From Legislation to Legitimation: The Role of the Portuguese Parliament

From Legislation to Legitimation This book is unique; it is the only book on the Portuguese parliament in English. The Portuguese parliament is a valuable case study to understand the different stages of development of a newly democratic parliament. From Legislation to Legitimation shows that, as democracy developed, the role of the Portuguese parliament changed considerably. Whereas in the first years of democracy the Assembleia da República was centred on its legislative role, during the second decade its legitimation role expanded, making scrutiny parliament’s main function. Using innovative research techniques, namely in the analysis of voting behaviour and of parliamentary debates-Cristina Leston-Bandeira develops Robert Packenham’s concept of legitimation and applies it to an empirical analysis of parliament’s legislative and scrutiny activity. These general findings are then applied and verified through a case study: the discussion of the Budget bills from 1985 to 1995. Moreover, Leston-Bandeira includes illuminating material from interviews with sixteen key Portuguese political actors, including the Portuguese Prime Minister from 1985 to 1995, Cavaco Silva. With its extensive and up-to-date empirical evidence, this book makes an important contribution to a more integrated understanding of Portuguese democracy, at the same time as it suggests new lines of research into the development of any newly democratic parliament. Cristina Leston-Bandeira is a lecturer in legislative studies at the University of Hull. She has established herself as the leading expert on the Portuguese parliament. Her research interests also include new parliaments, and the use of the internet by parliament.

Library of legislative studies series Series editor: Philip Norton Lord Norton of Louth, Centre for Legislative Studies, Hull University

The Library of Legislative Studies comprises scholarly books—including individual country studies as well as major comparative works—that advance knowledge of legislatures and legislative processes. The volumes in the Library are designed to be of value to students and scholars in legislative studies, comparative government, constitutional law, and European and regional integration. The Rise of Parliament Studies in Norweigan parliamentary government Edited by Hilmar Rommetvedt National Parliaments and the European Union Edited by Philip Norton Second Chambers Edited by Nicholas Baldwin and Donald Shell Parliaments in Asia Edited by Philip Norton and Nizam Ahmed The Uneasy Relationships between Parliamentary Members and Leaders Edited by Lawrence D Longley and Reuven Y Hazan Conscience and Parliament Edited by Philip Cowley Delegation and Accountability in European Integration Edited by Torbjorn Bergman Members of Parliament in Western Europe Edited by Wolfgang C Muller and Thomas Saalfield The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe Edited by David M Olson and Philip Norton The New Roles of Parliamentary Committees

Edited by Lawrence D Longley Parliaments and Citizens in Western Europe Philip Norton Parliaments and Pressure Groups in Western Europe Edited by Philip Norton The Scottish Parliament David Arter The Unseen Hand Edited by Rinus van Schendelen From Legislation to Legitimation The role of the Portuguese parliament Edited by Cristina Leston-Bandeira

From Legislation to Legitimation The role of the Portuguese parliament

Cristina Leston-Bandeira

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2004 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to http://www.ebookstore.tandf.co.uk/.” © 2004 Cristina Leston-Bandeira All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. The publisher makes no representation, express or implied, with regard to the accuracy of the information contained in this book and cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions that may be made. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Leston-Banderia, Cristina. From legislation to legitimation: the role of the Portuguese parliament/Cristina Leston-Banderia. p. cm. 1. Portugal. Congresso. 2. Portugal—Poitics and government— 1974–I. Title. JN8568.L48 2004 328.469′09′048–dc22 2003026197 ISBN 0-203-32288-6 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-714-65728-X (Print Edition)

For my boys, James, Tomás, Rafael and Mário Without whom all of this would be superfluous

Contents List of illustrations Preface List of abbreviations

Introduction 1 Analytic framework

x xiii xv

1 6

2 Description of the Portuguese context

17

3 The Portuguese parliament in context

34

4 Development of parliament’s role in policy-making: towards a ‘Western Model’ 5 Towards a new role: developing mechanisms of legitimation

65 77

6 The budget: a case study

100

7 Conclusion: from ‘legislative oriented’ to ‘legitimation oriented’

139

Appendix I:

brief profile of the interviewees

147

Appendix II:

brief characteristics of each legislature

153

Appendix III:

glossary of parliamentary terms

154

Bibliography

156

Index

185

List of illustrations Figures

1 Hours spent in the Committee stage, budget debates

104

2 Hours spent in the Chamber stages, budget debates

105

3 Voting distance indexes

121

Tables

1

Packenham’s functions

7

2

Portuguese politics since 1974: parliaments, governments, prime ministers and presidents of the republic

24

3

Party representation in parliament

25

4

Parliamentarism in Portugal

34

5

Rules of procedure in force since 1976

45

6

Agenda-setting according to different rules of procedures

52

7

Number of MPs per parliamentary group

52

8

Outcome of MPs’ bills

67

9

Proportion of municipal bills presented and approved at the final vote

67

10 Outcome of MPs’ bills (municipal bills excluded)

68

11 Proportion of MPs bills not discussed at first reading

70

12 Outcome of government’s bills

71

13 Proportion of delegation of powers bills

71

14 Ratifications proposed since 1976

72

15 Consideration of ratifications

73

16 Motions of rejection, confidence and censure

78

17 Classical parliamentary control instruments in the Portuguese parliament

85

18 Special debates in the Portuguese parliament

87

19 Number of substitutions of MPs

90

20 Petitions presented to parliament

92

21 Petitions presented to parliament, in the V and VI legislatures

93

22 Proportion of votes taken in committee and in the chamber, on the 106 budget, over the four legislatures 23 Proportion of votes taken in committee and in the chamber, on the 106 budget, in each year of the V and the VI legislatures 24 Number of speakers and interventions at the first reading of the budget, in the four legislatures

108

25 Real and virtual points of order and defences of consideration, in 110 the III and VI legislatures 26 Transfer requests of budget articles and amendments

111

27 Amendments to the budget proposed in each legislature

112

28 Amendments to the budget proposed in the V and VI legislatures 113 in each legislative year 29 Amendments proposed by the main parties, in the four

114

legislatures 30 Proportion of consensual amendments in the four legislatures

115

31 Proportion of amendments withdrawing or specifying a delegation of powers request

116

32 Proportion of amendments to requests of delegation of powers, in 116 the four legislatures 33 Votes taken on articles of the budget requesting a delegation of powers, in the four legislatures

118

34 Proportion of the opposition amendments which the majority PG(s) voted against

119

35 Votes of the opposition PGs on amendments and articles, in the IV legislature

119

36 Mean and standard deviation of the voting distance indexes

122

37 Dissenting votes on the budget in the four legislatures

123

38 Proportion of articles and amendments approved, in the four legislatures

125

39 Agreement test between the PRD’s vote and the votes outcome, in the IV legislature (kappa test)

126

40 Agreement tests in the IV legislature between the votes outcome and the votes of the PSD, PS and CDS (kappa test)

127

41 Proportion of local amendments

131

42 Number of amendments proposed by MPs from the autonomous regions

132

43 Proportion of local finances amendments

133

44 The role of the Assembleia da República, from 1983 to 1995

145

Preface My childhood was spent between political demonstrations and party meetings. As Portuguese democracy grew, so did I. Politics has always been in my life. Instead of being part of it, I opted to study it. As the study of Portuguese politics is still in its infancy, there is a huge amount of work to do. So I started at the beginning: parliament. Parliament is the best expression of the democratic ideals with which I grew up; this is why my interest for this institution has developed naturally over the years. There has been very little research on the Portuguese parliament, the Assembleia da República, and this book aims to provide a greater understanding of this institution. Most publications in the English language are outdated and provide a narrow-minded portrayal of the Portuguese parliament as a chaotic and irrelevant institution. This book is based on my PhD research and dissertation,1 carried out at the Centre for Legislative Studies at the University of Hull. The research was made possible thanks to a scholarship from the programme Praxis XXI of the Portuguese government, to which I am very grateful. The dissertation has been revised to include up-to-date information, but its main focus remains the same: the development of the Portuguese parliament over its second decade of democracy. Throughout my period of research, there have been a number of people to whom I am particularly grateful for their support, help and kindness. I am grateful to Professor Lord Norton for his continuing support and for giving me the opportunity to publish and therefore to mature ideas as the research developed. I am also grateful to Phil Cowley for making me believe that, somehow, working on the Portuguese parliament is important, even in the home country of the mother of all parliaments. Thank you also for his, and Mark Stuart’s, help with my many difficult, foreign expressions. Moreover, I am indebted to Professor Ed Page who gave me very good and stimulating advice on a number of occasions. From Portugal, I am grateful to all the interviewees who contributed to this research: Fernando Amaral, Barbosa de Melo, Cavaco Silva, Manuela Ferreira Leite, Rui Machete, José Magalhães, Magalhães Mota, Alberto Martins, Mota Amaral, Luís Sá, Manuel dos Santos, Guilherme Silva, Silva Lopes, Octávio Teixeira and Helena Torres Marques. All of the interviewees have had a major role in the second decade of Portuguese politics and provided a fundamental contribution to this research. Sadly, the MP Luís Sá died in October 1999. By remembering here some of his words and work, I hope to pay a small tribute to this MP from whom we expected so much more. I am also grateful to Leonor Coutinho for sharing with me her personal experience as an MP. I am particularly indebted to Conceição Azevedo and Margarida Guadálpi from the Divisão de Informação Legislativa e Parlamentar [DILP]. They have both always answerered my queries with great patience and have provided access to key information in the archives of the DILP. I am also grateful to Pedro Magalhães for his comments and for our conversations on Portuguese politics.

I am equally thankful to Sheila Young and the Clarks: Jo, Will, Ed, Alex, John and especially Sally. Thank you for all of their help with Tomás and Rafael. I would have not made it without that support. But of course, my main thanks go to James, who gave me much more than support and help. Thank you for all of the advice, for making me think clearly and for believing in my work. Finally, thank you to Tomás, Rafael and Mário for being ‘a luz do nosso jardim’.

Note 1 A summarised version of my PhD thesis, adapted for the Portuguese public, was published in C.Leston-Bandeira, Da Legislação à Legitimação: o papel do parlamento português (Lisbon: Instituto de Ciências Sociais, 2002).

List of abbreviations AD

Aliança Democrática [coalition between the PSD, the CDS and the PPM]1

AR

Assembleia da República [Portuguese parliament]

ASDI

Acção Social-Democrata Independente [parliamentary grouping formed by PSD dissenting MPs]

CDS

Centro Democrático e Social [christian democrat, catholic, party]

CRP

Constituição da República Portuguesa [constitution of the Portuguese republic]

DAR

Diário da Assembleia da República [official journal of the Portuguese parliament]

DILP

Divisão de Informação Legislativa e Parlamentar [division on legislative information of the Portuguese parliament]

DR

Diário da República [state official journal, where all laws and decree-laws are published]

GOPs

Grandes Opções do Plano [bill on the major policy plans proposed each year]

ID

Intervenção Democrática [parliamentary group composed by MPs of the MDP]

LEOE

Lei de Enquadramento do Orçamento de Estado [law on the budget deliberation process]

MDP

Movimento Democrático Português [small left-wing party]

MP

Member of Parliament; in Portuguese, Deputado (a) à Assembleia da República

OE

Orçamento de Estado [budget bill proposed each year]

PAOD

Período Antes da Ordem do Dia [first part of a plenary session]

PCP

Partido Comunista Português [communist party]

PEV

Partido Ecologista Os Verdes [greens party]

PG (s)

Parliamentary Group (s)

PPM

Partido Popular Monárquico [small monarchic party]

PRD

Partido Renovador Democrático [left liberal party]

PS

Partido Socialista [socialist/social democrat party]

PSD

Partido Social Democrata [right liberal party]

PSN

Partido da Solidariedade Nacional [party representative of

the pensioners] RP

Regimento [rules of procedure of the Portuguese parliament]

UDP

União Democrática Popular [small left-wing party]

UEDS

União da Esquerda para a Democracia Socialista [parliamentary grouping formed by PS dissenting MPs]

Note 1 More detail is given in the following chapters on each party.

Introduction Aims and object The main aim of this book is to contribute to the knowledge on the Portuguese parliament, the Assembleia da República. Although already over 20 years old, this is still in many ways an unknown institution. There is very little literature on it and much of what exists is dated. This study seeks to fill a notable gap. Given the lack of previous studies, many objects could have been chosen for this book. However, considering the non-existence of basic information (such as on the ruling framework and the scrutiny devices), this volume has necessarily to adopt a broad perspective. It is concerned with the overall development of the Assembleia da República as a newly democratic institution. For this, a period of 12 years has been chosen: 1983 to 1995, which includes three different political situations, a coalition, a minority and an absolute majority government. The main reason for the choice of this period is again linked with the absence of studies on parliament: only a very small part of existing literature has been dedicated to the period subsequent to 1985; most of the studies have focused on the first decade of Portuguese democracy (after 1974).1 Besides this, other reasons justify the choice of those 12 years in particular. 1987 was the first time that an absolute majority held by one party was elected to parliament; for the first time in Portuguese democracy, there was political stability and a full legislature period (four years) was completed. Thus, it is normal to expect considerable changes in the Assembleia after 1987, that is, in the V legislature. In 1991, the same absolute majority was re-elected to parliament for a further four years (VI legislature—1991–95). The repetition of two completed parliaments allows us to adequately understand the extent of the consequences of political stability for the development of a new institution. In order to fully assess the changes brought in by the absolute majorities, two previous legislatures were also included in the period studied here: the III (1983–85) and the IV (1985–87). This allows us to include in the analysis two different political situations: a coalition government (III) and a minority one (IV). Hence, the study of the Assembleia over this period of 12 years will provide a thorough understanding of the variables and processes involved in the development of a new democratic institution, once the troubled years of transition to democracy had been overcome. When needed, information will also be given on the periods before and after 1983–1995. The analysis will be carried out basically through two dimensions: policy-making and legitimation.

Methods and material used The object adopted in this book is therefore of considerable breadth. This explains the variety of research methods and material used. The research at the base of this book divides into four different types: (1) analysis of the Rules of Procedure in force

From Legislation to Legitimation

2

throughout the period, (2) overall assessment of parliament’s activity, (3) a case study (the deliberation process of the budget) and (4) an overview of the press coverage of parliament’s activity. (1) The Rules of Procedure is a fundamental document to understand the Portuguese parliament. Several revisions of this document have taken place, but no analysis has been undertaken. The comparative analysis undertaken of the old and the revised versions of the Rules of Procedure allows us to fully appreciate the changes undergone by this parliament. There were basically four revisions of this document: 1985, 1988, 1991 and 1993. The review of the different versions of the Rules of Procedure was carried out through a comparative analysis between the old and the new versions of all articles altered in each revision.2 (2) Since 1985, the Assembleia has published annual reports where information is given on parliamentary activity, namely on the deliberation process of the bills discussed in parliament and the scrutiny devices. The data analysed in this book on the overall parliamentary activity is based on these reports. It was from these, for instance, that a database was created on all of the bills discussed in parliament during those 12 years. For the period prior to 1985, the information was gathered directly from the Assembleia’s archives. (3) The deliberation process of the budget is used in this book as a way of obtaining detailed information about the role of parliament in policy-making and as a legitimation body. Because the whole of its deliberation process is recorded and published (unlike with ordinary bills), this case study gives access to information not available at an overall level (such as the second reading’s proceedings). What is more, the budget is discussed every year, enabling a comparative analysis over the years. The information on this case study has been collected from the parliamentary papers reporting the debates (see the bibliography—8.1.2.6—for a full list of these papers). From these papers it was possible to build a database of the votes on the budget. Adding to this, several indicators were also collected on the style of debate carried out (such as length of the debate, number of speakers and type of intervention). This case study provides clearer information about parliament’s role in policy-making than the overall data, and, moreover, it allows us to assess how the practice of parliamentary debate has developed over the years. (4) In the face of the lack of information on Portuguese politics (after the transition period), a file describing the 1983–95 period was created from the press reports of the main Portuguese weekly newspaper, the Expresso. Besides this, an outline contents analysis has been carried out on the type and frequency of the news published in that newspaper about parliament. This has provided background information on the changes in the image of parliament over the 12 years considered. Besides this, the author also carried out semi-structured interviews with a total of 15 political personalities:3 Fernando Amaral, Barbosa de Melo, Cavaco Silva, Manuela Ferreira Leite, Rui Machete, José Magalhães, Magalhães Mota, Alberto Martins, Mota Amaral, Luís Sá, Manuel dos Santos, Guilherme Silva, Silva Lopes, Octávio Teixeira and Helena Torres Marques. All of these personalities are nowadays, or were some time between 1983 and 1995, MPs in the Assembleia da República, with the exception of Cavaco Silva who was Prime Minister between 1985 and 1995. All of these personalities

Introduction

3

have had a major role in Portuguese politics, particularly during the period considered here (see Appendix I). Besides these politicians, the former director of parliament’s main division dealing with legislative information, Margarida Guadálpi, was also interviewed. These interviews have provided valuable information not only on the broad development of the Assembleia, but also on the practical consequences of the revisions of the Rules of Procedure and, specifically, on the deliberation process of the budget.

Book structure The book is divided into three parts, comprising six chapters. Broadly speaking, the first part presents the context of Portuguese politics and the parliamentary institution, the second considers the roles of parliament in policy-making and legitimation, and the final part concentrates on the case study of the budget. Chapter 1 explains the analytical framework adopted to analyse the development of the Assembleia da República from 1983 to 1995. It shows how the main analytical concepts are drawn from the work of authors such as Robert Packenham, Michael Mezey and Philip Norton. From this, two main analytical dimensions are defined: policy-making and legitimation. Complementing this, the chapter also stresses the importance of variables such as political change and legal framework in the analysis of a newly democratic institution such as the Assembleia. At the end of the chapter, the author suggests some propositions on the development of the Portuguese parliament in its second decade of democracy. Chapter 2 describes the Portuguese context. It includes a section explaining the main characteristics of the political system, which is’ a semi-presidential system with a strong parliamentary component. The proportional representation system is the elective method of most political organs. This is followed by two sections that describe the political periods, firstly since democracy was introduced in 1974 and then, in more detail, between 1983 and 1995. Chapter 3 is dedicated to the Portuguese parliament: it presents this institution, its historical origins and its present structure. The first section addresses the historical evolution of parliamentarism in Portugal since 1820, when it was first introduced, until the setting up of democracy in the mid 1970s. It goes through the liberal monarchy period (1820–1910), the first republic (1910–26) and the Salazar dictatorship (1926–74). This historical description helps in understanding some of the constitutional and political choices made in the period 1974–76, when the first constitution and parliamentary institutions were established. The second section of this chapter presents the current main characteristics of the structure of the contemporary Portuguese parliament. It gives particular attention to the centrality of the parliamentary groups (to the detriment of MPs) in the organisation and the agenda of the Assembleia. It also describes the main ruling organs, the resources available and how parliamentary activity is organised. The last section of this chapter is of particular importance: it deals with the revisions made to the Rules of Procedure. These revisions constitute an excellent indicator of the institutional development of the Assembleia da República. This section shows clearly that in the second decade of Portuguese democracy there was a strong rationalisation of parliamentary procedures: chamber dominance gave way to an empowerment of

From Legislation to Legitimation

4

committees, majoritarian control over the agenda was reinforced and procedures were considerably regulated. Chapter 4 presents the role of the Portuguese parliament in policy-making. Although the Assembleia seems to have a predominant role, it soon becomes clear that this is largely apparent. Not only the weight of parliament’s bills in the final legislative output is not as important as it might appear (a basic distinction has to be made and ‘municipal bills’ have to be differentiated, revealing the real weight of MPs’ bills), but also the government has its own means to legislate outside parliament. Still, constitutionally, parliament does have strong prerogatives in policy-making. The analysis will show that government’s power increased considerably with the absolute majorities, to the detriment of parliament’s; even though the Assembleia has actually more capacity nowadays to issue legislation than at the end of the first decade of democracy, as a result of the rationalisation of procedures. Chapter 5 shows the legitimation mechanisms that the Assembleia da República has developed over its second decade of democracy. Again, the change happened primarily as a result of the experience of the absolute majorities. The first section looks into the scrutiny devices of the Assembleia. It shows how scrutiny was not a priority in the first years of parliamentary democracy: its institutionalisation only started after 1985 and the routinisation of its use only happened with the absolute majorities. At the end of this period, new scrutiny devices were introduced allowing a more direct and immediate response to outside inputs. The second section is on the relationship between parliament and citizens. This has only become a primary concern since the 1990s and constitutes another indicator of the way the Portuguese parliament has developed legitimation mechanisms in the face of the loss of decisional power, following the experience of an absolute majority. Chapter 6 is dedicated to the case study of the budget. This case study illustrates, on one hand, the broad development undergone by the Portuguese parliament described in the previous chapters and, on the other, gives further elucidation of the policy-making and legitimation dimensions. This analysis will help to elucidate the dimension of the effects of the revisions of the Rules of Procedure on parliamentary practice, providing strong evidence on how a new parliament changes. The analysis of the votes gives clear clues to the differences in the role of parliament over the four legislatures under study, the III, the iy the V and the VI. This becomes particularly clear when complemented by the qualitative information collected from the debates and interviews. Finally, the conclusion brings together the evidence given in the previous chapters in support of the propositions attempted on the development of the Portuguese parliament. It shows how, in its second decade of democracy, the Assembleia da República has developed from a ‘legislative oriented institution’ to a ‘legitimation oriented one’.

Notes 1 See M.Braga da Cruz, ‘Sobre o Parlamento português: partidarização parlamentar e parlamentarização partidária’, Análise Social, Vol. XXIV, No. 100 (1988), pp. 97–125; T.Bruneau and A.MacLeod, Politics in Contemporary Portugal (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986); M.Lobo Antunes, ‘A Assembleia da República e a consolidação da democracia em Portugal’, Análise Social, Vol. XXIV, No. 100 (1988), pp. 77–95; and W.Opello, ‘Portugal’s Parliament: an organizational analysis of legislative performance’,

Introduction

5

Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. XI, No. 3 (1986), pp. 291–319. Only more recently has the study of the Portuguese parliament expanded, see: L.Sá, O Lugar da Assembleia da República no Sistema Político (Lisboa: Caminho, 1994); A.Araújo, A.Freire, M.Costa Lobo, C.Leston-Bandeira and P.Magalhães, O Parlamento Português: uma reforma necessária (Lisbon: Institute of Social Sciences/Institute Amaro da Costa/Portuguese Parliament, 2002), A.Filipe, As Oposições Parlamentares em Portugal—Práticas e Intervenções (1976–2000) (Lisbon: Vega Editora, 2002); and C.Leston-Bandeira and A.Freire, ‘Internalising the lessons of stable democracy: the Portuguese parliament’, in C.Leston-Bandeira (ed.), The Journal of Legislative Studies—special issue on Southern European Parliaments in Democracy, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2003), pp. 57–86. 2 This compilation of the Rules of Procedure’s revisions (article by article) carried out by the author is accessible through the Portuguese parliament’s website at . 3 For a brief profile on each interviewee, see Appendix I.

1 Analytic framework This first chapter presents the analytic framework adopted to study the Portuguese parliament from 1983 to 1995. It shows which concepts the book will draw from, in particular from the work of authors such as Robert Packenham, Michael Mezey and Philip Norton. It will also show the importance of remembering that the Assembleia da República is a newly democratic institution and that, therefore, great attention has to be given to political change and to the legal framework when analysing this institution.

1.1 Parliament beyond its traditional role There is a crucial lack of a theoretical framework as a basis for consideration of the Assembleia da República: only a very few studies have been published and no comprehensive analysis has been carried out of this institution. For this reason, this research follows the framework set by authors concerned with comparative legislative studies; namely Robert Packenham, Michael Mezey and Philip Norton. The choice of these authors’ work follows from an empirical study done on the V legislature of the Assembleia da República, that is the first absolute majority in the Portuguese parliament.1 In that study the image of a powerless assembly emerged, where parliamentary activity seemed dominated by a single parliamentary group and where the opposition members saw their role as pointless in the face of a cohesive majority, blindly supportive of the government’s actions. Also in the press, the institution of parliament was seen as pointless. This led to an inevitable question: did the Assembleia da República really not matter? Was there anything else besides its virtually non-existent decisional power? Basically, what role did, and does, the Assembleia da República play? What functions explain the need for a parliamentary institution? What functions explain the absurdity that would be the mere thought of abolishing the Assembleia? In order to answer these questions we need to adopt an open perspective on the activity of the Portuguese parliament; that is, we have to consider what functions the Assembleia da República plays in the Portuguese political system, besides its decisional role. The study of legislatures has undergone major changes over the last century. From the paradigm of the decline of legislatures, we moved effectively to the paradigm of the role of parliaments. In his chapter emphatically entitled ‘The decline of legislatures’,2 Lord Bryce famously expressed in 1921 the concerns about parliament’s performance that authors such as Bagehot had been pointing out, that is a loss of power and capacity in law-making. This notion of parliament as an undermined body was largely substantiated by the increasing power of political parties in overall politics, as well as the expansion of the executive; this became more differentiated and specialised as the state’s responsibilities extended to most areas of peoples’ daily life.3

Analytic framework

7

The idea of the decline of legislatures had as its main premise the fact that legislatures existed merely to make law. However, in the 1960s, the study of legislatures started to shift from this premise by looking into new variables, such as the legislators themselves; this gave place to a number of studies on legislative behaviour, typically by authors such as J.C.Wahlke and H.Eulau.4 It was only in the 1970s, though, that there came a major change in the study of legislatures. This happened primarily with the publication of Legislatures in Developmental Perspective.5 Until then, the analysis of legislatures embodied three main problems: firstly, the premise that legislatures existed to make law,6 secondly (and very closely linked to the first) the assumption of decline and, thirdly, an overwhelming focus on highly institutionalised legislatures, typically the American Congress and the British House of Commons. This meant that researchers took for granted a number of parliamentary features such as the mere act of an assembly meeting regularly and uninterruptedly. Legislatures in Developmental Perspective7 introduced a fundamental difference by looking into legislative institutions hardly considered institutionalised, indeed in many cases labelled non-democratic. When looking at these institutions, the perspective on legislatures had necessarily to change. In this context, the contribution of Robert Packenham is particularly interesting as it provides a comprehensive analysis of the Brazilian Congress based on a set of functions performed by parliament.8 The author actually concludes that the Congress, although at the time under a military regime, played a fundamental role in the maintenance of the political system. Packenham sees functions as consequences for the political system and, in those terms, identifies three main processes taking place in the Congress:9 • legitimation • recruitment, socialisation and training • political decision-making or influence. Each of these processes embodies particular functions, adding up to 11 distinct functions, expressed more fully by Philip Norton in Table 1.10 Packenham ranks those functions and concludes that the importance of the functions played by the Brazilian Congress follows the order in which they are given in Table 1 (from more to less important); that is, the law-making function, traditionally considered as the primary function of parliaments (if not the only

Table 1 Packenham’s functions Legitimation Latent legitimation (through meeting regularly and uninterruptedly) Manifest legitimation (giving the formal stamp of approval) ‘Safety valve’ or ‘tension release’ (outlet for tensions in the system) Recruitment, socialisation and training Recruitment Socialisation Training

From Legislation to Legitimation

8

Political decision-making or influence Law-making ‘Exit’ function (resolving an impasse in the political system) Interest-articulation Conflict resolution Administrative-oversight and patronage (includes ‘errand-running’) Source: P.Norton, ‘Parliaments: a framework for analysis’, in P.Norton (ed.), Parliaments in Western Europe (London: Frank Cass, 1990), p. 6.

one), was actually considered much less important than the legitimation functions, in terms of the consequences of the Congress for the political system. By meeting regularly and uninterruptedly, the Congress transmitted an image of institutional normality. Tensions were released through the debates which were widely reported in the press; as Packenham puts it: ‘Plenary session debates, committee meetings, party and factional strategy sessions, individual legislators’ statements (…) were a device for the release of tensions among both the relatively impotent legislators (who debated, met, spoke) and various layers of the attentive public (who read about the activities and thus gained some symbolic reassurance that the government was “democratic” and “vital”).’11 The main contribution of Packenham’s study is twofold: not only does he show that parliaments do perform a variety of functions besides making law (note that the ascription of different parliamentary functions had already been made, but never in such a comprehensive way),12 but also he shows that we should not necessarily expect parliament to have a decisional policy-making role. Although his study only comprised a one-year period, April 1964 to July 1965 (not addressing, therefore, the question of change), it raised fundamental questions about how to study legislatures. In this respect, Michael Mezey has also made a major contribution. In 1979, he published Comparative Legislatures13 where he established a typology to classify parliaments. Attempts to establish such typologies had already been made, notably by Nelson Polsby,14 but Mezey’s classification of legislatures is probably the one that offers the most complete perspective on parliament, as well as the most quoted to characterise individual legislatures. Mezey’s classification is based on two dimensions: policy-making and support. Policy-making is seen as parliament’s dimension that can change the most. In order to evaluate variation in policy-making power, Mezey differentiates three different levels in a continuum:15 • Strong: the legislature can modify and reject executive proposals. • Modest: the legislature has no capacity to reject policy proposals, but can modify them. • Little or no: the legislature can neither modify nor reject policy proposals. Recognising the difficulty in assessing the dimension of support, Mezey divides it into the lowest level of measurement, that is a dichotomised variable: less supported legislatures and more supported legislatures. Through the combination of these two

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dimensions (policy-making and support) he obtains five different types of legislatures: vulnerable, marginal, active, reactive and minimal.16 This classification has been widely used in comparative analysis; in particular, the concept of a minimal legislature, that is an institution with little or no policy-making power, but counting on considerable support, such as some of the old communist parliaments. For the purpose of this book, the main aspect to take into account in Mezey’s classification is the way the author differentiates various levels in the policy-making role. Mezey shows that policy-making is a continuum between two extremes representing very different types of legislatures. Although recognising the necessity to look into other dimensions of parliament, Mezey does state the importance of analysing policy-making as a fundamental indicator of parliament’s role. As Mezey stated in 1995, ‘changes in the status of a legislature typically involve movement along this policy-making continuum’.17 Besides that, Mezey specifies measurable indicators to determine the degree of power in policy-making. However, as Philip Norton has pointed out, this typology is not without problems, it ‘misses (…) the essential difference.’18 Taking the case of the House of Commons, Norton re-defined Mezey’s terms and presented a new typology.19 The problem perceived in the original typology is in the criteria used to differentiate between a strong and a modest policy-making legislature. The difference between these two being the fact that parliament can (or cannot) reject the executive proposals. However, if one is evaluating the role in policy-making, one should at the very least introduce a positive dimension; that is, a legislature with a strong policy-making power ‘must surely encompass the capacity to formulate, to “make” policy’.20 This positive dimension should be the main difference between a strong and a not so strong legislature in terms of policy-making. Norton redefines Mezey’s typology in the following way: • policy-making legislatures: can modify or reject measures brought forward by the executive and can formulate and substitute policies of their own; • policy-influencing legislatures: can modify or reject measures brought forward by the executive but cannot formulate and substitute policies of their own; • legislatures with little or no policy affect: can neither modify or reject policies brought forward by the executive nor formulate and substitute policies of their own.21 Norton’s typology improves Mezey’s idea of a continuum in the policy-making role and further specifies the indicators to use in the evaluation of that role. It recognises the value of the possibility of a positive action from parliament: to actually introduce and issue policy proposals. Besides policy-making and support, Comparative Legislatures22 considers two other main functions played by parliament: representation and system-maintenance. The function of representation is quite clear and basically makes the link between parliament and citizens. By system-maintenance it is understood ‘those things that the legislature does that contribute to the stability of the political system and enhance its capacity to survive.’23 This dimension incorporates functions that Packenham distinguished under different headings, as well as new ones: recruitment, integration, support for the policies and legitimisation. This concept of system-maintenance was at that time still slightly unclear. In 1995, Michael Mezey simply names this dimension as a legitimisation function.24

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This book is based on these main ideas from the contributions of Robert Packenham, Michael Mezey and Philip Norton. Packenham, for his evaluation of the importance of the legitimation function in his analysis of a minimal legislature, and, on the other hand, for turning to indicators that had until then been taken for granted. Mezey, for alerting ‘us to the need to explore a dimension of legislative activity beyond that of, but not exclusively, policy-making’;25 that is, although there is some evidence that legislatures play less of a policy-making role and more of a legitimation one, the first one still embodies one of the main reasons for the existence of parliaments. The contribution of Philip Norton’s work will be particularly important as it provides a clear-cut typology to assess the Assembleia’s role in policy-making. Therefore, this volume will analyse the role of the Portuguese parliament, between 1983 and 1995, basically under two dimensions: policy-making and legitimation. These two dimensions are seen as complementary and they provide a two-angle perspective for this analysis of the Assembleia da República. By policy-making we mean the formulation and production of proposals of policy and, in this sense, the case study of the budget will provide an excellent illustration of the role of the Assembleia da República in this area. One of the main bases of this case study will be the analysis of all the votes taken by government and MPs on each year’s budget from 1983 to 1995. By legitimation, we mean the expression and reinforcement, with more or less direct outcomes, of society’s pleas; it embodies therefore both Packenham’s idea of legitimation, as well as Mezey’s idea of representation. This will also be visible in the analysis of the budget, the debates on which are a constant attempt to make a bridge between the political agenda and society’s needs.

1.2 Parliament in a process of rapid change There is one aspect that none of these three authors fully addresses: the question of change. The question of change is, however, fundamental for the analysis of such a young parliament as the Assembleia da República. The Assembleia da República is just over 25 years old, which means that it has had to come through childhood (a touch disturbed), to adolescence and is slowly heading towards a mature stage; it has been changing a lot in a very short period of time. For this reason, this book looks at a period that stretches over 12 years, in order to evaluate how the coming of age has affected parliament’s role, and, on the other hand, to see how parliamentary changes have led to a new role. The few studies published in the English language on the Assembleia da República suffer exactly from the misconceptions that change in a young democracy can instil in our perception of reality. There are basically two English language studies: the one by Walter Opello and the one by Manuel Braga da Cruz and Miguel Lobo Antunes.26 Opello’s study aimed at evaluating the levels of institutionalisation of the Assembleia da República. The criteria used were based on the American Congress, leading necessarily to the evaluation (dramatically negative) of ‘desinstitutionalisation, decay and breakdown’ of the Portuguese parliament.27 The research for that study was concluded at the beginning of 1985, that is, not even ten years after the first Assembleia da República was elected.

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Crucially, the study by Braga da Cruz and Lobo Antunes was developed at a time of sharp and unexpected change in the Portuguese political system: between 1986 and 1987. Then, a fifth party emerged with an important share of the votes, in a party system which had been unchanged since 1975, when the total number of votes was effectively shared by just four major parties. Besides this, the government in power in 1985–87 had the support of a fragile minority in parliament, strongly constrained by the opposition (more detail will be given on this in the subsequent chapters). These precarious circumstances had clear effects on the interpretation drawn by Braga da Cruz and Lobo Antunes and explain the way their text emphasised disruptive features, neglecting the stabilising factors also present in the troubled Portuguese transition to democracy.28 A good example of this neglect of stabilising factors is the lack of attention given to the role of the Portuguese parties in the transition to democracy and to the significance of their representation in parliament. As a consequence, the role of parliament in the transition to democracy is overlooked and the most important factors in that process are identified outside the parliamentary arena. The party stability obtained in parliament was essential for the process of transition to democracy. The prescription of rules such as the loss of the MP’s mandate in case of switching parliamentary group guaranteed an essential base of stability to work upon. The importance of this in a new democracy is particularly revealing in Norton and Olson’s evaluation of the new parliaments of east and central Europe, where the markedly fluid nature of the party groups inside parliament is indicated as one of the main problems in those new democracies.29 Instead, the piece by Braga da Cruz and Lobo Antunes emphasises the disruptive factors in Portuguese transition to democracy, which in turn are emphatically reproduced by Ulrike Liebert in her notable comparative analysis of south European legislatures in the process of consolidation of democracy.30 This interpretation seems, therefore, to have been strongly constrained by the political situation current at the time of the research.31 Notwithstanding the misleading conclusions reached for the Portuguese case, Ulrike Liebert’s analysis is an important effort to understand the main variables conditioning legislative activity in new democracies. The factor of change is incorporated in the analysis of structurally changeable institutions. The classification of the south European legislatures is done under six headings, where the institutional variables are combined with political factors: legislative party systems, partyness of parliaments, nature of parliamentary majorities, parliamentary influence in legislative production, specialisation of permanent committees and institutionalisation.32 For the purpose of this book, the aspect to bring out from this set of variables is the perception of how fundamental it is, in the case of a new democracy, to take into account the variations in the type of majority (minority) present in parliament, on one hand, and, on the other, the formal framework conditioning legislative activity. Although these two dimensions are equally important to the understanding of any legislative institution, they are particularly relevant in a new parliament because they can bring deep and permanent alterations into the institution; they can be the structuring variables of a new institution. Based on Arend Lijphart’s models of democracy33 and on Weinbaum’s types of legislatures,34 Liebert puts together a classification for the south European parliaments. This classification takes into account the changes occurring during the period studied, just as Weinbaum had already done in 1975 in his study on the parliaments of Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan.35 Weinbaum had identified five different types of parliament:

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the co-ordinate, the subordinate, the submissive, the indeterminate and the competitivedominant. Following this typology, Liebert identified three shifts in type in the development of the Assembleia da República: from its inception to 1983 it was an indeterminate parliament, after which it shifted to a co-ordinate type, changing in 1987 to a subordinate one.36 Although Liebert’s classification points out the main trend of the Portuguese parliament, it also contains some inaccuracies37 and overlooks important differences between legislatures. The classification of the III legislature38 (when government had the support of a coalition between the two major parties) as a co-ordinate type is based on an inaccuracy. It is based on the assumption that the number of approved MPs’ bills represented a large proportion of the total, which was not the case as will be seen in chapter 4.39 Although the Assembleia da República did present in the III legislature some of the characteristics of a co-ordinate legislature, that is one maintaining ‘with the executive a relationship of cooperation and interdependence in processes of mutual consultation’,40 it also presented characteristics of a subordinate legislature. Besides, as this book will show, the III legislature presented crucial differences from the following, the iy which are not pointed out in Liebert’s classification. Indeed the IV legislature was a singular parliament, with major consequences for the political system, and more attention should have been given to it. In 1987 there was a major change in Portuguese politics: the election of an absolute majority based on a single party. This is identified by Liebert as the shift of the Assembleia da República towards a subordinate type of parliament, which seems adequate although not fully illustrative of that change. This book will try to understand how that shift happened and what it represented for the role of parliament. Notwithstanding these considerations, Liebert’s approach does identify the main trend undergone by the Assembleia da República and, more importantly, points out the importance of two crucial dimensions in the analysis of a parliament in a new democracy: political change and formal framework. The importance of this second dimension is also clear in Pasquino’s analysis of the relationships between government and parliament in southern Europe, just as in the contributions to the special issue of The Journal of Legislative Studies on the new parliaments of east and central Europe.41 The prescription, for instance, of a constructive motion of no confidence in Hungary has been the guarantee of stable legislatures, just as it was in Spain. The implantation of a new parliament demands a ruling framework (often defined in opposition to the previous regime) in order to guarantee indispensable institutional references which, in mature democracies, are somehow pre-existent to the very logic of long democratic practice. The question of whether it is political change that determines the revision of the rules of parliament, or whether it is the revision of the rules that constrains a change in parliament is difficult to resolve. However, in a new democracy the two are particularly closely linked. This is why the assessment of the changes in the Portuguese parliament’s rules, as well as its consequences in parliamentary activity, will be particularly important to assess the development of the role of the Assembleia da República.

