German Annual of Spatial Research and Policy
Editors:
ARL – Academy for Spatial Research and Planning, Hanover BBSR – Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development, Bonn IfL – Leibniz Institute for Regional Geography, Leipzig IOER – Leibniz Institute of Ecological and Regional Development, Dresden IRS – Leibniz Institute for Regional Development and Structural Planning, Erkner
Responsible for the 2009 edition: IRS – Leibniz Institute for Regional Development and Structural Planning, Erkner
Heiderose Kilper (Ed.)
New Disparities in Spatial Development in Europe With 39 Figures
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Editor Prof. Dr. Heiderose Kilper Leibniz Institute for Regional Development and Structural Planning (IRS) Flakenstraße 28-31 15537 Erkner, Germany
[email protected] In the German Annual are published scientific articles, which were reviewed according to international standards, as well as short reports about research work and practical experience.
Editorial staff: ts|pk, Berlin: Christoph Rosenkranz English language editor: David Skogley Layout: Karin Engelke, Berlin Picture credits figure back cover: Jürgen Hohmuth ISSN 1862-5738 e-ISSN 1862-572X ISBN 978-3-642-03401-5 e-ISBN 978-3-642-03402-2 DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-03402-2 Springer Heidelberg Dordrecht London New York c Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilm or in any other way, and storage in data banks. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the German Copyright Law of September 9, 1965, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Permissions for use must always be obtained from the editors, too. Violations are liable to prosecution under the German Copyright Law. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Cover design: eStudio Calamar S.L. Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)
Acknowledgement
V
Acknowledgement
Firstly, I would like to thank the following authors for their contributions to this publication: Juliane Albrecht, Andreas Blum, Isolde Brade, Thiemo W. Eser, Gérard Hutter, Gerold Janssen, Andreas Klee, Zoltán Kovács, Hans Joachim Kujath, Markus Leibenath, Tim Leibert, Monika Meyer, Bernhard Müller, Kai Pflanz, Gregor Prinzensing, Jan Prömmel, Sabine Scharfe, Paulina Schiappacasse, Suntje Schmidt, Volker Schmidt-Seiwert, Karl Peter Schön, Mathias Siedhoff, Christian Smigiel, Axel Stein, Sylke Stutzriemer, Dagmar Tille, Sabine Tzschaschel, Manuela Wolke and Sabine Zillmer. I would also like to thank Sebastian Lentz (IfL, Leipzig), Dietmar Scholich (ARL, Hannover), Bernhard Müller (IOER, Dresden), and Wendelin Strubelt (BBR/ BBSR, Bonn) who supported this publication as editors. Further thanks go to Gregor Prinzensing for coordinating the contributions and to Torsten Thurmann for the final editing. Last but not least I would like to thank Christoph Rosenkranz, from ts|pk in Berlin, for the competent editing of this publication.
Heiderose Kilper
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Contents
Contents 1
VII
Heiderose Kilper
Preface – Introduction
1
Refereed Section 2
Karl Peter Schön
Territorial Cohesion – Current Views of the Commission and the Member States of the European Union
2.1 2.2 2.2.1 2.2.2 2.2.3 2.2.4
Territorial Cohesion – A New Concept Combining Territorial Policy and Cohesion Policy Territorial Cohesion and European Spatial Development Policy The European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) The Lisbon Treaty (2007) The EU Member States’ Territorial Agenda of the European Union (2007) The Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion of the European Commission (2008)
Thiemo W. Eser
3
From Disparities to Diversity – Territorial Cohesion in the European Union
3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6
Approaching Territorial Cohesion in the European Union Disparities in Policy Conception Spatial Development and Territorial Cohesion Territorial Cohesion in the European Framework Disparities Relevant for Territorial Cohesion Territorial Cohesion: Shift of the Focus from Disparities to Diversity
7
7 7 7 9 13 15
19
19 20 21 23 28 31
VIII
Contents
Hans Joachim Kujath, Axel Stein
4
Spatial Patterns in the Knowledge Society
4.1 4.2 4.2.1 4.2.2 4.2.3 4.2.4 4.3 4.4 4.4.1 4.4.2 4.4.3 4.5
Background and Methodology Operationalising the Concept of the Knowledge Society for Spatial Discourse Technical Dimension Economic Dimension Social Dimension A New Spatial Structure for the Knowledge Society? Classification of Germany’s Subspaces Using a Cluster Analysis Identified Spatial Patterns Upscaling: The Emergence of Large Agglomerations Influenced by the Knowledge Society Corridors of Development: The Expansion of the Knowledge Society in Rural Areas located between Metropolitan Regions New Periphery: Regions with a Knowledge Society Deficit Conclusion: Knowledge Structures Space
Suntje Schmidt, Manuela Wolke
5
The Importance of Infrastructures and Interaction Networks for Regional Competitiveness in the Knowledge Economy
5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4
Introduction Functional Specialisation in the Knowledge Economy and their Spatial Characteristics Function-specific Interaction Networks Conclusions: Cities and Regions as Nodes of Knowledge – Infrastructure Demands
37 37 37 38 38 40 41 42 45 45 46
46 47
51
51 52 56 60
Contents
Volker Schmidt-Seiwert
6
Urbanisation Processes and Regional Disparities in Europe – The Role of Metropolitan Regions and the Importance of the Settlement Structure
6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6
Cities and Metropolitan Regions In Search of the Metropolitan Region Medium-term Growth of Densely Populated Outlying Areas Urban and Rural – A Changing Typology The Increasing Concentration of Economic Power Conclusion
Isolde Brade, Christian Smigiel, Zoltán Kovács
7
Suburban Residential Development in Post-socialist Urban Regions: The Case of Moscow, Sofia, and Budapest
7.1 7.2 7.2.1 7.2.2 7.2.3 7.2.4 7.2.5 7.3 7.3.1 7.3.2 7.3.3
The Rise of Suburbs Moscow The Suburbanisation of Moscow’s Urban Region Moscow’s Periphery during the Soviet Period Social and Demographic Characteristics of the Suburban Population Current Residential Suburbanisation Dacha Culture Sofia History of Urban Development before 1945 The Socialist Period and its Impacts on Suburban Development Processes, Actors, and Trends of Residential Suburbanisation in Sofia since 1990
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67
67 68 71 72 73 75
79
79 80 80 81 82 83 85 87 87 87 89
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7.4 7.4.1 7.4.2 7.4.3 7.5
Budapest The Historical Background of Urban Sprawl Processes, Actors, and Trends of Residential Suburbanisation in Budapest since 1990 Policies Affecting Residential Suburbanisation Similarities and Differences of Residential Suburbanisation in Moscow, Sofia, and Budapest: A Discussion and Conclusions
Bernhard Müller, Paulina Schiappacasse
8
The European Regional Demographic Mosaic – A Challenge for Spatial Development
8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6
Demographic Change – Repercussions for Urban and Regional Development Research Issues and Methodological Considerations The Rise of Ageing Regions European Patterns of Depopulation Developing a Regional Demographic Vulnerability Index (DVI) Perspectives
Tim Leibert
9
Polarisation or Convergence? Spatial Patterns of Fertility in Hungary 15 Years after the Beginning of the Process of Transformation
9.1 9.2 9.2.1 9.2.2
Theoretical Approaches to Explaining the Demographic Transformation in Hungary Hungary’s Economic Development since the Transformation Labour Market and Educational Level The Roma as an Indicator for Multiple Social Deprivation
93 93 95 97 98
105 105 106 108 115 119 121
129
129 132 133 134
9.3 9.3.1 9.3.2 9.3.3 9.4
Contents
XI
Hungary’s Demographic Development since 1990 Regional Patterns of Fertility “Ageing” of Fertility Multivariate Analysis Future Prospects: Which Future Spatial Patterns of Fertility are to be Expected?
134
Juliane Albrecht
10
The Subsidiarity Principle – Does it Impede Equal Ecological Living Conditions in Europe?
10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5
Subsidiarity as an “Architectural Principle” of the EU Content of the Subsidiarity Principle in Article 5 (2) EC Treaty The Subsidiarity Principle and Environmental Policy Application of the Subsidiarity Principle in Representative Examples of EC Environmental Legislation Conclusions and Outlook
135 136 138 141
145
145 146 150 153 158
Short Reports
Gérard Hutter, Andreas Klee, Monika Meyer, Gregor Prinzensing, Sabine Scharfe, Mathias Siedhoff, Sabine Tzschaschel
11
Demographic Change: Complexity as a Challenge for Urban and Regional Development
Markus Leibenath, Andreas Blum, Sylke Stutzriemer
12
Environmental Cooperation across Germany’s External Borders – The Case of Ecological Networks 171
167
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Gerold Janssen
13
European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) – Experiences and Prospects
Jan Prömmel, Dagmar Tille
14
Hist. Urban – Integrated Revitalisation of Historic Towns to Promote a Polycentric and Sustainable Development
Kai Pflanz, Sabine Zillmer
15
Germany in the Light of the Territorial Agenda – The ESPON Perspective
Appendix
List of Authors
Appendix
Portrait of the Editors’ Institutions
177
183
187
191 201
Preface – Introduction
1
Preface – Introduction
Heiderose Kilper
1
“New Disparities in Spatial Development in Europe” – several topics are included in both the title and theme of the German Annual of Spatial Research and Policy for the Year 2009. We are first of all concerned with the concept of spatial disparities, which has its roots in national spatial planning and spatial development policy. Regional development as interregional equalisation policy, for example, is well-anchored in the German constitution through fundamental legal standards and the division of powers among the respective federal states. The “establishment of uniform living conditions within the federal territory” and “securing the uniformity of living conditions beyond the borders of any single federal state” (Section 72 Paragraph 2 of German Basic Law [GG]) are expressly specified as aims of government action in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. With the major reform of Germany’s financial system in 1969 and incorporation of the joint task “Improvement of the Regional Economic Structure” in Section 91a of German Basic Law [GG]1 interventions on the part of the federal government and the wealthy federal states for the benefit of states and regions with less economic success were legitimised in constitutional terms as well. All of this would be inconceivable without the concept of spatial disparities. Yet what is meant by this? In order to provide the term with content a spatial reference value is required; either the total area of a national state or the total area of the European Union. “Spatial disparities” thus represents a relational category which may only be established in relation to a spatially superordinate scale. A “desired condition” of economic performance and social welfare on the part of a society and its equipment with technical, social and cultural infrastructure is defined as it were from a central top-down perspective and should be evenly distributed throughout the respective total area. If deviations from this “desired condition” are determined “toward the bottom” for regions and/ or sub-regions, then these are considered to be spatial and/ or regional disparities. The concept of spatial disparities is thus a measurement concept and a methodical instrument for regional research. With the aid of specific indicators regional deviations from given characteristics judged by a society to be relevant and which, in an ideal projection, should be evenly distributed 1 The basis of the major reform of the German financial system in 1969 was provided by a constitutional reform on the part of the then Grand Coalition with which the longstanding practice since the 1950s of co-financing the tasks of the combined federal states by the German federal government was given a legal basis. As specified in Section 91a/ b of German Basic Law [GG], a completely new instrument of interrelated policy was created with the “joint tasks” within the scope of German federalism. H. Kilper (ed.), New Disparities in Spatial Development in Europe, German Annual of Spatial Research and Policy, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-03402-2_1, © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009
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are measured within the total area and/ or in all of the regions of a national territory. The concept of spatial disparities is at the same time a normative concept. Which characteristics are deemed as relevant in a society ultimately represents a value judgment. A politically desired condition of social welfare is considered as the (value) standard for measuring regional disparities as undesired conditions that are to be eliminated with the aid of interregional equalisation policy. What was valid over decades as the basis for legitimating interregional equalisation policy and financial transfers in several EU Member States, in particular in German regional planning and regional development policy, is now undergoing an interesting expansion in connection with European integration. The European Union already exhibited a wide variety of the most diverse types of regions with its enlargement towards the west, north and south up to 1995 – flourishing economic regions, metropolitan centres, rural regions, stagnating and crisis regions, border regions; but also regions with special geographical characteristics such as, for example, the Alpine regions in Austria, the groups of islands in Greece, the long coastal regions of the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, the North and Baltic Seas, or the very sparsely populated regions in the north of Sweden and Finland which are also shaped by extreme climatic conditions. Past understanding of interregional equalisation policy, i. e. how it has been implemented within the national context, has only been partially suited to a European scale. The concept of territorial cohesion is used by the European Union to confront the disparities of spatial development and at the same time to preserve and shape the variety of European regions as development potential. Mentioned for the first time in the draft European Constitution, then in the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), this concept stands for the spatial integration of sectoral, i. e. economic and social, cohesion. Moreover, it aims to preserve natural resources and cultural heritage, while promoting more balanced competitive ability between the EU Member States and their regions. The title of the Green Paper published in October 2008 on territorial cohesion concisely brings the strategic focus of the concept to the point: “Turning Territorial Diversity into Strength.” The following two contributions will deal with this concept. Karl Peter Schön (BBSR) begins the discussion with some fundamental remarks. He provides an overview of the process of formulating a European position on the topic of “territorial cohesion” during the past ten years. In 1999 the document entitled European Spatial Development Perspectives (ESDP) stood at the beginning of this process. However, with the Green Paper on territorial cohesion it was given a further programmatic focus in October 2008. Thiemo W. Eser (Luxemburg/ ARL) is concerned with the problem of disparity at the European level in conjunction with the logic of this concept. He also initially outlines the landmarks related to the concept of territorial cohesion. Eser takes up the message “Turning Territorial Diversity into Strength” in the title of the Green
Preface – Introduction
3
Paper. He analyses the problem that regional development policy in the European Union requires an indicator system for the measurement of spatial disparities if it seeks to make efficient and effective use of its resources and instruments, while building on the potential and unique strength of the European Union to preserve and shape its regional diversity. He characterises the concept of territorial cohesion as one that is complex and applied across various sectors and at the same time aims to establish relations between areas and regions of the European Union. A further topic is then created with the concept of new spatial disparities. With the end of the Cold War and the waning of confrontation between the systems, with the collapse of the former socialist planned economies and their transformation into market economies in Central and Eastern Europe, and with dissolution of the economic and military alliances in the former Soviet sphere of influence, the European process of integration was confronted with completely new challenges. Already with German Reunification on 3 October 1999 – when the former GDR automatically became a member of the European Communities through accession to the sphere of influence of German Basic Law – and even more so with enlargement of the European Union toward the East in 2004 and 2007, social and economic inequality in the European Union reached dimensions which until then were completely unknown. However, new spatial disparities developed not only within the enlarged European Union, but also at the national level within the new EU Member States that have undergone profound transformation processes since the 1990s. These new regional patterns of social and economic inequality in the European Union are combined with processes of structural change that affect all of the EU Member States. The transformation from an industrial economy to a knowledge economy, the transformation in settlement structures due to extensive suburbanisation and thus growth processes in the surrounding areas of large cities, and the demographic transformation due to natural population development should be noted in this regard. To that extent the adjective “new” should be understood in a double sense: “new” in quantitative, but also in qualitative terms. The following contributions are concerned with new disparities of spatial development as a result of structural change. Hans Joachim Kujath and Axel Stein (IRS) address the spatial consequences of the transformation from the industrial to the knowledge society. The key argument here is that the transition to the knowledge society is more than a paraphrase of metropolisation. They discuss the development of the knowledge society and its spatial impact with regard to its technical, economic and social dimensions. On the basis of a factor and cluster analysis they identify nine clusters for Germany that stand for the types of space and locations of the knowledge society. They, in turn, may be grouped into three regional patterns: (1) agglomerations shaped by the knowledge society; (2) rural intermediate zones in which the knowledge society is propagated and which connect the respective agglomerations as corridors of development; (3)
4
Preface – Introduction
regions which (still) exhibit deficits in terms of the knowledge society and which they refer to as the “new periphery”. They demonstrate that to a substantial degree the regions of the knowledge society are formed by networks. Thus the constitution of cognitive knowledge regions in which questions of proximity and distance are redefined is observed in their work. In their contribution Suntje Schmidt and Manuela Wolke (IRS) discuss the position that metropolitan regions in particular would profit from expansion of the knowledge economy as they possess the required infrastructures for the trading, transferring, and accessing knowledge. In contrast they argue that the knowledge economy is not concentrated exclusively in metropolitan regions. The empirical database, on the basis of which they argue, represents a source data collection within the scope of corporate surveys carried out in the two metropolitan regions of Berlin and Munich and their surrounding areas in Brandenburg and Bavaria. What they observe is a close connection between forms of functional specialisation within the knowledge economy (they differentiate between four forms: high-tech industries; transformation-oriented services; transaction-oriented services; and the information and media industry) and their spatial location. This is expressed by the fact that companies that offer transformation-oriented services as well as companies in the information and media industry settle in non-metropolitan areas. The scope and quality of the interaction and cooperative relationships that companies in the knowledge economy maintain with their customers, suppliers and other partners in the generation of knowledge is regarded as an important explanatory approach. Volker Schmidt-Seiwert (BBSR) examines development in four types of settlement structures (i. e. central regions; urbanised surrounding areas; rural surrounding areas; and rural areas) of the twenty-seven Member States of the European Union as well as EU candidates and neighbouring countries in the period from 1981 to 2006. Ratios reflecting the development of the population, gross domestic product, and patent applications form the empirical basis of the study. Schmidt-Seiwert comes to the conclusion that the core urban regions – and with them in particular the densely populated surrounding areas – form the focus of concentration for both the population and the economy. However, in accordance with his findings, these developments do not follow the same course in all countries. Thus the suburban area forms the area of economic concentration and development, particularly in the countries of Northern and Western Europe. In their contribution Isolde Brade, Christian Smigiel, and Zoltán Kovács (IfL) are concerned with the spatial patterns of the suburbanisation processes that have drastically increased in Central and Eastern Europe since 1990. With Sofia and Budapest they selected the capitals of two new EU Member States; with Moscow they direct their view beyond the borders of the European Union. In three case studies they work out common features, but also important differences, which
Preface – Introduction
5
they derive from privatisation of the housing markets, the motorisation of private households and a liberalised housing policy. They see further important factors for the development of new settlement structures in the transformation of the social structure in post-socialist societies, in the gradual formation of a middle class in Budapest and a stratum of “nouveau riche” in Moscow and Sofia as well as in domestic and foreign investors who operate as new participants in the housing markets. They demonstrate that due to the special development of Hungary since the 1970s (“Goulash Communism”) the capital Budapest exhibits a completely unique development in the transformation of settlement structures. Despite the apparently necessary regional differentiation they speak of the “specifically post-socialist path of residential suburbanisation” which they demonstrate with one feature in particular: the complete isolation of newly built housing developments from their surrounding areas, both in physical, material and in social terms. Bernhard Müller and Paulina Schiappacasse (IOER/ TU Dresden) deal with demographic transformation in the EU 27 and its regional developments. The focus of their investigation is placed on the phenomena of aging and population decline. For their analysis they evaluated data on the 260 NUTS II regions of the EU 27. They ascertain profound demographic disparities between the various regions of Europe – after the last enlargement of the EU in particular – and speak of a “rather colourful demographic mosaic.” A further result of their investigation is that life expectancy is evidently higher in the countries of Western Europe – in particular in Italy, Spain and Sweden – than in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In the East-West Health Gap they see one of the greatest challenges facing the European Union. They suggest the introduction of a regional Demographic Vulnerability Index (DVI) with which the positioning of each and every one of the 260 NUTS II regions may be shown in the course of demographic transformation as part of comprehensive ranking throughout all of Europe. Thus the DVI can function as a type of early warning system for regional and local participants whose areas of responsibility are affected by the consequences of demographic transformation. In his investigation of regional differentiation in the generative behaviour of the population in Hungary Tim Leibert (IfL) treats a further aspect with regard to the topic of “demographic transformation”. He approaches the topic of disparity by setting changes in the generative behaviour of the Hungarian population in relationship to regional differences in economic power, employment/ unemployment, and education level. In terms of theory he relies on two approaches to explain the transformation of generative behaviour: crisis behaviour theory and the theory of the second demographic transition. The key arguments of both theories are subjected to an independent descriptive analysis of important demographic indicators as well as a multivariate analysis. His findings can be described as the “internal polarisation of Hungary”; that is, high regional fertility among teenagers, early marriage and a high number of children are closely connected with economic and social crisis indicators.
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Preface – Introduction
Examples are the regions in east Hungary and in Somogy County in southwest Hungary. In contrast, a high degree of childlessness and fertility postponement mark generative behaviour in the powerful economic regions of west Hungary with their respectively high levels of income and education. Leibert comes to the conclusion that the spatial pattern of generative behaviour in Hungary exhibits both elements of convergence and polarisation because the fertility rates have declined in all of the regions of Hungary and at the same time exhibits considerable differences within the scope of an interregional comparison. Juliane Albrecht (IOER) handles the topic from a completely different perspective. In her contribution she addresses the question as to whether or not the principle of subsidiarity prevents equivalent ecological living conditions in the European Union. She elucidates the dynamic relationship between the principles of limited authority and the appropriateness in which the subsidiarity principle is located. Using the examples of the Water Framework Directive, the Environmental Noise Directive, and a currently discussed draft for a Soil Protection Framework Directive, she examines whether the environmental policy of the European Union is in agreement with the principle of subsidiarity. Albrecht comes to the conclusion that the principle of subsidiarity in the EC Treaty does not represent an obstacle for the implementation of European environmental policy. She thus concludes that the EU Member States obviously take a positive stance toward uniform European legislation in order to achieve high standards in terms of environmental protection and in order to create equivalent ecological living conditions in Europe, even if the problems are of a regional or local nature. Following the main contributions short reports provide further insight into the research topics that are being worked on in the respective institutes of the regional sciences network, within the scope of their event activities as well as their promotion of PhD students.
Territorial 2.1 Introduction Cohesion
2
7
Territorial Cohesion – Current Views of the Commission and the Member States of the European Union Karl Peter Schön
2.1 Territorial Cohesion – A New Concept Combining Territorial Policy and Cohesion Policy Although the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union (which failed because of negative referenda in France and the Netherlands) and the EU Treaty of Lisbon (which at least temporarily failed after the negative referendum in Ireland) have not yet come into effect, these new treaties established “territorial cohesion” as a new basic goal of the European Union in addition to “economic and social cohesion”. In this context, EU ministers responsible for spatial development and territorial cohesion as well as the European Commission have started a debate on the meaning and interpretation of territorial cohesion and the elements, challenges, and strategies of a territorial cohesion policy. Territorial cohesion, as the wording implies, combines cohesion policies and territorial policies complementarily. It adds the element of territory to cohesion policy and to economic and social cohesion, and it emphasises the aspect of cohesion within European spatial and territorial policies. In this spirit, one could suppose that, on the one hand, cohesion policy involves more than territorial cohesion and that, on the other hand, territorial policy includes more than territorial cohesion. In this article I will explore what contributions EU ministers responsible for territorial cohesion and the European Commission have recently made to shaping and clarifying the policy object of territorial cohesion in Europe.
2.2 Territorial Cohesion and European Spatial Development Policy 2.2.1 The European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) 20 years ago, at the first ministerial meeting in Nantes in 1989, EU ministers responsible for spatial and territorial development started their intense cooperation. Ten years later, in 1999, they agreed upon the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP)1, which laid the grounds for the main themes, goals, and methods of European cooperation in the field of territorial development. With the 1 CEC (1999): ESDP. H. Kilper (ed.), New Disparities in Spatial Development in Europe, German Annual of Spatial Research and Policy, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-03402-2_2, © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009
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Territorial Cohesion
Fig. 1: Spatial structure of Europe. Source: BMVBS/ BBR (2007)
ESDP, the first milestone was created, which has provided the foundation and the orientation for political cooperation in the field of European spatial development until today. In a way, the ESDP has anticipated the European Union’s Lisbon and
2.2 Territorial Cohesion and European Spatial Development Territorial Cohesion Policy
9
Gothenburg Strategies by sketching elements of European territorial development based on balanced competitiveness and sustainable development. Economic and social cohesion, conservation of natural resources and cultural heritage, and a more balanced competitiveness within the European territory were the three main underlying objectives of the ESDP. More specifically, three policy guidelines for spatial development were formulated and elaborated in 60 detailed policy options: a balanced and polycentric urban system and a new urban-rural relationship; parity of access to infrastructure and knowledge; and sustainable development, prudent management, and the protection of nature and cultural heritage. The bold message of the ESDP was that ‘territory matters’, and this message was reiterated and deepened in the discourse that followed, leading to the Territorial Agenda of the EU and the concept of territorial cohesion. During the 1990s and in the beginning of the new millennium, some basic values, policy goals, and political strategies of European society were newly discussed and readjusted. This happened in the context of (and due to) intensifying globalisation, economic recession, unemployment and the bursting of the Internet bubble at the turn of the century, a new political awareness of climate change, energy provision, and demographic change and development, and, of course, in the context of the EU enlargement by twelve new member states and their integration into the European Union. 2.2.2 The Lisbon Treaty (2007) With the Lisbon Treaty (2007), territorial cohesion was introduced as a new basic goal for the European Union. It strengthens and supplements the other two cohesion goals, and in the new treaty, economic, social, and territorial cohesion go together as one threefold goal of the EU. There are no specific paragraphs on territorial cohesion as such, but all specifications laid down in the treaty refer to all three cohesion goals at the same time. One of the central passages is Article 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)2. After the general reference to an “overall harmonious development” of the EU (“In order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Union shall develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic, social and territorial cohesion.”), the central aim is formulated as in previous treaties: “In particular, the Union shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions.” This sentence obviously provides legal grounds for cohesion policies and the Structural Funds in general, and its main Objective 1 in particular. The next section of Article 174 TFEU is the most cited one when it comes to territorial cohesion and spatial development. It demands that particular attention be paid to specific types of regions, in the literature sometimes briefly referred to as ‘handicapped regions’. Article 174 TFEU 2 TFEU (2008).
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Territorial Cohesion
includes an enumeration of such regions and in particular mentions rural areas, areas undergoing industrial transition, and regions with natural or demographic handicaps. In this way, it directs economic, social, and territorial cohesion towards
Fig. 2: Accessibility and traffic junctions. Source: BMVBS/ BBR (2007)
2.2 Territorial Cohesion and European SpatialTerritorial Development Cohesion Policy
11
support for and attention to ‘handicapped regions’. In addition, the first half sentence “Among the regions concerned” puts them in the general context of the aim to support “overall harmonious development” and to reduce disparities between the levels of development in the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions: “Among the regions concerned, particular attention shall be paid to rural areas, areas affected by industrial transition, and regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps such as the northernmost regions with very low population density and island, crossborder and mountain regions” (Article 174 (3) TFEU). The legal and political debates, also initiated by many stakeholders of supposedly ‘handicapped regions’, have since then circled around some of these questions and positions: (1) On the one hand, among the least favoured regions, which are economically measured by an economic performance (GDP per capita) well under the EU average, island, cross-border, mountainous, and other historically or geographically ‘handicapped’ regions may have additional problems and challenges of many dimensions and thus need particular attention. But on
Fig. 3: Population development over a longer period. Source: BMVBS/ BBR (2007)
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Territorial Cohesion
the other hand, many mountain and island regions of Europe, for instance, are among the most attractive and wealthiest regions in the European Union and do not seem to need much extra ‘particular attention’. (2) ‘Particular attention’ does not necessarily mean more money and financial support from the European Union. Elements like good governance, integrated territorial development concepts, and making the best use of the region’s own territorial capital, seem to be the crucial elements of a successful territorial cohesion policy. (3) Territorial cohesion is also a matter of territorial scale. Traditional EU cohesion policy is mostly based on medium range NUTS II regions. However, there is some evidence that below this level there are also territorial dysfunctions that threaten the overall harmonious development of the European territory. For instance, in their Leipzig Charter on Sustainable European Cities3 European ministers responsible for urban development argued that deprived neighbourhoods in European cities are one of the major challenges to sustainable development and territorial cohesion, and have thus demanded a policy of social integration to reduce inequalities and prevent social exclusion. At the same time, the EU Commission’s Urban Audit has shown that disparities within cities sometimes tend to be larger than interregional disparities and that deprived inner-urban areas are among the least favoured areas of Europe. (4) Finally, with regard to their cooperation European territorial ministers have claimed that territorial cohesion and spatial development should not only support economically weak and lagging regions, but that it is also necessary to support the Lisbon Agenda themes of innovation and competitiveness through sound territorial policy approaches. This is an aspect not explicitly defined in the Lisbon Treaty, which leaves room for debate about the best territorial development strategies and their forms of organisation between cities and regions, Member States, and the European Commission. In his reflection on Article 174 of the TFEU, Fischer came to the conclusion that almost the entire EU territory is covered by the enumeration list of Article 174 and adds that it would have been more precise to identify those regions that do not need particular attention.4 It seems that it is the economically strong cities and metropolitan regions that (in this context) are not explicitly covered by Article 174 TFEU.
