under the auspices of international organisations such as the UN and the ICJ, proves that Cyprus was not regarded as a primary issue that needed immediate settlement. On the contrary, it seems that the interest of Greece was for Cyprus not to overshadow her foreign policy goals, in particular, her potential membership in the EEC, whereas Turkey’s interest was to cherish the illusion that she aimed at a just solution for the Cypriot people, although the negotiations between the two Cypriot communities were never likely to bear fruit. That said, any serious attempts to resolve the Cyprus issue were soon downgraded and yielded to the significance of the Aegean dispute. As already stated, any expansion of Greece’s territorial waters and airspace would certainly limit Turkey’s access to the Mediterranean. In addition, the fortification of the Greek islands would strengthen Greece’s defence and enhance her military capabilities, thus affecting the strategic interests of Ankara in the region. These facts, when coupled with the existence of oil resources in northern Aegean, could prove instrumental in reversing the roles of Greece and Turkey within the alliance to the advantage of the former. Taking into account that Turkey was suffering an arms embargo, as well as experiencing criticisms from the international community regarding the issue of human rights’ violations in the Turkish mainland and the occupation of Cyprus, any gain on strategic significance by Greece would disappoint Ankara’s expectations for regional supremacy. Once again, this could be an interpretation of Turkey’s intransigence as a whole, towards her matters of dispute with Greece. For the very same reasons, it is also possible to justify the alliance’s relative indifference. Certainly, the interest of the West was not to disturb the military balance between Greece and Turkey and their diplomatic relations, particularly at times of tension. Any interference of the Western alliance could have been misunderstood by either side and perceived as a bias towards the other. Therefore, despite the obvious concerns that the alliance might have had over

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the Aegean issue, a certain degree of impartiality was required by the West to preserve its interests. Still, the alliance’s indifference cannot really be regarded as a positive contribution. Instead, Greece and Turkey interpreted the West’s stance as apathy and decided to proceed and press for the fulfilment of their territorial claims at the expense of one another, no matter how irrational their demands were. Having said that, it is not clear whether the alliance would maintain the apathetic attitude revealed during the invasion of Cyprus, or decide to interfere, were Greece and Turkey to become engaged in a military confrontation. Whatever the alliance’s response, however, the cohesion of NATO’s Southern Flank would be in jeopardy, since, in the event of a Greek-Turkish war, and although this matter should have been treated as an internal problem for the West to resolve, Moscow’s response would remain unpredictable. Still, neither the UN, nor the ICJ should be relieved from the obligation to cautiously examine the Aegean and Cyprus disputes in view of the consequences that a Greek-Turkish war would have to the peace and stability in the region. Serious activity by either of the two international organisations, if not their mutual co-operation, could prove sufficient to the de-escalation of the tension between Greece and Turkey and for the attainment of a settlement. However, it is important to note that the issuing of a resolution would certainly not guarantee the settlement of the aforementioned disputes. Rather, what seems to be of great significance is the actual implementation of the respective resolutions, which at the time appeared quite unlikely to occur given the number of resolutions that were signed by the conflicting parties but never enforced. Therefore, it would be naïve to suggest that had either the UN or the ICJ managed to deliver a decision regarding the Aegean and Cyprus issues, Greece and Turkey would have committed themselves to putting it into practice. Instead, it would be necessary, once the decision was conceived, for the international community, or at least the Western alliance, to exert pressure on both sides and, subsequently, force them to comply. Only then, might a viable settlement have been reached that would normalise Greek-Turkish relations and restore the cohesion of NATO’s Southern Flank.


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Considering Greece and Turkey’s reluctance towards the Cyprus issue, the alliance’s indifference to the Greek-Turkish disputes, as well as the inability of both the UN and the ICJ to effectively deal with such issues, it is no surprise that the two Mediterranean states never relished a period of peacefulness. It now becomes clear that were Greece and Turkey to improve their troublesome relations, the active involvement of the international community would be of considerable significance.

7 Conclusion

This study has aimed to challenge the significance of foreign intervention in the formation of Greece’s foreign policy, and to examine the subsequent theories on the rationale for her disengagement from the Western alliance. We began with an analysis of Foreign Policy theory, as it was deemed crucial to further discussion to classify Greece within a certain category of states, concluding that it should be regarded as a small power, with all the relevant implications. We then proceeded to an assessment of the historical period that led up to the Nea Dimokratia era, which enabled us to look at foreign intervention from the time of the Greek Civil War until the imposition of the dictatorship, as well as to examine the factors responsible for domestic instability in Greece. We examined Greece’s relations with the United States and NATO and assessed the impact on her external affairs of her bid for EEC membership. We also examined the matters of dispute between Greece and Turkey and Greek attempts to attain a just and peaceful resolution through appeals to international organisations, namely, the United Nations and the International Court of Justice. Our analysis of Greece as a small power explains that it lacked the capabilities necessary to ensure fulfilment of its foreign policy objectives. It is possible to argue, therefore, that the fact that all the relevant external actors were highly powerful states—in political, economic and military terms—accounts for the degree of pressure exerted on the formation of Greek foreign policy. Likewise, it is

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possible to argue that Turkey was in an advantageous position visà-vis the Greek state, as far as the prevailing matters of dispute are concerned, since the former was a medium power—often ascribed the status of a peripheral power—and thus capable of affecting regional matters. Subsequently, it is now clear that the interrelationship among all pertinent actors was a peculiar one—despite Greece’s membership in NATO and the EEC, her close ties with the United States and her alliance with Turkey—due to the differentiated geopolitical interests of all relevant parties. The Greek Civil War encouraged the United States—in line with the tenets of the Truman Doctrine—to support the conservative government in Athens, to ensure that power would not fall into communist hands. Although the Civil War is not a subject of our examination, nevertheless it is an essential part of Modern Greek history that cannot be ignored. This is because, with the end of the internal strife in Greece between the legitimate conservative government and the communist party, the bitter memories of the majority of the Greek people soon came to define the political orientation of the country. The ideological conflict between democracy and communism, which resulted from a ruthless fratricidal war at a time when Greece was still suffering from the consequences of the Second World War, introduced an assortment of Greek institutions to an unparalleled antipathy towards communism, even before the Cold War dominated global affairs. As a result, the military and financial aid that Greece received from the United States was seen both as an embrace of the country by its new powerful patron and a crucial step to becoming part of the Western, democratic world. Once the communists in Greece were defeated, the mission of the United States changed from that of securing democracy to promoting the interests of the government in Washington, a task achieved through installing conservative governments in Athens, as well as through Greek membership in the North Atlantic alliance. Having secured internal stability and democratic rule in Greece, the United States then needed to strengthen the country’s ties with the Western alliance. Greek membership in NATO not only formalised her relations the West, but also contributed to the enlargement of her armed forces. This, in turn, improved European defence by en-

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hancing the defensive positions of the alliance as a whole— especially owing to Turkey’s inclusion—in the Eastern Mediterranean region; it also promoted the interests of the United States. The integration of Greece in NATO also resulted in her being firmly positioned under the United States protective umbrella through a new patron-client relationship. Despite the fact that the United States promoted democracy and openly favoured anything but communist rule in Greece, the measures adopted to produce a western-type political environment were certainly not democratic. The intervention of the United States in the national elections that followed the Civil War clearly demonstrated their intention to appoint a government that would promote their foreign policy goals in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as secure internal stability in Greece. This implies however that, on occasion, a party emerged victorious in the elections, and subsequently formed a government, which though legitimate, was not necessarily representative of Greek public opinion due to the peculiarities of the respective electoral methods. The only exception was the period between 1964 and 1974, when the centre-leftist EK party came to power only to be forced to resign by the Monarch and, eventually, replaced—allegedly with the support of the United States—by authoritarian rule. This pattern of government encourages speculation over Greece’s actual political inclination during the post-war period. The successive conservative governments that ruled Greece until 1963 were strongly supported by Washington, with any leftist movements suppressed by the Monarchy, the occasional conservative government and the military. Perhaps the only time when conservative rule was definitely representative of the average Greek voter was in the period that followed the fall of the junta and the restoration of democracy in Greece. It can thus be suggested that the ‘threat of communism’—as employed by the Greek colonels in 1967 to justify the imposition of the dictatorial regime—may not be far from reality, despite the fact that the communist party was banned and its followers forced to expatriate. A strong antipathy towards communism was more evident within military circles—in other words, those that had fought the communist guerrillas during the Civil War. Although the com-

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munist factor was officially absent from the Greek political arena, the various conspiracy theories that existed at the time were sufficient to generate confusion among the Greek public and allow the colonels to prevent yet another electoral victory of Georgios Papandreou’s EK party by imposing their dictatorship. This indicates that the fear of a communist uprising may also have been apparent to the United States and encouraged its attempts to consolidate the democratic institutions of Greece. It remains difficult to challenge the legitimacy of the post-war Greek governments, however, since they all took shape after nationwide elections had been lawfully held. Nevertheless, one could argue that US interference in the domestic affairs of Greece eventually enabled Washington to exploit its position and critically influence Greece’s foreign policy. The first and most prominent Greek foreign policy issue referred to Cyprus and the desire of the Cypriot people for independence. Many in Cyprus also promoted the idea of union with Greece, a goal that was shared and supported by numerous Greek governments. Because Britain’s role in the area was gradually diminishing, particularly after the Suez Canal crisis of 1956, and due to the strategic significance of Cyprus, the Cyprus issue soon attracted the attention of the United States. However the vested interests of Britain, Greece and Turkey made the issue of Cyprus’ independence extremely complex, and made United States intervention difficult because of its relations with all parties concerned. Furthermore, the United States was increasingly concerned about potential Soviet intervention, especially since many Cypriots supported the local communist party. Drastic measures were therefore adopted, to ensure that the conflict would be resolved in a manner beneficial to the Western alliance. There were several possible solutions to the Cyprus issue: the union of Cyprus with Greece alone (enosis); union with Greece and Turkey (double union); partition of the island; and, finally, independence. The union of Cyprus with Greece was soon rejected for a number of reasons. Turkey was the first to object to the ambitious plan, since she would find herself isolated by an enlarged Greek state that would affect both her access to the Mediterranean and Ankara’s ties with the West. Moreover, it was questionable

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whether the domestic situation in Greece would permit her to easily annex the island and in a manner that would not compromise the interests of the alliance. Likewise, the union of Cyprus with Greece and Turkey would not serve the cause of the alliance either, again due to unstable internal conditions in both Greece and Turkey. And since the Greek and Cypriot governments wholly rejected such a plan, the idea was soon abandoned. On the other hand, partition seemed to be more beneficial to the alliance—to Turkey as well, but not to Greece and Cyprus. It also appeared perhaps more feasible, considering that the two mother-states were in a position to significantly influence Cyprus’ internal affairs and exert pressure if necessary. Here, it is important to note that all of the above possible solutions would bring Cyprus, indirectly, into NATO, thus enabling the Western alliance to achieve control over the island and install military sites on its territory. However, all these solutions would also affect the interests of the Soviet Union in the Eastern Mediterranean, and so the Soviet leadership strongly opposed all such plans. Therefore, the only alternative was to declare the island independent, a solution that would be satisfactory both to the Western alliance—because of Britain’s military privileges in Cyprus—and the Soviet government for having prevented the seemingly formalised integration of Cyprus within the Western sphere of influence. Turkey would have been satisfied too, for obvious reasons. The same cannot be argued for Greece and Cyprus, given that independence would not serve the aspirations of those two states. At the same time that Cyprus gained its independence, Greece was concentrating its diplomatic efforts upon achieving association with the EEC. In view of the recent developments over the Cyprus issue, Greece altered her foreign policy priorities and decided to proceed with her integration in the European Community. Hence, when Cyprus’ limited independence became the cause of further internal strife on the island, Greece was incapable of responding effectively. This incapacity stemmed from domestic problems that would soon bring about further political instability, eventually leading to the imposition of the dictatorship. The Greek colonels, lacking any expertise in the field of foreign policy, only succeeded in securing the isolation of the country and the subsequent well-