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1.3 Patterns of developnient of the Portuguese parliament The preceding two sections have pointed out the main concerns providing the structure for this analysis of the role of the Portuguese parliament between 1983 and 1995. Looking into those 12 years allows us to assess how the Portuguese parliament developed in its second decade of democracy. The few studies published to date have been limited to the consideration of the first decade, providing an erroneous image of the current status of the Assembleia da República, as they are still quoted today in comparative studies. The second decade represented a very different development for the Portuguese parliament, as this study will show. In order to assess that development, this research focuses on the changes that have occurred in the role of parliament in terms of policy-making and in terms of legitimation. Across these two analytical dimensions there is a conditioning one: partyness, that is party distribution in parliament and its expression in terms of government support. Besides this, the Portuguese parliament’s pattern of development is also constrained by one major factor: the emergence in 1987 of an absolute majority of a single party in parliament. This marked the beginning of a new cycle in Portuguese politics and represented a definite change in the role of parliament. The main proposition for the pattern of development of the Assembleia da República between 1983 and 1995 is that it developed from a legislation parliament towards a legitimation one. This implies a change in both the policy-making and the legitimation dimensions. In policy-making, we suggest that, following Philip Norton’s typology, the Assembleia da República changed in the following way: • III legislature: a policy-influencing legislature • IV legislature: a policy-making legislature • V and VI legislatures: a legislature with little or no policy effect. Considering that a legitimation function is always present as long as a legislature exists, one could say that the main variation in this dimension would be an explicit assimilation of that role; and not merely an assumption inherent to its performance. As the Assembleia da República lost its decisional power in policy-making, it developed new ways to express its role in the Portuguese political system; it developed mechanisms to make the link with outside inputs more explicit. It stopped being what is called here a ‘legislative oriented parliament’ to become increasingly a ‘legitimation oriented parliament’. This change would have occurred with the emergence of the absolute majorities. In a ‘legislative oriented parliament’, the procedures and the main activity are defined according to the law-making function. In a ‘legitimation oriented parliament’, other functions are expressed in parliamentary procedures and agenda. One would expect, therefore, the following patterns of development of the Assembleia da República: • III legislature: a policy-influencing legislature in a legislative oriented institution. • IV legislature: a policy-making legislature in a legislative oriented institution. • V and VI legislatures: a legislature with little or no policy effect in a legitimation oriented institution.

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Hence, in order to assess the development of the Assembleia da República in its second decade of democracy, this book will look into two major dimensions: policy-making and legitimation. Through these two dimensions it will be possible to show how the Portuguese parliament has started to leave adolescence, progressively heading to a more mature stage. A lot happened in just 12 years and the changes in the type of majority present in parliament were fundamental for that development.

Notes 1 C.Leston-Bandeira and P.Coutinho Magalhães, As relações parlamento-governo, nas IVa e Va legislaturas (unpublished degree thesis, Lisbon: ISCTE, 1993). 2 Lord Bryce, Modern Democracies (Macmillan Company, 1921). 3 For a detailed explanation of this process, see P.Norton, ‘General Introduction’, in P.Norton (ed.), Legislatures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 1–16. 4 For a review on the literature about legislative behaviour, see R.Packenham, ‘Legislatures and Political Development’, in A.Kornberg and L.Musolf (eds), Legislatures in Developmental Perspective (Durham: Durham University Press, 1970), pp. 521–82. 5 Kornberg and Musolf (eds), Legislatures in Developmental Perspective (Durham: Durham University Press, 1970). The originality of this book is patent in its title. At a time when a number of countries were commonly referred to as ‘the third world’, this book represented a different perspective on those countries: by looking at them from a developmental point of view. 6 See Norton, ‘General Introduction’, pp. 3–4, for a deconstruction of the term legislature and its direct link to the act of making law. See also P.Norton, Does Parliament Matter? (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), p. 1. 7 Kornberg and Musolf (note 5). 8 Packenham (note 4). 9 Ibid., p. 526. 10 P.Norton, ‘Parliaments: a framework for analysis’, in P.Norton (ed.), Parliaments in Western Europe (London: Frank Cass, 1990), p. 6. 11 Packenham (note 4), p. 530. 12 See, for instance, W.Bagehot, ‘The House of Commons’, in The English Constitution (London: Chapman and Hall, 1867), published in P.Norton (ed.), Legislatures, pp. 36–56. Bagehot identified a total of five functions: the elective, the expressive, the teaching, the informing and the legislative functions. 13 M.Mezey, Comparative Legislatures (Durham: Duke University Press, 1979). 14 N.Polsby, ‘Legislatures’, in F.I.Greenstein and N.W.Polsby (eds), Handbook of Political Science (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 257–319. The author distinguishes between arena and transformative legislatures according to their independence towards external influence in their legislative power; this degree of independence varies in a continuum from a lower degree (arena) to a higher one (transformative). Polsby, then, combines these types with other characteristics of legislatures, such as the parliamentary organising majorities (from highly coalitional to narrowly based), according to which he classifies a set of nine different parliaments (Polsby, ‘Legislatures’, p. 296). 15 Mezey, Comparative Legislatures, pp. 26–7. 16 Ibid., p. 36. 17 M.Mezey, ‘Parliament in the New Europe’, in J.Hayward and E.Page (eds), Governing the New Europe (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 198. 18 Norton (note 10), pp. 4–5. 19 P.Norton, ‘Parliament and Policy in Britain: the House of Commons as a Policy Influencer’, in Teaching Politics, Vol. 13 (1984), pp. 198–221.

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20 Norton (note 10), p. 5. 21 P.Norton, ‘The legislative powers of parliament’, in C.Flinterman, A.Willentteringe and L.Waddington (eds), The Evolving Role of Parliaments in Europe (Antwerpen: Maklu Uitgevers, 1994), p. 18. Note that although Norton first defined this typology in 1984, in his study on the House of Commons as a policy-influencer, it was only in 1990, in the introduction to his first Parliaments in Western Europe that the differences from Mezey’s typology were more specifically clarified and better still in 1994, when Norton actually slightly modified the terms. 22 Mezey (note 15). 23 M.Mezey, ‘System Maintenance’, in Comparative Legislatures (Durham: Duke University Press, 1979), p. 223. 24 Mezey (note 17), p. 198. 25 Norton (note 10), p. 5; our italics. 26 W.Opello, ‘Portugal’s Parliament: an organizational analysis of legislative performance’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. XI, No. 3 (1986), pp. 291–319 and M.Braga da Cruz and M.Lobo Antunes, ‘Revolutionary transition and problems of parliamentary institutionalization: the case of the Portuguese National Assembly’, in U.Liebert and M.Cotta (eds), Parliament and Democratic consolidation in Southern Europe (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), pp. 154–83. This last project resulted in three more texts (in Portuguese) by these two authors, which have some important differences from the English version (M.Braga da Cruz, ‘Sobre o Parlamento português: partidarização parlamentar e parlamentarização partidária’, Análise Social, Vol. XXIV, No. 100 (1988), pp. 97–125; M.Lobo Antunes, ‘A Assembleia da República e a consolidação da democracia em Portugal’, Análise Social, Vol. XXIV, No. 100 (1988), pp. 77–95 and M.Braga da Cruz and M.Lobo Antunes, ‘Parlamento, partidos e governo—acerca da institucionalização política’, in M.Baptista Coelho (ed.), Portugal—O Sistema Político e Constitucional, 1974–87 (Lisbon: Instituto de Ciências Sociais, 1989), pp. 351–68. T.Bruneau and A.MacLeod also wrote a chapter on the Assembleia da República in their book (T.Bruneau and A.MacLeod, ‘The Parliament without prestige’, in T.Bruneau and A.MacLeod, Politics in Contemporary Portugal (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986), pp. 146–64, but it merely consisted of a description of the Assembleia da República and not an analysis as such of the institution. 27 Opello (note 26), p. 291. 28 Curiously, the conclusions of the Portuguese language version of that project does not suffer so much from this ailment; in fact, the individual text by Miguel Lobo Antunes actually emphasises the stabilising factors and sees the military dominance as a necessary way to an effective transition to democracy (Lobo Antunes, ‘A Assembleia da República e a consolidação da democracia em Portugal’). 29 P.Norton and D.Olson, ‘Parliaments in Adolescence’, The Journal of Legislative Studies— special issue on The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1996), pp. 231–43. See also D.Olson, ‘Party Formation and Party System Consolidation in the New Democracies of Central Europe’, Political Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1998), pp. 432–64. 30 U.Liebert, ‘Parliaments in the consolidation of democracy—a comparative assessment of Southern European experiences’, in U.Liebert and M.Cotta (eds), Parliament And Democratic Consolidation In Southern Europe (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), pp. 249– 72. 31 It should be noted that this piece by Braga da Cruz and Lobo Antunes and the one by Ulrike Liebert have been the main reference for comparative studies, whenever referring to the Portuguese parliament (Braga da Cruz and Lobo Antunes, ‘Revolutionary transition and problems of parliamentary institutionalization’ and Ulrike Liebert, ‘Parliaments in the consolidation of democracy’). Therefore, the presumptions of a highly unstable system and of a ‘rampant multipartyism’ have been reproduced thereafter. 32 Liebert (note 30), p. 251.

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33 A.Lijphart, Democracies—Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in TwentyOne Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). 34 M.G.Weinbaum, ‘Classification and change in legislative systems: with particular application to Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan’, in G.R.Boynton and C.L.Kim (eds), Legislative Systems in developing countries (Durham: Duke University Press, 1975), pp. 31– 68. 35 Weinbaum analysed legislative change from one type of legislature to another, in the cases of the three countries, illustrated in his Figure 2 (pp. 45–58). However, Weinbaum’s typology was not very clear in its definition of the criteria differentiating each type of parliament. 36 Liebert (note 30), p. 261. 37 A minor inaccuracy is the numerical reference to the legislatures which is not correct; this has to do with a misunderstanding of the logic of those first years of Portuguese democracy, which does lead to a more serious inaccuracy. Liebert considers as the I legislature the period 1974 to 1979, which is not correct as will be seen in the following chapter. Until 1976, there was a provisional situation in Portugal and only then was the first parliament elected; this first parliament constituted the I legislature, which lasted until 1980. This legislature contained much instability and the Assembleia da República could be considered as ‘indeterminate’. However, this indeterminate status ended by 1979, after the last presidential cabinet, contrary to Liebert’s interpretation that extends it until 1982. 38 And not IV legislature as is indicated in Liebert’s text. 39 As will be seen in chapter 4, one characteristic of the AR’s legislative output is a high production of what can be called ‘municipal bills’, which must be differentiated from the main bulk of legislation. This distinction, although made in the Portuguese versions of the Braga da Cruz and Lobo Antunes texts, was not made in Liebert and Cotta (eds), Parliament And Democratic Consolidation In Southern Europe, leading to erroneous conclusions. 40 Liebert (note 30), p. 259. 41 G.Pasquino, ‘Executive-Legislative relations in Southern Europe’ in R.Gunther, N.Diamandouros and H.J.Puhle (eds), The Politics of Democratic Consolidation (London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 261–283; and D.Olson and P.Norton (eds), The Journal of Legislative Studies—special issue on The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1996).

2 Description of the Portuguese context This chapter describes primary features of the Portuguese political systetn in order to provide a context for the subsequent analysis. It has a twofold perspective: systemic and diachronic. The first section introduces a basic explanation of the variables composing the Portuguese political system, in particular its semi-presidential character and the proportionality rule inherent in the representative system. The second section looks into the main events of Portuguese politics since 1974, that is when transition to democracy took place. This is important in order to understand the rapid change the Portuguese political system has been through in its first 25 plus years of democracy. The final section goes through the main events of the period studied here: 1983–95. These three sections provide a fundamental context to understand better the analysis developed in the subsequent chapters.

2.1 Main characteristics of the Portuguese political system Constitutionally, the Assembleia da República has substantial powers in the Portuguese political system. The political system is based on a triangular1 organisation, where power is shared between the president of the republic, parliament and government. Next to these institutions the Constitutional Tribunal also has important powers as the institution responsible for the oversight of constitutionality.2 Since 1976, four revisions of the constitution have taken place: in 1982, 1989, 1992 and 1997; in all of these revisions parliament’s powers have been enhanced.3 The 1982 revision centred primarily on political organisation, as a consequence of the elimination of the Council of the Revolution (a transitory body of the revolutionary period—see below). The following one involved a wider range of areas, but represented mainly a revision of the economic part of the constitution. The 1992 revision was basically an adaptation to take into account the Maastricht Treaty. Finally, the last revision was undertaken in the name of political reform introducing important changes in the rules at the base of the electoral system. The Portuguese political system has been defined as semi-presidential.4 It is, though, a much less presidential system than the French one. Three main reasons justify the semipresidential character of the Portuguese system: the direct election of the president of the republic, the veto powers on legislation and the power to dissolve parliament (as well as to dismiss the government) under certain conditions. These powers were slightly restricted in the 1982 revision of the constitution. The most significant alteration was the restriction in dismissing government: since 1982 this can only happen in order to guarantee «the regular functioning of the democratic institutions»; that is government stopped being politically responsible to the president.5 Besides this, a limitation was also

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introduced to the president’s right to dissolve parliament: this cannot happen in the first six months after the election of a new parliament, nor in the last six months of a president’s mandate.6 The president’s veto powers have played an important part in expressing the significance of that post. Although parliament can overcome that veto by a qualified majority, each presidential veto is considered as a serious questioning of a particular bill; this was particularly clear in the conflict generated in the early 1990s between the President Mário Soares and the Prime Minister Cavaco Silva. At that time, the presidential veto was used in order to criticise the government. The relevance of this criticism was particularly notable then in face of the over-dominance of the PSD [Partido Social Democrata]7 absolute majority (see below—2.3).8 Nevertheless, it is the Assembleia da República that is at the centre of the political system. Government is politically responsible to it and, constitutionally, has the duty to keep parliament well informed of its decisions and public administration actions.9 In this context, the constitution prescribes in some depth a wide range of scrutiny powers, such as Interpellations, Questions to the Government and Committees of Enquiry.10 Parliament may cause the resignation of the government by means of a motion of censure, if approved by an absolute majority of the MPs elected;11 that dismissal also happens if the government loses a motion of confidence. However, a cabinet team does not need an express vote of approval from parliament, nor does it have to derive from the elected parties in parliament. Between 1978 and 1979 three short-term presidential cabinets were actually nominated, although they did not survive: an executive team cannot establish government against the will of the Assembleia da República. Once designated by the president of the republic (taking into account the electoral results), the government has to present its programme before parliament. Although the programme does not need to be approved, any parliamentary group [PG] may present a motion of rejection which, if approved by an absolute majority of the MPs elected, prevents the government from taking office.12 The constitution ascribes to parliament a crucial role not only in political terms, but also in legislative ones. Parliament has an exclusive right to legislate in a wide range of areas, which have been progressively extended (the new areas included have been more specifically defined though). It includes a set of 21 distinct areas of legislation, covering matters such as the electoral laws and the basis of the education system.13 There is another range of areas in which parliament has a relative right to legislate, meaning that the competence to legislate may be conferred on the government, under the approval of a delegation of powers bill.14 Besides this, the bills requiring a qualified majority have also been reinforced, enhancing therefore parliament’s legislative power as it becomes less dependent on specific party majorities. As the constitutionalist Jorge Miranda puts it, at least constitutionally, there is a primacy of the Assembleia da República in the legislative process.15 The government also has relatively large legislative powers. These are only conditioned by the reserved legislative power of the Assembleia da República.16 Furthermore, government has its own exclusive right to legislate on questions referring to its internal functioning and organisation. Legislation issued by the government is named decree-law. Every decree-law (as long as it does not fall under government’s exclusive legislative area) can be called to parliament for consideration, an important scrutiny

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power for parliament. This consideration [ratificação]17 leads either to the confirmation of the decree-law (with, or without, amendments), or to the refusal to ratify it. Although the 1989 constitutional revision introduced crucial constraints in the use of this instrument, it may still be considered as a fundamental means to scrutinise government legislation. Another fundamental prerogative of parliament is, since the constitutional revision of 1982, the consideration and approval of the Budget, a crucial administration instrument. Both parliament and government have legislative initiative powers. Government may propose bills in parliament under the form of proposals of law [Propostas de Lei], just as MPs and PGs can present projects of law [Projectos de Lei]. Legislation issued by parliament is designated law. Both laws and decreelaws have to be, thereafter, promulgated by the president of the republic. The president has three options: to promulgate, to veto (in which case the legislation is sent back to parliament for a second consideration) or to question the bill’s constitutionality (in which case, it is sent to the Constitutional Tribunal).18 Besides the Assembleia da República, the Portuguese system also includes local representative assemblies, which appoint local executives, the Câmaras Municipais. Up to the 2001 local elections there were 308 Câmaras Municipais.19 These have considerable powers on a local level (which have increased over the years despite still being very dependent on the central administration) and their presidents are often influential figures, well-identifiable by the population. The lobby of the autarcas (representatives of the local power) is a powerful one. Besides the central and the local power, there is also space for an autonomous regional power for the two sets of islands of the Azores and Madeira. These islands enjoy considerable autonomy (which has also increased since 1976), although financially dependent on continental Portugal. In both the Azores and Madeira there is a parliamentary system at the regional level. Again, the regional lobby is known as influential and, particularly, as a persevering one. With the exception of the elections for the president of the republic (based on a second ballot system), the elections for these representative organs follow a proportional representation system; this proportional logic is at the very essence of the Portuguese political system. The electoral system for the Assembleia da República is defined with notable precision in the constitution: the 230 MPs20 are elected through the highest average method of the d’Hondt list system, through 22 multi-member constituencies.21 Portuguese constituencies are therefore quite large, which does not favour the contact between MPs and citizens, as André Gonçalves Pereira has pointed out.22 The number of deputies representing each constituency is determined in proportion to the size of the district’s population. However, according to the article 152° of the constitution, MPs are not the representatives of the constituency by which they are elected. They represent, instead, the country as a whole. As the MP Alberto Martins stated (when interviewed for this research), ‘the fact that [the MPs] are elected through a district constituency, is a mere question of administrative organisation in terms of electoral selection and nothing more than that.’23 The last constitutional revision introduced the possibility of bringing in single-member constituencies, but attempts to revise the electoral law in this way have failed until now. The principle of the separation of powers prevails in the relationship between executive and assembly. For this reason, a member of parliament cannot be, at the same

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time, a member of the government. Following more the presidential tradition than the parliamentary one, this principle aims to protect parliament from executive pressures. The same applies to the members of both the local and regional governments: these cannot be members of the Assembleia da República, unless they suspend their local/regional post.24 It should be noted though, that a number of MPs do have important responsibilities at the local and regional level.

2.2 Portuguese politics since 1974 On 25 April 1974 the carnations revolution put an end to nearly half a century of dictatorship. The revolution was planned and carried out by the military. It was though, in many ways, a peaceful and welcome coup: not a single shot was fired,25 people joined the military in large spontaneous demonstrations and soldiers carried carnations in the barrels of their guns. The turmoil came after, when the structure and character of the Portuguese political system was being discussed at the same time as social tensions spread all over Portugal. From 1974 to 1976 there was a provisional situation in Portugal characterised by a strong tension between two groups defending different models: one claiming a parliamentary democracy, even if transitory under military surveillance, and another one supporting a revolutionary model, based on forms of direct political representation and under the dominance of a military rule. Each model was defended by a different section inside the military, as well as by different parties.26 During that period, the military controlled political power and provisional governments were in place. Besides the Communist Party [PCP], parties basically did not exist during the dictatorship: they were formed in the days following the revolution and had to build a whole organisation and gather popular support. As major a task as it may seem, the Portuguese parties did develop in an extraordinary way27 and did eventually play a crucial role in the transition to democracy, as recently emphasised by Thomas Bruneau: ‘the importance of political parties in the political transition from dictatorship in Portugal cannot be overestimated’.28 The revolution was in its essence a military coup, largely as an expression of their dissatisfaction with the decolonisation process that led to a war in the colonies. Notwithstanding this, the military already expressed many of the claims the political forces would defend in the following months, namely in terms of the social and political models for Portugal. A political programme was issued on the very day following the coup, which foresaw already then many of the future constitutional provisions (the Programme of the Armed Forces Movement, MFA). The Programme foresaw the election of a constituent assembly, as well as a future representative assembly; it also specifically determined that the subsequent months would constitute a transitory period, under a military leadership, which would lead eventually to a transferral of power to elected political bodies.29 One year after the carnations revolution, on 25 April 1975, the Constituent Assembly was elected. This embodied the first free Portuguese elections based on a universal franchise. Despite calls for a blank vote as a vote for the revolution model, these elections represented a clear victory for those defending a representative democracy: there was a turn-out of 91.7 per cent and only 6.9 per cent of the voters opted for a blank vote.30

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Already at the time the vast majority of the votes were shared by just four parties; the same ones that have dominated Portuguese politics ever since: the Socialist Party [PS] with 37.9 per cent, the Democratic Popular Party [PPD] (later referred to as PSD) with 26.4 per cent, the PCP with 11.4 per cent and the Social Democratic Centre [CDS] with 7.6 per cent.31 The stability of the party system has been one of the main features of Portuguese democracy (see Table 3). Among other reasons, this stability was guaranteed through the prescription of crucial rules such as the conditioned loss of mandate if MPs switched to a different party from the one they were elected for. The drawing up of the constitution was partly done outside the Constituent Assembly, especially the provisions dealing with the organisation of political power, which were the result of direct negotiations between the military and political parties. The negotiations led to the signature of two pacts between the military and the main parties; the second one basically outlined the political organisation part of the 1976 constitution.32 Still, it was the active intervention of the parties inside the assembly (as well as the increasing proof of their popular support) that conferred on them the legitimacy which the military eventually lost. Since the military were the authors of the revolution, they were the ones with whom the parties had to negotiate. However, during all of that period there was a sense that this was a transitory period. As Miguel Lobo Antunes puts it, ‘the integration of the military in the system was not, thus, an anti-democratic formula, but instead a democratising [one], which aimed at avoiding (…) other intervention from the Armed Forces which could try to control or to overthrow the regime’.33 The transitory character of the 1976–80 period was also expressed in the constitution approved in April 1976. Together with the political institutions that have existed until today, the fundamental text prescribed a Council of the Revolution, composed of military representatives. This Council retained important powers of consultation and of oversight of the constitution, as well as legislative powers on military issues.34 However, it was seen as a transitory organ, which would disappear in the following revision of the constitution. Furthermore, the 1976 text determined that the first legislature elected would last until 1980 (independently of government resignations) and that the constitutional revision would take place in the second legislature.35 Two aspects have to be stressed from this first constitution: firstly, the transitory character ascribed to the Council of the Revolution; secondly, the way it foresaw some guarantee of stability, by prescribing a timing for both the first parliament and the revision of the constitution. These two aspects have been neglected in the literature on the Portuguese parliament. Instead, those first years of democracy have been seen as dominated by the military (with parliament playing only a very secondary role) and by political instability. There was indeed some political instability. However, this tends to be overstated due to the emphasis put on the presidential cabinets. Between 1978 and 1979, three cabinets with no parliamentary support were directly appointed by the president of the republic, none of which survived parliament’s opposition. This represents only a very short period of time and should be seen as a sign of the system experimenting with itself. Besides these three cabinets, the first parliament (1976–1980) gave place to three more governments based on the following parliamentary support: a PS minority (1976–77), a coalition between the PS and the CDS (1978) and a coalition between the PSD, the CDS and the PPM (a small monarchic party—1980), called the Democratic Alliance [AD].

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Thus, if one excludes the extraordinary presidential cabinets, three governments were in power during the first parliament (the I legislature). The II and III legislatures embodied coalition governments, the first being pre-election and the second post-election (see Table 2). This second coalition (1983–85) was quite singular as it joined the two major parties, PS and PSD (usually competitors), forming therefore a very large majority in parliament. The first decade of Portuguese politics witnessed thus some political instability, but hardly one with a ‘strong non-party factionalism, rampant multipartyism, wide diffusion of power, fluid parliamentary majorities and frequent estrangement from the executive.’36 This misconception is largely due to the importance given to the intervention of the president of the republic, when one could say that he played rather a stabilising role, even if power remained with the PGs. This misconception, as well as the overstatement of the military intervention, is closely linked with another misunderstanding of Portuguese politics: the character of the 1982 revision of the constitution. This revision, as seen above, embodied a number of assumptions already determined in 1976. The main one being that the Council of the Revolution would be eliminated. This had implications in the reorganisation of political power; namely in the re-definition of the powers of the president of the republic. The previous powers of the Council of the Revolution were distributed amongst the president and two new institutions: the Council of State, an advisory and consultative body, and the Constitutional Tribunal, responsible for the oversight of constitutionality. Therefore, the interpretation that Portugal started (only) to be demilitarised in 1982 is ill-founded. Just as is the conclusion reached by scholars outside of the country that the system changed then from a semi-presidential type to a semi-parliamentary one.37 As seen above, this is by no means accepted in the Portuguese constitutional literature and, although there is some discussion on this matter, the major assumption is that the Portuguese political system has remained since 1976 a semi-presidential one, essentially due to political practice. The transition to democracy was concomitant with the revolutionary period: from 1974 to 1976. During those two years, parts of the old ruling regime were substituted by a new political and legal framework. From then until 1985, the political system underwent a period of experimentation. Political instability prevailed and political power had to address primary economic and social problems. This could be seen as the period of consolidation of democracy (see Table 2).38 The general elections of 1985 led to the IV legislature and to a PSD minority government. This legislature had very singular characteristics, the main one being the unexpected appearance of a fifth party in the political system: the Democratic Renewal Party [PRD].39 The PRD appeared as a party above politics and not clearly defined in ideological terms; it had the patronage of the departing president of the republic, Ramalho Eanes and, symbolically, its seats in the Plenum were between the PSD and the PS, an indication of the mediator role it played in parliamentary politics. Formed on the eve of the 1985 elections, the PRD managed remarkably to gather 18 per cent of the votes; as a consequence, there was no major opposition party and no clearly defined focus of power in the IV legislature (see Table 3 for party representation). This distribution of political power made possible, on one hand, a strong parliament and, on the other hand, a particularly consensual one.

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Moreover, this legislature coincided with crucial events for the Portuguese political and socio-economic systems: the election of the first civil president of the republic,40 the election of Cavaco Silva as Prime Minister (who would stay in that post for the subsequent ten years) and, most importantly, the entrance of Portugal into the European Economic Community [EEC]. The IV legislature could be seen as the beginning of a new period. However, this was just a transitional period between two different cycles. The main change would come in 1987. The IV legislature came to an end with the approval of a motion of censure on the government. New elections were held in July 1987 leading to the first absolute majority in Portugal of one single party, the PSD; again, this was an unexpected result as the Portuguese electoral system does not favour absolute majorities. As unexpected as it may have been, it was repeated in 1991. The PRD decreased to a mere 5 per cent in 1987 and disappeared altogether from parliament in 1991. For the first time, a four year period of a legislature was completed and, then, repeated. These two legislatures (V and VI) were followed by the 1995 elections, won by the PS who formed a minority government (VII legislature). This minority support was however close to an absolute majority and, furthermore, it presented a fundamental difference from the IV legislature: the absence of widely diffused political power. Nowadays, the PS and the PSD retain together nearly 80 per cent of the votes. The VII legislature, although based on a minority, completed its four years of office. The V legislature gave way, thus, to years of political stability. It could be argued that since 1987 there has been a process of ‘maturation’ of democracy. Table 2 systematises Portuguese politics since 1974 and Table 3 shows party representation in parliament.

2.3 Period under study: 1983–1995 From 1983 to 1995, Portuguese politics passed through different stages in its democratic history. As this research centres on this period of time, this section will look in more detail at the main political events of those years. This will help to provide a context for the analysis of parliamentary activity developed in subsequent chapters. Between 1983 and 1995 there were four different legislatures: the III (1983–85), the IV (1985–87), the V (1987–91) and the VI (1991–95). On 25 April 1983, new parliamentary elections were held following the fall of the last AD government led by Pinto Balsemão. The PS won the elections, but it soon became clear that it would not govern with the minority support obtained at the elections. Very quickly the PS started negotiations with the other major party, the PSD. One month after the elections, the socialist Mário Soares was appointed Prime Minister and the socialdemocrat Mota Pinto, Deputy Prime Minister; it was the beginning of the III legislature and of a coalition known still as the Bloco Central (Central Bloc). The Central Bloc gathered the largest majority known in the Assembleia da República until today: 169 MPs (see Table 3). However, virtually from the outset of this coalition, there was continuous expression of dissent from its two PGs. In 1983, Portugal faced pressing economic and social problems. In that context, a loan had to be negotiated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and austerity policies were put in place.41 As José Magone stated, the Bloco Central embodied a ‘strategy of

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compromise, which aimed at achieving a working majority’ necessary to develop the austerity policies.42 Meanwhile, the government carried out negotiations to enter the EEC and a final agreement was signed in June 1985. During its two years of existence, the Bloco Central government had periodic meetings with both PGs in order to achieve compromises on the legislation to be proposed. Some of these meetings were indeed called at the last minute, in order to solve serious political crises and to persuade the PGs to follow the government’s proposals. The press reported frequently on these meetings. Notwithstanding this, there was frequent dissent expressed in chamber debates and even actual vote dissent, which is particularly uncommon in the Portuguese parliament as it is characterised by a strong party cohesiveness and dominance by the parties’ leaderships.43 That process of explicit (or predictable) criticism, and subsequent negotiation, was notable during the whole period of the coalition and in particular for the following bills: Abortion, Law on Dismissals (Lei dos Despedimentos), Law on Internal Security, and the Budget for 1985.44 Both the Abortion bill and the Law

Table 2 Portuguese politics since 1974: parliaments, governments, prime ministers and presidents of the republic Stage in Legislature Type of Prime President of Portuguese government minister the republic politics Transition to 1974/75— democracy no elected (revolutionary assembly period) 1975/76— Constituent Assembly 1976/80—I legislature

Provisional Provisional Provisional governments PMs* PRs* Provisional Provisional Provisional governments PMs* PRs*

Minority, PS Mário Ramalho Post-election Soares Eanes coalition, Mário Ramalho PS/CDS Soares Eanes Presidential Nobre da Ramalho cabinet Costa Eanes Presidential Mota Pinto Ramalho cabinet Eanes Ramalho Consolidation Presidential Ma de Lourdes Eanes of democracy cabinet Pintasilgo Pre-election Sá Ramalho coalition, Carneiro Eanes AD** 1980/83—II Pre-election Pinto Ramalho legislature coalition, Balsemão Eanes AD Pinto Ramalho Pre-election Balsemão Eanes coalition, AD

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1983/85— Post-election Mário Ramalho III coalition, Soares Eanes legislature PS/PSD Transitional 1985/87— Minority, Cavaco Ramalho period IV PSD Silva Eanes between two legislature Mário different Soares*** cycles 1987/91—V Absolute Cavaco Mário Soares legislature majority, Silva PSD ‘Maturation’ 1991/95— Absolute Cavaco Mário Soares of democracy VI majority, Silva Mário Soares legislature PSD António Jorge 1995/99— Minority, PS Guterres Sampaio**** VII legislature Notes * The provisional Prime Ministers were Palma Carlos, Vasco Gonçalves and Pinheiro de Azevedo. The Presidents of the Republic were António de Spínola and Costa Gomes. ** The AD (Aliança Democrática—Democratic Alliance) was formed by the PSD, the CDS and the PPM (a small monarchic party). *** Mário Soares was elected in February 1986. **** Jorge Sampaio was elected in January 1996.

Table 3 Party representation in parliament (number of MPs per PG; percentages are in proportion to the total number of seats in parliament) Parliamentary I** groups*

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

PSD 73 27.8% 82 32.8% 75 30% 88 35.2% 148 59.2% 135 58.7% 88 38.3% PS 107 40.7% 66 26.4% 94 37.6% 57 22.8% 60 24% 72 31.3% 112 48.7% PCP 40 15.2% 39 15.6% 40 16% 35 14% 27 10.8% 15 6.5% 13 5.7% CDS 42 15.9% 46 18.4% 30 12% 22 8.8% 4 1.6% 5 2.2% 15 6.5% PRD — — — — — — 45 18% 7 2.8% — — — — PPM — — 6 2.4% — — — — — — — — — — ASDI — — 4 1.6% 3 1.2% — — — — — — — — UEDS — — 4 1.6% 4 1.6% — — — — — — — — MDP/ID — — 2 0.8% 3 1.2% 3 1.2% 2 0.8% — — — — UDP 1 0.4% 1 0.4% — — — — — — — — — — PEV — — — — 1 0.4% — — 2 0.8% 2 0.9% 2 0.9% PSN — — — — — — — — — — 1 0.4% — — Total 263 100% 250 100% 250 100% 250 100% 250 100% 230 100% 230 100% Notes * Some of these PGs were elected together in a joint list. The PPM is a small monarchic

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party. The ASDI was formed by PSD dissenting MPs and the UEDS by PS dissenting MPs. Both the MDP and the UDP are small left-wing parties. The PEV is a greens party, but has been elected in a joint list with the PCP. The PSN emerged at the 1991 elections as the representative of pensioners. ** These are the results following the election in 1976. Due to constitutional prerogatives, there was an intermediate election in December 1979. However, these results were only in force until the following May, when elections to the II legislature took place. The seats elected at the 1979 elections were as follows: PSD (80), PS (74), PCP (44), CDS (43), PPM (5), MDP (3) and UDP (1).

on Internal Security resulted in vote dissent from MPs of the PSD, in the first case (January 1984), and of the PS in the second one (July 1984). In the case of the Law on Dismissals, the PS MPs close to the Trade Unions showed very strong opposition, causing such delay that this law never reached the first reading. In the case of the budget for 1985, several summits took place between the government partners, as well as with the PGs, from November 1984 to January 1985. This prevented major explicit dissent. Still, prominent MPs such as João Salgueiro (PSD) suspended their mandate45 in order to avoid dissenting in their vote at first reading. The relationship between the coalition government and its parliamentary base was therefore crucial in the process of formulating and issuing legislation. During the two years of the Bloco Central, considerable social protest spread as a direct consequence of the austerity programme which implied a substantial reduction of public spending; an example of this was the frequent news of unpaid salaries and subsequent protest. This made the coalition very unpopular both inside its supporting parties and the population.46 Disagreements led eventually to the dismissal of the Deputy Prime Minister, Mota Pinto, who assumed his post as an MP in March 1985.47 The subsequent PSD leader, Cavaco Silva, was elected in the following May at the party congress of Figueira da Foz48 and soon after withdrew the PSD ministers from the coalition. The President of the Republic, Ramalho Eanes, dissolved parliament and new elections were held in October 1985.49 The elections were won by the PSD who formed a government with minority support. It was the beginning of the IV legislature (1985/87). As said before, these elections stood out for the emergence of a newly created party, the PRD, which became the larger party after the PSD and the PS. As the journalist José Manuel Saraiva stated then, ‘the presence of a new party with strong parliamentary support makes everything much more complex’.50 In this same article, the author argued that this would be a much more efficient and stronger parliament. The discussion of the government programme was a first sign of the enhanced role ascribed to parliament. The newspapers reported on negotiations between the government and the opposition during the programme preparation itself, and the criticisms expressed in the debate were seen as a serious warning; a PSD MP commented then that ‘the government would have to negotiate its bills one by one, in order to carry through its programme.’51 Three motions of rejection were proposed (by the PS, the PCP and the MDP—a small left-wing party), but the programme was not rejected thanks to the abstentions of the CDS and, more importantly, the PRD. The strategic importance of the PRD was clear, therefore, from the very beginning of the IV legislature.

