Globalization: perspectives from Central and Eastern Europe

GLOBALIZATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE CONTEMPORARY STUDIES IN ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS S...

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GLOBALIZATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

CONTEMPORARY STUDIES IN ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS Series Editors:

Robert J. Thornton and J. Richard Aronson

Volume 83:

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The Irish Economy in Transition: Success, Problems and Prospects – Edited by J. R. Aronson, V. Munley and R. J. Thornton

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Asia Pacific Financial Markets in Comparative Perspective: Issues and Implications for the 21st Century – Edited by J. A. Batten and T. A. Fetherston

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Developments in Litigation Economics – Edited by P. A. Gaughan and R. J. Thornton

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European Responses to Globalization: Resistance, Adaptation and Alternatives – Edited by J. Laible and H. Barkey

CONTEMPORARY STUDIES IN ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS VOLUME 89

GLOBALIZATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE EDITED BY

KATALIN FA´BIAŃ Lafayette College, Easton, PA, USA

Amsterdam – Boston – Heidelberg – London – New York – Oxford Paris – San Diego – San Francisco – Singapore – Sydney – Tokyo JAI Press is an imprint of Elsevier

JAI Press is an imprint of Elsevier Linacre House, Jordan Hill, Oxford OX2 8DP, UK Radarweg 29, PO Box 211, 1000 AE Amsterdam, The Netherlands 525 B Street, Suite 1900, San Diego, CA 92101-4495, USA First edition 2007 Copyright r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publisher Permissions may be sought directly from Elsevier’s Science & Technology Rights Department in Oxford, UK: phone (+44) (0) 1865 843830; fax (+44) (0) 1865 853333; email: [email protected]. Alternatively you can submit your request online by visiting the Elsevier web site at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/permissions, and selecting Obtaining permission to use Elsevier material Notice No responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions or ideas contained in the material herein. Because of rapid advances in the medical sciences, in particular, independent verification of diagnoses and drug dosages should be made British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-0-7623-1457-7 ISSN: 1569-3759 (Series) For information on all JAI Press publications visit our website at books.elsevier.com Printed and bound in the United Kingdom 07 08 09 10 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

CONTENTS LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

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FOREWORD Jan Aart Scholte

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INTRODUCTION: PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBALIZATION FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE Katalin Fa´biań

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PART I: CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY SUPRATERRITORIALITY, EMBEDDEDNESS, OR BOTH? FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE Nina Bandelj

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NEO-LIBERAL SUPRATERRITORIALITY? THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION ON GLOBALIZATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE Petia Kostadinova

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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION FROM LABOR’S POINT OF VIEW: THE EU AND THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES Susan Glanz

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v

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CONTENTS

PART II: THE TRANSFORMATION OF TRADITIONAL POLITICS ON EUROPE’S EDGE: CHANGING BORDERS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE Margit Bessenyey Williams

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GLOBALIZATION, REGIONALIZATION, AND EUROPEANIZATION: IMPACT AND EFFECTS ON POLISH POLICY-MAKING Maria Raquel Freire and Teresa Cierco

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GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONAL INTEREST IN EU ENLARGEMENT: THE CASE OF GERMANY AND POLAND Randall E. Newnham

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CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE IN THE PROCESS OF GLOBALIZATION AND EUROPEANIZATION: COMPARING THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND POLAND Brˇetislav Dancˇa´k and Vı´t Hlousˇek

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PART III: NEW ACTORS AND INFLUENCES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION NORM DIFFUSION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE’S DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICIES Katalin Fa´biań

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Contents

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EUROPEANIZATION AND THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES POLICY IN SLOVENIA Zˇiva Humer

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GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLICY INTEGRATION: THE MARGINALIZATION OF POLISH AND CZECH ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS IN THE FACE OF TECHNOCRATIC EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE Lars K. Hallstrom

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Nina Bandelj

Department of Sociology, University of California, Irvine, CA, USA

Teresa Cierco

Department of International Relations, Social and Human Sciences Faculty, University Lusı´ ada of Porto, Portugal

Brˇetislav Dancˇa´k

International Institute of Political Science, Department of International Relations and European Studies, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic

Katalin Fa´biań

Department of Government and Law, Lafayette College, Easton, PA, USA

Maria Raquel Freire

International Relations Group, School of Economics, University of Coimbra, Portugal

Susan Glanz

College of Professional Studies, St. John’s University, NY, USA

Lars K. Hallstrom

Department of Political Science, St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, Canada

Vı´t Hlousˇek

International Institute of Political Science, Department of International Relations and European Studies, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic

Zˇiva Humer

Peace Institute, Institute for Contemporary Social and Political Studies, Ljubljana, Slovenia ix

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Petia Kostadinova

Center for European Studies, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA

Randall E. Newnham

Department of Political Science, Penn State University, Berks College, Reading, PA, USA

Jan Aart Scholte

Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK

Margit Bessenyey Williams

Department of Government and International Affairs, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, USA

FOREWORD Globalization studies are rapidly filling many a library shelf, and understandably so. The geographical shift in contemporary history towards a more global world is not only significant in its own right, but also interrelates closely with other principal social changes concurrently unfolding, for example, in respect of economy, governance, identity and knowledge. As a result, research built around a theme of globalization offers among the most promising avenues to develop a wide-ranging coherent systemic perspective on societal trends today. To realize this potential knowledge it is vital to combine general conceptual work on the one hand with contextually specific empirical enquiry on the other. Thus broad theoretical propositions need to be illustrated, demonstrated, specified and qualified in relation to concrete experiences. Conversely, to avoid aimless accumulation of data it is necessary to have a clear analytical steer from theory. Each strain of work – the more conceptual and the more empirical – depends on the other for the advance of globalization studies as a whole. Among other things, empirical research is important for revealing the diversity of global relations. Globalization is universal in the sense that people anywhere and everywhere on earth today are acquiring more transplanetary social connections. Communications, travel, production, consumption, finance, health, ecology, consciousness, law and violence are more and more linking persons directly across continents and seas. Yet this global social connectivity does not transpire everywhere in the same ways, to the same extents, and with the same implications. The specific causes, contents and consequences of globalization vary considerably by geographical locations as well as by other social positions like class and gender. Empirical research identifies this highly contextual character of globalization. One important approach to contextual analysis of globalization is to delve into its regional variations. How does transplanetary connectivity manifest itself in West Africa as against East Asia, or in Amazonia as against Scandinavia? Such research is the more necessary inasmuch as most general theory on globalization emanates from North America and Western Europe. Whether acknowledged or not, this work is steeped in the xi

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particular experiences of those parts of the world. Grand theories of globality therefore tend, in fact, to be culturally narrowly circumscribed, paradoxically giving the global quite a parochial turn. Hence the present book on globalization in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is especially welcome. Between these covers specialists on these countries – researchers who are moreover mostly born of the region itself – offer probing examinations of the intersections of transplanetary relations with cultural, ecological, economic, historical, political and psychological circumstances particular to this part of the world. The authors thereby adeptly put into practice the so-called ‘glocalization’ principle that globality is never divorced from the particular place of its expression. Many of the questions addressed in this volume equally apply to other areas: such as how globalization relates to historical turns in capitalist development; or how growing transplanetary connections reflect and reinforce shifting contours of cultural and political identity. Yet, as these essays demonstrate, the responses in CEE to such general questions often take contextually specific forms, for instance, in the deeper infatuations (at least initially) with neo-liberal policies towards globalization. In addition, the CEE countries bring certain other issues of globalization into particularly sharp focus. For example, the connections between globalization and national-level regime change have been especially pronounced in respect of transitions from communist-party rule. Experiences in CEE also pointedly highlight the complex relations between globalization and regionalization, whereby the growth of global links is an occasion to redraw boundaries as well as to transcend them. This book has further distinct appeal for its broad sectoral coverage and diverse disciplinary perspectives. In terms of issues the chapters address border controls, environmental concerns, foreign policy, gender, investment and trade. In addition, by incorporating work from Economics, International Relations, Political Science and Sociology the volume richly realizes opportunities afforded by globalization studies for interdisciplinary enquiry. Collectively, the chapters make an important inroad into deficits in globalization research regarding Central and Eastern Europe. Some other area studies research is published with an eye-catching reference to ‘globalization’ in the title but actually says little on that subject. Not so here. This book does consistently and carefully address issues of growing transplanetary connectivity, effectively teasing out connections between globalization, regionalization and national experiences in CEE. Moreover, by accepting the challenge of publishing in English the researchers make their accounts more available to readers beyond the countries concerned.

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Having made this generous overture, it is for globalization generalists, as well as specialists on globalization in other parts of the world, to grasp the opportunity to digest the work presented here and make warranted adjustments to their understandings. Trondheim and Linko¨ping, February 2007 Jan Aart Scholte


INTRODUCTION: PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBALIZATION FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE Katalin Fa´biań 1. INTRODUCTION The essays in this book are a study on how globalization, as one of the main driving forces in economics, international relations, and cultures, has affected politics in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. With the contributors paying particular attention to the changing nature of the interactions between various types of domestic institutions and international structures, this book attempts to interpret the process of economic, political, and cultural change in post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe as it transformed from a relatively isolated corner of the world into a globally interconnected community with a European identity, based on democratic values and liberal markets. While Central and Eastern Europe entered and engaged so clearly, deeply, and rapidly in the multiple channels of globalization, there is a lacunae of reflections on this notable change, and only a few, often very specialized scholarly texts provide an account of how this region fared during this profound and multidimensional transformation. The analyses in this volume bridge this gap in a methodologically novel manner by combining the time-tested area-studies focus of various casestudy countries and policies with the cross-disciplinary interpretations of the new theories of globalization. Globalization: Perspectives from Central and Eastern Europe Contemporary Studies in Economic and Financial Analysis, Volume 89, 1–21 Copyright r 2007 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1569-3759/doi:10.1016/S1569-3759(07)89013-9

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2. A THREE-PRONGED APPROACH: AREA STUDIES, GLOBALIZATION, AND INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS This collection of essays presents a broad range of topics on how globalization affects Central and Eastern Europe, from the most specific and local issues to transnational and less conventional forces that influence political exchanges across borders. By centrally locating the relationship between globalization and the Central and Eastern European economics, international relations, and civil society, this book highlights two interconnected lines of inquiry: (A) What are the main continuities and discontinuities of economics, international relations, and civil society in Central and Eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War? (B) What are the Central and Eastern European countries’ experiences of the effects of integration into global political, economic, and cultural frameworks? While globalization has assumed center stage in international politics, the case of Central and Eastern Europe as portrayed in this volume provides testimony to the mixing of its influence with local forces, sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse. The rapid encounter with global political, economic, and cultural currents did not miraculously and suddenly transform Central and Eastern Europe into a thriving and harmonious entity. An ebb of protracted negotiations followed the high expectations of changing the communist political and economic systems in the late 1980s. Compromises between old and new ideas produced unstable and often uneasy alliances that ‘‘raced to the middle’’ to capture support. With their revolutions and reforms still unresolved well into the second decade after the collapse of communism, many of Europe’s newest democracies are struggling not only with weak governments and deeply polarized societies, but also with economic and social problems. They have difficulty maintaining strong economic growth, often encounter major budget crises, and persistently face problematic minority relations. The rise of nationalism, various disconnected riots, and increasing dismay and apathy indicate that many people see themselves as unable to affect the very radical reforms that have taken place. Despite advances in economic growth and democratic consolidation, many segments of the population now describe themselves as losers in the change wrought by systemic changes and membership of the

Introduction

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European Union (EU). Once the poster child of democratic and economic transitions, Central and Eastern Europe is maturing into a somewhat rambunctious teenager, projecting more of a complex, idiosyncratic, and often problematic image, which is, notwithstanding, full of potential and surprises. The region’s experience and the outcome of its democratic, market-oriented reforms will continue to have repercussions on global efforts to induce and support such movements worldwide. Bearing in mind the significant attention paid to the EU’s eastern enlargements in 2004 and 2007, this book does not look exclusively at Central and Eastern Europe through the lens of the EU integration. Instead, our conceptual framework situates the EU enlargements as an integral component of global events. This broader framework of analysis helps us highlight the Central and Eastern European integration processes that bridge the regional and global dimensions. Why do we need to consider global dimensions in addition to the European integration when we discuss the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe? It appears to be more and more difficult, if not impossible to think of politics, economies, and societies solely in national or in an exclusively regional context. The increasing interconnectedness in political, economic, and cultural terms has made the national and even the regional context more porous and susceptible to global pressures (Katzenstein, 2005). It is important, if not imperative, to critically analyze the interactions between the global, regional, and local, not only to understand the ensuing change, but to develop a more accurate explanatory framework. With globalization as material reality with extremely powerful and sometimes devastating consequences, it has attracted much attention in the past two decades and has become ubiquitous in both scholarly analysis and everyday news. However, what does ‘‘global’’ mean? Although the actual phenomenon of cross-country exchanges between people, ideas, and technology is certainly not new, the term ‘‘globalization’’ only appeared in popular vocabulary in the early 1970s, with globalization debates in the popular press and academic discourse growing steadily ever since (see reviews in Mittelman, 2002; Scholte, 2005). Even if scholars debate the definition, chronology, the most appropriate method of measuring globalization, and especially its effects and evaluation, we witness at least some increased awareness of the interconnectedness among various political, economic, and social units in the world (Brunelle, 2007; Evans, 1997; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999). However, the mixed picture painted by the ambiguities and insecurities concerning globalization

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do not deny the profound transformation in its wake (see, for example Westbrook, 2004). On the contrary, globalization and a lens focused on its complex effects provide a new and potentially powerful manner to critically analyze the changes and continuities in politics, economics, and culture. The numerous scholars studying these issues have shown that globalization has various manifestations and consequences for states (Rosenau, 2003), international organizations (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; Slaughter, 2004), non-state actors such as cities (Sassen, 1991), both sub-national and international actors such as social movements (Guidry, Kennedy, & Zald, 2001; Keck & Sikkink, 1997; della Porta, Kriesi, & Rucht, 1999; Tarrow, 2005), and outcomes concerning welfare (Glatzer & Rueschemeyer, 2005), democracy (Eschle, 2001; Wejnert, 2005), the sciences (Drori, Meyer, Ramirez, & Schofer, 2003), labor (Silver, 2003), the environment (Mol, 2003), and the economy (Dicken, 2003), among others. Globalization differentially affected not only the various subjects, but also the world’s regions. Replicating this divide, scholarly attention focused on Europe (Berezin & Schain, 2003, Laible & Barkey, 2006; just to mention a few), Latin America (Kaufman & Nelson, 2004; Roett & Paz, 2003), and especially, North America (Bayes et al., 2006; Friedman, 2005), leaving other territories behind, or at least, temporarily, out of mind. Despite the many books and articles on globalization that now fill libraries, nobody has succeeded as of yet in pinning down this elusive and broad term. With the debates on the definition, chronology, measurement, and especially the evaluation of globalization still raging, every contributor in this volume tried to answer a narrower and more specific question of how globalization has affected Central and Eastern Europe. While we may not yet be able to unequivocally define globalization to everyone’s satisfaction, the term’s wide acceptance and its attractive analytical potential led to researchers making generous use of it. The authors of this book therefore adopted a working definition of globalization and applied it to study the Central and Eastern European region. They referenced various schools of thought about globalization, but paid special attention to two rather different conceptualizations: globalization as (a) the rise of supraterritoriality (coined by Jan Aart Scholte) and (b) Westernization as Americanization and/or Europeanization. The initial hypothesis, so strongly emerging from globalization literature, was that we have entered an increasingly interconnected world, where borders lose their strongly demarcated nature. Following this line of reasoning, we would expect the rise of supraterritoriality, i.e., accelerated global exchanges to create a new spatial geography where state borders do

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not constrain movement and exchange. With globalization profoundly affecting Central and Eastern Europe as a recently open region, we assumed that many elements of supraterritorialization should be noticeable. The lessons emerging from political economy, international relations, and civil society have indeed confirmed the powerful effects of globalization that at least partially diminished the influence of territorial borders. However, the final analysis of various Central and Eastern European case-study countries and policies stands witness to the continued importance of cultural and national delimitations. Our initial hypothesis on the exclusive reign of supraterritoriality was rejected. Why would this result emerge at the end of our investigation? First, Central and Eastern Europe may be more likely to retain strong elements of national and territorial affiliation exactly because of a reaction to its long historical periods of foreign occupation and external domination. Second, globalization and regional integration are multiple and dialectic processes that invoke complex and often contradictory elements. Each country also has its own specific set of policies and circumstances that give rise to yet more potential answers to supraterritorial challenges. Furthermore, as we continued to investigate the effects of globalization, our case study region has raised more questions and invited more detailed investigations about the perplexing coexistence of strong territoriality and various new, borderless communities. The continued, and in some cases strengthened, effects of borders and cultural boundaries proved to be quite unexpected findings in the context of Central and Eastern Europe. This region was the harbinger of a new, strong wave of globalization that dramatically altered the seemingly steadfast Cold War structures of international relations, economics, and culture. In retrospect, many see the end of communism in the Soviet Union and its European satellite states as emerging at least partially from the strong demonstration effect of market economies producing a higher standard of living in the West than is commonly available in the East, and the ‘‘Helsinki Effect’’ of human rights principles defined on the basis of individual political rights vis-a`-vis the rhetoric of Soviet-sponsored social and economic rights (Thomas, 2001). However, Central and Eastern Europe felt these effects mostly indirectly until the regime changes in 1989/1990, when the region joined as a relative novice to participate among the already roaring engines of globalization. Globalization and its effects are surely some of the most charged political battlegrounds of our age. Its advocates say it is an engine for universal prosperity, while its critics see it as a race to the bottom regarding the number

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of poor, albeit not entirely destitute people and other relatively defenseless entities such as the natural environment (see for example, Brennan, 2003; Dunkley, 2000; Larsson, 2001; Pfaller & Lerch, 2005). Much current work on Central and Eastern Europe points out superficial democratization, economic polarization, and cultural homogenization as the main effects of integration into the European and global political, economic, and cultural frameworks. This book debates these nearly exclusively pessimistic arguments. The essays presented here contend that both gains and losses occur in the interaction of the specific local issues with the broadest and often diffused global forces (such as educational, cultural, and legal effects). A few of the authors in this collection focus on one specific case-study country or policy, but they all advantageously extend their investigations beyond a single domestic framework. As a result of the disciplinary diversity of the contributors, the essays incorporate both conventional political and economic institutions (e.g., parliaments and government bureaucracies) and unconventional agents of political change (e.g., social movements, economic exchange, international organizations) in their analyses. But exactly whom have we been studying here? The names of the region and its meanings have changed significantly in the past, thus perpetuating a sense of identity in flux.

3. NAMING CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: THE EFFECTS OF GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY In the midst of integration in the global political and economic system, and in the process of a ‘‘return to Europe,’’ the identity of Central and Eastern Europe has re-awakened, redefining the political communities that the states in this region may represent. The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as several stateless people, divided sub-regions, and ethnic, linguistic, and religious minorities (the Rusin territory between Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary, or Muslims in Bulgaria, for example) keenly illustrate how previously submerged political and cultural identities can re-emerge or create themselves. The newly emerging Central and Eastern European political actors constructed their belonging by prescribing to one or another set of values (such as European, Slavic, Christian, Muslim). These choices of identity are based on viewing recent international political alliances as opportunities for emphasizing continuity with the pre-World War II past. It is particularly interesting in an area of such profound changes and challenges as Central and Eastern Europe to

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follow the developments of identity and the consequent changes in the region’s name and belonging. How did the meaning of Central and Eastern Europe shift from a rather narrow geographic space to a relatively broad and expanding region? What are the continuing and the discarded meanings of Central and Eastern Europe? Many post-modern scholars contend that naming matters, because how and what we call things reflects deep historical and psychological messages (Lakoff, 2004; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). The changes in names of the constituting segments of Europe also mirror the processes of domestic politics responding to the waves of international events and globalization. The writers included in this volume recognize that the naming process is still unfinished and that its ambiguities are further exacerbated by the selective softening and hardening of particular borders in the region (see also DeBardeleben, 2005). In between what social scientists described as a clearly delineated Eastern and Western Europe for half a century during the Cold War, there is the old–new Central and Eastern Europe. The term ‘‘Central Europe’’ recalls the pre-World War II close connections of this region to Austria (the Habsburg Empire, later evolving into the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy) and Germany. The adding of the ‘‘East’’ recalls this region’s most recent past in which it belonged in the Soviet sphere. The ambiguous ordering of ‘‘Central’’ or ‘‘Eastern,’’ adds a few other versions to the region’s names. Each variation reflects different political sensitivities that prioritize either its ‘‘East’’ or its ‘‘Central’’ aspect. Numerous politicians and writers made a point of emphatically omitting one or the other signifier to make their ideological choices more obvious. Interpretation permeates the various definitions, the idiosyncratic use of languages, the context and arguments, and the possibility of eventual mutual understanding. After 1989, instead of the two respective blocks of enemies in Eastern and Western Europe, the name and, more importantly, the concept of an old–new region were resuscitated under the designation of Central and Eastern Europe. The dusting off of the term ‘‘Central Europe’’ (or, in its dominant German terminology, Mitteleuropa) gave a new but familiar meaning, bridging the differences between Eastern and Western Europe. Some optimistically view the integration of Central and Eastern Europe with Western institutions as eliminating the previously clear borderline that divided Europe. From a two-fold bifurcation, a three-fold and less antagonistic division emerged. With adequate incentives, Central and Eastern Europe could provide a connective tissue between the two paths of political and economic development in the European continent. However, the borders and

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the meaning of Central and Eastern Europe are still unclear and remain contested. Not only because additional countries continue to be included in this term, but also because new divisions have subsequently appeared, often following earlier diplomatic ruptures. Some observers claim that instead of eliminating the earlier East–West divide, EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) integrations have simply moved the border further to the East (see Browning, 2003; Elsing, 2004; Kempe & van Meurs, 2002). The region’s name and its belonging to one or another political or military alliance aptly signify broader historical continuities and discontinuities. Historical evidence points to only three relatively small regions being consistently included in the concept of Central Europe: Bohemia, Moravia (in the Czech Republic), and their neighbor, the original Habsburg princedom in Austria (Walters, 1988). From the middle of the 19th century until World War II, the territories that are today’s Germany, Hungary, and Poland unequivocally belonged to the body of Central Europe. During the Cold War, not even the non-aligned or the militarily neutral nations could aspire to be seen as in between the two contending political–military alliances. Consequently, ‘‘Western’’ or ‘‘Eastern’’ Europe remained as the only available alternatives for 50 years. Since the end of the Cold War, the hybridization of names reflects the ambiguities of labeling – and the uncertainties of belonging. At the end of the Cold War, Central and Eastern Europe came to refer to Slovenia, Hungary, Austria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Germany. With the 2004 EU expansion, the region seems to have expanded to incorporate the Baltic countries of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia. With the 2007 EU expansion, Bulgaria and Romania are also becoming part of this resilient and flexible term. How and why did this rather dramatic change in the meaning of the term ‘‘Central and Eastern Europe’’ take place? It may be easier to answer the ‘‘why’’ part of the question first. What is clear about the changing meaning of Central and Eastern Europe is that geography alone has little to do with inclusion and exclusion. Instead, the reasons are deeply political. Global relations (indicating the inclusion of non-governmental entities in addition to the state-centered focus of traditional international relations) influence which countries are considered part of any region. In the case of Central and Eastern Europe, the European states may claim foremost affect, but governments beyond the European continent, as well as globally interconnected non-governmental actors have been shaping the current outcome. However, it is worthwhile investigating if domestic political changes or a new phase of international relations appeared first in our case-study region. Untangling the dense

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interconnection between domestic, international, and global actors and events illuminates the steadily increasing effect of global actors in this region. Scholarly opinion on the main constitutive agent for the 1989 regime changes in Eastern Europe remains divided although libraries of literature on democratic transitions have sprung from this debate. Many scholars of the Soviet system argue that domestic issues played the dominant role in leading the system toward economic collapse with internal political events (such as ideological or personality changes) hastening its demise (see, among others, Ash, 1990; Beissinger, 2002; Fish, 1995; Hough, 1997; Kotkin, 2001; Wallander, 2003). Others put a nearly exclusive emphasis on the effects of the international system as the main reason for the dissolution of the Soviet political and economic system. Some argue that the arms race, especially Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (‘‘Star Wars’’), accelerated the bankrupting of the Soviet machine (de Haas, 2001); others point out the considerable effect of intangible effects of growing interconnectedness such as information, human rights, and other value-laden forces that undermined the moral claims of the Soviet system (Pickvance, 1998; Richmond, 2003; Shane, 1994; Thomas, 2001). After a decade and a half of discussion, a third option that mixes the internal and external factors together in producing the decay of the Soviet system tentatively emerged as a consensus (Kramer, 2003; Kutchins, 2002; Vachudova´, 2005). This volume also argues in favor of including both domestic and international factors when explaining the contemporary changing economy, international relations, and social movements in Central and Eastern Europe. The bipolar Europe of the Cold War era (1948–1989), when the continent was overtly divided, is now a memory. After 1989, the division between East and West entered a process of redefinition that has transformed the European continent and the globe from predominantly two tones to a broader spectrum with a much more varied spatial geography. This new set of ‘‘colors’’ in global relations includes a few dominant hues and many nascent, yet undefined, tones of connections while maintaining a base reflection of, and reaction to, the Cold War era and to some select culturally significant earlier historical periods. In contrast to the much greater ambiguity of contemporary global political and economic alliances, the Cold War era presents a tempting simplicity. However, it is important to remember that even during the Cold War era, the Central and Eastern European upheavals for example, in 1953, 1956, and 1968, made the perception of the exclusively monochrome colors of East and West a gross oversimplification. Some examples of ambiguity at

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the height of the Cold War include the Soviet withdrawal from Austria in 1955, the Soviet–Yugoslav conflict between 1948–53, and the revolts and revolutions in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, all during the presence of the Soviet military. By acknowledging that the spheres of influence were contested even in Europe between 1948–89, it is impossible not to recognize that the collapse of the Soviet system allowed for a denser and, consequently, much more complicated type of relationship than that of merely friends or foes to develop between Central and Eastern Europe and other parts of the world. Starting in the early 1990s, the Central and Eastern European states experienced an unprecedented three-fold transformation. The political, economic, and cultural realms each transformed from communist rule to a more democratic and liberal system. The outcome of these difficult transitions is mostly positive, although certainly not without qualification. These transformations were rooted in and affected by both the domestic and the global environments producing a significant amount of continuities and many dislocations.

4. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE With the revealing historical process of naming Central and Eastern Europe and the region’s perplexing changes in contemporary international relations, the Cold War debates did not simply disappear without a trace. Instead, they were merely transformed (see Darst, 2001). One can recognize the influence of the earlier bipolar international political system in nearly every current global dispute, be it about development, democracy, the universality of human rights, or the applicability and desirability of neo-liberal economics. What appears absent today is a (relatively) cohesive ideology and (state) power to back up an alternative to the dominant Western, freemarket, and liberal democratic mantra. After the democratic transitions of Latin America and Southern Europe in the 1970s, the Central and Eastern European revolutions in 1989/1990 provided yet more convincing evidence of the quite plausibly universal attractiveness of these Western-inspired concepts (Huntington, 1991). However, the last two decades of political and economic developments in the comparatively successful Central and Eastern European region also provide significant reason for caution (see Ost, 2005). Increasingly, the instrumental recipe for political and economic success

Introduction

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reveals basic value considerations that may not easily translate from one country or region to another. Perhaps, the seeming universality of successful development patterns blinded most observers of the democratic transitions to naı¨ vely foresee the ‘‘end of history’’ and imagine that radical transformations in the formerly Soviet-dominated space would bring rapid and pleasant changes in their wake. Its heavy baggage of recent history possibly explains why many democratic and welfare-related changes in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe took place late, in a much more complex manner, and often with mixed results. We may also need to revise the expectations for uniform effects of democratization and market reforms, all generated at least in part by globalization. While homogenization is unarguably happening, globalization is not erasing idiosyncrasy and dialectical interactions between change and continuity. A particularly revealing continuity in this volume that characteristically reflects the Central and Eastern European experience is the contributors’ struggle with uniformity across the essays, which was essential for a definitionally clear focus. For example, first, we engaged in a difficult discussion on what to call this region that has changed its political affiliation and consequently, name from Eastern Europe to the most recently popular term of Central Europe. However, Central Europe generally excludes the Baltic States and the South Eastern European countries that some of the essays cover. We could finally agree on a traditionally less clearly defined term of Central and Eastern Europe, but our problem of finding a common language (beyond conforming to academic English prose) also extended to many other aspects of the text in general. Second, and possibly most painfully, all the contributors struggled with the confines of English academic prose. A nearly excruciating dilemma emerged. Either the native language and structure could shine through in the authentic expert local voices, or we could curtail the linguistic expression and the diversity in organization in the name of accessibility. Regardless of the incongruity of calling English the contemporary Lingua Franca, it is the language most likely to be accessible to many, and we resigned ourselves to trying to follow the rather strict choreography of academic English in the name of bringing across a clear message to audiences trained by globalization. Third, although nearly all the authors are from the Central and Eastern European region, we each had a very different relationship to communism. Not surprisingly, the Slovenian contributors most eloquently protested against calling the region postcommunist, saying that the ruling regime was clearly not a true communist

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system because it relied on oppression and never reached the level of material abundance required for this stage of development according to Marxist theory. For those familiar with Cold War history, the 1950s Yugoslav separation from the Soviet path may explain the Slovenian authors’ resistance to calling the current stage post-communist. From the perspective of evaluating the effects of globalization on Central and Eastern Europe, however, this exchange is just one more reminder of how much we are steeped in experiences that are at least in part culturally and geographically divided. While recognizing these three notable conundrums, this volume tries to show that bridges can be built by negotiating personal and national differences in spite of and along with value-orientations, cognitive, and spatial divisions. Our cooperation is just one of the examples of making fruitful use of the myriad, and possibly even increasing divisions across Central and Eastern Europe. There are now more states in post-communist Europe than ever before and the number of breakaway republics continues to grow (see, for example, the debates over independence for Kosova and Transdniester). The most recent stage of state formation since the fall of communism ironically coincided with Western Europe’s questioning of the efficiency and sustainability of the sovereign nation-state. Despite its failed constitution in 2005, EU has continued along the path of integration. The very eagerness of post-communist countries to unequivocally push for EU membership highlights not only the perceived economic benefits but also the emerging consensus on the eroding effect of globalization on state powers. As the various supranational economic and political institutions unfold (the World Trade Organization [WTO], the EU, NATO, the UN, etc.), the Central and Eastern European states are facing a major paradox: they must consolidate their powers and independence while simultaneously adjusting to panEuropean and global trends that transcend sovereignty. The role of the state has thus been radically redefined in the past few decades in this region that traditionally had very interventionist central powers. In tandem with this process of domestic redefinition of the role of the state, the relations of Central and Eastern European countries to one another have also become more reflective of their increasingly interdependent environment.

5. INTERSECTING MESSAGES ACROSS THE ESSAYS Three specific intersections form the main segments of this volume: political economy, international reactions, and social movements. Amidst the waves

Introduction

13

of globalization, each theme cuts across the borders separating domestic and international politics. But the authors view the processes and the products of global interactions quite diversely when looking at Central and Eastern Europe. Central and Eastern Europe’s entry to global economic streams is the first major segment of this volume that discusses the effects of globalization in this region. The abrupt entry of post-communist economies to the world stage initially dramatically disrupted their previous patterns of trade, production, and consumption. Privatization, plant closures, and high-unemployment rates furthered the steady declines of the GDP. However, after a few years of economic upheaval, Central and Eastern Europe stepped out of this downward spiral and by the turn of the century its economies approached the level of the mid-1980s. From the standpoint of establishing liberal markets, the economic recovery in Central and Eastern Europe demonstrated the advantage of starting the painful economic restructuring soon after the political regime change, which is in stark contrast to the path taken by the Soviet successor states. Although their national incomes have been rising, the post-communist countries continue to battle with economic disequilibria such as high unemployment (especially long-term and problematic in Poland) and persistent budget deficits (as in Hungary) that establish the impetus for abrupt government changes and lay the ground for occasional political chaos, anomie, and spillover to international relations, especially with their new partners in the EU. The first three essays of this volume discuss the political economy in Central and Eastern Europe and underline that much continuity persists in the face of the not-so-subtle effects of globalization. In contrast to economists’ view of capital flows that predict that investments move to maximize profits, Nina Bandelj argues that a different logic explains at least the initial steps for capitalist development in Central and Eastern Europe. She shows that the basis for the global reach of capital is the network of ethnic and personal contacts. While individual networks seem to be anathema to the faceless and rootless capital movements, these hard-to-quantify personal connections often provide the original impetus to invest in otherwise new and thus potentially risky territories such as capitalhungry Central and Eastern Europe immediately after the Cold War. These personal networks are uniquely capable of providing otherwise inaccessible information to form the basis of calculations that satisfy the profit-seeking motive. While Central and Eastern Europe undoubtedly entered a seemingly faceless flow of global capital and international banking, Bandelj makes the case that foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have continued to be

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territorially based and embedded in existing social relations between investor and host countries. Petia Kostadinova’s essay on political economy debates some of Bandelj’s arguments, but it also confirms the remarkable cross-country diversity among the Central and Eastern European countries regarding the extent to which their citizens participate in four aspects of globalization, namely outbound tourism, citizens working abroad, students studying abroad, and internet use. Kostadinova points out that neo-liberal globalization has spread similar neo-liberal economic policies and practices in Central and Eastern Europe. By increasing the ethic of self-reliance and reducing the level of government spending on social programs, neo-liberalism has made the citizens in the region more likely to get involved in globalization – whether by force or choice. To continue the study on how and why Central and Eastern Europeans participate in economic and social integration in this rapidly globalizing world, Susan Glanz studies Central and Eastern Europe from the perspective of labor. For the Central and Eastern European countries, economic integration meant accepting transnational rules and regulations that can help increase economic cooperation among partner countries. Social integration implied the transference of individuals’ exclusive association with their nation to a supranational, and in this case, European identity. Glanz’s essay evaluates the impact of the EU membership on the labor markets of Central and Eastern Europe, noting the precipitously falling labor market participation rates and increased unemployment. Similarly, Central and Eastern Europe’s social integration with Europe shows a rather pronounced lack of enthusiasm. However, Glanz claims that there may very well be a correlation between economic performance and social integration with Europe. That is, when the economies accelerate, association with the EU also increases. To achieve this goal, the Central and Eastern European governments and employers walk a tight line between satisfying the domestic demands for worker protection and global expectations of liberalizing labor markets. Balancing the needs of such contradictory principles is challenging, and only a few in the region have accomplished it – albeit often at a high price. If such challenges and contradictions characterize the political economy of Central and Eastern Europe, how did the region’s international affairs fare? Globalization propelled contradictory phenomena such as integration and further separation/segmentation, to enter the political arena. How can exclusion and inclusion take place simultaneously, often targeting the same people? Part II of this volume analyzes how even the traditional

Introduction

15

state-centered focus of international relations reflects these substantial changes in world politics, focusing on Central and Eastern Europe’s integration into European and global organizations and its tenuous separation from the Eastern part of the continent. The complex changes observed in this region question the unequivocal claims of increased security, improved level of development, and strengthened community. Margit B. Williams’ essay deliberates on the double-edge sensation of joy and fear by moving the EU’s Schengen borders further east. How complicated and confusing it is that the new EU’s current external borders have created more freedom and mobility for people within the signatory countries while simultaneously increasing control over the travels of their immediate neighbors, who are often ethnic and family kin. While borders technically disappeared over time between the member-states of the EU and of the Schengen agreement (one is barely aware of crossing the border between France, Belgium, the Netherlands, or for that matter, Germany in spite of their rather contentious histories), a new ‘‘paper’’ curtain is rising in the eastern borders. Schengen has reduced cross-border trade and family visits and made it more difficult for governments of countries like Hungary, Romania, and Poland to maintain ties with and promises made to ethnic kin abroad. The basic promise of European integration to facilitate trade, and the flow of people, ideas, and goods has also dramatically disrupted Central and Eastern Europe’s connection to Eastern Europe. The Cold War ended not with a bang or even a whimper, but with a messy, murky series of events that sounds tidy only in a history book version. In the second essay of the segment on the redefining of traditional international relations, Maria Raquel Freire and Teresa Cierco analyze the demanding challenges brought about by the integration of Central and Eastern Europe into international organizations, particularly the NATO and the EU. Following a three-vector approach that includes civil society, global economic forces, and NATO and EU membership, the authors parallel the European integration process with the global integration process by following the example of Poland. The authors note that most of the internal democratic reform and Polish external policy choices have reinforced the regional and global integration processes, but some also challenge established powers and rules. Like the other authors in this issue, Freire and Cierco are positive about the prospects of improvements in the general conditions of the new EU accession countries, but they warn that the EU and NATO enlargements also carry significant potential dangers. The lack of depth regarding democratic conditions in the EU member

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countries and the fragile economies of Central and Eastern Europe could easily wreck the progress that has already been made. To avoid exactly such a scenario when particular countries fall behind in a common project, the liberal school of international relations has traditionally advocated cooperation as a way of advancing national interest. How exemplarily Germany has combined the traditional realist agenda with supporting globalization is Randal Newnham’s main argument in the third chapter of the segment on the changing nature of international relations in Central and Eastern Europe. Two of Germany’s prime goals have been to widen the Union and to deepen its supranational characteristics. Newnham’s essay elaborates on the roots of and reasons for the many decades of German support for the EU’s eastward expansion, especially its steadfast support for the quick entry of Poland. By combining the protection of its own national interest with a broadly integrative agenda, Germany’s historically strong, but often controversial, special connection with the Central and Eastern European countries (both the new EU members and Russia) also bring the country more political leverage in the EU. Germany’s newfound strong political position fully affects the direction the EU takes. In addition to building the EU as a supranational and globally powerful institution according to its interests due to its careful diplomacy, Germany could negotiate other difficult and indeed nearly taboo topics such as the German minorities, relations to Russia, and energy dependence. National interest demonstrated once more how deeply it is interwoven with interpretations of security and development regarding the integration of Central and Eastern Europe to global and regional institutions. While both Poland and the Czech Republic cultivated and benefited from Germany’s special support for their entry to the EU, these two postcommunist countries developed remarkably different relationships with their EU partners. Reviewing how and why the Czech Republic and Poland chose different paths during the course of regional and global integration, Brˇ etislav Dancˇa´k and Vı´ t Hlousˇ ek argue that these countries see themselves and the best way to pursue their interests very differently in their current political environment. In addition to their distinct historical heritage and geographic location, the succession of various Central and Eastern European initiatives to create a common regional voice trained each country to find their now characteristic voice. While the authors note that the Czech Republic’s policy of accommodation and the Polish policy of initiation within the EU are not contrary responses to being a member of a globally powerful organization but rather a different emphasis on how they see the most fruitful mechanism of advancing their own and the EU’s agenda, the

Introduction

17

routes of their diplomatic demeanor have emerged as rather distinct options for the Central and Eastern Europeans (and others) to choose from, align with, or reject. In the cases of the Czech and Polish foreign policy choices, the emerging aspects of supraterritoriality have engendered further differentiation according to perceived national interests. Searching for and finding new routes of self-expression in international relations continues to be the main theme in Part III of this volume. The third section charts the remarkable entry of newcomers who wish to exert pressure on decision-makers in the field of international relations. One of the foremost effects of globalization has been the proliferation of non-governmental forces affecting global and domestic political events. The three essays in this segment not only show how globalization assisted the emergence of civil society and social movements in Central and Eastern Europe, but also highlight how the associations that form these movements reflect and affect globalization itself. Discussing the influence of global norms on domestic violence policies and movement activism in post-communist Europe, Katalin Fa´biań analyzes how the Polish, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, and Slovene governments reacted to domestic, EU, UN, and other global pressures to establish new norms related to domestic violence. Globalization and EU integration have been particularly effective instruments for introducing new norms of behavior related to democratization and human rights to the Central and Eastern European states and their inhabitants. Reviewing the causes of why recommendations from feminist NGOs that choose to transmit Western definitions and policies on domestic violence met with limited success sheds some light on how norms develop and diffuse. The interactions between governments, domestic, and international social movement organizations, the EU, and the UN inform us about one particular, gender-sensitive perspective of how democratic processes and respect for human rights have fared in Central and Eastern Europe. In the second essay of this segment, Zˇiva Humer continues the gendersensitive analysis of policy changes in Central and Eastern Europe. In her analysis of the adoption of equal opportunity legislation in Slovenia and other Central and Eastern European countries, Humer notes that this policy disregards the distinct political, economic, and cultural histories of the region and pays no attention to the effects of the communist era on gender relations. The homogenization of standards for gender equality in the EU memberstates did not empower women in Central and Eastern Europe and the topdown implementation of this policy in recent EU member-states undermined the only recently established legitimacy of the democratic process.

KATALIN FA´BIAŃ

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Like Humer, Lars Hallstrom, in the third essay in this segment, also calls for replacing the top-down mechanism of decision-making with better democratic consultation and inclusion of the public in higher-level leadership circles. Even though the environmental movements have been becoming more interconnected and vocal both in Europe and worldwide, Hallstrom notes the marginalization of Central and Eastern Europe’s less technically savvy NGOs in global and especially EU circles. Interviewing Czech and Polish environmental organizations, and government and EU officials, Hallstrom scrutinizes the radical differentiation among environmental social movement organizations that appear as a consequence of the NGOs encountering the EU’s technocratic elite. The marginalization of the less professionalized environmental NGOs may be an unintended consequence of EU integration, but this democratic deficit is an effect that global and regional organizations have previously encountered and need to pay attention to. As whole societies have been remade since 1989, the two sides of Europe that had officially glowered at each other across barbed wire for decades are now slowly settling down together. The contributors to this volume have considered what national and community leaders, scholars, and practitioners can learn from Central and Eastern Europe’s varied experiences in the globalizing world, and they examine the concept of globalization and the change in power from historical, cultural, institutional, economic, political, and sociological perspectives. From within this wide framework of change in Central and Eastern Europe, they attempt to provide a balanced overview of current evidence regarding the political, economic, and social effects of globalization. This book not only offers new information to scholars of Central and Eastern Europe, but it can also serve as a comprehensive introduction for more general readers interested in the discussions of the impact of EU enlargement, democratic transitions, and changing notions of political economy, foreign policy, and social movements in the new EU accession countries. These essays provide a foray into important debates on contemporary Europe and exemplify how intense the answers can be to long-familiar questions that globalization now poses anew.

REFERENCES Ash, T. G. (1990). The magic lantern: The revolution of ‘89 witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague. New York: Random House.

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Barnett, M., & Finnemore, M. (2004). Rules for the world: International organizations in global politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Bayes, J., Begne, P., Gonzalez, L., Harder, L., Hawkesworth, M., & Macdonald, L. (Eds). (2006). Women, democracy, and globalization in North America: A comparative study. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Beissinger, M. (2002). Nationalist mobilization and the collapse of the Soviet State. New York: Cambridge University Press. Berezin, M., & Schain, M. (Eds). (2003). Europe without borders: Remapping territory, citizenship, and identity in a transnational age. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Brennan, T. (2003). Globalization and its terrors: Daily life in the West. London and New York, NY: Routledge. Browning, C. (2003). The internal/external security paradox and the reconstruction of boundaries in the Baltic: The case of Kaliningrad. Alternatives, 28(5), 545–581. Brunelle, D. (2007). From world order to global disorder: States markets, and dissent. Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press. Darst, R. (2001). Smokestack diplomacy. Boston, MA: MIT Press. DeBardeleben, J. (Ed.) (2005). Soft or hard borders? Managing the divide in an enlarged Europe. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. Dicken, P. (2003). Global shift: Reshaping the global economic map in the 21st century. New York: Guilford. Drori, G., Meyer, J., Ramirez, F., & Schofer, E. (2003). Science in the modern world polity: Institutionalization and globalization. Stanford: Stanford University. Dunkley, G. (2000). The free trade adventure: The WTO, the Uruguay round and globalism – a critique. London and New York, NY: Zed Books. Elsing, S. (2004). EU-Ostgrenze: Der neue eiserne Vorhang [The EU’s eastern border: The new iron curtain]. Cafe´ Babel: The European Magazine, June 25. Also available at http:// www.cafebabel.com/en/article.asp?T=T&Id=2008. (Accessed on February 07, 2007). Eschle, C. (2001). Global democracy, social movements, and feminism. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Evans, P. (1997). The eclipse of the state? World Politics, 50, 62–87. Fish, S. (1995). Democracy from scratch: Opposition and regime in the new Russian revolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Friedman, T. (2005). The world is flat: A brief history of the twenty-first century. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Glatzer, M., & Rueschemeyer, D. (Eds). (2005). Globalization and the future of the welfare state. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. Guidry, J., Kennedy, M., & Zald, M. (Eds). (2001). Globalizations and social movements: Culture, power and the transnational public sphere. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan. de Haas, M. (2001). An analysis of Soviet, CIS and Russian military doctrines 1990–2000. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 14(4), 1–34. Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D., & Perraton, J. (1999). Global transformations: Politics, economics and culture. Standord, CA: Stanford University Press. Hough, J. (1997). Democratization and revolution in the USSR, 1985–1991. Washington: Brooking Institution Press. Huntington, S. (1991). The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Katzenstein, P. (2005). A world of regions: Asia and Europe in the American imperium. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

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Kaufman, R. & Nelson, J. (Eds). (2004). Crucial needs, weak incentives: Social sector reform, democratization, and globalization in Latin America. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press in cooperation with Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Keck, M., & Sikkink, K. (1997). Activist beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Kempe, I. & van Meurs, W. (2002). Prospects and risks: Beyond EU enlargement. Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research, Center for Applied Policy Research. Munich, Germany: Ludwig Maximillian University. Also available at http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/ download/2002/2002_prospects_risks.pdf (Accessed on February 07, 2007). Kotkin, S. (2001). Armageddon averted: The Soviet collapse 1970–2000. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kramer, M. (2003). The collapse of the Soviet Union. Journal of Cold War Studies, 5(4), 3–42. Kutchins, A. (Ed.) (2002). Russia after the fall. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Laible, J., & Barkey, H. (Eds). (2006). European responses to globalization. Oxford, UK: Elsevier. Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Lakoff, R. (2004). From Ancient Greece to Iraq, The power of the word exists even in times of war. New York Times, Science Section, May 18. Larsson, T. (2001). The race to the top: The real story of globalization. Washington, DC: CATO Institute. Mittelman, J. (2002). Globalization: An ascendant paradigm? International Studies Perspectives, 3, 1–14. Mol, A. (2003). Globalization and environmental reform. Boston, MA: MIT Press. Ost, D. (2005). The defeat of solidarity: Anger and politics in postcommunist Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Pfaller, A., & Lerch, M. (Eds). (2005). Challenges of globalization: New trends in international politics and society. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Pickvance, K. (1998). Democracy and environmental movements in Eastern Europe: A comparative study of Hungary and Russia. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. della Porta, D., Kriesi, H., & Rucht, D. (1999). Social movements in a globalizing world. London: Palgrave. Richmond, Y. (2003). Cultural exchange and the cold war: Raising the iron curtain. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Roett, R., & Paz, G. (Eds). (2003). Latin America in a changing global environment. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Rosenau, J. (2003). Distant proximities: Dynamics beyond globalization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Sassen, S. (1991). The global city. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Scholte, J. (2005). Globalization: A critical introduction (2nd ed.). Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Shane, S. (1994). Dismantling utopia: How information ended the Soviet Union. Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee Publisher. Silver, B. (2003). Forces of labor: Workers’ movements and globalization since 1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University. Slaughter, A. (2004). A new world order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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Tarrow, S. (2005). The new transnational activism. New York: Cambridge University Press. Thomas, D. (2001). The Helsinki effect: International norms, human rights, and the demise of communism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Vachudova´, M. (2005). Europe undivided: Democracy, leverage, and integration after communism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Wallander, C. (2003). Western policy and the demise of the Soviet Union. Journal of Cold War Studies, 5(4), 137–177. Walters, E. (1988). The other Europe: Eastern Europe to 1945. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Wejnert, B. (2005). Diffusion, development, and democracy 1800-1999. American Sociological Review, 70(1), 53–81. Westbrook, D. (2004). City of gold: An apology for global capitalism in a time of discontent. New York: Routledge.


PART I: CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY


SUPRATERRITORIALITY, EMBEDDEDNESS, OR BOTH? FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE Nina Bandelj ABSTRACT Does the rise of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Central and Eastern Europe lead to supraterritoriality? The analysis of FDI flows between world investor countries and Central and East European (CEE) hosts between 1989 and 2000 shows that the majority of FDI flows into CEE in this period do not exemplify a trend of undifferentiated transcendence of post-communist borders. Rather, FDI flows continue to be based in territoriality and embedded in existing social relations between investor and host countries: migration and trade flows, historical ties, political alliances, and cultural affinities. Nevertheless, the rhetoric supporting the opening of post-communist countries to FDI is widespread and consistent with the neoliberal credo, which has acquired a supraterritorial character. Ultimately, we see that embeddedness and supraterritoriality co-exist but they manifest themselves for distinct FDI phenomena: the concrete economic practice and the economic rhetoric, respectively.

Globalization: Perspectives from Central and Eastern Europe Contemporary Studies in Economic and Financial Analysis, Volume 89, 25–63 Copyright r 2007 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1569-3759/doi:10.1016/S1569-3759(07)89001-2

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1. INTRODUCTION One of the key indicators of economic globalization has been the rise in foreign direct investment (FDI), pronounced as ‘‘one of the most stable and economically important of the international capital flows’’ (Jensen, 2006, p. 23). The dramatically increasing amount of world FDI flows in the past three decades demonstrates the growing intensity of global exchanges and an ever-more prominent role of transnational corporations (TNCs) in creating a global economy. While in 1970, annual world FDI flows were US$12 million; by 2000, FDI inflows increased dramatically to $1.4 trillion. In the 1980s, FDI stock accounted, on average, for only about 5 percent of countries’ GDP. After less than 15 years, it increased more than four-fold to 22 percent (UNCTAD, 2006).1 FDI is investment made by a company in the investor country into a foreign, host country. The objective of FDI is to obtain a lasting interest and an active role in a company located in the host country. The lasting interest in the form of investment implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the investor and the host as well as a significant degree of influence by an investor on the management of a company in a host country. Hence, FDI is usually classified as investment of 10 percent or more of in the host firm, as opposed to portfolio investment, which refers to purchase of minority equity shares.2 There are two main types of FDI. First, FDI can take the form of foreign acquisition, in which the investor obtains a partial or full ownership in an existing company in a host country. Second, foreign investors can establish new companies in the host country, referred to as greenfield investment, wholly foreign-owned or in partnership with domestic investors (Dunning & Rojec, 1993). FDI has been considered as particularly important for Central and East European (CEE) countries.3 International financial organizations and many foreign and domestic economic advisors have proclaimed FDI as an engine in the transition to market and a powerful force for integration of this region into the global economy (IMF, 1997; UNCTAD, 1998). They shared a sentiment that ‘‘without massive inflows of foreign capital, successful transition [from planned to market economies] in Central and Eastern Europe is unlikely’’ (Schmidt, 1995, p. 268). As a catalyst in the transition from socialist command economy, FDI was thought to affect key macroeconomic indicators such as the balance of payments and employment. Foreign investors would bring financial, managerial, and technological resources to induce corporate restructuring in formerly stateowned enterprises and have positive spill-over effects on domestic firms

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(Meyer, 1995, 1998; Lankes & Venables, 1996; OECD, 1998; Bevan & Estrin, 2004). Indeed, while FDI was restricted before 1989, foreign investors started entering the region after the fall of the communist regimes.4 Liberalization of formerly closed socialist economies to foreign capital has been an integral part of market transition, the re-establishment of private property rights and competitive market exchange in CEE. The initial FDI inflows were minimal in absolute numbers but have grown rapidly since 1995. As a result, 15 years into the transition period, CEE countries have accumulated substantial FDI stock compared to the size of these post-communist5 economies. Since 1995, average FDI stock as percent share in GDP for CEE has been higher than the world average; by 2004, it was almost twice as high, contributing on average to 39 percent of GDP (Table 1). This puts CEE among the world’s top regions in terms of foreign capital penetration.6 The influx of FDI may really be ‘‘the most momentous structural force in the [post-communist] transformation process’’ (Bo¨ro¨cz, 2001, p. 1163). How to understand FDI in CEE? From one perspective, a substantial presence of transnational corporations (TNCs) and other private foreign investors may be a clear indicator of intensifying ‘‘transplanetary’’ connections and extending ‘‘supraterritoriality’’ (Scholte, 2005, p. 3) across postcommunist countries. Alternatively, FDI flows into CEE may indicate opening of the region’s borders and increased internationalization after the fall of communist regimes; but these capital flows nevertheless remain embedded in pre-existing international relations and are not a distinctly transborder and supraterritorial phenomenon. In this chapter, I examine FDI in 11 CEE countries that have either joined the European Union (EU) in May 2004 or have started the negotiation process: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The goal of the analysis is to find out which characterization, supraterritoriality or embeddedness best reflects the empirical trends in the flow of FDI in CEE. In particular, I consider whether there are any patterns between investor–host country relations and consequent FDI flows between them. I also pay special attention to the institutional and ideational forces that support FDI into CEE, in particular memberships in international organizations, EU integration, and the influence of neoliberal ideology on the openness to FDI as a development strategy. Based on the analysis of FDI flows between world investor countries and CEE host countries from 1989 to 2000, I argue that the majority of actual FDI flows into CEE in this period do not exemplify a trend of supraterritorialization and therefore undifferentiated transcendence of post-communist

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Table 1.

Foreign Direct Investment Trends.

FDI Inflows ($ billion)a

1970 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Average FDI Stock as % GDPb

CEE

World

CEE

World

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o1 o1 2 3 4 4 10 9 10 18 19 21 22 25 17 28

13 55 69 59 57 59 58 87 140 165 193 208 161 169 228 259 341 393 488 701 1,092 1,397 826 716 633 648

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o1 2 2 5 7 9 10 12 16 19 23 27 31 35 37 39

– 5 5 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 10 12 14 16 18 20 21 22 22

Note: Central and Eastern Europe (CEE): includes Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Source: UNCTAD (2006). a Cumulative FDI inflows in a particular year. b Average for the region/world.

borders. Rather, these flows of private foreign investment are embedded in existing social relations between investor and host countries: migration and trade flows, historical ties, political alliances, and cultural affinities. As such, most FDI flows into CEE continue to be differentiated based on territoriality. Nevertheless, the political rhetoric supporting economic liberalization in CEE is widespread and consistent with the universalizing neoliberal credo that advocates the removal of all barriers to free trade and capital flows and,


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moreover, adoption of provisions that encourage FDI. All this is to a large extent due to the rise of supraterritoriality. We therefore see two distinct and rather contrasting outcomes of globalization in CEE with respect to concrete economic practice, on the one hand, and economic rhetoric, on the other. The ideas of neoliberalism and its interpretation of FDI as a viable (and recommended) company strategy and country economic development policy have traveled widely and relatively uniformly in the policy circles of CEE, integrating this region into a transnational culture, which encourages and is encouraged by supraterritoriality. However, the economic practice of FDI in actual locales, where it takes place, has remained significantly differentiated by territoriality and nationality. When we bring these two observations together, it becomes apparent that supraterritoriality and embeddedness are co-existing, but they manifest themselves for different phenomena. In the next section, I first elaborate on the concepts of supraterritoriality and embeddedness. Then, I explicate how different kinds of social relations – migration and trade ties, historical connections, political alliances, and cultural affinities – structure FDI flows between countries. The fourth section presents actual FDI trends in CEE and the distribution of flows by different investor country of origin into 11 post-communist host countries by 2000. The fifth section underscores the institutional and ideational processes of economic liberalization in CEE and the role of international organizations and domestic politics in the relatively uniform adoption of neoliberal FDI policy across the region. The conclusion reiterates that embedded economic practice of FDI and supraterritorial cultural logic are mutually constitutive and emphasizes the importance of distinguishing the effects of globalization for different levels of analysis (local, national, and transnational) and for various aspects of this multiplex phenomenon.

2. ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: SUPRATERRITORIALITY OR EMBEDDEDNESS? Although the actual phenomenon of cross-country exchanges in capital, people, ideas, and technology is certainly not novel (Sklair, 1991; Sassen, 1996; Lechner & Boli, 2000), the term ‘‘globalization’’ appeared only in the early 1970s, with globalization debates in popular press and academic discourse growing exponentially ever since (Fiss & Hirsch, 2005). Indeed, one would be hard pressed to find a person who denies that in the recent decades the world has witnessed, at least some, time-space compression

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(Harvey, 1989) and ‘‘greater interdependence and mutual awareness (reflexivity) among economic, political, and social units in the world, and among actors in general’’ (Guilleń, 2001a, p. 236). Analysts are urged to consider the global economy, polity, and culture when studying what have traditionally been considered domestic affaires (Evans, 1997; Berger, 2000; Guilleń, 2001b; Brady, Beckfield, & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2005; Gereffi, 2005). But whether globalization is ‘‘civilizing, destructive, or feeble’’ remains an open question as Guilleń (2001a) asks in a review of the globalization literature (p. 235). From a practical standpoint, it is unlikely that we can uniformly characterize diverse and complex processes, all captured under the umbrella term ‘‘globalization.’’ The many scholars studying these issues have shown that it has various manifestations and consequences for: cities (Sassen, 1991), welfare state (Brady et al., 2005), democracy (Schwartzman, 1998; Wejnert, 2005), science (Drori, Meyer, Ramirez, & Schofer, 2003), social movements and activism (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; della Porta, Kriesi, & Rucht, 1999; Guidry, Kennedy, & Zald, 2001), labor (Silver, 2003), environment (Frank, Hironaka, & Schofer, 2000), and economy (Hirst & Thompson, 1999; Chase-Dunn, Kawano, & Brewer, 2000; Dicken, 2003; Gereffi, 2005), among others. Besides paying attention to its many diverse empirical manifestations, scholars have also called for analytical precision in using the term globalization. Scholte (2005) has urged to conceptualize globalization as a distinct phenomenon, different from internationalization, liberalization, universalization, or westernization. For Scholte (2005), internationalization refers to growth in interdependence between countries because of the increased frequency of various cross-border transactions. Liberalization denotes ‘‘a process of removing officially imposed constraints on movements of resources between countries in order to form an ‘open’ and ‘borderless’ world economy’’ (p. 56). Universalization captures the increased homogenization and standardization across the whole globe, and Westernization as a subset of universalization, denotes the spread of Western modernity principles such as capitalism, rationalism, and individualism, across the world (ibid., pp. 55–59). In contrast to these conceptualizations, which most scholars and observers have equated with ‘‘globalization,’’ Scholte (2005) identifies ‘‘globalization as the spread of transplanetary – and in recent times also more particularly supraterritorial – connections between people’’ (p. 59). This implies that global relations are characteristically transplanetary because they can link persons situated at any point on the globe. Globalization is the phenomenon that reduces barriers to such linkages. Moreover, such relations are supraterritorial because they ‘‘substantially


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transcend territorial geography y territorial locations, territorial distances and territorial borders’’ (ibid., p. 61). Bearing these distinctions in mind, there are at least two different ways to understand the practice of FDI in CEE, which I refer to as the supraterritoriality and the embeddedness theses. On the one hand, as an extension of the supraterritoriality conception, we could consider corporations which invest beyond their national borders as key engines that contribute to transplanetary linkages, and as such, encourage supraterritoriality. With the tremendous increase of FDI flows in the past couple of decades, as indicated in Fig. 1, foreign investors seem to defy national boundaries and seemingly easily cross territorial distances, bringing similar products and services to everyone, and thus encouraging a transplanetary experience of the contemporary world for everyone, including CEEs. We can derive two assumptions about foreign firms’ decision making on the basis of the supraterritoriality thesis. First, to encourage supraterritoriality, investors’ decisions are not very differentiated or adapted to the host-location context.

1600

25 FDI Inflows (left Y axis) FDI Stock (right Y axis)

1400

1000

15

800 10

600

FDI stock (% GDP)

FDI inflows ($ billion)

20 1200

400 5 200 0 1970

0 1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

Fig. 1. World FDI Trends (1970–2003). Note: FDI inflows record the amount of FDI sent from all the world’s investor countries in a single year. FDI stock records the total stock of FDI accumulated in foreign countries by a particular year. This is why the FDI inflows trend shows much more volatility than the FDI stock one. Source: UNCTAD (2006).

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Second, it follows that it is investors who are solely responsible for an FDI effort to be initiated and successfully realized. The actors on the host side of the FDI transactions seem to be mere passive receivers of these efforts. Powerful, usually Western, firms looking for profit-maximization invest where they want to invest because the whole world is one big market in their eyes. This is also consistent with the general equilibrium theory in international economics (Hymer, 1976 [1960]; Basi, 1963; Aharoni, 1966; Vernon, 1971; Stopford & Wells, 1972; Dunning, 1980, 1981, 1993; Jun & Singh, 1996; Markusen, 1995; Meyer, 1995, 1998; Billington, 1999; Wheeler & Moody, 1992; for review see Chakrabarti, 2001).7 Based on this perspective, we would expect that those post-communist countries that have been more economically prosperous have been able to attract more FDI, and that there is little differentiation in investor country of origin across individual host countries. On the other hand, in contrast to the supraterritoriality and the general equilibrium theory, the activities that corporations undertake outside of their (home) national contexts can be analyzed from an economic sociology perspective. This perspective emphasizes the social embeddedness of economic processes: i.e., the fact that economic actions are shaped by social structures, distributions of power, and cultural understandings, which all shape economic outcomes (Zukin & DiMaggio, 1990; for a review, see Smelser & Swedberg, 2005). The economic sociology perspective follows Max Weber’s ([1922] 1978) conceptualization of economic action as social action because in the processes of production, consumption, distribution, and exchange, actors orient their behavior toward each other and attribute meaning to each other’s actions. This leads economic sociologists to consider economic action, including FDI, as always relational and context dependent. The embeddedness perspective also builds on Karl Polanyi’s work about the institutional bases of the economy, whereby any economic arrangements, be it markets, redistribution, or reciprocity, are ‘‘embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic and non-economic’’ (Polanyi, 1957, p. 248). Therefore, from an economic sociology perspective, we can understand FDI transactions as social relations, embedded in social structures, power, and culture (Bandelj, 2002, 2007). Structural conditions encompass the influence of repeated patterns of social interaction, which can take form of social networks or social institutions. Both social networks and social institutions are influential for the choice of FDI locations and for the institutionalization of FDI as a legitimate development strategy of host countries.8 The economic sociology perspective also claims that the role of power is evident in any economic exchange because of the uneven distribution


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of resources, which gives rise to issues of control, and stimulates pursuits of political interests and power struggles between potential investors and hosts, as well as within corporations. Moreover, for economic sociologists culture affects economy because shared collective understandings and meanings shape the construction of economic goals and conceivable strategies to reach them. In something particular to cross-border exchanges such as FDI, cultural conceptions are also brought to bear in the process of differentiation between economic partners based on their national origin, so that American investment is not interpreted in the same way as German investment, for instance. Overall, the embeddedness perspective implies that, while some TNCs may appear ubiquitous, most corporations investing abroad will not move with the same ease across national borders. This is because most corporations engaging in FDI have clearly national origins and these will matter in their foreign investment efforts.9 In addition, the social conditions at potential host sites and the ties that hosts have to certain investor countries but not others lead to differential presence of international corporations in different parts of the world. This differentiation implies that the practice of FDI, considered so central to economic globalization, is not mostly contributing to supraterritoriality but that it reinforces embeddedness of actual economic transactions in existing international relations between investor and host countries. Moreover, in line with the embeddedness perspective, the Weberian emphasis on economic transactions as social relations presupposes agency, albeit with power asymmetries, by both sides to the exchange, i.e., investors and hosts. The economics conception that FDI is determined by profitmaximizing efforts of investors largely ignores the involvement of actors from the host side of FDI transactions. Or, this investor-centered perspective implies that the hosts passively accept investors’ efforts. However, by definition, FDI is an economic relation between two parties involved in the transaction. Consequently, the more in-depth analysis of FDI must take into account the actions of both investors and hosts and the relations between them. In doing so, we can examine how not only Western foreign investors but also hosts on the periphery influence the FDI process by asserting their interests, as well as making FDI transactions a site for possible resistance to globalization (cf. Guilleń, 2001a, 2001b, 2002a). Ultimately, this suggests that FDI will not be shaped only by the economic characteristics of host countries (as input for investors’ calculations of risk and return) but will be channeled through networks of social relations between countries. If so, then the national territorial origins of investors and FDI’s territorial destinations will play an important role in structuring the allocation of FDI.

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In sum, the conceptualization of globalization as supraterritoriality has specific implications for the penetration of FDI throughout CEE. If FDI is integral to the process characterized by transcendence of national borders and supraterritoriality, then the international corporations move seamlessly across any national border to host destinations that promise maximum profits. This would imply that those CEE countries which are more economically prosperous, i.e., have higher GDP levels than their counterparts, are more desired by profit-maximizing investors and thus attract more FDI.10 In contrast, when we examine empirical trends in CEE, we see that the relationship between GDP and FDI stock in 11 CEE countries is quite weak (Fig. 2). This prompts us to investigate whether political, economic, and cultural relations that CEE countries have with different investor countries are consequential for the allocation of FDI in CEE, as the embeddedness perspective implies. Such a finding would also support the position that receivers of international capital do not passively accept and welcome the entry of foreign corporations but play an important role in shaping the demand for FDI: they particularize the seemingly uniform global pressures and differentiate across investors from different national origins.

60 Estonia

FDI stock as % GDP

50

Hungary Czech R.

40 Latvia

30 Lithuania

20

Bulgaria Romania

Poland

Slovakia

Croatia

4,000

6,000 8,000 GDP per capita

Slovenia

10

0 0

2,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

Fig. 2. Relationship between Economic Prosperity and FDI Stock in CEE (2000). Note: Data are for 2000. Sources: EBRD (2001) and UNCTAD (2006).


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3. HOW SOCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN COUNTRIES INFLUENCE FDI FLOWS If FDI is embedded in social relations, as economic sociologists would expect, then the various types of links between economic actors in investor countries and those in host countries will play a role in the allocation of FDI at the aggregate level. Consider the following illustration of the importance of relations for economic action. Chicago’s Polonia is considered the largest local community of Polish Americans (Lopata, 1994, p. xxi). Established in late 1860s (Granacki, 2004, p. 9), it is a home for many of almost 10 million Americans who report some Polish ancestry (Erdmans, 1998, p. 16). At the end of 1970s and early 1980s, many Poles came to Chicago’s Polonia to escape the political turmoil of the last decade of the Communist rule. Several of these immigrants were university-educated men and women involved with the Solidarity movement that eventually led Poland’s first post-communist government. Even if their involvement in Solidarity had been minimal, they found little prospects for professional development in their homeland after the Communist government banned Solidarity in 1981. Bogdan Pukszta was one such man. As a young intellectual in his 30s, with a diploma in American Literature from the University of Si"esia, Pukszta left a life he characterized as ‘‘very depressing’’ in 1982 to come to Chicago where his parents and other relatives already lived. Chicago was ‘‘a place he had long dreamed of going, ever since he had written his thesis in Poland on the Chicago renaissance in American literature. Soon, he was another all-American immigrant success story’’ (Ungar, 1998, pp. 230–231). After the collapse of Polish communism, in the fall of 1989, Pukszta helped launch the Polish American Economic Forum and became its president in 1992. The goal of this Forum was promotion of private foreign investment in Poland. Erdmans contends that the Forum’s objective was clearly intertwined with the social and political ties that new immigrants and Polish Americans had with Poland: New immigrants created Forum to show support for the new Solidarity government by promoting and facilitating foreign investment in Poland’s private market y . New immigrants were eager to show their support by helping the new government develop a new market economy. Forum leaders who were immigrants defined economic support of the private market in Poland as a political act. Investment dollars were cast as a form of political demonstration. One leader said, Forum ‘is nothing more than an idea to make another demonstration – only without the rotten eggs.’ The political theme of Forum was its emphasis that investment dollars would contribute to the collective good – an

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NINA BANDELJ economically stable Poland. However strongly these economic objectives were emphasized, immigrants maintained that Forum was also a political organization and that supporting the new economy was a political act. In a questionnaire completed by 98 of the 170 people who attended Forum’s inaugural meeting, 70 percent of the respondents said they became involved in Forum for political reasons y . For example, one respondent said, ‘‘It’s our responsibility to bring help to our nation’’; other respondents echoed this sentiment, describing their membership in Forum as a ‘‘duty’’ and ‘‘obligation’’ in order ‘‘to help’’ Poland ‘‘our fatherland.’’ In my survey of 109 Forum members, 73 percent of the respondents indicated that they had joined Forum ‘‘to help Poland’’. (Erdmans, 1998, p. 173)

The establishment of the Polish American Economic Forum in Chicago after the fall of the Communist regime in Poland is a telling example of how foreign private investment into CEE is shaped by social, political, and cultural forces.11 Moreover, this example is a clear indication of the relational nature of foreign investment processes. The Polish American Economic Forum was not just a collection of profit-minded investors searching for the best investment opportunities in CEE, comparing countries to each other (and to destinations in Asia and Latin America), and then deciding on the location that promises the highest profits. Not at all. The Forum – a result of long-term migration ties between two countries – was an economic entity that promoted investments between two specific countries: American FDI into Poland. Based on this example, we can also infer that FDI, as economic exchange between different countries, is to a significant degree rooted in existing international relations. But what kind of relations stimulate FDI? First, countries build contacts with each other through exchanges of people and goods via migration and trade flows. These ties create personal and business networks, which will be later used to facilitate FDI transactions. Second, historical ties based on the frequency of interactions between the potential investor and potential host countries influence the level of knowledge that two parties coming from these countries possess of each other and make the transactions between those countries more likely. Third, states as political actors forge formal and informal political alliances with other states, which can be the basis of tighter economic investment relations between politically affiliated countries as opposed to others where those ties are less pronounced. Forth, nationality as a form of identity has particular cultural understandings and meanings associated with it (conveyed through language, customs, and frames of reference) and those meanings shape contacts between actors from different nations. Economic actors perceive those with certain national/ethnic backgrounds as more and others as less likely partners in transactions. This leads to differentiation of potential investment


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partners based on their national origin. Let us examine each of these relations in more detail.

3.1. Pre-Existing Migration and Trade Ties between Investors and Hosts As the case of Polish American Economic Forum indicated, countries can have an established network of personal and business connections between them which are used to facilitate FDI transactions. Two main types of such networks influence the choice of foreign investment sites: (a) business networks between foreign firms and companies in a host country, and (b) personal networks among affiliates of a specific host country and foreign investor firms. A potential investor firm can have its own established networks in a foreign country because it had previous trading relations with that country. Consider Glaxo, a large U.K. pharmaceuticals manufacturer that decided to invest in the Czech Republic. Glaxo decided to establish a subsidiary in the Czech Republic in 1993 to take advantage of the expanding market opportunities there y . Glaxo had had a representative office in Czechoslovakia for 15 years prior to the decision to establish a subsidiary. Although this was only a small office and sales were not large, this prior experience was beneficial when the subsidiary was established, both as the office already had some knowledge of the country and the market, and as Glaxo already had an established image and its name and products were known to some extent in the country. (Estrin, Hughes, & Todd, 1997, p. 71)

Consistent with this example, Rojec et al. (2001) report in a comprehensive overview of FDI in Slovenia that almost all large FDI investment efforts in that country were a result of previously existing business cooperation between the investor and host firm. In addition, a 1998 survey in Slovenia found that foreign investors listed the links between companies as one of the key factors guiding their choice of investment locations (TIPO, 1998). Based on these findings for Slovenia, we would expect that, more generally, established business ties between investors and hosts, aggregated in country-level business networks, will have a positive effect on future FDI between them.12 A decision to invest abroad can also be influenced by personal networks. De Mortanges and Caris’ (1994) study of Dutch investments in CEE identified promoters within a firm as very influential in foreign investment decisions. Promoters are people who personally made a case for investment because they had personal or other affiliate ties to a specific host country. Dobosiewicz (1992) argued that affiliation to a host country is often based on ethnic ties between sizeable and relatively affluent expatriate communities and their home countries. The investments facilitated by the Polish American

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Economic Forum described earlier could certainly be considered in this regard, as are many other FDI efforts where migrants serve as mediators. Consider Tom Kovac, a U.S. citizen, professional lobbyist and third generation Slovenian who had a vested personal interest in attracting American companies to Slovenia. Kovac met representatives of Telcomp, an American Telecommunications company through his lawyer’s office that was also servicing Telcomp. He suggested that the company look into investing in Slovenia in 2000. Telcomp was at that point considering several other investment sites and decided to look into the opportunities in Slovenia based on Kovac’s recommendation and his willingness to gather additional information about this opportunity for them. Since any foreign investor entering the Slovenian telecommunications sector needed to apply for an approval with the authorized State agency, Kovac called on his friendship with Jan Perko, a Slovenian state official to help gather the necessary documents. In my conversation with Perko, he was firm in his opinion that Telcomp had no chance in proceeding with its foreign investment without relying on an insider like him. He also said that he got involved primarily because of his friendship with Kovac, whose interest in attracting investment to Slovenia was clearly shaped by the affinity to his grandfather’s homeland.13 Why would immigrant links and contacts to particular countries influence FDI in post-communist Europe? Importantly, people with affiliations to host countries can facilitate information flows and/or lobby with potential investors. They can offer crucial information about home-countries’ political, economic, and legal systems, as well as business contacts in that country, and they can themselves facilitate transactions. All this helps interested foreign investors deal with the tremendous uncertainty that has plagued transforming CEE. Because of lack of FDI before 1989, formal mechanisms for gathering and assessing investment information had been either lacking or seriously underdeveloped (Estrin et al., 1997, p. 13). Many firms thus amassed information about investment opportunities through their business or personal ties. Personal ties might have an even more pronounced role for investments in countries which were considered extremely politically risky, such as Croatia up until the mid-1990s. Because violent political conflicts and civil war subsided in this former Yugoslav republic only by 1995, it is surprising that we see substantial U.S. investments in Croatia already during this time. One explanation points to sizable Croatian immigrant communities in the U.S. Immigrant Croats have maintained particularly strong links to their home country, substantiated through a high level of remittances sent back to Croatia, according to the records of the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 1999). It is thus likely


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that U.S. investments in Croatia were initiated through personal networks based on ethnic ties between host country immigrants and investor firms. Information provided by a consultant to the Croatian Investment Promotion Agency also supports this interpretation.14 Besides relations established on the basis of migration and trade, historical ties between countries may also play an important role in shaping FDI flows.

3.2. Historical Ties between Countries Some FDI transactions that happened in CEE after 1989 should also be considered in a context of historically established ties between countries. Although, the image of an ‘‘Iron Curtain’’ implies that the border between the communist East and capitalist West was impenetrable, some of the socialist countries that bordered with the West maintained pronounced contacts with their western neighbors. Watson (1994) reports of such relationship between Estonia (when it was still part of the Soviet Union) and Finland: The independent Estonian Republic had already enjoyed an intimate relationship with Finland during the interwar period. From the 1960s onwards, the diplomacy of Finnish president Urho Kekkonen facilitated a resumption of contacts. A regular ferry service between Helsinki and Tallinn brought a steady flow of Finnish tourists, lending a cosmopolitan flavour to the Estonian capital. During the same period, access to Finnish television opened up an ‘electronic window on the West’ for the residents of northern Estonia. (p. 83)

Similarly, the socialist Yugoslavia negotiated an arrangement with neighboring Austria about special border-crossing privileges. This mostly benefited the residents from the northern-most republic of former Yugoslavia, Slovenia, which directly bordered with Austria. Those Slovenians who lived within 15 km of the Austrian border had special permits, stalne obmejne propustnice, which allowed them more frequent crossing of Austrian borders and granted them lower customs tariffs for goods purchased in Austria. As one of the holders of such a permit told me, he knew of people who would also use this privilege to work in Austria or to export and sell goods that they manufactured in their small businesses for valuable foreign currency, as well as those who used the opportunities of frequent border crossings to deposit their savings in Austrian banks.15 Historical ties based on frequent interactions between countries are important because they increase the knowledge and familiarity across different national contexts. Knowledge and understanding of the other

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country, acquired through repeated interactions and common experiences, can be very useful for economic transactions in the highly uncertain postcommunist environment. As the above examples imply, such knowledge and familiarity is likely for countries that share borders, such as Austria with Slovenia; Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia; Sweden and Finland with the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; and Greece and Turkey with Bulgaria and Romania. (As we shall see later, FDI flows between these country pairs are quite significant.) Beside the links that may be created between countries that share a border, presence of national minorities of investor country origin in the host country, or vice versa, can also stimulate familiarity. Such a presence contributes to historical experiences and interactions between people from two different national backgrounds, which creates tacit knowledge about each other’s cultures and affirms cultural ties between two nations. National minorities in CEE countries are often the result of historical divisions of now-defunct kingdoms and empires, such as Prussia, or the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which do not correspond to current state boundaries. There are also many traces of historical migration dating back to medieval Europe. In particular, the presence of German ethnic minorities in many CEE countries is notable in this regard. Prauser and Rees report that: From the thirteenth century onwards German communities migrated eastward, establishing settlements, sometimes with the active encouragement of local lords and monarchs. By the start of the twentieth century there were German speaking communities spread across Eastern Europe y and sizeable settlements within the Austro-Hungarian empire (in what was to become Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia) y . In many of these societies the German speakers occupied prominent positions as landowners, clerics, officials, whilst others were farmers and artisans. Remnants of these communities survive in many of these countries today. (Prauser & Rees, 2004, p. 3; see also Wolff, 2000)

A historical presence of an ethnic minority creates the cultural knowledge and familiarity that influence many contemporary economic links, such as FDI. In fact, writing about the German minority in Romania, Wolff (2000, p. 229) observes that ‘‘the Romanian government has long recognized the ‘value’ of its German population in order to attract foreign investment and to establish mutually beneficial bilateral relationships with Germany’’. Extending this to other CEE countries, we can expect to see a pronounced presence of German investment in post-communist countries.16 Next, we turn to another type of relations between countries that can influence FDI – political alliances.


