From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire

From Cyrus to Alexander A History of the Persian Empire

PIERRE BRIANT Translated by P E T E R T.

DANIELS

Winona Lake, Indiana Eisenbrauns 2002

Originally published as Histoire de I'Empire perse by Librairie Artheme Fayard (Paris), copyright © 1996. All rights reserved. Translation copyright © 2002 by Eisenbrauns. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America.

Cataloging in Publication Data Briant, Pierre. [Histoire d e I ' E m p i r e p e r s e . E n g l i s h ] F r o m C y r u s to A l e x a n d e r : a history o f t h e P e r s i a n E m p i r e / Pierre B r i a n t ; translated by Peter T. D a n i e l s , p.

cm.

I n c l u d e s b i b l i o g r a p h i c a l references a n d index. I S B N 1-57506-031-0 (cloth : alio p a p e r ) 1. A c h a e m e n i d dynasty, 5 5 9 - 3 3 0 B.C.

2. Iran — H i s t o r y — T o 6 4 0 .

I. T i t l e . DS281.B7513

2002

935'.01-dc21 2001055736

The

p a p e r used

in this p u b l i c a t i o n

m e e t s the m i n i m u m

r e q u i r e m e n t s of

the

A m e r i c a n N a t i o n a l S t a n d a r d for I n f o r m a t i o n S c i e n c e s — P e r m a n e n c e of P a p e r for Printed Library M a t e r i a l s , A N S I Z 3 9 . 4 8 - 1 9 8 4 . ® ™

Et meme si ce nest, pas vrai, 11 faut croire a I'histoire ancienne. [And even if it is not true, you n e e d to b e l i e v e in a n c i e n t history LEO FERRE

U est difficile de savoir si une interpretation donnee est vraie, il est en revanche plus facile de reconnoitre les mauvaises. [It is difficult to know whether any particular interpretation is c o r r e c t — t h e b a d o n e s are so m u c h easier to identify] UMBERTO ECO

for Charles and

Marguerite

Contents List of Illustrations Preface to the English Translation Translator's Preface

xi xv xix

Introduction: On the Trail of an Empire

1

1. W a s T h e r e a n A c h a e m e n i d E m p i r e ? 1; Again: F r a g m e n t s of

ego-histoire

4. S p a c e a n d T i m e 9;

1;

2. F r o m A l e x a n d e r to C y r u s a n d Back

3. T h e Historian a n d H i s E v i d e n c e 5;

T o the R c a d e i

J I;

A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s 12

Prologue: The Persians before the Empire 1. W h y C y r u s ? 13; Ansan

16;

13

2. T h e F o u n d e r L e g e n d s 14;

4. A n s a n a n d S u s a 17;

Herodotus and Archaeology

18;

3. T h e K i n g s of

5. Persian Society before the C o n q u e s t s :

6. A n s a n , E c b a t a n a , B a b y l o n , a n d S u s a 21;

7. F r o m the M e d e s to the Persians 24;

8. C o n c l u s i o n

27

PART 1 T H E E M P I R E - B U I L D E R S : FROM CYRUS TO DARIUS

Chapter 1. The Land-Collectors: Cyrus the Great and Cambyses (559-522)

31

1. M e d o - P e r s i a n Hostilities, the D e f e a t o f Astyages, a n d the Fall o f E c b a t a n a (553-550)

31;

2. T h e N e w International Situation a n d Cyrus's Projects 33;

3. T h e D e f e a t of C r o e s u s a n d the E s t a b l i s h m e n t of a M e d i t e r r a n e a n F r o n t 35; 4. C y r u s in C e n t r a l Asia 38;

5. T h e C a p t u r e o f B a b y l o n (539) 40;

6. C y r u s , T r a n s - E u p h r a t e s , a n d E g y p t 44; 8. T h e E g y p t i a n C a m p a i g n ( 5 2 5 - 5 2 2 )

50;

7. F r o m C y r u s to C a m b y s e s 49; 9. C a m b y s e s a n d the Egyptian

Traditions 55

Chapter 2. The Conquest and After: An Interim Summary 1. F r o m C y r u s to D a r i u s : S o u r c e s a n d P r o b l e m s 62; Satrapies 63;

3. Tributes a n d Gifts 67;

4. C o n t i n u i t i e s a n d Adaptations:

T h e C a s e of B a b y l o n i a 70;

5. F r o m Bactra to S a r d i s 76;

C o n q u e r e d P o p u l a t i o n s 79;

7. T h e Seats o f Power 84;

Authority 89;

62

2. Satraps a n d

9. T h e K i n g a n d the G o d s 9 3 ;

6. Persians a n d 8. Royalty and

10. Bardiya's Usurpation

(522) 97

Chapter 3. Trouble, Secession, and Rebuilding (522-518) 1. D a r i u s C o m e s to Power (522) 107; 518)

114;

3. T h e Aftermath of Victory: T h e Official Story 122;

and the Six 128;

107

2. Revolts a n d R e c o n q u e s t s ( 5 2 2 -

5. S u m m a r y a n d Perspectives

vu

137

4. D a r i u s

Contents

viii

Chapter 4. Darius the Conqueror (520-486)

139

1. T h e Pursuit of Territorial E x p a n s i o n ( 5 2 0 - 5 1 3 ) Europe

141;

3. T h e Ionian Revolt ( 5 0 0 - 4 9 3 )

Memphis (492-486)

139;

146;

2. T h e Persians in

4. F r o m T h r a c e to

156

PART 2 T H E G R E A T KING

Chapter 5. Images of the World 1. T h e B u i l d e r - K i n g 165; Iconography

172;

165 2. T h e K i n g a n d H i s Peoples: Inscriptions a n d

3. An Idealized I m a g e of S p a c e a n d Imperial Power

4. I m a g e s a n d Realities: T h e K i n g . a m o n g His P e o p l e s Realities: T h e Imperial Festivals 195;

183;

175;

5. I m a g e s a n d

6. Royal T a b l e a n d Royal Paradise:

Exaltation of the C e n t e r a n d Appropriation of S p a c e 200 Chapter 6.

Representations of Royalty and M o n a r c h i c Ideology

1. S o u r c e s a n d P r o b l e m s 204; 3. T h e K i n g in M a j e s t y 216; E a r t h , and the Water 232;

204

2. T h e P r i n c e in His O w n Mirror 210; 4. T h e G o o d Warrior 225;

6. B e t w e e n M e n a n d G o d s

5. T h e K i n g , the

240

Chapter 7. People and Life at Court 1. S o u r c e s and P r o b l e m s 255; E u n u c h s 268; T a b l e 286;

255 2. H o u s e h o l d Staff 258;

4. T h e W o m e n ' s S i d e 277;

6. T h e Royal H u n t s 297;

3. T h e

5. At the G r e a t King's

7. Royal P o m p

299

Chapter 8. The King's Men

302

1. T h e G i v i n g K i n g 302;

2. U n e q u a l E x c h a n g e 316;

Faithful: T h e R a t i o n a l e of the S y s t e m 324; T h e D y n a m i c of the C o n t r a d i c t i o n s 331;

3. T h e K i n g a n d His

4. T h e K i n g a n d His Faithful: 5. K i n g a n d Satraps 338;

K i n g a n d His Faithful: T h e Persians, the G r e e k s , a n d the O t h e r s 7. A c h a e m e n i d Royalty a n d Persian Aristocracy

6.

The

347;

352

PART 3 TERRITORIES, POPULATIONS, AND THE D E P E N D E N T

ECONOMY

Chapter 9. Territories, Communication, and Trade 1. T h e Network of R o a d s 357;

357

2. C o n t r o l of the Imperial Territory 364;

3. L i n e s of C o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d T r a d e 377

Chapter 10. Royal Assessments and Tribute 1. S o u r c e s a n d P r o b l e m s 388; T r i b u t e 394;

2. S a t r a p i e s a n d Tributes 390;

4. Tributes, Gifts, a n d Assessments

Tribute: M e t a l a n d C o i n 406; a n d Adaptations 410; and T r i b u t e L a n d 415

388 399;

3. Gifts and

5. P a y m e n t s of

6. T h e Administration of Tribute: C o n t i n u i t i e s

7. T r i b u t e E c o n o m y a n d Appropriation: Royal L a n d

Contents

ix

Chapter 11. P e r s i a : E m p i r e a n d T r i b u t e E c o n o m y 1. T h e Persepolis Archives 422;

422

2 . Administrative H i e r a r c h y a n d

O r g a n i z a t i o n o f Production 425;

3. T h e World of Work: T h e kurtas 429;

4. Agriculture: P r o d u c e a n d L e v i e s 439;

5. L a n d s a n d E s t a t e s 442;

6. T h e Persepolis T a b l e t s a n d the Imperial Administration: S o u r c e s and P r o b l e m s 447; E g y p t 448;

7. T h e M a n a g e m e n t of Property a n d the Royal W a r e h o u s e s in

8. M a n a g e m e n t of S u r p l u s e s 4 5 1 ;

10. T h e King's H o u s e 463;

9. L a n d s a n d Peasants 456;

11. Transition 471

Chapter 12. T h e K i n g o f the L a n d s 1. D a r i u s a n d E g y p t 472; E u p h r a t e s 487 ;

472

2. B a b y l o n i a u n d e r D a r i u s 484;

3. Trans-

4. F r o m J e r u s a l e m to M a g n e s i a on the M e a n d e r 491;

5. Western Asia M i n o r : C i t i e s , Dynasts, and E m p i r e after the I o n i a n Revolt 493;

6. Population R e s e t t l e m e n t a n d D e p o r t a t i o n

505;

7. Unity

a n d Diversity 507

PART 4 FROM X E R X E S TO DARIUS I I I : AN EMPIRE IN TURMOIL Chapter 13. X e r x e s t h e G r e a t K i n g ( 4 8 6 - 4 6 5 ) 1. S o u r c e s a n d P r o b l e m s 515; Sardis to Sardis (480) 528;

515

2. F r o m D a r i u s to X e r x e s 518;

5. T h e Persian Defeat: Its C a u s e s a n d C o n s e q u e n c e s Peoples

543;

535;

7. X e r x e s , A h u r a - M a z d a , and Persia 550;

Offensives a n d Royal Territories ( 4 7 8 - 4 6 6 ) Strategy 559;

3. F r o m

4. X e r x e s b e t w e e n T w o Fronts ( 4 8 0 - 4 7 9 )

554;

531;

6. Xerxes and His 8. Athenian

9. X e r x e s ' W e s t e r n

10. F r o m X e r x e s to Artaxerxes 563;

I I . An Assessment 567

C h a p t e r 14. F r o m t h e A c c e s s i o n o f A r t a x e r x e s I t o t h e D e a t h o f D a r i u s II ( 4 6 5 - 4 0 5 / 4 0 4 )

569

1. O n e K i n g after Another (465) 569; 454) 573;

2. T h e E g y p t i a n Revolt (ca. 4 6 4 -

3. T r a n s - E u p h r a t e s Matters 577;

A e g e a n F r o n t 579;

4. T h e Asia M i n o r - E a s t e r n

5. E z r a and N e h e m i a h in J e r u s a l e m 583;

K i n g aftei Another ( 4 2 5 - 4 2 4 )

588;

6. O n e

7. Affairs on the Western Front 591;

8. T h e G r e a t K i n g in His C o u n t r i e s 6 0 0 C h a p t e r 15. A r t a x e r x e s II ( 4 0 5 / 4 0 4 - 3 5 9 / 3 5 8 ) a n d A r t a x e r x e s III ( 3 5 9 / 3 5 8 - 3 3 8 ) 1. T h e Reign of Artaxerxes II: S o u r c e s a n d P r o b l e m s 612; T w o Brothers ( 4 0 4 - 4 0 1 )

615;

3. Artaxerxes the Victor 630;

in Asia M i n o r a n d Artaxerxes IPs Strategy ( 4 0 0 - 3 9 6 ) M i n o r ( 3 9 6 - 3 9 4 ) 637;

2. T h e War of the

634;

4. C o n d i t i o n s

5. Agesilaus in Asia

6. A c h a e m e n i d S u c c e s s e s a n d Failures: F r o m Asia

M i n o r to E g y p t (ca. 3 9 6 - c a . 370) 645; P e o p l e s (ca. 3 6 6 - 3 5 9 / 3 5 8 )

656;

of Artaxerxes III ( 3 5 1 - 3 3 8 ) 681

7. Artaxerxes II, His Satraps, and His

8. At the H e a r t o f Power 6 7 5 ;

9. T h e Wars

. . . 612

Contents

X

PART 5 THE

FOURTH C E N T U R Y AND T H E EMPIRE OF DARIUS III IN T H E ACHAEMENID LONGUE DUREE: A PROSPECTIVE A S S E S S M E N T

Chapter 16. Lands, Peoples, and Satrapies: Taking Stock of the Achaemenid World

693

Introduction: In the S t e p s o f Alexander a n d o n the Trail o f D a r i u s 693; I. S o u r c e s a n d P r o b l e m s 696; Sardis to E p h e s u s 700;

2. T h e Satrapy of D a s c y l i u m

697;

3. F r o m

4. F r o m C e l a e n a e to H a l i c a r n a s s u s 7 0 5 ;

5. Pixodarus a t X a n t h u s 707;

6. F r o m T a r s u s to M a z a c a 7 0 9 ;

T a r s u s to S a m a r i a via S i d o n a n d J e r u s a l e m 713; 9. E g y p t from Artaxerxes III to D a r i u s III 7 1 7 ,

7. F r o m

8. F r o m G a z a to Petra 716; 10. F r o m Arbela to S u s a 7 1 9 ;

I I . T h e G r e a t K i n g , Alexander, a n d t h e Peoples o f the Z a g r o s M o u n t a i n s 726; 12. Persepolis, P a s a r g a d a e , a n d Persia 733;

13. F r o m Persepolis to

E c b a t a n a 737:

14. F r o m E c b a t a n a to the Halys 7 4 1 :

Cyropolis 743;

16. F r o m the P u n j a b to the I n d u s Delta 754;

15. F r o m E c b a t a n a to 17. F r o m

Pattala to S u s a a n d Babylon: T h e Persians a n d the Persian G u l f 758;

18. A n

Appraisal a n d S o m e Q u e s t i o n s 7 6 2 Chapter 1 7 . T h e G r e a t K i n g , H i s A n n i e s , a n d H i s T r e a s u r e s 1. T h e Accession of D a r i u s III 769;

769

2. T h e G r e a t K i n g a n d the Persian

Aristocracy 7 8 0 ;

3. T h e Royal A r m i e s 783;

Tribute E c o n o m y

800;

4. S u b j e c t Populations a n d

5. Transition 8 1 2

PART 6 THE

F A L L OF AN E M P I R E ( 3 3 6 - 3 3 0 )

Chapter 18. Darius and the Empire Confront Macedonian Aggression I . Territories, A r m i e s , a n d Strategies 817;

817

2 . D a r i u s a n d H i s Faithful 842;

3. T h e L o c a l Elites, D a r i u s , a n d Alexander: Popularity a n d U n p o p u l a r i t y o f A c h a e m e n i d D o m i n i o n 852;

4. T h e D e a t h o f a G r e a t K i n g (330) 864;

5. T h e Fall of a n E m p i r e 8 6 6

Conclusion: From Nabonidus to Seleucus

873

Research Notes

877

List of Abbreviations

1053

Bibliography

1059

Indexes

1125

Index of Sources Index of Personal Names Index of Divine Names . Index of Geographical Names Index of Ancient Words Index of Topics

1125 1149 1161 1162 1173 1180

List of Illustrations Maps 1. The Ionian Revolt

147

after Briant 1992b: 81

2. The Empire and its principal routes

366

after Briant 1992: 20-21

3. The itinerary of Cyrus and the Ten Thousand

367

after Xenophon, Anahase, Les Belles Lettres

4. The expedition of Agesilaus

639

after D u g a s ! 9 ! 0

5. Peoples and roads of the Zagros

727

after Briant 1976

6. Lands and peoples of the Iranian Plateau and Central Asia under Achaemenid rule

744

after Briant 1984b: 72

7. Alexander in India and eastern Iran

755

Will et al., U lVe siecle (Paris: P U F , 1975) 293

Genealogies From Artaxerxes I to Artaxerxes II

571

The Succession from Darius II to Darius III

773

Figures 1. Pyramidal tomb at Sardis

87

Cabill 1988

2. Tomb of Cyrus

87

Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1982: 76

3. Tomb at Buzpar

87

Vanden Bcrghe 1964: fig. 8

4. Tomb at Tas Kule

87

Cahill 1988

5. Relief from Palace P at Pasargadae

89

Stronach 1978

6. Winged genius at Pasargadae

91

Sancisi-Weerdcnberg 1982: 79

7. Seal of Kuras of Ansan (PFS 93*)

91

Garrison 1992: fig. 2

8. Relief at Behistun

125

Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1982: 108 XI

List of Illustrations

xi:

9. Plans of the terraces at Persepolis and Susa Persepolis — G h i r s h m a n 1951; Susa — Perrot 198'1

10. Peoples bearing the throne (Persepolis: Hall of the Hundred Columns) . Walser 1966

11. Lower register of throne-bearing peoples on the royal tombs Walser 1966

12. Some gift-bearing peoples: Medes, Elamites, Parthians, Aryans, Bactrians, Sagartians Koch 1992

13. Darius and his court as seen in a Greek painting of the fourth century . . Hamdf and Reinach, Necropole royak de Sidon, 1892: 290

14. Audience scene from the sarcophagus of Alexander v o n G r a e v e 1987: 137

15. Audience scene on a seal impression from Dascylium M u s c h e 1989

16. The tomb of Darius at Naqs-i Rustam Porada 1963: fig. 77

17. Royal coinage Stronach 1989b: fig. 1

18. The King, the Persians, and war a - b : Artaxerxes III? (Bittner 1985: Taf. 15.1); c: Artaxerxes III? ( D a n d a m a e v 1976: Taf. V.A); d: Kuras of Ansan (Amiet 1992: fig. 14); e: seal of the treasury of Oxus (Moorey 1978: fig. 7); f: seal of Arsama (Moorey 1978: fig 8)

19. The statue of Darius discovered at Susa C D A F ; ( 1 9 7 4 ) , fig. 21

20. Relief depicting royal audience from the Treasury at Persepolis Porada 1963: fig. 80

21. Tripylon (Council Hall), south jamb of the eastern doorway G h i r s h m a n 1957: fig. 6

22. Throne Hall, east jamb of the eastern doorway of the southern wall Ghirshman 1957: fig. 8

23. Tripylon (Council Hall), west jamb of the southern doorway G h i r s h m a n 1957: fig. 3

24. Throne Hall, south jamb of the northern doorway in the western wall: Combat of Royal Hero with a griffin G h i r s h m a n 1957: fig. 9

25. Rows of Persian and Median nobles Roaf 1983: 105

26. The royal chariot at Persepolis Littauer and Crouwel, Wheeled vehicles...,

27. The Royal Hero Moorey 1978: fig. 6; Porada 1963: fig. 85

28. Darius III in battle mosaic of Alexander— Nylancler 1983: fig. 2

1979

List of Illustrations 29. Hunt scenes on seals: a seal of Darius, showing the king hunting a lion; inscribed seal depicting a "Mede" hunting a wild hoar

xiii

232

a: Porada 1963: fig. 86; b: Perrotand C h i p i c z

30. Seal of Xerxes

235

Perrot and C h i p i e z : fig. 497

31. The Assyrian king with the "Tree of Life"

236

32. Assurbanipal and the vine-arbor

237

Margueron, Les Misopotctmiem, II (1991): 92

33. Magi and sacrifices

244

a: plaque from the treasury at Oxus (Porada 1963: fig. 84); b: stela from Dascylium ( C u m o n t , Religions orientates, fig. 10); c: seal from the Treasury at Persepolis (Houtkamp 1991: fig. 1); d: seal impression from Dascylium (Mellink 1988: fig. 12b) e: animal-sacrifice scene (Moorey 1988: fig. 44b); f: relief on the tomb o f a "Mede" from Qyzapan (Porada 1963: fig. 71)

34. Ahura-Mazda

248

G h i r s h m a n 1957: fig. 7

35. Fire altars and cult

249

Houtkamp 1991: fig. 2; Moorey 1988: fig. 44a, c, d

36. Hellenistic Persian coin showing a fire temple

250

Houtkamp 1991

37. Anahita: (a) the king before Anahita? (b) representation of Anahita?

253

Moorey 1979

38. Gate of Darius's palace at Susa (section)

260

C D A F / 4 ( 1 9 7 4 ) , fig. 17

39. A Scythian cares for his companion (on a vase from Koul-Oba in the Crimea)

266

M i n n s 1913

40. Servants waiting on tables: Persepolis (small staircase south of the Tripylon)

292

G h i r s h m a n 1957: fig. 5

41. Selection of Achaemenid vessels

295

Rozcnbcrg 1993 .figs. 4 , 6 , 9

42. Dogs used in the hunt and in battle by the Assyrians

299

Perrot and C h i p i e z

43. Achaemenid jewelry

306

M u s c h e 1992: CXIV, l . l l j C V I I , 1.11; CIV, 6 3.3

44. Statue of Udjahoresnet

473

2

C A H I V , fig. 20

45. Stela of the Apis that died in 518

480

2

C A H I V , fig. 21

46. Egyptian votive stela

483

2

C A H I V , fig. 22

47. Some Babylonian seal impressions, from Cyrus to Xerxes

486

Graziani 1989

48. Inscribed sarcophagus of Esmunazzar

490

xiv

List of Illustrations

49. Relief from Building G at Xanthus and two Persepolis reliefs

504

(a)Tritsch 1942; ( b - c ) Koch 1992

50. Sidonian coins, Samarian coins, and related evidence

606

( a - b ) Sidonian coins: Perrot and C h i p i e z V, figs. 511-512; (c) Cypro-Phoenician silver bowl (Childs 1978: fig. 29); ( d - e ) Samarian coins (Meshorer and Q c d a r 1991: 2

nos. 48 and 17), (f) port scene on a Treasury Tablet from Persepolis ( C A H I V , fig. 3); (g) Assyrian king in chariot; (h) satrap or dynast on a satrap's sarcophagus (Kleeman 1958: Taf. 32a)

51. Dynastic(?) coinage from Cilicia

611

Perrot and C h i p i e z V, fig. 517

52. Coin with Aramaic inscription of the name of Tarkumuwa

667

Shahbazi 1980b; fig. 121

53. Monument of the Nereids at Xanthus: (a) audience scene; (b-d) banquet scenes

671

FdX, VIII, pis. XXXII, LVI, L X , L I X

54. Parade on Pericles' monument at Limyra

673

Borchhardt 1976b

55. Persian relief from Paphlagonia

699

D o n e e ! a n d V o u t e 1984

56. "Greco-Persian" objects from Dascylium

700 2

(a) Kleemann 1958: Taf. 33a; ( b - c ) C A H I V , fig. 12a, c

57. Seal bearing the name of Manes

704

Masson 1987a

58. Xanthus Trilingual Inscription {FdX VI, 1974)

708

59. Cilician civic coins

710

Perrot and C h i p i e z V, figs. 514 and 519

60. Persian relief found near Kayseri

712

after Bittel 1952

61. Coins from Samaria and sealings from the Wadi ed-Daliyeh

715

Meshorer and Qedar 1991 - ( a ) no. 41; (b) no. 50; (c) no. 16; (d) no. 14; (e) no 58

(f-g) Leith, Wadi Daliyeh I (1990) W D 17

62. Some Murasu seals

722

Legiain 1925

63. Tomb of Artaxerxes II (reconstruction)

734

Flandin and C o s t e III, pi. 166

64. Unfinished tomb at Persepolis

735

Flandin and C o s t e 111, pi. 162

65.

Plan of a qanat (showing profile and vertical views) Goblot 1963

807

Preface to the English

Translation

The text of the book that is presented here to English-speaking readers differs very little from the French edition published by Editions Fayard in June, 1996. Yet during the first stage in the process of translation, in the late 1996 and early 1997,1 had hoped to make systematic modifications and additions to the original text in a way that took ac­ count of publications which had appeared after the latest revisions to the French manu­ script, in September 1995. A succession of delays in the preparation of the American translation dissuaded me from carrying out this enterprise, and here I would like to ex­ plain my decision to my readers. I have chosen to present updates and very detailed assessments of research in an­ other form, the Bulletin d'Histoire Achemenide (BHAch), organized in a way that fol­ lows the thematic structure of my book. Its aim is to give scholars periodic opportunities not only to become acquainted with recent bibliography, but also to have a critical analysis of it. The first number {BHAch I) took the form of a long article published in Supplement 1 to the journal Topoi (1997, pp. 5-127).' In it, I analyzed about 450 titles (articles and books) published between October 1995 and October 1997. The second Bulletin {BHAch II) appeared in 2001, in book form. Following the same plan, I ana­ lyzed more than 800 titles published between October 1997 and October 2000. To make it easier to use, BHAch II is accompanied by indexes which also cover the material in BHAch I. One of those indexes (pp. 327-30) makes it possible for readers to find the pages in my 1996 book that need to be revised in the light of new publications. Further­ more, the recent creation of a website specifically devoted to Achaemenid research 1

2

4

1. I point out that Ursula Weber and JoscF Wicsclibfcr have brought out an enormous Achaemenid

bibliography.cxhaustivc and minutely classified ( D a s Reich der Acluiinieniden. Eine Bibliographic (AMI, Erganzungsband 15; Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1996). 2. A single significant addition has been m a d e in the part of Chapter 9 devoted to customs and ex­ change: I have introduced an extraordinary d o c u m e n t dealing with customs in Egypt, drawing on the main expositions and conclusions of the study by myself and R. Descat, "Un registrc douanier d e la satrapie d'Egypte," in N. Grimal and B. M e n u , eds., La commerce en Egypte ancienne (IFAO Bibliotheque d'Etudes 121; C a i r o , 1998) 59-104. Subsequently, I decided to stop introducing new material and discussion. 3. S u p p l e m e n t 1 to Topoi (distributed by Boccard, in Paris) included papers from a meeting orga­ nized at the Maison de I'Orient (Lyon), March 31—April 1, 1997, published under the title Recherches r&entes sur I'empire achemenide. Almost twenty colleagues from various countries responded to a n invi­ tation from Jean-Frangois Sallcs a n d Marie-Kran^oise Boussac to discuss my book, at that time newly published by Fayard. 4. Bulletin d'Histoire Ache'me'nide II (Paris: Editions T h o t m , 2001), 334 p p . (sec http://www.thotmeditions.com/editions/bhachII02.htm). T h i s volume inaugurates a new scries, Persika, undertaken on the initiative of the "Chaire d'histoire et d e civilisation du moncle a c h e m e n i d e et de I'empire d'Alexandre" with the cooperation of the C o l l e g e dc France.

xv

Preface to the English Translation

XVI

(www.acliemenet.com) also gives scholars access to documentary and bibliographic re­ sources on a continuing basis. I have discussed one of the methodological questions raised by a systematic update, a question that is not limited to Achaemenid studies, in the "Noruz Lecture" presented at the Foundation for Iranian Studies (Washington, D.C., March 23, 2001) under the title "New Trends in Achaemenid History." There, with reference to the updates in BHAch1 and II, I stated: 5

6

When one strives to follow and evaluate research and publication on a day-to-day basis and in an exhaustive manner, one unavoidably develops a permanent habit of painful epistemological questioning of the real results of the research. This question is particularly difficult to resolve in the Humanities, where accumulated erudition and bibliographic tautology sometimes take the place of evidence that is accepted but misleading for scientific innova­ tion. To speak bluntly: what is really new in what is published recently? In our domain, what are the signs that permit us to assert that this or that study marks progress in the order of knowledge? The answer may seem easy as long as one is dealing with publications of docu­ ments, but it is quite a different matter when one considers interpretive publications. And even among publications of documents one has to make distinctions: some of them add only one unpublished document in a series that is already known, without modifying the general sense by much; others, on the other hand, call attention to documentation that in itself may suggest wholly new lines of interpretation. Then, after presenting results from excavations at Ayn Manawir in Egypt, I concluded: In this respect, the discoveries and publications on Achaemenid Egypt that I have presented in brief are not justrece?it, they are really new, and they open prospects of fundamental new growth in the near future. My point is that a thorough updating cannot be brought about in a satisfactory manner only with hundreds of bibliographic additions, heaped up one on the other. As publica­ tions accumulate, so the risk increases of burdening the text and the bibliographic notes with updates superimposed over one another, and of making the text more diffi­ cult to consult rather than more useful. Furthermore, in such a case the appearance of exhaustiveness would be largely an illusion, for two reasons. First, any book, however up-to-date its bibliography may be, is subject to some bibliographic lapse by the time it has appeared. Furthermore, as I have indicated, many added references really add 7

5. T h e creation of this web site also responds to purposes specific to the overall framework of Achae­ menid history, that is, an a i m to transform what has been a virtual scientific c o m m u n i t y into an actual scientific community: see my "Call for Collaboration" (Paris, 2000), available for downloading at http://www.achcmcnt.com/pdf7call.pdf, as well as the proceedings of a colloquium that I organized at the C o l l e g e de France, D e c . 15-16, 2000, "Achaemenid History and Data Bases on the Internet: an Assessment of Work in Progress and Prospects for Future Developments," available at http/Avww. achemenet.com/pdf/colloque/resumcs.pdf. With the agreement of the editors of Topoi, the entire text of BHAch 1 can be found on the site at http://www.achemenet.com/bibliographies/l)hachI.htm. 6. An English version is available at http://www.fis-iran.org/achcnieiiid.htni; the French text is available at http://ww.achemenet.com/rcssources/enligne/jasr/jasr01/htm under the title "L'histoire de I'empire a c h e m e n i d e aujourd'hui: nouvelles tendances, nouvelles perspectives." 7. By way of example, I may mention that as 1 write this preface, in early July, 2001, the provisional bibliographic list for BHAch III (which is intended to appear in 2003) already includes more than 150 titles, including some important books and articles.

Preface to the English Translation

xvi 1

nothing new, so it would be necessary to introduce a clear hierarchical distinction be­ tween "recent" and "new," and to justify in detail the criteria for selection—precisely as I tried to do in my Bulletins of 1997 and 2001. All this being so, I freely admit that taking into account the most innovative publica­ tions that appeared between 1995 and 2000 would make it possible to amend and detail many of the discussions in this book and to enrich significantly the iconographic docu­ mentation. If I have chosen nonetheless to present the American version practically in the same form as the initial French book, it is also because I have judged —whether rightly or wrongly the reader may decide—-that the general image of the Achaemenid Empire that I expounded in 1996 has not been fundamentally modified. Consider a particularly significant example, Chapter 16, in which I present a regional analysis of the empire and attempt an interpretation of relations between center and pe­ riphery, in the form of a prospective assessment (pp. 693ff.). T h e point of view that I adopt and defend there is that the documents discovered between about 1970 and 1995 put in serious doubt the "(pseudo-)statistical hypothesis of a scanty Persian presence and an inconsequential imperial occupation, based on bodies of evidence that are obsolete or reduced to a regional perspective" (p. 764). For this purpose, in the corresponding documentary notes (pp. 1029-1031) I present an assessment of recent discoveries, region by region. On the face of it, this section should be rewritten, since many new discoveries made available since 1995 ought to be included. But even if some discoveries treated in the 1996 version of the text remain under discussion, I believe that overall the docu­ ments published between 1995 and 2000 tend rather to confirm the historical interpre­ tation that I presented in the book, whether in the matter of the maintenance of organic links between central authority and the provinces, or in the matter of the policy adopted toward local or national sanctuaries, or in the matter of the spread and adapta­ tion of Persian imagery in various countries, or even in the matter of the economic condition of the empire at the arrival of Alexander. At the same time, wherever one or another interpretation has given rise to reservations and/or polemics, the reader can eas­ ily come to grips with it by consulting BHAc/i I and II and the indexes of BHAch I I . 8

9

10

11

12

8. For example, concerning the interpretation of the Elamite tablets found in Armenia (French edition, pp. 9 6 2 - 6 3 ; below p. 938), see the treatments discussed in BHAch I, 25 and BHAc/i II, 44. T h e discussion is obviously not closed. 9. T o take only one example, the discovery of settlements, qanats, and hundreds of demotic docu­ ments dated to the reigns of Artaxerxes I and Darius II at the site of Ayn Manawir is particularly striking (see most recently BIFAO 100 [2000], 4 6 9 - 7 9 , as well as the description of the work by Michel Wuttmann at http://www.achemcnet.com/recherche/sites/aynmanawir/aynmanawir.htm, a n d my Temarks in BHAch I, 32-34 and 8 8 - 9 0 , and II, 62, and in A r m i e s 1999/5, 1130-35). T h e new discoveries tend to support the position that 1 took on pp. 520 and 1006-08 on the maintenance of links between the center and the Egyptian province throughout the fifth century B.C. 10. O n these topics, to which I return at various points in the book, sec now the specific treatments in BHAch I, 94-97, II, 176-184 (on religious policy), a n d I, 98-104, II, 911-206 (on the spread of images). 11. T h e discovery of a network of qanats at Ayn Manawir also contributes to the discussion on pp. 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 about the relationship between the levying of tribute and investments in production, that is, about the e c o n o m i c rationality of the Achaemenid imperial system; see the studies collected in

Pierre Briant, ed., Irrigation et drainage dans I'Antiquite: qanats et canalisations souterraines en Iran, en &g)'pte eten Grece (Collection Persika 2; Paris: Editions T h o t m , 2001). 12.

S e c especially BHAch I I , 3 2 7 - 3 1 : "Index des discussions"

XVIII

Preface to the English Translation

In short, in order to be full and effective, a revision would have to be carried out on a strategy that is both selective and synthetic. But to do so would involve no more or less than writing a new book, or at least a fundamentally altered book. That is not the pur­ pose of the American translation made available today. The purpose is simply to put be­ fore English-speaking readers a book that was published in French five years ago. My book of 1996 represents a state-of-the-question , valid at a given moment, of the work car­ ried out by many scholars, as well as a the state of my own historical reflections. Readers of the French edition and of the American edition can easily avail themselves of the sev­ eral reviews published since the appearance of the Histoire de I'empire perse in 1996. And if they want to know about the development of the author's thought, including his pentimenti, they can also consult the bibliographic tools that I have made available, as well as the updates that I have published, both on primary documents" and on prob­ lems of historiography and method. 1 have no doubt that readers will be able to dispute the theses and interpretations of this book on the basis of their own thinking, but also in the light of publications that are recent and sometimes even publications that are new. 15

14

16

Paris, July 7, 2001

13. T h i s is the consideration that eventually dissuaded m e from introducing new and important iconographic documents that can be found with reproductions and commentaries in BHAch 1 (pp. 11,

16, 18, 21f., 26f, 34, 41, 67, 69, 74, 101) and BHAch II (pp. 34, 36, 40f, 43, 45, 47f., 58, 601, 64, 69, 76, 110f, 116, 192, 195f., 198f, 202f., 205), though it would be technically simple to do so. T h e main and indispensable correction to illustrations in the French publication consists of adding to the list of illus­ trations (pp. xiff.) an indication of the source of the drawings reproduced here, unfortunately forgotten in the page proofs of the 1996 French version. 14. A list can be found in BHAch II, 9 n. 8. As usual, s o m e are merely descriptive, while others present a deeper consideration of Achaemenid history today (see especially Matthew Stolper, "Une 'vi­ sion dure' de l'histoire a c h e m e n i d e (Note critique)," Annates 1999/5: 1109-26). 15. In particular, I have published drastic revisions of s o m e Greek inscriptions pertinent to Achae­ menid history, namely the inscription of Droaphernes and the Xanthus Trilingual in two articles pub­ lished in 1998 ("Droaphernes et la statue d e Sardes," in M . Brosius and A. Kuhrt, eds., Studies in Persian

History: Essays in Memory of David M. Lewis, Achaemenid History, 11 (Leiden), 205-26; "CitGs et satrapes dan I'Empire achemenide: Pix6daros ctXanthos," CRAI: 305-40) and the letter of Darius to G a datas in a study in press (available in pre-publication form at http://www.achemenet.com/ressources/ souspresse/manuscritsOl.htm). In the latter article I concluded that the d o c u m e n t is a falsification, of Roman date, and I therefore propose that it should be eliminated from discussions of Achaemenid his­ tory. Given that this is one of the most celebrated documents in Achaemenid historiography, it is also one of the texts most frequently cited in my book (see the index, p. 000, s.v. M L 12). T h i s last example shows clearly how difficult it would have been to patch up the original text in a satisfactory manner. 16. For example: " T h e Achaemenid Empire," in K. Raaflaub and N. Rosenstein, eds., Soldiers, So­

ciety and War in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998) 10 5-28; "L'histoire de I'empire a c h e m e n i d e aiijoiii'd'hiii: 1'historien et ses documents," Annates 1999/5, 112736; "Inscriptions multilingues d'epoque achemenide: le texte et l'imagc," in D. Valbelle and J . Leclant, eds., Le decret de Memphis (Actcs du C o l l o q u e de la Fondation Singer-Polignac, Paris l ' Juin 1999) (Paris: de Boccard, 2000), 9 1 - 1 1 5 ; "Histoire impdriale et histoire regionale. A propos de l'histoire cle Juda dans I'Empire achemenide,"in A. Lemaire and N . S a b o e , eds., Congress Volume Oslo 1998 ( V T Suppl. 80; 2000) 2 3 5 - 4 5 ; "Darius III face a Alexandre: mythe, histoire, legende," Annuaire du College c

de France, Resume des cours et conferences W9-2Q00 (Paris, 2000) 7 8 1 - 9 2 (also available at http-//www. college-de-francc.fr/college/annuaire-scientifique/coius99-2000/bnant/briant.pdf);

au College de France (Paris, 2000).

I^cou

inaugurate

Translator's

Preface

What stretches before the reader is an almost exact equivalent of the 1996 French edition. This is not according to the original plan; the American edition was to incorpo­ rate the author's corrections, revisions, and additions reflecting subsequent Achaemenid research. With one exception, however, no supplementary material was received (for reasons described by the author above) —the exception being the discussion of the Ara­ maic customs document from Egypt discussed in chap. 9/3 (pp. 385-387). The author's bracketed added passages in the Research Notes, which were to be revised into the text, are marked with [[double brackets J . Numbering of figures and maps in the original was somewhat erratic, so it diverges here. This is not to say there is no difference; hundreds of Classical references have been corrected. Given worlds enough and time, many corrections could also have been made to the citations of the contemporary literature. In order to avoid as much as pu&sible the pitfalls of indirect renderings, quotations from ancient sources have, when possible, been taken from published English translations (the mark -> appears in the reference for each such passage), rather than translated from the author's French renderings (forms of names in published translations have not been regularized. Only in a few cases, where the two versions are completely irreconcilable (or where the citation could not be matched with published translations), has a translation of the author's version been made. The sources used are the following:

Classical Aelian, Historical Miscellany, trans. N. G. Wilson (Loeb Classical Library [LCL], 1997) Aristotle, The Complete Works, the Oxford translations revised by Jonathan Barnes (Bollingen edition, 1984) Arrian, Anabasis of Alexander and Indica, trans. P. A. Blunt (LCL, 1976-83) Athenaeus, The Deipnosophists, trans. Charles Burton Gulick (LCL, 1928-33) Demosthenes, trans, unnamed, intro. by John Harrington (Everyman, [1954]) Diodorus Siculus, Library of History, trans. C. H. Oldiather, Charles L Sherman, C. Bradford Welles, Russel M. Geer, and F. R. Walton (LCL, 1933-67) Herodotus, The Histories, trans. Aubrey de Selinconrt (Penguin, 1954; rev. ed. John Marincola, 1996) Isocrates, trans. George Norton (LCL, 1928) Josephus, The Life: Against Apion, trans. H. St. J. Thackeray; The Jewish War, trans. H. St. J. Thackeray; Jewish Antiquities, trans. H. St. J. Thackeray et al. (LCL, 1926-65 [ 13 vols.]) C. Nepos, trans. John C. Rolfe (LCL, 1984) Pausanius, Description of Greece, trans. W. H. S. Jones, H. A. Ormered, and (arranged by) R. E. Wycherley (LCL, 1918-35 [5 vols.]) Plato, Complete Works, various translators, ed. John M. Cooper (Hacked: edition, 1997) Plutarch: Lives, trans. John Dryden, rev. Arthur Hugh Clough (Modern Library, undated repr. of 1864 ed.); Moralia, trans. Frank Cole Babbitt (LCL, 1931-36 [vols. 3-4]) Polyaenus, Stratagems of War, trans. R. Shepherd (Chicago: Ares, 1974). Polybius, The Histories, trans. W. R. Pa ton (LCL, 1922-27) [6 vols.]) xix

Translator's

XX

Preface

QuintusCurhus, History of Alexander, trans. John C. Rolfe (LCL, 1946) Strabo, The Geography, trans. Horace Leonard Jones (LCL, 1928-30 [vols. 5-7]) Thucydides, The Peleponnesian War, trans. Crawley (Modern Library, 1951 repr. of undated trans.) Xenophon, Hellenica and Anabasis, trans. Carleton L. Brownson; Oeconomicus and Scripta Minora, trans. E. C. Marchant; Gyropaedia, trans. Walter Miller [some citations, trans. H. G. Dakyns (Everyman, 1992 repr. of 1914 ed.)] (LCL, 1914-25) The principal ancient sources for which no English edition was available to me are Ctesias and Justin. Oriental Aramaic from Egypt: A. Cowley, Aramaic Papyri of the 5th Century B.C. (1923) [AP]; G. R. Driver, Aramaic Documents of the Fifth Century B.C. (2d ed., 1957) [AD]; Emil G. Kraeling, The Brooklyn Museum Aramaic Papyri (1953) [BMAP] Berossus: S. A. Burstein, The Babyloniaca ofBerossus (1978) Old Persian, Roland G. Kent, Old Persian: Grammar Texts Lexicon (2d ed., 1953) Biblical Jerusalem Bible I would like to express my gratitude to Larissa Bonfante, Professor of Classics at New York University, who provided access to many of the editions listed above; to Maureen Gallery Kovacs and Matthew W. Stolper for help with technical terminology, especially in numismatics and ancient economy and society respectively; and to sundry contribu­ tors to the newsgroup sci.lang for discussing some obscure French terminology. I have scrupulously maintained the author's distinctions between ville and cite ('town' and 'city'; see p. 377), and between sanctuaire and temple, at his request. I am also especially grateful to my friend and publisher Jim Eisenbraun for commis­ sioning this project in July 1996; after the French publisher's approval of the submitted specimen, translating began at the very end of that year and proceed during, roughly, the first halves of 1997,1998, 2000, and 2001. Jim and his editorial staff made many improve­ ments in the English style and French renderings; and Jim as book designer has as usual created a look that is both elegant and practical. After not too many pages, the reader will discover that this is not a connected narra­ tive history of the Persian Empire. Moreover, the reader is expected to be familiar with the narrative sequence of Achaemenid history, with the career of Alexander the Great, and with the entire Greek and Latin literature from which such histories have hitherto been drawn. The reader might find it useful to first turn to Joseph Wiesehofer, Ancient Persia (English translation, 1996) 1-101, for an overview that is thematically and con­ ceptually remarkably similar to this work, and to the Chronological Chart therein for the sequence of events, as far as they can be determined. Only then, I think, can this book (whose aim, superbly realized, is to show just how a historian must evaluate and extrapolate from the available sources) be used with profit. Clearly, this massive work represents only the first monument along the new highway through the crossroads of the ancient world. PETER T. DANIELS

New York City, March 2002

Introduction

On the Trail of an Empire 1. Was There an Achaemenid

Empire?

The Achaemenid Empire: created by the conquests of Cyrus (ca. 559-530) and C a m ­ byses (530-522) on the rubble and the fertile ground of the various kingdoms of the Near East, then expanded and reorganized by Darius I (522-486), for more than two centuries it extended from the Indus Valley to the Aegean Sea, from the Syr Darya to the Persian Gulf and the first cataract of the Nile —until the moment Darius III perished in a conspiracy, when his nemesis Alexander had already completed his conquest (330). The ordinary word Empire, as is well known, has no exact correspondence in any an­ cient language: the inscriptions of the Great Kings refer both to the land (Old Persian humi) and to the peoples (Old Persian dahyuldahyava), and the Greek authors speak of 'royal territories' (khora basileos), of the 'power' (arkhe) of the Great King and his satraps, or again of "kings, dynasties, cities, and peoples." The term Empire implies a territorial authority. This is in fact the basic problem posed by the origin and construction of the Achaemenid Empire. Marked by extraordinary ethnocultural diversity and by a thriving variety of forms of local organization, it evokes two interpretations: one that sees it as a sort of loose federation of autonomous countries under the distant aegis of a Great King, a federation that is evident solely from the perspective of tribute levies and military con­ scriptions; and another that without rejecting the evidence of diversity emphasizes the organizational dynamic of the many sorts of intervention by the central authority and the intense processes of acculturation. The direction in which my own preferences tend can be discerned even from this formulation of the problem —I will explain myself along the way. This in a nutshell is the aim of this book, which I now offer for the ap­ praisal of my readers.

2. From Alexander to Cyrus and Back Again: Fragments of ego-histoire This book was imprudently announced in a 1979 article but written between spring 1990 and spring 1993. I made limited revisions to the text and revised the Research Notes substantially in 1994 and 1995. But the conception and realization of the book, if only in a preliminary and preparatory form, goes back at least fifteen years, since it was in about 1982-83 that I began to jot down for myself the initial drafts, sketches, and plans that are now relegated to dead files. By way of a contribution to a genre that is fash­ ionable (at least in Fiance), ego-histoire, and coming straight out of the introduction I wrote in 1982 for my collection of articles (RTP), I would like to explain this book's ori­ gins in a personal way. Nothing predisposed me to devoting the greater part of my life to researching and teaching Achaemenid history. When I was a historian-in-training, stirred by ancient his­ tory during my studies at Poitiers, it was almost by chance, or more exactly because of a

2

On the Trail of an Empire

comment by H. Bengtson, that I began to take an interest in one of the successors of Al­ exander, the former satrap of Greater Phrygia, Antigonus the One-Eyed. That interest took shape as a thesis prepared under the supervision of Pierre Leveque. A well-known passage in Life of Eumenes (5.9-10) regarding the machinations of Antigonus's oppo­ nent in the environs of Celaenae, capital of Greater Phrygia, led me to ask questions about the status of the land and the peasants at the very beginning of the Hellenistic pe­ riod—investigations that I developed into an article about these peasants (laoi) of Asia Minor (1972). The first step had been taken: I had settled on the Near East (Asia, as I called it then, following the Greek authors), but a Near East revisited by Greco-Mace­ donian armies and by ancient and modern colonial historiography. The preparation of a long article on Eumenes of Cardia (1972-73) and of a small book on Alexander (1st ed., 1974) quickly convinced me of the need to go further back in time. Just what was this Achaemenid Empire, which was perennially accused of deca­ dence without being put in its historical context? I had always been struck by the fact that certain overeager epigones, following Droysen (who deserved less dogmatic disciples), insisted unequivocally that the Macedonian conquest had shaken up the political, eco­ nomic, and cultural structures of "Asia" from top to bottom; but, at the same time, what came before Alexander was never defined except as a foil to what came after. These in­ quiries led me to take as my first object of study the populations of the Zagros, whom the ancient authors presented as brigands who were unconcerned with agriculture and therefore "naturally" aggressive (1976). I came to realize with more and more conviction that our entire view of the Achaemenid Empire and its populations was corrupted by the distortions perpetrated by the ancient historians of Alexander. At the same time, it seemed to me equally evident that the historian could not avoid recourse to these same sources. I continued to plow this furrow for several years, and to some extent this book is intended as a contribution toward answering an ancient question: why did the Achaeme­ nid Empire fall to the blow of Macedonian aggression? But the chosen title is not simply a reflection of this veritable obsession or, if 1 may say so, of this long "quest for the Holy Grail." It is also meant to express a long-held and longnourished conviction: Alexander and his successors took over much of the Achaemenid system, a conclusion that I have often expressed with the formula "Alexander, last of the Achaemenids." Like any formula, this one has its limits and gives rise to contradictions of its own. Yet when all is said and done, it seems to me all the same to express the ex­ traordinary continuities that characterize the history of the Near East between the con­ quests of Cyrus and the death of Alexander. Heinz Kreissig, from whom I have learned a great deal, used the phrase "orientalischer hellenistischer Staaten" to describe this con­ tinuity. The Seleucid kingdom was in his eyes an obvious manifestation of it. The word continuity should not be misleading: it is not meant to deny the accommodations and adaptations brought about by the Macedonian conquest. But, at the same time, recent research makes it ever clearer, for example, that the Seleucid empire, in its origin and its constituent elements, was a branch grafted directly onto Achaemenid stock. During the 1970s, and still more at the beginning of the 1980s, the realization dawned on me more and more clearly that, however indispensible the Classical sources were, they could not by themselves answer the questions I was asking. I needed to pene­ trate the Achaemenid essence more intimately, a task for which I was not at all prepared. Luckily, 1 had already had some decisive encounters. First, Roman Ghirshman, who

From Alexander to Cyrus and Back Again

3

around 1972 had strongly encouraged me to plow my Achaemenid furrow: I could never forget the generous concern he showed me without fail until his death in 1979. Around 1977 (if I remember correctly), I made contact with Clarisse Herrenschmidt, who, if I may say so, "initiated" me into the royal Achaemenid inscriptions. During the 1970s, I also struck up contacts that have continued uninterrupted ever since with the Italian group led by Mario Liverani and sustained by his work and the work of his students: Mario Fales, Lucio Milano, and Carlo Zaccagnini, with whom I shared and still share thematic interests and conceptual approaches. The conversations that 1 have continued to have with them, as lively as they are frequent, have helped me put the Achaemenid case in the broader context of first-millennium Near Eastern history, and thus better to take into account the Assyro-Babylonian heritage in the structures of the Achaemenid Empire. It was around 1977-78 that jean-Claude Gardin, who was then leading explorations around the Hellenistic town of Ai-Khanum in Afghanistan, invited me to join his team. He had invited me to participate in their discussions as a historian and to contrast the tex­ tual record and the archaeological record. Though I was not able to take part in the fieldwork (soon interrupted for reasons known to everyone), I learned about the tremendous contribution of archaeology and also about the interpretive challenges that it poses for the historian more familiar with a text of Arrian than with the "trash cans" full of sherds. This collaboration led me to publish a book in 1984 on the relationship between Central Asia and the kingdoms of the Near East, situated first and foremost in the context of Achaemenid history. The debate, which I was able to pursue thereafter, was extremely rich in ensuing discussions. The reader will observe in due course that disagreements among us persist. The methodological problem remains: how can we reconcile the ar­ chaeological picture and the textual picture, which seem to engender two different con­ ceptualizations of the Achaemenid Empire? It will also be seen that this debate is not limited to the local context of Bactria. During the second half of the 1970s, when I had finished my study of the "brigands" of the ancient Zagros, I also had frequent exchanges with anthropologists who special­ ized in pastoral nomadism, in particular with Jean-Pierre Digard, whose Bakhtiaris were contiguous with "my" Uxians. This collaboration, pursued over several years, led to the writing of a book on the anthropology and history of the pastoral peoples of the Near East (1982b). It also touched on the problem of relations between center and periphery both in the Achaemenid Empire and in its Assyro-Babylonian predecessors and its Hel­ lenistic successors. In my intellectual history, the year 1983 is marked with a gold star. It was then that I participated for the first time in an Achaemenid Workshop at Groningen, at the invita­ tion of Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg, who, soon joined by Amelie Kuhrt, had launched a series that was to continue until 1990 in Ann Arbor (there in collaboration with Mar­ garet Root). For the first time, I felt that I was not working alone, self-taught concerning the subject matter of my main objective. Now I could join the "Achaemenidist commu­ nity/' which, small in number, offers the inestimable advantage of being international and linked by bonds of friendship. I could then carry on discussions more systematically on a historical problem clearly posed by the organizers and on a corpus of evidence as varied as were the components of the Empire. The numerous relationships that I was able to form during and outside these meetings were crucial for me. The initiative of

4

On the Trail of an Empire

Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg and Amelie Kuhrt gave a radically new impetus to Achae­ menid research. On the model of the Achaemenid Workshops, Clarisse Herrenschmidt and I organized a conference on tribute in the Persian Empire; Pierre Debord, Ray­ mond Descat, and the administration of the Centre Georges-Radet of Bordeaux set up two meetings, one on Asia Minor and one on monetary problems; Jean Kellens orga­ nized a colloquium at Liege dedicated to Persian religion; Josette Elayi and Jean Sapin organized three meetings on Syria-Palestine under the dominion of the Great Kings; and I organized a conference at Toulouse on the Anabasis of Xenophon, the proceed­ ings of which have now been published (1995b). In short, the Groningen initiative set in motion intense scholarly activity and a sizable output of first-rate articles, whose regu­ lar publication in the series Achaemenid History as well as in many journals fostered and stimulated discussion and debate periodically—to such an extent that the exponential growth of the bibliography sometimes gave me a feeling of powerlessness and discour­ agement. As much as this book may be very personal work, it also reflects (or is meant to reflect) the richness and productivity of a field of research that had long remained par­ tially fallow. In using this expression, I do not mean to minimize the importance or the scope of the work that the history of ancient Iran evoked over a long period and that I have carefully taken into account. What I want to say is simply that, taken in its entirety and not reduced to the study of a few major sites (Susa, Persepolis, Pasargadae), and de­ spite the attempt at synthesis by Olmstead in 1948 that continues to deserve our respect, the history of the Achaemenid Empire remained largely terrra incognita. It had been abandoned both by Assyriologists (for whom the fall of Babylon to Cyrus in 539 long marked the end of history) and by Classicists (who "kidnapped" Near Eastern history as of Alexander's landing in Asia in 334). In a way, squeezed between "eternal Greece" and "the millennial Orient," tossed between Hellenocentrism (from Aeschylus to Alexan­ der) and Judeocentrism (Cyrus refracted through the prism of the Return from the Exile), Achaemenid history did not exist as a distinct field of study. The initiative of Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg and Amelie Kuhrt thus brought Achaemenid studies se­ curely back within the field of history, the way marked out by a set of problems whose terms and stakes I recognized all the more easily because I had begun to try to define them on my own. There remains one aspect of my ego-histoire that I would like to broach quite frankly, as I have done on several occasions now and then in the last few years in publications and private conversations with colleagues and with students. The written sources for Achaemenid history are found in an extraordinary variety of languages: Old Persian, Elamite, Babylonian, Egyptian, Aramaic, Hebrew, Phoenician, Greek, and Latin, not to mention Lydian, Lycian, Phrygian, Carian, or any other yet-to-be-deciphered language. I must state at the outset that in no way am I a specialist in any of these languages. I can barely claim competence in Greek and Latin. This might be thought an insurmount­ able handicap. But though the term handicap expresses a reality that is beyond question, I do not think that the adjective insurmountable should be taken literally. To justify this position, I need to explain my working method. First of all, there are accessible transla­ tions of the basic texts, whether the royal inscriptions, selected Elamite tablets, Aramaic documents from Egypt or elsewhere, a certain number of Babylonian tablets, or hiero­ glyphic inscriptions—to give only a sampling of the available resources. But to use the texts in translation is not enough. It is necessary to turn to the original texts, at least the

The Historian and His Evidence

5

most important of them. Many documents that have been published in transliteration can be put to this use. There even a self-taught historian is able to identify what 1 will call the landmark words or the key words that give the text its sense. At this point one must turn to an exhaustive study of the philological literature, however difficult it may be. This is what I have tried to do, as systematically as I could. That is why, here and there, I have allowed myself to enter discussions and debates that in principle my linguistic and philological ignorance should prohibit me from approaching. From time to time 1 may propose that the historian's suggestions provide independent confirmation of a phil­ ological interpretation. And then, when a problem appeared that I found insoluble, I of­ ten have had recourse to the advice and counsel of friends and colleagues, who have not been stingy with their wisdom. How many e-mail messages have I exchanged with Matt Stolper, for example, about Babylonian tablets of the Achaemenid era? It should be clearly understood that I am obviously not endorsing ignorance. I cannot fail to recog­ nize the limits of self-instruction. It would be a miracle to possess simultaneously a his­ torian's training and immediate access to all the languages of the Empire. Unfortunately, as far as I know, such a rare bird does not exist—at any rate, neither my warble nor my plumage permits me to claim such a distinction! In spite of all the precautions I have deployed, I still recognize the risks I have as­ sumed in offering a book that—legitimately or not—claims to be exhaustive. As a result of my own failings, of unequal access to the corpora of documents, of the persistent and increasing breadth of the debates, or even of the uneven progress of thematic and re­ gional studies, the word exhaustive can provoke confusion or laughter. The problem is that, from the moment 1 began this undertaking, I was stuck with a sort of encyclopedism, with all the risks and illusions that go with such an approach. I did not have the liberty of sidestepping some discussion or other, out of my own interest in this or that question, or out of my own limited familiarity with this or that corpus. A work of synthe­ sis of this kind necessarily requires that the author tackle every aspect and component, whether political, ideological, socioeconomic, religious, cultural, etc., and attempt to integrate them, insofar as it is possible, into a general interpretation. I have thus had to consult all the dossiers of evidence, but I have also had to leave them only half-explored. In some areas, the breadth and complexity (not to mention the contradictions) of the discussions among specialists in this or that corpus has not resulted in well-defined po­ sitions on my part (I have in mind, inter alia, the exegetical and historical disputes about Ezra and Nehemiah). On the other hand, the reader will find, at least in the Research Notes, a "state-of-the-art" —that is, not just a bibliography but also and especially the rea­ sons for the differing interpretations. In other cases, I have taken a firmer position and proposed my own interpretations. I hope that this book will thus give rise to new special­ ized investigations, which will, without doubt, reopen discussion on many interpreta­ tions that I have often presented in the explicit form of alternative suggestions. 3. The Historian and His E v i d e n c e One of the most remarkable peculiarities of Achaemenid history is that, unlike most conquering peoples, the Persians left no written testaments of their own history, in the narrative sense of the word. It is noteworthy that unlike the Assyrian kings, the Great Kings had no Annals prepared where the memory of their mighty deeds on the battle­ field or in the hunt could be made heroic and preserved. We have no chronicle prepared

6

On the Trail of an Empire

by a court scholar at the command of the Great Kings. To be sure, according to Diodorus (II.32.4), Ctesias —a Greek physician in the court of Artaxerxes II, author of a Perska — boasted of having had access to "the royal records (basilikai diphtherai), in which the Persians in accordance with a certain law (nomos) of theirs kept an account of their ancient affairs." However, there is not another shred of evidence of such Persian histori­ cal archives, aside from a late and suspect tradition that attributes their destruction to Al­ exander. The archives referred to by the editor of Ezra (6:1-2), for example, were, rather, administrative. In these satrapal and/or royal archives {basilikai graphai; karammaru sa sarri) is preserved the written record of the most important decisions (land grants and reassignments, for example, and also fiscal documents). It is perhaps to such documents (found in several satrapal and/or imperial capitals) that Herodotus had access in com­ posing his well-known tribute list, but it is not out of the question that the historian from Halicarnassus collected his administrative data himself in interviews, a method men­ tioned on many occasions in his work. It is far more likely that at least in the Persica Cte­ sias relied on oral testimony, as explained by his epitomizer, Photius {Persica, §1). This is certainly how Herodotus, Ctesias, and several other Greek authors heard and retrans­ mitted the different versions of the legend ot the founder, Cyrus. The edifying tales of royal virtues were diffused throughout the Empire from the point of view of "educated people" (cf. Diodorus II.4.2); hence the interest that attaches, for example, to the Achae­ menid tales told by a late author, Aelian, who clearly takes his information from Hero­ dotus himself or from courtiers like Ctesias. From this point of view, the most striking example is a passage in which Polybius (X.28) transmits in writing an Achaemenid ad­ ministrative datum of the greatest interest that the Hyrcanian peasants had preserved in their collective memory for generations. By a series of extraordinary coincidences, a royal archivist or memoirist happened to be present when, at the demand of Antiochus III, the heads of the Hyrcanian communities recounted the privileges they had enjoyed since the time "when the Persians were the masters of Asia." It must be stressed that the information would have been totally lost if it had not had immediate relevance in the course of a military expedition mounted by the Seleucid king in Central Asia. Polybius found the report in a work that is now lost. We dare not underestimate the importance of oral tradition in the lands of the Near East. It was in oral form, in songs and recitations, mediated by the "masters of truth," the magi, that the Persians themselves transmitted the deeds of their kings and the memory of mythic heroes from generation to generation, and the young in their turn became the repositories of these oral traditions. In the collective imagination of the Persian people, history was conflated with its mythic expression and, in the royal pronouncements, with the genealogy of the dynasty. With the partial exception of the monumental trilingual inscription that Darius had engraved on the cliff at Behistun, the royal inscriptions are not narrative accounts: there is not a single direct reference to conquests or military ex­ peditions in them. Rather, they celebrate the omnipotence of the great god AhuraMazda, the transhistoric permanence of the dynastic principle, and the incomparable brilliance of the royal virtues. The Book of Benefactors, to which Herodotus (III. 140; VIII.85-86) and the composer of the book of Esther (6:1) allude, is no exception. It was a compilation of the names of persons who had rendered conspicuous services to the Great King and who (as such) could expect a royal gift; it therefore also had a place in the exaltation of the sovereign power. Achaemenid court art itself did not have a narra-

The Historian and His Evidence

1

tive purpose. Power and the King were represented in timeless attitudes, not a particular king in a historical situation; this holds true for royal images found on stone, coins, and seals as well. Written in the immovable and infinite time of the King, the history of the Persians was never situated in the measured time of History by the Persians themselves. The Great Kings and the Persians thus left the control of their historical memory to others. Here is an extraordinary situation: one must reconstruct the narrative thread of Achaemenid history from the writings of their subjects and their enemies —hence the power and authority long ascribed to the Greek authors. It is readily understandable that most of them wrote books devoted to memorializing the Greeks; and in the Athens of the fifth and fourth centuries, this memorial was constructed to a great extent on the carefully laid foundation of remembrances of confrontations with the Persians and vic­ tories won over the "barbarians of Asia." Among these authors, there is one who holds a special, preeminent place: Herodotus. In contrast to most of his contemporaries, he shows no evidence of systematic hostility to the Persians—hence the accusation directed against him by Plutarch of being a 'friend of the barbarians' (philobarbaros). The object of his Histories is to understand and explain the origins, however distant, of the Persian Wars. 'I'his gives us the advantage of lengthy digressions in the form of flashbacks on the history and institutions of many peoples and kingdoms of the Near East, Egypt in partic­ ular. It also gives us the advantage of interesting chapters on events in Persian history: the conquests of Cyrus, the seizure of Egypt by Cambyses, the accession of Darius, the reforms he introduced in tribute organization, as well as a digression on the internal or­ ganization of the Persian people and their principal social customs, and, of course, very long accounts of the Ionian Revolt (ca. 500-493) and the Persian Wars (490-479). In spite of its gaps and deficiencies, the abrupt end of the Histories in 479 leaves the histo­ rian of the Achaemenid Empire something of an orphan. Among Herodotus's succes­ sors, Thucydides has only a very peripheral interest in the Achaemenid Empire; as for Xenophon and Diodorus Siculus, their unbalanced approach tends to lend dispropor­ tionate weight to the Mediterranean side. Aside from the Anabasis of Xenophon, it was not until Alexander's expedition that the ancient historians penetrated the depths of the imperial territories, following in the footsteps of the conqueror. Finally, many ancient authors devoted works specifically to Persia, which are called the Persicas. But most are lost and known only from fragments (quotations in later au­ thors). The longest preserved fragment is the patriarch Photius's summary of the Persica of Ctesias. It is disappointing to read. The author, who lived some fifteen years at the court of Artaxerxes II, transmitted nothing but a slanted view dominated by the tortuous machinations of wicked princesses and the murky conspiracies of crafty eunuchs. He is undoubtedly one of the chief culprits in the success of a very incomplete and ideologized approach to the Achaemenid world. His Persica is not without some adumbration of the "Orientalism" of the modern period, which analyzes the courts of the Near East through a haze of very debatable readings, permeated mostly by observations on the murmurs of the harems and the decadence of the sultans. As for Xenophon, he wrote a long historical romance, the Cyropaedia, dedicated, as indicated by the title, to the ed­ ucation of the young Cyrus. The "Cyrus" he presents is certainly not the historical Cyrus; but he is a sort of paradigmatic embodiment of royal virtues. It is necessary, then, at each step, to distinguish the kernel of Achaemenid facts from the Greek interpreta­ tion—not always an easy task. It comes as no surprise that, generally speaking, the Greek

8

On the Trail of an Empire

authors transmitted a very Hellenocentric vision of Persian history and customs, just as certain books of the Bible, namely Nehemiah, Ezra, Esther, and Judith, provide a uni­ formly Judeocentric approach. But historians cannot choose their sources: given the available evidence, we have no choice but overwhelming reliance on Greek historiogra­ phy to reconstruct a narrative thread. However much one may rail, not to say become frustrated, at the nature of their works, the situation becomes even more awkward when one must do without them! What is more, one must not throw out the baby with the bathwater: some late authors (Athenaeus, Aelian) have preserved a great deal of informa­ tion about the person of the Great King and court life which, once it has been decoded, allows the historian to decipher what was also an Empire of signs (cf. chapters 5-7). From a methodological point of view, this book and the interpretations in it are thus largely the result of a labor of deconstruction of the Classical texts through which I have tried to show that, however partisan and ideological a Greek text may be, when it is lo­ cated in the web of its associations, it can provide a stimulating Achaemenid reading. Futhermore, the historical and historiographical status of royal pronouncements and images requires exactly the same approach. Fortunately, we also have records from the central authority: the royal inscriptions truly mirror the vision the Great Kings had of their power, their virtues, and their impe­ rial reach; they also furnish information of the greatest importance on their building ac­ tivities. But without doubt the most important find has been large groups of archives written on clay known as the Persepolis tablets, written in cuneiform in an Elamite that is riddled with Persian words. They provide a bureaucratic and "paper-shuffling" picture of the imperial administration that could scarcely be guessed from the Greek sources but would scarcely come as a surprise to the heirs of Assyro-Babylonian tradition. It is the same picture that the many Aramaic documents found in Egypt convey. Some royal and satrapal decrees are also known from translations into various languages of the Empire: these include a letter copied in Greek from Darius to Gadalas, one of his administrators in Asia Minor, and the correspondence in Demotic between Pharandates, satrap of Egypt, and the administrators of the sanctuary of the god Khnum at Elephantine. As a whole, this documentation shows both the many ways in which the central authority in­ tervened in local affairs and the persistent multilingualism of the Empire, tempered by the widespread use of Aramaic. To these written documents must be added the consid­ erable evidence from archaeology, iconography, and numismatics, from the Aegean to the Indus, that has been discovered and published. When the iconographic evidence, whether monuments or minor arts, in the royal residences or from the provinces, is added to the written sources (royal inscriptions; Ela­ mite and Babylonian tablets; inscriptions in Phoenician, Aramaic, or Egyptian, Lydian and Lycian, or more than one language; Aramaic papyri; Classical authors, etc.), the his­ torian has access to documentation that is both impressive and varied. But even when these varied corpora are brought together, they suffer from a dual handicap: they are very unevenly distributed in space and time. Some portions of the Empire, especially the sa­ trapies of the Iranian Plateau, Central Asia, and the Indus Valley, are virtually devoid of any written documentation. It is not until the conquest of Alexander that we have even minimal literary information; hence the overpowering weight of archaeological evi­ dence, which poses its own considerable interpretive difficulty. Some regions, on the other hand, are extraordinarily well documented: aside from Persia itself (the Elamite

Space and Time

9

tablets), we may specifically mention Susiana (both textual and archaeological evidence for royal building projects), Egypt (Aramaic documents from Elephantine and Saqqara, Demotic papyri, hieroglyphic inscriptions), Babylonia (thousands of tablets), and, obvi­ ously, Asia Minor (not only the Greek historians, but also late evidence in Greek, Ara­ maic, or Greek and Aramaic of the imperial Persian diaspora in Anatolia). Furthermore, the information from some provincial sites assumes special importance. This is true of Xanthus in Lycia, where the dynasts continued to build monuments of a different kind that regularly display both inscriptions in Lycian and Greek and court scenes whose iconographic repertoire testifies to Achaemenid influence. A written document of the greatest importance was discovered there in 1973: a stela with a text in three versions — Aramaic, Lycian, and Greek—that immediately became famous. It is now securely dated to the first year of Artaxerxes IV (338-3 36), a Great King of whom virtually nothing was known until then, apart from the name (Arses) regularly given him by the Classical sources (Arsu in Babylonian). For all of these reasons, I will frequently tarry at Xanthus, which appears to the historian as a sort of microcosm of Persian power in a regional sub­ division of the Empire for the entire time from Cyrus to Alexander. At the same lime, the example shows the interpretive difficulties that arise from the dominance of archae­ ological and iconographic sources. The evidence is distributed as unevenly in time as it is in space: the documents from the central authority are concentrated to a striking degree within the period from the conquest of Babylon by Cyrus to the middle of the fifth century, the date of the last Per­ sepolis documents; we can hardly expect to derive a complete history from the evidence of this single period. The reigns of Artaxerxes I (465-425/424) and Darius II (425/424405/404) remain fairly well documented, thanks to late documents from Persepolis, the Murasu archives in Babylonia, and Aramaic documents in Egypt. Otherwise, from Ar­ taxerxes II (405/404-359/358) on, the historian must resort, at least for the basic facts, to the reports of the Greek authors. But, as we have said, their attention is focused on the Aegean coast, military-diplomatic matters, and court intrigue. Not until Darius III (335330) do we find more abundant documentation, namely the Alexander historians who constitute, as I shall show (chapters 16-18), an "Achaemenid" source of exceptional in­ terest, once they have been decoded.

4. Space and Time The above observations immediately reveal the great difficulty faced by anyone who intends to write an analytical synthesis of the Achaemenid Empire. It must embrace a diachronic approach, a synchronic vision, and regional distinctions all at the same time. Though a single entity, the Empire had multiple manifestations because of its longevity and because of the great variety of the lands and cultures it comprised. Thus the tyranny of the document reemerges. How can one compose a global history of the longue duree, when the most significant evidence is limited to a few decades and/or a few areas? For the same reasons, where, how, and with what justification can we establish chronologi­ cal divisions that express an endogenous, ascertainable, and verifiable development? There is no reason to overlook the breaks marked by the death of a king and the acces­ sion of his successor, but one cannot attribute to them a determinative explanatory value because, whatever the recognized central position of the Great King, the pulse and breath of the history of the Empire over the longue duree cannot be reduced to incidents

10

On the Trail of an Empire

of dynastic history. Consequently, it is necessary to interrupt the chronological thread with thematic chapters. Despite the inauspicious distribution of the evidence, I have taken the risk of writing a general history in all of the aspects that I have listed. Risk is a bit pretentious because I have defined the several parts of the book mostly according to the distribution in time and space of all of the different kinds of evidence. What I am trying to say is that I have attempted to restore a full measure of importance to the fourth century, whose develop­ ment is too often misunderstood and treated superficially at the expense of surrendering the power of memory to the Greek polemicists and so rendering the end of the story un­ intelligible. I do not claim that the history in the chapters below (particularly chapter 15) is not primarily political, military, and diplomatic. It might be considered hard, even te­ dious, reading. But, on the one hand, to reprise a formula that I will repeat many times, historians cannot choose their sources. On the other hand, I hold as do others that there are no minor genres of history: in a history of a state built and destroyed by conquest, it would be unreasonable not to devote sustained attention to armies and military expedi­ tions. In the end, the study of war cannot be reduced to the caricature sometimes made of it with the pejorative label "battle-history." War is especially revealing of the workings of a state, even if it only reveals, for example, the scale of mobilization of human, mate­ rial, and technological means of production that it both presupposes and imposes. In order to highlight diachronic development more clearly, I have periodically pro­ vided an overview of the Empire, taken in its regional or even microregional compo­ nents (chapters 13/6-7; 14/8; 15/7). I have also drawn up some more general assessments at three key points. The first is at the death of Cambyses (522), to distinguish what is at­ tributed to the first two kings from what must be attributed to Darius (chapter 2). I have also made an assessment, which is meant to be exhaustive, at the end of the reign of Dar­ ius. Several long chapters (6-12) will perhaps provoke some criticism because of the use of later sources for the early fifth century, but I try to explain on several occasions the rea­ sons for my choice. The third general assessment occurs toward the beginning of the reign of Darius III, and it includes the entire fourth century. Its purpose is to take stock before the appearance of Alexander and better to assess what we have fallen into the un­ fortunate habit of calling "Achaemenid decadence (decline)." The reader will find there an overview of the peoples and countries of the Empire that is as complete as possible, without claiming to have exhausted the literature. This inventory is not confined to an analysis of the administrative organization; the longest passages are devoted to the anal­ ysis of intercultural relations (chapter 16). The assessment is filled out by a dynamic analysis of the central state apparatus (chapter 17). For reasons I will set forth in the proper place, in the introduction to part 4, such an assessment allows us to approach the last phase of Achaemenid history on a more solid basis: strictly speaking, the last chapter (18) is not about the conquest of Alexander but about the wars waged by Darius and the Empire against Macedonian aggression and about the response of the imperial elite to the general challenge of the Macedonian conquest. Conquest, resistance, and defection in turn eloquently reveal the state of the Empire when Darius perished in a conspiracy in the summer of 330.

To the Reader Whatever the origin and nature of the evidence at hand, history is simultaneously both explanation and interpretation. It is thus appropriate that the reader be informed about the sources that justify the author's interpretive choice. As a guide at each step of the way, I attempt to provide an inventory under the title "Sources and Problems." For the same reasons of clarity and rigor, I give frequent and sometimes lengthy quotations of ancient texts. By way of support for the explanation and the argument, I have also in­ cluded archaeological and iconographic evidence. In this way, I hope, readers will be clear about the path I have followed, the evidence that justifies and upports it, the argu­ ments I bring into play, and the worth of the interpretations I propose. They will have before their eyes all the elements that will permit them to conceive and/or propose alter­ native solutions. However much references to ancient sources may seem to burden the main text, I have found it necessary to provide them in parentheses, so that readers may look them up immediately, if they wish to examine, verify, or dispute them on the spot. I have also provided many subheadings—informative ones, I hope—so that readers can find their way easily through this substantial tome. And finally, I have deliberately ban­ ished the reference and explanatory notes to the back of the book, not only because some are very long and very detailed but also and especially because I hope that in this way the book will be more easily accessible to students and nonspecialists, who are rightly put off by the display of a sometimes over-erudite critical apparatus. Those who are interested are free to turn to the research appendix, like the specialists.

11

Acknowledgments I must first express my deepest gratitude to all those who have supported and stimu­ lated me through these years and lifted my spirits when I became discouraged. I do not know whether I would have begun without their stimulation or whether I would have persevered with such an ambitious undertaking. I thank all those who have been so kind as to provide me with advance copies of manuscripts that were in the course of publication,* Nor can I forget the exceptional access provided by Bernard Delavault and Alban Dussau, charges of the Semitic and Assyriological libraries of the College de France, respectively, whose Egyptological collec­ tion I consulted just as diligently. I recall that the Conseil scientifique of my university kindly granted me a sabbatical year. I also extend a tip of the hat to all of the students at Toulouse who for years have listened to my musings aloud in front of them and whose questions have often helped me clarify my thought. 1 think also of Sandra Pere (Tou­ louse) and Wouter Henkelman (Utrecht), who were of indescribable help in preparing the indexes; 1 took care of the subject index and general coordination, and obviously I take final responsibility for them all. My friends Amelie Kuhrt (London), Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg (Utrecht), Matt Stolper (Chicago), and Carlo Zaccagnini (Naples) read all or part of the manuscript and kindly shared their criticisms, always relevant and often extensive: I thank them from the bottom of my heart. I have amassed a special debt to Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg, beginning with our first meeting in Groningen in 1983. Even when all the French publishers I had con­ tacted exhibited great timidity, she offered to publish my book in the series she had founded and which she directs with Amelie Kuhrt. When Fayard and its editorial direc­ tor Denis Maraval expressed a desire to publish the manuscript, which was then in the course of word-processing in Utrecht, under the care of Mine L. Van Rosmalen, He­ leen Sancisi-Weerdenburg and the directors of the Netherlands Institute for the Near East (Leiden) accepted this proposal with great grace, for which I am especially grateful to them. Toulouse, October 1995

* L. Bregstein (Philadelphia), M Brosius (Oxford), P. Debord (Bordeaux), L. Depuydt (Provi­ dence), R. Descat (Bordeaux), D. Devauchelle (Paris), M . Garrison (San Antonio), L. L. G r a b b e (Hull), L. A. Heidorn (Chicago), W. Henkelman (Utrecht), C . Herrensclimidt (Paris), F. Israel ( R o m e ) , F. Joan­ nes (Paris), A. G. Keen (Belfast), H. Koch (Marburg), A, Kuhrt ( L o n d o n ) , A. Lemaire (Paris), G L e Rider (Paris), B. M e n u (Paris), M. C . Miller (Toronto), B. Porten (Jerusalem), M . C . Root (Ann Arbor), J. F. Salles (Lyon), H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg (Utrecht), S. Shcrwin-White ( L o n d o n ) , M . Stolper (Chi­ cago), F Vallat (Paris), R. J. van der Spek (Amsterdam), W. Vogelsang (Leiden), H. Wallinga (Utrecht), A. Yardeni (Jerusalem)

12

Prologue

The Persians before the Empire l. Why Cyrus?

Discontinuous Documentation and the Longue Dxirie The violent collapse of the mighty Assyrian Empire after the fall of Nineveh in 612 to a coalition of the Medes and Babylonians has sometimes been called a "scandal of history." The sudden appearance of the Persians in Near Eastern history and the light­ ning campaigns of Cyrus II, the Great, pose questions for the historian that are urgent both in their breadth and in their complexity. In two decades (550-530), the Persian armies led by Cyrus II conquered the Median, Lydian, and Neo-Babylonian kingdoms in succession and prepared the ground for Persian domination of the Iranian Plateau and Central Asia. How can we explain this sudden outburst into history by a people and a state hitherto practically unknown? How can we explain not only that this people could forge military forces sufficient to achieve conquests as impressive as they were rapid but also that, as early as the reign of Cyrus, it had available the technological and intellectual equipment that made the planning and building of Pasargadae possible? The historian who works on the longue duree is well aware that an illustrious reign and a decisive event are consistent only with a history whose roots delve deep into a fruit­ ful past. The Hellenistic historian Polybius was fully aware of this when he explained to his readers in the introduction to his History the need to reach far back in time, to un­ derstand how "the Roman state was able without precedent to extend its dominion over nearly all the inhabited world, and that in less than fifty-three years"; and he continued, "In this manner, when we come to the heart of my subject, we will have no trouble understanding how the Romans made their plans, what the military means and the ma­ terial resources available to them were when they engaged in this enterprise that per­ mitted them to impose their law on sea as well as on land and in all our regions." The same goes for the beginnings of Persian history: it is agreed that the victories of Cyrus could not be conceived without the prior existence of a structured state, an orga­ nized and trained army, a well-established royal authority, and numerous contacts with the Mesopotamian and Aegean kingdoms. Such great victories cannot be explained sim­ ply by a one-sided insistence on the decadence of the states conquered by Cyrus—a "decadence" whose rhythms and modalities it is convenient to avoid specifying. Nor can it be explained by recourse to the convenient but reductive supposition of the intrinsic superiority of nomads over settled peoples. In short, every historical reflection leads us to suggest that the accession of Cyrus II was not only the point of departure for the first territorial empire that brought political unification to the immense area from the Ae­ gean to the Indus; it was at the same time the outcome of a long process for which we have only fragmentary, elliptical, and discontinuous information. 13

14

The Persians before the Empire

Persian History and Creek

Representations

Persian history, indeed, was never treated in antiquity by a historian of the stature of a Polybius. The "theoretical model" of the Greek authors of histories of Persia is desper­ ately schematic and poor. Generally speaking, they are content to emphasize that the Persian Empire was nothing but the continuation of the Median kingdom conquered by Cyrus in 550. Take the case of Strabo. He is not satisfied to note that Ecbatana retained its prestige after the victory of Cyrus (XI. 13.5). With the aid of the most dubious argu­ ments from climate, he states that the Persians borrowed from the Medes their "Persian" stole, as it is n o w c a l l e d , a n d their zeal for archery a n d h o r s e m a n s h i p , a n d the c o u r t they pay to their kings, a n d their o r n a m e n t s , a n d the divine r e v e r e n c e paid by s u b ­ jects to kings. . . . T h e c u s t o m s even of the c o n q u e r e d looked to the c o n q u e r o r s so a u g u s t and appropriate to royal p o m p that they s u b m i t t e d to wear f e m i n i n e robes instead of g o i n g n a k e d or lightly c l a d , a n d to cover their b o d i e s all over with clothes. (XI. 13.9^)

He also refers to the opinion of other authors: "Some say that Medeia introduced this kind of dress when she, along with Jason, held dominion in this region" (XI.13.10-*-): how history and mythology are intertwined here! Still later (XI. 13.1 ]). In support of his reports, He­ rodotus describes in detail the "heinous crimes" perpetrated by the king both against the Egyptians and against well-born Persians, including his sister-wife. And Herodotus con­ cludes: "In view of all this, I have no doubt whatever that Cambyses was completely out of his mind" (III.38-*). It is clear that here Herodotus was depending closely on the oral sources he used in his reconstruction of the Egyptian campaign and the bloody succes­ sion to Cambyses. It is thus important to place his judgments in historical context, so as to gain the necessary perspective and thus to award Cambyses proper credit for his part in the construction of the Achaemenid Empire.

8. The Egyptian Campaign

(525-522)

The Egypt of Amasis Herodotus (III. 1-2), as we have seen, explains Cambyses' decision to march against Egypt by reasons that will scarcely satisfy the historian, for the interpretations he pro-

The Egyptian Campaign

(525-522)

51

vides of an Egyptian-Persian dynastic marriage at the time of Cyrus primarily reflect the viewpoint of Persian propaganda. Instead, an examination of the general strategic situa­ tion can allow us to understand the conditions that led Cambyses to start so important a military campaign. Having become master of Cyrus's empire, Cambyses had both to maintain dominion over the conquered countries and to extend the conquest toward the only remaining power of consequence in the Near East, the Egyptian kingdom. This must not be seen as a more or less irrational and uncontrollable desire to take over the entire inhabited world. Cambyses' strategy was instead predetermined by the decision made by his father to annex Trans-Euphrates to Babylonia. This would sooner or later require the subjuga­ tion of the countries located between the Euphrates and the Nile and thus necessitated conflict with Egypt, which in the past, and quite recently as well, had exhibited ambi­ tions in this region. The Egyptian campaign proper was thus certainly preceded by a series of conquests. Our ignorance in these areas is profound. We know in any case that Phoenicia and Cy­ prus were dependencies of Cambyses in 525. We know neither when nor how the con­ quest took place. According to Herodotus (III. 19-*-), "the Phoenicians had taken service under him of their own free will.. . . The Cyprians, too, had given their services to Per­ sia." Both were included in the naval forces mustered by Cambyses for his campaign against Egypt. The conquest of Cyprus was a heavy blow to Pharaoh Amasis because, ac­ cording to Herodotus (II.182-0), this king "was also the first man to take Cyprus and compel it to pay tribute." Since 664, Egypt had been governed by the Saite dynasty, whose first members ac­ complished the difficult task of reuniting the country. Traditionally included in the "Late Period" by Egyptologists, the Saite period seems to have been a true renaissance for Egypt. Since 570, Egypt had been ruled by Amasis, who died in 526. According to Herodotus, "it is said that the reign of Amasis was a time of unexampled material pros­ perity for Egypt; the earth gave its riches to the people as the river gave its riches to the earth. The total number of inhabited towns at this period was twenty thousand" (II. 177-0). Amasis also had powerful armed forces: a fleet that his predecessor, Necho II (610-595), had left him and an army considerably reinforced by contingents of merce­ naries from all over the Near East, including Caria and Ionia. Despite the assets he enjoyed, it can hardly be doubted that Amasis considered Cyrus's conquest of Babylonia a serious danger. He actively pursued a policy aimed at gaining allies for the struggle with the Persians, which was bound to break out in a short time. The Saite pharaohs had long since been fostering relations with numerous Greek states in Europe and Asia Minor. Herodotus (II. 178) labels Amasis a "Philhellene." Among the proofs of his philhellenism, he cites the case of Naucratis, a trading post in the Delta es­ tablished by cities of Asia Minor with the assent of the pharaoh, doubtless during the reign of Psammetichus I. This trade profited not only the Greeks and the Phoenicians (also represented in Egypt), but also the pharaoh, for Amasis maintained strict controls over imports and exports. Customs houses had been erected in the east of the Delta at the Pelusiac mouth and in the west, on the Canopic branch. Taxes were levied there on goods coming from the "northern foreign countries" (Phoenicia, Syria-Palestine) and "foreign countries of the Great Green" (Aegean, i.e., Greek countries), respectively. Numerous Greek sanctuaries received offerings from the pharaoh: the temple of Del­ phi and, in Asia Minor, the temple of Athena at Lindos on Rhodes, the temple of Hera

52

Chapter I. The Land-Collectors:

Cyrus the Great and Cambyses

at Samos, and the temple of the Branchidae at Didyma, as well as the sanctuary of Ath­ ena at Cyrene. The interest of the Saite kings in the cities of Asia Minor was long-stand­ ing: traditionally, it was from these cities that they recruited auxiliary troops, who were granted land in Egypt, to reinforce the Egyptian army. According to Herodotus (II. 163), Carians and Ionians under the command of Apries numbered 30,000 when he was de­ feated by Amasis. The author from Halicarnassus also states (II. 1540-) that Amasis settled the Ionians and Carians in Memphis "to protect him from his own people." In spite of the discontent provoked in the Egyptian soldiers by these favors granted to the soldiers from Asia Minor, Amasis was following the policy of his predecessors. Amasis could count among his allies Polycrates, who had established a tyranny on the island of Samos after a coup d'etat. "Once master of it, he concluded a pact of friendship with Amasis, king of Egypt, sealing it by a mutual exchange of presents," writes Herodo­ tus (III.39-*). It was to strengthen this alliance, established with an exchange gifts, that Amasis dedicated "two likenesses of himself, in wood" in the Heraion of Samos (11.182-*). Herodotus emphasizes the power that Polycrates soon acquired: "It was not long before the rapid increase of his power became the talk of Ionia and the rest of Greece. All his campaigns were victorious, his every venture a success."-* He extended his power as far as the Cyclades, including Rhenaea, near Delos. He soon represented a real threat to the Persian dominion over the Greek cities on the coast of Asia Minor after Cyrus. This is what Herodotus indicates, noting that Polycrates achieved a naval victory over the Mytilenians of Lesbos, allies of Miletus: but Miletus was a subject of the Per­ sians. The raids launched by the tyrant against the islands and the mainland towns im­ periled the Achaemenid positions. Herodotus himself emphatically notes that, in his opinion, Polycrates "had high hopes of making himself master of Ionia and the islands" (III. 122-*). These were perhaps the circumstances in which Cyrus made Oroetes "gov­ ernor of Sardis." Without doubt, Oroetes' main assignment was the defense of Achaeme­ nid territories against the actions of the tyrant. In relation to the Persians, Polycrates to some extent played the same role as Croesus when he entered into alliance with the Egyptian pharaoh. In discussing the concerns of Oroetes, Herodotus writes of Polycrates that he "was the first Greek we know of to plan the dominion of the sea" (III. 122-*). He was able to nur­ ture these ambitions thanks to his naval power. According to Herodotus (III.39-*), he had 100 penteconters (fifty-oared galleys). This was a naval force beyond the means of a Greek city, even one as rich as Samos. It is thus not out of the question that it was par­ tially as a result of the aid of Amasis that Polycrates was able to build and maintain such a naval force. According to Herodotus (III.44), in 525 Polycrates even had 40 triremes (galley with three banks of oars). The trireme was a great technological and military in­ novation that appeared in the Aegean world between 550 and 525. This may be the type of warship that Egypt had as well; it enabled Amasis to take Cyprus.

The Conquest of the Nile Valley and Its Approaches In 525, however, Egypt's situation had recently taken a turn for the worse. First of all, Amasis had died the year before; he was succeeded by his son Psammetichus III. The loss of Amasis, which occurred when Cambyses was preparing to march against Egypt, had serious consequences. In a long account in the form of a story, Herodotus describes the break between Amasis and Polycrates (III.40-43). According to Herodotus, the treaty

The Egyptian Campaign (525-522)

53

of friendship was abrogated on the initiative of Amasis, who was uneasy about the pros­ perity and unbridled ambition of Polycrates. In reality, Polycrates had himself estab­ lished contact with Cambyses, who had urged him to send him a squadron of ships. Polycrates dispatched a force of 40 triremes, which he was careful to man with "carefully selected crews, every man of which he had particular reason to suspect of disloyalty to himself . . . with instructions to Cambyses never to allow them to return to Samos."-* The episode poses several difficulties of interpretation, but the essence is clean Polycra­ tes forsook the Egyptian alliance and made overtures to the Persian king. No doubt he was uneasy about the dangers mounting against him (Sparta was preparing to send a fleet against Samos) and about the increasing opposition of a faction of the Samian elites who favored cooperation with Egypt. The tyrant's sudden shift of strategy can be under­ stood even better if we assume that it happened after the death of Amasis. Well informed about Cambyses' preparations, he had decided to seek safety in what he judged to be an inevitable Persian victory. The pharaoh suffered another defection, that of Phanes of Halicarnassus, "a brave and intelligent soldier," in the words of his compatriot Herodotus (III.4-*). He was one of the officers of the Carian troops serving close to the pharaoh, who harbored a strong fear of him, "as he was a person of consequence in the army and had very precise knowl­ edge of the internal condition of Egypt." Escaping the vigilance of the men sent in pur­ suit of him, Phanes reached Cambyses when he "was anxious to launch his attack on Egypt." He was able to provide the Great King with firsthand information on both the state of Egyptian forces and access routes to the Delta. Meanwhile, Cambyses had made considerable military preparations. Herodotus notes that, after the conquest of Asia Minor by Cyrus's troops, "the islanders had nothing to fear, because the Phoenicians were not yet subject to Persia and Persia herself was not a sea power" (1.143-*). The subjugation of Cyprus and Phoenicia allowed Cambyses to shift the course of things. In 525, the Phoenicians "were entirely dependent on the strength of their navy {nautikos stratos)." This force also included Cypriots, as well as Greeks from Ionia and Aeolis, including a contingent from Mytilene. We may say that Cambyses was the real creator of the Persian Navy, which was built with men and mate­ rials levied from both Phoenicia and Asia Minor. This was the compliment that the Per­ sians of Cambyses' entourage paid him when he asked them about his accomplishments: "T'hey had answered that he was better than his father, because he had kept all Cyrus' possession and acquired Egypt and the command of the sea into the bargain" (III.34-*-). It does in fact seem that Cambyses created the royal Persian navy in its entirety, and it was indispensable to his hopes of victorious engagement with the pharaoh, who had an im­ posing fleet of his own. The military operations are not known in great detail. While telling the story of Phanes, Herodotus dwells at length (III.4-9) on the relations established by Cambyses with the "king of the Arabs," who controlled the desert region between Gaza and the Egyptian border. A formal treaty permitted the Persian king access to enough water to reach the Nile Valley. It was certainly this approach route that allowed Cambyses to im­ pose his direct rule overTrans-Euphratian peoples and cities who before then had surely never seen a Persian soldier. This is the state of affairs that Polybius (XVI.22a) later re­ ports, praising the fidelity of the inhabitants of Gaza to their allies: "When the Persians invaded, for example, when elsewhere all were terrified by the power of the adversary,

54

Chapter I. The Land-Collectors:

Cyrus the Great and Cambyses

when all to the last man surrendered to the adversary, they confronted the danger on their own and together withstood the siege." Gaza was an important commercial cen­ ter—whose prosperity Herodotus compares to that of Sardis—and from that time on­ ward it constituted an essential support for the Persian occupation of Palestine and a bridgehead for any expedition to Egypt. Psammetichus headed an army comprising Egyptian soldiers and Carian and Greek auxiliaries and was positioned at the Pelusiac mouth of the Nile, where he awaited Cam­ byses. But Herodotus gives hardly any information about the fighting, being more inter­ ested in the terrible vengeance prepared by the pharaoh s Carian and Greek auxiliaries against Phanes (III. 11) and in a picturesque comparison of the relative toughness of Egyptian skulls versus Persian skulls (III. 12). He mentions simply that the battle ended badly for Psammetichus, whose Egyptian troops sought refuge in the citadel of Mem­ phis. "Cambyses laid seige to the town, and after a time it was surrendered" (111.13-v-). Psammetichus was taken prisoner. The choices made by Herodotus from the information available to him led him to pass over in silence both the strength of the resistance and the role of Psammetichus's navy. A late author, Polyaenus (VII.9), instead emphasizes that Cambyses had to besiege Pelusium and that the Egyptians were able to use catapults and other machines to block Cambyses in front of the town, which ipso facto closed off his entry to Egypt, since Egypt could not be entered without taking the town or having naval superiority. We know that an Egyptian, Udjahorresnet, commanded the sea-going fleet for Amasis and then for Psammetichus III. Because he presents himself as a favorite of Cambyses, we might guess that Udjahorresnet had abandoned Amasis, thus considerably facilitating Camby­ ses' victory at Pelusium; but the hypothesis remains weak. Once Pelusium was taken, the troops and the Persian navy were able to penetrate the Nile Valley and lay siege to Mem­ phis, which was linked to the sea by various waterways. One of these was traversed by Cambyses' boat, which carried a herald instructed to demand the surrender of the de­ fenders. The herald was killed, along with his retinue. Psammetichus and his troops were in fact able to mount a long resistance in the shadow of the "White Wall," which could not be taken without the support of the fleet. At the end of the siege (whose length Herodotus does not give), Cambyses was able to make his triumphal entry into the town, and a Persian-Egyptian garrison was stationed in the "White Wall." Once he had conquered Egypt, Cambyses intended to reassert on his own behalf the ambitions of the last pharaohs toward the west (Libya and Cyrenaica) and south (Nubia = Herodotus's Ethiopia). The Libyans, soon followed by the Greeks of Cyrene and Barca, sent gifts to Cambyses as tokens of surrender; as proof of his good will, Cambyses returned the Greek woman whom Amasis had wed when he made an alliance with the Greek town of Cyrene. Then, still following Herodotus (III. 17), "he planned a threefold expedition: against the Carthaginians, against the Ammonians, against the Long-Lived Ethiopians who live in Libya on the edge of the southern sea." The expedition against Carthage was canceled because the Phoenicians were unwilling to make war on a Phoe­ nician colony. Although the possibility of an expedition against Carthage seems un­ likely, the same cannot be said for royal designs on the south. Cambyses dedicated his efforts to the realization of a great "African project," which consisted in part of acquiring the kingdom of Meroe and in part of seizing strategic positions in the western oases. In this strategy, Cambyses was clearly following the policy of the Saites, who since Psam-

Cambyses and the Egyptian Traditions

55

metichus I had regularly sent expeditions to the south in order to put an end to the Cushite threat and to solidify their dominion at least as far as the First Cataract. A garri­ son was established at Elephantine. The garrison, already consisting partly of Jewish contingents, was there throughout the time of Cambyses, as we know because, in their petition dating to the reign of Darius II, the Jews recalled that their sanctuary had been built "in the days of the kings of Egypt" and was standing "when Cambyses came into Egypt," and they implied that Cambyses protected it (DAE 102 [AP 30—31 ->]). According to Herodotus, the expeditions, one against the oasis of A m n i o n , the other against Ethiopia, were repaid with utter disaster. Herodotus blames the "madness" of Cambyses, who "at once began his march against Ethiopia, without any orders for the provision of supplies, and without for a moment considering the fact that he was to take his men to the ends of the earth" (III.26-*). But the deliberate bias against Cambyses raises doubts about the accuracy of Herodotus's version. Other evidence indicates that the expedition did not founder in a military catastrophe, even if the difficulties of the un­ dertaking perhaps obliged the Great King to retreat. Specific evidence of this are the lat­ est results of excavations on the site of the fortress of Dorginarti, established in the Saite period at the same latitude as the Second Cataract. The pottery and an Aramaic text show that the fortress, which was doubtless part of an extended network, remained in use throughout the Achaemenid period.

9. Cambyses and the Egyptian

Traditions

The "Madness" of Cambyses: Sources and Problems According to Herodotus, up to this time, Cambyses behaved with a certain modera­ tion. He even "felt a touch of pity" and ordered that the son of Psammetichus be spared (III. 14-*). On the other hand, in the eyes of the same Herodotus, the king "lost his wits completely and, like the madman he was," launched his expedition against the Ethiopi­ ans (III.25-*). Madness completely possessed the spirit of the king after his return to Memphis. He was seized with fury toward the gods, the cults, the temples, and the priests of Egypt. Herodotus lays particular stress on the murder of the sacred bull Apis and his caretakers. He thinks that Cambyses considered the feasts held in honor of Apis to be celebrations saluting his Ethiopian (Nubian) defeat: C a m b y s e s o r d e r e d the priests to be w h i p p e d by the m e n w h o s e b u s i n e s s it was to carry o u t s u c h p u n i s h m e n t s , a n d any E g y p t i a n w h o was found still k e e p i n g holiday to be p u t to death In this way the festival was broken u p , the priests p u n i s h e d , a n d Apis, w h o lay in the t e m p l e for a t i m e wasting away from the w o u n d in his thigh, finally d i e d a n d was b u r i e d by t h e priests without the k n o w l e d g e o f C a m b y s e s . E v e n before this C a m b y s e s b a d b e e n far from sound in his m i n d ; b u t the E g y p t i a n s are c o n v i n c e d that the c o m p l e t e loss o f his reason was the direct result of this c r i m e . (Ill 2 9 0 )

There follows the tale of his "murderous madness" against highly placed Persians, against his brother Smerdis (III.30), his sister-wife (111.31-33), and against the Lydian Croesus (III.36-37). Then Herodotus brings grave accusations against the king who "broke open ancient tombs and examined the bodies, and even entered the temple of Hephaestus [Ptah] and jeered at the god's statue" (III.37-*-). And Herodotus concludes: In view of all this, 1 have no doubt whatever that Cambyses was completely out of his mind; it is the only possible explanation of his assault upon, and mockery of, everything which ancient law and custom have made sacred in Egypt" (III.38-*).

56

Chapter 1. The Land-Collectors: Cyrus the Great and Cambyses

Following Herodotus, all of the Classical authors repeat the theme of the madness and impiety of Cambyses. "Shocked by Egyptian religious practices, he had the temples of Apis and other gods demolished," writes Justin (1.9.2). Strabo offers the same explana­ tions to explain the destruction of the temples of Heliopolis and Thebes (XVII. 1.27,46). This hostile tradition is also found in Diodorus Siculus (1.46.40; 49.50-): T h e silver a n d gold a n d costly works o f ivory a n d rare stone [that the t e m p l e s o f T h e b e s c o n ­ tained] were carried off by the Persians w h e n C a m b y s e s b u r n e d the t e m p l e s of Egypt; a n d it was at this time, they say, that the Persians, by transferring all this wealth to Asia a n d taking artisans a l o n g from E g y p t , c o n s t r u c t e d their f a m o u s p a l a c e s in Persepolis a n d S u s a a n d t h r o u g h o u t M e d i a . . . . [ T h e circle o f gold c r o w n i n g the t o m b o f O z y m a n d i a s ] , they said, had b e e n p l u n d e r e d by C a m b y s e s a n d the Persians w h e n h e c o n q u e r e d Egypt.

A late tradition recorded by St. Jerome (Comm. Dan. 1.7.9) even suggests that Cambyses deported 2500 Egyptian cult images. In short, Cambyses, we are led to believe, is sup­ posed to have done everything he possibly could to alienate the Egyptian population as a whole, especially the great families who administered the temples, whose leading po­ sition in Egyptian society he certainly could not have been unaware of. Nor could he have been unaware of the role played by the pharaoh or the crown prince in the funeral rites that were intended to mark the earthly death of an Apis. We know for example that Psammetichus III, shortly before Cambyses' invasion, had himself gone through the es­ pecially trying ritual fast (total lack of nourishment for four days, and exclusively vege­ tarian diet for seventy clays) and that he had participated in the exhausting ceremonies that played out over the seventy days it took to embalm the sacred bull. Lastly, Cambyses could not have been unaware of the enormous popularity of Apis among the common folk of Egypt, who joined in the mourning. These people made up the towns and nomes of the provinces who, on the demand of the authorities in Memphis, furnished the enor­ mous quantities of materials needed for the mummification of the sacred animal (silver, gold, royal linen, myrrh, precious stones, and all sorts of "good things"). Even less could Cambyses have been unaware that, at the time of his return to Memphis, ceremonies marking the "revelation" of Apis were to be going on, which, according to Herodotus (III.27*), were celebrated by Egyptians wearing "their best clothes." In conclusion, in the version presented by Herodotus, Cambyses' Egyptian policy (which he contrasts with that of Darius; III.38) shows a strong break with the policy of his father, Cyrus, in conquered countries. Unable to offer a political explanation, Herodotus had no option but to resort to the "madness" of the king (III.38). But modern historians are obliged to show much greater rigor. Some of the deeds ascribed to the Persians cannot be denied, but they do not neces­ sarily carry the significance that the ancient authors attribute to them. A man as favor­ able toward the new master as the Egyptian Udjahorresnet (who will be discussed at greater length shortly) himself speaks of the "trouble that arose in this norae [of Sais], when the very great trouble arose in the entire land [of Egypt]." And exalting his good deeds, he writes: "I saved its [my city of Sais's] inhabitants from the very great trouble that arose in the entire land [of Egypt], the likes of which had never existed in this world." This trouble coincides with the settlement of the "foreigners" in Egypt, which led to a temporary state of anarchy. The disorders were not limited to the Delta, since the destruction of Egyptian temples is also recorded on the southern frontier, at Ele­ phantine. We can imagine that many other instances of outrage against both goods and

Cambyses and the Egyptian Traditions

57

persons were perpetrated by the troops. But it would be an error to see this as the mani­ festation of an anti-Egyptian policy laid down and enforced by Cambyses; it was simply the prerogative of the victors. Let us note also that sending Egyptian treasures (including the wealth of certain temples) to Persia was nothing out of the ordinary. It was exactly what Cyrus had done at Ecbatana and Sardis. Moreover, the tradition of the murder of the Apis by Cambyses must be completely reinterpreted in light of discoveries made at the Serapeum of Memphis, where the de­ ceased and embalmed Apises were laid to rest in sarcophagi. The epitaph of the Apis in­ terred at the time of Cambyses, in 524, has actually been found. The king, garbed as an Egyptian and on his knees, is there called "the Horns [.. .], king of Upper and Lower Egypt [...]," and the inscription says: [Year] 6, third month of Hie season Shemou, day 10 (?), under the Majesty of the king of Up­ per and Lower Egypt [. ..] endowed with eternal life, the god was brought in [peace toward the good West and laid to rest in the necropolis in] his [place] which is the place which his Majesty had made for him, [after] all [the ceremonies had been clone for him] in the em­ balming hall [..•]• It was done according to everything his Majesty had said [.. .]. (Posener no. 3) The inscription on the sarcophagus is equally eloquent on the role Cambyses played in the events: (Cambyses], the king of Upper and Lower Egypt.. . made as his monument to his father Apis-Osiris a large sarcophagus of granite, dedicated by the king [.. .], endowed with all life, with all perpetuity and prosperity (?), with all health, with all joy, appearing eternally as king of Upper and Lower Egypt. (Posener no. 4) The conclusion seems undeniable: Herodotus recorded spurious information. Far from having killed the young Apis, Cambyses participated in the embalming and funeral rites of an Apis, following the regulations and the ceremony that were well known, particu­ larly in the Saite period. The inscriptions also make it clear that it was in his capacity as "king of Upper and Lower Egypt," as "son of Ra" —in short, as pharaoh —that Cambyses led the funeral ceremonies. From this emerges an image of Cambyses quite different from that which Herodotus wished to convey. Cambyses was a conqueror seeking to take his place and his rank in the rites and rituals of the Egyptians; he was an Achaemenid king who wished to comply, as pharaoh, with the practices and beliefs that had become inscribed in the Egyptian longue duree. Confirmation of this wish is found in the inscrip­ tion on the Egyptian seal of the new pharaoh: The king of Upper and Lower Egypt, Cambyses, beloved of [the goddess] Wajet, sovereign of [the town of] Iniet, great, Eye of the Sun, sovereign of the Sky, mistress of the gods, to whom is given life, as to the Sun.

Udjahorresnet and Cambyses Conclusions of the same kind can be drawn from the analysis of another, even betterknown hieroglyphic text, namely, the inscriptions on a statuette that shows Udjahorres­ net, whom we have already met, carrying a small, portable shrine (fig. 44, p. 473). This statue and its inscriptions, probably erected in the temple of Osiris at Sai's, were in­ tended to ensure divine benevolence in the hereafter for the person represented, as is shown by the final appeal to the gods, who were asked to "recall all the meritorious deeds" of the dedicator. They were also intended to preserve his memory and his acts for

58

Chapter 1. The Land-Collectors: Cyrus the Great and Cambyses

future generations of pilgrims. Needless to say, the autobiographical character of the texts invites the historian to submit the texts to a critical reading. Udjahorresnet presents himself as a benefactor: he restored the splendor of the temple of Neith at Sa'is, he was "a good man" in the good town of SaVs, he "defended the weak against the powerful," he was "a good son and a good brother, filling those near to him with favors and privileges." On the other hand, he is much more discreet about the manner in which he passed from the service of Amasis and Psammetichus III to the ser­ vice of Cambyses and then Darius. However it may have happened, there is no doubt that he turned to the new power. In detailing, with a touch of vanity, the titles bestowed on him by Amasis, Psammetichus, Cambyses, and Darius, he presents himself as a man very close to all of the kings, both Saite and Persian: "I was a (man) honored by all his m a s t e r s . . . . They gave me gold ornaments and made for me all useful things" (Posener no. IF). Udjahorresnet, a figure of the transition, was firmly devoted to situating his ca­ reer and his actions in the service of purely Egyptian dynastic and ideological continuity. It is true that Udjahorresnet, as we have seen, alludes directly to the Persian invasion that caused "great trouble," not only in Sais but in all of Egypt. This reference permits him first and foremost to emphasize the relief he himself had brought to the temple of Neith, to his family, and more generally to the inhabitants of the Saite nome. However, it is also in this context that he established a special relationship with Cambyses. He had come before the king to complain about the presence of Achaemenid soldiers (the "for­ eigners") within the precinct of the sanctuary of Neith. The king ordered the evacuation of the troops and the purification of the temple. Throughout the text, Cambyses is pre­ sented as the restorer of order: expressions such as "as it was before," "as any king would do," "as any beneficent king would do," or "as any previous king would do" are used in regard to him several times. Cambyses "restored" landed estates to the goddess Neith; in the sanctuary he "replaced" people expelled by the s o l d i e r s . . . . In this way, Udjahorres­ net absolves the king of all responsibility for the extortions that were committed. Cam­ byses is added to the long series of "beneficent kings" who took care of the temples and cults. He went in person to SaTs, prostrated himself before the goddess, and presented his offerings, "as any beneficent king would do." He "established the presentation of liba­ tions to the lord of Eternity (Osiris) within the temple of Neith, as any previous king would do." Cambyses, the conqueror of Egypt, is thus clearly presented by Udjahorresnet as a pharaoh, in the full sense of the term. The Egyptian consistently names the Persian king "king of Upper and Lower Egypt"—a title he also bears in the inscriptions of the Serapeum. In reality, after the victory Cambyses played a sort of double role. He was "the great king of the foreign countries" who came to Egypt with "the foreigners of all the for­ eign countries." But, "as soon as he took possession of this entire land [ . . . ] , he was great sovereign of Egypt, great king of all the foreign countries." Through his titulature and his privileged relationship with the gods, Cambyses acquired in the eyes of Udjahorresnet the status of pharaoh, which clothed him with all of the attributes and endowed him with all of the traditional virtues. Thus, ideological bases were put in place on which the collaboration between Cambyses (later Darius) and Udjahorresnet was founded. From this point of view, the Egyptian's statements are not inconsistent with the Cyms Cylinder: in the same way that Cyrus was Babylonized, Cambyses in Egypt was Egyptianized by ' the Egyptians who wished to collaborate with the new power. For both of them it was the

Cambyses and the Egyptian Traditions

59

best way to present the image of a solicitous conqueror, graciously bending to the polit­ ico-religious traditions of the conquered countries. It was, in a way, acquiescing to Baby­ lonian and Egyptian continuity in order to highlight the Achaemenid discontinuity. There can be no doubt that this policy was defined by Cambyses himself. Udjahorres­ net even states that it was on the orders of the sovereign that he composed his titulature, namely "king of Upper and Lower Egypt." But it seems likely that Persian propaganda must have taken extra pains to justify the power of Cambyses in Egypt. Among the "im­ pious" crimes perpetrated by Cambyses at Sa'i's, Herodotus (III.I60) lists the violation of the sepulchre of Amasis: "He gave orders for his body to be taken from the tomb where it lay. This done, he proceeded to have it treated with every possible indignity, such as lashing with whips, pricking with goads, and the plucking of its hairs. . . . Cambyses ordered it to be burnt. This was a wicked thing to do. . . . " A priori, this behavior seems absolutely contrary to the express intention of Cambyses to act as the successor of the legitimate pharaohs. But other acts and accounts also tell of his desire to be linked di­ rectly with Pharaoh Hophra (Apries), whom Amasis had deposed in order to seize power. This is also the sense of one of the accounts of Cambyses that describes him as a son of Cyrus and a daughter of Apries. Amasis fell victim to a veritable damnatio memoriae in the Persian period.

Collaboration and Resistance It remains for us to inquire into the origin of Herodotus's presentation of the policy of Cambyses. If it is so contrary to the facts and to the statements of Udjahorresnet, it is be­ cause, at the time of his investigation in Egypt two generations later, the historian from Halicarnassus encountered informants hostile to the memory of the conqueror of Egypt—namely, Egyptian informants whom he cites numerous times. Now, at the time of Herodotus, relations between Egyptians and Persians were strained and difficult, the Egyptians having revolted several times after 525. It is this context that gave rise to leg­ ends and popular stories that presented Cambyses as the prototypical conqueror—bru­ tal, impious, and bloody. It should be added that Herodotus also gathered information and opinion from Persian circles that were very hostile to Cambyses. Nevertheless, it would also be excessive and misleading to suggest that the opinion and behavior of Udjahorresnet should be generalized. That the "legitimizing" propa­ ganda of Cambyses would have been ubiquitous and clever is one thing; that it would have aroused unanimous adherance and sympathy is another. The allegiance of Udjahor­ resnet himself was won conditionally: he would not have recognized Cambyses' power unless Cambyses had adopted the rules and precepts of traditional pharaonic royalty. Moreover, several indications suggest that not all Egyptians were ready to submit to the Persian king. Herodotus (III. H o ) describes the punishment incurred by the Egyp­ tians who massacred the herald sent by Cambyses to Memphis: 2000 young Egyptians, "their mouths bridled and a rope round their necks," were led to execution, the royal judges having decided that "for each man [massacred by the Egyptians] ten Egyptian noblemen should die." The staging of the "spectacle" is equally significant: the con­ demned were paraded before the conquered pharaoh, who was surrounded by the fa­ thers of the victims. Anxious above all to throw into relief the dignity of Psammetichus, Herodotus states that the pharaoh remained stone-faced upon seeing his son, unlike his companions, who dissolved in grief. Similarly, a few minutes earlier, Psammetichus had

60

Chapter ]. The Land-Collectors: Cyrus the Great and Cambyses

said nothing when his daughter was paraded, clothed as a slave, along with young aris­ tocratic ladies, similarly dressed. Through his demeanor, the pharaoh expressed his re­ fusal to accede to the new power. Indeed, Herodotus reports that Cambyses, who "felt a touch of pity," ordered the son of Psammetichus to be spared. In reality, he was the first to be put to death! He adds that Psammetichus "lived at court from that time onward. Here he was well treated," and he even thinks that "if he had only had the sense to keep out of mischief, he might have re­ covered Egypt and ruled it as governor" (III. 15o). He explains the supposed behavior of Cambyses by a rule of the Persian kings, "who are in the habit of treating the sons of kings with honour, and even of restoring to their sons the thrones of those who have re­ belled against them." But the Egyptian examples Herodotus cites are quite unconvinc­ ing. As for the behavior ascribed to the Persian kings, it is at least nuanced by Isocrates, who says kings "as a rule . . . do not reconcile with those who rebel before they have taken them prisoner" {Evag. 63). It is clear that Cambyses never dreamed of returning the government of Egypt to Psammetichus. It should be emphasized above all that Psammetichus was not content merely with intrigue: "He was caught in flagrante delicto inciting the Egyptians to revolt; and when he was discovered by Cambyses, he was forced to drink bull's blood; and he died on the spot. Thus was his end!" So it seems c l e a r that the pharaoh had never agreed to recognize the one who claimed to be his successor. Another social group —again closely linked to the Egyptian aristocracy—could with good reason claim to be unhappy with Cambyses' activities—namely, the administra­ tors of the Egyptian temples. It is true that Udjahorresnet emphasizes that, at his re­ quest, the new pharaoh restored to the goddess the revenues of the landed estates, "as it had been previously." But his exaltation of the new pharaoh's piety toward Neith of Sai's must be placed in the context of a statement that was intended primarily to stress the amount of benefactions the sanctuary at SaTs realized from the cooperation between Udjahorresnet and Cambyses. It appears that not all of the temples would have been so happy about Cambyses' policy. The stelas marking royal generosity to the temples, so numerous before 525, disappeared in the time of Cambyses. This observation has been linked to a royal decree attributed to Cambyses. The text, unfortunately quite difficult to read, is preserved in a Demotic document on the verso of the Demotic Chronicle. Cambyses is accused of having set drastic limitations on the revenues in kind that the Egyptian temples collected in the time of Amasis. Only three temples were exempt from this regulation. Many obscurities continue to surround the scope and objectives of the measure taken by Cambyses. The compilers contrast his conduct with that of Darius, who collected the Egyptian jurisprudential traditions, including those relating to "rights of the temples." Let us simply recall that the problem of relations between the temples and the king per­ sisted throughout Egyptian history, with the pharaohs attempting simultaneously to rec­ ognize the rights of the temples and to limit their financial power. The gifts of land to the temples were not disinterested: the pharaoh, who retained a right of eminent do­ main, thus developed a policy "intended less to enrich the temples than to keep active the economy of which they were the center" (D. Meeks). The Saites acted no differently. In this area, the discontinuity introduced by Cambyses is perhaps more apparent than real. To evaluate it, this measure must be placed in the framework of an overall study of

Cambyses and die Egyptian

Traditions

61

tribute administration in Egypt—a difficult task in view of the scarcity of documenta­ tion. Moreover, converging indications attest to the increase of tribute appropriations under his reign. The Egyptian temples no doubt did not avoid them. It is thus quite likely that the negative image of Cambyses goes back in part to the mo­ ment of the conquest and administrative organization of Egypt. On this hypothesis, we might think that the fiscal measures enacted by Cambyses were reprisals against the sanctuaries that had little inclination to legitimate the installation of a foreign power. Whatever it was, the royal decision need not be considered a contradiction of the gen­ eral policy applied to the Egyptians. As for the powerful Egyptian temples, the new pha­ raoh could not pursue a policy of unlimited generosity. He had to control them or risk reducing the conquest to a short-lived pretense. It was the same in Babylonia, where the proclamations of devotion to Cyrus and Cambyses went hand in hand with increased fis­ cal pressure (pp. 73f). It was not only the financial power of the new pharaoh that was at stake but also the reality of his power, so recent and fragile and threatened by opposi­ tion. Perhaps this is also why Egypt was converted to a satrapy whose government Cam­ byses, before departing, turned over to the Persian Aryandes. Called back by news of a rebellion in Persia, Cambyses left Egypt hastily in the spring of 522. While crossing Syria, he was wounded in the thigh; gangrene set in, and the son of Cyrus died at the beginning of summer, 522. Before returning at greater length to the events of 522, we should pause to draw up the initial balance sheet of the conquests.

Chapter 2

The Conquest and After: An Interim Summary l. From Cyrus to Darius: Sources and Problems By the time of Cambyses' death in 522, an impresssive amount of territory had been conquered in the span of thirty years. The Achaemenid dynasty, which around 550 ruled a narrow territory of the southern Zagros, had engulfed every kingdom and empire that shared the Near East and Central Asia. The range of its dominion extended thenceforth from Cyrenaica to the Hindu Kush, from the Syr Darya to the Persian Gulf. The earlier political structures were officially dissolved, and their titulature had vanished or else had been assumed by the conquerors. From this point of view alone, the reigns of Cyrus and Cambyses would appear to be a high point on the scale of the ancient history of the Near East. For the first time, a state had been formed with a single purpose, and what is more, a state that was based not merely on continental possessions; it also had wide access to the sea via the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea. With Cambyses, the new state had forged a naval power that allowed it to control a vast maritime front. This is in striking contrast to the geopolitical situation prevailing toward the middle of the sixth century. Traditionally, the organizational work is attributed almost exclusively to Darius. But there is no a priori reason to distinguish sharply between a phase of military conquests (Cyrus and Cambyses) and a phase of organization (Darius). Obviously no one would dream of depriving Darius of his justified renown in this area. Nonetheless, it must also be recognized that Darius and his advisers built on preexisting structures, which emerged both from local traditions and from the initial adaptations introduced by Cyrus and his son. That said, it must be admitted that we do not have the sort of abundant and varied documentation for Cyrus and Cambyses that is available from the reign of Da­ rius. Marked by the theme of "good king Cyrus," the Classical sources are of scant help. This remark holds true especially for Xenophon, who in the Cyropaedia assigns his hero an essential role in the organization of the empire: Cyrus, conqueror without peer (Xe­ nophon even credits him with the conquest of Egypt) and creator of the Persian army and cavalry, would have been the first, after the conquest of Babylon, ever to have a glo­ bal vision for the administrative organization of the Empire-in-the-making. He ap­ pointed the high officials of the central court (VIII. 1.9-12), organized the finances (1.13-14), required nobles to attend the royal court (1.5-6, 17-22), etc. —everything is listed under the name of Cyrus. The same goes for the institution of satraps (VIII.6.115) and of the inspectors' service for the satrapies and the express postal service (VIII.6.16-18). And Xenophon insists repeatedly on the durability of decisions made by Cyrus: "And the institutions which Cyrus inaugurated as a means of securing the king­ dom permanently to himself and the Persians, as has been set forth in the following nar62

Satraps and Satrapies

63

rative, these the succeeding kings have preserved unchanged even to this day" (VIII.I.70-). But none of this presentation has any diachronic value. Xenophon instead paints a timeless tableau of the Achaemenid Empire. Sufficient proof may be found in a comparison of the identical portraits of Cyrus the Elder in the Cyropaedia and Cyrus the Younger in the Anabasis. To be sure, many of the institutions portrayed in the Cyro­ paedia are known and confirmed by many other texts, but nothing requires us to at­ tribute them to Cyrus alone. In fact, the strictly Persian written evidence is bafflingly sparse. Cyrus is never men­ tioned by Darius in the Behistun inscription other than as father of Cambyses and Bar­ diya. Darius, whose legitimacy as monarch was not entirely above suspicion, was not afraid to write about his predecessors: "Those who were the former kings, as long as they lived, by them was not done thus as by the favor of Ahuramazda was done by me in one and the same year" (DB §§50-52o). It would be going too far, however, to attribute to Darius a desire to inflict a damnatio memoriae on the founder of the empire. Besides, we know that the memory of Cyrus was preserved with special fervor by the Persians. Cyrus was certainly one of the "great men" whose heroic deeds were passed on to the younger generation. "Cyrus—with whom nobody in Persia has ever dreamt of comparing him­ self," Herodotus remarks (III. 160-O), claiming to represent Darius's views. Wishing above all to legitimate his newly won power, Darius quite naturally dedicated the Behistun in­ scription to exaltation of his own accomplishments, which he intended to be preserved for posterity. The Behistun inscription is not a textbook of Persian history! There are sev­ eral copies of three trilingual inscriptions (in Old Persian, Akkadian, Elamite) in the name of Cyrus, found at Pasargadae. They are very short: "I am Cyrus the King, an Achaemenian" (CMa-o), or "Cyrus the Great King, an Achaemenian" (CMcO). An­ other (CM/;*) reads: "Cyrus the Great King, son of Cambyses the King, an Achaeme­ nian. He says: When . . . made . . ." But these documents must be excluded from the discussion, because their authenticity is now widely contested, not without excellent reasons. They most certainly derive from Darius, taking the role of forger that is attrib­ uted to him, who wished in this particular case to draw on the prestige of Cyrus to his own advantage. On the other hand, we can turn to archaeological records discovered in Persis, as well as to written records of non-Persian origin. The many Akkadian tablets provide indirect but valuable indications of the administration of Babylonia at the time of the founders of the Empire. Information that is drawn from texts and iconography from Judah, Egypt, and western Asia Minor may be added. Precisely because of the nature of the available documentation, the picture of the Empire around 522 cannot be more than partial. But it is well to attempt to paint it, in order better to comprehend not just the specifics of the reforms put in place by Darius after he seized power but also the breadth and limitations of the modifications and ad­ aptations Cyrus and Cambyses made to the organization of the countries they had just subjugated.

2. Satraps and Satrapies

The Satraps of Cyrus and Cambyses The long passage Herodotus dedicates to the reforms set in motion by Darius after his victory over his opponents begins with this phrase (III.89-S-): Darius "proceded to set up

64

Chapter 2. The Conquest and After

twenty provincial governorships (nomoi), called satrapies." It would be venturing well beyond the evidence to conclude from this text that the first satrapies were inaugurated at the beginning of Darius's reign (which is not what Herodotus says, in any case). The term satrap is in fact firmly attested from the time of Cyrus and Cambyses. First of all, this is what the situation existing in 522 shows: in his Behistun inscription, Darius him­ self refers to Dadarsi, "satrap in Bactria" (DB § § 10— 19), and Vivana, "satrap in Aracho­ sia" (DB §§54-64). We also learn that at this date Hystaspes, the father of Darius, held a high military post in Parthia-Hyrcania (and not the post of satrap of Persia, as Herodotus has it; III, 111.70). In Asia Minor, the Persian Oroetes was named "governor of Sardis" by Cyrus (Herodotus III.120-O). There, as elsewhere, Herodotus does not use the term sa­ trap, but the much less specific term hyparch. With the expression Sardion hyparkhos, Herodotus seems to refer to a vast district in Asia Minor, including both Lydia and Ionia (III. 127). The residence of Oroetes is sometimes Sardis (III. 126), sometimes Magnesia on the Meander (III.121). Oroetes was still in office at the accession of Darius. The sa­ trapy of Hellespontine Phrygia is also known, held at the time of Cambyses by Mitrobates (hyparkhos), who resided at Dascylium (III. 126). Shortly after the death of Cambyses, Oroetes put Mitrobates and his son Cranaspes to death and brought Helle­ spontine Phrygia under his authority. It is also known that, beginning in the fourth reg­ nal year of Cyrus (535), a certain Gubaru was given the title "governor (pihatu) of Babylonia and Trans-Euphrates." He was thus theoretically in charge of an immense sa­ trapy that included nearly all of the countries previously under the control of the NeoBabylonian king, from the Tigris to the approaches to the Nile. In an unclear context, he is mentioned together with a scribe-chancellor (bel temi) of Media, which could lead one to suspect the presence of an imperial adminstration at Ecbatana (cf. also Ezra 6:2). As for Egypt, Cambyses provided it with a "governor/satrap" (hyparkhos), the Persian Aryandes (Herodotus IV. 166). It might be supposed that within the most extensive satrapies there were sub-gover­ nors, but we have no indisputable attestations for this period, except perhaps in Babylon. Otherwise, it is quite clear that the creation of satrapies did not cause the preexisting political entities to disappear. The Greek and Phoenician cities and the Babylonian towns retained considerable autonomy, as long as they fulfilled the obligations placed on them, especially the financial and military obligations. The same was true for the province of Judah within the satrapy of Babylonia and Trans-Euphrates. Xenophon (VII.4.2->) states, with regard to Cilicia and Cyprus, that Cyrus "had never sent a Persian as satrap to govern either the Cilicians or the Cyprians, but was always satisfied with their native princes. Tribute, however, he did receive from them, and whenever he needed forces he made a requisition upon them for troops" (cf. also VIII.6.7). Herodotus says (1.28) that Cilicia had not been conquered by Croesus. It was still ruled at the time of Cyrus and Cambyses by a local dynast who bore the title syennesis (1.74), described as "king of the Cilicians" by Herodotus (V. 118). In spite of the conquest of Xanthus by the Mede Harpagus on the orders of Cyrus, Lycia also continued under the rule of petty lo­ cal dynasts, who nonetheless were required to recognize Persian power at least nomi­ nally. This situation does not necessarily imply that the Persians had no territorial base there, but we cannot verify this with a firsthand document as of this date. We are too poorly informed about the situation before Cyrus within Cilicia, Lycia, or even Caria to be able reasonably to discuss the modifications that may have come about in reaction to the Persian conquest.

Satraps and Satrapies

65

The Duties of the Satrap It is more difficult to determine the precise duties of Cyrus's and Cambyses' satraps. The actual word in Old Persian means 'protector of the realm [kingdom]'. In general, the Greek and Babylonian texts do not use the Old Persian word, preferring to render it with the more vague term 'governor' (hyparkhos/pihatu), and when it does appear, it generally does not convey any more specific meaning. At Behistun, when Darius names his two satraps, Vivana in Arachosia and Dadarsi in Bactria, he qualifies both as bandaka, a Persian term referring to a personal connection between the sovereign and the Persian aristocrats. In itself, the term connotes first and foremost the total loyalty to the king of the person described by it. In other words, the duty of a satrap was not necessarily connected to a territory. Moreover, the term satrapy (attributed to the Persians by He­ rodotus 1.192) does not occur at Behistun: Vivana and Dadarsi are satraps in Arachosia and in Bactria, respectively. A satrap was first and foremost the personal representative of the king. At the same time, the examples known from the time of Cyrus and Cambyses indicate that their satraps were charged with missions in a specific territory. A satrap was appointed by the king and had to adhere closely to the orders received from the central authority and remain accountable. Oroetes had already been a rebel in the time of Cambyses (who, according to Herodotus, wanted to dismiss him), and he clearly displayed his desire for independence when he killed the messenger of Darius. The messenger, it seems, had come to inform him of an order to appear at court (He­ rodotus III. 126). This is confirmed by a story (probably fictionalized) of relations be­ tween Cambyses and his brother Bardiya (called Tanyoxarces by Ctesias), who had been given a major district in eastern Iran by Cyrus. An intimate of Cambyses coun­ seled him to summon his brother: "To prove the infidelity of Tanyoxarces, he saw to it that if he were ordered to come, he would not come." Tanyoxarces did not defer to the royal command until the third summons and, says Ctesias, he was then put to death

(^Persica, §10). One of the primary tasks of the satrap must have been to maintain order and to extend Persian power. According to Herodotus (111.120), Oroetes fell out with Mitrobates when the latter reproached him for not having managed "to add the island of Samos to the do­ mains of the king." After he had come over to Cambyses, the tyrant Polycrates of Samos, it seems, schemed incessantly against the Persian possessions on the mainland and showed himself to be an overt rival of the satrapal court in Sardis. He tried at the same time to gain the support of certain Lydian aristocrats who were unhappy with the govern­ ment of Oroetes (Diodorus X. 16.4). According to Herodotus (III. 120o), who places the event "about the time of Cambyses' last sickness," the satrap decided to put an end to the power of Polycrates. To this end, he sent his principal adviser, the Lydian Myrsos, son of Gygcs, to the tyrant. Myrsos succeeded in persuading the tyrant to come and visit Oro­ etes, who for his part claimed to be threatened by Cambyses. Under these circum­ stances, Oroetes put Polycrates to death. Maeandrius then succeeded Polycrates. Although it does not imply direct submission to the Persian authorities, the death of Polycrates does attest to the desire of the satrap to expand the domains of the king. Hie military duty of the satraps is also evident in the role played by Dadarsi and Vi­ vana in 522-521 in the north and south of the Iranian Plateau, respectively. For these tasks, the satraps were definitely able to count on a standing army. We know that Oroetes was a powerful man, being governor of Phrygia, Lydia, and Ionia, with a thousand

66

Chapter 2. The Conquest and After

Persians in his bodyguard" (III. 127-0-). He thus had to be able to draft contingents from the conquered peoples. It is also likely that the system of assigning land in the con­ quered countries to Persian families began during the reigns of Cyrus and Cambyses. This was described by Xenophon as follows: "In times past it was their national custom that those who held lands should furnish cavalrymen from their possessions and that these, in case of war, should also take the field" (Cyr. VIII.8.20-O-). In exchange for land grants, Persian nobles of the imperial diaspora thus had to lead mounted contingents if any satrap demanded it. Since the system was seen in operation around 500 in western Asia Minor, it can reasonably be supposed that it went back to the time of the conquest. The satraps must have been able to rely on garrisons as well. A Persian garrison was stationed at Babylon. It is possible that the rebuilding of the fortress of Old Kandahar dates to the reign of Cyrus. In Egypt, the Elephantine garrison continued, as in the past, to guard the southern frontier of the country at the First Cataract; another watched over the White Wall at Memphis. Others are known to have been at Migdol (near Pelusium in the Delta) and other Delta sites. According to Herodotus (II.30-O), the Persians re­ tained the Saite installations, not only at Elephantine, but also "in Daphne at Pelusium against the Arabs and Assyrians, and a third at Marea to keep a watch on Libya." It is likely that the granting of land to garrison soldiers, especially well attested at Elephan­ tine, was also inherited by the Persians from the Saites (cf. 11.152). In Asia Minor, we know of the fortress of Sardis, where Croesus took refuge and was promptly besieged by Cyrus's troops. The fortress was situated on a formidable height, as is stressed by all of the ancient authors from Herodotus to Polybius. The taking of existing fortresses is pre­ sented by Xenophon as one of the goals of his Cyrus in the course of his conquests. He did this especially in the various regions of Asia Minor, particularly Caria and Phrygia, where his generals placed garrisons in the numerous citadels that had already been for­ tified by the Carians or the Phrygians (cf. Cyr. VII.4.1-11). Finally, the tale of the strug­ gles of 522-520 recorded in the Behistun inscription reveals the existence of numerous citadels (Old Persian dida; Elamite halmarris) in the Iranian countries: Sikayauvatis in Media (§DB % 13), Tigra and Uyama in Armenia (§§27-28), and Kapisakanis and Arsada in Arachosia (§§45, 47). The internal organization of these districts is very poorly known. We know of the ex­ istence of the treasurer Mithradata at Babylon in the time of Cyrus, but he was a royal, not a satrapal, treasurer. We know that there was a 'royal secretary' (grammatistes hasileios) with Oroetes, obviously in charge of the exchange of couriers with the central court. In this regard, Herodotus (III.128o) adds an explanatory aside: "an officer who forms part of every governor's establishment." The best-known example, the administra­ tion of Gubaru, shows that the satrap exchanged extensive correspondence not just with the central authority but also with all of his underlings and perhaps also with officials of other provinces. He thus had under his command a chancellery made up of a large number of secretaries and scribes (sipim). With this in mind, we can surely assume that, from this period on, archives must have existed in every satrapal capital, organized ac­ cording to imperial instructions and according to the local traditions of each conquered country. After his victory, Cyrus entrusted the guarding of the citadel of Sardis to a Persian named Tabalus. It thus appears that he was responsible directly to the king and not to the satrap. Let us recall in this regard what Xenophon wrote about the measures he attributes

Tributes and Gifts

67

to Cyrus, stressing their permanence, as usual: "And as Cyrus then effected his organiza­ tion, even so unto this day all the garrisons under the king (hai hypo basilei phylakai) are kept up" (Cyr. VIII.6. H o ) . According to Xenophon (VI. 1.1), the king considered this measure to be a precaution against revolts by the satraps. At the same time, it seems clear that, in a general way, the commanders of the citadels also had to function as subordi­ nates to the satrap, to the extent that he had received orders from the king.

3. Tributes and Gifts

Revenues and Fiscal Administration After mentioning the twenty districts (?zomoi/satrapies) organized by Darius, Herodo­ tus writes (111.89-0-): "Darius had "each nation assessed for taxes (pharoi).. . . During the reigns of Cyrus and Cambyses there was no fixed tribute at all, the revenue coming from gifts (dora) only." We will return below (chap. 10) to the extent of the modifications to the tribute system made by Darius. But at this point it is useful to introduce the subject in order to determine, as best we can, what revenues were paid to Cyrus and Cambyses in these regions. This means first and foremost understanding what Herodotus wrote and what he intended to tell his Greek readers. First of all, it is self-evident that neither Cyrus nor Cambyses neglected fiscal admin­ istration. Both of them needed considerable resources to maintain their armies and to succeed in their expeditions. After each victory, Cyrus had the treasures of the con­ quered kings sent to his capitals: the treasure of Astyages was sent to Pasargadae. The same was true for the treasures of Croesus. It is likely that Cambyses gave similar orders in Egypt, as well as in Babylon. We know in fact that, when the Jews returned to Jerusa­ lem, Cyrus ordered the treasurer Mithradata to return the sacred vessels that Nebuchad­ nezzar had taken to Babylon after the fall of Jerusalem to the heads of the community (Ezra 1:7-11, 5:14-15). This is how the accumulation of royal wealth that later so im­ pressed the Greeks began. Each imperial treasury was directed by a royal treasurer Cganzabara), such as Mithradata in Babylon in Cyrus's time. He was charged less with literally guarding the treasure than with its management: management, the income and expenditure of capital by order of the king. Both tribute and gifts accumulated in these treasuries. The existence of tribute levies in the time of Cyrus and Cambyses cannot be doubted. This is apparent not only in the Cyropaedia — which is always a priori under suspicion of anachronism —but also in He­ rodotus. It seems clear that the Greek cities of Ionia had to pay tribute, just as they had in the period of Lydian dominion (1.27). The principle is simple; whether in the form of "gifts" or "tribute," all peoples who acknowledged Persian supremacy were required to pay contributions in kind or in precious metal to the central authority, not to mention the military contingents or oarsmen they had to furnish in compliance with any royal requisition. This state of affairs is expressed by Herodotus himself, who also says that one of the first measures taken by the usurper Smerdis/Bardiya in his struggle with Cambyses was to every nation within his dominion he proclaimed, directly he came to the throne, a three years' remission of taxes and military service (phorou . .. ateleid)" (III.670; cf. Jus­ tin 1.9.12). Furthermore, only the assumption of regular tribute can explain the regular and permanent exemptions known from this era. Such was the case for a people of the Helmand Valley, the Ariaspi, who, for having rescued Cyrus's army from the brink of

68

Chapter 2. The Conquest and After

famine, received from die king the title Euergetes ('Benefactors') and thenceforth en­ joyed an exemption (ateleia). The same was true for Bardiya, who, at the death of Cyrus, had received a major district in Central Asia: "Cyrus had prescribed that he would hold these countries while enjoying an exemption (ateleis)" (Ctesias, Persica §8).

Tribute-Paying Peoples and Gift-Giving Peoples What, then, are the basic characteristics by which Herodotus distinguishes those he calls gift-givers from those he calls tribute-payers? Let us note from the start that this dis­ tinction is not an Achaemenid innovation; it can be found in many states of the Near East, from Mesopotamia to Egypt. It is thus likely that to a certain extent Herodotus gives a Greek cast to Near Eastern phenomena. The problem is that the vocabulary he uses manages to obscure the facts more than it lights the lamp for the modern historian. In fact, he implicitly analyzes Achaemenid tribute in terms of the tribute (phoros) levied by the Athenians on the membership of the Delian League, beginning in 478. But, whatever the similarities that can be established between the two organizations, we know that in reality the Achaemenid system was far more complex; tribute properly speaking was just one of the constituent sub-parts of the revenue system (chap. 10). Con­ sequently, it would be pointless to try to determine the Near Eastern terminology con­ cealed under Herodotus's vocabulary. Rather, we should look to Herodotus's method of literary development to bring to light his text's internal logic. Indeed, it rapidly becomes clear that neither Herodotus's approach nor his objective is that of a specialist in fiscal practice. The discussion in III.88-117 is dedicated primar­ ily to highlighting the political power of Darius. The introductory phrase gives the key to Herodotus's perspective: "In this way Darius became king of Persia. Following the conquests of Cyrus and Cambyses, his dominion extended over the whole of Asia, with the exception of Arabia" (III.88-*-). From the first, he stresses that after the accession of the new king, "power was felt in every corner of his dominions."-*- The first act of Darius was to erect an equestrian statue to glorify himself (111.88). "He then proceeded to set up twenty provincial governorships (arkhoi), called satrapies . . . and each nation [was] as­ sessed for taxes" (111.89-*-). Herodotus is trying to place Darius in both continuity and discontinuity with his pre­ decessors, whose conquests he had described. He intends first to show his readers that Darius enlarged the Achaemenid possessions (III. 117) and that his Empire thereafter ex­ tended far in all directions (III.98, 102, 106-7, 114-15). It is according to this logic that the numerical listing of levies that the king assessed on the conquered peoples proceeds from tribute proper to taxes imposed "over and above the regular tax" (III.91, 117-*-) to gifts (which are also added to the tribute in the calculation of royal revenues: III.97). The parenthesis on tribute (III.89-98) —if we may venture this paradoxical formula­ tion—is subordinate to an exposition of a political character and to a consideration of territorial strength. It is by this same logic that at the end of his story he states that even under Darius a few "peoples upon whom no regular tax was imposed made a contribution in the form of gifts."-*- These donors were first the Colchians and the Ethiopians, who even in He­ rodotus's day brought "presents for their taxes." The Colchians sent "a hundred boys and a hundred girls," the Ethiopians "about two quarts of unrefined gold, two hundred logs of ebony, [five Ethiopian boys,] and twenty elephant tusks. . . . Lastly, the Arabians brought a thousand t a l e n t s . . . of frankincense every year. This, then, was the revenue

Tributes and Gifts

69

which the king received over and above what was produced by regular taxation" (III.97). Let us attempt to explain the apparent paradox created by Herodotus's citation of the peoples who donated to Darius after peremptorily asserting that in the transition from Cyrus to Darius they passed from a system of gifts to a system of tribute. Let us stress from the start the expression used by Herodotus: these people taxed them­ selves. The terminology explains what was in principle the voluntary nature of the gift. A similar formula is found with regard to the Libyans, the Cyrenians, and the Barcaeans, who were stunned by the victory of Cambyses in Egypt: "The neighbouring Libyans were alarmed by the fate of Egypt and gave themselves up without striking a blow, agree­ ing to pay tribute (phoros) and sending presents (dora). A similar fear caused the people of Cyrene and Barca to follow their example" (III.13-*). It seems clear that from Herodo­ tus's point of view people who sent donations were less dependent on the Great King than people who paid tribute because they were taxed. We may note also that these peoples were located at the extremities (ta eskhata) of the imperial territory of Darius (111.97, 106-7, 115-16), at the edge of the "inhabited world" ( III. 106—7^-). We may re­ mark further that the periodicity of the gifts was not the same as that of tribute. While the Arabs' obligation was on an annual cycle, the Ethiopians paid only every two years and the Colchians every four years. But Herodotus himself expresses the limits of the very distinction that he posed as an absolute rule. On the one hand, both tributaries and donors were situated in the imperial realm, as he says very clearly regarding the Col­ chians (III.97). On the other hand, he states that the Libyans, the Cyrenians, and the Barcaeans did not just bring gifts to Cambyses; they also sent a tribute (phoros) "which they had set themselves" (III. 13). Finally, he reports why Cambyses refused the gifts sent by the Cyrenians. In his opinion, the king "objected to the smallness of the amount—it was only 500 minae of silver."-* In other words, however "voluntary" it may have been considered, the gift had to be of a certain value. All this leads us to believe that this amount was negotiated in advance with the king whose sovereignty was to be recog­ nized. The Cyrenians probably "forgot" to do this; hence Cambyses' refusal of what quite reasonably appeared to him to be thinly veiled contempt.

From Gyms to Darius Let us return to Herodotus's contrast between Cyrus and Cambyses on the one hand and Darius on the other. In reality, Herodotus did not, strictly speaking, claim that Da­ rius was the first to impose tribute; he intended primarily to stress that he was the first to fix the basis of the levies as well as their exact amounts. This is why the term fix recurs in his narrative several times, in different forms. This is probably the reason why, in He­ rodotus's eyes, Darius was the "creator" of tribute in the sense it would naturally have for an Athenian of the fifth century: a system where each subject entity was taxed by the rul­ ing power for a determined amount, evaluated in precious metal and calculated on ob­ jective criteria. Thus the final remark on the Ethiopians, the Colchians, and the Arabs. After the reforms instituted by the king, the category of "donor" peoples (in the sense un­ derstood by Herodotus) did not disappear. But henceforth, in the eyes of Herodotus it represented more a surviving peripheral element than a constituent element of the Achaemenid tribute system. From Cyrus to Darius, it was not the institution of tribute itself that was created from nothing; it was instead the conditions under which it was levied that were profoundly al­ tered. This more technical point of view also explains Herodotus (111.89) when he draws

Chapter 2. The Conquest and After

70

the portrait of Cyrus, considered by the Persians themselves as a "father," in contrast to Cambyses, the "despot" and Darius the "shopkeeper" (kapelos), in fact "driving a bar­ gain in all things." Cambyses "was harsh and reckless"; Cyrus, on the contrary, "was gentle and he had procured for the Persians all sorts of benefits." This is Herodotus's own interpretation, and it is quite difficult to find any factual justification for it. In the Greek portrait of Cyrus, he was a chivalrous conqueror to whom people submitted of their own free will, as Xenophon especially puts it (Cyr. 1.1). From this perspective, assessments are considered a "gift" in the political sense used by Herodotus. One can suppose that, from Cyrus to Cambyses, the initial modification occurred when Cyrus's successor strongly increased the fiscal pressure on his subjects (whether in the form of gifts or trib­ utes) to finance the Persian fleet needed to conquer Egypt, and thus arose his reputation for "severity," Darius was the first to set a value on land and to establish fixed numbers in proportion to this valuation and in this way perhaps earned the qualification kapelos 'retail trader' that Herodotus assigns to him. But this is nothing but conjecture.

Tribute and Coinage It is likely that at the time of the first two kings the Persian administrators generally continued to profit from the fiscal practices already in effect in the conquered coun­ tries—at Sardis, where the Lydian Pactyes was entrusted with levying tribute, as well as at Ecbatana, Babylon, or Egypt. We can also theorize that, at the time of Cyrus and Cambyses, in certain regions where there were no tribute rolls (eventually to be established by Darius), it was the satraps who negotiated with the local leaders, with all the risks of arbitrariness that such a procedure presupposes. It also appears clear that the levying of tribute under Cyrus and Cambyses in no way implies the existence of coinage. When the peoples furnished their tribute in precious metal, a standard of weight served as the basis for calculation: thus, for example, the "gift" of 500 minas of silver from the Cyrenians to Cambyses. If we accept that these were Babylonian minas, then the gift from the Cyrenians amounted to about 252 kg of silver. In any case, there was no specifically Persian coinage before Darius. In western Asia Minor, it seems that the gold and silver Lydian coins called "croesids" continued to be struck and used by the royal Achaemenid administration at Sardis. It is even possible that the silver "croesids" circulated only after the conquest of Sardis by Cyrus, thus vir­ tually playing the role of royal coinage. It is quite certainly in terms of the "light" croesid that the tribute from the Greek cities to the Achaemenid administration was measured.

4. Continuities

and Adaptations: The Case of Babylonia

Changes and Integration The question remains whether the conquest resulted in real changes for the con­ quered populations. Where the reigns of Cyrus and Cambyses are concerned, the re­ sponse can only be qualified, because the work of empire-building had just begun. It is clear that neither Cyrus nor his son wished (would they even have been able?) to bring about a total disruption of existing conditions. Many institutions known from their time find their antecedents in the Mesopotamian imperial structures of the previous centu­ ries. In other words, the transformations did not necessarily result from suppression or destruction of the existing institutions, but more often and doubtless more efficaciously came about by gradually adapting these institutions to the new structure outlined by the conquerors.

Continuities and Adaptations: The Case of Babylonia

71

We have seen that Cyrus himself, beginning with the conquest of Babylon, wished to put the accent more on the continuities than on the discontinuities, at least in his propagandistic assertions. He was recognized in October 539 as 'king of Babylon' and 'king of the countries' (sar Bahili/sar matati), in one instance even bearing the title 'king of the countries, king of the kings' (sar sarrani). The title "king of Babylon" passed very soon to his son Cambyses, who kept it for about a year (early 538 to early 537). Cambyses thus bore the title "king of Babylon" in association with his father, Cyrus ("king of the countries"), as is seen in the dual titulature found on some tablets: "Year 1 of Cambyses, king of Babylon, son of Cyrus, king of the countries." What is more, the internal admin­ istration of Babylon does not seem to have been severely damaged. For the first three years of Persian dominion, the highest administrator of the region was a certain NabCiabhe-bullit, who under Nabonidus already held the rank of sakin temi, the highest posi­ tion in the administration after the sakin mati ('governor of the countries'). This system does not reflect the re-creation of the old kingdom at all, since the delegated authority of Cambyses was exercised only over northern Babylonia. Furthermore, the disappearance of the double titulature (early 537) and the creation of a satrapy under the conrol of the Persian Gubaru (535) indicate that after this period of transition Cyrus considered it use­ ful to assert his direct supervision of the country. We know neither the reasons nor the circumstances that led the king to make these decisions, but the fact is clear: Babylonia was transformed at once into a full-blown satrapy. But what did this mean in practice? At first sight, the Babylonian documentation exhibits great continuity. In the absence of any satrapal archives, the Akkadian tablets we have basically come from private ar­ chives or temple archives. They do not refer explicitly to political upheavals. In the pri­ vate archives in particular, the major historical events, such as the conquest of Cyrus, would not even be noticeable if the notaries did not date their documents according to the regnal year of the sovereign in power. Several documents from the time of Cyrus and Cambyses indicate that the temple adminstrators continued to refer to regulations issued in the time of Nebuchadnezzar II, Neriglissar, and Nabonidus. Given these factors, it is not always easy to distinguish between the maintenance of Babylonian institutions and the assumption of power by the Persian conquerors. Thus, in a document like the Crafts­ men's Charter, from the Eanna during the reign of Cyrus (535-534), the artisans of the sanctuary pledge themselves before the authorities (the satammu and the royal Commis­ sioner) to work exclusively on the projects of construction and restoration at the Eanna and take their oath in the name of "Bel, Nabo, and the majesty of Cyrus, king of Baby­ lon." If he docs not keep his word, the guilty craftsman "will receive the punishment of the gods and the king." Should we see this document simply as an indication of strong continuity with prior practice? Or, rather, should it be considered also to be evidence of a policy of Cyrus, who was seeking to ensure the cooperation of the temple craftsmen in view of the restoration work he was then undertaking at Babylon, Uruk, and Ur? Otherwise, many individuals continued to pursue their own careers, not in the least affected by the political changes. We may mention, for example, a certain scribe at Sippar who is attested without interruption from 545 to 500. The careers of higher officials also continued uninterrupted. Among other examples, we may cite the case of SiriktiNinurta, who held the highest position (sandahakku) at Nippur from year 17 of Nabo­ nidus to year 7 of Cambyses. The title sandabakku itself continues to be attested at Nippur until (and beyond) the beginning of the reign of Darius (521) and intermittently as late as 73 B.C. We can make the same observation with regard to a major business firm

72

Chapter 2. The Conquest and After

like that of the Egibis, which is known from the beginning of the seventh century and which continued to operate under the reigns of Cyrus, Cambyses, and their immediate successors. However, these formal continuities can conceal adaptations to the new conditions. The reference to prior regulations might also indicate that the regulations had under­ gone modification. For instance, the Egibi archives also bear witness to the integration of the Babylonian ruling class into the new imperial context. A tablet dated 537 states that the principal representative of the firm, Itti-Marduk-balatu, did business at Ecba­ tana, with the debt payable (in Babylon) in dates at the Babylonian rate. Four years later, the same person is found operating the same way at a place in Iran, with the debt payable at Ecbatana. Furthermore, several tablets dated to the reign of Cambyses (another is dated to the reign of BardiyaAfahyazdata?) show that the Egibis also did business in Per­ sia, specifically at Humadesu, which is identified with Matezzis, very close to the site of Persepolis. The same Itti-Marduk-balatu entered into contracts there four times and also bought slaves with Iranian names there, whom he sold in Babylon, before selling them back again to his original business partner in Matezzis. Among other things, these docu­ ments show that the Egibis were able to adapt very quickly to the new conditions that de­ rived from the Persian conquest, at the same time that the conquerors were perfectly able to exploit the possibilities opened by the Babylonian institutions and hierarchies.

Temple Lands and Royal Administration The existing documentation also permits us to determine that the satrap Gubaru was involved in numerous matters. Given the fact that the majority of relevant tablets come from temple archives, his relations with the authorities of these temples are particularly well attested. This is particularly true of the Eanna of Uruk, which is dedicated to the goddess Inanna-Istar, the "Lady of Uruk." The Eanna was in control of vast agricultural areas irrigated by a sophisticated system of canals in a network along the Euphrates and dedicated primarily to growing cereals (barley in particular) as well as dates. Some of the land remained more or less fallow and was used to pasture sizable herds of livestock that were branded with the star of the goddess. It was from these lands that the temple drew its most clearly visible revenues. This is why the assessment of the standing crops (imittu emedu) was so important in the agricultural calendar. In the beginning, it is likely that this operation was linked to the calculation of the tithe that everyone, including the king, had to pay to the Babylonian temples. In principle, the temple administration was autonomous and controlled by the free citizens (mar bane) of the city of Uruk, who gathered in assembly (puhrii) to adjudicate differences that might arise, for example, between the temple authorities and their sub­ ordinates or the ordinary farmers. The supreme authority over temple affairs consisted of the director (qipu) and the administrator (satammu) of the Eanna. The administrator was in charge of the lands, management of temple personnel, and activities relating to religious service. From the eighth year of his reign (553) on, however, Nabonidus, as­ sisted by his son Belshazzar, introduced modifications that in general were not re­ scinded by Cyrus and Cambyses. In order to gain tighter control over such strategic financial powers and to improve agricultural profitability, the royal authority decided to play a direct role in the economic activities of the Babylonian temples under its control. Henceforth, the administrator of the temple of the goddess of Uruk was flanked by a "royal commissioner, overseer of the Eanna," who acted simultaneously as royal official

Continuities and Adaptations: The Case of Babylonia

73

and administrator of the Eanna. The Eanna also had a "head of the royal cash box," clearly a manager and protector of royal interests. The most important of the modifications introduced by the son of Nabonidus, in the name of his father, was the creation of what is now called the ferme generale. The system "consists, as far as we are able to recreate the main features, of putting under the author­ ity of a man or a small staff a certain amount of land and a certain number of men, on condition that the fermier general ('chief farmer') deliver a quantity of grain or dates fixed in advance" (E Joannes). The farms (barley or dates) were allocated to the highest bidder. The royal commissioner was present at every stage: the conclusion of the con­ tract with the fermier general, assessment of the harvest, transportation of the harvest, and so on. After the Persian conquest, a man named Kalba was fermier general of barley. He kept his post during the first two years of Cyrus, but thereafter the position was asso­ ciated with Nergal-epus for barley and Ardiya for dates. Beginning with the third year of Cyrus, Ardiya was in full control of the date farm. Beginning with Cambyses, this same concession was assigned jointly to four farmers, Ardiya retaining the most important farm until the end of Cambyses' reign. The same fragmentation is recorded for the bar­ ley farm. At the initiative ot Gubaru in 528, ten temple oblates were summoned to Baby­ lon, and a ferme generale was then created, with several heads. The situation at the end of the reign of Cambyses was rather different from the situation under Nabonidus. This change results in part from the tension that existed between the temple and royal power. After a short reestablishmentof the ferme generale at the beginning of the reign of Darius for an oblate named Gimillu, the end of the development led to the reclaiming of the organization by the temple authorities. In view of intentions generally attributed to Na­ bonidus and his sons, this was to some extent a check on royal authority, but a check the nature and extent of which is difficult to measure because of the loss (or nonpublication) of the temple archives from Darius.

The Fiscal Obligations of the Babylonian

Temples

There is no doubt whatever that the Great Kings drew considerable revenues from the Babylonian temples. Perhaps the fiscal pressure even increased in the time of Cyrus and Cambyses, especially if we recognize that, in contrast to their predecessors, the Per­ sian kings no longer tithed to the Babylonian temples. But a recent study of the Ebabbar of Sippar seems to contradict such a clear-cut theory. In any case, the examples of royal appropriations are many and varied. Under orders received from the satrap, the authorities of the Eanna of Uruk frequently had to offer all sorts of payments. The temple repeatedly had to send laborers to do construction work at the royal palaces or furnish raw materials (wood, bricks) for buildings. Each order includes the following threat addressed to the person responsible for the delivery: "If not, he will incur the punishment of Gubaru." The temple also had to deliver foodstuffs to the court, as sev­ eral documents from the time of Cyrus and Cambyses indicate. For instance, in 531 the Eanna had to deliver spices to the royal palace at Abanu. To fill this order, it had to borrow considerable amounts of silver. In 528, over a short period, the Eanna had to de­ liver successively 200 suckling lambs and kids, then 80 fatted oxen; several weeks ear­ lier, the temple authorities had received an order to transport 200 casks of sweet date beer to Abanu for the provisioning of the court. Perhaps these were unusual requisi­ tions, owing to the presence of the king and the court in residence near the Eanna. But other obligations also weighed permanently on the temples. At the Eanna, for example,

74

Chapter 2. The Conquest and After

we know of the existence of royal herds that obviously were fed and maintained at the expense of the temple. The Eanna also had to furnish soldiers to the royal administration, at least under cer­ tain special conditions. A series of tablets dating to the Neo-Babylonian period (reigns of Nebuchadnezzar II and Nabonidus) and to the reigns of Cyrus and Cambyses shows, for example, that the temple herds were sent to distant pastures on the bank of the Tigris. To maintain security, the Eanna levied and equipped archers to keep guard in the look­ outs. Indeed, some of these archers who answered to the Eanna were regularly attached to the royal army, even under Cyrus. The temples were subject to levies and assessments that also applied to the Babylo­ nian towns and their inhabitants. In particular, all those who owned land (whether indi­ viduals or organizations) had 'corvee' (urasu) obligations. This duty was required by the royal administrators so that they could maintain the canals. The Eanna of Uruk was no exception to the rule: the administrators were answerable to the king for the proper func­ tioning of the waterways that irrigated the lands of the sanctuary. In short, the Babylonian temples did not enjoy any more or any less right of extraterritoriality under Cyrus or Cambyses than under their Neo-Babylonian predecessors.

The Jurisdiction of Gubaru Even the organization of the ferine ginerale implied frequent interference from the satrap Gubaru, who sometimes acted directly, sometimes through the royal commis­ sioner at the Eanna. As the authority responsible for the farming contracts that were drawn up in the presence of the "royal commissioner, overseer of the Eanna," Gubaru had to see to the strict fulfillment of the obligations laid on the fermiers generaux. Violaters of any sort were generally summoned to Uruk by the royal commissioner. In 526, it was the satrap himself who sent the following summons to Ardiya, the date farmer: Before the end of the month of Kislimu of year 4 of Cambyses, king of Babylon, king of the countries, Ardiya, son of Nabfi-ban-abi, descendant of Remut-Ea, the fermier gen&ral of dates of Istar of Uruk, will bring 5,000 loads of palm fronds and give them to the palace of the king that is appointed over the Eanna, to Nabu-ah-iddin, royal commissioner, overseer of the Eanna. If he does not bring them, he will incur the punishment of Gubaru, the gov­ ernor of Babylon and Trans-Euphrates. (YBT 7.168) In the same way, he was involved in disputes regarding the irrigation work: Aqriya, son of Nabu-dala', will muster ten pioneers among the laborers who, divided into groups of six, are under his orders and give them for the canal Harri-kippi. If Nabii-balatsarri-iqbi, fermier general of the Piqudu canal, sends (different orders) to these pioneers and does not give them (for this work), he will incur the punishment of Gubaru, the governor of Babylon and Trans-Euphrates. (TCL 13.150) Once Gubaru even intervened to settle a dispute that arose between the authority of the Eanna and the authorities of the city of Uruk, who were refusing to see to guarding the Eanna. A decision was made by the temple administrator and the royal commissioner: the offenders were threatened with an appearance before Gubaru. And one tablet seems to imply that the punishments ordered by Gubaru and his subordinates were applied without stinting (YOS 7.128). These examples permit us to gauge the extent to which the overlapping interests of the cities, temples, farmers, and royal administration forced the satrap to intervene judi­ cially, at the expense of the city assembly (puhru). More precisely, in many cases Gu-

Continuities and Adaptations: The Case of Babylonia

75

baru's administration served as an appeals tribunal. The most striking example is the case brought by the temple authorities against the oblate Gimillu in September 538, a little less than a year after Cyrus's entry into Babylon. A crafty man with few scruples about his methods, he has already been mentioned (p. 73) in connection with his job, "in charge of livestock revenues of the Eanna." He was hauled before a tribunal at Uruk and convicted of livestock theft and sentenced. However, he continued to perform vari­ ous tasks at the Eanna and to enrich himself dishonestly, apparently thanks to protection from higher-ups. He even had the nerve to appeal to the jurisdiction of the satrap. The Uruk tribunal promptly decided to send him before the royal tribunal in Babylon. Suits and sentences apparently did not keep Gimillu from regaining his position in Camby­ ses' time, when he was again in charge of livestock at the Eanna. At the beginning of the reign of Darius, he even acquired the date concession, as well as a barley concession. In this capacity, we find him writing to the "accountant of Babylon" to complain of the conditions laid on him. Exasperated by his chicaneries, the leaders of the Eanna sum­ moned him in 520. He lost the ferine generale and then disappeared from the scene.

Administration of Land Finally, it is likely that one consequence of the Persian conquest was redistribution of some of the land for the profit of the king and the Persian conquerors. Despite the scar­ city of evidence, there is hardly any doubt that land was allotted to the crown in the first place. A good illustration of this is found in documents that required the Eanna to send labor to assist in the creation of several "paradises," royal residences par excellence. In Babylonia, as elsewhere, land was also allotted to high officials. A tablet dated 529 refers to Sila, Gubaru's superintendent (rab biti) — apparently the person charged with run­ ning the satrap's estates (bitu: 'house'). The use of "the canal of Gubaru," which is men­ tioned in this text, was conceded to communities located in the region of Hand id, which was apparently situated not far from Sippar. Two other estates near Uruk allotted to Per­ sians are known from Cambyses' time. But the greatest novelty seems to have been the institution of the hatru. This is well documented from the second half of the fifth century because of the archives of the house of Murasu. The term refers to a community that was alloted an area that it culti­ vated in family plots. These plots had various names; 'hand estate' [bit ritti), 'bow estate' [bit qasti), 'horse estate' (bit sisi), 'chariot estate' (bit narkabti). The last three terms in­ dicate that the original function of these plots was to supply soldiers for the king. Some texts (unfortunately, difficult to interpret) indicate that these plots, or some of them at least, existed at the time of Cyrus and Cambyses. One of them, dated to the first year of Cambyses king of Babylon (538), refers to a group of Egyptians represented by "the As­ sembly of the Elders," which, it seems, had carried out the division of plots within a bow estate. Other documents from the time of Cambyses refer to a "town of the Carians." These people seem to have settled on the king's land and to have been required to fur­ nish soldiers. Bow estates are also mentioned in the Babylonian version of the Behistun inscription. The passage seems to provide adequate confirmation that the institution was prevalent even before the accession of Darius, or at least that it was in the process of be­ ing organized (see p. 104). lb be sure, precedents for the institution can easily be identified in pre-Achaemenid Babylonia. But, as far as we can determine, Cyrus and Cambyses gave impetus and new significance to a system that simultaneously favored the territorial establishment of the

76

Chapter 2. The Conquest and After

new authority and the increase of agricultural production and royal revenues. Setting up communities of allotment-holders fully devoted to the new masters showed clearly that the conquest could not be reduced to a violent, transitory raid. Instead, the Great Kings demonstrated their intention to register their authority in space and time. The temple lands themselves were not treated any differently, because we know of the existence of bit ritti 'hand estates' at the Eanna during the reign of Cyrus. The holder of the estate had to pay taxes (ilku) to the king. We may assume that these estates allowed for the maintenance of men whose service was owed to the king by the temple. It appears that even the inhabitants of Nippur were not excluded from this system that, from the time of the first kings, permitted the conquerors to control the lands that had previously been administered directly by the governor (sandabakku) for the profit of the city and the temple of Enlil. To be sure, the available evidence does not allow us to speak of a gen­ eral reallocation of the land of Babylonia in the time of Cyrus and Cambyses, but it must be observed that the allotment of land to individuals or groups presupposes prior confiscation and/or the opening of previously unworked land. In any case, we get the impression that the kings and their counselors did not operate either from crisis to crisis or for the short term.

5. From Bactra to Sardis

Bactrian Polity and Achaemenid Power The extant evidence does not permit us to draw up an indisputable accounting of the innovations introduced by the conquerors. This is particularly true of certain regions, such as Central Asia, known only from archaeological data that, although plentiful, are nevertheless ambiguous. The archaeologists have revealed that Bactria was developed well before the Achaemenid period, and they infer from this the existence of state struc­ tures in Bactria from the end of the second millennium. It is this state that initiated the great hydraulic works that surveys have brought to light, particularly in the valley of the Upper Oxus (Amu Darya). The Achaemenid military conquest does not seem to have made any detectable material impact on the region, where we find a surprising stability of local traditions (especially in the pottery and the hydraulic technology). Given these factors, the conclusion has been drawn that in these countries the Achaemenid con­ quest at the time of Cyrus and later was no more than a kind of politico-military epiphenomenon: the introduction of a satrap, garrisons, tribute and military levies, and so on. The hydraulic works that were carried out during the period of Persian dominion thus would not need to be credited to the satrapal administration. On the contrary, the ar­ chaeological continuities tend rather to imply the upholding of strong local political tra­ ditions, on which the Persians had no effect. In short, any impact of Cyrus's conquest is undetectable in the field.

Central Authority and Cultural Polycentrism These fundamental discoveries most opportunely remind the historian that the ways and means of imperial conquest/administration must be evaluated in the light of ethnogeographic diversity. The heterogeneity of the Achaemenid political continuum is in­ deed striking. The societies existing before the conquest surely had not all reached the same stage of development. What, for example, did the master of the immense NeoBabylonian kingdom, a Phoenician city, a small Anatolian principality, and a nomadic

From Bactra to Sardis

77

ethnic group of the Iranian Plateau have in common? There is nothing to suggest a pri­ ori that the conquest had the same impact on every country. We must recognize instead that the innovations took root in different ways, the conquerors adapting to the specific sociopolitical and cultural frameworks of the conquered peoples. The best-known examples show indisputably that the conquerors never tried to unify the territories culturally. On the contrary, as we have seen, it was by building on the local hierarchy and traditions that Cyrus and Cambyses attempted to impose a new authority. The Persians, for example, did not try to spread either their language or their religion. Instead, they exhibited great reverence for the local religions and sanctuaries. Each people continued to speak its own language and use its own writing system. In Babylo­ nia, the proclamations of Cyrus were made in Akkadian and written in cuneiform, and at least beginning with Darius the royal inscriptions were composed in three languages, Persian, Akkadian, and Elamite. When Cyrus promulgated his edict on the Jews' return to Jerusalem, it was proclaimed in Hebrew and recorded in Aramaic. With only a few exceptions, only the Persians spoke Persian, worshiped the Persian gods, and maintained the cultural traditions of the ruling socioethnic class. Thus—can anyone reasonably doubt it? —neither Cyrus nor Cambyses had the simple aim of ruling in name only over some sort of loose federation of states that would have retained the essence of their sovereign prerogatives. Imperial multilingualism did not in itself present any obstacle to the exercise of Persian authority. It was kept under control by the Achaemenid administration's regular use of a form of Aramaic known as Imperial Aramaic. And if one observes that somewhat later the Persepolis tablets are written in Elamite, it is an Elamite laced with Persian technical terms. The appointment of satraps in Media, Anatolia, Babylonia, Egypt, or Central Asia does not imply the systematic, formal extinction of local political entities. The adminis­ trative jurisdictions were probably modeled on preexisting politico-territorial institu­ tions. The Great King continued to address himself to "peoples, cities, kings, and dynasts." On the one hand, the conquest led to the complete obliteration of the hege­ monic kingdoms (Media, Lydia, Babylonia, Egypt) within a unified Empire. On the other hand, the institution of the satrapy perfectly illustrates the conqueror's intention of creating a new state whose unity cannot be reduced to the symbolic. The local politi­ cal entities (peoples, cities, kings, dynasts) were integrated into the state, in different ways to be sure, but undeniably integrated nevertheless. All the same, the settling of a veritable imperial Persian diaspora in the provinces demonstrates the royal intent to cre­ ate conditions for effective authority over the conquered territories and populations. The respect shown for the local sanctuaries by the kings went hand in hand (with the rarest exceptions) with very strict oversight of their material resources and with the obli­ gation laid on them not to challenge Persian dominion in any way. The means Cambyses adopted to create an Achaemenid navy are also instructive. The navy was not simply a haphazard conglomeration of regional contingents whose com­ mand was left to the local leaders, but rather a royal fleet constructed on the initiative of the central government and commanded by Persian officers. In this process, the subject peoples were required to pay taxes in silver or in kind and to furnish oarsmen. A final ex­ ample is especially enlightening: the buildings built by Cyrus at Pasargadae. The activity of Lydian and Mesopotamian craftsmen there is indisputably attested, even apart from the stylistic and architectural borrowings from the Anatolian and Assyro-Babylonian

78

Chapter 2. The Conquest and After

areas, not to mention Phoenician and Egyptian. Consider the tomb of Cyrus or the fa­ miliar "winged genius." Moreover, the result of Cyrus's building activities cannot be ex­ plained simply as a collage of incompatible styles in which one might find confirmation of the permanence of the earlier artistic traditions. Thus, the introduction of irrigated gardens in Cyrus's new capital does not simply attest to the continuation of a technology well known particularly among the Neo-Assyrian kings. A more careful study shows that his landscape architects adapted the preexisting model by making the garden an integral part of the palace and one of the highlights of court life. Thus it was not the foreign artisans (Lydian, Babylonian, Elamite, Egyptian, etc.) who worked out the plan and defined the function of Pasargadae. Just like Persepolis later on, Pasargadae was conceived in its entirety by the king and his counselors as a function of a dynastic and imperial program within which the stylistic diversity fed the political unity of the palace as a whole, rather than damaging it. The stylistic syncretism also expresses the fact that the cultural diversity of the empire went hand in hand with the exaltation of the sovereign who assured its political unity. In every case, it is better to speak of adaptations of local sociopolitical structures within an imperial framework de­ fined by the kings and their counselors, rather than of continuities pure and simple. These adaptations do not imply the disappearance of local traditions, nor do they imply continuity of all their constituent elements. At this point, an initial methodological ob­ servation may be made: there is no necessary contradiction between imposition of Per­ sian authority and maintenance/partial adaptation of regional and local conditions.