3 LC (2007). 4 Fischer (2008), p 310.
2.2 Territorial Cohesion and European SpatialTerritorial Development Policy Cohesion
13
2.2.3 The EU Member States’ Territorial Agenda of the European Union (2007) In 2004 the new territorial cohesion objective induced the Dutch EU Presidency to take a new political initiative that aimed to reach a new understanding of spatial development policy with stronger links to the Lisbon Agenda (competitiveness, knowledge, innovation, and governance) and the Lisbon Treaty (territorial cohesion). This process eventually led to the adoption of the Territorial Agenda of the European Union (TAEU) and the Leipzig Charter on Sustainable European Cities (LC) in 2007. Both political documents were adopted at the Informal Ministerial Meeting on Urban Development and Territorial Cohesion held in Leipzig on 24/ 25 May 2007. Based on this, the First Action Programme for the Implementation of the Territorial Agenda of the European Union was adopted at the Informal Ministerial Meeting on Territorial Cohesion and Regional Policy held in Ponta Delgada (Azores) on 23/ 24 November 2007 (TAEUAP).
Fig. 4: Regions in the light of the Lisbon process. Source: BMVBS/ BBR (2007)
The Territorial Agenda of the EU brings two new aspects into the discussions: firstly, territorial governance and territorial cooperation, and secondly, the adoption of an “evidence-based” policy approach. In this spirit, the objective of “territorial cohesion” should be understood as a permanent process of political, organisational,
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Territorial Cohesion
and technical cooperation between all actors of spatial development (TAEU, Chapter I, No. 4) rather than a fixed and clearly defined objective (e. g. the reduction of regional disparities) that has to be followed. In the Agenda, the EU ministers refer to this cooperation process as “territorial governance”: The economic sector (especially local and regional entrepreneurship), the scientific and administrative sector (mainly local and regional authorities) and non-governmental organisations have to cooperate, and sectoral policies have to be aligned in order to fruitfully use the urgently required investments in European regions (TAEU, Chapter I, No. 5). This broad cooperative and interactive approach has already been applied in the writing process of the TAEU. During a stakeholder conference at the end of June 2006 in Amsterdam, a Europe-wide debate was initiated by Federal Minister Wolfgang Tiefensee. This debate included an Internet-based dialogue and an exchange of opinions with European institutions, non-governmental organisations, and companies. It actively involved European regional development actors in the working process. The approximately 100 stakeholders involved in the Internet dialogue were composed of (European) non-governmental organisations, local and regional authorities, universities, foundations, local umbrella organisations, and chambers from a variety of EU member states. Their comments had an influence on the discussion and the final version of the TAEU document. Apart from this dialogue-oriented procedure of identifying the most urgent themes and policy challenges for European spatial development and territorial cohesion, an evidence-based planning method was applied as a second crucial element in the TAEU process. The contribution of scientific evidence to the political debates has indeed been a desideratum from the beginning of the ESDP process.5 This necessity to know more about urban and regional development processes in Europe, which served as a source of input for policy formulation, led to the establishment of the European Spatial Planning Observation Network (ESPON), the most important joint effort to provide scientific evidence in this policy field. The result of this evidencebased method was a background document for the TAEU named Territorial State and Perspectives.6 This TSP document was written by a group of European researchers who were all involved in ESPON activities in one way or another and in close contact with those who prepared the TAEU document for the Ministerial Meeting. For the Ministers’ meeting itself, in May 2007, the Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning, on behalf of the German EU Council Presidency, prepared the collection entitled Maps on European Territorial Development7, which in a short and concise form illustrated the main priorities of the Territorial Agenda: polycentric cities and regions, structures of urban-rural partnerships, accessibility and infrastructure, hazards and risk management, ecological structures, and cultural resources. 5 See above. Cf. also Böhme, Schön (2006). 6 TSP (2007). 7 See BMVBS/ BBR (2007). Some of these maps are reproduced in this article (Fig. 1-4).
2.2 Territorial Cohesion and European SpatialTerritorial Development Cohesion Policy
15
2.2.4 The Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion of the European Commission (2008) It was the explicit political will of EU Member States, as expressed in the Territorial Agenda and the Leipzig ministerial meeting that, irrespective of the further ratification process of the new Lisbon Treaty, the territorial cohesion objective should be further developed. Based on this wish, the European Commission prepared and published a Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion with some accompanying and background documents8 and launched a debate on this subject. With its subtitle, the Green Paper suggests a general orientation toward turning territorial diversity into strength. In a section entitled “Towards more balanced and harmonious development” the Green Paper,9 which is only ten pages long and is accompanied by a background paper10 presenting some indicators and maps, provides input for four aspects of the discussion: how to deal with demographic and, even more, economic concentration in EU territory, how to better connect territories and overcome distances, how to support cooperation and overcome divisions, and how to pay attention to regions with specific geographic features (mountain regions, island regions, sparsely populated regions, etc.). In a further working document11 created by the Commission’s staff four maps summarise the thinking of the current Commission. These four maps show (1) a globalisation vulnerability index (based on estimated regional labour productivity, employment rate, and high and low educational levels in 2020), (2) a demography vulnerability index (based on the estimated regional share of older people, population decline, and the share of the working age population in 2020), (3) a climate change vulnerability index (based on the estimated regional population affected by flooded rivers, the size of the regional population living in areas less than 5m above sea level, regional drought hazards, and an agriculture and a tourism indicator), and (4) an energy vulnerability index (based on the energy consumption of households, industry, and transport). The European debate ended in February 2009 and led to a report on the results of this debate. Some observers and stakeholders hope and expect that the further process will lead to a white paper from the European Commission with more concrete strategies and suggestions for a European territorial cohesion policy. This may also depend on the further ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty, however, where territorial cohesion has an important legal and political basis and justification.
8 9 10 11
See CEC (2008a-d). CEC (2008a). CEC (2008b). CEC (2008c).
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Territorial Cohesion
References BMVBS/ BBR (2007), Maps on European territorial development, A contribution of the German Presidency to the Informal Ministerial Meeting on Urban Development and Territorial Cohesion to be held in Leipzig in May 2007 Böhme, Kai; Schön, Peter (2006), From Leipzig to Leipzig, in: DISP 165, p 61-70 CEC Commission of the European Communities (1999), European Spatial Development Perspective, Luxembourg (Office for Official Publications of the EC) CEC Commission of the European Communities (2008a), Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion, Turning Territorial Diversity into Strength, COM (2008) 616 final CEC Commission of the European Communities (2008b), Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying the Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion, SEC (2008) 2550 CEC Commission of the European Communities (2008c), Regions 2020, An Assessment of Future Challenges for EU Regions, Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 2868 CEC Commission of the European Communities (2008d), Regions 2020, Demographic Challenges for European Regions, Background document to Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2008) 2868 Final Regions 2020, an assessment of future challenges for EU regions Faludi, Andreas (2006), From European Spatial Development Policy to Territorial Cohesion Policy, in: Regional Studies, 40.6, p 667-678 Fischer, Klemens H. (2008), Der Vertrag von Lissabon, Text und Kommentar zum Europäischen Reformvertrag, Baden-Baden, Wien, Bern LC (2007), Leipzig Charter on Sustainable European Cities (Agreed upon on the occasion of the Informal Ministerial Meeting on Urban Development and Territorial Cohesion in Leipzig on 24/ 25 May 2007) Schön, Peter (2005), Territorial Cohesion in Europe, in: Planning Theory & Practice, vol. 6.3, p 389-400 TAEU (2007), Territorial Agenda of the European Union: Towards a More Competitive Europe of Diverse Regions (Agreed upon on the occasion of the Informal Ministerial Meeting on Urban Development and Territorial Cohesion in Leipzig on 24/ 25 May 2007), accessed at 14 April 2009: http://www.bmvbs.de/ Anlage/original_1005295/Territorial-Agenda-of-the-European-Union-Agreedon-25-May-2007-accessible.pdf TFEU (2008), Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Consolidated versions of the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, C 115, Volume 51, 9 May 2008, accessed at 14 April 2009: http://eur-lex.europa. eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:SOM:EN:HTML
Territorial References Cohesion
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TSP (2007), The Territorial State and Perspectives of the European Union: Towards a Stronger European Territorial Cohesion in the Light of the Lisbon and Gothenburg Ambitions (A background document for the Territorial Agenda of the European Union), accessed at 14 April 2009: http://www.bmvbs.de/Anlage/ original_1005296/The-Territorial-State-and-Perspectives-of-the-EuropeanUnion.pdf
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3.3 Determinants and Factors behind the Success From of Regional Disparities growth to Diversity Engines
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From Disparities to Diversity – Territorial Cohesion in the European Union
Thiemo W. Eser
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3.1 Approaching Territorial Cohesion in the European Union1 Territorial cohesion – a not-so-new buzz word used at the EU level is electrifying the community of politicians as well as researchers involved in regional policy and spatial planning. Territorial cohesion received particular attention when it was recognised, first in the constitutional Treaty and then in the Reform Treaty of Lisbon, as a Community objective equal in importance to economic and social cohesion. Territorial cohesion is an objective and a concept which has gained supporters with a variety of interests and views.2 One of its advantages certainly is that the term allows for coverage of a wider range of concerns. However, in putting them all together contradictions are emerging which are becoming most apparent when trying to measure territorial cohesion and decide on policy action. Territorial cohesion is certainly not a regulatory policy, but instead a redistributive policy in the wider sense.3 And thus some kind of norms and the deviation from these norms, generally understood as disparities, in our case disparities with regards to territory, have to be defined indicating the need for policy action. E. g., in EU cohesion policy the economic and social cohesion is measured by disparities of regional GDP per capita.4 Territorial cohesion seems to be a more complex matter and there are demands for examples of a territorial cohesion index.5 Identifying indicators support the clarification of a concept; but just what scope of indicators should be used to justify policy action with regard to territorial cohesion is not clear. The fact that the argumentation is going round in circles is apparent: as long as the concept is not clear indicators cannot be defined and vice versa. A definition of components of territorial cohesion needs to be clarified, at least to a minimum degree. An indication as to the long road ahead is the fact that the Commission’s Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion did not develop a working definition as the Territorial Agenda did. A number of issues and questions were raised, however.6 1 2 3 4
The article reflects the opinion of the author and does not constitute any official view. Böhme (2005); Schön (2005); Davoudi (2005); Faludi (2006); Waterhout (2007). Benz (2003). CEC (2007) and the Structural Funds Regulation, as an example of the geographical eligibility of the convergence objective in Art. 5 of Council Regulation (EC) 1083/ 2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down the general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, and the Cohesion Fund and Repelling Regulation (EC) 1260/ 1999. 5 Grasland, Hamez (2005). 6 CEC (2008). H. Kilper (ed.), New Disparities in Spatial Development in Europe, German Annual of Spatial Research and Policy, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-03402-2_3, © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009
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From Disparities to Diversity
This article intends to clarify the role, scope, and notion of the identification of disparities within the concept of territorial cohesion. As no common definition of territorial cohesion currently exists, the meaning of territorial cohesion is deduced from discussions within the ongoing policy process. The observation of the policy process allows for a better understanding of the role disparities and (in contrast the emerging importance) diversity may play in a territorial cohesion policy.
3.2 Disparities in Policy Conception In politics there are, in principle, three observable ways of making broad concepts of policies of a redistributive character (such as territorial cohesion) operational: One way is to have little concern about a clear definition and to leave things vague, as they are now, profiting from a sort of unifying unclearness. The vagueness allows for bargaining about political measures, covering the expectations of the various political stakeholders, and for declaring afterwards that all this is territorial cohesion. It would be for the researchers to ex-post make sense of, in our case, territorial cohesion as a coherent concept by trying to find the (un)intended storyline. The other extreme is, in terms of rationality, the ideal but in political terms the toughest way: First to clarify the concept and principles of territorial cohesion and then to develop indicators and policy measures with the help of research. The problem with this approach is that some stakeholders will not receive their expected benefit, which may provoke political resistance or the blocking of a discussion before it has even started. The third way is a compromise involving both approaches: First to agree on a common, politically accepted picture of the territory. Research activities then concentrate on finding the indicator system demanding as a result the policy measures and levels of intervention fitting the picture commonly agreed upon beforehand. Although not a systematic but a somehow rational glance applying indicators adheres to this approach. Dealing with a policy which aims at discretionary interventions such as regional policy and territorial cohesion – in contrast to policies which address the frame conditions such as internal market and equality of chance – the question of what should be done and where is of utmost importance and interest. Territorial cohesion faces a broad discussion concerning the overall concept and its objectives, and concerning its implementation.7 Territorial disparities beyond economic and social dimensions in the field of planning and spatial policy have only dealt with in the national context subject to substantial discussion as well as interventions.8 At the EU level a few measures under European Territorial Cooperation (Objective 3/ INTERREG)9 were explicitly linked to territorial cohesion 7 David (2007); Faludi (2007); Finka (2007); Waterhout (2007); Robert (2007); Böhme (2005); Schön (2005); Davoudi (2005). 8 For Germany see for example Gatzweiler, Strubelt (2007). 9 David (2007).
3.3 Spatial Development From Disparities and Territorial to Diversity Cohesion
21
or spatial development. Otherwise it is a dimension to be taken into account in formulating the national implementation of EU Cohesion Policy as it is described in the Community Strategic Guidelines on Cohesion.10 That means, for the moment at least, in political terms there was no need for the definition of clear-cut territorial cohesion as a base for interventions, as the current Treaty does not offer the full legal base to do so on the same level as economic and social cohesion.11 A new treaty is in the pipeline, however, raising high expectations, while the Commission’s Green Paper on territorial cohesion12 does not even mention the treaty as a point of reference.
3.3 Spatial Development and Territorial Cohesion In searching for the roots of territorial cohesion, reference has to be made to the European Model of Society. Territorial cohesion appears as the projection of the European Model of Society in terms of space and territory. In comparison to the liberal Anglo-Saxon model the European Model is characterised by the reconciliation of market and distribution, recognition of diversity, and the cultural identity of society.13 The increasing liberalisation of the markets in the European Community and later the EU went hand in hand with balancing policy measures. The Single European Act introduced the coordinated approach to Structural Funds, the Common Internal Market established by the Maastricht Treaty led to a substantial increase in the Structural Funds, and the European Monetary Union marked the establishment of the Cohesion Fund. All of this was basically concerned with economic and social cohesion, focussing on the potentially disadvantaged regions of this distribution and economic issues-oriented policy. Since the 1990s the increasing attention of the spatial development of the entire territory, and not only that of the obviously disadvantaged regions, can be seen as a response to the fact that competition through globalisation, fast technological and structural change, and the rather sectoral approach of EU policies14 is affecting all regions in different ways. For example, regions which benefit economically may loose their cultural identity through the introduction of an international standard. Spatial patterns are influenced by particular regional economic structures as well as by particular geographic features such as mountains or ruralness. In 1989 ministers responsible for spatial planning started to meet regularly in an informal setting15 in this policy field, which did not belong to the EU competences covered by the 10 11 12 13 14 15
European Union (2006). Eser, Schmeitz (2008). CEC (2008). See below p 27 in detail. Faludi (2007); Rifkin (2004); Scharpf (2002). Robert (2007). Williams (1996): The use of the term “spatial planning” was refused by the British and “spatial development” was used instead.
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From Disparities to Diversity
Treaty. The fact that the European Commission Directorate for Regional Policy (DG Regio) was influenced by the French in their wish for a more comprehensive approach to spatial development16 supported their efforts. European regional policy is thus based on the notion of economic and social cohesion, the key reference for regional policy and Structural Funds in the Treaty. DG Regio launched their activities in European spatial development with the Report Europe 2000+. In this report, cooperation for European Territorial Development17 claimed a more comprehensive approach to spatial development. A mutual benefit was apparent at the informal meeting of ministers responsible for Spatial Planning in Leipzig in 1994, which adopted the Principles of European Spatial Development (Leipzig Principles).18 At that time nobody expected it would take another five years to prepare the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP)19 or that it would first be adopted in Potsdam in 1999.20 The ESDP mainly promotes the “balanced and sustainable development of the territory of the European Union”. In its subtitle the ESDP refers to the “fundamental goals of economic and social cohesion, the conservation of natural resources and cultural heritage, and more balanced competitiveness of the European territory”,21 and proclaims “The EU will therefore gradually develop, in line with safeguarding regional diversity, from an Economic Union into an Environmental Union and into a Social Union.”22 If not already other parts of the text of the ESDP this last formulation alerted liberal thinkers. The ESDP did not reach broader support beyond the spatial developer’s scene at the EU and national level, although DG Regio referred to it in various regional policy-related documents such as the Cohesion Report defining the orientation for Structural Funds 2000-2006.23 The main messages that “territory matters” in many regards for economic, social, and environmental development, that sector policies indeed have a strong territorial impact, and the fact that there is truth in the common place that all activities are taking place or are located somewhere on the territory, are striking. The territory must, therefore, play a role for any kind of development. Although often used in the ESDP context as a normative term, the term “spatial development” is not normative and the subject as such was and is not easy to communicate. “Spatial” and “planning” are often not (yet) associated with modern policy making or a dynamic drive.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
Faludi (2006). CEC (1994). Böhme, Schön (2005). CEC (1999). Böhme, Schön (2006). CEC (1999), p 10. CEC (1999), p 10. Faludi (2006).
3.4 Territorial Cohesion From in the Disparities European to Framework Diversity
23
3.4 Territorial Cohesion in the European Framework Therefore it might not be a surprise that a new term entered the political arena. “Territorial cohesion” was mentioned in formal terms at the EU level in a very particular context rather limited in comparison to the ESDP concerns: “Without prejudice [...] and given the place occupied by services of general economic interest in the shared values of the Union and as well as their role in promoting social and territorial cohesion, the Community and the Member States, each within their respective powers and within the scope of application of this Treaty, shall take care that such services operate on the base of principles and conditions which enable them to fulfill their missions.” Article 7d of the Amsterdam Treaty, drawn up in 1997, later became Article 16 of the current (Nice) version of the Treaty. During the time Michel Barnier served as European Commissioner for Regional Policy (1999-2004) “the Commission invoked territorial cohesion as if it were already an area of EU policy”.24 Firstly it allowed the Commission to take a more independent stand versus the Ministers for spatial development, who certainly claimed the copyright on ESDP, but who were still not in full agreement about the EU’s competence in spatial development. Secondly, although mentioned in a very specific context, the territorial cohesion already mentioned in the Treaty gave a competence to the Commission. In 2001 the Second Cohesion Report entitled Unity, Solidarity, Diversity for Europe, its People and its Territory25 already had a “spatial touch” and devoted a whole chapter to territorial cohesion under the headline “Territorial cohesion: towards a more balanced development” making a strong reference to the ESDP. The chapter is descriptive, showing territorial imbalances such as the centralisation of economic development, and pointed at urban and rural areas, border regions, and areas with specific geographic features such as mountains, islands, and costal areas.26 Although in 2003 the value of cohesion policy was seriously challenged by the Sapir Report27, in 2004 politicians decided to consider territorial cohesion to be equal to that of economic and social cohesion in the text of the draft constitution (Article 3). The Third Cohesion Report deepened the concept in the same year: “The concept of territorial cohesion extends beyond the notion of economic and social 24 25 26 27
Faludi (2006), p 669. CEC (2001). CEC (2001). The discussion about the missing progress of the Lisbon strategy brought new aspects into the discussion. In summer 2003 the so-called Sapir Report initiated by the President of the European Commission criticised the Union because of a lack of effort in support for the competitiveness of Europe, which should be found in enforced measures in favour of the single market and a leaner policy approach by the Commission and a review of the budget (Published later as Sapir et al. (2004)). One of the six core points was “to redesign policies for convergence and restructuring”.
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From Disparities to Diversity
cohesion by both adding to this and reinforcing it. In policy terms, the objective is to help achieve a more balanced development by reducing existing disparities, preventing territorial imbalances and by making both sectoral polices which have a spatial impact and regional policy more coherent. The concern is also to improve territorial integration and encourage cooperation between regions.”28 Indeed, there was a long discussion within the Commission about whether cohesion policy can and should be part of the Lisbon Strategy or not, which ended in giving cohesion policy an important role in the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy. This line of argumentation was picked up by the Ministers for Spatial Development, who reported back at the end of 2004. The Dutch Presidency initiated a ministerial meeting under the name of Ministers Responsible for Territorial Cohesion, clearly indicating their claim on the dossier. With a clear reference to the ESDP, the Ministers drew a strong line between territorial cohesion and the Lisbon Strategy. In May 2005, this was further deepened at the Luxembourg ministerial meeting by introducing the concept of territorial capital in the approach to territorial cohesion in the scoping document adopted for the Territorial States document.29 The scoping document underlines the operationalisation of the ESDP in the new political context of territorial cohesion. At the same time the Commission promoted the notion of territorial cohesion in their proposal for the Community Strategic Guidelines on Cohesion in July 2005.30 However, after the Dutch and French rejection of the constitution DG Regio stalled the idea of a green paper on territorial cohesion first mentioned at the Luxembourg ministerial meeting. In addition, in October 2006 the Council reduced the ambitions on territorial cohesion in their decision concerning the final version on Community Strategic Guidelines, pronouncing the importance
28 CEC (2004), p 24. 29 Luxembourg Presidency (2005). 30 Definition of territorial cohesion as in the Community Strategic Guidelines CEC (2005), p 29: “The concept of territorial cohesion extends beyond the notion of economic and social cohesion, its objective being to help achieve a more balanced development, to build sustainable communities in urban and rural areas and to seek greater consistency with other sectoral polices which have a spatial impact. This also involves improving territorial integration and encouraging cooperation between and within regions. Improving territorial cohesion is a matter both of method – i. e. determining whether a multidisciplinary or integrated approach is needed – and of recognising the particular problems presented by different geographical circumstances. Success in the area of territorial cohesion therefore depends on a comprehensive strategy which sets the framework within which specific objectives and actions are pursued.”
3.4 Territorial Cohesion From in the Disparities European to Framework Diversity
25
of territorial cohesion for competitiveness and the Lisbon Agenda but leaving the operationalisation and implementation of the process in the national context.31 Member States saw the necessity of keeping the momentum going at the EU level and used the time between the Luxembourg meeting and the Leipzig informal ministerial meeting in May 2007 to elaborate on and adopt the Territorial Agenda32 together with the Territorial State33 document. High ambitions were formulated in the First Action Programme of the Territorial Agenda, adopted by ministers in November 2007 on the Azores, knowing that Member States would rely on progress on territorial cohesion in the Treaty.34 The Territorial Agenda did not further elaborate on a direct definition of territorial cohesion. However, six thematic priorities were formulated indicating the core concerns of territorial cohesion. On the ground of strengthening regional identities and making better use of territorial diversity the priorities are:35 “1. aim to strengthen polycentric development and innovation through networking of city-regions and cities 2. a need for new forms of partnership and territorial governance between rural and urban areas 3. the promotion of regional clusters of competition and innovation in Europe 4. support for the strengthening and extension of trans-European networks 5. the promotion of trans-European risk management, including the impacts of climate change 6. a requirement of strengthening ecological structures and cultural resources as an added value for development.” 31 European Union (2006), p 29, under the headline of The Territorial Dimension of Cohesion Policy: “The successful implementation of actions to promote territorial cohesion requires implementing mechanisms that can help to guarantee fair treatment for all territories based on their individual capacities as a factor of competitiveness. Thus, good governance is important to successfully addressing the territorial dimension. In fact the next generation of programmes promoting territorial cohesion should be part of the effort to ensure that all Europe’s territory has the opportunity to contribute to the growth and jobs agenda. More specifically, this means that a different meaning should be given to territorial cohesion, linked to each Member State’s history, culture or institutional situation. The development of high quality partnerships is also essential, bringing aboard actors at all levels, national regional, urban, rural and local. Success in the area of territorial cohesion depends on a comprehensive strategy which sets the framework within which specific objectives and actions are pursued.” 32 Territorial Agenda (2007); Eser, Schmeitz (2008). 33 Territorial State (2007). 34 Eser, Schmeitz (2008). 35 Territorial Agenda (2007), p 5. The Territorial Agenda, as an 8-page policy document, concentrates much less on an elaborate description of thematic issues than the Territorial State and Perspectives of the European Union document, which has approximately 90 pages (Territorial State (2007)).
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From Disparities to Diversity
Furthermore the five guiding principles for the implementation of the Territorial Agenda summarised in the First Action Programme for the implementation of the Territorial Agenda should be recalled in the context of the discussion of the impact of territorial cohesion in the new treaty: Solidarity between regions and territories, multi-level governance, integration of policies, coordination on territorial matters, and subsidiarity.36 The Lisbon Reform Treaty was adopted at the European Council in December 2007, territorial cohesion was included as before and the Treaty nearly always mentions “economic, social and territorial cohesion” together and in the same order: Under common provisions the Treaty on the European Union lists Article 3 “It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States.” The Treaty on the Function of the European Union, Article 4, adds beyond other the shared competence with Member States is applied in the principle areas of economic, social and territorial cohesion. Furthermore, Article 14 of the same Treaty highlights the importance of “[...] the services of general economic interest in the shared values of the Union as well as their role in promoting social and territorial cohesion”. The same article draws attention to the particular role of the European Parliament and the Council in establishing such a policy and the funding of such services.37 Furthermore Article 174 stipulates with regards to the cohesion policy: “In order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Union shall develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic, social and territorial cohesion. In particular, the Union shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions. Among the regions concerned, particular attention shall be paid to rural areas, areas affected by industrial transition, and regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps such as the northernmost regions with very low population density and island, cross‑border and mountain regions.” This Article provides guidance as to which disparities (backwardness of least favoured regions) and which types of regions should be addressed. In implementing cohesion policy Article 175 puts additional obligations on Member States to coordinate their economic policies toward the three cohesion objectives complemented by existing Structural Funds action and other financial instruments. The same article upgrades the Cohesion Report as a regular instrument for making proposals on policy reforms. The ratification process, at least until the Irish referendum gave it a halt, led to DG Regio wanting to be prepared for the beginning of 2009, when the Treaty was expected to come into force. It provoked the Commission to turn the report on territorial cohesion previously announced in Leipzig into a Green Paper published on 36 First Action Programme (2007). 37 The European Parliament claims to have had a strong role in promoting territorial cohesion in the Treaty, European Parliament (2008).
3.4 Territorial Cohesion From in the Disparities EuropeantoFramework Diversity
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6 October 2008. The title of the paper, Turning Territorial Diversity into Strength,38 which consisted of a mere ten pages of text, provides an idea of its content. The Commission, however, did not see any need to make any reference to the Lisbon Treaty as a reason for presenting the paper. The introduction picks up the idea of the title,39 but the paper does not really follow up the idea with regard to policy measures. The Green Paper remains on the level of the description of the main thematic issues identified by the European Commission: concentration – overcoming differences in density; connecting territories – overcoming distance; cooperation – overcoming division; and, regions with specific geographical features (It is worth mentioning that the Commission obviously tried to avoid the term “handicap” in that context). Finally, very short reference is made to where territorial cohesion affects sectoral policies at the EU level and in member states, followed by an extensive list of questions for consultation. The maps and tables accompanying the Green Paper were supposed to highlight the issue of diversity. The French presidency during the second half of 2008 had high ambitions for making progress on the future of the cohesion policy and territorial cohesion. In order to promote the discussion of the Green Paper, a discussion paper was prepared for a ministerial meeting of all ministers responsible for housing, spatial planning, urban policy, regional policy, and territorial cohesion at the end of November 2008. Discussions at various events organised by the French presidency40 revealed differences in the interpretation of the paper. There were voices for using territorial cohesion to identify the need for support on the level of geographical handicaps whereas the majority sees territorial cohesion not as a key for support but as a concept to better use available resources by building on the territorial potential of the regions. However, many agree on not needing a precise definition of territorial cohesion due to differences of definition in the national context but strongly support indicator work on territorial cohesion. The controversy and interest of the various players concerned with the notion of territorial cohesion must certainly materialise in the definition and measurement of disparities. The indicators resulting from these definitions may help to identify possible underlying contradictions inherent to the concept of territorial cohesion.
38 CEC (2008). 39 “From the frozen tundra in the Artic Circle to the tropical rainforest of Guyana, from the Alps to the Greek Islands, from global cities of London and Paris to small towns and villages dating back centuries, the EU harbours an incredibly rich territorial diversity. Territorial cohesion is about ensuring the harmonious development of all these places and about making sure that their citizens are able to make the most of the inherent features of these territories. As such, it is a means of transforming diversity into an asset that contributes to the sustainable development of the entire EU.” CEC (2008), p 3. 40 For example the Conference on Territorial Cohesion organised by the French presidency on 30/ 31 October 2008 in Paris.