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3.3. Political Alliances between Investors and Hosts One of the key theses of the economic sociology perspective is that economic processes are intimately intertwined with political relations. Outcomes related to FDI are no exception. For example, Sachs (1998) reports how ‘‘in 1989, post-communist Poland desperately needed a fund to stabilize the exchange rate y [and while] the IMF mission to Poland dismissed the idea of a stabilization fund y the Poles were able to lobby the United States directly’’ (p. 4). The U.S. helped establish the z"oty stabilization fund and prevent hyperinflation. Information provided in the Country Studies Series by Federal Research Division of the U.S. Library of Congress about Polish–U.S. international relations points to the strengthening of political links between the two countries after the fall of the communist regime in Poland. According to this Country Studies Series report for Poland, as a sign of its condemnation of communism, the U.S. imposed economic sanctions to Poland and vetoed Poland’s application to the IMF after Jaruzelski proclaimed the martial law in 1981 (Library of Congress, 2006). However, in the end of 1980s, when communists started giving way under the pressure of the Solidarity movement, the U.S. greeted the political developments and was committed to reward them with political and financial assistance: President Bush initially promised some US$100 million in economic assistance, and a three-year package totaling US$1 billion was proposed later in the year. In November Wa"˛esa visited Washington and addressed a joint session of the United States Congress, which greeted his unprecedented speech with promises of additional economic assistance y . The privately managed Polish-American Enterprise Fund (PAEF) was created in May 1990 to provide credit for Polish entrepreneurs to start businesses y [estimating] that it would make US$130 million in loans in 1991. Another nongovernmental organization, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, began providing loans, loan guarantees, insurance, and advice to facilitate United States private investment in Poland and other East European countries. In 1990 the United States led an international effort to create the US$200 million Polish Stabilization Fund, which was instrumental in making the zloty convertible with Western currencies. (U.S. Library of Congress, 2006)

This case illustrates that those CEE countries, which managed to develop close ties to rich and powerful states, could secure special benefits from their political alliances. Financial aid is the most obvious consequence. In addition, these alliances encourage political visits and facilitate exchanges of information between countries. In post-communism, such information may be about privatization related investment opportunities. As Stark and Bruszt (1998) report, ‘‘on June 21, 1988, Ka´roly Gro´sz [last Hungarian communist leader in power before the changes in 1989] remarked in a meeting to

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business leaders in San Francisco, ‘We would be very pleased if perhaps you would purchase some of our enterprises y even if they became 100 percent foreign owned’’’ (p. 54). The U.S. also provided assistance to postcommunist countries also in the form of IMF loans, which were given to all of these countries but Slovenia during some period between 1989 and 2000 (Vreeland, 2003).17 Therefore, if political alliances foster economic ties, we should see significant presence of U.S. investors in the CEE region, despite the fact that the geographical distances between the U.S. and CEE countries are large and resultant transaction costs high, which according to transaction economics discourages FDI. Finally, besides economic, historical, and political relations between countries, the embeddedness perspective also highlights the role of cultural ties between countries in shaping the patterns of FDI allocation in CEE. The next section considers this proposition in more detail.

3.4. Cultural Differentiation between FDI Partners Economic behavior is culturally embedded because shared collective understandings of economic strategies, goals, and actors influence economic outcomes. As Max Weber ([1922] 1978) emphasized, any economic exchange is constituted by the meaning that parties ascribe to observable (or imagined) behavior. For an economic exchange between social actors to happen, all parties involved must make sense of the transaction, that is, they must attribute meaning to it. In this process, people rely on culture, i.e., ‘‘a set of publicly shared codes or repertoires, building blocks that structure people’s ability to think and to share ideas’’ (Eliasoph & Lichterman, 2003, p. 735). These repertoires (variously also called schemas, frames, or typifications) help people make sense of the various phenomena around them, to perceive them, interpret them, and act upon them (Berger & Luckman, 1967; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Cultural embeddedness is especially important for understanding transnational processes and making cross-national comparisons (Zukin & DiMaggio, 1990, p. 19). When investment partners from different countries engage in economic transactions, as necessarily happens in FDI exchanges, nationality becomes more salient than in cases where all parties to a transaction share the same national background. The salience of nationality leads economic actors involved in the transaction to differentiate investors and hosts on the basis of their country of origin, considering some as more and others as less likely FDI partners.18 For instance, such differentiation


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came across in a remark by one of my CEE informants, a manager in a firm, which was targeted for investment by both American and German TNCs: The American mentality is to completely focus on profit, as opposed to the mentality of, let’s say, Germans. If we compare, how quickly a firm can be opened, closed, how quickly you can be dismissed with a smile y . Such an approach, this 100 percent focus on profitability and self-sufficiency y . Such narrow-mindedness also has a lot of negative effects. If we consider these threats, which were present, should we accept American capital? And on the other side, [there was] the German capital. These threats were much smaller with the Germans. The German mentality is different. There are long term alliances, partnerships, open relations, search for a common ground which satisfies both partners. These differences in mentalities, national characteristics, surely influence the amount of risk. Because the American capital, simply, if it doesn’t reach the required profit margin, it moves on. There is no sentimentality.19

Much research substantiates that management practices are not universal but culturally specific and dependent on national cultures (Bendix, 1956; Lincoln, Hanada, & Olson, 1981; Boltanski, 1990; Guilleń, 1994).20 On these grounds, hosts might be more welcoming investments that they consider closer to their cultural values and practices and resist those that are perceived as distant or threatening. Reception of an American household appliances manufacturer to buy a majority share in a Slovenian company illustrates the point of differentiation. Perceiving ‘‘the American way of doing business’’ as not caring about the workers and mercilessly downsizing, middle management of the targeted host firm mobilized workers and launched a news campaign against the U.S. investment, labeling it ‘‘a hostile take-over’’ (Delo Newspaper, 1997, p. 9). As a result, the American firm announced its withdrawal of the offer because they did not want to be perceived as having bad intentions (Bandelj, 2007). Half of this Slovenian company was later acquired by a German multinational, whose style of management was much more familiar to Slovenes due to a history of connections between the two countries. This case illustrates that investment flows are imbued with cultural significance; their place of origin can be relevant to the host’s willingness to accept them. The selective behavior also implies that when a history of conflicts exists between two countries, FDI transactions between them will not be as frequent as one might expect based on the fact that these countries share historical or trade or migration ties, for instance.21 Especially in cases where conflicts have erupted because of territorial or political disputes between two countries, FDI by one country may be interpreted as attempts to exercise control over that country. Resistance to Italian investments in Croatia in my conversation with one Croatian municipal official support

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this observation: ‘‘Our Office of External Affairs would quickly issue all the necessary investment documents to German or Swiss investors, no problem, but you know, that wouldn’t be the case for Italians.’’22 With this statement he implied that Italian investments are somehow different from, and therefore less desirable than German and Swiss ones. Indeed, this man went on to elaborate how ‘‘Italians just want to buy the whole of [Croatian] coast’’ and that Croatians ‘‘shouldn’t allow that to happen.’’22 Hostilities against Italian investments have been also present in Slovenia (Bandelj, 2006).

4. FDI TRENDS IN CEE If territoriality does not matter for global investors because they simply chase the most profitable investment locations, then social relations between countries described above should be of little consequence and we should not see significant differences in FDI flows within countries by investor country of origin. A detailed examination of FDI trends in CEE shows just the opposite. First of all, as displayed in Table 2, the top investors in CEE are not the same as top world investors. Based on total stock of investment in the region as of 2000, Germany and Netherlands ranked before the United States. In contrast, in 2000, the U.S. topped the world investor countries’ list. The U.K. and France ranked second and third in the world but they had a much less significant presence in CEE. Hong Kong was the world’s number 5 investor country but it did not have any notable investments in most postcommunist countries. On the other hand, Austria and Sweden were very prominent investor countries in CEE, placing 4th and 5th, respectively, but on the list of the world investors as of 2000, they were 23rd and 13th (UNCTAD, 2001). Table 2.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Top Investor Countries in 2000.

World

Central and Eastern Europe

United States United Kingdom France Germany Hong Kong

Germany Netherlands (#7 in the world) United States Austria (#23 in the world) Sweden (#13 in the world)

Note: Rankings are based on outward FDI stock as of 2000. Source: UNCTAD (2001).


45

Moreover, the presence of world top investor countries is not uniform across individual CEE countries (Table 3). German corporations are more prevalent in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia than the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In 2000, U.S. investment comprised about 20 percent of FDI stock in Croatia but less than 5 percent in its neighboring, more economically advanced, and politically stable former fellow Yugoslav republic, Slovenia. Estonia receives the great majority of all Finnish investment into the region. The biggest investors in Lithuania and Latvia are Denmark and Sweden, but they are much less prominent in Hungary or the Czech Republic or Poland, both of which receive the bulk of FDI into the region. Investments from Asian and Latin American and South African corporations into the region have been negligible. These trends indicate that there are significant patterns in who invests where and that activities of foreign corporations entering CEE follow a network of pre-existing relations between countries. This is consistent with the literature in economic sociology, which highlights the role of social relations in economic transactions (e.g., Granovetter, 1974, 1985; DiMaggio & Louch, 1998; Ingram & Roberts, 2000; Guseva & Rońa-Tas, 2001; for review, see Smith-Doerr & Powell, 2005). In particular, in cases where uncertainty surrounding economic transactions is high, such as in postcommunist Europe during the transition period, the role of social relations and pre-existing knowledge of potential partners in facilitating FDI transactions is even more pronounced. In this regard, we can stipulate that the uncertainty surrounding investments in foreign countries may be greater for those foreign corporations which are smaller, younger, have less experience in transnational activities, and uphold fewer standardized practices and routines. As Table 4 shows, some smaller countries, which are home to smaller TNCs, have a pronounced presence in CEE because of their preexisting relations to CEE countries. In particular, investors from Greece, a country with relatively minimal FDI outflows, have a prominent presence in Bulgaria as do investors from Cyprus and Turkey, whose FDI in Romania is also notable. Likewise, it is evident from Table 4 that Estonian and Russian companies feature prominently as investors in Latvia and Lithuania. All these FDI embeddedness trends do not align well with the expectation that flows of FDI into CEE encourage supraterritoriality. If investor companies were really transnational and host locations were undifferentiated except for their economic characteristics (which signal risk and return to investors), then the proportions of individual investor country’s FDI would be relatively similar across host countries, as all investors would perceive a particular host location as similarly (un)attractive. However, this does not

46

Table 3. Investments by Top World Investor Countries in CEE (% Share of Total FDI Stock in Host Country in 2000). World Ranking

Bulgaria

Croatia

Czech R.

Estonia

Hungary

Latvia

Lithuania

Poland

Romania

Slovakia

Slovenia

US UK France Germany Hong Kong Belgium/Luxembourg Netherlands Japan Switzerland Canada Italy Spain Sweden Australia Singapore Finland Taiwan Denmark Norway South Africa China South Korea Austria Argentina Malaysia

12 11 3 19 0 6 4 o1 3 o1 2 3 o1 o1 o1 o1 0 o1 o1 0 o1 o1 6 0 0

21 2 2 22 0 6 4 0 1 o1 2 o1 2 1 0 o1 0 o1 o1 0 0 0 25 0 0

6 3 4 26 0 5 30 o1 4 o1 o1 o1 1 o1 0 o1 o1 1 o1 0 o1 o1 11 0 o1

5 2 1 3 o1 o1 2 o1 1 o1 o1 o1 40 0 1 30 0 4 4 0 o1 0 o1 0 0

8 1 7 26 0 5 23 2 2 o1 3 o1 o1 0 o1 o1 0 o1 o1 0 o1 o1 12 0 0

9 5 o1 11 1 o1 3 0 2 o1 o1 o1 13 0 1 6 0 10 6 0 0 o1 o1 0 0

10 7 1 7 o1 4 1 o1 5 o1 o1 o1 17 o1 0 6 0 18 4 0 o1 o1 o1 0 0

10 3 12 19 o1 2 25 o1 2 o1 4 2 3 o1 o1 o1 o1 2 o1 o1 o1 o1 3 o1 0

7 5 7 11 o1 5 12 o1 2 1 7 1 1 o1 o1 o1 o1 o1 0 o1 1 5 5 0 o1

7 3 3 28 0 2 24 0 o1 o1 2 o1 o1 0 0 o1 0 o1 o1 0 0 0 14 0 0

4 4 11 12 o1 o1 3 o1 4 o1 5 0 o1 o1 o1 o1 0 1 0 0 0 0 46 0 0

Note: Significant presence is marked in bold. Data for 2000, except for Bulgaria 1999. Source: UNCTAD (2001, 2006), percentages computed by the author. The data for Romania are from Romania Factbook (2005), and pertain to 2002.

NINA BANDELJ

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Investor Country

Croatia Cyprus Czech R. Estonia Greece Hungary Poland Russia Turkey

Investment by Smaller Investor Countries in CEE (% Share of Total FDI Stock in Host Country in 2000). Bulgaria

Croatia

Czech R.

Estonia

Hungary

Latvia

Lithuania

Poland

Romania

Slovakia

Slovenia

0 10 1 0 4 o1 0 7 2

NA 0 o1 o1 0 o1 0 o1 o1

0 1 NA o1 o1 o1 0 o1 0

0 1 o1 NA 0 o1 0 1 0

0 0 o1 0 o1 NA 0 o1 o1

0 0 o1 11 o1 0 0 6 o1

0 o1 o1 6 o1 1 2 1 o1

0 o1 o1 0 o1 o1 NA 4 o1

0 8 o1 0 3 3 0 o1 4

0 0 6 0 o1 5 0 o1 o1

2 o1 4 0 0 o1 0 o1 o1


Table 4.

Note: Significant presence is marked in bold. Data for 2000, except for Bulgaria 1999. Source: UNCTAD (2001, 2006), percentages computed by the author. The data for Romania are from Romania Factbook (2005), and pertain to 2002.

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seem to be the case. Rather, when we consider those investor–host country pairs, which show high levels of FDI based on information reported in Tables 3 and 4, we can most often trace these flows to pre-existing international relations and cultural affinities between countries. Such embeddedness of economic transactions points to the persistent importance of territoriality and relevance of national origin in cross-country economic exchanges with CEE countries.23

5. FDI AND THE NEOLIBERAL CREDO Globalization does not only have structural but also many cultural manifestations. Increases in cross-border exchanges of financial capital, goods, and people are also accompanied by diffusion of ideas about appropriate economic strategies. While the practice of FDI transactions seems to remain embedded in social relations between countries rather than contribute to supraterritoriality, it would be hard to ignore the universalizing effect of neoliberal credo that has also taken a stronghold in CEE. Indeed, embeddedness of FDI practice should not be interpreted as evidence that globalization is feeble and unimportant. Rather, the difference between the universalizing character of ideas and particularized character of practice most likely indicates that globalization has differential effects for various kinds of phenomena. Many scholars have claimed that market deregulation and economic liberalization of the last two decades of the twentieth century have emerged on a global scale (e.g., Lash & Urry, 1987; Albert, 1993; Przeworski, 1995; Campbell & Pedersen, 2001). While many welcome these developments as evidence that market is finally freed to select the most efficient policies (see Posner, 1986; Williamson, 1990), others consider these changes as a result of a political project – neoliberalism – promoted by international organizations, such as IMF, the World Bank (WB), the European Bank for Restructuring and Development (EBRD), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and some national political forces, especially the U.S. and U.K. starting with the Reagan and Thatcher governments (Meyer, Boli, George, & Ramirez, 1997; Gore, 2000; Babb, 2001; Campbell & Pedersen, 2001; Carruthers, Babb, & Halliday, 2001; Brune, Garrett, & Kogut, 2004; Henisz, Zelner, & Guilleń, 2005). What is neoliberalism? As Henisz, Zelner, and Guilleń (2005) summarize [Neoliberalism] proposes to reduce the role of politics and the state in the economy so that markets may function unhindered y . [It] proposes to encourage entrepreneurship,


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investment, and long-run economic growth through reductions in subsidies, tax reforms, tax cuts, stabilization of the money supply, the free flow of trade and capital and y market-oriented reform of state-owned industries. Dozens of countries adopted elements of market-oriented reform between 1980s and 1999. Whereas in 1980s only 10 countries had adopted such an element in telecommunications and 44 had done so in electricity, these figures had respectively increased to 124 and 94 by the end of 1999. (p. 873)

Some note that the codification of the neoliberal agenda, explicitly aimed at developing countries, appeared in the so called, ‘‘Washington Consensus’’ (Williamson, 1990, p. xiii). This consensus advocated liberalization of trade and FDI, and privatization of state enterprises as vehicles to prosperity in developing countries. According to Charles Gore, Senior Economic Affairs Officer at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), [t]he introduction of the Washington Consensus involved not simply a swing from stateled to market-oriented policies, but also a shift in the ways in which development problems were framed and in the types of explanations through which policies were justified. Key changes were the partial globalization of development policy analysis, and a shift from historicism to a historical performance assessment. (2000, p. 789)

In 2000, Gore (2000) also predicted that ‘‘the demise of the Washington Consensus is inevitable because its methodology and ideology are in contradiction’’ (p. 789). Whether just a trend in economic policy-making that will soon be replaced with another set of ideas about the ‘‘right’’ way to economic development, or an indication that markets are finally let free to achieve allocative efficiency, neoliberalism undoubtedly has had a profound impact on global economics and politics, and post-1989 CEE. As Bockman and Eyal (2002) write, ‘‘[a]fter communist regimes in Eastern Europe collapsed in 1989, the new postcommunist governments have embarked, at various speeds, on neoliberal economic reforms designed to bring about rapid liberalization, macroeconomic restructuring, and, ultimately, privatization’’ (p. 310). While socialism was a mostly closed system that shied from international interactions, as soon as the Iron Curtain was lifted, CEE countries opened up to international influences, including the neoliberal policy prescriptions which international financial organizations have promoted and advocated. The package of shocktherapy reforms advocated by international advisors and many domestic leaders as the most effective approach of market transition was certainly in line with these neoliberal policy-making prescriptions (see Sachs, 1989; Lipton & Sachs, 1990; Sachs & Lipton, 1990; Blanchard, Dornbusch,

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Krugman, Layard, & Summers, 1991; Fischer & Gelb, 1991; Aslund, 1992, 1994, 1995; Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1996). As a further sign of globalization of CEE, immediately after 1989, many, if not all, CEE states sought membership in international organizations like the WTO or/and signed international agreements with the IMF. These organizations imposed a set of common standards and obligations in line with their philosophy of neoliberal economic development. For instance, signing Article VIII of the IMF agreement meant that members agreed not to ‘‘impose restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions’’ and thus facilitate cross-national financial flows (IMF, 2005a, p. 1). In addition, the EU accession process starting in the late 1990s contributed to the homogenization of economic policies across CEE countries including financial liberalization, elimination of tariffs, and openness to FDI. (Table 5 summarizes the integration of CEE in major international governmental organizations.) Besides responding to pressures from major international organizations, individual CEE countries have been changing their FDI policies also in response to their peers’ practices in the region. All this has led to efforts to provide additional incentives to foreign investors. The UNCTAD collects information and publishes reports on FDI climate in all of the world’s countries. In these reports, we can read that across the board, CEE countries are welcoming and encouraging FDI in line with the neoliberal credo (UNCTAD, 2006). It is important to acknowledge that the role of neoliberalism on political, economic, and cultural developments in post-communist CEE is not just a manifestation of an imbalance of power between the West and the East and thus an externally imposed pressure. In an insightful analysis, sociologists Johanna Bockman and Gil Eyal (2002) propose that neoliberalism’s success in Eastern Europe is in large part due to a transnational dialogue between American and East European economists in which neoliberal ideas were extensively discussed already during socialism . For instance, to facilitate this dialogue between scholars from the East and the West, the Ford Foundation had established exchanges during the Cold War with Poland (signed in 1957), Yugoslavia (1959), Hungary (1962), Romania (1965), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Bulgaria (1968). Participants in such dialogues were economists who later championed neoliberal reforms in their home countries, like Vaćlav Klaus, Prime Minister of the Czech Republic and Leszek Balcerowicz, Finance Minister from Poland. Bockman and Eyal counter a claim that neoliberalism was simply exported by Western advisors and international economic agencies to CEE. Instead they emphasize the

Integration of Central and Eastern Europe Countries into Major International Governmental Organizations (as of 2004).

Country

Europe Agreement Signed

Bulgaria

March 1993 October 2001a October 1993 June 1995 December 1991 June 1995 June 1995 December 1991 February 1993 October 1993 June 1996

Croatia Czech R. Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia

Europe Agreement into force

Application for EU Membership

EU Negotiations Begin

February 1995 –

December 1995 –

October 1999 –

February 1995 February 1998 February 1994 February 1998 February 1998 February 1994 February 1995 February 1995 February 1999

January 1996 November 1995 March 1994 October 1995 December 1995 April 1994 June 1995 June 1995 June 1996

March 1998 March 1998 March 1998 October 1999 October 1999 March 1998 October 1999 October 1999 March 1998

– – December 2002 December 2002 December 2002 December 2002 December 2002 December 2002 – December 2002 December 2002

Accession to EU

IMF Article VIII

GATT/WTO

2007 (expected) –

September 1998 May 1995 October 1995 August 1994 January 1996 June 1994 May 1994 June 1995 March 1998 October 1995 September 1995

December 1996 November 2000 January 1995 November 1999 January 1995 February 1999 May 2001 July 1995 January 1995 January 1995 July 1995

May 2004 May 2004 May 2004 May 2004 May 2004 May 2004 2007 (expected) May 2004 May 2004

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Source: European Union (2005) and IMF (2005b). a Stabilization and Association Agreement.

EU Negotiations Concluded


Table 5.

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active role of CEE reformers who advocated neoliberalism before 1989 because they participated in a transnational dialogue. It is likely that pressures to implement neoliberal policies in CEE had also a lot to do with loan conditionality and associational membership requirements, which Bockman and Eyal do not consider. Nevertheless, the authors’ point that both international organizations and domestic actors contribute to the structuring of the common world-culture (Meyer et al., 1997), in particular the spread of the neoliberal credo, is well taken. Post-communist states cannot be regarded as mere passive receivers of external influences and blind imitators of the Western culture. While external forces are crucial in the global environment, it is domestic actors and their interests that channel these forces and shape the extent to which countries embark on neoliberal development paths. Overall, due to the interaction of international and domestic forces, liberalization of markets and openness to foreign capital are the dominant economic policy ideas that have taken the center-stage in CEE. Admittedly, there is resistance to these policies by nationalist and socialist interest groups in different CEE countries. Most evidently, this was the case during the nationalist rule of Mecˇiar in Slovakia and Tudjman in Croatia. By the late 1990s, however, integral with the process of EU integration, none of the nationalist/socialist groups in CEE countries have had enough political support to change the general pattern of liberalization and openness to foreign capital.

6. CONCLUSION: SUPRATERRITORIAL CULTURAL LOGIC AND EMBEDDED ECONOMIC PRACTICE OF FDI IN CEE The contemporary global economic landscape is characterized by massive flows of capital across national borders. What determines these cross-border economic exchanges? To address this question, I examined in this chapter sources of FDI in post-communist CEE. I put forth an argument about the embeddedness of FDI practice. Foreign investors and hosts are not fully independent from one another but situated in various relational settings which differentially shape FDI flows between nations. Whether countries receive more or less FDI, and where this FDI comes from, are not solely dependent on their economic prosperity and stability but also on the networks of personal and international relations that they have established during socialism and in post-socialism. Investors and hosts rely on


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historical, political, migration, trade, and cultural relations between countries to pursue FDI transactions. The particularization of economic practice, maintaining its territorial and national character are in contrast to the universalizing neoliberal rhetoric encouraging general and widespread openness to global capital and foreign investment, which is promoted by many major international organizations and allied domestic political forces. What these findings point to is the mutual shaping of embeddedness and supraterritoriality in the contemporary world. FDI practice remains largely embedded in social relations between countries. However, we should acknowledge that it is the aspects of supraterritoriality that have contributed to the increasing prevalence of FDI across the globe. This ubiquity can be linked to the popularization of FDI as a firm investment strategy and macro-economic policy by international organizations, which advocate FDI as an engine in economic growth as part and parcel of the neoliberal credo. In addition, the spread of information via new information technologies and travel reinforce the notion that foreign countries can be viable locations for investment. Hence, the trend behind increasing FDI is grounded in the same conditions that contribute to supraterritoriality. Nevertheless, the embedded economic practice of FDI significantly reinforces territoriality. As such embeddedness and supraterritoriality are mutually constitutive. Finally, this analysis also speaks to the debate in the globalization literature on convergence vs. divergence in economic processes and outcomes across the world. What we see in post-communist CEE is, in fact, the simultaneity of convergence and divergence in globalization outcomes. When we examine a single phenomenon, such as FDI, at different levels of analysis (international and national) we can notice that coercive pressures from international institutions and mimicking of peer countries encourage similarity in the CEE ideologies about economic liberalization and in their FDI policies. At the same time, examining the practice of FDI transactions shows considerable diversity and creativity among the local actors and assertion of their specific interests. Actors particularize the investment process by differentiating between more or less welcome partners in FDI transactions. This means, as Viviana Zelizer (1999) stated, that uniformity and diversity are the two sides of the same coin . While we may get a onesided impression of convergence when our focus zeroes in on one particular segment, the divergence is revealed when we flip perspectives. In some aspects, global interconnectedness creates convergence to global models while in other respects, divergence persists. Thus, to advance the debate on convergence vs. divergence, we need more comparative research that systematically links different levels of analysis to examine which conditions

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better facilitate local reactions and assertions of local interest. We need more research that responds to Guilleń’s (2001a) call for research ‘‘that is sensitive to local variations and to how agency, interest, and resistance mediate in the relationship between globalization causes and outcomes’’ (p. 235). Ultimately, ‘‘Does globalization cause convergence or divergence?’’ is a wrong question to ask. More fruitful avenues of inquiry focus on identifying where and how the world is becoming more and more similar as well as where and how it remains differentiated. The task for future research is to explicate the mechanisms behind these trends and processes that sustain – concurrently – diversity and homogeneity.

NOTES 1. It is important to acknowledge that some scholars argue that the rise in global connections is not as extensive as often portrayed because the numbers do not adjust for inflation (Sutcliffe & Glyn, 1999). However, in particular for the case of FDI, even if we take inflation into account, the scope of the phenomenon since 1980s is quite substantial. Moreover, the measure of FDI as a share in GDP is a relative measure, and as Table 1 shows, these shares have clearly increased over time. 2. The 10 percent cutoff is defined by the international organizations that collect information on FDI, including International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and accepted by most national accounting systems that are abide these international standards. 3. The denotation of CEE used in this paper refers to the most advanced postcommunist countries that have either joined the European Union in 2004 or have started the negotiation process by then: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 4. Consistent with their socialist economic reform efforts, Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia instituted provisions that allowed joint ventures with foreigners in the late 1980s. However, these provisions showed their effects on the actual incoming FDI only beginning in 1989, the year in which initial data of these flows were recorded (Table 1). 5. I use the term ‘‘post-communist’’ to refer to the CEE societies after the fall of the communist regimes, for the sake of consistency throughout the volume. I recognize that, according to Marx, it is socialism that is the transitional phase between the exploitative capitalist system of private property of the means of production, and the classless society of communism. Actually existing regimes with Communist Party in power never achieved the communist (high) stage of development that Marx envisioned, so it may have been more appropriate to call these societies post-socialist. 6. According to UNCTAD (2006) classification, the only other region with higher FDI stock as percent of GDP is ‘‘Developing America, Other’’. This category


55

includes island states of the Central America where FDI stock as percent of GDP is 43. 7. Like the general equilibrium theory in economics, transaction cost economics also stipulates that the search for best return/risk ratios in international investments is the engine of FDI (Williamson, 1975, 1985; Buckley & Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1982; Vernon, 1983; Vickers, 1985; Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Hill, Hwang, & Kim, 1990; Sun, 1999). The profit-maximization imperative is also central to the ‘‘race to the bottom’’ thesis, claiming that competition between nations over investment capital leads to progressive lowering of regulatory standards, in particular the loosening of environmental protections and relaxing of labor standards, to facilitate unhindered profit making of TNCs (London & Ross, 1995; Robinson, 1995; Rodik, Bradford, & Lawrence, 1997; Mosley, 2003; Monks & Minow, 2004). 8. Post-communist states institutionalize FDI as a legitimate development strategy by establishing state-led FDI promotion agencies and via efforts of state privatization agencies, which sell major national assets to foreign owners (Bandelj, 2007). 9. Among the 100 biggest non-financial TNCs in 2003, only three have listed more than one country under ‘‘home economy’’ category. The U.K. and Netherlands are listed jointly as home economies for Royal Dutch/Shell Group and Unilever. Germany and the U.S. are listed for Daimler Chrysler AG. None of top 100 TNCs has more than two home economies listed (UNCTAD, 2006). 10. What consequences FDI has for economic prosperity of host countries has been the subject of extensive literature. Deep divides remain between economic studies, which find positive effects of FDI on economic growth (e.g., Kindleberger, 1970; Stopford & Wells, 1972; Knickerbocker, 1973; Hymer, 1976; Firebaugh, 1992; Balasubramanyam, Salisu, & Sapsford, 1999), and sociology studies. Sociological perspectives primarily of FDI in Third World countries find detrimental effects for sustainable development and for social equality in host countries (e.g., Galtung, 1971; Bornschier and Ballmer-Cao, 1979; Bornschier & Chase-Dunn, 1985; McMichael, 1996; DeMartino, 1998; Ranney, 1998; Beer & Boswell, 2002). Some studies also find that there are no significant effects of FDI on economic growth (Hein, 1992; Dutt, 1997). 11. While no data exist on precisely how many FDI efforts in Poland were initiated because of the actions of the Polish American Economic Forum, the following report found on the website of the American Embassy in Warsaw tells: ‘‘For over a decade, American investors have played a leading role in the Polish market. U.S. firms were the leading source of foreign investment in Poland from 1993 to 1997, ahead of investors from Germany, France, and Italy. Every year since, American companies have ranked among the top three FDI sources in Poland. In 2004, U.S. companies contributed 18 percent of FDI inflow to Poland, investing USD 1.43 billion’’ (United States Diplomatic Mission to Warsaw, Poland 2006). 12. Literature in economic sociology also reports that business significantly rely on social ties in economic transactions (for review, see Smith-Doerr & Powell, 2005). 13. Personal interview, Ljubljana, Slovenia, February 1, 2002. 14. Personal interview, Zagreb, Croatia, July 20, 1999. 15. Personal interview, Ljubljana, Slovenia, May 3, 2002.

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16. While the presence of German ethnic minorities throughout CEE could facilitate FDI, it is also important to note that the fact that Germany was an occupier of several of these states during the Second World War and this historical legacy could have negative effects. Obviously, historical experiences and familiarity with national minorities does not immediately imply positive affinities. As one of the informants at the American Chamber of Commerce in Prague told me, in the late 1990s a sentiment was prevalent in the Czech Republic to encourage FDI from the U.S. in order to avoid too strong a presence from German investors (Personal interview, Prague, June 26, 2002). 17. IMF loans were provided for the following periods: Bulgaria and Romania (1991–2000), Latvia and Estonia (1992–2000), Hungary (1988–1994, 1996–1998), Poland (1990–1996), Croatia (1994–2000), Lithuania (1992–1997), Czech Republic (1993–1994), Slovakia (1994–1996) and Vreeland (2003). 18. Admittedly, some TNCs are not solely owned by investors from one country and some are incorporated in countries other than where the owners come from. Nevertheless, in order to manage uncertainty associated with cross-border exchanges, actors will often rely on clues about the other parties based on the conceptions they hold about the countries these potential economic partners come from. Many of these conceptions are grounded in institutionalized practice of management which differs across countries (Bendix, 1956; Davidson, 1980; Hofstede, (2001 [1980]); Lincoln et al., 1981; Kogut & Singh, 1988; Boltanski, 1990; Benito & Gripsrud, 1992; Guilleń, 1994; Agarwal, 1994; Mead, 1994). 19. Personal interview, Zelezniki, Slovenia, March 30, 2004. 20. With the spread of MBA education into CEE (Bandelj & Purg, 2006), such practices may become more homogenous. Nevertheless, acknowledgment of cultural differences in doing business remains an important component in many of the MBA curricula, as well as guides to international management. 21. This example also implies that the different types of social relations (migration, trade, historical, political, and cultural) may reinforce each other in contributing to a successfully realized FDI between two countries. But these different social relations may also work in opposing directions, which complicates the process. My general typology is also not meant to propose that some of these social relations contribute more and others less to FDI. In general, these social relations should be considered as different important conduits for FDI to happen. 22. Personal interview, Moscenicka Draga, Croatia, October 30, 2001. 23. Some may argue that geographic proximity may also be a factor in FDI flows. I take this factor into account in analyses elsewhere (Bandelj, 2007) which quantitatively test, and find strong support, for the influence of different kinds of social relations on dyadic FDI, while controlling for geographic proximity.

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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION FROM LABOR’S POINT OF VIEW: THE EU AND THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES Susan Glanz ABSTRACT An aspect of globalization is the creation of macro-regions through integration. A macro-region is a territorial unit created through the process of cooperation, cohesion, and integration. Areas of integration can be political, economic, and social. An example of a macro-region is the European Union (EU). For EU member states and for acceding countries economic integration means accepting EU rules and regulations. The rationale behind these laws and rules is to increase economic, financial, and trade cooperation among partner countries. To increase the viability of this macro-region, the EU, has emphasized the need for social integration, which is the expansion of self-identification by individuals from viewing themselves as citizens of a country to a broader European identity, a citizen of Europe. This paper evaluates the impact of joining the European Union on the labor markets of Central and Eastern Europe


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countries, an economic integration; and the parallel expansion of the citizens’ identity expanding to include a European self-image, a social integration.

1. INTRODUCTION Jan Aart Scholte defined globalization as a transformation of social space that occurs with the spread of transplanetary – and in contemporary times often also supraterritorial – connections between people. (Scholte, 2005a, p. 24)

In Scholte’s definition, transplanetary means people become more able – physically, legally, linguistically, culturally, and psychologically – to engage with each other wherever on planet Earth they might be. (Scholte, 2005b, p. 59)

These interactions include ‘‘communications, diseases, finance, investment, travel and trade’’ (ibid., p. 61). A description of supraterritorial relations is social connections that substantially transcend territorial geography. They are relatively delinked from territory, that is, spacial domains that are mapped on the land surface of the earth, plus any adjoining waters and air spheres. (ibid., p. 61)

Supraterritoral relations are manifested several ways: from shifting some roles from national governments to macro-regional governance (for example, each EU member state gave up the right to its own trade legislation to the European Commission, or the setting of the European Union working time regulations supercede national laws), to the relative free movement of capital and labor across borders, increased production of goods and services by multinational companies, and increased trade. Another aspect of these supraterritorial relations is the expansion of identity from the state to ‘‘non-national, non-territorial collective identities. y Globalization has tended to generate hybridity, where persons have complex multifaceted identities’’ (ibid., p. 226). However, for the purposes of analyzing the impact of globalization on the labor force of Central and Eastern Europe in the past 15 years only two interconnected aspects of supraterritoriality will be included here: macroregionalization and expansion of national identity. Macro-regionalization is the voluntary widening and deepening of political, economic, and social interaction of at least two states, while hybridization is the ‘‘change in the manifestation of national identity’’ (ibid., p. 226). Macro-regions are created

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with the signing of regional agreements to organize policies, administration, the economy and/or public services for or by two or more states. The creation of a macro-region raises the question whether this step was undertaken as a ‘‘stepping-stone or a stumbling block’’ to globalization (World Bank, 2005a, p. 154). The answer to this question is that it is both. It aids globalization as it allows for new efficiencies in both the political and economic spheres. In the political sphere the new supranational governance structures allow for administration of new uniform standards in all fields where governance has shifted from the nation-state to a regional body; from enforcing ecological standards to food and consumer protection. In the economic area, the new regional markets allow the participants to take advantage of the economies of scale in production and distribution. On the other hand, the macro-regions create new borders that those outside the region cannot easily penetrate. For example, common EU trade policy against third countries or restrictive immigration policies for migrants from outside the EU (Scholte, 2005b; World Bank, 2005a; Kim, 2002; Nesadurai, 2002). Some of the best-known regional agreements are the Association of South East Asian Nations, ASEAN, a political and economic integration in Asia, MERCOSUR, the South American common market, NAFTA, the free trade agreement between Canada, Mexico and the USA, and the European Union, EU, which is an economic, political, and socially integrated unit of 25 nations. As the brief description of these agreements show they cover different areas from trade to politics, but all agreements aim for integration in specific areas by accepting supranational rules. The Hungarian economist Bela Balassa divided the integration process into five, well-defined phases (Balassa, 1961). The first phase is a free trade area, an agreement between a group of countries to eliminate tariffs, quotas, and preferences on most goods traded between them, but each country retains its own tariffs against nonmembers. The second phase is the customs union, which is a free trade area with common external tariffs. In the third stage, a single market or common market is created where members have common policies on product regulation and there is a freedom of movement of all the four factors of production (goods, services, capital, and labor). The fourth phase is an economic union, where the free movement of the factors of production is accompanied by some degree of harmonization of national economic policies. The last stage is the complete economic integration, which presupposes the unification of monetary, fiscal, social, and countercyclical policies and requires the setting-up of a supranational authority whose decisions are binding for the member states. (Balassa, 1961, p. 2)

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Why do countries form or join the regional agreements? The rationale for a country to join regional integration agreements is political, economic, or both. The political arguments for regional agreements are threefold: (1) that a group of states belonging to the agreement has more political bargaining power in international negotiations than individual states; (2) regional agreements cannot be easily overturned by successive elected governments, therefore provide stability; and lastly (3) it provides security to member states against outsiders. The economic arguments can be grouped into two categories: (1) the competitive and economies of scale effects; and (2) the foreign trade effects. The competitive and economies of scale effects are the cause and consequence of regional agreements. Larger markets allow companies to take advantage of the economies of scale decreasing monopoly power of domestic firms. The foreign trade effects mean that the larger market may change the pattern of production and direction and composition of trade (World Bank, 2000). Another argument for economic integration, which is similar to the political argument, is that member countries are less sensitive to economic actions from countries outside the agreement. Economists also argue that lowering trade barriers within a region reduces transaction costs, and increases competition, thus lowering the price of goods and services for the public (Alston, Kearl, & Vaughan, 1992; Bhagwati, 1991). When regional agreements are signed, nonmembers join these organizations to ensure that they have continued access to the markets of the members (Baldwin, 1997; Yamamoto, 1996). The focus of this paper is on one such regional integration – the European Union, and what the impact of joining this integration had on the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. The integration will be evaluated on two parallel levels, one on an economic level and the other, on a social level. Economic integration is both – a process and a state of affairs. Regarded as a process, it encompasses measures designed to abolish discrimination between economic units belonging to different national states; viewed as a state of affairs, it can be represented by the absence of various forms of discrimination between national economies. (Balassa, 1961, p. 1)

The impact of economic integration of Central and Eastern European countries into the European Communities/EU will be measured only by the effects on the employment levels in the formers’ labor markets.1 Social integration as defined by the EU ‘‘refers to ‘horizontal’ interactions between populations of member states (e.g., trust in other peoples or feeling as a European in addition to or contrast to a more national identity)’’ (Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, 1990, p. 41). It will be measured by


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the responses of the citizens of the Central and Eastern European countries to questions in regular Eurobarometer surveys aiming to evaluate changes in their primary affiliation, of citizens of their state to identifying themselves as Europeans. Economic integration of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia into the EU was successful, if measured by increased trade or converging income levels, but its impact on the labor market to-date, if measured by job creation, is negligible. At the same time, social integration has already taken place, as measured by the broadening self-identification, in spite of the lackluster job creation. This paper has two sections. The first section studies the history and the impact of economic integration on the labor markets of the Central and Eastern European countries. The second section looks at the changes in identification accompanying the economic changes.

2. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 2.1. A Brief History of Economic Integration in Europe After World War II, Europe was divided into two political blocks, Eastern and Western. Regional agreements were signed on both sides of the Iron Curtain to help create and foster economic growth within the respective regions. In Western Europe two regional economic agreements were signed; in Eastern Europe only one regional agreement was signed in the postwar period. The first Western European regional agreement was signed in 1951, by Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), France and Italy to form the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to make joint decisions about the coal and steel industry.2 The success of this arrangement prompted these same six countries to integrate other sectors of their economies with the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which created the European Economic Community (EEC), a common market. With the signing of this Treaty, Western Europe entered the third stage of integration according to Balassa’s definition of stages toward complete economic integration. Ten years later, in 1967, the European Economic Community, the European Coal and Steel Community and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) merged their executive organizations and called itself the European Communities (EC). The fourth phase of economic integration occurred when in several stages, other Western European countries joined the European Communities and

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its coordination and cooperation between member-states was strengthened with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 that created the European Union.3 This treaty prepared the way for the members of the EU to integrate further by creating an economic and monetary union (EMU) and by the introduction of a single European currency managed by a European Central Bank. The single currency – the euro – became a reality on January 1, 2002 and the EU entered into the fifth and final stage of integration. Another Western European regional agreement, EFTA, the European Free Trade Association was formed in 1960. It continues to be a free trade zone, remaining on the first level of economic integration. The goal of the seven founding members of EFTA: Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, was to create a single market, liberalizing trade of goods amongst member states, and that all European nations would join them. The rationale for EFTA was to indicate the original organizers’ dissatisfaction with the political goals of the European Economic Community. After the United Kingdom was successful in joining the EEC, it left EFTA. The UK was followed by several other EFTA members joining the EEC, leaving EFTA currently with only four members: Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein.4 On May 1, 2004 the 25 EU member states and three EFTA members (not Switzerland) joined together to create the European Economic Area (EEA) which is governed by the internal market rules of the EU.5 Countries on the East, behind the Iron Curtain, including Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, joined forces with Bulgaria, Romania, and the Soviet Union in 1949 to coordinate production under the aegis of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, also referred to as COMECON), which provided for agreements between states on production and trade, with settlements in rubbles.6 While the goal of economic integration in market economies was to increase competition for producers and consumers; the integration of the COMECON countries was based on centrally drawn plans of production, investment, prices and trade, thus eliminating aspects of competition. With German reunification in 1990, East Germany left the COMECON. In other countries price liberalization was introduced in the same year and it was accompanied with drastic cuts in subsidies to firms. As the former socialist markets collapsed, the COMECON became redundant and was dissolved on June 21, 1991 (Sobell, 1990). The high standard of living, choice of available goods, and well-being in Western Europe was envied by the citizens in Central and Eastern European countries. Thus, the new Central and Eastern European political leaders were quick to announce their intentions of moving toward political


101

pluralism and creating a market-based economic system in their respective countries. To them and the majority of the population this meant fusing their societies into the existing Western European economic, political, and security systems.

2.2. The CEE4 on Road to the EU The first free elections in 40 years (June 1989 in Poland, March/April 1990 in Hungary, June 1990 in Czechoslovakia) opened the way to economic and political transformations. These changes were the first step toward joining the EC. The second step was taken on December 16, 1991 when the European Communities signed the ‘‘Europe Agreements’’ with CEE3, i.e., Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.7 The goal of this agreement was to prepare CEE3 for accession to the European Union. The Europe Agreement was the political and economic underpinning of the desired EU integration of the CEE3 countries, as it required these countries to transform their economies into functioning market economies and to harmonize their legislations with the EC/EU laws, and thus to demonstrate their ability to adhere to the requirements of membership. The CEE3 countries began their accession talks with the EU just when the European Council agreed on the Maastricht Treaty, which moved the EU integration process to the fifth phase of full economic integration. The Hungarian and Polish governments submitted their applications for EU membership in April 1994. Slovakia applied for membership on June 27, 1995 and the Czech Republic submitted its application on January 17, 1996. (The dissolution of Czechoslovakia into the independent Czech and Slovak Republics occurred on January 1, 1993.) Accession talks between these four nations (hereafter CEE4) and the EU continued for several years. On May 1, 2004, all four countries became full members. Between 1991, when the CEE3 signed the Europe Agreement to 2004, when the four countries became members, the European Communities became the European Union, a group of nations that evolved from the fourth to the fifth stage of economic integration. The incorporation of these Central and Eastern European countries into the EU may be divided into three periods as measured by the formers’ economic growth. The first was the transitional stage, 1990–1993, marked by stagflation. Unemployment appeared, as opposed to ‘‘full-employment’’ under socialism, and falling labor market participation rates coupled with high inflation rates (Zimbalist & Sherman, 1984, p. 462). The second stage

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was the 1994–2000 period, which can be characterized as a jobless recovery, but with increasing incorporation into the EC economy as measured by increasing trade ties. The year 2000 is also the logical point for ending the second stage of economic transformation, as this is the year when the Czech Republic, Hungary surpassed for the first time, and Slovakia reached 99% of its 1989 real GDP according to the TransMONEE (2006) database. (Poland surpassed its 1989 GDP level already in 1996.) The third stage is from 2001 to the present. Another reason for separating the 1994–2005 period into two segments is that in 2000 the EU member states agreed on measurable employment goals and on strategies to achieve these goals, called the Lisbon Agenda.8 From 2001 the employment changes in both member and in the then candidate countries, in the CEE4, were evaluated against these goals both by national governments and the EU.

2.3. A Snapshot of the Czech, Hungarian, Polish, and Slovak Economies in the 1990s The economic transformation of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia from planned economies to market economies began in 1990, bringing about simultaneous political and economic upheaval in all three (eventually four) countries. The goal was to create market-based economies through privatization, that is, by the reduction of the role of the state in the economy. In 1989, the private sector’s contribution to the GDP was only 11% in Czechoslovakia, 20% in Hungary, and 28% in Poland.9 Privatization was used as a method of transformation for both economic and political reasons. It was used to establish property rights, to restore ownership of assets seized by the state, to form a private sector and the basis of a market economy, [and] to enable efficient governance and management of formerly state-owned enterprises. (Martin, 2000, p. 1)

Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe meant that entrepreneurs and managers had to learn the rules of the market, and employees had to learn a new way of working. The process of privatization resulted in radical restructuring of the economies. All citizens, whether directly or indirectly involved in the production process, were affected. Table 1 presents a snapshot of the economies of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia at the beginning of the transition from socialist economies to market economies, and in order to provide a way to evaluate these numbers, the data for West Germany, the largest European economy, is also included.


Table 1.

103

The State of the CEE3 Economies and W. Germany in 1989.

Population (in millions, mid-1989) GDP per capita (in 1990 US$) Average annual GDP growth rate in the 1980s (in %)a Centrally administered prices (% of total) Export to CMEA % of total % of GDP External debt/GDP (1990, %) Employment by sector (in %) Agriculture Industry Services

Czechoslovakia

Hungary

Poland

W. Germany

15.6

10.4

38.0

62.1

8,768

6,903

5,684

16,551

1.6

1.7

2.2

100

15

100 (excl. food)

NA

60 25 19

43 16 65

41 14 80

NA NA NA

18.8 35.5 41.0

25.3 38.0 36.0

3.7d 40.9 55.4

1.7 Czech Rep. 1.9 Slovakia

12.3b 45.5 42.2

12.6c 43.4 44.0

Source: OECD Development Centre Studies (2006a, 2006b). a World Bank (1996, p. 221). b ILO – KILM for Czech Republic, 1990. c ILO – KILM for Slovakia, 1991. d German Statistical Office http://www.destatis.de/indicators/e/lrerw05ae.htm (accessed on May 1, 2006).

Germany has historic, political, and economic ties to the CEE4 countries. Germany was also a leader in aiding the CEE4 in EU accession, by exporting her own know-how, norms, and institutions. Since 1990 the economic presence of Germany in the region has increased, due to their geographic proximity to each other resulting in Germany becoming a leading trade partner to all four countries (External and intra-European Union Trade – Statistical Yearbook, 2006, p. 124, 201, 224, 241). Hungary and Czechoslovakia are small countries, with populations of 10.3 and 15.6 million, respectively, and Poland is a medium sized country, with a population of 38 million, is 50% larger than the first two together. The combined population of these three countries was slightly more than that of West Germany’s, the largest EU country. The per capita GDP of Czechoslovakia, the richest of the CEE3 countries in 1989 was half, while

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Poland’s, the poorest CEE3 country, was a third of West Germany’s. Between 1980 and 1990 the average annual GDP growth rate was below 2% in the CEE3, which was below that of West Germany’s. (For comparison, the per capita GDP of Greece, the poorest EC member, with a population of 10.1 million, was $10,052, 13% more than the richest and nearly double than that of the poorest CEE3 country.) Hungary and Poland were also saddled with a large foreign currency debt as shown in Table 1. Employment in agriculture and in the industrial sector was higher in the CEE3 countries than in West Germany, while that in the service sector was obviously lower.

2.4. The First Stage of Transformation for the CEE: Stagflation As Table 1 shows, the late 1980s was a period of economic weakness in the CEE3 (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland). Revitalization of the economies was a mandate required of all newly elected governments. The steps undertaken in each country were identical in their aims. The methods used were price liberalization, privatization, and reduction of state subsidies, foreign trade liberalization and currency devaluation, as summarized in Table 2. (In Hungary price liberalization began in 1968, and foreign trade liberalization began in the early 1980s.) The consequence of price liberalizing was inflation, caused by the abolition of state-determined pricing system. Free market prices allowed prices to rise to market clearing levels, which in turn caused a drop in domestic demand, and consequently a drop in production and employment. At the same time the EC economy’s growth rate slowed, from 3.2% to 1.5%, reducing the demand for imports from Table 2.

Some of the Changes Introduced to Achieve Economic Transformation. Czechoslovakia

Price liberalization (date and % of goods) Currency devaluation Foreign trade liberalization State subsidies

Hungary

Poland

Jan. 1, 1991, instant, 85%

Began before 1989

Jan. 1, 1990, instant, 90%

Yes Extensive

Yes Began before 1989

Yes Extensive

From 16.1% to 4.6%

From 13% to 7%a

From 17.4% to 4%

Source: Nuti (1993). a Blanchard, Froot, and Sachs (1994).


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CEE4, thus adding to their unemployment problems.10 Furthermore reduced exports decreased government revenues at a time when welfare expenditures increased due to unemployment. Therefore, the need to finance welfare and unemployment programs forced the governments to borrow and thus this step further increased their budget deficits. There is extensive economic literature on the structural recession in Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s (see Brada, 1996; World Bank, 1996; Kornai, 1993, 1995; Blanchard, Froot, & Sachs, 1994; Adam, 1993). In this essay only one consequence of the economic recession will be analyzed: its impact on the labor market. 1990–1993 were the initial phase of transition and resulted in great hardships. While employment dropped in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in all 4 years under investigation; in Slovakia and in Hungary the GDP also fell in each year, as shown in Table 3. Pre-1990, there was no open unemployment in the centrally planned economies. Widespread overstaffing (i.e., labor hoarding in state-owned companies) occurred in many sectors and serious distortions in the allocation of labor in industry contributed to low levels of labor productivity. Almost instantly, as national economies were opened to world markets through price liberalization, cheaper and better quality goods entered the domestic markets contributing to a sharp decline in economic performance as shown by Table 3. Many unprofitable state-owned industries were shut down. A large part of capital stock became obsolete nearly overnight. Agricultural privatization took place with the exception of Poland, where the state sector played only a limited role in agriculture

Table 3. The Change in GDP and in Employment (Percentage Change from Previous Year). 1990 GDP Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia EU15

1.2 3.5 11.6 2.5 3.6

1991

Employ 0.9 1.9 4.9 1.8 2.5

GDP 11.6 11.9 7.0 14.6 2.5

1992

Employ 5.5 3.2 6.0 12.5 6.2

GDP 0.5 3.1 2.6 6.5 1.3

1993

Employ 2.6 9.2 5.1 1.0 1.1

GDP 0.1 0.6 3.8 3.7 0.5

Employ 1.6 6.3 3.7 1.0 1.6

Note: Hungarian statistical office; http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/eng/xstadat/tabl4_01_09a.html (accessed on May 1, 2006); http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/eng/xstadat/tabl4_01_15a.html (accessed on May 1, 2006).

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before 1990. It included the sale of the state-owned farms and restructuring the ownership of collective farms and compensation of owners whose property was expropriated in the late 1940s and the 1950s, resulting in lower agricultural employment. According to the OECD Labour Force Statistics (2005) agricultural employment fell 39% in the Czech Republic and 12% in Poland. In Hungary the drop in agricultural employment in this period was 50% (KSH)11. Thus, transformation came at a cost of declining employment in both agriculture and industry (Mickiewicz & Bell, 2000; Nesporova, 1999; Barr, 1994; Boeri & Keese, 1992; Boeri & Sziracki, 1993). Another consequence of the economic transformation was the increase in regional differences in employment rates within each country. Despite regional disparities in wages, labor mobility remained low in CEE4 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) countries.12 One of the main reasons for this lack of mobility was an underdeveloped housing market. The CEE4 countries were quick to privatize residential property, but housing prices followed regional economic fortunes, falling in some areas while increasing strongly in others. Many people were stuck with low-priced apartments in depressed regions (Nesporova, 2002; Burda & Profit, 1996). A large share of the cost of economic transformation was borne by those who could not afford to leave economically depressed districts. Economic transition lowered both male and female labor force participation rates, with women’s participation dropping faster than men’s. In the CEE4 countries gender roles are stereotypical in that women are expected to fill the double role of reconciling family and work life by taking care of the elderly and children. As public funds decreased for institutional child and eldercare many women were forced to leave the labor force. Eva Fodor wrote that traditional gender ideologies became especially pervasive in Poland, the only country in which abortion rights were revoked after 1989 and the introduction of family wage was seriously considered. The number of places in nursery schools and kindergartens declined sharply. (Fodor, 1997, p. 479)

The number of places in nursery schools and kindergartens fell in Hungary and the Czech Republic as well (Micklewright, 2000). A paper titled ‘‘Opportunity and Risk: Trends of Social Exclusion in Europe’’ (Council of Europe, 1998) published by the Council of Europe reported that ‘‘in the Czech Republic, there has been an 11.4% fall in the number of kindergartens since 1989’’ (see Chapter 5). According to the Hungarian Statistical Office’s (2001) Yearbook kindergarten enrollment fell by 13% between 1990 and 2000. Older workers (age 50 and above) tended to also


107

withdrew from the labor market, often taking advantage of various early retirement schemes (Allison & Ringold, 1996; also see, World Bank, 2002, 2004). The restructuring of the economies in all four CEE countries meant the simultaneous decrease in employment and increase in unemployment. To counteract the drop in the labor participation rate in the economy, the governments in each CEE4 countries increased educational opportunities both for young people and for the displaced workers to help retrain them. While the increase in educational opportunities is a positive development, it also increased the dependency ratios (i.e., the number of nonworking individuals that must be supported by each worker) as the tax revenue base also fell in each country and it added to the fiscal burden of each government and stretched the social safety net (Terrell, 1999). When the CEE3 and the EU signed the Europe Agreements in 1991, both sides saw the potential benefits of the agreement, as ‘‘increased security, stability and prosperity’’ (Avery & Cameron, 1998, p. 9). The EU member states also felt a moral obligation to help CEE4 countries as their political conditions have changed, and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl best expressed his sense of obligation, when he said the EU ‘‘should not y disappoint the trust that these countries have put in us’’ (Bundestag Bulletin, 1996, p. 871).13 To help end the economic downturn and to aid the CEE4 countries during their economic transformation from planned to market economies, Western countries created various funds. Of the support mechanisms, the largest was the EU’s PHARE program – Pologne, Hongrie Assistance a` la Reconstruction Economique, which was created in July 1989 to support the transition of Poland and Hungary to democracy and to market economies, and it was expanded to include all other acceding countries in 1990 (Baun, 2000). Other examples of other EU funded programs were TEMPUS – Trans European Mobility Scheme for University Students, and ETF – European Training Foundation, a fund set up to promote cooperation and co-ordination of assistance in the field of vocational training reform. The European Bank for Reconstructing and Development (EBRD) was established in 1991 for the specific purpose to promote productive and competitive investment in the acceding countries. The US government also supported the transformation process by funding various programs, such as the Support for Eastern European Democracy (SEED) program and several USAID programs, such as East Central European Scholarship Program (ECESP) and the ‘‘Partners for Financial Stability’’ Program etc. Some other sources of funding were the IMF transition programs (SBA – stand-by arrangements); World Bank loans,

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International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and International Development Association (IDA) financing loans and credits, and official aid by the governments of the 21 OECD developed countries.

2.5. The Second Stage: A Jobless Recovery By 1994, the second stage of CEE4 transformation and integration began. This was the year when real GDP began a nearly continuous growth in all four countries. The exceptions were the years 1997 and 1998 for the Czech Republic, where GDP declined by 0.7 and 1.1%, respectively. This fall in output according to the IMF were caused by the prolonged necessary tightening of fiscal and monetary policies in response to the widening of internal banking and external imbalances causing the currency crisis in early 1997 (IMF, 1999). In the 1994–2000 period employment fell in the Czech Republic for 4 years, declined for 3 years in Hungary and in Poland, and fell for 5 out of the 7 years in Slovakia. Overall, in the 1994–2000 period, employment rate only grew in Hungary, as shown in Table 4. In order to meet the requirements of the Europe Agreement of becoming market economies, the CEE4 countries chose an export-driven path. Exports earnings were necessary to finance both the economic transformation and to earn funds necessary to repay earlier large debts. In order to gain access to both foreign markets and funds, CEE4 firms had to become more efficient and productive. Besides privatization, Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) also assisted economic transformation in the CEE4. Companies, or parts of companies, were acquired by multinational corporations. CEE4 attracted FDI because they were geographically close to the EU markets, had low labor costs compared to Western Europe and the USA, maintained a relatively well-developed infrastructure, and can boast with a relatively educated workforce. Carstensen and Toubal (2003) in a study analyzing the determinants of FDI found that market potential, low relative unit labor costs, a skilled workforce and relative endowments have significant effects in attracting these funds into the CEE4. The FDI (ownership of 10% or more of a company by a nonresident) and foreign portfolio investments (less than 10% ownership) helped connect the CEE4 to the world. These financial flows cross borders without barriers aiding the recipient country to be part of the world trading system. Companies that attracted foreign funds became part of an international production system, and part of the global supply chain. As a result these companies also became a part of a global information system. Some of the best-known examples of large FDI are

The Change in GDP and Employment (Percentage Change from Previous Year).

1994 GDP CZ HU PL SK EU15

2.2 2.9 5.2 5.2 2.8

1995

Employ 1.1 2 1.6 4.2 0.1

GDP 5.9 1.5 2.7 5.8 2.6

1996

Employ 0.7 1.9 0.9 1.7 0.8

GDP 4.2 1.3 6.2 6.1 1.6

1997

Employ 0.2 0.8 1.2 3.6 0.5

GDP 0.7 4.6 7.1 4.6 2.6

1998

Employ 0.7 0 1.4 0.9 0.9

GDP 1.1 4.9 5.0 4.2 2.9

1999

Employ 1.4 1.4 1.2 0.3 1.8

GDP 1.2 4.2 4.5 1.5 3

2000

Employ 2.4 3.1 4 3 1.8

GDP 3.9 6 4.2 2 3.9

Employ 0.9 1 1.5 1.4 2

Note: Hungarian statistical office; http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/eng/xstadat/tabl4_01_15a.html (accessed on May 1, 2006); http:// portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/eng/xstadat/tabl4_01_09a.html (accessed on May 1, 2006).


Table 4.

109

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General Electric’s acquiring a major stake in the Hungarian firm Tungsram, Gyo¨ri Keksz brought up by Danone in Hungary; ABB, Daewoo, Ford, Linde, Motorola, Nestle´, Procter, and Gamble; Renault, Siemens, and Volkswagen in the Czech Republic, Audi, Bayer, Hoechst, Shell, Volvo in Slovakia; British Oxygen Corporation, Saint-Gobain, Philips, Steijn Design, ABB, and Nibco in Poland. Information not only flowed within the company of the particular CEE country, but between various units of the company regardless of borders. These ‘‘new’’ companies also gained access to the global marketplace as they could more easily take advantage of the economies of scale in production. Their sales increased and at the same time they had better access to resources, which reduced their costs. The importance of FDI in aiding the transformation of the CEE4 can be seen in foreign-owned firms’ share of exports and their share in employment. The OECD Report ‘‘Object Deletion Spot’’ on Transition Economies, The Reviews of Foreign Direct Investment for Hungary, states that over the period 1990 to 1999 foreign-owned companies now account for more than onethird of GDP and 30 percent of private-sector employment. y [and] foreign-owned companies generate around 80 percent of Hungary’s industrial exports. (OECD, 2000, p. 9)

According to the OECD Reviews of Foreign Direct Investment for the Czech Republic, ‘‘companies with foreign participation account for 65–70% of total manufacturing exports, and employ 280,000 employees (approximately 6% of total workforce)’’ (OECD, 2001, p. 18). In Poland, foreignowned firms accounted for 48% of the exports in 1998 (Kaminski & Smarzynska, 2001, p. 12). In 2000, foreign-owned firms generated B65% of exports and 20% of employment in Slovakia (OECD, 2004a, p. 31).

2.6. The Third Stage of Integration The new Millennium started with a worldwide economic slowdown, caused by the bursting of the dot-com bubble, the downturn in world trade, and geopolitical uncertainty stemming from terrorist attacks.14

As Table 5 shows the lower GDP growth rate in the EU15 impacted the CEE4 by reducing the demand for their exports and lowered domestic growth rates in 2001 and 2002. The continuous economic growth in the Czech Republic was led by the expansion of export-driven manufacturing production backed by FDI. Employment grew slightly in 3 of the 5 years, in


Table 5.

111

The Change in GDP and Employment (Percentage Change from Previous Year). 2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

GDP Employ GDP Employ GDP Employ GDP Employ GDP Employ CZ HU PL SK EU15

2.6 4.3 1.1 3.8 1.9

0.1 0.3 2.2 1.6 1.4

1.5 3.8 1.4 4.6 1.1

1.1 0.1 3.0 0.2 0.6

3.2 3.4 3.8 4.5 1.1

0.6 1.3 1.2 2.7 0.3

4.7 4.6 5.3 5.5 2.3

0.4 0.5 0.2 0.8 0.7

6.0 4.1 3.2 6.0 1.5

1.5 0.0 1.9 2.2 1.6

Note: Hungarian statistical office; http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/eng/xstadat/tabl4_01_15b.html (accessed on May 1, 2006); http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/eng/xstadat/tabl4_01_09b.html (accessed on May 1, 2006).

2001–2002 and 2005. In Hungary, wages, especially in the public sector, pensions and public infrastructures investments increased, and created large budget deficits in 2001 and 2002. The necessary fiscal belt tightening and tight money policy, in Hungary, slowed economic growth again in 2003. The economy recovered in 2004, employment grew only in the first 3 years of 2001–2003. In Poland, the low economic growth rate in 2001–2002 caused the employment rate to fall between the years of 2001–2003. The unemployment rate has remained the highest in Poland among the CEE4 countries, and it fell only slightly from the 2001 level of 18.2 to 17.7 in 2005.15 In the post-2001 period the fastest economic growth can be observed in Slovakia, which also resulted in employment growth in 2001, 2003, and 2005. At the same time the unemployment rate declined in Slovakia, from 19.3% in 2001 to 16.3% in 2005.15 According to the TransMONEE (2006) database, setting real GDP at 100 in 1989, it was in 2005 when the Czech Republic’s surpassed this level by 19.5%, Hungary by 24.2%, Poland by 46.8%, and Slovakia 24.9%.

2.7. Success or Failure? Economic Integration and Its Impact on the CEE4 Labor Markets Was economic integration into the EU beneficial to the CEE4? Enlargement boosted CEE4 growth rates through higher physical investment ratios due to EU transfers and higher FDI inflows, and through higher total factor productivity growth due to shifts in both the sectoral composition of output

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and to the implementation of structural reforms consequent to the more competitive EU internal market environment which the countries faced. One traditional measure of economic success is the reduction in the income gap between the CEE4 and the EU. If we measure by this tool, then the answer is yes. If we look at the per capita GDP in the CEE4 countries in 1994, when nearly continuous economic growth began, their per capita GDP was between 35 and 61% of the EU average as shown by Table 6. In 2005 the per capita GDP in the CEE4 rose to between 46 and 68% of the EU average. A World Bank study, assumed a continuous 2% growth rate for the EU and a continuous 5% growth rate for the CEE4 countries, estimated that it will take between 8 and 24 years for the CEE4 countries to reach 75% of the per capita GDP of the EU15 (World Bank, 2000, p. 42). Other studies have reached similar conclusions (Wagner & Hlouskova, 2005; EU Commission, 2001). If the success of integration is measured by the strengthening trade relations between the CEE4 and EU15, then again the answer is yes. According to Table 7 in 1990 less than half of the CEE4 trade was conducted with the EU15. By 2005, 60% of the CEE4 exports were directed to the EU15 and over 50% of the import originated in the EU15. Examining the trade ties between the CEE4 with the expanded EU25 in 2005, then the integration is even stronger. 77–85% of CEE4 exports are directed to the EU25, and between 67 and 81% of CEE4 imports originate from the EU25 (statistical yearbooks for the respective countries, and The External and intra-European Union Trade – Statistical Yearbook, 2006).

Table 6. Per Capita GDP in the CEE4 as a Percentage of the EU15 Per Capita GDP (in USD, Using Purchasing Power Parities). 2005a

1994

CZ HU PL SK EU15

Per capita GDP

% of EU15

Per capita GDP

% of EU15

11,912 9,008 6,920 7,651 19,476

61.16 46.25 35.53 39.28

20,606 17,924 13,894 15,983 30,438

67.70 58.89 45.65 52.51

Note: Hungarian statistical office; http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/eng/xstadat/tabl4_01_17b.html (accessed on January 20, 2007). a Preliminary data for 2005.


Table 7.

Share of Trade with the EU in 1990 and 2005.

Share of Exports to EU15 in Total Exports (%)

CZa HU PL SK

113

Share of Imports from EU15 in Total Imports (%)

Exports to EU25c

Imports from EU25c

1990

2005

1990

2005

2005

2005

40 46.7 55.6

66.2 65.3 67.3b 57.6

42.1 47.6 52.1

57.7 57.7 59.6b 41.1

84.2 76.3 77.2 85.4

81.1 67.4 74.7 78.9

Note: Hungarian statistical office; Czech statistical office; Poland 2005, Report on Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economics Affairs and Labour, (38–39); http://www.mgip.gov.pl/NR/ rdonlyres/C41A2C65-57AA-4A67-8CBD-F8F22CD6CEAB/15237/Report_foreign_2005.pdf (accessed on December 1, 2006). a Czechoslovakia for 1990. b 2004 for Poland. c europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat.

However, membership in the EU imposed costs on the CEE4 societies. The transformation to a market economy widened existing income differentials, increased poverty, and reintroduced unemployment (Heyns, 2005; Fo¨rster, Jesuit, & Smeeding, 2003). Who are the losers in this integration process? As Table 8 shows, in the past 15 years employment fell for both men and women, but it fell more for women. Table 8 can be somewhat misleading as no data exist for Slovakia pre-1995 and for Poland pre-1992, when a larger drop of female employment is noted in literature (Jurajda & Mathernova, 2004; Kwiatkowski, Socha, & Sztanderszka, 2001; Pongraćzne´, 2001). Employment rate for men dropped in CEE4, as restructuring of the economies meant that heavy industry jobs dramatically declined, and these employed predominantly males. Employment rates for both men and women in the 1994–2005 period were below the EU15 rates, except for Czech men. In Hungary employment for both men and women increased after 1998, but was still much below the EU rate. In contrast with the Czech, Slovak, and Polish data in the same period, in the EU15 both male and female employment increased. But who are the unemployed? If we analyze the unemployment data by age between 1993 and 2004, we can note that in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia unemployment increased in each age group as shown by Table 9. In Hungary, unemployment decreased, but not because the unemployed found work, but because large segments of the population withdrew from the labor market, and thus are

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Table 8.

Civilian Employment by Gender in Selected Years (Percent of 15–64 year-old population). CZ

1988 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 Change (1992–2005) Change (1994–2005)

HU

M

F

82.3 77.5 74.7 76.8 77.1 77.6 76.1 73 74.7 72.9 74 0.7 3.1

73.4 68.5 60.9 61.3 61.7 61.7 59.3 57.4 57.9 56.6 56.8 4.1 4.9

PL

M

63.4 59.1 57.1 57 58.1 60.6 61 61.1 61.1 2.3 4

F

52.6 49.2 47.5 45.6 46.4 49.1 49.4 50.2 50.3 2.3 2.8

M

67.2 65.4 63.6 63.9 65.4 61.7 57.3 57 58.6 8.6 5.0

SK F

54.3 53.0 52.1 52.1 52.4 49.5 46.9 46.3 46.7 7.6 5.4

M

EU-15 F

67.2 67.6 66.6 61.4 61.8 62.8 64.4

52.4 52.9 53.5 51.3 51.1 50.7 50.8

2.8

1.6

M

F

72.0 73.9 71.5 69.6 69.1 69.3 70.5 72.0 72.1 71.9 72.1 0.6 3.0

47.2 49.6 50.3 49.6 49.5 50.0 52.1 54.4 55.9 57.1 60 9.7 10.5

Note: OECD – Labor Force Statistics, 2006 edition, pp. 30, 148, 208, 278, 298.

Table 9.

Unemployment Rates by Age in Selected Years.

CZ

HU

PL

SK

15–24 25–54 55–64 15–24 25–54 55–64 15– 24 25–54 55–64 15–24 25–54 55–64 93 94 95 98 00 01 02 04 05a

8.4 8.7 7.8 12.4 17.0 16.6 16 20.4 19.3

3.4 3.4 3.3 5.5 7.7 7.2 6.5 7.3 7.3

3.9 3.5 2.9 3.8 5.2 4.9 4 5.4 5.2

22.9 20.9 18.6 13.5 12.7 11.2 12.6 15.5 19.4

10.4 9.3 8.9 6.8 5.7 5.1 5.2 5.5 6.4

8.4 7 5.4 6.2 3 2.9 3.1 3.1 3.0

30 32.6 31.2 23.2 35.2 41 43.9 40.8 37.8

12.7 12.8 11.7 9.5 13.9 15.8 17.5 16.9 16

6.5 6.5 5.9 5.9 9.4 9.7 10.5 11.6 11.2

27.3 24.8 25.1 37 39.1 37.4 32.7 29.9

11 11 10.2 15.5 15.9 15.3 16 14.4

9 7.6 7.5 12.3 12.3 15.3 15.4 13.2

Note: OECD – Labor Force Statistics (2005 edition, pp. 149–150, 209–210, 279–280, 299–300). OECD – Employment Outlook (2006, p. 252).

a

excluded from the labor statistics (Arnold, 2005, p. 129). In each country, the largest increase in unemployment was in the 15–24 year age group, as the demand for unskilled labor fell. In 2005 unemployment rate for the 15–24 age group fell slightly in Czech and Slovak Republics and Poland.


115

At the same time, between 1994 and 2005, as Table 10 shows the number of 15–24 year olds employed in each country decreased as educational opportunities increased. In the last 15 years there was a major shift in employment opportunities as the number of jobs requiring low skills, declined in the CEE4 countries especially in the manufacturing sector while employment in the service sector grew. The less educated, or those without formal educational credentials, have increasingly fewer job opportunities. ‘‘Labour market statistics are now at the heart of many EU policies.’’16 Although an employment chapter was included in the EU’s 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, quantifiable employment goals were set in the 2000 Lisbon Agenda (Europe in Figures, Eurostat Yearbook, 2005, p. 98). To achieve the goal of the EU’s Lisbon Agenda of becoming ‘‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-driven economy by 2010’’ and to combat high youth unemployment, the EU established The Education and Training 2010 program. This program set eight categories of benchmarks for all member countries (Education and Training 2010, 2004, p. 12). The CEE4 countries have not only met, but surpassed one particular EU benchmark, namely, the percentage of students who have completed high school education. According to data published by the UNICEF’s Innocenti Research Centre, in 2004, the high school enrollment rate of the 15–18 year olds was above 93% in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, and B83% in Slovakia (TransMONEE 2006 Database). To create new jobs and to help solve the overall unemployment problem, and in order to reduce the still large income gap between the Central and Eastern and Western Europe, it is necessary for successive CEE4 governments to continue to use active labor market policies, i.e., job placement, training, subsidized employment and public work programs, and to increase access to higher education. However, spending on various labor market policies in the CEE4 was well below that of the EU-15 where it was little over 2% of the GDP in 2003 (Europe in Figures, Eurostat Yearbook, 2005, p. 104). In the Czech and Slovak Republics in 2004 spending on active labor market policies was 0.5%, in Hungary it was 0.8%, and in Poland it was 0.2% of the GDP.17 Funding for education and labor market policies is largely a function of domestic budgets, and EU member states have budget deficit ceilings imposed on them, so for the CEE4 countries the possibility of increasing the share of these items in the budget is limited. EU membership also requires the CEE4 countries to eventually join the European Monetary Union, as the EMU is part of the aquis.18 The 1992 Maastricht Treaty set forth the economic and fiscal guidelines for participation in the EMU.19 The constraints of related EU laws, such as

116

Table 10. 1994

1995

15–24 Year Olds – Employed in Selected Years (in 1,000 s).

2000

2001

2003

2004

2005

% Change

% Change in Enrollment in (1994–2004)e Secondary education

CZ HU PL SK

805.0 471.4 1,560 300.7d

798.0 451.0 1,578 312d

598.0 473.4 1,521 282.3

544.0 447.1 1,364 269.5

446.0 355.5 1,202 260.3

396.0 305.8a 1,203 241.9

371.0c 277.4b 224.2d

53.9 41.1 22.9 25.4

+7.7 +17.5 +6.1 2.2

+25.3 +43.9 +31.9 +19.2

SUSAN GLANZ

Note: CZ, PL and SK – ILO; HU-KSH. a http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/munkerohelyz/munkerohelyz04.pdf, 18. b http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/munkerohelyz/munkerohelyz05.pdf, 7. c http://www.czso.cz/eng/redakce.nsf/i/203__1_employment_in_national_economy_by_age_part_1/$File/T2031_S1.pdf d http://www.statistics.sk/pls/elisw/casovy_Rad.procDlg e TransMONEE 2006 Database, UNICEF IRC, Florence.

Tertiary education


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the mandated maximum size of the budget deficit, the inability of granting tax breaks to attract foreign companies and the expense of meeting EU labor and environmental regulations, all limit the governments’ policy options. To maintain the higher than EU15 GDP growth rates, labor market policies must remain more liberal than in the EU15 yet within the constrains of the aquis. Indeed, according to the World Bank’s annually published Rigidity of Employment Index in 2005, this index was 24 for the Czech Republic, for Hungary and Poland it was 37, and for the Slovak Republic the index was 39. The index measures the flexibility of labor regulations by examining the difficulty of hiring a new worker, rigidity of rules on expanding or contracting working hours, the nonsalary costs of hiring a worker, and the difficulties and costs involved in dismissing a redundant worker. The index assigns values between 0 and 100, with higher values representing more rigid regulations. For comparison, the index for France was 66, and the index for Germany was 55 (World Bank, 2005b). In spite of the more liberal labor markets, the CEE4 was not successful in job creation. As Table 8 shows, between 1994 and 2005, employment fell in the Czech Republic, in Slovakia and in Poland and increased slightly only in Hungary, while employment rate in the EU15 increased in this time period. An OECD study found that if employment rates in the CEE4 were to reach EU15 level of 65%, the ‘‘GDP per capita could increase by up to 7–10% points’’ (OECD, 2004b, p. 9). In the past 15 years the CEE4 have become an integral part of the macroregion called EU. In 2002, according to Balassa’s criteria, the EU entered into the fifth stage of economic integration. When in 2004 the CEE4 acceded to the Union, they joined a ‘‘complete economic integration’’ in Balassa’s terms. This fifth level of integration implies not only economic, but also social integration. For the CEE4 to accede, each country had to meet the economic and political criteria set down and evaluated by the EU.

3. SOCIAL INTEGRATION Social integration is defined by the EU as ‘‘the ‘horizontal’ interactions between populations of member states (e.g., trust in other peoples or feeling as a European in addition or in contrast to a more national identity)’’ (Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, 1990, p. 41). The economic integration process that began in the 1950s with six Western European countries has expanded in 2004 to include 25 states across Europe and expanded from the initial coal and steel industries to include all areas of life.