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known consequences. These included: the deterioration of Greek relations with both the EEC and Cyprus; the disastrous effects of the ‘freezing’ of the Association Agreement; and, later, Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus. The EEC may have been the only external actor to exert pressure on the Greek dictators, but its own members often undermined its efforts because of their concurrent membership in NATO. Therefore, the EEC aim of re-establishing democracy in Greece never succeeded, probably because its views on Greece and in relation to EEC interests did not match those of the United States and NATO. EEC influence gradually declined and was eventually reduced to the issuing of mere statements that condemned the regime in Athens. This seriously impacted on diplomatic relations between Athens and Brussels, so that any hopes for Greece’s swift return to democratic rule simply vanished. The lack of purposeful political pressure on the Greek colonels resulted in the latter strengthening their grip on power, which led them to attempt to fulfil the task of achieving union with Cyprus. Sadly, the colonels underestimated Turkey’s likely response—the invasion that inevitably led to the de facto partition of the island. Maintaining diplomatic relations with the United States and NATO obviously did not deliver any goods either, apart from the military strengthening of the country that ensured, unintentionally or otherwise, the viability of the regime in Athens. Despite the international community’s condemnation of the dictatorship, as well as the seemingly genuine attempts of the EEC to exert pressure on the colonels for the return of Greece to democratic rule, the kind of ambiguity that characterised the role of the United States encouraged the Greek dictators to toughen their position. The superpower status of the United States clearly encouraged the government in Washington to temporarily ignore its principles of democracy and human rights and focus on the preservation of its strategic interests in the region and safeguarding cohesion within the NATO alliance. Even though United States tolerance contributed significantly to the prolonged existence of the regime, nevertheless, the related allegations of United States involvement in the imposition of the dictatorship in Greece lack support from official documentation, and Georgios Papadopoulos’ personal ambition to govern

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Greece tends to be underestimated. Contrary to the ‘conspiracy theories’ that habitually allude to United States involvement, one could suggest that the downfall of democracy resulted from Greece’s domestic instability and the subsequent intervention of its armed forces with the alleged intention to restore order. Following the two Turkish military operations that violated the territorial integrity of Cyprus, both the ‘national unity’ government and its successor, the Nea Dimokratia government, were confronted with the arduous task of dealing with the new realities of political life. The aims of Greek foreign policy were primarily: accession to the EEC; ‘independence’ from the Western alliance; elimination of the Turkish threat. These objectives, subsequently embraced, included such issues as the preservation of Greece’s sovereignty and national integrity, the restoration of diplomatic relations with other states and the consolidation of democracy. Several of these goals were inter-related and their overall success with regard to external affairs was necessary for Greece to enjoy the fruits of her foreign policy. It is noteworthy, however, that Cyprus was not of overwhelming concern to Greece, since the Cyprus issue threatened to jeopardise her interests, for reasons that will be discussed subsequently. The expectations of the Greek government regarding relations with the United States and NATO were clearly ambiguous: on the one hand, Greece aimed at gaining ‘independence’ in her external affairs and making clear her intentions regarding her future within the Western alliance. The government in Athens thus sought to challenge US authority over the military bases on Greek soil and attempted to establish diplomatic relations with the countries of the communist bloc. The main aims of the Nea Dimokratia governments seem to have been focused on: gaining more respect from the United States; enhancing Greece’s significance to the alliance; and indicating that Greece was no longer fully committed to the alliance, for as long as her demands remained unsatisfied. Although it would be possible to argue that these policies demonstrated the will of the respective Greek governments to downgrade the influence of the United States, such an argument would be far from reality.

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While Greek foreign policy aimed at signalling a degree of indifference towards the alliance, the country continued to receive military aid from the United States and would shortly engage in negotiations for her return to NATO. The main reason that the Greek government attempted to exert pressure on the United States over the issue of the military bases in Greece was that, during the period of her absence from the military wing of the alliance, Turkey had been granted operational control of the Aegean. Moreover, the fact that the Greek government never sought to interfere in United States foreign policy regarding settlement of the Cyprus issue, by either pressing Washington to accept the relevant UN resolutions or relating the bases’ matter to it, indicates that Greece was not willing to confront her patron. Even the imposition of the arms embargo on Turkey cannot be fully credited to Greek foreign policy, but to the determination of the US Congress to retain its power over external affairs. Greece aimed only to secure a deal that would jeopardise neither her national interests nor her territorial integrity and sovereignty; hence, it is questionable whether the Greek government truly endeavoured to achieve ‘independence’ from the US sphere of influence, even though further integration in Europe was purported to serve this purpose. Greek membership in the EEC was perceived as a crucial step towards securing democracy and achieving political stability and economic prosperity, while it would also push Turkey out of the limelight as the government in Athens was expected to gradually become more involved in European affairs. The conservative party of Nea Dimokratia shared the belief that European membership would become the backbone of both the country’s domestic and foreign politics, and so end Greece’s diplomatic isolation. However, the socialist and communist parties were doubtful over further Western integration, especially in relation to the Cyprus issue and Turkey’s aggressive policies. Both sides of the Greek political spectrum enjoyed some popular support because although Europe had the potential to improve Greece’s status within the international community, it had yet to prove itself more effective than the United States and NATO. Nevertheless, Greek policy-makers thought that EEC membership would eventually allow them great latitude in

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political manoeuvring, become less dependent on the Western alliance and downgrade Turkey’s role in continental matters. Greece’s main concern in the dispute with Turkey was the preservation of her territorial integrity, notably to ensure stability in the Aegean and to maintain a balance of power. Since the Western alliance had proven ineffective in dealing with this dispute, Greece viewed European Community membership as the only means available to counter-balance Turkey’s aggressive and expansionist behaviour and to diplomatically isolate her from the European continent. To achieve such an aim, Greece had to overcome her submissive attitude towards the West, become more demanding and secure closer relations with her European allies. The fact that the Greek government chose to deflect Turkey’s aggression with a pacific response not only confirms that Greece did not possess the necessary military capabilities to retaliate, but also that Greece was more concerned about the alliance’s response to the whole issue. Given that the government in Athens sought to exert diplomatic pressure on Turkey and reach a lasting peaceful settlement, Europe seemed to be the only alternative, particularly since the Western alliance did not seem willing to press Ankara to negotiate with Athens. However, the Cyprus issue, which had already troubled the Western alliance for nearly twenty years, was soon to resurface and become, once again, the main obstacle to Greece’s foreign policy aims. Greece’s European counterparts were rather hesitant, if not reluctant, to interfere in the Greek-Turkish dispute due to the complex nature of the Cyprus affair. Clearly, the European states feared that their involvement in the dispute would be interpreted as taking sides, thus frustrating one of their two Mediterranean allies. From a European perspective, apparently, impartiality and neutrality were the only avenues available for the resolution of the GreekTurkish conflict. What Greek officials did not fully appreciate, however, was that the states that comprised the EEC were also members of NATO and so would be quite unlikely to disregard the interests of the North Atlantic alliance. Such an attitude was witnessed throughout Greece’s campaign to reach a just solution over the Cyprus issue, and if a similar situation were to arise in the future—again at the expense of Greece’s national interests—it would

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undisputedly prove the Greek socialists and communists’ concerns accurate. Hence, membership in the European Community would not necessarily enable Greece to gain ‘independence’ from the Western alliance or to effectively exert pressure on Turkey. On the contrary, it would enable Greece to maintain and improve her relations with the other NATO members and, as a result, maintain her ties with the alliance as a whole, particularly after her decision to withdraw from NATO. In general, the intentions of the Nea Dimokratia government to gain access to the EEC and retain its membership within NATO clearly demonstrated the need for Greece to preserve her role and position within the Western camp. Despite the fact that Greek policy-makers concentrated their efforts on Greece becoming the tenth member of the Community, there is little substance to the suggestion that participation in the EEC would start the process of achieving ‘independence’. Although the EEC was clearly experiencing considerable economic success and political stability it did not possess the necessary means to disregard US interests and satisfy those of Greece, irrespective of the significance of the latter. Given that the Europeans had openly declared their intention against their involvement in the Greek-Turkish dispute, Greece would not only remain dependent upon the interests of the United States and NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean region, but also lack any effective support from the European Community. Foreign policy ‘independence’ for Greece, therefore, had yet to prove a practical proposition with regard to her conflict with Turkey. Instead, the Greek government soon appreciated the new political realities and, consequently, the Cyprus issue was no longer regarded as a matter of primary importance and was excluded from the foreign policy agenda. The interest of the Greek government in the Cyprus issue was to keep it ‘alive’ only within the framework of the UN and to utilise it as a lever for pressure upon Turkey as occasion served. Athens’ aim was to neutralise the impact of the Cyprus issue on Greece’s relations with Europe and prevent it from becoming a factor that could jeopardise her accession to the European Community. This policy caused not only a lack of support by the Greek government

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for Cyprus, but also the relative neglect of the issue as a whole. Inasmuch as the Cyprus issue could not possibly be settled by UN initiatives alone, instability on Cyprus was prolonged, eventually leading to the de jure partition of the island, which seemed to privately please all sides—apart from the Greek-Cypriots. On the other hand, it could be argued that the complex nature of the issue itself was the main reason that Greece never appeared truly committed to the settlement of the Cyprus dispute; especially given that the dispute remains unresolved to this day. Most probably, any significant commitment would have had serious effects on Greek foreign policy, as the Cyprus issue could easily disorientate Athens from the core issues of its external affairs. This would have been detrimental to the national interests of Greece, despite the fact that Cyprus was supposed to be part of those interests due to her ‘special relationship’ with the former. In other words, Cyprus was an issue that Greek policy-makers simply had to ignore in order to concentrate their efforts on other matters more vital to Greece’s external affairs. Any union between Greece and Cyprus would, therefore, remain an unfulfilled aim, as would the attainment of a just and lasting peaceful settlement. In fact, the Nea Dimokratia governments proved more determined to secure the country’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty by seeking an immediate settlement of the Aegean disputes. Without doubt, the issues of the continental shelf, territorial waters, airspace and fortification became the main concern of Greek policy-makers, who aimed to challenge Turkey’s expansionism. As soon as Turkey appeared reluctant to negotiate with Greece, therefore, Greece appealed to both the United Nations and the International Court of Justice, as well as referencing certain treaties and conventions, in the effort to peacefully resolve the various matters of dispute. However, the response of the two international organisations was as inadequate and ambiguous as the role of the Western alliance in the Greek-Turkish conflict, while the respective treaties and conventions were either incomplete or contradictory, which only further complicated relations between the disputing sides. As a result, these matters remained unresolved de-