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Also from the beginning of this legislature, the press reported extensively on an atmosphere of consensual and important work carried out in parliament, where government and opposition worked together to obtain the best of all goals; ‘never before have government and opposition worked in such detail on a matter of this nature [budget]’.52 There was a flow of articles praising the benefits of a minority government as it enhanced the quality of parliament’s work.53 The newspaper reports gave continuous detail of the problems and issues of legislation under discussion in parliament. The PRD occupied a prominent place in this discussion process. In the first year, the news recurrently reported on contacts between the government and the PRD; however, by the end of July 1986 this proximity was seriously damaged when the PRD, contrary to expectation, voted against a government bill for rural reform. At the same time as the importance of the Assembleia da República was widely recognised, the government expressed discontent with parliament’s action. This was first publicly shown in December 1985 through a letter sent to parliament by the Minister of Parliamentary Affairs, Fernando Nogueira, criticising the delay in the approval of the interim budget. This type of event was more and more frequent as the period of the legislature passed. In January 1987, the government was seen by the newspapers as a caretaker cabinet (governo de gestão), in the face of the conflict with parliament. The Prime Minister Cavaco Silva was the main protagonist of this growing conflict. In an interview carried out near the end of the legislature, Cavaco Silva centred most of his speech on accusing parliament of being obstructionist and of preventing the government delivering better results.54 This legislature coincided with a boom of the Portuguese economy, following similar trends elsewhere as a result of the fall in the oil prices.55 Besides this, in January 1986, Portugal joined the EEC, which provided the country with crucial financial support. It was in this context that the government gained increasing support among the population. In April 1987, following a final (and for many, trivial) public disagreement between government and parliament,56 the PRD proposed a motion of censure which was then approved with the support of the left-wing opposition. On 1 May, the President of the Republic, Mário Soares, announced his decision to dissolve parliament. New elections were held on 19 July giving way to the first absolute majority in Portuguese politics. Tired with political instability, the Portuguese people placed their trust in the technocratic style of the PSD leader, Cavaco Silva. It was the beginning of the V legislature, the first to complete its four years legislative term (1987–91). The main political feature of those four years was the dominance of the government’s will over parliamentary decisions and proceedings. At the end of that period, an article summarised this strategy through the Prime Minister’s attitude towards the Assembleia da República. The presence of Cavaco Silva in parliament became more and more infrequent as the legislature passed. That article stated that, from a total of 15 attendances over the four years, Cavaco Silva participated during the first year in six plenary sessions ‘in order to determine the style, to enforce the rules and to announce the works government would undertake. From then on, management of silence and of his absences has prevailed’.57 One of the main bases for the government’s dominance during this period was the PG of the PSD. From the beginning it became clear that the Prime Minister would not tolerate autonomous and dissenting behaviour from the PG. From the first trimester of

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1987, though, the press reported on some uneasiness amongst the PSD MPs. This was linked with restrictions imposed on the right to participate in a plenary debate. In the following years, similar demonstrations of disagreement were occasionally seen, in particular from reputable MPs such as Rui Machete. In March 1990, for instance, a group of MPs put forward a motion in a PG summit (jornada parlamentar) criticising the government’s ambiguous position towards ascribing, or not, a television channel to the Church; the PG demanded a positive resolution of that matter.58 The Prime Minister intervened himself in that summit and affirmed that ‘the PG does not have its own political strategy. Its political strategy is the PSD strategy.’59 The motion was withdrawn with no further polemics. These sporadic episodes became less and less frequent as the legislature passed, and even more so in the subsequent legislature, the VI. The dominance of the PSD government was also characterised by a notable unwillingness to accept any input from the opposition, in contrast with the IV legislature. Having the advantage of majoritarian support, the government put forward bills that it was not able to carry in the previous legislature. A good example of this was the so-called Pacote Laboral (basically a new Law on Dismissals). After considerable criticism from the trade unions and a general strike, the bill was approved in April 1988 and, three months later, the Constitutional Tribunal judged it unconstitutional. On 9 July the Expresso newspaper reported the consideration process of this bill as a particularly representative sign of the government’s intransigence.60 The changes undertaken in the Rules of Procedure of the Assembleia da República in 1988 were also representative of this; the polemical MP Silva Marques was ascribed the task to revise parliament’s Rules of Procedure and the newspapers reported on strong discontent from the opposition with the whole consideration process. Notwithstanding this, Cavaco’s government was very popular. Major structural works were undertaken and the economy indicated a clear growth. The government projected an image of decisive action on Portuguese problems. These were the years of the Democracia de Sucesso (Democracy of Success).61 This was only slightly affected by the scandals involving two prominent members of the government: Miguel Cadilhe (Minister of Finances) and Leonor Beleza (Minister of Health).62 The revision of the constitution in 1989 constituted another important event of the V legislature. This was carried out thanks to an agreement reached between the PSD and the PS (note that constitutional revision requires a majority of two-thirds). One of the main objects of this revision was the economic part: some of the socialist features were withdrawn and it became more liberal. It was in this context that the government started a series of privatisations.63 The VI legislature (1991/95) was very similar to the V, except that Cavaco Silva’s government became increasingly unpopular following a slowing down in the economy and an increasing negative image of PSD protagonists.64 Public protest gave way to fierce demonstrations of disapproval for the government’s policies. Plus, the inauguration of private television channels in October 1992 brought major changes in broadcasting. Not only did the one-sided state’s perspective cease to prevail, but also the style of reporting became much more sensationalist; the use of ‘live’ reporting increased considerably, for instance, giving strong projection to public demonstrations. Education became one of the main focuses for controversy: the creation of two different types of overall exams as a selective procedure was strongly contested by students (Prova Geral de Acesso in 1992 and Provas Globais in 1994), as well as the

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imposition of fees (from November 1992 until the end of the legislature). Three ministers of education were appointed and all were object of fierce criticism (Diamantino Durão: October 1991–March 1992; Couto dos Santos: March 1992–December 1993; Manuela Ferreira Leite: December 1993–October 1995). Another event representative of the unpopularity of the PSD government was the blockade of the Bridge 25th of April, one of the main entrances to Lisbon, Portugal’s capital city. On the dawn of 24 June 1994, a group of lorry drivers blocked the access to the bridge as a protest against an increase of 50 per cent on its toll. This blockade caused major disruption and was supported by small spontaneous blockades in the other entrances of the city. It was extensively broadcast and caused huge embarrassment for the government. The increase in the toll price was suspended and this issue caused recurrent problems to the government in the following months. In March and April 1993, there was also a crisis with the journalists reporting on parliamentary affairs. The PSD PG imposed on the journalists an interdiction of access to particular corridors in the Assembleia da República. This was seen as a sign of that party’s unbending attitude. The journalists refused to report on parliamentary affairs for nearly a month and the PS and the PCP joined the protest by reducing to a minimum their interventions in the Plenum. It is in this context of a series of public protests, that the debate on political system reform gained importance. This debate prevailed during the whole of the VI legislature. It started in 1991 with the debate on reform of the electoral system (which, after much discussion, did not happen).65 This debate on the need to narrow the distance between politics and citizens culminated with the discussion of the Pacote da Transparência (political transparency bill) in May 1995, which introduced strict rules on incompatibility in the MP’s job.66 During this legislature, parliament’s image in the press declined considerably, as pejorative news on MPs increased. The revision of the Rules of Procedure in 1993 was an attempt to address these image problems and to enhance the role of the Assembleia da República. The conflict between the President of the Republic, Mário Soares, and the Prime Minister became another major feature of the VI legislature. Not depending on PSD support for re-election,67 Mário Soares expressed frequently his disapproval of government’s actions. He became, for many, the face of the opposition to the government. The newspapers had a continuous flow of articles addressing a’new conflict PR-PM’. This tension was such that, from October 1994, there was continuous discussion on whether the President should dissolve parliament and call for new elections.68 Another aspect peculiar to the VI legislature was the change in leadership, style and even name of the CDS, the small right-wing party of the Portuguese four-party system. After the elections of 1991, the leader Freitas do Amaral stepped down and a new young leader was elected: Manuel Monteiro. Monteiro advocated major changes in the party’s line. From a pro-European party, it became the main opponent to the European project. It changed its name to CDS-PP, as a transition to what is today (simply called) PP, the People’s Party (Partido Popular); it became a populist party. This implied some changes in the CDS-PP PG’s actions, although its five MPs expressed public disagreement with the leadership.69 On 23 January 1995, Cavaco Silva announced to the country in a televised declaration that he would not run again for the PSD leadership; this came after three months of strong

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rumours to that effect, becoming commonly known as ‘Cavaco’s taboo’. A new PSD leader was elected in the following month, although Cavaco remained as prime minister until the end of his mandate, October 1995. The end of the VI legislature was seen as the end of the cavaquismo, a term identified with years of technocratic government, economic growth, major structural works and over-dominance by one single party; the ‘Orange State’(O Estado Laranja).70

Notes 1 J.J.G.Canotilho and V.Moreira, Fundamentos da Constituição (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 1991), p. 213. 2 On this, see P.Coutinho Magalhães and A.Araújo, ‘A justiça constitucional entre o direito e a política: o comportamento judicial no Tribunal Constitucional português’, Análise Social, Vol. XXXIII, No. 145 (1998), pp. 7–53; it shows the political role the Constitutional Tribunal has played, rather than just juridical. 3 J.Miranda, Manual de Direito Constitucional, Tomo I–O Estado e Os Sistemas Constitucionais (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 1997; orig. ed., 1981), pp. 370–407. 4 There has been wide discussion on which term best classifies the Portuguese political system; ‘semi-presidential’ has been the prevailing option. Terms such as ‘rationalised parliamentarism’ and ‘mixed system’ have also been used. For a review of the literature on this matter, see J.Miranda (note 3), pp. 364–5 and pp. 404–05. See Canotilho and Moreira (note 1), where the classification of semi-presidential is rejected even for the first constitution of 1976; instead the authors opt for ‘mixed parliamentary-presidential system’. For an updated and comprehensive analysis of this issue see M.Braga da Cruz, ‘O Presidente da República na Génese e Evolução do Sistema de Governo Português’, Análise Social, Vol. XXIX, No. 125–126 (1994), pp. 237–65. 5 Constituição da República Portuguesa, [CRP—unless otherwise stated, the article numbers refer to the 1997 version] (Portuguese constitution), 1982, arts. 136.º and 198.°. J.Miranda sees this alteration as a mere adaptation to practice, as no government has actually fallen, since 1976, by the action of the president of the republic (J.Miranda (note 4), pp. 408–09). 6 CRP, 1982, art. 175.°. 7 See footnote 31 for a definition of the main parties. 8 Note that the type of bills requiring a majority of two-thirds to overcome the presidential veto was actually extended in the 1989 revision of the constitution. Otherwise, a veto is overcome by the confirmation of an absolute majority of the total number of MPs elected. 9 CRP, arts. 156.º, 162.°, 180.°, 190.° and 191.°. 10 CRP, arts. 156.º, 178.° and 180.°, n° 2, d) and f). 11 Note that the 1976 constitution required the approval of two motions of censure in order to dismiss government. The 1982 revision reduced it to just one motion. 12 For the three types of motion: CRP, arts. 180.º, n° 2, h) and i), 192.°, 193.°, 194.° and 195°. 13 CRP, art. 164.º. 14 CRP, art. 165.°. 15 J.Miranda, ‘O actual sistema português de actos legislativos’, Legislação, 2 (1991), pp. 7–27. 16 Note that there is a third institution with legislative powers: the legislative assemblies of the two autonomous regions of the Azores and Madeira. The regional assemblies have exclusive power to legislate on issues of specific interest for the autonomous regions (CRP, art. 227.°). 17 The nomenclature of the ratifiçacão was changed in the constitution revision of 1997; it is now referred to as apreciação parlamentar (parliamentary appreciation); CRP, arts. 162.° and 169.°. 18 Note that this request to check the constitutionality of bills may also be required by a fifth of the parliamentarians; CRP, art. 278.°.

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19 See . 20 The 1989 constitutional revision reduced the number of MPs from 250 to 230. 21 CRP, arts. 149.º to 153.°. This includes the 18 constituencies of continental Portugal, the two islands of the Azores and Madeira, as well as the two outside Portugal: one for the emigrants living in Europe and another for those living outside Europe. Each constituency corresponds to an administrative district, with the exception of the emigrants’ constituencies. 22 A.Gonçalves Pereira, ‘Sistema eleitoral e sistema de governo’, in M.Baptista Coelho (ed.), Portugal—O Sistema Político e Constitucional, 1974–87 (Lisbon: Institute of Social Sciences, 1989), p. 285. 23 Alberto Martins was interviewed on 8 July 1996. He is an MP of the Socialist Party [PS—see footnote 31 for a definition of the main parties] and has been in parliament since 1987 (V legislature). In the VI legislature, he became a PS frontbencher MP and, in the VII, the chair of the main committee, the one on Constitutional Affairs (Comissão de Assuntos Constitucionais, Direitos, Liberdades e Garantias). He moved then to the government to take the office of Minister of State Reform. In 2002 the PS lost the general elections and Alberto Martins went back to parliament to serve as an opposition MP. 24 On the professional incompatibility inherent in the MP’s job: CRP, art. 154.° and Statute of the MPs [Estatuto dos Deputados], 1993, art. 20.º. 25 There was one exception to this: at the dictatorship secret police (PIDE) headquarters shots were fired over the heads of people demonstrating in the streets. This was not part of the revolution process in itself, though. 26 Braga da Cruz and Lobo Antunes, ‘Revolutionary transition and problems of parliamentary institutionalization: the case of the Portuguese National Assembly’, in U.Liebert and M.Cotta (eds), Parliament and Democratic consolidation in Southern Europe (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), pp. 154–83; A.Reis, ‘O processo de democratização’, in A.Reis (ed.), Portugal—20 anos de democracia (Lisbon: Temas e Debates, 1996; first ed., 1994), p. 24. 27 See I.van Biezen, ‘Building Party Organisations and the Relevance of Past Models: the Communist and Socialist Parties in Spain and Portugal’, West European Politics, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1998), pp. 32–62. 28 T.Bruneau, ‘lntroduction’, in T.Bruneau (ed.), Political parties and democmcy in Portugal (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 1. 29 See Miranda (note 3), in particular, pp. 326–9 and p. 333. 30 A.Freire, Mudança Eleitoral em Portugal (Oeiras: Celta Editora, 2001), p. 9; and M.Bacalhau, Atitudes, Opiniões e Comportamentos Políticos dos Portugueses: 1973–1993 (Lisbon: FLAD, 1994) p. 155. 31 According to M.Gallagher, M.Laver and P.Mair, Representative government in western Europe (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992), the PS (Partido Socialistd) is a socialist/social democrat party; the PSD (Partido Social Democratd) is a right liberal party; the PCP (Partido Comunista Português) is a communist party; and the CDS (Centro Democrático e Social) is a christian democrat, catholic, party. 32 For more detail on this process, see Braga da Cruz and Lobo Antunes (note 26), pp. 156–60 and, in particular, Reis (note 26), pp. 19–39. See the second pact in R.Caldeira and M.C.Silva (eds), Constituição Política da República Portuguesa, 1976 (Lisbon: Livraria Bertrand, 1976), pp. 343–52. 33 Lobo Antunes, ‘A Assembleia da República e a consolidação da democracia em Portugal’, Análise Social, Vol. XXIV, No. 100 (1988), pp. 77–95; translations into the English language have been carried out by the author. 34 CRP, 1976, arts. 113.º, 142.° to 149.°, 297.°. 35 Respectively, CRP, 1976, art. 299.° and art. 286.°.

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36 U.Liebert, ‘Parliaments in the consolidation of democracy—a comparative assessment of Southern European experiences’, in U.Liebert and M.Cotta (eds), Parliament And Democratic Consolidation In Southern Europe (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), p. 260. 37 Reflecting this interpretation, see ibid., p. 264, as well as G.Pasquino, ‘Executive-Legislative relations in Southern Europe’, in R.Gunther, N.Diamandouros and H.J.Puhle (eds), The Politics of Democratic Consolidation (London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 266 and p. 277, based on a quotation of W.Opello, Portugal’s political development: a comparative approach (Boulder: Westview, 1985). 38 Several authors date the 1982 constitutional revision as the beginning (or end) of the process of consolidation of Portuguese democracy. However, that conception neglects two important aspects: first, the conditioned and predicted character of that revision and, secondly, the political situation which only suffered a major change after 1985. 39 According to Gallagher, Laver and Mair (note 31), the PRD was a left liberal party. 40 Significantly, none of the main candidates had a military background. 41 For a summary on the Portuguese economy from 1976 to 1985 see: J.Silva Lopes, ‘Panorama geral da evolução económica entre 1960 e o início da década de 90’, in A.Barreto (ed.), A Situação Social em Portugal, 1960–1995 (Lisbon: Instituto de Ciências Sociais, 1997; first ed., 1996), pp. 239–43 and A.L.Sousa Franco, ‘O tempo crítico (1976–1985)’, in A.Reis (ed.), Portugal—20 anos de democracia (Lisbon: Temas e Debates, 1996; first ed., 1994), pp. 206–57. 42 J.Magone, ‘Portugal: the rationale of democratic regime building’, in W.Müller and K.Strom (eds.), Coalition Governments in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 529–58. 43 See Braga da Cruz, ‘Sobre o parlamento português: partidarização parlamentar e parlamentarização partidária’, Análise Social, Vol. XXIV, No. 100 (1988), pp. 97–125. 44 See the newspaper Expresso on the following dates: 15/10/83, 14/1/84 and 28/1/84 (Abortion); 14/4/84, 21/4/84, 12/5/84, 9/6/84, 16/3/85, 5/4/85 and 13/4/85 (Law on Dismissals); 16/6/84, 23/6/84, 30/6/84, 7/7/84 and 28/7/84 (Law on Internal Security); 20/10/84, 10/11/84, 15/12/84, 19/1/85 and 26/1/85 (Budget matters). 45 As it will be more fully explained in chapter 5 (see 5.2.1.), Portuguese MPs may suspend their mandate, being substituted by the subsequent MP of the constituency party list through which they were elected. The duration of a mandate suspension varies, after which MPs can reassume their mandate. 46 Magone (note 42). 47 Mota Pinto died as a result of a heart attack soon after assuming his mandate as an MP. 48 The congress of the Figueira da Foz (name of a locality) has been quoted since then as a symbol of Cavaco Silva’s unexpected bid for the PSD leadership. Cavaco only decided publicly to run for the PSD leadership after the congress had started. He justified his candidature as an answer to a plea from the party and not as a personal ambition. This is often quoted as a way to describe Cavaco as an apolitical personality, being more of a technocrat. 49 A caretaker government was kept over the summer. 50 J.M.Saraiva, ‘Assembleia da República: o regresso às minorias’, Expresso—Revista, 9/11/85, p. 24. 51 ‘Pela primeira vez desde 79, parlamento será polícia implacável do governo’, Expresso, 23/11/85, p. 4. 52 ‘Cavaco pensa fazer segunda-feira ‘violento discurso’de ataque ao PRD, PS e PCP’, Expresso, 5/4/86. 53 See T.de Sousa, ‘A virtude das minorias’, Expresso, 26/7/86. 54 Expresso—Revista, 28/3/87. 55 Interview with José Silva Lopes on 7 January 1999 and also J.Silva Lopes, ‘Enquadramento institucional e regulação económica a partir de 1974’, in A.Barreto (ed.), A Situação Social

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em Portugal, 1960–1995 (Lisbon: Instituto de Ciências Sociais, 1997; orig. ed., 1996), pp. 359–60. Silva Lopes was a PRD MP (as an Independent) in the IV and V legislatures. He has fulfilled several major posts in government, as well as in public administration. He is an expert on economic affairs. 56 This disagreement was caused by the scheduled itinerary of the visit to the Soviet Union of the President of the Assembleia da República (Fernando Amaral); somehow, a visit to Estonia was scheduled which, if undertaken, would have caused a diplomatic embarrassment for Portugal. Correspondence on this matter was reported in the newspapers. Although at the beginning this was seen as relatively unimportant, eventually press reports presented it as indicating a gross disrespect of parliament by government. 57 D.Reis, ‘A jogada de antecipação’, Expresso, 15/6/91, p. 2. 58 This happened in the context of the discussion on television privatisation. In its manifesto, the PSD had assumed a compromise to grant a channel to the Catholic Church. 59 ‘A “guerra santa” do PSD’, Expresso, 10/3/90. 60 ‘Pacote Laboral’, Expresso—Revista, 9/7/88. 61 Slogan launched at electoral campaign time, which became representative of the first years of the Cavaco decade. 62 The post of Minister (Ministro) in Portugal corresponds to a Secretary of State in Britain; ministers are called Secretários de Estado. 63 For an explanation of the centrality of the privatisations in the cavaquismo project, see J.M.Leite Viegas, ‘Elites e cultura política—liberalização económica e políticas sociais no contexto da integração comunitária’, in J.M.Leite Viegas and A.Firmino da Costa (eds), Portugal, que modernidade? (Lisbon: Celta Editora, 1998), pp. 121–Z45. 64 See AA.VV. ‘O ano mais negro do cavaquismo’, Expresso, 17/7/93, p. 3 and, for an explanation of the years of economic growth of Cavaco’s governments and its subsequent slowing down, Silva Lopes (note 41), pp. 245–6. 65 For a comprehensive presentation of different perspectives on this discussion on electoral reform in parliament and in the press, see M.Braga da Cruz (ed.), Sistema Eleitoral Português—debate político e parlamentar (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1998). 66 This bill was highly criticised then as demagogic and poorly drawn; besides, it actually pushed away from parliament MPs regarded as amongst the most reputable. 67 Mário Soares was first elected in 1986 and then re-elected in 1991 with the support of the two main parties. This was his last mandate, as the president can only be re-elected once. Note that Soares’ original party was the PS, although he gave back his membership card once elected President. 68 Note that the possibility to dissolve parliament had already been suggested back in June 1993. See interview with the President of the Assembleia da República, Barbosa de Melo, Diário de Notícias, 17/6/93, pp. 3–5 and the opinion piece by M.Villaverde Cabral, ‘Dissolver ou não dissolver o parlamento’, Diário de Notícias, 28/6/93, p. 9. 69 The reputable MP, Nogueira de Brito, renounced his mandate in December 1994, after 11 years in parliament. Two other well-respected MPs, Adriano Moreira and Narana Coissoró, expressed strong discontent with the party leadership. 70 Term deriving from the main colour, orange, associated to the PSD slogans.

3 The Portuguese parliament in context This chapter looks into the institutional characteristics of the Portuguese parliament, taking into special account the changes that have taken place since 1976. It is a chapter centring mainly on parliament’s formal structure. The aim is to explain parliament’s institutional framework in order to allow for a more integrated analysis of its activity in the subsequent chapters, as a thorough explanation is not available in the literature. The scarce literature that does exist on the Portuguese parliament has either a predominant legal perspective (and even in that case, there are no comprehensive studies of the parliament), or centres on parliamentary activity, neglecting the formal framework. In this context, Luís Sá’s text about the evolution and parliamentary organisation of the Assembleia da República represents a good (and the only) attempt.1 However, Sá does not take into consideration the legal changes that have occurred since the first Rules of Procedure [RP] were published in 1976. The changes introduced in the RP since 1976 are representative not only of parliament’s development but also of the political choices made since then; they are, thus, extremely revealing and fundamental to an understanding of a young institution such as the Assembleia da República. Before looking in detail at these changes, this chapter starts with two contextual sections. The first one looks briefly at the historical evolution of parliamentarism in Portugal since it was first introduced in 1820. The second section presents a number of variables that contribute to the specificity of the Assembleia da República; that is, its main institutional characteristics that, at the same time, indicate its difference from other parliaments.

3.1 Historical evolution Parliamentarism was first introduced in Portugal with the liberal revolution of 1820. However, not until 1974 was parliamentarism fully established. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the role of parliament oscillated between different forms and levels of representation and competences. During that time, there were four different political periods: the liberal monarchy (1820–1910), the first republic (1910– 26), the Estado Novo [New State] dictatorship (1926–1974) and democracy (1974–today) (see Table 4).

Table 4 Parliamentarism in Portugal Regime

Constitution Chambers Parliament in force

Liberal Const. of monarchy— 1822

Unicameral Cortes

The Portuguese parliament in context King’s powers constrained 1820–26 Liberal Charter of monarchy— 1826 King’s powers reinforced 1826–1910 Republic— Const. of parliamentary 1911 system 1910– 26

Dictatorship Const. of 1926–74 1933

Democracy— Const. of semi 1976 presidential system 1974– today

35

Bicameral Cortes— Câmara dos Deputados and Câmara dos Pares Bicameral Congresso da República— Câmara dos Deputados and Senado Bicameral Assembleia Nacional— Assembleia Nacional and Câmara Corporativa Unicameral Assembleia da República

3.1.1 Political system The 1822 constitution was the first one establishing the principle of parliamentary representation. This constitution has been considered by many, and still is today, as extremely modern for that time. Indeed, it may be argued that it came too soon, being quickly substituted by a different one: the Constitutional Charter, in 1826, under the patronage of the new King, D.Pedro IV The Charter was seen as a counterweight to the constitution of 1822. The constitution of 1822 introduced the principle of separation of powers: the legislative, the executive and the juridical. In this context, parliament had exclusive legislative competence (as well as legislative initiative) and fulfilled a major part in the political system, to the detriment of the King. The King had the executive power and restricted powers over legislation. Although he had a suspending veto power, this was in practice merely a way of asking parliament for a second consideration on a particular bill: the veto would become void if rejected by a majority in parliament. Furthermore, the King could not dissolve parliament. The 1826 Charter countered this dominance of the parliamentary institution by reinforcing the powers of the King. A fourth power was created, additional to the legislative, executive and juridical: the Moderating Power (Poder Moderador).2 The Moderating Power was supposed to have a balancing effect over the political system. However, in practice, it gave the King overwhelming powers over the three remaining

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powers, legislative, executive and even juridical. The King could, for instance, veto legislation, dissolve parliament, suspend magistrates and appoint the president of the parliamentary chambers. As Pinto dos Santos stated, ‘the Moderating Power was the key for the whole of the political system; (…) this conferred such power to the King, that it suppressed the representative nature of the legislative bodies’.3 In conjunction with additional acts, the Charter was in force basically until the end of the monarchical period. The only exception was the period between 1836 and 1842, following the Septembrist revolution which aimed at restoring some of the liberal principles of the 1822 constitution—this was done through the constitution of 1838 which overthrew the Charter for that period of time. The liberal monarchic period ended with the establishment of the republic, by means of a revolution on 5 October 1910. The subsequent constitution, of 1911, re-established the centrality of parliament in the political system. It constituted the first parliamentary political system in Portugal. A president of the republic was elected by parliament, but did not have significant powers, such as promulgating powers.4 Until the constitutional revision of 1919–21, this was indeed a pure parliamentary system. This revision attempted to rationalise the parliamentary system, by enhancing the president’s powers, giving for instance the right to dissolve parliament.5 These first two periods had great political instability, particularly the first republic. During the liberal monarchy, the King provided a stable basis. This disappeared with the republic making the political system all the more unstable, dependent as it was on a volatile parliament. As Braga da Cruz and Lobo Antunes stated, the ‘excessive parliamentary power provided for by the constitution of 1911 was largely responsible for the political instability which was ultimately to invalidate the regime’.6 This would be followed by extreme political stability in the subsequent regime. The first republic came to an end with the coup of 28 May 1926. This would lead to the anti-parliamentary dictatorial regime of the Estado Novo, led by António de Oliveira Salazar. For the first time, the constitution was not drawn up by a constituent assembly; it was in fact written by Salazar himself.7 There was subsequently a plebiscite on the proposed constitution; voting was compulsory in this plebiscite and the abstentions counted as votes in favour. This became the constitution of 1933 which would remain in force until the revolution of 1974, although revised by several constitutional laws. Parliament became a very minor institution in the political regime. Although it retained legislative powers, these were limited to the general basis of the juridical regimes. Besides this, government had wide legislative competence and was not politically responsible before parliament. Although formally political power was countered by a president of the republic directly elected, in actual fact it became embodied in the President of the Council, that is the head of government: Salazar. The Estado Novo ruled for 48 years, at the end of which the carnations revolution of 1974 opened the way to a democratic regime. As seen in chapter 2, parliament plays a central role in this regime, but its power is counterbalanced by other institutions, in particular the president of the republic, avoiding the excesses of the first republic’s parliamentarism.

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3.1.2 Parliament’s structure The present parliament is composed of a single chamber, the Assembleia da República. The option for a single chamber appeared as the natural solution back in the 1970s, following the past experience of bicameral parliaments. With the exception of the first constitution, of 1822, all the other constitutions since then have included a bicameral parliament (see Table 4). The Cortes remained as a single elected chamber until 1826. With the Charter (1826) came the institutionalisation of an upper chamber composed of hereditary and life peers nominated by the monarch: the Câmara dos Pares [Chamber of Peers]. The elected chamber became known as Câmara dos Deputados [Chamber of Deputies]. Cortes remained the name of parliament as a whole. This structure prevailed until the first republic.8 The republic introduced an elected upper chamber, the Senate [Senado] and the lower chamber remained as Câmara dos Deputados; parliament became known as the Congress of the Republic. The Estado Novo introduced a very different concept of parliament, described by Luís Sá as asymmetrical bicameralism.9 The elected chamber became the Assembleia Nacional [National Assembly] and, as the constitution stated, contiguous to it, there was a consultative chamber, the Corporative Chamber [Câmara Corporativa]. This was composed of representatives of social and local interests, nominated by the government.10 The importance of the role of the Corporative Chamber was such that it actually acquired effective cabinet status.11 It also became a symbol of the doctrine of the Estado Novo regime (heavily based on corporatism). In this context, and having seen the nondemocratic connotation given to an upper chamber, the choice for a single chamber parliament was only natural in 1974.12 3.1.3 Electoral system The representativeness of these parliamentary chambers has varied enormously since the constitution of 1822. Showing again its pioneering character, the constitution of 1822 established a nearly universal male suffrage. The only requirements were to have reached the voting age (25 years at the time) and have a fixed address. Furthermore, the vote was direct. Again, the Charter represented a retrogression: nearly universal direct vote was substituted by an indirect vote based on a franchise according to income. These criteria were democratised during the era of the monarchy. A direct vote was re-established with the additional act of 1852. The reforms of 1878 and 1895 extended the franchise by introducing additional criteria, not based on income, but on the fact of being literate, for instance. The franchise based on income was only abolished with the first republic. Still, the republicans did not apply all the demands they had made when they were in opposition. In the last decade of the monarchy, there was a strong claim for universal suffrage (at least male) and for a proportional representation system. The republic maintained the literacy restrictions13 and kept the majoritarian system from the monarchic period.14 Proportional representation was only introduced in the two main cities, Lisbon and Oporto.

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Formally, the suffrage was enlarged with the Estado Novo. However, in practice, the franchise was restricted to a particular layer of the population: the civil servants (funcionários do Estado). For this reason, Philippe Schmitter stated that the elections were a ‘political incest’: reproduction of one power by the very same power.15 The electoral lists were controlled by local authorities, who were responsible for actually making and verifying the lists. Although individuals had a right to register themselves in these lists, it rarely happened. According to Schmitter, more than a positive objective (to achieve something), the very regular occurrence of elections during the Estado Novo had mainly a negative dimension: that is to dissuade controversy on the representative character of the regime.16 3.1.4 Party system The biased representativeness of the Assembleia Nacional was also conditioned by the non-existence of parties. One of the main objectives of Salazar when he conceived the Estado Novo regime was for it to be a ‘representative state without parties’.17 The only political force represented in the Assembleia Nacional was the União Nacional (later Acção Nacional Popular), which did not consider itself as a party, but instead as ‘transpartisan’18—that is, national and hence above parties. Despite Salazar’s conception, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa characterised this as a ‘one dominant party system’. On his view, the União Nacional had all the characteristics of a party.19 Besides this, other parties, such as the PCP, existed but were not legally recognised. Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa considered that the Portuguese party system emerging from the liberal revolution stabilised in the second half of the nineteenth century.20 From a parliamentary point of view, though, and according to Manuel Pinto dos Santos, parties as such (with a programme and based on an organisation) did not exist until 1876.21 In 1876, the Progressist Party (Partido Progressista—with a socialist base) formed itself on the basis of a specific programme and continued its activity beyond the electoral period. Before then, parties tended to be convenient forms of organisation for electoral purposes. Once in parliament, there was no real sense of parties. Rather, MPs gathered around a specific leader, but had no sense of party cohesion. Besides this, the constitutional texts did not foresee the existence of parties. Parties, or parliamentary groups, were only constitutionally recognised in the 1919–21 revision of the republican constitution. Another major characteristic of the Portuguese political system of the nineteenth century was caciquismo; that is a clientelistic network through which local leaders offered votes from a locality in exchange for favours from the government. This developed in the second half of the nineteenth century as a strong supporting mechanism for the rotativismo (when political power alternated between two parties).22 With the republic came attempts to break this practice. The constitution of 1911 prescribed, for instance, that MPs represented the country as a nation and not the constituencies by which they were elected; this was a clear attempt to ensure independence of the MPs and to avoid the development of caciques. However, as Fernando Farelo Lopes has shown, the republic did not succeed in changing the Portuguese political culture, on the contrary. Throughout the first republic, caciquismo networks had great importance not only inside the political system, but also ‘as a form of organisation and distribution of power’.23

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This brief history of the Portuguese representative system will be fundamental for an understanding of the power currently ascribed to parties in parliament (subsequent section), as well as of the prevailing relationship between MPs and their constituencies regardless of the system (chapters 5 and 6). 3.1.5 Internal parliamentary organisation In terms of internal parliamentary organisation, one can say that the Portuguese parliament did not develop much from the Cortes period to the end of the Assembleia Nacional period. However, it should be stressed that this judgement is based on the information available, which is not very complete, with the exception of the Charter period.24 A first striking feature is the short length of the legislative sessions: three months. Three months was invariably the prescribed length of a legislative session from the Cortes of 1822 until the Assembleia Nacional, with the exception of the Congress of the Republic, when the length of a legislative session was four months.25 During the monarchic and republic periods the legislative sessions could be extended, which was not possible under the Estado Novo (according to the constitution) when each legislative session was restricted to three months. Another aspect indicating the diminishing role given to parliament during the Estado Novo was the reduction in the number of MPs. In one of the last elections of the republic, in 1918, 155 MPs were elected to the Chamber of Deputies.26 However, the constitution of 1933 established the number of MPs at 90; this was progressively enlarged in the subsequent revisions and in 1971 it settled at a mere 150 MPs. Four years later the new democratic Constituent Assembly was elected with 250 MPs. The number of MPs during the monarchic period varied accordingly to the variations in the size of the suffrage: from 100 MPs at the first election in 1820 to 177 in 1859.27 In terms of the division of work between Plenum and committees, again the retrogression of the Estado Novo is particularly clear. Manuel Pinto dos Santos showed that the Cortes of the Charter period had a well-developed system of committees. As the author wrote, ‘(…) the importance of committees becomes clear by the systematic regulation about them in the several rules of procedures, revealing a great concern of these parliaments with functionality.’28 In a first stage, next to the Plenum (which met every weekday) seven sections were appointed on a monthly basis in order to consider legislation. From 1856 on, this practice became more institutionalised and elected committees substituted the appointed sections. The Rules of Procedure of 1876 formalised this practice and actually introduced a distinction which is used nowadays in the Assembleia da República: permanent committees and special (ad-hoc) ones. The list of committees was established in the rules of procedure and followed the ministerial areas; the number varied between 16 and 20.29 The large number of committees suggests that they were constituted by no more than a half a dozen MPs. The committees had an important role in preparing the legislation to be discussed in the chamber, where the voting proceedings took place.30 The information about committees during the republic period is almost non-existent. However, by reading the debates of its Constituent Assembly it becomes clear that the Chamber of Deputies adopted the committee system of the monarchy. Indeed, great emphasis is put on the preparatory work done by committees. The list of committees

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referred to in those debates follows very closely the ones of the preceding regime; one exception is the committee on workers’ legislation (Comissão de legislação operária).31 What is more, the republican constitution prescribed specifically, after the revision of 1919–21, the division of parliament’s work between plenary sessions and sections.32 Contrary to this, the constitution of 1933 determined the non-existence of committees in the Assembleia Nacional. This position was revised in the constitutional revision of 1945, when the possibility of committees was introduced.33 However, there is no published information on the subsequent practice. The historical evolution of parliamentarism in Portugal shows two important aspects to bear in mind: firstly, its evolution during the nineteenth and a great part of the twentieth century did not necessarily represent a development of the parliamentary institution, but the contrary; secondly, the change of regime in 1974 did bring major changes in terms of the institutional framework of the Portuguese parliament. This contradicts the evaluation made by Braga da Cruz and Lobo Antunes. According to these authors, ‘parliamentary tradition was (…) not strictly speaking interrupted, but altered in a non-democratic manner, and was thus allowed to survive throughout Salazar’s authoritarian regime’.34 The information available shows that parliamentary practice during the Estado Novo was actually divested of parliamentary ‘meaning’.35 Requirements indicating a parliamentary practice, such as those identified by Robert Packenham for the Brazilian military dictatorship,36 were not complied within the Assembleia Nacional. The Assembleia’s activity was enclosed; it was an anti-parliamentary practice; it was in fact an interruption of parliamentary tradition. This is important in order to understand the extent of the task in 1976 when the first democratic parliament was elected; the extent to which parliament has had to develop since then.

3.2 Parliamentary structure This section presents the main characteristics of parliamentary organisation of the Assembleia da República.37 It is an overall picture centred on how parliament works, not focusing on the changes it has undergone in the last two decades. The organisation of the Assembleia da República has two major characteristics: its newly democratised character and the centrality of PGs. 3.2.1 The centrality of PGs to the detriment of MPs As explained above, the Portuguese parliament is elected through a proportional representation system, the closed list system of d’Hondt. The same system has been applied since the election of the Constituent Assembly. The drawing up of electoral lists is controlled by the central party offices, who decide on the inclusion, or not, of specific candidates in the list.38 Only parties can propose candidate lists to parliament. Once elected, MPs cannot switch to a different PG from the one they were elected for. If MPs no longer identify with their PG, they may leave the PG and become ‘independent MPs’. However, independent MPs have reduced opportunities to participate in parliamentary activity. On the other hand, it is important to stress that, constitutionally, MPs are not the

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representatives of their constituencies: they represent instead the nation as a whole. This follows the ruling of the republican constitution of 1911.39 As a direct consequence of the application of this representative system, PGs, rather than MPs as individuals, play a central role in parliament. PGs form the primary core of Portuguese parliamentary organisation. The centrality ascribed to the PGs is easily understandable under the historical framework described above. In many ways, it was the previous lack of a strong and clear party system that caused the collapse of the parliamentary system. The practical application of a proportional electoral system is not the only justification for the PGs’ centrality; this derives equally from actual regulation strengthening PGs both in the constitution and in the RP. In a comparison between several European parliaments, the Spanish author Manuel Ramirez considered ‘extraordinary’ [insólito] the level of detail to which the Portuguese constitution regulates PGs.40 In fact, in his opinion, ‘from a constitutional point of view, it is undoubtedly the Portuguese constitution of 1976 that more extensively recognises and regulates PGs.’41 The constitution prescribes some rights of the PGs which are exclusive to them. Individually considered, for example, MPs do not have a say in the setting of the parliamentary agenda, nor can they propose an interpellation to the government; these are the rights of the PGs.42 Parliamentary life is largely organised according to the PGs: participation in the chamber, membership of committees, allocation of work facilities, just to mention a few. As the former MP António Barreto emphatically wrote, ‘MPs, individually considered, have almost no rights, they are mere party delegates or assistants to the leaders’.43 Each PG elects a leader (president) and several deputy leaders, according to the PG’s size. They compose what is referred to as the directorates of the PGs, which are usually composed by the most well-known MPs. These, together with the committees’ PG coordinators, form what is commonly called the ‘national MPs’;44 that is, about a quarter of parliament’s MPs. As the MP Alberto Martins stated in an interview for this research, the national MPs ‘largely ensure the functioning of the Assembleia da República on a legislative level, and when it comes to the major political and economic decisions’. Counterpointed to these, the so called ‘regional MPs’ are more involved with the local partisan structures and constitute the vast bulk of the deputies. Candidates to parliament are under no obligation to live in the same constituency as the one they are elected by Indeed, quite often MPs will not reside at all in the constituency which elected them. Braga da Cruz showed that in most constituencies the number of MPs elected exceeds the number of MPs that effectively reside in the constituency. There are three exceptions to this: Coimbra, Oporto and, particularly, Lisbon, that is the three main cities that play a major role in public affairs.45 The Portuguese system does not embody, thus, an identification between MPs and their constituencies. This is indicative of the weak relationship between parliament and citizens. Whenever publicly referred to, MPs are merely identified according to the party by which they were elected, no reference being made to the constituency. Even independent MPs are recognised according to the party seats they occupy in parliament’s chamber, and not by their constituency. Besides this, as chapter 5 will show, the Portuguese parliament encloses a system of substitutions of MPs that leads to a faded image of who these MPs are.

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3.2.2 Ruling organs The Conference of the Representatives [Conferência de Líderes] is a good symbol of the centrality of PGs in Portuguese parliamentary organisation. The Conference is the main decision-making organ on political matters; it determines most of the plenary agenda, the times ascribed to each PG in a debate and any other important political matter. It is composed of a representative of each PG and of the government, as well as the president of parliament. The Conference of Representatives is where the PGs negotiate and decide on the main political matters of parliament. Although the Conference has the actual power, the most important organ inside parliament, hierarchically, is the Table [Mesa], where the president of parliament is assisted by four deputy speakers and four secretaries (all of whom are MPs). Formally, the President of the Assembleia da República has important responsibilities and is the second figure of the state, after the president of the republic. He, or she, is elected by the MPs and has come until today from the majoritarian PG. His, or her, mandate lasts for the whole of a legislature period, that is four legislative sessions, each lasting from 15 October to 15 June.46 When parliament is not convened, the Permanent Commission [Comissão Permanente] pursues its representation functions with the participation of the Mesa and representatives of the PGs. From an administrative point of view, the Assembleia da República has a Council of Administration [Conselho de Administração] equally composed by elected MPs, one per each PG; the president of the council is the MP from the largest PG.47 This council takes decisions on overall administrative matters, such as parliament’s budget. The daily administrative business is co-ordinated by the General Secretary [Secretária(o) Geral], who is nominated by the president of parliament and who also sits at the Council of Administration.48 This strong presence of MPs in the process of running parliamentary business is an indicator of the newly democratised character of the Assembleia da República. On one hand, the nomination to decisional bodies through elected representatives is highly valued in a young democracy such as the Portuguese democracy. On the other, professionalisation of the job of MP has not developed fully yet, explaining why the position of MP is often not a full-time occupation; complementary to this, there is a notable lack of infrastructure and human resources in the Assembleia da República. 3.2.3 Resources Despite a recent attempt to improve this situation, the resources of the Portuguese parliament are fairly poor when compared with other parliaments of Western Europe.49 Although formally the Assembleia da República has the means to provide MPs with adequate support in their parliamentary activity, in practice this still needs considerable development. The Portuguese parliament has a library that pre-dates the democratic period. The library is used regularly by only a minority of MPs or staff from the PGs, mainly for purposes of compiling information; it does not produce any studies. Besides the library, parliament includes other information services, which are not generally used by MPs. These services barely have any tradition of carrying out studies on parliamentary affairs. The support that these services provide for legislation and scrutinising work consists, very often, merely of juridical reports.