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The consensus of the citizens to actively participate in shaping the political, economic, and social agendas is a must for an economic and political integration to be successful. Individuals who identify with the goals of an economic or political unit will take more active part in it. A European ‘nation’ does not exist. However, a European identity is one of the identities amongst others (national, regional, and communal) that individuals can accept or reject. In order to keep the various goals of the EC/EU in the forefront and to encourage participation in the economic and political transformation process, the 1973 Copenhagen Summit of the European Community, the heads of states of the then nine member union made a decision ‘‘to draw up a document on the European Identity’’ (European Community Background Information No. 29, 1973, p. 19). The need for this European identity is explained as the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in common and the determination to take part in the construction of a United Europe, all give the European Identity its originality and its own dynamism. (Background Information, 1973, p. 118)

The work on creating supranational European symbols began and its results were accepted and adopted by member states. The Adonnino Report (also known as ‘‘A People’s Europe’’) proposed several identity-building measures in 1985, such as: the co-financing of TV programs and movies by member states, creation of EC/EU centers in each country to promote educational materials about the Community, the inter-university cooperation, and transferability of academic credits, the occasional issuance of stamps by member states with identical community symbols, etc. (Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement, 1985). By creating symbols the European Communities aimed at reinforcing the idea of a supranational European identity. Some examples of these new symbols are: the blue flag with a circle of 12 gold stars which became the EC/EU flag, May 9th was declared as ‘‘Europe Day’’ and became a holiday, and Beethoven’s ‘‘Ode to Joy’’ was accepted as the EU anthem. The first EU passports were also issued in 1985 by most member states, and the standardized driving license was introduced in 1996, serving as additional reminders of the economic and political unity of the EU. Another symbol, the euro, the common currency entered into circulation in 2002. The EU motto, ‘‘United in diversity,’’ is included in the 2004 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Of course symbols, by themselves, are not enough to help in changing or adding to an individual’s identification from local/ national units to Europe. To achieve this aim of broadening identity, in the


119

past 20 years the EU made extensive efforts to educate the public in the member states about the goals and institutions of the Union. The EU tried to measure the effectiveness of its educational efforts. The EU conducted a series of public opinion surveys in both the member states and accession countries to measure public opinion on various issues and the EU’s success in communicating its goals to the public. In member states the survey was called the Standard Eurobarometer. The Eurobarometer surveys are regularly completed for the European Commission since 1973. (The Commission is the executive body of the EU with one Commissioner nominated by each member state.) The resulting studies are published by the Public Opinion Analysis Sector of the European Commission – Directorate General Communication.20 In the candidate countries two different surveys were used, the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB) was an annual, general public survey conducted between 1990 and 1998, and the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CCEB) surveys were completed from 2001 to the spring of 2004. After the EU enlargement in May 2004, the CCEB series became part of the Standard Eurobarometer. The reason for the surveys in the candidate countries was best summarized in the first report published analyzing the answers to the 1990 Central and Eastern Eurobarometer survey Orientations towards the unification of Europe in general, and the European Community in particular, can be considered as legitimacy beliefs towards a supranational political system.21

3.1. Measuring Social Integration in CEE4 between 1990 and 2001 While the Regular Eurobarometer surveys conducted in the EC/EU member countries asked questions about identity, these questions were not asked in the candidate countries until 2001. As a result it is difficult to measure social integration between 1990 and 2001 in the CEE4. As a result of the lack of questions asking about social integration in the CEE4 countries social integration can only be measured indirectly until 2001. One indirect measurement of identification with the EC/EU is the hoped for date for accession. The desire of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland to join the European Community was best expressed by a 1990 statement by Vaclav Havel, at a meeting of the newly elected presidents, that ‘‘it is clear that our countries, which only recently were Soviet satellites, are now seeking the path to democracy and to rejoining Europe’’ (Havel, 1990, p. 7). The public’s similar aspiration is reflected by the answers given to the

120

SUSAN GLANZ

1990 Central and Eastern Eurobarometer survey question, ‘‘When, if ever, do you think (country) should become a member of the European Community? Should it become a member in y?’’, which are summarized in Table 11. In both Hungary and Poland B75% of the respondents expected that accession would occur within 5 years; in Czechoslovakia 62% of the respondents hoped for accession within 5 years. Opposition to membership was small, 2%, in each country (Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, 1990). Since measuring identity directly is not possible, a proxy question and a related answer will be used to measure social integration. The indirect measure of European identity will be the support for accession. The question asked to measure EU support is, ‘‘as you know, fifteen states of ‘Western’ Europe form together the ‘European Union.’ Would you say that your impressions of the aims and activities of the European Union are generally positive, neutral, or negative?’’ (Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, 1998, p. 59).22 The answers to this question – for selective years – are summarized in Table 12. Immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall, with the beginning of the economic and political transformation, expectations about EU aid and membership were relatively high in CEE4, but fell by 1993 in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as the transitional recession deepened. Between 1990 and 1993 the positive expectations of membership in the EU dropped in every country and correspondingly the negative opinions increased. As the economies of the CEE4 improved between 1994 and 1998, the positive views on the EU’s aims increased 14% in Poland, 10% in Hungary, 9% in Slovakia, and remained unchanged in the Czech Republic (Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, 1998). Why did less than 50% of the

Table 11.

Now In 5 years In 10 years Later Never Do not know

The Hoped-for Date for Accession in 1990. Czechoslovakia

Hungary

Poland

25 37 12 5 2 19

51 25 2 3 2 17

55 17 2 4 2 20

Note: http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en/eurobarometer/ec_reports/ceeb1_report.pdf, 50 (accessed on June 1, 2006).

Table 12. 1990

Opinion on the Aims of the EU in Selected Years.

1993

1994

1996

1997

1998

Positive Neutral Negative Positive Neutral Negative Positive Neutral Negative Positive Neutral Negative Positive Neutral Negative Positive Neutral Negative CZ HU PL SK

49 51 46 43

23 27 24 26

2 2 3 2

37 36 37 44

40 32 32 39

10 8 9 5

34 32 42 37

40 28 23 37

6 8 7 7

33 33 58 34

42 32 24 44

9 11 5 7

34 42 56 46

38 30 27 38

7 7 6 5

34 42 56 46

38 30 27 38

7 7 6 5

Note: http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en/eurobarometer/ec_reports/ceeb8_report.pdf, 59-64 (accessed on June 1, 2006); The question asked was ‘‘as you know, fifteen states of ‘western’ Europe form together the ‘European Union.’ Would you say that your impressions of the aims and activities of the European Union are generally positive, neutral, or negative?’’

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CEE4 respondents, except in Poland, have less positive impressions about the EU between 1990 and 1998, which provided the funds for so many programs and projects? The explanation is offered by the answer to one of the survey questions, which asked ‘‘compared to twelve months ago, do you think the financial situation of your households got better, remained the same or got worse?’’ (This question was not asked in 1998.) If we look at the answers listed in Table 13, from the second phase of integration, from 1994 to 1997, when real GDP began to grow in the CEE4, but employment remained unchanged, more respondents answered that their financial situation got worse in the previous year than those who answered that it improved. The radical transformation and the economic recession ended in the CEE4 countries in 1993, and their economies began to grow. However, this recovery did not improve the employment rates. The initial enthusiasm for market reforms and economic changes in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia waned as time progressed as shown by Table 14. At the same time, the satisfaction with the democratic process also decreased. In contrast, in Poland, where employment grew between 1995 and 1998, the market economy was increasingly viewed as the correct choice. In Poland as the economy grew with increasing employment rates, an increasing percentage of respondents answered that the financial situation of their household has improved. However, in the other three countries the disenchantment with the market economy grew between 1994 and 1998, as the overall employment rate remained unchanged. In Poland where satisfaction with the market economy increased, a parallel increase is also noticeable regarding the satisfaction with the development of democracy. In the other three countries the majority of the survey respondents were not satisfied with the democratization process in their countries (Annual Central and Eastern Eurobarometer Surveys). Using the answers to these proxy questions we can conclude that social integration between 1994 and 1998 declined. Unfortunately, there were no surveys completed between 1998 and 2001.

3.2. Measuring Social Integration between 2001 and 2005 From 2001 a new series of surveys called the CCEB were distributed, collected, and analyzed. These surveys allow a direct measurement of selfidentification Table 15. The question that directly measures social integration is ‘‘In the near future do you see yourself as y nationality only, nationality and European,

1992

Households’ Financial Situation in the Past Year.

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Better Same Worse Better Same Worse Better Same Worse Better Same Worse Better Same Worse Better Same Worse CZa HU PL SK a

13 9 10

20 24 25

66 66 64

37 16 26 24

22 20 27 17

36 55 35 55

22 8 10 14

33 23 32 26

45 68 54 60

22 8 11 16

37 24 32 31

Czechoslovakia in 1992. Various issues of the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer.

40 66 54 52

28 5 20 21

43 18 43 37

28 76 35 41

22 6 21 22

42 21 40 36

33 72 37 40


Table 13.

123

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Table 14.

Opinion on Market Economy and on Democratization.

Market Economy 1994

Democratization

1998

1994

1998

Right Wrong Right Wrong Satisfactory Not satisfactory Satisfactory Not satisfactory CZ HU PL SK

47 44 49 42

36 24 23 42

28 37 62 35

50 31 19 45

44 23 23 17

53 66 63 79

36 30 57 25

58 64 33 74

Note: For 1994—http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en/eurobarometer/ec_reports/ceeb5_report.pdf, 55 and 57 (accessed on June 1, 2006); for 1998—http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en/eurobarom eter/ec_reports/ceeb8_report.pdf ,117 and 119 (accessed on June 1, 2006).

Table 15.

Public Opinion on EU Membership.

A Good Thing

A Bad Thing

Neither Good [n]or Bad

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 CZ HU PL SK EU15

45 60 51 58 48

43 67 52 58 49

46 63 61 59 54

45 49 50 57 56a

44 39 54 50 50

9 7 11 5 13

14 11 20 14 14

13 5 11 5 11

10 10 8 4 13a

11 14 8 7 17

31 23 27 28 29

28 20 30 30 31

32 23 23 30 27

42 36 37 37 28a

44 42 34 42 29

Note: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/cceb/2001/cceb2001.1_en.pdf, 56; http://ec. europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/cceb/2002/cceb_2002_ann.pdf, 55; http://ec.europa.eu/pub lic_opinion/archives/cceb/2003/2003.2_full_report_final.pdf, 69; http://ec.europa.eu/public_ opinion/archives/eb/eb62/eb_62_en.pdf, 70; http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/ eb64/eb64_anx.pdf, 9 (all accessed on June 10, 2006). a EU25.

European and nationality or European only?’’ The answer to this question is summarized in Table 16. In all CEE4 countries, when European identity increases, national identity decreases. The one exception to this rule is the 2002–2003 period for the Czech Republic, where national identification remained virtually and identification with Europe fell slightly. In analyzing the answers to various Standard Eurobarometer surveys for the EU15, Carey found that ‘‘stronger feelings of national identity lead to lower support for the EU’’ (Carey, 2002, p. 387), and CEE4 citizens’ identification. In this respect CEE4 citizens conform to EU15 members. By 2005, with the exception of Hungary, over 50% of the CEE4 respondents answered that


Table 16.

Primary Self-Identification with a Nation-State or to Some Extent with Europe. Nationality Only

CZ HU PL SK EU15

125

European to Some Extent

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

37 49 34 28 38

38 43 37 27 38

37 39 32 25 40

48 61 45 38 44

37 51 40 38 41a

53 49 68 63 60

50 57 60 66 59

50 59 66 68 56

51 39 54 59 54

55 48 58 58 55a

Note: http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/cceb/2001/cceb20011_en.pdf, 32; http:// ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/cceb/2002/cceb_2002_en.pdf, 58; http://ec.europa.eu/public_ opinion/archives/cceb/2003/2003.2_full_report_final.pdf, 60; http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_ opinion/archives/eb/eb61/eb61_anx.pdf, 165; http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/ eb64_en.pdf, 48 (all accessed on June 10, 2006). a EU25.

they feel ‘‘European to some extent’’, indicating social integration (Candidate Countries Eurobarometers, 2001, 2002, 2003; Eurobarometer 61, 2004; Eurobarometer 64, 2005). Between 2001 and 2005 in the Czech Republic and Hungary the percentage of respondent reporting feeling European remained relatively stable, while in Poland it fell 10% and in Slovakia it fell 5% as shown by Table 16. To evaluate the relationship between changes in identification and employment, the answers to another survey question has to be analyzed. The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer survey that directly measured the impact of the lackluster job creation by asking the question ‘‘What are your expectations for the year to come: will (country) y be better, worse or the same, when it comes to your personal job situation?’’ The answers are summarized in Table 17. The correlation coefficient is positive between improving job expectations and expanding identification with EU. Between 2001 and 2003 before the CEE4’s EU accession the correlation coefficients are 0.5, 0.4, and 0.2. This correlation strengthened after the 2004 EU accession to 0.7 in 2004 and 0.9 in 2005.23 In 2005, after accession the ratio of respondents who felt that their employment situation would remain the same or get better increased. Hungarians were the most pessimistic, while Poles were the most optimistic about their job situation. With accession in 2004, citizens of the CEE4 were more optimistic about their job prospects, and this corresponds with the increased feeling of European identity in 2005.

126

Table 17. 2001

CZ HU PL SK

Job Expectations for the Coming Year.

2002

2003

2004

2005

Better

Worse

Same

Better

Worse

Same

Better

Worse

Same

Better

Worse

Same

Better

Worse

Same

8 14 19 10

9 15 17 16

53 51 51 45

11 18 16 14

10 12 18 12

49 47 54 47

11 15 18 10

15 23 23 22

41 40 47 37

9 10 13 13

14 21 19 18

45 47 58 41

14 12 19 16

10 23 7 14

56 54 65 47

Note: Various eurobarometer surveys.

SUSAN GLANZ


127

The EU does not aim to substitute, national and regional identities with an exclusively European identity. As the Adonnino Report states ‘‘the goal of adopting measures [is] to strengthen and promote its identity and its image both for its citizens and for the rest of the world’’ (Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement, 1985, p. 4). Both the Treaty on the European Union (also known as the Maastricht Treaty 1992) and the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (2003) state that ‘‘the Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States.’’24 However, the EU wants to expand self-identification to include a European identity along with national identification. Studies on the EU15 show that identification with several communities is common, and therefore it is not unusual for citizens to have multiple identities at the same time (Diez Medrano, 2003; Marks & Hooghe, 2003; Hooghe & Marks, 1999). This is true for the CEE4 nations as well. Identification with Europe has grown to be about the same in the CEE4 as in the EU. Support for the EU will most likely increase in the CEE4 when more jobs are created, and correspondingly, identification will probably become increasingly broader.

4. CONCLUSION Economic integration of the CEE4 into the EU has been successful if measured by expanded trade relations with the EU15 and EU25, and higher than average EU15 growth rates. Integration has not been successful if measured by the lower than EU15 employment rates. It is impossible to calculate what would have happened had the CEE4 countries not radically transformed their economies from planned economies to market economies. It is a fair guess that the CEE4’s participation in the European and world economy would have remained lower than it was in 1990. The levels of employment may have remained close to the pre-1990 levels, resulting in a lower rate of growth and a lower per capita income. This low growth rate would have further increased the income gap between the Central and Eastern and Western Europe. However, the cost of successful transformation resulted in a falling labor market participation rates and increased unemployment. To protect existing jobs and to create new jobs the CEE4 governments and the employers must walk a tight line between worker protections and liberalizing the labor markets necessary to create new jobs. Citizens of the CEE4 countries, just like the EU citizens, have multiple identities and will tilt towards a stronger European identity when their economic prospects improve. Since 2004,

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CEE4 citizens became EU citizens and the EU symbols became part of their everyday life, reenforcing their full partnership in this integration.

NOTES 1. The various stages of European integration are reflected in the names adopted by the members. Belgium, West Germany, Luxembourg, France, Italy, and the Netherlands created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. In 1957, these same six countries signed the Treaties of Rome, creating the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community (EEC). In 1967, the European Economic Community, the European Coal and Steel Community and Euratom merged their executive organizations and called it, the European Communities (EC). As other countries joined the European Communities and the coordination and cooperation between member-states was strengthened with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which created the European Union. (http://europa.eu/abc/history/index_en.htm, accessed on May 15, 2006). 2. The Treaty of Paris entered into force on July 23, 1952 for a limited duration of fifty years. Therefore the ECSC ceased to exist on July 23, 2002 and its responsibilities and assets were then assumed by the European Union. 3. New members to the EC were Denmark, Ireland, UK (1973), Greece (1981), Spain, Portugal (1986). In 1990 with the unification of Germany, East Germany automatically became a member. Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined in 1995. In 1985 Greenland left the EC. 4. EFTA countries participate, with no voting rights, in a number of EU Agencies and programs covering enterprises, the environment, and education and research programs. (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/eea/index.htm, accessed on November 30, 2006). 5. http://secretariat.efta.int/Web/EuropeanEconomicArea/introduction, accessed on November 30, 2006. 6. Countries that joined CMEA later were Albania, East Germany, Mongolia, Cuba, and Vietnam. 7. The Europe Agreement recognized that the applicants were intent on becoming EU members and were preparing their countries for this eventuality. The Copenhagen Summit in June 1993, gave the stamp of approval for membership if four criteria were met: (1) stable, pluralist democracy, respect for human rights, and minorities; (2) functioning market economy; (3) capacity to cope with competitive pressures; and (4) EU must be able to absorb them. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf, accessed on May 15, 2006. 8. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm, accessed on May 15, 2006. 9. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1996/12/pdf/borish.pdf, accessed on May 15, 2006. 10. EU Competitiveness Report 2001, Chapter 2. http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/ enterprise_policy/competitiveness/doc/competitiveness_report_2001/index.htm, accessed on January 7, 2007.


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11. http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/hun/agrar/html/tabl1_1_2.html, accessed on January 15, 2007. 12. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/16/31920392.pdf, p. 88, accessed on May 1, 2006. 13. Address by Chancellor Kohl to the Bundestag, Bulletin, no. 81, October 15, 1996. Bonn: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 871. 14. http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/pdf/COM2005_141_en.pdf (2005), accessed on May 1, 2006. 15. europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/, accessed on December 1, 2006. 16. Europe in Figures. Eurostat Yearbook 2005. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-CD-05-001/EN/KS-CD-05-001-EN.PDF, 98, accessed on January 4, 2007. 17. For the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia - http://epp.eurostat.ec. europa.eu. For Poland - http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05264.pdf, accessed on November 25, 2006. 18. The aquis or acquis communautaire is the entire body of legislation of the European Communities and Union. http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/glossary/ glossary_a_en.htm, accessed on May 13, 2006. 19. http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtext.html, accessed on May 1, 2006. 20. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm, accessed on January 5, 2007. 21. http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en/eurobarometer/ec_reports/ceeb1_report.pdf, 30, accessed on June 2, 2006. 22. In earlier years, the question referred to ‘‘twelve member of ‘Western’ Europe.’’ 23. Author’s calculations. 24. http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html and http://europa.eu.int/constitution/ futurum/constitution/part1/title1/index_en.htm, accessed on January 15, 2007.

REFERENCES Adam, J. (1993). Transformation to a market economy in the former Czechoslovakia. Europe-Asia Studies, 45(4), 627–645. Allison, C., & Ringold, D. (1996). Labor markets in transition in Central and Eastern Europe, 1989–1995. Washington, DC: Worldbank Publications. Alston, R. M., Kearl, J. R., & Vaughan, M. B. (1992). Is there a consensus among economists in the 1990s. American Economic Review, 82, 203–209, (Papers and Proceedings, 1991, May). Arnold, R. (2005). Economics (7th ed.). Mason, OH: South-Western Publishers. Avery, G., & Cameron, F. (1998). The enlargement of the European Union (p. 9). Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press. Balassa, B. (1961). The theory of economic integration. Homewood, IL: R. Irwin, Inc. Baldwin, R. E. (1997). The causes of regionalism. The World Economy, 20(7), 865–888. Barr, N. (Ed.) (1994). Labor markets and social policy in Central and Eastern Europe: The transition and beyond. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

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Baun, M. (2000). A wider Europe. The process and politics of European union enlargement. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Bhagwati, J. (1991). The world trading system at risk. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Blanchard, O., Froot, K. A., & Sachs, J. (Eds). (1994). The transition in Eastern Europe (Vol. 2). Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Boeri, T., & Keese, M. (1992). From labour shortage to labour shedding: Labour markets in Central and Eastern Europe. Communist Economies and Economic Transformation, 3, 373–394. Boeri, T., & Sziracki, G. (1993). Labour market developments and policies in Central and Eastern Europe: A comparative analysis. In: Labour market and social policy implications of restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe. Paris: OECD-ILO. Brada, J. (1996). Privatization is transition – or is it? The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(2), 67–86. Bulletin. (1996). Address by Chancellor Kohl to the Bundestag, no. 81, 15 Oct 1996. Bonn: Presseund Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, p. 871. Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement. (1985). http://aei.pitt.edu/992/01/ andonnino_report_peoples_europe.pdf (accessed on May 1, 2006). Burda, M., & Profit, S. (1996). Matching across space: Evidence on mobility in the Czech Republic, CEPR Discussion Papers, 1364. http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP1364.asp (accessed on May 1, 2006). Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, Fieldwork. (2001). Brussels: Directorate-General Press and Communication European Commission. Published 2002. Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, Fieldwork. (2002). Brussels: Directorate-General Press and Communication European Commission. Published 2002. Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, Fieldwork. (2003). Brussels: Directorate-General Press and Communication European Commission. May. Published 2003. Carey, S. (2002). Undivided loyalties: Is national identity an obstacle to European Integration? European Union Politics, 3(4), 387–413. Carstensen, K., & Toubal, F. (2003). Foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern European countries: A dynamic panel analysis. Kiel Working Papers 1143. http://www.uni-kiel.de/ ifw/pub/kap/2003/kap_2003_e.htm (accessed on May 1, 2006). Central and Eastern Eurobarometer. (1990). http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en/eurobarometer/ ec_reports/ceeb1_report.pdf (accessed on May 1, 2006). Central and Eastern Eurobarometer. (1998). http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ ceeb_en.htm (accessed on May 1, 2006). Council of Europe. (1998). Opportunity and risk: Trends of social exclusion in Europe. http://www.coe.int/t/e/social_cohesion/hdse/2_hdse_reports/3_Final_Report/ (accessed on January 4, 2007). Dı´ ez Medrano, J. (2003). Framing Europe: Attitudes to European integration in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Education and Training 2010. (2004). Commission staff working papers. Progress towards the common objectives in education and training. Indicators and benchmarks. http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/2010/doc/progress_towards_common_objectives_ en.pdf (accessed on July 10, 2006). EU Commission. (2001). Real convergence in candidate countries, past performance and scenarios in the pre-accession economic programmes, ECFIN/708/01-EN, Brussels.


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NEO-LIBERAL SUPRATERRITORIALITY? THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION ON GLOBALIZATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE Petia Kostadinova ABSTRACT This essay explores the relationship between neo-liberal transformation in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and globalization in the region. It starts with an overview of the increasing level of globalization activities in the CEE countries. The first section of this essay also shows remarkable cross-country diversity among the CEE countries regarding the extent to which their citizens participate in four aspects of globalization, outbound tourism, citizens working abroad, students studying abroad, and internet use. The second section of the essay identifies three ways in which neo-liberalism could affect citizens’ participation in globalization activities. A direct impact of neo-liberalism on globalization could be expected through the spread of similar neo-liberal economic policies and practices in CEE, which would then create the conditions for making citizens in the region more likely to get involved in globalization. Globalization: Perspectives from Central and Eastern Europe Contemporary Studies in Economic and Financial Analysis, Volume 89, 65–93 Copyright r 2007 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1569-3759/doi:10.1016/S1569-3759(07)89002-4

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Indirectly, neo-liberalism is expected to (1) increase self-reliance among citizens and (2) reduce the level of government spending on social programs, such as education and health care, thus creating less attractive social conditions in each country. The analysis in section three of this essay shows conflicting evidence about the linkages between neoliberalism and globalization in Central and Eastern Europe. Increased labor-flexibility, one of the most pronounced aspects of neo-liberalism, is associated with reduced participation in globalization activities. The indirect impact of neo-liberalism, however, is quite pronounced. Neo-liberalism is positively associated with the extent of self-reliance among the CEE citizens, yet it also leads to reduced government spending on healthcare and education. Both reduced reliance on the state and reduced spending for these programs, on the other hand are associated with an increase in globalization activities of CEE citizens.

1. INTRODUCTION In his recent bestseller, The World is Flat, Thomas Friedman argues that while Columbus discovered that the world is a globe, we are currently experiencing Globalization 3.0, with unprecedented level of connections and competition among individuals around the world, where Indian radiologists interpret CAT scans of US patients and Chinese college graduates are hired to type handwritten Japanese house plans (Friedman, 2005). It is beyond doubt that the world today is a very different place from 30 and even 15 years ago, with faster communication tools, more powerful computers, and almost universal spread of business-to-business transactions and person-to-person interactions. Although it is debatable whether these financial and economic aspects of globalization are new phenomena, the rise of globalization experienced on a personal level is unprecedented in human history.1 As, for example, Guillen (2001, p. 38) shows, the percentage of the world population engaged in tourist travel has tripled between 1980 and 1998. For the same period of time, the number of internet hosts in the world has increased almost 4,000 times (Guillen, 2001, p. 38). In recent years, scholars have also noticed a marked increase in the percentage of people who are in favor of globalization (see for example Lagos, 2003). Similar increases, although to a smaller degree, are also seen in levels of human mobility and migration, although such evidence could be questionable due to the lack of longer term historical data on human migration. These examples indicate an increase in the level of global

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activities, where individuals, in addition to countries and economies, are becoming more interconnected, their interactions more integrated, and their activities transcending traditional state boundaries of all kinds. This fascinating area of scholarly research, despite the proliferation of recent works, still remains largely unexplored, with no definitive answers to many of the big questions about globalization.2 Such unresolved questions range from the definition of globalization itself, to the factors affecting globalization, to the consequences of this process for individuals, countries, and the world. This essay addresses the second of these three questions in the context of the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).3 While no region in the world today is immune from globalization, post-communist Europe is where the globalization process, its presence in the region, and its causes remain understudied, especially relative to questions regarding political and economic transitions. This essay explores the links between neo-liberal transformation in CEE and globalization in the region. Section 1 of this essay starts with a definition of globalization and then moves to discussing the extent to which globalization is present in Central and Eastern Europe. This section shows increasing levels of globalization in the region in general but it also identifies cross-country variation in these levels, thus justifying the search for explanations of such diversity. Section 2 focuses on the linkages between globalization and economic liberalization; and in particular, this section discusses how the dominance of neo-liberal capitalism might contribute to the spread of globalization and more specifically, what aspects of neo-liberalism might promote globalization. Section 3 focuses on comparisons among 10 CEE countries, which have recently undergone both the adoption of neo-liberalism as a strategy of economic development and (re)incorporation in the rest of the world, politically, economically, and culturally.4 The analysis in Section 3 concludes that economic liberalization in CEE is associated with an increase in some aspects of globalization such as travel, study abroad, and internet use, and quite surprisingly, it is associated with a decline in the globalization activities related to work abroad.

2. DEFINING AND MEASURING GLOBALIZATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE Globalization has many manifestations, with billions of people experiencing its effects every day.5 Yet, academics, policy makers, journalists, and activists who struggle to define this process still could not agree whether the

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current wave of globalization is fundamentally different from previous ones. Debates range from whether globalization is a new phenomenon or an old one starting with the industrial revolution to whether it leads to the imposition of one particular, i.e. the American way of dealing with cultural, economic, and political matters. While acknowledging that innovations in communication, travel, and transportation technologies have driven economic integration, population migration, and the spread of ideas for centuries, the author sides with scholars who argue that modern-day globalization brings a ‘‘qualitative transformation in the political, economic, cultural, strategic, and technological worlds’’ (Overbeek, 2002, p. 75). These qualitative changes in the world are expressed in the rise of ‘‘economic, social and political activities increasingly transcend[ing] regions and national frontiers’’ (Held & McGrew, 2002, p. 7). The increase in such activities is what Scholte (2005, p. 59) defines as respatialization or increased ‘‘y transplanetary – and in recent times also more particularly supraterritorial – connections between people’’. Different authors follow what may seem as continuation of Scholte’s argument by pointing out the ‘‘growing irrelevance of the traditional distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ policy domains, or the contestation of where, precisely, the one ends and the other begins’’ (Ruggie, 2002, p. 104; see also Cerny, 1995 and EBRD Transition Report, 2001). Globalization then is a process we all know exists but one which is very hard to capture in scholarly terms, as globalization encompasses political, economic, social, and ecological processes and is thus manifested in multiple ways. For example, Scholte (2005, p. 74) lists 12 ways in which globalization could be observed. Guillen (2001, p. 38) also groups similar aspects of globalization into four categories.6 There have been some recent attempts to quantify the separate aspects of globalization, i.e., the economic, political, cultural areas, etc., by scholars such as Held and McGrew (1999), Guillen (2001), and Kurdle (2004). Additionally, since 2000 A. T. Kearney, a leading consulting company, in collaboration with Foreign Policy magazine, has published an annual composite Index of Globalization capturing globalization aspects, such as trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, international travel and tourism, international telephone traffic, crossborder remittances and personal transfers, number of internet users, internet hosts, and secure servers.7 These aspects of globalization are collapsed in four categories, economic, personal, technological, and political, of which only the political one – reflecting memberships in international organizations, treaties, and peacekeeping operations – is measured at the county level. The other three categories reflect globalization processes involving individuals or private businesses.8 Seven post-communist countries are


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included in the Index of Globalization, with the extremes among the CEE countries marked by the Czech Republic ranking the highest (15th place) and Romania – the lowest at 35th place. While having a measure of globalization, such as the above-described index, is useful for quick reference and comparison among countries, using it in research, especially when focusing on the causes of globalization is problematic for the following three reasons. Firstly, any index by definition is a composite measure, summarizing in one number a multitude of aspects and processes. Thus it conceals, rather than reveals, the diversity of globalization aspects and more importantly, it does not allow for temporal and other variations within countries to be exposed. For example, countries which have high levels of FDI might also have high number of internet hosts but a relatively low number of tourists. Using one composite measure for these three aspects of globalization would necessarily hide the diversity in the various types of globalization. Secondly, using a single Index of Globalization does not allow scholars to focus on the relationship among the different aspects of the globalization process.9 And thirdly, a composite measure of globalization does not allow exploring whether different factors have an impact on some aspects of globalization but not on others. Despite these shortcomings, the Index of Globalization is useful in the way it identifies measurable aspects of globalization on which the rest of this essay builds. Without discounting the multiplicity of globalization aspects and their importance, this essay focuses on those manifestations of globalization which directly involve people, as opposed to countries, economies, or corporations. One significant reason to do so is the novelty of globalization expressed at the individual level. Another reason for focusing on the individual level of experiencing globalization is the dearth of analyses on how individuals, rather than countries or economies, are involved in globalization and in particular, the lack of studies relating to how economic liberalization, pursued by states, affects globalization as experienced and practiced by individuals. Table 1 presents data on several aspects of globalization in CEE, measured at the individual level, i.e. even though for the purpose of a country-to-country comparison, the data are aggregated at the country level, they capture activities of individuals as well. Overall, none of these data are exact measures of globalization, yet they are rather good proxies for the number of people in each of the 10 CEE countries which all take part in multiple types of globalization activities. The rest of this section continues with a discussion of the data presented in Table 1, starting with an overview of the changes over time according to each of the globalization measures. The discussion then turns to

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Table 1.

Person-to-Person Aspects of Globalization in Central and Eastern Europe. Outbound Outbound Rate Change Tourism Tourism in Outbound 1997 2001 Tourism 1997–2001

Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia


Foreign Workers 1997

Foreign Workers 2001

Rate Change in Foreign Workers 1997–2001

37% 447% 115% 118% 77% 83% 126% 28% 7% NA

36% 353% 122% 109% 114% 97% 138% 29% 7% 104%

0.95 0.79 1.06 0.93 1.48 1.16 1.09 1.05 0.92 NA

0.01% 0.01% 0.15% 0.09% 0.003% 0.002% 0.08% 0.05% 0.06% 0.37%

0.08% 0.03% 0.36% 0.08% 0.04% 0.03% 0.12% 0.08% 1.29% 0.19%

5.5 2.5 2.4 0.8 11.4 15.5 1.4 1.5 22.7 0.5

Students Abroad 1998

Students Abroad 2001

Rate Change in Students Abroad 1998–2001

Internet Users 1997

Internet Users 2001

Rate Change in Internet Users 1997–2001

1.90% 1% 2.30% 1.80% 1% 1.50% 0.90% 1.50% 2.60% 1.90%

4.30% 1.50% 3.20% 1.80% 1.40% 2.00% 0.9% 2.00% 5.50% 1.80%

2.3 1.5 1.4 1.0 1.4 1.3 1.0 1.3 2.1 0.9

4.89 2.91 5.49 1.97 2.02 0.94 2.07 0.44 1.17 7.56

10.23 14.67 30.05 14.55 7.23 7.17 9.84 4.47 12.53 30.08

2.09 5.04 5.47 7.39 3.58 7.63 4.75 10.16 10.71 3.98

Source: International Organization for Migration (2000); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2004); United Nations (2000).

cross-country comparison showing variation among CEE countries within each measure. Finally, as a general overview that concludes the description of data used here, the 10 CEE countries are ranked within each category and then they are compared across the categories. The data in Table 1 also serve to show that (1) globalization could be measured even if imperfectly; (2) in recent years, CEE countries have experienced an increase in globalization measured at the individual level, as expressed by an increasing number of CEE citizens who are involved in various types of globalization activities;


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and (3) there is a significant variation between CEE countries regarding the extent of globalization as practiced by their citizens. Readers should regard the following few paragraphs as an overview of the level of globalization in CEE countries. Such an overview shows that globalization profoundly affects CEE and is a phenomenon worthy of further investigation. Section 3 of this essay, which follows after the theoretical discussion, focuses on analyzing some of the reasons for the different levels of globalization in CEE. Three of the four measures presented in Table 1 capture population mobility, expressed in outbound tourism, citizens working abroad, and students studying abroad.10 The fourth measure reflects the extent to which citizens in each of the 10 countries are using the internet.11 While the number of internet users per 100 people does not indicate whether users are engaged in globalization activities, such a measure nevertheless reflects the opportunity for such activities to take place.12 For each measure, the first two columns represent the available data for 1997 and 2001, respectively.13 The third column in each section of Table 1 reflects the rate of change between 1997 and 2001 for each country. A number greater than one in these columns represents an increase in globalization as measured by the respective indicator, while a number less than one indicates a decrease in globalization.14 One trend which immediately emerges from the data in Table 1 is the increase over time in each of the four globalization indicators but particularly in the data for labor mobility, study abroad, and internet use. Between 1997 and 2001, only two countries, Estonia and Slovenia, experienced a decline in the number of their citizens who worked abroad, while the other eight countries experienced an increase in this measure of globalization.15 For the same time period, Slovakia experienced the largest increase in the percentage of its citizens working abroad, almost a 23-times increase, a dramatically significant change given the relatively low percentages of foreign workers in the EU countries. Latvia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria were the other countries with significant increases in this measure, 15.5, 11.4, and 5.5 times, respectively. The remaining four countries, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Romania, and Poland experienced relatively small increases in the percentages of their citizens working in the EU, 2.5 times, 2.4, 1.5, and 1.4 times, respectively. In addition to experiencing a decrease in the number of its citizens working abroad as a measure of globalization, Slovenia was the only CEE country, which for the 1998–2001 period, also experienced a decline in the percentage of its students studying abroad. Two other countries, Hungary

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and Poland, did not experience a change in this measure, while the remaining seven countries experienced an increase. The highest rate of increase in the number of students studying in the EU, European Economic Area (EEA), or the EU candidate countries was in Bulgaria (2.3 times) and Slovakia (2.1 times). The increases for the remaining countries were 1.3 times (Lithuania and Romania), 1.4 times (Estonia and Latvia), and 1.5 times (the Czech Republic), respectively. Of the four indicators, the measure capturing one communication aspect of globalization, the number of internet users, underwent a universal increase in all 10 CEE countries during the 1997–2001 time period. The increase was most dramatic, over 10 times, in Slovakia and Romania, with Bulgaria experiencing the smallest change, a little over 2 times. The number of internet users in Latvia and Slovenia increased around four times, and was slightly higher, around five times in the Czech Republic and Estonia. Hungary and Lithuania experienced increases in this globalization indicator of about seven times. The only indicator of globalization that did not exhibit a consistent increase over time is the measure reflecting tourist travel. Four countries, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia experienced a decline in the number of their citizens traveling abroad, while the 1997 data for Slovenia is not available. Thus, the number of international tourists increased for only five countries and in all cases the changes were relatively minor, less than two times. The greatest increases in the tourism measure of globalization were in Latvia (1.48 times) and Lithuania (1.16 times). The number of Poles traveling abroad increased 1.09 times, and for Estonians and Romanians, the increase was 1.06 and 1.05 times, respectively. The 10 CEE countries also show a remarkable cross-country diversity regarding their level of globalization both within each globalization measure and between measures. Starting with the variation within each measure, there was a rather dramatic difference between the outbound tourists from the Czech Republic (353 percent of the total population in 2001) and those from the Slovak Republic (7 percent of the population also in 2001).16 Overall, in 4 of the 10 countries, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia, the percentages of international trips do not exceed 100 percent of the total population in each country, with Bulgaria and Romania at around 30 and Lithuania at 97. In addition to the Czech Republic, the citizens of the following five CEE countries engage in a high number of international trips, exceeding 100 percent of the total population in each country; Estonia (122), Hungary (109), Latvia (114), Poland (138), and Slovenia (104). There is less variation regarding the percentage of foreign workers from each CEE country and only in one country (Slovakia) this measure exceeds


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1 percent of the population.17 Excluding Slovakia, which is discussed above, in only three of the countries, Estonia (0.36), Poland (0.12), and Slovenia (0.19), the number of their citizens working in EU countries exceeds onetenth of 1 percent of their total populations. In the remaining six countries, this measure is around 0.08 of the total population (Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania) or around 0.03 of the total population (the Czech Republic, Latvia, and Lithuania). The number of students from each country studying in the EU, EEA, or in one of the EU candidate countries, remained relatively low, in all cases at or under 5.5 percent of the student population in each country. On the high end of the spectrum, Slovakia and Bulgaria had the highest percentage of their students studying in the EU, EEA, or a candidate country, 5.5 and 4.3 respectively, while only 0.9 percent of Polish students studied in Europe.18 Estonia is ranked third with 3.2 percent of its students studying in Europe, while in the remaining six countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovenia, the percentages were at or below 2 of the student population in the respective country. The last measure of globalization discussed in this essay, capturing the prevalence of internet use, also shows a significant cross-country variation. Estonia and Slovenia are the leaders in this category with 30 out every 100 people in each country using the internet. Romania has the lowest number of users, less than 5 out of every 100 people. Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland also have a relatively low number of internet users, less than 10 out of every 100 people, while slightly more citizens of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia use the internet, between 10 and 15 out of every 100 people in each country. Overall, the CEE data on globalization at the individual level, presented in Table 1 and discussed above, clearly shows that countries differ in the extent to which their citizens engage in globalization activities. It is also evident from the data in Table 1, but perhaps in a less obvious way, that citizens do not engage in all aspects of globalization at the same time. Put it differently, if the 10 CEE countries are ranked based on the percentage of their citizens taking part in each of the four globalization aspects, different countries will take the lead for different measures. For example, the Czech Republic ranks the highest in terms of the number of outbound tourist trips, and it is third in the number of internet users, but its rankings regarding citizens working in the rest of Europe and students studying in the rest of Europe are rather low, tenth and eight, respectively. Similarly, Slovakia sends the highest number of workers and students to other European countries, but it ranks the lowest in terms of outbound

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Table 2. Outbound Tourism 2001 Czech Republic Poland Estonia Latvia Hungary Slovenia Lithuania Bulgaria Romania Slovakia

Rankings of Ten CEE Countries in Four Aspects of Globalization. Foreign Workers 2001 Slovakia Estonia Slovenia Poland Hungary Romania Bulgaria Latvia Lithuania Czech Republic

Students Abroad 2001 Slovakia Bulgaria Estonia Lithuania Romania Hungary Slovenia Czech Republic Latvia Poland

Internet Users 2001 Slovenia Estonia Czech Republic Hungary Slovakia Bulgaria Poland Latvia Lithuania Romania

tourist trips and is ranked fifth in terms of the number of Slovak citizens using the internet. Similar examples could be given for the rest of the countries but for clarity purposes the rankings are summarized in Table 2, further strengthening the evidence of the high level of diversity in terms of globalization in CEE. The preceding descriptive discussion of some measures of individual-level globalization in CEE indicates why it is not advisable for scholars to combine globalization measures into a single index. Instead, to the extent possible, different ways to capture similar aspects of globalization should be used. This essay focuses exclusively on globalization as practiced by individuals, rather than countries, corporations, or national economies, and yet for just this one aspect, the data show a great level of diversity among countries and measures even when using only four possible measures of individual-level globalization. Showcasing this diversity also serves as an important justification to continue the scholarly pursuit for explanations of globalization, to which the rest of this chapter turns. Section 3, which follows in this essay, offers a discussion of the relationship between economic liberalization, captured by neo-liberal economic reforms, and globalization at the individual level, measured in the four ways discussed above. This discussion is exploratory in nature and does not offer a normative assessment of whether neo-liberalism is good or bad for globalization. Yet, in the absence of scholarly agreement about the causes of globalization, and especially given the simultaneity or even synchronicity of globalization and neo-liberalism in the CEE, the possibility for a relationship between the two processes should not be dismissed. The theoretical portion of Section 3 is


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based on the extensive globalization literature which is not specific to CEE. Later in Section 3, these arguments are applied to the CEE countries using the data presented in Section 2 of the essay. The theoretical analysis serves to investigate the merits to consider neo-liberalism as one of the many explanations for the rise and prevalence of globalization in CEE.

3. LINKS BETWEEN ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION The lack of consensus among scholars, policy-makers, and journalists regarding the definition, substance, and measurement of globalization creates a real gap in the scholarly understanding of what drives this process, i.e. what are the specific factors which contribute to its spread or decline. With this caveat, and keeping in mind that any explanation of globalization is conditional upon one’s definition and measurement, this section discusses the direct and indirect linkages between economic liberalization and globalization, starting with a definition of economic liberalization.19 In very broad terms, neo-liberal economic ideology promotes the withdrawal of the state from economic relations and sees to enhance the prominence of market over state. This ideology includes economic policies aimed at controlling inflation (at the expense of promoting employment), privatization of previously state-controlled enterprises, removing state monopolies, and increasing the competition for providing services, such as education and healthcare, normally seen as the purview of the state.20 In the framework of neo-liberalism ‘‘[c]ompetition – between individuals, between firms, between territorial entities (cities, regions, nations, regional groupings) – is held to be primary virtue’’ (Harvey, 2005, p. 65). Economic liberalization actively promotes the withdrawal of the state from economic relations.21 The neo-liberal trend began in the late 1970s with the introduction of new monetary and economic policies in Chile and their spread to Western Europe through the de-nationalization policies of Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain, and the restrictive monetarism of Ronald Reagan in the US. Economic liberalization policies were introduced in CEE after the collapse of communism in the region.22 As evidence that economic liberalization is spreading in the world, consider the Index of Economic Freedom compiled by the Heritage Foundation. When the calculation of the index started in 1995, only 36 countries, out of the 164 surveyed ranked as economies which were free or mostly free of government intervention. Of the 36 only 4, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovakia, and

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Neo-liberal policies (measured as structural reforms or labor flexibility)

Globalization (measured as international tourists, migrant workers, students aboard and internet users)

Fig. 1.

Social conditions (measured as government spending for education and healthcare)

Self-reliance (measured as approval of government intervention)

Direct and Indirect Ways of Neo-Liberalism on Globalization.

Hungary, were from CEE. In 2006, the number of free and mostly free economies has doubled to 72 with all Western European and 9 CEE countries included in the list. Only Romania was still ranked as mostly not free in 2006.23 The simultaneous spread of globalization and neo-liberalism raises the question whether the two processes are related and if so, to what extent. The following paragraphs explain the various ways in which neo-liberalism in general and some of its aspects in particular are interlinked with globalization. The focus is on how neo-liberalism could lead to an increase in globalization activities undertaken by individuals and the various causality arguments are graphically illustrated in Fig. 1. The arguments, depicted in Fig. 1, are derived from the theoretical literature on globalization rather than the experience of any one particular region or country and their applicability to globalization in CEE is determined later on in this section. Fig. 1 summarizes some of the ways in which neo-liberal policies could affect globalization, i.e. the ways in which neo-liberalism creates favorable conditions for an increased level of globalization activities. Most generally and most indirectly, the recent spread of the ideology of free markets has created an economic, political, and social climate where citizens are less likely to turn to the state for guidance, solutions to problems, or jobs.24 This relationship is mostly theoretical as public opinion research regarding the


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relationship between neo-liberalism and citizens’ reliance on the state is rather limited.25 An underlying tenet of neo-liberalism is the world-view of being a master of one’s own fate and the promotion of individualism. One would expect that in countries with more prominent neo-liberal practices, citizens would be less reliant on the state, and individuals sharing this attitude would be more likely to participate in globalization activities.26 Another indirect way in which the recent spread of neo-liberal policies could encourage globalization is through the promotion of similar (neo-liberal) economic practices across CEE. Such practices are intended to ‘level the playing field’ by creating freer access and opportunities for individuals and businesses to participate in the economy.27 Equality of opportunity, however, would not refer to the equality of resources for participants in the market, nor to the equality of the outcome. Instead, a level-playing field refers to equal access and equality before the law, i.e. equal rights to all potential participants in the economy, along with equal responsibilities.28 One example of creating equal opportunities is the full opening of the Central and Eastern economies to the EU market in the wake of their EU accessions. Of course, none of the economies in the EU or in the CEE accession countries are perfectly open and there are plenty of examples of protectionism either over agricultural products (in EU-25) or over purchasing of land by foreigners (in some new member states). Yet, these important exceptions aside, in general, economic liberalization has increased the possibility for any one person or business to participate in the economy, by spreading similar economic policies across CEE so that as Scholte (2005) points out ‘‘firms [can] place their production facilities wherever y the needed resources are more easily accessed and the costs are lowest’’ (p. 138). A particular aspect of neo-liberalism, labor flexibility, could play a direct role in facilitating the globalization activities of individuals. The flexibility of the labor market is based on the assumption that the labor force is a cost and needs to be accounted for in a company’s balance sheet. Increasing labor flexibility in a country’s legal system allows companies to adjust work hours, tasks, and wages in response to market conditions and needs. In a flexible labor market, workers often do not have set contracts and their wages, work schedules, and continued employment depend on whether their employer is making a profit or not. Policies increasing labor flexibility mean that businesses face fewer restrictions in hiring and firing workers, gain the upper hand in their relations with both government and labor, and can threaten to relocate globally to other regions that offer more favorable conditions, if the company’s expectations are not met.29 Research by Altomonte and Guagliano (2003) shows a steady increase in the flow of FDI

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in the CEE countries since the 1990s. Among the more interesting findings of the authors’ analysis is that the CEE share of the total FDI inflows in the developing countries has risen twofold between 1991 and 2001, indicating that the CEE countries are among the winners in the global competition for attracting foreign investment. The impact of labor flexibility on workers also creates the conditions for increased participation by individuals in global activities. Labor flexibility increases the mobility of business, yet a flexible labor market also means increased pressure on workers. Faced with the wage constraints, i.e. pressure to accept concessions for reduced wages, of a flexible labor market, workers end up in a greater need to relocate to another city, country, or continent in pursuit of better-paying jobs. The recent increase in workers’ migration from CEE, illustrated in Table 1, provides an example of how neo-liberal government policies could go hand-in-hand with individuals’ increased participation in globalization activities. Of course, other factors such as the lifting of migration restrictions (in the EU at least), or peoples’ desire for a better lifestyle, all play a role in determining whether workers would participate in globalization or not. Yet, as the subsequent analysis shows, specific neo-liberal policies should not be discounted from being one of the influential factors in these personal decisions to engage directly in global labor activities. In addition to promoting self-reliance and spreading similar economic practices, in particular labor flexibility, neo-liberalism could influence globalization by affecting social policy. The argument for this is also indirect and focuses on the impact of neo-liberal policies on spending for education and healthcare.30 The analysis of the impact of neo-liberal ideology on globalization activities pursued by individuals is developed below. In brief, the neo-liberalism-induced decrease of spending for education and healthcare could make it less attractive for citizens to live and be economically productive within the territorial boundaries of their birth country.31 While social security benefits, healthcare, and education systems still mostly remain the purview of the state, neo-liberal economic policies promote the reduction of social benefits and lead to increased outsourcing of state services to the private sector, for example, the privatization of the healthcare and pension systems in CEE.32 Thus, increased inequality associated with liberalization, and in particular the years of depression at the beginning of CEE’s economic liberalization, has increased social inequalities and the number of marginalized people. If there were fewer social benefits to keep people in a particular country, and if citizens had to increasingly contribute personal finances to pay for


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healthcare, education, and their retirement, why would they choose to do so in the country of their birth rather than where employment opportunities are better? One could further distinguish between the differing effects of neo-liberalism on the participation in globalization activities by the betteroff and the poor in a country.33 Some segments of the population, especially those who are young, have higher education, and are better off would be more likely to benefit from free-market economic policies and able to afford the increased cost of social benefits in their own country or to pay for private services. Thus, such groups of citizens would be likely to pursue globalization activities in search for even better opportunities. Those groups of the population, though, which are on the losing side of neo-liberal reforms, such as the older segment of the population, the poor and the less educated, would face a different dilemma. They would be more likely to participate in globalization activities, such as migration, and work abroad but also tourism and perhaps internet use, just to ensure their survival.34 In summary, this section identified three main ways in which the ideology of neo-liberalism could create favorable conditions to foster individuals’ participation in globalization activities. Firstly, since neo-liberalism advocates individualism and the primacy of the market in economic relations, economic liberalization could lead to a growing feeling of self-reliance among citizens and thus increase the likelihood of their participation in globalization vis-a`-vis relying on the state for help with, for example, employment. Secondly, the prevalence of neo-liberal practices in the world, and especially in the CEE countries, with special regard to labor flexibility policies, creates policy similarities that facilitate the mobility of both business and labor. The third manner in which neo-liberalism could facilitate participation in globalization is through its impacts on decreasing spending for education and healthcare. These three ways in which neo-liberalism relates to globalization are by no means exhaustive. Yet, due to the inconclusive research on the causes of globalization, no single explanation stands out regarding the CEE either. The rest of this section offers an analysis of the extent to which neo-liberalism is a viable explanation for the differences in engagement with globalization among the citizens of 10 CEE countries.35

3.1. Capturing Neo-Liberalism in CEE and Its Impact on Self-Reliance and Spending for Education and Healthcare Adequate measures of neo-liberalism, self-reliance, and social conditions are necessary before one could ascertain the validity of the arguments presented

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Table 3. Country


Explanatory Variables, Capturing the Direct and Indirect Effects of Neo-Liberalism on Globalization. SRI 2000

Labor Flexibility 2000

State Intervention 2000 (%)

Relative Health and Education Spending 2000 (%)

2.88 3.22 3.33 3.00 3.00 3.05 3.45 2.67 2.88 3.18

5.3 6 6 5.6 6 5.2 4.6 6.8 4.7 3.6

41 59 38 65 40 44 59 46 73 62

13 18 19 10 14 17 5 18 15 19

above. Table 3 summarizes such measures, which are described below. The author uses two measures, one general and one specific, that capture the extent to which CEE countries have adopted the principles of market capitalism.36 The general measure provides an account of the level of neoliberal economic reforms in each CEE country, while the specific one focuses on one aspect of such reforms – not captured in the general measure – that of labor flexibility. Additionally, data on self-reliance among CEE citizens, as well as of government spending on healthcare and education are used, as both factors are expected to channel the impact of neo-liberalism on globalization. One way to quantify the level of neo-liberal reforms in an economy is the structural reform index (SRI) designed by experts from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). This index captures the extent to which a country has adopted legislation that removes state controls from competition policy, the extent of reforms in the enterprise, banking, and financial sectors, as well as the effectiveness and extensiveness of company law legislation.37 For each CEE country, its SRI is an average of the country’s scores regarding each of the six indicators. It is measured on a scale from 0 to 4.33. This index provides a snapshot of the extent to which free market principles are adopted and thus provides an indication about the level of economic liberalization in the economy of each CEE country. Labor flexibility could strongly influence the number of citizens of each CEE country who wish (or feel compelled to) participate in globalization activities. A measure of labor flexibility is provided by Lawson and


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Bierhanzl (2004) who construct a comprehensive cross-country index measuring labor-market flexibility. Lawson and Bierhanzl’s (2004) labor flexibility index reflects ‘‘the extent to which employment decisions are made by individuals rather than a central authority’’ (p. 118). The index consists of a measure of the minimum wage, employment benefits, unemployment insurance, unionization, restrictions of hiring and dismissal, and the presence of policies such as training programs and early retirement plans. Each of these elements is evaluated for its affect on labor flexibility and quantified in a summary index on a 0–10 scale, where higher values indicate greater market flexibility.38 One of the indirect ways in which neo-liberalism could facilitate globalization is through promoting self-reliance among the citizens of CEE. Self-reliance is a very broad concept, and it is hard to measure. As a proxy for the extent to which CEE citizens are self-reliant, this essay uses responses to a questionnaire, Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, conducted by the European Union in 2001. One of the questions on the survey asked respondents whether they agree or disagree with the statement that the ‘‘state intervenes too much.’’39 The author assumes that a strong agreement with this statement would be an indication that CEE respondents are more likely to be self-reliant. A third, and also indirect, way in which neoliberalism could impact globalization is channeled through the effect of economic liberalization on spending for education and health programs, and is expressed in the percentage of the budget for each country directed at such programs. Table 3 presents data on the level of neo-liberalism (based on calculations by the EBRD), level of labor flexibility, and the spending on health and education program as a percentage from the total budget for 10 CEE countries for 2000. The year 2000 was selected, since it is reasonable to assume that the impact of neo-liberalism on globalization is not instantaneous and it takes time for citizens, who participate in globalization activities, to adjust to economic policies.40 Table 3 shows significant cross-country diversity in all four measures, neo-liberalism, globalization, and spending for education and healthcare in CEE, particularly regarding citizen’s perception of state intervention in their lives and spending for health and education. This diversity is discussed in the rest of this section. In 2000, Poland had the highest SRI of all the 10 CEE countries (3.45 of the maximum 4.33), while Romania had accomplished the least in terms of reforming the legal framework of its economy, and its SRI score was 2.67. Estonia had the second highest SRI score, 3.33, followed by the Czech Republic (3.22), Slovenia (3.18), and Lithuania (3.05). The remaining four countries had

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SRI scores of 3.0 (Latvia and Hungary) or below 3.0 (Bulgaria and Slovakia at 2.88). Among the CEE countries, Romania had the most flexible labor market among the CEE countries, as indicated by a score of 6.8 (out of 10.0) on the labor flexibility scale. Slovenia, on the other hand, had the most inflexible labor market, with a score of 3.6. The other CEE countries fell between these two extremes, with the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Latvia having labor markets almost as flexible as Romania’s, and a score of 6 each. Poland and Slovakia are closer to Slovenia, with scores of 4.6 and 4.7, respectively, while Bulgaria (5.3), Hungary (5.6), and Lithuania (5.2) occupy a middle ground. In 2000, the CEE country with the highest percentage of its citizens believing that the state intervenes too much in their lives was Slovakia (73 percent), while only 38 percent of Estonians thought that state intervention was too high in their country. In four of the countries, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania, around two-fifths, or 40 percent of their respective populations thought that state intervention in people’s lives was too much. Slightly higher number of Czechs and Poles (59% each), Hungarians (65%), and Slovenes (62%) supported this view. As indicated in the last column of Table 3, in 2002 there was much less diversity among CEE countries regarding the percentages of the budget that each country spent on education and healthcare. With the exception of Poland, which had by far the lowest spending (5 percent of its budget), the spending levels on education and health of the other CEE countries fall in two categories. On the higher end are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovenia that spent around 18–19 percent of their annual budgets on healthcare and education. The second group, including Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, and Slovakia, spent around 10–15 percent of the total budget for these two budget items. The comparisons in Table 3 show a considerable diversity among the 10 CEE countries regarding the two measures of neo-liberal reforms (SRI and labor flexibility index), spending for health and education, as well as citizens’s perceptions regarding state intervention. Data in Table 3 also show some intriguing relationships between the four measures represented there. The inverse relationship between the structural reform and labor flexibility indexes, while not the focus of this essay is worth noting. It indicates that countries with low levels of the SRI have more flexible labor markets than countries with high levels of SRI. This conclusion is not necessarily counter-intuitive, since these two measures capture two very different aspects of economic policy, thus a country could introduce a flexible labor market instead of, or before, reforming its legal environment.41 The relationships between neo-liberal


Table 4.

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Correlation Coefficients between Measures of Neo-Liberalism and Measures of Globalization. Level of NeoLiberal Reform

Outbound tourism 2001 Workers abroad 2001 Students abroad 2001 Internet users 2001 State intervention Health and education %GDP

0.57 0.15 0.57 0.53 0.07 0.28

Labor Flexibility

0.14 0.29 0.31 0.41

State Intervention

0.08 0.52 0.19 0.12

Health and Education %GDP 0.06 0.09 0.78 0.36

reforms on one hand and perceptions of state intervention and spending on the other are discussed in the subsequent section.

3.2. Evaluating the Role of Neo-Liberalism in Globalization of Central and Eastern Europe This essay identified three interrelated ways in which neo-liberalism promotes globalization in CEE: (1) through increasing self-reliance, (2) by introducing legislation aimed at lessening the role of the state in general and increasing labor flexibility in particular, and finally (3) by reduced social benefits, resulting from economic liberalization.42 The direct impact of neo-liberal ideology on globalization would originate from the increased level of market-driven relations in each economy, i.e. directly from introducing the regulations of market capitalism.43 The indirect roles of neo-liberalism would be channeled through its impact on spending for healthcare and education and on citizen’s perceptions about the role of the state in their lives. A change both in spending levels and perceptions about the role of the state is expected to have an impact on the extent to which citizens take part in globalization activities. The rest of this section analyzes these propositions using data on globalization in CEE presented earlier in the essay. Table 4 summarizes the correlations between the two measures of neo-liberalism (the level of neo-liberal reforms and the extent of labor flexibility) and the four measures of globalization in CEE (outbound tourism, citizens of each country working or studying abroad, and the number of internet users). This table also includes correlation coefficients

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between the measures of self-reliance and spending for healthcare and education, and globalization. The predominance of positive correlation coefficients in Table 4 suggest that there is at least some evidence that certain aspects of neo-liberalism contribute to an increase in globalization activities undertaken by citizens of the CEE. The following discussion of these results starts with the potential direct impact of economic liberalization, as measured by the EBRD’s SRI and Lawson and Bierhanzl’s Labor Flexibility Index.44 As seen in the second column of Table 4, the increased level of structural reforms is positively associated with three of the four globalization aspects. Those CEE countries that have more fully implemented neo-liberal reforms, as indicated by higher SRI scores, tend to have higher percentages of outbound tourists, of students studying abroad, as well as a higher number of internet users, than countries with lower SRI scores. The correlation between structural reforms and number of workers abroad, however, is a negative one, suggesting that countries with high levels of structural reforms have lower percentages of their citizens working abroad. Also contrary to predictions, labor flexibility, the alternative to SRI and a narrower way to measure economic liberalization, is negatively associated with three of the four globalization indicators. Only the correlation between labor flexibility and outbound tourism is a positive one. While EBRD’s structural reform and the labor flexibility indexes are used as proxies to capture any possible direct impact of neo-liberalism on globalization, the indirect impact could be channeled in two ways, (1) by increasing self-reliance among CEE citizens and (2) by reducing the social benefits associated with citizenship of a particular country. This logic does not imply that self-reliance or lower social protection in the home country are desirable developments, nor does it ignore the reality of growing feelings of nationalism and dissatisfaction with some of the outcomes of neoliberalism, such as reduced spending for social programs, increased emphasis on market efficiencies, and balanced budgets. Nevertheless, the consequences of economic liberalization could create such social and economic conditions under which citizens are more likely to participate in global activities.45 The last two columns of Table 4 list the correlation coefficients between the measures of citizens’ participation in globalization and the two proxies capturing some of the social consequences of neo-liberalism, i.e. public opinion regarding the extent of state intervention in citizens’ lives and the level of government spending on some social programs.46 The indirect relationships discussed above could be interpreted in the following way. First, the direct links between neo-liberalism and public


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opinion about state intervention, and neo-liberalism and government spending, each are verified through the correlation coefficients in the second column of Table 4. Secondly, the statistical evidence for relationships between public opinion regarding state intervention and globalization, and spending for education and healthcare, and globalization, are discussed. The presence of correlations in the expected direction in all instances serves to confirm the presence of an indirect relationship between neo-liberalism and globalization. Predictably, as seen in Table 4 (bottom of first column), there is a positive, albeit a weak one, correlation between the extent to which a country has undergone neo-liberal transformation, as measured by the SRI and the percentage of respondents who think that there is too much state intervention in their lives. The positive sign of this coefficient supports the conclusion that as the CEE economies have liberalized, the level of individualism has increased. Similarly, the negative relationship between economic liberalization and the level of spending for education and healthcare is confirmed by the negative correlation coefficient in the bottom cell ( 0.28) of the second column of Table 4. Countries which have higher scores on the SRI tend to spend less on health and education. The positive impact of neo-liberalism on self-reliance and its negative impact on spending for education and healthcare are both in the predicted directions, and showing these impacts constitutes the first step in revealing an indirect relationship between economic liberalization and globalization. The second step in this process involves discussing the relationship between self-reliance and spending for education and healthcare on globalization, to which the next paragraph is devoted. The correlation coefficients between the indicators of self-reliance and education and healthcare spending on the one hand and globalization on the other hand are shown in the third and fourth columns of Table 4. Column 3 shows positive correlations between public opinion regarding state intervention and each of the globalization indicators, such as outbound tourism, workers abroad, students abroad, and internet users. These positive correlations indicate that the CEE countries with higher percentage of their citizens who believe that the state intervenes too much in their lives also have higher percentage of citizens involved in globalization activities, compared to countries with a lower percentage of citizens who believe that the state intervenes too much. The results regarding the impact of lower spending for health and education on globalization, shown in column 4, are rather mixed, but they are mostly in the predicted direction, namely by increasing people’s intention to engage more with globalization. The positive correlation coefficients between lower spending for education and healthcare and

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international tourists, workers abroad, and internet users could be interpreted in the following way. Countries which spend more for health and education tend to have relatively high percentages of citizens involved in these three globalization activities. Vice versa, countries which spend less on education and healthcare have fewer citizens participating in international tourism, work abroad, and internet use. The only indicator of globalization which decreases as spending for social programs increases is the percentage of CEE students studying abroad. Countries with high level of spending on education and healthcare have lower percentage of their students studying in Europe than countries with relatively lower levels of spending for education and healthcare. Based on the above discussion, the indirect links between neo-liberalism and globalization could be summarized as follows. High levels of neoliberalism are associated with high percentage of citizens who think that state intervention in their lifes is too much. High percentage of citizens who believe that the state intervenes in their lives more than it should is, on the other hand, associated with more citizens using the internet or participating in foreign travel, work, or study abroad. Thus, indirectly, high degree of economic liberalization is associated with high levels of globalization on personal level. The logic regarding the indirect impact of neo-liberalism on people’s engagement in globalization through spending for education and healthcare is similar, although a bit more complex. Economic liberalization is negatively associated with spending on healthcare and education, meaning that as, for example, a country’s level of economic liberalization increases, its education and healthcare spending decreases. Spending for such programs, on the other hand is positively associated with citizens’ participation in three of the four globalization activities discussed here, tourism, working abroad, and internet use. As, for example, spending levels increase, so does participation in these three globalization activities and vice versa; as spending for education and healthcare is reduced, due to increased economic liberalization – as discussed above, participation in some globalization activities also decreases. As the only negative coefficient in column 4 shows, spending for education and healthcare is negatively associated only with the number of students abroad, meaning that as spending decreases, the number of CEE students studying abroad increases.

4. CONCLUSION This chapter focused on exploring the possible links between economic liberalization and globalization. Following Scholte (2005), globalization was


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defined as the process of increasing supraterritorial connections among people, which transcend states, regions, and continents. Economic liberalization was defined as the process of state withdrawal from regulating economic relations. Both of these concepts were applied to CEE countries. The scholarly literature has shown that neo-liberal government policies contribute to the spread of person-to-person global interaction in three interrelated ways. A direct impact could be expected through the spread of similar neo-liberal economic policies and practices in CEE, which would then create the conditions making citizens in the region more likely to get involved in globalization. Indirectly, neo-liberalism is expected to (1) increase the self-reliance among citizens; and (2) reduce the level of government spending on social programs, such as education and healthcare, thus creating less attractive social conditions in each country. A major part of the challenge of evaluating any possible impact of neoliberalism on peoples’ behavior toward globalization is finding ways to adequately capture both processes. This challenge is especially daunting with regard to globalization since there is very little agreement of the scholarly literature on what is globalization and how it could be measured. This essay intends to contribute to this debate by focusing on several aspects of globalization involving individuals, rather than countries or corporations. Specifically, the specific globalization indicators used here are the number of outgoing tourists, workers, and students abroad, as well as the number of internet users in each CEE country. Neo-liberal economic reforms are captured in two ways. First, as a general indicator of the level of economic liberalization in an economy, the essay uses the SRI, designed by the EBRD. A second, and a more specific indicator of neo-liberalism applied to CEE is the Lawson and Bierhanzls’ (2004) index of labor flexibility. Two other measures, one reflecting the extent of self-reliance among CEE citizens and another – the level of government spending for education and healthcare, capture the possible indirect ways of neo-liberalism to affect globalization are also used in this analysis. Overall, the analysis in this chapter shows that neo-liberalism does increase (both directly and indirectly) various globalization activities which CEE citizens undertook in 2001. The influence of economic liberalization on peoples’ engagement with globalization is especially evident through the indirect channels explained above. In brief, neo-liberalism is positively associated with the extent of self-reliance among CEE citizens and it is negatively associated with the level of government spending on healthcare and education. Both self-reliance and education and healthcare spending are positively associated with globalization. The direct relationship between

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economic liberalization and globalization is less conclusive. Expressed in the levels of structural reforms in each CEE country, neo-liberalism is positively associated with three of the four types of globalization activities. The role of labor flexibility, however, is opposite to the predicted direction and countries with more flexible markets tend to have, on average, lower numbers of citizens involved in globalization activities. Many of the conclusions from the analysis in this essay are tentative due to the lack of longitudinal globalization data for the CEE and the relatively short period of time when neo-liberalism and globalization have coexisted in the region. Yet, this essay offers a contribution towards the rather limited scholarly understanding of which factors affect globalization by focusing on neo-liberal ideology as a potential explanation for the variation in CEE citizens’ engagement with globalization. The conclusions of this essay, although quite limited in scope and very preliminary, offer an indication that neo-liberalism should be considered as a potential explanation for the recent spread of globalization in CEE, in addition to other possible explanations.

NOTES 1. For overviews of the different debates related to globalization, see for example Guillen (2001) and Scholte (2005). 2. For an example of the increase of scholarly publications about globalization, see Guillen (2001). 3. Perhaps the most fascinating topic regarding globalization is studying its political, societal, and economic consequences. This question, however, could not be addressed until scholars settle controversies about the definitional and causal issues of globalization. In other words, it is fruitless to ask what are the consequences of globalization without first agreeing on what this process involves, how it could be measured, and what are its causes. 4. In this essay, for the purposes of most-similar research design, CEE is defined as the former European communist countries, which are currently members of the European Union (EU). As of the writing of this essay, the following ten countries are EU members: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 5. While globalization is far from evenly spread and the wealthier segments of each society certainly experience globalization differently than the less well-off, very few regions, countries, and people are immune to globalization. Thus, even people who do not directly participate in global activities are affected by them indirectly. The assessment of the impact of globalization, however, is not the subject of this essay. 6. Three of the Guillen’s four categories, economic, financial, social, and political, include the 12 ways in which globalization is manifested according to Scholte, namely, communication, travel, production, markets, money, finance, organizations,


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military, ecology, heath, law, and consciousness. Guillen’s fourth category, bibliographical, refers to the spread of scholarly work on globalization and is not included in Scholte’s categorization. 7. A full description of the Index of Globalization and globalization rankings could be found at http://www.atkearney.com 8. Trade is the only exception, since it includes both state and non-state economic transactions. 9. While studying the relationship among aspects of globalization is not a subject of this essay, using an index for such purposes nevertheless emerges as an important shortcoming. Additionally, there are specific problems with the way in which various aspects of globalization are weighted in the A. T. Kearney Index of Globalization, detailed by Kurdle (2004). 10. ‘Outbound tourism’ reflects the number of leisure trips the citizens of each country made in the indicated year as a percentage of the total country population. The percentage in many cases exceeds 100 percent because the calculation is based on the number of trips, rather than the number of people engaged in international tourism. Thus, even though not everyone travels abroad, some citizens make more than one trip, resulting in the percentage of trips being higher than 100 percent of the population (World Tourism Organization, 2004). The measure of ‘citizens working abroad’ is calculated as the percentage of the population from each country working in the 27 member states of the EU. Of course, countries send workers abroad to other world regions; however, systematic data for the total number of foreign workers per country is not available. Source: Eurostat available at http:// epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/. ‘Students studying abroad’ represents the percentage of tertiary education students from each country who study in the 27 member states of the EU, the EU candidate countries, and any of the member-states of the European Economic Area which are not EU members (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway), are hereafter abbreviated as students studying in Europe. Citizens of the countries in this study enroll as students in other parts of the world too, yet the author’s’ inability to calculate the percentage of students studying abroad is due to the lack of systematic information about the total number of students per country (Eurostat, available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/). 11. Data is from United Nation’s Millennium Indicators, available at http:// mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=605 12. Two of the four measures of globalization, those of CEE citizens working or studying abroad are captured using data for work and study in Europe, due to the lack of systematic data for such globalization activities of CEE citizens in other world regions. Yet, the author is confident that measuring these aspects of globalization only at the European level is representative for the extent to which CEE citizens are engaged on work and study activities abroad. 13. Year 2001 was chosen as the end year for consistency purposes since most data, particularly those for tourism and internet use are not yet available beyond 2001. Year 1997 was selected as a point of time in the 1990s for which most data is available. The availability of student mobility data, however, started in 1998, so this is the year that is used. 14. The author chose the rate of change, rather than the simple difference in numbers between the two years, since the former is a better illustration of the

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dramatic increases in some areas of globalization. This is especially true for the measure of workers aboard, who constitute a very minor percentage of the work force but experienced the most dramatic increases between 1997 and 2001. Also, using a rate of change indicator provides a very quick at-a-glance way of determining whether there is an increase (number greater than one) or decrease (number lower than one) of the respective indicator. 15. For stylistic purposes the author uses ‘number of workers’ or number of students’ interchangeably with ‘percentage of workers’ or ‘percentage of students’, respectively. In both cases this decision is justified because of the relatively constant denominators in both fractions, the total population and the total number of students, respectively. For example, in the case of declining percentages of foreign workers from Estonia and Slovenia, since the denominator in the fraction (total population) did not vary much, the decline was due to the decrease in the numerator (number of foreign workers) rather than an increase in the denominator, thus representing a decline in numbers as well as a decline in terms of percentage. 16. In discussing cross-country variation regarding globalization, the author uses 2001 data, the latest available for all countries and all measures, even though for some countries and some measures, more recent data are available which are not presented and discussed here. 17. For stylistic purposes, diversity and variation are used interchangeably. 18. In the paragraph, in order to avoid repetition, Europe is used as substitute for the more cumbersome although more accurate expression ‘EU, EEA, or a candidate country.’ 19. For stylistic purposes, the author uses economic liberalism, neo-liberalism, and market capitalism interchangeably to mean economic relations among individuals and/or businesses which are free of, or subject to limited, state regulation and intervention. 20. While natural monopolies do exist in free market economies, economic liberalization is about creating or facilitating the creation of a free market where one did not exist before. Economic liberalization aims at dismantling state controls but not necessarily removing natural monopolies. 21. For a succinct overview of the evolution of neo-liberalism and its ideological relationship with liberalism in general and economic liberalism in particular, see Thorsen and Lie (nd) and Kendall (2003). 22. While many countries outside Europe, and some countries in Europe, have resisted liberalization and continue to offer alternative approaches to managing economic policies, the global trend in recent years has been for increased liberalization. This trend is partially based on the perception that neo-liberal economies grow faster than state-dominated ones. Examining the reasons for the spread of neo-liberalism or addressing the question of whether the liberalization trend would continue is beyond the scope of this essay. 23. Explanation of the Heritage Foundation Index, along with the data could be found at http://www.heritage.org/index 24. State is used here as a term denoting federal (if applicable), central, and local governments. 25. The author is not aware of any research on this topic. 26. It is of course also possible that when the state actively withdraws from economic and social policies, citizens would turn to local, rather than global identities,


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and there are some recent examples, such as in Poland, Hungary, or Bulgaria, regarding the rise of nationalistic tendencies. 27. Critics of neo-liberalism often associate it with a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ and with minimal provision of state services. While there is evidence for such an outcome due to economic liberalization in regions such as Latin America, in Europe, and particularly in CEE, the evidence is still mixed. 28. The term ‘potential participants’ is used here because the presence of equal economic rights and responsibilities does not force citizen’s participation in the market. Also, a full legal equality of potential market participants does not imply equality in practice. 29. The 2005 urban riots in France over the government’s plan to increase the flexibility of the French labor market are an example of popular dissatisfaction with such policies. 30. These two budget items, education and healthcare, are picked because they have a direct relevance to the economic status of citizens and thus the economic development of a country. 31. Whether and how citizens would be impacted by the social outcomes that neoliberalism produces depends very much on their social, educational, and economic characteristics. 32. For an overview of the extent of pension system reforms in CEE, see Fultz and Ruck (2001). Mark J. C. Nuijten (2003) discuss the extent of healthcare reforms in the region. 33. Although, there are no reliable statistics on the socio-economic status of migrants from the CEE countries, anecdotal evidence suggests that they are as likely to be poor and low skilled as they are likely to have higher education and be better-off. 34. This statement does not imply that older people would be more likely to participate in globalization activities than younger people, yet excluding the older generation from the list of economic losers would be a mistake. For an overview of which groups are winners and losers from economic transition in CEE, see Hayo (1998). 35. The data which are used here is presented in the beginning section of this essay. 36. The Heritage Foundation Index discussed above, while useful for a quick overview and comparison is not adequate for analytical purposes since it does not differentiate among different aspects of a free market economy. 37. Competition policy is aimed as reducing monopolies and sets the rules under which companies function. The measure of enterprise reform captures the extent to which a country’s enterprises function according to market principles. Banking and financial sector reforms govern the establishment and maintenance of free market regulation for banking and non-banking financial institutions, respectively. For more information, see any of the EBRD’s Transition Reports available at http:// www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/series/tr.htm 38. Labor flexibility is measured by Lawson and Bierhanzl index that is available only for the year 2000, which unfortunately prevents scholars from temporal analysis. The author is not aware of any other measures of labor flexibility. 39. The full question is the following: ‘‘For each of the following statements I am going to read out, could you please indicate on a scale from 1 to 4, to what extent you agree with each of these? Note that ‘‘1’’ means you totally agree with the opinion

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whereas ‘‘4’’ means you totally disagree. The numbers in-between allow you to shade your answer.’’ One of the statements respondents are asked to agree/disagree with is ‘‘the state intervenes too much.’’ A full description of the survey could be found at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cceb_en.htm 40. One could argue that even one year might be a short time for any impact of neo-liberalism on globalization to take place. Yet, the labor flexibility measure is available only for 2000, which prevents the use of a different lag, e.g., a longer time period between when labor flexibility is captured and when globalization activities take place. 41. The SRI reflects the extent to which the legal environment in an economy functions based on market principles, while the labor flexibility index indicates the ease with which the labor market can adjust to market pressures, via for example reductions in wages, benefits, or shifts of production. 42. While anecdotal evidence shows that one of the first reactions to globalization would be an increase in nationalistic feelings, such surge in nationalism does not mean that citizens would refuse to participate in globalization activities. In other words, they might participate reluctantly. 43. Indicated in the second numeral in the preceding sentence. 44. The discussion of the correlations in Table 4 follows an interpretation that is standard for quantitative analysis. A positive correlation coefficient indicates that the two variables vary together, i.e. a high value in one is associated with a high value in the other. A negative correlation coefficient, on the other hand, suggests the opposite relationship, namely that a high value in one variable is associated with a low value in the other. Correlation coefficients, as those discussed in Table 4, measure associations between two variables which can be observed across all countries in the sample but it does not necessarily apply to any two particular sets of countries. The lack of sufficient data on globalization in CEE does not allow for performing more sophisticated analysis at this time. Thus, the interpretation should be used cautiously as they do not indicate any causality, but merely that there is reason to expect that the two factors be related. 45. Again, no judgment is made whether such neoliberalism-induced participation is good or bad for economic development. 46. The author understands that these are rather crude measures of the potential impact of neo-liberalism on the social conditions in a country, but believes that these measures are nevertheless useful, since data measuring directly the level of selfreliance among CEE citizens are not presently available on a cross-national scale.

REFERENCES Altomonte, C., & Guagliano, C. (2003). Comparative study of FDI in Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. Economic Systems, 27, 223–246. Cerny, P. (1995). Globalization and the changing logic of collective action. International Organization, 49(4), 595–625. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. (2001). Transition Report. London: The Bank.


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Friedman, T. (2005). The world is flat: A brief history of the 21st Century. New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux. Fultz, E., & Ruck, M. (2001). Pension reform in Central and Eastern Europe: An update on the restructuring of national pension schemes in selected countries. Budapest: International Labor Organization. Guillen, M. (2001). Is globalization civilizing, destructive or feeble? A critique of five key debates in the social science literature. Annual Review of Sociology, 27, 235–260. Harvey, D. (2005). A brief history of neoliberalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Hayo, B. (1998). Public support for market reforms in Eastern Europe. Aberdeen: Centre for the Study of Public Policy. Held, D., & McGrew, A. (1999). Global transformations. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Held, D., & McGrew, A. (2002). Globalization/anti-globalization. Cambridge: Polity Press. International Organization for Migration. (2000). World migration report. New York and Geneva: United Nations. Kendall, G. (2003). From liberalism to neoliberalism. Paper presented at the Social Change in the 21st Century Conference, Queensland University of Technology. Kurdle, R. (2004). Globalization by the numbers: Quantitative indicators and the role of policy. International Studies Perspective, 5, 341–355. Lagos, M. (2003). World opinion: Global trends in culture and trade. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 15(3), 336–351. Lawson, R., & Bierhanzl, E. (2004). Labor market flexibility: An index approach to crosscountry comparisons. Journal of Labor Research, 25(1), 117–126. Nuijten, M. J. (2003). Health care reforms in six Central and Eastern European countries. European Journal of Health Economics, 4(4), 286–291. Overbeek, H. (2002). Neoliberalism and the regulation of global labor mobility. Annals AAPSS, 581(May), 74–90. Ruggie, J. G. (2002). At home abroad, abroad at home: International liberalization and domestic stability in the new world economy. In: E. Hovden & E. Keene (Eds), The globalization of liberalism. New York: Palgrave. Scholte, J. A. (2005). Globalization: A critical introduction. New York: Palgrave. Thorsen, D., & Lie, A. (nd). What is neoliberalism?: Department of Political Science. Norway: University of Oslo. United Nations. (2000). World Investment Report. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions and development. New York and Geneva: United Nations. World Tourism Organization. (2004). Yearbook of tourism statistics. Madrid: World Tourism Organization.



