Great Britain and Argentina: From Invasion to Recognition, 1806-26 (St. Antony's Series (Palgrave (Firm)).)

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Great Britain and Argentina From Invasion to Recognition, 1806-26

Klaus Gallo

St Antony’s Series General Editor: Richard Clogg (1999– ), Fellow of St Antony’s College, Oxford Recent titles include: Pilar Ortuño Anaya EUROPEAN SOCIALISTS AND SPAIN The Transition to Democracy, 1959–77 Renato Baumann (editor) BRAZIL IN THE 1990s An Economy in Transition Israel Getzler NIKOLAI SUKHANOV Chronicler of the Russian Revolution Arturo J. Cruz, Jr NICARAGUA’S CONSERVATIVE REPUBLIC, 1858–93 Pamela Lubell THE COMMUNIST PARTY DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION The Case of the Sixty-One Renegades Klaus Gallo GREAT BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA From Invasion to Recognition, 1806–26 Peter Mangold SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY Evaluating the Record, 1900–2000 Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi REFASHIONING IRAN Orientalism, Occidentalism and Nationalist Historiography Louise Haagh CITIZENSHIP, LABOUR MARKETS AND DEMOCRATIZATION Chile and the Modern Sequence Renato Colistete LABOUR RELATIONS AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN BRAZIL Greater São Paulo, 1945–60 Peter Lienhardt (edited by Ahmed Al-Shahi) SHAIKHDOMS OF EASTERN ARABIA John Crabtree and Laurence Whitehead (editors) TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC VIABILITY The Bolivian Experience Steve Tsang (editor) JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN HONG KONG

Karen Jochelson THE COLOUR OF DISEASE Syphilis and Racism in South Africa, 1880–1950 Julio Crespo MacLennan SPAIN AND THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 1957–85 Enrique Cárdenas, José Antonio Ocampo and Rosemary Thorp (editors) AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY LATIN AMERICA Volume 1: The Export Age Volume 2: Latin America in the 1930s Volume 3: Industrialization and the State in Latin America Jennifer G. Mathers THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SHIELD FROM STALIN TO YELTSIN Marta Dyczok THE GRAND ALLIANCE AND UKRAINIAN REFUGEES Mark Brzezinski THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN POLAND Suke Wolton LORD HAILEY, THE COLONIAL OFFICE AND THE POLITICS OF RACE AND EMPIRE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR The Loss of White Prestige Junko Tomaru THE POSTWAR RAPPROCHEMENT OF MALAYA AND JAPAN, 1945–61 The Roles of Britain and Japan in South-East Asia Eiichi Motono CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN SINO-BRITISH BUSINESS, 1860–1911 The Impact of the Pro-British Commercial Network in Shanghai Nikolas K. Gvosdev IMPERIAL POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES TOWARDS GEORGIA, 1760–1819

St Antony’s Series Series Standing Order ISBN 0–333–71109–2 (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England

Great Britain and Argentina From Invasion to Recognition, 1806–26 Klaus Gallo Professor of History Universidad Torcuato di Tella Buenos Aires Argentina

in association with

St Antony’s College, Oxford

© Klaus Gallo 2001 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published in paperback 2001 by PALGRAVE Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE is the new global academic imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC Scholarly and Reference Division and Palgrave Publishers Ltd (formerly Macmillan Press Ltd). ISBN 0–333–92099–6 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gallo, Klaus, 1961 – Great Britain and Argentina: from invasion to recognition, 1806-26 / Klaus Gallo. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p.) and index. ISBN 0–333–92099–6 1. Great Britain—Foreign relations—Argentina. 2. Argentina– –Foreign relations—Great Britain. 3. Great Britain—Foreign relations—1800–1837. 4. Argentina—Foreign relations– –1817–1860. I. Title. DA47.9.A7 G35 2001 327.82041’09’034—dc21 2001034497 10 10

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire

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Contents Acknowledgements Introduction

1

1

The River Plate Viceroyalty

9

2

The British Invasions of the River Plate

33

3

The Ministry of All the Talents and the River Plate Invasions

51

4

Strangford, Independence and the London Missions

85

5

Rivadavia and the British Attitude towards Recognition

115

Great Britain and the Recognition of the River Plate

137

6

Conclusion

161

Notes

165

Bibliography

181

Index

187

v

Acknowledgements Among numerous debts and obligations of gratitude the first is to the supervisor of my thesis – which has now been transformed into this book – Professor Malcolm Deas, for his expert teaching and guidance in a field of which he has a profound understanding; I am most grateful to him for his unfailing care and conscientiousness. I thank my parents Professor Ezequiel Gallo and Professor Francis Korn for their support and encouragement and for their comments on my draft thesis. My wife Mercedes Güiraldes helped me throughout by reading and correcting the later chapters, and Daniel Waisbein was so good as to offer his advice on the earlier chapters. Professor John Lynch, Professor Leslie Mitchell and Professor Alan Knight each read portions of the work, and I am particularly grateful to them for personally according me their suggestions for improvement. I would also like to thank Mr Carlos María de Alvear for his kindness and also for his guidance on the subject of his famous ancestor’s life. At the Archivo Nacional de Buenos Aires, I benefited from the invaluable aid of Dr Carlos Mayo and of Dr E. Saguier in tracing recondite sources. My thanks are also due to Gloria Cavanagh, Professor Paula Alonso and Professor Eduado Zimmerman for their friendly observations on my work. A special mention is due to the examiners of my thesis, Professors Patrick O’Brien and Carlos Malamud, for their valuable remarks and suggestions for improvement of this book. I am especially indebted to the Fellows of Wolfson College for having awarded the Norman-Hargreaves Scholarship to me during the course of my studies. I would also like to extend my gratitude to Fundación Antorchas, Editorial A–Z and Professor Sergio Labourdette.

vi

Introduction

This book is an analysis of the relations between Great Britain and the River Plate during 1806–26. It is essentially a study of the evolution of the political and diplomatic relations between the two countries. These commence with the British invasions of Buenos Aires and begin to take a more dramatic course after the emancipation of the River Plate from Spain in 1810, concluding at the time when the British Government acknowledges recognition of the United Provinces of the River Plate as an independent nation. This work aims to analyse and expand the previous contributions made by the historians who have written about British and Argentine relations in the nineteenth century. I consider that in spite of their publications there is still room for new interpretations on this subject, as I shall explain in this introduction. The history of the relations between Britain and Spanish America in the early nineteenth century is a subject that has been studied by several historians, especially British, mainly between the late 1930s and the late 1960s. The most obvious examples are Webster (a pioneer in this topic), Humphreys, Kauffmann, Rydjord, Lynch (the historian who has written more than anyone else on this subject), and, most recently, Miller. Also worth mentioning is Robertson, who worked on the relations of other European nations, such as Russia and France, with Spanish America in the early nineteenth century.1 There have also been historians who have focused on the relations of Britain with one particular Latin American nation during this period. In the case of Britain and Argentina, the works of Roberts, 1

2 Great Britain and Argentina

Ferns, and Street are the three most notable examples.2 Roberts’s book is principally concerned with the events that took place during the British invasions of the River Plate. He also covers, to a lesser extent, the period up to British recognition. This was the first serious work on the relations between the two countries in that period, and Roberts spent a long time in the British archives collecting material on this topic. This is reflected in the enormous amount of information in his book, which remains one of the most useful sources on the British invasions of the River Plate. However, his work now appears somewhat outdated. Although the sources used appear listed at the end of the book, there are no footnotes in his book. Ferns’s work is a thorough analysis of the relations between the two countries throughout the nineteenth century, with special emphasis on the political and commercial aspects. It is a masterly study and is still today the best source on this subject. As Ferns’s work covers the whole century, his analysis of the early nineteenth century is not as thorough as that of the other two studies mentioned here. Nevertheless it remains very useful, especially in its analysis of the commercial relations between the two nations. Street’s study covers the same period in the relations between Britain and the River Plate as does this book. Street makes full use of the available PRO material and exploits Argentine sources as well. His study is a political, diplomatic, and economic account of the relations between the two countries. The chapters on the period 1808–16, which deal with the influence of Lord Strangford in South America, represent his most significant contribution to this subject. For some reason, however, Street neglected the manuscripts in the British Library. The omission of this material is reflected in the lack of a thorough analysis of the role of the British Government throughout the period, especially in the chapters on the invasions. There one finds little analysis or explanation of the role of the Ministry of All the Talents, which is essential to an understanding of these events. Street also neglects the period after 1816, the years which led to recognition. He only devotes a few pages of his last chapter to explaining the process by which recognition was finally attained, which therefore leaves the treatment of this period markedly unbalanced with respect to previous years.

Introduction 3

Street’s book is one of the last significant contributions to the study of British and Argentine relations during the early nineteenth century. For the last 30 years this subject has been almost totally ignored.3 The reason for the abandonment of this topic probably lies in the notion, prevalent amongst some historians, that it has already been thoroughly investigated by the authors mentioned above. Nevertheless in the last 30 years new manuscript sources have been unearthed, especially in Britain, many of which are of special interest to the historians of British relations with Spanish America in the first half of the nineteenth century. A significant amount of secondary work on the history of this period has also appeared during these years in both Britain and in Argentina. Some of these publications have made full use of the primary sources that have recently come to light, and therefore provide more information as well as new interpretations on aspects of British and Argentinian history during these years. It is thus my opinion that if these new sources are incorporated into the material already used in the previous works on this topic, they justify a new study of the relations between Britain and Argentina during the early nineteenth century. It is mainly for this reason that I consider that a general reevaluation of this subject is both necessary and feasible. As mentioned above, this book primarily emphasizes the political and diplomatic aspects of the relations between the two countries. The commercial elements involved in the relations between these two countries during this period are too important to omit and will naturally be present in this work. However, it is not my intention to analyse the economic aspects as thoroughly as the political and diplomatic. The main reason for this is that I consider the study of commercial relations as almost a subject in itself. To incorporate them into this work at the same level of detail as the political and diplomatic relations, would necessarily require either a more superficial approach to the subject, or a far more voluminous book. It is important, when tackling the history of the relations between the two countries, to find an adequate equilibrium between the subject matter – the bilateral relationship – and the general situation of the two countries in the global context of the period. These considerations are even more weighty when the two countries are immersed in such diverse historical and political contexts as were Britain and Argentina in the early nineteenth century. It is vital to


have a clear idea of the different perspectives of the two countries towards each other during this period. In the era 1806–25, Europe was first under Napoleonic dominance and subsequently, after the fall of the French Empire, found herself dominated by an unstable conservative alliance of the leading states, which was seen as a means of achieving a stable balance of power. Britain led the fight against Napoleonic France, and later on more timidly resisted the designs of Metternich and the Holy Alliance. The recognition of the Spanish American colonies was not seriously considered by Britain until 1824. The River Plate region, after achieving independence in 1810, began to look in the direction of Europe, but especially Britain, in the hope of achieving recognition and assistance. For Great Britain, relations with the River Plate were a minor item in her foreign policy when compared to her relations with Europe at that time. However, the River Plate Governments during the postindependence period considered relations with Britain as an essential and central component of their foreign affairs. To illustrate this point even more crudely, the British invasions of the River Plate, for example, are considered a legendary episode in Argentine history and are familiar to all Argentines. The same cannot, however, be said about Britain, where one looks in vain for the merest reference to the invasions in the standard histories of Britain in the nineteenth century. This book is divided into six chapters. The second and third chapters cover 1806–7, and deal with the events of the British invasions of the River Plate. This may give the impression of a somewhat unbalanced structure, given that the next three chapters involve the remaining years of the period under study. The reason is that the British invasions are the most important and significant events in the relationship between the two countries in the whole twenty years and, the most abundant in terms of available archival material and secondary sources, which allow a much more extensive analysis. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the subject and is divided into two sections. The first section is a short introduction to the history of the Plate and focuses particularly on the period from 1776, the year the River Plate was made a Viceroyalty by Charles III of Spain, up to 1806. By this time the economic and social conditions of this area had changed substantially, facilitating a more

Introduction 5

active participation in political life by the leading creole citizens. The second section of this chapter offers a resumé of British strategic designs on Spanish America in the eighteenth century. Of central interest is the period 1780–1804, when Pitt the younger served as prime minister. During these years the Venezuelan Francisco Miranda had been in London lobbying the Government to mount a liberating expedition to South America. Henry Dundas, one of Pitt’s most important ministers, showed great interest in these South American projects and gradually came to realize that the River Plate was the most interesting focus for British interests in that continent. Chapter 2 deals directly with the British invasions of the River Plate. It includes an account of the preliminaries which led to Admiral Home Popham’s decision to capture Buenos Aires, and the actual events which took place. It offers an analysis of the main characters involved in the affair and, without entering into all the details of the actions which took place, provides a chronological account of the military campaigns. The third chapter continues the story of the invasions and of the consequences for the two countries involved. It is also divided into two sections. The first part reviews the role of the British administration in power at the time: the Ministry of All the Talents, a Whig–Tory coalition formed after Pitt’s second Administration came to an end. The reactions of the opposition factions and of public opinion towards the Buenos Aires affair are also analysed here. The second section addresses the repercussions of the invasions in the River Plate, and the attitudes adopted by the leading Spanish and creole figures towards the British invaders. Thus, the invasions are considered in Chapters 2 and 3 from three different perspectives. Chapter 4 covers the post-invasion years, and stretches from 1807 to 1815. This was a highly eventful period that commenced with the Portuguese court moving to Brazil as a consequence of the French invasion of Portugal. The role of the British minister attached to the Portuguese court in Rio de Janeiro, Lord Strangford, is examined, specifically in relation with the River Plate. His arrival coincided with the preliminary stages of the independence movement which was to reach its full development in Buenos Aires a couple of years later. Strangford was to play a pivotal role as mediator between the River Plate and the Portuguese over Uruguay and was at the time the only official link which the new Government in


the River Plate had with Great Britain. This chapter also analayses the first diplomatic missions sent to England from the River Plate and the effects the British alliance with Spain had on Britain’s reaction towards River Plate independence. This is accompanied by a review of the complicated internal situations in both countries and the way these affected their relationship. The chapter concludes with the fall of Napoleon and the dilemma that Britain faced with the dominance of the Holy Alliance in Europe. In Chapter 5 I analyse the period 1816–22. In 1816 full independence was declared in the River Plate. This, however, did not put an immediate end either to internal turmoil, or to the external menace of the Portuguese in Uruguay. Therefore assistance and recognition from Great Britain were still sought. Nevertheless, there was no substantial progress in the relations between the two countries during these years. In Britain the Liverpool Ministry was still finding it difficult to break with the Holy Alliance, and thus was reluctant to adopt novel policies vis-à-vis South America. Towards the end of this period, however, certain events occurred which indicated that recognition was not so far away. In the River Plate, Bernardino Rivadavia rose to prominence in 1821, and signs of political stability and economic progress seemed to be emerging. In Britain, George Canning replaced Lord Castlereagh at the Foreign Office in 1822, and his more liberal attitude promised favourable consequences for South America. Chapter 6, the last chapter, analyses the years 1823–26 which finally bring recognition. In 1823 Canning sent consuls to three newly-formed Latin American states, the River Plate being one of them. This marked the beginning of formal relations between the two countries, and it appeared to many at that time that recognition was now a mere formality. Nevertheless, in spite of growing pressure both from members of the opposition Whig faction in parliament, and from a considerable number of British merchants who pressed for recognition, Canning hesitated. He was essentially in favour of recognition, but waited to receive more assurances from British Consuls concerning the political stability of the region. This applied in the case of the River Plate, where the political situation appeared to be unstable after Rivadavia’s fall from power in 1824. News of Rivadavia’s fall provoked great concern in Britain, especially in commercial circles where Rivadavia had been highly appreciated.

Introduction 7

By this time, however, the United States’s recognition of the new states in 1823, and Britain’s increasing detachment from the Congress System in Europe, added to the generally satisfying reports received from Latin America, led to Britain´s recognition of the River Plate Provinces in 1825. Therefore, almost twenty years after the British invasions of Buenos Aires, formal relations between Britain and Argentina now commenced.

1 The River Plate Viceroyalty

The River Plate is the name given to the river that flows past Buenos Aires into the Atlantic Ocean. It was also the name assigned to the territory which today forms the Argentine Republic. The river was discovered by Juan Díaz de Solis in 1516, who named it the Mar Dulce. This is considered as the traditional date of discovery. In 1520, Fernando de Magallane’s expedition explored the Argentine coast from the River Plate to the strait that bears his name. From this voyage comes the first description of Patagonia. Magallane also discovered the river Uruguay. This expedition was followed by that of Sebastian Cabot in 1527–29, which explored the Paraná river and founded Fort Sancti Spiritus, the first Spanish settlement in River Plate territory. The Portuguese visited the River Plate for the first time in 1531, and thus gave the Spaniards the incentive to occupy the area. In 1536 the Spanish Crown sent out the adelantado Pedro de Mendoza, who founded Buenos Aires in the same year. In 1541, however, Buenos Aires was abandoned, a victim of hunger, disease, and Indian attacks. The settlers moved to Asunción, the present capital of Paraguay, which became the new centre of Spanish settlement and government. Shortly afterwards, in 1543, the Indian chieftain Diego de Rojas established the first settlements in the vast area of what is today the north-west of Argentina. This region was to become the Gobernación de Tucumán in 1563, attached to the Viceroyalty of Peru, which had been created in 1542. Thus all the lands formerly under the Inca Empire were united under Spanish rule. The jurisdiction of the Tucumán area included the present Argentine 9


provinces of Jujuy, Salta, Catamarca, La Rioja, Tucumán, Santiago del Estero and Córdoba. All these provinces had been founded during the period 1540–80, as a result of two Spanish colonizing streams, one from Peru, the other from Chile. It was also the most heavily populated Indian territory found in Argentina. This vast area was governed from the capital Santiago del Estero under the Audiencia of Charcas. The consolidation of the Tucumán provinces coincided with the appearance of other cities in the future River Plate terrain – notably Corrientes, to the east, and Santa Fe, to the north of Buenos Aires – and with the second foundation of Buenos Aires by Juan de Garay in the year 1580. Towards the end of the sixteenth century, Buenos Aires had already surpassed Asunción in terms of strategic importance and wealth. The Jesuits arrived in the River Plate area in 1607, and established the Doctrinas, Indian missions which stretched along the Paraguay, Paraná, and upper Uruguay rivers, and which rapidly developed into well organized administrative towns. The Jesuits controlled most of the primary education, in what is now Argentina, and all the secondary and university education until they were expelled by the Spanish Crown in 1767. The Jesuits were also responsible for creating the first University in the River Plate, in the year 1622 in the city of Córdoba. Buenos Aires had already been proclaimed the new capital of the province of the River Plate in 1617. This province also included Santa Fe, Corrientes and Concepción del Bermejo, which were later to be known as the provinces of the Litoral area of Argentina. The other two main provinces in the region were Paraguay and Tucumán, which consisted of the cities that had composed the Gobernación. These provinces were each under the control of a Gobernador, and were still subject to the Audiencia of Charcas in the Viceroyalty of Peru. Although this system lasted for a century and a half, the distances of the provinces from the central authority in Peru was often a cause of complaint from the local authorities. Moreover, the general desire of the Spanish Bourbon Kings was to strengthen colonial administration, and to increase the royal revenues from the American colonies. The most radical of the reforming Bourbons, Charles III, created the Viceroyalty of New Granada in 1737 in the north of the South American continent, which included modern Colombia, Ecuador,

The River Plate Viceroyalty 11

and Venezuela; and the Viceroyalty of the River Plate in 1776, which included the present republics of Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The territory was divided into eight Intendencias: Paraguay, La Paz, Potosí, Charcas, Buenos Aires, La Plata, Córdoba and Salta del Tucumán; the first Viceroy was Pedro de Ceballos. As a consequence of these administrative changes imposed by the Spanish Crown, Buenos Aires gradually turned into one of the most important centres of commerce in Spanish South America. The rapid demographic, economic, and political growth of this city from the mid-eighteenth century, and the steady decline of Lima as a centre of commerce, had been one of the most significant reasons for the creation of this Viceroyalty.1 There were also, however, strategic reasons which induced the Spanish Crown to effect these changes, such as the need to defend the River Plate against French and English designs on the South Atlantic and, more significantly, Portuguese encroachment in the River Plate area. In 1680 the Portuguese had founded Colonia de Sacramento, situated on the coast of Uruguay, separated from Buenos Aires by the River Plate. This post attracted English merchants, who had originally arrived in the River Plate attracted by the wealth of Potosí. However, the commercial restrictions implemented by the Spanish Crown, which allowed its South American colonies to trade only with the Spanish port of Seville, made it extremely difficult for the British to develop any sort of regular commercial enterprise. Nevertheless, as Buenos Aires emerged as one of the main centres of commerce in South America, British merchants sought to establish commercial links with the port. For this reason Colonia rapidly became a centre of contraband, which was facilitated by the lack of Spanish patrols in the area.2 Furthermore, after the Utrecht Treaty of 1713, which ratified Colonia as a Portuguese possession, the British were authorized for the next thirty years to participate in the slave trade in South America.3 This course of events had serious consequences for the Spanish American economy, and resulted in the loss of significant revenue for the Spanish Crown. Facing the menacing prospect of losing their predominance to the Portuguese and British in the continent, the Bourbons were forced to review their commercial policies in America, and decreed the opening of trade between Spain and all Spanish American ports.


The growth of the River Plate during the last decades of empire was, therefore, a consequence partly of the reforming policies of the Bourbons, and partly of the new economic reorientation they gave to their American colonies by allowing them free commercial intercourse with Spain and with other Spanish colonies. Nevertheless, the colonies were still not authorized to enter into direct commercial relations with other European nations. The demographic growth of the River Plate area was clearly evident in the rise of the city of Buenos Aires from the mideighteenth century: in the 1750s, Buenos Aires had a mere 19 000 inhabitants, a figure which had slightly increased by 1777, when the population reached 23 000. However, by the early nineteenth century a significant leap had occurred, and the population had reached 40 000 inhabitants.4 Other indications of progress in the River Plate were the rapid development and expansion of the pastoral economy in the countryside, especially in the wide area which today is known as the province of Buenos Aires, and also in the Litoral, where the provinces that run along the Paraná river, Santa Fe, and Corrientes, were rapidly becoming the main rural centres of the Viceroyalty. Of these three provinces, Corrientes was the least wealthy. It was essentially a centre of commerce and navigation; its ship-building industry was responsible for the construction of the boats that navigated the Paraná and Plata rivers, and of a few that reached the Atlantic. Also important in this province was the trade in commerce of wool and yerba mate.5 Santa Fe, a creation of the Jesuits, who used this province as commercial link between their missions in Paraguay and the actual province of Misiones with Buenos Aires, owed its wealth to agriculture, and had benefited enormously from the breeding and trade of the mules employed in the Potosí mines.6 On the Southern frontier of Santa Fe begins the northern sector of the province of Buenos Aires, which surrounds the northern, western, and southern limits of the city of Buenos Aires, like Santa Fe. Here, agriculture and cattle were developed on the estancias, the large estates established in the province of the Buenos Aires region. The main activity in these estancias was cattle breeding, which provided hides. The production of wheat was also significant, although by 1790 there was a marked decline in its


activity, as a consequence of restrictive official policies. The same occurred with the hide trade, and for a few years the Buenos Aires region gave a new emphasis to mule breeding. Nevertheless, cattle breeding revived in Buenos Aires with the creation of the saladeros, which enabled producers to preserve meat.7 According to Halperín Donghi, by the end of the eighteenth century the city of Buenos Aires was comparable to a city of the second order in Spain. By then, too, a significant number of Spanish merchants had established themselves as the leading members of a newly-formed commercial elite. They included Manuel de Anchorena, Martín de Alzaga, Gaspar de Santa Coloma, and Juan Larrea. Most had arrived in Buenos Aires as representatives of Spanish commercial houses and were responsible for infusing a new entrepreneurial spirit in this city.8 The situation that arose in Europe after the revolution of 1789 in France, which led Spain to declare war first against France in 1793 and then against Great Britain in 1796, would necessarily affect future developments in the commerce of South America and the River Plate area. As a consequence of events in Europe, Spain found herself unable to maintain normal commercial intercourse, since she was successively at war with the two most powerful European nations. Several modifications were introduced into the commercial regulations of her colonies in South America, emergency laws which allowed new commercial liberties, permission to trade freely with other nations. This new economic order further increased commercial activity in the River Plate, and would rapidly pave the way for the emergence of a local commercial group in Buenos Aires, which included future revolutionary leaders such as Manuel Belgrano, Hipólito Viéytes, and Mariano Moreno. Belgrano had received his education in Buenos Aires and later emigrated to Spain to complete his studies at the University of Salamanca, where he graduated as a lawyer. On his return to the River Plate in 1794 he was designated Secretary of the Consulado of Buenos Aires, the merchant tribunal. From this position he promoted the cause of development in the River Plate, writing a wide range of articles on economic matters, among other themes.9 The other renowned and enthusiastic promoter of agricultural development and free-trade ideals was Viéytes, a Rioplatense journal-


ist and writer on economic questions in the Semanario de Agricultura Industria y Comercio, which he founded in 1802, one of the first weekly papers to appear in Buenos Aires. He was also the owner of a soap factory where meetings were held of the members of a secret local society which he had organized with Nicolás Rodríguez Peña, another future revolutionary leader.10 The enigmatic and controversial Moreno, a lawyer and publicist, was also from Buenos Aires. He had received his education in the prestigious Colegio de San Carlos, and later in the University of Chuquisaca in Upper Peru, where he was heavily influenced by the political and economic ideals of the Enlightenment, especially Rousseau and Adam Smith. On his return to Buenos Aires he rapidly became involved in public affairs. At first he attached himself to the Spanish liberals who formed Alzaga’s group, acting for a while as their lawyer. However, he gradually became a vigorous exponent of local demands against the restrictions in trade proposed by the Spain-based monopoly merchants. In 1809 he published his Representación de los Hacendados, in which he defended the interests of the local merchants and demanded the opening of the River Plate economy. This document would become one of the most powerful antecedents of the revolution the following year.11 These three men, along with other leading creole characters, were to a large extent the initiators of the River Plate independence movement. However, their evolution towards the ideal of political and economic emancipation from Spain was gradual, and only began to take coherent shape after 1806. Until then, this enlightened creole group of merchants and lawyers seemed content to coexist with the Spanish merchants.12 Meanwhile, other innovations in the River Plate Viceroyalty towards the turn of the century were the reorganization of the educational system (which had not been modified since the Jesuits had been expelled), the creation of the Royal Academy of San Carlos, the installation of the first printing press, and the inauguration of the first theatre in Buenos Aires. However, the political situation, since the creation of the Viceroyalty, had not suffered many changes. When Viceroy Sobremonte, the seventh holder of the post, took over in 1804, the situation in the River Plate was generally speaking one of economic


progress and political and social stability, in spite of the warfare taking place in Europe at that time.

William Pitt and South America: the emergence of the River Plate as a new focus of British attention William Pitt the younger was the first British Prime Minister to take a direct interest in the Spanish American colonies. Nevertheless, as one of Pitt’s biographer’s points out, plans of one sort or the other regarding South America had been taken into consideration since the 1740s by other Prime Ministers, such as Walpole, the elder Pitt, Bute, and Shelburne.13 It was not until the 1780s, however, that Great Britain began taking a more serious interest in the Spanish colonies and, as we shall see, the ensuing plans began to include Buenos Aires as one of the key areas of British intervention in South America. British interest in South America was already manifest in the mid-seventeenth century after British troops took possession of Jamaica in 1655, and Oliver Cromwell declared his interest of extending British conquests to South America as well. The first eighteenth-century plan for a British expedition to Spanish America dates from 1711 when Governor Pullen of Bermuda advised Queen Anne’s chief minister, Robert Harley, the Earl of Oxford, that the River Plate was the best place in the world for establishing a British Colony.14 This suggestion was not taken seriously, and it was not until 1741 that British interest would focus again on South America when Admiral Vernon, after failing in his attempt to attack Cartagena, sought to persuade his Government that Britain ought to favour Spanish American independence in order to open up new markets for the benefit of British merchants. This idea apparently interested the Prime Minister Robert Walpole, but was disregarded by the Government that took office a year later.15 Admiral George Anson during his famous voyage which began only a few months after Vernon’s expedition, was eager to head towards the coasts of Chile and Peru in order to cut off communications between these colonies and Spain.16 Also worth mentioning is the unofficial joint Portuguese–British expedition to the Uruguayan coast in December 1762, though it failed in its objective to recapture Colonia de


Sacramento, which had been taken by the Spanish a few months before.17 The British also attempted to take possession of the Falkland Islands during this period. They claimed these islands for the first time in 1765 when an expedition commanded by Commodore Sir John Byron, grandfather of the famous poet, established a short-lived settlement. This provoked a confrontation with Spain. Britain eventually left the islands in 1774, but did not, however, renounce her claims to this land.18 One reason adduced for Britain’s more persistent interest in Spanish America after 1780, is that both the Franco-Spanish agreement of 1768 and the Franco-Portuguese one of 1783, had placed the French on the same legal footing in the Peninsula as Great Britain. This raised fears in Britain about French activity in the Spanish American colonies, as did the 1778 decree whereby Spain opened the major ports of her American colonies, thus threatening to shift the balance of trade in a new direction.19 Another reason, no doubt, was the presence in London of the Venezuelan Francisco de Miranda, who had arrived in Britain in 1785 and had been advocating the cause of South American emancipation ever since he had set foot in Europe. The British thought it desirable to devise a new and more vigorous policy with respect to Spanish America. One of the first serious plans to be found relating to South America was made a few years before Pitt took office. This plan was sketched out in June 1780, during the final years of Lord North’s long and turbulent Ministry. Elaborated by Colonel William Fullarton and approved by the cabinet, it proposed an expedition to South America via India, with the purpose of securing advantageous positions in Mexico, Peru, and Chile, offering independence to their colonies, and opening the trade of South America to the East Indian territories. This expedition was to be supported financially by the East India Company, as was made clear by the author of the project: If this plan should be adopted by government an arrangement should be made by the confidential directions of the East India Company and orders immediately dispatched by land to Madras and Bengal, that ships, stores and sepoys may be prepared to join


the troops to be sent from England. If the troops sail from hence in September they may arrive in Madras in January and in four months from the time the monsoons permit them to leave India they may reach the coast of South America.20 The East India Company agreed to be a party to this enterprise but, as we later learn from Fullarton himself, the expedition was abandoned on the declaration of the Dutch War.21 These speculations with respect to South America were not confined to residents of Great Britain. John Hippisley, a political writer and later an MP, also took a deep interest in the affairs of the Spanish American colonies during a sojourn in Italy in 1779 and 1780, from where he maintained confidential communications with the British government. Hippisley encountered many Jesuit societies, especially the Hispanic–Mexican and Hispanic–Peruvian groups, which were composed of Jesuits who had served in Spanish America and who were confined to the Vatican after 1767, when Charles III expelled them from Spanish America. Through their information Hippisley became acquainted with the unrest that, according to these informants, existed in some parts of the Spanish American dominions.22 In 1782 he wrote to Warren Hastings, the Governor-General of Bengal, on Fullarton’s behalf, advising that if the situation in India allowed a revival of the previous South American enterprise, the Colonel would readily submit information on the subject. Hippisley also confirmed news of a revolt in Peru, the Tupac Amaru rising, which had occurred the previous year.23 However, after the Versailles Treaty of January 1783, which marked the end of the American War of Independence, there was to be peace in Europe for the next few years. This led Great Britain to refrain from elaborating further agressive policies towards Spanish America. Nevertheless, that war had left a resentment in Britain towards both Spain and France for their support for American independence. Ideas of revenge were entertained by certain members of the Government. Viscount Hood, in charge of the Admiralty, wrote to Lord Hawkesbury: I hope that this Ministry will always keep it in mind the part that Spain took in obtaining the independence of North America and return them the compliment in liberating Spanish America


which I have not a doubt may be effected with a few troops when she is engaged in a war.24 The King, however, although he also felt resentment against France and Spain, would have none of this, as he had made clear to Pitt a year before: I return also the two letters from Mendiola and approve the disclaiming in the strongest manner all idea of interfering in the discontents of the inhabitants of the Spanish settlements in South America, as I ever thought the conduct of France in North America unjustifiable, I certainly can never copy so faithless an example.25 It is true, however, as John Lynch rightly points out, that the absence of compelling political and commercial motives was another reason that governed British policy towards those possessions for some years after 1783.26

In December of 1783 (at the age of twenty-four) William Pitt became Prime Minister, in spite of opposition from those who had been part of the previous coalition government, including the Whig faction led by Charles James Fox, and the Tory wing led by Lord North. Pitt’s Administration was characterized by its break from the party alliances which had maintained different factions of the Whig and Tory parties in power during the two previous years. He went as far as excluding the main figures of his own faction, the Chathamite Whigs, who had been influential in his own rise to power. The most notable victim of this exclusion was Lord Shelburne, one of Pitt’s main political mentors. As Hobhouse has summarized: Party was forgotten in Pitt’s overwhelming triumph; a Whig ruled, and the Tories backed him. Foreign politics were neglected after the Treaty [Versailles] had been signed. It was a time for economic recovery, the least spectacular sort of politics. Pitt could give the country exactly what it needed – sound finance and tranquillity.27


The recovery of Britain’s finances and the maintenance of peace were among Pitt’s main objectives. These were to be achieved, to a considerable degree, in the years preceeding Britain’s entry in the French Wars of 1793. During the first ten years of his government state revenues increased significantly, and wars with the other European powers were avoided. Economic recovery was achieved mainly thanks to the introduction of efficient fiscal policies and greater trade. From 1784 to 1793 British trade almost doubled. Imports increased from 10 million pounds to 20 million during the 1783–90 period alone, while the value of exports during the same period rose from 12 million pounds up to 20 million. Pitt’s Government was responsible for implementing several commercial treaties with other nations where free-trade regulations were implicit. In this sense, it has been frequently suggested that the British Prime Minister was considerably influenced by Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations which had been published a few years before.28 Pitt’s attention was also directed, during these years, to other problems related to the Empire, such as the investigations being held into the irregularities in the management of the East India Company. This became a major issue for the Whig faction of Burke, Fox, and Sheridan, who were the main prosecutors in the House of Commons when the investigations finally led to the impeachment of Warren Hastings in 1788. In the field of foreign affairs, the end of the 1780s brought with it the repercussions of the French Revolution, which had a profound effect in Britain, and to a great extent conditioned Pitt’s domestic policies, especially with regard to parliamentary reform. This widened even more the breach that already existed between the Prime Minister and the Foxite Whigs and the radical groups, and it would have effects on Pitt’s foreign policy. In the case of Spanish America, moreover, it would make Pitt suspicious about Miranda’s plans for emancipation. The Nootka Sound crisis of 1790 turned Britain’s and Pitt’s attention to Spanish America once again. The conflict was the consequence of a dispute between England and Spain over the right to make settlements on the north-west coast of North America. At one point, the conflict drove Pitt and William Grenville, the Prime Minister’s cousin and Home Secretary, to entrust an expedition to


Sir Archibald Campbell and Colonel William Dalrymple to accompany the main expedition to Louisiana, a focus of this crisis, and launch an assault on Mexico. There were also plans to attack Chile and Peru from India, a revival of the Fullarton project. The chances of these plans being put into execution seemed to increase when on 6 May 1790, after his speech in the Commons on the Nootka affair, Pitt (accompanied by Grenville), met Miranda to discuss the prospects of supporting a rising in South America. Pitt showed the Venezuelan’s papers to his cabinet.29 To Miranda’s disgust, the conflict was resolved a few months later and peace with Spain was restored. The Nootka Sound conflict represented, according to Ehrman, a peak in William Pitt’s diplomatic achievements, and strengthened his control over foreign affairs.30 This was just as well, for during the 1790s many problems would arise abroad as a consequence of the drastic changes occurring in France, and in the rest of Europe. The first conflict to arise was the declaration of war by Great Britain on France in 1793, as a result of French involvement in Holland and Belgium. The need to attract Spain to the coalition against France now became greater. Once this was achieved, however, Britain did not provide the expected support for Spain. From the autumn of 1794 until March 1795 the Spanish court was concerned with the possibility of a French invasion, and therefore looked to Britain for encouragement and assistance. But Lord Grenville, now Foreign Minister, responded with only the occasional dispatch, and made clear how little faith he had in Spanish resolve. It is no wonder that in 1796 Spain had a peaceful accommodation with France.31 This would bring South America once again into the picture. By this time, however, Miranda was no longer at hand. He had become a general in the French army under the command of General Charles Dumouriez, and was to take part in the Netherlands campaign. He had gone to Paris with the hope of persuading the French to assist him in his emancipation projects for South America, after his failure with Pitt in England. However, an influential figure in the Pitt Administration was by now starting to develop a firm interest in South America. Henry Dundas was rapidly becoming Pitt’s most faithful and valuable sup-


porter. Upon Pitt’s accession to power Dundas had begun as Treasurer of the Navy, a position he held until 1800. Later he became President of the Board of Control, where he handled the management of the affairs of India, and by 1791 he was Home Secretary. In 1794 he was given the War Office, and from this position he developed an interest in Spanish America. As Lynch has suggested, it is probable that Dundas was encouraged in this interest by certain individuals close to Miranda and at the same time close to the government. They included Governor Brooke of St. Helena and Nicholas Vansittart, a prominent young barrister and Tory member of parliament. These two men formed with others a South American ‘lobby’ under Dundas’s leadership.32 In September 1796 Dundas elaborated a secret memorandum proposing an expedition against Spanish America. He strongly recommended that: The sooner this armament sails the greatest would be the probability of its meeting with a successful passage and it should proceed directly to Buenos Aires which would make very little if any resistance. The squadron would there find a healthy climate and all sorts of refreshments particularly cattle in the greatest abundance, every means should be used to open an amicable intercourse with the Indians of the late Jesuit missions in Paraguay as it is probable the whole of that extensive country might be induced to claim the protection of the British government, and would form one of the most productive and improvable colonies in the world.33 Interestingly enough, attention was now focused on Buenos Aires, not on Mexico, Chile, or Peru, as in the previous plans, nor on Caracas as Miranda favoured. As future plans reflected, Dundas preferred this part of South America more than any other. It is possible that his interest in this specific region, as well as the idea of co-operation with the Indians, was a consequence of his aquaintance with Hippisley, although there is no sure evidence that the two men were in contact at that time. At the same time debates occurred in Cabinet about the merits of supporting continental campaigns in Europe against the French, as


opposed to a concentration on overseas conquests. Dundas was clearly a supporter of the latter, whereas Grenville was committed to a continental strategy and was influential in restraining Pitt from succumbing to the arguments on the side of Dundas’s overseas policies.34 By the end of 1796, Britain’s priority was the Mediterranean, where she was assisting the Austrians, now Britain’s only ally, in their struggle to keep France and Napoleon out of Italy. All the same, William Huskisson, Dundas’s under-secretary at the War Office, suggested that: The plan of making an attack on Buenos Aires ought nevertheless to be acted upon, and carried into effect as soon as the attention due to the Mediterranean service will admit.35 But this plan was soon rejected once again. Some members the Cabinet were, however, unhappy with the abandonment of the Buenos Aires plan. Lord Spencer, who had replaced Dundas at the Admiralty Office, shared this dissatisfaction, as his views in a letter to Dundas reflect: I need not tell your Lordship, who knows all my feelings on the subject, that I never in my life put pen on paper with more reluctance than I do to relinquish a plan of operation, which presented to this country much fair prospect of glory and permanent advantage.36 Towards the end of 1797, Thomas Picton, the future Governor of Trinidad, suggested to Dundas that ‘a moral revolution’ should be attempted, preferably in Cumana or Caracas.37 In 1798, after the capture of Trinidad by British forces, Pitt himself seemed to incline once more towards plans for South American expeditions. This renewed interest was enhanced by the return to England of Miranda, who had failed in his attempts to persuade the French to take action in South America. His adventures in France took place during the apocalyptic years of 1793 to 1797. As mentioned above, Miranda had enrolled as a general of the French army in the Dutch and Belgian campaigns under General Dumouriez, with whom he


had become friendly. However, after the complete failure of this expedition, Dumouriez and Miranda blamed each other for the reverse. Miranda subsequently spent the rest of his days in France in and out of jail, and narrowly escaped being guillotined during the Jacobin terror.38 As soon as he set foot in England again, Miranda again sought Pitt’s assistance. The main problem was to know who exactly Miranda was representing and what certainty there was of immediate creole support in South America for any British expedition. Neither his explanations – that he was representing a revolutionary junta composed of ‘deputies’ who had been sent from Spanish America to co-ordinate a project for the emancipation of their native lands from Spain, a junta which was supposed to have met in Paris in December 1797 – nor his military plans convinced Pitt completely.39 Some time in 1798 or 1799 Sir Ralph Abercromby, who had been responsible for the capture of Trinidad, presented a memorandum to the Government. He recounted the circumstances that had led to Britain’s involvement in Egypt, recently attacked by Napoleon Bonaparte. He concluded: Of all the objects that ought to claim our attention, the liberation of South America from the dominion of Spain seems to stand first; it can only be accomplished while we are still at war with Spain, and if it should be happily effected, it would be beyond the negotiation of peace. It should be undertaken without any view to conquest, to exclusive commerce or to plunder. Every port in South America, and the whole trade of that extensive continent, should be declared free, and laid open to every nation in the world. Every country should feel interested in it, Spain and Portugal excepted: Great Britain from her enterprise, from her capital, and from her industry, would in reality possess nine parts in ten of this great commerce. A market would be equally opened for British and East India commodities.40 He added that Buenos Aires and Montevideo, because of their strategic importance, should be considered the main targets of this plan. This new project, together with the continuous pressure from Miranda and rumours about the possibility of the United States’s


involvement in South American liberation schemes, increased the pressure on the Government to reach some decision. Dundas was still in favour of sending an expedition to South America to emancipate the colonies from Spain, much on the same lines suggested by Abercromby’s plan. His view, however, was opposed yet again by Lord Grenville: I have a very strong opinion that we ought not by any means to engage in the projects of General Miranda, or in those of the government of the United States of America, on this subject. It ought to be a very clear and certain prospect of good to be done by such measures, that should induce us to extend the spirit of revolutions, and to involve in that system the whole continent of South America.41 Lord Grenville’s views on this matter were not that much in accord with those of William Windham, the Secretary of War, who later, in conjunction with Grenville, was to play a major role in Britain’s South American policy: Every one, I suppose, will have a great distrust of the projects of General M.[Miranda], and not any great confidence in those of the United States of America. It is, in fact, from the horror of a revolution conducted by either one or the other, and the apprehension that such an attempt will notwithstanding be made, that I cannot but join with Mr. D.[Dundas] in thinking the subject well worthy of consideration, however strong the objections to which every measure of the sort must be liable.42 Pitt agreed with Grenville. He was wary about supporting emancipation and republican ideals after what had happened in France and, closer to South America, in Saint Domingue a few years before. During the course of November 1799, there were more debates in Pitt’s cabinet concerning Great Britain’s future policy, chiefly between Dundas and Grenville. On this occasion, the latter’s arguments were supported by the Home Secretary Lord Portland (who had replaced Dundas in that position in 1794) and Windham, in


what basically turned out to be a clash between the War Office and the Foreign Office. Dundas warned Grenville that he should not regard overseas conquests as diplomatic pawns that could be exchanged for territorial concessions on the continent. He also attempted to persuade the Foreign Minister, with regard to strategy, to give more priority to existing colonial trade, and to think of extending it to South America. His main concern, however, was with the defence of Turkish dominion in the Middle East in order to protect the Indian Empire.43 Dundas was the loser in this discussion, as the government chose to concentrate on a continental strategy. This did not, however, discourage the Secretary of War’s appetite for elaborating new plans for a South American campaign. In April 1800 Dundas presented a memorandum in April 1800 suggesting that the Government should drop its plans for attacking France, in alliance with the Austrians, and direct operations towards the Mediterranean and South America instead.44 He wrote to the Prime Minister as follows: If I am right on the ideas I have formed on the importance of the South American market to the interests of this country it is certainly highly material that the present moment should not be lost; for we cannot suppose that Spain, in its exhausted state, is capable to retain an efficient sovereignty over that country, as little can we suppose that France will long refrain from converting to her own use these advantages which will obviously result from a commercial intercourse with South America. Indeed, it is by no means unlikely that if we neglect the means now in our power, our foreberance may lead to the introduction and extension of a revolutionizing system to that immense empire.45 He later added that: Such being my view I disclaim all plan of conquest or colonization; but I propose to secure to this country commercial stations in such positions as bid fair to open to us, gradually and permanently, a commercial intercourse with the inhabitants of the rich provinces of the continent of South America.46


He further suggested that the main points of interest should be such widely distant locations as New Orleans, the River Plate, the river Orinoco and the coast of Chile. Grenville reacted strongly against the persistence of Dundas and his South American schemes asking: What possible justification can he find, for involving in all the horrors of confusion, anarchy, & civil war a large portion of the Globe, containing many millions of men, who have done us no injury, nor contributed in any perceptible degree to prolong or supported the war.47 In fact, the clash between the two ministers was not to last much longer. In March 1801 Pitt resigned after failing to persuade the King to accept his Catholic Emancipation policy. South American policy was thus left in limbo.