Text and Image To return to the Bactrian example, it is important to realize that the problem it poses is unique: the history of this country, particularly during the reign of Cyrus and Camby­ ses, is known essentially from archaeological evidence. In fact, the Classical authors are hardly even interested in these regions before the conquest of Alexander. In the Greek imagination, these regions are located "at the extremities of the oikoumene" on which they had no real information anyway. The countries of the Iranian Plateau remain largely terra incognita. It will suffice to recall here that before the time of Alexander no ancient author saw fit to offer his readers any description of Pasargadae or Persepolis. There is no reason to infer from this gap in the evidence that in the eyes of the Great Kings themselves the eastern Iranian countries were distant—not just geographically, but politically. On the contrary, the appointment of Bardiya, the younger son of Cyrus, to Bactra leads us to think that the Great Kings attached great importance to Bactria. And in 522, Dadarsi, the satrap of Bactra, made it possible for Darius to put down the rebellions that had broken out in the northern regions of the Iranian Plateau. In the eyes of Strabo (XI. 11.4), the Syr Darya itself was the "boundary" of the Persian Empire bor­ dering on the Saka of Central Asia, and Cyrus situated several garrison towns there. In short, the silence of the Classical authors cannot be used as an indication, one way or the other. The case of Bactria is unique because of the importance of the gap in textual evi­ dence. On the other hand, the methodological problems it poses turn up time and again in Achaemenid countries. Susa and Elam appear to have continued to exist as if nothing had happened; not a trace of Persian presence can be found in the archaeological record before Darius; the archaeological evidence shows the perseverance of Elamite traditions

Persians and Conquered

Populations

79

there. And we have hardly any archaeological evidence of Persian dominion in Egypt in the time of Cambyses. Thus, the interpretations of "Bactrian" archaeologists throw a rather different light on the process of taking control in the countries conquered by Cyrus and Cambyses, then administered by the Persians for more than two centuries. Although the evidence from Bactria supports the notion that the conquest had only a superficial effect on already de­ veloped regional organization, consideration of other evidence permits a different view of the effects of the conquest on other developed regions of the empire. Consequently, the Bactrian case calls upon the historian to propose a general characterization of the question of imperial coherence, and this must await a later discussion (chap. 16).

6. Persians and Conquered

Populations

Military Conquest and Ideological Strategy The analysis of the regional cases leads the historian to inquire into the relationships between conquering and conquered populations. This is a basic problem to which we will return several times, because in large part it frames the discussion just mentioned about the very coherence of the imperial structure. Despite the gaps in evidence, it is imperative that we analyze the solutions adopted by Cyrus and Cambyses, insofar as these solutions also unavoidably concerned their successors. The problem facing the conquerors can be presented in relatively simple terms. First and foremost, they needed to control the territories and populations as efficiently as pos­ sible. But considering the relatively small number of Persians, the military occupation of the territories constituted only a partial response to the problem facing the conquer­ ors. They not only had to be able to quash whatever revolts might arise, but they also, and most importantly, had to be able to take steps to prevent revolts from arising in the first place. To this end, Cyrus and Cambyses followed an ideological strategy meant to create conditions for cooperation with the local elites, a most urgent need. This is why, rather than appearing to be outsiders bent on overturning the existing kingdoms and so­ cieties, the Great Kings endeavored to appropriate local traditions to their advantage over the long run and to present themselves as protectors of the sanctuaries. At the same lime, this strategy required allowing the elites of the conquered countries to participate in the functioning of the new imperial power. But experience would soon show that the process of putting this policy in force was full of pitfalls and ambiguities. In fact, while the adoption of this strategy seems well established in its broad outlines, we must not allow ourselves to be confused by it. The actual cooperation of the local elites presupposes that they agreed beforehand to serve the new authority loyally. We must also dispel the illusions created by the dominant view of the ancient sources. He­ rodotus and philo-Persian [or Persian-leaning] Babylonian and Egyptian sources tend to deny or discount the vigor of the resistance put forth by the states and kingdoms that the Great Kings coveted for themselves. In reality, no military victory was easy or immediate. 1 he relatively humane fate that was accorded the vanquished monarchs is not evidence of Persian respect for the fallen kingdom. Rather, it was the first stage of their political strategy of "continuity," a strategy aimed at the same time at encouraging the ruling classes to ally with them. But putting this policy into effect presupposed the elites' alle­ giance to Persian imperial objectives—which obviously was not always the case. Cyrus

80

Chapter 2. The Conquest and After

realized this quickly in Lydia: carefid to cultivate the cooperation of the Lydian aristoc­ racy, he conferred on one of them, Pactyes, the job of raising tribute, a function that he may already have been responsible for under Croesus. Pactyes turned this to his advan­ tage by inciting the Lydians against the Persians. Of course, on the other hand, Pactyes was not representative of the entire aristocracy of the country. In Lydia, as elsewhere, representatives of the local dominant class surely collaborated and probably did not par­ ticipate in the revolt. This was certainly the case with "Myrsos, son of Gyges," who held an important position in the bureaucracy of the satrap of Sardis from Cyrus to Darius. The example of Pactyes could only make the Persians reluctant to award imperial com­ mand positions to local aristocrats in the future. The origins of these resistance movements are not easy to analyze. The example of the great rebellions of 522-520 (to which we will return in the next chapter) demon­ strates that the strength and permanence of the local dynastic-political traditions are only a partial explanation. It is also true that, initially, the aristocrats legitimately feared for their socioeconomic status. The temporary concessions of the kings did not always suffice to calm their uneasiness, especially because, in the face of resistance, Cyrus and Cambyses sometimes had to retaliate. Consider for example an Egyptian noble who, after the Persian victory, "fell from great wealth to poverty . . . . had nothing but what a beggar has." He was a close companion of the pharaoh, to whose table he had access, and his economic status was intimately linked to the fate of his master, whose destiny he shared. In some sense, he was the antithesis of someone like Udjahorresnet, who had had the forethought to choose the side of the victor. The will to resist expressed by some­ one like Pharaoh Psammetichus could only have weakened the position of the nobles who had remained faithful to him. Hence the extreme vigor of Cambyses' reaction against the great families. It was a very clear warning aimed at the local nobility: the maintenance of their socioeconomic privileges depended on their unreserved alle­ giance to the victors and accepting the reality of the newly imposed imperial structures. Otherwise, their property would be confiscated and their prestige would be abrogated.

The Political Personnel of Cyrus and Cambyses In any event, an analysis of the political staff of Cyrus and Cambyses clearly shows the limits of relying on local administrators. They are of course frequently mentioned in the most important corpus of documents, the Babylonian tablets. But—without excep­ tion—after the first years of occupation, local officials were awarded subservient jobs, not positions that involved setting policy at the highest level. Any attempt at statistical analysis of personal names is doomed from the start. In fact, the basic data of personal names come from private archives or temple archives, in which the proportion of Baby­ lonians is necessarily overwhelming. Furthermore, the transmission of titles and profes­ sional qualifications was a matter of privilege, passed down along family lines. By contrast, we do not have a single official (satrapal) archive that could provide compara­ ble data on the ethnic origin of the highest officials of the satrapy. Generally speaking, the Egyptian records reveal more continuity of lifestyle from be­ fore the conquest than novelties that may have been introduced by the Persians. This is especially true of a very interesting Demotic text known as the "Petition of Peteisis." This curious text tells of the quarrels of a family of priests serving the temple of Anion of Teuzoi (El-Hibeh) from year 4 of Psammetichus I (660) to year 4 of Cambyses. Provided

Persians and Conquered

Populations

81

with a benefice at Teuzoi, Peteisis (I) passed on his position to his son Esemteu, despite some problems, and then to his grandson Peteisis (II). While he was away on a military expedition with Pharaoh Psammetichus II (594-589), Peteisis (II) was stripped of his property and privileges. The family's troubles continued for a long time, under Amasis (570-525) and then Cambyses and Darius. The document gives the impression that, apart from references to regnal years of Cambyses and Darius, the Persian conquest was only hazily perceived. In particular, the names are all Egyptian. The reason is simple: in this text it is "ordinary" Egyptians who speak, not the officials of the satrapy. A "governor" appears, before whom the members of the family come to seek redress. But, during the reign of Cambyses, was he Persian (the satrap), or was he Egyptian? At this time, no cer­ tain solution has been found. Let us note simply that the Persian conquest did not bring a sudden end to the careers of the high bureaucrats (Khnemibre, Ahmose) who surrounded the last pharaohs. But it appears at the same time that their place in the administrative hierarchy was relatively modest, despite the sonorous titles they gave themselves, which say more about their prestige in Egyptian society than about political parity with the Persians of the satrapy. In any event, some titles disappeared with the conquest, in particular those of "elder be­ fore the king," "elder before his master," and "known to the king." Only a man like Ud­ jahorresnet could boast of being "known to the king (Cambyses)." Besides, if we examine Udjahorresnet's titulature before and after the conquest, we find that he retained many traditional titles. But this is more a question of honorary titles than political functions per se. We also see that he lost the only responsible position he held before the arrival of Cambyses, that of admiral of the fleet. Under Cambyses (then Darius) he held the position of chief medical officer. This was hardly an innovation, be­ cause Egyptian physicians were famous and were used at the Persian court in the time of Cyrus (cf. Herodotus III. 1). To be sure, it was an honorary position, which gave its in­ cumbent undeniable prestige. Udjahorresnet with pride specified that Cambyses "as­ signed him the position of chief medical officer, [he] placed [him] beside [him] as companion and director of the palace." He decked himself out with pompous titles like "pasha, royal chancellor, sole companion, true friend of the king who loves him," tradi­ tional Egyptian titles that had already been bestowed on him under Amasis and Psam­ metichus. This accumulation of titles does not obscure the fact that, despite his defection to Cambyses, Udjahorresnet did not receive a single position of political influ­ ence, either from the king or in Egypt itself. The Medes were apparently the only conquered peoples who acquired positions of the highest rank. At the news of the revolt of the Lydian Pactyes, Cyrus assigned the Mede Mazares to lead the operation of reconquest and suppression. On his death, the command passed to another Mede, Harpagus—the same man who had switched alle­ giance to Cyrus at the time of the conquest of Media. It was he who completed the con­ quest of the coast of Asia Minor. Among the generals who were with Darius at the beginning of his reign, we know another Mede, Takhmaspada. We may also cite the case of Datis "the Mede," who held a military post of the first rank at the end of the 490s and who perhaps had begun his career under Cambyses. The position of the Medes is certainly remarkable. It is likely that after the conquest of Ecbatana Media retained special prestige among the conquered countries, perhaps because of ancient political and cultural links between Persians and Medes. But at the

82

Chapter 2. The Conquest and After

same time it is clear that our perspective is somewhat skewed because of propaganda. For example, the marriage between Cyrus and Amytis, daughter of Astyages, recorded by Ctesias, is not a verified fact. It would thus be excessive to speak of a Persian-Median joint sovereignty. All of the ancient authors acclaim Cyrus as the one who uprooted rul­ ing power from the Medes in order to transfer it to the Persians. The former are the van­ quished, the latter the victors. Culturally, however, Medes and Persians were close cousins. In spite of these facts, the importance of the Median heritage in the state orga­ nization of Cyrus and Cambyses must be evaluated with detachment and moderation. The Elamite influence was far greater. In the Persian lists of known countries, starting from the time of Darius, Media is always listed after Persia. Media was also transformed into a satrapy and, unlike Persia, had to pay tribute like any other provincial govern­ ment. Furthermore, no satrap of Median origin is known with certainty. Medes seem to have held only military posts. In this function they were subordinate to the orders of the king. In Asia Minor, for example, the Median generals had to cooperate (at least) with the Persian satraps, with the Persian generals, and with the commander of the citadel of Sardis, Tabalus, who also was a Persian. It is quite remarkable that the satraps of Cyrus and Cambyses came without excep­ tion from Persian families: Gubaru in Babylonia-Trans-Euphrates, Aiyandes in Egypt, Oroetes in Sardis, Mitrobates in Dascylium, Dadarsi in Bactria, and Vivana in Aracho­ sia. The same was true for the imperial treasurer in Babylon, Mithradata. As Herodotus says (111.64), Cambyses' entourage in Egypt also was made up only of Persians. It was "the most distinguished" Persians that the dying king called before him to exhort not to let the Medes take control. Among these aristocrats, Herodotus particularly distin­ guishes the Achaemenids themselves. For example, the future king, Darius, enjoyed a high position at the court of Cyrus and Cambyses (Aelian, VH XII.43; Herodotus III. 139), and his father Hystaspes governed Parthia-Hyrcania or at least occupied a very important military position there (DB §35). It was also Persians who held trusted posi­ tions around the king, such as, under Cambyses, the "message-bearer" Prexaspes (whose son served as royal cupbearer) as well as the royal judges—for example, Sisamnes, who was put to death by Cambyses (Herodotus III.34; V.25). Considered as a whole, the composition of the political staff under the first kings demonstrates the grip on power held by the representatives of the Persian aristocracy in the government of the Empire. It was exclusively Persians who held the command and policy positions. This simple observation strikingly confirms that the Einpire-in-themaking was not simply the juxtaposition of preexisting state structures; it was an entirely new empire, where the conquerors, grouped around their king, kept for themselves po­ sitions, prebends, and benefices. The local political and social structures and elites were not appropriated, except to the extent they could be integrated into the new state-in­ formation. Local dignitaries were associated with the government of the Empire as aux­ iliaries to a new ethnically and socially homogenous ruling group. This group would henceforth become the dominant socioetlmic class, consisting for the most part of rep­ resentatives of the great aristocratic families of Persia.

Contacts and Acculturation This observation obviously is not meant to imply that the Persians did not establish close relationships with the local ruling classes. Some examples and simple logic suggest

Persians and Conquered

Populations

83

the opposite. In some regions, particularly in Fars and Elam, as we have seen, the con­ tacts and exchanges predate the conquest of Cyrus. In Babylonia, for example, during the first quarter of the sixth century, there were Babylonians with Iranian patronymics. In a document from the reign of Cambyses, issued in Persia to Matezzis, the descendant of a Babylonian has an Iranian name (Bagapada). But we know nothing more about pos­ sible marriages between Persians and members of other peoples. We might almost sup­ pose that during this period some of the Persian kings' concubines might have been Babylonian in origin. On the other hand, in Asia Minor, marriages between the Sardian aristocracy and families of the Greek cities, so abundantly attested from the Mermnad period, are completely absent from the documentation of the early Achaemenid period. Among local princes who were fascinated by Persian luxury and ways of life, Polycra­ tes, the tyrant of Samos, stands out. Herodotus (III. 125-C-) states that "apart from the lords of Syracuse, no other petty king in the Greek world can be compared with Polycrates for magnificence (megaloprepeie)." And numerous ancient authors like to cite the example of the tyrant of Samos, since one of their favorite topics was the relationship between power, wealth, and decadence. In their eyes, Polycrates epitomized the characteristics they commonly imputed to oriental kings, especially their love of luxury (tryphe). At Sa­ mos he re-created a genuine court, to which he brought celebrated poets (such as Anacreon) and also craftsmen recruited at high price (cf. Aelian, VH IX.4). He established workshops to produce sumptuous fabrics and celebrated drinking vessels. The opulence of the furnishings of the men's hall (andron) was well known, not to mention the pomp of the banquets held there. Among the creations that the ancient authors underscore was a neighborhood in Samos reserved for prostitution. Clearchus states that this quarter was modeled on one at Sardis and was in competition with it. There can hardly be any doubt that it was a sort of park, a "paradise." It is also said that Polycrates brought fabled animals from everywhere: dogs from Aegina and Laconia, goats from Scyros and Naxos, sheep from Miletus and Attica, hogs from Sicily (cf. Athenaeus XII.540e-f). This consti­ tutes one of the traditional functions of oriental paradises, which were also gardens for acclimatizing exotic species. In Polycrates, then, we have an example of a Greek tyrant fascinated by the luxury of the oriental courts, in whose eyes political rivalry was also ex­ pressed in the sumptuousness of court life. According to Herodotus (III. 122-o), "he had high hopes of making himself master of Ionia and the islands." In Polycrates' view, con­ tending with Sardis for power entailed copying and equalling the luxury of the Lydian kings and, later, of the Persian satrap of Sardis, who in a certain sense succeeded the Ly­ dian kings. The case of Polycrates is all the more interesting because a number of his innovations antedate the Persian conquest. The same authors who liked to extol the luxury of the Ly­ dians in every aspect of life also condemned their love of luxury. The rivalry between the courts of Polycrates and Oroetes takes place in an ongoing history. Thus, on arriving at Sardis, the Persians adopted some of the Lydian royal practices to their advantage. Para­ dises are attested in Lydia before Cyrus, not just at Sardis but also at Dascylium; like­ wise, royal hunts (cf. Strabo XIII. 1.17). This is not to say that Cyrus got the idea for the paradise at Pasargadae from Sardis. Such parks were known in Assyria and elsewhere well before. Rather, the Persians probably spread the model of the paradise still more widely in Asia Minor. Xenophon [Cyr. VIII.6.12). Of course, according to the Babylo­ nian version, the Median losses after this battle (the battle of Marus) amounted to 3,827 killed and 4,329 captured, which demonstrates that the total of the rebel army was much larger. The best evidence is that Hydarnes thereafter preferred to wait in prudent readi­ ness until the arrival of Darius, whom he would later join near Behistun. Thus either the decisive "victory" was nothing more than an uncertain engagement (or even a defeat),

Revolts and Reconquests (522-5 1 8)

119

or else the figures in the Babylonian version must be treated with caution. At any rate, the two interpretations are not mutually exclusive. It is proper to consider Darius's propagandistic intent: he loves to repeat that he overcame numerous powerful revolts with an army that he describes several times as "small." It seems clear that the main part of the force remained under Darius's direct command and that he used it to regain Baby­ lonia (October 522-early January 521). As a consequence, he was sending out army units of only a few thousand men under the command of his lieutenants. It is likely that the victory over Phraortes of Media (May 521) was of decisive strategic importance, con­ sidering the effect of this battle (the battle of Kundurus) on the Median rebel army (see the table). It is likely that the securing of the northern front in May-June allowed Darius to redeploy troops against Vahyazdata in Persia. If in the end Darius defeated all of the armies that had allied against Persian power, it is apparently because there was no real unified plan for opposing the royal armies. Iso­ lated, some of the rebels were quickly defeated. The first insurgent in Elam, Acina, sur­ rendered after the dispatch of a message from the king, and the second received no local help Impressed by the mere approach of the king (Darius says), the Elamites seized their "king" and put him to death themselves. In contrast, other revolutionaries offered long and stubborn resistance. The Armenian insurgents were able to survive five battles in six months; Fravartis of Media resisted for five months; and Vahyazdata of Persia was not captured until seven months had passed and two battles were fought in Persia itself. This is not to say that there was no interregional cooperation; quite the contrary. It is precisely cooperation that helps explain the danger presented particularly by the Me­ dian and Persian revolts. One of the dangers was that these revolts prevented Darius, in the beginning at least, from raising fresh troops in these two countries that constituted the base for Achaemenid conscription. Moreover, Fravartis took command of the Me­ dian army stationed in the country (§§24-25), and Vahyazdata assembled "the Persian army which (was) in the palace" (§40o). Then, after an initial defeat at Rakha, Vahyaz­ data raised a new army at Paisiyauvada, near Pasargadae (§42). What is more, neither of these rebellions was geographically limited to Media or Persia proper. Vahyazdata tried to nibble at the eastern part of the Iranian Plateau by sending an army against Arachosia. This offensive and the troubles in Sattagydia (a region located between Arachosia and Gandhara) threatened Achaemenid power on the southern Iranian Plateau as far as Carmania (late 522-early 521). The case of the revolt of Fravartis in Media is even clearer. In Sagartia, the rebel chief claimed, like Fravartis, to belong to the family of Cyaxares, and Darius calls the rebel chieftains of Parthia-Hyrcania "the partisans of Fravartis." It also seems (as we have seen) that the length of the struggle in Armenia was related to the Median rebellion. Fravartis held the strategic route from Media to Central Asia for awhile. After his defeat, moreover, he decided to march east, which is why Darius de­ tached an army corps that succeeded in catching up with him and capturing him at Rhagac, near the Caspian Gates. Darius understood the danger well: it was the reason he quickly moved to establish himself in Media (January 521)—so that he could coordi­ nate the counteroffensives and prevent Fravartis from cutting off his communications with Central Asia. It is perhaps because of the importance of the revolt of Fravartis that Herodotus highlights the Median uprising when he discusses the subjection of Ecba­ tana by Cyrus: "At a later period [the Medes] regretted their submission and revolted from Darius, but were defeated and again reduced" (1.130-O; cf. Diodorus XI.6.3).

120

Chapter 3. 'Trouble, Secession, and Rebuilding

(522-518)

The Political Aspect of the Revolts Defining the origins and causes of the revolts is especially problematic. The most noteworthy observation is that the various ringleaders all had dynastic aspirations. Each took the title "king": Acina proclaimed himself "king in Elam," Cicantakhma "king in Sagartia," Frada "king in Margiana," etc. In most cases, the rebels took a regnal name that permitted them to connect with the local dynasty that had been erased by Cyrus: in Babylon, Nidintu-Bel called himself "Nebuchadnezzar, son of Nabonidus"; Fravartis claimed that he was "of the family of Cyaxares [Uvaxstra]," like the Sagartian rebel. The desire to stir regional sentiments is evident. Even foreigners such as the Persian Martiya in Elam or the Armenian Arkha in Babylon sought to turn the assertion of dynastic con­ tinuity to their profit. This choice reflected a clear political intent to resume the course of local history and close what was by implication only a parenthesis of Achaemenid do­ minion. At Babylon, in fact, for several months private documents were dated to the ac­ cession year and first regnal year of a King Nebuchadnezzar (III or IV), and in Persia to the reign of Vahvazdata/Bardiya (but this may refer to the first Bardiya). Unfortunately, it is difficult to estimate the popular impact of these manipulations. The impact apparently was not very significant in Elam, where neither of the two "kings" was in a position to raise an army. On the other hand, the recurrence of revolts in the same region (Elam or Babylonia, in particular) suggests that the integration of conquered territories into the Achaemenid Empire was still very imperfect. Until Da­ rius, Susa also remained exclusively Elamite in character. But, generally, we lack infor­ mation on the breadth and depth of the rebellions. Some historians think that on the basis of the number of people killed and captured—about 100,000 in all—they can draw conclusions regarding the popular and national character of several uprisings. Even set­ ting aside the uncertainty of the readings, the totals for casualties in Media (nearly 50,000) and in Margiana (55,000 killed and 6,972 captured, according to some readings) are especially noteworthy. But does the extent of the losses indicate that the uprising led the entire population to take up arms in a national and popular revolt or, more simply, does it reflect ferocious repression striking out blindly at civilian populations who re­ mained aloof from the movement? There is little doubt that the Persians resorted to the use of terror: Darius boasts of massacring every survivor of the Babylonian armies that he attacked on the banks of the Tigris and the Euphrates (DB Bab. $17). In the end, the fact that the leaders raised troops from among the population says nothing about the "na­ tional" character of the movement. According to Darius, the revolts broke out after his victory over Gaumata (29 Sept. 522; §15). But, for reasons already given, the statement of the new king must be consid­ ered in perspective, because discontent was previously evident among the conquered populations. 7'he best proof of this is the measure taken by Smerdis to end tribute and military levies for three years (see above, p. 105). The dynastic difficulties at the heart of the Empire represented the ideal occasion for contesting Achaemenid authority. With­ out rejecting the reasonable idea that some countries clung to the memory of past gran­ deur, we are inclined to conclude that the deep source of discontent was the system of tribute—as Smerdis had understood. The revolts were led by the local ruling classes, who had been careful to reserve the profits derived from exploiting land and people for themselves instead of the newly dominant class of Persians. Their discontent also related

Revolts and Reconquests (522-5 J 8)

121

to the excessive burden of the levies, as is demonstrated by the complaints of the Egyp­ tians against their satrap, Aryandes (Polyaenus VII. 1.7). It is also useful to note that even in the countries where we can assume strong ethnocultural identity, nothing allows us to assume a unanimous anti-Persian sentiment. During the reigns of Cyrus and Cam­ byses, many local nobles willingly collaborated with Persian power. Let us recall, for example, that Darius was supported by a Persian-Median army and that one of his lieu­ tenants was the Mede Takhmaspada, who led the army to victory against the Sagartian rebel who claimed to be descended "from the stock of Cyaxares." Darius also names the Armenian Dadarsi, who supported him in Armenia. In any event, what was the signifi­ cance of the revolts at Susa and Babylonia led by a Persian (Martiya) and an Armenian (Arkha), respectively?

Darius and Vahyazdata One uprising took on special significance, namely, the revolt of Persia. A man named Vahyazdata raised the standard of revolt, claiming to be Bardiya, son of Cyrus. As Darius notes (§40). this was the second revolt fomented in the name of the family of Cyrus. Vahyazdata rallied to himself the army that arrived from Ansan and "became king in Persia." Once again, the unstable dynastic situation was at the root of the revolt. Vahyaz­ data was defeated by Artavardiya, who had been sent by Darius. Vahyazdata nonetheless succeeded in raising a second army and sending troops to Arachosia. It was not until mid-July 521 that he was completely defeated; at that time he was taken prisoner and executed in Darius's presence in the immediate vicinity of the future Persepolis. The origins and methods of this revolt are problematic. Did the new Bardiya receive aid from certain noble families who were disturbed by the advent of Darius, and/or was he principally supported by the peasant class, distressed by the loss of the other Bardiya? To ask the question is to reopen the matter of the first Bardiya's policy. If the theory that makes Bardiya I the spokesman of particular segments of Persian society is unfounded (above, p. 103), there is no reason to accept the social interpretation of the new revolt without reservation. For reasons already alluded to, the successive raising of two armies in Persia provides no solid indication of the sentiments of the Persian population. Darius liimself takes care not to attach any particular importance to the revolt of Vahyazdata, who receives the same attention as the other "liar-kings." Vahyazdata has no special place on the relief, unlike Gaumata. Darius thus implicitly denies that his dynastic situation was actually endangered by the rebel Vahyazdata, who is not distinguished in any way from the other liar-kings. We may rightly suppose that Darius's account is itself suspect. What appears obvious, nevertheless, is that he was able to gather representatives of the Persian nobility and the Achaemenid administration around him. Vivana, satrap in Arachosia, and Dadarsi, sa­ trap in Bactria, acted on Darius's orders with promptness and determination to repel the assaults led by Vahyazdata's forces (in Arachosia) and Frada's troops (in Margiana). Per­ haps it was the same for Aryandes in Egypt. Darius's father, Hystaspes, was also at hand, and he led the operations in Parthia-Hyrcania. Four of the six co-conspirators of 522 are listed among Darius's generals: Intaphernes, who put down the rebellion of Arkha in Babylonia (Nov. 521); Hydarnes, who fought against Fravartis in Media (Jan. 521); Go­ bryas, who was sent to quash a new Elamite rebellion (the next year) (§71); and Otanes liimself, shortly after, led an army to the conquest of Samos (Herodotus 111.141-49).

122

Chapter 3. Trouble, Secession, and Rebuilding

(522-518)

The Rebellion of Oroetes A single satrap refused to aid Darius —Oroetes, who since Cyrus's time had held the post of satrap of Sardis. This high-ranking person had already become famous when, at the end of Cambyses' reign, he eliminated Polycrates of Samos by treachery (III.12226). Herodotus provides our only information on the repercussions caused by the rise of Darius in the western lands of the Empire: After the death of Cambyses, and throughout the period when Persia was controlled by the Magi, [Oroetes] had lived in Sardis and offered no help to his countrymen in resisting the Median usurpation. Hehad, moreover, during these unsettled times, procured the death of Mitrobates, the governor of Dascylium . . . and also of Mitrobates' son Cranaspes, a man hardly less distinguished than his father (andres en Perseisi dokimoi). Nor were these two murders by any means his only acts of violence. (III. 126-0-) Then Herodotus specifies that Oroetes even had one of Darius's couriers executed on the road back because "what he ordered him did not suit him." The occurrence takes on special interest because it is the first recorded example of insubordination by a satrap. The date of these events is given with some precision by Herodotus. "The turmoil still lasted," he writes, and "Darius had just come to power." We are thus at the height of the period of revolts. We may assume that Darius, then at Ecbatana (early 521), had or­ dered Oroetes to march with the available troops, cross the Halys, and bring aid to the royal troops who were encountering many difficulties in the face of the Median and Ar­ menian revolts. Relying on his satrapal guard (1000 Persians), Oroetes chose to ignore the orders and defy the entirely new authority of Darius. Most unwilling to redeploy contingents on a new front, Darius turned to the Persians of his entourage. Herodotus reports that 30 Persians then rushed forward, "each one eager to do his bidding." Bagaeus was chosen by lot. When he arrived at Sardis, he employed a subterfuge to test the loyalty of the guards. Seeing that they displayed a great deal of reverence for some royal letters that he had the secretary open one after the other, Bagaeus unsealed the last of them: "King Darius orders the Persians of Sardis to kill Oroetes." This they did on the spot, and the property of the satrap was confiscated. Even cleansed of its fictionalized and bombastic tone, Herodotus's tale is very reveal­ ing of relations between the new king and the Persians, not just the Persians who sur­ rounded him but also the Persians of the imperial diaspora. Herodotus accents their loyalty, scandalized as they were by the murder of high aristocrats such as Mitrobates and his son. Reading Herodotus's account does not leave us with the impression that Oroetes would have found many Persians at Sardis ready to follow him in his rebellion. For them, loyalty to the monarchy consisted of the desire to preserve all of the privileges that accrued to them from imperial dominion. Indeed, by refusing to aid Darius and the Persians in maintaining order among the subject peoples, Oroetes put at issue not just the authority of Darius but also the edifice erected by Cyrus and Cambyses, which ne­ cessitated the existence of a strong, active, and legitimate central authority.

3. The Aftermath of Victory: The Official Story

Crime and Punishment, Publicity and Propaganda The measures taken against the liar-kings make the dangers faced by Darius as clear as the absolute will of the new king to wipe them out permanently. At his order, Nidintu-

The Aftermath of Victory. The Official Story

123

Bel of Babylon was impaled, along with 49 of his followers (DB Bab. §19). After Hys­ taspes' victory at Patigrabana, he executed the rebel chief and 80 nobles who accompa­ nied him (DB Bab. §29). So also in Margiana, where Frada was put to the sword along with all his followers (DB Bah. §31), and in Babylon where Hydarnes impaled Arkha and the nobles who were with him (DB Bab. §39). Vahyazdata and several dozen of his closest allies were impaled in Darius's presence (DB Bab. §35). Two revolts received spe­ cial treatment, both at the time when Darius happened to be in Media. The Sagartian rebel, Cicantakhma, was sent to him: "I cut off both his nose and ears, and put out one eye, he was kept bound at my palace entrance, all the people saw him. Afterwards J im­ paled him at Arbela" (DB §33*). Darius is still more expansive about the fate reserved for Fravartis the Mede: "I cut off his nose, ears, and tongue and plucked out an eye; he was chained under guard at the gate of my palace and everyone could see him there. [DB Bab. §25: Then I impaled him at Ecbatana.] As for his trusted lieutenants, I hung them at Ecbatana in the citadel" [DB §32; DB Bab. §25: "I hung their heads on the walls of the citadel"; DB El. agrees with D B Bab.}. The intensity of the punishment should not be surprising; it was customary in Hie Assyrian period and in the Achaemenid as well. Cutting off the nose and ears was the normal form of torture for rebels and usurp­ ers, the Greek authors would note. What should be stressed instead is the publicity that Darius accorded his executions. The entire population was invited to witness the liarking being tortured at the palace gates, We may recall that, according to Diodorus (XVII.71.6-*-), bronze poles, nine meters high, were erected near the gates of Persepolis: "they were intended to catch the eye of the beholder." This desire to stir the hnaginations of the Empire's populations was soon demon­ strated again by the new king. He ordered copies of the text inscribed at Behistun to be sent to every country in the Empire (DB §70). We now know that the stated will of the king did not remain empty words. At Babylon, fragments of the inscription, parts of what was originally an imposing stela, have been found. Fragments of an Aramaic version of the Behistun text on papyrus have been also been found, this time at Elephantine in Egypt. This is not the original copy sent by Darius to Egypt but probably a student copy, written during the reign of Darius II (422-405), proof that the text continued to be trans­ mitted, even in the form of schcolwork. But access to the royal account was not limited to the literate. At Babylon, a fragment of a copy of the Behistun relief has been discov­ ered, and another tablet has been found at Susa that shows traces of what may be part of another copy. We may presume that the reliefs and stelas were placed in prominent locations in each satrapy. No doubt the reproductions were protected in the same way as the origi­ nals. Addressing those who viewed the monument, Darius adjures them not to destroy the inscriptions or the sculptures; he invokes prosperity for those who protect it and mis­ fortune for those who destroy it (§§65-67). It is clear that by publishing the inscription in all parts of the Empire Darius wished it known to everyone everywhere that he was the uncontested Great King. Again addressing the visitor, he assures him of the absolute truth of his exploits and declares: "Now let that which has been done by me convince thee; thus to the people impart, do not conceal it: if this record thou shalt not conceal, (but) tell it to the people, may Ahuramazda be a friend unto thee, and may family be unto thee in abundance, and may thou live long" (§60o).

124

Chapter 3. Trouble, Secession, and Rebuilding

(522-5IS)

Truth and Lies at Behistun: Darius and Ahura-Mazda Immediately after his victories of 522-521, Darius decided to engrave the story of hi rise and his military exploits o n rock. He chose for this the cliff at Behistun, which domi­ nates the plain of Kermanshah, a short distance from the highway that leads from Baby­ lon to Ecbatana (Diodorus XVII.110.5) o n a plateau with an elevation of more than 1,000 meters. The cliff must have been a holy place for a long time, doubtless reused by the Persians to their advantage, since the ancient authors stress that the Persians wor­ shiped their gods in open air in high places. It is probably for this reason that the moun­ tain was named Bagistana, Iranian "Bagastana the 'abode of the gods'. According to Ctesias (cited by Diodorus II.13.2-o-), the mountain was dedicated to Zeus, by which he surely meant Ahura-Mazda and/or other Persian and Iranian gods. Ctesias, who de­ scribes the journey of Semiramis from Babylon to Ecbatana, adds the following details: s

And when she had arrived at the mountain known as Bagistanus, she encamped near it and laid out a park, which had a circumference of twelve stades [2 km] and, being situated in the plain, contained a great spring by means of which her plantings could be irrigated. The Ba­ gistanus mountain is sacred to Zeus and on the side facing the park has sheer cliffs which rise to a height of seventeen stades [3000 in]. The lowest part of these she smoothed off and engraved thereon a likeness of herself with a hundred spearmen at her side. And she also put this inscription on the cliff in Syrian letters...." It is clear that Darius lurks behind this description of Semiramis; Diodorus alludes very clearly (though imaginatively) to the relief and inscription of Behistun. When Alex­ ander made a special trip to visit the place, he and his companions were struck by the fruitfulness of the plain located at the foot of the cliff: "A magnificent country covered with fruit trees or rich in everything which makes for good living," comments Diodorus (XVII. 110,5-0-). Inasmuch as Cyrus had already created a paradise at Pasargadae, we are strongly inclined to think that the paradise at Behistun was a creation or a reconstruction by Darius himself, who wanted to give the monument erected to his glory the surround­ ings he thought it merited. We know in any case that early in 521 Darius was on the plain and that there he met up with the army of Hydarnes (DB $25). It seems quite likely that it was in the course of his long stay in Media (January-June 521) that Darius and his advisers worked out the plans for a monument where he might exalt the total tri­ umph, both dynastic and military, that was at hand. Inscriptions and relief were meant to represent the act of founding a new kingdom, a reborn empire. To this end, whatever models might have inspired the king and his advisers, it is clear that to their way of think­ ing it was not to be dependent on any existing monument; rather, it was to be an entirely new creation in which the borrowings were melted down and recast into a new work of art in service of a power for which no comparable precedent could be named. The monument takes on even greater importance as the sole narrative composition in all of Achaemenid art and as the first act ordered by Darius after his victory (fig. 8). Carved on a smooth surface 3 x 5.5 meters, the relief pictures Darius, facing right, dressed in a Persian robe, with a crenellated diadem on his head. In his left hand he holds a bow, which rests on his left foot. His right hand is raised to the level of his face, palm outward. Above his head, in a rectangular panel, is inscribed his titulature: "1 am Darius the Great King, King of Kings, King in Persia, king of countries (dahydva), son of Hystaspes, grandson of Arsames, an Achaemenian" (DBct). In front of him, joined by ropes around their necks, hands tied behind their backs, eight liar-kings are depicted.

The Aftermath of Victory: The Official Story

125

Fig. 8. Relief at Rehistun. They are differentia tied by their clothing and, more clearly, by short inscriptions naming them, repeating the phraseology adopted by Darius in his recapitulation (DB $52): "This is Acina, an Elamite who lied" (DBb-k). From left to right we can spot Acina, Nidintu-Bel, Fravartis, Martiya, Cicantakhma, Vahyazdata, Arkha, and Frada. The infe­ rior status of these persons is expressed not only by their posture but also by their height: 1.17 m, versus 1.72 m for Darius. But one of the liar-kings is in a position far more hu­ miliating, nmvdy Gaumata, who is lying on his back, hands raised in supplication to Darius, who stands over him in all his dignity and places his foot on his chest. The relief clearly illustrates the inscriptions that are arranged all around it. It is not at all realistic in the full sense. Gaumata is portrayed as if Darius had already won the title of king before he killed him. The presence of all the liar-kings in front of Darius is in­ tended to represent the king as the personal conqueror of each of them. This does not correspond to the reality expressed in the inscriptions: Martiya was executed by the Elamites themselves, Frada by the satrap Vivana, and Arkha by Vidarna/Hydarnes (on the order of the king, to be sure). But, above all, the relief makes no reference to the ways in which the liar-kings were tortured. The primary intent is to represent the king in his capacity as "conqueror," in the form of a message that is simultaneously both metaphor­ ical and realistic. All of these men are condemned as "liars." By "lying," they violated the law of kings as defined by Darius when speaking of the 23 subject countries, which he had just enu­ merated ($6): T h e s e are the c o u n t r i e s which c a m e u n t o m e ; by the favor o f A h u r a m a z d a they were my subjects

(handaka).

T h e y bore tribute

(baji)

to m e ; what was said u n t o them by m e either

by night or by day, that was d o n e . S a i t h D a r i u s the King: Within these countries, the m a n who was loyal, h i m I rewarded well; ( h i m ) w h o vvas evil, h i m I p u n i s h e d well. By the favor of A h u r a m a z d a , t h e s e c o u n t r i e s s h o w e d respect toward m y law

(data); as was said

to t h e m

by m e , thus was it d o n e . ( § $ 7 - 8 o )

In contrast, all of these false kings "lied to the people" by claiming to be sons of Cyrus or Nabonidus or descendants of Cyaxares. In the concept of power expressed for the hist

126

Chapter 3. Trouble, Secession, and Rebuilding

(522-518)

time at Behistun, the 'lie' (drauga) is directly connected with the revolt against estab­ lished, legitimate power. Thus, "when Cambyses had gone off to Egypt, after that the people became evil. After that, the Lie waxed great in the country, both in Persia and in Media and in the other provinces" ( § 1 0 o ) . And, further on, in column IV, Darius re­ peats: "These are the provinces which became rebellious. The Lie made them rebel­ lious, so that these (men) deceived the people" ( § 5 4 o ) , and he warns: "Thou who shalt be king hereafter, . . . the man who shall be a Lie-follower, him do thou punish well" (§55-0-, cf. §64). Darius presents himself as a man who does not lie and who has never lied, and he guarantees it by invoking Ahura-Mazda ( § § 5 6 - 5 8 ) . The lie (drauga) is im­ plicitly opposed to the truth (arta), and both terms belong equally to the political and the religious domain—if indeed Darius and his people could ever have distinguished and separated the political from the religious. There is a figure, placed above the scene, who plays a primordial role. This bearded individual emerges from a winged disk, is clothed in the Persian style, and wears a tall cylindrical headdress, itself topped with a six-pointed star. He holds a ring in his left hand, apparently offering it to Darius. It is currently understood to be a representation of Ahura-Mazda, the god who guarantees the kingdom to Darius by his power and protec­ tion and to whom he owes all his victories—this is what Darius incessantly affirms. Heis the only individual with whom Darius establishes a dialogue. It is in fact toward the god that Darius raises his hand, as if to receive the ring Ahura-Mazda holds in his left hand. This is a motif well known earlier in Near Eastern royal art: what we see at Behis­ tun is an investiture scene. Darius rightly could exclaim: "It is thanks to Ahura-Mazda that I am king. . . . It is Ahura-Mazda who has granted me the kingdom [or: conferred power on me]." The illustration thus strongly expresses the fact that, without being a god himself, the king is invested with royal power by the god and is Ahura-Mazda's proxy on earth, as the result of a genuine pact they had concluded. Ahura-Mazda is literally the king's god. This is a reality that Darius himself expresses perfectly in his inscription. Ahura-Mazda's name occurs 63 times, but the "other gods that exist" are mentioned only once, in a subordinate form: "This which I did, in one and the same year by the favor of Ahuramazda I did; Ahuramazda bore me aid, and the other gods who are" (§62-0-). It is to Ahura-Mazda that royal prayers are always raised in Darius's inscriptions. Though we fully reject the temptation to speak of evolution toward monotheism, we must recognize that in the official religion established by Darius, Ahura-Mazda had a supreme position. He is designated as the sovereign deity of the pantheon, and the other deities are invoked only nominally. This privileged alliance conferred absolute power on the king, and no one could question that power, except at the risk of divine displeasure. This is in fact the reason that the lie (drauga) and the truth (arta) represent political and religious con­ cepts simultaneously. The king rules over the lands and peoples (dahyava) thanks to the protection of Ahura-Mazda, and he must make truth reign and hunt down the lie among them in the name of the same precepts that govern relations between men and gods. But what is most novel about this monument is quite simply the fact that the Persian language (arya) was being written for the first time. Despite the continuing debate over the precise meaning of §70 and the actual act of transcribing a text already inscribed in Elamite, the inclination today is to recognize that Persian writing constituted a major in­ novation by Darius (who did not hesitate to use it at Pasargadae in order to tap into the prestige of Cyrus to his own advantage). Until this event, the king's deeds were transmit-

The Aftermath of Victory: 'The Official Story

127

ted in Persian exclusively through recitation and song and through the intermediary of masters of memory. To be sure, oral transmission remained a constant throughout the long history of the Persian people, as shown by the notable role of the magi in general. Rut this observation lends still more import to the first indubitable attestation of royal writing, inscribed in the presence of the king (and written on clay and parchment), a model that was followed by all of Darius's successors. By this very action the Great King could claim that he himself was first of all a master of truth. He intended to control the tradition he wished to be transmitted to future generations: the royal word, inscribed for all posterity on the rock, was placed under the aegis of Ahura-Mazda as protection against all those who might want to destroy it (DB $$65-67). This is how the king trans­ mitted not only the memory of his unique exploits but also his genealogy. In this way he took appropriate measures to have his word disseminated throughout the lands of his realm (DB $70), after having it authenticated—the text had previously been read to him. At the same time, the memory of his royalty was fixed. No one, not even his successors (DB $64), would have the right to question it: on the cliff at Behistun, the history of his­ torians is forestalled for all time.

New Campaigns, New Additions: Imperialism and Religion The composition as a whole would soon be modified to include events that unfolded while the royal artists were still working on the sacred mountain. A new column (col. V) had to be added, in Old Persian only (for lack of room). The text begins: "Saith Darius the King: This is what I did in both the second and the third year afteT that I became king. A province by name Elam —this became rebellious."-*- For the third time since Oc­ tober 522, the Elamites rebelled, led this time by Atamaita. Gobryas, the king's faithful handaka, was placed at the head of an army. He was victorious, captured Susa, and brought Atamaita before Darius, who put him to death (520). It was perhaps under these circumstances or shortly thereafter that Darius resolved to redesign Susa and erect a vast Achaemenid palace complex there. The following year, Darius himself took command of the royal army and marched against the Central Asian Saka. The Saka king, Skunkha, was taken prisoner and re­ placed by another king, apparently hand-picked by Darius. It is likely that the Saka (Da­ rius lists them among the rebellious peoples: DB $21) could not be subjugated by the satrap of Bactria, Vivana, who had been assigned that job, a task that fell to him quite naturally. Or maybe Vivana was killed during a battle with the Saka? We do not know. The fact is that after his victory Darius returned to Ecbatana and Behistun. Skunkha was added to the relief, behind the liar-kings. He is identifiable by his tall pointed hat, the marker of certain Saka peoples (Tigraxauda). The addition of Skunkha necessitated the destruction of the original Elamite text, vPhich was rewritten to the left of the Persian ver­ sion. This is also when the text of column V was added. The most noteworthy novelty of this Old Persian addition is without doubt the reli­ gious justification that Darius provides for the two campaigns against Elam and the Saka. The sentence can be understood as follows: "Those Elamites (Saka) were faithless and by them Ahuramazda was not worshipped. I worshiped Ahuramazda [in their lands?]; by the favor of Ahuramazda, as was my desire, thus I did unto them."-*- Or, per­ haps Darius is simply recognizing that it was because of his faith in Ahura-Mazda that he was able to conquer populations that did not worship his god. In either case, the

J 28

Chapter^.

Trouble, Secession, and Rebuilding (522-5 i 8)

politico-religious implications are enormous. In contrast to the royal assertions about the rebels in columns I—IV, in column V the rebels are no longer denounced solely as bear­ ers of the drauga ['liars']; they are called arika, usually translated 'faithless'. They are described in a clearly pejorative fashion as worshipers of non-Persian deities. This ex­ pression is also found in a Xerxes inscription, where the king condemns the cult of false gods (daiva) (chap. 13/6). This statement does not in any way imply that Darius completely altered the ideolog­ ical strategy of his predecessors in the conquered countries. But what is clear is that in just a few years, at the instigation of Darius, Persian royal authority was endowed with a uniformly steady and coherent politico-religious ideology. More than ever, in times of peace and times of war, the king was the earthly proxy of his god Ahura-Mazda. Further­ more, column V ends with this sentence: "Saith Darius the King: Whoso shall worship Ahuramazda, divine blessing will be upon him, both (while) living and (when) dead.'V In view of the overall context, this statement promised heaven to whoever served the king loyally.

4. Darius and the Six

Primus inter pares? We must now return at greater length to the relations between Darius and his com­ panions after his accession to the throne. Reading Herodotus without perspective, one actually receives the impression that Darius was bound by the agreements that had been mutually reached by the Six when he came to power (Otanes having taken himself out of the competition), concessions that basically would have made the new king primus in­ ter pares. According to Justin (who had read his Herodotus carefully), as a result of the murder of the magus, "the Great ones (principes) were equal in merit and nobilit)'" [virtide et nobilitate . . . pares; 1.10.1-2). This is the version also found in Plato (Laws 695c«-) in an otherwise very suspicious passage: "When [Darius] came and seized the empire with the aid of the other six, he split it up into seven divisions, of which some faint outlines still survive today." Are we to conclude that Darius had agreed on limita­ tions to his royal power from the beginning and that he presented himself simply as the chief victor leading an aristocratic restoration that was originally intended to limit the absolute monarchy that had been carried to extremes by Cambyses and Bardiya? We know that the title "the Seven" continued to be invoked as a sign of distinction among the Persian aristocracy, to the point of making them an integral part of the "ped­ igree" of certain aristocrats, as given by Herodotus. Thus we have references to Otanes (III. 140), Gobryas (IV. 132), or even Zopyrus, "son of the Megabyzus (I) who was one of the seven conspirators who killed the Magus" (III.1S3-0-), etc. Diodorus as late as the fourth century specifies that the satrap Rhosaces "was a descendant of one of the seven Persians who deposed the Magi" (XVI.47.2-v*), and Quintus Curtius introduces Orsines, chieftain of the tribe of Pasargadae, who was "a descendant of the 'seven Persians' and tracing his genealogy also to Cyrus" (IV. 1 Z.8-=>). The permanence of the term thus seems assured. But does this mean that the Seven constituted an entity that had the ability to control the activities of the king? Herodotus often calls the Seven protoi (III.68-70, 77). The small group of prdtoi was often convened by the king in times of peace or war. But it would be a mistake to con­ clude that the membership of the council was imposed on the king. What we call, purely

Darius and the Six

129

by convention, the "king's council" had no institutional existence of its own founded on regulations that the king could not overrule; its meetings and deliberations depended solely on the pleasure of the sovereign. Most decisions were made by the king alone, who received advice from these "confidants" who owed him everything. We cannot say that the nobles met in council simply because they were part of the protoi. It is clear that the king himself selected council members from among the aristocrats: the title "counselor" was included in the court titulature (cf. V. 11-24, and especially Aelian, VH XII.64). This interpretation is also based on Ezra and Esther, where Ahasuerus is shown convening "the seven administrators of Persia and Media who had privileged access to the royal presence and occupied the leading positions in the kingdom" (Esther l:13-14o). It has often been deduced that there was a college of seven judges, a sort of sovereign tribunal, it the court. But this passage is highly suspicious, given the many other references to the number seven in the same work: Ahasuerus reigned over 127 provinces (1:2), and also had "seven eunuchs in attendance on his person" (1:10-0-), Esther received "seven spe­ cial maids" in waiting (2:9-0-), etc. There is hardly any doubt that the composer was in fact aware of the existence of seven families. In itself, however, this observation consti­ tutes a reinterpretation that the modern historian cannot use as counter-evidence. The same remark holds true for a Xenophon passage often cited in this context (Anah. I.6.4-0-): to judge Orontas, Cyrus the Younger convened in his tent "seven of the noblest Persians among his attendants," to whom he adds Clearchus. All we need to do is collect the evidence concerning the royal judges to see that, properly speaking, there was no college of seven royal judges who were systematically chosen from the "Seven families" and who functioned independently of the king. Herodotus defines their func­ tion as follows: "These royal judges are specially chosen men, who hold office either for life or until they are found guilty of some misconduct; their duties are to determine suits and to interpret the ancient laws of the land, and all points of dispute are referred to them" (III.31-0-). It was they who condemned to death the Egyptians who had just killed a royal herald; it was they to whom Cambyses appealed to determine that he had the right to marry his sister. It was probably also the royal judges who are introduced by the composer of Esther. To judge the behavior of Queen Vashti, Ahasuerus asked his Friends to "pronounce law and judgment." They brought a report to the king proposing that an edict announcing the repudiation of the queen be proclaimed throughout the kingdom. These Friends are called "seven princes [JB: administrators] of Persia and Me­ dia" (Esther l:10ff.). The connection sometimes made between the royal judges and the privileged status of the seven families who aided Darius is worthless. When Artaxerxes II brought Tiribazus to judgment, "he assigned three of the most highly esteemed Persians as judges" (Diodorus XV. 10.1-0-). It is clear in fact that the appointment and dismissal of royal judges was solely on the authority of the king, who could reward whomever he wanted with the title of royal judge, including a man of low birth, such as the simple peasant Rhakokes (Aelian, VH 1.34). On several occasions, judges were condemned to death for handing down iniquitous judgments, particularly for having sold out for money (He­ rodotus V.25; VII. 194; Diodorus XV. 10. l o ) : "At this time other judges who were believed to have been corrupt were flayed alive and their skins stretched tight on judicial benches, The judges rendered their decisions seated on these, having before their eyes an example of the punishment meted out to corrupt decisions." Even the decision made

130

Chapter 3. Trouble, Secession, and Rebuilding

(522-518)

by the seven judges of Ahasuerus was more of an opinion: "If it is the king's pleasure, let him issue a royal edict." Even though the judges referred to "the law of the Persians and Medes" (Esther 1:19-*-), it is clear that the decision was based solely on royal authority. Their freedom of judgment was also limited because they were objects of surveil­ lance by the king. Although Diodorus states that Artaxerxes II himself was not present at the trial of his son Darius, this was not the rule. Plutarch adds that the king "com­ manded his scribes to write clown the opinion of every one of the judges, and show it to him" (Art. 29.8). Similarly, after the acquittal of Tiribazus the same Artaxerxes "summonded the judges one by one and asked each of them what principles of justice he had followed in clearing the accused" (Diodorus X V U . l * ) . The reasons that the judges gave for their decisions show very clearly that they arrived at their conclusions on the ba­ sis of the loyalty and devotion that Tiribazus had previously manifested in furthering royal interests. Quite often, however, people were condemned by the king without previously being arraigned before a tribunal. This was certainly true for royal judges, who were con­ demned by the king directly. He could also gTant clemency to whomever he wished. On one occasion, we even see the king pronouncing a death sentence on an accused person who had previously been acquitted by the judges (Ctesias, Persica §61). Good sense shines through in the reply that the royal judges gave to Cambyses when he inquired about marrying his sister: "They managed to find an answer which would neither violate the truth nor endanger their own necks: namely, that though they could discover no law which allowed brother to marry sister, there was undoubtedly a law which permitted the king of Persia to do what he pleased" (Herodotus III.31-*-). Herodotus understood per­ fectly well that the judges did this so as not to "endanger their own necks." In other words, the king remained the sole source of justice (Plutarch, Art. 23.5).

Darius's Point of View: Nobles and King at Behistun From Darius's point of view, the question of an authoritative council of advisers did not even arise. In the addition in §68, he was very discreet about the role of the six aris­ tocrats: "Saith Darius the King: These ate the men who were there at the time when I slew Gaumata the Magian who called himself Bardiya; at that time these men cooper­ ated as my followers (anusiya)" (§68-*-). Then, after giving the list, he adds, for the ben­ efit of his successors: "Thou who shalt be king hereafter, protect well the lineage (tauma) of these men." In the Babylonian version, the wording is: "Fully protect these men and take care of their descendants" (§54). But this royal statement loses much of its specificity when it is compared with other passages in column IV. Addressing those who behold the inscription, he proclaims: "Now let that which has been done by me convince thee; . . . tell it to the people, may Ahuramazda be a friend unto thee, and may family be unto thee in abundance" (§60-0-), or indeed, "If thou . . . shalt protect [this inscription! as long as unto thee there is strength, may Ahuramazda be a friend unto thee, and may family be unto thee in abundance, and may thou live long, and what thou shalt do, that may Ahuramazda make successful for thee" (§66-*-). These declarations are not unlike Cambyses' dying words in the presence of "the leading Per­ sians," who had gathered to hear his last will: "If you do as I bid you [depose the magus and reduce the Medes to obedience], I pray that the earth may be fruitful for you, your wives bear you children, your flocks multiply and freedom be yours for ever" (Herodo­ tus III.65-*). Indeed, the words of Darius sound like a commitment for him and his

Darius and die Six

131

successors to maintain the prestigious status of the families of the co-conspirators. But, • ntraclistinction to other promises of reward or punishment, they do not invoke Ahura-Mazda. It is also true that Darius is not the only one shown with the liar-kings on the cliff of Behistun. Behind him are two persons (smaller than the king but bigger than the rebels): one is shown carrying a bow in his right hand and the other is holding a lance with both hands, its butt on the ground. They are obviously two Persian nobles, bearing the royal arms. Their names are not given. Could they be, as on Darius's tomb, Aspa­ thines and Gobryas? All theories founder on an obvious fact: if their names have not been included, even though the liar-kings are identified by name, it is because Darius, by design, did not wish to raise these two people above anonymity. They stand metonymically for the nobles who aided him. Although we recognize that the titles "lancebearer" and "bow-bcarer" could distinguish one noble from another, nothing more can be said than that these titles were granted by the king in recognition of services rendered. We are thus closer to court nobility than to clan nobility. CO

The Six and Court Protocol: The Intaphernes Affair Of course, we presume that the statements of Darius are nothing but royal propa­ ganda. Let us return to the text of Herodotus, who details in the following terms the priv­ ileges that the six conspirators mutually agreed upon before choosing a king from among themselves: Permission, namely, for any of the seven to enter the p a l a c e u n a n n o u n c e d

(emeu eisaggelos),

except when the king was in b e d with a w o m a n . T h e y further agreed that the k i n g s h o u l d not marry outside the families o f the seven confederates. (III.840-)

Even if, despite the unlikelihood of the tale, we accept the reality of the agreement, we would do well to elucidate the implications. Let us stress first of all that, if indeed it was put into effect, the mitigation of court pro­ tocol for the benefit of the Seven did not last very long. This is what is suggested by the Intaphernes affair, which erupted some time later. There can be no doubt that Inta­ phernes was an important member of the conspiracy; in fact, Darius lists him first among those he calls his followers (DB §68). It was this individual who constantly showed loyalty to the new king. We know, for example, that it was he who led a victori­ ous army against a Babylonian rebel in November 521 (DB §50). Herodotus slates, however, that Intaphernes was put to death by the king (III. 11819-0-). Desiring an audience with Darius, Intaphernes "wished to enter the palace." At this point, Herodotus recalls that the Seven could "visit the king unannounced, pro­ vided that he was not, at that moment, in bed with a woman." Meanwhile, "he was, how­ ever, stopped by the king's chamberlain and the sentry on duty at the palace gate, who told him that Darius had, in fact, a woman with him at the time." In an angry fit, Inta­ phernes "cut off and ears and noses." The outcome of the story, which Herodotus reports on the model of the intrusion of the Seven into Smerdis's royal palace, suggests that Da­ rius was not yet totally sure of his power: "Thinking his six former confederates might all be in this business together, he sent for each of them in turn, and sounded them to see if they approved of what Intaphernes had done." Convinced that Intaphernes had acted alone, he took drastic measures: Intaphernes was put to death, along with all of the men of his House (oikeioi) — his sons and his relatives (syggeneis) — except one of his brothersin-law, who was saved from execution by his sister.

132

Chapter 3. Trouble, Secession, and Rebuilding ("522—5 J 8)

The tale is marked by a series of repetitive motifs, and thus supports a double reading. We may recognize that Darius's authority was to a degree stilt tentative for some time be­ cause of the privilege granted to the other conspirators. Under the terms in force, the guardians could only refuse Intaphernes access if the king was with one of his wives. But we must also consider the possibility that Intaphernes was flaunting Iris insubordination by violating rules of protocol that Darius had meanwhile restored to apply even to his old companions. Even given the hypothesis that Darius's authority was still tentative, we are led to the conclusion that the initial privileges were quickly revoked. In fact, no other text suggests that certain Persian aristocrats might be exempt from the rigors of court protocol, which were probably established at the time of Cyrus and Cambyses (pp. 9 Iff.) and later reinforced by Darius and particularly Xerxes.

The Marriages of Darius It is also clear that Darius paid no attention to the obligation to take a wife from among the families of the other conspirators: Tiie first women Darius married were Cyrus' two daughters Atossa and Artystoiie; the former had previously been the wife of hei brother Cambyses and also of the Magus; the latter was a virgin. Subsequently he married Parmys, a daughter of Cyrus' son Smerdis [Bardiya], and, in addition to these, the daughter of Otanes [Phaidime], the man who had exposed the Magus. (111.88} The intent and the message were clear: Darius linked himself directly to the stock of Cyrus by marrying Cyrus's two daughters (Atossa and Artystone) and granddaughter (Parmys). As for his marriage to the daughter of Otanes, it seems risky to see it as much of a concession to Otanes; this union is based on the custom whereby a new king took the wives of his predecessoc(s) (Atossa, Phaidime)—just as Smerdis/Bardiya had also married Atossa, the sister-wife of Cambyses. What the matrimonial policy of Darius ac­ tually reveals is concern for dynastic continuity—however false —rather than a desire for restoration of the aristocracy. Thus, indeed, "Davius entered into family relationships with the old kings. . . . Power appeared less to pass to a stranger than to remain in the family of Cyrus" (Justin 1.10.13-14). It is clear that Darius systematically applied a policy that on the one hand allowed him to link himself fictitiously to the family line of Cyrus and on the other restricted the number of individuals who had rights as members of the Achaemenid family in the nar­ row sense (i.e., direct descent). Finally, he also married one of his nieces, Phratagune, daughter of one of his brothers, Artanes (VII.224). The single known exception is his marriage to a daughter of Gobryas, but this was before his accession. He had three sons by her before gaining the throne. But the discussions recorded by Herodotus about the royal succession show that there was never any real question of transmitting power to his eldest son, born of this exogamous marriage (VII.2). As we shall soon see, the policy of the Great King consisted of parceling out his daughters, a matrimonial policy that holds exactly the opposite of the meaning attributed to it by Herodotus. And the successors of Darius singlemindedly followed the same policy. It was not until the reign of Darius II that the royal family became open to exogamous marriages (see below, pp. 589-590).

The Saga of Otanes The use of the term "the Seven" is exclusive to the Greek authors, who wanted to identify the people in their narratives and in some cases needed to distinguish among

Darius and the Six

133

eople with the same name (cf. Diodorus XI.57.1). In some cases, drey must have gotten wind of family traditions that tended to exaggerate the prestige of their ancestors. The story of Otanes and his family, revised and corrected between the fifth century and Ro­ man times, may be an illustration of this sort of beguiling distortion. We know, at least according to Herodotus, that Otanes had played an important role in the conspiracy of 522 and that as a result he had acquired privileges for himself and his descendants. Herodotus says, in fact, that Otanes renounced a position of power on the condition that neither he nor his descendants would be under the orders of whoever would become king, in perpetuity. Referring to this situation, Herodotus then writes: T o this day, the family of O t a n e s c o n t i n u e s to b e the only free

(eleuthere)

family in Persia

and submits to the king only so far as the m e m b e r s of it m a y c h o o s e ; they are b o u n d , how­ ever, to observe the law

(nomos)

like a n y o n e else. T h e other six then discussed the fairest

way of d e c i d i n g who s h o u l d have the throne. T h e y agreed that, if it fell to any of themselves, Otanes and his d e s c e n d a n t s s h o u l d receive, every year, a suit of M e d i a n clothes a n d s u c h other gifts as are held to b e of m o s t v a l u e by the Persians, as a m a r k of h o n o u r for the part h e had played in the plot against the M a g i , of which he was t h e p r i m e mover and principal or­ ganizer. ( I I I . 8 3 - 8 4 0 )

Later on, a legend of the Cappadocian court recounted the origins of the family and the dynasy in this way: T h e kings of C a p p a d o c i a say that they trace their ancestry b a c k to C y r u s the Persian, a n d also assert that they are d e s c e n d a n t s of o n e of the seven Persians w h o did away with the M a ­ gus. N o w as to their c o n n e c t i o n with C y r u s , they c o u n t as follows. C a m b y s e s the father of Cyrus had a sister of legitimate birth, Atossa. T o her a n d P h a r n a c e s , king of C a p p a d o c i a , was born a son, C a l l u s ; his son was S m e r d i s , bis A r t a m n e s , a n d his A n a p h a s , a m a n o f outstand­ ing bravery a n d daring, w h o was o n e of the seven Persians. S u c h then is the p e d i g r e e they trace for their kinship with C y r u s and with A n a p h a s , to w h o m , they say, b e c a u s e of his va­ lour the satrapy of C a p p a d o c i a was g r a n t e d , with the u n d e r s t a n d i n g that no tribute would be paid to the Persians. After his death a son of the s a m e n a m e ruled. W h e n he died, leaving two sons, D a t a m e s and A r i m n a e u s , D a t a m e s s u c c e e d e d to the throne, a m a n who both in war and in the other s p h e r e s of royal duty won praise, a n d who, e n g a g i n g the Persians in battle, fought brilliantly a n d died in battle. T h e k i n g d o m p a s s e d to his son A r i a m n e s , whose sons were Ariarathes a n d H o l o p h e r n e s ; A r i a m n e s ruled for fifty years and died without achieving anything worthy of note. T h e throne p a s s e d to Ariarathes (I), the cider of his sons, who is said to have loved his brother with a s u r p a s s i n g love, a n d p r o m o t e d h i m to the m o s t prominent positions: thus h e was sent to aid the Persians in their war against the E g y p t i a n s , and returned h o m e l a d e n with h o n o u r s , w h i c h O c h u s , the Persian king, bestowed for brav­ ery; he died in his native l a n d , leaving two s o n s , Ariarathes a n d Aryses. N o w his brother, the king of C a p p a d o c i a , h a v i n g no legitimate offspring of his own, a d o p t e d Ariarathes, the elder son of his brother. At a b o u t this t i m e A l e x a n d e r of M a c e d o n defeated a n d overthrew the Per­ sians, and then died; Perdiccas, who at this point h e l d the s u p r e m e c o m m a n d , d i s p a t c h e d l u i m e n e s to b e military governor o f C a p p a d o c i a . Ariarathes (I) was defeated, a n d fell in battle, a n d C a p p a d o c i a itself and the n e i g h b o u r i n g regions fell to the M a c e d o n i a n s . . . . (Diodorus XXXI.19.1-40)

Diodorus follows the history of the dynasty down to Roman times and concludes: "And that is enough on the genealogy of the kings of Cappadocia, who trace their origins back to Cyrus." We can thus see that this version was well attested at the time of Diodorus. We recognize in it several historical individuals—from Cambyses, father of Cyrus, to the

(34

Chapter 3. Trouble, Secession, and Rebuilding

(522-518)

Diadochi (and after), including Datames, the criminal satrap, who is incorporated into the genealogy. This genealogy enjoyed wide success, as is evidenced by the Holophernes in the book of Judith. Whatever the historical reality may have been, the family version has consciously ma­ nipulated it. Cyrus is named as the ancestor of the family, and Otanes (Anaphas) be­ comes the offspring of a Cappadocian king and the aunt of Cyrus (Atossa, who has clearly been confused, deliberately or not, with the daughter of Cyrus and the sister of Cambyses II). While a historian of family oral traditions can profit from this text, obvi­ ously someone who is interested in the origin and destiny of the Seven/Six cannot! The court legend was already known at the time of Polybius, who wrote about Mithradates of Pontus: "He boasted of descent from one of the Persian Seven who had killed the magus, and he maintained that his line had ever since retained the government that his ancestor had originally received from Darius in Pontus on the Euxine Sea" (V.43). Elsewhere (fragment 166), the same Polybius provides other details from the legend. In a digression devoted to Cappadocia, he records that an unnamed Persian accomplished a magnifi­ cent deed during a hunt with Artaxerxes (II). The royal mount was attacked by a lion; luckily, this Persian killed the lion with his akinakes "and saved the king from a great dangeT." In return, the king gave him a gift (dorea) of all the territory as far as he could see as he stood atop a high mountain. This tale repeats well-known motifs, particularly royal hunts for lions. It resembles the story Diodorus told about Tiribazus's deed at the court of Artaxerxes II (XV2.3) and the unhappy outcome of the identical action Mega­ byzus took to save Artaxerxes I (Ctesias §40). The legendary allocation of the land is also found in various forms in Greek (e.g., Polyaenus VI.24; Plutarch, Mor. 820d) as well as Iranian tradition. But the tradition is even more ancient. Diodorus, doubtless relying on Hieronymus of Cardia (a contemporary of the Diadochi), states that Mithradates (who took power in Cappadocia despite the opposition of Antigonus) was "a descendant of one of the seven Persians who slew the Magian" (XIX.40.2-0-). Appian heard it said that Mithradates "was linked to the Persian royal family" (Mith. 9). We know that Otanes, "who had been one of the Seven," led the conquest of Samos at the beginning of the reign of Darius (III.141-147). But Herodotus says nothing about his receiving territory in Cappadocia. He merely states that the House of Otanes re­ mained "free" and that Otanes would "receive, every year, a suit of Median clothes and such other gifts as are held to be of most value by the Persians, as a mark of honour" (III.83-84-0-). T h e settling of the family of Otanes in Cappadocia is simply deduced from the legend recorded (in different terms) by Diodorus and Polybius. This hypothesis (it is nothing else) is also based on a comparison with other examples of territorial conces­ sions ("without having to pay tribute"): to Bardiya from Cyrus (Ctesias $8), to Zopyrus I from Darius (Herodotus III. 160), and to Belesys from Arbaces (Diodorus II.28.4). How­ ever, for various reasons, the latter two cases are historically quite doubtful. We know, finally, that around 515-514, the satrap of Cappadocia was called Ariaramnes; it is he whom Darius entrusted with leading the initial expedition against the Scythians (Cte­ sias § 16). Should he be identified as one of the sons of Otanes, called Arimnaeus by Dio­ dorus? But Diodorus "specifies" that upon the death of Otanes it was the other son, Datames, who succeeded him! From all of this it appears that there is nothing to prove that Otanes received the satrapy of Cappadocia from Darius and still less to support the idea that Darius then

Darius and the Six

135

approved die creation of an independent kingdom! On the other hand, it is possible that lie had been favored with a dorea, as explained in the version known from Polybius; but the repetition of the motif of the hunt makes us suspicious. Perhaps the legend of sover­ eignty over Cappadocia was grafted onto this original kernel. After all, this would not be the only example of a Hellenistic genealogy that was fictitiously attached to the events of 522 (cf. Strabo XI. 14.15). Whatever the case may be, it does seem that manipulation of the tradition had already begun in Herodotus's time, since he represents Otanes as the "son of Pharnaspes" (III.68-*) and father of Cassandane, the mother of Cambyses (III.2). Indeed, the Behistun inscription proves that Herodotus's information is contrived, since Otanes' patronymic is Thukra (DB $68). It is likely that this original distortion in He­ rodotus is responsible for Diodorus's assertion of close family ties between the families of Otanes and Cyrus. It is true that, according to Ctesias ($20), Xerxes married Amestris, who is represented as the "daughter of Onophas." But is Onophas our Otanes? This seems totally hypothet­ ical. In one case, Herodotus (VII.62) distinguishes the names Otanes and Onophas. Even if we agree, that only one Otanes is at issue here, we must stress that this name is very common. Herodotus mentions an Otanes, father of Amestris, who in 480 led the Persian contingent (VII.61), but he lists several others as well. One is Sisamnes' son (V.25), another (or the same one) is married to one of Darius's daughters (V. 116), a third is Anaphes' father (VII.62), another is Smerdomenes' father (VII.82), and last, another is Patiramphes' father (VII.40). It would be most strange if Darius had consented to a marriage between his son Xerxes and the daughter of the Otanes of 522. The only cer­ tain union between the two families is the marriage of Darius and Phaidime, the daugh­ ter of Otanes and previously the wife of Cambyses and Bardiya. This was a marriage that did not carry the political ramifications of the supposed marriage between Xerxes and Otanes' daughter. Marrying Xerxes to Otanes' daughter would have introduced rights for any grandson Otanes mighthave (which Darius refused to the grandson of Gobryas). Furthermore, if Amestris really was the daughter of one of the Seven, Herodotus (VII.61) would doubtless have mentioned it, because he frequently mentions such fam­ ily connections (III. 153; IV. 132), even for Otanes (III.141).

The Family of Gobryas Let us now turn to Gobryas. We have seen that he played a fundamental role in the conspiracy and that, according to Herodotus, he was the strongest supporter of Darius. We also know that his alliance with Darius was long-standing, since exchanges of wives took place between the two families before 522. Darius's first wife was one of Gobryas's daughters. From this union three sons were bom, including Artobarzanes (VII.2). For his part, Gobryas had married one of Darius's sisters. From this marriage Mardonius (VII,5) and Arabignes (VII.97) were born. Gobryas also played a role during the upris­ ings of subject peoples, since in 520 he was sent to put down a new Elamite revolt (DB V $71). He again appears in 513 in the immediate entourage of the king in Scythia, counseling the king to order a retreat (IV. 132, 134). He then disappears from the Classical sources. He reappears in the Persepolis docu­ ments. In February-March 498, bearing an authorization from the king, he made use of the royal road between Susa and Persepolis, and he received travel rations at two stations near Susa. His caravan joined (or crossed) another. The document mentions "the wife

136

Chapter 3. Trouble, Secession, and Rebuilding

(522-518)

of Marclonius, a daughter of die king" (PFa 5). By chance this agrees with Herodotus who says that when Mardonius, the son of Gobryas and one of Darius's sisters, arrived in Asia Minor in 493 to take command, he had married Artozostra, one of Darius's daugh­ ters (VI.43). He was thus both the cousin and the brother-in-law of Xerxes. After his expedition in Thrace, Mardonius seems to have fallen out of royal favor. He did not par­ ticipate at all in the expedition of 490. Later, however, lie received an eminent position close to Xerxes. Herodotus judges him severely, and he was lost in the battle of Plataea. We know nothing of Mardonius's family after this event. The intimacy and permanence of family ties are demonstrated by the constant favor that Gobryas retained in the eyes of Darius and that his son Mardonius subsequently re­ ceived from Xerxes. The exceptional quantity of travel rations Gobryas received illus­ trates his eminent position in the court hierarchy, as does perhaps the elaborate nature of the seal impressed on the Persepolis tablet. But his participation in the conspiracy of the Seven does not seem to have given him any freedoms beyond those already experi­ enced by his family, and this status was due to marital alliances made prior to 522 and especially to his unswerving loyalty to the cause of the monarchy. Darius's choice of Xerxes (his son by Atossa) at the expense of Artobarzanes (his son by Gobryas's daughter) to succeed him shows very clearly that the exchange of wives functioned in no one's fa­ vor but Darius's.

The Saga of Megabyzus Megabyzus I is the best known of the other conspirators, because his family traditions were repeated by Herodotus and Ctesias. His son Zopyrus I, according to Herodotus, ac­ complished a tour de force and captured Babylon in the name of Darius (111.153-60). We might prefer Ctesias's version: he attributes the victory to his son Megabyzus II (Cte­ sias $22), who had married Amytis, Xerxes' daughter ($22). Three sons of Megabyzus II and Amytis are known-. Zopyrus II, Artyphius, and Artoxares ($$37, 39). An analysis of the career of Megabyzus under Xerxes and Artaxerxes indicates that, despite his illustri­ ous birth and his occasional success, he fell out of royal favor for several years. His sons faired no better: after the death of his father, the eldest son, Zopyrus II, left the king and went to Athens; Avtyphius was put to death after an ill-fated revolt against Darius II (Cte­ sias $ $ 50-51). The behavior of both indicates that the reconciliation of Megabyzus and Artaxerxes I depicted by Ctesias ($41) did not eliminate the mutual ill will between Megabyzus's family and the Great Kings.

Hydarnes We have no explicit mention of Hydarnes after 520. However, some Persepolis tablets attest that he was the satrap of Media under Darius. It is possible that a Hydarnes, son of Hydarnes, who commanded the Immortals in 480 was the son of the conspirator of 522; this may also be the case for a Sisamnes, son of Hydarnes (VII.66). But the relationship between the satrap Tissaphernes and the family must remain hypothetical. A Hydarnes family reappears after the accession of Darius II, but is it the same one? This is far from certain. In any case, the story of the family also gave rise to a court legend in the Helle­ nistic era. In fact, Strabo records that the Armenian dynasty went back to Orontes, who was himself a descendant of Hydarnes, "one of the Seven" (XI. 14.15). However, we know that the ties between Orontes and the Achaemenid royal family in reality went back only to his marriage to a daughter of Artaxerxes II, meaning that his distant descen-

Summary and Perspectives

137

dants could count Darius among their ancestors at Nemrud Dagh. This example proves once again that the traditions of the families of the Seven were systematically used later on for dynastic legitimation.

A Summary of the Discussion It thus does not appear that the families of the Seven were granted exceptional status in perpetuity by the Great Kings. Even if we accept the hypothesis that Bardiya/Gaumata sought to weaken some of the noble families, we still must avoid concluding that the ar­ istocracy was restored when he fell from power. That some clan chieftains cherished the hope, for a moment, of counterbalancing the powers of the king is a hypothesis that, while insufficiently supported, lies within the realm of possibility. We would still need to explain how Otanes could withdraw with such apparent good will. Only one of the Seven, Intaphernes, tried to free himself from the king's power. But his attempt was doomed to failure because Darius had meanwhile won prodigious victories and was able to attract the loyalty of the Persian aristocracy. Darius exhibited exceptional capacities for authoritv and command, which his companions do not seem to have seriously contested. While some descendants of the Seven received honors and special privileges, they were not fundamentally different from the honors that were granted to the other great noble families. This is probably the underlying reality expressed by Plutarch; "To the seven Persians who killed the magi the privilege was granted that they and their descen­ dants should wear their headdress tilted forward over the forehead; for this, so it appears, was their secret sign when they undertook their act" (Mor. 820do; cf. also Polyaenus VII. 11.2). This distinction, which Plutarch found a hint of in his evidence, was simply a royal gift that, far from obligating the king, increased the dependence of the nobles on him. This is probably why Gobryas and Aspathines appear bearing the royal weapons on the king's tomb at Naqs-i Rustam: they had been integrated into the court hierarchy (DNc-d). Finally, the phrase seven families after 520 is in large part illusory (we should speak of six families after the elimination of Intaphernes and his circle!). The label relates more to family traditions than to dynastic traditions, which, quite to the contrary, tended to push those who participated in the conspiracy that brought Darius to power into the shadows. But even if the Achaemenids (in the clan sense used by Herodotus 1.125) were part of the conspiracy, the family of Darius itself (the Achaemenids in the restricted sense imposed by the new king) was still placed above and beyond this small aristocratic circle—which was another way of excluding the aristocrats who had lent their aid to Da­ rius from dynastic competition.

5. Summary and Perspectives

A New Foundation for the Empire The ways and means of Darius's accession to power—to the extent that we can recon­ struct them—are a testimony to the new king's energy and decisiveness. Darius was un­ deniably an exceptional personality, but he also proved to have organizational ability. During the same time that he was reorganizing the entire tribute system, other projects were carried out in various regions: construction of new capitals, the conquest of Samos, expeditions from the Indus to the Nile; in 518 he also commissioned the satrap Aryandes

138

Chapter 3. Trouble, Secession, and Rebuilding

(522-518)

to gather Egyptian sages to collect the "Egyptian laws"; other measures affecting Jerusa­ lem were effected at the same time. What is striking is the care with which the king planned for the long term. Darius wanted above all to create a new lineage. To this end, he manipulated dynastic circum­ stances with a great deal of skill. T h e redefinition he imposed on the word Achaemenid allowed him to exclude those who belonged to the clan of the same name from the line of succession. Henceforth, power could only be transmitted from father to son in one re­ stricted family, which was placed under the blessing and protection of a founder-hero, Achaemenes, invented out of whole cloth. Darius and his counselors were able to carry out political and ideological rethinking that was no less remarkable. From early on, the king was preoccupied with providing an ideological base for his authority and his lineage. Beginning in the late 520s, Achaemenid monarchic ideology was articulated around rules and justifications where politics and religion were fused into a whole of rave consistency. T h e authority of the king and the rights of his family were henceforth under the protection of Ahura-Mazda, who was invoked as the great god of the king and the Empire. T h e concept of arta ('truth') —in relation to its antithetical corollary, drauga ('the Lie') —was the true linchpin of this ideological structure. This is the pro­ gram we see at work in the new residences in Susa and Persepolis as well as on the royal tomb at Naqs-i Rustam. Without in the least deprecating the work accomplished by his predecessors (chap. 2), we may thus assert that the advent of Darius marks the foundation of a new dynastic and imperial order. In this regard, the first years of his reign definitely represent a deci­ sive period in Achaemenid history. But at the same time, Darius took care to entrench his reign in the longue duree. The projects he undertook at Pasargadae are another testi­ mony to his ambition to place the upheaval he created within the continuity of Persian history. Contrary to what has long been thought, Darius actually never sought to inflict a damnatio memoriae on the founder of the Empire. On the contrary, he intended to promote skillful propaganda at Pasargadae that would allow him to establish a fictitious link with Cyrus, just as he did with his matrimonial policy.

Diachrony and Synchrony I should mention in passing that Darius's activity is attested in numerous domains and in numerous regions of the Empire. But it is impossible to offer an absolutely con­ tinuous story from the 520s until 486. I am thus led first to analyze each successive con­ quest by the new king individually, because it was these that permitted the Achaemenid Empire to achieve its greatest extent (chap. 4). The other aspects of his immense accom­ plishment will be treated in the course of thematic and regional chapters (chaps. 5-12); these studies will help us better to appreciate as a whole what the Empire was at the death of the Great King and will also lead us to understand better the particular accom­ plishment of Xerxes (chap. 13).

Chapter 4

Darius the Conqueror 1. The Pursuit of Territorial Expansion

(520-486)

(520-513)

Darius, Democedes, and the West Darius did not relax his efforts at extending the imperial realm. There is no question that, after the conquest of Cyrus and even more after the taking of Egypt, the Persians wanted to extend their dominion from the continent to the Aegean Islands. In this sense, Oroetes' attack on Polycrates on the island of Samos, for example, did not conflict with the objectives, overt or covert, of the central government. We have little enough infor­ mation about the countries of Asia Minor between the execution of Oroetes of Sardis ca. 522-520 and Darius's first direct offensive in Europe in 513. We are indebted to Herodo­ tus for several clarifications of Darius's Aegean policy at the very beginning of his reign. Unfortunately, Herodotus's notes are no more than a subplot, so to speak, in a fairly long but not very scientific digression about the adventures of Democedes, a physician from Crotone in Italy, who had been taken prisoner by the Persians when Oroetes put Po­ lycrates, tyrant of Samos, to death. Brought to the royal court after the execution of the miscreant satrap, Democedes became one of Darius's favorites: "He lived in a large house in Susa, took his meals at the king's table" (III.132-C-). He was also friendly with one of the king's wives, Atossa, daughter of Cyrus, on whom Herodotus tries to confer an unusual political position. At Atossa's urging, Darius let his desire to conquer Greece be­ come known. But, before launching an expedition, he decided to send out a reconaissance mission guided by Democedes: Darius "begged him to give the reconnoitering parly such guidance and information as they needed, and afterwards to return to Persia" (III. I35-0-). The Persians left from Sidon and "made a written report of the results of a careful survey of most of the notable features of the coast [of Greece], and finally arrived at'faientum" (III. 137->). Then Herodotus tells how the Persians, deprived of their guide Democedes, were reduced to slavery in lapygia (in Italy, then controlled by Greece) be­ fore being returned to Darius by Gillus, a Tarentine outlaw, and concludes "These Per­ sians . . . were the first who ever came from Asia to Greece" (III. 138*). It is hard to separate history from fairy tale in Herodotus's story. In the rationale of his approach, the Democedes affair takes on a particular purpose: to show that the Persian Empire and the Greek world were becoming acquainted well before the onset of the Persian Wars and that, quite early on, Darius cherished notions of conquest in the west. Darius, Syfoson, and Samos After narrating the adventures of Democedes, Herodotus begins a new digression with these words: "These events were followed by the capture of Samos" (III. 139o). The prob­ able chronological context makes one think that Darius's decision was made shortly after his accession (520-519?). As is often the case with Herodotus, however, what we consider the important causes of a historical event are presented in a personal, anecdotal form. 139

140

Chapter 4. Darius the Conqueror

(520-486)

One of Polycrates' brothers, Syloson, took part in the conquest of Egypt. During this expedition, Darius came to owe Syloson a favor because he had presented a garment to Darius as a gift. After the accession of Darius, Syloson presented himself at the gates of the royal palace, asserting his status as "benefactor" of the king—a term that included all who for any officially recognized reason had the right to request a favor (cf. chap. 8/1). He asked permission to recover Samos, which since the death of Polycrates had been in the hands of Maeandrius, son of Maeandrius, "the man whom Polycrates on leaving the island had appointed to tend to his affairs" (111. 139-42•*•). "Darius consented to Syloson's request, and dispatched a force under the command of Otanes, one of the seven, with orders to do everything that Syloson had asked; and Otanes, accordingly, went down to the coast to make his preparations" (III.141). Obviously, this does not de­ scribe a unique festival, since, speaking of the death of "Cyrus," Xenophon states that this was the seventh time the king went thus to Persia: "Cyrus performed the customary sacrifice (ta nomizomena hiera) and led the Persians in their national dance {kata ta patrio) and distributed presents among them all, as had been his custom" (VIII.7. 1-0-). Quite a few of the details given by Xenophon are found in other Classical authors. Herodotus (VII.40-41) describes the order of march for the royal procession of Xerxes that left Sardis in 480; Quintus Curtius (III.3.8-25) presents the order of the procession of Darius III leaving Babylon in 333. Along with some differences, common elements are found in Xenophon, Herodotus, and Quintus Curtius, which is all the more inter­ esting, given that they clearly derive from different sources. The procession sets out at sunrise (Xenophon, Quintus Curtius; cf. Herodotus VII.54). Cyrus was in his chariot, his charioteer nearby; likewise Darius III was placed in a chariot "in which he rode out­ standing (eminens) among the rest" (III.3.15o>); Xerxes was "riding in a chariot (harma) drawn by Nisaean horses, his charioteer, Patiramphes, son of Otanes the Persian, stand­ ing by his side" (VII.40o); the word used by Herodotus (harma) proves that it was a war chariot, not a four-wheel chariot (harmamaxe), two vehicles that the author explicitly distinguishes (VII.41). The procession was accompanied by guards and soldiers: • Cyrus: 4,000 lance-bearers (doryphoroi) before the chariot; 2,000 more on each side of the royal chariot; then (after the 200 royal horses), 10,000 cavalry (arranged 100 square), then two move groups of 10,000 cavalry;finallyallied troops and chariots (Cyr. VIII.3.15-18); • Xerxes: 1,000 Persian cavalry, 1,000 Persian pike-bearers, 10 Nisaean horses before the chariots of the god and the king; and afterward, other Persian troops: 1,000 pike-bearers, 1,000 cavalry, 10,000 lancers (with gold and silver sashes) and 10,000 Persian cavalry; • Darius III: tire 10,000 Immortals and the doryphoroi precede the royal chariot; 10,000 lancers follow the royal chariot. The king is also accompanied by his associates: near Cyrus are his relatives (syggeneis); before Darius Ill's chariot and after the Immortals walk his relatives (cognati); to the right and left of his chariot are placed 'the most noble of those close to him' (nohi-

Images and Realities. The King among His Peoples

185

lissim' propinquontm). Finally, each of the processions includes divine chariots: one for Zeus, one for the Sun, and a third one followed by a fire altar ("Cyrus"); the sacred char­ iot of Zeus (Xerxes); fire altars and "a chariot dedicated to Jupiter" (Darius HI). It thus seems clear that all three sources transmit credible information on the arrangement of the royal procession, whether during a regular ceremony held in Persia or a relocation of the royal court under other circumstances. In fact, many elements of the Classical de­ scriptions are found on some Persepolis reliefs: guards, royal horses, royal chariot, bear­ ers of royal appurtenances, processions of nobles, and even lines of servants bringing food and drink and vessels for the royal table. Despite striking, undeniable convergences of the evidence between the Persepolis re­ liefs and the accounts of Classical authors, numerous objections have been offered against the hypothesis that a New Year festival was celebrated at Persepolis. First of all, the hypothesis is based on the assumption that Persepolis was "a ritual city," dedicated solely to the political exaltation of the power of the Great King. To be sure, this aspect should not be underrated; quite the opposite. But the discovery of the Treasury and For­ tification tablets has proved indubitably that Persepolis was also a permanent economic center and the seat of administrative bureaus. We will also find that no contemporary text makes any mention of a New Year festival; but, however legitimate this observation, it must not be allowed to rule out the possibility that one existed, considering how sparse and fragmentary the Achaemenid documentation is. It is obviously more noteworthy that, according to the Classical authors, it was in autumn (and not in spring) that the court resided in Persia. Moreover, at no time does Xenophon mention the arrival of del­ egations of subject peoples. Instead, he stresses the king's distribution of gifts. The festi­ val he describes obviously takes place in a purely Persian context, where the religious element appears to predominate. As we know from the author of De Mundo (398a), the existence of 'receivers of gifts' {down apodekteres) at the court of the Great King proba­ bly did not require a ceremony, since the king could receive gifts on many other occa­ sions. The perennial declaration of Darius (and his successors) that "these are the countries that brought' me bciji" cannot be used to prove anything more than what it says. We note first that the Persian word baji connotes 'the king's share' more than trib­ ute per sc. Second, the frequent tabular comparisons set up between the friezes of trib­ utaries/givers and the discussion of tribute by Herodotus are in fact doomed to failure. Herodotus's list of tribute districts actually represents a different logic from the logic gov­ erning the composition of the lists and reliefs, even when in the tribute disposition of Darius the dahyulethnos retains its central position. This is why the depictions are habit­ ually described as Gift-Bearers rather than Tribute-Bearers (anyway, according to all in­ dications, the gifts were paid in money). However, the terminological adjustment obviously does not resolve the problem. The principal objection to positing an imperial festival is methodological in nature. Iconological and iconographic analysis has shown that, overall, inscriptions and reliefs are intended prima facie to impose and transmit the image of a universal, intangible power. Achaemenid rhetoric is nourished less by administrative realities than by ideo­ logical assumptions, which have their own logic. In other words, Persepolitan art is not a simple, quasi-photographic reflection of reality. Though it does capture reality, it does so in order to transform it and make it sublime; it relates less to a scenic scenario than to an ideological discourse on royalty and imperial might organized around themes

186

Chapter 5. Images of the World

particularly evocative of the power of the Great King: the king in majesty (audience re­ liefs, etc.), armed forces (rows of Persian and Elamite guards), the cooperation of the ar­ istocracy (rows of nobles in Persian or Mede garb), and imperial dominion in turn symbolized by the gifts from various populations and by the richness of the royal table. Under these conditions, it is perhaps risky to reconstruct a dynamic reality (observation of a periodic imperial festival around the king) on the basis of depictions that are static and immutable. We must recognize that the objection is weighty. At the same time, we must carefully observe that even if the royal artists, working according to an imposed model, were not charged with describing a festival and its appurtenances realistically, this does not ipso facto imply that the hypothesis of an imperial ceremony must be abandoned. In order to take into account all of the documented facts, we would do well to return to the Classi­ cal sources. Indeed, none of them indisputably corroborates the hypothesis of an impe­ rial festival periodically celebrated at Persepolis (whether or not it took place at the time of the New Year), hut some nf them describe the bestowing of gifts on the Great King, during the relocations of the court. Let us then set forth first of all the details of this Achaemenid custom in which the Greek authors show great interest.

The Nomadic King Here is how Xenophon explains the origins of the court migrations: Cyrus himself made his home in the centre of his domain, and in the winter season he spent seven months in Babylon, for there the climate is warm; in the spring he spent three months in Susa, and in the height of summer two months in licbatana. By so doing, they say, he en­ joyed the warmth and coolness of perpetual spring-time. (Cyr. VIII.6.22). In §3, Darius records his victories achieved with the aid of Ahura-Mazda, and he refers directly to the bearer-peoples, whom the viewer is invited to regard as an attestation of royal power. A final invocation and a prayer to Ahura-Mazda ( § 5 - 6 0 ) follow: aI1

w

Saith D a r i u s the King: T h i s which has b e e n clone, all that by the will o f A h u r a m a z d a I did. A h u r a m a z d a bore m e a i d , until I did the work. M e may A h u r a m a z d a protect from h a r m , and my royal h o u s e , a n d this land: this I pray of A h u r a m a z d a , this m a y A h u r a m a z d a give to me! O m a n , that which is the c o m m a n d o f A h u r a m a z d a , let this not s e e m r e p u g n a n t to thee; do not leave the right path; d o not rise in rebellion!

Another part (DNb^)~which was later repeated in summary by Xerxes (XP/)—is clearly remarkable for its style and inspiration. It comprises a sort of catalog of royal vir­ tues and an exposition of the duties of the king and his subjects. It is thus with good rea­ son that it is considered the Prince's Own Mirror:

Chapter 6. Representations of Royalty and Monarchic

212

Ideology

§ 7 — A great g o d is A h u r a m a z d a , w h o created this excellent work which is s e e n , who created h a p p i n e s s for m a n , who bestowed w i s d o m a n d efficiency on D a r i u s the King. !S8a — Saith D a r i u s the King: By the favor of A h u r a - M a z d a I a m of s u c h a sort that I a m a friend to right, I a m not a friend to wrong It is not my desire that the weak m a n s h o u l d have wrong d o n e to h i m by the might)'; nor is that m y desire, that the mighty m a n s h o u l d have wrong clone to h i m by the weak. $ 8 b — W h a t is right, that is my desire I a m not a friend to the m a n w h o is a Lie-follower. I a m not hot-tempered. W h a t things d e v e l o p in my anger, I hold firmly u n d e r control by my thinking power. I a m firmly ruling over my own ( i m p u l s e s ) . J 8 c — T h e m a n who c o o p e r a t e s , h i m a c c o r d i n g to his cooperative action, h i m thus do I re­ ward. W h o does h a r m , h i m a c c o r d i n g to the d a m a g e thus I p u n i s h . It is not my desire that a m a n s h o u l d d o h a r m ; nor indeed is that m y desire, if he s h o u l d do h a r m , he s h o u l d not be punished. § 8 d — W h a t a m a n says against a m a n , that d o e s not c o n v i n c e m e , until he satisfies the Or­ d i n a n c e of G o o d R e g u l a t i o n s . § 8 e — W h a t a m a n d o e s or performs (for m e ) a c c o r d i n g to his (natural) powers, (therewith) I a m satisfied, a n d m y p l e a s u r e is a b u n d a n t , a n d I a m well .•>ali:>ficd. [Xerxes: "And I gener­ ously repay m e n of g o o d will."] S8f—-Of s u c h a sort is m y u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d m y c o m m a n d : w h e n what has b e e n d o n e by m e thou shalt s e e or hear of, both in the p a l a c e a n d in the w a r - c a m p , this is m y activity over a n d a b o v e m y thinking power a n d my u n d e r s t a n d i n g . § 8 g — T h i s i n d e e d is m y activity: i n a s m u c h as my body has the strength, as battle-fighter I a m a g o o d battle-fighter. O n c e let there b e seen with u n d e r s t a n d i n g in the p l a c e (of battle), what I see (to b e ) rebellious, what I see (to b e ) not (rebellious); both with u n d e r s t a n d i n g and with c o m m a n d then a m I first to think with action, w h e n I see a rebel as well as w h e n I see a not-(rebel). $8h

T r a i n e d a m I both with h a n d s and with feet. As a h o r s e m a n I a m a g o o d h o r s e m a n .

As a b o w m a n I a m a g o o d b o w m a n both afoot and on h o r s e b a c k . As a s p e a r m a n I a m a g o o d s p e a r m a n both afoot a n d on h o r s e b a c k . J 8 i — A n d the (physical) skillfulnesses w h i c h A h u r a m a z d a has bestowed u p o n m e a n d I have had the strength to u s e t h e m — b y the favor of A h u r a m a z d a what h a s b e e n d o n e by m e , I have d o n e with these skillfulnesses which A h u r a m a z d a has bestowed u p o n m e . [S 1 4 a — M a y A h u r a - M a z d a protect m e and my work: XPl.\ A n i s o l a t e d p a r a g r a p h is s e p a r a t e d f r o m t h e b o d y o f t h e p r e c e d i n g i n s c r i p t i o n b y a b l a n k s p a c e , w h i c h w a s n o t r e p e a t e d b y X e r x e s . I n i n s p i r a t i o n , it c l o s e l y r e s e m b l e s t h e first p a r t

(DNa).

A s in

DNa

§6, the k i n g directly a d d r e s s e s a s u b j e c t

(marika)

w h o is n o t

s p e c i f i c a l l y i d e n t i f i e d , w h o s e e m s to s t a n d m e t o n y m i c a l l y for a l l o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n s d o m i n a t e d b y t h e G r e a t K i n g . H e d i c t a t e s h i s b e h a v i o r to h i m : S 9 a - b — O m e n i a l , vigorously m a k e thou known of what sort I a m , a n d o f what sort my skillfulnesses, and of what sort my superiority. L e t that not s e e m false to thee, w h i c h has been b e a r d by thy ears. T h a t d o thou hear, w h i c h is c o m m u n i c a t e d to thee. [ O m e n i a l ] , let that not be m a d e (to s e e m ) false to thee, w h i c h has b e e n d o n e by m e . T h a t d o thou b e h o l d , which [has b e e n inscribed]. L e t not the laws [be disobeyed] by thee. L e t not [anyone] b e un­ trained [in o b e d i e n c e ] . [ O m e n i a l ] , let not the king (feel h i m s e l f o b l i g e d to) inflict p u n i s h ­ m e n t (?) [for wrong-doing (?) on the swellers (in the l a n d ) ( ? ) ] .

The Victorious King and the King of Justice T h e s e c o n d text (DNb)

is m o r e r e v e a l i n g a b o u t t h e s p e c i f i c q u a l i t i e s a n d v i r t u e s o f

t h e k i n g . T h e y a r e d e f i n e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e to t w o s p h e r e s o f a c t i v i t y , a t o n c e d i s t i n c t a n d

The Prince in His Own Mirrors

213

closely complementary: the palace (viO: or the House) and the battlefield (§8f). Darius is not only a good infantryman and a good horseman, a good archer and a good lancer ($8h), but ' ^ g ' commander-in-chief. If he is able to lead his troops into com­ bat successfully, it is because he possesses particular intellectual qualities: intelligence and a spirit of analysis and decisiveness that free him from the emotion of panic (which any other soldier would be familiar with: §8g) and enable him rapidly to execute the clearest and most effective measures in the heat of battle (§8b. 11-13). The king is thus a leader of men. These statements remind us of many others, such as: "By the favor of Ahuramazda and of me, Darius the King, [this country Persia] does not feel fear of (any) other" (DPdo-) In numerous statements, Darius says that it was at the head of the Persian war­ riors that he conquered and mastered the peoples of his Empire. He refers to himself when he writes, addressing his subjects, " Then shall it become known to thee: the spear of a Persian man has gone forth far; then shall it become known to thee; a Persian man has delivered battle far indeed from Persia" [DNa §4). Also: "The Persian Man con­ quered Egypt" (DSrtM. The ideology of the warrior-king is very well illustrated at Behistivn in both text and image. Indeed, "this country Persia which Ahuramazda bestowed upon [him is] good, possessed of good horses, possessed of good men" (DPd>), and all the Persians are known for their valor, as stressed by Herodotus: "Prowess in fighting, the chief proof of manliness" (I.136-0-). Thanks to the protection of his god, the Great King was distinguished from all of the Persian warriors: he was not only a first-class horseman, archer, and lancer, but he also possessed the physical and intellectual qualities that made him a commander-in-chief beyond compare. The same qualities also make Darius a master of justice. As at Behistun, the king con­ trasts justice with the Lie (§8b). His capacities for comprehension and judgment allow him to dispense justice with complete equanimity, for he is able to transcend anger (!j8b). We may compare this royal statement with what Herodotus writes of the way in which the heads of Persian families and the king himself declared judgments: "Custom . . . forbids even the king himself to put a man to death for a single offence. . . . Their way is to balance faults against services, and then, if the faults are greater and more nu­ merous, anger may take its course" (1.137-0'). This is exactly the definition Darius him­ self provides of justice: he repays whoever "does wrong," This punishes "the Liefollower" and "who does harm" (§8a-c). This obviously relates to a highly monarchical conception of justice: every man is judged in proportion to the aid and assistance he brings to the king's interests—as Herodotus understood perfectly. But Darius's state­ ments go further. He tries to reconcile the interests of the powerful and the poor ( P a ) , hi his eyes, a poor man may behave as worthily as a rich man (1%). As well as being de­ fender of the peace against enemy attack, Darius is also guarantor and restorer of civil peace (cf. DSe 001). If the king can behave in this way, it is because of "regarding him­ self as divinely appointed for a law to the Persians, and the supreme arbitrator of good and evil" (Plutarch, Arc. 23.5*). n

e

s a

s o a

o o c

Text and Image Many Achaemenid objects illustrate Darius's statements in pictures. At Behistun and Naqs-i Rustam, Darius holds his bow in his left hand; at Behistun it rests on his left foot, which crushes Gaumata to the ground. The king is also represented as an archer on the royal coinage. In the various designs, he has the bow in his left hand and arrows in his

214

Chapter 6. Representations of Royalty and Monarchic Ideology

right, or sometimes a quiver on his shoulder, or he is kneeling to draw the bow; some­ times he has a lance on the right and the bow on the left, or even, on the run, he has the bow in his extended left hand while drawing an arrow with his right hand from the quiver on his shoulder (fig. 17). It seems clear that this figure is not a specific king, but the king in general. The contest won by Smerdis in Egypt is indicative of the importance of the bow as an attribute of sovereignty (III.30). Does not Aeschylus call Darius the royal archer? At Naqs-i Rustam the noble Gobryas is Darius's lance-bearer (arstibara), while another noble, Aspathines, is the bearer of the bow (vacahara) and the king's battle-axe (DNcd). The bow is expressly listed by the Classical authors as one of the "insignias of royal power," perhaps received by the Great King during the enthronement ceremony, The theme "victorious king" and the representation in the Behistun style of the people who are conquered is found on several seals (fig. 18). On one of them (attributed to Artaxevxes III), the king, with a lance upright in his right hand and quiver on his shoul­ der, holds a rope in his left hand that binds the neck of three conquered people (SA*b).

The Prince in His Own Mirrors

215

The text says, "I am Artaxerxes the Great King" (fig. 18c). Another seal, also from Egypt, shows a Persian king, his left hand grasping an Egyptian with an Egyptian hairdo (pschent), whom he thrusts through with his lance while holding four prisoners with a rope around their necks (fig. 18a—b); the motif of captives held by a rope is repeated on a seal on the Treasury tablets (PTS no. 28). Perhaps the Artaxerxes seal was meant to com­ memorate Artaxerxes l's victory over the rebel Inarus. The important thing is to note the persistence of the theme of lionizing the Great King as a hero. The theme of conquerorking is found on several seals: on one of them, a royal Persian kills a Saka, whom he holds by his pointed hat; a nearly identical scene is found on a cylinder seal from the Oxus treasury (Dalton no. 114, pi. XVI); on another, a king thrusts his lance through a Greek

216

Chapter 6. Representations of Royally and Monarchic

Ideology

warrior, who kneels before him immobilized by the king's left hand (fig. I8e). An image of the warrior king was already represented on the seal of Kuras of Ansan (fig. 18d); it is also found on the seal of Aisama, satrap of Egypt (fig. 18f). All of these representations are clearly intended to spread the image of a king endowed with all of the virtues of a fine warrior, just as this fact is expressed in words by Darius at Naqs-i Rustam and Behistun.

3. The King in Majesty

The Statue of Darius One of the most meaningful objects is the statue of Darius discovered at Susa in 1972 (fig. 19). It was placed on the gate on which construction began under Darius but which was only finished under Xerxes (fig. 38, p. 260). This gate, which dominates the plain at some 15 m high, gave visitors access to the Royal City on their way to the Apadana and the other palaces (fig. 9, p. 167; fig. 19). Probably, two identical statues were originally placed right and left, facing the interior. This is the first known example of Achaemenid monumental statuary; only the head is missing. Although it was carved in Egypt and is characterized both by its origin and its initial installation at Heliopolis, the statue repre­ sents the king in a way that is very similar to representations at Persepolis. The king holds a short staff in his right hand and a (lotus) flower in his left. Only the robe looks different, since it has neither decoration nor color. In fact, in every royal depiction, from Darius I to Artaxerxes I, the king wears the same robe with identical decoration (concentric circles, a row of striding lions). The costume

The King in Majesty

217

of "Cyrus" is described by Xenophon {Cyr. VIII.3.13-*): "A purple tunic shot with white (none but the king may wear such a one), trousers (anaxyrides) of scarlet dye about his legs, and a mantle (kandys) all of purple." Quintus Curtius features the same choice of colors in describing Darius Ill's robe: The attire of the king was noteworthy beyond all else in luxury; a purple-edged tunic woven about a white centre, a cloak of cloth of gold, ornamented with golden hawks, which seemed to attack each other with their beaks; from a golden belt, with which he was girt woman-fashion, he had hung a scimitar (akinakes), the scabbard of which was a single gem. The Persians called the king's head-dress (regium capitis insigne) kidaris; this was bound with a blue fillet variegated with white. (III.3.17-0-) Some ornaments do not appear on the Persepolis reliefs. It is not impossible that fash­ ion changed over time (cf. III.3.5). However, the colors noted at Persepolis are also found in this description. The choice of colors was certainly deliberate: in the IndoIranian traditions, white, red, and blue corresponded to the three categories of the so­ cial fabric, the priests (white), soldiers (red), and farmers (blue). There is no reason to suppose that the Susa statue was unique in royal Achaemenid art. We know from Herodotus (III.88-*) that, upon his accession, Darius's "first act was to erect a stone monument with a carving of a man on horseback, and the following in­ scription: Darius, son of Hystaspes, by the virtue of his horse and of his groom Oebares, won the throne of Persia. The horse's name was included." Whatever the legitimate doubts concerning the exact content of the inscription, the existence of this sort of relief cannot be ruled out. The craze for equestrian statues among the Persians is attested in a well-known Aramaic document, in which the satrap Arsama orders the sculptor HinzanSy, then in Egypt, to "execute a sculpture of a horse with its rider, corresponding to that which he previously executed for me, and other sculptures" (DAE 70 [AD 9*]). We also learn from Diodorus of Sicily (XVII. 17.6-*) that Ariobarzanes, "a former satrap of Phrygia," placed his statue in the temple of Athena Ilias. There is thus no difficulty in postu­ lating that other royal statues were found at other sites, including Persepolis (Quintus Curtius V.6.5). Furthermore, Plutarch records that after the sacking of the city one could still see "a large statue of Xerxes" (Alex. 37.5-*).

Iconography from Persepolis The king is also shown in numerous reliefs at Persepolis in conventional poses that arc often reflected on the two sides of an entrance, as in a mirror. He is seated on his throne (supported, as at Naqs-i Rustam, by the throne-bearers). He is sometimes accompanied by another royal figure, who is usually considered to be the crown prince, standing behind him. The king's feet rest on a footstool, and he has his long scepter in his right hand, with its end on the ground in front of the footstool (east gate of the Tripylon: Schmidt, pis. 77-78; fig. 21 here). On other reliefs, the king is shown without the prince; the only figure behind him is a servant holding a parasol over the king with his right hand and a towel in his left (Throne Room: Schmidt, pis. 104-5). Always seated on his throne in the same pose and holding a lotus flower in his left hand, the Great King is found under a canopy decorated with a lion frieze (surrounding an image of Ahura-Mazda) and friezes of rosettes (fig. 20). Outside of the canopy, guards fill out the scene, two on each side. The royal throne and footstool are placed on a dais. Behind the king, the crown prince stands on the dais, also holding a lotus flower in his

218

Chapter 6. Representations of Royalty and Monarchic Ideology

left hand, extending his right hand toward his father's throne. Directly in front of th king are two footed censers and a high court official bending toward the sovereign with his right hand to his mouth and a short staff in his left. Behind the crown prince we see two people: a servant holds a towel in his right hand, with his left hand on his right arnv the other probably represents the royal arms-bearer (battle-axe in his right hand, bow and gorytos ['quiver'] on his left shoulder). This was the subject of the reliefs in the Trea­ sury that were originally placed in the middle of the facade of the north portico of th Apadana (Schmidt, pis. 119-21). The crown prince is not found on later reliefs (four au­ dience scenes on the east and west gates of the Hall of a Hundred Columns [or Throne Room] started by Xerxes and built by Artaxerxes I; pis. 96-97); immediately behind the throne is the parasol-holder (fig. 22). There are also several cases where the king is shown walking, followed by two ser­ vants (fig. 23), one holding the parasol over the royal head, the other a towel folded over his forearm (Tripylon: Schmidt, pis. 75-76; Darius's palace: pis. 138-41; Xerxes' palace: pis. 178-84; "Harem": pis. 193-94); a scene showing the king accompanied by hi parasol-bearer is also found on a stamp published by Speleers (1917, no. 708; also show­ ing a lion and a trident stuck in the ground). Finally, on many reliefs a royal figure is depicted confronting real or imaginary ani­ mals (lions, bulls; monster with a horned lion's head or bird's head). Most often, the dif­ ferent kinds of combat are depicted side by side as if they constitute the elements of a single iconographic discourse (fig. 24). In general, the combatant grasps the animal's mane (or horns) with his left hand while plunging the sword in his right hand into the belly of the beast (Schmidt, pis. 114-17, 144-46, 195-97). Less commonly, the royal fig­ ure smothers a lion with his left arm: his left hand holds a lotus blossom, his right hand a dagger with which he is about to kill the lion (pi. 147, Darius's palace). It appears that these depictions, taken as a whole, are intended to give an image of the king as at once calm, sovereign, and triumphant. Other motifs in these scenes accord with this view (rows of guards and throne-bearers). Add to these the rows of nobles (fig. 25) and the very idea of an Empire united around the Great King is exalted. Fur­ thermore, the various depictions must not be confused in a too-simple analysis. We may e

e

s

Fig. 20. Relief depicting royal audience from the Treasury at Persepolis.

Fig. 21. Tripylon (Council Hall), south jamb of the eastern doorway.

Fig. 22. Throne Hall, east jamb of the eastern doorway of the southern wall.

220

Chapter 6. Representations of Royalty and Monarchic Ideology

The King in Majesty

221

isolate the last category, which is traditionally called "Royal Hero" (fig. 24). In fact, even jf the other three representations (figs. 21-23) do not constitute "photographs" (so to speak) of court life, they are no less testimonies to the protocol governing the Great King's court—an aspect absent from the figure of "Royal Hero."

The King on His Throne The commentary on the first three registers emerges from the images themselves and from details of court life gleaned from the Classical authors. They are intended primar­ ily to express the idea that the king is a man above other men. Each of these reliefs is topped by the disk of Ahura-Mazda. The king himself is shown in a fixed pose, some­ what hieratic. The servants accompanying him are there to relieve him of all of the physical discomforts resulting from the excessive heat (parasol, towel). Only the heir in the audience reliefs is placed on the dais that supports the royal throne. The joint pres­ ence of the king and his son further accentuates the immutable character of kingship. The king is also characterized by material attributes that are his alone. When he is seated on his throne, his feet rest on a footstool. This recalls what Dinon wrote (apud Athenaeus XII.514a-*): Whenever the king descended from his chariot, Dinon says, he never leaped down, al­ though the distance to the ground was short, nor did he lean on anyone's arms; rather, a golden stool {diphros) was always set in place for him, and he descended by stepping on this; and the king's stool-bearer (diphrophoros) attended him for this purpose. The bearer of the royal footstool is represented on the facades of the east and north wings of the Apadana. The footstool itself was well known to the Classical authors, be­ cause it was included in the booty seized by the Athenians after the battle of Plataea. According to the Alexandrian tales, this footstool was also used to assist the king in step­ ping up: when Alexander mounted the royal throne, his feet "dangled in the empty air," to use Quintus Curtius's picturesque and evocative phrase (V.2.13—15). In this way, the king avoided subverting the majesty that needed to be his in whatever pose he assumed. We also know that within the palace the distribution of rooms was such that the king

Fig. 25. Rows of Persian and Median nobles.

222

Chapter 6. Representations of Royalty and Monarchic Ideology

was the only one who could use certain corridors or tread on the Sardian carpets re­ served for him (Athenaeus XII.5 He). The Royal Audience The king is also shown seated on his throne in the audience reliefs. Many Classical authors took interest in the audience ritual, leaving the uncertain impression that the of­ ficial in Mede's clothing who comes bowing before the Great King is none other than the chiliarch, a Greek word translating Iranian hazarapatis (Commander of a Thou­ sand). He was the head of the Great King's personal guard (metonymically represented by the soldiers placed to the right and left of the relief). He was the one who received the petitions of all of those who sought an audience with the king: "Without him, none could gain audience" (Nepos Conon 3.2-3; cf. Plutarch, Them. 27.2-7). He was the one "who took messages in to the king and presented petitioners" (Aelian, VH I.210-) or pass­ ing on their messages to the king if they were not admitted to his presence. The Classical authors insist that it was necessary to perform a proskynesis ['obei­ sance'] before the sovereign in order to obtain an audience. This, for example, is what was clearly prescribed for Themistocles by the chiliarch Artabanus: A m o n g s t o u r m a n y excellent laws, we a c c o u n t this the m o s t excellent, to h o n o u r the king, a n d to worship h i m

(proskynein), as

the i m a g e o f the great preserver

(eikon theou) o f

the uni­

verse-, if, t h e n , you shall c o n s e n t to our laws, a n d fall d o w n before the k i n g a n d worship h i m , you m a y both s e e h i m a n d speak to h i m ; but if your m i n d b e otherwise, you m u s t m a k e u s e of others to i n t e r c e d e for you, for it is not the national c u s t o m here for the king to give audi­ e n c e to any o n e that doth not fall clown before h i m .

(Them.

27.4-50)

The chiliarch Tithraustes addresses Conon in the same words: any man brought before the king must "render to the king a rite of adoration (venerari)." Nepos adds, parenthet­ ically, "what in that country is called proskynesis" (Conon 3.3). It was the same for Ismenias, who was also received by the chiliarch Tithraustes (Aelian, VH 1.21). These three stories probably go back to a common model by which the Greeks expressed what had become for them a motif illustrating Persian despotism, often also recalled in connec­ tion with the satraps and Alexander. A comparison of the Classical texts and the reliefs nonetheless presents an interpre­ tive problem. Exactly what act must be performed by the person granted audience? In other words, what does the word proskynesis mean? In the audience reliefs, the impor­ tant person in front of the king bends forward and blows a kiss. But in many of the Greek authors, it very clearly refers to an act—also familiar in the pre-Achaemenid Near East and with the Parthians—consisting of falling prone or to one's knees before the royal throne. This is also what Herodotus describes when reporting social differences among the Persians: W h e n Persians m e e t in the streets o n e c a n always tell by the m o d e o f greeting whether or n o t they are o f the s a m e rank; for they do not speak b u t kiss —their ecpials u p o n the m o u t h , those s o m e w h a t superior on the c h e e k s . A m a n o f greatly inferior rank prostrates h i m s e l f in profound reverence

(prospipton proskynei ton heteron). ( 1 . 1 3 4 0 )

Although the term proskynesis implies a kiss, it cannot be reduced to only a kiss. Hence Ismenias's ruse: E n t e r i n g a n d c o m i n g into full view o f the king, h e surreptitiously took off the ring he hap­ p e n e d to be wearing a n d let it fall at his feet. L o o k i n g down q u i c k l y h e bent to pick it u p , as

The King in Majesty

223

Fig. 26. The royal chariot at Persepolis.

if he were p e r f o r m i n g the a c t o f h o m a g e Ipmskynesh). pression o f o b e i s a n c e

(proskynesis), b u t h e

T h i s gave the Persian king the i m ­

h a d not clone anything that causes G r e e k s a feel­

ing of s h a m e . (Aelian, V H 1.31*)

This text allows two interpretations. On the model o f other Greek tales, it can be taken to imply that proskynesis required falling to the ground. On the other hand, it may be taken to imply that bending forward sufficed (since Ismenias did not fall to his knees to recover the ring). A passage in Herodotus preserves this ambiguity (VII. 136*). Intro­ duced before Xerxes, the Spartans Sperchias and Bulis refused to perforin the required act despite being so ordered b y the guards: They "declared that they would never do such a thing, even though the guards should push their heads down on to the floor. It was not, they said, the custom in Sparta to worship a mere man like themselves, and it was not for that purpose that they had come to Persia." In Greek eyes, proskynesis was reserved for the gods. Whatever the details, there is no doubt about the general meaning of the ceremony: performing proskynesis recognized the majesty of the sovereign (cf. Xenophon, Anab. 1.8.21; [Aristotle] De Mundo 398a). The act could be performed outside of the physical presence of the king. We see the satrap Datames make proskynesis before a letter he had just received from Artaxerxes II (Polyaenus VII.21.5). But, contrary to what the Greeks deduced from it, the rite did not imply that the king was considered a god. Roy«/

Horses and Chariots

One of the processions depicted at Persepolis (south wing of the Apadana) is headed by an usher, followed by guards, a bearer of the royal footstool, and squires who bear whips and finely worked saddlecloths. Other squires (on the north wing) lead stallions. They are followed by two highly decorated chariots, each drawn by two horses guided by charioteers holding the reins (fig. 26). These are doubtless some of the famous Nisacan horses found in Xerxes' procession and described by Herodotus in this way: T h e n c a m e ten o f the sacred horses, known as N i s a e a n , in m a g n i f i c e n t h a r n e s s , .

. followed

by the holy chariot of Z e u s drawn by eight white horses. . . . T h e n c a m e the king himself, riding in a chariot drawn by N i s a e a n horses, his charioteer, P a t i r a m p h e s , son of O t a n e s the

Persian, s t a n d i n g

by his side. ( V I I . 4 0 * )

This chariot is the two-wheeled war and parade chariot (harma), clearly distinguished by every ancient author from the four-wheeled travel carriage (harmamaxa). This is the kind of chariot in which Xenophon presents Cyrus to the crowd during the parade at Persepolis. "Cyrus's private stud of horses, with gold bits, about two hundred in all, led along with gold-mounted bridles and covered over with gold-embroidered housings," were also part of the parade (Cyr. VIII.3.14—16o-). Wherever the king relocated, he was in fact accompanied by horses from the royal stable, who were quartered near the royal tent (Herodotus IX.70), 400 of them according to Quintus Curtius (III.3.21). Xenophon stresses the strong impression made by Cyrus, standing in his chariot: "And when they saw him, they all prostrated themselves before him (made proskynesis), either because some had been instructed to begin this act of homage, or because they were overcome by the splendour of his presence, or because Cyrus appeared so great and so goodly to look upon" (VIII.3.14-*). Many other texts attest to the majesty assumed by the king on his chariot. That is how he is shown in the celebrated Mosaic of Naples (fig. 28 on p. 229). On the verge of the Macedonian victory it commemorates, "the king himself, in extreme peril, caught up the reins, being forced to throw away the dignity of his posi­ tion and to violate the ancient custom of the Persian kings" (Diodorus XVII.34.6-0-). From his chariot, in fact, the king "rode outstanding among the rest" (Quintus Curtius III.3.15-*); Darius III "had entered battle standing high in his chariot" (1V.1.1-*); and to his immediate relations, he stated: "I myself, not only because it is my country's custom, but also that I may be seen of all, ride in a chariot" (IV. 14.26-*-). All of these texts very clearly express the fact that strict rules governed the movements of the king, all of which were designed to further enhance his stature. The royal horses and chariot thus do not appear in the Persepolis reliefs simply for decoration. The royal chariot obviously carried ideological weight: the chariot was part of the 'royal insignia' (insignia imperii). For this reason, opprobrium was cast on Darius

The Good Warrior

225

III in Macedonian propaganda: he had abandoned his chariot to facilitate what the an­ cient authors called his shameful flight (Quintus Curtius III. 11.12). At Gaugamela, the royal coachman was killed by a lance but, "standing as he was high in his chariot, [Da­ rius] blushed to abandon the battle-line of his subjects" (IV. 15.30*). In the end, he took flight. For the second time, Alexander was able to capture Darius's shield, bow, arrows, d chariot (Arrian III. 15.5). a n

The Royal Hero One of the most frequent themes on seals as well as on the Persepolis reliefs is the Royal Hero fighting real or monstrous animals; the Hero, in the middle, generally holds an animal in each hand (fig. 27b). The placement of these figures on the doorjambs seems to indicate that the king was an apotropaic figure, protecting his palace and his realm (yi9) in this way. In contrast to the figures in the seal representations, the main fig­ ure at Persepolis does not bear the familiar symbols of the king (robe, crown). Perhaps this is a personification of the victorious Persian Man to whom Darius alludes several times in his inscriptions. But identification with the king is simple and obvious: in a way, it is a variation on the theme of the victorious king.

i The Good Warrior

A Tall and Handsome King The Classical sources themselves also abound with notes on the exceptional physical prowess of the Great Kings. For Strabo (XV.3.21*), Darius I was "the most handsome of men, except for the length of his arms, for they reached even to his knees"! Herodotus paints a no less flattering portrait of Xerxes: "Amongst all these immense numbers there was not a man who, for stature and noble bearing, was more worthy than Xerxes to wield so vast a power" (VII. 187*). As for Artaxerxes, "surnamed the Long-handed, his right hand being longer than his left" (Plutarch, Art. L I * ) , "he owed his chief renown to his imposing appearance and his physical beauty, with which he coupled extraordinary military courage, since of all the Persians he was the one who was personally most wor­ thy" (Nepos, Reges 21.4). Darius III was "the tallest and handsomest man of his time" (Plutarch, Alex. 21.6*). Hence the familiar anecdote recorded by Diodorus (XVII.37.5) and Quintus Curtius (III. 12.16-17*): Darius's mother and wife were taken prisoner after the battle of Issus and brought to Alexander's tent, where Haephestion was also present. "Of the same age as the king, he nevertheless excelled him in bodily stature. Hence the queens, thinking that he was the king, did obeisance to him in their native fashion." The theme is especially prominent during periods of dynastic competition among the various candidates for royal power. As we noted above, this was the background for the anecdote contrasting Cambyses and Smerdis in Egypt, the latter being the only one who could bend the bow sent by the Ethiopian king. The theme would be revived with special vigor in the time of Artaxerxes II and Darius III. All of the texts testify that physi­ cal appeal and bravery in combat constituted potent justifications for royal power. This is probably the tradition (widespread in any event) referred to in Strabo's remark: "This, too, is a Medic custom—to choose the bravest man as king; not, however, among all Medes, but only among the mountaineers" (XI. 13.11 * ) . These are obviously a posteriori justifications: a man did not become king because he was handsome or a battlehardened lancer; it was because of his position as king that a man was automatically

226

Chapter 6. Representations of Royalty and Monarchic Ideology

designated handsome and courageous. If we are to believe Plutarch, the king's physical characteristics were even elevated to the rank of models to be emulated: "The Persians because Cyrus was hook-nosed, even to this day love hook-nosed men and consider them the most handsome" (Mor. 821eo). Court artists and officials received strict orders to disseminate the image of a king who was imposing in height and beauty. According to Plato (Ale. 121do), the eunuchs en­ trusted with the bodily care of the royal children "attend to all the needs of the infant child, and are especially concerned to make him as handsome as possible, shaping and straightening his infant limbs; and for this they are held in great esteem"! Pliny probably obtained the following information from the same source: "To give to the body the charming appearance," the Persian magi and kings coated themselves with an ointment, apparently somewhat unsavory, made from the flowers of a Cilician plant (helianihes 'sunflower') steeped in lion fat, saffron, and palm wine (XXIV. 165o). On all of the re­ liefs, the king is routinely made taller than the other persons. This is particularly obvious at Behistun, but it is also clear in the audience reliefs where, additionally, the king and the crown prince standing behind him are placed on a dais. Xenophon does not conceal the existence of ruses intended for the physical exalta­ tion of the king. When, during the parade at Persepolis, Cyrus "appeared so great and so goodly to look upon," it was not just because of the special splendor of his garments: "With him rode a charioteer, who was tall, but neither in reality nor in appearance so tall as he; at all events, Cyrus looked much taller" (Cyr. VIII.3.13-14

The ancient authors recount similar discussions in the camps of Cyrus the Younger and Artaxerxes before the battle of Cunaxa (Plutarch, Art. 7.3, 8.2). The exaltation of the fighting abilities of the Great King is thus purely ideological in nature and does not imply that the sovereign exaggerated his acts of valor on the battle­ field. During the rave wars in which he did participate, he manifested his abilities less as an elite warrior than as "a good battle fighter . . . first to think with action," to quote Da­ rius himself at Naqs-i Rustam {DNb §8g). At this point, we may note that Plutarch (Mor. 172fo) records that, in delivering his own testimonial, Darius stated "that in battles and in the face of formidable dangers he became more cool and collected." Tine performance of Artaxerxes II in the course of a campaign against the Cadusians was ex­ alted in court propaganda in exactly this way: With his quiver by bis side and his shield on his arm, he led them on foot, quitting his horse, through craggy and steep ways, insomuch that the sight of his cheerfulness and unwearied strength gave wings to the soldiers, and so lightened the journey that they made daily marches of above two hundred furlongs. (Plutarch, Art. 24.10-1 ! • ) Moreover, through his privileged relationship with the deities, whose frequent sacri­ fices he continued to observe during his expeditions (chap. 6/6 below), he solicited their protection for his army. Finally, heading the army also enabled the king to visit his subjects during the course of one of those peregrinations that brought the court from one end of the Empire to the other (chap. 5/4). For a king who had newly assumed power, it was also a way to assert his authority.

Darius III in Battle: An Agonistic Perspective on Royalty There is one item that places the Great King on the scene during a battle. This is the famous Mosaic of Naples, in which Darius III is standing in his chariot, surrounded by his protective guard, and directly confronts Alexander, who charges on his horse, lance

The Good Warrior

229

Fig. 28. Darius HI in battle. in hand (fig. 28). There is in fact a tradition that it took the personal confrontation of the two kings to decide the outcome of the battle. In the reply Alexander issued to his adver­ sary at Marathon, the Macedonian threw down a serious challenge: "If you claim the kingship, stand your ground and fight for it (agonisai peri autes) and do not flee, as I shall pursue you wherever you are" (Arrian II.I4.9-*). The choice of agonistic vocabu­ lary is obviously not innocent. The historian Polybius found this tradition worthless (XII.22.1-7). He quotes Callisthenes, who accompanied Alexander: "Alexander ar­ ranged his forces in such a way as to invite personal combat with Darius, who originally had the same intent toward Alexander." According to Chares of Mytilene, the single combat did take place at Issus: "In this battle he was wounded in the thigh, Chares says, by Darius, with whom he fought hand to hand" (Plutarch, Alex. 20.8-v-). This is the tra­ dition illustrated by the creator of the original scene. The tradition of the combat of chieftains is well attested among the Greeks and Macedonians, as well as the Persians and Iranians. For example, we know the suggestion of the commander of Persian-Iranian troops in Aria, Satibarzanes, for deciding the out­ come of a battle in which none of the adversaries seemed able to prevail: "He chal­ lenged to battle anyone who wished to fight in single combat" (Quintus Curtius VII.4.33-S-). Erigyius the Macedonian took up the challenge, and the combat (monomakhia) took place in an open area between the two armies; Satibarzanes was struck and killed, after which his troops surrendered to the Macedonians (cf. Diodorus XVII.83.5; Arrian III.28.2-3). The theme is also found in Darius Ill's royal propaganda. One of the versions claims that he owed his throne to his exceptional military valor, which he had proved by his victory in single combat against a Cadusian chieftain (Diodorus XVII.6.1— 2; Justin X.3.2-5; perhaps to be compared with Strabo XI.13.11).

230

Chapter 6. Representations of Royalty and Monarchic Ideology

Lastly, we may stress the obvious similarities between Callisthcnes' and Chares' ver­ sion of the battle of Issus and what is recorded by several ancient authors about the battle of Cunaxa, where in 401 the legitimate Great King (Artaxerxes 11) confronted his brother Cyrus, who claimed superior rights. Although Clearchus had advised against personal combat and had entreated him not to expose himself in this way, Cyrus felt that he must not show himself "unworthy of empire" (Plutarch, Art. 8.2-0). Just like Alexander and Darius at Issus, Cyrus and Artaxerxes, "who disputed the kingship (hyper tes basileias agonizomenoi), were placed at the center of the array. Thus in full view, they fell on each other, eager to decide the outcome of the battle for themselves. Fortune seemed to have reduced the war between the brothers to a single combat (monomakhia), comparable to that of Eteocles and Polynice sung by the tragic poets" (Diodorus XIV.23.5). The texts under consideration primarily express a Greek and/or Macedonian per­ spective. Note that Diodorus refers explicitly to a Greek custom when he refers to the single combat (monomakhia) of Eteocles and Polyneices. We also know that the tradi­ tion of single combat was known in Macedonia at the dawn of the Hellenistic era (cf. Athenaeus IV. 155a). The documentation thus gives expression to the Greek vision of Persian royal power, but it also transmits a Persian vision known from the court tales that set the Great King to grappling with one of his competitors. As Polybius understood per­ fectly, court tales deal with the realm of ideological representation and do not report the concrete realities of the battles of Issus and Cunaxa, divergent accounts of which contin­ ued to flourish. Actually, the court traditions confirm the central importance of warrior ability in the process of legitimation of royal authority. Whenever two aspirants came into confrontation, the quarrel could not be settled until an individual duel affirmed the aspirations of the winner.

The Hunter-King The hunt was another occasion when the Great King could demonstrate his bravery. Out of all of Cyrus the Younger's qualifications for kingship, the ones that to Xenophon justified his aspirations the most were his abilities in combat ("military accomplish­ ments, alike the use of the bow and of the javelin") and his love of the hunt: "He was the fondest of hunting and, more than that, the fondest of incurring danger in his pursuit of wild animals" (Anah. 1.9.5—6-0; cf. Cyr. 1.3.15; 1.4.7-15). Achaemenid inscriptions and iconography are mute on this point, as has already been explained (see 6/1 above). I lowever, texts from the high Hellenistic period can be used. One recurrent theme is that the king himself killed innumerable wild beasts. Quintus Curtius attributes to Alexander alone (ille) a kill of 4,000 wild animals (VIII. 1.19). This is a theme well known from As­ syrian inscriptions as well: Assurnasirpal II boasts of killing no less than 450 great lions and 390 wild bulls with his own hands, and cutting off the heads of 200 ostriches and 20 great lions (ANET: 558-60)! Alexander's successors did not fail to take up this theme in turn. Lysimachus was reputed to have killed a lion "of remarkable size" (VIII. 1.150) with his own hands. An even better story circulated: P e r d i c c a s the M a c e d o n i a n w h o a c c o m p a n i e d A l e x a n d e r on his m i s s i o n was apparently s o c o u r a g e o u s that h e o n c e went a l o n e into a c a v e w h e r e a lioness had her lair. H e did not catch the lioness, b u t h e e m e r g e d carrying the c u b s . P e r d i c c a s won a d m i r a t i o n for this feat. N o t only G r e e k s , b u t barbarians as well, are c o n v i n c e d that the lioness is a n a n i m a l of great bravery a n d very difficult to c o n t e n d with. T h e y say that the Assyrian S e m i r a m i s had her

The Cood Warrior

231

spirits raised, not if she killed a lion or leopard or another animal of that kind, but if she cap­ tured a lioness. (Aelian, VH XII.39*) The story clearly originated in circles close to Perdiccas. But it is also very clearly set in Near Eastern ideological context, as is shown by the reference to barbarians and Semiramis. A legend of Lysimachus portrays him overpowering "a most ferocious lion, by seizing his tongue and smothering him in that way" (Justin XV.3.7-8). Indeed, this motif is also common in the Assyrian period: in one of his inscriptions, Assumasirpal II boasts of seizing a lion once "by the ears" and another time "by the tail," and this is how the royal artists showed him. According to protocol, certain prerogatives were reserved for the king. On many oc­ casions Xenophon's Cyrus participates in hunts, particularly at Astyages' court. On one occasion, Cyrus reminds him that it is his right to cast the first spear (Gyr. 1.4.14). The existence of this protocol at the Persian court is confirmed by Plutarch (Mor. 173d). The story of Megabyzus offers a perfect illustration of this court custom: a

Artaxerxes (I) went hunting and a lion attacked him. As soon as the beast leapt, Megabyzus struck him with a javelin and bi ought him down. The king was angry because Mcgaby?.us had struck the beast before he could touch it himself; he ordered Megabyzus's head cut off. (Ctesias $40) In doing this, Megabyzus had not just violated the rules of protocol. It is important to state that the scene unfolded during a lion hunt; numerous documents indicate that lion hunts were a special privilege of the king. In other words, Megabyzus had cast doubt on Artaxerxes' abilities as a hunter and thus also his qualification to be king. This particularly pregnant theme appears again in an account of one of Alexander's hunts: When a lion of extraordinary size rushed to attack the king himself, it happened that Lysi­ machus, who was afterwards a king, being beside Alexander, began to oppose his hunting spear to the animal; but the king pushed him aside and ordered him to retire, adding that a lion could be killed by himself alone as well as by Lysimachus. And in fact Lysimachus, once when they were hunting in Syria, had indeed alone killed a lion of remarkable size, but had had his left shoulder torn to the bone and thus had come into great peril of his life The king, taunting him with this very experience, acted more vigorously than he spoke; for he not only met the wild beast, but killed him with a single wound. (Quintus Curtius VIII. 1.14-16*) During royal hunts, then, courtiers had to be circumspect. While someone who came to the aid of the king could be richly rewarded (Diodorus XV.10.3: Tiribazus; cf. Xeno­ phon, Anab. 1.9.6; Polybius, Frag. 38), the example of Megabyzus indicates that it was not a good idea to appear to be a rival. No hunting scenes are found in any of the palace reliefs, but they do appear in innu­ merable seals and seal impressions (fig. 29). The king is sometimes shown hunting from his chariot, as on Darius's cylinder seal (SDa) or as described in episodes narrated by Di­ odorus (XV.10.3) and by Polybius (Frag. 133). But, let us not fool ourselves; an image such as Darius in a chariot confronting an enormous lion (fig. 29a) belongs primarily to the repertory of monarchic ideology. These are not realistic, narrative scenes. Usually, the king hunts on horseback (cf. Aelian, VH VI. 14), like all the young Persians: "They hunt by throwing spears from horseback, and with bows and slings" (Strabo XV.3.18*). Herodotus mentions that during a hunting party Darius, jumping his horse quickly,

232

Chapter 6. Representations of Royalty and Monarchic Ideology

Fig 2%-b. Hunt seals; above (29a), seal of Darius, showing the king hunting a lion; below (2%), inscribed seal, depicting a "Mede" hunting a wild boar. scenes o n

suffered a severe sprain (III. 129). Nevertheless, it was in the hunt as in war that the king proved his exceptional courage and valor. For this reason, the other participants were ei­ ther completely unknown or else left in the shadows by the court artists. It must be stressed that in some seals the theme of hunter-king is confused with the theme of Royal Hero. Even when the king confronts lions, the scene is far from realistic. For example, on one seal, the king is perched on a camel and brandishes his lance at a lion rearing up at him on his hind legs (Frankfort 1939, XXXVII, m). The lion is in the same posture on another seal where the king, on foot and armed with a bow, faces the beast (XXXVII h). Nor does the famous seal of Darius constitute a "photograph" of a royal hunt: standing on his chariot, the king launches an arrow toward an immense lion, rear­ ing on its hind feet, while another lion (somewhat miniaturized) lies under the hooves of the horses, already felled by the royal arrow (SDa, fig. 29a). What is more, on some im­ pressions the hunter-king confronts a monster identical to those found at Persepolis. For example, the king, in his chariot, armed with his bow, faces a hybrid winged and horned being (apparently a griffin), also rearing on its hind legs (Frankfort XXXVII, n). 5. The King, the Earth, and the Water The Good

Gardener

The elite warrior Great King could also engage in agricultural work and influence the prosperity of the fields. Xenophon develops this theme with particular insistence in

The King, the Earth, and the Water

233

the Oeconomicus. In order to make his addressee (Critobidos) better understand the combined importance of war and agricidture, Socrates (fictitious mouthpiece of Xeno­ phon) g i a p l e of the king of the Persians: v e s

e x

m

Need we be ashamed of imitating the king of the Persians? For they say that he pays close attention to husbandry and the art of war, holding that these are two of the noblest and most necessary pursuits. (IV.40) Then Xenophon returns indefatigably to this point: "As for the country, he personally examines so much of it as he sees in the course of his progress through it." The mission entrusted to the governors was to ensure "that their country is densely populated and that the land is in cultivation and well stocked with the trees of the district and crops" (lV.8o). In the shape of a specific illustration of a general policy, Xenophon is careful to include a reference to the paradises: "Yet further," continues Socrates, "in all the districts he resides in and visits he takes care that there are (kepoi) 'paradises,' as they call them, full of all the good and beautiful things that the soil will produce, and in this he himself spends most of his time, except when the season precludes it." "By Zeus," says Critobulos, "Then it is of course necessary, Socrates, to take care that these paradises in which the king spends his time shall contain a fine stock of trees and all other beautiful things that the soil produces." (IV. 1 3 - 1 4 0 ) Elsewhere, Xenophon also states that his Cyrus ordered each of his satraps to estab­ lish paradises (Cyr. VIII.6.12). In fact, the Classical texts, Babylonian tablets, and also a few tablets from Persepolis show that there was at least one paradise in each satrapy. Among other examples, we may cite Plutarch's description of the paradise of the satrap Tissaphernes at Sardis, "the most beautiful of his parks, containing salubrious streams and meadows, where he had built pavilions, and paces of retirement royally and exquis­ itely adorned" (Plutarch, Ale. 24.7-0). The paradise at Dascylium was known to the Greeks for its fertility and charm (Xenophon, Hell. IV. 1.15—17). These qualities are de­ picted on several impressions and seals found at the site. Quintus Curtius wrote this about a paradise near Ecbatana: "The residences in that region have extensive, charm­ ing, and secluded parks with groves artificially planted; these were the special delight of both kings and satraps" (VII.2.22-0). However, the paradises were not just hunting pre­ serves; the preserves were only one constituent. When Socrates was trying to convince Critobulos that Cyrus the Younger "would have proved an excellent ruler" (Oec. IV. 180-), he cited several sources in support of this assessment, including a description of Lysander's visit to Cyrus the Younger's paradise at Sardis: "Lysander admired the beauty of the trees in it, the accuracy of the spacing, the stiaightness of the rows, the regularity of the angles and the multitude of the sweet scents that clung round them as they walked; and for wonder of these things he cried, 'Cyrus, I really do ad­ mire all these lovely things, but I am far more impressed with your agent's skill in measuring and arranging everything so exactly' Cyrus was delighted to hear this and said: 'Well, Lysander, the whole of the measurement and arrangement is my own work, and I did some of the planting myself.' 'What, Cyrus?' exclaimed Lysander, looking at him, and marking the beaut)' and perfume of his robes, and the splendour of the necklaces (to strepta) and bangles (pselia) and other jewels that he was wearing; 'did you really plant part of this with your own hands?' 'Does that surprise you, Lysander?' asked Cyrus in reply. "I swear by the

234

Chapter 6. Representations of Royalty and Monarchic Ideology S u n - g o d that 1 never yet sat d o w n to d i n n e r when in s o u n d liealth, without first working hard at s o m e task of war or agriculture, or exerting myself s o m e h o w . ' " (IV.20-25-*)

There is no doubt that Xenophon's narratives came from a version that sang the praises of Cyrus the Younger's royal qualities and that the link between the Great King and ag. riculture was thus one of the constituent elements of Achaemenid royal ideology. g systematically underscoring the brutal contrast between the verdure of the paradise and the barrenness of its surroundings, the Classical authors—without being fully aware of it—participated in the exaltation of a sovereign powerful enough to create prosperity and vegetation in the face of unfavorable natural conditions. But in the passage above, Xenophon —the only Classical author to preserve this fopos—brings in another characteristic feature: the king himself planted trees. This is not a Hellenizing invention of the author. We may cite a parallel passage from the book of Esther, which records the organization of a feast by Ahasuerus (Xerxes) in his palace at Susa; the author places the festival "in the enclosure adjoining the kings palace" (1:5^), The Vulgate says: "in the vestibule of the garden and the woods, which had been planted by the royal hands with a magnificence worthy of them" (horti et nemoris quwi regio cultu et maim consitum erat). More importantly, two iconographic testimonies con­ firm and illustrate the theme of gardener-king. A cylinder seal from the Achaemenid era shows a Persian using his long staff to guide a pair of oxen with humps drawing a plow. An almost identical scene is found on a coin from Tarsus in Cilicia: the work scene is shown on the obverse, surmounted by a winged disk, with the reverse showing a cow suckling a calf. There is scarcely any doubt that in both cases it is the king himself being shown as a gardener. v

Xerxes and the Plane (or Sycamore) Tree Other texts attest to a special relationship between the Great King and flora. In the course of his story of Xerxes' march between Phrygia and Sardis, Herodotus slates con­ cisely, "it was hereabouts that he came across a plane tree of such beauty that he was moved to decorate it (doresamenos) with golden ornaments (kosmos chryseos) and to leave behind one of his Immortals to guard it" (VII.31-*). The story was clearly very popular among the Greeks; another version has it that during Xerxes' passage through Phrygia (on his return from Europe) a plane (sycamore) tree metamorphosed miracu­ lously into an olive tree (Pliny, N H XVII.42). In his Variae Historiae, Aelian returns twice to the anecdote: T h e f a m o u s king Xerxes was ridiculous (gefoi'os), if it is true that h e d e s p i s e d sea a n d land, the handiwork o f Z e u s , m a n u f a c t u r i n g for h i m s e l f novel roads a n d a b n o r m a l sea route, and yet was the d e v o t e e

(dedouloto) o f

a p l a n e tree, w h i c h h e a d m i r e d . In Lydia, they say, h e saw

a large s p e c i m e n o f a p l a n e tree, a n d s t o p p e d for that d a y without a n y n e e d . H e m a d e the wilderness a r o u n d the tree his c a m p

(stathmos),

p a y i n g h o m a g e to the b r a n c h e s with n e c k l a c e s caretaker

(meledon) for

it, like a g u a r d

a n d a t t a c h e d to it e x p e n s i v e o r n a m e n t s ,

(strepta)

(phylake) to

(pselia). (phrouros), as

a n d bracelets

provide security

H e left a if it were

a w o m a n h e loved. W h a t benefit a c c r u e d to the tree as a result? T h e o r n a m e n t s it h a d ac­ q u i r e d , w h i c h w e r e q u i t e inappropriate to it, h u n g on it without serving a n y p u r p o s e a n d m a d e no c o n t r i b u t i o n to its a p p e a r a n c e , s i n c e the b e a u t y of a tree consists o f fine b r a n c h e s , a b u n d a n t leaves, a sturdy trunk, d e e p roots, m o v e m e n t in the wind, s h a d o w s p r e a d i n g all a r o u n d , c h a n g e in a c c o r d a n c e with the passing o f s e a s o n s , with irrigation c h a n n e l s to sup­ port it a n d rain water to sustain it. Xerxes' robes offerings

(ddra)

(chlamydes),

b a r b a r i a n g o l d , a n d the other

did not e n n o b l e the p l a n e or a n y other tree. (II. H^-)

The King, the Earth, and the Water

235

Aelia" judges roya) behavior just as severely and condescendingly elsewhere. He in­ cludes it among other examples of love "ri­ diculous (geloioi) and bizarre (paradoxoi)" for th same reasons as the passion avowed by a young Athenian for a statue of Tyche or attachments between humans and animals (IX.39**")- This assessment (no trace of it is Fig. 30. Seal of Xerxes. found in Herodotus) comes from the nega­ tive vision of Xerxes transmitted by all of the Greek authors who —following the model of their inspiration, Aelian—denounced the immoderation (hybris) of a man who did not shrink from affronting the laws of man and god by throwing a bridge across the sea. The same assumption of balance and moderation led Aelian to exalt the laws of nature that did not permit unnatural loves between humans and nonhumans, or personal, emotional relationships between a man and a tree: the growth of vegetation is permit­ ted (or forbidden) by the natural elements (waters, winds, seasons) and by the labor of the peasants (irrigation canals); the personal intervention even of a king as powerful as Xerxes is as nothing in the face of the immutable constraints of nature. e

In view of this, it is clear that Aelian understood nothing of the court history that he read, perhaps in Herodotus himself, and that he embellished with a moralizing com­ mentary suitable for reaching his Greek readers. If his account is read back into Persian and Iranian mindsets, it provides another attestation of the special relationship between the king and the vegetable kingdom. The gifts to the plane tree are of exactly the same kind as the gifts that the king presented to his Faithful and his Benefactors (bracelets, necklaces, robes) —that is, to the men who deserved to be recognized for their loyalty and devotion to the Royal House and to the person of the king (chapter 8/1). The Lydian plane tree was thenceforth as richly decorated as the Immortal whom Xerxes appointed as its guard and whose jewelry Quintus Curtius described as follows: "They are espe­ cially the ones whom a barbarian luxury of opulence rendered the most imposing: for them gold necklaces, for them robes embroidered with gold and sleeved tunics, also adorned with gems" (III.3.13). But these are also the jewelry worn by the king himself, as Xenophon recalls, stressing that the ornaments did not impede Cyrus the Younger from planting trees. There can hardly be any doubt that this episode echoes the existence of a tree cult. Several seals convey similar scenes. One of them (inscribed with the name of Xerxes) shows a person dressed and coiffed like a Persian king about to place a crown in front of a stylized tree of life (SXe; fig. 30). One of the Persepolis seals is particularly interesting. Two guards (similar to the guards shown at Susa and Persepolis) stand at attention, lances upright in front of them, on cither side of a palm tree, the winged disk surmount­ ing the scene (PTS no. 24). We are immediately reminded of the Immortals assigned to guard Xerxes' plane tree!

The Plane (Sycamore) Tree and the Golden Vine of the Great King The stories told by Herodotus and Aelian were embellished by the decorative ele­ ments (now lost) that enhanced the opulence of the Great King's palace. Herodotus records that during Darius's passage through Asia Minor in 513, the fantastically wealthy Lydian Pythius visited the royal entourage and offered the Great King "the golden plane-

236

Chapter 6. Representations of Royalty and Monarchic Ideology

Fig. 31. The Assyrian king with the "Tree of Life" tree and the golden vine" (VII.27-0). The existence of these arboriform decorations was also well known to the Greeks. The Arcadian Antiochus made this derisive reference when he returned from an embassy to the Great King in 367: "He thought that the King's wealth of money was also mere pretence, for he said that even the golden plane tree, that was forever harped upon, was not large enough to afford shade for a grass­ hopper" (Xenophon, Hell. VII. 1.38o). When Antigonus the One-Eyed inventoried the Treasury in the Susa citadel in 316, "he found in it the golden climbing vine and a great number of other objects of art, weighing all told fifteen thousand talents" (Diodorus XIX.48.6o). The reports of Hellenistic authors transcribed by Athenaeus are more precise. Among the testimonies to the luxury of the Great King is Chares of Mytilene, who specifically mentions that "in the bed-chamber a golden vine, jewel-studded, extended over the bed," and Amyntas states "that this vine had clusters composed of the costliest jewels" (XII.514fo). Phylarcus wrote: T h e f a m o u s plane-trees of gold, e v e n the g o l d e n vine u n d e r which the Persian kings often sat a n d held court, with its clusters of g r e e n crystals a n d rubies from India a n d other g e m s of every description, e x c e e d i n g l y costly t h o u g h they were, a p e a r e d to b e o f less worth . . . than the e x p e n s e lavished daily on all o c c a s i o n s at Alexander's court. (XII.539dO)

Achaemenid palaces were probably the model for the decoration of the palace of the Mauryan king at Pataliputra: "His palace has gilded columns: over all of these runs a vine carved in gold, and silver figures of birds, in the sight of which they take the greatest pleasure, adorn the structure" (Quintus Curtius VIII.8.26o). We are immediately re­ minded of the famous Assyrian banquet under the arbor (fig. 32). There is no doubt that in the Near East (and in many other parts of the ancient world) the vine was recognized and hailed as a symbol of fecundity, and its increase was considered a gauge of power. A good illustration is found in the dream that Herodotus says the Median king Astyages had shortly after his daughter Mandane's marriage to the Persian Cambyses:

The King, the Earth, and the Water

237

Fig. 32. Assurbanipal and the vine-arbor. It was mat a vine grew from his daughter's private parts and spread over Asia.... He told the interpreters about this dream, and then sent for his daughter, who was now pregnant. When she arrived, he kept her under strict watch, intending to make away with the child; for the fact vvas that the Magi had interpreted the dream to mean that his daughter's son would usurp his throne. (I. I08-0-) Such were the favorable auspices under which Cyrus vvas born. The vine that grew from Mandane's private parts was obviously nothing other than the guarantee of an un­ common destiny for the child and reports of conquests extending across all Asia. This is precisely what the Median king understood: "This dream announced the greatness [of the child about to be born] and presaged to Astyages the end of his crown." Hence the attempts to banish the baby and the happy outcome of the founder legend.

Artaxerxes II in the Paradise In the Achaemenid ideological context, we have two other testimonies that are par­ ticularly evocative of relations between the Great King and arboreal flora. In the Life of Artaxerxes, Plutarch tells of the difficulties encountered by the king and his army after their return from an expedition against the Cadusians. The army suffered from so many shortages that the chefs were unable to prepare the royal dinner (24.3). Then Plutarch includes the following anecdote: After they had arrived at one of his own mansions (stathnios basilikos), which had beautiful ornamented parks in the midst of a region naked and without trees, the weather being very cold, be gave full commission to his soldiers to provide themselves with wood by cutting down any, without exception, even the pine and cypress. And when they hesitated and were for sparing them, being large and goodly trees, he, taking up an axe himself, felled the great­ est and most beautiful of them. After which his men used their hatchets, and piling up many fires, passed away the night at their ease. {JJ25.1-*) It is clear that this passage is part of a discussion of the royal virtues of Artaxerxes II, whose physical stamina and bravery Plutarch wished to stress, as well as his abilities as a leader ($24.9-11). The connection between the king and the foliage was so well known to the soldiers that they did not dare to raise their axes against the trees, despite the king's authorization. This confirms the role of the king as the trees' protector. A para­ dise had to remain "undisturbed," that is, free from the ravages of war (Quintus Curtius

238

Chapter 6. Representations of Royalty and Monarchic Ideology

VIII.1.130-; cf. Polybius XXXI.29), The felling of trees in the paradise was considered an affront to the sovereignty and majesty of the Great King. It is quite striking that, accord­ ing to Diodorus of Sicily (XVI.41.5*), the first hostile act of the revolt by the Phoeni­ cians against Artaxerxes III was "the cutting clown and destroying of the royal park in which the Persian Kings were wont to take their recreation." Similarly, under the guise of reprisals, Cyrus the Younger ravaged the paradise of the satrap Belesys, who had sided with Artaxerxes II (Xenophon, Anab. 1.4.2), and the Spartan king Agesilaus "ravaged the orchards and the paradise of Tissaphernes" near Sardis (Diodorus XIV.80.2). Let us also stress that, as in Aelian's version and in many other texts, Plutarch accents the contrast between the aridity of the surrounding countryside and the flamboyant fe­ cundity of the paradise. Of the various tree species, Plutarch also seems to accord special value to pines and cypresses, because these species could only grow in these regions through acclimatization accompanied by intensive care, obviously on the initiative of the royal administration. Strabo, explaining the difficulties that Alexander encountered in 325-324 in procuring wood in Babylonia, states that Babylonia suffered "a scarcity of timber," so much so that Alexander had to sacrifice "the cypress trees in the groves and the parks" (XVI. 1.1 At Persepolis itself, many reliefs are punctuated by rows of pines (or cypresses).

Clearchus's Tomb The story of Clearchus, Cyrus the Younger's closest Greek associate, whose abilities as commander-in-chief Xenophon vaunts at length [Anab. II.3.11-13; 6.1-15), may also be mentioned in this connection. Shortly after the battle of Cunaxa, Clearchus and other Greek generals fell into the hands of the satrap Tissaphernes (II.5.31-32). Despite the claims of Xenophon (II.5.38), Clearchus was not put to death immediately but was imprisoned, according to Ctesias. Ctesias then established a relationship with the gen­ eral. Ctesias was undoubtedly following instructions from Cyrus the Younger's mother, Parysatis, who thus once more exhibited her desire to honor the memory of her favorite son. Contrary to Parysatis's wishes, however, Artaxerxes gave in to the repeated importunings of his wife, Stateira, and Clearchus was executed (Plutarch, Art. 18.4; Ctesias, Persica §60). At this point, Ctesias describes the divine signs that accompanied the burial of Clearchus: An extraordinary sight (terns) appeared around his body. In fact, spontaneously (automates), a very high mound rose over his corpse with the breath of a great wind. (j60) Citing Ctesias, Plutarch records the event with even more detail than Photius, adding an important detail: As for the remains of Clearchus, that a violent gust of wind, bearing before it a vast heap of earth, raised a mound to cover his body, upon which, after a short time, some dates having fallen there, a beautiful grove (alsos) of trees grew up and overshadowed the place. ($18.7
Fig. 33. Magi and sacrifices.

Between Men and Gods

245

7'eus Stratios ['Warrior'] there lurked an Iranian god, albeit partly Hellenized. The au'thor's comparison with the sacrificial practices of Persian kings at Pasargadae is also in­ teresting, even though it involved Persian princes (fig. 36, p. 250) and not Achaemenid kings. The heritage of the Great Kings remained quite vital in Hellenistic Persia.

The King, the Sacrifices, and the Magi Wherever he went, the king was accompanied by magi. Those around Xerxes, for ex­ ample, interpreted a solar eclipse (Herodotus VII.37), poured libations at Pergamum "to the spirits of the great men of old" (VII.43o), sacrificed white horses in the Strymon (VII. 113), and sacrificed to Thetis to calm the tempest (VII. 191). Magi around Cyrus "never failed to sing hymns to the gods at daybreak" (Cyr. VIII. 1.23V). In Darius Ill's procession, they went "next [after the Fire altars] chanting their traditional hymn" /Quintus Curtius IH.3.9^; cf. V. 1.22). Because of their position, the magi were justified in reserving part of the booty for the gods (Cyr. VI1.3.1; VII.35.1). Magi in the Cyropedia (VIII.3.11; VIII.1.23) chose the gods to whom the king had to sacrifice, "for the Persians think that they ought much more scrupulously to be guided by those whose profession (technitai) is with things divine than they are by those in other professions" (V1U.3.1 l O ; cf. StraboXV. 1.68, who compares them to the Sages of Mauryan India). One of the magi's numerous functions in Persian society and in relation to the king was to play an authoritative role in all of the sacrifices. Herodotus says this quite clearly: When the [worshipper] has cut up the animal and cooked it, he makes a little heap of the softest green-stuff he can find, preferably clover, and lays all the meat upon it. This done, a Magus (a member of this caste is always (nomos) present at sacrifices) utters an incantation over it. . . . Then after a short interval the worshipper removes the flesh and does what he pleases with it. (I.1324-) Strabo also makes many allusions to the role of the ?nagi: To fire they offer sacrifice by adding dry wood without the bark and by placing fat on top o f it; and then they pour oil upon it and light it below, not blowing with their breath but fan­ ning it; and those who blow the fire with their breath or put anything dead or filthy upon it are put to death. (XV. 3. H-fr) Then Strabo gives information concerning the sacrifices that were observed in his time in Cappadocia: And to water they offer sacrifice by going to a lake or river or spring, where, having dug a trench leading thereto, they slaughter a victim, being on their guard lest any of the water near by should be made bloody, believing that the blood would pollute the water; and then, placing pieces of meat on myrtle or laurel branches, the Magi touch them with slender wands and make incantations, pouring oil mixed with both milk and honey, though not into fire or water, but upon the ground, and they carry on their incantations for a long time, hold­ ing in their hands a bundle of slender myrtle wands (XV.3.140-) An image of Persian origin illustrates Strabo's words to some extent. It is found on a stela discovered near Dascylium in Hellespontine Phrygia, but it appears to be nearly identical to other illustrated items (fig. 33). Two persons (fig. 33b) stand before whatap|)ears to be a tall altar on legs. They wear Persian dress; their mouths are covered with a veil, and in their hands they hold a bundle of rods; the heads of a bull and a ram are placed on a bundle of branches in front of them. The veil and the bundle of twigs correspond to objects held by the officiant in the Avesta: the barsom and the piidam,

246

Chapter 6. Representations of Royalty and Monarchic Ideology

respectively. The officiant bearing the harsom is found in several iconographic represen­ tations (Dalton XIV.48-49). Nonetheless, not all of the information in Strabo is con­ firmed. He states, for example, that in "the places where the Fire bums" {pyratheia) and "where the Magi keep the fire ever burning.. . the people do not sacrifice victims with a sword either, but with a kind of tree-trunk, beating them to death as with a cudgel" (XV.3.15-0); On the other hand, on a Persepolis seal, an officiant is shown grasping a mouflon [wild sheep with curled horns] in his right hand and holding a short sword in his left (Schmidt II, pi. 15). This "contradiction" serves to remind us on the one hand that Strabo's information is late and on the other that cultic forms were not necessarily identical throughout the Empire (sec fig. 33e). Thus, the magi were not strictly priests but ritual experts whose mediation allowed the sacrificer to consume the meat offered to the deity. They are cited several times in this function in the Persepolis tablets. They were responsible to make libations and re­ ceived the necessary materials from the administration for this purpose: 12 marris of wine, at the disposal (kurmin) of ?, Irdakurraddus the magus (makus), who car­ ried out the lan sacrifice, received them for the libation in the km ceremony. From the first to the 12th month, 12 months in all, 19th year. For I month, he received 1 marriS. (PF 758) The magi were able to do this because of their special knowledge. If, for example, they made sacrifices to Thetis (Herodotus VII. 191), it was because they had particular au­ thority in this regard. In one of his polemics against the magi, Pliny the Elder describes a precious stone, a form of amethyst: "They keep off hail and locusts if they are used in conjunction with an incantation which they prescribe" (XXXVII.40.124-0-). Other pre­ cious stones, agates, were reputed by the magi to "avert storms and waterspouts and stop the flow of rivers" (XXXVII. 54.142*).

Sacrifices and Banquets The Classical authors especially describe animal sacrifices: Cyrus offers horses to the Sun, as well as "some exceptionally handsome bulls for Zeus and for the other gods as the magi directed" (Cyr. VIII.3.11-0, 24). The importance of meat sacrifices is empha­ sized by Strabo in many passages dedicated to Persian and/oT Iranian sacrifices. Quite another picture emerges, however, from the Persepolis tablets: the administration basi­ cally delivered grain, beer, or wine. Sometimes, it is true, the priest traded these prod­ ucts for sheep, but this action seems to have been reserved for a particular kind of sacrifice, the kusukum, offered especially in honor of Elamite gods. T h e liquid products were probably used for the libations, which all of the Classical authors (including Strabo) indicate most often comprised oil, milk, honey, and wine. Note also that, in the images on seals, animal sacrifices are relatively rare. In Strabo, at the end of the ceremony the meat is divided among the participants; none of it is set aside for the deity, who, the Persians say, desires only the soul [psyche) of the sacrificial victim and nothing else (XV.3.13). An illustration of this postsacrificial cus­ tom of sharing is also found in several Persepolis tablets that end with the formula "and the kurtas ate [the grain]" (PF 336-37). This probably refers to the organization of a fes­ tival. Each great sacrificial festival was in fact followed by a banquet, as Xenophon ex­ plains: "To all the winners [of chariot races Cyrus] gave cups and cattle, so that they might sacrifice and have a banquet. . . . When it was all over, they went back to the city to their lodgings" (VIII.3.33-34-0). But one detail given by Xenophon should be stressed: "The victims are omitted when the king does not offer sacrifice" (Cyr. VIII.3.34-0). In

Between Men and Gods

247

other words, the sacrifice was not intended solely to honor the gods; the festival and ac­ companying banquet exalted the might and generosity of the king. An excellent confirmation of this custom is found in a testimony from the beginning of the Hellenistic era: When [the soldiers] had arrived in Persepolis, the capital (to basiteion), Peucestes, who was general of this land, performed a magnificent sacrifice to the gods and to Alexander and Philip; and after gathering from almost the whole of Persia a multitude of sacrificial animals and of whatever else was needed for festivities and religious gatherings (panigyrk), he gave a feast to the army. (Diodorus XIX.22.1-0-) Then Diodorus describes the arrangements made by Peucestes to position the partici­ pants at the festival on the occasion of the sacrifice. They were placed in four concen­ tric circles, in accord with their hierarchic and social status: In the inner circle with a perimeter of two stades each of the generals and hipparchs and also each of the Persians who was most highly honoured occupied his own couch. In the middle of these there were altars for the gods and for Alexander and Philip. (22.2-3*-) There is hardly any doubt that Peucestes undertook the organization of Achaemenid religious festivals for his own profit. We know that in encampment and in battle, the Great King was always placed at the center (e.g., Cyr. VIII.5.8). The arrangement of the royal processions shows clearly that everyone in them received a place strictly in accord with his titles, his duties, and the status that the Great King afforded to him. Xenophon himself has a long digression on how important Cyrus considered protocol to be during the organization of the banquet that followed a sacrifice (Cyr. VIII.4.3). Peucestes had obviously adapted the ceremony to the new conditions arising with the Macedonian conquest. He had the altars dedicated to Alexander and Philip placed in the center, but because he was a recognized partisan of a collaboration loyal to the Persian aristocracy, he accorded them a central place alongside the most eminent Macedonian leaders. What is noteworthy is that the organization of the sacrifice and the banquet were pre­ pared in a context of competition between Peucestes and his rival, Eumenes. It is very clear that the distribution of meat to the soldiers had the objective of maintaining their loyalty (Diodorus XIX.21.3). Sometime later, Eumenes himself "performed a sacrifice to the gods and entertained the army sumptuously" (24.5*). In fact, Eumenes "rea­ s o n e d ] that Peucestes vvas playing up to the crowd in furtherance of his desire for the chief command" (23.1 * ) . And Diodorus specifies further that it was in his capacity as sa­ trap of Persia that Peucestes presided over the ceremonies. It is thus tempting to think that, by doing this, Peucestes had attempted to adorn himself with the prestige that sur­ rounded the Great King during the organization of festivals and sacrificial banquets.