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spite the concerted efforts of the Greek state, thus questioning the participation of Greece within the Western alliance. Although our analysis suggests that Greece and Turkey should be referred to as small and medium powers, respectively, their status and power within the international community alter significantly when assessed within a triangular pattern of relationship. In fact, the inter-relationship among Greece, Turkey and any one external actor—thus forming a ‘triangle’—would likely have affected the influence of the two Eastern Mediterranean states on matters of regional scope, depending on the situation and the actor concerned. Likewise, we may then assume that the interaction between different such triangles, involving the states in our examination, would also have affected the status and power of Greece and Turkey. To examine these two hypotheses we will recap Greece’s foreign policy, as we have already examined herein, and then proceed with analysis of the various triangles/relationships. Obviously, there are four pertinent triangles for this analysis: Greece and Turkey on one side and the United States (triangle A), NATO (B), the EEC (C) and the UN (D), respectively, on the other side (see figure below).*

TRIANGLE HYPOTHESIS NATO

A>B Greece < Turkey

US

B

A Greece < Turkey

A>D Greece < Turkey

A>C Greece < Turkey

Greece < Turkey

B>D Greece < Turkey

B>C Greece < Turkey UN

EEC

C Greece > Turkey

C>D Greece > Turkey

D Greece > Turkey

CONCLUSION *

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The direction of the arrows indicates the impact of one triangle upon another, while the bracket sign illustrates the degree of power between (1) Greece and Turkey at any given triangle and (2) any two triangles of Figure 2.

As far as the first two triangles (A and B) are concerned, Turkey appears to have been of greater significance, from a strategic perspective, because of her proximity to the Middle East oil resources and the Soviet Union; thus she enjoyed a more interdependent relationship with NATO and the United States. In contrast, in the other two triangles (C and D), Greece seems to have been in a slightly stronger position. In the case of triangle C, Greece’s candidacy for membership in the Community, along with Turkey’s poor economy and poor human rights record, gave her precedence over Turkey in European affairs. Similarly, Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus and the consequent issues of refugees and the unauthorised maintenance of Turkish troops on the island were significant matters that sustained Greece’s cause within the limits of the UN (triangle D). In the first two cases, the anti-American and anti-NATO feelings of the Greek public, coupled with Greece’s declining strategic significance, resulted in the deterioration of her relations with the United States and NATO. Under these circumstances, Greece’s position within the international system was certainly weakened, allowing Turkey to increase pressure on Athens. Then again, Greece enjoyed more EEC and UN support, thus strengthening her position within the international environment as well as sustaining her attempts to preserve national interests. With regard to the relations of Greece and Turkey with other significant parties of their external environment, it thus appears that both Mediterranean states managed to maintain their status as well as a balanced relationship between themselves. However, the above argument may well prove inaccurate, should the impact of the relations amongst all the triangles to be studied together, considering that all the pertinent actors enjoy different statuses. For instance, the impact of triangle A on triangle B probably resulted in strengthening Turkey’s position in military terms, due to the leading role of the United States within NATO. Similarly, and from a political and diplomatic perspective, Turkey’s status was, yet

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again, strengthened when triangles A and D interacted with one another. Considering that Turkey usually enjoyed either the direct support of the United States, as when the US objected to a number of UN resolutions, or else her indirect support, as when again the US decided to abstain from UN meetings, it becomes apparent that Ankara’s interests remained well secured. However, looking at the inter-relations between triangles A and C, conditions alter significantly. Although the United States still played an influential role in European affairs, mostly due to military ties with EEC members through NATO, the European Community was certainly an independent political entity. This may suggest that Greece’s candidacy for European membership generated support from the European side in favour of the Greek government, particularly when political and financial issues were concerned. Nevertheless, Greece’s international status did not improve dramatically, at least not at the expense of Turkey, but was probably the same as Turkey’s. The interrelationship between triangles B and C follows a similar pattern. Again, both NATO and the EEC were independent and distinct organisations that, however, cooperated to a great degree. This co-operation stemmed from the fact that the two organisations were composed of almost the same member-states—with the notable and highly significant exception of the North American members of NATO—which may suggest that high level interaction between the two was a common phenomenon. Yet due to the diverse interests of the EEC and NATO, Greece and Turkey enjoyed differentiated status within the two organisations, with Greece enjoying more support than Turkey within EEC circles, whereas the opposite occurred within NATO. In contrast, the impact of triangle B on triangle D had wholly different effects. From the alliance’s viewpoint, NATO’s strategic and military interests were more important than the UN’s ideals and principles. Hence, members of the alliance aimed first to serve the interests of NATO, and then those of the international community, which further strengthened Turkey’s position in the Eastern Mediterranean. Finally, the relationship between triangles C and D was quite a peculiar one. Both organisations were known for their devotion to principles like stability, peace, order and human rights; therefore,

CONCLUSION

225

they primarily supported the Greek cause. As a result, the cooperation between the two was most probably expressed by supporting and promoting the interests of Greece. The reason lay, again, with Greece’s application for membership with the EEC and the noble ideals of the Greek government, especially in relation to the Cyprus issue. The above analysis suggests that Turkey enjoyed far more support from her external environment than did Greece. Turkey’s geographical location and military capabilities gave her a power status that was simply beyond Greece’s reach. It thus appears clear that the Western alliance favoured Turkish interests over those of Greece, despite irregularities such as the arms embargo, and despite the occasional efforts of the EEC and the UN to promote Greek interests. Further, Turkey’s status as a medium power cannot be disregarded, especially since it lies at the base of her intransigence over the issues of dispute with Greece. The most interesting issue revealed in the above analysis is the role of the main external actors and their impact on Greek and Turkish foreign affairs. If we attempt to rate these four players, if only hypothetically, the United States would have to be ranked as the dominant power, followed by NATO, the EEC and finally the UN. The US status as a superpower meant that she was the main protagonist within the Western alliance, often defining the form of relations among the other actors in this study. The superpower status of the US also empowered her to conduct her foreign policy with the sole aim of preserving national interests. This means that no significant influence was ever exerted on the United StatesGreek-Turkish triangle. NATO was also in a position to influence the external relations of the two Mediterranean countries, and often compelled them to comply with its values and principles in order to serve the cause of the alliance. More specifically, NATO’s status within the international arena was further heightened when Washington openly supported its leadership. It is also important to note that NATO was important to both Greece and Turkey, at least from a military perspective, as NATO would support their struggle against the spread of communism domestically, and also protect

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them against the external threat of the Soviet Union along with the bordering Warsaw Pact forces. The European Community was probably a less significant actor since, at the time, it was not a fully integrated political and economic entity and thus had relatively little influence over its members. An additional obstacle was that the EEC did not possess its own armed forces; therefore, it remained dependent on the United States and NATO. These limitations do not necessarily suggest that the EEC was ineffective; they did, however, undermine its attempts to influence regional matters, especially the Greek-Turkish disputes. The United Nations, the last and probably least significant actor in the Greek-Turkish dispute, suffered from both ineffectiveness and inefficiency, since it not only lacked political influence and military capabilities, but its members appeared to be less committed to its values and principles. Often bypassed by the two superpowers, if not wholly ignored, the UN was in no position to seriously influence events of interest either to the United States or the Soviet Union, or even any other powerful states and organisations. The fact that various UN resolutions were never applied, although accepted by the majority of the signatory states, substantiates this view. In other words, the impact of the UN on Greece and Turkey was never expected to be detrimental to their national interests or the concerns of the other main actors. Because for the Western alliance Turkey was much more important than Greece, the foreign affairs of the two Mediterranean states were largely controlled by the US. For the same reason, it can be concluded that it was difficult for Greece to preserve her national interests. Therefore, Greece’s persistent efforts to disengage from the Western sphere of influence, notably from the United States and NATO, seem justified enough. Whether Greece’s withdrawal from NATO’s military scheme and her subsequent membership in the EEC were intended to lessen her dependence on the United States and NATO, however, remains doubtful. Although failure to attain an objective says nothing definitive about the intentions of an actor, were disengagement the intention of the Greek government its attempts undoubtedly failed. Instead, Greece continued to receive military aid from the United States and other

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NATO members, and returned to the alliance within a short period of time. Greece thus seems to have remained dependent, at least in military terms, on the United States and NATO. Secondly, Greece’s EEC membership should not be interpreted as ‘disengagement from the Western alliance,’ since both the United States and NATO were highly influential in European matters, as stated above and in earlier chapters as well. NATO and the United States, therefore, remained well-positioned to influence Greece’s national interests, if only through a variety of indirect channels. Finally, as already illustrated in the second chapter, the United States had managed to penetrate Greek domestic affairs by establishing close ties with the Monarch, the military and the intelligence services from the onset of the Civil War up to, presumably, the fall of the dictatorship. During that thirty-year period, the United States probably had access to most political, economic and military sectors in Greece, at least those that were critical to US national interests. That said, it is possible to argue that Washington’s role, with respect to Greek foreign policy, not only remained undiminished, but also became more significant after events in Cyprus and the ensuing Greek-Turkish disputes over the Aegean. Evidence suggests that in the post-war period the United States worked to penetrate Greece’s internal and external affairs in order to preserve US interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. This situation clearly defined the relationship and degree of co-operation between the two states, with the United States enjoying the benefits of her superpower status in a patron-client relationship and Greece being a quite willing partner. Nevertheless, there is no clear indication that the United States government, or its intelligence services, had any role in either the imposition of the dictatorship or the Cyprus invasion. Therefore, it is only possible to speculate over how these events could have served US foreign policy objectives, and imagine a probable scenario that, admittedly, would lack firm substantiation. The various ‘conspiracy theories’ that imply US intervention in both the installation of the military coup and the Cyprus events will remain unsupported contentions until the related documentation is declassified. Such theories may, however, ultimately prove to be not that far from reality. Given the US military pre-

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dominance in the region as well as the weakness of NATO Southern Flank compared to its central front in Europe, it would seem reasonable to assume that Washington would adopt drastic measures to safeguard her interests. Whether this suggests that US interference was very likely remains doubtful, but the fact that her strategic interests were never threatened despite the abolition of democracy in Greece and the possibility of a Greek-Turkish armed confrontation certainly encourages some belief in the established allegations. However, standards of objective empirical research restrict our study to those sources that can contribute to the clear understanding and impartial examination of the subject matter; hence, to hypothesise extensively should be limited. What seems more likely, however, is that Greek foreign policy, since the onset of the Civil War, suffered mainly because of domestic instability. The continuous struggle for power amongst the Monarchy, the government and the Armed Forces dominated Greek politics to the extent where dependence on external powers became essential for the country’s survival. Again, it could be argued that US financial and military aid could have enabled Washington to influence any one of the above three centres of power in ways that would promote its interests. However, it is also possible that events in Greece were unfolding in a way that served US interests, such that any form of excessive interference was rendered unnecessary—in direct contradiction to the main argument of the various ‘conspiracy theories’. As already noted, the Monarchy was probably never seen as an integral part of Greek society, let alone the political environment; the various governments were certainly not representative of the people; and the Armed Forces believed they were saving the country from communism. Thus, all three players could be considered as potential contenders for power, particularly when their interests were threatened. The Crown was always eager to maintain both its absolute power over, and influential role in, Greek political affairs and thus continued to pose a serious threat to all those governments that wished to gain more room for political manoeuvre, as well as to exercise further control over the military. The military, in its turn, saw the need to challenge the power of the king and of the elected governments in an attempt to