PART II: THE TRANSFORMATION OF TRADITIONAL POLITICS


ON EUROPE’S EDGE: CHANGING BORDERS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE Margit Bessenyey Williams ABSTRACT The European Union has pursued two contradictory policies over the last decade in response to the challenges of globalization. On the one hand, the EU has loosened borders to facilitate trade and make the EU more competitive globally. On the other hand, the EU has tightened borders to enhance its security, fearing the negative consequences of a globalized world. In this paper, I examine the effects of implementation of the EU’s Schengen border regime, a set of rules governing external border control, on the post-communist countries and the difficulties that Schengen has posed for the governments in the region. I also discuss the EU’s emerging European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), designed to address many of the concerns voiced by the Central and East European (CEE) officials regarding Schengen. An important element of ENP is to work across the EU external border to facilitate economic relations and develop joint institutions with non-members to create new cooperative borderlands. Two images are frequently invoked with regard to the evolution of the EU. Certain scholars portray the organization as moving toward a new, post-modern, post-Westphalian entity comprising an increasingly borderless Europe. Other scholars view European integration as a process by Globalization: Perspectives from Central and Eastern Europe Contemporary Studies in Economic and Financial Analysis, Volume 89, 137–171 Copyright r 2007 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1569-3759/doi:10.1016/S1569-3759(07)89004-8

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which the EU is increasingly taking on the trappings and functions of the state to build a ‘‘Fortress Europe.’’ The discussion of Schengen and the eastern enlargement suggests a more complex reality than either of these two images in which borders are constantly shifting and whose functions are changing in response to the different challenges posed by globalization and internal developments. The EU’s external borders will continue to change, both in terms of where they are located and how important these will be. Europe’s ENP, with its emphasis on cross-border cooperation, is changing borders into borderlands, zones of cooperation and collaboration across a line on a map. Governance and the shaping of policy are increasingly taking place at multiple sites and with different kinds of actors, further transforming the importance of borders. Perhaps, a new vision of European integration is needed to capture the evolution of the EU.

Once a border is set, albeit conventionally, it starts working as a border; in other words, it starts generating differences across it, and homogeneity within. This is even more the case when a border is designed as the manifestation of a vast programme of crafting a new identity and the common reality underlying it, as with a unified Europe y . This implies an increase in the differences currently existing between accession countries joining Schengen earlier and those that will join later, as well as between the latter and their neighbors further to the East. Gaps will only be widened by the imposition of impermeable borders. (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2002, p. 55) The only long term and sustainable response to migration pressure is not putting more barriers in place, sending people back or selective migration policies. The true response is investing massively in development. EU development Commissioner, Louis Michel. (Kubosova, 2006a)

1. INTRODUCTION In this chapter, I focus on the Schengen regime (‘‘Schengen’’) and implementation of the Schengen rules at the EU’s new external borders with the accession of eight new post-communist countries in May 2004.1 Named for the location where the initial 1985 intergovernmental agreement was signed by 5 of the then 12 EU members, Schengen today refers to the set of rules and regulations that has progressively eliminated national border controls (passports, customs checks, and so on) for residents of the EU. Eliminating member states’ internal border controls, however, required tightening the external borders of the EU and implementing extensive control measures to ensure the security of those living within the EU.

Changing Borders in Central and Eastern Europe

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In response to the challenges posed by globalization and the eastern enlargement, the EU has pursued two contradictory policies, opening up certain borders while tightening up others. I examine in this chapter the effects of these contradictory policies on the new Central and East European (CEE) members as well as what this might mean for the future of the EU as a whole. The first policy pursued by the EU has been to eliminate national border controls between member states to allow for the easier flow of economic goods and services as a way to respond to the economic challenges of globalization and enhance its global economic competitiveness. Thus, across the internal borders of many of the western countries of the EU, passport checks, border control stations, and customs examinations have been eliminated.2 The EU has also admitted additional countries into the EU, notably 10 new members in 2004, to create a larger single market. Furthermore, the EU has pursued global competitiveness by taking advantage of cheaper CEE labor than available in the old members. In short, the forces of economic globalization have pushed the EU countries to open up their borders, moving toward a borderless region to compete economically at the global level (Milward, 2002; Nye & Donahue, 2000; Ohmae, 1990, 1993, 1995). In contradiction to the above policy that has loosened borders between states, the EU has also tightened certain borders, not only posing great challenges for the new post-communist members but also undermining the EU’s professed goal of fostering regional stability. The tightening of the eastern EU border has been in response to EU member governments’ growing security fears regarding some of the negative elements of a globalized world, including the importation from the East of transnational networks of organized crime, illegal immigration, and terrorism (Naim, 2003). The prospect of admitting CEE countries that were less developed economically, politically, and institutionally into the EU also contributed to a growing focus on the security dimensions of Schengen and the tightening of the eastern borders at the expense of opening borders. So, how did the Schengen regime, which began as an economic project responding to the challenges of economic globalization, end up largely as a security project, and what are the implications of this change for the CEE countries? In the next section, I discuss Schengen from its origins among the West European states as a way to enhance the EU’s economic competitiveness to its present day focus on security to try and to mitigate the negative aspects of globalization associated with the 2004 and 2008 eastern enlargements. In conjunction with the shift in emphasis of Schengen from

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economics to security, there has also been a progressive transfer of competencies in this policy area to the Community institutions (the European Commission and the European Parliament in particular) and away from the member states. I also discuss the challenges the new CEE member states faced in implementing the Schengen requirements imposed by the EU. There have been financial, economic, social, and political ramifications for the citizens of the CEEC as well as for neighboring, non-EU member states. Many CEE individuals perceive that the EU is in the process of creating a new ‘‘Iron curtain’’ further east. Regional cooperation with neighboring no-EU member states has become more difficult as borders have become tighter between them. Notably, the new members have entered the EU as ‘‘second class citizens’’ (Kubosova, 2006b). While the new members have been required to put into place the Schengen-specific external border controls and regulations, existing EU member states have been unwilling to remove the internal border controls and allow CEE citizens to participate in the free movement of labor, a founding principle of a common market. Thus, from the perspective of CEEC citizens and governments, they have had to cope with the challenges of the Schengen regime without being allowed to participate in the economic benefits of free internal borders and access to the full EU labor market. In light of the difficulties posed by Schengen for the new member states, and in response to CEE governments’ criticisms, I discuss in the penultimate section the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), announced in March 2003. The ENP is designed to offset the sense of exclusion (financial, political, and psychological) that the citizens of countries that will remain outside of the EU feel, and allow these countries to gain access to the EU’s development assistance and to participate in certain EU policies. In exchange, these neighboring countries are expected to implement various reforms and cooperate in areas that are important to the EU, notably with regard to border control, democratization, and good governance. The ENP is an attempt on the part of the EU to extend its policymaking influence and directly effect change in neighboring countries beyond its external borders. Rather than further hardening the borders at the EU’s eastern edges as the Schengen regime has done, the ENP tries to decrease the importance of the external border controls and make the EU’s borders ‘‘fuzzier’’ (Christiansen, Petito, & Tonra, 2000). By way of conclusion, I discuss the two policies that the EU has pursued in response to the differing challenges of globalization within the broader debate of what type of organization the EU might become in the future.


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Two images are frequently invoked with regard to the evolution of the EU as an organization, each vision capturing a different EU response to the various challenges posed by globalization. Certain scholars portray the EU as creating a new political entity that is different from the Westphalian state that has dominated international relations for the last 200 years, moving toward a new, post-modern, post-Westphalian entity (see for example, Christiansen et al., 2000; Milward, 2002; Ruggie, 1993; Rumford, 2002; Waever, 1998). In response to the economic challenges posed by globalization, the member states of the EU have opened up their borders and established new policies to create a more efficient and streamlined single market. Globalization and European integration, furthermore, have resulted in a dispersion of governance away from the national state to additional entities situated at both the sub- and supra-national levels as well as to new non-state actors (such as private companies, travel agents, nongovernmental organizations, and other intergovernmental organizations). Such a development that allows new actors and entities to participate in the shaping of policies has been seen as one of the important side effects of globalization, with scholars suggesting that the state is losing its sovereignty to new actors. In this post-modern organizational form that the EU is taking on, borders become less important and blurred, and it is harder to make a distinction between inside and outside, the internal as compared to the external. Other scholars view European integration as a process through which the EU is increasingly taking on the trappings and functions of the state, in effect replicating the Westphalian state at a higher level (Christiansen, 2005; Reid, 2004; Snyder, 2005). These scholars emphasize the fact that the EU has become increasingly concerned with strengthening its external borders and defining where these are, one of the defining traits of the traditional Westphalian state. As Snyder argues, ‘‘more than other projects of European integration, the creation of an external frontier directly requires the EU to take on state-like functions, assume state-like roles, and acquire state-like capacities y . Border control y is the policy that demands that the EU behave like a traditional state’’ (2005). Other policy areas that point to the EU becoming more state-like is its emerging military capacity (albeit small in size), police force (Europol), and an EU foreign policy. All of these policy areas have historically been considered the purview of central governments. The language used in the draft constitution of 2004–2005 is another example of the way that the EU is trying to become more like a state, in effect moving toward a ‘‘United States of Europe’’ (Christiansen, 2005; Reid, 2004). The growing focus on secure borders, strengthening the

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security powers of the EU and building up a military capacity is a response to the insecurities and fears of people over organized crime groups, drug smugglers, and terrorists who can take advantage of the more porous borders that are the result of economic globalization. These two visions of the EU are usually treated as mutually exclusive and binary, with the EU evolving in one or the other of these directions but not both. Yet my discussion of the eastern enlargement, Schengen and the EU’s emerging ENP suggests a more complex reality than the above duality. Schengen has always involved both removing certain borders (to enhance economic competitiveness) and tightening others (the external borders). While elements of the Schengen regime have been transferred to supranational Community competencies, supporting the post-Westphalian, multilevel governance perspective, it is also true that member states continue to play a significant role in determining JHA policies. More than in other policy domains, perhaps because Schengen and JHA deal with protecting citizens from danger, states have guarded tightly how much authority they give up and competency they grant to the Community institutions. It should be added that Britain and Ireland, long-standing EU members, choose to remain outside the Schengen rules while a few EU non-member states (Switzerland, Iceland, and Norway) participate in the Schengen regime.3 At time of writing in early 2007, the new EU member post-communist countries do not participate in all aspects of Schengen. In this policy area, there is no clear EU boundary to delineate members from non-members. In addition, the EU’s ENP further blurs the lines between members and non-members by promoting cross-border cooperation between the EU and non-members and extending the EU’s policy influence to non-members. EU borders play numerous functions, with some more visible, some more separating, some more integrating, than others. Both visions of the EU are correct, reflecting the contradictory tensions of the EU’s Schengen policy that is in response to different dimensions of globalization.

2. THE SCHENGEN REGIME: FROM ECONOMIC TO SECURITY PROJECT In this section, I discuss how Schengen originated as an economic project designed to heighten the EU’s global economic competitiveness, but this project increasingly ended up focusing on security aspects as a result of the impending eastern enlargement. The greater emphasis on security and tightening up external borders has posed difficult challenges to the new


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post-communist members who had hoped to encourage more cross-border cooperation upon their accession into the EU. I analyze in this section the many challenges that Schengen has posed for the new EU members. EU cooperation in what is now known as Schengen began in the early 1980s on an ad hoc and intergovernmental basis. An important component of the Schengen regime has been to develop common screening mechanisms and security provisions at the Union’s external borders. Schengen members uniformly reinforce the external borders, and have established a common visa policy and standards for dealing with illegal immigrants and asylum seekers (Council of the European Union, 2002a). EU officials have tried to reassure the public and nationalist politicians that problems associated with the elimination of internal borders could be resolved by building walls around the outside (Shore, 2000). The European Commission and EU heads of government saw tighter controls at the external borders as an essential concomitant to greater freedom of movement internally. The impetus for eliminating national borders between EU member states was predominantly economic, with member states concerned with the global economic competitiveness of the EU. The decade of the 1970s produced a period of ‘‘Eurosclerosis’’ and ‘‘Europessimism’’ as the EU and the member states grappled with the challenges of an increasingly globalized economy, two oil crises, the collapse of the Bretton Woods international monetary system and stiff economic competition from the newly emerging Asian countries and the United States. The first discussions on removing physical border controls on people and goods were held between France and Germany to create an integrated economic area in which goods, services, capital, and persons could move uninhibited (Moravcsik, 1998). Out of these initial bilateral discussions emerged, the 1985 Schengen Agreement signed by five European Community member states (France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) in which the governments of these countries agreed to remove internal border controls amongst themselves. Parallel to these developments that took place on an intergovernmental basis involving only certain EU members, and therefore outside of the community structures, the European Commission under the leadership of Commission President Jacques Delors was negotiating with the member states to finalize the Single European Act (SEA).4 The SEA was signed in 1986 with the goal of establishing by 1992 an economic area in which goods, services, capital, and labor could genuinely move unrestricted. Central to the SEA was the European Commission’s vision of a Europe sans frontieres that would enhance the EU’s global economic competitiveness by decreasing

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transaction costs on trade between member states. As Milward argues, both the SEA and the Treaty on EU (1993) were ‘‘economic and political responses to the demands of globalization’’ (Milward, 2002, p. 17). Even as the internal borders were removed, however, national governments became concerned with the potential security implications of a borderless EU and its vulnerability to a globalizing world in which organized crime and other dangerous transnational groups could take advantage of the looser borders.5 Among the key concerns was that the EU member states would face a large influx of immigrants seeking a better life in Western Europe.6 Refugees and displaced persons were another major area of concern. The wars in the Persian Gulf and the former Yugoslavia dramatically increased the number of refugees seeking to flee violence, economic deprivation and human rights abuses in the early part of the 1990s. The relatively weak administrative and judicial capacities of the postcommunist countries, in combination with rampant corruption, also heightened security concerns as it was assumed by EU member states that the CEE countries would not be able to prevent immigrants from moving westward and trying to gain entrance into the EU. Politicians and EU officials also feared the spread of organized crime from the post-communist countries to the EU (Eisl, 1999; Friis, 1997). These security concerns led to a change in discourse among EU and national government officials with regard to Schengen. If in the early period of Schengen, government and Commission officials highlighted the economic benefits of a borderless world to meet the challenges of globalization and enhance the economic competitiveness of the EU, by the 1990s these same political leaders almost exclusively emphasized the security dimension, in large measure spurred by fears of bringing in administratively weaker and poorer CEE countries into the EU. While Schengen began as an economic project focused on eliminating borders by the time of the 2004 and 2008 accession of the post-communist countries into the EU, Schengen had evolved to incorporate also a security program. ‘‘The linking of internal and external borders of the European Community played an important role in the production of a spillover of the socio-economic project of the internal market into an internal security project’’ (Huysmans, 2000, p. 760). Also because of the impending accession of the CEE countries into the EU, the Schengen rules were brought into the supranational Community structures as opposed to remaining an intergovernmental agreement among the member states. The 1993 Treaty on EU for the first time incorporated aspects of JHA, of which Schengen is an important component, into the institutional structure of the EU.7 However, the most significant changes


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within JHA are reflected in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and the follow up 1999 Tampere European Council summit. The Amsterdam Treaty called for the creation of an ‘‘area of freedom, security, and justice’’ (AFSJ) within five years, defined as ‘‘one in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, immigration, asylum, and the prevention and combating of crime’’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2004a, p. 3). Amsterdam transferred several key policy areas, including asylum and immigration policy and issues concerning cooperation between civil courts into the EU’s first pillar, keeping only judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters still in the third pillar on an intergovernmental basis. The Amsterdam Treaty also brought into the Community first pillar the 1985 Schengen Agreement and the related 1990 Implementing Convention. As a result, Schengen became part of the acquis that the new EU members would have to implement.8 There were several reasons why the member states agreed to transfer JHA in 1997 from national control in the third pillar to the supranational first pillar institutions. High on the list of reasons was the post-communist countries’ insistence on joining the EU (Friis, 1997; Occhipinti, 2004).9 EU enlargement and the communitarization of JHA, in other words, were inextricably linked as politicians increasingly focused on the dangers of an increasingly globalized world. Concerns over the importation of organized crime, illegal immigration, and drug smuggling only grew within the EU member states as the degree of the post-communist states’ administrative weakness became clearer. By making Schengen part of the EU acquis, it ‘‘ma[d]e clear the linkage between the applicants’ ability to control their borders and accession’’ (Friis & Murphy, 1999, p. 224).10 The Schengen regime has posed, and continues to pose, numerous problems for many CEEC governments. For several of the CEECs, notably Poland and Hungary, Schengen contradicts many of these countries’ national interests. Pe´ter Kovaćs, a Hungarian analyst dealing with Schengen questions, made the point that ‘‘[t]he interest of EU members in pushing eastwards the Schengen borders is in no way congruent with the enlargement interests of the candidate countries’’ (Kovaćs, 2000, p. 53). Other analysts have made a similar argument, suggesting that the Schengen rules ‘‘may be perceived as a system that has been set up to defend the interests of existing members and does not sufficiently take into account the specific requirements of candidate members’’ (Anderson, 2000, p. 23). The newly emerging focus of Schengen on security and external border control as opposed to the economic advantages of opening up internal

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borders and creating greater economic efficiencies is what has posed such economic, political, and even psychological difficulties and hardships for the new EU members and their citizens as well as for neighboring countries (Dempsey, 2001; Fuller, 2003; Wolczuk & Piorko, 2001; Wolczuk & Wolczuk, 2003). As Mungio-Pippidi notes, [I]mplementation of the Schengen acquis by the new applicant states and the enforcement of the Schengen border appears to satisfy only the security-related concerns of West European states. Schengen is hardly a ‘security and stability factor’ for Eastern Europe; rather it induces new tensions between neighbouring countries that had barely managed to surpass prior tensions. (2002, p. 69; emphasis in original)

As part of the Schengen requirements, the 2004 EU accession candidates had to re-introduce visas for the citizens of certain countries even though since 1989 many of these people had been able to cross borders easily. While under communism travel had been highly restricted, when the Berlin Wall fell CEE governments attempted to create a more open border policy and an area of more liberalized movement of people (Apap, 2004; Batt, 2003). This was a deliberate strategy on the part of CEEC governments but the EU also strongly supported it because it encouraged regional and bilateral cooperation and good relations with neighbors. The result was a substantial movement of people after 1989. For many people in the post-communist countries, this was their first opportunity for largely unrestricted travel to other countries (Batt, 2003).11 Thus, the re-introduction of visas as part of Schengen was a shock to many CEE citizens. There is a strong perception among CEEs that the Schengen border regime is creating a new ‘‘Iron Curtain’’ across Europe, worsening relations between neighbors because some remain excluded from the EU (Apap et al., 2001; Browning, 2003; Daskalovski, 1999; Fuller, 2003; Pap, 2001).12 The effect of Schengen, from the perspective of many post-communist residents both inside the EU and outside, has been to move the ‘‘wall’’ eastward and create a group of Europeans who continue to find themselves on the ‘‘wrong side’’ of the border (Daskalovski, 1999). The European Commission itself recognized the potential for greater instability and regional tensions along its new eastern borders as the then candidates began to implement the Schengen rules. The enlargement y enhances the safety of the Eastern neighbors of the Union by strengthening stability y However, the enlargement may have adverse effects if it is interpreted as building new barriers y The justified safety-related views of the Eastern neighbors as well as the views concerning the position of Russian minorities in an enlarged Union must be taken into consideration y The disputes between the joining


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states and their Eastern neighbors may form a potential threat to the safety of the Union. (Commission of the European Communities, 1997, p. 102)

Apart from the psychological toll on citizens, implementation of the visa regime also had significant financial costs. For Moldovan or Ukrainian citizens, for example, travel to certain neighboring states (Romania or Hungary, respectively) did not even require a passport until the implementation of Schengen.13 The cost of obtaining a passport and a visa in addition to traveling to the appropriate consulate became prohibitive for individuals who did not earn much. Obtaining the proper papers also became time consuming as citizens often had to travel to a distant embassy or consulate (Chomette, 2003).14 Long travel times were compounded by the poor organizational capacities of the consulates that could not handle the jump in demand for visas, with people waiting in long lines to obtain a visa (Grabbe, 2000; Krystyniak, 2004).15 Both Hungary and Poland have significant kin minorities in neighboring countries whose citizens are generally poorer. Both of these countries wanted to maintain ties with neighboring countries and attempted to reduce the financial burden on people in the neighboring countries by offering free or very reduced price visas. The two governments also tried to delay implementing the Schengen visa regime until accession, but European officials pushed them to institute it prior to accession.16 While Schengen’s original goal was to open borders to facilitate trade between states with the shift in emphasis toward security, the tighter border controls decreased trade between the new EU member post-communist countries and their neighbors, affecting economic livelihoods on both sides of the border (Chomette, 2003; Dempsey, 2001; Morawska, 2002; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2002).17 Since 1989, in virtually all the post-communist countries a significant informal, cross-border economy (both legal and illegal) emerged that is mostly beneficial to all sides. Romanians and Ukrainians, for example, take advantage of the higher prices for their goods and produce in Hungary and Poland, respectively (Partos, 2003; Voyage, 2004). The Romanian and Ukrainian traders also have a greater selection of goods in Poland and Hungary that they can take back home and resell, making a modest profit (Chomette, 2003). Temporary migrant workers receive higher wages for their labor than what they would earn in their own country, and for some it is their only possibility to have a job. For their part, Hungarian and Polish businesses benefit from cheaper labor than what would be domestically available. Migrant workers are also willing to work at menial jobs that may otherwise go unfulfilled. Importantly, too, the cross-border trade has allowed

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the historically poorer and less economically developed eastern regions of countries like Poland and Hungary to sustain relatively strong economic growth even if this is still slower than in the western parts of the country. This economic growth can partially offset the sharply increasing internal regional disparities that are in large measure the result of integration into the EU (Batt, 2003). In contrast to these beneficial economic trends along the Eastern borders, as the new EU member CEE countries began to implement the Schengen requirements, the volume of cross-border traffic began to decline.18 Various measures relating to Schengen that Poland, for example, had to adopt prior to accession between 1997 and 1999 led to a dramatic 50% decrease in border traffic across the Polish–Ukrainian border (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2002, p. 67). When Slovakia instituted visas for Ukrainians in 2000, the number of Ukrainians visiting Slovakia dropped by three-quarters (Chomette, 2003). CEE governments were concerned that the sharp reduction in cross-border trade would lead to deteriorating living standards in those neighboring countries that remain outside the EU (Bort, 2002, p. 195).19 Such fears have been raised on both sides of the border. Similarly, the Polish government feared the deleterious economic effects of Ukraine being cut-off from Poland (Wolczuk & Wolczuk, 2003). Ekiert and Zielonka (2003, p. 11) argue that ‘‘[e]nlargement will shape the matrix of underlying social inequalities and the pattern of inclusion and exclusion on the entire continent’’ and may contribute to regional tensions. In the eyes of many analysts, the tightening of the external borders may also lead to increased illegal immigration, precisely the opposite of what Schengen is supposed to accomplish (Bort, 2002; Hayter, 2004). An official of the Polish Interior Ministry, Jan Wegryzn, notes that ‘‘[w]e realize that even with visas, the flow from the East will be difficult to stop. Whatever visa requirement or detection device we introduce, foreigners will always find a way around it y nevertheless, we have to meet the standards of the EU’’ (Steinborn, 2004, p. 7). Even EU officials recognize the difficulties that the Schengen visa regime has posed for the post-communist countries and that visas have not been very effective in curbing immigration (Batt, 2003). Temporary migrants, having successfully crossed the border and presently engaged in seasonal work or trade, are now more motivated to make their stay permanent (Bort, 2002; Piracha & Vickerman, 2003; Wolczuk & Piorko, 2001). Human trafficking will also most likely increase because ‘‘[b]y tightening border control, would-be refugees are driven into the arms of organized human smugglers’’ (Bort, 2002, p. 202; see also Grabbe, 2000).


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Of particular concern to Poland and Hungary is that the Schengen regime has made it more difficult to maintain ties to their ethnic kin in neighboring countries and to strengthen the cultural and historical relations between the motherland and its related symbolically important territories and people in neighboring countries. Poland has about 300,000 and 200,000 ethnic Poles living in Ukraine and Belarus, respectively. Hungary has some 400,000 Hungarians in northern Serbia (Vojvodina), 200,000 in Croatia, and 370,000 in Ukraine. For both Poland and Hungary, it is of great national importance that ties to ethnic kin and historic territories be maintained, but Schengen has made that more difficult. Schengen has also imposed significant direct financial costs on the new EU members’ governments. The Schengen Information System (SIS), the passport, and visa computer database that tracks illegal immigrants and stolen goods used at EU external border crossings, is highly sophisticated and extremely expensive (Bigo, 2002). Realizing that the high costs poses strains on government budgets, the Commission has increased the amount of funds dedicated to JHA since 1998. It has also helped to finance in part the Schengen technology and the training of border officials.20 EU member countries such as Germany have also heavily contributed on a bilateral basis to build up the eastern borders of neighboring countries, in particular those of Poland. These financial transfers, however, have not covered all the Schengen infrastructure and training costs. Furthermore, while the funds may cover the initial cost of purchasing the necessary Schengen technology, they do not cover routine maintenance and upkeep of this equipment (Interview, Laura Corrado, European Commission DG JHA, July 17, 2004).21 The new members also had to build many new consulates to accommodate the increase in number of visas that need to be issued with implementation of the Schengen visa regime. Furthermore, additional border crossing posts, with appropriately trained personnel, had to be established to meet Schengen requirements.22 Beyond tighter external borders, the other primary instrument used by the EU to control immigration has been the readmission agreements signed with the new EU members, prospective candidates, and also with other non-EU member states. Readmission agreements allow EU member countries to send back individuals that have entered the EU illegally to the neighboring country through which the asylum seeker transited or originated in. Alternatively, the EU can send the illegal immigrant to safe ‘‘third countries’’ (non-EU members).23 These readmission agreements in effect force external border regions to take on the financial and social burdens of the asylum issue. The goal from the EU’s perspective is to create a cordon

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sanitaire around the EU (Friis, 1997), making the eastern countries the new (and old) buffer zone.24 This protection zone also relieves the EU and member states from having to address the asylum problem directly because they can relegate processing asylum seekers to the new CEE EU members as well as countries outside the Union (Lavenex & Uc- arer, 2002). In a sense, the EU has ‘‘contracted out’’ what used to be domestic/national or internal EU migration controls (Boswell, 2003). As Lahav and Guiraudon (2000) argue, migration issues have moved away from the border and outside the state (see also Andreas, 2003).25 These readmission agreements have increased the economic and social costs on weak and poor eastern countries, North African states as well as the new CEE EU members.26 Hungary and other more prosperous postcommunist countries such as the Czech Republic became destinations in their own right as the prospect of accession became definite. The governments of these better-off CEECs have to deal with a growing number of migrants that are quasi-permanently stationed there because they cannot get through the Schengen border controls that the earlier EU member states have kept in place between old and new members. The governments had to establish additional refugee centers and provide refugees and illegal immigrants with basic resources (European Commission, 2001a, 2001b; McKinsey, 1998; Purvis, 2002). Officials and politicians in the CEE countries increasingly resent the EU’s Schengen requirements because they consider that the increased financial, social, and political costs of migration and border control have been dumped onto them and yet they do not receive the same rights and privileges as the earlier EU members.27 The post-communist EU member countries have not been able to benefit fully from the free movement of labor within the EU, one of the four fundamental freedoms of the EU. Fearing a massive wave of low-wage CEE workers, Germany and Austria were at the forefront in pushing the European Commission to obtain up to a seven-year delay in the free movement of workers.28 All EU member state governments except for Sweden ended up negotiating bilateral agreements with the new postcommunist members that set limits on CEE workers’ possibilities for work and/or to receive social welfare benefits for several years.29 As a result, workers in the CEE states did not gain with EU accession the same flexibility and opportunity as existing EU workers to move to other countries to find employment. In addition to contradicting the rationale of the single market acquis, these discriminatory actions have left a strong negative impression on CEE citizens who perceive that the EU is creating a second-class membership within the organization (Kubosova, 2006b).


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Ironically, many studies (Commission of the European Communities, 2005, 2006a, 2006b; Favell, 2006; Traser, 2006) have suggested that not only do the west European EU member states not have to fear a mass migration westward from the eastern new members, but that such a movement of workers would be economically beneficial to many earlier member states with rigid labor markets attempting to confront the challenges of economic globalization. As van Houtum and Pijpers (2005) point out, ‘‘fear of immigrants is generally not grounded in a thorough knowledge of current EU realities.’’ One of the main global challenges that the EU faces is a demographic crisis consisting of an aging population and declining population growth rates that has very serious economic, financial, and social ramifications for the EU as a whole. Given the long decline in population growth rates in many European countries and the strong trend toward an aging population, if the EU economy is to maintain productivity many workers will have to be brought into the EU member states. Studies have shown that in Sweden, Great Britain, and Ireland, whose governments allowed for the free movement of CEE labor upon the EU accession of the post-communist countries, national income and tax revenues have gone up and the gray market has shrunk (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a). Arguments that immigrants (legal or illegal) take away jobs are viewed as spurious by analysts because the immigrants tend to take jobs that West European nationals would not do anyway (Favell, 2006; Traser, 2006).30 Many West European countries (France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany) face sectoral labor shortages that could be alleviated by bringing in workers from Central and Eastern Europe.31 While most analysts concur that it would be beneficial from an economic and demographic standpoint to increase immigration and open up borders, ‘‘the political calculation on these issues seems to point to a different rationality’’ (Favell, 2006, p. 3). Populist politicians in Europe have been able to tap into the growing insecurities related to the effects of globalization, 9/11 and terrorism, reaping electoral benefits. While Jean Marie Le Pen of France is perhaps the best known of these politicians who preach from an antiimmigrant platform (and who has also been among the longest on the European political scene), almost all European countries have seen the rise in popularity of nationalist and populist political parties in the 1990s. It remains unclear why the voices of these populist politicians have gained more leverage in the political discourse over those advocating freer immigration in the face of Europe’s demographic and economic realities. EU member politicians’ and European Commission officials’ rhetoric regarding the Schengen regime increasingly reflects these broader contradictions and tensions. As a result of nationalist fears, it has been the security aspects of Schengen that have

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shaped the type of legislation being passed in the European Commission’s Justice and Home Affairs directorate in the late 1990s up to the present.32 The result of these West Europeans’ security concerns is that the EU is in effect creating a two-tiered membership as the new CEE members have not been allowed to participate fully in the Schengen regime. Not only do citizens of the new post-communist members not have the right to full free movement of labor in EU territory, national borders between the earlier and new members remain in place. According to the 2004 Accession Treaty controls at the internal borders between existing member states and the new members will not be removed until the new member complies with the Schengen Category 2 list of requirements.33 The EU Council decides when the new member has fully met the Schengen requirements after an evaluation by the Schengen Evaluation working group that reports to the JHA Council (Peers, 2004). After a satisfactory evaluation, each new member will be subject to a separate decision by the EU Council regarding the lifting of border controls between the new and old members, and this decision must be unanimous to pass.34 Although the border checks between old and new EU members would have to be eliminated by October 2007, in September 2006 the Commission proposed that this timetable be pushed back to 2009. CEE governments have strongly protested the Commission’s suggestion as this delay maintains their second-class status in the organization (Kubosova, 2006b). Perhaps, even more frustrating to CEE governments is that they have been asked to meet many contradictory requirements in preparing for membership. For example, not only have they had to comply with the Schengen acquis, but these governments have also had to work to develop regional cooperation with their neighbors.35 Regional cooperation has for long been on the EU’s list of requirements because it has feared importing instability related to borders and ethnic minorities into the organization (Bessenyey Williams, 2002a).36 However, Schengen has made such crossborder, regional cooperation more difficult as EU borders have been tightened. The sad irony is that for many people in the CEE region, the EU represents a model of conflict resolution in which borders have been gradually transcended and reduced in salience. The lesson of European integration for many CEEs was that it is possible to change centuries-old rivalries and build a genuine security community in which old enemies can collaborate and work together to create a zone of peace, prosperity, and stability (Bala´zs, 1993; Palańkai, 1993). As a Hungarian academic, Palańkai noted, ‘‘European integration clearly shows that economic and political interdependence inevitably leads to peace and stability, abolishing previous


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national rivalries’’ (1993, p. 63). Yet these countries’ experience with Schengen has been one of exacerbating regional tensions and making borders more visible and difficult to overturn. Rather than loosening borders to take advantage of the economic benefits of increased trade and cross-border cooperation within the CEE region that would benefit the EU as a whole in its attempts to meet the challenges of globalization, the security concerns have dominated both rhetoric and legislation, with Schengen heightening the salience of border controls.

3. EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY: A SOLUTION? The ENP, first outlined in March 2003, is the EU’s response to some of the CEE’s criticisms regarding Schengen and the contradictions implicit in the Schengen regime. How can the EU ensure the security of its citizens as the new external borders of the EU extend to regions with higher rates of poverty and instability and where the dangers of illegal immigration and crime are great? How to make non-EU members like Ukraine or Georgia who are immediate CEE neighbors feel less marginalized and excluded, all the while stating that it will be most unlikely that these countries will be able to join the EU? The EU’s concern is how to promote regional cooperation with these non-members, in the process perhaps making them more economically and politically stable, even as the external borders are being reinforced. The ENP is an attempt to manage the challenges of the 2004 and 2007 eastern enlargements, respond to the different forces of globalization, the economy versus security, that push the EU in contradictory directions and promote stability on the EU’s eastern and southern borders to enhance the EU’s internal security (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a, 2003b). Realizing the damage being done to cross-border relations as the Schengen rules were implemented, Poland, Norway, and the Baltic states played a key role in advocating that the EU reach out to its eastern neighbors. Originally focused only on the EU’s immediate eastern neighbors, the ENP was subsequently extended to include the EU’s southern neighbors in North Africa and the Middle East at the request of Spain and France who did not want their neighbors to be disadvantaged by the new initiative.37 The goal of ENP is to ‘‘avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union’’ (Commission of the European Communities,

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2003b, p. 4). The neighborhood policy seeks to draw countries that remain outside the EU into greater economic, political, and social cooperation with EU member states and allow them to participate in certain areas of EU policymaking, obtaining the economic and political benefits of close association with the EU without granting these countries membership. It is an attempt to reach beyond the EU’s external borders and work with these countries to influence their internal policies in a way that suits the EU, creating an additional level of governance consonant with globalization and the need to work with many actors to solve regional and global issues. At the heart of the Neighborhood Policy is the concern that the EU’s eastern and southern external borders are located near countries and regions that are dramatically poorer than the EU and also tend to be politically unstable. The goal of the ENP is to provide these countries and regions with sufficient incentives to implement various economic and political reforms desired by the EU, including moving toward democracy, protecting human rights and establishing the rule of law.38 The EU is also pressuring these countries to work with the EU on border control, curbing illegal immigration and tackling cross-border crime. In exchange, the EU provides these countries with favorable access to the largest single market in the world, additional financial assistance, and the opportunity to cooperate with member states and Community institutions in certain policy areas. As part of the ENP, the Commission drafts specific Action Plans that contain detailed steps and goals that the country in question must complete to move forward in the EU ENP. The first Action Plans were released in December 2004 for seven countries.39 Each bilateral Action Plan in theory was drafted in close consultation with representatives of the country, although officials from the partner countries complained that the Action Plans are more like ‘‘one-way monologues’’ in which the European Commission made it clear to the partner country what it wanted the government to do (Interview, Meineke de Ruiter, European Commission, DG Enlargement and JHA, July 15, 2004). Furthermore, even though there are some elements within each Action Plan that takes account of national specificities, they are very similar in terms of the structure and topics covered, and are based on the template of the association agreements that were signed with the 2004 EU candidate countries (Interview, Meineke de Ruiter, European Commission, DG Enlargement and JHA, July 15, 2004; see also Kelley, 2006; Cremona, 2004). Trying to facilitate regional cross-border cooperation, the Commission in 2003 also drew up a new European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) to simplify financial aid to the EU’s neighbors.40


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At the time of writing in early 2007, financial support for cross-border projects are still funded under several different EU programs, each with different timetables and procedures for bidding and disbursement.41 The Commission has long been criticized for the complexity and incoherence in the way that these different financial instruments operate within the EU and with non-members (Batt, 2002; Bessenyey Williams, 2002b). CEE officials have been among the most vocal in complaining that the EU’s financial assistance does little to promote cross-border projects, particularly when they relate to border regions of CEE and post-Soviet states. The European Parliament and EU Court of Auditors have also lengthily criticized the Commission in this area. The ENPI is to be developed in two phases: the first was a transition phase from 2004 to 2006 in which the existing legal and financial instruments have been used but in a simplified manner.42 On October 24, 2006, the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament approved the Commission’s proposal to create a single new financial instrument for the promotion of cross-border cooperation on the EU’s external borders that would promote social and economic cohesion on both sides of the border and simplify funding issues (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a; Official Journal of the European Union, 2006). In addition to the ENPI, also under discussion to facilitate cross-border relations was the establishment of a local cross-border visa that would allow for easier crossing at the EU’s external border. In May 2003, the Commission proposed a Council Regulation to facilitate border crossings for residents that have legitimate reasons to cross frequently the EU’s external land borders.43 The new local cross-border visa regime would entitle residents within a 50-km distance from the border to cross multiple times and stay within the border area for up to seven consecutive days, not to exceed three months within any one ½-year period (European Parliament, 2004). The idea is to facilitate cross-border trade, cultural and social exchanges and regional cooperation for residents in border regions. The regulations were supposed to be approved prior to the 2004 enlargement but the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament expressed grave reservations about the proposals, demanding that the Commission tighten up the security provisions of the regulation (Interviews, Laura Corrado and Sabine Zwaenepoel, European Commission; DG JHA, July 17, 2004). In early 2007, a local cross-border visa is still only under discussion and not yet a reality. While politicians and EU officials realize that regional cooperation might decrease tensions between neighbors, as with the broader Schengen regime, the security implications remain

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paramount and little progress is made in implementing various constructive proposals that might improve the situation. EU officials have slowly realized that in an era of growing interconnectedness and high economic competition, the EU cannot ensure the security of its citizens by tightening up its borders and ignoring the consequences. Hence emerged the institution of the ENP, designed to work with neighboring non-member countries that allows them to participate in contributing to the EU’s internal security.44 The Commission believes that by promoting cross-border projects and providing broader access to the EU’s economic market, it will be able to boost neighboring non-members’ economies and decrease the pressures for illegal immigration toward its territories. Political reforms are designed to promote democracy, human rights, and good governance, also contributing to stability (the ‘‘democratic peace’’ idea) in these countries and lessening asylum and refugee requests to EU countries. The EU’s internal security has increasingly become dependent on collaboration with foreign countries as well as with communication and travel-related businesses both inside and outside the EU (such as travel agents who check documents, transportation companies who are required to verify cargo, etc.). To the extent that the state alone can no longer guarantee its citizens’ safety, security is increasingly deterritorialized from a single center to multiple actors at different levels. Whether the conditionality and incentives of the EU Action Plans under the ENP are enough to push the neighboring countries toward implementing the desired EU reforms, however, remains to be seen. Arguably, the EU’s greatest foreign policy success to date has been the transformation of the post-communist countries to democracies and functioning market economies. Many people believe that it was partly the promise of membership that led the governments of these countries to institute the harsh reforms demanded by the EU. Analysts fear that without this membership incentive, reforms in neighboring non-EU members will not be instituted as aggressively as in the case of the new members (Cremona, 2004; Kelley, 2006). Furthermore, ‘‘the neighborhood countries differ considerably from the 1993 candidate countries in their stage of maturity toward the values the EU seeks to promote’’ (Kelley, 2006, p. 44). In the case of the North African and Middle Eastern countries, the EU has been engaged politically and economically in the region for more than a decade, encouraging them to institute democratic practices and a better human rights record, yet it resulted in little success. As Kelley (2006) suggests, the EU suffers from a credibility problem in working with these countries. The author is pessimistic that the ENP will be any more effective in pushing


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these countries to reform, particularly because the EU often pursues contradictory goals for strategic, economic or energy-security reasons. As Kelley succinctly points out with regard to ENP, ‘‘the policy tools are weaker, while the tasks in terms of political reforms are more demanding’’ (2006, p. 50). While the EU would like to promote greater stability on its external borders, until the ENP is retooled and given a greater priority within the EU, it seems unlikely that the ENP will realize its stated goals and it will remain of little help in addressing some of the security and economic challenges of globalization.

4. THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS: A SUMMARY Studies of globalization increasingly focus on borders and the changing nature and function of borders, with talk of ‘‘cross-bordering, un-bordering, and de-bordering: globalization is about a different type of bordering that is not constructed in terms of the state and the interstate system’’ (Scholte, 2004, p. 104; Newman, 2006; Rumford, 2006). At the heart of understanding EU developments with regard to the Schengen regime is that borders have different functions in a globalizing world. Analysis of Schengen and the EU’s 2004 and 2008 eastern enlargements highlight the distinct forces of globalization that the EU is subject to, notably the economic and security dimensions of globalization. The EU responded with contradictory policies and their impact on CEE politics and governance were also mixed. European integration, on the one hand, has been about opening up and loosening borders to create integrated networks that can enhance the EU’s economic competitiveness in an increasingly globalized world.45 The Schengen regime initially started out as an economic project to increase the efficiency of the European economy by eliminating barriers to trade and the movement of goods and people. The EU’s incorporation of the CEE countries was another way to meet the challenges of globalization through creating a larger economic market, using the cheaper labor in the CEE countries and benefiting from the faster rates of economic growth in these post-communist countries to spur the EU’s economy.46 Today this economic project has been mostly realized; no other region has gone as far in terms of the economic and political integration of states into a common economic market. As the EU’s territorial borders were transformed to facilitate the movement of goods and people in response to globalization, however, member-state governments became increasingly concerned over the security implications of

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eliminating borders. The discourse of Schengen in the 1990s increasingly highlighted the dangers of open borders and the potential security threat that these open borders could pose. Rather than highlighting the economic benefits, officials increasingly emphasized the necessity ‘‘to bound the edges of Europe more tightly’’ (Gowland, Dunphy, & Lythe, 2006, p. 27), fearing that less desirable or dangerous individuals could take advantage of the porous borders. The eastern enlargement only exacerbated these security fears as the EU’s new external borders would be located in regions of greater poverty and economic and political instability where corruption was rampant and border control weak to begin with. The result of these growing security concerns was that many Western European governments and the EU restricted the movement of certain categories of people, tightened the external borders and implemented a new EU visa regime. Because of these security concerns, the EU has also established relations with non-state actors and non-EU member countries to work jointly on increasing regional security. Scholars have debated the changing nature of governance as a result of globalization, with particular focus on the degree to which governance and authority for policy areas is being taken away from governments and transferred to other institutions. Scholars have developed the concept of global governance to describe this phenomenon in which the state is but one of several actors shaping policy. As Mittelman (2002, p. 6) points out, ‘‘[i]t is not that state sovereignty is losing meaning, but the multilevel environment in which it operates, and hence the meaning of the concept, is changing.’’ Discussion of the Schengen regime illustrates how this policy area has increasingly come to be shared by multiple actors, including supranational institutions, private companies, non-governmental organizations, and individuals. Schengen also highlights the tensions that result between states and supranational institutions regarding which entity or levels should be responsible for policy areas such as border control and how much authority the various institutions should exert. While the member states of the EU recognized the necessity for transferring substantial portions of JHA to the supranational institutions, they have done so reluctantly, with this transfer going in fits-and-starts rather than seamlessly forward. Central governments do not fully trust the capabilities of other states and the EU’s supranational institutions to ensure the security of their own citizens, and they have only haltingly ceded sovereignty in this policy domain.47 For its part, the EU has realized that the Community institutions and member states cannot ensure by themselves the security of people residing within the EU but it also requires the cooperation of neighboring states and other networks such as


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businesses. During the pre-accession period of the 1990s, the EU required the candidates to implement various elements of Schengen’s external border rules, in effect transferring responsibility for the EU’s security eastward onto the CEE countries. The ENP further extends this responsibility eastward and southward to non-member states in exchange for financial and economic support. In its aim to protect EU citizens and residents, the border of the EU has been ‘‘thickened,’’ (Andreas, 2003, p. 95). With regard to border control and the Schengen regime, there has not only been a transfer of competence upward to the supranational institutions of the EU but there has also been an attempt to extend governance horizontally and outward, coopting nonmembers to adopt EU policies and help in border security. The result is that the previously strictly internal and domestic security now has an important foreign policy component as well. The EU today stands at a crossroad as it grapples with the multiple challenges that pull its policies in contradictory directions. No other region in the world has created such an open and integrated economic market, making the EU a strong organization to meet the economic challenges of globalization. European integration offers a vision of stability and prosperity that many countries would like to participate in and emulate. Nevertheless, several tasks remain to be completed to make the EU an even stronger global political and economic contender. The EU must allow the post-communist countries to participate as equal members in the organization, including importantly granting the citizens of these countries the right to free movement of labor. The EU will also have to absorb at least two additional countries over the coming decade, Romania and Bulgaria, and perhaps several others as well. The EU will also have to address the region’s looming demographic crisis if it wants to successfully meet the challenges of globalization. An important component to addressing the demographic crisis is to shift the political discourse in Europe away from nationalist politicians’ security warnings to a more balanced discussion of the need for immigrants if the EU wants to continue to prosper. The ENP will also have to provide more meaningful incentives to neighboring countries to encourage them to maintain reforms. The ENP offers a more certain way to ensure the EU’s own security and continued prosperity than sealing Europe’s borders which has not been effective. Neither of the two prevailing images of the EU, ‘‘Fortress Europe’’ or an increasingly borderless and networked Europe, capture the full reality of the many developments regarding the EU’s external borders. The analysis of Schengen suggests a more complex reality in which borders are shifting and

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whose functions are changing in response to the different challenges posed by globalization and other internal developments. The Schengen regime involves both increased control and security at the borders as well as reaching across borders to work with officials from different states to protect citizens and to develop cross-national collaborative projects. The EU’s external borders will most likely continue to change, both in terms of where they are located and how important these will be. Some of the EU’s present external borders will become internal borders as Romania and Bulgaria join the EU in the future. Europe’s ENP, with its emphasis on cross-border cooperation, is changing borders into borderlands, zones of cooperation and collaboration across a line on a map (Rumford, 2006). Governance and the shaping of policy are increasingly taking place at multiple sites and with different kinds of actors, further transforming the importance of borders. Unlike the borders of the Westphalian state, the EU’s borders remain partly indeterminate and subject to change both in response to globalization and its continuing enlargement. Perhaps, a new vision of European integration, replacing both the ‘‘Fortress Europe’’ and the ‘‘networked, borderless Europe’’ images, is needed to capture the evolution of the EU.

NOTES 1. With this most recent enlargement, the EU added some 4,800 km of new borders, pushing the external frontier of the EU eastward to Russia, the Ukraine, and Turkey (Jesein, 2000). 2. Not all members participate in this borderless area. Two older members, Great Britain and Ireland, remain outside the Schengen regime, and none of the new members except for Malta and Cyprus have yet been allowed to participate in all aspects of Schengen. Notably, the internal borders between old and new member states still are in place. Furthermore, three non-EU countries also participate in the Schengen regime: Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland. 3. Norway and Iceland, while not EU members, are members of the Nordic Council that has its own passport-free zone that these countries did not want to lose once Sweden and Finland joined the Schengen regime. Norway and Iceland, therefore, have elected to participate in Schengen. Switzerland, in the heart of Europe, benefits from allowing trucks and people to pass through its territory without national border checks. 4. The European Commission supported the Schengen project even though it was initially outside Community structures as it saw this as a laboratory to see how an area without internal border controls would function (Guiraudon, 2004; Kostakopoulou, 2000; Wiener, 2000). 5. See Naim (2003) for a discussion of the link between security and globalization.


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6. EU member states were concerned with two types of immigration: a massive influx of people from the new post-communist countries and illegal immigration from non-candidate countries further east and from the south. In the case of the former, such fears were also prevalent when Spain and Portugal joined the EU. 7. Germany had been a strong proponent of greater cooperation in home affairs as it faced a massive inflow of refugees and asylum seekers after the Berlin Wall fell and Yugoslavia disintegrated. In 1992, Germany alone had over 400,000 requests for asylum. It had hoped to create a system to distribute asylum seekers throughout the EU, but other member states were not interested (Guiraudon, 2004). In order to have the TEU ratified by all the member states, Great Britain, Denmark, and Ireland, were granted specific ‘‘opt outs’’ with regard to Schengen. Since then, Denmark has acceded to the Schengen regime, with only Britain and Ireland remaining outside ‘‘Schengenland.’’ 8. Unlike Great Britain and Ireland, the new members were not granted the possibility of opting out of certain parts of the acquis. 9. There were also clearly other reasons for incorporating JHA into the Union beyond the enlargement issue. While organized criminal groups could move freely and operate transnationally, police and judicial authorities remained restricted by national territorial jurisdiction and boundaries. It became clear that more effective cooperation and coordination would be needed to combat crime (Occhipinti, 2004). 10. The Schengen rules meant some 3,000 additional pages of legislation with which the candidates had to comply. 11. For people in Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and Russia, the free circulation of people was possibly the most tangible positive benefit of the transition process (Voyage, 2004). Re-introduction of visas has been seen as a real step backward toward the communist era (Batt, 2003; Chomette, 2003). As Batt notes, ‘‘the right to move freely across borders seems to have been at the very heart of Central and East European citizens’ understanding of what it meant to be ‘free,’ and it has retained this significance in the post-communist period’’ (2003, p. 103). 12. Anderson argues that ‘‘[a]lthough the Iron Curtain analogy is an exaggeration,’’ he concurs that ‘‘the imposition of tight controls has important symbolic and psychological effects’’ (2000, p. 23). 13. Moldovans for 10 years in the 1990s only needed an identity card to travel to Romania. On July 1, 2001, Romania required Moldovans to obtain a passport as part of its compliance with EU demands. In transcarpathia, the poorest region of Ukraine where most of the ethnic Hungarians reside, Ukrainians crossing into Hungary did not need a passport, only a special border pass. Now these Ukrainians not only need a visa but often also have to obtain a passport if they do not have one (Fuller, 2003). 14. A three-month tourist visa for some countries costs $38 whereas some people in Ukraine earn less than 10 dollars per week (Steinborn, 2004). For Moldovans, the cost of a passport is about Euro 32, the equivalent of a Moldovan’s average monthly salary (Voyage, 2004). In the 1990s, a Hungarian living in Kis Szelmenc, Ukraine with relatives in neighboring Nagy Szelmenc, Slovakia could simply cross the border prior to Schengen. In 2004, this individual had to travel 420 miles and 3 days to obtain the necessary paperwork to visit his relatives (Champion, 2004). For a Russian wanting to visit Bulgaria, there were only two consulates where the

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Bulgarian visa could be obtained, Moscow and St. Petersburg, and most of those wanting to visit Bulgaria as a tourist were not from these cities (Jileva, 2004). In the case of a Ukrainian wanting to visit Polish relatives residing in Germany, he would have to obtain two visas: a visa to enter Poland and then the Schengen visa to enter Germany (Bryska, 2004). 15. Additional paperwork and increased difficulties in obtaining visas is not only a problem in CEE. After 9/11 and the greater security measures implemented by the United States, it has become much more difficult to enter the United States. 16. In the case of Poland, the government introduced the visa regime in 2000, but delayed it the longest with Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus for several years. It was not until October 2002 that the agreements for visa-free movement with Russia and Belarus were mutually terminated and for the Ukraine not until 2003. Hungary committed to adopt the visa regime already in 1999 except with its immediate neighbors where a significant Hungarian minority resides (Jileva, 2004). The Hungarian Parliament also passed the so-called Status Law that was designed to mitigate the negative effects of Schengen for the Hungarian minority abroad by facilitating their entry into Hungary (Bessenyey Williams, 2004). 17. In 2002, over 12 million people, mostly Ukrainians, crossed the PolishUkrainian border. The volume of this cross-border traffic from the East is such that in 1997 Poland was listed as among the world’s top 10 tourist destinations (Voyage, 2004; Wolczuk & Wolczuk, 2003). These people, referred to in Poland as tchelnoki or ‘‘those who go back and forth,’’ sometimes cross the border twice a day and even three times when business is good (Voyage, 2004). 18. The tightening down of the US–Canadian and US–Mexican borders in the wake of September 11th has had very similar results to what has been experienced in Europe. At these borders as well, there has been a dramatic slowdown in crossborder traffic and the cost of trade has increased significantly (Andreas, 2003). 19. The development gap between the new members and their eastern neighbors will also grow as the new members receive regional development financial assistance from the EU to bring their relatively low GDPs per capita up toward the levels of the older members. It is also expected that there will be greater foreign direct investment flows into the new EU member CEE countries following accession (Tugtan, 2004). 20. In 1997, PHARE allocations for JHA to the 10 candidates and Turkey were Euro 33 million; it increased to Euro 179 million by 2003. More than half of the funds was designated strictly for border control and customs (56%), with the balance spread out among the judiciary and penitentiary, police/organized crime/corruption/ drugs, and lastly migration/asylum and visa issues. Only in Slovakia was PHARE funding for border control less than for the other areas (information provided by Directorate General Justice and Home Affairs, July 2004). The Commission, recognizing the weakness of institution building in the area of JHA even after the accession of the new members, also established a Schengen Facility that provided lump sum funding for the period 2004 to 2006 to continue strengthening the EU’s new eastern external borders. The total budget for this facility amounted to Euro 953 million to seven post-communist countries (the Czech Republic being the only post-communist EU member not to receive any money as it is also the only new member with no external borders to manage. Its only Schengenrelated border is at the airport) (‘‘Financial Management of the Schengen Facility,’’


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information provided to author in Brussels, July 17, 2004 by Laura Corrado, European Commission, DG JHA). 21. At a minimum, at least 25% of the total budget for border control must be paid by the national governments of the new members. Upkeep of the border control equipment, such as trucks and small boats, is also a big concern. In 2002, for example, even though the EU financed the purchase of new trucks to be used for border control, the Romanian government did not have enough fuel to run the trucks (Interview, Laura Corrado, European Commission DG JHA, July 17, 2004). 22. Poland has the longest share of the EU’s external eastern border (1,244 km long), yet on this border in 2002 there were only 38 functioning crossing points versus 91 points on the Polish–Czech border (Marciniak, 2003). 23. Countries that are deemed safe are defined as those in which applicants’ life or freedoms would not be threatened. 24. Cordon sanitaire is a historical term that refers to the Central and East European region during the period between the two world wars when the newly formed countries from the cololpasing Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires were seen as an important buffer to protect Western Europe from the feared new communist Soviet Union. Today, some EU member countries see these same countries as a buffer against organized crime, terrorists, and illegal immigrants arriving from further East. 25. The EU has instituted these practices with the post-communist countries. The Cotonou agreement of 2000 signed between the EU and African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) nations includes a clause whereby these countries commit themselves to taking back their nationals deported from an EU member state (Guiraudon, 2004). 26. The EU has also used its leverage to get non-member countries like Georgia, Armenia, and the Ukraine to sign readmission agreements in exchange for financial assistance and favorable access to the EU’s single market. 27. This is true not only of the Schengen regime but also with regard to regional development assistance through the Structural and Cohesion Funds and financial support for farmers under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In both these instances, the new CEE EU member countries receive less financial support than the older member states. The newest EU members will also not be allowed to participate immediately in the economic and monetary union (EMU). 28. The restrictions on the free movement of labor were a blow in particular to the Polish and Hungarian governments that touted this as one of the main benefits of accession (Liebich, 2002; see also Danuta Hubner, 2004; Morawska, 2002; Smyth, 2004). 29. The terms of these agreements vary in the type of limits put on the CEE workers as well as how long these will remain in place, although all EU countries must phase out these limitations by 2011 (Smyth, 2004). Great Britain and Ireland, for example, did not restrict the ability of CEE laborers to work in their countries; however, they did restrict CEE workers’ access to social welfare benefits. Austria and Germany negotiated the most stringent agreements with the CEE governments, utilizing the maximum allowable seven years to limit CEE workers’ access to their labor markets (Kubosova, 2006b). In the last three years since 2004 when the postcommunist countries joined the EU, older member states have slowly begun to remove these restrictions as the expected waves of immigrants did not materialize.

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At the time of writing in early 2007, only Austria and Germany have stated that they will continue with the restrictions for the full seven years. France and Belgium have slowly and partially opened up their labor markets in sectors where these countries face a shortage of workers (Traser, 2006). 30. In the run-up to the ratification of the draft constitution, nationalist French politicians began to conjure up fears of ‘‘Polish plumbers’’ who would steal jobs from the French. However, there are many more Poles in Great Britain, and the British economy is in better shape than the French one (Maryniak, 2006). 31. In 2006, these three countries began to eliminate some of the transitional measures on the restrictions to labor movement, allowing non-national workers to obtain jobs in certain sectors where there exists a labor shortage. Sectors include both skilled (IT specialists, engineers, architects, and nurses) and unskilled (agricultural workers, construction) labor (Traser, 2006, p. 24). 32. Maryniak (2006) notes the different images used by businesses versus journalists and politicians with regard to the immigration issue. While the international business movement seeks to galvanize, encourage, and stimulate immigration, journalists and politicians adopt a different discourse that seeks to curtail immigrant movement and maintain the status quo. The latter depictions are more anxiety provoking, and businesses are in conflict with citizens’ sensibilities regarding security and stability. 33. Category 1 provisions include the requirements relating to a high level of external border control (conditions of entry, crossing of the external borders, cooperation and information exchange, visas, police cooperation in criminal matters and drugs). Among the most important of the Category 2 requirements is the integration of the acceding country into the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), a computerized data bank that tracks the movement of people, particularly criminals, and goods within the EU. As the Council has noted, ‘‘development of the new generation Schengen Information System y will obviously be one of the most important prerequisites for progress’’ toward a final evaluation (Council of the European Union, 2002a). The original SIS computer had difficulty in coping with the Scandinavian enlargement, and there are concerns about extension of the SIS II system to the East to include the new members (Anderson, 2002). 34. No single list of criteria exists to determine when a country has met the Schengen requirements. It is up to the Schengen Evaluation group to ‘‘specify certain criteria and requirements, including the requirements related to external border control, to be fulfilled y. These criteria and requirements are formulated on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the specific characteristics of the Member States (including geographical situation) to be evaluated’’ (Council of the European Union, 2002b). As such, the decision to remove the internal borders remains largely a political one. 35. In the case of Hungary and Poland, these governments were interested in regional cooperation separate from EU requirements. Hungary has a sizeable Hungarian minority in several neighboring countries, and Poland took it upon itself to improve historically tense ties with Ukraine. Early in the post-Cold war period, the Polish government developed a new policy of friendship and cooperation with Ukraine (Gow, 2003). 36. During the twentieth century, the borders of many CEE countries changed, often several times, resulting in people of a certain ethnic heritage suddenly finding


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themselves an ethnic minority in another country and creating secessionist and irredentist pressures in the region. 37. In May 2004, the Commission proposed a revised Wider Europe-Neighborhood program that added the southern Caucasus states (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) in light of Georgia’s ‘‘rose revolution’’ as well as the remaining Mediterranean Arab states that participate in the Barcelona process (Emerson, 2004). 38. The Commission uses language like ‘‘partnership,’’ ‘‘joint ownership,’’ and ‘‘common values’’ in the ENP documents to emphasize the bilateral dialogue, although it has been pointed out that the common values are mostly those that the EU wants. These include ‘‘strengthening democracy and the rule of law, the reform of the judiciary and the fight against corruption and organized crime, [and] respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms’’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2004b, p. 3). 39. They are Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia, and Ukraine. All these Action Plans were adopted by the EU and the partner countries in 2005 and took effect. Action Plans are being drafted for Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, and Lebanon (http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en. htm). EU officials will publish country reports two years after the Action Plans go into effect to assess the partner’s compliance with the reforms in the Action Plan. 40. The original instrument was called the European Neighborhood Instrument or ENI. During the course of 2004, it was decided to include Russia in this new financial instrument even though Russia is not part of the EU’s Neighborhood policy. Relations between Russia and the EU are governed by a strategic partnership, hence the change in name to ENPI (Commission of the European Communities, 2004a). 41. The three primary financial instruments supporting cross-border cooperation are the INTERREG program that falls within the Structural Funds for existing members, the PHARE CBC program for the accession candidates, and the TACIS CBC for supporting cross-border projects on the western border in the post-Soviet states. The Balkan countries are funded through a separate CARD initiative and the Mediterranean countries receive financial assistance through the MEDA program. Funds are disbursed to central government agencies who must then channel them down to the local actors and these are done separately and at different times, contributing to the slowness with which projects are implemented and completed. 42. 2006 marked the end of the EU’s budgetary cycle, and certain of the programs had funds designated through that date. 43. The Commission presented two separate Council Regulations (COM(2003) 502 final 2003/0193 and COM(2003) 502 final 2003/0194), the first for crossing the external land borders of the EU and the second for crossing the ‘‘temporary external land borders’’ between member states. Implementation of the Schengen regime is a several step process, with border controls between old and new members and between the new members remaining for some time. Until they are removed, the idea was to facilitate cross-border traffic across both sets of borders. 44. As the Commission noted in the first official ENP document, ‘‘Existing differences in living standards across the Union’s borders with its neighbors may be accentuated as a result of faster growth in the new Member States than in their external neighbors; common challenges in fields such as the environment, public health, and the prevention of and fight against organized crime will have to be addressed; efficient and secure border management will be essential both to protect

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our shared borders and to facilitate legitimate trade and passage’’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a, 2003b, p. 17). 45. Ruggie refers to these networks as ‘‘integrated space-of-flows’’ (1993, p. 172). 46. As the Commission notes in a recent report on enlargement: ‘‘Economically, enlargement has helped to increase prosperity and competitiveness, enabling the enlarged Union to respond better to the challenges of globalization’’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a, p. 2). 47. Member states have retained the right to reassert national border controls on a temporary basis if there is a potential security danger. France, for example, has suspended the open border regime on its Benelux border because the French government perceived Dutch policy drug policies as too liberal; France also closed its borders during the soccer championships, fearing the spread of riots.

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GLOBALIZATION, REGIONALIZATION, AND EUROPEANIZATION: IMPACT AND EFFECTS ON POLISH POLICY-MAKING Maria Raquel Freire and Teresa Cierco ABSTRACT The fast-developing processes of globalization, with increased political and economic interdependence, along with competition; regionalization dynamics revealing more localized ambitions and either constraining or advancing intentions and policies; and Europeanization as a particular dynamic related to the EU role as a global actor, applied to the Polish post-communist transition, constitute our vectors of analysis. This essay aims to address the simultaneously interconnected and heterogeneous responses of Polish post-communist course of change to global and regional processes, including European integration. In this line of research, we search for answers to how the linkages among globalization, regionalization, and Europeanization work in the case of Polish postcommunist transition. This will be pursued through an analysis of the democratization course, mainly regarding political, institutional and social aspects, and economic integration. Despite elements of complementarity Globalization: Perspectives from Central and Eastern Europe Contemporary Studies in Economic and Financial Analysis, Volume 89, 173–195 Copyright r 2007 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1569-3759/doi:10.1016/S1569-3759(07)89005-X

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and resistance in the working relationships among the three concepts, which are highly debatable, we find they have substantial implications on Polish policy-making. These implications include adjustment and bargaining between demands and concessions, resulting in gains and losses, though despite the negative effects associated and acknowledged, the fact of Poland pursuing the course of integration in the EU reveals an equation of cost–benefit, in favor of the EU.

1. INTRODUCTION The end of the Cold War and the desegregation of the Soviet bloc allowed a redrawing of the political landscape in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), with the states formerly under the communist regime redesigning policies and goals. With varying degrees of intensity, the CEE states have been experiencing the spread of democratic ideals and liberal economic principles, conveyed, among others, by international organizations, such as the European Union (EU). A rapprochement process for some of these states has led to integration in the Union.1 In this post-communist transition process, the global and regional dimensions, as well as domestic developments are addressed. We understand that while the role of national forces in the reconstruction of governance is fundamental, the relevance of global forces is undeniable, along with the regional setting of transition. The fast-developing processes of globalization, with increased political and economic interdependence, along with competition; regionalization dynamics revealing more localized ambitions and either constraining or advancing intentions and policies; and Europeanization as a particular dynamic related to the EU role as a global actor, constitute our vectors of analysis. New challenges emerge, therefore, not only for the countries in transition but also for EU countries, receptors and catalysts of reform and change. Any assessment of postcommunist change and of the process of Polish integration within the EU should therefore be encompassing, looking at the inter-linkages among globalization, regionalization, and Europeanization. This essay aims to address the simultaneously interconnected and heterogeneous responses of Polish post-communist course of change to global and regional processes, including European integration. In this line of research, we search for answers to how the linkages among globalization, regionalization, and Europeanization work in the case of Polish postcommunist transition. This will be pursued through an analysis of the

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democratization course, mainly regarding political, institutional and social aspects, and economic integration. Despite elements of complementarity and resistance in the working relationships among the three concepts, which are highly debatable, we find they have substantial implications on Polish policymaking. These implications include adjustment and bargaining between demands and concessions, resulting in gains and losses, though despite the negative effects associated and acknowledged, the fact of Poland pursuing the course of integration in the EU reveals an equation of cost–benefit, in favor of the EU. Following this line of research, the first part of this essay starts with the clarification of our conceptual framework and it includes the description of the relationships between our three main conceptual elements: globalization, regionalization, and Europeanization. We draw on these concepts as we explore the Polish transition course towards democracy after decades of Soviet rule, and investigate how this transition has been affected by the conjugation of these different but inter-related conceptual elements. Second, we apply this framework to the Polish integration course into the EU, examining the role of the EU in post-communist change, particularly regarding democratization and economic aspects. We conclude by tying up the post-communist transition in Poland with our vectors of analysis, identifying drivers for change and elements of hindrance in the process. If the influence of global and regional processes might not be a novelty, their working relations, by the complex antagonism they might imply, added to the Europeanization dynamics in a context of domestic reformulation, constitute a new reality to CEE states. And the optimist discourse about ‘‘all’s well that ends well,’’ which has been recurrently applied to the CEE states accession to the EU as the culmination of a process of maturation, is not straightforward. The continuous search for balance between domestic and external drivers results in a mix of reinvented policies with ingredients of support and contest that render the whole process of transition in Poland with interesting contours.

2. GLOBALIZATION, REGIONALIZATION AND EUROPEANIZATION: FRAMING THE CONCEPTS Globalization is a multi-faceted process, involving economic, political, and social aspects, with visible consequences in post-communist change. A very much debated concept, globalization raises issues concerning intensity, with

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regard to the level of interdependence and multi-lateralization. Its scope (with different studies emphasizing differentiated preferential areas of focus, such as economics, social and cultural aspects, or environmental matters) and reach, understood by some as a positive driving force promoting new opportunities for economic growth and social development, and criticized by others as raising a set of constraining issues by not reaching everyone, deepens economic asymmetries and allows social exclusion. We adopt an in-between understanding of globalization, looking at it as a process of high intensity, broad scope, and carrying a mixed record of adaptation and resistance. Thus, globalization, referring to the multiplicity of linkages and interconnections between international actors generally implies a variety of economic, social, and political forces as seen in such areas as market expansion, science and technology driven increases in global interdependence, a new wave of democratization, and co-operation for the sake of new economic, social, and cultural opportunities (McGrew cited in Busch, 2000, pp. 21–22; Ku¨hnhardt, 2002, p. 1; Schulz, Soderbaum, & Ojendal, 2001, p. 304). This increasing interdependence takes place in a context of ‘‘supraterritoriality,’’ where the current format of the nation-state has revealed its limits. ‘‘[W]e no longer live in a territorialist society. Rather, territorial spaces now coexist and interrelate with global spaces’’ (Scholte, 2002, p. 286). A novel order emerged after the end of the Cold War, in a context of change and interdependence, where territorialities are challenged by trans-nationality and a set of new unbounded phenomena, such as terrorism, transnational illicit practices, migratory flows, and economic interdependence – processes that surpass the control of the national authorities of a country and are global in scope. CEE states do not escape this reality, which points to issues of inclusion and exclusion, and diversity and homogeneity, generating reactions of support and contention. Global forces, in these various dimensions and carrying new adjustments and constraints have informed Poland’s post-communist transition and policy-making, reflecting the inter-linkage between domestic policy formulation and external influences in the process. The inputs associated with these processes are further developed in the section about Polish policy dynamics. Regionalization is also a difficult concept, both in terms of its definition, regarding aspects such as geographical proximity, sharing of a collective good, and cohesiveness, not always easily identifiable, and concerning its focus, since some studies on regionalization focus on its supra-national dimensions while others look at the local intra-state regional dynamics.


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This difference also points to the lenses we might use in our analysis, focusing more on the internal, or on the external political factors affecting regionalism (Katzenstein, 2000). Here we understand regionalization as a broad process of interaction and integration at the regional level, underlining the supra-national character of the process, through a focus on the EU. Despite understanding the existence of different regions in Europe, such as CEE, the Scandinavian countries, or the Balkan region, we focus our study on the EU as a wider region encompassing 27 member states, and look at the Polish integration process bearing in mind this wider region – the EU. Therefore, and following this understanding, a region might be defined as ‘‘a set of countries markedly interdependent over a wide range of different dimensions’’ (Katzenstein, 2000), hence the literature on the topic which usually associates geographic proximity, international interaction, and common bonds to the concept (Katzenstein, 2000, examples as referred include Cantori & Speigel, 1970, pp. 6–7; Russett, 1967: 11). These become elements expressing an aggregation of interests, in political, economic, geographic, and social terms as both a defensive reply and a commitment to global challenges. While efforts at the regional level to projecting economic potential, for example, work in parallel to the processes of globalization (Ku¨hnhardt, 2002, p. 5), introverted attitudes of a protective character within regional blocs, for instance regarding economic protection measures, might constitute a threat to the global trade system (Hettne & Soderbaum, 2005, p. 29). As Scholte argues, states have instigated regional projects and remain prominent participants in regionalization. However, in some ways, they have also been constrained to ‘go regional’, for example, in order to adequately respond to global challenges, such as capital flows and transborder ecological problems (Scholte, 2000: 147). Thus, regions are indelibly linked to both the larger international system of which they are a part, and to the different national systems which constitute them. As complementary processes, they occur simultaneously and feed on each other, thus leading to growing tensions between economic regionalism and economic multilateralism. (Katzenstein, 2000)

Integration into the EU as a fundamental expression of regionalization sets the context for the analysis of the EU influence in Polish post-communist transition. The issue pertains, among other aspects, to whether Polish negotiations towards accession were carried out in a symmetrical manner rather than by the imposition of a strategic use of norms and conditionalities enforced for reasons of self-interest (see Hettne & Soderbaum, 2005, pp. 538–539; Jorgensen, 2004, pp. 48–50). Moreover, linking globalization,

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regionalization, and Europeanization to create a set of tools to address the political, social, economic and security challenges of the international order, in an inter-operational manner, or in a manipulation of this same order, are issues of contention. These focus mainly on the much-needed balance in economic, social, and political-security terms in an unbalanced international setting after the end of the Cold War, where the states from CEE – for years part of the Warsaw Pact and of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) under Soviet control – search for accommodation into international organizations such as the EU. But while the EU pursues this open-door policy allowing the accession of new states, it also has to change and adapt itself both to an enlargement policy stretching resources and pressuring decision-making procedures and to the external environment where global forces inter-play. ‘‘Globalization is forcing the EU in the early 21st century into a global orientation which transcends the original raison d’eˆtre of European integration y . Europe is turning away from an internally-driven object to an externally-oriented subject of world politics’’ (Ku¨hnhardt, 2002, p. 16). So, regionalization can be understood as a political response to globalization. In this process, while there are rules and procedures which define criteria for who might get in and who stays out of the EU, broadly the so-called acquis communautaire, ‘‘the EU has to overcome traditional geographical restraints on the projection of its scope of action if it wants to live up to the challenges of globalization by continuing to lead the Europeanization process through political will and decision’’ (Ku¨hnhardt, 2002, p. 17). Europeanization as a concept implies, thus, the fulfillment of membership criteria, which include meeting democratic standards such as the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, along with economic indicators. It also means the ‘‘development of networks of interactions among domestic and supranational actors to initiate and unfold the decision making process during the input base’’ and the ‘‘gradual and differentiated diffusion-penetration of values, general norms, and specific decisions from European institutions into the domestic politics, that is, into the working domestic institutions, decision-making processes and domestic policies at different levels’’ (Morlino, 2002, pp. 237–260). In this way, Europeanization requires the socialization and internalization of EU norms and procedures both within the Union and as a pre-condition for those states applying to join. Therefore, through a focus on the promotion of stability through democratization, institution-building, and civic participation, Europeanization


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is understood here as a process of construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies. (Radaelli, 2000, p. 4)

It goes further than regionalization by implying a process of gradual socialization and internalization of political and economic policies along side security measures as understood by the EU, through, for example, legislative adaptation. This deepening process is embedded in the criteria for accession to the EU, as well as in its neighborhood policy (European Neighborhood Policy – ENP), as a mechanism of harmonization of practices that might facilitate co-operation between the EU, accession candidates and its wide neighboring area (stretching to the Mediterranean, and through the Middle East to the Caucasus). Consequently, Europeanization aims at endorsing a broader regional community, beyond the actual EU borders, to include ENP countries.2 Europeanization, in this context, has been understood as a demonstration of the working relationship between the regional framing and global forces as catalysts of new challenges in a supra-territorial context. ‘‘The concept of Europeanization, developed during the 1990s, was for many an extension of the globalization debate – since the economy was globalizing, the EU had to either embrace and enhance this development or build walls to protect the distinctive importance of ‘‘social Europe’’ (Geyer, 2003, p. 562). Europeanization emerged as the response to the convergence of external and internal challenges, allowing the EU to find a balance between going global while remaining distinctive. Poland, which entered the EU in 2004 has gone through this Europeanization process, adopting and getting adapted to the EU acquis. These developments are further analyzed in the section on Polish integration into the EU, looking at the driving forces behind change and questioning a process where, in instances, intentions and decisions have not matched expectations. Within the EU the goals of promoting and expanding democratic practices (as a fundamental dimension implied in the Europeanization process) have been clearly stated in the organization’s founding documents. Understanding democracy beyond the minimal definition of Schumpeter (1952), we add to the holding of free elections, good governance principles, particularly focusing on political accountability, ruling stability and civic participation, as fundamental elements in a democratic state. Economic development is also

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added to our analysis as a major EU goal. When looking at the Polish case through this framing, a gradual maturation in the democratization of Polish politics is noticeable, while acknowledging this as an arduous process still carrying many limitations, particularly regarding good governance principles and economic indicators – issues further analyzed in the section devoted to Polish integration into the EU. However, and as noted before, these criteria do not just apply to candidate countries, but also to member states, leading many to criticize the EU for lack of democracy. The distance between EU bureaucracy and the population is asserted as one of the main problems, and it has been finding expression in the very low turn out of voters in European elections (Scholte, 1997, p. 451; Ku¨hnhardt, 2002, p. 27). It is, therefore, interesting to underline this ambivalent course of demanding candidate countries’ compliance with a number of rules which have themselves found limited application (in particular those related to representativity and accountability). This has led some to perceive that the ‘‘enlargement process of the EU enhances social and regional disparities within the Union, and while the CEE countries worked hard to meet the norms and criteria for accession; they have been confronted with challenges which contradict their needs and hopes’’ (Ku¨hnhardt, 2002, pp. 5–6). This has been so in economic matters, as can be seen in Polish high unemployment rates and social impoverishment, as well as regarding the democratization of practices – so difficult a process internally and yet meeting resistance in the EU frame (again with expression for example in the low turnout in European electoral processes). Europeanization is thus closely linked to regionalization, increasing the potential for co-operation and the sharing of practices, through the spreading of norms, which become socialized in the EU space. In addition, while promoting liberal economy principles it is working as a catalyst for global forces, enhancing economic and trade links. These two dimensions of Europeanization are visible in the Polish effort at internalization of the EU acquis, as well as in the adopted democratic and liberal economy pattern, following regional and global challenges and not always conforming to internal demands. After analyzing the relationships between these three vectors – globalization, regionalization, and Europeanization –, the following section looks at Polish policy dynamics before and after accession to the EU, identifying how domestic policies have been constrained and enhanced by the convergence of the global and the regional dimensions in the country’s policy options and policy making.