The King and the Cult of Aliura-Mazda The links between the king and Ahura-Mazda are abundantly attested in the royal in­ scriptions, as has already been stressed several times. In the prayers of Darius I, AhuraMazda, "the greatest of the gods," is most often invoked alone (DP/r, DPe, D S z , DSaa), less commonly in the company of the "other gods" (DPd, DPf). This is confirmed later in the speeches of consolation that a eunuch addressed to Darius III, who was distraught over the fate of the princesses and royal sons after the battle of Issus. Their only suffering, the eunuch explained to the king, vvas that they missed only "the light of your counte­ nance, which I doubt not but the lord {kyrios) Oromasdes [Ahura-Mazda] will yet restore

248

Chapter 6. Representations of Royalty and Monarchic Ideology

to its former glory" (Plutarch, Alex. 30.5^) Let us also mention an episode from th reign of Artaxerxes II as it is recorded by Ph,. tarch. After the supreme punishment was imposed on a felonious son, "going forth into tiie court [of the palace], he worshipped the sun, and said, 'Depart in peace, ye Per­ sians, and declare to your fellow-subjects how the mighty Oromasdes hath dealt out vengeance to the contrivers of unjust and un­ lawful things'" (Art. 29.12-fr). Ahura-Mazda was indeed the source of royal power and in­ fluence (farnah). Outside of these examples, even the name of Ahura-Mazda is rarely mentioned. Sometimes he is recognizable under the name of Zeus. This is certainly the case in Fig. 34. Ahura-Mazda. Herodotus's digression on the Persian cults: "Zeus, in their system, is the whole circle of the heavens, and they sacrifice to him from the tops of mountains" (1.131-*). We can in fact recognize this as a muted echo of the god "who created heaven, who created earth." It was also certainly Ahura-Mazda to whom were dedicated "the holy chariot of Zeus" brought to Greece by Xerxes (VII.40;O- VIII. 115), the "chariot sacred to Zeus" in Cyrus's procession (Cyr. VIII.3.12-*-), and again "the chariot consecrated to Jupiter" in the pro­ cession of Darius III (Quintus Curtius 111.3.1W). But it would be simplistic to "trans­ late" Zeus automatically as Ahura-Mazda. The Persepolis tablets mention Ahura-Mazda only rarely. In the available documents, an attendant receives items for sacrifice to Ahura-Mazda and other gods. We have only one attestation of a sacrifice honoring Ahura-Mazda alone (PF 771). This silence is hard to explain solely on the basis of the uneven survival of the documentation. The following solution has been proposed: one of the sacrifices, the lan, was practiced regularly by the magi in the context of a official state cult in honor of the great god. This hypothesis offers the advantage of restoring the importance we would expect Ahura-Mazda to have in Darius's Persia. But we must rec­ ognize that we lack what might be called tangible evidence. The iconography and identification of the winged disk remain controversial. With­ out discounting the opposing arguments, we will here accept the hypothesis that it is in­ deed a representation of Ahura-Mazda. This winged disk, from which a bearded figure identical to the king frequently emerges (fig. 34), is found on many Persepolis reliefs. But the winged disk appears on nearly every Achaemenid seal, and not only on seals de­ picting a royal figure. Several seals on Treasury tablets show a scene with two Persians worshiping Ahura-Mazda. e

The King and the Worship of Fire We know that Fire was one of the elements of nature that the Persians worshiped (He­ rodotus 1.131). Strabo also states that Fire and Water were the elements most honored (XV3.I4). He continues: "And to whatever god they offer sacrifice, to him they first offer

Between Men and Gods

249

prayer with fire" (XV.3.16o). According to Dinon (FGrH 690 F28), "of all of the gods, the Persians raise statues (agalmata) only to Fire and Water." The Sakian Sirakes was aware of this, for he invoked "the eternal Fire and the sacred Water" to win the confi­ dence of Darius (Polyaenus VII. 11.12). It was probably because of the sacred character of Fire that the burning of corpses was forbidden (Strabo XV.3.18; cf. Ctesias §57: para ton nomon). In the Persepolis tablets, we find two titles whose roots are related to fire: "dthravapati- and atrvasa. The holders of the first title filled administrative functions that do not seem to have had anything to do with the religion. The second ('Guardians of the Fire') was different and is mentioned more often. The context is sometimes ritual, but Fire worship as such is not explicitly attested. Note, however, that one of the deities mentioned in the tablets, Naryasanga, maintained a privileged relationship with Fire. The most that is safe to assume is that in each place where these attendants are men­ tioned there was a Fire sanctuary. Indeed, we have no archaeological evidence from the Achaemenid period, but the importance of Fire sanctuaries in the Hellenistic period (fig. 36) undoubtedly exhibits continuity with the Achaemenid period. At Naqs-i Rustam, as we have seen (fig. 16, p. 211,) Darius stands before a Fire altar with leaping flames, the scene surmounted by a winged disk and a crescent moon. It is hard to grasp the dynamics of the scene —if it is even intended to portray anything

250

Chapter 6. Representations of Royalty and Monarchic

Ideology

specific. We may nevertheless suppose that it refers, in a stylized, sacred manner, to a sacrifice offered personally by the Great King before a fire altar. A simj. lar scene is found on numerous stamps on Treasury tablets (fig. 35). One of the most remarkable representations is a seal (fig. 35b) inscribed with the name Zarathustris. Beneath the emblem of Ahura-Mazda, on each side of a fire altar stand attendants in Persian garb. The at­ tendant on the left holds a bundle of rit­ ual rods (barsom) in his hand, and the attendant on the right holds a libation spoon in both hands. This is the only known representation of the sacrifice later known as the atas-zohr. In any case, the picture at NaqS-i Rustam and the Classical texts together imply privileged relations between the king and Fire. Perhaps it is Fire that Xenophon's Cyrus invokes, using the name Hephaestus, in order to strengthen the cour­ age of the soldiers during the assault led by his hero against Babylon (Cyr. VII.5.22). The order of items in the royal processions, spelled out for us by Xenophon, expresses clearly the place that Fire held in the reality of royal power. In Cyrus's cortege, after the chariot of Zeus and the chariot of the Sun, and before the chariot of the king, "followed men car­ rying fire on a greataltar" (Cyr. VIII.3.12*). However, Xenophon says nothing of specific sacrifices in honor of Fire (3.24). Fire assumed an even more eminent position in Darius Ill's cortege:

Fig. 36. Hellenistic Persian coin showing a fire temple.

N o w the order o f m a r c h was as follows. In front o n silver altars was carried the fire which

they called sacred and eternal (Ignis, quern ipsi sacrum et aetemum vocabant). Next c a m e the M a g i , c h a n t i n g their traditional h y m n , (patrhmi carmen; Q u i n t u s C u r t i u s I I I . 3 . 9 - 1 0 * )

Finally, the practice of extinguishing the sacred Fires when the king died (Diodorus XVII. 114.4-5) attests to the facts that (1) there were official Fire sanctuaries in all of the satrapies (guarded by the magi: Dinon, FGrH 690 F28) and (2) that there was an official religion linked very closely to the person and majesty of the king.

The King, Mithra, and the Sun The Sun was another of the natural elements mentioned by the ancient authors that was worshiped by the Persians (cf. Plutarch, Art. 29.12). In the festival organized by Cyrus in Persia was a chariot of the Sun "with white harnesses, crowned like the chariot of Zeus"; the cortege also included horses as "a sacrifice for the Sun," soon to be sacri­ ficed in the fire (Cyr. VIII.3.12,* 24). Let us also remark in passing that Herodotus (1.216*) said of the Scythians —an Iranian people —"the only god they worship is the sun, to which they sacrifice horses." Without doubt the Sun was included among "the gods who have our country in their keeping" to whom Xerxes urged the Persians to pray

Between Men and Gods

251

before crossing die Hellespont (VII.53«-). The place of the Sun and its relationship with horses are also clearly brought out in Quintus Curtius's description of Darius Ill's order of march: When the clay was already bright, the signal was given from the king's tent with the horn; above the tent, from which it might be seen by all, there gleamed an image of the sun en­ closed in crystal.. . . [The Fire altars and the chariot of Jupiter/Ahura-Mazdaj were followed by a horse of extraordinary size, which they called the steed of the Sun. Golden wands and white robes adorned the drivers of the horses. (III.3.8, 11) The relationship between Mithra and horses is also well attested, especially by Strabo. According to him, every year the satrap of Armenia was required to send to the court 20,000 colts to be sacrificed during the festival celebrated in honor of Mithra (Mithrakana; XI. 14.9; cf. Xenophon, Anab. IV.5.24 and IV.535: Helios). The offering of a he­ catomb of horses to the Sun by Cyrus occurred at the Mithrakana. But the sacrifice of horses was not reserved exclusively for the cult of Mithra. Recall, for example, that when the magi arrived at the River Strymon in Thrace they "tried to propitiate [it] by a sacrifice of white h o r s e s " (Herodotus VII. 113-0-). Another passage in Herodotus (1.189) also brings together sacred white horses and a river. It is thus risky to establish the identity of a god by the kind of animals offered to him in sacrifice. It is frequently thought that the Persians assimilated the Sun to Mithra, as claimed by Strabo (XV.3.13), Hesychius, and the Suda. Nonetheless, modern debate about this con­ tinues at a lively pace, for the documentation is both very heterogeneous and full of con­ tradictions. No sacrifice to the Sun (or to Mithra) is recorded in the Persepolis tablets. Note also that no royal inscription refers explicitly to Mithra (or to Anahita) prior to Arta­ xerxes II. Darius sometimes lifts his prayers and thanks to "Ahura-Mazda and the other gods" (DPa, DPf). It is generally supposed that this expression includes (among others) Mithra and Anahita. Two of the Yashts of the Avesta are dedicated to Anahita and Mithra, but their use is problematic; it is in fact not easy to distinguish the various chro­ nological strata. This observation holds still more firmly for the Greek and Latin texts, for a number of late ones refer to the solar (and military) cult of Mithra (Sol Invictus), which was strikingly popular in the Roman period. In Xenophon, Cyrus the Younger also evokes Mithra in his paradise (Oec. IV.24). Artaxerxes acclaimed the exceptional size of a pomegranate offered to him by a simple Persian peasant (Plutarch, Art. 4.5; Ae­ lian, VH 1.33). This was because Mithra, the god of oaths and contracts, a warrior god, was also the god who protected fields and harvests. It was "he who gives favor at his whim, who gives fields at his whim, who does nothing bad to the one who plows, who increases the waters, who hears the appeal, who spreads the waters, who makes the plants grow, who gives increase." He follows the paths "that make fertile fields." In this same Yasht 10 of the Avesta, he is saluted as "Mithra of the vast pastures." The attributes of just warrior and protector of the earth and peasants were complementarily fused with each other in the person of Mithra, just as they were in the person of the Great King. We know from Xenophon (Cyr. VIII.3.9), Herodotus (VII.54), and Quintus Curtius (HI.3.8: patrio more) that the royal procession set out at sunrise. But there is nothing to make us think that in doing this the Persians were specifically honoring Mithra. Perhaps they honored the god Hvarlra, who is attested in the Persepolis tablets, if he indeed per­ sonified the spirit of the sunrise, as some believe. It is equally improbable that the prayer

252

Chapter 6. Representations of Royalty and Monarchic

Ideology

addressed to the Sun by Xerxes before crossing tire Hellespont was in reality directed specifically to Mithra. One of the most troubling pieces of evidence is late: when before the battle of Arbela Darius III invoked "the Sun and Mithras, and the sacred and eternal fire" (Quintus Cur­ tius IV. 13.12-0) — a statement that implies a formal distinction between the two deities whatever their original genetic relationship may have been. It makes sense at this point to compare this text with another piece of evidence that also dates to the reign of Darius III. A speech put in the king's mouth by Plutarch (Alex. 30.7) reveals that, to the Per­ sians, Mithra was both the god who guaranteed contracts (as confirmed by the Iranian and Greek documentation) and the god of light. This indicates that Mithra, among all his functions (warrior, protector of the fields, etc.), maintained a special relationship with the Sun, the source of light. To be sure, Mithra was not the only deity endowed with radiant force. Ahura-Mazda was also (and first of all) the source of light (cf. Plu­ tarch, Alex. 30.5). But the two items are not necessarily mutually exclusive, for many (if not all) deities have plurifunctional properties and share common or related character­ istics. All in all, the complex case of the identity of Mithra is not closed; the best we can do is to recognize, on the one hand, that, in the Achaemenid period, Mithra was closely related to the Sun and, on the other hand, that there was never either formal or exclusive assimilation (at least not in the official fonns of the religion; it is not easy to penetrate into popular beliefs). We have seen that during the festivals of Mithra (Mithrakana) thousands of horses were offered to the god. This is the only festival for which we are informed about the spe­ cial role played by the king—that is, about one of the aspects of his participation. In a digression about drunkenness, Atlienaeus quotes Ctesias and Duris in these words: Ctesias says that in India the king is not permitted to get drunk. But among the Persians the king is allowed to get drunk on one day, that on which they sacrifice to Mithra. On this point Duris.in the seventh book of his Histories, writes as follows: "In only one of the festivals cel­ ebrated by the Persians, that to Mithra, the king gets drunk and dances 'the Persian', no one else throughout Asia does this, but everyone abstains on this day from the dance" (X.434e->) To tell the truth, the evidence remains difficult to interpret, especially when we com­ pare a fact provided by Demetrius of Skepsis relating to the time of Antiochus the Great. According to him, "it was the habit not merely of the king's friends but also of the king himself to dance under arms at dinner (deipnon)" (Atlienaeus IV. 155b-v*). But, from the time of the Great King to the Seleucid king, similar features may have concealed differ­ ing functions (in the Persian court, only the king danced the persica). We know in any case that, at the Achaemenid court, dances were part of the ritual: when "Cyrus" "per­ formed the customary sacrifice and led the Persians in their national (kata ta patria) dance" (Xenophon, Cyr. VIII.7.1-*-). We also know that the persica was widely known. Xenophon presents it as an expression of joy among the Persians (Cyr. VIII.4.12). Duris specifies that the Persians regularly gave themselves over to it, in the same way that they took up horsemanship, because it strengthened the muscles. One can well believe this, if one recalls Xenophon's description: Lastly, [a Mysian] danced the Persian dance, clashing his shields together and crouching down and then rising up again; and all this he did, keeping time to the music of the flute (Anab. VI.!.!()•)

Between Men and Gods

253

Let us note in passing that Duris's comparison of the persica with riding exercises is per­ haps not fortuitous. Aelian, who certainly got his information from Ctesias, records that the Persians banged bronze weapons in front of their horses to accustom them to the clangor of battle (Anim. XVI.25). Could this be a fleeting allusion to the shields struck by the soldiers while dancing the persica? In any case, it appears that the persica was a military dance, quite appropriate for honoring a warrior-god such as Mithra. It is also noteworthy that on the day of the festival of Mithra, only the king could dance the persica. Likewise, only the king could become drunk. Drunkenness was per­ haps a common condition among the Persians, including their kings, since according to Plutarch (Art. 6.4), Cyrus the Younger—to demonstrate his royal qualities—boasted of holding his liquor better than his brother Artaxerxes. And, according to Ctesias (Persica $45), Xerxes II perished at the hand of conspirators "when after a festival he fell asleep drunk in his palace"! It has sometimes been supposed that royal drunkenness on the clay of Mithrakana was due to drinking haoma, which is considered an intoxicating beverage but whose ingredients remain hotly disputed; but this is sheer speculation. Would not royal drunkenness instead relate to a fertility rite, symbolized by the vine?

The Worship ofAnahita Anahita, like Mithra, does not appear in the royal inscriptions until Artaxerxes II, but we know that he granted special privileges to her worship in all of the imperial capitals, from Bactra to Sardis. Without devaluing the meaning of Artaxerxes IPs decrees, we can surmise, however, that devotion to the goddess did not result simply from a sudden change; worship of her must have evolved over a long period of time. Other than late attestations of Anahita in Asia Minor in the form of Anaitis or Persian Artemis, evidence for her worship is basically limited to scenes on seals and rings. One of the seals, belonging to Gorgippa (Anapa), shows (fig. 37a) a king dressed in a long robe and wearing a crenellated crown; he extends both hands toward a woman, who also wears a crenellated crown. She appears in a radiant nimbus, standing on a lion; in her right hand she holds a flower, in the left a baton. Another seal (Louvre, Coll. de Clercq) shows (fig. 37b) a woman seated on a chair with a low back, feet on a footstool; she wears a crown and holds a lotus flower in her left hand; with her right hand she is about to take a dove being presented by a young child standing in front of her; behind the child we recognize a footed censer. Another female figure (also wearing a crenellated crown) fills

Fig. 37. Anahita. (a) The king before Anahita? (b) Representation ofAnahita?

254

Chapter 6. Representations of Royalty and Monarchic

Ideology

out the scene at the right. These two seals are often compared with a scene on a ring from the Oxus treasury: a woman is seated on a coach with a low back; she wears a crenellated crown; she holds a flower in her right hand and a crown in her left. Although the interpretation is contested, these are probably three representations of Anahita. The connections with the dove are well attested. The connection with lions is brought out in an anecdote in Aelian, who records that in a sanctuary of Anaitis in Elymais tame lions roam freely (Anim. XII.23). Furthermore, we have a document whose date is more certain: a seal impression on Treasury tablets portrays a woman, a goddess also surrounded by a radiant nimbus (PTS 91). This document to some extent furnishes the missing link. With this evidence, the figure of the king facing Anahita riding on her lion can be added to the file on relations between the Great King and the deities. Even­ tually, we will need to consider certain modifications that Artaxerxes II made to the wor­ ship of the goddess (chapter 15/8). Another equally interesting fact is that the imagery of the first seal very closely re­ sembles Urartian and Mesopotamian depictions. It seems clear, in this context, that Anahita owes much to Mesopotamian Istar. Because of this, it is reasonable to suppose that syncretism was at work at least as early as the arrival of the Persians in these regions. This is probably what Herodotus meant when he wrote that the Persians "learned from the Assyrians and Arabians the cult of Uranian Aphrodite" (I.13I). We are thus led to believe that even though the goddess is not mentioned in the inscriptions of the early kings, she was quite certainly worshiped at an early period. We should also recall that, according to Tacitus (III.62), there was a sanctuary in honor of Anaitis [Persian Diana] in Lydia as early as the reign of Cyrus.

Chapter 7

People and Life at Court } . Sources and Problems In the foregoing chapters, I have already offered a partial account of the way that the central court functioned as the locus of power par excellence: it was where the king lived with his family and household, where the nobility had to reside, where administra­ tive and strategic decisions were made, where the satraps were summoned or where they came to consult with the king, where foreign ambassadors were received, where festivals and sacrifices presided over by the king were held, and so on. Paradoxically, documen­ tation of court life is rare and unevenly distributed. The Persepolis tablets occasionally provide indirect but important information, despite their narrowly administrative char­ acter {see chap. 11), but it must be said that most information comes directly or indi­ rectly from the Greek authors of the fourth century and from Alexander's historians. The former depend most often on Ctesias and other court writers, such as Dinon; both are abundantly used by two authors we quote frequently, Plutarch in the Life of Artaxerxes and Aelian in his Historical Miscellany. Many other authors focused on the Achaemenid court (e.g., Heraclides of Cyme, Phylarcus, Theopompus). Their works are lost, but for­ tunately they are quoted by Atlienaeus, to whom we will frequently refer. On the other hand, for the fifth century we know practically nothing specific, because unlike Ctesias, Herodotus is hardly interested in court life, aside from his discussions of Darius's mar­ riages, the (supposed) role of Atossa regarding her royal husband, and the romance of Masistes with which his Inquiries ends. In a very general way, the fourth-century authors and Alexander's historians were guided by the desire to evoke a sense of wonder in their readers by dwelling on what they considered most characteristic of the Great King's court—its opulence, which they took as both a manifestation of its power and proof of its weakness. Also important to us are the numerous details they provide on the organization of the royal banquets and ponder­ ous digressions on the dissolute life and nefarious influence of the Persian princesses. They are much more sparing of details on administrative organization, with the excep­ tion of lists. Thus Xenophon enumerates "tax-collectors, paymasters, boards of public works, keepers of his estates, stewards of his commissary department, . . . superinten­ dents of his horses and hounds" (Cyr. VIII. 1.9o-). The author of De Mundo writes: in ad­ dition to the guards, servants, and porters, there were "stewards of his revenues and leaders in war and hunting, and receivers of gifts, and others. . ." (398a 2O-30-*)- But it must be acknowledged that we know nothing more about most of these people than their titles. The selection of information was obviously carried out as a function of a string of cul­ tural presuppositions and ideological stereotypes. It is clear that it was the king's bed and the king's table that most attracted the Greeks. All we need to look at for confirmation of 255

256

Chapter 7. People and Life at Court

this is the abbreviated inventory of Darius Ill's camp (Athenaeus XIII.608a). Using these sources thus poses a methodological problem that has already been pointed out several times in this book. In this particular case, we must not "throw the baby out with the bath­ water." That is, in reading the Classical authors, we must distinguish the Greek interpre­ tive coating from the Achaemenid nugget of information. Rejecting the interpretation the Greek writers gave to an Achaemenid court custom does not imply that the custom or practice they were dealing with was pure and simple invention on their part.

Tents and Palaces Let us also stress the fact that many authors allude to Persian court customs in the context of wars fought by the Persian, Greek, and Macedonian armies. Thus, they were particularly interested in booty, a fact that resulted in fairly exact descriptions (albeit with selective quotation to some extent) of the Persian camps captured after battles. In Alexander's day, the Great King fought far from his palace. He and his court, as we have seen, migrated periodically between the various royal residences. The king relocated with not only his close family, household, and courtiers, but also the various depart­ ments of the administration. The mountains of luggage were transported on camelback and muleback, as well as by a special kind of porter whose Persian name, given by Quintus Curtius, is gangahas 'treasury porters' (III. 13.7-0). The word 'treasury' (Persian *ganza: 111.13.5*) also refers to all of the paraphernalia that followed the king. In fact, "the greater part of his money and everything else a great king takes with him even on campaign for his extravagant way of living" (Arrian II. 11.10O-); "when the Persian king goes to war, he is always well provided not only with victuals from home (oikos) and his own cattle" (Herodotus I.I880). When the group stopped, specialized workers had to level the ground and erect the royal tent. Xenophon marveled at how quickly "each one has assigned to him likewise the part that he is to do" in packing and unpacking all of the baggage (Cyr. VIII.5.2,45-0-). The royal tent was erected in the middle of the camp (VIII.5.3, 8-10) and marked with distinctive symbols (cf. Quintus Curtius III.8.7). Each officer also had a tent of his own, recognizable by an ensign flying from a mast (Cyr. VIII.5.13). T h e royal tent was truly monumental, reproducing to the last detail the private apartments of the palace. According to Herodotus (IX.70-0-), Xerxes' tent (left in Greece for the use of Mardonius) even contained "the manger used by his horses—a remarkable piece of work, all in bronze" (cf. Quintus Curtius III.3.21). As in any palace, there was a gate, where entry was strictly controlled. There was also a banquet hall; its luxury amazed all the Greeks who had taken possession of Mardonius s tent after the battle of Plataea. This was a cloth and leather monument of impressive dimensions. According to Chares of Mytilene, Al­ exander's banquet tent was raised on columns 15 m high. The interior of this portable palace measured nearly 700 m in circumference (Athenaeus XU.538b-d, 539d). This was the tent where Alexander held court and granted audiences, after the model of the Great Kings on the road. He sat on a gold seat surrounded by his personal guard (539f), which included 500 Persian melophoroi 'bodyguards' [lit.: 'apple-bearers'] (Aelian, VH IX.3o). We can understand how the Athenians were later able to conceptualize their own Odeon on the model of Xerxes' tent. Descriptions by Greek authors go on to provide original information about this tent. Plutarch, for instance, records our only information about the splendor of Darius Hi's bathing rooms:

Sources and Problems

257

Darius's tent, w h i c h was full of s p l e n d i d furniture a n d quantities of gold a n d silver, they re­ served for A l e x a n d e r himself. . . . W h e n h e b e h e l d the b a t h i n g vessels, the water-pots, the pans, a n d the o i n t m e n t b o x e s , all of gold curiously wrought, a n d s m e l t the fragrant o d o u r s with which the w h o l e p l a c e was exquisitely p e r f u m e d , a n d from t h e n c e passed into a pavil­ ion o f great size a n d height, w h e r e the c o u c h e s a n d tables a n d preparations for an entertain­ ment were perfectly m a g n i f i c e n t , h e turned to t h o s e a b o u t h i m a n d said, "This, it s e e m s , is royalty."

[Alex.

20.12-13*)

The reflection placed on Alexander's lips reminds us of the reaction of Pausanias and the Greeks to the indolent luxury of Mardonius's tent, which they seized after the battle of Plataea (Herodotus IX.82), and many other authors dwell on the splendor of the Per­ sian generals' tents. The descriptions of Alexander's tent are equally rich in informa­ tion, since he obviously took up a custom of the Great Kings. In general, all the ancient authors' expatiations on the luxury of Alexander's court (reprehensible in their eyes) underline the continuities with Achaemenid practice. The Classical texts are even more important in that we know so little of the environ­ ment within the royal residences. At Susa, a residential quarter containing the royal apartments has been found. Movement between rooms was accomplished with special corridors. But it is generally thought that royal Susa included only a very few permanent residences. The same thinking has been offered about Persepolis. It is sometimes in­ ferred that, during the migrations of the court, the royal entourage stayed in tent cities set out on the plain below the terrace. Indeed, we know that the court included a great number of people because, according to Dinon and Ctesias, 15,000 people, including the soldiers, were fed every day (Athenaeus IV. 146c). Nevertheless, these interpretations give rise to several methodological reservations. First of all, these interpretations rely on gaps in the archaeological record. It is clear that any conclusions regarding the permanent occupation of Persepolis must be consid­ ered premature as long as the plain has not been systematically excavated. We know that from Cambyses' time on, palaces and residences were built there. We also know that in Artaxerxes IPs time a new palace was built at Susa, down on the Shaur River. There are other ways in which archaeology is not entirely silent. A bathing room has been found at Persepolis. It seems clear that the Great King retired to bathe there regularly (cf. Ae­ lian, VH XII. 1), as did the Persian nobles (cf. Polyaenus VIII. 16.1; Diodorus XIV.80.8), as well as Alexander at Babylon (cf. Plutarch, Alex. 76.1-5; Arrian VII.25). Some reliefs (waiters on the royal table) and objects (dishes) imply the existence of reception halls within the palace. The well-known existence of a military quarter indicates that other buildings had been built for the various guard corps. The kurtas, who worked in the many workshops, were perhaps housed nearby as well. What is more, the Classical texts are sometimes explicit on this subject. The large number of references to the king's bedroom is major evidence: from a passage in Plu­ tarch (Art., 29.3), we can even infer that the walls were not very thick! Again, Diodorus says in his description of Persepolis that "scattered about the royal terrace were resi­ dences (katalyseis) of the kings and . . . generals, all luxuriously furnished," and he men­ tions that "private houses (idiotikoi oikoi) had been furnished with every sort of wealth" (XVII.71.8*, 70.2*). Bagoas's house (oikos), which Alexander gave to Parmenion, should be included among these private residences (Plutarch, Alex. 39.10). A comparison of the descriptions of the Achaemenid palaces with the descriptions of Alexander's tent is also interesting. According to Chares, Alexander took his meals with

Chapter 7. People and Life at Court

258

His guests in a sumptuous tent at Susa, while the soldiers, foreign ambassadors, and tour­ ists ate in the palace courtyard (aide) (Atlienaeus XII.538c). Heraclides writes of royal Achaemenid meals in which the Great King and his guests dined in two halls (oikemata) in the royal palace while the soldiers of the guard and other troops shared their rations in the palace courtyard (aule) (Atlienaeus IV. 145a—f). We do not know why Alexander chose to organize his festivities in a tent even though the Persian palaces were still stand­ ing. Perhaps the explanation can be found in the permanently mobile nature of Alexan­ der's court? There is general agreement that the Persian royal tent was as exact a replica as possible of the palaces at Susa and Persepolis. Protocol and the layout of the rooms corresponded as closely as possible to those of the permanent residences. Furthermore, there were certainly royal apartments, luxuriously furnished, in each of the major cities of the provinces in which the king could stay from time to time.

2. Household

Staff

The Chiliarch and the Audience Service The high court officer best known to the Greeks was undoubtedly the officer they called the chiliarch, whose title may have been rendered in Iranian as ftdzctrapcftis'Commander of a Thousand'. The Persian word is borrowed directly into Greek in the trans­ literated form azarapateis (Hesychius: plural) and also in the less precise form azabarites (Ctesias §46). The reason this officer appears so often in the works of the ancient authors was that (as they have it) every visitor needed his intercession in order to be granted an audience (see chap. 6/3 above). According to Diodorus of Sicily (XVIII.48.4-*), "The po­ sition and rank of chiliarch had first been brought to fame and honour by the Persian kings." Nepos writes of Tithraustes, chiliarch at Avtaxevxes II's court, "that he held the second rank in the State" (Conon 3.2). Thus, we may say that most ancient writers re­ garded the chiliarch as the highest person in the Achaemenid court, the controller and supervisor of every department; in short, he acted as prime minister or grand vizier (to use the traditional expression). This interpretation is highly improbable. For one thing, the documents visually ad­ duced in its support are of quite unequal value. Furthermore, and most importantly, it contradicts what is known of the power structure. The king doubtless had a bureaucracy of scribes and other permanent staff around him. But he never delegated his sovereign power to anyone. Even Parnaka, head of the economic administration of Persia, was sub­ ject to him (see chap. 11/10 below). Every bureau chief was personally responsible to him, such as the one who ran the Treasury of the Royal House (perhaps distinct from the imperial Treasuries: see p. 946), whom Nepos calls 'guardian of the royal fortune' (gazae custos regiae; Dat. 14.3), or the head of the royal correspondence (astandes; Plutarch, Aiex. 18.8). When the king had to make a decision, either he acted alone or he appealed to a few men chosen according to their recognized abilities. A council with a permanent membership never existed (chap. 3/4 above). Every court job was temporary and could be transferred from one day to the next to another trustworthy man. The author of De Mundo (398a) Despite the efforts of Iranists to find vocabulary of Persian origin, not one item in the Achaemenid corpus confirms the existence of such an institution. A word in the Ara­ maic documents from Egypt, gausaka, has often been thought to parallel the Greek ex­ pressions, but the comparison does not seem definitive. The gausaka was actually a satrapal inspector who, upon the summons of a community, came to make an inquiry on the spot accompanied by "judges and policemen(?) who —[like themselves] —are placed over the province of the Southern District" (DAE 101 [AP 27]).

Royal Letters and Satrapal

Subordination

We have also seen how Darius's envoy Bagaeus knew how to impress the Persians at Sardis with royal letters, which were taken metonymically as the royal word itself (111.128). The royal couriers were inviolable in their person —hence the seriousness of the accusation against the same Oroetes (III. 127). For the Persians, the reading of a royal message took on a character as impressive as an order given directly by a king in the flesh: did it not start out with "Saith Darius the King"? Polyaenus (VII.21.5) records that the satrap Datames, upon receiving a letter from King Artaxerxes II, performed the rite of proskynesis before it and offered the sacrifice customary for good news. Satraps and/or

King and Satraps

345

generals received royal instructions that they had to follow to the letter. There are many examples. When Aristagoras brought Artaphernes the proposal to conquer Samos, the satrap gave his approval in principle but made the following response to the Milesian: "The only other thing we need is to get the king's approval." It was not until he received the royal letter that he undertook military preparation (Herodotus V.31-32-V-). In a gen­ eral way, the heads of provinces did not have the right to take the smallest military or dip­ lomatic initiative (e.g., Xenophon, Hell. IV.8.16-17). In order to justify their actions, they exchanged many letters with the central authority (e.g., Xenophon, Anab. 1.5.2-3) or visited the court (e.g., Hell. 1.3.9; IV.8.16; Diodorus XIV.39, 81;XV.4.2). The generals refer explicitly to royal letters that were composed extremely carefully (cf. Herodotus VI.97, 101). The Persian satraps frequently plead for an exception from royal control in order to make a diplomatic or military decision (cf. Xenophon, Hell. 1.5.5; III.2.20; 4.5— 6,11, etc.). It was otherwise very unusual for a king's instructions not to be followed word for word. For example, Otanes proceeded to massacre the Samians, contrary to Darius's order, which said "not to kill or capture any Samian, but to hand the island over to Sy­ loson intact" (Herodotus III. 147). But there were good reasons for his acting against or­ ders: contrary to assurances that they had given, Maeandrius and his men had massacred "the Persians of the highest rank," who, after making the agreement, "were sitting on their chairs of state" (III. 144-45). If a satrap intended to disobey, he knew well that he risked being denounced before the king—as is shown by the prelude to the revolt of Cyrus the Younger against his brother (chap. 15/2). Many examples in fact show that the satraps or the strategoi were frequently denounced, wrongly or rightly, by other satraps or by high provincial officials. In all likelihood, in such cases the suspect satrap was ipso facto called to court—as were, for example, Bardiya/Tanyoxarces by Cambyses and Ochus by Sogdianus (according to Ctesias, §10, 47). The satrap then had to answer the accusations brought against him be­ fore the king himself. Moreover, to lead a war presupposes the requisite financial and military means. We can be sure that neither the treasurers nor the managers of store­ houses would furnish a speck of merchandise without receiving instructions from the central authority, worked out to the penny. It was not simply up to the satrap himself to order the minting of coins. We will also see that the fixing of a tribute rate by Darius in principle relieved the satraps of any possibility of adjusting the amount of tribute assess­ ments (see also chap. 10/2). While the Babylonian tablets and the Aramaic documents from Egypt show that in each satrapy justice was rendered by the satrap and his subordi­ nates, many examples also show that the Great King could intervene in decisions at any moment if the local populations exercised their right of appeal; this provided a means of tempering and controlling the possible arbitrariness of the satraps (see chap. 12/4).

Satrapal Courts and the Royal Court Xenophon explains that one of the satrap's fixed obligations was to organize his court on the model of the central court [Cyr. VIII.6.10-13). Unfortunately, we have only a handful of documents that portray these satrapal courts, except in the areas that held special fascination for the Greek authors. The luxury and furnishings of the satrapal courts never failed to spark the imagination of the Greeks. The example of Pausanias of Sparta shows that some Greeks were dazzled by the Persian lifestyle in Asia Minor, as had been even more true of Polycrates of Samos at an earlier period (chap. 2/6).

346

Chapter 8. The King's Men

In particular, the Greek authors give consistent accounts of the satrapal paradises along with their resorts. These allowed a life of luxury characteristic "of satraps and kings" (Quintus Curtius VII.2.22). The description of Cyrus the Younger's paradise at Sardis given by Xenophon (Oec. IV20-25) is familiar, as is Plutarch's description of Ti$saphernes' paradises in the same town: "One of them was the handsomest, because its lawns and its refreshing waters, its retreats and its manicured lawns displayed an unimag­ inable royal luxury" (Ale. 24.7). This description is not dissimilar to the description of the paradise laid out near Cyrus's tomb at Pasargadae (see chap. 2/7 above). Every sa­ trapy had at least one, including Persia (chap. 11/5). In Asia Minor alone, in addition to the paradise at Sardis, Xenophon describes others at Celaenae and Dascylium. At Celaenae, Xenophon's companions were able to see "a great park, rilled with wild animals . . . and watered by the Meander" (Anab. 1.2.7). Xenophon's description of the paradise in Dascylium (Hell. IV. 1.15-16) is particularly evocative: T h a t is w h e r e P h a r n a b a z u s m a i n t a i n e d his residence, with h a n d s o m e , large villages all r o u n d , a b u n d a n t l y provided with all the resources, a n d with g a m e both in e n c l o s e d para­ dises a n d in the o p e n s p a c e s — m a g n i f i c e n t g a m e ! T h r o u g h the w h o l e length flowed a river stocked with every kind of fish. Wildfowl were there in a b u n d a n c e as well, for those who m i g h t hunt for birds.

Xenophon's description is illustrated in the scenes on certain bullas from Dascylium (some dating from the reign of Xerxes). Numerous kinds of birds are depicted there, in­ cluding a falcon holding a lobster in its beak. One of the satrapal customs that the Greeks often elaborated on (having endured it themselves) was the routine of the satrapal audience. For instance, in order to obtain money from Cyrus the Younger, the Spartan Callicratidas, despite all his proud preju­ dices, had to resort "to go and beg at the doors of the king's commanders, as Lysander had done." Upon his arrival at the gate of Cyrus's palace, the guard let him know that Cyrus "was busy drinking." He soon endured a new rebuff, and "he took it hardly and set off for Ephesus" (Plutarch, Lysander 6-0-). In Xenophon's report, Cyrus made Callicrati­ das wait two days: "Callicratidas was unhappy with this delay, furious with having to wait so long at the Gate." Callicratidas complained later: "When I went to find Cyrus, he put off doing what I asked day after day, and I could not find satisfaction without endlessly going to the Gate" (Xenophon, Hell. 1.6.6-10). These long delays became proverbial. To highlight the haughty nature of Aspasia (Pericles' companion), a comic author wrote, "You could get an interview with Pharnabazus quicker than with her!" (Athenaeus XIII.570c). Of course the problem of imperturbable officials was not limited to the satrapal courts of Asia Minor. We can see it in Egypt in the mishaps of the person portrayed in the Peti­ tion of Peteisis: "For seven months 1 tried to get justice from the governor or his officials, with no success, because Pkoip, the administrator of Teuzoi, who had gone to Memphis, plotted against me and told everyone, 'Keep him from reaching the governor!'" The satraps' table-fare was perceived as an additional tax on subject populations (chap. 10/4) and was no less striking to the imagination than other customs. One of the many ways in which Pausanias manifested his "Medization" was by his table, "served in the Persian style" (Thucydides 1.130.1). Imitating Xerxes' lent that was captured after the battle of Plataea (Herodotus IX.82), the satraps' tents also served as dining rooms, whose opulence always astonished the Greeks. Tiribazus of Armenia's tent had "silver-footed

The King and His Faithful: The Persians, the Greeks, and Others

347

couches in it, and drinking cups, and people who said that they were his bakers and his cup-bearers" (Xenophon, Anab. IV.4.21). As for Agesilans, he pretended to look down on the luxury flaunted by Pharnabazus, who "had arrived in expensive splendor.... His ser­ vants spread at his feet those carpets on which the Persians love to loll lazily" (Xeno­ phon, Hell. IV. 1.30). The best description of a Persian general's tent appears in the book of Judith, namely, the tent of Holophernes, into which the heroine is conducted: "Holophernes was resting on his bed under a canopy of purple and gold studded with emeralds and precious sloncs." When he left the tent, it was "with silver torches carried before him" (Judith 10:21-22*). Judith was then taken to the place where his silver dinner ser­ vice was laid, and quantities of food and wine were ready (Judith 12:1). The looting after the murder of the Persian gives an idea of the richness of his surroundings: "The people looted the camp for thirty days. They gave Judith the tent of Holophernes, all his silver plates, his divans, his drinking bowls and all his furniture" (Judith 15:1 ]•>). All of these texts give an idea of the richness of the satrapal palaces. Satraps arranged banquets ac­ cording to the royal model, such as Cyrus the Younger's banquet described by Aelian in his story about the adventures of Aspasia (VH XII. I). It is clear, then, that in all of the activities of the satrapal court, the arrangements were identical to those of the central court, whether it was audience rituals (when Cyrus the Younger received people in his palace at Sardis, he was seated on a chair of gold and sil­ ver: Xenophon, Hell. 1.5.3) or organizing banquets or hunts. On this point, the material Xenophon gives in the Cyropaedia sounds right: in their provinces, the satraps had to act and behave in the image of the king: "they had to imitate everything they saw Cyrus do" (VIIl.6,10). Among all of the measures recorded by Xenophon, there are two that seem particularly significant: "To obligate all those who were to receive land and an official residence to frequent the [satrap's] G a t e . . . . To educate at the Gate .. . the children who would be born." To put it another way, the Persian youths of the provinces received at the satraps' Gates the education that the Persians of Persia normally received. The Persian provincial nobility vvas invited to transform itself into a court nobility. Isocrates also confirms this fact (in his own way); the better to condemn the failings of the barbar­ ians, he writes: "Therefore, those of them who go down to the seashore and whom they call satraps do not appear unworthy of the education of their country and keep the same customs" (Paneg. 152). All of these arrangements were intended to conserve the political and cultural homogeneity of the Persians of the imperial diaspora. S o this epigram from Hie Palatine Anthology (1X.423) makes perfect sense: "Sardis, the king's Persia in Asia."

6. The King and His Faithful: The Persians, the Greeks, and the Others

Sources and Problems Before drawing general conclusions (chap. 8/7 below) from the preceding analyses, we need to broach a question that so far has deliberately been set aside: Were Persians the sole beneficiaries of the imperial system of favors? The question is particularly legit­ imate because the inquiry has been conducted almost exclusively on the basis of Greek sources, which list many more Greeks than Persians among the Benefactors and among the persons the king honored with court titles, gifts, and favors. Has reality been con­ structed in a way that fits the corpus of evidence?

348

Chapter 8. The Kings Men

To read Herodotus, the Greeks held a decisive place close to the kings. According to him, for example, Demaratus played a major role in the choice of Xerxes as heir, in pref­ erence to Artobarzanes (VII.3), and Histiaeus had Darius's ear (V. 106-7). Themistocles arrived at court just at the time of the accession of Artaxerxes I, and the new king put to­ tal confidence in him. Entirely in character, Herodotus gives the definition of the royal euergetes ('Benefactors') with regard to Greeks, who he states were called orosangae in Persian (VIII.85). Then he gives the names of Theomestor and Phylacus of Samos, who were rewarded for their valor at Salamis: "Theomestor in reward for this service was in­ vested by the Persians with the tyranny of Samos, and Phylacus was enrolled in the cata­ logue of the King's Benefactors and presented with a large estate (hhore)." Further on, we again gain the impression that, of all the participants in Salamis whose names the royal secretaries recorded, only the Greeks were honored by Xerxes (VIII.90: Samothracian ship)! Similarly, in his passage on the preparation for Xerxes' expedition, Herodotus appears to assign a disproportionate role to the Athenian diviner Onomacritus (VII.6), The evidentiary context thus requires a more careful analysis of the place of Greeks in Darius's entourage. In fact, there are several who obtained advantages and prefer­ ences: Democedes, the physician from Crotone, was rewarded with gold for healing Da­ rius's sprain, but also with an estate (oikos) and a court title, "Tablemate" (Herodotus III. 130-32). For giving Darius a purple cloak at the time of Cambyses' expedition to Egypt, Syloson was made tyrant of Samos (111.130-49). Coes was made tyrant of Mytilene in 512 (V.I 1) because he counseled the king judiciously (IV.97). Another Ion­ ian, Histiaeus of Miletus, was rewarded at the same time with a land grant in the country of the Edonians in Thrace (V. 11); then Darius brought him to Susa, promising that he would be his Tablemate and counselor (V.24). Herodotus also records the arrival of De­ maratus to see Darius, after he had been exiled from Sparta. Quite a few other Greek ex­ iles are known, especially from the time following the Persian Wars. Many of them— Themistocles is one of the best-known cases —received cities in Asia Minor from the Great Kings, following a procedure already attested in Cyrus's time. Among them were Gongylus, Demaratus, and their offspring, who received lands and towns in Troas from Xerxes. In some cases, even entire Greek communities were collectively honored by the king: "At Acanthus, Xerxes issued a proclamation of friendship to the people and made them a present of a suit of Median clothes, with many expressions of approval for their enthusiastic support of the war and for the work they had done on the canal" (VII. 117). In another city, AbdeTa: "Xerxes is known to have . . . made a pact of friendship with the people there, and to have given them a golden scimitar (akinakes) and a gold-embroi­ dered headband" (VIII. 120). There is no disputing that there were many Greeks at the Great King's court. But the composition of Herodotus's audience (he addressed Greeks principally) and, more gen­ erally, the Hellenocentric orientation of the available sources tend to influence our in­ terpretation. It is clear that, although the Great King used Greek representatives, it was only for the relations they maintained with the Greek cities. When Pausanias acquired the (relative) confidence of Xerxes, it was because Xerxes hoped to turn it to his advan­ tage in the continuing war against the Greeks in Asia Minor: "In agreement with the noble Artabazus, whom I sent to you, see to my affairs with full confidence and conduct them most gloriously and however is best for both." So says Xerxes in a letter attributed to him by Thucydides (1.130.3). In other words, Pausanias was subordinate to the initia-

The King and His Faithful: The Persians, the Greeks, and Others

349

lives of the Persian Artabazus (who had just received the satrapy of Dascylium), and he had to act in the royal interest. The same was true of Themistocles, who said to the king: "Today, likewise, I have the opportunity to do much good for you, and here I am, pur­ sued by the Greeks, because of my friendship with you" (Thucydides 1.137.4). Plutarch in turn comments as follows: "They even say that in successive reigns, in which the af­ fairs of Persia were more closely intertwined with the affairs of Greece, whenever the kings needed a Greek, every one of them wrote letters promising that he would be more prominent at court than Themistocles" (Them. 29.9). Furthermore, when Themistocles went back clown to the sea, it was "to take up the affairs of Greece" (30.1). "The king hoped, through [Themistocles], to see the Greek world enslaved" (Thucydides 1.138.2). But as Plutarch notes in passing (31.3), the Great King's gaze was not fixed constantly on the shores of the Aegean. And Aelian (VH 1.22) is careful to state—since it would not be self-evident to his readers! —that the gifts given to ambassadors by the king were not reserved for Greeks alone. There were of course representatives of other peoples at court, such as Udjahorresnet, who followed Cambyses when he departed from Egypt and who resided for some time at Darius's court. When he returned to Egypt, it was be­ cause it was profitable to do so. In other words, in every conquered country, the Great King found collaborators (in the neutral sense) ready to serve his interests, as long as they received royal rewards that would bring them wealth and prestige—of which Udja­ horresnet boasted: "I was honored by all my masters; [as long as] I lived(?) they gave me finery of gold and made me every useful thing" (Posener, no. ID).

Foreigners and the Court Hierarchy The question is, even when Greeks (or other foreigners) had court titles (including Benefactor) or prestige gifts (robes, jewelry), were they on an equal footing with Persian nobles? An explicit passage in Plutarch entertains some doubt. He says that Themisto­ cles was especially honored by the Great King "because he participated in the royal hunts and the palace entertainments . . . , and he even became a friend of the king's mother." The Persian nobles at the court, however, reacted rather badly, and Plutarch explains their irritation: "It is true that the honors he received were nothing like what had been done for any other foreigner" (hoi alloi xenoi; Them. 29.6). A similar interpre­ tation is found in Thucydides (1.138.2): "Themistocles then took on an important posi­ tion with the king, as no Greek had ever done before." In fact, as Plutarch explains later on, satiated by the great dorea he enjoyed at Magnesia, the Greek "was honored as an equal to Persians of the first rank" (timomenos homoia Person aristois; Them. 31.3). We may also recall the case of Entimus the Cretan, who participated in Artaxerxes IPs "din­ ner of the Kinsmen." Phaenias (quoted by Athenaeus II.48f>) stresses the exceptional nature of such an honor's being granted to a Greek: "The Persians took umbrage at this, because they felt that the honour was being vulgarized (demeuomene)." To illustrate the special position of Themistocles, Plutarch records how the king re­ fused to grant Demaratus the privilege (considered obviously disproportionate) "of mak­ ing his entry to Sardis, on horseback, with the tiara set in the royal manner upon his head." This request aroused irony in the king's cousin Mithropastes and the anger of Xerxes. Themistocles had to intervene to reconcile the Icing with the Spartan exile (29.8). Obviously, as a Greek, Demaratus did not know his place, probably supposing that royal favor made him an equal of Persians of the highest distinction. This was also

350

Chapter 8. The King's Men

true of the Spartan Pausanias, if Thucydides is to be believed. When Pausanius received Xerxes' letter, his ambition grew in unwonted proportion: H e grew u n a b l e to live in the c u s t o m a r y fashion: h e left B y z a n t i u m dressed as a M e d e ; h e toured T h r a c e with a n escort o f M e d e s a n d E g y p t i a n s ; his table was served in the Persian m o d e ; u n a b l e to c o n t a i n his e m o t i o n s , h e revealed through his trivial behavior what h e was p l a n n i n g later on a grand s c a l e . E v e n t u a l l y h e proved difficult to a p p r o a c h . ( T h u c y d i d e s 1.130.1-2)

Pausanias clearly hoped that, through his behavior as a Persian satrap, he would be iden­ tified with the dominant socioethnic class. Upon reading Xerxes' (ambiguous) reply, he was perhaps convinced that the king had implicitly agreed to one of his ambitions: to wed a daughter of the Great King (§128.7). There was no clear basis for this—Xerxes was completely silent on this point. Obviously—just like Demaratus —Pausanias had not un­ derstood that, despite his assurances of loyalty to the king, his Greek origin prohibited him from ever achieving the position of a Persian aristocrat in the king's entourage.

Persian Ethnicity To be thorough, we must also mention Metiochus, son of Miltiades, the old Athenian tyrant of the Chersonese. During the reconquest subsequent to the Ionian revolt, Meti­ ochus was captured by the Phoenicians and brought to Darius: T h e king, however, far from d o i n g a n y h a r m to M e t i o c h u s , treated h i m with the greatest lib­ erality; he presented h i m with a h o u s e

(oikos)

(ktesis), a n d a Persian wife, Persas kekosmeatai). ( H e r o d o t u s V I . 4 1 )

a n d property

w h o m h e h a d c h i l d r e n who lived as Persians (es

by

Here we have an extremely rare case of a non-Persian marrying a Persian woman. We also know of the marriage of Gygaea, daughter of Amyntas of Macedonia, to the Persian Bubares. Of this union was born "a son who stayed in Asia, named Amyntas after his maternal grandfather, who enjoyed by the king's gift the revenues of the important Phrygian town of Alabanda" (VIII. 136). But the difference between the two examples is obvious. In all probability, Amyntas (who kept a Macedonian name) was not recog­ nized as a Persian, in contrast to the sons of Metiochus. It is also clear that Metiochus's sons' acceptance as native Persians—their "naturalization," as it were—resulted from royal favor, which there is every reason to consider exceptional.

The Ethnic Composition of the High Imperial Personnel The ethnic composition of the highest ranking personnel clearly illustrates the privi­ leged place that the Persians held in the Empire that they had conquered and the pro­ ceeds of which they fully intended to keep for themselves. The fact that local elites were recognized does not contradict this principle, since positions held by local elites were limited, at least under the first kings, to posts without political influence (see chap. 2/6 above). To begin with a region that is better documented than others —Egypt—we see that, beginning in the time of Darius, the leaders of the Egyptian satrapy were Persians. This was true of the satraps themselves (Aryandes, then Pharandates) and also, at SyeneElephantine, of Parnu and Ravaka, as well as of the leaders of the expedition to Cyrenaica, Amasis and Badres. Even Ariyavvrata, saris of Coptos, and his brother Atiyawahy were Persians. The Greek texts, the Elamite tablets from Persepolis, the Babylonian tablets, the Egyptian documents, and several references in the Behistun inscription provide suffi­ cient documentation on the satraps to compile a table that is statistically significant:

The King and His Faithful: The Persians, the Greeks, and Others Babylonia Egypt Sardis Dascylium Cappadocia Susa Media Bactria Aria Arachosia Camiania

351

Gubaru (535-525), Ustanu (521-516), Huta-x-x (486), to whom Bagapa (503) may perhaps be added Aryandes (522?-ca. 510?); Pharandates (519-492), Achaemenes (484-ca. 462) Oroetes (ca. 525-520); Artaphernes (513-492) Mitrobates (ca. 525-522); Oebares (493); Artabazus (479) Ariaramnes (514) Bakabana (ca. 500-495) Hydarnes (ca. 520[?]-ca. 499) [PF: Miturna] Dadarsi (522), Artapan (ca. 500-465?) Harbamissa (Arbamisa) Vivana (522); Bakabadus Karkis

The distribution of military command is also quite impressive. First of all, of course, we have the catalog of Xerxes' army. As Herodotus explains, the commanders of major divisions, in both the infantry (VII.82) and the navy (VII.97), were all king's men, often highborn Persians. Second, a look at the major expeditions leaves no doubt about the ethnicity of the commanders: Samos (520-519) Barca (513) Scythia (514?) Scythia (513) Thrace (512) Head of the shore troops: Naxos (500) Ionia (500-493) Thrace (492) Europe (490) Europe (480-479) Asia Minor (479) Eurymedon (466)

Egypt (456?)

Otanes (Herodotus III. 142) Amasis and Badres (IV. 167) Ariaramnes (Ctesias §15) Gobryas, among those close to Darius (Herodotus IV. 132, 134) Megabazus (IV. 143; V.l-24) Otanes (V.25) Megabates (V.32-35) Artaphernes, Artybius, Daurises, Hymaees, Otanes (V. 108ff.) Mardonius (VI.43-45) Datis (the Mede) and Artaphernes (VI.94) Mardonius (VIII. 100-101) Tigranes (IX.96) Tithraustes and Pharandates (Diodorus XI.60-61); Ariomardos, son of Gobryas, according to Callisthenes (Plutarch, Cz'mon 12.5) Pharandates and Artabazus (Diodorus XI.75, 77)

The statistical picture in the Persepolis sources is the same. Except for the administra­ tive workers (kurtas), of course, and specialized jobs (such as Babylonian scribes), the core of the personnel who governed lands, men, and workplaces was of Persian origin. Despite this fairly substantial documentation, at least two problems remain. For one thing, the description "Persian" may sometimes be ambiguous. In some cases, the label may simply have designated one of the king's men. The uncertainty disappears when the family and/or ethnic background of the person are expressly given—which is fairly fre­ quent in the Greek authors, consistent in the Behistun inscription, and quite notewor­ thy in a remarkable Persepolis tablet (PT 4). On one occasion, Herodotus includes a very valuable detail: the commanders of the expedition against Barca are described as

Chapter 8. The King's Men

352

"Amasis, a man of the Maraphian tribe, to command the former, and Bad res of the genos Pasargadae" (Herodotus IV. 167-0-). For another thing, as we know, the Iranian onomasticon is largely unmarked for ethnicity. Absent any relevant details, therefore, we must re­ main circumspect about the ethnic background of people, especially since it is not impossible that non-Iranians took Iranian names when they were incorporated (in one way or another) into the dominant socioethnic class. In any case, the presence of Iranians other than Persians around the king is not open to doubt. Specifically, we know of Datis, to whom nearly all the ancient sources assign a Median origin; two of his sons, Harmamithras and Tithaeus, commanded all the mounted troops of Xerxes in 480 (Herodotus VI1.88). We also know that in 522, along­ side the Persian generals (Hydarnes, Vaumisa, Hystaspes, Vivana, Vidafarnah, Dadarsi of Bactria, Artavardiya, Gobryas), Darius appointed an Armenian, Dadarsi (sent to Ar­ menia) and a Mede, Takhmaspada (sent to Sagartia). This callup of Median generals was nothing new; Cyrus also had several around him. Other sources refer explicitly to non-Persian Iranians: at the heart of the conspiracy against Darius described by Aelian (VH VI. 14) was the Hyrcanian Aribazus, who was supported by "several of the most dis­ tinguished Persians"; among '"the most influential persons" around Cambyses, Ctesias lists Artasyras, a Hyrcanian (§9); Artasyras's son Artabanus "acquired around Xerxes the influence his father had had around Darius" (§20). In sum, the statistical data permit only one conclusion: to direct the satrapies and lead the armies or even to command the garrisons (besides Pavnu and Ravaka at SyeneElephantine, cf. Boges at Eion and Mascames at Drabescus: Herodotus VII. 106-7; 113), Darius and, later, Xerxes drew massively on representatives of the Persian aristoc­ racy. The composition of the Empire's highest officials strikingly shows that it was ruled by an ensemble of great aristocratic families united around the dynasty and the cultural traditions of the Persian people. From the inception of the Empire, it was this domi­ nant socioethnic class that held poweT from the Indus to the Mediterranean and in­ tended to keep it. The elites of the subject nations or the Greek political exiles might receive important positions but not positions of political influence such as satraps or strategoi. They collaborated closely with the Persians, but they were not co-wielders of poweT. The honors and favors they might receive from the king did not place them ipso facto on an equal footing with the representatives of the great families. Finally, among the subject peoples, the Medes doubtless retained a special place, albeit secondary and of diminishing importance.

7. Achaemenid

Royalty and Persian Aristocracy

Power and Kinship To some extent, the Great Kings were able to turn the conflicts that might arise be­ tween dynastic power and the power of the great aristocratic Persian families to their ad­ vantage. The Persian nobles could closely identify with the dynastic ethic because they shared the guiding principles. By instituting a system of gifts "with strings attached," court hierarchy, and education based on monarchic values, the Great Kings succeeded in insinuating themselves into the aristocratic circles. Family solidarity, though it did not disappear, was diminished by the establishment of a personal relationship (bandaka) between each aristocrat and the king. Because of this, the kings had no need for headon assaults on the solidarity of the aristocratic families, which was the usual matrix for social and demographic reproduction.

Achaemenid Royalty and Persian Aristocracy

353

Consequently, the aristocratic houses were drawn into the monarchic sphere, though they conserved their social role. Heraclides' account of the organization of the king's table and the tables of the heads of aristocratic houses is full of information. Even when the Persian aristocrats invited their own Tablemates to dinner, they were still obligated to lunch at the royal table, where they were recognized as the most honored of the royal Tablemates (Athenaeus IV. 145f—H6a). This division of social space/time admirably ex­ emplifies the double allegiance of the Persian aristocrats—toward their family clan and toward their king. But all of the measures taken by the kings (court hierarchy, obligation to attend at court, training of the noble youth according to dynastic norms) strongly prompted the aristocrats to give unfailing priority to the king. A new stage was reached in the integration of the nobility when, at some unknown date, kinship vocabulary infil­ trated the court hierarchy. At the same time, the similarities in the organization of the royal family and the aris­ tocratic families show that the Achaemenid dynasty itself continued to function accord­ ing to the rules and values common to the entire aristocracy. The kings behaved no differently than a certain Mentor, who took an active part in raising the ten sons of his brother-in-law Artabazus: "Mentor was so enchanted with the large number of children born to the marriage that he promoted the lads, giving them the most distinguished commands in the armed forces" (Diodorus XVI.52.4-0-). The highest official in the royal administration of Persia at the time of Darius was Parnaka, whose seal calls him "son of Arsames." He was thus in all probability Darius's cousin through his father Ar­ sames, brother of Hystaspes. This Parnaka/Pharnaces fathered the "satrapal dynasty" of Hellespontine Phrygia, through Artabazus, who was named to the post by Xerxes in 479-478. Darius's father himself held a very important position in Parthia-Hyrcania in 522. One of his uncles, Artabanus, influenced him a great deal; two of Artabanus's sons (Tritantaechmes and Artyphius) commanded units in Xerxes' army (Herodotus VII.26, 66). One of Darius's brothers, "his brother by the same father," Artaphernes I, was sa­ trap of Sardis around 500 (Herodotus V.25-0-, 30, 73, 100), and he kept this position un­ til 492 at least (PF 1404-5). To lead the squadron against Samos, he chose his son Artaphernes II, Darius's nephew, who in 490 led the army against Greece with Datis and who in 480 was one of the contingent commanders of Xerxes' army (VII.74). Around 500, another cousin of Darius, Megabates, commanded the fleet (V.33); he may have been the father of Megabazus, who in 480 was one of Xerxes' admirals (VII.97); another(?) Megabates bears the title of admiral in a tablet from the reign of Darius (PT 8). The number of Darius's sons in Xerxes' army is also very impressive —no less than twelve by five different mothers. Some commanded land or sea contingents; several were killed in action. In the battle of the Eurymedon, the generals were Tithraustes, il­ legitimate son of Xerxes, and Pharandates, a nephew of the king (Diodorus XI.60.5; 61.3). In Artaxerxes I's entourage, we encounter one of his cousins, Mithropastes (Plu­ tarch, Them. 29.7). For the reconquest of Egypt, Artaxerxes I also sent an army com­ manded by Achaemenes, his own brother by Darius (Ctesias §32; Diodorus XI.74.1). Quite a few satraps were also chosen from the immediate family: Bardiya (Cambyses' brother by Cyrus), Artaphernes (Darius's brother by Hystaspes), Artarios (Artaxerxes I's son), Cyrus the Younger (Darius IPs son and Artaxerxes IPs brother), and so on. The difference is that, in the case of the royal family, kinship relations were intermingled with the rationale of dynastic succession; the great aristocratic houses were excluded

354

Chapter 8. The King's Men

from this, but they were invited to ally themselves devotedly and faithfully in the defense of dynastic continuity.

The Dynastic Pact The speech that Xenophon writes for Cambyses (father of his Cyrus) illustrates force­ fully what might be called a dynastic pact (Cyr. VIII.5.22-26). Addressing the Persian aristocracy, he first states that this Empire, conquered by force of arms, is a Persian Em­ pire. He summons the nobles to assist the king in maintaining Persian dominion over the subject peoples. Cambyses especially stresses the common interests that the king and the Persian nobility have in the face of the danger presented by rebellions by the conquered peoples. If Persian dominion is not retained, the nobles risk losing all of the advantages that conquest brought them: "And you, Persians, if any enemy people at­ tempts to bring an end to the dominance (arkhe) of Cyrus, or if any conquered people attempts to defect, you shall intervene, both for yourselves and for Cyrus, in accordance with the orders he will issue to you" (§25). This is also what Chrysantas says to his peers, echoing Cambyses in these words: "It must be understood perfectly that Cyrus will never be able to employ LIS for his own ad­ vantage without it also being for our own, since our interests are the same and our ene­ mies are the same" (VIII. 1.5). By the gifts and positions they received, the aristocrats drew economic profit from conquest, profits that they risked losing if they were to disso­ ciate from the king, since they knew perfectly well the precariousness of their position. When Agesilaus tried to persuade Pharnabazus, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, to ally with the Greeks against the king, he tried to lure him with the possibility "of no longer reinforcing the king's power but his [own] by reducing his companions to slavery (homodou/oi) to make them his dependents (hypekooi)." Pharnabazus responded straight­ forwardly: Well! If the king were to s e n d s o m e o n e e l s e to b e g e n e r a l a n d p l a c e m e u n d e r his orders, I would a g r e e to b e your friend a n d ally. B u t if h e entrusts the c o m m a n d to m e — w h i c h is, 1 think, a n o b l e a m b i t i o n (philotitnia)—you

h a d better understand that I will m a k e war on

you to the best o f my abilities. (Hell. IV.4.37)

Put another way, the gifts/services exchange was included in the "dynastic pact," by which the king undertook—absent blatant treachery or obvious error by a satrap or a strategos—to protect and favor his Faithful (handaka).

Synchrony and Diachrony The efficacy of the system over the longue duree can only be judged in hindsight. While in general the relationship between the monarchy and the aristocracy continued to rest on the foundations described above, there certainly were developments, over the course of time, which we will analyze in their proper place. The transformations may have involved the actual composition of the dominant socioethnic class, because of the ongoing, very close intimacy between the Persians of the imperial diaspora and the local elites. Transformations also have occurred during periods of dynastic troubles. Although the "dynastic pact" implied that the balance of power was very strongly tilted in favor of the Great King, it is clear that some periods of turmoil resulting from problems of suc­ cession or from external wars created special conditions, to which we shall return at the proper time (see especially chaps. 15/2, 17/2, 18/2).

PART THREE

Territories, Populations, and the Dependent Economy

Chapter 9

Territories, Communication,

and Trade

l. The Network of Roads The ancient authors were literally fascinated by the vast extent of the Achaemenid imperial territory. Many of them include full discussions or at least remarks on the com­ munications system within the Empire. They all recognize a relationship between reg­ ularity of communication and the ability of the central authority to make its presence felt in the conquered countries. Some, especially in the fourth century, insist—not unpolemically—on the impossibility of the king's mastering the imperial territory, espe­ cially since he had to gather his forces from throughout his domain (cf. Xenophon, Anab. 1.5.9, II.4.3; Diodorus XIV.22.2; Isocrates, Paneg. 165; Quintus Curtius III.2.9, etc.). Others, however, were particularly struck by the contrast they saw between the vast extent of the Empire and the rapidity of communication.

The Royal Roads In his tale of the preparations for the Ionian revolt, Herodotus describes the diplo­ matic tour of Aristagoras of Miletus to various Greek cities in Europe that he hoped to enlist as allies. In order to persuade King Cleomenes of Sparta, Aristagoras carried "to the interview a map of the world engraved on bronze" (V.49-V-). Apparently, Herodotus used a document like this to give details "on the road leading from the sea to the king," that is, the road linking Sardis to Susa, which, he writes, "traverses populated, secure re­ gions." For each region, Herodotus gives the distance in parasangs (a Persian measure equivalent to about 5.4 km), the number of hostels and stopping places found in the sta­ tions (stathmoi), and the rivers crossed and guardposts placed at regular intervals all along the way (V.52-54*). This is the route traditionally called the Royal Road. Regarding the extent and regional divisions of the Achaemenid road network, how­ ever, Herodotus's description is fragmentary. In this passage at least, his eastern geograph­ ical horizon extends no farther than Susa and Babylonia; he apparently knows nothing of the roads to Persia or a fortiori of the roads across the Iranian Plateau and Central Asia. It is particularly unfortunate that Ctesias's work on the subject has not survived: "In it he described the relays (stathmoi), days elapsed, and parasangs between Ephesus and Bactra and India," says Photius (Persica §64). The Persepolis tablets have the advantage of rep­ resenting the view from the center—even though not all the information from the tablets has been published yet. While the Susa-Persepolis connections are the most frequently attested, the following also appear: Bactra (2 mentions), Carmania (9 or 10), India (7), Arachosia and Kandahai (11), Aria (4), Sagartia (2), Media (I), Babylonia (1 or 2), Egypt (1), and Sardis (3). The entire imperial territory is covered. The Royal Road from Sardis to Susa is thus just one royal road among many others (cf. also Diodorus XIX. 19.2: [hodos] basilike between Susiana and Media via Babylonia; Ps.-Arist., Oecon. II.2.14b [Caria]; R C 20 [Hellespontine Phrygia], etc.). This is why the Hellenistic-period sources are so important: they cover (however unevenly) all the territories formerly dominated by 357

Chapter 9. Territories, Communication,

358

and Trade

the Great Kings. The chroniclers of military operations enable us to reconstruct the du­ ration of this or that movement of the army on the march: from Babylon to Susa: 22 days (Diodorus XIX.55.2); from Susa to Persia: about 30 days (XIX. 17.6); from Susa to Ecba­ tana via the royal road across Babylonia: 40 days (XIX. 19.2); from Susa to Ecbatana by the direct path across the Cossean mountains of Luristan: 9 days (XIX. 19.8); from Ecba­ tana to Persepolis: 20 days (XIX.46.6); etc. Added to the variety of information given by Herodotus and Xenophon, the data taken from the military authors (both Classical and Hellenistic) enable us to reconstruct generally, if not in detail, the network of major Achaemenid roads—keeping in mind that the accounts of military campaigns only consider roads from the point of view of the provisions the army might be able to find there. We may note first that the capitals of the Empire (Pasargadae, Persepolis, Susa, Babylon, Ecbatana) were linked by major high­ ways, in a rough quadrilateral. The best-known itinerary is Persepolis-Susa, since it can be reconstructed not only by analyzing Alexander's route but also from the Persepolis tablets: there were about twenty stops between Persepolis and Bezitme (near Susa). Ac­ cording to the Hellenistic authors, crossing the Fahliyun region took nine stages, from Parmadan to Dasher. From Susa to Ecbatana, the royal road avoided the central Zagros (Luristan), since the direct route crossing Cossean country was "difficult and narrow, skirting precipices" (Diodorus XIX. 19.2*). The main road took a longer route across the Babylonian plain before veering east to reach the Iranian Plateau near Behistun. From Ecbatana, another road reached Persia by Gabae (Isfahan) and ended up at the Persian Gulf at Bushire. Furthermore, the variety of countries named in the tablets shows that the capitals were connected to all the provinces in the Empire. Northward, the venerable Khorasan road joined Ecbatana to Bactra, via Rhagae [Teheran], the Caspian Gates, Hyrcania, and Parthia. Southward, leaving Fars, one could travel to Arachosia (Kandahar) and Gandhara (Kabul area), and from there to Bactra as well as to the Indus Valley. The North Road and the South Road were joined by a transverse road used by Cyrus and then Alexander via Aria (Artacoana/Herat), Drangiana (the Helmand basin and land of Ariaspi), and Kandahar. From Kandahar, another itinerary (used by Craterus in 325) gave access directly to the Indus Valley through the Bolan Pass. Toward the Mediterranean there were two main itineraries that coincided from Susa to Arbela (east bank of the Tigris). From Arbela, Herodotus's Royal Road reached Sardis via the upper Tigris and upper Euphrates, Armenia, and Cappadocia, the Halys, Greater Phrygia (Celaenae), and the Meander Valley. Here is Herodotus's version:

Region crossed

Parasangs

Lydia-Phrygia Cappadocia

94.5 104 15.5 56.5 (137) 42.5

Cilicia Armenia Matiene Cissia

Stops (stathmoi) 20 28 3 15 ). Coming from the other direction, Issus is where Cyrus the Younger, having taken the land route, joined up with his fleet, which had set sail from Ephesus. To get heavy goods out of the back country, there was scarcely any other alternative than using the coastal rivers and hugging the shore until reaching the mouth of another river. Many Greek cities in Asia Minor struck coins showing a river god, often holding a bow, a stern, or a rudder. In northern Asia Minor, the Hypius, Rhyndacus, Lycus, Sangarius, Iris, and Halys rivers were navigable; these were the routes for shipping out the timber cut along their upper reaches. The same was true for the Eurymedon River in southern Asia Minor. Of course, land transport of heavy goods was not unknown in the Near East, as in, for example, king Assurbanipal's account of his Egyptian campaign and the booty that resulted. He says that he transported two enormous obelisks from Thebes in Fgypt to Assyria (ANF.T 295). But only powerful states had the ability to mobilize a labor force both large enough and specialized enough to accomplish such a move. In an example from a later time, Antigonus the One-Eyed made gigantic preparations for an expedition against Egypt in 312. Established at Tyre, he sought the aid of the Phoeni­ cian kings: "He himself collected wood cutters, sawyers, and shipwrights from all sides, and carried wood to the sea from Lebanon. There were eight thousand men employed in cutting and sawing the timber and one thousand pair of draught animals in transport­ ing it" (Diodorus XIX.58.2-0-). After arriving at the coast, the wood had to be transported by sea to its destination. When Solomon requested lumber from King Hiram of Tyre, he replied that the wood would be conveyed in the form of rafts from Tyre as far as Joppa; it is likely that the same was done with the wood offered by Cyrus for the reconstruction of the temple in Jerusalem. On the Syro-Palestinian coast, several small coastal rivers were also accessible to cargo ships. 3

The Euphrates Boats Rivers and canals held a special place in the social and economic life of Babylonia. Except in its upper reaches, which were cut off by rapids, the Euphrates was navigable, as was one of its tributaries, the Khabur. Many cuneiform texts attest to the importance of trade in heavy products (grain, bitumen, wood, stone, etc.) throughout the second and first millennia. Herodotus also took a lively interest in Euphrates navigation. In par­ ticular, he gives a fairly precise description of the boats in use in his day: I will next describe the thing which surprised me most of all in this country, after Babylon itself: I mean the boats which ply down the Euphrates to the city. These boats are circular in shape and made of hide, they build them in Armenia to the northward of Assyria, where they cut ribs of osiers to make the frames and then stretch watertight skins taut on the under side for the body of the craft; they are notfined-offor tapered in any way at bow or stern, but quite round like a shield. The men fill them with straw . . . and let the current take them downstream. They are controlled by two men; each has a paddle which he works standing up, one in front drawing his paddle towards him, the other behind giving it a backward thrust. The boats vary a great deal in size; some are very big, the biggest of all having a ca­ pacity of some hundred and thirty tons [ 5000 talents]. Every boat carries a live donkey— the larger ones several—and when they reach Babylon and the cargoes have been offered for

380

Chapter 9. Territories, Communication,

and Trade

sale, the boats are broken u p , the frames a n d straw sold a n d the hides l o a d e d on the donkeys' backs for the return journey overland to A r m e n i a . It is q u i t e i m p o s s i b l e to p a d d l e the boats u p s t r e a m b e c a u s e o f the strength o f the current, a n d that is why they are constructed o f h i d e instead of wood. B a c k in A r m e n i a with their donkeys, the m e n build a n o t h e r lot o f boats to the s a m e d e s i g n . (I.194).

Herodotus seems to have confused two kinds of small craft well known in both ancient and modern Mesopotamia: the kelek, a raft constructed on a series of inflated skins, de­ scribed several times by Xenophon in the Anabasis; and the quffa (Akkadian quppu), which is a type of round boat covered with leather. Only the kelek can navigate the rap­ ids of the Euphrates. Not all of the boats were built to this pattern. This is shown, for ex­ ample, by a Neo-Babylonian-period tablet from the archives of the Eanna at Uruk: it states that 5 minas of silver are allotted for the wood for 22 boats that were to transport 30,000 measures of asphalt. The text states that the work squad includes, in addition to unspecialized laborers, a blacksmith, two builders, and four boat carpenters; the latter are a special type of carpenter, distinguished for instance from "door carpenters." In the Babylonian towns, all economic activity depended closely on numerous water­ ways, which were often a network of great complexity. They guaranteed the irrigation of the fields and the supply of drinking water as much as the transport of heavy objects. This is documented, for example, in the archives of the Eanna of Uruk. When the temple administrators bought bitumen and asphalt, these materials were transported by boat. The waterways were also used to convey both grain and date harvests to the city quays. The collection centers throughout the year were located on the shores of the nav­ igable routes: "along the high waters," to use the Babylonian expression that referred to canals that were navigable year round. It was the same in Babylon, where materials for the large temple downtown were offloaded at the "Quay of Bel." Most of the sixty canals near Nippur were navigable. At Uruk, there were flotillas that belonged either to the Eanna or, more often, to professional boatmen who worked for the temple, taking in a fairly high fee for boat and crew rental. Sometimes, peasants and soldiers were required for hauling boats. This could require quite a few craft; on one occasion, for example, we read of the crop-watcher of the Eanna, who needed to transport the barley harvest and contacted a flotilla of 300 small boats, which were immediately placed at his disposal. At Nippur, service lands were granted in concession to the "commander of the boatmen."

Transport on the Tigris In its upper course, the Tigris River was accessible to large transport ships as far as north of the Nineveh area. The Assyrian kings often used the river to float building tim­ ber and enormous sculptures for their palaces. Sennacherib built a fleet at Nineveh; it sailed down the Tigris to Opis, where the boats were transferred to the Euphrates by a canal. In the Achaemenid period, the use of the Tigris is confirmed by Darius Ill's plans in 332-331. He had decided to concentrate his immense forces in the upper valley of the Tigris at Arbela, a major town on the road connecting Babylon to the West: "He would receive his supplies either by land or by the Tigris" (Quintus Curtius 1V.9.8), he thought. The east bank of the Tigris was in fact edged by the king's highway described by Herodotus and taken by the Ten Thousand on their return northward. During this march the soldiers passed near the town of Opis, where there was a bridge; there can be no doubt that Opis was a river port of prime importance. In 539, Cyrus crossed theTigris

Lines of Communication

and Trade

381

and achieved a decisive victory over the Babylonian armies. Xenophon calls it a "consid­ erable city" (II.4.25) and describes the traffic he saw all around: "There are canals that branch off the Tigris. There are four of them. They are a plethra [approximately 30 m] wide and very deep. Boats filled with wheat travel them" (1.7.15). Tablets from the reign of Cyrus also indicate that the town contained a bustling market, where representatives of the House of Egibi went to buy and sell slaves. From Babylonia to Elam Navigation was not restricted to the great north-south routes represented by the Eu­ phrates and the Tigris. The two rivers and their tributaries were linked by many canals, which especially facilitated trade between two extremely important Achaemenid centers, Babylonia and Elam (Susiana). Beyond the transverse canals, the Persian Gulf repre­ sented a means for privileged communication. This was already evident in the strategic measures adopted as far back as the Assyrian king Sennacherib: desiring to attack Elam from Babylon, he ordered his fleet to descend the Euphrates, skirt the coast of the Per­ sian Gulf, and then land at the mouth of the Karun, on whose banks a decisive land battle was fought. It is likely that the return up the Euphrates was aided by the powerful tides, which at that time reached as far as Uruk. The comings and goings of the Macedonian fleets in 324 are also informative. After their meeting in Carmania, Nearchus, commander of the fleet, and Alexander agreed to rendezvous at Susa. Guided by a Persian pilot, Nearchus sailed up the Pasitigris (Karun) as far as Ahwaz, then took the Eulaios up to Susa. The next year, Alexander in turn, leav­ ing Susa, went down the Eulaios and reached the mouth of the Tigris; while another part of the fleet went back up the Eulaios as far as the junction with the canal linking the Eulaios with the Tigris and finally entered the Tigris. And Nearchus, who by then had reached the mouth of the Euphrates, met up with Alexander by once more taking the Eulaios. The hazards of navigation—emphasized as early as Sennacherib—made the use of professional pilots obligatory. This is what Nearchus had to say, speaking about the northern section of the Persian coast of the Gulf: "Along the Persian coast, the route was nothing but shoals, reefs, and lagoons" (hid. 38.8). The Susiana coast was similar: "The sea has little depth overall, the reefs extend far from the shores, and it is difficult to enter the ports" (40.10). Several Babylonian tablets attest to the regularity and vigor of trade. In 505, six men received payment in kind (wool) to take a boat loaded with barley to Elam. In 499, two Babylonians received a fee for taking a boat carrying garments to Elam. The House of Egibi, the commercial company, had agents on the spot. A text from the time of Nabonidus attests that, upon their return, the Babylonian boats brought "fruits of the Elamite orchards" to Babylonia. This document reminds us of what Diodorus Siculus wrote later (XVII.77.4). Speaking of "all kinds of fruit" yielded by the Uxian country (a region of Fahliyun), he wrote: "Because they dry the harvest after it is ripe, the merchants who sail the [Pasijtigris [Karun] are able to bring down a variety of dishes to Babylonia that are a delight to their customers."

From the Mediterranean to Babylonia In a letter attributed to him (Letter 30), Themistocles describes a trip that took him on an official mission from the coasts of Asia Minor to Babylon and/or Susa:

382

Chapter 9. Territories, Communication,

and Trade

D i n i n g the m a r c h , I crossed a hilly country a n d a d e e p valley. I saw a n d passed through d e e p valleys, w h o s e slopes were inhabited a n d cultivated. T h e u n i n h a b i t e d portions sheltered wild beasts a n d herds o f other a n i m a l s . I navigated m a n y rivers a n d visited m a n y peoples.

Along with other information, the text explicitly refers to the use of both land and river routes, especially for travelers from Asia Minor to Babylon. Babylonian rivers and ca­ nals were closely connected to the Mediterranean coast, because of the combination of three types of transport: river, land, and sea. T h e source of the Euphrates is no more than about 180 km from the Gulf of Alexandretta [in modern Turkey], with which trade was always active. This is probably what Herodotus was thinking of when he described the cargo of the Babylonian boats as "mostly [Phoenician] wine in palm-wood casks"; he also refers to "anyone today who travels from the Mediterranean to Babylon and comes down the Euphrates" (I.185,-0- 194-*), Merchandise offloaded in Phoenician ports arrived atThapsacus by land, then went down the Euphrates to Babylon. Regular use of these routes must have been considered normal, considering that the Athenian admiral Conon, who was in Cyprus at one point and wanted to meet the king [Arta­ xerxes II] as soon as possible, sailed for Cilicia. traveled to Thapsacus overland, and "descended the Euphrates to Babylon" (Diodorus X1V.81.4). In 324, Alexander had a fleet of 45 ships built in Phoenicia. "These ships were taken in pieces to the Euphrates at the city of Thapsacus, where they were reassembled and went down the river to Babylon . . . where the king had a harbor dug able to receive 1000 warships, as well as arsenals for this harbor" (Arrian VII.20.2-4). From the Achaemenid period proper, we can quote a passage from the Foundation Charter of Darius's palace at Susa: "The wood used here was brought from a mountain called Lebanon. The people from across the river (Ebir-nari) brought it to Babylon; from Babylon, the Carians and Ionians brought it to Susa" (DSf §3g). The Lebanese lumber had thus been transported along the route just described: by land, then by river, interspersed with the segment by sea through the Persian Gulf. The Ionians to which this inscription refers may have been the Milesians who were punished as follows after the Ionian revolt (492): "The men [Milesians] in the city who were captured alive were sent as prisoners to Susa; Darius did them no harm, and settled them in Ampe on the Persian Gulf, near the mouth of the Tigris" (Herodotus VI.20*). This city of Ampe might be identified with Aginis, an important trading post that Arrian locates near the mouth of the Tigris. Writing in the Roman period, the geographer Strabo cited a third-hand report of an Athenian ambassador, Diotimus, who led an embassy to Susa in 437-436. His story was recorded by his contemporary Damastes, then became known to Strabo by way of Era­ tosthenes. Strabo intended to demonstrate the unreliability of the information transmit­ ted by Damastes. He polemicized against him in these words: E r a t o s t h e n e s gives us an e x a m p l e o f D a m a s t e s ' stupidity, b e c a u s e h e says that the Arabian G u l f is a lake a n d that D i o t i m u s , s o n o f S t r o m b i c h o s , l e a d i n g a d e l e g a t i o n o f Athenians, traveled by water from the Kydnos in C i l i c i a as far a s the River C h o a s p e s that flows past S u s a , a n d that h e arrived in S u s a in 40 days a n d that these things h a d been told h i m by D a ­ mastes himself. (1.3.1)

How, then, can we believe that a water voyage from Cilicia to Susa was possible? Era­ tosthenes himself and Strabo obviously considered Damastes' assertions to be nonsense pure and simple, and Strabo passed them on simply to show that his colleague was not to be believed. The text has sometimes been understood in the following way: having

Lines of Communication

and Trade

383

traveled by sea from Athens to Cilicia, the Athenian ships would then have continued to the Nile Delta, taken the canal from the Nile to the Red Sea, and then retraced the path of the fleet sent by Darius from Egypt to the Persian Gulf (cf. chap. 12/1 below). However, it is far simpler to think that the Athenians followed the traditional route, landing in Cilicia, reaching the Euphrates overland, and sailing from Thapsacus, then reaching lower Babylonia; from there it was possible to reach Susa by an uninterrupted water passage, as we have already seen. The Phoenician ports played a major role in this whole arrangement, even though their role is not well attested in the High Achaemenid period. Sidon is where Athenian ambassadors docked in the 360s before traveling on to the king, thanks to the assistance the Sidonian king Straton had given them (Tod, no. 139). Sidon is where Democedes left for Greece on Darius's orders (Herodotus III. 136). Diodorus (XVI.41.4) says that, to­ ward the middle of the fourth century, Sidon prospered greatly from commerce (dia res emporias). No less important was a site such as Myriandrus, in the Gulf of Alexandretta. Here is how Xenophon describes it at the end of the fifth century {Anab. 1.4.5): "A city inhabited by the Phoenicians on the seacoast, it was a trading post (emporion) where a large number of merchant ships were anchored." Myriandrus's site was in fact excep­ tional: "It is located where two economically important roads met: the road that links the Gulf of Issus to the Euphrates via the Gates of the Amanus and the road that links Syria to coastal Cilicia via the Cilician Gates; it was a commercial nerve-center" (G. Kestemont). In a military context, Diodorus also attests to the importance of the traffic be­ tween Cilicia and Cyprus in the 380s (XV.3.1). Archaeology brings regional or interregional commerce to light, much more so than long- or middle-distance trade. The most interesting documents come from shortly be­ fore Cyrus's conquest of Babylon. In them we see that Babylonian storekeepers, some­ times on commission from the Eanna of Uruk, imported a number of products from Ebir Nari, including iron and copper from Yamana (Cyprus?), iron from Lebanon, alum and "Egyptian blue" from Egypt, as well as foodstuffs (honey, wine, spices) and textiles. It seems clear that the Phoenician merchants served as middlemen between the Mediterranean West and the Babylonian merchants in this era. There is no reason to think it was any different in the Achaemenid period.

The Inland Waterways of Egypt: The Nile between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea? Herodotus, who was so fascinated by Euphrates boats, also discusses Egyptian boats, whose materials and method of construction he describes. He calls them baris and states that "some of them [are] of many tons' carrying capacity" (II.960-); Herodotus's descrip­ tion has often been compared with an Aramaic papyrus dealing with the repair of a boat belonging to the Persian administration (DAE 61 [AP 26]). Herodotus makes certain to include pilots among the seven Egyptian hereditary classes (11.164). The Egyptian ex­ pression "to be boatless," for that matter, refers to a condition of absolute poverty. As we know, the Nile has always been the essential artery of Egyptian navigation. Diodorus fol­ lows Herodotus (11.108) in attributing the most important labors in this area to the pha­ raoh he calls Sesoosis [Sesostris]: O v e r the entire l a n d from M e m p h i s to the sea h e d u g frequent canals l e a d i n g from the river, his p u r p o s e b e i n g that the p e o p l e m i g h t carry o u t the harvesting of their crops quickly a n d

384

Chapter 9. Territories, Communication,

and Trade

easily, and that, through the constant intercourse of the peasants with one another, every dis­ trict might enjoy both an easy livelihood and a great abundance of all things which minister to man's enjoyment. The greatest result of this work, however, was that he made the country secure and difficult of access against attacks by enemies; for practically all the best part of Egypt, which before this time had been easy of passage for horses and carts, has from that time on been very difficult for an enemy to invade by reason of the great number of canals leading from the river. (1.57*) We will see how the independent pharaohs of the fourth century used this system to bar the Achaemenid armies access to the Delta road (chap. 15/9 below). The role of the Egyptian inland waterways is well attested in the Aramaic papyri, especially in supply­ ing the Elephantine garrison (DAE 54-55 [AP 2, 24]) but also in mail delivery (DAE 14, 17 [Padua I, AP 42] and commercial trade (DAE 26, 109 [LH 2, Berlin 23000]) be­ tween Upper and Lower Egypt. Herodotus (11.99) stresses that the Persians carefully maintained dikes and canals in Egypt, especially to avoid the risk of flooding Memphis. Linked directly to the Nile by a canal, the port of Memphis was extremely busy. It housed not just the administration's military arsenal but also a commercial port, where communities of Carian, Ionian, and Phoenician merchants were located. We also know that on Darius's initiative a canal was (re)opened between the Nile and the Red Sea. The Great King's objective is a bit murky, since it now appears that, contrary to the boastful statement on one of the canal stelas (Posener no. 9), no direct, regular communications link between the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf existed during the Achaemenid period. One of the stelas discovered in the area of this canal came from Tell el-Maskhuta (Posener no. 8). Indeed, recent sur­ veys in the area have produced very interesting results: pottery from various Greek cities of Asia Minor and the islands (Chios, Thasos, Lesbos, Samos) dating from all phases of the fifth century has been noted, as well as from Phoenician cities. Although the pur­ pose is difficult to reconstruct with any certainty, we are led to infer that the canal facil­ itated the development of trade between the great commercial cities of the Aegean, the Nile Valley, and the Red Sea. Phoenician and Greek (Chios) pottery has also been found at a site (Dorginarti) between the First and Second Cataracts. Finally, a papyrus from the time of Darius 1 attests to the existence of trade between Elephantine and Lower Nubia (P. Loeb 1).

Customs Collection and Trade As is so often the case, it is the reference to royal taxes that provides information re­ garding the products and trade on which the taxes are levied. Customs duties are at­ tested at Opis and Babylon in the form of river tolls and bridge tolls. We learn from Pseudo-Aristotle (II.34a) that there were customs duties in Babylonia: having fallen (ac­ cording to the author) into disuse in Alexander's time, "an ancient regulation (nomos) in force in Babylonia required the payment of 10% (dekate) on any product entering the country (ton eisagomenon)" The book of Ezra (4:20) implies the existence of regular customs duties throughout the Empire. There is little doubt that customs posts were es­ tablished in the main stopover towns, such as Thapsacus on the Euphrates, as well as many others. Perhaps they were also established in the towns on the frontiers of sa­ trapies, such as Cydrara, which marks the border between Lydia and Cavia (Herodotus VII.30), or Iconium, which Xenophon (1.2.19) calls "the last city in Phrygia" (when coming from Celaenae).

Lines of Communication

and Trade

385

Customs Collection on the Nile We can garner extremely interesting information about customs collection from a very recently published Aramaic document, which the editors date to the reign of Xerxes, around 475 (TADAE C.3.7). It consists of extracts from the ledger of an Achae­ menid Egyptian customs post that survives as a palimpsest beneath a famous text, the Ahiqar story (TADAE C-1.1). The extracts record the inspection, registration, and taxa­ tion of ships that entered and left Egypt. Some ships are explicitly called Ionian (ywny); others are not marked by any ethnic label, but, given that they were transporting mer­ chandise probably originating in Phoenicia (wood and especially Sidonian wine), we are led to think that they were Phoenician boats (another undated Aramaic document [TADAE C3.12 (DAE 12, AP 72)] attests to the use of Sidonian wine in Egypt). It seems that both the wood and the wine came from ports (in Asia Minor in the first case, in Phoenicia in the second) whose names are given, but there remain many difficulties in identifying them with certainty (Phaselis for the Ionian ships?). Arrival and departure dates of the boats arc also given, as are their technical specifications and even the names of their captains. A number of Greek names from Asia Minor are found among the Ion­ ians, and even one apparently Iranian name (Spitaka). All this information was recorded by the royal customs administrators during inspection when the ships arrived and de­ parted. Regardless of their origin or type, every boat was taxed upon entry according to the value of the cargo. The Ionian ships paid a tax called mndt', that is, mandattu (an Akkadian word referring to various fiscal levies, including taxes in Achaemenid Egypt); these were duties assessed in gold or silver, to which part (mnt) of the cargo of (olive?) oil was added. The Phoenician boats paid 10% ( m V ) of each product carried, a fact that enables us to determine the exact composition of the cargo: it included amphorae (kd; Greek kados) of wine, different kinds of wood (unfinished wood, boards, etc.), met­ als (bronze, iron, tin), wool, and (much more rarely) clay (Samos earth?). In addition, each boat paid another fixed tax referred to by the rather mysterious label "silver of the men." On the return trip, every boat paid the "silver of the men," and the Ionian boats paid a tax proportionate to the value of the natron they were exporting from Egypt. All of these assessments were recorded in the accounts of 'the king's house' (byt mlh ), that is, the royal administration. The name of the place where assessments took place is not given. One naturally thinks of Memphis. What is striking is the continuity of the Egyptian system during the Persian period with the customs system known from the Saite period —thanks to several hieroglyphic stelas—and from the period of Egyptian independence in the fourth cen­ tury known from the Naucratis stela. We know that during the time of Nectanebo I (380), the pharaoh exacted taxes (in gold, silver, or kind) on goods imported from tire Mediterranean to Naucratis as well as on the produce of Naucratis itself: one-tenth of the assessment was then transferred to the Treasury of Neith at Sa'i's. It would not be sur­ prising if, in his "fervor" in regard to Neith, Cambyses had reinstated such regulations. Whatever the case, the extant documents very clearly fit into a chronological and orga­ nizational continuum between the Saite period and the fourth century. Since we know that the assessment was made at the entrance to the Canopic Mouth of the Nile Delta in the fourth century, in the city of 'Enwe (Greek Thonis), we may imagine that this was also the case during the period of Achaemenid dominion. }

Chapter 9. Territories, Communication, and Trade

386

From the Nile to the Euphrates The aforementioned Aramaic document, exciting in itself, becomes even more infor­ mative when we compare two Neo-Babylonian tablets that record the quantities of mer­ chandise imported and sold on the Babylonian market a few years before Cyrus's conquest. Here is a simplified inventory (based on the groundbreaking study by A. L. Oppenheim): YOS

6.168 ( 5 5 0

TCL

B.C)

C o p p e r from Yamana

600 minas

Dye

81 minas, 20 shekels

Tin

37 minas

Bluc-pnrple wool

16 minas, 15 shekels

C o p p e r from Yamana

205 minas

Lapis lazuli/"Egyptian blue"

55 minas

12.84 (551

B.C.)

C o p p e r from Y a m a n a

295 minas

Tin

37 minas

Lapis lazuli

55 minas

Fibers

153 minas

Fibers

153 minas

Alum from Egypt

233 minas

Alum from Egypt in sacks

233 ininas

Dye

32 minas, 20 shekels

Iron from Yamana

130 minas

Iron fromYamana

130 minas

Iron from L e b a n o n

257 minas

Iron from L e b a n o n

257 minas

Assorted honeys White wine

20 'jars': kandanu

Dye

120 minas

Spice

40 minas

Spice

1 kurru

Juniper resin

1 kurru

Both tablets refer to the importation into Babylonia of products from the west, as cer­ tain place-names make very clear (Yamana, Lebanon, Egypt). Following a route known well to Herodotus (1.185, 194) when he wrote of the importing of Phoenician wine into Babylonia, many products imported from various Mediterranean countries were in fact transshipped in Phoenician ports and from there transported to Babylonia (pp. 382f. above). We may also note that, both in the Babylonian tablets and in our Aramaic docu­ ment, the commerce was often in identical products (sometimes more easily identifi­ able in Akkadian): copper and iron (from Yamana), iron from Lebanon, tin, wine (and honey from various places in the tablets), and wool (dyed purple and blue). From Egypt came Egyptian blue (imitation lapis lazuli) and alum. In this regard, T C L 12.84 states: "233 minas of Egyptian alum with (its) containers (aban gabt sa Misir adi gurdbu)" — that is, skin or canvas bags. Alum was a product related to natron, and both were used in Babylonia. From the Neo-Babylonian and Saite periods to the Persian pe­ riod, then, we find the same products circulating and being traded between Asia Minor, Egypt, Cyprus, Syro-Phoenicia, and Babylonia —using complex and multifaceted procedures and routes. The contextual difference is that the Babylonian docu­ ments illustrate the last step in these transactions, the sale in Babylonia carried out by

Lines of Communication

and Trade

387

the merchants (emporoi), and they can only suggest the role of the naukleroi (Phoeni­ cians, as it happens, in some cases at least) revealed by the Egyptian customs docu­ ment. The Egyptian customs document, on the other hand, has nothing to say about the mechanisms involved in bringing to market the merchandise imported by this means into the Nile Valley. The merchandise probably was offered for sale by the own­ ers of the boats, not just at Naucratis but also at Memphis, and no doubt at other sites between Thonis and Memphis.

Conclusion In the final analysis, it is tempting to conclude that the absence of direct references to commerce and tradesmen on the land routes results primarily from the distorting ef­ fect of documentation that is oriented almost exclusively toward the military and politi­ cal spheres. Our information on customs and tolls seems to confirm the breadth and density of trade. Furthermore, royal assessments could lake other forms. We know, for example, that Arab peoples had to pay the enormous quantity of 1,000 talents [ca. 30 tons] of incense to the Great King as a "gift" (Herodotus III.97*) every year. In reality, this was nothing but a bleeding off of the commercial profits generated by the trade be­ tween Palestine and South Arabia.

Chapter 10

Royal Assessments and Tribute l. Sources and Problems

Tribute and Power It is useful at this point to devote a separate discussion to Darius's fiscal policy, within the context of the overwhelming task that he undertook, which involved reestablishing order and redefining his predecessors' policies. Given the construction work undertaken in his new capitals of Persepolis and Susa, the military expeditions, the gifts he gave, as well as the basic requirements of the court, Darius had to be able to count on signifi­ cant, regular income. Actually, as we have seen, Cyrus, Cambyses, and Rardiya had also been careful not to neglect fiscal administration. Assessments on subject peoples did not begin with Darius. It is nonetheless true that every ancient text attributes to Darius a de­ termining role in the establishment of tribute. The problem is to try to evaluate with pre­ cision the scope of his actions and their consequences for history. One of the sources bearing on tribute is the royal proclamations; their intent was to glorify the imperial unification accomplished by Darius without taking into consider­ ation any regional particularities. The Greek sources also exhibit this point of view, for the simple reason that they basically assume that the Achaemenid Empire was a unity, from Sardis to Bactra. Generally speaking, the Classical texts are simultaneously indis­ pensable and enormously frustrating. They offer two contradictory pictures of the impact of Achaemenid tribute: some stress the moderation of Darius's taxes; most, however, love to denounce them as an unbearable burden. They likewise offer two images of the king, who is presented now as a just king, fairly compassionate toward his subjects, and now as a shopkeeper (kapelos), "because of his imposition of regular taxes, and other similar measures" (Herodotus III. 89-0). But the royal texts are constructed from an essentially political and ideological view­ point: they exalt the mythical memory of an ideal king; however, the majority of the Greek authors are led by a desire (often colored by polemic) to denounce the inherent defects of a system that made the Greeks of Asia "slaves" to the Great King, indirectly, via tribute, which was a metaphor for imperial dominion itself (e.g., Herodotus VIM [doideuo] and VII.7 [doidotere]). This approach is nonetheless analytically interesting. The problem is that neither the imperial nor the Classical version is susceptible to math­ ematically precise proof. This is why Herodotus's long discussion (III.89-97) of the tax reforms undertaken by Darius is so interesting and helpful. This text offers a wealth of information, even on the level of accounting practice, despite the fact that Herodotus himself is no expert in fiscal matters. He is also focused on the political aspect of royal policy—in other words, on the immediate relationship between tribute levying and im­ perial dominion. For this reason, he never takes a bird's-eye view. This is why his passage on tribute and taxes still poses many difficult interpretive problems, especially regarding other royal assessments and regulation of revenues. 388

Sources and Problems

389

Diachrony and Synchrony To analyze the dynamic of the system as a whole, it is essential to broaden the docu­ mentary base and introduce later texts into the discussion. In doing so, there is obviously a risk of wiping out the diachronic perspective. Therefore, use of texts later than Darius and Xerxes will have to be justified by whether they fit into a logical and coherent whole. In fact, there is every reason to believe that the tribute system did not undergo any revo­ lutionary modifications—except, obviously, the variations in extent and number of sa­ trapies or the allocation of this or that people to this or that district. At any moment, the king might come up with new assignments (e.g., Arrian 1.24.5). We should also recog­ nize that temporary adjustments could be made in the base rate or amount of tribute. A specific example of this is the measure taken by Artaphernes in 492 after the revolt of Ionia (see chap. 12/5). But these localized and limited variations do not appear ever to have challenged the operation of the system in toto. This remark is not meant to elimi­ nate the diachronic dimension in favor of an exclusively thematic approach. We will try to indicate, wherever the evidence warrants it, the changes and potential breakdowns. As it happens, the most numerous and useful sources date to the end of the Achae­ menid period, or more precisely, to the transition between the Achaemenid period and the High Hellenistic age. This wide array of evidence derives from the breadth of the re­ ports written by Alexander's historians, who describe the typically Achaemenid institu­ tions that were taken over (in whole or in part) by the Macedonian conqueror. This wealth of documentation also derives from the increasing number of Greek inscriptions from Hellenistic western Asia Minor. In fact, it is not hard to show that in many cases the institutions from the period of the Diadochi (the successors of Alexander) or the Seleucid kings were copied from Achaemenid practices. Achaemenid institutions can then be reconstructed by looking at their reflection in the evidence, always with an awareness of the need for methodological caution: there is a risk of getting lost in a hall of mirrors! The last quarter of the fourth century is also the period from which the minor work Oeconomica dates. It was written by a representative of the Aristotelian school (and for this reason it is usually attributed to the anonymous "Pseudo-Aristotle"). In fact, the Oeconomica has the only overall analysis of the operation of the Achaemenid assessment system. The author seeks a model for economy in the sense he understands: the ways and means used by an oekonome, that is, the manager of a house, to "acquire . . . and to guard . . . [and] order his possessions aright and make a proper use of t h e m . . . . For the preser­ vation of wealth it is best to follow both the Persian and the Laconian methods. . . . The Persian system was that everything should be organized and that the master should su­ perintend everything personally" (1.6.1—3-0). After these general reminders in book I, book II contains a condensed but incisive analysis of the four types of economy (II. 1.1— 8-0): "That of the king is the most important and the simplest, that of the city is the most varied and the easiest, that of the individual the least important and the most varied"; the "satrapal economy" is added, organically linked to the royal economy: the satrapal econ­ omy concerns receipts (tributes, taxes, etc.), and the royal economy has to do with the successful management of goods (what the Greeks call oikonomia); the king enjoyed rev­ enues procured for him by his satraps. The common principle of the four kinds of econ­ omy is simple: "The expenditure must not exceed the income" (II. 1.6-o)! There follows

390

Chapter 10. Royal Assessments and Tribute

a long series of examples of ruses and subterfuges by which individuals, cities, and sa­ traps amassed the money they were lacking (11.2). A Greek like the author of the Oeconomica took an interest in the Persian Empire be­ cause he could thus study the example of an organization where, unlike in Greek cities, the king was never faced with fiscal problems. And it is quite clear that the author saw the reason as being the regularity and size of the assessments imposed by the satraps in the name of the king. This was also the point of view worked out earlier by Xenophon, who, in a work called the Oeconomicus on the ideal management of a large estate, high­ lighted the Great King's interest in his peasants and in "working the land." Xenophon also stressed the way in which tribute afforded the king a means of regularly paying those he owed.

The Documents from the Central Administration In addition to the Classical sources, we are very fortunate to have documents from the Persian central administration, in particular, the thousands of tablets from Persepo­ lis. In light of this documentation, Pseudo-Aristotle's text may be reevaluated, since the tablets clarify the operation of the royal economy at Persepolis. Babylonia is the best documented region in the remainder of the Empire, even though most of the informa­ tion on the organization of land and related fiscal matters is later than Darius I. The Babylonian material dates basically to the reigns of Artaxerxes I and Darius II; nonethe­ less, here too, careful analysis permits us to assume that, basically, the economic struc­ tures go back to Darius I and even in some cases to Cyrus and Cambyses. The same methodology applies to the Aramaic materials from Egypt, a fact that assumes decisive importance. The composition and chronological assignment of regional subsets of documents call to mind our basic rule of thumb: despite the global character of the Achaemenid tribute organization implied by Pseudo-Aristotle and Herodotus, it makes sense always to contextualize our analyses by distinct regions. This is why the breadth and specificity of the Persepolis documentation demand separate discussion. At the same time, the questions raised by this documentation lead us to situate them in the framework of the Empire as a whole (chap. 11), before returning to regional studies (chap. 12). Only this sort of "dialogue" between center and periphery will come close to raising, if not resolving, in all their depth, the complicated problems related to the over­ all functioning of an economic system based on regional tribute.

2. Satrapies and Tributes

Herodotus and the Tributes of Darius Darius and his advisers tackled the task of tribute reorganization with great speed. Herodotus attests to this haste by writing: " he then proceeded to set up twenty provincial governorships (nomoi), called satrapies. . . and assessed [each] for taxes" (III.89o). The reformed tributes were probably levied for the first time in 518-517, that is, at the end of the moratorium decreed by Bardiya in 522. Following his exposition, Herodotus gives a list of the districts, indicating exactly which peoples belonged to them, as well as the amount of tribute allocated from each (III.90-94). The tabulation is shown on p. 391.

Nomes, Satrapies, and Peoples This passage from Herodotus has stimulated and continues to stimulate multifarious analyses from historians. Some have maintained that this list contains no credible infor-

Satrapies and Tributes

Peoples

Nome

iiibutein Talents

I

Ionians, iVlagncsiaiis in Asia, Aeolians, Lycians, Milyans, Pampliylians

400

II

Mysians, Lyclians, Lasonians, Cabalians, Hytennians

500

III

[Hcllespontinc] Phrygians, Thracians of Asia, Paphlagonians, Mariandynians, Syrians

360

IV

Cilicians

500

V

from PosidcUim to Egypt (Arabs exempted)

350

VI

Egypt, adjacent Libyans, Cyrene, Barca

700

VII

Sattagydians, Gandharans, Dadicae, Aparytae

170

VIII

Susa and the country of the Cissians

IX

Babylonia and the rest of Assyria

X

Ecbatana, the rest of Media, Paricanians, Ortliokorybantes

450

XI

Caspians, Pausicae, Pantiinathi, Daritac

200

XII

Bactrinns and . . (?)

360

XIII

Pactyans, Armenians, and neighboring peoples as far as the Pontus Euxiims

400

XIV

Sagartians, Sangians, Thanianaeans, Utians, Myci, and inhabitants of the Erythrean Sea

600

XV

Snka and Caspians

250

XVI

Partisans, Chorasmians, Sogdians, Arians

300

XVII

Paricanians, Ethiopians of Asia

400

XVIII

Matieni, Saspires, Alarodians

200

XIX

Moschians, Tibarenians, Macrones, Mossynoeci, Mares

300

XX

Indians

360

39!

Additional

Considerations

360 white horses

income from the fish of Lake Moeris + 120,000 inedimnes of wheat for the Persian garrison at Memphis

300 1000

500 young eunuchs

•nation, because its composition is modeled on a Greek literary and poetic tradition go­ ing back to Homer's Catalogue of Ships. This negative judgment clearly goes too far. For one thing, the comparison frequently made between Herodotus's list and the depictions of peoples at Persepolis and elsewhere is not relevant. These two different kinds of docu­ ments clearly pertain to different concepts: one source (documents from the central ad­ ministration) gives an idealized and ideological representation of the imperial realm (see chap. 5); the other (Herodotus) indisputably refers to an administrative organiza­ tion. Of course, because he was from Asia Minor, Herodotus clearly Hellenized the facts: it is most striking in particular to note that he begins his list with the Ionian dis­ tricts, whereas in every Achaemenid document the country lists begin with Persia, which is considered to be the heart of royal power. Similarly, the vitriolic criticisms brought against the figures he provides must be abandoned. It is hardly surprising that

Chapter 10. Royal Assessments and Tribute

392

Herodotus encountered various difficulties in converting to talents the amounts that had been furnished to him in claries. But, despite several conversion and arithmetic errors, it is apparent that the numerical information he gives must be considered reliable. The precision suggests quite strongly that he had access—through unknown (and doubtless indirect) channels—to official documents, such as, for example, quotations (written or oral) from the archives of Sardis and elsewhere. Anyway, even though Herodotus assigns the list of administrative districts to the reign of Darius, it is not certain that some of the information does not date to a later period, that is, the period during which Herodotus was gathering the data to be included in his Inquiry. India, for example, was manifestly not included in the system until after Da­ rius's conquest; at the very least, payment of the tribute decided previously could not be imposed until after the conquest. Herodotus (III.96-*-) himself states that "as time went on, other tribute came in from the islands and from the peoples in Europe as far as Thessaly" — that is, in the period subsequent to 512-510. But it is very difficult to be sure of the details. T h e rationale behind some of the groupings is not always transparent. Furthermore, it can be quite difficult to locate precisely on a map some of the peoples listed by He­ rodotus, using names that he has distorted. According to him, the arkhai (governments) were called satrapies by the Persians and were headed by governors (arkhontes). The problem is that we do not have any list of satrapies earlier than the death of Alexander that could be used to systematically verify the statements of the historian from Halicarnassus. We are not entirely devoid of information on Darius's satraps, however. Along with the Greek texts, Babylonian documents and Persepolis tablets allow us to prepare a partial list and correlate it with Herodotus's list.

Date

Satrap

Residence

Herodotus's Nome

Mitrobates

525?

Dascylium

III

Oroetes

+521

Sardis and Magnesia

I and II?

Gubaru

522-

Babylonia and Trans-Euphrates

Ustfinu

535-525

Huhi|. . .]

521-516

Egypt and Cyrenaica

Aryancles

486

Susa

VI

Bakabana

525-510?

Bactra

VIII

DSdarsi

500-499

V a n d IX

Iixlabnnus

522

Vivana

500

Kandahar

Bakabadus

522

Aria

Harbamissa

494

Ecbatana

Miturna (Hyckrnes)

?

Arachosia XVII?

XVI (iii part) X

503-499

In some cases (Dascylium, Sardis, Egypt, Susa, Bactra, and Ecbatana), the agreement between the nomes of Herodotus and the satrapal jurisdictions is adequate, as a first ap­ proximation at least. But this is not generally true. For instance, there seems to have been a satrap in Aria in Darius's time, and the existence of a satrapy of Parthia or ParthiaHyrcania is attested at a later period; furthermore, in a very general way, Sogdiana was connected to Bactria. Despite all these things, the Arians are included with the Par-

Satrapies and Tributes

393

thians, Cliorasmians, and Sogdians in Herodotus's immense XVItli nome. Conversely, Herodotus demarcates a Vth division (III.92) whose boundaries correspond fairly closely to what is usually called Trans-Euphrates (Ebir Nari). In fact, we know that at the date assigned to Darius's reform, Trans-Euphrates continued to be included within the vast administration of Babylonia and Trans-Euphrates. Within this vast satrapy, TransEuphrates apparently constituted a tributary subunit, as indicated by a decision of Da­ rius regarding Jerusalem around 518 (Ezra 6:8), involving "tribute from the province of Ebir Nari" (middat Abar nahare). Nonetheless, we do not possess documentation that could systematically prove Herodotus wrong. One of the main problems is that in later times there was a distinction between satrapal districts and tribute districts. It is likely that in most cases there was no such difference: the responsibility to collect the tribute imposed on the ethne that were supposed to be under a satrap's authority fell to the sa­ trap. Nevertheless, a late passage in Arrian (1.24.5) seems to indicate that, even after the adjustment of a boundary between two satrapies, an ethnos belonging to one satrapy was permitted to continue to pay its tribute in a neighboring satrapy (chap. 16/4). The method that Darius used to determine the boundaries of the districts and their tribute, as reported by Herodotus, is most interesting: "for administrative purposes neighbouring nations were joined in a single unit (kata ethnea), outlying peoples were considered to belong to this nation or that, according to convenience" (111.89*). From the perspective of tribute, the peoples of a nome were "grouped together (es touto tetagemenoi)" (III.92-0-), they "contribute together (es touto sumpherontes)" (III.92->), "a par­ ticular sum of tribute was set for all the peoples [of a nome]" (III.90). With just one exception —the Vth division (III.9 lo-) —the borders of the districts are never given with reference to geographical features. A tribute district was first and foremost a combina­ tion of neighboring peoples. The term ethnos corresponds fairly closely to a word used by the Great Kings in their inscriptions, dahyu. Both refer to a community and to the ter­ ritory in which that community lived and reproduced. c

Setting the Amount of Tribute There are two texts—late but interesting—that inform us of the practical considera­ tions involved in setting tribute amounts at the beginning of the reign of Darius, one from Plutarch and one from Polyaenus. Tradition records the actions taken by Darius on a very auspicious day: After fixing the a m o u n t o f taxes w h i c h his s u b j e c t s were to pay, h e s e n t for the l e a d i n g m e n (hoi protoi) of the provinces (eparchies), a n d asked t h e m if t h e taxes were not p e r h a p s heavy; and when the m e n said that the taxes were m o d e r a t e , h e o r d e r e d that e a c h should pay only half as m u c h . ( P l u t a r c h , Mor. 172f (PT 79). Their specialty is sometimes indicated more specifically: they work stone, they carve reliefs in wood, they contribute to the completion of a hypostyle hall, they are goldsmiths or smelters. The mass of Treasury tablets attests to the per­ petual work on ornamentation and finishing at Persepolis throughout the reign of Xerxes

430

Chapter ii. Persia: Empire and Tribute Economy

in particular. In the Fortification tablets, the craftsmen (marrip) working at Persepolis are also named, but relatively infrequently. Between 507 and 500, certain tablets record the transport to Persepolis of grain, flour, and wine intended for craftsmen's rations; the distributor is Abbateya (1580-84, 1587, 1594, 1614, 1801, 1831; cf. 1049 and 1953). Eth­ nic background is given once (Lycians: PF 1049); specialties are cited rarely: sculptors in stone (PF 1587, 1633), goldsmiths (PF 872, 1805), woodworkers (PF 1799?). An Ara­ maic gloss (PF 1587) refers to quarrymen. One is reminded of the Greek graffiti found in a quarry near Persepolis—one graffito carved with the name Pytharcus, another Nikias. Furthermore, the mortars and pestles of Persepolis show that, under Xerxes and Artaxerxes I, kurtas were employed in the fortress's shops to make objects apparently in­ tended for royal tableware. But not all of the craftsmen were concentrated at Persepolis. The Persepolis treasurer also provided a "salary" to kurtas who made coats of mail at Niriz (PT 52) or who worked at Fasa (PT 53) or Shiraz (PT 42-42a, 60). Like the treasury in Persepolis, the treasuries scattered all around the territory in fact included groups of 'treasury workers' (kurtas kapnuskip) of varying size. A wide variety of trades is found among them: masons at Urandus (PTP 27-33, 67-68), Sardian blacksmiths at Kurra (PF 873), and goldsmiths at Hidalu (PF 874). Among the most specialized groups were the kurtas to whom the administra­ tion delivered skins, which they treated to make parchment, which in turn was used by the many chancelleries and accounting offices. Furthermore, 23 texts from various sites refer to groups of pasap consisting entirely of women. These were (probably) weavers who worked wool and made a wide variety of clothing. On the orders of Abbateya in 497, a group of 31 kurtas from the Niriz treasury came to Persepolis, where they worked as masons (PF 1852). These kurtas wore not necessarily master masons previously; it is possible that they had been summoned as common la­ borers and enrolled as workers in squads intended for masonry works. It appears in any case that groups of workers were periodically moved from one spot to another as needed. Such movements are frequently attested in tablets from Category Q (travel rations): from Susa to Persepolis, from Susa to Makkan, from Persepolis to Susa, from Rakkan to Tammukhan, and so on. Relocation of workers is also mentioned in the Treasury tablets. At the end of Darius's reign, construction workers, who were used in the building of a palace at Nupistas (Naqs-i Rustam? PT 9), were brought from Egypt; in 462-461, a re­ nowned specialist in stone ornamentation was ordered from Susa to Persepolis (PT 78). The groiips moved in this way could be sizable: 547 Egyptians from Susa to Persepolis (PF 1557); 108 Cappadocians from Persepolis to Elam (PF 1577); 1500 men from Per­ sepolis to Susa (PF 1542); 150 Thracians, 980 Cappadocians, and 303 Lycians from one place to another within Fars (PFa 18 and 30); etc. The change in the number of kurtas on the same site is further evidence of the prac­ tice of worker relocation. The orders for distribution of rations in effect allow us to com­ pile an annual census. We can see that some of the treasuries had only small groups attached permanently, such as Hiran (except in 488: 88 kurtas), Kurpun, and even Pasar­ gadae. On the other hand, at Matezzis, rations were distributed to 259 workers in 506, 694 in 499, 702 in 498, and 677 in 497; at Urandus, the figures are as follows: 15 in 503, 544 in 502, and an average of more than 200 until 497. The variations are sometimes striking: at Parmizzan, where there regularly were very small groups (5 in 505 and 6 in 501), the number reaches 527 in one year (508?). To be sure, the figures must not be

The World of Work: The kurtas

431

taken as a precise reflection of the circumstances, because the archives we have are in­ complete and, in particular, they fall silent regarding the number of craftsmen working at Persepolis. Nonetheless, they give an overall idea of the hierarchy of the treasuries and of the movements of laborers from site to site. Centurions and Foremen The orders concerning rations and movements of kurtas emanated from 'heads of kurtas' (kurdabattis), who also might carry out the duties of distributors (saramana). Or­ ders could be sent directly from Parnaka's office, sometimes even from the royal chan­ cellery itself. But the groups of kurtas, in particular the best supplied, had their own internal organization, subject of course to the authority of administration officials. Sev­ eral times in the Fortification tablets products are directed to 'heads of a hundred' (sadabattisf'satapati) and 'heads of ten' (dasabattis/*daOapati), explicitly named according to the formula "the decurion/centurion of such-and-such" (PF 138-43). A 'head of four' (zatturubattis) is even found once (PT 1963: 10). One Treasury tablet records a list of persons (tassup/people) divided into hundreds (PT 84). We are tempted to think that it was the job of these centurions and decurions to distribute the rations among their men. Nonetheless, the information drawn from the Treasury tablets does not fully confirm this interpretation. In some exemplars, the centurion is indeed the distributor (sara­ mana; PT 42-42a, 53, 60). But this is not the rule. In 483-482, a group of Syrian, Egyp­ tian, and Ionian kurtas working at Persepolis comprised 201 units in all. The rations were divided unequally among subgroups comprising 46 men each, obviously because of their differing qualifications. The group also includes 63 men called centurions and subcenturions. If we suppose (which is only logical) that each tablet deals with a specific category of workers who received rations, it is obvious that each of the centurions (how­ ever many there were) did not command 100 men. They are called more precisely "cen­ turions who [belong to the category] of centurions." This is probably a distinction that entitled one to a larger ration than the 138 other workers (PT 15). This was probably also true for the Egyptian centurion Haradduma, a carpenter/joiner, who in one tablet is the only person specified as receiving a ration (PT 1). He must have been an especially re­ spected craftsman, considering the amount of his ration (the equivalent of 6'/2 siculi per month), which was much higher than that of other centurions (1 + ' / ) + V& siculi per month for each of the 63 centurions and subcenturions of PT 15). It was also much higher than the ration of a particular decorator who, even though he was specially sum­ moned from Susa to Persepolis in 462-461, received only Vi siculus per month ( P T 7 8 ) . The modesty of his ration seems all the more inexplicable in that he is called pirramanakurras, which represents the Persian "framanakara, which is translated 'foreman'. In 466-465, a man named Eskus was the foreman of 612 carpenters working at Persepo­ lis, but the amount of his ration is not stated (PT 75). In 466, two carpenters' foremen received an allocation of \ A siculi per month (PT 44). l

Food Rations and the Organization of Production According to the Fortification tablets, rations in kind were distributed unequally ac­ cording to gender and age. In general, men, 'boys' (puhu), women, and girls were distin­ guished, although some uncertainty remains about the exact meaning of puhu (defined by age? or by status [servant]?). In an overall analysis, it appears that 83% of the men received 30 QA of grain per month, or about 16.5 kg (figuring 56 kg per hectoliter), the

Chapter 1 1 . Persia: Empire and Tribute Economy

432

others receiving between 11 and 25 kg; 87% of the women received between 11 and 16.5 kg, nearly all the others drawing 22 kg. But these mean figures do not take into account the diversity of situations. By way of example (among hundreds more), let us consider the amount of grain rations handed out in March 498 to 702 kurtas in Matezzis, who re­ ceived 1,638.5 BAR, that is, more than 100 quintals (PF 960 [1 quintal = 100 kg]). The allocation was as follows: 1 man

27.50 kg

4 women

27.50 kg

120 women

22.00

18.75

146 women

16.50

16.50

100 women

11.00

48 men

22.00

31 men 23 men 15 "boys" (puhu)

13.25

3 girls

13.75

28 "boys"

11.00

13 girls

11.00

38 "boys"

11.00

43 girls

8.25

20 "boys"

5.50

22 girls

5.50

22 "boys"

2.75

17 girls

8 libap

2.75 11.00

We can see differences within each category as well, without in any particular case hav­ ing any information to help understand the criteria (aside from age, which is clearly not the only consideration). Furthermore, a new category appears here, the lihap. The libap are often mentioned in groups of travelers who are supplied from the warehouses on the royal roads. Two subgroups can be very generally distinguished, the saluip and the li­ bap—two categories that correspond to different social statuses but are not defined fur­ ther—the "gentlemen" and the servants/slaves. The gentlemen usually receive 0.82 kg per clay, the puhu 0.55 kg, and the servants/libap 0.55 kg as well. While grain was obviously the staple food, some groups also received wine or beer, but this is relatively rare: less than '/5 of the cases. In March and April 500, for example, 24 marris of wine (ca. 228 liters) were distributed to 8 kurtas of Niriz, as follows: 19.4 li­ ters for each of 2 men, 9.7 liters for each of 2 other men, and 23 liters for one woman (PF 878). We can conclude from these two examples that the women were not systematically less well provided for than the men. The ration of three mams'of wine (29 liters) is reg­ ularly allocated to women who bore the title irsara, which renders the Persian maOista 'head'. This title could obviously be applied to men, who therefore received very high ra­ tions. But there were often women heads of women pasap. These women heads re­ ceived a very high grain ration of 27.5 kg. On one occasion (PF 1790), 5 of these women received '/i sheep; on another, 544 ordinary female workers of Urandus earned '/30 sheep per month (PF 1794), even though the distribution of meat to kurtas is extremely rare (PF 823-25, 1793). The kurtas-pasap were among the groups that received supplemen­ tary rations: one liter of flour per month in one case (PF 1090) and 3 liters of beer for six months in another (PF 1108). Even within the group of weavers—a small number of whom were male —the rations were divided into three subgroups according to job, whether the garments being made were of a more or less fine fabric or texture (super­ fine, very fine, or other). It was probably the same on the construction sites at Persepolis: it seems quite likely that the work there was divided aaccording to squads and teams, each one assigned to a specific repetitive task.

The World of Work: The kurtas

433

The Aramaic inscriptions from Persepolis also attest to the administration's efforts to keep close watch on the kurtas and to increase their productivity. These inscriptions, on dishes, pestles, and mortars of green stone ("green chert"), are composed on the follow­ ing model (according to one of the proposed interpretations): IN THE TREASURY OF THE FORTRESS ON THE ORDERS OF X, SEGAN

N MADE THIS MORTAR/PESTLE/DISH WHICH HE TURNED 1

2

ON THE AUTHORITY OF Y (TREASURER) AND/OR Y (SUBTREASURER) SERIES (OF WORK) OF YEAR A

The procedure can be reconstructed as follows. Workshops for stone vessel-making (doubtless intended to adorn the royal table) were located in rooms in the treasury. Craftsmen whose status is not specifically indicated but who clearly fell under the ge­ neric category of treasury workers (kurtas kapnuskip), found so frequently in the tablets, worked there. Some of them, the turner-polishers, were specialists. The kurtas teams— perhaps grouped into decuries (tens) or centuries (hundreds)—were directed and over­ seen by segan 'provosts/guards' who themselves were under the orders of the treasurer C'ganzabaTa) and the subtreasurer ("upa-ganzabara) then i n office. The notices written on each object allowed the administrator to verify (and doubtless pay for) the labor of the workers who were involved in the production. They also allowed him to establish a cor­ relation between the weight of stone provided to each workshop and the number of ob­ jects produced, thus providing a means of measuring the output. The mention of the date and the serial number confirms the meticulous, detail-oriented character of the ad­ ministration of the treasury, so clearly attested throughout the Persian documentation. And, were it not marked by an obvious flair for the dramatic, we would not hesitate to use a passage from Diodorus of Sicily to illustrate the administration's concern for "effi­ ciency" (XVII.69.40-). According to Alexander's historian, as a matter of fact, the Greek kurtas of Persepolis were treated in this way: "They were persons who had acquired skills or crafts and had made good progress in their instruction; then their other extremities had been amputated and they were left only those which were vital to their profession"!

Origins and Status of the kurtas We have still not explained the status of the kurtas, and to do so is no easy task. The etymology of the term (garda) is not much help. Only context might allow us to attempt some semblance of a description. The first observation is that the kurtas represented a sampling of nearly all of the peoples of the Empire, including Persians in apparently limited number. Among the kurtas were Bactrians, Sogdians, Babylonians, Assyrians, Elamites, Arabs, Syrians, Egyptians, Lycians, Carians, Ionians, Sardians, Cappadocians, and Thracians. The occurrences of these different peoples vary in number: while Cari­ ans are named only 3 times (PF 1123; PT 37, 1963: 2) and Arabs only 4 (PF 1477, 1507, 1534; PFa 17), others appear in many tablets, especially Lycians (more than 10 times) and Thracians (at least 20 times). But it seems difficult to draw inferences from statistics based on such fragmentary archives. Why did they come, or why were they brought, to Persia? There is no single answer, and several compatible explanations can be offered. The policy of deportation of con­ quered populations is attested several times, as it was in the Assyrian and Neo-Babylon i a n periods (for example, the Judahites under Nebuchadnezzar). After the defeat and

434

Chapter I1. Persia: Empire and Tribute Economy

destruction of Sidon in 345-344 by Artaxerxes III, men and women of the city were led captive to Babylon, where "they entered the royal palace" (ABC no. 9, p. 114). The Clas­ sical texts frequently refer to this practice, which the Persian generals sometimes use as the ultimate threat (Herodotus VI.3,9, 94). The Milesians were subjected to deportation (VI.32, 98), as were the Paeonians of Thrace (VI.98), Barcaeans (IV.204), Eretrians (VI. 101, 119), Boeotians, and Carians, not to mention the Branchidae of Miletus who, fleeing Miletus during Xerxes' predations, were settled in Bactria. No document ex­ pressly names Persia as a destination to which deportees were sent. They mention in­ stead what the Greeks liked to call "the extremities of the Empire": Bactria, Babylonia, Elam, as well as the islands in the Persian Gulf that were frequently a place of deporta­ tion, as much for miscreant Persians as for conquered populations. But there is no doubt that prisoners of war could be settled in Fars. Alexander, upon his arrival in Persia in 331, made contact with Greeks deported to Persia, as well as with a Lycian shepherd, who told him he had been reduced to this condition after a defeat. We are immediately reminded of the kurtas shepherds known from the tablets. The same is true for the Greeks in Persepolis who "had been carried away from their homes by previous kings of Persia" (Diodorus XVII.69.3*) and who, mutilated by their masters, complained to Alexander of having been forced to toil in slave workshops (ergastules; Quintus Cur­ tius V. 5.13). Quite another picture emerges from the "foundation charters" of Darius's palace at Susa (chap. 5/2). There the king is glorified for bringing raw materials and specialized craftsmen —Ionians, Sardians, Egyptians, Carians, Bactrians, Elamites, Babylonians— from everywhere. Despite the deeply ideological character of these royal proclamations, we can easily agree that Darius utilized ethnic contingents whose specialites were well known. This selective use of specialists is well known from the Neo-Assyrian kings. There is also no doubt that to accomplish his construction projects at Pasargadae, Cyrus himself called on craftsmen from Lydia and Ionia. According to Diodorus Siculus (I.46.4-0-), it was the same with Cambyses, who, not content to pillage the temples of Egypt, "[took] artisans (technitai) along from Egypt, [and] constructed their famous pal­ aces in Persepolis and Susa and throughout Media." It is unfortunately difficult to con­ firm whether the ethnic groups mentioned in the tablets were specialized in a particular activity. Though it is true that Babylonians were employed as scribes who wrote on parchment by Parnaka, this was not their only activity. Other Babylonians were "seed merchants" (PF 1811, 1821-22) and still others gravediggers (? PF 1856). Among the Carians, some were stoneworkers (PT 37) and others masons (PT 37, PT 1963: 2). The Egyptians and Syrians worked in various building trades: masonry, carpentry, sculpting, etc. If we add the fact that groups of kurtas were sometimes ethnically mixed, we see that any conclusion regarding ethnic specialities becomes useless and illusory. The individually named craftsmen constitute a special case, such as, for example, the Egyptian foreman specializing in woodworking who was employed at Persepolis in 490489 (PT 1) or the decorator foreman who was called posthaste from Susa to Persepolis (PT 78). It is tempting to suppose that some master craftsmen/artists might have come to Persepolis not because they were forced to but because they were requested by Persian officials seeking especially skilled technicians. This was perhaps the situation (later) in the case of the sculptor Telephanes of Phocis, mentioned by Pliny (NH XXXIV. 19.68), and many other famous Greek artists in various fields (athletes, poets, dancers), even if

The World of Work: The kurtas

435

some of them (the physicians Democedes and Ctesias) were captives. This hypothesis implies that at the end of their engagement (contract?), they could return home or seek another situation. Meanwhile, this process—if it can be proved —could only have worked for a very limited number of highly skilled craftsmen. There was no real labor market (see below, chap. 11/9, the case of Hinzanay). There must be other explanations for why thou­ sands of kurtas with no particular qualifications other than what was assigned to them were, for example, temporarily moved to the construction sites of Persepolis, where most of them carried out repetitive tasks that involved no particular creativity.

Demographics and Population Growth Women about to give birth were among the recipients of special rations (PF 1200-37, 1248). Although the term kurtas is not always qualified, there is no doubt that it often re­ fers to women workers, whose specialty is sometimes indicated: for example, weavers (? PF 1200, 1203, 1236; cf. 1224). From time to time they are listed by name. They gen­ erally receive wine, beer, and flour. The ration is doubled in the event of the birth of a bov: for example, 10 liters of wine or beer for a boy, 5 liters for a girl; 11 kg of grain for a boy, 5.5 kg for a girl. Some mothers are rewarded with higher allocations (kamakas: 15 liters of wine in one case), for reasons we do not know. Several tablets show that each mother received both wine/beer and grain products. Even though the sample is limited in number and timespan (most of the tablets come from 500-497), it is interesting to ob­ serve that the total number of births is 449, 247 of them boys (55%). There do not seem to be any examples of twins. Nevertheless, this documentation testifies to a policy of vol­ untary supplements on the part of the administration—well attested also (in a quite dif­ ferent political context) for Persian families themselves (cf. Herodotus 1.136; Strabo XV.3.17). It is clear that these postnatal rations were over and above normal rations—as it were, a reward. At the same time, the bonuses must have allowed the women to recu­ perate from childbirth under good conditions and doubtless to nurse their babies—if we suppose that the ancients thought that lactation was optimized by drinking beer! These documents also show that some of the kurtas of Fars were quite simply a result of natural population growth, since doubtless the status of mothers was passed on to their children. Unfortunately, we know nothing about the fathers. The actual origin of the mothers is rarely specified: Thracians in one case (PF 1215), Ionians in another (PF 1224). Bui were the fathers Thracians or Ionians? We may return to the Lycian shepherd who guided Alexander toward the Persian Gates, "whose father was a Lycian, and his mother a Persian," Plutarch states (Alex. 37.1*). There were kurtas who at that time worked in the 'slave-prisons' (ergastula) of Persepolis, whose representatives referred to women "whom chance and necessity have joined to [them]" and who had given them children "whom slavery has compelled [them] to acknowledge" (Quintus Curtius V.5.15, 20->). But can we also apply these details to the Persia of Darius I, and would these accounts then describe a current practice? The Babylonian Chronicle on the tak­ ing of Sidon by Artaxerxes III and the Greek texts show that the groups of deportees in­ cluded men and women. But what became of the young children? Were they permanently integrated into a group of kurtas that included (hypothetical!)') their fathers and mothers? Fortunately, we have —as we have seen—a very large number of ration tablets that record amounts differ­ entiated by age and sex, according to categories generally understood as men, women,

Chapter i I. Persia: Empire and Tribute Economy

436

boys, and girls. On the basis of these documents we can derive some statistics. Taking into account all of the Fortification tablets, M. A. Dandamaev has drawn up the follow­ ing table:

Total

Men

Women

Boys

Girls

21,576

8,183

8,564

2,687

2,142

100%

37.5%

39.8%

12.7%

10%

Observing that the numerical rations of men to women and boys to girls are approxi­ mately equal, the only conclusion that seems possible is that the kurtas lived in families. But the reasoning is not airtight. First of all, the fertility rate seems abnormally low, even if we allow for high infant mortality (cf. Ctesias §49). It also needs to be stressed that any conclusion based on overall percentages has no probative value, since it assumes that the kurtas constituted a fixed, autonomous, and homogeneous community—which was ob­ viously not true. In fact, if we are to inquire into family structure, we must actually ana­ lyze the composition of strictly isolated groups of kurlaS. We observe first of all that many kurtas did not have equal numbers of men and women. This is particularly true in the case of the treasury weavers. In 14 tablets from 5 sites, dating between 501 and 496, the percentage of women in the groups is between 63% and 73.5%. The increase in the number of women and children is still more im­ pressive if we take the example of the treasury of Shiraz. We see that a recruitment took place in 505 and then again between 502 and 499. In the first recruitment, the number of men remained unchanged, while the number of women and children grew from 6 to 18. Between 502 and 499, the number of children increased from 16 to 99. Women and children thereafter represent some 90% of the total. This new recruitment led to a reor­ ganization of labor in the group. One tablet shows that the group was divided into 11 subgroups: 6 consisted of men only and 5 of women only, sometimes mixed with a few men. It seems clear that these changes are not due to demographics but to decisions made by the administration, which was interested in increasing productivity by estab­ lishing a sexual division of labor. In this reorganization of labor, we presume that women and children were separated from fathers. However, there is also nothing to show that the women were the mothers of the boys and girls who worked beside them. It also appears that the percentage of children is sometimes abnormally low. One text lists a group of Carian goldsmiths: it includes 27 men, 27 women, 13 girls, and 3 boys (PT 37). Even if we assume (without any proof) that these Carians comprised 27 cou­ ples, it is no less true that the proportion of boys is inexplicable, because the texts record­ ing the rations given to the mothers indicate that the number of boys born is slightly higher than the number of girls born. We can multiply the examples of imbalance: there was not one girl in a group consisting of 70 men, 95 women, and 20 boys (PF 951); 103 men, 364 women, 122 boys, and 84 girls composed a group from Matezzis (PF 959; cf. 960); 250 men, 220 women, 18 boys, and 32 girls appear in a group of Thracian kurtas (PF 1010); a group of craftsmen on the construction sites of Persepolis in 466 consisted entirely of 501 men ( P T 7 4 ) . Let us now consider an aberrant (in the statistical sense) case. It concerns the Persian boys (puhu), labeled kurtas, who "copied texts" at Pittaman and who in March and No­ vember 499 received grain and wine rations at the order of Suddayauda (PF 871 and

The World of Work: The kurtas

437

] 137). Apparently, these hoys or young men were removed from their families and as­ sembled at a location where they learned the rudiments of the scribal trade. We also see that between March and November their number shrank from 29 to 16 and that within the group there was a hierarchy of rations. It is also true that, in the same year in the same place, two tablets record a group reporting to the same officials that consisted only of men and women (PF 903-4). But we must resist the temptation to see these men and women as the fathers and mothers of the Persian puhu: the group in fact comprises just one man and four women. And, what happened to the daughters? Even though the (sole) reference to the wife (irtiri) of a kurtas (PF 999 ^) might pos­ sibly lead us to believe that marriages were recognized by the administration, the notion of kurtas living in families must be given up entirely. This simple observation offers much toward comprehending their status. It is in fact clear that the administration was not satisfied with just moving the groups of kurtas from one place to another within the territory. In order to increase productivity, it broke family units or forbade their creation (if any were actually recognized by the authorities). The tablets also show that the bond between mother and child was not permanent. While we might suppose that a mother kept her child near her for the first few years—be it only in apprenticeship to a trade— the texts also prove that the children or youths were taken to other groups that could themselves be broken up according to the needs of personnel management, however these needs were defined by the admininstration. Finally, the overall deficit in youths (both male and female) makes us think that some of them may have been sent to court to be turned into palace slaves —on the model of the Colchians and Babylonians, who every year had to send 100 boys and 100 girls (Col­ chians) and 500 eunuch boys (Babylonians) to the king (Herodotus 111.92,111.97). There can be no doubt that the various departments of the Achaemenid court included a large number of slaves. Furthermore, the category of royal slaves (arad-sarrutu) is well known from the Babylonian texts, which, for example, mention a slave of Cambyses (before his accession); we also know the category of palace slaves (arad ekalli). The Akkadian Forti­ fication tablet (Fort. 11786) includes a clause under whose terms the seller attests that the slave he is selling is not a royal slave (or a free citizen or an oblate), a standard clause in this sort of transaction, but it merits special attention because the tablet was com­ posed in Persia. 2

Family Breakup and Ethnic Uniformity A final(?) difficult)' remains. The presence of several ethnic groups at the same site is well attested: for example, Lycians and Thracians at Rakkan (PF 1946), where we also find Cappadocians (PFa 30). Among the groups of kurtas, a very small number comprise members of different ethnic groups: Lycians and Thracians (PF 1006, 1172, 1823), Ly­ cians and Bactrians (PF 1947), Egyptians and Assyrians (YBC 16813), to which may be added a group of craftsmen at the construction sites at Persepolis, where side by side one finds Ionians, Syrians, and Egyptians (PT 15). In these groups, the rations are divided ac­ cording to the traditional categories (men, women, boys, and girls), not by ethnic back­ ground. Very generally, then, groups of kurtas for which ethnicity is indicated remained homogeneous. It is tempting to conclude that, while the administration separated par­ ents and children, it did not make a parallel attempt to dilute their collective identity. But is ethnicity an absolute criterion for cultural homogeneity? Doubt on this score is not unreasonable.

438

Chapter 11. Persia: Empire and Tribute Economy

Based on analyses of communities of foreigners settled in Babylonia, it is generally agreed that these communities maintained considerable internal cohesion, because the Achaemenid authorities recognized their traditional structures and their cultural pecu­ liarities, particularly their religious practices. How was it in Fars? Examination of tablets concerning rations given to attendants of various religions shows that the Persians per­ mitted the growth of faith in gods other than their own gods—even though the propor­ tion of Persian deities is overwhelming. The attendants of Elamite gods (Humban, Napirisa, Simut, Napazapa) and Babylonian gods (Adad, KI) also received rations. Sometimes the rations were given "for the gods," without specifically identifying them. In most cases, products were intended for several gods, and it is not unusual to find ra­ tions distributed jointly to attendants of Iranian and non-Iranian gods (PF 338-39, 1956). This may indicate that at some locations there were sanctuaries for both. Sanctuaries honoring Elamite gods are found in many geographical regions; this is easily explained by the antiquity of the Elamite population in Ansan and the activity, of Elamite scribes in the chancelleries. They are found especially in the northwest, of course, which amounted to a veritable Elamite enclave, as is confirmed by the use of Elamite month names for dating documents. The distribution of Babylonian gods is very similar, except that they are less frequently attested. It is generally recognized that the record once more illustrates what we may call the religious policy of the Achae­ menids, who were careful not to undermine the religious beliefs of their subjects. On the other hand, we know nothing of the religious practices of the kurtas. One tab­ let shows that the kurtas could participate in religious festivals (PF 337). It says: "80 BAR of grain, at the disposal of Bakamira. Bakabana, the priest, received this grain and used it for the religious ceremony: 40 BAR for Ahura-Mazda, 40 for the god Misdusi. Then the kurtas ate it. Year 22." But what is the significance of the presence of kurtas at a festival in honor of Persian gods? Were these Persian kurtas? Or were nearby kurtas simply called together to participate in a festival and the distribution of rations that went along with it? We have no references to Greek, Cappadocian, or Syrian gods. Considering the fact that more than 120 (of the published) Fortification tablets are concerned with priests, gods, and services, it is hard to imagine that the absence of gods other than Ira­ nian, Elamite, and Babylonian deities is due to chance. Nor is there any reason to be­ lieve that the Persians forbade the kurtas to honor their traditional gods. However, the available evidence strongly suggests that the administration did not provide grain or wine for their sacrifices. It thus appears justifiable to consider the example of Elamite and Babylonian reli­ gious practice a special case. We must also ask: were the Elamite and Babylonian sanc­ tuaries intended for kurtas? The answer is not clear. The existence of homogenous groups of Babylonians in Persia is well documented. As early as Cambyses' reign, there is evidence of businessmen coming to borrow money and trade in slaves at Matezzis (chap. 2/7). The Akkadian Fortification tablet clearly confirms this point. Though writ­ ten in Persia, it uses the traditional Babylonian model, and the very titulary of Darius is Babylonian: "Darius, king of Babylon, king of the lands" (Fort. 11786). It shows that the Babylonians of Persepolis preserved a certain ethno-cultural homogeneity. It must again be stressed that the Babylonians portrayed in the Akkadian tablets were not administra­ tive workers; they were free men. Some probably came to Persia to look after their busi­ nesses; others came and went from Babylonia to Persia to make deals, just as they would go to Ecbatana or Susa.

Agriculture: Produce and Levies

439

This was certainly not the case for the great majority of groups of kurtas. Unlike some "Medizing" Greek communities, the Lycians, Cappadocians, and other Syrians did not move voluntarily to Persia, where they clearly had no autonomy within a system that de­ nied them individual and collective liberty. The administration's vocabulary is quite re­ vealing in regard to the Persians' opinion of them: groups of kurtas constituted an undifferentiated labor force that the administration intended to exploit unhindered. All in all, this was a situation much closer to slavery than the "helot" type of rural depen­ dency, a system in which the local peasants (the laoi of the Hellenistic inscriptions) con­ tinued to live in their villages with their families and continued to own property.

4. Agriculture: Produce and Levies

Bazis and Other Levies One category of tablets refers to the receipt of sheep and goats, paid as a tax called baziS (PF 267-73). The texts include the number of animals, specified according to kind, age, and sex. The name of the administrator responsible for receiving the animals is also given. In several other tablets we can distinguish two people with the same name, Makama, who can be distinguished by their patronymics: one was the son of Nappunda (PF 268); the other, the son of Wuntis, held office at Pirritukkas (PF 269-70). The name appears in an account book (PF 2008) that lists the number of animals received by Makama, who reported to Harrena, in years 15 and 16 (507 and 506). He also appears in an account of year 19 (503), where he has the title 'head of the herds' (kasabattis) at Urandus (PF 2025). There he received 526 animals turned over to him by Raubasa "and his companions." A man named Umizza, a shepherd, received 48. The previous year (504), Umizza, there called royal shepherd at Hiran, was named in a letter sent by "Rau­ basa and his companions," by order of Parnaka, to persons who are not clearly identified (PF 2070). In this letter, Raubasa and his companions have the title "payers(?) of the land(?)." For all its (major!) obscurity, there is no doubt that these men were subject to levies. T h e text also indicates that they were in charge of bazikara (bazis collectors), whom they sent into various districts. In other documents, the circumstances remain obscure and diffi­ cult to interpret. The word bazikara appears in two later tablets (466). In one case, a ba­ zikara distributes rations to kurtas (PT 54). In another document, some kurtas are called bazikara and receive a salary for their services (PT 41). The bazikara (Elamite matira) received grain, sometimes explicitly designated for "the royal cattle." For instance, it was a bazikara, Kaupiya, who in the same year at Hadaran twice set aside the grain intended for "the royal cattle" (PF 1943, PFa 32). Kaupiya was obviously an important member of the livestock-rearing administration, since on several occasions he delivered sheep to high-ranking persons and to the king (PF 663,678, 696). The size of the rations awarded to him (PF 843, 1323) shows that he was a high-ranking official. Do these references mean that the bazikara were in charge of overseeing the royal flocks and herds (above the shepherds) or that bazis was also levied on other animal products as well as agricul­ tural products (which would help us interpret Raubasa's title)? It is hard to know. It should also be observed that in a warehouse account from Kurkarraka, the title of an official, rusdabazis, appears; this title can be understood as 'levier of tax on land' (PF 1968). The levy of grain deducted for him corresponds to '/HI of the total. The existence of a tithe is also verified by several tablets referring to wine (PF 1953-54, 1997-2001).

440

Chapter 11. Persia: Empire and Tribute Economy

Every year a portion of the warehoused amount was set aside as a "tithe." On one occa­ sion, the word 'tither' ("daOaiya) is associated with grain, and the administrator con­ cerned was "named by the king" (PF 1942). In another example, a series of tablets (PF 546-653) mentions the collection of produce (grain, wine, fruit, and sesame) levied in the villages and collected in a warehouse before being transferred to another warehouse probably located in the heart of the district. Part of these levies ('/io for barley, '/30 for ses­ ame) was then set aside for seed or for animal feed. Finally, one series of tablets (PF 4 8 49, 388-96, 428) records the transportation and delivery of various products (wine, vari­ ous kinds of grain, and sesame). The word for their destination is ukpiyatas ("upa-yata) which refers to payments in kind; in Babylonia there also was a tax called 'transportation of payments in kind' (zebelu Sa upiydta), probably intended for tire king's table. On one occasion, the text is a little more specific: "300 BAR of grain-tarmu, at the disposal of Babena, received by fVlanna-Kitin in his capacity of(?) royal ukpiyatas. Year 28. He made beer from this grain" (PF 428). t

The Levy of Animal bazis Taken in conjunction with other accounts of sheep and goats (PF 2007-12), the documents listing the animal bazis invite us to attempt a reconstruction of the various ways that animals were levied, despite major uncertainties that cannot be resolved. The clearest (or least obscure!) text is the previously mentioned letter from Raubasa and his companions (PF 2070) that lists the baziS collected in the district of Hirau. It seems that Umizza, the shepherd "who lives in Hiran," was required to collect 48 head of sheep and goats that were entrusted to him by Raubasa. Whatever the case, it is remarkable that the following year he received the same number of animals that Raubasa and his compan­ ions had previously entrusted to him (PF 2025). Only the proportion of males and fe­ males changed. This seems to imply that each district was assessed the same number of animals each year. Four individuals— including a woman—paid 5, 5,8, and 9 sheep and goats, respectively: they were attached to (dependents of?) the 'estate' (irmatam) of Miturna (Gk. Hydarnes). Two other persons paid 15 and 6 animals: one was a treasury worker (kapnuski; from Hiran?); the other was called a "kurtas of the king." It thus seems that sheep and goats were paid as Dazis'tribute' each year. Part of the total received was consigned to shepherds (e.g., Umizza) and part to the 'head of herds' (kasabattis) of the district (e.g., Makema). Some animals could be sent to Harrena, the head kasabattis (PF 271). They could be moved long distances, since two tablets mention the transportation of bazis to Susa (PF 57, 1495). According to the second tablet, 32 men received travel ra­ tions for this purpose: by order of Bakabadus, they transferred Undana's bazis to Susa. These two officials are attested elsewhere as administrators in charge of sheep and goats (PF 62-66). Both were in charge of sheep and goats sent to treasuries. In fact, another series of tablets (PF 58-77) records the delivery of skins (primarily sheep and goat, but also camel) to treasuries, where they were processed. In the ac­ counts, these are the animals that are listed separately before being slaughtered on site. The hides were then sent to the treasuries under the supervision of officials. Wool prob­ ably also came from this source, to be worked by kurtas specialists. The animals that re­ mained alive were raised on the spot by kurtas (cf. P F 848, 1142). The existence of kurtas shepherds is actually attested in several Treasury tablets, which mention two groups: one with more than 370 individuals (men, women, boys, and girls) and the other with 131 (PT 50, 61; cf. PT 1963: 13). Shepherds (batera) are also mentioned here and there in

Agriculture: Produce and Levies

441

the Fortification tablets. Wc also know of Lycian shepherds who were working near Per­ sepolis when Alexander arrived. We may note that the management of other fauna, such as cattle (PF 2085-86) or fowl (PF 1721), followed the same pattern. The accounts of the Barnis station in particular show that cattle were also divided into various groups: those to be slaughtered, those to be kept alive on the spot, and those to be entrusted to shep­ herds (batera; PF 2013; cf. 1947, 2085, 2087). The Akkadian Treasury tablet gives us a handle on the extent of the gaps in evidence and on the extent of our ignorance (PT 85). In this text, in fact, we can see that, after the end of 502, a rax (mandattu) was paid in weighed silver by three people: (1) a woman named Indukka, mother of Tutu, 'head merchant' (tamkaru); (2) Pattemidu the Mede, "son of the shepherd"; and (3) N, "shepherd." hi some tablets, the word bazis is replaced by the Akkadian word mandattu, which in general designates a mandatory tribute assess­ ment. We know that this is also the word used by Arsama —along with the word for trea­ sury (*ganza)—$or the amount of "taxes/fees" levied on his Egyptian estates and the estates of two other Persian nobles (DAE 71-72 [AD 10-11]). In the Behistun inscrip­ tion, mandattu is the translation for bazis. Of course, mandattu and bazis are semantically too flexible for us to conclude that Pattemidu and the anonymous shepherd settled the animal baziS tax in weighed silver. In any case, P T 85 at least proves that, at Persep­ olis in 502, two different professional categories—including one or two shepherds—paid their taxes in siculi of weighed silver—a fact that cannot be gleaned from any of the Elamite Fortification tablets. -

The Direct Producers Because of its allusive character, the documentation does not answer an outstanding, haunting question: who paid these different taxes? That is, who grew the produce? The first thing that needs to be said is that—aside from the shepherds (above) — there are very few explicit references to kurtas dedicated to working the land, although there must have been many in the fields and farms. Since, for example, kurtas received seed from the administration several times (PF 123,463,484, 508), we can conclude that they were fanners. There can no longer be any doubt that the labor of cultivation in the par­ adises required a considerable workforce (PFa 33). But the word 'farmer' itself is absent or not yet recognized in the record. The references to 'nurserymen' (marsaparra) or 'ir­ rigation specialists' remain hypothetical or even seriously disputed, since the second of these words is sometimes understood as 'spinner/weaver'. Some Aramaic glosses provide complementary details. In one tablet (PF 855), rations were distributed to kurtas called pirrasanas: the Aramaic inscription says "rations for millers." The reason for this surpris­ ing lack of references to farmers is not easy to determine. Perhaps the agricultural work­ ers lived off part of the harvest and so did not receive rations, or at least the rations were not recorded by the administration. On the other hand, the situation was different for the kurtas who worked at processing agricultural products: winemakers, brewers, mill­ ers, oil-pressers, bakers(?), and those who were used in the warehouses or to transport the products from place to place, as well as those who worked in the bureaucracy (accoun­ tants, scribes, etc.). In any case, the kurtas were certainly not the only people working the land. Persian peasants are in fact portrayed several times by the Classical authors, unfortunately in ref­ erences that are quite indirect. Among the reforms attributed to "Cyrus," Xenophon de­ scribes the establishment of a corps of 10,000 lancers in the royal guard; according to

442

Chapter 11. Persia: Empire and Tribute Economy

Xenophon (Cyr. VII.5.67), Cyrus chose Persians who lived in abject poverty; Xenophon calls them autourgoi, that is, farmers working their own small parcels. This is also the word used by Aelian (VH 1.31). These peasants are sometimes mentioned by name (Sinetes, Omises, Rhakokes); they worked hard (1.31) in their gardens (paradeisoi) and farms (epauleis; 1.32). They raised animals (cattle, sheep) and cultivated wheat and the vine, fruit (1.31-32) and vegetables (lettuce: 1.34). This is obviously the social class Xen­ ophon's Pheraulas comes from. His father was a poor peasant, forced to borrow seed in the difficult gap between two harvests (Cyr. VIII.3.36-38). The importance of these texts, however, is in providing a concrete picture of a littleknown segment of the population, namely, free smallholders, since the entirety of the documentation from Persepolis leads us to suppose that the land was worked entirely by the kurtas. But what possible relationship to the information found in the tablets can be discovered? We might, for example, contrast the case of Pheraulas's father with the kur­ tas who received seed from the administration (PF 123, 463, 484, 508). However, what is the informational value of the rags-to-riches tale of Pheraulas? We know, again from Aelian, that the Persian smallholders were required to give gifts to the Great King when he crossed Persia (VH 1.31-32). Is it possible that the recently proposed meaning 'gift' for nutanuyas/naddnu allows us to understand Aelian? It has also been proposed that the growers entered into a farming contract with the ad­ ministration each year. They kept and fed the animals entrusted to them and in return kept part of the increase. But it must be noted that no such system is set forth in the documentation available to us. All we have is two accounts (PF 2010-11) that give lists of persons (12 and 22). Some of these people's names are found in other documents, where they are clearly labeled administrators. One of these was Mannuka, who in 493 was responsible for the flour paid for tanning work. To be sure, the potential for men with the same name counsels caution. But do these data really have to do with free smallholders? According to this theory, the boundary between the produce of farmers or landowners and the produce raised on lands controlled directly by the administration is not clear. Did the agricultural kurtas simply have to pay part of their produce, keeping a fixed percentage for themselves? In sum, the uncertainties remain so great because we do not know the answer to a ba­ sic question: can all of the assessments that can be identified in the tablets be considered fiscal levies (whether they are called tribute or not, which remains a subsidiary discus­ sion)? Indeed, this question raises another, which is also very important, of the status of lands and persons in the Persian countryside. The observations presented above repre­ sent only partial answers, which now must be considered more systematically.

5. Lands and Estates

Partetas Despite the stress placed on agricultural and animal produce, the tablets hardly ever refer explicitly to the soil—apart from a few (uncertain) references to pastureland. Nonetheless, three words deserve special attention: partetas, irrnatam, and ulhi. There can no longer be any doubt that the partetas corresponds precisely to what the Greek au­ thors meant by "paradise," which in turn is clearly a loanword from Persian (*paradaida). The criticisms that had been leveled against this interpretation were based on the belief that the Persian paradises were solely hunting preserves. However, the Classi-

Lands and Estates

443

cal sources prove indubitably that paradise use was much more varied. Paradises also in­ cluded plantations and farmlands, especially produce gardens and orchards. For Xenophon, the paradise was a specific kind of garden (kepos; Oec. IV. 13). The notion of gardens/fields is what Aelian means by the word (VH 1.32), referring to small holdings in Persia proper, and it is the meaning of "market gardens" that the Greeks retroject to the Hellenistic period. At any rate, this is the sense of the word in a Greek inscription from Sardis, of Achaemenid origin (Sardis VII. I. I ) , that records the various components of a "gift estate" (dorea). Favorable locations were chosen for the partetas:, in particular, places with running ^ter—rivers and springs. Several parts of Persia offer these features. Following Nearchus, Strabo (XV.3.1) and Arrian (Ind. 40.2-5) divided Persia into three major cli­ matic and ecological regions. The Persian Gulf coast was described as "sandy and sterile owing to the heat." The northern mountainous zone was "wintry and snowy." In con­ trast, Arrian emphasized the fertility of the central zone, what Strabo called CoelePersis, which he placed in the neighborhood of Pasargadae (XV.3.6): T h e country is grassy with water m e a d o w s , m a n y vines a n d all other Fruits except the olive; it is rich with all sorts of g a r d e n s (paradeisoi),

h a s pure rivers flowing through a n d lakes, a n d

is good for all sorts o f birds that h a u n t rivers a n d lakes, a n d for horses; it provides pasture for the other d o m e s t i c a n i m a l s , is well w o o d e d , a n d has plenty of g a m e . ( A n i m , Ind. 40.3-4*)

Quintus Curtius described the Persepolis area as "a spacious plain . . . , a fertile land, and abounding in many villages and cities," watered by the Araxes, edged with "plane trees also and poplars," "and the soil was very rich and abounded in fodder" (V.4.6-7, 20*). This was also true of the region of Fahliyun, within Persia and Susiana. The eye­ witnesses (of Alexander's time and later) have left enthusiastic descriptions: "Rich, wa­ tered by numerous streams, and productive of many fruits of all kinds" (Diodorus XVII.67.3*). After describing the road between Susiana and Persia as "steep-sided, sunscorched, offering no respite," Diodorus of Sicily notes the sudden change that wel­ comes the traveler entering the Fahliyun basin: [ T h e s e c o n d part of the road] was over high land, blessed with a very healthful c l i m a t e a n d full of the fruits appropriate to the season. F o r there were g l e n s heavily overgrown a n d shad)', cultivated trees of various kinds in paradises, also natural c o n v e r g i n g glades full o f trees of every sort a n d streams o f water, so that travellers lingered with delight in p l a c e s pleasantly inviting repose. Also there was a n a b u n d a n c e of cattle of every k i n d . . . . In density o f p o p u ­ lation, too, this country far surpassed the other satrapies. ( X I X . 2 1 . 2 - 3 * )

There can be no doubt that such a paradise was the location for an Achaemenicl-period pavilion that has been discovered in the Fahliyun region. It was also in paradises that the king and court very often halted during their relocations (e.g., Plutarch, Art. 25.1). Of course, the fertility of these paradises also relied on hydraulic installations such as have been uncovered by archaeologists in the paradise near Pasargadae. We even know that Cyrus's tomb was so equipped: "A grove had been planted round [the paradise] with all sorts of trees and irrigated, and deep grass had grown in the meadow" (Arrian, Anab. VI.29.4*). Achaemenid-period canals and reservoirs have also been discovered in the Persepolis plain. One Fortification tablet (PFa 33) is particularly illuminating. It is an inventory (refer­ ring to seed?) of 6,166 fruit trees (quince, pear, apple, date, mulberry, etc.) that were to

444

Chapter 11. Persia: Empire and Tribute Economy

be planted in three paradises close to Persepolis. Two other texts (PF 1946, PT 38) appar­ ently refer to kurtas whose job was "guarding trees" (cf. also PT 49 and 1963: 9). Another tablet (PF 1815) mentions rations to be given to four kurtas whose job had to do with trees in a paradise near Persepolis. The paradises were also potential sources of lumber (cf. esp. Plutarch, Art. 25.1-2), which was especially impressive in lands such as Babylo­ nia that had no forests (Strabo XVI. 1.5, 11). Aside from these occurrences (which are the easiest to interpret), the word partetas reappears in a series of 15 tablets (PF 144-58). Some of the paradises named in these tab­ lets seem to be located in the Persepolis area, one of them at Nupistas (Naqs-i Rustam?). But the tablets deal only with administrative matters, not with estate management. They are actually records of storage of several products: various fruits, dates, figs, and graintarmu were placed in the care of an administrator for later distribution (as rations) on or­ ders to be received by the distributor (sometimes explicitly named). We may note that on ten occasions the products are called royal (sunkina). But this point is difficult to in­ terpret, because the adjective "royal" is not used systematically; it appears to modify less the storage depot than the origin of the products collected—which for that matter rep­ resents another problem (chap. 11/10 below). From this elliptical record, it seems likely that the administration of the paradises—which must have had a specific manager, in Persia as in other regions—was included in the general management of produce that cir­ culated between different administrative levels and different districts; in this respect, then, paradise administration functioned as just another branch of government, at least under certain conditions.

Innatam The second category of "estate," the innatam, poses more difficult problems. We are not certain of the Old Persian equivalent. In the Elamite version of the Behistun inscrip­ tion, the word appears in connection with Vivana, who was said to "perform the func­ tion of satrap in Arachosia" (DB $47). In the great revolts of 522, Vivana won a battle with the rebels near the fortress of Arsada in Arachosia, and this fortress is called Vivana's irmatam. This usage is difficult to interpret, for two reasons. First, there is no equivalent for this phrase in the Old Persian version, which has nothing but 'fortress' (dida), as in the Akkadian version (birtu). It is also hard to determine, from all the evidence, just what the Elamite writer had in mind. Given that in the tablets from Susa from the time before Achaemenid dominion the word irmatam referred to a kind of "estate" (in a vague sense) and that the word appears to be borrowed from Old Persian in the first place, there is no reason to think that its meaning would be any different in the Behistun inscription. But if so, why would the Persian version have the word dida? And what was the relationship between a fortress and an irmatam in a satrapy in 522? It is possible that, as in the Per­ sepolis tablets, the word 'fortress' (Elam. haimarris) refers to both a military headquarters and an established administrative center, something like a county seat that collected the produce of the surrounding region. If the satrap Vivana held an "estate" there, we can understand why the rebels would have made it the prime objective of their offensive. The text also makes it clear that these estates existed before the reign of Darius, a fact that could not be known for certain from the Susa tablets. The word appears in 30 Fortification tablets (9 of them unpublished). Each time, it is associated with a person's name: the irmatam of Istimanka, of Irtuppiya, of Dayaka, of

Lands and Estates

445

Misparma, etc. In most cases, the texts recoid the deposit of merchandise in an irmatam (PF 2079), or the irmatam is at the disposal (kurmin) of a specific administrator. These products are 'set aside' (nutika; e.g., PF 1857) before being distributed in ration form by a distributor, who is also named (PF 331, 1256, 1892). These rations can be distributed to kurtas (1368, 1802) or to animals (331: camels), sometimes on sealed orders of the king (PF 1256). On one occasion, one of these estates is called simply "the one where Irsena, the head of the kurtas (kurdabattis), is the organizer/distributor (saramana)" (PF 1368). The same tablet also shows that the estate in question served as a stopping-place for troops of kurtas who were being moved from one place to another; they received travel rations for one day. From this perspective, the irmatam are included within the general administration, just like the partetas. Both served as collection, storage, and distribution centers for local produce. In addition, irmatam and paradises are sometimes associated. In six tablets (PF 150-55) dated to year 22 (500), the destination of grain deposited in some paradises is given as follows: "To be used in the irmatam of Sutezza." Two of these tablets can be connected with three others that are included in the series concerning levies on agricul­ tural products of the nearby villages or farms (PF 152/640-41, 153/637). In these tablets Sutezza appears to be in charge of produce that was collected around Mutrizas (PF 640) or Saurakkas (PF 641) and stored in the paradises of Mutrizas and Kutkus. At Kutkus, Sutezza again was in charge of the grain set aside for seed (PF 520-21). Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the irmatam were also agricultural estates. Most were located in the central region, near paradises, which implies that they had been carved out of fertile, irrigated land. We are led to suppose that they were granted by the king to administrators. They were thus perquisites, including the one Vivana had been granted in Arachosia because he was satrap. Given all these factors, the gift can hardly be considered entirely free. The concessionaires were not free of obligation to the ad­ ministration; they were mere cogs in the machinery. In some inventories, the irmatam are located in a district (batin) and near villages (humanus). The structure of the text on one tablet (PF 1857) seems to imply that they were also accounted as financial units by the administration. This tablet also indicates that the concessionaires of "estates" were required to turn over part of their produce (grain in this instance) to the administration's warehouse. Another tablet (PF 2070) concerning the levying of bazis confirms that these estates did not enjoy any sort of financial immunity: four "taxpayers" are actually re­ ferred to as "being at the irmatam of Miturna(?)," who himself carried out official tasks; this may be why he had this estate.

Ulhi The third word is ulhi. In the royal inscriptions, ulhi corresponds to Old Persian viO and Akkadian bitu, two synonyms that can be translated 'house', which is less a building than the ensemble of people who live and work on an "estate," which includes lands and various kinds of farms and which is headed by the master of the house. This is exactly the sense of the word in §16 of the Behistun inscription: where the Old Persian has viO, the Elamite has ulhi. In his prayers to Ahura-Mazda (cf. D N a §6, DPe), Darius be­ seeches the god to protect him and the people of Persia (dahyu) and his house (vi8). And certain decorative elements in the palace (window frames, door hinges) bear the inscrip­ tion "Made in the house (vi6) of the king" (DPc, DPi, A !). The word corresponds 1

446

Chapter II. Persia: Empire and Tribute Economy

exactly to Greek oikos, which is what the Greek texts frequently call the Persian royal house (e.g., M L 12). It also appears in this meaning in several Persepolis tablets. In 506, Parnaka, under orders from King Darius, sent the following order to Harrena, head of the flock department: "Give Irtasduna, the princess, 100 sheep [to be taken] from my house" (ulhi; Fort. 6764). In another tablet (PF 1987 -' ), sheep are transferred to the royal house (ulhi sunkina) and entrusted to the care of a shepherd. Other people operated in an estate referred to as an ulhi. This was the case for Irtas­ duna, one of Darius's wives, known to Herodotus as Artystone, who had two of this kind of estate, at Mirandu and Kuknaka (PF 1835-37), and also for Arsames, a son of Darius (unpublished tablet), and also for a woman called Irdabama, who held an ulhi at Sullake (PFa 27). It is likely that Irtasduna also held interests near the village of Matannan, where she sent a letter requesting a supply of grain (PF 1857). Twice grain was appar­ ently set aside at her request (PF 166 and 168). In the second example, the organizer (saramana) is named S a l a m a n a ; this was probably the same person who transmitted Arrystone's orders for the delivery of produce "taken from her ulhi" on three separate oc­ casions (PF 1836-38). Two other individuals had this kind of estate: Rammanuya (PF 1855) and perhaps Naktanna(?; PF 2075). Unfortunately, we know nothing of their cir­ cumstances. In every case, these estates appear in letters in which the master or mistress of the ulhi orders the delivery of a certain amount of produce to a particular person, specifying that they were to take the grain or wine "from my ulhi." One letter from Irda­ bama is addressed to accountants (PFa 27), and one from Artystone expects rations for her accountant Kamsabana (PF 1837). Physically, the agricultural estates connected to an ulhi cannot have been different from an irmatam or a paradise. The terminological distinction may not be random, however, since members of the royal family never re­ ceive an irmatam but always an ulhi. But this observation —which may be overturned by the publication of additional tablets—does not help explain the actual difference in sta­ tus. In the village of Matannan, it even appears as though some of the produce was paid to the administration on Artystone's orders (PF 1857). The house of the princesses included much more than farms. They obviously had a personal retinue and a sizable staff. Evidence for this is the large quantities of foodstuffs placed at their disposal for travel (PF 730-39, 2019, 2035). The same was true for other royal princesses (PFa 5), who doubtless also headed houses. Arsames is named in these contexts, along with Artystone (PF 733-34, 2035). He also had horses (PFa 24, 29 ). Furthermore, several tablets list the payment of rations to kurtas, who are called kurtas of Artystone or Irdabama (PF 1236, 1454; 849, 1002, 1028-29, 1041-43, 1098, 1109, 1198, 1221, 1232). These documents are problematic, because they do not make clear the relationship between the princesses and these workers, who do not seem to be distin­ guished from other identical groups. They work in a specific place (Sbiraz, for ex­ ample); they perform the same labor (for example, the women-pasap of Artystone: PF' 1236). It is possible that these kurtas were generally attached to the administration but that their services may have been required by the beneficiaries of the temporary assign­ ment. On the other hand, members of the royal family surely also had subordinates who were permanently assigned to work in their house, such as the person "attached to the house (viO) of Hystaspes," father of Darius (PF 1596), who may be compared with the people attached to the royal vid, among whom were included personnel holding impor­ tant positions in the palace economy (PF 1946 " ). 30

2

10

7J

77

The Persepolis Tablets and the Imperial Administration 6. The Persepolis Tablets and the Imperial Sources and Problems

447

Administration:

After reconstructing the organization of labor and production in Fars, especially in the time of Darius, a basic problem remains. Should the picture derived from the tablets be confined to Persia proper, or can it be extended to all (or to some parts) of the Empire, albeit taking into account local circumstances? Or, in other words, does the Persepolis documentation specifically reflect, however mechanically, organizational pe­ culiarities of Persia proper only? Let us stress from the start that the cpiestion has a deci­ sive importance: from the answer two contradictory pictures of the Achaemenid Empire follow. One picture reveals a very lax organization of countries that continued to carry on according to their traditional ways, without any impact of Persian dominion detect­ able. The other—the so-called "hard" view—turns the Achaemenid Empire into an im­ perial construct in the fullest sense —that is, a State within which the conquerors established and unified rules of administrative organization and economic exploitation that, without a head-on assault on local traditions, nevertheless infiltrated them from within and modified them profoundly, at least in several key ways that permitted the dominant socioethnic class to enjoy hegemony in alliance with the local aristocracies. Let us begin by dismissing a fallacious argument based on the narrowness of the chro­ nological and spatial extent of the tablets (chap. 11/1 above). The dating of the tablets (between 509 and 458) does not in the slightest imply that the administrative organiza­ tion known in Darius's time suddenly vanished in the seventh year of Artaxerxes I, nor, of course, that it was not in place before 509. For reasons already given, it is cleaT that we have only a tiny sample of a mass of documentation that must have been enormous. As for the geographic range of the tablets, here too we must beware of the vagaries of pres­ ervation. First of all, it cannot be denied that there were archival deposits in every satra­ pal territory. Herodotus inserts this detail, as an aside, regarding the secretary of Oroetes: "an officer who forms part of every governor's establishment (grammatistai basileioi" (III. 128-*-). Xenophon also alludes to this institution when he mentions the presence of Megaphernes, a "royal scribe," in Cyrus the Younger's service (phoinikistes basileios; Anab. 1.2.20). In Babylonian, biblical, and Egyptian documents, we also find exalted persons in the satrapal administration bearing the titles (sometimes multiple) bel lemi and sipiru, that is, 'chancellor' and 'scribe'. It is thus very clear that all the satrapal chan­ celleries were organized on the same model and that they were responsible for dispatch­ ing letters and orders and receiving and preserving letters from the royal chancellery. It is true that no satrapal archive in the strict sense has been found intact and com­ plete. This gap is due first to the chances of discovery but also and especially to the per­ ishability of the commonly used materials (papyrus, parchment, wooden tablets coated with wax). An episode from the Life ofEumenes (2.6-7) very concretely attests to the fra­ gility of these archives: after the destruction of Alexander's tent by fire, "the king wrote to all the satraps and strategoi to send copies of the destroyed documents, which were all collected, following his orders, by Eumenes." And at Dascylium, satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia, a group of bullas bearing cuneiform and Aramaic inscriptions and sealings has been found. Some of them are written in the name of Xerxes. The impressions left by papyrus and thread attest to the existence of letters and documents written on parch­ ment or papyrus deposited in the satrapal archives; only the clay envelopes (the bullas) have survived to this day.