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achieve integrity within its own circles and disengagement from the political sphere. The outcome of these rivalries is well known and understanding them is crucial to the arguments advanced herein. The Monarch, twice, forced a Greek Prime Minister to resign, with the second case serving as the long-awaited excuse for the Armed Forces to initiate their premeditated intervention, principally because of the considerable rise of leftist voters in the early 1960s. The reappearance of the ‘communist threat’ coupled with domestic instability gave Georgios Papadopoulos an unexpectedly unique opportunity to satisfy his personal ambition to rule Greece and ‘save’ her from communism. However, instead of ‘saving’ Greece from its external threats, Papadopoulos and his partners only achieved the isolation of the country, with all the consequences that entailed, and the precipitation of additional problems in the arena of foreign policy that eventually led to the Cyprus crisis. If it were to be assumed that these events served the interests of the United States and the cause of the Western alliance, there is no concrete evidence to argue that they were encouraged, or even directed, by the government in Washington. Foreign ‘interference’ would thus come in the form of tolerance, if not indifference, despite the facts that prove United States involvement in Greece’s domestic affairs at the early stages of the Cold War and direct interference in the Cyprus issue from the late 1950s onwards. Greek policy-makers, too, bear a significant degree of responsibility regarding the failure of the Greek foreign policy to satisfy, or at least preserve, the country’s national interests, and perhaps the accusations of national underbidding against Konstantinos Karamanlis are not entirely unfounded. The most intriguing issue that influenced Greek foreign policy at this time was Karamanlis’ persistent efforts to fully integrate Greece into the Western world, a rather ambitious plan designed to counter-balance Turkey’s important role in regional matters. Greece’s diplomatic position vis-à-vis Turkey was quite weak, thus creating the need for external support, but to seek support from the very same states that had already betrayed her over the military coup and the Cyprus invasion would probably not satisfy Greece’s foreign policy aims. On the other

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hand, the alternatives for the Greek government appeared limited enough to restrict its moves within the Western sphere of influence, particularly since engagement with the non-aligned movement did not appeal to Greece, nor did any relationship with the communist bloc. Furthermore, although any form of disengagement from the alliance would appear to satisfy the government in Athens—and public opinion even more—it would lead to severe questioning of Greece’s loyalty and commitment to that alliance. That said, it seems that ‘independence’ was not really the issue for the Karamanlis government, but merely an attempt to exert pressure on the Western alliance. In reality, the foregoing policy of Greece was based firmly on the belief that Greece was an integral part of the West. Such an interpretation is central to the present analysis for it would not only prove the relevant claims for ‘independence’ incorrect, but also justify Karamanlis’ statement that Greece belonged to the West, if not destined for it. However, Karamanlis’ statement is also questionable given that Greece had withdrawn from NATO’s military wing and was pursuing European Community membership in order to counter-balance the influence of the United States. It is thus critical to this study to establish the precise meaning of the Greek leader’s declaration that ‘We [Greece] belong[ed] to the West.’ One possible explanation is that the Greek government sought economic prosperity and political stability, which could only be attained through the capitalist model found in the Western democratic societies. Moreover, Greece was in need of external protection in order to halt Turkey’s expansionist policies. For this reason, the ‘West’ would contemplate re-entry into the Western alliance, as well as accession to the European Community. Instead of arguing against ‘foreign intervention’, therefore, the government in Athens should appear willing to ‘westernise’ the various sectors of the Greek society—if these hypotheses were correct. Hence, ‘independence’ would yet again remain a rather ambitious vision, and one that was impossible to realise, particularly since such ‘westernisation’ would allow Western states to penetrate all sectors of Greek society and influence her internal and external affairs. As a result, the whole concept of ‘We belong to the West’ does not seem to encourage any form of ‘inde-

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pendence’, but allows us to speculate over Greece’s role in regional matters and her subsequent foreign policy aims with regard to Turkey’s policies. Furthermore, the fact that both NATO and the EEC openly declared their impartiality to the Greek-Turkish disputes implies anything but foreign intervention. Hence, given Greece’s small power status, her need to align with a powerful patron and the uncertainty that characterised her internal affairs, the Greek state’s dependence on the United States and the Western alliance was inevitable. Such dependence should not necessarily be interpreted as foreign interference for reasons already outlined above and in previous chapters. On the contrary, it suggests that the issue of ‘independence’ clearly lacks substance, at least during the early stage of the political changeover, and, in essence, before the completion of Greece’s accession to the European Community. Greece was not in a position, at the time, to either rely on her own capabilities or seek a different identity within the international community. For obvious reasons, Greece had to remain in the Western sphere of influence in order to preserve her territorial integrity and sovereignty as well as to consolidate democracy. Such interests were of prime concern to Greece ever since the outbreak of the Civil War, and remained significant throughout the Cold War period, predominantly due to the rivalry between the two superpowers and her strategic location. However, Greece was part of an alliance and as already suggested membership entails commitment, which means certain interests would have to be sacrificed for the cause of the latter. Likewise, membership concerns cooperation among the states that constitute the alliance; thus, dependence of one state, especially a small power like Greece, upon its allies should be regarded as a natural state of affairs and not a situation that undermines the interests of the weaker party. We can therefore suggest that all members of the alliance, and even the alliance as a whole, could directly affect the foreign policy of a state, but we cannot assume that they could actually dictate it. Whether dependence can be interpreted as, or take the form of, foreign interference is certainly arguable. Based on the available documents, we argue that in the case of Greece, foreign interference and dependence seem to have been limited and in certain instances justifi-

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able, although we remind the reader that there exist a significant number of still-classified documents that may alter the foregoing analysis.

Notes

Chapter Two 1 Jones, Roy, Analysing foreign policy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), pp.11 2 Reid, George, The impact of very small size on the international behaviour of microstates (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1974), pp.15 3 Papadakis, Maria and Harvey Starr, ‘Opportunity, willingness and small states: the relationship between environment and foreign policy’ in Hermann, Charles, Charles Kegley Jr. and James Rosenau, New directions in the study of foreign policy (London: Harper Collins Academic, 1987), pp.419 4 Neumann, Iver and Sieglinde Gstöll, ‘Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World? Small States in International Relations’ Centre for Small State Studies Working Paper (2004), pp.3 5 Neumann and Gstöll: Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World?, pp.7-12 6 Neumann and Gstöll: Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World?, pp.18-19 7 Goetschel, Laurent, ‘Small States and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU: A Comparative Analysis’ Working Paper No.14, National Research Program “Foundations and Possibilities of Swiss Foreign Policy” (Berne, May 2000), p.6 8 Goetschel: Small States and the Common Foreign and Security Policy, pp.1 9 Elman, Miriam, ‘The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in Its Own Backyard’ British Journal of Political Science vol.25 (1995), pp.176 10 Wiberg, Hakan, ‘The Security of Small Nations: Challenges and Defences’ Journal of Peace Research vol.24, no.4 (1987), pp.339 11 Handel, Michael, Weak states in the international system (London: Frank Cass, 1981), pp.11 12 Mathisen, Trygve, The functions of small states in the strategies of great powers (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1971), pp.17 13 Vital, David, The inequality of states (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), pp.184

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14 Zahariadis, Nikolaos, ‘Nationalism and Small-State Foreign Policy: The Greek Response to the Macedonian Issue’ Political Science Quarterly vol.109, no.4 (1994), pp.653 15 Zahariadis: Nationalism and Small-State, pp. 648 Chapter Three 1 These military regimes were installed in 1909, 1922, 1925, 1935 and 1936 2 Two Balkan Wars (1912 and 1913), the First World War (1914–1918), the Asia Minor catastrophe (1919–1922), the Second World War (1940–1944) and the Greek Civil War (1946–1949) 3 Elections were held in 1946, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1956, 1958, 1961, 1963 and 1964 4 Wittneer, Larabee, American Intervention in Greece 1943-1949 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp.105 5 Wittner: American Intervention, pp.116 6 Leader of the Liberal Party (Komma Phileleftheron), the only party of the Centre with a significant share of the votes (14 per cent) 7 Legg, Keith, Politics in modern Greece (Stanford University Press, 1969), pp.63-4 8 Iatrides, John, ‘American Attitudes Toward the Political System of Postwar Greece’ in Couloumbis, Theodore and John Iatrides (eds), Greek-American Relations: A Critical review (New York: Athens Printing Company, 1980), pp.67 9 Wittner: American Intervention, pp.290-1 10 Campbell, John and Philip Sherrard, Modern Greece (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp.265 11 Clogg, Richard, Parties and Elections in Greece (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1987), pp.42 12 Campbell and Sherrard: Modern Greece, pp.264 13 Clogg: Parties and Elections in Greece, pp.42-3 14 Campbell and Sherrard: Modern Greece, pp.249 15 Legg: Politics in modern Greece, pp.215 16 Legg: Politics in modern Greece, pp.192-3 17 Legg: Politics in modern Greece, pp.192 18 Legg: Politics in modern Greece, pp.193 19 Legg: Politics in modern Greece, pp.215 20 Finer, Samuel E., The Man on Horseback (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988), pp.50 21 Finer: The Man on Horseback, pp.250 22 Poulantzas, Nicos, The crisis of dictatorships (London: NLB, 1976), pp.34 23 Papadopoulos, Georgios, To pistevo mas (Our belief) (Athens, 1968-1972), vol.4, pp.134 24 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Controlling the Damage: U.S. Policy Options for Greece, report of a Study Mission to Greece January 18 to 21, 1974, Pursuant to H. Res. 267 (Library of Congress, February 1974), pp.1 25 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Controlling the Damage, pp.13 26 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Controlling the Damage, pp.15

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27 Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, Department of State, Central Files, POL GREECE, May, 5, 1967, in US Department of State, Volume XVI Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 1964-1968 Foreign Relations of the United States (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 2000) 28 The manifesto of IDEA [Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon (Holy Bond of Greek Officers–IDEA)] stated that its members were strongly opposed to the corruption of the Greek political system and claimed that only a dictatorship could shield Greece from her external and internal threats. 29 Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, Department of State, Central Files, POL GREECE, May, 5, 1967, in US Department of State, Volume XVI Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 1964-1968 Foreign Relations of the United States (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 2000) 30 Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 GREECE, April, 23, 1967, in US Department of State, Volume XVI Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 1964-1968 Foreign Relations of the United States (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 2000) 31 Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 GREECE, April, 21, 1967, in US Department of State, Volume XVI Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 1964-1968 Foreign Relations of the United States (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 2000) 32 Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President, Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President – Walt Rostow, Vol. 35, July, 21, 1967, in US Department of State, Volume XVI Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 19641968 Foreign Relations of the United States (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 2000) 33 Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 GREECE-US, March, 27, 1968, in US Department of State, Volume XVI Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 1964-1968 Foreign Relations of the United States (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 2000) 34 Memorandum of Conversations, Department of State, Central Files, POL GREECE-US, April 22, 1968, in US Department of State, Volume XVI Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 1964-1968 Foreign Relations of the United States (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 2000) 35 Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-5 GREECE, September, 19, 1968, in US Department of State, Volume XVI Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 1964-1968 Foreign Relations of the United States (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 2000) 36 Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Johnson, Johnson Library, National Security File, Country