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In addition to those broad services, each committee usually has two members of staff, both fulfilling administrative tasks. The reform of 1993 improved this situation by foreseeing, legally, the possibility of employing research assistants. However, it should be noted that at the time parliament did not generally employ new research assistants; they were merely requested from other services inside parliament, where they often pursued their original tasks.50 Still, nowadays every committee has at least one research assistant. On what concerns the PGs, they tend to comprise mainly administrative staff. Only the bigger PGs include some research staff, as the number of staff depends on the size of the group. For example, a majoritarian PG constituted by 130 MPs would be entitled to 14 staff members for administrative matters and seven assistants for the official leader.51 This brief presentation of parliamentary resources seems to justify the common complaint by MPs about the inadequacy of the existing means for legislative work. The inauguration in 1999 of a new building contiguous to parliament has provided, among other things, new meeting rooms and offices for MPs. Still, conditions are not conducive to work, as most offices are shared between two MPs. Before that, and since the VI legislature, a typical MP had to share an office with four other MPs; before then, space was even scarcer, as Bruneau and Macleod pointed out in 1986: Portuguese deputies work under very trying conditions. Very few have individual offices and must therefore either conduct their business (…) in one of the big rooms set aside for the parliamentary group or borrow the office of one of the group’s official leaders. Often only one telephone exists to receive messages for all the members of any one parliamentary group and secretarial staff is minimal.52 3.2.4 Organisation of parliamentary activity Parliament’s activity is divided between the Plenum [Plenário] and the standing specialised committees [Comissões especializadas permanentes]. The Plenum constitutes undoubtedly the most visible face of parliament. The President of the Assembleia da República (or one of the deputy presidents) presides over the plenary meetings, which take place usually in the first three days of the week. As said above, most of the plenary agenda is decided at the Conference of the Representatives. Still, the RP safeguards the opposition PGs and the independent MPs by prescribing a number of prerogatives on this matter (see below). A typical plenary session is composed of two different moments: PAOD [Período antes da ordem do dia] and POD [Período da ordem do did]. The PAOD is dedicated to administrative questions and, importantly, to current issues. It is in the PAOD that, for instance, votes on current affairs53 and urgency debates take place. The POD is the main part of a plenary session; it is to the POD that plenary agenda refer to. It is in the POD that parliament’s constitutional competences are carried out: consideration of legislation, interpellations to the government, motions and so on. The list of standing committees is determined at the beginning of each legislature period; they are therefore permanent for a whole parliament. This list follows closely the areas of governmental ministries. From 1983 to 1995, they varied between 11 and 14 and the average number of members per committee was 23.3 MPs. The number of members

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in each standing committee, as well as the chairs, is distributed between the different PGs according to their proportional representation in parliament. Committee members are appointed by the PGs, usually taking into account the preferences of the MPs as well as their specialised area of work. PGs designate also an MP ‘co-ordinator’ in each committee; the co-ordinator decides what position the PG should take on the issues discussed in committee. This is not always a formal post but is broadly recognised by the PGs and the media. The chairs of the committees have an important role in determining the agenda of the meetings. Since 1993 committees’ meetings follow a publicity rule restricted to the media. Besides the standing committees, parliament can also appoint committees of inquiry and ad hoc committees. Committees of inquiry are designated to investigate a particular problem identified in the actions of government or the public administration (see 5.1). The object of ad hoc committees can vary considerably. Typically, they have been formed to work on deliberations such as the revision of the constitution or of the RP. As the following section will show, the competences and functions of the Plenum and committees have changed considerably during the last two decades. Still, both the chamber and the committees have legislative and scrutiny functions. However, scrutiny is mainly ascribed to the chamber. The legislative proceedings divide in the following way: • Prior referral [Apreciação prévia], in committee—each bill is considered in its general terms and a report is written on whether it is ready to be discussed by parliament; • First reading [Generalidade], in the chamber—general debate and vote on the broad statements of a bill; • Second reading [Especialidade], normally in the committees—discussion and votes on the individual articles of a bill;54 • Final vote [Votação Final Global] in the chamber—final overall vote for confirmation of the bill as amended after the second reading. The government participates in all readings, but does not have the right to vote. The first reading is a major stage, as it is then that the PGs first express their consent or opposition to a bill. The whole of parliament’s activity is strongly regulated in legal documents; the main one (excluding the constitution) being the RP. This strong regulation is also representative of the new character of Portuguese democracy. The implantation of a new democracy demands a ruling framework in order to guarantee indispensable institutional references which, in mature democracies, are somehow preexistent by the very logic of long democratic practice. Even more indicative of the newness of the regime is the number of changes this legal framework has undergone in such a short period of time. The next section looks in detail at these changes.

3.3 Structural changes, 1983–1995: a rationalisation trend The activity of the Assembleia da República is formally ruled by the RP [Regimento]. Together with other statutes,55 the RP governs most aspects of parliamentary life and is an essential reference to understand the character of the Portuguese parliament, as well as the changes it has undergone. Some minor and isolated alterations were made in 1977–78

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and in 1982 a new edition of the RP was published, mainly as an adaptation to the new constitution numbering system. However, the main revisions of the RP have taken place in the second decade of Portuguese democracy; that is during the period studied here: between the III and the VI legislatures (1983–95). The first main revision of the RP was in the III legislature, between 1984 and 1985: then the experience of ten years of parliamentary practice (somewhat tangled) expressed itself in a major revision of procedures. Only then did the political climate favour a major revision: before then, other primary matters had to be attended to. What is more, this legislature presented a very large coalition majority that made possible the necessary agreements to revise the RP. The Portuguese experience has shown, in fact, that the RP can only be revised when there is a party majority. Three more revisions followed the one of 1985, all of which took place during the period of the PSD absolute majorities: 1988, 1991 and 1993.56 The 1985 revision had two main effects: firstly, the regulation of many aspects of parliament’s activity and, secondly, a first hint of rationalisation of parliamentary procedures. The 1988 revision would carry out, though, a much stronger move towards rationalisation of parliamentary activity. The main change of the 1991

Table 5 Rules of procedure in force since 1976 Rules of procedure

Years in Main effects of force revision

Rules of Procedure of 1976 Rules of Procedure of 1985 Rules of Procedure of 1988 Rules of Procedure of 1991 Rules of Procedure of 1993

1976– 1985 1985– 1988

First RP of the Assembleia da República Regulation of parliamentary activity

1988– 1991

Rationalisation of parliamentary activity

1991– 1993

Enhancement of the petitions device

1993– 2002

Opening parliament to the outside world

revision was the regulation and enhancement of the process of presenting petitions to parliament. Finally, the 1993 revision was thought of as a ‘reform of parliament’57 and its main effect was opening parliament to the outside world (see Table 5). All of these revisions had an important purpose in strengthening the regulatory framework of parliamentary procedures, bringing more organisation to parliament’s activity. This process of defining rules is necessarily progressive, accompanying the history of a parliament and becomes particularly clear in a young institution such as the Assembleia da República.

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3.3.1 From a chamber dominance to an empowerment of the committees The Assembleia da República of 1983 was a parliament dominated by the debates in the chamber. All the legislative proceedings took place, as a rule, in the chamber and the committees had little autonomous competence. Since then, parliamentary activity has been redistributed between chamber and committees and their functions have been rearranged. The rearrangement of functions resulted from, on one hand, a reduction of the time and competences attributed to the plenary debates and, on the other, an enhancement of the committees’ role. 3.3.1.1 Reduction of time spent in chamber A clear difference between the early 1980s’ chamber debates and the ones of the 1990s is their length in time. In the 1980s, a first reading debate could last three days, but nowadays it will be confined to one day. The rationalisation of the time spent in the chamber has been the result of two procedures: reduction of explicit time prescribed for a particular type of debate or referral to the Conference of the Representatives of the decisions on the time to be spent in each debate. Participation in plenary debates and its division among the different PGs and government depend both on regulation in the RP and the decisions of the Conference of the Representatives. The procedures that do not have a particular amount of time prescribed in the RP are, as a consequence, decided according to the Conference of the Representatives. Other procedures do have a particular amount of time prescribed in the RP, normally in order to guarantee the participation of every single PG, independently of the Conference of the Representatives’ decisions. These regulations are foreseen in the case of special debates (for instance, Motion of Censure), but they may also happen in some proceedings of ordinary debates. The 1985 revision was the first one to proceed with this rationalisation. It introduced the rule ascribing to the Conference of the Representatives the power to decide on the general time to be spent in a plenary debate.58 Before 1985, the RP did not foresee a limit for the overall time to be spent in a chamber debate. A specific limit of 15 minutes was also introduced in the overall time to be used by a speaker to answer questions from MPs after a speech in the chamber [Respost a Pedidos de Esclarecimento].59 This was to avoid these answers extending over a long period of time, when a large number of questions had been asked. Specific time limits were introduced in several articles for other different types of intervention, where before no limit was foreseen.60 Furthermore, some of the timings already prescribed in the RP were reduced, such as the ones regulating the interventions in the POD.61 An intervention to present a bill to the chamber, for instance, could last 30 minutes; in 1985 it was reduced to 20 minutes. The same type of reduction applied also to the other time references prescribed in this article. The duration of the debate on the government’s programme was also reduced, from five to three days.62 The restrictions imposed on the oral vote explanations are also indicative of the way the 1985 revision aimed at rationalising the plenary debates. After a vote, MPs may produce a vote explanation, either written or oral, where they explain the reasons for their vote. Many MPs used this as an opportunity for an additional say in the debate, hence extending considerably the length of the debates (see chapter 6 for this use in the budget

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debates). Because of the extended use of this procedure, the 1985 revision restricted considerably the oral vote explanations; these became confined to special debates such as the motions of censure and confidence and to MPs who had not participated yet in the debate.63 Instead, MPs could make full use, from then on, of written vote explanations. In 1988 the oral vote explanations were eliminated altogether, except at the stage of the final vote of a bill (where there is no previous debate).64 The rationalisation was extended in the 1988 revision: not only were timings reduced even further but, most importantly, in a few debates the timings were withdrawn and referred to the Conference of the Representatives. A clear example of the former is the alteration made to the possibility to intervene in a bill deliberation debate. Before 1988, a minimum of 10 minutes was guaranteed for each PG to intervene in any discussion of a legislative initiative in the Plenum; since then, that minimum has been reduced to 5 minutes.65 Simultaneously, the presentation of a bill at first reading was limited to 20 minutes.66 Before then, there was no regulation of the duration.67 Nevertheless, parliamentary practice showed that the presentation of a bill at first reading usually lasted much more than twenty minutes. The introduction of this limit represents a clear attempt to control the extension of plenary debates, a characteristic of the first years of the democratic parliament. In several special debates, the regulation of a specific duration was simply eliminated. This was the case with the following: discussion of the government’s programme,68 motion of censure,69 debate to give assent to the president of the republic’s absence out of the country,70 urgency deliberation of a bill71 and, finally, interpellations72. Once the reference to a specific duration has been removed, distribution of time depends entirely on the decision of the Conference of the Representatives. This means that the amount of time will be determined according to the will of the majoritarian group, as the decisions of the Conference of the Representatives are reached by majority, when a consensus has not been achieved. In the case of the urgent deliberation of a bill and of the interpellations, these alterations have had particularly negative effects, causing a decline in the use of those parliamentary instruments. The urgency deliberation suffered the removal of most of its regulating clauses, becoming thus analogous to a common deliberation. Not only was the character of urgency nearly lost, but also its proceedings became more dependent on the majority will. The case of the interpellations is very typical of the rationalisation process that has affected parliamentary activity. Interpellations have lost most of the solemn character ascribed to them in 1976. As with other special debates, the proceedings of an interpellation include a first stage, where representatives of the proponent PG, as well as representatives of the government, produce long introductory speeches. After this introduction, the debate takes place, followed by a third stage: the closing arguments presented by representatives of both the proponent PG and the government. Until the revision of 1988, the introduction was done by one or more MPs and members of the government, for maximum periods of one hour for each speaker. The closing arguments were presented by one MP and by one government member and had a maximum duration of half an hour each. The alterations introduced in 1988 reduced, on one hand, the number of speakers in the introductory stage and, on the other, removed the references to duration. Since then, only one MP and one government member can speak

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in the introduction and the overall time spent in an interpellation has become dependent on the decisions of the Conference of the Representatives. These alterations largely explain the decrease in the average length of an interpellation debate from the IV (10.05 hours) to the V Legislature (6.30 hours).73 Furthermore, before 1988 and according to the RP, the last speaker in an interpellation was an MP; since then, the government member is the one who has the last word in an interpellation debate. 3.3.1.2 Empowerment of committees The decline of the chamber’s predominance was mirrored by a transferral of competences to the committees. Not only were committees’ proceedings considerably regulated, but also several new responsibilities were ascribed to them. On several occasions, Fernando Amaral, the president of parliament from 1984 to 1987, expressed very clearly the need to strengthen the committees in order to bring more efficacy to parliamentary work.74 In particular, the committees’ role in the legislative proceedings has been considerably enhanced. In the first decade of the Portuguese parliament, committees could not meet (by rule) at the same time as the Plenum. In 1985, the committees were granted that possibility75 and, in 1988, the second reading was ascribed to them.76 Until 1988, every single bill had its second reading in the chamber, unless a request to transfer the reading to the committee was approved (Requerimento de baixa à Comissão);77since 1988, the proceeding has been inverted and, thus, it is possible to vote to transfer the second reading from the committee to the chamber (Avocação pelo Plenário). Furthermore, in 1993, strong emphasis was put on the committee referral stage prior to the first reading, which until then was a mere formality (see below). Committees have been progressively ascribed more powers to gather evidence on whatever issues are under discussion. In 1985, they were given the power to carry out studies78 and, in 1988, the power to undertake parliamentary auditions and to request the testimony of any citizen.79 Furthermore, the 1988 revision also represented a small effort to encourage more publicity for the committees’ work; until then committees met behind closed doors.80 The introduction of article 147.° [Public discussion] brought the possibility of public discussions in standing committees. Furthermore, the addition of two clauses in article 114.° [Minutes of the committees] gave way to the thorough recording of committees’ proceedings, as well as to the publicising of committees’ minutes, whenever decided so by the majority of its members. The RP revision of 1993 revealed a strong concern for the work of standing committees to be more open. Two clauses were added to the committees’ rules in order to determine that some particular meetings had to be open to the media. This is now the case for any meeting that includes one of the following proceedings: discussion and approval of legislation under the second reading, deliberation and vote on reports on legislative initiatives. Hence, most of the meetings of standing committees are now open to the media. Committees may still decide through a vote not to open the proceedings to the media. But, these alterations inverted the rule of publicity: before 1993 the publicity of a committee meeting had to be approved by its members; since then it is the secrecy that has to be voted for.81 Still, it should be stressed that this publicity rule applies only to the media and not to the general public. Also in 1993, three clauses were introduced in the article 112.° [Powers of the Standing Committees], to guarantee that information on

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committees’ work is dispensed to the media on a regular basis; broadly every week and, in matters of particular relevance, on the same day as the respective meeting. It is worth saying, though, that these alterations were not followed by an important change in the actual information reported by the media during the VI legislature. The media started to report meetings where polemical issues were discussed, or where a government member was heard, but the regular work of ordinary legislation remained, in most cases, unknown to public opinion. Nonetheless, since then the media seem to have been acquiring the habit of reporting the work of committees on a more regular basis. This was visible in the legislature following the period studied here, the VII (1995–99), and may be related to the fact that the government had a minority support in parliament. The RP revision in 1991 contributed to the empowerment of the standing committees as it gave more autonomy to their decisions. It exempted them from the specific authorisation from the president of parliament on some matters, such as requests for the presence of government members and the promotion of public discussion of labour legislation.82 Since 1991, each standing committee has the power to carry out those initiatives by itself. These alterations are a way of decentralizing the parliamentary decisional process. This trend strengthening the committees’ power and autonomy was reinforced by the revision of the RP in 2002 through a variety of amendments.83 3.3.1.3 Rearrangement of functions between chamber and committee The empowerment of the committees, to the detriment of the chamber’s competence, is a good indicator of the rationalisation process the Portuguese parliament has undergone in its second decade of democracy. Originally identified with the chamber, the legislative function has become more and more a standing committee responsibility. In the first years of democracy, the idea of deciding through public discussion was extremely important. This explained the prominence of the Plenum in the legislative process. Democratic practice has emphasised, though, the need for effective decisions. On the other hand, the absolute majorities experience gave way to the need for more opportunities to discuss current issues in a public way. As a result, the Plenum has fulfilled increasingly a legitimation function, rather than a legislative one. Indicative of this is the creation of more opportunities in the chamber to discuss current issues, reflecting problems in Portuguese society. In 1985 there was a first timid attempt to move in this direction, but the practice was not institutionalised.84 A clear move towards that direction would only take place in the revisions of 1991 and 1993. Not only were three new special debates created, but also some old provisions for chamber debates were strongly regulated. The RP revision of 1991 created the Urgency Debates, meant to discuss unexpected polemical issues in an expeditious way; however, these were not regulated until the introduction of a new article two years later.85 At the same time the Actuality Debates (Debates sobre Assuntos de Actualidade) were regulated, although the possibility to participate in the chamber on those issues was foreseen since 1976.86 The 1993 revision also created two other special debates: the Standing Committees Debate and the so-called Debate on the Nation State (O Estado da Nação). The former consists of a debate that any standing committee may propose in order to discuss matters within their competence.87 The Debate on the Nation State aims to evaluate the political year, taking

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place thus at the end of each legislative session.88 It became an important debate in the last two years of the Cavaquismo, since it involved the participation of the Prime Minister Cavaco Silva; in fact, the Estado da Nação debate of 1995 was broadcast on television and was the last time Cavaco Silva spoke in parliament. The importance of this debate has increased even further since then, attracting huge media attention every year. These debates were promoted in the last years of the absolute majority period. The experience of parliamentary practice under the absolute majorities gave rise to a need for more opportunities in parliament to speak up for society’s concerns, as a reaction to the majority’s predominance. More chances for debate were needed not only to counterbalance the cuts introduced with the RP revision of 1988 (see above),but also to provide more opportunities for the opposition to express its own views. Under the absolute majorities, the creation of publicity around prominent issues was the main opportunity the opposition had to influence the government’s decisions. The rate of bills discussed in the chamber for second reading is a good example of the way the opposition used the Plenum as a platform to influence the government. Although since 1988 the RP establishes that the second reading takes place in standing committees (unless voted otherwise), the rate of bills discussed in the chamber for second reading is actually higher after that date than before. Whereas in the III and IV legislatures, respectively, only 28 per cent and 17 per cent of bills reaching the second reading stage were discussed in the chamber (at a time when that was the normal rule), in the V and VI, those values increased to 36 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively. Thus, the strong effort to diminish the Plenum’s prominence and to stimulate a more significant role for the standing committees in the legislative process, was actually followed by an increasing demand for more opportunities in the chamber to speak up on problematic issues of concern to Portuguese society. The RP revision of 1988 was particularly important for that trend. Naturally, that demand was primarily expressed by the opposition parties as an effect of the overall control that the majoritarian party had over parliamentary agenda. 3.3.2 Reproduction of the majority control over the agenda Another characteristic of the rationalisation process has been the way majoritarian criteria have increasingly substituted consensual ones in the distribution of rights and responsibilities. A first clear sign of this can be seen in the way the management of the chamber debates has become so much more dependent on the decisions of the Conference of the Representatives, as seen in the previous section. But, besides this, parliamentary rights such as the number of questions that can be put to the government or the right to interrupt a plenary session have clearly become more favourable to the PGs with larger numbers. 3.3.2.1 Means of reinforcement of majority powers: right to set the agenda of a plenary meeting This rationalisation move affected mainly the so-called opposition rights [Direitos Potestativos]. These are rights granted to the opposition PGs, independent of their size, as a counterbalance to the weight of majorities. The existence of such rights acts as a

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guarantee to preserve opposition participation in parliamentary activity, independent of the size or ‘colour’ of the majorities. The two most emblematic changes concerned the decision rule of the Conference of the Representatives and the right to set the plenary agenda. Until 1985, there was no prescribed decision rule for the Conference of the Representatives. The revision of the RP introduced the majority rule: that is, since then, decisions are taken by majority when a consensus has not been achieved.89 The 1985 revision also introduced another fundamental majoritarian criterion: to regulate the distribution of parliamentary rights according to the size of the PG, besides the fact of belonging, or not, to the government; until then, only this second criterion was considered.90 For instance, before 1985 any PG from the opposition could book the agenda of six plenary meetings and any PG from the government could book four.91 The 1985 revision introduced a distinction between small, medium and large PGs:92 Opposition—PGs with less than 25 MPs PGs with 25 to 50 MPs PGs with more than 50 MPs Government—PGs with less than 25 MPs PGs with 25 to 50 MPs PGs with more than 50 MPs

two meetings four meetings six meetings one meeting two meetings three meetings

In 1988, the majoritarian criteria were reinforced and, although membership of the government was considered, the PG size actually became the key factor; to some extent, the concept of opposition right faded away. This is particularly clear in the right to set a plenary agenda. Originally, the agendasetting right was thought of as a guarantee for the opposition factions to schedule their own bills in a plenary session. This acted as a guarantee regardless of the majoritarian PG(s), who had in any case a decisive word in the Conference of the Representatives where most of the plenary agenda is determined. The revision of 1988 challenged this concept and, since then, the larger a PG is, the more meetings it is entitled to, whether in opposition or in government. Between 1985 and 1988, a PG represented in the government was not entitled to more than three meetings, even if constituted by more than 50 MPs; that was the maximum of meetings it would be entitled to. Simultaneously, any PG from the opposition composed of more than 50 MPs was entitled to six meetings, but no more than that. With the revision of 1988, these limits ceased to exist. The clause referring to the PGs represented in government states that they are entitled to set the agenda of one plenary meeting per each fraction of 25 MPs.93 It soon becomes clear that the application of this logic to a majoritarian PG, with no limits established, has the following implication: reproduction of the majoritarian party’s dominance. Table 6 expresses this change. It shows the number of meetings each PG would be entitled to, according to the rules on agenda-setting of the RP of 1976, of 1985

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Table 6 Agenda-setting according to different rules of procedures (number of plenary meetings each PG was, or would have been, entitled to; figures in bold indicate the party(ies) represented in the government)* Rules of Rules of Rules of Procedure 1976 Procedure 1985 Procedure 1988 (in force in the (in force in the (in force in the I, II and III) IV) V, VI and VII) II III IV V VI VII II III IV V VI VII II III IV V VI VII Parliamentary groups PSD 4 4 4 4 4 6 3 3 3 3 3 6 4 3 4 6 6 8 PS 6 4 6 6 6 4 6 3 6 6 6 3 6 4 6 6 8 5 PCP 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 2 2 CDS 4 6 6 6 6 6 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 1 1 2 PRD —— 6 6 — — —— 4 2 — — —— 4 1 — — PPM 4 ———— — 1 ———— — 1 ———— — ASDI 6 6 ——— — 2 2 ——— — 1 1 ——— — UEDS 6 6 — — — — 2 2 — — — — 1 1 — — — — MDP/ID 6 6 6 6 — — 2 2 2 2 — — 1 1 1 1 — — UDP 2 ———— — 2 ———— — 1 ———— — PEV — 2 — 6 6 6 — 2 — 2 2 2 — 1 — 1 1 1 PSN ———— 2 — ———— 2 — ———— 1 — Note * The I legislature was not included in this Table because it comprised several changes of government, which would make tabular representation difficult. The independent MPs have not been included for the same reason.

Table 7 Number of MPs per parliamentary group (figures in bold indicate the party (ies) represented in the government) Parliamentary groups II III IV V VI VII PSD PS PCP CDS PRD PPM ASDI UEDS MDP/ID UDP

82 66 39 46 — 6 4 4 2 1

75 94 40 30 — — 3 4 3 —

88 148 135 88 57 60 72 112 35 27 15 13 22 4 5 15 45 7 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 3 2 — — — — — —

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— 1 — 2 2 2 — — — — 1 — 250 250 250 250 230 230

(when the first changes on this were introduced) and of 1988.94 It also indicates when each of these rules was actually in force. Table 6 shows that the changes in the 1988 revision favoured mainly the two larger PGs and particularly the ones represented in the government. Conversely, the number of meetings for the smaller opposition PGs decreased; which may be considered as being contradictory to the very concept of opposition rights. On the other hand, an overview of the three models of RPs clearly indicates how under the original ruling plenary activity could be brought to a halt: the concern to safeguard the opposition PGs led to an allocation of rights regardless of their size. This becomes clear when we take into account Table 7 that gives the number of MPs per PG. For instance, although the ASDI had only four MPs and the PS 66 in the II legislature, both PGs were entitled to the same number of meetings, six. The introduction of majoritarian criteria in 1985 was a way to introduce efficacy into parliamentary activity. The experience of ten years of snarled parliamentary practice made clear the need for a rationalisation of procedures. Added to this, the revision of 1988 was also a direct reaction by the majoritarian PG to the domination of the opposition parties during the IV legislature. 3.3.2.2 Other examples of the reproduction of majority dominance The right to set the Plenum agenda is very symbolic of the way majoritarian criteria have substituted consensual ones. However, the same process occurred with other parliamentary instruments, such as: (a) number of questions to the government per PG; (b) constitution of the Table [Mesa]; (c) guarantee of a minimal time for each PG in the PAOD; (d) request for interruption or closure of a plenary meeting. (a) The revision of 1988 introduced changes in the number of questions to the government that each PG has the right to ask. Once again, the size of the PG became the key factor in the allocation of questions. According to the RP of 1985, every PG could put two oral questions to the government, independent of their size. Furthermore, each opposition PG could ask two written questions and each PG represented in the government one written question.95 Both oral and written questions were orally answered in the chamber in meetings specially brought together for that purpose. In 1988, written questions ceased to exist and each PG became entitled to one oral question to the government per every 25 MPs, regardless of being part, or not, of the government.96 Thus, according to the rules of 1985, the majoritarian PG elected in 1987 would have been entitled to ask just three questions to the government. Under the rules of 1988, this increased to six. In practice, this prescription has not had much effect as PGs represented in government tend not to ask many questions. Nonetheless, it is important to stress

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such sharp changes in the principle prevailing in the distribution of that instrument of parliamentary control. (b) Since 1988, only PGs constituted of more than 25 MPs can propose a secretary to the Mesa of the Assembleia da República;97 before, each of the four largest PGs appointed both a deputy president and a secretary.98 In practice, only the PSD and the PS could appoint a secretary in the VI legislature. Although it may look like a change of minor importance, this modification is significant in the sense that it indicates a particular trend: rationalisation of the proceedings and control of parliamentary practice by the larger PGs. (c) Until 1991, the PAOD had a normal duration of one hour to be distributed among PGs proportionally to their size; moreover, a minimum time was guaranteed to every single PG. The revision of 1991 eliminated the last ruling. (d) From 1976 to 1985, any PG had the right to request the interruption of a plenary meeting, for a maximum duration of half an hour. It consisted of a request that could not be refused by the president of parliament; it incorporated a right of every PG, independent of its size.99 The revision of 1985 introduced, again, a majoritarian criterion. It made a distinction between smaller and larger PGs; the first ones became entitled to only 15 minute interruptions and the latter to 30 minute.100 Moreover, since the revision of 1991, the request can actually be refused if so decided by the Plenum; that is, it has become fairly dependent on the majority will.101 What is more, the right of interruption could be used once in every single plenary meeting. The revision of 1991 limited it to once a week. These alterations clearly indicate the rationalisation move imposed on parliamentary practice after the mid-1980s. They constitute a way to avoid the tangled meetings of the first decade of democracy, when the majority PGs accused the opposition of disrupting the plenary meetings. The request to close a plenary meeting suffered similar alterations in 1988. The chamber may vote on requests to close the meeting, unless certain conditions have not been fulfilled. According to the RP of 1985, that request could not be accepted for a vote while two speakers of the PGs registered to participate in the debate, had not yet spoken. After 1988, that prescription has been restricted according to the size of the PGs: two speakers for each PG with more than 25 MPs and one speaker for the others.102 Following this reinforcement of the majorities, the RP revision of 1993 introduced a few counter-balancing rules. In particular, there was an effort to enhance the rights of the independent MPs, which had been considerably impaired by the 1988 revision.103 The 1991 revision had already introduced some amendments on this matter, by promoting opportunities for the independent MPs to speak in plenary debates. Still, it was the revision of 1993 that sought to integrate the independent MPs in parliamentary life. Since 1993, specific prescriptions allow independent MPs to take part in standing committees’ work, as well as to book a first reading debate for one bill per each legislative session.104 Furthermore, this revision introduced more opportunities for independent MPs to participate in the chamber.

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3.3.3 Regulation of procedures The regulation of procedures was a main feature in the period under study. This was especially so in the first and last revisions of the RP, 1985 and 1993. After ten years of experience, there was a strong need in 1985 for a tighter regulation of parliamentary procedures. Much of that regulation was an adaptation to practice, but a lot of it was also a way to introduce some organisation and to institutionalise parliamentary procedures. In 1993, regulation came as a way to counterbalance the effects brought by the alterations of the absolute majorities. In 1991, there was an important effort to regulate a particular procedure: the petitions. Until then, there was virtually no prescription regulating the process of presenting and discussing a petition.105 3.3.3.1 Regulation in 1985: organising and institutionalising By going through the amendments made in 1985, it soon becomes clear that the introduction of organisation in the chamber debates was a primary concern. This revision introduced many specifications in the rules prescribing the process of arranging a plenary meeting and, in particular, the norms ruling the participation in the debates in itself. The organisation of the PAOD is a good example of this. Before 1985, the RP simply stated the type of issues to be discussed at the PAOD and that it should last one hour.106 Nothing else was mentioned, namely who was responsible for organising the PAOD and how to line up speakers in each debate. The revision of 1985 specified these and other requirements to follow in the organisation of a PAOD.107 A number of articles were extended in order to specify the conditions under which MPs and members of government may participate in a plenary debate.108 There was a concern about labelling every single intervention in the Plenum; giving it a name and specifying its purpose. This is particularly clear in the introduction of a new article solely dedicated to the purposes of the use of the word. This article stated that each speaker had to justify the reason why he or she wished to intervene; if the reason was not correctly followed, the president of parliament could interrupt the speaker.109 Thus, at the end of ten years of parliamentary practice, the 1985 revision was an opportunity to bring some control over the development of the chamber debates. The justification for this need will become clear in chapter 6, when the practice of the budget debates will be presented. At the same time, this revision also institutionalised a few of the parliamentary procedures commonly used today. The questions to the government and the Requerimentos [written question addressing more technical and administrative matters] are clear examples of this. Before this revision, there was virtually no regulation on how to use these two control instruments. Specific new articles were introduced in the RP in order to regulate the proceedings to follow in the act of proposing questions.110 It was only then, for instance, that the periodic character of the meetings for questions to the government was institutionalised. Besides this, the 1985 revision also introduced some organisation in the presentation of parliamentary work in itself. A good example of this was the institutionalisation of annual reports on parliamentary activity.111 Until 1985, there was no publication reporting on parliamentary activity Since then, these annual reports have been the main (and often

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only) source available on the work of the Portuguese parliament. This change was due mainly to the efforts of the then President of Parliament, Fernando Amaral. Amaral strongly supported this idea and made a first attempt to publish a report on parliamentary activity112 The concern to regulate procedures and parliamentary activity was therefore very clear in 1985. This provides a good illustration of how a newly democratic parliament actually develops: by setting rules, experimenting with them and then regulating them to make the actual practice possible. 3.3.3.2 Regulation in 1993: enhancing the work of parliament The 1993 revision to the RP also represented an important effort to regulate parliamentary activity. Fernando Amaral was again a key figure in this revision—now as an ordinary MP he chaired the ad hoc committee that brought forward the revision. The regulation undergone then had a clear purpose of dignifying parliament’s work. It had three primary aims: (a) to avoid the overuse, and consequent misuse, of some parliamentary procedures, (b) to ensure (more) quality in the legislative work and, (c) to tighten up the responsibilities in the job of MP (a) The modifications introduced in procedures such as the Defence of Consideration [Defesa de Consideração]113 are a good example of the effort made to enhance the merit of chamber debates. Following the majoritarian control of the parliamentary agenda in the years of the absolute majorities, the opposition parties used every single opportunity available in the chamber to publicise their own views. It was in this context that several means to speak in the chamber were repeatedly misused. This was notoriously the case of the Defence of Consideration and the Points of Order [Interpelação à Mesa].114 The time used in these procedures is not discounted from the overall time allocated to each PG, constituting, therefore, valuable opportunities for MPs to extend their intervention in the chamber. This overuse led eventually to a misuse of such procedures: PGs did not use them for their ascribed purpose but as an extra opportunity to speak in the Plenum. In order to avoid this, it was decided in the particular case of the Defence of Consideration, that it should be formulated only at the end of a debate.115 Being postponed, that procedure would lose its impact and, therefore, a great part of its interest as a means of publicity. Still, the revised article foresaw that the offended MP could be given immediate voice, when considered justifiable. In practice this is what has tended to happen and the 2002 revision actually reinstated the previous ruling.116 A similar alteration was introduced in the Pedido de Esclarecimento [‘Request of Elucidation’].117 This procedure was often misused as MPs took it not as a way to put forward a question, but rather to state their own points of view. Following this, the speaker answered globally to all the Pedidos de Esdarecimento in more of a final speech rather than in specific answers to each question. In response to this, the revision introduced some amendments encouraging the speakers to give their answers after each question.118

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Such small adjustments are indicative of the attempt to assign more relevance to the plenary debates. Nonetheless, it was at the level of legislative work that more substantial regulation was brought forward in the revision of 1993. (b) A considerable amount of articles were revised in 1993 in order to guarantee that the presentation and deliberation of bills contained complete information. Particular requirements were reinforced in the presentation of ratifications [Ratificações] and government bills, in particular bills with delegation of powers.119 In the case of ratifications, the request for more detailed information aimed to prevent the multiplication of ‘false’ ratifications. Asking for ratifications became another way for the opposition PGs to criticise government policies in the chamber, even if the approval of a particular decree-law was inevitable.120 Quite often, the ratifications were considered ‘false’, because they did not embody any alternative text. For this reason, the 1993 revision introduced a demand for a justification of the ratification’s motives. Some measures had already been introduced in the revision of 1991 in order to avoid the delaying effect of ratifications121 and therefore its systematic use. In the case of the information on government bills, there was a concern to ensure a tighter control on the government’s initiative. A common complaint expressed by opposition MPs during the years of the absolute majority was the lack of information in the bills presented by government. They criticised particularly the delegation of powers bills, which tended to be more and more ambiguous, leaving space for applications uncontrollable by the MPs. In both cases, it is not possible to say if there has been an important change in practice. What has been more obvious is the importance reports have acquired in the legislative deliberation process of the Assembleia da República. Demanding detailed reports on legislation under deliberation is another way of ensuring an increasingly reliable legislative output. This allows for more scrupulous work and stimulates a deeper involvement by the different parts in parliament. Some initial measures were taken in the revision of 1988, when a regular report on parliamentary work, such as the external visits undertaken by MPs, was demanded.122 In 1991, the importance of reports was emphasised in different articles. Nonetheless, it was in 1993 that there was a clear and strong regulation. In every single article referring to legislative work, references to the process of preparing a report were added or reinforced. Specific clauses were introduced with the sole purpose of demanding a set of requirements to be included in a report, and one long and detailed article was added123 in the chapter on committees, just to regulate the responsibility and preparation of reports. The importance given to this type of bill preparation is particularly clear in the way the first stage of deliberation was enhanced. This stage consists of a committee referral prior to the first reading debate and existed before 1993. However, it used to represent a mere formal stage. Since 1993, this committee referral has acquired importance and every report resulting from it is presented, together with the respective bill, at the first reading debate.124 The new emphasis on the production of reports was followed by an encouragement to deliver regular information to the press and to develop audiences with a variety of associations, such as the representative of the local

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councils. It is quite clear, therefore, that the revision of 1993 demonstrated an effort to consign more reliability to parliament’s work. It is in this context that committees’ work was particularly regulated, acquiring some autonomy inside parliament, at the same time as they were assigned an increasing visibility, in order to avoid the one-sided image given by the plenary debates. (c) The RP revision of 1993 also introduced fundamental changes into parliamentary instruments such as questions to the government and the committees of inquiry which have improved their legal framework, as there was an effort to respond to some of the problems embodied in those instruments (see chapter 5). However, it is in the regulation of MPs’ responsibilities that the attempt to dignify parliament’s image is clearer. As shown by a press analysis carried out elsewhere,125 parliament’s image declined during the period of the absolute majorities, partly due to the development of a pejorative public perception of MPs’ role. Specifically, there was some discussion in the media on the absences of MPs, after some disciplinary problems in the majoritarian party. As a response to this, the conditions leading to a deprivation of an MP’s mandate were tightened up in the RP revision of 1993. Until then, MPs would lose their seat if absent from the Plenum in all of its first five meetings or in nine consecutive meetings during the rest of the legislative period.126 Thus, only in extreme situations would MPs be deprived of their seat. With the revision of 1993, that deprivation occurs if an MP is absent from the Plenum in all of the first four meetings or in any other four meetings during a single legislative year.127 What is more, the system of sanctions was equally tightened up.128 Furthermore, small references have been introduced with the specific purpose of stimulating the direct contact between MPs and constituencies. For instance, since 1993, the article that co-ordinates parliamentary work between Plenum and committees dedicates particular attention to the need of foreseeing some time for MPs to contact their constituencies.129 In addition, a clause was added establishing as a duty of the president of parliament the promotion of offices specifically aimed at receiving people from the constituencies. 130 As seen in the previous section, Portuguese MPs have complained for a long time about the poor support resources available. However, it was only in 1993 that there was an effort to improve the situation. Besides offices for contacts with citizens, this revision also established that MPs should be entitled to individual offices.131 The prescription of these resources does not imply, naturally, an immediate adjustment in parliamentary practice. Still, there have been some improvements in this respect as seen above. Whereas in the 1970s and 1980s, no offices were allocated to MPs (unless they were in the PGs directorate), at the beginning of the 1990s the common rule was an office for five MPs. Each of these small prescriptions may not result in deep changes in parliamentary life, but, from an overall point of view, they do constitute a significant effort to dignify the role of MPs and the Assembleia da República. At the beginning of the 1990s, there was a perception of the inadequacies brought about by the experience of an absolute majority in parliament; just as, in 1985 and 1988, there was a perception of the inefficacy caused by a system dominated by the chamber discussions and by the respect for the proportionality

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rule. This was particularly reinforced in 1988 following the experience of a very strong opposition during the IV legislature. This overview of the changes introduced in the RP from 1985 to 1993 is an indicator of the extent to which the Portuguese parliament has changed in its second decade of democracy. The subsequent chapters will look in more detail at the actual changes in parliamentary practice. As will be seen, the impact of many of these legal changes is perfectly noticeable throughout parliamentary activity.