448

Chapter 11. Persia: Empire and Tribute Economy

The spatial extent of the tablets is considerably widened by Category Q (travel ra­ tions), which covers all the imperial territories. The very operation of the system implies that the archives associated with warehouses that supplied the road network were nu­ merous throughout every satrapy. But it is likely that many items were recorded on papyrus or parchment. It was the same for the travel voucher given by Arsama to his steward Nehtihor when he sent him to Egypt (DAE 67 [AD 6])—and the relationship of this text with the tablets of Category Q has long been recognized. Other documents, such as the Aramaic ostraca of Arad, confirm—if there were any need —that the organi­ zation of travel on the royal roads relied on a unified imperial system. Elsewhere, though exceptional, several discoveries are noteworthy, in particular an Elamite tablet from Susa, another from Kandahar, others in Armenia(?). Paradoxically, the random character of these finds testifies to the fact that they are representative (cf. chap. 16/18). It is thus possible that the specificity of the Persepolis documentation does not imply that the bureaucratic organization of production was limited to Persia or to the Persepolis-Susa axis. Obviously, this remains to be proved, on the basis of better-assembled re­ gional corpora. It would in fact be bad methodology to extend mechanically any analysis drawn from the tablets to the entire Empire. The reason is not simply that Persia and the Persians constituted a country-people (dahyu) with an out-of-the-ordinary political and ideological status. It is also because, on some points, the interpretations of the tablets are burdened with a degree of uncertainty. Under these conditions, to be grounded, any ex­ tension of the results of analyzing the tablets must come from comparison with other documents that are themselves unequivocal.

7. The Management

of Property and the Royal Warehouses in Egypt

Egypt's very arid climate means that only its documentary record is comparable to that of Persepolis. In addition to a quantity of letters on papyrus or skin from the archives of the satrap Arsama, we have several official letters attesting to the minutiae of the satra­ pal administration, especially concerning the receipt and disbursement of products that require the existence of warehouses. We will illustrate this topic through five docu­ ments. Some of them are late (reign of Darius II), but all of them allow us to imagine that the organization they depict goes back at least to the reign of Darius I.

The Resupplying of the Garrison

ofSyene-EIephantine

The first document is a demotic papyrus from the last year of Darius I (486; P. Loeb 1). It states that the Egyptian Khnumemash, son of Horwenmefer, had been instructed along with the Persian Artaban to seek out commodities, especially wheat, in the moun­ tainous region (jebel). The grain was to be stored, probably at Syene, in the house of the man who had given the order, another Egyptian, Osoreris. The letter of claim/com­ plaint is addressed to Parnu, "charge of the southern district," who was Osoreris's imme­ diate superior. We can imagine that Khnumemash was an Egyptian boatman and that he worked for the administrators responsible for feeding the soldiers of Syene-Elephanline, under the direction of Parnu. The resupplying of the garrison is also the topic of an Aramaic document (DAE 54 [AP 2]) dated to year 2 of Xerxes (484). Two people with Jewish names, Hosea and Ahi'ab, received commodities (barley and lentils) directly from an Egyptian named Espemet, "servant^?)" of the commander Hanani—commodities that he was ordered to transport by boat to Elephantine. The barley and lentils were intended as rations for the

The Management of Properly and the Royal Warehouses in Egypt

449

soldier-colonists: 22 soldiers belonging to two different military units (centuries). Hosea and Ahi'ab were instructed in Espemet's presence to deliver the commodities "before the officials of the house of the king and before the scribes of the warehouse"; it was the responsibility of the latter to organize the division among the 22 garrisoneers envisioned by the document. The document is authenticated by numerous named witnesses and also specifies the amount of individual rations and the total of commodities received: 32.38 hi, of which 6.16 hi was lentils. The warehouse scribes were to repay the cost to Espemet. In the corresponding case, Hosea and Ahi'ab undertook to pay Espemet 100 kars of refined silver. As a deposit, they put up as collateral the salary they received from the house of the king as well as their houses and property, which, if there were a default, Espemet would have the right to seize. We thus see that in Egypt the various ranks of the hierarchy were personally responsible for the goods in their charge: in case of loss or theft, they had to repay the value out of their own pocket. Another document (DAE 55 [AP 24*]) permits a better understanding of the proce­ dure, although it comes from a later period (May 419). It concerns the accounts of the garrison of Syene-Elephantine. The scribes and accountants summarized the total of rations distributed to the soldiers of Syene and Elephantine in one year. The barley in question came from various locations, from the province of Thebes and the southern district (of which Elephantine was the capital). It had been brought to Syene through the efforts of several people with Egyptian names, probably boatmen whose status was analogous to that of Espemet or Peteisis, another boatman known from an Egyptian seal. Part of the cargo was deposited in the granary; the rest was distributed to soldiers of the garrison as food rations {ptp). As far as we can reconstruct, the traffic in goods was thus handled at Syene in a manner clearly similar to the process reflected in the Persepolis tablets. The document under consideration is very like general accounts prepared at Persepolis. A fourth document, moreover, indicates that the local administrators—the scribes—were required to send " each item month by month" to Memphis (DAE 60 [AP 17-0]). The local administrators were reimbursed by the central office in Memphis on the basis of this document. Inspectors ("azdakara) were responsible for overseeing the regular ration distribution procedure on the spot.

The Repair of an Administration Boat The fifth document (DAE 61 [AP 26-0-]) is an especially rich illustration of the bureau­ cratic nature of the satrapal administration. Dated 411, it concerns the repair of a boat. The boat was operated by two Egyptians, Psamsineith and another boatman whose name is not preserved, both of whom have the title "boatmen of the fortifications"—the latter word referring to Syene and Elephantine. The boatmen are not the boat-owners: they have "charge of it" in the same way that the soldier-colonists have "charge" of land. The boat thus belonged to the administration. The Egyptian boatmen use it for official busi­ ness, such as transporting foodstuffs to Syene, a service for which they receive payment. We also note that at this time Psamsineith and his partner's boat was in need of repair: its deckwork needed to be entirely replaced. The work could only take place in an ad­ ministration dockyard, at Elephantine, and to this end the managers had to commit to expenses that in the last analysis could only be authorized by the satrap Arsama. This was the reason the letter was sent by Arsama to the Egyptian Wahprc'mahi, who seems to have been responsible for the management of materials at the Elephantine navy yard. But the final decision was preceded by a voluminous exchange of letters and orders

450

Chapter 11. Persia: Empire and Tribute Economy

between Syene and Memphis. First of all, Psamsineith and his partner had sought out their immediate superior, the Persian Mithradata, who had the (Persian) title "nav-pati, or head sailor; he had authority over the numerous boatmen in his district. They had in­ formed Mithradata of the state of disrepair of their craft. After an initial inspection of the boat, which had rim aground "in front of the fortress," a report had been sent to Arsama by Mithradata's boss. But, before authorizing the repair, the satrap required an inspec­ tion to be made and a very detailed estimate drawn up. These operations had to be car­ ried out jointly by the treasury accountants ("ganza), the "foremen" (^framanakara; Samasillek and his colleagues), and the head carpenter in charge of the district, an Egyptian called Samaw, son of KonOfi. After the inspection of the boat—carried out in the presence of Mithradata and the two boatmen —a very precise estimate was communicated to the office in Memphis. Thereupon, the satrapal office sent an order to Wahpre'mahi authorizing him to furnish the materials to the head carpenter Samaw: the number and quality of wooden boards needed for the repair of different parts of the boat are listed, as well as other supplies (sails, bronze plates, etc.)—even the number of nails: 425 bronze nails for the gunwale, 200 for attaching metal elements. Additionally, they were required to provide arsenic and sulfur, whose weight would be calculated "according to the standard weight of Per­ sia." It was also specified that, in exchange for the new wood, "they shall bring to the treasury the used wood and broken (boards)." This detail bespeaks the rarity of wood in Egypt. The text also indicates that among the boards provided to the carpenter were "used pine boards." But it also shows that the administration would not allow the waste of any items that were its property; for example, they did not want the boatmen (or the shipyard workers) to resell the used boards for their own profit! There is no doubt that, upon completion of the repairs, the administration in Memphis required from Wah­ pre'mahi an equally detailed written proof of the use of the materials. This implies yet another inspection of the boat by the head carpenter and the treasury accountants; it was up to them to determine whether the administration warehouses should receive back any unused nails! And this entire bureaucratic apparatus was deployed for a total ex­ pense of not more than one talent ten minas!

Royal Dockyards and Workshops Other dockyards are known in Egypt, particularly the dockyard in Memphis, which is attested in an Aramaic document that unfortunately is poorly preserved. It is called "house of boats." The text itself is a sort of journal in which the movements of the per­ sonnel are minutely recorded. The personnel are multi-ethnic and, as at the Elephan­ tine colony, the dockyard workers are grouped in "thousands" (dgalin), which were perhaps in turn divided into centuries (as at Persepolis). One of these thousands re­ ported to an Iranian, Bagapata. As it stands, the document supplies no direct informa­ tion on the status of the workers garrisoned in the Memphis dockyard. There is nothing that permits us to equate them with the kurtas of Persepolis, though this theory is attrac­ tive. Nor do we know anything of their actual relationship with the military dgalin at­ tested at Memphis in more recently published papyri. The existence of royal workshops in Egypt is strongly implied by the discovery, at Susa in particular, of many aragonite vases with hieroglyphic inscriptions with the names of Darius, Xerxes, and Artaxerxes I, in a simple form "Xerxes Great King" or a more elaborate form, such as "King of Upper and Lower Egypt, Lord of the Two Lands,

Management of Surpluses

451

Darius, may he live forever." The vases of Xerxes and Artaxerxes have a quadrilingual text (Persian, Elamite, Babylonian, and Egyptian). Several of these vases are dated by regnal year. Two of them indicate the contents in Egyptian measures. It is virtually cer­ tain that these vases were made in Egyptian workshops and sent to the central court. Per­ haps the manufacturing process was organized in Egypt after the pattern of the Persepolis workshops that specialized in stone vessels (chap. 11/3 above). Royal stone tableware has also been found at Persepolis. The inscribed objects bear the name of Xerxes exclusively, in four languages. Their shape and the engraving of the inscriptions are very similar to earlier Egyptian vases. But it is difficult to say whether they were made in Egypt, rather than in Persepolis by Egyptian craftsmen. Manufacture of weapons is known in Memphis already during pharaonic times. Vases inscribed with the names of Psammetichus and Amasis have been found at Persep­ olis, part of the booty seized by Cambyses. They are very like the vases dated to the time of Darius and his successors. Shipyards are also very well attested in pharaonic Egypt. The boatyards were controlled by the "master of the shipping," whose duties and powers were assumed by the satrap of Egypt. Nonetheless, the obvious continuity must not cause us to lose sight of the innovations introduced by the Persians. The abundance of Persian-origin administrative terminology in the Aramaic texts provides specific evi­ dence of this; the meaning of these terms can often be recovered by comparison with the Persepolis tablet lexicon. The treasury ("ganza) named in the papyri seems to operate in a fashion identical to that of the treasuries found in Persia. It can be referred to with the terms "warehouse," "king's warehouse," or "king's house." In each case, it includes both a treasury proper and warehouses, since the military received salaries in silver (prs) as well as rations in kind (ptp). The treasury is where the reserves are deposited, "before the authorities of Government House and before the clerks of the treasury" (DAE 54 [AP 2*]). This provides us with an illustration of a procedure well known in Persepolis, where the produce is "at the disposal" (kurmin) of an official, who then provides it to the official in charge of distribution (saramana). Titles well attested at Persepolis are also found. At Elephantine, the disbursement from the warehouse of the materials needed for repairing the boat is authorized by offi­ cials who bear the Persian title "hamarakara, a title also found in the texts from Persep­ olis and in Akkadian documents. These officials are simultaneously archivists and accountants who according to the Treasury tablets are in charge of groups of kurtas. Among the officials responsible for drawing up the estimate (also a Persian word) were Samasillek and his colleagues, who bear the title framanakara 'foremen' —a term that also appears in the Persepolis materials. Analysis of the documents shows that these bor­ rowings are not only linguistic; they relate to an identical organization for managing pro­ duce and its distribution among the warehouses and treasuries.

8. Management

of

Surpluses

Rack to Pseudo-Aristotle At this point, a parallel with another source is inescapable: the Oeconomica of Pseudo-Aristotle. When the Treasury tablets were published by G. G. Cameron in 1948, one of the first reviewers (F. Altheim)—soon followed by Cameron himself—pointed out the similarities between Pseudo-Aristotle's analysis and the practices of the adminis­ tration in Persepolis. The proposed comparisons deal with the payment of rations in

452

Chapter 1 I. Persia: Empire and Tribute Economy

silver to the kurtas, interpreted in light of an expression in the Oeconomica. We will soon come back to this passage. Let us simply note that it is included within a broader discus­ sion of the royal economy, which embraced four sectors: "coinage, exports, imports, and expenditure" (II. 1.3-*-). At this point, the author refers very tersely to the management of surpluses in kind generated by the assessments imposed by the administration. The Per­ sepolis tablets, especially the Fortification tablets, provide both a striking confirmation and a precise commentary on Pseudo-Aristotle's analysis, because these four categories relate to the basic, central operations that may be reconstructed from them: assessments/ warehousi ng/arch iving/distribu tion. For the administration responsible, the first duty was to oversee the preservation and recording of products collected. To stay within the same geographical and chronological framework, we may cite a Greek parallel dating to the very beginning of the Hellenistic period (320), a text that echoes Pseudo-Aristotle as much as the Persepolis tablets. The Diadoche Eumenes of Cardia—who at the time was under attack by Antipater, who considered himself the supreme representative of the imperial order—was reinforcing his cavalry from the royal stud farms of the Ida, in Troas: He took as many [horses] as he had occasion for, and sent an account of his doing so to the overseers, at which Antipater is said to have laughed, calling it truly laudable in Eumenes thus to hold himself prepared for giving in to them (or would it be taking from them?) strict account of all matters of administration [ta hasilika). (Plutarch, Ewn. 8.5-*-) Antipater's reaction might be understandable; he was surprised to learn that Eumenes, even during such a chaotic period, showed himself to be so legalistic and hopeful of his political survival. That is, Eumenes, careful to display his loyalty, took care to apply the accounting rules that the Macedonians had carried over from the Achaemenid adminis­ tration. At the same time, the episode strongly suggests that the political disturbances had done nothing to modify bureaucratic routines; the bureaucrats knew well that at any mo­ ment they might be asked for accounts of their management— that is, a ledger of receipts and outflow.

Surplus in Kind and Exchanges The author of the Oeconomica not only discussed the stocking of produce of the tage in the royal warehouses (paratheseis), such as those located at stages along the royal roads (II.2.34a: thesauroi) or the strategic reserves deposited by the satraps in their terri­ tories (e.g., Xenophon, Anab. III.4.31), but also considered their marketing. The phrase "consider at what moment and in what way it will be advantageous to sell them" refers to one of the missions of the royal economy, which operated equally on the exagogima and the eisagogima (II. 1.2). These two words designate not what we call exports and im­ ports, but rather the shipment of produce out from and receipt into the royal ware­ houses. Perhaps the author was thinking of the needs of the State apparatus (army units on the move, official travel on the royal roads, royal table, transfers of produce from one satrapy to another, etc.), maintenance of which required permanent inventories. But his analysis goes further: the verb used, diatithestai, comes from the vocabulary of the mar­ ket. What the author is referring to, then, is a method that made it possible for the king to make money by selling off surplus from his granaries at the right moment (II. 1.3). There is no hint of a theoretical approach. It is clear that, aside from massive requisi­ tions like those of the Great Kings for their expeditions, or aside from particularly bad

Management

of Surpluses

453

years, the inventories of wheat {or other products) were subject to precise management: what was to be done with the surplus? This is exactly the question answered by the au­ thor: the administration profited from circumstances favorable to releasing inventories to the market. The author clearly found this problem very interesting, as is shown by one of the financial strategies he attributed to Antimenes of Rhodes, in Alexander's time: "Antimenes ordered the satraps to keep the storehouses along the royal roads filled ac­ cording to the custom of the country; but whenever an army or any other body of men unaccompanied by the king passed along, he used to send one of his own men and sell the contents of the storehouses" (II.38*0'). Though Antimenes' behavior appears rather reprehensible from the perspective of administrative regulations, it at least recalls the principle set forth by Pseudo-Aristotle —namely, the marketing of wheat from the royal granaries. A concrete illustration of the procedure is found in another document from western Asia Minor in the last quarter of the fourth century. In a reply to the ambassadors from the town of Lebedos, Antigonus the One-Eyed answered that he was not favorably dis­ posed toward the maintenance of wheat reserves by the towns themselves: this system would prove too costly to them, he wrote. And he recalled his policy in the following words: Until now, we have not been willing to grant to any town the right of importing wheat or es­ tablishing wheat reserves.. . . Again in the present case, our initial thought was not to autho­ rize this operation, inasmuch as the tribute land (kkora phorologoumene) is nearby, and thus it is easy, we believe, to seek out there whatever may be desired. (RC 3 ' ) 80 8S

In other words, the king profited from the existence of a nearby market (Greek cities) by selling surplus wheat derived from tribute (to use the word in a general sense). At this date, he even had sufficient political means to impose what appears to have been a sort of monopoly; since the towns did not have the right to buy overseas, they were required to buy from the administrators of the royal granaries. We have one other attestation from the beginning of the Hellenistic period, in a decree in honor of Thersippos: one of the good deeds for which he was recognized by the city was the provision of wheat to the city during a famine (sitodeia): "He obtained from the satrap the right to import wheat (eisagoga[n site])" [OGIS 4). This wheat clearly came from the satrapal administration's re­ serves, and the previous example strongly suggests that Thersippos negotiated the purchase with the satrap. Other inscriptions published more recently confirm the fre­ quency of such sales in the Seleucid period. It is clear that these practices were inherited from the Achaemenid period. This asser­ tion of continuity is not simply hypothetical. First of all, the existence of satrapal inven­ tories is explicit in the instructions issued by Darius regarding Jerusalem (Ezra 6:9; cf. Josephus, Ant. XI. 16). We have decisive evidence for the practice itself (that has been entirely overlooked). It comes from an Athenian decree of disputed date (probably to­ ward the middle of the fourth century) that honors the satrap Orontes, who at the time held a post in Asia Minor (presumably in Mysia). Orontes was awarded Athenian citi­ zenship because he had responded favorably to a request from the town. The Athenian armies at the time were fighting in the regions near the Straits; because they were in ex­ treme financial difficulty, the strategoi found themselves unable to pay the misthos (part of which was to be paid in kind) to their soldiers. Athens then turned, quite naturally we might add, to the Persian satrap, because every Greek knew that he had vast reserves of

Chapter 1I. Persia: Empire and Tribute Economy

454

wheat (like any other satrap). Athenian ambassadors then came to present this request to Orontes. The decree clearly shows that Oront.es did not donate the wheat but sold it— because the decree states which funds the necessary payment was to be taken from, and it gives instructions to the treasurers regarding the repayment of the funds to the satrap (IG II 207a). It thus seems clear that Antigonus and the Seleucid kings were merely fol­ lowing the example of the satraps of Asia Minor; they would regularly offer for sale the surplus of the royal granaries on the Aegean market—with, no doubt, the prior assent of the central authority and on condition that the price be high. 2

The Fish of Lake Moeris Several passages in Herodotus provide further indication of the conversion into silver of levies in kind. He notes—as we have already seen—that the profit on fish from Lake Moeris paid a talent a day to the royal treasury (to basilikon; III.91). To put it another way, every day the "royal fish" were sold on the nearby market, in Memphis or else­ where. This is of course a special case, since it was difficult to preserve fish, except as salted fish, which the Egyptians were very fond of (11.77). But in the long term, it was a general problem for the administration: how can we turn a profit on the yield of income in kind?

The Athos Canal Workers We might ask whether war was an excellent opportunity for selling one's inventory. Perhaps part of the answer may be found in Herodotus's description of the immense preparations made by Darius and Xerxes. On hearing the news from Marathon, Darius ordered the mustering of troops as well as the gathering of "warships, transports, horses, and foodstuffs" (VII.I*). Several years later, Xerxes reprised his father's work: Provision dumps were being formed for the troops, lest either men or animals should go hungry on the march to Greece. For these dumps the most convenient sites were chosen after a careful survey, the provisions being brought from many different parts of Asia in mer­ chantmen or transport vessels. (VII.25) It is unfortunate that Herodotus does not provide further details. But we may suppose that the wheat came primarily from the royal granaries, and that the king had authorized stewards at the granaries to make 'disbursements' (exagogima). We learn that the food supplies for the Immortals, "separate from that of the rest of the army, [were] brought along for them on camels and mules" (VII,83*). It is particu­ larly unfortunate that we know nothing of the distribution of supplies to the soldiers. Did they receive rations free, or did they have to pay for them? This question may be sur­ prising, but it is legitimate. From numerous examples, we know that ancient a r m i e s including the Achaemenid armies—did not have, properly speaking, a quartermaster corps. Most often, the soldiers lived off the land, either by pillage or by purchase from the locals. This is how Cyrus the Younger's mercenaries survived; the only preparation he undertook was to plan for flour and wine wagons in case the Greeks were unable to find supplies on the spot (Anab. 1.10.18). Cyrus's actual army was accompanied by mer­ chants who presided over the "Lydian market": at a time of scarcity, the Greek merce­ naries came to resupply themselves, but they were discouraged from buying by the prices asked (Anab. 1.5.6). We also know of Phoenician merchants in Alexander's army (Arrian VI.22.4). One of the most interesting examples involves satrapal troops in Cyprus in 386-385:

Management of Surpluses

455

S i n c e Evagoras h a d such a d v a n t a g e s , h e entered the war with confidence. First, since he had not a few boats o f the sort used for piracy, h e lay in wait for the supplies c o m i n g to the enemy, sank s o m e of their ships a t s e a , drove off others, a n d c a p t u r e d yet others

Conse­

quently, the m e r c h a n t s (emporoi) d i d not dare to convey food to C y p r u s ; a n d since large ar­ m a m e n t s h a d b e e n gathered o n the island, the army o f the Persians soon suffered from lack of food a n d the want led to revolt, the m e r c e n a r i e s of the Persians attacking their officers, slaying s o m e o f t h e m , a n d filling the c a m p with t u m u l t a n d revolt. It was with difficult)' that the generals o f the Persians a n d the leader o f the naval a r m a m e n t , known as G l o s , put a n end to the mutiny. S a i l i n g off with their entire fleet, they transported a large quantity o f grain from Cilicia a n d provided a great a b u n d a n c e of food. ( D i o d o r u s XV.3.1-3*)

Indeed, at this time, as in the time of Darius, the Cilician coast constituted a supply base for the Persian armies; it was from Cilicia that the Persian generals drew on royal wheat reserves to bring supplies to Cyprus. When the sea was free, it fell to the emporoi to en­ sure the supplies. We may imagine that in this era merchants went to buy wheat in the royal granaries and then resold it to the soldiers at, no doubt, a considerable profit. In other words, according to this theory, part of soldiers' pay returned to the royal treasury via the royal graiuiiies, minus the traders' cut. Of course, Darius's and Xerxes' soldiers were not mercenaries. But this does not mean that they had less money (in the form of weighed silver). We have already seen that raising royal soldiers in Babylonia did not cost the royal treasury anything, since they furnished their own equipment and the equip­ ment for their staff, and they were required to bring foodstuffs for several days (chap. 10/ 4). It would not be surprising if troop movements created their own market, permitting the administration to peddle its surplus to its own soldiers. This is in fact how the system operated that was set up to ensure supplies for the labor force working on the Athos canal, a labor force consisting of contingents of subject peoples and squads requisitioned in the Greek towns of the region: In a m e a d o w near by the workmen h a d their m e e t i n g - p l a c e (agora) a n d market

(preterion),

and grain ready g r o u n d was b r o u g h t over in great quantity from Asia. (VII.23-0>)

It thus seems certain that the workers purchased their rations. Perhaps they received a sal ary (in whatever form: silver or tokens), which they hastened to spend in the military warehouses!

Return to Persepolis It is not impossible that Herodotus's text describes a procedure similar to the process seen in action in the Treasury tablets. Beginning in 493, payments were made to the kur­ tas in silver, at least for part of their salary. The fo-rfasapparently received silver and food­ stuffs (beer, grain, wine). Some obscurity remains concerning the practical operation. What is certain, however, is that the mode of payment implies the establishment of fixed prices for commodities at the rate of 3 siculi for 1 sheep and 1 siculus for 1 marris (9.7 liters) of wine. This method of payment is often compared to one of the principles of the royal economy, which is reported in these words by Pseudo-Aristotle: "In regard to ex­ penditure, what expenses ought to be curtailed and when, and whether one should pay what is expended in coin (nomisma) or in commodities which have an equivalent value" (anti nomismatos onia; 2.1.3*)—with the slight but essential difference that the Persians certainly did not use coined silver but weighed silver. Taking this principle together with another rule ("The expenditure must not exceed the income": 1.6.7*), it is clear that the primary goal of the royal economy was to increase the central authority's revenues.

456

Chapter 11. Persia: Empire and Tribute Economy

Given these factors, we may suppose that the silver allocated to the administration workers would buy foodstuffs that would eke out the rations in kind that they received normally. But from whom would they buy? It is not impossible that a private market ex­ isted in Persia, since several Babylonian texts refer to merchants in Persia. Also, it is likely that, for example, the court was not fed exclusively by levies in kind, since Dinon (apud Athenaeus 14.652c) alludes to royal buyers (hoi agorastai) who came to the mar­ ket to buy (dneisthai) figs. However, if it existed at Persepolis, this market was not "free" in the usual sense, since the prices were fixed by the administation. Other documents attest to transactions carried out by administrators. Thus, in 503, the head of the ware­ house of Udarakka set aside grain and in return received "one top-quality mule and one top-quality cow" (PF 1978). The trade was probably with another warehouse (even per­ haps within the Udarakka fortress), not with private merchants. Every case involves exchange of merchandise—never silver. Otherwise, the minuteness of some silver allo­ cations ('/is siculus) makes it unlikely that the admininstration actually weighed and cal­ culated such small payments. It seems more likely that these payments were strictly "paper" transactions; that is, the kurtas had credit that fhev could spend in the adminis­ tration warehouses. If so, it was a win-win situation for the administration, since it could fix the prices and require the kurtas to shop there. Living conditions for the kurtas be­ came more and more difficult as prices rose, as can actually be seen at Persepolis be­ tween December 467 and August 466. The texts display extraordinary variation in the price of grain. The price rose to five times normal and then grew still more; it did not return to normal until August 466. We know nothing of the circumstances. All we can say is that the quality of life of the kurtas eroded drastically because of the administration monopoly. Overall, this example seems to confirm that there was no free market that could (possibly) have lowered prices by massive imports from nearby regions (such as Babylonia). Compared with the Herodotus text we started with, the Persepolis documents throw a stark, empirical light on the methods involved in managing the surplus goods stocked in the royal granaries. Were these methods applied systematically in every satrapy? Meanwhile, an Aramaic document from Egypt poses a real problem (DAE 54 [AP 2]). Recall that two Egyptian boatmen received barley and lentils from Espemet, servant(?) of the commander Hanani, to transport to the Elephantine warehouse. In fact, the docu­ ment explicitly provides that the clerks of the Elephantine warehouse were to "re­ imburse the price" to Espemet, in the amount of 100 kars. It shows that a warehouse (Syene) could "sell" merchandise to another warehouse (Elephantine) following a pro­ cedure known from documents from Persepolis. Were these goods purchased at Syene on the Egyptian market? It is possible that this is the case, because the provision of pro­ duce to the garrisons from tribute paid in kind (Herodotus 111.91) would probably not suffice to ensure regular resupply.

9 . Lands and Peasants

Kurtas, garda, gardu Comparison of texts from other sources can also deepen our analysis of another series of Persepolis tablets. The word kurtas, in the form gardalgardu, appears in Aramaic documents from Egypt and in Babylonian tablets. Both sources are often used to clarify the meaning of the word kurtas in the Persepolis tablets.The word garda is used in three

Lands and Peasants

457

Aramaic letters dated 420-410. One vvas sent by Arsama to Nehtihor, manager of the sa­ trap's estates in Egypt (DAE 68 [AD 7]). Arsama complains about Nehtihor's behavior, which he compares unfavorably with that of his previous steward, Psammesek, who de­ spite difficulties had "carefully protected our garda and property"; he had even sought elsewhere for garda to replace those who had died or fled. Likewise for other stewards in Lower Egypt. Hence Arsama's order: "Seek diligently elsewhere fox garda — all kinds of artisans; bring them into my courtyard, mark them with my sign, and appropriate them for my estate {hit), just as the former superintendents used to do" [Whitehead]. The sec­ ond letter was sent by another Persian noble, Varfis, who also held lands in Egypt. It is also addressed to Nehtihor, who, defying Arsama's order, had not given a group of Cilicians to Masapata, Varfis's steward, Masapata had complained thus: "He has assaulted my lady's garda and taken goods from them." Hence Varfis's anger, which is vented in the following words to Nehtihor: "Now then, you have no business with my garda\ Give back what you forcibly took from the garda ..." (DAE 73 [AD 12; Whitehead]). The third letter was sent by the satrap of Egypt, Arsama, to his steward Nehtihor and his accountants in Egypt (DAE 70 [AD 9]): F r o m Arsama to N e h t i h o r , K e n z a s i r m a a n d his c o l l e a g u e s [ a c c o u n t a n t s ] . N o w then, I h a v e a servant, a s c u l p t o r

(palikara-kara)

n a m e d Hinzanay, w h o m B a g a s a r u b r o u g h t to S u s a .

G i v e h i m a n d his staff (bet) the s a m e rations as m y other g a r d e - p e r s o n n e l [polishers?] s o that he will m a k e reliefs o f a m o u n t e d soldier . . . , a n d m a k e a relief of a horse with its char­ iot, just as he formerly m a d e for m e , a m o n g other reliefs. L e t t h e m be d i s p a t c h e d a n d brought to m e i m m e d i a t e l y ! Artohi knows a b o u t this order. S c r i b e : RaSta. [ W h i t e h e a d / transliteration of n a m e s , G r e l o t ]

Arsama's letter is constructed on the same pattern that the princesses Irtasduna and Irdabama used when drafting letters to the accountants of their house (cf. PFa 27). The sculptor Hinzanay, 'servant' ( lym) of Arsama, and the women of his house {bet) were to receive rations in kind (ptp) from Arsama's steward, "the same as my other garda" The sculptor in question —certainly a Mesopotamian—was famous enough to have been summoned to Susa by Arsama before being dispatched to Egypt. We also see that he vvas an itinerant artist who took his family with him when he moved. He had laborers under him, specialists in stonework, like the "foremen" of Persepolis (cf. PT 75). His status is not clearly indicated. It is undoubtedly dangerous to make him into a prototype of a free wage-earner. Arsama calls him a slave-servant ('lym); the vocabulary is vague (cf. DAE 69 [AD 8]), to be sure, but we might compare Hinzanay's case with several others known from the tablets, where certain individuals are said to be "attached to the house" (PF 1946). Rather than being a free itinerant craftsman, Hinzanay seems to have become a dependent craftsman, whom Arsama moves around at will in his own interest. One of Arsama's phrases, "garda—all kinds of artisans," is a virtual Aramaic caique of a Persian phrase known from a Treasury tablet (PT 79) in its Elamite caique (kurtas marrip misbazana). But the lexical comparison provides no indication of the garda's status; the word garda is used here in its generic sense of 'personnel'. The Cilicians, named in the second letter and in other documents, are included among these 'personnel'. In two documents they are described with sufficiently vague words ( bd, lym) that they can be considered slaves as much as servants (DAE 66, 67 [AD 5, 6]). We do not know how the stewards recruited new "slaves": by purchase in Egypt, or at some other market after be­ ing captured in war? It is likely that a large majority worked in the fields, but the estates (

(

e

458

Chapter 1 J . Persia: Empire and Tribute Economy

of nobles also employed a staff with very diverse skills. A certain number—such as those who were assigned to Masapata's wife—must have been domestic servants. All in all, the prevailing impression is that here the word garda is more a label than a technical term whose judicial status can immediately be defined. We may note in passing that garda owned personal property, since Nehtihor is accused of having taken some of it for him­ self (DAE 73 [AD 12]). We can conclude, however, that they were not free men but de­ pendents and/or slaves who worked the lands and the estate for rations provided by the stewards. Another fact needs to be brought up: the mention of a brand or mark that these people were required to wear. It is paradoxically via a passage in Quintus Curtius that we can indirectly establish a functional link between the Aramaic documents and the Per­ sepolis tablets. Describing Alexander's arrival in 331, Quintus Curtius (like Diodorus) devotes a passage (meant to be moving) to the Greeks who had been deported to Persep­ olis and who, he writes, worked in the slave shops (ergastules). He adds an interesting de­ tail: they were "branded with the characters of barbarian letters" (V.5.6-C-). This practice is well known in Babylonia; just as slaves (sirku) and the Eanna temple's flocks were marked with the goddess's star, private slaves were frequently branded with the name of their master. The only Akkadian text from the Fortification archives confirms this cus­ tom (Fort. 1 1786). A Babylonian document from Cambyses' lime even states that the hand of a slave of Itti-Marduk-balatu "bears an inscription in Akkadian and [another] in Aramaic" (Camb. 143). Two other Aramaic documents from Egypt offer striking paral­ lels. A case involving division of property among heirs mentions a male slave ( bd) whose hand bears a yod and an Aramaic word reproducing the name of the deceased owner (DAE 41 [AP 28]). Another letter confirms that slaves were branded on the arm with the names of their successive owners (DAE 22 [Bodleian ostracon 1]). The infor­ mation given by Quintus Curtius thus certainly appears to be legitimate. But should we conclude from this that every kurtas was branded? It is difficult to say. A passage in He­ rodotus nonetheless seems to imply that this was in fact the case for prisoners of war (VII.233: Greek prisoners marked with 'royal marks' [stigmata basileia]). What cannot be doubted, on the other hand, is that slaves proper (sold, bought, tattooed) are known from one of the two Akkadian tablets from Persepolis and, previously, from tablets from the time of Cambyses and Bardiya written at Matezzis (chap. 2/7). But in every case this concerns private slaves, who obviously had to be clearly distinguished from the kurtas belonging to the administration. The word kurtas is also found in several Babylonian tablets, in the form gardu. But, as always, it is used allusively and erratically, sneaking furtively into contexts whose very logic most often escapes us and which always assume that we know exactly the thing we are hoping to find out. One document, dating to Darius I (between 507 and 500), states that gardu can be enrolled into the army reserve. The other attestations are later and ap­ pear in documents from the archive of the house of Murasu under Artaxerxes I and Da­ rius II. What we find in these texts first is that gardu could farm plots of land that they had rented from the Murasu. We also find technical terms that are borrowed from the Persian vocabulary well known from Persepolis. We have terms such as royal gardu, for example, as well as a head gardu (gardupatu = kurdabattis); another official has the title pitipabaga of the gardu, or 'distributor of rations in kind' (ptp)—a title recognizable from Dinon in the transcription potibazis (Athenaeus XI.503f = FGrH 690 F4). In two (

Lands and Peasants

459

documents, these officials levy taxes on lands of the royal prince worked by the Murasu, who have rented the land to gardu. The gardu are themselves hierarchically subordinate to three higher persons. One has the title saknu of the gardu; on the model of the segan who oversee the kurtas of the workshops in Persepolis, he was, as it were, their "fore­ man." Another is called satrap (a very flexible term in the Babylonian documents). Both are royal officials. We are thus tempted to conclude that the nobles and the gardu who worked on the estates of the king and the nobility in Babylonia were organized on a socioadministrative model very like that of Persepolis: they received their rations from the royal administration. At the same time, the Babylonian documents show that, in lieu of rations, other gardu received land to farm from within the hatru system. So it was, for example, for a gardu called Salammanu. Elsewhere, the same person was called "Gardu of the fourth year of Darius [II]." This is a rather mysterious expression; one attempted explanation has compared this phrase with the use of the word rabbap, which at Persepolis modifies some kurtas. Thanks to the Behistun inscription, the basic meaning of the word is fairly clear: 'connected/attached/dependent'. It has been translated 'conscripted', a word that would qualify groups of kurtas temporarily requisitioned tor state corvees in Kars. Of course, the corvee system is known in Babylonia. It is also known that, in the time of Da­ rius I, Babylonians could receive orders to perform military service in Elam for a speci­ fied duration. But too much uncertainly remains to be able to be certain about the interpretation of the word rabbap in the (dim!) light of the Babylonian tablets, especially since in this example the mutual support the Persian and Babylonian documents seem to provide rests instead on circular reasoning.

Kurtas and laoi: Tissaphernes and the Peasants of Parysatis's Villages However allusive, a passage in Xenophon also deserves to be included in the discus­ sion, After the Greek mercenaries retreated from Babylon, they arrived near "villages of Parysatis" (probably not far from Opis). Xenophon wrote: Tissaphernes, by way of insulting Cyrus, gave over these villages—except that it was forbid­ den to enslave the inhabitants (plen andrapodan)—to the Greeks to plunder. In them there was gram in abundance and cattle and other property. (Anab. II.4.27) Politically, Xenophon's explanation fits well enough into the post-Cunaxa context, Tissa­ phernes being an enemy of Cyrus and hated by Parysatis. The prohibition he then im­ poses takes on a certain interest, at least giving us something to reflect on. Among all the documents bearing on the laoi 'common people', we may cite the socalled Mnesimachus inscription (Sardis VII. 1.1), which refers to a dorea near Sardis. In the inventory are listed many villages (komai) and laoi, with each village paying a phoros to the military district (chiliarchy) to which it belonged. All the available documents testify that, even in the case of a donation, the peasants remained attached to their vil­ lage, which, in Xenophon's Armenia, was governed by a komarch, who was required to transmit the dasmos 'tribute' to the royal administration (Anab. IV.5.9-10, 24). Else­ where, very often, the literary and epigraphic texts from Asia Minor confirm this ar­ rangement, and it is implicit in Darius's letter to Gadatas (ML 12): bound to their village, the peasants (laoi, laoi hasilikoi 'palace slaves', hierodouloi 'temple slaves') are protected by the administration —in no case may they be captured or sold on the slave market (cf. chap. 12/4). We are then led to inquire whether this is the context that lies

Chapter 11. Persia: Empire and Tribute Economy

460

behind T i s s a p h e r n e s ' behavior in Babylonia. T i s s a p h e r n e s ' behavior can be contrasted with Mithradates': to m a k e his rebellion (apostasis)

against the G r e a t K i n g obvious,

Mithradates pillaged the villages (komai; Polyaenus VII.29.1; cf. N e p o s , Dat.

10.2). An­

other e x a m p l e leaps to mind: we know that deeds recording slave sales in Babylonia reg­ ularly included a restrictive clause: the sale (duly registered in the royal archives) was only valid if the slaves in question were not royal slaves, free citizens, or t e m p l e oblates. If the c o m p a r i s o n with the Babylonian e x a m p l e is valid, we must recognize that the vil­ lagers assigned to gift land also benefited from this kind of safety c l a u s e and thus that their sociolegal status was c o m p a r a b l e to the status enjoyed by the laoi and hierodouloi known in Anatolia in the Hellenistic period and later. T o finish u p on this point, we must also stress, nonetheless, that the c o n c l u s i o n just offered c a n n o t b e generalized. It c a n n o t be a p p l i e d to a n y o n e other than the peasants who b e c a u s e of the c o n c e s s i o n of land c o n t i n u e d to live in their traditional villages and cultivated their ancestral territories. X e n o p h o n also refers to them in the

Cyropaedia,

c o m p o s i n g the following s p e e c h for "Cyrus," who has just laid his hands on regions sub­ ject to the "Assyrians": There are two things that it were well for us to look out for: that we make ourselves masters of those who own this properly, and that they stay where they are. For an inhabited country (oikoumene khora) is a very valuable possession, but a land destitute of people becomes like­ wise destitute of produce. Those, therefore, who tried to keep you off, you slew, I know, and you did right. . . . But those who surrendered you have brought as prisoners of war (aikhmalotoi). Now, if we should let them go, we should, 1 think, do what would be in itself an ad­ vantage. For, in the first place, we should not have to keep watch against them nor should we have to keep watch over them, nor yet to furnish them with food;. . . and in the second place, if we let them go, we shall have more prisoners of war than if we do not. For, if we are masters of the country, all they that dvveU therein will be our prisoners of war; and the rest, when they see these alive and set at liberty, will stay in their places and choose to submit rather than to fight. (IV.4.5-8*) In other words, the tribute e c o n o m y m a d e it necessary to maintain the system of libertyd e p e n d e n c e that characterized the laoi so well. H e n c e the words spoken by "Cyrus" to the "Assyrian" prisoners: You shall dwell in the same houses and work the same farms; you shall lie with the same wives and have control of your children just as now. But you shall not have to fight either us or any one else. (IV.4.10—11-0-) T h e c o m p a r i s o n s with other corpora lead us to think that X e n o p h o n merely transmitted a G r e e k vision of village d e p e n d e n c e : the m e a s u r e taken by T i s s a p h e r n e s s e e m s to be a concrete illustration of the policy attributed to "Cyrus." Booty was limited to harvest and stock, and the villagers are explicitly excluded; in the opposite c a s e , the satrap would have negated the e c o n o m i c benefits granted by the king to Parysatis, since a gift of land without peasants was useless. T h i s fact provides a m e a s u r e of the distance from the status

of the laoi to the status of the kurtas. Irmatam, ulhi, and Gift Lands (doreai) Similarly, we are tempted to c o m p a r e the tablets with other d o c u m e n t a r y corpora to try to dispel s o m e of the uncertainty s u r r o u n d i n g the exact status of the estates (irmatam, ulhi) allotted to princes, princesses, and high-ranking persons who b e l o n g e d to Darius's inner circle.

Lands and Peasants

461

As we have just seen from a passage in Xenophon, the Classical authors often testify to the existence of lands and/or revenues granted to Persian princesses. This holds, for example, for the revenue from the fish of Lake Moeris in Egypt, which Herodotus men­ tioned in his passage on tribute (III.91). Xenophon uses comparable expressions to de­ scribe the villages near Aleppo that belonged to Parysatis, wife of Darius II: "They had been given her for girdle-money" (Anab. I.4.90-; cf. II.4.27). Likewise in Plato: I o n c e spoke with a reliable m a n who travelled over to the Persian court, a n d he told m e that he crossed a very large a n d rich tract of l a n d , nearly a day's journey across, w h i c h the locals called "the Q u e e n ' s girdle." There's another o n e c a l l e d "the Q u e e n ' s veil," a s well as m a n y others, all fine a n d rich properties, e a c h o n e n a m e d for a part o f the Q u e e n ' s wardrobe, b e ­ cause e a c h o n e is set aside to p a y for the Q u e e n ' s finery. (Ale. 123b—cO-)

Many other ancient authors refer to this practice, which Cicero considered (pejoratively) to be specific to Oriental kings (Verr. 111.33). Whatever limitations there are on our use of Classical sources, in every case they ex­ plain that the princesses had lands and villages in various regions of the Empire from which they drew revenue that was allocated to their own house. Confirmation is found in numerous Babylonian tablets from the reigns of Artaxerxes I and Darius II that refer to houses (bitu), that is, estates assigned to members of the royal family (as well as to Per­ sian nobles). We know in Artaxerxes I's time about an "estate of the lady of the palace" (perhaps one of the king's wives), as well as an "estate of the king's son" (marsarri; reign of Darius II). Let us notice in particular several references to estates of Parysatis, among which we may quote the following: 60 KUR of barley, farm rent i m p o s e d , rent in kind of the lands [of Parysatis], (located) a l o n g the Addu-ab-usur c a n a l , right [and left] b a n k s , [from its sluicegate to] its m o u t h , w h e r e [its] water [flows o u t ] , from year 3 o f D a r [ i u s the king, (lands) that (are) in the hands o f ] M a t t a n i Iama [slave o f Ea-bullitsu the steward (paqdit)] o f Parysatis, (and) who (are) [at the disposal of Rimut-Ninurta son of] Murasti, the barley in question, [60 KUR, farm rent i m p o s e d o n ] these [lands] for year 3, [Mat]an[ni-Iama from the h a n d s ] o f Enlil-itannu a n d Mu[tir-gimmilli treasurers] of R i m u t - N i n u r t a received, it has b e e n paid; M a t t a n i - I a m a will have drawn up a receipt (for) 60 KUR, farm rent i m p o s e d o n these lands for year 3 (and) c o i n i n g from R i [...] and Ea-bullitsu the steward of Parysatis to Enlil-itannu and [Mutir-gimilli he will give (it)]. [ N a m e s o f the witnesses a n d the scribe.] N i p p u r , 12-ix-3 o f D a r i u s . ( P B S II/1.50; trans, after G. Carclascia)

Various estates allocated to Arsama, prince of the (royal) house, are also mentioned be­ tween 425 and 404. If the tablets relating to Parysatis echo Xenophon and Plato, those cit­ ing Arsama quite naturally remind us of several Aramaic letters from him when he was satrap of Egypt, where he also had estates (bet; DAE 62-73 [AD 1-12]). In addition, he was not the only one: some documents refer to two other Persian nobles, Varfis and Varolii, who also had lands in Egypt (DAE 71-73 [AD 10-12]). Of course, these docu­ ments are much later than the Persepolis tablets; nevertheless, the comparison with Babylonian tablets from the reign of Darius I leads us to think that the internal organiza­ tion of the Babylonian estates did not change noticeably between Darius I and Darius II. The translation of bet (Akk. bitu) as 'estate' should not give rise to any confusion. Lands allocated to estates of this sort did not necessarily comprise a homogeneous terri­ torial entity, set apart and individually identified as such in the countryside. These were not "rural estates" or manors surrounded by high walls. These "houses" included various cadastral elements, including hatru lands (bow lands, for example) and portions of 'royal

462

Chapter J I. Persia: Empire and Tribute Economy

land' (uzbarra). This is also the picture portrayed in a Greek inscription from Sardis (Sardis VII. 1.1) that lists the different elements of a dorea of Achaemenid origin: the concessionaire was one Mnesimachus from the end of the fourth century and his allot­ ment included villages, kleroi (military lots?), gardens for rent (paradeisoi), etc. This sug­ gests that the king did not grant his family members and favorites rural farms in units as we would understand them: the administration allocated revenues to them from a cer­ tain number of cadastral units, which could be increased or diminished. The origin and status of the lands allocated in this fashion make it clear at the same time that the con­ cessionaires—whether nobles or princesses—were not relieved of financial obligation to the king: even if hatru lands were granted to a prince of the royal house, they retained their original obligations, namely, various taxes and royal service (furnishing soldiers when called up by the king and/or the satrap). Likewise, the dorea of Mnesimachus re­ mained subject to the payment of tribute (phoroi) that burdened the villages and kleroi of his dorea. This is the sense in which the accounts of the Greek authors preserve some of the institutional reality: what the king gave was not so much the land and the peasants but part of the revenue; in the eyes of a Xenophon or a Plato, the villages allocated to Parysatis represent nothing more than what is nowadays called a civil list. It was the same for the revenue from the fish in Lake Moeris. Even though they were grants, from the outset these concessions were clearly understood as revocable; they were not private property in the full sense. That the grants were revocable does not imply that the beneficiaries did not actively concern themselves with managing them. In general, they entrusted management to stewards (paqdu), such as NehtihSr, Psammesek, Hatubasti, or Masapata in Egypt, or Labasi, steward of the Babylonian estates of a royal prince, and Ua-bulitsu, steward of Parysatis. Their mission was to watch over the lands, property, and workers—and thus produce and revenues. In exchange for their services, they received grants of land (cf. D A E 69 [AD 8]). It thus was the responsibility of the beneficiaries to exploit their estates in such a way as to extract the maximum profit after deducting the taxes payable to the royal administration. This was in fact the goal that Arsama and the other Persian nobles set for their stewards (DAE 68, 71 [AD 7, 10]). Even when gathered in compact and incomplete form, these facts are incomparably more detailed than what can be extracted from the Persepolis tablets. Setting aside the word ulhi (which corresponds to the Akkadian bitu) and setting aside the status of the concessionaires (princesses), it is in fact difficult to build sturdy bridges between the various pieces of the documentary record. The relationships are only partial and uncer­ tain. As an example, let us examine the data from a single tablet. It records the provision of travel rations to 71 'boys' (puhu) of Abbamus and Irtasduna, servants "who transport a treasury (kapnuski = "ganza) from Kerman to Susa" (PFa 14). Whoever the first of these two women may be (she is certainly high-ranking), the information is problematic. An­ other tablet (PF 1357) records the transportation of a treasury (kapnuski) from Babylon to Persepolis, but it is silent regarding the administrative background. There is a similar event in PF 1342 (a treasurer ["ganzabara] transports silver from Susa to Matezzis). It is tempting to compare the first of these documents (PFa 14) with a letter from the satrap of Egypt, Arsama, ordering the 'treasury' ("ganza), consisting in part of the proceeds of taxes (mandattu) assessed on the Egyptian estates of the Persian nobles, to be brought to Babylon (DAE 71 [AD 10]). Perhaps Irtasduna and the other princess possessed estates

The King's House

463

in Carmania, and the "treasury" designated either the revenues they extracted or else the proceeds of taxes they owed to the royal administration, or perhaps both at once. The letter Arsama entrusts to his steward Nehtihor (DAE 67 [AD 6]) wonderfully il­ lustrates the ambiguities of the word 'house' (hitu). By sending him back to Egypt, the satrap entrusts him with nothing less than a travel voucher. Addressing the stewards in charge of the stations that lined the road from Babylonia to Egypt (from medinah to medincih), he required them to deliver to Nehtihor and his companions rations (ptp) taken "from his house (bet)." But to what does this refer? The fact that the steward of his estates in Egypt (Nehtihor) and the stewards of the various cities involved had the same title (peqid/paqdu) does not imply that the duties of the two were the same. Nor does the fact that the personnel of Arsama's estates also received rations (ptp) prove that the "houses" of Arbela or Damascus were assimilated to the satrap's Egyptian estates. For how else can we explain the fact that travel rations were taken from "private" funds, whereas the Persepolis tablets show that travel rations were provided by the administrators of state warehouses? The tablets allow us to offer an answer, albeit a hypothetical one. These "estates" must have been comparable to irmatam, that is, estates whose status was at the conver­ gence of private and public interests. We have seen that they functioned as centers for the collection and distribution of the products of owners who were exempt from irma­ tam assessments. We may suppose that the house of Arsama had "credit" at Labiru, Ar­ bela, or Damascus, which he was able to use to support activities in which his satrapal interests proper mingled with his personal interests. We can easily use the parallel ex­ ample of the status of satrapal paradises. Here is how Pharnabazus reacted after the dam­ age caused by Agesilaus's soldiers in his paradise at Dascylium: And the beautiful dwellings a n d paradises, full o f trees a n d wild a n i m a l s , w h i c h m y father left m e , in which I took d e l i g h t , — a l l these paradises I s e e cut d o w n .

(Hell.

IV.

1.330-)

Pharnabazus's wording seems to imply that, from his perspective, the paradise had been transmitted to him by inheritance. In reality, what he had "inherited" was the position of satrap. The paradise was not his personal property; it remained attached to the position he held directly by royal favor, not from his father. But, as it happens, the practice of pass­ ing on the post within the family tends to obscure a basic fact: the paradise was an estate accompanying the job that, like the estates of Arsama in Egypt, was located at the con­ vergence of the interests of the king and the concessionaire.

10. The King's House

The King's Sheep, Camels, and Horses But what are the circumstances underlying Darius's order to take 100 sheep from his house (ulhi) and provide them to Artystone (Fort. 6764)? The easiest answer is the most obvious, which is to suppose that the royal house was at the confluence of power in both the political and economic senses. This observation seems even more obvious when we consider that the order was given to Parnaka, who was in charge of managing production and the labor force in Fars. In a letter sent by Darius to Gadatas, the steward of a para­ dise in Asia Minor, the Greek translation reads: "You will have great recognition in the king's house" (en basileos oikoi; M L 12). The word is oikos, which is very close to Persian vi0 and often was used by the Greeks to label what they thought of as the patrimonial

464

Chapter 11. Persia: Empire and Tribute Economy

management system of the Empire. The same conclusion seems to emerge from the Babylonian financial formula "taxes paid, the king's soldier, the king's flour, the barra and all sorts of rent for the king's house (bit sarri)." However, the vocabulary of the tablets prompts us to be cautious. We may briefly note that some texts refer to 'royal shepherds' (batera sunkina; PF 2025, Fort. 1091), "sheep of the king" (PF 775, 1442), "cattle of the king" (1946, 1965, 1991; PFa 32), "horses and mules of the king and princes" (1793), "royal horses" (1668-69,1675, 178487; 1942), and a "horse of Ariaramnes" (PFa 24, 29). Some stable heads (mudunra) are "attached to the royal estate" (PF I 9 4 6 " ) or else named as specifically dealing with the king's horses (1765) or "horses and mules of the king and princes" (PF 1793). The lower courtyard at Persepolis (or part of it) is said to "belong to the royal warehouse" (PF 1797). Some lots of products deposited in the warehouses are also called "royal" (PF 150-56, 158-60), etc. One of the most interesting documents is a "transportation autho­ rization" that records the passage of a considerable flock (more than 100,000 head) that was brought from Persepolis to Susa by about 700 shepherds (PF 1442), accompanied no doubt by scores of dogs(cf. PF 1264-66, 1904). This document certainly refers to kurta$, since they are described as "belonging to the treasury" and the sheep are "royal sheep." The same analysis may also hold for other tablets that mention the movement of flocks over long distances (PFa 31). The question posed by the documentation is thus very simple—simple to formulate, at least. Why is the word 'royal' (sunkina) used in only a minority of cases? What does this word mean? Is it definitive, or simply a passing reference to a well-known fact? Were there other flocks and other shepherds that were not "royal" even though they belonged to the royal administration and received rations from it? Or should we think that the omission of the adjective sunkina has no particular significance and is due simply to the haste of the scribes, who had no need to specify what everyone knew? The latter notion is the opinion, for example, of the editor of the Fortification tablets, who in the tablets referring to delivery of products to warehouses inserts the word "royal" in some cases (PF 2-4, 30-32, 53, 378-83, 385-87) but not in others (PF 435, 459-60, 488, etc.). Mean­ while, there is nothing to prove that one of the words for warehouse (huthut) must always be considered to refer to a "royal warehouse." Because the word sunkina describes some warehouses (PF 42, 133, 431, 533, 543, 650, 729, 1796-97, 1943 - ) but not others, is it not more likely that not all of them are royal? And if some administrators were "named (damana) by the king" (1942 ' ), was it not because they had a privileged relationship with the royal house? It is true that the reasons for the presence or absence of the adjective "royal" are diffi­ cult to bring to light. Why, for example, is the bazis called "royal" only once (PF 2025)? And why is another tax, the ukpiyatas, called "royal" only 6 of 13 times (PF 48-49, 388, 395, 396, 428)? We, like the editor of these texts, are obviously tempted to assume that the adjective is implicit everywhere. Comparison of parallel tablets sometimes permits us to observe that certain words were omitted by the scribe from one or the other. Umizza is called "royal shepherd" at Hiran in one tablet (PF 2070) and simply "shep­ herd" in a text from the following year (PF 2025), even though the context is exactly the same. We may also cite the captivating example of the 33 camels that were brought from Persepolis to Susa "toward the king" (PF 1787), then sent back to Persepolis a month later (PF 1786, PFa 26 and 29). In the first text they are called "royal" but not in the other 73

77

15

23-2

1

16

The King's House

465

three, which, like an echo, record the flour rations they received on the return trip. And even the texts of these three tablets are not precisely identical: the destination is some­ times Persepolis, sometimes Matezzis (which is, to be sure, a suburb of Persepolis); the name of the official in charge is not always given, nor that of Bakabada, who gave the travel authorization. Nor are the purposes of the three tablets identical. In the general account (PFa 29), the scribe omitted certain details but added others, though we do not know just which documents lay before him. Whatever the case, it is not clear why some camels called "royal" on the inbound journey could have lost this characteristic a month later on the way back! But the situation appears less simple as soon as we consider the longer series of texts. Of the hundreds of tablets recording rations paid to the kurtas, only 4 refer explicitly to royal kurtas (PF 1092, 1127, 1211, 20 7 0 ) , and of more than 100 texts concerning ra­ tions given to horses, only 5 list rations to horses of the king or princes (PF 1669-70, 1775,1784; PFa 24 = PFa 29). Some ration accounts make it look as though some of the rations were reserved for the "royal cattle" (sesame: PF 1991, 2082). But in the larger ac­ count books, feed for the royal cattle is only part of the total (PFa 32): this is especially clear in PF 1792, where Suddayauda, the head of the kurtas, addresses Parnaka through his superior, Harrena, and states that he has set aside 60 BAR of grain for cattle expressly identified as "royal." Similarly, in another general account (PFa 29), the rations allo­ cated to "a horse of Ariaramnes" represents only a specific subgroup of a general account (cf. PFa 24) in which other horses received their travel rations. It states simply that the ration of 5 BAR of grain to which he is entitled includes his travel ration of 2 BAR. It is clear that this ration was much higher than that of other horses named previously (0.7 BAR), In other words, among all the horses fed by the administration, the royal (or princely) horses constituted a special, recognized category. This observation holds for sheep, poultry, and cattle that are called royal as well. We should especially note the de­ scription of some head stablemen (mudunra): they are "attached to the [royal] house" (PF I946 - ), as others are "attached to the house of Hystaspes" ( 1 9 5 6 " ; vi9 = ulhi). 2 3 - 2 5

73

77

Two Economic Domains? But if royal and princely houses really existed, distinct from the general administra­ tion, what was their relationship? In this regard, one tablet is particularly interesting. It says: O n e ox, u n d e r the responsibility

(zakke)

(kurmin)

of R u m a d a , a t the w a r e h o u s e ^ ) , [was] paid

to the king, [to] A n z a m a n a k k a . Year 19. I s k u m i p a n n a [was] the s h e p h e r d

(hatera).

(PF692)

The editor includes it among the texts referring to deliveries to the king, specifically, in fact, to the royal table (PF 691-740). Despite clear onomastic connections with the next tablet (PF 693) and translation difficulties, it may have to do with a completely different operation. The word zakke is fairly rare in the tablets and its usage is ill defined. In some cases, zakke has to do with distributions to kurtas (1178-81, 1986-87: "He paid [amount] to [specified] kurtas"), but we cannot clearly distinguish a difference from the ordinary distributions (though there certainly must have been one!). In four cases, zakke involves "purchase" by an administrator of an animal in exchange for grain (PF 197678, 1980), thus apparently referring to transactions between two warehouses. This is per­ haps what is going on: the document seems to mean simply that on one occasion an ox

466

Chapter 11. Persia: Empire and Tribute Economy

was requisitioned from administration livestock and transferred to the royal estate (per­ haps in a trade). If so, this could be how an ox became "royal," with the named shep­ herd being either the royal shepherd who received the ox in the name of the king or (more likely) the warehouse shepherd. It must have been a fairly common operation that allowed the men in charge of the royal herds to (re)buikl their livestock with care­ fully selected animals. One tablet (PF 198732) seems to report that administrators ex­ changed grain for sheep that were then transferred to the royal house (ulhi sunkina) and placed in the care of a shepherd, no doubt one in charge of royal flocks. Another states that Darius's shepherd received 55 animals from the irmatam of Irtuppiya, in Parmadan (Fort. 1091). Let us return to the particularly interesting example of Umizza, a 'royal shepherd' (batera sunkina) whose situation is very clearly spelled out in one tablet (PF 2070): "Umizza, son of Halpa, who lives in Hiran, in [the district] called Halkukaptarris." He appears in two tablets dated to different years (504 and 503) but reflecting the same con­ text, since the same administrators' names are found in both (PF 2025 and 2070) and both deal with the collection of bazis (labeled "royal" once: 2025). In each case. Umizza receives sheep and goats, while others were delivered to the local "head of flocks." If, as seems logical, a royal shepherd deals with royal sheep, we can conclude that some (small: less than !/io) part of the sheep and goats resulting from the bazis (and not imme­ diately slaughtered) was requisitioned yearly to rebuild the royal flocks, the rest going quite naturally to the heads of the administration's flocks. Other transfers between royal property and the administration's property are attested. In some cases, "royal" products were placed in reserve in the paradise warehouses (PF 150-56, 159-60). On one occasion, royal grain was reserved for seed to be divided among four officials, including a head stableman (mudunra; PF 440). Much more nu­ merous are the documents that describe providing the king or his family members with various products from the warehouses. The products in question could be delivered to a royal warehouse: wine (PF 42, 729), grain (PF 1796, 384(?)), fruit (PF 133), as well as animals (PF 1797: horses). Sometimes, grain or sesame is "set aside" "in the royal ware­ houses^)" (PF 533, 543) or simply "for the king" (PF 1846). The fruit deposited in this way sometimes comes explicitly from levies assessed on the surrounding villages (PF 650). We have also seen that "royal" animals were frequently fed from the administra­ tion's reserves. This was the case for an enormous flock of royal sheep that was taken to Susa by kurtas "attached to the treasury" (PF 1442). Another series of tablets (PF 6 9 1 740, 2033-35) records the provision of foodstuffs in the course of relocations of the king or members of the royal family: Irtasduna, Arsames, Irdabama (PF 730-40, 2035), or even Darius's sisters (PFa 5, 31).

Parnaka, Persia, and Darius We have seen that the royal inscriptions reserve a separate position for Persia among the peoples (dahyava) ruled by Darius. Herodotus, for one, confers a special tribute sta­ tus on it in a passage (III.97) in which limitations and gaps have already been high­ lighted. A priori, the special place of Persia within the Empire does not imply ipso facto that it was devoid of any state administration. But we cannot be sure, since the docu­ ments do not deal directly with the problem of territorial administration of the country raised by some Persepolis tablets.

The King's House

467

Nevertheless, the special status of Persia raises the question of the place of Parnaka. Did he exercise a sort of economic high command, with the right to intervene in the strictly political realm? We have no clear reference to a satrapy in Persia at the time of the first kings. Three times, the tablets refer to "satraps" (PF 679-81). They record the payment of rations to three people; the first two are called "satrap carrying out his duties at Makkash"; the third is referred to as "satrap carrying out his duties at Pura(?)." The ra­ tions of wine and grain that they received are unusually high. But this information can­ not be used to define their status; in fact, these rations were travel rations probably used to feed members of their entourage (even though they are not mentioned; cf. PFa 4, PFT 23). If they really were satraps in the administrative sense (and the label not just a generic title), they seem nevertheless to have carried out their duties far from Persia. The Classical texts are silent. The information given by Herodotus on the duties of the "governor" (hyparkhos) of Persia, the duties that Hystaspes is supposed to have per­ formed before 522, is clearly erroneous (III.70; cf. DB §35). Not until the time of Alex­ ander is any information available, and not until then do we learn that there was a satrap of Persia. Ariobarzanes: again, it is important to stress that only Arrian uses this title (III. 18.2), which is not without its own problems of interpretation. At this date, there was also a garrison guarding Persepolis, and Persia was peppered with citadels that Alexander had to overthrow by force. We also learn that someone called Tiridates was 'guardian of the royal fortune' (custos pecuniae regis) and that another Persian, Gobares, was 'prefect' (praefectus) of Pasargadae. Diodorus says of Tiridates that he "governed the town" of Per­ sepolis, probably in the absence of Ariobarzanes, whom he forbade to reenter the town because he himself was negotiating with Alexander. All the same, he turned over to the king the treasury that he guarded (cf. chap. 16/12). Tiridates' Persian title would have been "ganzahara. At first sight, the information given by the Hellenistic authors does not contradict the (scarce) information gleaned from the tablets. First of all, the citadels are mentioned many times. The citadels (halmarris) were not solely centers for collection and redistri­ bution of products derived from taxes on the countryside but also—doubtless origi­ nally—full-fledged military sites that also served as relay stations for the transmission of acoustic signals (Diodorus XIX. 17.6: phylakai). Two tablets (PF 1591,1812) list the pay­ ment of rations (beer, grain) to the 'guards of the fortress' (halmarris nuskip), including the one at Persepolis; in one case, the group consisted of three squads (10, 20, and 70 men), each headed by a named commander. These soldiers are to be distinguished from the kurtas attached to the workshops of a treasury (kapnuskira) or the kurtas who oversaw the workshops (PF 874), as well as from the guardians of the paradises or rural estates, who are also kurtas (puhu). Limited as it is, this information proves (if that were necessary) that the garrisons re­ vealed in 331 had not suddenly been positioned to stave off the Macedonian advance. But by itself this information does not permit us to conclude anything regarding the po­ litical status of Persia in the time of Darius I. What is problematic, obviously, is that no satrap is ever cited in his official capacity in the tablets among the high-ranking persons who receive rations. It is true that the absence of any title connected with the name Par­ naka is a basis for nothing more than an argument from silence; and this argument is less definitive, obviously, than the approach proposed by some interpreters, who refer to some as satraps who never had the title because of the role they played in the distribution

468

Chapter IJ. Persia: Empire and Tribute Economy

of halmi to travelers who used the royal roads. Nevertheless, the argument from silence is not without value, because, as we have seen, the word satrap is present in the Persepo­ lis archives. The tablets also inform us of the existence of several bodies of administrators en­ trusted with judicial tasks. Three tablets refer, for example, to samidakurra, a word that is sometimes understood as "peace officers/conciliators" (PF 1311, 1374, 1461). Other persons seem to perform the functions of police. One tablet (PF 1272) reports the deliv­ ery of wine rations to a certain Bakabada, called "judge (databara) of Parnaka." Since he received rations for 20 days, it is likely that his job took him from one place to another within Persia. The expression "judge of Parnaka" should occasion no surprise. The same construction is found in Babylonian tablets—as in "ddtabaru of Artareme," a person who clearly carried out official duties (Artarius/Artareme was satrap of Babylonia), or the "judge of Gubaru," satrap (or high administrator) of Babylonia at the time of Darius II. From Aelian (VH 1.34) we know of the existence of itinerant judges in Persia at the time of Artaxerxes II. However, the tasks of Bakabada appear different in kind. There is no proof that Bakabada actually was an official acting on the spot in the name of a satrap. This theory, in fact, would not help us understand why the tablets never give Parnaka the title of satrap; he is never so identified. Parnaka's duties were very wide-ranging, but at the same time they were limited to the administration of property and government work­ ers. This is undoubtedly the context in which the "judge of Parnaka" operated. It seems likely, in fact, that in administrative usage the word data 'law' referred to rules governing the behavior of bureaucrats, including their calculations of their fiscal accounts (PF 1980). It is thus likely that Bakabada, in the name of Parnaka, was given the task of ruling on disputes internal to the administration and ensuring that accountants and warehouse heads adhered to the rules and obligations of their positions. In this sense, the relation­ ship between Bakabada and Aelian's itinerant judges must not lead us to identify the former's job with the missions assigned to the latter: Bakabada was part of the general ad­ ministration; the others belonged to the royal administration. The modesty of his daily ration (less than a liter of beer) does not lead us to attribute an eminent position in the administrative hierarchy to him. From all this, we can firmly conclude that Parnaka had neither the title nor the responsibilities of a satrap, insofar as we define these based on our analysis of the satraps located in the various provinces of Darius (cf. chap. 12). Two further observations may be added to this one. First, it is doubtful that the great aristocratic Persian families would have been subject to the same administration that was responsible for the life and work of the kurtas. Their way of life was more "tribal," in the sense that Herodotus lends to the Persian gene (1.125), than territorial. At this point we should recall that Quintus Curtius writes of Orxines in 325: "From there they [Alex­ ander and company] came to Pasargada; that is a Persian race (gens), whose satrap was Orsines" (X. 1.22-0). Of course, Quintus Curtius's terminology is not certain. The con­ tinuation of the story shows that Orxines was the head of the tribe of Pasargadae. But at the same time, in every language, the administrative content of the word satrap itself is uncertain. All things considered, it would not be inconceivable for the title to be borne by the chiefs of the great aristocratic families that doubtless controlled the peasants who worked on the land attached to the tribe. Whatever the reality of this (secondary) termi­ nological usage, it is reasonable to think that alongside the territorial division belonging to the administration headed by Parnaka, the old division familiar to the Persian clans

The King's House

469

and tribes continued to operate, whether their chiefs did or did not bear the title "sa­ trap" Furthermore, within the civil society of the Persians, the name of the tribe contin­ ued to be linked to the name of the ancestor, as seen in the example of "Masdayasna of the Maraphi" (PF 1797) and the (contemporaries) of Amasis of the Maraphii and Badres of the Pasargadae (Herodotus IV167). According to this theory, the later creation of the position "satrap of Persia" significantly reinforced royal power in Persia itself at the ex­ pense of the hereditary chiefs of the tribes; but too many uncertainties remain on this point to be able to sustain such a theory. We should also keep in mind that the geographical and political area covered by the Persepolis tablets does not include all of Persia. The Persian ethnos included subgroups located on the margins of the royal domain itself. While some of these groups, such as the Sagartians or the Yautiyans, are listed by Herodotus among the tributary peoples, others are not—in particular, the Mardians and Uxians. The former lived in the moun­ tains not far from the heart of royal power, the latter in the mountains abutting Susiana and Persia, close to a region firmly administered by the royal administration, the basin of Fahliyun. Roth populations were short-ranging nomads connected with basic valley agriculture. For example, "the mountain Uxians" are described thus by Arrian: "They had no money or arable land, but were mostly herdsmen (nomeis)" (III. 17.6*). The amount of annual tribute imposed on them by Alexander reveals the extent of their live­ stock: 100 horses, 500 pack animals, and 30,000 sheep (Arrian III.17.6). They were nei­ ther tribute-payers nor donors; on the contrary, it was the Great Kings who paid them gifts or tribute when they crossed their territory, according to the Hellenistic authors (chap. 16/11). In sum, one conclusion seems inevitable: not all of Persia was managed directly by the administration headed by Parnaka.

Royal House, Persia, and Empire: A Hypothesis When Darius ordered that 100 sheep be delivered to Irtasduna from his house {ulhi), we are tempted to suppose that he was not referring generically to property managed by the administration but rather that he was instructing Parnaka to charge these animals to a specific account. The orders given by Irtasduna, Irdabama, and Arsames to charge merchandise taken from their house (idhi) and designated for specific persons seem to be a similar case. It is perhaps possible to locate traces of a royal house distinct from the general fiscal administration in the Classical texts. We know that when the Great King relocated, he was accompanied by his entire court, including a treasury transported by hundreds of animals. Of course, it is not certain that this treasury could be confused with the treasuries kept in the capitals of the Empire —the very treasuries Alexander seized in 331-330. This at any rate is what is suggested by a passage by Chares of Mytilene, quoted by Athenaeus in a long discussion of the tryphe of the Persian kings: Near the royal b e d , b e y o n d the h e a d o f it, was a c h a m b e r large e n o u g h to c o n t a i n five c o u c h e s , wherein were stored 5000 talents o f g o l d c o i n filling the w h o l e , and it was called the royal c u s h i o n . At the foot was a s e c o n d , t h r e e - c o u c h c h a m b e r , c o n t a i n i n g 3000 talents in silver m o n e y , a n d c a l l e d the royal footstool. ( X I I . 5 H e - f > )

This text reveals the formulas commonly employed by the Greek authors to designate Hie revenues assigned by the king to the official list of Persian princesses (the veil, the queen's slipper, etc.). The comparison is interesting; in fact, it suggests that the king had

470

Chapter J 1 . Persia: Empire and Tribute Economy

a treasury available for his own needs that we should not confused with the treasuries managed by the treasurers appearing in the Persepolis tablets. This interpretation is based on the distinction we suggested between tage and tributeproducing land (chap. 10/7). Although all of the territories—what we call the E m p i r e belonged to the conquering king (by way of tribute assessments), parts were reserved for him (the tage) as dorea for the specific needs of his own house. It is our suggestion that Persia itself was organized on the same model—namely, within the country, we can dis­ tinguish the territories of the ethne, the estates of the nobles (established by inheritance and/or by royal gift), the lands managed by the administration, and the royal land (taken in the restricted sense implied by the word tage, in Pseudo-Aristotle). T h e tage is the phe­ nomenon referred to by the tablets naming the royal ulhi, otherwise known as the royal house (oikia basileos). This Persian royal tage was indeed a dorea in Pseudo-Aristotle's sense—that is, it was not distinguished in the landscape of the administration's land. Lands and villages were assigned to the royal house, and they undoubtedly were also managed by their own stewards. Revenues from these properties fed the personal trea­ sury of the sovereign and permitted his patrimony to flourish. Darius told Parnaka to charge the 100 sheep he gave to Irtasduna to this account. Our hypothesis—which we offer here solely for the purpose of discussion —implies that the king was not only the master of the Empire but that he also had a separate life as a private person or, rather, as the head of a house {ulhi); its funds are not to he confused with what is normally called the royal economy. The ambiguity of the vocabulary perhaps reflects the ambiguity of the situation, which simultaneously distinguishes and confuses. The sense of the word ulhi cannot be reduced to a rural estate, in contrast to a working estate (irmatam), of which the satrapal paradise is a well-known example. Originally, the royal house must have consisted of family property—just like any aristocratic house (oikos: Herodotus III. 119; chap. 8/4). In principle, the king's house was sustained by the produce coming from the part that, etymologically, means 'the king's part', paid to the king in the form of a "gift" according to a process that is probably distantly echoed in the nomos persikos so carefully defined by Aelian (VH 1.31; chap. 10/3); this is in fact the original meaning of baji-bazis. This "division" must be very ancient, since the word bazis appears in the name of the fifth Persian month (July-August), *drnabazis 'month of bazis on the harvest'. During the course of reinforcement of royal power, only the word bazis remained, though it came to signify only one of the financial levies. This hypothesis does not imply the existence of two rigidly distinct economies. It was Parnaka whom Darius ordered to take sheep from his ulhi and transfer them to Irtasduna's account. In fact, the king's house had resources other than the income from par­ ticular estates. Every year, part of the produce or profit was set aside and placed in a special account belonging to the king's house. Despite the activity of a staff "attached to the king's house," many functions were carried out by administrators working directly for Parnaka. The royal shepherd Umizza himself appears to have had (unclear) hierarchical relationships with Missumanya, who, on the authority of Harrena (PF 2025, 2070), had responsibilities in the administration of herds (PF 267, 2012). What makes the interpre­ tation so difficult is that the houses—royal and princely—are included at the same time and in different forms within the purview of the royal economy, because it was precisely from the king that princes and princesses enjoyed the revenues of their houses, in the

Transition

471

same way that Parnaka's authority derived from royal delegation. Somehow, by virtue of his position, Parnaka found himself at the intersection of the two spheres that the king dominated without making a clear distinction between them. At this point, it is tempting to think that this was the reality hinted at by Darius when he simultaneously distin­ guishes and combines in a condensed formula the two elements that are his country (dahyu = Persia) and his house (vi8 = oikos; cf. DPe, DNa). From a historical point of view, we may ask, finally, whether the ambiguity of the vo­ cabulary also accounts for the (difficult and conflicting) gestation and development of state bureaucracy, originating from a world that was, in the end, considered to be the personal property of the sovereign. Within the dynamic of tribute, the ideological repre­ sentations and the politico-economic realities were fused because, by means of tribute, gifts, and assessments, the Great King revealed and exercised his unshared authority not so much over the lands themselves as over the wealth they produced through the labor of his subjects.

I I . Transition As viewed by a Greek author writing toward the end of the fourth century in Asia Mi­ nor, the structure of the royal economy was very much the same as the operation two centuries earlier in Fars or Achaemenid Egypt. Analyzed in light of the Persepolis docu­ ments, the regional corpora show an undeniable internal coherence. This conclusion has the advantage of restoring an imperial universality to what is usually considered a simple reporting of local income. In particular, we have seen the considerable contri­ bution of the Aramaic documents from Egypt to the discussion. Indeed, there is no de­ cisive historical reason to consider Egypt a special case within the Empire. On the contrary, the evidence from Egypt fully reveals the limitations of the argument that would mechanically link the quantity of documentation with the degree to which a country was integrated into the imperial structures. Actually (and noting that the quan­ tity of evidence is purely accidental), Egypt was the only country that succeeded in detaching itself politically from the center for two generations? Despite gaps in the documentation, and whatever the extent of local peculiarities, we may reasonably sup­ pose that the management of royal property was organized identically in every satrapy in the Empire. The obvious concurrence of the analysis by Pseudo-Aristotle, the informa­ tion in the Egyptian and Babylonian documents, and the Persepolis model leads us to think that this organization had been in place since the time of Darius. These observations do not necessarily imply that the installation of an imperial administrative machine always obliterated local traditions, particularly in the socio­ economic and cultural realms. It is clear, for example, that the existence of a category called gardu did not obliterate other categories of worker in Babylonia. In the Achaeme­ nid period, as before, we encounter in Babylonia as many free laborers and owners as slaves proper and groups of dependents (often linked to the economy of the sanctuaries), whose status, to repeat the famous formula of the lexicographer Pollux, puts them "be­ tween free and slave." In other words, the approach adopted here does not eliminate re­ gional approaches; it makes them still more necessary. The inquiry has already been initiated in the course of the previous chapter (chap. 10/7). It will now be pursued more systematically.

Chapter 12

The King of the Lands l. Darius and Egypt

Satraps and Satrapy Our sources on Darius's policy in Egypt are abundant and varied. The texts (Egyp­ tian, Aramaic, Greek) and the archaeological data (statue of Darius, paintings and sculptures, stelas, naoi) eloquently testify to Darius's varied activity on the shores of the Nile and in the Eastern and Western Deserts: sanctuary-building, codifying "Egyptian law," digging a canal between the Nile and the Red Sea, and so forth. Whatever uncer­ tainties remain about the conditions leading to Egypt's revolt in 522, it is clear that Aryandes was confirmed as satrap by Darius at that time and that he ruled at least until 510, the date when he was deposed and put to death under conditions that Herodotus's narrative (IV. 166) does not fully clarify. In fact, Demotic texts show that in 492 Pharan­ dates assumed the role of satrap (Berlin P. 15339-15340) until later, in 484, when Xerxes installed his own brother, Achaemenes, in Egypt (Herodotus VII.7). After the conquest by Cambyses, the Persian satrap held court in Memphis, the site of the offices and various administrative branches. The citadel, or White Wall (Jnb hd), was held by a garrison of Persians and auxiliaries, and in order to support them, the Egyptians had to pay 120,000 bushels of wheat in addition to tribute (Herodotus 111.91). The basic territorial organization (villages, nomes) underwent no apparent modifica­ tion. But, under the supreme authority of Memphis, Egypt itself was divided into a num­ ber of districts that the fifth-century Aramaic texts call 'provinces' (medinah). The Aramaic documents show that the southern district (Tsetres) had Elephantine as its cap­ ital and was distinct from the province of Thebes (DAE 55 [AP 24]). A garrison was sta­ tioned at Syene-the-Fortress and, opposite it, on the island of Elephantine. At the top of the hierarchy, but dependent on the satrap, we know of the frataraka 'governor' who lived on Elephantine, while the garrison commander (rah hayla) lived in Syene. The first garrison head we know of appears in an Aramaic papyrus dated 495, a contract among three women of Jewish origin; the first two women refer to "half the share which was granted to us by the king's judges and Ravaka the commander" (DAE 2 [AP 1]). "Commander" was undoubtedly also the position held by Parnu (a Persian or Iranian), who is named in Demotic papyri dated 487 and 486; he was designated as the "represen­ tative of the southern district, to whom the fortress(?) of Syene is entrusted" (Berlin P, 13582; P. Loeb 1). In all probability, Ravaka's decision involves a part of the share (mnt) allocated by the administration to the soldier-colonists of Elephantine, which also involved rations in the form of foodstuffs (ptp) and weighed silver (prs). The intervention of the Achaemenid authorities in civil and/or private judicial affairs is frequently attested. For instance, in a petition (ca. 410) the members of the Jewish community in Elephantine demand that "an inquiry be conducted by the judges, the police, and the informers (gausaka) in charge of the Southern District province" (DAE 101 [ AP 27]). 472

Darius and Egypt

473

The troops and garrison at Syene-Elephantine, just above the First Cataract, had to maintain order as part of their brief and at the same time had to guard the southern fron­ tier with Nubia. The Nubian frontier, however, was not particularly close, as we infer from one of the documents mentioning Parnu that refers to a convoy of wheat coming from south of the First Cataract (P. Loeb 1).

{Jdjahorresnet's Return to Sais Overall, the Egyptian documen­ tation testifies to a fair degree of continuity from Cambyses to Da­ rius. Our earliest evidence—partial, to be sure—comes from the biogra­ phy of the famous Udjahorresnet, whom we saw in action after the conquest of the country in 525. It appears that he accompanied Cam­ byses when lie left Egypt in 522 but then found himself in the entou­ rage of Darius, who soon sent him back to the Nile Valley (fig. 44). He writes: His royal Majesty of Upper and Lower Egypt, Darius, may he live forever, ordered me to return to Egypt—while his Majesty was in Elam, when he was Great King of all the foreign countries and great sovereign of Egypt—to Fig. 44. Statue of Udjahorresnet. put back in order the institution of the scribal bureau . . . after its destruction. The barbarians carried me from country to country and eventually brought me to Egypt, as had been ordered by the Lord of the Double Land. (Posener no. IE) Thus, like Nehtihor, steward of Arsama, who returned to Egypt "through province after province" (DAE 67 [AD 6]), Udjahorresnet, armed with a royal authorization, used offi­ cial services to return to the Nile Valley "through country after country." There, he writes, he restored an institution for teaching medicine (House of Life), providing the students with all they needed to pursue their studies, "as it had been before." And the Egyptian specifies: "His Majesty did this because he knew the usefulness of this art for reviving ev­ ery sick person." We have indeed seen that Egyptian physicians were highly regarded at the Achaemenid court (chap. 7/2); it is they who were brought to Darius when he suf­ fered a major sprain while dismounting from his horse during a hunt, since they "had a reputation for the highest eminence in their profession" (Herodotus III.129*). Udjahor­ resnet stresses that the work of restoration undertaken at Darius's initiative encompassed the entire sanctuary of Neith at Sais: "His Majesty did this . . . to preserve the names of all the gods, their temples, the income from their wakf properties, and the observance of their festivals, for all time." In Udjahorresnet's eyes, Darius thus continued the work of Cambyses, who had manifested a pronounced piety toward the goddess Neith.

474

Chapter 12. The King of the Lands

Darius and the Egyptian Laws It was just about the same date, 519, that Darius sent a letter to his satrap in Egypt, which we know (in fragmentary form) from a text on the back of the Demotic Chronicle. Darius ordered his satrap to assemble Egyptian sages, chosen from among priests, war­ riors, and scribes. They were instructed to gather in writing all of the old laws of Egypt clown to year 44 of Pharaoh Amasis, that is, 526 —the eve of the Achaemenid conquest. The commission worked for sixteen years (519-503) and produced two copies of its work, one in Demotic, the other in Aramaic. The text does not detail the exact content of the book that they produced. It simply dis­ tinguishes "public (or constitutional) law," "temple law," and "private law." It is helpful to compare this text with other papyri of the Ptolemaic era that may have been composed on the model of Darius's code. One of them, in Demotic, is known as the "legal code of Hermopolis West." More than a law code in the strict sense, it is a collection of legal pre­ cedents dealing basically with leases and property disputes. The judge could easily find the path to follow in each case that might turn up. It is practically certain that these col­ lections were edited by religious personnel, who had available to them documents pre­ served in the Houses of Life —such as the one that Udjahorresnet restored at Sai's.

Pharandates and the Sanctuary of Khnum at Elephantine Settling disputes apparently was a common role for Darius and his governor in Egypt and so it is that they came to intervene in a matter of the sanctuary of the god Khnum at Elephantine later on, in 492-491. Two Demotic letters found at Elephantine attest to relations between the administrative council of the sanctuary and a man called Pharan­ dates, "to whom Egypt is entrusted" (Berlin P. 15339-15340). This cannot refer to any­ one other than the satrap, the successor of Aryandes. The matter in question was the naming of a lesonis at Elephantine; the lesonis was not strictly a priest but an adminis­ trator of temple property—comparable, as it were, to the neocore [administrator] of a Greek temple. In the first letter, Pharandates reminds the college of priests of Khnum of the conditions (social and moral) required of candidates for the post and for being con­ sidered "in agreement with what Darius the pharaoh commanded." Eight months later, the priests of Khnum wrote to Pharandates. Without referring directly to the satrap's pre­ vious letter, they let him know the name of the one they had chosen. The intervention of Darius and his representative in Egypt was thus not onerous. To judge by the chronology of the letters and their content, the people of Khnum did not, strictly speaking, submit their candidate for the approval of the government; all they did was to communicate the name of their choice to the satrap. Pharandates was satisfied with the prior reminder that the choice had to conform to conditions known to both sides. There is no doubt that in doing this, Pharandates was simply reprising a role that traditionally was the responsibility of the pharaoh, a fact that is reflected in the name "Darius the pharaoh." Furthermore, the well-known text called the Petition of Peteisis seems to record limits on the exercise of royal power in these domains. In the ninth year of Darius (512), Petei­ sis III was imprisoned by Ahmose, who had come to make an inquiry at El-Hibeh (Teuzoi) alongside the lesonis Zeubestefonk, son of Jenharoii. Peteisis was a temple scribe at the time. His report was forwarded to the governor (the satrap of Memphis?). A little later, Pkoip came to El-Hibeh, where he denounced Peteisis before the priests. More-

Darius and Egypt

475

over "He relieved the lesonis of his duties, threw him in prison, and bolted the door of our prison. Subsequently he replaced the lesonis with Jenharoii, son of Petehapi." After many difficulties, Peteisis gained an audience with the governor, to whom he brought charges regarding the activities of the priests of Teuzoi. On his return, Peteisis found his house burned down. The governor then convened the priests at Memphis. Only the lesonis responded to the summons. He was punished with fifty strokes of the rod, but finally he was allowed to return to Teuzoi in the company of Peteisis who, despite the promises of the lesonis, was unable to assert his rights (P. Rylands IX).

Darius in the Temple ofHibis (El Kharga) Darius's activity as builder is easily spotted at a number of locations in Egypt. At ElKab, the imperial sanctuary of Upper Egypt, where the new Horus, the pharaoh, re­ ceived the white crown, the temple was rebuilt by Darius. On a counterweight found at Karnak, the king bears the epithet "beloved of Haroeris," who was the lord of Upper Egypt. A fragment of ritual furnishing also bears an inscription in the name of Darius. More recently, in the same sanctuary, a half-drum of a column inscribed with the name of Darius has been found: "He who performed the rites, the king of Upper and Lower Egypt, Darius." The presence of Darius is particularly significant in the oasis of El Kharga, about 200 km west of the Nile Valley on the same latitude as Luxor. An Egyptian-style temple has been found there, the only intact Egyptian-style temple known from the New Kingdom to the Ptolemaic period. The initial work there was clone by the last pharaohs of the Saite dynasty, but most of the construction dates to Darius. Decorated with representations of hundreds of Egyptian deities, the sanctuary was dedicated primarily to Amon-Re. Darius is shown as pharaoh many times, wearing the crowns and traditional appurtenances, presenting various offerings to the gods and goddesses of the Egyptian pantheon (in­ cense, wine, water, land). Two hymns to Amon are inscribed there, as well as a hymn to the Sun that the king recited in the course of the ceremonies. Darius is saluted in it as follows: "The Master of the diadems, son of Amon, chosen of Ra . . . , the gold Horus 'Lord of the Lands, beloved of all the gods and goddesses of Egypt,' king of Upper and Lower Egypt, 'ray of Ra,' Ra's own son who loves Darius, may he live forever, beloved of Amon-Ra, lord of Hibis, great god rich in vigor, may he live forever." On the exterior wall, several inscriptions celebrate Darius's work as a builder. Amon-Re manifested his satisfaction as follows: Amon-Re, his disk appeared in life-power in the morning, illuminating the Two Lands with the splendor of his eyes.. . . The gods are cheerful. He has seen the precious, splendid, and comfortable chambers of his temple. There is no other prince who is great like the king of Upper and Lower Egypt. Son of Re, Darius, sovereign of all the princes of [all] the foreign countries. He [made] this as his monument to his father Amenebis, great god, powerful of arms, by making tor him . . . of good white stone from Meska, place of eternity, whose walls were founded by Sechar, built with labor perfect for eternity, whose decoration was exe­ cuted by Resi-inbef, who created the beauty of its gates, and in which the Sun shines for ever and ever. Many reliefs portray privileged links between the gods and the pharaoh, who in this case was Darius. For example, four panels mounted on the east wall of hypostyle hall B show Darius and several specific gods: Mut takes the king's hand and gives life to his nos­ trils; we also see the god Imy-wet extending his scepter toward Darius's nostrils; below,

Chapter 12. The King of the Lands

476

Darius is embraced by Isis, who addresses him as her well-beloved son. Furthermore, the goddess Neith of SaTs nurses the young Darius while Hathor of Hibis holds him by the arms. Two inscriptions explain the scene: "Words spoken by the great Neith, the di­ vine mother, lady of Sai's who presides at Hibis," and (behind her): "Take, O youth, her nipples with your mouth; she is the powerful one who heads Sai's." The same scene is repeated in room L of the sanctuary: "Words spoken by the great Neith, lady of Sai's: "I suckle your body with [my] milk, in such a way that you gather the Double Land with all the Rekhyt. [subject peoples] to your breast, O my son!" Elsewhere (hypostyle hall N), it is Mut who nurses Darius. This well-known pharaonic rite confers divine status on the new king.

Darius at Heliopolis A recently published object, a statue of Darius (fig. 19), was eventually placed at the entrance to the Gate of Susa known as the "Darius Gate." However, a statement by Da­ rius himself makes it clear that the statue came from Egypt, where it had been carved. Engraved on the segments of the belt, the folds of the tunic, and the edge of the base are four hieroglyphic inscriptions. One of them refers to: T h e portrait m a d e in the exact i m a g e of the perfect g o d , master of the T w o L a n d s , w h i c h His Majesty h a d m a d e so that a m o n u m e n t to h i m m i g h t b e p e r m a n e n t l y established a n d so that his a p p e a r a n c e m i g h t b e r e m e m b e r e d before his father, A t u m , H e l i o p o l i t a n lord o f the T w o L a n d s , RS-Harakhte, for all eternity. M a y h e a c c o r d to h i m in return all life a n d all power, all health, all joy, as Ra [enjoys].

The longest inscription underlines still more clearly the links between Darius and Atum, even as it intermingles Pharaonic and Persian titulary: T h e king of U p p e r a n d L o w e r E g y p t , master o f the T w o l a n d s , D a r a y w e s h , m a y h e live for­ ever! T h e great king, the king o f kings, the s u p r e m e lord of the earth [in its totality, the s o n of the] father-of-a-god W i s h t a p a [Hystaspes], the A c h a e m e n i d , h e w h o a p p e a r e d as king of U p p e r a n d L o w e r E g y p t on the seat w h e r e H o r u s reigns over the living, like Ra at the head of the g o d s , eternally!

The god confers a universal power on Darius: I give you all the c o u n t r i e s o f plain a n d m o u n t a i n u n i t e d u n d e r your s a n d a l s . I give you U p p e r E g y p t a n d L o w e r E g y p t , w h o a d d r e s s a d o r a t i o n s to your h a n d s o m e face, as to Ra's, eternally.

Darius's Pharaonic

Reputation

In every case, the Classical sources paint Darius as a pharaoh highly respectful of the customs of his Egyptian subjects, in contrast to the behavior of Cambyses. Thus the statue of Darius from Susa makes us think of what Herodotus (II. 110) and Diodorus Siculus (I.58.4-0-) wrote of relations between Darius and the priests of the sanctuary of He­ phaestus [Ptah] in Memphis. This sanctuary, according to the Greek authors, is where reliefs extolling the exploits of the pharaoh Sesostris, who was famous for his Asiatic con­ quests, had been placed. Darius wished to place his own statue above the statue of Se­ sostris. The priests would hear of no such thing: "The chief priest (arkhihiereus) opposed it in a speech which he made in an assembly of the priests, to the effect that Darius had not yet surpassed the deeds of Sesoosis." Darius seems to have taken this quite well and abandoned his plan for the moment. If this popular tradition has any significance at all, it indicates that, in Egypt, Darius attempted to assimilate for his own benefit the prestige

Darius and Egypt

All

of earlier pharaohs, particularly Sesostris, who was presented by Herodotus and Di­ odorus as the greatest of conquerors and administrators. Before launching into the con­ quest of the inhabited world, Sesostris, after "dividing the entire land into thirty-six parts which the Egyptians call nomes, set over each a nomarch, who should superintend the collection of the royal revenues and administer all the affairs of his division." He sur­ rounded himself with men of his generation who were totally devoted to him: "And upon all these commanders he bestowed allotments of the best land in Egypt, in order that, enjoying sufficient income and lacking nothing, they might sedulously practice the art of war." His conquests encompassed an immense space, from the Ganges to the Danube. He conquered Thrace and also the rest of Asia and most of the Cyclades, and in Thrace he erected inscribed columns bearing representations of the conquered peo­ ples. "He dealt gently with all conquered peoples and, after concluding his campaign in nine years, commanded the nations to bring presents each year to Egypt according to their ability (kata dynamin)" (Diodorus 1.54-55*). Diodorus again insists on the peace­ time accomplishments of this pharaoh; by using the workforce assembled after military campaigns, "in the whole region from Memphis to the sea, he dug many canals all opening into the Nile, in order to facilitate the transport of the fruits and the commer­ cial relations of all the inhabitants; but, more importantly, he safeguarded the country from enemy invasions" (1.56-57). It is quite tempting to see in the portrayal of the ex­ ploits of Sesostris implicit references to the achievements of Darius in many domains, in the same way that Diodorus (following Ctesias) dealt with the mythic queen Semiramis in the light of Achaemenid reality. Similarly, Diodorus situates Darius's codification of Egyptian law within the phara­ onic tongue duree, succeeding the work of prior pharaohs such as Mneves, Sasyches, Se­ sostris, and Bocchoris (1.94-95): A sixth m a n to c o n c e r n h i m s e l f with the laws of the E g y p t i a n s , it is said, was D a r i u s the fa­ ther o f Xerxes; for h e was i n c e n s e d at the lawlessness which his predecessor, C a m b y s e s , h a d shown in his treatment o f the s a n c t u a r i e s o f E g y p t , a n d aspired to live a life o f virtue a n d of piety towards the gods. I n d e e d h e a s s o c i a t e d with the priests of E g y p t t h e m s e l v e s , a n d took part with t h e m in the study of t h e o l o g y a n d of the events r e c o r d e d in their sacred books

(hierai graphai); a n d w h e n

h e l e a r n e d from these books a b o u t the greatness of soul of the a n ­

cient kings a n d a b o u t their g o o d w i l l towards their subjects h e imitated their m a n n e r o f life. For this reason h e was the o b j e c t o f s u c h great h o n o u r that h e a l o n e of all the kings was a d ­ dressed as a g o d by the E g y p t i a n s in his lifetime, while at his death he was a c c o r d e d e q u a l honours with the a n c i e n t kings o f E g y p t w h o h a d ruled in strictest a c c o r d with the laws.

In parallel, Herodotus (11.158-59*) and Diodorus (1.33*) stress that, by establishing a waterway between Bubastis and the Red Sea, Darius repeated the accomplishment of Necho II, the pharoah who, according to Herodotus, "began the construction of the ca­ nal, . . . a work afterwards completed by Darius the Persian." Herodotus mentions that Necho was forced to interrupt the work because of opposition from the Egyptians; an oracle had proclaimed "that his labour was all for the advantage of the 'barbarian,'" by which it was sometimes understood that it was the foreign merchants who would reap the benefits of the direct link. Diodorus repeats the tradition, but he adds that "Darius left it unfinished," for he had been convinced by his advisers "that if he dug through the neck of land, he would be responsible for the submergence of Egypt" because of the dif­ ference in level between the Red Sea and Egyptian territory! This approach allowed Di­ odorus to credit Ptolemy alone with finishing the earlier projects.

478

Chapter 12. The King of the Lands

The Pharaoh and the Great King On the canal stelas, Darius is designated "born of Neith, mistress of Sais. . . . He whom Ra placed on the throne to finish what he had started." His "mother," Neith, be­ stowed the bow on him "to repel his enemies every day, as she had done for her son R&" (Posener no. 8). The pictorial compositions at Hibis (El-Kharga) speak to the ideological objectives of Darius and his counselors in Egypt. Another bit of evidence is interesting. A small wooden naos (shrine) was found at Hermopolis bearing inscriptions in the name of "perfect god, lord of the Two Lands, Darius," "the king of Upper and Lower Egypt, Darius," and "Long live the perfect god, lord of the Two Lands, Darius, living eternally." All of these texts and other evidence together lead us to think that Darius wished to sig­ nal a continuity with the traditions of pharaonic power. On the other hand, the ideological discourse is sometimes ambiguous. The two Niles are depicted under the Egyptian winged disk on the Tell el-Maskhuta stela. The gods ad­ dress Darius in these words: "I give you all the lands, all the subjected countries, all the foreign countries, all the B o w s . . . . I give it to you to appear as king of Upper and Lower E g y p t . . . . " Darius is "bom of Neith, mistress of Sais; image of Ra'; he whom R3 placed on his throne to finish what he had started." T h e hieroglyphic text, however, repeats the Persian titulature of Darius: "Great King, king of kings," and he is also hailed as "king of kings, son of Hystaspes, the Achaemenid" (Posener no. 8); similarly, on the Susa statue, even Hystaspes is Egyptianized with the attribute "father-of-a-god." The Persian quality of Darius's rule is also expressed by the trilingual (Persian, Elamite, Akkadian) inscrip­ tion arranged on the left portion of the royal robe of that statue: "This is the stone statue that King Darius ordered to be made in Egypt in order that anyone who sees it in the future will know that the Persian Man ruled Egypt" (DSab). This arrogant proclamation of dominion by force of arms leaves no doubt regarding the Persian nature of the new master. It recalls the words that this same Darius had inscribed at Naqs-i Rustam, metonymically addressing an unnamed subject: "Observe the statues that carry the throne. . . . Then you will know that the spear of the Persian warrior has reached far, just as you will know that far from Persia, the Persian warrioT has made war" (DNa). It is no less striking that, on a statue carved in Egypt by Egyptian craftsmen, the Great King wears Persian ceremonial dress. In fact, in all probability the statue was originally placed in the sanctuary of Atum in Heliopolis. The goal could only have been to impress the Egyp­ tians with an unambiguous representation of Persian power. The digging of the canal at Suez is generally set in the context of the mission Darius entrusted to one of his squadrons. We are informed about this by Herodotus (IV.44*), who doubtless received his information from his Carian compatriot, Scylax of Carianda, who took part in the expedition: T h e greater part o f Asia was discovered by D a r i u s . Fie w a n t e d to find o u t where the Indus joins the s e a — t h e I n d u s is the only river other than the N i l e w h e r e c r o c o d i l e s are f o u n d — a n d for this p u r p o s e sent off o n a n expedition d o w n the river a n u m b e r o f m e n w h o s e word h e c o u l d trust. L e d by a C a r y a n d i a n n a m e d Scylax, the e x p e d i t i o n sailed from C a s p a t y r u s in the district of Pactyica, following the c o u r s e of the river eastward until it reached the sea; t h e n , turning westward, the ships followed the coast, a n d after a voyage o f s o m e thirty m o n t h s r e a c h e d the p l a c e from which the king o f E g y p t h a d sent o u t the P h o e n i c i a n s , w h o m I have already m e n t i o n e d , to c i r c u m n a v i g a t e L i b y a . After this voyage was c o m p l e t e d , D a r i u s s u b d u e d the Indians a n d m a d e regular u s e o f the s o u t h e r n o c e a n . In this way all

Darius and Egypt

479

Asia with the e x c e p t i o n o f the easterly part, has b e e n proved to he s u r r o u n d e d by s e a , a n d

so to have a general geographical resemblance to Libya.

This passage in Herodotus is inserted, obviously, in a more general discussion of the lim­ its of the known world and the configuration of each of the major geographical entities (IV.36-46), and this discussion itself is included within a vast panorama of Darius's Eu­ ropean conquests. As best we can tell, the mission entrusted to his squadron consisted of reconnoitering t h e Indus preparatory to the conquest of the country {around 518?). He­ rodotus sets up a direct connection with a decree issued b y Pharaoh N e c h o after the ces­ sation of work on the canal: Necho ordered some Phoenicians to circumnavigate Africa via the Austral Sea (Indian Ocean), returning via the Pillars of Hercules (Gibraltar), a voyage that they were to complete in three years (IV.43). According to Scylax's tale, the fleet sent b y Darius would have circled the Arabian Peninsula before reentering the Red Sea. But, whatever the reality of this circumnavigation may have been, it is too much to imagine that at the same time the king would have ordered the digging of the canal in order to establish a regular shipping line between Egypt and the Persian Gulf. If it ever took p l a c e , the sending of boats filled with tribute certainly was an unusual event. Da­ rius's order, affixed to the stela of Shaluf (Posener, no. 9), is more closely related to the sort of thing we see in the royal inscriptions: it represents a symbolic takeover of the space delimited ideally by the wakes of ships. Furthermore, the inscriptions are accompanied by Egyptian-style depictions of the peoples theoretically subject to the power of the Great King. However, the construction of the canal need not be reduced to a political vi­ sion; exploratory campaigns demonstrate that there was significant expansion of trade in the region of Tell el-Maskhuta throughout the fifth century. From Cambyses to Darius The Classical authors love to sharply contrast the Egyptian policies of Cambyses (im­ pious) and Darius (respectful of Egyptian religion). The opposition is noted explicitly by Diodorus when he discusses Darius as legislator. Following Cambyses' model, Darius concerned himself with the interment of an Apis in year 4 of his reign (Posener no. 5) as "King of Upper and Lower Egypt, lord of the Double Country, endowed with life [like] Ra [eternally? . . . ] . . . Indeed, His Majesty loved [the living Apis] more than any king." Although the chronological context raises some problems, we may recall what Polyae­ nus wrote in this regard (VII. 11.7). T h e E g y p t i a n s c o u l d not tolerate the oppression o f the satrap Aryandes, a n d , for this r e a s o n , they rebelled. D a r i u s crossed Arabia D e s e r t a . H e arrived at the very m o m e n t when the Egyptians were in m o u r n i n g , for, on that very day, the Apis h a d c e a s e d to "appear." D a r i u s issued the following order: 100 talents o f g o l d would b e given to w h o e v e r could restore Apis. Pleasantly surprised by the piety o f the king, the E g y p t i a n s s u b m i t t e d voluntarily to D a r i u s .

It is interesting to compare this text with the hieroglyphic inscription just mentioned, whose text is as follows (fig. 45): Year 4, third m o n t h o f the s e a s o n S h e m u , d a y 13, u n d e r the M a j e s t y o f the king of U p p e r and L o w e r E g y p t D a r i u s , e n d o w e d with life like R a eternally ( ? ) . . . , this god was led in p e a c e toward the beautiful W e s t a n d laid to rest in the n e c r o p o l i s , in his p l a c e which is t h e p l a c e his Majesty h a d p r e p a r e d for h i m — n o t h i n g like this h a d ever b e e n d o n e before—after all the c e r e m o n i e s h a d b e e n p e r f o r m e d for h i m in the e m b a l m i n g c h a m b e r . I n d e e d , H i s M a j ­ esty glorified h i m as H o r u s h a d d o n e for his father Osiris. T h e y m a d e h i m a great s a r c o p h a g u s

Chapter 12. The King of the Lands

480

o f solid, costly m a t e r i a l , as h a d b e e n d o n e previously; they dressed h i m in g a r m e n t s , they sent his a m ­ ulets a n d all his o r n a m e n t s o f gold and

every s u p e r b p r e c i o u s s u b ­

s t a n c e , they were m o r e beautiful than h a d b e e n m a d e before. In­ d e e d , His M a j e s t y loved the living A p i s m o r e than any k i n g . . . . M a y D a r i u s b e a b l e to b e for the Apis a recipient o f life a n d prosperity for­ ever ( ? ) . (Posener no. 5)

A more recently discovered inscrip­ tion shows additionally that, in year 33 of Darius, there was a solemn pro­ cession for the interment of the mother of an Apis. This comparison of Polyaenus - -~ -\ and the Apis stela raises chronologi­ fc^z* goo _ cal questions that are still disputed. Furthermore, given that the Poly­ aenus passage reports the opposition shown by some Egyptians to the pol­ icy of Darius's satrap, we must in­ quire into the exact reasons for this unpopularity. What is principally found in the passage is the traditional picture, setting the good king in op­ position to the evil satrap. We tend to doubt that Darius could have sup­ Fig. 45. Stela of the Apis that died in 518. pressed what is presented as an up­ rising (apostasis) with such ease. Diodorus, on the other hand, as we have seen, notes that the priests of the sanctuary of Ptah in Memphis refused to allow Darius to erect his statue alongside Sesostris's. While Diodorus did affirm that Darius abandoned his plan without bitterness, it would be naive to conclude from this that Darius's relations with the priests were unclouded, inasmuch as Diodorus wished to stress Darius's "benevolence" toward Egyptian religion. Further­ more, if the anecdote is based on a specific event, it tends instead to prove that the priests were far from reconciled to allowing a foreign king, even a pharaohized one, to impose any decision on them. The contrast between Cambyses and Darius is only relative, in view of the reevaluation of Cambyses' policies already presented (chaps. 1/8-9; 2). They both wanted to be considered in Egypt simultaneously as Great Kings and as legitimate sovereigns. We can no longer state with certainty that Darius suppressed Cambyses' measures re­ garding Egyptian temple revenues, even though the contrast between the two kings is implicit in the viewpoint found in the text on the back of the Demotic Chronicle. Of course, in the temple of Hibis at El-Kharga, Darius is shown several times offering fields

-

nam

Darius and Egypt

481

and lands to various Egyptian gods. But these are atemporal representations of the pha­ raoh which do not necessarily imply actual donations, though they do not exclude them. In regard to the temples, Darius found himself with the same problem as Camby­ ses: he wanted to attract the temples' support without conceding too much power to them, which would be counter to the interests of the royal authority. Moreover, a De­ motic document from 486 seems to indicate that titularies of benefices in the sanctuary of Khniim at Elephantine were obliged to make payments into the account of the com­ mander, Parnu (in this case for myrrh; Ber/1'71 P. 13582).

Persians and Egyptians Contacts between conquered peoples and the central authority were not established via an administration in the abstract. The imperial administration was represented lo­ cally, not by satraps alone, but by an entire bureaucratic staff. At least as early as the time of Cyrus and Cambyses, Persians were sent by the king into every one of his provinces. All high-ranking administrators of the Egyptian satrapy were Persian, be they satraps, governors, or garrison commanders of Syene-Elephantine, governors of Coptos, or even military officers sent against Barca in Libya in 513. But at the same lime, the Persians had Egyptians in their service, for reasons already suggested. For instance, one of the high officials of the tribute administration, the senti, was Egyptian; we also know of an Osorwer, one of Parnu's subordinates, at Syene. And the Peteisis Romance only gives names of Egyptians at the governor's court in Memphis (P. Rylands IX). As in Cambyses' day, Egyptians accepted work in the service of the pharaohized con­ queror without apparent difficulty. In addition to Udjahorresnet himself, we can men­ tion Khnemibre, who in a series of more than a dozen inscriptions gives valuable information on his origins and duties (Posener nos. 11-23). These inscriptions were carved in the rock in Wadi Hammamat, a place that, traditionally, the pharaohs used as a source for stone for statues and buildings. This is also the source from which the block was quarried that was eventually carved into the statue of Darius discovered at Susa. In Egypt, Khnemibre held the title "head of labor of Southern and Northern Egypt," at least as early as the last year of Pharaoh Amasis. In a fictional genealogy, he claims fam­ ily links with predecessors in the New Kingdom and the Ethiopian period. Some of his inscriptions date to years 26 (496), 27 (495), 28 (494), and 30 (492) of Darius. Some are dedications to the gods Min, Horus, and Isis of Coptos. He gives himself grandiose titles such as "commander of the soldiers, commander of the work of the troops." It is possible that this title refers to the military organization of expeditions for quarrying stone. It is equally likely that the title does not correspond to the exact powers bestowed on him. We also have a series of texts inscribed in the name of a Persian, Atiyawahy, "son of Artames and the lady Qanju," whose activity in Wadi Hammamat spans 51 years, from Cambyses 6 (524) to Xerxes 13 (473). He hails Darius as follows: "The good god, lord of the Double Country, Darius, endowed with life like Ra, beloved of Min the Great, who dwells at Coptos" (Posener no. 24). It is likely that his job was to supply stone to the con­ struction yard at El-Kharga. He bears the title "saris of Persia": doubtless he was gover­ nor of Coptos and the entire region of the Wadi Hammamat. Another Egyptian, Ahmose, gives himself prestigious titles: "Honored before the Apis-Osiris, the sole companion, the head of soldiers Ahmose . . . , " and he states that he played a very prominent role during the interment of an Apis:

482

Chapter 12. The King of the Lands

He stood before the Apis, in charge of the archers and directing the troop and the elite sol­ diers to be sure this god achieved his place in the necropolis. I am a servant active for your ka. I spent every night on watch without sleeping, seeking how to do all the things needful for you. I placed respect for you in the hearts of the people and the foreigners of all the for­ eign countries who were in Egypt by what I did in your embalming chamber. 1 sent messen­ gers to the South and others to the North to summon all the governors of towns and provinces bearing their gifts to your embalming chamber. . . . (Posener no. 6)

Once more, the traditional terminology must not lead us into error. The primary function of this type of inscription is to preserve the memory of an important person among the Egyptians—to whom the inscriptions are addressed. The words used by Ahmose do not imply that he personally organized all the ceremonies that accompanied the interment of an Apis. The titles themselves say more about his prestigious status in Egyptian society than about his actual place in the political-administrative hierarchy of the country. On the model of Darius himself, Persians in Egypt could adopt Egyptian customs. It is particularly striking to note that Amasis, whom Herodotus refers to as a member of the illustrious Persian tribe of Maraphii, had an Egyptian name (IV. 167). Since Polyaenus calls him Arsames (VII.28.1), we are led to believe that he adopted the Egyptian custom of double naming. We also know of Ariyawrata (brother of Atiyawahy), who in a later in­ scription (461) presents himself as follows; "The Persian Ariyawrata, nicknamed Jeho, son of Artames, born of the lady Qanju" (Posener no. 31). Such naming practices doubt­ less facilitated Persian contact with the Egyptians, but we cannot conclude with cer­ tainty that the conquerors were Egyptianized on the basis of the names. We will make the same cautionary remark regarding certain Persians' invocations of Egyptian gods. This is the case with Persian administrators who officiated in the Wadi Hammamat: Atiyawahy, mentioned above, who is attested under Cambyses, Darius, and Xerxes; and his brother Ariyawrata, under Xerxes and Artaxerxes I. The two brothers in­ voked, or at least referred to, Egyptian gods in this formula: Min the great, who is on [his] altar Year 10 of the Lord of the Double Country Xerxes Made by the saris of Persia, Atiyawahy and Ariyawrata

or: Made by the saris of Persia, Atiyawahy, may he dwell before Min who is on [his] altar. (Posener nos. 27-28).

It seems risky to take this as an index of Egyptianization in the strict sense. It was only an imitation of the Great Kings, all of whom adopted an Egyptian titulary. Since the broth­ ers were governors of Coptos, it was logical for them to invoke the god of the city, Min. Votive bulls found in Egypt indicate that some Persians, imitating Cambyses and Darius, also showed respect for Apis. Conversely, Egyptians tried to assimilate to the dominant socioethnic class. In addi­ tion to Udjahorresnet, we may cite the case of Ptah-hotep. His statue bears an inscription with the title of treasurer, but it is difficult on this basis to know the exact position he held in the satrapal administration. On his Egyptian robe, he wears typically Persian jewelry (a torque), doubtless a royal gift. Elsewhere, a seal carved with the name of Pe­ teisis, an Egyptian boatman, also testifies to the interweaving of Egyptian and Persian traditions. In particular, we can make out the image of Ahura-Mazda, in the form of a body breaking away from horizontal wings.

Darius and Egypt

483

Generally speaking, the representatives of the Egyptian elite had few problems be­ coming supporters of Cambyses and Da­ rius because the practice of conferring royal gifts was well known among the pharaohs. One of the most interesting docu­ ments in this regard is an inscribed statue found in the vicinity of Priene. It appears that the dedicator, a man named Pedon, performed a service for Psammetichus. As a reward, the pharaoh bestowed on him as "prize for his value (aristeia), a gold brace­ let and a town, by reason of his courage (aretes heneka)." He had his image por­ trayed in Egyptian style, and the statue itself was certainly made in Egypt. It was in fact typical for a pharaoh to decorate faithful subjects with necklaces or bracelets. The gift of a town is also known from other texts. We are instantly struck by the fact that the manner of distinction and the objects them­ selves correspond closely to what is known Fig. 46. Egyptian votive stela. of Achaemenid royal gifts (lands, towns, bracelets, necklaces; see chap. 8/1). The decoration of Ptah-hotep's robe also reflects the encounter between Pharaonic and Achaemenid practices. It is no less noteworthy that a sculptor portrayed the jewelry worn by Udjahorresnet in the Egyptian style. In other words, neither Udjahorresnet nor Ptah-hotep would have felt a sense of "betrayal" if they received gifts and honors from the Great King, for from their point of view, it was just an­ other pharaoh who was honoring them in this way. This is precisely the meaning of one of Udjahorresnet's statements: "I was a [man] honored before my masters; [as long as] I lived(?) they gave me gold jewelry and made every useful thing for me" (Posener no. IF). It is clear here as elsewhere that Udjahorresnet did not distinguish the Saites from the Great Kings; in other words, the latter are situated in the longue dur&e of pharaonic history. The allegiance of the Egyptians to Darius sometimes took more personal forms. One of the most interesting items is a votive stela showing an Egyptian praying before the Ho­ rus falcon (fig. 46). The dedicator addresses him as Darius, who was assimilated to the Egyptian god. This was a private monument, which seems to show that, in the popular Egyptian consciousness, Darius was thoroughly and genuinely divinized.

A Brief Evaluation All in all, the nature of Darius's power in Egypt elicits a mixed evaluation. The desire for pharaonic continuity cannot be denied, but perhaps we should no longer insist on this factor to the exclusion of others, especially because Udjahorresnet so suspiciously insists on it. He must have seen only advantage in thus exalting his loyalty to Cambyses and Darius, both of whom he intentionally situates within Egyptian continuity. The statements of Darius himself are more ambiguous: even while presenting himself as

484

Chapter 12. The King of the Lands

legitimate sovereign, lie never fails to stress that he is the conqueror who does not owe his power simply to the good will of Udjahorresnet and his ilk. The passage from Saite power to Persian dominion was not achieved without upheavals and changes. Together with Cambyses' decree, the disappearance of foundation stelas seems to illustrate Per­ sian repossession of the Egyptian sanctuaries. The suppression of the "Divine Consort" should perhaps be placed in the same context. It was a religious and dynastic institution that obviously no longer suited the new conditions after the conquest and the "appear­ ance" of a pharaoh whose interests encompassed a horizon infinitely vaster than the Nile Valley and its surroundings.

2. Babylonia under

Darius

Sources Despite the large number of tablets dated to the reign of Darius I, the history of Baby­ lonia is rather poorly known after Intaphernes (Vidafarnah) regained control of the re­ gion in 520 (DB §50). This is because in many cases the mention of Darius's regnal year—"king of Babylon, king of the countries"—is nothing more than an element in the dating formula of documents coming from the private sector. Thus, only rarely and in­ directly are we able to detect the presence and actual operation of the Achaemenid administration. In comparison with the previous period, we suffer from the loss (or nonpublication) of the temple archives, especially for the Eanna of Uruk. Darius's accession to power coincided with Gimillu's appointment to the ferme generale. This dishonest oblate carried out his dubious operations under the usurper Nebuchadnezzar IV, before being dismissed in 520. After this date, the materials are painfully lacking, aside from sporadic documents from 511-510 that mention the name (Muranu) of the king's prin­ cipal at the Eanna. Given the state of the evidence, no conclusions of a historical nature can be drawn concerning the relationship between the Persian authority and the towns and sanctuaries of Babylonia, although the number of published tablets increases each year.

Satraps and Governors The administrative system set up by Cyrus in 535 survived the troubles of 522-520. The "governor of Babylonia and Ebir Nari [Trans-Euphrates]" continued to rule an enormous district extending from the Tigris to the borders of Egypt. It was ruled by an individual whom the Babylonian texts call 'governor' (pihatu) and whom the Greek texts call "satrap": "The government of this region—the satrapy, as the Persians call i t is of all the governments the most considerable," writes Herodotus, for example (1.197; cf. 111.161), underlining the considerable profits that the satrap could draw from the re­ gion. There are tablets attesting that, between 521 and 516, Ustanu held the post. He dis­ appeared at an undetermined date; a text shows that in October 486, a few weeks before the death of Darius, the government was secured by H u t a [ . . . ] , son of Pagakanna. The territory of Babylonia proper was itself subdivided, testimony to persistent continuities. We know for example of the existence of the "country of the Sea" (Mat Tamtim) in the marsh region of the Lower Tigris. The great towns were still administered by local gov­ ernors, the sakin temi, Babylonians who must have come from the class of mar bane, the citizen-landowners with full rights in the Babylonian cities. In the time of Darius I, they are known at Ur, Borsippa, and Babylon.

Babylonia under Darius

485

At the same time, these local governors appear to have been more and more fully in­ tegrated into the satrapal administration. First of all, after 521, the sandabakku disap­ peared, though until this date the position had represented the highest territorial office in Babylonia. It appears that after Darius came to power, he replaced many of the Baby­ lonian holders of high office. Babylon remained one of the capitals of the Empire where the king and court were periodically in residence. A tablet from 496 refers to the new palace. This royal presence was also symbolized by the erection of a replica of the monu­ ment and inscription of Behistun in the capital of Babylonia. The growing integration of the country into the imperial administration is also marked by the increasing number of Persian names, particularly in the areas of finance and justice. It is interesting to note that one of the governors of Babylon, Iddin-Nergal, had the Persian title "vardana-pati 'chief of the town'. A series of tablets also mentions a certain Bagasaru, who held the post of treasurer in Babylon between 518 and 501. His title is given in its Babylonian form, rab kasir, then in its Iranian form, "ganzabara, in tablets from 511 to 501. Bagasaru was one of the Persians who held land in Babylonia, doubtless company land. His house was run by a majordomo (rab biti) called Pissiya, who had a large staff under him. Several tablets show that Bagasaru did not work his lands directly: he had them managed by rep­ resentatives of the Egibi business concern, who returned part of the harvests (or their value) to him as farm rent. That is, beginning with Darius I, a system was in place for managing lands and revenues. Documentation from the house of Murasu during the reigns of Artaxerxes I and Darius II allows us to analyze this system more precisely. It was a system that implied close cooperation between the aristocracy and the Persian power and the representatives of Babylonian business firms. On this topic, one of the represen­ tatives of the Egibi family, Marduk-nasir-apli, who bore the nickname Sirku, also acted as the administration's intermediary: for example, he levied taxes on land held in Baby­ lonia. He also collected certain royal taxes, as is concretely shown in a tablet ( T C L 13.196): [ C o n c e r n i n g ] the c o l l e c t i o n of tolls on the bridge a n d the quai [for boats] g o i n g d o w n s t r e a m and u p s t r e a m , prerogative o f G u z a n u , the g o v e r n o r o f B a b y l o n , which is at the disposal of Sirku, for the half of the part that returns to h i m of t h e r e v e n u e on the bridge o f G u z a n u , the governor o f B a b y l o n , w h i c h h e shares with M u r a n u , son of N a b u - m u k m - a p l i , N a b i l - b u lissu, son of G u z a n u , as well as H a r i s a n u a n d I q u p u [and] N e r g a i - i b n i , the g u a r d i a n s of the bridge. Sirku, son of I d d i n a i a , d e s c e n d a n t of E g i b i , a n d M u r a n u , s o n o f Mabu-mukin-apli, d e s c e n d a n t of . . . ? . . . in farm rent for 15 shekels of white silver of '/8 alloy, o f current q u a l ­ ity, have given [this c o l l e c t i o n ] to Bel-asua, son of Nergal-uballit, d e s c e n d a n t of M u d a m m i q Adad a n d to U b a n i , son of Bel-ahhe-eriba, d e s c e n d a n t of . . . ? . . . Bel-asua a n d U b a r u will tax the boats that d o c k at the bridge. Bel-asua a n d U b a r u will not transfer the silver from t h e monthly r e v e n u e from the bridge b e l o n g i n g to Sirku a n d M u r a n u , o w n e r s of part o f this [rev­ e n u e ] , without Sirku's a g r e e m e n t . B e l - a s u a a n d U b a r u will show Sirku a n d the [other] guardians of the bridge every written instruction c o n c e r n i n g this b r i d g e , (after E J o a n n e s )

The document sheds light on the river tolls in Babylonia, the concession of revenues to elevated persons, and the way certain taxes were collected. Estates and hatru We have several tablets showing that during the time of Darius the same system of military lots that had been set up in the time of Cyrus and Cambyses existed; the system was newly extended beginning at the end of the 520s. Each "estate" was burdened with

486

Chapter 12. The King of the Lands

a series of fees that, taken to­ gether, were called ilku. In prin­ ciple, each military lot allowed the administration to draft sol­ diers who are described in the same way as their "estates"; for ex­ ample, horsemen were drafted from a horse estate. Several docu­ ments from Darius's reign show that the Babylonian soldiers could be subject to exceptional mobilizations, such as to serve in Elam. In every case, they had to equip themselves according to the standards set by the adminis­ tration, bearing their own associ­ Fig. 47. Some Babylonian seal impressions, from ated costs, which could be quite Cyrus to Xerxes. high. The soldiers could be req­ uisitioned "at the head of ships," which meant that they had to escort them, or maybe even haul them, in the guise of urasu service. This was a requisition for manual labor, which in Darius's time was an element of ilku. In the later documents (Artaxerxes I and Darius II), the enumeration of charges as­ sessed on military allotments was regularly recorded in the following way: "Full taxes, the king's soldier, the king's flour, the king's barra, and all kinds of contributions/gifts (nadanu) for the king's house." There is every reason to believe it was the same under Darius I. The terms used indicate that the assessment involved taxes in kind. But several documents reveal that, beginning with the reign of Darius I, some property owners paid in silver equivalents. This is how the role of the Egibi was established. They also man­ aged working land, such as the military allotments. Thus, Sirku (that is, Marduk-nasirapli) collected the tax on lots around Babylon between 497 and 495. It was also the Egibi who worked the estates of "the house of the royal son" (bltu sa mar sarri). This activity was quite lucrative, judging by the shares drawn by Bagasaru and the Egibis from the or­ chards between 518 and 500: one-third for the former, and he was the landowner; twothirds for the latter, and they were the managers!

Persians and Babylonians For Babylonia, the onomastic information that has been gathered to date allows us to state that the number of Persians and Iranians increased between 521 and 483 but that it remained relatively modest, nonetheless, in view of the considerable number not only of Babylonians but also of representatives of various countries. As for the processes of Ira­ nian-Babylonian acculturation, they are especially evident in later documentation (tab­ lets and seals of the house of Murasu). Nonetheless, they are also detectable in the earlier period, even though the scenes on seals remain predominantly Babylonian (fig. 47). From the beginning of the fifth century on, we observe the practice of inter­ marriage and the consequent adoption of Iranian names by Babylonians and vice versa.

Trans-Euphrates

487

To be sure, Persian-Babylonian contacts are old. The importance of Babylonia in the Empire and the frequent presence of the court in Babylon could only have encouraged contacts and mutual influence.

3. Trans-Euphrates

The District of Trans-Euphrates Within the immense district whose central seat was at Babylon, Trans-Euphrates was ruled by a governor who was both a private individual and a subordinate governmental official. At the beginning of Darius's reign, the book of Ezra mentions "Tattenai, satrap of Transeuphrates [Ebir Nari], Shethar-bozenai [Satibarzanes] and their [Persian] col­ leagues" (5:3*-). In tablets dated 502, he also has the title 'governor' (pihatu) of Ebir Nari. It is likely that his residence was in Damascus, on which our information is both paltry and late. We know that Damascus was an important stage on the road between Babylonia and Egypt. The form sent by Arsama with Nehtihor mentions the presence of two stewards there (DAE 67 [AD 6]); this might explain (if not confirm) Josephus's state­ ment (Ant. XI.2.2) thai Cambyses died in Damascus during his return from Egypt. Wc also know that at the time of Darius III, the town was governed by a "prefect" (Quintus Curtius 1II-3.2). Finally, Strabo describes it as "the most famous of the cities in that part of the world in the time of the Persian empire" (XVI.2.20*). It is evident from a passage in Berossus (FGrH 680 Fl 1) that the town was important in the imperial regime at the time of Artaxerxes II. Despite the similarity between the (generic) titles for governor, pihatu and pehd, Tat­ tenai did not rule a completely distinct satrapy, but there is no document to clarify the nature of his relationship with the governor of Babylon and Ebir Nari. Darius's reply to Tattenai nonetheless refers to the "royal revenue—that is, from the tribute of Transeu­ phrates [Ebir Nari]" (Ezra 6:8-*-), which shows that the management of tribute was orga­ nized by subregions. Ebir Nari, we know, corresponds fairly precisely to Herodotus's Fifth Nome —from Posideium (Ras-el Bassit) to the borders of Egypt (III.91). Even within these large regions, peoples and territories were in turn divided into medinahs— a term conveniently rendered 'provinces'. The redactor of the book of Esther (1:1) refers to the 127 provinces of the Empire of Ahasuerus. The term is also found in the letter from Arsama to the stewards ordered to deliver rations to Nehtihor and his servants, who were returning to Egypt: "Give them these rations, from steward to steward, following the route that goes from province to province (medinah), until Nehtihor arrives in Egypt" (DAE 67 [AD 6]); it is a pity that the document says nothing of the stages dotting the journey from Damascus to the Nile Valley.

The Province ofjudah There is no doubt that, beginning with the time of Cyrus or Cambyses, the land of Judah by itself constituted a medinah. But until Nehemiah's arrival in the time of Arta­ xerxes I (chap. 14/5), we have no specific information on its organization. Nehemiah himself refers to it as follows: "The former governors, my predecessors, had been a bur­ den on the people, from whom they took forty silver shekels each day as their subsis­ tence allowance"; in contrast, he says that he himself "never ate governor's bread" (Neh 5:15-18). There is no doubt that the Jewish community was subject to paying tribute to the kings, as well as various taxes, such as "the satrap's table." But who were the former

488

Chapter \2. The King of the Lands

governors? The theory that makes Judah a dependency of Samaria at this date seems to have little foundation. A series of seal impressions and bullas has been found in Judah on which explicit references to the province of Judah (Yehud) and a governor (peha) can be read. On the basis of this evidence, a list of the governors of the province between Zerubbabel and Nehemiah has been reconstructed: Elnathan (perhaps Zerubbabel's successor), Yeho-ezer (early fifth century), Ahzai (early fifth century) —all of them Jews (as were Zerubbabel and Nehemiah). Numerous seals attest to Persian presence, but they are probably later (second half of the fifth century and the fourth century). The province of Judah and its governor came under the authority of the governor of Ebir Nari. At the beginning of Darius's reign, Governor Tattenai, accompanied by his chancellery and court, made a tour of inspection of Jerusalem. They found the Jews busy rebuilding the temple of Yahweh. Questioned by Tattenai, the Elders justified the labor by referring to an old decree from Cyrus. Unconvinced, the governor sent a letter to Darius asking him to search "in the king's [royal archives] in Babylon" (Ezra 5:17*). It was actually in the citadel of Ecbatana that evidence of the document was found. As a result, the Great King ordered Tattenai to let the Jews complete the construction work. Here is the order from Darius, as it is transmitted by the redactors of Ezra (6:6-12*): Wherefore, Tattenai, satrap of Trans-Euphrates, Shethar-bozenai and you, their colleagues, the officials of Trans-Euphrates, withdraw from there; leave the high commissioner of Judah and the elders of the Jews to work on this Temple of God; they are to rebuild this Temple of God on its ancient site. This, I decree, is how you must assist the elders of the Jews in the reconstruction of the Temple of God: the expenses of these people are to be paid, promptly and without fail, from the royal revenue—that is, from the tribute of Trans-Euphrates. What they need for [sacrifices] to the God of heaven: young bulls, rams and lambs, as also wheat, salt, wine and oil, is to be supplied to them daily, without fail, as required by the priests of Jerusalem, so that they may offer acceptable sacrifices to the God of heaven and pray for the lives of the king and his sons. I also decree this: If anyone disobeys this edict, a beam is to be torn from his house, he is to be pilloried upright on it and his house is to be made into a dung heap for this crime. May the God who causes his name to live there overthrow any king or people who dares to defy this and destroy the Temple of God in Jerusalem! I, Darius, have issued this decree. Let it be obeyed to the letter! Darius thus repeated the measures ordered by Cyrus, providing new donations, since the expenses were charged to the tributes collected by the government of Trans-Euphrates. In return, the priests of Jerusalem were to invoke the protection of their god on Darius and his sons. The work was completed in March 515, and the Jews were able to celebrate Passover right away. The Jerusalem community thus continued to enjoy internal auton­ omy, as had been the case since Cyrus, while at the same time it had to exhibit its sub­ mission to Achaemenid authority (in particular in the area of tribute).

Cyprus We are considerably less well informed about other subregions, such as Cyprus and Phoenicia, which were also subordinate to the government of Trans-Euphrates. Both had to pay tribute (Herodotus 111.91) and furnish naval contingents. Both were divided into numerous city-states. Herodotus (VII.98) selectively names the rulers he considers the most important: two Cypriot kings (Gorgus and Timonax) and three Phoenician kings (Tetramnestus of Sidon, Matten of Tyre, and Merbalus of Aradus). It is clear that Cyprus, because of its close relations with Cilicia (see below), always represented a strategic location that was essential to Persian Mediterranean policy; thus,

Trans-Euphrates

489

we can extend to the entire period the reflections that Diodorus assigned to Artaxerxes II in the 380s: "The king understood the advantageous position of Cyprus, being able to furnish a considerable fleet and serve as an outpost in the Asian war" (XVI.42.4). The is­ land also had old ties to Phoenicia. There was a town there called "Carthage of Tyre" (Amathonte or Kition), and the evidence of Phoenician influence in it is considerable, alongside Greek influences and ancient Eteo-Cypriot roots. Moreover, many dynasties were of Phoenician origin and continued to use the Phoenician language in their inscriptions. We learn a little more about Cyprus at the time of the Ionian revolt. Onesilus, brother of Gorgus, king of Salamis, seized power and persuaded the Cypriot cities, ex­ cept Amathus, to join the revolt (Herodotus V.104). At this point, Herodotus gives the ge­ nealogy of the king of Salamis—a kingdom that appears to have been the most important on the island. The king of Salamis, Gorgus, and his brother Onesilus were sons of Chersis, grandsons of Siromus, great-grandsons of Euelthon (V104). Power thus passed from father to son. But on at least one occasion we see that the Great King inter­ vened in these internal affairs. According to Herodotus, the Persian victors had the Salamisians return power to Gorgus (V.115). Since Gorgus had fled to the Persians (VII. 104), he must have recovered his throne due to the direct support of Darius. At the end of the revolt, Herodotus writes simply, "after a year of freedom Cyprus was once more brought into subjection" (V.l 16-0-). But Herodotus's vocabulary tells us nothing of the status of the Phoenician cities. We know that Persian garrisons were stationed on the island, but it is likely that they were already present before. We are prompted (without proof) to repeat the judgment formulated by Diodorus on the position of the Cypriot kings in the fourth century: "In this island were nine populous cities, and under them were ranged the small towns which were suburbs of the nine cities. Each of these cities had a king who governed the city and was subject to the King of the Persians" (XVI.42.4*). At the same time, the expedition led by Artaxerxes II demonstrates that the Great King could not allow a Cypriot king to formally declare his independence and stop paying tribute (cf. Diodorus XV.9.2).

Phoenicia Like the Cypriot city-states and Syria-Palestine, the Phoenician city-states are in­ cluded in the Fifth Nome of Herodotus (111.91). Their prime appearances in the sources are to furnish large, renowned naval contingents, from Cambyses' conquest of Egypt to Xerxes' expedition (525-479). According to Herodotus (VII.89), the Phoenicians, grouped with "the Syrians of Palestine," provided Xerxes with the biggest contingent (300 ships). "Next to the [Persian] commanders the following were the best known of those who sailed with the fleet:" the kings of Sidon, Tyre, and Arad (VII.98-0-), and he states that "the fastest ships were the Phoenician —and of these the Sidonian were the best" (VI1.96-V-): the only comparable ships were those of Artemisia of Halicarnassus, which "were the most famous in the fleet, after the contingent from Sidon" (VII.99-0-). It was the Phoenicians of Sidon who won the rowing match organized near Abydos (VII.44). It was a Sidonian ship from which Xerxes reviewed the navy at Doriscus (VII. 100) and which he boarded when the fleet departed (VII. 128). The reputation of the Phoenician ships was well founded. A sealing on a Persepolis tablet (PT 8) from the reign of Darius shows a vessel shaped very like the Sidonian vessels known from later Si­ donian coins (fig. 50f, p. 606).

490

Chapter \2. The King of the Lands The most interesting document comes from Sidon: the sarcophagus of King Esmunazar II, which is of Egyptian origin (fig. 48). The king presents himself as follows: 1, E s h m u n ' a z a r , k i n g of S i d o n , the s o n of king T a b n i t , king o f S i d o n , the g r a n d s o n of king E s h m u n ' a z a r , k i n g of S i d o n , a n d my m o t h e r , A i W a s h t a t t , priestess of Astarte, our mistress the q u e e n , the d a u g h t e r of king E s h m u n ' a z a r , king o f S i d o n . (Rosen­ thal, A N E T 6 6 2 )

Then, referring to his numerous benefac­ tions in honor of the city, he states: T h e L o r d o f K i n g s gave us D o r a n d J o p p a , the m i g h t y lands o f D a g o n , w h i c h are in the Plain o f S h a r o n , in a c c o r d a n c e with the i m p o r t a n t d e e d s w h i c h I did. A n d we a d d e d t h e m to the borders o f the country, so that they would b e l o n g to S i d o n forever.

The inscription thus attests to the allocation of lands to Sidon by the Great King. But the dale and, therefore, the circumstances of the gift remain in dispute. The Phoenician ships had indeed played an important role from \ 7 " Cambyses down to Xerxes and beyond. Fig. 48. Inscribed sarcophagus of Moreover, according to Herodotus (VII.98), Esmunazar. in 480 the Sidonian contingent was led by Tetramnestus, son of Anysus. Even if some linguistic deformation of the personal names has taken place, there is no way to make this into a reference to Esmunazar, son of Tabnit, who, moreover, died at the age of 14. Since we have no independent gauge for fixing the chronology of the kings of Sidon at the end of the sixth and beginning of the fifth century, the question remains open. Moreover, Herodotus says the king of Sidon enjoyed a special position under Xerxes. Before the battle of Salamis, he was the first one Xerxes went to for advice among "the rulers of states and comanders of squadrons. . . [they] took their seats according to the degree of privilege which the king had assigned them —the lord of Sidon first, the lord of Tyre second, and so on in their order" (VHI.67-68 >). But, contrary to what has some­ times been supposed, the king of Sidon was not the admiral of the Persian fleet, which remained under the control of high-ranking Persians. Herodotus names four of them (including two sons of Darius), and he states that the Phoenician contingents (and oth­ ers) reported to Prexaspes and Megabazus. If the local chiefs (including Artemisia) were consulted, it was because of their expertise in plying the sea; the privileged place of the king of Sidon was due simply to the well-known maneuverability of the ships he had pro­ vided to the Great King. But responsibility for strategy rested solely with the Great King and his associates. ). But he does not date the episode precisely ("many years after" [Xerxes' expedition in Europe]). The Argive diplomatic mission possibly should be dated to 466-465. The ancient litera­ ture on this treaty dates primarily to the fourth century. But we may provisionally agree that there may well have been negotiations between Athens and Artaxerxes around 449. We will then observe that, setting aside the distortions introduced by later Athenian pro­ paganda, this was apparently a limited accord: the Athenians evacuated Cyprus and Egypt in exchange for formal agreement by the satraps not to intervene directly in the Greek cities that at that time were parties to the Athenian Alliance. There is certainly no question that this was an Athenian triumph, especially at a moment when Pericles obvi­ ously thought the chapter of the Persian Wars was at an end. From the Persian perspec­ tive, then, we can imagine that continuing control of the eastern Aegean heavily outweighed any provisional concessions that were granted; the central power certainly thought, on the one hand, that these concessions were limited and temporary and, on the other, that none of them commited the Persians to abandoning the king's eminent rights to "the territory over which he was ruler." The Great King never relinquished his tribute prerogatives, even when the Athenian occupation temporarily prevented the sa­ traps from collecting the annual levies in the Alliance cities (Thucydides VIII.4.5; 6.1). All the same, the Great King himself did not participate directly in the agreement; the Athenians had to enforce it on the satraps. We may also suspect that at court it was also thought that the situation in Greece opened up numerous prospects for weakening the Athenian position. The Persians had even fewer reasons to accept a diplomatic "Waterloo" because they were far from unaware of the difficulties Athens was experiencing with its allies, difficul­ ties they themselves had nurtured. We know, in fact, from a decree ( M L 40) dated (hypothetically) to 453-452 that the members of the council of the city of Erythrae had to agree "not to receive [into the city] any of the exiles who sought refuge from the Medes." Some time later (451-450?), another decree guaranteed Athens' assistance to Sigeion against any enemy coming "from the mainland," a phrase that generally refers to the Per­ sians, or Greeks aided by the Persians (ATL 111:255). Conflicts between the allied cities were thus used by the satraps of Sardis or Dascylium, who then tried to install factions favorable to secession from the Athenian Alliance; these factions would naturally seek support from the mainland Persian satraps. Obviously, the signing of the supposed "Peace of Callias" did not interrupt the activi­ ties of the satraps. In 441, a border conflict broke out between Miletus and Samos. The Athenians did not intervene (in the spirit of actions taken by Artaphernes in 493—see

The Asia Minor - Eastern Aegean Front

581

chap. 12/5 —the two cities would have had to appeal to the satrap, if they recognized his authority at the time). The defeated Milesians appealed to Athens, which installed a democratic regime in Samos. As usual, the Samian exiles sought refuge with Pissuthnes, the satrap of Sardis. An alliance (symmakhia) was formed; under the terms of the agree­ ment, Pissuthnes furnished 700 auxiliaries, and they allowed the exiles to regain their footing in Samos, "after which they revolted [against Athens], gave up the Athenian gar­ rison left with them and its commanders to Pissuthnes"; soon Byzantium joined the re­ volt (Thucydides 1.115.2-5*). It is clear that the Samians counted on massive Persian support. When Pericles set sail for Samos, he rerouted part of the squadron to Caria "upon the news that the Phoenician fleet was approaching," and a Samian, Stesagoras, was sent to meet it (1.116). It is possible that this news came from a Persian attempt at disinformation; at the least it indicates that the Athenians had no illusions about one of the clauses of the "Peace" that in principle prohibited an Achaemenid navy from patrol­ ling the coasts of Asia Minor. Further, there is nothing to indicate that Pissuthnes was required to return the Athenian garrison that had been taken off to Sardis. In any case, the Samian and Erythraean examples prove that the Great King had in­ structed the Persian satraps to profit as much as possible from Athenian setbacks. It is quite clear that in each allied city there was a group of "Medizers" ready to work for the advantage of the Persians against the Athenians. In 430, exiled Ionians sought out the Lacedaemonian admiral Alcides and let him know that he could easily provoke the de­ fection of Ionia from the Athenian side: "They would probably induce Pissuthnes to join them in the war" (Thucydides III.31.1*). This is the context of Thucydides' report that "Itamenes and the barbarians, who had been called in by certain individuals in a parly quarrel" (34.1*) moved into Colophon's upper town; at Notium, exiles "called in Arca­ dian and barbarian mercenaries from Pissuthnes, and . . . formed a new community with the Median party of the Colophonians who joined them from the upper town. . . . Paches [an Athenian] then gave up Notium to the Colophonians not of the Median party (hoi medisantes)" (34.2-4*). The outbreak of the Peloponnesian War would soon enough offer the Great King new possibilities for intervention. Thucydides (II.7.1) presents the hopes of the Lacedae­ monians and their allies as follows: "They resolved to send embassies to the king and to . . . others of the barbarian powers." Some time later, they actually sent embassies to Artaxerxes "to persuade the king to supply funds and join in the war" (11.67.1*). They planned to go to Pharnaces of Dascylium, "who was to send them up the country to the king." A Thracian named Sadocus turned the Lacedaemonian ambassadors over to the Athenians, who were very anxious to block such contacts (67.2). In 424-423, the Athe­ nians seized a Persian ambassador, Artaphernes, "on his way from the king to Lacedaemon" (IV.50.2*). The tenor of the captured letter indicated that the king remained puzzled because of the conflicting information he was receiving from the ambassadors who had sought him out: "If however they were prepared to speak plainly they might send him some envoys with this Persian [i.e., Artaphernes]" (50.2*). It thus seems that, at least after the time of the Egyptian campaign at the beginning of the 450s, diplomatic contacts between Spartans and Achaemenids had never ceased (1.109.2-3), even if the Spartans had thus far refused to take decisive action, because they were concerned above all not to have to fight far from their Peloponnesian bases (cf. III. 31.2). The Athen­ ians themselves were very careful to ensure the safe travel of Artaphernes to Ephesus

582

Chapter 14. From Artaxerxes I to the Death of Darius II

with all the honor due one of his rank; included in his escort were representatives who clearly had been instructed to make contact with Artaxerxes (IV.50.3). Strabo (1.3.1) mentions Diotimus's embassy to Susa; Aristophanes mocks the presence of Athenian ambassadors in Persia and Persian ambassadors in Athens in 425 and 424. Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that the Great King had already become the arbiter of Greek affairs, as he clearly would be in the fourth century; but the process had been set in motion. In short, if there ever was a "Peace of Callias" in 449-448, it particularly functioned to the advantage of the Persians, who on the one hand could thereafter enjoy their Egyp­ tian and Cypriot possessions in peace and on the other would no longer make the mis­ take of interfering in the internal affairs of the Athenian alliance. We may thus ask whether, from the Persian point of view, the agreement reached around 449-448 actu­ ally had a totally different meaning from the significance put forward by the Greek au­ thors of the fourth century. We may recall that, according to Diodorus himself, Artaxerxes intended to initiate talks not with Athens alone but with all of the Greeks (XII.4.4). The context does not exclude the possibility that several Greek cities had al­ ready sent deputations to the Great King. Is it possible that this situation provided a pre­ cedent for the congress that was gathered by Artaxerxes II at Susa in 387 and before which he had his decree read (Xenophon, Hell. VI.31)? Of course, the circumstances were different, not least with respect to power relationships. But from the Great King's perspective, the difference was insignificant. The clause granting autonomy to Asian cit­ ies—which Diodorus and others present as a striking Greek victory—could just as well be considered as targeting Athens, since, applied systematically by the Persians, its pur­ pose was to achieve dominion over Athens; we are tempted to think that it was by bran­ dishing it as a slogan that the Persian satraps of Asia Minor supported the intrigues of those among the allies who wished to escape the unbearable yoke of Athens (cf. Thu­ cydides 11.63.2: tyrannis). In other words, it is not impossible that the 449-448 agree­ ment was interpreted in totally opposite senses in Athens and Susa: in Athens, it was lauded as an unprecedented victory; at Susa, it was seen as a royal correction. Anyway, it appears from the way that Plutarch reports it that the Athenians were fully aware of the limits imposed on them by the agreement (and/or the balance of power!), because Plu­ tarch writes regarding Pericles: "he did not comply with the giddy impulses of the citi­ zens . . . when . . . they were eager to interfere again in Egypt, and to disturb the King of Persia's maritime dominions" (Per. 20.3*). In the final analysis, we are led to believe that if there really were diplomatic negotiations in 449, the result was not so much a Peace of Callias as a Peace of the King. Artaxerxes in 449 was no more ready than his father in 466 to accept conditions that were unilaterally determined by Athens. Despite gaps in the evidence, we see nothing that might justify the notion that there had been an Achaemenid diplomatic/military di­ saster. From Artaxerxes' perspective, it appears that on the one hand his rights over Asia Minor were never abandoned, and on the other, he commanded the satraps of Sardis and Dascylium to attempt to regain the lost territory. We do not know why the Great King did not initiate a mass mobilization to lead a more energetic reconquest. Perhaps more than anything he had not forgotten recent defeats in pitched battle; no doubt he also believed that such efforts would be pointless and that he could in any case hope that divisions among the Greeks and the Athenians' military, political, and financial difficul­ ties would lead to the same result in the long run. In fact, throughout Achaemenid his­ tory, the mobilization of a royal army proved to be the rarest of exceptions.

Ezra and Nehemiah in Jerusalem

583

Return to Xanthus It is difficult, even impossible, to plot exactly on a map the Persian gains and losses in Asia Minor at the end of Artaxerxes' reign. The Attic tribute lists show that from year to year the positions could change very rapidly, in either direction. Between 428 and 425, Athens clearly put great effort into firmly controlling the islands. We learn at the same time that the Athenians lost some very important positions, such as Caria and Lycia, the latter disappearing from the lists at the end of the 440s. The failures to reinstall Athenian dominion there were as frequent as the attempts. In 428, leading "collection ships" (argyrologoi), the strategos Lysicles suffered a reverse in Caria, in the plain of the Meander (Thucydides III. 19.2). In 430-429, the Athenian strategos Melesander was given com­ mand of a squad of six ships with the mission of going to Caria and Lycia to collect tribute in those parts, and also to prevent the Peloponnesian privateers from taking up their station in those waters and molesting the passage of the merchantmen from Phaselis and Phoenicia and the adjoining continent. However, Melesander, going up the country into Lycia with a force of Athenians from the ships and the allies, was defeated and killed in battle, with the loss of a number of his troops. (Thucydides 11.69.1-2*) The first point of interest in Thucydides' text is that hostilities did not interrupt com­ merce with territories belonging to the king—an observation generally confirmed else­ where. It also reveals the importance that the Athenians attached to Lycia in their strategic planning. Last, it shows that despite their efforts, the Athenians were never able to bring the region back to the heart of the alliance. But the passage is interesting for another reason, and a very unusual one at that: we find an allusion to the episode in a famous text, the Xanthus Pillar inscription (TL 44). Even though the Lycian text is only partially deciphered, the name Melesander (Milasantra) can be read; he was defeated by an army commanded by a person named Trbbenimi, a Lycian name also known later (a descendant?) from coins and a tomb inscription (TL 128, 135). Another passage refers to a victory won (probably much later) by the Kheriga dynasty. Obviously, nothing proves that the dynasts of Xanthus and surrounding towns had acted at the instigation of the Persian satraps; that they consistently portrayed themselves as descendants of Harpagus is not sufficient proof. The proud exaltation of their victories over the Athenians certainly primarily expresses that they wished to appear as fully independent leaders; this of course also played into the hands of the Persian. Cer­ tainly, the Persian authorities must immediately have attempted to profit from the situa­ tion, only stopping short of claiming, as did Isocrates (Paneg. 161*), that "Lycia no Persian has ever subdued"! Perhaps the Persian leaders intervened just as they had in Ionia, providing support for agitators who wished to break with Athens.

5. Ezra and Nehemiah

in Jerusalem

Ezra's Mission Meanwhile, life in the provinces went on, with no apparent connection to the events in Asia Minor. What we have to go by, primarily, are the biblical books of Ezra and Nehemiah. They report that, with the express permission of Artaxerxes, these two Jews carried out missions to Jerusalem: Ezra in the seventh year of Artaxerxes (458), Nehe­ miah in the twentieth (445). Ezra was "a scribe versed in the Law of Moses" (Ezra 7:6*), the priest-scribe, the scribe who was especially learned in the text of Yahweh's com­ mandments and his laws relating to Israel" (7:11*). Accompanied by a new caravan of

584

Chapter 14. From Artaxerxes I to the Death of Darius II

returnees (7:7, 8:1-12), Ezra went to Jerusalem bearing a royal letter (7:12-26). The king allocated materials in order to allow the temple and sacrifices to regain their former splendor: offerings from the king himself and the court, gifts sent by the Jews liv­ ing in Babylonia, and vessels for the temple. Furthermore, the order was given to the Trans-Euphrates treasurers to provide Ezra with whatever he asked —up to 100 talents of silver, 400 liters of wine, 400 liters of oil, 400,000 liters of wheat, and "salt as requested." Part of the sacrifices were intended to ensure divine protection for the king, his sons, and their Empire. In all respects, the steps taken by Artaxerxes conformed to those en­ acted previously by Cyrus and Darius. It is possible, even likely, that Ezra was also au­ thorized to continue work on building the temple (cf. 6:14, 9:9). But Artaxerxes went further: the satrapal authorities were prohibited "to levy tribute, customs or tolls" on the temple personnel. As has already been pointed out (chap. 12/4), only one parallel is known: the exemption from tribute and corvee that Darius's ancestors awarded to the "sacred gardeners" who worked the land of Apollo of Aulai ( M L 12). From the point of view of both the Jews and the royal power, the principal mission entrusted to Ezra was in the legal realm. He was in fact ordered to appoint judges and magistrates "to administer justice for the whole people of Transeuphrates"; exemplary punishment was promised to any who did not carry out "the Law of your God—which is the law of the king" (7:25*). We must still ask about the content of this law, though doubtless it refers to the Torah. In order to "purify" the people of Judah, Ezra promul­ gated the law prohibiting mixed marriages and, during an official ceremony of renewal of the Covenant, the men repudiated their foreign wives and sent away the children they had borne (Ezra 10). But what is especially noteworthy is that thereafter the laws of the country were placed under the protection of the king and thus were included in the allencompassing category of royal law (see chap. 12/7). As Artaxerxes' review puts it (7:25), all who opposed the law (by rejecting the decisions made by the judges appointed by Ezra) would find themselves subject to royal punishment. As in many other examples, this case forcefully illustrates the connection between internal autonomy of a subject community and royal dominion. The king became the protector and guarantor of local customs, as long as they did not contradict Persian interests; even more, by returning harmony to Jerusalem, Ezra served the cause of imperial order.

Nehemiah's Mission Thirteen years later, at his own request, Nehemiah also was sent to Jerusalem by the Great King. He had been alerted by his brother Hanani to the deplorable state of the community and the town. Artaxerxes gave letters to Nehemiah as he had to Ezra. Some were addressed "to the governors of Transeuphrates" and instructed them to fa­ cilitate the trip for the Jew and his companions. Others were addressed to Asaph, "keeper of the king's park," who was ordered to furnish timber "for the gates of the cit­ adel of the Temple, for the city walls," as well as for the house in which Nehemiah planned to live (Neh. 2:1-10). The work soon began: "The wall was finished within fifty-two days, on the twenty-fifth of Elul" (October 445; 6:15*). Nehemiah put his brother Hanani in charge of Jerusalem and Hananiah in command of the garrison (7:2). Then he proceeded to lake a census of the population (7:6-68). Steps were taken, in the presence of Ezra(?), to restore the splendor of the rituals and daily life of the temple and its personnel. After twelve years, Nehemiah returned to the king (433).

Ezra and Nehemiah in Jerusalem

585

He soon had to return to Jerusalem (ca. 430-425), having discovered that the rules he had instituted were not being enforced. In particular, the Jews no longer paid the tithe owed to the temple personnel. Nehemiah once more had to take action requiring re­ spect for the Sabbath and forbidding mixed marriages (13:6-31). Such is the outline of Chronicles, which is apparently based on the memoirs of Nehemiah himself. Above and beyond the many debates about a text filled with traps and pitfalls, one point seems certain. Like Ezra, Nehemiah had received orders from the Great King; un­ like Ezra, he held an official position: 'governor' (peha). He emphasizes the contrast be­ tween himself and the governors who preceded him in the position (5:14-17). His jurisdiction was "the country of Judah" (5:14), that is, the province (medinah) that on fourth-century coins is called Yehud. Apparently the province, including Jerusalem it­ self, was divided into districts (pelek), which probably were tribal in origin but perhaps also corresponded to fiscal subdivisions. Like the governors of other provinces in the re­ gion, Nehemiah acted under the authority of the governor of Trans-Euphrates, who was undoubtedly based at Damascus. This governor, it seems, held an estate within the ju­ risdiction of the province that was something like a satrapal paradise, and the inhabi­ tants of the province were required to perform corvee on his estate (3:7). Nehemiah, it seems, was accompanied by a "king's commissioner for all such matters as concerned the people" (11:24-0-) — as it happens, a Jew—but the breadth of his jurisdiction vis-a-vis the governor is not clearly established. Following the model of a "real" satrap, the gov­ ernor of Judah received a special tax ("the governor's bread") that permitted him to sup­ ply his table every day and to entertain his guests (5:14-18). One of his main tasks was to levy the royal tribute (cf. 5:3). He also had a military function, since he put Jerusalem in a state of military readiness and entrusted the citadel to one of his close associates. Nehemiah had instructions from the Great King specifically to reestablish political and social order. The description given by Nehemiah himself reveals extremely sharp social conflict. The common people complained of having to indenture their children to be able to eat; some had to mortgage their fields and vineyards to pay the royal tribute. In order to restore peace, Nehemiah took astonishing measures: he no longer collected the "governor's bread" tax. But this act had primarily symbolic (and self-justification) value, even though it takes into account the combined effect of the royal levies and sa­ trapal taxes. The basic problem lay at the level of relations between rich and poor: by lending money at interest, the former starved the latter. Like a Judahite Solon, Nehe­ miah was not a social revolutionary: though he proclaimed the abolition of debt and re­ quired the rich to return the mortgaged fields, vineyards, and olive groves to the small land-holders (5:10), there was no thought of actually dividing up the land. The impov­ erishment of the small land-holders was thus not simply an automatic result of the im­ position of tribute: tribute only played a role of revealing and accelerating what already existed in the context of class relations specific to Jewish society. The various taxes also converged in that everyone had to pay for maintenance of the temple and its personnel: a one-third shekel head tax (10:33), as well as "first-fruits and tithes, . . . those portions • •. awarded . . . to . . . the cantors and gatekeepers too . . . " (12:44-47*). The burden was so heavy that during Nehemiah's absence the Jews had stopped bringing "the tithe of corn wine, and oil to the storehouses" (13:12*). It thus appears that from Cyrus to Artaxerxes there was considerable consistency in royal policy, though we are not able to say that the Great King took special interest in

586

Chapter 14. From Artaxerxes I to the Death of Darius U

this small region. The importance of Judah is only an "optical illusion" created by the uneven distribution of evidence. In particular, there is nothing to prove that Susa or Per­ sepolis considered Judah a bulwark of Persian dominion against fickle and unruly Egypt. More likely, from the Persian point of view, Nehemiah's mission was to establish a new basis for assessing tribute and guaranteeing regular payment: mutatis mutandis, and keeping in mind their purposes, his reforms can be compared with those carried out by Artaphernes in 493 in the cities of Ionia that had been ravaged by war and social ten­ sion (cf. chap. 12/5). From Jerusalem to Elephantine The principles on which Jewish autonomy and the limits of its effectiveness were es­ tablished are clarified by Aramaic documents from Egypt during the reign of Darius H. In 410, during a murky affair (to which we return below in chap. 14/8) that found them in opposition to the governor of Syene, the Jews of the Elephantine garrison sent a peti­ tion addressed jointly to "Johanan the high priest and his colleagues the priests who are in Jerusalem, and to Ostana the brother of Anani and the nobles of the Jews" —that is, to everyone who constituted the internal government of the community of Jerusalem, alongside the "governor of Judah" proper (DAE 102 [AP 30-31*]). The people of Ele­ phantine received no reply to their plea. The reason was probably because in their ritu­ als they had violated the "Law of Moses," as had recently been proclaimed so forcefully by Ezra and/or Nehemiah. Their petition in fact concerned the reconstruction of the temple of Yahweh that they had built on the island in the Nile, contrary to the principle of the uniqueness of the center of worship. One document, certainly from 419, shows that the Jews of Elephantine paid a head tax intended to sustain the expense of the temple service, conduct that was even more reprehensible because this money would serve to honor not only Yahweh but also Aramean gods (Bet'el and Anat; DAE 89 [AP 22]). In contrast, when Ezra was sent to Jerusalem, the Jewish settlers in Babylonia had given him offerings for the temple in Jerusalem (Ezra 7:16). The Jews (or, rather, Judeo-Arameans) of Elephantine probably had appealed to the authorities in Jerusalem at an earlier time because the Great King had conferred on the rulers of Jerusalem the authority to intervene in purely religious affairs of the Jewish di­ aspora in the Empire. Anyway, the royal edict sent to Ezra said: "Appoint scribes and judges to administer justice for the whole people of Transeuphrates, that is, for all who know the Law of your God. You must teach those who do not know it" (Ezra 7:25*). We find an illustration of this state of affairs in an Aramaic papyrus from Egypt. In 418, one Hanani (Nehemiah's brother?) came to Elephantine bearing a very important docu­ ment that regulated the celebration of Passover by the Jews (DAE 96 [AD 8]). It does seem that in this case the initiative came from the authorities in Jerusalem, who wanted to unify ritual throughout the diaspora. Hanani's letter states that the order came from the king and was sent to Arsama, the satrap of Egypt. But the central government was not in a position to intervene in a purely internal religious matter of the Jewish communites of the Empire. All it did was to grant official sanction ("royal law") to a local ruling ("laws of the countries"). c

The Enemies of Nehemiah and Judah To read the Chronicler, the arrival of Nehemiah did not disarm the hostility of Judah's neighbors; quite the reverse. As in the previous episode (cf. above, chap. 14/4),

Ezra and Nehemiah in Jerusalem

587

Judah's neighbors intended to communicate to the Great King their condemnation of the royal ambitions they attributed to Nehemiah, in light of the fortifications he had just provided for Jerusalem (6:6-7). The danger was even greater because many neighbors of Judah had family members in the province because of the many intermarriages that all of Ezra's efforts (if he really did precede Nehemiah) had obviously failed to suppress. Even the high priest's son took a wife from outside Judah. On his second mission, Ne­ hemiah had to renew the prohibition. A coalition against Judah and Nehemiah developed: the Chronicler names "Sanballat the Horonite, Tobiah of Amnion, and Gasmu the Arab" (Neh 2:19, 6:1-7). The first was the leader of "troops from Samaria" (3:34 [Heb.; 4:2 Eng.]). We know that in 410 someone else called Sanballat was "governor of Samaria" (DAE 102), and he must have been a descendant. Papyri and inscribed bullas from Wadi ed-Daliyeh, north of Jericho, provide an additional reference point: dated between 375 and 335, they mention yet an­ other Sanballat, who in all likelihood belonged to the same family. In the Elephantine document from 410, we see that Sanballat I had his sons Dalayah and Selemyah beside him. There was thus a veritable dynasty that governed Samaria, at least between the reigns of Artaxerxes I and Darius III. The bullas and papyri of Wadi ed-Daliyeh and coins show that these men bore the title "governor (pete) of Samaria"; Samaria was the name of the province (medinah) as well as the town (qryt'), which is sometimes called "Samaria the fortress" (byrt*), according to a formula frequently found in Achaenienidperiod documents, at Sardis, Xanthus, and Meydancikkale as well as at Syene-Elephantine. Here, as elsewhere, the Persians recognized a local dynasty, but there is no question that its members received the title of governor directly from the central power. Like their colleagues at Jerusalem, the dynast-governors of Samaria depended on the higher au­ thority of the governor of Trans-Euphrates. The other two members of what the book of Nehemiah portrays as an anti-Judahite coalition are harder to identify. The name of Gasmu the Arab is usually related to the same name found in dedications inscribed on silver vessels found at Tell el-Maskhuta in Egypt. One is inscribed with the name "Qaynu, son of Gasmu, king of Qedar" (DAE 68 [AD 7]). But the extent of the Arab Qedarite kingdom and its relationship to the Achae­ menid authorities remains problematic. As for Tobiah, he was probably part of a dynasty also known from later Aramaic inscriptions found in Transjordan (Iraq el-Emir); per­ haps he was recognized by the Persians as governor of the region. Sanballat's hostility does not seem to have been religious in origin. At this time, the word Samaritan had not yet acquired the sectarian significance it took on in the Helle­ nistic period when the sanctuary on Mount Gerizim, Jerusalem's rival, was founded; it refers exclusively to the inhabitants of the province (medinah) of Samaria. Furthermore, when the authorities in Jerusalem remained deaf to their plea in 410, the Jews of Ele­ phantine did not hesitate to send a letter to the sons of Sanballat (DAE 102). Thus, it seems that the governor of Samaria and his neighbors (Gasmu, Tobiah) were uneasy about the strengthening of the governor of Judah's power, which is why they attempted to stir up the fears of the Persian government. Without being able to prove it, we may suggest that these local jurisdictional squabbles can be compared to the tensions seen in Asia Minor between the satraps of Sardis and Dascylium, who were continually disput­ ing control over frontier territory (the Troad). If this is true, perhaps Nehemiah had re­ ceived guarantees on this point from the central government.

588

Chapter 14. From Artaxerxes 1 to the Death of Darius 11

6. One King after Another

(425-424)

Ctesias and the Babylonian Tablets According to Ctesias (§44), Artaxerxes and his wife Damaspia (unknown elsewhere) perished on the same day. They had only one legitimate son, who took the throne under the name Xerxes (II). But several of Artaxerxes' illegitimate sons who had strong ambi­ tions challenged Xerxes II. The main challenger was Sogdianus, son of Alogune. He fo­ mented a conspiracy against his half-brother with the help of Pharnacyas, Menostanes, and several others; 45 days after his accession, Xerxes was assassinated, "while he lay drunk in his palace," and Sogdianus took the royal title (§45), naming Menostanes chil­ iarch [azabarites/hazarapatis; §46). One of his half-brothers, Ochus, also born to a Baby­ lonian woman (Cosmartidene), had received the satrapy of Hyrcania from his father and married one of his half-sisters, Parysatis, daughter of a third Babylonian concubine, Andia. Ochus refused to attend the meetings called by Sogdianus and won several impor­ tant people to his side, including Arbarius, the commander of Sogdianus's cavalry. He soon seized power and took the throne name Darius II (§§47-48). This is a sketch of the tale told by Ctesias. The Babylonian tablets, moreover, allow us to conclude that the events between the death of Artaxerxes and the accession of Darius II unfolded between the end of Decem­ ber 424 and February 423 and also that the reigns of Xerxes II and Sogdianus were not officially recognized by the Babylonian scribes. Many details elude us. It is likely that Xerxes took the throne because of his parentage and perhaps also because his father had recognized him as crown prince. It seems that, presented with the accession of the new king, Sogdianus and Ochus announced their pretensions simultaneously. Ctesias's re­ port shows that the aristocrats had to choose sides, and in the ensuing battle, Ochus managed to win over very important men, such as Arbarius, the commander of Sogdi­ anus's cavalry; Arsames (Arsama), the satrap of Egypt; and even Artoxares, who at the time of Artaxerxes I had been exiled to Armenia because he had spoken to the king on behalf of Megabyzus (§40). It just so happens, by extraordinary coincidence, that many of the people just named are also known from Babylonian tablets belonging to the archives of the Murasfl, a busi­ ness establishment that during the reigns of Artaxerxes I and Darius II dealt specifically with the management of land around Nippur, including land granted by the king to members of his family and high crown officials. Alongside the "house of the woman of the palace" in the time of Artaxerxes I and the "house of Parysatis" (after the accession of Darius II), we also can identify Arsama, who in addition to his estates in Egypt kept land and livestock in Babylonia under Artaxerxes I and Darius II. We can also identify Menostanes, son of Artarios; he was a brother of Artaxerxes I and satrap of Babylonia at the time of Megabyzus's rebellion. His son Menostanes had at that time been defeated by Megabyzus's troops (§38), then defected to Sogdianus, who made him his chiliarch (§§45-46). Menostanes, a nephew of Artaxerxes I who is known as Manustanu in the Babylonian tablets, is called mar bit sarri 'royal prince'; he died soon, shortly after the de­ feat of Sogdianus, and his estates then passed to one Artahsar, who is none other than Artoxares; according to Ctesias, he had declared himself a compatriot of Ochus (§47). (Arbareme in the tablets) was similarly rewarded for switching to Ochus's side lock, stock, and barrel (Ctesias §47).

One King after Another (425-424)

589

Although Ctesias is not explicit on this point, it appears that Artarios and Menostanes did not succeed in winning over Babylonia to Sogdianus, who very likely lived at Susa after his accession. It seems clear at the same time that the Babylonian troops supported Ochus (cf. §§46-47). The Babylonian tablets lead us to believe that Ochus did muster the soldiers who in return for the use of land (within a halm) were required to respond to any call-up. To go by Ctesias's story, there does not seem to have been a pitched battle. Just as Tanyoxarces had eventually done (§10), Sogdianus agreed to give himself up when ordered by the new king, and he was executed "after reigning 6 months 15 clays" ($48). Darius then had to face two other rebels: his full-brother Arsites (like him, the son of Artaxerxes and Cosmartidene) and Artyphius, the son of Megabyzus, who some 30 years earlier had already participated in the revolt against Artaxerxes I alongside his fa­ ther (§37). They were soon put to death, as well as Pharnacyas, one of Sogdianus's lieu­ tenants. Menostanes chose suicide (§§50-51).