It is difficult to define exactly Pitt’s attitude towards Spanish America during these years. Most of the time, he seemed uncomfortable when the issue was raised. Although he usually agreed with Dundas, when it came to Spanish America he was more inclined to adopt Grenville’s position. It seems rash then, to assert, as Roberts has done, that Pitt favoured South American independence for commercial reasons.48 John Street also agrees with Roberts on this point.49 Although this was certainly the position of Dundas, and Pitt himself was certainly interested in South America as a market, there seems to be no evidence that this led him to favour South American emancipation. As Miranda’s biographer concludes ‘we can do little more than speculate about Pitt’s precise object in the Spanish Indies’.50 The new Administration was led by Henry Addington as Prime Minister, who signed the controversial Peace of Amiens with France a year after taking office. The administration included Nicholas Vansittart as joint Secretary of the Treasury. Vansittart, as mentioned before, had been interested in South American affairs for many years, and was one of Miranda’s closest friends in England. He was also responsible for introducing Miranda to Admiral Home


Popham, who had just arrived from the Cape of Good Hope.51 Popham was closely linked to Dundas, a fellow Scot, and had kept in touch with him and Husskisson during his stay at the Cape, encouraging them not to abandon plans for an expedition to Buenos Aires.52 He formed a close association in London with both Miranda and Vansittart, as well as with Alexander Davison, a successful government contractor. These men rapidly began to elaborate plans for an expedition which would have as its aim the emancipation of South America. The main problem they were to encounter was that the British government, although still on unfriendly terms with Spain, was also concerned that Spain should not fall completely under French dominion. Lord Pelham, the Home Secretary, showed interest in Spanish American emancipation, but had to emphasize this point to all those interested in the South American cause: The idea of liberating South America is certainly not a new one to me; but I think it one of those great measures, the consequences of which must have so very extensive an influence that I can not venture to give my consent to making the attempt without a further discussion, and without knowing the principles and ulterior views of those with whom I am to embark in the enterprise. It might be the means of shutting us completely out of Europe – an extremity we may be driven to, and, therefore, it might be wise to look to it. But I am not prepared to say that we should engage in an enterprise that may accelerate it by throwing Spain still more into the hands of France. It is impossible to support the independence of Old Spain, and be admitted to a participation of the trade in New Spain.53 The Government’s caution did not, however, stop Miranda and Popham from preparing plans for an expedition. After the renewal of war with France in 1803, Popham presented a secret memorandum to Charles Yorke, the Secretary of War, in which he proposed an expedition to South America which would have Buenos Aires and Venezuela as its main targets. Most alarming in this plan were Popham’s ideas regarding the fate of these colonies once liberated from Spain. Though it had never hitherto been clear what Popham’s position was on this point, here it was made manifest:


It must be evident to every person who possesses a knowledge of the geographical situation of the great continent, its population and resources, that any permanent influence of Great Britain, whether fixed by absolute conquest, or conquest in the first instance, followed up by successful political intrigue, (which I contend is authorized by all usages of war) must offer the greatest commercial advantages, not only to this country, but to our possessions in India, by opening a direct trade on each side of the continent, and drawing all the wealth of Spanish America from our enemies, which has always been their principal support in every war with Great Britain.54 It seems evident that Popham’s main idea for this enterprise was commercial and that he envisaged British conquest to achieve this goal, unlike Miranda who clearly expected assistance from this nation to help secure independence from the Spanish Crown. It is also worth noticing that the link with India appears once again, and they are similar to the objectives contained in Fullarton’s plan. During its three years of office the Addington Administration never showed much interest in South America. There was no decisive break between Great Britain and Spain during these years. Addington’s government was unpopular, and the nation was alarmed by the French menace, now that Napoleon was in such a commanding position. It did not come as much of a surprise when in May 1804 Pitt returned to power. The return of Pitt to office also brought back Dundas, by now referred to as Viscount Melville, who this time went to the Admiralty. But not all the old Pitt loyalists were back. Lord Grenville refused to join the new Ministry after his cousin, strongly influenced by the King, had rejected the idea of forming a union of parties, which would include Fox and his faction, and which Grenville believed was essential in the circumstances.55 Grenville’s absence signified an additional boost for the Spanish American ‘lobby’ for they would now be able to deal with Melville, and eventually with Pitt, without any opposition from the Cabinet. Their cause was further enhanced when Spain once more declared war on Britain that same year, after the seizure of Spanish frigates by British forces.


These circumstances were enough to whet the appetite of Miranda, Popham, and their friends. It was not long before new memoranda and all sorts of plans on Spanish America started piling up again. In October 1804 Pitt arranged a meeting with Melville, Popham, and Miranda to discuss the possibility of sending an expedition to South America. At this meeting Miranda was assured by Melville that if such an expedition was to take place, its sole objective would be to secure independence for the Latin Americans: For even if England wished to retain a part of South America for herself she could not do so because the difficulties encountered in sending from time to time two thousand Englishmen to India to preserve dominions that she possessed in nearly absolute sovereignty was almost impossible.56 This conclusion was further emphasized in Popham’s new memorandum, which contained a significant change from his previous proposal, and was also clearer in its objectives: The idea of conquering South America is totally out of the question, but the possibility of gaining all its prominent points, alienating it from its present European connexions, fixing on some military position and enjoying all its commercial advantages can be reduced to a fair calculation, if not a certain operation; the nerve and spirit which such an enterprise would give to this country if successful are incalculable, the riches that it would bring in, the new sources that it would open for our manufactures and navigation both from Europe and Terra Firma, and from Asia to the Pacific are equally incalculable and the popularity and stability it would give any government that undertook it may be estimated from the preceding propositions with the additional satisfaction of knowing that some accounts must be received of the result of its first operation in three months after it sailed from England.57 The destination of this new expedition would once again be Venezuela and Buenos Aires, in that order of preference.


Another plan was sent to the Government by William Jacob, a traveller, miscellaneous writer, and later Tory MP for Rye, Sussex.58 Jacob’s plan consisted of a triple expedition to different points of Spanish America, the logic being that If one or even two of them failed, the other might be secure, and form a point, from whence future attacks might be made, with the greatest certainty of success.59 The targets were Buenos Aires, Chile and Panama. Jacob argued that the great advantage for both Britain and South America was the [c]onsumption of our manufactures; and as I have no doubt but in their present state, to say nothing of what improvement may be produced, by infusing British spirit amongst them, the inhabitants of that country would consume a quantity of our commodities, equal in value to what we now export to every part of the world, I feel no necessity of enlarging on its advantages or showing how much such an increase of exports, would augment our marine, and improve every other source of our national prosperity.60 There was a novel element in this project. As is clear from by its title, it embodied detailed analysis about the character of the inhabitants of Spanish America. This knowledge was acquired by Jacob no doubt through conversations with South Americans and Spaniards living in England, such as the New Granadan Pedro Fermin de Vargas and Joseph Pavia, a former Spanish officer who had held posts in both Venezuela and Mexico. Like Miranda, they were eager to take part in any British expedition. 61 Influenced by their accounts of the favourable disposition of the South Americans towards a British expedition, Jacob came to the conclusion that it would be in Britain’s best interest to transform these colonies into independent states. He was also confident about the proposed attack on Buenos Aires: I consider the landing of the troops, and the submission of the country the same thing. Buenos Aires is unfortified, and its numerous population is fed principally on animal food, which is


brought daily from the plains, and therefore if for but a day or two that channel was stopped, famine could produce a surrender. The few troops at Cordoba, and Corrientes, and Tucuman, when collected would never be able to meet our own forces, or intercept their supplies.62 In the light of future events Jacob’s optimism appears somewhat simple-minded, but it is nevertheless clear that Jacob possessed at least some information about the territory he was proposing to attack. In a follow up letter to Pitt Jacob said that he hoped ‘the glory which awaits the liberator of Spanish America will be yours and inmark [sic] the honourable custom [sic] of your name’.63 At about the same time Captain Charles Herbert warned Melville about the urgency of organizing an expedition to Spanish America before the French got hold of any portion of this continent. He recommended that the attack should not be directed against the island colonies, Mexico or the Spanish Main: Those are not parts of America to attack for many reasons, of which the least forcible, is the terrible enmity of the climate to Europeans; any army landed there, would always melt away under its pestilence, before it could do anything decisive. Rio de la Plata must be the spot where the death blow to Spanish American power must be struck.64 Pitt, however, though he had shown renewed interest some months earlier, was now once again rapidly losing interest in the whole South American cause. Kauffmann suggests that one reason was that Pitt was too occupied with the formation of the Third Coalition against France, and was obsessed with obtaining Russia’s participation in this alliance. A major condition for Russian agreement was that Great Britain should re-establish relations with Spain. Tsar Alexander expressed to Pitt his desire to see the conflict between Spain and Britain resolved. Eventually, the Act of Coalition was signed in April 1805. It provided for the inclusion of Spain, and Russia was to use her influence in Madrid to put an end to the conflict between Spain and Britain.65 Another major blow to the Spanish American lobby was, as Rydjord points out, the impeachment of Melville, which forced him


to retire from office. A special commission had been formed to inquire into frauds and irregularities in the naval departments. By February 1805 suspicions of Melville’s conduct while he had been head of the Treasureship of the Navy between 1784 and 1798 increased: there was conclusive evidence that large sums of public money had been applied to uses other than those of the Navy.66 Even after France reached a commanding situation in Europe as a result of Napoleon’s resounding victories over the Austrian and Pussian armies during 1805, Pitt remained unconvinced about the Spanish American strategy. According to Lynch, the main cause for Pitt’s continuing indecision was ‘the traditional factors inhibiting British policy in Spanish America, fear of the political consequences of disrupting the area, reluctance to undertake the heavy military commitment involved, and lack of conviction in the commercial argument’.67 These factors, along with the absence of Melville, seem to have reinforced Pitt’s reluctance to endorse plans for South American expeditions, even though Popham and Miranda kept on pressing him. Eventually Popham and Miranda decided to part company. Miranda, with the permission of the British Government, began to recruit volunteers, and set off to recruit more in the United States, in order to gather enough men for an expedition to Caracas. Popham departed for the Cape of Good Hope, where a British expedition had been sent to recover the Cape, then in the hands of the French. The main reason why Popham embarked in this expedition was because the Cape was the ideal spot from which to launch an expedition to South America when the time was ripe. William Pitt died in January 1806. The defeat of the Third Coalition, at Austerlitz, although partially alleviated by the news of Trafalgar, was a final blow for him. The question of Spanish American policy was left unresolved by Pitt and his administration, although the events that were to take place in the months that followed were in part a consequence of these previous years of planning and scheming.

2 The British Invasions of the River Plate

It is probable that the British invasions of the River Plate would never have taken place had it not been for the determination of Sir Home Popham. He had been exploring the possibilities of carrying out his plan for an expedition to this area for six years. Although the other commanders who took part in this expedition and the British Government itself were also to blame for the many mistakes made during this enterprise, Sir Home Popham was responsible for ensuring that the River Plate expedition got under way in the first place. The only person who could have prevented Popham’s expedition from setting out was the Military Commander in the Cape of Good Hope, Sir David Baird. He agreed to give Popham permission to embark on this project as Naval Commander, and supplied him with troops which were placed under the command of General William Carr Beresford. The following words adressed to Beresford by Baird express the ambiguity and confusion that would characterize the expedition: it is alike impossible and unnecessary for me to give you any specific instructions or advice. Your proceedings can alone be governed by circumstances, and I feel the fullest persuasion, that the general good of the service will be the leading principles of your conduct in all situations.1 One would have thought that the ‘leading principles’ of Beresford’s conduct should have been provided by Popham, who 33


after all had spent so many years – with Pitt, Melville, and Miranda among others – sketching out memoranda on all sorts of expeditions to South America. Nevertheless, two days later Baird wrote to Lord Castlereagh at the War Office, assuming joint responsibility for the enterprise on behalf of both himself and of Sir Home: In forming this determination I am perfectly aware that both the Commodore and myself have taken upon ourselves a high responsibility; but the great importance of the object, in a national point of view will, I trust, bear us out, and excuse us to His Majesty, for conducting a service, having previously received his special and gracious commands.2 By this time, however, Lord Castlereagh was no longer in office. On the death of Pitt, the Government was replaced by the ‘Ministry of All the Talents’. Popham, for his part, was also in touch with Lord Castlereagh, as well as with William Marsden at the Admiralty. In his first letter to Castlereagh, he sent a copy of his 1804 memorandum proposing an expedition to the River Plate by way of justifying his present conduct. He added: You will observe my Lord; that the paper in question holds out under certain combinations, some prospect of a general emancipation in South America, and that the great organ of action in this undertaking is General Miranda who is now in London. Rio de la Plata is one of the points proposed to be attacked, and was considered more a military position than one of absolute negotiation, though considerable dependence was placed on the effect which a successful issue in other places might have had in that respect. If therefore such an enterprise on general grounds of advantage to the Kingdom has been so long in agitation by different cabinets, I have reason to conclude that no formidable objection has ever existed either to the principle or policy of the measure. I am however aware that much has been said on the expediency of foreign territorial acquisition, taken simply as a conquest, but the agreement applied to situations without commercial resources, and which were exceedingly remote from the inspection or intercourse of the mother country.3

The British Invasions of the River Plate 35

There were a few errors in this letter. General Miranda was not in London at that time; he was in Caracas. With the few American and English soldiers he had managed to recruit, he was trying to overthrow Spanish rule and promote independence. Popham was obviously unaware of this. He also misunderstood, or intentionally avoided mentioning that a British expedition to Spanish America had been vetoed by previous British Governments, precisely because the principles and policies justifying such an enterprise never seemed sufficiently convincing. The last paragraph is the most intriguing; Popham seems convinced of the ‘expediency’ of not taking the River Plate as a conquest. This was consistent with the main principles set out in his last memorandum on this subject, but it was a notion that was dropped once the troops disembarked in Buenos Aires and operations had begun. According to Ferns, the contradiction between conquest and liberation was one Sir Home was never able to resolve during the expedition.4 The controversial character of Sir Home should not, however, have surprised those who were acquainted with him, for controversy seems to be a constant feature of his career. Home Popham was born on 12 October 1762 in Tetuan, where his father Stephen was Consul. He was the twenty-first child of his mother, who died after giving birth to him. He was educated at Westminster and Cambridge. In 1778 he entered the Navy and, after stations in Calcutta and Ostend, he served with distinction in China. Shortly after, however, he was charged with illegal trading in contravention of the East India Company charter. In later years he served in Antwerp – where he was made a Knight of the Order of Malta by the King and Queen of Holland for his services – and also in Egypt. Here he met another South American plotter, Sir Ralph Abercromby, who was probably the man first responsible for Popham’s later interest in the continent. In 1804 Sir Home was under investigation for ‘enormous and unnecessary’ expenditure while in India, but apparently these accusations were unproven. They had been advanced by Benjamin Tucker, the secretary of Admiral Lord St. Vincent, who for some unknown reason always disliked Popham. By this stage in his career, Popham had made quite a few enemies in the Navy. Other notable features of his naval career include his abilities as an astronomical observer and


his use of the chronometer for determining longitudes whilst in the Red Sea – a method which at that time was rarely so consistently employed. He also perfected a code of signals which was adopted by the navy in 1803 and which continued in use for a long time.5 Although he made many enemies in the Navy – apart from St. Vincent, he was also disliked by such notables as Sir Samuel Hood and Sir Richard Goodwin Keates – Popham managed to secure himself successive seats in Parliament, where he was Tory member for several different constituencies. From this position he strengthened his links with the Pittite faction and with other prominent Tory politicians who supported Pitt’s policies. The most notable of these figures were Melville, William Huskisson, and Nicholas Vansittart. They cultivated Popham, and made him their chosen candidate for the command of an expedition to South America whenever it should be approved. As early as February 1801 Popham was corresponding with Huskisson, then junior secretary to Melville at the Admiralty Office, and advising him about the convenience of sending an expedition to the River Plate as soon as possible.6 This occurred while Popham was at the Cape of Good Hope, from where Melville had asked him to give detailed notice of any news he heard from Buenos Aires. As we have seen, an expedition to the Plate had been one of Melville’s favourite projects for some time.7 Lord Melville was out of office at the time of the River Plate invasions – he was being subjected to thorough investigation for irregularities in the administration of the East India Company. He was nonetheless elated when he heard the news of Sir Home’s initial success: … you know that for a number of years the acquisition of the market of South America has been a most favourite object with me and if our ministers are not infatuated they have it now in their power without a difficulty. I am likewise most truly rejoiced that the prize has fallen into Sir Home’s hands: if some of those who sit at the table of the Admiralty can blush I think they must have done so when they read the dispatches and recollect the multiplied injuries they have done that gallant and meritorious officer and servant of the public.8


It was absolutely clear that, from the moment in the summer of 1805 when Sir Home had finally persuaded William Pitt to allow him to embark on the expedition to recover the Cape of Good Hope from the French, this was for him a springboard for his South American venture. As he himself put it in his court martial more than a year after the failure of his expedition: On the 29th of July, 1805, I took leave of Mr. Pitt, when I had a long conversation with him on the original project of the expedition to South America; in the course of which Mr. Pitt informed me that [in] the then state of Europe, and the confederacy in part formed, and forming against France, there was a great anxiety to endeavour, by friendly negotiation, to detach Spain from her connection with that power; and that, until the result of such an attempt should be known, it was desirable to suspend all hostile operations in South America; but that in case of failure in this object, it was his intention again to enter on the original project.9 Once he had reached the Cape, Sir Home sought desperately for any excuse that would allow him to go ahead with his main objective. That moment finally arrived: On the 4th March 1806, I learnt of the defeat of the Russian Army at Austerlitz, and that Bonaparte was in possession in Vienna. This Honourable Court will, therefore, not fail to observe the causes which contributed to suspend any expedition to South America, as a matter of policy, and to change my original destination to an attack on the Cape, were suddenly done away.10 According to The Morning Chronicle, Sir David Baird only agreed to provide men to Popham for this enterprise once he was assured that he would receive two-fifths of the prize money from the River Plate invasions.11 On 28 March Popham received details of the defenceless state of the River Plate from an American merchant called Thomas Waine,12 and on 9 April he wrote to the Admiralty informing them that he intended to sail to the South American coast in search of flour.13


This he did eventually on 14 April, taking with him Beresford’s troops. His original idea was first to take possession of Montevideo, but it was then argued that there was a better chance of securing supplies for his army in Buenos Aires. He changed his destination. Whether this was just an excuse is not known but, as we have seen, the latter city had always seemed to be the main target in the different memoranda. Fortescue has nevertheless suggested that the reason for the change of destination to Buenos Aires was that there was more prize money to be found in that city.14 When, on 27 June 1806, Sir Home arrived in Buenos Aires, with a mere 1600 troops, he did not act according to the memorandum he had elaborated years before with Lord Melville. What ideals guided Sir Home during the whole enterprise are hard to establish. General Beresford’s letter to Lord Castlereagh of 11 July 1806 illustrates the lack of any clear guidelines for the operations: His Majesty’s Ministers must be fully aware of the very peculiar predicament in which I am at present placed, being not only without instructions to guide me in the civil duties I have to perform; but altogether unacquainted even with the outlines of what may be the intentions of His Majesty’s government in respect to this place.15 Later in the same letter, Beresford makes some interesting observations about the possible reaction of the population of Buenos Aires to the invaders: Since writing my letter to Sir David Baird I have had such information as assures me that the people of this city are not only more reconciled to the change of masters but would be well satisfied and desire to remain under His Majesty’s protection and nothing but the fear of again falling under the dominion of their late masters prevents them from coming openly forward and our present small force cannot give them sufficient confidence not to fear the consequences of such a step and being myself ignorant of what may be the intentions of His Majesty’s Government I am necessarily cautious of advancing anything that will commit it or occasion the people to commit themselves and until I am instructed on that point I will be satisfied that everything


remains quiet. Certainly however if we retain this place only during the war and that my instructions will permit me we can act a part here that will totally alienate the affections of the people from the Spanish yoke and which if it is again restored to that government will make it extremely difficult for it to govern.16 From these observations one could conclude that Sir Home and General Beresford were waiting for Government authorization to go ahead with some kind of liberation. However, what seems to be implicit in the memorandum is that from the moment Sir Home decided to launch the expedition, the liberation question would remain vague. In a letter to W. Marsden written a few months later, Sir Home hints that the lack of resolution regarding liberation was not his responsibility: … the object of this expedition was considered by the natives to apply principally to their independence; by the blacks to their total liberation; and if General Beresford had felt himself authorized, or justified, in confirming either of these propositions, no exertions whatever would have been made to dispossess him of his conquest.17 This was indeed a serious accusation to make. Apart from the fact that apparently Beresford and Popham never got on well with each other, this assessment raises the question of who was in fact in charge during this enterprise.18 Although Beresford was the troop commander, it is difficult to imagine that, had it been Sir Home’s firm intention, right from the start, to assist the natives in their emancipation, he could not have persuaded Beresford to comply. Moreover, Popham seemed interested in having other details settled before resolving that matter. One of his first imprudent actions after occupation was to invite the mercantile community in England, to whom he wrote immediately, to take advantage of such a significant acquisition. This step would surely have been more appropriate once it became clear that he had effectively taken control of the situation there. What is more intriguing however, and what raises even more doubts


about Popham’s real intentions, is the lack of evidence of any type of contact between him and the inhabitants of the River Plate. In the letter to Marsden he indicated that he had been in touch with Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, who was gradually emerging as one of the main figures of the Buenos Aires resistance movement. Nevertheless Popham does not appear to have made many other approaches to the creole faction. One of the reasons for this may have been that for most of the time he remained on board ship, but this seems a lame explanation for failing to establish closer contacts with the creoles. Furthermore, had he been eager to favour an emancipation scheme, one might expect that he would have dwelt more on this subject during his court martial.

It is not our intention to go into all the details of the developments that led to the failure of the initial phase of the expedition. However we must flag the main events.19 Things started to go wrong for the British squadron earlier than expected. Right from the start there was an urgent need for reinforcements. Beresford had sent requests for such reinforcements both to Baird, now in Saint Helena, and to Castlereagh. Baird promptly sent around 2000 men, but the government sent reinforcements only when it received the first dispatches from the Plate. This was in midSeptember and by that time Lord Castlereagh, as mentioned above, was already out of office, replaced by William Windham. The reinforcements were sent under the command of Sir Samuel Auchmuty and sailed on 9 October. All communications between the commanders in the Río de la Plata and the British Government were subject to the enormous time it took in those days for despatches to arrive. This must always be borne in mind when following developments in Buenos Aires and the handling of the situation by the government. The reinforcements did not arrive when they were most needed. Although July had been quiet in terms of skirmishes between the British garrison and the River Plate population, the latter gradually began to grow impatient as it became clearer that the British invaders had no intention of initiating any king of emancipation, at


least not until they got some sort of go-ahead from England. Beresford’s proclamation granting freedom of worship, religion and commerce (with England only) to the River Plate Provinces, which was promulgated as soon as the expedition had arrived in Buenos Aires, had little effect on the locals, especially given that these socalled advantages were to be effected under the patronage of King George III. Sir Home Popham also provoked resentment when he ordered the immediate confiscation of the local treasure which was being transported inland by the Viceroy of the River Plate, the Marquess of Sobremonte. He had decided to flee to Córdoba to prevent the British laying hands on the treasure, an action which was regarded by the creoles as combining cowardice and treachery. This state of affairs gave rise to a state of animosity towards the British, and the native elite decided to create a militia led by Martín de Pueyrredón and Santiago de Liniers, a French officer in the service of the Spanish Crown who had arrived in the River Plate a few years before. In early August this local militia under the leadership of Liniers confronted a British battalion led by Beresford. Although the militia were quickly dispersed, reinforcements arrived from Montevideo. The city of Buenos Aires prepared to confront the British Army, and on 12 August after almost three days of fighting, the British were forced to surrender and the locals recaptured the city. This was a fatal blow for Beresford and for Popham, the main architect of this project. Both men later complained bitterly to the British Government about the conduct of the local inhabitants, many of whom had sworn their allegiance to King George III. This complaint Fortescue correctly calls ridiculous. If the creoles had been guaranteed some assistance from the British in liberating themselves from Spain, such lamentations would have been more understandable. Given the ambiguous nature of the enterprise from the very moment the British forces arrived in the River Plate, it was to be expected that at a certain point an insurrection would take place. Beresford was taken prisoner. Popham, who was safely on board his ship, managed to sail back to England a few months later. According to Fortescue this was most unfortunate, for it prevented the colonists ‘hanging him as he deserved’.20


Since first landing at the Cape of Good Hope Popham had used every possible argument to persuade his superiors to allow him to embark on this expedition. He had obviously spent a considerable amount of time working on this project, and his memoranda clearly suggest that he was aware of many factors, including such as the economic oppression to which the South American colonists were subjected by the Spanish Crown, and he had probably persuaded himself that this was reason enough to atempt the expedition. But given his complete irresolution, his lack of both tact and realism once he had arrived in the River Plate, one finds it difficult to agree with Ferns when he concludes that Sir Home ‘had a good knowledge of the politics behind his adventure and shrewd notions of what might be the consequences of his action in economic as well as military terms’.21 When Sir Home eventually landed in England, he had to face a Court Martial for having acted without official instructions. The trial took place in 1807, and was presided over by Admiral Lord St. Vincent (which Popham must have deeply resented). Among the witnesses called were Lord Melville and Huskisson, who were mainly questioned about the contacts between themselves, Pitt and Popham. They confirmed that Pitt had never authorized such an expedition, but that he had always remained open-minded about such a project, should the situation in Europe favour it. Popham conducted his own defence so well that he got off with only a severe reprimand for his actions.22 Beresford, as we have already mentioned, was taken prisoner and sent into the interior with many other British officers and soldiers. His ordeals in captivity will figure in the next chapter. Although both Beresford and Popham have been criticized for their failure to help emancipate the creoles of the River Plate, the instructions that were eventually sent to them by Windham were hardly more decisive: But the part of your conduct requiring most care is that which relates to the assurances to be given, in proclamation or otherwise, to the inhabitants of these provinces as to the support which they may ultimately have to expect from His Majesty’s Arms, as from stipulations to be made in their favour in the event of peace. On this head you cannot follow a better rule than that


which you have hitherto pursued, of abstaining from any declarations by which His Majesty would stand pledged to any conditions which might not be in his power to make good, and which might lead the inhabitants of the Spanish provinces into measures of which they might afterwards repent.23 Needless to say, by the time these instructions were drawn up the fate of the initial stage of the expedition had been sealed. However, they are a good indication of the degree of confusion the new Government suffered with respect to the whole enterprise, although as we shall see later, their members had never even been warned that the expedition was taking place.

As mentioned above, a squadron under the command of Auchmuty had been sent to reinforce Beresford’s men. Auchmuty naturally received from Windham the same orders that had been given to Beresford and Popham. He was to place himself under Beresford’s command and, if the latter had surrendered or was found to be in difficulties, he was to establish a foothold in the area and hold it for at least three weeks, by which time further reinforcements of three thousand men would arrive.24 Auchmuty reached the shores of Montevideo on 29 October, where he met Popham, still on board his ship awaiting for permission to sail back to England. He acquainted Auchmuty with the new situation. Auchmuty sailed towards the eastern coast of what is now Uruguay and, once there, decided to take possession of both the island of Gorriti and the locality of Maldonado, which were defenceless, in order to establish a headquarters and base from where he could eventually attempt to recapture Buenos Aires once the reinforcements from England had arrived. However, to get closer to Buenos Aires Auchmuty decided that there was no alternative but to occupy Montevideo itself, even without reinforcements. This Auchmuty succeeded in doing at the beginning of February. In Buenos Aires meanwhile, the local militia commanders had deposed Sobremonte and named Liniers as his successor. On hearing this news Auchmuty was optimistic about the prospects of


persuading Liniers and his faction to throw off Spanish rule and accept that of King George. He was still under the impression that the creoles would prefer anything to falling again into the hands of their old masters. He would, however, be rapidly disillusioned by the information received from Beresford, who had arrived in Montevideo in May after escaping from the Argentine interior with the assistance of two prominent Rioplatense creoles. He assured Auchmuty that there was no way he could achieve his ambitions with Liniers’s Government. Auchmuty offered the command of his forces to Beresford. This offer was declined and therefore Auchmuty had no alternative but to wait for reinforcements to arrive. In the meantime he spent his time corresponding with members of the Government in Buenos Aires in search of some kind of peaceful solution. Auchmuty never satisfied the Rioplatenses, for he expected that they would surrender their positions so that the British could recover the city. This correspondence, along with the information he received from Montevideo, might have enabled Auchmuty to form a clearer picture of the situation in Buenos Aires, of the politics of the ruling faction, and of their attitudes to both the English presence and Spanish rule. However, in March Auchmuty sent this somewhat simplistic report to England:

From the answers [of the local inhabitants] it may be supposed, that the leading people are unanimous in their determination to defend the place and to keep their prisoners. But it appears that there are two parties in that city. The party now in power, are mostly natives of Spain, in the principal offices of the church and state and devoted to the Spanish Government. It has been their policy to inflame the minds of the lower order against the English, by every species of exaggeration and falsehood, and to lead them to such acts of atrocity as may preclude the possibility of any communications with us from a consciousness, that similarly situated, they would breathe nothing but revenge, they expect no mercy, and are become desperate and determined. The second party consist of natives of the country, with some Spaniards, that are settled in it. The oppression of the mother country, has made them most anxious to


shake off the Spanish yoke and though from their ignorance, their want of morals, and the barbarity of their dispositions, they are totally unfitted to govern themselves, they aim to follow the steps of the North Americans, and erect an independent state. If we would promise them independence, they would instantly revolt against the government and join us, with the great mass of inhabitants.25 Apart from the fact that Auchmuty’s opinion of the native faction was extremely exaggerated and dismissive, he had not grasped the essence of the situation. Reinforcements finally arrived at Montevideo on 10 May under the command of General John Whitelocke, who had been chosen as the new Commander in the River Plate by the Talents Ministry. The circumstances surrounding the nomination of this officer were quite peculiar. Whitelocke’s record included distinguished service in the West Indies and a controversial intervention in Saint Domingue in 1794 where he had last served. According to Fortescue, his character was enough to indicate that he was not the right man for this job: His most objectionable characteristic seems to have been arrogant but spasmodic self-confidence, with an affection for coarse speech and manners which he conceived to be soldier-like bluntness, but which often degenerated into mere rudeness towards some of his inferiors and familiar obscenity of language towards others. He stooped to court the favour of the rank and file by affecting use of their phrases, with the inevitable result that he earned only their thorough contempt. The inference is that he sought popularity with the lower rank of the Army because he was unable to gain the respect of the higher. Such an Officer is wholly unfit for any command.26 Whitelocke’s forces were soon to be joined by more reinforcements under the command of Colonel Robert Crauford, who arrived in Montevideo in the early days of June. Crauford’s original mission was to cross the Andes and take Chile; not surprisingly, this goal was later dropped and he was sent to reinforce the River Plate troops. The orders given to Whitelocke and Crauford were that they


should reduce Buenos Aires, without ‘necessarily annoying the enemy’, while capturing as much territory as they could.27 There was to be no mention of liberation. Rather, the instructions implicitly ruled this possibility out. It would be interesting to know what the position of the Government would have been if they had read the accounts of Beresford or Popham of the locals’ reactions to the expedition. British troops finally set foot in Buenos Aires on 28 June. Reinforcements had been left, however, in both Colonia and Montevideo. Whitelocke was not optimistic about recovering the city, even if the odds seemed clearly in his favour given the advantages of his army over the local militia. The conclusions he arrived at a few weeks after landing in the River Plate clearly show his state of mind: I cannot but lament what is in fact too true, that we have scarcely one friend in this country, and unless I am enabled by the aid of a very fine army, materially to change the present impression, there is nothing to expect from the formation of colonial costs, so much to be desired.28 On 4 July the troops were finally ready to make the assault. It remained to be seen how this attack would be conducted. A contemporary anecdote is significant. Whitelocke’s original plan consisted of approaching the outskirts of the city and bombarding it until it surrendered. This seemed to be the safest tactic to follow in order to recover the city, and it was the plan which most of the other officers endorsed. However, Whitelocke gradually abandoned his original strategy, and gave in to the arguments of his second-in-command, General Leveson-Gower, who opposed the bombardment, sustaining that it was inhumane and would only provoke even more animosity against the British army. He suggested instead that the troops, divided in columns, should march through the main streets of the city with their rifles unloaded, so they would not be tempted to open fire, followed by the artillery. This was the strategy eventually adopted, which proved responsible for the capitulation of the British army a couple of days later, on 6 July. The British troops might have continued to fight and might still have suc-


ceeded, but the many casualties caused Whitelocke to surrender, a decision which was severely criticized by some members of the army.29 On returning to London, Whitelocke, like Popham, had to face a court martial. He was extremely unpopular with large sectors of British society, and an exemplary punishment was expected. Whitelocke had certainly not proved competent and, judging by his indecisive manner, Fortescue is correct in assessing that he was not the most suitable person to take command of this expedition or, as The Morning Chronicle reflected, to command an army of considerable size and quality.30 However, it is surprising that Whitelocke should have received so much more blame than Popham, who by contrast had found ample support when he returned to Britain. This raises the question of the extent to which public opinion had been correctly informed about these events. Leading newspapers such as The Times and The Morning Chronicle had published many letters from the commanders in the River Plate to the Government, as they would later publish the proceedings of Popham´s and Whitelocke´s trials. Yet few people knew how Popham had encouraged the enterprise through his active lobbying. The contradictions and lack of principle which characterized his actions in the River Plate were never fully exposed to the general public. General Miranda had been the inspiration of Popham´s advocacy. After the failure of his expedition to Caracas, Miranda showed his thorough disappointment with Popham’s conduct at the Plate in a letter he sent to Admiral Thomas Cochrane (the British naval officer who had supported Miranda during his atempt to liberate Caracas): I wish Sir Home Popham had shown, (when he pretended to have gone to promote and execute the plans that were pre-concerted with me by Lord Melville, Mr. Pitt, Mr. Addington, etc.) that it was never a question of entering the country as masters and confiscators; but on the contrary as allies and supporters of their independency, for the benefits of trade and commerce that were to be stipulated with the government of Great Britain, besides a considerable sum of money, as a recompense to the army and navy that were to co-operate in this human and beneficial enterprise. They may have been the plans of General


Beresford and Sir Home Popham but they certainly were never those of the British Ministers I have just mentioned, or of mine.31 Whitelocke was a victim of the Talents Ministry’s complete lack of cohesion. He was confronted with a complicated set of instructions, not at all easy to fulfil. Moreover, he seemed from the start to suffer the same pessimism that most of the Talents ministers had felt about the enterprise from its inception. This was reflected in his letter of 20 June to Windham, and in his statements during his trial: It was supposed that the character of this country for liberality and good conduct towards those who came under our dominion, ensured us the good wishes of the greater part, and the cooperation, at least of the community. The public hopes and expectation were raised to the highest pitch, and no suspicion existed that it was possible for the greater part of the population of South America to entertain any than a just feeling of attachment to our Government; still less that it was possible that such a rooted antipathy could exist towards us, as to justify the assertion (the proof of which has been shown to demonstration) that we had not, when I arrived in South America, one single friend in the whole country. Whether the opinion of the illustrious statesman [Pitt], now no more, who had frequently turned his thoughts towards South America, had led him to contemplate the propriety of establishing military posts there, of the co-operating only with those who gladly have followed the example of North America, and availed themselves of our assistance in their independence, I have no means of knowing, but experience has shewn, that any other course of proceeding, even if most successful, and almost in proportion to success, had the effect of placing us at a greater distance than ever from our ultimate object – those of friendly intercourse and trade with the country. An attack, attended with temporary success and ultimate misfortune, had taught us to estimate rather more highly, the difficulty of obtaining an establishment in the country; but the decision upon the subject of the feelings of the people towards us still prevailed.32


He later emphasized, quoting Auchmuty’s letter to Windham of 6 March, that the expedition would have been more successful had the commanders been allowed to aid the creoles and help them achieve independence.33 Whitelocke was found guilty, and was expelled from the army. Many had expected a much harsher sanction, even death. In many ways, Whitelocke’s trial marked the end of the affair. However, in Ferns’s view, the British invasions of the River Plate marked the beginning of British–Argentine relations. The idea of sending expeditions to South America did not end with this episode. On the contrary, the lessons learned in the River Plate now sharpened the precise objectives of British policy in South America. Castlereagh, now at the War Office, immediately began preparations for a liberating expedition to South America under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and Beresford began advising him on the numbers of men required and on the necessity of an expedition of all-out liberation directed at the River Plate.34 Great Britain had been forced to surrender and to evacuate its troops from the River Plate without achieving any of the advantages which an expedition to South America supposedly offered. Neither conquest nor emancipation had been achieved. Britain had been unable to establish either a strategic military base or a stronger commercial link in South America. More embarrassing, as The Morning Chronicle repeatedly emphasized, was the fact that a British army had been defeated by improvised creole and Spanish militia units.35 Nevertheless, somewhat paradoxically, the invasions helped accelerate the emancipation process in the River Plate. One must be careful, however, when estimating how influential the invasions were in bringing about independence in the Viceroyalty. Obviously many other internal and external circumstances were involved. What is beyond doubt is that Argentine independence owed little to the alleged shrewdness and sound calculation of Sir Home Popham. Ferns, for example, has suggested that Sir Home was not as much a fool as he was made out to be, given that, after all, his timing of the expedition and his assessment of the animosity of the creoles against their Spanish masters was correct. This view lacks substance, essentially because Popham’s motivations for embarking on this enterprise are still open to discussion. Although there is not enough evidence to suggest that what induced Popham to invade the River Plate was, as has been fre-


quently stated, the prize money, his indecisive participation in the invasions makes it unwise to exclude this interpretation. Moreover, his actions might easily have contributed to complicate the future relations of Great Britain and the Spanish American colonies. As it was, the events which followed his rash initiative placed Britain in an advantageous position. The River Plate adventure provoked a great deal of uproar and embarrassment in England. It did however constitute a landmark with respect to the future policy to be adopted towards these colonies. The experience enabled the British to obtain a clearer picture of the situation in a very significant region of the Spanish Empire. This gave them a strategic advantage over the other European powers.