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From Disparities to Diversity
3.5 Disparities Relevant for Territorial Cohesion Although the Lisbon Treaty is not ratified, the policy process on territorial cohesion is not coming to a halt. It is obvious that territorial cohesion is about to be fully adopted in the canon of economic and social cohesion in structural Funds policies. The question of whether the impact of the three cohesion objectives will reach beyond Structural Funds and monitor sector policies is open, but Article 3 of the treaty allows for this broader interpretation41 and Article 174 addresses the reduction of disparities in least favoured regions. The reporting system of the Third Cohesion Report made a distinction between economic and social cohesion (addressing economic/ sectoral growth and unemployment-related issues) and territorial cohesion (addressing urban and rural settlement structure-related issues, the concentration of economic activities, and regions with specific geographic features). In contrast, the Fourth Cohesion Report draws the three dimensions together in one chapter without allocating specific indicators for the three dimensions. The chapter makes explicit territorial reference to balanced territorial development, polycentric development, urban drivers (large European cities, small and medium-sized cities, suburbanisation, inner-city imbalances), and rural areas, and also links urban-rural, ultra-peripheral, northern sparsely populated, mountain areas, and islands. Community policies such as R&D and innovation policies, state aid, Lisbon, and the budget are also addressed42 and are in line with the notion of territorial cohesion mentioned above. The thematic priorities of the Territorial Agenda have already been presented in Section 3, which already gives the reader an indication about the understanding of territorial cohesion. In addition, the main territorial challenges are mentioned there, including: • global economic competition, • increasing global pressure to restructure and modernise, new emerging markets, and technological development, • climate change: new hazard patterns, new potentials, • energy supply and efficiency: increasing energy prices, • demography: ageing and migration processes, • transport and accessibility/ mobility: saturation of Euro-corridors, urban transport, • geographic structure of Europe: territorial concentration of economic activities in the core area of Europe, and in capital cities in Member States as well as areas of EU enlargement.43
41 The territorial impacts of sector policies have already been subject to reporting in both, the Cohesion reports (2001, 2004, 2007) as well as the reports elaborated on the level of informal ministerial meetings such as the Territorial State (2007) document. 42 CEC (2007). 43 Territorial Agenda (2007).
3.5 Disparities Relevant for Territorial Cohesion From Disparities to Diversity
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Nearly all these points are also addressed in the Cohesion Report, however, limits of data rather than conceptual limits restrict the scope of reporting. The notion of territorial cohesion remains vague and far away from a definition of this complex issue,44 as well as the identification of disparities. This weakens the role of the report, as such, for direct policy implications. The report is, indeed, an interesting instrument for identifying the position of regions in a more general European context. However, it may not lead to any direct consequences in policy. The strategic orientation of the Structural Funds achieved by the cascade of Community Strategic Guidelines on Cohesion, National Strategic Reference Frameworks, and Operational Programmes also calls for monitoring and assessing the progress and success of the regional policy. The National Strategic Reference Frameworks touch a wide range of issues related to the Lisbon Strategy, including territorial issues.45 The monitoring of progress with regard to the goals defined in the strategic documents is necessary and is in the best case properly addressed in the national context. Progress would mean identifying the baseline and change for each region as well as bench-marking,46 which would go against the notion of the current strategic orientation, employing the national context and not the EU context for subsidiarity reasons.47 How do the Structural Funds work in practice? Using disparities to define political action requires the consideration of two dimensions: (1) Defining indicators: which indicators are relevant for which policy measure or purpose? (2) Defining relevant disparities: The deviation of a certain standard and the (political) ambition to change the deviation from standard. For example, although many reference documents and the Lisbon Treaty mention economic, social, and territorial cohesion on a similar level, it is not evident to consider indicators for all dimensions on an equal level. The identification of those regions which currently receive the majority of funding through Structural Funds under convergence (Objective 1) is taking place only on the basis of GDP/ capita. The indicator is seen as an indicator for disparities in economic terms. However the allocation of funds, i. e. the spending within an area of an Operational Programme is based on a much wider set of indicators. In the second case the goals for a particular area are described and require justification in relation to the proposed spending. Objective 2 on competitiveness does not provide for a European definition of the regions eligible for funding. It is the task of the national/ regional level to deliver the reasoning for the allocation of funding to selected regions in their country. This opens the door for a broad range of individually defined indicators and relevant disparities. So it is a matter of interpretation concerning which indicators are presented and which disparities are referred to. Some use the structural changes in the past, others structural changes 44 Böhme (2005). 45 Bachtler, Polverari (2007). 46 This would come close to the introduction of the Open Method of Coordination. Eser, Schmeitz (2008). 47 European Union (2006), p 29.
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From Disparities to Diversity
expected in the future as an indicator. The introduction of evaluation requirements for Structural Funds Programmes even supports this kind of individual approach, however, moving away from a strictly European approach. Trying to capture the full picture of the types of indicators needed for territorial cohesion at an ESPON workshop brought this issue to a head: “There is a need for considering a mixture of indicators […] basically consisting of three types of indicators: (1) classical/ simple socio-economic indicators (many used in other policy contexts) giving basic information, broken down into regions and cities (such as GDP, unemployment, CO2 emissions, etc.), (2) indicators (often composite) on thematic/ territorial issues (such as accessibility, connectivity, depopulation, vulnerability to natural risks, etc.), (3) new composite “territorial cohesion” indicators (catching balance, polycentricity, and other policy orientations of territorial cohesion)”. 48 It is apparent that territorial phenomena and structures, even in a multi-scalar presentation, such as “balance” and “polycentricity,” “proximity to services,” “border discontinuities,” and “potential accessibility” are important in the context of territorial cohesion. Territorial cohesion, in comparison to economic and social cohesion, addresses to a much greater extent the relationships between points of the territory and relationships between sectoral policies. In this sense economic and social cohesion belong to sectoral issues. Territorial cohesion will always have to deal with the complexity of either/ and/ or sectoral issues in an integrated way, as well as with the strong emphasis on observing the relationship between the points of the territory. This complexity was confirmed in several exercises developed in the ESPON framework, the Camagni model,49 as well as through the efforts of Grasland and Hamez on a European territorial cohesion index50 and the regional classification of Europe.51 A trade-off between complexity and comprehensibility exists; there are good reasons politicians resist complex indicators which they do not understand and which would give researchers a political role.52 A positive effect of measuring territorial cohesion in its complexity is the combination of a wide range of issues, which allow for potentially conflicting views to be identified. On the one hand, for example, islands are seen as territories with a permanent geographic handicap due to deficits of accessibility. On the other hand, the geographic position as an island and reduced accessibility often is a valuable asset for tourism. This can lead to income even higher than in more central regions. In an integrated view of territorial cohesion both disparities in accessibility and income 48 ESPON (2008). The website indicated in the references includes all the presentations of the workshop. 49 Camagni (2007); Böhme, Eser (2008). 50 Grasland, Hamez (2005). 51 Schmidt-Seiwert (2005). 52 Hamez (2005).
3.6 Territorial Cohesion: Shift of the Focus fromDisparities DisparitiestotoDiversity Diversity From
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have to be put into relation, leading to the conclusion that a lack of accessibility is not automatically synonymous with economic disadvantages. A similar scenario can be conducted for other types of regions such as rural areas where the difference of disparities on different spatial scales is emerging. A small rural area seen as the hinterland of an agglomeration leads to a rather different picture, depending on the scale the area is addressed with.53 So there is a decision to be taken on the political side concerning which disparities should be addressed on which level. The concept of territorial capital as raised in the Scoping Document54 and the Territorial State (2007) could act as a reference framework in that regard, as it calls for covering a wide range of assets within each region. With regards to the profile of a particular region on its present situation it would be useful to identify particular strengths and weaknesses (disparities) in comparison to other regions as well in comparison to the development ambitions of the political leaders of this region. This approach takes into account the diversity of assets and provides the basis for diversified development strategies. This takes us back to the notion of diversity in the Green Paper: Disparities call for a norm leading to policy action, whereas diversity assumes that differences exist, however, without claiming that a difference is – per se – subject to policy action. Diversity regarding the notion of territorial cohesion leads to the search for an appropriate (in contrast to an inappropriate) development strategy for a certain profile of a region or territory.
3.6 Territorial Cohesion: Shift of the Focus from Disparities to Diversity Consequently, two conclusions should be drawn: Firstly, territorial cohesion calls for the identification of disparities with regard to economic and social cohesion. But territorial cohesion does not stop at that point. More important appears to be the identification of diversity in the sense of indicating potentials for development. Diversity actually recognises that disparities may exist with regard to different indicators. However, the main focus on the political side is to make use of the diversity and to view it as a potential rather than a deficiency. Secondly, using this potential draws attention to the search for a tailor-made and appropriate strategy, meaning that a process of involving and coordinating all actors in the hope of agreeing on a common strategy is a constitutive part of the approach. The review of territorial cohesion in the policy process confirms the complexity of the concept, because territorial cohesion covers broad sectoral issues and sets parts of a territory in relationship to one another. The complexity has consequences concerning the observation of disparities: Only broadly understood (single and 53 See for example: Richardson, Dabinett (2005). 54 Luxembourg Presidency (2005) based on an OECD approach.
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From Disparities to Diversity
simple) indicators receive unequivocal support on the policy side for action. Would diversity in territorial cohesion ever be used to directly allocate grants to regions? There are serious doubts about this, as territorial cohesion deals with many issues such as “harmonious development”, where it might be possible to find only a vague indicator set covering economic, social, and environmental dimensions. A difficult remaining task is to reach agreement about drawing a line in the grey zone where harmonious turns into disharmonious.55 The discussion clearly proves the wide range of ideas inherent to the notion of territorial cohesion – so – a bullet-proof definition of disparities is neither necessary nor possible. As far as territorial cohesion is concerned the main political purposes are the coordination of cohesion and other sectoral policy measures in a horizontal and vertical way with regard to their impact on the territory and the use of the territorial potentials. Consequently, the observation of diversity in terms of territorial cohesion has to be part of a policy process which informs about progress and indicates shortcomings. In this way all the actors in the EU, whether at the national, regional, or local level, are put into a position to make the right policy choices. From a bottom-up point of view, territorial cohesion has much to do with strategy building – using the assets available at a location or in a country for place-based, integrated, and tailor-made policy solutions. The meaning and interpretation of disparities differs depending on the context and the strategy of, or for, a location and this is particularly true in the context of territorial cohesion. With regard to territorial cohesion, therefore, the process and governance are at least as important as the identification of disparities and the diversity.56 The question remains of what role the measuring of disparities (in the narrow sense) will play in territorial cohesion. The measurement of disparities and their direct use in policy terms will remain important for selecting regions and territories for the allocation of funding. In order to agree on the allocation of funding, an agreement on indicators which make regions or territories comparable is necessary and which show clearly identifiable disparities. Currently, economic and social indicators such as GDP per capita and unemployment show disparities commonly accepted for funding. In contrast, information on diversity is sound background information for a policy which has a strong strategic and process-oriented character. In a European top-down view, as in the Cohesion Report, but also in the Community Strategic Guidelines on Cohesion it is important to observe how a territory is developing and where to emphasise particular policies. The bottom-up perspective of social and economic actors of a particular region, all located somewhere on the European map, is about their situation and the use of their development opportunities. Territorial cohesion in the European Union is about joining these perspectives.
55 Another example ‘polycentricity’. Davoudi (2003). 56 The Community Strategic Guidelines also stress the procedural character of territorial cohesion. European Union (2006), p 29.
From Disparities to References Diversity
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References Bachtler, John; Polverari, Laura (2007), Delivering Territorial Cohesion: European Cohesion Policy and the European Model of Society, in: Faludi, Andreas (ed.), Territorial Cohesion and the European Model of Society, Cambridge, Mass. (Lincoln Institute), p 105-128 Benz, Arthur (2003), Mehrebenenverflechtung in der Europäischen Union, in: Jachtenfuchs, Markus; Kohler-Koch, Beate (eds.), Europäische Integration, Opladen, Leske & Budrich, p 317-351 Böhme, Kai (2005), Territorial Cohesion: A Policy Phenomenon in Europe or a Global Issue?, in: Planning Theory & Practice, vol. 6.3, p 387-388 Böhme, Kai; Eser, Thiemo W. (2008), Territorial Impact Analysis of EU Policies, in: Faludi, Andreas (ed.), European Spatial Research and Planning, Cambridge Mass. (Lincoln Institute), p 43-66 Böhme, Kai; Schön, Peter (2006), From Leipzig to Leipzig, in: DISP 165, p 61-70 Camagni, Roberto (2007), Territorial Development Policies in the European Model of Society, in: Faludi, Andreas (ed.), Territorial Cohesion and the European Model of Society, Cambridge Mass. (Lincoln Institute), p 129-144 CEC Commission of the European Communities (1999), European Spatial Development Perspective, Luxembourg (Office for Official Publications of the EC) CEC Commission of the European Communities (2001), Unity, Solidarity, Diversity for Europe, its People and its Territory, Second Report on Social and Economic Cohesion, Luxembourg (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities) CEC Commission of the European Communities (2004), A New Partnership for Cohesion: Convergence, Competitiveness, Cooperation, Third Report on Social and Economic Cohesion, Luxembourg (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities) CEC Commission of the European Communities (2005), Cohesion Policy in Support of Growth and Jobs: Community Strategic Guidelines, 2007-2013, Communication from the Commission, Brussels, 5 July 2005 Com (2005) 0299 CEC Commission of the European Communities (2007), Growing regions, Growing Europe, Fourth Report on Social and Economic Cohesion, Luxembourg (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities) CEC Commission of the European Communities (2008), Turning Territorial Diversity into Strength, Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion Communication from the Commissions Luxembourg (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities) David, Carl-Heinz (2007), Status and Perspectives of Territorial Cohesion with Respect to European Spatial Development Policy (ESDP) – Normative and Governance Aspects, in: Scholich, Dietmar (ed.), German Annual of Spatial Research and Policy 2007 – Territorial Cohesion, Berlin et al. (Springer), p 5-22
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Davoudi, Simin (2005), Understanding Territorial Cohesion, in: Planning, Practice & Research, vol. 20.4, p 433-441 Davoudi, Simin (2003), Polycentricity in European Spatial Planning: from an Analytical Tool to a Normative Agenda, in: European Planning Studies, vol. 11.8, p 979-999 Eser, Thiemo W.; Schmeitz, Peter (2008), The making of the Territorial Agenda of the European Union: Policy, Polity and Politics, in: Faludi, Andreas (ed.), European Spatial Research and Planning, Cambridge Mass. (Lincoln Institute), p 249-270 ESPON (2008), Workshop Report – Towards Territorial Indicators and Indices, Luxembourg, accessed at 22 August 2008: http://www.espon.eu/mmp/online/ website/content/programme/1455/1663/index_EN.html European Parliament (2008), Economic and Social Cohesion, Fact sheet 4.4.1, accessed at 22 August 2008: www.europarl.Europa.eu/facts/4_4_1_en.htm European Union (2006), Community Strategic Guidelines on Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion, 2007-2013 Annex to the Council Decision of 6 October 2006 on the Community Strategic Guidelines on Cohesion Official Journal of the European Union No. L 291/ 14 of 21 October 2006 Faludi, Andreas (2006), From European Spatial Development Policy to Territorial Cohesion Policy, in: Regional Studies, 40.6, p 667-678 Faludi, Andreas (2007), The European Model of Society, in: Faludi, Andreas (ed), Territorial Cohesion and the European Model of Society, Cambridge Mass. (Lincoln Institute), p 1-22 Finka, Maros (2007), Territorial Cohesion – Between Expectations, Disparities and Contradictions, in: Scholich, Dietmar (ed.), German Annual of Spatial Research and Policy 2007 – Territorial Cohesion, Berlin, et al. (Springer), p 23-40 First Action Programme (2007), Agreed on the Occasion of the Informal Ministerial Meeting on Territorial Cohesion and Regional Policy on the Azores on 23/ 24 November 2007 French Presidency (2008), Note of introduction to the debate of minister on territorial cohesion during the informal meeting, Marseilles, 26 November 2008 Gatzweiler, Hans-Peter; Strubelt, Wendelin (2007), Regional Disparities – Reasons Enough to Run a Cohesion Oriented Spatial Policy?, in: Scholich, Dietmar (ed.), German Annual of Spatial Research and Policy 2007 – Territorial Cohesion, Berlin et al. (Springer), p 5-22 Grasland, Claude; Hamez, Grégory (2005), Vers la construction d’un indicateur de cohesion territoriale européen?, in: L’Espace Géographique, 2, p 97-116 Hamez, Grégory (2005), Territorial Cohesion: How to Operationalize and Measure the Concept, in: Planning Theory & Practice, 6.3, p 400-402
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Luxembourg Presidency (2005), Scoping Document and summary of Political Messages for an Assessment of the Territorial State and the Perspectives of the European Union: Towards a Stronger European Territorial Cohesion in the Light of the Lisbon and Gothenburg Ambitions, Luxembourg, accessed at 22 August 2008: http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/documents_travail/2005/05/20regio/ Min_DOC_1_fin.pdf Richardson, Tim; Dabinett, Gordon (2005), Governance and Polycentric Urban Development: The Territorial and Political Translation of Spatial Ideas, in: ESPON (ed.), European Territorial Research in Progress, Luxembourg (ESPON) p 115-132 Rifkin, Jeremy (2004), The European Dream: How Europe’s Future is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream, Cambridge (Polity Press) Robert, Jacques (2007), The Origins of Territorial Cohesion and the Vagaries of its Trajetories, in: Faludi, Andreas (ed.), Territorial Cohesion and the European Model of Society, Cambridge Mass. (Lincoln Institute), p 23-37 Sapir, André et al. (2004), An Agenda for a Growing Europe: The Sapir Report, Oxford (University Press) Scharpf, Fritz W. (2002), The European Social Model: Coping with the challenge of diversity, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40.4, p 645-670 Schmidt-Seiwert, Volker (2005), Interdisciplinary Classification of Regions, in: ESPON (ed.), European Territorial Research in Progress, Luxembourg (ESPON) p 115-132 Schön, Peter (2005), Territorial Cohesion in Europe, in: Planning Theory & Practice, 6.3, p 389-400 Territorial Agenda (2007), Territorial Agenda of the European Union: Towards a more competitive Europe of diverse regions (Agreed on the occasion of the Informal Ministerial Meeting on Urban Development and Territorial Cohesion in Leipzig on 24/ 25 May 2007), accessed at 22 August 2008: http://www.bmvbs.de/ Anlage/original_1005295/Territorial-Agenda-of-the-European-Union-Agreedon-25-May-2007-accessible.pdf Territorial State (2007), The Territorial State and Perspectives of the European Union: Towards a stronger European territorial cohesion in the light of the Lisbon and Gothenburg ambitions (A background document for the Territorial Agenda of the European Union), accessed at 22 August 2008: http://www. bmvbs.de/Anlage/original_1005296/The-Territorial-State-and-Perspectives-ofthe-European-Union.pdf Waterhout, Bas (2007), Territorial Cohesion and the Underlying Discourses, in: Faludi, Andreas (ed.), Territorial Cohesion and the European Model of Society, Cambridge Mass. (Lincoln Institute), p 1-22 Williams, Richard H. (1996), European Union Spatial Policy and Planning, London (Chapman)
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Spatial Patterns in the Knowledge Society
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Spatial Patterns in the Knowledge Society
Hans Joachim Kujath, Axel Stein
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4.1 Background and Methodology Knowledge was already considered an important resource by the industrial society and a motor for the development of society and its spaces. In comparison, today’s visible transition to the knowledge society is distinguishable through a qualitative leap in the way knowledge is produced, shared, and used. As early as the 1960s Peter Drucker mentioned the knowledge society as an emerging economic and social order in which knowledge would replace work, raw materials, and capital and become the central source of productivity, economic growth, and social change.1 These radical changes have a technical, an economic, and a social dimension and their effect becomes apparent at the spatial level. This article, which is based on various investigations2 into economic structural change, elaborates on the interaction of different knowledge society based dimensions and the social changes caused by them, for example in control systems, norms, and expectations. The spatial consequences of this change are described using a cluster analysis specially conducted for this issue. The result is a picture that describes the new spatial structures of the knowledge society in Germany and that makes a knowledge society based classification of spaces possible for the first time. In carrying out this investigation it has become clear that the transition to the knowledge society – as opposed to what has been discussed in scientific and political debate – is more than just a paraphrase of metropolisation.
4.2 Operationalising the Concept of the Knowledge Society for Spatial Discourse The understanding of the concept of the knowledge society has changed over the course of time. Due to its close association with technical progress, especially in the area of communication media, rather one-dimensional technical formulations predominated at first, such as information revolution and information society. 3 Later, economic changes and their consequences for the social environment were added as well. Although the knowledge society is the result of a process, which became particularly obvious in the 1970s with the decline of aging industries and the rise of knowledge-based economic sectors, and even though the first social and economic 1 Drucker (1969). 2 e. g. Kujath, Pflanz, Stein, Zillmer (2008); Heinelt, Kujath, Zimmermann (2007). 3 Nora, Minc (1979); Wersig (1983). H. Kilper (ed.), New Disparities in Spatial Development in Europe, German Annual of Spatial Research and Policy, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-03402-2_4, © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009
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studies were already available in the 1960s, the topic only recently became a focus of spatial science and spatial policy debate. The development of the knowledge society and its spatial effects can be discussed in three dimensions. 4.2.1 Technical Dimension The technical dimension is one of the main pillars of the knowledge society: It describes the radical changes that occurred in information and communication technologies. This made it possible for households and companies to take advantage of worldwide sources of knowledge and information to a degree that was unimaginable before, dramatically accelerating the transfer of knowledge between actors. Just as the transport revolution caused by railways and motorised vehicles was the driving force of social development in the industrial society, now it is the digital revolution. A prerequisite of the information society is thus the provision of, as well as the development of space with telecommunication infrastructure. It makes participation in the knowledge society’s global stream of information (e. g. the establishment of domains) possible in the first place. The knowledge society is therefore neither a local nor a national phenomenon, but is instead an expression of globalisation that affects all historically developed structures in our society and would not be imaginable without the growth of these new technologies. Along with the digital revolution, the role of supporting “traditional” technologies meant to overcome spatial barriers also changes. This is especially true for those transport systems which guarantee longdistance traffic in the new and larger spatial context, therefore facilitating a meeting of knowledge carriers in global knowledge networks. From a spatial science point of view, transactions between actors are thereby considerably simplified and costs for transactions and transport minimised. For many authors these are prerequisites for the “death of distance”, the decline of cities, and a dispersive distribution of social activities in space.4 On the one hand, from a purely technological point of view, the thesis of sinking transaction costs and thus a spatial dispersion of mainly economic activities is understandable. On the other hand, the spatial development of the knowledge society is influenced by agglomeration forces that, at the same time, reflect changing economic and social demands. 4.2.2 Economic Dimension Being forced by changes in the technical dimension, transformation to knowledgebased systems is noticeable particularly in economic and social terms, which in turn have an impact on the technical changes. An attribute of this change is – let us contemplate the economic dimension – the radical shift of material inputs to
4 Cairncross (1997); Friedman (2006).
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“symbolic” or knowledge-based inputs in production processes.5 Traditional production factors such as land, capital, and work are being increasingly overshadowed by knowledge: Scientific innovations, the competences of knowledge workers, the ability to systematically convert these competences into immaterial and material goods and services, as well as the organisational rebuilding of the economy into tightly networked non-hierarchical systems of knowledge sharing are the new characteristics of a knowledge-based economy. Interest is increasingly being focused on systematic (analytical) knowledge – as opposed to empirical knowledge (e. g. manual skills) – as a structurally significant type of knowledge. This is based on scientific knowledge that, after several operationalising steps, is reflected in products, the organisation of production processes, as well as in blueprints and patents. The economic processing of knowledge has changed in so far, as knowledge nowadays is applied to itself, i. e. it is reflexive and therefore enhances its own efficiency, i. e. its productive force.6 Knowledge as a productive capacity has by now penetrated nearly all economic processes and all economic sectors.7 It is changing the structure of our national economies and is leading to the formation of new economic sectors, which we can conclusively refer to as the knowledge economy.8 In the knowledge economy accessibility and proximity are considered as preconditions for communication and the sharing of knowledge. They are key requirements for the initiation of learning and innovation processes, for the gaining of new insights, and therefore for economic success. New information and communication technologies are helpful in this regard, but in the knowledge economy the question of how to overcome cognitive distance or to create cognitive proximity is more important than that of whether standardised data and codified information can be transported over great distances. The sharing and generation of knowledge are based on communication, and the closer together actors are concerning their cognitive models of interpretation and their language, the easier it becomes. Physical proximity between actors is often indispensable in this regard. It makes personal conversations easier, which are among the most intensive forms of 5 6 7 8
Stehr (1992), p 113. Strulik (2004). Brand, Volkert (2003), p 23. In this context, the extent to which business is based on knowledge is a first distinguishing feature between those economic sectors that can be attributed to the knowledge economy and those that cannot. Differentiating the knowledge economy from the rest of the economy is based here on the German Statistical Classification of Economic Activities, WZ 93 (2003). This distinguishes between industry and services, considers R&D expenditures above 2.5 percent of industrial turnover, as well as the proportion of highly qualified workers in industrial and service sectors. On closer examination it will be possible to ascertain structural differentiations that are not in accordance with traditional branches and which provide a functional typology of knowledge economy based subsystems: the high-technology industry, transformation-oriented services, transaction-oriented services, and the information and media industry (Kujath, Schmidt (2007)).
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communication, and it is also an easier way of overcoming cognitive distances than, for example, written correspondence or an email.9 In scientific debates metropolitan spaces therefore count as the “sticky places” of the knowledge economy, firstly because actors can make personal contact with other actors at very little cost, and secondly, because metropolitan spaces offer a large variety of communication partners and sources of knowledge, which can be used for interdisciplinary knowledge connections.10 4.2.3 Social Dimension The reflexivity of knowledge is becoming a characteristic feature of the knowledge society, which is not only changing economic activity, but society as a whole. An indicator of this social dimension is that individuals search for experiences by way of “exploratory behaviour” and reflect on it in the form of systematic variations instead of simply passively having an experience.11 Strategic action in the knowledge society occurs in that the future is anticipated through hypothetical designs, simulations, and models. The causes of deviations from actual events are systematically researched and fed back into the fields of activity. Knowledge is therefore transformed from a factor for stabilising social practices to a factor in the (insecure) development of these relationships. Knowledge itself thus becomes a problem because it is continuously revised, is considered to be in need of permanent improvement, and is made available to social actors as a renewable resource. As a result, less and less social activities within and outside of the economy remain unquestioned as given and accepted as being embedded in a traditional “old” system.12 The challenge that society faces is that it must constantly question norms and rules while simultaneously inventing them anew.13 If industrial society was characterised by the continuity of experience (the past) and expectation (the future), by a linear vision of progress, by Fordian models of social organisation and the Taylorised organisation of commercial and social processes (the division of labour), today we are confronted with the reverse problem of how the immeasurable abundance of highly specialised and fragmented knowledge can be selected, filtered, and perhaps combined in networks (knowledge sharing). In a society that constantly questions and corrects its own foundations, and in which the complexity of social interaction is increasing, spatial proximity and thus agglomerations gain in importance. In the scientific debate this thesis is bolstered by referring to the advantages urbanisation has for production, the sharing and selection of knowledge, and the safeguarding of individuals against the risks and challenges of constant change in social networks and institutional contexts.14 According to this 9 10 11 12 13 14
Boschma (2005). Allan (2000). Weingart (2001), p 17. Willke (2001), p 290. Heidenreich (2002). Schamp (2000), p 153.