Notes 1 L.Sá, O Lugar da Assembleia da República no Sistema Político (Lisboa: Caminho, 1994), pp. 133–210. 2 This was based on Benjamin Constant’s concept of Royal Power (Le Pouvoir Royal); see B.Constant, ‘Principes de Politique—De la nature du pouvoir royal dans une monarchie constitutionnelle’, in A.Roulin (ed.), Oeuvres de Benjamin Constant (Librairie Gallimard, 1957), pp. 1112–23. 3 M.Pinto dos Santos, Monarquia Constitucional—organização e relações do poder governamental com a Câmara dos deputados, 1834–1910 (Lisbon: Assembleia da República, 1986), p. 203. 4 Except for the short-lived dictatorship of Sidónio Pais, where the President of the Republic played a central role, being now directly elected (1917–18). Curiously it was only under this dictatorship that male universal suffrage was foreseen, as a way to gather popular support. 5 M.Rebelo de Sousa, Os partidos políticos no direito constitucional português (Braga: Livraria Cruz, 1983), p. 174. 6 Braga da Cruz and Lobo Antunes, ‘Revolutionary transition and problems of parliamentary institutionalization: the case of the Portuguese National Assembly’, in U.Liebert and M.Cotta (eds), Parliament and Democratic consolidation in Southern Europe (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), p. 155. 7 Miranda, Manual de Direito Constitucional, Tomo I—O Estado e Os Sistemas Constitucionais (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 1997; orig. ed., 1981), p. 295. 8 There were some attempts, though, to introduce an elective character in the upper chamber. The short-lived constitution of 1838 changed the name of the upper chamber to Chamber of the Senators, who would now be elected; this was applied in two elections, in 1838 and 1840 (P.Tavares de Almeida, Legislação eleitoral portuguesa, 1820–1926 (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1998), Table 7, p. 743). Furthermore, the additional act of 1885 introduced the elective rule for a proportion of the Peers, but this was abolished in the following act, in 1896. 9 Sá (note 1), p. 160. 10 About the way Salazar himself controlled the nomination of deputies for both chambers, see A.Costa Pinto, ‘Twentieth-Century Portugal: an introduction’, in A.Costa Pinto (ed.), Modern Portugal (Palo Alto: SPOSS, 1998), p. 24. 11 Braga da Cruz and Lobo Antunes (note 6), p. 156. 12 Note that the programme of the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA) foresaw already a single chamber. It was designated then as Assembleia Legislativa [Legislative Assembly]. After some discussion in the Constituent Assembly, the MPs opted for the term Assembleia da República (following the suggestion of the then MP, Mota Pinto); the term ‘republic’ was seen as a more general term (legislative being restrictive to a law issuing function) and referring to the whole nation. Curiously, the term ‘parliament’ was abandoned, because of its pejorative connotation in the Portuguese language. (Sá (note 1), p. 189).

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13 Note that the first republican electoral law gave the franchise also to ‘heads of families’, but this was withdrawn in 1913. 14 There were several variations in the electoral system applied during the last two decades of the monarchy; for instance, the system prescribed a special clause for the representation of minorities. For more detail on this, see Tavares de Almeida (note 8), pp.XXV/XXXV. 15 P.Schmitter, ‘Portée et signification des élections dans le Portugal autoritaire (1933–1974)’, Revue Française de Science Politique, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1977), p. 96. 16 Ibid., pp. 120–21. 17 Miranda (note 7), p. 303. 18 M.Braga da Cruz, As origens da democracia cristã e o salazarismo (Lisbon: Presença, 1980), p. 378. 19 The author prefers the expression ‘party dominant regime’, as opposed to ‘single-party regime’, because other forms of political representation were occasionally allowed, although, in practice, they had no political significance (Rebelo de Sousa (note5), p. 187). 20 Ibid., p. 156. 21 Pinto dos Santos (note 3), p. 200. 22 The alternation was basically between the Partido Progressista and the Partido Regenerador (conservative), although both parties embodied different forms; for detail, see diagram in Pinto dos Santos (note 3), Appendix VIII. 23 F.Farelo Lopes, ‘Clientelismo, «crise de participação» e deslegitimação na I República’, Análise Sorial, Vol. XXVI, No. 111 (1991), p. 401. 24 There is virtually no information available on the internal organisation of the Cortes of the 1822 Constitution, the Congress of the Republic or the Assembleia Nacional. 25 Constitution of 1911, art. 11.º. 1.°. Note that a few of the constitution projects discussed in 1911 foresaw a longer period for the legislative sessions; see, in particular, the project of the Grémio Montanha which foresaw a legislative session from 5 October until the following 30 June (‘Projecto da Constituição Portuguesa—enviado ao parlamento pelo Grémio Montanha’, in Actas da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte de 1911 (Lisbon: Assembleia da República, 1986), p. 629). 26 There was a subsequent election, in 1919, but the information available does not refer to the totality of the MPs; in any case, there was then a further increase in the number of MPs. 27 Tavares de Almeida (note 8), Tables 4 and 5, pp. 737–9. 28 Pinto dos Santos (note 3), p. 167. 29 Ibid., pp. 169–70. 30 Ibid., p. 184. 31 See Actas da Assembleia Nacional Constituinte de 1911 (note 25), pp. 11–38. 32 Miranda (note 7), p. 292. 33 Constitution of 1933, art. 95.°. 34 Braga da Cruz and Lobo Antunes (note 6), p. 156. 35 According to the Weberian concept of meaning (M.Weber, The theory of social and economic organization (Illinois: The Free Press Glencoe, 1947), pp. 88–94). 36 R.Packenham, ‘Legislatures and Political Development’, in A.Kornberg and L.Musolf (eds), Legislatures in Developmental Perspective (Durham: Durham University Press, 1970). 37 For an explanation of the main parliamentary terms, see Glossary of Parliamentary Terms in Appendix III. 38 Braga da Cruz, ‘Sobre o parlamento português: partidarização parlamentar e parlamentarização partidária’, Análise Social, Vol. XXIV, No. 100 (1988), p. 106. 39 CRP, art. 152.º. Following the option made in the republican constitution, this rule aims at avoiding the development of powerful local clientelistic networks. 40 M.Ramirez, ‘Teoría y Práctica del Grupo Parlamentario’, Revista de Estudios Políticos, Vol. 11 (1979), p. 9. 41 Ibid., p. 9.

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42 CRP, art. 180.º. 43 A.Barreto, ‘A Assembleia da República: uma instituição subalternizada’, Os Silêncios do Regime (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1992), p. 161. 44 More recently the chairs of the committees have also acquired this status. 45 Braga da Cruz (note 38), p. 122. 46 Quite often the legislative sessions are extended until mid-July. The revision of the constitution of 1997 changed the starting date of a legislative session to 15 September. 47 Lei Orgânica da Assembleia da República [Law on the internal organisation of the Assembleia da República], 1993, arts. 12.° to 17.°. 48 Ibid., arts. 20.° to 23.°. 49 See the contributions to P.Norton (ed.), Parliaments and Governments in Western Europe (London: Frank Cass, 1998). 50 As pointed out by the former Director of the Division on Legislative Information [DILP], Margarida Guadálpi, in several informal interviews carried out in June 1996. 51 Lei Orgânica da Assembleia da República (note 47), art. 63°/63.°-A. 52 T.Bruneau and A.MacLeod, Politics in Contemporary Portugal (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986), p. 152. 53 On the occasion of events such as a disaster in a neighbouring country or the death of a wellknown figure, MPs express their solidarity with the affected people by proposing a vote of sorrow, which is usually approved by unanimity. 54 According to the constitution, some matters have their second reading in the chamber (CRP, art. 168.º). 55 Other ordinances include the Statute of the MPs [Estatuto dos Deputados], the Committees of Inquiry Law and the Petitions Law; all of which have been part of the RP but were subsequently separated into autonomous statutes. There is also the Lei Orgânica da Assembleia da República, prescribing parliament’s internal organisation from an administrative point of view. 56 Since then, only one more general revision has taken place, in 2002, again under a majority—the coalition between the PSD and the CDS-PP. This last revision is not taken into account in here and references will only be made when absolutely relevant. For a summary of the main changes introduced in 2002, see S.Alves Martins, Instituições Políticas Nacionais e Europeias—A Revisão Regimental de 2003, Causas e Principais Altemções (unpublished article, Lisbon, ISCTE, 2003) and C.Leston-Bandeira and A.Freire, ‘Internalising the lessons of stable democracy: the Portuguese parliament’, in C.LestonBandeira (ed.), The Journal of Legislative Studies—special issue on Southern European Parliaments in Democracy, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2003), pp. 57–86. 57 The Reform of Parliament was the title given to both the ad hoc committee responsible for revising the RP and the publication about the committee’s proceedings edited by its chair, Fernando Amaral (F.Amaral (ed.), A Reforma do Parlamento—reflexões, documentos, reflexos (Lisbon: Assembleia da República, 1993)). 58 RP, 1985, arts. 95.° and 146.°. 59 RP, 1982, art. 98.°; RP, 1985, art. 88.°. 60 Defence of Consideration: RP, 1985, art. 89.°; Protests and counter-protests: RP, 1985, art. 90.°; Appeals, RP, 1985, art. 134.º. 61 RP, 1982, art. 103.º; RP, 1985, art. 96.°. 62 RP, 1982, art. 194.º; RP, 1985, art. 221.°. 63 RP, 1982, art. 100.º; RP, 1985, art. 92.°. 64 RP, 1988, arts. 94.° and 160.°. 65 RP, 1985, art. 146.º, 3); RP, 1988, art. 150.º, 3). 66 RP, 1988, art. 138.°, 2). 67 RP, 1985, art. 135.°, 2).

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68 RP, 1988, art. 227.°: discussion of the government’s programme; art. 228.°: closing of the debate. Corresponding articles in the RP, 1985: arts. 222.° and 224.°. 69 RP, 1985, art. 230.°; RP, 1988, art. 234.°. 70 RP, 1985, art. 267.°; RP, 1988, art. 268.°. 71 RP, 1985, art. 285.°; RP, 1988, art. 286.°. 72 RP, 1985, art. 240.°; RP, 1988, art. 241.°. 73 C.Leston-Bandeira, ‘Controlo parlamentar na Assembleia da República: a transladação de poder da IV para a V legislatura’, Legislação, 12 (1995), p. 136. 74 See, for instance, ‘Presidente da Assembleia da República obriga comissões a trabalhar’, in Expresso, 29/12/84 and ‘Assembleia da República: o regresso as minorias’, Expresso— Revista, 9/11/85, pp. 24–25. 75 RP, 1982, art. 62.°; RP, 1985, art. 52.°. 76 RP, 1988, art. 154.°. 77 To some extent, this legal alteration was a mere adaptation to parliamentary practice. A high percentage of bills used to be transferred to committee for second reading, after a unanimous vote on a request. Still, the regulation of this practice is significant of the rationalisation move experienced then. 78 RP, 1982, art. 114.°; RP, 1985, art. 108.º. 79 RP, 1988, arts. 111.° and 110.°. 80 With the exception of the budget debates. 81 RP, 1991, art. 118.º; RP, 1993, art. 120.º. 82 RP, 1988, arts. 109.º and 143.°; RP, 1991, arts. 109.º and 143.°. According to the constitution, Trade Unions and any Workers Committee have the right to participate in the production of legislation on labour issues (CPR, arts. 54.° and 56.°). Thus, the Assembleia da República has the duty to consult those organisations whenever labour legislation is being considered. 83 This revision created amongst others the Conference of the Representatives of the Committees; Alves Martins (note 56), pp. 14–15. 84 This revision created the ‘political declarations’ [Declaração Política], giving an opportunity to PGs to make an intervention in the PAOD, every fortnight, on any subject of their choice (RP, 1985, arts. 71.° and 73.°). It also institutionalised the Actuality Debates [Debates sobre Assuntos de Actualidade], by introducing a new section in the RP on this (RP, 1985, art. 241.°). However, effective regulation would only come later (see below). 85 RP, 1991, art. 72.°; RP, 1993, arts. 72.° and 77.°. 86 This debate takes place, according to the RP, once a month and can also be referred to as Debate sobre assunto de relevante importância, nacional ou internacional [Debate on Issues of Important Relevance, National or International]; RP, 1976, art. 81.°; RP, 1993, art. 76.°. In 1976 it was referred to as a participation on matters of relevant political interest [tratamento de assuntos de interesse político relevante]. 87 RP, 1993, art. 37.°. 88 RP, 1993, art. 245.°. 89 RP, 1982, art. 30.°; RP, 1985, art. 21.°. The importance of this alteration is clear in H.Döring, ‘Time as a scarce resource: government control of the agenda’, in H.Döring (ed.), Parliaments and majority rule in western Europe (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1995), p. 228. Because of this alteration in 1985, H.Döring considered the Portuguese system amongst the most majoritarian ones in terms of agenda setting, in a sample of 18 European countries. 90 The only party size restriction was the case of PGs with a single MP 91 RP, 1982, art. 71.°. 92 RP, 1985, art. 61.°. 93 Note that the limit of ‘25 MPs’ was adjusted in the 1991 revision of the RP to ‘a tenth of the total number of MPs in parliament’, following the 1989 constitutional revision that reduced

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the number of MPs from 250 to 230. The VI legislature was the first one to be elected with 230 MPs. The same applies to any subsequent reference to the limit of ‘25 MPs’. 94 There was no relevant change in the ruling on agenda setting in both revisions of 1991 and 1993. 95 RP, 1985, art. 235.°. 96 RP, 1988, art. 238.°. 97 RP, 1988, art. 22.°. 98 RP, 1985, art. 23.°. 99 RP, 1976, art. 79.°. 100 RP, 1985, art. 69.°. The criteria for smaller and larger is 25 MPs or (after 1991), a tenth of the MPs. 101 RP, 1991, art. 70.°. 102 RP, 1985, art. 147.º; RP, 1988, art. 151.º. 103 Then, the possibility for independent MPs to gather in a parliamentary ‘grouping’ [agrupamento parlamentar] was withdrawn. These parliamentary groupings had given independent MPs the means to participate in parliamentary life. 104 RP, 1993, respectively, art. 31.° and art. 62.°. 105 RP, 1991, arts. 245.° to 255.°. In 1993, the rules on petitions were withdrawn into a separate ordinance, the Petitions Law. 106 RP, 1982, art. 81.°. 107 RP, 1985, art. 71.° (from two, it enlarged to five clauses). 108 Namely, RP, 1985, arts. 79.° (Use of the word by MPs), 80.° (Use of the word by members of government), 81.° (Purposes for the use of the word), 85.° (To invoke the RP and question the Table), 87.° (Appeals), 88.° (Further elucidation—questions), 89.° (Reaction to offence to the honour or consideration), 90.° (Protests and counter-protests), 92.° (Vote explanations), and 95.° (Organisation of debates). 109 RP, 1985, art. 81.°. 110 Questions to the Government: RP, 1985, arts. 232.° to 237.°. Requerimentos: RP, 1985, new section, arts. 242.° and 243.°. 111 RP, 1985, new section, arts. 289.° and 290.°. 112 See Diário da Assembleia da República [DAR], II-s, suplemento, n° 13, 11/12/85 and F.Amaral, O parlamento visto por dentro—á laia de relatório. A 1a sessão legislativa da IV legislatura (Lisbon: Assembleia da República, 1985). 113 The Defence of Consideration is a procedure through which an MP can complain that that he (or she) has been offended, or its PG, by another MP or member of the government; to which, usually, the offender answers back, presenting an explanation of his (or her) words. 114 The Interpelações à Mesa aim to give voice to procedural problems and to questions to the Table. 115 RP, 1993, art. 92.°. 116 Alves Martins (note 56), p. 14. 117 The Pedido de Esclarecimento is a question put to a speaker who has just made a speech in the chamber. 118 RP, 1993, art. 91.°. 119 Respectively, RP, 1993, arts. 201.°, 137.° and 200.°. See chapter 2 for an explanation of ‘ratifications’. 120 Braga da Cruz and Lobo Antunes (note 6), p. 176. 121 The ratification process caused a delay in the publication of the decree-law under consideration. 122 RP, 1988, art. 116.°. 123 RP, 1993, art. 34.°. 124 RP, 1993, art. 153.°.

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125 C.Leston-Bandeira, ‘O impacto das maiorias absolutas na actividade e na imagem do Parlamento português’, Análise Social, Vol. XXXI, No. 135 (1996), pp. 171–9. 126 RP, 1991, art. 4.°. 127 RP, 1993, art. 4.°. 128 Statute of the MPs, 1991, art. 20° vs. 1993, art. 23.°. Each absence should be sanctioned through the application of a fine directly discounted from the MP’s salary. 129 RP, 1993, art. 53.°. 130 RP, 1993, art. 17.°. 131 RP, 1993, art. 6.°.

4 Development of parliament’s role in policymaking Towards a ‘Western Model’ The Assembleia da República played a fundamental role in the first years of democracy in establishing a new legislative framework for the democratic system. Some of that work had to be done in the months immediately after the revolution (such as laws on freedom of association and political parties) and was carried out by the provisional governments. However, a lot was left to be done when the first Assembleia da República was elected. Many of the basic laws structuring the political and socio-economic system of the democratic regime were issued by parliament; after 1982, some were actually brought under parliament’s reserved area of legislation. Lobo Antunes quotes a list of such primary laws: electoral system, constitutional tribunal, national defence, local finances, re-structuring of property, rural reform, the basis of the education system, the national health service.1 Besides this, some of the fundamental laws require a qualified majority for approval, ascribing necessarily an important role in policy-making to parliament.2 Amongst these are: the revision of the constitution, the finances of the autonomous regions (the Azores and Madeira) and regulation of political associations. Even if some of the negotiations between PGs actually happened between the party leaders, it is the symbolic significance of the parliamentary arena that ascribed those parties with the legitimacy to negotiate, in the name of the people who elected them. As the primary legislative framework of the democratic regime was established, the role of parliament in policy-making diminished, at the same time as the need for more specific and regulatory legislation increased; a typically governmental competence. Nevertheless, the Assembleia da República did seem to maintain an important part in the process of issuing law, although all the more dependent on the party majority. The period studied here, 1983–1995, shows significant changes on this matter, due to the experience of the absolute majorities. Only three authors have undertaken research on the legislative function of the Assembleia da República: Pedro Coutinho Magalhães, Miguel Lobo Antunes and Walter Opello.3 All three authors draw substantially different conclusions. In his discussion, Opello ignores completely the new democratic character of the Portuguese parliament and applies to it a model and criteria appropriate to well-developed institutions. Although this author provides some data and was the first author to proceed to such analysis, his conclusions about the legislative role of the Assembleia da República are necessarily in line with the overall arguments he puts forward of decay and breakdown. According to Opello,‘the Assembly has been marginal in the policy formation process and has made no significant contribution to public policy in Portugal since coming into being a decade ago’.4

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Opello’s conclusions are based on a very superficial analysis of the data on policymaking.5 His conclusions originate from two main arguments: the predominance of government’s bills over private members’ bills (neglecting the reality elsewhere in western democracies) and the overwhelmingly sectoral nature of these last bills (giving too much attention to municipal bills—see below, 4.1–and neglecting the importance of some of the major bills approved by parliament in its first decade). Contrary to this, Lobo Antunes develops an argument showing the predominant role of the Assembleia da República in the legislative process.6 His discussion centres, on one hand, on the number of major bills issued by parliament for the setting up of the new political and socio-economic framework of the democratic regime; and, on the other, on a comparative analysis which shows a success rate of the Portuguese parliamentary bills in comparison with other west European parliaments. However, crucially, this author’s study does not include the period of the absolute majorities. Coutinho Magalhães’ study includes nearly all the period of the absolute majorities. Rather than opting for a definition of a predominant or non-predominant position of parliament in the policy-making process, this author concludes that the Assembleia da República occupies a space of ‘no-decision’.7 His argument is based on the proportion of bills that end up by never being discussed and on the type of bills approved by parliament—again considerable importance is given to the proportion of municipal bills. Both Lobo Antunes and Coutinho Magalhães present valuable arguments based on accurate data about the legislative process in the Assembleia da República. However, both give a partial view. Lobo Antunes omits the legislative output of the government and neglects the non-decisional factors pointed out later by Coutinho Magalhães. On the other hand, Coutinho Magalhães’ argument neglects the new democratic character of the Portuguese parliament: although this author undertakes a detailed analysis on its legislative performance, he does not take into consideration the necessarily ‘immature’ character of the Portuguese parliament; an institution still in search of its identity. In addition, his argument is highly conditioned by the impact, at that time, of the experience of the absolute majorities, neglecting, therefore, the few factors indicating an active role of parliament. This chapter will attempt to present a balanced argument by giving particular attention to those gaps in previous work.

4.1 An apparent predominance of parliament in the policy-making process An overview of the legislative work of the Portuguese parliament since 1976 would seem to indicate a rather strong role for this institution in the policy-making process.8 However, that role is to a large extent only apparent and partial. Table 8 gives information on the bills initiated by MPs (Projects of Law), which may support the idea not only of a quite active role of parliament in policy-making, but also of a reinforcement of that role over the years. According to Table 8, not only has there been a high rate of MPs’ bills approved at the final vote since 1976, but also the proportion would seem to have increased over the years. This would indicate a strong role of parliament in the policy-making process. A proportion of around 40 per cent of approved bills (as was the case in the majoritarian

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legislatures of the III and V) would undoubtedly be an exceptional situation in Western Europe. Besides this, it would actually seem that in the early years of democracy there were fewer chances for a bill to be approved at the final vote. However, in reality, these rates give a rather biased image of the legislative performance of the Portuguese parliament. There is a fundamental qualitative point to be made about the bills presented by MPs in the Assembleia da República: the bills covering the arrangement of geographical administrative boundaries; that is, bills whose sole purpose is, for example, to elevate a town to the category of a city, or to determine new boundaries of freguesias, the smallest division inside a county. Since 1976, these bills have represented a substantial part of the overall number of bills presented and, especially, of those approved. Table 9 displays the number of these bills—referred to as municipal bills—presented since 1976, as well as of those approved at the final vote.

Table 8 Outcome of MPs’ bills (percentages in relation to the total number of MPs’ bills proposed in each legislature) I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

Proposed, 537 399 541 441 785 599 691 total Proposed, 134.3 133 270.5 220.5 196.3 149.8 172.75 average per year Rejected 8.6% 8% 3.1% 3.9% 10.3% 16.9% 10.8% at first reading Approved 19.2% 7.8% 40.7% 24.1% 41.5% 33.4% 44.7% at final vote* Source: Own data file built from the Assembleia da República’s archives and its activity reports published annually since 1985. Note * The rate of bills approved at the final vote includes cases where a particular bill was not the single origin bill for that law; that is cases where a specific law originates from more than one bill.

Table 9 Proportion of municipal bills presented and approved at the final vote (percentages in relation to the total number of MPs’ bills presented/approved at the final vote) I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

Presented 40.9% 40% 45.3% 24.9% 42.5% 28% 31.8% Approved 3.9% 0.0% 86.8% 23.6% 71.8% 60.5% 42.7% Source: Own data file built from the Assembleia da

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República’s archives and its activity reports.

Walter Opello was the first author to distinguish these bills, which he described as bagatela [trifle]. Besides the municipal bills, Opello’s bagatelas also included bills setting the official delimitation of wine-growing regions. The weight of this type of bill in the overall number of bills presented and approved in the Portuguese parliament is one of the factors at the root of the arguments developed by both Opello and Coutinho Magalhães. Contrary to this, Lobo Antunes neglects the importance of these bills by only referring to them in footnotes. In his examination of the legislative output of the different PGs, Luís Sá automatically excludes municipal bills.9 There are three main reasons to justify a dissociation of this type of bill from the rest: first, they consist broadly speaking of oversimplified texts, secondly, they involve a very simple deliberation process (usually, the three voting stages take place all at the same time in one single afternoon); and, thirdly, the final number of municipal bills that are passed result, basically, from a general agreement between the several PGs. However, although they have to be distinguished from the rest of the bills, no significance should be given to them. Both Opello and Coutinho Magalhães argue from this that parliament does not produce relevant legislation. If anything, the number of municipal bills indicate a prevailing relationship between the MPs and their constituencies, in spite of the representative system which denies that relationship.10 The municipal bills should be distinguished for methodological reasons. Having made this distinction, we can now assess the overall evolution of MPs’ bills without the municipal bills; Table 10 gives the same indicators as Table 8. Table 10 shows a more reliable picture of the legislative performance of Portuguese parliamentarians. Not only is the rate of MPs’ approved bills not as strangely high as indicated above, but also the proportion of MPs’ bills rejected at first reading increased markedly with the absolute majorities; becoming closer to the western model, although still far away from it.11 The values referring to the VII legislature confirm that it was the absolute majorities that brought a change. Although there was a decrease of the rejected bills from the VI to the VII, it was still higher than in the other minoritarian legislature (the IV) and closer to the values referring to the absolute majorities period; hence, showing an increasing trend in the rate of rejected bills. At the same time, though, the approval rate at final vote has more or less been sustained (if not actually increased), only depending on the variations between

Table 10 Outcome of MPs’ bills (municipal bills excluded) (percentages in relation to the total number of non-municipal MPs’ bills proposed in each legislature) I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

Proposed, 314 239 296 331 451 431 471 total Proposed, 78.5 79.7 148 165.5 112.8 107.8 117.8 average per year Rejected 14.6% 13% 5.7% 4.2% 18% 23.4% 15.7%

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at first reading Approved 31.5% 13% 9.8% 24.5% 20.4% 18.3% 37.6% at final vote Source: Own data file built from the Assembleia da República’s archives and its activity reports.

majoritarian and minoritarian legislatures. A proportion of around 20 per cent of bills approved at final vote12 does constitute a positive rate, compared with other western parliaments.13 This is indicative of some dominance of the legislative process by the Assembleia da República: the ‘90% rule’14 does not apply totally to the Portuguese parliament. Independent of the rates of rejected and approved bills, there is another major factor that should be taken into consideration in the legislative process: the capacity to discuss the bills proposed. Coutinho Magalhães argued that because about 50 per cent of the bills proposed are never actually discussed, the Assembleia da República is a ‘no-decision space’. However, this evaluation does not take into account the newly democratic character of the Portuguese parliament, neglecting the problems of rationalisation of procedures. Table 11 gives the proportion of bills not discussed at first reading since 1976, clearly showing that the Portuguese parliament has had more and more capacity to discuss at first reading the bills proposed. Table 11 shows that nowadays a bill has a much greater chance to be included on the agenda at first reading. This is particularly clear once the municipal bills have been excluded. In the first decade, a large majority of the bills did not reach the first reading, therefore not ever being discussed. Despite the restrictions introduced in the agendasetting right, the rationalisation of procedures has had visible effects and nowadays, independent of the bills’ outcome, PGs actually have potentially a better chance to discuss their bills and to put forward their arguments in the chamber. The argument that in the absolute majorities there was more capacity to discuss bills just because it was only then that the legislature period was complete, falls through. Firstly, the I legislature was already then a four-year period (with governmental instability); secondly, there are no significant differences between each individual legislative session; thirdly, the values of the VII confirm a considerable increase in the number of bills discussed at first reading. It cannot be explained either by a decrease in the number of bills proposed by MPs: although there was a slight decrease during the absolute majorities, the number of bills proposed has not changed significantly over the last decade. This increased capacity to discuss bills indicates the newly democratised character of the Assembleia da República. It is part of its developmental process as a new institution. This also points out how careful one should be with the choice of variables when analysing a new parliament.

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Table 11 Proportion of MPs bills not discussed at first reading (percentages in relation to the total number of MPs bills proposed) I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

Total MPs’ 64.2% 75.2% 49.7% 65.1% 40.1% 40.9% 30.9% bills MPs’ bills, 40.1% 60.7% 73.3% 61.9% 47.2% 45.9% 27% excludingthe municipal ones Source: Own data file built from the Assembleia da República’s archives and its activity reports.

Hence, an overview of parliament’s legislative output shows not only that MPs’ bills have had a higher chance to be discussed, but also that the final vote approval rate is high, even if the number of rejected bills has become closer to the western model.15 Besides this, the constitutional provisions have enhanced the role of parliament in the legislative process, as seen in chapter 2 (the number of laws requiring a qualified majority for approval has enlarged). Individually considered, thus, parliament does indicate a predominant role in the legislative process. However, this is only a partial view; particular attention has to be given to government’s legislation.

4.2 Government’s legislation: a partial predominance of parliament Government bills (Proposals of Law) undoubtedly do enjoy greater success in the deliberation process. Although the number presented is lower than MPs’ bills, nowadays proposals of law are almost always approved. Since 1976, their success rate has been higher than that for MPs’ bills, though it was the experience of the two absolute majorities that reinforced that difference. Only since 1987 have the proposals of law attained the level of approval of 90 per cent:16 they are not rejected and, as can be seen from Table 12, practically all are discussed at first reading. Before 1987, the situation was very different, mainly due to the high proportion of bills not discussed at first reading. This was what prevented a 90 per cent approval rate of proposals of law, since practically none of those passing the first reading was rejected. The exception was the IV legislature when 9 per cent of the proposals of law were rejected; this is easily understandable considering the minoritarian character of this legislature. Despite also being a minoritarian legislature, the success rate of government’s bills in the VII follows a pattern closer to the absolute majorities period, than to the IV A few proposals of law were rejected (4 per cent), but in a smaller proportion than in the IV (9 per cent) and the final

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Table 12 Outcome of government’s bills (percentages in relation to the total number of government bills proposed in each legislature) I

II

III IV

V

VI

VII

Proposed, 332 131 103 44 176 118 262 total Proposed, 83 43.7 51.5 22 44 29.5 65.5 average per year Not 38% 44.3% 25.2% 15. 2.3% 6.8% 9.2% discussed 9% at first reading Rejected 3.3% 0 0 9. 0 0* 3.8% at first 1% reading Approved 54.5% 49.6% 68% 34. 94.9% 88.9% 81.3% at final 1% vote Source: Own data file built from the Assembleia da República’s archives and its activity reports. Note * Although no government bill was rejected at first reading, there was one (a Basis bill) rejected at final vote. This constitutes a surprising exception, though: the majoritarian PG did not gather enough MPs to guarantee a qualified majority, which would have been necessary to approve that particular bill.

Table 13 Proportion of delegation of powers bills (percentages in relation to the total number of government bills proposed) I*

II*

III

IV

V

VI

VII

45.2% 38.2% 46.6% 25% 44.9% 51.7% 22.9% Source: Own data file built from the Assembleia da República’s archives and its activity reports. Note * A considerable number of these powers delegation bills referred to loans requests: 12% (I) and 4% (II) of all government bills presented in each legislature.

vote approval rate (81 per cent) is in line more with the values of the absolute majorities period rather than with the IV (34 per cent). The proposals of law do therefore experience a more favourable deliberative process in the Assembleia da República than MPs’ bills, just as happens in most western

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countries. This is one of the factors suggesting that, despite the prerogatives foreseen in the constitution, parliament plays a role of reduced importance in the process of policymaking. This idea is reinforced when one considers the delegation of powers bills. This type of government bill has represented a large proportion of the proposals of law since 1976, as can be seen from Table 13. The delegation of powers bills are requests from the government to legislate on matters falling under parliament’s relative legislative reserved area. These bills derive therefore from parliament’s legislative power and are required to be clear and precise about the new legislation to be issued. During the absolute majorities the government was widely criticised by the opposition MPs for a lack of definition in its delegation of power bills. What is more, as Table 13 shows, during that period these bills represented an increasing proportion of the bills put forward by government. MPs saw this as emblematic of the government’s power in the legislative process. In the subsequent legislature the proportion of delegation of powers bills has decreased considerably. From a level of 52 per cent, the proportion of delegation of powers bills decreased to 23 per cent of the total government bills proposed in the VII. These data show that the success rate of government bills is constrained by the level of government support in parliament, which indicates some predominance of the Assembleia da República in the policy-making process. However, this potential dominance of the Assembleia da República is only partial. As said in chapter 2, the government does have powers to issue legislation outside the proceedings of parliament: through decree-laws. Most of the decree-laws issued by government are regulatory statutes and derive, in one way or another, from legislation issued by parliament; still, they do form a great part of current policy-making and are, in practice, unmanageable by parliament.

4.3 Ratification: a means to control government’s legislation The number of decree-laws produced by government is considerably higher than the bills issued by parliament. José Magalhães has showed that between 1977 and

Table 14 Ratifications proposed since 1976 I

II III IV V

VI

VII

Total 336 225 174 160 190 161 113 number Average per 84 75 87 80 47.5 40.25 28.25 legislative session Sources: I legislature: M.Braga da Cruz and. M.Lobo Antunes, ‘Parlamento, partidos e governo— acerca da institucionalização política’, in M.Baptista Coelho (ed.), Portugal—O Sistema Político e Constitucional, 1974/1987 (Lisbon: ICS, 1989), p. 365. III legislature: own data file built from the

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Assembleia da República’s archives and from its activity reports. IV and V legislatures: C.Leston-Bandeira and P.Magalhães, As Relações Parlamento/Governo nas IV e V Legislaturas (unpublished degree thesis, Lisbon: ISCTE, 1993), pp. 87–8. II, VI and VII legislatures: A.Filipe, As Oposições Parlamentares em Portugal—Práticas e Intervenções (1976–2000) (Lisbon: Vega Editora, 2002), pp. 233–57.

1993 the number of decree—laws was nearly seven times higher than the number of laws: 8451 decree-laws for 1249 laws.17 It could be argued that the vast majority of those decree-laws consist of regulations of minor complexity. Still, it soon becomes clear that only with some difficulty would the Assembleia da República be able to scrutinise effectively so many decree—laws. Parliament does, however, have the legal means to scrutinise decree—laws: by requesting the ratification of a decree—law, or the refusal of its ratification, as shown in chapter 2. The opportunity to request a parliamentary consideration of a decree—law has been frequently used by opposition PGs since 1976. Even if no effective decision is reached (amendment or refusal of the decree—law), the discussion of a ratification in the chamber provides the opposition with a chance to publicise their own point of view on a particular government policy. It is for this reason that the number of ratifications proposed was very high, at least in the first decade (see Table 14). The use of the procedure to discuss ratifications was often seen as obstructionist and eventually led to its restriction in the 1989 revision of the constitution. Before this revision, whenever a ratification was presented, parliament could decide to suspend the respective decree—law. This explains the interest of the opposition for this instrument. In the III legislature, for instance, 85 per cent of the ratifications were presented by the PCP, the main opposition party then. Since the 1989 revision, the suspension of decree—laws may only be applied to the ones produced under a delegation of powers bill. What is more, that suspension lapses if, after ten plenary meetings, parliament has not decided on the ratification request. Furthermore, the process of ratification itself lapses if, after 15 plenary meetings, parliament has not reached a final decision. José Magalhães considers that these alterations caused a significant weakening of parliament’s capacity to scrutinise government’s legislative activity.18 However, the 1993 revision of the RP answered this criticism in part, as it provided that the consideration of a ratification of a decree—law produced under a powers delegation bill, must be scheduled in the chamber during the six meetings following its presentation.19

Table 15 Consideration of ratifications (percentages in relation to the total number of ratifications presented)* II III Discussed in chamber

17.3 7.5

IV

V

VI

29 42.1 63.2

VII 81.4

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Approved 8 5.1 13.8** 3.2 13.2 36.3** with amendments Source: Legislatures III and VI: own data file built from the Assembleia da República’s archives and from its activity reports. IV and V legislatures: C.Leston-Bandeira and P.Magalhães, As Relações Parlamento/Governo nas IV e V Legislaturas (unpublished degree thesis, Lisbon: ISCTE, 1993), pp. 87–8. II and VII legislatures: A.Filipe, As Oposições Parlamentares em Portugal—Práticas e Intervenções (1976–2000), pp. 233–57. Notes * Information on the I legislature is rather cumbersome due to the several changes in government within that period. However, details can be found in A.Filipe, As Oposições Parlamentares em Portugal—Práticas e Intervenções (1976–2000), pp. 208–28. ** In both minoritarian legislatures, ratification of decree-laws was actually refused: 6 cases in the IV and 15 in theVII.

Still, the introduction of the 1989 restrictions explains the significant decrease in the number of ratifications presented since the IV legislature. Those restrictions did not affect, nonetheless, the proportion of ratifications which are actually discussed in the chamber. In fact, as can be seen in Table 15, the proportion of ratifications discussed in the chamber has increased considerably in the last few legislatures, attaining a level of 81 per cent in the VII. Surprisingly, in the second absolute majority legislature (VI) there was a pro portion of ratifications (13 per cent) which actually introduced amendments in decree-laws. However, as Luís Sá points out, those alterations were minimal and in some cases they did not even correspond to the original proposals included in the request for ratification.20 Still, the ability to debate ratifications was seen by the PGs as another way of creating some publicity in the chamber for their own point of view. On the other hand, in the VII legislature not only were nearly all of the ratifications discussed in the chamber, but also 36 per cent of these introduced changes in the decreelaws considered and 15 actually refused the ratification of decree-laws.21 Independent of the actual alterations introduced in government’s decree-laws, these values do show that in the absence of a majority, parliament does have some capacity to constrain government’s actions. Different dimensions contribute to our understanding of the role of the Assembleia da República in policy-making. Firstly, although parliament does have an important role, this is only partial considering the government’s vast legislation. Parliament’s predominance results largely from the constitutional prerogatives (for instance, the reserved competence to legislate on a number of areas), although it can vary considerably according to the government’s basis of support in parliament. Secondly, some indicators

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show that this role has developed towards the western European model where government dominates the legislative process. Thirdly, and importantly, this development was a direct consequence of, on one hand, the existence for eight years of a stable and cohesive absolute majority, and, on the other, of a consistent rationalisation of procedures; two factors that are closely linked. These observations may enable us to understand better which variables interfere in the development of a new parliament.

