George W. Bush and China: Policies, Problems, and Partnerships

WANG

International Relations • Asian Studies

Briefly touching on the China-policy legacy of Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, Wang provides a review of significant developments in U.S.-China policy during President George W. Bush’s first term in office. By following with an analysis of the varied agendas of Bush’s foreign policy advisers during his second term, readers are able to trace the influence of advisers on the president’s China policy. Wang chronicles the reordering of U.S. security priorities after September 11, showing how this prompted Washington to embrace China in a measured partnership and has resulted in the short-term stabilization of U.S.-China relations. Chi Wang is cofounder and president of the U.S.–China Policy Foundation.

For orders and information please contact the publisher LEXINGTON BOOKS A division of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200 Lanham, Maryland 20706 1-800-462-6420 www.lexingtonbooks.com

GeorgeBushChinaPODLITH.indd 1

George W. Bush and China

This study analyzes the United States policies regarding China during the administration of President George W. Bush. Chi Wang examines the relationship between the United States and China from its tense origins to its current stability and shows that the China policy of the United States is ultimately based on pragmatic national interest that eventually overcomes short-term ideological difficulties or mistakes made by inexperienced American administrations.

George W. Bush and China Policies, Problems, and Partnership

ISBN-13: 978-0-7391-2917-3 ISBN-10: 0-7391-2917-1

CHI WANG

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George W. Bush and China

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GEORGE W. BUSH AND CHINA POLICIES, PROBLEMS, AND PARTNERSHIP Chi Wang

LEXINGTON BOOKS A division of ROWMAN

& LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC.

Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK

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LEXINGTON BOOKS A division of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200 Lanham, MD 20706 Estover Road Plymouth PL6 7PY United Kingdom Copyright © 2009 by Lexington Books All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. British Library Cataloging in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Control Number: 2008932236 ISBN-13: 978-0-7391-2917-3 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-7391-2917-1 (cloth : alk. paper) eISBN-13: 978-0-7391-3164-0 eISBN-10: 0-7391-3164-8 Printed in the United States of America

⬁ ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

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CONTENTS

AC K NOW L E D G M E N T S

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I N T RO D U C T I O N

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PART I BRIEF REVIEW OF U.S.–CHINA RELATIONS SINCE TIANANMEN 1

GEORGE H. W. BUSH AND BILL CLINTON

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GEORGE W. BUSH’S EARLY YEARS

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THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S PRE–SEPTEMBER 11 CHINA POLICY

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THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S CHINA POLICY SINCE 2001 WTO Membership Grounds for Cooperation

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PART II

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Arms Sales and Military Strategy November 2002 Powell’s Trip to Asia March 2003 China’s Role in U.S.–DPRK Relations Three Gorges Dam Hong Kong High-Level Meetings Leadership Change and Continuity

15 16 17 18 20 21 22 24 25

BUSH’S FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORS Richard B. Cheney, Vice President The Department of State The Department of Defense Other Advisors Superficial Policy Change

29 31 34 39 42 44

ISSUES

ISSUE 1: TAIWAN IN U.S.–CHINA RELATIONS Pro-Taiwan Policy China Takes Strong Stand against Aegis Bush Appears to End Strategic Ambiguity Bush Encourages Taiwan Separatists PRC Firm on One-China Principle Continued Military Cooperation with Taiwan Pro-China Policy Pressure from All Sides—The Future of U.S. Policy toward Taiwan

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ISSUE 2: SECURITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA National Missile Defense The Bush Administration Consults Other Nations China Wary of U.S. Initiative Six-Party Talks ISSUE 3: MILITARY-TOMILITARY CONTACTS The Plane Collision Controversy Background China, United States Exchange Belligerent Remarks U.S. Voices Regret China Accepts U.S. Letter of Regret U.S. Bellicose After Crew Returns Agreement Reached on Plane’s Return Military Relations since 2001 Aura of Confusion Surrounds Policy Resumption of Military Exchanges Guantanamo Detainees Opportunities for Cooperation ISSUE 4: SINO–U.S. ECONOMIC RELATIONS Trade Chinese Foreign Direct Investment The Yuan

C O NC L U S I O N Relations since Spring 2006

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BIBLIOGR APHY

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INDEX

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

uring the several years when this book progressed from research into words, I benefited from the advice, guidance, and help of those around me. There have been so many individuals who have helped me, and I wish to take the opportunity to thank a few, if not all, of those who supported my work along the way. First, I owe my gratitude to my editor Joseph Parry whose dedication, advice, and constructive criticism have guided my work. Without the guidance and commitment of Mr. Parry this publication would not be before you today. I wish also to acknowledge the dedicated staff of Lexington Books, including Melissa Wilks, who tirelessly worked in support of this book. Thank you for always being available to me as we worked toward our final goal. Additionally, before my work ever saw the eyes of an editor, I was lucky to have my informed and highly qualified friend Richard Howard, former Chief of the Asian Division at the Library of Congress, as a resource. Thank you to Richard, who took time out of his busy schedule to review the earliest drafts

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of my work. His knowledge and discerning eye refined my words, and his encouragement renewed my dedication on a regular basis. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the staff of the U.S.–China Policy Foundation and three talented young scholars, David Canes, Abigail Cuthbertson, and Corinne Milliken, who have helped me with my research. I am grateful to those who helped me develop and refine my ideas. However, I alone am responsible for any omissions, errors, or misinterpretations of the facts that may be contained in the following pages.

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he emergence this decade of China on the world stage has presented U.S. policymakers with the daunting task of redefining policies designed to deal with a nation once considered closed, mysterious, and even backward. U.S. policy toward China during the years following the rise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949 was characterized by efforts to contain and isolate China because of its Communist ideology. Ironically, it was the staunchly anti-Communist president Richard Nixon who realized the strategic and economic benefits of opening up to China; since 1972, bilateral trade and investment with China has grown exponentially and become virtually indispensible to both economies. In 2004, trade between the United States and China reached $231 billion1 and U.S. investment in China grew by $4 billion.2 Although the end of the Cold War lessened China’s value as a bulwark against Russia, China remains central to U.S. interest in a peaceful, stable Asia. China’s cooperation with the United States and active participation in the international community are essential to

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U.S. efforts to combat international terrorism and halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). China’s unprecedented growth and increasing influence on issues both domestic and foreign have complicated efforts by recent U.S. presidential administrations to develop a concrete set of policy rules when dealing with China. It is therefore unsurprising that tracking the legacy of President George W. Bush’s administration as it relates to the U.S.–China relationship has been a complicated endeavor. This book seeks to examine the development of the Bush administration’s China policies as they were affected by historical context and current political determinants. Bush began his first term with no prior experience in managing foreign relations and even less knowledge of China. Many analysts attribute the administration’s provocative and incoherent approach to China during its first nine months in office to inexperience on the part of both the president and his cabinet. However, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration began to develop its foreign policy within the framework of the “global war on terror,” and Sino-American relations improved immediately. Although much of the world has become increasingly critical of the perceived American belligerent, unilateral foreign policy, the Chinese government has maintained its relationship with the United States. China’s support of the United States is not the only factor that has served to improve Sino-American relations since 2001. The views of officials within the administration have shaped China policy throughout Bush’s two terms. Many political observers have noted that the administration operates in a highly centralized manner, with the top leadership closely managing all aspects of foreign policy. Therefore, it is necessary to conxii

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sider the views of top officials on issues central to the U.S.–China relationship when analyzing the administration’s approach to China and the effects that its development and implementation may have on the future of Sino-American relations. Actions by the president and these officials, few of whom are China experts, demonstrated the view of China as a “strategic competitor.” For example, over the course of her first year as secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice moved to improve ties with Japan while distancing herself from the Chinese government. Furthermore, some have interpreted the president’s courting of India as a move to balance China’s growing global influence; this was most notably demonstrated by Bush’s efforts to forge a nuclear partnership with India’s internationally marginalized nuclear program. Eventually, new voices were heard in the administration’s internal debate on China. The influence of those who labeled China a “strategic competitor” waned in favor of individuals who sought to engage China. Among this group was Clark T. Randt Jr., the longest-serving American ambassador to the PRC. Randt, an expert on Chinese law and a fluent mandarin speaker, attended Yale University with President Bush.3 His personal relationship with the president has given him unique access to the White House, where he has been able to steer policy away from confrontation with China and toward engagement. Furthermore, Christopher Hill, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, has played a role in shaping the administration’s post–September 11 China policy. Hill, a former ambassador to South Korea, Poland, and Macedonia, and one-time special envoy to Kosovo, has played a pivotal role in the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear xiii

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program. He has been adept at handling his Chinese counterparts and in the process has gained unprecedented access to the president for a mid-level State Department official.4 Hill has taken a proactive non-confrontational stance with his dealings with North Korea, and his influence may have in part tempered the administration’s China policy. Lastly, the influence of former president George H. W. Bush on his son’s China policy, although unquantifiable, cannot be disregarded. George H. W. Bush, unlike his son, ascended to the presidency with impressive credentials in foreign policy. He served as chief American liaison to the PRC, the equivalent of ambassador, in 1974 and 1975 after serving as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.5 During his presidency, Bush continued to develop positive relations with Chinese. In the wake of the Tiananmen Square student protests and resulting government crackdown in 1989, Bush, while publicly condemning the use of force, secretly sent National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to Beijing three weeks after the crackdown. James Mann, a leading American journalist who wrote the book, About Face, a history of the U.S.–China relationship, has argued that the trip was motivated by three distinct aims. First, Bush and his administration sought to moderate the government’s treatment of protestors in the months immediately following the protest. Second, the mission hoped to reopen direct contact with the Chinese leadership. Finally, the trip served to confirm the administration’s commitment to Sino-American relations and reiterate the idea that American sanctions imposed in the wake of the protest would be temporary and short-lived.6 The president’s decision to send the Scowcroft mission to Beijing before the dust had settled in Tiananmen, a major political risk, demonstrated his commitment to the long-term improvement xiv

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of Chinese relations at the expense of immediate public demands. The issue of human rights abuses versus positive U.S.– China relations has continued into the current administration. George W. Bush has chosen to take a route similar to his father by downplaying human rights in an effort to maintain a productive, non-confrontational relationship with China. As the Bush administration comes to a close, it prepares to leave behind a legacy of engagement with China. Sino-American relations under the current administration have reached a high point since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1979. Although Bush is not pro-China, during his presidency he has come to better understand China and the benefits of a productive and cooperative SinoAmerican relationship. During his first presidential campaign in 2000, Bush criticized the PRC on its human rights record. However, since taking office, Bush has moderated criticism of China’s human rights record, and has even been criticized for not pushing the PRC to improve its record.7 Recently, Bush has remained committed to engagement with China and has confirmed his attendance at the 2008 Beijing Olympics despite protests against China’s policies in Tibet. The author does not seek to present himself or Bush as a “panda-hugger” by downplaying the role of human rights in Sino-American relations. Rather the goal is to present an objective study of the current administration’s China policy. Regardless of the author’s opinion of China’s human rights record, it is clear that the current administration has placed a priority on positive, productive Sino-American relations at the expense of its commitment to international human rights. Furthermore, two wars in the Middle East and the xv

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overarching war on terror have dominated the administration’s foreign policy. Although human rights are important to the president—the administration continues to monitor human rights—they are not an immediate priority as the administration attempts to manage an increasingly unpopular war and flagging economy. In a post–September 11 world, shifting priorities have demanded that the Bush administration prioritize immediate security and economic concerns over value-based policies. Therefore, human rights have not played a defining role in Sino-American relations since Bush’s inauguration in 2001 and do not play a pivotal role when studying the evolution of the administration’s China policy. Although Bush has not emphasized the issue of China’s human rights record during his presidency, his administration did not begin its relationship with China based on engagement. The administration’s initial policy was defined by its view of China as a “strategic competitor” and potential threat to the United States. Out of the “strategic competitor” view emerged a policy that at best can be labeled inconsistent and at worst confrontational. However, through direct interaction with China on issues of security, including North Korea, Taiwan, and military contacts, and economic relations, the administration was able to develop a tempered China policy. The study concludes that while the Bush administration’s initial words and actions led to an unnecessarily tense relationship between the nations, the reordering of security priorities after September 11 has prompted Washington to embrace China in a measured partnership and resulted in the short-term stabilization of U.S.–China relations.

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NOTES 1. “U.S. Census Bureau: Foreign Trade Statistics, 2004,” www.census .gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2004. 2. “Foreign Investment in China,” The U.S.–China Business Council, March 2005, www.uschina.org/statistics/2005foreigninvestment.html. 3. “Ambassador Clark T. Randt, Jr.,” Embassy of the United States: Beijing, China, http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/ambassador.html (3 June 2008). 4. Glen Kessler, “Mid-Level Official Steered U.S. Shift on North Korea,” Washington Post, 26 May 2008, A1. 5. James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 67–69. 6. James Mann, About Face, 205–8. 7. James Kurlantzick, “Broken Promises,” The New Republic, May 12, 2008. www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=212009fd-2984-4469-bf9ced2dfc3dbb81 (3 June 2008).

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GEORGE H. W. BUSH AND BILL CLINTON

lthough U.S.–China relations were seriously damaged in the aftermath of the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, President George H. W. Bush managed to restore some normalcy to the relationship by taking a realistic and optimistic tone with China. He imposed sanctions after the Tiananmen incident, but sent advisors Brent Scowcroft and Lawrence Eagleburger to China a month later on a secret mission to keep lines of communication open with Beijing. Whenever George H. W. Bush raised contentious issues such as religious freedom and human rights with Beijing, he did so in a friendly, nonadversarial way. The Chinese government accepted his gestures, and, along with the Chinese people, developed trust and faith in his leadership. U.S. relations with China during President Bill Clinton’s first three years in office were characterized by a noticeably hardened stance toward the mainland, especially with regard to human rights. This shift in position led Clinton to grant a visa to then-Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui to visit the United States

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and give a speech at Lee’s alma mater, Cornell University in May 1995. During his visit, Lee gave a political speech that was harshly critical of China. He maintained that Taiwan was “determined to play a peaceful and constructive role among the family of nations.”1 Mainland China was infuriated by these comments, and Beijing temporarily recalled its ambassador to Washington. U.S.–China–Taiwan tensions were further escalated in July, when China fired missiles north of Taiwan as part of its annual military exercises in the region. In March 1996, the Chinese government held additional military exercises in which missiles were fired much closer to Taiwan than in the previous year; the United States responded to these military displays by directing two aircraft carriers close to the Taiwan Strait. The role that the United States played during the showdown over Taiwan and the ensuing tensions that resulted prompted President Clinton to reconsider his administration’s foreign policy stance with regard to China. The preservation of U.S. interests in the region, especially pertaining to trade and human rights issues, necessitated efforts to prevent the further deterioration of U.S.–China relations. Therefore beginning in 1996, the Clinton administration adopted a policy of collaboration and engagement with China, working to establish stable and mutually beneficial relations. This new attitude was first publicly demonstrated later that year when Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited New York and accepted an invitation from Clinton to visit Washington, D.C.; in October 1997, President Jiang came to Washington for the first Chinese state visit of Clinton’s presidency. Reciprocating the gesture, President Clinton spent ten days traveling throughout China, including a stop in Hong Kong, in June 1998. Clinton hailed China as a strategic partner and for the first time publicly stated the

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“Three No’s” to Taiwan: that America would not support Taiwanese independence, two Chinas, or Taiwanese membership in the United Nations.2 Clinton’s visit could be seen as the zenith of U.S.–China relations since the 1989 events in Tiananmen Square. The Chinese government and people developed faith in Clinton and trusted his intentions; they felt Clinton truly desired improved economic and political ties between China and the United States. Even while Clinton wanted to reduce his nation’s trade deficit with China, he negotiated for China’s admission into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and supported Congress in issuing permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status. In 1999, Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji visited the United States and proceeded with fruitful negotiations for China to join the WTO. In 2000, near the end of his presidency, Clinton signed into law a bill that granted PNTR status to China once it had become a member of the WTO; this agreement was contingent upon a finding by the president that the terms of membership were at least equivalent to a November 1999 U.S.–China trade pact. Although controversy resulting from the Monica Lewinsky scandal diminished President Clinton’s personal involvement with China, Defense Secretary William Cohen and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright both believed in constructive relations with China and worked to further bilateral interactions. The rhetoric in Congress and the media toward China was toned down; the general prevailing notion in the United States was that increased trade would contribute to economic development in China, which would eventually lead to demands for political reform.

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NOTES 1. James Mann, About Face, 326–27. 2. “Transcript of Remarks by the President and the First Lady in the Discussion of Shaping China for the 21st Century,” Office of the White House Press Secretary, 30 June, 1998.

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GEORGE W. BUSH’S EARLY YEARS

lthough George Walker Bush was born into a family already possessed of a grand and accomplished political lineage, his pathway into politics was far from certain. Born on July 6, 1946, Bush followed his father’s elite educational path, attending Andover and Yale before earning his MBA from Harvard Business School. Between college and business school, he enlisted in the National Guard and was stationed in Texas during the Vietnam War. However, while his father rose to prominence in American politics and foreign affairs, Bush dappled unsuccessfully in both politics and the oil business. Bush was always popular and outgoing, but there were many critics that felt his wild youth, brash manner, and the shadow of his father’s career left him unprepared for a career in politics.1 Bush’s first opportunity to distinguish himself came in 1988 when he and a group of investors purchased the Texas Rangers Major League Baseball franchise. Unlike Bush’s previous oil

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ventures, the Rangers proved to be a highly lucrative investment; his ownership also provided Bush with a public platform on which to begin a political career. In 1993, he ran a successful campaign for governor of Texas with a surprising level of support from a variety of demographics. The Washington Post reported that the 1993 election exit polls “indicated he made a strong showing with white men. But Bush also showed he could attract women, younger voters and Hispanics.”2 George W. Bush once visited his father when the elder Bush was serving as Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office to China. He also traveled internationally on business while working in the oil industry. However, during his 2000 presidential campaign, Bush was frequently criticized for his lack of awareness of or interest in international issues. In sharp contrast to previous election cycles, China played a surprisingly small role in the 2000 presidential elections, as the candidate debates tended to focus more on the issues of education, social security, and moral decay. Spotlighted issues with regard to international policy focused more on matters of missile defense and the issue of the United States as a police state. Bush’s foreign policy platform specifically emphasized the need to support a stronger economic and political relationship with Latin America, especially Mexico, and a reduction of involvement in “nation building” and other small-scale military engagements. Despite the lack of campaign rhetoric with regard to China, it is quite evident that the views of Vice President Al Gore and then Governor Bush were markedly different. A Gore victory would likely have signified the continuation of a strategic partnership based on cooperation rather than the confrontational approach embraced by Bush.

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NOTES 1. George Lardner Jr. and Lois Romano, “Bush’s Move Up to the Majors,” Washington Post, 31 July 1991, A1. 2. Lardner and Romano, “Bush’s Move Up to the Majors,” A1.

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THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S PRE–SEPTEMBER 11 CHINA POLICY hen George W. Bush first assumed office, his administration adopted an aggressive foreign policy position, responding to perceptions that Chinese expansionary interests in Asia were a threat to the United States and that China could eventually seek to displace the United States in the region. In a November 1999 speech, Bush negated the unifying effects of Clinton’s words during his 1998 China tour by stating that China was not America’s strategic partner, but was instead a competitor.1 This speech quickly prompted the creation of the widely used term “strategic competitor.” Thus even before entering the White House, Bush had established a confrontational foundation on which his administration’s approach to China would be based. Aside from being confrontational, Bush’s China policy also appeared contradictory. On separate occasions, the administration announced major shifts in China policy only to retract the statements. For example, the Defense Department announced that it was terminating military-to-military

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contacts with China, but quickly withdrew the announcement. Furthermore, when asked about his stance with regard to U.S.–Taiwan relations, Bush committed the U.S. military to defend Taiwan should China attack it. When questioned later about this policy shift, Bush said that he did not mean to waver from previous presidents’ Taiwan policy. Certainly one explanation for the contradictory stance initially adopted toward China is that the Bush administration contained no senior-level officials with any significant amount of China experience. Secretary of State Colin Powell was a military official universally praised for his management abilities, but without background in Sino-American relations; Condoleezza Rice, Bush’s first national security advisor and later his secretary of state, is a Russia expert; Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly, and the National Security Council’s Senior Director for Asia Torkel Patterson all specialized in Japan. President Bush’s foreign policy advisors held assertive opinions of America’s role in the world, but lacked necessary expertise that would allow them to make appropriate and informed decisions on U.S. relations with China. As a result, the administration initially dealt with China in an overly confrontational and contradictory way.

NOTES 1. George W. Bush, “A Distinctly American Internationalism,” remarks at the Ronald Reagan Library, 19 November 1999.