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argument, metropolises offer better opportunities for finding a suitable job within a diverse and differentiated job market and for perceiving cultural and knowledge society based trends in a timely fashion. The bottom line is that the knowledge available in metropolitan areas gives social actors temporary advantages, power, and privileges in the form of advance know-how.15 4.2.4 A New Spatial Structure for the Knowledge Society? Theories about how spatial patterns of the knowledge society will develop have been fragmentary and rather vague up to now. One reason for this is the invisibility of knowledge, knowledge flows, and knowledge spillovers. In his standard work Geography and Trade Paul Krugman noted that it is impossible to observe knowledge flows, “They leave no ‘paper-trails’ by which they can be measured and tracked, and there is nothing to prevent the theorist from assuming anything about them.”16 If the industrial age was about the visible and systematic ordering of the spatial functions, the organisation of transport, the transport of material goods between spatially separate types of functions, and about the balance of interests between the largest social groups (workers, employees, and capital), the knowledge society’s driving forces are less visible.17 Model considerations of the knowledge society have not yet led to any complete spatial images. There is, however, a paradoxical relationship between two contradicting theories: The technology oriented line of argumentation provides us with information about globalisation and the spatial expansion of social spheres of activity due to the decreasing costs of transport and transactions. It supports the concept that “The world is flat”.18 The economic and social perspective points in the opposite direction and predicts a world that is almost exclusively dominated by large agglomerations, metropolises, and mega-cities, where spatial disparities are increasingly exacerbated (“brain gain” and “brain drain”). In many regards agglomerations appear to favour the exchange and the application of knowledge as they offer spatial proximity between bearers of knowledge, as well as a great wealth of resources that can be taken advantage of for the sharing of knowledge and for processes of learning and innovation.19 They are considered especially stimulating and secure spaces for the “creative class”, i. e. knowledge workers who find the desired and appropriate atmosphere and infrastructure in which to develop new ways of living.20 From this scientific point of view new communication and transport technologies do not contradict the trend toward agglomerations, but instead even 15 Meusburger (2008). 16 Krugman (1993), p 53. For this reason he avoids integrating the subject of knowledge in his geo-economic deliberations. 17 Drucker (1969), p 252. 18 Friedman (2006). 19 Romer (1990); Malecki (2000); Dybe (2002); Kujath (2005). 20 Florida (2005); Blotevogel (2005).
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support the enhanced position of metropolitan locations. These develop into leading infrastructure nodes of telecommunication and transport due to the great need for worldwide contacts and connections. In this way metropolitan areas can distinguish themselves as nodes of global knowledge flows and as knowledge and information marketplaces where globally dispersed knowledge can be brought together.21 As to the question of what kind of role remains for urban spaces located between large metropolises, little research has been done to date,22 and so far there are few established facts about rural space in the knowledge society.
4.3 Classification of Germany’s Subspaces Using a Cluster Analysis The multidimensionality of the knowledge society finds its spatial reflection in different patterns, which in the following sections will be methodologically analysed using secondary statistics and combined into a complex image using both a factor and a cluster analysis. The basis of the cluster analysis is formed by 15 indicators, which were reduced to four orthogonalised factors within the framework of a factor analysis (Fig. 1). The factors adequately reflect the three dimensions of the knowledge society mentioned before. The first factor, “science and education”, has a high correlation
Fig. 1: Indicators and factors of the cluster analysis. Source: Kujath, Pflanz, Stein, Zillmer (2008), p 24
21 Malecki (2002). 22 Aring, Reuther (2008).
4.3 Classification of Germany’s Spatial Patterns Subspaces in4.3 Using theDoes Knowledge a Cluster HistorySociety Analysis Matter?
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Fig. 2: Types of spaces and locations in the knowledge society and their spatial distribution. Source: Kujath, Pflanz, Stein, Zillmer (2008), p 25
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with indicators of the social dimension as well as with public sector employees in the knowledge society, i. e. employees at universities, adult education institutions, libraries, archives, museums, and botanic gardens and zoos. Furthermore, an average correlation is found with employment in transformation-oriented services and research-intensive professional groups. The economic dimension of the knowledge society is represented in both of the factors “information, technology, transaction” and “high-technology”. And finally, there is a high degree of correlation between the “infrastructure” factor and three indicators of the technical dimension. Using these four factors, and with the help of the statistical tools of cluster analyses, it is possible to standardise German districts (Landkreise) and independent cities (kreisfreie Städte). The result of the cluster analysis is a generalised map with imprecise district borders and a strongly schematically oriented representation from which it is possible to determine nine different types of spaces and locations of the knowledge society (Fig. 2, 3).
Fig. 3: Characterisation of types of spaces and locations using factor averages. Source: Kujath, Pflanz, Stein, Zillmer (2008), p 26
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4.4 Identified Spatial Patterns In taking a closer look at the spatial structure formed by the nine types of clusters in Germany, three very specific knowledge society relevant spatial patterns become apparent. They will be explained in more detail in the following text. 4.4.1 Upscaling: The Emergence of Large Agglomerations Influenced by the Knowledge Society There are prominent knowledge society hubs where knowledge society based attributes concentrate. These are, with a few exceptions, the large metropolitan centres in which numerous factors that characterise the knowledge society achieve positive averages. Each of the principal metropolitan locations has a distinct knowledge society related profile from which a functional division of tasks within the German urban system can be deduced. These knowledge society clusters are bound to existing structures of industrial society based urban systems, so that the functional changes these cities pass through often take place within the scope of a developmental path. Another phenomenon produced by the knowledge society’s dynamism are the extended metropolitan regions, in which all knowledge society cluster types are found. Agglomerations such as Munich, Rhine-Main, Rhine-Ruhr, HanoverBrunswick-Göttingen, Nuremberg, and Stuttgart consist of a leading service centre and numerous neighbouring cities that each have their own specialisation. These regions represent the diversity of the knowledge society. The diversity within the regions themselves is an expression of the specificity of the qualification and knowledge requirements resulting in the individual cities being only able to exist within vast spatial knowledge society based contexts in which critical masses of knowledge society relevant factors – such as R&D, high-technology firms, knowledge-intensive service providers, and suitable infrastructures of literacy, education, and communication – are available (“economies of scope”). In spatial development policy concepts for metropolitan regions and knowledge regions this tendency of spatial upscaling is being focused on with varying degrees of intensity. With this in mind, it is logical that few urban areas outside metropolitan regions can belong to this leading group of cities. And they are only able to achieve this position in a few selected fields of high technology and service, often linked to companies which dominate the local economy (e. g. BMW in Regensburg, Jenoptik in Jena, HUK in Coburg, or Debeka in Koblenz). A special role is played by cities which are strongly influenced by science and education but that do not have prominent positions in high technology and service fields within the knowledge economy. The spectrum stretches from large individual metropolitan centres (Berlin, Bremen, and Dresden) to important functional locations in other metropolitan regions (e. g. Brunswick, Essen, Mainz, and Augsburg) to mid-sized and smaller scientifically important locations that, as regiopoles, are of
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great importance for the corridors of development (e. g. Kiel, Bielefeld, Würzburg, and Freiburg) described in the following section. 4.4.2 Corridors of Development: The Expansion of the Knowledge Society in Rural Areas located between Metropolitan Regions Developmental options for the knowledge society also exist between metropolitan regions. These areas cover large parts of rural western Germany. In their spatial distribution they form corridors of development connecting metropolitan areas. In these corridors mid-sized and small cities form a chain of knowledge society nodes, and rural regions either develop into high technology regions or service centres that have infrastructures highly relevant to the knowledge society. Four such corridors presently stand out: (1) a broad high-technology based corridor stretching from Karlsruhe to Stuttgart, Ulm, Munich, and finally to Salzburg, (2) the Rhine corridor, which stretches from Basel to Karlsruhe, the Rhine-Main region, and finally to the Rhineland and into the Netherlands, with a unique high density of strong knowledge society based subspaces, (3) a corridor running from the Ruhr valley through Hannover/ Bremen to Hamburg and on to Kiel, (4) a corridor between the Rhine-Main region and Nuremberg. Due to the spatial assemblage of these knowledge society clusters the structure of the regions becomes clear: Large cities are at their core, urban centres between these cities have a complementary function as regiopoles, and rural areas strongly influenced by the knowledge society absorb all knowledge society based activities that the large centres, despite all their advantages, do not necessarily need. For the purposes of communicating and spreading knowledge, accessibility and proximity are determining factors in the knowledge society for the ability to share knowledge, initiate learning processes, create new insights, reduce insecurity, and plan common activities. Obviously, such conditions are not only found in large cities or the urban areas that surround them, but also occur in various forms and intensities in developmental corridors, especially in the regiopoles located within them. 4.4.3 New Periphery: Regions with a Knowledge Society Deficit The remaining part of Germany, which has a mainly rural character, is not entirely uncoupled from the knowledge society. However, such large deficits exist with regard to this type of society that in some cases the disparities between these areas and centres of knowledge society based activities may lead to a spatial polarisation that is difficult to resolve.
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The part of this periphery located in western Germany has a limited number of knowledge society associated companies. From an infrastructural point of view the area is secluded and in terms of science and education (universities) it is often disadvantaged. The eastern German part is conspicuous for its good educational indicators, which can be traced back to the role federal state affiliation plays and to the high regard professional training enjoyed in the GDR, and which is noticeable in both the number of graduates as well as the level of education. The consequences of this are high rates of employment in the knowledge-intensive public sector and the largely publicly financed health sector. A private sector economy which supports knowledge society development is missing in these regions, as well as knowledgeintensive services and the high technology sector. And the weak economic base is obviously not compensated for through an alliance with the numerous universities in the region, whose knowledge society based development is equally dependent on public services and financial transfers. The locational disadvantages of the periphery are – if looked at positively – associated with a development that is indirectly connected to the knowledge society, for example tourism, the health sector, and agriculture. Certain technical and economic indicators of the knowledge society do exist, however, for example a relatively high density of “.de domains” in tourist areas or the establishment of life and health management networks, both of which could serve to renew the economic structure. These regions distinguish themselves by the fact that the actors who reside there are merely applying knowledge society competency developed elsewhere. The development of selective areas into knowledge economy locations will be the result of this. This type of region can gain knowledge economy strength through links with knowledge society based scientific and service cities in adjacent areas. If the partnership between knowledge society actors in cities and rural areas is successful, actors in rural areas will gain access to the knowledge society and, inversely, knowledge society based actors in the regiopoles will profit from an extended range of activity that increases their critical mass. When their developmental concepts are successfully coordinated with local potentials and linked to neighbouring knowledge society centres, such regions can clearly distinguish themselves from residual regions that exhibit no or few relevant knowledge society based characteristics.
4.5 Conclusion: Knowledge Structures Space The knowledge society contributes to the reconfiguration of spaces. The fact that most agglomerations profit from the trends that accompany its development is clearly discernible and certain locations within rural regions derive benefits as well. In a fundamental sense the knowledge society favours urban-regional relationships, which, from a politico-administrative perspective, increase the necessity of suitable territorial reference areas, for example knowledge regions. This type of development differs from industrial society in that it establishes special networks. In a causative sense, knowledge is responsible for the fact that the
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knowledge society’s actors not only estimate and evaluate proximity and distance according to physical, but also according to other (e. g. cognitive or institutional) parameters. In pre-industrial and industrial society, however, physical space, with its patterns of specialisation, dominated the actors’ behaviour. It formed a space for action which costs a great deal of time and energy to “overcome”, and which became very apparent in various theoretical models. In the knowledge society these types of model structures are still valid, but at the same time additional spatial categories, which are more difficult to conceive, are coming to the forefront. There are, for instance, cognitive knowledge spaces that stretch between the locations of scientists who have complementary research themes, or institutional spaces that serve as good examples for both the territorial validity of educational systems restricted by state and municipal borders and new institutional arrangements in the knowledge economy which cut across the structure of territorial entities. The specificity of knowledge therefore means that the knowledge society’s spaces will, to a great extent, consist of networks which only overlap territorial spatial categories to a certain degree, and will in part consciously ignore them. This has two implications: Firstly, in a spatial sense, the knowledge society organises itself to a lesser degree according to the production of material goods and much more according to the production of knowledge. Created are at core not material goods, but knowledge goods which are naturally (but not exclusively) built into the circulation of material goods. It remains open which importance local flows of knowledge (based on proximity) have in relationship to supraregional networks. The only thing that is certain is that proximity and distance can be both fruitful and restrictive for the knowledge society, and that it depends in each case on the context, i. e. the specific concept of proximity. Secondly, networks have a common functional content, which makes it necessary to consider the reconfiguration of space in the knowledge society not simply under traditional physical aspects. The special value of these functional networks for a territorial unit such as a metropolis, a rural district, or an urban region can only be exploited when these various knowledge worlds (knowledge spaces) are linked to one another. The resulting concentration explains the special knowledge society based suitability of agglomerations as well as the special profiles of some administrative districts in which pooling, when seen from a chronologic perspective, occurs around an established developmental path. Particularly important are transactions and their associated costs incurred by overcoming the barriers of communication and understanding that are crucial for the development of the knowledge society. These barriers are effective in a spatial sense – but in a (for example) cognitive or institutional, as opposed to a physical, sense. In further research into knowledge society based implications for spatial development, special attention therefore needs to be given to the institutional arrangements (i. e. forms of governance) that are chosen by actors in order to reduce these transaction costs.
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References Allen, John (2000), Power/ Economic Knowledge: Symbolic and Spatial Formations, in: Bryson, John; Daniels, Peter; Henry, Nick; Pollard, Jane (eds.), Knowledge, Space, Economy, London, New York (Routledge), p 15-33 Aring, Jürgen; Reuther, Iris (eds.) (2008), Regiopolen – Die kleinen Großstädte im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, Berlin (Jovis) Blotevogel, Hans Heinrich (2005), Metropolregionen, in: Handwörterbuch der Raumordnung (4th edition), Hannover (ARL), p 642-647 Boschma, Ron (2005), Proximity and Innovation, A Critical Assessment, in: Regional Studies, 39 (1), p 61-74 Brand, Martin; Volkert, Bernd (2003), Regionales Monitoring zur Wissensökonomie – Ansatzpunkte, Anforderungen, Grenzen, Stuttgart (Akademie für Technikfolgenabschätzung) Cairncross, Frances (1997), The Death of Distance: How the Communications Revolution Will Change Our Lives, Boston (Texere) Drucker, Peter Ferdinand (1969), The Age of Discontinuity: Guidelines to Our Changing Society, New York (Harper & Row) Dybe, Georg (2002), Regionaler wirtschaftlicher Wandel, Die Sicht der evolutorischen Ökonomie und der „Neuen Wachstumstheorie“ (series: Stadtund Regionalwissenschaften des IRS, vol. 2), Münster, Hamburg, London (LIT) Florida, Richard (2005), Cities and the Creative Class, New York, London (Routledge) Friedman, Thomas (2006), The World is Flat – The Globalized World in the TwentyFirst Century, (2nd edition), London (Farrar, Straus and Giroux) Heidenreich, Martin (2002), Merkmale der Wissensgesellschaft, in: Bund-LänderKommission für Bildungsplanung und Forschungsförderung et al. (eds.), Lernen in der Wissensgesellschaft, Innsbruck, p 334-363 Heinelt, Hubert; Kujath, Hans Joachim; Zimmermann, Karsten (eds.) (2007), Wissensbasierte Dienstleister in Metropolregionen, Opladen, Farmington Hills (Barbara Budrich) Krugman, Paul (1991), Geography and Trade, Cambridge (MIT Press) Kujath, Hans Joachim (2005), Die neue Rolle der Metropolregionen in der Wissensökonomie, in: idem. (eds.), Knoten im Netz, Zur neuen Rolle der Metropolregionen in der Dienstleistungswirtschaft und Wissensökonomie (series Stadt- und Regionalwissenschaften des IRS, vol. 4), Münster, Hamburg, London (LIT), p 23-64 Kujath, Hans Joachim; Pflanz, Kai; Stein, Axel; Zillmer, Sabine (2008), Raumentwicklungspolitische Ansätze zur Förderung der Wissensgesellschaft (series Werkstatt: Praxis, no. 58), Bonn (Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung) Kujath, Hans Joachim; Schmidt, Suntje (2007), Wissensökonomie und die Entwicklung von Städtesystemen, in: Stadt- und Regionalforschung, vol. 2007/ 2, Bonn (SoFid – Sozialwissenschaftlicher Fachinformationsdienst), p 9-29
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Malecki, Edward (2000), Creating and Sustaining Competitiveness, Local Knowledge and Economic Geography, in: Bryson, John; Daniels, Peter; Henry, Nick; Pollard, Jane (eds.), Knowledge, Space, Economy, London, New York (Routledge), p 103-119 Malecki, Edward (2002), The Economic Geography of Internet Infrastructure, in: Economic Geograpy, 78, p 399-424 Meusburger, Peter (2008), The Nexus of Knowledge and Space, in: idem., Welker, Michael; Wunder, Edgar (eds.), Clashes of Knowledge, Orthodoxies and Heterodoxies in Science and Religion, Berlin, Heidelberg (Springer), p 43-98 Nora, Simon; Minc, Alain (1979), Die Informatisierung der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt am Main, New York (Campus) Romer, Paul (1990), Endogenous Technological Change, in: Journal of Political Economy, vol. 98, no. 5, p 71-103 Schamp, Eike (2000), Vernetzte Produktion, Industriegeographie aus institutioneller Perspektive, Darmstadt (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft) Stehr, Nico (1992), Experts, Counsellors and Advisors, in: idem., Ericson, Richard (ed.), The Culture of Power and Knowledge, Berlin, New York (de Gruyter), p 107-155 Strulik, Torsten (2004), Nichtwissen und Vertrauen in der Wissensökonomie, Frankfurt, New York (Campus) Weingart, Peter (2001), Die Stunde der Wahrheit? Zum Verhältnis der Wissenschaft zu Politik, Wirtschaft und Medien in der Wissensgesellschaft, Weilerswist (Velbrück Wissenschaft) Wersig, Gernot (1983) (ed.), Informatisierung der Gesellschaft, Wie bewältigen wir die neuen Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien, München (K.G. Saur) Willke, Helmut (2001), Systemisches Wissensmanagement, Stuttgart (Lucius & Lucius)
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The Importance of Infrastructures and Interaction Networks for Regional Competitiveness in the Knowledge Economy
Suntje Schmidt, Manuela Wolke
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5.1 Introduction Economic processes, while not the sole influence on cities and regions, indisputably play a dominant role in their development. The change in economic structure and the accompanying spread of the knowledge economy are often discussed in relation to increasing spatial disparities, usually with an emphasis on metropolitan regions as being best equipped with the infrastructures necessary for the trade and transfer of, and access to knowledge. These include not only transport infrastructures, but especially telecommunication infrastructures and venues for transregional knowledge transfer, such as trade fairs, exhibitions and congresses that provide temporary spatial proximity. Because interaction relationships in the knowledge economy are based more on the transfer of knowledge than on the transport of goods, specific infrastructure facilities take on growing significance in terms of regional economic competitiveness. With the changing spatial-functional division of labour and sharing of knowledge, the relationship and interaction structures of the economy in space also undergo transformation.1 These structures and the infrastructure facilities they require are the focus of this paper. The terms “knowledge economy” and “knowledge based economy” are often used without a clear definition, or even a delineation that would serve secondary statistical analysis within the standard industrial classifications. Defining this economic area is certainly difficult and requires further research, as the ongoing economic structural change is not limited to a few individual industries, but has led to fundamental transformations in all economic sectors. Following the approach conceived by the Leibniz Institute for Regional Development and Structural Planning (IRS), this paper undertakes a delineation of the knowledge economy, differentiating between four forms of functional specialisation within it. This is the basis for an analysis of secondary statistical data which yields a spatially differentiated picture of specialisation patterns and supports the assumption that the knowledge economy is not exclusively concentrated in metropolitan regions. Rather, non-metropolitan regions also appear to offer development options for the spatial expansion of the knowledge economy. This descriptive spatial analysis is followed by a discussion of the specific demands of the various forms of functional specialisation within the knowledge economy in connection with their interaction 1 Kujath, Schmidt (2007). H. Kilper (ed.), New Disparities in Spatial Development in Europe, German Annual of Spatial Research and Policy, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-03402-2_5, © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009
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and communication relationships as well as selected related infrastructures.2 The primary objective of this paper is to illustrate that the spatially differentiated development tendencies observed within the knowledge economy can be understood in terms of a spatial specialisation of functions. Options for action, derived from the respective specialisations of the individual regions, can be tailored for use in a spatial development policy to promote regional competitiveness in the context of the knowledge economy.
5.2 Functional Specialisation in the Knowledge Economy and their Spatial Characteristics In 1996 the OECD defined the knowledge based economy as high-tech industries as well as economic sectors with an above-average proportion of highly skilled workers.3 This definition indicates that the change in economic structure pervades many branches of the economy and cannot be assessed in terms of the qualitative and quantitative growth of any one individual economic sector alone. Many different attempts at a definition followed. While these will not be presented in detail here, it becomes clear that a definition according to economic sectors poses difficulty. This leads van Winden to emphasise two perspectives on the knowledge economy. One is based on a rather technological understanding of knowledge, according to which new knowledge leads to new products and production methods and growth in productivity; the other views the knowledge economy as an economy in which knowledge takes on a dominant role in all economic areas.4 The approach taken by the IRS is situated between these perspectives. The knowledge economy is seen here as an economy in which knowledge is a production factor and processinfluencing factor, as well as a product of the knowledge economy. The concrete pragmatic definition of the knowledge economy has been made in accordance with the ISI/ NIW5 lists6 and is based on the German Classification of Economic Activities of 2003 or the corresponding European classification, the NACE7. As chief criteria for the inclusion of economic sectors these classifications use the R&D proportion of company volume and the proportion of highly skilled employees. They differentiate 2 This discussion is based on primary data collected by us through company surveys in the metropolitan regions of Berlin and Munich as well as in the respective neighboring city regions of the states of Brandenburg and Bavaria. 3 OECD (1996). 4 Van Winden (2006). 5 ISI – Frauenhofer Institut für System- und Innovationsforschung (Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research); NIW – Niedersächsisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Lower Saxony Institute for Economic Research). 6 ISI/ NIW; Legler et al. (2005). 7 ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� NACE – Nomenclature statistique des Activités économiques dans la Communauté Européenne (Nomenclature of economic activities).
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between economic sectors with cutting-edge technologies (with R&D proportion above 8.5 percent), those with advanced technologies (R&D proportion between 3.5 percent and 8.5 percent), and knowledge intensive industries and services. In all three areas, the proportion of highly skilled employees is above 7.0 percent. Thus defined, the knowledge economy is very heterogeneous in composition, ranging from knowledge intensive industrial manufacturing and specialised areas of design and development to business-oriented service providers, to the multimedia sector. The change to the knowledge economy, however, cannot be understood in terms of a polarising juxtaposition of services and industrial sectors, as a separation of this kind is often no longer possible (e. g. industrially manufactured products are coupled with services). Authors such as Stein, Duranton and Puga,8 therefore propose that service sectors no longer be differentiated from production sectors, because occupationally oriented specialisations now more often lead to functional (as opposed to sectoral) forms of specialisation in and between companies. In keeping with the idea of functional specialisation and division of labour, the following forms of specialisation were delineated within the knowledge economy.9 High-tech industries: This area includes companies that produce knowledge intensive material goods through the integration of (new) knowledge and innovation. This can occur both in the context of the production process itself and through the enhancement of the product through knowledge components. The resulting goods are highly knowledge-intensive, often requiring an intensive research and development phase. Companies with this functional specialisation differ from producers of traditional industrial commodities in that they are strongly specialised in the creation of customer-specific products. Automobile and machine construction, the chemical industry and medical technology are typical of this form of specialisation. Focus: Creation of knowledge-intensive material goods through the integration of new knowledge in products and processes. Transformation-oriented services: It is characteristic for these companies that they transform existing knowledge into new knowledge that is of use in various economic fields of application. We assume that they are closely connected with classical industrial production, as well as with the high-technology sector. They create, above all, knowledge-intensive services that contribute to product and process innovations. To an ever greater extent, the services provided by these companies lie in R&D, product development and improvement, the development of new technical production methods, industrial design specification, technological “road maps”, and demand analysis. Typical representatives are companies from the area of research and development, architectural and engineering firms, and companies providing servicing and maintenance for advanced technology. 8 Stein (2002); Duranton, Puga (2003); Stein (2003). 9 Kujath, Schmidt (2007).
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Focus: Transformation of knowledge into new knowledge of use to various economic fields of application. Transaction-oriented services: These firms offer knowledge-intensive services oriented to the organisation and management of other companies’ economic transactions. Here knowledge is transformed into other non-material, client-specific services related not to products and technical production processes, but to the transaction processes connected with them, within and between companies. These include, for example, the acquisition, bundling, and processing of information, financial services, legal services, business consulting, market analysis, and marketing. The major firms in this area of activity are integrated in the decisionmaking processes of the industrial “global players”. Focus: Organisation and management of business transactions. Information and media industries: This category is comprised of companies whose main area of business lies in the transformation of knowledge into (information) commodities that may be highly standardised. The main activity in this branch of the knowledge economy is the development of prototypes that can be easily reproduced. The copies take on the character of mass products, in that they are standardised and made available to a wide range of customers. This area of the knowledge economy, represented by firms in the software, film and media industries, is positioned between classical services and service industrialisation. Focus: Transformation of knowledge into standardised information goods. It is known that the structural change to the knowledge economy is spatially differentiated. For Germany’s districts and independent cities it is apparent that the development dynamics of locating knowledge-intensive jobs are very different from region to region, with some more strongly impacted by, or better able to profit from the structural change than others. This means that in connection with the development of the knowledge economy, new disparities arise while existing ones diminish or, possibly, increase. A differentiated examination of the four outlined types of functional specialisation within the knowledge economy offers a first explanatory approach for such regionspecific participation in the economic structural change. In the following, using the analysis of secondary statistical data on employees subject to compulsory social insurance (SI employees), the relevance of the four functional areas will be discussed with regard to the changes in economic structure. In 2006 about seven million, or more than one-quarter of all SI employees in Germany were active in companies in the knowledge economy. With 3.2 million SI employees, the high-technology function clearly dominated compared to transaction-oriented service providers (2.5 million), information and media industries (0.7 million), and transformation-oriented services (0.6 million). This nationwide overview illustrates the emergence of spatially differentiated patterns of specialisation at the level of Germany’s districts and independent cities. For
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Fig. 1: Location quotients for the four forms of functional specialisation in the knowledge economy. Source: IRS (2008)
all four functional specialisations, regions can be identified whose economies have specialised in one or more functional types. As a comparative indicator of economic-spatial specialisation, the location quotient was selected, as it enables spatially differentiated analyses (Fig. 1).
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A pronounced specialisation in the high-technology area can be found in Southern Germany, especially in Baden-Wuerttemberg and parts of Bavaria. It is not the economic structures of the large urban centres10 that have specialised in this area of the knowledge economy, but rather those of small and medium-sized cities, some of which are in peripheral locations. North of this Southern German concentration there are only isolated regions in which high-tech industries disproportionally dominate the regional economy. This spatial pattern seems to confirm the assumption that an economic functional specialisation in the high-tech area is strongly path dependent following trajectories from traditional industrial sectors. The functional area of transformation-oriented service providers, in contrast, plays an above-average role in the economic structures both of the urban agglomerations and of the adjacent regions. This can be viewed as a tendency towards concentration. Proximity to science and research as well as to the high-technology area seems to be decisive. The picture for the area of transaction-oriented service providers and the information and media sector starkly contrasts with this. There is a pronounced tendency toward specialisation within the economic structures of large cities in these functional types, including the metropolitan regions of Hamburg, Berlin, Stuttgart, Munich, the Rhine-Ruhr and the Rhine-Main. This is the case not only in Germany’s “old” western states, but in the economic structures of the agglomerations in the “new” federal states, which show a similar tendency, though at an as yet lower level (e. g. in the metropolitan regions of Halle, Leipzig, and Chemnitz). Overall, economic specialisation in transaction-oriented services is thus clearly a large-city phenomenon and can be seen as a tendency toward spatial concentration. In summary, it is clear that within Germany there exist differentiated economicspatial specialisations, and that these include both tendencies toward concentration and patterns of dispersion. The cities and regions of the new federal states, in which path dependencies were frequently cut off or interrupted, can be viewed positively as in the process of catching up in the context of the development dynamics of the knowledge economy.
5.3 Function-specific Interaction Networks How can this differentiated spatial pattern of the four forms of functional specialisation within the knowledge economy be explained, and what are the resulting development options for cities and regions? One explanation emerges from the analysis of the interaction networks in which companies operate. We assume that knowledge transfer and creation occur differently in the four functional areas of the knowledge economy, as is reflected in the corresponding interaction networks as well as demands on infrastructure and, ultimately, space. In the following, this assumption is to be verified for the formalised 10 Cities with population of over 100,000 are considered to be large urban centers.
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networks used by companies for the transfer of, access to, and joint creation of new knowledge. The company surveys conducted by the IRS in the metropolitan regions of Berlin and Munich are the basis of this. These surveys, however, included service providers only, but no high-technology companies.11 By formalised networks we mean, in this context, interactions with clients, supplier relationships, corporate arrangements and partnerships. Almost all companies surveyed have established, alongside their client relationships, various forms of interaction with other companies as well as with other economically relevant actors (Fig. 2). It is of interest here that there are obviously significant differences with regard to the degree of formalisation. Transaction-oriented service providers, for example, are much more strongly integrated in corporate associations than are firms from the other two chosen functional areas of the knowledge economy. It can be seen that significantly fewer transaction-oriented service providers operate in partnerships or work together with suppliers than do companies of the other two functional areas. In the question of partnerships, a further significant difference comes to light, in this case between transformation-oriented service providers and companies in the information and media area.