Notes 1 Lobo Antunes, ‘A Assembleia da República e a consolidação da democracia em Portugal’, Análise Social, Vol. XXIV, No. 100 (1988), p. 88. 2 J.Miranda, Manual de Direito Constitucional, Tomo V—Actividade Constitucional do Estado (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 1997), pp. 166–8 and pp. 271–2. 3 P.Coutinho Magalhães, ‘A actividade legislativa da Assembleia da República e o seu papel no sistema político’, Legislação, Vol. 12 (1995), pp. 87–119; Lobo Antunes (note 1); W.Opello, ‘Portugal’s Parliament: an organizational analysis of legislative performance’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. XI, No. 3 (1986), pp. 291–319. 4 Opello (note 3), p. 313. 5 Note that Opello’s article is mainly an analysis of the level of institutionalisation of the Portuguese parliament based on the criteria of autonomy, complexity and universalism; in spite of its title, only three pages of the article are actually dedicated to the analysis of legislative performance. 6 Note that only a very small part of this author’s article is dedicated to the analysis of policymaking, Lobo Antunes (note 1). 7 Coutinho Magalhães (note 3), p. 104. 8 For more detail on the differences between parties in the policy-making process, see A.Filipe, As Oposições Parlamentares em Portugal—Práticas e Intervenções (1976–2000) (Lisbon: Vega Editora, 2002), pp. 207–64. 9 L.Sá, O Lugar da Assembleia da República no Sistema Político (Lisboa: Caminho, 1994), p. 330. 10 Note that a few of these municipal bills have acquired great visibility in public opinion in the last decade. The most recent controversial cases included the elevation to Council of Fátima and Canas de Senhorim (see A.Sá Lopes, ‘Sampaio rejeita nova lei dos concelhos’, Público, 15/07/03). 11 See note 13. 12 It could be argued that those 20 per cent would mainly correspond to majoritarian PG’s bills. However, it is not the case. In the legislatures presented in Table 10, the percentages of the majoritarian PG’s bills approved in the final vote were as follows: IIIrd–31 per cent; IVth– 12.3 per cent; Vth–28.3 per cent; VIth–34.2 per cent. [percentages in relation to the bills approved at the final vote, in each legislature]. 13 See the tables in R.Andeweg and L.Nijzink, ‘Beyond the two-body image: relations between ministers and MPs’, in H.Döring (ed.), Parliaments and majority rule in western Europe (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1995), pp. 171–2; and in I.Mattson, ‘Private Members’ Initiatives and Amendments’, in ibid., p. 478. Only a very small proportion of European parliaments has a percentage above 10 per cent of passed MPs’ bills. See also Interparliamentary Union, Parliaments of the World (Aldershot: Inter-parliamentary Union, 1986), pp. 912–20; P.Norton (ed.), Parliaments in Western Europe (London: Frank Cass, 1990); and P.Norton (ed.), Parliaments and Governments in Western Europe (London: Frank Cass, 1998). 14 The 90 per cent rule, applied in most countries, implies a proportion of ‘90 per cent of legislative activity being initiated by the executive, which gets 90 per cent of what it wants’

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(D.Olson and P.Norton, ‘Legislatures in democratic transition’, Journal of Legislative Studies—special issue on the new parliaments of central and eastern Europe, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1996), p. 7). 15 This could actually be a direct cause of the fact that nowadays more bills reach the first reading stage. 16 Note that in a large majority of the world’s parliaments the proportion of government bills passed varies between 90 per cent and 100 per cent (42 countries out of 60 according to Parliaments of the World (note 13), p. 911). 17 J.Magalhães, ‘A constituição e as suas revisões, a lei e a justiça’, in A.Reis (ed.), Portugal: 20 anos de Democracia (Lisboa: Temas e Debates, 1996; first ed., 1994), p. 129. Jorge Miranda adds that in 1994 and 1995 there were 661 decree-laws and 136 laws (Miranda (note 2), p. 157). 18 J.Magalhães, Dicionário da Revisão Constitucional (Lisbon: Publicações Europa-América, 1989), p. 90. In the same sense (restrictive alterations in the 1989 revision), Miranda (note 2), p. 330. 19 RP, 1993, art. 202.°. 20 Sá (note 9), p. 260. 21 Please note that some of the ratifications presented in the VII referred to legislation passed by the preceding government: 15 of the ratifications presented, seven of the ratifications approved with amendments and three of the ratifications refused (Filipe (note 8), pp. 256–7).

5 Towards a new role Developing mechanisms of legitimation The Assembleia da República of 1976 was mainly thought of as a legislative institution. Emphasis was put on the legislative proceedings. Provision for control instruments was scarce and imprecise. Scrutiny was identified with ultimate control mechanisms such as motions of censure or interpellations. Control mechanisms consisted of solemn and sporadic debates which aimed fundamentally at questioning the very existence of government, rather than scrutinising ordinary government policy and public administration actions. To some extent, the control function was seen as a guarantee of democracy, rather than a practice of democracy. This assumption has changed through the last two decades, as parliamentary practice evolved and new legal provisions were introduced: solemnity has given way to routine in scrutiny practice. At the same time, it has been through the scrutiny function that parliament has opened up to the outside world, giving full meaning to the concept of legitimation. This chapter looks into these changes in the scrutiny function of the Portuguese parliament. Again, the main changes happened during the period studied here, 1983–95, and were largely a consequence of the experience of the absolute majorities. Towards the end of that period, at the beginning of the 1990s, there was a particular concern with the relationship with citizens. In this context, a series of small initiatives were carried out in order to professionalise the job of MP and, on the other hand, to bring citizens closer to parliament; in particular, special attention was given to the petition right. Again, this can be seen as a development of the legitimation function. The second section of this chapter will be dedicated to this issue.

5.1 Scrutiny reinvented This section provides a comprehensive view of the changes undergone in the scrutiny function. The first part centres on the classical control instruments, that is, besides the motions, the interpellations, questions to the government (and Requerimentos—see below) and committees of inquiry. The second part moves into the ‘new scrutiny mechanisms’, that is new forms of scrutiny that developed at the beginning of the 1990s: special debates and informative procedures. The changes undergone by the parliamentary control instruments are highly representative of the broad development the Assembleia da República has followed since it was first elected in 1976. In spite of this obvious reason for studying it, there are hardly any published studies on the control activity of the Assembleia da República. Besides sporadic references in articles about other aspects of the Assembleia da República, there

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are only two texts dedicated to Portuguese parliamentary control: the one by António Vitorino, written towards the end of the first decade of democracy and the one by this author, centred on a comparison of the IV and V legislatures.1 Both of these articles conclude that the Portuguese parliamentary control devices are unsatisfactory and that there is a lack of interest in these instruments both by political actors and public opinion (with the exception of the proposals of committees of inquiry). Importantly, these texts were written before the experience of the eight years of absolute majorities. Although the text by this author identifies some of the changes brought in by the V legislature, it does not have a full view of the consequences of the absolute majority experience which changed the character of scrutiny itself. Both articles centre on the classical control instruments, dedicating virtually no space to new scrutiny forms. 5.1.1 Classical parliamentary control instruments 5.1.1.1 Political responsibility before parliament As mentioned above, parliamentary control in the first years of democracy was thought of as a guarantee of democracy and was primarily identified with the motions of rejection, confidence and censure. The chapter on ‘political oversight and scrutiny’ of the 1976 RP dedicated most of its regulation to the processes of presenting and discussing motions of rejection (associated to the government’s programme), confidence and censure (articles 194° to 204°). The terms of the debate were precisely stated. The same did not happen with scrutiny instruments such as the questions to the government, which actually did not exist as such then: there was merely an ambiguous possibility to meet with the government in plenary sessions to ask questions. No mention was made of the Requerimentos, written questions. The concentration on mechanisms such as the motions is understandable at a time when the establishment of democracy was the main priority. As explained in chapter 2, although an incoming government does not need an expressed vote of approval, any PG may propose a motion of rejection to its programme which, if approved by an absolute majority of the total number of MPs, prevents the government from taking office.2 Since 1976 only one government has resigned following the approval of a motion of rejection, the third government (the first presidential cabinet in 1978 led by Nobre da Costa). However, the PGs have often used this procedure, as can be seen in Table 16. This table gives the number of each type of motion proposed since 1976. It has to be stressed that there is some uncertainty on how complete the data are about the

Table 16 Motions of rejection, confidence and censure I II III IV V VI VII Motions of 9 6 — 3 2 2 — rejection Motions of 2 3 2 1 — — — confidence Motions of censure —* 1 1 1 1 1** —

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Sources: Legislatures I to III: information from the Division of Documentation of the Portuguese parliament, kindly granted by Professor Manuel Braga da Cruz, and newspapers. Legislatures IV to VII: activity reports of the Assembleia da República. Notes * Three motions of censure were actually proposed on two different occasions, but the governments resigned before they were discussed (two to the fourth government and one to the sixth). ** Another motion of censure was actually discussed but withdrawn from voting, in which case it is considered as an interpellation.

legislatures prior to the IV Table 16 shows the motions that took place, but more could have existed in the first three legislatures. The number of motions of rejection has diminished over the years and in the VII legislature there was not a single one. In the subsequent legislature, the VIII, two motions of rejection were proposed (as well as three motions of censure),3 following the trend of the absolute majorities period.4 The high number in the I legislature is partly due to the variety of governments that were nominated in those years. Notwithstanding this, the number was higher in those first years of democracy. The same applies to the motions of confidence. Motions of confidence were often presented with the discussion of the government’s programme, as a way to obtain an express vote of investiture from the chamber.5 It was the case of the three governments of the AD, between 1980 and 1983, and of the Central Bloc (1983/85). The only motion of confidence that has led to the resignation of government was the one rejected in 1977 against the first constitutional government, led by Mário Soares from the PS. Motions of confidence have also been used as a way to force parliamentary support and minimise opposition from parliament; it was the case of the motion proposed in June 1984 by the Central Bloc government, which aimed at neutralising open criticism from the MPs of both PGs supporting the government (the PS and the PSD). The motions of censure have been less used by the PGs. One possible explanation for the low number of these motions in the first years rests on the constitutional requirement of an approval of two motions of censure in order to cause government resignation. This was the rule until the constitutional revision of 1982.6 Besides this, there is another reason explaining the low number: if a motion of censure is not approved, the proponent PG cannot propose another one in the same year. This constraint is still in force today7 Only one government has resigned following the approval of a motion of censure:8 the tenth presided over by Cavaco Silva (1985–87—IV legislature). In the VII legislature no motion was proposed, despite the minority support of the government (or maybe because of that). Several reasons could be put forward to explain this, but the main one is linked to the development of Portuguese democracy. In the second decade, and particularly with the experience of the absolute majorities, the value of political stability has been internalised by the political actors. Adding to this, as the

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following section will show, parliamentarians have nowadays a number of other opportunities to promote large debates on government’s policy, without the political instability risks of a motion. When motions have been used, as in the VIII legislature, their purpose has been more to cause public impact and set the public agenda, than effective questioning of the government. The use of the motions gives us some clues on the development of the scrutiny function of the Assembleia da República. This development becomes particularly clear when a closer look is taken at the ordinary scrutiny instruments: Requerimentos and questions to the government, interpellations and proposals of committees of inquiry. 5.1.1.2 Requerimentos and questions to the government MPs may put questions to the government through two means: the Requerimentos and the questions to the government. The Requerimentos are written questions addressing smaller points, often of an administrative and technical nature. They were only institutionalised as such in the revision of the RP of 1985, although the practice already existed before. The 1985 revision introduced a new section in the RP specifically to regulate the presentation of Requerimentos, as well as two new articles.9 This institutionalisation is a probable explanation for the strong increase in the number of Requerimentos from the II to the III legislature (see Table 17, section 5.1.1.5). One of the main complaints about this device is the slow and low rate of answers from the government. In order to fight this, the 1993 revision slightly tightened the pressures upon the government to answer the Requerimentos. Before then, the RP stated that the DAR [official parliamentary journal] should publish every semester the list of the unanswered Requerimentos; in 1993, it specified that this list should be published every January, April and June.10 Besides this, a specific clause was introduced saying that the government (department in question) should answer the Requerimentos according to the urgency of the matter in question.11 There are no precise data available on the answer rate for the first three legislatures, but the information on the subsequent legislatures indicates that the proportion of answers given to Requerimentos has increased over the years. By the end of the IV legislature only 37 per cent of the Requerimentos had an answer from the government, whereas in the VII legislature 65 per cent had received an answer.12 The questions to the government [QGs] have been the most criticised scrutiny device of the Assembleia da República. A quick comparison between this device and its equivalents in other European parliaments shows clearly its inadequacy.13 This inadequacy is apparent not only in the low number of questions put to the government compared to other countries, but also in three primary features of the Portuguese question time system: its occasional occurrence, its lack of flexibility, and the government’s right to choose the questions it wishes to answer. Although there have been some timid attempts to improve the system, these problems have remained the same since 1976. The RP of 1976 foresaw the possibility of booking meetings in the chamber for MPs to put QGs.14 However, it was only in the 1985 revision that the mechanism of QGs [Perguntas ao Governo] was institutionalised: it prescribed that the meetings to ask those questions had to be booked15 and it specified the requisites to follow in the process of presenting and asking QGs.16 As Table 17 shows (section 5.1.1.5), this instrument was hardly put into practice in the I and the II legislatures; this only started happening in the

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III legislature (1983–85). The 1985 RP revision also introduced a new type of question: the oral question to the government, which is the only one remaining today.17 Before then, the RP only foresaw written QGs: these were questions fully put into writing, sent to the government and then answered in the chamber.18 In the case of the oral questions, the government only knows the title of the question; the complete question is thereafter asked in the chamber. The written QGs were eliminated in 1988. MPs usually describe the meetings for QGs as monotonous and uninteresting. This might explain why they always take place on a Friday morning, attracting virtually no media coverage.19 Several factors contribute to this unsatisfactory feeling, well expressed by the MP José Magalhães when interviewed for this research:20 ‘(…) the rules of unpredictability, of non-definition of the agenda (…) of vivacity that follow that indeterminacy [present in systems such as the British Question Time] do not happen in our system. Our system remains too rigid and predictable.’ The main reason for the predictability of the Portuguese system lies in the government’s right to choose the questions it wishes to answer. This right has been foreseen in the RP since 1976, when art. 206.° stated that the president of parliament would contact the prime minister to enquire about which questions the government would answer. In 1985 it became specifically prescribed that ‘the government chooses the questions it wishes to answer, in whatever order it decides more convenient’.21 In 1993 there was an attempt to overcome this by eliminating that clause. However, some of the MPs interviewed were not even aware that this clause had been eliminated and assumed that the government still chooses the questions, and José Magalhães, who acknowledged it, said ‘but of course the government still chooses the questions’. One way the opposition PGs have found to compel the government to answer questions is by repeating the same question until the government chooses it. This became particularly clear during the V legislature.22 This strategy could eventually compel the government to answer, as there was an informal rule according to which the government should answer at least one question per PG. However, over the V legislature the government stopped following this informal rule. As a response to this, the 1993 reform introduced a clause prescribing specifically that every PG should be able to put at least one question to the government.23 Thus there was a real attempt in 1993 to introduce constraints in the right of the government to choose, but this has been only partly successful. Still, the main changes introduced by the 1993 reform centred on the debate in itself. Until then the meetings for QGs consisted in a succession of the following sequence: question, answer (in both cases it often consists of previously written speeches), further question from the interrogative MP and final answer. Since 1993, after the first question and answer, other MPs (from the same or another PG) may also put further questions.24 This has brought more liveliness to the debate. According to the MPs interviewed this has indeed strengthened this device. The MP Barbosa de Melo actually considered that, because of this, the QGs debates are nowadays ‘much better’.25 Still, these alterations have not transformed this instrument into the popular public scrutiny device known in other parliaments. The 2002 RP revision has attempted once again to improve the QGs device, namely by introducing a new type of question.26 However, it is still early days to assess the impact of these latest changes.

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5.1.1.3 Interpellations The interpellation [Interpelação] is a scrutiny device of greater solemnity. Originally, it was thought of as a broad debate on government’s performance and it often lasted for more than one plenary session. The solemn character ascribed to the interpellations is clear in the importance prescribed in the constitution itself. For instance, it is the constitution that determines how many interpellations each PG has the right to propose: two per parliamentary year, which is much more restricted than in other countries.27 The prescription in the constitution, which has barely changed since 1976,28 partly explains the rigidity of this device. The RP only rules on the debate in itself. The solemn character of the interpellation has diminished over these last two decades. As shown in chapter 3 (3.3.1.2), the broad rationalisation of parliamentary practice has had direct consequences for the interpellation (reduction of the time and the number of speakers, inversion in the order of the closing arguments). Adding to this, the 1976 ruling prescribed that the closing speech had to be done by the prime minister, in 1985 this was extended to any other member of the government and in 1988 the reference to the prime minister was removed.29 The loss of solemnity has also been visible in the practice of the debates in itself, as shown elsewhere by this author.30 Significant differences emerge between the IV and the V legislatures: debates drew less participation (reduction in the number of participants, of questions addressed to the government, of speeches) and became more politicised. The subjects under discussion have also become more and more specific. Although it is still considered by the PGs as a major debate, the interpellation offers little flexibility: the constitution restricts its number to two and it does not allow an expeditious answer to unexpected polemical issues, as do the new special debates. 5.1.1.4 Committees of inquiry The Assembleia da República has a system of committees of inquiry similar to those existing in France, Germany, Italy and Spain. The committees have considerable formal powers, are formed on an ad hoc basis, follow a proportional representation logic and in practice do not have sanctions over government’s actions. Still, the political significance of the Portuguese inquiry committees has been important in determining the political agenda. It is in this sense that they were particularly valued by the PGs during the absolute majorities period. Committees of inquiry can be constituted to investigate legal or constitutional irregularities of the government or the public administration. Again, the regulation of this device has been considerably reinforced over the past two decades, in particular in the reform of 1993. The only reference in the constitution of 1976 was a very small clause stating that parliament could designate committees of inquiry.31 Formally, these committees have the same powers as the judicial authorities. However, in practice, the delays and difficulties in obtaining information have been one of the main criticisms by MPs, particularly during the absolute majorities. As a response to this, the 1993 revision introduced detailed regulation compelling other entities, namely the government, to provide information to the committees of inquiry as soon as possible.32 Still, several cases of refusal to provide information to parliamentary inquiries took place during the VII legislature. It was notably the case with a few witnesses in the

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inquiry into irregularities in the JAE (Junta Autonóma de Estradas—the state company responsible for the construction and maintenance of the road network in Portugal). Moreover, the inquiry into the plane crash that caused the death of the Prime Minister Francisco Sá Carneiro in 1980 had to be suspended for one-and-a-half years, while it awaited authorisation from a Court to be given access to a particular piece of information.33 The actual constitution of a committee of inquiry is preceded by a crucial moment: the discussion in the chamber of the proposal to form the committee. This is often the most (if not the only) public moment of a committee of inquiry. It is then that the accusations that will form the basis of the inquiry are put forward. To a great extent, this is the actual moment explaining the political interest of the committees of inquiry and not the inquiry in itself. As António Vitorino stated: the request for an inquiry often takes the form of a formal charge against the government [libelo acusatório do governo], likely to put forward conclusions, transforming the debate on the constitution of an inquiry into one of the most lively and polemical parliamentary debates, where the scrutiny capacity of parliament is the more visible.34 This explains the high rate of proposals of inquiries during the absolute majorities (see Table 17, section 5.1.1.5), as well as some of the issues put forward for inquiry. The issues suit the political agenda, regardless sometimes of an actual irregularity. For instance, the inquiry n°15/V, on irregularities of the local council of Loures was proposed just before the local elections and by the candidate to the presidency of that council, the MP Pacheco Perreira. Another illustrative example was the proposal n°2/VI which simply proposed an inquiry into the government’s cultural policy, without alleging any specific irregularity on the government’s part. The debates on proposals of committees of inquiry are fully reported in the media and are politically important regardless of the actual outcome of the inquiry. The debate on the proposal of an inquiry usually ends with a vote. However, according to an opposition right prescribed in the constitution since 1982, any group of a fifth of the MPs do have the possibility to request the compulsory establishment of a committee of inquiry, to the limit of one inquiry per MP, in each parliamentary year.35 In fact, as shown elsewhere,36 during the V legislature the MPs adopted a careful use of this right. During the first year of that legislature, out of 11 proposals, ten were rejected and one was a compulsory inquiry. In the following year the opposition PGs changed their strategy and, as soon as it was clear that the majority would reject the proposed inquiry, they substituted this by a compulsory request. Following this, the majority also changed its strategy and started to propose inquiries at the same time as the opposition on the same issues. The proceedings of these committees depend to a large extent on the majority will, as they follow a proportional representation logic. The chairs and the rapporteurs are usually MPs from the majoritarian PG and every decision has to be voted as a committee decision, hence giving the majority control over the proceedings. Naturally, in the presence of a minority government the dominance of one majoritarian PG does not exist and there is a wider possibility for all MPs to intervene in the proceedings. As the MP

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Luís Sá stated, when interviewed for this research, ‘the highest contribution to enhance the committee of inquiry is the non-existence of an absolute majority’.37 The 1993 revision represented an effort to enhance the committees of inquiry, partly following the complaints of the opposition MPs during the absolute majorities. Among other things, it brought the publicity rule for some of the committee’s meetings. Before then, the proceedings took place behind closed doors, unless otherwise decided by the MPs. The practice was one of closed doors. This was seen by the opposition as one of the causes for the non-efficacy of the inquiries, safeguarding the dominance of the majority PG. Following this, the publicity rule became prescribed in 1993 for particular meetings: the first ones (election of the chair, approval of regulation, definition of objectives), the final one when the report is voted and vote explanations are issued and any meeting where the witness giving evidence requires it.38 In the case of the other meetings, MPs may decide through a vote to open the meeting, as was the case for all meetings before 1993. During the VII legislature, a large number of these committees’ meetings were public and the media gave detailed reports on them. As shown elsewhere,39 most of the conclusions reached by the committees end up by clearing the government or the public administration, at least in a majority situation. Moreover, the inquiries tend to extend over long periods of time and when the concluding reports are discussed in the chamber, they have lost the original impact. The 1993 revision tried to overcome these delays by introducing tight timing rules to force the inquiries to reach their conclusions as soon as possible.40 Although the practice during the VII legislature might have brought an enhancement of the actual inquiries (probably due to its minority character), the parliamentary inquiry has represented mainly an opportunity to create a debate with wide coverage in the media, regardless of the actual outcome of the inquiries. 5.1.1.5 A routinisation of parliamentary control At the end of the first decade of Portuguese democracy and, crucially, before the experience of the absolute majorities, António Vitorino stated the following as a conclusion on the parliamentary control function of the Assembleia da República: Parliamentary practice shows, thus, that the parliamentary action in Portugal is still in search for its own identity, for an adequate understanding (and use) of the devices that constitutionally and legally allow parliamentary control of government’s action, under a perspective of normal co-operation and collaboration between the organs of political power.41 This quotation reflects the nature of parliamentary control in the first decade: it was not a common parliamentary practice and its use was still in its beginnings. Plus, as seen in the previous sections, the regulation of common parliamentary control has only developed in the second decade of democracy, since the revision of 1985. In the first decade, solemnity and non-continuity were the main characteristics of parliamentary control. This changed with, on one hand, parliamentary practice itself in a second democratic decade, at a time when primary concerns to ensure transition to democracy had been substituted by

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concerns of efficacy, to make democracy work; and, on the other, the very experience of two consecutive absolute majorities. In the previous sections we saw that it was only in the 1985 revision of the RP that the QGs and Requerimentos were institutionalised. It was only then, for instance, that the habit of booking a specific meeting to put QGs became formalised. In 1993, the revision aimed again at reinforcing the scrutiny capacity of parliament. This was particularly clear in the case of the QGs and the committees of inquiry. Meanwhile, the 1988 revision had clear effects in diminishing the solemnity of the interpellations. Table 17 shows the average use of scrutiny devices since 1976, indicating that control activity has become more of a routine, losing some of its solemnity. For the QGs, the indicator chosen is the number of meetings where those questions are answered. There is no information available for the whole period on the actual number of questions answered; and, besides this, the low number of these meetings in comparison to other countries is, in itself, relevant. In any case, during the IV and V an average of seven questions was answered in each of these plenary meetings. For the committees of inquiry, the indicator is the number of proposals of committees due to the importance ascribed to that moment, as seen in the previous section.

Table 17 Classical parliamentary control instruments in the Portuguese parliament (average per legislative session, in each legislature) I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

Interpellations 1.5 3 3.5 2 5.5 6.25 5.5 Meetings for: 1 1 3 2.5 9.5 8 8.75 Questions to the government Proposals of 0.5 5.7 8 4 5.75 8.3 2.25 Committees of inquiry Requerimentos 628.25 865.3 2307 2388.5 1175.3 1250.5 1245.5 (written questions) Sources: Legislatures I to III: information from the Division of Documentation of the Portuguese parliament, kindly granted by Professor Manuel Braga da Cruz. Legislatures IV to VII: activity reports of the Assembleia da República.

Table 17 shows how, in the first years of democracy, parliamentary control was hardly a priority in MPs’ agenda. Devices such as the interpellations and the QGs were barely used. It also shows that two things happened in the first absolute majority legislature (V): a sharper increase in the use of most control instruments and a decrease of the Requerimentos. All through the first democratic decade, there had been a steady expansion of the control function, but this is clearer after 1987 (V legislature). It was only after that date, for instance, that the opposition PGs used to its limit the constitutional right to propose an interpellation: two per parliamentary year for each PG. However, this

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expansion only happened with the devices involving public discussion: interpellations, QGs and proposals of committees of inquiry. A Requerimento has no public visibility, unless the proponent publicises it to the media.42 Again, the parliamentarians saw the chamber as a privileged site to affirm their comments and criticisms of government’s actions. Before 1987 this need was not so well marked. What is more, this pattern did not change up to the end of the VII legislature. About the same number of Requerimentos were sent to the government, not as many as one might expect under a minority government. The figures referring to the VII are, in fact, closer to the absolute majority period than to the IV legislature (the other minoritarian legislature). The only indicator that does not follow this pattern is the number of proposals of committees of inquiry. This is probably due to the new opportunities of debates in the chamber, since the discussion of committees of inquiry was mainly seen as a way to create a debate on an embarrassing issue for the government. In spite of this expansion, and as seen in the previous sections, these control devices have been the object of widespread criticism, in particular during the V legislature when the rationalisation move of the 1988 RP revision had been put in place and no new forms of debate had yet been foreseen. Thus, although the practice of parliamentary control has been internalised by the Portuguese parliamentarians, at the beginning of the 1990s there was a clear feeling that the scrutiny devices available were unsatisfactory. 5.1.2 New scrutiny instruments Beyond the overall unsatisfactory character of the classical control devices, complementary means to scrutinise government and public administration were developed during the absolute majorities. This happened mainly through two means: promoting public debate and reinforcing the informative function of parliament; the ascription to the standing committees of a more active role was also an important factor in this development. The chamber debates have provided, since the time of the Constituent Assembly, a primary site for commenting on and criticising government’s actions. As both Miguel Lobo Antunes and Jorge Miranda show,43 although the Constituent Assembly did not have political or legislative powers, its MPs strongly conditioned political life by taking full advantage of the PAOD [Período Antes da Ordem do Did]. As explained in chapter 3 (3.2.4), the PAOD consists of the first part of each plenary session, where current affairs are dealt with, as well as internal affairs of the assembly; it precedes the main part of a plenary session. Thanks to the possibility of intervening in the PAOD, PGs had an active role in criticising political life during the period of the Constituent Assembly. According to Lobo Antunes, through this continuous criticism the Constituent Assembly was able to counterpoint its democratic legitimacy (as the only elected organ in power) to the revolutionary legitimacy. As seen in chapter 2 (2.2), the struggle between these two types of legitimacy was a fundamental factor in the Portuguese transition to democracy. Furthermore, the criticism made on the floor of the chamber has been seen as a major cause of the breakdown of governmental coalitions such as the AD or the Central Bloc. This tribune function of the chamber debates had a main characteristic: the inputs derived from the political system itself and the outcome aimed at the same political system.

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Following the absolute majorities, this tribune function of the chamber has expanded opening up progressively to other spheres of society. It is in this context that the extraordinary increase of the special debates must be understood. Chapter 3 showed the investment put into new scrutiny devices at the end of the absolute majorities period, in particular in the 1993 revision of the RP. Nowadays, besides the classical control devices, PGs may also ask for an Urgency Debate (which has to be put on the agenda within seven days of its approval by the Conference of Representatives)44 or an Actuality Debate (which does not contain the urgency character of the previous debate). Plus, there was no prescribed limit in the number of debates each PG may propose.45 The government may equally ask for either of these debates. Besides this, there is also the annual Nation State Debate aimed at evaluating the political year, which has the participation of the prime minister and attracts overwhelming media coverage. Furthermore, the standing committees may also propose a debate to discuss issues within their competence. Table 18 shows how popular special debates have become. The data refer only to the period between the IV and the VII legislatures. There is no information available on the first three legislatures, which indicates that either no special debates took

Table 18 Special debates in the Portuguese parliament (average per legislative year) IV

V

VI

VII*

Number of special 2.5 3.75 7.75 23 debates Source: Activity reports of the Assembleia da República. Note * To these we need to add seven more (1.75 per legislative year) monthly debates with the prime minister.

place then or that its importance was overlooked. Over the last few legislatures, the average number of special debates per year has increased from 2.5 in the IV to 37 debates in the VIII,46 which represents an extraordinary increase. The main bulk of the special debates are urgency debates, an answer to a particular polemical issue arising in society. The issues vary considerably, from ‘mad cow’ disease to the government’s response to floods. To call for a special debate on a particular issue has become a way of the PG ascribing to it the seriousness it ‘deserves’. The recognition of a particular problem will, naturally, be welcomed by the affected actors. The press reports them extensively, the opposition PGs see them as an effective means of intervening and for the government they are a valuable way to publicise its policies. A considerable number of the debates proposed by the government aim to report on European Union affairs, but they have also been used as a way to promote new policies. Besides this, the Prime Minister António Guterres also promoted the practice of what he called a prime-ministerial monthly debate in parliament. This comes as a response to one of the main criticisms directed at the former Prime Minister, Cavaco Silva: his rare participation in parliament’s debates. Although Guterres did participate in more debates

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than his predecessor,47 it should be noted that overall these prime-ministerial ‘monthly’ debates only took place on seven occasions over the four years of the VII legislature. The 2002 RP revision has meanwhile institutionalised this practice.48 The promotion of public hearings has also been an expanding feature of the Assembleia da República. This has accompanied the strengthening of the committees’ role. In 1988 the power to take evidence was recognised in the RP and, in 1993, it was formally recognised that the auditions could take place publicly. As committees’ proceedings became more open to the media, calling for a public hearing has also become more popular. To a much less extent, public hearings have also been promoted by the PGs themselves. The institutionalisation of the public hearings was actually considered by Alberto Martins as the main contribution of the 1993 revision. Showing the importance given to this device, Alberto Martins (chair of the main standing committee on constitutional affairs in the VII legislature) stated in interview, ‘parliament’s possibility to promote a hearing of certain public entities on a particular subject (…) was very effective and represented a real opening of parliament to the outside world.’ Again, the topics have varied enormously, but they are usually integrated in the process of considering legislation. It should be remembered that since 1976 the Assembleia da República has been constitutionally compelled to consult a number of associations whenever particular legislation is being discussed: typically, the trade unions and workers’ committees (labour legislation) and the autonomous regions (legislation affecting those regions). Moreover, the obligation to consult other agents has expanded and the 1993 version of the RP specified the compulsory consultation of associations representative of the local councils when relevant legislation is being discussed. However, until recently these consultations were not done under the form of a public hearing, but instead through exchange of documentation or contacts behind closed doors with selected MPs or PGs. It is difficult to assess exactly how many public hearings have taken place, as the information available is not very clear. Besides, this information has only been included in the annual reports of the Assembleia da República since the beginning of the VI legislature. The information available shows a substantial increase though: from an average of eight auditions per year in the VI to 23 in the VII. Although there is some doubt as to the reliability of these data, they do indicate an expansion of this device. The committees have become more aware of the usefulness of this device, as well as the PGs. The media have also taken an interest in reporting a considerable number of the public hearings. The development of public hearings as a means of gathering information on a particular bill has been accompanied by greater care taken with the preparation of reports informing legislation. As seen in chapter 3, the 1993 revision of the RP introduced rules throughout the legislative proceedings in order to guarantee a more informative framework for the legislation under consideration. It is in this context that the prior referral stage has provided parliamentarians with a much more integrative and informative preparation of legislation. The MPs interviewed argued that this is still highly dependent on the actual rapporteur, but eventually agreed that the new care taken on reports has indeed enhanced the consideration of legislation in parliament. In the same way the 1993 revision also reinforced the need for more precise information as a

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requirement for the proposal of powers delegation bills. In this sense, it could be argued that the influence of parliament on government’s decisions might have increased. In the VII and 1/VIII legislatures the annual reports also included information on a variety of extra-parliamentary debates and seminars that parliament organises (promoted by its President, PGs or committees). This is another indicator of the importance given nowadays to the concern of transforming parliament into a bridge between the outside inputs and the political process. These activities have involved interest groups, experts and ordinary citizens.

5.2 Relationship with citizens: a primary concern in the political discourse in the 1990s As seen in chapter 2, the Portuguese political system does not favour a close relationship between parliament and citizens. Most of the causes for this weak relationship are in the structure of the political system in itself (namely the electoral system), which basically has not changed since 1976. This is a problem commonly referred to by both members of the public and politicians. The issue has been particularly recurrent since the beginning of the 1990s, as the debate on a democratic deficit increased, partly due to the experience of an absolute majority in parliament. The government presented a proposal of law to revise the electoral system, an ad hoc parliamentary committee was created to analyse that issue,49 seminars were organised and the newspapers had a flow of opinion articles about the electoral system;50 in all of these, the question of bringing MPs closer to citizens was predominant. Still, this discussion did not result, then, in a reform of the electoral system. However, it did result in a few small initiatives in parliament aimed at narrowing the gap between MPs and citizens. 5.2.1 The substitution/representative system One of the direct causes, as well as indicators, of the weak relationship between citizens and parliament is the lack of professionalisation of the MP’s job. Several reasons explain this lack of professionalisation and they are all connected with the youth of Portuguese democracy. The representative system is undoubtedly one of those reasons, as clearly shown in the system of substitutions of MPs. This system has been used to such an extent that it could be said that there has been a ‘volatility’ of MPs: the MPs that citizens elect are not necessarily the ones that will represent them. However, there are clear signs showing that this started to change with the absolute majorities experience, thanks not only to specific regulation but also probably to a stronger internalising of the job of MP by the Portuguese parliamentarians. In each constituency, MPs are elected from the lists presented by the parties. If any of those elected MPs is unable to assume their mandate, then they will be substituted by the subsequent candidate from the party list, whoever is next in the list; thus, the MP actually assuming the mandate may not have been originally elected. This happens, for instance, every time an MP assumes a post in government, as they cannot be members of parliament and government at the same time. These replacements may be temporary, as MPs can resume their mandate once the suspension is over, as long as it is not longer than

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18 months.51 The substituting process has been extensively used since 1976, when substitutions of MPs were done for as little as two or three days. Since then, the substitution process has been considerably restricted and again this happened during the period studied here, the second decade of democracy. Table 19 shows the number of substitutions of MPs since 1976. There are two primary causes for the high rate of substitutions of MPs: electoral campaigning and undertaking a post in government. The most emblematic example of an elected MP who has never assumed his post is Álvaro Cunhal, charismatic leader of the PCP, who was elected on each occasion from 1976 until 1991, but never assumed his post as MP, although very active in the electoral campaigns.52 Another example was the athlete Rosa Mota (a national figure in Portugal) who

Table 19 Number of substitutions of MPs (average per legislative year) I II 1st/III IV

V VI VII

Number of 64 219 576 207.5 118 90 60.7 substitutions Sources: I to III legislatures: W.Opello, ‘Portugal’s Parliament: an organisational analysis of legislative performance’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. XI, No. 3 (August 1986), p. 297. V legislature: Memória da V Legislatura, 1987– 1991 (Lisbon: Assembleia da República, 1993). IV and VI legislatures: DILP. VII legislature: activity reports of the Assembleia da República. Note There is no information available on the second year of the III (1984–85).

was in 1995 a top list candidate of the PS for the district of Oporto, but, although elected, never took up her mandate; she was merely a very popular figure used in the electoral campaign. Still, the factor causing more substitutions is the act of assuming a post in government, as it is incompatible with the job of MP. These two types of substitutions may not have deep effects on parliamentary practice as they generally involve long-term substitutions. However, they do have a marked effect in the sense that they deprive parliament of the MPs potentially most well known next to citizens; instead, a number of unknown figures assume the role of MP. Besides this type of substitution there are many others, caused by all sorts of reasons (mostly professional obligations),53 which have had deeper effects on the relationship between parliament and citizens, as they consist of short-term replacements. This type of substitution has permitted the circulation of MPs in and out of the Assembleia da República with extreme ease, enabling the existence of a substantial number of MPs completely unknown to the public. Although the data concerning the first three legislatures indicated an increase in the rate of substitutions,54 Table 19 shows that since the IV legislature there has actually been a strong decrease. This becomes particularly clear if one considers the rate in the VII legislature: most of the substitutions took place in the first year (82 per cent), suggesting

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that they were mainly caused by MPs taking up jobs in the government. The process of substitutions has been considerably restricted in the RP since 1985, when a minimum of 15 days was imposed for each mandate suspension; later, in 1993, that restriction came up to 45 days, that is, nowadays, no MP can be replaced for less than one-and-a-half months.55 Still, the substituting process has clear effects on the relationship between parliament and citizens: not only because citizens cannot generally identify who represents their district in parliament, but also because the representatives are not necessarily identifiable. As André Gonçalves Pereira stated, ‘when taken to its limit, the system of substitutions of MPs by other members of the list can lead to an almost total rupture of the deputy-elector relationship’.56 The second decade of democracy has brought an improvement in this situation though, as a result not only of the legal limits introduced, but also of the development of parliament into a more ‘mature’ institution. The constitution revision of 1997 introduced a new factor that may in the future strengthen the links between citizens and their MPs. It introduced the possibility of single member constituencies in the electoral system, in conjunction with the principle of proportional representation which was kept.57 MPs could become closer to their electors, as well as more well known.58 Following these changes, the government presented for public discussion a proposal to revise the electoral system: a mixed system combining multi and single member constituencies. In the presentation of this proposal, the issue of narrowing the distance between parliament and citizens was the only argument put forward to justify the need to revise the electoral system: we do not intend to introduce any rupture with those principles and values of our electoral system which have proved adequate over the years, but instead to ameliorate it on what concerns the quality of representation of citizens, promoting the link between elected and electors and a more direct political responsibility of the MP in front of his or her electors.59,60 5.2.2 The petition right—legal enhancement Efforts to bring MPs closer to citizens have been made in other areas besides the representative system. The most significant example is the attention given to the petition right. The petition right was barely regulated until the beginning of the 1990s. The 1989 revision of the constitution brought in important changes by introducing the possibility of a petition being discussed in the chamber.61 This was followed by the creation of a standing committee for petitions and by a Petitions Law, which regulated in detail the process of presenting and analysing a petition. Moreover, the 1991 revision of the RP introduced strong regulation in the process of presenting petitions to parliament—an extensive set of articles was revised and added (articles 37.°, 123.°, 245.° to 248.°, 250.° to 254.º).62 The petition right is, as José Magalhães wrote, ‘the freer of citizens’ rights, but also one of the less guaranteed as to its results’.63 It consists, basically, of a claim any citizen may wish to present concerning government or public administration, or any suggestion of legislation on a particular issue. Its effects have been fairly inconsequential though, particularly before petitions could be discussed in the chamber.