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THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S CHINA POLICY SINCE 2001 WTO MEMBERSHIP

ince September 11, 2001, and President Bush’s participation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit the following month in Shanghai, Sino–U.S. relations have improved considerably, if not consistently. On December 11, 2001, the People’s Republic of China was granted membership in the World Trade Organization. After nearly fifteen years of effort and some 900 pages of legal text, China joined the ranks of the 142 member governments already represented in the organization. According to a WTO spokesperson, “As a result of this negotiation, China has agreed to undertake a series of important commitments to open and liberalize its regime in order to better integrate in the world economy and offer a more predictable environment for trade and foreign investment in accordance with WTO rules.”1 China’s inclusion in the WTO has had, and will continue to have, a very significant impact on U.S.–China trade relations;

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some U.S. firms benefit from access to the China market while others suffer from competition with Chinese exporters. A number of safeguards against the threat of surges in imports (particularly textiles) were included in the 1999 trade agreement that the United States signed with China as a prerequisite for China’s entry into the WTO. Since then, China has argued, these safeguards have been abused by American producers. While their intended effect was to correct actual import surges, they have been invoked to prevent American companies from potential threats that have not yet materialized.2 A WTO study predicts that without trade barriers, Chinese textiles could jump from 16 percent to 50 percent of the American market.3 Adding to the concern over the U.S. trade deficit with China has been the issue of China’s fixed exchange rate. In July 2005, China abandoned its decade-old peg to the dollar and moved to a managed float of the Yuan against a basket of currencies. Still, such a move is unlikely to have the desired effect of a significant reduction in the bilateral trade deficit.

GROUNDS FOR COOPER ATION

Despite these tensions, the U.S. and Chinese economies continue to provide each other with the markets needed to maintain mutual economic growth. Yet, the economy was not the only issue sustaining Sino–U.S. cooperation at the start of the new millennium; since September 11, 2001, China and the United States have found common ground in other aspects of both foreign and domestic policy. China has attempted to tie its ongoing struggle with Muslim separatist groups in Xinjiang to the U.S.-led war against terror, and the United States has relied

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upon China to pressure North Korea into the resumption of multilateral talks aimed at the eradication of its nuclear weapons program. One month after his historic January 2002 State of the Union address, in which he first categorized the authoritarian regimes of North Korea, Iraq, and Iran as belonging to “the Axis of Evil,” President Bush visited Beijing to commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of Nixon’s historic trip. During this visit, President Bush stated, “We recognize that terrorism is a threat to both our countries, and I welcome China’s cooperation in our war against terror. I encourage China to continue to be a force for peace among its neighbors—on the Korean Peninsula, in Southeast Asia and in South Asia.”4 In late April of that year, then Vice President Hu Jintao traveled to the United States as a guest of President Bush. Hu reiterated the commitment of the two countries to cooperation on security issues and remarked, “It is in the common interests of China and the U.S. to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, South Asia and the Middle East. In recent years the two countries have conducted effective dialogue and cooperation in these fields. The two sides should stay in contact and strengthen cooperation.”5

ARMS SALES AND MILITARY STR ATEGY

Nevertheless, the issue of arms sales remained a sensitive issue. President Bush, having been recently advised by the CIA that China was supplying missile technology to both North Korea and Iran,6 sanctioned several Chinese companies shortly before his trip to Beijing.7 A March 2002 meeting in Florida between Taiwanese Defense Minister Tang Yao-ming and U.S.

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Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly angered Vice President Hu. During his April-May visit to the United States, Vice President Hu asserted, “If any trouble occurs on the Taiwan question, it would be difficult for China–U.S. relations to move forward, and retrogression may even occur. The question of Taiwan is China’s internal matter and should be resolved by the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. . . . Selling sophisticated weapons to Taiwan or upgrading U.S.–Taiwan relations is inconsistent with the foregoing commitments, serving neither peace [nor] stability in the Taiwan Strait nor China–U.S. relationship and the common interests of the two countries.”8 With the July 2002 publication of the U.S. Defense Department’s report to Congress on “The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” Sino–U.S. relations were once again strained. The report concluded, “Over the last few years, [the Department of Defense] has identified improvements in China’s military capabilities in a significant number of areas. . . . Chinese doctrine is moving towards the goal of surprise, deception and shock effect in the opening phase of a campaign. China is exploring coercive strategies designed to bring Taipei to terms quickly.”9 Despite insistence from Beijing that its military policy is defensive in nature, preparations for combat between the two powers over Taiwan’s sovereignty remain a major point of contention in Sino–U.S. relations.

NOVEMBER 2002

The November 2002 Communist Party Congress (CPC) marked the beginning of the end of Jiang Zemin’s rule as Hu Jintao as-

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sumed the position of head of the Chinese Communist Party. Jiang held on to his positions of president until the National People’s Congress in March 2003, and chairman of the Central Military Commission, through which he continued to exert control from behind the scenes until he passed that title to Hu in September 2004, three years ahead of schedule. Though drawn out, the process of transition of power was peaceful and smooth, demonstrating the regime’s stability to the rest of the world. Another development that would have long-term implications for Sino–U.S. relations occurred in November 2002, just prior to the opening of the CPC. In this case, however, the change was economic rather than political. Chinese authorities announced sweeping reform of their capital markets, enabling foreign investors to buy “state shares” or “legal-person shares” of listed companies (although foreign investors would be prohibited from owning a controlling interest).10 This brought the Chinese economy a step closer to the liberalization upheld by the WTO.

POWELL’S TRIP TO ASIA

In February 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell visited China as part of a trip to East Asia. Officially, the trip was based around the inauguration of South Korean President Roh Moohyun. However, Powell’s primary objectives were to rally support for U.S.-led intervention in Iraq and to discuss concerns over the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (North Korea) recent rejection of its commitment to the U.S.–DPRK Agreed Framework of 1994. During a press conference following his

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meeting with then President Jiang, Powell stated, “The United States feels strongly that North Korea’s actions pose a threat to regional stability and to the global non-proliferation regime. I cannot emphasize enough how seriously all of us would view any move by North Korea toward reprocessing of the spent fuel rods and production of nuclear weapons. And we are prepared to address these issues with North Korea in a multilateral context in which China and other nations can participate.”11 Although Beijing was somewhat reluctant to take sides with the United States in condemning North Korea, China did extend an offer to host the opposing governments in Beijing for a round of talks; this offer would commence one of the PRC’s most ambitious diplomatic initiatives to date. Shortly after Powell departed from Beijing, the United States revealed intelligence indicating that the DPRK had restarted a nuclear reactor in Yongbyon that had been closed down as part of the Agreed Framework.

MARCH 2003

March 2003 was a tumultuous month for both the PRC and for the world at large. China was embracing a new generation of leaders with different perspectives and priorities than the previous administration. During the annual People’s Congress, Hu Jintao assumed the position of president and Wen Jiabao was named premier (succeeding Zhu Rongji). Wen, a geologist by training, had long been involved in party politics. Having served as a top aide to Zhao Ziyang (who had been next in line to assume authority of the Party after Deng but had been purged during the 1989 Tiananmen Square movement), Wen

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survived the internal power struggle and emerged as Zhu’s protégé and ultimately his deputy. While both Zhu and Jiang developed their careers in investment-rich Shanghai, both Wen and Hu spent considerable time working in the less-developed western regions of the country. This new generation of leaders, led by Hu and Wen, has stressed the importance of addressing the growing wealth gap that has accompanied the shift to a market economy. On December 5–6, 2003, Hu led a government delegation to the Hebei village of Xibaipo, where he emphasized his intention to remember the needs of those left behind by the country’s rapid economic growth.12 Despite this optimistic message, March 2003 began a period of great uncertainty and danger in China and the world. Dismissing the efforts of China and a number of other United Nations Security Council members to extend the U.N.-sanctioned weapons inspections, the United States and Britain commenced “Operation Iraqi Freedom.” China’s foreign ministry called the operation “a violation of the U.N. charter and the basic norms of international law.”13 On March 18, two days prior to the intervention, Hu Jintao spoke by phone with his counterparts in Russia, France, and the United States, encouraging a diplomatic approach to disarmament.14 Nevertheless, by April 2003, China, along with the other Security Council members who had opposed the operation, conceded that U.N. sanctions against Iraq should be lifted.15 Meanwhile, in March 2003, another crisis was unfolding in China that demanded immediate attention. In late 2002, a yetundiagnosed virus had quietly emerged in the southern province of Guangdong; by March and April 2003, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) had spread to thousands of people throughout China, Southeast Asia, and the world. Symptomatically similar to pneumonia and meningitis, SARS quickly

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brought the economy of China to a halt and had a number of farreaching implications as tens of thousands of people exposed to the virus were quarantined, travel was restricted, and schools and businesses were closed. Faced with international criticism for having played down the seriousness of the SARS threat when it first emerged, the new Chinese leadership attributed blame to Beijing Mayor Meng Xuenong and China’s Minister of Health Zhang Wenkang. As punishment, both men were relieved of their duties and stripped of their party membership in April. Not until June 24, 2003, with the infection rate of people in China having reached 5,327—including 349 deaths (8,096 infections and 774 deaths worldwide)16—did the World Health Organization’s director for the western Pacific, Dr. Shigeru Omi, announce that SARS had been brought under control in Beijing. While the U.S. government remained sympathetic to individuals in China and elsewhere that were affected by SARS, they also viewed the SARS outbreak (and the PRC’s initial denial of its severity) as justification for Taiwan’s membership in the World Heath Organization. Taiwan was forced to withdraw its membership in the WHO in 1972—a year after losing its seat in the United Nations—and has organized an annual bid to rejoin every year since 1997. Each year, China has blocked this bid, asserting that Taiwan is a part of China as maintained in the One-China Policy, and is therefore represented by China’s seat.17 On May 16, 2003, the U.S. Congress passed a bill supporting Taiwan’s bid in light of the recent spread of SARS from the mainland to the island.

CHINA’S ROLE IN U.S.–DPRK RELATIONS

Meanwhile, the resumption of U.S.–DPRK dialogue, coordinated by Beijing, ushered in a period of strategic optimism in 20

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the Bush administration’s relationship with China. In March 2003, shortly after North Korea test-fired a missile into the sea in the direction of Japan, China briefly suspended its supply of oil to the country. China cited technical difficulties, but most observers speculated that the real reason behind the three-day cessation was political; at the time, China was providing the DPRK with approximately 70 percent of the country’s total oil.18 It seemed to be an effective strategy. On April 12, North Korea’s foreign ministry issued a statement demonstrating interest in returning to negotiations and asserted that it would “not stick to any dialogue format”19 for discussions (thereby resolving one of the major obstacles to the resumption of talks) as long as the United States made a “bold shift in its Korean policy for the settlement of the nuclear issue.”20 On April 23, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly and his DPRK counterpart, Li Gun, began a round of trilateral talks in Beijing. During the meetings, they agreed to hold the first round of Six-Party Talks in Beijing in August (subsequent rounds were held in Beijing in February and June 2004 before being suspended and then resumed in July 2005). Little tangible progress was made during any of the talks, but diplomatic channels were maintained in hopes of an eventual peaceful resolution.

THREE GORGES DAM

While China was praised for its success in restarting dialogue on the topic of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, many in the international community, and within China itself, criticized the completion of the first stage of the controversial Three Gorges Dam in late spring 2003. By this stage in the 21

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dam’s development, 700,000 residents had already been relocated.21 Costing an estimated $25 billion, the project should be complete by 2009 (by which time more than 1 million people will have to relocate).22 The Clinton administration discouraged the Import-Export Bank from supporting the project in 1995,23 and in an unusual circumstance for such a large development project, the World Bank did not assist the Chinese government with loans. Still, some argue that Washington cannot afford to be too critical of the dam given its need to prioritize its affairs with China, its own history of ecologically and culturally destructive dam building (including President Bush’s opposition to the efforts of U.S. congressmen, Native American tribes, and environmental and sporting groups to breach the Snake River dams in the northwestern United States),24 and the high-profile involvement of American financial institutions (most notably Morgan Stanley Dean Witter) in the project’s financing.25

HONG KONG

In July 2003, as the U.S. State Department was finalizing preparations for the upcoming first round of the six-party talks in Beijing, the world media turned its attention to Hong Kong where half a million people took to the streets in protest over Beijing’s controversial “Anti-Subversion Law.” According to Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law (the mini constitution that dictates the relationship between Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Beijing), the Hong Kong government was obliged to pass an internal security bill. However, controversy arose when the citizens of the island began to fear that Tung

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Chee-Hwa, their PRC-friendly chief executive, would pass a bill that severely restricted the individual liberties of SAR residents. On July 10, 2003, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly published an op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal, writing, “The July 1 march demonstrates the need for better channels of communication between the populace and their government. . . . There is no more effective means of providing that better channel than through the institutions of democracy.”26 This message was warmly welcomed by Beijing (especially in light of the U.S.-led democratizing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan). However, in the end, Tung bowed to popular pressure, shelved the bill, and lost face with many of Hong Kong’s citizens and with the government in Beijing. Regina Ip, Hong Kong’s secretary for security, and Anthony Leung, its finance secretary, resigned in the immediate aftermath of the protests. Tung held on to his position until March 2005, when he too resigned, two years prior to the end of his term. In June 2005, Tung was replaced by Donald Tsang, a popular top official under British occupation who was retained by Beijing after the 1997 handover. Tsang will hold office for the remaining two years of Tung’s term. So far, China is not putting pressure on Tsang to revive the anti-subversion legislation and Tsang says he is not planning to do so.27 Still, the battle over the Anti-Subversion Law was not a victory for the people of Hong Kong. In April 2004, the standing committee of China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) issued an interpretation of the Basic Law. In its reading of the law, NPC determined that any move to change Hong Kong Legco’s electoral method must first be approved by Beijing,28 ominous indeed for the island’s next election. In anticipation of this

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interpretation, the U.S. State Department issued the U.S.–Hong Kong Policy Act Report on April 1, 2004, and following up on this report, the 108th Congress issued S.J Res. 33: Expressing support for freedom in Hong Kong on April 21. Both documents reaffirmed the U.S. government’s support of Hong Kong’s autonomy as a SAR.

HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS

In the final three months of 2003, Presidents Bush and Hu met in Bangkok, and Premier Wen Jiabao traveled to the United States. In mid-October, while in Thailand to meet with AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders, Presidents Bush and Hu held a bilateral meeting followed by a joint news conference. Focusing on the common interests and concerns of the two states, President Bush summarized the content of their meeting, stating, “We talked about the need to make sure that trade is open and that both countries benefit from trade. I congratulated China on its recent space launch. I thanked the President for his work on the recent Security Council resolution for Iraq. We talked about our mutual desire to wage and win the fight against terror. We spent time, of course, talking about North Korea. We have a mutual goal, and that is that the Peninsula be free of nuclear weapons.”29 A little over a month later, Chinese Premier Wen traveled to the United States, stopping in Boston, New York, and Washington. While the visit attracted media attention, it was generally perceived as full of fanfare but lacking substance.30 Wen was greeted at the White House with a nineteen-gun salute. Later, he stood at Bush’s side as the U.S. president publicly criticized

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Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian’s efforts to alter the crossstrait status quo. Still, little progress was made on the issues of the trade imbalance or North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Responding to concerns over China’s $120 billion trade surplus with the United States, Wen argued that a solution would come from increased U.S. exports to China rather than decreased imports of Chinese goods into the United States.31 While President Bush thanked Wen for Beijing’s role in negotiations with North Korea, he rejected Wen’s request that Washington adopt a more conciliatory position toward Pyongyang.32

LEADERSHIP CHANGE AND CONTINUITY

The year 2004 saw elections in Taiwan (March and December), Hong Kong (September), and the United States (November), as well as the completion of the transfer of power from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao (September). Despite President Bush’s criticism of Chen Shui-bian, the Taiwanese president was reelected in a hotly contested election in March 2004. However, his supporters in the Pan-Green parties lost their majority in December’s legislative Yuan elections. Given the popular discontent in Hong Kong discussed earlier, many outsiders were surprised when pro-democracy parties gained a mere three seats in the Legco, enabling the pro-Beijing parties to maintain a substantial majority of seats despite the record 55.6 percent voter turnout.33 In the United States, meanwhile, high voter turnout did not result in any ambiguity in the presidential election, unlike in 2000. President Bush defeated Massachusetts Senator John Kerry not only in terms of electoral votes, but with 3.5 million

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more popular votes as well.34 Yet, perhaps the most surprising governmental transition occurred in Beijing when Jiang Zemin conceded his last official title—head of the Central Military Commission—to his successor, Hu Jintao, in September 2004— three years ahead of schedule. This move ended speculation of a domestic power struggle and solidified the authority of the Fourth Generation of Chinese leaders. The year 2005 saw a thaw in ROC-PRC relations and a return to the Six-Party Talks. Both of these changes will be discussed in detail in later sections. At this point, we will turn to the recent changes and continuity within the presidential administration that took place in the first year of President Bush’s second term.

NOTES 1. “WTO Ministerial Conference Approves China’s Accession,” WTO Press Releases, 10 November 2001, www.wto.org/english/news_ e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm. 2. “The Looming Revolution,” Economist, 11 November 2004, www.economist.com. 3. “The Looming Revolution,” www.economist.com. 4. “Transcript of President Bush’s remarks with Chinese President Jiang Zemin,” 21 February 2002, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2002/02/20020221-7.html. 5. “Transcript of President Hu’s speech ‘Enhanced Mutual Understanding and Trust Towards a Constructive and Cooperative Relationship Between China and the United States,’” 1 May 2002, www .china-embassy.org/eng/zt/hjtfm/t36335.htm. 6. “Proliferating Challenges,” Economist, 21 February 2002, www .economist.com.

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7. “No Change,” Economist, 28 February 2002, www.economist .com. 8. “Transcript of President Hu’s speech “‘Enhanced Mutual Understanding and Trust.” 9. “Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act: The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” Department of Defense, July 2002, 2, www.defenselink.mil/ news/Jul2002/d20020712china.pdf. 10. “China Shares End Higher on Foreign Ownership News,” Dow Jones International News, 4 November 2002. 11. “Transcript from Secretary Powell’s press conference at the St. Regis Hotel in Beijing,” 24 February 2003, www.state.gov/secretary/ former/powell/remarks/2003/17892.htm. 12. H. Lyman Miller, “Hu Leadership Focuses on Compassionate Conservative Governance,” China Leadership Monitor 6 (Spring 2003): 71. 13. “A Fight to the Finish,” Economist, 20 March 2003, www .economist.com. 14. “China Appeals for Halt to Military Action in Iraq,” Xinhua, 21 March 2003, www.xinhuanet.com/english. 15. “UN Members Back US Call on Sanctions,” Associated Press, 19 April 2003, www.ap.org. 16. “Summary of probable SARS cases with onset of illness from 1 November 2002 to 31 July 2003,” World Health Organization, 31 December 2003, www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table2004_04_21/en. 17. “China Protests US Bill Supporting Taiwan’s Entry to WHO,” Agence France Presse, 16 May 2003, www.afp.com. 18. “Desperate Straits,” Economist, 1 May 2003, www.economist .com. 19. “Mr. Kim’s Change of Heart,” Economist, 23 April 2003, www.economist.com. 20. “Mr. Kim’s Change of Heart,” www.economist.com.

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21. Erik Eckholm, “As Dam on Yangtze Closes, Chinese Tally Gains and Loss,” New York Times, 9 June 2003, A1. 22. Eckholm, “As Dam on Yangtze Closes, Chinese Tally Gains and Loss,” A1 23. “Clinton Refuses Support for China’s Dam Project,” The Australian, 16 October 1995, www.theaustralian.news.com.au/. 24. “Reevaluating Dams,” The Boston Globe, 9 June 2003, A14. 25. James Harding, “Three Gorges seeks to open foreign funding floodgates: But widespread investor concern may lead to problems,” Financial Times, 6 August 1998, 10. 26. James Kelly, “Hong Kong Now Must Move to Enlarge Democracy, State’s Kelly Says,” Wall Street Journal, 10 July 2003, online.wsj.com. 27. “A Knight of the People’s Paradise,” Economist, 16 June 2005, www.economist.com. 28. “One Country, One System,” Economist, 7 April 2004, www.economist.com. 29. “Remarks by President Bush and President Hu Jintao of China,” The White House, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/ 10/20031019-6.html. 30. Bonnie Glaser, “Wen Jiabao’s Visit Caps an Outstanding Year,” Comparative Connections 5 (4) (January 1990): 37–47. 31. Glaser, “Wen Jiabao’s Visit Caps an Outstanding Year,” 39. 32. Glaser, “Wen Jiabao’s Visit Caps an Outstanding Year,” 41. 33. “Suffrage on sufferance,” Economist, 16 September 2004, www.economist.com. 34. “Now, unite us,” Economist, 4 November 2004, www .economist.com.

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resident Bush’s administration includes some of the most powerful and controversial members of any U.S. cabinet in recent years. Armed with a strong ideological mission and a generally complacent Congress, the power of the president and his senior cabinet members has surpassed that of his recent predecessors in the four years since the September 11 terrorist attacks. In the introduction to his work, Same Bed Different Dreams, David M. Lampton asserts that “one key to the productive management of the relationship between the United States and China is effective and secure political leadership in both nations. To that end, individuals are of enormous consequence.”1 If this is the case, the Bush administration proves to be an illustrative example. However, despite the administration’s strong personalities, a controversial worldview and efforts to centralize power in the executive branch, the U.S. China policy today has not radically departed from the policy structure that was in place at the end of the Clinton administration. The reality

P

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that U.S.–China relations have changed so dramatically since the start of President Bush’s first term in 2001 suggests that, although individual personalities may have held a degree of sway when the Sino–U.S. relationship was in its initial stages, the realities and complexities of this bilateral relationship soon limit the influence that any one ideology or personality can have. In a November 2004 joint press conference with the U.S. president, President Hu Jintao remarked that the two presidents had just, “together reviewed how far this relationship has come in the past four years.”2 During the first nine months of President Bush’s first term, the relationship was anything but smooth. Bush’s original cabinet, led by “neoconservatives” including Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, was extremely wary of a perceived China threat. Following the April 1, 2001 collision of an American surveillance plane and a Chinese fighter jet (during which the Chinese pilot was killed and the American crew was forced to make an emergency landing on the Chinese island of Hainan), Sino–U.S. tensions were exacerbated. During the next month, Bush and then-president Jiang Zemin refrained from any direct contact yet both conveyed their impressions to their respective media outlets. When Bush told an ABC television interviewer later that month that he would do “whatever it takes” to defend Taiwan from any Chinese attack, Sino–U.S. relations reached an administration low. Then came the September 11 attacks, and faced with a much more immediate threat, the United States and China took advantage of the opportunity to improve their rapport.