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3. POLISH POLICY DYNAMICS: FROM FAST-MOVING ADJUSTMENT TO SLOW-MOTION COMPROMISE Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Poland has been through a process of fundamental change. The years of Soviet occupation left deep scars in this country where despite foreign occupation, national identity survived. The riots and strikes that took place under the Soviet regime testify the Polish unwillingness to accommodate to the central ruling power in Moscow.3 The people’s dissatisfaction was a central catalyst to the process of communist demise, where the Independent and Self-Governing Trade Union, Solidarnosć´ (Solidarity) played a key role. Formed in September 1980, at the Gdansk Shipyards, Solidarity was an anti-communist trade union and a social movement that involved an array of people. These ranged from those associated with the Catholic Church to members of the anti-communist left. Although primarily a labour movement led and supported by workers and represented by its charismatic chairman, Lech Wa"˛esa, Solidarnosć´ managed to attract massive support and became by 1980 a lobbying association for national reform. Even though it overtly disavowed political ambitions, the movement became a de facto vehicle of opposition to the communists still in power.4 The movement spread from the industrial to the agricultural sector, which brought about the founding of Rural Solidarity, which pressured the regime to recognize private farmers as the economic foundation of the country’s agricultural sector.5 This was the first time a ruling communist regime accepted a political organization operating outside the regime’s control. It was also the first time an overwhelming majority of the workers under such a regime acted loyally to a movement fundamentally opposed to the ruling powers, and they assisted to bring about a fundamental development for the consolidation of civic movements in Poland. Although in those early years civil society was much controlled, it was very active and fully mobilized, such as the strikes and protests of the 1980s demonstrate. In 1989, amid widespread predictions of social explosion, Wojciech Jaruzelski, Secretary General of the Communist Party, initiated the Round-Table talks with the trade union and other opposition groups. These negotiations, which symbolized the beginning of the transition process in Poland, resulted in a historical compromise: Solidarnosć´ would gain legal status and the right to propose candidates for Parliamentary elections, under the condition that a majority of seats would be granted to

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the communists. The resulting coalition dominated by Solidarnosć´ produced a non-communist majority, under the leadership of Tadeusz Mazowiecki. His government was committed to dismantling the communist system and replacing it with a Western-style liberal democracy by launching a peaceful transformation of the Polish political system (dissolution of the secret police, restoration of private property, gradual liberalization of the economy, abolition of censorship and restoration of freedom of the press, speech, and religion). It was at this point that the history of Poland entered the post-communist era. However, these positive signs of change that also identified a new course in Polish politics, soon became problematic due to internal political differences, corruption and elite-driven policy goals that quickly generated popular discontent with the path of reforms and the democratization process. During the 1990s, successive and unstable governmental coalitions were the result of the difficult democratic transition in the country. In 1993, the post-communist coalition between the Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD) and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) ended with a crisis between Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak and President Wa"˛esa, with the latter accusing Pawlak of putting the party’s interests above those of the nation. Once more, the coalition government formed after the 1997 Parliamentary elections between the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) and the Freedom Union (UW) – two parties that had roots in the Solidarnosć´ movement – ended in June 2000 due to serious internal friction.6 As a result of voter disillusionment, in the 2001 Parliamentary elections, SLD won. When Leszek Miller was appointed as Prime Minister, he assumed the process of market reform and EU accession as a priority, and formed a coalition with the Peasant Party (2001–2003). This commitment to integration in the EU conditioned the making of Polish politics from then onwards. It brought with it a package of reforms with the EU stamp, leading Poland to embark on the reformulation of politics and practices in order to comply with the EU criteria for membership – the Europeanization process, as earlier defined. This decision was made in context of profound domestic change, where the affirmation of independence from a Soviet past was much strong. In addition, Polish authorities felt their place was in the EU given that the regional dimension of Poland constituted an invitation and incentive for reform. Nevertheless, as in the other CEE countries, this revealed to be a slow process since democracy needs time to consolidate, requires the dissemination and understanding of democratic principles at all levels of society, and the consequent adaptation to a new conceptualization of social, political, and


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economic practices. This was to be a gradual and demanding, but not irreversible process that required internalization and socialization as fundamental tenets for transition. Global forces also pushed Poland towards this course. The wave of democratization that swept across CEE in the 1990s was an opportunity Poland wanted to build upon. Therefore, throughout the 1990s, the search for integration into Western organizations, such as the EU, became a priority in Polish politics and a goal that was pursued from then on by the coalitions and governments in power independently of their political orientation be they left wing (1993 and 2001) or right wing (1997 and 2005). The denial of the communist system revealed a consolidated desire to move beyond the old rule and reinforce the process of democratic transition. It was a process that assumed global dimensions and carried global effects over post-communist politics. The transition to democracy gained a new impetus in Poland with the adoption of a new Constitution in 1997, which defined the legal foundations for the new political, social, and economic order. The first post-communist Constitution of the country defined the functioning of the state, the division of power between state bodies (strengthening the power of Parliament), and the rights and obligations of its citizens. But from wording to action is a long way. Despite progress and advances in its political–institutional performance, after 17 years, Poland still faces serious difficulties in the implementation of reforms. In the process of socialization and internalization of democracy as a concept and as a practice there have been noticeable advances, despite known limits, particularly with regard to an active civil society, the development of an independent media, and the democratic institutional process of electoral choice. These internal developments have been affected by the Europeanization process and regionalization, as well as by global forces, such as the wave of democratization and growing economic interdependence (market expansion, for example). However, there have also been easily identifiable problems particularly those regarding the relationship between the political dealings and civil society – a relationship that is often apart and not always in convergence. Due to corruption, and in instances an elite-driven process, Polish politics often reflect the interests of those in power rather than the interests of those they were supposed to be representing. This is a problem not exclusive to Poland but one that endangers the internal course of democratization and economic growth. Nonetheless, whether seen mainly as a set of economic, institutional, or ideational forces, the drivers of globalization in economic terms have served as a major rationale for Polish governments to alter: (a) their countries’ macroeconomic policies, by focusing

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on tight monetary policies, budgetary austerity, and low inflation; (b) their microeconomic policies, by liberalizing their markets, deregulating the rules governing business, privatizing companies belonging to public sector, and increasing flexibility in labor markets; (c) their socioeconomic policies, by cutting social spending and rationalizing social services (see Schmidt, 2006). The Polish government followed the ‘‘shock therapy’’ policy, which brought about economic and social consequences. By applying neo-liberal principles particularly regarding the ending of managed economy through the withdrawal of price controls and subsidies to state-owned industries, among other measures, the immediate effect was a dramatic increase in unemployment and rising poverty.7 In the transition period, one of the most-important priorities for the CEE countries was the creation of a viable market economy. Privatization was one of the first steps to reach this aim. Adversities, such as the aforementioned – unemployment and increasing poverty – resulted from the drastic economic measures. These problems, along with corruption scandals, led to strong criticism both at home and externally towards the Polish ruling elites, but did not put on hold the course of transition. The high costs directly related to the transition model resulting from adaptation to the EU acquis, as a result of the process of regional integration, are also an expression of the need to face the challenges associated to globalization, and the requirements of economic efficiency and competitiveness. In this process of Polish adaptation to EU norms, the government approved on April 26, 2000 the ‘‘National Programme of Preparations to the Accession to the European Union.’’ This program provided guidelines for adjustment to the EU requirements. Containing a chronology of legislative work and a list of legal acts to be adopted, it worked as a roadmap for Polish adjustment of policies and practices to the EU acquis. Advances included reforms in the coal and steel industries, and in agriculture. These also meant the introduction of new veterinary and sanitary norms as well as the privatization and deregulation of the economic sectors traditionally under state monopoly, such as energy and telecommunications (Ners, 2000; see also Hasselmann, 2006, pp. 49–75). However, the still ongoing reform process is not all about success stories. The aforementioned difficulties remain. On the one hand, this was and still is a complex process for the Polish government that had to deal with imposed requirements while unmatched popular expectations, particularly those regarding immediate rewards increase general discontent. On the other hand, the process has been assisting Poland in reinforcing capacities to face the negative effects of globalization while allowing the country to make the most of the interaction between global forces. This means giving Poland


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the legal, political, and economic means to face growing interdependence and the many challenges associated with globalization. Moreover, Poland gains a more competitive industry, social and political mechanisms to face transnational threats, like illegal migration or the trafficking of drugs, arms, and human beings. As a member of the EU, Poland reinforces its means to address these threats by closely co-operating with the other member states, and benefits from an ensemble of principles and practices that are enforced as a response. As such it might be argued that EU membership serves as a kind of protection regarding issues Poland would have much difficulty in responding on its own. But being in the EU is not a self-made response to these problems. This issue recalls again the fact that regionalization also serves as a form of empowerment of globalization, by fostering social and economic dynamics. To give adequate response to these, Poland’s economic and political dealings need a solid basis, which is still under construction despite accession to the EU. Thus, there is a continuous feeling of adjustment and containment both regarding globalization and regionalization – a result of the ambivalent requirements and results associated with these dynamics. In addition, and also as a demonstration of this ambivalence and Polish internal difficulties to respond to global and regional challenges, the political instability in the country, a feature marking Polish politics since the demise of the Soviet communist bloc, has been throughout the accession process and still is a serious obstacle to the new transition period that began in May 2004 with Poland’s admission to the EU. Just two days after Polish formal membership in the EU, Prime Minister Leszek Miller resigned in the face of popular discontent with the precarious social and economic situation mainly due to high unemployment rates, government spending cuts (especially on health, education, and welfare, the so-called ‘‘Hausner’s Plan’’ (European Commission, 2005), and a series of corruption scandals at home. Difficulties extend to the media and the judiciary system, sectors where independence is also fundamental for an assurance of transparency and accountability. Furthermore, there have been recurrent complaints about manipulation of information and violations of provisions regarding confidentiality of processes and leaking of information. Naturally, these are problems that further hamper the democratization process. The incompetence of successive governments to deal with these serious and delicate issues brought disillusionment to Polish society. In fact, corruption in different sectors, from politics to economics and the judiciary system, has undermined the consolidation of Poland’s path towards democratization. Several scandals have agitated society with cases of bribery, illegal fund

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diverting, inappropriate preferential treatment to private companies and criminal activities leading to renewals in government.8 However, these changes at the governing level result not only from corruption but also from deficient responses to social and economic problems and the implementation of different political programs did not manage to really improve the image of politicians in the country. Together with general disillusionment about the integration process in the EU, as leading simultaneously to a loss of autonomy and gains in regional power, the reactions of the Polish society to unbalanced results led a conservative and traditional party, the centre-right Law and Justice (PiS), to win the majority of votes (27%) in the 2005 elections. With a program focusing on better public safety, the reform of the legal system to fight crime and corruption, and traditional and Christian values (Araloff, 2005), PiS became the largest party in the Sejm with 155 seats. It could be said that this was a demonstration of nationalist feelings emerging in reaction to demanding processes, particularly in social terms. However, it turned out to be impossible to form a coalition government between the two parties that had received the highest number of votes, the PiS and the Civic Platform (PO), also a centre-right party, due to the severity of the negative campaign which accentuated differences in economic issues and created an antagonistic relationship between the two parties (Jasiewicz & Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, 2006, p. 1231). Hence, the PiS formed a minority government relying on the tacit support of smaller populist and agrarian parties, such as the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), Self-Defense Party (Samoobrona), and the League of Polish Families (LPR). In February 2006, PiS signed a co-operation agreement, known as the Stabilization Pact, with Samoobrona and the LPR, and in May, the three formed a majority coalition government with a political orientation not in line with the Polish commitments within the EU and NATO (Bernstein, 2006). On the one hand, Samoobrona follows isolationist ideas, defending an increase in governmental social programs. Being hostile to foreign investment, the party is anti-EU and against the adoption of the euro and this represents a major source of potential resistance to Europeanization. On the other hand, the LPR is a deeply conservative political party whose electoral base has strong religious values. Combining social conservatism with isolationism and left-wing economic policies, it defends social policies, such as universal health care and public education, and is also anti-EU, having been the only significant political force in Poland that opposed Polish membership in the EU. Although both parties are eurosceptic, Poland’s new Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga assured European countries that Warsaw’s


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foreign policy had already been decided before the coalition was formed, and that it was ‘‘the responsibility of the largest coalition parties, namely Law and Justice’’ (Eubusiness, 2006). Nonetheless, political instability remains. In July 2006, reports of a rift between Marcinkiewicz and the PiS party leader Kaczynski, led to the resignation of the first and the formation of a new government with Kaczynski as Prime Minister.9 These internal developments are directly linked to the process of integration into the EU and to all the hard requirements associated with the absorption of the EU acquis into Polish legislation and practices. Europeanization, by allowing similarity to EU ways of dealing means simultaneously more proximity, while involving also questions about identity, nationalism, and differentiation. This has been evinced in this more recent period where isolationist trends have gained voice within Polish society. They reflect the disconnection between the civil and political dimensions in the country, and a more realist look at the EU.

4. POLISH INTEGRATION INTO THE EU: MATCHING THE EXPECTATIONS? The 2004 enlargement expanded the frontiers of the EU, increased its population and raised its cultural, historical, and economic diversity. In light of the wide scope of the EU acquis that Poland was required to adopt, a process of profound transformation was initiated with effect in the country’s political and administrative culture as well as in its economic and social setting. Nevertheless, this process of adjustment and reform is not over yet. Officially, the invitation to Poland and other CEE countries to apply for membership was made at the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, which set out the criteria regarding the requirements for accession. Thus, EU membership was not unconditional. According to the Presidency conclusions, membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and, protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. (European Commission, 2006)

Thus, this has been a process that has had as centre stage democratization and liberal economic principles. The toughening of accession conditions, as formulated in the Copenhagen criteria of 1993, reveals the inter-linkages between the processes of regionalization as understood here and global forces. These conditions envisaged pressing Poland toward reforms allowing

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the country to cope with competition arising from globalization, and other such economic processes within the EU. In addition, by way of achieving democratic stability in its internal practices, Poland would be contributing to further stabilization in the EU. The process of regional integration, by seeking the formation of a regional community (EU), channels the Polish desire of ‘‘being in Europe’’ and is a reflex of the Polish desire to belong to Europe, despite visible anti-EU trends in the country. In fact, this European identity has been assisting the whole process of integration and adaptation to both EU requisites and global trends regarding the expansion of democratization and neo-liberal principles. And this has meant that, in the cost–benefit equation, the anti-EU voices have not had enough weight to reverse the process of transition. The aim of becoming a EU member stimulated economic and democratic reforms in Poland. It also became a motivating factor for the adoption of unpopular measures necessary at the reform level of the governing policies in their political, economic, and social dimensions. As stated by Gunter Verheugen, former Commissioner Directorate General for Enlargement, the most powerful motivation for Poland to achieve the necessary reforms ‘‘was the clear and credible prospect of joining the EU’’ (Verheugen, 2002). A dream that came true, but which carried with it many expectations that did not prove easy to match. Polish integration into the EU aimed at preparing Poland to cope with some of the effects of globalization, such as trade, capital liberalization, and the intensive use of modern technology. In a manner similar to the fundamental changes implied in the process of privatization, and regarding democratization that globalization is promoting internationally, Poland’s accession to the EU is affecting its cost and profit opportunities both in regional and global terms. Within the EU it is providing domestic incentives for adjustment, in various sectors, including private and public companies, governmental political and administrative institutions, and organizations at the level of civil society. Notwithstanding, these adjustments have revealed superficial democratization and economic and social inequality that have been hindering the process. In addition, the European economic slowdown provided opportunities for a constituency of populists to raise their objections to EU policies – a reflection of this can be seen in the 2005 Polish election.10 Despite the large economic and other benefits coming from the EU, support for membership in the EU was not easy to secure. A feeling of fatigue began to develop in Poland as the accession date was approaching. The domestic political context of instability, economic strains, and the demands associated with


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democratization, led the Polish society to the realization that the journey towards membership had been arduous and demanding (Johnson, 2005, p. 114). Populist parties, such as Samoobrona and the LPR drew on this fatigue to call for a rejection of the EU bid and tried to build on this general resentment to pursue their political goals. Part of this Polish euroskepticism was based on ideological and structural factors. Factors that implied understanding the EU as an entity allegedly based on a materialist, secular, and cosmopolitan vision of society that could harm Poland’s national identity (Jasiewicz & Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, 2004, p. 1108). This Polish nationalist tendency emerged as a reaction to both globalization and regionalization over the political–economic situation and as a way of affirming the country’s national interests. Moreover, the reaction was an excuse used by these political groupings for Poland to protect itself given the country’s poor results. It was also a rhetoric exercise that paid off among the most reticent sectors of the population regarding European integration. Nevertheless, and despite their anti-Europe discourse there are no signs of a clear wish to reverse the whole process of accession. In addition, the existing signs might serve as an alert for analyzing Polish politics within the EU in the light of voices against a Federal Republic of Europe and the ‘‘Brussels system,’’ that claim the need for Polish real independence.11 The Polish government obtained support for EU accession against a background of low popular participation in the June 2003 referendum. While a large majority of those that turned out to vote did indeed support accession (77%), this support among those eligible to vote was generally low (with 58% of the population coming to vote) (Jasiewicz & Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, 2004, p. 1118; Szczerbiak, 2003, p. 1). Nevertheless, as EU accession approached, opinion polls in Poland demonstrated declining enthusiasm (see Table 1). This might be explained by the fact that as negotiations were close to conclusion,

Table 1. Public opinion in Poland Towards the EU Referendum June 2003 May 2004 Survey May 2006 Survey

Polish Public Opinion Towards the EU. Yes to EU Membership (%)

No to EU Membership (%)

77 58 67

23 10 6

Source: Data from Osrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej – OBOP, 2006 and EU official information available at [http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_e.htm]. Accessed on August 3, 2006.

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the focus moved from a general perception that EU membership was a ‘‘good thing’’ to a focus on more specific policies and demands, particularly those regarding the most problematic issues such as the CAP dossier (common agricultural policy), free movement of labor and capital, environmental issues, and justice and home affairs which were left to the last round of talks (Osrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej – OBOP, 2006). Despite these ups and downs in Polish public opinion prior and after EU accession, the successive Polish governments have, at different paces but following the same direction, assumed the difficult task of reforming the economy and political institutions, as well as gathering consensus among the major political forces regarding integration in the EU. As a result, during the 1990s there was a rapid integration of the Polish economy in the EU as various legal and economic restrictions were gradually removed and the Europe Agreements established the framework for bilateral relations between the EU and each individual candidate country.12 Economic growth, the rise in foreign direct investment and technology, the reduction in low-skill labor-intensive products, and increased trade are some of Poland’s benefits in its 2 years within the EU (Global Outlook, 2006). However, the transition and adaptation of Poland to the EU standards and ways of dealing is still in the making, this is, it is not yet complete. Poland is in a phase of democratic consolidation. The post-accession period does not mean an end to the overall reform process that demands (from the citizen to the governing authorities in Warsaw) further efforts at the political, economic, and social levels of Polish society. Just being an EU member is not a self-fulfilling condition of economic well being or ready made formula for political success. ‘‘We know that EU membership does not mean that our countries should rest on their laurels. Being part of the Union in itself will not solve all of our problems [in] difficult areas of political, social and economic life’’ (Kaczynski, 2004).

5. CONCLUSION The year 1989 marked the dawn of a new era for the CEE countries, which had for decades been under Soviet control. At different speeds and with distinct goals, these post-communist states embarked upon a process of transformation in political, economic, social and security terms. This was an enormous challenge in a context where the quest for integration into Western organizations, such as the EU, became a priority for many of the


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CEE governments. In Poland, the post-communist transition course involved profound changes in governance and polity that followed liberal democratic principles. This implied: (a) the strengthening of the civil society, the reconfiguration of legislative and institutional practices, including the development of political parties, and the adaptation of a competitive and transparent electoral system; (b) the gradual liberalization of the economy – economic reforms stimulating emerging market structures based on privatization and competitive practices – influenced by neo-liberal global processes; (c) that these new political and economic procedures and practices at the state level and at the grass roots were influenced by the conditionality and the opportunities associated with membership in the EU. The inclusion of Poland in the EU allowed the post-communist transition process initiated after the demise of the Soviet bloc, to give place to a new phase in transition – that of democratic consolidation. This process of institution building and the subsequent absorption of the EU rules (acquis communautaire) were fundamental in matching the criteria for accession of Poland to the EU. However, this process did not end in May 2004 with the formal signature of Polish entry into the Union. It still requires adjustments to a political, social, and economic way of living, different from the Soviet-style centralized and planned ruling, and distanced from the welfare dream in the immediate period after communist demise. The social and economic efforts implied in the transition help to explain the growing disenchantment visible in the process and the general feeling of unaccomplishment that came to light in the 2005 elections. Globalization, like the global integration of markets, trade liberalization, market deregulation, and regional forces, such as the EU internal market rules, are creating new opportunities and challenges for Poland. This effect is visible to the extent that political practices and governmental policies are influenced by a globally induced dynamism of competition. In a positive tone, the differentiated dynamics of globalization, regionalization, and Europeanization have pushed Poland to reform and adaptation to the postCold War order. The impetus of the global forces toward democratization in the 1990s was a real challenge to the new regimes in CEE countries – Poland included. At the regional level, cooperation and financial assistance within the EU, further deepened by Europeanization, were fundamental to the consolidation of the Polish course towards democratization. In a supraterritoral context, and in the face of transnational threats and challenges, these global forces have been acting as both a catalyst for policy review and for the implementation of new policies, such as democratization.

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On a more negative note, these processes have limited Polish autonomy in policy making and policy decision. This is particularly visible within the EU framework where many decisions are made at the supranational level. The increasing liberalization of the economy and market deregulation have surpassed the control of the Polish authorities. Moreover, the inclusion of Poland in the EU’s internal market, where competitiveness is high, added further pressure on its weak agricultural and industrial sectors. But all in all, and despite acknowledgement of complementarity and resistance in the relationships between these three vectors, the consolidation of Polish democratization is on track.

NOTES 1. The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 2. ENP members are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus (observer), Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya (observer), Moldova, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine. 3. Various civic movements were active in communist Poland, despite the oppression of the regime. They gained increasing prominence throughout the 1970s and 1980s. After Gomulka’s accession to power in October 1956, the influence of popular opinion at the governmental level became clear, with Poland emerging as one of the more open societies in Central and Eastern Europe. Gomulka’s pledge to follow a ‘‘Polish road to socialism’’ in tandem with national traditions disappointed many Poles by failing to dismantle the fundamentals of the Stalinist system. In December 1970, disturbances and strikes in the cities of Gdansk, Gdynia, and Szczecin reflected deep dissatisfaction with living and employment conditions in the country. Edward Gierek replaced Gomulka in power in December 1970 and tried to pacify public opinion through some economic liberalization measures. In this context, the 1975 Helsinki Accord inspired open dissent over human rights issues. In 1976, a group of intellectuals formed the Committee for Defence of Workers (Komitet Obrony Robotniko´w – KOR), and students organized the Committee for Student Solidarity. Together, these organizations intensified pressure over Gierek particularly with respect to the liberalization of state controls, also supporting underground publications challenging the official dogma. By the end of the 1970s, the hard-pressed Gierek regime faced opposition from dissatisfied labour forces, dissident intelligentsia, and the Roman Catholic clergy. Democratically oriented activists intensified their activities at defending the interests of workers and standing for the respect for human rights, a strategy that paid off handsomely in the 1980s. Available at http://www.tiscali.co.uk/ reference/encyclopaedia/hutchinson/m0019842.html, accessed on May 2, 2006. 4. Available at http://info-poland.buffalo.edu/classroom/longhist6.html, accessed on 2 May 2006. 5. Available at http://www.workmall.com/wfb2001/poland/poland_history_the_ birth_of_solidarity.html, accessed on 2 May 2006.


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6. This post-Solidarnosć´ coalition collapsed over a dispute regarding Warsaw’s local government election. Despite a national agreement between coalition partners (Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek representing the senior coalition partner AWS) and the decision to advance Pawel Piskorski from the UW as a candidate to the position of Mayor of Warsaw, the councilors from the AWS withdrew their support. In the face of this internal crisis, UW withdrew his Minister from government leading to the end of the coalition and to the formation of a minority government in May 2000 under the AWS. The sole unifying factor in the AWS/UW coalition, their anti-communist orientation, was not enough to overcome the existing political contradictions between the two. It was also not enough to guarantee stability to the AWS government (Millard, 2001, pp. 379–400). 7. According to governmental statistics, five million Poles live in extreme poverty and the official unemployment rate in 2004 was 20.6 percent (Paczynska, 2005). 8. For example, in December 2002, the Rywin affair, an alleged attempt by politicians to interfere with the legislative process, was investigated by a special Parliamentary Committee. Also, in October 2003, the Starachowice affair directly connected government ministers to organized crime (Inessa, 2003). 9. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/5159994.htm, accessed on 15 January 2007. 10. Information available at http://www.elections.pap.pl/cgi-bin/news.pl?lang=en, accessed on October 30, 2006. 11. Information available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3806503.stm, accessed on 30 October 2006. 12. The EU Association Agreement with Poland was signed in December 1991 and entered into force in February 1994. It provided a framework for political dialogue, promoted the expansion of trade and economic relations, and defined a basis for Community technical and financial assistance and an appropriate framework for supporting Poland’s gradual integration into the EU. Available at http://www.european-movement.org/enlargement/focus_on_poland.php, accessed on October 30, 2006.

REFERENCES Araloff, S. (2005). Poland’s elections: Brief information about the participants. In: Global challenges research, Axis Information and Analysis, September 24, 2005. Available at [http://axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=396]. Accessed on July 30, 2006. Bernstein, R. (2006). Populist joining coalition in Poland. The New York Times, 29 April 2006. Busch, A. (2000). Unpacking the globalization debate: Approaches, evidence and data. In: C. Hay & D. Marsh (Eds), Demystifying globalization. London: Macmillan Press. Cantori, L., & Speigel, S. (1970). The international relations of regions: A comparative approach. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. EUbusiness. (2006). Eurosceptics will not Change Poland’s EU Policy. EUbusiness, May 17. Available at [www.eubusiness.com]. Accessed on July 29, 2006. European Commission. (2005). Commission’s assessment of the November 2004 update of the convergence programme of Poland. February 2.

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Geyer, R. (2003). Globalization, Europeanization, complexity, and the future of Scandinavian exceptionalism. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 16(4), 559–576. Global Outlook. (2006). Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), New European Democracies Project. Available at [http://www.csis.org/nedp/]. Accessed on June 2, 2006. Hasselmann, C. (2006). Policy reform and the development of democracy in Eastern Europe. Aldershot: Ashgate. Hettne, B., & Soderbaum, F. (2005). Civilian power or soft imperialism? The EU as a global actor and the role of interregionalism. European Foreign Affairs Review, 10(4), 535–552. Jasiewicz, K., & Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, A. (2004). Poland. European Journal of Political Research, 43(7/8), 1106–1115. Jasiewicz, K., & Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, A. (2006). Poland. European Journal of Political Research, 45(7/8), 1231–1246. Johnson, D. (2005). The new outsiders of Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of European Integration, 27(1), 111–131. Jorgensen, K. (2004). European foreign policy: Conceptualizing the domain. In: W. Carlsnaes, H. Sjursen & B. White (Eds), Contemporary European foreign policy (pp. 48–50). London: Sage Publications. Kaczynski, L. (2004). Building Europe that is equal for all. Global Agenda. Available at [http:// www.president.pl/x.node?id=2011999]. Accessed on May 2, 2006. Katzenstein, P. (2000). Regionalism and Asia. New Political Economy, 5(3), 353–370. Kuhnhardt, L. (2002). Implications of globalization on the raison d’eˆtre of European integration. Arena Working Papers WP 37/2002, 1–55. Inessa, K. (2003). Fresh scandal hits Poland’s ruling SLD. Transitions on Line, July 14. Millard, F. (2001). Party development and the Polish presidential election of October 2000. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 2(3), 379–400. Morlino, L. (2002). The Europeanisation of Southern Europe. In: A. Costa Pinto & N. S. Teixera (Eds), Southern Europe and the making of the European Union 1945–1980 (pp. 237–260). New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Ners, K. (2000). Poland: A ‘‘healthy’’ if not yet a wealthy European democracy. European Policy Centre. June 13, 2000. Available at [www.theepc.be/en/ce.asp?TYP=CE&LV=177& see=y&t=42&PG=CE/EN/detail&I=13&AI=2]. Accessed on August 3, 2006. Osrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej – OBOP. Available at [www.tns-global.pl/]. Accessed on August 2, 2006. Paczynska, A. (2005). Inequality, political participation, and democratic deepening in Poland. East European Politics and Societies, 19(4), 573–612. Radaelli, C. (2000). Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive change. European Integration online Papers (EloP), 4 (8). Available at [http\\eiop.or.at\eiop\ texte\2000-008a.htm]. Accessed on May 3, 2006. Russett, B. M. (1967). International regions and the international system: A study in political ecology. Chicago: Rand-McNally. Schmidt, V. (2006). Democracy in Europe: Institutions, ideas, discourse. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Scholte, J. (1997). Global capitalism and the state. International Affairs, 73(3), 427–452.


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Scholte, J. (2000). Globalization: A critical introduction. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave. Scholte, J. (2002). Civil society and democracy in global governance. Global Governance, 8, 281–304. Schulz, M., Soderbaum, F., & Ojendal, J. (Eds). (2001). Regionalization in a globalizing world: A comparative perspective on forms, actors and processes. London: Zed Books. Schumpeter, J. (1952). Capitalism, socialism and democracy. London: George Allen and Unwin. Szczerbiak, A. (2003). Referendum Briefing N.5, The Polish EU Accession Referendum, 7–8 June 2003. Opposing Europe Research Network (OERN). Available at [http://www. sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/poland5.pdf]. Accessed on May 2, 2006. Verheugen, G. (2002). Member of the European Commission, responsible for Enlargement. Strategy Paper and Progress Reports, Brussels, SPEECH/02/462, October 9, 2002.


GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONAL INTEREST IN EU ENLARGEMENT: THE CASE OF GERMANY AND POLAND Randall E. Newnham ABSTRACT How do traditional state interests fit into a new Europe in which globalization may seem to render them irrelevant? Globalization is often thought of as undermining the sovereignty of states. States are forced to work through multilateral institutions in a globalizing world, which may seem to render states largely irrelevant. As this chapter will show, though, some countries are able to use multilateral institutions (such as the European Union, EU) as a new arena to advance their national goals. Germany is a classic example of such a state. Since its history of aggression has left the country distrusted by its neighbors, Germany has found that it can best advance its national goals by embedding them in multilateral processes – such as European integration. The following chapter will examine this process by focusing on one case: the role of German–Polish relations in the 2004 expansion of the EU. After an introductory section, the chapter will first focus on Germany’s goals, showing how it hoped that expansion would further German national interests, including its economic and security needs and Globalization: Perspectives from Central and Eastern Europe Contemporary Studies in Economic and Financial Analysis, Volume 89, 197–225 Copyright r 2007 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1569-3759/doi:10.1016/S1569-3759(07)89006-1

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the historical necessity of atoning for the Second World War. Yet Berlin also was careful to avoid overt unilateral actions, working carefully through the EU to advance its agenda. Next, the chapter will trace Germany’s actions, showing how it worked to support the 2004 expansion and Poland’s inclusion in it, often over the objections of some of its EU partners. Finally, the chapter will detail the outcome of the process, showing that the results were positive for both Germany and Poland, as well as for the overall cause of European integration. Thus, for the Germans at least, the seeming dichotomy between ‘‘doing good and doing well’’ can be reconciled. This may offer a model for other countries to follow, showing that a careful use of state power can advance national goals even in a globalizing world.

1. INTRODUCTION On June 7–8, 2003, the people of Poland voted in a referendum on their country’s future membership in the European Union (EU). Almost 80 percent of the voters approved membership and turnout easily passed 50 percent (as required under Polish law for a valid result) (Poland’s Official, 2003). Poland thus officially accepted the invitation which the EU had extended to 10 states at its December 2002 summit in Copenhagen. The 10 countries – Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Cyprus, and Malta – joined the Union in May 2004, in time to take part in the elections to the European Parliament in June. This momentous expansion has transformed the political, economic, and social map of Europe, marking the end of the Cold War-era division of Europe into East and West. Why, though, did the EU expansion take place? Many works have described the events of the recent expansion. Yet fewer have tried to explain what caused it. Often it appears as if some impersonal, mysterious global force was at work, making expansion a foregone conclusion. The competitive forces of the world economy and converging political, economic, and social systems seemed to set the stage for European unification, as part of a broader worldwide trend of globalization.1 In fact, however, events do not happen on their own: as Vladimir Lenin put it, politics is always a question of ‘‘kto-kovo’’ – who is doing what to whom? Who has the power? Whose interests are driving the events? The main argument of this essay is that while larger trends such as globalization may have helped to make EU expansion

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possible, the interests of individual countries were crucial in shaping the timing and nature of the expansion. Yet are these two sets of factors, globalization and state interests, always in opposition? Scholte argues convincingly that this is not the case. As he puts it: Stronger states can substantially influence global and supraterritorial activities and indeed exploit the new geography to considerable advantage. For example, the US government has become a sole superpower in good part thanks to its use of global rules and institutions y Arguably major states – such as those in the OECD and Group of 7 – have in fact gained new power as they have lost traditional sovereignty. (Scholte, 2004b, p. 9)

Authors such as Sassen (1996) and Hirst and Thompson (1996) agree. In short, globalization may make it hard for states to act unilaterally. Yet by empowering multilateral institutions it gives clever leaders a new way to exert power – by working through these institutions to advance their own state goals. Germany, as we shall see, is unusually well positioned to exploit this phenomenon. Germany’s history tends to limit any effort to pursue national interests unilaterally (Markovits & Reich, 1997). Thus, since 1945 all German leaders have pursued a policy of enveloping the country’s neighbors in a web of mutually beneficial ties, seeing this as the best way to achieve German goals without arousing fear or bad memories. The nature of post1945 German foreign policy thus seems compatible with both the processes of ‘‘Europeanization’’ and globalization (Banchoff, 1999). This compatibility is strengthened by the main sources of German power. While states such as the U.S. are often tempted to use unilateral military power, Germany since 1945 has been seen primarily as a Zivilmacht, a ‘‘civilian power’’ (Maull, 1990, 2007). Contemporary German influence derives primarily from economics and ‘‘soft power,’’ not military force (Nye, 2004). Such influence, in contrast to unilateral power, is well suited to the quiet projection of influence within international institutions. Germany’s ability to advance its state goals by acting within multilateral institutions such as the EU helps to explain the seeming paradox of German power since reunification in 1990. Realists such as Mearsheimer (1990) expected the larger Germany to return to its militaristic, pre-1945 past, trying to exert unilateral power and even building nuclear weapons. When it did not, analysts puzzled over this strange reticence. Why was Germany so strong economically and politically, yet so reluctant to exert leadership? (Banchoff, 1999). As this chapter argues, though, there is no paradox.

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Germany is exerting leadership: it just does so more subtly, working behind the scenes in multilateral groups to influence others to follow its goals. If Scholte and his colleagues are correct, Germany could be a model for how other states will exert power in the future as the world becomes more globalized. German policy, then, often seems to advance its national agenda through its role as a leading state in multilateral bodies, notably the EU. How can this be seen in practice? This chapter will analyze the country’s role as a key advocate of the recent EU expansion. The work will be structured as follows. First, I will argue that Germany had a uniquely strong interest in supporting the EU’s eastward expansion. In contrast, many other EU states had only a weak interest in expansion; some, in fact, had good reason to oppose it. Next, I will look at some of the steps taken by the German leaders to promote expansion, showing how they worked to keep the process on track and speed it up, while other EU states often sought to derail or at least delay it. Finally, I will show that Germany has gained in many areas from supporting EU enlargement – yet so have its Eastern neighbors and the region as a whole. The main focus throughout this essay will be on German relations with Poland. Why was this particular relationship so crucial to EU expansion? Poland was by far the largest of the EU candidate states, accounting for more than half of the 75 million people who joined the Union in 2004. Germany, meanwhile, is the largest and wealthiest of the 15 original EU members. The two states were also central to the political process of expansion. Germany played a uniquely strong role, in pushing for EU enlargement, and Poland was the state that Germany was most concerned with adding to the group. As Wood puts it, ‘‘Germany, representing the ‘west,’ and Poland, the ‘east,’ are central actors in the enlargement process’’ (2002, p. 97). These two states are also central to Europe geographically, with their Oder–Neisse border forming a major part of the border between the ‘‘old’’ and ‘‘new’’ EU states.2 The importance of these two states is only underlined by the fact that Poland is receiving over half of the net subsidies given to the new EU members. Germany, on the other hand, is by far the largest EU net payer state, effectively providing over 60 percent of these subsidies. According to one estimate, by 2007 Germany will be contributing 11.13 billion Euros yearly of the net 17.35 billion transferred between EU states (over 64 percent), while Poland will receive 9.40 billion of these transfers (over 54 percent) (Weise, 2002, p. 29).3 It is in German–Polish ties that Germany’s vital role in the expansion process can be seen most clearly. Here, too, Germany’s ability to pursue its national interests in a multilateral


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context stands out. Yet as the next section will show, Germany faced serious resistance in achieving these goals.

2. CONFLICTING INTERESTS IN THE EU This section will focus on the differences among the 15 pre-2004 members of the EU (EU-15) over how, when – and, indeed, if – the Union should expand. It will show that, while the states which joined in 2004 were expected to benefit from membership, the gains to the existing members seemed likely to be much more uneven. In particular, this section will outline several factors which allowed Germany to benefit more from enlargement, both economically and politically, than its EU partners. This made Germany much more willing to pursue the rapid integration of new members from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Most observers believe that EU expansion will clearly be beneficial for the 10 new member states. It is expected that they will vastly raise their overall standard of living, through access to West European markets, investments, and subsidies (European Commission, 2006). For example, recent estimates for the 2008–2013 period project that Poland will receive a net transfer of about 3.8 percent of Gross National Income (GNI) from the EU in each of these years (Europe’s World Guide to the EU Budget Negotiations, 2005, p. 141). The expansion states are surely well aware that time and again – as was the case with Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Ireland – EU membership has catapulted poor states to a much higher level of wealth. In addition to the economic benefits, the political and security payoff of being seen as ‘‘part of the West’’ is immense, especially for the eight states that were part of the Soviet bloc. Getting ‘‘back to Europe’’ has been a mantra for reformers in the region, since it symbolizes a final break with the isolation and oppression of the Communist period (Henderson, 1999). For the EU-15, on the other hand, the benefits of expansion were not always so obvious. Thus, fearful of popular dissent, most of the 15 did not ratify expansion by a referendum, as was done in all but one of the candidate states.4 There were potential gains, but they seemed to be divided very unequally between the EU members. Who were the likely ‘‘winners’’ and ‘‘losers’’ among the EU-15? For several reasons, Germany seemed to be the country whose economic and political interests were best served by the eastward expansion of the EU, particularly the membership of Poland. Meanwhile other states – including Spain, Portugal, and Ireland – seemed likely to gain the least.

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What factors explain these divergent interests? Four major areas will be discussed in the remainder of this section. First, expansion may well harm those EU-15 states which had been receiving large agricultural and structural support subsidies from the organization. Second, the incoming states are economically complementary to some original members and competitive with others. Third, geography plays a role – states which border CEE are more concerned with the region. Fourth, some states have extensive historical and cultural ties with the new Eastern members, while others do not. All four of these factors predisposed Germany to favor the 2004 expansion and some of its EU partners to oppose it. The first factor dividing the EU-15 is the role of subsidies. States such as Poland compete with the poorer EU-15 states (such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Ireland) in the hunt for EU subsidies. Such subsidies – notably those for agriculture and for ‘‘structurally disadvantaged’’ regions – go mainly to less wealthy countries. It was clear that all of the prospective new members were dramatically poorer than any of the current EU states. For example, Poland’s GNP per capita was estimated in 2004 at $6,100, compared with $14,220 for Portugal and $16,730 for Greece, the two poorest members of the EU-15.5 A 2002 study showed that the poorest states among the EU-15 received a yearly net income of over 300 Euros per person from the EU, amounting to up to four percent of their GNP. At that time, the leading net recipient states were Ireland (329 Euros per capita), Greece (307), Portugal (227), and Spain (159) (Weise, 2002, p. 29). Within 10 years of the 2004 expansion, this study showed, such income could be cut drastically. Under some scenarios, major recipient states like Spain could actually become net payers. This competition for EU subsidies is much less important for states such as Germany, whose GNP/capita (in 2005 about $29,800) lies well above the EU average (CIA, 2006). Germany’s main concern is to ensure that overall subsidies do not rise too rapidly, since Berlin is the largest net payer into the EU budget. As long as this is accomplished, the redistribution of subsidies is of relatively little importance to Germany – while it is of enormous importance to the poorest of the EU-15. A second, related economic factor also helped to split Germany from many other EU states on the expansion issue: the sectoral composition of their economies. The advanced German economy was strong in different sectors than the 10 new members’ economies, meaning it could easily benefit from increased trade with them. Relatively less developed EU-15 states, in contrast, faced more direct competition from the new members – and thus were more skeptical about admitting the new states.


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Although its economy is modernizing, Poland, like the other new member states, relies heavily on farming and relatively low-tech manufactured products like steel and textiles. 2002 data showed that about 28 percent of Poland’s workforce was still engaged in agriculture, as compared with only one percent in Germany (CIA, 2002). Here, Poland is in direct competition with less-developed EU-15 states such as Greece (19 percent of workforce in agriculture) and Portugal (10 percent), not to mention France, the EU’s agricultural powerhouse. The relatively less-developed EU-15 countries have long benefited from highly protective trade policies; now, in addition to losing subsidies, they face a direct threat from new low-wage competitors within the EU. Early results of expansion seem to show that these fears were justified. For example, riding a wave of subsidies and exports to the EU-15, farmers in the 10 new EU states saw their incomes shoot up by 70 percent in 2004–2005. Polish farmers enjoyed a whopping 95 percent gain – almost a doubling of incomes. Meanwhile, EU-15 farmers saw a slight decline in income (European Commission, 2006, pp. 97–98). In contrast to states which are stronger in agriculture and low-tech products, Germany has an economy based on high-tech manufacturing and services. The economies of the expansion states are thus complementary to Germany, not in competition with it. Germany stands to benefit greatly through trade with the new members. It can buy cheaper food, textiles, and steel – currently imported from more expensive sources in the ‘‘old’’ EU. Meanwhile, Germany is likely to find a ready market in the expansion states for everything from insurance and banking services to luxury automobiles. The fact that Germany was already the leading trading partner of most CEE candidate states before expansion meant that it would benefit the most from the growth in this trade which would follow EU expansion. Already Polish trade with Germany has quadrupled from about 8.4 billion Euros to 34.8 billion between 1992 and 2004 (Statistisches Jahrbuch, 2005).6 As a relatively wealthy state, Germany can also benefit from the fact that it is rich in capital, which states such as Poland need. German investors stand to reap rich rewards in the rapidly modernizing expansion states. Meanwhile, poorer countries among the EU-15 may suffer as capital is diverted to the new members. In all, thanks to its economic structure, studies before 2004 projected that Germany would gain an annual GDP boost of about 0.4 percent from expansion (Keuschnigg, Keuschnigg, & Kohler, 2001). This is a substantial figure, given Germany’s recent sluggish growth. In addition to economic issues – the need for subsidies and sectoral economic structure – a third factor dividing Germany from others in the EU-15 on the enlargement issue was geography. Germany borders Poland

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and the Czech Republic. Of the other 14 ‘‘old’’ EU states, only Italy and Austria share borders with expansion countries (a factor which helped to push them into the pro-expansion camp). Its status as a border state drove Germany to support rapid EU expansion since it feared the many negative consequences that could come from having poor, politically unstable neighbors. This could include illegal migration (not just of Poles but of Third World migrants taking advantage of poorly guarded borders), as well as all kinds of smuggling and cross-border crime. Germany dreaded such threats to its security, as well as the potential heavy economic burden of trying to stabilize its eastern neighbors by itself. By contrast, if the accession states joined the EU and prospered, geography would seem to assure that Germany would reap the largest benefits. Standing in the center of an expanded EU, not at the periphery of the ‘‘old’’ EU, is thus very much in Germany’s interests. Meanwhile, states such as Ireland or Portugal, distant from the Oder–Neisse line, saw both the benefits of enlargement and the threat of delaying it as much less important. They thus tended to favor delaying the expensive, politically complex expansion process. For example, if expansion were delayed and desperate eastern migrants or criminals flooded into the EU, would this pose as much of a problem in Dublin as in Berlin? Most Irish politicians did not think so.7 A fourth factor which separated Germany from some of its EU-15 partners on the expansion issue was its unique cultural and historical links to the CEE accession states, which further deepened Germany’s interest in pushing for rapid expansion. Whether Germany was cooperating with states in CEE or was conquering them, it remained far more interested in the region than more distant countries such as Britain or Spain – or even France.8 From the time of the Hanseatic League in the early Middle Ages, Germans have played a powerful role in trade with the region. German minorities were present throughout the region, and to some extent still are. German culture and the German language were long influential in the CEE accession states. As recently as 1939, just before the outbreak of the Second World War, Germany included the Memel region (now in Lithuania), East Prussia (now in Russia), Silesia and Pomerania (now in Poland), and the Sudetenland (now in the Czech Republic). Given its long history of involvement in the CEE area, Germany had historically seen itself as the leader of Mitteleuropa, a region stretching far into eastern and southeastern Europe (Katzenstein, 1997). To such a country, the Cold War division of Europe was very unnatural and painful. Long before EU expansion, the German definition of Europe included countries as far to the East as Estonia. For example, as early as 1992, German officials were raising the


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possibility of eventual EU membership for the Baltic States – while many others in the EU were still unsure if they wanted to support membership for even Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary (Kuschel, 1992, p. 93). While a typical Spanish diplomat might know little about the Baltic States, a German diplomat might well have a long-lost ancestral estate there – or might have even lived there as a youth.9 Just as important as the history of relatively positive ties in areas such as trade and cultural links was another, darker factor: Germany’s atrocities in the region in the Second World War. All of the new EU member states in CEE suffered heavily at Germany’s hands during this period. Thus, Germany still carries a sense of historical guilt, which it can assuage by ensuring the stability and prosperity of these states today (Markovits & Reich, 1997). The German sense of guilt is especially relevant for the countries that suffered the highest losses in the war, notably Poland. It is hardly surprising that, when speaking to the Polish parliament in December 2000, Chancellor Schro¨der called Poland’s entry into the Union ‘‘a commandment of historical justice’’ (Wood, 2002, p. 103). Germany’s sense of historical obligation to the countries of CEE increased further when they helped to pave the way for the achievement of Germany’s central national goal since the 1940s: reunification. The Poles inadvertently played a crucial role in speeding up the dissolution of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Poland’s economic problems, the Solidarity period, and finally the election of the first non-communist government in the region in the summer of 1989 all greatly destabilized the GDR (Newnham, 2000). Soon thereafter, the Hungarian government abrogated its treaty with the GDR, which had obligated Budapest to return East German refugees. The resulting hole in the Iron Curtain was another nail in East Germany’s coffin. As with the economic and geographic factors noted above, Germany’s historical and cultural reasons for favoring expansion were generally not shared by other EU states.10 One need only recall British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s infamous statement at the time of the 1938 Munich Accords with Hitler. Britain, he said, would not go to war because of ‘‘a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing’’ – Czechoslovakia and Germany (Self, 2006, p. 337). Despite advancing globalization, which has helped to broaden notions of Europe to include more countries, many in Ireland, Spain, or Portugal undoubtedly still see Poland today as a ‘‘faraway land,’’ to say nothing of Estonia or Latvia. While lacking a sense of cultural connection to the East, many in the EU-15 also have much less of a sense of historical obligation to the region than do

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the Germans. Most of the EU-15 opposed Hitler in the Second World War, and they feel no guilt for Germany’s actions in Poland or elsewhere. And while the other EU-15 states certainly did benefit from the role of CEE in helping to end the Cold War, they benefited far less than the Germans, since their lands were not front line states in that war and were never divided by it. In all, then, Germany differed from its EU-15 partners in its economic goals, geographic position, and historical and cultural links to CEE. All of these major factors would seem to fit into a purely state-centered interpretation of EU expansion: Germany promoted it to advance its unique national economic and political interests. Yet the matter is more complex; by promoting EU expansion, Germany was also quite consciously advancing a liberal, ‘‘pro-globalization’’ agenda, which made it appear altruistic. First, Germans tend to stress a ‘‘post-modern’’ foreign policy approach, believing that German leadership in Europe should be exercised in a subtle way, through consensus, not saber-rattling. Indeed, Germans are so accustomed to pursuing their country’s goals through a European consensus that they often seem to convince themselves that they are acting only ‘‘in Europe’s name,’’ not in their own interests.11 For example, analyst Roland Freudenstein (1998, pp. 45–46) went to great lengths to insist that Germany’s interest in EU expansion was fully shared by the other West European states.12 Germans often believe that ‘‘Other EU states – such as Britain and France – think first about what is good for their countries, and only second about what is good for Europe. Germany thinks first about what is good for Europe.’’13 As this section has shown, promoting EU expansion was indeed in Germany’s interests; yet the Germans were right to argue that they were also acting to further European unity and help their neighbors. With some justification, Germany portrayed its actions in supporting EU expansion as promoting cooperation and even globalization. EU expansion would greatly increase the region’s trade and investment links, bringing the new members into a strong European network, which in turn was linked to global culture and global markets. No one can deny that for countries like Poland entry into the EU has led to a massive increase in foreign investment, trade, and all sorts of cultural and political connections to the rest of the world. Furthermore, German support for expansion seemed generous, not merely self-centered. EU expansion benefited Germany, but it would also provide a huge economic and political benefit to the new member states. Germany was also supporting expansion with direct economic generosity; already the largest EU net contributor, it faced potential new costs with the


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accession of 10 new poor members. Also, Germany was sacrificing its political sovereignty, an important part of the process of globalization. Germany has long been a strong supporter not just of enlargement, but of EU ‘‘deepening,’’ urging all members to give up more national power to the Union. As enlargement proceeded, it actively supported a strong new EU constitution, which would give the organization new power over the member states (Hoffmann & Shaw, 2004). This fits well with Scholte’s contention, noted above, that in a globalizing world states may be willing to give up some sovereignty to multilateral bodies – while at the same time, they may gain new power by working through those bodies. Thus, Germany’s actions, while advancing its self-centered national interest, also advanced transnational, global interests. How is this possible? The Germans were pursuing national interests by pursuing Europeanization and globalization.14 Given Germany’s historical legacy, the country realized that it could not advance its national goals through unilateral action; its neighbors would never accept this. Germany could credibly exercise power, then, only through its membership in larger organizations – be they panEuropean (EU), transatlantic (NATO), or worldwide (UN). Yet, in another paradox, Germany’s effort to promote globalization through EU expansion was often resisted by other EU members. As we shall see in the next section, this sometimes forced Germany to take action within the organization to promote its expansion agenda, even when this caused conflicts with its EU partners.

3. GERMAN ACTIONS DRIVE EU EXPANSION There is, as we have seen, good reason to believe that Germany had an interest (for both selfish and altruistic reasons) in pushing for rapid EU expansion, particularly for the inclusion of its largest and closest neighbor, Poland. How was this interest reflected in actual German actions? This section will trace some of the events that show that Germany did, indeed, act as an important advocate for the expansion states, especially Poland, even when this led to conflicts within the EU. First, Germany supported Poland in negotiating an Association Agreement in 1991, a first step toward membership. Second, Germany was quick to begin to admit some Polish workers and to allow Poles visa-free admission to the country. Third, Germany consistently argued for speeding up EU expansion talks throughout the 1990s, while other countries pushed for delay. It used its control of the rotating EU Council Presidency in both 1994 and 1999 to

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advance the process. Germany specifically supported Poland’s demands for rapid accession, insisting it be included in the first group of new member states and countering demands to allow other countries to enter first. Fourth, Germany acted at the Nice summit in 2000 to ensure that Poland and the other expansion states would win full voting rights in the EU Council of Ministers, allowing its own voting strength to be cut in the process. Fifth, Germany helped mediate disputes between the new states and some in the EU-15 (notably France) over the 2003 Iraq War. In all, Germany’s stance was very helpful to Poland, allowing Warsaw to negotiate confidently with the EU, knowing that Poland’s rapid accession was all but guaranteed. Even before the fall of the Berlin Wall, optimistic reformers in Poland had come to believe that ‘‘the way to Europe goes through Germany.’’15 With Germany reunified, they argued, Poland would gain a direct border with the West, which would facilitate trade, investment, internal change in Poland, and eventual membership in the EU. However, it was not until after German reunification in 1990 and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in the following year that Poland’s dreams could become a reality. As subsequent events would show, the way to Europe did indeed go through Germany – and with Germany’s active assistance. The first step taken by Germany to support Poland’s inclusion in the EU was to commit itself, in 1990–1991, to act as an advocate for Poland and the other accession states in the admission process. Germany’s commitment to Polish EU membership was a key issue in the bilateral talks over a Friendship Treaty, eventually signed in June 1991 (Newnham, 2000, pp. 46–59). In this treaty Germany agreed to act as Poland’s advocate in the EU expansion question. Although German interests clearly pointed toward supporting expansion, it hesitated at first to make its special advocacy role clear in a treaty, for fear of offending its EU partners by seeming to speak for the organization. Germany’s commitment to support expansion was particularly important since many other West European states seemed to oppose it – or at best, wanted to delay it. A good illustration of the contrast between Germany and some of its EU partners could be seen in the negotiation process over the Association Agreements between the EU and the CEE states. These accords called for limited links, far short of membership, yet many in the EU-15 hesitated to take even this step. For example, the first three such accords, with Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, were delayed for months in fall 1991 because France took an extremely hard line on limiting agricultural imports from these states. In the end, the three CEE states had to walk out


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of the talks before France could be induced to compromise. Clearly, for Paris, French farmers took priority over EU expansion (Dugiel, 1998). After the treaties were finally completed in December 1991, Germany again showed its support for expansion by ratifying them quickly. Other EU members were not so eager; amid intense debates, the formal ratification process was not completed until 1994, more than two years after the treaties were signed (Kucia, 2000). The implementation of the Association Agreements also shows Germany’s commitment to lead the process of integrating the CEE states into the EU. For example, during the 1990s it was more generous than its EU partners in permitting Easterners to work in Germany, despite persistently high German unemployment. This German policy drew on labor migration patterns dating back to the nineteenth century and before. Before the First World War, Polish workers were common both in the booming coal and steel industry of the Ruhr and in seasonal agricultural work. An estimated 800,000 Polish farm workers were employed annually in the Second German Reich, and about 300,000 Poles had settled in the Ruhr by 1910 (Deutsche und Polen, 1991, p. 18). Under the 1991 Association Agreements, states were allowed to admit CEE workers on a bilateral basis. Reviving its historical links to the region, Germany was quick to act on this possibility, unlike most other EU states. By 1998, almost 60 percent of the Polish, Hungarian, and Romanian workers in the EU were employed in Germany (Hofhansel, 2000, pp. 10–11). Over 400,000 citizens of the 2004 expansion states lived in the Federal Republic. Germany had special programs in place to admit cross-border commuters, guest workers, and workers in construction and agriculture.16 The last two categories account for the largest share of CEE workers. Germany began admitting construction workers in 1989–1990, even before the Association Agreement was in place. It raised its quota of Polish construction workers to over 35,000 in 1992, and also admitted some from Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Hungary (Hofhansel, 2000, p. 12). In the agricultural sector, hundreds of thousands of Polish seasonal workers have become as indispensable to German farmers as Mexican farm workers are in America. In 1996, Poles accounted for 89 percent of the seasonal workers in Germany (Hofhansel, 2000, p. 13). In 2001, 261,133 Polish seasonal workers were admitted (Bilateral Relations, 2006). Overall, 411,400 Poles were allowed to work legally in Germany in 2004 (Bilateral Relations, 2006). In addition to these legal flows of workers, many illegal workers have crossed the border. For example, in 2004 it was estimated that there were over 30,000 illegal Polish cleaning women and handymen in Berlin alone (Der illegale, 2004).

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Certainly not everyone in Germany has benefited from the flow of cheap labor from the CEE region; blue-collar workers and their unions have been highly suspicious. Like many in the U.S., German workers fear the dark side of globalization: losing their jobs to low-wage competitors, either through immigration or free trade. Thus before the 2004 expansion, the socialist government of Chancellor Schro¨der agreed with its EU partners that there should be a seven-year transitional period before totally free labor movement would be permitted (Wood, 2002, p. 100). At this point other EU states, Sweden, Ireland, and Britain, moved ahead of Germany in their acceptance of East European workers.17 As in the question of working rights, in the 1990s Germany was much quicker than most EU members to allow visa-free travel by Poles and other CEE nationals. The border with Poland was opened to visa-free travel on April 8, 1991, only six months after German unification brought the border of the Federal Republic to the Oder River (Newnham, 2000, p. 53). This was a matter of concern to other EU-15 states, since under the Schengen accord many of them had already abolished border controls with Germany. This meant that the Poles were effectively gaining visa-free admission to Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, and France, which had signed the Schengen agreement before 1991. Germany’s Schengen partners were outraged that Berlin was effectively determining their immigration procedures for them. Thus, Germany hastily negotiated an agreement with the other Schengen states, committing itself and Poland to take back any illegal immigrants – an agreement which proved quite ineffective at deterring immigration. Predictably, well before 2004, there was indeed a large influx of Poles to countries in the Schengen group (Mieteks, 2003, pp. 98–99). By 1996, with the expansion of the Schengen zone, visa-free travel to Germany gave Poles admission to all EU states except Britain and Ireland, as well as to non-EU members Iceland and Norway. Again, Germany had acted as Poland’s valued advocate in relations with the Union. Another key issue in the EU accession process was the overall timetable under which the new members would be admitted. While the EU-15 did endorse expansion in principle, some government leaders continued to speak of the accession process as lasting for decades, or as French President Francois Mitterrand said, ‘‘several dozen years’’ (Into the Unknown, 1991, p. 58). Germany, in contrast, always advocated faster expansion. As early as 1991, before the Association Agreements were even negotiated, The Economist reported that ‘‘Polish and Czechoslovak membership in the EC, German diplomats say, would resolve Germany’s historic problems with those countries. The talk in Bonn is that these two and Hungary could


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be ready to join by 1998’’ (Into the Unknown, 1991, p. 58). Similarly, in early 1992 Foreign Minister Genscher asserted that the first CEE candidates would join ‘‘before the end of the century’’ (Tewes, 2002, p. 100). This ambitious timetable was reaffirmed several times, for example, by Chancellor Kohl during his July 1995 state visit to Poland (Tewes, 2002, p. 117). Wherever possible, Germany used its leadership role in the EU to push for this accelerated timetable for CEE accession. When it held the Presidency of the EU in 1994, it focused on the expansion process. At the Essen EU summit that year, Germany invited leaders of the accession states to take part, the first time this had ever occurred (Tewes, 2002, p. 102). This gesture initiated a policy of ‘‘Structured Dialogue,’’ with participation by the candidate countries soon becoming routine. Under German leadership, the concrete details of the accession process were quickly worked out, and eventually published in an EU White Paper in 1995 (McCartney, 2001, p. 23). Similarly, when Germany again assumed the EU Presidency in the first half of 1999, it again showed its support for faster expansion (Handl et al., 1999, pp. 18–20; Tewes, 2002, pp. 213–216). This continuity was particularly striking, since the newly elected Chancellor, Gerhard Schro¨der, at first seemed less supportive of the Eastern states than Helmut Kohl. Elected on a wave of voter anger over the weak German economy, he had demanded that Germany be allowed to significantly shrink its net contribution to the Union. His new Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, went so far as to state that enlargement could only happen if Germany’s costs were reduced (Bundesregierung, 1998). Here again, as in the question of labor migration, one can see a potential conflict between German domestic and foreign policy goals. While foreign policy interests seem to dictate generosity toward Poland and Germany’s other eastern partners, domestic groups are reluctant to bear higher costs – either in terms of lost jobs or higher EU budgets. Yet in the end Germany backed down from its demand for a cut in its net contributions to the EU, deciding that enlargement was worth the price. During its 1999 presidency, Berlin was able to win the EU’s assent to a tentative budgetary framework for 2000–2006. This document was vital to ensuring the accession of the new members, as it showed how the Union would pay for their admission. To win its passage, Germany had to agree to continue its net contributions to the EU – about 10 or 11 billion Euros per year (Weise, 2002, p. 29). As Foreign Minister Fischer stated after the decisive Berlin Summit, ‘‘I realized for the first time last night that Europe

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will fly apart y if our country does not exercise its leadership function’’ (Tewes, 2002, p. 216). In September 1999, the commitment of the Schro¨der government to the expansion of the Union led to the appointment of Gu¨nter Verheugen, a political ally of the Chancellor, as EU Commissioner for Enlargement. Another key role played by Germany throughout the accession negotiations was in insisting that Poland remain among the first group of candidates to be admitted. Germany’s position on this matter was of crucial importance, since several EU members considered demoting Poland to a second group of accession states, which would be admitted later. Also, several of the other accession states – such as the Czech Republic and Slovenia – did consider trying to move ahead of Poland, if it would help them join the Union more rapidly. Poland, these states argued, would be too costly and difficult to admit quickly, since it was the largest accession state, with an especially sizable and backward agricultural sector, and its government was moving too slowly to prepare for admission. Poland would require extremely large subsidies, particularly under the Common Agricultural Program (CAP), which many in the EU (including Germany) wanted to restrict. Yet despite the costs and difficulties, Germany was determined to include Warsaw in the first round of admission. This was affirmed time and again by German leaders. For example, in early 2002, Foreign Minister Fischer reiterated that ‘‘Germany is interested in seeing EU enlargement take place as soon as possible, with Poland among the first group as the largest candidate country’’ (Poland-Germany Forum, 2002). As Tewes puts it, ‘‘For Germany an enlargement without Poland was unimaginable and unacceptable. Since this was so, there was a tacit understanding in the EU that Poland would have to be in the first wave, even if it did not quite fulfill all the criteria as well as the other countries’’ (2002, p. 118). Germany intervened again on behalf of Poland and the other accession states on the issue of voting power in the new EU. At the Nice summit in 2000, under France’s Presidency, the European Council (the heads of government of the EU states) debated a plan for political representation in an expanded Union. Paris pushed hard for two principles that served French interests: first, it insisted that it retain equal representation with Germany in the Council of Ministers, although France’s population is only 70 percent of Germany’s. Second, it demanded that the new EU members be placed in a sort of second-class citizenship, receiving a lower number of Council votes than existing EU members of the same size. French President Chirac was willing to delay EU expansion over these demands. In the end, Germany sacrificed again, agreeing to keep its unfairly low Council voting power if


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Chirac would grant full voting weight to the new member states, as he finally agreed to do (McCartney, 2001, pp. 23–24). Finally, Germany also worked to overcome divisions between some of the EU-15 and the CEE accession states on security issues such as the Iraq war. These foreign policy divisions also threatened to delay the expansion process. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was opposed by a group including France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg, while it was supported by Britain, Spain, and Italy. In this debate, the CEE accession states overwhelmingly sided with the U.S., prompting Defense Secretary Rumsfeld to draw his now-famous distinction between ‘‘old’’ and ‘‘new’’ Europe (Smith, 2003). Some countries, especially France, feared that the new EU members would push Europe to follow America’s hawkish, interventionist agenda, making the EU unable to speak independently on foreign policy. As it had in 2000 at Nice and in 1991 (when it walked out of the Association Agreement talks), France did not hesitate to threaten the CEE states. On February 17, 2003, at the height of the contentious UN debate over authorizing U.S. action in Iraq, French President Chirac suggested y that opposing France and Germany could hurt candidates for European Union membership. He warned, in particular, that Romania and Bulgaria, the poorest of the thirteen candidates and the two that are still negotiating to enter the bloc in 2007, ‘‘could hardly find a better way’’ of reducing their chances for membership than by speaking up against France. (Chirac, 2003)

His comments were echoed by the French Defense Minister who, while visiting Warsaw, told the Poles ‘‘it is better to keep silent when you don’t know what is going on’’ (Chirac, 2003). Germany, although it strongly agreed with France’s position on the Iraq war, rejected Chirac’s comments. Berlin felt that EU expansion was too important to jeopardize over this foreign policy debate. Germany played an important role in soothing French–Polish differences, for example, at the yearly meeting of the Weimar Triangle (consisting of France, Germany, and Poland) in May 2003 (Lang, 2003). Similarly, former German President Richard von Weizsa¨cker sought to integrate Poland into EU foreign policy decision making by stating that future EU security policy would be determined by a new ‘‘club of four’’: France, Germany, Britain, and Poland (Eine harte, 2003). Germany’s support for Poland had a tangible impact – not only on its EU-15 partners but on the Poles as well. With strong German support for Polish admission, Warsaw had a stronger bargaining position on the many details of the enlargement process. If Poland was all but guaranteed rapid

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admission in the first group of new member states, it could afford to try to drive a tough bargain in its accession talks with the European Commission. Poland’s stubbornness could be seen in the talks over a key sticking point, the size of the agricultural subsidies to be granted to the new members. Poland pushed hard for direct payments to its farmers under the CAP, a move opposed by most in the EU-15 states.18 In the end, members agreed that the new states would receive direct CAP payments amounting to 25 percent of those received by EU-15 farmers, an amount which will rise to 100 percent over 10 years (Open Season, 2002).19 By bringing the new states into the generous CAP, the EU may have missed a crucial chance to reform the system. With its negative impact on world trade, particularly on the Third World, the CAP is a major blemish on the EU’s self-image as a supporter of free trade and globalization in general. Poland’s hard bargaining helped ensure that the EU talks with Warsaw were unusually slow and difficult. As one analyst noted when the talks were nearing completion, Poland clearly ‘‘lags behind its neighbors in adapting to EU standards’’ (McCartney, 2001, p. 21).20 Finally, Poland decided to disrupt the December 2002 Copenhagen summit, where the accession plan was to be finalized. In a dramatic last-minute gambit, Poland attempted to win two billion Euros in additional subsidies by threatening to walk out of the meeting. In the end, Poland did not receive more money, but the EU-15 agreed that a billion Euros should be paid to Poland quickly, as direct subsidies, rather than later as initially planned (Poles, 2002). None of the other accession states dared to attempt such brinkmanship; yet Poland firmly believed that it was ‘‘too important to be left out’’ (Poles, 2002). In sum, then, Germany did act on its conviction that Poland should enter the EU. Its actions had a major impact on shaping events. Those in the EU-15 who sought to delay expansion or rewrite its terms in their favor faced a strong foe in Germany. The Poles, meanwhile, knew they had a steadfast ally – and used that knowledge when negotiating their accession terms. Two questions remain to be answered. What benefits did Germany and its partners receive for its steadfast advocacy of EU expansion? And how do these benefits support this chapter’s argument about the compatibility of state interests and globalization?

4. EU EXPANSION: BENEFITS FOR ALL? Clearly, as the previous section has shown, Germany acted as an advocate for Poland and the other CEE accession states during their quest to join the


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EU. By doing so, the German leaders were able to further their country’s national interests, help their eastern neighbors and even further the cause of globalization, as this section will show. In short, Berlin succeeded in simultaneously ‘‘doing good and doing well.’’ How did Germany’s support for the EU accession of CEE states such as Poland help to advance German political and economic goals? As noted above in the discussion of German interests, the country stands to gain in many areas. Given its geographic position, the structure of its economy and its strong historical links with the East, Germany is likely to benefit more than most other EU-15 states from the increased trade and investment links which are emerging since expansion. Clearly this is recognized in Poland and elsewhere in the region, where some fear a new ‘‘German invasion’’ in the form of German purchases of Polish land and businesses (Kosc, 2001). In addition to economic benefits, Germany hopes to gain greatly in security terms by moving the EU eastward, warding off crime and illegal immigrants from the country’s eastern border.21 The intangible political, economic, and security benefits which Germany gains simply by having stable eastern neighbors will also be very high. However, just as importantly, Germany was also able to use the EU accession process to make progress on many difficult bilateral problems with its eastern neighbors. This can be clearly seen in German–Polish relations. As will be shown below, Germany was able to advance its bilateral agenda in such controversial areas as cross-border cooperation, minority rights, and the right of Germans to purchase land in Poland. A good example of the way in which the EU umbrella can resolve bilateral issues is the issue of cross-border cooperation. Before the accession process began, Poland’s suspicions about German intentions limited cooperation between the two countries’ border regions. For example, in 1991, the leader of the German state of Brandenburg, Manfred Stolpe, proposed a bilateral plan for cross-border cooperation with Poland. To the surprise of Germany, Warsaw rejected the plan (Newnham, 2000, pp. 64–65). Since the Stolpe plan envisioned a German–Polish ‘‘cooperative zone’’ extending 100 km into Poland, it was seen by some suspicious Poles as an attempt to effectively annex a large strip of formerly German territory. Stolpe’s idea of modernizing the crumbling Polish border port of Szczecin (known in German as Stettin) by putting it under ‘‘international management’’ was also portrayed by Polish critics as a German annexation attempt (Newnham, 2000, pp. 64–65). Obviously, centuries of border disputes between the two states (lasting until Germany formally recognized the Oder–Neisse border in November 1990) would not easily be forgotten.

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Germany quickly learned that rather than act alone, it should build crossborder cooperation under a multilateral umbrella, on the basis of the existing EU Euroregion program. Berlin realized that Poland could not object to a program which was in place throughout the EU-15, building regional cooperation even between historic enemies like France and Germany. Several Euroregions were soon operating successfully along the German–Polish border.22 As in the cross-border cooperation issue, Germany had struggled for years to win Warsaw over on two other similarly sensitive bilateral problems: the rights of the German minority in Poland and the right of Germans to buy land in the country. Historical wounds made these topics difficult. Throughout the Wilhelmine, Weimar, and Nazi periods (1870–1945), Germany used its ethnic minority as a fifth column against Poland. The German minority often worked to support Berlin’s claims to Polish territory, with most even supporting the Nazi occupation after 1939. Throughout these periods, Germans also used their wealth to buy up large amounts of farmland in Polish areas, effectively consigning Poles to the status of hired hands on German estates. After the Second World War most Germans were expelled, although it has been estimated that several hundred thousand Poles still claim German ethnicity (Cordell, 2001). Until recently, Poles were understandably reluctant to admit that a German minority still existed in their country, much less to allow German-language schools, church services, and street signs. Thus, for example, many Poles reacted very negatively when some ethnic Germans demanded the right to erect memorials (marked by the Iron Cross, symbol of the German army) to their relatives who fought for Germany in both world wars (Newnham, 2000, p. 51). Germany worked hard for decades to resolve the difficult minority issue in bilateral talks. Some progress was made, especially in the 1991 German– Polish Friendship Treaty, in which minority rights were a key issue (Newnham, 2000, pp. 55–57). Yet here again, Germany could achieve its goals more completely and with less friction by portraying the issue as one of complying with European norms, a necessary prerequisite to EU admission. Thus, in 1997, when Poland formally altered its constitution to anchor minority rights in the document, this was officially done at the behest of the EU, not Germany (McCartney, 2001, pp. 20–21).23 Similarly, another contentious issue, German land purchase rights, was also the subject of years of bilateral talks. Here, no progress was made even in the 1991 Friendship Treaty. Yet Poland admitted that this issue, too, would have to be resolved as part of EU accession. It was clear that


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forbidding citizens of a fellow EU state from buying land would be a grave violation of the Union’s Common Market principles. Thus, in a letter accompanying the 1991 bilateral treaty, the Polish government stated that ‘‘the possible admission of Poland to the European Community y will create increasing possibilities for German citizens to settle in Poland’’ (Newnham, 2000, p. 55). Even today, Poles continue to fear that Germans will buy up cheap land in their country (Kosc, 2001). Consequently, their government insisted on being allowed a transitional period after accession before full land ownership rights will be granted to foreigners. This period ranges from 5 to 12 years depending on the type of land purchase.24 Despite this delay, Germany has achieved a result that it had been unable to obtain in years of bilateral talks. Here again, through using the EU Germany was able to achieve its goals without angering its eastern neighbor. As a German author puts it, this approach enables Germany to ‘‘avoid the suspicion of hegemonism which could be aroused if we attempted to establish more exposed bilateral relations with these countries’’ (Schmidt, 1996, p. 220).25 As in this study’s earlier discussion of German motivations, one might think that these outcomes simply show that Germany was using the EU expansion process for its own national benefit. Yet expansion clearly benefited others as well. First, the 2004 CEE expansion states, including Poland, have seen great economic and political progress. They have experienced rapid economic growth, a surge in exports to the now-opened markets of the EU-15, and a similar surge in investment (European Commission, 2006). Agricultural producers in the new EU states have benefited greatly, both from direct EU subsidies and access to the lucrative West European market, with its artificially high food prices. Additionally, the new members have benefited both from the perceived EU umbrella of stability and from their new roles in the decision-making structure of an organization of worldwide importance. Some in the region remain unhappy, as seen in the 2005 election victory of right-wing parties in Poland, which have exploited fears about the rush of economic reform and cultural liberalization which the EU has brought. Yet despite this, it is hard to portray accession to the EU as a net loss for Poland and the other expansion states. In addition to the direct benefits for the new members, one could also argue that Germany’s actions in pressing for EU expansion fit well with a worldwide trend toward globalization. As a Zivilmacht (‘‘civilian power’’) since the Second World War, Germany has favored a world in which military conflict declines, economic prosperity grows, and countries unite in cooperative decision making. It has sought to promote the emergence of this

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new world order through ‘‘self-restraint and voluntary ties to an allEuropean order’’ (Maull, 2007, p. 7). EU expansion, as promoted by Germany, is a classic example of advancing globalization, based on cooperation, increased trade, and mutual benefits. The German effort to expand the EU contains all the factors which authors such as Mittelman include in the globalizing trend, including the decline of national power in the face of advancing supra-national and sub-national networks; the advance of economic liberalism; and the breaking down of physical and cultural boundaries between states (2002, pp. 7–8).

5. CONCLUSION This chapter has traced Germany’s role in promoting EU expansion, particularly the inclusion of Poland. The study first examined the nature of Germany’s goals in the CEE region. It next showed how Germany acted on these goals, serving as Poland’s prime advocate and helping to smooth its way to admission in 2004. Finally, the chapter noted the benefits which Germany gained from Polish accession – and also the benefits to Poland and to the overall cause of European integration. What is the significance of the large German role in EU expansion? Many Germans believe that their country has been acting for the greater good of Europe – in contrast to its often more selfish EU partners. However, while the German government may have been acting ‘‘in Europe’s name,’’ it was certainly acting in Germany’s name y and in Germany’s strategic interests (Ash, 1994). Yet at the same time, its generosity won it friends throughout the CEE region, with one Polish report noting that the German role as Poland’s ‘‘champion’’ has ensured that ‘‘the stereotype of Germany as an enemy of Poland is in the process of crumbling’’ (Handl, 1999, p. 180). In all, then, Germany seems to have found an ideal way to exercise its power: by embedding its own goals in the process of globalization and working through multilateral institutions. By helping the Poles and their CEE neighbors to achieve their goals, the Germans were able to achieve their own. This would seem to be an ideal combination of self-interested and selfless motivations, showing that the two are not necessarily as irreconcilable as some might believe. If Scholte (2004b, p. 9) and others are correct, Germany also is a good model for other countries in a globalizing world. Because of its history, it has long sought to achieve its goals by working quietly within multilateral bodies. In the future, this may prove to be the best tactic for other large powers – even the United States.


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NOTES 1. For an overview of the concept of globalization, see for example, Mittelman (2002) and Scholte (1997, 2004a). The concept is applied to the EU by authors such as Verdier and Breen (2001). There is a legitimate debate over whether the growth of the EU can truly be seen as part of globalization (increasing worldwide economic and political integration) or as a response to it (with Europe trying to expand its economic area to successfully compete against other regions). This chapter assumes the former. In particular, I believe that EU expansion greatly served globalization, since it has opened a number of formerly relatively isolated states to global cultural norms, political values, and economic penetration. 2. The Oder–Neisse line has sometimes been portrayed as a new ‘‘golden curtain,’’ an economic divide which has replaced the older Iron Curtain. For more on this border and its significance, see for example, Schultz and Nothnagle (1999). 3. Figures from the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), cited in Weise, and author’s calculations. While Germany contributes about a quarter of the EU budget, it receives relatively few subsidies from the organization, making its share of net contributions much higher. 4. The lone exception was Cyprus. In some of the EU-15, such as Germany, a referendum seemed to be constitutionally prohibited. However, other leaders deliberately chose to avoid one. The caution of the EU-15 leaders was justified, as seen in the 2005 rejection of the proposed new EU Constitution in France and the Netherlands, due in part to fears generated by EU expansion. For details see Sbragia et al. (2006). 5. World Bank estimates for 2004, in current U.S. dollars (Key Development Data and Statistics, 2006). Figures calculated on the basis of purchasing power parity are somewhat more optimistic. Tuschhoff, for example, asserts that Poland was at about 40 percent of the EU average per capita GNP in 2001. Yet even at that level, Poland would need over 30 years to reach even 75 percent of the EU average (Tuschhoff, 2002, p. 4). 6. Hofhansel notes that between 1989 and 1995, as EU exports to Eastern Europe grew by 131 percent, Germany’s share of these exports rose from 36 to 51 percent (2000, p. 5). For more on Germany’s economic role in Central and Eastern Europe, see for example, Markovits and Reich (1997, pp. 169–180) and Newnham (2002). 7. Since it was far from the expansion states and thus expected few migrants, Ireland did not ask for a transitional period before admitting workers from the new states (as did all other EU-15 states except Britain and Sweden). To its surprise, a huge surge of workers followed – up to 200,000 since 2004, about half from Poland. Thus far, the strong Irish economy has easily absorbed them. See for example, Ford (2006). 8. Others in the EU-15 had their own cultural and historical links to accession states, which led them to favor admission for particular candidates. An obvious example is Greece, which championed the admission of the largely Greek island of Cyprus. Similarly, Italy favored the admission of Malta (as did Britain, the country’s former colonial ruler). And Finland advocated the rapid accession of Estonia, which speaks a related Finno-Ugric language.