Fig. 2: Interaction networks in the knowledge economy.12 Source: IRS (2002)
The interaction relationships shown in Fig. 2 suggest that companies, through their interconnectedness outside of client relationships, seek to expand their own 11 Schmidt, Wolke (2004); Wolke, Schmidt (2004); Jähnke, Wolke (2004). 12 “*” indicate the level of statistical significance regarding Chi-square: ***=highly significant, **=very significant, *=significant.
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knowledge base. The forms of and focuses in the interaction or relationship structures provide indications of the kinds of knowledge that are exchanged or jointly created between economic actors. Partnerships, for example, allow multiple companies and organisations to work together to develop new products or services. The handling of the jointly developed knowledge is governed by partnership rules, so that unwanted spillovers are avoided to the greatest possible extent. This enables potential competitors to collaborate in partnerships, as free-riding and unwanted spillover risks are minimised through contracts. The development of something new, whether this be a product, a service, or a certain production process, also always involves uncertainties as to its marketing opportunities or as to whether such newly created knowledge can gain currency. Partnerships not only allow these uncertainties to be borne by multiple actors, but can include potential multipliers for future marketing. In the framework of partnerships, the parties usually receive equal treatment and have rights and obligations, likewise governed by contract. The binding element between them is the jointly agreed aim of the partnership, which – until it is achieved – offers the actors a temporary institutional space. In this way, partnerships reduce institutional distances13 in order to facilitate knowledge exchange among their members. In comparison with supplier relationships, the “level playing field” in partnerships allows the minimisation of control and enforcement costs.14 This may account for the empirical observation that transformation oriented service providers are involved in such arrangements more frequently than are companies in the other polled functional types of specialisation. Research and development companies, which make up a major part of transformation-oriented services, need to enter – possibly temporary and changing – partnerships in order to maximise their knowledge base for the development of their services or products. Such companies require ongoing knowledge exchange within a secure institutional framework. Partnerships seem to be especially well-suited to this purpose. But more than half of the surveyed companies in the information and media industry work in partnerships also because this form of interaction affords them a project-linked, temporary collaboration with correspondingly reduced risk and guiding governance mechanisms. Whereas in partnerships both the initial knowledge-input by the partners and the resulting new knowledge, new knowledge intensive goods, or innovations often cannot be accurately predicted, the services or products provided by suppliers are clearly definable. Demanders and suppliers are connected by a clear purchasing contract. Relationships of this kind, however, are less transparent than those in partnerships. Although the service to be performed or the product to be delivered is clearly specified, the demander does not have a view into how it is created. While in partnerships the participating companies are involved in the creation of knowledge and have an overview of the competencies and know-how of their partners, this 13 Boschma (2005). 14 Kräkel (2004), p 347 ff.
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often remains unclear in supplier relationships. The supplied services or products generally are previously established, familiar knowledge-intensive goods and services, in contrast to the innovations that partnerships seek to jointly create. The question concerning the use of suppliers or external services was answered in the affirmative significantly less often by transaction-oriented service providers than by companies of the other two groups. This corresponds to the result that firms of this functional specialisation are more frequently incorporated in business associations in which new products and services are also developed or adapted. Corporate associations may indicate high internal knowledge flows. In principle, such networks provide the greatest protection against unwanted knowledge dissemination, but at the same time represent the greatest danger of knowledge lock-ins, due to the closed nature of the group of individuals that is party to the internal knowledge flows. Corporate associations may serve various purposes. They can be an expression of a functional and often also a spatial division of labour. They may additionally represent the sales of services or products in different regions, for example through branch systems or companies’ range of products. In the case of branch systems, the knowledge stream can be viewed as a hierarchical dissemination of knowledge, as decisions about products or product adaptations are made and communicated centrally.15 The empirical result that transaction-oriented service providers significantly more often work in corporate associations can be explained by the high proportion of companies from the financial and insurance sectors that belong to this type of specialisation. These companies, especially, need structures in which highly sensitive data and information can be exchanged with the greatest possible security. In contrast to temporary partnerships and consortiums, corporate networks offer better protection against the unwanted and uncontrolled spread of knowledge. This juxtaposition of the different forms of interaction networks leads to the assumption that the modes of transferring, sharing, and creating knowledge also have an influence on the spatial distribution and scope of activities in the knowledge economy, since every form of interaction places different demands on the respective specific infrastructures. Explanations for the spatial concentration of economic activities generally emphasise the necessity of spatial proximity to, above all, clients, suppliers, partners, and knowledge milieus (localisation and urbanisation advantages). We were not able to confirm this assumption through our surveys. First of all, service providers obviously are able to establish supra-regional client relations, contrasting the widely acknowledged assumption of the necessity for spatial proximity between service providers and their clients. This is especially true for the information and media industry as well as transformation-oriented service providers (compare Fig. 3). In comparison, a larger proportion of transactionoriented service providers build up regional client relations. However, the majority of service providers throughout all functional specialisation provide knowledge15 Schmidt, Wolke (2008).
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intensive services which are exported beyond a regional scope. Following the arguments, e. g. formulated in export-basis theories, such relations are advantageous for regions, if different types of supplier relations are of regional character. If this is true, services with supra-regional client relations contribute to regional growth if they use regional resources for providing and developing their services. However, the survey showed that companies with supra-regional client relationships also establish their partnerships and supplier relationships supra-regionally. On the other hand, companies with predominantly regional clients tend to be regionally oriented in their interaction relationships with partners and suppliers too. In this light, assumptions on the importance of regional resources, regional innovation systems, local embeddedness, local knowledge milieus or clusters for regional growth too lose their strength. Putting economic functions into perspective, one is able to better understand the logic of economic networks and hence can better understand shifting location demands of different economic functions.
Fig. 3: Spatial situation of clients. Source: Schmidt, Wolke (2008), p 17
5.4 Conclusions: Cities and Regions as Nodes of Knowledge – Infrastructure Demands The distinguishing characteristic of transaction oriented-service providers is that they organise, manage, and carry out diverse transactions for their clients. These activities are strongly connected to the service provider’s detailed knowledge of its clients’ internal business strategies, which is accompanied by an understanding of the background of the clients’ specific decisions and objectives. Since the service
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providing company is integrated in the clients’ internal decision making processes, it is party to information that as a rule must be treated confidentially and therefore is communicated in personal discussions and meetings. Changes or adjustments may be made by clients on short notice, requiring the service provider to be easily accessible to the client. To work effectively in their clients’ interest, transactionoriented service providers need precise knowledge of their clients’ institutional, and thus usually their regional context. This may include knowledge of how to deal with legal regulations, or of markets and market access strategies, including politics and administrations. Such knowledge is decisive for the position of the clients in national or global competition. For this reason, it is vital to the client that this knowledge be shared with as few external economic actors as possible. This aim is facilitated by organising in corporate associations in which knowledge is disseminated within the boundaries of the service providing company via the network locations. In comparison to the other functional types, partnerships play only a minor role for transaction-oriented service providers, because knowledge is generally created in interaction with the client and through corporate networks. Metropolitan regions represent advantageous sites for knowledge transfer and exchange of this kind. They are characterised by the spatial agglomeration of economic and non-economic actors who, as intermediaries, represent important sources of knowledge or, in the form of administrations, support the legal framework for business transactions. Due to the presence of different and overlapping infrastructures as well as their interconnectedness throughout a broad geographical area, metropolitan regions are additionally suited to the establishment of corporate networks, as they facilitate the organisation of information and knowledge transfer over the greatest space possible. The spatial proximity to its clients seems to be less important for the information and media industry as well as for transformation-oriented service providers. This is in part because, for these functional types, interaction with clients can seemingly be more easily coordinated and organised, as it arises from the nature of the service performed. Furthermore, their clients are not necessarily the sole or central knowledge source for them, as it is the case within the transaction-oriented service sector. The service providers’ tasks can be clearly formulated, allowing them to organise the delivery of their services in modules and work steps. Here, too, personal contacts with clients are of high importance, but the scheduling of services can be controlled by the provider. In comparison with transaction-oriented services, a coordination effort of this kind requires significantly lower costs, affording the possibility of establishing client relationships over a wide geographical area. If, however, the spatial distribution of the information and media industry as compared with transformation oriented services cannot be explained by their client relationships, the causes for this possibly lie in the spatial organisation of th knowledge sharing and knowledge creation processes between service providers and their suppliers or partners.
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Services that can be characterised as transformation-oriented are often very research and/ or technology intensive. They involve the processing of the service provider’s internal company knowledge, the knowledge held by the client, and externally created knowledge for the client and his requirements. These service providers create knowledge that is usable in various economic fields of application and can be integrated in the business contexts of the clients. The creation of innovations and new knowledge is often collaborative, its weight being distributed over numerous shoulders in order to benefit16 from “economies of specialisation”17. Compared to the other functional specialisations, these service providers evince a noticeably high proportion of partnerships. Assuming that new knowledge is cooperatively created, this indicates that these metropolitan companies seek to reduce search costs for the identification of suitable “knowledge providers”. Even if, depending on the commission, new partnerships must be established, the companies can call upon a pool of qualified partners that does not need to be based in the respective region, that is, in the local metropolitan area. They enter into partnerships and supplier relationships that may have previously proved themselves in other contexts. These companies require relationships based on trust, as this increases companies’ willingness to share knowledge. Due to the stability of these relationships, the partners and suppliers are not forced to be in spatial proximity to the service providers, as the geographical distance can be compensated by the cognitive and organisational proximity within partnerships. The spatial functional specialisation rather seems to emerge from the spatial concentration of technological knowledge (e. g. in significant sectoral clusters or in university locations), that is, in places that offer support through the organisation, management and linking of expertise.18 Such locations are characterised e. g. by an above average density of education infrastructures (e. g. university, colleges, public research) and development organisations or selected high-tech regions that offer access to “fresh” knowledge in the fields of both scientific and applied knowledge. The information and media industry specialises in transforming knowledge into knowledge goods that can be standardised. It is characterised by a great variety of possible products that can be applied in diverse economic contexts. Such a clear emphasis on application leads to a high dynamic of knowledge creation and thus also to temporally limited project contexts within and between organisations.19 The “creative class”20 forms an important part of this type of functional specialisation. As a result, it also largely determines its spatial location, in that it seeks out “tolerant” city regions (ibid.) with a high-quality “look and feel” in which to live and work.21 Due to the intensive use of information and communication technologies (significantly 16 17 18 19 20 21
Jansen (2004). Breschi, Lissoni (2001). Antonelli, Quéré (2002). Grabher (2002a); Grabher (2002b). Florida (2004). Helbrecht (1998); Helbrecht (2005).
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stronger than in the other two functional specialisations)22 and the frequently changing project contexts, metropolitan regions also serve as suitable sites for the information and media industry. This factor is determined by the possibilities of information and communication technologies as networking infrastructures, as well as by quality transport infrastructures that allow and perpetuate relationships organised over a wide geographical area. A comparable analysis for the high-technology sector has yet to be carried out. If the assumption of the spatial location of this functional type is determined by path dependencies that also determine regional development trajectories, then it is above all selected traditional industrial sites that are characterised by this functional specialisation within the knowledge economy. However, which regions have been able to successfully carry out the structural change to the knowledge economy appears to depend strongly on the companies’ ability to free themselves from old, rigid relationship structures and to establish interaction relationships in which knowledge and information can be exchanged and transferred without institutional or organisational barriers. The analyses presented here make clear that institutional and organisational arrangements of knowledge sharing and transfer, as well as knowledge protection, are not without spatial impacts. The relationship between knowledge sharing and institutions has previously been investigated in different academic disciplines, above all in economics, the sociology of knowledge, and industrial and organisational psychology. Up to now, little attention has been given to the spatial implications that the IRS pursues in its research. How do these observations contribute to a debate on regional disparities in the knowledge economy? Firstly, regions seem to participate in the knowledge economy to different extents. The high importance of traffic infrastructures that support face-to-face communication, information and communication infrastructures supporting virtual communication, and local bound places for an interregional knowledge exchange (e. g. fairs, congresses, etc.) seems to emphasise the key role of metropolitan regions in the knowledge economy. If these infrastructures were the main and exclusive location factors in the knowledge economy, regional economic disparities certainly would increase to a very significant extend. But, as illustrated in Fig. 1, metropolitan regions are not the only ones successfully participating in the knowledge economy. This cannot only be explained by regional development trajectories based on industrial history. Instead, it becomes obvious that e. g. service industries become a factor for regional growth as well. In this light, one could speak of regional differences rather than disparities. Regional policies that address the industrial base of regions alone could therefore be misleading and indeed lead to increasing regional disparities, because few regions only could profit from them. However, due to the different types of networks that the above introduced functional specialisation in the knowledge economy develop, location demands of 22 Schmidt, Wolke (2008).
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companies clearly differ from those demanded by companies of the industrial sector. Infrastructure policies do play a central role, but do not solely address the already mentioned ones. Infrastructure for education, training, on-the-job tuition, soft skills development, but also social infrastructures for communication, networking, and accessing different types of knowledge need to be moved into focus too. Successful participation in the structural change – the basis of regional competitiveness – hence appears to lie in recognising the respective specific interaction and relationship networks of the dominating functional areas of the knowledge economy. Correspondingly adapted infrastructure offerings could then support the development of regional competitiveness and attract companies seeking to locate. However, to what extent companies from the same functional area of the knowledge economy, depending on their location (major city, agglomeration, peripheral region), have further specific infrastructure requirements remains an open question. The importance of transaction costs in the context of the knowledge economy and space is one of the subjects the IRS is currently investigating in order to provide further answers to questions of regional competitiveness.
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References Antonelli, Cristiano; Quére, Michel (2002), The Governance of Interactive Learning within Innovation Systems, in: Urban Studies 39 (5-6), p 1051-1063 Boschma, Ron (2005), Proximity and Innovation: A Critical Assessment, in: Regional Studies 39 (1), p 61-74 Breschi, Stefano; Lissoni, Francesco (2001), Knowledge Spillovers and Local Innovation Systems: A Critical Survey, in: Industrial and Corporate Change 10 (4), p 975-1005 Duranton, Gilles; Puga, Diego (2003), From sectoral to functional Urban Specialisation, in: cepr Discussion Paper 2971 Florida, Richard (2004), The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It’s Transforming Work, Leisure, Community and Everyday Life, New York: Basic Books, 2nd edition Grabher, Gernot (2002a), The Project Ecology of Advertising: Tasks, Talents and Teams, in: Regional Studies 36 (3), p 245-262 Grabher, Gernot (2002b), Temporary Collaboration in Projects: Widening regional Trajectories? Paper from the workshop “Rethinking regional innovation and change: Path dependency or regional breakthrough?”, Stuttgart, Akademie für Technikfolgenabschätzung Helbrecht, Ilse (1998), The Creative Metropolis, Services, Symbols, and Spaces, in: International Journal of Architectural Theory 3 (1) Helbrecht, Ilse (2005), Geographisches Kapital – Das Fundament der kreativen Metropolis, in: Kujath, Hans Joachim (ed.), Knoten im Netz – Beiträge zur neuen Rolle der Metropolregionen in der Dienstleistungswirtschaft und Wissensökonomie, Münster, Hamburg, Berlin, Wien, London, LIT-Verlag, p 121-155 ISI/ NIW (2005), Zur technologischen Leistungsfähigkeit Deutschlands 2005, Bonn Jähnke, Petra; Wolke, Manuela (2005), Berlin und München – Metropolregionen als vernetzte Informationsdienstleistungsstandorte?, in: Kujath, Hans Joachim (ed.), Knoten im Netz – Beiträge zur neuen Rolle der Metropolregionen in der Dienstleistungswirtschaft und Wissensökonomie, Münster, Hamburg, Berlin, Wien, London, LIT-Verlag, p 245-284 Jansen, Dorothea (2004), Networks, Social Capital and Knowledge Production, Speyer, Forschungsinstitut für Öffentliche Verwaltung Speyer Kräkel, Matthias (2004), Organisation und Management, Tübingen Kujath, Hans Joachim; Schmidt, Suntje (2007), Wissensökonomie und die Entwicklung von Städtesystemen, in: soFid – Fachinformationsdienst 2007 (2), p 9-29
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Legler, Harald; Gehrke, Birgit; Krawczyk, Olaf (2005), Deutschlands forschungs- und wissensintensive Wirtschaftszweige: Spezialisierung, Wachstum, Beschäftigung und Qualifikationserfordernisse, in: Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF) (ed.), Studien zum deutschen Innovationssystem, Berlin, NIW – Niedersächsisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Lower Saxony Institute for Economic Research) OECD (1996), The Knowledge-Based Economy, in: General Distribution OECD 96 (102) Schmidt, Suntje; Wolke, Manuela (2004), Thesen zur organisatorischen und räumlichen Ordnung wissensbasierter Dienstleistungen – Berlin und München im Vergleich, in: Matthiesen, Ulf (ed.), Stadtregion und Wissen, Analysen und Plädoyers für eine wissensbasierte Stadtpolitik, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, p 123-147 Schmidt, Suntje; Wolke, Manuela (2007), Regional vs. Inter-Regional Networks – The Importance of Technical Infrastructures and Interaction Networks for the Regional Competitiveness in the Knowledge Economy, Presentation at the EUGEO – Conference: Workshop Session “Standort Europa” at Risk in Amsterdam, 20 August 2007 Schmidt, Suntje; Wolke, Manuela (2008), Knowledge Economic Specialisation of Regions as development Potentials, Regional Studies Association International Conference – Regions: The Dilemmas of Integration and Competition, Prague, RSA, available at: http://www.regional-studies-assoc.ac.uk/events/prague08/ papers/Schmidt.pdf Stein, Rolf (2002), Producer Services, Transaction Activities, and Cities: Rethinking Occupational Categories in Economic Geography, in: European Planning Studies 10 (6), p 723-743 Stein, Rolf (2003), Economic Specialisation in Metropolitan Areas revisited: Transactional Occupations in Hamburg, Germany, in: Urban Studies 40 (11), p 2187-2205 Van Winden, Willem (2006), Small and medium sized cities in the knowledge based Economy: Challenges and policy options, Lecture delivered in Magdeburg, 18 October 2005, at the Congress IBA Stadtumbau Sachsen-Anhalt in Magdeburg, 17-19 October 2005, available at: http://www.euricur.nl/content_assets/Microsoft%2Word%20-%20LezingMagdeburg.pdf Wolke, Manuela; Schmidt, Suntje (2004), Berlin und München als Standorte wissensintensiver Dienstleister-Verflechtungen, Interaktionsstrukturen und metropolitane Standortanforderungen, in: Matthiesen, Ulf (ed.), Stadtregion und Wissen – Analysen und Plädoyers für eine wissensbasierte Stadtpolitik, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, p 123-147
Urbanisation Processes and Regional in Analysis Europe 4.3Disparities Does History 4.4 Matter?
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Urbanisation Processes and Regional Disparities in Europe – The Role of Metropolitan Regions and the Importance of the Settlement Structure
Volker Schmidt-Seiwert
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6.1 Cities and Metropolitan Regions In the last few years the spatial development policy discussion has, with regard to its consideration of space, shifted from a single ‘Europe of Regions’ to an integrated one of a territory of regions, metropolitan regions, and cities. The Territorial Agenda1 agreed upon in 2007 covers the territorial coexistence and the spatial responsibilities of cities and regions, and views metropolitan regions, urban centres, and the surrounding (perhaps rural) environs as being the spatial level of the spatial development activity that actually guides development. In doing so, cities are considered to be the motors of development. Building a network between different cities of various importance and the regional actors within and between urban regions should introduce the conditions necessary for the support and strengthening of development. The Leipzig Charter for integrated urban development policy, which was also initiated in 2007, provided momentum for a so-called “general inspection” of the motors of spatial development from an urban development policy point of view.2 The guiding principles and goals of the charter aim at a strengthening of cities as such and as focal points of development in metropolitan regions. Urban development policies and spatial development policies are thereby integrated in a common territorial whole. According to the report The Territorial State and Perspectives of the European Union,3 a background document of the Territorial Agenda, cities and metropolitan regions are the main features of a territorial structure as well as home to more than 80
1 Territorial Agenda of the European Union – Towards a More Competitive and Sustainable Europe of Diverse Regions (2007). Agreed on the occasion of the Informal Ministerial Meeting on Urban Development and Territorial Cohesion in Leipzig on 24/ 25 May 2007. 2 Leipzig Charter on Sustainable European Cities (2007). Agreed on the occasion of the Informal Ministerial Meeting on Urban Development and Territorial Cohesion in Leipzig on 24/ 25 May 2007. 3 The Territorial State and Perspectives of the European Union. Towards a Stronger European Territorial Cohesion in the Light of the Lisbon and Gothenburg Ambitions (2007). A Background Document for the Territorial Agenda of the European Union. H. Kilper (ed.), New Disparities in Spatial Development in Europe, German Annual of Spatial Research and Policy, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-03402-2_6, © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009
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percent of European citizens. In the Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion4 presented by the EU Commission in 2008 a comparison is made between national averages and the high level of gross domestic product per inhabitant, the productivity, employment, and research and innovation-related activities in capital cities and in most densely populated conurbations. The importance of metropolitan regions and cities in the spatial context is currently very high on the political agenda. At least for certain chosen indices regarding population, economic performance, and innovative capability an attempt is made in this paper to consider the roles of metropolitan regions based on several indicators.5 A comparison made over time of, for example, population development during the last quarter century, i. e. from 1981 to 2006, is meant to look into the growing importance of metropolitan regions.
6.2 In Search of the Metropolitan Region Determining the starting point of an analysis of cities and metropolitan regions in an European comparison is not simple. A Europe-wide comparison of cities and rural areas based on national definitions is not possible at all, as these individual national contexts differ from one another too greatly, or are missing altogether. The German example, for instance, points this out very clearly. Committed pan-European initiatives such as Urban Audit6 are concentrated on cities as such, or rather on large urban zones. Although the European network of cities is certainly well covered here, the formation of new or division of other area categories from what is left over is not possible. Classifying the roles of cities in their regional settings is difficult on this basis, as Urban Audit currently suffers from the inadequate embedding of urban statistics in regional statistical systems, and from the simple fact that only a limited number of cities are included in the report. Taking a closer look at the complex of issues concerning cities and regions (from an analytical point of view) implies referring to regional statistical sources, due to the availability of data. The lowest regional level of regional statistical reporting from Eurostat, the European Union’s bureau of statistics, the NUTS level 3, would allow for a fundamental, if also thematically limited, analysis. 4 European Commission: Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion – Turning Territorial Diversity into Strength (2008). 5 The source of data for these analyses is the BBSR’s ongoing spatial observation of Europe. In general the data comes from the European Union’s statistical office (Eurostat) and national statistical offices. Data used to observe innovative capability is obtained from the European Patent Office’s patent databank. 6 The European Urban Audit is an initiative of the European Commission’s DirectorateGeneral of Regional Policy in cooperation with national statistical offices, and is coordinated by Eurostat. A basic examination and analysis is provided by The State of European Cities Report from 2007.
Urbanisation Processes Regional in Europe 6.2 Inand Search of4.3 theDisparities Does Metropolitan History Matter? Region
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A typology of metropolitan regions and their regional surroundings that goes beyond regional statistical data is required. There are a variety of possible approaches. Within the framework of the European Spatial Planning Observatory Network (ESPON) a typology of urban-rural relationships on the basis of human influence and the proximity to nature has been created.7 Additional projects in this network are concerned with the determination of functional urban areas and their spheres of influence, or rather their accessibility with private transport.8 The OECD provides a Europe-wide urban-rural typology, or rather primarily a typology of rural areas.9 This is based on the population density of communities and their share of the population of a NUTS III region. In the Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion the EU Commission deals with the question in its urban-rural typology in NUTS III regions following the OECD’s differentiation and combines these with ESPON’s ideas regarding travel time per passenger car to an urban centre.10 The Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR) has a somewhat different orientation concerning its approach to settlement structure. Regions are standardised according to both the importance of the largest regional centre and population density.11 This approach is hierarchical and begins a European comparison with the standardisation of agglomeration areas, 7 ESPON Project 1.1.2: Urban-rural relations in Europe, Lead Partner: Helsinki University of Technology – Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, CURS, Final Report 2005. 8 ESPON Project 1.1.1: Urban areas as nodes in a polycentric development, Lead Partner: Nordic Centre for Spatial Development, Nordregio, Final Report 2005. The areas in this project considered to be functional urban areas (FUA) were also defined as part of a so-called Potential Urban Strategic Horizon (PUSH) due to their accessibility by private automobile within 45 minutes. Activities within the framework of the ESPON 2006 programme were looked at in greater depth with regard to functional urban areas in a follow-up project: ESPON Project 1.4.3: Study on Urban Functions, leading partner: Free University of Brussels – IGEAT, Final Report 2007. In the ESPON Programme 2013 a new project entitled FOCI (Future Orientation of Cities) is currently running. 9 The OECD’s typology distinguishes between the rurality of a NUTS III region based on the share of population in rural communities (LAU 2). Predominantly rural regions have more than 50 percent while predominantly urban regions have less than 15 percent. 10 Commission staff working document accompanying the Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion – Turning territorial diversity into strength, European Commission 2008, p 13. 11 Settlement structure types exist for both Germany and Europe. The different regional basis, spatial planning regions for Germany, and NUTS II for Europe only allow a limited comparison to be made. Key limits for the demarcation of NUTS II regions in agglomerations are as a rule 300,000 inhabitants for centres and a density of 300 inhabitants per sq km (I/ sq km), for urbanised regions 300,000 inhabitants and a density of over 100 I/ sq km, for rural regions a centre with no more than 125,000 inhabitants and a density of less than 100 I/ sq km. On the NUTS III level core regions in agglomerations have a centre with over 300,000 inhabitants and a density over 300 I/ sq km, urbanised regions have a centre with over 150,000 inhabitants and a density over 150 I/ sq km, and rural core regions have a centre with over 125,000 inhabitants and a density of more than 150 I/ sq km. For more information see www.raumbeobachtung.de.
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Fig. 1: Combined NUTS III – Type by the relation of urban centre and surrounding. Source: BBSR Spatial Monitoring System of Europe
urbanised areas, and rural areas at the regional level of NUTS II. In an additional step this approach is transferred to NUTS III regions and the three basic types of higher regional levels are each divided into lower levels. In this way it is possible, for example, to identify core regions (central cities) in both agglomeration areas and urbanised areas as well as in rural areas. Conversely, this standardisation also allows for the identification of rural areas within agglomeration areas.
and Regional in Europe 6.3 Urbanisation Medium-termProcesses Growth of Densely Populated 4.3Disparities Does History Outlying Matter? Areas
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The NUTS III settlement structure types can also be regrouped according to urbanrural relationships in so-called comprehensive region-types. These nine types are put into four spatial order categories: core regions, metropolitan areas, rural areas, and rural regions. From a European point of view core regions also cover core regions in rural regions, i. e. rural areas that have a larger central city.
6.3 Medium-term Growth of Densely Populated Outlying Areas In 1981 approximately 61 percent of the European Union’s 462 million inhabitants lived in urban core regions (as defined by the BBSR) and the densely populated areas surrounding them. Cities, with around 56 percent of all inhabitants, had significantly more than half the population. At this time approximately 113 million inhabitants, nearly a quarter of the population, lived in rural areas. In a somewhat larger geographic view of the European continent that includes EU candidate countries such as Croatia, Macedonia, and Turkey, as well as Western European countries such as Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and Lichtenstein, the core cities and their outlying areas are home to approximately 58 percent of a total of 525 million inhabitants. Around 58 percent also live in urban core regions. With 29 percent, rural areas have a slightly higher share when compared to the EU. A quarter of a century later, in 2006, approximately 64 percent of the European Union’s 494 million inhabitants lived in core cities and their outlying areas. The core regions as such had a share of 58 percent. In the broader European area the share of population living in core regions and their surrounding areas was approximately 62 percent, which is identical to the share living in cities within this spatial category. In the observed time period from 1981 to 2006 the number of inhabitants in the European Union increased approximately 7.0 percent while in the core regions the number of inhabitants increased by around 7.6 percent. In comparison, the populations in densely populated outlying areas and rural outlying areas grew slightly more, i. e. by about 8 percent. Rural areas had a population increase of 4.6 percent. The development between 2001 and 2006 indicates that core regions are the areas within the EU that are now exhibiting above-average population growth. With an increase of nearly 3.0 percent, their development is significantly higher than the overall growth rate of 2.0 percent. The situation in individual Member States is, however, quite varied. In Germany, for example, core regions lost population during this entire time period. Even though the total population in Germany increased by 5.0 percent, the number of inhabitants in core regions decreased by about 0.6 percent. Population growth of about 9.2 percent in densely populated outlying areas is an indicator of the suburbanisation that occurred during this time. At the same time, the population of rural areas decreased by about 4.4 percent.