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The relationship quickly rebounded and during the first thirteen months of his presidency, Bush traveled to the PRC twice and invited President Jiang to visit him at his ranch in Crawford, Texas. President Bush also formed a generally friendly relationship with Jiang’s successor, Hu Jintao. One senior administration official reported that Bush has long been very supportive of Hu, viewing him as a young, emerging leader who would grow in stature with a few “feathers in his cap.”3 Moreover, despite a general lack of enthusiasm for Bush’s foreign policy among the Chinese populace, China’s leaders (with the notable exception of former Vice Premier Qian Qichen) have also expressed their support for the development of Sino–U.S. ties under Bush.4 Yet, as many political analysts observe, President Bush does not act without the advice of his powerful advisors and cabinet members. I will now turn to a brief overview of those advisors who have had the most influence over the shaping of President Bush’s foreign policy agenda.

RICHARD B. CHENEY, VICE PRESIDENT

Dick Cheney is considered by many observers to be the most powerful U.S. vice president in history. A leader among the “neoconservatives” in the White House, Cheney has become a controversial figure in American politics. His influence, though subtle, is known to be substantial. In addition to serving as U.S. congressman from Wyoming from 1978 to 1989, Cheney gained worldwide prominence as secretary of defense during the first Gulf War. One of his earliest stints in government service came when current secretary of defense Donald

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Rumsfeld tapped him as a deputy when Rumsfeld was a White House counselor to President Richard M. Nixon. Later, Cheney was Rumsfeld’s assistant during Rumsfeld’s tenure as White House chief of staff to President Gerald Ford. Cheney became the youngest White House chief of staff at age thirty-four when Rumsfeld left for his first tenure as secretary of defense. Cheney’s China policy is difficult to categorize. While considered to have been one of the key architects of the Iraqi occupation and the subsequent imposition of democracy in Iraq, Cheney does not have a similar vision for China. In an April 2001 interview on the PBS program Commanding Heights Cheney stated I was in China 25 years ago. I know what it was like when Mao was still alive, and I know what fantastic progress there has been economically. There are still significant parts of the population in China that have never benefited from that growing prosperity. But, there are [millions] of Chinese today who are living better lives than they were 25 or 30 years ago because of what’s happening with respect to the world economy and because of the changes they’ve had to make in order to become part of the world economy.5

Interestingly, these comments were made shortly after the EP-3E spy plane incident, during which time Cheney argued that the United States should not apologize to China for the collision, which killed a Chinese pilot.6 Still, when it comes to China, Cheney is generally considered a pragmatist. Some have argued that this approach was developed during Cheney’s years working for corporate giants Morgan Stanley and Halliburton. Cheney visited China while employed by both corporations; notoriously raising eyebrows in

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March 1995 when he visited the region only a month after Chinese Navy vessels entered the waters around the Spratly Islands and erected structures on Mischief Reef, land also claimed by the Philippines. In response to China’s aggressive move, then Philippines President Fidel Ramos had sent the Philippine Navy into the area and called on Washington for support. In his capacity as a member of Morgan Stanley’s board of directors, Cheney met with Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian and told the Chinese state media outlet, Xinhua, and Singaporean press that he did “not really perceive any threat from China to the world or the region.”7 Shortly after Cheney’s visit, the People’s Construction Bank of China announced an expansion of its partnership with Morgan Stanley.8 Cheney’s first visit to China as vice president occurred in April 2004—coinciding with the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act. Indeed, Taiwan was the key issue debated during Cheney’s three-day visit. Prior to the visit, Chinese Vice President Zeng Qinghong asserted, “We hope that the United States can carry out its commitment and not sell weapons to Taiwan.”9 Later, Chinese media outlets controversially edited out portions of Cheney’s remarks at Fudan University in Shanghai pertaining to Taiwan and human rights after promising to publish his entire speech. Nevertheless, Cheney’s relationship with the Chinese government remains friendly. During Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s trip to Asia in March 2005, Cheney refused to comment on China’s recently announced Anti-Secession Laws, citing diplomatic sensitivity.10 Cheney did say of Sino–U.S. relations that “generally, the relationship is in pretty good shape. . . . That does not mean we agree on everything.”11

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However, some of those watching Washington have begun to observe a decline in Cheney’s power to influence President Bush. A Washington Post article asserted, “Cheney’s influence has waned. He’s lost his top aide, his public ratings are dismal, and his network of supporters inside the administration has dissolved. At the same time, Rice has taken charge at State, and the National Security Council has faded even further.”12

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

In January 2005, Condoleezza Rice, formerly the National Security advisor, was sworn in as secretary of state, succeeding Colin Powell in the position. The U.S. Senate’s 85-13 vote on Rice’s confirmation was the sharpest opposition to a secretary of state nominee since World War II.13 Notably, the controversy had little to do with her record on China. In fact, she mentioned China only once in her opening address as secretary. In March 2005, Rice made her first tour of Asia in her new capacity. According to what seems to be the protocol of the Bush administration, China was last on Rice’s itinerary (in this case following stops in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Japan, and the Republic of Korea). During a March 19 speech at Sophia University in Tokyo, Rice articulated the administration’s Asia policy, stating that the three objectives of U.S. policy in Asia are security, opportunity, and freedom. While her assessment of U.S. relations with its traditional allies (including Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India) was optimistic, she expressed caution with regard to China. She argued that as a “new factor,” China “has the potential for good or for bad . . . the U.S.–Japan relationship, the U.S.–South Korean relation-

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ship, and the U.S.–Indian relationship, all are important in creating an environment in which China is more likely to play a positive role than a negative role. These alliances are not against China; they are alliances that are devoted to stable security and political and economic and, indeed, values-based relationships that put China in the context of those relationships.”14 While acknowledging the key role that China plays in maintaining the security of the region (specifically with regard to North Korea), Rice did add that she hoped to see changes in China’s governance, remarking that “even China must eventually embrace some form of open, genuinely representative government if it is to reap the benefits and meet the challenges of a globalizing world.”15 Interestingly, in the January/February 2000 issue of Foreign Affairs, Rice wrote an article titled “Promoting the National Interest” in which she asserted that “China resents the role of the United States in the Asia Pacific region. This means that China is not a ‘status quo’ power but one that would like to alter Asia’s balance of power in its own favor. That alone makes it a strategic competitor, not the ‘strategic partner’ the Clinton administration once called it.”16 Rice went on to accuse the Clinton administration of “tilt[ing] toward Beijing.”17 Indeed, in remarks delivered later at Sophia University, Rice did attempt to distance the Bush administration’s policy from her earlier article, joking, “never write an article and then go into government; people might actually read it.”18 Nevertheless, Rice’s policy toward China does seem to be less friendly than that of her predecessor. It is difficult to say whether or not Rice has developed and maintained the level of intimacy with her PRC counterpart that her predecessor Colin Powell did with Foreign Minister Li

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Zhaoxing. In remarks before Henry Kissinger and a panel of China scholars assembled at Texas A&M University in November 2003, Powell reflected on his relationship with his Chinese counterpart and “friend” and stated that their “relationship has become so informal and so close . . . [that they] talk to one another as friends, talk candidly, talk directly. Don’t pull punches. This is what friendship is all about.”19 In some of their last statements as secretary and deputy secretary of state, Powell and Richard Armitage made very strong statements in support of China’s claim to Taiwan. In a controversial interview on Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV in October 2004, Powell asserted that “both sides should show restraint . . . look for ways of improving dialogue across the Straits and move forward to that day when we will see a peaceful reunification . . . our policy is clear. There is only one China. Taiwan is not independent. It does not enjoy sovereignty as a nation” (emphasis added).20 Powell later qualified his response by saying that when he had said “reunification” he had meant to say “resolution.” It is not known whether this error was an intentional message or a genuine mistake. Nevertheless, Powell appeared to be more sympathetic to the recent actions of the PRC than of Taiwan in its ongoing struggle over control of the island. Powell first traveled to China in 1973 as a White House fellow. Rice does not have the same legacy. A Russia expert by training, as NSA Rice did not travel to China until shortly before the 2004 election. As colleagues at the State Department, Rice and President Bush selected a rather surprising mix of Bush loyalists. Rice replaced the deputy secretary of state, Richard Armitage, with former U.S. trade representative Bob Zoellick. As op-

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posed to the neoconservatives who dominated the White House in Bush’s first term, both Rice and Zoellick are perceived as realists. Both have ties to major players in shaping President George H. W. Bush’s foreign policy. While Rice was mentored by former NSA Brent Scowcroft (who secretly visited Beijing in the months after the PRC’s June 4, 1989 crackdown on student protesters in order to maintain dialogue between the two states), Zoellick served as counsel to George H. W. Bush’s secretary of state, James Baker. For his part, Zoellick has had his own experience dealing with China on a number of trade issues from intellectual property rights to WTO accession, and so far he seems to be pragmatic in his approach to the country.21 At present, the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs is staffed by few China scholars. Assistant Secretary Christopher R. Hill spent most of his career in Eastern Europe. Hill served as ambassador to the Republic of Korea and is very involved in the Six-Party Talks, but he has little previous knowledge of China and Sino–U.S. relations. However, Hill has been credited with unprecedented access to the president.22 Although the full extent of his influence over the president is not known, Hill’s policy of engagement with China on the issue of North Korea may steer the administration toward a China policy based on engagement not competition. Bush’s diplomatic appointments also demonstrated a conflicted China policy. In 2005, Bush appointed former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton as the new permanent representative of the United States to the United Nations. John Bolton has had a long and controversial role in Chinese politics. Between 1999 and 2001, while senior vice president of the American Enterprise Institute,

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Bolton authored a series of editorials that were published in the Taipei Times. These articles were highly critical of both China’s Taiwan policy (calling its 2000 white paper “one of Beijing’s most serious policy blunders in years”23) and of the Clinton administration’s China policy (asserting that the Carter administration’s derecognization of Taiwan “was a mistake at the time, which we can and should correct.”24). Furthermore, in a February 2005 speech in Tokyo before an international audience, Bolton criticized the Chinese government for allowing its munitions companies to sell missile technology to Iran and other nations the United States considers rogue states.25 The Economist called Bolton “the most controversial Ambassador ever sent by America to the United Nations.” Some of Bolton’s colleagues in the UN appreciated the goals Bolton was trying to achieve, but not his abrasive style.26,27 The New York Times, in its editorial The Shame of the United Nations, praised Bolton’s stance on “reforming the disgraceful United Nations Human Rights Commission,”28 saying “John Bolton is right; Secretary-General Kofi Annan is wrong.” The Times also said that the commission at that time was composed of “some of the world’s most abusive regimes” who used their membership as cover to continue their abusiveness. Although Bush renominated Bolton for the position once his appointment expired in 2006, too many doubts had been cast on Bolton’s suitability to best represent U.S. interests as ambassador to the U.N. On December 4, 2006, after months of drawn-out conformation hearings in Congress, Bolton announced that he would terminate his work as U.S. representative to the UN at the end of the recess appointment and would not continue to seek confirmation.29 His letter of resignation from the Bush administration was accepted on December 4, 2006, effective when his recess

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appointment ended December 9 at the formal adjournment of the 109th Congress. Although his position as U.S. ambassador to the U.N. was short lived, his nomination and subsequent recess appointment demonstrated the administration’s continuing confrontational international diplomacy. Bolton’s appointment to the U.N., however, did not signal an increase in confrontation between the administration and their Chinese counterparts. This may be due in part to the influence of U.S. Ambassador to the PRC Clark T. Randt, Jr. Randt, a former Yale classmate of President Bush, is fluent in Mandarin and possesses expertise in Chinese law. Since his appointment in 2001, Randt has become the longest serving American ambassador to the PRC. The combination of his expertise in China, the relationships his long tenure has allowed him to develop with his Chinese counterparts, and his personal relationship with President Bush has allowed Randt to steer the administration’s China policy toward engagement.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

If prospects for the development of U.S.–China cooperation under the new leadership of the Department of State were mixed, they remained less optimistic at the Department of Defense under the leadership of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Not the best-liked political leader domestically, Rumsfeld is particularly unpopular in the international community. The former U.S. congressman led the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission (the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat

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to the United States) and accused China of carrying out “extensive transfers of Iran’s solid-fueled ballistic missile program,” arguing further that China “has supplied Pakistan with a design for a nuclear weapon [before it signed NPT] and additional nuclear weapons assistance. It has even transferred complete ballistic missile systems to Saudi Arabia.”30 Upon assuming office, Rumsfeld quickly became embroiled in the April 2001 spy plane incident and enraged Chinese leaders when he refused to apologize for the death of the Chinese pilot. By June of that year, before a European audience, Rumsfeld accused the Chinese of helping develop Iraqi defense systems (while he alluded to other countries’ involvement in developing the Iraqi military, China was the only country he mentioned by name).31 Rumsfeld also suspended all pre-scheduled Sino–U.S. military exchanges upon assuming his position, subjecting them to individual review by his office. Finally, Rumsfeld long maintained close contacts with the Taiwanese military establishment and frequently advocated for stronger U.S. military support of the island. Rumsfeld’s deputy assistant secretary of defense, Richard Lawless, can also claim considerable knowledge in the field of U.S.–Taiwan relations and is considered by many to be a stalwart defender of the island. Nevertheless, more than five years into his position, engaged in two international military interventions and embroiled in reported incidents of prisoner abuse in Guantanamo, Afghanistan, and Iraq (most notoriously Abu Ghraib), Rumsfeld began to adopt an increasingly pragmatic approach to China. In February 2005, Rumsfeld announced his intentions to make his first trip to China as secretary later in the year. Ironically an announcement intended to herald a warm-

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ing in U.S.–China relations sparked controversy as a result of the secretary’s comment that “The People’s Republic of China is a country that we hope and pray enters the civilized world in an orderly way without the grinding of gears, and that they become a constructive force in that part of the world and a player in the global environment that’s constructive’’ (emphasis added).32 Rumsfeld later qualified the comment but in terms of public perceptions, the damage was done. In October 2005, Secretary Rumsfeld made his first official visit to China. During the course of the three-day tour (on which he was accompanied by Treasury Secretary John Snow and World Bank Director Paul Wolfowitz), Rumsfeld addressed rising CCP officials at the Central Party School, noting that China is “a country we would like to see engage the world, as they are, in a peaceful and constructive way.”33 However, he also challenged the secrecy surrounding China’s military buildup asserting, “It’s interesting that other countries wonder why they would be increasing their defense effort at the pace they are and yet not acknowledging it.”34 Rumsfeld’s tenure as secretary of defense ended with his November 7, 2006 resignation and the confirmation of Robert Gates on December 6, 2006. Gates originally rose in influence during the presidency of George H. W. Bush, first as deputy national security advisor and later as director of the CIA, although the role of former President Bush in the selection process for Rumsfeld’s successor is not clear. However, some have argued that his appointment as secretary of defense in 2006 was evidence of the current administration’s shift toward pragmatism and greater international engagement.35 Gates made his first official visit to China in November 2007. During Gates’s visit, a direct hotline between the Chinese and

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U.S. militaries,36 military exchanges and joint exercises,37 and American access to Chinese records from the Korean War were announced. Although the Department of Defense remains concentrated on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Gates’ interaction with Chinese leaders has demonstrated a commitment to cooperation and communication with China.

OTHER ADVISORS

In addition to members of the Departments of Defense and State and the vice president, there have been other administration officials who have been China policy shapers. Bush’s second term saw the appointments of former Congressman Rob Portman (a Republican from Ohio who has established a reputation for supporting free trade in general, and normal trade rules with China in particular)38 as U.S. Trade Representative and Stephen Hadley (who served as Deputy NSA under Condoleezza Rice) as National Security Advisor. Neither is expected to diverge much from the paths established by their predecessors. In addition, in January 2004, Michael Green was named special assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and senior director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council. Dr. Green speaks fluent Japanese, has spent considerable time in Japan, and has published numerous articles and texts on U.S.–Japanese relations. Finally, the role of former President George H. W. Bush, although unquantifiable, cannot be ignored. Although holding no official role in the current administration, George H. W. Bush’s experiences both in China as former head of the Amer-

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ican liaison office in Beijing and as president during the 1989 student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square are invaluable to his son. Prior to becoming president, George H. W. Bush had made it clear that he would work to promote a strong and productive Sino-American relationship. 39 However, within six months of his inauguration, immediately following the June 4, 1989 crackdown on protestors in Tiananmen Square, George H. W. Bush’s China policy was tested. Following the crackdown, Bush was caught between American public outrage and maintaining productive relations with Asia’s rising power. In the days following the crackdown on protestors in Beijing, State and Defense Department officials decided to suspend military contacts between China and the United States. Furthermore, the administration coordinated with international allies to postpone World Bank loans to China. However, author and journalist James Mann has argued that these measures were taken in an effort to appease an outraged Congress and the public at large.40 Behind closed doors, Bush remained committed to a non-confrontational China policy; however, it was apparent that a rapprochement with China in the months after the Tiananmen incident would not be accepted by Congress or the public. Therefore, it was decided that a secret envoy would be sent to China with a goal to assure Chinese officials that American sanctions would be temporary and to underscore the administration’s commitment to its relationship with China. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger met with Deng Xiaoping in Beijing on July 2, 1989, less than a month after the crackdown41 and less than two weeks after sanctions against China had been

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imposed, including a ban on high level contact with China.42 Although the Scowcroft-Eagleburger trip was later revealed to the public in December 1989, Bush remained committed to positive relations with China.43 During his presidency he maintained his support for China’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, and continued to grant unconditional MFN status to China. Although established concerns about China’s human rights record continued through President George H. W. Bush’s administration, his China policy favored continued engagement in China to assure the strategic advantages that relationship provided for U.S. domestic and international development. The balance struck by George H. W. Bush has been followed by his son, who continues to monitor human rights in China, but whose policies have prioritized China’s strategic importance.

SUPERFICIAL POLICY CHANGE

While the composition of the Bush administration’s secondterm cabinet combines continuity with change, those with backgrounds in Sino–U.S. relations and those without, and strong, controversial public figures with relative unknowns, the China–U.S. relationship does not seem so different from what it was by the end of the Clinton or George H. W. Bush administrations (despite the fact that all three entered with very different China agendas). On the eve of the 2004 U.S. presidential election, Yan Xuetong, director of Tsinghua University’s Institute for International Studies, commented that “whoever wins the election, there’s no need to worry because they will adopt the same policy, especially on the Taiwan issue. . . If there is some change, it will be superficial.”44 Given the complexities of the Sino–U.S. relations, it seems that all recent U.S. presidents 44

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(despite their different priorities, ideologies, and personalities) have concluded that the general approach of their predecessors (being that of “strategic partnership”) is the most effective means to achieve their policy goals vis-à-vis the PRC leadership.

NOTES 1. David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.–China Relations, 1989–2000 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 9. 2. “Remarks Made by President Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao after Bilateral Meeting,” Congressional Quarterly, 20 November 2004, www.cq.com. 3. James Harding, “Bush Tries to Embrace Challenge of Emerging Superpower Competitor,” Financial Times, 22 October 2003, 8. 4. “Bush or Kerry, It Won’t Rattle China,” South China Morning Post, 31 October 2004, www.scmp.com. 5. “Transcript of interview with Vice President Cheney,” Commanding Heights, PBS, 25 April 2001, www.pbs.org/wgbh/commanding heights/shared/minitextlo/int_richardcheney.html. 6. Merle D. Kellerhals, “Cheney, Powell Say an Apology to China is Not Appropriate,” United States Embassy, Tokyo, 8 April 2001, tokyo.usembassy.gov. 7. John B. Judis, “China Town,” New Republic, 10 March 1997. www.tnr.com. 8. Judis, “China Town,” www.tnr.com. 9. “Cheney Meets with Chinese Leaders,” Associated Press, 13 April 2004, www.ap.org. 10. Jim Vandehei, “Cheney Defends Bush Appointments,” Washington Post, 23 March 2005, A1. 11. Vandehei, “Cheney Defends Bush Appointments,” A1. 12. David Rothkopf, “Look Who’s Running the World Now,” Washington Post, 23 March 2005, A1. 45

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13. Richard B. Schmitt and Tyler Marshall, “Rice is Confirmed Despite Opposition,” Los Angeles Times, 27 January 2005, A24. 14. “Remarks at Sophia University by Secretary Condoleeza Rice,” 19 March 2005. www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43655.htm. 15. “Remarks at Sophia University by Secretary Condoleeza Rice.” 16. Condoleeza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs, 79, no. 1 (January/February 2000): 56. 17. Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” 56. 18. “Remarks at Sophia University by Secretary Condoleeza Rice.” 19. “Remarks at Conference on China-US Relations,” FDCH Federal Department and Agency Data, Regulatory Intelligence Data, 5 November 2003. 20. “Interview with Anthony Yuen of Phoenix TV,” States News Service, 25 October 2004. 21. “Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Nomination of Robert Zoellick to be Deputy Secretary of State, Chaired by Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN),” Federal News Service, 15 February 2005. 22. Glen Kessler, “Mid-Level Official Steered U.S. Shift on North Korea,” Washington Post, May 26, 2008, A1. 23. John Bolton, “Beijing’s Threats a Real Blunder,” Taipei Times, 5 March 2000, 8. 24. John Bolton, “Dual Recognition Acknowledges Reality,” Taipei Times, 3 February 2000, 9. 25. “Bush Nominates Bolton as UN Ambassador,” CNN, 8 March 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/03/07/bolton/. 26. “His UN-doing,” Economist, 7 December 2006, 33–34, www .economist.com. 27. “A Matter of Honour,” Economist, 26 June, 2007, www .economist.com. 28. “The Shame of the United Nations,” New York Times, 26 February, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/26/opinion/26sun2.html. 29. “Bush: ‘I’m not happy’ about Bolton’s resignation,” CNN, 5 December 2006. www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/12/04/bolton.resigns/ index.html?iref=newssearch.