3 The Ministry of All the Talents and the River Plate Invasions

In February 1806, after the defeat of the Third Coalition by France at Austerlitz and the death of Pitt, a new Ministry was formed in Great Britain. This ministry was labelled the ‘Ministry of All The Talents’; it was a coalition government, and it owed its distinctive name to the presence in its ranks of some of the most prestigious characters in British politics. The Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury of this new ministry was Lord Grenville, who had served for many years in his cousin Pitt’s Ministry, both as Home Secretary from 1789 to 1791, and as Foreign Secretary from 1791 up to 1801. In that year Pitt’s first Ministry was replaced by the Addington Administration. Grenville had started to distance himself from Pitt, because his cousin had supported the Peace of Amiens, sponsored by the Addingtonians, and because of Pitt’s unwillingness to join forces with Fox in order to consolidate a union of parties, which Grenville considered indispensable for the country, in view of the current crisis in Europe and the French menace. He had begun to move closer to the Foxites and had refused to form part of the new Pitt administration in 1804, despite the pleas of both Pitt and George III. Grenville’s main ambition was to resist French expansion, and he thought that the best way of achieving this consisted in supporting the efforts of determined allies with modest subsidies and auxiliary campaigns to restore the European equilibrium.1 Charles James Fox became Foreign Secretary in this new Ministry. He was the most prestigious member of the Administration. For 51


more than twenty years he had been at the head of the Whig party and he represented the main opposition to the Pitt Ministry. He had remained completely out of favour with King George III after he had supported the principles of the French Revolution, and also because of his close association with Prince George, who he influenced towards the Whig faction and against his father’s and Pitt’s policies. For these reasons, and because of his excessive gambling and increasing personal debts, Fox’s public appeal had also declined considerably. The combination of these factors had kept him out of office for a long time. Nevertheless, his support for such progressive causes as the abolition of the slave trade and Catholic emancipation, his undoubted political talents, and his notorious charm, still maintained him as a popular figure on the British scene. His main objective as Foreign Secretary was to reach a peace agreement with France, although this line of policy was not the most popular among the majority in the Government.2 Other prominent members of this Ministry at the War Office were William Windham, a disciple of Edmund Burke and a former member of Pitt’s first Government; Lord Howick (the future Earl Grey of the Reform Bill), an ardent supporter of Fox’s Whig principles; Lord Sidmouth (previously Addington, the man responsible for the peace of Amiens); Tom Grenville, brother of the Prime Minister; and Lord Holland, nephew of Fox. As we have said, this was a coalition Government. The mix of the different factions inside the Cabinet is well explained by Trevelyan: It was composed of two sorts of Tories and two sorts of Whigs: The Foxite Whigs; the Grenvillites, Whig and Tory; and the Addingtonian Tories. The last-named could scarcely claim to add to the Talents of the Ministry, but they served to give it a broader bottom, and so left its enemy the King no immediate chance of sending for a different set of servants.3 This was therefore a predominantly Whig Administration; the major counter-balance was the Tory element inside the Grenville faction. Nevertheless the differences between the two main figures of the Government were not so great, and even though Fox was more sceptical than Grenville about continental alliances and was more

The “Talents” Ministry and the River Plate Invasions 53

optimistic than the Prime Minister about peace talks with Napoleon, this did not mean that Fox´s and Grenville’s foreign policies were radically opposed.4 Both agreed in sending the Earl of Lauderdale to Paris to open conversations with Talleyrand. Indeed, Fox seemed a very good choice as Foreign Secretary. According to one of his biographers, foreign policy was Fox’ s forte: ‘it was on foreign politics alone that he could rise to full height, and unfold the whole power of his mind’.5 Chancellor maintains that Fox’s wish for peace negotiations with France was not only doctrinaire; he was also concerned with keeping good relations with the United States, supporting the economy of the West Indies, and had favoured revolutionary schemes against the Spanish colonies in South America as a way to check Bonaparte’s power in Europe.6 But, by this time, Fox was a sick man. He died on 13 September 1806, and the Government lost one of its most valuable members. Lord Howick, Fox’s most loyal follower, succeeded him as Foreign Secretary, leaving his previous post at the Admiralty to Tom Grenville, also a Whig. On that very same day news had arrived in Britain of the taking of Buenos Aires by British troops under Beresford on 27 June. As described in the previous chapter, the idea of an expedition against Buenos Aires had been contemplated by Popham, Pitt, and especially Melville, who also considered the possibility of aiding Miranda. Although no serious force had been organized during those years, Miranda eventually managed to mount a small expedition of British and American volunteers and had reached the shores of Venezuela, near Caracas, in April 1806. As we have seen, Popham had persuaded Pitt to allow him to embark on an expedition to the Cape of Good Hope with the idea of eventually gaining permission from the Prime Minister to organize an expedition to South America if matters in Europe took a turn for the worse. After the expedition commanded by Sir David Baird had taken possession of the Cape, Popham had decided to take matters into his own hands. As soon as he heard about the defeat of the Austrian army at Austerlitz, and once Baird agreed to allow him to embark on this mission, he had set off on 14 April. The Ministry of All the Talents was completely hostile to all these South American schemes. As seems to have been usual in those days, Pitt and Melville had not informed the rest of the Government about any


such plans and had taken all the papers relating to these projects to their respective homes, so that by the time a new Ministry stepped in, there was no existant record.7 When it learnt about Miranda’s expedition, the Talents Ministry decided to allow him to employ a small number of British troops. Lord Howick at the Admiralty outlined the cabinet’s feelings on 3 June, in his instructions to the British naval commander, Lord Cochrane, who had been sent to observe Miranda’s movements: …so long as the persons engaged in this undertaking shall conduct themselves in a manner not prejudiced to the interests of the British Government, you are to take care that they suffer no interruption from any part of the Force under your command, and if, in the course of these transactions, any British ship should proceed for the purpose of commerce, to the ports occupied by the insurgents, they will, off course, receive that protection which they are entitled to expect in any port of the world; but you are carefully to abstain from any measures which may tend to commit His Majesty’s Government the future support of an undertaking, in which it has hitherto taken part.8 This last sentence makes evident the caution of the ministry when it came to promoting revolutionary activities, but, as we said before, Fox had been interested in the possibility of fostering revolution in these colonies and had welcomed Miranda’s expedition, especially after the news of the apparent failure of peace negotiations in Paris, and the prospect of the collapse of his continental strategy.9 Public opinion also seemed to be favourably disposed towards this expedition, as reflected in an article in The Morning Chronicle on 25 October 1806.10 However, the general feeling inside the Cabinet with respect to this specific adventure was sceptical. Windham, for example, was in favour of British intervention in South America, but regarded support for Miranda as ‘throwing in a fire brand and standing back’.11 Nevertheless, as John Lynch points out, Miranda’s illprepared scheme was one thing and the capture of Buenos Aires by a British expedition was quite another.12


The news of this event put the Ministry in an uncomfortable situation. The first warning the Government received of an attack on Buenos Aires came towards the end of June 1806, when a dispatch sent by Popham announcing his departure from the Cape on this new enterprise was received at the Admiralty. A meeting of the cabinet was immediately arranged to consider the matter. After the meeting William Windham informed the King: It is humbly submitted to Your Majesty that Sir Home Popham should be superseded in his present command, and recalled to give an account of his conduct in having left his station and proceeded, without any instructions or authority to do so, to attack the Spanish settlements in the Rio de la Plata. The King agreed completely: Sir Home Popham and Sir David Baird having undertaken the attack upon the Spanish settlements on the Rio de la Plata without any orders or authority whatsoever, The King considers that such conduct should be checked as bad precedent, and therefore cannot disapprove of the Minute of Cabinet submitted to him by Mr. Windham.13 However, after the news of the taking of Buenos Aires, the reaction of both Minister and King was somewhat different. Windham wrote to George III, on 13 September 1806: The dispatches received this morning from M.Gen.Beresford and Sir Home Popham appear to be so important and to contain intelligence so satisfactory that Mr. Windham trusts your Majesty with them at an unusual hour. They contain an account of the complete success of the expedition undertaken by those Officers, so far as it has hitherto gone, and as far as its consequences can be anticipated, and prove the state of things in the country which has been the object of it, to be as comfortable to the views and information on which they had acted, as may form some excuse possibly in your Majesty’s eyes, for the irregularity on the proceeding on the part of those by whom the expedition was set on foot.


Mr. Windham should be sorry if he appeared to your Majesty, in presuming to offer the above reflections, to be willing to justify by success what was in itself improper. He merely wished humbly to urge in their favour that their fault not be aggravated by their having engaged on an enterprize not likely to redound to the advantage and aggrandisement of your Majesty’s Kingdoms. The King replied on 14 September 1806: The King has received with much satisfaction the dispatches which report the capture of Buenos Aires, as communicated by Mr. Windham, and although the undertaking appears in the first instance to have been unauthorized, it is impossible not to approve of the manner in which it was planned and executed by the Commander and the troops and the seamen employed. His Majesty trusts from the reports made, that the acquisition of Buenos Aires will prove very advantageous to this Country.14 What now remained to be seen was how the Talents Ministry would handle this unexpected acquisition. A few days after the news of the invasions was received, The Times reported that Lord Auckland, President of the Board of Trade, had arranged a meeting which included other members of the Government such as Grenville, Petty, Spencer, Ellenborough, and the Spanish American schemer Vansittart, to consider trading prospects with Buenos Aires, and in what way they could exploit the commercial advantages to be found there.15 Four days later their efforts were rewarded quite inadvertently, when The Times published a circular sent by Popham to the merchants and manufacturers of Britain alerting them to the benefits to be found in this new South American market. This letter provoked a combination of uproar and euphoria in the financial community of London, although the Government regarded such an action as premature and unwise.16 One of the most important questions the Ministry had to decide was how the expedition should conduct itself once it had taken possession of Buenos Aires. Should its commanders act as conquerors,


or should they help the South American creoles achieve emancipation from Spain? One thing was clear: Sir Home Popham had begun this enterprise with no specific orders from the Pitt Administration, and in the complete ignorance of the Government that replaced it. As we have seen, when Miranda had discussed the matter with Popham, Lord Melville, and Pitt in October 1804, Melville had assured him that if such an expedition ever took place its only objective would be to secure independence for the Latin Americans.17 However, it had never been clear what Pitt’s thoughts on the subject were, and Popham himself had always been suspected of being more interested in prize money than in fostering revolution in the Americas.

The Talents Ministry’s position on this issue was also at first unclear, although on 11 September 1806 Windham had written to Lord Grenville expressing his view that attempts to revolutionize Spanish America should not be allowed, and that this conquest should rather be seen as an opportunity to prevent the French from menacing these territories: To pass from this to an opposite quarter, I cannot but feel a strong conviction of the truth of the opinions contained in the letter you sent me from Hislop, and a great longing that a part of the force which we are now disposing of, was applied, not to the revolutionizing, but to the obtaining possession of part of the Spanish settlements in South America. A footing once obtained there, the rest would do itself by a mild and gradual operation; or, if it did not, we should equally be in a situation to secure a great position or the advantages which such an event is supposed likely to produce, and what is most of consequence of all, to prevent probably the French from establishing themselves there.18 Windham had in fact received many letters at the War Office concerning South America before the Ministry had any idea of Popham’s ambitions in relation to South America. They came


mainly from businessmen and politicians familiar with the area. The two most interesting characters in this respect were William Jacob, whom we have already mentioned, and Thomas Douglas, fifth Earl of Selkirk, a Scottish peer in the House of Lords, a close friend of Walter Scott, and a man well known for his interest in projects and theories of colonial settlement, especially in Canada, where he had been living two years earlier.19 A letter of 22 March 1806 written by Selkirk to John Hippisley who, as we have seen, also had a keen interest in South America, had reached Windham’s office. It contained interesting observations on South America, showed a deep knowledge of the situation in the different Viceroyalties, and suggested sending a British expedition to the area as soon as possible, making very clear what the objective of this expedition should be: Any partial or predatory expedition on the other hand, would only tend to disgrace our National character. But a comprehensive plan for liberating those provinces, for establishing in them a national independent government of their own, and for opening a free trade with them, would not only promote our commercial interests, but would be such a proof of dignified moderation in our government as would tend to recover and establish our national honor and consideration all over the world. He later added with great insight that: I must own however that my hopes of seeing anything done effectually, is very much damped by the consideration of the individuals, to whom the conduct of such an expedition is most likely to be intrusted. This is an enterprise in which the talents of a statesman are much more needed than those of a General.20 On 7 June of that same year Selkirk wrote a memorandum to Windham himself entitled ‘Observations on the proposed expedition to Spanish America’, again emphasizing the convenience of helping the creoles to gain independence from Spain, and the ways in which the Government might derive the full benefit of South American trade.21 Whether Selkirk had any previous infor-


mation about Popham’s plans we do not know. He was aware, as mentioned in this letter, that Miranda’s expedition was on its way to Caracas, but unless he had close connections with Popham’s friends at the Admiralty, or with members of the previous Administration, it seems unlikely that he would have had any knowledge or information about the Buenos Aires expedition, for the news of Popham´s departure for the River Plate reached the Government almost a month after Selkirk’s memorandum was received. Windham did not seem to pay much attention to his suggestions, as we shall see. Fox had also received information on South America as early as February 1806, when he had just taken office. Jacob sent him a remarkably complete and accurate geographical description of the South American continent. This was in fact the copy of the report he had already sent to both Pitt and Windham, during the last Administration.22 According to Jacob, Buenos Aires was valuable not only as a market, but also as a potential source of naval stores, of hemp and flax, which ‘would enrich Great Britain and render her independent of both Russia and India’.23 Prior to that, in early February, Nicholas Vansittart, who had been joint Secretary of the Treasury during Addington’s Ministry, advised Fox to reach some type of commercial agreement with the South American inhabitants. This would be advantageous, according to Vansittart, especially in view of the numerous complaints received from Lancashire about the stagnation of trade, and it was imperative that it should be done before France annexed the continent to its Empire.24 Vansittart was one of Miranda’s closest acquaintances in London, and had been responsible for introducing him to Popham and to both Melville and Pitt, hence it is likely that he had previous knowledge of the two expeditions and other interesting information besides.25 However when he later joined the Government, at Sidmouth’s recommendation, he never, as far as we know, gave any further information about the expeditions at a time when the Ministry, and particularly Grenville, were anxious to know more. There were more advocates of action recommending the Government to intervene in South America. They included a certain General Sullivan, who was against the idea of Miranda’s joint enterprise with the United States and suggested that an expedition to the River Plate and Chile should be sent as soon as possible,26 and also


the political writer Sir Philip Francis, better known as – or at least suspected of being – Junius, who favoured the idea of taking action in the River Plate, the most appealing of all the Spanish American markets.27 After Fox’s death, Grenville was uncertain what line to follow in foreign affairs. After all, Fox had been the champion of peace with the French. Curiously, his successor as Foreign Secretary, Lord Howick, apparently upset with the slow progress of the peace talks in Paris, was urging war; so was Windham, opposed to continental involvement and more favourable to South American schemes. Grenville, faced with the possibility of a rupture inside his Cabinet, stood by the peace negotiations.28 Then, all of a sudden, Grenville began to regard the conquest of Buenos Aires as an ideal tool for such negotiations. The first indication of this switch is contained in a letter Grenville sent to Lauderdale in Paris, of unknown date, but almost certainly written a few days after receiving confirmation of the capture of Buenos Aires:

I always felt great reluctance to the embarking in South American projects because I knew that it was much easier to get into them than out again. The capture of Buenos Aires, trumpeted as it was by Popham and his agents, has already produced such an impression here as will make the surrender of that conquest most extremely difficult, unless one could get much more for it in the way of security in Europe than I know how to shape or expect.29

The almost ill-tempered tone of this letter is a good indication of Grenville’s feelings towards the conquest and its complications. He made his point clearer on 14 September, when he wrote again to Lauderdale:

Of Buenos Aires I say nothing, except that it may, I think, tend to facilitate peace, or to afford an opening for measures that will make a deep impression in France. My earnest wish is that you may be able to make use of it effectually for the first of these objects.30


As he mentioned in the previous letter, Grenville was under pressure from the enthusiasm with which the news of the conquest of Buenos Aires had been received in England, especially by the mercantile community. His new attitude, as well as the peace negotiations themselves, would prove increasingly unpopular amongst both his cabinet colleagues and the public at large.

Nevertheless, towards the end of September preparations were being made for sending reinforcements to the River Plate. The Marquess of Wellesley offered the services of his brother, the future Duke of Wellington, recently returned from service in India, and Grenville seemed to agree that it would be a good idea to send him to Buenos Aires as the new commander.31 But Windham was against this idea. He suspected that, given Beresford’s success, ‘… Sir A. Wellesley will not be popular, though really very proper’, as he told Grenville.32 By this time there were plenty of advertisements on the front page of The Times regarding trips to Buenos Aires, and details about the different types of merchandise available for buying or selling.33 Eventually, on 11 October a new expedition set off, under the command of Sir Samuel Auchmuty. All the same, in the sessions of the House of Commons which began in December the Government was accused by the Tory opposition, notably by Canning and Castlereagh, of sending this supporting expedition much too late. These accusations were made at the time when rumours were circulating about the recapture of Buenos Aires. Windham replied to one of Lord Castlereagh’s accusations in a comprehensive and humorous style:

If the expedition was only across the Channel, there were plenty of vessels that might have been easily got ready for that purpose; but when it was recollected that they were to cross the Atlantic, to look for another expedition; and if they could not find it, or should discover that it had been unsuccessful, to recross it again, to look for a place of safety; it would not be supposed that such a description of ships could be got ready and fitted out in so short a time. The Noble


Lord would perhaps have sent them over in air-balloons, or some such other expeditious mode of conveyance.34 As Fortescue argues, it is difficult to see what more the Government could have done.35 But some coherent instructions as to how these forces should conduct themselves once they had arrived should have been imparted to the commanding officer. Instead, they were to proceed under the same instructions that had been sent to Beresford towards the end of the previous month. Basically, these insisted that the invading troops should retain possession, avoiding any participation in revolutionary enterprises.36 The same orders were also to be found a few weeks later in Windham’s instructions to General Crauford for his aborted expedition to Chile.37 This, as Harvey maintains, implies that the Government, assuming that the South Americans were pleased with a British presence, did not themselves question the terms on which the invaders came.38 The Government had been warned by Jacob about the problem on 24 September, a few days before Auchmuty’s expedition left, when Jacob wrote to Windham as follows: It will, I presume, appear wise that in all the future official papers relative to Buenos Aires the idea of conquest be as much as possible kept out of sight, the fact of its having been obtained by conquest is too obvious to admit of a doubt, but the less it strikes the view of the inhabitants the more easily and economically the business of government be conducted.39 One can only conclude, at this point, that the Government was waiting for more detailed information about what was going on in Buenos Aires. Only then could it decide what further steps would be adopted. In the meantime, the only thing clear with respect to its new conquest was that they had to hold on to it, especially as the situation in Europe was getting more complicated. On 10 November the Ministry learnt of the failure of Miranda’s expedition. Worse news followed. After destroying the Prussian forces at Jena in October, Napoleon Bonaparte promulgated the Berlin Decrees on 22 November, which excluded British commerce from all ports under his control. This marked an end to the peace conversations. It also meant a turning point in the Ministry of All


the Talents’ position towards South America. Earl Fitzwilliam, Lord President, summed up the feeling thus: ‘There is an end of the old world and we must look to the new.’40

William Windham was from now on to become the key figure in all the decisions respecting South American policies. He was in charge of the War Office and had been the firmest advocate of a South American policy, right from the start. This policy was now supported by most of the cabinet. According to John Courtnay, a Whig MP, even Fox had remarked a few days before his death that ‘if peace could not be had on tolerable terms, the war must be carried on vigorously, but chiefly in South America’, and Grenville, now in favour of the continuation of war, agreed that there was no other place in which to fight.41 Windham was an intriguing character. He had been Samuel Johnson’s closest friend, and his attachment to Burke was so close that Windham became the Irishman´s political pupil.42 After his participation in the Pitt Administration, he firmly opposed the Addington Government, and by the time Pitt was back in office in 1804, he had already joined forces with the Grenville faction. Once back in office, his main obsession was to change the recruitment law, replacing life enlistment in the army by recruitment for seven years. This scheme was opposed by the King, which opposition seemed at one point to be a major obstacle in the way of the formation of this Government.43 Now that South America was a central issue, it is paradoxical that both Windham and Grenville were supporting a policy they had previously opposed: in fact, during Pitt’s Administration, they had stood against Melville’s wishes to enlarge Britain’s overseas possessions, not least in South America.44 Grenville, moreover, now thought that the whole of South America could be captured in twelve months, and was so eager to get on with it that, with the help of Lord Wellesley among others, he started preparing a series of alarmingly unrealistic projects for expeditions to Mexico and South America. This did not mean, however, that the Ministry had a clear idea of whether it favoured either conquest or liberation for the continent. The only exception was Lord Holland, who had become Lord


Privy Seal in October. He made his point when Lord Grenville consulted him about the proposed expedition to Mexico. He told the Prime Minister that … unless the experiment is connected from the beginning with some plan of establishing an independent Monarchy in Mexico, I should very much question the policy of undertaking it all.45 Lord Holland’s preference towards independence in Mexico also applied to Buenos Aires, as he made clear in the Cabinet meeting on 11 February 1807 when, after news had been received of the reconquest of Buenos Aires by local forces, the Government had to decide what steps it would take. The news of the recapture of Buenos Aires was officially confirmed in London on 25 January 1807, although rumours had started to seep through as early as the beginning of the month. This was almost five months after the actual event had taken place which, even for those days, was a long time for such news to take to arrive. This new development precipitated several debates in the House of Commons, where the issue had already been raised in December, the month the parliamentary session had started. Lord Howick, the Foreign Secretary, found himself under attack by the opposition, which blamed the Ministry for not having openly supported Miranda’s expedition and for not being more resolute about reinforcing the troops in Buenos Aires. The protests intensified with the news of the reconquest. As mentioned before, Canning and Castlereagh were the most outraged of the opposition. Both Lord Howick and Windham explained the difficulties and risks of sending reinforcements across the Atlantic to support such a dubious expedition. Howick further emphasized the Government’s position when he stated that: ‘….Whatever success we have obtained in South America, His Majesty’s Ministers do not pretend to give themselves any credit for.’46 As for the complaints by the opposition regarding the Government’s nomination of General Crauford, who was considered unfit for such command, Howick responded that the selection of Popham, who had at least the same number of superiors in the navy, had never excited such complaints (here there was an implicit suggestion by Howick, to the effect that Popham was a Pittite and also an MP in the Tory


interest).47 Howick also condemned the fact that Popham had unnecessarily raised the expectations of the business community, by sending them a letter in which he invited his readers to take commercial advantage of the new possessions as soon as possible. Howick added that: Perhaps his [Popham’s] letter to seek mercantile gratitude, while offending against professional duty, was one of the fatal effects to be apprehended from that mischievous system of reward administered by the committee at Lloyd’s, called The Patriotic Fund, a committee which is held out to the Navy as giving greater reward and encouragement than the government of the country.48 Nevertheless, during these heated debates there was no mention on either side of the House on whether the expedition should favour conquest or rather assistance to the Spanish Americans for their emancipation from the Spanish Monarchy. This point had only come up, as we have stated, when a Cabinet meeting was held on 11 February 1807 to decide whether or not a new expedition was to be sent to Spanish America. In the course of this meeting, the views about Buenos Aires of the different members of the Talents Ministry became clearer. Windham, as expected, advocated sending a new force to recover the conquests recently lost. Tom Grenville was also in favour of this policy, and thought that even temporary control of Buenos Aires would be useful for peace negotiations. Sidmouth preferred a South American policy to European intervention. Howick thought the whole enterprise was too dangerous, and that an insecure hold on Buenos Aires would only prove to be a constant drain on national resources; he was keen on sticking to a continental policy. His Foxite colleague, Lord Holland, as already mentioned, favoured intervention in Buenos Aires on the condition that its aim would be to foster independence in those lands, a view shared by Lord Moira, head of the Ordnance Office.49 Indeed, the Cabinet must have been aware of Popham’s letter to W. Marsden, of 25 August 1806, quoted in the previous chapter, which had arrived in January, where he gave his opinion that the Spanish Americans had been expecting the expedition to assist them in gaining emancipation.50


However, Lord Grenville did not favour any plan which had independence as its main object. Holland himself later explained why his views were not shared by the Prime Minister: A revolution in a country inhabited by such a variety of races and colours, all animated with feelings of jealousy and resentment to one another, and all inexperienced and ignorant of the government of mankind, would lead, it was urged, to interminable civil wars, massacres, and outrages, which would convert the whole continent of South America into a scene of confusion, plunder and carnage.51 This apprehensive attitude towards the emancipation of the Spanish American colonies is similar to Pitt’s own position on this issue a few years before, when he indicated his fears that emancipation would only help to promote Jacobin ideals in South America. Nevertheless, Grenville did not offer any alternative, and it seems reasonable to suggest that he placed his faith in whatever policy Windham decided to adopt. As it was, the Government finally decided to reinforce the troops in Buenos Aires. Lord Howick recorded his opinion against the measure in a separate minute; other than this, there seems to have been no other major dissension inside the Cabinet. It would appear that, apart from Windham’s influence on the final decree, Lord Sidmouth’s support for this measure was also critical, overcoming the opposition of the Foxite faction.52 The next step, a crucial one, was to choose a commander and decide on the instructions he should receive. Windham’s choice was to prove controversial indeed. It fell on General Whitelocke, whose previous performance in Saint Domingue during the uprisings of 1794 had, as we have pointed out, raised many doubts about his ability to command. Lord Holland’s account of this choice is remarkable: Anxious as he [Windham] was about South American projects, he did not select the officer from any knowledge of his qualifications or confidence in his skill, but from motives of convenience. Whitelocke had been Inspector-General. In that capacity he had


courted the Duke of York, and offended Mr. Windham by opposing the favourite project of the latter for enlisting for a term of years, and not for life. To give that wise and recent measure a fair chance, Mr. Windham was desirous to appoint an Inspectorgeneral who was friendly to its success.53 Thus, the best way of getting rid of Whitelocke was to send him down to Buenos Aires, which is, to say the least, an astonishing way of selecting a commander for an expedition across the Atlantic. But Windham claims that he had suggested Sir John Stuart, and that the decision to select Whitelocke was mainly due to the influence of the Duke of York, the King’s brother.54 Windham’s instructions to Whitelocke were also to be the subject of controversy. In Fortescue’s opinion they were absurd. This author’s summary of the orders which Whitelocke had to fulfil proves the point: …. He was to reduce the province of Buenos Aires by force of arms and exile the authors of the insurrection which had overthrown Beresford; and yet he was to consider that his main object was not to distress or annoy the inhabitants to British rule, but was forbidden to give them assurance of British protection against the vengeance of Old Spain after the conclusion of peace.55 These were ambiguous and complicated orders. The story surrounding the final draft of these instructions contains some curious elements. They were signed on 3 March by Lord Howick, who had been largely against the idea of the expedition taking place, and not by Windham, the Minister of War and practically the mastermind of the whole operation. The reason why Windham was unable to draft the final instructions was later explained by Lord Holland, the member of the Cabinet most critical of the manner in which this whole affair had been conducted. According to Lord Holland, Windham had made an ‘unnecessary’ journey to Norfolk when the instructions were being drawn up. The instructions were finally completed by another Secretary of State, who Lord Holland does not name, without any supervision from Windham, who later, according to Lord Holland, regretted and disapproved of some of their contents.56 If his account about this


extremely puzzling episode is accurate, it raises many questions about the handling of the whole operation. The most obvious question, given Windham’s eagerness for the project throughout the existence of this administration, is the following: how was it possible that, when the moment finally arrived for him to organize the whole enterprise, Windham was so careless and irresponsible in both the selection of the commander and in the drafting of instructions? In March 1807 the Ministry of All the Talents came to an end, after increasing pressure for Catholic emancipation had proved intolerable to the King, who chose to replace it by an administration more amenable to his wishes. This short-lived Ministry is best remembered for finally having brought about the abolition of the slave trade. Beyond that, it could boast no other major achievement. There was not much else it could do, given the resistance it encountered from George III to many of its Whig-oriented initiatives. The Tory ministry that took over included George Canning as Foreign Secretary and Lord Castlereagh at the War Office. They had both been closely following the events in the Río de la Plata, and Castlereagh presented a memorandum to the Cabinet in May 1807 on South America. He complained about the complete lack of principle of the previous Ministry in its operations in that region. When he analysed what the role of the present Administration should be regarding South America, he made his view clear that In looking to any scheme for liberating South America, it seems indispensable that we should not present ourselves in any other light than as auxiliaries and protectors.57 The lesson had no doubt been learnt. But one should not forget that this approach had been prevously recommended by people like Jacob and Lord Selkirk and, inside the Government, had been fruitlessly advocated by Moira and Lord Holland throughout the previous year. The loss of Buenos Aires in June produced a great deal of resentment and criticism amongst both opponents and supporters of the previous Government. Criticism was directed at both the military commanders and the politicians. Among newspapers The Morning Chronicle was one


of the most critical of the whole conduct of the invasion. An article which appeared in the middle of September blamed the previous Government for creating unfounded expectations among the people about the favourable outcome of this enterprise.58 The Duke of Northumberland, an old Pittite, later remarked that: The easy capture of Buenos Aires at first blinded, however, our silly Ministers, and they determined to perservere in the business, which they have now brought to a fine issue. I understand much abuse is bestowed on General Whitelocke. Without pretending in any degree to justify him, it appears to me that the Cabinet which gave into this foolish plan and ordered the execution of it is the most culpable.59 Of those who had been part of the previous Government, Lord Auckland complained to Lord Grenville: I suppose you lament over the catastrophe of Buenos Aires; nothing but the plan adopted could have produced it. It is extremely mortifying, for our garrison was living on the best of terms with the Spaniards, our trade was rapidly increasing, and if we had chosen to play the game of independence, I am confident we would have placed all the Spanish provinces on their legs without bloodshed or revolutionary convulsions. I never was so hurt. Many obvious projects of infinite importance are gone for ever.60 Richard Sheridan, the celebrated poet and playwright, MP of the Foxite faction, and Navy Treasurer during the Talents Ministry, ironically remarked that the Talents ‘not only ran its heads against a wall, but actually built a wall for the purpose of running its head against it’, in reference to the River Plate expedition.61 Others who had been closely related with the late Ministry also resented the fact that independence had not been the main goal of the expedition. Like Lord Holland, they thought Windham was to be blamed. As Lord Temple, brother of Grenville, explained: What makes all this sad story worse, is that it is hinted we might have had Buenos Aires and the whole of New Spain without the loss of a man, for every purpose to which we ought to have


looked, had we agreed to acknowledge the independence of the country, or that we even might have held them in dominion had we engaged not to give them up at a peace, but that Whitelocke refused proposals which were made to him with a view to these objects, before the fatal attack upon this town. If this is so it makes the story doubly horrible. Whitelocke is to be tried but Crauford not. The language of government is, that there are documents in the Colonial Office that will implicate Windham, or they will show that remonstrances were made to him, principally from the Duke of York’s office, against the appointment of Whitelocke, whose former conduct in Santo Domingo had proved him to be quite unfit for the command. I am rather inclined to believe that there is some foundation in this.62 The writer William Burke, a friend of Miranda, and who in fact, as recent research has spotted, turned out to be the Utilitarian philosopher James Mill, emphasized the point:63 This object, so far as it related to the restoration of peace, undoubtedly reflects honour on those who entertained it; but with respect to Spanish America, which was to be degraded into a mere make-weight in the scales of negotiation, it was comptemtible and ill-advised, and affords for history an humiliating instance of the persons, who over their wine toasted ‘liberty over the globe’, issuing instructions to crush her in South America.64 As we can see, most people blamed the Talents Ministry for failing chosen to instruct the expedition to proclaim a guarantee of independence to the Spanish Americans, as Lord Holland had suggested in that famous Cabinet meeting of 11 February when the reconquest of Buenos Aires was being discussed. One is tempted to ask what would have happened had Holland’s uncle, Charles James Fox, been alive during those deliberations. Leslie Mitchell points out that uncle and nephew walked absolutely in step along the main lines of policy.65 Fox might therefore have shared Lord Holland’s views on South American affairs and, influential as he was in the Cabinet, he might have helped sway policy in favour of independence. One is also tempted to ask what would have happened had the Tories been


in office during these events. Would they have taken more decisive measures? It is unfair to suggest, however, as Roberts and Street have done, that the Pittites and the Tories had always favoured the idea of independence, whereas the ‘Whigs’, as they put it, preferred conquest.66 As already stated, there is no evidence that Pitt favoured the emancipation of the Spanish Colonies; on the contrary, it seems that he was not too sympathetic to the idea. Castlereagh and Canning, on the other hand, began thinking of supporting independence only after the invasions of the River Plate had already taken place. Both had urged the quick reinforcement of the troops already there, but there is no evidence that either man had supported a policy of emancipation. The Ministry was much divided on this issue. True, Windham’s view of ‘hanging on’ to the new possession after recapturing it finally prevailed over the idea of either emancipation or non-intervention. But this idea had not been shared by the entire Cabinet. One cannot but agree with Lynch when he emphasizes the same point, that ‘The attempts of historians (for example Roberts[…] and Street[…]) to contrast a Tory policy of emancipation with a Whig policy of conquest are not supported by a sufficient amount of continuous evidence.’67 Lynch also summarizes well the main inconsistencies of the Ministry of All the Talents: ‘The policy of this administration, indeed was marked by neither imperialism nor liberalism but by utter improvisation’.68 It is understandable that, in the midst of the Napoleonic wars, when fears of invasion by the French dominated most politicians and the population in general, this new government was not at all prepared to solve the dilemma presented by the sudden capture of a significant part of the Spanish possessions in South America. The whole plan had been conceived during the days of the previous administration, in the utmost secrecy, and had unexpectedly been carried out by a naval commander. It also seems clear that some of the members of the Talents Ministry, especially Grenville, would have preferred not to have had to deal with the problem at all. This was later confirmed by Lord Howick in the House of Lords, when he declared that the Government did not even feel proud when the news of Popham’s early success had reached England. However, these shortcomings are not enough to explain why Windham and the rest of the Ministry were so careless in the planning and preparations of the new expedition.


Spanish and creole attitudes to the British invasions On 23 January 1808, almost a year after his River Plate adventures, Colonel Beresford wrote from Madeira, where he was now posted, to the Foreign Secretary, Viscount Castlereagh, concerning the character and disposition of the people of Buenos Aires with particular regard to their attitude to the British invasions: In respect to the political sentiments of the great body of the people (I must say the creoles) I was too well acquainted with them to be induced to change my opinions of them from what I have ever declared to your Lordship, yet whoever on that account expects assistance from them towards furthering their own wishes, little knows the people and would be disappointed; they must be first conquered, and the Spanish part shifted from them, before they will be much inclined to come forward, and they must be well assured that the object of Great Britain is to give them independence, for though they are decidedly inclined to throw off the yoke of Spain, they are still more hostile to receiving that of any other nation, and we conquering it for ourselves would be carrying a millstone about our necks, as they would be continually watching and plotting to get rid of us, and it would give too powerful a handle to our enemies and the friends of Spain to work upon the ignorance and fanaticism of the lower class.69 This letter was written at the time when Castlereagh was preparing a new expedition to South America. It is likely that he had requested intelligence from Beresford, given his recent experience in the River Plate. The passage accurately depicts what had been the general mood amongst the inhabitants of Buenos Aires during the invasions. There were, however, more complexities to the matter.

The analysis of Rioplatense sentiment during the invasions is not an easy task. There are hardly any private documents or publications of this period available, so one has to rely on the official correspon-


dence of the Viceregal Government and on the memoirs and private and official correspondence of British officers and statesmen. There are a few letters of the period which contain interesting details and anecdotes of the invasions, as well as of the trials held to determine whether certain citizens had been guilty of treason during the invasions, notably Alzaga’s trial in 1809. These documents are to be found in Argentina’s Archivo General de la Nación and in the Museo Mitre, and help to throw more light on these events. Some secondary sources are also helpful. Roberts suggests that already by 1803 there existed in Buenos Aires two independence movements. One, apparently more inclined to Great Britain, was headed by Juan José Castelli; the other sympathized more with France, and was led by Santiago de Liniers and his brother, and included Juan Martín de Pueyrredón in its ranks. According to Roberts, this explains why Liniers and Pueyrredón were closely connected with the organization of the local militia to combat the British forces.70 Liniers had been born in Niort, France, in 1753, the son of a naval officer. After a military education in Malta, he returned to France in 1768 only to leave again in 1774, this time for good. His destination was Spain. Like many other French soldiers at that time, he offered his services to the Spanish Crown. He entered the training school for marines in Cádiz, and in 1776 accompanied Viceroy Cevallos’ expedition to the River Plate, although he returned to Spain shortly afterwards. In 1778 he was again sent to the River Plate as Port Captain responsible for guarding the estuary. Thereafter he remained in the River Plate.71 Castelli, born in Buenos Aires in 1764, was a lawyer closely connected with Belgrano, Viéytes and Rodríguez Peña, and had worked with them to promote economic progress in the River Plate region. It was apparently Castelli’s faction which sent Mariano Castilla to London with the object of securing British support and assistance for the independence of the River Plate Viceroyalty.72 There is, unfortunately, scant information concerning these two factions. There is however evidence of Castilla’s stay in London. He remained for about three years, which included the time of the invasions, and he corresponded with Foreign Secretaries Windham and Castlereagh. One of his letters to Castlereagh is highly dramatic. Castilla gives a thorough account of his misfortunes since he arrived


in London: he had not received any payment from the British Government for his services, and more worrying for him, he had received news from his friends in Buenos Aires that he was considered a traitor by the Viceregal authorities. His friends considered that he had not achieved anything substantial for the cause of independence since he had left. Worst of all he had also lost a lot of money as a result of these activities.73 According to Roberts, Castilla was part of a network of South American spies operating in London who were paid by the British Government, which feared that France had firm intentions of organizing an expedition to South America.74 The British kept these men, all of whom were creoles, under close watch and contemplated the possibility of assisting independence movements in Spanish America when the time was right. Such conspirators included the New Granadan Pedro Fermín de Vargas and, of course, Francisco Miranda, the earliest and most prestigious of them all.75 There is evidence that Castilla was in contact with these men. Unfortunately we do not know with whom he was keeping in touch in Buenos Aires. The theory suggested by Roberts, that he had been sent by one of the revolutionary factions, presumably Castelli’s, seems plausible, but there is no hard evidence for it. Another interesting aspect of these affairs prior to the invasions is the role of Colonel James Burke, who would later reappear in 1808–9 as a British agent operating in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. In 1804 he arrived in Buenos Aires, apparently under Castilla’s auspices, as a British spy collecting information about the revolutionary movements in the River Plate.76 Here again one is confronted by a lack of evidence. It would be most interesting to find out whether Burke had any contacts with Popham, Miranda, and the ministers who favoured sending an expedition to South America. It seems highly unlikely, however, given the existing evidence about the antecedents of Popham’s expedition, that Burke’s mission (if it was indeed a mission), had any influence on the eventual decision to invade. Roberts has suggested that it is likely that Burke had assured the revolutionary faction in Buenos Aires that Great Britain would be willing to send an expedition to assist them in their emancipation from Spain. This conjecture is also based on insufficient evidence. As we can see, the


origins of creole activity before the invasions are obscure. The activities of these revolutionary groups, to which some of the most notable creoles supposedly belonged, if they existed at all, were carried on in the utmost secrecy. When the British army arrived in Buenos Aires, one of its commanders, presumably either Popham or Beresford, was ‘confronted’ by a leader of a creole group. Most sources seem to agree that this person was Castelli, who inquired about the objectives of their mission.77 The answers received from the British commanders must have seemed highly unsatisfactory to the leaders of this movement. The British did not clarify at all what was the object of the enterprise, and certainly did not leave the creoles at ease with what they were most eager to find out, namely if there was any probability that they would be assisted by this force in gaining emancipation. Beresford apparently told Castelli that he could not take any decisions on this matter until he received orders from England.78 Some two weeks after disembarking Beresford reported that the town remained tranquil and that the people in general seemed satisfied with the British presence. He added: The creoles or in other words the inhabitants of the country are only prevented by the power of Spain from coming forward with enthusiasm to express their joy at the change of sovereigns and any assurance guaranteeing them from such a change would I think bring them forth with gladness and zeal to offer their assistance in maintaining His Majesty’s dominion over this country but they all express their fears of being given up at the end of the war.79 What seems to have occurred, however, is that most of the members of the alleged independence group, once it became clear to them that the invaders were not comitted to support independence, decided to join the local militia which was preparing to combat the invaders. This was the case with Pueyrredón and Manuel Belgrano, for example. Others, such as Castelli, decided to wait upon events. As we shall see, very few decided to support the British.80 There was also a feeling of anger and impotence at the ease with which a few British soldiers had taken possession of Buenos Aires. This induced


many creoles to join the local militias, which were rapidly organizing themselves to recover the city. Manuel Belgrano, for example, after his early doubts, decided to join the militia in part from such indignation: Confieso que me indigné, y que nunca sentí más haber ignorado, como ya dije anteriormente, hasta los rudimentos de la milicia; todavía fue mayor mi incomodidad cuando vi entrar las tropas enemigas y su despreciable número para una población como la de Buenos Aires: esta idea no se apartó de mi imaginación y poco faltó para que me hubiese hecho perder la cabeza: que era muy doloroso ver a mi patria bajo otra dominación y sobre todo en tal estado de degradación, que hubiese sido subyugada por una empresa aventurera, cual era la del bravo y honrado Beresford, cuyo valor admiro y admiraré siempre en esta peligrosa empresa.81 This reaction was similar to that of Mariano Moreno who stated: Yo he visto en la plaza llorar a muchos hombres por la infamia con que se les entregaba; y yo mismo he llorado más que otro alguno, cuando, a las tres de la tarde del 27 de Julio de 1806, vi entrar 1560 hombres ingleses, que apoderados de mi patria se alojaron en el fuerte y demás cuarteles de esta ciudad.82 The local miltia were divided into two regiments, the Patricios and Arribeños, which consisted entirely of creoles. They were led by Santiago de Liniers. A Spanish militia was also organized and was commanded by Sentenach, Ezquiaga, and Esteve y Llach, three Catalans fully loyal to the Alcalde Mayor, Martin de Alzaga. It is important to mention at this stage that, after the Viceroy Sobremonte had decided to flee to Córdoba with the treasure, Alzaga had established himself as the commanding figure in Buenos Aires, a situation which would, however, substantially change after Liniers’s military victories in the ‘reconquest’. Nevertheless, as we shall see later, Alzaga’s role during the invasions remains the most interesting and conspicuous of all the parts played by local characters in these events. A Spanish merchant who had arrived in the River Plate several years before, Alzaga had acquired a great reputation as one of the most suc-


cessful entrepreneurs in the region. He epitomized the sentiments of those leading Spanish merchants who were strongly opposed to the influence of the British free-trade ideals which had rapidly penetrated in Buenos Aires, and which had attracted the creole elite and those who formed the revolutionary groups. The local creoles and the Spanish army had at a certain point realized that the British were not as numerous as they had once thought and, as Captain Gillespie explains, they came to see that they themselves might not be so incapable of confronting this small English army: Widely scattered over the Pampas frontiers in small bodies, and never regimented for exercise or combined evolution, they were strangers to obedience, and on the day of trial, they could be expected to act only as a rabble, without motive or object. This was the description of our opponents, when we disembarked upon the shores of La Plata, in 1806, to whom was joined a heterogeneous mixture of nominated peons. None of them having ever seen an enemy in the field, they were panic-struck at the outset, and carrying it along with them in their precipitate retreat, the city surrendered under a similar impression. While we held the place, they had time to pause, and to recover from it, and it was during that peaceful interval they first began to calculate upon the popular strength, and on the means of applying it. Every individual possessing either observation or feeling, was stung with shame when he ascertained the numbers by which his capital had been conquered, and each telling a tale to his comrade from wounded pride, one universal flame of revolt was kindled against us. The calamitous issue is well known, arising out of the inequality of the conflict, but the retrospect is adduced in circumstantial detail of the origin of that military bias which has since charactarized, and has spread a new impulse of activity over all orders in those dependencies.83 The invaders had established General Beresford as the new Viceroy. This was the only change they imposed on the Viceroyalty, as they left the Cabildo, the Audiencia and the Church completely untouched. They invited the local citizens to sign their allegiance to King George III, and a list of some 58 names was collected. Unfortunately there is no trace of this tantalizing list, which would


prove more than interesting.84 There were some rumours that Castelli, who appeared under the name Francisco, was part of this list.85 One of his biographers, however, denies that it could refer him.86 What seems highly likely, given the apparent inactivity of those prestigious members of the revolutionary groups, is that, as Roberts suggests, they chose to wait and see. The ambiguity in the attitude of these men is not hard to understand, if it is true that Beresford, when approached by this group, simply assured them that he could do no more than attempt to get official authorization to assist their emancipation.87 It is important to note, however, that the British officers cannot be blamed for failing to take the initiative and espouse the creole cause. In any case they would later be proved right for not having taken part in any such scheme, in the light of the orders sent by the War Office to Beresford in September: It is almost superfluous to observe to you that my instructions of the 24th of July last, having been written with views wholly different from those which your present dispatches give rise to, can be no longer considered as being in force. They may serve however to show what in every state of things must be alike impressed upon your mind that the great and ruling consideration which has so long restrained His Majesty from invading this part of His enemy’s territories, has been the fear of exciting in those countries, from their known impatience of their former governments, a spirit of insurrection and revolt leading to consequences the most fatal, and which except by the presence of a very superior force, His Majesty may not have the means of controlling.88 As mentioned above, there were only sporadic cases of declared support for the British. However there was to be one notorious case. After the reconquest, Beresford, Pack, and many other British officers and soldiers were made prisoners and confined to various interior provinces instead of being sent back to England as they would have wished. Beresford was sent to Luján, and it was there that he became acquainted with Saturnino Rodríguez Peña, Liniers’s secretary and an officer in his army. Rodríguez Peña was also, with his brother Nicolás, a member of the one of the most influencial Rioplatense pro-independence creole groups. Many times he had


been sent to Luján by Liniers with messages for Beresford. It was during these meetings that Rodríguez Peña was persuaded by Beresford that, if he were set free, he would try to persuade Auchmuty and the other British commanders in Montevideo to help the creoles gain emancipation from the Spanish crown. It is possible that Beresford’s assurances were genuine, judging by his suggestions to Castlereagh the following year, in the letter we quoted at the start of this chapter. The most intricate aspect of these dealings, however, are the suspicions which arise about Liniers’s role. The historian Williams Alzaga suggests that the behaviour of both Liniers and Martín de Alzaga was highly suspicious during this episode.89 He reached this conclusion taking into account that Rodríguez Peña had been Liniers’s secretary, and that, therefore, the latter was probably aware of the negotiations. Alzaga had agreed to grant an interview to Rodríguez Peña and to listen to his arguments in support of the release of the English Officers in Luján. Two years later he was subject to a trial on account of this action, at which he was accused of treason.90 Beresford’s escape eventually took place in mid-February. Aided by Rodríguez Peña, he managed to arrive safely in Montevideo.