Families and Powers The succession after Artaxerxes I both confirms the persistence of dynastic problems and constitutes a special case. It is surprising that Artaxerxes and Damaspia had only one legitimate son. Others may have died young, as did thirteen of the children of Darius II and Parysatis (§49). Whatever the case, after the disposal of Xerxes II, power was con­ tested among the illegitimate sons of the dead king—Sogdianus and Ochus, and later Arsites. According to Herodotus (III.2), a 'rule' (nomos) disqualified illegitimate sons from the succession. But like many other Persian royal nomos he mentions (cf. VII.2), this regulation did not have the critical force that Herodotus imputes to it. There is no doubt, for one thing, that the nothoi (illegitimate children) enjoyed high status in the court (cf. Herodotus VIII.103; Diodorus XI.61.5), and for another, the important thing in every case was to ensure family continuity. It is also remarkable that no great family ever attempted to seize control: the Great Ones were content to side with one or another of the contestants, a sign that Ochus and Sogdianus were truly considered sons of Arta­ xerxes and as such endowed with a certain familial, and thus dynastic, legitimacy. While most of the nobility was satisfied with the rewards granted by the new king (court titles, land grants), one family was singled out to receive considerably greater benefits. At an unknown date, in fact, Darius married his son Arsaces to Stateira, daugh­ ter of Hydarnes, and at the same time the king's daughter Amestris married Teritushmes, son of Hydarnes. In Ctesias a long passage follows on the adventures of the two couples, culminating in the death of Teritushmes (in battle) and the torture of his entire family (sister, mother, brothers, and two more sisters; $§54-55). Ctesias charges all these mur­ ders to Parysatis, archetype of the "cruel princess," who had been infuriated by Teritouchmes' behavior. According to Ctesias, Teritushmes had fallen in love with his sister Roxanne and executed Amestris, the daughter of Darius and Parysatis (§54). Ctesias also says that Darius wanted to kill Stateira, the daughter of Hydarnes and wife of his son Ar­ saces, but Parysatis allowed herself to be moved by the appeals of her son: "Darius yielded to him as well, but warned Parysatis that she would regret it" (§56). We know that during the reign of Artaxerxes II, Parysatis finally did away with Stateira (§61; Plu­ tarch, Art. 19), before approving a union between Artaxerxes II and her daughter Atossa {Art. 23.3-7). Nonetheless, the entire family was not exterminated, since in 400 a brother of Stateira was in the entourage of Tissaphernes (Xenophon, Anab. II.3.17).

590

Chapter 14. From Artaxerxes I to the Death of Darius U

The cross-marriages with the family of Hydarnes constituted a noteworthy novelty in Achaemenid family policy. At least from the time of Cambyses, marriages had been based on strict endogamy. The exchanges of wives with Hydarnes in themselves granted him exceptional personal power. Unfortunately, we know nothing about him. It cannot be said for sure that he was indeed a descendant of Vidarna, one of the conspirators of 522. Whatever the case, he must have provided a great deal of assistance to Ochus dur­ ing the war of succession. At the same time, the bloody actions soon taken by Darius and Parysatis show that they were far from granting permanent arrangements. Their own marriage was destined to give meaning back to the policy of endogamy and prevent a great family from one day claiming royal power. In other words, the matrimonial conces­ sions made to Hydarnes were purely based on the moment; as soon as he was sure of his power, Darius was quite willing to lop off potential rival branches. At the same time, the events demonstrate the Achaemenids' capacity for rebuilding the dynastic stock. In fact, Artaxerxes I married Ochus to his half-sister Parysatis, and from this union a new Achae­ menid branch was intended to sprout. Before coming to power, Ochus and Parysatis had produced two children: a daughter, Amestris; and Arsaces, the future Artaxerxes II ($49).

Legitimacy and Propaganda It is clear that Ochus's victory resulted from a combination of forces he had managed to gather on his side; but it also appears that each competitor was able to conduct a skill­ ful propaganda campaign on the theme of his own legitimacy. Perhaps Pausanias's curi­ ous incidental citation (II. 5) comes from this tradition, according to which "Darius, illegitimate son (nothos) of Artaxerxes, with the support of all of the Persian people (ho Person demos), dethroned Sogdianus, legitimate son (gnesios) of Artaxerxes." Did Sogdianus attempt to deck himself out with a (highly debatable) genetic legitimacy? Possibly, but we know nothing of him before the death of Artaxerxes. Does his name ("the Sogdian") mean that he was born during his father's campaign in eastern Iran at the begin­ ning of his reign? Did Artaxerxes make contingency arrangements, before he died, in case Xerxes died suddenly? According to this theory, did he recognize Sogdianus's rights as eldest son? And was naming Ochus to the satrapy of Hyrcania a sort of compensation to the younger son? All these questions (and others, too) remain unanswered. The "Persian people" referred to by Pausanias are doubtless the army, which Ctesias states was hostile to Sogdianus ($45). Ctesias makes this observation during a passage that clearly comes directly out of propaganda spawned in Ochus's circle. Ctesias says that Sogdianus gave a certain Bagorazus the task of driving the funeral chariot on which the remains of Artaxerxes I and Xerxes II were placed: "In fact, the mules that drew the fu­ neral chariot, as if they had been waiting for the remains of the son [Xerxes] as well, re­ fused to move; but when Xerxes' body arrived, they moved on in high spirits" ($45). Then, Ctesias says, Sogdianus got rid of Bagorazus, "on the pretext that he had aban­ doned his father's body" ($46). Even though Photius's summary is somewhat less than clear, it seems that some controversy arose over what to do with the royal remains; in fact, organization of the funeral solemnities reverted to the heir. What Bagorazus had cast doubt on was neither more nor less than the legitimacy of Sogdianus. A passage in Polyaenus (VII.7.17) confirms that from Ochus's point of view, it had become his respon­ sibility, after ten months, to "proclaim the royal mourning according to Persian custom." Polyaenus also says that during this time Ochus sealed documents with his father's seal. In fact, as we know, Ochus was recognized as king in February 424. What Ctesias and

Affairs on the Western Front

591

Polyaenus transmit, in their own way, is probably a scrap of the official version that circu­ lated after Ochus's accession. In the same vein, a Greek tradition passed on the image of Darius II as a king with little interest in ostentatious luxury, someone who said on his deathbed that he had "practised justice before all men and gods" (Athenaeus XII.548e-v-).

Darius the Great King The reuse of the throne name "Darius" conferred additional legitimacy on the new king. In his few inscriptions, Darius II, imitating his predecessors, uses almost word for word the titles of Darius I at Naqs-i Rustam and presents himself as son of and successor to Artaxerxes I (D Sh). At Susa he claims to have built an apadana (D Sa) and to have completed another palace (hadis) begun by his father (D Sb), and he had his tomb ex­ cavated near his father's, on the cliff at Naqs-i Rustam. On the other hand, he did not rebuild the palace erected by Darius I, which had been destroyed by fire during the reign of Artaxerxes I (cf. A Sd). In the absence of written evidence, we know nothing of any possible building activity at Persepolis. 2

2

2

2

7. Affairs on the Western Front

The Situation in Asia Minor (424-413) In the absence of evidence from the center, we are reduced to narratives that refer al­ most exclusively to Asia Minor and Egypt. We have seen that just before the death of Artaxerxes the Athenians had sent Artaphernes to Ephesus, obviously wishing to open talks with the Great King (Thucydides IV.50.3). Andocides, an Athenian orator of the fourth century, refers very generally to a treaty consummated between Athens and the Great King after Artaxerxes' accession: "We concluded a truce (spondai) with the Great King and we established friendship (philia) with him forever; the agreement was nego­ tiated by Epilycus, son of Teisandrus, my mother's brother" (Pace 29). Whether this re­ port refers to a renewal of the so-called Peace of Callias or a new treaty is not easy to determine in the absence of any external confirmation (aside from an Athenian decree commending Heraclides—but the date itself is debated). All the same, we may agree that at the presumed date, around 424-423, the Great King and Athens both had reasons to avoid overt conflict. This may be the context of the revolt of Pissuthnes, which Ctesias alone mentions in his story of the difficulties encountered by the king shortly after his accession. With the aid of Athenian mercenaries commanded by Lycon, the satrap of Sardis revolted. Darius sent an army against him commanded by three generals, including Tissaphernes. Pis­ suthnes was betrayed by Lycon and executed, and the satrapy of Sardis was bestowed on Tissaphernes (§52). Perhaps Pissuthnes had tried to profit from Darius's setback (Ctesias had just described the revolt led by Arsites and Artyphius before mentioning an obscure intrigue planned by Artoxares; see §§50-51, 53). Nonetheless, although cordial relations had been declared between the Athenians and Darius, the Athenians violated the agreement a few years later, as Andocides states: "After that, we hear of Amorges, slave of the king and exile. . . . Result: the angry king be­ came the ally of the Lacedaemonians and provided them with 5,000 talents to under­ write the war until they were able to destroy our power" (Perce 29). We know in fact from Phucydides (VIII.54.3) that the Athenians had sent aid to Amorges (who is also named on the Xanthus Pillar inscription), and we learn from him as well that this Amorges was

592

Chapter 14. From Artaxerxes I to the Death of Darius II

the illegitimate son of Pissuthnes and that Tissaphernes had been ordered by the king to bring the rebel to him, dead or alive (VIII.5.5). It appears that the Athenian decision to aid Amorges was made before the expedition to Sicily—that is, in 414.

The Aftermath of the Athenian Debacle in Sicily The defeats suffered by the Athenians in Sicily (September 413) soon provided the Great King with an opportunity to take revenge. In a magnificent account, Thucydides describes the shock that the disaster caused in Athens: the Athenians were fearful that "their adversaries at home, redoubling all their preparations, would vigorously attack them by sea and land at once, aided by their own revolted confederates" (VIII. 1.2-0-). Hopes were high, in fact, in Sparta and Greece (VIII.2). There soon were envoys in Lacedaemon from Chios and Erythrae, as well as ambassadors from Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, who [Tissaphernes] invited the Peleponnesians to come over, and promised to maintain their army. The king had lately called upon him for the tribute from his government, for which he was in arrears, being unable to raise it from the Hellenic towns by reason of the Athenians; and he therefore calculated that by weakening the Athenians he should get the tribute better paid, and should also draw the Lacedaemonians into alliance with the king; and by this means, as the king had commanded him, take alive or dead Amorges.... (VIII.4.5*) Thucydides describes similar hopes on the part of Pharnabazus, who hoped to "procure a fleet for the Hellespont" (VIII.6.1o). With this goal in mind, his envoys brought a sum of 25 talents (VIII.8.1). At Sparta, a great battle for influence broke out between the two delegations. The Lacedaemonians "decidedly favored the Chians and Tissaphernes," led in that direction by the influence of Alcibiades and even more by the hope of gaining ac­ cess to powerful fleets at Chios and Erythrae (VIII.6.3-5*). In the spring of 412, after many difficulties, Lacedaemonian ships arrived below the walls of Chios, commanded by Chalcideus and Alcibiades and soon aided at Teos by Stages, one of Tissaphernes' lieutenants. Thus began the Ionian War. If we accept Thucydides' explanation, Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes had both "lately" received the order to levy tribute on the Greek cities. In theory, the king had never given up his rights, but the new situation offered him the possibility of putting them into practice. This mission involved launching overt operations against Athens so as to reaffirm Achaemenid dominion over the Asia Minor coast; in other words, all prior treaties, if any had ever really existed, were declared null and void by Athens' own actions.

The Spartan-Achaemenid

Treaties (412-411)

Soon (summer of 412), Tissaphernes reached an initial formal agreement of alliance (symmakhia) with Chalcideus between Lacedaemon and the king. The two allies agreed to wage war or be at peace jointly, and the rights of the king were reaffirmed in the fol­ lowing way: "Whatever country or cities the king has, or the king's ancestors had, shall be the king's; and whatever came in to the Athenians from these cities, either money or any other thing, the king and the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall jointly hinder the Athenians from receiving either money or any other thing" (VIII. 18o-). In return, the Persians were to treat any who left the Lacedaemonian alliance as enemies. But it is clear that in general the treaty favored the Persians and Tissaphernes and that they were able to reestablish their dominion without major cost, other than the financial expenditures.

Affairs on the Western Front

593

Even though the terms of the treaty were not restricted to Tissaphernes' domain, he as satrap of Sardis intended to be first to take advantage of it. Despite the Athenians and with the aid of the Peleponnesian armies, Tissaphernes soon captured Amorges on la­ sus allowing his allies to take plunder and impress the rebel's mercenaries, before estab­ lishing a garrison on lasus (VIII.28.2-5; 29.1). Because Tissaphernes was reluctant to pay off their troops, the Peleponnesians requested a new treaty, which was drawn up in the winter of 412-411 (VIII.37). In reality, the differences between the two versions are scarcely noticeable, aside from the fact that this time the treaty is made in the name of the king and his sons. At the beginning of 41 j , one of the Spartan commissioners, Lichas considered the second treaty outrageous and null and void (43.3-4). Alcibiades also advised Tissaphernes not to become too closely involved with the Lacedaemonians: He "generally betrayed a coolness in the war that was too plain to be mistaken" (46.5*). But the Spartans scarcely had a choice of allies; Lichas also objected to the Milesians "that [they] ought to show a reasonable submission to Tissaphernes and to pay him court, until the war should be happily settled" (84.5*)! At the same time, Alcibiades, al­ ways eager to return to Athens in triumph, urged Tissaphernes to settle with Athens. It did not happen. On the contrary, Tissaphernes concluded a third treaty in the summer of 411. The satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia was directly involved, and Tissaphernes promised the arrival of a Phoenician squadron; from that moment onward, the Peloponnesians had to support their own ships, because Tissaphernes had agreed to lend them funding only until the end of the war (VIII.58). The Athenian Reconquest (411-407) In truth, not the slightest trace of a Phoenician navy was seen in Asia Minor during these years; Thucydides thought that Tissaphernes had never intended to provide a fleet (VIII.87). Given the situation, the Lacedaemonians decided in the end to respond favor­ ably to Pharnabazus's repeated demands, since he had promised to "provide for their support" (VIII.81.2). But the Athenians piled victory upon victory. At the same time, contention between the satraps was predominant. Tissaphernes made a special trip to the Hellespont: he apprehended Alcibiades and placed him under arrest at Sardis, "say­ ing that the King ordered him to make war upon the Athenians" (Xenophon, Hell. 1.1.9*). But until the arrival of Cyrus in 407, the generals were in disarray, so much so that the Athenians were able to embark on a victorious counterattack under the com­ mand of Thrasybulus and Alcibiades. Flush with success, Alcibiades finally had his tri­ umphal return to the city. Pharnabazus was unable to counter the situation and in 408 came to an agreement with the Athenian leadership: he would give them 20 talents, au­ thorize them to levy tribute on the town of Chalcedon, and commit himself to take their ambassadors to the king (Hell. 1.3.9). During this time, the Athenians captured By­ zantium. The following spring (407), when they expected to depart to see the king, the Athenian ambassadors saw none other than Cyrus the Younger arrive at Gordion, ac­ companied by Lacedaemonian ambassadors led by Boeotius, who stated that they "had obtained from the King everything they wanted" (Hell. 1.4.2*).

Darius 11 and His Satraps It must be recognized that, until Cryus's arrival at Gordion, tentative and disorga­ nized initiatives by Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus had not led to any great success, apart from the treaties with Sparta—and Tissaphernes did not seem very eager to apply them.

594

Chapter 1 4. From Artaxerxes I to the Death of Darius U

Darius had indeed secured recognition of his dominion over Asia Minor from the Lacedaemonians, but the Athenian reconquests in 407 appeared to render this accom­ plishment partly moot. One of the reasons for this was the dogged competitiveness that motivated Tissa­ phernes and Pharnabazus. Though this trait first appeared in 413 at Sparta, it never flagged during these years. Thucydides highlights Tissaphernes' anxiety when the Spar­ tans decided to send forces into the Hellespont, "being also vexed to think that Pharna­ bazus should receive them, and in less time and at less cost perhaps succeed better against Athens than he had done" {VIII. 1 0 9 . I n fact, Tissaphernes' ambition did not exceed his rival's: "Pharnabazus was inviting [the Peleponnesians] to come, and making every effort to get the fleet and, like Tissaphernes, to cause the revolt of the cities in his government still subject to Athens, founding great hopes in his success" (VIII.99*). For both of them, the important thing was to succeed in a way that would ensure the king's favor (VIII.6.1). This is why Pharnabazus's envoys refused "to take part in the Chios ex­ pedition" (VIII.8) in 413. At the same time, Tissaphernes' primary objective was to cap­ ture Amorges. And, of course, the Peloponnesian allies did not pass up the opportunity to take advantage of this rivalry from lime to time (cf. Hell. 1.1.31-32). These inter-satrapal competitions are frequently attested, especially between Sardis and Dascylium, which had long-standing border disputes. For the Great King it was cer­ tainly a convenient way to keep a satrap from getting inordinately important (cf. Xeno­ phon, Anab. 1.1.8); but a corollary of this convenience was a degree of inefficiency. It seems particularly strange that Alcibiades managed to escape from his prison in Sardis with his Athenian companion Mantitheos shortly after his arrest by Tissaphernes: they "provided themselves with horses and made their escape from Sardis by night to Clazomenae" (Hell. 1.1.10*). Taking into account the strength of the garrison at Sardis and the difficulty of travel on the region's roads, we are tempted to think that Alcibiades had the benefit of help from inside accomplices. It is quite likely that the Persians of Sardis were hostile to Tissaphernes' strategy, like the Persians of the early 490s who seem to have conspired with Histiaeus of Miletus against Artaphernes' enterprises (Herodotus VI.4). It is also likely that Tissaphernes' hesitancy reflects more general dissension about the course of action to take with regard to Athens and Sparta. Another reason for the inter-satrapal rivalry is the fact that neither Tissaphernes nor Pharnabazus had sufficient military forces to allow them to really win the day. This is why each of them attempted to invite the Peleponnesians into their own territory in 413. Furthermore, even on land, the Persian cavalry was not always the uncontested king of battle; in 409, for instance, the plentiful cavalry of Pharnabazus was defeated by Alcibi­ ades' army of horsemen and hoplites (1.2.16). In the same year, the Athenian Thrasyllus was able to make a foray into Lydia, "when the grain was ripening"; Stages, Tissapher­ nes' subordinate, was able to take only a single prisoner, despite the strength of his cav­ alry (1.2.4-5*). But it was on the sea that Persian incompetence was most glaring and most crucial. Apart from the case of the mysterious Phoenician fleet promised by Tissaphernes— which no one ever managed to see! —the satraps had no navy at all. At most, they could hire crews (though not without frequent mutual recriminations) and let their Pelopon­ nesian allies build ships using timber cut from the royal forests (Hell. 1.1.24-25). Thus, because of their naval inferiority, they participated only marginally in a war that

Affairs on the Western Front

595

unfolded between the Athenian and Peloponnesian navies. In 411, when there was an amphibious battle between Athenians and Lacedaemonians, we have a picture of Phar­ nabazus reduced to "riding his horse into the sea as far as possible, [where he] bore a share in the fighting and cheered on his followers, cavalry and infantry" (I.1.6-C-). T h e Athenians took control of the Straits and were even able to impose customs duties (in the form of a tithe) on the grain-ships that passed by Chalcedon (1.1.22). The agree­ ment between Pharnabazus and Alcibiades the following year expresses perfectly the satrap's inability to repel an attack on his territory (1.3.8-13). Of course, the satraps had significant resources that enabled them to hire mercenar­ ies (though fairly limited in number) and especially to pay the Peleponnesian soldiers fighting at their side. But it is not certain that their financial capacity was unlimited. It seems in fact that, from Tissaphernes' and Pharnabazus's viewpoint, the important thing was to carry on operations with the least possible expense (cf. Thucydides VIII.87.5; 109.1). The Peleponnesians and Tissaphernes himself also appear often to have relied on levies collected from the Greek cities of Asia Minor, which in turn exhibited some reluctance to cooperate (cf. VIII.36.1: 45.5). On at least one occasion, Tissaphernes re­ fused to increase the mercenaries' pay while waiting, he claimed, for an answer from the king (VIII.29.1), letting it be understood that he would raise wages if any money arrived from Darius (45.5-6). On several occasions, the Peleponnesian allies complained that they did not receive enough regular income to live on (cf. VIII.78). Later on, Alcibiades addressed the representatives of the allies as follows: H e also pointed out tha t T i s s a p h e r n e s was at present carrying o u t the war at his own c h a r g e s (ta idia khremata),

a n d h a d g o o d c a u s e for e c o n o m y , b u t that as s o o n as he received remit­

tances (trophe) from the king h e would give t h e m their pay in full, a n d d o what was r e a s o n ­ able for the cities. (VIII.45.6-0-)

These "own charges" were doubtless the funds available to the satrap in his personal ac­ count. Considerable sums are involved, since some years later Tithrausles was able to pay some troops by withdrawing 220 talents of silver from "the personal resources of Tis­ saphernes" (ek tes omias tes Tissaphernous; Hell. Oxyr. 19.3). This must have been a for­ tune that existed somewhere on the borderline between state structure and personal property (as did the paradises, for example). Whatever the case, the king thought that the satraps ought to use these "own charges" to pay their soldiers. Perhaps the king also thought that the order he had given to Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus to collect tribute from the cities (VIII.5.5; 6.1) implied that he did not have to finance the war. The author of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia (19.2) complains, moreover, about the Great King's great avarice, referring explicitly to the time of Darius II (and his successor): T h e soldiers were paid by the sirafegoi in a d e p l o r a b l e fashion. Anyway, this was their habit, as in the War o f D e c e l i a w h e n they [the Persians] w e r e allied with the P e l e p o n n e s i a n s ; they provided m o n e y o n a s c a l e b o t h m e a n a n d shabby, a n d their allies' triremes w o u l d often have b e e n sent b a c k h a d not C y r u s acted swiftly. Responsibility for this state o f affairs lies with the G r e a t King: eveiy l i m e h e d e c i d e d to m a k e war, he sent a small s u m o f m o n e y at the b e g i n n i n g to t h o s e w h o were to carry it o u t , b u t h e did not take into a c c o u n t s u b s e q u e n t events, so m u c h so that if they were not a b l e to u s e m o n e y o f their own (ek ton idion), the generals h a d to d i s b a n d their a r m i e s .

In other words, the king made an initial investment that the satraps were required to manage as best they could. If they were not able to get the business taken care of in the

596

Chapter 14. From Artaxerxes I to the Death of Darius II

time allotted, they had to pay from their own funds (see also Hell. 1.5.3). In time of war, just as in time of peace, the Great King was quite economical—he kept a careful eye on his own fortune. We thus have the impression that we are seeing in this a specific illus­ tration of a more general policy by which imperial revenue was managed. It might be compared, mutatis mutandis, with an instruction included in the travel voucher that Ar­ sama gave to his steward Nehtihor: "And if he is in a place more than one day, on the later days do not give them extra provisions" (DAE 67 [AD 6]). An Aramaic document from Egypt (DAE 54 [AP 2]) demonstrates the same principle. Thus, the personal finan­ cial responsibility of administrative functionaries seems to have extended all the way up to satraps, even when they made warl This was one of many ways of limiting satrapal ambition.

Darius II, Asia Minor, and the Other Fronts It is difficult to understand the expectations and objectives of the strategy set in mo­ tion by the Great King. Too much remains unknown. A Babylonian tablet dated No­ vember 407 illustrates the extent of our ignorance: it refers to a "state of siege" at Uruk, and we have no idea what this refers to. Other tablets, dated to 422, refer to a gathering of soldiers at Uruk. The discrepancy in date prevents relating it to the 407 tablet; further­ more, it alludes to regular reviews, the existence of which does not imply that the region was then in turmoil (see below). Moreover, incidental passages in Xenophon's Hellenica refer to a Median revolt that was put down at the end of 407 (1.2.19) and to a war that Darius II waged against the Cadusians in 405 (II. 1.13). It is true that, generally speaking, we know practically nothing of military activities outside of the Asia Minor region. It is only because Plutarch wrote a life of Artaxerxes II that we learn, for example, that he too led an expedition against the Cadusians in the 380s (Art. 24). Then again, some recently published Babylonian astronomical tablets (ADRTB nos. -369, -367) also lead us to dis­ trust the deafening noise created by the Classical sources on matters of the western front (cf. also chap. 15/1). In Asia Minor itself, the satraps faced other dangers for which our only information is circumstantial. Xenophon mentions that, several years later, a subordinate of Pharna­ bazus named Mania, the wife and successor of Zenis of Dardanus, governed the region in Aeolis that was subject to Dascylium; in addition to other services she rendered to the satrap, "she also accompanied Pharnabazus in the field, even when he invaded the land of the Mysians or the Pisidians because of their continually ravaging the King's territory" (Hell. III. 1.13*). The failure of the Mysians and Pisidians to be submissive, frequently highlighted by the fourth-century Greek authors, explains the frequency of the expedi­ tions against them. When Cyrus the Younger wanted to conceal from his troops the fact that he was actually leading them against Artaxerxes II, he led them to believe that he was leading them against the Pisidians (Xenophon, Anab. 1.2.1). And, according to Dio­ dorus, during the battle of the Eurymedon, the Persian troops believed for a while that they had been attacked by the Pisidians (XI.61.4). But the stereotypical nature of a num­ ber of Classical references to the irredentism of the "mountain peoples" alerts the criti­ cal caution of the historian (cf. chap. 16/11, 16/18). Finally, according to Diodorus (XIII.46.6*), the reason that the Phoenician navy never appeared in Asia Minor was because they had learned that "the king of the Arabi­ ans and the king of the Egyptians had designs upon Phoenicia." Did the clanger oblige

Affairs on the Western Front

597

Tissaphernes —or rather, Darius—to reroute the squadron toward the Nile Valley? In truth there is no formal proof of this interpretation. A passage in Thucydides (VIII.3 5.2) simply makes us think that merchant ships carrying wheat arrived in Asia Minor from Egypt in 412; but it is difficult to conclude from this that an Egyptian dynasty had al­ ready taken the Athenians' side against the Persians. We are also completely in the dark as to the identity of this mysterious "king of the Arabians." The travel voucher Arsama provided to his steward implies that at this time (around 411-410) the road between Babylonia and Egypt was safe (DAE 67 [AD 6]). On the other hand, it is likely that in the Delta the Persians continued to pursue the policy that we have already discussed (see chap. 14/2 above), namely, to leave the local dynasts in place. But we have absolutely no information about the details. Aramaic papyri from Elephantine mention troubles in 410 and the quartering of troops (hndyz) in the citadel as a result of the intrigues of some­ one named Anudaru (DAE 66 [AD 5]). Arsama's estates suffered damage (DAE 68 [AD 7]); Pamun, an Egyptian steward in the service of the satrap, was killed (DAE 69 [AD 8]). For their part, the Jews mention that "detachments of the Egyptians rebelled" in 410 (DAE 101 [AP 27*]). But the actual troubles related here appear to be of limited extent, without a clear connection to the war that supposedly provoked sending a royal fleet to the Delta. In the final analysis— without totally rejecting such an interpretation—we are led to think that the reasons for the apparent passivity of Darius II on the Asia Minor front are to be found neither in Egypt, nor among the Cadusians, Medes, or Pisidians. Two expla­ nations can be offered, one political-diplomatic, the other military. We can imagine that, together with with Tissaphernes' timidity, the fluctuating strategy of the Spartans sowed turmoil and uncertainty among the king's advisers. The Lacedaemonian strategy must have appeared foreign, opaque, and contradictory to Darius II, just as it had to his father, Artaxerxes (cf. Thucydides IV.50.2). As far as we can tell, the Great King seems not to have fully comprehended the situation; like Tissaphernes, he seems to have ex­ pected that the Greeks would wear each other out.

Darius U and His Annies The second explanation puts the accent on the Great King's military weakness. This, we know, is a recurrent stereotype in the Greek view of Persia, especially in the fourth century, beginning with Xenophon in the last chapter of the Cyropedia. A similar per­ spective is found in many other Greek authors, such as Plato (Laws 697d). But taking into account the deeply polemical character of these appraisals, historians must instead base their work on external evidence, which allows them to lest the validity of such interpretations. We generally turn to the Babylonian sources. It is frequently stressed, in fact, that within the framework of the development of the system of military land allotments (the l)atru system) the plot-holders, instead of providing the military service connected to the properly they controlled, apparently preferred to pay the entire cost (ilku) in the form of money ("paid service"). This phenomenon can be detected from the time of Darius I on, but it tended to become more widespread in the time of Artaxerxes I and Darius II. This observation also can be connected to increasing reliance on Greek mercenaries. The to­ tality of the reconstruction tends to validate Xenophon's critical remarks about the Per­ sians' abandonment of the ancestral rules requiring landholders to "furnish cavalrymen

598

Chapter 14. From Artaxerxes I to the Death of Darius II

from their possessions and that these, in case of war, should also take the field, while those who performed outpost duty in defence of the country received pay for their ser­ vices," so much so that "enemies may range up and down their land with less hindrance than friends" (Cyr. VIII.8.20-21*). Even if we do not insist that Xenophon's comments are essentially a caricature, we still need to stress that the Babylonian evidence is more ambivalent than it appears. In­ sofar as it can be reconstructed from the tablets, the situation at the time of Darius l i s accession shows that the hatru system was already fully operational. For one thing, we know that Ochus (the future Darius II) was ruler of Babylonia and that he could gather a huge army. The tablets also indicate that, in order to respond to mobilization orders, the tenant farmers had to borrow vast sums from the house of Murasu—and there are many examples of this process. We know in fact that most of the time the plot-holders did not work the land themselves but turned the management over to the Murasu or other business concerns of the same type. So while the documentation implies that the financial position of the grant-holders was not spectacular, it also indicates that they were nevertheless committed to the military obligations they had taken on. Several documents from year 2 of Darius (422) show that at that time, by royal order, the tenants in the Nippur region were required to furnish the 'king's soldier' (Sab sarri) to take part in a review that would be held at Uruk (UC 9/3; 10/61-62; PBS 11/1:54,162). Another tablet belonging to the same lot is even more explicit: Gadal-lama, son of Rahum-ili, declared of his own free will to Rimut-Ninurta, descendant of Murasu, as follows: "Because Rahum-ili adopted your brother Elli-sum-iddin, you now possess the share of Barik-ili in the plow and fallow land held in tenure as 'horse land' (bit sisi) by Rafjum-ili. Give me a horse with harness and reins, a suhattu coat with neckpiece and hood, an iron armor with hood, a quiver, 120 arrows, some with heads, some without, a sword(?) with its scabbard, 2 iron spears, and I will perform the service attached to your share in the tenure land." Rimut-Ninurta agreed and gave him a horse and the military equip­ ment mentioned above, as well as 1 mina of silver for his travel provisions, in order to obey the royal order to go to Uruk in connection with this "horse land." Gadal-lama bears respon­ sibility for presenting the equipment given to him. He will show it for registration to Sabin, the man in charge of the secretaries of the army, and he will give the deed of registration to Rimut-Ninurta. [Names of witnesses and scribe] Nippur, 18 Tebet, year 2 of Darius. ([422] UC 9/68; trans. F. Joannes/P. Beau lieu) Through adoption, a member of the house of Murasu thus acquired part of a horse es­ tate. Rimut-Ninurta had no desire to fulfill the military service associated with the land granted by the king (in the hatru system) and entered into an agreement with the son of the holder of the other part: Gadal-lama attended the assembly with a horse and the en­ tire required weaponry (compare Xenophon, Hell. III.4.15!). This document is transparent: it explains very clearly that at this time, at Nippur, es­ tates were subject to active military service, though the identity of the person who per­ formed it did not matter to the administration. The core of the administration's concern was that each estate recorded in the archives furnish the soldier(s) whose service justi­ fied the very rationale for the system. And, compared with other documents dated to the same months of the same year, it is not possible to argue that this text could be taken as illustrating a special or unusual case. Even if we cannot prove it, it seems highly un­ likely that the order to assemble at Uruk was issued in preparation for a military expedi­ tion; it is more plausible that there actually were annual assemblies, which Xenophon

Affairs on the Western Front

599

several times says took place regularly in each military region at "the place of assembly"

(syllogos). Finally, later tablets from the reign of Artaxerxes II imply the general continuity of the system. The archives of the barber Kusur-Ea, son of Sin-ahhe-bullit, include (among others) seven texts referring to a practically identical procedure between the years 399 and 363- One of his relatives, Nidintu-Sin, made a contract with the barber, asking Kusur-Ea to furnish him with all of the equipment that citizens of Ur were required to furnish for military service; in exchange, he would appear at the royal assembly held in the 8th year of Artaxerxes II (397; U E T 4.109). Kusur-Ea was in fact subject to service be­ cause he held one quarter of a 'bow estate' (bit qasti; U E T 4.106 [363 B . C . ] ) . Here, the word 'assembly' renders the Old Persian word "handaisa, which is also found in the El­ ephantine archives (DAE 36, 66, 101 [AP 13, AD 5, AP 27]; Aram, hndyz). Whether the service was carried out directly by the plot-holder or by a substitute (who was armed by the former), the Babylonian document thus incontestably shows that the plots were per­ petually tied to the original royal obligation. Reliance on Greek mercenaries at this date remained fairly limited. Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus counted on the Lacedaemonian contingents primarily to fulfill the mission entrusted to them by Darius: to gather the tribute from cities still under Athe­ nian control. They also were able to utilize levies of horsemen from Persians living in the imperial diaspora, following a well-known, long-lived system. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the colonization strategy actively pursued from the time of Darius and Xerxes had a major impact in the military realm; striking confirmation is found through the study of the composition of Cyrus the Younger's army (see chap. 15/2). Evidence no longer requires us to believe that there was a significant deterioration in the system of military plots in Egypt, either in Elephantine or in Memphis. The campaigns of Darius and his armies against Media and the Cadusians provide strong confirmation that the central authority could place as much military force on active duty as strategy required. In short, it does not appear that the undeniable Persian military shortcomings in Asia Minor have to be explained by recourse to the convenient but simplistic theory of the decadence of the Great King's army. Similarly, the observation that the Great King did not send funds to his satraps in Asia Minor is woefully insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the royal coffers were empty! All of this evidence seems much more to be a result of a policy decision made at the center, which for reasons that remain to be clarified did not wish to commit powerful armies on the Aegean front. We could offer an entire series of interpretations of a tech­ nical sort (burden and cost of levies, for example), but no single element was determi­ native. Given the rarity of general mobilizations throughout Achaemenid history, we perhaps should not be overly surprised that Darius II did not consider an Empire-wide conscription useful now. It seems especially clear that the Great King and h'is advisers thought that the Lacedaemonian alliance would have to provide sufficient support for the Asia Minor satraps to get the upper hand, and that the subsequent reconquests would have to finance military operations, since they would provide the basis for the reintroduction of tribute assessments in the Greek cities. The only exception to this pre­ sumed rule was the assembling of that famous Phoenician navy we have already mentioned in Cilicia, and it obviously functioned under direct orders from the central authority (Thucydides VIII.88.5).

600

Chapter 14. From Artaxerxes I to the Death of Darius II

Cyrus in Asia Minor When the Great King decided to send Cyrus to Asia Minor in 407, it was perhaps to calm dissension that was brewing between his sons; he was certainly aware of the need to pursue a more energetic policy. It is possible that the Spartan Boeotius and his col­ leagues had apprised him of the situation, persuading him to act. Nevertheless, the pow­ ers entrusted to Cyrus and the amount of money offered to him to conduct the war leave no doubt regarding the royal intent: Cyrus in fact "brought with him a letter, addressed to all the dwellers upon the sea (Asia Minor; kato) and bearing the King's seal, which contained among other things these words: 'I send down Cyrus as karanos' — the word 'karanos' means 'lord' (kyrie) — 'of those whose mustering-place is Castolus'" (Hell. 1.4.3;* cf. Anab. 1.1.2). In other words, Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes were thereafter his subordinates. His mission was clear: "In order to be ruler of all the peoples on the coast and to support the Lacedaemonians in the war" (Hell. 1.4.3*). The time for royal hesitation and inter-satrapal rivalry was over. Cyrus immediately ordered Pharnabazus to detain the Athenian ambassadors in such a way as not to alert Athens to the Great King's new intentions; it was not until three years later that they were allowed to leave Asia Mi­ nor, at a time when the fate of the Athenian armies had already nearly been sealed. The appointment of Cyrus coincided with the arrival of a particularly energetic and decisive Lacedaemonian admiral, Lysander. The two men soon came to trust each other, and with Persian support Lysander was able to reinforce his army and navy. When he was absent, during the summer of 406, the Athenians achieved a victory in the Arginusae islands. However, they were not able to benefit from the victory: the strategoi were doomed! Lysander's return (summer of 405) marked the beginning of a new stage in Spartan-Achaemenid relations. Some time later, Cyrus the Younger was recalled to his father's sickbed. Before leaving, he gave Lysander large sums of money and, according to Xenophon, "assigned all his authority to him" (Hell. II. 1.14-15). In September of the same year, Lysander won a decisive sea battle over the Athenians at Aigos-Potamos. Some months later (April-May, 404), Athens fell to Lysander. Meanwhile, Darius died (between September 405 and April 404).

8. The Great King in His Countries

The Murasu, Babylonia, and the Royal Administration At this point, we would do well to pause for a moment and attempt to draw up a new imperial balance-sheet, which should not be reduced to territorial and military consid­ erations alone but should be drawn from regional realities. One of the best-documented countries is Babylonia. In fact, we have several hundred tablets from the archives of a Babylonian business concern, the Murasu, whose activities are particularly well attested between year 25 of Artaxerxes I (440-439) and year 7 of Darius II (417-416). Some other tablets, dating between 413 and 404, provide evidence for the activity of an old subordi­ nate of the house of Murasu, but it is difficult to establish in what capacity he func­ tioned. The cessation of the archives probably reflects the dissolution of the business, although we should not necessarily infer that there was a major modification of the pat­ tern, since the Murasu, whose activities were centered around Nippur, were no doubt only one of the firms that did business in Babylonia at this time. The Murasu were not a bank in the modern sense. Their basic activity was managing land, and this is why their archives are a prime source as much for reconstructing land

The Great King in His Countries

601

management as for fiscal organization. The tenant-farmers, rather than devoting them­ selves directly to working their lands, entrusted the land's management to the Murasu, and in return the latter turned over the rent to the tenants. The Murasu themselves gen­ erally sublet the land to farmers, and this explains the large number of farming contracts found in the archives. Some of the parcels exploited in this system are identified as "royal lands," as well as 'royal gifts' (nidintu sarri) — which benefited highly placed per­ sons (primarily members of the court and Iranians). Well-known people are found among them, including Parysatis and Prince Arsama (satrap of Egypt), as well as many other important persons, some of them known from Ctesias. Also among the tenants were members of the hatru (military and nonmilitary), who also utilized the services of the Murasu, whether as land managers or moneylenders. The debts incurred were cal­ culated not on the plot itself—which, though it could be transferred by inheritance, re­ mained inalienable —but on future harvests. The Murasu thus played a very important role: both they and the tenants had a mutual interest in increasing the yield of the land. Furthermore, they sold the produce of the farms, which was perishable, on the open market, allowing the tenants to pay their interest in silver, without having to bother themselves with carrying out a difficult transaction. BeUunu One of the notables of the period is a Babylonian, Belsunu, who is known from a se­ ries of tablets gathered into an "archive" that was deposited under one of the citadels of Babylon (the Kasr); the archive dates from 438 to 400. He was a son of Bel-usursu and was called "governor (pikatu) of Babylon" between 421 and 414. The title is not the same as what we call satrap; in Babylon, the satrap was the Persian Gubaru/Gobryas, who is attested until 417. Belsunu was thus one of the satrap's subordinates (a Greek au­ thor, probably referring to him, calls him hyparchos). Then, between 407 and 401, his title was "governor of Ebir Nari," which the Greek authors transcribe as "satrap of Syria." In all probability, then, we can identify him with the Belesys whom Xenophon calls "sa­ trap of Syria" during Cyrus the Younger's offensive against his brother Artaxerxes II in 401 (Anab. 1.4.10; cf. Diodorus XIV.20.5). Perhaps this Babylonian's new title was the re­ ward that Darius II gave him for his aid. The tablets provide very important information on the role and possible activities of Belsunu. One of them, dated around 416-415, is particularly interesting (TBER, AO 2569):

[broken lines .

. .] we displayed(?) the stolen property (?) [ . . . ] [ . . . Ea-iddin, Marduk-z]er-li-

sir, a n d Bel-lcimur, the a c c o u n t a n t s of the t e m p l e o f Uras a n d ( ? ) . . . , son] of S i h a ( ? ) , dis­ covered the stolen property that h a d b e e n carried off by(?) Bel-ittannu, [son o f B u l l u t u , a n d ] his son [Bel]-usursu a n d Uras-nasir, son of N i d i n t u , in D i l b a t [in their h o u s e s ( ? ) ] , (seized(?)) it, a n d p u t it u n d e r seal in the treasury of (the g o d ) Uras, a n d [. . . ] . T h e y held Bel-ittannu, son o f B u l l u t u , a n d his s o n Bel-usursu in d e t e n t i o n ( ? ) in Dilbat, a n d they p u t their h o u s e s u n d e r seal. [Uras-nasir a n d (?). . . ( ? ) ] their [. . . ] e s c a p e d a n d { c a m e } to Baby­ lon, to B e l s u n u , the [governor of B a b y l o n ] . T h e n Marduk-zer-lisir a n d B e l - l u m u r [. . . ] dis­ played to the a s s e m b l y of E s a g i l [the stolen g o o d s that] they h a d seized in their [. . .] a n d h a d [...] a n d [ p u t u n d e r seal(?)] in the treasury of Uras. S u b s e q u e n t l y , the [assembly(?)] a d ­ dressed { B e l s u n u } , governor o f B a b y l o n , as follows: "Uras-nasir, w h o [. . .] the stolen g o o d s [•..] a n d then e s c a p e d from D i l b a t a n d c a m e to you [. . .]." Uras-nasir a n d [.. .] to the as­ sembly of Esagil [. . . Uras]-nasir, ( a n d ) a l o n g with h i m ( ? ) the g o o d s that(?) he carried off [•..] year 8 o f D a r [ i u s . . . ] they interrogated [. . .] sw[ore(?) a n oath] by the iron d a g [ g e r ( ? )

Chapter 14. From Artaxerxes I to the Death of Darius II

602

.. ] [Ea-iddin, Marduk-zer-llsir, and] Bel-lGmur, accountants and [overseers] [of the temple of Uras] . . . to Dilbat, to Uras-nasir, [son of Nidintu(?),] [Bel-ittan]nu, son of Bullutu and his son, Bel-usursu [ . . . ] . . . investigate and in lieu of [...] that was given to the estate of Uras [. . .] in year 2 of King Darius. Ea-iddin, Marduk-z[er-lisir (...)] [and Bel]-lumur, the accountants and overseers of the temple of Uras [and?] the accountants and overseers, and the collegium of the temple [.. .], [...] with the concurrence of the assembly of Esagil . . . [ . . . ] . . . of Uras-[nasir . . .] Bel-usursu, son [ of . . . ] [ . . . remainder broken . . .]. (trans. M. Stolper) In summary: a theft took place in the sanctuary of the god Uras at Dilbat. The thieves were captured, and the recovered stolen goods were put under seal in the god's treasury. One of the thieves went to find Belsunu, the "governor of Babylon." At the same time, the sanctuary treasurers sent the case to the assembly of the Esagila in Babylon, which in turn applied to Belsunu to turn over the miscreant. The guilty parties were sentenced to repay the treasury of Uras out of their own funds. T h e text throws some light on a city, Dilbat, that is relatively little known at this period, and on the continuity of administra­ tive practices from the time of Cyrus and Cambyses on, particularly the role of the "civic" assembly of the Esagila and its relationship with the governor. It also illustrates the length of the process, since apparently four years elapsed between the event and the punishment of the criminals. In parallel with his public activities, Belsunu actively pursued business in the private sector, which was reminiscent of what the Murasu had done previously. Not only was he actively involved with his land, which he possessed as a 'royal gift' (nidintu sarri), but he also worked other land of the same type, which generally belonged to people with Ira­ nian names. Belsunu's integration into Babylonian society is also well illustrated by another tablet (that does not mention his title): a subordinate/servant of Belsunu is di­ rected by his master to ensure regular offerings in honor of the gods Zababa and Ninurta throughout the twelve months of year 5 of Artaxerxes II (TCL 13.204).

Darius II in Egypt Turning to Egypt, we note that the epigraphic evidence is not comparable in extent to that known from the reigns of Cambyses, Darius, and Xerxes. The latest inscriptions from the Wadi Hammamat and the latest inscribed vessels date to the reign of Artaxerxes I (Posener nos. 33, 78-82; A'Orsk). But, paradoxically, numerous Aramaic documents date to the tenure of Arsama in the time of Darius II, and they allow us to reconstruct as faithfully as possible the various levels of Persian officials in Egypt, the system of soldiercolonists, and the management of royal property (see chap. 11/7). A few isolated bits of evidence also attest to the "presence" of Darius II in the country. First, there is the car­ touche of Darius II that appears in the temple of El-Kharga, as if he wished to take credit for the policy of his distinguished predecessor. It also seems that the sanctuary of Horus at Edfu benefited from major land grants. A seal found at Memphis appears to be carved with the name of Darius (II), showing a Royal Hero triumphing over two sphinxes (SD a). We may stress, finally, that the Aramaic version of the Behistun inscription and part of the Naqs-i Rustam inscription were written on the back of a papyrus that can be dated with certainty to Darius II (before 418). We cannot be sure that this was an expres­ sion of the royal desire to disseminate anew the deeds of his ancestor to make a political connection; perhaps instead the papyrus was only a schoolboy exercise. If this is the case, the document shows even more eloquently the practical ways and means through which diffusion of Achaemenid monarchic ideology took place among the children of 2

The Great King in His Countries

603

the Judeo-Aramean colonists of Elephantine. It would be very risky to conclude, as sometimes happens, that the gaps in the evidence mechanically represent the central authority's lack of interest in a province whose intrinsic importance had not diminished. Putting it together, the existing evidence instead suggests that there were no noteworthy changes in royal policy during the fifth century, after the reconquest by Artaxerxes I.

The Persian Authorities Confront Jews and Egyptians in Elephantine We learn a bit more about one particular point from an Aramaic dossier from Ele­ phantine. In year 14 of King Darius (410), the Jews of Elephantine, during the satrap Arsama's absence in Babylonia, sent a complaint to Memphis regarding both the Egyp­ tians and the governor of Syene, Widranga (DAE 101 [AP 27*]). They state that the ad­ ministrators of the sanctuary of Khnum had made an agreement with Widranga, to whom "they gave money and valuables." As a result, the Egyptians "will not allow [the Jews] to bring meal-offering and incense and sacrifice to offer there to Ya'u the God of heaven . . . but they made there a fire(?) and the rest of the fittings they took for them­ selves, all of it"; in short, "they destroyed the altar house." The Jews thus asked to have the sanctuary rebuilt in its prior location. To underline the illegality of the Egyptians and Widranga conniving together, the Jews also state that their enemies had raided royal property, since they destroyed "part of the king's stores which is in the fortress of Yeb,. . . and they built a wall in the midst of the fortress of Yeb." Finally, they stopped up a well that had supplied the garrison whenever the troops were assembled there (hndyz). Widranga's accountability was fully established: according to the Jews, it was he who ordered the destruction of Yaho's sanctuary at the request of the priests of Khnum. In or­ der to accomplish this, he sent a letter to his son Nafaina, who had succeeded him as head of the garrison (rab hayld) at Syene-the-Fortress. Nafaina led a troop of Egyptians "with the other forces" and proceeded to destroy the temple totally and seized the sacred vessels (DAE 102 [AP 30]). As a result, the Jews requested the opening of an "inquiry. . . by the judges, police, and informers who are set over the guard of the southern District" (DAE 101 [AP 27]). At the same time, the Jews sent a complaint to the Jerusalem authorities, namely, "to Johanan the high priest and his colleagues the priests who are in Jerusalem, and to Ostanes the brother of Anani, and the nobles of the Jews." The letter went unanswered (DAE 102 [AP 30] lines 17-18*). Threejears later, in 407, they turned to both Bagohi, "governor of Judah," and "Dalaiah and Selemiah the sons of Sanballat governor of Sa­ maria." They remind the governors that the Jewish community had been in mourning for three years and specify that they had made "neither offering, nor incense, nor holo­ caust" in the sanctuary. They implore Bagohi to intervene with "his friends in Egypt" to give them permission to rebuild their temple. The dual approach to Bagohi and Samari­ tan authorities associated with Arsama (who had meanwhile returned to Egypt; D A E 103 [AP 32]) finally got results. The satrap made a decision that provided for terms under which the temple could be rebuilt "as it was built before." On the other hand, though the incense and the offering could be carried out normally, this was not the case for the holocausts of rams, oxen, and goats." The Jews agreed to give some money and 1,000 ardabs of barley to the house of Arsama (DAE 104 [AP 33]). The matter presents formidable interpretive problems. We must first pay attention to the makeup of the available material. We have the details only from the Jews them­ selves—that is, from the arguments they presented to the authorities. The materials are

604

Chapter 14. From Artaxerxes I to the Death of Darius II

necessarily incomplete and undoubtedly biased. The Jews continually contrast their loyal behavior with the Egyptians' felonious behavior: "We are free from blame, and any­ thing harmful of this kind has not been found in us" (DAE 101 [AP 27] lines 14-15*). That is, the Jews state that they are not rebels, in contrast to various groups of the Egyp­ tians (lines 1-2). But the modern historian cannot take an advocate's arguments as a court clerk's record. The Jews also accuse the Egyptians of buying off Widranga. Though it is true that the Classical texts refer to the king's condemnations of judges who em­ bezzle, we must also remember that the payment of baksheesh was ubiquitous in Egypt and Babylonia. In this case, the Jews themselves made major gifts to the house of Arsama to thank him for his services. Finally, the very nature of the documentation (letters and memoranda) does not clarify episodes for which we would like to have more informa­ tion. In their 407 petition to Jerusalem and Samaria, the Jews say of Widranga: "The dogs tore off the anklet from his legs, and all the riches he had gained were destroyed, and all the men who had sought to do evil to that temple, all of them, were killed and we saw (our desire) upon them" (DAE 102 [AP 30] lines 15-16*). Despite some uncertain points of reading and translation, it thus seems that Widranga and the temple's vandalizers received serious punishment. But we do not know who punished them or why, espe­ cially since Widranga seems to reappear, complete with the title "commander of the garrison," in one or possibly two documents dated 398. What emerges clearly is that during these years a conflict broke out between the lead­ ers of the Jewish community of Elephantine and the leaders of the temple of Khnum. But why? Another document, unfortunately fragmentary, refers to a visit to Memphis. It alludes to troubles at Thebes: the Jews "fear robbery," and investigators are accused of taking bribes from the Egyptians (DAE 97 [AP 27]). In another text, a Jew complains that Widranga, now commander of the garrison at Syene, imprisoned him at Abydos "because of a precious(?) stone which they found stolen in the hand(s) of the dealers" (DAE 98 [AP 38*). But these isolated and fragmentary data are difficult to interpret and to connect to the events at Syene-Elephantine. Let us linger especially on this impris­ oned Jew's complaint to his colleagues at Elephantine: "It is known by you that Khnum is against us from the time that Hanani was in Egypt till now." Was this a religious con­ flict? Did the destruction of the temple and the Jews' houses (DAE 100 [AP 34]) mean that Widranga and the Egyptians shared anti-Jewish sentiments? Hypotheses such as these seem difficult to sustain. Although Widranga was able to demonstrate a certain amount of devotion to Egyptian gods, for reasons shared with high Persian officers of the satrapy from Darius on, there is nothing to indicate that he was so Egyptianized that he sided with the priests of Khnum for purely religious reasons. We would do well now to return to basics. As governor, Widranga had to adjudicate a dispute that had arisen between the representatives of the Jewish community and the administrators of the temple of Khnum. There must have been a trial, after which Na­ faina, acting in his official capacity, was required to carry out the sentence pronounced by his father, who also was acting in his official capacity. What was the purpose of the litigation? Several earlier documents show that judges often had to make decisions re­ garding property disputes, and a number of these disputes involved land adjacent to the sanctuaries of Yaho and Khnum (DAE 32-36 [AP 5, 6, 8, 9, 13]). The Jewish sanctuary in fact abutted Khnum's estate. It appears that the litigation between the two sanctuaries pertained purely to property, since the new buildings put up by the priests of Khnum

The Great King in His Countries

605

were encroaching on some royal properties (granary and a well) as well as on Yaho's es­ tate. When it proved impossible for the two sides to arrive at a compromise, they submit­ ted the matter to the governor for arbitration. As any other judge, Widranga would have referred to the corpus of local jurispru­ dence that Darius had ordered collected more than a century earlier. If we concede the relationship between this book of jurisprudence and Egyptian customary law of the Hel­ lenistic period, we may stress that a very important part of the latter is devoted to con­ flicts relating to land ownership. One section is expressly dedicated to cases involving buildings erected on land that is later on claimed by someone else. Without being able to prove it completely, we can imagine that the Egyptians claimed to be the actual (be­ cause they were the first) owners of the parcel on which the temple of Yaho had been built. This theory is partially confirmed by the Jews themselves. In one of their petitions, they in fact provide one component of a rebuttal. Looking back on the destruction of their sanctuaries, they state: Already in the days of the kings of Egypt our fathers had built that temple in the fortress of Yeb, and when Cambyses came into Egypt he found that temple built, and the temples of the gods of Egypt all of them they overthrew, but no one did any harm to that temple. (DAE ]02 [AP30] lines 12-13*) Because it is included in a petition that was intended to plead their cause to recognized authorities (Judahite and Samaritan), the statement should be seen as an argument shaped by its administrative context. In this case, the Jews were trying to prove that the building of their temple had been authorized first of all by the Saite phaTaohs and later confirmed by Cambyses. We recognize this as a well-known form of legal defense: to val­ idate their rights, the managers of a temple (or a city) refer to prior privileges, of which the present authorities require them to furnish proof (cf. Tacitus, Annals III.61-63). We may recall the behavior of Tattenai at Jerusalem or even Darius's letter to Gadatas; in the first case, the Jews referred to Cyrus's edict; in the second, the authorities of the temple of Apollo recalled that their privileges went back to Darius's ancestors (cf. chap. 12/4). It is the same here: the Jewish leaders came before Widranga's tribunal because they faced adversaries who demanded the demolition of the temple of Yaho; they reminded the gov­ ernor that the existence of the temple had been officially confirmed by Cambyses. If the Jews lost the trial, it was very likely because, unlike the people of Jerusalem who ap­ pealed to Tattenai, they were unable to produce a written document. If Widranga de­ cided in favor of the Egyptians, it was perhaps quite simply because the documents they were able to produce were immeasurably superior to the Jews' purely oral statements. The decision and the rationale for it were as follows: the Jews were required to dismantle the temple, because the parcel was declared the property of Khnum. The episode is very instructive regarding the relationship between the administration and the various ethnocultural communities of the Empire and regarding the procedures that protected the rights of each of them. We do not know what grounds Arsama had for nullifying Widranga's decision, because we do not have the text of the satrap's deci­ sion—only an indirect and fragmentary citation (DAE 104 [AP 33]). But we must stress that in this case the Persian authorities of Syene and then Memphis had to choose be­ tween two rationales: one giving priority to a royal decision (Cambyses' decree), the other resting on recognizing the "law of the countries" (Egyptian jurisprudence).

606

Chapter 14. From Artaxerxes I to the Death of Darius II

The Great King in His Countries

607

Widranga opted for the latter, for reasons that probably had less to do with personal pref­ erence for the Egyptians and their gods than with the need to maintain order, which in an Egyptian context could only be achieved by conforming to Egyptian law.

A Business Letter We have an especially vivid illustration of everyday relations between Persians/Irani­ ans and other peoples living in Egypt in an undated Aramaic papyrus that retranscribes a letter sent by Spendadata, son of Fravartipata, to Hori and Petemehfl: To my brothers Hori and Petemehu, your brother Spentadata. May all the gods grant at all times the prosperity of my brothers! And now, I have a boat, common to me and to its owner, which is in your hands. Be advised that Armaidata will tell you that I have given him charge of the boat, and let him do whatever he wants. Also, give him my share of the rent of [this] boat [which is ours]. There is [a total] of 8 shekels, I gave [it] to [...] to give it [in exchange] for grain to bring to me. And there is 1 karsh 8 shekels of silver that I gave you to buy wheat for Yatma. Total of money: 1 karsh, 8 shekels. If you bought grain with this amount and brought it into your houses, good! If not, give the money to Armaidata. He will bring it to us. And if [this] grain remains available to vou, tell Armaidata and give it to him in such a way that he can sell it. (DAE 109) The transaction seems fairly simple: two Iranians or Persians got together to buy and transport wheat, which they intended to sell; it seems that a third person, Yatma (an Ara­ maic name) also contributed money to the deal. The two sailors are Egyptians, as in ev­ ery other known case. Many details escape us. Nonetheless, the text has the advantage of providing concrete information on the commercial activities of two Persians/Iranians, who no doubt held important posts at Elephantine, and on their relations with two Egyp­ tians. The document allows us to see that the Persians of Egypt, following the pattern of the Persians of Babylonia, had no problem thoroughly integrating themselves in the commercial environment and profiting from it. Perhaps the wheat was partly intended to feed the garrison reserves?

The Great King in Sidon and Elephantine Sometimes only the iconography makes it possible to identify the Persian presence in one region or another, especially in regions where other sources are silent during the time of Artaxerxes I and Darius II. This is the case for Sidon. On the city's earliest coins, which date to the third quarter of the fifth century, the Great King is depicted in various poses (fig. 50a-b). Some show a Sidonian ship on the obverse, sometimes moored at the foot of fortifications; the reverse shows the following scene: "The king of Persia standing in his chariot drawn by four horses galloping to the left; he is capped with the fivepointed kidaris and dressed in a candys; he raises and extends the right hand; the chario­ teer is in the chariot beside the king holding the reins in both hands. Beneath the horses, the carcass of an ibex" (Babelon II.2, no. 889; cf. nos. 890,892-93,895). On other coins, two lions, on the obverse, spring backward, and a ship is moored at the base of the for­ tress; on the reverse: "The king of Persia standing battling a lion; he is capped with the crenellated kidaris and dressed in the kandys; in his right hand he brandishes the short sword [akinakes]; in his left hand he holds a lion by the mane, his arm straining; the lion is rearing in front of him on his two hind legs. Empty square" (nos. 891, 894, 896). On still others, he is shown standing, drawing a bow, opposite a liead-and-neck view ibex (no. 897), or, half-kneeling, holding a spear in his right hand and a bow in his left (no. 898).

608

Chapter 14. From Artaxerxes I to the Death of Darius H

These scenes correspond quite closely to nearly identical depictions in court art (Royal Hero confronting a lion) or on seals (king in his chariot) and coins (king as archer and lancer; cf. chap. 6). The iconographic influence also shows up in reverse—if we may put it that way: a seal on some Treasury tablets (PTS no. 32) shows a ship very much like those found on Sidonian coins (fig. 50f). This specific example indicates that the iconography of Sidonian coins spread into other regions. To remain within the period we are considering here, we may note in particular that the Sidonian types were copied at Elephantine with, on the obverse, a Sidonian ship (and the name Syene in Aramaic: swyn), and on the reverse, the Royal Hero fighting the lion, with a cock poised between them. We also know of Elephantine imitations of Milesian coins with a Persian archer on the reverse. The Sidonian types are also found in Samaria (fig. 50d-e). There is no doubt that the kings of Sidon deliberately copied motifs from the Achae­ menid iconongraphic repertoire when they had coins struck. There is no room for un­ certainty about the political significance. Sidonian coinage is in fact entirely unique; in the other Phoenician cities, the coins from this time show nothing but local symbols. The iconographic distinctiveness expresses the special place held by Sidon within the (very poorly known) organization of Phoenicia at this time. It certainly reflects an older heritage, since the inscription on Esmunazar's sarcophagus shows that there were close connections between the Great King and the city (see chap. 12/3). The presence of the king of Sidon beside Conon before, during, and after the battle of Cnidos at the begin­ ning of the fourth century further demonstrates that since the time of Cambyses the Si­ donian navy had maintained a prime position in the Great King's strategic thinking (Diodorus XIV.79.8; Hell. Oxyr. 9.2). We may stress that seals with royal Achaemenid im­ ages have also been found in the territory of Dor, which had previously been given to Esmunazzar. Meanwhile, it must be emphasized that the interpretation related above always raises doubts because of debates about the identfication of the person standing in the chariot: some authors suggest that it is Baal of the city rather than the Great King. Even though this is the minority opinion (and probably unsupportable), we must stress that the argu­ ments brought up on this topic are very similar to the arguments put forward on the po­ litical significance of the scenes on a Sidonian sarcophagus known as the sarcophagus of the satrap, which dates to approximately the same period (late fifth, early fourth cen­ tury). Is the person on the throne (fig. 50h) the satrap (or even the Great King himself) or the king of Sidon, portrayed in the image of the Great King? Or to put the problem another way: in the absence of any written evidence, does iconographic evidence permit us to establish the nature of political relationships that existed between the local dynasts and the Achaemenid authorities?

The Lycian Case The same question underlies every discussion of the political significance of the Ly­ cian texts from the end of the fifth century. Although they are only partially deciphered, the Lycian inscriptions of the Xanthus Pillar (which was created at the beginning of the fourth century) reveal familiar names like Amorges, Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, lasus, Caunus, Darius II, and Artaxerxes II. Despite much obscurity regarding the details, there is hardly any doubt that the inscriptions refer to events that took place in Lycia and southwestern Asia Minor during the Ionian War; they also provide evidence of the in-

The Great King in His Countries

609

volvement of the dynast of Xanthus, who at the time was Gergis/Kheriga, son of Harpagus. The dynast probably aided Tissaphernes, specifically by supplying triremes for the battle in 412 in which the satrap opposed the Persian traitor Amorges, who had taken ref­ uge in lasus (Thucydides VIII.28.2-4). Furthermore, evidence of Tissaphernes' activity in the region is provided(?) by a coin that bears his name in Lycian (partly restored) and that also bears the name Xanthus (Arnna), though it is difficult to decide whether it dates to the period before or after Cyrus's arrival in Asia Minor, since this event restricted Tis­ saphernes' authority to Caria, under the supreme command of Darius's younger son. Unfortunately, this numismatic evidence does not permit us to describe the relationship between Tissaphernes and the Lycian dynasts—particularly the dynast of Xanthus — with complete certainty. The analysis of the relationship between the satrap and Xan­ thus depends fundamentally on the interpretation placed on the "portraits" on certain coins struck at Xanthus by the dynasts. The thesis of relatively strict Persian control is derived from another thesis that sees the coin-portraits as representing the satrap him­ self; but however appealing this interpretation may be, it has not been unanimously ncceptecl. The ambiguity of the Lycian evidence is constant. The available evidence reveals clear, growing Greek cultural influence at the Xanthus dynastic court. This holds for the dynastic coinage, and it holds also for a Greek epigram that exalts the military excel­ lence of Gergis, son of Harpagus. It holds even more for the poem of Arbinas, which was written at the beginning of the next century by the Greek diviner Symmachus of Pellana. Symmachus may have arrived at Caunus with the Peloponnesian navy around 412, before entering the service of Gergis and, later, his son Arbinas. The subject of the po­ ems is purely domestic, we might say, since they transmit for posterity the victories won by the dynasts of Xanthus over their relatives and neighbors and celebrate the rebuilding of a Xanthian princedom that extended through the valley of the Xanthus. There is no trace in all of this of specifically imperial interests. The composition suggests that the do­ mestic life of Lycia went on under Persian dominion as if nothing had happened. But it is a good idea to provide a more nuanced perspective. When Arbinas cele­ brated his own and his father's virtues, he had no reason to refer to the Persian political presence; this is in sharp contrast to the Lycian Chronicle (Pillar Inscription). But the two propositions should not be set sharply in opposition to one another: the Persians ap­ parently did not interfere in purely domestic dynastic matters, as long as the victorious dynast did not challenge his submission to the Great King. Even in the cultural realm, increasing Greek influence need not be interpreted as marking the increasing auton­ omy of the Xanthian dynasts. On the contrary, their continued dependence on Persia is illustrated, for example, by one of the poems celebrating the victories of Arbinas: "Arbi­ nas is distinguished over all in all human knowledge, archery, warriorhood, and expert horsemanship." One is immediately reminded of the royal virtues as presented by Da­ rius: the good warrior and the good horseman. Of course, Symmachus, the author of the elegy, certainly did not slavishly copy the Naqs-i Rustam inscription (or some copy that might have circulated in one form or another). Let us say rather that the vocabulary used also reveals, in Greek garb, the stamp of the aristocratic Persian ethic that had been present in Lycia since the beginning of the fifth century (chap. 12/5 end). In order to es­ tablish their legitimacy, the Xanthian dynasts borrowed their literary themes and icono­ graphic repertoire from both Iran and Greece, in equal measure. In short, this sort of

610

Chapter 14. From Artaxerxes I to the Death of Darius II

evidence does not allow the historian either to assert or to exclude the influence of the Achaemenid authorities in Lycia in the last decades of the fifth century. The only texts that provide information about this are naturally those that belong to the narrative genre (Thucydides, Pillar inscription). They suggest that when external danger loomed, the Lycian dynasts were included in Persian planning, and, simultaneously, that the Lycians might have been able to profit from this, achieving their own goals.

The Cilician Case In other regions, we have only very difficult fragmentary, heterogeneous, and poorly dated evidence. This remark is particularly true of Cilicia, a region that we have every reason to believe continued to play the military role it had always had throughout Achaemenid history. We have no specific example at this date, but an episode in the Cypriot War, a few decades later, removes any doubt about this point (Diodorus XV. 3.13). After Xenagoras's appointment by Xerxes in 479 (Herodotus IX. 107), the documenta­ tion is singularly lacking. Not until the campaign of Cyrus the Younger do we have ac­ cess to any information. Cyrus was joined at Caystru-pedion by Kpyaxa, "the wife of Syennesis, the king of the Cilicians" (Xenophon, Anab. I.2.12*). The Cilician dynast himself refused to defend the Cilician Gates (1.2.21) and fell back to Tarsus, where his palace was located (1.2.23). According to Xenophon, he made an agreement with Cyrus in which he gave great sums of money to him in return for the promise that his territory (khora) would not be ravaged by Cyrus's troops (1.2.27). Ctesias's and Diodorus's passing references are not particularly explicit on the nature of the syennesis's power and his re­ lations with the Persians, other than that in principle he owed respect to the Great King. We have long known of series of Cilician coins that traditionally have been viewed as dynastic coinage, even though they bear no name other than that of their place of issue, usually Tarsus (fig. 51). A person believed to be the dynast is depicted on his horse, often holding two spears and wearing a bashlyk. The reverse is most often decorated with the image of a Greek hoplile in combat (Babelon nos. 504-20). One series dated (hypothetically) to the last decades of the fifth century always has the mounted dynast on the ob­ verse, but on the reverse we see royal images, described thus: "The king of Persia as archer on one knee facing right and drawing the bow; he is bearded, bare-headed, dressed in the pleated candys gathered at the waist; his quiver full of arrows is on his back; in the field at left the handled cross" (Babelon no. 521; cf. nos. 522-25; fig. 51 here). On several other coins, two royal figures are depicted: "Two kings of Persia, stand­ ing facing each other; both are bearded and dressed in the candys; each rests on his spear with both hands; they have the bow and quiver on their back . . . " (no. 526; cf. no. 527). On three other examples, the royal images occupy front and back; on the obverse, the Royal Hero battles the lion, seizing him by the mane with his right hand and plunging his short sword into the lion's flank with his left hand (no. 528; cf. nos. 529-30); on the reverse, the standing king leans on his spear. The Cilician mint is marked by the pres­ ence of the cross with handle, which the king holds in his left hand on the later coins, and by the inscription "Tarsus" in Aramaic (in Aramaic and Greek on some examples; nos. 528-30). Because of ongoing chronological uncertainties, it is difficult to come to firm conclu­ sions on the basis of this numismatic evidence. Nonetheless, two noteworthy observa­ tions may be made: on the one hand, royal images were diffused throughout various

The Great King in His Countries

611

Fig. 51. Dynastic(?) coinage from Cilicia. parrs of lire Empire, from Sidon to Cilicia, and this diffusion was achieved in a privi­ leged way by means of coins and seals; on the other, the frequent connection, on ob­ verse and reverse, of the images of the dynast and the king (or Royal Hero) was an association that had obvious political significance but that informs us only imperfectly about the relationship between the two.

The Persians and the Kings of Cyprus Located a stone's throw or two from the Cilician coast— from which the Persians kept an eve on it—Cyprus remained in the Achaemenid sphere of influence. We learn from Isocrates (Evag. 18-20) that a man of Tyrian origin (who was probably a Phoenician from Cyprus) deposed the king of Salamis and seized power shortly after 450. In his ea­ gerness to promote the militant Hellenism of his hero Evagoras, Isocrates gives the im­ pression that Salamis and the other cities previously had never been subject to the Persians. He writes, in fact, that the new master hastened to "deliver the town to the bar­ barians and to subject the island to the slavery of the Great King." Actually, the Cypriot cities appear never to have left Persian dominion after the the Ionian Revolt was quashed (cf. Diodorus XII.3.2; 4.2). Around 415, another "Tyrian" named Abdemon came to power in the city, probably by renewing his allegiance to Darius II, since Dio­ dorus considered him "a Friend of the King of the Persians" (XIV.98.1-**). He tried to kill Evagoras, whom Isocrates presents as the legitimate descendant of the Teucrid dynasty. Evagoras sought refuge at Soloi in Cilicia. There he recruited a small force, left for Cy­ prus, and managed to drive out Abdemon (Diodorus XIV.98.1; Isocrates, Evag. 26-32). Contrary to what Isocrates says, the new king of Salamis did not immediately try to rebel; we even find Evagoras acting as mediator between Tissaphernes and Athens in 410, which implies that he had good relations with the satrap. During this period, his status is exactly what we can draw from Diodorus's subsequent discussion: he was the sole ruler of Salamis and had to pay tribute to the Great King, who granted him the royal of­ fice at Salamis (XV.8.2-3). This was clearly true for other petty kings of Cyprus as well, such as the case of that Agyris whom Diodorus some years later presents as an ally (symmakhos) of the Persians (XV.98.2). Obviously, viewed from the heartland, the convul­ sions that Cyprus was suffering were considered purely local affairs that did not affect the facts of Persian power over Cyprus. As in the previous period, the Persians unthinkingly continued to rely on the populations of Phoenician origin, pitting them against the Greek communities on the island.

Chapter 15

Artaxerxes II (405/404-359/358) and Artaxerxes III (359/358-338) 1. The Reign of Artaxerxes II: Sources and Problems

The Greek Authors' View The accession of Artaxerxes at Darius II's death inaugurated the longest reign in Achaemenid history. Once again, it is up to the historian at the outset to stress the gaps and serious distortions in the evidence, which first and foremost bears the stamp of the dominant position held by the Classical sources, which quite naturally pay dispropor­ tionate attention to affairs on the western front. Fortunately, Cyrus the Younger's recruit­ ment of Greek mercenaries provides us with many descriptions of his rebellion until his death in the battle of Cunaxa (404-401). We might speculate, however, that the young prince had been on the offensive since Bactra —the silence regarding matters on the Ira­ nian Plateau (aside from fleeting allusions to raising troops) being especially significant. In this earlier case, of course, Cyrus would not have been able to recruit Greek merce­ naries, with the result that all we have on these events are a few scattered sentences, sim­ ilar to Plutarch's comments on Ariaramnes' "rebellion" against Xerxes (see chap. 13/2). The Classical authors are much less loquacious on the next forty years—that is, on virtually the entire reign of Artaxerxes. We have a few narrative sources, but none of them really answers either the questions or the needs of the historian of the Achaemenid Em­ pire. In the Hellenica, Xenophon continues his history of relationships among the Greek cities until 362-361. Because of Xenophon as well as the anonymous author of the Hel­ lenica of Oxyrhynchus, we are informed about the Greco-Persian conflicts in western Asia Minor and the Great King's increasing role in Greek affairs. On the other hand, Xenophon is no more truly interested in the internal life of the Empire than his prede­ cessors. Diodorus's very limited discussions of these same Greco-Persian matters proba­ bly come from Ephorus, all of them stamped with the theme of the political and military weakness of the Great Kings. Ctesias's work, again in the same vein, covers events down to 382. Dinon, another author of a Persica, is "a historian in whose account of Persian af­ fairs we have the most confidence," according to C . Nepos, who wrote a Life of Datames (Conon 5.4*); but Dinon is scarcely known and then only from fragments, which give the impression that he was particularly interested in court protocols. We know that Cte­ sias also inspired Aelian, many of whose stories take place in the Persia of Artaxerxes II. Plutarch turned to Ctesias, Dinon, Xenophon, and a few others when he wrote his Life of Artaxerxes, the only biography of a Great King that has reached us. Twelve of its thirty chapters are devoted to relations between the king and Cyrus the Younger ($$213) and five to the succession of Artaxerxes II ($$26-30). Diplomatic and military mat­ ters do not receive much attention: he only writes about relations with the Spartans 612

The Reign of Artaxerxes U: Sources and Problems

613

(§§20-22) and an expedition against the Cadusians (§§24-25) and makes a very fleeting allusion to an Egyptian campaign (§§24.1). The composition is basically structured iround court personalities and affairs and one person in particular, Parysatis. She gave Cyrus her unconditional support—hence the chapters devoted to the savage revenge carried out against those who opposed her favorite son, especially those who boasted of killing him on the battlefield (§§14-17). At the same time, she used her influence to ease the imprisonment of Clearchus (§18). Stateira soon became the target of Parysatis's vengeful wrath, and she died, poisoned by her mother-in-law (§19). Plutarch was also greatly interested in personal affairs, including Artaxerxes' marriage to his daughter Atossa (§23) and conflict with his oldest son, Darius, regarding Aspasia, Cyrus's former companion (§§26-27.1-5). The Achaemenid court as seen by Plutarch (and Ctesias) was dominated by the per­ sonalities of two exceptional women, Stateira and Parysatis, whose hatred for each other continually smoldered. Parysatis "detested her [Stateira] more than any other person, and because she wished to have no one so powerful as herself" (§ 17.4*). After the elimi­ nation of her daughter-in-law, her political influence, which had been far from negli­ gible, grew considerably: "She obtained great power with him [Artaxerxes], and was gratified in all her requests," and she was quick to use her influence to grant prerogatives to those who loved the king and his daughter Atossa (§23.1-5-0-). The king's anger after the murder of Stateira did not last; after he exiled Parysatis to Babylon (§ 19.10), he "was reconciled to her, and sent for her, being assured that she had wisdom and courage fit for royal power" (§23.2-0-). Another woman, the king's daughter-wife Atossa, seems to have been motivated by a feverish lust for power: Plutarch reports that she supported Ochus more than her other brothers, and she had an affair with him (§26.2-3). Her am­ bition grew still higher after the execution of the oldest son, Darius, who had spun a plot against his father because he had stolen Aspasia away from him (§§26-27). Ochus was thereafter "high in his hopes, being confident in the influence of Atossa" (§30.1-0). Throughout the biography of Artaxerxes, the Persian court appears to be consumed by the hateful and cruel ambitions of the women, by the conspiracies of eunuchs and cour­ tesans, by assassinations and executions that piled horror on horror, by general recrimi­ nations, and by wearisome amorous intrigues. It is thus easy to understand the narrative's disastrous end, coming after the tale of the suicide of one of Artaxerxes' sons and the murder of Arsames by his brother, Ochus: "When [Artaxerxes] heard of the fate of Ar­ sames, he could not sustain it at all, but sinking at once under the weight of his grief and distress, expired" (§30.9-0-). The reign of Artaxerxes was also the heyday of an Athenian orator, Isocrates, another of those largely responsible for the idea of "Persian decadence." Isocrates was a cham­ pion of Pan-Hellenism and the war against Persia, and he never ceased urging the Greeks to mount an assault on the Empire he described as decaying. This is especially clear in the Panegyricus, which was written at the end of the 380s: if it is to be believed, the Persians no longer controlled a single western land, from the Straits to Egypt. Like many others —especially Xenophon in book VIII of the Cyropedia — the Athenian orator found reason for hope in the expedition of the Ten Thousand (a phrase only later ap­ plied to Cyrus's Greek mercenaries); the expedition is offered as absolute proof of the Persians' inability to defend even the heart of their Empire. What is customarily called the great Satraps' Revolt" in the 360s has long seemed to confirm that Artaxerxes II

614

Chapter I5. Artaxerxes H and Artaxerxes HI

exercised nothing more than ficticious authority over provinces mangled by Greek as­ saults and the autonomous tendencies of the governors. We must emphasize once more: ideological decryption of the Classical texts does not by itself license a simplistic reconstruction that would be the exact mirror image of the Greek perspective. It is again appropriate, if we are to make full use of the texts, to ask them questions that go beyond the problem of Greco-Persian relations. In other words, if the Persian situation did seem to worsen, additional sources are needed to prove it. The situation is even more paradoxical because gaps in documentation from the center at the same time require the historian to use the Classical record itself to correct the very vision to which it gave rise. But, when all is said and done, the contradiction is only an illusion, due principally to the Greek authors themselves. A few chapters apart, Plutarch stresses both the Great King's military weakness (20.1-2) and then his eminent prowess as a warrior (24.9-10). The second of these passages derives directly from the royal pro­ paganda. It is thus the historian's duty to try to come to an understanding on the basis of highly ideologized texts that fluctuate between denigration and apologia. To put it an­ other way, the best we can do is to bring to light a few scattered shreds of historical reality.

The View from Susa, Babylon, and Persepolis The task is particularly delicate because, compared with the Classical sources, the sources from the center remain inadequate. They are not, however, totally absent. Once again, most of our information is on the king's activities as builder, clue to inscriptions found at several sites. At the same time, though the royal inscriptions maintain their nonnarrative character, they also exhibit noteworthy innovations that deserve special ex­ amination; for example, for the first time a Great King explicitly invokes the protection of Anahita and Mithra. Finally, it must be remembered that the Classical sources some­ times transmit (more or less precisely and adequately) documents and decrees that came from the royal bureaucracy. An example is the very important reference in Berossus to a royal order concerning the worship of Anahita in the various regions of the Empire, from Bactra to Sardis. Finally, Plutarch and his sources got wind of regulations and court histories that have made it possible for us to trace the organization of the central court (see chap. 7). It is also Plutarch who provides our only information about the royal inves­ titure ceremony at Pasargadae. The period of Artaxerxes II and his immediate successors is also clarified by the sometimes copious regional bodies of evidence, especially in Asia Minor and Judea-Samaria, but in Babylonia as well. There are even some tablets that offer the only echo, distant and faint though it is, of Cyrus's campaign against his brother, for Xenophon's Belesys can be none other than the Belsunu who is now well known from a group of Babylonian tablets. At the same time, allusions in other Babylonian documents reveal our ignorance. A tablet dated to year 38 of Artaxerxes refers to a battle won by "the king's troops" (ADRTB no. -366); another (no. -369), from the seventh month of the 36th year of the same king, mentions that Artaxerxes assembled his troops and left to fight in the territory of Razaunda, probably in Media. Together with some Classical texts that also mention, errati­ cally and incidentally, expeditions of Darius II and his successor in Media (Xenophon, Hell. 1.2.19) and among the Cadusians (II.1.13; Plutarch, Art. 24), these tablets contrib­ ute (albeit modestly) to restoring a breadth and depth to the imperial presence that the Greek tradition generally tends to efface from the memory of the reader. Paradoxically, the astronomical tablet that is (albeit modestly) one of the most informative, at least in

The War of the Two Brothers ( 4 0 4 - 4 0 J)

615

narrative terms, deals with affairs taking place on the western front, on the island of Cy­ prus (ADRTB no. 440)!

2. The War of the Two Brothers

(404-401)

From Darius II to Artaxerxes II In addition to illegitimate children born to his concubines (cf. Xenophon, Anab. II.4.25), Darius II had several sons from his marriage to Parysatis. The marriage was quite prolific, since according to Ctesias ($49), Darius and Parysatis had thirteen chil­ dren, most of whom died prematurely. A daughter (Amestris) and at least four sons sur­ vived: the oldest, Arses, who was born before 424; then Cyrus, Ostanes, and Oxathres (Plutarch, Arf. 1.2, Ctesias $49). "Now when Darius lay sick and suspected that the end of his life was near, he wished to have both his sons with him. The elder, as it chanced, was with him already; but Cyrus he summoned from the province over which he had made him satrap" (Xenophon, Anab. 1.1.1-2*). Cyrus came, accompanied by Tissa­ phernes and a troop of Greek mercenaries (1.1.2). Plutarch says that Cyrus was summoned by his mother, who favored him over his older brother (Art. 2.3-4). He also says that she tried to persuade her ill husband to choose Cyrus, using the same arguments that Herodotus attributes to Demaratus when Darius's succession was in question (VII.3). The explicit repetition of the motif is highly suspicious. It is unlikely that Darius II waited until the end of his life to decree the suc­ cession. Even though we are not able to determine the exact date, we must assume that the appointment of Arses as crown prince took place several years earlier. The exact rea­ sons for Darius's choice are not available to us, but it is likely that Arses' status as oldest weighed heavily in his favor. In any case, after his father's death, the oldest son seated himself on the throne and took the name Artaxerxes. At this time, he was inaugurated at Pasargadae, in a ceremony described for us only by Plutarch (Art. 3.1-2; chap. 13/2). One tradition states that Arses heard his father's last words on his deathbed (Athe­ naeus XII.548e). Of course, this scenario very much reminds us of the scene Xenophon depicts (imagines!) at the end of the Cyropaedia (VIII.7.5—28*): sensing his declining vigor, Cyrus summoned Cambyses, Tanaoxares [Bardiya], and the highest officials. Xe­ nophon wrote a long speech for the king, and at the end of this utterance he breathed his last. In the speech, he divides his powers between his two sons: the older, Cambyses, received the kingship, and the younger, an immense satrapal territory. Cyrus, who was fully aware of the potential dangers surrounding his succession, adjures his sons to live in harmony, especially impressing on the second-born the requirement "to let no one more readily than yourself yield obedience to your brother or more zealously support him." The tradition recorded by Athenaeus thus very likely represents a component of court propaganda that originally was intended to legitimate Artaxerxes II rather than Cyrus the Younger. Another tradition states that the real motive for summoning Cyrus was quite different from the motive that Plutarch reports. Cyrus was accused of executing two members of the royal family (Autoboisaces and Mitraeus) at Sardis (Xenophon, Hell. II. 1.8). Accord­ ing to this theory, he was summoned to answer for his actions. These data are both unverifiable and probable. There is in fact hardly any doubt that, while remaining completely loyal to his father, Cyrus garnered all the profit he possibly could from the very high position that Darius had awarded him at Sardis. A series of coins apparently

6)6

Chapter 15. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III

issued during this period is quite remarkable: they are Athenian "owls" (tetradrachms) overstruck with a portrait of a king, who surely must be Darius II. More interestingly, some individual examples bear a second portrait. This much smaller portrait has two characteristics: it does not wear the royal kidaris, and it is beardless. It is thus highly likely that it represents Cyrus. This definitely is not coinage of revolution—that is, these imitations of Athenian owls were without doubt struck at Sardis by the karanos to pay the wages of Peloponnesian military units. Nonetheless, they also demonstrate the very high opinion that Cyrus had of himself and of his own authority. According to Plutarch, it was shortly before Artaxerxes' investiture ceremony that Cyrus first overtly displayed his ambition. Tissaphernes relied on the testimony of the magus who had overseen the education of Cyrus and thus brought charges against him: "as though he had been about to lie in wait for the king in the temple, and to assault and assassinate him as he was putting off his garment [in order to don the robe of Cyrus the Elder]. Some affirm that he was apprehended upon this impeachment, others that he had entered the temple and was pointed out there, as he lay lurking by the priest." He was rescued from execution only by the immediate pleas of Parysatis: "Artaxerxes . . . sent him away again to the sea" (Art. 3.3—6-0-). The magus's accusations appear particu­ larly legitimate because he "was likely to be as much disappointed as any man that his pupil did not succeed to the throne" (Art. 3.3*). Even though this story gives the impres­ sion that Cyrus had other support at court besides his mother's (which can hardly be doubted), it remains hard to believe. It is hard to imagine a pretender to the throne de­ filing the sanctuary of Anahita. The story was doubtless invented later as a part of the royal propaganda that was designed to smear the memory of the rebellious brother. How­ ever, the existence of conflict at this time cannot be denied. Though Xenophon does not repeat the story presented by Plutarch, he reports that, after Artaxerxes' accesssion, Cyrus was (falsely) denounced by Tissaphernes and that he owed his survival, to the in­ tervention of his mother (Anab. 1.1.3).

Cyrus's Preparations and Artaxerxes' Response: From Memphis to Sardis After his brother was inaugurated, Cyrus returned to Sardis, which, "however, could no longer content him;. . . his resentment. . . made him more eagerly desirous of the kingdom than before" (Art. 3.6;* cf. Xenophon, Anab. 1.1.4). Tissaphernes, whom he (formerly) "considered a friend" (Anab. 1.1.2), was always at his side. Recent events had just proved to him that Tissaphernes in fact wanted only to get rid of him. At first, then, Cyrus considered it wise to act in great secrecy, "so that he might take the King as com­ pletely unprepared as possible" (Anab. 1.1.6*). He continued to correspond regularly with his brother (Anab. 1.1.8; Plutarch, Art. 4.3), and he entertained his envoys lavishly, hoping to entice them to his side (1.1.5). Additionally, he remitted the tribute to the court regularly (1.1.8). In order to amass troops, he entered into secret agreements with mercenary com­ manders who were his guests; he asked each one to keep his contingent ready and to re­ spond immediately to any summons that might be sent (1.1.6-11). At the same time, he parleyed with the Spartan authorities, reminding them of the services he had rendered them earlier during their fight against the Athenian districts in Asia Minor. Lacedaemon responded positively to his contact: it officially authorized Clearchus to place himself at the service of Persia (Art. 6.5) and ordered the head of the navy "to hold himself under

The War of the Two Brothers (404-401)

617

Cyrus' orders, in case he had any request to make" (Hell. III. 1.1*). It appears that the Lacedaemonian authorities were careful not to declare themselves too openly, prefer­ ring to await the outcome of the pending confrontation between the two brothers (Dio­ dorus XIV.21.1; cf. 11.2). Finally, both Diodorus (XIV.35.2) and Xenophon indicate that a large number of Greek cities defected to Cyrus, abandoning Tissaphernes, to whom they "had originally belonged . . . , by gift of the King" (Anab. 1.1.6-*). Cyrus immedi­ ately besieged Miletus when it refused to accept his authority (1.1.7). Cyrus came up with all sorts of excuses to justify his military preparations. First of all, he said that he was preparing to make war on Tissaphernes, who had exiled the opposi­ tion in order to hold onto Miletus (Anab. 1.1.7). This was the explanation that he gave two of the Greek mercenary commanders, "saying that he intended to make war upon Tissaphernes with the aid of the Milesian exiles" (1.1.11*). Next, when he gathered his troops at Sardis in the spring of 401, "the pretext he offered was that he wished to drive the Pisidians out of his land entirely" (1.2.1*). This ruse was intended for the Greek mer­ cenaries, who had no interest in marching against the Great King personally. It was also meant to allay the suspicion of the king's men. since expeditions against the Pisidians were becoming quite a routine affair. Tissaphernes was not taken in, since he "had taken note of these proceedings and come to the conclusion that Cyrus' preparations were too extensive to be against the Pisidians; he accordingly made his way to the King as quickly as he could, with about five hundred horsemen. And when the King heard from Tissa­ phernes about Cyrus' array, he set about making counterpreparations" (1.2.4-5*). This at any rate is Xenophon's summary version of Persian affairs in Asia Minor between 404 and 401. In Xenophon's reading, Artaxerxes possessed a strange blindness: "The King failed to perceive the plot against himself, but believed that Cyrus was spending money on his troops because he was at war with Tissaphernes. Consequently he was not at all dis­ pleased at their being at war" (1.1.8*). It is hard to believe, despite Plutarch (Art. 4.3), that the influence of Parysatis was sufficient to deceive Artaxerxes regarding Cyrus's true intentions. The comings and goings between Sardis and the central court imply that nu­ merous reports reached the Great King. It is true that Xenophon's remark could be ex­ plained by a royal policy that was intended to counterbalance one satrap's power with another's. But it is difficult to understand why Artaxerxes chose to support his brother, whose ambition had long been known to him —even though Cyrus was careful to send to the court "the tribute which came in from the cities he chanced to have that belonged to Tissaphernes" (1.1.8*). Nothing suggests that Artaxerxes ever replied favorably to Cyrus, who "urged . . . that these Ionian cities should be given to him instead of remain­ ing under the rule of Tissaphernes."* Instead, one gets the impression that these inter­ pretations are integrated a little too successfully into the tendentious portrait of the king found especially in the opening chapters of Plutarch, who delights in contrasting the ir­ resolute and dithering (mellesis) character of Artaxerxes (§4.4) with his brother's ener­ getic ambition (§6.1). The case of Orontas brings very different thoughts to mind. Here is how Cyrus him­ self later portrays this person, whom he is judging on grounds of treason in summer 401: Phis man was given me at first by my father, to be my subject; then, at the bidding, as he himself said, of my brother, this man levied war upon me, holding the citadel of Sar­ dis (1.6.6*). Orontas, the phrourarch of Sardis, had at some point received royal orders

618

Chapter 15. Artaxerxes 11 and Artaxerxes 111

to engage in armed combat against the followers of Cyrus, who even accused him of de­ serting to the Mysians and ravaging territory subject to Cyrus's control (1.6.7). The ex­ ample strongly suggests that the war between Artaxerxes and Cyrus began—albeit in embryonic form—long before the departure from Sardis in March 401 and that Tissa­ phernes and Orontas had been ordered by the king to thwart the ambitions of his younger brother. Ephorus provides a version of the dating and source of the accusations against Cyrus that is completely different from Xenophon's; it is transmitted by Diodorus (XiV.H.]_ 4), Nepos (Ale. 9.3-4), and Plutarch (Ale. 37.8-39). According to Ephorus, Alcibiades was exiled from Athens and driven completely away; he took refuge at the court of Pharnabazus at Dascylium, who (in accordance with a longstanding Achaemenid pol­ icy) gave him the town of Grynium so that he could provide for his needs. At this point, Alcibiades sought an alliance with the Great King in order to reopen the war against Sparta. When he learned of Cyrus's preparations, he saw a way of garnering the favor of Artaxerxes, and he pestered Pharnabazus for an official safe-conduct (halmi in the PF, adeia in Demosthenes XXIII. 159), and Pharnabazus authorized it. However, according to Diodorus, Pharnabazus "usurped the function of reporter and sent trusted men to dis­ close the matter to the King." He also assassinated Alcibiades while he was en route, with the assistance of a mysterious "satrap of Paphlagonia" (Diodorus XIV. 11.3*). Ac­ cording to this version, Artaxerxes was already informed of his brother's military prepa­ rations by 404-403. So we are faced with two contradictory accounts. It is likely that, as on a previous oc­ casion (Themistocles' arrival in Asia Minor: chap. 13/9), one comes from the court of Sardis, the other from the court of Dascylium. How can we choose one? We might eliminate the second account by suggesting that in this passage, as in at least one other case (XIV.35.1), Diodorus (Ephorus) simply confused Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes. But an analysis of Alcibiades' route confirms that he did indeed leave from Dascylium. We might nonetheless conclude that the Dascylium version was invented later in order to reinforce Pharnabazus's status vis-a-vis Tissaphernes, who received wide authority in Asia Minor after the battle of Cunaxa. This is a perfectly reasonable hypothesis—apart from the fact that the competition between the two satraps is attested beginning at least as early as 412. We may add that the actions taken by Darius II in 407 could only have aroused Pharnabazus's hostility against Cyrus, who, as general commander of the mari­ time regions, had taken control of "Aeolis, and the neighbouring territories" (cf. Diodo­ rus XIV. 19.6*); these regions had always been disputed by Dascylium and Sardis. It is logical to prefer Pharnabazus's version, to the extent that it offers a picture of the central authority that is consistent with the policy it was then following at Sardis against Cyrus. The only counterargument comes from Diodorus himself—probably still following Ephorus: after describing Cyrus's march to Babylonia, he presents Artaxerxes' situation as follows: he "had learned some time before (palai) from Pharnabazus that Cyrus was secretly collecting an army to lead against him, and when he now (tote) learned that he was on the march [toward the High Country (anabasis)}, he summoned his armaments from every place to Ecbatana in Media" (XIV.22.lo-). By stating once more that Phar­ nabazus had warned the king much earlier, Diodorus also implies that he had done nothing in the interim—although the expression used could also be understood to mean that the order quoted by Diodorus consisted simply of ordering already-mobilized troops to move to their mustering stations.

The War of the Two Brothers

(404-401)

619

At the same time, it is clear that the tales of the Greek authors are devoted exclusively to Cyrus's campaign. This leads to another theory: the Classical sources pass over impor­ tant events in other regions of the Empire in silence, which would explain Artaxerxes' ipparent lack of activity better than does a secret undertaking by Cyrus. This interpreta­ tion is easy to test, if not to establish with complete certainty. In fact, at this time, another front required the full, vigilant attention of Artaxerxes—Egypt. We know for a fact that, after Cyrus's arrival in Cilicia (summer of 401), the strategos Abrocomas turned toward the Euphrates and then toward Babylonia, having "turned about in his journey from Phoenicia" (Anah. 1.4.5*). The meaning is clear: as in many later episodes, the concen­ tration of an army in Phoenicia signified an offensive against the Nile Valley. The Ele­ phantine documents confirm that there was an Egyptian revolt. The last document dated to Artaxerxes II at Elephantine is from the end of 401 (DAE 53 [BMAP 12]). An­ other, from September 400, refers to year 5 of King Amyrtaeus (DAE 7 [AP 35]), who therefore must have been proclaimed pharaoh during 404. He must have been a descen­ dant of the rebels that we know were in the Delta during the fifth century—specifically, a grandson of Amyrtaeus I (cf. Herodotus III. 15). The Elephantine documents show that between 404 and 400 (or even 398) Upper Egypt remained under Persian control but that, conversely, Amyrtaeus dominated all or part of the Delta. It was obviously in order to subdue him, probably shortly after his accession, that Artaxerxes assembled an army in Phoenicia under the command of Abrocomas (cf. Isocrates, Phil. 101). This was not the first time that the Egyptian dynasts of the Delta tried to profit from a disputed suc­ cession (cf. Diodorus XI.71.3). But as it happens, circumstances were particularly favor­ able to them. It is, moreover, not impossible that Cyrus had consciously taken advantage of the situation then prevailing in the Nile Valley; he was certainly not unaware of events in Egypt. We know in fact that one of his closest lieutenants was Tamos, probably an Egyptian-born Carian from Memphis. Indeed, we learn that, after Cyrus's death, Ta­ mos feared Tissaphernes' vengeance and fled to Egypt with his family and his wealth. He expected to take refuge with Psammetichus, "king of the Egyptians, who was a de­ scendant of the famous Psammetichus." There is no reason to challenge this testimony from Diodorus (XIV.35.4*) on the grounds that he confused Amyrtaeus and Psammeti­ chus; as in previous periods, the Delta was divided among several rival dynasts. Indeed, it is quite interesting to observe that, according to Diodorus, Tamos expected the protec­ tion of Psammetichus, "because of a good turn he had done the king in the past." Dio­ dorus offers no relevant details, but we might ask whether Tamos had previously been instructed by Cyrus to initiate a relationship with the Egyptian dynast on the chance that he might thus strike a fatal blow to Achaemenid interests in Egypt. In any case, Cyrus could not have been unaware that, whatever Abrocomas would decide (whether to submit to him or to remain faithful to the Great King), the offensive he was leading against his brother would interrupt the reconquest of Egypt already in progress. It is thus easy to understand why the Great King did not immediately in 404-401 use the information provided by Pharnabazus. He first ordered a mobilization to reconquer Egypt. We thus also understand why Xenophon and Ephorus agree on one point: Arta­ xerxes was not able to proceed with his preparations until later, because he was other­ wise occupied (Anab. 1.2.4-5; Diodorus XIV.22.1). In order to do battle with his brother between 404 and 401, then, Artaxerxes was only able to count on the loyalty of his people m Asia Minor, such as Tissaphernes, Orontas, and certainly Pharnabazus as well, in the hope that open warfare at Sardis and in Ionia would deter Cyrus from marching against

620

Chapter 15. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III

him. This explains the king's satisfaction at seeing Cyrus and Tissaphernes at each other's throats (1.1.8), an observation that Xenophon expanded into an incomplete and probably erroneous interpretation. When Tissaphernes left Asia Minor in the spring of 401, it was not really that he intended to inform the king of Cyrus's already well-known preparations; more simply, once Cyrus's revolt had officially begun, he decided imme­ diately to place himself under the authority of the Great King, who awarded him a very high command in the army he had assembled {Anab. 1.7.12, 8.9).

Cyrus the Younger's Army The contingents summoned by Cyrus assembled at Sardis. Each mercenary com­ mander brought his men; they came from Asian cities but mainly from the Pelopponesus— 8,100 troops all together (Anab. 1.2.3-4). At Colossae, Menon of Thessaly joined up, leading 1,500 more soldiers (1.2.6); at Celaenae in Greater Phrygia, the army was filled out with the men of the exiled Lacedaemonian Clearchus (2,000), Sosis the Syracusan (300), and Agias the Arcadian (1,000). The Greek army reviewed by Cyrus in the capital of Greater Phrygia thus amounted to 12,900 men, and at Issus the 700 hoplites of the Spartan Cheirisophus joined Lhein, arriving by sea (1.4.2). IL is Lhis assemblage that a later tradition marked by apologetic tendencies refers to collectively as the Ten Thou­ sand. They are the main topic of Xenophon's narrative, along with the contentious rela­ tions among its leaders (especially Clearchus and Menon) and their persistent reluctance to follow Cyrus beyond Tarsus and the Euphrates. At first sight, the attraction of using Greek infantrymen (hoplites and peltasts) is easily explained: they had especially good reputations as a result of their long combat experience (cf. Diodorus XIV23.4), and Cyrus himself adopted some of the Greek equipment (breastplates and swords) to equip the elite of his cavalry (XIV.22.6; cf. Anab. 1.8.7). In comparison with everything known before, this is the first time a Persian leader made such massive use of mercenaries. Xenophon's (and other Greeks') view needs several major corrections. As he himself notes, Cyrus's army included Greeks and barbarians (1.2.16). There were two armies side by side, Greek and barbarian (Ctesias §58), just as there were two navies, with the bar­ barian navy under the command of Tamos (Diodorus XIV. 19.5). There were two distinct commands, though Cyrus himself remained commander-in-chief (XIV. 19.9). At Cunaxa, the two armies took up separate positions (Xenophon, Anab. 1.8.14); only 1,000 of the barbarian army, men from the Paphlagonian contingent, were arrayed alongside Clearchus, commander of the Greeks (1.8.5; Diodorus XIV.22.5). On the left flank were the Paphlagonians—whose cavalry was particularly famous (Anab. V.6.8) — as well as the troops drafted from Phrygia and Lydia, as well as 1,000 horsemen under the command of Ariaeus. Cyrus placed himself at the center of the formation, surrounded by the brav­ est of the Persians and the other barbarians (Anab. 1.8.5; Diodorus XIV.22.5-6). Also in the center were contingents led by faithful subjects such as Procles, "the ruler of Teuthrania" and a descendant of the Demaratus to whom Xerxes had granted territory in Aeolis (Anab. II.1.3*). In sum, Cyrus had assembled all the territorial forces of Asia Minor: contingents of subject peoples (Paphlagonians), horsemen levied from the Per­ sians of the imperial diaspora, and soldiers provided by families who had settled in Asia Minor after the time of Xerxes (see chap. 13/9). Cyrus was thus not content with gather­ ing Greek mercenaries; he also ordered a general mobilization throughout Asia Minor (Didorus XIV. 19.7), and this enabled him to recruit a cavalry, without which he would never have been able to commence such an enterprise (cf. Anab. II.4.6).

The War of the Two Brothers

(404-401)

621

Propaganda and Legitimation For his project to succeed, the young prince, while assembling a cohesive fighting force, had to generate personal loyalty strong enough to break the links that bound the Persians to the Great King. Without being fully aware of the fact, all the ancient authors report that the armed conflict was accompanied by a vigorous propaganda war: Yet busy, factious men, that delighted in change (hoi neoteriskoi kai polypragmones), pro­ fessed it to be their opinion that the times needed Cyrus, a man of great spirit, an excellent warrior, and a lover of his friends, and that the largeness of their empire required a bold and enterprising prince. (Plutarch, Art. 6.1*) Though Plutarch's words confirm that he unfailingly favors stability and order, the themes he conveys are the very ones that Cyrus's camp undertook to propagate. T h e passage is even more significant because it is embedded within a comparison of Cyrus and his brother, who appears to be known for his "natural dilatoriness . . . which was taken by many for clemency" (4.4*). To illustrate his thesis, Plutarch cites the king's polydoria and gifts offered him by the simple peasants, albeit without understanding their significance, at least in this passage (cf. Mor. 172b and Aelian, VH 1.31—33). He also notes that Artaxerxes allowed his younger brothers to partake of his table, and his wife to travel in an open carriage (§4-4-5; 5 f. Mor. 173f). Cyrus is contrasted to the king, who was criticized as weak in character: ; c

among many other high praises of himself,.. . said he had the stronger soul; was more a phi­ losopher and a better Magian; and could drink and bear more wine than his brother, who, as he averred, was such a coward and so little like a man, that he could neither sit his horse in hunting nor his throne in time of danger. (S6.5-0-; cf. Mor. 173e-f) This quotation does not call for much comment, because it is obvious that by procla­ mations of this sort Cyrus intended to legitimate his claim to supreme authority by dis­ qualifying his brother with respect to traditional Achaemenid royal ideological attributes. The thesis is consciously and systematically laid out by Xenophon in his eulogy for Cyrus: Cyrus from his youth was regarded as "the best of them," courageous in both the hunt and war; he was loyal in his commitments, merciless toward delinquents of any stripe, bringing order and security throughout his territory. Xenophon and others par­ ticularly stress that he was diligent in rewarding excellence, that "he never let. . . zeal go unrewarded," that he displayed unparalleled polydoria, sending his Friends food from his table (Anah. 1.9.1-28*). Moreover, Cyrus was also a "good gardener" (Xeno­ phon, Oec. IV.20-25) —a virtue later exalted by the propaganda that came from Parysatis's entourage (chap. 6/5). In short, "no man, Greek or barbarian, has ever been loved by a greater number of people" (Anab. I.9.28*), and, "if Cyrus had only lived, . . . he would have proved an excellent ruler" (Oec. IV. 18). Though the clear similarities with the Cyropaedia indicate that Xenophon is here painting a portrait of the ideal king, what we know about the monarchic ideology also shows that the materials used to paint this portrait were the virtues that all genuine Achaemenid documents ascribe to the Great King (cf. chap. 6). The gods themselves legitimated the pretender's royal ambitions, and this can be gleaned from a story told by Xenophon. In July 401, Cyrus's army arrived at Thapsacus on the Euphrates, "the width of which was four stadia [ca. 700 m ] " (Anab. 1.4.11*). In the course of his retreat, Abrocomas had burned the bridges (4.18o): "Cyrus proceeded

622

Chapter J 5. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes HI

to cross the river, and the rest of the army followed him, to the last man. And in the cross­ ing no one was wetted above the breast by the water." There is nothing remarkable about this, since at that time the river was at a low flow, and the soldiers waded across. What is more interesting is the ensuing interpretation of this "stunt": T h e p e o p l e of T h a p s a c u s said that this river h a d never b e e n passable on foot e x c e p t at this time.

. . It s e e m e d , accordingly, that here was a d i v i n e (theios) intervention, a n d that the

river h a d plainly retired before C y r u s b e c a u s e h e was d e s t i n e d to be king. (1.4.18*)

We have a parallel episode in Plutarch's Life of Lucidlus. During his Armenian cam­ paign, the Roman Lucullus too found himself at odds with unenthusiastic soldiers (§24.1). The army reached the Euphrates at flood, "finding the waters high and rough from the winter." During the night, inexplicably, the level of the waters fell, and at dawn the river had returned to its bed: T h e inhabitants, d i s c o v e r i n g the little islands in the river, a n d the water stagnating a m o n g t h e m , a thing w h i c h h a d rarely h a p p e n e d before, m a d e o b e i s a n c e to L u c u l l u s , before w h o m the very river was h u m b l e a n d s u b m i s s i v e , a n d yielded a n easy a n d swift p a s s a g e . ( § 2 4 . 2 * )

The tradition is particularly interesting in that the Lucullus episode is set in Iranian ter­ ritory (Acilisene) at the very location of a famous sanctuary of Anahita, who would soon issue an additional favorable omen to the Roman—a heifer branded with the mark of the goddess, a torch, offered herself up. Lucullus sacrificed her; "besides which, he offered also a bull to Euphrates, for his safe passage" (§24.4-5-0). We can end with another par­ allel, taken from Tacitus (Ann. VI.37): Vitellius and Tiridates reached the banks of the Euphrates with their troops; the Roman Vitellius offered a suovetaurile to the gods, ac­ cording to Roman custom, while Tiridates "sacrificed a horse in honor of the river": T h e inhabitants p r o c l a i m e d that without any rain the E u p h r a t e s had just risen all by itself b e y o n d m e a s u r e , a n d that the c l e a n s i n g f o a m f o r m e d circles that looked like n o t h i n g so m u c h as d i a d e m s , portent of a favorable o m e n .

All of these stories reflect topoi that are well grounded in royal Near Eastern literature. How often, for example, do the Assyrian kings claim to have crossed torrents or preci­ pices without hindrance! Furthermore, privileged relationships between the king, the waters, and the rivers are found in these stories, and these relationships also appear in a story regarding Cyrus the Elder that Herodotus transmits (1.188). Persona* and Dynastic Loyalty It is clear, at least to hear Xenophon tell it, that Cyrus's vaunted polyddria toward "the barbarians of his own province" was designed to ensure that they "should be capable sol­ diers and should feel kindly (eunoia) toward him" (1.1.5-v-). There is no doubt that Cyrus surrounded himself with men in whose loyalty he was completely confident (cf. Diodo­ rus XIV. 19.9). His purpose was to generate loyalty toward himself that would rival the loyalty any Persian might show to their king (Anab. 1.6.6-8). But does Cyrus's propa­ ganda imply that he was successful, or does it show that he needed to persuade those who were reluctant to embrace his cause? This question is somewhat artificial, since the two possible answers are not mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, the question has decisive importance, which can be stated a bit more precisely: Were all of the Persians of Asia Minor unreservedly committed to the cause of the one who already considered himself the equal of a king?

The War of the Two Brothers (404-401)

623

There is no doubt regarding the ones who joined him. His closest confidants were those whom Xenophon calls his'Faithful' (pistoi; cf. 1.5.15) — his handaka, those bound to him by personal ties, symbolized by a handclasp before the gods (1.6.6-7). The small group that remained faithful to the end were his Tablemates (homotrapezoi) (1.8.25), a title that by itself indicates that Cyrus had re-created a court hierarchy based on the royal court. Among his "Faithful," Xenophon singles out Artapates, "the most faithful of Cyrus' chamberlains" (6.11,* 8.28); the rebel Orontas was executed in Artapates' tent (6.11). One tradition claims that Artapates killed himself on his master's corpse: "he had a dagger (akinakes) of gold, and he also wore a necklace and bracelets and all the other ornaments that the noblest Persians (hoi aristoi Person) wear; for he had been honored (time) by Cyrus because of his affection (eunoia) and fidelity (pistotes)" (8.29-0). The gold akinakes was clearly a "royal" gift (cf. 1.3.27), which distinguished him from other Persian aristocrats, who all wore glittering robes decorated with sumptuous jewels (1.5.8). The Persians of Asia Minor who sided with Cyrus generally are referred to by Diodo­ rus as "satraps" (XIV.35.2). Alongside unnamed Persians who held subordinate com­ mands (XIV 19.9: in the army), Diodorus refers tn relatives (syggeneis) of Cyrus who were governors of Lydia and Phrygia (XIV. 19.6). On rare occasions, a few Persians are ex­ plicitly named by the ancient authors: Artaozus and Mithradates, for example, "who had been most faithful friends of Cyrus" (II.5.35*); also Satiphernes, "a noble man and a faithful friend to Cyrus" (Plutarch, Art. 11.2*); Ariaeus, "Cyrus's satrap," who was one of his Friends (11.1*) and commanded the cavalry on the left flank in the battle of Cunaxa (Diodorus XIV.24.1; cf. Anab. 1.8.5: Kyrou hyparkhos). He was "most highly honoured by Cyrus" (III.2.5*), and he was certainly of noble origin (cf. II.1.1-4). Xenophon also mentions Pategyas, "a trusty Persian of Cyrus' staff" (1.8.1*). But the problem remains unresolved: Do these examples indicate a general eager­ ness to march against Artaxerxes? For Xenophon, the question answers itself. The best proof of Cyrus's kingly merit, he says, is the following observation: "Although Cyrus was a slave, no one deserted him to join the King . . . ; on the other hand, many went over from the King to Cyrus after the two had become enemies" (Anab. 1.9.29;* cf. Oec. IV. 18). Ctesias provides confirmation: "Many turncoats changed from Artaxerxes to Cyrus, but not one changed from Cyrus to Artaxerxes" (§58). Here we find one of the justifications that Alexander later offered to contest the legitimacy of Darius Ill's author­ ity (Arrian II. 14.7): the true leader must know how to inspire the loyalty and devotion of his followers. What was the truth? In fact, though "tens of thousands" of turncoats are mentioned (Oec. IV. 18), none but the 400 Greek mercenaries of Abrocomas can be pinpointed, and they no doubt were attracted by hope for high wages (Anab. 1.4.3). Though hardly repre­ sentative politically, this shift in allegiance compensated to some extent for the defection of two mercenary leaders, Xennias and Pasion, who, as soon as Cyrus's real destination became known, chose to board ship and return to Greece (1.4.7). Cyrus was so unsure of his Greeks that he had taken the precaution of holding the wives and children of the strategoi hostage, at Tralles (1.4.8). It is perhaps for the same sort of reason that the Ly­ dian market, where the soldiers could provision themselves, was located "in the barbar­ ian army" (1.3.14,5.6). To stimulate the Greeks to follow where he wanted to lead them, Cyrus constantly resorted to ruse and deception. The Pisidian goal (see p. 617) proved to have been a decoy as soon as the army arrived at Tarsus. The soldiers refused to return

624

Chapter J 5. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III

to the road for 20 days, "for they suspected by this time that they were going against the King" (1.3. I*). A real riot erupted against Clearchus, because many of the mercenaries wanted to return on their own (1.3.1-14). At this point, Cyrus claimed that he was marching only against Abrocomas on the Euphrates and that, once they got there, they would see what the appropriate course of action would be (1.3.20); according to Dio­ dorus, he announced that he was leading them "against a certain satrap of Syria" (XIV.20.5*). Not until they arrived at Thapsacus did he openly unveil his plans; there he calmed the reawakening uneasiness with promises of increased pay (1.4.11-13). Ap­ parently Cyrus's promises failed to persuade all of the Greeks (4.13). In other cases, their loyalty remained conditional, as is seen by the assurances Cyrus proceeded to give: "he promised that he would give every man five minas in silver when they reached Babylon and their pay in full until he brought the Greeks back to Ionia again" (Anab. 1.4.13*). Now let us return to the perspective of the Persian aristocracy. The reality is that Cte­ sias gives but a single example of defectors to Cyrus: Arbarius apparently defected shortly before the decisive battle. But we do not know whether this is the same person as the Arbarius who twenty years later betrayed Secundianus to join Ochus/Dnrins II ($47). And even this example is scarcely convincing, since Ctesias states that this Arbarius "was denounced" ($58), an indication that he was an isolated case, even if some of his com­ patriots then joined Cyrus's side (Anab. 1.7.2). Xenophon, as an exception to the rule he had just illustrated, gives the example of Orontas, who was convicted of treason against Cyrus. The author places the episode in Babylonia (1.6). Orontas was a member of the highest nobility and enjoyed immense prestige: "a Persian, who was related to the King by birth and was reckoned among the best of the Persians in matters of war" ($6.1*). Un­ der the pretext of hindering the activities of marauders from the royal army, he had asked Cyrus to entrust a corps of horsemen to him. At the same time, he sent a letter to Arta­ xerxes, announcing his change of allegiance. But he was betrayed by the messenger and arrested, convicted, and executed. Cyrus convened a tribunal to try him, comprising the seven most distinguished Per­ sians among his attendants; he included Clearchus, the most faithful of the Greek strategoi ($6.4-5). The verdict was signaled in the traditional way: "Every man of them arose . . . and took him by the girdle, as a sign that he was condemned to death" ($6.10;-»- cf. Diodorus XVII.30.4). Xenophon interjects that even the relatives (syggeneis) of the ac­ cused had to perform the fatal gesture. Some additional details indicate that Orontas had a large network of associates. Xenophon notes, for instance, that even after his sen­ tencing, "when the men who in former days were wont to do him homage saw him, they made their obeisance even then, although they knew that he was being led forth to death" ($6.10-*-). The end of the episode is equally revealing; "Now after he had been conducted into the tent of Artapates, the most faithful of Cyrus' chamberlains, from that moment no man ever saw Orontas living or dead, nor could anyone say from actual knowledge how he was put to death, —it was all conjectures, of one sort and another; and no grave of his was ever seen" ($6.11-0-). The confidentiality imposed by Cyrus was probably intended to forestall any official mourning in honor of the condemned man. It is also quite noteworthy that Cyrus did not call on Persian troops, but on Greek detach­ ments that were not susceptible to being torn between conflicting loyalties, to guard the tent where the trial was being conducted (§6.4). The inclusion of the Greek Clearchus among the judges was certainly also due to the same considerations. Convening the

The War of the Two Brothers (404-401)

625

seven most distinguished Persians was probably intended to assure the support of fully faithful Persians; by including kinsmen of the accused, Cyrus was also attempting to compel them to restate publicly their personal loyalty to him. Furthermore, it can be deduced from Xenophon's tale itself that Orontas was not the only one to exhibit misgivings regarding Cyrus. Without stressing it, Xenophon in fact notes that a few weeks earlier, in Lycaonia, "Cyrus put to death a Persian named Megaphernes, who was a wearer of the royal purple" (phoinikistes basileios; I.2.20o). We know nothing further about this person; his job may have allowed him to set up a rela­ tionship with Artaxerxes' camp. Xenophon adds that someone else was put to death at the same time. He describes him with a less than clear phrase: "another dignitary among his subordinates" (heis ton hyparkhon dynastes; 2 . 2 0 o ) . Could this have been one of the officers in charge of a district (cf. Hell. III. 1.12)? Cyrus did in fact need their support in order to have access to the treasuries and well-stocked storehouses along the route. So far, he had not encountered any major obstacles. The authorities at Celaenae (cf. Plu­ tarch, Them. 30.1), for example, clearly did not oppose his requests (Anab. 1.2.7-9). This interpretation is supported by an action that Cyrus took in T.ycaonia: "This country he gave over to the Greeks to plunder, on the ground that it was hostile territory" (polemia khora; 2.19o). This phrase very plainly refers to a land that could be ravaged because it had not submitted. This was also the case in Cilicia prior to the submission of the syen­ nesis; as soon as he had submitted, Cyrus promised "that his land should not be plun­ dered any more and that they might take back the slaves that had been seized in case they should chance upon them anywhere" (1.2.27-0). Earlier on, in fact, the syennesis had refused to ally himself with Cyrus. He was soon forced to do so by the simultaneous arrival of Cyrus's army and navy (1.2.21-26). Accord­ ing to Xenophon, the syennesis agreed to give Cyrus large sums of money for his army, and Cyrus in return presented such gifts of honor as the Great Kings usually bestowed (2.27). Clearly, the syennesis's alliance was purely tactical. Ctesias stresses it: "He fought (synemakhei) both at the side of Cyrus and for the side of Artaxerxes" (§58). Photius's summary, fortunately, is filled in by the information given by Diodorus (XIV.20.3-o): On learning the truth about the war [Syennesis] agreed to join him as an ally against Arta­ xerxes; and he sent one of his two sons along with Cyrus, giving him also a strong contingent of Cilicians for his army. For Syennesis, being by nature unscrupulous and having adjusted himself to the uncertainty of Fortune, had dispatched his other son secretly to the King to reveal to him the armaments that had been gathered against him and to assure him that he took the part of (symmakhia) Cyrus out of necessity, but that he was still faithful (eunoia) to the King and, when the opportunity arose, would desert Cyrus and join the army of the King. The syennesis was certainly not the only one to adopt an attitude guided by an eye on the future. Diodorus notes, for instance, that "the Lacedaemonians had not yet openly entered upon the war, but were concealing their purpose, awaiting the turn of the war" (XIV.21.2o). The ancient authors were merely sharing in the anxiety of the Greeks, who, it must be noted, were especially intimidated by the Empire's vastness: "The word had got about that it was a four months' march for an army to Bactria" (Diodorus XIV.20.4o)! We know nothing of the reactions of the "barbarian army." According to Diodorus, the Persian high command had been informed of the true objective ever since Cyrus's departure from Sardis (XIV. 19.9). Diodorus's phrasing implies that the ordinary troops (to plethos)

626

Chapter 15. Artaxerxes 11 and Artaxerxes III

had been left out of this confidence, just like the Greeks. Of course, it was legitimate to answer the call of the karanos to march against the Pisidians (or "some rebellious Cili­ cian tyrants": Diodorus XIV. 19.3), but it was dangerous to take arms against the Great King. It is true that no proof can be offered, but it is possible that stirrings of discontent or reluctance saw the light of day among the "barbarian" contingents as well. Xenophon states that "no man, Greek or barbarian, has ever been loved by a greater number of people" (I.9.28-0-). It is possible that he is here referring, in an apologetic fash­ ion, to the support Cyrus received from the Greek cities of Asia Minor (1.1.7; Diodorus XIV.35.2). In any case, Cyrus's entourage included non-Persians as well (cf. 1.9.28). The processes by which mercenaries were enlisted show that Cyrus entered into personal hospitality pacts with several Greeks: Aristippus the Thessalian, Proxenus the Boeotian, Sophaenetus the Stymphalian, and Socrates the Achaean (1.1.10-11). Before the revolt started, Xenias the Arcadian "commanded for him the mercenary force in the cities" of Ionia (1.2.1 • ) . Cyrus attempted to gather around him the Greek exiles, such as the Mile­ sians (1.2.2), and Clearchus as well, who had been exiled from Lacedaemon and who gathered a troop of mercenaries for his own purposes (1.1.9). Cyrus considered him "the man who was honored above the rest of the Greeks" (I.6.6-0-) and certainly the most faithful of the mercenary leaders—which is why he later enjoyed the special protection of Parysatis. We also know of a certain Gaulites, "a Samian exile who was there and was in the confidence of Cyrus" (1.7.5-0); during the Ionian War, he had worked closely with Tissaphernes; Thucydides represents him as "a Carian, who spoke the two languages" (VIII.85.2-v-). We can also mention the Carian-Memphite Tamos, "trusted friend" of Cyrus, who appointed him governor "of Ionia, Aeolis, and the neighboring territories" before he departed (Diodorus XIV. 19.6-0-) and also "commander of the barbarian fleet" (XIV.19.5-0-; Anab. 1.2.21). His son, Glos, participated in the expedition against Arta­ xerxes [Anab. II. 1.3). Does the presence of a significant number of non-Persians around Cyrus indicate a growing intimacy of relationships between the Persians of Asia Minor and their neigh­ bors, and/or does it reflect a specific policy of Cyrus, who was anxious to fend off the hos­ tility of some Persians of the western region? It is difficult to answer these questions with complete certainty. A man such as Tamos, for example, began his career well before Cyrus's arrival at Sardis. One can hardly fail to be fascinated, though, by the division of powers Cyrus decided on before beginning his campaign. Though Persians were put in charge of Lydia and Phrygia, Tamos, as we have just seen, received the command "of Ionia, Aeolis, and the neighboring territories" (XIV.19.6-o). In particular, it is remarkable that he governed Aeolis and its neighbors, but there is no doubt that this arrangement goes back to 407. On the other hand, the version of Ephorus (analyzed above) implies that Pharnabazus was inducted into the "Faithful" of the Great King after Cyrus's return to Asia Minor. Furthermore, if, as Diodorus maintains (XIV. 19.6), Cyrus gave Lydia and Phrygia to some of his kinsmen (syggeneis), this disposition implies that Pharnabazus must also have lost his satrapy or that he was demoted to a subordinate position—and for this and other reasons he sided with the king. When he arrived in Cilicia, Cyrus suffered another huge reverse. Abrocomas (having been entrusted with the expedition to Egypt), rather than joining Cyrus—who certainly must have made contact with him —retreated instead toward the Euphrates with his army, burning the bridges at Thapsacus to slow the rebel's advance [Anab. 1.4.18). Abro-

The War of the Two Brothers (404-401)

627

comas was not the only one to side with the king. So did Belesys (Belsunu), the governer of Syria (Ebir Nari), as is unambiguously implicit in Cyrus's order to lay waste the satra­ pal residence and paradise that were idyllically sited atthe springs of the Dardas (1.4.10). We may also note that according to Diodorus (XIV.20.5), in order to mislead them one more time (Anah. 1.2.1), Cyrus revealed his goal in the following words at Tarsus: "He was leading the army, not against Artaxerxes, but against a certain satrap of Syria" (Dio­ dorus XIV.20.5*). He certainly made the same claim with regard to the satrap of Baby­ lonia, who perhaps is the Gobryas who was one of the commanders of the royal army during the battle of Cunaxa (1.7.12). Tiribazus also sided with the Great King (Plutarch, Art. 7.3, 10.1); Xenophon represents him as "governor of Western Armenia" (Anab. IV.4.4). Artasyras, "the king's eye," was also with the king (Plutarch, Arf. 12.1-3*). In fact, this Artasyras was the father of Orontes (OGIS 264, 390-92), who seems to have been a governor in eastern Armenia (cf. Xenophon, Anab. III.5.17; cf. IV.3.4); this Oron­ tes had brought a contingent to the king (II.4.9). Even though the evidence is partial in both senses of the word, one conclusion it tempts us to draw is that Cyrus did not succeed in gaining the support of officers sta­ tioned beyond his official jurisdiction. A second conclusion is that an unknown number of his peers and subordinates refused to cut their ties of allegiance to the one they con­ sidered the sole Great King, Artaxerxes II. Finally, some of his other allies committed themselves only with much caution or many second thoughts. The record does not con­ firm the hopes that Plutarch claims Cyrus nourished in 404: that he would be able to win to his side not only "those of his own province near the sea, b u t . . . many of those in the upper countries" (Art. 6.2*).

Artaxerxes and Cyrus Face Off The arrival of Cyrus and his army in Babylonia created a political and strategic situa­ tion unprecedented in Achaemenid history. The Great King was threatened at the very heart of his Empire by a single enemy at the head of a major force intent on seizing su­ preme power. The danger was thus even more pressing than that faced by Darius in 522-521, when disorganized rebels never tried (or never succeeded) to unify for a march on the center of the Empire (see chap. 3/2). Cyrus's expedition thus represents a sort of prefiguring of Alexander's conquest. Just like Darius III in 331, Artaxerxes lost control of Asia Minor and regions beyond the Euphrates, including Egypt. His response to this challenge evokes the measures taken by the Great King seventy years later. Artaxerxes had less time for preparation than Darius III, who was able to gather and train an army while Alexander pursued his conquest of Syria-Phoenicia and Egypt, be­ fore returning to the road to the Euphrates (late 333 - autumn 331). Just like the Per­ sians in 331, the Great King ordered Abrocomas to destroy the bridges over the Euphrates to slow down Cyrus's march (1.4.18). And, just like Mazaeus when faced with the Macedonian, Artaxerxes decided to apply a scorched-earth policy in advance of Cyrus (1.6.2). At the same time, he proceeded to prepare the defenses of Babylonia. Ac­ cording to Xenophon, during the third clay's march in the country, they came upon "a deep trench, five fathoms in width and three fathoms in depth.. . . This trench extended up through the plain . . . reaching to the wall of Media. . . . The trench had been con­ structed by the Great King as a means of defence when he learned that Cyrus was inarching against him" (1.7.14-16;* cf. Plutarch, Art. 7.2). Further on, Xenophon

628

Chapter J 5. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes HI

explains that "the so-called wall of Media . . . was built of baked bricks, laid in asphalt, and was twenty feet wide and a hundred feet high; its length was said to be twenty parasangs, and it is not far distant from Babylon" (II.4.12-0). Cyrus's propaganda spread the news that, having built the wall, Artaxerxes turned tail and refused combat (1.8.19). While certain obscurities concerning the course of this wall do exist, it actually appears that the Great King reused prior construction to good effect and that he adopted a wellknown strategy—using the waterways to cut off access to Babylon (see chap. 9/2) —how­ ever, apparently with no great success. Xenophon stresses the speed of Cyrus's march. The prince stopped only to secure provisions (1.5.9) in the villages along the route (1.4.19; 5.4, 10): "Cyrus sometimes made these stages through the desert very long, whenever he wanted to reach water or fresh fodder" (1.5.7*). Choosing a route for its swiftness forced the army to cross inhospitable territory, called "Arabia" by Xenophon (1.5.1-3), and brought them to the edge of fam­ ine, which particularly upset the Greeks: "It was not possible to buy any [grain] except in the Lydian market attached to the barbarian army of Cyrus, at the price of four sigli for a capithe of wheat flour or barley meal" (1.5.6*). There is no doubt that the price went up sharply in such contexts (cf. Plutarch, Art. 24.3). The soldiers were unable to indulge in such luxury and "therefore managed to subsist by eating meat" (Anab. 1.5.7*), probably from hunting (1.5.2-3). Cyrus's haste is explained above all, according to Xenophon, by his need to prevent the Great King from assembling his forces: "His thought was that the faster he went, the more unprepared the King would be to fight with him, while, on the other hand, the slower he went, the greater would be the army that was gathering for the King." Like so many ancient authors, Xenophon thought that "while the King's empire was strong in its extent of territory and number of inhabitants, it was weak by reason of the greatness of the distances and the scattered condition of its forces, in case one should be swift in making his attack upon it" (1.5.9*). Cyrus's haste contrasts dramatically with the relative leisure of his march until he reached the Eu­ phrates: he stayed 7 days at Colossae (2.6), 30 days at Celaenae (2.9), 3 days at Peltae (2.10), 5 days at Caystru-pedion (2.11), 20 days at Tarsus, 3 days at Issus (4.2), and 5 days at Thapsacus (4.11)—73 days in all. It is unlikely that the length of the stopovers can simply be explained, with Xenophon (1.3.21), by the alleged ill will of the Greek merce­ naries, who were often left waiting for their pay. Beginning with the crossing of the Eu­ phrates, the army proceeded at a forced-march pace, even though Cyrus must have already been growing uneasy at the preparations of Artaxerxes, which unsubstantiated rumors at Tarsus indicated were considerable (Diodorus XIV.20.4). When Cyrus chose to follow a swift route that did not have many resupply points, it was because a decisive strategic factor had arisen in the meantime. According to Xenophon (1.4.5*), Cyrus ex­ pected Abrocomas to bar his passage through the Syrian Gates: "Abrocomas, however, did not do so, but as soon as he heard that Cyrus was in Cilicia, he turned about in his journey from Phoenicia and marched off to join the King, with an army, so the report ran, of three hundred thousand men." Continuing with Xenophon's account, Abroco­ mas arrived five days after the battle of Cunaxa (1.7.12). His delay was not due to daw­ dling: quite simply, he had chosen to take the Royal Road, which, though much longer, allowed him to resupply his troops (cf. Arrian III.7.3). After he left the Euphrates be­ hind, Cyrus had taken a speedy route that was intended to prevent Abrocomas's army from joining up with the royal army.

The War of the Two Brothers (404-401)

629

According to Diodorus (XIV.22.1*), Artaxerxes "summoned his armaments from ev­ ery place to Ecbatana in Media" as soon as he got wind of Cyrus's departure. This detail does not imply that the king was then at his summer residence (it was early spring). More likely, he was at Babylon. The mention of Ecbatana as the assembly point is easy to explain: just as Darius III was to do later on, Artaxerxes II ordered the mobilization of troops from the Iranian Plateau as far as the Indus. Diodorus states that the troops from those distant places did not arrive in time "because of the remoteness of those regions" (XIV.22.2*). This is confirmed by Xenophon: as the Greek mercenaries who had sur­ vived the battle passed Opis on the Tigris, they "met the bastard brother (nothos adelphos) of Cyrus and Artaxerxes, who was leading a large army from Susa and Ecbatana to the support, as he said, of the King" (Anab. II.4.25-0-). The rapidity of Cyrus's march had also prevented Artaxerxes from carrying out his initial plans, which had apparently in­ cluded Abrocomas's forces, since Abrocomas is named by Xenophon as one of the four commanders (along with Tissaphernes, Gobryas, and Arbaces; 1.7.12). The royal army drawn up atCunaxa thus did not include the forces from western Asia Minor (preempted by Cyrus), Abrocomas's army (still on the road), or the eastern Ira­ nian contingents (who would also arrive too late). It had been mustered exclusively from the closest regions: Babylonia, Susiana, Media, Persia; the Cadusians also sent a cavalry contingent commanded by Artagerses (Plutarch, Art. 9). For reasons already discussed in connection with Xerxes' army, it is impossible to provide reliable estimates of the size of the king's forces (cf. Plutarch, Art. 13.3-4). We may simply surmise, with Xenophon (1.8.13), that they were superior in number to Cyrus's. Contrary to one of the favorite claims of the Greek authors (and contrary to the mercenaries' expectations: they were "full of confidence and scorn"), Xenophon (1.8.14) and Plutarch (Arc. 7.5*) both stress the discipline and training of Artaxerxes' soldiers: "The very manner in which [Arta­ xerxes] led on his men, silently and slowly, made the Grecians stand amazed at his good discipline; who had expected irregular shouting and leaping, much confusion and sepa­ ration between one body of men and another, in so vast a multitude of troops"! Plu­ tarch's sources instead attribute the defeat to Cyrus's overweening pride and Clearchus's lack of discipline (Art. 8.2-6). Just as Darius III and his advisers were to do later on, Artaxerxes placed great confi­ dence in his scythe-equipped chariots: "and the scythes they carried reached out side­ ways from the axles and were also set under the chariot bodies, pointing towards the ground, so as to cut to pieces whatever they met; the intention, then, was that they should drive into the ranks of the Greeks and cut the troops to pieces" (1.8.10*). The success rate was not as high as expected: just as Alexander's soldiers were to do, "when­ ever the Greeks saw them coming, they would open a gap for their passage" (1.8.20*). The Greeks were ranged on the right flank with a detachment of 1000 Paphlagonian horsemen and gave chase to the enemy; as a result, they escaped the deluge of shafts fired by the king's archers and spearmen (1.8.19; cf. 1.8.9 and II. 1.6; Diodorus XIV.23.12). The hand-to-hand fighting favored Clearchus's Greeks, who too confidently threw themselves into pursuit of their opponents. Xenophon tells us (1.8.24) that this is when Cyrus, fearing that the Greek contingent would be surrounded, attacked in the middle; lie was killed in circumstances that the conflicting traditions do not permit us to recon­ struct (1.8.24-29). On the left flank, Ariaeus, after initial successful engagements, was stunned into retreat by the news of the death of Cyrus and was afraid that he would be

Chapter I5. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III

630

encircled by the king's contingents (Diodorus XIV.24.1). The death of Cyrus sealed the fate of the battle and the expedition.

3. Artaxerxes the Victor

The Process of Relegitimation After the death of Cyrus on the battlefield at Cunaxa, Artaxerxes immediately took ac­ tions designed to extirpate the memory of him who, after his initial victories, "was al­ ready being saluted with homage as King by his attendants" (1.8.21*). "And when he had come near the dead body, and, according to a certain law of the Persians, the right hand and head had been lopped off from the trunk, he gave orders that the latter should be brought to him, and, grasping the hair of it, which was long and bushy, he showed it to those who were still uncertain and disposed to fly. They were amazed at it, and did him homage; so that there were presently seventy thousand of them got about him, and en­ tered the camp again with him" (Plutarch, Art. 13.2*). Artaxerxes showed clearly that he was the one who had won the loyalty of thousands and the one whose legitimacy was proved by the victory. A court tradition transmitted by Dinon even claims that Cyrus was killed by the hand of the king himself (Plutarch, Art. 10.3). "For it was his desire that every one, whether Greek or barbarian, should believe that in the mutual assaults and conflicts between him and his brother, he, giving and receiving a blow, was himself indeed wounded, but the other lost his life" ($16.2*). This is why, as Plutarch reports it, Artaxerxes was very irritated to hear that a simple Caunian soldier and a young Persian, Mithradates, each made the claim or let it be understood that it was he who had done the deed. Artaxerxes "was greatly enraged at it, as having the lie given him, and being in danger to forfeit the most glorious and most pleasant circumstance of his victory" (§ 16.1*). Throughout his reign, no opportunity to portray the king as a proven general and an accomplished leader of men was missed (§24.9-11). At the same time, the royal inscriptions show that Artaxerxes followed the model of not only his father Darius II (A Sfc, A Sd) but, like his predecessors, also the model of Darius I. He insisted on dynastic continuity, particularly in this sort of inscription from Susa (A Sa*): "Saith Artaxerxes the Great King, King of Kings, King of Countries, King in this earth, son of Darius the King, of Darius (who was) son of Artaxerxes the King, of Artaxerxes (who was) son of Xerxes the King, of Xerxes (who was) son of Darius the King, of Darius (who was) son of Hystaspes, an Achaemenian: This palace Darius my greatgreat-grandfather built; later under Artaxerxes my grandfather it was b u r n e d ; . . . this pal­ ace I (re)built. .." (cf. also A Hc). 2

2

2

2

Reward and Punishment After the first treaty with the Greeks, "the King led his army off to Babylon. In that city he accorded fitting honours to everyone who had performed deeds of courage in the battle" (Diodorus XIV.26.4*). First among the persons honored was Tissaphernes, be­ cause he had joined the king as early as spring 401 and played a decisive role at Cunaxa: at least in one version, he was head of one of the four divisions (1.7.12) and was said to have taken over the army when Artaxerxes was wounded: "He slew great numbers of the enemy, so that his presence was conspicuous from afar. . . . [The King] judged Tissa­ phernes to have been the bravest of all. Consequently he honoured him with rich gifts,

Artaxerxes the Victor

631

gave him his own daughter in marriage, and henceforth continued to hold him as his most trusted friend" (XIV.23.6;* 26.4*). He certainly was one of the king's favorites, since he was permitted shortly afterward to let the Greeks pillage "the villages of Parysatis" at Tikrit, not far from Opis (cf. II.4.27). Another noble, Orontes, the satrap of Armenia, mar­ ried Rhodogune, a daughter of the king (Anab. JII.4.13; Plutarch §27.7; O G / S 391-92). Perhaps it was at the same time that the king promised two other daughters to Pharnaba­ zus and Tiribazus (27.7). The latter was one of the Friends of the king and had played a major role at Cunaxa (Plutarch, Arf. 7.3), where he saved the king's life (according to one of the versions; §10.1). It was not until fifteen years later that Pharnabazus gained the noteworthy dignity of becoming the king's son-in-law (Xenophon, Hell. V.1.28). Tissaphernes received an even greater promotion: "Now . . . Tissaphernes, who was thought to have proved himself very valuable to the King in the war against his brother, was sent down as satrap both of the provinces which he himself had previously ruled and of those which Cyrus had ruled" (Xenophon, Hell. III. 1.3*). He then set about regain­ ing control of the cities and dignitaries who had taken the rebel's side as rapidly as pos­ sible. Tissaphernes abandoned the Greek survivors at the Gates of Armenia and returned to Sardis by the Royal Road (Diodorus XIV. 27.4). All the leaders except Tamos, who chose to flee to Egypt (35.4), came to pay homage to the new karanos; Tamos's son Glus, who had received a royal pardon, was even put in charge of the armed forces (35.3). Ariaeus, another old companion of Cyrus, received a command: in any case, some years later he was the satrap of Phrygia (cf. Diodorus XIV.80.8; Polyaenus VII. 11.6); later still (around 394), he held a post at Sardis (Hell. Oxyr. 14.3). His status as a former enemy of the king even worked to his advantage to some extent, since rebels would seek refuge with him at Sardis, obviously hoping that he would mediate for them with the king to obtain a royal pardon (Xenophon, Hell. IV. 1.27). We note with interest that the Great King did not hesitate to pardon a number of rebels. Do these decisions speak to the uncertainty of his power after the victory at Cunaxa? It is difficult to answer this question. It is true that all of the ancient texts insist on the "gentility" of Artaxerxes II and on his practice of royal gifts. But the distribution of the evidence may be deceptive. It is passible that the king, at an unknown date, pro­ mulgated a relaxation of certain court regulations, particularly regarding royal hunts; but even on this point chronological uncertainties remain. We may simply note that after Cunaxa the Great King hardly had any choice regarding ways of winning over to himself nobles who had followed Cyrus (by choice or by force). Under other circum­ stances, however, Artaxerxes did not shrink from using drastic measures even against those close to him (cf. Plutarch, Art. 25.3). Even Tissaphernes did not escape royal pun­ ishment some years later after losing the battle outside Sardis against Agesilaus (§5 be­ low), though Artaxerxes "continued to hold him as his most trusted friend" (Diodorus XIV. 26.4*).

The Great King and His Armies Arguing that the return of the survivors of Cyrus's mercenaries to the sea demon­ strated quality of character, Plutarch offers this thought to his readers: Making it plain to all men that the Persian king and his empire were mighty indeed in gold and luxury and women, but otherwise were a mere show and vain display, upon this all Greece took courage and despised the barbarians. (Art. 20.1-2*)

632

Chapter J 5. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III

This comment conveys an idea that was equally dear to Xenophon, whether in the last chapter of the Cyropaedia or in the Agesilaus, a small work dedicated to singing the praises of a Greek hero whose human qualities contrasted in every way with the Great King, who was viewed as mired in luxury and sloth. Magnifying the deeds of the Ten Thousand is a common topos of fourth-century authors, who brought them forward as proof that "any one who is engaged in war with [the Persians] can, if he desire, range up and down their country without having to strike a blow" (Cyr. VIII.8.7*) —and that be­ cause the Persians had been rendered effeminate by a dissolute life, they "can conduct their wars only with the assistance of Greeks" (8.26-*-). This point of view is particularly stressed by Isocrates (Paneg. 138-49), who ends his discussion of the softness of the Per­ sians thus: "They made themselves objects of derision under the very walls of their King's palace" (§149*). Even if we invoke the ritual reminder that the state of the evidence leaves everything in doubt, the status of the Greek mercenaries during the battle of Cunaxa and in the fol­ lowing weeks poses real problems. In Xenophon's version, they prolonged the battle un­ til evening, winning several engagements with detachments of the royal army (1.10.419). They were sure of having won and even raised a monument (Diodorus XIV.24.4) before returning to their camp, where they discovered that the enemy's light infantry had pillaged the food reserves (Anab. 1.10.18-19). It was not until daybreak that Procles and Glus informed them of the death of Cyrus (II. 1.2-3). The battle lines were so strained that there had evidently been two different battles: on the left flank, Ariaeus had retreated; from there, he had sent Procles and Glus to request that Clearchus and the Greeks join him, proposing that they organize a joint return to Ionia (II. 1.3). Clearchus refused, even offering to put Ariaeus on the Persian throne, and he sent messengers to inform him (II. 1.4-5). Ariaeus replied that this was out of the question (II.2.1). An agree­ ment was finally reached, with both swearing to an alliance, and Ariaeus agreed to guide the Greeks to the coast (II.2.8-9). At the same time, emissaries from Tissaphernes and the king parleyed with the Greeks, demanding that they lay down their arms. Clearchus arrogantly refused, emphasizing that his forces were intact (II. 1.7-13); it was even said that not a "single man among the Greeks [got] any hurt whatever in this battle" (1.8.20*). Nonetheless, the mercenaries were not in full agreement; a few groups agreed to surrender (II. 1.14; 2.17). Xenophon's account continues: he says that the king himself was afraid of the army of Clearchus and Ariaeus (11.2.18; 3.1). This is why Tissaphernes and a brother-in-law of Artaxerxes showed up on his behalf with orders to come to an agreement: if the Greeks agreed not to fight, the Persians would supply them (II.3.1729). The Greeks were fully aware that without guides they would never manage to over­ come the obstacles or resupply themselves in the country. So it was that they set out for the west bank of the Tigris Valley under the watchful eye of Tissaphernes (II.4.8-28). Why, then, had the Great King failed to order his generals to begin the battle? Should this be seen as proof of his weakness? This is clearly Clearchus's perspective, which was accepted by Xenophon. Mercenaries quoted by Xenophon thought that the king was waiting until all of his troops were reunited (II.4.3). Not until some time later was the recombination of the various royal contingents completed: "the troops of O r o n t a s . . . , the barbarians whom Cyrus had brought with him on his upward march, and those with whom the King's brother had come to the aid of the King [II.4.25-26], besides these con­ tingents Tissaphernes had all the troops that the King had given him; the result was, that

Artaxerxes the Victor

633

his army appeared exceedingly large" (III.4.13*). Nevertheless, Tissaphernes did not or­ ganize his army into battle order; he was content to mount occasional attacks on the Greeks, shadowing them as far as the Upper Tigris. Meanwhile, basic strategic changes had taken place. According to Diodorus, Tissa­ phernes submitted the following plan to Artaxerxes: He "promised him that he would destroy them one and all, if the King would supply him with armaments and come to terms with Aridaeus, for he believed that Aridaeus would betray the Greeks to him in the course of the march. The King readily accepted this suggestion and allowed him to se­ lect from his entire army as many of the best troops as he chose" (XIV.26.5*). The first order of business was the recovery of Ariaeus and the large body of troops under him that Cyrus had levied in Asia Minor. "Ariaeus' brothers and other relatives came to him and certain Persians came to his followers, and they kept encouraging them and bringing pledges to some of them from the King that the King would bear them no ill-will be­ cause of their campaign with Cyrus against him or because of anything else in the past" (Anab. II.4. ! • ) . The negotiations between the two camps soon succeeded. Ariaeus and his companions. Artaozus and Mithradates, "who had been most faithful friends of Cyrus,"* laid a trap for the Greeks: several strategoi and lokhagos summoned to Tissa­ phernes' tent were seized and put to death (II.5.31-6.1). By winning Ariaeus's troops over to him, eliminating the main Greek strategoi, and gathering a large army, Tissa­ phernes was in a position of power from that time forward. He left the Greeks at the fron­ tier of the land of the Carduchi to return to his territory at Sardis (Diodorus XIV.27.4). At this point, it was impossible for the Greeks to return directly to Ionia; they could only march north. There is no doubt that the Persians were certain that the survivors would not overcome the natural barriers (rivers, mountains), the attacks of the mountain peoples, or the attacks of the troops of the Armenian satrapy. Events suggest contrasting conclusions regarding Artaxerxes IPs military situation after Cunaxa. The very make-up of the armies of Cyrus and Artaxerxes indicates that the system of conscription continued to operate perfectly from Asia Minor to India, even though the delay of the eastern Iranian contingents demonstrates that it was not possible to organize a general muster in a few months. Given the relatively limited geographic distribution of the conscripts who did fight at Issus, there is hardly any doubt that the Great King, for his part, was able to count on the soldiers provided by the Babylonian hatrus, among others. The reliance on thousands of Greek mercenaries in Cyrus's army constituted a decided novelty, quite apart from the important role Cyrus assigned them in the battle, in combination with his cavalry. It is no less true, however, that the con­ frontation at Cunaxa was not a duel between Cyrus's Greek mercenaries and Artaxerxes' regulars; it was the clash of two royal armies. As in the battles in Greece and Asia Minor in 490 and 480-79, the Greek foot soldiers seemed to exhibit clear superiority over the infantrymen they faced. This observation, however, needs to be tempered: for one thing, let us recall that Plutarch (Arr. 7.5) and Xenophon (1.8.14) stress the maneuverability of the royal army; for another, Tissa­ phernes' actions after the battle can be accounted for by his fear of the army com­ manded by Ariaeus, or, to put it another way, he feared joint maneuvers involving the inter-satrapal army and the Greek army. The Persian leaders thus adroitly chose to sepa­ rate them and then forced the Greeks onto an itinerary that they could assume would prove fatal. After Megabyzus's victory over Amyrtaeus, he had acted no differently. He

634

Chapter 15. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III

reached an agreement with the Egyptian rebel's Greek mercenaries: "No ill shall be done them by the king's men, and the Greeks shall return home whenever they wish" (Ctesias §34); they took the road to Cyrene and, according to Thucydides (1.110.1*), "most of them perished" (there is a different version in Diodorus XI.77.5). But there is a difference in scale: in 401, the Greeks were in Babylonia. The Persians were anxious to see them out of the heart of the Empire. At the same time, we may ob­ serve that the Persians never pretended to accept the offers of services that the heads of the mercenaries had made to them several times, emphasizing that they would be very useful in a fight against the unsubdued peoples (Anab. II. 1.14,5.13-14). At this time, it appears that the Persian leaders did not even consider including the Greek mercenaries in the royal army. Did the Great King fear that mercenaries could be used by an ambi­ tious man, as Cyrus had done? This is the burden of Tissaphernes' convoluted speech to Clearchus: "Tire King alone may wear upright the tiara that is upon the head, but an­ other, too, with your help, might easily so wear the one that is upon the heart" (II.5.23-$-). The mercenaries themselves seem to have been persuaded that they could make and unmake kings, as shown by the offers they made along these lines to Ariaeus (II. 1.4); they were convinced, Clearchus says, that "to those who are victorious in battle belongs also the right to rule" (II. 1.4*). But the proposals they sent to Ariaeus were rather naive, and the Persian let them know, in ironic understatement, that "there were many Per­ sians of higher rank than himself and they would not tolerate his being king" (II.2.1*). It is clear that not a single Persian had the slightest notion of abandoning Artaxerxes; on the contrary, all hoped to obtain from him favor or pardon from him.

4. Conditions in Asia Minor and Artaxerxes H's Strategy

(400-396)

From Sardis to Memphis As we have seen, after Cunaxa and the "expulsion" of the Greek mercenaries, Tissa­ phernes returned to his governorship in Sardis (Diodorus XIV.27.4). It was his job, in fact, to restore order to Asia Minor. Diodorus stresses that the Greek cities that had sup­ ported Cyrus were scared to death (XIV.35.6). And with good reason: one of Tissa­ phernes' first acts was that he "demanded that all the Ionian cities should be subject to him." They refused and appealed to Sparta for help (Xenophon, Hell. III. 1.3*). Without delay, Tissaphernes devastated the territory of Cyme and laid siege to the town; at the be­ ginning of winter (400-399), the Persian accepted heavy ransoms for the prisoners and lifted the siege (Diodorus XIV.35.7). The following spring (399), the first Spartan expe­ ditionary force landed on the Asia Minor coast. Greco-Persian hostilities thus broke out once again on the coast of Asia Minor. For reasons we have already discussed, the Great King had to deal with the Egyptian front at the same time. When the Greek mercenaries offered their services to Tissa­ phernes, they had not neglected to bring up the matter of the Egyptians, with whom the Persians were "especially angry" (Anab. II.5.13;-0- cf. I L L 14). If the king wished to march against Egypt—said Clearchus—"I do not see what force you could better employ to aid you in chastising them than the force which I now have" (Anab. II. 5.13*). A contract at­ tests that Pharaoh Amyrtaeus was recognized at Elephantine in 400 (DAE 7 [AP 35]). In 398, Nepherites founded the XXIXth dynasty (DAE 105 [BMAP 13]) and reigned until 393. It is surprising that no source mentions an attempted Persian reconquest. Not until the reign of Hakoris (392-380), around 385(?), is there evidence for the assembling of an

Conditions in Asia Minor and Artaxerxes IPs Strategy (400-396)

63 5

army to march against Egypt (cf. Isocrates, Paneg. 140). Meanwhile, Egypt had entered into the coalition put together by Sparta against Artaxerxes as an equal partner. As in the 460s (see chap. 14/2), from that point forward Egypt was included in a much wider front, with the important difference that this time the Persians no longer had a base in the country. The Elephantine garrison, for example, had gone over with both weapons and supplies to the side of the independent pharaohs (DAE 7,105). Artaxerxes' task was even more difficult because Tamos, Cyrus's lieutenant, fled Asia Minor in 400 and took ref­ uge with the pharaoh, along with his fortune and the fleet he commanded (Diodorus XIV.35.4-5) — "fifty triremes which had been fitted out at great expense . . . [but Psam­ metichus took] for his own both Tamos' possessions and his fleet" (XIV. 19.5*).

Artaxerxes, His Satraps, and the Asia Minor Front At the very moment when Amyrtaeus was extending his power into Upper Egypt, Thibron, the Lacedaemonian commander-in-chief, landed in Asia Minor (spring, 399). He was leading a smaller force but recruited troops in the Greek cities, and then soon joined up with the Greek refugees of the Anabasis (Hell. III. 1.4-6). He could then "draw up his troops against Tissaphernes even on the plains" and took many towns and strong­ holds in Mysia, Aeolis, and the Troad (III. 1.8*). Complaints from Greek cities that he fleeced soon resulted in his replacement by Dercyllidas, who resurrected a traditional tactic: he played Tissaphernes off against Pharnabazus. He then headed for "the Aeolis, in the territory of Pharnabazus, without doing any harm whatever to his allies" (III. 1.10*). Pharnabazus was very unhappy at being stripped of this region and "secretly envied Tissaphernes his position as general" (III.2.13*); he agreed to a truce with Der­ cyllidas, "thinking that Aeolis had been made a strong base of attack upon his own dwell­ ing-place (oikesis), Phrygia" (III.2.1,* 9). In short, they were back to a situation very like what prevailed in 412-407, with the two satraps in perpetual competition. Obviously, Tissaphernes had not succeeded in gaining the upper hand, as had Cyrus the Younger at Sardis. The dissension surfaced once again some time later, during preparation for a pitched battle near Magnesia. The two satraps had combined their forces: "The entire Persian force which chanced to be at hand, all the Greek troops which each of the two satraps had, and horsemen in great numbers, those of Tissaphernes upon the right wing and those of Pharnabazus upon the left" (III.2.15*). According to Xenophon, Tissaphernes (in contrast to Pharnabazus) was not particularly eager for combat and offered to nego­ tiate with Dercyllidas (III.2.18). One of the reasons undoubtedly was that war threatened to ravage Caria, where Tissaphernes' estates were (oikos; III.2.12). The talks between the Persians and Dercyllidas led to a truce: the Persians demanded that the Lacedaemonian troops and the governors (hannostes) who had been stationed in the Greek towns since Lysander's victories depart; Dercyllidas demanded autonomy for the Greek cities. Both sides decided on consultations—with the Great King and the Spartan leadership, re­ spectively (III.2.20). In effect, the Persians were asking that the treaties with the king and his representatives agreed to by Sparta during the Ionian War fifteen years earlier be put into effect. Pharnabazus was instructed to sound out the king regarding his intentions (Diodorus XIV.39.6). The satrap of Dascylium, Diodorus tells us, favored a vigorous sea offensive. Just after the first truce with Dercyllidas, he had sought out the king and persuaded him to fund him (in the amount of 500 talents of silver) and to appeal to the Athenian Conon

636

Chapter 15. Artaxerxes U and Artaxerxes 111

(XIV.39.1). Ever since the Athenian defeats of 405, he had taken refuge with Evagoras of Salamis, on Cyprus, at the very time when Evagoras had been doing everything he could to increase the city's prosperity and had inaugurated vast arms programs. There is no indication that the Cypriot king was trying to escape from the Persian yoke. His origi­ nal objective was to extend his power throughout the island at the expense of the other petty kinglets. It is nonetheless possible that he took advantage of the war between the brothers to take certain liberties with his obligations as a subject. In 398, contacts were established between Evagoras and Artaxerxes, perhaps with Ctesias as go-between. Eva­ goras agreed to resume payment of tribute (Persica $63), since under the present circum­ stances he shared the Persians' hostility to Sparta, whose power was a check on his ambitions. These were the conditions under which Pharnabazus arrived in Cyprus, bearing a letter from the king ordering all the kings of the island to prepare about one hundred triremes. Conon accepted an appointment as admiral of the fleet. He then set sail for Cilicia, where he began his preparations for the war that was about to commence against the Peloponnesian navy (Diodorus XIV.39.2-4). This was an important event. As far as we can determine, this was the first royal navy that seems to have been assembled since the famous Phoenician navy of 412 (not con­ sidering Cyrus the Younger's fleet in 401). This royal navy (hasilikos stolos) did not com­ prise Cypriot ships alone; somewhat later, Conon was joined by a Cilician contingent, as well as a Phoenician squadron commanded by the king of the Sidonians (Diodorus XIV.79.8; Hell. Oxyr. 4.2). Sparta soon got wind of these massive naval preparations through a Syracusan merchant who was in Phoenicia on business at the time: Seeing Phoenician war-ships—some of them sailing in from other places, others lying there fully manned, and yet others still making ready for sea—and hearing, besides, that there were to be three hundred of them, . . . [he] reported to the Lacedaemonians that the King and Tissaphernes were preparing this expedition; but whither it was bound he said he did not know. (Hell. III.4.1-0-) The methods used to assemble the royal fleet indicate that Persian authority, however shaken by Cyrus's revolt, was fully operational among its Levantine subjects. We see that, as in earlier times, the king of Sidon played a very important role for the Persians. On the other hand, the theory that the syennesis in Cilicia was in political decline at this date must be viewed with some hesitancy, since no independent evidence supports it. At the same time, the king continued to raise the troops needed to fight in Asia Minor (Nepos, Ages. 2.1; Xenophon, Ages. 6.1). He also decreed that the command be unified in such a way as to avoid repeating previous errors: Tissaphernes was named com­ mander-in-chief (strategos ton panton). Despite the hatred that Pharnabazus, now back in Asia Minor, nursed toward Tissaphernes, he did not shrink from "assuring him that he was ready to make war together with him, to be his ally, and to aid him in driving the Greeks out of the territory of the King" (Hell. III.2.13*). But the competition between Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes was more complicated than this, since (according to sev­ eral ancient authors, e.g., Nepos, Conon 2.2), Pharnabazus received command of mari­ time operations, thus doubling up on the Athenian Conon. It seems clear that the command assigned to Tissaphernes was reduced to the ground troops. To carry out his objective, the king also released considerable resources. Some time later, to be sure, we learn that a riot broke out in Conon's army when the soldiers com­ plained about not receiving their pay (Hell. Oxyr. 15; cf. Isocrates, Paneg. 142). Justin

Agesilaus in Asia Minor (196-394)

637

was probably not wrong to see this as the result of machinations by the "king's lieuten­ ants, who were in the habit of defrauding the soldiers of their pay" (VI.2.11). To deal with the problem, Conon appealed directly to Artaxerxes, promising to destroy Lacedae­ monian sea power if Artaxerxes would grant him sufficient money and equipment: "Arta­ xerxes approved Conon, honoured him with rich gifts, and appointed a paymaster who should supply funds in abundance as Conon might assign them" (Diodorus XIV.81.6;-vcf. Nepos Conon 4.2 and Hell. Oxyr. 19). So it appears that, quite atypically, Conon re­ ceived permission to draw on royal supplies without checking each time with the central court (cf. Nepos, Conon 4.1). Access to such resources could hardly avoid arousing great hope among the enemies of Sparta, who were numerous in both Greece and the Ae­ gean. This is why Sparta had to wage war against Elis during the expedition led by Dercyllidas (400-398; Hell. III.2.21-31), and then later had to deal with an attempted helot revolt (397; I1I.3.4-11). And despite being at peace with its former enemy, Athens sent an embassy to the Great King and provided secret reinforcements (sailors) to Conon, who was then at Caunus (Hell. Oxyr. 7.1). We are unable to discern, then, the strange passivity in Artaxerxes that the ancient sources attribute to Darius II (see chap. 14/7). Obviously, Artaxerxes made the firm and irrevocable decision to fight energetically to regain control of the Aegean coast. There is no doubt that the king's objective embraced the entire Aegean as well. Confronted by this threat, Sparta sent King Agesilaus to Asia Minor in 396. At the same time, it dis­ patched ambassadors to Pharaoh Nepherites, who provided the equipment for 100 tri­ remes and 500,000 measures of wheat—which soon fell into the hands of Conon, who had just taken Rhodes (Diodorus XIV.79.4-7; cf. Justin VI.2.1-2). The pharaoh realized that his survival depended on a Spartan victory. Conversely, Artaxerxes knew that re­ taking Egypt presupposed the reestablishment of hegemony over the Aegean Sea, which his predecessors had gradually lost during the course of the previous century. From this point of view, the Great King's actions after Cunaxa represent a sort of strategic turn­ about: the hour of reconquest was at hand.

5. Agesilaus in Asia Minor (396-394)

The Defeat of Tissaphernes Sparta was confronted with imminent danger and decided to prosecute the war on a grander scale (cf. Diodorus XIV.79.1). King Agesilaus was sent at the head of a 12,000man expeditionary force, and he soon reached Ephesus (Hell. III.4.1-5; spring, 396). His mission was clear: to ensure the autonomy of the cities of Asia Minor (III.4.5). At first, Tissaphernes agreed to a truce, with the excuse that he had to get the king's permis­ sion. In reality, he was completely aware of Artaxerxes' intention: he was stalling for time until the king's troops could reach him (III.4.6; cf. Nepos, Ages. 2.4). He also needed to gain enough time for the Phoenician shipyards to complete the craft promised to Conon, as well as to free the fleet that the Lacedaemonian admiral Pharax had block­ aded at Caunus; this he accomplished (Diodorus XIV.79.4-8; Hell. Oxyr. 9.2-3). When the truce expired, then, Tissaphernes was able to demand that Agesilaus pull back from the Asia Minor territories; the Spartan responded immediately that this was out of the question (He//. III.4.HJ). Agesilaus assembled the Carian, Aeolian, Ionian, and Hellespontine contingents at Ephesus (III.4.11). Tissaphernes thought that the Spartan intended to ravage his estates

638

Chapter I5. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III

in Caria, so he sent his infantry to Caria and concentrated his cavalry on the plain of the Meander, expecting to cut off the Greek troops there. Contrary to expectations, Agesilaus took the Phrygian route. A battle took place near Dascyliunv. Phamabazus's lieuten­ ants, Rhathines and Bagaeus, won a cavalry engagement but had to retreat when the hoplites charged. Agesilaus then returned to Ephesus (III.4.11-15). The purpose of this offensive was not to conquer towns and territory; all of the ancient authors instead stress the amount of booty seized by the Spartan (Xenophon, Hell. III.4.12; Nepos, Ages. 3.2; Plutarch, Ages. 9.4). Diodorus (XIV.79.2) also states that the army was accompanied by a large number of merchants (agoraios . . . okhlos), who clearly had been instructed to find ways to market the booty (cf. Plutarch, Ages. 9.8; Xenophon, Hell. IV. 1.26). It is clear that first and foremost Agesilaus had decided that money was to be the ultimate means of achieving his real objectives. With this reinforcement, he then decided to send out an army capable of successfully opposing the Persian forces: Perceiving that, unless he obtained an adequate cavalry force, he would not be able to cam­ paign in the plains, he resolved that this must be provided, so that he might not have to carry on a skulking warfare. Accordingly he assigned the richest men of all the cities in that region to the duty of raising horses; and by proclaiming that whoever supplied a horse and arms and a competent man would not have to serve himself, he caused these arrangements to be car­ ried out with all the expedition that was to be expected when men were eagerly looking for substitutes to die in their stead. (Hell. III.4.15*) At the same time, the Ephesus workshops were operating at full capacity: "The market was full of all sorts of horses and weapons, offered for sale, and the copper-workers, car­ penters, smiths, leather-cutters, and painters were all engaged in making martial weap­ ons, so that one might have thought that the city was really a workshop of war" (III.4.17*). The soldiers themselves were given daily drills. Agesilaus announced that he was prepared to march on Sardis (spring, 395). Curi­ ously enough, Tissaphernes did not believe a word of it and one more time sent his troops to defend Caria. A battle on the banks of the Pactolus ended with an advantage to the Greeks. From this point on, Xenophon's story is very sketchy. According to him, after the battle, Tissaphernes was indicted by the Persians of Sardis and was soon condemned to death by Artaxerxes. Tithraustes was sent to Sardis, and Tissaphernes was beheaded {Hell. III.4.21-25; Diodorus XIV.80.1-8; Hell. Oxyr. 11.2-12.4) and his possessions (ousia) confiscated to provide funds with which to pay the soldiers (Hell. Oxyr. 19.3). The new commander once again informed Agesilaus of the king's demands: "That the cities in Asia, retaining their independence, should render him the ancient tribute" (III,4.25*). A six-month truce was then agreed to. Agesilaus received supplies from Tithraustes that made it possible for him to march to Hellespontine Phrygia. At this mo­ ment, the order from Sparta to take complete command of the navy reached him; he then issued orders to the coastal cities to provide ships and entrusted their command to his brother-in-law Peisander (III.4.25-28).