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30. “Executive Summary,” Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States: 5 of 27. See also Lampton, Same Bed Different Dreams, 169. 31. “US Resumes Limited China Contacts,” BBC News, 4 June 2001, news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1368599.stm. 32. Eric Schmitt, “Rumsfeld Warns of Concern About Expansion of China’s Navy,” New York Times, 18 February 2005, A9. 33. Philip Pan, “In China, Rumsfeld Urges Greater Global Role, Freedom, Military Candor,” Washington Post, 19 October 2005, A18. 34. Pan, “In China, Rumsfeld Urges Greater Global Role, Freedom, Military Candor,” A18. 35. Shane Scott, “Robert Gates a Cautious Player from a Past Bush Team,” New York Times, 9 November 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2006/11/09/washington/09gates.html?fta=y. 36. “Joint Press Availability with Secretary Gates and Minister Gangchuan from the Ministry of National Defense, Beijing, China,” November 5 2007, www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx? transcriptid=4080. 37. “Secretary Gates Delivers Remarks and Forbidden City,” November 6, 2007, www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx? transcriptid=4082. 38. Greg Hitt, “Bush Names a Longtime Ally as US Trade Representative,” The Wall Street Journal, 18 March 2005, A2. 39. Robert L. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.– China Relations 1989–2000 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 62. 40. Mann, About Face, 195–98. 41. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen, 80–81. 42. Mann, About Face, 223. 43. Mann, About Face, 223. 44. “Bush or Kerry, It Won’t Rattle China,” www.scmp.com.

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ISSUE 1: TAIWAN IN U.S.–CHINA RELATIONS n an administration known for prizing loyalty above all else, the issue of U.S.–Taiwan relations is interesting. During George W. Bush’s first term, there existed a notable and troubling gap between military and diplomatic policy toward the island. While Colin Powell and the State Department asserted that relations with China were the best they had ever been,1 the military worked more closely with the Taiwanese, in anticipation of a congressionally approved, record-breaking arms sale to Taiwan. Meanwhile, President Bush floated between both extremes. Early in his presidency, Bush stated that the United States “would do whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself,”2 but later he warmed to China’s role in strategic cooperation. This section will look back at the development of the two very different positions on Taiwan and how and when they gained the support of the U.S. president.

I

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PRO-TAIWAN POLICY

The Bush administration developed a closer political and military relationship with Taiwan than any administration had since the normalization of U.S.–China relations in 1979. Close U.S.–Taiwan relations served both as a way to endorse the island’s vibrant democracy and to contain China’s rise. During the early years of the first Bush administration, government officials began to debate what was once unthinkable, including a visit to Washington by Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian and the establishment of secure military communications between U.S. and Taiwanese forces.3 Although a state visit by Chen never occurred, Chen did visit the United States in June 2001 and again in October 2005. Early in the Bush administration, U.S. military activity demonstrated the administration’s close relations with Taiwan. In early 2002, the Pentagon built up U.S. forces in the Pacific and formulated detailed plans to respond to a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. The administration’s assertive Taiwan policy emerged, in part, out of administration members’ involvement in earlier Taiwan security discussions. For example, Richard L. Armitage, Bush’s first deputy secretary of state, and James A. Kelly, Bush’s assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, participated in a series of secret meetings between the United States, Taiwan, and Japan in 1997.4

CHINA TAKES STRONG STAND AGAINST AEGIS

The Bush administration’s Taiwan policy created conflict between the United States and China. The first major dispute be-

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tween the Bush administration and China over U.S.–Taiwan relations erupted in April 2001 over the proposed sale of the Aegis air defense and battle management system to the ROC. Taiwan had requested four Arleigh destroyers manned with the Aegis, at a cost of close to $800 million apiece. The Aegis’s radar, which coordinates ships, planes, and missiles over a large area, can track 100 targets simultaneously. The Aegis could form the foundation for a future theater missile defense system to defend Taiwan against a Chinese attack. When Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Qian Qichen visited the United States in March 2001, he said selling the Aegis would be a “grave violation” of the 1982 joint arms communiqué negotiated by the United States and China that limited the quantity and quality of arms America sends Taiwan. Qian stated that “it would change the essence of the issue from a peaceful approach to bring about unification to . . . a military approach.”5 Earlier in March, Qian had also told the English language China Daily, that the Taiwan issue is “not only a problem left over by China’s civil war, it is also the result of U.S. military intervention and the sale of advanced weapons systems to Taiwan.”6 In addition to discouraging the Aegis sale, the Chinese government urged the United States not to sell Taiwan the PAC-3 anti-ballistic missile system, which even the U.S. military had not yet deployed,7 or submarines. In the end, President Bush deferred a decision on the Aegis and the PAC-3, but he approved an arms package totaling more than $4 billion. The 2001 arms package was the largest package since the elder President Bush sold 150 F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan in 1992. Bush approved the sale of four Kiddclass destroyers, twelve anti-submarine planes, up to eight diesel-powered submarines, and minesweeping helicopters.8

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The Kidd destroyers would become the most powerful ships in Taiwan’s navy. In response to the package approval, Yang Jiechi, Chinese ambassador to the United States (2001–2005), presented a formal protest against the weapons sales to the State Department. While China understood that the Taiwan Relations Act bound the United States to provide weapons for its defense, the package surprised Beijing both in terms of the quality and quantity of weapon systems offered. In approving the submarines, the United States went directly against Beijing’s position. Despite the fact that the most important item to China, the Aegis, was not approved, the response to the package was chilly at best. Part of Taiwan’s motivation for requesting advanced weapons might be to cause a rift in the overall U.S.–China relationship. The sale of advanced weapons to Taiwan would anger China. In response, China could export nuclear and other sensitive military technologies in spite of the detrimental effects it would have on the U.S.–China relationship.

BUSH APPEARS TO END STR ATEGIC AMBIGUITY

China was further distressed by comments President Bush made on ABC’s Good Morning America on April 25, 2001. Asked if the United States had an obligation to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack, Bush answered, “Yes, we do and the Chinese must understand that. Yes, I would.” He was then asked, “With the full force of [the] American military?” Bush responded, “Whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself.”9 In a CNN interview a few hours later, however, Bush

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stated that he supported the “One China” policy and that he opposed a Taiwanese declaration of independence. He said that his statements on ABC did not break new ground, and that he was only reiterating what other presidents had said. The result of the comments on ABC and CNN was confusion. Because Bush retracted his statement on Good Morning America, the comment could not be considered policy. Nevertheless, his comments were contradictory; the repercussions of Bush’s statements have not yet totally dissipated. Kenneth Lieberthal, who was President Clinton’s director of Asian affairs at the National Security Council, maintained, “This clearly does go beyond what any previous administration has indicated either orally or in writing.”10 Lieberthal said Bush had even gone beyond the abrogated 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between Taiwan and the United States. In 2004, Democratic presidential candidate John F. Kerry said on the Senate floor that Bush’s statements discarded the long-held policy of “strategic ambiguity” in the Taiwan Strait without consulting Congress or U.S. allies. The U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity dates back to the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. This legislation states that an attempt to solve the Taiwan question by anything other than peaceful means would be “of grave concern to the United States,” but does not state if the United States would intervene in a war in the Taiwan Strait.11 By not stating specifically whether the United States would intervene, the Taiwan Relations Act prompted caution on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Beijing did not attack Taipei because it could not be sure the Americans would remain neutral, and Taipei did not declare formal independence because it was not guaranteed American aid.

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Bush’s initial statement marked a unilateral move away from strategic ambiguity to an ironclad assertion of America’s willingness to use military power to realize its interests. It was a commitment to use the full force of the American military against China should it attack Taiwan. Bush’s later statement that he had not meant to stray from the assertions of previous presidents created the appearance that his administration did not understand the intricacies of U.S.–China relations. This situation shows that any new administration requires input from experienced China hands to prevent the arbitrary redefinition of painstakingly constructed and long-held U.S. policy. Unintentionally guaranteeing U.S. protection of Taiwan was an irresponsible act that temporarily encouraged pro-independence forces on Taiwan and increased the likelihood that the United States would be drawn into a war in the near future.

BUSH ENCOUR AGES TAIWAN SEPAR ATISTS

Unintentionally or otherwise, the Bush administration early on signaled to both Taipei and Beijing that the United States was willing to defend Taiwan in the event of a cross-Strait war. In 2003, Bush publicly criticized President Chen and contradicted earlier impressions of his commitment to Taiwan. Nevertheless, although Taiwan remains officially cautious about Bush’s pledge of overt support for the island, in private many pro-independence activists believe that the United States will unconditionally protect Taiwan. They believe that Bush’s “whatever it takes” statement, combined with the size of the arms package he approved clearly demonstrate that the Bush

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administration will actively support their struggle for independence. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue said Bush’s statement on ABC “shows that [the United States] has drifted further on a dangerous road.”12 She also argued that Bush had violated the three U.S.–China joint communiqués in which the United States acknowledged the Beijing government’s claim to Taiwan. As Zhang correctly noted, the proposed arms package violates the 1982 joint U.S.–China communiqué, in which the United States agreed that arms sales to Taiwan would not “exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative terms the level of those supplied in recent years.” The communiqué continued by stating that the United States “intends to gradually reduce its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to final resolution.”13 Even accounting for inflation, $4 billion worth of weapons is a substantial increase over previous sales, which were slightly more than $500 million in the last years of the Carter administration.14 A package of such size not only threatens to embolden separatist forces on the island, but the inclusion of offensive weapons such as diesel submarines poses a direct threat to Chinese national security. The United States must realize that selling large quantities of advanced arms to Taiwan will only increase the chance for irrational decisions in Taipei and the possibility that the United States will be drawn into a full-scale war with a nuclear power. In Washington, China analysts were universally shocked by the implications of President Bush’s comments that the United States would do “whatever it takes” to defend Taiwan. Even Ted Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy

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studies at the conservative Cato Institute, criticized Bush’s statement.15 Comparing the Taiwan issue with the competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union in Western Europe, Carpenter notes that Taiwan embodies “issues of national pride and prestige” to China in a way that Western Europe did not for the USSR during the Cold War. China perceives Taiwan to be a rightful part of its sovereign territory. While Taiwan is a major trading partner of the United States and a fellow democracy, its importance to the United States does not measure up to the perceived importance of Western Europe and North Asia during the Cold War.16 Carpenter advised that the United States should continue to arm Taiwan but issue a firm statement that it will not intervene in a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait.17 The issue of Taiwan is salient to both American and Chinese national security. Confusing and contradictory comments only increase the chance of misunderstanding and conflict between Beijing, Washington, and Taipei. Without a clear and consistent policy toward cross-Taiwan Strait relations, it is extremely difficult for other nations to gauge American national sentiment and to predict U.S. actions. In the highly militarized Taiwan Strait, such confusion could lead to disaster.

PRC FIRM ON ONE-CHINA PRINCIPLE

Ultimately, China desires peaceful reunification with Taiwan. The mainland Chinese realize that trade between the mainland and Taiwan amounts to more than $60 billion per year,18 with Taiwan having invested more than $80 billion in the mainland during the past fifteen years.19 However, the leader-

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ship in Beijing will not compromise on issues relating to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, including their belief that Taiwan is indivisible from the Chinese nation. Beijing’s official position is that it will not enter into negotiations with Taipei under any conditions unless the Taiwanese accept the one-China principle, nor will it tolerate a situation of one China-one Taiwan, two Chinas, or an independent Taiwan. China realizes that any use of force against the island will be met with extreme opposition from both the international community and the population of Taiwan. Despite these and other severe consequences, Beijing has consistently and persuasively stated that it will go to war before it relinquishes its claim of sovereignty over the island. Over the past twenty years, I have had many opportunities to talk with Chinese Politburo Standing Committee members in the United States and China, including Deng Xiaoping, generals and other military representatives, as well as China’s increasingly influential think-tank scholars and university professors. During these discussions, they most frequently invoke the future of China, U.S.–China relations, China’s economy, and Taiwan. Among these issues, none has been more important to the Chinese, liberal and conservative, than Taiwan. Since the 1990s, Chinese leaders have become more flexible in their approach to reconciliation. China now demands only that Taiwan accept the one-China principle as a precursor to negotiations. As long as Taiwan accepts that the inhabitants on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are Chinese and belong to one China, mainland China will be open to considering any type of political arrangements. The Chinese policymakers, think-tank scholars, and academics with whom I have spoken say that unless the United States abides by the August 1982 joint communiqué on arms sales to

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Taiwan, China will not believe the U.S. commitment to a peaceful resolution in the Taiwan Strait. For the mainland Chinese to believe that the United States desires peace in the Taiwan Strait, the United States will eventually have to end all arms sales to Taiwan, as called for in the communiqué. If President Bush, perhaps influenced by hard-line advisors, continues to ignore legal commitments to Beijing by strengthening military and political relations with Taiwan, U.S.–China conflict is inevitable. If Taiwan declares independence, China will resort to force. Strengthened ties with the United States only embolden independence advocates who believe the United States will protect them if their actions precipitate a cross-strait war. A military conflict between China and the United States will result in incalculable damage to vital U.S. interests including global economic recession, widespread instability in the Asia-Pacific region, and emboldening U.S. enemies worldwide.

CONTINUED MILITARY COOPER ATION WITH TAIWAN

It is increasingly difficult to decipher the Bush administration’s approach to Taiwan relations. In late 2002, the Bush administration granted permission for Taiwanese military officers to attend classes at the Pentagon-funded Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. Additionally, the Bush administration has relaxed restrictions on U.S. military officers traveling to Taiwan. U.S. military representatives are currently involved in dozens of programs on the island, including classroom seminars and training in the field. U.S. officers are advising Taiwan’s military at all levels in policy, implementation, and training. Pentagon officials

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are involved in helping Taiwan reform its military “software,” including training and civilian control and improving inter-service operability.20 In addition, the two militaries have established a hotline for communicating in case of an emergency. Continuing the Clinton administration’s initiative, the U.S. military is bolstering its forces in the Pacific to respond quickly and powerfully to any Chinese move toward Taiwan. According to Peter Brookes, former deputy assistant defense secretary for Asian and Pacific affairs, the United States has decided to “improve our forward deterrent posture” by expanding the number of carrier battle groups in the Western Pacific and deploying additional warships and guided missile submarines.21 Until now, U.S. Navy policy has been to maintain only one carrier battle group in the western Pacific. The Navy plans to base three Los Angeles–class nuclear-fueled attack submarines in Guam. In February 2005, the United States and Japan presented a joint security declaration asserting that Taiwan’s security is a “common strategic objective.”22 This move signified Secretary of State Rice’s new Asia policy, articulated in her Sophia University speech, which places the development of U.S. relations with its long-time allies (such as Japan) above the improvement of relations with less benign partners (such as China). This joint declaration could be seen as a particularly stinging diplomatic strike against China, which continues to harbor long-held animosity toward Japan and suspicion of the U.S.–Japanese alliance in Asia. In April 2002, Taiwan Defense Minister Tang Yao-ming attended a three-day conference in Florida and met with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. At the conference, Wolfowitz committed the United States to helping Taiwan with its military modernization, something no senior defense official has done publicly in years. Wolfowitz announced that “we are

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eager to help. . . . Just as important as arms sales issues, these non-hardware or software exchanges serve very important purposes.”23 China issued a protest with the U.S. ambassador, and warned that the visit could halt the recent progress in bilateral relations. However, unlike its reaction to previous incidents, Beijing did not respond by calling off the upcoming U.S. trip by Vice President Hu Jintao. In 2004, the United States continued to permit controversial “stopovers” on U.S. soil by Taiwanese officials. In China’s view, U.S. approval of a two-night stopover in New York and a onenight stop in Houston, Texas, by Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian en route to a diplomatic tour of Latin America was a clear violation of the one-China principle. While the United States maintains that it supports the one-China policy and that Taiwan is part of China, allowing high-level Taiwanese officials to visit the United States presents a different picture. Shortly after Chen’s reelection, Taiwanese Vice President Annette Lu stopped to “refuel” in the United States and, while doing so, called for the renaming of the Republic of China to Taiwan, ROC.24 In June 2004, a senior Taiwan delegation, led by the head of the then Pan-Green legislative Yuan (consisting of the Democratic Progressive Party, the Taiwan Solidarity Union, and the minor Taiwan Independence Party), visited Washington to discuss the details of the weapons package that had been approved by President Bush in 2001.25

PRO-CHINA POLICY

Despite the appearance of a one-sided, pro-Taiwan China policy, President Bush has warmed to Beijing. Just as the mili-

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tary has detected an increased threat from China in recent years, U.S. diplomatic officials have been faced with the reality of an international system in which both China and the United States stand to gain through cooperation. Economically, China is a key U.S. trading partner and the holder of an enormous amount of U.S. dollars. Strategically, China is critical in bringing North Korea to the table to discuss its nuclear weapons programs. The White House has taken steps to maintain positive U.S.–China relations. In June 2004, the White House pressured the Pentagon to call off a visit to Taiwan by Major-General John Allen. Observers assumed this decision was made in response to pressure from Beijing and displeasure over Taiwan taking too long to finalize President Bush’s 2001 weapons deal.26 During a visit by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in December 2004, President Bush issued a warning about Taiwan’s aspirations for independence stating, “The comment and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose.”27 Furthermore, the United States committed itself to the process of regular high-level talks between Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick and his Ministry of Foreign Affairs counterpart.

PRESSURE FROM ALL SIDES—THE FUTURE OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN

Because of the strategic and economic significance of the U.S.–China relationship and the complex and unpredictable nature of the relationship between the United States, the PRC

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and the ROC, different interests will continue to pressure policymakers in all three governments. With Rice now in a key position at the State Department, it is likely that the amicability toward China displayed under Powell will be tempered. With Secretary Rumsfeld’s visit to China, the development of a direct U.S.–PRC military line, and the continued threat of a nuclear North Korea it is likely that the U.S. military will be pressed to improve its relations with China (and, in doing so, pursue its partnership with Taiwan less fervently). In an article in Foreign Affairs, Kenneth Lieberthal argued that “right now, there appears to be an unusual two-year window of opportunity to change the underlying cross-strait dynamic because the top leaders in Beijing, Taipei and Washington now have terms of office that stretch until at least late 2007.”28 Because of the interconnectedness of this tri-polar relationship, all three governments have tools and motives to appease and coerce one another. If these governments can develop these tools and motives into coherent, articulate “carrot and stick” policies, they may be able to take advantage of this window of opportunity. However, if they cannot reconcile the diverse set of interests within their own governments into rational, consistent policies there is an increased threat of a dangerous crisis developing in the region.

NOTES 1. Colin Powell, “A Strategy of Partnerships,” Foreign Affairs 83 (1) (January/February 2004): 22. 2. “Bush Defends Taiwan Arms Sales,” BBC News, 25 April 2001, bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1295542.stm.

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3. John Pomfret, “In Fact and in Tone, U.S. Expresses New Fondness for Taiwan,” Washington Post, 30 April 2002, A12. 4. Pomfret, “In Fact and in Tone, U.S. Expresses New Fondness for Taiwan.” 5. Steven Mufson, and Robert Kaiser, “China Warns U.S. on Warship Sale to Taiwan,” Washington Post, 21 March 2001, A25. 6. Craig Smith, “Visiting Chinese to Urge Bush Not to Sell Arms to Taiwan,” New York Times, March 12, 2001, A5. 7. Along with the Aegis-equipped destroyers, the PAC 3 antiballistic missile system is another main component of a future theater missile defense (TMD) system. 8. Steven Mufson and Dana Milbank, “Taiwan to Get Variety of Arms,” Washington Post, 24 April 2001, A1. 9. Steven Mufson, “President Pledges Defense of Taiwan: Policy Unchanged, White House Says,” Washington Post, 26 April 2001, A1. 10. Mufson, “President Pledges Defense of Taiwan,” A22. 11. Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China: an Investigative History (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), 274. 12. John Leicester, “China Attacks Bush Over Taiwan,” Yahoo!News, 26 April 2001, www.news.yahoo.com. 13. “United States-China Joint Communiqué on United States Arms Sales to Taiwan,” August 17, 1982. 14. Mann, About Face, 124. 15. Ted Galen Carpenter, “Going Too Far: Bush’s Pledge to Defend Taiwan,” Cato: Foreign Policy Briefing no. 66 (30 May 2001): 3–4. 16. Carpenter, “Going Too Far,” 4. See also Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy,” International Security 25 (4) (Spring 2001): 17–20. 17. Carpenter, “Going Too Far,” 5. 18. Jin Zhang, “Cross Strait Trade Imbalance Speeds Up,” China Daily, 19 January 2004, www2.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2004-01/19/ content_300375.htm.