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37

38 39 40 41 42 43 44

45 46 47 48 49 50 51

52

53

54

GREECE AND THE AMERICAN EMBRACE File, Greece, Vol. 4, October 8, 1968, in US Department of State, Volume XVI Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 1964-1968 Foreign Relations of the United States (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 2000) Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 GREECE, March 24, 1967, in US Department of State, Volume XVI Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 1964-1968 Foreign Relations of the United States (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 2000) O’ Malley, Brendan and Ian Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999), pp.1 (also in British Cabinet minutes C54 245, 21.7.54) O’Malley and Craig: The Cyprus Conspiracy, pp.12 O’Malley and Craig: The Cyprus Conspiracy, pp.12 O’Malley and Craig: The Cyprus Conspiracy, pp.49 Makarios had previously been arrested and exiled to Seychelles Consisting of the treaties of Alliance, Establishment and Guarantee Department of State, INR–NIE Files, in US Department of State, Volume X E. Europe; Soviet Union; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 1958-1960 Foreign Relations of the United States (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 1993) O’Malley and Craig: The Cyprus Conspiracy, pp.78 O’Malley and Craig: The Cyprus Conspiracy, pp.82 O’Malley and Craig: The Cyprus Conspiracy, pp.80-4 (also in British Colonial Office papers CO926/977) O’Malley and Craig: The Cyprus Conspiracy, pp.85 The Zurich Agreement, Agreement between Konstantinos Karamanlis and Adnan Menderes O’Malley and Craig: The Cyprus Conspiracy, pp.75 Department of State, NSC 6003, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63D 351, NSC 6003 Series, par.10, in US Department of State, Volume X E. Europe; Soviet Union; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 1958-1960 Foreign Relations of the United States (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 1993) Department of State, NSC 6003, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63D 351, NSC 6003 Series, par.12, in US Department of State, Volume X E. Europe; Soviet Union; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 1958-1960 Foreign Relations of the United States (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 1993) Department of State, NSC 6003, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63D 351, NSC 6003 Series, par.31, in US Department of State, Volume X E. Europe; Soviet Union; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 1958-1960 Foreign Relations of the United States (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 1993) Department of State, NSC 6003, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63D 351, NSC 6003 Series, par.39, in US Department of State, Volume X E. Europe; Soviet Union; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 1958-1960 Foreign Relations of the United States (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 1993)

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55 Department of State, NSC 6003, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63D 351, NSC 6003 Series, par.40, in US Department of State, Volume X E. Europe; Soviet Union; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 1958-1960 Foreign Relations of the United States (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 1993) 56 Department of State, NSC 6003, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63D 351, NSC 6003 Series, par.41, 42, 43, in US Department of State, Volume X E. Europe; Soviet Union; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 1958-1960 Foreign Relations of the United States (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 1993) 57 Department of State, NSC 6003, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63D 351, NSC 6003 Series, par.45, in US Department of State, Volume X E. Europe; Soviet Union; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, 1958-1960 Foreign Relations of the United States (United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 1993) 58 O’Malley and Craig: The Cyprus Conspiracy, pp.91 59 The Acheson Plan was considered as an attempt to unify Cyprus with Greece, so as to integrate the island into the western alliance, but ceded 4.1 per cent of Cyprus’ territory (the area of Karpasia) to Turkey. The plan was accepted by Turkey’s government, but rejected by Georgios Papandreou. 60 O’Malley and Craig: The Cyprus Conspiracy, pp.117 61 O’Malley and Craig: The Cyprus Conspiracy, pp.118 62 O’Malley and Craig: The Cyprus Conspiracy, pp.119 Chapter Four 1 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Controlling the Damage: U.S. Policy Options for Greece, report of a Study Mission to Greece January 18 to 21, 1974, Pursuant to H. Res. 267 (Library of Congress, February 1974), pp.12 2 95th Congress, 1st Session, United States Military Installations and Objectives in the Mediterranean, Report prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on International Relations, by the Foreign Affairs and National Defence Division, Congressional Research Service (Library of Congress, 27 March 1977) 3 95th Congress, 2nd Session, The Military Aspects of Banning Arms Aid to Turkey, Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, (United States Senate, 28 June 1978) 4 Those bases were located at: Hellenikon (functioning as Headquarters); the Suda Bay complex (equipped to accommodate the entire 6th Fleet); Iraklion (responsible for monitoring communications from Libya and the Middle East); Nea Makri (served as a communications station in Athens); and Elefsina (accommodated the 6th Fleet from 1972 to 1974, but was shut in 1975 by the first post-junta Greek government. (Valinakis (ed.), 1989, pp.11-2) 5 95th Congress, 2nd Session: The Military Aspects of Banning Arms Aid to Turkey 6 National Security Study Memorandum 227, July 16, 1975 7 O’ Malley, Brendan and Ian Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999), pp.139 8 Karamanlis’ Foundation, Archive: Events and Texts, vol.7 (Athens, 1996), pp.221

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9 Treaty of Alliance, Article 2, in J. Joseph, Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics (London: Macmillan Press, 1997) 10 Mirbagheri, Farid, Cyprus and International Peacemaking (London: Hurst and Company, 1998), pp.102-3 11 Richter, Heinz, ‘The Greek-Turkish Conflict’ in Sarafis, Marion and Martin Eve, Background to contemporary Greece (London: Merlin Press, 1990), pp.324 12 Kourvetaris, George and Betty Dobratz, A profile of modern Greece: In search of identity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp.104 13 117th Congress, 1st Session, U.S. Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean: Managing the Greece, Turkey, Cyprus Triangle, Hearing before the subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on International relations (House of Representatives, 13 June 2001), pp.15-6 14 117th Congress, 1st Session: U.S. Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, pp.15-6 15 94th Congress, 1st Session, Suspension of Prohibitions Against Military Assistance to Turkey, Hearing before the Committee on International Relations (House of Representatives, 10 July 1975), p.37 16 Karamanlis’ Foundation, Archive: Events and Texts, vol.8 (Athens, 1996), pp.37 17 Woodhouse, Christopher, E anodos ke e ptosi ton sintagmatarhon (The rise and fall of the colonels) (Athens: Elliniki Evroekdotiki, 1985), pp. 213 18 Stern, Laurence, The Wrong Horse (New York: Times Books, 1977), pp.163 19 Delnoie, Lois, ‘Turkey in NATO: An Ambivalent Ally,’ Occasional Paper 58 (Kingston, Ontario: Centre for International Relations, Queen’s University, 2005), pp.4 20 Hackett, Clifford, ‘Ethnic Politics in Congress: The Turkish Embargo Experience’ in Said, Abdul Aziz (ed.), Ethnicity and US Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp.27 21 National Security Decision Memorandum 267, 1974 22 94th Congress, 1st Session, Suspension of Prohibitions Against Military Assistance to Turkey, Hearing before the Committee on International Relations (House of Representatives, 10 July 1975), p.45 23 94th Congress, H.RES.553, Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the ban on military assistance to Turkey should not be lifted until such time as Turkish forces are withdrawn from Cyprus and there is a negotiated settlement in Cyprus (Library of Congress, 18 June 1975) 24 94th Congress, S.2230 [Public Law94-104 (6/10/1975)], A bill to authorise appropriations for the Board of International Broadcasting for fiscal year 1976; and to promote improved relations between the United States, Greece and Turkey, to assist in the solution of the refugee problem on Cyprus, and to otherwise strengthen the North Atlantic Alliance (Library of Congress, 30 July 1975) 25 95th Congress, S.UP.AMDT.1492, Amends: S.3075, Amends Senate Unprinted Amendment 1491 to amend the Foreign Assistance of 1961 (Library of Congress, 25 July 1978) 26 117th Congress, 1st Session, U.S. Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, pp.14-6 27 117th Congress, 1st Session, U.S. Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, pp.14-6

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28 The installations would have to be transferred elsewhere; the 6th Fleet would no longer be accommodated in Greek waters; Turkey would become isolated; the early warning system would cease to operate on Greek soil; the Soviet fleet could gain access to the Mediterranean; the Bosporus straits would become hard to defend; the US would no longer be in a position to support either Israel or the Middle East oil resources; and NATO would no longer control the air corridors above the Greek mainland and territorial waters. 29 (a) Request that the Alliance exert pressure on Turkey to withdraw her occupation forces from Cyprus, while also stipulating that Greece would revise her position within NATO were the situation to remain unaltered; (b) exploit the US bases’ uncertain status so as to oblige the government in Washington to force the Turkish leadership to comply with Greece’s demands; (c) issue a political statement declaring the ‘freezing’ of certain NATO functions in Greece, while also threatening to apply restricting measures or even shut the US bases. (Valinakis, 1987, p.354-5) 30 Greece favoured a settlement that reflected the status quo in the Aegean Sea prior to her withdrawal from NATO. The same plan also insisted on Greece committing fewer forces to NATO, thus lessening her dependence. (Valinakis, 1987, p.121) 31 Karamanlis’ Foundation, Archive: Events and Texts, vol.11 (Athens, 1996), pp.201-3 32 This ratio suggested that military aid to Greece should be confined to 70 per cent of the total military supplies to Turkey. (Stearns, 1992, p.57) 33 National Security Decision Memorandum 291, April 8, 1975 34 Valinakis, Ioannis, Exoteriki Politiki ke Ethniki Amina 1974-1987 (Foreign Policy and National Defence 1974-1987) (Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 1987), pp.239 [for the full text see Department of State press Release on ‘Principles to Guide Future United States-Greek Defence Co-operation (April 15, 1976)] 35 The 7:10 came from comparing total US military aid to Greece and Turkey from 1946 to 1976. (Stearns, Monteagle, Periplokes Simmahies (Intricate Alliances), Athens: Pontiki, 1992, pp.61) 36 For a complete account of this DECA see 96th Congress, 2nd Session, United States Defence and Economic Co-operation Agreement, 1980, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, (US House of Representatives, 7 May 1980) 37 Notice To Airmen 38 Clogg, Richard, Greece in the 1980’s (London: MacMillan Press, 1983), pp.140 39 Greek Parliament, Greek Parliamentary Proceedings, 1974-1981 (Athens), Parliamentary Proceedings, 1980, p.740 40 This perception was based on the fact that had those bases not been accommodated in Greece they would then have to be transferred to neighbouring Turkey. Moreover, the bases cemented the position of Greece within the western alliance, served defensive purposes and attracted both military and economic benefits. At the same time, it was made clear that Greece would not have to be involved in any regional conflict nor take part in any US military in-