Saturnino Rodríguez Peña was the only well-known Rioplatense who decidedly embraced English interests during the invasions, and who actually offered his services to them, thinking that this was the best chance for emancipation. He was assisted in this mission by another creole who was not, however, from the River Plate, the AltoPeruvian Manuel Aniceto Padilla, an obscure and intriguing character who was serving a prison sentence at the time of the invasions for having stolen the jewels of his concubine, and who was later released by Beresford for some unknown reason.91 These two creoles also succeeded in escaping, and a few months later they served as emissaries for the British Government in the Portuguese Court in Rio de Janeiro, and later reached England. Towards March 1807, however, the situation looked bleak indeed for the British, as well as for their prospects of gaining creole


support. The creoles had however given sufficient proof of their antipathy towards the Spanish authorities, as Auchmuty wrote from Montevideo when news was received of the removal of Viceroy Sobremonte that same month: The seizure of the Viceroy by the inhabitants of Buenos Ayres, an event certainly very important in itself, first gave me an insight into the views of many of the leading men, and convinced me, that however inimical they were to us they were still more so to the present government.92 It must have begun to become clear, at this stage, to Auchmuty and to many other officers, that even if they had been strongly reinforced since the reconquest, what they needed from the Government in England more than men were official instructions allowing them to assist the creoles in their emancipation schemes. Such instructions, as we know, never arrived. In the meantime, while the British forces were in Montevideo waiting for reinforcements to arrive for a new attack on Buenos Aires, Auchmuty had occasionally been sending his officers on peace missions to Buenos Aires, where they warned General Liniers about the difficulties he and his men would encounter once the British army, newly reinforced, decided to occupy the city once more: he should surrender in order to avoid more bloodshed. Liniers, however, remained unperturbed by these insinuations. He did not have much choice anyhow, for by then the whole town was determined not to surrender in such a disgraceful manner ever again. Liniers was hardly a free agent and, as one of Auchmuty’s envoys, General Campbell, reported in a particularly vivid account, his situation was far from comfortable: On my enquiring for the General, or the person who had the chief command, I was introduced by the officer of the Navy, who conducted me on shore, to Gen.Liniers. I then delivered my dispatches, and on the General receiving them, the crowd was so great, that gathered round him, that he could hardly open them, some reading over his shoulders, others holding the papers by the corners, that they may be the better able to see the content of them. After a great deal of conversation regard-


ing my mission, the General told me, they had the greatest confidence in their numbers, and that the sword must decide, at the same time adding, that it did not depend on him, as a council must be held. I was asked to dinner. The table was large and crowded, and every attention was paid me by the General and his staff, but a short time after dinner, a person ran into the room, saying my boat was coming towards shore, with a white flag, on which some of the people at the table got up, and said we must be prisoners. Their expression was ‘Liniers, they must be prisoners, they have broken the truce.’ Others said that we should not be prisoners, and the dispute ran so high, and in such a manner, that General Liniers found it necessary to take me into his own room, and sent one of his aid de camps for a guard, to clear the mob, that I might get on board, regretting that I would not come on shore anymore, but that he would send the answers on board. From what I could see, there seemed to be a great deal of party work amongst them, and I thought that General Liniers was in a disagreeable situation, and had little authority.93 General Liniers was, on the whole, thoroughly respected by the British officers. However there were a few exceptions. Captain Gillespie, for example, was unimpressed with his character: Public economy, and the immemorial system of a government which had ruled with a suspicious jealousy, might have been supposed, after every danger had ceased, to have suggested the disbandment of so many natives in arms, but no reduction followed, and General Liniers who had commanded them with reiterated fortune in war, was continued at their head after peace. In testimony of the popular gratitude, he was successively called to be governor of Buenos Ayres, and at last to fill the viceroy’s chair, vacated by the dethronement of the marquis Sobremonte, which was the highest dignity in their power to bestow. The crowded successes that had accompanied him, were erroneously imputed to his talents and firmness, but in reality he possessed neither. Since landing in South America as an emigrant from the naval service of France, and a refugee from her convulsions, his habits had been depraved, and his


associates low, and having a natural genius for political intrigue, he exercised it amongst the lower orders of the capital, as well as through some of his national accomplices, in the interior. Although now an officer in the service of Spain, he was in every sinew, and at heart a gaul.94 At this stage, however, no matter how controversial Linier´s role as a leader might have seemed, it is beyond doubt that the prevailing feelings amongst the creole and Spanish soldiers was one of absolute loyalty towards the Spanish Crown, and of clear and utter rejection of the British invaders, and all this, in no small degree, was due to Liniers’s organizational skills. The situation confronted by General Whitelocke once he entered Buenos Aires in June was completely different from that faced by Beresford a year before. Whitelocke encountered no revolutionary groups, timidly speculating about the possibility of finding aid for emancipation, nor the shabby Spanish guard, nor bewildered citizens too shocked to react. The whole town was ready to play its part in defeating the enemy. Moreover, the militia, emboldened by the knowledge that it had defeated the same enemy before, had also been reinforced and was more prepared than ever to confront the British army. As General Whitelocke reported: The whole system appears to have been galling to the inhabitants, and instead of an impression favourable to Great Britain, I am persuaded that it will be difficult ever to do away with the idea that individual interest influenced the whole of these proceedings, and not any great national object! I say so much because I cannot but lament what is in fact too true, that we have scarcely one friend in the country.95 There were still however a few pro-British members of the revolutionary group, like Viéytes, Castelli, and Nicolás Rodríguez Peña, the brother of Saturnino, who at the time of the second invasion, although not volunteering their services to the British, chose to retire to the countryside and to await the outcome of Whitlocke’s new attack. According to Williams Alzaga, these men expected to be rewarded by Whitelocke if he was successful.96 By now, however,


this small focus of creole sympathizers was completely irrelevant to a commander who had explicit orders to recapture the town on His Majesty’s behalf. Moreover the new invaders seemed quite disgusted with what they saw: The people of this country have been totally misrepresented they are slothful to the last degree, and obtain food at so easy a rate that they will not labour. The Spaniard who is the only description of person who trades, is ruined by the arrival of the British merchants, the creole, who wishes to live in that indolence which alone is grateful to him, dislikes the restraint which the neighbourhood of an armed force imposes to him, above all bigotry is here at its height, and has so much influence that no army of protestants could ever against this vast population have ultimate success.97 It was Whitelocke, however, who summed up the state of total desolation of the British army in the River Plate, especially with respect to the lack of creole support: Upon the evacuation by a British Army it might be naturally expected, that some adherents would be committed in its cause, and thereby become obnoxious of their former government, and dependent on ours for support. But nothing can more strongly mark the inimical disposition of the country towards us, than the circumstance of their having only two individuals [Padilla and Rodríguez Peña] of any respectability, who having sacrificed their Spanish connections and prospects, are thrown on the generosity of the British nation for the means of subsistence.98 This last remark reflects vividly the River Plate creoles’ attitude towards the British throughout the invasions. Right from the start ‘the inimical disposition’ had prevailed. We have repeatedly stated that, had the British arrived with the intention of assisting the emancipation of the creoles, this disposition might well have been altered. Even then, one should recall that shortly before these events took place in the River Plate, Francisco Miranda had commanded an ostensibly liberating expedition to


Venezuela, and his mission did not encounter the expected creole support. It seems likely that the only men who would have been capable of changing the course of public opinion among the creoles were future revolutionaries such as Castelli. However the British policy of conquest right from the start left absolutely no room for such men even to consider openly approaching His Majesty’s troops. It is no wonder then that Rodríguez Peña and Padilla were the only two figures of any reputation amongst the creoles who opted to support the British cause wholeheartedly. Castelli and his followers evidently preferred to wait and see. Moreover, the resolute manner in which Liniers, Pueyrredón, and Alzaga resisted the invasions and organized the militia to combat them, contributed rapidly to a feeling of resentment towards the invaders. Speculations about the possible involvement of these three men with emancipation plans, which could imply that they in fact entertained ideas of reaching some agreement with the British, seem very unfounded. Justifiably, they are still seen as the heroes of these events.

4 Strangford, Independence and the London Missions

By 1807, Napoleon Bonaparte’s domination of Europe was at its peak. A year later his invasion of Spain eventually provided the British army with the scenario in which to confront his army. This naturally meant a new alliance between Great Britain and Spain, added to the traditional alliance Britain already had with Portugual, whose Prince Regent, the future King Joao VI, had in 1807 decided to move his court to Brazil, due to the menace of a French invasion in the Iberian peninsula. This event is most significant for the analysis of Britain’s relations with Latin America during this period. For the first time, Britain had direct participation and representation in the South American continent. Lord Strangford was appointed as British representative to the Portuguese Court in Rio de Janeiro, where he remained for the next nine years. Strangford had been instrumental in convincing the Portuguese Emperor to move to South America.1 The importance of Strangford’s presence in Rio de Janeiro was magnified even more by the outbreak of independence movements in 1810 in Caracas and Buenos Aires, both of which occurred as a result of the French occupation of Spain, and the attempt to make Joseph Bonaparte the new King of the Spanish Empire. These two revolutionary movements did not, however, declare complete separation from the Spanish Crown; they remained loyal to Ferdinand, son of the deposed King Charles IV. Nevertheless, the River Plate revolution marked a crucial twist for relations with Great Britain, as the revolutionaries rapidly sought British recognition and 85


assistance. For the next fourteen years diplomatic missions were repeatedly sent to London. Great Britain was in an awkward position: allied to Spain on the one hand, and on the other receiving delegations from the revolutionary governments of both Caracas and the River Plate who were trying to obtain protection from Spain. This situation would begin to clarify only in 1815 when the defeat of Napoleon and the formation of the Holy Alliance allowed Britain to view her relations with Spain and its Colonies from a different standpoint. Furthermore, in 1816 the River Plate declared its complete emancipation from the Spanish Empire.

Naturally enough, during this period 1807–16 the internal affairs of both Great Britain and the River Plate were affected, in one way or the other, by the events which were taking place in both continents. In England three different Governments were formed during these nine years, the Administrations of the Duke of Portland, Spencer Perceval, and Lord Liverpool, who would remain in power until 1827. The Río de La Plata received during those years the last Viceroys, Sobremonte, Liniers, and Cisneros, and the first experiences of revolutionary government: the Primera Junta, the two Triunviratos, and the three Directores Supremos – Posadas, Alvear, and Pueyrredón – who followed. The Ministry of the Duke of Portland succeeded the Talents who, apart from being largely responsible for the misfortunes of the River Plate invasions, had also failed to reach a peaceful solution with France. The Portland Administration was absolutely convinced that no peace was possible as long as Napoleon was in power, and therefore it decided from the start to adopt a Pittite line in foreign affairs. It was no surprise that the Cabinet should be composed almost entirely of Tories.2 Among them were George Canning and Viscount Castlereagh, who, as we have already seen, were the two most prominent Tory opponents in the House of Commons of the Talents’ policies in South America. Canning became Foreign Secretary, and Castlereagh took the War Office. Castlereagh had been the first of the two to take an interest in South American affairs, and this was reflected almost as soon as he had resumed his ministerial functions. As mentioned in the previous chapter, he

Strangford, Independence and the London Missions 87

started to sketch plans for an expedition to South America. He was not certain about the exact destination of this new expedition, but he was absolutely clear about the objectives: the enterprise would have the sole intention of assisting in the emancipation of the Spanish colonies, which would enable Great Britain to gain commercial advantages, and also to prevent possible French designs on this region.3 The expedition would be commanded by General Sir Arthur Wellesley (the future Duke of Wellington), and supported by General Miranda. Troops were sent to Cork and were set to sail for South America but they were diverted to Spain, where Wellington’s fame awaited, once news of Spanish resistance to Napoleon persuaded the British Government to aid the Spaniards. Castlereagh’s interest in South America did not however fade away after this event. Whilst laying plans for the expedition, he had taken a keen interest in analysing the most appropriate form of government for the Spanish Americans once they were liberated from the Spanish Crown, an issue that in the past had deterred successive British governments from taking part in any of Miranda’s expeditions to South America. The fear of Jacobin principles emerging once liberation was achieved had been the traditional excuse given by Pittites and Tories, and Castlereagh was also subject to such fears. Nevertheless, Castlereagh had been warned by General Charles Dumouriez, the former French revolutionary, now military advisor to the British Foreign Secretary, that the best policy England could adopt with respect to Spanish America was to relinquish all ideas of military conquest and instead support the emancipation of the territories. Furthermore, Dumouriez suggested that once emancipation was achieved, a constitutional monarchy should be established with the exiled Duke of Orleans as King.4 This idea was more appealing to Castlereagh than the menacing notion of a new democracy. Dumouriez had in fact been in contact with Miranda several years before, as already mentioned, when he commanded the French expedition to Belgium and Holland in 1793. It is probable that Dumouriez got most of his information on the the Spanish colonies from Miranda. Nevertheless, Dumouriez’ interest in South America remained lively, and he became one of the British Government’s main informants on the area, in part as a result of his new South American contacts, such as Pedro Fermín de Vargas, Mariano Castilla, and


Aniceto Padilla. After assisting Beresford’s escape, Padilla had fled to Rio de Janeiro and later to England, where he received payment from the British Government for his services.5 Apparently he kept the General well informed about events in the River Plate, and from this source Dumouriez passed on information to Castlereagh.6 Castlereagh’s interest quickened when towards the end of 1808 he decided to send his own agent to the River Plate. For this secret mission he designated Captain James Burke. He instructed him that the object of his journey was to find out as much as he could about the sentiments of the Rioplatenses. He was also ordered to inform the officials concerning the situation in Spain, and assure them that England had fervently embraced the cause of Spain; that as a consequence of this, the hostilities between the two nations had come to an end; and furthermore, that Britain had supplied the Spaniards with money, arms, and ammunition, and was firmly allied with them in their cause against the French. Castlereagh concluded this note emphatically, stressing to the Captain that: You will therefore direct all your exertions in working the minds of the Spaniards against the French, and inculcate that the sole motive which influences the conduct of Great Britain has been and is to prevent Spain and the Spanish provinces from falling under the yoke of the French, and to enable them to maintain their independence against that power.7 Castlereagh’s opinion clearly reflects the degree of concern in Great Britain at the possibility of France spreading her hegemony to Spanish America, one of the few commercial and strategic resorts left to Britain in the face of the Continental blockade Napoleon had decreed, which was creating enormous complications.

By now the Portuguese court was established in Rio de Janeiro and Admiral Sidney Smith and Lord Strangford, the two British emissaries who had been so instrumental in this move, were already stationed there. These two men were also close cousins. Sidney Smith was born in 1764, and his extensive and eventful naval career is well


known. He was also a Member of Parliament. By the time he arrived in Rio de Janeiro he had already served and seen action in France, Sweden, Gibraltar, Turkey, Naples, and Portugal, where he had been sent to make the arrangements for the departure of the Prince Regent and the Royal Family to Brazil. He had eventually been made commander of that naval station.8 Strangford was born Percy Clinton Smythe in 1780. After studying at Trinity College, Dublin, he entered the diplomatic service as secretary of the legation in Lisbon. He soon established himself as a respected figure at the Portuguese Court, especially after he had translated and published Portuguese poetry in The Edinburgh Review. He had convinced the Prince Regent and the rest of the Court to emigrate to Rio de Janeiro in November 1807, as the French advanced. Strangford was ordered to follow them to Rio, where he was appointed Envoy Extraordinary.9 A certain rivalry existed between the cousins, who both claimed the credit for having successfully escorted the Portuguese Royal Family to Brazil.10 As we shall see later, Strangford and Smith were frequently to clash on matters concerning the Portuguese Crown’s policy in the River Plate. As soon as these two men arrived in Brazil, they were confronted with a delicate situation. The Portuguese Court in Rio de Janeiro warmly espoused the idea of annexing the Banda Oriental – the territory which had for decades been in dispute between Spain and Portugal – and possibly even thought of annexing Buenos Aires itself. This desire had developed before news arrived of the Spanish uprising against France and, therefore, before it was known to the English emissaries that Spain was now allied to England. At first Smith had been inclined to assist the Prince Regent Joao in his designs, which were a consequence of Portuguese resentment against Spain for having assisted the French in the occupation of Portugal. Strangford went along with this, for he was primarily concerned that the River Plate should be protected from any possible French attack. But once news arrived of the so-called Farse of Bayona, the subsequent Spanish revolt of May 1808, and, moreover, of Britain’s decision to send forces to the peninsula, Strangford was determined to avoid any confrontation between the two peninsular nations, now that they were both allied with Great Britain against the common enemy, France.


Smith, however, remained in favour of the court’s scheme, especially after the Prince Regent’s wife, the formidable Princess Carlota Joaquina, sister of the future Ferdinand VII of Spain, had decided that she would create a Regency in the River Plate. Smith, who had become very intimate with the Princess, maintained that his motive for supporting this plan was to secure Great Britain’s commercial advantages in the River Plate. Strangford, however, remained sceptical and decided against further action until instructions arrived from Great Britain. Moreover, at the Foreign Office, Canning had expressed his disapproval of Smith’s intentions.11 Strangford, like Smith, was also in favour of securing the British commercial position in the River Plate, but not at the cost of Carlota’s plan which implied, of course, the separation of the Plate from Spain. However, in spite of Strangford’s and more significantly of Canning’s feelings, Smith decided to go ahead with the Princess’s project. He used a letter Castlereagh had sent in August 1808, in which the latter mentioned that in the eventuality of France crushing the Spaniards he might consider taking action in the River Plate, to support his strategy.12 In March 1809 Smith addressed a letter to Liniers at Buenos Aires in which he set out the advantages Liniers would enjoy if he accepted Carlota Joaquina as new Regent, and in this way rid himself of the Spaniards.13 Smith also claimed that this project was consistent with Great Britain’s strategy against France in Europe, and emphasized his country’s position with respect to Spanish America: … if by any hard fortune Spain shall fall into the grasp of Bonaparte, it is as much the duty of Great Britain as it is that of the Spanish Colonies to preserve them from falling into the same servitude and it is in the interest of these colonies to secure themselves from so ignominious a fate, but in doing so Great Britain would aim [at] neither sovereignty nor territorial occupancy and would confine her views to forming such a connection with the Spanish dominions in South America as might be best calculated to protect their independence and resources against the designs of the common enemy.14 Admiral Sidney Smith then wrote to Castlereagh to inform him of the evolution of his plan, but by that time Strangford had managed


to persuade Joao to send an official note to King George III asking for the removal of the Admiral, on the grounds of his threat to the peace of the region. This eventually occurred; Rear-Admiral De Courcy was nominated as Smith’s replacement. Thus ended the adventures in Rio de Janeiro of a British emissary who openly supported a plan that favoured the independence of the River Plate, whatever its extravagant nature. It is interesting to consider what line Strangford now adopted, and what the reaction now was in the River Plate towards the whole Carlota scheme.

Between the reconquest and the arrival of the Portuguese Court in Rio de Janeiro, the situation in the River Plate had been relatively stable. Santiago de Liniers had been confirmed as Viceroy by the Spanish Crown towards the end of 1807 – he received the news of this ratification in June 1808 – and was still held in esteem by the people of Buenos Aires because of his role during the British invasions. The creole faction that had shown inclinations towards independence remained loyal to him. Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, the other great hero of the reconquest, had sailed for Spain. There he witnessed the precarious situation of that nation, and saw how rapidly it was now falling into the hands of France. On hearing about British preparations for a liberating expedition to South America, he became enthusiastic about the idea and in May 1808 sent to London two emissaries, the future revolutionaries José Moldes and Manuel Pinto, to find out more. These emissaries met Miranda, and Moldes was received by the Prime Minister, the Duke of Portland, who gave him an account of the preparations for the expedition. However, while they were still in London, news of the Anglo–Spanish alliance arrived, which put an end to all plans for an expedition to Spanish America.15 According to Roberts, the River Plate authorities had also heard about this expedition. Liniers had organized his troops and put them on alert. The creole party were also aware of the news, and were preparing to assist this new enterprise.16 They were most in contact with Saturnino Rodríguez Peña who, after assisting Beresford’s escape, had fled to Rio de Janeiro, and from there was maintaining a frequent correspondence with Padilla and Miranda in


England. Through Miranda, Rodríguez Peña learnt of the expedition plans, which he favoured, and towards the end of June 1808 he told Miranda that he had already warned his acquaintances in the Plate about the expedition. He insisted that Miranda should try to mount the expedition as soon as possible, for he was already aware that there was a strong possibility of an agreement between Spain and England.17 This information he probably picked up from Strangford, with whom he maintained close relations. As soon as news of the alliance between Britain and Spain was received in the River Plate, Liniers, aware that an expedition was now unlikely to attack Spanish America, allowed the entry of English merchants into Buenos Aires. However, the events taking place in Spain made matters more uncomfortable for Liniers given his French origin, and allowed certain Spaniards and creoles who supported the Spanish cause in the River Plate to raise suspicions about the Viceroy’s possible loyalty to Napoleon. This movement was headed by such prominent figures as Alzaga, Juan Antonio de Santa Coloma, and Mariano Moreno. In early 1809 they pressed Liniers to resign. However, when news of the suspicions held by these men was made public by Liniers’s loyal commanders Cornelio Saavedra and Martín Rodríguez, there was a popular demonstration in favour of the Viceroy and his position was restored.

Soon, Liniers would be confronted by another delicate situation: Princess Carlota Joaquina’s plan. Saturnino Rodríguez Peña was an ardent supporter of this plan and had established links with Admiral Sidney Smith, the main backer of the scheme. In the River Plate, the creole faction to which Rodrígez Peña belonged, which also included his brother Nicolás, Belgrano, Viéytes, and Castelli among others, were also in favour of this idea, and in September 1808 he sent a note to Carlota Joaquina and her brother Pedro Carlos, asking them to come to the River Plate and establish a monarchy. The creole group argued that a constitutional monarchy would best suit the River Plate, and would also benefit commerce with Great Britain, of vital importance to them.18 The Princess agreed to send James Paroissien, an English friend of Rodríguez Peña who was at that time residing in Rio de Janeiro, as secret agent to the River Plate for the


purpose of influencing the inhabitants in favour of Carlota.19 However an informant of the Princess in Rio de Janeiro, José Presas, warned her that Rodrígez Peña and his party were in fact republicans, and were using her in order to get rid of the Spaniards. He also maintained that both Paroissien and Rodríguez Peña were double agents. Although this was not true, Carlota was persuaded by her informant and warned the Spanish authorities in the River Plate that Paroissien was an impostor. Paroissien was therefore arrested as soon as he arrived in Montevideo.20 In November, Carlota Joaquina sent another emissary to the River Plate to inform her about the situation, and to see if she should persevere with her plan. This emissary was the Portuguese Felipe Contucci, an acquaintance of Miranda.21 There was still some support for Carlota Joaquina’s cause despite the fact that she had fallen into disrepute with many of the creole faction because of the Rodríguz Peña incident. Some notables among the more moderate creoles, such as Gregorio Funes, Juan José Paso, and Cornelio Saavedra, expressed their sympathies, but by the time she sent James Burke south in March 1809, the movement was completely discredited; Burke was arrested, and later fled.22 The arrival of a new Viceroy, Baltasar Hidalgo de Cisneros, sent by the Spanish Junta to the River Plate, marked the end of Carlota’s designs. Since the events of Bayona the creole movement under Belgrano (who had supported Liniers and now openly rejected Cisneros) had advocated allegiance to Ferdinand VII and looked to Great Britain, more precisely to Strangford, for assistance and guidance. Strangford, with no instructions from England, played a double role: he supported Spanish interests but secretly kept in touch with the River Plate creoles. However, he received no instructions until 1812.23 This was caused to a considerable degree by the change of government in England. The Duke of Portland’s Ministry ended in late 1809, and was replaced by that of Spencer Perceval, another predominantly Tory Cabinet that followed the same strategy in foreign affairs. However, with regard to Spanish America this change of Ministry proved to be significant. Having discarded the services of Castlereagh and Canning, the new Ministry could find no one with knowledge of South America. The new Foreign Secretary, the Marquess of Wellesley, was not as well informed as his predecessors, in spite of the fact that his brother had in the last six


years been involved in several projects for Spanish American expeditions.24 The consequences of this change were to become apparent now that South America again demanded serious consideration by the English Government. Yet, for some unknown reason, no instructions were sent to Strangford in the course of the three years that this Ministry remained in office. Anglo-River Plate relations stagnated. Strangford’s role in Spanish America, and especially in the River Plate, acquired great importance during these years. All communications between the River Plate and Great Britain during this period were entirely conducted by him.

After the Carlota affair and the events which led to the arrival of Cisneros, the situation in the River Plate entered another period of apparent stabilization. Strangford was aware, however, that discontent lurked under the surface. People were much alarmed about the situation in Spain and the uncertain future prospects there. Another source of discontent were Cisneros’s persistent attempts to jeopardize the freedom of commerce with Great Britain, which had been advocated earlier by Mariano Moreno and decreed in November 1809, although precariously maintained. There was also a great deal of uneasiness in the River Plate with the liberal Cortes formed in Cádiz, which had established that all Spanish colonies should remain politically attached to the Spanish Monarchy. The creoles however, considered themselves as one of the kingdoms united and governed by the King, and his absence from the Throne meant therefore, that they were now entitled to their own political rights.25 Matters came to a head on 22 May 1810 when a Cabildo Abierto, an open assembly, was called, at which a group of notable Rioplatense creoles claimed that as the Spanish Throne was vacant, sovereignty should revert to the people of the River Plate and an autonomous government should be formed. On 25 May popular pressure forced the Spanish authorities to yield. Cisneros had to resign, and a local Junta composed almost entirely of creoles was formed. Its members tried to make it clear that theirs was not a revolution declaring absolute emancipation from Spain, and that they maintained their


loyalty to Ferdinand, the King in captivity.26 The leading personalities of this newly formed Junta were Cornelio Saavedra and Mariano Moreno. The former represented the more moderate line of the government, whilst the latter, with other members of the Junta, such as Belgrano and Castelli (in spite of his previous allegiance to Alzaga), now embodied the more intransigent line within the revolution.27 The Junta, however, was immediately confronted by reactions in the interior, still loyal to Spain. This provoked violent uprisings against the Junta and militias were therefore formed in Buenos Aires in response. In Córdoba, for example, Santiago Liniers, the hero of the invasions, who had voiced his opposition towards the revolution, was arrested and later executed. Two years later, Alzaga was to meet the same fate. The Junta had decided to bid for Britain’s friendship and protection and therefore communicated to Strangford the news of the revolution and their allegiance to Ferdinand. He responded sympathetically, and especially praised the revolutionaries for declaring free trade with all friendly nations and for their loyalty to Ferdinand.28 He confessed, however, that he had no orders from Great Britain and could not offer any sort of protection until he received them. The Junta therefore decided to send a delegate to London to seek recognition and arms for the defence of the territory. The man chosen for this enterprise, the first official diplomatic envoy from the River Plate to Great Britain, was Matías Irigoyen, a young naval officer.29 He arrived in London on 6 August 1810, and met Wellesley shortly afterwards. The Marquess had already received delegates from Venezuela, which had revolted against Spain a few months before and sent Luis López Méndez, Andrés Bello, and the young Simón Bolívar to England. They arrived with instructions similar to those of Irigoyen, and Wellesley had assured them that despite her friendly relations with Spain, Great Britain would not supply Spain with military aid to use against her colonies. Moreover, he urged the Spanish Cortes in Cádiz to open the ports of the colonies to British commerce.30 He could not, however, formally recognize their independence nor supply them with arms, although he did not object to their request to allow Miranda to return to Caracas as head of the revolutionary movement.


In September Irigoyen informed the Junta that when the Marquess asked what aid the Junta expected to receive from England: ….yo contesté a S.E. que eso que no podía ser sino fúsiles; entonces me dijo S.E. que eso era una cosa que no podía ser, pues que ademas de oponerse a las leyes del Reyno, ya no habían por haberse consumido más de 300 mil en España.31 In spite of this, however, Irigoyen optimistically added: Ya he dicho que esta reunión fue presenciada por el Secretario de la Embajada Española, y yo creo que es partido tomado por el Ministerio Inglés para tranquilizar a los Españoles. En fin esta situación no puede durar, la derrota de los Ingleses, que se espera por momentos, nos dará la primacía, entre tanto el Ministerio Ingles aunque se gobierna con mucha circunspección, por no romper con los Españoles, no por eso oculta sus miras, y deseos que toda la América se haga independiente, pues así lo demuestra con enviar a Miranda al Reyno de Caracas.32 This optimism was premature. Wellesley had been sympathetic towards the emissary from the Plate, but in fact he had granted him only the same concessions that had been promised before to the other South American delegates: basically, that Great Britain could provide protection for these colonies against France, that they would not support any designs by Spain to attack the colonies, but that they would not provide the creoles with arms, or concede them official recognition.33 The Junta had also sent two other men to England in August, an Army officer named José Agustín Aguirre, who accompanied an English merchant resident of Buenos Aires called Thomas Crompton, hoping that the latter, because of his nationality, would be able to convince his Government to supply the River Plate with arms and ammunition. These negotiations came to nothing.34

At the same time, incidents occurred in the River Plate as a consequence of a naval blockade declared by a Portuguese squadron.


Strangford had been unable to prevent the Portuguese from invading the Banda Oriental in June, but he was assured by them that they would take no action in the River Plate. The blockade was only a precaution against revolutionary forces operating near the Brazilian border. Strangford nevertheless made an official complaint against the blockade. He also sent Padilla, now assisting him in Rio de Janeiro, with letters to the Buenos Aires Junta clarifying his position and asking them not to take any aggresive measures against the Portuguese in Montevideo. However, when things seemed to be settling down, the Spanish authorities in Montevideo convinced Captain Elliott, the British naval commander stationed in the River Plate for the protection of British merchant interests, to maintain the blockade of Buenos Aires. The British merchants in Buenos Aires, represented by Alexander Mackinnon, complained bitterly to Elliott, and the Junta sent Padilla back to Rio de Janeiro with a formal complaint to Strangford, asking him to get rid of Elliott.35 Strangford in turn sent Admiral De Courcy to the River Plate with orders for Elliott to end the blockade, and to tell him that he was to be replaced by Captain Ramsay.36 Ramsay, together with Captain Fabian, had been stationed in the River Plate since the revolution and had maintained friendly relations with the Junta.37 Strangford informed Wellesley about these events towards the end of September. He also took the opportunity to ask for instructions and to make his government aware of the intricate situation that now faced the rebellious Spanish American colonies, especially in regard to their future relations with France and Britain: The question whether these countries are to become English or French is now an issue, and its decision will most probably depend upon the part which the British Cabinet may take, whether it should resolve to support the cause of the Spanish Americans, (availing itself of the opening which is left for that purpose, in consequences of the government having preserved the name of Ferdinand VII), or whether it should refuse to acknowledge that government, and thereby compell the people to insist on a declaration of independence, a step to which they would certainly have recourse, sooner than return to the ancient system, and which the agents of France would not fail to convert to the most profitable account.38


This last point made by Strangford is both intriguing and curious. The fear of France taking advantage if the colonies declared full independence, may have been in part a consequence of certain Jacobin ideals which had been advocated by the revolutionaries in Caracas and Buenos Aires, but seems more likely a case of the traditional Tory prejudice of the time, that revolutions would systematically tend to adopt Jacobin ideals. However, Strangford did mention that in the River Plate the inhabitants were much more inclined to Great Britain. All the same, he warned his Government that: Although the government of Buenos Ayres are sincerely and entirely disposed in favour of Great Britain, they cannot but remember they owe their own political existence to the choice of the people. They have already experienced the full force of popular influence, and they naturally look with apprehension to every circumstance which by rendering Great Britain an object of suspicion to the people at large might eventually direct that influence against themselves.39 Strangford’s, and supposedly Britain’s, stand with regard to the revolution in the River Plate was clear. Britain supported the movement in so far as it was faithful to Ferdinand and represented a rejection by the creoles of Spanish rule now that the country was completely in the hands of France. What was also clear, however, was that Strangford was aware that if full emancipation was achieved, either England’s alliance with Spain or her close relations with the Spanish colonies, especially the River Plate, would suffer a crisis which at that moment England was in no way prepared to face. Strangford’s task therefore was to see that the River Plate revolution maintained itself on a steady course, as this was of vital importance for his nation’s interests. Street has argued, against the traditional view prevalent amongst certain Argentine historians, that Strangford’s favourable position towards the revolutionaries was not a consequence of his sympathy towards them, but only a means of maintaining Great Britain’s commercial and strategic advantages in South America. This to a great extent seems to have been the case. However, it clearly reflects the talents of a man acting with no instructions from his Government, devising what he conceived was best for the interests of his nation.


Towards the end of 1810 Mariano Moreno, in charge of the foreign relations of the Junta, clashed with Saavedra and resigned. Apparently, it was due to this confrontation that he was later sent to England on a mission accompanied by his brother Manuel and Tomás Guido, with the same instructions as Matías Irigoyen. Another reason why Moreno was chosen for this mission, apart from the fact that it was thought necessary to send a prestigous political figure, was that he had always favoured closer commercial relations with Great Britain. He was supported by the British merchants in the River Plate, who strongly recommended him to their Government.40 Moreno might thus have made a favourable impression on the British Ministry, although it was likely, as Street suggests, that he would not have much luck in gaining any concrete benefits.41 Unfortunately Moreno died on the ship that was carrying him to England. His brother took charge of the mission. This represented not only a blow for the River Plate provinces who thus lost one of their most charismatic revolutionary leaders, but also a set-back for the mission itself. Moreno was the only official emissary. Neither his brother nor Guido carried official credentials. Nevertheless Manuel Moreno decided to persevere with the mission. On their arrival to England Moreno and Guido were rapidly informed by William Hamilton, Secretary to the Foreign Office, that Great Britain’s position towards the South American revolutionaries remained unaltered. Wellesley agreed to meet the two men in June 1811, and confirmed this opinion.42 Moreno remained confident about the prospects of success of his mission, for he had reason to believe that changes in the British Government would favour their cause. In August he informed his Government: El Príncipe Regente se halla en el día ligado a varias restricciones puestas por el Parlamento hasta que entre en el pleno ejercicio de los derechos de la Corona: sus ideas son muy liberales, y cuando se cumpla el tiempo prefijado por el Parlamento, que será el 20 o 25 de Octubre próximo, en cuyo tiempo si el Rey no se mejora se le declarará enteramente exonerado de sus funciones, o bien suceda su muerte que por momentos se está esperando, no seguirá el presente sistema. Entonces se mudará enteramente el Ministerio, y se prestará más atención a los asuntos de America,


segun la opinión de los que estarán en el oficio, y ya se señalan con el dedo por la confianza y amistad que les profesa el Príncipe. Entretanto hay que esperar se mude la conducta de este gabinete con respecto a nosotros, y según su empeño por las cosas de España, todo lo que se podía conseguir es la perfecta neutralidad que hasta ahora han guardado en nuestros domésticos disgustos.43 That King George III was expected to die at any moment, and that his son, the Prince Regent, would succeed, was naturally encouraging for Moreno. It was well known that the Prince Regent was close to the Whig faction of Grey and Lord Holland, who since the fall of the Talents Ministry had remained in opposition to the Ministries that had followed. It was almost a foregone conclusion that when the Prince Regent succeeded, a Whig Ministry would take office. Moreno thought that this would automatically mean a change in policy towards Spanish America. Until this occurred, however, the Whig position was far from clear, and although Whig newspapers such as The Morning Chronicle had shown their support for the revolutions, the famous Holland House circle and Lord Holland himself were more inclined towards the cause of the Spanish Cortes, and therefore did not much appear to favour the South American rebels.44 Nevertheless, George III still lived, and there was more room for doubt than Moreno thought about the expectations of the imminent formation of a Whig Ministry once the Prince Regent came to the Throne.

By now matters in the River Plate were again in turmoil. The Spanish authorities in Montevideo named the Royalist General Elío as new Viceroy of the River Plate. The nomination was naturally rejected by the revolutionaries in Buenos Aires. As a result of this negative response the Spaniards, on February 1811, declared Montevideo the new capital and ordered the renewal of the blockade of Buenos Aires. This was shortly followed by an uprising in the interior of the Banda Oriental by rural militias under the leadership of Captain José Gervasio Artigas, in clear defiance of the Revolutionary Junta.45 The Portuguese forces remained in the area, so the Junta sent Manuel de Sarratea to Rio


de Janeiro to request Strangford’s mediation. After strenuous efforts, strangford managed to convince Elío to desist from the blockade. Elío repented in November, and ordered the blockade to continue. After the renewal of hostilities in the area, Strangford decided to distance himself from these events. For a while this attitude provoked irritation and suspicion in the River Plate towards Strangford, who was merely avoiding adding further confusion to the situation. He was afraid that if he showed his sympathy to the revolutionaries, they might take it as an invitation to attack Montevideo.46 As a result of these events, the Junta was replaced by a Triumvirate composed of Sarratea (who was much esteemed by Strangford), Manuel Chiclana, and Juan José Paso, of the Moreno faction.

In London, Manuel Moreno was having trouble in getting the British government to recognize his official character. His position was complicated even more by the presence in London of Manuel Padilla, who now claimed that he had also been sent as envoy of the River Plate, though he was only being used by Strangford to deliver messages to the Foreign Minister. That his friend Dumouriez recommended his services to Wellesley made Padilla feel entitled to act officially, infuriating Moreno to such a degree that he denounced Padilla’s activities both to the British Foreign Minister and to his home Government.47 Things had not gone well for Moreno, as Wellesley’s policy towards the Spanish American colonies had not changed. Wellesley had ordered his brother Arthur in Cadiz to negotiate some type of solution with the Cortes: Britain could not afford to have the Spanish American colonies attacked by Spain, as this might provoke the South Americans to join forces with France. It was also necessary for Great Britain to maintain her commerce in the area. These arguments were firmly rejected by the Spaniards, and no further progress was achieved. This was as far as the Marquess would go in support of the Spanish American colonies, in view of the complicated state of affairs in Europe.48 The situation was indeed difficult, but one wonders why Wellesley did not take advantage of Strangford and his considerable influence in South America. He neither corresponded with him nor took any of his advice.49


Manuel Moreno also tried to attract attention by obtaining support for the cause of the colonies in the press and in other publications. He established relations with José María Blanco White, the Spanish exile who had founded El Español, which favoured the cause of the rebels in South America, and who was also close to the Holland House circle, and also with William Walton, a publicist who wrote numerous articles in the The Morning Chronicle. As mentioned above, The Morning Chronicle was favourable to the Spanish American revolutions. Walton wrote also for other newspapers, criticizing his Government for not adopting a more liberal attitude.50

Early in 1812 Moreno’s expectations rose when Castleregh was recalled to the Foreign Office. Although clearly identified with the Tory foreign policy line of maintaining a cautious stand with respect to the Spanish American colonies, Castlereagh had shown more interest than Wellesley in their affairs, and had already corresponded with Strangford in his last period in office. He was therefore familiar with the situation both in Brazil and Spanish America.51 Nevertheless, the Moreno mission was already in jeopardy. Although he wrote regularly to his Government, Moreno in turn did not receive any instructions on the future line of policy to follow. The situation within the British Government remained unclear. Although George III was still alive, rumours were still current that the Prince Regent might form a new Ministry. Moreno wrote to Buenos Aires: Todos los papeles públicos de estos países hablan de una mutación muy pronta en el Ministerio actual. El Príncipe Regente ha pasado una carta al Duque de York en que manifiesta ser su voluntad hacer una reforma en el plan actual de la Administración; ninguna duda cabe ya de que habrá una variación en pocos dias: lo que no se ha aclarado aún es si será total de todos los que están en oficio, o solamente parcial combinando en la presente administración algunos miembros distinguidos de la oposición, a cuya última parte se inclinan los papeles ministeriales.52


The Prince Regent, however, was not as strongly inclined to the Whigs as he had been in the days of Fox and Sheridan. Although Grey still thought that he was loyal to them, Prince George was in fact no longer committed to this Whig faction. Evidence became conclusive when Prince George had to form a new Ministry after the murder of Spencer Perceval in June 1812. He decidedly favoured the appointment, as Prime Minister, of Lord Liverpool, an ardent Tory who formed a predominantly Tory Ministry with Castlereagh remaining in the Foreign Office. Other members included Lord Bathurst at the War Office, Melville, Vansittart, and Sidmouth. Almost immediately, there was evidence of a new approach to Spanish America by this new government, which appeared more inclined than previous ones to pay more attention to the events taking place in that continent. An example was Castlereagh’s approach to Moreno, some few weeks after he returned to the Foreign Office. In a letter that Moreno was to deliver to his government, Castlereagh gave a detailed explanation of the reasons for Wellesley’s position and for his silence respecting the affairs of the River Plate in the last two years.53 Moreno was on his way back, thus ending his mission. According to Street, Moreno had done little to enhance relations with Great Britain and, furthermore, he had left a poor impression in England, especially on account of the Padilla affair.54 In the letter Castlereagh explained to the River Plate patriots that Britain’s silence had not been a product of indifference, pointing out that his government had pressed the Cortes to respect free trade in the area and not to take military action against the colonies.55 A few months later in 1812 Castlereagh was also in touch with Strangford, who after three years finally received instructions from his Government. With respect to the Portuguese blockade, Castlereagh ordered Strangford to ensure that this should not interfere with the normal commercial intercourse between Britain and the River Plate. Towards the end of his dispatch he emphasized that: In any future communication which Your Lordship may have with the local Government of Buenos Ayres, you may assure them that this line of conduct has been adopted by H.R.H. the Prince Regent, at the same time that his influence with the Court of Brazil is also


extended to procure the evacuation of the Spanish territories by the Portuguese Troops, in the sanguine expectation that his offers of mediation between Old Spain and her transatlantic provinces may be met equally by both parties with a true spirit of conciliation, and that Buenos Ayres will be ready to take advantage of the first favourable opportunity to set the example to the other parts of Spanish America by cordially uniting their brethren in Europe in acknowledging their allegiance to their lawful Sovereign, Ferdinand VII, and in contributing, under the sanction of his name, to the efforts now making in Europe to uphold the integrity of the Spanish Monarchy.56 Thus, although there was a clear intention of giving greater priority to South America, British policy remained basically unchanged in relation to the independent status recently achieved by some of Spain’s colonies in that continent. The British Foreign Minister pointed this out prettty clearly when he made reference to ‘the example’ the River Plate was expected to give by not moving further towards independence, remaining faithful to Ferdinand and setting an example for the rest of Spanish America. Castlereagh’s letter was enough for Strangford to put pressure on the Portuguese Court in Rio de Janeiro, now that the position of Great British opposition to the Portuguese presence in the River Plate had been made official in May. The Portuguese had sent an envoy to Buenos Aires, an officer named John Rademaker, who reached an agreement with the Triumvirate to end hostilities. However, when the Buenos Aires government asked Rademaker to assist them in signing an armistice whereby Montevideo would be incorporated in the United Provinces of the River Plate, the Portuguese emissary realized that he was not empowered so to do. The Triumvirate asked Strangford to intercede. Strangford was not pleased by this proposal, but nevertheless in September sent Captain Heywood to communicate Castlereagh’s desire that the Portuguese troops should evacuate the Banda Oriental, and his hopes of re-establishing commercial relations between Great Britain and the River Plate. Strangford added that he hoped the River Plate would stay loyal to Spain.57 The River Plate Government thanked Strangford for his services, and confirmed their friendship with Great Britain. They made no reference, however, to their loyalty to Spain.