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19. Jane Skanderup, “Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Economic Strategy and the WTO,” Issues and Insights 1–4 (January 2004): 7. 20. Philip Pan, “U.S. Hits Obstacles in Helping Taiwan Guard Against China,” Washington Post, 30 October 2003, A1. 21. Pan, “U.S. Hits Obstacles In Helping Taiwan Guard Against China,” A1. 22. Anthony Faiola, “Japan to Join US Policy on Taiwan,” Washington Post, 18 February 2005, A1. 23. Pomfret, “In Fact and in Tone, U.S. Expresses New Fondness for Taiwan,” A12. 24. Bonnie Glaser and Jane Skanderup, “U.S.–China Relations: Anxiety About Taiwan Hits New Heights,” Comparative Connections vol. 6, no. 2 (July 2004): 40. 25. Glaser and Skanderup, “U.S.-China Relations: Anxiety About Taiwan Hits New Heights,” 40. 26. “China Pressure: U.S. Calls Off Visit to Taiwan,” Agence France Presse, 29 June 2004. www.afp.com. 27. Glenn Kessler, “Cheney to Reassert US Stance on Taiwan,” Washington Post, 14 April 2004, A20. 28. Kenneth Lieberthal, “Preventing a War Over Taiwan,’ Foreign Affairs 84 (2) (March/April 2005): 53–63.

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ISSUE 2: SECURITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

The Bush Administration Consults Other Nations major policy initiative of the Bush administration was the creation of a national missile defense system. In the face of widespread international apprehension over plans to develop and deploy the system, the Bush administration sent a team of U.S. envoys, including then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, to consult with Russian and European leaders on national missile defense in early May 2001. Given China’s importance and that it would be directly affected by a U.S. national missile defense system, it was surprising that China was not visited by the envoy. However, on May 15, James Kelly, thenAssistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, did meet with arms control and foreign policy officials in Beijing. Kelly indicated that he “stressed that our plans for a missile defense system would not be a threat to China.”1 In March, Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Qian Qichen led a delegation to

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the United States that met with high-ranking administration officials, including President Bush, and members of Congress. National missile defense was one of the issues Qian’s delegation discussed. As Kelly was leaving Beijing, he noted there were still differences of opinion between Beijing and Washington on the issue, but that his talks were a good beginning “to what both sides agreed would be a continuing dialogue on these important security issues.”2 Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi stated that U.S. missile defense would “harm others without benefiting the United States itself.”3 He asserted that China’s opposition to the United States building such a system “because it destroys the global strategic balance and upsets international stability.” According to Sun, “When you invent a new shield, you will invent new types of spears. It always goes like that.”4 Sun also maintained, “China will not sit idly by and watch its national interests suffer harm.”5 In contrast to comments made by Sha Zukang, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Department, in March, Sun indicated China was more opposed to theater missile defense than national missile defense because theater missile defense would upset the balance of power in Asia.6 China Wary of U.S. Initiative In a September 1999 speech at the Citadel in Charleston, S.C., then Governor Bush mentioned the need to counter missile threats from both rogue states as well as China. According to the media, China has only eighteen DF-5 long-range intercontinental missiles with the capability to reach America.7 Given this, China was puzzled as to why the United States should fear

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a Chinese missile threat. Beijing believes that if the United States successfully implements national missile defense, it will severely undermine China’s strategic position and make the United States more willing to intervene in issues that affect China’s interests, including Taiwan. The link between national missile defense and Taiwan is very salient to Chinese policymakers. An American theater missile defense system could be expanded to Taiwan, and enable it to protect itself against Chinese missiles. If national missile defense is successfully deployed by the United States, China will seek ways to counter it strategically. China’s energies are currently focused on economic development, and the government does not wish to divert its attention and resources to an arms race. Sha Zukang said China was encouraged by the Bush administration’s assurances that national missile defense is not meant to undermine China’s ability to defend itself. Sha indicated that “China welcomes the statement, and we are ready to have dialogue and discussion with the Americans.”8 While he maintained that a national missile shield for the United States would be “unilateral nuclear expansion,” he maintained China would negotiate on the issue of the United States protecting itself from a limited missile attack. Sha also expressed China is not against a theater missile defense to defend American troops and ships in Asia.9 However, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson backed away from the latter stance in subsequent comments. If the United States successfully deploys national missile defense, China will likely build its nuclear forces to maintain its strategic position, even though it would rather allocate scarce resources for peaceful economic development. This may cause an arms race in South Asia; India would likely respond to

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China and increase its own nuclear forces. This in turn would cause Pakistan to increase its nuclear capabilities. If the United States insists on pursuing national missile defense, it must do so in a way that does not hurt China’s strategic position.

SIX-PARTY TALKS

China surprised the international community in August 2003 when it announced that it would host the first “Six-Party Talks” to help diffuse the North Korean nuclear crisis. The most recent North Korean nuclear crisis began in the fall of 2002 when North Korea admitted it was conducting a clandestine uranium processing program. As U.S.–North Korean relations deteriorated during the spring of 2003, the United States increasingly called for China to play a more active role in defusing the crisis. Throughout most of the period since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China had been wary of multilateral organizations and had never taken the lead in dealing with an international crisis. In this case, however, Beijing played the key role in initiating dialogue between North Korea and the United States. China’s active involvement in the North Korean nuclear crisis is proof of China’s increasing self-confidence and the high priority that China places on preserving regional peace and stability. Just before the first round of talks, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing stated that “China is playing a constructive role in helping to bring the nuclear issue of the peninsula on to the track of a peaceful solution. We are happy that we seem to enjoy full support of all the international community.”10

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China’s motivations for trying to resolve the North Korean problem are twofold. First, Beijing fears that a nuclear-armed North Korea could trigger an arms race in East Asia leading South Korea, Japan, and possibly even Taiwan to rekindle their interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. Second, China is extremely concerned about the negative effects of a North Korean regime implosion or U.S.-induced “regime change” that would result in hundreds of thousands of North Koreans fleeing into China’s sensitive northeast. China fears that a mass migration to this region could spark explosive social unrest. According to Chu Shulong, an international security expert at Tsinghua University, “China realized that if things got out of control, North Korea could go crazy and President Bush could go crazy, too. We saw danger on both sides.”11 Since the commencement of the Six-Party Talks, China has faced a number of diplomatic obstacles. In August and September 2005, the long-stalled fourth round of talks commenced, and on September 19, representatives of all six parties issued a joint statement asserting that the DPRK “committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards.”12 Still this development warranted cautious optimism. Only a day after this announcement, North Korea renewed its demand for a light-water nuclear reactor. The U.S. government maintains that the feasibility of such a project cannot even be discussed until after the DPRK has abandoned its nuclear weapons program. It remains to be seen whether negotiations, which have failed so many times before, will achieve success. Thus far, China’s leverage with regard to North Korea has proven less

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substantial than originally thought by many American policymakers. At a March 10, 2005 United States congressional hearing several members of Congress referred to China’s role in the North Korean stalemate as a “litmus test”13 for the future trajectory of Sino-American relations. During the hearing, U.S. policymakers called on China to do more to coax North Korea back to the negotiating table. Henry Sokolski of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center asserted that “several opportunities to leverage China on North Korea have recently arisen that have not yet been exploited.”14 It has been argued that China no longer sees North Korea as an ideological partner or as a buffer against “Western containment.”15 With these traditional interests in the isolated regime no longer relevant, some argue that China now sees its relationship with North Korea as “a bargaining chip” in its relations with the United States.16 Michael Swaine asserts that “Washington has become increasingly dependent on China to prevent the emergence on the Korean Peninsula of another major foreign policy dilemma beyond those occurring in Iraq, Afghanistan and Israel-Palestine.”17 Still others argue that Sino-American cooperation is not one-dimensional. China needs to maintain its relationship with the United States just as the United States needs China. Placed in the difficult, yet potentially empowering, position of mediator, China has attempted to pressure both Washington and Pyongyang to adopt more conciliatory positions. Beijing sees the United States as too inflexible. For the U.S. part, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Evans Revere asserted that “the opening phase of this agreement that we proposed last year requires a commitment on the part of the DPRK to start the

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process.”18 Wary of North Korea’s legacy of reneging on diplomatic commitments, the White House refuses to discuss the details of any concessions until Pyongyang begins disarming its nuclear arsenal. However, Kim Jong Il remains wary of any cooperation with a government that labels him part of the “Axis of Evil.” Furthermore, three of President Clinton’s former advisors observe that “the bottom line is that North Korea is no better off today than it was in 1994, before [the Agreed Framework, established under Clinton] was completed. Indeed, a strong case can be made that—a decade later—North Korea is in worse shape. . . . While the benefits to North Korea from the Agreed Framework may not have appreciably improved its situation, some might argue that they prevented the collapse of an undesirable regime. This seems unlikely, given the role of China.”19 Given the lack of improvements in North Korea under the Agreed Framework, it is not surprising that Kim Jong Il is wary of the outcome of future negotiations with the United States. While the United States offers “sticks” such as the threat of Security Council-backed sanctions, it has offered few tangible “carrots” (beyond security assurances) since the collapse of the Agreed Framework. Undoubtedly, such assurances are critical. Daniel A. Pinkston of the Monterey Institute of International Studies’ Center for Nonproliferation Studies recently warned members of Congress that “pressure alone is not sufficient to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program. . . . North Korea will only abandon its nuclear weapons program if it feels secure enough to do so . . . but China cannot provide the type of credible security assurances to persuade North Korea to give up its ‘nuclear deterrent.’”20

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Pinkston concluded that “in Pyongyang’s view, the U.S. is the only nation that can provide the type of security assurances that might persuade North Korea to commit to the ‘complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement’ of its nuclear weapons program.”21 However, if the United States is truly serious about its desire to succeed in disarming North Korea of its nuclear weapons program, it may find itself in the undesirable position of having to offer its opponent some early material support. For the meantime, China has attempted to fill this void by supplying North Korea with oil and food imports as well as a market for their exports. Meanwhile, China continues to pressure North Korea. It is critical that the Bush administration recognize this. When a “technical problem” forced China to cut off North Korea’s oil supply in 2003, China was able to coerce Kim into returning to negotiations with the United States. While U.S. officials have praised the diplomatic efforts of the PRC in the past, they have done so inconsistently. The question then becomes whether it is lack of political will or lack of political clout that prevents China from forcing the DPRK to adopt policies favorable to the United States. It is most likely a combination of the two. While the interests of China and the United States on the Korean Peninsula are not identical, Washington must recognize that Beijing seems to embrace its role as conflict mediator—particularly the influence and prestige associated with such a role. Only by cooperating as equals will China and the United States have a chance to make progress with Pyongyang. The United States must be more open to China’s recommendations if it truly expects the PRC to take full advantage of its leverage in North Korea.

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NOTES 1. Erik Eckholm, “China Unconvinced as Missile Talks End,” New York Times, 16 May 2001, A6. 2. Eckholm, “China Unconvinced as Missile Talks End,” A16. 3. Eckholm, “China Unconvinced as Missile Talks End,” A16. 4. Phillip Pan, “China Firm On Missile Defense Opposition,” Washington Post, 16 May 2001, A19. 5. Eckholm, “China Unconvinced as Missile Talks End,” A6. 6. Pan, “China Firm On Missile Defense Opposition,” A19. 7. Michael Gordon, “Bush to Meet Chinese on Issues Crucial for Ties,” Washington Post, 19 March 2001, A1. 8. Craig Smith, “China Willing to Talk About Missile Defenses,” New York Times, 15 March 2001, A10. 9. John Pomfret, “Beijing Eases Stand On Missile Defense,” Washington Post, 15 March 2001, A21. 10. John Pomfret, “A New Direction for Chinese Diplomacy; Nuclear Threat in North Korea Prompts Ambitious Moves Toward Multilateralism,” Washington Post, 16 August 2003, A17. 11. Promfret, “A New Direction for Chinese Diplomacy,” A17. 12. “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing, September 19, 2005,” www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490 .htm. 13. “China’s Proliferation Practices and Role in the North Korea Crisis: Opening Statement of C. Richard D’Amato, Chairman,” Hearing before the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission, 10 March 2005, www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_ testimonies/05_03_10wrtr/damata_richard_open_statement.pdfpdf; “China’s Proliferation Practices and Role in the North Korea Crisis: Opening Statement of Roger W. Robinson, Jr.,” Hearing before the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission, 10 March 2005, www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/ 05_03_10wrtr/robinson_roger_open_statement.pdf.

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14. “Treating the DPRK as a Global Nuclear Challenge,” written testimony submitted to the hearing before the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission, 10 March 2005, www.uscc.gov/ hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_03_10wrtr/robinson_ roger_open_statement.pdf. 15. Quan Jing, “A Regional Discussion of the Six-Party Process: Challenges and Opportunities in North Korea” The Brookings Institution, 11 March 2005, 48, www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/ 2005/0311north%20korea/20050311.pdf. 16. Jing, “A Regional Discussion,” 49–50. 17. Michael D. Swaine, “Exploiting a Strategic Opening,” Strategic Asia 2004–05: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power (Seattle: National Bureau for Asia Research, 2004), 81. 18. Evans Revere, “A Regional Discussion of the Six-Party Process: Challenges and Opportunities in North Korea,” The Brookings Institution, 11 March 2005, 13, www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/ 2005/0311north%20korea/20050311.pdf. 19. Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brookings University Press, 2004), 391. 20. “Testimony of Daniel A. Pinkston, Congressional Hearing on China’s Proliferation Practices and Role in the North Korea Crisis,” Testimony before the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission, 10 March 2005. www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/ written_testimonies/05_03_10wrtr/pinkston_daniel_wrts.pdf. 21. “Testimony of Daniel A. Pinkston,”www.uscc.gov/hearings/ 2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_03_10wrtr/pinkston_daniel_wrt s.pdf.

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ISSUE 3: MILITARY-TOMILITARY CONTACTS

lthough China’s participation in multilateral diplomacy has earned it some positive feedback from the international community, its military development continues to keep China under the watchful eye of the United States. Although China has long maintained a policy of “no first use” of weapons, words and actions by both officials and the government have raised concerns. In December 2004, PLA Major General Zhu Chenghu indicated that a serious military threat by the United States would warrant a nuclear response by the People’s Liberation Army.1 When General Zhu reiterated this opinion before an audience of visiting correspondents in Hong Kong in July 2005, he aroused strong criticism from Washington and Beijing. Zhu asserted, “If the Americans draw their missiles and position-guided ammunition on to the target zone on China’s territory, I think we will have to respond with nuclear weapons.”2 PRC and PLA leadership quickly distanced themselves from General Zhu’s “opinion,” stressing that there had been no change to China’s long-held “no first use” of nuclear weapons policy.

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Less than a week after General Zhu’s remarks made international headlines the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) published its long-awaited Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005. In terms of its recommendations to Congress, little had changed since the last report. The U.S. Defense Department maintained its concern that China’s ongoing military buildup could pose a threat to other countries. The report asserted that “over the long term, if current trends persist, PLA capabilities could pose a credible threat to other modern militaries operating in the region.”3 Information on China’s military, including its defense spending, has long been shrouded in secrecy. According to the findings of the OSD report, the country’s actual military spending is two to three times higher than Beijing publicly announces, making it the third highest in the world—behind that of the United States and Russia.4 Referring to China’s military equipment, the report voices serious concern over the buildup of the Chinese naval and air forces, in particular. The report also warned of the consequences of any decision by the European Union to lift its 1989 arms embargo on China. The OSD warned that an end to EU sanctions would precipitate an acceleration of China’s military modernization that would, in turn, “have direct implications for stability in the Taiwan Strait and the safety of U.S. personnel; it would also accelerate a shift in the regional balance of power, affecting the security of many countries. . . . Finally, Beijing’s track record in transfers of conventional arms and military technologies suggests EU or other third-party sales to China could lead to improvements in the systems that Chinese companies market abroad.”5

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MILITARY-TO-MILITARY

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It has been a tumultuous five years for Sino-American military relations. In order to understand the current state of U.S.–China military contacts, one must understand and assess the impact of past events. THE PLANE COLLISION CONTROVERSY

Background On April 1, 2001, an American surveillance plane and a Chinese fighter jet collided approximately eighty miles southeast of the China’s Hainan island. The American plane, an EP-3E Aries II turboprop, made an emergency landing on Hainan. The Chinese F-8 fighter jet crashed into the South China Sea; its pilot, Wang Wei, was killed. The Chinese government said the crash was caused by a sudden veering of the American plane and that the United States bore “total responsibility” for what happened.6 The United States argued that Wang’s jet had hit the American plane. China detained the EP-3E’s twenty-four American crewmembers and boarded the damaged aircraft. The detention of the crew and aircraft combined with China’s distress at losing a fighter pilot and a plane created a crisis that could not have been foreseen when President Bush took office. How he dealt with the delicate problem, however, had the potential to significantly affect the U.S.–China relationship. Furthermore, fears arose that a negative reception of Bush’s actions in China could lead to an increase in dissident detention and arrests. Despite these fears, the U.S. advantageous position vis-à-vis China allowed it to push for a resolution of the crisis in its

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favor. Military relations with China, and by extension U.S. relations with Taiwan, became an important bargaining chip in American efforts to resolve the crisis. The release of an arms package for Taiwan was just weeks away when the incident occurred, and the pending decision on the Aegis battle system became colored by the crisis. Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del.) said his opposition to “upping the ante” on Taiwan arms sales “could be overwhelmed by events.”7 Should the situations not have been resolved favorably, it was clear that the United States could respond by aggressively moving forward with national missile defense and trying to stamp out China’s strategic position. Furthermore, China’s economic development was tied to its trade relationship with the United States. On April 4, days after the collision, Congress introduced a bill to revoke normal trade relations with China. Initial American actions after the collisions demonstrated U.S. leverage over China and American commitment to use that leverage to obtain an outcome in American favor. According to Norman Polmar, a Navy analyst and author who is an expert on electronic intelligence, this was the first time an EP-3E was captured by a foreign government. Because of the plane’s military importance and the sensitive information it contained, American officials sought to protect it from search after it landed on Hainan. Cmdr. John Singley, a spokesman for the U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii, said the plane had sovereign immune status, meaning it could not be searched, inspected, or held without U.S. permission.8 Joseph Prueher, U.S. ambassador to China, also made that assertion.9 Other U.S. officials, including Adm. Dennis Blair, commanderin-chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, maintained that the plane was similar to an embassy. However, legal and intelli-

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gence experts disagreed with that claim. Jeffrey Smith, a lawyer who served in the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, said that although the plane was obviously U.S. property, “its status is in no way comparable to an embassy.”10 American attempts to prevent the Chinese from boarding the plane failed. However, U.S. military officials ascertained that the crew deleted top-secret codes and intelligence and threw sensitive electronic equipment into the South China Sea, before the plane was boarded by the Chinese. It would later be acknowledged by Pentagon officials that some classified manuals and other documents dealing with “tactics and operations” had not been thrown out or destroyed by the time Chinese security forces entered the aircraft. Although the crew was able to meet with U.S. diplomats on April 3, the crisis was far from resolved. China, United States Exchange Belligerent Remarks In both China and the United States, officials spoke with highly contentious rhetoric. Sen. John Warner (R-Va.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said the incident would not have occurred if the Chinese had respected international airspace. Warner said China would be seen as “very unprofessional” if it did not explain the collision accurately and release the plane and crew.11 Cmdr. Rex Totty of the U.S. Pacific Command stated that the Chinese had a history of tailing close to American planes.12 On the other side, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao defended the legality of China’s monitoring of the U.S. aircraft, and criticized the American plane for entering

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Chinese airspace and landing on Chinese territory without permission. He said the crew never signaled the Chinese they were landing on Hainan island, as they were bound to do by international law. Totty responded that the plane gave the standard “mayday” emergency alert before landing.13 On April 3, President Bush said it was time for the American crew to come home and the plane to be returned.14 The Chinese responded harshly to the president’s statements, requesting “the United States . . . take full responsibility, make an apology to the Chinese government and people, and give [China] an explanation for its actions.” Meanwhile, Chinese President Jiang Zemin maintained China had “full evidence” that the U.S. plane caused the crash by breaking standard flight rules, and called on the United States to make an official apology as well as to end surveillance flights along China’s coast.15 Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu, when asked when the twenty-four American crew members would be released, replied that the answer lay in China’s demand for an apology and explanation. Zhu also criticized the United States for flying a surveillance plane over the 200-mile exclusive economic zone off China’s coast, calling it an abuse of “freedom of overflight,” and stated that the United States had “threatened China’s security.” Referring to China as the “victim country” in the incident, he said the plane had no immunity from being boarded and asserted China’s right to inspect it.16 Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan reportedly told Ambassador Prueher that the United States had been arrogant and had “made groundless accusations against China.”17 Earlier, Prueher indicated the U.S. government would “have a

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problem” with apologizing to China.18 Secretary of State Powell said bluntly, “We have nothing to apologize for.”19 Despite the crisis, President Jiang went forward with a scheduled twelve-day trip to Latin America on April 4. Meanwhile, there was a stirring of anti-Chinese sentiment in Congress. Some eighty members of Congress, more than two-thirds of them Republican, sent a letter on April 3 to President Bush asking that Taiwan be granted its request for advanced weapons, including the Aegis radar systems. The letter, which had been circulating for several weeks, did not contain any reference to the plane collision; however, the timing of the letter’s delivery was most likely related to the plane crisis. The next day, a coalition of House members introduced a bill that would revoke China’s normal trading status.20 Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa), head of the Senate Finance Committee, which deals with trade issues, predicted that if the controversy continued to grow, trade relations between China and the United States could be affected, as the position of China opponents would be strengthened.21 U.S. Voices Regret Despite the introduction of a bill to remove China’s normal trading state, tensions began to ease on April 4. Secretary of State Powell sent a letter to Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Qian outlining suggestions to defuse the crisis. Powell also publicly voiced regret over the incident. “We regret the Chinese plane did not get down safe and we regret the loss of the life of that Chinese pilot,” he said.22 The next day, President Bush also voiced public regret, saying, “I regret that a Chinese pilot