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Every petition presented to parliament is distributed to the committee responsible for the subject petitioned.64 Since 1991, any petition with a minimum of 1000 signatories is thereafter discussed in the chamber where each PG expresses its opinion on it. In 1993, that limit was raised to 4000 and at the same time it was decided that, independent of the number of signatories, any petition could be discussed in the chamber, as long as it was considered of special interest.65 Also since 1993, it has become clearer that parliament may intervene, through recommendations, in order to correct a particular situation of injustice or illegality brought up by a petition. There was a particular concern then in regulating the process of analysing petitions, by introducing time limits for reports and by specifying the committee powers to request information from other authorities.66 It is clear, thus, that at the beginning of the 1990s there was a distinct concern for enhancing the parliamentary instrument of petitions, as a way of bringing citizens closer to parliament. These improvements were well received by the public as there was an increase of petitions presented to parliament, in particular of those suitable to be discussed in the chamber. 5.2.3 The petition right—a short-lived interest from the public The act of presenting a petition is the clearest instrument available for citizens’ pleas to parliament, and yet it is hardly a successful one. The main criticisms of this instrument are its ineffectiveness and the long time span between the presentation of a petition and its consideration by parliament.67 Besides this, it soon becomes clear that the main petitioner is not the citizen, but rather organised groups, such as trade unions. Still, the legal enhancement of this device at the beginning of the 1990s was followed by a stronger interest by the public. Table 20 shows that the number of petitions presented to parliament has increased over the period studied here.68 In fact, in the first years of parliament, citizens seemed to have great confidence in this instrument, judging by the number of petitions presented during the first legislature. However, this confidence was obviously broken during the II and III legislatures, that is during the coalition governments. The IV legislature coincided with a new increase, probably due to parliament’s image then as a strong institution. However, it was the beginning of the 1990s that represented a new boost in the belief in the petition device. A closer look into the V and VI legislatures shows that the high rate of petitions was mainly due to the bulk of petitions presented between 1990 and 1992, that is when the main reforms were set up. Table 21 shows that both in the last legislative session of the V legislature (1990–91) and in the first one of the VI (1991–92)

Table 20 Petitions presented to parliament I

II III IV V VI

Total number of 294 66 51 134 296 316 petitions presented to parliament Average per year of 73.5 22 25.5 67 74 79 petitions presented to parliament

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Sources: Legislatures I to III: M.Braga da Cruz, ‘Sobre o Parlamento português: partidarização parlamentar e parlamentarização partidária’, Análise Social, Vol. XXIV, No. 100 (1988), p. 111. IV and V: activity report of the Petitions Committee, DAR, II-C, 12, 18/1/1992. VI: activity report of the Petitions Committee, DAR, II-C, 30, 16/9/1995. Notes There is no information available for the VII legislature. This seems to be due to two reasons: the non-existence of a committee on petitions and the minority character of this legislature, which means that other matters had priority.

Table 21 Petitions presented to parliament, in the V and VI legislatures Total 1st, 4th/V 1st/VI Total 2nd, 2nd & (1990/91) (1991/92) 3rd & 4th 3rd of V of VI leg. leg. (1992/93– (1987/88– 1993/94– 1988/89– 1994/95) 1989/90) Petitions 153 143 150 166 presented Sources: Activity reports of the Petitions Committee and of the Assembleia da República as mentioned above.

the number of petitions presented was nearly as high as during the remaining three years of each legislature. In particular, the number of petitions with 1000 (or more) signatories increased after 1990, following the changes allowing the discussion of those in the chamber. The first report of the Petitions Committee actually stated that ‘in the first and second legislative sessions [of the V legislature, 1987–89] there is no record of any collective petition signed by more than 1000 citizens, which leads us to conclude that the creation of the Petitions Committee brought about expectations, which were significantly enhanced with the law 43/90’69 published in 1990. However, the public expectations were not adequately met, as between 1992 and 1995 there was a considerable decrease. At the same moment as the first petitions were being discussed in the chamber, there was a prevailing judgement of disappointment in the newspaper reports.70 These reports clearly welcomed the changes introduced, but, at the same time, pointed out the inadequacies of the system–it was emphatically noticed, for instance, that the PGs had had some difficulty in setting aside a plenary session for the discussion of petitions, as it meant conceding their own agenda. Besides that, the newspapers also stressed the excessive time span between the moment a petition is sent and its consideration by

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parliament. In some cases, the length of time is such that the discussion of a petition becomes pointless, as pointed out by the Expresso newspaper referring to the petition about the 1991 budget, discussed in May 1991, when the annual budget had already been in application for five months. The time span may actually last several years: the petition 92/IV, sent to parliament in 1986 by mineworkers and concerning retirement conditions, was discussed in the chamber in January 1993.71 The petitions’ inconsequential results constitute another major reason for the disappointment felt about the petition right. It is not easy to evaluate the petitions’ effects, but in most cases they seem to be minimal. The only direct effect that may follow the consideration of a petition is a possible recommendation sent by parliament. Parliament may, for instance, send the petition and respective reports to other authorities, such as a ministry or a local council, to inform them of a particular problem so that measures may be taken. The V legislature report of the petitions committee stated that out of 163 petitions considered, 18 were sent to various ministries, eight to the PGs and five to other authorities. These recommendations may, in this way, lead to the presentation of new legislation by the PGs or the government; but this is a mere indirect effect of a petition and hard to assess. Since 1993, recommendations can be more definite in actually involving parliament in the resolution of a problem; it is the case of the ‘Diligência conciliadora’, that is a conciliatory initiative.72 In this initiative, the petitioner and a representative of the entity aimed at by the petition are invited to attend a meeting with representatives of parliament in order to find a solution to the problem raised. However, according to parliament’s reports, there has been only one of such conciliatory initiatives, which resulted in the resolution of the problem raised by the petitioner, that is the consideration of some of his working time for the calculation of his pension.73 Besides that, a petition may occasionally lead to the presentation of a question to the government or, in particular, a Requerimento which involves fewer restrictions in its presentation. In addition, the Petition Law explicitly mentions the possibility of a parliamentary inquiry being proposed, following the contents of a petition. Moreover, the discussion in the chamber does bring some publicity to the problems raised by a petition, although again it would be difficult to assess its effects. Still, it soon becomes clear that, due to its lack of effectiveness, the act of presenting a petition has kept citizens away, rather than bringing them closer to parliament. As the VI legislature petitions report concluded in the future activity of the petitions committee, it will be important to progress in two fundamental areas: the speed in the response from the petitions committee and the enhancement of the collaboration between the committee and the entities responsible for the resolution of the issues raised.74 Although there was a clear concern to improve this situation in the middle of the absolute majority period, the practice that followed brought more disappointment. During the VII legislature the treatment of petitions was hardly visible in parliament. There is no petitions committee and, therefore, no reports. Several attempts were made in the context

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of this research to obtain information on the existing petitions, but soon parliamentary officers made it clear that other matters had priority. 5.2.4 Other small initiatives to bring citizens closer to MPs In conjunction with the improvements made to the representative system and the petition right, parliament introduced other small initiatives under the general goal of bringing citizens closer to MPs. One of the ways chosen was by giving individual MPs (still, in a very restrictive way) more possibility to intervene independent of their PG agenda. In the 1991 revision of the RP, independent MPs had some of their rights enlarged and it was prescribed that every MP was entitled to a 10-minute speech in the chamber for each legislative session.75 This has been mainly used by the so called regional MPs, to whom the PGs tend not to allocate time to intervene in the Plenum; the speeches have centred on specific constituency matters. This type of speech, based on local issues, is devalued by the central press, which labels them as parochial.76 However, Barbosa de Melo (who has the experience of having conducted four years of plenary sessions) remarked in interview that this type of speech is usually extensively reported in the local press, having therefore some effect at constituency level. As seen in chapter 3 (3.3.3.2), the revision of 1993 prescribed in the RP, for the first time, the allocation of time in parliamentary work for contacts between MPs and citizens, as well as the existence of an office for such contacts. Specifically, it stipulated that every fortnight there should be a place for contacts between MPs and citizens in the constituencies. These contacts would take place at the Governo Civil, a sort of a-partisan representative of the public administration in each district.77 There is little evidence of the actual application of that prescription. Still, in the VII legislature, there was an attempt to implement this principle in the district of Coimbra, according to the MP Barbosa de Melo. As stated by Barbosa de Melo, those direct contacts with citizens are very interesting as they bring in information, otherwise unknown to the MP. However, due to the large size of the district, those contacts tend to be restricted to the people living in the main centre, that is the city of Coimbra. According to the MP’s own words, this was a positive ‘experience’, not repeated in other districts, which he hoped would be developed. Naturally, the bigger the district, the more difficult the application of that prescription. Besides these legal changes, at the beginning of the VI legislature (October 1991) the PGs assumed publicly the objective of bringing parliament closer to citizens. For instance, the new leader of the majoritarian PG, Duarte Lima, had several initiatives in that sense, such as publicising a book that compiled a synthesis of the main problems of each district of Portugal, which would be used as a guide in the work of MPs.78 Thus, at the beginning of the 1990s there was a clear attempt to bring citizens closer to parliament. This came as a way to enhance parliament’s image, just as did the RP revision of 1993. On the other hand, this reflects once again the development of the Portuguese parliament into a different stage: the one of ‘maturation’, when primary concerns have been attended and parliamentary practice has brought new needs. The concern to bring citizens closer to parliament is undoubtedly a ‘luxury’ of democratically consolidated parliamentary institutions. Curiously, back in 1976 the main concern was to

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avoid the dangers of the past caciquismo and the MP’s mandate was prescribed as nonimperative, that is non-regional based. After two decades of democracy the constitution itself foresees the possibility of the introduction of single-member constituencies, contrary to the principles of representation proclaimed back in the 1970s. The enhancement of the relationship between parliament and citizens is one of the signs indicating that the Assembleia da República has evolved to a ‘legitimation oriented parliament’, that is an institution where the main activity and procedures are structured according to a legitimation function, rather than legislative. The prevailing concern has become to make the bridge with the outside world, that is to express outside inputs, as well as to make sure that this is recognised by the involved actors. Particularly significant in this respect has been the development of parliamentary scrutiny of government’s actions. In the first decade there was hardly any provision or practice on scrutiny; then, parliament’s activity and procedures were oriented according to the legislative function. This started to change with the period under study here and, particularly, with the absolute majorities. It was during the V and the VI that, beyond little decisional power over the legislative process, parliamentary control became a routine for parliamentarians, at the same time as it expanded into new forms of scrutiny; the boom of the special debates thereafter is well representative of this. As parliamentarians’ priorities changed, so did the use of parliamentary procedures, as will be seen in more detail in the following chapter on the case study of the budget.

Notes 1 A.Vitorino, ‘O controlo parlamentar dos actos do Governo’, in M.B.Coelho (ed.), Portugal: o sistema político e constitucional (1974–1987) (Lisboa: ICS, 1989), pp. 369–86; and C.Leston—Bandeira, ‘Controlo parlamentar na Assembleia da República: a transladação de poder da IV para a V legislatura’, Legislação, Vol. 12 (1995), pp. 121–51. 2 CRP, art. 192.º. 3 See . 4‘Relatório de Actividade da Assembleia da República referente à 1a sessão legislativa da VIII legislatura’, Diário da Assembleia da República, n° 32, II-C, 02/07/01, p. 405. 5 M.Lobo Antunes, A Assembleia da República e a consolidação da democracia em Portugal’, Análise Social, Vol. XXIV, No. 100 (1988), p. 94. 6 CRP, 1976, art. 198.°. 7 CRP, 1976, art. 197.º; CRP, 1997, art. 194.º. 8 The rule of approval is the same as for the motion of rejection: absolute majority of the total number of MPs in parliament. 9 RP, 1985, arts. 242.° and 243.°. 10 RP, 1985, art. 243.°; RP, 1993, art. 247.°. 11 RP, 1993, art. 246.°, n°2. 12 According to the activity reports of the Assembleia da República and information given by the Divisão de Informação Legislativa e Parlamentar (DILP). According to this same source the answers’ rate in the V was 61 per cent. According to the government report on the parliamentary year in the VII legislature, that rate had been 53 per cent in the VIth (Ministério dos Assuntos Parlamentares, Balanço da Actividade Parlamentar—um governo com iniciativa (Lisbon: Ministério dos Assuntos Parlamentares, 1998), p. 8). 13 See Y.Mény and A.Knapp, Government and Politics in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 211–3, for a summarised comparison between Britain, France, Italy and Germany. The case of Spain is also extremely revealing for its flexibility. It

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foresees three types of questions to the government: written (where the proportions are seven to ten times higher than the number of Requerimentos presented), oral (put in the chamber), and oral put in the committees. See J.Montero Gibert and J.García Morillo, El control parlamentario (Madrid: Tecnos, 1984), pp. 71–89, and M.Sánchez de Dios, ‘La esencia del régimen: el control parlamentario del Gobierno’, Política y Sociedad, Vol. 20 (1995), pp. 42–3. 14 RP, 1976, art. 72.°. 15 RP, 1985, art. 62.°. 16 RP, 1985, arts. 232.° to 238.°. 17 Note that the 2002 RP revision has introduced a new type of oral question: the departmental [sectorial] questions to the government [QGs], meant to be put in meetings with a common ministerial area (RP, 2002, arts. 240.° and 241.°). 18 Contrary to the Requerimentos, which are answered in writing. 19 See the suggestion that QGs’ meetings should be set on a Tuesday afternoon to improve its public impact, in A.Araújo, A.Freire, M.Costa Lobo, C.Leston-Bandeira and P.Magalhães, O Parlamento Português: uma reforma necessária (Lisbon: Institute of Social Sciences/Institute Amaro da Costa/Portuguese Parliament, 2002), p. 160. 20 José Magalhães was interviewed on 9 July 1996. He is a former PCP MP who became Independent following the breakdown of the Soviet Union bloc and the refusal of the Portuguese Communist Party to acknowledge this, and then joined the PS. J.Magalhães is one of the most well-known MPs and has played a fundamental role in the last three revisions of the constitution as well as of the RP. 21 RP, 1985, art. 235.°, n°3. 22 Leston-Bandeira (note 1), p. 131. 23 RP, 1993, art. 241.°, n°3. 24 RP, 1993, art. 241.°, n°4. 25 Barbosa de Melo was interviewed on 11 July 1996. He was a PSD MP in the Constituent Assembly, I, VI and VII legislatures, as well as Speaker of parliament between 1991 and 1995 (VI legislature). B.de Melo was the President of the PSD PG in the first years of democracy and has since then become one of PSD’s main figures in the field of constitutional affairs. 26 See footnote 17. 27 CRP, art. 180.º. In Spain the number of interpellations per PG is prescribed in the RP [Reglamentos], which foresees one interpellation per each group of 10 MPs. In Germany there is no limit (T.Saalfeld, ‘The German Bundestag: influence and accountability in a complex environment’, in P.Norton (ed.), Parliaments and Governments in Western Europe (London: Frank Cass, 1998), p. 64). 28 The only change was the following: the 1976 constitution prescribed that the interpellation should be a debate on broad policy (CRP, 1976, art. 183.º, n°2); the 1989 revision added the possibility of the debate being on a specific policy (CRP, 1989, art. 183.°, n°2). 29 RP, 1976, art. 210.°; RP, 1985, art. 240.°; RP, 1988, art. 241.°. 30 Leston-Bandeira (note 1), pp. 136–9. 31 CRP, 1976, art. 181.°. 32 Law on the parliamentary inquiries, [Regime jurídico dos inquéritos parlamentares], n°5/93, art. 13.°. Note that the 1993 revision withdrew from the RP most of the regulation referring to committees of inquiry, integrating it in a single autonomous law on the inquiries. This extended considerably the previous law n°43/77. 33 See ‘Camarate tem novas testemunhas’, in Público, 19/6/99, p. 19. This inquiry, known as the Camarate case (after the place where the plane crash took place), was the sixth of its kind; two further committees of inquiry have been created in the two subsequent legislatures (VIII and IX). The first one was approved in November 1982, in the II legislature, but until today none of them have reached satisfactory conclusions.

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34 Vitorino (note 1), p. 381. 35 CRP, 1982, art. 181.º, n°4; CRP, 1997, art. 178.º, n°4. 36 Leston-Bandeira (note 1), p. 145. 37 Luís Sá was interviewed on 12 My 1996. He was an MP of the PCP in the VI and VII legislatures and had been introduced by his party as one of the new faces of the PCP. He was also the author of one of the only books published about the Portuguese parliament (L.Sá, O Lugar da Assembleia da República no Sistema Político (Lisboa: Caminho, 1994)). Sadly and unexpectedly, he died on 15 October 1999; he was 47 years old. 38 Law on the parliamentary inquiries, n°5/93, art. 15.°. 39 Leston-Bandeira (note 1), p. 147. 40 Law on the parliamentary inquiries, n°5/93, art. 11.º. 1.°. 41 Vitorino (note 1), p. 386. 42 This actually became more of a common practice during the VII legislature. 43 Lobo Antunes (note 5), p. 80; and J.Miranda, Manual de Direito Constitucional, Tomo I—O Estado e Os Sistemas Constitucionais (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 1997; first ed., 1981), p. 344. 44 RP, 1993, art. 77.°. 45 At least up to the 1993 revision. The subsequent revision has introduced limits. 46 Data given directly by parliament’s staff (DILP). 47 The Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs’ webpage stated that over the four years of the VII legislature António Guterres went to parliament 50 times, whereas Cavaco Silva went 19 times during the VI (see ‘Balanço da VIIa legislatura’ ). 48 RP, 2002, art. 239.°. 49 Considerable detail on the process of discussion of the Portuguese electoral system is given in M.Braga da Cruz, ‘A reforma do sistema eleitoral: evolução de uma controvérsia actual’, in Instituições políticas e processos sociais (Venda Nova: Bertrand Editora, 1995), pp. 269– 96; and M.Braga da Cruz (ed.), Sistema Eleitoral Português—debate político e parlamentar (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1998). 50 See, for instance, the various opinion articles published in the dailies Público and Diário de Notícias in the first months of 1992. Introducing a set of opinion articles, the daily Público, in ‘Revisão da Lei Eleitoral’, 21/1/92, stated that ‘the need to bring the electors closer to the elected has entered into the discourse of all political forces’. 51 This limit of 18 months was determined in the 1993 reform. Before then, the substitutions could last as long as two years, following the alterations introduced in 1985. In the early years, though, a mandate suspension could only be as long as one year [Statute of the MPs, 1982, art. 18.°; 1985/1993, art. 5.°]. This limit does not apply to MPs who have suspended their mandate to become members of the government. 52 This is explained by the orthodox communist perception that parliament is a form of bourgeois representation, with which they do not totally agree. 53 Short-term substitutions have also been used as a way to avoid dissenting from party discipline, as well as to introduce specific MPs specialised in particular areas, whenever their topic is discussed in the chamber. For example, in the VI legislature, the PS had a number of representatives of ethnic communities in their lists, who took up their mandate as MPs whenever issues such as immigration policy were discussed in parliament. 54 The high rate of substitutions in the first legislatures were one of the reasons that led Walter Opello to conclude that there was a very low level of institutionalisation of the Portuguese parliament (W.Opello, ‘Portugal’s Parliament: an organizational analysis of legislative performance’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. XI, No. 3 (1986), pp. 291–319. 55 Statute of the MPs, art. 5.°. 56 A.Gonçalves Pereira, ‘Sistema eleitoral e sistema de governo’, in M.Baptista Coelho (ed.), Portugal—O Sistema Político e Constitucional, 1974–87 (Lisbon: Institute of Social Sciences, 1989), p. 286.

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57 CRP, art. 149.º. 58 Although nothing was specified on this matter, it is assumed that the process of substitutions of MPs would not be possible in the single member constituencies. 59 Presidência do Conselho de Ministros, Revisão da lei eleitoral para a Assembleia da República—anteprojecto de articulado e relatório (Lisbon: Presidência do Conselho de Ministros, 1997), p.II; expression in bold in the original. 60 Besides this, note that the constitutional revision of 1997 also introduced the right of citizens to initiate legislation in parliament (CRP, art. 167.º). Before then, this right was only allocated to the MPs, PGs, government and regional assemblies. 61 CRP, 1989, art. 52.°. 62 In 1993, most of this regulation was transferred from the RP to the actual law on the petition right (Petitions Law, n°43/90). 63 J.Magalhães, Dicionário da Revisão Constitucional (Lisbon: Publicaçães Europa América, 1989), p. 82. 64 From 1989 to 1995, there was a specific standing committee for petitions, which gathered all the petitions sent to parliament. Since 1995, the petitions have instead been distributed amongst the different standing committees, according to their subject. 65 Besides this, since 1993, any petition with a minimum of 2500 signatories, although not discussed in the chamber, is published in the official parliamentary journal, the DAR. 66 See changes introduced by law 6/93 into the Petition Law (43/90), articles 15.°, 17.° and 18.°. 67 Unlike parliamentary bills, petitions do not expire with the end of a legislature period. 68 There is a slight difference between the number of petitions sent to parliament and the ones actually admitted for consideration. Parliament’s reports are not always clear about that. ‘Petitions presented to parliament’ is understood here as the number of petitions admitted for consideration. 69 Activity report of the Petitions Committee, DAR, II-C, 12, 18/1/92, p. 163. 70 See ‘O milagre das petiçães’, Expresso, 27/4/91; ‘Petições: a falsa partida’, Expresso, 4/5/91; and ‘As portas abertas de São Bento’, Público, 17/2/92. 71 DAR, I, 33, 27/1/93. 72 Petition Law (43/90), changed by law 6/93, art. 18.°. 73 DAR, II-C, 6, 9/12/94, Petition n.84/V 74 DAR, II-C, 30, 16/9/95, p. 230. 75 RP, 1991, art. 80.°; RP, 1993, art. 81.°. 76 See, for instance, D.Reis and C.Figueiredo, ‘As vozes da sexta fila’ (The voices of the sixth row), Expresso, 25/5/91. 77 This idea of a need for an office representing parliament in the constituencies has been recurrent in the news since 1987. Stories were published then about the possibility of the Assembleia da República opening representative bodies all over the country (see Expresso 14/2/87). 78 See A.Sá Lopes, ‘Sociais-democratas fazem retrato sobre as carências dos distritos—PSD reinvindica “peso específico” dos deputados junto do governo’, Público, 22/5/92.

6 The budget A case study The discussion of the budget is one of the most important moments of the parliamentary year. The consideration of the budget has been, since 1982, a fundamental power of parliament over government policy. It is also one of the few bills where the whole deliberation process is fully recorded and published.1 In the case of an ordinary bill, only the chamber proceedings are published and no information is given about the discussion and voting in committee. Only in the case of a few bills, such as the revision of the constitution and the budget, are the committee proceedings recorded. The case study of the budget provides us therefore with an excellent opportunity to look into the committee stage discussion and voting. What is more, because every year a new budget is discussed, it also allows a comparative analysis over the years. Because it gives access to the committee proceedings, this case study makes possible a more thorough understanding of the role of parliament in policy-making. The overall data given for policy-making in chapter 4 only refer to the first reading and the final votes and can be misleading. Laws2 are often the product of several bills, after the discussion of amendments in second reading. However, parliament’s reports are not clear about the specific contribution of the different bills discussed to each law approved at final vote; in fact, these reports consider that a bill has been approved at final vote, as long as it has contributed in some way to the final law, regardless of the importance of that contribution. Although it is important to take into account the different contributions that make up a law, the information given by parliament’s reports on the proportion of bills approved at final vote is bound to overestimate the real contribution of MPs’ bills to the legislation issued by parliament. Besides this, there are two other reasons explaining why the budget is such an interesting bill to use as a case study on the role of the Portuguese parliament. Firstly, it is seen as a sort of annual discussion of the government’s programme—or of its execution, as put by former Prime Minister Cavaco Silva, in an interview for this study.3 Secondly, the budget aggregates different areas representative of various interests and people in society, from health to justice, from education to foreign affairs; the budget is a bill of interest to the whole of society. It is, therefore, a good indicator of the pressure put on parliament by the different sectors of society. Furthermore, parliament’s power and ability to change the state budget is traditionally seen as a crucial measure of this institution’s role in the political system; the more parliament changes the budget, the more power it has. Still, it should be stressed that the budget will be analysed here merely as an indicator and not for itself; that is, no analysis will be made of the actual budgetary changes introduced, this would require a

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competence in economics that the author of this book does not have. Such a competence is not necessary for the purposes of this research. By looking into the budget’s deliberative process from 1983 to 1995, this chapter provides therefore a more reliable account of the policy-making role of the Portuguese parliament. Besides this legislative dimension, the debates on the budget are also a good indicator of the general development of the Assembleia da República in those 12 years. It shows the rationalisation of parliamentary work and the development of mechanisms of legitimation—how faced with little decisional power, MPs found new ways to put forward their points of view. After a brief outline of the legal framework, this chapter will look into the organisation of debates and voting over those 12 years; this will be followed by an analysis of the amendments put forward, as well as of the voting, which will show clear differences in the decisional power of each of the four legislatures studied. Finally, the last section will look into how MPs have used the debates of the budget to make the bridge with the outside world and to influence government.

6.1 Legal framework The Portuguese constitution ascribes important legislative powers to the Assembleia da República, one of them being to discuss and approve the state budget of each year: the Orçamento Geral do Estado. This power was prescribed in the revision of the constitution of 1982,4 when parliament’s role in the political system was enhanced to the detriment of the president of the republic and the government. Before then, parliament merely discussed and voted on a broad statement of intentions for the following year’s budget; it was the so called Lei de Meios [Law of Means], where an overall sum was indicated for each government’s department.5 This followed the ruling from the previous regime, the Estado Novo. The transformation from the Lei de Meios to the Orçamento Geral do Estado is seen by the MPs most involved with budgetary matters as the main change in the Portuguese parliament since democracy was introduced, a point emphasised by Manuela Ferreira Leite when interviewed for this study.6 After 1982, the consideration of the budget became one of the most important features in parliament’s activity, as it transferred to the Assembleia da República the power to scrutinise and amend a crucial instrument of governance. In 1983, a Budget Law was issued setting the procedures to follow in the presentation, discussion and approval of budget bills. This law prescribed a basic division in the second reading of a budget’s discussion: the part referring to expenditure and the one referring to revenue. The first should be considered in a parliamentary committee and the latter in the chamber.7 However, some articles affect both expenditure and revenue and, as a consequence, the division between committee and chamber is often not very clear and open to interpretation. The decision to consider a particular article in committee or in the chamber became, in fact, an issue causing frequent disagreement between majority and opposition—the discussion in the chamber being seen by the opposition as a way to guarantee more publicity for their proposals. Parliament’s RP were adapted to correspond to this law in the revision of 1985 and specific rules were set up for the budget debate. Following the general trend of

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rearrangement of functions between chamber and committees, as seen in chapter 3 (3.3.1.), the 1988 RP revision eliminated the distinction between matters to be discussed in the committee and those in the chamber; it was understood that the whole of the second reading would take place in the committee, like any ordinary bill.8 As no new Budget Law was then issued, parliament’s ruling became in conflict with the Budget Law of 1983. However, the chair of the Economy and Finance Committee, Rui Machete, decided to stick with the 1983 ruling, so matters referring to revenue continued to have their second reading in the chamber. 9 In 1991, a new Budget Law brought important changes into the deliberative process. It restricted the matters for discussion in the chamber to some extent, but, on the other hand, it gave MPs means to transfer particular articles to the chamber.10 Before 1991, every aspect referring to the tax system was dealt with in the chamber; since then, some of these matters may be considered in committee. The only matters that remain allocated to the chamber are the following: extinction and creation of taxes, as well as loans and other means of financing. At the same time, this new Budget Law also prescribed a valuable device for MPs: the possibility to transfer to the chamber any article referring to the tax system. Any group of a tenth of the overall number of MPs (that is 23 MPs) can demand the compulsory transfer (not subject to a vote) to the chamber of any article on the tax system. This right was largely used, during the period studied here, by the main opposition party, the PS, the only PG with enough MPs to make such a request. Moreover, this Budget Law reinforced the government’s duty to keep parliament well informed about all factors contributing to the assessment of a budget bill. It established a larger and more specific set of reports to be added to every budget bill.11 Plus, it specifically introduced a new article determining the government’s obligation to inform parliament regularly about the execution of the budget.12 Even so, the MPs interviewed considered that a lot remains to be done in this respect (information on the actual execution). The MP Manuel dos Santos put great emphasis on this issue: the next Budget Law should reinforce parliament’s power over the execution of the annual budgets.13,14 Still, all interviewees agreed that, over the years, the quality and quantity of information given with the budget bill by the government to parliament has improved considerably. Even the usually critical communist MP, Octávio Teixeira, considered that information has improved. He remembered how, in the first discussion of the budget (1983–84), the government simply sent to parliament a large volume of paper, which was of no use to the MPs;15 in this respect, the Cavaco Silva governments coincided with a progressive improvement in the quality of information given to parliament.

6.2 The debates on the budget 6.2.1 Division between Chamber and Committee According to the Law, the budget bill should be approved by 15 December each year.16 In mid-October, government presents the bill to the Assembleia da República. The bill is then distributed to the standing committees for the prior referral stage. In the case of the budget, the prior referral includes all standing committees. Each committee makes a report on the budget area of its competence, after having discussed it and heard members

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of the government. All of these reports are sent to the Economy and Finance Committee, which produces a final report. The debates contributing to these reports are not recorded and, therefore, cannot be included in this analysis. This prior referral is followed by the first reading in the chamber with both MPs and government ministers being present. The final report of the Economy and Finance Committee is often read in the chamber just before the first reading debate starts. If approved, the bill proceeds to the Economy and Finance Committee where part of the second reading takes place. Here, the budget of each department is analysed in detail with the participation of government representatives. This is where some important votes are taken, in particular all of those referring to expenditure such as propositions to assign an amount of money to build a particular school. MPs not belonging to the Economy and Finance Committee may participate in these debates just as they can propose amendments; they cannot vote, though, this being reserved for the members of the Committee. The second part of this stage takes place in the chamber (where all MPs participate and vote). It basically consists of the final part of the second reading and a final vote on the amended overall budget bill. The second reading in the chamber consists of the discussion and vote on articles and amendments referring to revenue. Besides this, MPs may also request the transfer to the chamber of any article or amendment that has already been discussed and voted in committee (hereafter ‘Transfer Request’—Requerimento de Avocação pelo Plenário). These Transfer Requests are subject to a vote and have been overwhelmingly rejected. Moreover, since 1991, as seen above, any group of 23 MPs may decide the transfer to the chamber of a particular article or amendment referring to the tax system. The second reading is immediately followed by the final vote. Thus, briefly, the deliberative process of the budget involves three stages (excluding the prior referral which is not recorded): • first reading in the chamber • second reading in the committee • part of the second reading, as well as final vote, in the chamber An overview of the debates on the budget provides us with good clues on the development of parliamentary work in the Assembleia da República over the four legislatures studied here. The amount of time spent discussing and amending the budget is a first indicator on this; it shows how parliament dedicates less and less time to examining bills.17 In the two parliaments with absolute majorities, although the number of discussion days does not vary much from the other legislatures, each plenary session is strikingly shorter. The RP prescribes the number of days that the budget discussion can last, preventing therefore large variations on this.18 Still, there was a steady decrease in the number of days taken to discuss the budget from the III to the VI: from an average of 16.5 days to a mere 11. However, it is the decrease in the length of each debate that emphasises this trend. A simple, but significant, indicator of this is the latest closing time of each first reading debate. Whereas both in the III and IV Legislatures, the average latest closing time was 1:00 am, in the V that time decreased to 10:00 p.m., falling to 8:00 p.m. in the VI. The difference is even more abrupt when looking at the third stage of the

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deliberation, which also takes place in the chamber: 9.45 a.m. (III) and 9.00 a.m. (IV) to 2.35 a.m. (V) and 10.50 p.m. (VI). This explains the nostalgia of long-serving MPs in referring to the ‘good old days’, when parliament used to meet for long hours of ‘serious’ debate. When interviewed, the MP Helena Torres Marques put great emphasis on the fact that they actually spent nights debating the budget in the first years.19 Curiously, such differences are not so visible in committee. The average latest closing time does not decrease over the four legislatures, remaining indeed approximately the same: 3:00 a.m. for the III and V, 5:00 a.m. for the IV and 4:00 a.m. for the VI. This trendless fluctuation is confirmed by another indicator: the total number of hours spent in each debate. Taking into account merely the stage of committee work, one could say that although MPs spent slightly less time in the budget’s deliberation during the absolute majorities, there is little evidence of deep changes. In fact, Figure 1

Figure 1 Hours spent in the Committee stage, budget debates. Source: Parliamentary papers [DAR] reporting the budget debates (see bibliography).

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Figure 2 Hours spent in the Chamber stages, budget debates. Source: Parliamentary papers [DAR] reporting the debates on the budget (see bibliography). shows that the amount of time spent in committee deliberation has not decreased much from the III and IV legislatures to the V What is more, that time has actually increased from the V legislature to the VI. However, a different picture emerges if one considers the same indicator in the other two stages, those in the chamber. As Figure 2 shows, from the III and the IV legislatures to those with absolute majorities, there is a clear and strong decrease in the overall time spent discussing the budget in the Plenum. The rationalisation process described in chapter 3 (3.3) had clear effects in the reduction of the time spent in the chamber, contrary to the committee’s work which was actually enhanced. Although this trend is continuous throughout the period between 1983 and 1995, the data referring to the third stage (Figure 2) show that it was particularly the experience of the absolute majorities that contributed to the decline of the Plenum’s prominence: there was an increase of the time spent in the chamber from the III to the iy which dropped considerably in the V and VI. The legislative function was increasingly pushed to the committee. In contrast, the chamber was seen more and more by the

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opposition as an opportunity to publicise its policy proposals and to exert influence over government’s decisions. This trend is confirmed by the increasing number of votes taken in committee, to the detriment of the chamber. Table 22 shows this tendency very clearly: in all III, IV and V the proportion of votes taken on the budget in the chamber was

Table 22 Proportion of votes taken in committee and in the chamber, on the budget, over the four legislatures (in percentage) III

IV

V

VI

Committee 41.2 36.2 46.2 50.0 Chamber 58.8 63.8 53.8 50.0 Source: Parliamentary papers [DAR] reporting the debates on the budget (see bibliography).