During 1812 news had gradually been arriving in both Brazil and the River Plate of the victories of the British and Spanish armies over the French in the Iberian peninsula. While this news served to enhance Strangford’s position, it was received with mixed emotions in the River Plate, where many people were by now accustomed to the benefits of autonomous government, and were beginning to favour the idea of declaring complete independence from the Spanish Empire. This feeling was surely increased with the arrival in Buenos Aires in March 1812 of three creole officers, Matías Zapiola, Carlos María de Alvear, and the future liberator José de San Martín. They had been fighting in the Spanish army against the French, and now returned after a short stay in London, where they had established contacts with other Spanish Americans – López Méndez, Bello, the Mexican Fray Servando Teresa de Mier and, probably, Miranda. It was in London that they had apparently joined the Venezuelan’s masonic lodge, which had been established in London with the object of spreading patriotic ideals in Europe and South America.58 For this reason they created a similar organization to that of Miranda in the River Plate, the ‘Logia Lautaro’, with the firm intention of further promoting independence. They soon joined forces with another independence movement, the ‘Sociedad Patriótica’, headed by a fervent supporter of the emancipation cause, Bernardo de Monteagudo, who, with the support of the three newly arrived officers, pressed the Triumvirate to call a constituent assembly which would discuss the prospects of total independence.59 The Triumvirate was already unpopular on account of its heavy-handed actions and of the defeats of the army commanded by Manuel Belgrano in the northern provinces, still loyal to Spain. Now it rejected the idea of a constituent assembly. Soon afterwards, a revolution headed by Monteagudo, Alvear and San Martin ousted the Triumvirate.60 A new Triumvirate was then formed, whose members were Paso, Antonio Alvarez Jonte, and Nicolás Rodríuez Peña. It was announced that a constituent assembly would meet in January 1813 in Buenos Aires, made up of representatives of all the River Plate districts that were loyal to the revolutionary government. The Constituent Assembly declared that the United Provinces of the River Plate were autonomous; there would be no more invocation of


Ferdinand’s name. This was an enormous step towards full independence. If the latter was not declared immediately this was to a great extent the result of apprehension regarding Great Britain’s reaction.61 Apparently alarmed by all these changes, Strangford decided to send further news of the allied victories in Spain, hoping that this would impress the creoles in the River Plate, and induce them to reconsider their position. But his efforts did not have the desired effect.62

Towards the end of 1812, the government of the United Provinces of the River Plate was the only major Spanish territory in South America which remained independent. There were growing fears, however, that the Spaniards would soon send forces to the River Plate, as they had to Caracas. The Triumvirate therefore decided to send Manuel de Sarratea once again on a mission to Rio de Janeiro, where he would meet Strangford, and then to Spain and England, to seek recognition from Great Britain and to persuade the British Government to prevent any Spanish attempt to reconquer the Plate. Robert Staples, who had been acting as unofficial British Consul in the River Plate, wrote to William Hamilton at the Foreign Office, giving him details of this emissary: With respect to Mr.Sarratea, he has the character of being an ambitious man. He was at the time I left this country, a member of the government. He has always appeared one of the most moderate men here, and complained of the violent measures and character of his former colleagues. He is well informed on the subjects relating to this country and is generally looked upon as a man of superior talents to most of those here.63 These qualities, as mentioned before, were also appreciated by Strangford, who now favoured the policy of Sarratea’s Government as regards Britain’s assistance. He therefore explained to Castlereagh that: The leading persons at Buenos Ayres have now discovered that the liberation of Spain, the supposed impossibility of which was


the groundwork and justification of all their proceedings, has actually been effected, and they were in consequence led to apprehend that the disposable force of that country will soon be sufficiently augmented to enable her to make a powerful and decisive effort to recover her Transatlantic dominions, to meet which all their means of resistance would be totally inadequate. These considerations have operated very strongly in producing a much more pacific disposition on the side of the government of Buenos Ayres. It is now ardently hoped by that body that it may not be too late to recur with success to the intervention and protection of Great Britain, through which it might not only be possible to obtain such terms of accommodation as should provide for the security of their persons and property against the future vengeance of Spain but also to guarantee and ensure the execution of those terms when granted.64 Strangford tried to persuade the Spanish royal representatives in Brazil to accept the conditions offered by the River Plate Government, but the Spaniards, after hearing the news of the successive victories of loyal forces in the northern provinces of the River Plate, decided not to make any decision.65 Strangford, in turn, asked Castlereagh for instructions: I hope most earnestly that the reception given to the proposals of which Manuel de Sarratea was the bearer may have been such as to encourage and augment these favourable dispositions. If, however, weighty reasons should prevent his Royal Highness’s Confidential Servants from advising the resumption by Great Britain of the character of mediatrix between Spain and her Colonies, I beg most earnestly to be furnished with instructions as to the adoption of the alternative to which the latter will in that case most probably resort.66 This letter reflects Strangford’s alertness respecting the possibility of acts of aggression by Spain in the River Plate, which he now feared would seriously compromise Great Britain’s relations in the region. Strangford also seems to display substantial sympathy not only to Sarratea but to the River Plate Government in general.


In January 1814 the Assembly decided to change the Triumvirate and leave the executive in the hands of a single person only. The choice of Director Supremo was Gervasio Posadas, Alvear’s uncle. This change had arisen from the need to create a more decisive and centralized government which could get a firm grip on the situation in the northern Provinces, and also as a consequence of the constant menace of the Spanish Royalists, now led by General Gaspar Vigodet, who were still contemplating attacking the Buenos Aires Government.67 By February the situation was so tense, after new attempts to sign a truce had failed, that an expedition was sent to Montevideo commanded by the Irish-born Admiral William Brown, with Alvear and General José Rondeau in command of the troops, which eventually emerged victorious and helped re-establish peace in the area.68 Strangford, on hearing the news of this victory, suggested to the Buenos Aires government that this was an opportunity to settle their dispute with Spain, further underlining his desire for full restoration of relations and the avoidance of any emancipation declaration in the River Plate. His desires were made known to Posadas in Buenos Aires.69 Despite the victory, Posadas’s government was still under pressure on many fronts. Most worrying were the efforts of the Uruguayan patriot leader Gervasio Artigas to unite the provinces of the Litoral area and oppose the centralized rule of the Buenos Aires Government. After the final defeat of the French armies in Spain, the news of the restoration of Ferdinand VII to the Spanish throne renewed fears that a Spanish expedition might be sent to the River Plate.70 Alarmed, the Buenos Aires Government decided to ask for Great Britain’s assistance. Strangford’s suggestions were therefore taken seriously and a new diplomatic mission, was despatched, designed to reinforce that of Sarratea. There was, however, another reason for this mission. As a consequence of the growing insecurity of the River Plate Government, Posadas and a large faction favoured, as a means for stabilizing the situation, the adoption of a constitutional monarchy in the River Plate, which they hoped would receive the support of Europe.71 The two persons designated for this mission were Manuel Belgrano and Bernardino Rivadavia. They received two kinds of instructions from their Government, one public, one secret. The


first was to obtain guarantees from the restored Spanish monarch that there would be no further Spanish aggression against the River Plate Provinces; the second, which according to Halperín were more explicit, authorized the emissaries to negotiate political independence, which implied creating an autonomous monarchy with a Spanish infante on the throne, or, at least, civil liberties for the Rioplatense Government, which meant reincorporation to the Spanish Crown on the condition that they would be allowed to preserve their own government.72 Belgrano was chosen after being replaced as Commander of the Northern Army by San Martín. Rivadavia had been Secretary of War in the first Triumvirate. The son of Spanish parents, he had married the daughter of former Viceroy Del Pino and, after fighting as an officer in the Galician corps against the British during the invasions, he began to support the revolutionary ideals of Mariano Moreno. He then became deeply involved in the first actions of the revolutionary government. According to Mitre, these two men were chosen because they were both sympathetic towards Great Britain, and because Belgrano at least favoured the idea of establishing a monarchy. As we have mentioned before, he had been seriously involved in the Carlota scheme.73 Strangford was apparently satisfied with the objectives of the mission and with the two men selected. He explained to his Foreign Minister that: They are to visit this place [Rio de Janeiro], whence they are to go to England in order to obtain from the Spanish Ambassador in London such assurances of security for their persons as may be necessary to enable them to proceed with confidence to Spain. I do most earnestly hope that the Spanish government will not permit itself to cast away this opportunity, perhaps the last, of restoring an amicable understanding between Spain and her Colonies, and that the very concessions required by the latter will be an increase of strength and wealth to the former.74 Belgrano and Rivadavia stayed in Rio de Janeiro till March of the next year. There they were informed of another change in the River Plate Government, albeit a minor one which did not alter the mission. As a result of increasing problems caused by the


Government’s inability to control internal affairs, as well as the suspicions which the Belgano and Rivadavia mission provoked in the interior, Alvear had replaced Posadas in the Directorio in January 1815. To some it appeared that this mission had been designed to create an approach between the Government and the Spaniards.75 Alvear, the new Director, was an enigmatic character. He was the son of Diego de Alvear, a Spanish Naval officer and later royal official, who arrived at Buenos Aires with Cevallos’s expedition in 1776. Here he was commissioned by the Spanish Crown to settle the question of boundaries with Portugal. Having married a creole, with whom he had eight children including Carlos María, born in 1789, he stayed in the River Plate until 1804 when he decided to return to Spain with all his family. On the journey home, the vessel carrying Alvear’s wife and seven of his children was attacked by a British frigate, as this nation and Spain were at war at the time, and all these perished. Alvear and his son Carlos, however, survived, as they were on another vessel. They were captured and taken to England. Here they were freed and financially compensated. After residing in London for a few years Alvear returned to Spain with an English wife, and his son Carlos accompanied them. In Spain Carlos María de Alvear began his military career and fought against the French. He returned in 1812 to his native country where, as we have seen, he immediately became immersed in political and military activity.76 In late February, while in Rio de Janeiro, Rivadavia contacted Alvear just before his departure to England. After gathering information on the political British situation, he commented on the prospects of the mission: Felízmente debe observarse que el Ministerio actual (en Londres) tiene razones particulares que no concurren en cualquier otro (excusa para evadirse) que pueda suceder: estos son los comprometimientos contraídos durante la guerra con Napoleón, con la España. Más es indudable que el Ministerio pierde a grandes pasos su opinión y que al presente debe haberla perdido mucho mas lo primero por las ventajas de los grandes talentos y opinión del Lord Grenville y Lord Grey y Marques de Welleslley jefes de la oposición, a los cuales debe haberse agregado ya el Duque de Wellington que se retiraba de Paris a Londres y lo segundo por las


fuertes armas de que usaba el partido de la oposición a las cuales se les ha agregado ahora la del poco ventajoso tratado con Norte América, según se deduce del parte dado por el Ministerio al Lord Mayor. El Ministerio en tan críticas circunstancias para conservarse no tiene otro recurso que ceder a aquellas opiniones que hace valer la oposición y llegan a hacerse populares : una de estas es felizmente aprovechar las disposiciones de la América del Sur en favor de su nación y de su comercio.77 This information on British affairs in England had probably been passed on to Rivadavia by Strangford, who mentioned to Rivadavia that, although he supported the principles of this mission, he had no official instructions from his own Government and therefore could not anticipate his country’s support for this diplomatic venture.78 As is clearly shown in the above letter to Alvear, Rivadavia was excited by the prospect of a Whig Ministry being formed by the time he arrived in England. But these expectations proved to be exaggerated, as he would later find out. Shortly after Belgrano and Rivadavia had arrived in London in May 1815, Alvear suddenly decided to send his secretary Manuel García to see Strangford with secret instructions. Alvear expressed his desire that the Provinces of the River Plate should from now on remain annexed to Great Britain and were ready to accept British laws, and British Government authority, making himself responsible for this decision.79 To stress further the seriousness of his request, Alvear added emphatically that British troops should immediately be sent with an authorized Commander responsible for enabling British sovereignty in the River Plate Provinces.80 This stunning appeal for assistance at all costs is a clear reflection of Alvear’s total impotence at this stage. His Government was in great difficulties because of growing dissatisfaction in the provinces (especially the Litoral area now under Artigas’s command) directed against the centralist policies of the Directorio. García, however, never made use of these instructions when he arrived in Rio de Janeiro, fearing correctly that they might be too extreme.81 Apparently, Alvear’s desires were reported to the British Government by Robert Staples.82 Shortly afterwards, Strangford was on his way back to England, ending nine exhausting years immersed in events in Brazil and the


River Plate. Almost immediately after he left, the Portuguese forces again invaded the Banda Oriental. Meanwhile, Belgrano and Rivadavia arrived in London, where they contacted Sarratea, who informed them that in view of the present situation in Europe this was not the right moment to approach the British Government. The Liverpool Administration, in spite of Rivadavia’s hope that it would be replaced, was still firmly in office and allied to Spain, and therefore would not remotely contemplate the independence of the Spanish American colonies.83 Moreover, it seems that the emissaries were unable to meet with Castlereagh or any other minister. To add to this confusion, news was received in England of the revolt against Alvear in June 1815. This did not help the River Plate improve its reputation for stability.84 For a few months Sarratea was in touch with Charles IV, the former King of Spain now exiled in Italy, who toyed with the idea of naming one of his sons, Francisco de Paula, as the future King of the River Plate. The idea soon came to nothing.85 The emissaries found themselves in a cul-de-sac. Towards the end of 1815 Belgrano decided to return to the River Plate, whilst Sarratea and Rivadavia stayed in Europe witnessing Napoleon’s final defeat and the establishment of the Holy Alliance, awaiting more favourable circumstances. The situation in the River Plate in early 1816 was one of disorder and uncertainty. General Rondeau had taken over as new Director Supremo from Alvear, who had been forced into exile, and the Litoral forces were constantly threatening to topple the Government. Most of the creole revolutionaries were still seeking Britain’s assistance, as the new British consul in Rio de Janeiro informed his Government: They [the creoles] are deterred by the fear of vengeance, as I have before had the honour to state, from yielding to their former masters, and are determined to die sooner than trust to them alone. It is almost needless to state to your Lordship that Great Britain is the power to which their hopes are turned, and to whose mediation they look forward as the only prospect of safety.86


However, European events, as mentioned above, prevented any possible aid or support from Great Britain. The main characters involved in the May Revolution soon became aware of this difficulty. Internal turmoil induced them to convene a National Congress in Tucumàn in July 1816, which would complete the region’s emancipation from Spain.

5 Rivadavia and the British Attitude Towards Recognition

The independence of the River Plate was proclaimed on 9 July 1816, marking the complete separation of the territory from Spain. The threat of the imminent arrival of a large Spanish expedition bent on reconquest was one of the main reasons why the River Plate creoles were compelled to declare independence that year in the Tucumán Congress. In April 1815 Spain had sent the largest expeditionary force ever to reach South America, under the command of General Pablo Morillo. At first it was thought that the expedition might head towards the River Plate; however it later became clear that Venezuela was the destination of Morillo’s expedition and was the main target of the Spanish reconquest in the continent.1 However, there were persistent rumours that a second expedition would head for the River Plate quite soon, which created alarm in this area. From 1814, British policy towards Spanish America had been conditioned by the more famous Congress that had met in Vienna. Now that independence had been openly declared in the Rio de la Plata, Great Britain had to decide whether or not to recognize this new status. The question of recognizing River Plate independence was a delicate one for Great Britain. After aligning new forces with Austria, Prussia, and Russia at the Congress of Vienna and defeating Napoleon at Waterloo the year after, Britain found herself immersed in a new European order, which under the conservative principles of Austria’s Chancellor Metternich had formed a Holy Alliance to prevent the resurrection of republican ideals or of revolutionary movements which might threaten the new post-Napoleonic balance of power in Europe.2 115


This anti-revolutionary spirit also applied to all principalities, small states and kingdoms, and to overseas colonies which were still under the rule of European powers. The news of the Tucumán Congress was therefore not well received by Metternich and his associates in the Holy Alliance. Nor was all that well received by Castlereagh either, for however detached Britain tried to remain from the illiberal principles of the Alliance, it shared many of its concerns, including the restoration of peace on the Continent and the preservation of the restored Bourbon Monarchy in France. Another British goal was to keep the French out of Spain and Portugal, which obviously implied the continuation of the Anglo-Spanish alliance forged in 1808 to combat the Napoleonic menace.3 These imperatives seriously limited any support by Great Britain for the emancipation of the Spanish American colonies. Moreover, Lord Strangford was no longer at hand, and although Robert Staples returned to the River Plate in early 1813 after a visit to London, he was still denied official recognition by Castlereagh and the British Government.4 However, the British community in Buenos Aires reacted favourably to the declaration of independence of the River Plate Provinces, as they thought independence would enhance their commercial prospects in the area. The merchants urged Staples to contact the British Government and persuade it to recognize independence and designate him as Consul.5 This move, nevertheless, failed. Economic conditions had vastly improved for the British merchants since the 1810 declaration of independence, especially after the decrees of the First Triumvirate which, once the last vestiges of Spanish monopoly had been removed, had reduced import duties.6 But the development of a free market economy in the River Plate was still seriously impeded by the cost of waging war against the Spaniards in the north and by the internal disputes with the Litoral provinces of Santa Fé, Entre Ríos, and Corrientes. Under the leadership of Artigas these provinces opposed political centralism and what they regarded as the economic monopoly of Buenos Aires, which sought to minimize the participation of these provinces in foreign trade. Corrientes even introduced protectionist measures against Buenos Aires, and in this way threatened free trade interests in the capital.7 These conflicts ruined the hopes of British merchants, both in Britain and in the Río de la Plata, which had risen high at the time of

Rivadavia and the British Attitude Towards Recognition 117

the 1810 revolution. In fact, River Plate trade at this stage represented a very small part of British overseas commerce.8 Nevertheless, by 1816 British products represented the major part of all foreign merchandise arriving at the port of Buenos Aires, and the low prices of the majority of these products, especially textiles, created a great deal of animosity on the part of local merchants. The situation was even worse in the interior, and British merchants found it much harder to establish themselves in the provinces than in Buenos Aires, given the resentment they incurred amongst provincial merchants.9 The clearest example was the case of the Robertson brothers, authors of the well known Letters on South America, one of the most fascinating contemporary accounts of gaucho and rural life in the Litoral area. Arriving from Scotland, they established themselves in Corrientes, but found it almost impossible to coexist with the creole traders, both large and small, in the province. Fearing for their lives, they decided to move to Buenos Aires, which they found more congenial.10 The plight of the British merchants was made all the more complicated by the internal and external unrest in the River Plate. Not only were major provinces, such as Córdoba and Santa Fe, in open revolt; there was also the menace of a Portuguese army advancing to occupy the Banda Oriental and of a Spanish army in Upper Peru preparing to enter Tucumán. The meeting of the Constituent Congress in Tucumán, which brought together the delegates of the different provinces of the River Plate, was basically a response to this crisis, and although the declaration of full independence was agreed by all the delegates, it did not necessarily imply, as John Lynch rightly points out, the consolidation of national unification.11 However, the nomination of a new Director Supremo, in the person of Juan Martín de Pueyrredón, hero of the British invasions, was acceptable to most of the representatives at the Tucumán Congress, and seemed as if it might placate differences.12 Pueyrredón was also favourably treated by the English press, as evidenced by an article appearing in The Times in December 1817, which remarked that ‘He appears to us at present, the able vindicator of his country, her government, her laws, and the right of her people […] in such a character he is entitled to our respect.’13 On the diplomatic front, the impact of the new Concert of Europe was rapidly felt by all those South American envoys who were trying


in vain to attract Castlereagh’s attention and obtain Britain’s approval of Spanish American independence. This was especially the case with the representatives of the two countries where the independence movement was strongest. The Venezuelan envoys Andrés Bello and Luis López Méndez, who had been left in London by Miranda and Bolívar to work for some sort of British recognition, were instead struggling to earn a living, finding Castlereagh and the British Government increasingly unresponsive.14 The River Plate delegates Rivadavia and Sarratea were in much the same predicament. Furthermore, their difficulties were aggravated by a mutual quarrel. Sarratea made known his feelings about the futility of Belgrano’s and Rivadavia’s mission, now that they had been ordered to return to the River Plate by the Director Supremo Alvear. Another reason for the disagreement had been Belgrano’s and Rivadavia’s disapproval of Sarratea’s involvement with Count Cabarrus, in the Príncipe de Paula affair, mentioned in the previous chapter.15 Belgrano had returned to Buenos Aires in November 1815, but Rivadavia had decided to stay England. However, he was still unable to shift Castlereagh’s stance.16 It was becoming clear that within the Vienna Concert, Castlereagh was prepared to discuss the Spanish American question with the representatives of the other European powers, but not with creole envoys from South America in London, to whom, basically, he had nothing to say. Rivadavia decided to try his luck in Paris in 1816, hoping to obtain a more favourable reaction towards the cause of South American emancipation from the restored Bourbons, although the chances were surely not very high.17 Sarratea left Europe shortly afterwards and returned to Buenos Aires. He was appointed Minister of Government and Foreign Relations in Pueyrredon’s Administration. Rivadavia thus remained the only River Plate envoy in Europe. He started to correspond with Pueyrredón, who readily accepted his role as Envoy of the River Plate and agreed to pay him a salary for his services.18 There was scant communication with the British in Rio de Janeiro either. When Strangford departed contacts were made with his successor, Henry Chamberlain, but Chmaberlain did not carry the same weight as his predecessor. However, when Manuel de Sarratea arrived in Rio de Janeiro from Europe in early 1817, in order to promote his plan for the placing of Francisco de Paula on the throne of a new South American kingdom, Chamberlain con-


tacted Castlereagh to inform him about what he considered a very frivolous scheme. The tone of his letter emphasizes the unwillingness of the British Government to be a party to this monarchical project: In order the more readily to induce people to join him [in supporting his scheme], he [Sarratea] pretends to have enjoyed a degree of confidence with the British Government never bestowed upon any of the Agents from the River Plate that preceded him, and he has officially but privately stated to the Supreme Director [Pueyrredón] that he was made acquainted with the whole policy of His Majesty’s Ministers with regard to this quarter of America.19 The idea of establishing monarchies in South America had thus been revitalized after the abortive Carlota affair, especially with the return of Belgrano and Sarratea from Europe. The role of Belgrano in the Congress of Tucumán had been highly influential, for he secured approval of two of the three proposals he put to the Congress. One, of course, was the declaration of full independence, to which almost all patriots readily adhered. The second was the adoption as the national flag of the blue and white flag he had raised after his victory over the Spaniards in the same city of Tucumán four years earlier. The third and most controversial of his proposals, which was not decided on, was the creation of a monarchy in the River Plate. As mentioned before, Belgrano had been a ‘Carlotino’ and, after his experience in England, he had returned home absolutely convinced that one of the main reasons why Britain had not provided sufficient support to the independence cause in the River Plate, had been the absence of strong government since the outbreak of the revolution. Once this had been achieved, Belgrano felt that Britain and the rest of Europe would be more inclined to accept the new political order in South America.20 However, his intricate new monarchical scheme was not as readily accepted as his other two proposals. The new scheme consisted in the placing of the descendant of an Inca on the throne of the new kingdom, a project perhaps inspired by Miranda’s proposal of 1804, which had been presented to William Pitt and his Cabinet. This idea


was supported by some leading creoles of the River Plate provinces, such as Martín de Güemes, leader of the gaucho army in the north, who thought this would be the best way of uniting Buenos Aires with Upper Peru, and by José de San Martín, who was then preparing his army to cross the Andes and to liberate Chile. However, the idea of installing such an exotic monarchy was unappealing to most of the other patriots, notably to Rivadavia.21

Meanwhile, in Europe Rivadavia found his situation to be increasingly difficult because of events taking place in that continent. Nevertheless, he seemed satisfied with the attitude of France – the country where he was now living – towards the liberation of the Spanish American colonies, and he wrote to the new Director Supremo accordingly: Claro es que el efecto, acaso primero y mas grandes de estos principios, es la libertad de la América. Así su independencia es el objeto de los deseos de toda la Francia y demás Naciones del Continente. Ella es la gran cuestión del día, nadie se atreve ya a atacar directamente los derechos y justicia de los Americanos, que pelean por lo mas sagrado del hombre.22 Rivadavia also strongly condemned Great Britain’s intransigence towards the cause of independence: La dependencia mayor o menor en que todos los Monarcas están del Gabinete de St. James, y la política profundamente antisocial que ha inventado y ejerce contra todo el mundo, son, en mi concepto, las únicas causas sólidas que, no solo retardan el reconocimiento de la independencia de América sino que amenazan su libertad. Este Gabinete, a quien solo la grandeza y felicidad de sus crímenes libra de las calificaciones y de los renombres mas degradantes de la sociedad, ha empleado todo su influjo con el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos y le ha inducido a presentar al Congreso un Bill, dirigido a prohibir el que se venda a los llamados insurgentes, buques, armas y toda clase de municiones de guerra.23


Rivadavia’s anger reflected his resentment towards Castlereagh and the Liverpool Administration for the almost complete lack of attention they had shown both to him and Belgrano during their stay in England the previous year. Although his tone seems to denote an excessive sensitivity towards the British Government, a final point of complaint in his letter, regarding rumoured British support for a renewed Portuguese attempt to invade the River Plate, genuinely alarmed him more than the other less important issues mentioned in the passage above. Rivadavia did, however, make clear that of English public opinion, the opinion of ‘la Nación Inglesa’ as he put it towards the cause of South American independence, was much more positive than that of the Government. He made clear to Pueyrredón that: No estará por demas advertir que no se hiera ahí de ningún modo a la Nación Inglesa, ella está en lo principal por nuestra causa, al contrario, es preciso hacer una formal distinción entre ella y su gobierno. Tampoco debemos atacar a este abiertamente, sino manifestar con prudencia y energía que estamos al alcance de nuestros derechos, del poco lugar que se les hace y de las injurias que se nos irrogan.24 Rivadavia never specifies in this letter exactly to whom he is referring, or on what evidence he bases such an assertion concerning the British public’s view of the Spanish American cause, although he does refer to the attitude of the Whig opposition. By this time, several notorious Whig leaders were voicing their complaints in Parliament against what they felt was a clear inclination of the Government to support Spain against her South American colonies. The most notable were Sir James Mackintosh, the famous historian whose Vindicae Galicae of 1791 was evidence that he had espoused the French Revolution cause with even more enthusiasm than Charles James Fox; Henry Brougham, who, with Grey, was one of the most influential Whigs of the day; and Lord Landsdowne, member of one of the most powerful Whig families. Rivadavia specifically referred to a speech delivered in the House of Commons by Brougham, probably in March 1817, where he severely attacked the Government and defended the mercantile interests of


the nation, claiming that the Government’s support of Ferdinand VII had cut off England’s natural connection with South America.25 Brougham was one of the main contributors to The Edinburgh Review, the principal organ of Whig thought, and among his writings were articles favourable to South American independence.26 However, there is no evidence that Rivadavia ever approached any of these Whig leaders during his stay in England. Some Venezuelans, notably Andres Bello, were in touch with Lord Holland and frequented the Holland House ‘Spanish circle’ of Blanco White, but apparently this was not the case with Rivadavia.27

Meanwhile, the Tory Government of Lord Liverpool was finding it hard to achieve an appropriate middle ground between the peace policy of the Holy Alliance and a suitable Spanish American policy which would not conflict with Spain. According to Kauffmann, Castlereagh’s Latin American policies are understandable only against the background of his struggle for a Concert of Europe.28 In Kauffmann’s view, during this period Castlereagh retarded the progress of Spanish American diplomacy in order to satisfy his Congress allies.29 Castlereagh’s main anxiety about the Holy Alliance’s attitude towards the Spanish American colonies, was that it might lead to armed intervention. As soon as he saw that Spain might appeal to her European allies for their support, Castlereagh proposed a ‘Confidential Memorandum’ to the Alliance on 28 August 1817, which received from them a commitment to neutrality. It was agreed that only Spain had the right to armed intervention in the American continent.30 Of the Congress nations, Austria and Prussia were the most enthusiastic in backing Castlereagh’s memorandum. More than to anything else, this derived from the fact that Russia, their most powerful neighbour, wished to support Spain by imposing economic sanctions on the South Americans. Russian support for Spain was further shown in 1817, when Tsar Alexander I sold eight warships to the Spaniards. Although the Russians eventually accepted the memorandum and remained neutral, nevertheless Ferdinand VII remained determined to send a Spanish expedition against South America despite Castelereagh’s memorandum.31


The situation in the River Plate was complicated by a new Portuguese attack on Montevideo, but internally matters seemed more stable after the Congress of Tucumán. To the west, San Martín had successfully crossed the Andes and reached Chile, where he joined the Chilean General Bernardo O’Higgins in February 1817 and defeated the Spanish loyalist troops at Chacabuco. After suffering some minor set-backs, San Martín defeated them again at Maipú, in April 1818, thus securing Chile’s independence. These victories were the foundation of San Martín’s enormous reputation throughout South America, and earned him the title of Liberator of Chile. News of his successes were received enthusiastically in England. At the same time they produced a certain uneasiness amongst the Liverpool Administration, which was concernd about their effect in Vienna. On receiving news of San Martín’s victory at Maipú, Chamberlain wrote to Castlereagh from Rio de Janeiro, expressing a degree of optimism about San Martín, now that the General had voiced his desire for British mediation in South America and his support for the creation of monarchies: The victory of Maipú has strengthened rather than diminished his wishes on this point [British mediation]. The prevention of the expected change in Government which he [San Martín] thinks would be a calamity and only retard the final settlement of affairs is the object that is supposed to have brought him from Chile [to Buenos Aires]. He is avowedly a friend to a monarchical form of Government, and says that none other can suit the people of Buenos Aires and of Chile, or their habits.32 This would seem to imply that Castlereagh favoured some sort of monarchical solution for the independent states. A year later, the Liberator’s hope that Britain should assist his cause was confirmed when San Martín himself wrote to Castlereagh expressing his belief that a representative monarchy in Buenos Aires would be the best possible solution.33 San Martín’s role was central during the next four years. He entered Peru in late 1820, paving the way for its eventual complete liberation by Bolívar, to whom San Martín ceded command at the controversial meeting between the two heroes in Guayaquil on 22 July 1822. San


Martín had his detractors in Britain, especially amongst those who favoured the establishment of republics in South America. The famous philosopher Jeremy Bentham had his suspicions about San Martín’s political principles, and feared that he would tarnish his liberating reputation by establishing authoritarian rather than representative governments. On learning of San Martín’s successful invasion of Peru, and his adoption of the title of ‘Protector of Peru’, Bentham felt his fears to be confirmed. He wrote, although he eventually did not send, a letter to San Martín expressing admiration for his victories, but criticizing his attitude towards the liberated peoples. Bentham advised San Martín to ‘let the direction be temporary and the end in view and real design a republican democracy as soon as the state of the country is ripe for it, not only the end, but eventually the very means’.34 Bentham preferred Bolívar, whom he admired both for his military achievements and for his apparent sympathy with republican ideals. While seriously questioning Bolívar’s political decisions in the following years, Bentham maintained a regular correspondence with him.35

In the meantime, Castlereagh consolidated the agreement among the Congress nations mandating strict neutrality towards South America which he had proposed on the Secret Memorandum of 1817. This became agreed policy at the first meeting of the Congress nations held in August 1818, at Aix-La-Chapelle, a meeting which now included France. At home, however, Castlereagh found it extremely difficult to reconcile the different political factions to his policy, which was unpopular in Britain.36 His extreme conservatism became the target of satire and was mocked by the most celebrated romantic and radical poets of the day, such as Byron and Shelley, who also found a target in the Foreign Minister’s dull personality. Another source of discontent with the Government’s Spanish American policy was the Royal Proclamation of 1817 against military service by British soldiers in South America. This proclamation was issued after numerous complaints by the Spanish Ambassador about British volunteers enrolling in Bolívar’s and San Martín’s armies. Two notable examples were David Florence O’Leary,


Bolívar’s Irish aide, and the legendary Alexander Cochrane, the Scottish Admiral, brother of Lord Thomas Cochrane, who assisted San Martín.37 The prohibition became law in 1819, as the Foreign Enlistment Act. It provoked great opposition both in and out of Government. Canning complained on behalf of the merchants of Liverpool, the constituency which he represented, claiming that the law would seriously damage Britain’s commercial intercourse with South America. The Whigs led by Lord Holland opposed it in Parliament, on much the same grounds.38 Moreover, in October 1818 the Government refused to countenance any reference of commercial matters with British naval officers stationed off South America; it would only do so through properly appointed consuls. In early 1819, the Government made clear to Staples in Buenos Aires, that he could not be appointed a Consul. He was nevertheless named British Commercial Agent by the British merchants of Buenos Aires.39 As Ferns maintains, the policy of non-interference in Spanish America pursued by the Liverpool Administration was basically a consequence of its European policy, and of the anti-revolutionary sentiments of many of its ministers.40 Ferns maintains that the chief objectives of Castlereagh’s policy towards Spanish America were similar to those Castlereagh had set out to achieve in 1807, when, from the War Office of the Portland Administration, he had ordered an expedition to Spanish America.41 The idea then had been to restore and reinforce sympathy for Great Britain in that continent, after the embarrassing and suspicious experiences of the Río de la Plata the year before. Castlereagh favoured a solid commercial connection, opposed British political involvement, and wished to avoid the appearance of any colonial designs in the region. As to the establishment of the commercial connection, Castlereagh’s scheme of getting the Congress nations’ acceptance of a policy of neutrality towards Spanish America was, in many respects, a means to secure the development of Britain’s Spanish American commerce. However, this was as far as Castlereagh would go, and he never bowed to the pressures of the British mercantile community for a more vigorous commercial policy, irrespective of how this might affect relations with Spain. Castlereagh was only too aware that these pressures meant entering in the deep waters of recognition, which, at this stage, he preferred to avoid.


For Rivadavia in France, recognition was becoming a more and more impossible ambition. The introduction of France into the European alliance had raised his hopes, although he was aware, as he mentioned to Pueyrredón, that France was joining the Holy Alliance fom a position of inferiority: Lo que hay de mas trascendencia es, que habiéndose opuesto la Inglaterra y la Austria a que la Francia entrase como igual en todo a cada una de las potencias, que componían la Cuádruple Alianza, o pudiendo ésta por otra parte subsistir ni con el mismo objeto, ni en los mismos términos; se ha disuelto el Tratado que contenía sus bases, y queda por consiguiente cada Nación librada por si sola en su marcha política.42 Rivadavia at this point regularly commuted between Paris and London. He was still confident of reaching some sort of agreement with the Spanish legation in London, hoping that his credentials would be accepted and that recognition would at least be considered. For this reason he embarked for England again in June 1818, and was received by the Duke of San Carlos, the Spanish Ambassador in London. However, his proposals were again rejected and he immediately returned to Paris. Here, Rivadavia seemed to be more comfortable; at least he spoke the language, whereas his knowledge of English was limited. He also seemed to have more acquaintances in Paris, including luminaries of the Parisian intellectual and political scene such as Destutt De Tracy, the Abbé De Pradt, and Lafayette, who were sympathetic to the cause of the Spanish American independence.43 Rivadavia did have one illustrious contact in England. During one of his stays in London he had been introduced to Bentham by Antonio Alvarez Jonte, a Chilean agent.44 The correspondence between Bentham and Rivadavia lasted from 1818 to 1824, and Bentham’s ideals were to have a significant influence on Rivadavia’s future role in the politics of Argentina. Bentham was now in his seventies, and a much respected figure. A few years before, his attention had first been drawn to Spanish America by Francisco de Miranda, a close friend of James Mill, John Stuart Mill’s father, who was closely related to Bentham. With Miranda, Mill had written a couple of articles for The Edinburgh Review.45


Before embarking for Venezuela, Miranda had regularly consulted Bentham for advice on the legal code most suitable to for the emancipated nation.46 Subsequently, Bentham had closely followed the evolution of the independence movements in South America and openly supported the cause. As correspondence with Rivadavia shows, Bentham firmly believed that a republican form of government would suit the colonies better than the muchtalked-about monarchical alternative, which Rivadavia himself had at one point favoured. In this respect Bentham differed not only from Castlereagh and most of the Liverpool Administration, but also from Whig circles such as Holland House, and from The Edinburgh Review, which also favoured the adoption of limited monarchy in South America.47 In October 1818 Bentham expressed to Rivadavia his fears concerning the role of the Spanish American liberators and the danger of their acquiring too much personal power.48 This concern was to be the central theme of his future correspondence with Bolívar and San Martín. Back in France in January 1819 Rivadavia, through the good offices of Lafayette, met the Foreign Minister, the Marquis Dessolles. At that time Dessolles was, with Elie Decazes, the most influential of Louis XVIII’s ministers. The Marquis took an interest in the River Plate, about which he had been previously unacquainted, and suggested that a constitutional monarchy would be most suitable.49 In the course of this same year a French emissary in the River Plate approached Pueyrredón and proposed to him the establishment of a monarchy with a French prince. This emissary, Hilaire Le Moyne, was a former Colonel of the French army, and had been sent to the River Plate in late 1818 by the Marquis D’Osmond, the French Ambassador in London. In March 1818, the Ambassador had contacted the Duc de Richelieu, one of the most important ministers of the King, urging him to establish a French monarch in the independent states of South America, and offered the services of colonel Le Moyne for this delicate mission.50

Since the French Revolution, France’s policy in Spanish America had been relatively diffident and marginal compared to British policy. During the revolutionary period, the only time when a certain inter-


est was evident was when Brissot and Dumouriez floated the idea of assisting Miranda’s emancipation plans for South America, and employed him as a general in their army for the Dutch and Belgian campaigns, with the idea of using his services later for a South American expedition. During the Napoleonic period, French interest in Spanish America increased significantly. The defeat of the French fleet at Trafalgar in October 1805, naturally reduced this nation’s chances of establishing a significant pressence in South America. Nevertheless, in 1806 François De Pons, a French commercial agent in the Captaincy-General of Venezuela, warned Napoleon about English designs and suggested that only French intervention could prevent them. Shortly afterwards, during the invasions of the River Plate, Liniers sent his famous letter to Napoleon, announcing the British defeat and expressing his loyalty to France.51 In 1808, the French invasion of Spain – the event that ultimately provoked the independence of the River Plate – threatened Napoleonic intervention in the colonies as well. Napoleon and General Murat were interested in securing commercial relations with these colonies, and the rumours of a new English expedition to South America induced them to send the Marquise de Sassenay, who had resided and traded in Buenos Aires and was a friend of Liniers, to the River Plate with the task of finding out as much as possible about the inhabitants’ feelings towards France. As soon as he arrived, however, there came news of the Spanish resistance after the events of Bayonne, which induced the Viceroyalty to declare its loyalty to Ferdinand VII. Sassenay had to flee to Montevideo. After this episode France paid scant attention to South American affairs for over a decade, probably as a result of the political changes which had taken place in that continent during that period.52

The plan to install a French monarch in the River Plate was seriously considered in 1819 in both Buenos Aires and France. Pueyrredón, who like Liniers was of French ancestry, wrote to Richelieu in March 1818 offering commercial relations. Although his letter was never answered, the arrival of Le Moyne gave the Director Supremo another chance to establish relations with France. Le Moyne suggested that Louis Phillipe, the Duc d’Orleans, was the ideal candidate for the local


throne. This idea was also favoured by Pueyrredón. When Le Moyne returned to France, the Director Supremo sent José Valentín Gómez, a canon of the Cathedral of Buenos Aires, on a secret mission to Paris to carry this project foward. In mid 1819 Gómez met Dessolles, who had already been informed of the situation in the River Plate by Rivadavia and who now favoured the idea of establishing a monarchy. The French Foreign Minister, however, advised Gómez that it would be preferable to nominate a different candidate other than Orleans, someone connected to both the French and Spanish royal families. He suggested the Duke of Lucca, son of a sister of Ferdinand VII and of King Louis of Parma. The Duke was not considered sufficiently distinguished by Gómez, who decided to delay his response until he received further orders from Buenos Aires. Meanwhile, Dessolles and the French Government had become so seriously involved in this project that they thought it necessary to inform Tsar Alexander, Russia being the dominant power in the Holy Alliance, that France was steadily working for a closer relationship. The Tsar agreed in principle with the idea, but thought that it would be wiser not to interfere with the Aix-La-Chapelle neutrality agreement. On the other hand, he did not want to prejudice his good relations with Spain. In spite of her persistence, France had to abandon the whole project once Spain and the other European nations found out about the secret negotiations.53 News of this affair produced an outburst of fury in diverse sectors of British public opinion. The Times commented on the secret monarchical schemes of the French in the River Plate, blaming the British Government for not acting more resolutely, and claiming that the Cabinet had ‘always treated the South Americans with the greatest reserve, as if fearing contamination by simple contact’. The Times concluded that ‘British interest is likely to gain the ascendancy in the River Plate, rather through the disposition of the inhabitants than any influence exerted by our ministers’.54 These remarks came from a newspaper which originally supported the Liverpool Administration’s line of conduct towards Spanish America. Castlereagh described the incident as further evidence of France’s diplomatic deviousness and hypocrisy. According to Webster, the episode drove the British Foreign Minister to think more favourably of the recognition of Spanish American independence.55


After the nomination of Gómez by Pueyrredón, Rivadavia saw no reason to remain in Europe and returned to the River Plate, where the situation remained extremely complicated. Although the victories of San Martín against the Spaniards in Chile produced a general state of euphoria in Buenos Aires, the internal conflicts in the River Plate continued, with growing opposition in the provinces to the centralizing policies of the Supreme Government. In spite of the Tucumán Congress, which was supposedly to balance the interests of the provinces with those of Buenos Aires and reduce the risks of civil war, the Constitution promulgated in 1819 further enhanced the powers of the Director Supremo and reinforced the strongly centralizing tendencies of the government. The provinces also resented the commercial advantages of the capital, and accused it of monopolizing most of the trade. Under the leadership of local caudillos, the provinces started to form their own armies, threatening to declare their independence from Buenos Aires or to join forces with Artigas in Uruguay. The secret negotiations of Pueyrredón with the French also prompted opposition. Pueyrredón found his situation untenable and decided to resign. He was replaced by General Rondeau, who immediately turned to Belgrano and San Martín for military aid against the provincial militias. His requests were ignored.56 The most powerful caudillos were Francisco Ramírez in Entre Ríos and Estanislao López in Santa Fe, both sympathizers with Artigas and advocates of a federal system in the River Plate. After the unofficial declaration of independence by these and other important provinces, including Córdoba and Tucumán, civil war was inevitable. Rondeau, leading a weak army, was defeated by the forces of López and Ramírez at Cepeda in February 1820. Rondeau resigned, and the Buenos Aires Government collapsed.57 Buenos Aires therefore had to give in to the caudillos’ demands. The Treaty of Pilar made a series of concessions to the provinces, recognizing their jurisdiction in the form of a federal structure, establishing freedom for river navigation, and allowing free commercial relations between the River Plate provinces, which had evidently been the main causes of friction. The Directorio was abolished and Buenos Aires now acquired a Governor imposed by the caudillos themselves. The River Plate was left without a single national government. The candidate chosen for Governor of Buenos Aires, in spite of his previous participation in the first centralist creole government, was


Manuel de Sarratea, who had displayed his sympathy for the federalist cause since returning from Europe. However, Sarratea lasted only a few months. After internal elections General Martín Rodríguez, another of the heroes of the British invasions, was chosen as Governor of the Capital.58 These changes only contributed further to emphasize the image of unreliability that the independent colonies of Spanish America enjoyed amongst the nations of the European Concert. To complicate matters even further, since 1816 Ferdinand VII had again been organizing another large expedition to recover his colonies in South America. It was only thanks to the Riego rebellion of 1820, when the Spanish army, supported by the Liberals, refused to sail and demanded the restoration of the 1812 Constitution in order to subvert absolutism, that this expedition was abandoned.