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is missing, and I regret that one of their airplanes is lost. Our prayers go out to the family, to the pilot.”23 Despite this new language, China continued to press for an American apology. On April 7, Qian replied to Powell that the U.S. response to the incident was “still unacceptable . . . and the Chinese people are extremely dissatisfied with this.”24 The April 7 edition of China’s state-run People’s Liberation Army Daily repeated China’s demand for an apology and echoed President Jiang’s call for the United States to stop reconnaissance flights near China. A State Department official, however, said that while Chinese officials took a hard line in public pronouncements, privately they were working with the American side. A top administration official said the United States was addressing the matter as “an accident and a trauma for the Chinese, and as a situation to be resolved by being temperate and realizing that moderate and appropriate steps are needed to handle this.”25 On April 8, Vice President Cheney and Secretary of State Powell warned that China’s refusal to return the crew of the plane was causing mounting risk of long-term damage to the U.S.–China relationship. While not accepting U.S. responsibility for the collision, Powell expressed “sorrow” for the death of Wang Wei. Referring to Wang’s wife, Powell said on CBS’s Face the Nation, “We’re sorry that her husband was lost, no matter what the fault was.”26 Powell also said the United States was sorry that its plane had landed in China without permission, but said the United States could not be seen to be giving an apology in which it accepted responsibility.27 Meanwhile, President Bush sent a sympathy letter to Wang’s wife. The next day, President Bush also warned of the possible effect on U.S.–China relations. “It is now time for our troops to

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come home, so that our relationship does not become damaged,” he said.28 However, Chinese officials, reacting to the more conciliatory words of the previous days, said it was not enough. Chinese officials described President Jiang as “highly unsatisfied.” Zhu of the Foreign Ministry asked, “Where is the responsibility? I think it is very clear. The pronouncements of the United States are unacceptable to the Chinese people.”29 China Accepts U.S. Letter of Regret On April 10, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said Powell’s remarks were “a step in the right direction,” but called for a full apology.30 Finally, on April 12, Ambassador Prueher gave Chinese Foreign Minister Tang a letter in English that expressed regret and sorrow about the incident. The United States said it was “very sorry” for the loss of the Chinese fighter pilot and his plane, as well as for the fact that it had entered Chinese airspace and landed at a Chinese air base without permission. The United States did maintain, however, that the American plane had followed international emergency procedures.31 The two governments’ translations of the letter into Chinese demonstrated their different interpretations. China translated “very sorry” as “shenbiao qianyi,” which signifies “a deep expression of apology or regret.” Mei Renyi, director of the American Studies Center at Beijing Foreign Studies University, said that to the Chinese, the use of “shenbiao qianyi” means one is admitting fault and accepting responsibility. On the other hand, in the U.S. version, the term “feichang wanxi” was used, for “very sorry.” That expresses a lot of sympathy without constituting an apology. The United States also used

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“feichang baoqian” to express its feeling over its plane having landed without permission; that expression means “extremely sorry” again without constituting an apology. After receiving the letter, the Chinese government released the crew “on humanitarian grounds,” in the words of President Jiang. The EP-3E plane became subject to negotiations under the 1998 U.S.–Chinese Military Maritime Consultation Agreement. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Sun said the United States had sent “a letter of apology.”32 U.S. Bellicose After Crew Returns After the crew’s safe return home, the United States blamed the Chinese pilot for causing the collision.33 Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhang responded that such comments were irresponsible and could harm U.S.–China relations. According to Zhang, the United States “ignored the facts and called black white” following the American crew’s release from China. “It is not beneficial for the development of Sino–U.S. relations and not beneficial to the forthcoming talks,” Zhang said, referring to the joint Chinese-American discussion of the incident that began April 18.34 Despite Zhu’s criticisms, an April 5 poll found that the American public was generally supportive of President Bush and dismayed with China. Out of 505 randomly picked American adults, 64 percent approved of the way Bush dealt with China regarding the April 1 collision, while only 24 percent disapproved. Fifty-four percent of respondents rejected the idea of the United States apologizing to China; 40 percent said America should apologize. The poll found strong support that

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China should return both the crew and the damaged American plane.35 Of deep concern, respondents said they considered China an “unfriendly” nation by more than a two-to-one margin, with 20 percent describing China as an “enemy” of the United States. Half of those polled said China should be primarily considered a military threat, while 36 percent said it should be seen primarily as a trading partner.36 The administration echoed the public’s belligerent mood after the crew was returned. At a news conference on April 13, President Bush spoke harshly toward China. In addition, Pentagon officials said they were considering allowing highranking Taiwanese officials to visit the United States, reducing military-to-military contacts with China, ending or reducing other official exchange programs with China, restricting U.S.–Chinese technology transfers, delaying authorization of satellite launches and campaigning against China’s bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games. The Bush administration demonstrated its dissatisfaction with China through more than words. Two Taiwanese dignitaries came to the United States on the heels of the controversy. President Chen Shui-bian attended a dinner meeting with approximately 20 members of Congress in New York and met Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. Former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui visited Los Angeles and then his alma mater, Cornell University in Ithaca, N.Y., when he came to the United States in late June. Additionally, the Pentagon prepared for possible reactions should talks between China and the United States over the plane not go well. One Pentagon plan was for fighter jets to accompany reconnaissance planes near China in the future.37

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Such an action would have been viewed by China as extremely unfriendly and hostile. Another option was to send Aegis radar-equipped ships to the area to track Chinese fighter jets that intercept American intelligence planes. While less provocative, this too would be viewed by China as unfriendly. Agreement Reached on Plane’s Return On April 18 and 19, the United States and China met in Beijing to discuss the plane incident. The United States threatened to withdraw from the talks if the Chinese did not agree to discuss the return of the damaged aircraft. The negotiations adjourned without agreement as to the cause of the crash or the fate of the plane. According to Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang, the decision on returning the plane would be linked to China’s investigation of the incident and to the U.S. response to China’s call for an end to reconnaissance missions off the coast.38 On April 29, the official New China News Agency reported that American officials would be allowed to view the damaged plane “in view of international precedents.”39 Lockheed Martin technicians who inspected the plane said it could be repaired and flown out of China. However, the Chinese government maintained that it would not allow the plane to fly out of China. The U.S. and Chinese governments eventually agreed that the plane would be dismantled and the pieces would be flown back to the United States. The wings and tail of the EP-3E plane were detached from the fuselage and the big pieces were put into a Russian-made Antonov-124 cargo plane. The AN-124 plane was flown out of China and brought to Georgia. The pieces of the $80 million spy plane would be reassembled so it could fly again.

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The United States waited until May 7 to resume reconnaissance flights off China’s coast. At that time, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer commented that “it is our prerogative and right to fly in international airspace, to preserve the peace by flying reconnaissance missions.”40 The unarmed Air Force RC-135 plane was not pursued by Chinese aircraft, officials maintained. The EP-3E controversy marked the first time President Bush dealt directly with China. Unfortunately, China was disappointed by Bush’s initial bellicose reaction and by his remarks after the crew was returned.

MILITARY RELATIONS SINCE 2001

Since the EP-3E plane incident in April 2001, Sino–U.S. relations in general, and military-to-military relations in particular, have improved substantially. Nevertheless, U.S. policy toward the People’s Liberation Army and the defense ambitions of China remain conflicted and inconsistent. This represents the complicated nature of Sino-American relations, diverging interests within the Bush administration and Congress, and the changing politics of an international system in which both the United States and China are great powers. Aura of Confusion Surrounds Policy Throughout Bush’s first term, the Department of State, under Colin Powell, was in a dispute with the Department of Defense, under Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, over the best approach to deal with the Chinese government. This tension was

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most pronounced in the months leading up to September 11, 2001, but has continued in more muted debate since. Secretary of State Powell (with the support of business interests in Congress) pointed to the progress of Sino-American relations and the growth of their mutual interests, stating in 2004, “U.S. relations with China are the best they have been since President Richard Nixon first visited Beijing more than thirty years ago.”41 This sentiment seemed to manifest itself in post-September 11 White House doctrine. The President’s National Security Strategy for the United States of America of September 17, 2002 asserts, “The United States’ relationship with China is an important part of our strategy to promote a stable, peaceful and prosperous China. We welcome the emergence of a strong, peaceful and prosperous China.”42 However, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s approach to China was more cautious. Upon assuming office in 2001, Rumsfeld immediately cancelled all pre-existing military exchanges and ordered that all future exchanges be cleared by his office on a case-by-case basis. On May 2, 2001, the Pentagon circulated a memorandum written by Christopher Williams, a Rumsfeld aide, who said all such contacts were to be suspended. It then released another statement that said the first memorandum was mistaken and that all such interaction would be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.43 Pentagon spokesman Adm. Craig Quigley called the initial memorandum an “honest misinterpretation by a member of [Rumsfeld’s] staff.” This explanation defies reason. According to one Republican staff aide on Capitol Hill, Williams is known for his careful style and his ability to coordinate with others.44 Even if that

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was not the case, a pronouncement of such importance would have to be reviewed by numerous colleagues within the Defense Department. Williams could not have written and released the statement without consulting other staff. The Bush administration appears to have made the decision to sever military relations with China, and then backtracked to merely downgrade such ties. By releasing two different memoranda, the administration revealed the internal debate over the U.S.–China relationship. Rumsfeld opposed Bush’s attempts to reinvigorate the military relationship, believing that it was imperative for the United States to first establish clear guidelines as to the pace and scope of exchanges.45 “I don’t think we ought to be so eager for military-to-military contact that we end up providing things to another country that they don’t provide to us, or where the value is not roughly comparable,” Rumsfeld said.46 Through early June 2001, there was no direct interaction between American and Chinese military officers. Several visits to the United States by Chinese military officers were canceled, and U.S. military personnel were not permitted to travel to China. Chinese officers were no longer being asked to attend seminars at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu. Secretary Rumsfeld told officers attending a multinational seminar on relief operations to which Chinese officers were also invited to “minimize contact” with their Chinese counterparts.47 The United States stopped asking permission for port stops in Hong Kong. As some U.S. military officers have argued, Rumsfeld’s actions hurt U.S. interests because military-to-military contacts provide the United States insight into Beijing’s military thinking, lead to potentially useful personal contacts and let the Chinese

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see the power the of the U.S. military.48 There is also a link to the Taiwan issue. If the Chinese see first-hand the strength of U.S. military firepower, they may be more restrained with respect to Taiwan. In addition, by interacting with the Chinese military, the United States gains a valuable assessment of how much force China can deliver against Taiwan. Rumsfeld claimed he canceled almost all military-to-military contacts with China so that Americans would not be mistreated in China because of the plane controversy.49 However, top Rumsfeld aides said he curtailed these contacts to show America’s deep displeasure with how China was handling the plane controversy.50 Neither justification is suitable. Whatever problems exist between the United States and China, the Chinese government can be expected to behave professionally toward Americans on official visits. Temporarily halting virtually all military ties only added to the tension over the plane incident. Continuing such contacts would have shown the Chinese that the United States still cared about its overall relationship with China and that the plane controversy was seen by the United States as a temporary misfortune to be resolved and put behind the two nations. Another sound point was made by Gen. H. C. Stackpole III, a retired three-star general who heads the Pentagon-funded Asia-Pacific Security Center. He claimed that curtailing contacts strengthens hard-liners in Beijing. “Those in China who do not wish to have the U.S. as an enemy find their voices become muted,” Stackpole said.51 Resumption of Military Exchanges On June 4, 2001, Rumsfeld announced he was cautiously resuming military-to-military contacts with China, and in Febru-

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ary 2005, he announced plans to visit China in the coming year. Before Rumsfeld left the Department of Defense, it was rumored that he might establish a direct military-to-military emergency line with his PLA counterpart.52 While these actions may point to a change of heart—or at least concession to external pressure—within the Defense Department, it is important to remember that its leadership was not alone in its concern regarding China. China-wary interests in Congress introduced a section attached to the 2000–2001 National Defense Authorization Act that expressly restricted PLA access to certain types of military sites.53 The CIA also adopted a more cautious approach to China’s military ambitions under the leadership of then-Director of Central Intelligence Porter Goss. In his February 16, 2005, testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Goss argued, “Beijing’s military modernization and military buildup is tilting the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. Improved Chinese capabilities threaten U.S. forces in the region.”54 Nevertheless, despite setbacks, military-to-military exchanges have continued uninterrupted since their resumption in June 2001. In October 2005, Secretary Rumsfeld made his first official visit to China. Other noteworthy exchanges in recent years include visits to China by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith (2002, 2004), the U.S. Navy’s PACCOM Commander Admiral Tom Fargo (2002), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers (2004), and Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Richard Lawless (2005); and visits to the United States by Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan (2003) and Chief of the General Staff of the PLA Liang Guanglie (2004). In addition to these exchanges, during his first term President Bush met with his Chinese counterparts (first Jiang

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Zemin and later Hu Jintao) an unprecedented number of times.55 Since Rumsfeld’s departure from the Department of Defense, U.S.–China military relations have remained complex; however, the new Defense Secretary has sought to maintain and enhance military contacts. In November 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made his first official visit to China. Although the issues of China’s military expansion and Taiwan continue to complicate U.S.–Chinese military-to-military relations, attempts to promote cooperation and communication were made during Gates’s trip. During Gates’s visit, for example, an agreement to establish a direct telephone hotline between the Chinese Ministry of National Defense and the U.S. Department of Defense was announced.56 Pentagon officials, who noted that the Chinese did not have a similar arrangement with any other nation, classified the hotline’s development as significant.57 Although the hotline is evidence of improving Sino-American military relations, its creation also underscores the increasing importance of China’s expanding military in the Asia-Pacific region.58 The hotline was not the only cooperative development announced during Secretary Gates’s Beijing trip. Gates and General Cao Gangchuan, China’s defense minister, also announced agreements to increase military-to-military exchanges. Although exchanges had continued uninterrupted since June 2001, this agreement marked a development in military relations. Gates and Cao indicated there would be a mixture of exchanges from military education institutions and of mid-level and junior level officers and visits of senior officials to both countries.59 Furthermore, the two countries planned to orga-

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nize a new joint naval exercise. Defense Minister Cao also indicated that China would open its military archives to help account for American soldiers still missing from the Korean War.60 Guantanamo Detainees Despite increased contacts between high-ranking American and Chinese military officials, debate about military and security issues still exist between the United States and China. One increasingly contentious issue involves the fate of the approximately twenty-two Uighur detainees at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo in Cuba. At present, China is home to 8.4 million Muslim Uighurs who live primarily in Xinjiang Province. The Chinese government, fearing Uighur separatism, has marginalized this minority population since the formal annexation of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region in 1949. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has detained approximately twenty-two Uighurs at Guantanamo, most having been arrested in Afghanistan. Currently, over half of the detainees have received non-enemy combatant status (NECS). China would like them returned to Xinjiang. Under pressure from human rights organizations, Uighur American associations, and Congress, the United States has sought alternative solutions. Thus far, the United States has been unable to find a third country to accept the detainees with NECS (it is known that at least Switzerland and Norway have declined). Both the detainees and the relatively well-organized Uighur American associations have publicly indicated their hope that the NECS detainees will be granted political asylum in the United States.

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Opportunities for Cooperation Although issues, such as the fate of the Uighur detainees, continue to create obstacles for smooth U.S.–China military relations, it is clear that as the international system evolves there are many opportunities for Sino–U.S. cooperation. Recent examples include China’s support of the United States post-Iraq war reconstruction resolutions in the United Nations Security Council (of which both states are permanent members) and China’s emergence as mediator in the North Korea–U.S. nuclear standoff. In the Security Council, China cooperated with the United States in passing resolutions 1472, 1483, 1500, and 1511. China was instrumental in negotiating the passage of resolution 1511 (pertaining to post-Iraq war reconstruction) by France.61 Indicating further interest in reconstruction efforts, China pledged $25 million in humanitarian aid during the post-war reconstruction summit held in Madrid in October 2003.62 Meanwhile, as the North Korean nuclear situation has become increasingly precarious, China has emerged as a critical force. As discussed earlier, both the United States and China have been eager to maintain dialogue on the issue of a nuclearfree Korean Peninsula. As North Korea’s historic ally and main supplier of food and energy aid, China remains the great hope for a peaceful resolution to the situation. Should war and not peace be the eventual outcome, China would prove an indispensable U.S. ally. While Washington may wish that Beijing would adopt a harder line, the Bush administration and Congress recognize the value of China’s contributions to the escalating situation. Given these opportunities for cooperation, it is important that the United States maintain a military-to-military rela-

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tionship with the PRC. However, acknowledging that the potential for conflict between the two powers exists along with the potential for cooperation, the U.S. military must be strategic in its approach to exchanges. PACCOM Commander Admiral Fargo argues that “our military-to-military relationship with China is multi-faceted and includes strategic dialogue, functional contacts, military educational contacts and other bilateral events. Its purpose is to facilitate, at the military level, a genuine exchange of thought, promoting understanding and consistency in our relationship.”63 Similarly, China expert David Shambaugh believes that exchanges should occur in the context of high-level strategic and defense policy dialogue, functional and educational exchanges, confidencebuilding measures, and joint participation in multinational security forums.64

NOTES 1. Major General Zhu made this statement to former Ambassador Chas Freeman and Admiral Dennis Blair when the two men were in China during a visit sponsored by the U.S.–China Policy Foundation. 2. Joseph Kahn, “Chinese General Sees US as Nuclear Target,” International Herald Tribune, 16 July 2005, www.iht.com/articles/2005/ 07/15/news/china.php. 3. “Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 2005, www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf. 4. “Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005,” 22. 5. “Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005,” 25.

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6. Elisabeth Rosenthal and David Sanger, “U.S. Plane in China After It Collides With Chinese Jet,” New York Times, 2 April 2001, A1. 7. Alison Mitchell, “Anti-China Coalition in Congress is Emboldened,” New York Times, 5 April 2001, A1. 8. James Dao, “China’s Shadowing Had Annoyed U.S,” New York Times, 2 April 2001, A1. 9. Steven Mufson and Phillip Pan, “Spy Plane Delays Irk President,” Washington Post, 3 April 2001, A16. 10. Neil King Jr., Greg Jaffe, and Charles Hutzler, “China Refuses to Release U.S. Spy Plane, Crew,” Wall Street Journal, 3 April 2001, A21. 11. James Dao, “China’s Shadowing Had Annoyed U.S.,” New York Times, 2 April 2001, A1. 12. Elisabeth Rosenthal and David Sanger, “U.S. Plane in China After It Collides With Chinese Jet.” 13. Erik Eckholm, “A Standoff Brews,” New York Times, 4 April 2001, A8. 14. “In Statement of President: ‘It Is Time,’” New York Times, 4 April 2001, A9. 15. Eckholm, “A Standoff Brews,” A1. 16. Eckholm, “A Standoff Brews,” A8. 17. Elisabeth Rosenthal, “Beijing Steps Up Its War of Words Over Air Collision,” New York Times, 5 April 2001, A1. 18. Eckholm, “A Standoff Brews,” A1. 19. David Sanger, “Powell Sees No Need for Apology; Bush Again Urges Return of Crew,” New York Times, 4 April 2001, A1. 20. Congress approved NTR for China in June. In July, the resolution attempting to take away NTR from China was defeated 259–169. 21. Alison Mitchell, “Anti-China Coalition in Congress is Emboldened,” New York Times, 5 April 2001, A1. 22. David Sanger and Jane Perlez, “Powell Offers China Aides Outline for Standoff’s End,” New York Times, 5 April 2001, A10.

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23. Phillip Pan and John Pomfret, “U.S. Words of Regret Ease China Tension,” Washington Post, 6 April 2001, A31. 24. John Pomfret, “China Insists On U.S. Apology,” Washington Post, 8 April 2001, A19. 25. Mike Allen, “Bush Seeks to Avert Repeat of Carter’s Hostage Crisis,” Washington Post, 8 April 2001, A18. 26. Steven Mufson and Vernon Loeb, “U.S. Warns of Damaged Relations With China,” Washington Post, 8 April 2001, A14. 27. David Sanger and Jane Perlez, “U.S. Sends Beijing Formal Statement Expressing Regret,” New York Times, 11 April 2001, A10. 28. Mike Allen and Steven Mufson, “Bush Backs Diplomacy, But Also Warns China,” Washington Post, 10 April 2001, A16. 29. Allen and Mufson, “Bush Backs Diplomacy, But Also Warns China,” A1 and A16. 30. Sanger and Perlez, “U.S. Sends Beijing Formal Statement Expressing Regret,” A10. 31. Phillip Pan and John Pomfret, “American Crew Heads Home; China Accepts Letter of Regret,” Washington Post, 12 April 2001, A1. 32. Pan and Pomfret, “American Crew Heads Home; China Accepts Letter of Regret,” A20. 33. William Claiborne and Dan Morgan, “Crew Returns With No Apologies,” Washington Post, 15 April 2001, A1. 34. John Pomfret, “China Ends Search For Missing Fighter Pilot,” Washington Post, 15 April 2001, A14. 35. Richard Morin and Claudia Deane, “Public Rallies Around Bush Over China Standoff,” Washington Post, 6 April 2001, A29. 36. Dana Milbank, “Standoff Sours Americans’ View of China, Survey Finds,” Washington Post, 7 April 2001, A15. 37. Thomas Ricks, “China Flights May Get Escorts,” Washington Post, 19 April 2001, A16. 38. Clay Chandler, “No Deal Reached On Plane,” Washington Post, 20 April 2001, A15.