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Since 2001, however, core regions in Germany have experienced population growth of about 0.8 percent even though overall population growth has stagnated. Densely populated outlying areas have also recorded a slight increase in the population (about 0.3 percent), although this has not been as great as in core areas. Population decline in the country’s rural outlying areas (1.1 percent) as well as in rural areas (2.4 percent) are an indication of an increasing concentration process. In the UK rural outlying areas have most visibly experienced population growth, during the entire period of time as well as in the last few years. While national population grew by 7.4 percent between 1981 and 2006, core regions have only grown by 4.6 percent. As opposed to this, rural outlying areas have increased by 15.8 percent. From 2001 to 2006 core regions nationally grew by 2.5 percent while rural outlying areas continued to grow by an above-average 3.6 percent. In Eastern Europe the analysis confirms the concentration process in core regions. Whereas the population in rural outlying areas and rural areas grew by about 6.0 percent between 1981 and 2006, in core regions it increased by 7.4 percent. Even though the total population generally decreased between 2001 and 2006, urban areas continued to exhibit growth (about 0.3 percent), be it ever so slight. Turkey has shown a clear tendency toward urbanisation, along with simultaneous rapid population growth. The size of the population increased greatly between 1981 and 2006. In doing so, the population either lived in core regions (nearly 53 percent) or rural areas (45 percent). The remaining part of the population lived in rural outlying areas and slowly developing densely populated areas surrounding cities. Between 1981 and 2006 the country’s population as a whole had a growth rate of 60 percent, while in core regions population grew by approximately 83.3 percent and in rural areas only by about 40 percent. With growth rates of 6.7 percent at the national level, 9.3 percent in the core regions, and 4.1 percent in rural areas, this development is continuing.
6.4 Urban and Rural – A Changing Typology If one looks behind regional population development based on combined structure types, another type of development can be found. Not only the regional population as such is undergoing change over time; the typology itself is also changing. Regional population development has an influence on population density; growth and shrinkage of urban populations in large regional centres have an influence on settlement structure classification. Over the course of time in individual cases it may even result in a change in the regional centre. In Germany the demographic development of a declining population, especially in Eastern Germany, has lead to some areas changing from rural outlying areas to rural areas. The districts of Potsdam-Mittelmark and Dahme-Spreewald are two examples. At the same time, some rural areas near large core regions are developing into densely populated areas, for instance the districts of Harburg, Stade, and
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Osterholz. All in all, there is a tendency toward the densification of rural areas. From 1981 to 2006 rural areas across Europe developed into urban core regions, for example Cyprus, the regions Cantabria and Murcia in Spain, Perugia in Italy, and Maine-et-Loire in France. Cambridgeshire in England is also an example of a region that has developed from a rural outlying area into a core region. Examples of regions that have developed from rural outlying areas to densely populated outlying areas are Somerset and Dorset, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Haute Savoie, the district of Ahrweiler, and the cantons of Schwyz and Freiburg in Switzerland.
6.5 The Increasing Concentration of Economic Power Urban core regions are the economically strongest regions within the EU. In 1981, measured in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), 42 percent of the EU’s total economic performance was concentrated in these regions. If the share of GDP in the densely populated outlying areas is added to this, the total amount increases to 72 percent. In that same year rural areas had an 18 percent share. A quarter of a century later core regions and their surrounding areas had a total economic performance of 75 percent, while rural areas only had a 15 percent share. The concentration of total economic production is especially obvious in countries like Belgium and the United Kingdom. In these two countries the core regions and densely populated outlying areas have 97 percent and 89 percent (respectively) of national economic performance. In Germany and Italy the share of total economic production is 81 percent, while in Portugal it is 87 percent, in Spain 67 percent, and in France 64 percent. In countries like Portugal and Spain economic power is clearly dominated by the core regions. The share of economic performance in these two countries is 64 percent and 62 percent, respectively. In the United Kingdom core regions and densely populated surrounding areas are equal in terms of economic performance, as each has 47 percent. In Belgium and Germany the economic importance of densely populated outlying areas is higher by far. In these countries the urbanised areas surrounding cities, with 53 percent and 46 percent, respectively, have a larger share than the core regions (with 44 percent and 35 percent, respectively). Distinct differences are found regarding the contribution rural areas make to national production. In densely populated Belgium the share of total production is only 1.7 percent, in Germany 2.5 percent, and in the United Kingdom 3.0 percent. In countries that are more agrarian in nature the importance rural areas have in the economy is naturally greater. In Portugal the share of economic performance these areas have is 16 percent, and increases to 25 percent in Spain, 26 percent in France, 37 percent in Denmark, and 41 percent in Austria. The importance of rural areas inevitably increases in countries such as Ireland, Finland, Sweden, and Norway, where the settlement structure is only characterised by core regions and rural areas. The share rural areas have in these countries is approximately 60
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percent. The low share of GDP (32 percent) rural areas in Turkey have, although the settlement structure is similar, is an indication of the economy’s orientation and its productivity. The development of the gross domestic product, measured in euros between 2000 and 2005, is a sign of above-average growth in the European Union’s core regions. While the EU’s overall economy grew by an average of 3.7 percent in this period of time, economic growth in the core regions was almost 4.1 percent. Economic growth in rural areas was even more significant, however, where the sum of all produced goods and services grew to 4.5 percent. With a growth rate of 2.9 percent, densely populated outlying areas exhibited below-average development, as did rural outlying areas with 3.6 percent. The above-average development of core regions is a trend particularly prevalent in Southern and Eastern European countries, and can also be found in Switzerland. In a fundamental sense, the economic growth of these countries is a consequence of the below-average development of the rural areas, which in the end has led to the increased concentration. Bulgaria, Greece, and Italy are representatives of this group. Spain, however, is an exception in Southern Europe. Just as in Germany, the economy in Spain’s core regions has developed similarly to the national average, while the economic development of rural areas has been below-average. Another type of development occurred in France, where both the urban cores and rural areas, in a national comparison, grew at below-average rates between 2000 and 2005. Rural areas in this country had the highest average annual growth. The concentration of economic power in core regions and densely populated areas surrounding them continues in terms of the amount of innovations reaching market maturity, as measured in the number of patent applications in 2005. But it is not the EU’s core regions that have a clear advantage in this regard, as their share of the total number or patent applications is, at 47.3 percent, only slightly higher than their share of economic performance. In a total European perspective, it is the densely populated outlying areas that stand out as potential areas of innovation. With a 40 percent share of patent applications, the importance these areas have concerning innovation is clearly greater than it is for total economic production. It is possible to roughly divide the individual Member States into two groups. One group reflects the general European trend while in the second the core regions have a fairly dominant number of patent applications. Countries like France and Switzerland are examples of countries that belong to the first group. The number of patent applications their core regions have is not an indication of their overall economic importance, while their densely populated outlying areas are significantly more important in this regard. Their share of the total number of national patents is, at 69 percent and 64 percent respectively, higher than their economic power as measured by GDP. The Netherlands, whose urban core regions have an 80 percent share of the number of patent applications, Denmark (75.7 percent), and Spain (73.7 percent) belong to the second group. In comparison Germany and the United Kingdom, to a
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great extent, have a balance between economic and innovative activities. The share of patents that core regions have in both countries is higher than the share of GDP, and the share that densely populated outlying areas have are comparable in their dimensions. The countries that became new Member States between 2004 and 2007 only account for about one percent of the total number of registered patents in the European Union.12 Rural areas have very little importance as far as innovations are concerned and their share of patent applications does not begin to approach their overall economic importance. In spite of this, however, it should be stressed that rural areas in some countries, for instance in Ireland (53.6 percent) and Norway (47.3 percent), have a share of patents that forms a clear counterweight to urban core regions.
6.6 Conclusion Urban core regions and their densely populated outlying areas together form the focal point of the population and the economy. Approximately half of the European Union’s total population lives in urban core regions and nearly 45 percent of the overall economic performance occurs there as well. Together with the surrounding densely populated areas they are home to three-quarters of the EU’s inhabitants and three-quarters of its gross domestic product. During the observed quarter of a century between 1981 and 2006 overall concentration continued in Europe. Rural areas in particular became less important during this period of time. It became clear, however, that development neither occurred to the same extent in all countries nor even in comparable directions. Densely populated outlying areas are of central importance in a number of countries and not just in traditionally densely populated countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany. In these countries, as in so many nations in Western and Northern Europe, suburban areas within densely populated zones form focal points and development areas for economic activities. By contrast, in Southern and Eastern Europe the growing importance of urban core areas is continuing, and in Eastern Europe this development often only favours regions surrounding capital cities. And yet, demographic change is indicating that the densification of population and economic activities is not a one-way street leading from rural areas to urban core regions. In several cases urban cores are shrinking as a result of populations that are moving to densely populated outlying areas, which are often adjacent to larger regional centres. These developments demonstrate that urban regions in Europe do not form any kind of homogeneous group. They therefore require regionally adapted strategies 12 Cf. also: ESPON Project 3.1: ESPON Atlas – Mapping the structure of the European Territory, Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning (BBR) (ed.) (2006), or: Kartensammlung zur Europäischen Raumentwicklung, Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Affairs and Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning (ed.) (2007).
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somewhere between shrinkage and growth, and development and adaptation. Some urban regions, in an understanding of cities and their regional surroundings, must recognise the fact that it is not necessarily cities, but densely populated outlying areas that will serve as the motors of development. With this knowledge of different regional currents in Europe in mind, common strategies which have an ability to adapt to specific situations are called for. For more information on population structure and development as well as gross domestic product and patents by different types of combined settlement structure see www.raumbeobachtung.de.
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References ESPON Project 1.1.1: Urban areas as nodes in a polycentric development, Lead Partner: Nordic Centre for Spatial Development, Nordregio, Final Report 2005 ESPON Project 1.1.2: Urban-rural relations in Europe, Lead Partner: Helsinki University of Technology – Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, CURS, Final Report 2005 ESPON Project 1.4.3: Study on Urban Functions, Lead Partner: Free University of Brussels – IGEAT, Final Report 2007 ESPON Project 3.1: ESPON Atlas – Mapping the structure of the European Territory, Lead Partner and Editor: Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning (BBR), 2006 European Commission: Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion – Turning territorial diversity into strength, COM (2008) 616 final European Commission: Commission staff working document accompanying the Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion – Turning territorial diversity into strength, European Commission 2008 European Commission: State of European Cities Report – Adding value to the European Urban Audit, Study prepared by ECOTEC Research and Consulting Ltd, in cooperation with NordRegio and Eurofutures, Brussels 2007 Leipzig Charta on Sustainable European Cities, Agreed on the occasion of the Informal Ministerial Meeting on Urban Development and Territorial Cohesion in Leipzig on 24/ 25 May 2007, Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Affairs (ed.), Berlin 2007 Maps on European territorial development – A contribution of the German Presidency to the Informal Ministerial Meeting on Urban Development and Territorial Cohesion in Leipzig in May 2007, Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Affairs and Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning (eds.), Berlin/ Bonn 2007 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): OECD Regions at a Glance, 2009, web book version Territorial Agenda of the European Union – Towards a more competitive and sustainable Europe of diverse regions, agreed on the occasion of the Informal Ministerial Meeting on Urban Development and Territorial Cohesion in Leipzig on 24/ 25 May 2007, Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Affairs (ed.), Berlin 2007 The Territorial State and Perspectives of the European Union – Towards a stronger European Territorial Cohesion in the light of the Lisbon and Gothenburg ambitions – A background document for the Territorial Agenda of the European Union, Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Affairs (ed.), Berlin 2007
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Suburban Residential Development in Post-socialist Urban Regions
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Suburban Residential Development in Post-socialist Urban Regions: The Case of Moscow, Sofia, and Budapest
Isolde Brade, Christian Smigiel, Zoltán Kovács
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7.1 The Rise of Suburbs Suburban growth has been one of the most prevailing urban phenomena that has shaped the urban landscape in Central and Eastern Europe since 1990. Triggered by the fundamental reorganisation of societal and economic systems, the social and spatial setting of post-socialist urban regions has changed significantly.1 These changes are especially striking in terms of housing. After the collapse of the centrally controlled system for the planning and distribution of housing, local land and housing markets were liberalised. Due to the privatisation of housing and the appearance of new actors, urban areas underwent far-reaching transformation. While inner-city areas experienced a permanent loss of population and the rapid transformation of residential space into commercial sites, suburban areas became the most dynamic areas in terms of housing construction and population growth.2 Furthermore, the negligence and infrastructural deficits of large socialist housing estates provided a source of residents for suburbanisation, as those who could afford it started to leave the compact cities. Although these features and the driving forces of suburban growth tend to be similar for the majority of Central and Eastern European urban regions, differences and specific features can be observed on closer examination. Different empirical studies have shown that levels of suburban residential growth and the actors involved differ quite widely in the various countries and urban regions that were investigated.3 All this can be seen as a result of the overlapping of socialist legacies, global influences, and individual development pathways. In this article we focus on recent patterns of suburban residential development in three Central and Eastern European capital cities: Moscow, Sofia, and Budapest. In all three urban regions significant suburban growth has evolved both in terms of population and new housing construction over the last few decades. As a result these cities have experienced a very dynamic form of urban sprawl, which has caused severe challenges for the planning and sustainable development of suburban areas. Despite the similarities in recent suburban development, the historical pathways of the three cities differ considerably. Budapest, the capital city of Hungary, was already affected by the first waves of residential suburbanisation in the 1960s and 1 Enyedi (1998); Szelényi (1996); Weclawowicz (1998). 2 Borén, Gentile (2007). 3 Kok, Kovács (1999); Kährik, Tammaru (2008); Leetma, Tammaru (2007); Novák, Sykora (2007); Ouredniček (2007); Tammaru (2005); Timár, Váradi (2001). H. Kilper (ed.), New Disparities in Spatial Development in Europe, German Annual of Spatial Research and Policy, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-03402-2_7, © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009
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70s. In this period Hungary moved away from a rigid redistributive economy to a system which was often referred as ‘goulash communism’. Part of this policy involved the implementation of market economy elements in some spheres of life, including the housing market. Private housing construction was not only allowed but even subsidised, and consequently wealthier residents began to move to the suburbs.4 By contrast, suburban residential development was relatively negligible in Sofia before 1990. During communism strict planning control, as well as a lack of building plots and building materials prevented a large movement of people to the suburbs – except for a small number in the southern part of the city.5 Moscow is a third example where the development of the suburban belt was fostered mainly by the construction of so-called ‘dormitory towns’, i. e. the extension of small and medium-sized towns within the urban agglomeration and the emergence of huge settlements of summer cottages (so-called dachas). Rooted deeply in the Russian culture, this recreational function triggered the construction of a vast number of second homes around Moscow, and provided a good opportunity for new waves of immigration after socialism.6 Despite these different trajectories of suburban development, it can be concluded that suburban residential growth in all three cities remained much below the level of western cities prior to 1990. This was mainly due to strict planning control, limited opportunities for single family home construction, and the low level of private car ownership. The main objective of this article is to highlight recent developments and processes of suburban residential growth in Moscow, Sofia, and Budapest. Before analysing current processes, however, the issue of ‘socialist suburbanisation’ is also addressed. By describing the historical background as well as the recent dynamics of suburbanisation, we want to contribute to a better understanding of a process that is often referred to as post-socialist residential suburbanisation. The main emphasis is placed on the transformation of the housing market, new forms of mobility among households, and changing housing policy in Moscow, Sofia, and Budapest.
7.2 Moscow 7.2.1 The Suburbanisation of Moscow’s Urban Region At the beginning of the 1990s the entire Moscow region experienced a spatially strongly differentiated and polarised type of economic and social development. The inner city was marked by the rapid development of a business infrastructure oriented to international standards, new office locations and shopping streets, and the emergence of areas devoted to luxury consumption which served the expensive 4 Berényi (1986); Tosics (2006). 5 Dainov et al. (2007). 6 Brade, Nefedova (1998).
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tastes of the new elites. On the one hand, such exclusive urban space faced an urban periphery marked by various manifestations of decline, while on the other hand showing signs of a thriving small business economy at ‘improvised’ locations (open markets, workshops, etc.). Long-term investments were only initiated in the urban periphery in the course of the Russian Federation’s gradual economic consolidation, beginning in the late 1990s. Hundreds of new housing developments and even entire new small-scale towns are now being erected. The outskirts surrounding the Moscow ring road (MKAD7) currently appear to be one of the most important investment zones outside of the downtown area. 7.2.2 Moscow’s Periphery during the Soviet Period The strong expansion of the Moscow urban area during the Soviet period led to an increased population density and to the formation of industrial agglomerations outside of the compact city. Rapid industrialisation from the 1930s until the 1950s led to a massive immigration of labourers which in turn greatly reinforced the housing crisis. The situation only improved after 1960 as industrial housing construction became established and huge housing programs were implemented. Along with the expanding city limits, such large residential areas also gradually pushed their way outwards and moved the administrative city limits into oblast (Russian administrative districts) areas. High levels of concentration of the population occured on the city’s periphery. The most densely populated areas are no longer the city’s center but instead the large-scale housing estates on the fringes of the city, the so-called dormitory towns.8 These highly specialised towns with their economic and social foundations in large research and technology companies located on the urban periphery experienced meteoric population increases during the Soviet period due to dynamic industrialisation. Soviet urban planners sought to establish a settlement pattern in the surrounding region that was as balanced as possible by way of centralised migration control. Reality overtook all such plans, however. As strict restrictions on migration to the city of Moscow (propiska) had been in place since 1932, those who found work in Moscow but were not permitted to reside there settled in the adjoining region. As a consequence, it was mainly migration from other Soviet oblasti that led to increased population density on the outer periphery and in Moscow’s suburbs respectively.
7 Moskovskaya kol’cevaya avtodoroga. 8 Brade, Rudolph (2006).
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7.2.3 Social and Demographic Characteristics of the Suburban Population Albeit the Moscow region has always attracted migrants from Russia’s remote regions, and this trend has experienced a considerable boost since 2003. For the first time, population growth in the oblast has exceeded that of the city of Moscow, and the margin is growing. Economic barriers are the reason for this: a shortage of affordable housing and real estate has curbed the influx into Moscow. Fig. 1 shows the significance of Oblast Moscow as a destination of migration from Central Russia.
Fig. 1: Balance of migration in the city of Moscow, Oblast Moscow, and the neighboring oblasts (per 10,000 inhabitants). Source: Goskomstat Rossii 2006 (2007); Goskomstat Rossii 1995 (1996)
The population that permanently resides in Moscow’s surrounding region has, in the first instance, not been growing due to an influx of residents from the core city, particularly young ‘middle class’ families, but as a result of migration from other parts of the country or even from abroad (immigrant workers). Moscow’s suburban region is no longer merely a stepping stone in the process of relocating to Moscow, but is increasingly viewed as a place for living and working in its own right. The majority of Muscovites who acquire housing in the suburban ring in the immediate vicinity of the city buy single-family homes. The vast majority of newly acquired suburban homes are either intended as lucrative investments or for use as a second residence for recreational purposes for Moscow’s inhabitants. Typically, people keep their dwellings in the city as their permanent residences, either for their own use or for making a profit by letting on an informal basis. When purchasing housing, the oblast population’s demand is mainly geared toward acquiring condominiums in multi-storey buildings for their own use. The large majority of migrants to Oblast Moscow are of working age. This has gradually changed the socio-demographic image and perception of the average inhabitant of Moscow’s neighboring regions, which is reflected in new behavioral patterns, for instance, in terms of economic activities and spatial mobility.
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In the past 20 years, especially the qualification level of the workforce commuting to Moscow has increased. In the Soviet period, the so-called limitshiki9 filled those jobs deemed unattractive in the capital city; in the 1990s, migrant workers from the former Soviet republics (mainly from Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldavia) or from remote Russian regions replaced them. These migrants are for the most part better trained and more skilled than the former limitshiki. They are motivated by the significantly higher wages paid in the Russian capital as compared to the income that they could achieve in their own countries. According to estimates two million people currently commute to Moscow daily, about half of them to work. Approximately 50 to 80 percent of the employees who live within the first ring of raions (Russian administrative unit) closest to Moscow commute to the city. The surrounding suburbs have been transformed into bedroom communities – a process that has been fueled by the full-fledged economic crisis and deindustrialisation of the 1990s. A significant increase in the number of medium and large-scale businesses in the surrounding region was first registered in 2000. The required workforce has been recruited from surrounding settlements and, increasingly, from the city of Moscow as well. 7.2.4 Current Residential Suburbanisation Single-family housing construction in general started in the mid-1990s. But it was not before the year 2000 that the development of complete single-family housing settlements began in the Moscow region. While in 2001 there were only about 30 such settlements in the suburban region, by the end of 2007 there were already more than 700 settlements of the economy and business class types and about 80 in the elite-class.10, 11 This large number of new residential complexes has to a significant extent shaped the oblast’s overall settlement pattern, especially within the raions close to the city (Fig. 2). Residential suburbanisation has taken a somewhat ambivalent course. On the one hand, sustained high demand from Moscow’s upper class and increasing demand from a growing middle class for residential real estate in the greater Moscow area as a lucrative form of investment and, mainly, as a second residence has fueled ongoing residential suburbanisation. On the other hand, the increasing shortage of building sites, current high prices for land and housing, the considerable lack of infrastructure, public transport, and facilities for young people, and the 9 Limitshik – a worker from another region who was granted a temporary permit to reside in Moscow in order to work in desperately needed but unattractive jobs. The limitshiki were usually allotted a bed in a boarding house and were socially isolated and little recognised. 10 Russian housing market analysts distinguish between three housing types: elite, business, and economy. The distinction takes into account different levels of lot size, living space per sqm, unit costs, and special features (Bfai (2007)). 11 Makhrova (2007), p 34.
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comparatively low income of the majority of the population has thus far prevented the acceleration of suburbanisation and the mass spread of economy class residential developments. Many of the new settlements are not officially registered as such with the oblast nor are the residents who occupy them. Municipal administrations and developers strike gentlemen’s agreements designating areas for development ‘on demand’, frequently violating provisions for protecting certain areas. Not until spring 2007 did Oblast Moscow, with its new “General Development Plan”, have an instrument at its disposal that allowed it to channel and order thriving residential development. Most of the single-family house settlements have been built since the early 1990s in the western, southwestern, and northwestern sectors. Favored locations are mostly concentrated within a distance of up to 50 km from Moscow city limits. Traditionally, the entire area west of Moscow enjoys great prestige. Even in the prerevolutionary era, the Russian elites erected their dachas in this thickly wooded region, which were later taken over by the Soviet elites. Most recently, the new Russian elites have favored this area, leading to an even more dense settlement pattern. Here, industrial density and its negative environmental impact is much lower than in the eastern sectors. The south and east of the urban region are areas where mainly logistics and industrial facilities are concentrated. The industrialised east is the least favored sector for residential development.
Fig. 2: One of the largest townhouse settlements consisting of about 800 housing units is located in Dubrovka on the southwestern artery to Troick. Source: Brade (2007)
5.2Suburban The national Residential system of Development financial balance in Post-socialist and equal living Urban 7.2conditions Regions Moscow
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By 2004 over a third of all new residential settlements had been erected within 15 km of the MKAD beltway, and over 40 percent within 35 km. Only one percent of all new residential settlements are located more than 55 km from the beltway.12 Nonetheless, the current trend, especially in the economy class, is a clear move toward the more distant raions due to a lack of available space within those closest to the city; yet there, too, the more prestigious western and northern sectors are favored. The more distant raions are also becoming increasingly attractive as locations for manorial residences, park-like estates, or ranches of the affluent classes from Moscow and other regions. These properties typically consist of several hectares of land, and, apart from the main building, the estates include a number of other buildings for guests, domestic staff, security service, outbuildings, in-door swimming pools, gyms, etc. The vast majority of the new developments are not only gated, but tightly controlled by professional private security guards. They are not open to the public. All of the business and elite-class developments have very restricted access. The most important factors determining demand and thus price are the image of a sector, the distance to the city centre, as well as transportation connections, the landscape, and environmental conditions. Prices for an average-sized lot on Rublevskoe Avenue in the west start at approximately one million US dollars (value in 2004). The market for luxury homes, however, has gradually become saturated recently. On the other hand, the aspiring middle class’s demand for affordable housing is on the rise. Economy class homes currently account for 50 percent of demand but only for 20 percent of supply.13 These homes cost about $ 1300 US per sqm and thus cost approximately $ 250,000 to $ 350,000 US per unit. 7.2.5 Dacha Culture Capital city residents perceived the surrounding region first and foremost as a recreational area. A specific feature of Russia, which was carried over from the Soviet period, is that a high percentage of the population owns small suburban plots of land with small houses – so-called dachas (Fig. 3). The garden allotment in the surrounding regions was inseparably linked to the cramped conditions of everyday urban life among Muscovites as a generous, rural addition. Compact housing development in the city as well as densely laid-out leisure communities mirrored the ideal of the socialist city. The main objective of this development strategy was not protecting the integrity of the landscape or containing urban sprawl, but realising the idea of community, where people live and spend their leisure time together, fostering supportive relationships among neighbors and relationships of social control.
12 Makhrova (2006). 13 Bfai (2007).
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Dacha or garden settlements comprise several hundred lots mostly along the railroad lines due to the extremely low level of motorisation during soviet times. In the wake of legislation liberalising access to land for garden use, the process reached its peak by the mid-1980s at about one million dacha or garden plots in the greater Moscow area. Since the mid-1990s, no new areas have been designated for garden settlements due to the scarcity of vacant land. The main reason must lie in the fact that municipalities have been able to sell municipal land much more profitably to developers of new residential settlements.
Fig. 3: A typical Russian dacha. Source: Brade (2007)
The sizable number of dachniki plus the continuously rising number of residents of the new residential settlements regularly leads to a precipitous growth in population during the season from May to October, putting great strain on the suburban
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infrastructure in general, and on the transportation system in particular. Neither the Oblast administration nor its municipal counterparts have proved up to the task of providing adequate infrastructure for accommodating heightened demand; hence, extreme traffic bottlenecks are part of the daily experience. The Russian Federation’s gradual economic consolidation since the late 1990s has been accompanied by the diffusion of long-term investments into the Moscow periphery. ‘Hypertrophic’ growth of large-scale residential developments, singlefamily housing settlements, and weekend cottages (dachi) in Moscow’s surrounding region continued throughout the 1990s and has yet to slow down – the process will presumably result in vast urban sprawl affecting the entire region.
7.3 Sofia 7.3.1 History of Urban Development before 1945 In 1879, when Bulgaria gained independence and Sofia was declared the nation’s capital, the city was only of moderate size. Although having a long tradition as an urban settlement, Sofia was inhabited by only 12,000 citizens in an area of less than three sq km.14 After becoming the Bulgarian capital the city underwent profound changes which altered many aspects of the cityscape. New cultural, commercial, and industrial activities started to concentrate in Sofia. Over the next five decades the population increased rapidly and by the 1930s there were 300,000 residents. In the course of this dynamic urban growth new socio-spatial segregation patterns emerged as well. The neighbourhoods on the east and south sides of the city became the upscale quarters, because of their fashionable architecture, generous apartment size, and their vicinity to urban open space and the nearby Vitosha Mountain.15 Northern and western suburbs of that time, which were located close to industrial sites, emerged as estates for blue collar workers or poor war refugees. Following this clear division of areas for wealthier people in the south and less affluent groups in northern and western parts, a similar pattern could be observed in nearby rural villages. Particularly the villages south of Sofia developed as zones for summer residences of the aristocracy and high status groups. These settlements nevertheless retained their rural character because of missing transport links with the city and the exclusive use of these areas as recreational zones and agricultural land.16 7.3.2 The Socialist Period and its Impacts on Suburban Development Sofia experienced a period of urban expansion after World War II. As in many other socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, an intense urbanisation process 14 Valkanov (2005); Hirt, Stanilov (2007). 15 Hirt, Stanilov (2007). 16 Staddon, Mollov (2000).