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9. Many Germans, even those still alive today, experienced the pain of Europe’s division in the 1940s personally. The large role played in German politics by groups such as the BdV (Bund der Vertriebenen, or Federation of Expellees), the umbrella organization of Germans who left Eastern Europe after the Second World War, is well known (Wood, 2005). But such connections to the East are reflected on an individual scale by millions of Germans such as Helmut Kohl’s Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, who fled from East Germany as a young man, or famous author Gu¨nter Grass, marked forever by his youth in Danzig (now Gdansk, Poland). Marion Gra¨fin Do¨nhoff, for example (1909–2002), longtime publisher of the influential newspaper Die Zeit, was a leading voice for German–Polish reconciliation. She fled her family’s estate in East Prussia (today in Poland) on horseback in the winter of 1945, an experience which shaped her views decisively (see Do¨nhoff, 2001). 10. The major exception among the EU-15 is Austria, which shares both Germany’s Second World War guilt and its sense of being culturally and historically linked to the East (through the former Austro-Hungarian Empire). 11. Ash makes the definitive argument that Germany often acts ‘‘in Europe’s name’’ (1994). See also the review article on German foreign policy by McCartney (2002) and the literature review in Erb (2003). Many authors have used constructivist concepts to show how, in reaction to its extreme nationalist past, Germany has come to identify strongly with the idea of ‘‘Europe’’ and use it to justify its foreign policy goals (cf. Banchoff, 1999). Yet as this study argues, Germany still has its own national interests as well. 12. He made the assertion, for example, that all of the EU states have an equal stake in rewarding the Eastern states for their role in ending the Cold War. This seems unlikely. How much, for example, did the Cold War hurt neutral states like Ireland? Or even NATO members like Spain and Portugal, who were distant from the Iron Curtain? Surely states in either group may be grateful to a country like Poland, but they will not feel the deep sense of obligation that Germany does. Similarly, Freudenstein argued that all European states naturally share an interest in eliminating any residual divisions in Europe. This begs the question, of course, which states one defines as ‘‘part of Europe.’’ As noted above, Germans tend to include in their definition countries as far east as the Baltic States, which other Europeans may not. 13. Author’s interview with Prof. Ju¨rgen Dieringer, Central European University, Budapest, June 2003. 14. The concept that Germany is pursuing both sets of goals has become widespread in recent literature on German foreign policy, which agrees that the country is an important world power – but of a new type, eschewing a purely national agenda in favor of more cooperative behavior. See for example, Ash (1994), Banchoff (1999), Newnham (2002), Erb (2003), and Maull (2007). 15. As early as the mid-1980s, representatives of the Polish opposition such as Arthur Hajnicz shared these views with German audiences, at a time when most Germans viewed reunification as impossible (Newnham, 2000, pp. 14–16). 16. It is interesting to compare Germany’s willingness to admit at least some workers from CEE with its usual extreme reluctance to become an Einwanderungsland [land of immigration]. For example, there was great controversy in Germany


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when Chancellor Schro¨der decided to create a ‘‘green card’’ program to admit a few thousand foreign computer experts in 1999 (Martin, von Loeffelholz, & Straubhaar, 2002). Since prejudice and high unemployment have made any immigration controversial, the decision to permit larger CEE migration showed the great political importance German leaders attached to helping the region. 17. However, the flood of cheap labor into those countries, which Germany had experienced in the 1990s, soon led these states, too, to reconsider their generous policies. Thus, for example, Britain has imposed much stricter limits on workers from Romania and Bulgaria, which joined the EU at the start of 2007. 18. Net payers into the CAP, such as Germany, opposed paying the Polish farmers because it would increase their contributions. But net recipients, such as Spain, Italy, and France, were also harshly critical of the Polish position, fearing that payments to the Poles would eventually force reductions in their own CAP subsidies. See Buckwell and Tangermann (1999). 19. While this still leaves CEE farmers at a temporary disadvantage, it is an important victory in principle. Direct CAP payments to farmers, which began in 1992, were designed to compensate EU-15 farmers for agreeing to lower prices closer to world market levels. Since CEE farmers had never received the higher, pre-1992 CAP prices, it could be argued that they should not be entitled to any direct payments. 20. She notes that in 2001, Poland had fully completed negotiations on only 17 of the 31 chapters of its accession agreement, while Hungary had completed 22. 21. These benefits may not be certain. For example, while moving the EU border eastward may help to make it harder for immigrants from the Ukraine or the third world to cross Poland to reach the German frontier, it is now easier for citizens of the accession states themselves to enter. 22. These include the Euroregions Pomerania, Viadrina, and Spree-Neisse-Bober (all bilateral) as well as Neisse (trilateral, incorporating part of the Czech Republic as well as Polish and German lands). The Neisse region, the first to be created (1991) is explicitly modeled on a similar trilateral Euroregion (including Belgium and the Netherlands) on Germany’s western border. 23. Germany and Austria have used a similar tactic (thus far without success) to persuade the Czech Republic to repudiate the so-called Benesˇ decrees, post-1945 laws which expelled the German minority from that country. Rather than complaining about the unfair treatment of Germans or Austrians in particular, they argue that the decrees are contrary to current European human rights norms. For more on this controversy, see Frowein, Bernitz, and Kingsland (2002). 24. Poland negotiated the right to prevent foreigners from purchasing agricultural land for 12 years. Foreigners who have lived in the country for three years are exempt from this rule, although the residency requirement is seven years in regions close to the German border. Poland also reserved the right to restrict purchase of land for second homes for five years – a measure aimed specifically at preventing Germans (especially aging former ‘‘expellees’’) from building vacation homes (Purchasing Property, 2006). 25. Wood notes yet another area in which Germany has sought to ‘‘Europeanize’’ a difficult bilateral issue: the problem of ‘‘cultural goods’’ – German books, art, and other items which Poland seized at the end of the Second World War. For example,

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to avoid allied bombs some major libraries and galleries moved their collections to seemingly safe villages in Silesia; after 1945, those lands fell to Poland. Germany has struggled for years to induce the Poles to return the captured items. Yet in the face of the far greater destruction caused by the Nazis, Poles were very reluctant to comply. Chancellor Schro¨der sought to ease the way for a return by referring to it as ‘‘both nations communally winning back a European cultural heritage’’ (Wood, 2002, p. 106). Here again, an appeal to European norms may bear fruit where bilateral pressure fails.

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CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE IN THE PROCESS OF GLOBALIZATION AND EUROPEANIZATION: COMPARING THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND POLAND$ Brˇ etislav Dancˇa´k and Vı´ t Hlousˇ ek ABSTRACT For both the Czech Republic and Poland, globalization is intricately linked to European integration and Europeanization. Globalization and European integration have strongly influenced the policies of these countries over the last 17 years. The Czech policy of accommodation and the Polish policy of initiation toward the European Union (EU) show two different ways how the individual Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries can react to the process of Europeanization. The Czech and Polish policies within CEE area are illustrative examples of reactions $

The article has been developed in the framework of the Czech Science Foundation (GA CR), research project ‘‘Trans-Atlantic Relations and Foreign Policy of Central European Countries’’ (Code No. 407/06/P444).


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to the supraterritorializing effects of globalization. These two CEE countries have answered some of the challenges of globalization through sub-regional cooperation in the Central European Initiative (CEI), Visegrad Group (VG), and the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), followed by accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and later joining the EU. The Czech Republic and Poland are gradually entering the area of supra-territoriality. But concurrently both, as EU member states, participate in building and strengthening external territorial borders of the EU through the Schengen Agreement. Despite sharing the experience of disappearing of the EU internal borders, the Czech Republic and Poland have not completely relinquished their existing territorial identity. In the context of the break-up of the Czechoslovak federation it is also useful to examine the issues of deterritorialization and reterritorialization.

1. INTRODUCTION The core of the Czech and Polish foreign policy interests lie in Europe. From that point of view joining the European Community/European Union (EC/EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were two crucial goals that had directed foreign policy of the Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic and Poland since Annus Mirabilis, 1989 (Ash, 1990). The EU is the primary source of current and future development of both countries in political, economic, social, and cultural terms. The membership in the EU is also perceived as a soft security guarantee. Soft security is usually connected with non-military threats such as illegal migration, organized crime, trafficking (people, drugs, nuclear materials, etc.), environmental and health risks, corruption, and economic and political risks related to it. A full-value hard security guarantee is provided by membership in the NATO. Hard security is widely understood in military terms, and threats are usually emanating from conflicting interstate relations. Responses to these kinds of threats include military means (see, Buzan, 1991; Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1997; Vrey¨, 2005). The collapse of the ‘bipolar’ system of the Cold War caused radical changes in the geopolitical status of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). When Iron Curtain (which had demarcated a deep rift in Europe) disappeared, a new political environment rendered cooperation among the nations of the region possible (Rupnik, 1990). Long-term competition

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between the ‘West’ and ‘East’ ended and the processes of European integration and globalization directly influenced Czech and Polish domestic and foreign policies. The following text describes and evaluates the influence of regionalism, European integration and globalization on the Czech Republic and Poland. In our analysis, we point out the similarities and differences between Czech and Polish approach to the challenges brought by globalization in various fields of activities. Under the term regionalism we understand ‘‘development of institutionalized cooperation among states and other actors on the basis of regional contiguity as a feature of global politics’’ (Christiansen, 2005, p. 580). Regional cooperation is then defined as collaboration between countries on the level of continents. The forms of regional cooperation differ throughout the world, varying in scope and shape. An example of regional cooperation in Northern America is North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), in South-East Asia it is the Association of South-East Asian States (ASEAN), while in Asia-Pacific it is Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Similar examples can be spotted on other continents and in the context of rapid increase of the importance of regional cooperation in the 1990s, it is being referred to as new regionalism (Hettne, Inotai, & Sunkel, 1999; cf. Christiansen, 2005, p. 591). Specific example is European regional cooperation, which has already exceeded the scope of standard regional cooperation and within the framework of the EU it evolved into integration. In this sense, integration is understood as ‘‘creation of a new polity bringing together a number of different constituent parts (member states)’’ (Christiansen, 2005, p. 580). Since regional cooperation involves the whole continent, we shall define those several forms of cooperation, which has developed between CEE countries, as sub-regional cooperation. These include Central European Initiative (CEI), the Visegrad Group (VG), and the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). We perceive sub-regional cooperation of the Czech Republic and Poland within CEE as a pre-stage to their eventual accession to the EU, and thus we consider it a part of the process of Europeanization. Europeanization is directly linked to European integration and the EU. Europeanization and its outputs influence the depth of European integration, thus we pay it special attention in the following text. The process of European integration cannot be analyzed isolated from a broader context of globalization, mainly because the EU is considered both ‘‘as a shelter from, and as an accelerator of, global processes’’ (Wallace, 2000; cf. Christiansen, 2005, p. 587).

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According to Thomas Christiansen European integration and the EU should be granted a prominent position in the study of globalization, because ‘‘European integration is regarded either as an expression of turbocharged globalization or as a protective shield against the negative ‘fall-out’ from globalization’’ (ibid., 2005, p. 587). Applying this dual concept of relationship between European integration and globalization on the Czech Republic and Poland, we shall explore the degree to what globalization has influenced the behavior of both countries in global scale. The present state of European integration is followed by a growing importance of decision-making on a supranational level, where a number of competences, formerly designated to national governments, are transferred onto various EU bodies (Westlake & Galloway, 2004). On the one hand, this enhances decision process within the 27 member states, making it more effective; but on the other hand, it undermines the role of national states. The powers of national states are being watered down in the global scale, but for different reasons than in the EU. While in the EU powers are being delegated voluntarily on the basis of optional selection and negotiated limits, globalization diminishes the importance of territorial states as a consequence of ‘‘widening, deepening, and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness’’ (McGrew, 2005, p. 20). Jan Aart Scholte (2000) views the weakening of national territorial states as a characteristic attribute of globalization and calls it deterritorialization (pp. 16, 46). This paper examines the way Czech Republic and Poland react to the challenges of globalization. In the context of the position of the Czech Republic and Poland in CEE, EU, NATO and with a regard to globalization, we are determined to answer the following questions: How does globalization influence the stance of the Czech Republic and Poland toward European integration? To what extent did globalization shape the interest of both countries in European integration? Where, in what areas is the influence of globalization on the conduct of the Czech Republic and Poland most clearly demonstrated?

2. REFRAMING THE CZECH AND POLISH POSITIONS IN CEE IN TRANSITION: SUB-REGIONAL COOPERATION IN PRE-VISEGRAD AND VISEGRAD PERIOD In connection with the development in CEE from 1980s to 1990s, globalization has demonstrated its influence by two phenomena: gradual


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disintegration of the Eastern bloc and further integration of the Western European countries. The benefits of regional cooperation, which has evolved between Western European countries after World War II, inspired latter cooperation between four countries on the river of Danube. The first sub-regional community in CEE not related to the bipolar world of the Cold War was founded on November 12, 1989, in Budapest. The new organization was called the Initiative of Four or Quadragonale and joined together Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Yugoslavia. In 1989, each of the members was a part of different political, economic, and security groups. Hungary was a member of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Treaty; Italy was a member of NATO and European Community; Austria was a neutral state and a member of the European Free Trade Association; and Yugoslavia belonged to the non-aligned movement. Czechoslovakia, Poland, and other post-communist countries soon expressed interest in joining the Quadragonale. The group expanded quickly. The first new country to join was Czechoslovakia, in 1990. Poland was next, in 1991. In connection with the accessions of new states, the name of the organization changed to Pentagonala and Hexagonala, respectively. After another round of enlargement with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia, the organization finally transformed itself into the CEI in 1992. The governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland saw the significance of CEI in enabling their closer cooperation with European Community countries. The structure and functioning of CEI did not aim at the creation of a firm institutional framework; it was rather a flexible sub-regional initiative suitable for the exchange views. CEI has been a good basis for meetings of politicians where questions of sub-regional stability and development are discussed; it may add to the completion the European integration process. The Visegrad period of CEE cooperation started after a meeting among Czechoslovakian president Vaćlav Havel, Polish president Lech Wa"˛esa, and Hungarian prime minister Jo´zsef Antall, in Visegrad (located in the Danube bend, between Slovakia and Hungary). At Visegrad the Declaration on Cooperation between the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Hungary in Striving for European Integration was signed on February 15, 1991 (Jagodzin´ski, 2006, pp. 236–237). This event had a crucial impact on the further development of sub-regional cooperation in CEE. In the Visegrad Declaration, the three countries expressed: ‘‘It is the conviction of the states’ signatories that in the light of the political, economic and social challenges ahead of them,

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and their efforts for renewal based on principles of democracy, their cooperation is a significant step on the way to general European integration’’ (Jagodzin´ski, 2006, p. 236). The informal political group was at first named the Visegrad Triangle (V3); after the division of Czechoslovakia in 1993, it was renamed as the Visegrad Four (V4) or the Visegrad Group (VG). Sub-regional cooperation of VG was originally meant to augment the ambitions of CEE countries to fully participate in the process of European integration. Individual states were not able to effectively react on their own to major political changes, which have occurred after the collapse of Berlin wall. Therefore, they decided to act jointly and the VG exemplifies an early effort for political expression of CEE solidarity (Lewis, 1994, p. 8). Therefore, to be able to fully participate in regional cooperation and European integration within the framework of European Community and the EU (since 1993), these countries first needed to unbind their ties with the Soviet bloc. The Visegrad countries adopted a joint course of action and coordinated their decisions to dismantle the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in June 1991 and the Warsaw Treaty (WT) in July 1991. The Soviet Union used these two organizations during the Cold War for economic and military control over its satellite countries in CEE. Between 1991 and 1993, the first stage of the Visegrad cooperation also symbolized a renewal of a neighborhood policy, which had been damaged in the previous 40 years due to the World War II and the subordination of these countries to the Soviet Union. The involuntary participation of the CEE in the Kremlin-directed ‘Eastern Block’ fractured the natural relations between nations and created more antagonism in Europe than cooperation. In comparison with the western part of Europe, where regional cooperation and integration have flourished since the 1950s, the CEE experienced outbreaks of violence in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Poland (1981). Renewal of the CEE neighborhood was already clear in 1989, when the modification in the terminology indicating the area has also revealed impending geopolitical changes. As Jacques Rupnik (1990) stated, ‘‘The return of Central Europe as an idea is an attempt by the nations of the area to think of themselves as subjects, not merely as objects, of history’’ (p. 250). Vaćlav Havel symbolically expressed these countries’ interest in setting cooperation and taking part in the process of European integration when he spoke in November 1989 about the ‘return to Europe’. By ‘return’ he meant participation in the wider framework of regional cooperation. The creation and further development of VG in this sense also corresponds with Scholte’s


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(2000) view that ‘‘globalization has in various ways encouraged the concurrent contemporary trend of regionalization’’ (p. 61). The goals set by the Visegrad founding countries were as follows: (a) full restitution of state independence, democracy, and freedom; (b) elimination of all existing social, economic, and spiritual aspects of the totalitarian system; (c) construction of a parliamentary democracy, a modern State of Law, respect for human rights, and freedoms; (d) creation of a modern free market economy; and (e) full involvement in the European political and economic system, as well as the system of security and legislation (Jagodzin´ski, 2006, p. 236). These goals can be perceived from at least two main perspectives. First, they can be seen as an effort to pick up the threads of the broken continuity connecting CEE with Western European development, due to the involuntary separation of CEE countries from Western European integration after World War II (Wandycz, 1992). Second, these developments of sub-regional cooperation can also be seen as a reaction to globalization. Established goals signalize the signatories’ interest in joining European integration process, which is above all bound with the EU and the concept of Europeanization (He´ritier, 2005, pp. 199–201; Pridham, 2005, p. 1–24). At the same time, as mentioned above, we understand sub-regional cooperation as a pre-stage of wider regional integration and eventually membership in the EU. Since the dynamic development of regionalism in the 1990s is by a number of authors assigned to globalization, we assume that the context of globalization then includes also the evolution of VG (Christiansen, 2005; Baldwin, 1995). The Czech and Polish approaches toward geopolitical challenges, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union (disintegration of the ‘Eastern block’) and the emergence of the EU (integration of the Western-European countries) just after 1989 were, in principle, similar. No single country in CEE would have been able to take separate action in cases such as dismantling the Warsaw Treaty or the CMEA because of the complexity of these processes and the disproportional power of the Soviet Union over CEE. But shortly after their first successes in the dissolution of CMEA and WT in 1991, a diversity in approaches to sub-regional cooperation and European integration among VG appeared. The difference between the Czech minimalist and Polish maximalist attitudes toward CEE cooperation became relevant already during the early Visegrad period (Kolankiewicz, 1994, pp. 483–484). Minimalist approach of the Czech Republic demonstrated itself in the first half of the 1990s mostly by reluctance, or at least little interest in further institutionalization of sub-regional cooperation. Czech political

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representation, headed by Prime Minister Vaćlav Klaus, did not consider closer relations with other VG group as vital for the pace of the Czech Republic into the EU. Particularly in the first months after the breakup of Czechoslovakia, individual steps were being favored. Thus, the Czech Republic preferred CEFTA to VG or CEI. In contrast, Polish maximalist approach resulted in tendencies to vest in a ‘sub-regional power’ in the CEE region. Its representatives were not hiding their ambitions to act as spokesmen for the whole of VG. For example, in 1992 on the meeting of Bundestag foreign relations committee, Polish president Lech Wa"˛esa presented a plan to create ‘EC-bis’ and ‘NATO-bis’ (Budnikowski et al., 1994, p. 176). Both ideas were in conflict with the interests of remaining VG countries and they eventually proved negative for Poland itself. Establishing firmer sub-regional structures like EC-bis and NATO-bis, substituting full membership in both organizations, would actually mean freezing respective accession processes. Moreover, Polish efforts to assert its leading role did not meet a clear positive response from the rest of VG countries, as it turned out during the visit of Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs W"adys"aw Bartoszewski in Brussels in June 1995, where he tactlessly emphasized the fact that Poland alone is bigger than remaining VG countries altogether, so it should be treated different (Financial Times, 18/7/1995). In terms of cooperation within the CEE area, Poland’s maximalist approach served to emphasize its primary national interests. Poland gained its position in CEE due to its considerably large size and geopolitical relevance. In addition to its size and population (nearly 40 million), there is significant evidence that the country is located on one of the main lines of relationships among the EU, NATO, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation. Poland has showed its leading role in respect to these organizations and countries several times in the last decade. Recent examples include the Polish involvement in the ‘Orange Revolution’ in Ukraine (2004) and the Polish veto during the EU–Russian negotiations on energy issues (2006) (RFE/RL, November 14, 2006). Poland is categorized as a mid-sized European country, comparable for instance to Spain (Poland is approximately 313,000 km2 and has 38 million citizens, Spain is approximately 505,000 km2 and has 40 million citizens). The leading role of Poland can be especially well demonstrated in the field of CEE security issues – NATO. At the end of 1993, Clinton administration introduced the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, meant to help post-communist countries prepare themselves for NATO admission. VG countries did not accept the plan eagerly though for two reasons. Firstly, the program addressed all


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post-communist states, disregarding the differences in the swiftness of political reforms carried out. VG countries were thus put on the same level with, for example, Russia or Albania. Secondly, VG countries worried that PfP will not lead to fast membership in NATO, but rather slowdown the whole process of enlargement; in other words it would become a poor excuse for not being accepted as fully fledged members (Goldgeier, 1999; Asmus, 2002). In spite of that, to make ‘‘Strategy of Enlargement’’ (Lake, 1993) successful it was necessary to engage VG countries in PfP. Without the participation of these countries, which most clearly manifested their interest to join NATO and at the same time pushed their reforms the furthest, the program would fail its purpose. Therefore, in advance of Clinton’s official visit to Europe in January 1994, a group of his close staff set off for VG countries to persuade their representatives to accept PfP. The plan was that Clinton would submit the draft in a NATO summit in Brussels in the beginning of January, and then travel to Prague, where he would offer PfP to VG countries. To make them accept the program, Madeleine Albright, John Shalikashvili, and Charles Gati visited the capitals of VG countries to explain the benefits of PfP. Poland was the most skeptical, making the talks with Lech Wa"˛esa very complicated. After American side assured that PfP is no substitute for a full membership, Warsaw eventually vowed its participation in the program (Albright, 2003, pp. 167–171). Another reason why Polish standpoint was so important was that without Poland’s involvement in the NATO enlargement, the premise of stabilization of the CEE area would have made the project a de facto failure. Because of Poland’s active position among NATO candidate states and its geopolitical relevance, the Clinton administration had a special attitude toward Warsaw (Asmus, 2002, pp. 62–63; Brzezinski, 2004, pp. 192–196). The Czech willingness to take advantage of CEE cooperation slowed after 1992 and this country’s main focus shifted toward economic issues. The Czech Republic was a strong supporter of establishing the CEFTA on December 21, 1992, in Cracow. In the late summer in 1992, it was clear that Czechoslovakia was on its way to dissolution, and the two republics started creating their separate ministerial structures. Of course, among others, a ministry of foreign affairs and a ministry of industry were established. Despite the fact that the former Czechoslovakia existed until December 31, 1992, CEFTA was signed by four ministers responsible for foreign trade from four republics: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. The decline in Czech side’s interest in political cooperation in the framework of VG was caused also by the split-up of federation.

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The emergence of two new independent republics changed political order in CEE. On the political map of Europe, a state populated by 15 million people has been replaced by two states with 10 million (the Czech Republic) and 5 million (Slovakia) citizens. Regarding the influence of globalization on the demise of federation and creation of independent republics we can confirm Scholte’s (2000) argument that ‘‘reterritorialization occurs when certain territorial units decline in significance and other territorial configurations obtain increased importance’’ (p. 60–61). On the one hand, dissolution of federation brought a natural drop in the importance of previous Czechoslovak integration politics; on the other hand, it allowed individual integration politics of the Czech Republic and Slovakia to shape more sharply. If we focus solely on the Czechoslovak case until its dissolution in 1993, we must state that the influence of the globalization process on the break-up of Czechs and Slovaks was rather marginal and key agents can rather be found in domestic policy. Mostly, it was the differing perception of political and economic reforms in the beginning of the 1990s in the Czech and Slovak part of the federation. While political elites in the former focused on a reform from centrally planned economy to a market one, an overwhelming majority in the latter concentrated on the process of nation building. The differences eventually led to a final decision to separate both the republics. Some tendencies to form an independent Slovak state already existed in the past. In the 20th century, a short-lived separation of the Slovak state from the Czechoslovak Republic has already occurred in 1939. After World War II, both parts were reunited, and in 1969, the federal structure of the state system was created, which divided the unitary state into the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic. The dissolution of Czechoslovak federation weakened sub-regional political cooperation, but it did not rule out trade and foreign exchange collaboration within the VG. All Visegrad states were parties to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and participated in further liberalization of international trade, which is considered one of the key conditions for the globalization of world economy (Scholte, 2005, pp. 599–619). In this respect, influence of globalization on sub-regional economic cooperation within the VG is evident with the signature of CEFTA. The Visegrad countries believed that a gradual elimination of barriers to mutual trade would help them during the transitional period from March 1, 1993 to January 1, 2001, when a functional free trade zone was to be created. According to Article I, CEFTA is based on a regulation of the Article XXIV of the GATT. The Article XXIV defines the conditions


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of trade, which have to be met by a free trade area. CEFTA introduced a ‘standstill’ clause, which defined the maximum level of protection of the national market (customs duties). The signatories committed themselves not to raise this level of protection (CEFTA, 1992, p. 3). Under CEFTA, the participating countries act independently and maintain their sovereignty while the agreement is in force. The member states do not relinquish their autonomy and authority to another supraterritorial entity/organization. CEFTA is not a supranational organization, nor does it pursue the aim of creating an international organization even though such tendencies appeared during 1995 and 1996 when Slovakia expressed its intentions to establish the headquarters of CEFTA in Bratislava. Although it was not only the Czech contingent that rejected this attempt to create a more institutionalized form of cooperation, the Czech minimalist approach toward CEE’s sub-regional cooperation was well-demonstrated during this period. From the Czech point of view, CEFTA was the first stage of full EU membership; but it was not intended as a substitute. The conditions for participating in CEFTA support this argument. According to amendments (1995) to original Agreement from 1992, the applicant must meet the following requirements: (a) have signed European Association Agreement with the EU (first step toward the EU membership); (b) membership in World Trade Organization (to which GATT transformed in 1995); (c) obtain acceptance of all current CEFTA members. The number of CEFTA countries was gradually increasing since 1992 and in 2004 the agreement involved these countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. After the VG countries and Slovenia entered the EU in May 2004, CEFTA ceased to apply on them and the only countries that remained were Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania. In the following years, more countries gradually expressed their interest in joining the CEFTA – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, and Serbia. After Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in January 2007, they ceased to be subject to CEFTA. On the foundation and functioning of CEFTA, we can clearly demonstrate the influence of globalization on the behavior of countries in the CEE sub-region. Committing mutual trade liberalization to GATT/WTO principles developed conditions for further dynamics of intra-VG trade. At the same time, economic ties among VG countries have intensified and thus provided for deeper regional cooperation in the process of European integration. By setting the terms for participation

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in CEFTA, including the European Association Agreement, CEFTA countries directed their efforts to join EU, which is closely connected with Europeanization.

3. EUROPEANIZATION, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, AND GLOBALIZATION Europeanization is a term that represents the mutual links between the EU and domestic political systems in member and potential candidate states. This term is used not only within political science, but also within the framework of other social sciences such as sociology, anthropology, and economics (see, Bo¨rzel & Risse, 2003; Hix & Goetz, 2000; Cowles, Caporaso, & Risse, 2001; for CEE: Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). Writers of Europeanization have rather eclectically combined comparative political science, international political economy, policy analysis, European integration theories (in particular, the multilevel governance approach), and theories of international relations (Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003, pp. 331–341). Most of the scholars dealing with the Europeanization generally present their work from the perspective of the EU and its policies. The writers seem to perceive Europeanization as the national policies reacting to the changing European environment, its institutions, values, and policies. A typical example of this is Radaelli’s frequently quoted definition of Europeanization as: ‘‘Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies’’ (Radaelli, 2000, p. 4). What does this definition mean for CEE? How does it apply to the CEE area and process of European integration? Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier argue that in the context of CEE, Europeanization is the adoption of rules created on the EU level, for example, implementing the acquis communautaire, which is the common legal basis for EU members (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005, p. 7). However, this understanding of Europeanization is only one of the aspects in which the political regimes of the CEE countries have transformed, i.e., it is a path of external transformation. In contrast, internal transformation is generated by the intrinsic motivation of a society to implement reforms,


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and in the case of CEE leaders and governments, to build a consolidated democracy and a market economy. In contrast to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, we believe that Europeanization needs to be understood as a bi-directional process: it is both the communication and adjustments between national political arenas and the EU and the external influence of EU-level changes on domestic policy. Considering that the process of European integration, such as EU itself, is also viewed as an ‘‘expression turbo-charged globalization’’ (Christiansen, 2005, p. 587), we also understand Europeanization of the Czech Republic and Poland as a part of this process. The extent of adherence to EU requirements and mutual interaction among individual member states affect the depth of European integration and capabilities of EU in the global scale. At the time of writing, in early 2007, EU as a whole acts as an important global player in economy. In practice, the EU’s global sway can be identified in, e.g., the WTO negotiations, where the EU together with the U.S. determine the rules for liberalization of world trade for other countries. For the EU to take a global role in the domain of international politics and security, it is necessary that it advances on a higher level of political integration (Longhurst & Zaborowski, 2005, pp. 195–205). The success of this integration depends on, among others, the extent of Europeanization of its candidate and new member countries. Europeanization can have many varying outcomes. According to Radaelli, national political systems may respond to the EU by absorption (i.e., by adopting of Europeanization without any significant change in local conditions), transformation (i.e., deep adaptation to the impulses of Europeanization), inertia (i.e., the absence of change), or retrenchment (i.e., the reaction to the pressure of adaptation is to turn toward a less proEuropean policy than at the beginning) (Radaelli, 2003, pp. 37–38). The connection between Europeanization and political transition in CEE is evidently complementary (see Pridham, 2005). Attila A´gh (1998) mentioned Europeanization as a possible scenario of democratic transformation for countries in CEE in the 1990s, well before their accession to the EU. Formulation of the EU’s 1993 Copenhagen criteria for candidate states, and the adoption of its principles to institutionalized dialogue by the European Commission (since 1994) supported the course of Europeanization (Vachudova, 2005, pp. 120–132). The term Europeanization of CEE, in the sense of the adaptation of EU rules, might be used to describe the fifth (2004) wave of EU enlargement. What is the relationship between globalization and Europeanization? For Hanspeter Kriesi, European integration is a part of globalization,

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which divides societies into winners and losers. The European cleavage is reflected in two groups: those who support globalization and those who adamantly defend their traditional national values (Kriesi, 2003). From this point of view, Europeanization can be seen as a component of globalization and is close to Scholte’s conceptualization of deterritorialization and supraterritorialization (Scholte, 2000, pp. 16, 22, 46–50). In Scholte’s terms, there is a shift from the territorial identity of the Westphalian states toward supraterritorial identities. From the point of view of the EU member country, the process that takes place is deterritorialization, i.e., Scholte’s earlier term. But there is also a possibility that the EU is a new spatial expression of a more traditional territoriality in the world. One example of this distinct possibility is the protectionist trade measures adopted by the EU in agricultural products and food. These measures are in contradiction to the liberalizing globalization trends and the liberalization of international trade. We have observed that the processes of globalization and Europeanization are complementary for the new EU member states, such as the Czech Republic and Poland. The framework of European integration was and still is perceived by the Czech and Polish political representatives as the most appropriate answer to the challenge of globalization.

4. POLICY OF ACCOMMODATION AND POLICY OF INITIATION TOWARD THE EU The Czech policy toward the EU could be described as accommodating. To demonstrate the main features of the Czech policy of accommodation, we can compare it to that of Poland. Poland’s attitude toward the EU could be described as initiating. We are comparing these two countries because of their similar newcomer status in the EU, their geographical location in CEE, their post-World War II experiences as part of the ‘Eastern Block’ subordinated to the Soviet Union, and their political and economic developments during the 1990s. For a country to adopt a policy of accommodation in the EU means emphasizing the most successful establishment within the existing EU structures and their corresponding rules. In the case of the Czech Republic, the goal of policy of accommodation has been the country’s acceptance as a member of the EU. Accommodation is similar to adaptation, which is mentioned by Radaelli in connection with Europeanization as a positive


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response to pressure for change coming from the EU (Radaelli, 2004, pp. 3–4). A policy of accommodation is effective when the internal mechanisms of EU procedures are mastered at a high level. In that case, an individual country would be able to successfully use the political and economic potentials offered by the EU. We understand the policy of accommodation as policy when the state exerts pressure to effect changes that correspond to its own interests without confrontation. The preferred changes are not asserted radically and their presentation within the EU framework is made in harmony with other countries having the same or very similar opinions. At the same time, a relatively high level of cohesion is preferred between the current position and the wider EU consensus. The country’s policy goal is the acceptance of the EU within its own population and the perception of the EU as an entity to which the Czech Republic is intrinsically attached. For that purpose a special department at Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs was created before the referendum on joining the EU in 2003. This department was later transformed into department for promoting the Czech Republic abroad. Referendum on joining the EU held on June 13–14, 2003 was the first and (to date) the last time in modern Czech history when a nationwide referendum was used. With participation of 55 percent of eligible voters, the supporters of joining the EU won 77 percent compared to the opponents’ 23 percent (Referendum, 2003). For the same reason, to mobilize for and popularize the EU within Czech society, the Department for EU Information was established at the Czech Office of the Government (directly subordinated to the Prime Minister) in 2005. In the spirit of accommodation policy, the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs formulated the ‘‘Draft Concept of the Czech Republic’s Intentions within the European Union’’ in 2004. The Concept later adopted by the Government stated: Due to its economic position, geographical location, size and history, the Czech Republic is an advocate of European integration and a communitarian approach, which ensures the best equal position of member states. The Czech Republic will support cohesion of the EU during the development of European integration. Should heterogeneity of the Union be on the increase, the Czech Republic will endeavor that its activities be as close as possible to the focal point of integration and that it does not find itself on its periphery, as the case may be. (Draft Concept, 2004, p. 2)

A policy of accommodation may at times appear passive and it may seem to result in a country’s consent to conditions that may not be beneficial. However, accommodation can create a favorable condition/environment for the Czech Republic’s rapid and relatively easy establishment within the EU.

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One of the attributes of the Czech policy of accommodation is that it is not driven by the country’s need for the ‘Czech voice’ to be heard at all times and in all places. The policy has to reflect the limited potential (political, economic, etc.) of a small country and the real possibilities of this country’s influence in a larger group of 27 member states, where the size, population (for instance, the number of MPs in European Parliament), and other factors count heavily in the common decision making. Under the accommodation policy, a stable position within the EU and the reinforcement of relationships with other EU members are considered beneficial. When explaining Poland’s policy of initiation, we should state that this approach does not contradict the policy of accommodation; nor are the two policies opposites. In fact, in order to be fully developed, this initiation policy needs to contain the basic elements of the policy of accommodation. The initiation approach is driven by the aspiration to move beyond the existing EU framework. It means, for instance, that Poland wants to impact the current EU agenda, including Union’s eastern neighborhood policy, which has been developed in past years not in small part because of Polish efforts. Poland attempts to significantly influence the direction of existing EU projects. Many of these objectives can be found in the ‘‘Report on the State of Polish Foreign Policy,’’ dated January 2004, issued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, W"odzimierz Cimoszewicz. Our primary objective in the framework of the Union’s common foreign policy will consist of strengthening and invigorating EU cooperation with its neighbors, in particular the eastern ones, through the establishment of the Eastern Dimension of the EU policy. The relevant proposals that we have put forward over the last few months have animated the Union’s debates on the subject. We will continue our involvement in the work on the EU initiative ‘A Wider Europe – A New Neighborhood’. (Cimoszewicz, 2004, p. 3)

For Poland, its size and a certain awareness of its ‘indispensability’ when solving key issues of European integration are often factors used in negotiations with other partners. Poland takes initiative in areas that are to its own advantage and it submits new topics, such as that mentioned by Cimoszewicz above, to be included in the EU agenda. Poland readily and successfully has defended its interests, even when these interests are not in agreement with the prevailing opinion of the EU. For example, the final version of the 2003 European Constitution was amended due to significant pressure from Poland in case of its voting power. According to the Nice Treaty adopted in 2001, Poland (and also Spain) has almost as many votes in the EU Council of Ministers as Germany and France. While proposed version of the Constitution reduced Polish voting power because of


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distribution of votes according to population size. This version preferred bigger countries like Germany or France (BBC, 2003). The policy of initiation requires permanent multilevel diplomacy, both within the EU and among its member states, as well as between other nonEU countries and organizations. Poland appears determined to look beyond the horizon of the outer EU borders, and it is especially inclined to consider its eastern neighbors, Ukraine and Belarus. Poland is becoming an increasingly powerful supporter of the Eastern Dimension of the EU which is Union’s initiative oriented toward Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. Poland has a number of political, economic, and security reasons for doing so. The most obvious motive is the effort to shift the borders of the EU further to the east in the future. Very similar motives can be found in German policy concerning the NATO and EU enlargements in 1999 and 2004, respectively (Goldgeier, 1999, pp. 34–35; Trouille, 2002, p. 55–57). Such gradual shifting of borders can be seen from the point of globalization as an expression of supraterritoriality. Owing to NATO and EU enlargement, Germany ceased to be a ‘border’ state, and similar tendency of Poland can be seen easily. The Czech Republic is also an example of a state that exemplifies many examples of supraterritoriality, especially due to its position inside EU and NATO. The policy of accommodation and the policy of initiation are partially determined by choice, but they are also partially based on the objective potentials of the countries themselves (size, geopolitical position, economic power, etc.). These factors must be considered when summarizing the benefits and risks of either policy. The benefits for the Czech Republic’s policy of accommodation include a consolidated position within the EU. The Czech Republic is able to efficiently use EU mechanisms to secure its own development, for example, through gaining EU funds for underdeveloped areas. The claim of ‘performing well’ within the EU is supported by the EU selection of the Czech Republic as the second new EU member state for Presidency of the European Council (EC) in the first half of 2009. The Czech Presidency of the EC is the result of changes in method used for choosing individual country since 2007. There is no alphabetical key applied (Westlake & Galloway, 2004, p. 337; Council Decision, 1/1/2007). The Czech Republic can benefit from the various aspects of its geographic position inside the EU, as it is surrounded on all sides by the EU member states. Only the Czech Republic and Luxembourg share their land borders only with EU countries. Benefits resulted from the location inside the EU include, for instance, soft-security guarantee, low costs of international trade, participation in Schengen zone, etc. The membership status has an influence on the position of the Czech Republic (also Poland) in the system

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of protection of the outer EU borders based on the Schengen Agreement. The Schengen system applies to most EU countries and to some nonmember states, such as Norway. Both the Czech Republic and Poland participated in strengthening of the territorial borders delineated between the EU member states and neighbors of the EU in the east and southeast. The gradual removal of internal borders between the Schengen countries is accompanied by the reinforced controls of EU external borders. Therefore, the Czech Republic and Poland are clearly, even if gradually, entering the area of supraterritoriality; but concurrently participate, as EU member states, in the strict territorial delimitation of this greater whole. At the same time, it is obvious that the Czech Republic and Poland have not completely relinquished their existing territorial identity. The Czech ‘insider’ benefit may also pose a risk, as the geographic position inside the EU may strengthen the focus on EU issues, further weaken interest in CEE, and insulate from the many other aspects of globalization. In such a case, the Czech Republic would side to countries which perceive their membership in the EU more like a ‘‘protective shield against the negative ‘fall-out’ from globalization’’ (Christiansen, 2005, p. 587). This way, the chances of the Czech Republic to actively influence EU policy may be eventually reduced in the long run. The Polish policy of initiation implies the ongoing search for close cooperation with other countries both within and outside the EU. The first and primary Polish emphasis has been on Ukraine, but increased attention has also been paid to the Central Asia and Caucasus. Polish interest in its eastern neighbors is easily understandable and is implicit given the location of the country and the importance it attributes to act as a connection between west and east. The advantage of the policy of initiation is that it puts emphasis on maintaining a wider scope of foreign policy and the state is broadly engaged in an active position with others. The active nature of the policy of initiation compels Poland to consider and to prepare a number of variants of its political development and thus maintain a high level of dynamism in international negotiations. Poland is thus not merely a participant, but also often the direct initiator of the global and EU-related movements it influences (Dancˇa´k & Hlousˇ ek, 2006). The risk of the Polish position can be a persistent creation of new foreign policy possibilities, while the existing opportunities may not be used very effectively. The creation of future opportunities may consume the energy necessary for the effective management of the existing agenda. Moreover, it is possible that Poland could concentrate on a certain foreign policy area, giving increased attention and means to that area, but it may not succeed in


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receiving a sufficiently positive response from other EU members and therefore its efforts would have been wasted. In this context, the 2005 agreement between Germany and Russia to build a North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP) that bypasses Polish territory is one sensitive case in which Poland’s policy of initiation failed, as it was unable to block the agreement (Łoskot, 2005). This agreement contradicts Poland’s long-term security interests and it has clearly demonstrated the Polish inability to protect its foreign policy objectives inside the EU. The Czech Republic is unlikely to often play the role of initiator of change in European policies or dramatically affecting the EU’s position. The model in which the Czech Republic will probably attempt to pursue its EU affairs will be close to Radaelli’s classifications, where we can expect absorption and transformation as the most probable responses to Europeanization impulses. The Czech policy of accommodation reveals the possibility of adaptation to conditions required by the development of further European integration. Exceptions can of course occur, for instance, when the Czech Republic tries to change the course of foreign policy of the 27 EU member countries toward the totalitarian regime of Fidel Castro in Cuba. Such an event took place when the Czech Republic initiated a move to re-impose sanctions against Cuba at a European Council meeting on June 13, 2005 (Council EU, 2005, p. 10; Lazarova, 2005, p. 1). From the view of the Czech Republic the talks were not successful. Mainly due to Spanish tolerant stand to Cuba, efforts to push through a tougher EU position and thus wield greater pressure to change Castro’s totalitarian regime have failed. Nevertheless, the Czech Republic does not limit its endeavor to globally promote human rights only to EU activities; it promotes this cause also in the UN, either individually or in cooperation with other countries. It became almost a tradition that the Czech Republic annually leads a group of countries criticizing the persecution of opponents of Castro’s regime. In order to support Cuban dissidents, former Czech president Vaćlav Havel in September 2003 initiated the establishment of ‘‘International Committee for Democracy in Cuba’’ (ICDC, 2003). Owing to its policy of initiation, Poland is predestined to a more active conduct in influencing European policies. However, these very trends in foreign policy complicate the Polish ability to adapt to the process of Europeanization. Of course, Polish reactions of retrenchment or inertia toward the European integration process are legitimate. However, in our opinion, the increased occurrence of retrenchment or inertia may render the Polish influence within the EU. This policy orientation may place Poland in a politically peripheral or even inferior position in the EU.

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In the context of EU position as a significant global player in international politics and security issues, it is necessary to pay attention to the relationship of the Czech Republic and Poland with NATO and USA. As we have mentioned above, to become a global actor it is vital for the EU to maintain political unity of its member states. In comparison to the level of economic integration, we can say that integration in the security domain lags behind substantially. Evolution of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its integral part European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) has not yet reached the degree to call EU a significant global actor in security policy (de Jonge Oudraat, 2004). The main reason is that in security and foreign policy issues EU member states primarily seek to advance their own interests, failing to act in unity. For a comparison take the example of WTO, where EU has a strong bargaining position, as it represents the interest of 27 states. Unlike that in the area of foreign and security policy a number of states are tied to other global organizations and actors, with whom they coordinate their conduct. When speaking about foreign and security policy of the Czech Republic and Poland, we mean above all others NATO and USA. The Czech Republic and Poland are considered as Atlanticists, i.e., countries that pursue close ties of Europe (EU) and the United States. In both the countries this Atlanticism is most clearly demonstrated in the political and security cooperation with the USA on a bilateral level, while in multilateral relations via the framework of NATO (Frost & Odom, 1997). The dynamics of globalization of security was greatly advanced by the events of 9/11, which considerably shaped the view of military globalization. In accord with Mittelman’s words ‘‘9/11 marked a restructuring of the processes that constitute globalization y . The political and military dimensions of globalization gained ascendance relative to its economic forces, often seen as the main root’’ (Mittelman, 2004, p. 225). When analyzing the influence of globalization in the military dimension, in the cases of the Czech Republic and Poland we observe the impact of strong preference of the Atlantic bond. Both the countries engage themselves in NATO operations conducted ‘‘out of area’’, having a global security reach, illustrated by military operations in Afghanistan. Military dimension of globalization is also connected with close bilateral relations to USA. As an example, take the January 2007 request of U.S. administration to the Czech Republic to host a missile defense radar and to Poland to host long-range ground-based interceptors on their territories. Both the cases constitute key parts of anti-ballistic missile defense (U.S. Missile Defense in Europe, 2007).


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5. CONCLUSION In our assessment of the effects of globalization in the Czech Republic and Poland, we assume that ‘‘contemporary globalization is highly uneven – it varies in its intensity and extensity between different spheres of activity’’ (McGrew, 2005, p. 38). Therefore, we conclude that significant differences can be seen between the influence of globalization on the standpoint and behavior of the Czech Republic and Poland in relation to process of European integration and the EU and in relation to the NATO and USA. In this context, the Czech Republic and Poland have tried in economic policy to meet the challenges of globalization by emphasizing sub-regional cooperation. Both the countries have reacted to the supraterritorializing effects of globalization through sub-regional cooperation in the CEI, VG, and the CEFTA, followed by accession to the EU. The existence of differences between the minimalist and the maximalist approaches of the Czech Republic and Poland, respectively, have an impact on the intensity of subregional cooperation. The framework of European integration is perceived by the Czech and Polish political representatives as the most appropriate answer to the challenge of globalization in its economic dimension. In the military dimension of globalization, substantial consequences of Atlanticist direction can be observed in both Czech and Polish cases. Their willingness to participate in the military dimension of European integration process is quite low. This turns clear especially when compared to developed stage of European economic integration, which is globally manifested e.g., in the WTO negotiations. In the area of foreign and security policy both the Czech Republic and Poland are tied to other global organizations and actors, namely NATO and USA.

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PART III: NEW ACTORS AND INFLUENCES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION


NORM DIFFUSION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE’S DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICIES Katalin Fa´biań ABSTRACT The international women’s movement has always focused on discrimination against women, but only in the past few decades have activists been focusing on violence against women, and within this framework, domestic violence. Global feminist activism found common ground in protecting women from physical, sexual, and emotional abuse. This framework traveled to Eastern Europe with the advent of regime changes there. In post-communist Europe, it took only a decade and a half for the Polish, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, and Slovene governments to react to domestic and global pressures and establish new definitions and policies regarding domestic violence. However, the feminist NGOs’ definitions and policy recommendations met with limited success. Feminist-inspired norms, such as specific domestic violence courts and distancing ordinances, diffused to a mediocre level of half-hearted official responses in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). This middle-of-the-road approach attempted to de-gender and thus to de-politicize feminists’ fundamental gender-sensitive claims. A norm diffusion to reach the middle ground took place through a complex set of interactions that involved various types of political actors ranging from international governmental organizations, such as the UN Globalization: Perspectives from Central and Eastern Europe Contemporary Studies in Economic and Financial Analysis, Volume 89, 253–303 Copyright r 2007 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1569-3759/doi:10.1016/S1569-3759(07)89008-5

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and the EU, governments, international and local NGOs. Analyzing the process of these multiple-level and manifold interactions sheds light on the partially deterritorialized nature of globalization. The development of norms and their difffnousion regarding domestic violence policy also inform us about how democratic processes, efforts to achieve gender equality, and the global context interact in CEE.

1. INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICIES IN CEE? In past decades, domestic violence has emerged as one of the prime subjects of social movement activism. Governments and international organizations (IOs) all over the world have responded to some degree to the call of global grassroots organizing efforts to raise awareness of domestic violence, prevent violence in the home, provide services to victims of domestic violence, and to produce and effectively implement comprehensive government policies on the subject (see Merry, 2006; Weldon, 2002). The interactions of various international activists ignited a debate in postcommunist CEE regarding the definition of and appropriate policy on domestic violence. Underpinning this regional debate is a parallel global contestation over norms that are most often framed within an international human rights framework. The universal nature of human rights is particularly central to debates on domestic violence. On the one hand, with increasing globalization, the normative expectations of universal human rights are increasingly the measure that democratic governments are expected to follow. On the other hand, debate about the universality of human rights still rages, especially in light of globalization not affecting every part of the world in the same way. With the internationally uneven effects of both human rights and globalization, there has been no global agreement yet on how to define domestic violence and the extent to which relevant government policies should be centralized, become gender-specific, favor the judicial/criminalizing route, or take a preventive/educational approach, etc. Neither do we have any proven method of eliminating domestic violence and there is no country in the world where domestic violence is no longer a problem (see Alvarez, 2005; Kaplan, 2001; WAVE, 2002). While considerable controversy and debate characterize many aspects of how to deal with domestic violence, the issue itself has unarguably been in

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the limelight internationally since the 1980s. This is due to a large extent to globalization and the accompanying international feminist organizing. The most recent wave of globalization, ostensibly since the 1960s, spurred a dramatic increase in both material and abstract, information-related exchanges across otherwise distant territories and it prompted a change in awareness regarding all sorts of political, economic, social, and cultural issues (Scholte, 2005). Globalization propelled issues like gender equality, violence against women, and by extension, violence in the family setting to major policy debates in many national settings, such as the post-communist countries of CEE. Globalization also thoroughly affected the organization and the issueselection of feminist groups, who like other political movements, have been routinely divided in their definitions, foci of activities in general, and interpretations of domestic violence in particular. Assisted by various global exchanges, such as growing personal travel, ease of information exchange, and the four UN women’s conferences in Mexico City (1975), Copenhagen (1980), Nairobi (1985), and Beijing (1995), the international exchange between feminists produced a major agreement among Western and Southern activists in their focus on violence against women, and subsequently, domestic violence (UNIFEM, 1995; UNIFEM and The Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, 2006). With this strategic agreement, the globalization of domestic violence-related norms has earnestly begun. The agreement between North and South regarding the activists’ focus on violence against women and domestic violence acknowledges that these issues are complex and their severity may vary according to political and cultural circumstances, but the agreement constitutes a universal argument that violence against women and domestic violence have relevance everywhere (Kardam, 2004, p. 90). This universal argument has led to many feminists reasoning that domestic violence has to be considered in gender-specific terms. Since gender is defined as a product of socialization in contrast to sex that emerges from biological attributes, this interpretation calls for a political solution either implicitly, such as by raising awareness, or explicitly, by calling on the state and its agencies to prevent domestic violence and protect its victims. All kinds of social and political actors and forces entered the debate on defining domestic violence and promoting their respective policies. Governmental and non-governmental forces, and domestic and international actors have all become active in discussing and developing policies concerning violence against women in general and domestic violence in particular. International governmental organizations (IGOs), such as the UN through

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the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the European Union (EU) especially through the Daphne Program, along with international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), such as Women Against Violence Europe (WAVE) and Amnesty International, tried to influence governments and publics and have become active promoters of human rights principles worldwide (Keck & Sikkink, 1997; Risse & Sikkink, 1999; Tsutsui & Wotipka, 2004). As relative newcomers to the international human rights discourse and newly democratic countries, Central and Eastern European1 governments and publics felt that they had to acknowledge domestic violence as a problem and consequently provide services for its victims. These Central and Eastern European governments acted partially in response to external pressure and partially as a way of appeasing their domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that raised such concerns. However, despite the apparent progress, recognizing domestic violence as a pandemic and a major human rights violation is still a low priority in the eyes of many, and Central and Eastern European policy responses failed to produce the comprehensive change in approach that activists were calling for. The partial and contested nature of change regarding domestic violence in CEE exemplifies some of the most intriguing characteristics of contemporary globalization affecting the region and highlights the complex transformation process from communism to a capitalist liberal democracy. Globalization has had a dramatic and overwhelming impact on the region, and has undoubtedly contributed palpably to the rapid incorporation of neo-liberal democratic and market-oriented principles. Seemingly unstoppable and bringing major political, economic, and cultural changes in its wake, globalization appears to be a force that does not recognize state boundaries, demonstrating instead a rise of supraterritoriality (Scholte, 2005). However, the supraterritorial spread of liberal democratic institutions and market domination is still played out at least in part in strictly territorially defined entities such as states, local governments, jurisdictions, police precincts, and domestic violence shelters. A small, albeit increasing, number of actors who are involved in trying to remedy concrete domestic violence cases and who pursue anti-violence advocacy in these territorial units reach out and/or are directly affected by global actors as well as emerging global norms. This partial, controversial, and dynamic process of globalization offers an intriguing glimpse into the dialectical nature of interactions between both tangible and intangible contemporary international and domestic forces. To investigate both the theoretical and practical underpinnings of the effects of globalization, different concrete national


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frameworks serve in this essay as examples of change regarding domestic violence in CEE. The central issue driving this essay is how globalization affects Central and Eastern European definitions of and policies on domestic violence. This topic unavoidably and directly connects to gender analysis. A genderspecific perspective is incorporated in this essay because this angle is one of the central contentions of this topic, as it forcefully reminds us of a central aspect of power and politics, i.e., the interpretation of the inequality of the sexes. This study of the increasingly global exchange between domestic NGOs and INGOs, and the influences on post-communist countries from mostly Western European and North American governments to develop domestic violence policies can also address not only inequalities in global affairs, but also one of gender studies’ most hotly debated topics: gender equality and its application to public policies. I begin this essay by setting out a theoretical framework for analyzing norms within a global context. Next, I identify naming domestic violence as the first major effect of global norms influencing public policies in CEE. I then trace the effect of global norms in the evolution of policies related to domestic violence in Central and Eastern European countries. To determine the extent of definitional and normative differences between Central and Eastern European and global feminist norms, in Section 3, I list some of the main actors influencing the definition and policies related to domestic violence. The roles of some of these global actors, such as Western and local NGOs, and the EU on CEE’s domestic violence policies are the themes of the fourth part. The conclusion discusses the results of global influences on defining and attending to domestic violence in CEE by analyzing possibilities and limitations of global norm diffusion.

2. GLOBAL OR NOT: HOW DO NORMS INFORM THE CONSTRUCTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICIES? Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. In the process of tensions and contradictions in international life, norms emerge as broadly accepted beliefs that may or may not be codified. They often amount to an ethical (normative) claim about what actors should or should not do. As a result, they are frequently contested in the public sphere: in the media, among political parties and NGOs, and also within and among governments. Some of these norms become internationalized, eventually

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replacing armies and economic might as the leverage of global power politics. The power of international norms, void of physical force, has increasingly become the subject of inquiry in the social sciences. The recent re-emphasis on norms as determinants of state behavior represents a return to traditional value concerns in the field of domestic and international politics. How do norms emerge and what are their effects? The central problem of the literature is how to explain change in expectations, policies, and eventually, behavior (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Is there an international norm related to domestic violence? There may not be one fully internationally accredited set of human rights norms, such as the UN’s 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, although even this has been the subject of considerable ongoing debate about just how universal its reach really is. In the 70 years’ history, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the interpretation has also changed and evolved to a layered set of generations of human rights, moving from an early and partial consensus of political and civil rights to a set of still developing, broad call for economic and community rights (Orend, 2002). Building on the appeal of universal human rights, feminists argue that women’s rights are integral to human rights and violence against women fundamentally undermines the exercise of such inalienable rights. Since the 1970s, feminist activists have started to construct a comprehensive set of norms to address domestic violence against women. In an increasingly globally interconnected fashion, feminist NGOs reached out for each others support. The feminist grassroots advocacy regarding the elimination of gender violence has gained some notable IGOs’, such as the UN’s and the Council of Europe’s, reinforcement. Emerging consensus on women’s rights as human rights and recognition of domestic violence as part of gender violence has assisted in advocating a set of interlocking recommendations regarding the definition of domestic violence and related governmental policies. This set of recommendations includes specific domestic violence law, easily accessible and separate domestic violence courts, distancing ordinance, and an increase in the number of and funding for shelters. Global feminist activist groups have cooperated intensely with feminist scholarship. From the intersection of gender equality norms and various public policies that appeared in many international contexts as a topic of debate, a new academic field of investigation emerged: comparative feminist public policy (Mazur, 1999, 2002). The scholarly investigations of this field tend to give credence to feminist scholarship that maintains that women are mostly, or nearly exclusively, the victims of domestic violence (Schechter,


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1982; Walby, 2004). These arguments contrast with the claims of both revisionist feminists (Mills, 2003) and conservative thinkers and politicians who tend to see the family and the home as safe haven. Non-feminists argue that if and where intimate violence occurs, it is more complex than feminists posit it; and if protection is necessary, then children, the elderly, and men all need equal protection. Protecting children from violence often becomes the first common denominator between competing interpretations of domestic violence. Feminists often accept this broad focus as the initial step to protect women as well, while more conservative political actors consider the focus on the welfare of children as necessary for national survival. The division and conflict between feminist and more conservative forces replicated itself from the Western European and North American contexts to all over the world and it influenced the positions taken by NGOs, governments, and the general public regarding the evaluation of the severity of and appropriate policies on domestic violence. An important component in the relationship among NGOs, IOs (both governmental and non-governmental), and national governments is that it increasingly takes place on a global level. Globalization has also profoundly affected specific policies and related decision-making processes, such as how we recognize and deal with domestic violence. While the women’s movement has, since its inception, focused on discrimination against women in its many guises, only relatively recently have activists paid specific attention to domestic violence as a part of a global campaign to protect women against violence and as a part of assuring universal human rights (Keck & Sikkink, 1997).

3. CEE: THE EFFECTS OF SUPRATERRITORIALIZATION Encouraged by international activism and increased attention to women’s right to physical safety as a basic human right, Central and Eastern European NGOs incorporated various elements of these global approaches into their arguments to convince the public, their governments, and the international community of the value of their claims. After a decade and a half of activism, these NGOs and their activities became the subjects of contention between the various global and local forces that interpret norms concerning domestic violence very differently. Many of the seemingly substantive legal and attitudinal changes regarding domestic violence that these Central and Eastern European NGOs and the global feminist forces

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introduced, have not yet produced any significant change in practice in the region. Despite considerable differences in size, customs, and current political orientation among Central and Eastern European countries, why did their governments respond to global and domestic pressure in a similarly resistant, half-hearted manner? Why did a stalemate develop between governments, local NGOs, and their international counterparts in CEE over domestic violence policies? My research reveals that the locally specific gender socialization during the communist era still principally determines Central and Eastern European official responses about something literally and figuratively as ‘‘close to home’’ as the issues of domestic violence. Despite CEE’s rapid opening toward the international arena, feminist interpretations of policy encountered serious opposition after the 1989 transitions. Consequently, the gender-specific interpretation of human rights norms, which have gained considerable acceptance in IGOs such as the UN and the European Union (EU) because of the persistent and successful arguments of the feminist social movement organization, have not attracted the attention of more than a narrow set of NGO activists in CEE. For my research, I interviewed Polish, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, and Slovene government officials and representatives of various NGOs dealing with victims of domestic violence in the summer of 2003 and the fall of 2004. I attended international workshops in 2004, organized by WAVE in Vienna, Austria, for NGOs across Europe to discuss common problems and launch common projects. In 2003–2004 and in 2006, I interviewed NGO activists, government officials, and politicians about their actions to deal with domestic violence and their reactions to one another and also to the others’ actions and policies. I asked them to evaluate the effect of international actors and their experiences with the UN, the EU, various INGOs, and foreign governments. Mapping the inner logic of contemporary political negotiations requires multiple research strategies, including interviews, content analysis of interviews and publications, and mapping the flow of information and funding. Since 2002, I have collected Central and Eastern European and English-language media reports on the status of domestic violence in CEE’s to chart a chronological history that is otherwise hidden and may not be systematically recorded. Local events, such as protests about reported child abuse or information on bills submitted to Parliament, rarely make the headlines and are infrequently accessible by mainstream, internet-based information networks. Even when an item is reported in national media, there is often no accurate analysis of the causes and effects. While NGOs’ awareness-raising is especially difficult on this terrain of media omission or


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slant, it also makes a researcher’s task quite challenging. It is revealing that several particularly horrific cases, hyped in the national media, dealt nearly exclusively with (a) (mostly male) children killed by their (step)fathers and (b) mothers committing infanticide. I tried to keep abreast of such hidden information by keeping in contact with my interviewees and signing up to various specialized, internet-based communication networks of NGOs, such as WAVE, the Europe-wide network dedicated to eliminate violence against women and No+ ta´rs (Female Companion), a Hungarian listserv for activists. Various sources, such as NGO activists’ recollection of their events and their publications that were aimed to raise attention to domestic violence helped me to unearth the social and political impact of activists, international norms, and policy tools as they cross borders to influence social movements and governments, resulting in legislation about domestic violence in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia. The first major change in this region was the naming of domestic violence.

3.1. Naming Domestic Violence in CEE The concept of domestic violence has long existed in the Central and Eastern European countries but not only that it had various names, the understanding of this concept has also remained rather fuzzy at the edges. Opponents of feminist groups have intensively scrutinized this partially intentional and strategic conceptual vagueness both internationally and in post-communist Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia. How to name a previously anonymous issue? Naming powerfully affects perception and in naming domestic violence, the enmeshed conditions of ‘‘how we do things’’ and new norms collide. Many global norms and influences affected the processes of finding a name for ‘‘domestic violence’’ in Central and Eastern European, but the result, at least for the time being, has been a middle-of-the-road solution with which no one is really satisfied. The persistent debate over naming the problem both in CEE and internationally highlights that diverse notions of gender equality, alternative interpretations of personal and state responsibility, and different domestic and international norms collide in this symbolic, but behaviorally and cognitively important instance when we name something. Each Central and Eastern European language labeled the problem differently. Nearly every Western term has been tried in their local translations, from ‘‘wife beating’’ and ‘‘wife abuse,’’ to ‘‘spousal violence’’

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and ‘‘partner abuse.’’ Verbal battles raged in each country about the implied meaning of violence among intimate partners. Both the relationship between the partners and the location where the violence is committed are contentious issues in the naming process. For now, the broad terms, such as ‘‘domestic violence’’ (domaćı´ho na´silı´ in Czech, domaće na´silie in Slovak) and ‘‘violence in the family’’ (csala´don belu¨li ero+ szak in Hungarian) have emerged victorious (for differences of perception, see Vanya, 2001). The course of these debates is more than a simple chronology of events. Analyzing the reasons why raising the issue and naming domestic violence have caused heated debates also shines some light on the underlying causes of lawmakers’ objections and popular resistances to altering the previous arrangement of power and authority. How did domestic violence begin to be recognized? With the regime change, social movement activists, including feminists, traveled to and from CEE. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, women activists in CEE learned of the then new agreement among Western and Southern feminist movements to focus on the problems related to violence against women and the emerging ‘‘good practices’’ to provide shelter to the victims and deal with the perpetrators. The construct of violence among intimate partners struck a cord with activists in the region – partially because it seemed to have fit the reality they knew and partially because these were themes the West was willing to support ideologically and financially. With enthusiasm, but also with some skepticism toward the West and their own governments, NGOs in CEE started to apply this concept to their local environments. However, their first challenge was to name the concept. In the naming process, local cultures/traditions collided with the new international gender-specific norms. Naming ‘‘domestic violence’’ in an inclusive but not confrontational manner was a crucial but difficult first task, hampered by numerous political, linguistic, and cultural challenges. Only after finding at least an operational name, could individual and state responsibilities be separated in a domestic violence policy to the extent that law enforcement would be able to earnestly deal with implementation. First, identifying the hurt party became problematic because every term borrowed from the West emphasizes a different actor considered to be the vulnerable party. If the general term becomes ‘‘violence against women’’ (which has been the usage in feminist-inspired international discourse), it implies that only women can be the victims. This terminology was quite unpalatable to Central and Eastern European decision-makers and they rejected this feminist interpretation, claiming that many other groups, including men, are equally vulnerable. Consequently, many social


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movement activists decided to shift the language to gender-neutral territory in order to effectively engage politicians and the general public. Most politicians and scholars in the Central and Eastern European region habitually note that if a policy framework accepts the term as violence against women, then abuse against the elderly, children, and men would be omitted from the notion of violence in the home. Feminists argue that much of the violence against children, elderly, and even young men springs from women’s oppression, because men often try to shape women’s behavior by hurting other family members. These feminist voices battled to reach the mainstream media. Instead of a broad array of activists being heard, a lone feminist legal scholar (such as Krisztina Morvai in Hungary) or a central activist (such as Ursula Nowakowska in Poland) would become the spokesperson for increased attention to domestic violence.2 The debate continues over whether anyone, regardless of sex, age, or marital status, is equally likely to become a victim of violence in the family, or if there is a need to emphasize that gender-based violence is a manifestation of the prevailing patriarchic order and separate it from other types of crimes. Second, specifying where the violence takes place turned out to be similarly challenging because both the ‘‘home’’ and the ‘‘family’’ are conspicuously vague. The images of ‘‘violence in the family’’ and ‘‘violence in the home’’ offended and politically distanced many social conservatives who wished to envision the family and their domicile as a harmonious entity that offers a safe haven to its members and inhabitants. Using this argument, the more nationalist and conservative politicians in the Hungarian Parliament objected to using the often used terminology (csala´don belu¨li ero+ szak, violence in the family) in 2003 (Orsza´ggyu+ le´si Naplo´, 2003). Third, should only violence in marital relations be subject to public scrutiny as the term ‘‘wife abuse’’ suggests? With co-habitation and divorce rates in CEE reaching record highs, the traditional approach of limiting domestic violence to married partners living at the same location was becoming untenable. However, the alternative to ‘‘wife abuse,’’ which would have been ‘‘partner violence,’’ would also infer homosexual relationships and legitimating homosexual partnerships even in such a backhanded way would be an unwelcome task for most politicians in CEE (see, for examples of homophobic sentiments in the region: Hammarberg, 2006; Kitlinski & Leszkowicz, 2005). The end result (to date) of the terminological quandary in CEE was ‘‘domestic violence.’’ This way, violence was extricated from male power and neutralized into a more socially acceptable expression. However, this

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compromise in terminology demonstrated the lasting influence of previous cultural arrangements, especially gender relations and the associated imbalance of power between the sexes. Despite the profound social changes affecting gender roles during communism and the many political transformations since 1989, this aspect of power imbalance between men and women had until now generally escaped the scrutiny of the state and the public. But now the challenge of naming and dealing with violence among intimate partners was in the open, placing this sensitive, politically and culturally charged question in the center. Considering domestic violence as a crime challenges the legitimacy of established power relations, both within intimate relationships and also in the context of the state and its law enforcement. In recognizing domestic violence as a crime and by calling for collective resistance to unjust authority, basic social patterns of behavior, such as traditional gender roles, perception of appropriate behavior, individuals’ rights, and the state’s responsibility are fundamentally questioned. In the post-communist European societies where social transformation has been especially rapid, the last vestiges of what feels like stability in intimate relations may be especially difficult to deal with.3 Feminist movements that pointed out violence against women and violence in the home dramatically revealed the gap between the notion and reality of security and welfare. Central and Eastern European NGOs subsequently interpreted news reports on violence in the homes in the context of this revelation and organized survivors’ testimonials (Interviews with Gyo¨rgyi To´th, NANE, Dr. Krisztina Morvai Budapest, Hungary, summers 2004, 2005, 2006, and with Ursula Nowakowska, Centrum Praw Kobiet, July 2003). Even this most toned down and least confrontational term of ‘‘domestic violence’’ poses many problems in CEE, as some anti-feminist scholars and policy-makers are eager to point out. Fundamental features of democratic procedures such as equality before the law, the usual methods of evidence gathering at a crime scene, and the ideal of balancing gender equality and difference are questioned in the case of violence in the home. For example, the type of admissible evidence between intimate partners became a sticky question to address within the new rule of law-based judicial systems. The neophyte advocacy of clearly transparent and corroborated evidence was eager to reject any semblance to the hearsay testimonials of the show trials of communism. How could evidence be sought in cases of emotional abuse? Should only physical violence be considered a target of criminalization? What kind of witness evidence is permissible? Even if the effects of beating can be more clearly demonstrated, physical violence is most frequently the


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result of often long-standing emotional and psychological maltreatment (see, for example Daniel & Banks, 2003, pp. 154–164). Emotions do not seem to fit squarely in the legal categories, as testimonies of domestic violence survivors who point out the inadequacies of state protection rarely receive a sympathetic ear. The question remains as to why so many women’s testimonials are dismissively scrutinized and then disregarded. At the same time, ample attention is offered to battered men who have not yet mounted a campaign to protect their rights, although politicians have already lined up in their defense (Interviews with Branko Grim, Social Democratic Party (SDS), Ljubljana, Slovenia, October 4, 2004 and with Dr. A´gnes Vadai, Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), Budapest, Hungary, June 24, 2003).4 The muddled, problematic, and globally influenced nature of naming domestic violence in CEE forecast the similarly internationally interconnected, problematic, and mediocre convergence of domestic violence policies.

3.2. Changes in CEE’s Domestic Violence Policies While there are relatively few empirical studies on the prevalence of domestic violence in CEE, a preponderance of evidence, from the ledger of calls of domestic violence NGOs to scholarly data, support the pandemic label. From the number of substantive (non-crank) calls received, hotlines and feminist NGOs in the region claim that between every fifth to every third women becomes a victim of violence in her family or in the hands of her partner (see Veselicˆ, 2006). Olga To´th found that over one-third of Hungarians were raised in a threatening environment and approximately 20 percent witnessed their father beat their mother at least on one occasion (To´th, 1999, 2002). Similarly, Serbanescu and Goodwin (2005) note the widely varying proportions of domestic violence in post-communist countries, ranging from 5 percent in Georgia to 29 percent in Romania for reported lifetime experience of spousal physical abuse. Nowakowska and Jablonska (2000) cite 1993 and 1996 polls that indicate that 1 in 6 Polish women experience violence of their male partner (pp. 147–153). In 1999, 14,000 women were murdered in cases of domestic violence in Russia (UNICEF, 1999). Thanks to the influence of international human rights and gender equality norms, the monitoring and lobbying activities of international and local NGOs and IGOs, people became more aware of domestic violence, and policies were developed to address this problem in CEE.

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Following the uneasy but tangible success of having named domestic violence, domestic NGOs and international pressure have succeeded in changing the status quo about domestic violence in CEE. Most important, domestic violence moved into public discourse as the general public, governments, and various organizations defined and discussed its meaning (see Tables 1 and 2). Various global forces assisted the feminist NGOs’ drive to introduce domestic violence as a new term into CEE in the wake of the 1989 regime transformations. The ideas and policies regarding domestic violence, developed most extensively in the Western European and North American contexts, traveled rapidly to post-communist CEE. Traditionally, violence against women had been accepted, occasionally even glorified, and dismissed as a private affair in CEE. The impact of ideas and activists promulgating feminism, democracy, and respect for human rights has since started to break down the status quo. International norms related to human rights and a feminist interpretation of domestic violence policy imported from the West profoundly stirred up CEE’s general acquiescence in this regard and a noticeable transformation has slowly and very controversially started to change attitudes and policies on domestic violence. In the eyes of feminist researchers and activists, it is evident that domestic violence, battering, and intimate partner violence occur in all societies and cover a wide variety of behaviors. Its most common form occurs between men and women, with women forming the overwhelming majority of victims.5 It is also an axiom among these circles that gender stereotypes, women’s economic and emotional dependence on men, cultural acceptance of gender inequality, and loose or non-existent legislation to protect women’s fundamental rights cause and perpetuate domestic violence (see, McCue, 1995; Open Society Institute, 2006). While there appears to be no country in the world where domestic violence is not a problem, governmental and public responses vary widely from denial or failure to offer widespread, diverse types of services to victims and perpetrators. Western Europe and North America have very diverse practices regarding domestic violence and their feminist movements have greatly affected other regions’ definitions and policies. However, even with feminist movements organizing globally, only 89 countries in the world have specific domestic violence laws. Despite the significant international diversity regarding the definition and the policies regarding domestic violence, a set of guidelines has emerged which, after decades of practice, can be considered as an emerging set of international norms. The international set of norms related to domestic

Recent Areas of Change Concerning Domestic Violence Issues Government Actions by Date and Country. Czech Republic

Hungary

Poland

Slovakia

Slovenia

Ratification Date of CEDAWa Ratification Date of Optional Protocol – CEDAWb Establishment of Specific Government Offices for Women’s Rightsc

February 22, 1993

December 22, 1980

July 30, 1980

May 28, 1993

July 6, 1982

February 26, 2001

December 22, 2000

December 22, 2003

November 17, 2000

September 23, 2004

(1) 1979 – Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (2) 2002 – Council of Czech Government for Equal Opportunities of Women and Men

(3) 2002 – Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women recommends dissemination of CEDAW and Optional Protocol in Hungary

1986 – Plenipotentiary for Women 1997 – Renamed Plenipotentiary for Family Also, 1991 – Parliamentary Group of Women

1992 – Office for Women’s Policy 2001 – Renamed Office for Equal Opportunities

Previously Existing Government Offices Advancing Women’s Rightsd

1997 – Minister of Labor & Social Affairs administers 1995 Beijing obligations, and coordinates government policy on status of women

1997 – Ministry of Social Affairs administers National Action Plan for Beijing plus 5

1995 – National Program for Women developed after Beijing Conference – government change in 1996 dissolved this program

1996 – Co-ordination Committee on Women’s Issues 1997 – National Gender Center 1999 – Department of Equal Opportunities and Parliamentary Women’s Committee 1997 – Slovak Government Office of Human Rights and Minorities


Table 1.

2002 – National Assembly adopts special provision guaranteeing nonsexist language in legislation

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Table 1. (Continued ) Hungary

Poland

Slovakia

Slovenia

Implementation of Notable Bills & Laws – Prevention of VAWe

2003 – Criminal Code Amended to recognize VAW as distinct crime

2003 – Parliamentary strategy for dealing with VAW

2003 – VAW laws strengthened, expanding definition and increasing penalties

1992–1993 – Proposal to amend criminal legislation and Parliamentary debate leads to adoption of some protection measures 2002 – Ministry of Justice revises criminal legislation

Implementation of Notable Bill & Laws – Marriagef (Marital Rape)

(4) By 2002, had an improved framework and an amended and approved legislation to promote equality through the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women

1997 – Marital Rape defined as crime

1997 – Criminal Legislation includes protections from rape, physical harm 2003 – government adopts National Plan for Advancement of Women, pledging to introduce legislation to protect women victims of violence 1998 – Polish Penal Code considers marital rape as a form of statutory rape

2002 – Slovak Penal Code changes definition of closely related persons to include ex-wives

(6) 2003 – EOO introduces Implementation of the Principle of Equal Treatment Act (IPETA) 2003 – Employment Relations Act is clearly antidiscriminatory

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Czech Republic

2002 – Ministry for Children, Youth, and Sports announces intentions for education campaign on VAW, coordinating with other ministries and NGOs

2004 – Gov’t works with NGOs on ‘‘16 Days of Activism’’ Campaign 2005 – government Plenipotentiary for Equal Status of Men and Women launches ‘‘To Overcome Violence!’’ using TV, radio, leaflets, and billboard to remind Poles that VAW is a crime

(12) 2001 – Campaign Fifth Women, which is a gender violence awarenessraising initiative, is launched. (7) 2003 – Several NGO’s working with human rights and women’s issues get together to raise awareness about domestic violence following a family tragedy

1996 – Media Campaign by Women’s Policy Office against VAW targeted at secondary school students 1999 – Media Campaign by same Office continues to focus on VAW to raise awareness and pressure on government to enact various international recommendations


GovernmentSponsored Awareness Campaignsg

2006 – Labor Code and Employment Act are ‘‘expanded’’ by country’s ban on gender discrimination 2003 – Commissioner for Human Rights and Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs launches campaign aimed at educating teenagers on VAW, using TV, radio, and even a video game

a

Dates of ratification for all CEDAW member countries, UN CEDAW, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm. Dates of ratification for the Optional Protocol to CEDAW for all member countries, UN CEDAW, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/ cedaw/protocol/sigop.htm. c Sources for each country may be found, in their respective orders: Czech Republic – http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/8.htm Hungary – http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/gems/eeo/guide/hungary/msf.htm Poland – http://www.cities-localgovernments.org/uclg/index.asp Slovakia – http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/beijing+5stat/statments/slovakia6.htm Slovenia – http://fatherhood.social.dk/Partners/SI.html b

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Sources for each country may be found, in their respective orders: Czech Republic – http://www.stopvaw.org/Czech_Republic2.html Hungary – http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/gems/eeo/guide/hungary/msf.htm Poland – http://www.feministki.org.pl/pl/raport.html Slovenia – http://www.hrea.org/lists/women-rights/markup/msg00201.html e Sources for each country may be found, in their respective orders: Czech Republic – http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27833.htm Hungary – http://www.stopvaw.org/Legislative_Trends_and_New_Developments10.html Poland – http://www.stopvaw.org/Poland2.html Slovakia – http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27863.htm Slovenia – http://www.npwj.org/?q=node/157 f Sources for each country may be found, in their respective orders: Hungary – http://www.ce-review.org/01/16/csardas16.html Poland – http://www.feministki.org.pl/pl/raport.html Slovakia – http://www.stopvaw.org/Slovakia.html g Sources for each country may be found in their respective orders: Czech Republic – http://www.radio.cz/en/article/46548 Hungary – http://www.wave-network.org/cmsimages/doku/fempower_6_eng.pdf Poland – http://www.oska.org.pl/english/articles.php?id=16, http://www.stopvaw.org/29Jul20054.html Slovenia – http://www.uem-rs.si/eng/cedaw2/4.html, http://www.uem-rs.si/eng/violence/schedule.html

270

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Recent Areas of Change Concerning Domestic Violence Issues – NGO Actions by Date and Country. Czech Republic

Hungary

Lobbying Parliament for Domestic Violence Lawsa

2002 – NGOs rally behind ProFem to lobby for VAW legislation

NGOs financially supported by Governmentb

2003 – Government 2004 – Government assisted NGOs funded NGO-run dealing with training for law and trafficking of women judicial officials for (La Strada) victim assistance

1997 – Hungarian NGOs lobby Parliament for marital rape law

Poland

Slovakia

Slovenia

1997 – Gender 2000 – Women’s Rights 2000 – Aspekt, Pro Mainstreaming Center lobbies for Familia, Fenestra, & Project (Office for law on VAW Alliance of Women Equal Opportunities) intimate in Slovakia lobby aims for gender relationships yearly for official perspective in all stance against VAW policy development (a) 2002 – Act on Equal (a) 2000 – President 1998 – NGO’s work Opportunities for signs Freedom of with Parliament on Women and Men Information Act in creating a ‘‘Public grants power to support of a Activities’’ Bill, in Office for Equal campaign involving support of Opportunities to 120 NGOs humanitarian fund projects of (b) 2002 – Adopts ‘‘1% assistance NGOs Tax Law,’’ and (b) By 2005 – IPETA NGOs are given allows NGOs to be lighter income tax present in judicial laws proceedings for discriminated peoples


Table 2.