The "Anabasis" of Agesilaus Diodorus provides further details about Agesilaus's plans after the battle of the Pacto­ lus: he "was about to attack the satrapies farther inland (and), but led his army back to the sea when he could not obtain favourable omens from the sacrifices" (XIV80.5-*-). The much more detailed report in the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia shows us that these sacri­ fices took place when, fresh from the plain of Sardis (accompanied for pari of the journey

Agesilaus in Asia Minor (396-394)

639

Map 4. The expedition of Agesilaus.

by Tissaphernes), Agesilaus went up the valley of the Cogamus before arriving on the banks of the Meander (12.1). Sacrifices were then offered to discover whether it was aus­ picious to move against Celaenae, the fortified capital of Greater Phrygia (12.4). When the gods provided a negative indication, Agesilaus went back down the Meander Valley to Ephesus (cf. also Diodorus XIV.80.5). In reality, the omens simply confirmed a prior decision: to march against Celaenae would be terribly risky. Agesilaus had had a twofold goal: to make an impression on the inland populations and to collect sizable booty. He seems to have had some success in meeting these goals. Artaxerxes suffered some anxiety at the initial results of the land engagements (Diodorus XIV.80.6) because he had received information concerning the Greek predations on the plain of Sardis and beyond, including Tissaphernes' paradise (80.2). No doubt the Persians of Sardis were even more displeased with Tissaphernes because this was the first time since the Ionian raid in 499 that such unheard-of events had taken place. Moreover, according to the anonymous author ($21.1), Tithraustes agreed to the truce on the condition that Agesi­ laus would not pillage the Lydian countryside. It appears that more than anything else the Persians wished to keep Sardis and Lydia safe from war. As in earlier episodes, the leaders of Sardis were happy to see the theater of operations shift to the coast of Hellespontine Phrygia! Nonetheless, Agesilaus did not give up his plan to advance on the interior. While Peisander was readying the navy, "Agesilaus continued the march to Phrygia" (Hell. IU.4.29*). He hoped to be able to count on the Mysians, who were said to be unsubmis­ sive to the Great King. For this reason he ravaged their territory, but this action did not have the anticipated result: only a portion of the Mysians placed themselves under his

640

Chapter I5. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes HI

command; another portion did severe damage to his troops [Hell. Oxyr. 21.1-3). Agesi­ laus did not let up on ravaging Pharnabazus's lands. He was soon joined by the Persian Spithridates, who had broken with the satrap of Dascylium some time earlier (Xeno­ phon, Hell. III.4.10; Ages. 3.3; Hell. Oxyr. 21.3-4): And when Spithridates said that if he would come to Paphlagonia with him, he would bring the king of the Paphlagonians to a conference and make him an ally (symmakhos), Agesilaus eagerly undertook the journey, since this was a thing he had long desired—to win some na­ tion (ethnos) away from the Persian King. (Hell. IV.1.2-V-) Accompanied by his new allies, Agesilaus took the interior road to Greater Phrygia and rejoined the royal way at Leontocephalae. Though he was able to extort some booty, he failed to take the town (Hell. Oxyr. 22.5), one of the most secure in Phrygia (Appian, Mith. 10: khorion okhyrotaton). He then advanced against Gordion, "a fortress (khorion) built on a hill and well supplied," but there too he had to fall back in the face of resis­ tance put up by Rhathines (21.6), a subordinate of Pharnabazus (cf. Xenophon, Anab. VI.5.7 and Hell. III.4.13). The Spartan next returned to Cius in Mysia and then Hellespontine Phrygia {Hell. Oxyr. 22.1-3). At this point Xenophon (and many other authors follow in his wake) de­ votes a long digression to relations between Pharnabazus and Agesilaus. At first, Phar­ nabazus's cavalry and scythe-equipped chariots won total victory, but then the Greeks managed to plunder the satrap's camp (IV. 1.15-26). The author of the Oxyrhynchus Hellenica indicates that, meanwhile, Agesilaus had tried to take Dascylium, "a very strong place (khorion okhyron), fortified by the king, where they said Pharnabazus kept the sil­ ver and gold he had" (22.3). Agesilaus brought the boats of the Peloponnesian navy from the Hellespont and ordered the commander to load all of the booty and take it to Cyzicus; then he sent his soldiers to their winter quarters, ordering them to regather the fol­ lowing spring (394; 22.4). The Spartan was unable to capture the citadel and so proceeded with controlled pillaging of the surroundings, particularly the prosperous, game-rich satrapal paradise (Hell. IV. 1.15-16). We are then told that Pharnabazus com­ plained to Agesilaus in these words: "I have not so much as a meal in my own land un­ less, like the beasts, I pick up a bit of what you may leave" (IV. 1.33-0-)! These words were spoken, Xenophon would have us believe, during a conversation between the leaders that was arranged by a Greek who had invited them both. After the meeting, Agesilaus left the country and encamped in the plain of Thebe near the Gulf of Adramyttium (spring, 394), and this is where he was when he received the order from the Spartan au­ thorities to return immediately to Greece. According to Hell. Oxyr. (22.4), his goal then was to march on Cappadocia: despite the obvious geographical mistake about the layout of Asia Minor, the datum indicates clearly that Agesilaus had decided to resume the march to the interior. Xenophon says no different: "He was preparing to march as far as he could into the interior (anotato), thinking that he would detach from the King all the nations (ethne) which he could put in his rear" (Xenophon, Hell. IV. 1.41-*-). A similar appraisal is found in Plutarch: He "now resolved to carry away the war from the seaside, and to march further up into the country, and to attack the King of Persia himself in his own home in Susa and Ecbatana; not willing to let the monarch sit idle in his chair, playing umpire in the conflicts of the Greeks, and bribing their popular leaders" (Ages. 15.1;* cf. Pel. 30.3). The words used by Nepos are no less grandiose: "He was already planning to march against the Persians

Agesilaus in Asia Minor

(396-394)

641

and attack the King himself" (Ages. 4.1-2*). Finally, Isocrates, going on about the re­ markable military weakness of the Persians, as was his wont, stated "that Agesilaus, with the help of the army of Cyrus, conquered almost all the territory this side of the Halys river" (Paneg. 145). Note that he took the opportunity of this comment to connect Agesilaus with Cyrus the Younger. We know in fact that the escapades of these two lead_ C y r u s (that is, the Greek mercenaries!) and Agesilaus—were constantly cited in Greece as especially eloquent precedents: both "brought the King to extremities" (Xe­ nophon, Hell. VI. 1.12*)! Similarly, in the Agesilaus, the Spartan hero is systematically contrasted with a decadent Great King. If we follow Xenophon in this panegyric, Agesi­ laus was a Greek (Spartan) hero whose adventures explicitly matched those of the Ho­ meric heroes: Agesilaus embarks on nothing less than a new Trojan War; emulating Agamemnon, he set sail from Aulis (cf. Plutarch, Ages. 6.6-8; Xenophon, Hell. III.4.3; Diodorus XIV.79.1). In all of these Greek accounts we can recognize the traditional stereotypes of the Per­ sians and the Great King (cf. Hell. III.4.19). But, above and beyond the Greek polemic and the private fantasies of the Lacedaemonian king, there is no doubt that from the mo­ ment of his arrival in Asia Minor he intended to pursue a very different war from the war that had been fought by his predecessors in the fifth century. With the exception of a brief appearance by Lacedaemonian troops in the Meander Valley and an Athenian raid on the fields of Lydia (Hell. 1.2.4-5), the fifth-century Greek generals had always con­ fined their operations to the coast and to pillaging in the areas of royal territory closest to the sea. It is possible that the very recent example of the Ten Thousand was actually in­ terpreted in Greece and Asia Minor as proof of the relative permeability of the Empire's land defenses (cf. Xenophon, Hell. III.4.2). But it is important to distinguish the Achae­ menid reality from the impression gathered from the Greek portrayals (which, more­ over, are badly informed about facts of geography, as has just been seen and as is well confirmed by passages in the Anabasis). And this is why the historian of the Achaemenid Empire is interested in Agesilaus's operations: they provide an opportunity to take stock of Persian control of territory in western Asia Minor. e r s

Persian Defenses Confronting Agesilaus's Offense: Satraps and ethne Xenophon's account is partial (in both senses of the word); according to him, the campaigns of his hero unfolded without major opposition (e.g., Hell. IV. 1.17). Quite an­ other picture emerges from the Oxyrhynchus Hellenica, which fortunately is closer to an arid campaign journal than an expansive and often misleading literary reconstruction. If Agesilaus really did have a momentary notion of retracing Cyrus's progress (whose trail he would follow between Sardis and the frontier of Greater Phrygia), he must have been a cockeyed optimist. The Persian leaders clearly adopted a traditional tactic to confront him: avoiding giving battle (cf. Xenophon, Hell. IV. 1.17), allowing him to wander the countryside until necessity forced him to return to the coast. Agesilaus's main goal seems never to have been anything more than amassing booty in order to feed and pay his sol­ diers (Hell. Oxyr. 22.4). His greatest fear was lack of supplies (22.4). To be a threat to Per­ sian dominion, he would have had to attack major towns. As it happened, every time he set up his battle line in front of a fortification held by the king's men, he was unable to conquer it, whether at Leontocephalae, Gordion, or Miletu teikhe (21.5-6; 22.3) —not to mention Sardis, Celaenae, or Dascylium. This series of failures illustrates the discon­ nect between the ambitions attributed to him and military reality. Agesilaus obviously

642

Chapter 15. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III

had no siege engines, and, furthermore, no citadel commander was of a mind to desert the king. Agesilaus clearly was counting on winning the allegiance of the peoples of the inte­ rior, whose independence from the central authority is smugly stressed by all the fourthcentury authors. But we may inquire whether in this regard, too, the Spartan was the vic­ tim of his informers and/or his own fantasies. We have seen that the Mysians did not flock to him en masse, and that several communities even opposed him openly (Hell. Oxyr. 21.1-3; 22.3). The reaction of the Mysian people could perhaps be explained by their desire to preserve their lands and villages from the ravages of war; it could just as well be explained by fear of Persian reprisals—the satrap of Dascylium regularly led ex­ peditions against Mysians who rebelled overtly (Xenophon, Hell. III. 1.13). Moreover, many Mysians were serving in Pharnabazus's army (IV. 1.24). Agesilaus scored greater success with the dynast-king of Paphlagonia, who provided a thousand horsemen and a thousand peltasts (soldiers armed with light shields). This dynast seems already to have broken with the central authority, since Xenophon states that "he had been summoned by the Persian King and had refused to go up to him" (IVI 3-0-); an invitation of this sort, of course, could bode no good! To refuse the king's invitation was tantamount to cross­ ing the line one more time into rebellion, since in normal times Paphlagonia was also required to furnish a troop contingent whenever a satrapal requisition was issued (cf. Diodorus XIV.22.5). At any rate, Agesilaus wanted to cement the Paphlagonian alliance still more solidly, so he negotiated a marriage between the dynast and Spithridates' daughter (Xenophon, Hell. IV.1.2-15). It must again be remarked that, according to Hell. Oxyr. (22.1), Agesilaus concluded a truce (spondai) with the Paphlagonians, which implies that not all of the groups considered the dynast their leader. Like Mysia, Paph­ lagonia must have been split among several rival chieftains. This reality—that some re­ gions had multiple local chieftains—certainly applied to various locales in Asia Minor and is well illustrated by Artaxerxes' war several years later against the Cadusians; in this case, there were two local kings, and each was anxious to obtain for himself "the friend­ ship and alliance of the king" (Plutarch, Art. 24.6-0-; cf. chap. 16/18). Furthermore, the Persians may have kept an eye on Mysia and Paphlagonia more di­ rectly than the ancient texts suggest. In the context of preparations for Cyrus the Younger's expedition, Diodorus mentions a "satrap of Paphlagonia" who furnished Al­ cibiades with a safe-conduct that Pharnabazus had refused to him (XIV. 11.3). Diodorus also, discussing the beginning of the Satraps' Revolt (which he places at the end of the 360s), refers to Orontes, the leader of the rebels, as the "satrap of Mysia" (XV.90.3-0-3). These comments clearly could be simple mistakes by Diodorus, who is quite free with the word "satrap." But the term might also designate officials subordinate to a satrap (of Dascylium and/or Sardis). Let us recall the parallel case of Zenis of Dardanus, the "sa­ trap" who was appointed by Pharnabazus in the part of the Aeolis that fell under his ju­ risdiction and who was responsible for overseeing the country, levying tribute (transferred to Pharnabazus), leading contingents of the satrapal army, and scheduling ostentatious receptions for the satrap of Dascylium during his inspection lours (Xeno­ phon, Hell. III.1.10-15). In short, Zenis acted like a satrap (satrapeuein: III. 1.10) ac­ countable to Pharnabazus; Zenis (who was succeeded by his widow Mania) was one of the governors dependent on the authority of Pharnabazus (III. 1.12: ponton ton hyparkhon). If we follow this theory, we might ask whether Ariobarzanes fulfilled the same

Agesilaus in Asia Minor

(396-394)

643

function in Paphlagonia in 407; Ariobarzanes, a relative(?) of Pharnabazus, was ordered in 407 to bring the Athenian ambassadors, whom the satrap of Dascylium had detained for three years, to Cius in Mysia (Hell. 1.4.7). Ambiguity also results from the confusion between geographic regions and ethnic groups. We have already pointed out that neither Mysia nor Paphlagonia was unified. Several episodes reveal that certain parties in Mysia were firmly under the thumb of the Persians. Many military establishments had been set up there beginning in the time of Darius and Xerxes (chap. 13/9). The survivors of the Ten Thousand had had rough times there as soon as they reached Pergainum, which Xenophon places in Mysia, in the plain of the Caicus (Anab. VII.8.8), the same place where the work of Orontes ("satrap of Mysia") is attested (OGIS 264, lines 6-9). The Persian Asidates had a very large rural estate, peopled with slaves and dependents, on this plain. The estate was fortified (tyrsis, pyrgion, teikhos; Anab. VII.8.12-14). Moreover, the defenders were able to communi­ cate with other positions in the surroundings, using signals beacons: There came to their assistance Itamenes with his own force, and from Comania Assyrian hoplites and Hyrcanian horsemen — these also being mercenaries in the service of the King—to the number of eighty, as well as about eight hundred peltasts, and more from Parthenium, and more from ApoIIonia and from the nearby places (khoria), including horsemen... . And Procles also came to the rescue, from Halisarna and Teuthrania, the de­ scendant of Damaratus. (VII.8.15, 1 7 0 ) The men of Gongylus of Eretria soon joined in; he had been established in the region during the time of Xerxes (VII.8.17; cf. Hell. III.1.6). This example is a perfect illustra­ tion of the density of Achaemenid territorial occupation in this Mysian region: it was populated with military colonists and garrisons, and bristled with small forts. Confirma­ tion is found in a passage in Polyaenus (VI. 10) in the context of Thibron's expedition in Aeolis; it too appears to have been covered with a dense network of small forts com­ manded by a "phrourarch of the strongholds (khoria) of the Aeolid." Of course, these observations do not answer the subsidiary question of whether there were governments of Mysia or Paphlagonia. But though we note that the satraps could at any moment count on contingents of horsemen led by the Persians of the diaspora, we can easily agree that the imperial territories were not as empty of defenses as the Greek authors would have us believe or as Agesilaus himself perhaps imagined. Despite the vic­ tory near Sardis, he was unable to appropriate for himself any Achaemenid strategic space (roads, storehouses, citadels; see chap. 11/2). If he really did cherish the dream of inarching once more on the interior in 394, his chances of success were practically nil. The Persians and Agesilaus Face Off Agesilaus was unable to seize the strong towns in the interior, but the theoretical pos­ sibility of creating enough unrest that some Persians would desert the king remained. But even the hopes of this possibility that he might have harbored were dashed. When he returned from his expedition, as we have seen, he conversed at length with Pharna­ bazus. According to Xenophon, he emphasized to the satrap, "It is within your power by joining with us to live in the enjoyment of your possessions without doing homage to anyone or having any master" (despotes; Hell. IV. 1.35-0). And he adds: We urge upon you . . . to increase, not the King's empire, but your own, subduing those who arc now your fellow-slaves (homodouloi) so that they shall be your subjects (hypekooi). (IV 1.36-0)

644

Chapter 15. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III

In context, this speech was intended to convince Pharnabazus to make himself into an independent prince by transforming the other Persians in his satrapy into handaka. Pharnabazus replied simply that, if the king named another general, he would agree to be Agesilaus's friend and ally; if not, his connection to the Great King could not be sev­ ered (IV. 1.37). The satrap's dilatory response in fact left Agesilaus with no hope, even more so because Pharnabazus had much earlier been promised one of Artaxerxes' daughters (Plutarch, Art. 27.7) —a promise that was kept some years later (Xenophon,

Hell. V I . 28). The only attested defector was Spithridates. He was a high-born Persian who broke with Pharnabazus when the latter proposed to take his daughter as concubine (Xeno­ phon, Ages. 3.3); when Lysander approached, he fled to Cyzicus, where he left his whole family, his treasure, and his following of 200 horsemen and, along with his son Megabates, joined Agesilaus (Xenophon, Hell. III.4.10; IV. 1.6-7; Hell. Oxyr. 21.4). His duties under Pharnabazus are not precisely known: Hell. Oxyr. notes simply "that he lived with Pharnabazus and served him" (21.4). He thus belonged to the circle of landed aristrocrafs used by the satrap of Dascylium for occasional missions. We know that in 410 he shared command with Rhathines of the contingents who, with the Bithynians, were mustered by Pharnabazus to prevent the survivors of the Ten Thousand from en­ tering Phrygia (Anah. VI.4.24, 5.7). But the missions accomplished by one or another satrapal official say nothing at all about their permanent job; during Agesilaus's expedi­ tion, this same Rhathines was in command of Gordion (Hell. Oxyr. 21.6). Most notable is the fact that Spithridates agreed to marry his daughter to the Paphlagonian dynast (Hell. IV. 1.4-15). We are tempted to conclude from this that he had had a long and close relationship with Paphlagonia. The alliance between Agesilaus and Spithridates did not last. After the successful at­ tack on Phamabazus's baggage and caravan (394), Spithridates and his Paphlagonian al­ lies took booty. They were soon relieved of it by Agesilaus's lieutenant, on the excuse that it had to be placed in the hands of the "officers in charge of sale of booty." According to Xenophon, this practice is what drove Agesilaus's allies to abandon him (IV. 1.26-27). In reality, this complaint was probably just a pretext. Contrary to Xenophon, Spithridates and the Paphlagonians had certainly drawn their own conclusions from recent events, which held out little hope of victory to the Lacedaemonian. Their concern from that moment onward was to obtain the king's pardon. So they left immediately for Sardis to meet with Ariaeus, the former companion of Cyrus the Younger; when Ariaeus had left Lydia, Tithraustes had given him a command alongside another Persian, Pasiphernes (Hell. Oxyr. 19.3), and he had recently displayed his loyalty by actively participating in the execution of Tissaphernes (Diodorus XIV.80.8). They had decided to put "their trust in Ariaeus because he also had revolted from the King and made war on him." Xeno­ phon lets it be known that this desertion sounded the death knell for Agesilaus's hopes: "Nothing happened during the campaign which was more distressing to Agesilaus than the desertion of Spithridates, Megabates, and the Paphlagonians" (Hell. IV.1.28*).

Agesilaus: A Summary Agesilaus was recalled in haste to Sparta, which was threatened by a coalition of Greek cities (including Athens) that wanted to escape its dominion; he left Asia Minor with a less than impressive resume. Aside from a contingent commanded by Dercylli­ das that he sent to the Hellespont shortly after his departure (Hell. IV.3.3) and the garri-

Achaemenid Successes and Failures: From Asia Minor to Egypt

645

sons still found here and there, he had had to abandon to their fate the cities he had come to liberate from the Persian yoke. The only positive point in the record is the ex­ istence of the navy that the Spartan chief had ordered built the year before and had entrusted to his brother-in-law Peisander (III.4.28—29). It is true that he had also dem­ onstrated that the Persians controlled the roads to Sardis only imperfectly. Thibron had already shown the way by campaigning against Magnesia and Tralles (Diodorus XIV.36.2-3). Agesilaus went further, since he had understood that he needed a cavalry to confront the Persians. Some time later, the Spartan Diphridas even succeeded in capturing Struthas's son-in-law "as they were journeying to Sardis" (Hell. IV.8.21*). Meanwhile, all in all, even if the Spartan had exhibited boldness by developing an "anabasis" strategy [driving for the interior], he does not seem ever to have believed that he could drive the Persians from the satrapies of Sardis and Dascylium. In any case, this goal was unrealizable both because the imperial defenses were solid and because the very idea of an expedition of this kind had certainly never entered the mind of the Spar­ tan leaders. In short, despite the Trojan setting, neither geographically nor politically was Agesilaus a prototype of Alexander.

6. Achaemenid Successes and Failures: From Asia Minor to Egypt (ca. 396 - ca. 370)

The Defeat of Sparta During the same period, after being named admiral of the royal navy ($4 above), Conon completed his preparations and began his offensive. His first success (396), after obtaining funds from Tithraustes and the Great King, was to incite a Rhodian party to rise up against the Spartans and welcome his fleet (Diodorus XIV.79.5-6). This was a major victory because of the commercial and strategic importance of the island. In con­ cert with Pharnabazus, Conon piloted the navy to the Cnidian Chersonese to confront the Lacedaemonian navy that was moored at Cnidos. The ensuing battle proved a strik­ ing victory for his squadrons (Diodorus XIV.83.4-7; Xenophon, Hell. IV.3.11-12). The conquerors gained immediate profit from driving the Lacedaemonian garrisons from both the islands (Cos, Nisyros, Teos, Mytilene, Chios) and the coast (Ephesus, Erythrae; Diodorus XIV.84.3): Pharnabazus and Conon . . made a tour of the islands and the cities on the sea coast, drove out the Laconian governors, and encouraged the cities by saying that they would not estab­ lish fortified citadels within their walls and would leave them independent. And the people of the cities received this announcement with joy and approval, and enthusiastically sent gifts of friendship to Pharnabazus. (Hell. IV.8.1-2*) Only Dercyllidas was in a position to resist the offensive of Pharnabazus when he re­ turned to his territory (IV.8.5). The following spring (393), Conon and Pharnabazus's navy returned to sea. Pharnabazus's goal was to wreak vengeance on Sparta: his navy took Cythera, liberating the Cyclades in the process (Diodorus 84.5), then "sailing to the Isthmus of Corinth and there exhorting the allies to carry on the war zealously and show themselves men faithful to the King, he left them all the money that he had" (IV.8.8*). The Persian may even have been hailed at Athens with an honorary decree (cf. Tod no. 199). This was the first time since 480 that an Achaemenid navy had come to support the "Medizers"! The Persian triumph seemed resplendent.

646

Chapter J 5. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III

The Persians Caught between Athenians and

Lacedaemonians

In truth, however, the Persian victory was fragile and uncertain. The Persians, willynilly, were once again squeezed between Sparta's desire to maintain its dominion and Athens's wish to reestablish its own. The victory at Cnidos and those that followed were also the work of Conon, who since 405 had dreamed of nothing but restoring the glory of his homeland. On his insistence, Pharnabazus agreed to leave a part of his fleet and money with him, and Conon was soon to use it to rebuild the walls of Athens and Pi­ raeus that had been destroyed by the Spartans in 404 (Hell. IV.8.9-10). The Lacedaemo­ nians used this new opportunity to break their alliances and to try to arrange a new treaty with Artaxerxes against Athens. Playing on dissension among the Persian leaders, some­ thing they were very good at, they sent Antalcidas to Tiribazus at Sardis; meanwhile, the king had made Tiribazus head of the royal troops in Asia Minor (Diodorus XIV.85.4). Antalcidas arrived, and right behind him arrived ambassadors from Athens and from the cities that fought alongside it against Sparta as well. Each delegation addressed Tiri­ bazus in turn, making him their arbitrator. Antalcidas offered peace, "just such a peace as the King had wished for. For the Lacedaemonians, he said, urged no claim against the King to the Greek cities in Asia and they were content that all the islands and the Greek cities in general should be independent" (Hell. IV.8.14*). As the speeches of the other delegates show, the Spartan offer encompassed the problems of the cities of Europe. The Athenians opposed it strongly, quite rightly thinking that such a peace would prevent them from achieving their ambitious goals. The Persian leaders were not all in agreement about strategy at this time. Tiribazus brought Conon to Sardis and threw him in prison (Diodorus XIV.85.4). He provided money to the Lacedaemonians secretly because he could not make a decision to do this without consulting with the king (Hell. IV.8.16*). Obviously, Tiribazus would not have been able to persuade Artaxerxes, who sent Struthas to Sardis, who "devoted himself as­ siduously to the Athenians"; his hostility toward the Spartans surely grew when, shortly afterward, the Lacedaemonian Diphridas seized his son-in-law Tigranes and held him for ransom (IV.8.21)! The following years brought an escalation of hostilities between Athenians and Lacedaemonians in Asia Minor, and the Persians scarcely appear to have been in a position to arbitrate. The Lacedaemonians reinstalled governors (harmostai; IV.8.29). But the truth is doubtless more complicated than Xenophon indicates, for his ac­ count is devoted entirely to Athens-Sparta hostilities. In fact, we learn from an inscription that we have already discussed (see chap. 12/5) that during these years Struthas (Struses) arbitrated a territorial disagreement between Miletus and Myus, which he submitted to judges from twelve Ionian towns (Tod no. 113), a sign that at that date Sardis could im­ pose its own arbitration on the cities of the Ionian coast, along the lines of the decrees made a century earlier by Artaphernes. It is very likely that an important administrative change took place during these years (between 395 and 391) as well: Caria, hitherto a de­ pendency of Sardis, was made into an autonomous satrapy and entrusted to Hecatomnus, heir to a dynastic power centered on Mylasa, capital of the koinon ('federation') of the Carians. It is possible that Artaxerxes did this to render war on Sparta more efficient.

From Cyprus to Egypt Seen from Susa or Babylon, matters cannot be reduced to the contradictory ambi­ tions of Athens and Sparta on the coast of Asia Minor. The Great King was primarily pre-

Achaemenid Successes and Failures: From Asia Minor to Egypt

647

occupied with the events then unfolding in Egypt and Cyprus. In fact, it is in the context of 391-390 that Diodorus discusses the fears of the Great King, who was alerted by some Cypriot kings (Amathus, Soloi, and Kition). They were desperately fighting off the as­ saults of Evagoras's forces and sought Persian aid: They accused Evagoras of having slain King Agyris, an ally of the Persians, and promised to join the King in acquiring the island for him. The King, not only because he did not wish Evagoras to grow any stronger, but also because he appreciated the strategic position of Cy­ prus and its great naval strength whereby it would be able to protect Asia in front, decided to accept the alliance (symmakhem). He dismissed the ambassadors and for himself sent letters to the cities situated on the sea and to their commanding satraps to construct triremes and with all speed to make ready everything the fleet might need. (XIV.98.3-v-) Ever since he had come to power (see chap. 14/8), Evagoras of Salamis had method­ ically pursued his goal —to extend his power over the other cities on the island. More­ over, since 398 he had collaborated with Artaxerxes II in the war against Lacedaemonian forces. But the effective disappearance of the Spartan threat to the Aegean coasts after the battle of Cnidos changed the situation drastically. Diodorus's text is very clear: the break did not come from Evagoras (who no longer had any interest there); it was a cold decision of Artaxerxes. Isocrates agrees {Evag. 67-68). At the moment he regained con­ trol of Asia Minor, the Great King at all costs wanted to avoid seeing an economic and military power arise on his flank that threatened to reduce to nothing the maritime strat­ egy he had pursued consistently since Cunaxa; thus, control of the island presupposed that power there would be fragmented among a number of simultaneous kinglets who, as we have just seen, would inform on each other to the central authority. A recently published Phoenician inscription provides several clarifications regarding the initial battles on Cyprus. The inscription, dated to year 1 of Milkyaton (son of Baalrom), the king of Kition, commemorates the erection of a monument after a victory won by the king "and all the people of Kition" over "our enemies and their Paphian auxilia­ ries." There can hardly be any doubt that the term "enemies" designates Evagoras and his allies—among whom only the Paphians are named. We thus have a direct echo of the open warfare between Kition and its allies (Amathontes, Soloi) on the one side and Salamis and its allies on the other. It is quite noteworthy that it was after this victory that Milkyaton took the title of king (392?), founding a royal dynasty that can be followed down to 312. Unlike an older inscription from Idalion, which dates to somewhere be­ tween 470 and 440, the "Medes" are not named. But we cannot doubt that the new ruler of Kition received aid and support from Artaxerxes, as Diodorus reports (XIV.98.3). It is nonethless likely that this success came in a period before the direct intervention of Per­ sian forces; it was not until several years later that the Persians won a naval battle near Kition (cf. XV.3.4-5). At any rate, this sort of dynastic monument clearly highlights the close cooperation between the new king and "all the people of Kition." Moreover, seen in the context of Persian-Cypriot relations, the battles against Evagoras of Salamis also (primarily?) belong to the history of Cyprus in the longue duree—a history that cannot be reduced to the vagaries of dominion by the Great King. One essential element certainly played a part in Persian policy: if Cyprus were not retaken, any expedition against the Nile Valley was doomed to failure. And, in fact, the reconquest of Egypt was the topmost priority for Artaxerxes. Just as negotiations between the Greeks and Tithraustes were beginning, power was changing hands in Egypt. In 394-393 (or 392-391), Nepherites perished in dynastic turmoil. Two dynasts proclaimed

648

Chapter 15. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III

themselves pharaoh simultaneously: Muthis, son of Nepherites, and Psammuthis. The debate was soon settled by a third person, Hakoris (perhaps a relative of Nepherites), who took power at the beginning of 392 (or 392-391). His titles and the breadth of his building program show his desire to connect himself with the glorious tradition of the Saite period and to pursue the war against the Persians doggedly; he knew that they had never aban­ doned the idea of reconquest. The reign of this sovereign (whom he calls Pakorios) is the topic of the lost twelfth book of Theopompus's History, in which "the story of the deeds and acts of the Greeks and Barbarians down to his time is found" (FGrH 115 F103).

The Initial Operations

(391-387/386)

It is quite noteworthy that in 391-390 the Great King wanted to act rapidly (Diodorus XIV.98.3: kata spouden). He probably hoped to prevent Evagoras from receiving external aid. Theopompus notes the alliance between Hakoris and Evagoras. It is possible that Evagoras had sent ambassadors to Hakoris, as he had to Athens (Lysias XIX.21-23), but it seems quite unlikely that the pharaoh was in any position to send him reinforcements at that time. On the other hand, the unleashing of the Cypriot operation could only help Hakoris, since it gave him time to consolidate his power and prepare his country for the inevitable Persian offense. It is possible, as Isocrates suggests (Paneg. 161), that Tyre took the side of Evagoras, be­ cause a few years later Tyrian ships fought alongside his (Diodorus XV.2.4); but Tyre's defection from Persia may have come several years after the onset of hostilities. At one point, Evagoras also received aid from Athens: in 390-389, Athens sent ten ships that were hailed for inspection by a Lacedaemonian admiral (Xenophon, Hell. IV8.24; Ly­ sias XIX.2Iff., 43). Some time later (388-387), Athens sent new reinforcements to Eva­ goras—10 triremes and 800 peltasts commanded by Chabrias (V. 1.10) —but we know nothing of the outcome (probably nothing happened). At almost the same time (388), the Athenian Thrasybulus advanced with a squadron along the southern coast of Asia Minor as far as Aspendus on the mouth of the Eurymedon, where he tried to levy taxes on the inhabitants. They, however, became fed up with the soldiers' predations and slew the Athenian general in his tent (IV8.30; Diodorus XIV.99.4). These occasional military operations clearly belong more to the history of the Athens-Sparta conflict than to the af­ fairs of Cyprus. In any case, the strange behavior of the Spartans and Athenians, with re­ spect to the ships sent by Athens to Cyprus in 390-389, was stressed by Xenophon: "Both parties were acting in this affair in a manner absolutely opposed to their own interests; for the Athenians, although they had the King for a friend, were sending aid to Euagoras who was making war upon the King, and Teleutias, although the Lacedaemonians were at war with the King,was destroying people who were sailing to make war upon him" (Hell. IV.8.24*)! In short, in 391-390, Evagoras could not count on any external allies. The Persian troops had two commanders: the Persian Autophradates (land army) and Hecatomnus, the "Carian dynast" (as admiral; Diodorus X1V.98.4; Theopompus FGrH 115, F103). We know practically nothing about this first campaign. According to Isoc­ rates, the results were not commensurate with the enormous financial sacrifices to wbicb the Great King consented, since during the war Evagoras "took Tyre by storm, caused Cilicia to revolt from the Great King" (Evag. 60-62-0-). Of what value, then, are the words of the Athenian polemicist? Perhaps they simply convey that one of the results was that Tyre was captured by the king of Salamis. Let us simply recall that all the an­ cient authors, especially Diodorus, imply that between about 390 and 387-386 the Great

Achaemenid Successes and Failures: From Asia Minor to Egypt

649

King and his generals primarily used the time to complete their preparations. A navy was assembled in Asia Minor, at Phocaea and Cyme, and troops were gathered in Cilicia, where the entire army was concentrated before crossing to Cyprus (XV.2.1-2). The se­ quence and rationale of Diodorus's presentation imply that during this time Evagoras also gathered reinforcements with the aid he found among his neighbors (2.3-4).

The King's Peace (386) Meanwhile, Antalcidas, who had accompanied Tiribazus all the way to the King, ob­ tained from him "an agreement that the King should be an ally of the Lacedaemonians if the Athenians and their allies refused to accept the peace which he himself directed them to accept" (V.1.25->). Most of the Greek cities were worn out by the continual wars and yearned for peace: "So that when Tiribazus ordered those to be present who desired to give ear to the peace which the King had sent down, all speedily presented them­ selves. And when they had come together, Tiribazus showed them the king's seal" and read the following document: "King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia should belong to him (heautou einai), as well as Clazomenae and Cyprus among the islands, and that the other Greek cities, both small and great, should be left independent, except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; and these should belong, as of old, to the Athenians. But whichever of the two parties does not accept this peace, upon them I will make war, in company with those who desire this arrangement, both by land and by sea, with ships and with money." (V. 1.30-31*) With the exception of the Thebans, all the participants "[swore] that they would abide by the treaty which the King had proposed; thereupon the armies were disbanded and the naval armaments were likewise disbanded" (V. 1.35). From a Greek point of view, the peace (also known as the Peace of Antalcidas) cer­ tainly meant a victory for Sparta, which lost no time in proclaiming the leagues created around Athens and Thebes obsolete, because they were contrary to the clause guaran­ teeing the autonomy of the cities. From the Persian point of view, the victory was no less complete. The peace brought an end to the era that began with the creation of the Delian League in 478-477: the cities in Asia returned wholly to the Achaemenid fold, and the cities in Europe agreed that they would no longer attempt to get them to leave. The king's territories, so often pillaged and threatened since 478-477, remained safe and protected thereafter. In a way, Artaxerxes II succeeded in bringing to completion the program Alcibiades had suggested to Tissaphernes nearly forty years earlier: to play the Greeks off against each other (Thucydides VIII.46.1-4). The Great King owed this victory not just to the internal weakening of the Greek cities or the distribution of "royal-archer" coins (silver siculi and gold darics); he owed it first and foremost to the resoluteness and constancy of his policy and deeds.

A Universal Conflagration? It is easy enough to understand how the open hostilities at the end of the 390s could resume stronger than ever after 387. According to Justin (VI.6.2), Artaxerxes was so eager to impose peace around 387 because, "preoccupied with the war against Egypt, he feared that if he sent aid to the Lacedaemonians against his satraps, his armies would be tied up m Greece." Even if Justin is especially interested in illustrating the king's cynicism, the thought he ascribes to him should not be surprising: it reminds us of a comparable deci­ sion made by Artaxerxes I in the 460s (Thucydides 1.109.2; Diodorus XI.74.5). Diodorus

650

Chapter 15. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III

in turn says that the peace that the king imposed on the Greeks left him able to operate with a free rein, and he "made ready his armaments for the war against Cyprus. For Eva­ goras had got possession of almost the whole of Cyprus and gathered strong armaments, because Artaxerxes was distracted by the war against the Greeks" (XIV110.5*). In addi­ tion, Theopompus says the fighting on Cyprus continued even more vigorously after the peace of 386 (FGrH 115 F103). The text read to the Greek delegations also explicitly stated that Cyprus was part of the king's territory (Hell. V. 1.31). The ancient authors are unanimous in emphasizing that Artaxerxes then found him­ self facing multiple rebellions, which they characterize as not merely simultaneous but coordinated. Diodorus says Evagoras had a very wide network of alliances: the king of Egypt, Hakoris, sent significant forces, and Hecatomnus of Caria secretly provided him with large amounts of money for hiring mercenaries. Evagoras also possessed Tyre and "several other towns," which furnished ships. As Diodorus tells it, the entire Levant was seceding, since Evagoras also received aid from "such o t h e r s . . . as were at odds with the Persians, either secretly or openly," and "not a few soldiers were sent him by the king of the Arabs and by certain others of whom the King of the Persians was suspicious" (XV.2.3-4*). A similar narrative is found in Theopompus: he reports "how Hakoris the Egyptian made alliance with the Pisidians" (FGrH 115 FI03). In the Panegyric (380), Isocrates lays out a catastrophic review of Persia's status in the Levant: Are not Egypt and Cyprus in revolt against him? Have not Phoenicia and Syria been devas­ tated because of the war? Has not Tyre, on which he set great store, been seized by his foes? Of the cities in Cilicia, the greater number are held by those who side with us and the rest are not diffcult to acquire. Lycia no Persian has ever subdued. Hecatomnus, the viceroy of Caria, has in reality been disaffected for a long time now, and will openly declare himself whenever we wish. From Cnidos to Sinope the coast of Asia is settled by Hellenes, and these we need not to persuade to go to war—all we have to do is not to restrain them. ($§161-62*) Isocrates' chronologically rather imprecise presentation certainly need not be taken ab­ solutely literally; his purpose was to persuade the Greeks to launch an offensive in Asia Minor. To that end, he was attempting to prove the Persians' extreme military weakness, which was illustrated particularly by their defeats in Egypt, as well as by the exploits of Cyrus's mercenaries and Agesilaus's troops ($$138-59). The existence of unrest in this period is well illustrated by the biography of Datames presented to us by Cornelius Nepos. Datames, son of Camisares, "governed that part of Cilicia which adjoins Cappadocia and is inhabited by the Leucosyri, or 'White Syri­ ans'" ($1.1*); he was a member of the royal palace guard and displayed his valor as a sol­ dier for the first time "in the war which the king waged against the Cadusii," during which his father died ($1.2*). This Cadusian war is also mentioned by Diodorus, in the context of the Cyprus war, so it took place about 385-384 (Diodorus XV.8.5; 10.1). Plu­ tarch (Arf. 24) seems to refer to a second Cadusian war, which he places at the time of the second Egyptian expedition, in 374 (Art. 24.1; cf. Tragus Pompeius, Pro/. X). Nepos goes on to say that his hero once again demonstrated his bravery "when Autophradates, at the king's command, was making war on the peoples that had revolted" ($2.1*). Ne­ pos says nothing about the identity of these peoples. On the other hand, we know that Datames led another expedition after 387, this time against Thuys, dynast of Paphlago­ nia, who "did not own obedience to the king" ($2.2*). While the existence of unrest is established, there is nothing to suggest that it consti­ tuted a vast common front formed at the instigation of Hakoris and/or Evagoras. We

Achaemenid Successes and Failures: From Asia Minor to Egypt

651

must' in fact stress that the Greek authors were fond of this sort of catalogue, as is illus­ trated particularly well by the systematic review that Diodorus lays out (XV.90.2-4) of the rebellions fomented against Artaxerxes about twenty years later (see chap. 15/7 be­ low). The evidence implies that Artaxerxes' campaigns in the Zagros were a local affair injected into the longue durie of Cadusian affairs (see chap. 16/18). And, while the alli­ ance between Hakoris and the Greeks and Evagoras is undeniable, it nonetheless ap­ pears strange that the pharaoh would be so interested in acting in concert with the Pisidians, as Theopompus states; this allusion indicates no more than that at this point the Pisidians (or some of them at least) were opposed to royal forces—which is a given throughout Achaemenid history. Similarly, the example of Thuys is not isolated; the Paphlagonian dynasts were frequently opposed to Persian authority, as shown by the very recent example of Agesilaus and Spithridates. Other information given by the an­ cient authors must be taken with a grain of salt. For instance, there is nothing to indi­ cate that Cilicia was ever totally endangered, aside from the unfortunate raid by Thrasybulus in the region of Aspendus in Pamphylia (Hell. IV8.30; Diodorus XIV.99.4). It is clear that at this date, as before, Cilicia was utilized by the Persians virtually as a military base (Diodorus XV.3.3), and this is also indicated by the coins struck by Tiriba­ zus in several Cilician cities (Tarsus, Issus, Soloi, Mallus). Furthermore, the peace of 386 prohibited the Greeks from interfering. It must also be recalled that Cilicia itself in­ cluded distinct subregions (see chap. 16/6). We may recall, for example, that Datames was ordered by Artaxerxes to defeat Aspis, "the ruler of Cataonia;.. . [who] far from ac­ knowledging allegiance to Artaxerxes, even overran the regions neighbouring to Persia and carried off what was being brought to the king" (Nepos, Dat. 4.1-2*). This again re­ fers to a minor, local problem, which one is tempted to compare with the false goal that Cyrus announced to his expedition in 401 to deceive his mercenaries: they were "lead­ ing the army to Cilicia against the despots who were in rebellion against the King" (Di­ odorus XIV. 19.3*). Moreover, it is quite noteworthy that Datames landed in Cilicia on the way from Syria, before marching against Aspis (Dat. 4.4). Finally, the matter of the Carian satrap Hecatomnus also remains uncertain. During the first offensive in 3 9 3 392, he was entrusted with military operations (Diodorus XIV.98.4), in cooperation with Autophradates, according to Theopompus (FGrH 112, F103). Diodorus places him among Evagoras's secret allies in 387, the one to whom Evagoras sent great sums of money to hire mercenaries (XV.2.3); and Isocrates, in the Panegyric (§162*), believes he had "been disaffected for a long time now." But formal proof of his rebellion is singu­ larly lacking. However difficult the task, it is still necessary to distinguish these purely local troubles from genuine networks of alliances (Hakoris/Evagoras, Evagoras/Tyre), Among those in­ volved in alliances we should include the person Diodorus calls the "king of the Arabs" (XV.2.4), who is also mentioned in a similar context earlier, in 411-410 (XIII.46.6); he may have been the head of the tribe whose territories adjoined the road between Gaza and Egypt. But nothing allows us to state with certainty that the disturbance embraced all of Syria-Palestine or all of Phoenicia. Mounting an expedition to Egypt around 3 8 5 384 (below) presupposes, on the contrary, that the Persians were able to requisition ships m Phoenicia and that they controlled traditional logistical bases (Sidon, Acre, Gaza). It is nonetheless true that Artaxerxes II's situation at that date was difficult and filled with potential dangers, since he needed simultaneously both to carry out local expeditions and to gather considerable forces to overcome Evagoras and Hakoris.

652

Chapter i 5. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III

The Offensive against Evagoras

(387/386-383/381)

After lengthy preparations, land and sea forces were entrusted to Orontes and Tiriba­ zus, who were ordered to subdue Evagoras. The breadth of preparations carried out in both camps (Diodorus XV 2) indicates that the confrontation was expected to be deci­ sive. On Cyprus, the Persian navy scored a victory at Kition, and then the army laid siege to Salamis (Diodorus XV.3.4-6; 4.1). At this point, Evagoras sought out Hakoris in Egypt "and urged him to continue the war energetically and to consider the war against the Persians a common undertaking" (XV.4.3*). He brought back nothing from this contact except pretty words and a piddling amount of money (XV.8.1). Fresh from his victory over the Persian forces (or perhaps still in the middle of the fight), the pharaoh obviously considered the Cypriot front a secondary matter. After lengthy negotiations, peace was imposed by the Great King under the following conditions: " E v a g o r a s . . . should be king of Salamis, pay the fixed tribute annually, and obey as a king the orders of the King" (XV.9.2-0; around 383-381). Diodorus presents as one of Evagoras's achievements that he was recognized as king of Salamis (XV.8.2-3; ° 2 ) . Actually, on the political and strategic level, down the line Evagoras had to retreat, since the terms of his surrender forbade him to undertake any future offensive against the other Cypriot kings, all of whom from then on would be the Great King's preferred allies on the island. Like them, Evagoras thereafter had to bend to the Achaemenid au­ thorities in all things and provide tribute and naval contingents. In sum, matters in Cy­ prus were back to the place they had been some twenty years earlier, before Evagoras had begun to extend his dominion over other kingdoms on the island. Combined with the outcome of the peace of 386, the Cyprus victory was crucial to Achaemenid author­ ity because of the central strategic importance of the island of Cyprus to the Persian po­ sition in the eastern Aegean. Undoubtedly, it also allowed them to retake the Phoenician cities that had joined Evagoras, particularly Tyre.

The Egyptian Defeats At the same time, however, the Great King suffered a defeat in his principal objec­ tive, the reconquest of Egypt. In his Panegyric, Isocrates (our only source, unfortunately) in fact alludes to an operation against Egypt in the 380s: T a k e , first, the case o f Egypt: s i n c e its revolt from the K i n g , what progress has h e m a d e against its inhabitants? D i d he not d i s p a t c h to this war the m o s t r e n o w n e d o f the Persians, A b r o c o m a s a n d T i t h r a u s t e s a n d P h a r n a b a z u s , a n d did not they, after r e m a i n i n g there three years a n d suffering m o r e disasters than they inflicted, finally withdraw in s u c h d i s g r a c e that the rebels are n o longer c o n t e n t witli their f r e e d o m , b u t are already trying to extend their do­ m i n i o n over the n e i g h b o u r i n g p e o p l e s as well? (Paneg. 1 4 0 * )

The date of this fruitless expedition is uncertain; it appears, however, that it was carried out at the same time that the Persian troops were in action against Cyprus. The fact re­ mains that it was a considerable setback. An independent Egypt would be a perpetual threat to Persian dominion over the lands of Ebir Nari. It would also be a natural ally to anyone who wanted to take on the Persians, including subordinates of the Great King. So it was when Glus, Tiribazus's son-in-law, chose to rebel against the king at the end of the 380s, because he was afraid of being swept up in the accusations against his fatherin-law. As commander of the Cyprus fleet (Diodorus XV.3.2), he had played a decisive

Achaemenid Successes and Failures: From Asia Minor to Egypt

653

role in the battle of Kition against Evagoras (XV.3.6). Endowed with an abundance of money and soldiers, he entered into alliance with Hakoris and the Spartans (XV.9.3-5) but fell to an assassin's hand (XV. 18.1). To be sure, his case is special, because he was the son of the Carian-Memphite Tamos, Cyrus's old admiral, who had sought refuge with Psammetichus in 400. But it is also worth observing that, according to Diodorus (XV. 18.1), Glus's plans were taken up by a certain Tachos, whose name indicates that he had an Egyptian background; he had founded a city in land located on the borders of Cyme and Clazomenae (18.2-4). It thus appears that Glus and, later, Tachos at­ tempted to set up with the aid of the pharaohs a sort of "dynasty" in Asia Minor, situated not coincidentally very close to Cymae, Persia's very important naval base in Asia Minor. The danger was even more serious in that Hakoris apparently continued his prepara­ tions, gathering a large number of Greek mercenaries and even recruiting the Athenian Chabrias, who was engaged privately, because at this time Athens was far from anxious to engage in hostilities with Artaxerxes. According to Diodorus, the pharaoh gathered his troops "for the campaign (pros ten strateian) . . . and with great dispatch made prepara­ tions to fight the Persians" (XV.29.1-2*). Does the phrase indicate that Hakoris had de­ cided to go on the offensive? We cannot say with certainty. What is certain, however, is that Artaxerxes did not abandon his plan to reconquer the Nile Valley, especially in view of the fact that, from this point on, Egypt could no longer count on external allies. Pharnabazus, who was ordered to advance against Egypt, set up his logistical base at Acre in Palestine and gathered a massive navy, since it was said that no expedition against Egypt could succeed without the support of a navy, both for resupplying the troops and for negating the defenses of the Delta. The ships must have been built in Phoenicia (cf. Polyaenus III.9.63) as well as Cyprus and Cilicia, where Pharnabazus's coinage also attests to the enlistment of troops. During his preparations, Pharnabazus sent an embassy to Athens, demanding that Chabrias be recalled from Egypt and Iphicrates be sent to Acre; his demands were met (XV.29.4). These are the reasons why (still following Diodorus; XV.38.1*) Artaxerxes intervened directly in 375 to stop the hostili­ ties that were ripping the Greek cities apart, "intending to make war on the Egyptians and being busily engaged in organizing a considerable mercenary army." In 373 the full force of Persian intervention was set in motion. In Egypt, after a con­ fused period of infighting after the death of Hakoris (380), Nectanebo was recognized as pharaoh, thus founding what is conventionally called the XXXth Dynasty, and he soon adopted Hakoris's strategy toward the Persian threat. The Egyptians, expecting Pharna­ bazus's attack, had fortified the Delta: "Nectanebos . . . was emboldened, chiefly by the strength of the country, for Egypt is extremely difficult of approach, and secondly by the fact that all points of invasion from land or sea had been carefully blocked" (XV.42. 1*). The Egyptian leaders had erected fortifications on each of the mouths of the Nile; near the Pelusiac mouth, the principal point of entry, walls interrupted the navigable chan­ nels, and land routes were flooded in order to prevent their use: "Accordingly it was not easy either for the ships to sail in, or for the cavalry to draw near, or for the infantry to approach." Pharnabazus therefore decided to attack by the Mendesian mouth, where his troops leveled the fortification (42.3-5*). Shortly afterward, the Egyptians regained their footing on the site; the annual flood had forced Pharnabazus to evacuate Egypt (43.1-4).

654

Chapter 15. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III

According to Diodorus (XV.41.2), one of the reasons for the defeat lay in the length of the Persian preparations (several years). "For Pharnabazus marched slowly and had given plenty of time for the enemy to prepare"; and he explains the attitude of the Per­ sian leader as follows: "Indeed it is the usual custom for the Persian commanders, not being independent in the general conduct of war, to refer all matters to the King and await his replies concerning every detail" (41.5-0-). This is a remark made by many Greek authors, and it certainly reflects part of the truth: for one thing, the assembly of so large an army, the construction of a navy, and the training of soldiers is a long-term affair; for another, the Persian generals traditionally had to apply to the court for every expense that exceeded the budget that had been allocated (see, e.g., Diodorus XV.4.2). But this explanation is also polemical in nature: it fits comfortably into the predominant Greek presentation of Persian military incompetence. It is doubtful that Pharnabazus was idle throughout this period. If the Egyptian revolt spread toward Palestine, it is likely that the Persian general took advantage of his presence in the region to restore Achaemenid or­ der in such a way as to secure his rear. Anyway, the construction of fortifications in Egypt goes back to an earlier period; we know, for example, that Chabrias (who left Egypt at the latest in 379) had directed the construction of earthworks near Pelusia and Lake Mareotis (Strabo XVI.2.33; XVII. 1.22). In fact, the Egyptian pharaohs had been preparing for many years already, which doubtless also explains Pharnabazus's aforementioned failure. Because of the inferiority of their forces, the Egyptians needed first and foremost to prevent the Persian army and navy from entering the Delta. This is exactly the same strategy they adopted toward Artaxerxes III in 343, also profiting at that time from the long duration of Persian preparations (cf. Diodorus XVI.46.7). Diodorus also presents what he describes as the incompetence of the Persian high command. According to him, Iphicrates, head of the Greek mercenaries in the army, had proposed a different strategy. After they took the fort at the Mendesian mouth, he suggested going up the Nile to take Memphis, which at that point was undefended, tak­ ing advantage of the situation to seize the town with his troops. Pharnabazus's refusal was, for Diodorus, the reason that the expedition failed (XV.43). But it is risky to accord too much credibility to a story so fully devoted to singing the praises of the Greek strategos. We get the primary impression that Diodorus, under the influence of his sources, wants to express the idea so often found in the fourth-century authors that the Persians were incapable of winning a battle without the advice and counsel of Greek leaders. He even repeats the same explanation to account for the defeat of Nectanebo II by Arta­ xerxes III in 343 (XVI.48.1-2); the theme of the rivalry between Persian and Greek lead­ ers is also found in this story (XVI.49.1-4; cf. 50.4-6 and XVII. 18.2-4). Contrary to what Diodorus would have us believe, Iphicrates was certainly not Phar­ nabazus's equal. Iphicrates was entrusted with training recruits (Nepos, Iph. 2.4) and, under the authority of Pharnabazus and other Persian leaders (Diodorus XV.43.2; Ne­ pos, Dat. 3.5: Tithraustes and Datames himself), he oversaw preparation of the Greek troops and their maneuvers, seconded by other mercenary leaders (Dat. 5.6: Mandro­ cles of Magnesia). In sum, the structure of Pharnabazus's army was similar to the orga­ nization of Cyrus the Younger's army in 401, except that Iphicrates probably did not enjoy the prestigious status under Pharnabazus that Cyrus had accorded Clearchus. Diodorus's text seems to indicate simply that Iphicrates was asked for his opinion during a war council held after the capture of the Mendesian fortification; his opinion appar-

Achaemenid Successes and Failures: From Asia Minor to Egypt

655

ently differed from the views held by Pharnabazus and his Persian lieutenants. Diodo­ rus's version continues, explaining the attitude of Pharnabazus and the other Persian leaders as jealousy: they were afraid Iphicrates would seize Egypt for himself ($43.2). This presentation scarcely convinces. Pharnabazus might have had excellent strategic reasons for turning down this plan, first among them the need to justify himself later to the king—which accounts for the thought ascribed to him: he responded to Iphicrates "that it was because he was master of his words but the King was master of his actions" ($41.2*). In other words, he preferred not to risk losing everything in a raid that would cut him off from his rear bases, since the essential thing, in his eyes, was to return to the king totally crowned with victory. Setting aside the personal antagonism portrayed so dramatically by Diodorus, the simplest explanation is to suppose that the Persian com­ mand had underestimated the capacity for prolonged resistance by the Egyptian de­ fenses in the Delta, as well as the logistical difficulties connected with the deployment of such extensive forces in a land where first the enemy and second the force of nature (flood) would render unusable the preferred access approach via the Nile. It seems strange that Pharnabazus's army would leave Egypt so quickly, in contrast to what the Persians had done around 460, when several years of fighting had been needed to put down the rebellion (see chap. 14/2). It seems clear that this was not a decision born out of a moment of panic. Despite what Diodorus would have us believe (XV.43.4), no one need fear that Pharnabazus was ignorant of the timing of the Nile flood! We can imagine that the central authority feared that its army would get bogged down in an in­ terminable war of inches in Egypt. Nor, in fact, was it a withdrawal pure and simple. On the contrary, the Persian army retreated to their Palestinian bases, where they prepared a new offensive. But it is not until the last year of Artaxerxes II that we hear fleeting ref­ erences to a new attempt, in an entirely different strategic context. Meanwhile, Persians and Egyptians were encamped face to face, on the brink of war, and we cannot exclude the possibility of confrontations suppressed by the Classical sources. Whatever the case, the fact remains that the Achaemenid armies proved unable to regain their footing in the Nile Valley. This was a painful failure for Artaxerxes, who had cherished the project ever since his victory over his brother, Cyrus.

Artaxerxes and the Greeks A basic, tangible result was achieved nonetheless—the victory on Cyprus. The mili­ tary activity of the Persian armies in Syria-Palestine and the disarray of the Greek cities in Europe left the pharaohs to face Persian power alone. Neither Sparta nor Athens (de­ spite the presence of Chabrias alongside Hakoris) sought to carry out military operations in the royal territories after 386. After the unfortunate Egyptian campaign, Pharnabazus even sent a message to the Athenians, setting forth Iphicrates' accountability and urging them to judge him. The Athenians refused the satrap's request but sent a courteous and respectful reply nonetheless (Diodorus XV.43.6). Since they were thoroughly occupied with settling the problem of hegemony, Sparta, Athens, and Thebes held scrupulously to the terms of the King's Peace, even after Athens (in 378-377) formalized the new na­ val alliance that it had begun to create in the 380s. The peace of 386 was reaffirmed twice on the initiative of Artaxerxes: first in 375 and then in 371. In the first year, a con­ gress was held at Sparta at the insistence of the Great King's envoys; one of the Athenian ambassadors look the opportunity to refer to the autonomy clause of the peace of 386

656

Chapter i 5. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III

solely to denounce the behavior of the Lacedaemonians (Xenophon, Hell. VI.4.9). The general peace of 371 encompassed all of the Greek cities except Thebes (Diodorus XV.50.4), which a few weeks later was to inflict a memorable defeat on Sparta at Leuctra (371). Artaxerxes II had become the the Greeks' arbitrator. 7. Artaxerxes II, His Satraps, and His Peoples (ca.

366-359/358)

Diodorus and the "Great Revolt" of the Satraps: The Empire in Flames? This general peace in Greece is the context in which Diodorus presents what is con­ ventionally called the "great revolt of the satraps" (XV.93.1). He dates the beginnings of the uprisings to 361. As he puts it, the Empire was on the brink of implosion and disaster: D u r i n g their term of office the inhabitants of the Asiatic c o a s t revolted from Persia, a n d s o m e of the satraps a n d g e n e r a l s rising in insurrection m a d e war on Artaxerxes. At the s a m e t i m e T a c h o s the E g y p t i a n king d e c i d e d to fight the Persians a n d p r e p a r e d ships a n d gath­ ered infantry forces. H a v i n g p r o c u r e d m a n y m e r c e n a r i e s from the G r e e k cities, he per­ s u a d e d the L a c e d a e m o n i a n s likewise to fight with h i m , for the S p a r t a n s were e s t r a n g e d from Artaxerxes b e c a u s e the M e s s e n i a n s had b e e n i n c l u d e d by the K i n g o n the s a m e terms as the other G r e e k s in the g e n e r a l p e a c e . W h e n the g e n e r a l u p r i s i n g a g a i n s t the Persians reached s u c h large proportions, the K i n g also b e g a n m a k i n g preparations for the war. For at o n e a n d the s a m e t i m e he m u s t n e e d s fight the E g y p t i a n king, the G r e e k cities of Asia, the L a c e d a e m o n i a n s a n d the allies of t h e s e , — s a t r a p s a n d g e n e r a l s w h o ruled the coastal districts a n d had a g r e e d u p o n m a k i n g c o m m o n c a u s e with t h e m

(koinopragia).

O f these

the m o s t d i s t i n g u i s h e d were A r i o b a r z a n e s , satrap of Phrygia, who at the d e a t h of Mithridates had taken possession of his k i n g d o m

(hasileia),

a n d M a u s o l u s , overlord of C a r i a , who

was m a s t e r of m a n y strongholds a n d i m p o r t a n t cities of which the hearth a n d m o t h e r city was H a l i c a r n a s s u s , w h i c h p o s s e s s e d a f a m o u s a c r o p o l i s a n d the royal p a l a c e of C a r i a ; a n d , in a d d i t i o n to the two a l r e a d y m e n t i o n e d , O r o n t e s , satrap of M y s i a , a n d Autophradates, sa­ trap of Lydia. Apart from the Ionians were L y c i a n s , Pisidians, P a m p h y l i a n s , a n d C i l i c i a n s , likewise S y r i a n s , P h o e n i c i a n s , a n d practically all the coastal p e o p l e s

(ethne). With

the re­

volt so extensive, half the revenues of the K i n g were cut off a n d what r e m a i n e d were insuf­ ficient for the e x p e n s e s of the war. ( X V ^ O * )

It is immediately plain to see that, with respect to evidence, we are in a situation similar to the one we are placed in by Isocrates with regard to the 380s (Paneg. 161-62; cf. p. 650 above). The historian is thus faced with the same problem as in the earlier con­ text. Diodorus's presentation arouses the greatest reservations a priori. The last sentence of the catalogue of woes in particular eloquently illustrates the distortions brought about by a Hellenocentric viewpoint, and it reminds us of a remark of Polyclitus that is mentioned incidentally by Strabo (XV3.2I). But no one can believe that the revolt (whatever magnitude is ascribed to it) exhausted the Great King's monetary reserves and prevented him from making war on the rebels. Apart from this grandiose fresco painted by Diodorus, we have neither continuous nor complete documentation of any kind, except for a summary of the work of Tragus Pompeius. The summary covers an expedition of Artaxerxes II against the Cadusians and then explains how the Great King "pursued his dignitaries (purpurati) who had de­ fected (defectores) in Asia: first of all Datames, satrap of [Paphlagonia], a land whose ori­ gin is presented; then the satrap of the Hellespont, Ariobarzanes; and next in Syria the governor of Armenia, Orontes; how he conquered them all and died, leaving the throne to his son Ochus" (Prol. X). This information is not found in Justin, who unfortunately

Artaxerxes II, His Satraps, and His Peoples (ca.

366-359/358)

657

was engrossed in Greek (VI.6-9), Macedonian (VII), and Greco-Macedonian (VIII—IX) affairs, and did not consider it necessary to explain; he did not take up the course of Arta­ xerxes II's reign except to cover the royal succession (X.3.1-2), before arriving very quickly at the accession of Darius III (X.3.3-7). Justin's method does not diminish the value of the summary of Trogus Pompeius, but it is unfortunately too fleeting to constilute a basis for historical reconstruction. Trogus Pompeius places Datames first among the rebels, but Diodorus omits his role entirely, at least in the catalogue of rebels. Diodorus does name Datames, but apparently assigns him a personal role only in repelling the counterattack mounted by Artabazus (XV.91). We learn more about this person from C . Nepos's biography of him, which dates his revolt (wrongly) to the return of the expedition against Aspis of Cataonia (§ 5.16). The life and works of Datames are also cited by Polyaenus (VII.21.1-7; VII.29.1-2; cfi VII.28) and Pseudo-Aristotle (Oecon. II.24a-b = Polyaenus VII.21.1) to illustrate the theme of military deception and fiscal stratagem as practiced by the satraps and generals. Again in Polyaenus we find several short stories introducing Orontes (VII. 14.2-4), Ari­ obarzanes (VII.26). and Autophradates (VII.27.1-3). Each is an anecdotal tale with a major defect: none is situated in the chronology precisely. The biography by Nepos be­ longs to the genre of saga: it is entirely devoted to singing the praises of a hero who is haunted by the king's ingratitude and his associates' betrayals. References to the satraps and countries in revolt also decorate several discourses de­ livered by Athenian orators and politicians, which at least have the advantage of being situated more precisely in the chronology. In 354, Demosthenes beseeches his fellow citizens to shoulder a financial burden and makes it clear that the Athenians had noth­ ing to fear from the Great King: Nor is there, as it a p p e a r s to m e , a n y g r o u n d for what s o m e persons fear, that, h a v i n g m o n e y , he will collect a large body of m e r c e n a r i e s . I d o indeed believe, that against E g y p t a n d Orontes, a n d any other barbarians, m a n y o f the G r e e k s w o u l d b e willing to serve in his p a y . . . . Against G r e e c e , however, I d o not b e l i e v e that a n y G r e c i a n would m a r c h . F o r whither c o u l d h e betake h i m s e l f afterwards? G o to Phrygia a n d be a slave? (Sym. 3l-32->)

In an oration delivered in 352, this same orator strongly opposed a decree issued by Aristocrates, who had proposed protective measures that would be to the advantage of Chandemus, the head of the mercenaries. On this occasion, Demosthenes recalled several recent deeds of Charidemus, who, he writes, had hired his services to Mentor and Memnon, brother-in-law of Artabazus, who himself had just been captured by Au­ tophradates. Later, the mercenary leader received a safe-conduct pass from the satrap, permitting him to cross into Chersonesus in Thrace (C. Arisf. 154-59). The following year (351-350), Demosthenes made a resounding plea for Athens' intervention on be­ half of Rhoclian democrats who had been banished from their city on Mausolus's initia­ tive. By doing so, the orator claimed, he opposed those who, nevertheless, "counseled the republic to turn to the Egyptians for aid against the king of Persia" (LITJ. Rliod. §5); he recalls that "Once, O Athenians, you sent Timotheus out to assist Ariobarzanes" (cf. also Isocrates, Ech. 111): T i m o t h e u s , s e e i n g that A r i o b a r z a n e s h a d openly revolted from the king, a n d that S a m o s was garrisoned by C y p r o t h e m i s , u n d e r the a p p o i n t m e n t of T'igranes, the king's d e p u t y (hyparkhos), r e n o u n c e d the intention of assisting Ariobarzanes, b u t invested the island with his forces a n d delivered it. A n d to this day there has b e e n no war against you o n that a c c o u n t

(Lib. Rhod. $$9-104>)

658

Chapter 15. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III

What can wc make of these brief allusions? First of all, we note that they extend the time of troubles considerably. In turn, this chronology (correlated in Demosthenes and Isocrates with the ongoing Egyptian secession) again accentuates the impression, im­ plicit in Diodorus, that the central authority in the western provinces was deeply and permanently disorganized. The impression is also reinforced by the use of the word basileia 'kingdom' to describe Ariobarzanes' power in Phrygia (Diodorus XV.90.3) and by a comparison between two of Isocrates' discourses—one from 380 (Paneg. 161), the other from 347 {Phil. 100-101; cf. p. 683). As in Diodorus in 361, the entire Mediterra­ nean region seems to have been united in rebellion for nearly the entire fourth century. But the orators' insistence seems suspicious, since the goal of their argument was pre­ cisely to demonstrate to their hearers (ekklesia) and correspondents (Philip II) that the Great King was merely a paper tiger. To accomplish this, they did not even hesitate to contradict themselves within a few paragraphs (Demosthenes, Sym. 3-9 and 29-32) or within a few years: in 347, Isocrates praised Artaxerxes IPs reign to the skies, at least in comparison with the reign of his successor (Phil. 99-100); in 380, he had ridiculed it (Paneg. 138-66). Even if we separate these discourses from the ideological current that bears them along, they provide very few precise details—very few details, at any rate, that can easily be integrated into a framework that could be constructed independently. The fact is that the references (in Demosthenes in particular) are merely incidental and acci­ dental, offering nothing more than a few names and a few hints as to how the Greek pol­ iticians envisaged the possible consequences of the occasional interventions of some of their strategoi and/or mercenary chiefs in the internal affairs of the Achaemenid Empire. There are also two Greek inscriptions that very indirectly allude to satraps. One (found at Argos and now lost) comprises the statement of several Greek states that had just agreed to a common peace (koine eirene). The parties affirm that a state of war did not exist between them and the Great King and that, if he meant them no ill, they would remain at peace with him; on the other hand, if the king or anyone coming from his ter­ ritories (ek tes ekeinou khoras) were to march against the Hellenes, they would organize a common defense. The broken beginning of the text includes (perhaps) a reference to an envoy who came from the satraps' side ([para t\on satrapon; Tod no. 145). Addition­ ally, an Athenian inscription, unfortunately perennially burdened by arguments about establishing the text itself and its chronology, refers to the granting of honors (including citizenship) to Orontes because he had sold wheat to Athenian strategoi following an ex­ change of ambassadors and negotiations ( I G I I 207). This decree provides fodder for the debate on the satrapal duties of Orontes in Mysia, but the connection with the story of his revolt is tenuous: there is nothing to indicate either that by issuing the decree Athens was exhibiting any sort of military alliance with Persia, or that the sale of wheat to the city clearly illustrates secessionist tendencies on the part of the satrap. The first decree cited here (whose authenticity has sometimes been doubted) first of all shows that the Greek cities were very anxious to prove their eagerness for the common peace renewed under the aegis of the Great King; the beginning of the text especially seems to confirm that there was a koinopragict ('joint enterprise') between satraps at this date, as Diodorus mentions in his catalogue (XY90.3). But because the stone was broken at the top, the date of the decree, the restoration of the text (para or peri?), and the subsequent inter­ pretations are themselves largely based on Diodorus's text—which removes consider­ able weight from the pile of evidence thus constructed! 2

Artaxerxes II, His Satraps, and His Peoples (ca. 366-359/35SJ

659

The outcome of the foregoing investigation, we can see, is not very encouraging: the Classical sources are sparse and allusive and are not interested in the internal history of the Achaemenid Empire. There is one apparently more informative text (Diodorus), but its structure and typology make the historian highly suspicious. There are two allusive Greek inscriptions, but their readings are very uncertain and so is their date. Finally, there are no Achaemenid sources at all, apart from a large number of coins minted by strategoi and satraps, and whether these individuals were revolutionary most often re­ mains to be demonstrated. Moreover, the chronology of the activities can never be re­ constructed with complete certainty. Indeed, what good are proposals regarding chains of causality if the actual order of events cannot be established? It is thus quite under­ standable that major disagreements among historians remain regarding the develop­ ment, breadth, and purposes of the revolt (or better: the revolts). Schematically, we can consider this in terms of two opposing views—one maximalist, one minimalist. The former tends to present the rebellions as a vast unified movement that had an ultimate goal of raising a frontal assault on the power of Artaxerxes and perhaps even marching on Babylonia to destroy him In addition to Diodorus. the pro­ ponents of this theory appeal to Tragus Pompeius (Prol. X) and Polyaenus (VII.21.3). Trogus Pompeius states that Artaxerxes II defeated Orontes in Syria; Polyaenus says that Datames marched beyond the Euphrates during his war against the Great King. If we postulate that all of these offensives (and the Egyptian rebellion) are organically con­ nected, we get the impression that Artaxerxes' authority was threatened in its very own strongholds. A few years ago, however, dissenting views were expressed, and these tend to reduce (sometimes drastically) the various revolts and rebellions to localized affairs that never really threatened the Great King. Both views run into difficult chronological problems, not to mention the fragility of arguments based on evidence that is not only heterogeneous and anecdotal but also puts far too much stock in the Greek portrayals (the quasi-structural weakness of Achaemenid evidence) and in the self-interest of the Greek states (which were peripherally involved in the quarrels in Asia Minor). All this is as good as to say that the following discussion traffics more in the wealth of our igno­ rance than in the poverty of our certainty.

The Initial Revolts: Datames The career of Datames marvelously illustrates the breadth and complexity of the his­ torical and chronological arguments. Let us recall first of all that Diodorus does not list him among the satraps and strategoi who reached agreement on a treaty of cooperation (XV.90.3). He discusses Datames in a separate chapter, implying quite clearly that his re­ bellion occurred while the traitorous satraps were busy polishing their weapons (91.2) — that is, during the 360s. Diodorus's purpose is not to offer a connected narrative of events, but simply to give other examples of treason that embellished the revolts ( 9 1 . 1 2). Thus he reports that a royal strategos, Artabazus, penetrated into Cappadocia, where Datames was satrap; despite being betrayed by his father-in-law, Mithrobarzanes, Data­ mes was victorious (91.2-6). On the rest of Datames' career, Diodorus is laconic to a fault: "As for Datames, though even before this he was admired for his generalship, at that time he won far greater acclaim for both his courage and his sagacity in the art of war; but King Artaxerxes, when he learned about Datames' exploit as a general, because he was impatient to be rid of him, instigated his assassination" (91.7*).

660

Chapter 15. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III

Mithiobarzan.es' betrayal and Datames' end are also found in the biography by Ne­ pos, who offers a more detailed story of the background of the satrap and the first part of his dazzling career (§ 1-3.4). After his victory over Thuys of Paphlagonia (in the 380s), Datames was sent to Acre in company with Pharnabazus and Tithraustes, who were then readying the Egyptian expeditionary force; then, after the recall of Pharnabazus (cer­ tainly after the defeat in 374), Datames was placed at the head of the army (§3.5). At this point, the king ordered him to bring an end to the disorders caused by Aspis of Cataonia. After he was successful, he returned to Acre (§4-5.1). This, Nepos says, is when the rup­ ture with the Great King took place: Datames was warned by his friend Pandantes, the "keeper of the royal treasury," of a plot by courtiers, so he 'determined to leave the king's service' (descicere a rege) without letting anything betray his intentions. He left with his entire household for Cappadocia, and "then he secretly (elam) came to an understand­ ing (amicitia) with Ariobarzanes" ( 5.6-0-). Then comes the tale of his father-in-law Mithrobarzanes' betrayal —not during a war against Artabazus but in a battle against some Pisidians (§6). His oldest son Sysinas soon abandoned him and switched to Artaxerxes' side, and Datames found himself under attack by Autophradates, who had received or­ ders from the king to deal with Datames but, finding himself unable to win, made a truce with Datames (§§7-8). A story of new betrayals follows (§9), the last of them planned by Mithradates, son of Ariobarzanes, who at the king's command enticed Data­ mes into a trap and killed him (§§10-11). As we have already stressed several times, the biography by Nepos must not be taken at face value. Nepos (just like Diodorus) was eager to extol the worth and the virtues of his hero and built his tale on a series of repetitive motifs: Datames' strategic brilliance, the kings' ingratitude, and a series of betrayals (his father-in-law; his oldest son). Veracity and historic coherence count for little. From author to author, the chronology and the characters vary, and this is why serious doubts have been raised about the conditions and chronology of the revolt. According to Nepos, the revolt took place (hut secretly) at the end of the 370s —that is, at a date much earlier than that fixed by Diodorus for the gen­ eral conflagration and the royal armies' campaigns against Datames. Nepos s only expla­ nation for Datames' defection is quite surprising: when he was at the zenith of royal favor, the announcement of a courtiers' conspiracy was all it took for him to decide to make the break, because he was afraid that a setback in Egypt would alienate Artaxerxes' favor. That Datames was considered a rebel by the court can scarcely be doubted. But when, and under what conditions? According to Nepos, a secret treaty was first con­ cluded with Ariobarzanes, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. However, nothing indicates that Ariobarzanes had declared his independence from the Great King as early as the 370s. It seems instead that it was the subsequent accusations of his son Sysinas that per­ suaded the Great King (§7.1), who then ordered Autophradates, the satrap of Sardis, to move against the rebel (§§7.1-8.5). If we date the campaign to approximately 367, it is rather difficult to elucidate the nature of the relationships that had previously main­ tained Datames' loyalty to the central authority. The paucity and contradictory nature of the information make perfectly contradictory interpretations possible. We could sup­ pose, for example, that his campaign against the Pisidians (Dat. 6) —or, more precisely, against unidentified groups of Pisidians (cf. §6.1) —related to periodic Achaemenid army sallies against a traditionally unstable people; but it might also clearly reflect a

Artaxerxes II, His Satraps, and His Peoples (ca.

366-359/358)

661

rebel's desire to enlist Pisidians in his service (cf. §4.4). Furthermore, several anecdotes and coins imply that there were campaigns in northern Asia Minor (Sinope, Amisus) at a date that is very hard to pin down. Polyaenus records an interesting anecdote: while he was besieging Sinope, Datames received a letter from Artaxerxes ordering him to call off the operation. He immediately "made obeisance before the letter and offered the sacri­ fice usually offered for good news" (VII.21.5). One is tempted to see this as proof of the satrap's loyalty, as a perspective exactly opposite the one that Nepos presents—as long as Artaxerxes' letter does not point to Datames' rebellion-in-progress and the satrap's obei­ sance before the royal letter is not simply mockery! We also know that Datames was not afraid to seize even the wealth of Cappadocian sanctuaries in order to finance his cam­ paign (Polyaenus VII.21.1; Ps.-Arist., Oecon. II.24a). Once again, this is an episode that can support two readings. It might illustrate a banal fact—namely, a lack of cash that forced the satraps and generals to stopgap measures in order to pay their troops. But it might also be seen as proof of rebellion. This is a good point at which to bring up an important question: what exactly is a rebel? One of the best definitions—the most forthright, in any case —is found in Nepos's text and also appears in nearly identical words in an anecdote in Polyaenus (VII.29.1). Nepos says that finally, greatly frustrated, the Great King gave Mithradates carte blanche to get rid of Datames. Mithradates tried to act like a rebel, because he knew that Data­ mes was extremely wary. So Mithradates adopted attitudes and made decisions that would advertise his open break with the king: Mithridates prepared his forces and made friends (amicitia) with Datames without meeting him. He then began to raid the king's provinces (regis provincias vexat), and storm his for­ tresses (castella expugnat), gaining a great amount of booty (magnas praedas ccipit), of which he divided a part among his soldiers and sent a part to Datames; he likewise handed over several fortresses (castella) to the Carian. By continuing this conduct for a long time lie convinced Datames that he was engaged in implacable war against the king (se infinitum adversus regem sucepisse betlum). (§ 10.2—30-) Polyaenus similarly uses the words phrouria basileos/komai/phoroi/leia: the attacks on the royal garrisons, the villages, and the tribute proved that he was an enemy of the king (polemios einai basilei). Many texts, Xenophon's in particular, in fact show that a sa­ trap's fundamental duty was to use the garrisons (castellalphrouria) to maintain order, and this in turn allowed the peasants (cf. komai) to work and to maintain production without being subjected to raids (cf. praedaelleia), so that they would be able to pay tribute (phoroi). The robbing of tribute is also why Aspis of Cataonia had been pursued by the royal armies: he "even overran the regions neighbouring to Persia and carried off what was being brought to the king" (Dat. 4.2*}. This behavior was the opposite of the conduct of a good satrap, who would protect his country from the lavages of war (cf. Quintus Curtius III.4.5: terra quam a populationibus vindicare debebat). This was one of the justifications given (it appears) by Arsites in 334 to oppose the scorched-earth strategy proposed by Memnon: "He would not suffer one house to be burned belonging to his subjects" (Arrian 1.12.10*). Clearly, this definition of "rebel" is no less partial. More generally, one was consid­ ered guilty or unworthy if one did not defer to royal orders or if one carried out a mis­ sion badly. The line between loyalty and rebellion was thus both fine and porous: it was the judgment of the king that counted, as is so clearly shown by Tiribazus's appearance

662

Chapter 15. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III

when he was criticized by Orontes, who was "envious of Tiribazus' high position" (Diodorus XV.8.3;* cf. 10-11). This example also demonstrates the role of formal ac­ cusations, which could come from local populations who were unhappy with an admin­ istrator's demands, or from royal inspectors and delegates, or from a jealous colleague. This was how the king stayed informed regarding the progress of the provinces. In short, while Datames' rebellion must undoubtedly be dated a few years before 361, its exact chronology and concrete circumstances remain indecipherably hazy.

The Troubles in Western Asia Minor (366-361) Conflict also broke out in western Asia Minor before 361. According to Nepos (Dat. 5.6), Datames' first ally was Ariobarzanes; Diodorus's catalogue for 361 (p. 656 above) designates Ariobarzanes as satrap of Phrygia (XV90.3). In truth, by then Ariobarzanes had lost the siege of Dascylium. According to Demosthenes (Lib. Rhod. §§9-10), he had overtly declared himself in rebellion when the Athenian Timotheus was sent to lend him a hand in 366; he also received aid from the Spartan Agesilaus. This may be the con­ text in which Ariobarzanes, his son, and two of his Greek subordinates received Athe­ nian citizenship. The king had sent a fleet and an army to confront the rebel; the fleet was commanded by Mausolus, the satrap-dynast of Caria, and the army was led by Autophradates, the satrap of Sardis, after his return from the fruitless expedition against Data­ mes. Some time later, the king ordered the rebel captured, and he was crucified (364?). He seems to have been betrayed by his own son, Mithradates. We also learn that the sa­ trapy of Dascylium passed to Artabazus, son of Pharnabazus and Apame —that is, Arta­ xerxes' grandson (363-362?). One of the new satrap's first campaigns (during his voyage to Dascylium?) was to fight Datames, without success. Meanwhile, we lose track of Ari­ obarzanes until he is named by Diodorus in the catalogue of rebellious satraps in 361. Perhaps it was also in these years that Orontes began to assert his power in Mysia, in the region of Pergamum. But the sources for this are also poor. We know for sure that Orontes was satrap of Armenia in 401 and that around 384 he took part in the Cyprus campaign, and this is when he accused his colleague Tiribazus of carrying out private operations. The judgment favored Tiribazus: "The King . . . bestowed upon Tiribazus the highest honours, such as were customary. Orontes, however, he condemned as one who had fabricated a false accusation, expelled him from his list of friends, and sub­ jected him to the utmost marks of degradation" (Diodorus XV. 11.2*). Orontes then van­ ishes from sight (from our sources!) until the moment when, in 361, Diodorus calls him "satrap of Mysia" (XV90.3). Whatever authority had been conferred on him (satrap in his own right, lieutenant governor), Orontes must have been transferred from Armenia to western Asia Minor at a date unknown to us, perhaps as a repercussion of the disfavor that had befallen him after the Cyprus affair. His private activity in Mysia near Perga­ mum is attested in a Greek inscription (OGIS 264): the date is not given, but the person is unambiguously described as a rebel against the Great King (apostas). His coinage at Adramyttium and Cisthenes shows that he was enlisting mercenaries, who made it pos­ sible for him to take Cyme, despite the cavalry dispatched by Autophradates to oppose him (Polyaenus VII. 14.3). Another anecdote reports him leading harassing operations near Sardis (VII. 14.2). It appears that these skirmishes and offensives must be dated be­ fore 362-361; furthermore, they indicate that, despite the opposition of Autophradates and other "generals of the king" (VII. 14.2), Orontes was trying to enlarge the bases of his territorial authority.

Artaxerxes U, His Satraps, and His Peoples (ca. 366-359/358)

663

As meager and uncertain as it is, the information we can glean already gives us reason lo increase our doubts about Diodorus's version. The satrapal turmoil did not burst out suddenly in 361; instead, it reflects unrest that was both endemic and localized. Further­ more, the participation of some of the rebel leaders whom Diodorus catalogues could have been temporary. We know hardly anything about Autophradates except for a badly dated passage (362-361?) in which Demosthenes (C. Arist. 154) mentions that, when Charidemus arrived in Asia Minor, Artabazus was taken prisoner by Autophradates and shortly afterward released—which constitutes a very feeble hint. Finally, still according to Diodorus, Orontes' revolt ended as quickly as it had begun. After collecting money to hire mercenaries (XV.91.1) and sending Rheomithres to Egypt to request money from Pharaoh Tachos (92.1), Orontes suddenly changed his plans: He . • • proceeded to betray his trust. For suspecting that he would obtain from the King not only great rewards (doreai megalai) but would also succeed to the satrapy of all the coastal region if he should deliver the rebels into the hands of the Persians, he first arrested those who brought the money and dispatched Ihem to Artaxerxes; then afterward he delivered many of the cities and the soldiers who had been hired to the commanding officers who had been sent by the King. (91.1 )? Why is Anahita no longer mentioned? And why does Berossus say not a word about Mithra? The "omission" of Mithra seems even more odd because it is solely in regard to the public worship of Mithra that we have any corrobo­ rative information. We know from Strabo (XI. 14.9) that, during the Achaemenid era, the satrap of Armenia had to send 20,000 colts each year to the Great King at the time of the Mithriaka, that is, the official celebrations in honor of Mithra. Some passages in Xeno­ phon show that this practice was in effect at least beginning with the time of Artaxerxes II, because each village in Armenia yearly had to send colts as royal dasmos (Anab. IV.5.24) and that (some of?) these colts were dedicated to the Sun (IV.5.35). We also learn of these official festivals in honor of Mithra from Duris, who stresses the central role played by the king (Athenaeus X.434e). Most Classical references to Mithra date ap­ proximately to the reign of Artaxerxes II (e.g., Xenophon, Oec. IV.24; Plutarch, Art. 4.5; Aelian, VH 1.33). But does this necessarily imply that there was a close chronological 3

At the Heart of Power

677

connection to the change in royal formulary that appears at the time of Artaxerxes II? Nothing could be less certain. Behind these questions lurks a basic problem, already posed by Plutarch's wellknown text on the enthronement of Artaxerxes II at Pasargadae in a temple dedicated to Anahita, here called "warlike goddess" (Art. 3.2-0-): precisely how new was the novelty in­ troduced by Artaxerxes II? What, for example, is the meaning of Berossus's distinction between towns (Babylon, Susa, Ecbatana) that received the order to erect (anastesas) statues versus other towns (Persepolis, Bactra, Damascus, and Sardis), in which appar­ ently the accent is placed solely on worship (sebein), as if statues already existed (or as if one could worship without a statue)? And, if such statues did exist here and there, how are we to appraise the novelty of the edict? Or again: if Berossus does not mention Mithra, is it because we have only a partial quotation of the royal edict, or because the worship of Mithra was not concerned with holy statues —even though statues seem to have represented the most noteworthy novelty to Berossus himself? This observation in turn poses another problem. A priori, Berossus's text does not harmonize perfectly with what Herodotus, for example, says (1.131*): "The erection of statues (agalmata). temples, and altars is not an accepted practice among them [the Per­ sians].. . . [T]hey sacrifice . . . from the tops of mountains" (cf. likewise Strabo XV.3.13). But are these peremptory statements legitimate? We can overlook Strabo's assertion (XV.3.15) that statues (xoana) of Anahita and Omanus were transported with great pomp during festivals in the Persian sanctuaries in Cappadocia; his comment refers to a later period. More important is a passage by Dinon (also cited by Clement of Alexandria), written in the fourth century, with information at variance with Herodotus: according to Dinon, though Persians, Medes, and magi did indeed sacrifice on the heights, they wor­ shiped two gods in the form of statues (agalmata) — namely, Fire and Water (FGrH 690 F28). Dinon's chronology does not allow us to determine that he is describing a change initiated by Artaxerxes II. Nevertheless, he does not mention Mithra or Anahita, except to suggest that Fire designated the former and Water the latter, which seems very un­ likely: Water and Fire are two clearly individualized gods whose central place in Persian sacrificial practice is stressed by Strabo (XV.3.14, 16). So we are back to the basic ques­ tion regarding the innovation introduced in the time of Artaxerxes II.

Droaphernes and the Sardis Statue It is easy to see the problem's stumbling block: we are utterly unable to find confirma­ tion or illustration anywhere else of the change suggested by the royal inscriptions and made explicit in the Berossus quotation. To confirm the change, in fact, we would need to have some precisely dated evidence that would allow us to demonstrate that official sanctuaries of Anahita, complete with cultic statues, were erected in the towns listed by Berossus beginning in the time of Artaxerxes II. However, this is not the case; though the spread of sanctuaries of Persian Anaitis/Anahita in western Asia Minor certainly goes back a long time (cf. Tacitus, Ann. 111.62), we have no direct evidence of the existence of a sanctuary of Anahita at Sardis itself before 322 (Pausanias VII.6.6: Persian Artemis). A recently published text from Sardis has been claimed as a parallel (SEG XXIX. 1205); it is a Greek inscription, in which three parts can be identified —a dedication and two prohibitions:

678

Chapter i 5. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes HI

( 1 - 5 ) In the ?9th year o f Artaxerxes, D r o a p h e r n e s , s o n o f Baraces./ry^f/rWiosof Lydia, [dedi­ cated] the statue

(andrias)

to Z e u s of B a i a d a t e s .

(5-11) H e ( ? ) orders the neocores therapentes

[temple administrators] [of Z e u s ] w h o have the

right to enter the adyton a n d w h o crown the g o d not to participate in the mysteries o f S a b a zios o f those w h o bring the victims to be i m m o l a t e d a n d o f Angdistis a n d o f M a . (11-13) T h e y ( ? ) order the neocore D o r a t e s to abstain from these mysteries.

The Greek text w a s (re)carved during the Roman Empire period for reasons that re­ main unclear. This peculiarity probably explains several puzzles that remain. Basically, the text records a decision made by Droaphernes, who is unknown elsewhere but bears a typically Iranian name; he must have been an important person in the satrapal admin­ istration of Sardis (though the word hyparkhos alone does not allow us to determine his exact position). As the formula "Zeus of Baiadates" implies, the decision involves a family cult comparable to the "Men of Pharnaces" known to have been in Pontus from Strabo (XII.3.31). Baradates, according to this hypothesis, must be considered the an­ cestor of Droaphernes, son of Baraces. It is especially noteworthy to observe that Droaphernes dedicated a statue. But must it necessarily be seen as a concrete expression of a general policy that had the goal of multiplying cult statues throughout the Empire? To imagine that the statue was even the statue of a god—a conclusion hardly permitted by the word used (andrias: statue of a hu­ man)—is not supportable in any respect. In the first place, the date of the inscription is problematic: apart from the suggested comparison with Berossus, not a single feature al­ lows the text to be assigned to Artaxerxes II (ca. 366-365) rather than Artaxerxes I (ca. 427), since the copy we have comes from several centuries after Droaphernes' decree. As for the Zeus who is honored, there is nothing to allow an interpretatio graeca claiming that Ahura-Mazda appeared in the original version. It is much more likely that Zeus here refers to a local god, who could cpiite simply be the Lydian Zeus, who is well at­ tested at Sardis from the beginning of the sixth century on. Given all of these factors, there is no reason to submit the inscription to a close comparison with the decision Berossus ascribes to Artaxerxes II.

Anahita and Istar Moreover, it is quite paradoxical that not one text refers to any official celebration in honor of Anahita—and this festival was supposedly established precisely in the time of Artaxerxes II. Or to be more precise, we have one piece of evidence, which is not with­ out its own interpretive problems. Plutarch states that Artaxerxes II took the following ac­ tion against Aspasia, the former companion of Cyrus the Younger: "Me consecrated her priestess to Diana of Ecbatana, whom they name Anaitis, that she might spend the re­ mainder of her days in strict chastity" (Art. 27.4-*). First, the passage formally implies that the sanctuary of Anahita of Ecbatana, known from other later texts, already existed at least in the time of Artaxerxes, and it even gives the impression that it had been founded earlier. It is tempting to compare Plutarch's evidence with a much earlier text from the time of the Assyrian, Esarhaddon: it names a woman who bears the title 'royal oblate' (selutu sa sarri) in the sanctuary of Istar of Arbela. To be sure, we do not know whether a sanctuary of Istar still existed in Achaemenid Arbela, but the significance of the town makes the supposition likely. A priori, the comparison appears to go hand in hand with the representations of An3hita on several iconographic objects (seals, sealings, rings) already presented (fig. 37a-b,

At the Heart of Power

679

p 253); these objects exhibit syncretisms between Anahita and Istar, the great Mcsopotamian goddess, that had doubtless been operative for a very long time. Must we, how­ ever, infer that the goddess whose statues and worship Artaxerxes II intended to spread throughout the Empire was none other than a Babylonicized Anahita? This theory is hard to believe, in the same way that the related theory postulating a "Babylonicization" of the Achaemenid dynasty during the fourth century, usually connected with the halfBabylonian origin of Darius II and Parysatis, is hard to believe. We may also note that Istar is not the only goddess to whom a woman was consecrated; on the contrary, it was a very widespread custom. Strabo mentions that it was practiced in the temples of Ana­ hita in Cappadocia (XI. 14.16), and he reports similar practices at Zeleia, in the sanctu­ ary of Anaitis founded by the Persians (cf. XI.8.4); furthermore, hierodules are also found in other sanctuaries dedicated to Persian gods (XII.3.37): a Greek inscription from Cap­ padocia attests the consecration of hierodules to "the great goddess Anaitis Barzochara." What would be the significance of this decree for peoples from eastern Iran to western Asia Minor who were not affected in the slightest by the syncretism between Anahita and Istar? In I.ydia. for example, the assimilations and syncretisms in progress involved the goddesses Anahita and Artemis. Could it have been precisely because of her mutable character that Anahita was the goddess of choice for a king who wanted to diffuse among his peoples the worship of a goddess that each of them could recognize as their own?

Back to Berossus While the political nature of the royal decree scarcely seems to offer any room for doubt, the fundamental problem in fact remains: to whom was Artaxerxes' decree ad­ dressed? It seems rather improbable that Artaxerxes II departed from the policy of his predecessors and tried to impose the worship of Iranian gods on the regions named by Berossus. Moreover, though Anahita was certainly the object of syncretisms with local gods, as we have seen, it was not the intention of the Great King to confuse the official worship of the goddess with local gods. While such syncretisms already existed, the Great King's purpose clearly was to transplant the worship and images of a fully Iranian goddess. Berossus's list provides a key: we immediately recognize it as a list of the main centers of Achaemenid dominion: Babylon, Susa, Ecbatana, Persepolis, Bactra, Damas­ cus, and Sardis. Given these facts, the most likely explanation —at least, the one we ac­ cept here —is that Artaxerxes was addressing his decree to the Persians who had settled in the various provinces of the Empire. By exalting the goddess who dispensed royal le­ gitimacy, Artaxerxes vvas seeking to bind the imperial Persian diaspora still more closely to himself. His pronouncement served to reinforce the function that Xenophon quite rightly attributes to the satrapal courts: they were to be the guardians of Persian mores and the locus of ideological perpetuation of the dominant socioethnic class—that is, "Persia in Asia Minor for the king," to repeat the poet Bianor's colorful phrase character­ izing Sardis {Anth. Pal. IX.423). One more question remains: when and why? Does the existence of an edict allow us to suggest that Artaxerxes vvas responding to an internal crisis in the Empire by promul­ gating the edict? What historical circumstances would lie behind it, according to this hypothesis? The edict might have been an outcome of the ideological contest with his brother Cyrus the Younger or might have been connected with the satrapal unrest. How­ ever, recalling the precedent of Xerxes and the daiva (see chap. 13/6-7), we must point out that another interpretation is possible: Artaxerxes II was reaffirming the sacral nature

680

Chapter 15. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III

of royal power that was indissolubly linked to the protection of the gods, outside of all concrete historical time. Let us end with this acknowledgment: the interpretation that we have just presented leaves many questions hanging, and we ourselves are incapable of providing well-founded answers.

The Imperial Realm Berossus's text is interesting in another way, which we will consider briefly—the world of administration. His list of sites also comprises a sort of inventory of the imperial realm, organized around traditional residences (Persepolis, Susa, Babylon, Ecbatana) and capitals of vast regions: Bactra (Iranian Plateau), Damascus (Trans-Euphrates), and Sardis (Asia Minor and Anatolia). The omission of Memphis confirms a contrario the accuracy of Berossus's information. Though the importance of Damascus or Sardis could already have been known through other sources, we will stress specifically that this is the first explicit mention of Bactra since Artaxerxes I's campaign there at the beginning of his reign (Ctesias $31). Berossus's reference confirms what we could learn (or guess), beginning, on the one hand, with the role attributed to Dadarsi in 522-521 and, on the other, with the situation that seems to have prevailed in the time of Darius III —namely, that the responsibilities of the satrap of Bactra extended far beyond the horizon of Bactria proper. This mention in turn can be connected with other information (also very unspecific) dating to the reigns of Artaxerxes II and his successor. Let us recall in particular that, when he had to face the advance of Cyrus the Younger, Artaxerxes mustered troops at Ecbatana (Diodo­ rus XIV.22.1-2), though these troops arrived too late. They were led by an illegitimate brother of the king (Xenophon, Anab- II.4.25), which at least proves that the Iranian Pla­ teau and Central Asia continued to furnish soldiers whenever a general mobilization was decreed; further confirmation will be found in the disposition of troops by Darius III in 333-331. Of course, the texts are far from eloquent, and the interpretation of some of them is uncertain, but they opportunely remind us that, seen from the center, the Empire ex­ tended as far as Central Asia. India itself is not completely absent from the evidence that dates to the reign of Artaxerxes II. The work Ctesias devoted to this region is filled with fantastic stories that must have captivated his listeners. Nonetheless, we will stress that, whether directly or through Aelian, we learn that the kings of the Indus were required to send gifts to the Great King regularly; this may be how Darius III obtained Indian ele­ phants (cf. Quintus Curtius V.2.10). Let us add, finally, that in Ctesias's lost work dedi­ cated to the royal roads and stages, he followed an itinerary from Ephesus to Bactra and India (FGrH 688 F33: apou Ephesou mekhri Baktron kai Indikes). By itself, this informa­ tion remains vague; nonetheless, the implication is that at this date the connections be­ tween Susa and the Indus Valley had not been broken, and the Indian kings continued to show their subjection to the Great King.

From Artaxerxes II to Artaxerxes III According to Plutarch, the old king's last years were strewn with pitfalls and conspir­ acies. Plutarch first of all relates that Artaxerxes had three legitimate sons from his mar­ riage to Stateira: Darius (the oldest), Ariaspes (called Ariarathes by Justin X.I.I), and Ochus (the youngest; Art. 26.1-2; cf. 30.2). His concubines bore him a great number of illegitimate children as well (115 sons according to Justin X . l . l , 5), among them Ar-

The Wars of Artaxerxes 111 (351-338)

681

sames (Plutarch §30.1, 8). "Being willing to put clown in good time his son Ochus's hopes, lest. . . wars and contentions might again inflict his kingdom," the king named Darius crown prince (Plutarch §26.4-5-v-). Soon, an intense resentment impelled Da­ rius egged on by Tiribazus, to weave a plot against his father (§27-28). The prince ex­ pected that many courtiers would be ready to follow him (§29.1), including, according to Justin (X. 1.5), fifty of his illegitimate brothers. The conspiracy was uncovered through information provided by a eunuch; Darius was brought to trial before the royal judges and put to death (Plutarch §29), "along with the wives and children of all the conspira­ tors" (Justin X.2.6). Following this, in Plutarch, is an account of the contemptible schemes of Ochus, who was bolstered by his lover Atossa; she was both his sister and his stepmother (§23.3-7; 30.1; cf. Val. Max. IX.2.7). Through his stratagems and accusa­ tions, Ochus managed to drive his legitimate brother Ariaspes mad, and he chose to take his own life (§30.1-5; different version in Aelian, VH IX.42). Soon he had his illegiti­ mate brother, Arsames, who was the king's favorite, killed (§30.7-8). These were the cir­ cumstances at the time of Artaxerxes' death of old age, after a long reign (between November 35 ) and April 358, according to Babylonian tablets). Behind the frantic romanticism of Plutarch's tale, we can observe several realities. First of all, following the model of his predecessors, Artaxerxes II was careful to desig­ nate a crown prince during his lifetime—his oldest son, as it happens. Second, the se­ lection of a crown prince did not result in sharing power (despite Justin X. 1.2). Finally, and as a corollary to our second point, the status of crown prince was itself unstable. Plu­ tarch, in contrast, breathes not a word about the designation of a new heir after the deaths of Darius and then Ariaspes. He is content to note that the king showed a prefer­ ence for one of his illegitimate sons, Arsames. In reality, everything leads us to believe that, when Artaxerxes II died, everything was ready for the transition. If, as we may rea­ sonably suppose, Ochus had been placed by his father at the head of the army sent to fight Tachos (Syncellus, p. 486, 20: "while his father was still alive"), this designation all by itself removes our doubts. Without dwelling on it, Diodorus (XV.93.1) simply notes that, when Artaxerxes II died, Ochus succeeded his father. This is not to say that the suc­ cession was welcomed by everyone. One late author, for example, mentions that on his accession the new Artaxerxes "buried Atossa alive, who was both his sister and his step­ mother. He locked his uncle and more than 100 sons and grandsons in an empty court­ yard and had them killed in a hail of arrows" (Val. Max. IV.2.7; cf. Justin X.3.1). This presentation fits perfectly with the despicable image of Artaxerxes III in the ancient lit­ erature (e.g., Plutarch §30.9). However, even if we suppose that the tradition transmitted by Valerius Maximus is accurate, all that can be concluded from it is that Ochus had made enemies at court before his accession. Furthermore, Plutarch himself also notes that, as at the time of the succession of Darius II (§6.1-2), the court was disrupted by the activities of opposing factions favoring Darius or Ochus (§26.1). c

9. The Wars of Artaxerxes 111 (351-338) Artaxerxes III and Artabazus It appears that the new Great King found himself beset with troubles in Asia Minor shortly after his accession—or perhaps the troubles had always been there in latent form. In the course of Diodorus's discussion of Athens' war against its rebellious allies between

682

Chapter 15. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III

ca. 357 and 355 (XVI.7.3-4; 21-22.1-2), he states that the Athenian strategos Chares, who hoped to alleviate the financial burden of the military operations, had entered into an agreement with the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, Artabazus, who was then in re­ volt (apostas) against the king. With Chares' help, the satrap won a victory over the royal army (§22.1). Soon thereafter, facing threats from Artaxerxes, Athens ceased its interven­ tion. Traces of these events can also be found in anecdotal fragments that provide a few additional details: the royal forces were led by Tithraustes, whose status is not clarifiedhe had a khora ('position') in Phrygia, and he had just overpowered Chares [FCrH 105 F4). After the Athenian's departure, Artabazus received aid from the Thebans, who sent him a force commanded by Pammenes, and with Pammenes' help he achieved victory over "the satraps who had been dispatched by the king" (Diodorus §34.1-2). Though it seems certain that Artabazus received no assistance from the other satraps in Asia Minor, the reasons for and origins of his rebellion remain thickly cloaked in mys­ tery. According to the Scholia on Demosthenes (4.14), the king ordered the satraps to disband their mercenaries. However, aside from some problems posed by this informa­ tion (see chap. 17/3), it explains nothing about Artabazus's behavior. Instead, we must imagine, as in the previous period, that Artabazus was accused by one of his colleagues, for reasons that totally escape us but that apparently persuaded the king (cf. Diodorus XVI.52.3: egklemata). Under unspecified conditions, Artabazus, with his entire family, chose exile at the court of Philip II of Macedon (ibid.).

Fadure in Egypt, Revolt in Phoenicia and Cyprus (351-345) While these minor flareups were being extinguished in Asia Minor, the new king was primarily engrossed with the situation in Trans-Euphrates and Egypt. Even though at the time of his accession he might have guessed that he had a free hand in dealing with Egypt, he in fact knew nothing about the destructive effects of Nectanebo IPs rebellion or about the difficulties that the pretender faced when his attempt to assert his authority was challenged. We do not know much about the intentions of Artaxerxes III. In a highly suspect passage that was intended to illustrate the cowardice of the Great King, who was reluctant to assume leadership of operations himself, Diodorus simply notes that Persian generals were once again defeated when they tried to regain a foothold in Egypt during the period from 361 to 351 (XVI.40.3-5). But we have not a shred of corroborative evi­ dence of their attacks on Egypt prior to the moment when Artaxerxes himself sum­ moned his army and suffered a defeat in 351 (Isocrates, Phil. 101; Demosthenes, Lib. Rhod. §§11-12); he avenged the insult a few years later. In 347, Isocrates addressed a stirring tribute to Philip II of Macedon. He promised that the king would win victory after victory, for the Persian Empire vvas moribund fol­ lowing the failure that the Great King had just experienced in Egypt (351): Furthermore, Cyprus and Phoenicia and Cilicia, and that region from which the barbarians used to recruit their fleet, belonged at that time to the King [Artaxerxes II], but now they have either revolted from him or are so involved in war and its attendant ills that none of these peoples is of any use to him; while to you, if you desire to make war upon him, they will be serviceable. And mark also that Idrieus [of Caria], who is the most prosperous of the present rulers of the mainland, must in the nature of things be more hostile to the interests of the King than are those who are making open war against him;... but if you should cross over to the mainland . . . you will also induce many of the other satraps [besides Idrieus] to throw ofF the King's power if you promise them "freedom" and scatter broadcast over Asia

The Wars of Artaxerxes HI (351-338)

683

that word which, when sown among the Hellenes, has broken up both our [Athens'] empire and that of the Lacedaemonians. (Phil. 102—4-0-) In this speech we find one of those catalogues of countries that were unsubmissive to the Great King of which the Athenian orator was so fond; on this occasion, however, he did not hesitate to provide a contrast by elevating the reign of Artaxerxes II, which he had ridiculed in a discourse in 380 (Paneg. 161; see p. 650 above; cf. p. 658). Nonethe­ less behind the outrageousness of the thinking, Isocrates is alluding to undeniable facts that Diodorus, in particular, treats in book XVI. According to Diodorus, in fact, the stimulus for the Egyptian conflict came from the Sidonians, who persuaded the other Phoenicians to take up arms against the Persians and to make a treaty (symmakhia) with the pharaoh, Nectanebo, before engaging in an immense war effort. The war officially commenced when the Sidonians devastated the Persian paradise located near their town and destroyed the stocks of fodder stored by the satraps with the Egyptian war in mind; they also executed several leading Persians (XVI.41)- At the same time, a revolt connected to the earlier rebellion on the island broke out on Cyprus, with the nine kings declaring independence (42.3-4). While Arta­ xerxes was gathering an army at Babylon ($42.1), he ordered Idrieus of Caria to lead an army and a navy to Cyprus ($42.6-9), just as Mazaeus, "governor of Cilicia," and Belesys, "satrap of Syria," were conducting the first operations against Phoenicia. Tennes, "king of Sidon," had meanwhile acquired considerable reinforcements through levies on the Sidonian population and the arrival of a contingent of mercenaries sent by the pha­ raoh and commanded by Mentor; Mazaeus and Belesys were forced back (42.1-2). They later combined their forces with the royal army that arrived from Babylonia. According to Diodorus, the Great King did not really have to fight, since the king of Sidon, Tennes, who soon joined up with Mentor, preferred to betray his fellow citizens. He delivered one hundred Phoenicians to Artaxerxes and then opened the gates of the city; he was soon put to death. The Sidonians chose to kill themselves, their women and children, and to put their houses to the torch; appalled by the king's savagery, the other Phoeni­ cians surrendered ($43-45.6). Shortly after(?), the Cypriot cities were recaptured or sur­ rendered; Pnytagoras of Salamis alone held out, but he too soon submitted ($46.1-3). Interesting and detailed though it is, Diodorus's tale poses many problems. First of all, the chronology is often fluid, as it is throughout book XVI. The only external chronologi­ cal evidence is a fragment of the Babylonian Chronicle (ABC no. 9, p. 114), dated to year 14 of Artaxerxes III, that refers to the sending of Sidonian prisoners to the royal palace in Babylon in October 345. We deduce from this that Sidon was taken some weeks or months earlier, perhaps even in 346, at the same time acknowledging that Isocrates refers to a revolt still in progress in 347 (Phil. 102). The revolt certainly lasted quite a while, since Mazaeus and Belesys were ordered to suppress it at first; but it is hardly possible to fix a precise chronology or to state with certainty that the Phoenician revolt broke out im­ mediately after the defeat by the Egyptians in 351, because Diodorus's phrasing leads us to believe otherwise —that several years elapsed between the two events. It is clear in fact that, after the failure on the Nile, the Persians immediately began to prepare an immense force, for the Great King had determined to put an end once and for all to secessions by the pharaoh (Diodorus XVI.40.5-6). Artaxerxes' real purpose in leaving Babylonia was to advance against Egypt (cf. $$43.2; 44.1-5). Sidon was clearly one of the bases for Persian logistical preparations; it was there that the navy and troops were assembled and the

684

Chapter J 5. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes HI

cavalry's fodder stored (§41.5). Diodorus's story clearly indicates that Persia's preparations were already well under way when the revolt broke out. In short, it does not seem that the revolt lasted as long as from 351 to 346, as is sometimes stated. The preparations of the army partly explain some of the causes of the beginning of hostilities. Diodorus indicates that Tennes of Sidon was counting on the militias levied in the city and on Greek mercenaries, some of whom had been sent by Nectanebo un­ der Mentor's command (§§41-4; 42.2; 44.6). He also says that, because of its unparal­ leled wealth, Sidon was in a position to gather triremes, mercenaries, all sorts of arms, and quantities of provisions (§§ 41.4; 44.5) — indicating that Tennes had been able to take advantage of the slowness of the Great King's preparations. Without denying Sidon's own strengths, we must nonetheless stress that its leaders had been able to profit from the fact that the Persians had chosen their city as the place for their preparations for the Egyptian expedition. It is clear that the Sidonians seized some strategic imperial supplies (§41.5). Given this background, we are tempted to think that its 100 triremes and pentaremes (§44.6) constituted the contingent it had been required to prepare for the war in Egypt. The inhabitants burned their ships after Tennes' betrayal, and the goal of this action must have been more to weaken the royal navy than to prevent some of them from fleeing (§45.4). In other words, like Aristagoras in 499 (see p. 153 above), the Sidonian leaders had deprived the Persians of the means that were intended to sustain the offensive that the Great King was preparing to launch against Egypt. We are less well informed regarding the origins of and reasons for the revolt, inas­ much as we know little of the history of Sidon and Phoenicia in the preceding decades; we know only of the participation of the Sidonian navy in Conon's war and the equivo­ cal behavior of Straton during Tachos's offensive, some ten years earlier. Diodorus high­ lights the hatred that the Persian leaders who lived in the city had aroused. The arrogant orders and requisitions, he says, had created or strengthened a strong mood of discontent regarding the imperial war taxes (§41.2, 5), which were severely depleting the profits that the city drew from its commercial activities (dia tas emporias; §41.4). Nor was this the first time Sidon had been forced to contribute; they had suffered fiscally ever since Cam­ byses' first Egyptian expedition in 525. Does the huge extent of Persian preparations, stressed by Diodorus (§40.6), suffice to explain the decision of the Sidonian leaders to burn their bridges when they devastated the royal paradise and to execute high Persian officials? They must have known even at that moment that the war the Great King would wage against them would be merciless (cf. §41.6). This and several other questions remain unanswered. In fact, it is hard to explain why Tennes chose to betray the city when he received the news of the arrival of Artaxerxes' army. According to Diodorus (§43. !-*•), as soon as he was informed of the size of the royal army, the king of Sidon "thought that the insurgents were incapable of fighting against it." We cannot explain this sudden change of direction by assuming that Tennes had previously been unaware of the king's preparations; this is an obviously unsupportable bypothesis. Does his attitude reveal that there was internal conflict in the city? Further­ more, we never see the other Phoenician cities joining the rebellion, even though Dio­ dorus, without explicitly saying so, seems to suggest that the Sidonians were united with Aradus and Tyre (§41.1; cf. §45.1). In fact, only Sidon seems to have opposed the Per­ sians; it was the only one of the three cities to be severely punished. In short, the blind­ ness of the Sidonian leaders is hard to explain. Perhaps the hoped-for support of

The Wars of Artaxerxes III (351-338)

685

Nectanebo must be considered. Had be promised them that he would intervene di­ rectly? It is possible, given that the pharaohs were generally not parsimonious with such promises; the Sidonians must also have recalled Tachos's recent offensive. For Diodorus, at any rate, it certainly was the Egyptian example that impelled the Phoenicians and, later, the Cypriots to revolt (§§40.5; 42.5). Last, it is very likely that, during the period when the Great King was preparing his army at Babylon, the Persian forces in Phoenicia itself were not very numerous; this would explain how the Sidonian forces and their mer­ cenaries managed to repel the initial counterattack led by Mazaeus and Belesys.

from Sidon to Jerusalem and Jericho It would also be quite interesting to discover whether the Sidonian and Cypriot rebel­ lions extended to neighboring countries—a theory that might help to explain the Si­ donians' apparent optimism. However, it must also be recognized that we have only meager and contradictory evidence about this point. Several late authors refer to the de­ portation of Jews to Hyrcania, carrying out orders issued by the Great King. Another au­ thor (Solinus) speaks of the destruction of Jericho in the time of Artaxerxes III (during his return from Egypt). But aside from the fact that these texts are suspect or contradic­ tory (on the chronological level), there is no external evidence to confirm the existence of a revolt that would have excited Judah and Samaria.

The Reconquest of Egypt (343-342) As a part of the Great King's strategy, calming Phoenicia and Cyprus was definitely an important matter. Nonetheless, he remained obsessed with the Egyptian problem, and he had begun enormous preparations to deal with it some years earlier (XVI.40.6). Accompanied by a war flotilla and considerable transport (§40.6: stereotypical num­ bers), the Great King set out on the road to Egypt at the end of 343. Some months later (summer 342), he entered Memphis, whereupon Nectanebo fled to Upper Egypt and then Nubia (§51.1-2). From the point of view of Achaemenid history, one of the most important questions is why Artaxerxes succeeded at what had eluded so many Achaeme­ nid armies since the beginning of the fourth century. In answering this question, we have nothing to rely on but Diodorus Siculus's detailed report (XVI.46.4-9, 47-51), which can easily be compared on many points with his own accounts of the expeditions led by Pharnabazus (XV41-43), by Perdiccas against Ptolemy (XVIII.33-36), and even by Antigonus against the same Ptolemy in 306 (XX.73-76). It is also a good idea to men­ tion—before returning to it at greater length (chap. 18/3) —that the entire passage in Diodorus is vitiated by the decisive importance he attributes to the Greek mercenaries throughout the course of the campaign. Diodorus states that the Achaemenid army suffered from the same handicaps that he had already stressed in the descriptions of previous expeditions. Before even arriving in the Nile Valley, the enemy troops had to overcome many obstacles. First, they had to cross the terrifying "region without water" that stretched south of Gaza. We know that Cambyses had recourse to the services of the "king of the Arabs" when he crossed this region (Herodotus III.5-9), just as Esarhaddon had, in his time (ANET 292), and Anti­ gonus in 306 (Diodorus XX.73.3), we do not know what happened in 343. Next came the region of quicksand, the Barathra (Diodorus 1.30.4-7; XX.73.3; cf. Polybius V.80.1), m which Artaxerxes III lost a number of soldiers (XVI.46.5) because, Diodorus says, the 5

686

Chapter 15. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III

Persians had no idea of the topography of the area. He states elswhere that, when Tennes of Sidon entered into negotiations with Artaxerxes III, he emphasized that he could guide the royal army (XVI.43.3). We are further amazed that the Persians did not seek out local guides (cf. XVI.48.3). In this case, we have the impression that Diodorus was reusing a motif illustrated earlier by the role that Herodotus assigned to Phanes, the head of the mercenaries who accompanied Cambyses in 525 (III.4). The only advantage Diodorus grants to Artaxerxes—and this is a deeply rooted fopos~is the crushing numerical superiority of his army: Nectanebo had 20,000 Greek mercenaries, 20,000 Libyans, and 60,000 Egyptian makhimoi ('soldiers') (XVI.47.5-7), facing an "uncountable" royal army, as implied by the conventionalized numbers cited (300,000 infantrymen, 30,000 cavalry, 300 triremes, and 500 other transport vessels: XVI.40.6). He recalls the most memorable episodes, at least in his eyes: early on, it seems, an army corps, aided by Egyptian guides, managed to cross the river and establish a bridgehead on the opposite bank (XVI.48.3-5); this was what Nectanebo had feared, and he hastened to Memphis in order to ready its defenses ($48.6). This fallback in turn aroused uncertainty in the Egyptian camp and led some Greek mercenaries to negotiate terms of surrender. This resulted in the fall of Pelusium, which was soon followed by the taking of Bubastis and other fortified cities ($49.7-8; 51.1). Thereafter, the way to the Nile was free, and the royal fleet was able to sail up the river as far as Memphis (cf. Thucydides 1.104.2). Moreover, Diodorus stresses that the royal army set off very late because of the length of the preparations, which allowed the ruler of Egypt to continue building up the coun­ try's defenses (XVI.46.7; 49.7; cf. XV.41.2, 5). Behind this cliche there certainly lies a truth, for the offensive against Egypt did not take place until the winter of 343-342. For one thing, after the conquest of Sidon the king probably waited for the surrender of the Cypriot cities (46.1-3); for another, further preparations doubtless were completed in the midst of some confusion because of the Sidonian revolt (cf. 45.4: destruction of the ships). Diodorus also states that, before his departure from Babylon (or when he arrived in Phoenicia), Artaxerxes sent messengers to Greece to recruit mercenaries; Athens and Sparta declined nonconfrontationally, but Thebes and Argos sent contingents (44.1-3). This was also the period when the contingents from the subject cities of Asia Minor were joining the royal army (44.4; cf. 46.4). After the fall of Sidon, the Great King also wel­ comed Mentor and his 4,000 men (42.2; 47.4). These delays encouraged Nectanebo to use traditional tactics: like all of the pharaohs, he sought to take advantage of the topography. Thus, to render the river uncrossable and to prevent landings on the beaches of the Delta, fortifications were placed on all the mouths of the Nile, especially the Pelusian branch, which had the most beaches (XVI.46.6-7, XV.47.2-4, XX.76.3). A large quantity of boats that were well suited for river combat had been gathered from along the Nile (XVI.47.6); these boats also transported troops from one point to another to prevent enemy troops from landing on the beaches (XX.75.1; 76.3-4). The banks of the river itself were fortified in such a way as to prevent passage (XVI.47.7; cf. XV.47.3; XVIII.33.6, 34.1-4). It looks as though, in order to cover all bets, the Great King chose a favorable season, just as Antigonus had in 306, when he left Palestine at the rising of the Pleiades —that is, at the beginning of November (XX.73.3), a time when the army would not be endangered by the Nile flood (cf. XV.48.4). But in itself this auspicious choice was not a token of success: Antigonus still

The Wars of Artaxerxes HI (351-338)

687

faced failure and even suggested retreating and returning "with more complete prepara­ tion and at the time at which the Nile was supposed to be lowest" (XX.76.5o). Pharnabazus's failure had also shown that sustained resistance by Egyptian defenses could force an attacker to defer the assault too long, resulting in the collapse of the attack (XV.48.1-4). Does Diodorus's very unfavorable portrayal of Nectanebo reflect, to a greater or lesser extent, the feelings of the Egyptians? It is impossible to answer such questions: that Arta­ xerxes used Egyptian guides does not tell us anything specific about their attitude toward the pharaoh; and, even Nicostratus, after all, took hostages as a part of his strategy (XVI.48.3). We may simply note, with Diodorus (§§48.6; 49.2-3), that Nectanebo's with­ drawal to Memphis demoralized his soldiers. Finally, Nectanebo very quickly lost hope and gave up on defending Memphis to the death, preferring to flee to Nubia in the belief that many cities were ready to betray him (§51.1). We may wonder whether the internal weakening of pharaonic authority (the subject of military edicts throughout the fourth century) was not in fact one of the most important reasons for the Egyptian failure; but this is simply a guess, and the existing evidence does not permit us to an ive at a more cer­ tain conclusion. Diodorus states that Nectanebo was scarcely inclined to take the risks necessary to maintain hegemony (hyper tes hegemonias; 51.1). This attitude seems en­ tirely opposite to the thoughts that Diodorus imputes to Artaxerxes, who resolved to head the army himself in order to personally lead the fight to preserve his kingdom/kingship (agonas hyper tes hasileias; §40.6). Even though Diodorus's presentation and aggressive vocabulary express royal propaganda, there is little doubt that Artaxerxes III had made it his personal goal not only to reestablish order in Phoenicia but also to reconquer Egypt. He had reached power in troubled circumstances, and now he was determined to prove his military prowess, which in turn would provide justification of his power. A passage in Theopompus illustrates the importance attached to the march on Egypt. It was an occa­ sion when the Great King summoned representatives of the subject peoples as he passed by, and they came to bring him gifts and ritual presents (FGrH 115 F263a-b). This meant that Diodorus was able to write, correctly, that when he returned from Egypt, laden with booty, the Great King acquired great renown for his victories (§51.3). In other words, he had reinforced his authority and prestige among his family and his peoples. On this occasion, a royal seal exalting the king's personal victory over the Egyptians was engraved (SA*a; fig. 18b, p. 215).

Artaxerxes III in Egypt And so Egypt returned to the Achaemenid fold, nearly sixty years after Amyrtaeus's se­ cession. A Persian administration under the direction of Pharandates was reinstalled in the country (XVI.51.3); however, we cannot say with certainty that Pharandates was a descendant of the satrap with the same name from the time of Darius I (chap. 12/1). Tra­ ditionally, Artaxerxes III had an appalling reputation in both the Egyptian and the Clas­ sical traditions; in this respect, he is like Cambyses, with whom he is frequently compared in the ancient texts. The origin of this negative reputation is surely to be found in the actions he took, reported by Diodorus as follows: After.. . demolishing the walls of the most important cities, by plundering the shrines [he] gathered a vast quantity of silver and gold, and he carried off the inscribed records from the ancient temples {tas ek ton archaion hieron anagraphas), which later on Bagoas returned to the Egyptian priests on the payment of huge sums by way of ransom. (XVI.51.2-*-)

688

Chapter 15. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes HI

Artaxerxes was even accused, just as Cambyses was, of killing the sacred bull Apis; ac­ cording to Aelian (VH VI.8), Bagoas assassinated Artaxerxes in order to punish the king for his disgraceful Egyptian deeds! Coins show that the new conqueror bore the title of pharaoh. Mentor in Asia Minor When he had returned, Artaxerxes sent Mentor to Asia Minor. After Mentor had in­ terceded with the King, asking that Artabazus and his family be allowed to return (XVI.52.3-4), His prime objective was to march against Hermias, "the tyrant of Atarnaeus, who had revolted from the King and was master of many fortresses and cities" (§52.5*). Then, without going into detail, Diodorus writes that Mentor brought other leaders (hegemones) who had broken with the Persians back to their senses and that, by force or by stratagem, he soon subdued them all (§52.84-). This statement obviously re­ fers to localized disturbances of no great importance. Mentor fulfilled the customary mission of maintaining order in the face of local "dynasts," who were recognized by the Achaemenid authority but also had to exhibit steadfast loyalty on every occasion. Al­ though Diodorus's text does not allow us to arrive at a sure conclusion, it does in fact seem that, after the submission of Hermias, Mentor's activities were located on the pe­ riphery of the old domain of this "tyrant"—that is, in Aeolis and the Troad, regions tra­ ditionally governed from Dascylium. Artaxerxes III and Philip II The initial diplomatic and military interactions between Artaxerxes III and Philip II apparently date to the years after the reconquest of Egypt. But did the court have a Macedonian policy, and if so, at what date did it take shape and achieve consistency? Let us stress from the start that the answer to this question risks being only a reflection, as in a distorted mirror, of an image that comes out of a prophetic or eschatological history— that is, a history that presumes that Alexander's conquest was a matter of necessity. At the same time, let us stress that we have no direct evidence that would allow us to recon­ struct in detail the picture of Philip's progress in Greece and Thrace as it was seen by the Achaemenid authorities. The first indication of direct relations between the Persian Empire and the Mace­ donian kingdom is that Artabazus and his family took up exile status with Philip II (Di­ odorus XVI.52.3). There is no reason to infer from this that Philip II intended to show animosity toward Artaxerxes at that date, especially since Artaxerxes had recently come to power under highly irregular circumstances. That Philip II accepted a Persian exile does not necessarily imply a rupture with the Great King. A Persian refugee from Dascy­ lium could scarcely find refuge anywhere other than in Europe. We can name at least two Persians of distinction who had sought refuge in Athens during the fifth century in order to escape royal punishment (Plutarch, Cimon 10.9: Rhoisaces; Ctesias §43: Zopyrus). Artabazus's choice of Macedon as a place to settle was due in part to its proximity to a region nearly on the border of his satrapy; despite the defeats of 479, relations among Dascylium, Thrace, and Macedon were undoubtedly not simply cut off. Furthermore, a Persian noble could find a structure and way of life among the local aristocracy in Macedon rather like that to which he was accustomed. Furthermore, we are aware of at least one other Persian, Amminapes, who found asylum at the court of Philip II, for rea­ sons unknown to us (Quintus Curtius VI.4.25).

The Wars of Artaxerxes III (351-338) The context of Artabazus's return to the Great King has sometimes been taken as an indication of Philip's activities in the Empire. In a harangue delivered in 341, Demos­ thenes offered his listeners an argument for the policy of alliance with the Great King that he favored: Secondly, the agent and confidant of all Philip's preparations against the king has been snatched off (anaspastos), and the king will hear all the proceedings, not from Athenian ac­ cusers, whom he might consider to be speaking for their own interests, but from the acting minister himself. {Phil. IV 32*) This "agent," we know, was Hermias, who is presented by Diodorus in the context of the mission entrusted to Mentor by Artaxerxes III after his victory in Egypt. There has been a tendency to take Demosthenes literally and infer that Philip, through his inter­ mediary Hermias, planned to disrupt the Achaemenid position in western Asia Minor. This theory deserves little credit. It is in fact remarkable that in his version Diodorus does not breathe a word of possible Macedonian collusion with Hermias, the tyrant of Atarnaeus, and reduces Mentor's mission simply to restoring the imperial order that was disturbed in some locales (XVI.52.5-8); and this comes from the very baine Diodorus who elsewhere did not hesitate to state that, when the king of Macedon had triumphed at Delphi in 346-345, he dreamed that he would be recognized as strategos autokrator of the Greeks and then would march against the Persians (XVI.60.5). Although Philip's "Persian policy" is as opaque to us as Artaxerxes' "Macedonian policy," nothing in Philip's behavior at this date confirms that he was immediately ready to take action on the goal that Isocrates vigorously advocated in 347 — to mount an expediton to Asia Minor. In the same harangue, Demosthenes stressed for his audience another circumstance unfavorable to Philip: "Those whom the king trusts and regards as his benefactors are at enmity and war with Philip" (Phil. IV 31-0). This clearly alludes to the hostilities then going on at Perinthus, as is even more clearly set forth in an (apocryphal) response to an (apocryphal) letter from Philip: "The satraps of Asia have just thrown in mercenary troops for the relief of Perinthus . . ." (Reply 5*). Diodorus confirms the existence of these hostilities: Philip's growth in power had been reported in Asia, and the Persian king, viewing this power with alarm, wrote to his satraps on the coast to give all possible assistance to the Pcvinthians. They consequently took counsel and sent off to Perinthus a force of mercenaries, ample funds, and sufficient stocks of food, missiles, and other materials required for operations. (XVI.75.1-2*) Pausanias (1.29.10) adds a significant detail: it was Arsites, satrap of Heliespontine Phry­ gia, who coordinated operations; this seems logical, given the strategic location of the territories of Dascylium. Moreover, in 334 we find this same Arsites directing the opera­ tions against Alexander, again in consultation with his colleagues (Arrian 1.12.8-10). The aid provided to Perinthus was among the charges leveled by Alexander against Darius in a letter he sent after the battle of Issus. According to the text preserved by Ar­ rian (II. 14.5), Ochus was also accused of sending an army into Thrace. The Macedonian king even went so far as to put the responsibility for the murder of his father on the Per­ sian court. Darius recalled that previously there had been a treaty of friendship and alli­ ance (philia kai symmakhia) between Artaxerxes III and Philip II (II. 14.2). The absence of any corroborative evidence for any such treaty has opened the way to speculation, and

690

Chapter 15. Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III

the overarching characteristic of these speculations is that they contradict each other; it would be useless to add one more item to this house of cards—it is a miracle that it has not already collapsed! We must remain content to note only that embassies were cer­ tainly exchanged between the two courts, though we are not able to identify their mis­ sions, which perhaps were limited to good- or bad-neighborliness (cf. Plutarch, Alex. 5.1-3; Quintus Curtius HI.7.1). Certainly, the two capitals, Pella and Susa, were not un­ familiar with each other. The record contains just one certainty—the Persian-Mace­ donian hostilities at Perinthus, which vvas besieged about 341 by Philip. But even here we must be careful: Demosthenes attempted to make an argument from the situation at Perinthus that would persuade his fellow citizens that the Great King was ready to enter into an alliance with them and send them money for the war; but by no means does this make the orator an objective observer of the "Macedonian policy" of Artaxerxes! For, when all is said and done, at least according to Aeschines (III.238), Artaxerxes was quick to let the Athenians know that he would not be sending them any money! Let us summarize. There is no doubt that Artaxerxes III, like his predecessors, fol­ lowed a policy toward the Greek cities that involved sending fairly frequent royal embas­ sies. It is also beyond doubt that Macedon's opponents, such as Demosthenes, thought that the support of the Great King represented the only credible alternative with which to oppose Philip IPs progress. Last, it is certain that the arrival of Macedonian armies at the Straits aroused the anxiety of the satrap of Dascylium, who certainly shared his con­ cern with the Great King. The king took limited defensive steps, restricting himself to sending relief to Perinthus. Did he perhaps also send a body of mercenaries into Thrace, as in Alexander's accusation? We cannot say, but is this not simply one more stylistic re­ dundancy? In short, the court was kept informed about Philip's operations. It seems dif­ ficult to go beyond these observations, since, after all, it is not obvious that Philip's intentions were any clearer to the Great King and his advisers than they are to us today. Persia's expert consultants on Balkan policy must have often been bewildered by the in­ comprehensible contradictions of the European powers (cf. Thucydides IV.50.2). We must await Philip's victory at Chaeronea (338) and then the founding of the Corinthian League (337) before things become entirely clear. Meanwhile, Artaxerxes III had died by an assassin's hand, and one of his sons, Arses (Artaxerxes IV), had succeeded him (August-September 338).

PART FIVE

T h e Fourth Century and the Empire of Darius III in the Achaemenid longue duree: A Prospective Assessment

Chapter 16

Lands, Peoples, and Satrapies: Taking Stock of the Achaemenid World Introduction: In the Steps of Alexander and on the Trail of Darius Another "Achaemenid" Source: The Alexandrian

Historians

Before beginning the final chapter, which is my account of the confrontation be­ tween Darius III and Alexander, I would like to pause to synthesize and integrate the facts, interpretations, and theories that have been presented in the preceding chapters. The inquiry can also move forward because of the contributions of a "new" corpus —the ancient historians of Alexander. Thus far, we have deliberately limited use of them, ex­ cept in the chapters in part 2 that are devoted to relatively stable aspects of the Persian tradition. We consider "stable" those things that constitute the very principles of royal Achaemenid ideology, whether it be royal virtue, representations of the imperial realm, or even the people and life of the court—all those aspects that the texts from the time of Darius III imply go back to "ancestral custom" (e.g., Diodorus XVII.34.6; 35.3; Quintus Curtius III.3.8; III.8.12; IV. 13.26, etc.). Two examples may quickly clarify this point. (1) Quintus Cmtius's famous description (III.3.8-25) of the royal procession before the battle of Issus is amazingly like the somewhat parallel descriptions provided by Xeno­ phon (of "Cyrus") and Herodotus (of Xerxes; see chap. 5/4 above). (2) Similarly, the de­ scription, again by Quintus Curtius (V. 1.17-23), of Alexander's entry into Babylon could be integrated, at a stage before careful analysis, into a discussion of "royal entries," which we have every reason to believe did not change significantly in either principle or orga­ nization. There is even one place where Quintus Curtius himself compares Darius III with Xerxes—in regard to the methods that the Great Kings used for counting and enu­ merating the contingents of the royal army (III.2.2). This example must not, however, lead us to imagine that royal customs were completely static. For one thing, Quintus Curtius's comparison does not necessarily commit the modern historian to the same conclusion; for another, it does not imply a general paralysis of royal protocol, which, as we have seen, underwent several modifications over time, any more than the apparently repetitive character of the royal inscriptions should lead us to conclude that nothing changed between Cyrus and Darius III; we have observed, for example, that innovations were introduced in the times of Artaxerxes I and Artaxerxes II (chaps. 14/1, 15/8). On the other hand, the sources going back to the time of Alexander, situated within the longue duree of the fourth century, are of decisive importance in our attempt to de­ termine the state of the Empire at the time of the accession of Darius III. Of course, just like the Greek authors of the fourth century, the courtier-historians often transmitted a biased view of the conquest and the conquered. We will come back to this point several tunes. We will see that in some cases the information offered by the Hellenistic writers must be taken with as much caution as is required for the writers of the fourth century. 693

694

Chapter 16. Lands, Peoples, and Satrapies

For example, caution is called for when they introduce us to the little-known peoples of the Zagros, whom they identify using the undifferentiated and reductive label of "savage brigands," or more generally when they try to contrast, one final time, Achaemenid stasis with the innovations spurred by Alexander (work on the Babylonian canals and rivers). The primary reason for this is that the ideology promoted by Alexander's Companions is homologous with that which runs through the writings of the fourth-century authors. But the responsibility also belongs to the historian who reads and makes use of them. In fact, many of the details reported by the ancients can only be understood when they are located in the longue duree of Persian history. Here is how the Alexander histories con­ stitute an "Achaemenid" source: they illuminate Achaemenid history, which in turn helps the historian to understand the sense and significance of the information they pro­ vide. To take but a single example, it is obvious that Anian's and Quintus Curtius's descriptions of Alexander's entries into Sardis and, later, Babylon take on their full his­ torical meaning only when they are placed in the context of the "royal entries" well known from the Achaemenid period (primarily), and earlier periods as well. This Achae­ menid perspective has the effect of ruining the traditional interpretation of this informa­ tion about the relationships that Alexander developed with the elites of the conquered countries. Beyond these distortions (which the Achaemenid context allows us to examine and thus to correct), Alexander's historians (used, each in then own fashion, by Plutarch, Ar­ rian, Quintus Curtius, Diodorus, Justin, and several others) considerably modify the way we look at the Empire—for very simple reasons. First, following Alexander step by step, they carry us along the trail of Darius and lead us to discover the Upper Country, about which the Classical authors are all but silent, except for Cyrus's march from Sar­ dis to Babylon and the return of the Greek mercenaries from the Tigris Valley and the Black Sea by way of the Armenian mountains, Bithynia, and Paphlagonia. This time, (nearly) every satrapy is traversed. As a result, the Achaemenid world takes on a breadth and depth that we have been unable to examine since the time of Darius I, because of an abundance and variety of evidence unequaled throughout the fifth and fourth centu­ ries. It suffices to recall, for instance, that the Companions of Alexander were the first to provide written descriptions of Persepolis and Pasargadae. Furthermore, the Iranian Pla­ teau and Central Asia are no longer terra incognita. Of course, the modern historian would prefer to have more detailed sources; it is nonetheless true that the information drawn from the fourth-century writers makes it possible for us to attempt a tour of the Great King's entire domain from the geographical, ecological, and ethnographic points of view concurrently (even if, on this last point, Asia Minor once again takes pride of place). For the first time since Herodotus (VII-IX), because of these sources we can, for example, compile a Who's Who of the imperial elite. There is obviously a flip side to this coin. By definition, the military historians follow the conqueror and exalt his memory. At best, Darius's territorial dominion appears only as a chimera, in a context that often suggests it never represented more than a feeble bul­ wark against the victorious progress of the Macedonian armies. The descriptions are thus very uneven from one region to the next, in direct relationship to the obstacles encoun­ tered by Alexander. We glean only meager information on Cappadocia and Armenia, for example, which in large measure remained satrapies in partibus [barbarorum], whereas the resistance encountered in the course of several weeks between Susa and Persepolis

In the Steps of Alexander and on the Trail of Darius

695

yields valuable notes on Uxiana, the Uxians, and the Persian Gates. This is especially true for the Iranian Plateau, Central Asia, and the Indus Valley. When Alexander tra­ versed Aria, Arachosia, Bactria, and Sogdiana, Darius III was dead, and the royal procla­ mation of Bessus had not aroused the Achaemenid loyalist sentiments that he had expected. And so the impression prevails that Persian dominion in these regions was light, and this in turn reinforces certain conclusions that have sometimes been drawn from the silence of the Classical sources. But was the sense of emergency felt in Bactria and Sogdiana when Alexander invaded a reflection of the situation that prevailed ear­ lier? This example illustrates one of the major difficulties in using the Alexandrian sources: bringing Achaemenid conditions to light is a sometimes delicate problem, inso­ far as in each case we cannot assume complete continuity with the past. In sum, the Hellenistic sources (Babylonian, Egyptian, Greek, etc.), in comparison with the Greek sources of the fourth century, are exceptionally rich in Achaemenid data. To be sure, we have not one royal inscription, nor can we identify a single structure that can be attributed with certainty to Darius (not even the incomplete tomb at Persepolis: fig. 64, p. 735). But many texts and depictions from Asia Minor, Egypt, and Samaria, in addition to Babylonia—enlarge and enrich the corpus, anchoring it to a regional foundation. Without being paradoxical, we might even say that the reign of Darius III is particularly well documented. The devaluation (nearly a damnatio memoriae) to which the last representative of the Achaemenid dynasty was subjected is thus not simply a me­ chanical reflection of the poverty of our evidence; it is primarily due to the unbridled Alexandrocentrism that modern historiography has long fed on. This fixation arises not from imitation of the Macedonian conqueror's courtiers but from an excessive focus on just one of the protagonists —who thus appeared to travel through an empire that had no prior existence.

Methods and Aims The problem is well known: Darius III is often presented as a weak king who con­ trolled (badly) a decaying Empire, unable to rely on the faithfulness of his satraps or on an army worthy of the name or on the support of the subject populations, who endured an unbearable financial burden, which was then simply hoarded (hence the economic stagnation) —the totality of the interpretation tending to create the all-too-well-known "colossus with fect of clay." Wc know that the image comes directly from the polemical Greek authors of the fourth century and that it was taken up and even magnified by the historiography of colonial Europe. We have already had several occasions to bring up the specific problem posed by the use of these documents, as well as their success in modern historiography. Though we must conclude that the Greek interpretation gener­ ally falsifies the landscape, the problem of tracing internal changes that the Achaemenid imperial structure must have undergone from the time of Darius I on remains. This as­ sessment is the burden of two chapters here (16-17), which parallel the chapters above that assess the Empire during the times of Darius and Xerxes (chaps. 5, 13). In between, partial assessments have been furnished, especially in the area of territorial dominion of the Great Kings. It is now appropriate to broaden them and extend them in different di­ rections: the lands and populations (chap. 16) and the instruments of authority (chap. 17). 1 his is a prospective assessment, for these varying approaches will be taken up again and discussed, in context, in the last chapter (18), which will attempt to understand

Chapter 16. Lands, Peoples, and Satrapies

696

more precisely why the Great King was conquered by Alexander. This intermediate as­ sessment is absolutely indispensable if we wish to avoid the well-known vicious circle: the Empire was conquered because it was in a state of profound structural crisis ("Achae­ menid decadence"), and this state of crisis is "confirmed" by the defeat.

I. Sources and Problems It is for the reign of Darius III and the subsequent Macedonian dominion that we have the most information on the administrative organization of the Empire. The first complete list of satrapies, as they existed at the time of Alexander's death, dates to the age of the Diadochi. In a famous passage that is part of a geographical discussion, Diodorus differentiates the satrapies "sloping to the north" from the satrapies sloping "to the south" (XVIII.!>•*•). Even more useful are the lists of satrapies as they were divided among the Companions of Alexander in 323 and 320 (e.g., XVIII. 3.1-2). All of these documents are very interesting (we will use them), but they are not enough. In fact, they do not nec­ essarily reflect the exact state of affairs in 334; Alexander had already made some changes, and so did Perdiccas. who, for example, in 323 conferred on Eumenes all of the Anatolian territories that had not submitted to Alexander (XVIII.3.1-*-). Other texts and contexts provide further essential information that permits us to get back to the situation prevailing at the accession of Darius III. First, of course, there are the tales that follow Alexander step by step, always naming the satraps in office and the region or regions over which they held sway. Next, we have the mobilizations ordered by Darius III. At the battle of the Granicus, we find contingents led by the satraps of Asia Minor; at Issus, the contingents were drafted from the central and western portions of the Empire; at Gaugamela, we find troops that were enrolled from as far away as India (Arrian III.8.3-6*):

Position

Name

Contingents

Bessus

satrap of Bactria

Bactrians, S o g d i a n s , S a k i a n s

Barsaentes

satrap of the A r a c h o t i a n s

Arachotians and Indian hillmen

Salibarzanes

satrap of the Areians

Areians

Phratapharnes

Parthians, H y r c a n i a n s , Tapyrians

Atropates

Medes, Cadusians, Albanians,

Orondobates,

p e o p l e s b o r d e r i n g the Persian G u l f

Sacesinians

Ariobarzanes, Orxines Oxathres

son of Abulites the satrap

Susianians and Uxians

Bupares

B a b y l o n i a n s , d e p o r t e d C a r i a n s , and

Orontes and Milhraustes

Armenians

Sittacenians

Ariaces Mazaeus

satrap?

Cappadocians Syrians

These lists pose several interpretive problems. There are obvious discrepancies from one list to another, and it is not always easy to come to a decision; for instance, when Arrian describes the Persian order of battle at Gaugamela (III. 11.3*), he reports that

The Satrapy of Dascylium

697

"Aristobulus tells us that a document giving the order as Darius drew it up was after­ wards captured." Furthermore (again in the context of the military units brought to Da­ rius prior to the battle of Gaugamela), it is not certain that the person named as the leader of the contingent must automatically be considered the satrap of the regions from which the troops were drawn: in some cases, Arrian actually calls them satrap (Bessus, Barsaentes, and Satibarzanes); in the other (more numerous) cases, he uses a phrase that refers primarily to their position as head of the contingents (agein, arkhein; III.8.3-6); in at least one case, it is not the satrap (Abulites of Susa) but his son Oxathres who is ordered to lead the satrapal contingent. Parallel passages sometimes permit reso­ lution of the ambiguity (e.g., III.23.7). In any case, an inventory of the Empire cannot be restricted to a simple enumeration of districts. It is necessary to gather concurrent data on the human and material re­ sources available to the Great King. For this purpose, Strabo provides essential informa­ tion on both the extent and the human geography of the lands of the Near East. His report of course represents a late state of affairs, but Strabo quite often positions his data diachronically and usually also provides some material specifically dated to the period of Achaemenid dominion. Many other sources (literary, archaeological, epigraphic, and iconographic) dating from various times (from the fourth century to the Greco-Roman period) allow us to fill in the picture, particularly of the peoples who lived in the Empire and of the contacts they wove among themselves —thus permitting us to place all of this information in the longue duree. Following the steps of Alexander, we proceed from west to east—that is, from the least poorly understood to the most poorly investigated; be­ cause of the uneven spread of the data, the accounts are of highly variable importance. In any case, our intention here is not to draw up an exhaustive regional and microregional assessment (which would require a book in itself) but to isolate and integrate the data that will permit us to apprehend the reality of Achaemenid territorial dominion between Artaxerxes II and Darius III.

2 . The Satrapy of

Dascylium

As in previous periods, the residence of the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia was in Dascylium, on the edge of Lake Manyas (Dascylitis), which was accessible to warships by way of the Rhyndacus (Hell. Oxyr. 22.3-4). It was defended by a stronghold (22.3: khorion okhyron), furnished with a garrison (Arrian 1.17.2), and famous for the immense paradise, teeming with fish and game, in which Pharnabazus took great delight (Xeno­ phon, Hell. IV. 1.15-16). In 334, its satrap was Arsites, who may have been in place be­ ginning with the exile of Artabazus (who had taken refuge at the court of Macedon after his abortive revolt against Artaxerxes III around the middle of the 350s: chap. 15/9). If we carefully follow the argument of Diodorus's text on Mentor's operations in Asia Minor after the reconquest of Egypt (XVI.52), it appears that his mission was limited to setting the affairs of the satrapy of Dascylium back in order. This is the context of his fights with Hermias of Atarnaeus and other petty local chieftains in the Troad and Aeolis (chap. 15/9), as well as the recall from exile of Artabazus, Memnon, and all of their abundant progeny. Artabazus did not regain his post at Dascylium, but he became an influential adviser to the Great King and enjoyed an exalted position alongside him in the court hi­ erarchy (cf. Arrian III.23.7). Meanwhile, the family remained solidly settled in the re­ gion. For one thing, Arsites himself may have been a relative. For another, we know that

698

Chapter 16. Lands, Peoples, and Satrapies

Memnon had land and estates in the Troad in 334 (cf. Polyaenus IV.3.15 and Arrian 1.17.8: khora tou Memnonos); it is possible that he received them from his brother Men­ tor (as a reward from Artaxerxes), who disappears from the scene after his victories. In this connection, it is not uninteresting to note that when one of the Companions of Al­ exander arrived at the sanctuary of Athena Ilias, before the battle of Granicus, he "no­ ticed in front of the temple a statue of Ariobarzanes, a former satrap of Phrygia, lying fallen on the ground" (Diodorus XVII. 17.6*). Just like Xerxes (Herodotus VII.43), Ario­ barzanes sacrificed to the goddess; but he had gone further by placing a statue there, thus placing a Greek sanctuary under the goddess's protection and in the process caus­ ing prestige to redound to himself. His statue also served to mark a territory, the Troad, to which his ancestors in Dascylium had always laid claim in opposition to the ambi­ tions of the satraps of Sardis. In addition to being charge of the Troad, the satrap of Dascylium had responsibility for part of Mysia (which may have been placed under the authority of a lieutenant gov­ ernor or even, for a time, a satrap of its own [Orontes]: chap. 15/5). The Paphlagonians also were a dependency of Dascylium; they were famous for their cavalry (Xenophon, Anab. V.6.8) and had provided a contingent to Cyrus the Younger (1.8.5; Diodorus XIV.22.5); in 334, they placed themselves under the orders of the satrap Arsites (Diodo­ rus XVII. 19.4). According to Quintus Curtius and Arrian, the Paphlagonians rushed an embassy to Alexander while he was staying at Ancyra, a town near Gangra, which is be­ lieved to be the capital of the lieutenant governor of Paphlagonia. They offered their people's submission and requested that Alexander not invade the country; the king or­ dered them to place themselves under the authority of Calas, whom he had named sa­ trap of Hellesponline Phrygia in place of Arsites some months earlier (Arrian II.4.1-2; cf. 1.17.1 and Quintus Curtius III.I.24). Quintus Curtius adds that the Paphlagonians sent hostages to Alexander and "obtained freedom from the obligation of paying tribute, which they had not rendered even to the Persians" (1.23*), while the king "order[ed] the inhabitants of the territory Arsites ruled to pay the same taxes as they used to pay to Darius," apparently including "natives who came clown from the hills" (Arrian 1.17.1*). This interpretation is difficult to confirm, because we have no information on the region after the events relating to the passage of Agesilaus and Datames' campaign against Thuys. Nonetheless, it is doubtful that the Paphlagonians, who sent a contingent to Ca­ las, no longer paid tribute in 334. It seems more likely that Quintus Curtius's source was referring to the well-known fact that Paphlagonia, which had not been invaded by Alex­ ander, was included among the unsubmissive countries in 323 (cf. Diodorus XVIII.3.1). In the eyes of the fourth-century Greek authors, the region had always been considered independent of the Persians —a generalization that is obviously inappropriate. During the Persian counterattack after Issus, Paphlagonia was one of the recruiting bases used by Darius's generals (Quintus Curtius IV 1.34; 5.13). The discovery of a Greco-Persian relief in the region (fig. 55) even seems to imply the presence of an imperial diaspora. The Paphlagonian marriage of Camisares, the father of Datames (Nepos, Dat. 1-3), and the matrimonial designs of Spithridates (Xenophon, Hell. IV. 1.4-5) in themselves sug­ gest that connections were common and fairly close between the representatives of the imperial diaspora and the Paphlagonian aristocracy. On the coast, the main town was Sinope, which had several dependent tributary cit­ ies: Trapezus, Cerasus, and Cotyora (Xenophon, Anab. IV.8.22; V.3.2; V5.3). Sinope

The Scttmpy of Dascylium had a rich and famous port and thus was broadly open to the sea; the town was also closely linked to the back country and exported its timber resources (Strabo XII.3.12). Cappadocian ocher was exported by way of Sinope as well (XII.2.10). Isocrates' phrase (Phil. 120: "Asia from Cilicia to Sinope") illustrates the extent of its commercial relations—as far as southern Asia Minor—and this is also attested by discoveries of coins. It was also at Sinope that the rebel­ lious Datames had coins struck in his name; around 332, some Persian

699

Fig. 55. Persian relief from Paphtagonia.

generals also issued coins there, with Aramaic legends. Between 334 and 330, the Sinopeans continued to consider themselves subjects of Darius (Arrian III.24.4;-0- Quintus Curtius VI.5.6); they were not considered to be "part of the Greek league" (to koinon ton Hellenon) by Alexander. Let us note finally that Iranian personal names frequently ap­ pear on the seals marking ownership of amphorae from the city. Bithynia, another country on the Black Sea coast, was in principle a dependency of Dascylium; it was west of Paphlagonia and its best-known town was Heraclea, in the ter­ ritory of the Mariandynians (cf. Strabo XII.3.4, 9; Xenophon, Anab. VI.2.1). We know little about relations between the Bithynian leaders and the satrap of Dascylium. In 400, Pharnabazus sent a cavalry troop to aid the Bithynians against the Greek mercenaries (Anab. VI.4.24). In other circumstances, however, we find the same Pharnabazus at war with the Bithynians (Hell. III.2.2). Their relations with the satrap of Dascylium must have been as irregular and contradictory as the relations between Dascylium and the various Paphlagonian chieftains (chap. 15/5). In 334, the region seems to have been ruled by the local prince Bas; and Calas, the Macedonian satrap of Dascylium, led an unsuccessful expedition against Bas, in the course of which Calas met his end. Bas was succeeded by his son Zipoithes. Heraclea always exhibited great loyalty to the Achae­ menid authority. In the course of the fifth century, the Heracleans at first refused to pay tribute to Athens, "because of their friendship toward the Persian kings" (ob amicitiam regum persicorum; Justin XVI.3.9), and then yielded to Athenian threats. Around 364, Clearchus took power with the help of a force led by Mithradates, son of Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, and he renewed a traditional policy of alliance with the Achaemenid authorities, as is illustrated in particular by the sending of several em­ bassies to Artaxerxes II and III. His "Persianization" is demonstrated by the discovery of a portrait carved in Persian style that probably represents the tyrant himself. Clearchus's successors did not modify the substance of his policy, not even after the victory at the Granicus. According to the local historian Memnon, Dionysius of Heraclea actually profited from the battle at the Granicus (FGrH 434 F4); the requests presented to Alex­ ander by the Heraclean exiles obviously fell on deaf ears. The satrapal court at Dascylium had certainly been wide open to Greek influences for several generations. This is eloquently evidenced by many "Greco-Persian" stelas,

700

Chapter 16. Lands, Peoples, and Satrapies

bullas, and seals (fig. 56a-c). At this point, we cannot help recalling that around 360 the satrap Artabazus married a sister of the two Rhodians, Mentor and Memnon. The mar­ riage was fruitful, producing eleven sons and ten daughters, including Pharnabazus, who fought alongside his uncle Memnon on the Asia Minor front in 334-333 before succeeding him as commander of naval operations. One of the daughters was Barsine, who successively married her uncles Mentor and Memnon before becoming a Com­ panion of Alexander, to whom she may have given the famous Heracles. According to Plutarch (Alex. 21.9-0-), "she had been instructed in the Grecian learning" (paideia hellenike). The societal promotion of the two Rhodians is all the more remarkable in that through his mother, Apame, Artabazus was grandson of Artaxerxes I.

3. From Sardis to Ephesus The satrapy of Lydia, bordering on Hellespontine Phrygia, had its capital at Sardis. The administrative organization of the satrapy continues to pose problems that are diffi­ cult to resolve, particularly regarding the name attributed to Spithridates' territory: "sa­ trap of Lydia and Ionia" (Arrian 1.12.8-0). From the beginning of the fourth century, whenever an inscription refers to a "satrap of Ionia" (Tod no. 113), the exact relation­ ships that link the two components are far from clear: in 334, the Macedonian Asandrus received "Lydia and the rest of Spithridates' district" (arkhe; Arrian 1.17.7;* chap. 18/2). The satrap in place in 334, Spithridates (Spithrobates in Diodorus XVII. 19.4), had sue-

From Sardis to Ephesus

701

ceeded his father Rhosaces (I) at an unknown date; the latter was "a descendant of one of the seven," who had taken part in the Egyptian campaign in 343 (XVI.47.2:), 12,000 according to Nepos [Iph. 2.4); and Tachos repeated this in 360 (XVI.92.2-3). The Sidonians also managed to recruit a multitude (plethos) of mercenar­ ies (XVI.41.4-v-), and the same was true of the army sent by the Great King against Cy­ prus (§42.7-9). Furthermore, the army of Inarus in the 460s used mercenaries: the Egyptian rebel counted on military aid (symmakhia; XI.71.4) sent by Athens (cf. Thucy­ dides 1.104, 109), and his mercenaries are specifically portrayed by Ctesias within the framework of the Megabyzus saga (§§32-37). (2) The Greeks always appear in the forward elements of the army. According to Dio­ dorus, in 343 only the Greek army (hellenike dynamis) was engaged in the front lines and "the rest of the army" was held in reserve under the command of Artaxerxes III. The Greek army itself was divided into three regiments, each commanded by a Greek and a Persian: Lacrates and Rhosaces, Nicostratus and Aristazanes, Mentor and Bagoas. Given the prominent role attributed to the Greek leaders, we get the impression that the Per-

The Royal Armies

785

sian leaders were subordinate to them (XVI.47.1-4). This is also what Diodorus wants us to believe when he states that Artaxerxes was being very careful when he acquired mer­ cenaries and their commanders because he remembered his previous defeat with great acrimony (§44.1-2). This is a curious conclusion, suggesting that on his previous expe­ dition the Great King had had no mercenary troops, given that Diodorus himself con­ tinually exalts their role in all of the Egyptian campaigns (cf. XV.41E). Of course, Diodorus also notes the presence of "barbarian forces" in the Great King's army (XVI.47.2, 4; §50.3; XI.74-75), but in every case he highlights the special value and courage of the Greek leaders and in every case he also introduces the contrast between the Greeks and their employers (whether Egyptian or Persian). Furthermore, the paral­ lelism between the two armies that Diodorus wishes to present becomes even more strik­ ing when we consider the order of battle he presents: Nectanebo II and Artaxerxes both kept themselves in reserve, behind the front lines (XVI.47.5-6), as if the Greek merce­ naries constituted the heart of their respective forces. A similar scheme is also found in the tales concerning the participation of Chares in the rebellion of Artabazus When Diodorus states that Chares fought alongside (symmakhon) the satrap (XVI.22.1; 34.1), it is clear that he attributes the glory of the victories to Chares. He treats the Theban Pammenes similarly some time later: "By defeating the sa­ traps in two great battles, [he] won great glory for himself and the Boeotians" (§34.2o). The one (Ephorus?) who inspired a scholia to Demosthenes 4.19 even passes over the presence of Artabazus alongside Chares in silence: it is Chares alone who led 10,000 mercenaries to a stunning victory over Tithraustes, who commanded a considerable force of 20,000 Persians, most of whom were horsemen (cf. also FGrH 105 F5). We may emphasize in passing that this kind of presentation is not applied only to Persians; Dio­ dorus adopts it for the pharaohs' armies as well as for the Phoenician army that rebelled against the Persians. Using a stereotyped expression, he reports on the throngs of merce­ naries raised by the authorities in Sidon (XVI.41.4). But, in reality, only Mentor's 4000 mercenaries are specifically named (§42.2), and they primarily belong to the category of citizen-soldiers (stratidtai politikoi)—who in fact do seem to have taken the main role in all of the fighting (§44.5-6; cf. §45.4-5). (3) As Diodorus reports them, the confrontations of the 343-342 campaign thus seem to be reduced to fights between Greek mercenaries from the two sides. Though he men­ tions the presence of Libyans and Egyptians in Nectanebo IPs army (XVI.47.6), he scarcely brings them onto the scene in what follows; it is the Greeks who defend Pelusiuirt courageously (§49.2), even as we learn incidentally that the garrisons comprised Greeks and Egyptians (§49.7). When Diodorus mentions this, it is primarily to illustrate the stark contrast between Greeks and Egyptians (§49.8; §50.2). The Persian side is han­ dled similarly. The Thebans faced the Spartan Philophron, who commanded the garri­ son at Pelusium, and they threw themselves boldly into the battle, "being eager to show themselves the best of the Greeks that were taking part in the expedition" (46.8-9-v*). The Argive Nicostratus was first to cross the Nile and thus determined the success of the operations, and it was another Greek, Cleinius of Cos, who opposed him in the Egyp­ tian camp (§48.3-5). Similarly, Lacrates the Theban actively pursued the siege of Pelu­ sium (§49.1-3), and Mentor the Rhodian took Bubastis and other nearby cities (§49.78). Likewise, again, in 371, Iphicrates dashed at the head of his men against a fortifica­ tion on the Mendes Mouth of the Nile (XV.42.5).

786

Chapter 17. The Great King, His Armies, and His Treasures

(4) This presentation is articulated on the basis of a single assumption: the superiority of the Greeks, both soldiers and officers—who were so superior that victories were due entirely to them and defeats were attributable solely to their employers. Thus, Hakoris sent for Chabrias only because he "ha[d] no capable general" (XV.29.2*). Similarly, it was certainly because Pharnabazus insisted that the Athenians sent him Iphicrates (XV.29.2), and Diodorus devotes an entire chapter to Iphicrates' valor (XV.44). Likewise, Artaxerxes III himself asked the Argives to give the command to Nicostratus, who was fa­ mous for his bravery and valor (XVI.44.2-3). Chabrias and Agesilaus, alongside Tachos are treated in the same way (XV.92.2-3), etc. Furthermore, Nectanebo II was conquered in 343 because of his military incompetence combined with overconfidence resulting from previous victories; in fact, Diodorus thinks, his earlier victory (in 351) was clue to the fact that he had turned over command of the troops to commanders of Greek mer­ cenaries, the Athenian Diophantus and the Spartan Lamius (XVI.48.1-2). The same ex­ planation appears in this context that Diodorus had given for the failure of Tachos in 361-359; Tachos had ignored the "wise counsel" of Agesilaus (XV.92.3). Similarly, Phar­ nabazus had ignored the judicious suggestions of Iphicrates (XV.43). The Greek leaders were in fact swift and brave (XV.43.1-2, 5-6; 44.2), in contrast to the Persian generals, who were "cowardly and inexperienced" (XVI.40.4) and who were further characterized by their hesitancy and timidity (XV.43.1-2) — they were unable to march quickly on the enemy because they lost much time readying their armies and ceaselessly seeking the advice of the Great King (XV.41.2-5; XVI.46.7; cf. XVII.18.2). This resulted in frequent clashes between Persian and Greek leaders, the former supposedly envious of the latter (XV.43.2,6), and this is the background for presenting the disputes between them in 343 (XVI.50.1-4) and again in 334 (Arrian 1.12.10; cf. Diodorus XVII. 18.3). The uncommon bravery of the Greek soldiers is illustrated primarily as a contrast to the cowardice of the Egyptian soldiers, who after the initial clashes could think of nothing other than trying to make peace with the Persians (XI.77.3; XVI.49.7-8). (5) The superiority of the Greeks was recognized by the Persians themselves. This was already the significance of the description presented by Xenophon of the military re­ view organized in Cilicia by Cyrus the Younger. It was the Greeks of his army—and they alone —who incited panic among the barbarians (Anab. 1.2.17-18). The case was the same during the Egyptian campaigns: because he admired Greek valor, Megabyzus agreed to a treaty with them, for he feared direct confrontation (Diodorus XI.77.4). The Greeks saved their lives "by their courage" (idia arete; ^77.5^). Some anecdotes from Polyaenus—who himself may have been dependent on Ephorus —also promulgate this stereotype. For instance, facing the Persians, Gastron, a Spartan leader in Egypt, armed the Greeks in Egyptian style and the Egyptians in Greek style and put the latter in the front line: "The Persians actually taking them for what they appeared to be, threw them­ selves into disorder and fled" (II. 16). In a similar situation, Orontes was facing Autophra­ dates: he hoped to impress his enemy and make him believe that a reinforcement of Greek mercenaries was on their way, so "he armed the most vigorous of the barbarians in Greek style" and mingled them with the Greeks: "Seeing the Greek arms, Autophra­ dates convinced himself that these were the reinforcements he had heard tell of: not dar­ ing to risk combat, he struck camp and fled" (VII. 14.4). The first anecdote is all the more striking in that it is not based on any sort of military rationale, even a false one (in contrast to Orontes' actions): instead, we get the impression that the author was using the parable for purely ideological ends.

The Royal Annies

787

(6) The valor of the Greeks is even more noteworthy because, generally speaking, they were minority participants: in 343, there were 10,000 Greeks within the immense yal army (XVI.40.6: stereotyped figures; cf. XI.74.1); on the Egyptian side, again in 343, we find 20,000 Greeks alongside 20,000 Libyans and 60,000 Egyptian makhimoi (XV1.47.6). ro

The Use of Mercenaries and "Decadence": Achaemenid Truth and Athenian Filter The coherence, and thus the apparent credibility, of the thesis we have just schemat­ ically laid out is even more noteworthy because it was already worked out in the fourth century by all of the Greek authors. But this only seems paradoxical —it is this very unanimity that casts grave doubt on every one of its constituent elements and thus on the totality of the thesis. In fact, it seems clear that it is built on a radical antithesis be­ tween Greek and barbarian that is quite frequently asserted by the masters of Panhellenism (Isocrates, Ephorus) and the advocates of the theory of "Persian decadence" (Isocrates, Ephorus, Plato, Xenophon in the last chapter of the Cyropaedia). The "analy­ sis" of the decadence itself proceeds through convenient, effective stereotypes: wealth and opulence (tryphe) inexorably made the Persians effeminate and caused them to abandon their traditional warrior virtues. It is thus abundantly clear that this theory is embedded in the longue duree of Greco-Persian relations;. We recall that it is already fully present in the speech that Herodotus gives Aristagoras of Miletus to deliver to Cle­ omenes of Sparta: the barbarians are not only immensely rich but they also "have little taste for war (Oute [. ..] alkimoi).. . how easy they are to beat! you . . . are the strongest power in the Greek world" (V.49^). It is clear, finally, that this certainty was conceived in the heart of the battles at Thermopylae, Salamis, Plataea, and Mycale, because we know that the memory of all of these clashes was both piously preserved and cannily transformed by the fourth-century Athenian authors. At any rate, it is enough to recall the explanation offered by Diodorus/Ephorus for the behavior of the Greeks in Egypt: at the time of their participation in the battles alongside Inarus, the Greeks hoped to be worthy of their predecessors' example atThermopylae (XI.77.3-4). The precedent of the Persian Wars was also cited by Chares: after "his" victory over Tithraustes, he did not flinch from presenting it to the Athenians as "the sister to the battle of Marathon" (scho­ lia on Demosthenes 4.14; cf. Plutarch, Aratus 16.3)! The intellectual frailty and the implications of the ideological assumptions of this presentation no longer need to be pointed out. All the same, other authors have worked out totally different theories about the political components of the tryphe (symbol of power) and/or underlined the valor and courage of the Persian combatants, whether confronting the Greeks in 490-479 [480-479?] or Alexander's Macedonians. Neverthe­ less, to understand the logic and effectiveness of these stereotypes better—in order to reder them harmless—they must be placed into an even more precise context. When they are put into the context of the 350s, these narratives on the use of mercenaries also re­ flect a debate internal to the city. Though there are several possible corpora to consider, it is enough to consider the harangues that Demosthenes delivered during the course of wars and conflicts with Philip II. In these harangues, the Macedonian king's power (just like the Great King's; cf. Symm. 3-9; 29-32) is sometimes highlighted and sometimes devalued, not as a function of observable change, but simply as a function of the orator's own forensic requirements. If the orator felt the assembly's resolve weakening, he would try to strengthen it by emphasizing the "decadence" of the kingdom of Macedon, which

788

Chapter J 7. The Great King, His Armies, and His Treasures

he describes with the same stereotypes that were described as flaws in the Achaemenid system. For instance, Philip behaves like a barbarian, surrounding himself with buf­ foons—"The rest about him are brigands and parasites, and men of that character, who will get drunk and perform dances which I scruple to name before you" Olynt. II. 194-)! This moral weakness is accompanied "quite naturally" by the decadence of the Mace­ donian army. Demosthenes appealed to testimony that was both anonymous and false (and against all probability) and was quite willing to slander the king's soldiers, Mace­ donian infantry (pezhetairoi) and mercenaries (xenoi) alike: "His mercenaries and guards, indeed, have the reputation of admirable and well-trained soldiers, but, as I heard from one who had been in the country, a man incapable of falsehood, they are no better than others" ($ I7-Q-). It is not difficult to notice that, within his own civic rationale, the use of mercenaries was passionately opposed by Demosthenes. Mercenaries were eager for cash and booty, and their leaders often took initiatives contrary to the city's interests (e.g., Olynt. 11.28; Isocrates, Peace 44). In the First Philippic, delivered in 351, he urged his fellow citizens to re-create citizen armies, and he denounced the leaders of the mercenaries who did not hesitate to sell themselves to the highest bidder: "they go off to Artabazus or any­ where" ( § 2 4 ^ ) , which the scholiast renders (4.24) with a very tendentious statement: "Not wishing themselves to fight because of the danger, the Athenians engaged paid out­ siders (xenoi misthomenoi)." The same evaluation is found in Diodorus (X.34.8-13), where it is included in a general discussion contrasting the Greek cities with the tyrants and kings. The author, who here also is presenting Ephorus's opinion, urges the Greeks not to resort to the deplorable habit of drafting mercenary troops (xenikai dynameis) in place of civic armies (politikai dynameis). Diodorus tirelessly embroiders the stereotype of the Greek (Athenian) vision of the Persian Wars, and he in fact stresses the superiority of valor/courage (arete = Greeks) over number (plethos = barbarians). In nearly identical words, Demosthenes and Diodorus describe the appeal to mercenaries as one of the symptoms of the decadence of civic spirit. Like Xenophon when he discusses the Per­ sians in the last chapter of the Cyropaedia or the Spartans in the last chapter of the Constitution of the Lacedaemonians (the Spartans of "the olden days" and the Persians "of today" are themselves contrasted comprehensively in the Agesilaus IX), Demosthenes enjoys contrasting the virtue of the ancients with the moral decadence he sees in the Athens of his day. In ancient times, "the king of this country [Macedon] was submissive to them, as a barbarian should be to Greeks" (Olynt. III,24"v-); in ancient times, instead of appealing to mercenaries, the people "dared to campaign for themselves" (III.30). The discourse is all-encompassing and takes on universal value: it applies to any state suspected of being unable to mobilize its own people against an enemy. This explains why the pharaohs counted less on their troops than on their country's natural defenses (Diodorus XV.42.1-3; XVI.46.7-8, 47.6-7, 48.7). This is also a well-known motif in Greek literature —condemnation of cities that put all their hope in their fortifications in­ stead of counting first on the courage of their citizens. The same charge is brought against the Persians by Alexander (cf. Arrian VII.7.7). Of course—and we have already repeated it several times here —the ideological de­ cryption of the Greek sources cannot take the place of proof: Achaemenid reality is not the mirror image of Greek portrayals. But it is necessary to state that the many references to the Great King's Greek mercenaries do not in themselves have probative value; their

The Royal Armies

789

primary purpose is to charge tire Persians with decadence of civic spirit, which is paral­ leled by the assumed weakness of the satraps' and Great Kings' armies—and both of these are presented in a convenient opposition between a "then" (virtue) and a "now" (decadence) that is constructed from whole cloth, whether it concerns Athens, Sparta, or Persia. In the logic of this discourse, the Persian (or Egyptian) reference thus primar­ ily plays a supporting role; it does not require proof derived from verified or verifiable facts. But then, though no one would ever consider viewing the effectiveness and orga­ nization of Philip's army solely through the distorting prism of Demosthenes' ha­ rangues, how could any historian be so credulous as to portray the Persian Empire on the basis of the words of the Athenian orators and polemicists? We can only imagine that the ancient orators would be thoroughly amazed to learn that probative value is some­ times still today granted to an "analysis" of the Empire of Artaxerxes III or Darius III as a city unable to defend itself on its own and that put its security into the hands of foreign mercenaries without batting an eyelash!

Command Structure We remain equally skeptical about Diodorus's presentation of the command struc­ ture when the leaders of Greek mercenaries took part in combat. We have seen that Diodorus claims that the command of the three regiments created by Artaxerxes III in 343 was entrusted to three Greek-Persian pairs; he even wants us to believe that the Greeks were in charge of the maneuvers. The vocabulary he uses does not give rise to the ambiguities because, in principle, the Greek was the strategos and the Persian was the hegemon (XVI.47.1), which implies that authority belonged to the latter. However, Aristazanes is said to "share the command (synarkhon)" with Nicostratus (47.3), and Ba­ goas "fought alongside (synastrateuto) Mentor" ($47.4). Regardless of what their titles were, the actions of commanders in some other cases erase the doubts that Diodorus's vocabulary and presentation generate: after Lacrates made an agreement with the mer­ cenaries of Pelusium, "Artaxerxes dispatched Bagoas with barbarian soldiers to take over (paralamhanein) Pelusium" ($49.4;-v- cf. 6: paradidomi). The term used is clear: a Per­ sian was officially responsible for taking possession of the town in the name of the king. At Bubastis, the Greeks of the garrison sent emissaries to Bagoas; again, he was the first to enter the town, at the head of the barbarian soldiers ($50.1, 4). Furthermore, Diodorus portrays conflict that arose due to the coadministration of Persians and Greeks, such as the disputes between Lacrates and Bagoas (49.1-6) or Mentor and Bagoas (50.1-6). This evidence is also found in the campaign of 373: "Pharnabazus became suspicious of his [Iphicrates'] boldness and his courage for fear lest he take possession of Egypt for himself. . . . Some generals [on Pharnabazus's staff] indeed bore a grudge against him and were attempting to fasten unfair charges upon him" (Diodorus XV.43.2o-). The participation of the mercenary leaders in the staff's de­ liberations is also attested for Cyrus the Younger, but in every case the final decision rested with the chief of staff, who was always a Persian. So this much is clear: under the King's supreme authority, it was the Persians who retained command. Who can doubt it when Diodorus emphasizes the royal favor enjoyed by the three Persian generals in 343, all of them "preferred above the others for valour and loyalty" (XV1.47.1*)? Rhosaces boasted of descent from one of the Seven ($47.2); Aristazanes "was an usher (eisaggeleus) of the King and the most faithful of his friends (pistotatos ton philon) after

790

Chapter 17. The Great King, His Armies, and His Treasures

Bagoas" ($47.3-0); and as for the last of the three, it was he "whom the King trusted most" (§47.4o)-' The Greeks appear as often as they do in part because of the highly partisan orienta­ tion of the work of Ephorus. We have also seen that an anonymous author attributes the direction of military operations against Tithraustes to Chares and Pammenes. Because of an incidental reference, we learn that, after a raid led by Pammenes, Artabazus awarded command of the troops to two of his brothers, Oxythras and Dibictus (Polyae­ nus VII.33.2). The Greeks might also be at the fore because the Persian leaders preferred to sacrifice the mercenaries before engaging their own "barbarian" troops. Finally, Greek commanders appear often because, as in Cyrus the Younger's army, the Greek leaders retained command of the unit they had themselves recruited (cf. XVI.48.3: Nicostratus ton Argeion strategos). Nevertheless, this limited command was incorpo­ rated into a chain headed by Persians, and the general direction of operations and stra­ tegic decisions remained with the Great King himself (§49.6-7).