240


tervention in the Middle East. For this reason, it was difficult for Greece to negotiate and preserve her interests in 1980, given the tension in the Persian Gulf and in south-west Asia. More precisely, the two aforementioned incidents underlined Turkey’s strategic significance, which was further highlighted since the imposition of a military the coup that was clearly more pro-NATO. (Valinakis: Exoteriki Politiki ke Ethniki Amina 1974-1987 (Foreign Policy and National Defence 1974-1987), pp.265) 41 Greek Parliament: Parliamentary Proceedings, 1976, p.369 (also in Parliamentary Proceedings, 1978, p.1790-1 and in Stearns: Intricate Alliances, pp.28 42 (a) Promote the dynamics of the status quo; (b) curb US influence in the Arab world; (c) lessen the significance of US relations with Israel; (d) retain access to the Middle East oil reserves; (e) deny support to the US armed forced in Africa; (f) render NATO’s political and military infrastructure incompetent of taking action in times of crises and war. (Etzold, Thomas, ‘The Soviet Union in the Mediterranean’ in Kaplan, Lawrence S., Robert W.W. Clawson and Raimondo Luraghi (eds.), NATO and the Mediterranean (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985), pp.31-7 43 Joseph, Joseph, Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), pp.73 Chapter Five 1 Feld provides a detailed account of the Greek and Turkish association agreements with EEC [Feld, Werner, ‘The Association Agreements of the European Communities: A Comparative Analysis’ International Organisation vol.19, issue 2 (Spring 1965), pp. 223-249] 2 Verney, Sussanah, ‘Greece and the European Community’ in Featherstone, Kevin and Dimitris Katsoudas, Political change in Greece (London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp.256 3 Weil, George, A Foreign Policy for Europe? (Bruges: College of Europe, 1970), pp.72 4 Weil: A Foreign Policy, pp.73 5 Siotis, Jean, ‘Characteristics and motives for entry’ in Gorman, Lyn and MarjaLiisa Kiljunen (eds.), The Enlargement of the European Community: Case-Studies of Greece, Portugal and Spain (London: Macmillan Press, 1983), pp.59 6 Coufoudakis, Van, ‘The European Economic Community and the ‘freezing’ of the Greek association 1967-1974’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol.16 (1977), pp.116 7 Coufoudakis mentions a Schiller as President of the European Commission; nevertheless, our findings confirm that Jean Rey served in that capacity from 1967 to 1970. 8 Coufoudakis: The European Economic Community, pp.119 9 Coufoudakis: The European Economic Community, pp.120 10 For a detailed account of the violations of the European Convention of Human Rights see Buergenthal, Thomas, ‘Proceedings Against Greece under the

NOTES

11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18 19

20 21 22 23 24 25

26 27 28

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European Convention of Human Rights’ American Journal of International Law vol.62, issue 2 (April 1968) Coufoudakis mentions a Vals as Prime Minister of Belgium; however, our findings confirm that Gaston Eyskens was in office during that term. Yannopoulos, George, Greece and the European Communities: The First Decade of a Troubled Association (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1975), pp.23 Yannopoulos: Greece and the European Communities, pp.23 Coufoudakis: The European Economic Community, pp.129 Coufoudakis: The European Economic Community, pp.131 Yannopoulos: Greece and the European Communities, pp.5 The importance of EEC membership to Greece is clearly illustrated in Contogeorgis’ speech, during a symposium organised by the College of Europe, concerning the Community’s further enlargement. (Contogeorgis, George, ‘The Greek view of the community and Greece’s approach to membership’ in Wallace, William and Inneke Herreman (eds.), A Community of Twelve? The Impact of Further Enlargement on the European Communities (Bruges: De Temple, 1978), pp.22-31 Verney: ‘Greece and the European Community’ in Featherstone, Kevin and Dimitris Katsoudas, Political change in Greece (London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp.p.259 Pesmazoglu was appointed by the Greek government for the negotiations with the EEC regarding association and later headed “the Greek delegation in the Mixed Parliamentary Commission on Greece and the European Community.” (Pesmazoglu, Ioannis, ‘Greece’s proposed accession to the EEC’ The World Today vol.32 (1976), pp.142 Pesmazoglu: Greece’s proposed accession to the EEC, pp.150 Tsoukalis, Loukas, The European Community and its Mediterranean Enlargement (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981b), pp.108 Tsalicoglou, Iacovos, Negotiating for entry (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995), pp.30 Commission Bulletin of European Community, Opinion on Greek application for membership, transmitted to the council by the Commission on 29th January 1976, no.2, Supplement, 1976, pp.9 Neale, Frank, ‘Greece - Next member of the Community’ The Business Economist vol.9, no.1 (1977), pp.15-16 Coufoudakis, Van, ‘Greek Foreign Policy 1945-1985: Seeking Independence in an Interdependent World – Problems and Prospects’ in Featherstone, Kevin and Dimitris Katsoudas, Political change in Greece (London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp.236-7 Kohlhase, Norbert, ‘The Greco-Turkish conflict from a European Community perspective’ The World Today vol.37, no.4 (April 1981), pp.133 Manisali, Erol, ‘Turkish-EEC Relations: A Review of Mutual Responsibilities’ Dis Politika vol.6, no.3-4 (1977), pp.70 Manisali: Turkish-EEC Relations, pp.71

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29 Tsardanidis, Charalambos, ‘The EEC-Cyprus Association Agreement: Ten years of a troubled relationship 1973-1983’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol.XXII, no.4 (June 1984b), pp.362 30 Tsardanidis, Charalambos, The politics of the EEC-Cyprus Association Agreement 1972-1982 (Nicosia, 1988a), p.139-41 31 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Controlling the Damage: U.S. Policy Options for Greece, report of a Study Mission to Greece January 18 to 21, 1974, Pursuant to H. Res. 267 (Library of Congress, February 1974), pp.6 Chapter Six 1 For an historical account of the three-mile limit see Kent, Hunz, ‘The historical origins of the three-mile limit’ American Journal of International Law, vol.48 (1954) 2 Charney, Jonathan, ‘Progress in International Maritime Boundary Delimitation Law’ The American Journal of International Law vol.88, no.2 (1994b), pp.227 3 Charney: Progress in International Maritime, pp.244-5 4 Nelson, L. D. M., ‘The Roles of Equity in the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries’ The American Journal of International Law vol.84, no.4 (1990), pp.838 5 Nelson: The Roles of Equity, pp.839-41 6 Nelson: The Roles of Equity, pp.846 7 For an extensive analysis of the legal status of islands see Bowett, Derek, The legal regime of islands in international law (New York: Oceana, 1979) 8 Karl, Donald, ‘Islands and the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf: A Framework for Analysis’ The American Journal of International Law vol.71, no.4 (1977), pp.646 9 Karl: Islands and the Delimitation, pp.647 10 Karl: Islands and the Delimitation, pp.669-671 11 United Nations, Law of the Sea Convention, Article 3, New York: UN, 1 November 1994 12 Sioussiouras, Petros, ‘Legal Interpretations of Turkey’s Aspirations in the Aegean Sea’ Aegean Working Papers Issue 1 (December 2003), pp.137 13 Schmitt, Michael, Aegean Angst: The Greek Turkish Dispute, Naval War College Review, vol.2, no.1 (Summer 1996), pp.58 14 For more information on intercepting and forcing down aircraft see Sundberg, Jacob, ‘Legitimate responses to aerial intruders’ Annals of Air and Space Law vol.x (1985) 15 Richter, Heinz, ‘The Greek-Turkish Conflict’ in Sarafis, Marion and Martin Eve, Background to contemporary Greece (London: Merlin Press, 1990), pp. 329 16 Greek NOTAMs 1066 and 1152 17 Richter: ‘The Greek-Turkish Conflict’ in Sarafis, Marion and Martin Eve, Background to contemporary Greece (London: Merlin Press, 1990), pp. 329 18 Clogg, Richard, Greece in the 1980’s (London: MacMillan Press, 1983), pp.139 19 Camp, Glen, ‘Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus’ Political Science Quarterly vol. 95 (Spring 1980), pp.59 (also in Harbottle, Michael, ‘The Strategy of Third

NOTES

20 21 22 23 24

25 26 27

243

Party Intervention in Conflict Resolution’ International Journal vol. 35, no. 1 (Winter 1980), pp.124) Richter: ‘The Greek-Turkish Conflict’ in Sarafis, Marion and Martin Eve, Background to contemporary Greece (London: Merlin Press, 1990), pp.338 One canton along the Nicosia-Kyrinia road and two in northern Cyprus (Karpasia-Lefka) Karamanlis’ Foundation, Archive: Events and Texts, vol.9 (Athens, 1996), pp.162 (It is noteworthy that the issue of double union had been previously agreed with Turkey, on June 4, 1971, during the era of the Greek dictatorship.) Richter: ‘The Greek-Turkish Conflict’ in Sarafis, Marion and Martin Eve, Background to contemporary Greece (London: Merlin Press, 1990), pp.339 94th Congress, 1st Session, Crisis on Cyprus: 1975, One Year After the Invasion, A Staff Report prepared for the use of the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees of the Committee on the Judiciary (Unites States Senate, 20 June 1975), pp.45 Moran, Michael, Sovereignty Divided (Nicosia: CYREP, 1999), pp.105 Faulds, Andrew (ed.), Excerpta Cypria for Today (London: K. Rustem and Brother, 1988), pp.166 Faulds: Excerpta Cypria, pp.171

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Kathimerini, To Politehneio itan shedio tis hountas me apotero skopo ti dihotomisi tis Kiprou (The Polytechnic was junta’s plan aiming at the partition of Cyprus), 20 November 1975, p.3 Kathimerini, Proshediasmeni itan i sfagi katethese ehtes o Kanellopoulos (Kanellopoulos testified yesterday that the massacre was premeditated), 20 November 1975, p.1 Kathimerini, Politehneio: e thisia kai e anatasi (Polytechnic: The sacrifice and the uplift), 16 November 1975, pp.4-5 Kathimerini, Praktores xenon ipiresion edrasan sto Politehneio (Agents from foreign agencies operated in the Polytechnic), 24 October 1975, p.1 Kathimerini, Giati e stratiotiki kanoun praxikopimata (Why military officials stage coups), by Yolanta Terentsio, 11 October 1975, p.6 Kathimerini, To alithino prosopo tis diktatorias (The real face of the dictatorship), Part 9, by George Drosos, 1 October 1975, p.5 Kathimerini, To alithino prosopo tis diktatorias (The real face of the dictatorship), Part 8, by George Drosos, 29 September 1975, p.5 Kathimerini, To alithino prosopo tis diktatorias (The real face of the dictatorship), Part 7, by George Drosos, 28 September 1975, p.5 Kathimerini, To alithino prosopo tis diktatorias (The real face of the dictatorship), Part 6, by George Drosos, 27 September 1975, p.5 Kathimerini, To alithino prosopo tis diktatorias (The real face of the dictatorship), Part 5, by George Drosos, 26 September 1975, p.5 Kathimerini, To alithino prosopo tis diktatorias (The real face of the dictatorship), Part 4, by George Drosos, 25 September 1975, p.5 Kathimerini, To alithino prosopo tis diktatorias (The real face of the dictatorship), Part 3, by George Drosos, 24 September 1975, p.5 Kathimerini, To alithino prosopo tis diktatorias (The real face of the dictatorship), Part 2, by George Drosos, 23 September 1975, p.5 Kathimerini, To alithino prosopo tis diktatorias (The real face of the dictatorship), Part 1, by George Drosos, 21 September 1975, p.5 Kathimerini, O Kanellopoulos katethese gia ton rolo tis Ouasigkton (Kanellopoulos testified about the role of Washington), 6 September 1975, p.1 Kathimerini, O Grivas tha paramerize ton Makario gia na gini e dihotomisi (Grivas would sideline Makarios to allow for partition), 5 September 1975, p.10 Kathimerini, E CIA ihe steni sinergasia me ti hounta (CIA was in close co-operation with the junta), 10 August 1975, p.3 Kathimerini, Diethnis apomonosi tis Ellados stin eptaetia (Greece in international isolation during the seven years), 7 August 1975, p.4 Kathimerini, Stin Ouasigkton anamorfothike to shedio Promitheus (The Promitheous Plan was revised in Washington), 6 August 1975, p.4 Kathimerini, E praxikopimaties epernan entoles apo to exoteriko (The perpetrators were receiving orders from abroad), 6 August 1975, p.1 Kathimerini, Ta tourkika simferonta iperispisan e diktatores (The dictators served Turkish interests), 5 August 1975, p.1