Table 23 Proportion of votes taken in committee and in the chamber, on the budget, in each year of the V and the VI legislatures (in percentage) 1/V 2/V 3/V 4/V 1/VI 2/VI 3/VI 4/VI Committee 53.1 48.9 45.6 38.2 52.0 62.5 53.6 35.2 Chamber 46.9 51.1 54.4 61.8 48.0 37.5 46.4 64.8 Source: Parliamentary papers [DAR] reporting the debates on the budget (see bibliography).

higher than those in committee; this changed in the VI when the votes were shared in equal parts between the chamber and the committee. This transfer of the legislative function to the committee followed not only the broad rationalisation move described in chapter 3, but also the changes in the rules of the 1991 Budget Law (see 6.1), which transferred the voting of some revenue matters from the Plenum to the Economy and Finance Committee. As time spent in the chamber diminished, every opportunity to speak up in the Plenum became ever more valuable. The importance of the chamber as a privileged site to publicise the PGs’ proposals is particularly clear in the large number of votes taken in the chamber in the last years of the V and VI. Table 23 shows the proportion of votes taken in committee and in the chamber in each year of those two legislatures. Note that these were the first legislatures in the Portuguese parliament when the prospect of elections was certain. In face of that prospect, the PGs dramatically increased their input into the chamber. The importance of this is particularly clear if compared to the contrary general trend (see Table 22). During the first three years of the VI legislature the votes were taken primarily in committee; this changed completely in the fourth year. There was also a considerable increase in the number of votes taken in the chamber in the last year of the V The reduction of the time spent in the chamber and the enhancement of the role of the Economy and Finance Committee is representative of the broad move of rationalising procedures of the Assembleia da República. This rationalisation process was also visible

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in the increasing organisation of the debates on the budget, both in the chamber and in the committee. 6.2.2 Organisation of debates and voting One of the interesting aspects in analysing the budget debates from 1983 to 1995 is the possibility to witness how a deliberation process develops: how it first starts in parliament and progressively leads to the setting up of a ruling framework. This happens not only through the formal regulation of procedural rules, but also importantly through the very practice of the debates. A pattern of debate had to be internalised by the MPs, members of government and the Table (who conducts the sessions). In 1983, MPs did not know exactly which rules to follow and what to expect and demand from the government (in terms of information provided, for instance); by the end of the VI, the pattern of the budget debate had long been established and rationalisation of procedures was fully visible. In the III legislature, an important part of the budget debates centred on the issue of how to conduct the debate and how to vote. There were frequent arguments about when MPs (or government members) were allowed to intervene or which order to follow in the voting; a recurrent problem was how to determine whether an amendment or article had been fully discussed. As a consequence, the debates were rather tangled. There was no specific day dedicated just for voting and the votes were mingled with the debate itself. In addition, the main opposition party, the PCP, was a fierce opponent of the large majority held by the PS-PSD, which only made the discussion itself even more tangled. In the IV legislature, there was much less discussion on procedural matters, as well as less conflict in the debates; in particular during the first year, when the opposition behaved as if responsible for keeping political stability. During the second year, conflict increased progressively, as disagreements between the government and the opposition escalated. Over these two years the debates became more organised and both MPs and government became more familiar with the discussion of the budget. Both in the debates and in the interviews carried out for this study, there was some emphasis on the improvement of the information provided by the government of the IV The voting was still relatively mingled with the debate, but it took place on a separate day set aside for that purpose. Before, the votes were taken as the discussion developed. Both in the III and the IV, there were a substantial number of proposals and counterproposals formulated as a result of the discussion itself. This was particularly true in the IV, when the interventions tended to be more specific on particular matters of the budget. In contrast, the V second reading debates became increasingly an exchange of broad policy statements. This became even more of a reality in the VI when the debates were considerably rationalised. The data on the committee stage show that, although there was an increase in the overall time used to intervene during the VI, the number of interventions actually decreased, suggesting that they consisted primarily of broad statements, rather than small contributions to a discussion.20 The data on the first reading confirm this, as can be seen in Table 24. In the V, there was a strong awareness of the rules governing interventions both in the chamber and committee, and the voting process became much more rationalised. Some amendments started to be aggregated and voted on together, so that some votes could

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actually represent, for instance, 20 or 60 amendments.21 These aggregated amendments usually concerned expenditure, proposing an amount of

Table 24 Number of speakers and interventions at the first reading of the budget, in the four legislatures (average per legislative year) III

IV

V

VI

Speakers 151 150.5 86.75 70 Speeches 62 69 39.25 30.75 Questions to Speeches 116.5 110.5 66 50.75 Points of Order 51.5 39.5 37.25 23 Protests 35 0.5 0.5 0 Defences of 5.5 4.5 8.25 4 Consideration/Honour Total number of 327 258 181 137 interventions Total number of hours 30h28 25h15 17h34 13h45 Source: Parliamentary papers [DAR] reporting the debates on the budget (see bibliography).

money to build schools, hospitals, courts, and so on, in specific towns of the country. This rationalisation process went forward during the VI legislature when even articles from the budget bill were aggregated in a single vote; in some cases, different clauses from different articles were actually aggregated in a single vote. In these last years of the absolute majority period, the voting occurred more and more in a serial way with no discussion between each vote. Following the broad tendency of a decrease in time used in the chamber, the number of speakers per PG and for the government also diminished over the four legislatures, just as did the number of interventions—that is the number of times a speaker talked, regardless of the procedure used. Table 24 shows this very clearly; it indicates the number of times MPs and members of government spoke in the first reading, over the four legislatures, as well as the different procedures they used (see Appendix III: Glossary of Parliamentary Terms). The other two stages were not included for specific reasons: in the second stage (in committee) it is often difficult to determine which procedure is being used and the third stage would bring some difficulty of interpretation as it mixes the second reading with the final vote. Table 24 shows that not only there was a consistent decrease in the number of speakers and interventions over the four legislatures, but also that the main drop was from the coalition and minority legislatures to the absolute majority ones. The number of speakers dropped by around 40 per cent from the IV to the V, as did the number of speeches and questions to speeches. The rationalisation process undergone at the beginning of the absolute majority period is very clear. What is more, this change happened primarily in the second year of the V legislature (1988–89), after which the values did not vary much.22 This suggests that the 1988 revision of the RP was the main cause of the rationalisation of parliamentary practice undergone during those years, rather

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than the practical effects of an absolute majority. It was the changes introduced in 1988 that pushed forward the rationalisation process. The effects of the changes are obvious in other indicators shown in Table 24, namely the protests. This procedure was repeatedly used in the early years and often caused the debates to extend considerably. MPs tended to use the ‘protest’ if they were unhappy about another speaker’s words, rather than calling for the defence of consideration, seen as a last resort procedure. Until the revision of 1985, ‘protests’ were not regulated in the RP. There was a single article mentioning the possibility of MPs using this procedure with no prescription of the conditions of how to use it, for how long or how often.23 The revision of 1985 eliminated that article and substituted it with several others specifying the conditions to follow in the use of procedures such as protests. A time limit was introduced (2 minutes per protest) and it became clear that this time would be discounted from the overall time allocated to each PG in a debate;24 before then, this was unclear. The effects of this regulation are clear in the above table: from an average of 35 protests per year in the III legislature, these dropped to 1 in the two years of the IV, as well as in each of the first two years of the V, disappearing altogether thereafter. As a consequence of the new rules introducing limits on the use of parliamentary procedures, as well as of the restrictions introduced in the time available in each debate (see 3.3.1.1), the PGs started to favour different procedures. Time available in the chamber and opportunities to speak there became all the more valuable for the PGs and, as a consequence, they adapted their strategy. The use of procedures such as points of order and defences of consideration is indicative of this. The time used by these procedures is not deductible from the overall time allocated for each debate; they constitute, therefore, good opportunities to intervene on the floor of the Assembleia. Table 24 shows that those two procedures are the only ones that did not drop in the same proportion as the overall time spent in each first reading of the budget. From the IV to the V there was only a decrease of 6% in the number of points of order and, in the case of the defences of consideration, there was actually an increase to nearly double. What is more, the nature of the use of these procedures also changed. Whereas in the III and in the IV, points of order were actually used to raise questions on parliamentary procedures and defences of consideration for serious offence between speakers, in the subsequent legislatures PGs used them increasingly for other purposes. There was an increase of what is called here ‘virtual’ points of order and defences of consideration, instead of ‘real’ ones. An MP would, for instance, ask to raise a point of order and then carry on commenting on someone else’s speech. At the end of the first debate of the VI legislature, for instance, opposition MPs created a political incident in the chamber around the issue of some specific VAT funds, which until then had been directed to the local councils. Thanks to a clever use of virtual points of order, the opposition delayed the session, led the public in the galleries to demonstrate (being subsequently removed after the Speaker had to repeat the order three times) and managed to hit the headlines in the evening news.25 Table 25 shows the proportion of real and virtual points of order and defences of consideration in the first reading debates of the budget in the III and the VI legislatures. The interpretation of the values of Table 25 is clear: more and more speakers saw the procedures not deductible from the overall time as valuable opportunities to speak in the

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chamber. What is more, this increased in the last years of the VI legislature: out of 18 uses of these procedures in the 4th/VI, 15 were virtual and

Table 25 Real and virtual points of order and defences of consideration, in the III and VI legislatures (percentage in relation to the total number of both procedures) III

VI

Real 89.8 40.7 Virtual 10.2 59.3 Source: Parliamentary papers [DAR] reporting the debates on the budget (see bibliography). Note The distinction between ‘virtual’ and ‘real’ can be unclear when coding. The values of the Table refer only to those cases where there was no doubt about the nature of the procedure. A virtual point of order is one where there is no mention of procedural problems and no question is directed to the Table, A virtual defence of consideration is one where it is clear that there is no object of offence and nothing distinguishes it from a normal speech on the matter in debate. The cases raising doubts about their nature have not been included, but constitute only a small part. There were 88 coded cases in the III and 81 in the VI.

only three were real. In the face of this increasing virtual use of procedures, the revision of 1993 introduced some changes aiming at discouraging it. As explained in chapter 3 (see 3.3.3.2), it was decided then that a speaker asking to intervene for a defence of consideration would only be able to do so at the end of the debate. Being postponed, this procedure would lose most of its impact. Before 1993, defences of consideration had priority over any other procedure, which meant that MPs could use them as a way to intervene before other speakers. Table 24 indicates that these changes were acknowledged by the MPs: it shows a decline in the number of defences of consideration from the V and the VI by more than half. Again, this change occurred after the RP revision (March 1993) and in the last two years of the VI legislature there were no defences of consideration at the budget debates’ first readings. Interestingly, this procedure started to be used in the committee stage. This is indicative of the way MPs and members of government internalised the rationalisation process. Following the changes in the chamber, debates in the Economy and Finance Committee became also much more organised. There was a concern to label every single intervention, as well as to set timings, following broadly the rules applied to the chamber. Although there are no strict time limits at committee stage, MPs started to use the procedure of defence of consideration to intervene in the debate. The first time this happened was in the 3rd/V Then, the highly respected chair Rui Machete made the following comment:

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Naturally, I will have to give you the floor [to the independent MP Helena Roseta], but if we carry on this way we are not going to do any debate on the budget, because we will be reproducing all the faults and weaknesses that have unfortunately poisoned some of the chamber debates.26

Table 26 Transfer requests of budget articles and amendments (average per legislative year) III IV

V

VI

Transfer requests 1 0 10 12.75 Source: Parliamentary papers [DAR] reporting the debates on the budget (see bibliography).

During the VI legislature, defences of consideration became more frequent at the committee stage, just as did the virtual use of them and of points of order. The use of Transfer Requests [Requerimentos de Avocação]27 in the period of the absolute majorities was another clear sign of the PGs’ change of strategy to intervene in parliament. As explained before, any PG may propose to transfer the vote on a particular article or amendment from the committee to the chamber; this takes the form of a ‘written request’ [Requerimento], which is read in the chamber and subsequently voted on. In this way, PGs obtain extra time to present in the Plenum their arguments on issues that were discussed in committee. Table 26 shows that the practice of using this procedure was only institutionalised during the absolute majorities. In the III legislature, in each year, only one Transfer Request was presented, in the IV there were none and from the beginning of the V to the end of the VI that number increased from 6 to 19. The strong increase of the number of Transfer Requests presented suggests that its use was merely a way of obtaining extra time in the chamber, traditionally the public face of parliament. Note that these Transfer Requests were overwhelmingly rejected by the majority party. The debates on the budget over the four legislatures give, therefore, plenty of evidence on how Portuguese parliamentary activity developed over those years. The rationalisation process is evident throughout the debates and the votes. The several revisions of the RP had clear effects on parliamentary activity. However, they were obviously not the only cause for the rationalisation; this was also the consequence of parliamentary practice itself, which in a new democracy can change quite rapidly. As new rules were brought in, new practice developed and new needs emerged; this is the development process towards a ‘mature’ institution.

6.3 Amendments to the budget 6.3.1 Overview The identification of the exact number of amendments put forward to the budget bill presents some difficulties. Although most of the amendments proposed are published in the DAR, many are not published beforehand because they are formulated during the debate itself. Besides this, tracing the amendments in the DAR is not always a clear-cut task.28 Since the identification of the number of amendments proposed does not offer

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guarantees of accuracy, it was decided to identify them by their vote; that is, our measure on the number of amendments put forward by the PGs is based on the number of votes taken; that is, it is assumed that the number of amendments corresponds to the number of votes. However, four problems occur with this option: firstly, some of the amendments proposed are withdrawn by their proponents before being voted on, and sometimes even before being discussed; secondly, some amendments are not voted on because they become irrelevant (prejudicado), after another amendment has been approved on the same issue;29 thirdly, the aggregation of several amendments into one vote makes it impossible to register them individually; finally, the complexity of each amendment varies enormously. These four problems are equally valid for each article of the budget bill proposed by the government. The first two problems are difficult to resolve as parliamentary papers do not always give the necessary information to evaluate the number of withdrawn and irrelevant amendments. However, there is no reason to expect that the variation in their number would have any dramatic effect on the overall number of amendments and articles voted on. The other two problems are actually solved by the MPs’ choices themselves, when they decide to vote on several amendments (articles) at the same time or to divide a particular amendment (article) into different parts, each voted on separately. The purpose of presenting an amendment, or article, is to cause the discussion of a particular problem, just as its vote is a form of demonstrating a political choice. In that sense each vote that the MPs decide to take30 is in itself representative of a political decision on a particular issue; this is why, for the purpose of analysis, each vote will be considered as a single amendment or article, according to the subscriber (amendments are proposed by PGs (or MPs) and articles by the government). Although the budget bill has grown in extent from 1983 to 1995, the number of proposed amendments has slightly decreased as can be seen in Table 27.31 The variation between legislatures is not particularly significant (especially taking into account the problems mentioned above). What is more, the reduction of amendments in the last two legislatures might be misleading, as it was at the V legislature that amendments started to be aggregated on a regular basis into large groups and voted together (generally, on the expenditure part of the budget). However, within each legislature there are some interesting variations.

Table 27 Amendments to the budget proposed in each legislature (average per legislative year) III

IV

V

VI

Number of amendments 208 186.5 178 171 Source: Parliamentary papers [DAR] reporting the debates on the budget (see bibliography).

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Table 28 Amendments to the budget proposed in the V and VI legislatures in each legislative year 1/V 2/V 3/V 4/V 1/VI 2/VI 3/VI 4/VI Number of 183 167 155 207 135 179 158 212 amendments Source: Parliamentary papers [DAR] reporting the debates on the budget (see bibliography).

In the III legislature, the number of amendments does not vary much between the two years; but in the IV the number nearly doubles in the second year, probably as a result of the intensifying conflict between the PSD and the opposition parties. In the absolute majority legislatures, the increase in the number of amendments happened consistently in the fourth year, that is the last year of each legislature, when the proximity of elections was known to everyone. Table 28 shows the number of proposed amendments in each year of the V and VI legislatures. Table 28 indicates that, faced with prospective elections, the parties presented more proposals, many of them corresponding to compromises assumed in the electoral manifestos. It was a way of putting forward and discussing their own point of view and to determine the political agenda. This supports the same argument put forward above regarding the division of votes between committee and chamber: at the end of the legislative period, the number of votes taken in the chamber increased considerably (see 6.2.1). This shows that, regardless of the chances of having their amendments approved, the PGs used parliament’s arena as a privileged place to introduce themselves to the public, as well as their proposals. 6.3.2 Parties proposals The distinction between PGs, in terms of the number of amendments proposed, reveals important differences between the main parties. The communist party was the main one proposing amendments, except for the last legislature.32 This is typical of their behaviour in parliament: they are known for proposing substantial numbers of proposals. In the III, the PCP was the main opposition party and proposed a particularly large number of amendments: 127.5 on average per year, as opposed to 52.5 (in the IV), 58.3 (in the V) and 49.5 (in the VI). In fact, the PCP amendments represented 61 per cent of the total number of amendments proposed to the budget in the III legislature, as Table 29 shows. This is indicative of the particularly fierce opposing action of the PCP during those two years; this party was the main opposition focus in parliament, despite representing a similar proportion of seats as the CDS (see Table 3, 2.2). The CDS played, on the other hand, a very modest role in proposing amendments throughout the four legislatures. It was particularly weak in the V: from an average of about 13 amendments per year in the III/IV, CDS amendments fell to 4.5 in the V This can be partly explained by the sharp reduction in the size of the PG from the IV to the V: from 22 MPs to only 4.33 Moreover, this PG clearly showed a diminished interest in the budget debates, especially in the last two years

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Table 29 Amendments proposed by the main parties, in the four legislatures (percentages in relation to the total number of amendments) III

IV

V

VI

CDS 6.3 7.2 2.5 8.0 PCP 61.3 28.1 32.7 28.9 PRD — 12.6 7.9 — PS 0.7 15.5 24.2 32.6 PSD 0.7 10.5 19.4 18.3 PS/PSD 18.8 — — — OTHER 12.2 26.1 13.3 12.2 Total 100 100 100 100 Source: Parliamentary papers [DAR] reporting the debates on the budget (see bibliography).

of the V legislature. In the 3rd/V the CDS did not propose a single amendment to the budget. What is more, no CDS MP participated in the committee debates (where most of the second reading takes place) in either of the last two years of the V legislature; the CDS only intervened on the last days of those meetings, when voting took place. When the MP Nogueira de Brito entered the committee room on its last meeting (when voting took place) in the 4th/V, the chair, Rui Machete, made the following ironic comment: ‘— Very happy to see you…’ [‘—Tenho muito gosto em vê-lo…’].34 The VI legislature represented a new boost in this PG’s activity, probably as a result of a change in the party’s leadership; it was then that the young new leader Manuel Monteiro brought a new style of action to the party. As for the PS, the main opposition party from the IV to the VI, it proposed progressively a more and more important share of the amendments presented. As part of the government team, in the III, the PS presented together with the PSD a proportion of around 19 per cent. Many of these amendments were a result of the discussion itself: as problems were identified by other PGs, the PS-PSD majority would propose an amendment, in particular in the case of requests for delegation of powers by the government, as we will see below. The elections to the IV legislature represented a major downfall for the PS: not only did it fail to be the party with the most votes, but also the newly emerged PRD attracted mainly PS voters. Although it was the second most supported party, the role of the PS was in fact seriously diminished. This explains why in the first year of the IV the PS was the PG proposing the smallest proportion of amendments: only 6.5 per cent. From the 2nd/IV onwards, the PS gradually recovered its role as the main opposition party and, in the VI, it proposed the largest proportion of the amendments: 32.6 per cent. Also in this case, a change in the leadership might explain a more active role of this PG (António Guterres was elected as the new PS leader at the beginning of the VI). It is difficult to assess the exact number of proposals put forward by the PSD. The government cannot propose amendments, therefore it presents them through its supporting PG. This is why it is not always clear in the parliamentary papers which amendments are actually subscribed to by the PSD parliamentary group. In

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Table 30 Proportion of consensual amendments in the four legislatures (percentage in relation to the total number of amendments proposed) III

IV

V VI

Consensual amendments 1.9* 20.9 4.5 4.4 Source: Parliamentary papers [DAR] reporting the debates on the budget (see bibliography). Note * This does not include amendments subscribed to by the PS-PSD majority.

any case, the proportion of amendments proposed by the majority party does not vary much. It represented between 18 per cent and 19 per cent, except in the IV legislature when it fell to 10.5 per cent of the total number of amendments. This difference between a situation of minority government and majority may be explained by government’s degree of confidence in seeing its proposals approved. In a situation of absolute majority, the government felt free to add to the budget text through the majority PG. From the four legislatures, the IV is the one where the total number of amendments is the more equally distributed between the PGs: no one PG represented a clear focus of action; even in the case of the PCP, this was the parliament in which it proposed the lowest proportion of amendments. This was partly due to the presence of a fifth main party, the PRD (who proposed 12.6 per cent of the total amendments), and also to the consensual mood in parliament. A good indicator of this ‘mood’ is the number of amendments subscribed to by several PGs, called here ‘consensual amendments’. As Table 30 shows, the consensual amendments represented 20.9 per cent of the total number of amendments proposed in the IV This represents undoubtedly a high proportion of amendments subscribed to by more than one PG, especially if compared to the mere 2 per cent or 4 per cent in the other legislatures. The consensus mood was particularly strong in the first year of the IV legislature, 1985–86, when the consensual amendments represented 32.3 per cent of the total number of amendments proposed. However, although this consensual mood was shared by the government’s party (as a necessity to keep in power), the consensus was mainly shared between the opposition PGs: 84.6 per cent of the consensual amendments of the IV were not subscribed to by the PSD. In the absence of a clear focus of power, the opposition knew that parliament had a major say in politics and that it was up to the opposition PGs to seize it by reaching agreements, instead of acting individually As a following section on voting will show, in reality, the decisional power would actually remain in one single PG: the one ideologically at the centre, the PRD. 6.3.3 The myth of the delegation of powers bills The government’s misuse of delegation of powers bills [Autorizações Legislativas] was the object of frequent complaint from the opposition during the absolute majority period. As seen before, government may propose bills asking parliament for a delegation of

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powers to legislate on a specific matter. These bills should clearly define the object and the extent of the legislation to be brought forward. The opposition MPs repeatedly claimed not only that government used this legislative procedure too often, but also that the delegation of powers bills were too vague about their object and extent. The recurrence of these complaints in previous interviews led to the introduction in this study of a specific variable about the requests for delegation of powers included in the budget bill. If there were indeed too many delegation of power articles or if they were poorly specified, we would expect to find a reasonable number of amendments aiming either at withdrawing requests for delegation of powers, or introducing specifications in the request made by the government. However, the information collected indicates that this did not happen. Table 31 shows the number of amendments presented that aimed at withdrawing a delegation of powers request or at specifying it in more detail. The information displayed in Table 31 refers only to those cases where it was absolutely clear that the aim of the proponent was to withdraw or to specify a request of delegation of powers. The table shows that, during the absolute majority period, the opposition complaints about government’s misuse of delegation of powers requests did not agree with corresponding behaviour from the opposition: only a small percentage of the amendments aimed at withdrawing or specifying that type of request. This is confirmed by the total number of amendments moved to articles of the budget which request a delegation of powers, whatever the objective of the amendment.35 Table 32 shows the proportion of these for the four legislatures.

Table 31 Proportion of amendments withdrawing or specifying a delegation of powers request (percentage in relation to the total number of amendments to delegation of powers requests) III IV V VI Amendments withdrawing a 10.2 11.8 7.3 0 delegation of powers request Amendments specifying a 6.3 4.2 3.3 4.4 delegation of powers request Source: Parliamentary papers [DAR] reporting the debates on the budget (see bibliography).

Table 32 Proportion of amendments to requests of delegation of powers, in the four legislatures (percentage in relation to the total number of amendments proposed to the budget bill) III IV

V VI

Amendments to requests of 26.9 31.9 21.1 9.9 delegation of power Source: Parliamentary papers [DAR] reporting the debates on the budget (see bibliography).

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Independently of the amendments’ aim, PGs were not as interested in the delegation of powers requests as one might expect from their discourse; in particular, there was a strong decrease in the number of amendments in the VI legislature aiming at that type of request. By contrast, in the two previous legislatures, the opposition did effectively express concern about the formulation of delegation of powers requests. This can be clearly seen in the reading of the debates. Both in the III and the IV legislatures, there was considerable discussion about the lack of specification in the government’s requests, whereas in the V and VI this tended to fade. As some of the MPs interviewed agreed, this development is partly the result of a learning process from both parts, parliament and government. Since the first budget was discussed back in 1983, the type of information given by government has improved considerably, partly as a result of the criticisms made in the debates. In this context, small parties such as the UEDS [União da Esquerda para a Democracia Socialista] and, particularly, the ASDI [Acção Social-Democrata Independente] had a fundamental role in the III legislature.36 The MPs of these two parties were elected as independents in the lists of the PS and formed separate PGs once in parliament.37 They were relatively close to the PS (and to the PSD, in the case of the ASDI) but, at the same time, they freely expressed criticism of government’s decisions. This ambivalence made possible the formulation of many suggestions to the budget’s text which were accepted by the majority PS-PSD; in particular, in the case of poorly defined requests for delegation of powers. In interview, Magalhães Mota had a firm view on parliament’s role in introducing limits and specifications to the requests of delegation of powers.38 This former ASDI MP said that, thanks to the concerns expressed in those first years of the discussion of the budget, as well as the actual improvements introduced, there was an internalisation of a proper use of the technique of delegation of powers requests. The discussion of article 8.° of the budget for 1984 is a good example of the way the ASDI led the government to agree to specifications in requests for delegation of powers. This PG pointed out the lack of specification in that article, which would enable the government to proceed with transfers of money such as the one to the autonomous regions, without much specification of its aims. After some discussion, the Budget Secretary of State himself agreed to some changes, just as the majority parties agreed to others, and in the end a new PS-PSD amendment was put forward to meet the lack of specification.39 Another indicator showing that there has been better care in asking for a delegation of powers from parliament, is the reduction in the number of votes taken on these requests. The budget has presented more and more direct changes to Taxes Codes, instead of asking for a delegation of powers to issue legislation on those matters. In these cases, the government proposes an alternative text to replace actual articles in a Tax Code. An important number of the amendments about revenue are, therefore, directed more and more to those direct changes in the Codes. Table 33 shows that the proportion of votes taken on delegation of powers requests has indeed decreased considerably from the first two legislatures to the absolute majority ones. Independently of a more or less extensive use of delegation of powers bills by the government, Table 33 shows a diminishing concern from the PGs with this

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Table 33 Votes taken on articles of the budget requesting a delegation of powers, in the four legislatures (percentage in relation to the total number of votes on the budget articles) III IV

V

VI

Votes taken on articles 68.4 74.2 56.6 38.7 requesting a delegation of powers Source: Parliamentary papers [DAR] reporting the debates on the budget (see bibliography).

type of bill. It should be remembered that if any PG wishes to vote on a particular article or clause of the budget separately, that this will be done. In the III and IV there was indeed a higher concern with the amount of information given to parliament by government; in particular in the IV when the opposition had considerable power. A good example of this was the number of amendments proposed with the sole purpose of obliging government to provide information to parliament on a specific matter: 5 per cent of the amendments proposed in the IV had that sole purpose; what is more, most of them were approved (17 out of 19).

6.4 Voting on the budget One of the main advantages of the budget case study is the possibility to look in detail at the voting behaviour of Portuguese MPs, as well as at the actual decisional power of the different PGs. This section studies the votes on the second reading of the budget bills over the four legislatures. The three different political situations known from 1983 to 1995 (coalition, minority and absolute majority) clearly suggest two patterns of power in the policy-making process: an influential one in the III, V, and VI, and a decisional one in the IV Still, in the III legislature the majority was formed by two different (major) parties which meant that some policy negotiation took place in parliament. There is, thus, some difference in parliament’s role in 1983–85 to that in the period of the absolute majorities. The votes on the budget were either taken in committee or in the chamber, according to the issue and requests to transfer the vote to the Plenum, as explained above (see 6.2.1). Because of the detail provided in the budget data, they allow a clearer picture of parliament’s power and role in policy-making, than the overall data referring to the first reading and final votes of all bills, seen in chapter 4. 6.4.1 Voting behaviour 6.4.1.1 Consensus versus conflict An overview of the votes taken on parties’ amendments and government’s articles shows that political positions were less extreme in the IV legislature, than in the other three

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legislatures. Notably, the dichotomy between majority and opposition was less acute. In that minority parliament, PGs had necessarily to work together to achieve decisions. Table 34 illustrates this. It shows the proportion of the amendments proposed by the main opposition PGs which the majority PG (or PGs in the case of the III) voted against, in each legislature. Table 34 indicates that the disagreements between majority and opposition were not as distinct in the IV legislature, as in the other legislatures. Although always high, the proportion of the opposition amendments which got a vote against them from the majority was actually below the 90 per cent level during the minority legislature. By contrast, in the absolute majority period that proportion of votes was very near to 100 per cent. On the other hand, the opposition parties also worked more closely together during the IV legislature; among other things, they tended to vote in favour of each others’ amendments more often, as can be seen in Table 35. This table shows the direction of the main opposition PGs’ votes on articles and amendments in the IV legislature: the proportion of the votes in favour, against and abstentions.

Table 34 Proportion of the opposition amendments which the majority PG(s) voted against (percentage in relation to each PG’s total number of amendments) III

IV

V

VI

PS — 85.7 99.4 98.2 PRD — 61.1** 98.2 — PCP 100 86.9 99.6 99.0 CDS 82.6* 65.2* 94.1* 100 Source: Parliamentary papers [DAR] reporting the debates on the budget (see bibliography). Notes This table excludes the unanimity votes, that is votes in which all PGs agreed on a same vote. The same applies to the subsequent tables. * These percentages refer to a small number of amendments: III and IV=23; V=17. ** This percentage refers to a small number of amendments: 36.

Table 35 Votes of the opposition PGs on amendments and articles, in the IV legislature (percentage in relation to the total number of votes of each party) PS PRD PCP CDS F Ag Ab F Ag Ab F Ag Ab F Ag Ab Government 63.8 10.2 25.2 82.7 1.6 15.7 9.4 36.2 54.3 81.1 3.1 15.6 PSD* 20.0 40.0 40.0 43.3 36.7 20.0 10.0 50.0 40.0 83.3 3.3 13.3 PS 100 26.8 48.2 25.0 78.6 8.9 12.5 12.5 82.1 5.4

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PRD* 86.1 2.7 8.3 100 80.6 2.8 16.7 44.4 33.3 22.2 PCP 62.6 9.1 27.3 40.4 37.4 22.2 100 11.1 69.7 19.2 CDS* 39.1 39.1 21.7 13.0 56.5 26.1 39.1 47.8 13.0 100 Source: Parliamentary papers [DAR] reporting the debates on the budget (see bibliography). Notes F: votes in favour; Ag: votes against; Ab: abstentions. * Note that these percentages refer to a small number of amendments: PSD=30, PRD=36 and CDS=23.

Table 35 shows that, for instance, the PS voted in favour of a very large proportion of the amendments proposed by the PRD and the PCP (86 per cent and 63 per cent respectively); and so did the PCP in relation to the PS and the PRD amendments (79 per cent and 81 per cent). Besides this, the opposition PGs were also reasonably in agreement with government’s proposals: the PS voted in favour of 64 per cent of the budget articles and the PRD 83 per cent;40 what is more, the PCP, known for its strong opposition, only voted against 36 per cent of the articles of the budgets proposed by the PSD government of Cavaco Silva in those two years of the IV legislature.41 Naturally, a lot of this agreement was only possible thanks to much negotiation and to changes introduced in accordance with demands made by the opposition. In some cases, the government withdrew articles from voting, which were bound to be rejected; in most of the cases additional amendments were proposed by the PSD to meet the criticisms made, or, alternatively, opposition amendments were approved. The IV legislature was, therefore, a very different parliament from the other three, due to its minority nature. PGs worked together with government for each vote. On the contrary, in the majoritarian legislatures PGs had much more dichotomised positions. This can be more clearly perceived through the indicator of the voting distance index. This expresses how similarly or differently pairs of parties have voted.42 The voting distance index varies between zero and one, the former representing total agreement and, the latter, total difference. Figure 3 shows the voting distance indexes for the four legislatures; that is, it shows how similarly or differently pairs of parties have voted over the four legislatures. Figure 3 confirms that there was a stronger consensus in the IV legislature than in the other three legislatures. Not only are the voting distance indexes broadly closer to zero (they tend to be situated towards the left side of the diagram), but also they tend to concentrate together. This idea is sustained by the mean and the standard deviation of the voting distance indexes in each legislature, shown in Table 36. Table 36 shows that the parties worked more closely together in the IV legislature. Not only is the mean lower, indicating voting indexes that are relatively low, that is votes more in agreement than different; but also, the standard deviation is low, indicating small variation between the indexes, that is less dichotomised positions between the parties. In contrast, the III legislature has considerably dichotomised voting distance indexes. There are two main reasons for this: the total agreement between the two main parties that formed the government coalition (PS and PSD) and the oppositional behaviour of the PCP Similarly, the voting distance indexes of the two absolute majorities indicate a rather dichotomised relation between the majority party, the PSD, and the opposition. Simultaneously, the voting distances between opposition parties tended to narrow.

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Figure 3 Voting distance indexes*. Source: Parliamentary papers [DAR] reporting the debates on the budget (see bibliography). Notes * IPS and IPSD refer to individual MPs of the PS and the PSD who voted differently from their PG. ** The voting distance indexes referring to the ASDI and the UEDS in the III legislature are not included for three reasons: clarity of presentation,

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the non-existence of those PGs in the subsequent legislatures and their very small size. In any case, the indexes were as follows: PSD/ASDI and PS/ASDI (0.23), PSD/UEDS and PS/UEDS (0.52), PCP/ASDI (0.57), PCP/UEDS (0.30), CDS/ASDI (0.33), CDS/UEDS (0.40). From the IV to the V legislature, the PSD voting distances moved up in the diagram to the right-hand side, indicating a higher disagreement between this party and the opposition PGs. At the same time, the voting distances between opposition parties moved towards zero, indicating that the opposition parties had a closer voting behaviour in the V than in the IV.43 Interestingly, the dichotomy between majority and opposition does not increase particularly in the VI legislature. The changes occur more in a clearer definition of a left-wing side (PCP and PS) and a right-wing side (PSD and CDS). Although the relationship between the two right-wing parties does not change, the CDS moves away from both the PS and PCP, just as the PSD and the PS move slightly more apart. What is more, the PS and the PCP have a closer voting behaviour than in any of the previous legislatures. This dichotomy between left-wing parties and

Table 36 Mean and standard deviation of the voting distance indexes III*

IV

V

VI

Mean 0.45 0.38 0.42 0.50 Standard deviation 0.21 0.15 0.20 0.22 Source: Parliamentary papers [DAR] reporting the debates on the budget (see bibliography). Note * This takes into account ASDI and UEDS.

right-wing ones, rather than majority and opposition, explains the higher mean and standard deviation. Thus, in terms of voting behaviour there is a clear difference between the minoritarian parliament and the majoritarian ones. The necessity to reach agreements in the former is reflected very clearly in the voting behaviour. In the majoritarian legislatures there was more space for conflict to be expressed. Another major difference between the majority and the minority parliaments was the existence of party dissent. 6.4.1.2 Party dissent The Portuguese system ascribes a central role to PGs, as seen in chapter 3 (see 3.2.1); individually considered, MPs have little scope for intervention in parliament’s decisions. The system does not favour party dissent, as Braga da Cruz has shown.44 The constitution

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prescribes the loss of mandate if MPs switch to a different PG than the one for which they were elected, and the PGs’ internal regulations require the compliance of MPs with party voting. The PCP actually reserves the right to dismiss MPs, if the party is not happy with their action in parliament. Although there was some expression of party dissent in the first years of Portuguese democracy (which actually led to splits in the PS and the PSD PGs),45 the second decade legislatures have had a strong party discipline. In this context, the mere occurence of party dissent in the votes on the budget is a surprising finding. Although one might expect some dissent in the III legislature,46 its occurrence during the absolute majority period reveals a dimension non-existent in the overall perspective on the legislative performance of the Portuguese parliament. Table 37 shows the number of votes in which there was dissent, independent of how many MPs actually voted differently from their party.47 Although these values on party dissent may seem irrelevant if compared to other countries,48 in the Portuguese context they are surprising. The fact that it has a proportional representation system and that it is a new democracy (where mechanisms were put in place to avoid party factionalism) leads one to expect no dissent. This expectation is such that the few studies carried out on the parliaments of Portugal and Spain do not even measure party dissent; total party cohesion is simply assumed. Party cohesion has been emphasised by several Spanish scholars.49 However, no

Table 37 Dissenting votes on the budget in the four legislatures III IV V VI Votes with dissent from PSD 14 1 34 16 MPs Votes with dissent from PS MPs 24 1 5 9 Percentage of dissenting votes in 6.1 0.3 3.5 2.7 each legislature Source: Parliamentary papers [DAR] reporting the debates on the budget (see bibliography).

exhaustive study has been carried out on this matter. A possible explanation for this is the fact that voting at second reading has not been the object of comprehensive studies; this would be where party dissent would appear, as it takes place mainly in committee.50 Another surprising aspect of this dissent on the budget bill is its link with the MPs’ constituencies: 75 per cent of the dissenting votes were on local amendments, that is amendments centred on specific regions of the country. More than half of those are specifically about the autonomous regions of Madeira and the Azores. It should be added that the proportion of dissent would probably be higher if all MPs could vote in committee. As mentioned before, only the members of the Economy and Finance Committee are allowed to vote in this committee, where an important part of budget second reading voting takes place. Besides this, voting dissent in committee was not possible in some occasions due to the way votes were expressed: by one representative of each PG. Gradually, though, dissent has become possible whatever the method used to vote.

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Together with the actual number of dissenting votes, other ways in which MPs have expressed disagreement with their party’s vote should also be considered. Besides disagreement explicitly stated during the discussion in the chamber or, more often, in the committee, MPs occasionally submit a written vote explanation which is published together with the debate’s parliamentary paper. It was the case, for instance, of the MPs of the JSD (Juventude Social Democrata—Youth of the PSD) over the V legislature and of a group of 21 PSD MPs in the 2nd/VI, who did not agree with a value approved by the government for a tax on beer. In their vote explanation, these MPs explicitly disagreed with the government’s decision, although explaining simultaneously that they gave their consent to the government’s proposal ‘for party discipline’ reasons.51 Through vote explanations, MPs declare their disagreement with their party’s decision (or the government’s), whether they have dissented in vote, or not. Besides this, it has also happened that MPs leave the room in order to avoid dissenting from the party. It was the case in the III legislature, for example, of the MP Portugal da Fonseca (then a front bench PSD MP), who left the room just before an amendment subscribed to by himself was rejected by his own party; this amendment aimed at granting a particular sum of money to build a road in a locality of that MP’s constituency (Oliveira de Azeméis in the district of Aveiro).52 6.4.2 Vote outcomes An overview of the approval rates shows no big surprises throughout the four legislatures: whereas the government’s budget passed overwhelmingly, opposition proposals had a high rate of failure. Still, there are important nuances to stress. 6.4.2.1 The IV legislature: a policy-making parliament As expected, the opposition proposals had a reasonable approval rate during the minority government. In fact, as Table 38 shows, this rate was particularly high, which indicates the power the opposition held then. A proportion of nearly 60 per cent of approved amendments is a strong indicator of the opposition’s power in the years of 1985–87.53 It shows that the budget bill was significantly altered by the opposition and often against the will of the government’s party; the PSD voted against 59 per cent of the approved opposition amendments. The debates show that in many of these cases, the majority PG put a lot of effort into trying to dissuade the opposition. A clear example of this was the regulation, in the first legislative session, of a new tax (which the PSD voted against): the tax on oil products.54 According to the former PRD MP, Silva Lopes, in interview, this was just a way to legalise an existing rate charged by the government. However, there was strong opposition from the government to this measure. According to Silva Lopes, the PRD originally proposed this amendment, but it became a joint effort with the PS and the PCP, who obtained the key information to include in the terms of this new tax. Because of the co-operation of those two other parties, the PRD agreed to their request to reduce the price of petrol. The government strongly opposed this reduction in the petrol price, and argued that they would rather reduce the price of milk; it became known as ‘the petrol or the milk’ argument. This case

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became emblematic of the relationship between parliament and government in the IV legislature, where the former was seen as coercive of Cavaco’s government actions.55 What is more, 18 per cent of the PSD’s amendments were rejected (seemingly by the opposition parliamentary groups), just as was one article from the budget.

Table 38 Proportion of articles and amendments approved, in the four legislatures* (in percentage) III

IV

V

VI

Government’s articles 100 99.5 100 100 Majority party(ies)’s 100 83** 91.4 100 amendments Opposition’s 5.8 58.2 5.2 2.6 amendments Source: Parliamentary papers [DAR] reporting the debates on the budget (see bibliography). Notes * By majority party amendments it is understood any amendment which is subscribed to by the PSD(/PS), even if it is not the only proponent. The opposition amendments only include proposals that were not subscribed to by the majority party. Amendments subscribed by the committee overall were not considered as it is not always clear who are the subscribers. ** This percentage refers to a small number of amendments: 47.

In addition, the bill Grandes Opções do Plano for 1987 was rejected. This bill is presented together with the budget and establishes a set of main orientations in the government’s policy plans for the following year. Besides this, much of the government’s text was constrained through the discussion in committee or in the chamber: proposals were withdrawn by the government under pressure from opposition PGs and agreements were reached to approve additional amendments from the opposition or the PSD, so that articles would not be rejected. This continuous negotiation between government and opposition reflects itself in the voting behaviour, as seen above, which shows a much wider consensus between the different PGs than in the majoritarian legislatures. As the interviewees confirmed, negotiation happened in the parliamentary arena. A number of indicators do suggest, therefore, that from 1985 to 1987 the Portuguese parliament was typical of a policy-making legislature, that is one ‘which can not only modify or reject government measures, but can [itself] formulate and substitute a policy for that proposed by government’.56 6.4.2.2 The decisional role of the PRD This decisional role of parliament in the IV legislature was largely due to the party distribution in the chamber. However, there was one party in particular that seemed to play a crucial part in parliament’s decisional power: the PRD. Placed at the centre of a

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well-distributed party spectrum, the PRD seemed not only to be a mediator between the government’s party and the opposition, but also to have a major role in the opposition moves. The PRD had 45 MPs from a total of 250 and sat in the chamber between the left-wing parties (PCP—35 MPs and the PS—54 MPs)57 and the right wing ones (PSD—88 MPs and the CDS—22 MPs). Throughout the IV legislature there were frequent swings of the PRD from left to right, from the opposition side to the government’s. In April 1987, the PRD provoked the end of the IV legislature by proposing a motion of censure in parliament. The budget analysis helps to clarify to what extent this act was representative of the PRD’s actual power during the two years of the IV legislature. The reading of the budget debates of the IV legislature confirm the very important role of the PRD. Its MPs were often considered as the mediating opinion that would balance two opposite scales, majority and opposition, left and right; equally, they were respected for their technical preparation in the discussion of the bill. The work, then, of PRD MPs such as Silva Lopes, Magalhães Mota and Ivo Pinho is still quoted today. In the interviews carried out for this study, the interviewees were unanimous in remembering the quality of the PRD’s preparation in budgetary matters and some saw in that the explanation for the success of that PG at that time. The voting distance indexes show that the PRD was the party with the closest relationship to other parties (see Figure 3): its distance to the other four main parties varied between 0.2 and 0.33. More importantly, the PRD’s views frequently constrained the decisions taken, whether by vote or by mere informal suggestion. A first indicator of this is the rate of the PRD’s approved amendments: 96 per cent

Table 39 Agreement test between the PRD’s vote and the votes outcome, in the IV legislature (kappa test) Vote outcome Approved Rejected PRD’s vote Favour 272 4 Against 5 97 Kappa=0.93 (significance