Memnon, the Persian Satraps, and Darius III It is quilt; striking lo observe that, once more, Diodorus—this time in book XVII — repeats the same sort of explanation to account for the unusual position of the Rhodian Memnon at the beginning of Darius Ill's reign. At the time of the first Macedonian of­ fensive in 336-335, only Memnon seems to have been able to counterattack: he was the one who put Parmenion to flight near Pitane in Aeolis (§7.8). Even though Darius chose 'his best commanders' (aristoi hegemones; unnamed), he selected Memnon as the one to whom he gave 5000 mercenaries "and ordered him to march to Cyzicus and try to get possession of it" (§7.2-3-0"). What was the reason for this choice? Memnon was "out­ standing in courage (andreia) and in strategic understanding." His special position is also evident during the war council atZeleia, which is described by both Diodorus and Arrian. It is clear that Diodorus strongly preferred the scorched-earth policy that was pro­ moted, against the rest of the Persians, by Memnon, whom Diodorus presents once more as "famed for his military competence"—portraying the Persian generals once again as incompetent, because they delayed making decisions and launching a cam­ paign (§18.2-3'v*). Memnon again was the one who appeared to direct the Persians' re­ treat to Miletus (§22.1) and then Halicamassus, in the course of which it was he who repelled the initial assaults (§24.5), made a sortie, and inflicted heavy losses on the Macedonians (§25.5). He called a council of the officers (hegemones) who surrounded him (hoi peri ton Memnona; §25.3), who elsewhere (§27.5*0") are called 'generals and sa­ traps' (strategoi kai satrapai). These officers, clearly, were first and foremost the com­ manders of mercenaries, among them the Athenians Ephialtes and Thrasybulus (§25.6; §26.2-3). Darius recognized Memnon's exceptional valor and sent a letter "to those who dwelt next to the sea, directing them one and all to take orders from Memnon. [He] as­ sumed the supreme command" (ton olon hegemonia; ^23.6*0"). To support him, Darius provided huge sums of money (§29.1). It is thus easy to understand the end result: "With his death Darius's fortunes also collapsed" (§29.4-0")—and with his death Alexander's confidence rose (§31.4). This is the point at which Diodorus depicts a war council as­ sembled by Darius. The Athenian Charidemus proposed sending an army to the coast to be commanded by "a general who had given proof of his ability" (himself! §30.3), but Darius flew into a towering rage and decided to take the head of his troops himself: "he searched for a competent general to take over Memnon's command but could find no

The Royal Armies

791

one, ami finally felt constrained to go down himself to lake part in the contest for the kingdom (eis ton hyper tes basileias kindynon)" (|30.7"v-). This is exactly the same expla­ nation that Diodorus himself had given (XVI^O.S-G^) for the choice Artaxerxes III had made prior to the Egyptian revolts: Artaxerxes was hobbled by the cowardice and incom­ petence of his generals and so had to get beyond his own weakness and laziness; thus, he "adopted the plan of carrying out in person the struggles to preserve his kingdom" (tous

hyper tes basileias

agonas).

The presentation in its entirety provides a portrait of Darius as an irresolute man who put all of his confidence in the Rhodian and his mercenaries. However, a single com­ ment serves to destroy the presentation by Diodorus's source: Darius was able to set out for Cilicia in the summer of 333, obviously, because he had already begun preparing his army at Babylon many months before, unable to anticipate that Memnon's death would require him to do so. It is also clear that Diodorus focuses his story on Memnon and never names the Persian generals who abandoned the battlefield at the Granicus. This is not unlike what happens at Halicamassus, where Diodorus very conveniently (for the consistency of his discnurse) "forgets" to mention the active presence of Orontobates, the satrap of Caria (cf. Arrian 1.23.1). It is also quite obvious that the arguments ex­ changed in the war council at Zcleia strangely recall the disputes between Greek and Persian leaders in Egypt, also reconstructed by Diodorus: in 334 at Zeleia, the account­ ability of the Persian leaders was criticized, just as Tachos and Pharnabazus had been condemned for refusing to adopt the strategic planning ("wise counsels") offered by Chabrias (XV.92.3) and Iphicrates (XV43), respectively. It is also clear that Memnon's unusual position is conceptually parallel to the status that Diodorus conferred on his brother Mentor after the Egyptian campaign (XVI.50.7; 52.1-2)—which is hardly con­ vincing. Furthermore, the Great King's absolute confidence in Memnon singularly re­ calls what Diodorus (again) wrote about the assistance that Artaxerxes III expected from the arrival of the Argive Nicostratus at the beginning of the Egyptian campaign (XVI.44.2-3). Of course, Diodorus was not the only author to ascribe such importance to Memnon's activities; but the support of Arrian and Quintus Curtius does not by itself confer validity on a theory that they are the only ones to develop with such consistency. We will return later to an analysis of the role played by Memnon at the beginning of Al­ exander's offensive. Here let us simply observe that the many repetitions of motifs found in both books XVI and XVII of Diodorus lead us to consider with some caution the pre­ eminence that the author attributes to the Rhodian and the Greek mercenaries —not to mention his judgment regarding the incompetence of the Persian generals and the cow­ ardliness of the Great King.

The Great King and the Satraps' Mercenaries Furthermore, the stories concerning the mercenaries of Artabazus and Orontes have given rise to a more truly political analysis that carries a much more formidable weight because it is attributed to the Great King himself. In his presentation of the beginnings of Artabazus's revolt against Artaxerxes III in the mid-350s (cf. chap. 15/9 above), the anonymous scholiast (Schol. Dem. 4.19) provides the following information: T h e king o f the Persians sent a n order to the coastal satraps to d i s b a n d their m e r c e n a r y armies (ta mistofihorika strateumata),

o n the g r o u n d s o f the e n o r m o u s expenses they were

incurring; as a c o n s e q u e n c e , the satraps dismissed the soldiers (stratiCtai). N u m b e r i n g about 10,000, these soldiers presented themselves to C h a r e s , the Athenian general, who was

792

Chapter 17. The Great King, His Armies, and His Treasures

then leader of a mercenary army (xenike dynamis), and they placed themselves under his command. Then in revolt (apostas), the Persian Artabazus was fighting against the king; he summoned Chares to take his army into the king's territory

At first sight, the king's order seems to illustrate the thesis that the central authority was weakening in the face of satraps who could build up armies of their own using merce­ naries. This interpretation in turn has sometimes been cited in support of the broader idea that there was a shift toward the creation of personal satrapal armies, such as can be seen in the Hellenistic period. This interpretation is also bolstered by noting one of Alexander's orders, as presented by Diodorus (XVII. 106.3'v ): "He wrote to all his gener­ als and satraps in Asia, ordering them, as soon as they had read his letter, to disband all their mercenaries instantly." We may add that, at an earlier time, several satraps re­ volted with the assistance of mercenaries (e.g., Ctesias $37, $52). However, this theory is weak. The comparison with Alexander's order, though obvi­ ously tempting, is purely formal. Diodorus's account is in fact quite clearly placed in the very unsettled context of Alexander's return from India; at that time, we know, the king had to take draconian measures against both usurpers (in Persia and Media) and satraps who had taken advantage of his absence to plunder and pillage the people. It is in this context that Diodorus reveals the fears of some of the generals: "Some who had merce­ nary troops revolted against the king's authority" (XVII. 106.2O-). By giving the order that Diodorus reports, then, Alexander was trying to deny satraps and generals who had al­ ready entered into revolt the use of their mercenaries. There is nothing of this in the scholiast's text. Instead, for one thing, Artabazus recruited mercenaries after his revolt; and for another, the satraps (we do wonder who exactly they might have been) do not offer any objection to obeying the king's order. T h e impression prevails in the scholiast's account, that no one had challenged the king's authority and no one, at that time, was really threatened. These observations lead us to view the information with considerable skepticism. We are tempted to think that the author has attributed to Artaxerxes III an attitude often at­ tributed to the Persians by the Greeks, who loved to criticize the Great King's avarice (cf. Plutarch, Alex. 69.2) and his unwillingness to pay the Greek soldiers in his service (Hell Oxyr. 19.2). Even if we grant the information credence, it must be observed that the scholiast contradicts Diodoros (XVI.22.1-2)—and this has certainly created difficulties for the commentators. Moreover, the scholiast has quite freely interpreted a passage in the First Philippic, where Demosthenes denounces the leaders of the mercenaries, who were quite willing to abandon the mission entrusted to them in order to set sail "to Arta­ bazus or anywhere" ($24*). While still following the course of Demosthenes' argument, the scholiast adds details found only in his account: departing from a discourse on civic concerns (see above), the inspirer of the gloss (Ephorus?) establishes a connection with a "fact" that appears to condemn the same evils among the Persians; and/or, perhaps, the gloss simply illustrates the policy that Demosthenes is proposing vis-a-vis the merce­ naries—namely, to dismiss them. In sum, the text of the scholium does not make a con­ tribution that solidifies the basis of the historical interpretation drawn from it. >

Mercenaries and "Mercenaries": The Greeks and the Others Of course, the presence of mercenary troops within the fourth-century royal and sa­ trapal armies is beyond doubt. However, it is still necessary to inquire into the central

The Royal Armies

793

role attributed to them by the Greek autiiors, as well as into the internal changes in the Empire that might have fed the theory of the decadence of the Achaemenid military. Discussion of this point requires us to answer two preliminary questions: What was a mercenary in the Achaemenid armies? and were all the mercenaries Greek? These questions are not usually asked, even though it is obvious that the problem has (nearly) always been considered in the context of its Greek component—the significance of the use of mercenaries with respect to the internal sociopolitical development of the Greek cities. Indeed, neither the vocabulary used nor historical probability provides serious support for this interpretation—which nonetheless is confidently and assuredly pro­ claimed as certain. In order to make the proof more convincing, here we shall select ex­ amples taken exclusively from the Mediterranean theater of the Empire's operations, because we would like to believe that no one would dream of arguing that the garrisons of Babylon, Susa, Persepolis, Ecbatana, or Bactra comprised primarily Greeks! Though we cannot claim to have performed a complete census, let us present some noteworthy examples taken from Alexander's ancient historians. Arrian, referring to the mercenaries (20,000 according to him) that were one of the components of the satrapal army in 334, uses the generic term xenoi pezoi misthophoroi 'foreign infantry mercenar­ ies' (I.H.4*; 1.16.2); the Macedonians found themselves faced with misthophoroi at Ephesus (1.17.9), xenoi hoi misthophoroi at Miletus (1.19.1), xenoi at Halicamassus (1.20.2; 23.5), xenoi misthophoroi at Hyparna (1.24.4), and so on. But were all these xenoi and/or misthophoroi actually Greeks? The presence of Greek mercenaries is certainly mentioned quite often, but they clearly constituted only a part of the misthophoroi (1.19.6; 1.29.5; III.6.2). Several phrases used to describe these troops are unambiguous: at Sylleion, Arrian clearly distinguishes the xenoi misthophoroi from the [xenoi] epikhouroi 'natives' (1.26.5*), the latter clearly referring to soldiers that were recruited on the spot; at Celaenae, we find 1000 Carians and 100 misthophoroi hellenes (1.29.1), and at Gaza Arahes hoi misthotoi (II.25.4; cf. 11.27.1 and Quintus Curtius 1V.6.15: Arabs quidam, Darei miles), mixed with Persians (Quintus Curtius IV.6.30). It is thus undeni­ able that, even in the western regions, the mercenaries in Persian service were not exclu­ sively of Greek origin. Furthermore, this fact could also be gained from reading Xenophon's general description of the occupation troops in the satrapies: "The king an­ nually reviews the mercenaries (misthophoroi) and all the other troops ordered to be un­ der arms" (Oecon. IV.6*v-): the mercenaries are explicitly distinguished from the soldiers of the garrisons; but there is absolutely no reason to catalogue them all as Greeks (even if there must have been Greeks among them, at least in western Asia Minor). Here is an­ other significant example: Diodorus, in the tale of the expedition against the Cypriot kings in the 350s, writes that the wealth of the island attracted hordes of "soldiers (stratiotai)... in the hope of gain" (XVI.42.8-9*). The context and vocabulary ensure that these were soldiers fighting for pay and a share of the booty, and it is just as clear that the passage does not refer to Greeks exclusively, because Diodorus states that they came from the mainland—namely, Syria and Cilicia. There obviously were plenty of people in those regions quite ready to sign up. Where did these non-Greek mercenaries come from, and how were they enrolled? I he answer seems obvious: mercenaries were hired in every region of the Empire and, more precisely, by the satraps and generals in the territories that came under their au­ thority, such as the Arab misthotoi who were hired by Batis at Gaza; the Chalybian and

794

Chapter 17. The Great King, His Armies, and His Treasures

Taochian misthotoi in the army of Tiribazus of Armenia (Xenophon, Anab. IV.4.18); the Armenian, Mardian, and Chaldean misthophoroi found among the troops of Orontes and Artuchas (1V.3.4); and probably the Mysians in Pharnabazus's army (Xenophon, Hell. IV.l,24). Elsewhere, Xenophon writes that the Chaldeans of Armenia "serve for hire (misthou strateuontai) when any one wants them" (Cyr. III.2.7*). The hiring of mercenaries was thus certainly a very general practice, and Strabo mentions that the Persians hired mercenaries (misthophoroi) among the Hydraces of India (XV 1.6); there are many examples of the use of mercenaries in India at this time (e.g., Arrian IV.26.1 and 27.3; Diodorus XVII.84; Plutarch, Alex. 59.3-4). This is perhaps what Ctesias is de­ scribing as well (Indica $22). Mercenaries are the troops that Xenophon refers to with the entirely characteristic description hoi basileos misthophoroi (Anab. VII.8.15*). This passage shows quite clearly that the author was specifying the territorial troops and gar­ risons of Mysia, who came to the aid of Asidates from all of the strongholds in the region; they included, for example, "Assyrian hoplites and Hyrcanian horsemen." We also know about the existence of Median, Hyrcanian, and Bactrian military colonies in Asia Minor in 334 (Diodorus XVII. 19.4), Hyrcanian settlements in Lydia are attested by Strabo (X1II.4.13), and Bactrian settlements in the same region are mentioned indirectly by Athenaeus (XIV.636a-b). These examples first of all—as if it were really necessary—con­ firm that not all of the paid garrison soldiers of the Empire were Greeks. Furthermore, it seems clear that all of the soldiers permanently settled in this fashion are vaguely iden­ tified by the Greek authors as misthophoroi, which is translated by the quite ambiguous term 'mercenaries'. To some extent, the Greek word is not totally misleading, since these Achaemenid "mercenaries" received pay (in the form of rations: trophe). We can easily imagine that, if the Greeks had had the occasion to mention the garrison at Elephan­ tine, they would have designated them as mercenaries, because they received rations in kind and money. But at the same time, the Greek word is misleading and introduces confusion, because the basileos misthophoroi are not mercenaries in the precise sense that this word had in ancient Greece. Let us return for a moment to Artaxerxes III in 345-343. Diodorus mentions that, alongside the mercenaries raised in Greece (and the ones led by Mentor), the king raised 6000 stratiotai from the coastal lands of Asia Minor, adding that the army thus included 10,000 Greeks as symmakhoi 'allies' (XVI.44.4). These details elicit two remarks. First, the phrase used (hoi ten parathalattion tesAsias oikountes 'inhabitants of the seacoast of Asia Minor') does not necessarily imply (despite Diodorus: Hellenes) that all 6000 sol­ diers were Greek; among them might have been Carians or Lycians (for example). Sec­ ond, and more generally, Diodorus's merging of the mercenaries and the symmakhoi is highly doubtful. Even though the word symmakhoi can take on the broad and neutral enough sense of 'military reinforcements', it could also refer to something more specific. We know, for example, that during Darius Ill's (incomplete) reinforcement of Ecbatana, he received Cadusian and Scythian symmakhoi (Arrian III. 19.3). Later, Bessus hoped to attract Saka to himself as symmakhoi (III.25.3), just as Spitamenes had counted on the symmakhia he formed with the Saka, to whom he had promised a share in the booty (IV.5.4-5). In addition, Bessus had brought some Saka to Gaugamela, and Arrian states that they had not been registered as 'subjects' (hypekooi) but had sent a contingent 'on the basis of an alliance with Darius' (kata symmakhian ten Dareiou; 111.8.3'v'). These last examples lead us to believe that the 6000 soldiers enlisted by Artaxerxes III were not mer-

The Royal Armies

795

cenaries in the Greek sense but "mercenaries" in the Achaemenid sense —that is, they were soldiers who signed up not on their own initiative but because of an imperial obli­ gation placed on them collectively (as on the Arabs, Mysians, Taochians, Chaldeans, Mardians, Chalybians, and other Indians). The 6000 "mercenary" symmakhoi of the army in Egypt were probably nothing other than troops enrolled in the cities and among the subject coastal peoples by the Asia Minor satraps; they were then sent to the Great King, who was in Phoenicia at the time. Furthermore, it is entirely characteristic of Dio­ dorus that he distinguishes them and collectively refers to them with the phrase /?oi tou basileos Hellenes 'the King's Greeks' (XVI.47.4), which clearly echoes Xenophon's hoi basileos misthophoroi. The distinction that he introduces docs not refer primarily to the ethnic origin of the soldiers but to the institutional method of their recruitment. In Achaemenid reality, the "royal mercenaries" must be distinguished, for example, from the soldiers of the Babylonian hatrus, who were recpiired to bear the costs of enroll­ ment themselves; in turn, these are distinct from the Persians of the imperial diaspora, who had to provide troops whenever they were requisitioned. The "royal mercenaries" in fact received their rations (trophe) from the central administration (Xennphnn, Oec. IV.5-7). We thus should distinguish the levies that were organized in the framework of general or partial mobilizations (assessments comparable to tribute levies: cf. Herodotus III.67 and Justin 1.9.12-13) from the enrollment of paid soldiers from subject peoples, even if both were constituents of the royal army (or a satrapal army). If this description of the system is accurate, the existence of troops of "royal mercenaries," far from consti­ tuting a symptom of the withering of the Great King's miltary resources, must instead be considered proof of the Empire's ability to renew them. This also reminds us of the di­ versity of methods used by the central authority to control and exploit the peoples of the Empire: Carduchi, Taochians, and other Chaldeans, all of whom Xenophon (Anab. V.5,17) refers to as nonsubjects (hypekooi) of the king, provided soldiers in the category of "royal mercenaries."

"Greek Army" and "Barbarian Army" In order to define the participation of the mercenaries more precisely, it is important to define the composition of the royal armies in the fourth century. Unfortunately, the ancient terminology is often muddled. The name "Persians" itself is ambiguous: the 20,000 Persians —especially horsemen —commanded by Tithraustes when he fought Ar­ tabazus (Schol. Dem. 4.19) were certainly not all of Persian origin, even though there is no doubt that he had recourse to mobilizing contingents that were led by representatives of the Persian aristocracy who had settled permanently in Greater Phrygia. Here, as in many other cases, "Persians" means 'loyal soldiers levied within the framework of impe­ rial structures' (including ethnic Persians, obviously). In the case of Diodorus, he is most often satisfied to speak of the barbarian army, without further specification; nonetheless, apart from the obvious precedent of the "barbarian" army of Cyrus the Younger (chap. 15/2), the methods of enlistment used by Artaxerxes III in Babylon imply that forces lev­ ied in Mesopotamia and the east of the Empire were combined (XV1.42.1). As usual, the king was joined en route by satrapal contingents that came from Asia Minor (probably in Cilicia), including "a large force of cavalry and no small body of infantry composed of barbarians" led by Rhosaces, "satrap of Ionia and Lydia" (§47.2"v-). It is also possible that Mazaeus and Belesys, who had previously been defeated by the Sidonians (§42.1-2), led

796

Chapter 17. The Great King, His Armies, and His Treasures

the contingents from Cilicia and Syria (if Belesys had not died in the meantime). In Phoenicia, they joined the mercenaries, as well as the symmakhoi of Asia Minor (§44.1_ 4). The royal army comprised the totality of these contingents, within which the portion singled out by Diodorus under the term "Greek army" (as in the army of Cyrus the Younger) constituted a numerical minority. Other examples may be added that testify eloquently to the undiminished abilities of the military resources belonging to the satraps and Great Kings up to and including the reign of Darius III. One of the most interesting comes from the reign of Artaxerxes II, a period when it is generally agreed that the satraps very largely depended on the enlist­ ment of (Greek) mercenaries. There is a very precise inventory in Nepos (Dat. 8.1-2-v-) of contingents that Autophradates put on the line against the rebel Datames: Of (Persian) barbarians he bad twenty thousand horse and a hundred thousand foot, of the troops that the Persians call Cardaces, besides three thousand shngersof the same national­ ity; and in addition, eight thousand Cappadocians, ten thousand Armenians, five thousand Paphlagonians, ten thousand Phrygians, five thousand Lydians, about three thousand Aspenclians and Pisidiaii^, Iwo thousand Cilicians, the number of Captiani, and three thousand Greek mercenaries, along with an enormous number of light-armed troops. This document, which there is no reason to doubt, is very clear. Nepos carefully distin* guishes the Persians proper (barbarians, Persians, Cardaces) from the other contin­ gents; he no less precisely distinguishes the Greek mercenaries from the troops levied from the Asia Minor satrapies as imperial assessments (Cappadocia, Armenia, Lydia, Cilicia; we do not know which ethnos is concealed behind the name "Captiani" [Cataonians?]). It is possible that the Pisidians and Aspendians were enrolled as "mercenar­ ies" (in the Achaemenid sense; see above). Note, finally, that, whatever doubts may legitimately be nurtured about the absolute numbers, the share of Greek mercenaries is proportionally very small. The composition of the satrapal contingents at the battle of the Granicus is stripped of all ambiguity. If at first we set aside the problem of foreign mercenaries —to which we shall shortly return —the methods of assembling satrapal troops provide information that is generally consistent from source to source. The Asia Minor satraps (those who are named are Arsites of Hellespontine Phrygia, Spithridates of Lydia and Ionia, Atizyes of Greater Phrygia, and Mithrobuzanes of Cappadocia) mustered their troops from every­ where: among them were Hyrcanian horsemen, Medes, and Bactrians (which may all have come from permanent colonies and garrisons) —that is, the "royal mercenaries" (above); the masters of doreai (such as Memnon, and probably Arsames as well) brought their "own horsemen"; subject peoples provided a contingent to the satrap who ruled them (a contingent of Paphlagonian horsemen alongside Arsites). In the methods used to raise it and in its very composition, the army commanded by Arsites in 334 matches feature for feature the "barbarian" army assembled by Cyrus the Younger in Asia Minor. Let us now consider the armies led in person by Darius at Issus and Gaugamela. The evidence poses two preliminary methodological problems. First, the numbers are im­ moderately exaggerated by the ancient authors (though by differing amounts). We may recall here what was said about the armies of Xerxes in 480 and suggest that it is impos­ sible to establish a numerical value that is certain. Furthermore, we can note in passing that Quintus Curtius explicitly compares the review organized by Darius HI with the census of Xerxes' army at Doriscus (III.2.2), leading to the comment: "An all but innu­ merable mass of cavalry and foot, which gave the appearance of being greater than it ac-

The Royal Armies

797

tually was" (2.3-Q-)! Second, the analysis of the initial disposition of the hoop formations and the unfolding of the battles in principle should have provided some basic informa­ tion. Unfortunately, in this case as in so many others, the ancient tales are fragmentary and contradictory—so much so that reconstructing the maneuvers continues to divide the war-game specialists. This is especially the case for the battle of the Granicus, on which the reports of Arrian and Diodorus disagree from beginning to end. In any event, the ancient texts are in sufficient agreement that we may state, without fear of error, that Darius created his armies with the help of ethnic contingents levied in every satrapy of the Empire that he controlled at the time (cf. the phrase kata ethne: Ar­ rian II.8.8; Diodorus XVII.58.1 [Gaugamela]). In order to prepare for the battle that was about to take place at Issus, the Great King brought troops from everywhere to Babylon. Though the extended time that the process took prevented the arrival of the contingents from the Iranian Plateau, the troops included in his army were (according to Quintus Curtius) Persians, Medes, Barcaeans, Armenians, and Hyrcani (Quintus Curtius III.2.49- order of battle: III.9.1-6; and Arrian II.8.5-8). Similarly, between 332 and 331, Darius once again convened his troops at Babylon, before bringing them close to Arbela. This time, the contingents from the Iranian Plateau had arrived in time (cf. Quintus Curtius 1V.9.1-3), and they seem to have formed, according to Arrian (who refers to an official document preserved by Aristobulus), the heart of the new royal army (III. 11.3-7); each satrap brought his own contingent(s) (III.8.3-7). Without analyzing each situation in de­ tail, the conclusion is obvious: from 334 to 331, Darius employed all of the military re­ sources of the Empire—all of which leads us to think that the troops at that time were both highly diversified (colonies, garrisons, soldiers of the imperial diaspora, contingents of the subject people, "royal mercenaries") and quite large. The problem of the Darius Ill's Greek mercenaries remains—a problem that we have deliberately set aside until now. The ancient texts present three well-known problems: the number, the ethnic origin, and the technical specialization of these troops. We should first of all present the information on these problems provided by Alexander's au­ thors, distinguishing them chronologically. (1) Alone among the ancient authors, Arrian twice mentions the presence of 20,000 "foreign mercenary infantry" in the satraps' army at the Granicus, in addition to 20,000 "Persian" infantrymen (I.14.4;-v- II.7.6). These mercenaries were commanded by the Persian Omares (1.16.3). Diodorus speaks of 100,000 Persian foot soldiers (XVII.19.5-0-). Plutarch alludes to foot-soldier combat when he states that the Persian infantry was not slow to flee: only the Greek mercenaries stood their ground, only to be massacred by Al­ exander (Alex. 16.12-14); according to Arrian, none survived, except for 2000 who were taken prisoner (1.16.2). (2) After he decided to oppose Alexander directly, Darius ordered Pharnabazus, the nephew of and successor to Memnon (who had died in the summer of 33 3), to send for­ eign mercenaries (peregrini milites/xenoi misthophoroi) to him. Pharnabazus followed these instructions and brought them from Mytilene to Lycia, where he turned them over toThymondas, son of Mentor, his close relative (Quintus Curtius III.3.1; Arrian II.2.12). The mercenaries seem to have been brought by sea to Tripolis in Phoenicia, and there they joined the royal army (Arrian III. 13.3). Quintus Curtius stresses that Darius put all of his hope in these mercenaries (III.3.1; III.8.1). Just like Arrian (11.8.6), Quintus Curtius says that there were 30,000 mercenaries who, in his opinion, constituted "the undeniable elite of the army." They were placed under the command of Thymondas on

798

Chapter 17. The Great King, His Armies, and His Treasures

the right flank, while 20,000 barbarian infantrymen were placed on the left flank (III.9.2-3). Arrian states that the 30,000 Greek mercenaries were placed at the head of the "hoplite troops," facing the Macedonian phalanx, while 60,000 "Cardacian hoplites" were placed on the other side (II.8.6). Behind the Greek mercenaries and the "Persian phalanx," the other contingents were ranged kata ethne (Arrian II.8.8). (3) After the defeat, several thousand Greek mercenaries accompanied Darius in his train: the number was 4000, according to Arrian (II. 13.1). Another 8000 left the battle­ field on the orders of their leaders (Amyntas the Macedonian, Thymondas, Aristomedes of Pherae, and Bianor of Acarnania) and reached Tripolis in Phoenicia (Arrian 11.13.23). At Gaugamela, close to Darius (at the center), there was a contingent of Greek mer­ cenaries alongside his Persian troops, opposite the Macedonian phalanx (Arrian III. 11.7). Quintus Curtius, who places Darius in the left flank (IV. 14.8), is not explicit, but like Arrian (III. 16.2) he mentions that foreign mercenaries accompanied Darius when he fled (V.8.3: 4000; 2000 in Arrian). According to Arrian, they were led by Paron of Phocaea and Glaucus the Etolian (III. 16.2). Quintus Curtius also mentions this Pa­ ron (Patron) and gives him a speech in which he recalls that only a very small number of mercenaries remained out of the 50,000 that had begun the battle (VI 1.5); he pre­ sents them as the last bulwark of royal legitimacy against conspirators (V.8.3; 10.7; 11.12). There is clearly much smugness in this claim about faithfulness—which is also found in Aelian (Anim. VI.25) when he speaks of the unconditional faithfulness of the Great King's dog, which he directly compares with the faithfulness of Cyrus the Younger's Tablemates at Cunaxa! The numbers provided are both scarcely credible and difficult to check (cf. Polybius XII.17-22). It is clear that Quintus Curtius overstates the number of mercenaries in the Great King's service—he has Patron refer to 50,000. Even if we assume that Quintus Curtius was totaling the 20,000 mercenaries from the battle of the Granicus (Arrian) and the 30,000 from Issus (which is not at all certain), each of these figures by itself is prob­ lematic. Throughout his story, the mercenaries occupy a special position alongside Da­ rius, because he loves to contrast their courage and faithfulness with the cowardice of the barbarians (cf. III.9.11; 11.17-18). The barbarians are opulently clothed ("like women"), but they are far from courageous (see III.3.14; compare V. 1.23). Arrian's num­ ber (20,000 mercenaries at the Granicus) has long been rightly doubted, though he points out that he is referring to foreign mercenaries—not just Greek mercenaries (even though he later tends to "Hellenize" them). That the Asia Minor satraps had Greek mer­ cenaries at their disposal is indisputable, but that they arrayed 20,000 of them at the Granicus is utterly impossible. Finally, let us stress that this infantry force does not seem to have held a significant place in the strategic thinking of the satraps, because they are never reported as having participated (except quite incidentally in Plutarch). It is thus risky to state that the Greek mercenaries were never as numerous in the Achaemenid armies as between 333 and 331. Though Alexander's ancient historians strongly insisted on the number and valor of Darius Ill's mercenaries, on the one hand, they did so be­ cause, by calling them Greeks, they could sing the limitless praise of Alexander's "panHellenic" merits (Arrian 1.16.6); on the other hand, they did so because they loved to stress the unshakable devotion that some Greek leaders showed to Darius. Finally, for reasons already given, the "royal mercenaries" may have been included in the count of the xenoi misthophoroi, just like the colonists levied in Asia Minor (Diodorus XVII. 19.4).

The Royal Armies

799

Since the problem of the numbers seems insoluble, we would do better to examine the function of the mercenaries at Issus and Gaugamela. First of all, it is clear that the Persian high command had no illusions about the military abilities of some of the con­ tingents that were organized kata ethne, despite the training sessions that all of the royal troops regularly received (Diodorus XI.75.3; XVII.55.1). At Issus, these groups were placed far from the front line indeed (Arrian II.8.8). Obviously, the Persians relied most of all on the contingents of Persian and Iranian horsemen, as is clearly seen in the three set battles. At Issus, there is no reason to doubt the order that Darius gave to Pharnabazus and Thymondas to assemble (some of) the mercenaries in Cilicia for the impending battle. The ancient authors state several times that Darius believed that they were the only force capable of stopping the Macedonian phalanx. Here again we see the classic theme of Greek tactical superiority in infantry combat, which in turn implies that the Persians had only poorly-prepared infantrymen. Does this mean that after the defeats of 480-479, the Persians never attempted to put an infantry worthy of the name into the field? On this point, we have serious reservations. The order of battle at Issus and Gaugamela in fact suggests a considerably different interpretation. At Issus, the Greek mercenaries were not alone against the Macedonian phalanx; not far from them, in fact, "60,000 of the so-called Cardaces, who were also hoplites," were placed (Arrian II.8.6"0-). Together they constituted the "Darius phalanx" (II.8.10). Even though Arrian reduces the infantry combats to a duel between Greeks and Macedonians (II. 10.5-7), there is no reason to follow him across this terrain that is so well known to the entire Greek tradition (cf. II. 10.7: toisgenesi toi te Hellenikoi kai toi Makedonikoi philotimia, comparable with Diodorus XVI.46.9: agon/philotimia between the Spartans and Thebans before Pelusium in 343). At Gaugamela, Darius also had a phalanx (Arrian III. 14.1) that faced the Macedonian phalanx and comprised Greek mer­ cenaries and "Persian troops" (111.11.7*0*). Unfortunately we do not know exactly who the Cardaces were, but we could legitimately think that they made up the Persian pha­ lanx. In support of this idea, we may note that they already appear in the army that Au­ tophradates set against Datames some 40 years earlier; there were 100,000 of them, as Nepos would have it (Dat. 8.2:.. . quos Mi [the Persians] Cardacas appellant). The term also appears in Strabo's passage (XV.3.18) on the education of young Persians, which is perhaps an interpolation. According to Strabo, the term Kardakes refers to military and physical attributes; in his context, it seems to refer, originally at least, to young men who had completed the rite of passage from adolescence to adulthood. But later (or simulta­ neously), it more likely refers to elite infantry troops who underwent training compara­ ble to that of the Greek and Macedonian infantry. Intermittent and accidental though they may be, several other pieces of information indicate that the Persians attempted to adapt their armaments and their tactics to Mace­ donian techniques. Diodorus, for example, states that Darius introduced some innova­ tions in 332-331: "He had fashioned swords (xiphe) and lances (xysta) much longer than his earlier types because it was thought that Alexander had had a great advantage in this respect in the battle in Cilicia" (XVII.53. I*). This tactic might seem to be too little, too late. Quintus Curtius explains that Darius actually had been doing this sort of thing since the beginning of his reign: he "had ordered that the form of the Persian scabbard of the scimitar (acinacislakinakes) should be changed to that shape which the Greeks used" (III.3.6-0-). The adaptations go back even earlier: Cyrus the Younger's elite

800

Chapter 17. The Great King, His Armies, and His Treasures

horsemen, who were the best equipped, carried Greek breastplates and swords (Diodo­ rus XIV.22.60). This evidence stimulates some reflections. While there is no reason to reject the evi­ dence, it is important to stress the limits of its applicability. Diodorus and Quintus Cur­ tius, who are dependent on their Greek and Macedonian informants, report only what they consider interesting from the Greek point of view—namely, that in order better to withstand Alexander, Darius had tried to mimic certain Greek tactics. Though the re­ mark may (though far from certainly) imply a positive evaluation of the Great King within the rationale of one of Diodorus's sources (XVII.7.1), this says nothing more than that the information was meant to support the notion that the only hope for survival for - Darius's Empire was "Hellenization." However, should we not recognize that the Persian general staff wanted to improve the tactical capabilities of their troops by adopting many other practices apart from those they could copy from the Greeks? To ask the question is to answer it. Arrian, for example, mentions the presence of elephants in front of the Per­ sian battle line (III. 11.6; see §15.6 and FGrH 151 F5). We can legitimately question the practicality of elephants in battle, but the novelty of the deployment (on the western front at least! [Ctesias §6]) and its Indian origin are beyond doubt. Similarly, all of the an­ cient authors report that Darius relied heavily on his scythed war chariots to disrupt the Macedonian battle line. This was a specifically Persian tactic (Xenophon, Cyr. VI. 1.29— 30) that the Greek troops, to their horror, had already experienced in Asia Minor when fighting Pharnabazus (Hell. IV. 1.17-19) and at Cunaxa against Artaxerxes II (Plutarch, Arf. 7.6). The occasional borrowing of Greek weaponry must not lead us to the conclu­ sion that the Achaemenid army was suffering from technical stagnation, and the (lim­ ited) recourse to Greek mercenaries should not lead us to imagine a withering away of imperial military forces, and even less that Persia's native abilities were drying up. Ac­ cording to eyewitness testimony (Hieronymus of Cardia) about the region of Fahliyun, "Those who inhabited this country were the most warlike of the Persians, every man be­ ing a bowman and a slinger, and in density of population, too, this country far surpassed the other satrapies" (Diodorus XIX.21.3*v*)—and this does not include the contingents that the Diadochi were able to draw from the country (e.g., XIX. 17.4: 10,000 archers). There is thus no longer any reason to follow Xenophon in his reconstructed speech on the decadence of the education offered to young Persians at the heart of the Empire. In sum, in 334 as before, the Great King could rely on considerable military strength. To confront the Greek and Macedonian phalanx, he could deploy his own phalanx, and there is nothing to lead us to believe that from the beginning of the fourth century on the Achaemenid infantry had lost the maneuverability that had so impressed some of the Greek observers of the battle of Cunaxa (cf. Plutarch, Art. 7.4-6). We shall return to this later (chap. 18/5); but let us say for now that the defeats inflicted by Alexander must not be considered either proof, or even a significant indication, of military disarray in the Empire of Darius III.

4. Subject Populations and Tribute

Economy

Hoarding and Stagnation: Obvious but False One of the most frequently suggested causes for the weakening of the Empire and the . victory of Alexander certainly is the structural crisis inflicted by the tribute economy. This crisis, which was bitterly resented by the subject population, would in turn explain

Subject Populations and Tribute Economy

801

their disaffection with the Great King and their defection to the Macedonian conqueror. This theory was first formulated by Olmstead, who gave his chapter on royal assessments a title that left no room for ambiguity: "Overtaxation and Its Results." Olmstead begins with Herodotus's tribute list, which he contextualizes not at the heart of Darius's reign but at the pivot between Xerxes and Artaxerxes, as if to demonstrate more dramatically the notion of a general crisis that would be illustrated by the assassination of the Great King and bloody struggles for the succession. Olmstead's idea may be summarized as fol­ lows. The imperial fiscal administration created a unidirectional flow of wealth, from the periphery to the center, symbolized by the size of the treasuries captured by Alexander. This "surtax" created a shortage of money in the provinces —hence, he says, simulta­ neous inflation and price increases that are especially observable in Babylonia. This led to many revolts by the subject peoples and is even reflected in the need that the Babylo­ nians found themselves faced with—to auction off their daughters (Herodotus 1.196). It is worth noting that this theory, despite the criticisms it has received from time to time, continues to permeate many recent works about both the Achaemenids and Alex­ ander. !t therefore might be worthwhile to investigate its origins. Droysen's publications deserve special consideration. One of the most remarkable innovations attributed to Al­ exander by Droysen, the "inventor of the Hellenistic period," was the "extent of eco­ nomic success," which he explains first and foremost as a result of the fact that Alexander put the Persian treasuries into circulation. We cannot help quoting Droysen's splendid sentence on this topic: When Alexander liberated these riches that had previously been sequestered, when [the new power] let them escape its bosom, as the heart pumps blood, it is easy to understand that labor and commerce spread them around, in faster and faster circulation, among the long-ligatured members of the Empire; we see how, by this means, the economic life of the peoples, from whom Persian dominion had sucked the life force like a vampire, had to re­ cover and prosper. It is quite noteworthy that Droysen is content to support his suggestion by referring only to Plutarch's De Fortuna Alexandri (1.8 [Moralia ~}~}0c\-v>]). In his delirious panegyric to the Conqueror, he emphasizes that Alexander did not come to Asia simply to turn it into booty; his true desire was "to render all upon earth subject to one law of reason and one form of government and to reveal all men as one people"! However, although we can comprehend how, given both the rationale of his histori­ cal-philosophical vision and the state of the evidence in his time, Droysen was able to maintain the theory of the "vampirization" of the Empire, how can we explain why such a simplistic, not to mention poorly argued, position could have known (and could still know) such success? We can imagine that two historiographic streams, however gener­ ally contradictory, played a decisive role. First there is what might be called European colonial historiography, which in its search for models and precedents often turned to the "great colonizers" of Antiquity, such as Alexander. Mimicking Plutarch's presenta­ tion, historians have presented Alexander as a generous, chivalrous conqueror who brought progress to a stagnant Asia. The reestablishment of peace, opening of roads, founding of towns, and monetization of the Persian treasuries were the vectors and methods of unprecedented economic and commercial expansion. We will not dwell long on the failings of this reconstruction, which is based primarily on the assumption that a conquering and commercial Europe was culturally superior. What is more sur­ prising—at least at first sight—is that Marxist historiography has contributed in no small

802

Chapter 17. The Great King, His Armies, and His Treasures

measure to spreading the model as well. We know that Engels and Marx conceived the theoretical model of the "Asiatic mode of production." "Asiatic" societies are fundamen­ tally characterized by "stagnation"; in fact, to repeat the words of ]. Chesneaux, Marx "was literally haunted —the word is not too strong—by the problem of 'Oriental stagna­ tion.'" While Marxist scholars (aided by Wittfogel's analyses, which they also adduced) in the 1970s and 1980s vigorously rejected this notion, it is no less true that it has not dis­ appeared at all —it is attested by the (highly politicized) use of the word "stagnation" in the language of perestroika. Even though Marxist thought has scarcely touched on the study of the Achaemenid Empire and Alexander's conquests, historians have nonethe­ less long made reference (most often implicitly) to a model that postulates both overexploitation of tribute and economic stagnation, as seen in Olmstead. It is true that the ancient sources also may be used to illustrate the centripetal circu­ lation of resources. This is in fact the basic idea underpinning the ancient discussions of the king's table and the royal paradises: the untold wealth of the Great King is explained as coming from conquest and taxes (chap. 5/6). For example, Strabo, following Polyclihis. explains that each king had to build at Susa not only a residence (nikew) but also treasuries (thesauroi) and storehouses (paratheseis), where they deposited the tribute money in hope of managing it wisely (oikonomia; XV.3.21). Diodorus states that the trea­ suries seized by Alexander at both Susa and Persepolis were the result of ceaseless accu­ mulation from the time of Cyrus onward (XVII.66.1; 71.1). And Plutarch reports that at Susa "Alexander found . . . five thousand talents' worth of Hermionian purple, that had been laid up there an hundred and ninety years, and yet kept its colour as fresh and lively as at first" (Alex. 36.2-0-). In the thinking of Pseudo-Aristotle, the good operation of the royal economy is the purpose and justification of the tribute system he analyzes. The royal economy, he writes, "is universal in scope." According to Pseudo-Aristotle, the Great King understood perfectly how to apply the maxim he records in these words: "The expenditure must not exceed the income" (II.I.6). We can also cite the passage where Herodotus explains how the Great King kept the gold and silver tribute in his stock (III.96; cf. Strabo XV.3.21). According to Strabo, the king used a very small part of tribute income for his well-known policy of redistribution through gifts and to enhance the opulence of his table and palaces. Both explain the political and ideological func­ tion of the Great King's treasuries. However, this is obviously only a partial explanation: the expenses to which Pseudo-Aristotle alluded were not limited to luxury goods. Even though the Greek authors took court expenditures into account, it is easy to understand why they considered the method of managing the royal wealth to be particularly "fru­ gal," because the Great King had immense stores of precious metals at any point in time; as Strabo put it when describing a later period, he never struck more coins than lie needed for anticipated expenses, bit by bit (XV.3.21). This was precisely the situation in the time of Darius III. In short, the king had no need for recourse to the financial strat­ egies used by the cities, satraps, or generals —which are described and deplored by the author of the Oeconomica. Each of these texts contributes to establishing a picture of a Great King who was stingy, if not greedy—someone who could part with his riches only with the greatest dif­ ficulty. In Greek eyes, in fact, the Great King was a model economist, in the sense of a careful administrator of a great estate (oikos), and they assimilate the Empire to this model in a manner that is both simplistic and suggestive. In fact, the Great King took

Subject Populations and Tribute Economy

803

care of his expenses "with economy (oikonomikos) and even with parsimony (akribos)," as Heraclides of Cyme put it (Athenaeus IV. MSd'v*), and the Greek soldiers engaged in his service—so it seems —complained about it (Hell. Oxyr. 19.2). In the same vein, Plu­ tarch does not even hesitate to state that the Great Kings (insofar as he knew!) rarely vis­ ited Persia, and Artaxerxes never went there at all, because they hated having to hand out gold pieces to pregnant women as royal custom demanded (Alex. 69.2). But the the­ ory of hoarding/vampirization goes too far when both economic stagnation and violent, generalized discontent against Persian authority among the subject peoples are derived from it—all of which is marshalled to provide a historical interpretation of the Mace­ donian victory. Even when it is stripped of its rhetorical excesses, this interpretation raises many doubts. First of all, it tends to minimize the very rationale for the operation of a system based on redistribution. At any rate, this is partially explained by Strabo himself: in the context of noting, like Herodotus, that the Great King spent gold or silver only at the mo­ ment it was needed, Strabo explains that only a very small portion was turned into coin­ age (as confirmed by the treasury inventories of 331-330) and that nw»l of the precious metal vvas transformed into pieces of equipment (kataskeuai; furniture); furthermore, "they consider those metals as better adapted for presents (doreai) and for depositing in storehouses" (pros keimelion apothesin; XV.3.21-V-). Indeed, as we have seen (chap. 8), "royal gifts" were the very essence of the king's relationship with the Faithful. In addi­ tion, it is certainly a mistake to state that the royal treasure was derived exclusively from the yield of tribute and gifts; some of it was the booty of war. After a conquest, the Great Kings seized the treasuries of the defeated kings and brought them to their capitals, which is exactly what Alexander did. Finally, though it is no doubt true that part of the tribute actually was taken all the way to Persia (Susa, Babylon), it is also clear that, de­ spite the inadequacy of the ancient sources, the amount in the treasuries seized by Alex­ ander in the great capitals was far less than the amount of tribute that we might theoretically reconstruct had been collected since Cyrus or Darius. It is obvious that a major portion of the tribute remained in the treasuries of the satrapal capitals, and Alex­ ander took possession of these as well. Moreover, the contrast often invoked between Achaemenid hoarding and the sudden circulation (monetization) of the royal wealth by Alexander should be evaluated care­ fully, '['he conclusions drawn, which are based on analysis of partial sources, come from two assumptions that are both open to challenge. The first assumption is that economic prosperity requires the use of coined money; but the case of Babylonia (which is not unique: e.g., PT 85) shows that weighed silver played a similar and equally effective role. The second assumption (which is almost dead) is that the Achaemenid Empire did not know the use of coined money; but this is false on two counts. First, in the Mediterra­ nean lands, cash money was common and became more and more widespread begin­ ning in the second half of the fifth century, as shown, for example, by the Cilician, Cypriot, Phoenician, Judean, and Samaritan issues. Moreover, small denominations ap­ peared in more and more dense distribution, which in themselves were obviously one of the vectors for local monetary trade (even if trading was not limited to the monetary level). In addition, Athenian coinage (originals and imitations) circulated widely from Egypt to Central Asia. Assuming that this is really the basic point (which is far from certain), the least one can say is that the Achaemenid lands did not lack for means of

804

Chapter 17. The Great King, His Armies, and His Treasures

payment and trade. It is quite surprising that Olmstead, based on the Babylonian mate­ rial, connects the lack of silver and coin to inflation, on the one hand, and to rising prices, on the other. Even if we assume that the word inflation is justifiable, we do not see how inflation could be connected with the lack of liquid assets. Instead, stagna­ tion/deflation is a more likely result. It seems clear enough that the analytical tools com­ monly used (not without error and approximation!) in our capitalist societies are not directly applicable to Babylonia at the end of the fifth century. We have elsewhere dis­ cussed the difficulties faced by the historian in interpreting the "price increase" that took place at Persepolis around 466 (see chap. 11/8). Let's face it: though it is easy enough to expose the failures of one's predecessors, it is vastly more difficult to offer an alternative positive reconstruction. The basic reason is the crying inadequacy of the sources and the absence of truly functional theoretical models; at least, the profusion of models reveals nothing more than our inability to de­ scribe and explain the general operation of an Empire where unity and diversity inter­ acted dialectically. It is extraordinarily difficult to draw a picture of the flow of exchange that is both supportable and satisfying However, we cannot be satisfied with a simplistic picture (such as the one painted by Alexander's colonial historiography), which com­ bines the opening of roads, the spread of peace, and the circulation of merchandise. We reject this simplistic explanation quite simply because the sources do not allow it—not the literary sources, not the numismatic evidence, and not the results of archaeology. It is enough here to observe that, for example, the texts (Greek or Elamite) bearing on the roads never associate the use of the great imperial highways with the traffic of merchants and merchandise. Only very rarely are we (fleetingly) informed about commercial pros­ perity of the sort achieved by Sidon around the middle of the fourth century (cf. Diodo­ rus XVI.41.4: dia res emporias). Certainly, no historical inference is to be drawn from this silence; it can be explained first of all by the narrowly political (Persepolis tablets) and military (Greek and Hellenistic sources) orientation of the available evidence. An­ other factor is that a major portion of transportation was by water (seas and rivers), for which direct evidence is rare, except in Babylonia. The recent discovery of a customs memorandum from Egypt dating to the time of Xerxes reminds us of the dangers of any argument from silence (TADAE C.3.7; chap. 9/3: Customs Collection and Trade, above). Babylonia remains the best-documented region, and this presumably is why Olmstead made it the basis of his interpretations. But even in the case of Babylon, it is necessary to emphasize the gaps in the documentation, which primarily relate to the un­ even chronological distribution of the tablets. Because of this, any attempt to follow the fluctuations of the Babylonian economy from Cyrus to Darius III will be at risk.

Center and Periphery At the same time, it seems clear that the theory of Achaemenid hoarding/vampirization is based on another certainty—that the Great Kings, who were jealous for their power and authority more than anything else, had no interest in pursuing a policy that would develop the conquered countries, which were considered sources of revenue first and foremost. It is true that each of the elements of the interpretation that has just been presented in summary can be supported by evidence, whether it concerns the ostenta­ tious luxury of the Great Kings or the severity of the assessments. After all, to PseudoAristotle, the royal economy appeared to operate as a gigantic financial sump fed by the

Subject Populations and Tribute Economy

805

satrapal economy. On the other side of the issue, we tend to distrust principles derived from monarchic ideology, which bestows on the king the image of a benefactor and de­ fender of the workers in the fields. Even after the evidence has been gathered, the prob­ lem remains unsolved. The Empire was in fact not merely a "symbolic capital" but also a collection of means of production (primarily land and water) and productive powers (in particular human productive powers). In the vision—which was necessarily their vij of an Empire destined to perdure, the Great Kings certainly did concern them­ selves with guaranteeing the regularity of their income, they were determined to preserve and increase their capital and to bequeath it to their successors magnified and enriched. The term capital must not send shivers down our spines; whether conquered, bought, or given, a city (or a territory) "could not be anything more than a productive organism susceptible to appreciation" (J.-fVl. Bertrand) and thus subject also to the cal­ culation of profitability, which in the case of the Great King (his predecessors, his suc­ cessors) was measured by the scale of its yield in tribute. This is in fact the significance of some Hellenistic inscriptions: for example, by guaranteeing that the inhabitants of a city retained possession of land that was contested by "barbarians," a royal governor re­ minded the citizens (Arsinoe in Cilicia) that they had to "fully cultivate the land and make plantations (phyteu[santes\), in order to live in prosperity and in order to pay the king greater revenues (prosodoi) than before" ( S E C XXXIX. 1426). Here, the gift of land, which often has been reduced to its political component, is explicitly considered by the king to be a long-term investment—and this will soon be confirmed by Polybius (X.28.2-4; below). s

o n

It is true that Xenophon presents a picture of the Great King as a wise economist: he was eager to see the tribute pour in regularly; he rewarded the governors charged with receipt of tribute, as well as the military leaders, who were responsible for seeing to the security of the fields. In the Great King's eyes, good governors, whom he rewards, are those "who are able to show him that their country is densely populated and that the land is in cultivation and well stocked with the trees of the district and with the crops" (Oec. IV.S'v -). Xenophon highlights the fact that the Great King's interest in maintaining and developing the population and increasing the value of regions cannot merely be as­ signed to the ideological category of the "good gardener" (see chap. 6/5). The paradises were not merely striking evidence of the king's authority over the growing cycle, nor sim­ ply hunting preserves; they also were agricultural estates, places for horticultural experi­ mentation carefully undertaken and cultivated by the villagers assigned to them (cf. Xenophon, Anab. IV.4.7; Hell. IV. 1.15; PFa 33; M L 12). The granting of doreai itself tended to improve production. The evidence frequently portrays holders of land grants as absentee landlords and simple farmers. But even if the Murasu tablets can support this interpretation, it nonetheless remains partial. First of all, even when they delegated responsibilities, the Murasu were concerned both with generating personal profit from renting land and gathering the royal duties. On the other hand, the "owner farm" grant holders had great interest in good yield from their lands, as attested by the Arsama cor­ respondence (DAE 68 [AD 7]). 1

In his discussions of the conquests of "Cyrus," Xenophon often mentions the con­ queror's policy that had the goal of generating profit from the land and peasants. Thus, 'Cyrus" stated with respect to the "Assyrian" peasants: "No change.whatever shall come to you except that you shall not have the same ruler over you as before; but you shall

806

Chapter 17. The Great King, His Armies, and His Treasures

dwell in the same houses and work the same farms; you shall live with the same wives and have control of your children just as now. But you shall not have to fight either us or any one else" (Cyr. IV.4.10-11;0 cf. III.3.22). Of course, Xenophon's model can be crit­ icized, but is it anything other than a praise of "good kingship"? The ideological theme of "defense of the peasants" conceals a basic practicality in that the lands and peasants regularly filled the royal coffers with tribute. The maintenance of existing social struc­ tures (village communities) represents both a purpose and a means of gaining political and tribute dominion. In this respect, the ideology of peace is not a simple distortion of the truth: the king and his satraps were "protectors of the peasants," and this contributed to the maintenance of the level of production capability and guaranteed harvest and trib­ ute, as Xenophon rightly insists. He has "Cyrus" speak the following words: "An inhab­ ited country is a very valuable possession, but a land destitute of people becomes likewise destitute of produce" (Cyr. IV4.5-C-). This confirms the "birth-rate incentive policy" (cf. p. 733) attested in Persia both among the Persians themselves and among the kurta$—a policy designed to increase human reproduction that, pursued throughout the Achaeme­ nid period (Plutarch, Alex. 69.1-2; Mor. 246a-h), had some success, as attested by Dio­ dorus Siculus at the beginning of the Hellenistic period (XIX.21.3). It is quite clear that this evidence is disparate, vague, and susceptible to varying inter­ pretations. Can we really speak of profitable investments that must have been financed directly by the royal administration, which then skimmed off part of the profits or derived tribute while hoping to generate additional future profits? Aside from the Persepolis tab­ lets (chap. 11), the available evidence is terribly inadequate. The inadequacy is not sim­ ply quantitative but qualitative as well, in that no document explicitly speaks of a policy of economic development (and certainly none would be expected). The same evidence can support varying interpretations as a function of the assumptions and models used. The case of the canal from the Nile to the Red Sea is entirely typical in this regard. Once it has been proved that the goal of creation of the canal was not to establish a direct, per­ manent link between the Nile Valley and Susa, must we conclude that Darius's decison was based purely on political-ideological motives? Recent explorations in the Tell elMaskhuta region has produced evidence of a rather sizable influx of pottery from various Greek cities (Chios, Thasos, Lesbos) and especially from Phoenicia. Was development of trade in the region Darius's goal, or does it merely represent a side effect of an action that emerged primarily from the political sphere? It is obviously impossible to offer a sure answer. However, if we place Darius's policy in the longue duree between Necho (cf. Diodorus II. 158-59) and the Ptolemies (e.g., Diodorus 1.33), it is not likely that we would think that the Great King had no commercial (fiscal) interest in the matter at all. The evidence regarding water-resource policy seems clearer. At all times, in the great irrigated valleys, the king and his administration took charge of the great water works. This was true in Babylonia—a case that we have already had occasion to discuss (chap. 16/10) —ns is shown by Arrian (VII.7.7; VII.21) and Strabo (XVI. 1.11). The Babylonian texts reveal that there was a special Water Department. For Egypt, we have nothing but a single passage in Herodotus (11.90), which is interesting at least because it shows that the royal administration maintained and reinforced the levees that protected Memphis and environs each year (an activity that we might be inclined to doubt); in all likelihood, we once again have only a partial view of much more extensive work. There is another text that adds to this topic, a passage in Polybius that by pure chance preserves direct

Subject Populations and Tribute

Economy

807

information on the Great Kings' initiatives regarding the water supply. Within an ac­ count of Antiochus Ill's campaign against the Parthian king Arsaces, Polybius offers the following information on methods of bringing water to a part of Hyrcania that is referred to as desert:

Pig. 65. Plan of a q a n a t (showing profile and vertical views).

808

Chapter 17. The Great King, His Armies, and His Treasures

In the region I speak o f there is no water visible o n the surface, b u t even in the desert there are a n u m b e r o f u n d e r g r o u n d (hyponomoi) c h a n n e l s c o m m u n i c a t i n g with wells

(phreatiai)

u n k n o w n to those not a c q u a i n t e d with the country. A b o u t these a true story is told by the in­ habitants. T h e y say that at the t i m e w h e n the Persians were the rulers o f Asia they gave to those w h o c o n v e y e d a s u p p l y o f water to p l a c e s previously unirrigated the right of cultivating (karpeusai)

the l a n d for five g e n e r a t i o n s , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y as the T a u r u s [ E l b u r z ] h a s many

large streams d e s c e n d i n g from it, p e o p l e i n c u r r e d great e x p e n s e a n d trouble in m a k i n g u n ­ d e r g r o u n d c h a n n e l s r e a c h i n g a l o n g distance, so that at the present d a y those w h o m a k e use of the water d o not k n o w w h e n c e the c h a n n e l s derive their supply. ( X . 2 8 . 2 - 4 * )

Polybius describes quite precisely installations called c/anats that have been used for centuries in Iran: they are subterranean corridors that sometimes run tens of kilometers to water sources lying under the slopes of well-watered mountains. The technology cer­ tainly goes back before the Persian conquest, but Polybius includes a very important clarification of a well-thought-out policy of the royal administration. This work did not require the mobilization of a vast labor force (unlike the great Babylonian, Egyptian, and Bactrian canals); instead, it was carried out by the local populations. In exchange for investment in lire form of labor, Hyrcanian communities received not ownership but use (karpeusai) of the land. The royal administration drew benefit from it in several ways. It is obvious, for one thing, that arrangements like this made it possible to place water reserves along the high road from Media to Central Asia. Furthermore, it enabled lands to be planted that had previously been unproductive and thus supported a policy of agrarian colonization. Finally, nothing suggests that the Hyrcanians received a tax ex­ emption. The word karpeusai indicates only that they had the right to cultivate a plot of which they were not the real owner; it does not imply they were free of all royal assess­ ments. In reality, the administration certainly expected to receive revenue from these parcels in the form of tribute and/or water taxes (cf. chap. 10/7). The fact that the de­ scription is an isolated example should neither surprise us nor create a statistical illu­ sion; we have access to this information in the first place only because the qanats played a role in military strategy. Thus, we may draw the inference, without much risk, that the royal administration followed an identical policy in other parts of the Iranian Plateau and perhaps in other parts of the Empire (Arabia, Egypt). Of course, the form of royal involvement is different from what one would find in Babylonia; in Iran we find encouragement rather than direct intervention, but the contrast is essentially more for­ mal than structural. There is today every indication that the scope of the imperial administration cannot be reduced to extracting tribute. On the contrary, it is easy to see that many regions of the Empire, far from falling into somnolence, were actually in a stage of expansion and population growth, whether Syria, Babylonia, Susiana, or Bactria; whether Hyrcania or the medinah of Samaria or Arachosia (despite Plutarch [Mor. 328c], the Arachosians did not have to wait for Alexander to bring them agriculture!). Archaeological explorations have instead revealed a picture of sustained development from the time of the inception of the Empire on, even though in Babylonia it is not always easy to distinguish an Achae­ menid phase from a Neo-Babylonian phase. Xenophon's account largely confirms that around 400 Babylonia was fully irrigated and cultivated (e.g., Anab. II.3.10-13; 4.13) by a dense population divided among prosperous towns and villages (II.4.13, 22, 25); it had paradises ($4.14) as well as lands held by Parysatis (II.4.27). Of course, the case of Bac­ tria, to which we will not return here, shows that the development of production capa-

Subject Populations and Tribute Economy

809

bility cannot always be put into a direct causal relationship with imperial control—even though the contrary is more obvious in Babylonia. But the fact remains: even when the hvo spheres, political and economic, are kept apart on methodological grounds, we must observe that the long Achaemenid dominion did not lead to general impoverish­ ment that could be explained by "vampirization." In the end, Xenophon's perspective is not so far from reality; his view of the economy coincides with that very likely held by the Great Kings: it is the careful management of an estate (oikos). The Great Kings understood that, to ensure the regularity—nay, the in­ crease—of their revenues, they needed to take measures that would promote the devel­ opment of production capabilities. However, we will not conclude that they followed an "economic policy." For one thing, economic development cannot be reduced to central interference in matters; not all of the productive capability is controlled by the royal ad­ ministration; far from it. Furthermore, the decisions made by the Great Kings do not be­ long exclusively to the economic sphere, which always was subordinated to politicalmilitary concerns. It would thus be better to speak of "tribute policy," which implies that the income from development was primarily destined to exalt royal splendor in all of its aspects and manifestations. We could without difficulty add all kinds of activities related to construction (in the center and the provinces) to the sphere of indirect encourage­ ment. For instance, the splendor of satrapal residences presupposes considerable devel­ opment of artistic technique (well displayed by the activity of Greek artists, or artists working in Greek style, in many regions of the Empire); these royal and satrapal courts certainly created a market, especially for luxury goods intended for the Great King and the imperial and court elite (cf. Herodotus VIII.105; Athenaeus XII.531b; XIV.652b-c; Aelian, VH XII. 1; Diodorus XVII.67.3 and 108.4). This example serves to illustrate one of the operating rules of the tribute economy, which Parmenion recalled for Alexander at Persepolis (Arrian III. 18.1 l*v*): the circulation of the Empire's products cannot be re­ duced to its centripetal component, since the (undeniable) sucking of riches from the periphery to the center requires that the periphery not be ruined by the demands and as­ sessments of the center. If the center were sucking the periphery dry—as Parmenion puts it—the king would not be acting as a good manager of his property (ktemata), and "the Asians would not so readily adhere to him." If, in fact, the periphery fed (the "royal table") and exalted the center, the center for its part contributed, by means of the State apparatus, to maintaining—even developing, and in any case favoring—the activities of the periphery.

"Overexploitation ofTribute" and Revolt Let us return to one of the components of the argument brought by Olmstead and his followers: the growing burden of tributes and taxes would have generally stirred up dis­ content in the Empire and thus facilitated (in the long run) Alexander's conquest. The real problem is that it is very difficult to assess the actual burden imposed by the various tributes and taxes paid to the Great King in relation to the production capacities of the countries; without this information, it is also difficult to infer that the tribute and taxes were an exhausting burden on the peoples. Sometimes (following Plutarch, Mor. I72f and Polyaenus VII. 11.3) it is claimed that Darius's tribute was fairly moderate, some­ times that it was (or became) unbearable —both without the claims' being based on ac­ tual numerical analysis. The reason is obviously that the slate of the evidence does not really permit such calculations. Even if we can make some assumptions about the level

810

Chapter 17. 'The Great King, His Armies, and His Treasures

of tribute, we still somehow need to add in the multiple taxes, which themselves are gen­ erally not quantified by the ancient texts, with only one exception (Neh 5:15). There is hardly any doubt that the special payments would heavily burden the resources of the people and cities; we are thinking particularly about the expenses occasioned by the vis­ its of the court and about Herodotus's comment on the condition of the Greek cities vis­ ited by the royal caravan in 480: "The Greeks who had to entertain the Persian army and provide a dinner for the king . . . were utterly ruined, and were obliged to leave house and home" (VII. 118*0); Herodotus emphasizes the resignation of the downtrodden: "The various places along the route did manage to carry out their orders, though not without severe suffering" (VII. 120*0)! In addition, the weight of tribute, taxes, and satrapal requisitions was added to the as­ sessments already in effect in any given area (whether the land belonged to a sanctuary, an ethnos, or a city). We might think, for example, that in the Greek cities the system of double taxation—civic and royal —led to tensions between the civic government and the royal administration; we are thinking here of the tensions that are better known for the Hellenistic period, when cities begged the king or his representative to grant them control (kyrioi) of taxes that Pseudo-Aristotle considers among the satrapal levies. We know, for example, that when a city granted an 'exemption' (ateleia) to an individual, it stated that the royal taxes (hasilika tele) were excluded from the scope of the decree. Part of production and wealth were ever after diverted to the royal treasury, with nothing but negative consequences for the immediate producers, especially the peasants, because the source of all wealth is in the land, as Pseudo-Aristotle insists several times. One of the aspects of the creation of the doreai had the same effect, since the holders of the land grants only had to pay a fixed tribute and thus had every reason to increase the yield re­ sulting from peasant labor. Let it suffice for now to make a brief reference to just one ex­ ample—the tragic situation of the Jewish smallholders, who around the middle of the fifth century complained in these words: "We have had to borrow money on our fields and our vineyards to pay the king's tax (middalphoroi tou basileos)" (Neh. 5:4o). The tribute charged was all the heavier because it was a surcharge on top of the satrapal taxes (governor's bread: 5:14-15) and the various assessments paid to the Temple and its per­ sonnel (13:10-13). The connection between regional crisis and imperial dominion is never simple to ex­ pose. We may observe, for example, that around 418 the price of foodstuffs suffered an exorbitant increase in several Babylonian towns. But who can say that this (brief and lo­ calized) "subsistence crisis" was due to royal taxation and not (e.g.) bad harvests? Astro­ nomical tablets regularly refer to the unlucky consequences of torrential rains in some years, using a formula like: "There was a famine in the land. The people (sold their chil­ dren]" (ADRTB no. -373; cf. nos. -366 and -369). We wonder to what extent these prac­ tices explain what Herodotus says in a passage (1.196) often used by Olmstead to connect Persian conquest with impoverishment of simple Babylonians. We obviously lack direct evidence of the perception that Babylonian peasants might have had of Persian control of tribute. Wc might nevertheless quote a tablet (YOS 7.128) from the time of Cambyses (528) that records a dispute brought before the marbani of Uruk; in it, a priest of Istar is accused by a shepherd from Uruk of stealing 60 sheep from the flock of Istar and threat­ ening that he would choke the shepherd with the cord of his necklace while whispering into his ear, "This is how Gubalu and Parnaka break the backs of people." Whoever Par-

Subject Populations and Tribute Economy

811

naka may be {the future administrator at Persepolis under Darius?), he was the confed­ erate of Gubaru, who can only be the satrap of Babylonia and Ebir Nari. Should we see in the priest's threatening words evidence of the implacable nature of imperial coercion as it was experienced by the subject-administrators? Perhaps; but if the threat does refer to an actual event and is not merely a metaphor, we also wonder what perception the Babylonian social elite might have had about their relations with the satrapal adminis­ tration and, more broadly, with the imperial organizational structures. We should also emphasize that historiography has long been affected by the theory of continued price increases in Achaemenid Babylonia; however, a recent study has cast doubt on this "cer­ tainty," because it finds that prices of some staple products fell between Artaxerxes I and Darius III. Other investigations on the same topic are in progress, and they no doubt will nuance and complement the analyses that have been based on a newly published but narrow corpus (the astronomical tablets). In short, it seems unlikely that there will ever be a return to the traditional theory. Another interesting example just referred to comes from Judah in the time of Nehe­ miah. The peasants complain of "hav[ing] had to borrow money on [their] fields and [their] vineyards to pay the king's tax" (Neh 5:4). But the context makes it very clear that the overburdening of the peasantry is not due solely to the royal tribute: internal class warfare and temple assessments contributed just as much to the impoverishment of the Jewish peasantry (see chap. 14/5). Similarly, in the Greek cities (and elsewhere), in addition to the royal tribute, the city authorities levied civic taxes. More than any­ thing, it was the totality of the various tax systems that explains various situations, whether in Judah or the Greek cities; and in Babylonia, it was the totality of state taxes and the profits siphoned off by the Murasu (and other land managers). But not all of the inhabitants of a community suffered equally, because the tribute drain did not accrue only to the Great King and his Faithful (even if they were the main beneficiaries, on both the political and the economic levels). An analysis of one example of the circula­ tion of the income from assessments (in kind) of the tage (sale of royal wheat: IG U , 207) implies that the Greek cities received back some benefit from the purchase of royal wheat (according to Antigonus, it was cheaper than the wheat available on the Aegean market: RC 3). While the political and financial advantage for the Great King and his satraps is obvious, the operation also profited the cities themselves and the richest citi­ zens, who were adept at negotiating the situation to their advantage. In the same way, in Babylonia, the Murasu earned some of their profit from converting taxes paid in kind into silver, and their operations also contributed to the enrichment of the Persians who had received land there. An Aramaic document from Egypt records an association be­ tween Persians and non-Persians in a commercial enterprise (DAE 109)—a fact also well attested in the Babylonian evidence. In other words, the tribute system was not by itself the cause of tensions between the dominators and the dominated. Peasants, who certainly were part of the dominated (as seen in Babylonia), did not gain any advantage from the circulation of goods; rather, they suffered from it. This probably explains He­ rodotus's interpretation of the impoverishment of the Babylonian people (1.196: pas tis ton demon), even if the connection that he makes between conquest and impoverish­ ment must be discounted, to say the least. In contrast, the local elites, who were closely linked to the imperial elite (or part of it), themselves profited from the circulation of the products paid into the royal tax system. This is probably one of the reasons for the long 2

812

Chapter 17. The Great King, His Armies, and His Treasures

life enjoyed by local dynasties and, more generally, client regimes; Persian authority was to some extent concealed behind the screen of the local gentry, who were entrusted with levying tribute and taxes locally, with the result that any possible discontent on the part of the peasants was aimed at these gentry (as seen in Nehemiah's Judah). In a way, the king's strategy for dealing with the sanctuaries and social elites of his provinces was noth­ ing other than the political-ideological component of a much larger imperial project and the success of this project presupposes both political centralization and social and cutural polycentrism. It is important to observe that there is no evidence that would permit us to attribute the known revolts to the cause of tribute alone. The burden of tribute may be why the great revolts of 522 broke out (cf. Justin 1.7.2), and this happens to be Bardiya's analy­ sis—he exempted his peoples from tribute and military expenses for three years (Justin 1.9.2; Herodotus III.67). It has also been suggested that the Ionian revolt was connected, at least in part, to tribute; if we have properly understood the meaning of the measures taken by Artaphernes, we can see that the royal administration was able to discern the consequences and thus reform the allocation of tribute, while maintaining the total amount (chap. 12/5). This is, after all, an explanation that would confirm that, like Bar­ diya, the administration of Darius was able to adapt to the needs of the hour. But the only explicit reference along these lines comes from Diodorus, who describes the revolt that was born in Egypt at the time of Inarus in these words: "Mustering an army, they revolted from the Persians, and after expelling the Persians whose duty it was to collect the tribute from Egypt (kai tous phorologountas ten Aigypton ton Person ekbalountes) . . ." (XI.71.3-0-). There is no significant reason to reject this statement, even though it is embedded in a stream that is both dominant and suspect, a stream that says that the Per­ sians "governed avariciously and arrogantly" (Quintus Curtius IV.7.1;* cf. Diodorus XVII.49.1 and Polyaenus VII. 1.7). But are we really certain that all of the tribute-collec­ tors in Diodorus's text were "Persians"? The available evidence implies that it would have been Egyptians who were in charge on the local level (cf. Arrian III.5.4; Ps.-Arist., Oec. II.33a). In Diodorus's version, the tribute-collectors were the primary symbols of Persian authority, whatever their ethnic origin. In another case (Sidon), the insurgents first attacked the satrapal paradises (Diodorus XVI.41.5-0). Even if the action had the ad­ ditional purpose of destroying Persian fodder reserves, the symbolic import was consid­ erably greater than a slap in the face. This is very clearly explained by Diodorus: "The first hostile act was the cutting down and destroying of the royal park in which the Per­ sian Kings were wont to take their recreation"; this was neither more nor less than a dec­ laration of war (cf. Plutarch, Art. 25.1-2). The same motivations probably prompted the leaders of the Egyptian revolt to put the "Persian" (that is, imperial) tribute collectors to death.

5. Transition Whatever point of view one chooses, one irrefutable conclusion emerges: Darius Ill's Empire was not moribund, as it was smugly described by the Greco-Hellenistic authors. Whether the topic is the authority and aura of the Great King, his financial and military abilities, the productive activity of the various countries, or the cooperation of local elites, there is nothing to suggest that, from Darius I to Darius III, the internal capabili­ ties of the Empire were crumbling. This observation confirms at the least that the theory

Transition

813

of "Achaemenid decadence" must definitively be relegated to a display case in the mu­ seum of historiographic wonders. But clearly this is no more than a partial conclusion that leaves the way open to another interpretation: the defeat at the hands of the Mace­ donians does not reveal a cyclic crisis of the Empire but a structural weakness. This is the hypothesis that we propose to test in the next chapter, which is dedicated to the im­ perial response to Macedonian aggression. The task is not a simple one because, like the Persian Wars, the war of Darius III is known to us only from authors entirely committed to the European cause. It is thus only in a vacuum that we can reconstruct the Achae­ menid view of Alexander's conquest, after a close decryption of the ancient sources. To try to resolve the problem that has been raised, we will discuss three points in order, resituated diachronically: Darius's strategy, the Persian aristocracy's attitude, and the posi­ tion taken by the local elites when they were confronted by the Macedonian's overtures.

PART SIX

The Fall of an Empire (336-330)

Chapter 18

Darius and the Empire Confront Macedonian Aggression l. Territories, Armies, and Strategies

The First Macedonian Offensive (336-335) We know that after the victory at Chaeronea Philip set about creating a league of which he was hegemdn. The officially announced purpose of the league was to carry out an offensive: the goal was to campaign against the Persians in revenge for the devastation of 480 and thus to liberate the Creek cities of Asia (Diodorus XVI.89). To this end, the king of Macedon sent an advance army corps to Asia Minor in 336 commanded by Par­ menion, Attalus, and Amyntas, who were to prepare for the landing of the royal army (XVI.91.2; Justin IX.5.8). We are quite poorly informed about the operation, since the ancient authors (Diodorus and Polyaenus) cast their spotlight exclusively on Memnon of Rhodes. The first actions, certainly, were not favorable to the Persians; this is quite certainly when pro-Persian governments were ejected from Lesbos, Chios, Ephesus, and perhaps also lasus. In the temple of Artemis at Ephesus and in several towns on Lesbos, statues of Philip were erected at this time, and Parmenion settled factions there that are referred to as "democratic" (cf. Arrian 1.17.11). Perhaps the statue that Ariobarzanes had erected in the sanctuary of Athena Ilias was pulled down during the fighting in Troas (Diodorus XVII. 17.6). The assassination of Philip II and the accession of Alexander did not interrupt the operations, but these events certainly created conditions more favor­ able for Darius III to mount a counterattack. At the beginning of his reign, Alexander sent a new detachment to Asia Minor led by Hecataeus; he joined Attalus and Parme­ nion, though his actual mission was to see to the death of Attains, who had fallen under the suspicion of the new king (Diodorus XVII.2.3-6). Attalus's machinations were stir­ ring up trouble in the Macedonian army up to the moment he was assassinated, either by his own men (§5.1-2) or on Parmenion's initiative (Quintus Curtius VII. 1.3; VIII.7.5). Nevertheless, throughout 335, Parmenion's advances were reduced to almost nothing. Although Memnon did not manage to take Cyzicus (Diodorus XVII.7.8; Polyaenus V.44.5), pro-Persian tyrants were reestablished in the cities of Lesbos and at Ephesus (cf. Arrian 1.17.12: Syrphax and his brothers). In Troas, Callas also suffered sev­ eral defeats (Diodorus XVII.7.10). At the beginning of 334, apparently only Abydos was in Macedonian hands (cf. Arrian 1.11.6). Despite being poorly documented, these events stimulate several reflections. On the military level, the situation is mixed. Initially, the Macedonian expeditionary corps won major victories. Apparently, Parmenion had even been able to advance as far as Magne­ sia ad Sipylum (Polyaenus V.44.4), and this confirms the relative permeability of the Per­ sian defenses (at least at an early stage)—something that was already apparent in the Greek offensives of the fifth and fourth centuries. At the same time, we need to stress that 817

818

Chapter 18. Darius and the Empire Confront Macedonian

Aggression

our sources remain partial, in both senses of the word. Darius "thought to turn the com­ ing war back upon Macedonia," according to Diodorus (XVII.7.1*), "and began to pay serious attention to his forces. He fitted out a large number of ships of war and assem­ bled numerous strong armies, choosing at the same time his best commanders." This is the context in which he turned to Memnon, who was "outstanding in courage and in strategic grasp. The king gave him five thousand mercenaries and ordered him to march to Cyzicus and to try to get possession of it" (§7.2-3). However, Diodorus's presenta­ tion must at least be nuanced and supplemented. First of all, Memnon was certainly not the only campaign leader. The financial strategems attributed to the Rhodian (Ps.-Arist., Oec. 11.29 [1351b]) are evidence of the fact that he was acting as the head of a troop of mercenaries in the service of the Persians. Memnon paid and fed his men by imposing taxes on the cities; this perhaps explains the reaction of the inhabitants of Cyzicus (Polyaenus V.44.5), who had no desire to give in to extortion. Furthermore, it was not only Greek mercenaries that were hired, and Memnon was not made commander-inchief of the royal troops. Specifically, it is impossible to think that Arsites, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, did not participate in fighting that mostly took place in his terri­ tory, and we can make the same observation about Spithridates of Sardis. It is even ex­ tremely likely that, as in 341-340 (Pausanias 1.29.10), so also in 334 (Arrian 1.12.8-10) Arsites was the one who received the Great King's direct orders. Moreover, Diodorus seems to imply that the Persians did not really get under way until after Alexander's ac­ cession ($7.2), which occurred at almost the same time as Darius's accession (summer, 335). However, the notion that the Persians responded slowly is also dubious; whatever the extent of the troubles at the center and in some provinces (Egypt?) —certainly less than is usually suggested—the central authority had probably been alerted by Arsites and taken appropriate action. The Xanthus trilingual and the appointment of Oronto­ bates to the satrapy of Caria-Lycia (Arrian 1.23.8) testify that the reign of Arses/Artaxerxes IV and the beginning of the reign of Darius were marked by more than palace intrigues. It simply turns out that Diodorus and Polyaenus, fixated on the personality of Memnon, had nothing to say about the operations of 336—and from this we cannot necessarily in­ fer passivity on the part of the Great King. On the contrary, there is every reason to be­ lieve, with Diodorus (XVII.7.1-3), that even if other fronts (Egypt?) might have required their attention, Artaxerxes IV and Darius III very quickly became aware of the problems on the Asia Minor front.

Darius, His Satraps, and Alexander's Landing (May-June 334) Alexander was secure in his European rear and thus he and his army took the Thracian route in the early spring of 334 and crossed the Hellespont (Arrian 1.11.6-8; 12.17). Parmenion was given the largest part of the army, which crossed unopposed from Sestus to Abydos with the aid of 160 triremes and a substantial number of cargo boats (ploia). Meanwhile, Alexander, assisted by a small troop, landed in Troas, where he car­ ried out his "Homeric pilgrimage" (cf. Diodorus XVII. 17.1-3; Plutarch, Alex. 15.7-9). Next, he came to Arisbe and Percote, before taking a position on the banks of the Grani­ cus (Arrian 1.13.1). Persian "satraps and generals" had gathered their forces near Zeleia, where they considered what action to take in response to Alexander's landing (1.12.8-10). One of the most controversial problems is: Why did the Persians not attempt to pre­ vent the Macedonian landing? Diodorus is the only one to ask the question explicitly,

Territories, Armies, and Strategies

819

and lie has a read)' answer: "The Persian satraps and generals had not acted in time to prevent the crossing of the Macedonians, but they mustered their forces (athroisthentes) and took counsel [Council of Zeleia] So they decided to fight it out, and summon­ ing forces from every quarter (tas pantakhothen dynameis metapempsamenoi) .. ., they advanced in the direction of Hellespontine Phrygia" (XVII. 18.2, 4o). This delay seems quite surprising, because both the initial Macedonian offensive of 336-335 and the preparations and public proclamations of Alexander left no doubt about his intentions. We recognize this as one of the favorite motifs of Diodorus as well as of Xenophon and other Greek authors: the deliberate pace of the Persian armies was a crippling handicap (e.g., XV.41.2). However, though this remark really can be applied to the assembling of immense royal armies (as at Issus and Gaugamela, for example), it is much less convinc­ ing for the army of the Granicus, which comprised territorial troops (military colonies, horsemen provided by the Persians of the diaspora and land-grant holders) and contin­ gents of subject peoples (such as the Paphlagonians), all of whom could be brought together in a short time. Moreover, these troops (some of them, at least) had been mobi­ lized before 334, since they must have taken part in the fighting in 336 and 335. De­ pending on the date assigned to the battle (April or May), we can imagine that the Persians might have assembled their troops in their winter quarters, which might have been rather far apart (compare XIX.44.4; 68.2). However, paradoxically, apart from the fact that this hypothesis would naturally lead to confirmation of the idea that the Per­ sians had taken many months to assemble their army, a comparison with Arrian leads to a much more reasonable solution. In fact, as Diodorus writes, a war council was held at Zeleia; all the satraps of Asia Minor took part, and the list is given by Arrian (Diodorus names only Memnon). Arrian very clearly states that the Persian troops had already pitched their camp near the city at that time (1.12.8: katestratopedeukotes). In short, de­ spite Diodorus's claim, the Persian generals certainly did not wait until their strategy was planned before issuing the order to mobilize. The reason for the situation was quite dif­ ferent. We quite simply doubt that a land army alone would have been adequate to pre­ vent a landing, even if we recall that a Persian commander did challenge Greek ships with his horsemen on one occasion, near Abydos, as a last resort (Xenophon, Hell. 1.1.6) and also that land troops could occasionally prevent a fleet from gaining access to water supplies (e.g., Arrian 1.19.8). They would still have had to know which beachheads the Macedonian army intended to use for landings—something that would have been very difficult to determine, because Alexander, for reasons that might not have been due solely to his desire to pay homage to the Greek heroes of the Trojan War, chose to split his forces (Arrian 1.11.6; 12.6). In short, the Persian generals did not bring their troops to the sea "to prevent the crossing of the Macedonians" (diabasis: Diodorus § 18.2-0-) quite simply because the very idea never crossed their minds. If the Persians had decided to prevent the crossing by the Macedonian army, they obviously would have had to appeal to their sea power. To be sure, not one ancient text refers to the existence of even one Persian boat in the area. This is even more surprising because at that time, in comparison with the 160 triremes (and cargo boats) Alexander controlled (Arrian 1.11.6), the Persians had undeniable naval supremacy. They domi­ nated the sea (thalassokratein), writes Arrian (1.18.6) of the situation a few weeks later when Alexander was at the gates of Miletus. Arrian numbers the royal navy at 400 ships (§18.5) that were manned by well-trained crews, who had come from Cyprus and

820

Chapter 18. Darius and the Empire Confront Macedonian

Aggression

Phoenicia in particular (§18.7; 11.13.7). There also were contingents from Greek cities (1.19.11: Iassus). Arrian states that this fleet "[arrived] too late" at Miletus (§18.5) which indicates that the Achaemenid squadrons were already on the Asia Minor frontbut this tells us nothing of their comings and goings in the previous weeks, because we do not know from what region they had set sail for Miletus. As a result, we continue to be surprised about the absence of the fleet from the Hellespont; most often, it is attrib­ uted to Khabbabash's revolt in Egypt. While this theory is not unattractive, it should be recalled at the same time that the only available evidence —the Satrap Stela — does not permit a certain date to be assigned to events in the Delta. Obviously, to date this revolt on the basis that it delayed the arrival of the fleet on the coast of Asia Minor is to adopt circular reasoning that is historically attractive but methodologically has little to recom­ mend it. As a result, we must conclude that we have no answer to the question or, more precisely, that none of the possible answers transcends the limit of probability, absent additional evidence. Whatever the case, it is clear that the Persian generals did "hold a council of war," to use Arrian's phrase CI.12.8-!>-). He describes the meeting as follows: against the advice of Memnon, who recommended a scorched-earth policy, Arsites, with the support of the other Persian commanders, chose to give battle. Memnon's suggestion was based on two considerations: first, "the M a c e d o n i a n s . . . were far superior in infantry"; second, "Alex­ ander would not stay in the country for want of provisions." In rebuttal, "it is said (legetai) that Arsites stated in the Persian council that he would not suffer one house to be burned belonging to his subjects." He was supported by the other Persians, moreover, who "suspectfed] Memnon of deliberately holding up warlike operations for the sake of the honour (time) he held from the king." The war council is also reported by Diodorus, who presents Memnon's speech identically (XVII.18.2-4-5-). Diodorus strongly supports the Rhodian's strategic choice: "This was the best counsel, as after-events made clear." Then Diodorus offers his explanation of the (in his eyes unreasonable) attitude of the sa­ traps and generals: they rejected the Rhodian's suggestions as "beneath the dignity (megalopsykhia) of. the Persians" (§18.3-0-). The ancient tales and simple reasoning invite a number of questions, as much about the role of Memnon as about the reasons for the strategic choice of the Persians and about Darius's participation. First, let us note that, while the versions of Arrian and Dio­ dorus essentially agree, Diodorus has once more outrageously favored Memnon, who is once again presented as "famed for his military competence" (§18.2;-0- cf. §7.2 and §20.7). He makes Memnon the key person of the war council, without naming a single one of the Persian satraps and generals! The role that Diodorus attributes to Memnon and his evaluation of Memnon's proposals are very much like other meetings he de­ scribes, particularly the discussions between Iphicrates and Pharnabazus in Egypt. In that case, too, the Greek's advice (which is considered especially judicious by Diodorus) is rejected by Pharnabazus and the Persian leaders near him, for motives that strangely resemble those Diodorus attributes to Arsites and his colleagues: "Pharnabazus became suspicious of his [Iphicrates'] boldness and his courage for fear lest he take possession of Egypt for himself (kat'idian).. . . Some generals indeed bore a grudge against him and were attempting to fasten unfair charges upon him" (XV.43.2-0-). In an observably similar manner, Diodorus exalts the figure of Memnon and confers on him an authority and in­ fluence he certainly did not have in the spring of 334. On the same occasion, Diodorus

Territories, Armies, and Strategies

821

credits him with plans ("transfer entirely the theater of the war to Europe") that were certainly not appropriate at that date. In reality, Arrian makes it clear that the council c o m p " ' Persians (syllogos ton Person; 12.10) and that within it, logically, pride of place was held by Arsites, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia; it was he who bore pri­ mary responsibility for conducting operations, as he had in 341 (Pausanias 1.29.10). In 334 Memnon was nothing more than the leader of a contingent of horsemen levied on the land he held in Troas (Diodorus XVII. 19.4). If his opinion was asked for, it was only one opinion among many. It would be of great interest to know where the ancient authors got their information. If, as is likely, Arrian is depending on the same source as Diodorus, he has at least used it more circumspectly (legetai 'it is said') and with less par­ tisanship, although he too reports that the Persian leaders feared the ambition of the Rhodian, who enjoyed royal favor. The arguments exchanged by Memnon and the Persians continue to raise various critical doubts. A posteriori, we are tempted to agree with Diodorus that Memnon's strat­ egy would have been effective. Alexander certainly needed to resupply his forces from the land, and all of the ancient authors stress that he was short of funds at the time. Ac­ cording to Quintus Curtius (X.2.24) and Arrian (VII.9.6), he had even inherited a debt of 600 talents from his father. The spoils of war and income from mines in Macedon had alleviated the situation, and at his landing, he had enough funds to allow him to sustain his army for 30 days. In other words, it was absolutely necessary that he gain a rapid vic­ tory that would allow him to get his hands on satrapal treasuries. Against these argu­ ments, which seem both rational and reasonable, the Persian leaders, according to Diodorus and Arrian, advanced two arguments, which a priori appear to be rather incon­ sistent. Arsites' proclamation can be compared with other texts to show explicitly that a satrap's primary mission was to protect the land from the ravages of war (e.g., Quintus Curtius III.4.5); this is how he earned and retained the confidence of the Great King and was the basis on which he could expect promotions in royal favor (Xenophon, Oec. IV.811). These assumptions prevented him, in principle, from adopting Memnon's tactic. But we doubt that Arsites would have reached such a decisive conclusion simply by re­ ferring to these considerations. The debate is similar to the one between Artabazus and Mardonius in 479, reported by Herodotus (IX.41-0-). Artabazus countered Mardonius's argument by proposing that they not give battle but instead persuade the Greeks to drop out of the coalition. Herodotus strongly takes Artabazus's side, describing him as "a man of some foresight," whereas Mardonius "expressed himself in much more uncompromis­ ing terms": he was certain that "the Persian army was much stronger than the Greek . . . it would be best . . . to engage in battle in the customary Persian way (nomos ton Per­ seon)" From Herodotus to Diodorus and from Mardonius to Arsites, the similarities are obvious. The megalopsykhia ('arrogance') of the satraps in 334 clearly corresponds to the nomos ton Perseon invoked by Mardonius; the satraps considered it unworthy of their rank and valor to refuse combat. In spite (and/or because) of the striking convergence of the reports on Zeleia with Herodotus's story, it would be very unwise to adopt Diodorus's intepretation without nuancing it. The concept of Persian megalopsykhia that he invokes is developed in real life in the athletic-contest perspective that he imposes on the battle of the Granicus; its out­ come was determined, as he presents it, by the result of a monomakhia that pitted Alex­ ander against Spithrobates [Spithridates], "a Persian of superior courage. . . . To the sec

822

Chapter }8. Darius and the Empire Confront Macedonian

Aggression

Persian, it seemed as if this opportunity for a single combat was god-given. He hoped that by his individual gallantry Asia might be relieved of its terrible menace" (XVII.20.23o). The duel took place in the sight of the transfixed soldiers (§20.5) and is presented according to a model that Diodorus (XVII.83.5-6) and Quintus Curtius (VII.4.32-38) use elsewhere—the same model that several ancient authors apply as a way of interpret­ ing the battle of Issus (Polybius XII.22.2; FGrH 125 F6). However, aside from the fact that Diodorus's tale is easily challenged, if the word (megalopsykhia) he employs is applied without discernment, we are likely to be led onto shifting and uncertain ground — the "psychology of peoples." Though the courage of the Persians is hailed by all of Alex­ ander's authors, there is nothing embedded in an aristocrat's genes that requires him to give battle at any cost! Perhaps contrary to what Diodorus intended, or in any case con­ trary to what some have made him say on one occasion or another, the Persians were not regularly stripped of common sense —whatever we may think of the tactical disposition they adopted in the battle. Their aristocratic ethic (megalopsykhia) —for which parallels may easily be found among the Macedonians—did not necessarily lead them to make "uncompromising" decisions (Herodotus IX.41-*-) completely divorced from military ra­ tionality. Furthermore, Herodotus cannot hide the fact that Mardonius's decision was also based on a reasonable objective (to keep the Greeks from assembling their forces). Like all the nomoi, the nomoi persikoi [ton Perseon] — which was invoked, it seems, by Mardonius—were subordinate to the principle of reality. We can list many cases where the Persian leaders either applied the scorched-earth strategy (e.g., Quintus Curtius III.4.3; including Darius himself: e.g., Quintus Curtius IV.9.14; Diodorus XVII.55.2) or displayed tactical caution (e.g., Diodorus XV.43.1-2), or refused combat that they con­ sidered lost in advance (e.g., Xenophon, Hell. IV. 1.17). Arsites and his colleagues cer­ tainly were aware of the relevant fact that, above and beyond (rather airy) discussions of traditional ethics, the Great King was interested in only one thing: victory. Thus, the situation certainly could appeaT favorable to them in 334 (the judgments post eventurn pronounced by Diodorus and Herodotus in favor of Memnon's and Artabazus's choices were of interest only to their authors). The Persians had in fact achieved noteworthy suc­ cesses over the Macedonian forces in the previous year; in addition, Arsites could legit­ imately estimate that his numerical superiority and the valor of his horsemen would confirm his optimistic view of the future. But let us go further and ask a simple question: Was Arsites completely free to adopt the strategy of his choice? The ancient authors do not say a word about Darius III. If we consider that Diodorus states that the Great King had previously ordered a general mo­ bilization (§7.2) and that elsewhere he never stops emphasizing (if only to deplore) the fact that the Persian generals depended on the king's orders for everything (e.g., XV.41.2), can we really imagine that Darius III was not interested in the situation as it stood in the spring of 334 and that he permitted Arsites to make the strategic decisions on his own? Only one author, Justin, alludes to this, and he does so very indirectly and, in the context, recalls the tenor of the arguments exchanged at Zeleia: "Meanwhile, King Darius, trusting in his forces, disdained to have recourse to a ruse and stated that to conceal his plans was to devalue the victory.. . . The first encounter therefore (igitur) took place in the plain of Adraste" (Justin XI.6.8.10). While Justin's formulations can be subjected to criticism, they at least suggest that Arsites had received orders from the Great King that he should plan for battle in Phrygia. This conforms with Achaemenid

Territories, Armies, and Strategies

823

practice: though the tactics in fact came from Arsites (who consulted his colleagues on this point), the strategy was imposed by Darius (cf. the exact parallel in Diodorus XVI.75-1 —2) — just as in Greece Mardonius made his decisions on the basis of orders sent to him by Xerxes (chap. 13/4-5). This leads us very much to doubt that the Council of Zeleia was really called to choose between two strategies; it is far more probable that the main purpose was to decide on what tactics to adopt (choice of location, the dispo­ sition of the contingents, the role and position of each of the commanders). The satraps engaged in combat quite simply because they had been ordered to do so and because they feared that disobedience would look like treason to the royal cause and result in se­ vere punishment by the Great King {FGrH 151 F l . l ; Irm. Alex. §19). Even if we agree that a debate took place in the terms recorded by Diodorus and/or Arrian, their interpre­ tation of it (given in different words) is certainly incorrect. We may simply imagine that in the course of the debate there was an incidental "ethical" discussion. But the purpose of this discussion was not to define strategy or to question a royal decree that the Persians would easily accept because the battle would give them the opportunity to demonstrate the megalopsykhia that, according to Diodorus, was so important to them. It would also provide Arsites with an opportunity to display his valor before Darius III, although the opportunity came with a well-known risk (Arrian 1.16.3 [suicide of a satrap, due to his failure]).

Darius in Babylon and the Asia Minor Front (334-333) From the Achaemenid point of view, the defeat at the Granicus was not really a deci­ sive event. On the other hand, taking into account the difficulties Alexander faced when he landed (on the financial level, for instance), the victory freed him from many of his fears. He had not been driven back into the sea, and he now had additional assets that he could use to pursue his goal. The victory was followed by a series of impressive suc­ cesses: he took possession of Dascylium, which had been abandoned by its garrison, and he made Calas satrap of Lesser Phrygia and ordered the inhabitants to pay "the same taxes as they used to pay to Darius" (Arrian 1.17.1-2-*-). He soon made his official entry into Sardis, which Mithrenes had surrendered to him without a fight (§17.3-8), and he seized its treasuries (Diodorus XVII.21,7). At least for the short term, the Macedonian had no more financial woes. It was soon the turn of Ephesus, Magnesia, Tralles, and many other coastal cities (Arrian 1.17.9-13; 18.1-2), and then of Miletus, which the Per­ sian fleet could not really rescue, because it arrived after the Macedonian fleet, which was commanded by Nicanor. After some resistance, the garrison surrendered (§18.3-9; 19; cf. Diodorus §22.2-4). From the Persian perspective, the military losses were appreciable though, as always, they are difficult for us to quantify (1000 horsemen according to Arrian 1.16.2). Brave leaders fell: Arrian mentions Niphates, Petenes, Spithridates, Mithrobuzanes, Mithra­ dates, Arbupales, Pharnaces, and Omares (1.16,3); Rhosaces (Spithridates' brother) was also gravely wounded during the battle (1.15.7). Arsites fled the battlefield and chose sui­ cide (1.16.3). Of the participants at the war council of Zeleia (1.12.8-9), only Rheo­ mithres and Arsames survived, in addition to Memnon (and perhaps his sons: 1.15.2). Rheomithres returned to Darius's camp. Atizyes, the satrap of Greater Phrygia, also left the battlefield safe and sound after, it appears, stopping in his capital, Celaenae (1.25.3), which he had abandoned when Alexander arrived (1.29.1). Arsames, after trying to gel

824

Chapter IS. Darius and the Empire Confront Macedonian

Aggression

Cilicia into a state of defensive readiness, also joined Darius, who was then on tlie march toward Cilicia. Rheomithres, Arsames, and Atizyes later died in the battle of Issus (II. 11.8). A major portion of the army nonetheless managed to retreat to the south; the units commanded by the escapees, including Memnon, fell back to Halicarnassus, a powerfully fortified city that was watched over by the satrap Orontobates. The arrival of the troops from the Granicus allowed the town to post an impressive garrison of Persians and mercenaries (1.20.2), and it was also reinforced by soldiers transported by the navy ($20.7). Alexander and his troops suffered several sizable reverses; for instance, at Myrv dus, despite promises made by deserters at the outset, the city refused to surrender ($20.5-7). The Macedonian efforts were ultimately successful, but only in part. When he left Halicarnassus at the end of 334, Alexander left behind a troop of 3000 infantry and 200 horsemen commanded by Ptolemy, who was ordered to take the two citadels that remained in Persian hands ($22.1-6; cf. Diodorus XVII.24-27). The Empire at this time found itself in an utterly unheard-of strategic situation, the only possible precedent being Cyrus the Younger's offensive. It was not the first time sa­ traps had known defeat in Asia Minor or that an enemy had camped just outside the walls of Sardis; but it was the first time that the citadel at Sardis had fallen and that the adversary had continued his march with no noticeable obstacles as far as the walls of Halicarnassus, proclaiming long and loud the entire time that his ambitions went well beyond the "liberation of the Greek cities." We would love to know how Darius and his advisers reacted to this avalanche of catastrophic news. We are quite poorly informed about this (to say the least), because the ancient authors follow Alexander step by step without paying the least attention to the Great King. We learn that, when Alexander took his winter campaign to Pamphylia-Lycia, the Great King attempted to stir up a con­ spiracy against his enemy: he sent a messenger to Alexander Lyncestes, who he had learned was prepared to betray Alexander. The royal envoy fell into the hands of Parme­ nion, the Lyncestian was arrested, and from the Persian point of view, that was the end of the matter (Arrian 1.25). But the story itself should be taken with a grain of salt, be­ cause Persian participation in the plot may simply represent a later accusation. There is no doubt that the Great King sent messengers to certain leaders to urge them to resist to the end —this, at least, is what can be gleaned from the statements of the defenders of Celaenae (Quintus Curtius III. 1.8). Nevertheless, it must be noted that we are certain about one specific major strategic decision: in the summer of 334, the Great King ap­ pointed Memnon (then at Halicarnassus) "to the command of lower Asia [coastal re­ gions] and the whole fleet" (Arrian 1.20.3;* II.l.l; Diodorus XVII.23.5-6). The title "commander of the fleet" reminds us that at this time the Persians held he­ gemony of the sea. At Miletus, in fact, Alexander ordered his navy to disband, except for the Athenian squadron and some cargo boats. According to Arrian (1.20.1*), Alexander had long been certain of his inferiority on the water (cf. $ 18.6-8) and, furthermore, "he was then short of money"; lastly, "he reflected that as he now controlled Asia with his land troops, he no longer needed a navy, and that by capturing the cities on the coast he would break up the Persian fleet, since they would have nowhere to make up their crews from, and no place in Asia where they could put in" ($20.1*). Alexander's decision to take this course of action was already questioned in Antiquity (cf. Diodorus XVII.23.13). The plan to destroy Persian naval power by conquering the coastline in fact pre­ sented considerable risk. The success that Alexander's troops had enjoyed when they

Territories, Armies, and Strategies

825

prevented a Persian landing near Miletus was quite unusual, because it simply required them to defend an area that was both well-defined and quite circumscribed —the isle of Lade and the port of Miletus (Arrian §§18.5; 19.2-3); the result was that the Persians were forced to seek water far away, at Samos (§19.7-10). But to extend this strategy to the entire Mediterranean front was a major gamble. It was impossible to control the entire area, at the cost of tying down thousands of garrison troops, because this would have con­ siderably weakened the army as it moved forward (cf. Quintus Curtius IV. 1.35). The conquest of Lycia, which was carried out, according to Arrian (1.24.3*), "to render the enemy's navy useless," did not impede Pharnabazus at all when he proceeded to meet up with Thymondas's ships in August 333 (II.2.1-2). Furthermore, when Alexander left Caria at the end of 334, he had not deprived the Persians of all of their mainland bases: Orontobates and Memnon still held two acropolises at Halicamassus (1.23.1-6); the Per­ sians also held the island of Cos, from which Memnon set sail some time later (Diodo­ rus XVII.27.5), as well as Samos (Arrian 1.19.8). Southern Caria constituted a first-class base for the Persians—especially after the Macedonian forces certainly suffered several defeats; the evidence for the defeats is that by September of the following year (333), Or­ ontobates was in control of "the citadel of Halicamassus,. . . Myndus, Caunus, Thera and Callipolis" (II.5.7;* cf. Quintus Curtius III.7.4). Thereafter, Alexander's strategy, at least in the short term, left the way entirely open to the Persian navy, which meant that, in the middle term, Persian naval superiority threatened to wipe out Alexander's control of the Asia Minor coast. Alexander quickly became cognizant of this danger because, even before the death of Memnon (July-August 333), he ordered a new war fleet to as­ semble: "He gave Amphoterus command of the fleet at the shore of the Hellespont and Hegelochus of the land-forces, in order that these officers might free Lesbos, Chios and Cos from the enemies' garrisons. . . . And the allies were ordered, as was provided by their treaty, to furnish ships to guard the Hellespont" (Quintus Curtius III. 1.19-20*). Meanwhile, Memnon had gone on the offensive and taken Chios, and the towns on Les­ bos also surrendered, except for Mytilene. It seems quite obvious that Darius and his advisers were kept up to date about the situation and that the appointment of Memnon to head the fleet and to defend the coast was intended to use him to the best possible advantage. Was Darius hoping that success would force Alexander to turn back? Or, was he beginning to build an army from this moment on? We know that around the end of the summer of 333 Darius departed from Babylon at the head of the royal army, accompanied by the entire court, "according to the traditional custom of the Persians" (Diodorus XVII.25.3). According to Diodorus, the decision to summon the royal army was made late, after a council that was held when the news of Memnon's death was received in the summer of 333 (§§30; 31.1; Quintus Curtius places it when Darius was in Syria: III.8.2-11). However, as they are re­ corded by Diodorus, the terms of the discussion provoke suspicion because the presen­ tation carries with it accusations against Darius that are identical to those brought previously against Artaxerxes III (XVI.40.5-6). Should we also be suspicious of the chro­ nology? It is difficult to decide. When we realize how long these general mobilizations took (as often stressed by Diodorus himself: cf. XV.41.2), it seems difficult to believe that the army of 333 could have been gathered, armed, and trained in only a few months. In another respect, the draft of troops was not universal, because, to use Quintus Curtius's phrase (III.2.9; cf. IV.9.1-2), the speed (festinatio) with which the assembly took place

826

Chapter 18. Darius and the Empire Confront Macedonian

Aggression

prevented the contingents from the Iranian Plateau and Centra) Asia from being sum­ moned. So two interpretations become available: (1) from this moment on, Darius be­ gan to levy his troops to prepare for any eventuality, or (2) he thought (or hoped) that leaders and troops in Asia Minor would be enough to deal with the problem. According to the second theory, Darius was behaving no differently from his predecessors: never, after Xerxes in 480-479, had the regions of Asia Minor seen a royal army. But if this be the case, we must also conclude that the Great King had not taken the measure of either the situation or his adversary's determination. To be able to make a judgment regarding Darius's state of mind, we would have to know the content of Memnon's mission. In the course of a report that Diodorus provides regarding a council that Darius held when he learned of the Rhodian's death, he states that, until the Great King received the news, he "had counted on Memnon's transfer­ ring the impact of the war from Asia into Europe" (§30.lo-). The same information ap­ pears in Arrian (II. 1.1). Diodorus adds that Memnon's initial successes encouraged many island cities to send delegations and even stirred up unrest as far as Euboea and Greece, whose leaders received bribes from the Rhodian ($29.3). Finally, according to Quintus Curtius (III. 1.19-20) and Arrian (III.2.3), Alexander, while at Gordion in the spring of 333, ordered a navy to be rebuilt precisely because of the dangers posed by the situation; he agreed to considerable expenditures for this purpose and sent money to those in Greece who were looking after the cities. There can be no doubt, in fact, that on the eve of the battle of Issus some Greeks believed that the balance of forces tipped in favor of the Great King (cf. Aeschines III. 164); in addition, Athens, Thebes, and Sparta had sent ambassadors to the Great King (Arrian II. 15.2-4; Quintus Curtius III. 13.5). However, that Memnon's campaign aroused such hope (in Greece) or fear (in Macedon) might simply have resulted from untrammeled rumor of the kind that Arrian passes on (II.2.4); whether the Rhodian actually carried out this strategy is a different question. In the spring of 333, Memnon reconquered Chios and then concentrated his forces on Lesbos: only Mytilene resisted, and it was during the siege of this town that Memnon died of an illness (July-August 333). This, in any case, is the skeletal narrative provided by Arrian (II. 1.1-2) and Diodorus (§29.2: with an error). Clearly, Memnon at this time had no intention of taking advantage of his crushing superiority by carrying the war into Europe; instead, he dedicated many weeks to completing the blockade of Mytilene. Memnon's activities lead us to believe that his goal in the short term was to retake the coastal cities and the islands, foiling Alexander's appraisals of the situation (Arrian 1.20.1) —thus explaining the Macedonian's reaction when he learned that his adversary was threatening not Europe but his prior conquests in Achaemenid territory. All in all, we can imagine that Memnon's military activities corresponded to the mission Darius gave him —a mission that is implicit in the geographical range of the expertise that brought Memnon the Great King's recognition in the first place, namely, the coast of Asia Minor. It is likely that the European designs attributed to Memnon came from a Greek tra­ dition that was originally concerned only with his and his family's memory (cf. Tod II no. 199) and that this tradition is best represented by Diodorus (chap. 17/3 above). Dio­ dorus even says (and this seems quite unlikely) that the Rhodian had proposed carrying the fight to Europe already in the war council at Zeleia (§18.2). Diodorus (§29.4) and Arrian (II. 1.3), in almost identical terms, present the death of the Rhodian as a major re-

Territories, Armies, and Strategies

827

lief to Alexander (Diodorus §31.3-4) and a full-scale disaster for Darius, so that he now had to take the leadership of the army himself (Diodorus $30; cf. also Quintus Curtius III.2.1). From this it is sometimes inferred that Darius at this time decided to abandon his maritime strategy in favor of a mainland strategy. However, none of these interpreta­ tions appears to be valid. First of all, Memnon's succession had already been dealt with: before he died, he had turned his responsibilities over to Autophradates and Pharnaba­ zus son of Artabazus, his nephew, anticipating that Darius would confirm these arrange­ ments (Arrian II. 1.3)—and Darius did so soon afterward, confirming Pharnabazus in his position (II.2.1). In addition, the death of Memnon did not interrupt the maritime offen­ sive at all, even though the dispatch of mercenaries to Darius probably weakened Phar­ nabazus's and Autophradates' capabilities. The operations that took place in the interim prior to the battle of Issus on the contrary demonstrate that Memnon's successors aban­ doned his strategic, somewhat dilatory caution and threw themselves more vigorously into the assault on Macedonian positions. Autophradates and Pharnabazus vigorously pursued the siege of Mytilene, which soon fell; the city became "allies of Darius on the basis of the peace of Antalcidas," a garrison was established, a friendly district was en­ trusted to one of the oligarchs who had been exiled by Alexander the previous year, and taxes were levied on the inhabitants (II. 1.4-5*). The terms of the treaty imposed on Chios (and shortly afterward on Tenedos: Arrian II.2.2) show that Darius was not in the least willing to accept the initial Macedonian conquests. On the contrary, the Great King tended to interpret the dictum imposed on the Greeks in 386 by his grandfather Artaxerxes II very broadly. The conquest of Tenedos was probably part of a much wider goal — to cut off the wheat supply coming from the Hellespont, a danger that Alexander had already prepared for even before the death of Memnon (cf. Quintus Curtius III.1.19-20). Nevertheless, it was only later that the Macedonian fleet became fully operational (cf. Arrian II.2.3), and this is clear from the fact that, even though Datames suffered a reverse of no great magnitude at Siphnos (II.2.4-5), it had no lasting conse­ quences, and the Achaemenid fleet retained its superiority. The most painful setback for tlie Persians took place in Caria. When he was in Cilicia (September 333), Alexander to his great relief learned about the victory that Ptolemy and Asandrus (the satrap of Caria) had won over Orontobates, who went on to lose his positions at Myndus, Callipolis, Cainius, Thera, Triopium, and Cos (II.5.7; Quintus Curtius III.7.4). This was certainly a setback of the first magnitude; nevertheless, either Halicarnassus remained in Persian hands or they recaptured it shortly afterward (cf. Arrian II. 13.6). To answer the question raised earlier, we can be sure that Darius, at least from this time onward—but surely already since the preceding year—was perfectly well aware of the danger presented by the Macedonian offensive. To counter it, he and his counselors had devised a strategy that was both maritime (reconquering the coasts of Asia Minor) and mainland (preparing an army that would take the offensive). Despite Diodorus's statement (XVII.30.7), Darius decided to take the leadership of the army and lead it "to­ ward the coast" not because he thought that the death of Memnon represented a deci­ sive blockage of his goals at sea; on the contrary, while Pharnabazus, Autophradates, and their lieutenants led the offensive by sea, he personally prepared to confront the Mace­ donian army. However, as everyone knows, a strategic plan, however well conceived it may appear (especially as reconstructed by the modern-day historian!), is only worth the means that are actually available to carry it out and any advantage that the plan may

828

Chapter 18. Darius and the Empire Confront Macedonian

Aggression

grant the creator of the plan vis-a-vis the enemy. From this perspective, the situation was ambiguous. First, it is clear that Alexander, who had just welcomed major reinforce­ ments at Gordion, was not dissuaded from pursuing his march to the south, and he re­ sumed doing so around June-July 333. At the same time, it must be stressed that the Macedonian still found himself in a precarious situation, caught, as it were, between a rock and a hard place: the Persian navy was still operating off the coast and the royal army was approaching from Cilicia. The fact that he summoned several garrisons that had been left in the rear (Quintus Curtius IV. 1.35) shows that in some respects he had his back to the wall. In the short term, the success of his plan to conquer the coasts as­ sumed that he would be able to take some Phoenician towns. Darius also understood this; the best proof of his eagerness (festinatio) to reach Cilicia is that he chose not to wait on the contingents from the Iranian Plateau and Central Asia (Quintus Curtius III.2.9). In order to compensate for their absence, the Great King in the summer of 333 ordered Pharnabazus to bring some of the mercenaries who were fighting on the Medi­ terranean front, despite the fact that this risked depleting a critical position, his Aegean rear (cf. Arrian II. 1.2; Quintus Curtius III.3.1). The presence of Sabaces, the satrap of Egypt, at Issus implies that he had brought a contingent with him, and this probably weakened Persian positions in the Nile Valley (Arrian III. 1.2; cf. Quintus Curtius IV1.28). As long as we do not conclude from the results of the battle of Issus that the fate of the Achaemenid Empire was already definitively sealed, we must recognize that the battle about to unfold in Cilicia would take on critical importance for Alexander.

From Issus to Gaugamela (November 333 - October 331) Alexander's victory at Issus made it possible for him to march on Phoenicia, and many Phoenician towns opened their gates to him: Aradus, Marathus, Sigon, Mariamme, then Byblus and Sidon (Arrian II. 13.7-8; 15.6-7; Quintus Curtius IV. 1.15-16). The Tyrians, however, offered him a pro forma rejection (Arrian 11.16.7-8). In response, Alexander basically concentrated on capturing Tyre, a success that validated his strategic plan, which was to take the coasts before conquering the interior (Arrian 11.17). The Macedonians did not even have to wait for the powerful Phoenician city to fall; the kings of Aradus and Byblus were ready to capitulate and "left Autophradates and his ships and joined Alexander with their own fleet, along with the Sidonian triremes; thus some eighty Phoenician sail came over to him. In the same days nine triremes came from R h o d e s , . . . three from Soli and Mallus and ten from Lycia." It was soon the turn of the kings of Cyprus, who commanded 120 ships; they also joined Alexander because "they were alarmed at the whole of Phoenicia being already in Alexander's power" (Ar­ rian 11.20.1-3;* early 332). The concomitant arrival of a Macedonian ship marked the return of Alexander's navy in force to Aegean waters, commanded by Amphoteric and Hegelochus (Quintus Curtius IV.5.14). The successive defections of these forces con­ firmed the success of the strategy that was initiated by the disbanding of the navy at Mi­ letus in the summer of 334. But meanwhile, the Persians had not been taking it easy. They launched a vigorous counterattack in Asia Minor. We have only meager information about this land offensive in Quintus Curtius and Diodorus (but not Arrian). We know that quite a few of Darius's regiments had left the battlefield safe and sound, still under his command—4000 men, according to Arrian (II. 13.1). Several mercenary units commanded by Amyntas (a

Territories, Armies, and Strategies

829

Macedonian exile), Thymondas, Aristomedes, and Bianor had managed to reach Tripo]is in Phoenicia, where they gained reinforcements. One of them, Amyntas, on his own iuthority then led a fruitless attack on Egypt (Arrian 11.13.2-3; Diodorus XV1I.48.2-5; Quintus Curtius IV. 1.27-33; cf. §7.1). Diodorus and Quintus Curtius include the ad­ ventures of these mercenary leaders in a more general discussion of Persian counteroffensives after the battle of Issus: His [Amyntas's] experience vvas paralleled by those of the other officers and troop leaders who escaped at the head of their military units from the battle at Issus and attempted to maintain the Persian cause. Some got to important cities and held them for Daieius, others raised tribes (ethne) and furnishing themselves with troops from them performed appropri­ ate duties in the time under review. (Diodorus XVII.48.5-60) Quintus Curtius returns to these events on several occasions: The generals of Darius who had survived the battle of Issus, and all the force that had fol­ lowed them in theirflight,with the addition of vigorous young soldiers of the Cappadocians and Paphlagonians (assumpta etiam Cappadocum et Paphlagonum juventute), were trying to recover Lydia. The governor of Lydia (Lydiae praeerat) was Anligoiius, one of Alexander's generals; he, although he had sent very many soldiers from his garrisons to the king, never­ theless scorned the barbarians and led his forces out to battle. There also the fortune of the contending parties was the same; in three battles fought in one region and another, the Per­ sians were routed. (Quintus Curtius IV. 1.34—35-0) Quintus Curtius (IV. 1.36) says that these last events happened at the same time (eodem tempore) that a fleet of the Macedonians, which had been summoned from Greece, defeated Aristomenes, who had been sent by Darius to recover the coast of the Hellespont, and captured or sank his ships. Then (deinde) Pharnabazus, commander of the Persian fleet, having ex­ acted money from the Milesians and put a garrison into the city of Chios, sailed with a hun­ dred ships to Andros and from there to Siphnos. These islands also he occupied with garrisons, besides fining them. (IV.1.36-370) Quintus Curtius comes back to this later, in the context of the celebration of the Isth­ mian Games (IV.5.11) — that is, June-July 332, after the fall of Tyre (during the siege of Gaza?). But the chronological connection is expressed quite loosely, as follows: But not only was Alexander himself proceeding to reduce the cities which still rejected the yoke of his rule, but his generals also, distinguished leaders, had invaded many places: Calas Paphlagonia, Antigonus Lycaonia; Balacrus, having vanquished Hydarnes, Darius' satrap, had recovered Miletus; Amphoterus and Hegelochus with a fleet of 160 ships had brought the islands between Acbaia and Asia under the sway of Alexander. (IV.5.13-14) From this gap-filled but consistent and perfectly credible information we must con­ clude that, after the battle of Issus, Persian generals took positions in Cappadocia and Paphlagonia and carried on conscription efforts there. With the armies thus raised they launched an initial offensive that Antigonus thwarted. Plis victories, however, did not settle the problem: the second Quintus Curtius quotation shows that the Persians con­ tinued to occupy Cilicia, Paphlagonia, Lycaonia, as well as the Aegean coast (Miletus). It was not before mid-332, at the earliest, that the Persian danger was definitively over­ come as a result of the Macedonian offensive that was carried out as much on land as by sea.

830

Chapter 18. Darius and the Empire Confront Macedonian

Aggression

In fact, Pharnabazus and Autophradates were able to pursue objectives in the Ae­ gean. Until the defection of the Cypriot, Phoenician, Lycian, and Cilician contingents at the beginning of 332 (Arrian 11.20.1), they had a nearly intact strike force. When Al­ exander appeared below their walls, at any rate, the Tyrians thought that "the Persians were still supreme at sea" (Arrian II. 18.2-0). This was also, according to Arrian, Alexan­ der's view (II. 17.2-3). They could also count on support from their mainland bases in Caria —Halicarnassus and Cos (Arrian II. 13.4) and probably Miletus as well (Quintus Curtius IV.5.13). In the autumn of 333 (before Issus), they had left Cos for Siphnus, where Agis of Sparta, who was planning to rebel against Antipater, had come to join them. They were in Siphnus when they received the stunning news of the defeat at Is­ sus, avid Agis was sent to Crete "to stabilize the situation." Pharnabazus reinforced the guard at Chios (some of whose inhabitants were considering a revolt), occupied Andros (Quintus Curtius IV. 1.37-40), and then rejoined Autophradates at Halicarnassus (Ar­ rian II. 13.4-6; Quintus Curtius IV.5.15-16). This is perhaps when Autophradates carried out an operation in the region of Ephesus (Polyaenus VII.27.2) and launched a raid on Samothrace (Plutarch, Mor. 339e; cf. Alex. 48.4). Despite the presence of the Mace­ donian navy, then, the Persian leaders after Issus continued to actively pursue their ob­ jectives, even though it is difficult to follow their trail in detail because the evidence is fragmentary. Thus, between the end of autumn 333 and the end of spring 332, combat continued unrelentingly on the mainland as well as along the coast and in the islands. In order to try to understand these conflicts on the various fronts, it is attractive to think that they all pursued the same strategy. According to this theory, the strategy could only have been de­ fined by Darius himself, but two observations appear to argue against this interpretation. First, Amyntas's attack on Egypt reflects his own purely personal motives (cf. Arrian II. 13.3), which Quintus Curtius thinks were based on his own interpretation of "finderskeepers" (IV. 1.27: velut certo jure possessum). Second, the content of the diplomatic of­ fers attributed to Darius after the battle of Issus seems to imply that he was deeply de­ pressed. But neither of these obervations actually would prevent alternative explanations. If Amyntas's designs on Egypt really were personal, it is very strange that when he reached Pelusium he presented himself as having been ordered to go there by Darius himself (Diodorus §48.3). Furthermore—precisely as Arrian implies (11.13.1-3)—the other leaders who accompanied Amyntas as far as Tripolis and Cyprus did not follow hiin to the Nile; in all probability, then, they were subsumed under Pharnabazus's command at Siphnos. Finally, we will return to Darius's diplomatic overtures later, because rather than being able to infer from them that the Great King was weak, we can only interpret them in the context of a preliminary elucidation of the royal strategy after Issus. Of course, there are several accounts of Darius's involvement on the Aegean front after Issus. After his retreat from Issus, the Great King returned to Babylon, where he im­ mediately began to assemble a new army, appealing particularly to contingents from the Iranian Plateau and Central Asia (Diodorus XVII.39.1-4; Quintus Curtius IV.6.1-2; 9.13). It seems utterly impossible that he was cut off from information about the progress of operations on the Aegean front, because he was fully aware that the fall of Tyre would obliterate all of his hopes of seeing Alexander turned back. We must therefore stress the reasoning that Diodorus attributes to the Tyrian leaders: "They wanted to gratify Da­ reius and keep unimpaired their loyalty to him, and thought also that they would receive

Territories, Armies, and Strategies

831

great gifts from the king in return for such a favour. They would draw Alexander into a otracted ] difficult siege and give Dareius time for his military preparations" (XVII.40.3*). It is also not impossible that the problems Alexander had to deal with in Syria (the I3eqa a Valley) during the siege of Tyre can also be attributed to Achaemenid fomentation. Alexander may have taken the risk of "dividing his forces" because he thought the danger was real (cf. Quintus Curtius IV.2.24; 3.1, 7). In addition, the fall of Damascus and the naming of a satrap of Syria shortly after the battle of Issus (Arrian II 13.7) certainly did not signify the total submission of the country, as the revolt of Sa­ maria made clear a short while later (332-331; Quintus Curtius IV8.9-11). We also know that when Amyntas arrived in Egypt his attack was repelled by Mazaces, who must have been named satrap of Egypt shortly after Issus to replace Sabaces, who was killed during the battle for Cilicia (cf. Arrian III. 1.2). Finally, we will stress Quintus Curtius's explanation of operations in the Hellespont at the beginning of 332: the Macedonian navy won a victory over Aristomenes, "who had been sent by Darius to recover the coast flIK

c

of the Hellespont (qui ad Hellesponti

oram reciperandam

a Dareo erat missus)"

(IV. 1.36*). The totality of the evidence thus leads us to conclude quite definitively that after his defeat Darius did not abandon the strategy he had formed in 334, whicb consisted of pushing hard to assemble a royal army and continuing offensives in Asia Minor in Alex­ ander's rear. He could correctly believe that Alexander's territorial control in Asia Minor was very superficial, especially in the regions (Paphlagonia and Cappadocia) where his own generals had raised their armies. Quintus Curtius names only one of these generals, Hydarnes. But we have long known of coins from Sinope that were struck with names that can be identified as Mithropastes, Orontobates, and Hydarnes (in Aramaic). Mithropastes may be the son of Arsites, the former satrap of Dascylium, of whom we know only that he was exiled by Darius to the head of the Persian Gulf at an unknown date and under unknown circumstances (Strabo XVI.5.5). This Orontobates may have been the satrap of Caria who disappears from the sources after the fighting in Caria. Hydar­ nes, finally, may be one of the sons of Mazaeus, the former satrap of Cilicia-Syria. What­ ever the case, we doubt that these generals took the offensive on their own initiative; it is far more likely that they were sent by Darius, who gave them letters authorizing the levying of troops and the use of any treasury funds that remained intact (without doubt in Cappadocia). According to a well-documented practice (cf. Ps.-Arist., Oecon. II.24a), the generals would strike coins to pay their troops in a coastal town, Sinope, which at that time still maintained its Persian alliance (Arrian III.24.4; Quintus Curtius VI.5.6). The goal entrusted to them clearly was to reestablish Achaemenid authority in Asia Mi­ nor, to cut Alexander's lines of communication, and to advance toward the coast (cf. Hy­ darnes to Miletus). This is probably why in Quintus Curtius's first discussion (IV. 1.35) only Antigonus is named; it was his responsibility as satrap of Greater Phrygia and ruler of the strategic town of Celaenae to defend the royal road. The task attributed to Antigo­ nus by Quintus Curtius (Lydiae praeerat), despite the terminological imprecision it im­ plies, may indicate that he was ordered by Alexander to coordinate the Macedonian defenses. It is also possible that royal orders reached the coast at the same time, as evidenced by Quintus Curtius's statement concerning the mission assigned to Aristomenes in the Hel­ lespont (IV. 1.36); furthermore, it was also on Darius's orders that Thymondas had come

832

Chapter 18. Darius and the Empire Confront Macedonian Aggression

to Pharnabazus at Siphnos and there turned over the mercenaries under his command This interpretation would provide an even better explanation of why, during his private adventure in Egypt, Amyntas could claim to have been assigned an official mission by the Great King: "He proclaimed that he had been sent by King Dareius as military com­ mander because the satrap of Egypt had been killed fighting at Issus in Cilicia" (Diodo­ rus XVII.48.3-v-). Amyntas thus would have been attempting to evict the satrap who had recently been named by Darius (that is, Mazaces; cf. Quintus Curtius IV. 1.28), even though he had probably simply been ordered by the king to take mercenaries to Egypt to reinforce the garrisons there. Diodorus also says ($48.2*0-) that Agis had "received from the Persian king ships and money," but Arrian does not mention a royal order and at­ tributes the initiative to Pharnabazus alone (II. 13.4-5). One of Pharnabazus's problems at this time was financial (cf. Quintus Curtius IV. 1.37: levies of taxes at Miletus, Andros, and Siphnus by Pharnabazus). It is probable that, unlike the generals who struck coins at Sinope, the Persian coastal commanders did not have access to treasury funds, which in that region were controlled and used by Alexander. But it must not necessarily be con­ cluded that communication between the Great King and Pharnabazus was cut off at that time, especially if we acknowledge, as seems obvious, that the Persian land and sea offensives were coordinated. The initial victories of Antigonus and then, several months later (in the first months of 332?), of Balacrus (satrap of Cilicia) and Calas (satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia) marked the fall of Persia in Anatolia. Nevertheless, Cappadocia and Armenia responded to the royal order to mobilize; in the months after Issus, both regularly sent their contin­ gents to the Great King, under the leadership of Ariaces (Cappadocia) and of Orontes and Mithraustes (Armenia) (Arrian III.8.5). At the same time, the Macedonian navy continued its offensive. Nonetheless, it was not before the end of 332 that the navy's ad­ miral, Hegelochus, was able to report to Alexander, who was then in Egypt: he and Am­ photeric had managed to take, successively, Tenedos, Chios (where Pharnabazus and Aristonicus, tyrant of Methymna, had been taken prisoner), Mytilene, and Cos (Arrian III.2.3-7; Quintus Curtius IV.5.14-22). Pharnabazus disappears (until 322) from the sources after his escape from Chios, and it thus appears that nothing remained of the Persian naval forces except perhaps some small residual groups of "pirate" ships. Only Agis continued the struggle in Europe, though without any direct connection with the Persian front. Meanwhile, Alexander captured Gaza, and then Egypt was surrendered by the satrap Mazaces, who did not have sufficent forces to resist (cf. Arrian III. 1.1-2). In 331, Alexan­ der was able to take the road to Tyre and Babylonia and to confront Darius, and along the way he bloodily quashed the rebellion in Samaria (Quintus Curtius IV.8.9-11).

Darius and Alexander. War and Peace (333-33IJ — Another Reading All of the ancient authors say that during the same period diplomatic negotiations be­ tween the two camps opened and that they were initiated by Darius. The number and date of the diplomatic missions and letters sent by the Great King vary from one to the next. Here is a summary of the information that the ancient authors report. (1) According to Arrian (II. 14.1-3-0*) and Quintus Curtius (IV. 1.7-14), the Great King sent a message to Alexander immediately after the battle of Issus, and the Macedonian would have received it when he was at Marathus (around November-December 333),

Territories, Armies, and Strategies

833

The Great King requested that the members of his family (mother, wife, children) imrisoned at Damascus (Arrian) be restored, for ransom (Quintus Curtius), and suggested a treaty of "friendship and an alliance." (2) A second mission arrived during the siege of Tyre (Arrian N.25.1-0-). Quintus Cur­ tius (IV.5.1) dates it after the fall of the town, though without certainty (isdemferme diebus). Once again the king offered ransom (10,000 talents) and a treaty of friendship and alliance, and for the first time he agreed to give up some territory, though the amount varies among the sources: "all the country west of the Euphrates to the Greek sea" (Ar­ rian Itin. Alex. §43); "the entire region lying between the Hellespont and the Halys River" (Quintus Curtius IV.5.1;-*- cf. Diodorus §39.1). Quintus Curtius and Arrian state that the Great King proposed sealing the treaty by a marriage between his daughter Stateira and Alexander, and Quintus Curtius adds the detail that the territory conceded (Lydia, the Ionians, Aeolis, the coast of the Hellespont," IV.5.7-0-) was to be the dowry (IV.5.1, ?)• Some of these proposed terms also appear in an anonymous author (FGrH 151 F3). (3) With the notable (but logical) exception of Arrian, all of the authors speak of a third diplomatic overture, which took place when Alexander had already crossed the Euphrates. In addition to ransom for his mother and daughters (his son also remained hostage in Alexander's hands, according to Quintus Curtius IV. 11.6) and a treaty of friendship and alliance, the Great King offered "all the country between the Hellespont and the Euphrates" and the hand of one of his daughters (Quintus Curtius IV. 11.5;-*Justin XI. 12.10; Diodorus §54.2). Quintus Curtius reiterates that this territory would be the princess's dowry (IV. 11.5). Diodorus adds: "Alexander would become Dareius's sonin-law and occupy the place of a son, while sharing in the rule of the whole empire"

(koinonon genesthai tes holes basileias; §54.2); (4) Plutarch, on the other hand, makes only one allusion to these negotiations, which he places at Tyre during Alexander's second stay (around June 331). He mentions the ransom (1,000 talents), "all the countries on this side the river Euphrates," a marriage, and amity and alliance (Alex. 29.7-*-). These data have long attracted the attention of historians, but they have not received an exhaustive treatment recently. While we can easily understand that Darius might have sent letters and ambassadors to Alexander, is the content, as recorded by the an­ cient authors, credible? Though the request that Alexander free captives does not present many problems, can we agree on the other hand that the Great King almost cer­ tainly would never have offered to give up part of his kingdom to Alexander, let alone that he would have offered to share his kingship with the victor of Issus (Diodorus)? Again, to put it more clearly: do the texts we have reflect, whether in whole or in part, the true nature of the relationship between the two kings at this time, or is it nothing but a piece of Macedonian propaganda? The first task, obviously, is to establish a relationship between the concessions offered by the king and the military and political situation, both as the modern historian might analyze it now and also as Darius would have envisaged it then (the latter is not an easy task). The offers attributed to Darius by the ancient authors in fact necessarily imply that he felt that he was in an inferior position; thus, giving up territory appeared to him to be the only option. The ancient authors present the king's concessions as graduated: (1) the request to return prisoners, (2) the abandonment of territory as far as the Halys, and

834

Chapter 18. Darius and the Empire Confront Macedonian

Aggression

(3) then the Euphrates. The progression actually seems logical: as Alexander ironically remarks, the Great King each time abandons only territories that he had already lost There is an identical gradation in the varying amounts of ransom offered. But does the internal logic followed by the ancient presentations actually match what Darius de­ cided? This is the crux of the problem. Like the Tynans (Arrian II. 16.7-0), we today rightly believe that after the battle of Issus "the issue of the w a r . . . was still obscure." As Diodorus explains (§39.1), Darius's deter­ mination was steadfast. He still had immense resources in both men and money; specif­ ically, he could count on the arrival of the contingents from the Iranian Plateau and Central Asia (cf. Quintus Curtius IV6.1-2; Diodorus §39.3). In 331, the contingents available to him came from every imperial territory under his control, from Cappadocia to the Indus (cf. Arrian III.8.3-6). Alexander's ongoing siege of Tyre immobilized him and allowed Darius to oversee the assembling of troops undisturbed. At the same time, as we have seen, Darius did not abandon his Aegean strategy. In addition, despite Alex­ ander's statements in his letter from Marathus (II. 14.7), there is nothing to indicate that the Great King had suffered significant defections among the high-ranking Persian aris­ tocrats (chap. 18/2 below). Between the end of 333 and spring-summer of 332 (the pre­ sumed date of the second embassy), the situation had partly reversed —to Alexander's advantage —primarily because of the defection of Phoenician and Cypriot units from Pharnabazus's navy and the renewed activity of the Macedonian navy. Meanwhile, the siege of Tyre dragged on; Quintus Curtius mentions twice that Alexander was even on the brink of despair and turning back (IV.3.11; IV.4.1). Despite some victories won by Antigonus, the Persian offensives in Alexander's rear were not yet totally neutralized (cf. the chronological alignments in Quintus Curtius IV.5.11-14). Beyond Tyre, Alexander knew that he would also have to conquer Gaza, which was commanded by Batis; he had made considerable preparations that would probably let him put up a lengthy resistance (cf. Arrian II.25.4), and Quintus Curtius (IV.6.7-0) hails him as "a man of exceptional loyalty to his king (eximiae in regem sui fidei)"; the use of this phrase implies that he had received instructions from Darius (cf. V.3.4). At Babylon, meanwhile, Darius actively pursued his military preparations; he even introduced technical innovations in the arming of his troops (Diodorus §53.1-3; Quin­ tus Curtius IV.9.3-4). He and his advisers carefully chose the field of battle, at a spot (near Arbela) on the great road (DAE 67 [AD 6]) that they knew Alexander would take due to logistical considerations (Arrian III.7.3; Quintus Curtius IV. 10.13). The royal army trained there every day (Diodorus §§53.4; 55.1). Supply logistics were meticu­ lously organized (Quintus Curtius IV9.8). In order to avoid the errors made at Issus (cf. Quintus Curtius IV13.6), the ground was leveled (IV9.10; Diodorus §53.4) to permit the cavalry and chariots to maneuver easily (Arrian III.8.7). According to Polyaenus (IV.3.17) and Quintus Curtius (IV3.36), iron caltrops (a device with four metal points) had been driven into the soil as a hazard to the maneuvers of the Macedonian cavalry. The Great King took other measures to impede Alexander's march. For instance, Ma­ zaeus had been ordered to guard the Euphrates, and he did such a good job that the Macedonian pontoon-builders were not able to finish their work before Alexander ar­ rived (cf. Arrian III.7.1-2). When he retreated, Mazaeus tried to apply a scorched-earth policy (Quintus Curtius IV.9.13; 10.10-13; Diodorus §55.1-2). Quintus Curtius repeats an unverifiable tradition and even adds that Darius tried to organize an assassination

Territories, Armies, and Strategies

835

]o\ against Alexander (IV. 10.16-17). In conclusion, we see nothing in the deeds and be­ havior of Darius that might illustrate that he had a sense of panic or despair. Though the repeated successes of Alexander were undeniably nothing but failures for Darius, after Issus he was still completely determined to confront the Macedonian army once more, and he did everything possible to prepare. It was Darius who determined the strategy at this time; Alexander had to adapt to the plans worked out by the Persian staff—not the other way round. Diodorus acknowledges this with the following appreciation: "He was not crushed in spirit in spite of the tremendous setback he had received" (§39. l o ) . In short, the Great King was not in the sort of desperate situation that might be expected from the breadth of territorial concessions attributed to him. The ancient authors clearly realized that they had a problem, because if the offers of territory (even "reduced," contra Arrian, to the Halys border) are dated to the time of the siege of Tyre, they were made at a time when Darius had already issued the general mo­ bilization order (hence the coordinated decision made by the Tyrians, following Diodo­ rus $40.3; cf. FGrH 151 F1.7: dia to speudein epi ton Dareion). The ancient authors, even though they generate their own contradictions, all sidestep the problem by stating that it was the breakdown of negotiations that forced the Great King to prepare an army, "despairing of peace, which he had believed that he could obtain through letters and en­ voys" (Quintus Curtius IV.6.1;* cf. Arrian II.25.3; Diodorus §55.1). The problem is that Arrian dates this attitude of Darius to spring-summer 332 (approximately), while Diodo­ rus dates it to summer-fall 331, at a time when the royal army had already been assem­ bled (Diodorus) or was well along in the process (Arrian). The offer of the Euphrates is literally incomprehensible: at this time, it was evident that Darius had in fact decided to fight, because, as even Quintus Curtius avers, he left Babylon for Arbela (IV 9.6) before sending the third embassy to Alexander (IV.l 1.1; cf. Diodorus 54.1-2). The ancient au­ thors offer two intepretations to explain the inexplicable. (1) Darius preferred to arrange a peace rather than confront Alexander. This is the picture that drives Alexander's responses, which are constructed on a consistent model. Thus, he refuses all of the territorial concessions, which would do no more than authen­ ticate the conquests that had already been achieved. He aspired to control the entire kingdom and to wield undivided power. He goads Darius to another battle that will de­ cide the contest. It is clear that this image is built on a very popular motif: Alexander never stops pursuing an enemy who slinks away in flight; and this motif was consistently driven home by the sources close to the Macedonian camp and spread wide in many de­ pictions. Quintus Curtius even claims that for a moment (end of 332 - beginning of 331?) the Great King considered leaving Babylon and seeking refuge in the Iranian Pla­ teau countries; he gave up this plan only because he understood that, because he faced so firm a foe, all flight was futile (IV.9.1-2). But whatever interpretation is put on the "flights" of Darius III at Issus and Gaugamela (chap. 6/4), the information on the Great King's military preparations offered by Quintus Curtius and Diodorus themselves (above) impugns the interpretations that they suggest. (2) The later overtures (for instance, the Euphrates as border) are explained by Da­ rius's passionate admiration for Alexander; after all, he had just learned from one of his eunuchs about the care with which Alexander had surrounded his wife Stateira, who bad just died (cf. Quintus Curtius IV. 10.18-33). Th is is presumed to explain the sense­ less speech given to the Great King: "O Gods of my fathers, . . . may no one, I pray, be

836

Chapter 18. Darius and the Empire Confront Macedonian

Aggression

king of Asia, rather than that enemy so just" (§10.34-*-), and the following: 'Accordingly (itaque) . . . overcome by his enemy's continence, Darius sent ten envoys" (§11.1 cf. Justin XI. 12.6-9: itaque). None of these laborious and/or rhetorical comments could convince anyone. Furthermore, it is clear that the speeches attributed to the Great King's ambassadors at this time are improbable reconstructions that bear no evidentiary value (cf. in particular Quintus Curtius IV.l 1.2-9). Whatever the (political or personal) importance Darius attached to the members of his family who were held in Alexander's camp, it is hard to believe that at the moment his army was actively training on the bat­ tlefield of Gaugamela he could imagine exchanging them for half of his territory. The offer is even more unbelievable because, under this "exchange theory," the Great King's prime concern would have to have been the fate of his son; indeed, according to Quin­ tus Curtius (IV11.6), Darius asked Alexander to return his mother and daughters but would be willing to let him keep the young boy hostage. This is all incredible—unless we assume that the Great King "had the virtues of a private citizen more than the at­ tributes of the leader of an empire" (G. Radet)! It is easy to find two of the favorite com­ ponents of Macedonian propaganda in the words and thoughts attributed to Darius by Quintus Curtius and Justin: the greatness of spirit and moderation of Alexander on the one hand, and on the other, the voluntary dismantling of the Empire by Darius, who with his dying breath charged his "chivalrous" conquerer to punish Bessus, the satrap who committed regicide (Diodorus §73.4; cf. Plutarch, Alex. 43.4; Justin XII. 11.5). In short, the ancient comments on the (imagined) personality of the Great King do nothing to clarify the political decisions attributed to him. Alexander's historians could provide no credible explanation for the strategy that they thought the Great King fol­ lowed. The reason is simple: Quintus Curtius and Diodorus in particular faced an in­ surmountable paradox: they were unable to reconcile two very different pictures of the Great King—a decisive commander-in-chief on the one hand and a completely pan­ icked head of state on the other. Only Arrian escapes the internal contradictions. His negative evaluation and judgment of Darius never varies and brooks not a single excep­ tion: the speeches he gives Alexander always contain canonical images of weak and ef­ feminate Persians, in contrast to tough Macedonians and glorious Greeks (II.7.3-7)—a practice that is reminiscent of the precedent of the Ten Thousand (II.7.8-9; cf. 1.12.3) and that certainly is dependent on his source, one of his favorite authors, Xenophon. Darius is presented as a pawn in the hands of his advisers (II.6.4); he has a defeatist men­ tality (§10.1); he is unwilling to part with any of the royal paraphernalia of opulence (fryphe), "even on campaign" (§11.10-0-). All of these judgments about Darius are repeated in his funeral oration —"No man showed less spirit or sense in warfare" (III.22.2-v-); and he was guilty of infamous cowardice at Gaugamela: "he himself was among the first to flee dishonourably at Arbela, and lost the greatest army of the whole barbarian race" (§22.4-0-). Arrian had already developed all of these themes in the (highly suspect) text of the letter he had Alexander send to Darius from Marathus (II. 14). The letter amounts to an organized attack on the legitimacy of Darius, composed according to the canons of dynastic propaganda. The Great King is contrasted with the powerful, victorious Alexan­ der (who, however, is compassionate toward the members of Darius's family) and is dis­ qualified on every count: he is not a legitimate king; he is abandoned by those close to him, who "voluntarily" turned to Alexander (Arrian II.14.7-0-); he not only was van­ quished on the battlefield but in his ignominious flight he abandoned the symbols of his

Territories, Armies, and Strategies

837

luthority (bow and arrows, mantle, chariot), with the result that thereafter their sym­ bolic power redounded to Alexander's glory (II. 11.6; 12.4-5; III. 15.6). In this context, the abandonment of territory would crown the entire picture, because Darius himself agreed to divide the Empire and even to grant Alexander an equal share of authority (Diodorus). All of this confirms that there were two contradictory views of the personality of Da­ rius III i' Antiquity. It seems obvious that the tradition of abandoning territory emerged from a stream of Macedonian propaganda that obligingly emphasized the Great King's weakness and cowardice. Arrian followed this stream unswervingly. Diodorus and Quin­ tus Curtius also adopted it, but they melded it with information from another, more "Persocentric" source. Because they inherited two traditions, their narratives are marked by many contradictions and awkward explanations. Moreover, we have already seen that Diodorus provides both versions of Darius's accession a few lines apart without realizing that they are mutually exclusive (§§5.3-6; 6-7.1-2). The only point on which the two agree is the notorious abandonment of territories, but it is probably accidental that Ar­ rian is the only nne who dates the offer of the Euphrates as a boundary to the siege of Tyre (11.25.1). Modern commentators almost unanimously reject Arrian's version and in so doing validate the other version, which describes the ceding of Trans-Halys Anatolia. But does this version really have better foundations? Is it more credible? This is indeed the problem. The choice of the Halys and the Euphrates as the borders offered by Darius is no gauge of Achaemenid authenticity. The Greeks had known since the time of Herodotus (1.74-v-) that the Halys was considered the border between the kingdoms of Media and Lydia, and the diplomatic agreement between the two had been sealed with a marriage between the son of Cyaxares and the daughter of Alyattes because "treaties seldom re­ main intact without powerful sanctions [family bonds]." Moreover, the territory thus "ceded" corresponds almost exactly to a theme, dear to Isocrates, by which conquest could be measured (Phil. 120: "Asia from Cilicia to Sinope"). The notion of the Euphra­ tes as a border seems at first sight to have been transferred from the administrative term Ebir Nari —that is, 'beyond the river', which is rendered in Greek as 'beyond the Eu­ phrates' (peran Euphratou) in Darius's letter to Gadatas ( M L 12). But the formulas used by Alexander's historians —"between the Euphrates and the Greek sea" (Arrian), "this side of the Euphrates" (Diodorus, Plutarch), "between the Hellespont and the Euphra­ tes" (Quintus Curtius), and "as far as the Euphrates" (Justin) —clearly represent an Aegeocentric view of the Achaemenid world, simultaneously betraying a Greek or Macedonian hand (just like the phrase "this side of the Halys"). Furthermore, in Greek representations of Achaemenid space, the Euphrates was traditionally perceived as a cul­ tural boundary beyond which deepest Asia, both mysterious and unsettling, com­ menced (cf. in particular Chariton of Aphrodisias, Chaereas and Callirhoe 5.1.3). There can be no doubt that these at least in part are the political-geographic assumptions that lie behind the construction of the (conventional) dialogue between Alexander and the elderly Parmenion, who here as elswhere appears in his (entirely conventional) role of "peasant from the Danube" (Arrian 11.25.2; Diodorus 54.4-5; Quintus Curtius IV. 11.11— 13). These observations lead us to take the probative value frequently accorded to the gradated nature of Darius's territorial concessions with considerable reservation. In reality, the theme of "gradated response" in the ancient authors typically relates to the 1

838

Chapter 18. Darius and the Empire Confront Macedonian

Aggression

category of contrived evidence; it essentially serves as a posteriori legitimation of the suc­ cessive phases of Alexander's conquests. To this end, the writers have deliberately taken over geographical-administrative terminology that would establish an apparent continu­ ity with existing Near Eastern formulas, but they have reinterpreted them from a Euro­ pean perspective on imperial space. If we attempt to see things from the Persian point of view, the preceding discussions invite us once more to reread the texts that, rather than portraying the thoughts of Da­ rius, reveal the afterthoughts of Alexander. We must especially stress that never in Achaemenid history had there been a precedent for relinquishing territory in this fash­ ion. To this observation one obviously might retort that no Great King had ever found himself in a similar situation in the past. The only parallel that might be suggested is when Artaxerxes II faced Cyrus the Younger. Of course, the two examples are not fully congruent, because this one concerns two royal sons—though on the military and stra­ tegic level, Artaxerxes l i s position in the summer of 401 was at least as serious as Darius's (although, unlike Darius III, Artaxerxes did not have the contingents from the Iranian Plateau and Central Asia). Nevertheless, there never was a question, even for a moment, that the Great King would abandon an ounce of his sovereignty, even in favor of a younger brother. Diodorus's gloss (XVII.54.2) on the sharing of power (koinonon genesthai tes hasileias) is highly suspicious; strangely enough, it recalls a promise of the same type that (also according to Diodorus; XI.71.4) Inarus supposedly made to the Athenians in the 460s (koinen autois parexesthai ten hasileian). Power-sharing and joint regency are in fact notions absolutely foreign to the Achaemenid concept of monarchy. The parallel sometimes suggested on the basis of the position that Diodorus (once again) attributes to Mentor after the Egyptian campaign (XVI.50.8) is built on sand: there never was a vice-regency at any time in the entire history of the Achaemenid dynasty. Does Quintus Curtius's insistence on the idea of "dowry," in connection with the supposed offer of Darius's daughter to Alexander, allow us to alleviate the difficulty? To put it another way, to what extent would ceding land as a dowry possibly limit Alexan­ der's future rights? To answer the question with any finality, we would have to under­ stand "matrimonial law" among the Persians with some precision, which is not really possible. But to formulate the dowry theory is also to acknowledge that the conditions for devolution of power would have been understood by Darius and his entourage. In other words, adopting Quintus Curtius's theory raises new difficulties: who would reign after Darius's death—his own son or Alexander? And when Alexander died, would not power depart from the Achaemenids forever: would not a son born to a Macedonian fa­ ther and an Iranian mother be considered a Macedonian, as is demonstrated by the Susa marriages? We do not really think that Darius could have been naive about this point. We are even more wary because the dissipation of a kingdom through dowry is one of the favorite motifs in monarchic literature that has a goal of justifying a conquest post eventum by claiming family rights. Let us simply recall the stories circulating in Persia and Egypt of a Persian-Egyptian marriage (cf. Herodotus III. 1-2) or the fiction that made the Persians the heirs of the Median kingdom through an engagement agreed to by "Cyaxares" in the presence of his future son-in-law "Cyrus": "With her I offer you all Media as a dowry, for I have no legitimate male issue" (Xenophon, Cyr. VIII.5.19-*-). This is a rather banal motif that probably goes back to Ctesias, because it is found wordfor-word in Nicolas of Damascus (FGrH 90 F66.8): Astyages gives his daughter in mar-

Territories, Armies, and Strategies

839

riage to Spitamenes with "Media for a dowry." For all of these reasons, the dowry theory raises great reservations. Nevertheless, it is not impossible that the Great King offered one of his daughters in marriage to Alexander. But on what basis and with what intent? First of all, we may note that in second-millennium Near Eastern interdynastic matrimonial practice, every dowry had a functional (and thus inseparable) association with the bride-price paid si­ multaneously by the future son-in-law. At the same time, it must be stressed that, in the Achaemenid context itself, to hold the position of king's son-in-law never conferred any special authority: instead, the position was a royal gift that obligated the recipient vis-a­ vis his royal father-in-law (and not vice versa; see chap. 8/1). Is this how Darius would have understood it? From Darius's point of view, this union would in fact have served as a bargaining chip ensuring a retreat by the Macedonian forces. The response that Alex­ ander seems to have made to this proposal (cf. Arrian II.25.3) implies that a marriage of this kind offered by Darius alone could in no way be considered equivalent to a sharing of power and/or territories. Alexander was both smarter and more ambitious than Pausa­ nias (cf Thucydides 1.128.7)! Furthermore, the tradition of the dowry is repeated by an anonymous author, though in a form slightly different from Quintus Curtius's: Darius wanted to obtain the freedom of some captives and sent (apparently immediately after the battle of Issus) an embassy to Alexander seeking peace: "He gave him {didous) all the territories this side of the Halys, and whichever one of his daughters Alexander would choose to marry, and 20,000 talents by way of dowry (emproikia)" (FGrH 151 F1.5). In this account, the dowry is formally distinct from the ransom and it consists solely of a gift of money. If, then, there is no doubt about the reality of diplomatic overtures, we nevertheless do not see how this would justify, from the Persian perspective, Darius's offers of terri­ tory—at least in the terms recorded by Alexander's historians (cession pure and simple, or as a dowry). Instead, we are led to conclude that the territorial concessions attributed to Darius between 333 and 331 were falsely promoted by Macedonian propagandists. Obviously, it is always difficult to reject a unanimous tradition on the basis that we con­ sider the tradition improbable—an idea that itself comes from the historian's personal interpretation or his own conviction. But the agreement of Alexander's ancient histori­ ans is not sufficient ground to support their theory. In fact, the agreement essentially results from an illusion, if we agree that they used the same source for this detail. Fur­ thermore, the agreement is no more than partial, because only Quintus Curtius and an anonymous author (FGrH 151 F1.5) provide the dowry clause, and they do so in differ­ ent terms. Finally and most importantly, textual and contextual analysis nearly inevita­ bly lead to this theory, because it is the only approach that actually takes into account the activities and decisions actually attested for Darius (in contrast to his assumed and reconstructed thoughts), the change in power relations, Achaemenid political traditions and concepts, and the internal contradictions found in the Hellenistic and Roman au­ thors. The interpretation is made even less desperate by the fact that one tradition has echoed it even in Antiquity. According to Diodorus (XVII.39.2o), in fact, when Alexan­ der gathered the council of his Friends, he "concealed the real letter. Forging another more in accord with his interests he introduced it to his advisers." The chronological un­ certainty of the passage does not lessen the force of the objection that it generates: the fabrication of forged letters (not to mention speeches!) was a practice well known in the

840

Chapter 18. Darius and the Empire Confront Macedonian

Aggression

time of Alexander and in the Hellenistic period. The improbability of the strategy and of the thoughts attributed to Darius reinforces the conviction that we are dealing with a Macedonian fraud —a conclusion that is no more difficult to accept than the impossibil­ ity of proposing truly credible alternative explanations.

The Consequences of Gaugamela

(331-230)

Despite his immense, intense military preparations, Darius was once again van­ quished on the battlefield at Gaugamela. This defeat had considerably more serious consequences than the defeat at Issus. When the Great King returned to Arbela, he and his advisers held a conference. According to the ancient authors, they faced a dramatic choice: either to return to Babylon, where Mazaeus and his contingents were soon com­ ing to seek refuge (cf. Quintus Curtius IV. 16.7), and there take advantage of the strength of the position to prepare Babylon defensively and thus block Alexander's advance-, or else to attempt to assemble a new army and thus prepare for a final confrontation. Be­ cause of the recent rout, both options presented major disadvantages: leaving open the Babylon road would in the end allow Alexander to seize the great capitals, their trea­ sures, and the rich plains of Babylonia and Susiana; but to fall back to Babylon would be equivalent to recognizing that the fall of the city—however long the siege might takewould signify the end of Achaemenid dominion and the conclusive defeat of Darius III, who would then fall into the hands of the conqueror. Darius chose, against the advice of some of his intimates, it appears (cf. Quintus Curtius V. 1.7), to fall back to Ecbatana, taking the road from Arbela across the mountains of Armenia (V. 1.9; Arrian III. 16.1; ADKTB no. -330). According to Arrian (III. 16.2), this option was based on two consid­ erations. First, Darius knew that Alexander would soon attack Babylon; the good road from Arbela to Babylon offered Alexander the supplies that his troops needed, which were not available on the route chosen by Darius; given these factors, the Great King was quite aware that his adversary was intent on capturing rich, prestigious towns such as Babylon. Second, Darius counted on rebuilding an army at Ecbatana, aided by a new mobilization that had been launched in the East Iranian satrapies (Diodorus §§64.1-2; 73.1), especially Bactria, which according to Quintus Curtius (V10.3-0-) "occupies a third of Asia, and the number of its men of military age equalled the armies which Da­ rius had lost." We know that, when Alexander arrived in Babylonia, Mazaeus did not really attempt to organize the town's resistance, even though it was well fortified, and he capitulated to Alexander; the satrap of Susiana soon followed his example. Quintus Curtius, describ­ ing the surrender of Susa to Alexander by the satrap Abulites, muses that he did this "whether by order of Darius, . . . or of his own volition" (V.2.8*). This is basically the problem faced by the modern historian as well. Diodorus, also commenting on Abulites, reveals varying traditions about his voluntary surrender to Alexander: Some haVe written that he did this in compliance with orders given by Dareius to his trusted officials. The king of Persia hoped by this policy, it is suggested, that Alexander would be kept busy with dazzling distractions and the acquisition of brilliant cities and huge treasures, while he, Darius, won time by his flight to prepare for a renewed warfare. (§65.5-*-) A little earlier, Quintus Curtius had offered his own interpretation, in the context of his discussion of the debate between Darius and his circle at Arbela after the retreat from Gaugamela. He says that, when he left the road to Babylon open, the Great Kings thinking was as follows:

'Territories, Armies, and Strategies

841

He himself h a d learned from e x p e r i e n c e that costly e q u i p m e n t a n d c o n c u b i n e s a n d trains of e u n u c h s were n o t h i n g else than b u r d e n s a n d h i n d r a n c e s . Alexander, dragging these s a m e clogs after h i m , w o u l d b e inferior in the resources by w h i c h he h a d formerly c o n q u e r e d .

This is obviously a personal gloss by Quintus Curtius (or his source) that regurgitates all of the cliches about tryphe, built on a litany of evocative terms: "costly," "concubines," "eunuchs." Quintus Curtius and the other ancient historians would soon use the same images to criticize the "orientalization" of Alexander. Moreover, coming as it does from a Latin historian's pen, the passage is very reminiscent of the description of Hannibal and "the delights of Capua" (cf. V. 1.36-38). It is also difficult to make sense of the thoughts attributed to Darius by Diodorus, because the best way to gain time would ob­ viously have been to order Mazaeus and Abulites to continue to resist as long as pos­ sible. Arrian also refers to the strategy of the Great King, who was then at Ecbatana: Darius had d e t e r m i n e d , if A l e x a n d e r were to r e m a i n at S u s a a n d B a b y l o n , to wait h i m s e l f where he was in M e d i a , in c a s e there were any new d e v e l o p m e n t s [neoterizein: disaffec­ tion?) on Alexander's side, but if Alexander were to inarch straight against h i m , he p r o p o s e d to go u p country to the P a i t h y a e a n s a n d H y r c a n i a , as far as B a c t r a , ravaging all the country and making further progress i m p o s s i b l e for Alexander. . . . H e stayed himself in E c b a t a n a with the force h e h a d c o l l e c t e d . . . . [Alexander] was informed o n the road that D a r i u s h a d decided to m e e t h i m in battle a n d fight it o u t a g a i n . . . . (III. 19.1-3*)

Arrian's passage raises several difficulties, because it is placed at a late time (May-June, 330) and confuses several stages of Darius's strategy (which is perhaps the source of the chronological inversion of Susa and Babylon). The thoughts that Arrian gives to Darius do not mean that he believed that Babylon and Susa would not resist; the word used (neoterizein) even makes it possible to believe that the Great King hoped that Alexander might still find himself in the grip of difficulties. These thoughts are only understand­ able if in the meanwhile the Great King's hopes had not been realized and he had learned of the fall of the capitals (by swift courier, the news could have reached him at Ecbatana in a day or two, via Persepolis and Gabae). This is probably the situation that lies behind the statements of Quintus Curtius and Diodorus: Darius hoped that for whatever reason (logistics, perhaps) Alexander would stay awhile in Babylon. It is only posf eventwn that Arrian (III. 16.2) is able to state that, according to the Great King him­ self, since early October 331, Babylon and Susa comprised the 'prize of the war' (tou polemou ton athhn)—a phrase from the world of sports that gives Darius the false im­ age of a competitor who recognizes, sportsmanlike, the victory of his opponent. On the contrary, as Arrian recognizes without attempting to evade the implications, it is clear that, throughout the winter of 331-330, the Great King did not abandon his initial plan, which was to raise an army and give battle: "Darius was preparing himself for battle rather than for flight" (Quintus Curtius V.8.2;* cf. Diodorus 73.1). Only later did he make the decision to withdraw toward the Upper Satrapies. We can now answer Quintus Curtius's question about Abulites' behavior: "whether by order of D a r i u s , . . . or of his own volition" (V.2.8*). Whether it concerns Babylon or Susa, the first possibility—that Abulites acted on orders from Darius—seems even less likely, because the Great King was quite aware that a new mobilization would take quite a few months. We must thus assume instead that, quite logically, Darius had sent orders to Mazaeus and Abulites instructing them to put up the strongest possible resistance to

842

Chapter }8. Darius and the Empire Confront Macedonian Aggression

Alexander. In fact, Darius must have written to all of the satraps while at Fcbatana. Ac­ cording to Diodorus (§64.2). Good relations between Alexander and the Babylonian leaders did not wane. Two episodes illustrate their relationship, both during the king's last years. Many ancient au­ thors relate that the Chaldeans wanted to dissuade Alexander from entering Babylon, arguing against it on the basis of bad omens taken from examining the stars and constel­ lations. According to an ancient tradition, Alexander did not give in to their pleas, be­ cause he suspected that they wished to keep for themselves the funds he wanted to dedicate to the reconstruction of the temples (Arrian VII. 17.1-4). This anecdote has sometimes been thought to reveal that bad relations prevailed between Alexander and the sanctuaries at this time. In truth, when the warning from the Chaldeans is situated in the longue duree of Babylonian tradition, it appears that the Chaldeans were simply behaving consistently in the role that they had played throughout Antiquity: the Chal­ deans, who were entrusted with observing the skies and drawing omens from them, sim-

The Local Elites, Darius, and Alexander

863

I wished "to report to the king the danger which threatened . . . that he must under no circumstances make his entry into the city;. . . but he must abandon his intended route d pass the city by" (Diodorus XVII.l 12.2-3o). Some time later, another incident made an unfortunate impression on the Greek ob­ servers, who then misinterpreted a Babylonian custom that they did not know existed. The ancient authors tell the same story in sometimes varying words. One day, a Babylo­ nian of uncertain status, who was condemned by common law, managed to approach the king's throne and seat himself upon it: He "put on the royal dress and bound his head with the diadem, then seated himself upon the chair and remained quiet" (Diodo­ rus §116.2—3-0). Arrian records the eunuchs' reaction as follows: a n

Owing to some Persian custom (nomos persikos) they did not drag him off the throne but rent their garments and beat themselves on their breasts and faces as if some terrible disaster had happened. (VII.24.34-) Once again, Arrian confirms that Alexander understood nothing about the matter. He suspected a plot and had the man questioned, but "he would only say that the idea had come to him to do so"; and Arrian adds, in the same vein, "This actually made the seers readier to interpret what had happened as portending no good for Alexander" (VII.24.3-0). According to Diodorus, conversely, Alexander then remembered the initial warning that the Chaldeans had given him, and he showered the advisers who had urged him to disregard it with reproaches, while he himself "was impressed anew with the skill of the Chaldaeans and their insight" (§116.4-0). For Diodorus, in both cases, it was a sign from the gods—a "portent about his kingship" (§116.5-0). Diodorus was well informed. Despite some (easily understandable) differences, the episode fits into a wellfed stream of Mesopotamian tradition—that of the substitute king. When omens re­ garding the life of the king were disturbing, a man of low birth was chosen, and he re­ ceived all of the outward appurtenances of power: the raiment, the scepter, a queen, and a court—though the real power was exercised by the king who, in principle, was se­ questered elsewhere. When the risk was believed to have passed, the substitute was put to death. We can thus reasonably imagine that this episode in 323 did not result from the spontaneous initiative of a poor wretch —as is implied in any case by Arrian's refer­ ence to a nomos persikos (actually, in this case, a venerable Babylonian tradition). The Chaldeans were more and more disturbed by the multiplication of omens and resorted to the substitute king ritual (with Alexander's consent) and thus cleansed the king of the threats accumulating around him. All of these episodes attest to Alexander's acceptance by the local elites at Babylon—the only condition being that he rule according to local tradition, as "King of the Lands," as the Great Kings always had. While the reality of the "Babylonization" of Alexander seems generally to be well es­ tablished, at the same time, other texts dissuade us from concluding that the reaction of the Babylonian elites harmonizes completely with the image of "liberator" that the an­ cient texts conventionally ascribe to Alexander. First, we may note that in a tablet dated to 329 Alexander is called "king of the Haneans," which highlights his foreign origin (ADRTB no. -328). However, another text is even more interesting—the famous Dynas­ tic Prophecy. Though the text is difficult, because the tablet is broken and fragmentary, this prophecy (obviously post eventum) devotes several lines to the reign of Darius III. The composers record the invasion of the Macedonians (here also referred to as Hane­ ans) and a defeat by Darius; they continue:

864

Chapter 18. Darius and the Empire Confront Macedonian Aggression

Afterwards, he {the king) will refit [his] army and ra[ise] his weapons; Enlil, Shamash, and [Marduk] will go at the side of his army [and] the overthrow of the army of the Hanaean he will [bring about]. He will carry off his extensive booty and [bring (it)] into his palace. The people who had [experienced] misfortune [will enjoy] well-being. The mood of the land [will be a happy one]. Tax exemption (zakutu). (BHLT, p. 35 [col. III. 1 2 - 2 3 ] ) There would be no point in comparing this text with the Alexander historians in an at­ tempt to determine which historical events are referred to. Recording of events per se is in fact not the purpose of this kind of literature, which simply sets out "good" and "bad" reigns alternately. However, it is quite notable that here Darius {the king), aided by the Babylonian gods, in the end is victorious over Alexander (the Hanean), and this tri­ umph is received with joy in Babylon, whose inhabitants then regain their prosperity. The person of Darius III has thus been reintroduced in the context of a traditional nar­ rative on good Babylonian kingship. The text shows that the attitudes of the elite were at least ameliorated with respect to new masters. One perfectly reasonable theory is that the text itself was composed at the beginning of the Hellenistic period in the context of the inauguration of Seleucus's rule in Babylo­ nia. Thus, we cannot conclude that it reflects the perspective of the Babylonians in 331; it is more likely that it expresses the change in relationship between Macedonians and Babylonians in the time of the wars that ravaged the country at the beginning of the age of the Diadochi. The text certainly does confirm that the Achaemenid period was not seen as particularly oppressive (at least in comparison with Macedonian dominion). It also stresses that the Babylonian leaders' submission to Alexander was linked to royal be­ havior that was in accord with the country's traditions—just as in Udjahorresnet's Egypt, Cambyses and Darius had to follow the precepts of "right kingship" ("as did every previ­ ous benevolent king"). This obligation is reflected in the Macedonian propaganda, which described Alexander's hydraulic constructions in Babylonia as worthy of "good rulers (hegemones agathoi)" (Strabo XVI. 1.10*-; cf. Arrian VII.21.6). In other words— and in conclusion —the defection of the leaders to Alexander did not occur because they were pressured by the enthusiasm of a population that craved liberation; the surren­ der was conditional, because it was based on negotiations that the Babylonians certainly came to with great caution. After all, the (subsequent) message of the Dynastic Prophecy was not particularly favorable to Alexander or, in general, to the Macedonian conquest, which the editors present as a (vain!) attempt to interrupt the happy course of the reign of the "good king," Darius.