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Kathimerini, O Makarezos kataskevazei ipomnima peri kommounistikou kindinou ke oplon (Makarezos design conceives memo of communist threat and arms), 3 August 1975, p.12 Kathimerini, Ektropi ihe isigithi ke to 1956 o Papadopoulos (Papadopoulos recommended subversion in 1956), 3 August 1975, p.5 Kathimerini, Kataskevazan anisihies (They were creating concerns), 3 August 1975, p.1 Kathimerini, Pies monades kinithikan tin nikta tis 21 Apriliou (Which units were mobilized in the night of April 21), 2 August 1975, p.6 Kathimerini, Shimatizan kivernisi dia vois e mikri aksiomatiki (Junior officers were forming government by acclamation), 2 August 1975, p.5 Kathimerini, Einai ntropi! Erxetai sto Epiteleio o G. Papadopoulos (It is a shame! G. Papadopoulos is coming to the General Staff), 2 August 1975, p.4 Kathimerini, E antistratigi apokaliptoun to mistiko tis 21is Apriliou (The LieutenantGenerals reveal the secret of 21st April), 2 August 1975, p.1 Kathimerini, E praxikopimaties epevlithisan me tin via san stratos katohis (The instigators imposed themselves with force as occupation army), 1 August 1975, pp.4-5 Kathimerini, Stratos katohis itan e hounta (The junta was an occupation army), 1 August 1975, p.1 Kathimerini, Apo to 1956 ithelan ektropi (Since 1956 they wished for subversion), 31 July 1975, p.6 Kathimerini, Mono me tin Dimokratia antimetopizonte e kindini (Only with Democracy the dangers can be tackled), 31 July 1975, pp.4-5 Kathimerini, Me tin via kai tin apati anetrepsan tin dimokratia (With violence and deceit they overthrew democracy), 31 July 1975, p.1 Kathimerini, Stis 21 Fevrouariou edothi e entoli na gini to praxikopima (On 21st February the order to instigate the coup was given), 30 July 1975, p.3 Kathimerini, Xenos paragon stin sinomosia (Foreign agent in the conspiracy), 27 July 1975, p.3 Kathimerini, To praxikopima tha arhize apo tin Athina (The coup would start from Athens), 23 July 1975, p.3 Kathimerini, Ta tanks ton Athinon tha kinousan oi sinomotes (The conspirators would mobilize the tanks in Athens), 23 July 1975, p.1 Kathimerini, Makariotate, etimazonte ta tanks gia tin anatropi sas (Your Excellency, the tanks are getting ready to overthrow you), by Alekos Trakas, 15 July 1975, p.3 Kathimerini, Georgios Papadopoulos: Se 12 hronia tha kiverniso tin Ellada (George Papadopoulos: In 12 years I will govern Greece), Part 4, by George Drosos, 6 July 1975, p.3 Kathimerini, Georgios Papadopoulos: Se 12 hronia tha kiverniso tin Ellada (George Papadopoulos: In 12 years I will govern Greece), Part 3, by George Drosos, 5 July 1975, p.3 Kathimerini, Georgios Papadopoulos: Se 12 hronia tha kiverniso tin Ellada (George Papadopoulos: In 12 years I will govern Greece), Part 2, by George Drosos, 4 July 1975, p.3

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Theodorakopoulos, Panagiotis, To Kongreso stin Diamorfosi tis Amerikanikis Exoterikis Politikis: O Rolos tou sti Periptosi tis Elladas (Congress in shaping US Foreign Policy: Its Role in the Case of Greece) (Athens: Sideris, 1996) Theodoropoulos, Viron, The Turkish and Us [I Tourki kai emis] (Athens: Fitrakis, 1988) Thorhallson, Baldur, The role of small states in the EU (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000) Tsakaloyannis, Panos, ‘The European Community and the Greek-Turkish dispute’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol.XIX, no.1 (September 1980), pp. 35-54 Tsalicoglou, Iacovos, Negotiating for entry (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995) Tsardanidis, Charalambos, The politics of the EEC-Cyprus Association Agreement 19721982 (Nicosia, 1988a) Tsardanidis, Charalambos, ‘The European Community and the Cyprus problem since 1974’ Journal of Political and Military Sociology vol.16 (1988b), pp. 155-171 Tsardanidis, Charalambos, ‘The European Community and the Cyprus crisis of 1974’ Revue Hellenique de Droit International vol.5 (1984a), pp. 185-207 Tsardanidis, Charalambos, ‘The EEC-Cyprus Association Agreement: Ten years of a troubled relationship 1973-1983’ Journal of Common Market Studies vol.XXII, no.4 (June 1984b), pp. 351-376 Tsoucalas, Constantine, The Greek tragedy (London: Penguin Books, 1969) Tsoukalis, Loukas, ‘Greece in Europe: The tenth member’ The World Today vol.37 (April 1981a), pp. 120-126 Tsoukalis, Loukas, The European Community and its Mediterranean Enlargement (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981b) Ulman, Haluk, ‘Geneva Conference: July – August 1974’ Dis Politika vol.4, no.2-3 (1974), pp. 46-65 United States Foreign Policy Regarding Greece, Turkey and Cyprus – The Rule of law and American Interests, A conference presented by The Aegean foundation and the American Hellenic Institute in co-operation with the Ohio State University College of Law and modern Greek Studies program (Washington: American Hellenic Institute, 1989)

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Index

Acheson plan, 82, 104 Adriatic Sea, 174 Aegean Army, 190-191 Aegean Sea, 2-4, 32, 86, 88, 91-92, 106-108, 114, 120, 122-123, 125, 134-135, 147-148, 150-153, 156, 158, 164, 166, 169-170, 174-194, 196, 198-200, 202, 206-208, 218219, 221, 227 Afghanistan, 99, 115 Agios Efstratios, 180 AHEPA, see American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association AHI, see American Hellenic Institute Air Traffic Service, 188 AKEL, see Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou Algeria, 93 Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Elections, 38 American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association, 110, 117 American Hellenic Institute, 110, 117 American Mission for Aid to Greece, 35, 89 Andros, 186

Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou (Progressive Party of the Working People), 81, 94, 127 anti-Americanism (anti-American), 43, 64, 89-90, 223 Arab (world), 24, 68, 115, 150, 154, 171 Arab-Israeli, 59, 71, 92, 95, 101, 109, 128 Archbishop Iakovos, 205 Archbishop Makarios, 77-79, 81-83, 94-97, 101-102, 104, 118, 127, 159, 196-204 ASPIDA, see Axiomatiki Sozoun Patrida Idees Dimokratia Axiokratia Athens Flight Information Region, 184-189 ATS, see Air Traffic Service Austria, 16 Averoff, Evangelos, 77, 85, 128, 187 Axiomatiki Sozoun Patrida Idees Dimokratia Axiokratia (Officers Save the Country, Ideas, Democracy and Meritocracy), 61-62 Ball, George, 113 Ball plan, 104 Balkan Peninsula (Balkans), 35, 60,

280


76, 86, 91-92, 107, 149-150, 193 Belgium (Belgian), 16, 143 Belize, 171 Bitsios, Dimitris, 192 Black Sea, 177 Boyatt, Thomas, 105, 118 Brademas, John, 109 Britain (British), 12, 20, 33-34, 36, 51, 52, 64, 76-80, 82, 92, 95, 97, 101, 107, 127, 160, 162, 170, 200, 214, 215 British Foreign Office, 5 Brown, Harold, 115 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 115 Bulgaria, 16 Campbell, Lock, 45 Canada, 176 Carter, Jimmy, 111, 115-116 administration, 104, 122 Central Intelligence Agency, 4-5, 38, 42, 45, 47, 55, 58-59, 61-62, 83, 94-95 Chicago Convention, 183 Chile, 118, 170 China, 109 Chios, 181, 190 Churchill, Winston, 34, 78 Church of Cyprus, 77 CIA, see Central Intelligence Agency civil war, the Greek, 35, 38-40, 4752, 54, 56-57, 61, 68, 75, 82, 85, 212-213, 227-228, 231 Cleridis, Glafkos, 5, 195-196 Clifford, Clark, 115 The US Congress, 59, 64, 99, 104, 106-107, 109-118, 132, 201, 218 Public Affairs Committee, 110 Convention of the Law of Sea, 170171, 175-177, 182 Council of Europe, 65, 68, 88, 142143 Council of Ministers, 162

The Crown, 37, 41, 45-48, 55, 5759, 62, 87, 205, 228 Cypriot National Guard, 95 Cyprus (Cypriot), 2-5, 16-17, 31, 34, 59-61, 63, 66, 73, 76-91, 93-94, 96-120, 124-132, 134, 137-138, 143-145, 147-148, 150, 152-153, 155-166, 179, 190-192, 194-208, 214-221, 223, 225, 227, 229 Czechoslovakia, 64 Czech Republic, 16 DECA, see Defense and Economic Agreement Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 14 Defense and Economic Agreement, 121-122 Denktash, Rauf, 159, 197 Denmark, 16, 176 Dimokratiki Enosis (Democratic Union), 42 Dimokratiki Parataxis (Democratic Camp), 39-40 Dimokratikon Proodeftikon Komma (Democratic Progressive Party), 39 Dimokratikos Stratos tis Elladas (Democratic Army of Greece), 38 Dodecanese islands, 180-181, 186, 190-191 Dominican Republic, 171 Dulles, Allen, 42 Eagleton, Thomas, 109, 117 Ecevit, Bülent, 95-96, 102, 115 Ecuador, 170 EDA, see Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera Eden, Anthony, 78 EEC, see European Economic Community