271

272

Table 2. (Continued ) Czech Republic Police/Legal Professional Trainingc

Establishment of Hotlinesd

Poland

Slovakia

Slovenia

1994 to 2007 – NANE 2001 – NGOs operate 2002 – System of police 1999 – Association SOS holds training training reorganized 15 centers to not only works to educate seminars for police/ to lessen incidents of help victims of abuse government officials 2001 SOS holds police abuse and but also train those on VAW training seminars for violence dealing with these 2000 – booklets Social Workers 2003 – Training victims published with Seminars held with experts from United Kingdom to train social workers on domestic violence issues 2000 – Women’s Policy 2000 – Women’s Rights 1997 – Slovak 2003 – White Circle of 2004 – Ministry of Office and Ministry Center operates government Safety and Riaps Youth, Family, of Labor, Family, volunteer-supported approves National offer hotlines and Social Affairs, and and Social Affairs hotline for VAW Action Plan for counseling Equal Opportunity support NGO-led victims Women, which calls open up a 24/7 SOS hotline for for establishment of hotline for VAW domestic violence hotlines victims victims 1999 – Little or no beds 2003 – State partially 107 state-supported 2003 – Parliament calls 1999 – Only 8 or 10 funded 3 shelters for provided by the shelters for battered shelters established for network of battered women, state. Increasing women in whole throughout country shelters by March with a capacity for 40 number of NGOs country (also about 2004, yet government people starting to deal with 150 homeless shelters fails to implement this problem – yet these are often this goal dangerous for 2004 – No Government women) run shelters for domestic violence, only ‘‘mother Criminal procedure regulating VAW cases distributed to police. Plans for special training for police to deal with victims of VAW

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Establishment of Shelterse

Hungary

a

2003 – Media Campaign against VAW supported by Open Society Fund, including 10 NGOs

2002 – Women’s Rights 2002 – Enacted ‘‘16 Days of Activism Center works with Against Gender other NGOs to Violence’’ launch national TV Campaign, using and radio campaign ‘‘Fifth Woman’’ to pressure slogan on PSAs, government to enact posters, billboards, more laws on VAW and websites; Public 2004 – ‘‘16 Days of campaigns through Activism Against media helping small Gender Violence’’ number of women’s enacted by many associations become NGOs, with public much more effective events and poster campaigns

2002 – Third of nationwide media campaigns launched by SOS, entitled ‘‘What’s the Matter Little Girl,’’ using posters and advertising to alert public of VAW and inform victims of places to turn to

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Sources for each country may be found, in their respective orders: Czech Republic – http://www.praguepost.com/P03/2002/Art/1106/news6.php Hungary – http://www.ce-review.org/01/16/csardas16.html Poland – http://temida.free.ngo.pl/activities.htm Slovakia – http://www.moznostvolby.sk/ihf2000.htm Slovenia – http://www.uem-rs.si/eng/govor-atene.html b Sources for each country may be found, in their respective orders: Czech Republic – http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27833.htm Hungary – http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41685.htm Poland – http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol1iss1/cr_cee.htm Slovakia – http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2000/slovakia.pdf, http://www.usaid.gov/locations/eur ope_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2002/slovakia.pdf


NGO-Sponsored Awareness Campaignsf

homes.’’ In October minister calls for extension of these homes to include VAW 1994 – NANE starts public media campaign 1999 – NGOs cooperate to organize public debates and demonstrations for women’s rights

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Slovenia – http://www.rtd.si/SYCP/documents/employmentSocSecurity/EO.html, http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/fundamen tal_rights/pdf/legnet/slsum05_en.pdf c Sources for each country may be found in their respective orders: Czech Republic – ‘‘Committee experts applaud Czech Republic’s political will to implement Convention on Elimination of Discrimination against Women.’’ UN press release. August 9, 2002. Lexis–Nexis. Hungary – ‘‘Women and violence: The domestic and sexual violence project,’’ Katalin Koncz, WIN News. Lexis–Nexis. Fall, 1994. Poland – http://www.thegully.com/essays/gaymundo/040111_poland_rights_women.html Slovakia – http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/67DFE57415A55A4CC1256D6A002E3B11?opendocument, http://www. ohchr.org/english/bodies/CRC/docs/study/responses/Slovakia.pdf Slovenia – http://www.drustvo-sos.si/english/background.htm d Sources for each country may be found in their respective orders: Czech Republic – http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27833.htm Hungary – http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41685.htm Poland – http://temida.free.ngo.pl/activities.htm Slovakia – http://www.stopvaw.org/National_Plan_of_Action21.html Slovenia – http://www.ihf-hr.org/viewbinary/viewdocument.php?doc_id=2071 e Sources for each country may be found in their respective orders: Czech Republic – http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27833.htm Hungary – http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/hun-summary-eng Poland – http://www.feministki.org.pl/pl/raport.html Slovakia – http://www.slovakspectator.sk/clanok-3959.html Slovenia – http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27864.htm f Sources for each country may be found in their respective orders: Czech Republic – http://www.cwgl.rutgers.edu/16days/kit04/calattach/Czech%20Republic%20-%20ROSA%20Domestic%20Violen ce%20Campaign.doc Hungary – http://www.nane.hu/kiadvanyok/szorolapok/naneangol.doc Poland – http://www.osi.hu/vaw/propbycount.php?count=poland, http://www.oska.org.pl/english/print.php?what=article&id=16 Slovakia – http://www.womenaid.org/16days/english/report.html, http://www.qub.ac.uk/egg/Summaries/Slovakia-WP3Summ.doc Slovenia – http://www.fairfund.org/subpage.asp?P=about&S=countries&T=slovenia


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violence includes several aspects, with considerable flexibility built in for differences in legal systems and customs, such as (a) specific domestic violence laws, (b) separate and quickly available domestic violence courts, (c) distancing ordinances against perpetrators, (d) reliable funding for independent women’s shelters and hotlines, and (e) training of judges, police, social workers, and healthcare providers to recognize and treat domestic violence victims without further traumatizing them. This emerging set of international norms implies state responsibility to assist victims of domestic violence. State responsibility can include preventive measures though education and public awareness campaigns, and establishing services for victims of domestic violence, such as quick and effective police intervention, speedy legal attention, shelter and welfare support in time of immediate need. Some of the emerging rules of state behavior regarding victims of domestic violence have been codified in international treaties, such as UN’s CEDAW and the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, national law (such as in Austria, Sweden, and the USA); and they are listed in best practices handbooks (e.g., WAVE), training manuals (e.g., the EU’s Daphne-financed publications) (United Nations, 2006). In addition, scholars also refer to these aspects of policies when assessing the reach and impact of national policies on violence against women (e.g., Bunch, 1995; Buzawa & Buzawa, 2002; Clarke, 1997; Deanham & Gillespie, 1999; Dobash & Dobash, 1992; Elman, 1996a, 1996b; Hanmer & Itzin, 2000; Merry, 2006; Weldon, 2002). These, and other internationally accepted standards and norms of behavior are expected to shape and legitimate states as social actors in the international arena, and in this process contribute to the development of a ‘‘world culture’’ or ‘‘world society’’ (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997). CEE, however, has not yet managed to incorporate many of the elements identified as part of this emerging set of international norms. Even when a strong law that criminalized domestic violence was passed, as in Slovakia, its implementation was inconsistent or non-existent. In the cases of Hungary and Poland, the very limited laws were watered-down versions of the standards recommended by IOs. For instance, the Hungarian Parliament passed a resolution in 2003 to prepare a comprehensive bill on domestic violence within a year, but at the time of writing in 2007, no such law exists. Similarly, half-hearted series of actions took place regarding the long-awaited bill regarding perpetrators of domestic violence. In February 2006, the Hungarian government passed a bill on a distancing ordinance, but it does not mention domestic violence. Because the Hungarian Constitutional Court announced that the distancing

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ordinance would interfere with the protection of private property, the distancing ordinance can only be issued when formal criminal proceedings have already started. The condition of formal criminal proceedings renders this law not only useless in the eyes of human rights groups and feminist NGOs, but places it in direct contrast to practices in Western Europe and the USA (HCM, 2006). Facing resistance from prosecutors, politicians, and the general public, NGOs’ opinion in the Czech Republic and Slovenia was that they could be most successful if they did not strive for anything more than amendments to the criminal code, working instead with personal networks to change the attitudes of social workers and the police (Interviews with SOS Hotline and The Association Against Violent Communication, Ljubljana, Slovenia 2004 and Gender Studies Center, Prague Czech Republic, 2003). With Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia joining the EU in 2004, women’s NGOs hoped that gender equality in CEE would become a center of attention as the EU and new member countries battled over the meaning of minority protection (although they mostly focused on the Roma/Gypsy populations). However, this expectation was not realized because for the EU, gender equality issues have been a rather low priority, and accession negotiations focused on the required chapters, which were mostly devoid of social matters. While EU institutions provided an important policy venue for feminists to argue for equal pay and equal treatment in employment, this area of gender equality rather strictly falls under the realm of economic issues and it has been difficult to extend this message to related areas. On other issues of gender equality, more specifically violence against women, the EU has been much less direct.6 The EU itself did not deal directly with social matters until the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. Although it has been vocal about calling for combating gender violence and it has undertaken a number of mostly symbolic initiatives, none of its actions have committed member states to change their policies and practices. There are no legally binding treaty provisions or directions that specifically address gender violence. The European Commission confirmed this stance in its 2004 Report on Equality between Men and Women stating that ‘‘the prevention of and fight against domestic violence fall mainly under local and national competences of Memberstates’’ (European Commission, 2004, p. 11). The only tangible legal change in the Central and Eastern European countries from a gender equality perspective arising from the EU accession was the passing of the Equal Opportunity laws in the Central and Eastern European 2004 accession countries (Humer, 2004).


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In contrast to the limited actual options that the EU accession offered for NGO activists working with domestic violence survivors, the image of the EU created some leverage for the Central and Eastern European NGOs to bring more attention to domestic violence. At the doorstep of EU membership, the CEE governments wanted to look their best, even if attention to domestic violence was not on the EU’s list of expectations. This posturing offered an opportunity for NGOs to advance domestic violence policies and recommend the application of international norms. The list of legal changes related to domestic violence (see Tables 1 and 2) in all 2004 Central and Eastern European EU-member countries testify that NGOs successfully used the image of the EU as an emblem of human rights and democracy to advance their gender equality-related claims. Government equal opportunity offices (EOO in Tables 1 and 2) started to appear at the time of EU accession, with a separate branch often reserved for women’s issues. These government offices were the direct links that NGOs used rather successfully to connect to and lobby governments. The feminist NGOs’ leverage was nothing more than symbolic framing when they presented their claims regarding domestic violence as something that was expected of prospective members of the EU. As political scientists and social movement theorists noted, NGOs’ political opportunity tends to be widest at times of transition, when fears and expectations push decisionmakers to be more sensitive to potential constituents’ claims. Even though some of the NGOs’ legislative proposals did not become law, the 2003 date when nearly all of the Central and Eastern European countries introduced domestic violence bills testifies to the power of this symbolic framing strategy. Although Slovenia passed its domestic violence bill in 1992–1993, even this earlier date harmonizes with the above explanation of symbolic strategic framing. Having just declared independence, Slovenia was trying to differentiate itself from the warring successor states of the former Yugoslavia. In addition to these both symbolically and strategically favorable conditions in both the domestic and the international environment, Slovenia inherited a relatively strong and independent women’s movement from socialist times (Jalusˇ icˇ, 2002). Slovene activists took advantage of these opportunities and not only established a strong and lively relationship with the Office of Equal Opportunities, but also gained renewable state support for independently run hotlines and shelters (Interviews with Cˇelje Women’s Shelter, Cˇelje, and Office of Equal Opportunities, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 2004). Without these structural advances, Slovene NGOs would have faced the same difficult narrowing of avenues for dialogue about domestic violence that the

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others experienced after 2004, when the Central and Eastern European countries became members of the EU. While policies regarding domestic violence are still debated and many bills are still pending in CEE, feminist and human rights groups have accomplished a significant feat by raising attention to domestic violence and establishing several, even if not a wholly comprehensive set of, policies against domestic violence. This achievement is even more notable in light of how difficult it has been to convince the public and politicians to focus on this issue and for feminists and other advocacy groups to propose effective legislation regarding domestic violence that had a good likelihood of being accepted. Feminist activism in CEE actively cooperated with like-minded groups globally and it extensively utilized the global wave of democratization and the international attention to honoring human rights. NGOs recognized that the communist past made contemporary CEE acutely sensitive to human rights violations. These countries have chosen to be in the forefront of IOs and pursue the human rights agenda to integrate their recent history and experience into current diplomacy (McMahon, 2005). In this pursuit, these countries may have rhetorically trapped themselves on the side of universality and might not be able to continue to deny the gender-specific imbalances in power and the resulting discriminations, such as violence against women and within it, domestic violence. But in the meantime, by trying to harmonize universal claims with regional cultural and historical specificity with regard to domestic violence policies, Central and Eastern European countries continue their long history of negotiation between forces of various Eastern and Western legal and cultural traditions. While governments in CEE have responded to pressures from both the domestic sphere and the IOs of various kinds (both foreign governments and non-governmental organizations), their responses can be characterized as lukewarm or, in the eyes of feminist observers, hostile to incorporate into their laws and daily practices the emerging norms regarding domestic violence. Central and Eastern European governments rarely choose to implement any of the cornerstones of feminist policy recommendations, such as specific domestic violence laws. They most often rejected establishing distancing ordinances and refrained from supporting (especially the independent) women’s shelters. In contrast to the universal human rights claim that feminists and human rights advocates promote, stand the overwhelming number of Central and Eastern European cases of official foot-dragging. The slow implementation


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of separate domestic violence laws and the still widespread denial of the seriousness of domestic violence could point to a historically and culturally different nature of political and gender socialization, produced by decades of communist rule and its policies of women’s emancipation. Across the board, Central and Eastern European politicians and scholars have repeatedly challenged the feminist contention that women are the main victims of domestic violence (Krizsań, Paantjens, & van Lamoen, 2004; OSI, 2006). Central and Eastern European governments, media, and a broad spectrum of the politicians and publics doubt that domestic violence is a pandemic which needs special attention and funding. These debates are not only very similar across the countries of CEE but their governments’ reactions are also alike in offering partial solutions to problems that require comprehensive sets (see, in a broader policy framework, Hrzenjak, Jalusic, Sauer, & Tertinegg, 2004). These resistances can remind us of the limitations of the potential universal applicability of norms, whether these are about the assumption of women’s victimhood, the criminalization of domestic violence, or the use of psychological programs for perpetrators. Why are the Central and Eastern European governments so resistant toward this issue? Is there something unique in their resistance? Many of the problems regarding the definition and policies in domestic violence in CEE are not specific to the region. What distinguishes the more successful cases where domestic violence legislation has emerged is the presence of a strong constituency supporting feminist movements. In the presence of such a constituency, the conceptual fuzziness of domestic violence has not undermined the NGOs’ hard-won capacity to deal with this problem (see Deanham & Gillespie, 1999; Moghadam, 2005; Wedel, 1998). Reflecting the powerful effects of networking internationally, ‘‘transnational feminist networks’’ (Moghadam’s term) between NGOs in the post-communist countries and the West, cultivated in part by funding, have provided a mechanism for the diffusion of anti-domestic violence policies in CEE (Johnson & Brunell, 2006). Why did the Central and Eastern European governments adopt a middle ground in terms of policies between what feminists consider as international standards and taking no action at all? This middle ground has proved to be a very treacherous landscape because, on the one hand, it seems to demonstrate that a sincere effort produced some tangible changes in domestic violence policy but on the other hand, the possibilities of implementation are weak and the results are even meager. At the same time as changes were taking place in both the recognition of and the policies regarding domestic violence, a sizeable gap opened up

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between Central and Eastern European governmental policies and feminist NGOs, INGOs, and IGOs. Feminist activists and the international women’s movement have been in the forefront of drawing attention to the worldwide problem of violence against women and more specifically, domestic violence. Central and Eastern European governments and publics have generally refused to accept the feminist interpretation and declined to incorporate most segments of feminist NGOs’ policy recommendations. This gap between interpretations has resulted in a stalemate. In a nearly uniform manner, Central and Eastern European governments have enacted a few, usually symbolic changes. Examples of symbolic actions by governments can amount to, for example, passing changes in the legal or the penal code, but then not following up these changes with more detailed implementation of the law and appropriate training of lawyers, social workers, and the police. Modifications in domestic violence policy in CEE are the result, but these legal changes remained highly fragmented and barely implemented. The changes did not amount to a systematic and interlocking overhaul of the legal system and social services that feminists argue are necessary to help victims of domestic violence. Besides political parties whose major interests are often far removed from gender concerns, only a narrow set of politically engaged actors, including a small segment of civil society have pushed for broader recognition of human rights and within it, women’s rights as human rights. A decade and a half after the regime transitions, in CEE the large majority of NGOs are still very weak, dependent on the state or on foreign funding, and barely integrated into the democratic decision-making process (Howard, 2002, 2003). The situation of those NGOs, whose focus is on less-salient topics than current politics is interested in, becomes precarious and their lobbying capacity can remain extremely limited without external support. The preceding discussion on terminology and the related various conceptual problems regarding domestic violence in post-communist CEE have already indicated some of the effects of global actors and norms on the definitions of domestic violence and the ensuing political and legal deliberations over policy implementation. Which global actors exerted the most influence on Central and Eastern European countries and how did they accomplish this task? The next segment focuses on the three most notable globally interconnected actors that affected domestic violence policies in CEE.


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4. GLOBAL INFLUENCES ON CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN NORM ADOPTION IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICIES Over the last decade, the skepticism toward and denial of domestic violence have been at least partially transformed in CEE. These changes were set in motion by the efforts of an internationally engaged set of activists, IOs, and state governments. The debate raging over domestic violence in CEE is superficially about which definitions and corresponding policies governments and NGOs should use, but in effect, such debates represent very different values and interests. Profound value differences about individual rights, social responsibilities, nationalism, and, in particular, gender roles affect these definitional and policy debates. These value differences are embodied in corresponding norms. Who were carrying these norms to CEE? How were these norms influencing the Central and Eastern European publics and policy-makers regarding domestic violence? 4.1. Global Influences on Central and Eastern European Domestic Violence Policies The main international influences on Central and Eastern European domestic violence policies can be roughly divided into (1) tangible forms of pressure exerted through personal, financial, and organizational means; and (2) intangibles such as norms that the concrete actors develop, debate, and, under favorable conditions, transmit to other actors and locales. The tangible and intangible influences are in a dialectical relationship with one another. Concrete actors bring the norms to life, but the intangible value considerations impel actors in the first place to raise their voices, find one another, and work together. Cause and effect interconnect and in a feedback mechanism may strengthen one another. For example, a particular NGO’s or government’s successful implementation of an anti-domestic violence policy can strengthen agreement over the founding principles within their respective settings, and even partial success may provide sufficient examples for others to follow. This feedback mechanism happened with the case of the Austrian model regarding domestic violence, whose ideology, network of shelters, and interlocking legal provisions have provided inspiration to many feminist and human rights NGOs in CEE.

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A reverse feedback mechanism can also take place, however, when seemingly universally applicable norms fall apart when they encounter steady resistance. Norms do not exist inertly ‘‘out there’’ for one or another political actor to pick them up. Norms develop through many iterations across numerous actors and are subject to persistent change until they become codified (and often even afterwards). The number of interactions between various actors, the ensuing debates, and likelihood of re-interpretations further increases when activists engage in the international environment (see for a more optimist interpretation of NGOs’ global effect, Tarrow, 2005; and for a more concerned-critical one, Slaughter, 2004). Most notably, two main forms of influence have contributed to the development of a set of norms concerning domestic violence: (1) Tangible/concrete actors: (A) International Organizations (IOs), (i) NGOs, both formal and informal groups of the feminist movement such as the East–West Women’s Network, human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, and international funding agencies such as the Soros Foundationfinanced Open Society Institute (OSI), (ii) International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) such as the EU, the UN, and the Council of Europe, (B) Individual state governments, most evidently the USA, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Austria, (C) Transnational Corporations (TNCs) such as Phillip Morris and Johnson & Johnson, (D) Professional organizations such as the American Bar Association. (2) Intangibles: Broad international norms, such as democratization and the corresponding respect for human rights, women’s rights, and the broad solidarity-based norms of the European social democratic model that can be widened to potentially include concerns related to domestic violence. Feminist and human rights NGOs in CEE used the international environment, especially the EU, the UN, as leverages to gain lawmakers’ attention to address the issue of domestic violence. NGOs perceived that referring to the normative framework of human rights and democratization of the EU and the UN provided them with avenues to lobby for their interpretation and policy recommendations, even if these issues were in effect low on the actual agenda of these IGOs.


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The globally induced and incipient norms related to domestic violence traveled to CEE in the form of definitions and policy recommendations. Many women’s NGOs and human rights groups in CEE have since become inspired by Western feminist ideology and examples of Western European and North American feminist activism (see related examples of emerging transnational feminist policy networks in Alvarez, 1998, 2000; Grewal, 1998; Moghadam, 2005). That the Central and Eastern European women’s groups and human rights groups activists decided to focus on domestic violence among the many potential issues was greatly due to the inspiration, and to some extent dependence, on Western ideological, strategic, and financial frameworks. Feminist NGOs in CEE were among the first (along with the environmental movement) to turn toward the West after the regime transitions, both for funding and for strategic and ideological advice. But when the Central and Eastern European feminist NGOs opened up toward the West and met potential international counterparts, these two future partners found themselves in very different positions.

4.2. Effects of Western Feminist Social Movements on Domestic Violence Policies In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the international women’s movement had already been energized by an agreement organized primarily through the UN’s Women’s Conferences. The otherwise often sharply conflicting groups agreed that women have an intrinsic right to physical safety. The international women’s movement then started to focus on violence against women and developed a set of public policy recommendations to diminish and eventually eliminate this problem. Domestic violence was one of the fields that reached prominence within the ‘‘violence against women’’ framework. Campaigns against domestic violence and the roots of the shelter movement originated in the UK where, in 1971, the controversial Erin Pizzey established what is considered to be the first battered women’s shelter.7 They were established in the USA later that decade, and were soon transplanted to Western Europe (Dobash & Dobash, 1992; Tierney, 1982). The international women’s movement has established a complex (and still contentious) definition of domestic violence as a subcategory of violence against women that analytically separates it from other forms of violence, such as child or elder abuse (see, for example Buzawa & Buzawa, 2002; Marcus, 1994; Weldon, 2002). This definition also maintains that violence in the home is not an individual or cultural problem, but is a violation of

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human rights for which individual states and the broader community of nations, such as the UN, should provide protection against. If a state fails in this obligation, it should be held responsible (Thomas & Beasley, 1993). In this instance, many feminist theorists’, postmodern writers’, and antifeminists’ objections to grouping all women together notwithstanding differences in class, ethnicity, religion, ability, disability, or sexual preference (Riley, 1988; Young, 1995) were put aside to confer a common identity of potential victimhood and promotion of universal human rights. With the spread of liberal democracy, feminist movements struggled to gain a voice in politics, but slowly (and still partially) managed to convince governments to produce more gender-sensitive laws and policies that included protective orders, domestic violence courts, shelters, trained jurors, police, health professionals, and social workers to recognize and sensitively assist victims. These policy recommendations became part of an emerging international norm on how to address domestic violence. Feminist activists recognized that violence in the home, especially among intimate partners, is prevalent. They attracted attention to this problem, produced awareness-raising campaigns, lobbied governments for funding, and established a network of shelters. But none of these often-comprehensive policies and extensive network shelters has managed to eliminate the problem of violence against women or diminish domestic violence either in Western Europe or in North America. Nevertheless, the feminist movement against violence was still successful in many regards. First and foremost, the various local movements provided facilities for those who needed them. Second, they created an awareness of a previously unrecognized potentially pandemic problem. Raising awareness of domestic violence and making clear that this is an unacceptable practice has probably contributed to more women becoming more willing to make their case public, turning to shelters, and relying on various legal services, such as restraining orders.

4.3. Effects of Central and Eastern European Feminist and Human Rights NGOs on Domestic Violence Policies The Central and Eastern European NGOs emerged from a very different political, economic, and social setting than the democratic traditions in the West did. Only with the advent of regime change in 1989 did freedom of association come to be a reality in CEE. However, dramatic economic restructuring and persistently high unemployment have made activism for social causes an unattainable option for many people. In addition, those


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women who were inspired by feminist principles and were driven to be part of a fledging movement often struggle with the heritage of the communist past, which at least in its rhetoric, supported women’s emancipation in employment and in politics, and provided for broad welfare services, even if these services were frequently of low quality. The communist regimes claimed to have achieved gender equality, and social movements dealing with women’s issues in particular faced significant obstacles. The general perception was that communist governments gave special privileges to women in employment and politics, and that the socialist interpretation of gender equality had been detrimental to the nation and to the family. Accordingly, post-1989 governments encouraged women’s return to the home (Funk & Mueller, 1993; Gal & Kligman, 2000). While many Central and Eastern European women perceived staying at home as a welcome liberation in contrast to the communist-era double or triple burden of paid work, traditional household work, and obligatory political involvement; the post-1989 turn toward supporting traditional gender arrangements further entrenched the inequality between the sexes that had never totally been eliminated. In contrast to the popular perception of women’s alleged equality and privilege under communism, Central and Eastern European feminist NGOs recognized the applicability of domestic violence to the region and they imported many of the terms and recommendations of their Western counterparts. Central and Eastern European feminist NGOs’ new focus on domestic violence had the advantage of both ideological and financial support from Western NGOs, certain Western governments, and various INGOs, such the UN and the EU. With this backing, local NGOs launched various media campaigns and lobbied their governments to harmonize policy with the related international norms. After the fall of the communist system, the broad human rights framework and policy recommendations concerning domestic violence, most notably the Austrian framework, traveled to CEE. In public policy and organizational behavior literature, there are plenty of similar examples of organizations routinely coping models that are deemed legitimate in the environment where they function (Meyer & Scott, 1992). The Austrian framework was particularly attractive to Central and Eastern European feminist activists for at least three related reasons. First, the Austrian model has already provided for Italy and Germany a model of integrated, multi-agency framework of intervention and blueprint for setting up domestic violence shelters, all based on the Duluth (Minnesota, USA) model (WAVE, 2000; Information Centre Against Violence, 2000). Second, Central and Eastern

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European activists were invited to join as partners with the WAVE Network, headquartered in Vienna, Austria. As part of WAVE’s network, Central and Eastern European NGOs could attend Europe-wide information sessions, trainings, and learn about what WAVE considered to be good practices for the prevention of domestic violence (Interviews, WAVE training session, Fall 2004). Third, activists from the Austrian Women’s Shelter Network and Austrian government and police officers were willing to travel, and to provide testimony and policy support when Central and Eastern European NGOs requested their assistance in public events, trainings of jurors and police, and lobbying governments (Interviews, with ROSA, Prague, the Czech Republic, Dr. Krisztina Morvai, Budapest, Hungary, Summer 2003). Transnational norms and international actors exerted pressure, most often indirectly but on occasion directly and personally, on the region to deal with this newly named problem. Central and Eastern European women’s groups routinely implied in their appeals to various local authorities that the degree to which post-communist countries were willing to respond to domestic violence could be used as a gauge of their desire to join the community of democratic nations.

4.4. Effects of IGOs The EU and the UN directly influenced Central and Eastern European’s post-communist governments regarding domestic violence. These organizations’ influence concerning domestic violence policies have been palpable, albeit directly opposite to what one would expect given the very different licenses of these two IGOs. While the EU could have a more immediate and direct influence on its member-states, as of 2007, it had only an indirect effect on CEE’s policies (Krizsań & Zentai, 2004; Rossilli, 2000; Verloo, Maratou-Alipranti, van Beveren, van Lamoen, & Tertinegg, 2004). Since the member-states failed to unanimously adopt the European Constitution in 2005 and thus the further political integration of the EU suffered a major setback, the EU has been further concentrating on market-related affairs and has refrained from directly intervening in controversial areas, such as domestic violence. However, the UN’s CEDAW, which lacks the supranational authority of the EU, had a direct effect by calling on its signatories to implement their promises. For example, in 2005, the UN’s CEDAW Committee issued its first direct condemnation of the Hungarian state apparatus for failing to provide the most basic protection for a victim of domestic violence (A. T. contra Hungary, 2005).


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The next two segments will discuss the effects of the UN and the EU on Central and Eastern European policies related to domestic violence. First, I will explain why the EU has had a limited effect on its Central and Eastern European member-states regarding domestic violence policies. 4.4.1. The Effects of the EU on CEE’s Domestic Violence Policies There are historical and institutional reasons why the EU has influenced domestic violence policies in its Central and Eastern member-states only in a symbolic manner. Institutionally, the EU has strict limits on its capacity to intervene where its supranational jurisdiction does not yet reach, such as social policy. The EU’s principle of subsidiarity also highlights democratic credentials, such as elected representatives’ accountability by giving priority to national and local legislatures, when they are deemed appropriate and closest to deal with specific problems. While the subsidiarity principle is meant to halt the EU’s democratic deficit, it also created a major obstacle to harmonize policies that have implications for human rights and other basic licenses for the exercise of democracy. While EU membership has been particularly attractive for the Central and Eastern European countries, none of the reasons why this region wanted to join has a direct link with improving human rights as they apply to domestic violence.8 Historically, the EU has plenty of limitations to engage in domestic policy issues in CEE, even if these policies may relate directly to its fundamental call for democracy and the respect for human rights, such as domestic violence. For Brussels, the most important reason to integrate CEE has been the immediate economic and security aspects. But even economic integration has been slow and difficult, and EU integration has not progressed as far as EU members harmonizing their rather diverse approaches toward preventing domestic violence and assisting its victims. However, by offering the prospect of membership, the EU has gained considerably more direct leverage to influence CEE even in social policy issues than if it had remained just the giant next door, although it has continued to focus on market integration. At the same time, the EU and its institutions have not been indifferent to gender violence. EU applicant countries have to satisfy the conditions of the Copenhagen criteria which includes the adoption of the acquis communautaire, i.e., the entire accumulated body of EU law, including treaties, regulations, directives, and judgments of European institutions. In addition to the legal binding and enforceable ‘‘hard law’’ of the acquis, the European Commission argued that nonbinding resolutions and recommendations should also be part of conditionality (Grabbe, 2002, p. 253). Most social

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policy and human rights-related themes are part of the non-binding resolutions and recommendations that the EU passed. By framing violence against women as a human rights issue and announcing various resolutions and recommendations, the EU has exerted pressure on member-states and candidate countries to deal more effectively with domestic violence. For example, the Council of the EU held the first meeting of experts regarding the issue of gender violence in December 1998, resulting in the adoption of the ‘‘Measures to Combat Male (Domestic) Violence against Women Standards and Recommendations.’’ Fifty-two explicit norms and recommendations were listed in this document, focusing on the responsibilities of police organizations and adequate criminal proceedings (Measures to Combat Male Violence Against Women, 2002). The EU-endorsed recommendations also emphasized the need for cooperation between state institutions and NGOs, building on the experience of previous decades in many West European countries. During 1999, two more meetings were held, resulting in 10 additional recommendations to the original 52. The additional provisions emphasized that member-states need to establish explicit laws about domestic violence and to improve and closely monitor their implementation, and to increase state funding for services for victims of domestic violence, such as shelters, hotlines, legal aid, housing, training, and employment. In addition, the new recommendations included a focus on the importance of expanding transnational networks, which the EU’s Daphne project further developed. In the wake of these policy recommendations, the European Parliament passed a ‘‘Recommendation on Combating Violence against Women’’ in February 2006, which focused on different forms of violence and was explicit in its encouragement to take action (European Parliament, 2006). Following this line of reasoning, the EU dedicated 50 million Euros to the creation of a Gender Institute, located in Vilnius, Lithuania, to focus on gender equality issues (Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council, 2006). Progress in EU integration has been slow in areas beyond the single market, but the EU’s view for years was that it is better to progress slowly than to isolate any member-state or to leave behind a potentially volatile region that is indisputably part of Europe and on its doorstep. However, on May 29, 2005, French voters rejected the proposed EU Constitution by a clear majority and Dutch voters followed with an even larger margin three days later. In both the cases, objections to the burdens of enlargement of the EU after the admission of the Central and Eastern European members together with Malta and Cyprus played at least some part in this outcome. This shook the barely built foundations of a united Europe, and raised the


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question of how much further than a common market the EU could become. Therefore, the EU has not initiated the transfer of competency to its supranational institutions to gain complete purview over domestic violence policies, even if these issues directly connect to human rights norms, democracy, and states’ obligations to protect their citizens. The murky nature of the EU’s post-2005 political project allowed time and provided further ideological ammunition to the more conservative and nationalist voices in CEE. These politicians began to question and challenge both trust in the EU and the reasons why they should sacrifice their newly won sovereignty in favor of a distant and unelected bureaucracy. In the name of democracy and the EU’s own subsidiarity principle, countries resisted new top-down efforts and seemingly endless rules imposed from abroad.9 Both domestic and international events constrained the development of deeper cooperation between the EU institutions and member-states’ social policy regarding domestic violence. In addition to the above-described reservations of the EU’s bureaucracy to engage in member states’ social policies, the Central and Eastern European NGOs became to some extent disillusioned by the EU. The EU’s flagship Daphne Program has been a prime target for Central and Eastern European NGOs’ criticism and disappointment. The Daphne Program was originally a four-year EU funding scheme, launched in 2000 and then extended for four more years in 2004 to help prevent violence against children, young people, and women. While its main aims were to provide support to the victims of violence and prevent their future exposure to violence, its agenda has increasingly included many other themes as well. In 2006, members of the European Parliament tabled some initiatives to separate the Daphne projects concerning domestic violence from the other projects, such as the fight against drugs, but the focus of the Daphne projects increasingly became the protection of children from violence (Justice and Home Affairs, 2006). On the surface, Daphne is a very attractive supporting mechanism for NGOs working to prevent violence. A few, but slowly increasing number of, Central and Eastern European NGOs have managed to participate (Montoya Kirk & Moburg-Jones, 2006). However, many of these NGOs charge that Daphne is imposing an immense administrative bureaucratic burden that only long-standing and well-established professional groups can muster (Interviews with Habeas Corpus Working Group, Budapest Hungary, Summer 2006). Many Daphne projects require the cooperation of three or more previously non-affiliated NGOs from different countries to propose mega-projects that can only survive until they get the (often late)

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EU funding. These high EU-Daphne project expectations toward a fledging civil society have led to Central and Eastern European NGOs’ disillusion in a partner whom they aspire to satisfy in their extreme need of external support and validation. 4.4.2. The Effects of the UN on CEE’s Domestic Violence Policies As the saying goes, when one door closes, another one may open, which is what happened when the UN’s CEDAW became active exactly when pressure from the EU regarding attention to domestic violence waned. Although the UN operates on an intergovernmental principle that leaves the sovereignty of member-states intact, the UN has created an arena in the international environment for states to impose pressures to conform by mimicking other states and by formally embracing their positions, norms, and beliefs. Formal acceptance of other states’ actions and beliefs is an often-used strategy to signal to other states that the state shares these beliefs and norms and is therefore not a deviant actor (Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2005). Becoming in the 1980s among the first signatories and quickly ratifying CEDAW’s platform of action constituted a set of norms related to gender equality that the socialist states were eager to show off to the world. CEDAW’s platform is becoming one of the main unifying forces among the many interpretations of gender equality across different social and political contexts, and as such, a force of globalization. How did CEDAW become such a powerful international force in promoting norms and policies related to domestic violence, when this term is not even in the original treaty document? The CEDAW entered into force in 1981, and as of November 2, 2006, 185 countries – over 90 percent of the members of the United Nations – are signatories (CEDAW, 2006). Although CEDAW represents a valuable statement of women’s human rights, it is essentially a weak and often ignored instrument among the states that have become party to it. Signatories to CEDAW have made more reservations to its provisions than any other UN convention (Cameron, 2001). To strengthen the oversight role of CEDAW, after four years of difficult negotiations, the 43rd session of the Commission on the Status of Women adopted the Optional Protocol to CEDAW in March 1999. The Optional Protocol brought CEDAW on an equal footing with other international human rights instruments and enhanced the enforcement mechanisms by creating the CEDAW Committee. The Optional Protocol gives individual women and groups of women the ability to make a direct complaint to the CEDAW Committee. The CEDAW Committee consists of members elected


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by the signatory states, but these members are expected to act as experts on women’s issues and not as their country’s national representatives. As of January 23, 2007, 84 countries became parties to the Optional Protocol, with the countries of CEE among the early adopters (CEDAW, 2007). The CEDAW Committee will only consider complaints related to incidents within the domestic jurisdiction of State Parties to the Optional Protocol and only when the complainant has demonstrated that available domestic remedies have been exhausted. When all other domestic avenues of support had closed, Hungarian and Slovak victims used the UN’s CEDAW as an international mechanism to lodge a complaint against their governments through the Optional Protocol. The 2005 direct condemnation by the CEDAW Committee of the Hungarian government’s failure to protect a victim of domestic violence would not have been possible had domestic NGOs and INGOs not spread the message in CEE that domestic violence is not permissible. The Central and Eastern European claimants’ entry to international circles was highly unusual. A direct engagement is personally and legally very challenging, even with some NGO support. In the case of A.T., the Hungarian victim of domestic violence, her action would not have been possible had she not heard of Hungarian NGOs struggling with the government to establish specific domestic violence laws based on international recommendations and had she not reached out for support to feminist NGOs (A.T. contra Hungary, 2005). The Hungarian feminist activist and lawyer Krisztina Morvai was at the time also a member on the CEDAW Committee and her support was most likely crucial to bringing this case to the Committee’s attention. But other Central and Eastern European countries, such as Slovakia, have also been subject to the CEDAW Committee’s criticism over forcible sterilizations of Gypsy women (Joint Submission, 2006; Responses by the Czech Republic to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2006). Utilizing a globally interconnected network of human rights NGOs and feminist experts, and relying on incipient international norms condemning violence against women, Central and Eastern European victims could directly turn to the international arena for help against their own governments. The CEDAW Committee’s condemnation shamed these democratizing governments into action. Even if the Central and Eastern European governments have only partially responded to these criticisms and continue to resist incorporating a comprehensive set of laws and policies to prevent domestic violence and to assist its victims, they surely wish to avoid stepping into the negative international limelight any time soon. The direct

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engagement between individuals from the Central and Eastern European region and international institutions have positively identified an international leverage that promotes change in awareness and attitudes regarding violence against women in general and domestic violence in particular. This unique exchange also underlines the emerging and increasingly evident, but still partial effect of globally interconnected forces regarding domestic violence in CEE.

5. CONCLUSIONS: CEE AS A JUNCTURE OF GLOBAL AND LOCAL INTERPRETATIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE In the past decade and a half, CEE has inched toward implementing a meaningful democratic environment. Because domestic violence robs its victims of physical safety, it fundamentally undermines a basic premise of equality, which is itself a bedrock of democratic political participation. Acknowledging domestic violence, changing public opinions regarding its victims and the perpetrators, and altering a whole array of public policies have been a major test for the new democracies. It has taken a decade for post-communist Europe to develop activist networks capable of pressuring their respective governments to address the long-neglected issue of domestic violence. Despite numerous difficulties in bringing up this issue, many NGOs in CEE devised successful strategies to bring attention to domestic violence, create a public discourse, establish services for victims, and push for legislative action. These NGO strategies fully utilized international networks: they requested expert assistance, transferred policy tools, and applied for and received funds from abroad. They applied Western feminist analysis and tried to establish a voice in the Central and Eastern European media to influence the public and the politicians. Their efforts produced a slow but noticeable change in laws. After a decade and a half, activists can count an increasing awareness of domestic violence in the region as success. In post-communist CEE, acknowledging domestic violence has been especially challenging. In this region, the heritage of the communist period is still simultaneously vilified and exalted. The new problems of the capitalist transition have produced unemployment, homelessness, poverty, and deepening inequality. These deep social problems also challenge meaningful gender equality. Despite the existence of legal structures in the postcommunist countries giving women substantial rights and protection,


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investigations by the International Helsinki Federation of Human Rights clearly indicated that such laws were largely not enforced (2000a, 2000b). Women’s status remains largely defined by traditional expectations in postcommunist Europe. However, Central and Eastern European countries have not only signed various international treaties and become members of various IOs, but they now also exist in an even more interconnected global environment. With the rise of supra-territoriality evidenced by internet use, frequent international travel, etc., NGOs exchange information with one another without major territorial constraints. NGOs can assist one another by bringing pressure on their governments to fulfill promises, empty until now, made under various treaties. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) called this phenomenon ‘‘a paradox of empty promises,’’ discussing how empty commitments of states to international human rights treaties create avenues for international and national activists to put pressures on non-complying states and foster compliance. States can become responsive to domestic and international pressures, which push them to change their behavior and conform to their promises. Self-imposed or externally imposed pressures create powerful incentives to resolve the dissonance of non-compliance by adjusting states’ behavior to their formal promises. In the process of globalization and the rise of supraterritoriality, policy changes may be expedited by international cooperation, moving from (1) state repression and (2) denial, to (3) tactical concessions, (4) prescriptive status, and (5) rule-consistent behavior (Risse & Sikkink, 1999). Domestic violence policies in CEE have moved from the first two steps to occasional denial and a vacillation between steps three and four. At this stage, the governments may offer some tactical concessions to the demands of local NGOs and to the aligned members of the international community. Local and international NGOs make regular prescriptive references to global feminist norms regarding domestic violence and the universality of human rights as valid and urgent claims for CEE to abide by these norms and establish services such as hotlines and shelters with more government support. The naming of domestic violence and a particular set of related public policies have emerged as a diffused, middle-of-the-road response to local activists’ skillful application of international norms in CEE. Enforced gender equality, one of the hallmarks of the communist system, made it difficult for Central and Eastern European feminist and human rights activists to effectively convince politicians and the public that the new governments needed to promote gender equality and assist the predominantly female victims of domestic violence. The problem of

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domestic violence has rarely (and even then, only briefly) appeared prominently as a pressing social or legal problem despite indications that sexual, physical, and psychological violence among intimate partners is widespread. Apparently, the new and still partial domestic violence policies were most often directed at protecting children. In response to the activism of various local and international NGOs, the concept and public perception of domestic violence underwent a significant transformation in CEE. From a problem whose real nature and social prevalence was long absent from general public discourse or was largely misconceived, domestic violence has gradually emerged as an issue. Even more important, the sustained presence of the issue in public discourse has facilitated political discussions, even if the actual decisions on legislative and policy changes to prevent and act against domestic violence are still pending. Like many homogenizing global influences, international human rights are not generally embraced in the same manner and within a similar time frame. In the differential acceptance of international norms and policies related to domestic violence, the universality of human rights appears in remarkably different ways in post-communist CEE that stem from the region’s own historical, social, and cultural heritage. The diffusion of the norms recommended by international agencies regarding domestic violence policies in CEE once more challenges the notion of fully converging regional political, economic, and cultural systems into a single model of capitalist liberal democracy. International norms related to domestic violence diffused and cascaded to a mediocre level of half-hearted official responses in CEE. Instead of calling attention to violence against women, the politically correct terms became more neutral terms, such as domestic violence. This neutral terminology has further perpetuated the image of women being equally the perpetrators themselves. After a decade and a half of activism, local feminist NGOs still face the intense resistance of their governments over the implementation of norms recommended by various international agencies to eliminate domestic violence in CEE. In all these years of often sharply divided local political engagements, some anti-violence NGOs withdrew to service provision by becoming professionalized and they often became co-opted, while others responded by strengthening their international connections and on occasion openly protesting the lack of attention to victims of domestic violence. As a controversial and stalemated issue in CEE, domestic violence ultimately blended with other hotly debated contemporary policy topics, such as prostitution, abortion rights, and voluntary sterilization. These public policy issues stand at the juncture of


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human rights, social responsibility, and gender roles, and they have been the subjects of public debates not least because of the enhanced global encounter between local publics, NGO activists, IOs, and state governments.

NOTES 1. The term CEE as consisting of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia is based on recent political and economic processes, such as these previously communist countries’ accession to the EU in 2004. 2. The implications of having one person as the face of the movement are not negligible. For instance, when in 2006 Krisztina Morvai decided to publicly challenge the Socialist Party-led Hungarian government both regarding the government’s nomination of Andrea Peto+ to replace her in the CEDAW Committee and their handling of the protests commemorating the 1956 uprising, her previously prominent role in raising awareness regarding domestic violence was suddenly put into striking partisan terms. The NGOs who previously associated with her desperately wanted to avoid the nationalist and anti-Semitic charges that she earned (Czene, 2007). 3. The idealization of the home as the one reliably safe place in life supposedly created more of an alliance between men and women as they faced the state as a tyrant intruder during times of oppression in communism. This resistance was coined the ‘‘politics of anti-politics’’ (Konra´d, 1984). The deepest moral shocks about the depth of the state’s infiltration emerged in the previous Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR/East Germany) and Romania where secret service documents showed that family members also (were forced to) spy against one another (Childs & Popplewell, 1996; Deletant, 1995). 4. Dr. A´gnes Vadai was one of the co-sponsors of the Parliamentary resolution to establish a domestic violence law. 5. In France, over 95 percent of victims of assault are women, half of who report abused by intimate partners (UN Commission on Human Rights, 1996, para 61). Similarly, the Austrian Women’s Shelter Network stated that 96 percent of victims were female (WAVE, 2002). In Slovenia, the percentage of women victims of violence increased from 44.6 percent in 1999 to 81.4 percent in 2000 (Veselicˆ, 2006). 6. For a review of the EU and its effect on gender equality in employment, see for example Cichowski (2002), Ellina (2003), Elman (1996), Hoskyns (1995), Kilpatrick (2001), and Mazey (1998). 7. Erin Pizzey also stressed that women could also be perpetrators of domestic violence. Her book, Prone to Violence (1982) was hotly debated because of its explicitly non-gender-specific orientation. Pizzey argues that the British feminists substituted the anti-Capitalist Marxist critique with a similarly general attack on all men (Pizzey, 2005). 8. Three main reasons can explain the Central and Eastern European countries’ profound interest in joining the EU. First, EU membership means a seat at the table where decisions affecting all of Europe are made. With the exception of Poland, the small Central and Eastern European might not wield much influence among

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27 members, but according to general rationale, it is better to be inside looking out than outside looking in. Second, joining the EU is very important symbolically, signifying the end of the Cold War and the continent’s division. It also symbolizes the inclusion of former communist countries into the ‘rich man’s club.’ In practical terms, it also means an end to many decades of humiliation and the inconvenience of having to go through often-long procedures to visit relatives or work in Germany or Austria. Third, from an equally practical consideration, as poorer members of a wealthy organization (with the notable exception of Slovenia, which will soon become a net payer to the EU), the Central and Eastern European would receive a cornucopia of subsidies, as well as opportunities for more or less unrestricted study and work abroad. Joining the EU is still regarded in the region as an essential step in its rite of passage into the modern, prosperous, and democratic world. 9. The principle of subsidiarity means that what the lesser entity can do adequately should not be done by the greater entity unless it can do it better. Taken over into EU policies, subsidiarity is used as an instrument for determining when the Union is to act in areas not coming under its exclusive competence. The subsidiarity principle was first introduced in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht as a general principle applicable to all areas of non-exclusive competence (The EU’s website, Outcome of European Convention, and also: http://www.europa.eu/ scadplus/european_convention/subsidiarity_en.htm (accessed on October 16, 2006)).

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INTERVIEWS Slovenia, September and October 2004: Branko Grim, Social Democratic Party (SDS), Ljubjana Suzi Kvas, C˘elje Women’s Shelter, C˘elje Sonja Robnik, Office of Equal Opportunities, Ljubljana Dora Lesˇ nik and Sˆpela Veselicˆ, SOS Hotline, Ljubljana Maja Plaz, The Association Against Violent Communication, Ljubljana Budapest, Hungary, 2001–2006: Dr. A´gnes Vadai, MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party), June 2003 Gyo¨rgyi To´th, NANE!, June 2003, July 2004, June 2006 Dr. Krisztina Morvai, Women’s and Children’s Rights Research and Training Center foundation, June 2003, July 2004, June 2006 Ge´za Juha´sz, Habeas Corpus Working Group, Budapest Hungary, July 2006 Prague, Czech Republic, July 2003: Gender Studies Center proFem – Central European Consulting Centre Marie Vavronova, Nadace ROSA–ROSA Foundation Bratislava, Slovakia, June 2003: Katarina Farkasˇ ova´, Alliance of Women in Slovakia Jana Cvikova´, ASPECT Monika Bosa, ESET


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Poland, July 2003: Oska: National Women’s Information Center, Warsaw Ursula Nowakowska, Centrum Praw Kobiet-Women’s Right Center, Warsaw Luis Avia, Director of Blue Line, PARPA-State Agency for Prevention of Alcohol Problems, Warsaw Women’s Foundation eFKa, Krakow


EUROPEANIZATION AND THE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES POLICY IN SLOVENIA Zˇiva Humer ABSTRACT This chapter explores the Slovenian equal opportunities policy in the context of globalization debates. Focusing mainly on the equal opportunities legislation in Slovenia and the other recent European Union (EU) member states, the aim of the chapter is to reflect upon globalization as Europeanization and as supraterritorialization. Supraterritorial processes, such as the second wave of Western feminist movement established a mutual relationship with feminists in the former Yugoslavia during the 1980s. Feminism and the feminist movement in Yugoslavia and in Slovenia in the 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s, in particular, represent an important basis for gender equality politics and legislation in Slovenia. Another significant element that contributes to the introduction of gender equality legislation is EU integration. In Slovenia and also in other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries that recently joined the European Union, the accession played a considerable role in adopting gender equality legislation. Europeanization in the context of equal opportunities policy leads to the homogenization process of standards for gender equality in the EU member states. In terms of legislation in member countries, the Europeanization of gender equality policy is performed as top-down Globalization: Perspectives from Central and Eastern Europe Contemporary Studies in Economic and Financial Analysis, Volume 89, 305–326 Copyright r 2007 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1569-3759/doi:10.1016/S1569-3759(07)89009-7

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politics particularly in recent member states, such as CEE. Using the example of gender equality policy in Slovenia, this chapter analyzes equal opportunities policy as a concept and as a legal mechanism emerging from the Western tradition, which was directly applied to CEE countries, such as Slovenia, when they joined the EU.

1. INTRODUCTION Equality between women and men is often called gender equality.1 It has been one of the most contested terrains in political theory. In particular, feminist theory has extensively contributed to books, articles, and discussions in newspapers and journals on equality between women and men (see Squires, 1999; Bacchi, 1996; Bock & James, 1992; Okin, 1979, 1989; Pateman, 1988). Besides theoretical debates, equality between women and men occupies an important position on the political agenda in the European Union (EU). The EU equal opportunities policy, which incorporates gender equality legislation, covers equality between women and men mainly in the public sphere, particularly in the labor market and politics. The equal opportunities policy ‘‘is a procedural approach whereby the concern is that all people – irrespective to gender – are subject to the same procedural rules and formal evaluations in order that they may equally choose to pursue their own ends in their own way’’ (Squires, 1999, p. 120). Equal opportunities is a policy based on the liberal idea of equal rights and distribution as well as an equality policy which refers to the differences between women and men, among men and among women (Shrage, 2000). As for the EU member candidate countries, the EU requirements concerning equal opportunities legislation were binding conditions for accession.2 The accession to the European Union has played a considerable role in the adoption of equal opportunities legislation in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).3 The way how a country introduced gender equality legislation in its national legal framework was up to the candidate’s decision.4 In Slovenia, the National Assembly adopted an umbrella law on gender equality, the Act on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, on June 21, 2002. As an umbrella law, the Act on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men is general and broad, and as such, represents the legislative basis for gender equality policy in Slovenia. From among the CEE countries that recently joined the EU, this chapter focuses on Slovenia and its equal opportunities policy from the perspective of Europeanization and supraterritorialization debates.5

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In the former Yugoslavia, gender equality was part of formal equality legislation. However, formal equality legislation was manifested as inequality between women and men in their everyday lives (such as wage gap, glass ceiling), as Butorova states that ‘‘equality de iure was often inequality de facto’’ (1996, p. 81). In Slovenia and in other parts of the former Yugoslavia, women’s entry to mass employment in the 1960s and 1970s only appeared to solve the problem of women by emancipation. The lack of consideration for gender equality in the former Yugoslavia was transmitted to the transition period in Slovenia and to the period of Slovenia’s accession to the EU. After the rise of democracy in the 1990s and the integration of CEE countries to the EU, gender equality-related themes were incorporated in the political agenda of CEE countries as a part of the EU’s law, the acquis communitaire (Gortnar & Salecl, 2004). Apart from the integration to the EU in 2004, it was the feminist movement in Slovenia in the 1980s and 1990s that importantly contributed to the foundations of gender equality politics. The preservation of the Article 55 (the right to abortion) in the Slovene Constitution in December 1991, the formations of women-specific state institutions, such as Komisija za zˇensko politiko (Committee for Women’s Politics) and Urad za zˇensko politiko (Office for Women’s Politics) are the most remarkable examples of success of the feminist movement in Slovenia as they form the local basis of gender equality politics. The feminist movement in Slovenia developed from an intersection of the local environments in the former Yugoslavia and of the international feminist movement. As such, the Slovene feminist movements represent supraterritorial processes, where territory is no longer fully territorially fixed and borders no longer present a particular obstacle for interaction among people. Particularly, when referring to globalization as supraterritorialization, I use Scholte’s (2000) concept where globalization encompasses the transformation of human geography, which includes supraterritorial relations among people and which shifts social structures from governments to governance (p. 46). This chapter examines the equal opportunities policy in Slovenia during three periods: the period of the 1980s of the former Yugoslavia, the transition process in the 1990s, and the EU period (Slovenia’s accession and membership). My aim is twofold. One aim is to explore how globalization as Europeanization extends Western legal mechanisms to Slovenia in the field of gender equality. The second aim is to seek how feminist movements of the second wave, provided an example of the supraterritorial process, influencing feminism and the feminist movement in Yugoslavia in the 1980s. I argue that feminism in the former Yugoslavia in the 1980s,

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influenced by the Western feminist movement, represents a pillar of developing a new equal opportunities policy in the 1980s and onward in Slovenia. As such, the feminist movement in Slovenia emerged and thrived as an intersection of local needs and international movement support. The first part of the chapter discusses the former Yugoslav position on gender equality and then proceeds to the post-1989 transition period in Slovenia. Feminist gatherings, feminist literature and frequent exchanges of information and experience between feminists from the West and feminists in the former Yugoslavia represent feminist movements as a supraterritorial process. In the transition period, Slovenia’s politics was focused on the pronouncedly territorial process of establishing the new state, its security, and its integration to supranational institutions, such as NATO and the EU. Gender equality politics seemed to be on the margins of political agenda in Slovenia during the 1990s. Feminist groups, which were a significant part of civil society in Slovenia during the second half of the 1980s and during the 1990s, were influenced by the second wave of the Western feminist movement. They were also affected by the experiences of feminist movement in Yugoslavia and its attitude toward gender equality. The feminist movement in Slovenia, enriched with feminist experience and equality legislation in the former Yugoslavia, laid the foundations of equal opportunities policy. In the second part of the chapter, the investigation of the role of the EU as a promoter of common European political issues in its member states will follow the analysis of the period of Slovenia’s accession to the EU. The EU demonstrates a homogenizing effect in terms of enforcing gender equality legislation in its member states without considering the particular local aspects of gender politics. The equal opportunities policy in the EU member states shifts from national and territorial frames to supraterritorial relations. In applying the EU policies and mechanisms of gender equality and transferring those to the post-communist countries, my question is what the effects of gender equality are. Focusing on Slovenia, my central argument is that the adoption of equal opportunities policy in the accession process in CEE countries lack the consideration of local social and gender contexts, and it works as a homogenization of standards and mechanisms for gender equality in member states. Europeanization is a process of developing governance of the EU, which is accomplished through setting the rules and common standards in all member states and is a ‘‘part of global reordering’’ (Pieterse, 2002, p. 129). Since the 1980s, European integration is no more only economically oriented, but political considerations are more and more


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interwoven with economic parameters (Pieterse, 2002). Europeanization in terms of gender equality legislation in the EU member states shows the extension of the Western legal culture to CEE countries. The EU accession process signifies a powerful external base for the legitimization of the equal opportunities policy in Slovenia, where the official politics ‘‘forgot’’ women after the shift from communism to capitalism and liberal democracy. The EU is a supranational institution, which among many issues is stressing its principles and values also in gender equality in member states. The EU enlargement brought the introduction of equal opportunities policy to CEE countries, where feminism and gender equality issues were and still are publicly perceived as negative or unnecessary (Jalusˇ icˇ, 2002; Butorova, 1996; Adamik, 1993; Sˇiklova, 1993, 1996; Drakulic´, 1993; Havelkova, 1993).

2. FORMAL EQUALITY AND UNEQUAL POSITION OF WOMEN AND MEN IN YUGOSLAVIA Communism and its relation to gender equality and women’s emancipation are explained in an illustrative way by Sˇiklova (1996) noting that ‘‘nobody would be left behind, nobody would get ahead and we would be all in the same boat’’ (p. 12). The idea of equality in communism incorporated sameness and collectivist spirit (see Bretherton, 2001; Kiczkova & Farkasova, 1993). The communist ideology was based on the belief that inequality between women and men would be resolved when inequality, based on class relations and private property, was eliminated (Fodor, 2004; Jalusˇ icˇ, 1999; Jeraj, 2003). Therefore, the general idea of equality was the inclusion and participation of both women and men in the public sphere, that is, in the sphere of politics and labor market (Kiczkova & Farkasova, 1993; Watson, 2000). In addition to the role of mothers and housewives, women were also expected according to the communist ideology to enter the public space as workers (Duhacˇek, 1993; Fodor, 2004; Jeraj, 2003; Petrova, 1993). The double burden including women’s full employment and caring for the family in communism advanced to women’s ‘‘struggles on three fronts’’ – in the family as mothers, housewives, as good workers at their jobs, and as social activists in public activities (Petrova, 1993, p. 23). Women’s mass entry into labor sphere in communist countries was considered as a ‘‘duty to the state and to their families’’ (Molyneux, 1982, p. 174). According to Fodor’s comparison between the communist gender regime in Hungary and the

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capitalist gender regime in Austria in the early 1980s, 73 percent of women of working age were employed full time in Hungary, while in Austria 43 percent of women were engaged in paid employment. As a result of the gendered ideology of communism, only about 5 percent of women in Hungary were classified as housewives in 1982, while in Austria about 40 percent of women were listed as housewives (Fodor, 2004, p. 789). In 1989, between 70 and 90 percent of women of working age were engaged in paid full-time employment in CEE countries (Gortnar, 2002, p. 8). In Slovenia, the employment of women after the Second World War grew steadily from 33.2 percent of women among all employed in 1953 to 47.7 percent of women among all employed in 1997 (Kozmik & Jeram, 1997, p. 107; Urad za zˇensko politiko (Office for Women’s Politics), 1993, p. 25). Women in the former Yugoslavia encountered the Western-defined concept of gender equality based on the experience of communism, where legislation granted women the right to vote, the right for choice regarding abortion, also at least in principle, advocated equal pay and quotas in politics (Duhacˇek, 1993; Jeraj, 2003). The formal equality during communism included many social provisions, such as daycare centers for children and health insurance coverage that enabled women to participate in the labor sphere (Jalusˇ icˇ, 1999, 2002; Duhacˇek, 1993). Communism in Yugoslavia improved the situation of women in the labor sphere in terms of economic independence and in the domain of social rights (Gortnar, 2002; Watson, 2000). Women were engaged in the public sphere as workers, but not as citizens. In this regard, women were unlike – to a certain extent – men (Einhorn, 1993). However, the high level of employment of women and their relative economic independence did not change or extensively influence the traditional gender roles of women and men in the private sphere. One would expect that formal equality would lead to equality between women and men in their everyday lives during communism in CEE countries. On the contrary, statistics show that during communism women in the former Czechoslovakia earned 50 percent of male salary for equal work (Sˇiklova, 1993, p. 75; Havelkova, 1993). In general, in CEE countries women earned around 66–75 percent of men’s wages (Gortnar, 2002, p. 8). In politics, women in CEE countries were strongly represented as the quota system ensured women between 23 and 30 percent of the parliamentary seats, representation in the Party and in trade unions. However, they were excluded from political power. For example, less than 5 percent in the highest Communist Party organs in the former Soviet Union were women in the 1960s and 1970s (Pollert, 2001, p. 16). In the former Yugoslavia, there was a 30 percent quota for women’s participation in the politics, but they


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were only tokens and lacked political power in the decision-making processes (Drakulic´, 1993). Despite the formal rights women had in Yugoslavia, they remained ‘‘subordinated and segregated in all walks of life’’ (Milic´, 1993, p. 111). However, one important stage in Yugoslavia of the 1980s was feminism, which, on the one hand, represented supraterritorial process of interaction and cooperation with women from Western countries. On the other hand, feminism in Yugoslavia represented a critical stand toward the unequal political and economic situation of women and men in their society.

3. FEMINIST MOVEMENT IN YUGOSLAVIA IN THE 1980S6 Feminist movements have become global movements, which are not territorially fixed by national borders and politics. The second wave of feminism in the 1960s and 1970s, emerging from the USA and Western European countries, had a profound impact on ideas and local feminist initiatives in other parts of the world. One of the locations where these ideas found a fertile ground was the former Yugoslavia. As borders of the former Yugoslavia were relatively open to the West – in comparison with its communist neighbors – people could rather freely travel abroad. Books, music and other items from the Western world were accessible but with some restrictions (Drakulic´, 1992; Jalusˇ icˇ, 2002). This relative openness enabled the Western feminism and the feminist movement’s spirit to enter the former Yugoslavia in the 1980s, bringing along related literature and inspiring feminist gatherings, where activists from abroad also participated (Jalusˇ icˇ, 2002; Drakulic´, 1992).7 Although the Western feminist movement influenced the feminist movement in the former Yugoslavia, feminism in the late 1970s emerged from the rebellion against the ruling party and its paternalistic attitude toward women. There was also a widespread dissatisfaction with ethno-nationalisms in the former Yugoslavia that became especially prevalent after Tito’s death in 1980 (Jalusˇ icˇ, 2002; Milic´, 1993). Feminist ideas and analyses of gender equality were accessible to women in the former Yugoslavia through feminist literature and feminist gatherings. An illustration of one such example comes as early as 1978, when a group of female academics organized a feminist conference Drug-ca zˇena, Zˇensko pitanje – novi pristup (Women’s Question – New Approach) at the Student Cultural Center in Belgrade. Feminists from Western and some Eastern European countries participated.8 According to Lepa MlaXenovic´,

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a well-known feminist who was publicly active from the late 1970s onwards, the women’s question was for the first time a relevant issue discussed in a public space. This gathering in Belgrade was one of the key events in the feminist movement in Yugoslavia after the Second World War (MlaXenovic´, 2006). Feminist centers in the former Yugoslavia were mostly in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana, where feminist activism was very strong (Jalusˇ icˇ, 2002). Since all organized activities had to be subsumed under the official structures of the Communist Party or a federation, feminist groups in the 1980s were also organized in such formal structures. Among the many feminist groups in the former Yugoslavia, a women’s section Zˇena i drusˇtvo (Woman and Society) at the Sociological Association was established in Zagreb, Croatia, in 1979. This women’s association had an important influence on feminist activism in Ljubljana, particularly by organizing feminist gatherings and connecting female academics (Jalusˇ icˇ, 2002, p. 27).9 In Ljubljana, Slovenia, a group of women researchers and professors established Zˇenska sekcija pri sociolosˇkem drusˇtvu (Women’s Section at the Sociological Association) in 1984 (Jalusˇ icˇ, 2002; Susˇ nik, 2004).10 The Women’s Section organized roundtables, lectures on feminism and psychoanalysis, feminism and Marxism, published articles, and represented the first feminist consciousness-raising group after the Second World War in Slovenia (Jalusˇ icˇ, 1999; Susˇ nik, 2004).11 MlaXenovic´ (2006) indicates that there were two major turning points of feminist activism in Yugoslavia. Besides the first international feminist conference in 1978, Yugoslav feminist conferences and the establishment of SOS Hotlines for Women and Children Victims of Violence represents the pillar of feminist movement in Yugoslavia in the 1980s. The importance of feminist groups is not only in creating a forum for interaction among women in Yugoslavia, but also in publicly pointing out the taboo issues, such as, violence against women, sexuality, sisterhood, and many others. The first Yugoslav feminist conference was organized by the feminist group Lilit in Ljubljana in 1987. This gathering connected feminists from all over Yugoslavia, and issues of sisterhood and of women’s art in culture were discussed. Three feminist conferences followed suit: the first one was held in Zagreb in 1988, the second in Belgrade in 1990, and the last one in 1991, just before the war started in the former Yugoslavia, again in Ljubljana.12 SOS Hotlines for Women and Children Victims of Violence was established in 1988 in Zagreb, in 1989 in Ljubljana, and in 1990 in Belgrade. According to MlaXenovic´, SOS hotlines represent feminist solidarity among women and the fight against men’s violence against women. Moreover, workshops and


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educational training for SOS hot lines were based on mutual exchange of knowledge and experience between feminists from all over Yugoslavia (MlaXenovic´, 2006). When feminist groups in the 1980s became stronger and louder in claiming women’s rights for equality, the ruling Communist Party disapproved their activities and saw them as one of the dangers to communist system. This marginalization was especially obvious when the feminist groups brought topics such as violence against women, rape within marriage, and women’s sexuality from the closet of the private sphere to the public (MlaXenovic´, 2006; Jalusˇ icˇ, 2002). One of the first open conflicts with the Communist Party occurred at the Sociological Days entitled Druzˇina in vloga zˇenske v samoupravni socialisticˇni druzˇbi (Family and the Role of Women in Self-Management Socialist Society) in 1976 in Portorozˇ, Slovenia. In that conference, the question of feminism in communism was for the first time on the agenda, causing a huge debate and an open conflict between feminism and politics. For example, one of the ideologists of the Communist Party, Stipe Sˇuvar reacted in the periodical Nasˇe teme (Our topics) with the text titled ‘‘Feminism as a form of conservative consciousness’’ (Jalusˇ icˇ, 2002, pp. 103–104). The former Yugoslavia wrapped gender equality under the equality for all, and its leadership expected the elimination of private property and class division to lead in that direction. These divisions did not disappear and equality did not happen. Feminism, in the eyes of the ruling party, was considered as unnecessary, because in their view, communism emancipated women in the former Yugoslavia after the Second World War (Drakulic´, 1984, p. 103). Despite the communist elite’s resentment of feminist groups in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, feminist groups and their activism emerged and thrived as an intersection of local needs and international movement support.

4. TRANSITION PERIOD IN SLOVENIA The war-torn breakdown of the former Yugoslavia in 1991 and the transition from communism to democracy was marked by political and social uncertainty, unemployment, and the privatization process. These processes had a worse impact among women than men. Some of the main concerns of Slovenian politics in the 1990s were the integration of the country into supranational institutions like the EU and NATO. At the same time, the governmental outlays for social provisions and facilities were

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reduced and participation of women in politics decreased from the quota of 30 percent during the communist period to 8 percent in 1996 (see Jalusˇ icˇ & Antic´, 2001; Antic´, 1999; Drakulic´, 1993). As Drakulic´ (1993) pointed out, ‘‘women once again are being told that something else is more important than their rights: this time, it is democracy’’ (p. 128). The equality of women and men was again a marginal issue, which was put on the agenda only in the accession period due to the EU accession requirements. However, the feminist heritage from the former Yugoslavia, the existing legislation of gender equality, such as the constitutional right to decide on abortion, and the feminist movement in Slovenia in the late 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s laid the basis for equal opportunities policy in Slovenia. In the most recent post-communist period in Slovenia, the percentage of employed women was still increasing also due to the rapid increase of unemployment among men. In effect, the number of all full-time employed women decreased from 384,483 in 1988 to 313,388 in 1992 (Urad za zˇensko politiko (Office for Women’s Politics), 1993, pp. 25–26). Analogues trends characterized the unemployment, where the number of unemployed women increased from 7.412 in 1987 to 56.677 in 1995 (Kozmik & Jeram, 1997, p. 116). Even with the equal pay legislation, the wage gap between men and women in all branches of the economy in Slovenia today is about 10 percent (Urad za enake mozˇnosti (Office for Equal Opportunities), 2006, p. 38). In contrast to the relatively small widening of the wage gap, women’s political participation has dramatically decreased since the 1990s: from 16.8 percent of women MPs in 1992 to 8.4 percent of women MPs in 1996 and to 13.3 percent of women MPs in 2000 and 2004. In 2004, there was only one women minister (assigned to the Ministry of Agriculture) among 15 ministers (Urad za enake mozˇnosti (Office for Equal Opportunities), 2006). Despite the refusal to implement quotas in the Slovene National Assembly because it was deemed as an unpleasant reminder of state socialism, there is a minimum of 40 percent quota for MPs of the Republic of Slovenia in the European Parliament, which resulted in 43 percent of women MEPs (Urad za enake mozˇnosti (Office for Equal Opportunities), 2006).13 The equality of men and women was not a focus of politics during the transition period in Slovenia and as such, it was not taken seriously in public discourse. Women were not taken as ‘‘serious political agents’’ by male colleagues in politics and in general in public discourse (Jalusˇ icˇ & Antic´, 2001, p. 44). This is still the case. Despite social and political uncertainty in the 1990s and a rather negative political attitude toward feminism and gender equality-related themes in Slovene official politics and in public discourse, feminist groups laid the foundations for equal opportunities policy.


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5. FEMINISM AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITES POLICY IN SLOVENIA In the late 1980s and during the first half of 1990s, feminist groups played an important role in the new social movements. Feminist heritage from the communist period in Yugoslavia, enriched with the Western feminist movement, represent the basis for gender equality politics in the post-1990 transition period in Slovenia. The feminist movement in Slovenia cooperated with institutionalized politics, which resulted in preserving the constitutional right to decide on abortion in 1991 when the Slovenian Constitution was adopted. When the new constitution was adopted, the debate in the National Assembly was going on whether the abortion right should stay in the Constitution or not.14 This polarized debate in the newly independent Slovenia resulted in the demonstrations in December 11, 1991, for making the abortion right a constitutional right. This protest brought together not only feminist groups, but also men, MPs, and peace movement activists. The feminist group, Zˇenske za politiko (Women for Politics) was central in organizing the demonstration. They also produced an anthology, titled Abortus. Pravica do izbire (Abortion. The Right to Choose) in 1991 (Jalusˇ icˇ, 2002, pp. 77–80). Zˇenske za politiko (Women for Politics) initiated the coalition Za izbiro (For Choice), which consisted of different feminist groups, trade unions, different political non-governmental parties, including Zeleni (the Green Party), which was a part of governmental coalition Demos. The coalition Za izbiro (For Choice) submitted a petition to the government for the inclusion of Article 55 (The Right to Free Will to Decide on Childbirth) in the new Slovenian Constitution. A large demonstration was held during the National Assembly meeting on December 11, 1991, in Ljubljana, when a group of women brought a Christmas tree, decorated with condoms, and presented it to the National Assembly. Many MPs joined the demonstrators on the square before the Assembly building. The result of the joint feminist campaign was the preservation of Article 55 in the Slovenian Constitution (Jalusˇ icˇ, 2002, pp. 77–80). Feminism in this period directly influenced the formation of the institutions in the new state, which seems to be a significant step toward gender equality politics in Slovenia. The influence of feminism and its public activities were empowered by the cooperation between feminist groups and governmental institutions. The cooperation between a NGO, such as Zˇenske za politiko (Women for Politics) and the parliamentary Komisija za zˇensko politiko (Committee for Women’s Politics) was an important actor, especially on the abortion issue.

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Komisija za zˇensko politiko (Committee for Women’s Politics) in the Slovenian National Assembly was established in 1990 and it worked until 2000.15 Their main tasks were to give objections, opinions, and proposals during the procedure of passing laws in the Slovenian National Assembly, particularly the legislation related to improving the position of women. Despite the fact that Komisija za zˇensko politiko (Committee for Women’s Politics) was a consultative body with limited authority, its cooperation with Zˇenske za politiko (Women for Politics) and their common lobbying together with male MPs resulted in the fact that Komisija za zˇensko politiko (Committee for Women’s Politics) addressed many proposals in health and family policy, and adopted the favorable legislation on health policy, social policy and on the right to abortion. The cooperation of the governmental Komisija za zˇensko politiko (Committee for Women’s Politics) and the NGOs, like Zˇenske za politko (Women for Politics), was also to exert pressure on official politics. Besides, Zˇenske za politiko (Women for Politics) initiated the idea of a Ministry for Women. This pressure resulted in the establishment of the governmental Urad za zˇensko politiko (Office for Women’s Politics) (Jalusˇ icˇ, 2002, p. 74; Gortnar, 2002, p. 43). Another important institution in the field of gender equality politics is the governmental office, Urad za zˇensko politiko (The Office for Women’s Politics), which was founded in 1992 and renamed Urad za enake mozˇnosti (The Office for Equal Opportunities) in 2001.16 Despite its limited authority and marginalized status in the Slovenian Government, Urad za enake mozˇnosti (The Office for Equal Opportunities) has remained the main political actor of gender equality in institutionalized politics.17 The main aim of this Office is to monitor the implementation of laws and regulations on assuring gender equality and to cooperate with ministries, the government, and the EU (Gortnar, 2002, p. 43). The list of its main achievements regarding equal opportunities includes the umbrella law, the 2002 Act on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men and the 2004 Act on Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment. The Act on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men was adopted by the Slovenian National Assembly in June 21, 2002, as a part of the EU’s law, the acquis communitaire and this law became a part of Slovenian gender equality politics. Overall, gender equality politics in Slovenia in the 1990s emerged as a result of the feminist heritage from the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. These social movement activities and not the EU have laid the foundations for the Slovenian governmental institutions, such as Urad za enake mozˇnosti (Office for Equal Opportunities) and Komisija za enake mozˇnosti (Commission for Equal Opportunities). These two offices, which emerge from the


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civil society movement, along with the strong involvement of feminist groups, have prepared the ground for the institutionalization of gender equality politics and the equal opportunities policy. The influence of the EU and the EU integration deals merely with setting standards for gender equality in the public sphere, in labor market and in politics, while traditional gender roles and family relations have remained again in the closet of the private sphere.

6. EU INTEGRATION AND GENDER EQUALITY Notwithstanding weak interest about gender equality-related themes in the transition period shown by the Slovenian politics and especially male politicians, the foundation for the introduction of equal opportunities legislation were established after the first multi-party elections in 1992 (Gortnar, 2002, p. 45). The explanation for this apparent contradiction is fourfold. Firstly, the measures for gender equality in the public sphere, which were ratified by the former Yugoslavia, became a part of the legislation of the Republic of Slovenia after 1991. Secondly, international influence on gender equality politics in Slovenia (international documents and declarations), such as the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), the Community Framework Strategy on Gender Equality (2001–2005), and the Beijing conference made the impact (1995). Thirdly, and most importantly for this chapter, feminist movements in the 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s put pressure on the official politics in Slovenia and directly influenced the formation of state institutions, thus enabling the preservation of Article 55 in the Slovenian Constitution.18 The fourth important element for adopting the equal opportunities policy in Slovenia, particularly the Act on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men (2002), was the integration to the EU in 2004. Regardless of the ambivalent attitude of politicians in the 1990s toward gender equality-related themes, the legislative framework for the genderrelated aspects of equal opportunities policy is well established in Slovenia, also due to the strong feminist influence in the late 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s. The Slovenian legislative framework of equal opportunities is regulated by the Constitution in Article 14, which declares equal human rights and basic freedoms to everyone irrespective of nationality, gender, race, language, religion, political, or other beliefs (Ustava Republike Slovenije (Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia), 2006). Article 14 is supported by other anti-discrimination laws, such as the prohibition of direct and indirect discrimination at work in the (Zakon o delovnih razmerjih

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(Employment Relations Act), 2006; Gortnar, 2002). In family policy, the Act on paternity leave (2003), regulated by the Zakon o starsˇ evskem varstvu in druzˇinskih prejemkih (Parental Protection and Family Benefit Act) (Official Gazette, no. 110, 2001), underpins the idea of gender equality with the possibility of sharing the parental leave between men and women. Despite the legal possibility of sharing parental leave since 2001, childcare has remained highly gendered.19 Statistics show that only approximately 2 percent of men use parental leave (Ministry for Work, Family and Social Affairs, 2006).20 While the feminist movement had influence on gender equality politics in the 1990s, then the EU played an important role in the accession period in Slovenia. The EU requirements for accession address the candidate countries’ legal harmonization with the EU legislation. The EU requirements on equal opportunities legislation, as already emphasized, were binding for the candidate countries. The Act was introduced in 2002 to the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia as part of the legislative package of the EU recommendations and directives as acquis communautaire. As an umbrella law, the Act regulates gender equality in Slovenia in general. In order to establish equal opportunities and equal treatment of women and men, the Act provides general and special measures. The general measures are related to the law that prohibits discrimination based on gender. They include the activities of the government and of the Office for Equal Opportunities to promote within their work equal opportunities and equal treatment of women and men. The special measures are concerned with promoting equality of women and men in the public sphere by implementing positive, encouraging and programme measures. The list of measures states the need to assure ‘‘gender equality’’ in those fields where underrepresentation of either women or men is observed (i.e., when a representation of either women or men is lower than 40 percent) (Act, Article 7/2, p. 3). The Act is based on the EU directives and documents, and one can easily notice the parallel between the topics and terminology of the EU documents, such as the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Community Framework Strategy on Gender Equality (2001–2005), and the Act. Each of these laws, the Slovenian and the EU, strive for equal opportunities for women and men in the public sphere: in labor market and in politics. They both also aim for equal participation by using positive action, like introduction of quotas, which Slovenia already had under communism. The shortcomings of the Act and the EU laws are also the same: they both overlook the relevance of the private sphere, especially the gender division of domestic work and care work. Another problematic issue is that the introduction of this bill followed a top-down strategy. Because equal opportunities legislation was a part of


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the EU legal framework, Slovenia adopted this legislation without adjusting it to its local context. There was no public discussion about equal opportunities legislation in Slovenia and MPs discussed it only briefly, more or less just from the legislative perspective; they did not discuss the relevance of such law or gender equality itself (Humer & Susˇ nik, 2004). All what the people in Slovenia could hear in the media was that this legislation was a necessary step in joining the EU. To sum up, what counted for higher-level politics and politicians in Slovenia was the formality of adopting the law on equal opportunities and not the relevance of gender equality as such. This demonstrates the Slovenia’s case, where politicians and public administration were mostly interested in ‘‘the formal and legal aspects of alignment with the EU and the question of administrative efficiency rather than the actual content of the issues’’ (Jalusˇ icˇ & Antic´, 2001, p. 52). The fulfillment in Slovenia of the EU requirements and directives are pursued through a top-down strategy. Besides, the EU does not request from candidate countries to show any political will to deal with gender equality politics (as emphasized by Regulska, 2001). This lack of oversight marginalizes the problem of gender inequality on both levels: on the level of the EU and that of candidate countries. The EU requirements for adopting the equal opportunities policy in candidate countries work as a template for adopting gender equality legislation to improve the position of women in labor market and in politics.

7. CONCLUSION In Slovenia, gender equality politics has not yet been a priority on the political agenda. In the former Yugoslavia, gender equality was formally granted in the legislation, but the unequal position of women and men was visible in every step in life. The feminist movement in Yugoslavia in the 1980s, influenced by the feminist movements from the West, laid the foundations for gender equality politics. In particular, the Slovenian feminist movement as a part of civil society movements in the late 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s significantly influenced the institutionalization of gender equality politics. Another relevant element toward the establishment of equal opportunity as the country’s official policy was Slovenia’s EU integration in 2004. Equal opportunities became fundamental principles of Slovene legislation, originally coming from the EU legislation with regard to employment policy, labor market, and political participation (Gortnar & Salecl, 2004). Equal

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opportunities legislation in Slovenia, such as the Act on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men (2002) and the Act Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment (2004), were adopted during the accession period. The EU impacts on the Slovene equal opportunities can be recognized in the Slovenian Act on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men. The Act itself reflects the EU’s approach on gender equality in labor market and in politics. Legal mechanisms, such as the Act, which aim to achieve equality for women and men in the public sphere, are inadequate with regard to achieving their main goal – gender equality in all spheres of life. In Slovenia, for example, one could speculate that without the EU’s pressure in the accession period, equal opportunities policy and, in particular, the related Act, would not have been introduced or adopted since there was and still is almost no interest among politicians and the general public on gender-related issues. Overall, even though the chapter’s focus is mainly on Slovenia, transferring the EU equal opportunities policy to CEE ‘‘assumes that – regardless of history or political situation – gender relations are essentially the same’’ in the twenty-five EU countries and therefore should be treated the same way (Watson, 2000, p. 370). What is at stake here is not only the effectiveness of transferring gender equality politics from the EU to CEE, but also whether homogenizing gender equality politics on the EU level can work for every member state in the same way and with similarly positive effects. As Shaw (2000) critically states, that ‘‘processes of deterritorialization must not be overemphasized, as there exist very different gender regimes or gender contracts across the member states’’ (p. 424).