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39. Phillip Pan, “China to Let U.S. See Plane,” Washington Post, 30 April 2001, A1. 40. Thom Shanker, “U.S. Resumes Its Spy Flights Close to China,” New York Times, 8 May 2001, A11. 41. Colin Powell, “A Strategy of Partnerships,” Foreign Affairs vol. 83, no. 1 (January/February 2004): 22. 42. “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” 17 September 2002, www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss8.html. 43. During previous administrations, a year’s worth of military contacts would be approved at once. U.S.–China military contacts have included visits by warships to each other’s ports, nearly annual visits by senior officers and lower-level exchanges in areas such as military medicine. 44. Thomas Ricks, “U.S. to Limit Military Ties with China,” Washington Post, 3 May 2001, A1. 45. Kenneth R. Timmerman, “Rumsfeld Demands China Reciprocity,” Insight on the News, 15 July 2002, 22–24. 46. Bill Gertz, “Rumsfeld Says U.S. Presence in Asia is Vital; Strength Key in China Strategy,” Washington Times, 25 July 2001, A1. 47. Bonnie S. Glaser, “U.S-China Relations: Mid-Air Collision Cripples Sino–U.S. Relations,” Comparative Connections vol. 3, no. 2 (MayJuly, 2001): 27. 48. Michael Gordon, “Rumsfeld Limiting Military Contacts With the Chinese,” New York Times, 4 June 2001, A8. 49. “Rumsfeld Says Ties to China Resuming,” Reuters, 5 June 2001, www.reuters.com. 50. Gordon, “Rumsfeld Limiting Military Contacts With the Chinese,” A1. 51. Gordon, “Rumsfeld Limiting Military Contacts With the Chinese,” A8. 52. Bill Gertz, “Rumsfeld to Visit China, Eyes Hotline for Defense,” Washington Times, 9 February 2005, www.washingtontimes.com. 53. David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 348.

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54. “DCI Testimony: Global Intelligence Challenges 2005; Global Intelligence Challenges 2005: Meeting Long-Term Challenges with a Long-Term Strategy; Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence Porter J. Goss before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” 16 February 2005, www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/ 2005/Goss_testimony_02162005.html. 55. Michael Swaine, “Reverse Course? The Fragile Turnaround in US-China Relations,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief no. 22 (February 2003): 1. 56. “Joint Press Availability with Secretary Gates and Minister Gangchuan from the Ministry of National Defense, Beijing, China,” November 5, 2007, www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx? transcriptid=4080. 57. Thom Shanker, “Gates Questions China on Military Growth,” New York Times, November 6, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/11/06/ world/asia/06china.html?_r=1&oref=slogin. 58. Edward Cody, “China and U.S. To Establish Military Hotline,” Washington Post, November 6, 2007, A16. 59. “Secretary Gates Delivers Remarks at Forbidden City,” November 6, 2007, www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx? transcriptid=4082. 60. Shanker, “Gates Questions China on Military Growth.” 61. Wenzhao Tao, “Changes and Drivers in Sino-US Relations,” CSIS China Strategy vol. 3 (2004): 22. 62. Tao, “Changes and Drivers in Sino–U.S. Relations,” 22. 63. “Remarks by Admiral Tom Fargo, Commander of the United States Navy Pacific Command, at the Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University,” 14 January 2004. 64. Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military, 349–50.

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ISSUE 4: SINO–U.S. ECONOMIC RELATIONS

hina’s 2001 admission into the World Trade Organization marked the successful culmination of fifteen years of Sino–U.S. negotiations. Nevertheless, in the four years since this victory, U.S.–PRC economic tensions have not relaxed. Issues pertaining to trade deficits, currency values, and market access all threaten to inflame relations in the near future—undermining not just the countries’ obligations to the WTO but also some political aspects of their bilateral relationship. Sinologist Bates Gill recently observed that “never in the post-World War II era has the United States had such an important economic partner that was not a close friend or ally. As such, China defies ready categorization in the American political and economic psyche.”1

C

TR ADE

U.S. trade relations with China have become an increasingly sensitive political issue and, as such, came to the fore in the 103

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2004 presidential campaign. Neither President Bush nor Senator John Kerry could afford to ignore the protestations of organized labor, those employed in manufacturing or service industries with outsourcing, or their elected representatives. In March 2004, the United States filed its first formal complaint against China in the WTO, accusing China of unfair discrimination against American semi-conductors. On July 8, however, then U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick announced that this complaint had been settled outside the WTO. Nevertheless, the resolution of that immediate conflict did signify the resolution of broader trade-related tensions between the two nations. In an agreement that had been reached a decade prior, the international community had agreed to slowly abolish the textile quota regime established in 1974 under the Multi-Fiber Agreement. The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) came into effect in 1995 when the United States, Canada, and the European Union adopted a staged elimination of quotas. However, on the eve of 2005, 49 percent of import quotas (measured in terms of volume) remained,2 resulting in vocal objections from the Chinese. Although the first quarter of 2005 witnessed an increase in the number of Chinese pants exported to America by 1,573 percent and the number of Chinese cotton shirts and T-shirts sold in the United States by 1,277 percent,3 these statistics must be considered within the appropriate context. For the most part, the increase in Chinese imports comes at the expense of other countries’ industries and did not directly affect American employment. Nicholas Lardy has argued that “the U.S. global trade deficit is the mirror image of its low savings rate relative to its rate of investment. . . . Selective trade liber-

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alization abroad only affects the country-by-country distribution of the U.S. global trade deficit, not its overall size.”4 It is important to keep in mind the implications that increased exports from China have for the U.S. economy. First, a number of Chinese exports are produced by foreign-owned corporations (which are rapidly expanding their presence in the PRC) or by their Chinese subsidiaries.5 Therefore, it is easy to over-emphasize the value of the trade deficit when considering the value of U.S.–PRC economic and trade relations. Consequently, policymakers must remember that when adopting measures intended to curb Chinese exports, they will likely adversely affect the growing number of U.S.-invested companies based in China.6 Second, China’s economic growth has created a growing consumer market, which has increased China’s demand for foreign imports. From 1990 to 2000, U.S. business exports to China grew more rapidly than those to any other large export market.7 Therefore, while some U.S. industries may be hurt by trade liberalization with China, others stand to gain. During his December 2003 visit to the United States, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao finalized multi-billion dollar deals with U.S.-based aircraft corporations, soybean producers, and telecom component manufacturers.8

CHINESE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

American policymakers and their constituents have grown increasingly alarmed by increases in Chinese investment abroad and the perceived influence it buys within these countries. This sentiment is evident in the concern that was expressed by

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U.S. policymakers in response to Chinese state visits to other Western nations. The Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held hearings on April 6, 2005, on China’s growing presence in Latin America, in response to then President Jiang Zemin’s thirteen-day visit to Latin America in April 2001. Subsequent visits to the region by President Hu Jintao (November 2004) and Vice President Zeng Qinghong (March 2005). The Congressional Research Service produced a report in April 2006 titled China’s Growing Interest in Latin America, asserting that “while Beijing’s interests in the region appear largely economic, they also have a political and diplomatic dimension and may have longer-term implications for U.S. interests.”9 Although Latin America’s natural resources (such as oil, copper, and iron) and diplomatic affairs (twelve Latin American and Caribbean countries still maintain diplomatic ties to Taiwan) are undoubtedly both subjects of great interest to China, most China scholars and U.S. executive branch officials have concluded that at this point in time, China remains too preoccupied with domestic affairs to project its political influence as far abroad as Latin America. Furthermore, while receptive to Chinese investment, many countries in the region are wary of competition with Chinese firms for a share of the U.S. textile market. Still, Chinese overseas investment has not been limited to nations south of the Rio Grande. Increasingly, Chinese firms are looking to invest in the United States. A much-politicized example was China National Offshore Oil Corporation’s (CNOOC) ultimately unsuccessful $18.5 billion bid for American energy firm Unocal during the summer of 2005. In what many analysts likened to the U.S. hysteria surrounding highprofile purchases of American firms by Japanese companies in

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the 1980s, a number of members of Congress objected loudly to the idea that a foreign (particularly a Chinese) firm could own a U.S. energy interest. While Unocal’s resources account for less than 1 percent of U.S. domestic consumption, the bid came at a time of extreme oil insecurity. A letter by Congressman Richard Pombo (R-Calif.) to President Bush raising concerns about the potential acquisition was followed by a second letter of concern signed by forty-one Republican and Democratic members of the House. Concerned that their protestations were not being heard, the House of Representatives voted 398-15 on June 30, 2005, for a non-binding resolution asserting that the takeover “would threaten to impair the national security of the United States.”10 Ultimately, CNOOC withdrew its bid on August 2, clearing the way for Unocal shareholders to accept Chevron Texaco’s substantially lower $17.6 billion bid. This case highlights China’s growing need for energy. Since assuming the presidency in late 2002, Hu Jintao has traveled to Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Africa on missions focused largely on securing energy supplies that will not pass through American or European companies before reaching China. China has also pursued oil deals with Russia and Central Asian nations; signing a preliminary $70 billion commitment to buy Iranian oil and natural gas. In 2005, Beijing began construction of a strategic oil reserve on the coast of Zhejiang province. Ultimately, officials aim to create a reserve large enough to allow China’s economy and military to function for at least three months without imported oil. Chen Fengying, a senior strategist at the government-backed China Contemporary International Relations Institute in Beijing, told the New York Times in June 2005 that “relations between China and the United States

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are mostly stable, but the energy problem is the most serious threat.” Chen added that while “we talk about terrorism and Taiwan . . . there is nowhere near enough attention to energy.”11

THE YUAN

Arguably the most controversial aspect of Sino–U.S. economic relations in recent years has been the value of the yuan. For a decade, until July 2005, the Chinese yuan (RMB) had been pegged at approximately 8.28 to the dollar.12 In recent years, many U.S. politicians have blamed China’s fixed exchange rate regime for America’s growing trade deficit. Leading this movement are Senator Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.), Senator Susan Collins (R-Maine), Senator Evan Bayh (D-Ind.), Congressman Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.) and Congressman Tim Ryan (DOhio)—all of whom introduced legislation calling for the imposition of tariffs intended to pressure China into revaluing its currency.13 In recent years, the Bush administration has also amplified its calls for a revaluation. In 2003, the U.S. Treasury Department and China’s central bank established the Technical Cooperation Program, intended to assist China with its transition to a flexible currency regime.14 During this period, then-Treasury Secretary John Snow and then-Commerce Secretary Donald Evans traveled to China and re-asserted the United States hope for a currency revaluation.15 Diplomacy was not the only mechanism by which the federal government attempted to place pressure on China; according to one senior Commerce Department official, since China’s admission into the WTO, the Commerce Department has initiated more anti-

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dumping investigations and imposed more anti-dumping measures on products from China than those originating anywhere else.16 In 2003, more than half of all new anti-dumping orders involved China. 17 Although the yuan was undoubtedly undervalued, it remains to be seen whether evaluation will have the desired effect. In March 2004, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan argued that given the fragility of the Chinese financial system (which had been mired in bad loans), it would be unwise for China to float its currency. Such a move might trigger capital flight out of China, further undermining its financial system.18 Often overlooked is the fact that only 10 percent of total U.S. imports originate in China.19 Therefore, even a rather large 10 percent appreciation would reduce the dollar’s trade-weighted value by only 1 percent.20 Further complicating the situation is the fact that as much as 60 percent of the U.S. $600 billion plus current account deficit has been financed by Japan and China in recent years.21 Development of Sino-American relations has continued on the economic front. In September 2006, the U.S.–China Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) was announced. The SED created a platform to address economic challenges facing the U.S. and China and to use effectively existing bilateral commissions and dialogues.22 Since its formation, the SED has met three times; however, resolutions on key issues, such as the value of the yuan, have not been reached. Although the SED has not created any broad reaching reforms in Sino-American economic relations, it has created a forum to discuss major concerns of both parties and to bolster bilateral relations. Most recently, the December 2007 SED addressed issues of product and consumer safety, foreign participation in Chinese

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securities firms and markets, and greater transparency of administrative-rule making regarding their World Trade Organization commitments.23 After the SED in December 2007, “U.S. officials emphasized that while there were few ‘deliverables’ at [the] week’s talks there had been subtle but significant progress in how the two countries relate.”24 Since Hu’s 2006 visit, Bush and his administration maintained strong ties with their Chinese counterparts. While issues of contention between the two powers remained, and those within the administration and Congress who support a tougher stance against the PRC remain popular with some interests and constituencies, the overall approach of the United States in its policy toward China remained pragmatic. It is likely to remain so for the remainder of President Bush’s second term in office. Washington and Beijing have made progress in their increasingly critical economic relationship. Policymakers and business communities on both sides recognize that bilateral trade need not be a zero-sum game. Both economies have much to gain from well-managed cooperation. Still, there will be losers on both sides and political leaders in both countries will be pressed to address their concerns. Blaming the other country is tempting, but further politicization of trade relations must be avoided. As two of the most powerful and dynamic economies in the world, actions undertaken by the United States and China have resounding effects on the health and stability of the global economy as a whole. Therefore, it is essential that each nation accept the reality of the other’s influence and attempt to manage their relationship (with due sensitivity to the other’s domestic politics and pressures) so that both gain through bilateral trade and monetary policy.

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NOTES 1. Bates Gill and Sue Ann Tay, Partners and Competitors: Coming to Terms with the US–China Economic Relationship (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2004), 1. 2. “The Looming Revolution,” Economist, 11 November 2004, www.economist.com. 3. “The Great Stitch-Up,” Economist, 26 May 2005, www.economist.com. 4. Nicholas R. Lardy, Integrating China into the Global Economy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), 158. 5. Lardy, Integrating China into the Global Economy, 159. 6. Gill and Tay, Partners and Competitors, 17. 7. Lardy, Integrating China into the Global Economy, 161. 8. Gill and Tay, Partners and Competitors, 19. 9. Kerry Dumbaugh and Mark P. Sullivan, “China’s Growing Interest in Latin America,” CRS Report for Congress RS22119, 20 April 2005, 2. 10. H. Res. 344, 109th Congress, thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D? c109:2:./temp/~c109l3IDUZ. 11. Joseph Kahn, “Behind China’s Bid for Unocal: A Costly Quest for Energy Control,” New York Times, 27 June 2005, A9. 12. “What’s it worth,” Economist, 19 May 2005, www.economist .com. 13. “Putting Up the Barricades,” The Economist 21 April 2005, www.economist.com. 14. Gill and Tay, Partners and Competitors, 19. 15. Gill and Tay, Partners and Competitors, 15. 16. Gill and Tay, Partners and Competitors, 25. 17. Gill and Tay, Partners and Competitors, 25. 18. “Unusually Clear,” Economist, 3 March 2004, www.economist .com. 19. “What’s it worth,” Economist.

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20. “What’s it worth,” Economist. 21. “What’s it worth,” Economist; Gill and Tay, Partners and Competitors, 17. 22. “Fact Sheet Creation of the U.S.–China Strategic Economic Dialogue,” U.S. Department of Treasury, 20 September 2006, www.ustreas .gov/press/releases/hp107.htm. 23. “The Third U.S.–China Strategic Economic Dialogue December 12–13, 2007, Beijing Joint Fact Sheet,” U.S. Department of Treasury, 13 December 2007, www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp732.htm. 24. Ariana Eunjung Cha, “U.S.–China Talks Build Trust, But No Major Deals,” Washington Post, 14 December 2007, D4.

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RELATIONS SINCE SPRING 2006

n November 20, 2005, President Bush visited China for the second time as president. The one-day visit was a part of a larger tour of Asia. While most accounts interpreted the visit as cordial if not warm, some tensions were evident. A few days prior to arriving in Beijing, President Bush commented from Japan that China’s leaders are finding “that once the door to freedom is opened even a crack, it cannot be closed.”1 Equally defiant, President Hu failed to release any political prisoners in the days leading up to Bush’s visit. In fact, several prominent Chinese dissidents were placed under house arrest for the duration of Bush’s trip to Asia, much to the dismay of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice who stated that the issue was being raised “quite vociferously with the Chinese government.”2 While in Beijing, Bush attended a Protestant service at one of the country’s state-sanctioned churches in an effort to raise awareness of U.S. concerns regarding Chinese religious freedom.

O

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Still, the visit was generally positive. In the end, U.S. officials reported that the purpose of the visit was not so much to return with tangible indicators of progress as it was to deepen Bush’s relationship with President Hu.3 In April 2006, Hu Jintao visited the United States with stops in Seattle, Washington, D.C., and New Haven, Connecticut. Although Hu’s trip did not produce watershed agreements, the exchange of frank and respectful dialogue between political and corporate elite was constructive. On the eve of Hu’s arrival, China signed 106 contracts with American companies totaling roughly $16.2 billion.4 Included in this spending spree, was the purchase of eighty Boeing 737 jets for approximately $4 billion and the purchase by four Chinese computer manufacturers of Microsoft’s Windows operating system.5 As such, it was with great fanfare that Hu began his U.S. visit in Washington State with tours of the Microsoft and Boeing headquarters. Prior to Hu’s April 18 arrival, Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates had expressed satisfaction with China’s attempt to stop violations of intellectual property rights. Gates pointed to a recent Chinese government regulation requiring domestic computer manufacturers pre-install genuine software instead of contracting third-party firms.6 This new policy sought to curtail software piracy by placing greater responsibility on computer manufacturers. In a speech at Microsoft’s Redmond, Washington, headquarters, Hu reinforced his commitment to protecting intellectual property rights: “You, Mr. Bill Gates, are a friend of China, and I’m a friend of Microsoft.” Hu went on to say he used the Windows operating system on a daily basis.7 The positive tone set by China’s Boeing and Microsoft purchases and the regulations regarding operating systems was re-

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inforced during Hu’s Boeing and Microsoft visits. Although the over $16.2 billion spent shortly before Hu’s visit did not balance the U.S. trade deficit with China, the gesture demonstrated Chinese good intentions for U.S.–Chinese economic relations. Furthermore, Chinese regulations requiring genuine operating systems be installed on Chinese-made computers showed a commitment to protecting intellectual property rights. By beginning his U.S. trip with visits to American businesses, Hu demonstrated the important role of American business to China. The Chinese media and government referred to Hu’s 2006 American trip as a state visit; however, a state visit normally begins in Washington, D.C. Hu began his American tour visits to Boeing and Microsoft, demonstrating the increasingly important role Sino–American business relations have on overall U.S.–China relations. However, one can wonder if Hu fully anticipated the effect his West Coast visit would have on Boeing, Microsoft, and their competitors. Hu’s Boeing and Microsoft visits might have been seen by some as an indirect endorsement. By July 2007, Boeing jets comprised 59 percent of the commercial jets operating in mainland China; Airbus, Boeing’s main competitor, made up 31 percent of the total fleet.8 Hu’s trip continued on April 20, 2006 when he arrived at the White House and was greeted by an Honor Guard and a twentyone-gun salute. However, before Hu’s arrival in Washington, D.C., a dispute between the United States and China emerged over the protocol for Hu’s White House visit. As mentioned above, the Chinese called Hu’s trip a state visit; however, the United States called it an official visit. Although the difference between a state and an official visit appears purely semantic, and the White House did treat Hu to a great deal of pageantry and respect, the symbolism of a state visit was important to Hu.