As a consequence of these events, Castlereagh was unable to argue the case for recognition of the ex-colonies at the Concert meeting in Troppau, held in 1820. The Holy Alliance would not deliberate on the Spanish American colonies until Ferdinand VII was restored to his throne. The Liverpool Administration also faced an internal crisis in 1820 arising from the coronation of George IV who, after a prolonged regency, had become King on the death of George III. As soon as he had succeeded George III he announced his intention of divorcing his wife Queen Caroline on grounds of adultery. Caroline was to face a divorce trial, approved by the Liverpool Administration. The trial rapidly turned into a cause celébre with the active participation of notable Whigs such as Brougham and Grey. Castlereagh, not one of George IV’s favourites, was forced to focus his attention on these problems. The Liverpool Government become increasingly unpopular because of its support for the King, and many of its members, including Castlereagh, feared for their lives in the face of the ever increasing hostility of the London mobs. The trial was excruciatingly long. Castlereagh could not turn his full attention to foreign affairs until 1821, when the whole episode finally ended.59 Relations between Great Britain and the River Plate at this stage were not flourishing either. A contributory cause was the unfavourable policy of the Pueyrredón Administration toward


British commercial interests. Pueyrredon´s Government had been reluctant to allow the export of bullion and attempted unsuccessfully to force loans on the British community residing in the River Plate. Worse followed when the political crisis of 1819–20 produced a marked reduction in commercial activity. Stocks of British merchandise remained unsold for some months.60 Nevertheless a vital turn in the commercial relations of Great Britain and the River Plate occured in 1821, when Martín Rodríguez appointed Bernardino Rivadavia as his new Minister of Government and Foreign Affairs.61 Rivadavia was undoubtedly one of the most able men involved in the early stages of emancipation. He was not the most charismatic of characters, and did not attract the sympathies of the leading creoles, notably San Martín. His ideas were not much to the taste of the interior provinces either. The reasons for this antagonism towards him included his early support for the liberal ideas of Mariano Moreno, his assumed support for monarchical projects, and his alleged preference for trade. He had proved, however, to be an important figure in the first independent governments. The first Triumvirate named him their Secretary, and even Alvear, who like San Martín originally disliked Rivadavia, made use of his services for the joint mission with Belgrano to Europe. Rivadavia’s years in Europe had acquainted him with the affairs of that continent, and had furthered his political education. This stay abroad transformed him into one of the most progressive and modernizing politicians in the River Plate, and this was reflected in the wide range of reforms he espoused, especially during the Rodríguez Government, where he acted as Minister of Government and Foreign Affairs, and later in 1826 when he was elected as first President of The River Plate Provinces. These reforms included a radical transformation in the structure of the legislative system, electoral refom, a plan for a new House of Representatives to replace the anachronic Cabildos, the guarantee of civil liberties, freedom of expression, the foundation of a National Bank, and reform of bureaucracy, of the military, of public works, of protection of commerce, of the sciences, of the arts, and of the church.62 The political mind of Rivadavia had expanded thanks to the ideas he had received from Bentham, whose utilitarian principles fitted in with Rivadavia’s incipient liberal tendencies, as they had in England amongst diverse political figures, including the radical Francis Place,


the reforming Whig Henry Brougham, and the liberal Tory Robert Peel, who adopted many of Bentham’s ideals at one time or another.63 Many of the measures introduced by Rivadavia were, to a degree, the result of Bentham’s inflence.64 Rivadavia’s main concern, however, was fundamentally economic. His plan of economic modernization included the development of industry, the federalization of Buenos Aires and its customs house, the promotion of immigration and land distribution (under the emphyteusis system), colonization, and fiscal reformation. All these reforms represented an abrupt transformation with respect to the economic policies adopted by the previous creole governments.65 These economic, political, and social changes were evidently welcomed by the British residents in the River Plate, who described Rivadavia as the best thing that had happened to them, even calling him the ‘William Pitt of Buenos Aires’. The British reaction was all the warmer considering the tribulations they had gone through in recent years from the unfavourable economic decrees of the Pueyrredón Administration, the confusion and fear of the years 1819–20, and the antipathy they faced from provincial merchants.66

In Europe, the main issue affecting the Concert of Europe was the repercussions of the Riego revolt and the revolution in Spain, which had left Ferdinand VII practically at the mercy of the Spanish Liberals, who forced him to abide by the 1812 Constitution. Certain European Governments, namely France and the Eastern European powers, resolved that intervention was necessary in Spain in order to restore Ferdinand VII’s absolute powers. Austria, with the support of other nations, had already intervened in the Kingdom of Naples after a Carbonari uprising. France was especially keen to intervene in Ferdinand’s favour; Louis XVIII anxiously desired the full restoration of Bourbon rule in Spain. Castlereagh had no enthusiasm for such intervention, especially in Spain, and managed to postpone intervention by appealing to the other nations of the Holy Alliance to reconsider.67 He disliked both the arrogance of the King of Spain and what he regarded as the naive and unrealistic attitude of the Spanish liberals.68


Castlereagh believed that events in Spain would probably make his Ministry more aware of the need to grant recognition to the South American states, and to decide which states were fit for recognition.69 He now regarded recognition ‘rather as a matter of time than of principle’, and was seriously entertaining the idea of granting recognition in the forthcoming Concert meeting which would begin on 22 October 1822 in Verona. The fact that he had already agreed to recognize the River Plate and Colombia, and probably also Mexico and Chile, is an indication of his conviction in this respect.70 In August, however, Castlereagh committed suicide, after suffering several weeks of severe melancholy, partly in consequence of the pressures he had been subjected to in recent years. Castlereagh’s replacement was not named immediately, although the Liverpool Administration sent the Duke of Wellington to represent Britain at the Verona Congress. This appointment was to have negative effects for British recognition of the Spanish American states. Wellington, like his brother the Marquess of Wellesley, had little understanding of this issue and, moreover, was not particularly in favour of recognition. All the same, he was instructed by his Government to go ahead with Castlereagh’s plan, and to do as much as possible to get the other European nations to accept Spanish American recognition. However, when it came to the discussion of the South American question in the Congress, Wellington presented timid and unconvincing arguments which made little impression on the other nations present.71 Attention was diverted, to Villele, the French Foreign Minister, who sought a rapid solution of the Spanish internal situation, on which France was now completely determined.72 Wellington’s lack of enthusiasm at this Congress might have been the main reason why Lord Liverpool did not name him as Foreign Minister. The choice of Castlereagh’s successor as the head of Foreign Affairs should have been obvious at the time. The Government was, at this stage, eager to find a man with experience of office, who was in accord with its line in foreign affairs. The natural candidate, therefore, was George Canning who, like Castlereagh, belonged to the same Pittite tradition, especially regarding foreign policy. Although he did not share the ultra-conservative tendencies of some of the members of the Liverpool Administration, he had nevertheless supported this government from the start. Canning was fundamentally more liberal than


Castlereagh on economic issues policies as well as foreign policy, and although he was detested by the Whigs, especially by the Foxite wing who considered him a ‘turncoat’, he could very well have belonged to one of their factions. But from the beginning of his political career he had pledged his allegiance to the Pittite Tories and had remained staunchly faithful ever since. Canning had initiated a new tendency inside his party, aligning himself with fellow Tories who were basically more in favour of economic reform and free-trade policies than the main bulk of the Liverpool Government. Members of this group, which included the likes of Huskisson and the young Robert Peel, were known as liberal Tories.73 Charles Webster, in his classic study of Castlereagh, was one of the first to sustain that had Castlereagh lived longer he would, sooner or later, have achieved the recognition of the Spanish American states.74 Webster thus posed a counterfactual argument. One of his disciples, John Derry, maintains that ‘the chances are that the outcome of British policy would have been similar, but the method, if not the timing, would have been different. In essentials Canning’s policy towards Spanish America differed little from that of Castlereagh’.75 Webster is even more conclusive when he states that had Castlereagh lived ‘it would have been more clear to posterity that the independence of the Spanish colonies had been won and maintained by the enterprise and heroism of the South Americans themselves’,76 in clear reference to the fact that Castlereagh, however favourable to recognition, would never have considered himself the champion of their cause, a title more identified with his successor. Canning had previously shown interest in Spanish American affairs and, as we have seen, was especially concerned about the promotion of commercial relations between Great Britain and the independent South American colonies, and had also urged Castlereagh openly to support recognition.77 As Charles Petrie maintains, Castlereagh had supported commercial relations with South America to a certain degree, and waited for the right moment to declare political recognition, exploring the possibility that these colonies might eventually adopt monarchical governments which he would have welcomed.78 Canning, although also favourable to the creation of monarchies in Spanish


America, gave the impression that he had fewer preconditions about recognition. As soon as Canning took over at the Foreign Office in September 1822 he immediately focused his attention on the Spanish American question, showing a much more energetic attitude than his predecessor.79 Canning had never sympathized with the Holy Alliance and its principles. His ambitions were, first, to shatter the Congress system, and second, to declare as soon as possible the recognition of the Spanish American colonies, not only as a matter of economic advantage for Great Britain, but also on the basis of political and ideological principle.80 Canning was soon pressing the Cabinet to support his recognition policy.81 The breach which Canning was trying to open between Great Britain and the European Concert of Nations provoked internal opposition from both the King and part of the Cabinet.82 Nevertheless, as Waddell asserts, Canning rapidly proved to the Liverpool Administration that he could command influence in Europe comparable to that of his predecessor.83 In November 1822 Canning had already taken the first steps, by offering Spain the services of Great Britain as mediator in the dispute between that country and its colonies. The year 1823 found Great Britain in a defiant position vis-à-vis Europe. Canning drew up a list of future British Consuls to be sent to Spanish America, a condition considered indispensable by the British Ministry for achieving official commercial relations with the new states. This clearly presaged the shape of things to come.84 These Consuls were effectively nominated in 1824, and sailed for their destinations towards the end of the year. Canning had taken a decisive step towards British recognition of River Plate independence, which would now be only a matter of time.

6 Great Britain and the Recognition of the River Plate

On 6 April 1823 French troops invaded Spain for the second time in fourteen years, seeking to restore Ferdinand VII’s absolute powers and to end the Constitutionalists’ rule. This measure had negative repercussions among the other members of the Holy Alliance, especially in Great Britain. From this moment Britian’s Latin American policy would take a more consistent course. Canning was at this stage clearly set against the Holy Alliance. The fact that Austria, Prussia, and Russia reacted negatively against the French occupation of Spain did not impress him. It was clear that these nations were not against France for intervening in Spain, but for not having done so in concert with the other members of the Alliance.1 But such concertation was precisely what provoked Canning’s criticism of the Holy Alliance. He was insistent that his Government should adopt a more independent stand, and therefore preferred a policy of every nation for itself.2 Spanish America became a crucial issue for Canning, and would from now on play a prominent role in Britain’s policy towards the Alliance and, most especially, towards France. As in 1808, fears arose in England concerning the future policy of France in Spanish America. The terrifying prospect of French predominance in South America was one of the main reasons why Canning accelerated his policy in favour of Spanish American interests from 1823 onwards. Canning’s initial policy in this area, as seen in the previous chapter, was commercial and strategic, and fundamentally designed to preserve the balance of power against the United States, whose growing commercial expansion was coming to be regarded as a menace to the interests of Britain and Europe.3 137


The major obstacles Canning had to overcome in England before establishing closer relations with the Spanish American states were the lack of support and the suspicions of members of the Government. This reluctance was shared by the King himself and, not surprisingly, by the Duke of Wellington. The animosity and lack of enthusiasm of the latter had already been seen at Verona, when he failed to put to the other European representatives a strong argument in favour of Castlereagh’s new approach towards Spanish American recognition. 4 The Duke’s position towards South America was best summed-up by himself some years later, when he expressed that ‘I always had a horror of revolutionising a country for a political object. I always said, if they rise themselves, well and good, but do not stir them up; it is a fearful responsibility.’5 This line of reasoning was shared by most of his ultra-Tory friends. Canning gradually began to exploit the situation in Europe, provoked by the French intervention in Spain, in favour of his Spanish American policy. The most notable example of this line of conduct was manifested on 9 October 1823, when Canning met Prince Polignac, the French Ambassador in London. By May the French Army had reached Madrid, and had managed to suppress the Constitutionalist faction. One of the dilemmas now facing the French Government was how to deal with the Spanish American colonies. France was only too aware that Britain had already established commercial links with some of the emancipated colonies, and that she was now considering recognizing their independence in order to enhance and consolidate those relations. France was also interested in furthering commercial relations with the ex-colonies, and realized the disadvantages which would arise from prior British recognition. On the other hand, France was clearly in no position to acknowledge Spanish American independence, given the close alliance it maintained with the Spanish Crown.6 The French Government authorized Polignac to seek a secret meeting with Canning in order to find a possible solution. It was clearly also in Britain’s interest to prevent any possible French or Spanish interference in their commercial relations with Spanish America. The meeting between Canning and Polignac was in fact due to Wellington’s initiative, for it was he who first suggested that such a meeting would be the best way to sort out the differences

Great Britain and the Recognition of the River Plate 139

between the two nations.7 During the meeting, both men agreed that the restoration of Spanish authority in the Americas or exclusive commercial privileges was hopeless, and resolved to oppose any territorial designs by other nations in the former colonies, although this was not to restrict Britain’s existing trade with that continent. Thus Britain agreed to delay her recognition of the colonies, but warned that any act of interference or aggression by any other nation would prompt immediate recognition.8 This agreement would later be known as the Polignac Memorandum. It remained secret for a few months and proved to be a masterstroke of diplomacy by Canning. With the completion of the Memorandum, he had achieved one of his main objectives, which was to destroy any prospects of French military intervention in the Spanish American colonies. This would not only have damaged Britain’s commercial relations in that area, but would surely also have forced her to take some sort of action against France. The Memorandum would also help to deter possible designs on South America on the part of other European nations, and it therefore enabled Canning to remain in comfortable isolation from Metternich and the Holy Alliance, from which he would detach himself completely in the course of the following year.9

In the months before his meeting with Polignac Canning had been frequently in touch with the United States Minister in London, Richard Rush, aiming at an Anglo-American understanding to balance the hegemony of the Holy Alliance nations and their possible intentions towards the South American continent. The American Minister, on behalf of his Government, seemed eager to consolidate this agreement with Britain, but when he suggested to Canning a joint recognition of the Spanish American colonies, the British Foreign Minister responded negatively. According to Kauffmann, Canning delayed recognition while he waited to see whether any of the Alliance nations would try to intervene in Latin America. He considered that if British recognition were followed by armed intervention by one of their European allies, this would not only prove embarrassing but would also put in jeopardy his whole international strategy.10


After completing the Polignac Memorandum, Canning saw no urgency in negotiating an alliance with the United States. The assurances implicit in the memorandum, preventing any possible European interference in the South American continent, allowed Britain to proceed more slowly towards the recognition of the emancipated states. Rush approached Canning again on this subject several times during the final months of 1823, and was somewhat surprised at the manner in which Canning suddenly seemed to have lost interest in an Anglo-American treaty and continually avoided any mention of the Spanish American question. He reported on Canning’s attitude to his Government and, on receiving his despatches, President James Monroe and Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, decided to propose Spanish American recognition to Congress.11 Throughout November, heated debates on this topic took place in Washington. Some members of the US Government feared that recognition might be too defiant towards Great Britain; notables such as Thomas Jefferson held this view, but others, led by Adams, were convinced that this was the right moment to recognize Spanish American independence. Adams gained Monroe’s approval, and on 2 December 1823 the ‘Monroe Doctrine’ came into existence. This was more than a recognition of independence, whereby the United States of America not only recognized Spanish American independence, but also declared that any attempt made by European powers to invade with territories in the Western Hemisphere would be met with North American resistance. This included any such attempt by Great Britain.12 The news of Monroe’s declaration was received with a certain uneasiness by Canning, who feared that the South Americans might now turn towards the United States as their main protector and commercial ally. For this reason, Canning immediately made the Polignac Memorandum public, and presented it as the forerunner of the North American declaration. He also distributed copies of the memorandum in Parliament and made sure that they reached the independent states of South America. It is worth mentioning at this point that in Buenos Aires, in spite of the news of Monroe’s declaration, recognition of their independence from Great Britain was still more anxiously awaited and regarded as much more significant.13 Another precedent which Canning could cite as further evidence of Great Britain’s goodwill towards the Spanish American colonies, was the sending of Consuls to those areas where the process of


emancipation was more advanced. The states chosen were the River Plate, Colombia, and Mexico. The man designated in October by Canning to act as Consul-General in the United Provinces of the River Plate government was Woodbine Parish, who thus became the first British diplomatic representative in Buenos Aires. Born in England in 1796, Woodbine Parish was the son of a Lincolnshire clergyman, received his education at Eton, and later entered the diplomatic service, where he was an assistant of Joseph Planta, private secretary to Castlereagh. He was related to John Parish of Bath, a businessman who had commercial relations interests in the River Plate, and also to the Robertson brothers who were still living in Buenos Aires at the time of his arrival in March 1824. It is probable that he was chosen as Consul precisely because of these family ties.14 He was twenty-seven when he arrived in the River Plate, describing it as a ‘disagreeable and disheartening place’, although he was to reside there for nine years.15 Canning had taken the necessary precautions of instructing his Consuls to point out to the South American authorities in these three different states that they should not take their appointments as an indication of an imminent recognition by His Majesty’s Government. For this reason, in one of their first meetings, Parish warned Rivadavia that it was his Government’s desire that recognition should first be sought from Spain. The impossibility of such recognition was surely obvious at the time but, given the friendly relations of Great Britain with Spain, it was a formality that could not be avoided. Rivadavia explained to Parish that the Spanish Liberals had sent commissioners to the River Plate in 1823. However, they had demanded too many privileges and powers in return for recognizing River Plate independence. Furthermore, now that the Liberals had been overthrown by the French, which meant the restoration of the royal powers of Ferdinand VII, Rivadavia considered that any such effort would be completely fruitless.16 Rivadavia was still the most influential minister in the Buenos Aires Government at the time of Parish’s arrival. His position at this stage, however, was not as solid as it had been during the first two years. At home, he had to confront the animosity of both the interior provinces – who accused him of trying to impose policies on them as if Buenos Aires were still the capital – and the political factions in


Buenos Aires itself, which made the prospects for the re-election of the Rodríguez ministry in the forthcoming elections look slim.17 The continuing presence of the Portuguese in Uruguay still represented a menace. Brazilian independence had been declared in 1822, but Rivadavia had no luck when he sent commissioners to Rio de Janeiro to urge new authorities to abandon all attempts to take possession of Uruguay. In spite of these difficulties, Parish rapidly showed his sympathy towards Rivadavia, and manifested his optimism concerning the state of affirs in the River Plate, as is reflected in one of the first reports he sent to Canning: Such is a summary of the formation and progress of the present free government of Buenos Ayres. The first years, indeed, of the revolution were marked with those scenes of bloodshed and disorder over which it might be merciful to cast the veil of oblivion; but where is the people who have established their liberty without similar attendant circumstances; and what are the horrors which have marked the former struggles for freedom not only in this hemisphere, but in our own, in England, in France, Italy, and lastly in unhappy Spain ? Experience dearly bought is of the greater value. In this country, indeed, the lessons which have been learnt from the course of events are inappreciable. The errors of the past will be shunned for the future; and the benefits of a good government, which has been at last established, are now quite sufficiently known and understood to ensure the support of all classes of the people.18 Shortly afterwards however, details about the complexities of incipient political life in the River Plate were also to be expressed by Parish to Canning, on the occasion of Rivadavia’s leaving office when the Rodríguez Administration was ousted from the government of the Province of Buenos Aires after the elections of April 1824: He [Rivadavia] had done more for the general amelioration of this state in the last three years, than all his predecessors in power, but in carrying his plans into effect Mr. Rivadavia has necessarily created many personal enemies especially amongst


the military and the clergy. The numbers of the first he has very considerably reduced; and of the numerous convents and monasteries which formerly possessed controlling influence in Buenos Aires, few only now exist. The persons who have suffered by these measures, have since the election of the new governor, been actively employed to raise a feeling against Rivadavia, and I am sorry to add apparently not without some success.19 This last sentence clearly emphasizes how Parish considered Rivadavia an indispensable figure in the development of a peaceful and progressive state. He had impressed Parish favourably the few times they had met, and the daunting prospect of a new Government, many of whose members were supposedly enemies of Rivadavia, no doubt produced a certain amount of anxiety in both Parish and the British commercial community. After all, Rivadavia’s liberalism, reflected in many of his reforms whilst in office, had helped to create a Government which was acceptable to most of the British merchants, and to many of the politicians in England who believed that if such progressive goals could be achieved they would help to accelerate recognition from Great Britain, indispensable for succesful commercial intercourse between the two countries. There was, however, a fair amount of hasty optimism in Parish’s early reports to his Government with regard to the stability achieved in the River Plate since Rivadavia had taken office. As Ferns correctly points out, these reports contrasted with those sent at the same time by the British mercantile community in Buenos Aires. These correspondents revealed that, however fond they were of Rivadavia, stability had yet to be restored, and that only when this was achieved could the River Plate become a reliable and permanent trading partner with England.20

The question of British recognition had been in Rivadavia’s mind ever since he arrived in office. As soon as he heard that Canning was sending a Consul to the River Plate, he decided in turn to designate a representative to act in the same capacity in London. He chose John Hullett, from Hullett Brothers & Company, one of the most important


British firms in Buenos Aires. This choice did not please Canning at all. He thought it would have been much more convenient for both nations if Rivadavia had chosen a native from the River Plate.21 Indeed, as if he foresaw that Rivadavia’s choice of Hullett would not please the British Government, Parish had sought to convince him to designate San Martín, who was now back in Buenos Aires, and who had expressed his desire to emigrate to Europe. Rivadavia, who had never been on good terms with San Martín, astutely explained to Parish that this nomination would not be entirely suitable as San Martín the Liberator, was in favour of the installation of a European Monarch in the River Plate, and was still eager to negotiate this solution. Rivadavia even claimed that it was the main reason why San Martín wished to leave for Europe.22 More significantly, in November 1823, a few months before the British Consul’s arrival in Buenos Aires, Rivadavia decided to send a diplomatic mission to Great Britain, which was to be secret and unofficial, and another to the United States, for the purpose of placing a River Plate diplomatic aid in Washington. Ever since the appearance of a publication in the River Plate which announced, after the Verona Congress, that the Holy Alliance threatened to intervene in the revolutionary states, Rivadavia had felt the need to gain British and American support against any Alliance expedition to South America. Fears increased when news reached Buenos Aires of the French occupation of Spain the following year, prompting the immediate despatch of the missions.23 The man chosen by Rivadavia to head the British mission and afterwards act as diplomatic representative in the United States, was none other than Carlos María de Alvear, who had been Director Supremo when Rivadavia had been sent to Europe on a similar mission in 1815. After that tumultuous experience in power, Alvear had been forced to live in exile in Rio de Janeiro and later in Montevideo. Here he joined the Chilean José Antonio Carrera, with whom in 1819 he entered the Federalist cause in an attempt to oust the Pueyrredón Administration, allying with Santa Fe Governor Estanislao López and his army, which was then preparing to attack Buenos Aires. After a misunderstanding with López, Alvear was soon forced back into exile.24 When the Rodríguez Government announced an amnesty in November 1821, Alvear decided to return. He was on good terms with


Rivadavia, which was further shown when Rivadavia appointed him for this mission.25 Parish insinuated that Alvear should find no difficulties in approaching Canning, whom he had already informed about this visit.26 Alvear finally received instructions from Rivadavia in February 1824. He was to seek an interview with Canning and explain to him that the unofficial nature of his mission was due to the fact that the River Plate Government had no doubts about Britain’s favourable disposition in favour of their cause. He also had to explain to Canning that the main aim of his journey was to report to the British Government on the situation in the River Plate and to receive ratification of British support. He was told to find out as much as possible about the reaction of the British Government and of British public opinion towards the recognition of the Spanish American states. Alvear was to put forward much the same arguments in his visit to the United States, as well as to thank Monroe for his declaration of the previous year.27

Alvear arrived at Liverpool on 5 June 1824 after an 84-day journey. There he was enthusiastically greeted by a delegation of local merchants who were interested in hearing about the situation in South America. Six days later, on arriving at Birmingham, he was invited to a meeting of merchants and manufacturers who were also anxious to inquire about the same subject.28 During his stay in England a petition for the recognition of the emancipated South American states was presented to the Government by some of the major firms of Liverpool and London.29 When he arrived in London, Alvear made sure that the favourable remarks he had expressed about Rivadavia in these meetings were published in the newspapers, a means of predisposing English public opinion in favour of the cause of the independent South American states, and of promoting the case for recognition.30 On June 29 Alvear sent Rivadavia an account of what he had been able to find out about the reaction in England towards South America, and enclosed a copy of the Polignac Memorandum. It had only recently been made public, and was a complete novelty to Alvear. With respect to the British Government’s policy towards


South American states, Alvear transcribed the speech made by Lord Liverpool in Parliament, and his answer to a question from the Marquess of Lansdowne, on the current state of relations with the new states of Spanish America: En la sesión tenida en la Cámara de los Lores el 24 del corriente, un miembro de ella, el Marqués de Landsdown, habiendo preguntado al primer ministro Lord Liverpool cuales eran las relaciones y disposiciones del Gobierno respecto de los nuevos estados de Sud América, respondió éste que el gobierno no tenía ningún compromiso directo ni indirecto con potencia alguna para reconocer o no la independencia de aquellos estados y que estaba enteramente libre para determinar sobre este punto, según los intereses de la nación inglesa; que habiendo dado el paso de proponer al Gobierno Español fuese el primero en hacer el reconocimiento de aquellas sus antiguas colonias, haciéndole ver la necesidad y conveniencia que le resultaría de tal procedimiento, el gabinete de Madrid había rehusado decididamente acceder a tal propuesta, razón porque el Gobierno Inglés quedaba ya libre aun con respecto a España, para hacer (a su debido tiempo) el reconocimiento de aquellos nuevos estados, y para contraer con ellos obligaciones tanto morales como de cualquiera otra especie y añadió: el Gobierno ha enviado comisionados a varios de aquellos estados para que formando una idea exacta de la situación respectiva de ellos, se pueda proceder a su reconocimiento; como el informe de los comisionados no ha llegado aún, se suspende todo procedimiento, bien entendido; que estando salvo el Gobierno Inglés, como se ha dicho anteriormente, de todo compromiso, tanto con las potencias extranjeras como con la España misma, sólo espera las noticias de sus comisionados para determinar sobre el asunto en cuestión.31 This announcement by the Prime Minister led Alvear to conclude that the Liverpool Administration was inclined towards recognition, although he had yet to meet Canning to confirm this assessment. Alvear meanwhile met some of the envoys of the other South American states, who were there for similar reasons. Among them were José Manuel Hurtado of Colombia, José Mariano Michelena of


Mexico and Juan García del Río of Peru. García del Río had actually held two meetings with Prince Polignac. Hurtado, moreover, had already managed to have a couple of conferences with Canning. He told Alvear that the British Foreign Minister had informed him that he had recently exhorted the Portuguese to recognize Brazilian independence, and had expressed his hope that, if this were achieved, Spain might shortly recognize South American independence as well.32 On 6 July 1824 Alvear had further reason to believe there was a favourable disposition towards the recognition of the River Plate. On the same day The Times reprinted Canning’s letter to Rivadavia announcing the appointment of Parish as Consul to Buenos Aires. There was also news about the completion of a loan from Baring Brothers to the Government of Buenos Aires. It had been negotiated by one of the Robertson brothers, now a Director of the Bank of Buenos Aires, and by Félix Castro, a prominent Rioplatense merchant.33 In spite of this good news, Alvear was unable to arrange a meeting with Canning, and by late July his hopes of doing so were low. Alvear expressed his regret to John Hullet that he had been unable to meet with the Foreign Minister. A few days later, on 21 July – the very day he was to set to sail – thanks to John Hullet’s mediation Alvear unexpectedly received an invitation to meet Canning. On receiving this invitation he naturally suspended his journey.34 The meeting between Alvear and Canning took place on 22 July 1824. What transpires from Alvear’s account is that Canning gave him a cool reception. Before the interview he had sent Alvear a set of questions about the state of affairs in the River Plate. Once he had the Rioplatense envoy in front of him he immediately proceeded to cross-examine him in a hasty and almost irritable manner.35 Canning’s first move was to ask Alvear if he knew anything about Rivadavia’s departure from the Government, to which Alvear answered that he had no official confirmation of this. The Foreign Minister carried on with the interrogation and asked a few questions concerning the characteristics of the political institutions functioning in the River Plate, such as the extent of authority attributed to the Executive and to the Congress. He also enquired about the situation of the other South American states, and indicated that the events occurring in Peru, where Bolívar was still


attempting to defeat the Spanish, could prove menacing for the River Plate if the Spaniards were to triumph. Alvear replied that the River Plate Provinces had acquired their emancipation from Spain fourteen years ago and no longer had reason to fear the Spaniards.36 Whilst reviewing the South American situation Alvear took the opportunity to bring Canning up to date about the situation of Uruguay, still being threatened by Portuguese troops, and to attempt to gain his sympathy for the River Plate. Canning initially reacted with alarm and surprise, but then merely asked if there was any way of finding a solution. He also asked Alvear about the real authority of Buenos Aires over the other River Plate Provinces. Alvear answered that the capital had no authority over the Provinces, Canning astutely followed the question by asking exactly whom Alvear was representing in his capacity of Minister to the United States. Alvear replied that he was representing all the River Plate Provinces, since the United States Government had, with President Monroe’s declaration, recognized the independence of all the Provinces which had comprised the River Plate Viceroyalty.37 The conference ended with Canning’s request to see Alvear’s credentials. Alvear promptly refused this request, fearing that it was a strategy to make him reveal official papers concerning his mission to the United States. He explained that he did not have his credentials with him at that moment. Towards the end of the meeting Alvear conveyed his Government’s conviction that Great Britain was the most progressive, illustrious, and moral nation in Europe, and the most sympathetic to the newly formed States of South America. At this point Canning abruptly interrupted Alvear’s speech and, bluntly acknowledging the Rioplatenses praise of his country, put an end to the meeting.38 The effect this meeting had on Canning and on his appreciation of the situation in the River Plate is not easy to determine. Neither is it clear, for that matter, why he adopted such a cool attitude towards Alvear during this conference. He could have been in a bad mood on that particular day, or he might have felt suspicious about the exact nature of Alvear’a mission. Another reason might well have been a certain degree of irritation at the way in which Alvear had conducted himself since arriving in England, stimulating the hopes of the British merchants and exciting public opinion about the prosperous future of the River Plate. This served only to put further pressure on the Govern-


ment to take a rapid decision in the delicate matter of recognition. However, another likely explanation of Canning’s attitude may lie in the arrival of news in London from Buenos Aires of Rivadavia’s departure from the Government, which may have created a negative impression on the Foreign Minister. As to the influence this meeting had on Canning’s future decisions about South American states, it does not seem that Alvear’s visit contributed much by way of accelerating recognition. Nor did Alvear add much to what Canning knew already about River Plate affairs. Alvear embarked on 29 July for the United States, where a more auspicious welcome was awaiting him. During the time Alvear was in England, the Liverpool Ministry had to deal with frequent complaints voiced by the Whig opposition in Parliament. At the beginning of the 1824 session Lansdowne, who was mentioned in Alvear’s letter to Rivadavia, and who was at this stage the most active of the Whigs in South America affairs, drew up a motion for the recognition of South American independence as guarantee against any Spanish attacks. The motion was defeated by 95 to 34.39 Brougham also condemned the Government for failing to oppose the Holy Alliance, and thus losing influence in Europe.40 Many other prominent Whigs supported the London merchants and their demands for South American recognition. Mackintosh, for example, criticized Canning for having suggested that it was those with commercial interests in South America who were most anxious for recognition. This eccentric Whig leader riposted: With regard to the influence of what may be said here upon the loans to the independent states, I can only say, that I have not the slightest interest in them. I find ample employment for the whole of my capital at home; and however I might speculate in other matters, I am certainly not a speculator of that sort.41 Mackintosh was even more emphatic when he spoke in the House of Commons on 15 June 1824 on the occasion of the petition presented by the merchants of London: When Great Britain (I hope very soon) recognises the states of Spanish America, it will not be as a concession to them, for they


need no such recognition; but it will be for her own interest, to protect the trade and navigation of her subjects, to acquire the best means of cultivating friendly relations with important countries, and of composing by immediate negotiation those differences which might otherwise terminate in war.42 The Times remained sceptical about Mackintosh’s position as regards towards Spanish America, which was not in favour of complete recognition, claiming that his efforts were ‘reduced to very little, in short to nothing’. It thought that the debate with Canning had been dull, and argued that its only interesting feature was a slight indication that the Foreign Minister might consider some sort of partial recognition. It concluded that, if this was effected, ‘we applaud the prudence of the British Minister’.43 Other notable Whigs chose to adopt a more moderate stance. The Holland House circle, as mentioned before, had their loyalties to Spain, and this naturally put them in an awkward position regarding South America. Grey, for example, was more concerned for the stability of Europe, and reckoned that recognition would place Britain in a difficult position. He agreed with Canning that England had no right to stop Spain from trying to recover her colonies, but argued further that she had no right to prevent Spain’s allies from helping her. Nevertheless, he ended up favouring recognition and supported Landsdowne’s motion.44 Canning also encountered bitter opposition within the Cabinet, from the more conservative faction, led by Wellington, which disliked his policy of distancing himself from the Holy Alliance.45 For this faction, more sympathetic to Castlereagh’s foreign policy, the Alliance, with all its faults, symbolized European stability, and they feared that undoing it would only disrupt the order which had been maintained on the continent since Napoleon’s defeat. They therefore viewed the recognition of the South American states as an anti-Alliance policy and, by the middle of 1824, Canning was certainly giving them the impression that he was effectively working in favour of this cause. As if this were not enough, the King still strongly opposed South American recognition.46 These diverse poles of opposition towards his handling of South American recognition left Canning in a delicate situation. He had most of the Whigs pressing for immediate recognition while his Tory enemies, and the King himself, accused him of going too far.


Nevertheless, the Tory and Whig opposition to Canning’s South American policy was not strong enough to effect any change in the Foreign Office. The Whigs criticized his delay in announcing recognition, but basically favoured the policy he had adopted, and as for the die-hard Tories, they were only too aware that Canning’s tenure at the Foreign Office guaranteed their own tenure in power. In spite of their desire for a policy more sympathetic to the Holy Alliance, they were prepared to sacrifice such a stand in order to remain in the Ministry.47 This was apparent when, in Parliamentary debates towards the end of July, Lord Liverpool and Canning managed to obtain a consensus in both Houses when they formally declared that Britain no longer had to consult either Spain or her other European allies on South American recognition and would, from now on, unilaterally determine the right moment for recognition.48 This was what Alvear reported to Rivadavia. At much the same time as his conference with Alvear, Canning sent to Parish his reactions to the first reports he had received about the River Plate: Your despatches contain, generally speaking, a satisfactory report of the situation of Buenos Ayres; of the moderate principles of the Government, of its tendency to a stable and tranquil settlement; and of the disposition manifested, as well as by persons in power as by the inhabitants at large, to cultivate with this country the closest relations of friendly intercourse.49 Although there was no mention in this letter of his meeting with Alvear, Canning made clear the present stance of Great Britain regarding relations with the River Plate and with Spain. He enquired more about one of the points he had put to Alvear during his interrogation, which apparently was still not all together clear to him: It is neither the right nor the intention of Great Britain to do anything to promote the separation of any of the Spanish Colonies from Spain. But the fact of that separation is an indispensable preliminary to any further proceedings or inquiries; and it is not till after the fact has been decisively ascertained, that a question can arise as to the expediency of entering into


arrangements founded upon a recognition of it. The fact of separation seems to be clearly established with respect to Buenos Ayres, by the length of time which has elapsed since its original declaration, of independence, and since a Spanish force has existed in its territory; and by the absence of anything like a Spanish party in the state. The competency of that state to enter into arrangements with other countries does not appear liable to question. But there is one point upon which your report is not so clear, as might be desired, I mean as to the power of the government of Buenos Ayres to bind by its stipulations with a foreign state, all the members of the government of Buenos Ayres.50 It seems obvious that Canning was eager to know what authority the Government of Buenos Aires enjoyed over the rest of the River Plate provinces. Canning may have assumed that here lay the key to the future stability of the state, which seemed to be a criterion for recognition. He nevertheless instructed Parish that if the situation in the River Plate remained stable, he was to inform the Government there that it was His Majesty’s desire to conclude a commercial treaty with them soon. He stressed that: The full power of the government of Rio de La Plata will necessarily set forth the political style and title by which that Government designates itself; and you will not proceed to the opening of the negotiation unless that instrument shall bear upon the face of it the authority, not of Buenos Ayres alone, but of the whole of the States comprehended in the description of the United States of Rio de la Plata.51 The sudden appearance of this treaty question arose from the need of Canning and Lord Liverpool to formalize commercial relations as well as recognition. Nevertheless, they needed still further evidence of the stability and unity in the River Plate to present the case for recognition to the rest of the Cabinet. At the same time, Rivadavia was preparing to embark on another trip to England. After refusing to stay on as a minister in the Government of Las Heras, who had offered to keep him in his post in spite of his being considered an ‘enemy’ of the new Government, he had decided to leave


for London, explaining that he was going for personal reasons, but also as to promote the diplomatic and economic interests of the River Plate.52 He was named Charge d’Affaires of the River Plate in London. Parish was enthusiastic about Rivadavia’s trip to England, and reported to Canning that: Mr. Rivadavia’s intentions in leaving this country were as I have already stated in a former despatch to visit his children, and upon his private affairs; but it has appeared to me in public view that the greatest advantages may arise from his presence in England at this moment, advantages which I could neither reconcile it to myself to overlook or to hesitate at once to suggest to the consideration of this government.53 Parish also believed that Rivadavia was the ideal representative to communicate the state of things in the River Plate, as he had been the principal Minister of the previous Government. He added: That if the time be approaching and from my present knowledge of the settled state of things here joined to the advises received from England, I feel that it cannot be far distant for entering into relations with these provinces of a more ostensible character. No one possesses to such an extent the confidence of the government and people of Buenos Aires as Mr. Rivadavia, no one is better qualified to enter upon any negotiations with His Majesty’s government which may be necessary towards their final establishment.54 Rivadavia arrived in London in September. Canning seemed as pleased as Parish about his arrival: M de Rivadavia arrived by the same packet which brought your despatches. He professes himself not to be furnished with any powers on the part of his Government, but states himself ready to furnish every information in his power [as] to the state of affairs in Buenos Aires. It is certainly very important for His


Majesty’s Government to possess in him so valuable and so authentic a source of information.55 Although it was true that one the reasons for Rivadavia’s journey to England was to visit his children, who were in boarding schools in this country, and to persuade the Government that the River Plate was stable and thus accelerate recognition, he had other private affairs to attend to, probably the most important reason for his return. In November 1823 Rivadavia had written to Hullett & Company, informing them of the existence of rich mines of both gold and silver in Famatina, near the city of La Rioja. He offered them participation in their exploitation and began negotiations to create an English mining company. Hullett & Company organized the Rio de la Plata Mining Company with a nominal capital of one million pounds. This association with Hullett & Company helps explain why Rivadavia designated John Hullett as Consul of the River Plate in London.56 Another venture Rivadavia was keen on exploring was to encourage the immigration of British subjects to the Plate, in order to advance local agriculture. He thought that the introduction of immigrants from England and northern Europe would improve the social, economic, and political condition of the River Plate and would eventually stimulate agriculture. Rivadavia always regarded agriculture as the source of wealth of the River Plate provinces. He intended to attract these immigrants by offering them the same incentives he was offering for local farmers by way of the Emphyteusis Law – Rivadavia’s most important reform in agriculture – whereby state lands would now be rented to tenants.57 Rivadavia’s most significant venture during this trip to London, however, was to secure a loan of a million pounds for the Government of Buenos Aires, which became effective in July 1824. This loan had been pursued by Rivadavia while he was still acting as Minister of the Buenos Aires Government, and had been approved by congress in August 1822. The money was to be used by the government to build adequate port facilities, to provide the city with running water, and to build towns on the southern frontier of the province of Buenos Aires to discourage indian raids.58 Canning soon realized that Rivadavia had other business to attend to in England apart from promoting the political credibility of the


River Plate states. Canning reported to Parish about Rivadavia’s activities in England: M. Rivadavia lived while here in constant intercourse with commercial establishments in this country, establishments highly respectable but still consisting of persons deeply interested in the fluctuations of commercial affairs. I desire that you will lose no opportunity of impressing upon M. Garcia how inexpedient it is that the Government of Buenos Ayres should place the conduct of their affairs in England in the hands of any person in such a situation.59 These strictures were written by Canning almost a year after Rivadavia’s arrival in London. It is worth clarifying here that, during the intervening months, Rivadavia had also been engaged in other activities, mentioned below, which had provoked similar reactions from Canning. The fact that as a rule British diplomats were forbidden to trade, partly explains Canning’s negative reaction towards Rivadavia’s commercial activities whilst in London: he expected the similar ethical behaviour from a River Plate emissary.