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started, which was driven by extensive industrialisation, mass production of largescale housing estates and the nationalisation of agricultural land. Huge industrial sites were erected within and outside the city’s boundaries. This massive industrialisation drive, which started in the late 1940s, triggered a huge influx of workers from all over the country. In the period between 1945 and 1955 the population grew at an annual rate of more than four percent. During the next three decades population growth did not slow down. Thus, in 30 years the population of Sofia almost tripled from 366,000 in 1945 to almost one million inhabitants in 1975. This massive influx of people into the city caused severe problems with regards to infrastructure and housing. Although high-density housing estates were constructed at the city’s periphery (approximately 300,000 prefabricated flats were built during the socialist period), the public authorities decided to implement legal steps to reduce pressure on the housing market. A strict policy of restriction on migration was implemented and remained in force until 1990 in order to regulate the process of immigration. Beyond the urban boundary, which was marked by high-rise housing estates, different patterns of suburban development occurred. While in the north and northeast of Sofia heavy industry occupied most of suburban territory, the southern suburban areas were predominantly used as agricultural land and to some extent for residential purposes as well. Nevertheless, Sofia did not experience substantial residential suburban development due to a different kind of regulation. Housing for permanent use, for instance, was not allowed. However, the former villages to the south of Sofia, which had already been incorporated into the Sofia metropolitan area before World War II, were declared so-called “villa-zones”.17 Therefore housing for seasonal use was allowed and the tradition of summer residences within these areas continued. Especially the so-called “Vitosha-collar” (consisting of the villages Boyana, Dragalevci, Knyazhevo, Simeonovo) remained a popular area for self-built detached houses on small pieces of land, similar to weekend houses in many other East European urban regions. Despite the popularity of this area and the steadily growing number of small houses, the “Vitosha-collar” retained its rural character. This was due to the fact that hardly any public investments were made in public sanitation, heating, roads, or other forms of infrastructure. Except for its connection with the Sofia public bus transport system, the “Vitosha-collar” was kept as a separate recreational zone within the Sofia municipality. In conclusion it can be said that residential suburbanisation as a process of relative or absolute deconcentration of population within an urban region did not take place in the Sofia agglomeration during socialist times due to different kinds of political and economic restrictions.
17 Hirt, Stanilov (2007).
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7.3.3 Processes, Actors, and Trends of Residential Suburbanisation in Sofia since 1990 The epochal upheaval of 1989 resulted in deep economic and social changes for Bulgaria and its capital. The heavy industry sector collapsed. Since the end of the 1990s the growth of the tertiary sector has started to compensate for the decline in industrial jobs. Since then Sofia has attracted around two-thirds of Bulgaria’s FDI18.19 This development also brought a concentration of high-paid jobs to Sofia, which initiated a constant influx of people to the city. Although Sofia experienced a dramatic decrease in birth rates and a brain drain of high-skilled professionals to Western Europe and the United States, the stable influx of people from all over the country has exceeded the sum of emigrants plus the consequences caused by a natural decrease. In fact, between 1992 and 2006 the number of people living in Sofia increased by about 24 percent. While official statistics tend to underestimate the number of people that are currently living in Sofia, numerous experts and different representative surveys agree that about 1.9 million people permanently live and work in Sofia, which means that more than 25 percent of Bulgaria’s population is concentrated in Sofia.20
Fig. 4: Yearly change of population 1992-2001. Source: NSI (2003)
18 Foreign Direct Investments. 19 Dainov et al. (2007). 20 Dainov et al. (2007).
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According to census data, this population growth mainly occurred in the southern suburbs of the Sofia agglomeration (Fig. 4). While the inner-city districts, the northern, and north-western suburban districts have continuously lost more than two percent of their population annually,21 the southern suburban belt gained about 1.7 percent per year during the same period of time. This spatial concentration of suburban population growth is also reflected in other parameters, such as residential construction, traffic volume, and to some extent workplaces. One important feature that has influenced this population surge in the southern districts was the reintroduction of land and housing markets after 1990. Restitution of former nationalised land to its previous owners made it possible to buy property without any restrictions. Not surprisingly the southern suburban belt of Sofia, which has traditionally enjoyed great prestige, has developed as the most attractive area and as the zone with the highest housing prices for suburban property in Sofia.22 Additionally, it has turned into the most dynamic area in terms of housing construction. Triggered by a chronic housing shortage that even increased during the 1990s and the persistent dilapidation of the socialist housing stock, especially wealthier households have tended to move out of the city and initiated a growth in population and housing in southern suburban areas. Moreover, a specific tax policy which especially benefits affluent households and their new luxurious homes has fostered suburban growth, because “[…] properties are taxed per square meter, rather than by assessed value”.23 Concerning the boom in housing construction, two major phases can be distinguished. The first phase started in the beginning of the 1990s, when mostly a small group of affluent households decided to move to the southern suburbs. This stage of early suburban residential growth was a development predominantly led by private households, which in most cases built new single-family houses on their own or converted their summer residences into permanent residences. It is also possible to say that a general opacity of land use regulation and land tenure, as well as an absence of public urban governance, favoured this uncontrolled urban sprawl. The suburban growth of the 1990s was the first step in an ongoing densification of construction that transformed the southern suburban belt from a densely wooded recreational zone into an urban district of Sofia. However, due to the economic breakdown in the 1990s and political and societal instability, construction activities remained on an individual level and did not intensify before 2000. Since then the situation has changed considerably. Accompanied by economic growth, a strong demand for housing, and a high expectation of profits, international property companies started to launch real estate products.24 In recent years new housing construction has spread dramatically, which led to a transformation of the southern 21 The exceptions are the districts of Poduyane and Vrabnica. In both cases population growth was caused by the incorporation of former rural areas (Tsvetkova (2007)). 22 Imoti (2007). 23 Hirt, Stanilov (2007), p 775. 24 Bfai (2006).
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belt into a huge building plot. In this context it is surprising to note that even though almost all new housing complexes are advertised as luxury apartments in untouched natural surroundings, the whole southern belt remains poorly equipped in terms of accessible green spaces and infrastructure. One reason is that building regulations were removed by public authorities in order to facilitate housing construction.25 Concerning the lack of infrastructure, which is a general problem for the entire city, it can be concluded that since 1990 public investments in infrastructure have not happened at all.26 Furthermore a lack of strategies, missing public funding, corruption, an out-dated master plan, and an aversion to public intervention created an overall degradation of services.27 The aforementioned boom in housing construction has led to more than a process of densification and the mushrooming of housing. Moreover, a general socio-spatial change in the southern districts of Sofia has occurred. The growing divergence between long-time residents, who had moved or had housing in these areas before 1990, and newcomers who have moved to the suburbs since 1990 is becoming an essential feature of ongoing suburban residential development. In a recent household survey in one of Sofia’s suburban districts conducted by the authors,28 clear differences between long-time residents and newcomers in terms of household structure, economic situation, and age became apparent. Despite the fact that both groups are well-educated, many parameters highlight the differences between these two groups. While newcomers are predominantly younger and have high incomes, long-time residents are predominantly older and have only moderate incomes. There are also differences in terms of current jobs. While the majority of newcomers are self-employed and run small or medium-sized businesses, the majority of long-time residents are pensioners, who must often continue working in order to have a decent life. Concerning the predominant household type, it can be concluded that the majority of newcomers live in classical family-households (parents plus children). In contrast, long-time residents predominantly live in twoperson households due to their specific ages. Antagonism between long-time residents and newcomers goes beyond socioeconomic differences, however. An in-depth survey on suburban residential development in the “Vitosha-collar” conducted by Sonia Hirt shows that sociospatial change concerns both attitudes towards the life of residents and the physical form of housing. Whereas long-time residents usually possess smaller houses built on a small piece of land and fenced with moderate see-through materials such as 25 26 27 28
Hirt, Stanilov (2006). Tsenkova (2007). Sofia city strategy (2003). The household survey is part of an international research project at the Leibniz Institute of Regional Geography in Leipzig, funded by the German Scientific Foundation (DFG). The aim of this project is to compare socio-spatial change in selected urban regions in Central and Eastern Europe. Within the Sofia urban region five different case study areas were chosen in order to survey processes of socio-spatial upgrading and decline.
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chain-link fences or bushes, newcomers’ homes are situated on much larger pieces of land, surrounded by thick and solid walls, and are equipped with security equipment such as video surveillance (Fig. 5).29 This pattern of new fortified citadels of affluent newcomers on the one side and moderate homes of poorer long-term residents on the other side reveals social separation and segregation and displays a trend of increasing social distances within a spatial proximity. This indicates that the social weight of those walls overshadows their physical might and symbolises an ongoing socio-spatial division.
Fig. 5: New fortified suburban housing in Sofia’s southern outskirts. Source: Smigiel (2008)
In this context it is important to mention the spread of gated and guarded housing complexes as a novel socio-spatial form of housing mainly in the outskirts of Sofia. These new complexes can be defined as closed and privately governed neighbourhoods where access is controlled by guards or CCTV systems and restricted by gates, walls, fences, or natural boundaries. An important aspect is that the exclusivity goes beyond the individual accommodation unit. In an ongoing survey we counted about 50 gated and guarded housing complexes in Sofia, whereas two-thirds are still in construction. While the number of residential units varies from nine to 900, it seems 29 Hirt, Stanilov (2007).
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that there is a clear trend towards large-scale projects that are beginning to include different kinds of services such as shopping centres, schools, medical services, and leisure facilities. One explanation for the growth in size and the type of features is the increasing number of financially well-equipped international real estate developers. While the “first generation” of gated and guarded housing complexes were mainly developed in the 1990s by private Bulgarian developers in remote areas outside of Sofia for an exclusive group of people who wanted security and seclusion, recent growth is due to investments made by internationally operating real estate companies and comes along with the “introduction of an international lifestyle” for a larger group of customers. Besides the growing supply of housing in the southern suburban belt, demand will certainly remain high as well. A recent international comparative study investigating real estate markets in twelve Central and Eastern European capitals concluded that Sofia has the highest share of inhabitants of household formation age. 27 percent of the current population are between 20 and 34 years old, which is considered to be the age of buyers entering the residential market for the first time.30 In combination with the shortage of housing it can therefore be expected that demand for suburban housing will remain consistently high. The results of the afore-mentioned household survey underline the strong desire to move to suburbia. Accordingly, the overwhelming majority would move to suburbia if they could choose freely. Although the majority of people can not afford it, the expansion of mortgage markets and relatively low interest rates will probably contribute to a higher affordability of suburban housing and will lead to a scenario which a Bulgarian real estate magazine summarised as, “Floating boarders: Where does the city end and the mountain begin?”31 And indeed, increasing demand for housing in the southern belt reinforces the tendency of the city to creep ‘uphill’.
7.4 Budapest 7.4.1 The Historical Background of Urban Sprawl Budapest has a population of 1.7 million, which has been continuously decreasing since the mid-1980s when the peak was nearly 2.1 million. Budapest and its urban region have been continuously influenced by cycles of concentration and deconcentration concerning the population and economy over the last century. Urban sprawl has been one of the most striking urban phenomena over the last two decades in Budapest. This process could be closely linked to political changes and the subsequent transition of the country, which brought about a liberalisation of the housing market, a differentiation of housing demands, and growing segregation. 30 REAS (2008). 31 Pino (2007).
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Historically, the first signs of suburbanisation around Budapest can be traced back to the end of the 19th century, when an extension of the tram network and the construction of new suburban railway lines enabled the development of residential areas outside the city proper.32 This was the first impetus for suburbanisation which resulted in numerous commuter villages around Budapest that were mainly inhabited by low-income earners. The second stage in the development of the suburban belt occurred during the inter-war period, when the rapid growth of industrial production and rising rents inside Budapest resulted in the expansion of suburban communities, some of which became medium-sized cities with 50-60 thousand inhabitants (e. g. Újpest, Kispest, and Csepel). The creation of Greater Budapest in 1950 symbolises the beginning of the third period of suburban development around Budapest. Through the development of the metropolitan transport network the city expanded its zone of influence very quickly in the 1950s and 1960s. The overstrained industrial development of the city and the consequent demand for labour attracted many immigrants from the provinces to Budapest and the surrounding region. In order to cope with growing housing shortages, administrative restrictions on the influx of people were introduced in the late 1950s. These stated that only people who had worked or studied in Budapest for five years were allowed to acquire accommodation and settle down in the city.33 As a result of these administrative restrictions, which were intended to slow down immigration to the city, surrounding municipalities experienced rapid growth rates from the late 1950s onwards. Gradually a new commuter zone and a new agglomeration zone emerged outside the city boundary. This rapid increase in population within a confined area led to an inevitable result: an inadequate technical and social infrastructure together with a lack of jobs were the hallmarks of the suburban areas. As a consequence, an extensive mono-functional residential area, which was strictly dependent on the centre of the city, arose around Budapest. A new phenomenon that began in the early 1970s was the mushrooming of second homes on the periphery of Budapest. Weekend houses were especially popular, particularly on the northern and western peripheries of Budapest where the hilly landscape and ample open space offered a more attractive environment. In most cases these second homes were simply wooden cabins with very basic facilities on a small piece of land. The owners usually came from modest social circumstances and very often lived in high-rise housing estates or in inner-city tenement blocks.34 Beginning in the late 1970s recreational areas in the north and west experienced a new dynamism. Weekend houses were converted into permanent homes and became targets for the first wave of out-migration from Budapest.35 The first clear-cut signs of residential suburbanisation appeared in the 1980s. This was partly due to a new 32 33 34 35
Enyedi, Szirmai (1992). Kovács (1994). Földi (2006). Berényi (1986).
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housing policy (1983), which gave more financial support to the private sector, and partly due to rapidly growing differences in income within society. Income differences grew as the role of the second economy became more important, and it also entailed increasing demand for single-family homes in a suburban location. Consequently, the level of out-migration from Budapest into surrounding Pest County areas surpassed immigration from Pest County into the city for the first time in 1987 (Fig. 6). Despite all these developments suburbanisation around Budapest, in comparison to the processes in Western Europe, remained limited during state socialism. A more intensive migration of people towards the periphery was prevented by numerous factors, including state control over housing and local land markets, the low level of private car ownership, and the lack of infrastructure (communal services, i. e. the supply of gas, water, etc.) in the surrounding communities. It can be generally concluded that the socialist state made few investments in communal infrastructure or services in suburban areas, and consequently those areas were not considered at all desirable by wealthier residents concentrated on the hilly Buda-side of the city.36
Fig. 6: Balance of migration between Budapest and Pest County (1980-2004). Source: Statistical Yearbook of Budapest (2005)
7.4.2 Processes, Actors, and Trends of Residential Suburbanisation in Budapest since 1990 The process of suburbanisation around Budapest accelerated sharply after 1990. The rapid increase in car ownership, deregulation of local land and housing markets, and appearance of new actors in the housing market speeded up migration into the suburbs considerably. Beginning in the early 1990s the negative balance of migration between Budapest and Pest County increased rapidly and almost reached the level of 18,000 persons a year. Peaking in 2000, the negative balance of migration 36 Kok, Kovács (1999).
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thereafter started to decrease slightly. In this respect, post-socialist residential suburbanisation in Budapest can be divided into two phases: between 1990 and 2000 (the rapid increase of suburbanisation), and since 2000 (the consolidation of the process). Suburbanisation (i. e. the negative balance of migration with surrounding municipalities) is still a clear tendency even though the number of people leaving Budapest has decreased slightly. The total migrational loss of Budapest is thus less than it was earlier. General indicators of demographic profiles and migration patterns equally reflect the strong impact of suburbanisation in the metropolitan region after 1990. According to statistics, on 1 January 2007 the population of Budapest was 1,696,000, thus the population of the city has decreased by nearly 321,000 since 1990. In Budapest this excessive population loss was simultaneously caused by both a natural decrease and
Fig. 7: Natural increase and migration in Budapest metropolitan region (1990-2007). Source: Central Statistical Office (CSO) (2008), Budapest
Fig. 8: Suburban housing on the Buda Hills. Source: Herfert (2008)
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a profound migration to the suburban zone. On the other hand, in the agglomeration zone a small-scale natural decrease was easily counterbalanced by the massive outflow of people from the core city (Fig. 7). The main targets of suburban migration were predominantly rural communities in hilly areas north and west of Budapest which offered high-quality residential environments in an attractive landscape. In the last decade the construction of detached houses, terraced houses, and occasionally residential parks (kind of gated communities) has flourished in these areas. In social terms it is usually young, middle-class families with children who move out of the core city. The selective residential deconcentration of the population resulted in radical changes in the socio-demographic characteristics of the hinterland. It can be concluded that the social status of the suburbs has generally increased. This is confirmed by statistics about education, for example the proportion of people with university degrees (within the age group 15+) increased from 3.2 to 12.7 percent in the zone of agglomeration between 1990 and 2001. Generally speaking, since 1990 the functional interplay between the city and surrounding area has become greater through commuters and economic cooperation. Some of the rapidly growing economic growth poles around Budapest (e. g. Budaörs, Gödöllő) attract many employees from the core city due to the large number or workplaces they offer. In terms of their physical appearance and function, some of these areas (e. g. Budaörs) very much resemble North American edge-cities.37 7.4.3 Policies Affecting Residential Suburbanisation Changes in the early 1990s (the decentralisation of public administration, privatisation of public housing and agricultural land, and lifting of all types of control over the income of people) created very favourable conditions on both the demand and supply sides of the suburbanisation process. The decentralisation of decision making and a lack of overall planning control in the metropolitan zone created incentives for the suburban settlements to introduce policies for attracting middle and higher-income households. In addition, the 1990s was a period of intensive infrastructure development, as a consequence of which many settlements around Budapest established an almost full spectrum of communal services within a short time. Connected to this, many of the settlements re-zoned and converted agricultural land to residential, a decision which became a local right after 1990. Because there were no large scale regeneration programmes in Budapest’s inner city in the 1990s and the renewal of large housing estates was also not on the agenda, and private housing areas within the city were quite expensive, the best housing opportunities for young and affluent families were offered by the suburban settlements. The communities around Budapest had highly diverse attitudes towards suburbanisation. Some considered the influx of residents from Budapest to be 37 Dövényi, Kovács (2006).
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beneficial; others were against this process and tried to preserve the cohesion of local society.38 At the end of the 1990s the strategy of some of the suburban settlements changed, as a consequence of changes in tax regulations and an increase in the demand for services. While the share of personal income tax revenues on the local level decreased, opportunities to acquire business turnover tax from new entrepreneurs increased. Due to these changes the interest of some local governments shifted from attracting residential suburbanisation towards attracting non-residential (i. e. business) development. Another reason for decreasing interest in residential projects was the growing demand from families moving into the area for public services, which could not be provided easily. Another aspect of the relative decrease in suburbanisation was that at the beginning of the 2000s bank lending became available for new housing, which created a new market-driven supply. Developers began to build garden city developments, with a dominance of urban, as opposed to suburban, locations.39 In a political sense the long uncontrolled phase of suburbanisation around Budapest ended in 2005 when the Hungarian Parliament passed the Act on Spatial Planning in the Agglomeration of Budapest. With this spatial regulatory plan communities around Budapest lost exclusive planning rights with regard to their own territory, especially concerning the possibility to make decisions about the rezoning of land. This law marked a clear end to the boom in the development of the suburban belt around Budapest. The long-term effects of the law are not yet known, but it is fair to assume that residential suburbanisation will slow down further in the coming years, and in the light of ongoing inner-city regeneration programmes perhaps even a new phase of re-urbanisation will occur.
7.5 Similarities and Differences of Residential Suburbanisation in Moscow, Sofia, and Budapest: A Discussion and Conclusions The case studies of Moscow, Sofia, and Budapest have shown that suburban residential development speeded up considerably after 1990. While in socialist times suburban growth was restricted and occured mainly due to the inward migration of people from the countryside, the number of people moving from the city centre to the suburbs increased drastically after 1990. The only exception in this respect is Budapest, where the first signs of population de-concentration started to evolve as early as the 1970s. In all three cases it could be observed that in the wake of the re-establishment of a private property market, deregulated housing policies, and increased mobility, suburban areas became very attractive destinations for people when making 38 Kok, Kovács (1999). 39 Tosics (2006).
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residential decisions. In addition, the shortage of adequate housing in inner-city areas, the downgrading of socialist housing stock, and an increasing displacement of residential functions by high-class business and retail functions also enhanced the general trend of residential mobility towards suburban housing. But despite these general similarities the dynamics, motives, and factors of suburban residential growth have been rather different in each of the three cases. The reasons behind this are related to the different historical pathways the cities followed and differences in the broader economic and political conditions of post-socialist transition. It should be noted, however, that in general it is possible to distinguish between two different stages of suburban residential development. The first stage concerns development that occurred during the early period of transformation in the 1990s, which was then superseded by a second stage that has evolved since 2000. At the beginning of the 1990s the real estate market in the Moscow and Sofia suburban areas initially emerged as a “dacha market” serving seasonal usage. This dominant feature of socialist suburbia experienced a kind of physical upgrading, e. g. because of the conversion of many houses from seasonal use buildings into permanent residences. Many owners utilised the improved conditions concerning the supply of building materials and started to enlarge and modernise their houses or to even build new ones. Due to the elimination of restrictions on suburban housing construction, the extreme liberalisation of planning control, unregistered land acquisition through socalled gentlemen’s agreements, and the lack of other kinds of land use regulations, new patterns of suburban housing emerged. Luxurious villas next to simple singlefamily houses and moderately equipped former dachas were a typical image of the 1990s. But due to the fact that this process was exclusively led by individual households or small private investors, the level of public infrastructure remained relatively low. In many suburbs of Moscow and Sofia paved roads, sewage systems, and public waste disposal did not exist in the 1990s. Moreover there were hardly any private companies that would have been able to provide these facilities. It is therefore not entirely accurate to conclude that the former “dacha” or “summer cottage zones” experienced an overall upgrading in terms of living conditions in the 1990s. The situation was somewhat different in Budapest. The existence of a private property sector since the 1980s, persistent economic growth, and new land use regulations created favourable conditions for suburban residential development. Besides having different dynamics in Budapest on the one hand and Moscow and Sofia on the other hand, the role of public institutions and the economic performance of the national economy also exhibited distinct differences, which in turn affected residential suburban development. While Russia and Bulgaria experienced a deep economic crisis in the 1990s, which had a profound impact on the socio-economic situation of thousands of households, Hungary and especially Budapest experienced slight but steady economic growth throughout the 1990s. This economic growth strengthened a new kind of “middle class” consisting of young and well-educated
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households with middle or higher incomes, who in turn have been the driving force behind residential suburbanisation. As a consequence, in Budapest a pattern of suburbanisation emerged similar to that of western societies in the 1970s. In both Moscow and Sofia the so-called middle class was financially unable to create such a process. In fact suburban growth in both cities was mainly driven by a small segment of young and affluent households. Despite these differences a specific feature of “post-socialist suburbanisation” in all three cities is the social mixture or coexistence of different suburbanites. A further common characteristic was the unregulated, uncontrolled growth of suburban settlements, at least until recently. As a result of weak public institutions and legal uncertainty, unlawful appropriation has been the order of the day, especially in Moscow and Sofia. Since 2000 the situation has changed considerably. The 1990s patterns of “post-socialist suburbanisation” have been modified, because new actors have emerged and the economic and political circumstances of urban development have changed as well. In Budapest suburban residential growth slowed down after 2000. The dominant trend of the 1990s, which could be called the ‘classical stage’ of suburbanisation, has weakened in recent years. Although the city of Budapest is still loosing population and many households still have a desire to move to the outskirts, inner-city areas are becoming increasingly attractive due to large scale redevelopment programmes. Suburban municipalities are also more interested in attracting business enterprises than new residents because of higher tax revenues and fewer costs for public infrastructure. And finally, after 2000 Hungarian politicians decided to reduce the exclusive rights of suburban communes in order to reduce the dimensions of urban sprawl and its costs. In Moscow and Sofia the moderate picture of suburban development during the 1990s has changed dramatically since 2000. Especially in Moscow new construction firms and developers have started to erect completely new settlements for the emerging upper class. In contrast to Sofia, where a lot of new residential complexes have been built by international developers in recent years, in Moscow mostly Russian companies are responsible for the ongoing urban sprawl. The reason for this kind of construction boom is on the one hand the high expectation of profits for investors, and on the other hand, the improved economic situation in both Moscow and Sofia. And, at least in Moscow, a growing “middle class” and its great demand for suburban housing gives further impetus to suburban residential growth. In Sofia, the target group for suburban housing consists of young and mostly affluent households. A so-called middle class has not yet developed. In many cases new suburban settlements are equipped with a huge amount of security measures. This rapid increase in control facilities is completed by the spread of gated and guarded housing complexes that is particularly prevalent in Moscow but is also increasing in Sofia and Budapest as well. Recent studies that looked behind the walls have shown that the current trend in security measures can
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be understood in terms of status and service rather than as evidence of a society which fears crime or physical insecurity. In summary, it can therefore be said, that distinct differences occur in terms of the shape, scale, and direction of residential suburbanisation. In Budapest and Sofia newly built suburban homes are predominantly used as permanent residences, whereas in Moscow we find a much more dispersed setting, consisting of a large number of newly acquired homes that are used as second residences or for investment purposes. Furthermore, in Budapest and Sofia the main targets of suburban migration were predominantly existing rural settlements within the urban agglomeration, whereas migrants who left Moscow for the suburban areas preferred newly built settlements with strong security measures both within and outside the urban agglomeration. These newly erected suburban settlements are completely isolated from their surroundings in both a physical and social sense. Previous studies of Russian cities confirmed the existence of this pattern, which might be perceived as a specific post-Soviet way of residential suburbanisation.