NOTES 1. In this chapter I use both the terms ‘‘gender equality politics’’ and ‘‘gender equality policy’’. With the former term, I refer to the broader understanding of politics, which goes beyond narrow understanding of politics as government, elections and political parties, by including citizens as political thinkers and issues, such as gender equality as political issue. The term ‘‘gender equality policy’’ is used in the context of legislation and its implementation, rules and rights of citizens. 2. In the fifth EU enlargement on May 1, 2004, the following ten countries became the EU member states: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 3. The EU developed three approaches to equal opportunities policy: equal treatment, positive action, and gender mainstreaming (Mazey, 2000; Rees, 1998). In this chapter, equal opportunities policy is used as a concept, which was developed in the West and implemented in the East through Europeanization.


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4. The accession country could introduce several articles within already existing bills (for example, employment bill, antidiscrimination bill, etc.) or it could introduce and adopt a new bill on gender equality, as it was the case in Slovenia. 5. I consider Slovenia as a post-socialist country and the term ‘‘state socialism’’ to denote the political and economic system in Slovenia from 1945 to 1991, when it was a part of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. According to Marx, socialism is only the transitional phase to communist society. The social and political system in the CEE countries has never reached the level of communism, which Marx considered necessary. To reach consistency in this volume, I use the term post-communist when referring to CEE countries, including Slovenia. 6. In this chapter, I mention only some of the most important feminist groups and some notable feminists, especially the ones who started feminist activism in the former Yugoslavia during the 1980s. 7. The considerable stream of translation of the feminist literature into languages of the former Yugoslavia largely contributed to the development of feminism in Yugoslavia during the 1980s. Some of the most notable feminist publications include: Der dressierte Mann by Esther Vilar, translated into Croatian in 1976, Against Our Will by Susan Brownmiller, translated into Slovene in 1988, Woman in Socialism by Aleksandra Kollontaj was translated into Slovene in 1984 (Jalusˇ icˇ, 2002). 8. Among the many feminists from the West who participated in the conference were Parveen Adams, Christine Deplhy, Chiara Saraceno, Nil Yalter, and Alice Schwarzer. There are some well-known intellectuals among the feminists from Yugoslavia who participated in the conference, such as Zˇarana Papic´ and Lydia Sklevicky, Silva Mezˇnaricˇ, Rada Ivekovic´, AnXelka Milic´, and Nada Ler-Sofronic´ (Jalusˇ icˇ, 2002, p. 61). For the complete list of participants of the feminist conference in Belgrade in 1978, please see the web page of Asociacija za zˇensku iniciativu (which is the former group Woman and Society, renamed in 1997 to Association for Women’s Initaitive – AWIN), http://www.awin.org.yu 9. A group with the same name as Zagreb-based Zˇena i drusˇtvo (Woman and Society) was also established at the Belgrade Student Cultural Center in 1980 (MlaXenovic´, 2006). 10. One of the important features of the feminist groups in Slovenia was circling, meaning that when in a feminist group conflicts occurred, the group did not necessarily disintegrate, but simply two or three other feminist groups were formed. For example, Zˇenske za politiko (Women for Politics) was established in 1990 from the members of other groups, such as Lilit, SOS telefon za zˇenske in otroke – zˇrtve nasilja (SOS Hot Line for Women and Children – Victims of Violence). Many members of Women for Politics became later members of other groups and institutions, such as the governmental Urad za zˇensko politiko (Office for Women’s Politics), the NGO Zˇenske v cˇrnem (Women in Black), Zˇenska svetovalnica (Women Counseling), Minerva (part of Liberal Democratic Party) (Jalusˇ icˇ, 2002). 11. Before the Second World War, women’s associations and groups were numerous in Slovenia as well as in other parts of Yugoslavia. They also had international connections with other groups. For example, the Slovenian Zˇenski pokret (Women’s Movement) (1926–1941) was a member of the International Alliance of Women for Suffrage and Equal Citizenship (Jeraj, 2000). After the Second World War, the communist system prohibited all independent organizing, among them women’s

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organizations. The Communist Party established Antifasˇisticˇna fronta zˇensk (AFZˇ/ Antifascist Women’s Front), which was a state supplement for women’s organizations (Jeraj, 2000). AFZˇ was an example of the state feminism, where women’s questions were put under the aegis of the building the new communist country where, according to the communist ideology, women were expected to contribute with their work and activities to the development of communism and the Communist Party. 12. The slogan of the fourth Yugoslav feminist conference in Ljubljana was ‘‘Good girls go to heaven, bad girls go to Ljubljana’’ (MlaXenovic´, 2006, p. 2). 13. After ten years of more or less ongoing debate on quotas in the National Assembly and in parliamentary bodies, the Government of the Republic of Slovenia proposed quotas as an element of fostering equal participation of women and men (Gortnar, 2004). Quotas for the local elections were adopted in 2005 the Local Elections Act and for the national elections in 2006 the National Assembly Elections Act 2006. In the elections to the 2008 National Assembly, 25 percent quota will be implemented and in the elections in 2012, 35 percent quota for the equal participation of women and men MPs will be put into effect. In the local elections in 2006, there was 20 percent quota, which will increase to 30 percent in the elections of 2010 and then to 40 percent quota in the elections of 2014 (Zakon o volitvah v drzˇavni zbor (The National Assembly Elections Act), 2006; Zakon o lokalnih volitvah (The Local Elections Act), 2005). 14. The constitutional right to abortion was available in the former Yugoslavia since 1977, which prompted many women from abroad to come to the former Yugoslavia to have abortion (Brownmiller, 2002). The abortion right in the former Yugoslavia was accessible on request to all women who were up to 10 weeks pregnant. After 10 weeks, the permission for abortion of the medical board was requested. If the woman was underage, meaning she was less than 18 years old, she needed the parent’s consent (Bahovec, 1991, pp. 256–257). The right to abortion can be considered a relevant communist heritage and correspondent to a communist image that created a basis for gender equality in the former Yugoslavia. 15. In 1996, after the national elections the Committee for Women’s Politics was renamed the Committee for Equal Opportunites in order to show that its policy does not exclude men, but includes both women and men. After the national elections in 2000, the Commission for Equal Opportunites was abolished due to reorganization of parliamentray bodies. 16. The Office for Women’s Politics was renamed the Office for Equal Opportunities in the accession period, when the new name encompassed equal opportunities of women and men and not only women. Besides, at that time the Office for Equal Opportunities started with the coordination of implementing the EU Directives of Anti-discrimination in the field of gender equality. 17. The Office for Equal Opportunites receives low financial resources from the national budget, which results in the lack of employees at the Office and also burdening their work. 18. The most important document among the gender equity-related documents that were ratified under the legislation of the former SFR Yugoslavia is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Official Gazette, 1981). The Convention was ratified by the SFR Yugoslavia in 1981 and became valid in Slovenia in September 17, 1992, on the foundation of the Act on the Notification of


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Succession (Proposal of the law). It shows the supraterritorial processes of gender equality as an idea, which goes beyond national borders and territories. 19. The possibility of sharing parental leave between partners is recommended, but legislatively it is not obligatory. 20. Parental leave, which is an integral part of the Parental Protection and Family Benefit Act (2001), consists of maternity leave, paternity leave, childcare leave and adoption leave. Maternity leave consists of 105 days; parental leave consists of 260 days, which start after the maternity leave is finished. Parental leave can be shared between partners or granted to grandparents or other persons in certain conditions. Paternity leave is exclusively for fathers and it consists of 90 days, of which the first 15 days are paid and have to be used within the time of maternity leave, while the rest of 75 days are not paid (Rener, Sˇvab, Zˇakelj, & Humer, 2005, pp. 33–34). Statistics shows that in 2004 approximately 72 percent of employed men used the first 15 days of paternity leave and only 9 percent used the unpaid part of paternity leave (Ministry for Work, Family and Social Affairs, 2006).

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Drakulic´, S. (1992). Kako smo prezˇiveli komunizem in se celo smejali. [How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed]. Maribor: Rotis. Drakulic´, S. (1993). Women and the new democracy in the former Yugoslavia. In: N. Funk & M. Mueller (Eds), Gender politics and post-communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (pp. 123–131). New York: Routledge. Duhacˇek, D. (1993). Women’s time in the former Yugoslavia. In: N. Funk & M. Mueller (Eds), Gender politics and post-communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (pp. 131–138). New York: Routledge. Einhorn, B. (1993). Cinderella goes to market: Citizenship, gender and women’s movements in East Central Europe. London: Verso. Fodor, E. (2004). The state socialist emancipation project: Gender inequality in workplace authority in Hungary and Austria. Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 29(31), 783–813. Gender Equality. Community framework strategy on gender equality (2001–2005). Retrieved May 15, 2006, from http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/equ_opp/strategy_en.html Gortnar, M. (2002). EU enlargement and gender mainstreaming in a comparative perspective: Slovenia, Hungary and the Netherlands. Unpublished MA Thesis. Central European University, Budapest. Gortnar, M. (2004). Razprave o kvotah v slovenskem parlamentu. [Discussions on Quotas in Slovenian Parliament]. Teorija in praksa, XLI(5–6), 1034–1050. Gortnar, M., & Salecl, T. (2004). Pregled pravne ureditve v EU in Sloveniji na podrocˇju cˇlovekovih pravic zˇensk (kljucˇne direktive in zakoni). [An Overview of the EU and Slovene Legislation in the Sphere of Women’s Human Rights (Key Directives and Acts)]. In: V. Jalusˇ icˇ & D. Zagorac (Eds), Cˇlovekove pravice zˇensk. Uvodna pojasnila in dokumenti. [Women’s Human Rights. Introductory Explanations and Documents] (pp. 114–147). Ljubljana: Drusˇ tvo Amnesty International Slovenije and Mirovni insˇ titut (Peace Institute). Havelkova, H. (1993). ‘‘Patriarchy’’ in Czech society. Hypatia, 8(4), 89–96. Humer, Zˇ., Susˇ nik, M. (2004). Politika enakih mozˇnosti zˇensk in mosˇkih brez medijske pozornosti. [Politics of the Equal Opportunities for Women and Men without Media Coverage]. Medijska prezˇa/MediaWatch Journal, 20(21), 47–48, Retrieved April 16, 2006, from http://mediawatch.mirovni-institut.si/ Jalusˇ icˇ, V. (1999). Women in post-socialist Slovenia: Socially adapted, politically marginalized. In: S. P. Ramet (Ed.), Gender politics in the Western Balkans: Women and society in Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav successor states (pp. 109–131). University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press. Jalusˇ icˇ, V. (2002). Kako smo hodile v feministicˇno gimnazijo. [How We Attended Feminist Gymnasium] Ljubljana: *cf. Jalusˇ icˇ, V., & Antic´, G. M. (2001). Women–politics–opportunities. Ljubljana: Mirovni insˇ titut. Jeraj, M. (2000). Slovenska zˇenska drusˇtva med obema vojnama (1918–1941). [Slovene Women’s Associations between Wars (1918–1941)]. Arhivi, XXIII(2), 53–61. Jeraj, M. (2003). Komunisticˇna partija, Antifasˇisticˇna fronta zˇensk in uresnicˇevanje enakopravnosti v Sloveniji (1942–1953). [Communist Party, Antifascist Women’s Front and Establishment of Equality of Rights in Slovenia (1942–1953)]. Arhivi, 26(1), 161–178. Kiczkova, Z., & Farkasova, E. (1993). The emancipation of women: A concept that failed. In: N. Funk & M. Mueller (Eds), Gender politics and post-communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (pp. 84–95). New York: Routledge. Kozmik, V., & Jeram, J. (Eds) (1997). Polozˇaj zˇensk v Sloveniji v devetdesetih. [Women in Slovenia in the 1990s]. Porocˇilo Urada za zˇensko politiko za obdobje


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1990–1995. [Report of the Office for Women’s Politics for the Period 1990–1995]. Ljubljana: ensko politiko (Office for Women’s Politics). Mazey, S. (2000). Integrating gender intellectual and y real world mainstreaming. Journal of European Public Policy, 7(4), 333–345 (http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals). Milic´, A. (1993). Women and nationalisms in the former Yugoslavia. In: N. Funk & M. Mueller (Eds), Gender politics and post-communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (pp. 109–123). New York: Routledge. MlaXenovic´, L. (2006). Pocˇeci feminizma. Zˇenski pokret u Beogradu, Zagrebu, Ljubljani. [The Beginnings of Feminism. Women’s Movement in Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana]. Autonomni zˇenski centar. [Autonomus Women’s Center]. Retrieved November 25, 2006, from http://www.womenngo.org.yu Molyneux, M. (1982). Women in socialist societies: Problems of theory and practice. In: K. Young, C. Wolkowitz & R. McCullagh (Eds), Of marriage and the market: Women’s subordination in an international perspective (pp. 169–200). London: Routledge. Nederveen Pieterse, J. (2002). Europe, traveling light: Europeanization and globalization. In: M. Kempny & A. Jawlowska (Eds), Identity in transformation. Postmodernity, postcommunism, and globalization (pp. 127–145). Westport: Praeger. Okin, S. M. (1979). Women in western political thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Okin, S. M. (1989). Justice, gender and the family. New York: Basic books. Pateman, C. (1988). The sexual contract. Cambridge: Polity Press. Petrova, D. (1993). The winding road to emancipation in Bulgaria. In: N. Funk & M. Mueller (Eds), Gender politics and post-communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (pp. 22–30). New York: Routledge. Pollert, A. (2001). Gender relations, equal opportunities and women in transition in Central Eastren Europe. Paper presented to Central European University Programme on Gender and Culture, Budapest. Rees, T. (1998). Mainstreaming equality in the European Union. London: Routledge. Regulska, J. (2001). Gendered integration of Europe: New boundaries of exclusion. In: G. Jahnert, H. M. Nickel & J. Gohrisch (Eds), Gender in transition in Eastern and Central Europe proceedings (pp. 85–96). Berlin: Trafo Verlag. Rener, T., Sˇvab, A., Zˇakelj, T., & Humer, Zˇ. (2005). Perspektive novega ocˇetovstva v Sloveniji: vpliv mehanizma ocˇetovskega dopusta na aktivno ocˇetovanje. [Prospects of New Fatherhood in Slovenia: The Influence of Paternal Leave on Active Fatherhood], Zakljucˇno porocˇilo [Research report]. Ljubljana: Urad RS za enake mozˇnosti, Fakulteta za druzˇbene vede [Office for Equal Opportunities, Faculty for Social Sciences]. Scholte, A. J. (2000). Globalization: A critical introduction. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Shaw, J. (2000). Importing gender: The challenge of feminism and the analysis of the EU legal order. Journal of European Public Policy, 7(3), 406–431. Shrage, L. (2000). Equal opportunity. In: A. M Jaggar & I. M. Young (Eds), A companion to feminist philosophy (pp. 559–569). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Sˇiklova, J. (1993). Are women in Central and Eastern Europe conservative? In: N. Funk & M. Mueller (Eds), Gender politics and post-communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (pp. 74–84). New York: Routledge. Sˇiklova, J. (1996). Report on women in the post-communist center of Europe: Personal view from Prague. In: Z. Butorova (Ed.), She and He in Slovakia. Gender issues in public opinion (pp. 7–19). USPO: Bratislava.

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Squires, J. (1999). Gender in political theory. Cambridge: Polity Press. Susˇ nik, M. (2004). Second wave feminist groups in Slovenia (1980–1995). In: D. Knezˇevic´ & K. Dilic´ (Eds), Seminar women and politics: Contemporary women’s/feminist movements in post-communist countries – 10 years After (pp. 199–209). Zagreb: Zˇenska Infoteka. Treaty of Amsterdam. (1997). Retrieved May 12, 2006, from http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/ s50000.htm Urad za enake mozˇnosti. (Office for Equal Opportunities.) Proposal of the law on equal opportunities for women and men. Unpublished. Urad za enake mozˇnosti (Office for Equal Opportunities) (2006). 4th periodic report of the Republic of Slovenia on implementation of the convention of elimination of all forms of discrimination against women, Ljubljana. Retrieved September 12, 2006, from http:// www.uem.gov.si Urad za zˇensko politiko (Office for Women’s Politics). (1993). Zacˇetno porocˇilo Republike Slovenije o sprejetih ukrepih za odpravo vseh oblik diskriminacije zˇensk (First report of the Republic of Slovenia on implementation of the Convention of Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). Mihelacˇ: Ljubljana. Ustava Republike Slovenije (URS) (Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia) (2006). Retrieved April 26, 2006, from http://www.sigov.si/mnz/si/upl/urloksam/ZAKONODAJA/USTAV/ baze/regi/zakoni/b/Z91581AC.htm Vlada RS, Ministrstvo za delo, druzˇino in socialne zadeve (The Government of the Republic of Slovenia, Ministry for Work, Family and Social Affairs) (2006). Druzˇinski prejemki. [Family benefits]. Retrieved November 17, 2006, from http://www.mddsz.gov.si/si/ statistika/druzinski_prejemki/ Watson, P. (2000). Politics, policy and identitty: EU eastern enlargement and east–west differences. Journal of European Public Policy, 7(3), 369–384. Zakon o delovnih razmerjih (Employment Relationship Act) Ur.l.RS, Sˇt. 42/2002; 79/2006. Zakon o lokalnih volitvah (The Local Elections Act). Ur. l. RS, sˇ t. 72/2005. Retrieved September 17, 2006, from http://www.uradni-list.si Zakon o starsˇ evskem varstvu in druzˇinskih prejemkih (Parental Protection and the Family Benefit Act). Ur. l. RS, sˇ t. 110/2003-UBP. Zakon o volitvah v drzˇavni zbor (The National Assembly Elections Act). Ur. L. RS, sˇ t. 78/2006. Retrieved September 17, 2006, from http://zakonodaja.gov.si

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLICY INTEGRATION: THE MARGINALIZATION OF POLISH AND CZECH ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS IN THE FACE OF TECHNOCRATIC EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE Lars K. Hallstrom ABSTRACT Much potential has been ascribed to the emergence and possibilities of a ‘‘global civil society,’’ one that takes the concept of civil society and civic activism and involvement beyond the traditional confines of the nationstate, and moves it instead into a globalized and increasingly politically integrated context. In general, the concept of global civil society has been treated as a positive development, with considerable attention being paid to the emancipatory and participatory opportunities that it presents. This essay explores the other side of the equation, i.e., the marginalization of national and European-level civil society and these participatory and emancipatory benefits in Central and Eastern Europe during a process of Globalization: Perspectives from Central and Eastern Europe Contemporary Studies in Economic and Financial Analysis, Volume 89, 327–360 Copyright r 2007 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1569-3759/doi:10.1016/S1569-3759(07)89010-3

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globalization and EU integration. Drawing from the emerging literatures on global civil society, this paper compares the normative and empirical emphases of that literature with the experiences and opinions of Central and Eastern European environmental NGOs. It examines how Central and Eastern European environmental movements have moved toward becoming more interconnected both in Europe and worldwide, yet are marginalized in favor of a style of environmental policy-making emerging from Brussels that emphasizes technocracy, scientific over public knowledge, and a top-down approach to the policy-making process. As a result, many of the democratic elements of civil society found at the national level have became neglected at the European and the global levels, replacing democratic politics (at least in the form of social movements) with the emergence of supranational technocratic institutions.

1. INTRODUCTION For most of the modern period, the state has been both the primary actor, and the primary unit of analysis, in both international politics and politics in general. As Strange points out, the study of politics throughout the majority of the twentieth century has indeed been colonized by the state, not only in terms of political theory but also in empirical research (which has focused largely on comparisons of domestic politics), institutional description and analyses, and the effects of individual, group, and leadership political behavior (Strange, 1996). For many authors (Habermas, 2003; Kuehls, 1996; Weber, 1995; Barber, 1996; Woodin & Lucas, 2004; Keating, 2002; Harnisch, 2002), the gradual deterioration of the premise of sovereign nation-states and the emergence of newly recognized actors has coincided with a new liberal conception of the global economy, one of ‘‘fast convergence of national economies, gradually rendering states and politics superfluous’’ (Telo, 2001, p. 9). In this context, a fundamental shift in the understanding and conceptualization of the international has taken place. This shift has come to include global financial markets, transnational corporations, and the realization that both private and public networks of diverse actors are making or influencing fundamental decisions, creating new authorities, and in some cases actively exercising political authority. In this emerging environment of declining but still very real state authority, multiple political and non-political actors, overlapping and multiple levels and locations of decision-making, and growing uncertainty by analysts, citizens, and even politicians about where

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authority is located, there are pressures pushing both outward, to the global, and back inward, to the local and regional. The European Union (EU) lies at the heart of this sovereignty/postsovereignty debate. Particularly since the end of the Cold War and the accelerated process of political integration and development that resulted in the Treaty of Maastricht (1993), the European Union can be understood as a set of parallel and necessarily intersecting or overlapping projects that include economic, political, and social streams. European integration has been an attempt to strengthen and promote regional enterprise and national economies through a process of internal European de-regulation, yet simultaneously an effort to protect those enterprises and economies at the regional level. It has also been an attempt to connect Europeans across a range of ethnicities, territories, political histories, and environments through political institutions, elections, and policy harmonization. Since 1989, the EU has included a series of strategies and negotiations to simultaneously incorporate a large set of post-communist polities in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), to both contribute to their economic and political consolidation as ‘‘liberal democracies’’ and facilitate their integration into the pseudo-poststate institutions and policies generated since the first Europe-wide association, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).1 Although initiated, and often analyzed from the standpoint of state-based politics (see for example, Moravcsik, 1993), the EU has become (particularly as it expands eastward), as Gamble points out, one of three regional cores (North America, the European Union, and East Asia) (Telo, 2001). Each of these cores, like the EU, is committed to the elimination of barriers and obstacles to trade within a region, and to the rest of the world. At a time when trade and markets have become key signifiers of both globalization and integration processes, European regionalization also hinges on ‘‘complex processes of social change which involve distinctive new patterns of social interaction between non-state actors’’ (ibid., 28). This, in turn, raises the issues that this essay seeks to address. Specifically, I wish to explore the intersections between: (1) globalization and the changing status of the nation-state and national politics regarding environmental politics; (2) the temporally and perhaps causally coincident emergence of an ambiguous, amorphous, and complex concept and entity known as global civil society; and (3) the place for, and effects on, components of national civil society within the first two, i.e., the nation-state and global civil society. Stemming from previous work that has explored the democratic and participatory implications of the political integration and harmonization processes of European enlargement, I hope to better assess how these

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implications may be placed within a global context, both in terms of globalization and the concept/practices of global civil society.2 In order to examine these factors, I first provide an overview of the theoretical and geo-political context in which this paper is situated. More specifically, I examine how forces such as new forms of economic and political integration function at the same time as the traditional structures and capacities of the nation-state are, if not eroding, then changing on numerous fronts. This is followed by a brief examination of how globalization, the environmental movement, and the political actions of civil society in CEE relate to each other, and in particular how the environment can serve to galvanize action in civil society. Having set the more general stage for this essay, I then move to an examination of how environmentalists within Central and Eastern European civil society have responded to the forces driving socio-political and economic change. In particular, I analyze what the effects of economic and political integration are, because these form part of both globalization and Europeanization that have shaped the context of Central and Eastern European political life. Analyses of globalization, market liberalization, and the emergence of regional econo-political blocs have pointed to three emergent political characteristics: (1) the democratic challenges that these trends create at the level of the state; (2) the potential shift to trans-border and supraterritorial socio-political space; and (3) the potentially contradictory democratic opportunities that have emerged from the same processes (Kaldor, 2003; Scholte, 1997; Scholte, 2002). However, such global democratic assessments may have been overly optimistic, overplaying the positive opportunities. In turn, I argue that while the decade of the 1990s might have seen both considerable expansion and qualitative change in the activities and nature of Central and Eastern European civil activity as a result of both the liberalization impetus of globalization and state-level participation in the accession process,3 such an expansion or change was not entirely positive or democratic. In fact, rather than leading to the largely positive assessments made by authors such as Keane (2003) and Kaldor (2003) about the potential for inserting CEE’s civil society into a global civil society, this period resulted in both a political and social marginalization in the processes of becoming participants in (1) an increasingly globalized and regionalized (EU) economy; (2) a European polity and economy sui generis; and (3) a multi-level system of governance, policy-making, and policy implementation.4 As a result of these findings, I point to the need for a re-examination of (1) how we conceptualize and assess the emergence and functioning of global civil society; (2) the validity and viability of the different networks and


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connections – whether institutionalized or ad hoc – that compose global civil society as part of post-statist politics (Keane, 2003; Esty & Ivanova, 2002); and (3) the causal mechanisms of globalization, communications, cooperation, and the decline or retreat of the state. These mechanisms are optimistically expected to result in a pro-democratic global civil society that is ‘‘marked by non-integration y multiplicity without unity y [and] perceived or reflexive’’ (Keane, 2003, p. 7).

2. FRAGMENTATION, INTEGRATION, AND GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY Without entering into a larger discussion of the sovereignty problematique here (see for example, Kuehls, 1996; Weber, 1995; Debrix, 1996), there is little doubt that the shift toward globalized markets, corporations, and competition have influenced the previous, even if often uncomfortable, balance between private and public decision-making. Specifically, the state (and particularly the capacity of a state to protect its economy and populace) has become subservient to the demands and fluctuations of shifting market demand, multi- and transnational corporations, and the pursuit of lower costs and higher profits. As Jurgen Habermas (2003) notes in his reference to Richard Mu¨nch’s work, the practices of global capitalism have led to the very real question as to what degree political controls and authority can be exercised over markets and market-based actors that have already moved beyond the constraints of functioning within the nationstate. This statement is particularly relevant to the European Union, as it continues to struggle in adapting at the political level to the patterns created by economic integration and the removal of state-based barriers to trade and capital. The economic developments in CEE since 1989 have also defined and redefined state, economy, and society from international – where states remain the primary actors and the activities of the state are split between high and low, foreign and domestic – into transnational. In this new system, as Habermas (2003) points out, ‘‘States are now embedded in markets, rather than national economies being embedded within state borders’’ (p. 88). As a result, according to Habermas, not only are new and potentially extensive limits placed upon the capacity and influence of the social state, but these limits often stand in direct opposition to one of the primary projects that has emerged from post-1945 western European states (such as Germany).5 These tasks include mediating, moderating, and compensating for the

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socially undesirable and unjust outcomes created by capitalism. Without such a project, and without the positive state or some similar state-like authority to undertake and guarantee the implementation of that marketcorrecting project, not only does political and civil society lose its primary location and focus of activity (i.e., because the state itself is reduced or eliminated) but the state itself loses both legitimacy and capacity as an actor. As Scholte (1997) points out, globalization has emerged as a process of supraterritorialization, where ‘‘the state, being territorially grounded, cannot be sufficient by itself as an agent of democracy’’ (p. 290). Globalization, therefore, poses a series of questions in terms of not only the role and capacity of the state as a political actor, entity, and unit of analysis, but perhaps more importantly also in terms of democracy, and in particular the ability of citizens and citizen organizations to both govern their own affairs, and to influence or address their social, cultural, economic, or environmental condition through democratic political means. As a result of this expanded economic and political sphere of cause and effect, there are considerable democratic shortcomings that arise in terms of representative politics, participation, engagement, and legitimacy. The absence of statebased connective mechanisms between citizens, decisions, and actions points to a fundamental democratic deficit when comparing the ideal-type, statebased democracy to the globalized version. In addition, there are also serious questions raised when new institutions, relationships, and procedures emerge at the supranational and global level in order to manage the functionality of global economic activity, as well as the political, policy, and social demands of citizens. It is, therefore, critical to consider how emergent governance regimes, whether explicitly economic (such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organization (WTO)), or both economic and political/social in orientation (such as the EU), have reacted to, and affect, those organizations that seek to exert pressure upon them. As O’Brien, Anne, Jan, and Marc (2000) point out, such responses vary across institutional settings as a result of these organizations’ culture, structure, and vulnerability to external and internal influences. Yet, there is no doubt that there are emergent and powerful forms of multilateral/multi-level governance. These still-to-be-confirmed new forms may see political authorities and civil society actors attempt to ‘‘reconstitute y on a global scale, building a system of global governance from the bottom up’’ (O’Brien et al., 2000, p. 3), or where international multilateralism seeks to maintain a variant of the state-centric status quo and to integrate hostile or potentially destabilizing states into that status quo. In either case, the reshaping of the


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state-economy-civil society nexus presents serious challenges to not only theorists of international relations and international political economy, but also to those concerned with the fact that the actions, policies, structures, and decisions of institutions, such as the WTO and the EU, affect millions of people. These questions are, therefore, most pertinent to a discussion of CEE as these countries continue to integrate their economies, political decisionmaking, and policy activities within the context of the European Union and also in global decision-making structures. Not only do such actions raise significant questions about the nature of representative and participatory democracy in CEE, they also refer scholars and the public alike back to a fundamental question of political science: Who rules, and how do they rule? In an increasingly complicated structure of both European and global political economy, states such as Poland and the Czech Republic are faced with political pressures from within the traditional sources of the body politic, as well as from neighboring states in the region, and ultimately about how to collectively compose the EU as a political, economic, and regulatory body. Termed the ‘‘reregulation’’ of deregulation by Telo (2001), and consisting of the defensive/offensive variants of the ‘‘Third Way’’ by Habermas (2003), such supranational pressures affecting CEE exemplify an attempt to understand the political demands of democratic governance and participation within a new politico-economic space. Ranging from activities such as cushioning the effects of globalized capitalism to attempting to reformulate politics to a supranational level (see Cox, 1997; O’Brien et al., 2000), there is a recognition that there are new and more political avenues and opportunity structures for democratic and citizen-based participation and involvement. However, these opportunity structures may not function or be the same as the domestic state, nor may they necessarily seek to create or provide mechanisms for democratic governance. Instead, what is emerging, particularly in the European context, is a set of institutions, procedures, and agreements that are gradually attempting to reshape the functional democratic space of national-level democracy, and maintain or develop a form of democratic legitimacy in doing so. Whether or not this is successful, however, is another question. If the European Union is viewed from the perspectives of globalization and democracy, a paradoxical set of opportunities for CEE states emerges. On the one hand, after several decades of state socialism and commandbased economies, the EU presents an opportunity to join into a larger pattern of global economic integration, political democratization, and sociocultural fragmentation, all under the aegis of capitalism (Tehranian, 2002;

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Aksu & Camilleri, 2002; Huntington, 1991). Indeed, as a number of authors and politicians in CEE have pointed out, in many ways there was never any other alternative than liberalization, policy reform and harmonization, democratic institutions, and ultimately membership in NATO and the European Union (Franklin & Baun, 1995). On the other hand, integration into both the regional econo-political node of the European Union, and into the larger global context, bring into sight the democratic weaknesses and absences not only of the post-communist and western European states, but also the democratic gaps at the transnational level. In essence, these political societies in CEE have expanded from one set of democratic deficits (between civil society and state socialism) to two, and perhaps even three (present both at the national level, and within the pan-European and global institutions and decision-making). As de-regulation of markets occurs increasingly within the context of both political and democratic change, Habermas (2003) points to the functional loss of citizens’ political power as a process where each step ‘‘means a disempowerment or self-limitation of political power as the medium for realizing collectively binding decisions’’ (p. 95). As a result, while the institutional, economic, and inter-governmental arrangements that have led to the European Union have tied national economies and currencies together in a ‘‘regime of continental magnitude that is very thickly networked horizontally’’ (ibid., p. 95), they have simultaneously led to the structural and functional weakening of national decision-making. In practice, this implies that the public sphere actually begins to ‘close’ as economic forces gain priority, and in turn, the democratic roles of civil society are weakened (Arato, 1994; Bibic & Graziano, 1994; Chryssochoou, 1998). In terms of the European Union, even as its political structures and processes attempt to ‘‘catch-up’’ to economic liberalism, it has also become a microcosm for analysis of globalizing forces acting at the global level and has produced an increasingly marginalized collection of civil societies oriented primarily around the state, yet they are attempting to reconcile and legitimate their activities within an increasingly integrated economic and political sphere. In doing so, national and regional civil societies must select and interact with multiple levels and locations of governance and decision-making. Regardless of whether such elements of society are trying to catch-up to a new global reality, or are simply responding to global economic pressures by seeking to bolster the role of the state as a protective agent, a key factor lies in both how agents of civil society behave vis-a`-vis with the effects of globalization (which include transnational political and policy harmonization) and how national agents perceive or view


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the effects of globalization, and their own behavior in a pan-European context.6

3. ENVIRONMENTALISM AND GLOBALIZATION Environmental organizations and activism present a key opportunity to consider the implications of my representation of both globalization and European integration, and for improving our understanding of how civil society’s involvement and participation in the political sphere are affected by globalization. There are a number of reasons for these aims, both in the larger sense of global economic and political trends, and in the more specific case of Central and Eastern Europe, as it has integrated into the European Union. There are many different environmental discourses currently at play in environmental politics and activism (Dryzek, 1997). A number of these discourse are, as Woodin and Lucas (2004) point out, in direct opposition to the processes of globalization. This opposition stems from a number of factors, including the extremely strong correlation between global neoliberalism, environmental degradation, and the increasing economic and social gaps between the haves, the have-nots, and the have-mores. As numerous authors have pointed out since the 1960s, there is a significant connection, and potentially a causal relationship, between industrial practices, economic consumption, and changes to environmental quality (see for example, Limits to Growth (Meadows, Meadows, Randers, & Behrens, 1972); Silent Spring (Carson, 1962); or Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity Revisited (Ophuls & Boyan, 1992)). Although it is difficult to identify the nature of causality, there is little question that as globalization has accelerated, environmental indicators have shown a marked decline. While there have been serious, and in some cases effective, efforts to improve both environmental awareness and quality (such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and the early success in North America of Earth Day), indicators of global environmental degradation continue to point to massive consumption of natural resources, including a doubling a fresh water usage every 20 years, major declines in biodiversity, and massive emissions of pollutants and wastes that are linked directly to economic growth, population and consumption growth, and issues of environmental health. In fact, environmental factors bring into sharp focus some of the same issues as globalization: the failure or inability of the nation-state to exert control over its own territory, or to protect that territory from external environmental threats; the movement of air and water-borne pollutants

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without regard for national borders; and the often ineffective effects of transnational agreements to manage these issues at a global or regional level. These factors all point to the retreat of the state from its earlier (theoretical) primacy in securing environmental quality and protection for citizens. Robin Eckersley points out that as the discourses of international relations and political economy begin to incorporate those ecological components which can directly challenge the sovereignty assumption (see for example, Kuehls, 1996) there is a corresponding ‘‘greening of sovereignty’’ where environmental issues provide a mechanism for disputing the sovereignty claims of the nation-state (Eckersley, 2004, p. 203). There is, therefore, again an emergent paradox – even as states lose sovereign capacity in the light of global or regional economic integration and the forces of globalization, it is increasingly recognized that environmental problems, many of which may be derived from those same forces, may require regulatory and even coercive capacity at the local, state, and suprastate level in order to be resolved or reduced. While it may be premature to argue that the ‘‘sleeping gallery’’ of the public sphere has been awakened by environmental problems and activism, national civil societies have reacted to corporations and government alike by capitalizing on the networks that compose the public sphere, and exploiting the ‘‘abstract and virtual forms y of the new communications technologies such as the internet’’ (Eckersley, 2004, p. 147). In this way, localized activism has been able, albeit to varying degrees, to influence political and policy outcomes at multiple levels. In essence, environmental actors and organizations, including those in CEE, both before and increasingly so after 1989, have taken elements of advocacy beyond the realm of the nation-state, creating a new intermediary structure between political and economic structures, on the one hand, and the private sphere, on the other. This new sphere, while similar to state-based participation and advocacy, differs in that it is not bound by the physical, political, or geographic boundaries of the state in either effect or action – it has, in fact, become at least partially supraterritorial. Although such supraterritorial forces may further legitimate and reinforce the structures of the state and of global integration, more commonly the components of civil society concerned with improving environmental quality and policy are critical of both the state and of economic globalization, and they seek to reform values, motives, and action both above and below the state.7 Environmental organizations, therefore, may seek to influence the state to act vis-a`-vis transnational corporations and other states in the global or regional context, oppose the actions of the state both locally and globally, and even seek participation


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and a role in those activities taking place above the state level by connecting with one another both within a state and to other sympathetic organizations in other parts of Europe or even the world. In fact, it has been argued that the emergence of civil society-like initiatives are indicators of the emergence of a new control or limit on the capacity or power of both the state and global institutional arrangements (Kaldor, 2003; Keane, 2003). Working beyond, across, and within territorially defined political spaces, environmental organizations, like other non-state-based actions can theoretically perform multiple actions. They may be able to pluralize locations of power beyond the state, identify and work within and between multiple state-based and societally based foci of influence and function as a critical or discursive alternative to the power of those institutionalized foci. In terms of applying these observations about supraterritorality and the potential of global civil society to post-Communist Europe, Kaldor (2003) has gone so far as to suggest that the combination of earlier dissident movements and ‘‘new’’ (post-communist, more Westernized) civil society in CEE has served as a legitimating factor in the emergence of non-state-based governance structures, leading to a more open and deliberative policymaking space (p. 77). The questions that Kaldor’s assertion raises are (1) the extent that this transformation in Central and Eastern European civil society is taking place in locations of emerging supra- and sub-state governance; and (2) to place a more empirical assessment within the larger context of the democratic transition of both the CEE state, and the emergent transnational changes taking place in the European Union. While some authors (see for example, Dryzek, 2000) see it as imperative to maintain a separation between state and civil society in order to ensure the vibrancy and critical capacity of the public sphere, a different approach is to question how different elements of civil society, state-based institutions, and global power structures are responding to ecologically-based feedback and activism from citizens. Similarly, this approach must also consider how patterns of both inclusion and exclusion contribute to the health or viability of civil society, the development of policy and the potentials for ecological democratization. These questions continue to be of particular importance and relevance to the states of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as of Western Europe. Not only must states still manage ‘‘domestic politics’’ within their own borders, they must do so while simultaneously attempting to create, and manage European and global politics and economics. The question that follows, then, is just how elements of Central and Eastern European civil society, and particularly those that may be oriented to

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multiple levels of relevance and activity, have responded to these pressures. The remainder of this chapter, therefore, examines Polish and Czech environmental organizations within that context.

4. CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS There are few places better suited to an examination of these broad questions of democratic participation and environmental policy than the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Not only have these states undergone massive political and economic reforms as a result of the transition from Communist rule, but they have simultaneously undertaken, since 1993, a transition to becoming ‘‘European’’ as well as democratic and liberal market economies.8 This process includes not only the reform of domestic political-economic life, but also the increased influence and involvement of non-state actors and institutions. While civil society, without question, had a significant role in the recent political history of states such as Poland and Czechoslovakia the years since 1989 have seen a long and protracted period of accession negotiations involving multiple actors and institutions. This period also constitutes an intense engagement of CEE states with the global context and globalization – much of the transition process these states have followed has included becoming part of neo-liberalism and the global marketplace. Although space does not permit a full account of the environmental issues that have been present in CEE, the poor quality of the environment in both the (former) Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe attracted international public attention after 1989. A wide range of media coverage quickly drew attention to the combination of extensive (yet often highly localized) industrial pollution, poor water quality, and even acts of environmental terrorism conducted by Soviet authorities. In addition to the ecological costs of outdated industrial infrastructure, weak environmental regulations, and limited enforcement, environmental issues also pose a significant threat to the health, and even the lives, of citizens in both CEE and the European Union (Carter & Turnock, 1996; DeBardeleben & Hannigan, 1995). While the EU is not just a recipient of pollutants from the East (there have been cases, for example, of waste being smuggled from Germany into Poland for disposal) the geography and weather patterns of the CEE states lead to what commonly perceived by the west to be a negative environmental relationship (Interview with DG XI Official, Brussels 2000).


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As a result, according to policy elites both in Brussels and the capital cities of CEE, issues of environmental quality, policy, and implementation were an important part of the EU accession negotiations. They, therefore, present an excellent case study of an issue area that has created demands for local, national, and supranational political activity while simultaneously triggering, if not requiring, citizen-based responses and activism. It is, therefore, possible to explore the key questions underlying this essay by examining two CEE case studies: the Czech Republic and Poland. While different in size, economy, and political history, both states have a significant history of antipolitical civil society (exemplified in groups such as Solidarity and Charter 77 that sought to distance themselves from state socialist politics (Konrad, 1984)) as well as environmental activism. Both were part of the Visegrad Group that sought early membership in the European Union, and they both successfully became members of the EU in 2004 (Matlary, 1994). For Poland and the Czech Republic, successfully engaging in supranational politics via negotiations with the European Union since 1993 required not only massive amounts of international aid, both international and domestic investment, and domestic political reforms, but also coming to grips with the possibility of limited sovereignty as a practical reality of post-1989 European politics (Agh, 1999).9 At a more general level, this meant the potential sacrifice of national autonomy to European policies and regulation, in exchange for membership and a voice in the European Union. In terms of the environment for the Central and Eastern European states, this has meant recognizing and eventually implementing the environmental acquis communitaire, spending huge amounts on investment in environmental technologies, infrastructure, harmonization and remediation, and developing ways for citizens and environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) to become involved in the policy-making and implementation process.10 As a result, what emerged during the 1990s in the Czech Republic and Poland was a still-evolving system of environmental governance that attempted to incorporate citizen and activist-based participation at multiple levels, ranging from the local or municipal up to the European and international. However, the ways in which this multi-level style of governance emerged have marginalized or reinforced the marginalization of environmental organizations as legitimate participants and inputs in environmental policy. Rather than capitalizing upon the opportunities that environmental organizations can provide for both stateand non-state-based political and policy critique, public expertise, and even democratic legitimacy, the result of a combination of socio-political

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Communist legacies, economic policy and environmental policy harmonization has been a reinforcement of the EU’s historical model of top-down, nonparticipatory technocratic governance. While the EU, and the European Commission and Parliament in particular, have taken considerable steps toward greater democratic accountability and transparency since the Treaty of Maastricht, there were two important trends in the thinking of both EU elites and policy officials that became apparent during the process: (1) the continued belief that environmental decisions should be, and typically are, made at the level of the European Union, rather than the member-state; and (2) that NGOs can and should function in multiple ways, but none based upon a form of democratic input (interviews with members of the European Commission, Brussels, March– July 2000). The two capacities suggested by EU officials are (1) to provide expert or technical advice on environmental quality and (2) to function as a legitimation and dissemination mechanism for information about environmental policy and strategies being developed in Brussels. European officials and Parliamentarians have seen a dramatic increase in the number and diversity of interests working in or at the European level as integration has accelerated.11 However, the patterns that have emerged during the 1990s as the shift toward greater supra-state governance in Europe took place saw a greater engagement of industry-based expertise and their interests, and only limited steps toward encouraging or involving a non-state-based or supranational/supraterritorial variant of civil society. The movement toward multi-level governance within the EU could have served as a facilitating mechanism for the exchange of citizen-oriented opinion and perspectives derived from the various sustainability discourses within civil society, and the opportunity for both national and European policy officials to build grass-roots connections to public knowledge and opinion about the environment, environmental quality, and even the role of the state in environmental protection. Instead, European-level environmental policy was moved away from environmental NGOs and closer to the technocratic apparatus of the EU in Brussels. This, in turn, has (1) resulted in a greatly increased role for supranational (EU) environmental governance in Europe; (2) shifted policymaking away from the conventional state–civil society relationship to the supra-state level in CEE; and (3) has de-emphasized opportunity structures for citizen or participatory access into environmental policy in Brussels. The basis of environmental discourse in the EU has, therefore, continued to shift toward scientific or technical expertise, rather than any participatory or deliberative ethic.12


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As a result of these shifts, where even the implementation and enforcement of environmental policies and regulations has drawn increased EU and Commission attention (European Commission, 1998), environmental organizations and activism in CEE have faced four potential areas of action: (1) maintain a focus on state-based politics and policy; (2) shift focus toward the opportunities for participation offered by the scientific and regulatory regime of the European Union; (3) withdraw into either highly localized environmental activism, or even into the type of anti-political venues of political expression utilized before 1989; or (4) follow the suggestion of Kaldor (2003) and others to engage in ‘‘flexible and integrative networks y to address international problems, i.e., to build networks from within civil society across national, institutional, and spatial borders’’ (Streck, 2002, p. 2). Although there has been a combination of these responses in the Czech Republic and Poland, the 1990s saw few successful attempts at network building and the development of civil society at either national or European levels within the environmental sphere. While there is some evidence of each of the four possibilities listed above in CEE during the decade 1989, the dominant pattern (and particularly in the Czech Republic) for environmental organizations has not been one of connection into and within global civil society, but rather (1) a withdrawal from political life and participation in the public policy process; (2) a tendency toward apolitical protest; and (3) extremely limited incidence of inter-organizational cooperation, networking, or accessing the membership of global environmental civil society. As a result, while there was great optimism and hope for a renewed and important role for civil society, both for the Czech and Polish peoples, and indeed across CEE, this optimism was not justified.

5. CZECH ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS The Czech Republic, like many other states in CEE in the early 1990s, inherited a socially and politically fragmented society characterized by limited trust, and in turn interaction, between citizens and policy making. Citizens and policy officials alike have spent much of the past 15 years attempting to develop or learn how to act collectively, negotiate public interests and political spaces, and effectively construct a participatory political ethic. In fact, public involvement in political life and policy-making has been typically characterized as sporadic and possibly inappropriate after 1989 due to the combination of limited public information about policy and

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policy processes, a largely absent vision or model of public/political interaction, and a general lack of experience with non-dissident participatory politics (Potucek, 1999). The first half of the 1990s saw a dramatic increase in the number and diversity of the civic sector in the Czech Republic, increasing from approximately 2000 registered associations in 1989 to almost 40,000 in the mid-1990s (Fric, 1999; Potucek, 1999) This dramatic increase is perhaps not surprising, given the considerable oppression of Czech civil society under Communist rule and the regional tendency toward attempting to create civil society and a democratic political culture from above (Scho¨pflin, 1990).13 In both cases, the effect has been to slow the consolidation of civil society and participatory politics, leaving many Czechs concerned about elected officials, party politics, corruption and party leadership, yet unwilling or unable to compromise or create viable alternatives (Tucker et al., 2000). This combination of difficulties in participatory politics is particularly prevalent in the environmental sphere. While there have been considerable improvements in the quality of the environment since 1989 due to industrial closures and restructuring, the Czech Republic still faces considerable environmental challenges, and decisions such as the construction of the Temelin nuclear power plant at the end of the 1990s raised considerable international concern, particularly from EU members such as Austria and Germany. At the same time, while environmental issues did play a role in pre-1989 dissidence, their role and importance quickly dissipated after the first democratic reforms and elections. As Bedrich Moldan, one of the founders of the Czech ‘‘Green Parliament’’ in 1990 pointed out, environmental problems and the possibility of policy solutions were based on a very limited conception of policy effects. Similarly, throughout the early 1990s, the Klaus government actively denied the possibility of any long-term policy process based on a concept of sustainable development, and emphasized instead the need for economic development through privatization, modernization, and economic integration. As a result of this emphasis on Western-style neo-liberal development, the same policy also denied any need for citizen-based participation in environmental policy formulation, implementation, and protection, leading to a significant gap between those affected by environmental problems, and those who implement policies. The economic and political environment in the Czech Republic after 1992 thus resembled the larger shift toward emphasizing global markets, comparative advantage, and neo-liberal ideology. Like in other parts of the world (i.e., the South), privatization policies and free markets were expected to bring costs of goods down, but both costs and benefits of


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transition and integration were not distributed evenly across the population. What many citizens of the Czech Republic found was that not only were the costs unequally distributed, they were also higher than anticipated. The combination of intensive political reforms and the predominantly economic focus driving both the EU accession negotiations and the reform process under the first Klaus administration (1992–1996) led, in fact, to a considerable marginalization of Czech environmentalism and environmental organizations. This marginalization occurred to the point where environmentalists have been listed as subversive elements by the Czech government and therefore a threat to democracy (Fagin & Jehlicka, 1998). Early attempts to build on the participatory ethic of pre-1989 dissidence and even the massive protests in Wenceslas Square in 1989 quickly gave way to the drive for economic growth and efficiency, leading environmental policymaking in the Czech Republic to become largely technocratic, often poorly designed and generally lacking in opportunities for citizen involvement. Klaus effectively removed environmental issues and policy from the political agenda, contributing in part to a substantial suspicion of environmental organizations. At the same time, many Czechs were skeptical as to the capacity of both citizens, and citizen organizations, to positively affect environmental change (Interview at the Czech Ministry of Environment, May 24, 2000). As a municipal politician and long-standing environmentalist from the town of Dubecz pointed out, [Klaus] taught that the environmental problems are only some kind of cream on the cake. In a way, it was reasonable to say we must earn money to pay for environmental problems. On the other side, it is also true that these problems should be solved together with development and other problems. We cannot wait twenty years because there will be nothing left to protect. (Interview, Dubecz, May 15, 2000)

The post-1989 domestic pattern of the environmental civil society’s involvement in Czech public policy has been strained from the standpoint of participatory democracy. As a result of this strain, and the barriers toward meaningful or influential participation in environmental politics, environmental organizations explained that they needed to shift their focus. Rather than attempt to play a role in governmental politics, they could either orient toward technical expertise, as in the case of Deti Zeme (Children of the Earth), or focus on small-scale education, environmental remediation, and eco-management (Interview, Cesky svaz ochrancu prirody (Czech Union of Nature Conservation), May 15, 2000). As explained by officials in the EU’s Directorate General Environment, even large groups have had difficulty in actively influencing policy-making, both at the national and EU levels.

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Additionally, contact between ENGOs and policy officials, and even between ENGOs and the general public, has generally been limited and often ad hoc. In conjunction with these patterns, there has been a limited degree of support from the general public – a 2000 survey conducted by the Czech Ministry of Environment found that while 60 percent of Czechs thought environmental organizations were useful, 25 percent saw them as harmful, particularly in terms of non-governmental organizations that actively attempted to involve or recruit the public (Sofres-Factum, 2000). Czech environmental organizations, and indeed social movement NGOs in general have struggled for both legitimacy and policy influence and this absence has led to a re-shaping of Czech environmental governance. While environmental action did have a small role to play in the dissident civil society of the Communist Party-dominated years, the pattern of environmental governance that developed during the 1990s gave little voice to citizen-based activism or input into the content, or even implementation, of environmental policy. This new form of environmental governance, which is very consistent with the larger social patterns of public disengagement, skepticism and mistrust in politics during the 1990s, did not lead to components of national civil society connecting into larger networks of similarly oriented organizations in other states or at the supranational level. Instead, what occurred was a more general withdrawal from explicit or publicly political life, particularly for environmental groups, while policy officials necessarily shifted their focus away from domestic sources of input and participation. Rather than functioning either in opposition or in cooperation with Czech civil society and public participation in the environmental policy process, both politicians and policy elites moved toward the EU for guidance and implementation of environmental policy. This was the result of multiple factors, including not only the impetus from the then Prime Minister Klaus to focus on Western-style economic reforms, but also the nature of the integration process. While this process was usually framed as a series of negotiations, the reality was more one of assistance, aid, and direction from the EU. Thus, rather than attempting to establish a common policy discourse or consensus on policy content and implementation, the Czech perspective, experience, or input into environmental policy could easily be over-ridden. This issue is further compounded by the lack of information for the Czech public about not only the accession process, but also about participation in environmental policy. As a senior member of the Czech Ministry of Environment noted ‘‘people are not as much interest in environment as it (sic) was in the beginning y they feel there is only a very little that they can


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do personally’’ (Interview in Prague, May 24, 2000). As a result, while the processes of democratic transition may have included early institutional and procedural reforms, the longer-term issues of transforming political culture and civil society were, in fact, negatively affected by the ways those changes were undertaken. These effects placed environmental organizations, as a component of Czech civil society, in a problematic position. In addition to a considerable lack of public support, often their only chance for a legitimate or influential role in the policy process is as technical or scientific experts. Even this role has become increasingly limited as the Czech Republic moved closer to full membership in the EU. As the negotiations progressed through the 1990s and on to 2004, environmental organizations largely lost their role as a mechanism for grassroots activism and participation, and instead became, in many ways, part of the state-based technocratic apparatus they had often opposed. For those groups that chose not to formalize and professionalize, the trend was one of withdrawal and refocusing usually at a very concentrated local level. For example, the Czech Union for Nature Conservation (a fairly small, long-established group that is oriented toward conservation, preservation, and maintaining protected areas) had some success in the areas of small-scale environmental protection, remediation and biodiversity (Interview, May 15, 2000). Specifically, this group has been able to successfully work in preserving environmentally sensitive areas in the Prague suburbs, as well as working on the conservation of wildlife under threat in the region. One reason behind this type of success was the importance of developing working relationships with local and regional governments. However, as a Ministry of Environment official pointed out, the emerging pattern of policy and political relationships between the Czech Republic and the European Union has meant that both national and EU policies often overshadow, and can even override local efforts (Interview, May 24, 2000, Prague). Such a model of environmental policy-making and governance from the perspective of environmental groups shows the absence of connection or communication with a larger environmental movement, either at the European or global level. Instead, the professionalization or withdrawal of environmental organizations may have actually reinforced the fragmentation of Czech civil society, and limited the democratic potential of that society both nationally and globally. Indeed, during the 1990s, both public opinion generally, and environmental organizations specifically, saw decreased satisfaction with Czech democracy, increased skepticism about membership in the European Union, and decreasing levels of information

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about the EU generally.14 This left many Czechs doubtful of the new European context into which they were integrating. Although Western organizations, such as Greenpeace, have longestablished offices in the Czech Republic, there is limited evidence that they support the inclusion of Czech environmental organizations in either transnational ENGO cooperation or involvement in what Streck (2002) calls ‘‘networked [environmental] governance’’ (p. 1). In networked environmental governance, elements of the private sector, civil society organizations, and governments join together to complement traditional, state-based legal and institutional arrangements. Not only have Czech environmental organizations struggled to gain legitimacy and influence within their own country, but they have rarely had the opportunity, or the resources, to participate in or influence the international arrangements and institutions stemming from globalization. At the regional level, the capacity of Czech environmental organizations to participate, let alone influence, either the formation or the implementation of the environmental acquis at the European level has also been extremely limited. Very few environmental organizations from CEE have the resources or political capital necessary to either maintain a presence in Brussels, actively lobby the Commission or the European Parliament, or in many cases to even meet with an Environmental Desk Officer (Interviews, March 2000, Brussels). This limited capacity to contribute to supranational environmental governance is reflected in the experiences and opinions of Czech environmentalists during the 1990s. Environmental NGOs had very little mention or concern with environmental organizations beyond Czech borders, and given the patterns described above, in fact there was often very little opportunity for cooperation with other environmental groups within Czech borders. While no environmental organization of the 17 interviewed in both Prague and Warsaw during 2000 pointed to any particular animosity or competition with other environmental groups, or even with other voluntary components of civil society, the idea of cooperating or integrating into a larger social movement was not viewed as appealing or possible. Although survey data from 2000 points to the fact that many Czech environmental organizations do consider themselves to be part of a much larger (new) social movement, there was little evidence in the interviews of any actual or meaningful incorporation into that movement (Sofres-Factum, 2000). Thus, while environmental organizations were aware of a larger movement that they could connect to, there were multiple factors preventing that connection. The combination of EU-based integration, the historical legacy of a strong, party-based state (see for example, Hollis, 1999), has caused the gap


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between the practices of policy-making and citizens to expand, leaving only a limited role for citizens and their groups at both the national and EU levels. Although, technologies such as the Internet and wireless communications have permitted major environmental groups to expand their connectivity into localized and grassroots groups, in terms of public policy Czech environmental groups perceived their role largely in local or scientific terms.15 They also saw limited potential for growth or expansion into collective action, functioning beyond the immediate geographic area, or shifting their focus toward supranational policy-making and regulation (Interviews with member of the Czech Ministry of Environment, May 24, 2000; representative of Deti Zeme (Children of the Earth), May 11, 2000; representative of Brontosaurus, May 13, 2000). Interestingly, when queried as to whether increased interaction with EU individuals or institutions would be considered desirable, a number of ENGO representatives asked whether I (the interviewer) knew of any persons or possibilities for funding that might assist them in doing so! Again, this question points to both a knowledge of the larger (both European and global) environmental movement, and the potential to participate in that movement. However, it also points to the lack of knowledge or capacity in order to do so. While there is a brief democratic and participatory history in the Czech Republic, the ideas of privatization, economic growth and integration, and infrastructural development took primacy over public opinion and democratic deliberation. These economic changes were driven by the global impetus toward increasing trade and free markets. Throughout the 1990s, despite the presence of substantial environmental problems, most Czechs had little information or knowledge about the potential balance between environmental policies and economic development, and tended to see the two as mutually exclusive. This was reinforced at the executive level by Klaus, and with large-scale development of transportation and trade infrastructure. While the development of projects such as highways and compatible rail for economic integration may have been necessary, the marginalization and localization of environmental organizations meant that for many social movement organizations, policy-making and political participation were removed from the list of available options. Rather than seizing an opportunity to affect the democratic and participatory changes that emerged during the 1990s, old members abandoned environmental organizations and new members did not appear as these activists moved into both a newly entrepreneurial economy and politics. As a result, while from an optimistic standpoint such groups might have provided, as part of an amorphous global collective, a connection into

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global civil society and its participatory/dissident impetus, they have been removed from both national politics and European integration. Instead of becoming part of a civil sphere with a voice in the development and direction of increasingly integrated environmental policy (whether in terms of regulatory standards, conservation, or genetically modified foods), they have withdrawn to local conservation activities, education, and environmental remediation. In fact, in many ways grassroots and collectively based environmental movements in the Czech Republic have lost position in environmental policy, and while connection to global civil society might provide an alternative forum for activism, they have limited resources, connections, and intent to establish them.

6. POLISH ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS Although the economic growth of Poland in the early 1990s lagged behind other CEE states such as the Czech Republic and Hungary, the combination of a strong and broadly based anti-communist sentiment, an independent class of rural peasantry, and Solidarity-centered mass mobilization pointed to a strong chance that Poland would become a quick success story in political and economic transition. However, in the space of less than six years, that degree of optimism decreased due to the fragmentation of Polish politics and an extended period of transitional difficulties for Polish civil society. Specifically, there was a tendency to emphasize private over public virtues, as well as a trend toward both social and political ‘‘hyper-pluralism’’ (i.e., the pursuit of narrow, self-interested goals by individuals and organizations, rather than a combination of actions seeking the common good and thus satisfying self-interest Korbonski, 1996, p. 300).16 While the number of NGOs in Poland exploded to approximately 50,000 by the end of the 1990s (Interview, Stowarzyzenie KLON/JAWOR Offices, June 13, 2000), many of the crucial characteristics of civil society that scholars have identified as elements of a democratic global civil society (such as trust, tolerance, peacefulness, and openness toward compromise) became largely absent as Poland moved toward membership in the EU (see Keane’s ‘‘ideal-type,’’ 2003). In this section, I explore why this absence emerged by analyzing Poland’s economic and political integration. While this absence has multiple causes, including political culture, the communist legacy, the electoral law, the strong influence of the Catholic Church and the political leadership of Poland, I focus here on the interaction of domestic and international forces in the environmental movement.


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Political involvement in general declined in Poland during the 1990s. Characterized by a general distrust of political parties and politicians, and even politics in general, the early years of democracy and integration into EU policy structures saw Polish society in general become increasingly removed from both Polish and European politics. Increasing skepticism and uncertainty about the future of both domestic politics and the role for Poland in an enlarged Europe, combined with a movement of interest articulation to trade unions and their relationship with newly privatized industry, meant that NGOs of all types, while flourishing in terms of numbers, were often granted only a marginal place in terms of public policy. This trend created a complicated pattern of political and non-governmental influence in policy, with variable models articulated by the Polish government of the role for civil society, and this certainly held true for environmental organizations. While one government official from the Prime Minister’s Office in Warsaw characterized the ‘‘Environmental Protection Sector’’ (his words) as particularly strong in terms of NGO–government cooperation, he also identified significant variation in terms of strength and capacity between and across different sectors of the economy. This official also pointed out that while there is probably not a state within the OECD or EU where NGOs do not play a systematic role in policy-making and implementation, public officials often saw cooperation in Poland as both difficult and conflictual, thus limiting their desire to cooperate (Interview with member of Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), Warsaw, June 1, 2000). The shift of policy authority to Brussels, and an increasingly regulatory approach to policy during the 1990s led Poland, like the Czech Republic, to develop troublesome patterns of interaction with the public and NGOs. This was particularly true for environmental groups, which, while flourishing in number as a result of increased political freedom, remained limited actors in the public policy process. The Polish movement of environmental activism away from national politics was all the more surprising because of the comparatively successful history of environmental organizations, both under the Communist Party and even during the Round Table negotiations. Domestic officials interviewed for this study often pointed out that Poland has a long history of environmental conservation and protection, and had passed legislation legitimizing public participation and access to information as early as 1980. At that time, the Polish Environmental Protection and Development Act (EPDA) officially recognized environmental organizations as legal, and environmental groups, such as the Polski Klub Ekologiczny (PKE) (Polish Ecology Club), were granted the right to participate in legislative and

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administrative hearings. In 1989, an Ecological Protocol was created by the Polish state that contained several provisions concerning rights to participation in environmental decision-making, the exemption of environmental information from state secrecy, the right to conduct and publish environmental research, and the capacity for freedom of access to environmental information.17 As a result, while the legal basis for a participatory and civil form of environmental policy-making was present from the beginning of the transitional period, it was the combination of a specific and historically based model of public administration, a lack of public support and the strength of trade unions that marginalized much of the momentum gained by the Polish environmental movement. Throughout the 1990s, there was little attention paid to the activities of organized interests and limited access to policy-making, and economic reforms have further removed environmental considerations from public and political consideration. Additionally, the Ministry of Environmental Protection is historically a limited actor in Polish politics, and has had limited success in developing legislative or administrative capacity in terms of both the constitutional and legal environment. As a result, Polish government officials have perceived certain sectors of civil society to benefit the state, while others must struggle under a still-evolving legal framework. For example, the NGOs that work in cooperation with local or national government administration on issues of public welfare, often with funding from state or foreign sources, have been exempt from any form of regulation. This naturally created a political climate where politically dominant NGOs continue to gain access and pressure both for more funding and favored status by government, while others can be deliberately omitted from providing input in the policy-making process. This has combined with a shift in public behavior toward fragmentation and competition, although this shift started to emerge even as early as the Round Table talks in 1989 (Korbonski, 1996; Belka, Hausner, Jasinski, Marody, & Zirk-Sadowski, 1997). In turn, the interaction between citizens, collective action, and the apparatus of the state became either diminished or deeply complicated by the transitional process, the adoption of incomplete political and legal reforms, and even negative public opinion. For environmental organizations, this led to the pursuit of two different strategies, (1) professionalization and a form of capture or evolution toward the dominant practices of interest groups in the European Union and (2) a withdrawal from active involvement in trying to influence public policymaking. Thus, while some organizations sought to become ‘‘Western’’ and ‘‘democratic’’ in their practices, many others responded very slowly and


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cautiously to EU and global integration and policy transfer (Interview, representative of KLON/JAWOR, Warsaw, June 13, 2000). This was, in part, the result of some of the early successes and losses of the environmental movement, but it also reflects a more general pattern of citizen activism in Poland during the 1990s. While it is difficult to relate such a socio-political trend to other states in CEE, this pattern does have implications for the larger effects of globalization during the 1990s. The Polish environmental movement as a whole underwent a period of expansion and fragmentation during the 1990s. The expansion created both a series of locally and nationally oriented NGOs drawing from a range of funding, and the fragmentation produced ideological, and issue-specific factors to form their identity. In many cases, these organizations, like their Czech counterparts, chose to emphasize separation from the state and pursue local or small-scale projects (Interview with representative of KLON/JAWOR, June 13, 2000). Instead of participating as NGOs and interest groups, certain portions of the post-communist environmental movements chose to actively reject conventional engagement in politics, and instead focused on activities such as the theatre of the absurd, a rejection of violence, and communist-era, anti-political forms of political expression. These organizations, as one would expect, were typically built around only loose and informal structures of organization, had a high degree of social interaction among the members, and were often at odds or in conflict with the more mainstream and professionalizing environmental groups. In this context, such groups, in addition to the larger fragmentation of civil society, did little to create democratic connections or build the legitimacy of citizen-based activism. In turn, this presented not only challenges to the legitimacy of the newly democratic Polish state, but also to the emerging structures of governance and economic integration at the European level. However, as the 1990s drew to a close, environmental organizations moved toward greater involvement in Polish politics and policy-making, as well as toward greater connection and integration to broader European and global environmentalism. The early anti-organizational and antihierarchical tendencies present in Poland gradually started to shift not only toward a reduction of both absurdist and protest activities (with the more radical environmental groups either disappearing altogether or shifting to realo or realistic) perspectives, but also toward becoming both competent and more established players in the policy-making process. As environmental organizations have started to overcome their distrust and misapprehensions about other NGOs, it has necessarily followed that new forms of

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cooperation, alliance-building, and information sharing have emerged (Jancar-Webster, 1998). The degree of interaction between NGOs, the corporate sectors, the European Union, and the government started to expand dramatically as Poland moved closer to accession. The European Environment Centre (EEC), for example, established regular communications (although the substance of these communications is unknown) with several hundred NGOs and businesses within Poland. As a KLON member pointed out, NGOs from across policy sectors, and indeed CEE, have started to engage in attempts at self-regulation, holding annual conventions, and information-sharing meetings (Interview with KLON/JAWOR representative, Warsaw, June 13, 2000). In contrast to the Czech Republic, where environmental organizations saw their role and capacity in environmental policy-making as decreasing and tended to pursue more localized, small-scale activities, a number of Polish NGOs pointed toward increasing activity and communication beyond Polish borders. In addition to seeing improved interaction with Polish businesses (particularly in the areas of eco-labeling and energy conservation), many actors pointed to the gradual but optimistic shift in environmental activity. These activities moved away from protests and interventions toward more Western European non-governmental activities that are viewed as legitimate and not necessarily protest-based. In particular, while many environmental groups have started to draw upon the academic and scientific expertise of their members in order to assist or influence the technocratic components of environmental policy-making, they have also sought to influence policy formulation and implementation, contribute to environmental problem solving, and foster links to the Polish public and non-domestic environmental actors, such as other international environmental organizations and both EU and state-based governmental institutions (Interview with KLON/JAWOR representative, June 13 2000). Polish environmental groups started to have increased contact with EU officials and institutions as the accession negotiations continued, and as the final phase of negotiation drew near, the intensity of interaction increased. The increased connections derived both from the urgency of completing the negotiations as well as the broader capacity of Polish NGOs. While far from all Polish environmental organizations pursued such contacts, a number of groups developed communication with both the European Commission (often through Desk Officers) and the EU Delegation to Warsaw. However, only a very small number of Polish NGOs provided input to the Commission on issues such as the enlargement, environment, and regionalism. However, these groups composed an extremely small


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portion of the environmental ‘population’ (only three of approximately 1000) (Interview with European Environment Centre (EEC), June 16, 2000). For many Polish environmental NGOs during the 1990s, the lack of resources and membership base made it difficult to even consider moving beyond the local realm. In turn, the vast portion of Polish environmental groups did not see it as possible to function at the national, let alone at the supranational level. As a result, a small number of the larger, and in some cases long-standing environmental groups took on the role of environmental representation, while the others concentrated on local affairs. This division of labor indicates the potential for a diverse and multi-functional pattern of non-governmental environmental politics in Poland. However, such a division of labor also points to a highly selective and technically oriented policy style where only a certain collection of public organizations, and usually those with a specific set of scientific, such as chemical or environmental expertise, are contributing to the state-level and the European environmental policy agenda. While in comparison to the Czech Republic, the Poles may have been front-runners in terms of the diversification and democratization of environmental politics, and in the future a gradual shift toward a strong CEE presence in environmental governance may also develop, the patterns of the 1990s point to a fragmented and divided environmental civil society.

7. CONCLUSIONS: AN EMERGING EUROPEAN OR GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY? Although considerable attention has been paid in the academic and advocacy literatures to the emergence of a fluid, flexible, emancipatory collection of actors and actions that have emerged under the concept of ‘‘global civil society,’’ it is also important to examine in more specific cases how the component actors, and their activities emerge and develop. It is perhaps key, in this regard, to move beyond identifying the events that have triggered large-scale collective responses such as the 1989 Leipzig and 1968 Prague demonstrations. We also need to consider how and why it is that actions such as economic and political integration, policy harmonization, free trade, and increased labor mobility might affect the viability of both the state and non-state civil participation in politics. In both countries examined in this essay, a number of factors emerged to push environmental policy and environmental activism down on the list of priorities. In the Czech Republic, the combination of a strongly

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party-oriented leadership (especially under Klaus’ leadership) that explicitly sought to pursue a neo-liberal and Western economy in conjunction with increasingly scientific, rather than public, knowledge left many environmental organizations with a small number of choices. For many groups lacking the connections and resources to bring their perspective or input into the policy process, the choice became one of pragmatic simplicity – namely, to focus on the local environments and activities that could be meaningful and efficacious. For others with greater scientific capacity, a consulting role could be undertaken, but often at the loss of public or grassroots input. In Poland, while similar patterns emerged, the trend toward NGOs’ withdrawal started to reverse by the end of the 1990s. Some environmental groups were actively seeking and finding cooperation with other NGOs, even across national borders. This pattern, which provides a nascent connection to global civil society, should perhaps not be overestimated. The patterns of fragmentation and withdrawal present in Poland have also been indicative of an on-going struggle to locate a viable place for civil society in policy-making and to move beyond the presence of a single representative body (such as Solidarity) for political expression. While environmental NGOs face considerable difficulties in both of the countries, we may connect these problems to the larger questions of global civil society. In particular, what lessons might European integration, as a special microcosm for some of the globalization forces, teach us about the factors shaping or marginalizing civil society? What quickly emerges in the Central and Eastern European context is that both a shift away from direct connection to the policy-making process, as well as an implicit movement toward egalitarian representation have taken place. As Chandhoke (2005) points out, not only are individual polities defined by the inequality of their positions in the world system, but so too are the positions and status of national components of civil society. While Chandhoke demonstrates the limited capacity and resources of tribes in Central India to influence global and national politics, the issues facing Central and Eastern European environmentalism present similar barriers created by limited access and resources. Obviously, not every group, whether Western or Eastern, North or South, can possess the tools, capacity, vocabulary, or finances to garner attention or exercise influence in the ‘‘public sphere of civil societies.’’ Only some of these groups manage to create a system, in which key organizations and actors become not only representatives, but also builders of the new experiential reality (Chandhoke, 2005, p. 361). As many Czech and Polish environmental groups have withdrawn back to the local, the organizations that are typically left standing in the public


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arena are those which developed legitimacy, capital, scientific expertise, personnel, and membership base necessary to assist or meet the needs of state, EU and possibly global policy-making. Groups without such capacity, while often still effective or at least active, are reduced to a localized existence. Others may choose to abandon the political sphere altogether, or at the very least to reshape it to fit their own particular vision (e.g., Theatre of the Absurd). More importantly, those groups that manage to create an opportunity to interact with both national and supranational governance have shifted their orientation away from grassroots and more citizen-based activism to take advantage of the specific (i.e., scientific or technocratic) needs of both the European Commission and national ministries. Although this does provide some limited voice for citizen-based input into the development and implementation of environmental policy in CEE, it also points to a potentially troubling trend of increasingly technocratic policymaking, particularly at the European level, and of the rejection or abandonment of public knowledge and opinion in favor of science, and the bifurcation of environmentalism into two camps. These two camps, in addition to the realist-fundamentalist split (which was much less prevalent in CEE than in Germany, for example), are based upon a more obvious division – those who have, and those who do not. This essay points to the need for a more nuanced and critical perspective on both the emergence and participation in global civil society, and the functioning of European integration in terms of democratic citizenship and participation in the policy process. Not only should the dynamics driving both the positive and negative aspects of cooperation in civil society beyond state-borders be considered in detail, we should also be sensitive to the exercise of power, authority, and influence within that context. Civil society, whether at global or national levels, is not a neutral and entirely open forum. Despite the optimism of some, it is also not necessarily something that will automatically emerge. In turn, it is necessary to consider the forms and relationships that emerge as new power structures develop and to understand precisely what it is that citizen-based politics, whether environmental or not, manage to achieve.

NOTES 1. Two of the original criteria for membership in the EU are a functioning liberal economy and democratic institutions and practices. 2. There are multiple conceptualizations and definitions of civil society. In this text, I define civil society as a critical interactive space within the public sphere, one

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that overlaps with both the political sphere and the private sphere, thus creating a key link between family and state. 3. Much of the activity categorized as civil society prior to 1989 was oriented toward opposition and dissent against state socialism. A qualitative shift away from this orientation and toward more conventional democratic, civil society-based politics was a key part of the democratic imagination of dissidents such as Havel. However, the transition to a new form of civil society post-1989 did not follow the paths imagined by either CEE dissidents, or Western scholars (Tucker et al., 2000; Skilling & Wilson, 1991; Seligman, 1998; Scho¨pflin, 1990; Ost, 1990). 4. Although the institutions and procedures of the EU have become firmly entrenched in Western European political and economic life, the finalite´ politique of the EU has yet to be determined. Not only is the geographic size and scope of the EU still emerging, even such fundamental elements as a European Constitution are still under development. As a result, the EU, as an on-going project with no set model of completion is often referred to as a polity sui generis (Joerges, Meny, & Weiler, 2000). 5. Habermas identifies four definitions of the state: (1) The administrative state, based on the levying of taxes and the administration of a legal system; (2) the sovereign territorial states of classical international law; (3) the national state, based upon the creation of ‘‘the people’’; and (4) the social state, oriented around securing rights (2003: 89). 6. It should be noted that I am not arguing for the development or analysis of a ‘‘European’’ society or culture. However, it should also be recognized that the presence of the EU as a polity with a distinctly (although changing) population and boundaries, does present a new and discrete operational field of inquiry. Although there is the danger of re-creating state-based analysis of politics at the European level, what I present here offers the possibility of conceptualizing EU-based politics as both part of, and distinct from, the politics of the individual member-states. 7. Not only environmental organizations or new social movements in general oppose the structures or policies of states. Similarly, certain organizations, and particularly those that endorse an ecological modernization discourse, can be co-opted and removed of autonomous influence by the state (see Dryzek, 1997). 8. Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome (March 1957) stated that ‘‘Any European state may apply to become a member of the Community.’’ The concept of being, or becoming, ‘‘European’’ has therefore been at the heart of all previous (and presumably future) enlargements. 9. As Agh (1999) points out, membership in the EU and adoption of the acquis can reduce the capacity of states to act autonomously. However, it is important to note that smaller states can actually gain ‘‘sovereignty’’ over their domestic affairs by participating in the relatively egalitarian institutions of the EU. 10. Estimates of the implementation costs for harmonizing Czech environmental policies with those of the EU are above 250 million Czech crowns (see for example, Fagin & Jehlicka, 1998). 11. The number of ‘‘Euro’’ interest groups in Brussels has grown from estimates of 300 in 1970 (Butt Philip, 1985), 654 in 1986 (Grote, 1989) and 525 in 1990 (Mazey & Richardson, 1993). This trend has continued as the EU has developed. 12. While the EU is rapidly becoming the dominant environmental actor in Europe, it does not yet garner universal support, legitimacy, or trust from the


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European public as a guarantor of environmental quality or safety. As responses to the food safety scares and the EU moratorium on genetically modified foods (GMOs) demonstrated, states can reassert under special conditions (such as health hazards) their legitimacy as policy-making bodies in the environmental domain (Guehlstorf & Hallstrom, 2005). 13. There has been a historical pattern within Eastern Europe that political and economic development (that are comparable to Western levels) could only be achieved by adopting Western forms, regardless of fit to local custom and culture. However, while politics in ‘‘the West’’ saw the emergence of a relatively strong set of autonomous spheres of power, such spheres were typically weak in Eastern Europe. The state has taken on roles allocated to civil society and encouraged the development of civil society ‘‘from above’’ (Scho¨pflin, 1990). 14. Based on Eurobarometer data, the number of Czechs claiming to have no information or knowledge about the European Union actually grew from 43.3 percent in 1994 to 71.7 percent in 1997 (Potucek, 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1996, 1997). 15. Oneworld.net is a connectivity webspace that has been identified as an example of the virtual mechanisms that can allow NGOs and other actors to network and connect (Carmin & VanDeveer, 2004). 16. Public virtues in a democratic context include characteristics such as the ability to compromise, trust, tolerance, a willingness to participate, and a respect for other views or beliefs. In contrast, private virtues include distrust, dislike, and contempt for others, limited desire to compromise, and a preference for highly specific affinity groups (Dahrendorf, 1967). 17. Earlier in Poland’s history, environmental activism presented considerable legal challenges. For example, discussing environmental hazards was illegal during the 1970s, and there was even a combined legal-ideological stance (also present in other state socialist countries) that environmental damage from industrial activities was impossible. In fact, it was considered a strictly a ‘‘capitalist’’ problem (Hicks, 1996).

REFERENCES Agh, A. (1999). Processes of democratization in the East Central European and Balkan states: Sovereignty-related conflicts in the context of Europeanization. Communist and PostCommunist Studies, 32, 263–279. Aksu, A., & Camilleri, J. A. (2002). Democratizing global governance. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Arato, A. (1994). The rise, decline and reconstruction of the concept of civil society, and directions for future research. In: A. Bibic & G. Graziano (Eds), Civil Society, Political Society, Democracy (pp. 3–16). Slovenia: Slovenian Political Science Associations. Barber, B. (1996). Jihad vs McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are reshaping the World. New York: Ballantine Books. Belka, M., Hausner, J., Jasinski, L. J., Marody, M., & Zirk-Sadowski, M. (1997). The Polish transformation from the perspective of European integration. Warsa: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Bibic, A., & Graziano, G. (1994). Civil society, political society, democracy. Slovenia: Slovenia Political Science Association.

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