In the last months of 1824 Canning decided to press for the recognition of the River Plate. In spite of his doubts and suspicions about the stability of the political situation, especially after Rivadavia’s departure from the Government, Canning was convinced at this point that the new state was ready for recognition.60 Parish’s despatches had certainly done a lot to persuade Canning to take this decision. Around 3500 Englishmen were now residing in Buenos Aires, and 39 English commercial houses were already operating in the city, and this must surely have weighed favourably with him as a clear indication of the extent to which British commercial interests in the River Plate had expanded.61 However, there was still dissent in Liverpool’s Cabinet. Wellington insisted that River Plate recognition should not be declared until there was some acceptance of the central authority of


Buenos Aires by the other provinces of the River Plate.62 According to Webster, Wellington was only attempting to gain time in order to reach an agreement with the other European powers to prevent recognition from being granted at all.63 The decision was therefore left in suspense for a few more months. Canning, as he had already done in August, sent further instructions to Parish in September, and pressed him to find more evidence about the stability and unity of the republic and report it to the British Government as soon as possible.64 Parish immediately sought to satisfy Canning’s request by contacting Manuel García, who had replaced Rivadavia as the most important minister of the new Government. A lawyer, García had been Minister of Finance of the previous Government and seemed determined to develop the economy of the River Plate as Rivadavia had done before him, especially by accelerating financial reform. Parish must have taken a liking to García, for he confidentially disclosed to him many of Canning’s despatches.65 Parish also requested that the River Plate government declare religious toleration. This, García explained, might take some time.66 With respect to River Plate unity, Parish advised García that he should present to him a convincing report so that Parish could put forward a reassuring case to his government about this most vital requirement for the recognition of this state.67 In October, García duly complied and presented a formal note to Parish, explaining that although all the River Plate Provinces had separate administrations for the conduct of their domestic affairs, they still looked to the Government of Buenos Aires for the handling of all negotiations regarding foreign relations.68 In late October 1824, Parish wrote to Canning stating that he considered it wiser for Britain to delay any contacts or decisions regarding the River Plate until a national government was consolidated. Parish regarded that there were reasonable chances for the re-establishment of a national government which would unify all the provinces with Buenos Aires as their capital. In January of the following year a National Congress was due to take place in Buenos Aires to resolve this matter. 69 Parish also informed Canning that he had taken the liberty of disclosing confidentially the last instructions he had received to García. This was to give García the notion of imminent recognition by the British Government, and was a clever move by Parish, who must surely


have been aware that by informing García of Britain’s favourable disposition he could contribute to the desirable unification of the River Plate provinces. In a despatch to Canning, Parish explained why he had disclosed such information: With this feeling I called upon Mr.Garcia in the evening, and made known to him confidentially the determination which His Majesty’s Government had come to as to the establishment of future relations with these provinces. I can ill describe the satisfaction with which this communication was received by the Buenos Ayrean Minister, nor had I the smallest difficulty in convincing him of the obvious necessity of the existence of a formal authority on the part of the whole of the United Provinces before the negotiation could be in any way opened.70 Canning approved Parish’s proceedings in this affair after he received the above letter in late December, and praised the Consul for his astute judgement.71 Also in December the news of the victory of Bolivar’s Commander General Antonio Sucre over the Spanish Army at Ayacucho in Upper Peru speeded the process by which the members of the Congress agreed to place the conduct of foreign affairs of the Confederation in the hands of the Government of Buenos Aires, thus providing Parish and Canning with the requirement they had both been awaiting. For this reason Parish, who in late December had already announced to the leading British residents in Buenos Aires and to members of the local government the imminence of British recognition, signed the Anglo-Argentine Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with García on 14 February 1825. The Treaty established the basis for the future relationship between the two countries.72 It regulated the conditions for trade, and guaranteed the civil rights of British citizens residing in the River Plate as well as formally granting them freedom of worship. The Treaty was ratified by the British Government in May 1825. By then Canning had already achieved the recognition of the United Provinces of the River Plate, or Las Provincias Unidas del Río de la Plata. In mid-December 1824, Canning had urged the government to accept his proposal for the recognition of Mexico, Colombia, and Buenos Aires, on the grounds that the Holy Alliance powers had per-


suaded France to remain in Spain, and that this represented a continuing menace to British interests in South America. When Canning perceived that this plea was still met by opposition, both he and Lord Liverpool threatened to resign. In the face of this threat, recognition was accepted by the Ministry, and announced in an unenthusiastic message by the King in the opening session of Parliament on 7 February 1825.73 The fact that Canning did not need to await any further confirmation about the situation in the River Plate implies that he was already satisfied from what he had heard about the course of events there. Canning thus consolidated his reputation of champion of the Latin American cause. However, many contemporaries remained unimpressed with his achievement. The feeling amongst certain members of the Whig faction was that Canning had delayed far too long in announcing recognition; Brougham, for example, claimed that the credit should go to Mackintosh who, he considered, had done a great deal to bring the Liverpool Ministry to consider South American recognition.74 This muted reaction could also be seen in the House of Commons in December 1825, when Canning again justified South American recognition. In a speech he delivered on the persistent Franco-Spanish conflict, he uttered his famous phrase ‘I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old’. After a moment of silence, this was followed by ‘the sound of faint mocking laughter from the corner of the chamber’, before the House erupted into cheering and applause.75

In spite of recognition, Canning was still confronted by problems in the River Plate in the two years that followed. The question of the Banda Oriental was still unresolved. This had been one of the matters Rivadavia wished to settle during his stay in Europe. While still in London, however, he had further irritated the British Foreign Minister when it was discovered that his mission was also destined for France. In a letter to Parish, Canning referred to this: Such being the case, it is almost unnecessary for me to dwell at any length upon the irregularity of the double mission with which Mr.Rivadavia has been charged by his Government. It


must be obvious to you, and you will easily be able to convince the Government of Buenos Ayres, that no satisfactory relations could possibly exist between His Majesty’s Government and by any individual, however eminent, who should be accredited at the same time both to this country and to France.76 Further strife followed when Rivadavia told Canning that it was Britain’s duty to ensure that Uruguay was restored to the River Plate given, he claimed, that a promise was implicit in a statement made in 1812 by Lord Strangford. Rivadavia argued that Strangford had given a written guarantee to the River Plate Government that Britain would ensure the Banda Oriental’s independence from the Portuguese in the Armistice signed that year.77 To these pretensions Canning responded, arguing that: Mr. Rivadavia ought to know that there is nothing in the whole circle of diplomatic engagements so solemn as one of guarantee; that no nation ever contacts such an engagement without some strenuous motive or some over-ruling interest; that even then no Government, having the honour of the country whose affairs it manages, at heart, would contract that engagement but upon the most mature deliberation, and in the most precise and definite terms.78 By this time, Rivadavia was already back in Buenos Aires, where he was elected first President of the reunited Provincias Unidas del Río de la Plata in February 1826. Canning had written to Parish stating that he was only too glad to see him leave England.79 The dispute between Brazil and Argentina over the fate of the Banda Oriental later developed into a war between the two nations, which began in early 1826. The eventual outcome of this dispute was the independence of Uruguay in 1828, one of the two solutions Canning had effectively suggested when he delivered instructions to the British commissioner sent as mediator: First, that the cession of Montevideo by Brazil should be negotiated on the basis of the arrangement which was in progress between Spain and Portugal when the military revolution at Cadiz broke out, Viz., that of a pecuniary compensation to be


paid by Buenos Ayres to Brazil for the expenses incurred by that power in the occupation of Montevideo; or, secondly that the town and territory of Montevideo should become and remain independent of either country, in a position somewhat similar of the Hanseatic towns of Europe.80 Thus, Canning had used the Latin American question as a defensive strategy against the fading conservative ambitions of the Holy Alliance, and to this end was now even prepared to accept the establishment of republics in South America; this from a man still imbued with that anti-revolutionary Pittite tradition.

Conclusion

When Canning eventually recognized River Plate independence in 1825, it seemed as if the slow and complicated process of initial exploratory relations between the River Plate and Great Britain had come to a happy end, and that a new and more straightforward relationship was about to commence. This process had begun in 1806 when British troops invaded the River Plate as a result of Popham’s rash initiative. Although it was far from clear at the time, the invasions, as Ferns has pointed out, paved the way to an AngloArgentine relationshionship. After this affair, British knowledge and awareness about the internal affairs of the River Plate increased considerably. Britain’s interest in Spanish America had been evident throughout the eighteenth century, mainly for commercial and strategic reasons, and the River Plate area in particular had caught Dundas’ attention. The British Navy, with which Dundas was connected for a long period, had warned the Government several times about the convenience of South American expeditions. Lord Strangford’s arrival with the Portuguese court in Brazil gave Britain another chance to view the affairs in the River Plate at close hand. Strangford, as we have seen, took an immediate interest in the Rioplatense situation, and at first it seemed that his interest was shared by his Government. This was especially the case with Canning, who showed a high degree of concern over the Carlota affair. However, from 1809 to 1816 Strangford’s dispatches relating to River Plate affairs no longer seemed to provoke the same interest. This apparent lack of interest had to do with the consolidation of 161


Britain’s alliance with Spain, which left her in an uncomfortable position regarding the independence of the South American states. Therefore, during the period 1810–20, British policy towards these states was pretty diffident. The effect in Europe of the River Plate’s declarations of independence in 1810 and 1816 was especially negative as regards the major powers. This was hardly surprising given the anti-revolutionary spirit which prevailed in Europe during those years, and which Britain partly shared. This aversion to possible revolutionary outbreaks in South America was reflected in British reactions to the various missions sent from Buenos Aires during this period. Not only was Castlereagh’s attitude towards these diplomatic delegations both distant and hesitant; he also gave support to monarchical projects in the new South American states. The diplomatic missions sent by the first independent Governments of the River Plate to Great Britain clearly illustrate that Britain was the country seen as most important by these Governments. Although Rivadavia eventually became disillusioned with Britain’s apparent lack of interest in 1816, and chose to try his luck in France, there always existed a clear idea amongst River Plate politicians that British support and recognition were the most vital. The advantages implicit in the consolidation of a sound commercial relationship between the River Plate and Great Britain, once recognition was granted, is undoubtedly a major explanation for the understanding of the Rioplatense inclination towards Britain. However, the correspondence between the River Plate emissaries and the government officials does not suggest that this was the exclusive objective. The commercial intercourse between Britain and the new Latin American states began to develop more strongly from the 1820s onwards. The original motives of the River Plate missions to London had to do with the need to gain political credibility and acceptance from the nation which they most admired and respected. This had been the position adopted by the other Latin American states, such as Mexico, Venezuela and Chile, who also sent emissaries to England for the same reasons. However, the succesive rioplatense agents sent on missions to London, during the 1810s, lacked the sufficient diplomatic experience to convince the British Government to acknowledge the independence of the River Plate provinces.

Conclusion 163

The importance Britain attached to the new states’ political credibility was to be evident throughout the period 1810–25. It was, as many historians have maintained, an excuse for delaying recognition, but it also clearly reflected Britain’s concern about the outcome of republican experiments in these nations. The appearance in Lord Liverpool’s Administration of a more liberal-minded figure, Canning, did not necessarily mean that these fears would rapidly evaporate. Like Castlereagh before him, Canning also preferred the creation of monarchies in South America, and this was one of the reasons why the Whigs questioned how open-minded Canning really was with respect to South America. Nevertheless, Canning proved instrumental in making Britain adopt a more determined and favourable inclination towards River Plate and Latin American recognition. No less significant than Canning’s appearance on the scene was Rivadavia’s entry into River Plate politics a year earlier. What seemed a very complex political situation in the River Plate in 1820, due to the constant Portuguese presence in Uruguay and the increasing resentment of the River Plate provinces towards Buenos Aires’s central government, changed substantially when the political structure was modified, and the capital and provinces became autonomous. Rivadavia’s incorporation to the newly created Government of Buenos Aires, in 1821, proved highly significant as he was largely responsible for introducing innovative economic and social reforms which provoked the admiration of the fast-growing British community in Buenos Aires. It would not take long for these new developments to attract the attention of the British Government. The emergence of both Canning and Rivadavia was therefore significant for speeding the process of recognition. They had both followed the evolution of relations between their countries for quite some time. Canning was well aware of the confusion surrounding the invasions as, along with Castlereagh, he was at the time very much involved in the parliamentary debates which they provoked. Canning had frequently stated his opinions against such enterprises. He was also in contact with Strangford during the latter’s first years in Rio de Janeiro. Later, when he was out of office, he became a keen advocate of the claims of the merchants of Liverpool, the constituency he represented, for free trade with South America.


Rivadavia, for his part, had lived in England for a considerable number of months during the time of his diplomatic mission in Europe, and was clearly influenced by British economic ideals. He also had a declared admiration for the British educational system, and had expressed a desire to promote British immigration to the Plate Provinces. In spite of being more interested in the Spanish American colonies than his predecessors in the Government, Canning’s main line of policy did not differ that much from theirs. He clearly subordinated the Spanish American question to the interests of British foreign policy in Europe. The recognition of the South American states was no exception to this rule. This implicitly applied to the line of policy adopted by Britain towards the River Plate, and partly explains the lack of a more regular and consistent policy. Canning’s decision to concede recognition to the South American states, was partly motivated by the claims his government received from commercial agents at home, demanding free trade with that region, and from diverse sectors of British public opinion who expressed sympathy with the South American republics. The increment of British commercial houses in Buenos Aires was another important reason. Relations between Britain and Argentina were destined to become much closer from mid-century, as Ferns has so vividly illustrated. Nevertheless, it was the indiscretion of Popham, followed by the diplomatic manoeuvres of Canning and Rivadavia, which opened Anglo-Argentine relations.

Notes Introduction 1 The most important work of these historians on this subject are: C. Webster, Britain and the Independence of Latin America 1812–1830, 2 Vols, London, 1938; R.A. Humphreys, British Consular Reports on the Trade and Politics of Latin America, London, 1952; W.W. Kauffmann, British Policy and the Independence of Latin America 1804–1822, New Haven, 1951; J. Rydjord, Foreign Interest in the Independence of New Spain, Durham NC, 1935; R. Miller, Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, London, 1993; J. Lynch, ‘British Policy and the Independence of Latin America’, Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 1, no.1, pp. 1–30, 1969; W.S. Robertson, France and Latin American Independence, Baltimore, 1939. 2 C. Roberts, Las Invasiones Inglesas del Río de la Plata 1806–1807, Buenos Aires, 1938; H.S. Ferns, Great Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century, Oxford, 1960; J. Street, Gran Bretaña y el Río de la Plata, Buenos Aires, 1967. 3 Two recent exceptions are the works of A. Hennessy and J. King, The Land that England Lost: Britain and Argentina, a Special Relationship, London, 1992; and D. McLean, War, Diplomacy and Informal Empire. Britian and the Republics of La Plata 1836–1853, London, 1995.

1

The River Plate Viceroyalty

1 N. Bessio Moreno, Buenos Aires, Puerto del Río de la Plata Capital de la Argentina. Estudio Crítico de su Población, 1536–1939, Buenos Aires, 1939; J.L. Moreno, ‘La Estructura Social y Demográfica de la ciudad de Buenos Aires en el año 1778’, Anuario del Instituto de Investigaciones de Rosario, no. 8, 1975. 2 J. Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, 1782–1810. The Intendant System in the Viceroyalty of the Río de La Plata, London, 1958. Argentine edition, Buenos Aires, 1962, p. 37. 3 ibid., p. 38. 4 For full demographic details on Buenos Aires during these years see N. Bessio Moreno, Buenos Aires, and J.L. Moreno, ‘La Estructura Social’. 5 T. Halperín Donghi, El Río de la Plata al Comenzar el Siglo XIX, Buenos Aires, 1961, p. 33; and the same author’s Revolución y Guerra, Formación de una Elite Dirigente en la Argentina Criolla, Buenos Aires, 1972, pp. 27–40. Also very relevant for this subject is J.C. Garavaglia, Economía, Sociedad y Regiones, Buenos Aires, 1987. 6 T. Halperín Donghi, El Río de la Plata, pp. 35–6. For a vivid contemporary description of this area at that time, see Concolorcorvo, El Lazarillo de Ciegos Caminantes, Buenos Aires, 1997. 165

166 Notes 7 Halperín Donghi, supra, pp. 36–44; Concorcorvo, El Lazarillo; On the development of agriculture in the province of Buenos Aires during this period, see the recent works of C. Mayo, Estancia y Sociedad en La Pampa 1740–1820, Buenos Aires, 1995; and S. Amaral, The Rise of Capitalism on the Pampas: The Estancias of Buenos Aires, 1785–1870, Cambridge, 1998. 8 Halperín Donghi, supra, p. 52. For a further understanding of the origins of the mercantile society in the River Plate in the late colonial period see S. Socolow. The Merchants of Buenos Aires 1778–1810. Family and Commerce, Cambridge, 1978. 9 On the formation and role of this group during the final stages of the Viceregal period, see T. Halperín Donghi, Revolución y Guerra, pp. 130–42; J.C. Chiaramonte, Ciudades, Provincias, Estados: Orígenes de la Nación Argentina (1800–1846), Buenos Aires, 1987, pp. 37–86. 10 T. Halperín Donghi, n. 6 supra. 11 ibid. 12 ibid. Also Socolow, The Merchants of Buenos Aires. 13 J. Ehrman, The Younger Pitt. The Years of Acclaim, London, 1969, p. 385. 14 C. Roberts, Las Invasiones Inglesas, Buenos Aires, 1938, p. 24. 15 ibid. 16 Dictionary of National Biography (hereafter DNB), London, 1908, vol. I, p. 504. 17 E. Barba, Don Pedro de Cevallos, Madrid, 1988, p. 77. 18 For details on the antecedents of Britain and the Falklands see J. Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands, 2nd edition, New Haven, 1982. 19 ibid. 20 ‘Extract for a proposal of an expedition to Spanish America, by India, dated 3 June 1780 – laid before the cabinet of Lord North and approved – by Col. Fullarton. 3 June 1780’, Public Records Office (hereafter PRO) War Office (hereafter WO) 1/178. 21 Colonel Fullarton to W. Pitt, 11 October 1787, PRO 30/8, 103/1. 22 DNB, vol. IX, p. 904; R. Terragno, ‘Las fuentes del plan libertador’, Todo es Historia, no. 231, August 1986. 23 J. Hippisley to W. Hastings, 11 August 1782, published in C.W. Vane, Marquess of Londonderry (Comp.), Lord Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence, 12 vols, London, 1948–53, vol. VII, p. 267. Hereafter, Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence. 24 Viscount Hood to Lord Hawkesbury, 11 December 1787, British Library (hereafter BL), Additional Manuscripts (hereafter Add. Mss.) 38222. 25 George III to W. Pitt, 3 July 1786, PRO 30/8, 103/1. 26 J. Lynch, ‘British Policy and Latin America, 1783–1808’, Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, 1969. p. 10. 27 C. Hobhouse, Fox, London, 1938, p. 168. 28 J. Ehrmann, The Younger Pitt, p. 66; F. O’Gorman, The Long Eighteenth Century. British Political & Social History 1688–1832, London, 1997, p. 218; D.D. Raphael, Adam Smith, Oxford, 1987, p. 27; P. O’Brien, ‘Public Finance in the Wars with France’, published in H.T. Dickinson (ed.), Britain and the French Revolution. 1789–1815, London, 1989, pp. 165–87 29 J. Ehrman, The Younger Pitt, p. 562. 30 ibid., p. 571.

Notes 167 31 P. Jupp, Lord Grenville, 1759–1834, Oxford, 1985, p. 176. 32 J. Lynch, ‘British Policy’, p. 12. 33 ‘Secret Memorandum. Proposal for an expedition against Spanish America by the Pacific Ocean. H. Dundas, September 1796’, Scottish Record Office (hereafter SRO) GO 51/1/520. 34 P. Jupp, Lord Grenville, p. 240. 35 W. Husskisson to H. Dundas, 30 October 1796, BL, Add. Mss. 38734. 36 Earl Spencer to H. Dundas, 2 March 1797, PRO, WO 1/178. 37 Thomas Picton to H. Dundas, 17 December 1797, PRO, WO 1/193. 38 W.S. Robertson, The life of Miranda, 2 vols., Chapel Hill, 1929, vol 1, pp. 142–160. 39 ibid., vol. 1, p. 166. 40 ‘On the liberation of South America from the dominion of Spain’, by Sir Ralph Abercromby. Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence, vol. VII, p. 269. 41 ‘Memorandum for consideration of the Cabinet. 30 October 1799’, Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence, vol VII, p. 285. 42 ibid.,p. 284. 43 P. Jupp, Lord Grenville,p. 241. 44 P. Mackesy, ‘Strategic problems on the British war effort’, in H.J. Dickinson(ed. ), Britain and the French Revolution, p. 161. 45 Sir Henry Dundas to W. Pitt, 31 March 1800, PRO, WO1/193. 46 ibid. 47 Note in P. Jupp, Lord Grenville, p. 248. 48 C. Roberts, Las invasiones Inglesas, p. 23. 49 J. Street, Gran Bretaña , Buenos Aires, 1967, p. 23. 50 W.S. Robertson, Life of Miranda, vol I., p. 118. 51 J. Lynch, ‘British policy. ‘ p. 12. 52 H. Popham to W. Husskisson, 19 February 1801, BL, Add. Mss. 38736. 53 Castlereagh Memoirs and Correspondence, vol VII, p. 286. 54 ‘Secret. Popham to Yorke. 26 November 1803’, Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence, vol VII, p. 288. 55 P. Jupp, Lord Grenville, pp. 324–344. 56 W.S. Robertson, Life of Miranda, vol I, p. 278. 57 Annonymous, ‘Miranda and the British Admiralty’, American Historical Review, VI, 1901. p. 514. 58 D. N. B., Vol X, p. 559. 59 ‘Plans for occupying Spanish America with observations on the character and views of its inhabitans’, W. Jacob, 26 October 1804. PRO 30/8 345. 60 ibid. 61 W. Jacob to W. Pitt, 26 November 1804, PRO 30/8 133/1. 62 ibid. 63 Jacob to Pitt, 26 November 1804, PRO 30/8 148/1. 64 Captain Charles Herbert to Melville, February 1805, Archivo General de la Nación (Hereafter AGN), 2–5–4. 65 W.W. Kauffmann, British Policy, p. 12. 66 J. Rydjord, Foreign Interest, p. 239; D. N. B., vol VI, p. 189; P. Jupp, Grenville, p. 338. 67 J. Lynch, ‘British policy’, p. 17.

168 Notes

2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

33 34 35

The British Invasions of the River Plate Sir D. Baird to General W. Beresford, 12 April 1806, PRO, WO 1/161. Baird to Castlereagh, 14 April 1806, PRO, WO 1/161. Popham to Castlereagh, 30 April 1806, PRO, WO 1/161. H.S. Ferns. Great Britain and Argentina, p. 22. DNB, vol. XIV, pp. 143–6. Sir Home Popham to William Huskisson, 19 February 1801, BL, Add. Mss. 38736. Popham to Huskisson, 19 February 1801, BL, Add. Mss. 38736. Lord Melville to A. Davison, 15 July 1806, Scottish National Library. MS 3393. A Full and Correct Report on the Trial of Sir Home Popham, London, 1807, p. 92. ibid., pp. 94–5. The Morning Chronicle, 22 July 1806. T. Waine to Popham, 28 March 1806, PRO, WO 1/161. Popham to Admiralty, 9 March 1806, PRO, Adm. 1/58. J.W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, London, 1899–1930, 13 vols, vol. V, p. 315. Beresford to Castlereagh, 11 July 1806, PRO, WO 1/161. ibid. Popham to W. Marsden, 25 August 1806. In Trial to Sir Home Popham, appendix. ibid. For a more detailed account of the actions which occurred during the invasions see W. Fortescue, British Army, vol. V, pp. 310–18, 368–436; H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina; Carlos Roberts, Las Invasiones Inglesas, and I. Fletcher, The Waters of Oblivion. The British Invasion of the Rio de la Plata, Tunbridge Wells, 1991. H. Fortescue, British Army, vol. V, p. 371. H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, p. 22. Trial of Sir Home Popham, London, 1807, p. 92. W. Windham to General Crauford, 30 October 1806, BL, Add. Mss. 37884. ibid. S. Auchmuty to Windham, 6 March 1807, PRO, WO 1/161. W. Fortescue, British Army, vol. V, p. 386. ibid., p. 389. Whitelocke to Windham, 20 June 1807, PRO, WO 1/161. W. Fortescue, The British Army, vol. V, p. 386. The Morning Chronicle, 14 September 1807. Miranda to Cochrane, 4 June 1807, PRO, WO 1/1113. Blanchard and Ramsay, The Trial at Large of Lieut-Gen. Whitelocke, Late Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in South America, by General Court Martial, Held at Chelsea Hospital, on Thursday January 28th, 1808, London, 1808, pp. 689–90. ibid., p. 694. Beresford to Castlereagh, 23 January 1808, PRO, WO 1/354. The Morning Chronicle, 30 September 1806.

Notes 169

3

The Ministry of All the Talents and the River Plate

1 P. Jupp, Grenville, p. 370. 2 C. Hobhouse, Fox, London, p. 264. The latest and most exhaustive work on Fox, is Leslie Mitchell’s Charles James Fox, Oxford, 1992. 3 G.M. Trevelyan, Lord Grey of the Reform Bill, London, 1920, p. 142. 4 P. Jupp, Grenville, p. 370. 5 C. Hobhouse, Fox. p. 58. 6 V. Chancellor, ‘The Ministry of All the Talents. January 1806–March 1807, a Political Study’, unpublished D.Phil thesis, University of Oxford, 1978, introduction, p. 3. 7 Carlos Roberts, Las Invasiones Inglesas , p. 181. 8 W.B. Taylor, ‘The Foxite Party and Foreign Politics’, unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of London, 1974, p. 186. 9 V. Chancellor, ‘The Ministry of All the Talents’, p. 92. 10 The Morning Chronicle, 25 October 1806. 11 V. Chancellor, ‘The Ministry of All the Talents’, p. 99. 12 J. Lynch, ‘British Policy’, p. 19. 13 A. Aspinall, The Later Correspondence of George III, 1783–1810, Cambridge, 5 vols, 1962–70, vol. IV, p. 458. 14 ibid., pp. 469–70. 15 The Times, 16 September 1806. 16 The Times, 20 September 1806. 17 W.S. Robertson, The Life of Miranda, vol. I, p. 278. 18 Historical Manuscripts Commission, Manuscripts of J.B. Fortescue, Preserved at Dropmore, London, 1892–1927, 10 vols, vol. VIII, pp. 352–3. Referred to as Dropmore Papers hereafter. 19 DNB, vol. V, pp. 350–1. 20 Thomas Douglas, Earl of Selkirk to Sir J. Hippisley, 22 March 1806, BL, Add. Mss. 37849. 21 Selkirk to Windham, 7 June 1806, BL, Add. Mss. 37884. 22 Jacob to Fox, 26 February 1806, BL, Add. Mss. 51468. 23 John Lynch, ‘British Policy’, p. 20. 24 Vansittart to Fox, 5 February 1806, BL, Add. Mss. 51468. 25 W.S. Robertson, The Life of Miranda, vol. 1, p. 260. 26 Gen. Sullivan to Grenville, 19 April 1806, BL, Add. Mss. 59079. 27 Sir P. Francis to Grenville, 19 February 1807, BL, Add. Mss. 59079. 28 W.B. Taylor, ‘The Foxite party’, p. 86. 29 Grenville to the Earl of Lauderdale, date unknown. Dropmore Papers, vol. VIII, pp. 419–20. 30 Grenville to Lauderdale, 14 September 1806, ibid., vol. VIII, p. 358. 31 Wellesley to Grenville, September 1806, ibid., vol. VIII, pp. 433–4. 32 Windham to Grenville, 22 September 1806, ibid., vol. VIII, p. 436. 33 The Times, 2 October 1806. 34 Windham speech in the House of Commons on 21 January 1807, in T.C. Hansard, The Parliamtary Debates, London, 1812, vol. VIII, cols 492–3. 35 Fortescue, British Army, vol. V, p. 319. 36 C. Roberts, Las Invasiones Inglesas, p. 186. Fortescue, British Army, vol. V, p. 319.

170 Notes 37 Windham to Crauford, 30 October 1806, BL, Add. Mss. 37884. 38 A.D. Harvey, ‘The Ministry of all the Talents: The Whigs in Office, February 1806 to March 1807’, Historical Journal, 1972, no. 15, p. 636. 39 Jacob to Windham, 24 September 1806. BL, Add. Mss. 37884. promote economic progress in the River Plate region. It was apparently Castelli’s faction which sent Mariano Castilla to London with the object of securing British support and assistance for the independence of the River Plate Viceroyalty.72 40 V. Chancellor, ‘The Ministry of all the Talents’, p. 214. 41 W.B. Taylor, ‘The Foxite Party’, p. 108. 42 DNB, Vol. XXI, p. 644. 43 A.D. Harvey, ‘The Ministry of All the Talents’, p. 627. 44 Ibid., p. 633. 45 Holland to Grenville, 7 December 1806, Dropmore Papers, vol. VIII, p. 460. 46 Parliamentary Debates, vol. IX, cols 73–74. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid., vol. IX, cols 74–5. 49 BL Add.Mss. 5191. V. Chancellor, ‘The Ministry of All the Talents’, p. 215; E.A. Smith, Lord Grey 1764–1845, Oxford, 1990, p. 118. 50 Sir Home Popham to William Marsden, 25 August 1806, in Correct Report of Trial to Sir Home Popham, Appendix. 51 Lord Stavordale (ed.), Further Memoirs of the Whig Party, 1802–21 by Lord Holland, London, 1905, p. 114. 52 V. Chancellor, ‘The Ministry of All the Talents’, p. 215; E.A. Smith, Lord Grey, p. 169. 53 Lord Holland, Further Memoirs of the Whig Party, p. 116. 54 H. Baring (ed.), Diary of the Rt. Hon. William Windham, 1866, p. 467. 55 W. Fortescue, British Army, vol. V, pp. 435–6. 56 Lord Holland, Further Memoirs of the Whig Party, pp. 115–16. 57 Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence, vol. VII, p. 321. 58 The Morning Chronicle, 14 September 1807. 59 Duke of Northumberland to Colonel Macmahon, 30 September, 1807. In Correspondence of George Prince of Wales 1770–1812, ed. A. Aspinall, 1938, 7 vols, vol. VI, pp. 211–12. 60 Auckland to Grenville, 23 September 1807, Dropmore Papers, vol. X. p. 138. 61 W.W. Kaufmann, British Policy, p. 32. 62 Temple to Auckland, 2 October 1807, BL, Add. Mss. 34457. 63 J. Rodríguez, ‘William Burke’ and Francisco Miranda. The Word and the Deed in Spanish America’s Emancipation, Landham, 1994. 64 W. Burke, Aditional reasons for our inmediately emancipating Spanish America, London, 1808, pp. 19–20. 65 L. Mitchell, Holland House, London, 1980, p. 40. 66 C. Roberts, Las Invasiones Inglesas, pp. 182, 186; J. Street, Gran Bretaña y la Independencia del Río de la Plata, Buenos Aires, 1967, pp. 44, 96. 67 John Lynch, ‘British Policy’, note on p. 21. 68 ibid., p. 21. 69 Beresford to Castlereagh, 23 January 1808, WO 1/354. 70 C. Roberts, Las Invasiones Inglesas, p. 42. 71 P. Groussac, Santiago de Liniers, Buenos Aires, 1907, pp. 3–12.

Notes 171 72 C. Roberts, Las Invasiones Inglesas, p. 42. 73 The letter to Castlereagh is dated 27 August 1807, WO 1/1117. His other correspondence is under PRO, WO 1/1111, 1/117 and 1/354. Further information about this mission can be found in C. Roberts, Las Invasiones Inglesas, p. 49. 74 C. Roberts, ibid., p. 42. 75 ibid., p. 49. 76 ibid., p. 49. 77 ibid., p. 118. ‘Notas de las invasiones inglesas recogidas por Florencio Varela de Don Bernardino Rivadavia’, Museo Mitre 3–2–1; Alberto M. Salas, Diario de Buenos Aires 1806–1807, Buenos Aires, 1981, p. 107; J.C. Chaves, Castelli, el Adalid de Mayo, Buenos Aires, 1943, p. 86. 78 J.C. Chaves, Castelli, p. 86. 79 Beresford to Castlereagh, 16 July 1806, PRO, WO 161/1. 80 C. Roberts, Las invasiones Inglesas, p. 123. 81 ‘Belgrano-Autobiografía’, published in Biblioteca de Mayo, Buenos Aires, 1960, p. 9. 82 Manuel Moreno, ‘Memorias de Mariano Moreno’, published in Biblioteca de Mayo, Buenos Aires, 1960, p. 51 83 W. Gillespie, Gleanings and Remarks Collected During Many Months Residence in Buenos Ayres and the Upper Country, Leeds 1818, p. 298. 84 H.V. Livermore, ‘Captain Gillespie and the 58 Anglophiles of Buenos Aires in 1806’, Hispanic American Historic Review, 1981, pp. 69–78. 85 ibid., p. 78. 86 J.C. Chaves, Castelli, p. 84. 87 C. Roberts, Las invasiones Inglesas, p. 123. 88 Windham to Beresford, 21 September 1806, PRO, WO1/161. 89 E. Williams Alzaga, La Fuga del General Beresford, Buenos Aires, 1965, p. 262. 90 ibid., pp. 142–3. 91 ‘Notas de las invasiones inglesas recogidas por Florencio Varela de Bernardino Rivadavia’ Museo Mitre 3–2–1. 92 Auchmuty to Windham, 6 March 1807. PRO, WO 1/162. 93 General Campbell to Auchmuty, 20 March 1807, PRO, WO 1/161. 94 Captain Gillespie, Gleanings and remarks, p. 299. 95 Whitelocke to Windham, 20 June 1807, PRO, WO 1/162. 96 E. Wiliams Alzaga, Fuga del General Beresford, pp. 230–1. 97 General Leveson Gower to Windham, 9 July 1807, PRO, WO 1/162. 98 Whitelocke to Castlereagh, 10 September 1807, PRO, WO 1/162.

4

Stangford, Independence and the London Missions

1 J. Street, ‘Lord Strangford and Río de La Plata’, Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. XXXIII, no. 4, November 1953, p. 477. 2 P. Jupp, Lord Grenville, pp. 421–3; G.M. Trevelyan, Lord Grey, pp. 160–2. 3 Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence, vol. VII, p. 321. J. Street, Gran Bretaña, p. 97; P. Mackesy, ‘Strategic Problems’, p. 163. 4 Castlereagh, Memoirs and Correspondence, vol. VII, p. 98. 5 J. Street, Gran Bretaña, note p. 89.

172 Notes 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

ibid. note p. 99. Castlereagh to Major James Burke, 4 August 1808, PRO, FO, 72/91. DNB, vol. XVIII, pp. 571–4. ibid., pp. 603–4. ibid. J. Street, ‘Lord Strangford’, p. 481. Castlereagh to Smith, 4 August 1808, PRO, FO 72/91. J. Street, ‘Lord Strangford’, p. 482. Smith to Liniers, 18 March 1808, AGN, Sala 7, 17–6–2. ibid. C. Roberts, Las Invasiones Inglesas, p. 336. ibid., p. 329. ibid., p. 328. J. Street, Gran Bretaña, p. 121. R.A. Humphreys, Liberation in South America 1806–1827. The Career of James Paroissien, London, 1952, p. 26. ibid., pp. 28–9. J. Street, Gran Bretaña, pp. 122–3. ibid., pp. 122–4. J. Street, ‘Lord Strangford’, p. 214. W.W. Kauffmann, British Policy, p. 39. For this particular subject the recent book by J.E. Rodríguez, The Independence of Spanish America, Cambridge, 1998, particularly Chapter 2, is most useful. T. Halperín Donghi, Revolución y Guerra, pp. 169–74. ibid. J. Street, Gran Bretaña, pp. 169–70. ibid., p. 170. ibid., p. 172. M. Irigoyen to C. Saavedra, September 1810. AGN, Misiones Diplomáticas, Buenos Aires, 1937, pp. 32–3. ibid. J. Street, Gran Bretaña, p. 173. The most interesting books on Spanish policy towards their former colonies in America are; M. Costeloe, Response to Revolution. Imperial Spain and the Spanish American Revolutions 1810–1840, Cambridge, 1986; and also B. Hamnett, La Política Española en una Epoca Revolucionaria, México, 1985. ibid., p. 176. E. Fitte, El Precio de la Libertad, Buenos Aires, 1965, p. 181. ibid., p. 216. J. Street, Gran Bretaña, pp. 179–94. Strangford to Wellesley, 28 September 1810. AGN Sala 7, 2–5–4. ibid. Street, Gran Bretaña, p. 197. ibid., p. 199. ibid. Moreno to Saavedra, 21 August 1811. AGN, Misiones Diplomaticas, pp. 218–19. L. Mitchell, Holland House, p. 229.

Notes 173 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67

68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77

78 79

T. Halperín Donghi, Revolución y Guerra, pp. 179–86. J. Street, Gran Bretaña, p. 209. C. Roberts, Las Invasiones Inglesas, p. 40. W.W. Kaufmann, British Policy, p. 66. J. Street, Gran Bretaña, p. 202. ibid., p. 199. See also, M. Murphy, Blanco White. Self Banished Spaniard, New Haven, 1989. W.W. Kaufmann, British Policy, p. 69. M. Moreno to Saavedra, 19 February 1812. AGN, Misiones Diplomáticas, pp. 258–9. J. Street, Gran Bretaña, p. 206. ibid., p. 205. ibid., p. 209. Castlereagh to Strangford, 13 July 1812. C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, 2 vols, Oxford, 1937, vol. 1, p. 83. J. Street, Gran Bretaña, p. 216. W.S. Robertson, Life of Miranda, vol. I, p. 199. T. Halperín Donghi, Revolución y Guerra, pp. 239–42. J. Street, Gran Bretaña, p. 229. T. Halperín Donghi, n. 59 Supra, pp. 242–4. ibid. ibid., p. 229. Staples to Hamilton, 18 November 1813. AGN, Sala 7 17–6–2. Strangford to Castlereagh, 18 December 1813, in C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, vol. I, pp. 85–6. J. Street, Gran Bretaña, p. 237. Strangford to Castlereagh, 20 April 1814, in C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, vol. I, p. 91. T. Halperín Donghi, Historia Argentina. De la Revolución de Independencia a la Confederación Rosista, Buenos Aires, 1993 4rta, reimpresión, p. 96; J. Street, Gran Bretaña, p. 239. T. Halperín Donghi, Historia Argentina, p. 76; J. Street, Gran Bretaña, p. 242. J. Street, ibid. ibid., pp. 243–4. T. Halperín Donghi, Historia Argentina, pp. 96–7; R. Piccirilli, Rivadavia y su Tiempo, 2 vols, Buenos Aires, 1943, p. 262. T. Halperín Donghi, n. 71 Supra. B. Mitre, Historia de Belgrano, Buenos Aires, 1887, 4 vols, vol. III, pp. 264–342. Strangford to Castlereagh, 30 November 1814. C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, vol. I, p. 93. J. Street, Gran Bretaña, p. 246. T. Davis, Carlos de Alvear. Man of Revolution, New Haven, 1955, p. 60. Rivadavia to Alvear, 28 February 1815, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Comisión de Bernardino Rivadavia (1814–1820), Buenos Aires, 1933–36, p. 116. J. Street, Gran Bretaña, p. 249. B. Mitre, Historia de Belgrano, vol. VII, p. 347. In one of the most dramatic passages of this letter Alvear exclaimed: ‘Estas Provincias desean pertenecer

174 Notes

80 81

82 83 84 85 86

5 1 2 3 4

5 6 7 8 9 10 11

12 13 14

15 16

á la Gran Bretaña, obedecer su gobierno, y vivir bajo su influjo poderoso. Ellas se abandonan sin condición alguna á la generosidad y buena fe del pueblo Inglés, y yo estoy resuelto á sostener tan justa solicitud para librarla de los males que la afligen.’ ibid. ibid. ibid. pp. 348–9. A curious anecdote surrounds the story of this letter. García handed it to Rivadavia, who also feared what it contained and the consequences it might produce. He therefore decided not to open it and kept it closed until 1842. While in exile in Rio de Janeiro, he came across it when he was clasifying his personal papers. T. Halperín Donghi, Historia Argentina, p. 97. R. Pichirilli, Rivadavia y su tiempo, vol. I, p. 267. T. Halperín Donghi, Revolución y Guerra, p. 366; J. Street, Gran Bretaña p. 256. R. Piccirilli, Rivadavia y su Tiempo, vol. I, pp. 268–9. Mitre, Historia de Belgrano, vol. III, p. 349. H. Chamberlain to Castlereagh, 10 February 1816, in C. Webster, Great Britain and the Independence of Latin America, p. 99

Rivadavia and the British Attitude towards Recognition J. Lynch, Spanish American Revolutions, 2nd edition, London, 1986, p. 209. Kauffmann, British Policy, pp. 81–93 ibid. H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, p. 90; M. Belgrano, ‘La política extranjera en los Estados de Europa (1813–1816)’; in Academia Nacional de la Historia; Historia de la Nación Argentina, vol. VI, pp. 577–611. H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, p. 90. J. Lynch, Spanish American Revolutions, p. 66; H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, p. 73. P. Ferré, Memorias, Buenos Aires, 1921, p. 21; H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, p. 74. H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, p. 84; F.Crouzet, ‘The Impact of the French Wars on the British Economy’, in Britain and the French, p. 192. Ferns; n. 8 Supra. J.P. and W.P. Robertson, Letters on South America: Comprising Travels on the Banks of the Parana and the Río de la Plata, 3 vols, London, 1843. J. Lynch, Spanish American Revolutions, p. 68; T. Halperín Donghi, Revolución y Guerra, p. 249. On the much debated topic regarding the origins of the formation of a true Argentine identity see J.C. Chiaramonte, Ciudades, Provincias, Estados, Particularly pp. 111–77. T. Halperín Donghi, Revolución y Guerra, p. 269. The Times, 18 December 1817. For more information on the Venezuelan diplomatic mission in London at this time, see P. Grases, Tiempo de Bello en Londres y Otros Ensayos, Caracas, 1962. R. Piccirilli, Rivadavia y su Tiempo, vol. I, p. 271. ibid.

Notes 175 17 W.S. Robertson, France and Latin American Independence, Baltimore, 1939, p. 158. 18 Rivadavia to Pueyrredón, 18 December 1816, published in Comisión de Bernardino Rivadavia ante España y Otras Potencias de Europa (1814–1820), Buenos Aires, 1933–36, p. 178. 19 Chamberlain to Castlereagh, 17 February 1817, In C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, vol. I pp. 101–2. 20 B. Mitre, Historia de Belgrano, vol. III, p. 66. 21 ibid. 22 Rivadavia to Pueyrredón, 22 March 1817 Museo Mitre 7–10–6; also in Comisión de Bernardino Rivadavia, p. 178. 23 Rivadavia to Pueyrredón, n. 22 Supra. 24 ibid. 25 J. Lynch,’Great Britain and Spanish American Independence 1810–1830’, in J. Lynch (Ed.), Andrés Bello. The London Years, London, 1982; pp. 15–16. 26 For more references on this subject, see B.M. Fontana, Rethinking the Politics of Commercial Society. The Edinburgh Review,1802–1832, Cambridge, 1985; and R. Stewart, Henry Brougham. His Public Career 1778–1868, London, 1986. 27 P. Grases, Tiempo de Bello, pp. 43–60; M. Murphy, Blanco White, p. 98. An exhaustive analysis of the contacts between South American emmisaries and these London circles can be found in M.T. Berruezo León, La Lucha de Hispanoamérica por su Independencia en Inglaterra, Madrid, 1989. 28 W. W. Kauffmann, British Policy, p. 78. 29 ibid., p. 93; also, M. Belgrano, ‘La Santa Alianza. las evidencias al exterior’, in A.N. de la Historia, Historia Argentina, vol. VI. pp. 949–1001. 30 C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, vol. I, p. 14. 31 D.A.G. Waddel, ‘International Politics and Latin American Independence’, in L. Bethell(Ed.), The Independence of Latin America, Cambridge, 1987, p. 205. 32 Chamberlain to Castlereagh, 14 July 1818, in C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, vol. I, p. 104. 33 San Martín to Castlereagh, 11 April 1818, in C. Webster, Britain and the Independence of Latin America, vol. I, p. 554. 34 M. Williford, Jeremy Bentham on Spanish America, Baton Rouge, 1980, p. 36. 35 For more details of Bentham’s relationship with Bolívar, see P. Schwartz and C. Rodríguez Braun, ‘Las Relaciones entre Jeremías Bentham y S. Bolívar’ in A. Filippi, Bolívar y Europa, vol. 1, Caracas, 1986. 36 Kauffmann, Britain Policy, p. 103. 37 For more information on the careers of these British legionaries see, A. Hasbrouck, Foreign Legionaries in the Liberation of Spanish America, New York, 1969. 38 D.A.G. Waddell, ‘Intrnational Politics and Latin America’, p. 207. 39 H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, p. 91. 40 ibid., p. 91. 41 ibid., p. 93. 42 Rivadavia to Pueyrredón, 28 November 1818, AGN Sección 1, 2–1–6. 43 R. Piccirilli, Rivadavia y su tiempo, vol. I, p. 276.