INDEX EENA, see Enosi Ellinon Neon Axiomatikon Egypt, 24, 64, 93, 99-100 Eisenhower, Dwight, 78 EK, see Enosis Kentrou Ellinikos Sinagermos (Greek Rally), 40-42, 57, 61 England (English), 14, 176 Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera (United Democratic Left), 4046, 48, 52, 62, 68-69 enosis, 79, 83, 102, 214 Enosis Dimokratikon Aristeron (Union of Democratic Leftists), 39 Enosi Ellinon Neon Axiomatikon (Union of Greek Young Officers), 61 Enosis Kentrou (Centre Union), 4446, 49-50, 55-59, 68, 71, 74, 83, 213-214 EOKA, see Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston EPC, see European Political Cooperation ERE, see Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis Estonia, 16 Ethiopia, 100 Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters), 95 Ethniki Proodeftiki Enosis Kentrou (National Progressive Centre Union), 39-40 Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis (National Radical Union Party), 4146, 57, 68, 74 EU, see European Union European Commission, 5, 26, 142144, 149, 165 European Convention on Human Rights, 143 European Council, 5, 144, 146, 148 European Economic Community,

281 4, 26, 31-33, 60, 65, 67-68, 85-86, 88, 90, 125, 131, 133, 137-167, 178, 183, 193, 195, 197, 199, 204, 206-207, 212, 215-220, 222-227, 230-231 European Parliament, 16, 27, 142143, 145, 152, 154 European Political Cooperation, 159 European Union, 12, 15-16, 20, 22, 26-27 Finland, 16, 174 FIR, see Athens Flight Information Region Ford, Gerald, 111, 114-115, 205 Administration, 105, 116 foreign policy, definition of, 8-9 of small powers, 11-18 France (French), 12, 20, 34, 64, 71, 73, 77, 80, 92, 160, 162, 170, 176 Fulbright, William, 59 Geneva Convention, 103, 170-171, 173-182, 184 Geneva Declaration, 127 Germany (German), 13, 24, 92, 115, 176 Gizikis, Phaidon, 84 Grady, Henry, 39 Great Britain, see Britain Greek-Cypriot, 77, 127, 160, 197, 201-202, 206 Greek Orthodox Church, in North America, 110 Greenland, 171 Griswold, Dwight, 35 Grivas, Georgios, 81, 94 Gulf of Finland, 174 Habsburg Empire, 12 Hague Tribunal, 174 Haig, Alexander, 116 Hallstein, Walter, 139

282


Hartman, Arthur, 118 Havana Convention, 183 Holland, 171, 176 House of Representatives, 109, 111, 117 Select Committee on Intelligence, 106 Hungary, 16 ICAO, see International Civil Aviation Organisation ICJ, see International Court of Justice IDEA, see Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon (Holy Bond of Greek Officers), 46, 58, 61-62, 69, 71, 75 Ikaria, 190 Imvros, 181, 190 Inomeni Parataxi Ethnikofronon (United Camp of the Nationally Minded), 37 İnönü, İsmet, 101 International Civil Aviation Organisation, 183-186, 189 International Court of Justice, 4-5, 169, 172, 182, 192-194, 202, 205209, 221 international system, 10-11 small powers in, 22-27 Italy, 115, 174, 181-182 Ioannides, Dimitrios, 55, 76, 84, 95 Iran (Iranian), 37, 51, 100, 112, 123, 174, 177 revolution, 99, 115 Iraq, 24, 100, 123, 177 Ireland, 16 Israel (Israeli), 59, 71, 92, 95, 99101, 109, 112, 128-129 Japan, 171 Johnson, Lyndon, 72, 82, 101 Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group, 37, 50

Joint United States Military Assistance Group in Greece, 59, 62 Jordan, 93, 171 JUSMAGG, see Joint United States Military Assistance Group in Greece JUSMAPG, see Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group Justice Department, the US, 99 Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis, 41 Karamanlis, Konstantinos, 5, 32, 41-45, 57-58, 69, 74, 79, 84-87, 96, 98, 103, 105, 116, 121-122, 128, 131, 133, 138, 146-150, 153154, 176, 187, 193, 195-197, 199, 205, 229-230 administration, 125 Kennedy, John Fitzgerald, administration, 44 Kentriki Ypiresia Pliroforion (Central Intelligence Service), 38, 96 Khadafi, Moammar, 64 King George II, 38 King Konstantinos, 46, 69 King Paul, 40 Kissinger, Henry, 5, 102-103, 109112, 117-118, 132, 134, 205 KKE, see Kommounistiko Komma Elladas Kollias, Konstantinos, 72 Komma Aristeron Phileleftheron (Party of Leftist Liberals), 39-40, 43 Komma Proodeftikon Philelefteron Kentrou (Progressive Liberal Centre Party), 39 Kommounistiko Komma Elladas (Greek Communist Party), 38, 48-49, 52, 56, 60-61 Korea, 171 Korean War, 37, 51, 61 Kuwait, 24 KYP, see Kentriki Ypiresia Pliro-

INDEX forion Kyprianou, Spyros, 195, 197 Lachs, Manfred, 193 Laikon Komma (People’s Party), 37, 39 Lambrakis, Christos, 74 Lambrakis, Grigorios, 45 Latvia, 16 Ledsky, Nelson, 118 Lesvos, 181, 188, 190 Libya, 64, 172 Limnos, 180, 186, 188, 190 Lithuania, 16 London Agreement, 79-80 Luxembourg, 16 Macmillan, Harold, 79 MacNamara, Robert, 82 Madrid Convention, 183 Makarezos, Nicholas, 62 Malta, 16, 64 MAP, see Military Assistance Program Marshall, George, 35 Marshall plan, 51, 61 Maury, Jack, 47 Mavros, Georgios, 193-194, 205 Maw, Carlyle, 111 McCloskey, Robert, 116 McGhee, George, 39 Military Assistance Program, 73-74 Mintoff, Dom, 64 Monarchy (monarch), 34, 37-38, 46, 48-50, 54, 57, 68-71, 87-88, 213, 227-229 Montego Bay Convention, 173-174, 180 Nasser, Abdel Gammal, 64 National Security Council, 4-5, 95, 115, 117 reports, 35, 80 NATO, see North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

283 Nea Dimokratia (New Democracy), 2, 4, 7, 85-86, 88, 126, 147-148, 152, 217-218, 221 Nea Politiki Kinisis (New Political Movement), 43 Netherlands, 16 Nimetz, Matthew, 104 Nimetz plan, 104-105 Nixon, Richard, 64, 95, 101, 108109, 111 administration, 93, 134 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2, 4, 26, 31-33, 36-37, 40, 50-51, 59-60, 63-69, 71-73, 75, 78-83, 88-94, 98-105, 112-116, 119-128, 130-131, 133-135, 137-138, 141148, 150, 152-155, 158, 161-167, 169, 178-180, 185-191, 193, 194, 197, 200, 204, 206, 208, 212-213, 215-220, 222-228, 230-231 NATO Charter, 124 Norway, 171 NOTAM, see Notice To Airmen Notice To Airmen, 122, 185-189 NSC see National security Council Oman, 174 Palau, 171 Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima (Panhellenic Socialist Movement), 91, 124 Papadopoulos, Georgios, 5, 55-56, 59, 62-63, 69, 71, 75-76, 83, 127, 216, 229 Papagos, Alexandros, 40-41, 57, 61 Papandreou, Andreas, 5, 58-59, 62, 69, 70-74, 91, 123-124, 126, 152, 187, 192 Papandreou, Georgios, 44-47, 50, 55, 57-58, 61-62, 70, 82, 87, 89, 214 Paraskevopoulos, Ioannis, 45 Paris Convention, 183 PASOK, see Panellinio Sosialistiko

284


Kinima Pattakos, Stylianos, 62 Pentagon, the US, 64 Persian Gulf, 174 Peru, 170 Pesmatzoglu, Ioannis, 147 Peurifoy, John, 40 Phileleftheron Dimokratikon Komma (Liberal Democratic Party), 43 Pipinelis, Panagiotis, 45, 75 Plastiras, Nicolaos, 39 Portugal, 16, 150-151 Proodeftikon Komma (Progressive Party), 46 Prussia, 12 Psara, 181 Queen Frederica, 45 Radio Free Europe, 100 Radio Liberty, 100 Rallis, Georgios, 5, 42, 122, 128, 130, 187 Romania, 16 Rosenthal, Benjamin, 109, 117 Rossides, Eugene, 99-110, 117 Rusk, Dean, 72 Russia, 12, 34 Sadat, Anwar, 64 Samos, 190 Samothrace, 190 Sampson, Nikos, 95, 97, 102-103 Sarbanes, Paul, 109 Senate, the US, 104 Singapore, 171 Sisco, Joseph, 95, 113, 118 Slovakia, 16 Slovenia, 16 Sofoulis, Themistocles, 38 Sosialistikon Komma-Enosis Laikis Dimokratias (Socialist Party - Union of Popular Democracy), 39 Soviet Union (Soviet), 2, 15, 24, 35,

64, 66, 80, 82-86, 91-94, 99-101, 104-106, 109, 115-116, 119, 125131, 140, 142, 155, 160-161, 171, 174, 176-177, 179-180, 191, 199201, 203, 205, 214-215, 223, 226 Spain, 150-151, 170 Spantidakis, Grigorios, 47 Stalin, Joseph, 34 Stassinopoulos, Mihael, 193 The US State Department, 4-5, 35, 43-44, 62, 64, 69, 71, 73-74, 100102, 106, 117 Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 64 Stephanopoulos, Stephanos, 41, 74 Syria, 59, 93, 100, 171, 177 Talbot, Phillips, 47, 71-75 Tasca, Henry, 103 Tenedos, 181, 190 Thrace, 191 Togo, 171 Treaty of Alliance, 96 Treaty of Establishment, 79-80 Treaty of Guarantee, 79-81, 84, 96, 160 Treaty of Lausanne, 181, 190-191 Treaty of Montreaux, 190-191 Treaty of Paris, 181, 190-191 Treaty of Rome, 138, 142 Truman Doctrine, 35, 51-52, 61, 89, 108, 111 Tsaglayangil, Ihsan Sabri, 192, 196 Tsaldaris, Konstantinos, 37-38 Tsouderos, Emmanouil, 39 Tunisia, 172 Turkish Army see Aegean Army Turkish-Cypriot, 77, 80, 96-97, 106, 113, 119, 159, 196, 198, 202 Turkish State Petroleum Corporation, 181 UN, see United Nations UNCLOS, see Convention of the Law of Sea

INDEX UNFICYP, see United Nations Force in Cyprus United Hellenic American Congress, 110 United Nations, 4, 12, 14, 78, 82, 96, 105, 129, 131, 152, 160-161, 169, 195-198, 200-209, 220-226 General Assembly, 201 Charter, 96, 175, 190, 191 Resolutions, 83, 127, 192, 200203, 218, 224, 226 Security Council, 192, 201-202 United Nations Force in Cyprus, 82 Vance, Cyrus, 113, 116 Venizelos, Eleftherios, 76 Venizelos, Sophoclis, 39-40, 44 Vietnam, 83, 109, 116

285 Voice of America, 100 Waldheim, Kurt, 196 Warsaw Pact, 85, 92, 96, 115, 125, 163, 178, 190-191, 226 Washington Post, 47 West Germany, 20, 64, 157, 160, 162 World Trade Organisation, 12, 26 Yugoslavia (Yugoslav), 150, 174 Yugoslav Federation, 15 Zaimis, Alexandros, 76 Zaimis, Andreas, 201 Zolotas, Zenophone, 74 Zumwalt, Elmo, 93 Zurich Agreement, 79-80

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