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References Berényi, Ivan (1986), Conflicts in Land-use in Suburbia: The Example of Budapest, in: Erdkundliches Wissen, 76, p 126-133, Stuttgart (Steiner Verlag) Bfai – Bundesagentur für Außenwirtschaft (2006), Immobilienmarkt Bulgarien 2006 Bfai – Bundesagentur für Außenwirtschaft (2007), Eigenheimboom im Moskauer Umland führt zu Milliardeninvestitionen, accessed at 14 April 2009: http://www. bfai.de/DE/Navigation/home/home.html Borén, Thomas; Gentile, Michael (2007), Metropolitan Processes in Post-communist States: An Introduction, in: Geografiska Annaler, Series B, Human Geography 89, 2, p 95-110 Brade, Isolde; Rudolph Robert (2006), Globalisation or Marginalisation? The outskirts of Moscow in Transition, in: European Spatial Research and Policy, 13, 2, p 43-61 Brade, Isolde; Nefedova, Tania (1998), Entwicklungstendenzen und Perspektiven der Stadt-Umland-Prozesse in Russland, in: Europa Regional, 4, p 23-34 Dainov, Evgenii; Nanchev, Ivan; Pancheva, Maria; Garnizov, Vasil (2007), The “Sofia Model”, Creation out of Chaos, Pathways to creative and knowledgebased regions, ACRE report 2.10 Dövényi, Zoltán; Kovács, Zoltán (2006), Budapest: Post-socialist Metropolitan Periphery between ‘Catching Up’ and Individual Development Path, in: European Spatial Research and Policy, 13 (2), p 23-41 Enyedi, György (1998), Transformation in Central European Postsocialist Cities, in: Enyedi, György (ed.), Social Change and Urban Restructuring in Central Europe, p 9-34, Budapest (Akadémiai Kiadó) Enyedi, György; Szirmai, Viktoría (1992), Budapest – a Central European Capital, London (Belhaven Press) Földi, Zsusza (2006), Neighbourhood Dynamics in Inner-Budapest – A Realist Approach, in: Netherlands Geographical Sudies, (350), Utrecht Hirt, Sonia; Kovachev, Atanas (2006), The Changing Spatial Structure of Postsocialist Sofia, in: Tsenkova, Sasha (ed.), The Urban Mosaic of Post-Socialist Europe, p 113-130 Hirt, Sonia; Stanilov, Kiril (2007), The Perils of Post-socialist Transformation: Residential Development in Sofia, in: Stanilov, Kiril (ed.), The Post-Socialist City, p 215-244 Imoti (2007), Housing Prices in Sofia 2005-2007, in: Imoti 12/ 2007, p 150-160 Kährik, Anneli; Tammaru, Tiit (2008), Population Composition in New Suburban Settlements of the Tallinn Metropolitan Area, in: Urban Studies 45, 5-6, p 10551078 Kok, Herman; Kovács, Zoltán (1999), The Process of Suburbanization in the Agglomeration of Budapest, in: Netherlands Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 14, 2, p 119-141
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Kovács, Zoltán (1994), A City at the Crossroads: Social and Economic Transformation in Budapest, Urban Studies, 31.7, p 1081-1096 Leetmaa, Kadri; Tammaru, Tiit (2007), Suburbanization in Countries in Transition: Destination of Suburbanizers in the Tallinn Metropolitan Area, in: Geografiska Annaler, Series B: Human Geography, 89, 2, p 127-146 Makhrova, Alla G. (2007), Changing Housing Markets in Russian Cities, in: Geographische Rundschau international, 3, 1, p 28-35 Makhrova, Alla G. (2006), Territorial Differentiation of Country-House Market in the Moscow Oblast (russ), in: Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta, Ser. 5. Geografia, No. 2, p 29-34, Moscow Novák, Jakub; Sykora, Ludek (2007), A city in Motion: Time-space Activity and Mobility Patterns of Suburban Inhabitants and the Structuration of the Spatial Organization of the Prague Metropolitan Area, in: Geografiska Annaler, Series B: Human Geography, 89, 2, p 147-168 Ouredniček, Martin (2007), Differential Suburban Development in the Prague Urban Region, in: Geografiska Annaler, Series B: Human Geography, 89, 2, p 111-126 Pino, Albena (2007), Floating Borders: Where Does the City End and the Mountain Begin, in: Property Wise, 5/ 2007, p 12-20 REAS (2008), Residential Markets in Central European Capitals, accessed at 1 August 2008: http://www.reas.pl/index.php?pid=202&fileid=501 Sofia Municipality (2003), Sofia City Strategy Staddon, Caedmon; Mollov, Bellin (2000), City Profile: Sofia, Bulgaria, in: Cities, 17, p 379-387 Szelényi, Ivan (1996), Cities under Socialism – and After, in: Andrusz, Gregory; Harloe, Michael; Szelényi, Ivan (eds.), Cities after Socialism: Urban and Regional Change and Conflict in Post-socialist Societies, p 286-317, Oxford (Blackwell) Tammaru, Tiit (2005), Suburbanisation, Employment Change, and Commuting in the Tallinn Metropolitan Area, in: Environment and Planning, 37, 9, p 16691687 Timár, Judit; Váradi, Monika Mária (2001), The Uneven Development of Suburbanization during Transition in Hungary, in: European Urban and Regional Studies, 8, 4, p 349-360 Tosics, Ivan (2006), Spatial Restructuring in Post-socialist Budapest, in: Tsenkova, Sasha; Nedovic-Budic, Zorica (eds.), The Urban Mosaic of Post-Socialist Europe, Space, Institutions and Policy, p 131-150, Heidelberg (Physica-Verlag) Tsenkova, Sasha (2007), Reinventing Strategic Planning in Post-socialist Cities: Experiences from Sofia, in: European Planning Studies, 15, 3, p 295-317 Tsvetkova, Irina (2007), Dimensionen der sozialräumlichen Differenzierung im postsozialistischen Sofia, (unpublished draft) Valkanov, Yani (2005), Suburbanisation in Sofia: Changing Spatial Structure of a Post-communist City, in: Eckardt, Frank (ed.), Paths of Urban Transformation, p 175-194
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Weclawowicz, Grzegorz (1998), Social Polarisation in Post-socialist Cities: Budapest, Prague and Warsaw, in: Enyedi, György (ed), Social Change and Urban Restructuring in Central Europe, p 55-66, Budapest (Akadémiai Kiadó)
7.2 UrbanThe Structural European Type Regional Approach Demographic and Urban Metabolism Mosaic 105
8
The European Regional Demographic Mosaic – A Challenge for Spatial Development
Bernhard Müller, Paulina Schiappacasse
8.1 Demographic Change – Repercussions for Urban and Regional Development Scientific concerns about the causes of demographic change – fertility, mortality, and migration – have a long history in Europe.1 Recently, the number of studies and publications on demographic change and its repercussions has been increasing. Academies, foundations, and associations have been giving more and more attention to the issue. They have organised conferences, prepared position papers, and drawn up recommendations for stakeholders; for example in Germany the Bertelsmann and the Schader Foundations. Much of the discussion centres on the consequences of ageing and in some countries – such as Germany, one of the forerunners of the discussion – on the consequences of depopulation (often referred to as shrinkage). The debate is increasingly spreading to wider segments of society, including the media, the business community, and policy makers among others. Some state governments have established expert groups, commissioned reports, created administrative units, or staged broad-ranging congresses and dissemination strategies in order to reach as many interest groups as possible and to mobilise the public about the subject. Meanwhile demographic change has also become a highly ranked priority issue in European policy making, as it has fundamental repercussions for social security systems, economies and labour markets, as well as for public finance.2 Demographic change is of far-reaching importance for politics, the economy, and society as a whole because demographic stagnation or decline, as well as ageing, strongly affect almost all political arenas. Whereas the overall impacts of demographic change are more and more widely discussed, challenges for spatial development in European regions, cities, and towns are still rather dimly taken note of. It is not only the European Union and its member states as a whole but regional and local communities in particular that are affected by depopulation and ageing. In many respects, they bear responsibility for providing public services, manage change, and are the locus of civil society engagement. Owing to demographic change, demand is falling in many areas, while in some it is changing structurally and in others it is expanding. At the same time, 1 Spengler (1938); Notestein et al. (1944); Doublet (1948); Livi-Bacci (1974); Calot, Hecht (1978); Teitelbaum, Winter (1985); Fialova et al. (1990); Coleman (1995); Niessen, Schibel (2002); RAND-Europe (2004). 2 EU (2005). H. Kilper (ed.), New Disparities in Spatial Development in Europe, German Annual of Spatial Research and Policy, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-03402-2_8, © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009
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the scope of regional and local politics and administration is changing as the impact of depopulation and ageing on municipal financial resources, which are often scarce to begin with, further limits local government room to manoeuvre.3 Where population figures are falling there are tendencies towards a drop in housing demand. Where population is ageing there will be considerable shifts in housing needs and in the demand for new neighbourhood facilities. This all affects social and technical infrastructure ancillary to housing. In the medium and long term, for example, on the one hand, a drop in demand for day nurseries, kindergartens, and schools is anticipated, and to some extent this is already taking place in many regions. On the other hand, facilities for the elderly and especially for the “late elderly” will be in much greater demand. Shortages in medical health care supply and the mushrooming of senior citizens’ homes in some areas are visible signs of the challenges ahead. In the field of public utility services, the problems to be expected are also serious. Population decline is perpetuating dropping capacity utilisation due to changing consumer behaviour (e. g. in water consumption) and to more efficient technology (e. g. in energy and district heating supply). Since durable utility systems are difficult to adapt to demographic developments, higher per capita spending is incurred, which is more and more difficult to pass on to a dwindling number of users. Although in public discussion depopulation and ageing are more likely associated with problems, one should not overlook the fact that they may also unveil chances and new opportunities. This may be the case if we think of the potentials of redeveloping and modernising cities and city structures. And it is true if we look at the capacities and capabilities of the elderly, who, unlike their parents and grandparents, are able to enjoy (in overall terms) much longer lives in good health and with high productivity. In order to make use of these opportunities, however, substantial rethinking is needed. First, it requires public acceptance of demographic evidence. This is especially true for political decision makers who either avoid the topic altogether, diminish its consequences, or simply try to turn adverse processes around, towards trends they are used to. And second, on the local level, this requires a reorientation of growth and youth-centred urban and regional development thinking towards the improvement of existing realities (especially the quality of life) and an acknowledgement of the strengths of ageing-sensitive urban and regional development strategies.4
8.2 Research Issues and Methodological Considerations There are relatively few contributions concerning the identification and analysis of demographic patterns at the regional level in Europe. One explanation for this 3 Müller (2004). 4 Müller (2003); Beetz et al. (2009).
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can be related to the lack of acceptable data in adequate scales, which is a severe restriction to measuring the shape, intensity, and speed of changes and thus to the creation of elaborate respective scenarios. Three studies shall be mentioned here. The 2005 ESPON report describes and analyses the variety of demographic situations in different parts of Europe with an overall focus on the EU 27, i. e. the 27 member states of the European Union. In the same year, Bucher and Mai published a report related to depopulation and its consequences in 1500 regions in 33 European countries; but their conclusions nevertheless remained at a national level. Finally, the Forum for Sustainable Development of German Business in cooperation with the Rostock Centre for the Study of Demographic Change developed a demographic risk map “conceived to help companies to integrate demographic change into their strategic planning”.5 It is stated there that the so-called “regional demographic location risk” is the “outcome of expert assessment regarding the regional interplay between demographic processes and location factors”. The related indicator is obtained from the arithmetic mean of the scores for individual location factors like labour supply, human capital, productivity, and R&D. The paper presented here points in a different direction. Its objectives are (1) to get an insight into the current demographic situation in the regions of EU 27, (2) to develop a comprehensive regional Demographic Vulnerability Index (DVI), and (3) to shed some light on activities and needs for further cooperation and an exchange of experience among regions in Europe. The study is based on recent figures from Eurostat, i. e. the Statistical Office of the European Communities, and national statistical offices of European countries, as well as literature from international sources.6 The region as the object of scrutiny was defined according to the Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units on level II (NUTS7 II) developed by Eurostat. In 19 of the EU 27 countries the NUTS II regions do not represent politico-administrative but merely statistical divisions. Data from 260 NUTS II regions8 was analysed. The use of NUTS II regions is not without problems. Three of them shall be mentioned here. First, in terms of population and area, the regional division has a remarkable range of sizes. This is not trivial when the different indicators or variables concerning depopulation and ageing are analysed. As an illustration, in nearly 73 percent of the regions, the respective population is above one million inhabitants, and only one percent of the regions contain less than 100,000 inhabitants. For example, the Åland region in Finland has the lowest population (26,766 inhabitants) while Ile de 5 Available online: http://www.demographic-risk-map.eu/index.aspx. 6 Schiappacasse, Müller (2009). 7 The acronym is derived from the French name for the scheme, nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques. There are three levels of NUTS (I-III) and two levels of local administrative units (LAUs), formerly called NUTS IV and V. 8 Six regions were excluded: the French overseas departments of Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyana, and Reunion and the Spanish autonomous communities of Ceuta and Melilla.
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France has the highest (11,264,492 inhabitants). As for the area, there is an even more considerable difference between the smallest region, Brussels (161 sq km), and the largest one, Övre Norrland (165,296 sq km) in Sweden. Second, the definition of NUTS II regions has weaknesses concerning functionally interrelated territorial entities, e. g. within metropolitan areas. For example, some metropolitan areas like Inner London, Brussels, and Hamburg have a rather narrow, primarily urban administrative delineation, whereas in the case of Ile de France, the (“functional”) region contains, apart from Paris, also the interconnected surrounding area. Third, another major constraint for data analysis at the European regional level is the time dimension. Available data shows remarkable differences concerning the year of data collection, the period it covers,9 and the length of time series of data. Some European countries have censuses, however, in different years, while others only depend on local registers or representative surveys within different time periods. Due to these difficulties, data from different years concerning the individual countries had to be compared. The analysed time period covers the decade from around 1996 to approximately 2006. The individual differences in time periods are indicated in the figures wherever necessary.
8.3 The Rise of Ageing Regions Dealing with ageing has become one of the great overall challenges in Europe. It is an obvious trend with a very high incidence in almost all European regions. In the 2005 EU Green Paper on Demographic Change it was estimated that the number of elderly people10 in EU 27 would increase by more than 44 percent between 2005 and 2050 and that the number of late elderly people would even increase by more than 180 percent during the same period.11 Recent statistics show that in the EU 27
9 For example, some indicators like the total fertility rate (TFR), i. e. the average number of children born to women who are in their reproductive years (cross-sectional aggregation) (cf. OECD Family Database), suffer from such difficulties. The TFR is measured by cumulating age-specific fertility rates in a given cohort between the age of 15 and 49 in some European countries while in others the cohort ranges from 15 to 45 years. 10 Conventionally, an “elderly” group is comprised of persons aged 65 years and over. Following Orimo et al. (2006) the evidence of this definition “[…] originally dates back to more than a century ago in Germany, when Prince Bismarck, selected 65 as the age at which citizens will be able to participate in the national pension plan” (p 149). During the 1930s Roosevelt also chose 65 as an age when social security benefits were to be provided. For the purpose of this article, elderly people are defined as aged between 65 and 79, whereas late elderly represent persons aged 80 and over. 11 EU (2005).
The European Regional 8.3 TheDemographic Rise of Ageing Mosaic Regions 109
almost 20 million people were older than 80 in 2006,12 or about 4.0 percent of the total population. In the ten year period between 199613 and 2006, the total number of the late elderly increased by approximately 3.5 million; the annual growth rate was as high as 1.81 percent. The distribution of the growth rates of late elderly people in EU 27 and other European countries (Fig. 1) shows certain “hot spots”: (1) within regions in the south of the former EU 15, especially in the Iberian Peninsula, Italy, and Eastern Austria, (2) among the regions of the first ten countries of enlargement, particularly
Fig. 1: Annual growth rate of population aged older than 80 years in European regions (around 1996-2006). Source: Schiappacasse, Müller (2009)
12 Data for Ireland is from 2008, for France from 2005, and for Italy and the UK from 2004. Figures are not available for Bulgaria, therefore population aged over 65 was considered. 13 Data for Ireland and Italy is from 1994, for France from 1995, for the Netherlands from 1997, and for the UK from 1994 and 1997.
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in Poland and Slovenia, and (3) in Nordic countries, mainly Finland. “Pockets” of regions with a very impressive increase in the number of late elderly people also can be found in Northern France, Ireland, the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany Austria, Slovenia, Hungary, Greece, and Malta. Even though the regions with the highest share (over 6.0 percent) of their populations over 80 are located in Italy (Liguria, Toscana, Emilia Romagna, and Umbria), France (Limousin), Spain (Castilla y León, Principado de Asturias), Sweden, and the UK, the Netherlands’ region of Flevoland leads the European ageing process if one refers to growth rates of late elderly people, followed by Zachodnipomorskie and Dolnoslaskie in Poland, and Murcia in Spain. The case of Flevoland is especially interesting. Flevoland is basically a rather “young” region. The area, often called a “man-made miracle”, was built on land
Fig. 2: Total fertility rate in European regions (around 2000-2005). Source: Schiappacasse, Müller (2009)
The European Regional 8.3 TheDemographic Rise of Ageing Mosaic Regions 111
Fig. 3: Life expectancy at birth in European regions (around 2006). Source: Schiappacasse, Müller (2009)
reclaimed from the sea between 192714 and 1968. It did not become a separate province until 1986. Nowadays it is a spacious region, with two major new towns and several villages, and is within easy reach of Amsterdam. As Coleman and Garssen argue, Flevoland “is particularly attractive to those who wish to start a family and who are looking for an affordable home and garden in a neighbourhood that is safe for the children.”15 Nevertheless, the annual growth rate of the late elderly in Flevoland was 7.0 percent over the past decade. This may be taken as an indication of the fact that the aspirations of young families and elderly people concerning their preferred living conditions may show similarities – a fact which should be seriously considered when making decisions about local “age-specific” policies. 14 After a flood in 1916, it was decided that the Zuiderzee, an inland sea within the Netherlands would be enclosed and reclaimed. 15 Coleman, Garssen (2002), p 440.
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It is argued that there are two main reasons behind ageing in Europe:16 first the decline in fertility (Fig. 2), and second, the increase in the life expectancy of the population (Fig. 3). As regards fertility, at present in almost all of the EU regions (Fig. 2, 417) the total fertility rate (TFR18) is less than the level of reproduction. Among the 260 regions of EU 27, there are only three regions in EU 27 which are near this level: Northern Finland (Pohjois-Suomi) and the two regions shaping Ireland (the Border, Midland, Western, Southern, and Eastern regions). The Bucharest region in Romania is at the bottom of the list.
Fig. 4: Top-ten regions with the highest and lowest fertility rates in EU 27 (around 2000-2005). Source: Elaborated by the authors
Demographers and economists seeking to understand a fertility decline in refer to the concept of the second demographic transition: Europe experienced shifts in values and attitudes related to families, reproduction, and children at the same time that life expectancy increased, childhood mortality was reduced, and female literacy improved. Hill and Reeve mention three aspects from an evolutionary point 16 ESPON (2005). 17 Data for Finnish and Spanish regions is from 2006; data for Slovakian and British regions is from 2005; data for Italian and Polish regions is from 2004; data for French regions is from 2003; data from Irish regions is from 2002; data for Romanian and Greek regions is from 1999. 18 The TFR is an indicator of central importance concerning the future development of regions in terms of reproduction and their dependency on migratory movements to stabilise their population figures.
The European Regional Mosaic 8.3 TheDemographic Rise of Ageing Regions 113
of view19: (1) the spreading of “fertility restriction” as a result of imitation, (2) the availability of cheap and efficient birth control methods, and (3) adaptation as a response to changes in the social environment. The same shifts in values and attitudes seem to play an important role in those regions with extremely low fertility rates. Without wanting to discuss the concept of the second demographic transition, we have to acknowledge that there is a wide variety of reasons behind the low fertility rates in Europe. As regards Finland, it is argued that although economic uncertainties seem to have pushed the average age of women who have their first child up to 28, the birth rate stays high because it is fairly frequent for women to have a second and a third child.20 In the case of French regions, it is supposed that the fairly high average of over 1.9 is probably due to the government’s long-term policy of rewarding those who have children, for example, through the offering of financial incentives and favourable work regulations. In the case of Romania, Muresam confirmed that the country is experiencing an early stage of the second demographic transition.21 However, by European standards Romania still remains a society highly valuing marriage and childbearing, despite the evidence of family behaviour changes which have accompanied the political and socio-economic transformations after the fall of the communist regime. To what extent these processes can be linked to what the World Bank, in referring to former socialist countries, calls the “third” transition, i. e. “from red to grey,” a reflection of the overlap between demographic, political, social, and economic change, cannot be further discussed here.22 However, as Bradatan and Firebaugh argue23: What happened in the 1990s was a continuation of what began in the early 1980s, therefore transition explanations by themselves are incomplete in explaining the figures because they do not give appropriate weight to the effect of population policies. Based on this evidence, it is not surprising that there is only a low correlation between the growth rate of late elderly people and the fertility rate in Europe (Fig. 5). Factors behind this may be the above-described time gap and varying intensities in fertility rates, i. e. the differences between the beginning of a decline in the individual countries and the differing intensities among the regions. However, some further research seems to be needed in order to shed more light on this matter. As regards the second factor behind ageing in Europe, i. e. rising life expectancy, it is argued that the decline in mortality, the so-called “Mortality Revolution”24, is the most important explanation for ageing. Increased life expectancy can be attributed
19 20 21 22 23 24
Hill, Reeve (2005). Ministry of Education (2002). Muresam (2007). World Bank (2007). Bradatan, Firebaugh (2007). Easterlin (1995).
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Fig. 5: Correlation between fertility rate (around 2000-2005) and growth rate of population aged over 80 in EU 27. Source: Elaborated by the authors
largely to a rising standard of living combined with advances in medicine.25 The correlation between life expectancy and the standard of living, as well as between ageing and the standard of living (measured in PPS), however, is low. Thus, here there also seems to be room for further research. According to the latest statistics, a life expectancy gap between “Eastern” and “Western European”26 regions can be observed. Of the 260 regions, 55 have a life expectancy of over 80 years and all of them are located in Western Europe, predominantly in countries like Italy, Spain, and Sweden (Fig. 3). During the communist period life expectancy in Central and Eastern Europe fell behind that in the West. The situation was unprecedented, and it deteriorated even further after 1989. Hertzman, Kelly, and Bobak examined the contributions of environmental pollution, adverse lifestyle choices, inadequate health care services, and the stresses of the social and economic environment both before and after the fall of the iron curtain.27 The role of the social and economic environment was highlighted, and the subsidiary role of other health determinants was affirmed. As Zatonski argues, one of the biggest challenges facing Europe is the “East-West Health Gap”.28 The decline in fertility and increase in life expectancy are not the only issues involved in understanding the ageing process. Out-migration and the departure of younger people also contribute to an acceleration of ageing development. Concerning migration, however, there are hardly any figures available which would make it possible to compare trends at a regional level throughout Europe. 25 Oeppen, Vaupel (2002). 26 In the context of the EU, “East” refers to the former socialist countries and accession states whereas “West” represents mainly the former EU 15. 27 Hertzmann, Kelly, Bobak (1996). 28 Zatonski (2007).
The European RegionalPatterns Demographic Mosaic 115 8.4 European of Depopulation
8.4 European Patterns of Depopulation On an overall level the EU 27 has experienced a slight population growth of 0.8 percent per year during the recent decade, even though European countries are facing unprecedented depopulation.29 Fig. 6 shows the population dynamics represented by the annual growth rate for 260 EU 27 NUTS II regions, as well as for regions in some non-EU countries. During the past decade population decline affected 94 EU regions (35.3 percent) out of the 260, while population growth at an annual growth rate of over 1.0 pecent was limited to only 15 regions (5.8 percent).
Fig. 6: Annual total population growth rate in European regions (around 1996-2006). Source: Schiappacasse, Müller (2009)
29 Depopulation is defined as the condition of having reduced the number of inhabitants in a particular region during a certain time period. However, according to Kaufmann (2005) depopulation is more complex than just a one-dimensional decline in numbers.
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As regards spatial patterns of depopulation in Europe, three types of regions can be discerned (also Fig. 6): City-regions: In many cases, the cores of metropolitan areas and large cities are loosing population; quite often to surrounding areas. For instance, regions where capital cities are located like Berlin, Prague, Budapest, Bratislava, Sofia, and Bucharest and urban centres in the UK (Greater Manchester, Birmingham, and Liverpool) and Germany (Bremen and Düsseldorf) have been facing strong suburbanisation. Following Fainstein, one may suggest that this is proof of what happens when areas fail to find sufficient local advantages within a context of global competition.30 However, one may also argue that this can be viewed as an expression and impact of socio-economic prosperity under a society’s changing priorities in a politico-administrative system where a city – unlike in the US – may not easily increase its administrative boundaries by local annexation measures. Former industrial regions: In general, such regions have suffered from a depopulation process since the mid-1980s or earlier, much in the same way that structural decline has affected coal mining, steel production, and other heavy industries. A number of these areas are to be found in the EU 15 (Principado de Asturias, Liguria, Limburg, Saarland, Arnsberg, West and South Yorkshire, Lancashire and Derbyshire, and Nottinghamshire). East Germany, i. e. the NUTS II regions of Thuringia, Dresden, Leipzig, Chemnitz and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, has been extremely affected by this economic transformation after the removal of the iron curtain and German unification. However, the largest number of such regions are located in the accession countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria). In these regions economic reconversion exists alongside a rather low life expectancy and low fertility rates.31 Sparsely populated regions: These regions are spread all over Europe, from the northern parts of the Union, e. g. Sweden and Finland, to the Greek islands. They can also be found in Northern Spain, in Portugal, and Southern Italy as well as in France (Limousin and Champagne Ardenne), Austria, Germany, Scotland, and England. Sparsely populated areas show a wide range of characteristics: Some of them belong to the more prosperous regions in Europe; others range among the poorest areas. Some of them, especially the areas at the national “peripheries” share common problems.32 First, they are geographically isolated. Second, they face demographic problems such as young people moving away, often causing sexual imbalances in the areas left behind. And third, their economic development is slow and living standards tend to be low as well. Average incomes are usually lower than in other parts of the same country and in some cases there is a high incidence of severe rural poverty. Especially Eastern Europe is experiencing a sharp demographic transition as fertility declines dramatically and emigration increases (Fig. 6, 7). The situation in 30 Fainstein (2001). 31 Meslé, Vallin (2002). 32 Crauser (2001).
8.4 European of Depopulation The European RegionalPatterns Demographic Mosaic 117
Fig. 7: Top-ten regions of depopulation and population growth in EU 27 (around 1996-2006). Source: Elaborated by the authors
the Baltic States, Bulgaria, and Hungary is particularly critical, where the countries have a homogeneous pattern of depopulation. The spatial continuity of depopulation in the East contrasts with the rest of Europe, where only some regions, e. g. in Sweden, Finland, United Kingdom, Italy, and Greece, show depopulation trends, whereas we also find countries which do not have any depopulation at all, such as Ireland, Luxembourg, Cyprus, The Netherlands, and Belgium. Moreover, there are countries characterised by bipolar demographic dynamics, with both strongly depopulating regions and regions with population increases, such as Portugal, Spain, France, and Germany. According to Vassilev,33 the main reasons behind depopulation in Eastern European countries such as Bulgaria, are the relatively high mortality rate, which is far above the birth rate, and the negative migration balance, which is mainly due to poor transport and social infrastructures.34 Moreover, poor economic performance and the centre-periphery contrast seem to play a role too. For example, five of the six Bulgarian regions are among the lowest ranked economies in the EU 27. According to Botezatu, in Eastern European countries like the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria there is “a powerful tendency towards central and peripheral polarization, and a clear differentiation between the Western and Eastern regions.”35 33 Vassilev (2006). 34 European Commission, Portrait of the Europan Union. Available online: http://forum. europa.eu.int/irc/dsis/regportraits/info/data. 35 Botezatu (2007), p 3.
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As Bucher and Mai argue, the decline of fertility to a point less than the reproduction level of the population36 is a general factor behind depopulation.37 However, not all European regions suffer from depopulation and low TFR at the same time (Fig. 8). In fact, the correlation between fertility and population growth is rather low. One reason for this may be the fact that rising fertility rates only have a delayed impact on growth rates and that regions with increasing populations can fill the generation gap through international and/ or internal migration.
Fig. 8: Correlation between population growth rate (around 1996-2006) and fertility rate (around 2000-2005). Source: Elaborated by the authors
Scholars point out that there is little doubt that in many countries deteriorating regional demographic situations are economically and socially determined (e. g. Vassilev in his study about Bulgaria).38 As in other Eastern European countries, it seems that there is an apparent link between the population decline and negative socio-economic trends. According to Longman, “never in history have we had economic prosperity accompanied by depopulation.”39 Our analysis, however, shows that population decline in EU 27 on an overall level seems to be linked more to an individual or societal “choice” than driven by changes in prosperity. For example, the correlation between the Purchasing Power
36 Sub-replacement fertility is a total fertility rate that is not high enough to replace an area’s population. In developed countries replacement fertility is approximately 2.1, however this number is not a constant and depens on the dynamic of specific population over time. 37 Bucher, Mai (2005). 38 Vassilev (2005). 39 Longmann (2004).
8.5 Developing a Regional The European Demographic Regional Vulnerability Demographic Index Mosaic (DVI) 119
Standard (PPS)40 and the annual population growth rate is rather low (Fig. 9). There are many examples of regions in Europe where economic prosperity is accompanied by depopulation.
Fig. 9: Correlation between annual population growth rate (around 1996-2006) and purchasing power standard (Pps) in EU 27. Source: Elaborated by the authors
8.5 Developing a Regional Demographic Vulnerability Index (DVI) As outlined above, demographic change poses a number of challenges to urban and regional development and requires local and regional stakeholders to act more flexibly. For example, with diminishing workforces it may be difficult to attract employers to move to an area. A shrinking consumer demand drains capacity and vitality from the commercial sector. And the per-capita costs of services – e. g. the maintenance of physical and social infrastructures – rise with diminishing numbers of population, and relatively few people must share the fixed costs associated with maintenance and investments.41 In this line of analysis regions affected by depopulation and ageing may face a self-reinforcing cycle of decline, which can be described by decreased economic vitality, higher per capita costs that provide incentives for emigration, and the downward spiral of the quality of life and the supporting infrastructure. There are indications that regions and municipalities whose populations fall below a critical mass are destined to experience “irreversible decline” because they no longer have sufficient resources to maintain economic viability.42 40 The PPS (purchasing power standard) is an artificial currency that takes into account differences in national price levels. This unit allows for meaningful volume comparisons of economic indicators in different countries. 41 Müller (2004); Walser, Anderlik (2004). 42 Walser, Anderlik (2004).
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The European Regional Demographic Mosaic
Based on these considerations, we propose a regional Demographic Vulnerability Index (DVI) here in order to provide some comprehensive evidence-based information for regional and local stakeholders affected by demographic change. It expresses the extent to which a region is exposed to demographic change (in comparison with other regions in Europe) and is thus in danger of falling into a spiral of decline if no action is taken by the respective stakeholders at the different levels of policy-making. The assessment of vulnerability is based on the following variables during a given time frame (in this case the last decade): (1) the annual growth of the total population, (2) the annual growth of the population under 14 years of age, (3) the annual growth of the population over 80 years of age, (4) life expectancy, and (5) the fertility rate (Fig. 10). The individual (cardinal) values of the variables of each region are transformed into an ordinal scale according to the categories formed before, as shown in Fig. 10. The individual values are summed up in an index. As a result, the DVI can range from 0 (lowest vulnerability) to 20 (highest vulnerability). The DVI gives each region an overall score and ranking. Thus, the 260 European regions can be divided into three groups – a low (