176 Notes 44 M. Williford, Jeremy Bentham on Spanish America, Baton Rogue, 1980, p. 20. 45 ibid., p. 14. The articles written by Mill and Miranda were: ‘Emancipation of Spanish America’ which appeared in January 1809, and ‘Molina’s account of Chile’, which appeared in July 1809, both in the The Edinburgh Review. For full details of these publications see J. Rodríguez, ‘William Burke’ and Francisco Miranda, Chapter 6. 46 M. Williford, Bentham on Spanish America, p. 12. 47 J. Dinwiddy, ‘Liberal and Benthamite Circles in London 1810–1829’, in J. Lynch (ed.), Andrés Bello. The London Years, p. 134. 48 ibid., p. 34. 49 R. Piccirilli, Rivadavia y su tiempo, p. 284. 50 M. Belgrano, La Francia y la Monarquía en el Plata, Buenos Aires, 1933, p. 66. 51 W.S. Robertson, France and Latin American Independence, Baltimore, 1939, p. 17. 52 ibid., pp. 36–47. 53 W.S. Robetson, France and Latin American, pp. 157–76; M. Belgrano, La Francia, p. 69. 54 The Times, 3 July 1820. 55 W.S. Robertson, France and Latin America, p. 174; C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, vol I, p. 16; and W.W. Kauffmann, British Policy, p. 125. 56 T. Halperín Donghi, Revolución y Guerra, p. 352. 57 ibid. Also useful for this period is R. Levene, La Anarquía del Año 20, Buenos Aires, 1954. 58 T. Halperín Donghi, n. 56 Supra, p. 364. 59 W.W. Kauffmann, British Policy, p. 126. J. Derry, Castlereagh, London, 1976, p. 226. 60 J. Lynch, Spanish American Revolutions, p. 76. 61 For the Rioplatense foreign policy in this period see M. Belgrano, ‘La política exterior de Martín Rodríguez, el resurgimiento de la independencia’, Academia Nacional, Historia Argentina; vol. VI, pp. 521–569. 62 For the reforms inspired by Rivadavia in the 1820s, see: R. Piccirilli, Rivadavia y su Tiempo; D. Bushnell, Reform and Reaction in the Platine Provinces, Gainsville, 1983, pp. 20–9; M. Williford, Bentham on Spanish America, p. 39; L.A. Romero, La Felíz Experiencia 1820–1824, Buenos Aires, 1976, pp. 191–211; S. Bagú, El Plan Económico del Grupo Rivadaviano, Buenos Aires, 1966; M. Ternavasio, ‘Nueva Régimen Representativo y Expansión de la Frontera Política. Las Elecciones en el Estado de Buenos Aires: 1820–1840, in A. Annino (ed.), Historia de la Elecciones en Iberoamérica, Siglo XIX, Mexico, 1995; J.C. Chiaramonte, Ciudades, Provincias, Estados; J. Myers, ‘La Cultura Literaria del Período Rivadaviano: Saber Ilustrado y Discurso Republicano’, in F. Aliata y L. Munilla Lacasa, Carlo Zucchi y el Neoclasicismo en el Río de la Plata, Buenos Aires, 1998. 63 J. Dinwiddy, Bentham, Oxford, 1989, pp. 16–17. Also, R. Stewart, Henry Brougham, pp. 88–9; and T.A. Jenkins, Sir Robert Peel, London, 1999, pp. 32–3. 64 The exact degree of Bentham’s influence over Rivadavia has recently been debated by J. Harris, ‘Bernardino Rivadavia and Benthamite Discipleship’, in Latin American Research Review, vol. 33, no. 1, 1998, pp. 137–58.

Notes 177 65 S. Bagú, El Plan Económico, pp. 15–110. 66 Anonymous, A Five Years Residence in Buenos Aires During the Years 1820 to 1825. By an Englishman, London, 1825; Argentine translation, Un Inglés. Cinco Años en Buenos Aires. 1820–1825, Buenos Aires, 1986, pp. 54–7. 67 J.A. Droz, Europe Between Revolutions 1815–1848, London, 1985, pp. 219–20. 68 J. Derry, Castlereagh, p. 199. 69 C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, vol. I, p. 16. 70 ibid., p. 16. 71 ibid., p. 16. 72 ibid., p. 16. 73 G.K. Clark, Peel and the Conservative Party, London 1969, p. 41. 74 C. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1815–1822, London, 1908. 75 J. Derry, Castlereagh, p. 218. 76 ibid., p. 128, from C.Webster The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, p. 436. 77 C. Petrie, Canning, p. 182. 79 C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, p. 104. 80 W.W. Kaufmann, British Policy, p. 139. 81 C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, p. 18. 82 ibid., p. 19. 83 D.A.G. Waddell, ‘International Politics’, p. 209. 84 W.W. Kaufmann, British Policy, p. 144.

6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Great Britain and the Recognition of the River Plate W.W. Kauffmann, British Policy, p. 148. J. Lynch, ‘Great Britain’, p. 17. ibid., p. 17. ibid., p. 17. Earl of Stanhope, Notes of Conversations with The Duke of Wellington, Oxford, 1888, p. 69. D.A.G. Waddell, ‘International Politics’, p. 211. Sir C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, Vol. I, p. 20. D.A.G.Waddell, ‘International Politics’, p. 212. W.W. Kauffmann, British Policy, p. 157. ibid.; H. Peterson, Argentina and the United States 1810–1960, New York, 1964, pp. 83–91. W.W. Kauffmann, n. 9 Supra. ibid. Un Inglés, Cinco Años, p. 61. H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, p. 114; W. Hinde, George Canning, London, 1973, p. 349. H.S. Ferns, Supra. ibid., p. 116. L.A. Romero, La Feliz Experiencia, p. 244. Parish to Canning, PRO, FO 6/4; also in R.A. Humphreys; British Consular reports, pp. 1–26. Parish to Canning, 27 April 1824, AGN Sala 7, 17–6–2. H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, p. 119.

178 Notes 21 Canning to Parish, 19 November 1824, PRO, FO 6/3; also in H. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, p. 117. 22 Parish to Canning, 12 April 1824, P.R.O., F. O. 6/3; also in Sir C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, vol. I, pp. 110–14. 23 T. Davis, Man of Revolution, p. 31. 24 ibid., pp. 23–26. 25 ibid. 26 ibid., p. 37. Parish to Canning, 25 April 1824, P.R.O. , F.O. 6/3; also published in Sir C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, vol. I, pp. 110–12. 27 T. Davis, Man of Revolution, pp. 33–4. 28 H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, p. 123. 29 Alvear to Rivadavia, 15 June 1824; published in G. Rodríguez, Contribución Histórica y Documental, Buenos Aires, 1921, pp. 14–17. 30 T. Davis, Man of Revolution, p. 36. 31 Alvear to Rivadavia, 29 June 1824, in G. Rodríguez, Contribución Histórica, pp. 32–33. 32 T. Davis, Man of Revolution, p. 37. 33 F. G. Dawson, The First Latin American Debt Crisis. The City of London and the 1822–25 Loan Bubble, New Haven, 1990, pp. 79–80. 34 T. Davis, Man of Revolution, pp. 37–8. 35 ibid., pp. 39–42; G. Rodríguez, Contribución Histórica, pp. 44–9. 36 ibid. 37 ibid. 38 ibid. 39 A. Mitchell, Whigs in Opposition 1815–1830, Oxford, 1967, pp. 175–6. 40 F.G. Dawson, Latin American Debt Crisis, p. 76. 41 P. O’Leary, Sir James Mackintosh. The Whig Cicero, Aberdeen, 1989, p. 159. 42 ibid., p. 158. 43 The Times, 29 June 1824. 44 A. Mitchell, Whigs in Opposition, p. 176. 45 W.W. Kauffmann, British Policy, p. 214; W. Hinde, Canning, p. 349. 46 W.W. Kauffmann, Supra, pp. 176–8. 47 ibid., p. 174. 48 F.G. Dawson, Latin American Debt Crisis, p. 77. 49 Canning to Parish, 23 August 1824, PRO, FO 6/2; also in C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, vol. I, pp. 114–16, and in H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, p. 124. 50 ibid. 51 ibid. 52 J. Lynch, Spanish American Revolutions, p. 77. 53 Parish to Canning, 20 June 1824, AGN, Sección 7, 17–6–2. 54 ibid. 55 Canning to Parish, 29 September 1824, AGN, Sección 7, 17–6–2. 56 H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, pp. 134–7. Also on this subject, the very critical reports of an English traveller specially commisioned to give more information about this project are most revealing; F.B. Head, Reports Relating to the Failure of the Río de la Plata Mining Association, London, 1827.

Notes 179 57 ibid., pp. 138–9; L.A. Romero, La Felíz Experiencia, p. 251; S. Bagú, El Plan Económico; and, on the subject of immigration, the extremely critical account of this whole enterprise written by the British agent who was responsible for this enterprise along with Rivadavia: J.A.B. Beaumont, Travels in Buenos Aires and the Adjacent Provinces of the Río de La Plata, London, 1828. 58 H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, pp. 141–7; F. Griffith Dawson, Latin American Debt Crisis, pp. 77–80; S. Amaral, ‘El Empréstito de Londres de 1824’, in Desarrollo Ecinómico, vol. 23, no. 92, Enero-Marzo, 1984; E. Fitte, Historia de un Empréstito: La Emisión de Baring Brothers en 1824, Buenos Aires, 1962. 59 G. Canning to W. Parish, 26 September 1824, AGN, Sección 7. 60 Sir C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, vol. I, p. 23. 61 W.W. Kauffmann, British Policy, p. 176; W. Hinde, Canning, pp. 357–8; Annonymous, Un Inglés, p. 45. 62 Sir C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, vol. I, p. 23. 63 ibid., H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, p. 125. 64 ibid. 65 ibid., p. 127. 66 ibid., p. 126. 67 ibid. 68 ibid. 69 Parish to Canning, 24 October 1824, PRO, FO 6/5; Also in Sir C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, vol. I, pp. 116–19. The most exhaustive work on this congress is still E. Ravignani, ‘El Congreso Nacional de 1824–1827. La Convención Nacional de 1828–1829. Investigación y régimen de Pactos’. Academia Nacional de la Historia, Historia de la Nación Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1949, vol. VII, pp. 10–129. 70 Parish to Canning, Supra. 71 Canning to Parish, 26 December 1824, PRO, FO 6/5; also in Sir C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, vol. I, p. 119. 72 An Englishman, A Five Years Residence, p. 162. 73 W.W. Kauffmann, British Policy, pp. 176–9. 74 J. Lynch, ‘Great Britain’, p. 19. 75 W.W. Kauffmann, British Policy, p. 220; W. Hinde, Canning, pp. 372–4. 76 Canning to Parish, 24 May 1825, PR O, FO; 6/7; Also in Sir C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, vol. I, pp. 121–3. 77 H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina, p. 159. 78 Canning to Parish, 19 October 1825, PRO , FO 6/7, AGN, Seccion 7; also in C. Webster, Independence of Latin America, vol. I, pp. 130–4. 79 ibid. 80 G. Canning to L. Ponsonby, 28 February 1826, PRO, FO 6/12; also in Sir C. Webster, independence of Latin America, vol. I, pp. 138–9.

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Articles Anonymous, ‘Miranda and the British Admiralty’, American Historical Review, VI, 1901. M. Belgrano, ‘La Santa Alianza. Los Enviados al Exterior,’; ‘La Política Externa de los Estados de Europa (1813–1816)’; ‘La Política Exterior de Martín Rodríguez. El Resurgimiento de la Independencia’; all in Academia Nacional de la Historia, op. cit. vol. VI. F. Crouzet, ‘The Impact of the French Wars on the British Economy’, in H.T. Dickinson (ed.), Britain and the French Revolution, op.cit. J. Dinwiddy, ‘Liberal and Benthamite circles in London, 1810–29’, in J. Lynch (ed.), Andrés Bello, op. cit. K. Gallo, ‘El Ministerio de los Talentos y las Invasiones al Plata‘, Todo es Historia, 1991. J. Harris, ‘Bernardino Rivadavia and Benthamite Discipleship’, Latin American Research Review, vol. 33, no. 1, 1998. A.D. Harvey, ‘The Ministry of All the Talents: The Whigs in Office, February, 1806–March 1807’, Historical Journal, 1972.

186 Bibliography H.V. Livermore, ‘Captain Gillespie and the 58 Anglophiles of Buenos Aires in 1806’, Hispanic American Historical Review, 1981. J. Lynch, ‘British Policy and the Independence of Latin America’, Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1–30. 1969; ‘The Origins of Spanish American independence’, in L. Bethell (ed.), The Independence, op. cit.; ‘Great Britain and Spanish American Independence’, in J. Lynch (ed.), Andrés Bello, op. cit. P. Mackesy, ‘Strategic Problems on the British War Effort’, in H.T. Dickinson (ed.), Britain and the French Revolution, op. cit. J. Myers, ‘La Cultura Literaria del Período Rivadaviano: Saber Ilustrado y Discurso Republicano’, Published in F. Aliata y L. Munilla, Carlo Zucchi, op. cit. P. O’Brien, ‘Public Finance in the Wars with France’, in H.T. Dickinson (ed.), Britain and the French Revolution, op. cit. E. Ravignani, ‘El Congreso Nacional de 1824–1827. La Covención Nacional de 1828–1829. Investigación y Régimen de Pactos’, in Academia Nacional de la Historia, op. cit., vol. VII. P. Schwartz and C. Rodríguez Braun, ‘Las Relaciones de Jeremías Bentham y S. Bolívar’, in A. Fillippi, Bolívar y Europa, op. cit. J. Street. ‘Lord Strangford and the Rio de la Plata’, Hispanic American Historical Journal. no. 4 , November 1953. M. Ternavasio, ‘Nuevo Régimen Representativo y Expansión de la Frontera Política, Las Elecciones del Estado de Buenos Aires: 1820–1840’, in A. Annino (ed.), Historia de las Elecciones, op. cit. R. Terragno, ‘Los Orígenes del Plan Libertador’, Todo es Historia, 1986. D.A.G. Waddell, ‘International Politics and the Independence of Latin America’, Published in L. Bethell (ed.), The Independence, op. cit. J. Williams, ‘The Establishment of British Commerce in Argentina’, Hispanic American Historical Review,1944.

Index Abercromby, Ralph, 23, 24, 35 Adams, John Quincy, 140 Addington, Henry, Viscount Sidmouth, 26, 28, 47, 51, 52, 59, 63, 65, 66, 103 Addingtonians, 51, 52 Admiralty Office, 34, 36, 37, 54, 55, 59 Aguirre, José Agustín, 96 Aix-La-Chapelle, 124, 129 Alcalde Mayor, 76 Alexander I, Tsar, 31, 122, 129 Alvarez Jonte, Antonio, 105, 126 Alvear, Carlos María General, 86, 105, 108, 110–12, 118, 132, 144–9, 151 Alvear, Diego de, 110 Alzaga, Martín de, 13, 14, 73, 76, 79, 84, 92, 95 American War of Independence, 17 Amiens, Peace of, 26, 51 Anchorena, Manuel de, 13 Anglo-American relations, 139 Anglo-Argentine Treaty, 147 Anson, Admiral George, 15 Antwerp, 35 Archivo General de la Nación, 73 Argentina, 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 44, 49, 73, 98, 126, 159, 164 Arribeños, 76 Artigas, José Gervasio, 100, 108, 111, 116, 130 Asia, 29 Asunción del Paraguay, 9, 10 Atlantic Ocean, 10, 61, 67 Auchmuty, Samuel, 40, 43–5, 49, 61, 62, 79, 80 Auckland, William Eden, 1st Baron, 56, 69 Audiencia, 10, 77

Austerlitz, 32, 37, 51, 53 Austria, 22, 25, 32, 115, 122, 123, 126, 133, 137 Ayacucho, 157 Baird, General David, 33, 34, 40, 53, 55 Bank of Buenos Aires, 147 Bath, 141 Bathurst, Henry 3rd Earl, 103 Bayona, 89, 93, 128 Belgium, 20, 22, 87, 127 Belgrano, Manuel, 13, 73, 75, 76, 92, 93, 95, 105, 108–12, 118, 119, 130, 132 Bello, Andrés, 95, 105, 118, 122 Bengal, 16, 17 Bentham, Jeremy, 124, 126, 127, 132 Beresford, General William Carr, 33, 38–44, 46, 48, 49, 55, 61, 62, 67, 72, 75, 77–9, 88, 91 Berlin Decrees, 62 Birmingham, 145 Blanco White, José María, 102, 122 Board of Trade, 56 Bolívar, Simón, 95, 118, 123–5, 127, 147, 157 Bolivia, 11 Bonaparte, Joseph, 85 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 4, 6, 22, 23, 28, 32, 37, 53, 62, 85–8, 90, 92, 112, 115, 116, 128, 150 Bourbons, 10–12, 116, 118, 133 Brazil, 5, 85, 89, 97, 102, 103, 105–7, 111, 142, 147, 159, 160, 161 Brissot, Jacques, 128 Britain–Argentine relations, 3, 7, 49, 94, 161, 164

187

188 Index

British Channel, 61 British commerce, 6, 11, 18, 19, 23, 25, 26, 28, 30, 47, 54, 56, 58, 59, 62, 87, 88, 94, 95, 98, 101, 116, 117, 122, 125, 132, 135–9, 143, 149, 155, 157, 161, 162, 164 British educational system, 164 British forces, 22, 28, 33, 38, 41–6, 49, 56, 57, 66, 75, 77, 78, 80, 82, 83, 85, 105, 124, 161 Brtitish immigration, 154, 164 British Library, 2 British merchants, 6, 11, 39, 56, 61, 65, 83, 92, 97, 99, 116, 117, 125, 132, 143, 144, 145, 148, 164 British Navy, 21, 32, 35, 36, 65, 125, 161 Brooke, Governor, 21 Brougham, Henry, 121, 131, 149, 158 Brown, Admiral William, 108 Buenos Aires, 1, 3, 5, 7, 9–14, 21–3, 27, 29, 30, 35, 36, 38, 41, 43, 44, 46, 53–6, 60–2, 64–70, 72–7, 79, 81, 82, 85, 89–92, 95–8, 100, 102, 103–6, 108, 110, 116–18, 120, 123, 125, 127, 129, 130, 133, 141–4, 147–9, 151–7, 159, 160, 162–4 Burke, Edmund, 19, 52, 63 Burke, James Colonel, 74, 88, 93 Burke, William (James Mill), 70 Bute, John Stuart, Lord, 15 Byron, Commodore John, 16 Byron, George Gordon, Lord, 16, 124 Cabarrus, Count, 116 Cabildo, 77, 94, 132 Cabot, Sebastian, 9 Cádiz, 73, 94, 95, 101, 159 Calcutta, 35 Cambridge, 35 Campbell, Archibald, 20 Canada, 58

Canning, George, 6, 61, 64, 68, 71, 86, 90, 93, 125, 134–42, 145–61, 163, 164 Cape of Good Hope, 27, 32, 33, 36, 37, 42, 53 Caracas, 21, 22, 32, 35, 47, 53, 59, 86, 95, 96, 98, 106 Carbonaris, 133 Carlota Joaquina, Infanta, 90–4, 109, 119, 161 Carlotino, 119 Carrera, José Antonio, 144 Castelli, Juan José, 73–5, 78, 82, 84, 92, 95 Castilla, Mariano, 73, 74, 87 Castlereagh, Robert Stewart, Viscount, 2nd Marquiss of Londonderry, 6, 34, 38, 40, 49, 61, 64, 68, 71–3, 79, 86–8, 90, 93, 102–4, 106, 107, 112, 116, 118, 121–5, 127, 129, 131, 133–5, 138, 141, 150, 153, 162, 163 Castro, Félix, 147 Catamarca, 10 Catholic Emancipation, 26, 52, 68 Caudillos, 130 Cepeda, 130 Cevallos, Pedro de, 11, 73, 110 Chacabuco, 123 Chamberlain, Henry, 118, 123 Chancellor, Valerie, 53 Charcas, 10, 11 Charles III, 4, 10, 17 Charles IV, 85, 112 Chathamite Whigs, 18 Chiclana, Manuel, 101 Chile, 10, 15, 16, 20, 21, 26, 30, 45, 59, 61, 120, 123, 126, 130, 134, 144, 162 China, 35 Chuquisaca, 14 Church of Buenos Aires, 77, 129 Cisneros, Baltasar de, 86, 93, 94 Cochrane, Admiral Alexander, 125 Cochrane, Admiral Lord Thomas, 47, 54, 125

Index 189

Colombia, 10, 134, 141, 157 Colonia de Sacramento, 11, 15, 46 Colonial Office, 70 Concepción del Bermejo, 10 Congress of Tucumán, 113, 115–17, 119, 123, 130 Congrees of Vienna, 115, 116, 118, 124, 125 Congress System, 7 Constituent Assembly, 105 Contucci, Felipe, 93 Córdoba, 10, 11, 31, 41, 76, 95, 117, 130 Cork, 87 Corrientes, 10, 12, 31, 116, 117 Crauford, Colonel Robert, 45, 62, 64, 70 Crompton, Thomas, 96 Cromwell, Oliver, 15 Cumana, 22 D’Osmond, Marquis, 127 Dalrymple, Colonel William, 20 Davison, Alexander, 27 De Courcy, Admiral, 91, 97 De Paula, Prince Francisco, 112, 118 De Pons, Francois, 128 De Pradt, Abbé Dominique, 126 De Tracy, Destutt, 126 Decazes, Elie, 127 Del Pino, Viceroy Joaquín, 109 Dessolle, Marquis Augustin, 127, 129 Díaz de Solís, Juan, 9 Director Supremo, 86, 108, 110–12, 117–20, 129–30, 144 Dublin, 89 Dumouriez, General Charles, 22, 23, 87, 101, 128 Dundas, Henry, Viscount Melville, 5, 20–2, 24–9, 31, 32, 34, 36, 38, 42, 47, 53, 57, 59, 63, 103, 161 Dutch War, 17 East India, 16, 23 East India Company, 16, 17, 19, 36 Ecuador, 10

Egypt, 23, 35 Ehrman, John, 20 El Español, 102 Elío, General Francisco, 100, 101 Ellenborough, Edward, 56 Elliott, Captain, 97 Emphyteusis system, 133, 154 England, 6, 11, 22, 26, 29, 30, 39, 41–4, 50, 61, 71, 75, 77, 79, 80, 86–9, 92–6, 98, 99, 103, 106, 109–12, 117–19, 121–3, 126, 128, 132, 134, 137, 138, 141–3, 145, 146, 148–50, 152–5, 159, 162, 164 Enlightenment, 14 Entre Ríos, 116, 130 Esteve y Llach, Gerardo, 76 Eton, 141 Europe, 4, 6, 7, 13, 15, 17, 21, 27, 29, 32, 37, 42, 50, 51, 53, 60, 62, 65, 85, 90, 101, 104, 105, 108, 112, 113, 115–20, 122, 125, 126, 129–33, 136–40, 144, 145, 148–51, 156, 158–60, 162, 164 Ezquiaga, Miguel, 76 Fabian, Captain, 97 Falkland Islands, 16 Famatina, 154 Ferdinand VII, 85, 90, 93, 95, 97, 98, 104, 106, 108, 122, 128, 131, 133, 137, 141 Ferns, Henry, 2, 35, 42, 49, 125, 143, 161, 164 Foreign Office, 25, 86, 90, 99, 102, 103, 104, 106, 136, 151 Fortescue, John, 38, 41, 45, 47, 62, 67 Fox, Charles James, 18, 19, 28, 51, 52, 53, 54, 59, 60, 63, 70, 103, 121 Foxites, 19, 51, 52, 65, 66, 69, 135 France, 1, 5, 11, 13, 16–28, 31, 32, 37, 41, 51, 53, 57, 59, 60, 71, 73, 74, 80, 81, 85–92, 96–8, 101, 105, 116, 120, 124, 126,

190 Index

127–30, 133, 134, 137–9, 141, 142, 144, 148, 149–51, 158, 159, 162 Francis, Philip, 60 Franco-Portuguese agreement, 16 Franco-Spanish agreement, 16 French Army, 85, 89, 105, 108, 110, 127, 137, 138, 139, 144 French Revolution, 19, 52, 87, 121, 127 French Wars, 19 Fullarton, Colonel William, 16, 17, 28 Funes, Gregorio, 93 García del Río, Juan, 147 García, Manuel, 111, 155, 156, 157 Gauchos, 117, 120 George III, 18, 26, 28, 34, 41, 43, 44, 51, 52, 54, 55, 63, 64, 67, 68, 75, 77, 83, 91, 100, 102, 131 George IV (Prince Regent), 52, 99, 100, 102, 103, 131, 136, 138, 150, 152, 158 Gibraltar, 89 Gillespie, Captain Alexander, 77, 81 Gómez, José Valentín, 129, 130 Goodwin Keates, Admiral Richard, 36 Gorriti, island of, 43 Great Britain, 1–7, 11, 13, 15–24, 27, 28, 30–3, 35, 40, 41, 42, 44, 46, 47, 49–54, 59, 62, 63, 67, 72–5, 77, 78, 82, 84–98, 101–13, 115–21, 123–5, 129, 131–4, 136, 137, 139–41, 143–5, 150, 151, 155–7, 162, 163 Grenville, Tom, 52, 53, 56, 65 Grenville, William Wyndham, Baron, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 26, 28, 51–3, 57, 59–61, 63, 64, 66, 69, 71, 110 Grey, Charles, 2nd Earl, 52–4, 60, 64–7, 71, 100, 103, 110, 121, 131, 150 Guayaquil, 123 Güemes, Martín de, 120 Guido, Tomás, 99

Halperín Donghi, Tulio, 13, 109 Hamilton, William, 99, 106 Hanseatic Towns, 160 Harley, Robert, Earl of Oxford, 15 Harvey, A.D., 62 Hastings, Francis Rawdon Hastings, 2nd Earl of Moira, 65, 68 Hastings, Warren, 17, 19 Hawkesbury, Lord, see Lord Liverpool Herbert, Captain Charles, 31 Heywood, Captain, 104 Hippisley, John, 17, 21, 58 Hispanic–Mexican groups, 17 Hispanic–Peruvian groups, 17 Hobhouse, Charles, 18 Holy Alliance, 4, 6, 86, 112, 115, 116, 122, 126, 129, 131, 133, 136, 137, 139, 144, 149, 150, 151, 160 Holland, 20, 22, 35, 87, Holland, Henry Fox, 3rd Baron, 52, 63–70, 100, 122, 125 Holland House, 100, 102, 122, 127, 150 Hood, Admiral Samuel, 17, 36 House of Commons, 19, 20, 61, 64, 65, 86, 87, 121, 149, 151, 158 House of Lords, 58, 71, 146, 151 Howick, Lord, see Grey Hullett Company, 143, 154 Hullett, John, 143, 144, 147, 154 Humphreys, Robin, 1 Hurtado, José Manuel, 146, 147 Huskisson, William, 22, 27, 36, 42, 135 Incas, 9, 120 India, 17, 25, 28, 35, 59, 61 Indians, 9, 21, 154 Intendencias, 11 Irigoyen Matías, 95, 99 Italy, 22, 112, 142 Jacob, William, 30, 31, 58, 59, 61, 68 Jacobins, 23, 66, 87, 98

Index 191

Jamaica, 15 Jefferson, Thomas, 140 Jervis, John, Earl of St.Vincent, 35, 36, 42 Jena, 62 Jesuits, 10, 12, 17, 21 Joao VI, 85, 89, 91 Johnson, Samuel, 63 Jujuy, 10 Kauffmann, William, 31, 122, 139 La Paz, 11 La Rioja, 10, 154 Lafayette, Marie Joseph du Motier, Marquiss de, 126, 127 Lancashire, 59 Larrea, Juan, 13 Las Heras, General Gregorio de, 152 Latin America, 1, 6, 7, 29, 57, 85, 122, 160, 162, 163 Lauderdale, James Maitland, 8th Earl of Maitland, 53, 60 Lawndsdowne, Lord, see Petty Le Moyne, Hilaire, 127, 128, 129 Letters on South America, 117 Leveson Gower, General, 46 Liberal Tories, 135 Lima, 11 Lincolnshire, 141 Liniers, Santiago de, 41, 43, 44, 73, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 84, 86, 91, 92, 93, 95, 128 Litoral area, 10, 108, 111, 112, 116, 117 Liverpool, 145 Liverpool merchants, 125, 145, 163 Liverpool, Robert Jenkinson, 2nd Earl, 6, 86, 103, 112, 121–3, 125, 127, 129, 131, 134, 135, 146, 149, 151, 152, 155, 158, 163 Logia Lautaro, 105 London, 5, 16, 27, 34, 35, 47, 56, 59, 64, 73, 74, 91, 95, 101, 105, 109, 110, 111, 112, 116, 118, 126, 127, 131, 139, 145, 149, 153, 154, 155, 158, 162

London merchants, 149 López, Estanislao, 130, 144 López Méndez, Luis, 95, 105, 118, 127, 138 Louis of Parma, 129 Louis XVIII, 127 Louisiana, 20 Lucca, Duke of, 129 Luján, 78, 79 Lynch, John, 1, 18, 21, 32, 54, 117 Lloyd’s Patriotic Fund Committee, 65 Mackinnon, Alexander, 97 Mackintosh, James, 121, 149, 150, 158 Madeira, 72 Madras, 16, 17 Madrid, 31, 138 Magallanes, Fernando de, 9 Maipú, 123 Maldonado, 43 Malta, 35, 73 Mar Dulce, 9 Marsden, William, 34, 39, 40, 65 Masonic Lodges, 105 May Revolution, 113 Mediterranean, 22, 25 Melville, Viscount, see Dundas Mendoza, Pedro de, 9 Metternich, Klemens Von, Prince, 4, 115, 116, 139 Mexico, 16, 20, 21, 30, 31, 63, 64, 105, 134, 141, 157, 162 Michelena, José Mariano, 146 Middle East, 25 Mier, Fray Servando Teresa de, 105 Mill, James, 126 Miller, Rory, 1 Ministry of all the Talents, 2, 5, 34, 45, 51–4, 56, 57, 59, 61–3, 65, 68, 69, 71, 86 Miranda, General Francisco, 5, 16, 19–24, 26–30, 32, 34, 35, 47, 53, 54, 57, 59, 62, 64, 74, 83, 87, 91–3, 95, 96, 105, 118, 119, 126–8

192 Index

Misiones, 12 Mitchell, Leslie, 70 Mitre, Bartolomé, 109 Moira, Lord, see F.R. Hastings Moldes, José, 91 Monroe Doctrine, 140, 148 Monroe, James, 140, 145 Monteagudo, Bernardo de, 105 Montevideo, 23, 38, 41, 43–6, 79, 80, 93, 97, 100, 101, 104, 108, 123, 128, 144, 159, 160 Moreno faction, 101 Moreno, Mariano, 13, 14, 76, 92, 94, 95, 99, 109, 132 Moreno, Manuel, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103 Morillo, General Pablo, 115 Murat, General Joachim, 128 Museo Mitre, 73 Naples, 89, 133 Napoleonic wars, 71 National Congress, 156 Netherlands, 128 New Granada, 10, 30, 74 New Orleans, 26 Niort, 73 Nootka Sound, 19, 20 Norfolk, 67 North America, 17, 18, 19, 45, 48, 111, 140 North, Lord Frederick, 16, 18 Northern Army, 109 Northumberland, Duke of, 69 O’Leary, David Florence, 124 O’Higgins, Bernardo de, 123 Orinoco river, 26 Orleans, Louis Phillipe, Duc de, 87, 128, 129 Ostend, 35 Pacific Ocean, 29 Pack, Colonel Denis, 78 Padilla, Manuel Aniceto, 79, 83, 84, 88, 91, 97, 101, 103 Panama, 30

Paraguay river, 10 Paraguay, 9, 10–12, 21 Paraná river, 10, 12 Paris, 20, 23, 53, 54, 110, 118, 126, 129 Parish, John, 141 Parish, Woodbine, 141–5, 147, 151–3, 155–9 Parliament, 6, 21, 36, 64, 88, 99, 121, 125, 140, 146, 149, 151, 158, 163 Paroissien, James, 92, 93 Paso, Juan José, 93, 101, 105 Patagonia, 9 Patricios, 76 Pavia, Joseph, 30 Pedro Carlos, 92 Peel, Robert, 133, 135 Pelham, Lord Thomas, 27 Perceval, Spencer, 86, 93, 103 Peru, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 20, 123, 124, 147 Protector of, 126 Petrie, Charles, 135 Petty, Lord Henry, 3rd Marquess of Landsowne, 56, 121, 146, 149, 150 Picton, Thomas, 22 Pinto, Manuel, 91 Pitt, William (the younger), 5, 15, 16, 18–20, 22–4, 26, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 36, 37, 42, 47, 48, 52, 53, 57, 59, 63, 66, 119, 133 Pittites, 64, 69, 71, 86, 87, 134, 135, 160 Place, Francis, 132 Planta, Joseph, 141 Polignac Memorandum, 139, 140, 145 Polignac, Auguste Jules, Prince de, 138, 147 Popham, Admiral Home, 5, 27–9, 32–43, 46–9, 53, 57, 59, 60, 64, 65, 71, 74, 75, 161, 164 Popham, Stephen, 35 Portland, William BentinckCavendish, 3rd Duke of, 24, 86, 91, 93, 125

Index 193

Portugal, 5, 6, 11, 23, 89, 93, 97, 100, 103, 104, 110, 116, 147, 159 Portuguese Court, 79, 85, 89, 91, 104, 161 Portuguese forces, 112, 117, 121, 123, 142, 148, 163 Portuguese–British expedition, 15 Posadas, Gervasio, 86, 108, 110 Potosí, 11, 12 Presas, José, 93 Primera Junta, 86, 94–7, 99, 100, 101 Prussia, 32, 62, 115, 122, 137 public opinion, 5, 47, 54, 84, 121, 129, 145, 164 Public Records Office (PRO), 2 Pueyrredón, General Juan Martín de, 40, 41, 73, 75, 84, 91, 117–19, 121, 126–8, 130–3, 144 Pullen, Governor, 15 Queen Anne, 15 Queen Caroline, 131 Rademaker, John, 104 Ramírez, Francisco, 130 Ramsay, Captain, 97 Red Sea, 36 Reform Bill, 52 Representación de los Hacendados, 14 Richelieu, Armand du Plessis, Duc de, 127 Riego, General Rafael de, 131, 133 Rio de Janeiro, 5, 74, 79, 85, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 97, 100, 104, 110, 111, 112, 118, 123, 142, 144, 163 Río de La Plata Mining Company, 154 Río de la Plata river, 12 Rivadavia, Bernardino, 6, 108–12, 118, 120–2, 126, 129, 130, 132, 141–5, 147, 149, 151, 153–6, 158, 159, 162–4 River Plate, United Provinces of the (Provincias Unidas del Río de La Plata), 1, 2, 4–7, 9, 11–14, 33–5,

37, 40–2, 44–7, 49, 50, 55, 59, 61, 68, 69, 71, 73, 77, 83, 85, 86, 88–93, 95–101, 103–12, 115–21, 123, 125, 127–34, 136, 141–3, 145, 147, 151–9, 161–4 River Plate economy, 11–14, 21, 92, 94, 116, 117, 130, 133, 147, 153, 154, 156, 157, 163 River Plate educational system, 14 Roberts, Carlos, 1, 2, 26, 71, 73, 74, 77 Robertson, John Parish, 117, 141, 147 Robertson, William Parish, 117, 141, 147 Robertson, William Spence, 1, 26 Rodríguez Peña, Saturnino, 78, 79, 82–4, 91–3 Rodríguez Peña, Nicolás, 14, 73, 77, 82, 92, 105 Rodríguez, General Martín, 92, 131, 132, 142, 144 Rojas, Diego de, 9 Rondeau, General José, 108, 112, 130 Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 14 Rush, Richard, 139, 140 Russia, 1, 31, 37, 59, 115, 122, 129, 137 Rydjord, John, 2, 31 Rye, 30 Saavedra, Cornelio, 92, 93, 95, 99 Saint Domingue, 24, 45, 66, 70 Saint Helena, 21, 40 Saladeros, 13 Salamanca, University of, 13 Salta, 10, 11 San Carlos, Colegio de, 14 San Carlos, Duke of, 126 San Martín, General José de, 105, 109, 120, 123–5, 127, 130, 132, 144 Sancti Spíritus Fort, 9 Santa Coloma, Gaspar de, 13 Santa Coloma, José Antonio, 92 Santa Fe, 10, 12, 116, 117, 130, 144 Santiago del Estero, 10

194 Index

Sarratea, Manuel de, 100, 101, 106–8, 112, 118, 119, 131 Sassenay, Marquise de, 128 Scotland, 26, 58, 117, 125 Scott, Walter, 58 Selkirk, Thomas Douglas 5th Earl of, 58, 59, 68 Semanario de Agricultura y Comercio, 14 Sentenach, Felipe, 76 Seville, 11 Shelburne, William Petty, 2nd Earl of, 15, 18 Shelley, Percy Bysshe, 124 Sheridan, Richard Brinsley, 19, 69, 103 Sidmouth, Lord, see Addington slave trade, 11, 52, 68 Smith, Adam, 14, 19 Smith, Admiral Sidney, 88–92 Sobremonte, Marques de, 14, 41, 43, 76, 81, 86 Sociedad Patriótica, 105 South America, 1, 3, 5, 6, 11, 13, 15–18, 20–33, 36, 37, 42, 48, 49, 53, 57–60, 62–6, 68, 70–2, 74, 81, 85–7, 90, 91, 93, 94, 96, 98, 100–2, 104–6, 115, 117–19, 121–5, 127–9, 131, 134, 135, 137–41, 144–50, 158, 160–4 Spain, 4–6, 9–20, 23–5, 27, 28, 30, 31, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43–5, 50, 58, 67, 69, 71–6, 80, 82, 83, 85–96, 98, 100–2, 104, 106–10, 112, 113, 115, 116, 121, 122, 125, 126, 128, 129, 133, 134, 136–8, 141, 142, 144, 146–8, 150, 158, 162 Spanish America, 1, 3–5, 11, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 26–32, 50, 53, 55, 57, 60, 65, 66, 70, 87, 88, 90–2, 94, 96–8, 100–5, 107, 112, 115, 116, 118, 120–2, 127, 131, 134, 136–40, 145, 146, 149, 150, 161, 164 Spanish Army, 77, 82, 105, 106, 116, 117, 119, 123–26, 128–31, 135, 149, 157

Spanish commerce, 11, 13, 16 Spanish Constitution of 1812, 131, 133 Spanish Cortes, 94, 95, 100, 101, 103 Spanish Crown, 11, 42, 79, 82, 85, 91, 94, 108–10, 138 Spanish liberals, 132, 133, 141 Spanish merchants, 77 Spencer, George John, Lord, 22, 56 St.Vincent, Admiral, see Jervis Staples, Robert, 106, 111, 116, 125 Strangford, Percy Clinton Smythe, 6th Viscount, 2, 5, 85, 88–91, 93–5, 97, 98, 101–9, 111, 116, 118, 159, 161 Street, John, 2, 3, 26, 98, 99, 103 Stuart Mill, John, 126 Stuart, John, 67 Sucre, General Antonio, 157 Sullivan, General, 59 Sussex, 30 Sweden, 89 Talleyrand, Charles Maurice de, 53 Temple, Lord, 69 Tetuan, 35 The Edinburgh Review, 89, 122, 126, 127 The Morning Chronicle, 37, 47, 49, 54, 68, 100, 102 The Times, 47, 56, 61, 117, 129, 147, 150 Third Coalition, 31, 32, 51 Tierra firme, 29 Tories, 5, 18, 21, 30, 36, 52, 61, 64, 68, 71, 86, 87, 93, 98, 102, 103, 122, 135, 150, 151 Trafalgar, 32, 128 Treaty of Pilar, 130 Treveleyan, George Macaulay, 53 Trinidad, 22, 23 Trinity College, 89 Triunviratos, 86, 101, 108, 132 Troppau, 131 Tsar Alexander I, 122, 129 Tucker, Benjamin, 35

Index 195

Tucumán, 9, 31, 119, 130 Tupac Amaru, 17 Turkey, 25, 89 Ultra-Tories, 134, 138 United States of America, 7, 23, 24, 32, 53, 59, 120, 137, 139, 140, 144, 145, 148, 149 Upper Peru (Alto Peru), 14, 79, 117, 120, 157 Uruguay (Banda Oriental), 5, 6, 15, 43, 89, 97, 100, 104, 108, 112, 117, 130, 142, 148, 158, 159, 163 Uruguay river, 9, 10, 11 US Congress, 140 Utrecht Treaty, 1, 11 Vansittart, Nicholas, 21, 26, 27, 56, 59, 59, 103 Vargas, Pedro Fermín de, 30, 74, 87 Vatican, 17 Venezuela, 11, 22, 27, 29, 30, 53, 84, 95, 105, 115, 118, 122, 127, 128, 162 Vernon, Admiral, 15 Verona, 134, 144 Versailles Treaty, 17, 18 Vienna, 37, 115 Viéytes, Hipólito, 13, 73, 82, 92 Vigodet, General Gaspar, 108 Villele, Jean Baptiste, comte de, 134 Vindicae Galicae, 121

Waddell, D.A.G., 136 Waine, Thomas, 37 Walpole, Robert, 15 Walton, William, 102 War Office, 21, 25, 34, 49, 57, 63, 68, 78, 86, 103, 125 Washington, 144 Waterloo, 115 Wealth of Nations, 19 Webster, Charles, 1, 129, 135, 156 Wellesley, Marquess of, 61, 63, 93, 95–7, 99, 101, 102, 110, 134 Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of, 49, 61, 87, 101, 110, 134, 138, 150, 155, 156 West Indies, 45, 53 Westminister School, 35 Whigs, 5, 6, 18, 19, 52, 53, 63, 68, 100, 103, 111, 121, 122, 125, 127, 135, 149, 150, 151, 159, 163 Whitelocke, General John, 45–8, 66, 67, 69, 70, 82 Williams Alzaga, Enrique, 82 Windham, William, 24, 40, 42, 43, 48, 49, 52, 54–9, 61–71, 73 Yerba mate, 12 York, Duke of, 67, 70, 102 Yorke, Charles, 27 Zapiola, Matías, 105

Great Britain and Argentina: From Invasion to Recognition, 1806-26 (St. Antony's Series (Palgrave (Firm)).)

Great Britain and Argentina: From Invasion to Recognition, 1806-26 (St. Antony's Series (Palgrave (Firm)).)

Great Britain and Argentina: From Invasion to Recognition, 1806-26 (St. Antony's Series (Palgrave (Firm)).)

Argentina: from insolvency to growth

Great Britain

The Roman Invasion of Britain

Shakespeare's Romances (New Casebooks (Palgrave Macmillan (Firm)).)

Frommer's Great Britain

Frommer's Great Britain

Lonely Planet Great Britain

Discover Great Britain

007 Invasion from Space

Invasion from Space

The Roman Invasion of Britain (Roman Conquest of Britain)

Argentina

History, Historians, and Conservatism in Britain and America: From the Great War to Thatcher and Reagan

History, Historians, and Conservatism in Britain and America: From the Great War to Thatcher and Reagan

History, Historians, and Conservatism in Britain and America: From the Great War to Thatcher and Reagan

Letters from St. Petersburg

Amazing and Extraordinary Facts about Great Britain

Great Britain and the American Civil War

Saint Antonys Fire

Great Britain (Eyewitness Travel Guides)

Environmental History of Great Britain

Saint Antonys Fire

Big Walks of Great Britain

Flora of Great Britain and Ireland: Volume 4, Campanulaceae - Asteraceae (Flora of Great Britain and Ireland)

Amazing and Extraordinary Facts about Great Britain

Archaeological Practice and Heritage in Great Britain

Argentina

Great Britain and Argentina: From Invasion to Recognition, 1806-26 (St. Antony's Series (Palgrave (Firm)).)