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During the state visits of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, pictures of the men had dominated Chinese media. Hu’s visit, however, was not granted the same status as that of his predecessors, and subsequently Hu was deprived of images paralleling those of Deng and Jiang.9 On the day of Hu’s visit, the issue of state versus official visit was overshadowed by two events that quickly found their way into international media reports of the visit. First, during Hu’s remarks on the White House’s South lawn, a protestor with temporary press credentials shouted in Chinese and English that China persecuted Falun Gong members. The Secret Service removed the protestor from the event and President Bush urged Present Hu to carry on with his speech.10 Unfortunately, the protest dominated news coverage of the Hu–Bush meeting. The event was further marred when an American announcer confused the official name of Taiwan with that of China when introducing the Chinese anthem, indirectly referring to China as Taiwan. Hu, however, handled both situations with calmness and dignity and later accepted Bush’s apology.11 Despite the interruptions to Hu’s White House visit, Bush and Hu conducted an honest and respectful dialogue. Hu spoke of China’s willingness to work with Washington to end North Korea’s nuclear program through diplomatic channels,12 and Bush reasserted the importance of the six-party talks with North Korea. Furthermore, Bush restated U.S. opposition to Taiwanese independence and pledged future space cooperation.13 There was further optimism on the economic front. Hu spoke of reforms to make the Chinese currency more flexible, expand market access to foreign firms in China, and strengthen intellectual property rights. Although no new measures were announced to address the trade deficit, Hu indicated that he took the issue seriously.14

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Hu spent his final day in the United States at Yale University, which has maintained intellectual ties with China for over 150 years. In 1854, Yung Wing, the first Chinese student to study in the United States, graduated from Yale. This educational relationship has continued to the present, and at the time of Hu’s address, Yale faculty were involved in over eighty research and educational programs in China.15 In his address, Hu praised cultural exchanges between Chinese and American youth, whom he said serve as a bridge for increased understanding between the countries.16 Although no groundbreaking agreements came out of the Hu’s U.S. tour, it served to provide economic engagement and enhance understanding between America and China. Although there have been positive developments, the Taiwanese issue continues to complicate Sino-American security relations. Upcoming Taiwanese elections were probably the motive for a phone call made by President Hu to Bush on December 6, 2007. During their conversation the two leaders spoke about several issues; however, the approaching Taiwanese legislative elections was a key subject of the conversation. Both the United States and China were concerned about the outcome of Taiwanese elections and a referendum on Taiwanese U.N. membership scheduled to coincide with the Taiwanese presidential elections. During his call, Hu stated that the best way to address the Taiwan issue was though steady and healthy development of U.S.–China ties.17 Given its growing wealth gap, its emerging middle class, the increasing impact of international markets on its economy, its growing role in global diplomacy and international institutions, and its increased vulnerability to inter-party conflict, China’s leaders will likely remain too preoccupied with domestic stability

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to pose a serious threat to the United States. At the same time, issues highlighting the need for Sino–U.S. cooperation have increased in number and importance. The United States now looks to China for financial and U.N. Security Council support of its overseas missions. Both China and the United States have shared objectives in fighting the “war on terror.” Furthermore, since China’s admission into the WTO, joint investment projects have flourished. China provides the United States with both a source of inexpensive, high-quality labor and a growing consumer market for its exports. Still, Taiwan, human rights, religious freedom, the value of the yuan, and intellectual property rights remain key issues of contention. These issues and the powerful interests behind them should not be discounted. Nevertheless, seven years into his administration, it seems clear that President Bush has adopted a cooperative, if not friendly relationship with the Chinese government. Such a relationship was not always certain to develop; however, such a rapport has been maintained for the remainder of Bush’s term in office. The United States, China, and the rest of the world stand to gain from such a relationship.

NOTES 1. David E. Sanger, “Bush, in Japan, Suggests That China Expand Freedoms,” New York Times, 16 November 2005, A8. 2. Sanger, “Bush, in Japan, Suggests That China Expand Freedoms,” A8. 3. Sanger, “Bush, in Japan, Suggests That China Expand Freedoms,” A8. 4. Xin Li, “China eyes billions in U.S. deals; Will buy 80 Boeing aircraft, lift restrictions on beef imports,” Washington Times, 12 April 2006, www.washingtontimes.com. 118

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5. Joseph Kahn, “Chinese Leader Focuses on Business as 4-Day U.S. Visit Begins in Washington State,” New York Times, 19 April 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/04/19/world/asia/19hu.html. 6. “Movers: China sales of Windows suggest gain on piracy,” International Herald Tribune, 19 April 2006, www.iht.com/articles/2006/ 04/18/bloomberg/bxmove.php. 7. Kahn, “Chinese Leader Focuses on Business,” www.nytimes .com/2006/04/19/world/asia/19hu.html. 8. “Boeing in China,” www.boeing.com/companyoffices/aboutus/ boechina.html. 9. Jim Yardley, “Protocol takes precedence in Chinese visit: Labeling trip is not as easy as it seems,” International Herald Tribune, 10 April 2006, www.iht.com/articles/2006/04/09/news/china.php. 10. “An Unexpected Shout of Dissent,” New York Times, 21 April 2006, query. nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0DE1DE153FF93 2A15757C0A9609C8B63. 11. Joseph Kahn, “Bush and Hu Vow New Cooperation,” New York Times, 21 April 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/04/21/world/asia/21 prexy.html?scp=1&sq=Bush%20and%20Hu%20Vow%20New%20 Cooperation&st=cse. 12. Kahn, “Bush and Hu Vow New Cooperation.” 13. “Remarks by President Bush and President Hu Jintao of China,” International Herald Tribune, 20 April 2006, www.iht.com/ articles/2006/04/20/news/web.0420text.php. 14. “Remarks by President Bush and President Hu Jintao of China.” 15. Richard C. Levin, “Introduction of Hu Jintao,” 21 April 2006, opa.yale.edu/president/message.aspx?id=15. 16. Jintao Hu, “Speech by President Hu Jintao at Yale University,” 21 April 2006, www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t259224.htm. 17. “Chinese President Hu Jintao Holds Telephone Conversation with His U.S. Counterpart Bush,” Consulate of the PRC in San Francisco, 6 December 2007, www.chinaconsulatesf.org/eng/xw/t388453 .htm.

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s a Chinese-American, I was born and educated through high school in China, and my perspectives have been influenced by my Chinese education. However, in 1949, I came to the United States, where I obtained my bachelor degree, masters, and doctorate. My unique bicultural education has allowed me the opportunity to observe the development of SinoAmerican relations in the twentieth century from both a Chinese and American perspective. Furthermore, as a teacher of Chinese history and Sino-American relations for the past forty years, I have come to personally know the members of the American academic community dedicated to the study of China. My course syllabus regularly includes the issues of Tibet, Taiwan, human rights, and international trade. Furthermore, my personal relations have spanned decades and have included the founders of modern American Chinese studies to today’s rising stars. It is through my interaction and relationships with these men and women and my personal research that I have come to

A

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realize that most books written in America on China or Sino–American relations express a pro-American slant. For example, the issue of human rights is regularly addressed in works on Chinese–American relations. However, the concept of “human rights” is relatively foreign and new to China. As a child in China, I never heard the phrase. It was not until after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China that the issue of human rights in China was first introduced by proNationalist and pro-Taiwan groups in the United States. Since then, Chinese human rights violations have often been a subject in American literature on China. The issue of human rights has been well addressed by previous literature. Furthermore, as the former head of the China Section at the Library of Congress, I regularly read and reviewed Chinese literature on diverse issues, including human rights. Not surprisingly, there is a remarkable difference in opinion between Chinese and American scholars in the issue of human rights. Chinese academic literature on human rights is highly critical of the American human rights record, pointing to issues as broad as America’s treatment of Native Americans and more recently, the treatment of non-combatant enemies held in military prisons. Furthermore, this literature points to advancements in the quality of life and social equality as evidence of improved Chinese human rights. It is clear from the diverging American and Chinese viewpoints that this issue is highly contentious. It was not my intention when I began this work to take on the perspective of American or Chinese critics. As a result, I have not addressed the issue of human rights in detail. It was my intention to address developments in the U.S.– Chinese relationship from a different perspective, one that is not often told in the United States.

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Furthermore, the issue of human rights has not been as prominent in the Bush administration’s China policy as critics seek it to be. As such, although human rights remain an important issue to most Americans, they are not necessary in a discussion of the current administration’s China policy. Concerns about human rights have played a role in the Bush administration’s China policy, but these concerns have not been definitive. Some might argue that the administration has been distracted by its involvement in the conflicts in the Middle East, and unable and unwilling to address human rights violations in China. The relationship with China can be seen as a bright spot for a domestically and international embattled administration. Whatever the reason, the administration is making efforts to improve its relations with China, and this has included the method it uses to address Chinese human rights. In March 2008, the U.S. Department of State removed China from its list of worst human rights violators.1 Whether the State Department’s decision reflects the reality in China is not the concern of this present study; however, it does demonstrate the improving relations between the Bush administration and China. Although the portion of the report specific to China acknowledges a continuing lack of respect of human rights in China,2 the removal of China from the list of the world’s worst human rights violators is a furthering of SinoAmerican friendship. Human rights in China continue to be a major point of criticism outside of the administration; however, as mentioned above, they are not a primary focus of the Bush administration’s China policy. A discussion of Bush’s China policy is best conducted by reviewing military contacts, security concerns,

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including the role of China and the U.S. in international security discussions as represented by the Six Party Talks on North Korea, the Sino-American economic relationship, and the role of Taiwan in U.S.–China relations. Through this book, I have addressed these issues and the complex personalities and institutions that have created the Bush administration’s China policy. When I completed this book in the fall of 2007, I looked back on the Bush administration and saw that as it entered its final year, China would be a bright spot in Bush’s legacy. Although developments since the completion of the book, including contaminated Chinese exports and pro-Tibet protests surrounding the Olympic torch relay, have colored international and American perceptions of China, Bush has stood by his China policy while at the same time addressing concerns. During a September 6, 2007 meeting at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, Presidents Bush and Hu discussed mounting American concerns regarding the safety of Chinese exports.3 However, Bush has not allowed the contamination of Chinese exports to the United States to sour the U.S.–China relationship. Furthermore, despite criticisms, especially in the wake of social unrest in the Tibet Autonomous Region and Tibetan ethnic regions, Bush has remained steadfast in his attendance at the 2008 Beijing Olympics. A year after the completion of this book, it is clear that Bush remains committed to a positive relationship with China. Although there have been, and will continue to be, hiccups in SinoAmerican relations, the administration over the past eight years has established a constructive and positive China policy.

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NOTES 1. Jill Drew, “U.S. Delisting of China Upsets Rights Activists,” Washington Post, 13 March 2008, A13. 2. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2007: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong and Macau),” www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/ 2007/100518.htm. 3. Don Gonyea, “President Bush Discusses Exports with China’s Hu,” NPR, 6 September 2007, www.npr.org/templates/story/story .php?storyId=14204635.

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MANUSCRIPTS AND POLICY PAPERS Carpenter, Ted Galen. “Going Too Far: Bush’s Pledge to Defend Taiwan.” Cato: Foreign Policy Briefing 66 (May 30, 2001). Gill, Bates, and Sue Ann Tay. Partners and Competitors: Coming to Terms with the US-China Economic Relationship. Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2004. Lampton, David M. Same Bed Different Dreams: Managing U.S.–China Relations, 1989–2000. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. Lardy, Nicholas R. Integrating China into the Global Economy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002. Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton. New York: Vintage Books, 2000. Shambaugh, David. Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems and Prospects. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. Suettinger, Robert L. Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations 1989–2000. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004. Swaine, Michael D. “China: Exploiting a Strategic Opening.” Strategic Asia 2004–05: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power vol. 4 (2005): 67–102.

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Swaine, Michael. “Reverse Course? The Fragile Turnaround in US– China Relations.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief 22 (February 2003). Tao, Wenzhao. “Changes and Drivers in Sino-US Relations.” CSIS China Strategy vol. 3 (2004). Tyler, Patrick. A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China: an Investigative History. New York: Public Affairs, 1999. Wit, Joel S., Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci. Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004.

NEWSPAPERS, JOURNALS, AND BROADCAST NEWS Agence France Press The Associated Press The Australian BBC News The Boston Globe The China Daily China Leadership Monitor CNN Comparative Connections The Congressional Quarterly CRS Report for Congress CSI China Strategy Dow Jones International News The Economist The Financial Times Foreign Affairs Insight on the News The International Herald Tribune International Security

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Issues and Insights The Lost Angeles Times NPR The New Republic The New York Times PBS Reuters The South China Morning Post States News Service The Taipei Times The Wall Street Journal The Washington Post The Washington Times Xinhua News Agency

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Abu Gharib, 40 Aegis air defense and battle management system. See U.S.-Taiwan relations AEI. See American Enterprise Institute Albright, Madeline, 5 Allen, Major-General John, 63. See also U.S.-Taiwan relations American Enterprise Institute (AEI), 37 Annan, Kofi, 38 Annual Report to Congress: The Military power of the People’s Republic of China 2005, 78 APEC Summit. See Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit

Arleigh Destroyer. See U.S.Taiwan relations Armitage, Richard, 12, 36, 52 Arms Sales and Military Strategy, 15–16; Taiwanese Defense Ministry Tang Yaoming, 15 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, 13 Axis of Evil, 15, 73 Baker, James, 37 Bayh, Evan (D-Ind.), 108 Beijing Olympics 2008, 124 Biden, Joseph (D-Del.), 80 Blair, Dennis, 80 Boeing, 114–15 Bolton, John, 37–39

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Brookes, Peter, 61 Bush, George H. W., 3, 41, 42–44 Bush, George W., 7; adopted an aggressive foreign policy, 11; brief biography, 7–8; China policy since 2001, 13; committed the U.S. military to defend Taiwan, 12; early years, 15; second trip to China, 113–14; religious freedom in China, 113; strategic ambiguity, 54–56; “strategic competitor,” xiii, xvi, 11, 35. See also foreign policy advisors; pro-China policy; pro-Taiwan policy Cao, Gangchuan, 93, 94 Carpenter, Ted, 57–58 Central Military Commission, 17 Chen, Sui-bian, 25, 52; trip to South America, 62 Cheney, Richard B., 31–34; first trip to China, April 2004, 33; remarks at Fudan University, 33. See also foreign policy advisors Chinese foreign investment, 105–8 Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), 106–8 Chu, Shulong, 71 Clinton, Bill, 3; negotiated for China admission into World

Trade Organization (WTO), 5; permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status to China, 5; “Three No’s” to Taiwan, 5; trip to China, 4. See also World Trade Organization (WTO) CNOOC. See Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation Cohen, William, 5 Collins, Susan (R-Maine), 108 Commanding Heights, 32 communiqué, joint U.S.-China (1982), 57, 60 cooperation: grounds for U.S.China cooperation, 14–15, 95–96 currency. See also Yuan Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 62 Deng, Xiaoping, 43, 59, 116 Department of Defense, 39–42; dispute between Departments of State and Defense, 89–90. See also Rumsfeld, Donald; Gates, Robert Department of State, 34–39; dispute between Departments of State and Defense, 89–90. See also Powell, Colin; Rice, Condoleezza

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diesel-powered submarine. See U.S.-Taiwan relations DPP. See Democratic Progressive Party DPRK. See North Korea

Grassley, Charles E. (R-Iowa), 83 Green, Michael, 42 Greenspan, Alan, 109. See also Yuan Guantanamo detainees, 95–96

Eagleburger, Lawrence, 3, 43. See also Scowcroft, Brent; Scrowcroft-Eagleburger trip energy issue, 107–8 EP3-E spy plane incident, 30; agreement on EP3E Plane’s return, 88–89; plane collision controversy, 79–81 European Union, 78 Evans, Donald, 108 exports: contaminated Chinese exports, 124

Hadley, Stephen, 42 Hill, Chrisopher, xiii, 37 Hong Kong, 22–24; “AntiSubversion Law,” 22; Hong Kong Basic Law, 22 Hong Kong Secretary of Security. See Ip, Regina Hu, Jintao, 15, 18, 19, 25–26; meeting with George W. Bush, 24, 30; trip to U.S. as President (2006), 114–17; trip to U.S. as Vice President (2002), 15, 62; human rights in China, 44, 122–23 Hunter, Duncan (R-Calif.), 108

F16 fighter jets. See U.S.-Taiwan relations Fargo, Tom, 93, 97 Feith, Douglas, 93 Fleischer, Ari, 89 foreign policy advisors, 29 Fourth Generation of Chinese leadership, 26 Gates, Bill, 114 Gates, Robert, 41–42; China trip (2007), 94–95. See also foreign policy advisors Gill, Bates, 103 Giuliani, Rudolph, 87

IAEA. See International Atomic Energy Agency International Atomic Energy Agency, 71 Ip, Regina, Hong Kong Secretary of Security, 23 Jiang, Zemin, 4; end of Jiang Zemin’s rule, 16–17; EP3-E plane incident, 82–83; first state visit, 4; New York trip, 4; Washington, DC, trip, 4

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joint U.S.-China communiqué of 1982. See communiqué, joint U.S.-China (1982) Kelly, James, 12, 16, 21, 23, 52, 67–68 Kidd-class destroyer. See U.S.Taiwan relations Kim, Jong Il, 73. See also North Korea (DPRK); Six-Party Talks; U.S.-China-North Korea Relations; U.S.-DPRK dialogue Lampton, David M., 29 Lawless, Richard, 40 Lee, Teng-hui: trip to the U.S. (1995), 3–4 Li, Gun, 21 Li Zhaoxing, 70 Liang, Guanglie, 93 MFN. See Most Favored Nation military: military-to-military contacts, 77–96; resumption of military exchanges, 92–95; U.S.-China military relations since 2001, 89–96; U.S.Taiwan military cooperation, 60–62 Morgan Stanley, 32, 33 Most Favored Nation (MFN), 44 Myers, General Richard, 93

National Defense Authorization Act, 93 national missile defense, 67 “neoconservative,” 31 North Korea (DPRK), 15, 17–18; nuclear weapons 18, 63, 70–74. See also Six-Party Talks; U.S.-China-North Korea Relations; U.S.-DPRK dialogue Olympic torch relay, 124 one-China principle, 58–60 opportunities for U.S-China cooperation. See cooperation: grounds for U.S.-China cooperation PAC-3 anti-ballistic missile system. See U.S.-Taiwan relations Patterson, Torkel, 12 Philippines, 33 Pinkston, Daniel A., 73 plane collision controversy. See EP3-E spy plane incident Polman, Norman, 80 Pombo, Richard (R-Calif.), 107 Portman, Bob, 42 Powell, Colin, 12, 36, 51, 89–90; EP3-E plane incident, 83, 84; trip to China, 17. See also Department of State; foreign policy advisors

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pro-China policy, 62–63 pro-Taiwan policy, 52; Richard Armitage and James A. Kelly, 52 Prueher, Joseph, 80, 82, 85; Pyongyang. See Six-Party Talks Qian, Qichen, 53, 67–68, 83–84 Ramos, Fidel, 33 Randt, Clark, xiii, 39 religious freedom, 113 renminbi. See Yuan resumption of military exchanges. See military reunification with Taiwan, 58–59. See also one-China principle Rice, Condoleezza, 12, 33, 34, 37, 64, 113; Secretary of State, January 2005, 34–36, 61; trip to Asia, 33; U.S.Japanese alliance in Asia, 61. See also Department of State; foreign policy advisors RMB. See Yuan Roh, Moo-hyun, South Korean President, 17 Rumsfeld, Donald, 30, 32, 39–41, 90–92; trip to China, 41. See also foreign policy advisors; Department of Defense; weapons transfers Ryan, Tim (D-Ohio), 108

SARS. See Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Schumer, Charles (D-NY), 108 Scowcroft, Brent, 3, 37, 43. See also Eagleburger, Lawrence; Scowcroft-Eagleburger Trip (1989) Scowcroft-Eagleburger Trip (1989), 43–44. See also Eagleburger, Lawrence; Scowcroft, Brent Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), 19–20 Sha, Zukang, 68, 69 Shambaugh, David, 97 Singley, John, 80 Six-Party Talks, 26, 70–74; in Beijing, 21. See also North Korea (DPRK); U.S.-DPRK dialogue; U.S.-China-North Korea Relations Smith, Jeffery, 81 Snow, John, 108 Sokolski, Henry, 72 solid-fueled ballistic missile program. See weapons transfers Spratley Islands, 33 Stockpole, H.C., 92 strategic ambiguity, 54–56 Swaine, Michael, 72 Taiwan: Taiwan Elections (2004), 25, 55; Taiwan

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separatists, 56–58; Taiwan Solidarity Union, 62. See also U.S.-Taiwan relations Tang, Jiaxuan, 82, 85 Tang, Yiau-ming, 61 Three Gorges Damn, 21–22 Tiananmen Incident, 3 Tibet Autonomous Region, 124; pro-Tibet protests, 124 Totty, Rex, 81 trade relations, 103–5 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 71 Tsang, David, 23 Tung, Chee-Hwa, 22–23 U.N. See United Nations United Nations: Security Council, 96, 118. See also Bolton, John U.S.-China relations; confusion surrounds China policy, 89–92; economic relations, 103–10; Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED), 109. See also Bush, George W.; military; pro-China policy; weapons transfers U.S.-China-North Korea relations, 20–21. See also North Korea (DPRK); Six Party Talks U.S.-China-Taiwan relations, 51–52. See also Bush, George

W.; strategic ambiguity; Taiwan; U.S.-Taiwan relations U.S.-DPRK dialogue, 20. See also North Korea (DPRK); Six Party Talks U.S.-Taiwan relations, 12; Aegis air defense and battle management system, 53; Arleigh Destroyer, 53; dieselpowered submarine, 53; F16 fighter jets, 53; Kidd-class destroyer, 53–54; military sales to Taiwan, 53; PAC-3 anti-ballistic missile system, 53; Taiwan Relations Act, 55; weapons sales to Taiwan, 57. See also military; pro-Taiwan policy; strategic ambiguity; Taiwan Warner, John (R-Va.): Senate Armed Services Committee, 81 weapon sales to Taiwan. See U.S.-Taiwan relations weapons transfers: Chinese help to develop Iraqi defense systems, 40; Chinese transfer to Iran of solid-fueled ballistic missile program, 40; Chinese transferred ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia, 40 Wen, Jiabao, 18–19; trip to U.S., 24–25, 63, 105

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Williams, Christopher, 90–91 Wolfowitz, Paul, 12, 16, 30, 41, 61 World Trade Organization (WTO), 5, 13–14, 108 WTO. See World Trade Organization Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. See Guantanamo detainees Yale University, 117 Yan, Xuetong, 44 Yongbyon, 18. See also North Korea (DPRK); Six-Party

Talks; U.S.-China-North Korean relations; U.S.-DPRK dialogue Yuan (RMB), 108–10 Yung Wing, 117 Zeng, Qinghong, 33 Zhang, Qiyue, 57 Zhu, Bangzhao, 81–82, 85 Zhu, Chenghu: major general of PLA, 77–78; use of nuclear weapons, 77–78 Zhu, Rongji, 5, 18; trip to U.S. (1999), 5 Zoellick, Bob, 36–37

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