4. The Death of a Great King (330)

Darius at Ecbatana Taking into account all of these elements —both military and political—makes it pos­ sible to evaluate Darius's situation at Ecbatana. When Alexander suddenly left Persepo­ lis in May 330, he had only a very small amount of information about the Great King's actual situation; he thought that Darius, since October of the previous year, had been completing his preparations for a battle that would have to determine the final outcome of the war. When Alexander arrived in Gabiene (Gabae/Isfahan), at the Median Gates, he received urgent news that was delivered by Bisthanes (son of Artaxerxes III), "who re­ ported that Darius had fled four days before, with his treasure from Media of seven thou-

The Death of a Great King (130)

865

sand Talents and with about three thousand cavalry and about six thousand infantry" (Arrian III. 19.5-0-). Quintus Curtius states that the news-bearer was a Babylonian, Bagistanes, who told Alexander that Darius "was in danger either of death or of fetters" (V13.3*>)' ^ ' Hkely that Quintus Curtius confused the two messengers. It was only later (when Alexander reached the Caspian Gates) that Bagistanes and Antibelus, one of the sons of Mazaeus, informed him that Darius had been thrown in irons by the chiliarch Nabarzanes, Bessus the satrap of Bactria, and Barsaentes the satrap of Arachosia (Arrian s

Ili.21.1). In October 331, Darius planned to gather a new army. He had with him some sol­ diers who had followed him on his retreat, and among them were several thousand Greek mercenaries —whose faithfulness the ancient authors like to exalt unreservedly— as well as the Bactrian cavalry, some Persians from the royal Kinsmen, and his guard of melophoroi — that is, those who had surrounded him during the battle (Arrian III. 16.1; cf. 11.5). The Great King expected to draft soldiers in the regions near Ecbatana, par­ ticularly from the Cadusians and Saka, who in fact did send him contingents (Arrian III. 19.3). Nevertheless, he was primarily counting on troops levied in eastern Iran (cf. Diodorus XVII.73.1). Quintus Curtius calculates his army at 30,000 infantry (including 4000 Greeks), 4000 slingers and archers, and more than 3300 horsemen, "mostly Bac­ trian" (V.8.3-4*); Diodorus speaks of 30,000 men, "Persians and Greek mercenaries" ($73.1*); Arrian counts 3000 horsemen and 6000 infantry (III.19.5). It is always difficult to compare the numbers. Meanwhile, when Darius learned that Alexander had arrived by forced march, Darius decided to set out for the Upper Satrapies. The change in the balance of power led some contingents —Saka and Cadusians—to abandon the royal army (III. 19.4). Then, when Alexander resumed his pursuit of Darius from Ecbatana, "many of those who shared his flight deserted him during its course, and went off to their homes, and a good number had surrendered to Alexander" (III. 19.4; 20.2*). The military collapse primarily reveals the continued weakening of the Great King's political position. Quintus Curtius, in an account that is very favorable to Darius, writes that Darius's prestige continued to be solid: "In those nations the majesty of their kings is extraordinary; in response to his mere name the barbarians assemble, and veneration for his former fortune attends him even in adversity" (V.I0.2*); or this: "the reply of all the Persians was about the same, that it was impious for the king to be deserted" (V.9.16*). These are fine phrases, but they account for only a part of the situation and, as a result, distort it. Quintus Curtius himself also explains that Darius's decision to abandon Babylonia after Gaugamela had not been greeted enthusiastically by all who were close to him (V. 1.7-9). Nonetheless, Darius's royal authority remained strong enough among the satraps, generals, and subject peoples that he was still able to issue a new order to mobilize and could urge the satrapal leaders to remain faithful to him (Diodorus $64.2). But internal opposition did not miraculously vanish. Though we are unable to date the conspiracy precisely, we may reasonably suggest that the successive capitulation of Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis, without a fight, dealt a direct blow to the King's authority, because these surrenders signified the failure of the strategy adopted after Gaugamela. The failure was military, but also and especially political, as first Ma­ zaeus, then Abulites, Tiridates, and several others went over to Alexander. It is also likely that the torching of the palaces at Persepolis contributed even more to unsettling what had once been certain. Finally, the Persians of Ecbatana had certainly discovered by

866

Chapter IS. Darius and the Empire Confront Macedonian

Aggression

now that Alexander had warmly welcomed officials who had transferred into his service and he had entrusted high posts to them. Despite their attachment to the glorious mem­ ory of the Achaemenids, they must have thought that Alexander looked more and more like a credible alternative. This thought was reinforced even further after the conspiracy against the Great King.

The Conspiracy against the Great King The sources are unanimous in naming Bessus as the one at the heart of the treachery that, already long in preparation, broke out during the retreat to the Upper Satrapies. At this time, Darius was already the hostage of the satrap of Bactria, who had absolute per­ sonal control over his contingent of horsemen (Quintus Curtius V. 10.5, 12; 12.6). Against them, Darius basically could count on the loyalty of Artabazus, "the oldest of his friends" (V9.1-0), who attempted to organize his defense (cf. V 9 . 1 3 ) , aided by the Per­ sian contingent (§9.16) and Greek mercenaries (who feared Alexander's vengeance). Henceforth, there were two camps and two armies face to face. As Alexander's progress became known, the treachery was soon in the open: the conspirators put Darius under arrest. It appears that initially the primary objective of the conspirators was to deliver Da­ rius to Alexander, in the hope of obtaining large rewards (Quintus Curtius V.5.2; 12.1; cf. Arrian III.21.5 and 30.4). But they had so few illusions about the Macedonian's re­ sponse that they were preparing "to kill Darius, and make for Bactra with the forces of their nations" (V.10.6-O); they were counting on the reserves of men in Bactria . . . and "they expected to regain the power of the empire, should they succeed in getting posses­ sion of the province" (V. 10.4o). Arrian is probably closer to the truth when he presents the plan of Bessus and his companions as follows: their intent was to "preserve their poweT in common" (III.21.5o-), by which it must be understood, on the one hand, that any idea of counterattack was ruled out, and on the other, that operations would be di­ rected jointly by Bessus, Barsaentes, and Nabarzanes (cf. III.30.4). Nevertheless, Bessus's position was already preeminent. According to Arrian, he "had been recognized as commander by the Bactrian cavalry and the other barbarians who had fled with Darius, except by Artabazus and his sons and the Greek mercenaries.... Bessus was in command for the moment because of his relationship to Darius and because the act was done in his satrapy" (§21.4-5). These are the circumstances under which some of the Persians in Darius's entourage decided to change their allegiance to Alexander (§21.1). The agreement among the conspirators scarcely lasted. Nabarzanes and Bar­ saentes assassinated the Great King. They then fled with several hundred horsemen (§21.10). Barsaentes returned to his satrapy, thinking that he would be able to organize resistance to benefit himself; Nabarzanes soon came, accompanied by "other very highly placed Persian officers of Darius," to surrender to Alexander (§23.4-0). The third conspir­ ator, Bessus, for his part, reached Bactra with his troop of Bactrians and turncoat Persians; he had himself proclaimed Great King under the name Artaxerxes (§25.3; Diodorus §74.2; Quintus Curtius VI.6.13). Despite this royal claim by the satrap of Bactra, the as­ sassination of Darius marked once and for all the end of the dynasty and the Empire.

5. The Fall of an

Empire

Once the historian has recognized that the "decadence" explanation must be perma­ nently discarded, he finds himself at a loss when he is required to throw the light of day

The Fall of an Empire

867

onto the causes and origins of an event as spectacular as the fall of an Empire. The mas­ sive symbolic weight of this phrase certainly describes a responsibility that belongs to the historian —but this fact does not make the task any less intimidating.

The Cornelwood Lance It is necessary to observe that the Empire fell primarily because the royal and satrapal armies were conquered on the battlefields of the Granicus, Issus, and Gaugamela. The Great King found himself unable to parry militarily—or, more precisely, none of the imagined parries fulfilled all of the hopes he placed in them. Indeed, in 334, Darius had held naval superiority, and his armies and financial resources gave him a considerable strike force. At this same time, neither the energy nor the stability of the Great King, nor his strategic and military abilities, nor the connection of the officials to the dynasty could reasonably be challenged. In order to explain these defeats, we might invoke an entire series of more or less valid military causes. Arrian gives the following explanation for the victory at the Granicus: "Alexander's men were getting the best of it, not only through their strength and experience but because they were fighting with cornelwood [dog­ wood] lances against short javelins" (1.15.5*). This is why, according to Diodorus, dur­ ing the preparation of his army at Babylon in 332-331, Darius "had fashioned swords and lances much longer than his earlier types because it was thought that Alexander had had a great advantage in this respect in the battle in Cilicia" (§53.1*). However, even metaphorically, the historian is reluctant to reduce the Persian defeat to the superiority of the Macedonian cornelwood lance. This purely technical explanation is notoriously frustrating, even when we take into account the superior maneuverability of the Mace­ donian army and the clear vision, not to say genius, of its leader. We may add—and this is surely more important—that the Empire was not prepared for the military and strategic challenge posed by Alexander. Agesilaus's incursions had al­ ready proved that the imperial space was relatively permeable. In any case, the military cautiousness and the political impediments imposed on him after Sparta had prevented him from stirring up the ethnes as a whole and shattering the dynastic loyalty of the Asia Minor Persians. Thus, because of these restrictions, as we have seen, Agesilaus's attempt was doomed to failure (see chap. 15/5). However, as soon as an adversary had decided to wage total war against the Achaemenid armies and garrisons and had gained a firm foot­ hold in Asia Minor, it was extremely difficult to dislodge him; now he was the one who was able to take advantage of the organization of Achaemenid strategic space around strongholds, treasuries, and storehouses—places where the Great King's enemy could find ample supplies of money and materiel that had originally been created for the de­ fense of the imperial territories (see chap. 9/2). Only a Persian victory in the open field of battle could have ended the Macedonian offensive. So we have come around to the starting-point: once all of these details have been gathered into a coherent argument (or, at least a credible one), they allow us to understand how the Great King and his satraps lost the battles. But the fundamental question remains: Why did Darius lose the war?

Persian Royal Power and Multicultural

Empire

We must stress the absolutely novel character of the Macedonian offensive. For the first lime in its history, the Empire found itself confronting an adversary who was re­ solved to pursue total war to the end—that is, a war of conquest. Furthermore, the ad­ versary also understood that a victory in pitched battle was not enough to dethrone so

868

Chapter J 8. Darius and the Empire Confront Macedonian Aggression

powerful a Great King, and he knew that war also proceeds by means other than arms After each victory, Alexander, who had a connoisseur's appreciation of the Empire would try all means passible to achieve political success, taking advantage of the struc­ tural weaknesses of the Achaemenid imperial structure. This is demonstrated by the at­ titude of the local elites—as long as it is not misinterpreted. Contrary to the repeated affirmations of Macedonian propaganda, the leaders of the subject peoples were not longing for a liberator. Not one of the countries of the Empire —not even Babylonia or Egypt—was imbued with an acute national awareness that drove them irresistibly to­ ward independence. In fact, in each of these countries (and others), the population re­ mained committed to its own norms and continued to cultivate the memory of its own glorious past. It is true that we should at this point note several distinctions. The case of Egypt, which over two generations returned to the course of pharaonic history, cannot be equated with the case of Babylonia, where the royal residences symbolized that Per­ sian authority was taking root, or with the case of Susiana, which was linked closely by a long common history to the Persian high country (which itself was partly Elamized). In any case, the leaders of these great centers were not so naive as to believe that the Mace­ donian conquest signified a return to a Babylonia or an Egypt as it was before the con­ quest by Cyrus the Great. The choice was simply between one overlord and another, Finally, in the course of more than two centuries of subjection/cooperation, these peoples had woven often close relationships with the Persians and had themselves prof­ ited from the imperial system. In brief, the fall of the Empire was not due to general dis­ content on the part of the subject populations and their elites. The weakness of the Empire at the point of the Macedonian invasion was perfectly wedded to the force that had held it together throughout the period from Cyrus to Da­ rius III. The Persians had never attempted to attack the recognized traditions of their subjects: the multiethnic Empire remained multicultural, as is shown, for example, by its extraordinary linguistic diversity (e.g., Diodorus $53.4). Even if the political unity and the mixing of peoples in the Empire yielded remarkable intercultural achievements, it still is the case that, fundamentally, a Greek felt that he was a Greek and spoke Greek, an Egyptian felt that he was Egyptian and spoke Egyptian, and so on —for the Babylo­ nians and every other people, including the Persians, who never attempted to spread their language or impose their religion. On the contrary, throughout their history, the Great King and the Persians demonstrated their desire for them to maintain their own ethnocultural traditions. The unity of the Empire was thus accomplished by means of the uncontested, but personal, supremacy of the Great King. Thus, Alexander relent­ lessly attempted to capture Darius himself after each battle, and the Great King cer­ tainly made every effort to escape his enemy (as was his duly) —both goals perfectly illustrate the fragility of the system (which was quite evident, at any rate, from the Mace­ donian side); Thus, while there actually was an ideology of the King that continued to function perfectly at the center, an ideology of the Empire did not really exist, even though royal images were spread by means of seals and coins and by popular storytellers who narrated the court histories from land to land, echoes of which are found in Aelian's Historical Miscellany, as well as in Esther, Judith, and the Tale ofAhiqar. In other words, there was no Achaemenid identity that might have induced the peoples, in all of their diversity, to rise up and defend some common norms. In other kinds of state—nation-states, for in-

The Fall of an Empire

869

stance—a defeat in pitched battle did not signify the end of the community; the com­ munity might even organize a war of resistance in the adversary's rear. However, this strategy presupposes conditions that were foreign to the Achaemenid State. On the con­ trary the political-ideological structures that organized and governed the territories and populations by definition abandoned the destiny of the Empire to the fate of arms, and this would quickly convince the country's elites to turn to the conqueror and transfer their allegiance to him. As soon as the royal military was conquered, local leaders found themselves with a simple choice (which their ancestors had known since the conquests of Cyrus): to negotiate with the victor a way to maintain their dominant position within their own society. Negotiation was feasible for the victor because he acknowledged the ideological attributes of the community's identity—namely, the potency of the sanctuar­ ies and the perpetuation of traditional worship. These were concessions that Alexander was not only entirely prepared to grant but that he himself solicited.

The Dynastic Pact and Its Limits Moreover, Alexander developed the same strategy toward the Persians. In its very structure, the Empire was organized around the supremacy of the Great King—who in Persia was king. Around him revolved all of the activities of the representatives of the ar­ istocracy, who were provided with commands and economic advantages of all sorts. They were what we have called the dominant socioethnic class, united around the dy­ nasty and values of the Persian community. Generally, the system continued to function satisfactorily throughout the Achaemenid Empire; analysis of the high-ranking person­ nel of Darius III shows that managing the Empire remained mostly a family matter. De­ spite occasional crises, the dynastic problem did not deeply or permanently alter the loyalty of the Persian aristocracy to the Great King. The known satrapal revolts were lo­ calized and never had a goal of imposing a king who was not of royal stock. The attitude of the Persian population (reconstructed on the basis of the policy followed by Alexan­ der in the country) attests that Persia was always the heart of royal and imperial power. Finally, in every manifestation of his power, Darius III clearly had prestige and authority as great as that of his predecessors. However, the shock of the conquest also demonstrates the fragility of this structure, whose erectors had obviously never given thought to a challenge of such magnitude and scope. Indeed, during the first years of Alexander's campaign, there was no generalized desertion; on the contrary, the example of Mithrenes of Sardis remains an exceptional, basically inexplicable case. However, it also serves to reveal an attitude that many aristo­ crats were to adopt after defeat, especially after Gaugamela. Though the Persians consti­ tuted a highly homogeneous ethnocultural community, they were not formed into a nation. Their loyalty to the Great King was based on personal relationships, which could be transferred to another person who was endowed with the prestige of victory. As the military defeats accumulated, men like Mazaeus and Abulites, following Mithrenes, were anxious to conserve their prestigious positions and their economic privileges. In­ deed, in his approach to them, Alexander had long understood (even before his landing) that the political defeat of the Achaemenid Empire would emerge from the reproduc­ tion of gift-for-service relations that had always cemented the close alliance between the Great King and the Persian aristocracy—according to practices quite similar to those known in the Macedon of Philip and Alexander (cf. Arrian 1.5.4 and Plutarch, Eum.

870

Chapter 18. Darius and the Empire Confront Macedonian

Aggression

8.12). Alexander was able to create the conditions for a balance between his own ambi­ tion and the nobility's desire not to perish in the turmoil. Even though a circle of aristo­ crats remained faithful to the Great King until the end, their attitude does not contradict this general tendency. Alexander's success is not measured simply in the number of de­ fections; more importantly, he was able to attract to himself men who, like Mazaeus and Abulites, held key posts at decisive moments and could thus tip the balance of power one way or the other. Furthermore, the way in which the loyalty of a man like Artabazus was expressed— "the oldest of his Friends"—can support two readings. He certainly seems to have re­ solved not to abandon his king, and there is no question that he upheld this resolve. But the reasons that Alexander gave for granting him an eminent position in his administra­ tion are also very interesting: "He kept Artabazus and his sons by him in an honourable position, as they were among the most eminent Persians (en tois protois Person) and es­ pecially because of their loyalty to Darius" (kai tes es Dareion pisteos heneka; Arrian III.23.7*). Of course, Arrian is speaking from Alexander's point of view. But who could seriously imagine that, in the period between the death nf Darius and the change in al­ legiance of Artabazus and his children, the Persian aristocrat did not enter into discus­ sions with Alexander's camp? In one way or another, Artabazus was able to negotiate with Alexander for the loyalty that he had once demonstrated toward Darius. Because of his battlefield victories, Alexander had managed to persuade the Persians little by little to transfer their allegiance to him in exchange for concessions that are easy to imagine: land, power, and prestige (cf. Plutarch, Alex. 34.1). Moreover, the Persians had the same perspective as the elites of the conquered countries: in the process of transferring their allegiance, they did not wish to alter the nature of the relationships that traditionally had connected them to the sovereign. Thus, the "orientalization" of the Macedonian king and his court was the necessary compensation for his Iranian policy.

Mazaeus Once Again Above and beyond the uncertainties that remain, the examples of Mazaeus and Abu­ lites stimulate further reflection. The available evidence in fact strongly suggests that a man like Mazaeus, though inarguably of Persian origin, was also intimately immersed in Babylonian society; the names of some of his sons are irrefutable proof. There is no doubt that the same holds true for Abulites at Susa. Both are probably representatives of a human and political type: Persians who had woven close contacts with the elites of the countries they were sent to govern (though in the second case, perhaps, we have a "Persianized" Babylonian —hence the name of Abulites' son, Oxathres). With respect to the ideal type of an ethnically and culturally homogeneous sociocthnic class, these examples might seem to be examples of the failure of Persian authority. But, as always, historical reality is contradictory. The maintenance of imperial dominion was also accomplished by personal connections and by non-Persians' access to command positions (of which the Babylonian Belsunu is the prime example). These men—who, based on all of the evidence, were always considered Persians and considered themselves Persians in the po­ litical sense of the word —were at the same time a sign of the success of the imperial en­ terprise. In their position as cultural mediators, they symbolized and accelerated the creation of a new governing elite, and this elite's origin and composition paradoxically favored the permanence of Persian dominion. In this respect, too, the overwhelming

The Fall of an Empire

871

hallenge of the Macedonian conquest drove the contradictions to surface. If we assume cthat we have correctly understood the situation in Babylon in 331 following the defeat at Gaugamela, we may also imagine that the combined defections of Mazaeus and the Babylonian elites were coordinated, involving negotiations and discussions between the satrap and his friends and relatives in Babylonian society. At the very least, we can imag­ ine this hypothesis.

Bessus in Bactria Finally, let us return to the paramount case of Bessus. Unfortunately, his background is unknown to us, apart from the fact that he was related by blood to Darius and that Da­ rius had made him satrap of Bactria, one of the richest and most powerful regions of the Empire (cf Arrian III.21.5). His proclamation of himself as king obviously did not have much effect on his authority. On the other hand, it is interesting to note how he ac­ quired his hegemony in the conspiracy: he had been acclaimed leader by his Bactrian contingents ($21.4) who, throughout the last weeks of Darius, had constituted a shadow army. Bessus intended to turn Bactria into a redoubt, with himself as the master. Accord­ ing to Diodorus ( j / 4 . l o ) , "being known to everyone because of his administration, [he] now called upon the population to defend their freedom." We must not see this as set­ ting in motion a "war of nationalism" that would ultimately give way to a permanent "Bactrian independence." In his books on the history of the Diadochi, Diodorus fre­ quently uses the same sort of phrase: when Seleucus wanted to set foot in Babylonia, "most of the inhabitants came to meet him, and declaring themselves on his side, prom­ ised to aid him as he saw fit" (XIX.91. 1*). Peucestes, who was named satrap of Persia by Alexander, is described in the same way: despite the opposition of the other Mace­ donian leaders, he had learned Persian and adopted all of the Persian customs, with the result that he "had gained great favour with the inhabitants" (XiX.14.5-v>)— so much so that Antigonus was irritated to see "that Peucestes was enjoying great favour among the Persians." When Antigonus had decided to deprive him of his satrapy, "Thespius, one of their leading men (henos de ton epiphanestaton), even said frankly that the Persians would not obey anyone else" (XIX.48.5-*-). We can easily list other examples from the age of the Diadochi that illustrate the ambition of some Macedonian leaders who wanted to create personal power on the basis of support from a country and a people with which they had woven relationships of confidence and intercultural cooperation. Diodorus's phrase suggests that this was Bessus's ambition in Bactria. In this respect, after the Great King had died, Bessus served as something akin to a prefiguring of the Diadochi after Alexander's death. This shift was perhaps present in embryo in people such as Mazaeus who were closely linked to the governing elites of their satrapies. Nevertheless, in 334, the problem did not really arise; it is enough to consider the ex­ ample of Artabazus and his family to realize that no matter how close connections with the local populations might be, they did not diminish in the least the Persian and impe­ rial loyalty of the king's men. The dominant socioetlmic class, insofar as we know its composition under Darius III, remained united around its king and Persian power. Only the challenge posed by the totality of the Macedonian conquest led these people, one by one, to join the camp of the victor.

Conclusion

From Nabonidus to Seleucus Within the framework of ancient Near Eastern history, the Achaemenid phase takes on special significance. For the first time, countries that were hitherto divided among hostile rival kingdoms were gathered into a single, unified state, from the Indus to the Aegean Sea. Over the longue duree, this is the fundamental contribution of the con­ quests of Cyrus and Cambyses. The successive capturing of Ecbatana, Sardis, Bactra, Babylon, and Memphis marked the incorporation of kingdoms into the wider frame­ work of an empire. Whatever may have sometimes been claimed, this creation was not simply a facade. The prior kingdoms, as such, disappeared. For various reasons, the Great Kings simply acknowledged that at Babylon and Memphis they were putting on the older garb of Nabonidus and Psammetichus. Nevertheless, at the same time (or after a very short delay at Babylon), Babylonia and Egypt were transformed into satrapies gov­ erned by a satrap who held his position and made his decrees on the basis of direct orders from the Great King. The same was true at Sardis and Bactra (whatever state organiza­ tion might have existed previously); so it was at Ecbatana, with the difference that, at least under the first kings, Media and the Medes continued to have a special place in the Empire. No ancient heritage—whether of Babylonia, Egypt, Media, or Elam —had been denied; each had, on the contrary, been integrated into the dynamic force of a new state construct, as is shown specifically by our analysis of Achaemenid court art; it was not a simple juxtaposition of preexisting Near Eastern elements but a genuinely new elaboration in which the stylistic and iconographic diversity, far from delivering a blow to the unity of the whole, managed to reinforce it into an integrated exaltation of the un­ limited power of the Great King. In the same way, we can easily discover many elements within the royal ideology to which we can find parallels in the Assyro-Babylonian and Elamite kingdoms (warrior king, gardener-king, king of justice). However, they were in­ corporated into a new ideology for which, at its heart, the specifically Iranian and Per­ sian elements constituted a driving force. Recall in particular the central role accorded to the great god Ahura-Mazda and, later, Anahita and Mithra. We can make the same observations regarding Darius's tribute organization: it was grafted both onto realities al­ ready observable in earlier times and onto the initial tinkerings carried out by Darius's predecessors; however, by the organizational power that it presupposes and that was its impulse, his system went well beyond simple borrowing of accounting practices. The in­ verse thesis, which reduces the Achaemenid structure to borrowings from preceding kingdoms, is based, it seems to me, on a historical and methodological error. So I have already written about Alexander, some years ago. I hope the reader will excuse me for quoting myself: "The danger of isolating components or structures that were supposed to have been borrowed by Alexander is in fact great. . . . We cannot historically isolate one structure from an overall system of ideological representations, and a system is more than the sum of its parts" (RTF 359). What is true for Alexander with respect to 873

874

From Nabonidus to Seleucus

Achaemenid ideology also is true for Cyrus, Cambyses, and their successors with regard to the organizational structures of the kingdoms they would literally engulf in the sanie way that white blood cells engulf bacteria. The Empire was in fact a new single-celled organism that grew by absorbing scattered, hostile cells that then cooperated within a new cellular dynamic. In order to ensure the continuance of their power and rule, the Creat Kings were first and foremost supported by the Persian aristocracy. Within the aristocracy, each family entity had privileged access to positions of power that were endowed with a genuine ca­ pacity for initiative — under the direction of the Great King. I have frequently (including in this book) referred to this group as the dominant socioethnic class, which was con­ nected to the king through unequal relationships that were based on gift-and-service ex­ changes. Throughout Achaemenid history (including during the time of Darius III), the system continued to operate, because it was based on interests common to the dynasty and the aristocracy (the "dynastic pact"). At the same time, the Great Kings did not deny local elites access to the sphere of power. On the contrary, they received positions in the imperial hierarchy, sometimes at a high level. In parallel with the Great Kings' treat­ ment of local personnel, the central authority also recognized local forms of organiza­ tion, whether dynastic powers or sanctuaries or religion. The only limit on recognition of local traditions was the adherence of the imperial elites to the means and goals of the Persian authority, for which they served as local representatives and indispensable con­ tact points. Nevertheless, the Great King did not hesitate to take drastic measures against communities tempted by revolt (drauga), which since the time of Darius I had been identified with calling into question a Great King, who was the representative and earthly defender of the values of Truth-Justice (arta) that were exalted by Ahura-Mazda. To repeat a banal cliche, the Empire was characterized by both unity and diversity. This can be seen especially in its cultural manifestations, which are so well exemplified by the large number of languages and religions. This is why it is so difficult to analyze the Achaemenid imperial evolution as a whole: we end up alternately stressing the Em­ pire's integrative power and its centrifugal tendencies. For reasons already discussed, these two aspects are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Across the long course of Achaemenid history, the creation of a Persian imperial diaspora in the provinces accel­ erated the processes of acculturation, even when the processes were not limited to the Persians and the elites of the subject populations. Marriages and many kinds of personal contact (cf. Artabazus of Greater Phrygia) led to closer and closer relationships, which can be illustrated, for example, by the rise to command positions of non-Persians (Bel­ sunu), of men who emerged from two cultures (Abulites), or of those who still partici­ pated in two cultures (Mazaeus, Orontobates). This development does not seem to have threatened the unity of the Empire. On the contrary, it tended to create a dominant im­ perial class that was not limited to its Persian component; at the same time, whatever their ethnic origins had been, the leaders always considered themselves Persian in the political sense —Persians, that is, who were linked to the Great King by the same un­ equal gift-and-service relationship and by common political and material interests. Even young people born to a mixed marriage could gain full Persian status (cf. Data­ mes) through a privilege granted by the king (cf. Herodotus VI.41), following a proce­ dure similar to that by which a Seleucid king granted the honor of a Greek name to a man of Babylonian origin (YOS 1.52). I am tempted to think that this development ex-

From Nabonidus to Seleucus

875

)|ains the state of equilibrium that vvas the Empire's when Alexander conquered it. By using the phrase "state of equilibrium," I obviously do not intend to project an image of peaceful, unbroken cooperation (cf. the revolts) but I intend instead to express what was a political desire of the center (in the long term) to overcome the conflicts that could not be avoided within an imperial dynamic that vvas founded on both the Persians' su­ premacy and their cooperation with the local ruling classes. The Macedonian victory, then, provides no basis for any inference about a "crisis" of the Achaemenid Empire in 334 and even less basis for any claim about its "decadence" throughout the fourth cen­ tury. Put more simply, the genesis and nature of the Macedonian conquest prevented it from metamorphizing into a Nation-State that would have been able to consolidate it­ self through ideological norms that were common to all the peoples of the Empire in all their diversity. Situated within the Achaemenid longue duree, Alexander's conquest takes on two conflicting characteristics. On the one hand, the short period initiated by the arrival of the Macedonian was the prolongation of that longue duree. from the geopolitical point of view; this observation further devastates the theory of "Achaemenid decadence." The Macedonian in fact took over, for his own benefit, the principles and organization of an empire whose structures were totally alien to the Balkan world. One piece of evidence — the Oeconomica of Pseudo-Aristotle —which we are inclined to think was compiled in the last quarter of the fourth century in Asia Minor—demonstrates that, for the Greeks, the royal and satrapal economies represented a form of tribute organization that no Greek State had ever managed to get off the ground; the only exception was the Athe­ nian arkbe of the fifth century that itself borrowed much from the Achaemenid model. This is the context in which we must, to a great extent, seek the origins of the Mace­ donian conquest. As has often been noted, Philip II had already borrowed from the Achaemenid world, but in his time, these were nothing more than scattered borrowings that were not reintegrated into an overall dynamic. This dynamic was forced upon them by the conquest of the Achaemenid territory and the destruction-absorption of the impe­ rial organization of the Great Kings. Whatever may have been the intentions of the King of Macedon when he launched the initial offensive against the royal territories in 337336, his son pursued to completion a goal of unprecedented breadth that was based on the complete usurpation of the territorial and ideological forms of organization of Dar­ ius Ill's Empire, as well as the cooperation of the former ruling class. However, by posing as the heir of Darius, Alexander at the same time caused insur­ mountable conflicts to erupt. First, some of the Macedonian nobility were hostile to the idea of accepting Iranians as totally equal partners. Despite all his efforts—symbolized by the grandiose Iranian-Macedonian marriages at Susa—Alexander never really suc­ ceeded in creating a new ruling class that vvas as homogeneous and stable as the socio­ ethnic class that ruled the Empire of Darius III and his predecessors. The defection of local elites vvas not due in any respect to a deep disaffection with Persian power but was simply a function of the Great King's military defeat; it had also been conditioned by Hie deep and lasting acceptance of local norms by the new masters. Alexander's long absence in India had already shown that satraps (Macedonian or Iranian), thinking that the king's quest had failed, were quick to violate the agreements Alexander had made with the local elites. When Alexander died, none of the problems were resolved.

876

From Nahonidus to Seleucus

Furthermore, we should consider the dramatic inability of the Macedonian authority to organize any dynastic succession —thus demonstrating an extraordinary structural weak­ ness, in contrast to the remarkable Achaemenid capacity for renewal even in times of the most intense dynastic crises. We know what happened to the Empire's unity, which was more and more torn apart by the rival Diadochi under cover of defending the sover­ eign prerogatives of the two putative successors to Alexander. It took just a few years for the geopolitical situation to revert to one that, even taking into account intervening his­ torical changes, was reminiscent of that which prevailed in the Near East before Cyrusthe Empire was shattered into several rival kingdoms. The Macedonian enterprise which in the short term was a continuation of Achaemenid imperial history, would soon dig the grave of the political unity the Great Kings had been able to establish and safe­ guard through the preceding two and a half centuries. From the point of view of Neat Eastern imperial geopolitics, Alexander was indeed "the last of the Achaemenids." At the same time, the invention of the great Hellenistic kingdoms was carried out in partial continuity with Achaemenid practice. We know that Peucestes, who was ap­ pointed satrap of Persia by Alexander, ingeniously attempted, despite the objections of other Macedonians, to adopt the social practices of the Persians over whom he was sa­ trap in order to create a commonality of culture and destiny with the aristocracy of the country. Even though Persia did not recover its former independence at this time, it rep­ resents a sketch of the developments observed in other Near Eastern Hellenistic coun­ tries. Alongside other evidence (such as that of Diodorus), the Dynastic Prophecy suggests that Seleucus, with the assistance of his Iranian wife Apame, was able to win over the cooperation of the ruling elite in Babylonia; the latter were growing more and more frustrated by the destruction throughout the country that was a result of the con­ tinual wars of Eumenes and Antigonus. It was as a "King of the Lands"—not as a foreign conqueror—that Seleucus was recognized in Babylonia; he took up for his own benefit the political and ideological strategy that the Great Kings had faithfully followed. However remarkable it may have been, the Seleucid enterprise was on a far smaller scale than that of the Achaemenid Empire—and it found itself in a context where all at once traditional hostilities with Egypt reappeared and centrifugal tendencies increased, set loose by the deaths of Darius III and then Alexander. This is what we see, for exam­ ple, in Cappadocia and Armenia: here, where the Achaemenids defaulted sooner than elsewhere, their satraps were quick to establish dynasties with close connections (that they loved to stress) to the Achaemenid family. In a Greek-Armenian inscription from Agaca Kale, men who may have been direct descendants of the Ariaces who led the Cappadocian contingents at Gaugamela were quite ready to adorn themselves with the nos­ talgic title "legitimate satraps."

Research Notes Prologue

The Persians before the Empire • General bibliography.

B r i a n t 1984a has b e e n repeated here only to a rather small d e g r e e

and in a largely reworked a n d m o d i f i e d form to take into a c c o u n t m o r e recent specialized articles, particularly M i r o s c h e d j i 1985 a n d 1990a.

1. Why

Cyrus?

• Discontinuous Documentation

and the Longue Duree.

"Scandal of history" of the disap­

pearance of the Assyrian E m p i r e - see the d i s c u s s i o n by G a r e l l i (Garelli a n d Nikiprowetzky

1974:

125-28 and 2 3 9 - 4 2 ) , and the s u m m a r y of the topic in a m o r e closely a r g u e d form in Z a w a d s k i 1988a: 14-22; a n d the interpretive suggestions of N a ' a m a n 1991. T h e p r o b l e m of the b e g i n n i n g s of Persian history is very well stated by H a r m a t t a 1971 (even if stressing M e d i a n influence exclu­ sively is debatable; see below); s e e also the reflections of D e l a u n a y 1985: 7 1 - 8 1 , on the reasons why Aramaic scribes were u s e d d u r i n g the t i m e of C y r u s .

• Persian History and Greek Representations.

S e e Briant 1989a; on Median-Persian relations,

see also SS6-7, p p . 2 1 - 2 7 .

2. The Founder

Legends

Version of C t e s i a s in N i c o l a u s of D a m a s c u s : F C r H 90 F66, version of D i n o n in A t h e n a e u s XIV.633d-e; C y r u s l e g e n d a n d S a i g o n l e g e n d : D r e w s 1984 a n d B . L . L e w i s 1980; on the t h e m e of the a b a n d o n e d child, cf. also W i d e n g r e n 1966 a n d B i n d e r 1964: 1 7 - 2 8 ; on royal l e g e n d s in Ira­ nian literature, in particular in Firdawsi, see C h r i s t e n s e n 1936 (who finds similar traits in the leg­ ends reported by H e r o d o t u s a n d C t e s i a s ) , D a v i d s o n

1985, D u l e b a

remembrance of C y r u s a m o n g the Persians: X e n o p h o n , Cyr.

1987, Krasnowolska 1987;

1.2.1; H e r o d o t u s III.160; S t r a b o

XV.3.18; and A t h e n a e u s X V . 6 3 3 d - e : cf. c h a p . 8/3 on the e d u c a t i o n of y o u n g Persian aristocrats.

3. The Kings of Ansan Inscriptions of A r i a r a m n e s a n d Arsames: cf. s u m m a r y of the topic in L e c o q 1974a: 4 8 - 5 2 , who concludes that "the inauthenticity [of these texts] has not b e e n proved" (cf. also H e r r c n s c h m i d t 1979a); the discussion is directly c o n n e c t e d to the interpretation given to Darius's dynastic c l a i m s , which arc extremely s u s p e c t (on the g e n e a l o g y recorded by D a r i u s , see the keen reflections of Miroschedji 1985; 2 8 0 - 8 3 ) : w e return to these p r o b l e m s at greater length in chapters 2/10 a n d 3/1; seal of Kuras of Ansan: H a l l o c k 1977: 127, M i r o s c h e d j i 1985; 2 8 5 - 8 7 , B o l l w e g 1988; a n d m o s t re­ cently Garrison 1992: 3 - 7 (and n. 22).

4. Ansan and Susa Arrival of the Iranians in the Z a g r o s : cf. s u m m a r y of the topic and bibliography in B r i a n t 1984a: 79-83; add S u m n e r 1994, who prefers a higher d a t i n g ( m i d d l e of the s e c o n d m i l l e n n i u m ) ; on relations between the l o w l a n d s a n d the h i g h l a n d s , see Vallat 1980; C a r t e r a n d S t o l p e r 1984: 32ff.; Miroschedji 1990a; Tall-i M a l y a n tablets: Stolper 1984b; site of M a l y a n : S u m n e r 1988; co­ existence of several E l a m i t e "kings" at the b e g i n n i n g of the seventh century: cf. Stolper 1986;

877

Research Notes: Prologue

878

"royal cities": M i r o s c h e d j i 1986 a n d 1990a: 6 5 - 6 9 ; battles of E l a m i t e kings against the AssyriansC a r t e r a n d Stotper 1984: 4 4 - 5 5 , as well as G e i a r d i 1987 a n d a brief presentation in F r a m e 19922 5 5 - 5 6 ; a s s u m i n g the title "king of Ansan": M i r o s c h e d j i 1985: 2 9 6 - 9 9 ; c h r o n o l o g y a n d succession of the first kings: without d e n y i n g that they are just hypotheses, 1 follow on this point the interpre­ tations of M i r o s c h e d j i 1985: 2 8 0 - 2 8 5 (who refuses to r e c o g n i z e C y r u s in the Assurbanipal inscrip­ tion p u b l i s h e d by W e i d n e r chronology: cf. B o l l w e g

1930), b u t there r e m a i n uncertainties and d i s c u s s i o n on absolute

1988: 56 ( g e n e a l o g i c a l tree; explicitly d e n y i n g the reconstruction of

M i r o s c h e d j i ) ; the d i s c r e p a n c i e s explain why C y r u s the G r e a t is s o m e t i m e s n u m b e r e d II, some­ times III ( j u s t as his father is s o m e t i m e s d e s i g n a t e d C a m b y s e s I, s o m e t i m e s C a m b y s e s II), depend­ ing on the w e i g h t given to H e r o d o t u s V I I . 11

5. Persian

Society

before

the Conquests:

• Herodotus and Persian Society.

Herodotus

and

Archaeology

T e x t of H e r o d o t u s : B i i a n t 1984a: 1 0 5 - 1 0 , 1990a: 77-84-

tribal organization: see also the reports of X e n o p h o n (twelve tribes!) (Cyr. 1.2.5) a n d S t r a b o XV.3.1 cf. Von G a l l 1972; Iranian terms: D a n d a m a e v 1989a: 13; note that the term

"zantu does

:

not occur

in the O l d Persian texts; a c c o r d i n g to D a n d a m a e v a n d Livshits 1988: 459, it a p p e a r s several times in the E l a m i t e tablets from Persepolis as a c o n s t i t u e n t e l e m e n t in personal n a m e s , but seecoiifra S c h m i t t 1990b; G r e e k ( a n d M e s o p o t a m i a n ) view of the o p p o s i t i o n n o m a d s / f a r m e r s : Briant 1976 a n d 1982b: 9 - 5 6 ;

kara

in O P e r s . c a n d e s i g n a t e the a r m y as well as the p e o p l e ( w h e n c e the prob­

l e m s p o s e d by D B j[ 14: s e e below, c h a p . 2/10); the title

karanos a p p e a r s in

X e n o p h o n to describe

a military h e a d with exceptional powers: H a e b l e r 1982, Petit 1983, S e k u n d a 1988: 74; military prestige of the king: Briant 1984a: 1 1 4 - 1 7 .

• The Findings of Archaeology.

A b s e n c e of sedentary p o p u l a t i o n s : S u m n e r 1972: 264-65,

1986: 4 - 7 (without e n t h u s i a s m : "unsatisfactory . . . a s s u m p t i o n . . . hypothetical

explanation");

c o n c l u s i o n s repeated and strengthened by M i r o s c h e d j i 1985: 2 8 8 - 9 4 ("radical sedentary depopu­ lation"); s e e also M i r o s c h e d j i 1990a; agricultural activities in Persian m o n t h n a m e s : cf. the analy­ sis of H i n z 1973: 6 4 - 7 0 ; m a i n t e n a n c e of pastoral p o p u l a t i o n s in A c h a e m e n i d Fars: S u m n e r 1986: 3 0 - 3 1 ; cf. Briant 1976. O n the very i n c o m p l e t e c h a r a c t e r of explorations in Fars: cf. the remarks of M i r o s c h e d j i 1990a: 5 4 - 5 5 ; E l a m i t e influences: B i i a n t 1984a: 9 2 - 9 5 , M i r o s c h e d j i 1982 and 1985: 2 9 6 - 3 0 5 , C a l m e y e r 1988b (dress), B o l l w e g 1988 a n d G a r r i s o n 1992 (seals); archaeological results in K h u z i s t a n : C a r t e r 1994; t o m b of Arjan: Vallat 1984, A l i z a d e h 1985 (criticism by Vallat,

Ablran

10 [ 1 9 8 7 ] , no. 217); cf. also M i r o s c h e d j i 1990a: 55 a n d the article by M a j i z a d e h 1992 (pub­

lication of a bowl with s c e n e s of h u n t i n g , tribute-bearers, a n d b a n q u e t s : the author stresses Phoe­ nician a n d Assyrian influences); a c c o r d i n g to D u c h e n e ( 1 9 8 6 ) , A r j a n is to be identified with H u h n u r , halfway b e t w e e n the future site of Persepolis a n d S u s a , by p r o p o s i n g a relationship with the p l a c e - n a m e H u n a i r k n o w n from the Fortification tablets (cf. K o c h 1990: 1 9 8 - 2 0 0 ) . T h e Susa tablets were p u b l i s h e d in 1907; their dating was a n d is uncertain: H i n z ( 1 9 8 7 ) defends a high date (before 6 8 0 ) ; 6 0 0 - 5 4 0 is s u g g e s t e d by F. Vallat (1984: 11, n. 26); see a l s o M i r o s c h e d j i 1982 and 1990a: 79, a n d Steve 1986, from w h o m I take the term " N e o - E l a m i t e IIIB (ca 6 0 5 - 5 3 9 ) " (pp. 2021); quotation: G h i r s h m a n 1976b: 160; Iranian m e t a l l u r g i c a l tradition: M o o r e y 1984; on the term

irmatam, cf.

below, c h a p . 11/5, 11/9; Persians a n d I r a n i a n s in B a b y l o n : Z a d o k 1977: 6 6 - 6 7 ; Baby­

l o n i a n p o p u l a t i o n s in K h u z i s t a n : Stolper 1986; i m p o r t a n c e of intercultural contacts before Cyrus: cf. Briant 1984a.

6. Ansan, Ecbatana,

Babylon,

and

Susa

• The Consequences of the Fall of the Assyrian Empire.

O n the events that led to the demise

of Assyria, see (besides G o o s s e n s 1952 a n d G a r e l l i 1974: 1 2 5 - 2 8 , 2 3 9 - 4 2 ) the recent analyses by Zawadski 1988a a n d N a ' a m a n 1992. It will i m m e d i a t e l y b e s e e n that the interpretations continue to differ on very i m p o r t a n t points: b u t it w o u l d not b e a p p r o p r i a t e to review the d e b a t e here, in the c o u r s e of a d i s c u s s i o n devoted specifically to the kings of Ansan. It will h a v e to suffice to put in a

The Persians before the Empire

879

nutshell sonic facts a n d analyses that, even indirectly, m i g h t c o n t r i b u t e to the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the Near Eastern world u p o n the arrival o f C y r u s II; downfall o f the Assyrian capitals: s e e G o o s s e n s

1952: 9 0 - 9 3 ; K u y p e r 1981; S c u r l o c k 1990b; D a l l e y 1990, 1993; K u h r t 1995 { n o w b r i n g i n g

into the discussion the tablets from Tall S e t H a m a d [valley o f the K h a b u r ] ) , which prove that t h e political e n d o f imperial power did not m e a n the instant annihilation o f t h e l a n g u a g e or m o r e g e n ­ erally of Assyrian culture: cf. the articles collected in S A A B 7/2 [1993]); on the role o f the M e d e s ifter 610, see B a l t z e r 1973 ( a n d J o a n n e s 1995b, with t h e s u b s e q u e n t remarks of G a s c h e 1995 on the n a m e and dating o f the " M e d i a n Wall"); Astyages/Alyatres treat)' o f 585: the L a b y n e t u s of H e ­ rodotus c a n n o t b e N a b o n i d u s ( 5 5 6 - 5 3 9 ) (to w h o m h e gives the s a m e n a m e ) : cf. d i s c u s s i o n in Beaulieu 1989a: 8 0 - 8 2 ; the M e d e s a n d C e n t r a l Asia: Briant 1984b: 3 5 - 4 2 , reconstruction o f a n Elamite k i n g d o m c e n t e r e d on S u s a : M i r o s c h e d j i 1982, Vallat 1984, S t e v e 1986; the notion of the submission of S u s a to E c b a t a n a is d e f e n d e d by Z a w a d s k i 1988a: 1 3 8 - 4 3 (cf. also L u k o n i n 1989: 61 according to w h o m Astyages i m p o s e d his d o m i n a t i o n over E l a m in 585); b u t the e v i d e n c e is contradictory: s o m e take the o p p o s i t e view, that there a r e a n u m b e r o f links b e t w e e n S u s a a n d Babylon ( L u k o n i n 1989: 5 8 - 5 9 ; W i s e m a n 1956: 36; a n d C a r t e r - S t o l p e r 1984: 54); in any event, it is quite possible that E l a m was itself n o t unified, with various p r i n c e s , w h o were n o t necessarily strictly under the control o f S u s a , c o n t r o l l i n g local territory; B a b y l o n i a n c o n q u e s t s in the west: Wiseman 1956; n a m e of t h e last E l a m i t e king ( U m m a n i s ) : M i r o s c h e d j i ' s hypothesis 1982: 6 2 - 6 3 . • Austin on the World Stage.

C l a s s i c a l texts o n the fall of the Assyrian E m p i r e , in the final

analysis, all that c a n b e a g r e e d to are a few c o n t e m p o r a r y notes (cf. S c u r l o c k 1990b); we m a y a d d that the version o f A m y n t a s is already found in part in X e n o p h o n (Anab. I I I . 4 . 8 - 1 3 ) , w h o identifies the ruins he viewed in Assyria with t h e cities c a p t u r e d by C y r u s from the M e d e s ; on the "Arabs" of M e s o p o t a m i a , cf. Briant 1982b: 1 2 0 - 2 2 a n d D o n n e r 1986.

• Median Dominion.

T h e hypothesis that the Dream of Nabonidus (cited below, c h a p . 1/1,

p. 881) identifies C y r u s as ardu ('slave') of Astyages (so D a n d a m a e v 1984b. 8 2 - 8 6 ) derives from a faulty reading: cf. Baltzer 1973; tribute u n d e r M e d i a n d o m i n a t i o n : cf. Justin 1.7.2 (very g e n e r a l ) ; on Herodotus's M e d i a n dynastic chronology, s e e m o s t recently S c u r l o c k 1990a. • Dynastic Marriages?

Identification o f Aryenis, d a u g h t e r o f Alyattes: H e r o d o t u s 1.74 a n d es­

pecially a scholion to Plato (Pedley 1972: no. 96); note also that o n e o f the d a u g h t e r s o f D a r i u s was called M a n d a n e , at least in a c o u r t novel r e c o r d e d by D i o d o r u s X I . 5 7 . 1 . Another m a r r i a g e tradi­ tion is found in D i o d o r u s (11.10.1) a n d B e r o s s u s ( a p u d J o s e p h u s , Ag. Ap

1.19): a "Syrian" king

landscaped the H a n g i n g G a r d e n s o f B a b y l o n to p l e a s e his wife "who was originally from Persia" (Diodorus) or M e d i a ( B e r o s s u s ) : cf. also Q u i n t u s C u r t i u s V I . 3 5 . T h e d i m i n u t i o n of foundation legends attests a b o v e all to the vigor of the oral traditions.

7. From the Medes to the Persians • Borrowing and Inheritance.

T h e theory of M e d o - P c r s i a n linguistic inheritance is f o u n d al­

ready in M e i l l e t a n d B e n v e n i s l e 1931 (cf. particularly p. 7: "For historical, g e o g r a p h i c , a n d d i a l e c ­ tal reasons, it c a n b e n o t h i n g other than M e d i a n " ) ; cf. also R. S c h m i t t , RIA 7 / 7 - 8 (1990): 6 1 7 - 1 8 s.v. "Medische [ S p r a c h e ] " ; this is the basis on w h i c h H a r m a t t a 1971 reconstructed M e d i a n stale organization, w h i c h s u p p o s e d l y was c o p i e d by the A c h a e m e n i d s ; o n this point, s e e the c r i t i q u e o f Sancisi-Wcerdenburg 1988a: 2 0 8 - 1 0 . T h e theory was strongly c h a l l e n g e d by Skjscrv0 1983 ( s u m ­ marized here), as well a s by L e c o q 1987, w h o elsewhere ( 1 9 7 4 b ) sets forth the idea o f a PersoMedian koine; o n the n a m e M e d e a p p l i e d to the Persians, cf. G r a f 1984, a n d T u p l i n 1994.

• The Structure of the Median Kingdom: Medikos logos of Herodotus.

Cf. H e l m 1981 (oral tra­

ditions and Persian p r o p a g a n d a ) ; B r o w n 1988: 7 8 - 8 4 , S a n c i s i - W e e r d e n b u r g 1993a, also S c u r l o c k 1990a (on the M e d i a n c h r o n o l o g y o f H e r o d o t u s , j u d g e d perfectly a c c e p t a b l e ) ; note that C t e s i a s also devoted part o f his Persica to M e d i a n history: cf. D i o d o r u s H . 3 2 - 3 4 ; cf. also IX.20.4, w h e r e he mixes information from C t e s i a s with s o m e attributed explicitly to H e r o d o t u s , but which h e cites in a faulty way; on the p r o b l e m s p o s e d by the "Scythian interregnum," s e e n o w the detailed analysis

Research Notes: Prologue

880

of L a n f r a n c h i 1990 a n d the interpretations o f V o g e l s a n g 1992: 1 8 1 - 9 0 , 3 1 0 - 1 2 ; M e d e s a n d Assyr­ ians: cf. c h r o n o l o g i c a l table drawn u p by Brown, RIA 7 / 7 - 8 (1990): 620; role o f Cyaxares: Brown 1988: 8 1 - 8 6 , a l s o S a n c i s i - W e e r d e n b u r g 1988a: 2 0 2 - 3 , 2 1 1 . N o t e that C t e s i a s calls Cyaxares "founder o f M e d i a n h e g e m o n y " ; b u t given that D i o d o r u s (11.32.3) cites H e r o d o t u s , this is obvi­ ously a c o n f u s i o n with D e i o c e s ; the s a m e a u t h o r c l a i m s (II.34.6) that Astyages is the n a m e the G r e e k s g a v e to a certain A s p a n d a s ; finally, note in p a s s i n g that D i o d o r u s (11.34.1) cites a certain Astibaras a m o n g the M e d i a n sovereigns: this involves the e v i d e n c e o f a p e r s o n a l n a m e c o p i e d from an A c h a e m e n i d title (arstibara = G k . doryphoros 'lance-bearer') familiar from a n inscription of Naqs-i R u s t a m ( D N c ) a n d from B a b y l o n i a n tablets ( S t o l p e r 1985a: 55 n. 12). Scarcity o f Median a r c h a e o l o g i c a l remains: s e e several articles o f M u s c a r e l l a (1987, 1994) a n d the refinement of G e n i t o (1986), with the criticism o f V o g e l s a n g (1992: 177; b u t the u s e o f country lists leaves me m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y u n c o n v i n c e d ) a n d especially M e d v e d s k a y a 1992, w h o c o n c l u d e s on the basis of observations o f c e r a m i c s a n d g e o g r a p h y that Baba J a n c a n n o longer b e c o n s i d e r e d a M e d i a n site. O n " M e d i a n art," s e e t h e c o n v e n i e n t presentations o f P. C a l m e y e r in RIA 7 / 7 - 8 (1990): 6 1 8 - 1 9 and Encb II (1988) 5 6 5 - 6 9 a n d D . S t r o n a c b , 1977: 6 8 8 - 9 8 , 1981 a n d E n c l r II (1988) 2 8 8 - 9 0 . T h e the-' ory o f very limited spread of M e d i a n power is s u p p o r t e d especially by Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1988a, 1993a); Brown (1986, 1988) c o n s i d e r s the i m p a c t of Assyrian levies o n t h e p a s s a g e from a tribal society to a state society, b e g i n n i n g with the eighth century, ' t h e theory of the rewriting of history by the B a b y l o n i a n s in a n a n t i - M e d i a n direction is very strongly s u p p o r t e d by Zawadski 1988a: 1 3 2 - 4 8 , d a t e d by the a u t h o r to exactly 576 (p. 148); the interpretation s e e m s attractive but d o e s suffer from a significant weakness: it postulates that the c o m p o s e r s o f the Nabopolassar Chron­ icle systematically d e s i g n a t e d the M e d e s with t h e n a m e U m m a n - M a n d a (cf. p p . 1 2 7 - 2 9 ) ; however, this interpretation a p p e a r s very doubtful (cf. Baltzer 1973); u n d e r these c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the reas­ s e s s m e n t o f the role of t h e M e d e s in the anti-Assyrian coalition d o e s not carry m u c h conviction. • Appraisal of the Discussion.

T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f the E l a m i t e legacy to the Persians has been

stressed by n u m e r o u s authors (P. Amiet, F. Vallat, M . - J . S t e v e , M . G a r r i s o n ) ; cf. also Stolper 1984b: 4, r e g a r d i n g t h e tablets from Tall-i M a l y a n ("They s u p p l y a distant historical a n t e c e d e n t for Elam­ ite administrative r e c o r d i n g in Fars u n d e r the A c h a e m e n i d s " ) , a n d M i r o s c h e d j i 1982 a n d 1985. M i r o s c h e d j i c o n c l u d e s that the Persian administration in Fars "was probably set u p by Cyrus II in the m i d d l e o f the sixth century, w h e n the E m p i r e was established" (1985: 3 0 1 ; s e e below, c h a p . 2/9, p. 8 9 5 , on the organization o f the sacrifices a r o u n d the t o m b o f C y r u s ) ; perhaps we s h o u l d even c o n s i d e r that it was set u p before t h e first c o n q u e s t s (cf. Briant 1984a: 118)? Note in this regard that two high officials in Persia at the time o f D a r i u s c o n t i n u e d to u s e seals engraved with an E l a m i t e n a m e , H u m b a n - a b p i (cf. H i n z 1972b: 2 8 1 ) , a n d that the seal o f Kuras of Anjan h i m s e l f is a p p l i e d to six tablets (cf. o n this seal m o s t recently G a r r i s o n 1992: 3 - 1 0 ) ; on the other h a n d , the M e d i a n borrowings ( a r m s , clothing) are usually reconstructed on the basis o f later docu­ m e n t s , in particular the G r e e k a u t h o r s a n d the representations o f Persepolis (cf., for example, T r i i m p e l m a n n 1988; also C a l m e y e r , RIA 7 / 7 - 8 [1990] 6 1 5 - 1 7 ) . O n all these p r o b l e m s , see now a l s o the interesting treatment by T u p l i n 1994: 2 5 1 - 5 6 .

8.

Conclusion It m u s t b e stressed that m a n y of the hypotheses o f the ( s u p p o s e d ) relations between Nabonidus

a n d C y r u s (cf. s u m m a r y of the topic in Baltzer 1973: 8 7 - 8 8 ) a r e implicitly b a s e d on the assump­ tion o f the recognition o f A n s a n a s a military power by the other k i n g d o m s (specifically NeoBabylonian and Median).

Chapter 1

The Land-Collectors: Cyrus the Great and Cambyses I Medo-Persian Hostilities, the Defeat of Astyages, and the Fall of Ecbatana (553-550) • General Bibliography

on Cyrus.

D h o r m c 1912; O l m s t e a d 1948: 3 4 - 8 5 ; M a l l o w a n 1972;

Stronach J978: 2 8 5 - 9 5 ; C o o k 1983: 2 5 - 4 3 ; C u y l e r Y o u n g 1988: 2 8 - 4 6 ; D a n d a m a e v 1989a: 1 0 - 6 9 .

• Sources and Problems.

T h e Dream of Nabonidus is part of a long inscription of that king

(Inscription 1 in B e a u l i e u 1989a: 2 2 ; translation, p . 108, a n d c o m m e n t a r y , p p . 1 0 8 - 1 0 ) ; other Babylonian sources referring to the victory of C y r u s over Astyages: Nabonidus

Chronicle (text ed­

ited and translated by G r a y s o n , A B C : 1 0 4 - 1 1 ; cf. p. 106; cf. also t h e E n g l i s h translation in A N E T : 305 and the important remarks of T a d m n r 1965 o n the literary m o d e l s on which Hie text is built). T h e Dream (with other B a b y l o n i a n texts) p o s e s a n interpretive p r o b l e m regarding the g e n e r i c term U m m a n - M a n d a ; the p r o b l e m has b e e n d i s c u s s e d extensively a n d r e m a i n s d e b a t a b l e : cf. Baltzer 1973; Zawadski 1988; L a n f r a n c h i 1990; it looks a s though a general identification a s the M e d e s is no longer a c c e p t a b l e ; but h e r e , whatever the intentions of the author, it is clear that h e i n t e n d e d to identify the M e d e s ( a n d their k i n g Astyages) by the g e n e r i c pejorative U m m a n - M a n d a ; the role of Harpagus is a l s o stressed in a G r e e k tradition from Asia M i n o r that uses a chronological f o r m u l a of the form "when H a r p a g u s u r g e d C y r u s s o n o f C a m b y s e s to revolt [against Astyages]" ( M a z zarino 1947: 197 a n d 225); the tradition is s u s p e c t , b e c a u s e it c o u l d well c o m e directly from Har­ pagus himself, w h o s e links with Asia M i n o r a r e well attested; the p r o b l e m consists entirely o f determining w h e n H a r p a g u s s e c e d e d : at the b e g i n n i n g of (or e v e n before) the revolt, or at the e n d of the Medo-Persian war? In the first c a s e , o n e m u s t s u p p o s e the war to h a v e b e e n very short ( H e ­ rodotus); in the s e c o n d , o n e m u s t s u p p o s e that the defection o f H a r p a g u s c a n b e explained by the defeats suffered by the M e d i a n a r m i e s after a series o f victories: this is in fact the version o f D i o d o ­ rus IX.23; the date o f the b e g i n n i n g o f overt M e d o - P e r s i a n hostilities is disputed, d e p e n d i n g o n the interpretation of the v a g u e a n d contradictory c h r o n o l o g i c a l indications f o u n d in the Dream of Na­ bonidus (cf. Drews 1969; a l s o C o o k 1983: 27, 144; a n d especially T a d m o r 1965). N a b o n i d u s ' s d e ­ parture from T e i m a : B e a u l i e u 1989a: 149ff. P r e s u m e d relations between N a b o n i d u s a n d C y r u s : Beaulieu 1989a: 109, 144: to explain the wait-and-see policy r e g a r d i n g N a b o n i d u s at t h e b e g i n n i n g of his reign, the author notes: "It is likely that N a b o n i d u s was waiting for C y r u s ' revolt to start, a welcome event which w o u l d give h i m total f r e e d o m of action in Syria, Palestine, a n d Arabia." B u t wc d o not actually k n o w w h e t h e r in 556 a n y o n e thought a M e d o - P e r s i a n war was inevitable.

• Offensives and Counteroffensives.

Cf. Stronach 1978: 282; the Cyropaedia o f X e n o p h o n

does not mention a revolt; quite t h e contrary: o n c e elevated to t h e court o f his grandfather Astyages, Cyrus cooperated fully with his u n c l e C y a x a r e s , s u c c e s s o r o f Astyages(l), to the point that h e c o m ­ manded the united a r m y in his c a m p a i g n s against S a r d i s a n d then Babylon; despite several clashes due to the touchiness o f C y a x a r e s , t h e a g r e e m e n t c o n t i n u e d to hold until C y r u s married the daughter of C y a x a r e s ( w h o was without m a l e heir) a n d received all o f M e d i a as dowry (VIII.5.19); Xenophon was following or h i m s e l f inventing a s c e n a r i o that is obviously quite r e m o v e d from re­ ality—although from time to t i m e h e c a n s u p p l y a n interesting p i e c e o f information (to the extent that it can b e c o n f i r m e d by a n i n d e p e n d e n t source; c f b e l o w o n t h e story o f G o b r y a s ) . •

The New Master of Ecbatana.

T e n t a n d treasures o f Astyages: N i c o l a u s o f D a m a s c u s ,

FGrH 90 E66.45; cf. Nalx>nidits Chronicle I I . 3 - 4 ; o n the s y m b o l i s m o f entering the tent o f the van­ quished: Briant 1988c: 269; fate o f Astyages a n d of M e d i a : H e r o d o t u s 1.130: "Cyrus kept h i m near

881

Research Notes: Chapter I

882

h i m until his death a n d did h i m no other harm"; Justin 1.6.16: "Cyrus vvas c o n t e n t to deprive hiin of royalty a n d treated h i m like a grandfather rather than a defeated e n e m y , a n d since Astyages did not wish to return to M e d i a , h e gave h i m the g o v e r n m e n t of the great nation of the Hyrcanians ("Barcaeans" in C t e s i a s |j4; cf. Briant 1984b. 5 6 - 5 8 ) ; C t e s i a s , Persica $2: "Cyrus h o n o r e d him l i ^ his father"; s u b m i s s i o n of the C e n t r a l Asian p e o p l e s : N i c o l a u s of D a m a s c u s , FGrH 90 F 6 6 . 4 6 , and C t e s i a s , Persica $2; cf. Briant 1984b: 3 5 - 4 1 ; retention of E c b a t a n a as capital: cf. S t r a b o X I . 13.5 ("jf c o n t i n u e d to preserve m u c h of its a n c i e n t dignity; a n d E c b a t a n a was winter r e s i d e n c e for the Per­ sian kings";damnaUd-

A m a s i s : M e u l e n a e r e 1938 ( d o u b t s of T u p l i n 199 l a : 2 5 7 - 5 8 ) ; "cult" offered to

jahorresnet o n e h u n d r e d sixty years later in M e m p h i s : B r c s c i a n i 1985a; o n the recently discovered tomb, c f Verner 1989 a n d B a r e s 1992.

• Collaboration and Resistance:

the Persian k i n g s a n d the i n s u r g e n t E g y p t i a n "dynasties":

Briant 1988a: 1 4 9 - 5 0 ; d o n a t i o n stelas- M e e k s 1979; o n their d i s a p p e a r a n c e as of 525, s e e ibid. 6 5 5 : the author remarks that they r e a p p e a r u n d e r D a r i u s I; their " d i s a p p e a r a n c e " in 525 is thus p e r h a p s nothing but an a u t o m a t i c reflection of fragmentary d o c u m e n t a t i o n , whatever the c a s e , the c o r p u s in its current state of preservation s e e m s to indicate a desire o n the part of the G r e a t K i n g s to c o n ­ trol and limit tlie e c o n o m i c a n d

financial

p o w e r of the E g y p t i a n s a n c t u a r i e s ; "decree of C a m b y ­

ses": S p i e g e l b e r g 1914: 3 2 - 3 3 ; B r e s c i a n i 1989: 3 1 - 3 2 ; B r e s c i a n i (1983) thinks that the

three

temples cited are not the only three to have b e e n e x e m p t e d ; the text s i m p l y m e n t i o n s three t e m ­ ples of the region of M e m p h i s ; if this is true, the extent of the royal activity o u g h t to b e f u n d a m e n ­ tally reevaluated; fiscal p r e s s u r e u n d e r C a m b y s e s : W a l l i n g a

1984; n o m i n a t i o n

Herodotus IV. 166; on the basis of a text p u b l i s h e d by S t r a s s m a i e r

(Camb.

of Aryandes:

344), E b e l i n g , R / A

1.454C $36 thinks that w c have f r o m this p e r i o d m e n t i o n of a "governor of E g y p t " w h o , m o r e o v e r , lias a typically B a b y l o n i a n n a m e ; but, as K J o a n n e s a n d A. K u h r t h a v e p o i n t e d out (personal c o m ­ munications), this represents a faulty r e a d i n g (cf. K u h r t 1992): it really is a governor (of E g y p t ? ) , but his n a m e is not g i v e n (on this p o i n t at least, S t o l p e r [personal c o m m u n i c a t i o n o f 31 M a y 1993] agrees with K u h r t a n d J o a n n e s ) . T h e events s u r r o u n d i n g the d e a t h o f C a m b y s e s h a v e given rise to two hypotheses- s u i c i d e or natural c i r c u m s t a n c e s ; it is clear that H e r o d o t u s ' s text repeats a scries of motifs, s u c h as the w o u n d in the thigh (cf. S a n c i s i - W e e r d e n b u r g 1985: 467); but e x a m i n a t i o n of the terminology u s e d by D a r i u s at B e h i s t u n a n d of H e r o d o t u s ' s text has d e c i d e d in favor of the sec­ ond: Walscr 1983 ( a n d B r c s c i a n i 1981 b o n the a l l u s i o n to the e v e n t in the u n c l e a r text o n the verso of the D e w o f i c

chronicle, as well

as M a l b r a n - L a b a t ' s r e m a r k 1994: 109 n. 103 on the formal analy­

sis of the p a s s a g e c o r r e s p o n d i n g to D B Bab. T h e r e is a F r e n c h translation o f the text

§ !0).

on

the verso of the D e m o d e

Chronicle in

Devauchelle

1995:74-75 (also B r e s c i a n i 1996) — t h e " d e c r e e of C a m b y s e s . " O t h e r w i s e , b e g i n n i n g with c h r o n o ­ logical observations ( d a t e s on the Apis stelas, m e t h o d s o f s u c c e s s i o n of Apises), the a u t h o r c o m ­ ments (cf. also D e v a u c h e l l e 1994b: 1 0 2 - 3 ) that d o u b t s m u s t r e m a i n as to the now s t a n d a r d theory (which I have i n c l u d e d in the text) a b s o l v i n g C a m b y s e s of all b l a m e : "It is thus not p o s s i b l e to de­ finitively e x c l u d e the hypothesis of the m u r d e r of a 'young' Apis before he s u c c e e d e d the Apis w h o died in Year 5 — d o u b t l e s s b e f o r e his e n t h r o n e m e n t , w h i c h w o u l d e x p l a i n the fact that m e m o r y of him would have b e e n erased — b u t it r e m a i n s s u b j e c t to

caution"

(p. 70). Starting from the s a m e

premises, D c p u y d t 1995a arrives i n d e p e n d e n t l y at the s a m e c o n c l u s i o n , in a still clearer f o r m ; a c ­ cording to h i m , there is n o c o n t r a d i c t i o n b e t w e e n H e r o d o t u s a n d the a r c h a e o l o g i c a l e v i d e n c e ; the murder of a y o u n g A p i s thus r e m a i n s perfectly i m a g i n a b l e : "In light of the e v i d e n c e , I w o u l d per­ sonally rather b e l i e v e that C a m b y s e s is to b e p r e s u m e d guilty until proven innocent" (p. 126). If tins hypothesis c o n c e r n i n g the d e f e c t i o n s to the Persian c o n q u e r o r , is a c c e p t e d , I a m s o m e w h a t less sorry a b o u t s u g g e s t i n g that the fiscal m e a s u r e s taken by C a m b y s e s r e s p o n d e d p e r h a p s to the opposition of certain s a n c t u a r i e s , a n d not the reverse: if the "murder" of the y o u n g A p i s is

888

Research Notes: Chapter I

a c c e p t e d — w h a t e v e r the narrative s c h e m a implicit in s u c h an expression —we c a n without doubt think of the s a m e c h a i n of causation: E g y p t i a n resistance followed by reprisals from Cambyses We then recall a n o t h e r politico-religious situation well known t h r o u g h o u t A c h a e m e n i d historydrastic p u n i s h m e n t of p e o p l e s a n d s a n c t u a r i e s guilty of resistance a n d rebellion; that is, a situation exactly the opposite o f the o n e generally reconstructed on the basis of the statements of Ud\al\ Q

BoLisquet 1992: 175; on the status of Lycia d u r i n g this entire period, s e e now the detailed work of K e e n 1992a (consulted through the author's generosity), c h a p . 5/2 (he a d o p t s the hypothesis of a P e a c e of C a l l i a s in 4 6 2 - 4 6 1 ) : "It s e e m s likely that L y c i a n s returned to Persian a l l e g i a n c e when they left [the a l l e g i a n c e ) of Athens"; on M e l e s a n d e r ' s (then Lysicles') e x p e d i t i o n a n d the informa­ tion g l e a n e d from the Pillar Inscription, cf. ibid., c h a p . 6, a n d K e e n 1993b.

5. Ezra and Nehemiah

in

Jerusalem

• As a result of various kinds of a r g u m e n t , it has often b e e n p r o p o s e d that E z r a actually carried o u t his mission u n d e r Artaxerxes II, in 398: a s u m m a r y m a y be found in O d e d 1977d: 503-9 (which a d o p t s the low c h r o n o l o g y ) , Y a m a u c h i 1990: 2 5 3 - 5 6 (which inclines rather toward the dat­ ing a d o p t e d here, without d e n y i n g that the other interpretation is not u n a p p e a l i n g ) , Williamson 1987: 6 9 - 7 6 , a n d H o g l u n d 1989: 7 3 - 8 0 ( E z r a before N e h e m i a h ) . A m o n g the a r g u m e n t s some­ times a d d u c e d in s u p p o r t of the low c h r o n o l o g y is the E g y p t i a n situation at t h e b e g i n n i n g of the fourth century, a n d it is thought that Ezra's mission fits with the king's desire to protect the ap­ p r o a c h e s to the N i l e Valley (cf. C a z e l l e s 1954: 1 1 4 - 1 9 ) ; this is a traditional e x p l a n a t i o n , often of­ fered also to explain Cyrus's m e a s u r e of 538 (cf. c h a p . 1/6); but this is a s i m p l e argument of similarity, w i t h o u t any e v i d e n c e as a basis: at the risk of a p p e a r i n g naive (or ill i n f o r m e d ) , I must insist that even a n d especially after studying a m a p , I have never really u n d e r s t o o d what decisive strategic a d v a n t a g e against E g y p t the small l a n d of J u d a h c o u l d have h a d in the eyes of the Achae­ m e n i d central authority (or in the eyes of certain m o d e m interpreters?); other historical argu­ m e n t s are e q u a l l y weak: thus the a d m i s s i o n of D o r (near S i d o n ) to the D e l i a n L e a g u e (accepted by M e i g g s 1972: 4 2 0 - 2 1 ) , s o m e t i m e s interpreted as a n a r g u m e n t in favor of Ezra's high dating (cf. studies cited by Y a m a u c h i 1990: 254 n. 6 0 ) , is a n y t h i n g b u t certain (cf. L e m a i r e 1990: 56 n. 135; the note is not repeated in L e m a i r e 1994: 33). T h e d e b a t e , finally a n d especially, is part of a subtle a n d c o m p l e x d i s c u s s i o n of the c o n t e n t of the " M e m o i r s " of N e h e m i a h a n d , thus, the work and c h r o n o l o g y of the C h r o n i c l e r ; l o n g u n d e r way, t h e d i s c u s s i o n s e e m s to h a v e taken on new life these last few years (cf. the articles c o l l e c t e d by P. R. D a v i e s 1991), p e r h a p s u n d e r the influence of the rebirth of A c h a e m e n i d s t u d i e s (cf. H o g l u n d 1989, 1991; W i l l i a m s o n 1991; W e i n b e r g 1992a, b; G r a b b e 1992b [ s e e n too late]]); my lack of c o m p e t e n c e in the material k e e p s m e from participat­ i n g (cf. the clear s u m m a r y by Ackroyd 1988; d e v e l o p m e n t s c a n b e followed by m e a n s of the C/?ro-

nique

by P. A b a d i e , Trans. 1 (1989): 1 7 0 - 7 6 and 4 (1991): 1 4 1 - 4 5 ; see m o s t recently Dequeker

1993, who, d a t i n g E z r a to the Artaxerxes II p e r i o d , thinks that the reconstruction of the temple took p l a c e u n d e r D a r i u s II a n d not D a r i u s I [ a n d L e m a i r e 1995a: 5 7 - 6 1 , who, on the basis of the E g y p t i a n situation a n d the E l e p h a n t i n e d o c u m e n t s , c h o o s e s the date 3 9 8 ] ) ; I will slate nothing b u t an impression: to g o by the recent literature, the n o n s p e c i a l i s t would not d o well to intervene in the d i s c u s s i o n s a n d p o l e m i c s , w h o s e scientific b a s e s e s c a p e h i m m o r e a n d m o r e as the readings multiply (cf. D e q u e k e r ' s baffling 1993 article); we have the impression that at the present time no tradition enjoys the status of "historical fact" (cf. in particular G r a b b e 1994): in short, the dates in the text have b e e n a d o p t e d purely by convention: my only justification is that I a m in good com­ pany; b u t I w o u l d b e n o less so if I held the e x a c t o p p o s i t e position!

• Ezra's Mission.

S e e the d i s c u s s i o n s in C a z e l l e s 1954 ( w h o sets E z r a in 398); O d e d 1977b:

5 3 5 - 3 6 ; Purvis 1988: 169-70; Y a m a u c h i 1990: 2 5 6 - 5 7 , who following B l e n k i n s o p p (1987) sets up a parallel with the m i s s i o n entrusted by D a r i u s I to U d j a h o r r e s n e t a n d t h e similarity of the "Egyp­ tian laws": but, with G r a b b e 1994: 2 9 4 - 9 5 , the parallel d o e s not s e e m particularly legitimate to m e ; s e e also other reflections by the s a m e a u t h o r , w h o h a s m u l t i p l i e d the warnings and reserva­ tions on currently a c c e p t e d interpretations of Ezra's mission; I find myself a g r e e i n g with o n e of his observations (p. 297): " T h e closer o n e looks, the m o r e e n i g m a t i c Ezra's mission becomes," and "We have to c o n c l u d e that Ezra's mission is a p u z z l e " (p. 298).

From the Accession of Artaxerxes I to the Death of Darius U (465-405/404) Nehemiah's Mission.

977

It is i m p o s s i b l e for N e h e m i a h to have b e e n a e u n u c h ; it is e v e n

highly unlikely that h e was a c u p b e a r e r to the king (cf. O d e d 1977b: 528 a n d , both m o r e detailed and more certain, Y a m a u c h i 1980b, 1990: 2 6 0 - 6 4 ) . T h e literature on his mission is c o n s i d e r a b l e : summary m a y b e f o u n d in Y a m a u c h i 1990: 2 6 4 - 7 8 ; on the governors before N e h e m i a h , cf. chap- '2/3 a b o v e ; on the extent of the p r o v i n c e of J u d a h , cf. a s u m m a r y of the issue in L e m a i r e |990' 3 2 - 4 5 (cf. p p . 3 9 - 4 0 on

pelek

a n d the satrapal r e s i d e n c e at M i z p a h a n d G i b e o n , with the

remarks of Briant 1985b: 6 7 ) ; the duties of the c o m m i s s a r ( N e h 11:24) r e m a i n mysterious (cf. Helt­ zer J 989: 346 n. 7 1 , and now Heltzer 1994: a s u m m a r y will b e found there [pp. 1 0 9 - 1 3 ] , and c o m ­ parisons [interesting, b u t in m y o p i n i o n not very c o n v i n c i n g ] with U d j a h o r r e s n e t , H i s t i a e u s of Miletus, a n d Arlissis of C a r i a ) ; o n relations with the central authority, cf. also the reflections of Graf 1985: 9 2 - 9 3 a n d W e i n b e r g 1977: 3 2 - 3 8 (who thinks that N e h e m i a h was

notpehd

of the prov­

ince of J u d a h , b u t rather h e a d of what h e calls the "Biirger-T'empel-Gemeinde": cf. now W e i n b e r g ]992a, b): on Weinberg's views, cf. D i o n 1991 a n d the critical remarks of B l e n k i n s o p p 1991; on Nehemiah's social reforms, cf. (inter a l i a ) Y a m a u c h i 1980a, 1990: 272; Kreissig 1973; K i p p e n b e r g 1982: 5 4 - 7 7 ; Heltzer 1989b; on N e h e m i a h ' s fortification, cf. L a p e r r o u s a z 1979.

the

• From Jerusalem to Elephantine. DAE 89: cf. G r e l o t 1972: 3 5 4 - 6 7 , Porten 1986: 1 2 - 1 3 ; on Pascal Papyrus ( D A E 9 6 ) , cf. G r e l o t 1955, 1972: 3 7 8 - 8 6 , 1981; m o s t r e c e n t restoration in Por­

ten 1986: 7; on the interpretation, cf. also V i n c e n t 1937: 2 4 9 - 6 1 , B r i a n t 1986a: 4 3 2 - 3 4 , Frei 1984: 16-17, a n d , q u i t e recently, the (to say the least) s u r p r i s i n g p r o p o s a l s of D e q u e k e r 1993: 8 9 - 9 2 (who connects the d o c u m e n t to the reconstruction of the J e r u s a l e m t e m p l e , w h i c h he p l a c e s u n d e r D a ­ rius II and not D a r i u s I, on the basis of textual exegesis in w h i c h 1 refuse to get involved [ a n d L e ­ maire 1995a: 6 0 J ) ; finally I d o not b e l i e v e that we c a n say, with Porten a n d Yardeni 1993: 59, that the d o c u m e n t attests to the favor that D a r i u s II in p a r t i c u l a r is s u p p o s e d to have m a n i f e s t e d toward the Jewish c o m m u n i t y of E l e p h a n t i n e . O n the Jews in B a b y l o n i a , cf., e.g., C o o g a n 1974, Purvis 1988: 154-62 (who p o s e s , p p . 1 5 8 - 6 0 , the p r o b l e m of the p o s s i b l e existence of a t e m p l e ) .

• The Enemies of Nehemiah and Judah.

O n the province of S a m a r i a and the information

coming from Wadi e d - D a l i y e h , see the various p u b l i c a t i o n s of C r o s s ( 1 9 6 3 , 1 9 6 6 , 1 9 7 1 , 1 9 7 4 , 1 9 8 5 ) ; some of the papyri have b e e n s t u d i e d by G r o p p 1986, but we are still waiting for the final p u b l i c a ­ tion; the coins were recently p u b l i s h e d by M e s h o r e r a n d Q e d a r 1991 (we will return at a s u i t a b l e point to this rich material: c h a p . 16/7); s e e also L e m a i r e 1990: 6 4 - 6 7 (on the province of S a m a r i a ) and L e m a i r e - L o z a c h m e u r 1987 (on

byrt'/birta); s u m m a r y a n d

review on G a s m u a n d T o b i a h in L e ­

maire 1990: 4 5 - 5 4 , 6 8 - 7 2 . T o b i a h : on his r e s i d e n c e at Iraq e l - E m i r , cf. the p u b l i c a t i o n by Will a n d Larche et al. 1991: 5 - 9 . G a s m u the Arab: on the vessels a n d d e d i c a t i o n s of Tell e l - M a s k h u t a , cf. Durnbrell 1971, B r i a n t 1982b: 1 7 2 - 7 3 (with s o m e d o u b t s on the generally proposed reconstruc­ tions), a n d , s i n c e then, G r a f 1990a: 1 3 9 - 4 0 ; K n a u f 1990: 207; as well as Holladay 1992: 590; P a i c e 1993 [cf. L e m a i r e 1995a: 5 4 - 5 5 ] ; Sanballat's hostility is easily e x p l a i n e d if we a c c e p t the theory (worked out by Alt) that before N e h e m i a h , J u d a h was a d e p e n d e c y of S a m a r i a ; b u t the discovery of bullas inscribed with the n a m e s of governors before N e h e m i a h has d o n e away with this interpre­ tation (unless the d a t i n g s are c h a l l e n g e d , as was recently d o n e by B i a n c h i 1989): on Alt's position, see also the critical remarks of H o g l u n d 1989: 123ff.; [ o n relations b e t w e e n J u d a h a n d the S a m a r ­ itans, cf. also M a c c h i 1994: 3 3 - 4 4 ] . Lastly, I note that in several works (cf. 1 9 6 5 , 1 9 8 5 ) , M . D u n a n d connected the edifices built by N e h e m i a h in J e r u s a l e m with a vast royal project to d e f e n d the 'Mediterranean front of the E m p i r e " s u c h as, for e x a m p l e , s o m e S i d o n i a n buildings ( t e m p l e of E s h m u n ) , both of t h e m c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the p r e s e n c e of a "Persian p o d i u m " ; but this w h o l e recon­ struction is purely hypothetical, without solid f o u n d a t i o n (cf. my remarks in

Ablran

12 [1989]

no. 229, and J . Elayi's, Trans. 1 [1989]: 1 9 0 - 9 1 , as well as the d o u b t s of M a z z o n i 1 9 9 1 - 9 2 : 6 6 ) .

6. One King after Another

(425-424)

• Ctesias and the Babylonian Tablets.

Cf. L e w i s 1977: 7 1 - 7 6 , S t o l p e r 1985a: 1 0 4 - 2 4 , as well

as my remarks in B r i a n t 1994b: 118 n. 20; on the chronology, s e e the s u m m a r y by S t o l p e r 1983,

Research Notes: Chapter 14

978

1985a: 1 1 6 - 2 0 , a n d m o s t recently D e p u y d t 1995b; on the estates of the princes a n d princesses cf Stolper 1985a: 54ff., 6 4 - 6 6 ( A r s a m a ) , 8 9 - 9 3 (Artarios, M e n o s t a n e s , Artoxares), 96 (Arbarius/ A r b a r e m e ) ; on these p e o p l e , cf. also the notices of D a n d a m a e v 1992a nos. 16, 26, 33, 43, 185, 250 and on M e n o s t a n e s ( a n d his brother or a s s o c i a t e , U s t a p a n u ) , the text p u b l i s h e d by D o n b a z and S t o l p e r 1993. • Families and Powers.

Cf. a l s o Briant 1990a: 9 5 - 9 6 (and n. 49); like L e w i s (1977: 8 3 - 8 4 ) 1

d o u b t that H y d a r n e s , father of T i s s a p h e r n e s ( X a n t h u s Pillar Inscription), c a n b e the f a t h e r - i n d

aw

of D a r i u s II: it is highly unlikely that C t e s i a s would not have m e n t i o n e d the fact in the context. • Legitimacy and Propaganda.

Cf. Briant 199 la: 4 - 6 ; L e w i s (1977: 77 n. 77) stresses that the

epithet "illegitimate" is a p p l i e d to D a r i u s II by late s o u r c e s . • Darius the Great King.

Lewis (1977: 78 a n d n. 182) p u b l i s h e d a n inscription of Darius II 2

that is said to c o m e from H a m a d a n ( = D Ha; cf. M a y r h o f e r 1978: 17, 2 9 - 3 0 ) .

7. Affairs on the Western Front • The Situation in Asia Minor (424-412).

O n the various problems, cf. Andrewes 1961: 1-7

L e w i s 1977: 8 0 - 8 2 , C a r t l e d g e 1987: I87ff, B r i a n t 1995: 1 1 6 - 3 2 ; o n the P e a c e of E p i l y c u s , cf. most recently D e s c a t 1991, w h o stresses its novelty, a n d L e w i s 1992a: 122, 1992b: 4 2 2 n. 132; on the p r o b l e m s p o s e d by the Athenian aid for A m o r g e s , cf. the d i s c u s s i o n of L e w i s 1977: 8 5 - 8 6 , and the readings of the Pillar inscription by Shevoroskin 1977: 1 2 7 - 2 8 n. 1 (but several have now been dis­ m i s s e d by M e l c h e r t 1993, a n a l y z e d in the next p a r a g r a p h ) ; o n the I o n i a n War, I h a v e m a d e much u s e of L e w i s 1977: 8 6 - 1 3 5 as well as W e s l i a k e 1979 a n d , on s o m e c h r o n o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m s , Robert­ son 1980 (who p l a c e s the mission of A r t h m i o s of Z e l e i a in the context of 4 0 8 - 4 0 7 ; cf. also on this point W a l b a n k 1982, 1983, 1989).

• The Spartan-Achaemenid

Treaties (412-411).

Lewis 1977: 9 0 - 1 0 7 ; L e v y 1983; cf. a Iso Can-

fora 1990 a n d C a r t l e g e ' s d o u b t s (1987: 187) on the c h a r a c t e r of "treaty": the a u t h o r speaks of an "agreement." W h i l e the author's s u g g e s t i o n a l o n g these lines r e m a i n s very m o d e s t (p. 34), it is per­ h a p s in this context that we m i g h t l o c a t e the n e w r e a d i n g s of several lines of the Pillar Inscription by M e l c h e r t 1993: h e thinks the text refers to a n a c c o r d sworn b e t w e e n T i s s a p h e r n e s , son of Hy­ d a r n e s , and his L a c e d a e m o n i a n allies; presided over by the dynast of X a n t h u s (who speaks in the first p e r s o n ) , who acts as arbitrator/conciliator (maraza)

between the two allies, the agreement

would h a v e b e e n written o n two stelas, o n e d e p o s i t e d at H y t e n n a [ a r e a d i n g that removes from the text the p s e u d o - P e r s i a n personal n a m e U t a n a / O t a n e s J in the s a n c t u a r y of M a l i y a , the other at C a v m u s in the sanctuary d e d i c a t e d to M a l i y a , Artemis, a n d B a s i l e u s C a u n i u s ; it is thus possible that there we have, s e e n from the L y c i a n side a n d expressed in L y c i a n , a reference to the negotia­ tions o p e n e d at C a u n u s b e t w e e n T i s s a p h e r n e s a n d the S p a r t a n l e a d e r s ( T h u c y d i d e s VIII.58,1), b u t it c o u l d also d e a l with a different e p i s o d e W h a t e v e r the c a s e , a n article like Melchert's, com­ i n g after m a n y others (e.g., Shevoroskin 1977), o n c e a g a i n s h a r p e n s the historian's h o p e of one day h a v i n g a c o m p l e t e text that hopefully would fatten the skinny file of n o n - G r e e k narrative sources for the A c h a e m e n i d p e r i o d . • Darius 11 and His Satraps.

C o n c e r n i n g his e s c a p e from S a r d i s , A l c i b i a d e s c l a i m e d "per­

fidiously that T i s s a p h e r n e s h a d let h i m go" ( P l u t a r c h , Ale. 28.1); on the d i p l o m a t i c hesitations of T i s s a p h e r n e s , cf. L e w i s 1977: 1 2 9 - 3 1 ; o n t h e military inferiority of the satraps, cf. Westlake 1979: 3 7 - 4 0 ; cf. ibid, on the fiscal levies i m p o s e d o n the G r e e k cities, w h i c h , h e says, were o n e of the reasons for the limited e n t h u s i a s m on the part of those cities for participating in the war against Athens. T h e p h r a s e idia khremata is not u n r e m i n i s c e n t of others u s e d later by X e n o p h o n : in 405, C y r u s the Younger "assigned to L y s a n d e r all the tribute w h i c h c a m e in from his cities and be­

longed to h i m personally (tous phorous tous ek ton poleon, hoi autoi idioi escm)" (Hell. 11.1.1+^); w h e n h e arrived in Asia M i n o r with 500 talents r e l e a s e d by D a r i u s II, C y r u s also d e c l a r e d himself ready to "use his idia" if the royal f u n d i n g proved insufficient (Hell. 1.5.3); a n d , later, Cyrus b e g g e d his brother Artaxerxes II "that these I o n i a n cities s h o u l d be given to h i m instead of remain-

From the Accession of Artaxerxes I to the Death of Darius 11 (465-405M04)

979

ing under the rule of T i s s a p h e r n e s " (Anab. I . ] . 8 - > ) : "for, in fact, the Ionian cities h a d originally belonged to T i s s a p h e r n e s , by gift of the K i n g (dedomenai)" (1.1.6); the p h r a s e s used by X e n o p h o n are problematic; but I a m not certain that the a u t h o r is thus referring to a gift o f towns, c o m p a r a b l e to what was given to T h e m i s t o c l e s (a theory d e f e n d e d c a u t i o u s l y by L e w i s 1977: 1 1 9 - 2 2 , thinking that the gift was given to the p e r s o n , not the satrap); I a m t e m p t e d rather to think that in this way the king allowed the satrap entrusted with the war to finance it with the profit of tire tribute, which comes down to a u t h o r i z i n g h i m not to pay the full a m o u n t to the royal t r e a s u r i e s — a n obligation that, by contrast, fell on C y r u s (Anab. 1.1.8), d o u b t l e s s the s o u r c e of his discontent; o n these prob­ lems, cf. also T u p l i n 1987a: 1 3 3 - 3 5 ; on the financing of military c a m p a i g n s in these years, s e e es­ pecially Lewis 1989: 2 3 1 - 3 4 ; o n Cyrus's c o i n a g e , cf. Weiser 1989 (with the strong o b j e c t i o n s of C a s a b o n n e 1995b). • Darius II, Asia Minor, and the Other Fronts.

State of s i e g e at Uruk: Stolper 1990b: 572

(with caution, s i n c e the parallels invoked d a t e to the seventh century); the royal c o n c e r n for the other fronts is particularly stressed by L e w i s 1977: 1 3 3 - 3 4 ; in an earlier article, the s a m e a u t h o r (Lewis 1958) presented the idea that the P h o e n i c i a n navy was rerouted to E g y p t in 4 1 1 : on this point, cf. my critical r e m a r k s in B r i a n t 1988a: 143; m o r e o v e r , the text of T h u c y d i d e s V I I I . 3 5 is less forthcoming than s u p p o s e d by Kienitz 1953: 73 (which I m a d e the mistake of following too closely in Briant 1988a: 150). I n d e e d , the a b s e n c e of d o c u m e n t s from the center a n d certain recently p u b ­ lished Babylonian tablets m u s t l e a d the c o m m e n t a t o r to c a u t i o n a n d not overestimating the Aegean front in the i m p e r i a l strategy of these years. B u t , o n the o n e h a n d , the orders given by D a ­ rius II to P h a r n a b a z e s a n d T i s s a p h e r n e s s h o w that the decision to reassert authority over the G r e e k coastal cities was i n d e e d m a d e by the king; on the other, a n expedition s u c h as the o n e against the C a d u s i a n s certainly did not take o n s u c h military i m p o r t a n c e that it c o u l d e n d a n g e r the A c h a e ­ menid e n g a g e m e n t on the western front (on the " C a d u s i a n Wars," cf. my interpretive r e m a r k s in chap. 16/18). In short, it s e e m s to m e r e a s o n a b l e to d o u b t that these fronts c o u l d have led D a r i u s to neglect the affairs of Asia M i n o r (cf. also the reflections a l o n g these lines in T u p l i n 1987a: 1 3 9 4 2 a n d C a r t l e d g e 1987: 1 8 9 - 9 0 ) . • Darius II and His Armies.

O n the G r e e k stereotype of Persian military d e c a d e n c e , cf.

Biiant 1989a a n d the systematic analysis carried o u t in c h a p . 16/3; on c o m p e n s a t e d service (repay­ ment in silver for the ilku c h a r g e s ) , cf. J o a n n e s 1982: 2 0 - 2 1 , who, w h i l e noting that it is already known in the t i m e of D a r i u s I (p. 21), thinks that "it even b e c a m e the rule from the reign of Arta­ xerxes J" (p. 20) a n d that the contrary texts ( c o n v o c a t i o n s at U r u k u n d e r D a r i u s II: texts p p . 1 9 - 2 0 ) constituted n o t h i n g b u t "a few exceptions"; cf. a l s o p p . 2 5 - 2 6 - " U n d e r Artaxerxes I a n d D a r i u s II, this is the system that prevailed a n d , at least u n d e r u n u s u a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the feudatories of the Nippur region were not n o r m a l l y c o m p e l l e d to d o a n y t h i n g b u t pay the ilku in silver"; this inter­ pretation had already b e e n presented by C a r d a s c i a (1951: 8) a n d D a n d a m a e v (1967: 4 1 - 4 2 ) a n d it is widely a c c e p t e d a m o n g those w h o study the d e v e l o p m e n t of the G r e e k institution of m e r c e ­ naries under the A c h a e m e n i d s : cf. P i c a r d 1980: 2 2 2 - 2 3 (with several notes of caution nonetheless, p. 223); also R a h e 1980: 9 0 - 9 3 , a n d Petit 1993 (cf. Briant 1994b: 1 2 0 - 2 2 ) ; in contrast, m o r e c a u ­ tious regarding the G r e e k texts, S e i b t (1977: 1 2 1 - 3 8 ) d o e s not k n o w the B a b y l o n i a n material; on the G a d a l - l a m a affair, cf. C a r d a s c i a 1951: 1 7 9 - 8 2 (but I v e h e m e n t l y reject the c o n v e n t i o n a l "feu­ dal" interpretation) a n d 1958, from which I take the translation of U C 9/68 by P. B e a u l i e u in J o a n ­ nes, C A N E , p. 1481 (cf. a l s o C a r d a s c i a 1977); r e g a r d i n g the translation 'secretaries of the a r m y ' ['army cashiers' sipiru sa iicju], C a r d a s c i a 1951: 58 n. 2 m e n t i o n s b u t d o e s not a c c e p t S a n Nicolo's interpretation (non vidi), w h i c h c o m p a r e s the p h r a s e grammateis ton dynameon; the s u g g e s t i o n seems quite s e n s i b l e to m e : in the Hellenistic p e r i o d , these grammateis (senbdsipiru) were re­ quired to take the f u n c t i o n of soldiers (hoi grammateis ton tagmaton): cf. L a u n e y 1949II: 6 7 2 , a n d pp. 7 7 8 - 7 9 on their role in the distribution of military rations; on the B a b y l o n i a n p h r a s e , cf. also Stolper 1985a: 31 n. 116 a n d 93; c o n v o c a t i o n s at the syllogos: cf. texts gathered by W i d e n g r e n 1956: 152-60; texts d a t e d to Artaxerxes II: a n a l y z e d by D a n d a m a e v 1992a: 18 (on the barber's

980

Research Notes: Chapter 14

archives, cf. V a n Driel 1987: 1 6 4 - 6 7 ) . T h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f tenants' i n d e b t e d n e s s at t h e time of the fight b e t w e e n S o g d i a n u s a n d O c h u s are a n a l y z e d in detail by S t o l p e r 1985a: 104-24; h e devel­ ops the idea ( p p . 1 0 6 - 1 4 ) that the tablets record that t h e m e m b e r s of the hatru h a d to p l e d g e their plots (or m o r e precisely the r e v e n u e s derived from their plots) to the M u r a s u to b e able to outfit themselves d u r i n g the events relating to the s u c c e s s i o n . I stress that J o a n n e s (1982: 2 2 ) , Picard (loc. cit.), a n d R a h e (1980: 92) all refer to Stolper's work ( w h o in turn cites Parke a n d Seibt, p. 15Q n. 6 9 , in a sort o f " b i b l i o g r a p h i c tautology"); b u t Stolper's analysis d o e s n o t necessarily lead to the c o n c l u s i o n s they c o m e to: cf. the critical r e m a r k s by V a n Driel (1987: 1 7 4 - 7 6 ; 1989: 2 2 3 - 2 4 ) ; it furthermore s e e m s to m e that, m o r e recently, S t o l p e r has m o d i f i e d his initial proposal a bit (cf. S t o l p e r 1989c: 150, d i s c u s s i n g D a n d a m a e v 1967); o n the (limited) u s e o f G r e e k mercenaries in Asia M i n o r before the revolt of C y r u s the Younger, cf. S e i b t 1977: 3 5 - 5 1 . T o these remarks I will a d d o n e m o r e (in t h e form of a s u g g e s t i o n ) : w e m i g h t in fact ask to what extent the "pessimistic" interpretation o f the g e n e r a l i z a t i o n o f p a y m e n t in silver is not a distorted view, derived from a "flat" u s e of t h e e v i d e n c e c o n s i d e r e d . O n the royal taxes i n c u m b e n t o n t h e hatru, in fact, we have nothing b u t tablets from the archives o f t h e h o u s e o f M u r a s u ( a n d other h o u s e s from at least the t i m e o f D a r i u s ) . M o r e specifically they relate to t h e category a n a l y z e d by C a r d a s c i a (1951:98-120) u n d e r the n a m e "tax receipts": m a n a g i n g l a n d s entrusted to t h e m by the c o n c e s s i o n a i r e s , the Mu­ rasu took their profit in t h e l o r m o f vent, a n d it w a s they w h o , for this reason, p a i d the taxes to the saknutu, w h o , in turn, p a i d it to the royal treasury (cf. the c l e a r analysis by C a r d a s c i a 1951: 188— 98). T h i s p r o c e d u r e c a l l s forth three remarks; ( 1 ) w e h a v e n o t r a c e of t h e "normal" procedure, in w h i c h the c o n c e s s i o n a i r e p a i d the tax directly to the saknu ( C a r d a s c i a 1951: 192); (2) to pay the tax in silver, the M u r a s u h a d to transform the farm p r o d u c e , either by s a l e (cf. C a r d a s c i a 1951; 198) or by the transformation o f s o m e agricultural p r o d u c t s into "industrial" p r o d u c t s , dates and b e e r in particular (Van Driel 1989: 2 1 1 , 2 3 5 - 3 6 ) ; in this way they played a central role in the sys­ tem (as V a n Driel 1989 rightly insists), s i n c e t h e royal treasury preferred to d e a l with silver rather than agricultural p r o d u c t s ( s e e also Briant 1994d); (3) t h e p a y m e n t in silver by t h e M u r a s u thus d o e s not necessarily m e a n that the c o n c e s s i o n a i r e s did n o t o w e a c t u a l military service; o n the con­ trary, this was a n obligation that cost q u i t e dearly a n d that r e q u i r e d p u r c h a s e s from craftsmen ( a r m s , etc.): it was t h r o u g h the M u r a s O as i n t e r m e d i a r i e s that they g o t this silver, for, besides the taxes, the M u r a s u obviously p a i d a fee to the c o n c e s s i o n a i r e s for the lots they were m a n a g i n g . In other words, t h e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n o f the l a n d m a n a g e m e n t system (and thus o f p a y m e n t in silver) did not conflict with the military c a p a c i t i e s o f the Ijatru (which is by a n d l a r g e c o n c e a l e d by the na­ ture of o u r e v i d e n c e ) ; q u i t e t h e contrary, it was a p r i m a r y c o n d i t i o n o f their m a i n t e n a n c e . — On all of these p r o b l e m s , s e e also t h e clear reflections o f K u h r t 1989: 220 a n d the important com­ m e n t s by T u p l i n 1987b: 1 5 3 - 5 6 , in particular p p . 1 5 5 - 5 6 o n " c o m p e n s a t e d service"; the author, it s e e m s to m e , has reservations similar to those I s u g g e s t h e r e (citing t h e tablets relating to the bar­ b e r K u s u r - E a ) , w h i l e a g r e e i n g n o n e t h e l e s s that the actual levy o f the "king's soldier" b e c a m e rarer a n d rarer in favor o f the a p p e a l to m e r c e n a r i e s (p. 157). I m a i n t a i n m e a n w h i l e that the available d o c u m e n t a t i o n d o e s not allow s u c h statistical inferences: from recently p u b l i s h e d tablets, we learn for e x a m p l e o f a c o n v o c a t i o n of the a r m y by the king in 370 (ADRTB

n o . - 3 6 9 ) , or of the

existence o f fighting in 368 ( n o . - 3 6 7 ) ; this suffices to exemplify the a c c i d e n t a l nature o f military events s h o w i n g u p in t h e B a b y l o n i a n d o c u m e n t a t i o n ; anyway, it is n o t i m p o s s i b l e that every year the m e m b e r s o f certain military !}atru h a d to s e n d fully a r m e d soldiers, s u c h a s the sumptuously e q u i p p e d "Babylonian h o r s e m e n " w h o regularly c a m e to w e l c o m e the k i n g o n his frequent visits to B a b y l o n (cf. Q u i n t u s C u r t i u s V. 1.23; cf. a l s o m y reflections in R T P 45 a n d n. 2, as well as Kuhrt a n d S h e r w i n - W h i t e 1994: 312): a c c o r d i n g to X e n o p h o n , in a n y c a s e , s p e a k i n g in general of troop reviews, they were a n n u a l reviews (Oec. IV. 6); b e s i d e s , s u c h regularity w o u l d certainly m a k e it pos­ sible to m a i n t a i n the troops' military readiness at a n a p p r o p r i a t e level. [ O n paid service, see most recently t h e text B M 49718 e x p l a i n e d by Jursa 1995, w h o c o m p a r e s it with the texts concerning Kusur-Ea.]

From the Accession of Artaxerxes I to the Death of Darius H (465-405/404) • Cyrus in Asia Minor.

981

T h e theory o f a n e w treat)' b e t w e e n Sparta a n d D a r i u s (the so-called

treaty of Boiotios) was d e v e l o p e d by Lewis 1977: 124ff.; it h a s found strong and r e a s o n e d o p p o s i ­ tion from T u p l i n 1987a ( s o m e of w h o s e a r g u m e n t s a p p e a r to m e to b e c o n c l u s i v e ) ; on t h e amounts C y r u s received from the king, cf. L e w i s 1977: 131 n. 138; 1989: 231 (he notes the interest of the p a s s a g e Hell. Oxyr. 19.2 a n d stresses that for the first time t h e k i n g brings into play his o w n resources); on C y r u s a n d Lysander: cf. B o m m e l a e r 1981; t h e title karanos b o r n e by C y r u s : cf. Petit 1983; H a e b l e r 1982; a n d m o s t recently B e r n a r d 1994b: 500 a n d n. 53 (on the c o i n s o f the first Parthian kings, we find the word karanos in A r a m a i c , rendered in G r e e k by autokrator).

8. The Great King in His Countries • The Murasu, Babylonia, and the Royal Administration.

I s u m m a r i z e here with broad

strokes the work of C a r d a s c i a 1951, J o a n n e s 1982, Stolper 1985a, a n d V a n Driel 1989 ( w h o have just been q u o t e d a b o v e with r e s p e c t to m e r c e n a r i e s a n d hatru; cf. also S t o l p e r 1990c, 1992c; C A H y]2. 2 4 5 - 5 3 ) . M u c h information a n d analysis will also b e f o u n d in Bregstein 1993, in particular pp. 114-207, where the author with great precision presents the functional identity o f the owners of a seal: it thus constitutes the m o s t detailed presentation of t h e administrations a n d a d m i n i s t r a ­ tors in A c h a e m e n i d B a b y l o n i a : I m e n t i o n in p a s s i n g that in 418 we o b s e r v e a p r i c e increase in some Babylonian towns; it is possible that it lasted until 4 1 6 , b u t t h e sparse available d o c u m e n t a ­ tion does not allow u s to infer a d e e p structural crisis (cf. J o a n n e s 1982: 2 7 6 - 7 9 ) : there is in a n y case no trace of a B a b y l o n i a n revolt in these years, contrary to what the mistaken r e a d i n g o f a tab­ let had led us to believe (cf. S t o l p e r 1988a: 1 9 7 - 9 8 ) . • Belsunu.

O n his career, cf. especially S t o l p e r 1987, 1990a, 1995, a n d the remarks of G r a f

1993: 153-54; 1 thank F. J o a n n e s for providing m e with a translation of t h e d o c u m e n t T B E R A O 2569 (cf. also E n g l i s h translation by S t o l p e r 1992b: 1 2 3 - 2 5 ; the translation 'governor o f B a b y l o n ' seems to m e better than 'satrap o f Babylon'); in a n o t h e r article (1989b: 2 9 8 ) , Stolper raised d o u b t s about his earlier r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , stressing that B e l s u n u s e e m s to h a v e r e m a i n e d s u b o r d i n a t e to the satrap o f B a b y l o n ( o n t h e uncertainties o f Persian administrative vocabulary a n d its A k k a d i a n 2

caiques, cf. Stolper 1985a: 58; C A H V I : 2 5 2 - 5 3 ; D a n d a m a e v 1992b); on Belsunu's activities a s manager, cf. also S t o l p e r 1985b (with d o u b t s now expressed in S t o l p e r 1990a: 2 0 5 ) , V a n D r i e l 1989: 2 2 3 - 2 6 ; TCL 13.204: S t o l p e r 1987; 392 a n d n. 17. • Darius II in Egypt.

O n the p a r a d o x i c a l situation c o n c e r n i n g e v i d e n c e in E g y p t , cf. Briant

1984b: 58; A r a m a i c d o c u m e n t s of the reign o f D a r i u s II: list in B r e s c i a n i 1958; 187 ( a d d S e g a l 1983: 4, probably D a r i u s II); D a r i u s II at E l - K h a r g a : Kienitz 1953: 7 3 - 7 4 ; W i n l o c k (1941: 7ff.) thinks that it relates to D a r i u s I instead, but, m o r e recently, V a n W i j n g a a r d e n (1954: 6 9 - 7 0 ) at­ tributes the d o c u m e n t to D a r i u s II (cf. B r e s c i a n i 1958: 181, w h o also cites a sherd inscribed with the n a m e " [ - ] , s o n o f Artaxerxes"; s h e thinks it c o u l d relate to D a r i u s II b u t does not e x c l u d e Ar­ ses); a c c o r d i n g to G r e l o t (1972: 3 9 8 , referring to Posener 1936: 7 8 - 7 9 ) , D a r i u s II h a d a h y m n to Anion carved in the sanctuary of E l - K h a r g a ; I d o n o t k n o w where this information c o n i e s from (not found in Posener): w e thus s e e that s o m e uncertainty r e m a i n s r e g a r d i n g the possible p r e s e n c e of Darius II at E l - K h a r g a . F u r t h e r m o r e , C a z e l l e s (1955: 87 n. 3) asks whether the n a o s f o u n d a t Hermopolis M a g n a c o u l d b e attributed to D a r i u s II (rather than D a r i u s I), b u t Mysliwiec 1991 2

seems to e x c l u d e this hypothesis. D a r i u s Il's gifts at E d f u , cf. M e e k s 1972: 20, 55, 1 3 3 - 3 5 ; o n S D c i and the uncertainties of d a t i n g , cf. S c h m i t t 1981: 3 3 - 3 4 ; A r a m a i c version o f B e h i s t u n ( a n d Naqs-i Rustam: S i m s - W i l l i a m s 1981), cf. G r e e n f i e l d a n d Porten 1982: 2 - 4 ; Porten and Yardeni 1993; Por­ ten 1990: 17 on the date; I a d d that in their n e w p u b l i c a t i o n of the A r a m a i c text o f B e h i s t u n ( T A D A E C . 2 . 1 ) , Porten a n d Yardeni 1993: 59 repeat the theory already presented in G r e e n f i e l d and Porten 1982 o f c o p i e s for student u s e (for D B a n d DNa [ S i m s - W i l l i a m s 1981]), a n d they a d d this political explanation: "Perhaps t h e text was read periodically o n p u b l i c occasions"; o b s e r v i n g that the earliest d a t e in the text o n the verso is 417, they s u g g e s t that the n e w copy "may have b e e n written to c o m m e m o r a t e the 100th anniversary o f the great victories o f D a r i u s I w h i c h fell shortly

982

Research Notes: Chapter 14

after the a c c e s s i o n of his later n a m e s a k e , etc." E v e n t h o u g h the idea of a political i m p e t u s that had its s o u r c e at the center c a m e to my m i n d as well, I did not believe myself a b l e to a d o p t this sugges­ tion when I wrote the text of this note, a n d I d o not believe myself a b l e to sway from this rule of interpretive c a u t i o n , q u i t e a s i d e from the fact that the authors' c o m p a r i s o n between the revolts put d o w n by D a r i u s I a n d those f a c e d by D a r i u s II s e e m s excessive to m e . L a c k of interest in Egypt on the part of the G r e a t K i n g s in the fifth century is s u g g e s t e d , for e x a m p l e , by Kienitz 1953: 73-74 ( b a s e d — a s t o n i s h i n g l y ! —on the p r e s u m e d silting u p or filling with s a n d of the canal from the Nile to the R e d S e a ) ; a similar idea is found in D a n d a m a e v 1989a: 243: "After D a r i u s I, the Persian kings were b a s i c a l l y u n i n t e r e s t e d in the internal affairs of E g y p t " (referring to the limited number of d o c u m e n t s d a t e d to Artaxerxes I); it is clear that this position c o m e s directly from the traditional view of the rupture i n t r o d u c e d by Xerxes, a point of view that d o e s not stand u p to analysis (cf. c h a p . 13/6). R e g a r d i n g the a b s e n c e of stelas for the i n t e r m e n t of a n Apis or the m o t h e r of an Apis after those d a t e d to D a r i u s a n d Xerxes, then their r e a p p e a r a n c e b e g i n n i n g with Hakoris in 391, S m i t h (1992a: 207) s u g g e s t s that o n e m u s t s e e this as testimony to the restoration of the sanctuary, which "could well have b e e n o n e of the principal p r e o c c u p a t i o n s of the local g o v e r n m e n t after the end of A c h a e m e n i d d o m i n i o n in 404"; this is obviously a t e m p t i n g interpretation, b e c a u s e of the historical inferences it suggests; I will s i m p l y allow m y s e l f three remarks: (1) S m i t h himself stresses the special character of the stela that refers to D a r i u s a n d X e r x e s (cf. S m i t h 1988: 188; 1992a: 2 0 5 ) , a sort of official d o c u m e n t , as o p p o s e d to the stelas of the fourth century (up to and i n c l u d i n g A l e x a n d e r ) , which were inscribed by the m a s o n s at work d u r i n g the interment of the mothers of Apises; moreover, the first stela was reused later on, which o p e n s the way to a different interpretation, namely, that the stelas d a t i n g from the first Persion d o m i n i o n were destroyed after 404; the final p u b l i c a t i o n will certainly provide i m p o r t a n t information on this point; (2) mean­ while, I note that in the time of Artaxerxes I we see n o evident c h a n g e in the position of the Great K i n g in E g y p t : in the q u a d r i l i n g u a l inscription on a vase "Artaxerxes the g r e a t p h a r a o h "

(vazraka in

(A'Orsk), the

h i e r o g l y p h i c text calls him

the reconstructed Persian version: Ivlayrhofer 1978: 28);

these remarks d o not alleviate the difficulty, b u t they m i g h t a w a k e n interpretive c a u t i o n ; (3) [lastly I will take u p what D. D e v a u c h e l l e has very recently written (1995: 70): "We m a y remark the ab­ s e n c e of attestations c o n c e r n i n g the three or four Apises who lived at the end of the first Persian d o m i n i o n ; this is p e r h a p s d u e only to the c h a n c e preservation of a n c i e n t m o n u m e n t s " ; nonethe­ less the a u t h o r thinks it is p o s s i b l e that a c c o r d i n g to the recollections f o u n d on a stela of the Ptole­ m a i c era, the interment is dated either to c a . 412 or to the reign of D a r i u s II ( h e develops and explains this point in D e v a u c h e l l e 1994b: 1 0 4 - 6 ) ] .

• The Persian Authorities Confront Jews and Egyptians in Elephantine.

I repeat

here the ba­

sics of m y p r o o f in B r i a n t 1988a: 1 4 4 - 4 7 (where the b i b l i o g r a p h y m a y b e f o u n d ) , which 1 amend a n d c o m p l e t e in s o m e points; the relationship b e t w e e n the "code" of D a r i u s a n d the S y e n e E l e p b a n t i n e affairs were s u g g e s t e d to m e by r e a d i n g A l l a m 1986, 1993; M e l e z e - M o d r z j e w s k i 1986, 1989; I also note in p a s s i n g that the p h r a s e "in the time of C a m b y s e s " is f o u n d in a S a q q a r a papy­ rus but not in any explanatory context: cf. S e g a l 1983: 4. T h e fate a n d career of Widranga raise m a n y p r o b l e m s ; first of all, the p u n i s h m e n t that he is s u p p o s e d to have received (humiliation?) is inferred from a very difficult p a s s a g e in the petition sent by the Jews to the governor of J u d a h (DAE 102 [ = A P 30], line 15): the variety of solutions i m a g i n e d by the translators is considerable (cf. K r a e l i n g 1953: 105 n. 15; Porten 1968: 288 n. 19; G r e l o t 1972: 410 notes s a n d t); besides, Wid­ ranga s e e m s to b e n a m e d in a (badly d a m a g e d ) letter d a t e d to the a c c e s s i o n of Nepherires (Krae­ ling no. 13 = D A E 105), w h i c h s e e m s to i m p l y that h e had not lost his j o b a n d in any case that he had not b e e n e x e c u t e d , s i n c e he would have b e e n present a n d active on E l e p h a n t i n e in 399 or 398 (cf. K r a e l i n g 1953: 111-13; G r e l o t 1972: 422 with d o u b t s a b o u t the identification of this Widranga; [ L e m a i r e 1995a: 5 3 - 5 4 with s o m e a n n o y i n g typos in the d a t e s ] ) . T h e q u e s t i o n was reopened by L e m a i r e 1991c: 1 9 9 - 2 0 1 , who proposes d a t i n g the Aswan stela ( D A E 75) to Artaxerxes II (398), not Artaxerxes I (458); he m a k e s b a s i c corrections: rather than s e e i n g in it the erection of a Persian

From the Accession of Artaxerxes I to the Death of Darius II (465-405/404)

983

sanctuary, he thinks that W i d r a n g a d e d i c a t e d a s a n c t u a r y to "Osiris the p o w e r f u l " — h e n c e his note (p 201 n. 7) on D A E 98 [ = A P 38] a n d W i d r a n g a ' s "Egyptophilia": for reasons already given in Briant 1988a: 167, the Persians' m a r k e d devotion to E g y p t i a n p r a c t i c e s d o e s not s e e m to m e suffi­ cient proof of E g y p t o p h i l i a (in the political sense i m p l i e d by the authors w h o u s e the word: e.g., D o n a d o n i 1983: 35, referring specifically to W i d r a n g a ) ; all we c a n think is that, after the end of Persian d o m i n i o n , W i d r a n g a ( j u s t like the g a r r i s o n ) allied h i m s e l f with the new masters: but from this nothing c a n b e inferred a b o u t his "Egyptophilia"; after all, w h e n the Persians switched sides to Alexander (cf. c h a p . 18/3), n o o n e d r e a m e d of a c c u s i n g t h e m of " M a c e d o n o p h i l i a " : they simply obeyed whoever it s e e m e d to t h e m at the m o m e n t to b e in their interest to obey; for all these rea­ sons, I do not think that the new r e a d i n g s p r o p o s e d by L e m a i r e in themselves allow us to u n d e r ­ stand the reasons for W i d r a n g a ' s d e c i s i o n against the Jewish s a n c t u a r y at E l e p h a n t i n e . 1 c o n s i d e r the entire matter in detail in Briant 1996b. • A Business Letter.

B e s i d e s Grelot's c o m m e n t a r y , see Porten 1888b a n d Briant 1988a: 1 6 9 -

70; on "joint ventures" in B a b y l o n i a (without any Iranians), cf. D a n d a m a e v 1984a: 3 2 1 , 332, 3 7 1 .

• The Great King in Sidon and Elephantine. O n the coinage, besides Babelon (1910 II.2: 545-58), see m o r e recently Betlyon 1982: 3 - 9 a n d J.-A. G . Elayi 1993: 1 2 5 - 6 1 ; the b e g i n n i n g of coinage at Tyre a n d S i d o n is d a t e d c a . 450 by M i l d e n b e r t 1990: 144 n. 30 (cf. also J.-A. G . Elayi 19921)). P T S 32: cf. p h o t o in B r i a n t 1992d: 74 a n d drawing in E p h ' a l 1988: 157, who thinks it shows a "Phoenician trireme" ( o n the p r e s e n c e of fortifications on s o m e of these coins, cf. C h i l d s 1978: 79, Elayi 1986); seals from Dor: S t e r n 1 9 9 0 , 1 9 9 4 c : 1 9 0 - 9 2 ; c o i n s of S y e n e - E l e p h a n t i n e : Lipinski 1982: 27. D e b a t e on S i d o n i a n coins: b e g i n n i n g with study of the later c o i n s , where a n o t h e r p e r s o n (with Egyptian hairstyle) walks b e h i n d the c h a r i o t ( B a b e l o n no. 906fE), Seyrig ( 1 9 5 9 ) offered the hypothesis that the k i n g in the c h a r i o t is not the G r e a t K i n g b u t a n i m a g e of the g o d Baal of the city; this interpretation was cast into d o u b t by S c h l u m b e r g e r 1971, u s i n g a r g u m e n t s that s e e m very strong (cf. also Betlyon 1982: 10); it s h o u l d b e recalled that the motif of the king on his chariot is also found in P h o e n i c i a n imagery before the A c h a e m e n i d period: cf. a C y p r i o t - P h o e n i c i a n bowl from Praenestc (drawing in C h i l d s 1978: fig. 29 = fig. 50c, p. 606 here): hunt near the royal city (represented by two towers); s t a n d i n g u n d e r a parasol, the k i n g rests his right h a n d on the driver's shoulder who, l e a n i n g forward, holds the reins of the horse (two h o r s e s ? ) ; there as elsewhere, the imagery b e y o n d d o u b t owes m u c h to Neo-Assyrian m o d e l s (on these bowls, cf. C h i l d s 1978: 5 4 56, who is not directly interested in the m o t i f of the k i n g on his chariot). S a r c o p h a g u s of the satrap: the date a n d interpretation a r e controversial; against K l e e m a n 1958 ( a r o u n d 4 3 0 ) , G a b e l m a n n 1979 proposes the d e c a d e 3 8 0 - 3 7 0 , after a stylistic c o m p a r i s o n with the Lycian m o n u m e n t s : the comparison is also systematically d o n e to extract a historical interpretation from it (see m o s t re­ cently the d i s c u s s i o n by S t u c k y 1993); the "theory of d e p e n d e n c y " (principal person = G r e a t King) was worked o u t over several years by B o r c h h a r d t (cf. in p a r t i c u l a r 1983, a n d m o s t recently 1993a: 5 0 - 5 2 ) ; against this position, s e e K l e e m a n n (1958: 1 6 3 - 6 5 ) , G a b e l m a n (1984: 6 3 - 6 8 , on the a u d i e n c e s c e n e ) , a n d J a c o b s (1987: 7 1 - 7 3 ) . • The Lycian Case.

O n the L y c i a n texts of the X a n t h u s Pillar a n d the G r e e k e p i g r a p h i c cor­

pus, cf. the analyses by C h i l d s 1981: 6 2 - 6 9 ; B r y c e 1986: 1 0 5 - 8 ; a n d now B o u s q u e t 1992 ( d i s c u s s e d by Keen 1992a, c h a p . 17); a c c o r d i n g to C h i l d s (1981: 69), the s a r c o p h a g u s of M e r e h i s h o u l d be attributed to K h e r i g a , b e c a u s e of a n inscription on it; b u t D e m a r g n e (1974b: 96) thinks the ico­ nography leads to a lower date. C o i n of T i s s a p h e r n e s at X a n t h u s : p u b l i c a t i o n by Hurter 1979: 1 0 0 101, 108; on the u n c e r t a i n t i e s of the historical interpretation, cf. Harrison 1982a: 3 9 1 - 9 6 ; the theory of the satrapal portrait has b e e n d e v e l o p e d particularly by C a l m in m a n y works (cf. C a l m 1975, repeated in 1985: 594; 1989): on this s u b j e c t , s e e in particular m a n y works of Z a h l e : 1982, most recently 1989: 1 7 5 - 7 6 : contra C a l m , the a u t h o r thinks it is a portrait of the dynast p l a i n a n d simple; at the s a m e t i m e h e a g r e e s that s u c h c o i n a g e explains the military participation of L y c i a n s with the satrap a n d that, a c c o r d i n g to h i m , it was the satrap h i m s e l f w h o s u p p l i e d the silver for the minting; entirely o p p o s e d , Savalli (1988: 118 a n d n. 78) stresses the uncertainty of the restoration

Research Notes: Chapter 14

984

" T i s s a p h e r n e s " on the X a n t h u s c o i n , a n d s h e writes: "For this entire p e r i o d [ 4 4 0 - 3 8 0 a p p r o x ] there is n o trace of any control on the part of the A c h a e m e n i d k i n g s a n d / o r their satraps, other than [this coin]"; the s u g g e s t i o n s e e m s i n c a u t i o u s to m e b e c a u s e of the g e n e r a l i z a t i o n it draws, espe­ cially f r o m a n a l y z i n g the G r e e k p o e m s from X a n t h u s (interestingly, for all that); cf. the opposite position of B r y c e 1986: 109 (the a u t h o r of the pillar was "an ally, if not a vassal, of the satrap Tissa­ phernes"), a n d the a p p r e c i a t i o n of K e e n 1992a: c h a p . 7 ("In g e n e r a l the r u l i n g dynasty a t X a n t h u s s e e m s to have b e c o m e m o r e pro-Persian, both politically and culturally, after the accession of Kheriga"). O n the p o e m s c e l e b r a t i n g the d e e d s of G e r g i s a n d A r b i n a s , cf. now especially Bousq u e t 1992 (from w h o m 1 take m u c h ) ; on the p o e m of Arbinas: the theory of a direct borrowing from Persian c o n c e p t s is d e v e l o p e d (following R o b e r t 1975: 3 2 8 - 3 0 ) by H e r r e n s c h m i d t 198$. a g a i n s t this p o s i t i o n , S a v a l l i (1988: 1 0 6 - 1 0 ) exhibits the d e e p l y G r e e k character of the p o e m ; I am closer to the subtle position o f B o u s q u e t , w h o w h i l e c h a l l e n g i n g H e r r e n s c h m i d t ' s interpretation d e s c r i b e s A r b i n a s as "a dynast b r o u g h t u p in the Iranian fashion" (1992: 181); on the Xanthus dy­ nasts' own objectives d u r i n g the Ionian War, cf. the historical reconstructions of B o u s q u e t : "On the o c c a s i o n of the war in C a r i a , G e r g i s h a d to lay his h a n d s on the land of C a u n u s , " from which, later, Arbinas perpetrated his c o n q u e s t s in the X a n t h u s V a l l e y (1992: 1 7 5 - 7 8 , 180), but see now M e l c h e r t 1993, a n a l y z e d a b o v e .

• The Cilician Case.

O n C y r u s the Y o u n g e r in C i l i c i a , cf. E r z e n 1940: 1 1 6 - 2 0 , where the

s o u r c e s are g a t h e r e d ; a c c o r d i n g to Kraay (1976: 9 - 1 1 ) , several C i l i c i a n c o i n s of T i s s a p h e r n e s were issued to finance the ( f a m o u s ) P h o e n i c i a n navy in 4 1 1 - 4 1 0 , b u t the hypothesis r e m a i n s very du­ bious: cf. Harrison 1982a: 4 6 - 5 1 ; C a p e c c h i 1991: 6 8 - 6 9 ; P r i c e , R E A 9 1 / 1 - 2 (1989): 106; on the "dynastic" c o i n a g e , cf. the d o u b t s b r o u g h t o u t by Harrison 1982a: 4 4 0 - 5 0 a n d Moysey 1989: 127 n. 5; on this c o i n a g e , s e e also C a p e c c h i 1991: 6 8 - 7 2 ( a n d 7 2 - 8 5 on the c o i n a g e of the Cilician cit­ ies) a n d Weiser 1989: 2 7 8 - 8 1 (who thinks this m i g h t b e c o i n a g e of C y r u s the Younger during his p a s s a g e through C i l i c i a ) ; a c c o r d i n g to D a v e s n e (1989: 161), the C i l i c i a n c o i n a g e in its entirely ex­ presses "the a d o p t i o n of a c o m m o n s t a n d a r d , derived from the Persian shekel, [which] seems to i n d i c a t e that the A c h a e m e n i d p o w e r was at the root of this production"; b u t this political interpre­ tation s e e m s weak to m e . O n these n u m i s m a t i c a n d m o n e t a r y p r o b l e m s , s e e n o w Casabonne 1995a, b.

• The Persians and the Kings of Cyprus. (ADRTB no.

B a b y l o n i a n a s t r o n o m i c a l tablet

Cf. W i e s e h o f e r 1990a a n d C o l l o m b i e r 1990,1991. A - 4 4 0 ) refers directly to events taking p l a c e around

S a l a m i s on C y p r u s ; it has b e e n dated (not w i t h o u t reservations) by the editors to the reign of Arta­ xerxes I ( h e n c e its n u m b e r i n g ) ; b u t I a m p e r s u a d e d by the a r g u m e n t s of van der S p e k (1993a: 96) who tends to date it to the reign of Artaxerxes II; the text will thus relate to the affairs of Cyprus in the 380s ( c h a p . 15/6: " T h e Offensive a g a i n s t E v a g o r a s ( 3 8 7 / 3 8 6 - 3 8 3 / 3 8 1 ) , " p. 652; also chap. 15/1).

Chapter 15

Artaxerxes II (405/404-359/358) Artaxerxes III

and

(359/358-338)

J. The Reign of Artaxerxes If: Sources and Problems • The Greek Authors' View.

C f . Briant 1987b, 1989a, 1994b, a n d S a n c i s i - W e e r d e n b u r g 1987a;

on Plutarch's Life of Artaxerxes, cf. Orsi 1 9 7 9 - 8 0 , 1988, M a n f r e d i a n d Orsi 1987, Tagliaferro a n d Manganclli 1 9 9 1 - 9 2 , as for the stereotyped view of Artaxerxes II a n d the court conspiracies ( f a n n e d by the i n e s c a p a b l e Parysatis!) d i s c u s s e d by D a n d a m a e v 1989a a n d Petit 1993,1 have e x p l a i n e d else­ where what I think o f it (Briant 1993c; Briant 1994b: 1 1 8 - 1 9 ) ; for all these reasons (laid o u t as needed in the c o u r s e of this c h a p t e r ) , I d o not s h a r e the c o n f i d e n c e M o y s e y 1992 asks us to p l a c e in Plutarch, or that the s a m e author (1991: 1 1 2 - 1 4 ) grants to E p h o r u s on the g r o u n d s that h e is a n "eyewitness" (see c h a p . 15/7: A S u m m a r y of the D i s c u s s i o n , pp. 674ff.). O n D i n o n (FGrH 6 9 0 ) , cf. Stevenson 1987; o n the Oxyrhynchus Hellenica, cf. B r u c e 1967 a n d M c K e c h n i e - K e r n 1988; o n Xenophon's Hetlenica, cf. K r e n t z 1989 a n d now T u p l i n 1993 (who centers his proposal o n G r e e k matters); on the p h r a s e " T e n T h o u s a n d , " s e e M a s q u e r a y 1928.

• The View from Susa, Babylon, and Persepolis. O n Belesys/Belsunu, see several articles by 2

Stolper (most recently C A H V I : 2 3 8 - 3 9 a n d S t o l p e r 1995). ADRTB n o . - 3 6 9 : o n the p l a c e - n a m e 2

Razaunda, I o w e the s u g g e s t i o n ( M e d i a ) to S t o l p e r , C A H V I : 239. A D R T B n o . - 4 4 0 is dated to Artaxerxes I by the editors (despite t h e d o u b t s already expressed by S c h m i d t 1982c: 87); the tablet should instead b e d a t e d to Artaxerxes II, as s u g g e s t e d in turn by van d e r S p e k 1993a: 96, w h o p l a c e s it in the context of the Persians' battle against E v a g o r a s k n o w n from D i o d o r u s XV.2ff.; if we were able to date precisely D i o d o r u s ' s p h r a s e "this year" (§2.1-*-), w e c o u l d also p l a c e the tablet within Artaxerxes IPs reign (the editors' s u g g e s t i o n "year 24?" is n o m o r e than that). Obviously w e c a n in­ quire why a B a b y l o n i a n s c r i b e would look to the A e g e a n front for a c h r o n o l o g i c a l marker, given that generally s p e a k i n g references to events a r e strictly B a b y l o n - c e n t r i c ( S a c h s a n d H u n g e r 1988: 36). It is obviously n o t easy to discover why at this p o i n t the s c r i b e felt it would b e useful to m e n ­ tion a fact that (for us) b e l o n g s to i m p e r i a l history (cf. van der S p e k 1993a: 9 3 - 9 5 ) . M y s u g g e s t i o n (all else b e i n g e q u a l ) is as follows: e x a m i n a t i o n of the a s t r o n o m i c a l tablets and other B a b y l o n i a n chronicles of the A c h a e m e n i d and H e l l e n i s t i c p e r i o d s suggests (it s e e m s to m e ) that extra-Babylo­ nian regions a r e referenced only w h e n t h e k i n g or a m e m b e r o f the royal family was on the spot: this holds, for e x a m p l e , for A B C , C h r o n i c l e n o . 9 (p. 114), w h i c h d e a l s with Artaxerxes Ill's e x p e ­ dition against S i d o n a n d P h o e n i c i a ( D i o d o r u s X V I . 4 0 6ff.), or A B C , C h r o n i c l e no. 13, reverse: ex­ pedition of S e l e u c u s in Asia M i n o r and M a c e d o n i a ( S h e r w i n - W h i t e , / N E S 42/4 [1983]: 2 6 6 - 6 7 ; Briant 1994c: 4 6 3 - 6 7 ) , as well as s o m e a s t r o n o m i c a l tablets, s u c h as A D R T B n o . - 2 7 3 ( S h e r w i n White and K u h r t 1993: 4 6 - 4 7 ) , or another o n e ( n o . - 2 5 5 ) that a n n o u n c e s the death o f Q u e e n Stratonice in S a r d i s ( " T h a t m o n t h it was heard in B a b y l o n : q u e e n StratonikS died in Sardis"). I thus c o n c l u d e from this that, if van d e r Spek's p r o p o s e d d a t i n g is correct (which it has to b e if the reading is [Ar]su), then ADRTB n o . - 4 4 0 refers to a t i m e w h e n Artaxerxes II led the troops in per­ son against C y p r u s (or at least that h e was at the front at the b e g i n n i n g o f the war); a l t h o u g h w e can never b e absolutely certain, it is what D i o d o r u s writes ( X V 2 . 1 ) : Artaxerxes . . . estrateusen ep' Eiirtgoran ton Kuprou hasilea, where estrateuse s h o u l d b e taken in its primary s e n s e of ' m a k e (or participate in) a military expedition', that is, for a king, to lead at the h e a d of his troops ( c o m p a r e Diodorus X V I . 4 0 . 4 - 6 ; cf. H e r o d o t u s V I I . 3 - 6 ) ; d o u b t l e s s it is this p r e s e n c e that the tablet is refer­ ring to with the unfortunately b r o k e n f o r m u l a " . . . o f the l a n d l a m u n i a m m u which the king m a d e [• • •]." T h u s n o c o n c l u s i o n c a n b e d r a w n from this text a b o u t the suggestion that B a b y l o n w a s

985

Research Notes: Chapter 1 5

986

c o n c e r n e d with the "particular" i m p o r t a n c e of the A e g e a n front; for a B a b y l o n i a n scribe, it waj e q u a l l y noteworthy in other years to indicate that the king had led his troops against the countrj R a z a u n d a (ADRTB no. - 3 6 9 ) , or that the "king's troops had given battle [ s o m e w h e r e ] " (no - 3 6 6 ) and far m o r e interesting to m e n t i o n planetary c o n j u n c t i o n s , the level of the E u p h r a t e s flood, oi the price of barley on the B a b y l o n m a r k e t (cf. Slotsky 1993).

2. The War of the Two Brothers (404-401) • From Darius 11 to Artaxerxes II.

We k n o w n o t h i n g of the reasons for Parysatis's preference

for C y r u s (on the relationships of Parysatis, C y r u s , a n d Artaxerxes, the r a m b l i n g s of H u s i n g 1933 m u s t be relegated to d e a d storage, despite the e c h o e s that still are o c c a s i o n a l l y e n c o u n t e r e d to­ day): an a n c i e n t tradition (Aelian,

Anim. V I . 3 9 ;

Plutarch,

Mor.

328c) holds that she engaged in

FGrH

incestual relations with her y o u n g e r son; this tradition d o u b t l e s s g o e s b a c k to C t e s i a s (cf.

688 F 4 4 ) . T h e n a m e (Arsu) of D a r i u s IPs first son (called Arsices by C t e s i a s a n d O a r s e s by Dinon: P l u t a r c h , Art.

1.4) is c o n f i r m e d by B a b y l o n i a n tablets (cf. S c h m i t t 1982c: 8 4 - 8 5 ; 8 8 - 8 9 , and now

van der S p e k 1993a: 9 5 - 9 6 ) ; l a n d s b e l o n g i n g to the "son of the king

(mar sarri)" are attested

in the

N i p p u r area by tablets d a t i n g between years 1 a n d 7 of D a r i u s II ( S t o l p e r 1985a: 5 4 - 6 2 ) , but the d e s i g n a t i o n u s e d d o e s not r e q u i r e us to s u p p o s e that Arses had b e e n r e c o g n i z e d as crown-prince from that date; a l t h o u g h in fact the translation-interpretation 'crown p r i n c e ' ( a d o p t e d by Stolper) c a n b e justified for the S e l e u c i d period, w h e n the c u s t o m of a s s o c i a t i n g a n heir-designate with the t h r o n e — a n d even d o u b l e k i n g s h i p — e x i s t e d [ S h e r w i n - W h i t e a n d K u h r t 1993: 2 3 - 2 4 ; SherwinW h i t e , / N E S 32/4 [1982]: 2 6 5 - 6 6 ; B r i a n t 1994(1: 4 6 6 n. 2 2 ] , things were q u i t e different in the A c h a e m e n i d p e r i o d , for which n o t h i n g indicates that the p e r s o n called

mar Sarri actually

was the

o n e w h o was r e c o g n i z e d by his father in the c e r e m o n y d e s c r i b e d by P l u t a r c h , Art. 2 6 . 4 - 5 (it is even e x c l u d e d in the c a s e u n d e r analysis here): the p r o b l e m is d o u b t l e s s different for the title uma-

supitru,

w h i c h is also translated 'crown-prince' by Stolper, p p . 5 9 - 6 1 , following Eilers: cf. on this

point also c h a p . 13/2, p. 520. C o n c e r n i n g A t h e n a e u s X I I . 548e, d o u b t s r e m a i n , b e c a u s e of the vari­ o u s m e n c a l l e d O c h u s ; it c o u l d refer to either D a r i u s II or Artaxerxes III (the s a m e p r o b l e m with P o l y a e n u s VII. 17; see c h a p . 15/8: F r o m Artaxerxes II to Artaxerxes III, p p . 680ff.); b u t the charac­ teristics attributed to the dying king, the insistence o n the length of his reign, a n d especially the c o n d i t i o n s s u r r o u n d i n g the s u c c e s s i o n of Artaxerxes II m a k e us prefer to believe that the author is actually referring to the transition from D a r i u s II to Artaxerxes II; Justin V I I.I m a y derive from the s a m e tradition: "In his last instructions, D a r i u s left the throne to Artaxerxes, a n d to Cyrus the towns of w h i c h h e was governor." O n the interpolation i n c l u d e d in the

Hellenica

(II. 1.8), cf. the

d o u b t s of L e w i s 1977: 104 n. 83; but, if Xerxes is c o r r e c t e d to Artaxerxes, the d a t u m c a n be ac­ c e p t e d (cf. C o u s i n 1904: 3 2 - 3 3 ) ; on this point, we m a y also stress the c u r i o u s detail included by T h u c y d i d e s ( V I I I . 3 7 . 1 ) in the text of the s e c o n d treaty b e t w e e n the Persians a n d the L a c e d a e m o ­ n i a n s , in winter 4 1 2 - 4 1 1 : the c o n t r a c t u a l parties swearing to it o n the Persian side are listed as: " T h e king [ D a r i u s ] , the sons of the king

(hoi paides tous [tou] hasilos), a n d T i s s a p h e r n e s . "

Altheim

and Stiehl (1963: 1 5 0 - 5 1 ) think that the p h r a s e designates A u t o b o i s a c e s a n d M i t r a e u s , who the

Hellenica

interpolator says were "sons of Darius's sister"; they also think that this (unnamed)

w o m a n was Artaxerxes I's d a u g h t e r — h e n c e the m u r d e r s of A u t o b o i s a c e s a n d M i t r a e u s by Cyrus: these are a lot of a s s u m p t i o n s (it m i g h t also s i m p l y b e a d i p l o m a t i c formula just like the o n e doubt­ less found in E z r a 6:10). O n a n t i - C y r u s p r o p a g a n d a , cf. Orsi 1 9 7 9 - 8 0 ; C y r u s ' s c o i n a g e at Sardis: Weiser 1989.

• Cyrus's Preparations and Artaxerxes' Response: From Memphis to Sardis.

I know of no in­

vestigation intended specifically to p l a c e the events in the framework of A c h a e m e n i d history proper; recent studies are particularly interested in the itinerary of the T e n T h o u s a n d , on which they provide often i m p o r t a n t a n d interesting c o m m e n t a r y : see C o u s i n 1904: 2 1 3 - 3 3 ; Manfredi 1986; D o n n e r 1986; L e n d l e 1984 a n d 1986; D e b o r d 1995; J o a n n e s 1995; etc. In contrast, Cook

Artaxerxes II (405/404-159B58)

and Artaxerxes III (359/358-338)

987

(]983: 2 1 1 - 1 3 ) a n d D a n d a m a e v (1989a: 2 7 4 - 8 5 ) offer nothing new on the level of historical inter­ pretation, other than s o m e t i m e s surprising suggestions; in particular, 1 d o not see the basis for D a n d a m a e v ' s (1989a: 274) "It is p o s s i b l e that h e [ C y r u s ] h o p e d to d i m i n i s h the influence of the Persian nobility a n d to c r e a t e a centralized g o v e r n m e n t , c o m p a r a b l e to those w h i c h were estab­ lished in the Hellenistic period": on this point, cf. Briant 1993c: 4 2 1 - 2 2 ; despite its a g e a n d a few faults, C o u s i n ' s b o o k ( 1 9 0 4 ) s o m e t i m e s offers m o r e interesting q u e s t i o n s than m a n y recent stud­ ies. C y r u s and T i s s a p h e r n e s : a c c o r d i n g to L e w i s (1977: 1 2 0 - 2 1 ) , control of the cities was taken from C y r u s to b e given by Artaxerxes II to T i s s a p h e r n e s ; s e e the critical remarks of T u p l i n 1987a: ] 4 2 - 4 5 ; on the h i e r a r c h i c a l relationship b e t w e e n the two m e n , cf. the discussion by R u z i c k a 1985a, who offers several i m p o r t a n t s u g g e s t i o n s . A l c i b i a d e s a n d P h a r n a b a z u s : on the record a n d its contradictions, cf. Hatzfeld 1951: 3 4 1 - 4 9 (who thinks, contrary to the position d e f e n d e d here, that Cyrus's intentions were u n f o r e s e e a b l e by a n y o n e in 404; cf also R u z i c k a 1985a: 211 n. 22); on the path followed by A l c i b i a d e s , cf. R o b e r t 1980: 2 5 7 - 9 9 ; the P h a r n a b a z u s theory is a d o p t e d by C o u s i n (1904: 6 3 - 6 8 ) . E g y p t i a n revolt: we m a y n o t e that, a c c o r d i n g to X e n o p h o n ' s s o u r c e s (Anab. 1.8.9; II. 1.6), E g y p t i a n soldiers fought in the royal a r m y at C u n a x a : b u t this might refer to E g y p ­ tians who h a d settled in B a b y l o n i a ; o n the d a t e of D A E 7 [AP 35] ( S e p t e m b e r 11, 4 0 0 ) , see Porten 1990: 19. P s a m m e t i c h u s a n d A m y r t a e u s : cf. valid r e m a r k s of K i e n i t z 1953: 76, a n d now L l o y d 1994: 337 a n d 347 n. 48; o n the c h r o n o l o g y of the E g y p t i a n revolt a n d the Persian retreat, see L e ­ maire 1991c: 2 0 0 - 1 a n d 1995a: 5 1 - 5 6 . T a m o s a n d P s a m m e t i c h u s : despite C l o c h e 1919: 222, there is no reason to infer from the m u r d e r o f T a m o s that P s a m m e t i c h u s was a "Persophile"; the T a m o s episode has q u i t e recently b e e n cited by L l o y d 1994: 347, who believes that Diodorus's text is too allusive to s u p p o r t historical interpretation; this justifiable caution leads m e to stress o n c e m o r e that the idea ( d i s c u s s e d in my text) of a n a l l i a n c e s o u g h t by C y r u s is s i m p l y hypothetical; on the other h a n d , the existence of a privileged relationship b e t w e e n the E g y p t i a n dynasts a n d C a r i a n M e m p h i t e s in the service of the Persians is c o n f i r m e d by D i o d o r u s X V 9 4, who p l a c e s h i m s e l f some twenty years after Cyrus's revolt: G l u s , son-in-law of T i r i b a z u s , m a k e s a symmakhia with P h a ­ raoh Hakoris; of c o u r s e , G l u s was h i m s e l f the s o n of T a m o s ( X e n o p h o n , Anab. II. 1.3; B r i a n t 1988a: 161). • Cyrus the Younger's Army.

T h e r e are a great m a n y studies on Cyrus's G r e e k m e r c e n a r i e s :

one may especially c o n s u l t Roy 1967, S e i b t 1977: 5 1 - 6 9 , a n d M a r i n o v i c 1988: 2 4 - 3 6 ; cf. a l s o the analysis by C o u s i n 1904: 1 3 3 - 2 1 2 , w h i c h h a s the (rare) distinction of c o n s i d e r i n g C y r u s ' s "barbar­ ian" army (pp. 1 0 8 - 3 2 ) : o n this point see a l s o Briant 1985b: 6 2 - 6 3 ; a m o n g the a v a i l a b l e s o u r c e s , Westlake (1987) with g o o d reason r e e v a l u a t e s D i o d o r u s S i c u l u s ' s contribution. O n the size of Artaxerxes IPs a n d C y r u s the Younger's a r m i e s : as u s u a l , the figures offered by the a n c i e n t a u t h o r s are both contradictory a n d barely u s a b l e : D i o d o r u s (XIV. 19.7) m a k e s the ratio b e t w e e n m e r c e n a r ­ ies and barbarian a r m y 1 : 7, X e n o p h o n (1.7.10) 1 : 10, p r o p o r t i o n s l e a d i n g to e v a l u a t i o n s that are much too high (if only for logistical r e a s o n s ) ; just as with X e r x e s ' army in 480, there is virtually no way of c o m i n g to a d e c i s i o n , other than by a p p e a l i n g to the e m i n e n t l y s u b j e c t i v e n o t i o n of "rea­ sonable figures": cf. m o s t recently G . W y l i e 1992: 123, w h o (following others) suggests the s u m to­ tal of 30,000 for the rebel army. Is it necessary to a d d that the a n c i e n t estimates c o n c e r n i n g Artaxerxes IPs a r m y are e q u a l l y u n a c c e p t a b l e ? O n these p r o b l e m s , s e e also now the d i s c u s s i o n s and analyses of G a b r i e l l i 1995 a n d D e s c a t 1995. • Propaganda and Legitimation.

O n the crossing of the E u p h r a t e s a n d X e n o p h o n ' s tale, cf.

some remarks a l o n g these lines by D e s n i e r ( a p u d B r i q u e l 1981) a n d by Briquel a n d D e s n i e r 1983 (which I d o not follow for all their interpretations) [ t a k e n u p a g a i n in D e s n i e r 1995: 2 1 - 2 2 , 2 5 - 2 6 (received at the very m o m e n t o u r final revision was b e i n g c o m p l e t e d ) ] ; on the date of the event, cf. C o u s i n 1904: 3 0 7 - 8 ; o n the c r o s s i n g of the E u p h r a t e s by L u c u l l u s , cf. C u m o n t 1905a. A c c o r d ­ ing to Weiser 1989, C i l i c i a was w h e r e C y r u s first struck c o i n s with his i m a g e , coiffed with the royal kidaris. If the theory is correct, the m e s s a g e was clear: Artaxerxes was not facing any ordinary satra­ pal revolt. In his m i n d , C y r u s was already a c t i n g as a G r e a t K i n g would. B u t it m u s t b e r e c o g n i z e d

988

Research Notes: Chapter 15

that t h e interpretation is highly speculative: anyway, s e e n o w C a s a b o n n e 1995b. In any case 1 have the very clear i m p r e s s i o n that C y r u s was seriously in n e e d of metal reserves: it is n o d o u b t not out o f the q u e s t i o n that p r o m i s e s o f b o n u s e s were p r e d i c a t e d o n the victory to c o m e (Anab. 1.4. ] J. on these p r o b l e m s , cf. also D e s c a t 1995). • Personal and Dynastic Loyalty.

C o u s i n (1904: 92ff.) also holds grave d o u b t s a b o u t the scale

of defections to C y r u s , and he thinks (p. 9 2 ) that "the true strength of the king lay in the loyalty of his people," rightly s u p p o s i n g that it was a case o f p r o p a g a n d a intended to legitimate the rebel's kingly pretensions; unfortunately, the a u t h o r does n o t exhibit the s a m e critical attitude when he c h a r a c t e r i z e s Artaxerxes II as a weak prince, isolated within his h a r e m s (pp. 9 9 - 1 0 0 ) ; o n Megap h e r n e s ' title phoinikistes, cf. Lewis 1977: 25 n. 143; on the p h r a s e " e n e m y land," cf. R T P 58 n. 4on T a m o s a n d G i n s : cf. Briant 1988a: 161; administrative position and family o f O r o n t e s o f Arme­ nia: O s b o r n e 1973: 5 1 7 - 2 2 ; Belesys a n d G o b r y a s in 401: at that d a t e , B e l s u n u / B e l e s y s was "gover­ nor o f E b i r N a r i " ( c f Stolper 1987); the c a s e for G o b r y a s is less certain; a m a n with that n a m e was "governor of B a b y l o n i a " or "governor o f the country of Akkad" in the first years o f D a r i u s II, with the last (currently available) m e n t i o n d a t i n g to 417; it m i g h t b e the s a m e person (Stolper 1987: 3 9 6 - 9 8 ) . [ I w o n d e r whether this G o b r y a s c o u l d b e identified with the G o b a r e s (praefectus) of w h o m Pliny (VI. 30.120) recalls that he d u g a c a n a l to protect B a b y l o n i a from t h e E u p h r a t e s flood; a c c o r d i n g to h i m this was the N a r m a l c h a s (regium flumen). It is true that the risks o f homonymy are great (as m u c h in personal n a m e s as in river n a m e s ) a n d that t h e text m i g h t just as well be re­ ferring to G u b a r u in the time o f C y r u s a n d C a m b y s e s , both b e c a u s e several tablets mention a " G u b a r u c a n a l " ( J o a n n e s 1982: 326) a n d b e c a u s e there were c o n f u s i o n s in t h e C l a s s i c a l authors a m o n g the various "royal" c a n a l s (cf. the presentation o f the p r o b l e m in van d e r S p e k 1992: 23639). Pliny m i g h t also b e e c h o i n g a m e m o r y o f the m a j o r works carried o u t by (the later) Gulxiru in recligging/improving a n older canal (cf. for c o m p a r i s o n the text from the t i m e o f Xerxes, quoted by J o a n n e s 1982: 326: r e c r u i t m e n t of workers "for d i g g i n g t h e G u b a r u canal," n o t to m e n t i o n that the c a n a l is already found in a text from the time o f C a m b y s e s ) . T h e q u e s t i o n m u s t remain open.] I also note that a c c o r d i n g to Bivar (1961), o n e A r t i m a s ( h e p u b l i s h e s a seal of his bearing his name in A r a m a i c ) , w h o m the a u t h o r presents as h o l d i n g a n official position in Lycia, defected to Cyrus (subsequently, S h a h b a z i 1975: 1 1 9 - 2 4 c o n n e c t s h i m to M e g a b y z u s ' s family); but the use of the "sa­ trapal list" in Anab. V I I . 8 . 2 5 is very risky, a n d Bivar's theory thus carries a very high coefficient of uncertainty, especially b e c a u s e Artimas is n o t a specifically Persian n a m e (cf. also the incidental remark o f D a n d a m a e v 1992a: 45); the n a m e is very c o m m o n in C a r i a ( c f , e.g., Lipinski 1975: 166; Bliimel 1990); furthermore, R o b i n s o n (editorial note following Bivar) stresses that the Lycian ori­ gin o f the d o c u m e n t is far from proved. Bivar's theory has n o n e t h e l e s s b e e n repeated quite recently by M e l i k i a n - C h i r v a n i 1993: 1 1 4 - 1 5 ; the latter, moreover, m a k e s h i m the d e s c e n d a n t of the Arti­ m a s w h o s e n a m e is written in L y d i a n on a footed censer, w h o s e text (Artymalim) was published with c o m m e n t a r y by G u s m a n i 1983: this all m a k e s for q u i t e a rickety scaffolding o f hypothesesl T h r e e final remarks: ( 1 ) If a s I s u g g e s t e d in the previous p a r a g r a p h C y r u s h a d run o u t of money (until the m o m e n t h e was partly rescued by the syennesis), it has to b e a d m i t t e d that he did not suc­ c e e d in w i n n i n g over all the treasurers a n d other gaz.ophylaxoi a l o n g the route, w h o continued to d e m a n d a n a u t h o r i z e d chit from the royal c h a n c e l l e r y before turning over funds, which Cyrus was u n a b l e to provide (cf. for c o m p a r i s o n the texts q u o t e d in R T P 29 n. 3 a n d 49 n. 2, as well as my remarks in Briant 1989c: 3 2 8 - 2 9 ) : a process o f resistance n o d o u b t illustrated by Cyrus's retaliative acts (studied in the text) in L y c a o n i a ; (2) if C y r u s recruited so m a n y G r e e k m e r c e n a r i e s , I am not c o n v i n c e d that it was only b e c a u s e o f s o m e intrinsic technical superiority that h e recognized in them — it m a y also have b e e n b e c a u s e a certain n u m b e r o f regular contingents from Asia Minor re­ fused to defect to h i m ; u n d e r this hypothesis, the call to the G r e e k m e r c e n a r i e s would reflect less a tactical c h o i c e than a political constraint; (3) s o m e of t h e p r o b l e m s treated in this section have just b e e n b r o a c h e d by J o a n n e s 1995, w h o w o n d e r s ( p p . 183ff.) why C y r u s took a secondary road a l o n g the east bank o f the E u p h r a t e s ; J o a n n e s suggests a p o s s i b l e e l e m e n t o f surprise (p. 185); he a l s o thinks that this c h o i c e p r o c e e d e d from Cyrus's distrust o f s o m e o f his close associates.

Artaxerxes II ( 4 0 5 / 4 0 4 - 3 5 9 / 3 5 8 ) and Artaxerxes III ( 3 5 9 / 3 5 8 - 3 3 8 )

• Artaxerxes and Cynis Face Off.

989

O n the M e d i a n Wall, cf. Barnett 1963; see also L e n d l e

]986: 2 1 1 - H a n d Vallat 1989b, as well as the articles on the s u b j e c t in N A P R 1 (1987) a n d 2 (1989), and now G a s c h e 1995; on the word "Arabia" in X e n o p h o n , cf. B r i a n t 1982b: 1 2 1 - 2 2 and p o n n e r 1986 (also J o a n n e s 1995); on the delays in Cyrus's progress, cf. the remarks in C o u s i n 1904: 3 1 7 - 2 1 . It is particularly difficult to reconstruct the battle of C u n a x a , b e c a u s e of the contrastingand contradictory descriptions: cf. B i g w o o d 1983; G . W y l i e 1992; a n d E r h a r d t 1994, w h o s e dis­ cussion (pp. 1-2) bears a title ("Who won the battle of C u n a x a ? " ) that says a great d e a l a b o u t the persistent uncertainties, a n d w h o s e c o n c l u s i o n deserves to b e q u o t e d : "In short, T i s s a p h e r n e s won at C u n a x a . "

3. Artaxerxes the Victor • The Process ofRelegitimation.

Royal p r o p a g a n d a in Plutarch's biography, cf. Orsi 1 9 7 9 - 8 0 .

According to C a m e r o n 1955: 96, these were the c i r c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r which Artaxerxes a u t h o r i z e d a foundation l e g e n d that m a d e C y r u s into M a r d e s , the son of c o m m o n peasants, a n d had fake in­ scriptions carved in the n a m e s of A r i a r a m n e s a n d A r s a m e s in order to discredit Cyrus's l i n e a g e . But, for all sorts of r e a s o n s (in particular, the way f o u n d a t i o n l e g e n d s a r e e m b e l l i s h e d ) , C a m e r o n ' s interpretation is far from c o n v i n c i n g . B e s i d e s , a c c o r d i n g to S h a h b a z i 1972b, the t o m b of G u r - i Dukhtar (in the valley of B u z p a r , southwestern F a r s ) , p u b l i s h e d by V a n d e n B e r g h e 1964 [[whose high dating, before C y r u s the G r e a t , is n o l o n g e r a c c e p t e d today: cf. N y l a n d e r 1966]), was raised by Parysatis, on the m o d e l of C y r u s the Great's tomb (cf. fig, 2, p. 87 h e r e ) , to lay to rest the m e a g e r remains of C y r u s the Younger ( h e a d and right h a n d ) ; but, a s i d e from the fact that the m o n u m e n t could just as well d a t e to the end of the A c h a e m e n i d p e r i o d or e v e n the Hellenistic period (Stro­ nach 1978: 302) a n d that the C t e s i a s p a s s a g e ($59) q u o t e d by the a u t h o r actually s e e m s to refer to a burial at S u s a , o n e m i g h t reasonably d o u b t whether after s u c h a fierce struggle the king would have authorized the erection of s u c h a m o n u m e n t to the h o n o r of C y r u s , which c o u l d h a v e b e ­ come a d a n g e r o u s rallying-point within Persia itself ( c o m p a r e the political m e a s u r e s taken by Cyrus against the m e m o r y of the "rebel" Orontas: Anah. 1.6:1l-^: "no grave of his was ever seen"); in fact, the king h a d already m a d e an exceptional c o n c e s s i o n to Parysatis by s e c u r i n g the h e a d a n d right hand that h a d b e e n c u t off a c c o r d i n g to c u s t o m ( C t e s i a s $58; Plutarch,Art. 13.2), s i n c e nor­ mally the h e a d a n d h a n d of a u s u r p e r would s i m p l y b e d i s c a r d e d / e x p o s e d ( S t r a b o X V 3 . 1 7 :

riptetai),

which is to say, probably left for the a n i m a l s : cf. the fate of Cyrus's G r e e k

were decapitated (in X e n o p h o n ' s version,

Anah.

strategoi

who

II.6.29) and then "torn in p i e c e s by dogs a n d

birds" (Plutarch, Art. 17.7-Q-; a b o v e , p. 239 a n d c h a p . 2/9, p p . 93ff, on Persian funerary c u s t o m s ) ; this was probably the fate m e t e d out so secretly by C y r u s the Younger on Orontas (entrusting it to the faithful Artapates), w h e n c e X e n o p h o n ' s s e n t e n c e , " F r o m that m o m e n t n o m a n ever saw O r o n ­ tas living or d e a d , nor c o u l d a n y o n e say from actual k n o w l e d g e h o w h e was put to d e a t h , — i t was all conjectures, of o n e sort a n d another; and n o grave of his was ever seen" (1.6.11).

• Reward and Punishment.

O n the career of Ariaeus, cf. Lewis 1977: 119 n. 78 a n d H o r n -

blower 1994a: 7 8 - 7 9 ; on the p o s s i b l e modification of royal protocol a n d the c h r o n o l o g i c a l p r o b ­ lems posed by the a n c i e n t texts, s e e B r i a n t 1994e: 307—10 a n d c h a p . 14/1 above.

• The Great King and His Armies. O n the Persians and their "military weakness" in Plu­ Agesilaus, and Isocrates, see s o m e reflections in B r i a n t 1987b a n d

tarch's Artaxerxes, X e n o p h o n ' s

1989a; on the role of the G r e e k m e r c e n a r i e s , s e e the reflections of S e i b t 1977: 6 3 - 6 9 ; a n d R a h e 1980, who m a k e s the m i s t a k e , to m y way of thinking, of c o n s i d e r i n g it an established fact that the Babylonian

Ijatrus

n o l o n g e r furnished soldiers: on the

hatrus

in the t i m e of Artaxerxes II, cf. the

material investigated by J o a n n e s 1982: 4ff.; also D a n d a m a e v 1992a: 18, a n d c h a p . 14/7: D a r i u s II and His Armies, p p . 597ff; we will return to all these p r o b l e m s later: c h a p . 17/3.

4. Conditions in Asia Minor and Artaxerxes IVs Strategy (400-3%) • From Sardis to Memphis.

Return of T i s s a p h e r n e s to S a r d i s , cf. Lewis 1977: 1 3 8 - 3 9 ; Amyr­

taeus at E l e p h a n t i n e , cf. Porten 1990- 19, w h o dates the papyrus D A E 7 [AP 35] to S e p t e m b e r 11,

Research Notes: Chapter 15

990

400; b u t L e m a i r e (1991c: 2 0 0 - 2 0 1 ) proposes redating the Aswan stela ( D A E 75) a n d considers it possible that Persian control of S y e n e c o u l d have lasted until 398; on the c h r o n o l o g y of the first in­ d e p e n d e n t p h a r a o h s , cf. a l s o T r a u n e c k e r 1979 a n d m o s t recently Lloyd 1994; we m a y note finally that p e r h a p s these p h a r a o h s did not m a k e a s h a r p break with the Persian court, if we g o by an an­ e c d o t e preserved by Phylarcus ( a p u d A t h e n a e u s X I I I . 6 0 9 b ) : an (unfortunately u n n a m e d ) Egyptian king sent the f a m o u s c o u r t e s a n T i m o s a to Stateira, the wife of Artaxerxes: the word used

(doron)

without d o u b t refers to a "diplomatic gift," the kind well known between the p h a r a o h s and Near Eastern kings. [ T h e record of the E g y p t i a n b r e a k was reviewed by A. L e m a i r e in a talk given in Paris at the c o l l o q u i u m "Egypte e t T r a n s e u p h r a t e n e " ( M a y 1 0 - 1 1 , 1993) = L e m a i r e 1995a: 51-56.]) • Artaxerxes, His

Satraps, and the Asia Minor Front.

O n the S p a r t a policy, cf. Lewis 1977

;

1 3 9 E a n d Westlake 1986; o n T i s s a p h e r n e s a n d P h a r n a b a z u s , cf. Westlake 1981; Evagoras's atti­ tude: cf. C o s t a 1974: 4 6 - 5 0 ;

syennesis

of C i l i c i a : the theory of his political d e m i s e g o e s back to

F.rzen 1940: 1 1 4 - 2 0 , but the author rightly remarks that n o d o c u m e n t exists to positively support it (at least until the n o m i n a t i o n of M a z a e u s / M a z d a i a r o u n d 350: cf. Briant 1994b: 124); it is how­ ever not entirely certain that at that time (400) C i l i c i a was transformed into a satrapy in the full sense, s i n c e the coins struck in C i l i c i a by T i r i b a z u s , P h a r n a b a z u s , a n d D a t a m e s are not satrapal c o i n s properly s p e a k i n g b u t "karanic" c o i n s (cf. Briant 1989c: 329): on the donhts dial do need to be retained on this point, cf. L e m a i r e a n d L o z a c h m e u r 1990: 1 4 6 - 4 7 ; a n d now C a s a b o n n e 1995b.

5. Agesilaus in Asia Minor

(396-394)

• The Defeat ofTissaphemes.

Agesilaus's offensive a n d the c i r c u m s t a n c e s of the battle of the

Pactolus c o n t i n u e to p o s e t o p o g r a p h i c and historical p r o b l e m s , b e c a u s e of contradictions in the a n c i e n t sources: see D u g a s 1910, F o s s 1978, a n d the analyses of B r u c e 1967 (ad l o c ) , particularly pp. 150-56 on the battle o f Sardis; m o s t recently, cf. C a r t l e d g e 1987: 2 1 5 - 1 7 ; B o t h a 1988; Wylie 1992; D e Voto 1988; Dillery 1995: 109-14.

• The "Anabasis" of Agesilaus.

S e e especially D u g a s 1910 a n d B r u c e 1967, a s well as Wylie

1992 (who rightly holds Agesilaus's strategic ability in low e s t e e m ) ; on the m a n a n d his campaigns, cf. the synthesis by C a r t l e d g e 1987, e s p . p p . 1 8 0 - 2 1 8 (who also, p p . 2 1 7 - 1 8 , revises downward the territorial a m b i t i o n s a s s i g n e d to Agesilaus by the a n c i e n t authors).

• Persian Defenses Confronting Agesilaus's Offense: Satraps and ethne.

O n relations between

the Persians a n d the interior p e o p l e s , cf. B r i a n t 1976 a n d 1982b: 5 7 - 1 1 2 ( c h a p . 16/18, pp. 762ff.). Orontes' title ("satrap of Mysia") has c a u s e d m u c h ink to b e spilled in the service of studies dedi­ cated to reconstructing the "Satraps' Revolt" ( c h a p . 15/7, p p . 6 5 6 f f ) ; the validity of the information provided by D i o d o r u s is a c c e p t e d by O s b o r n e 1973 (fully e m p o w e r e d satrapal g o v e r n m e n t cen­ tered at P e r g a m u m : cf. O G I S 264, lines 4 - 9 ) , a l t h o u g h H o r n b l o w e r (1982: 1 7 6 - 7 8 ) thinks (unconvincingly, in m y o p i n i o n ) that toward 3 6 1 , O r o n t e s was still satrap of A r m e n i a ; cf. also Osborne 1982: 6 5 - 8 0 (where a p r o f o u n d discussion of the o p p o s i n g views is f o u n d , in particular a vigorous reply to H o r n b l o w e r , who t h e r e u p o n reiterated his view in H o r n b l o w e r 1994b: 220); Osborne's viewpoint is a d o p t e d by M o y s e y 1987; see also W e i s k o p f 1982: 1 0 8 - 1 8 a n d 1989: 7 0 - 7 6 , who, while a d m i t t i n g that O r o n t e s received a position in M y s i a , d e n i e s the e x i s t e n c e of an autonomous administration a n d c o m p a r e s O r o n t e s ' position to that of an Asidates, who was provided with land a n d estates; the a u t h o r recalls that D i o d o r u s ' s p h r a s e o l o g y is very elastic a n d suggests that the same holds for D i o d o r u s ' s m e n t i o n of a "satrapy of P a p h l a g o n i a " (1982: 114); on this point, cf. also Rob­ ert (1980: 2653".; cf. a l s o 2 0 3 - 1 9 ) , who without attacking h e a d on the p r o b l e m discussed here thinks it self-evident that the satrap of P a p h l a g o n i a resided at G a n g i a , not far f r o m Ancyta, the very s p o t — w e m a y note in p a s s i n g — w h e r e the P a p h l a g o n i a n leaders went to s u b m i t to Alexander in 334, with the king o r d e r i n g t h e m to o b e y the satrap of D a s c y l i u m , as in the past (Arrian H.4.1-2); let us add in p a s s i n g that P a p h l a g o n i a is not devoid of Persian i c o n o g r a p h i c e v i d e n c e : cf. DoncelVoute 1984 ( c h a p . 16/2, fig. 55, p. 699) a n d von G a l l 1966; on P o l y a e n u s VI. 10 (Aeolid) and the fortifications of Asidates ( M y s i a ) , see R T P 190; T u p l i n 1987c: 2 1 2 - 1 3 ; a n d D e b o r d 1994.

Artaxerxes II (405/404-359/358) • The Persians and Agesilaus Face Off.

and Artaxerxes III (3 59/3 58-338)

991

O n Spithridates a n d his estates, cf. S e k u n d a 1988a:

178-80; on his relations with A g e s i l a u s a n d the limited character of the threat h e p o s e d at the time, cf. Weiskopf 1989: 2 3 - 2 5 ; c o i n s struck in the n a m e of a Spithridates are known, but this one's precise identification is p r o b l e m a t i c ; h e m i g h t b e a satrap k n o w n from C l a s s i c a l s o u r c e s in 334 (cf. Harrison 1982a: 4 1 6 - 1 8 , C a l m 1989: 101); o n P h a r n a b a z u s ' s reply to A g e s i l a u s (Hell. IV. 1.35-36), cf. the reflections of L e w i s 1977: 1 5 0 - 5 1 , a n d c h a p . 8 / 7 : " T h e D y n a s t i c Pact," p. 354.

6 Achaemenid ' (ca. 396-ca.

Successes 370)

» The Defeat of Sparta.

and Failures:

From Asia Minor to Egypt

C o n o n at R h o d e s : B e r t h o l d 1980: 3 5 - 3 8 a n d Westlake 1983 [ a n d

2

now C A H V I : 6 7 - 7 0 ; 1 0 3 - 6 ] ; o n the military o p e r a t i o n s in Asia M i n o r , cf. Lewis 1977: 1 4 2 - 4 7 .

• The Persians Caught between Athenians and Lacedaemonians.

T h e position of S t r u m a s

(called "satrap o f Ionia" in T o d II, no. 113) raises several p r o b l e m s that s u p p o r t a n a b u n d a n t litera­ ture on the holders o f the satrapy o f S a r d i s a n d o n the administrative delimitation of this j u r i s d i c ­ tion during these years (cf. L e w i s 1977: 118 n. 7 5 ; Weiskopf 1982: 8 8 - 9 3 ; Hornblower 1982: 37 n. 10; Petit 1988: 3 0 9 - 1 1 ; C h a u m o n t 1990: 598; H o r n b l o w e r 1994a: 7 7 - 7 8 ) , b u t e a c h of t h e s o l u ­ tions that has b e e n s u g g e s t e d runs u p against difficulties that a p p e a r difficult to s u r m o u n t with cer­ tainty. O n the creation o f t h e satrapy o f C a r i a , cf. H o r n b l o w e r 1982: 3 4 - 3 8 and R u z i c k a 1992b; 16-20; against this (universally a c c e p t e d ) position, Petit ( 1 9 8 8 ) has d e f e n d e d a p a r a d o x i c a l thesis: he says the H e c a t o m n i d s were never officially r e c o g n i z e d a s satraps by Artaxerxes; b u t , to u s e a li­ totes, the proof lacks conviction (cf. m y brief remarks in Ahst. Iran. 12 [1989] no. 283 a n d Descat's, Topoi 3/1 [1993]: 2 6 5 - 6 6 , as well a s H o r n b l o w e r 1994b: 2 1 5 - 1 6 ; o n the status of M a u s o l u s , s e e also chap. 16/18, p p . 7 6 7 f ) . • From C y p r u s to Egypt.

O n Evagoras's policy, cf. C o s t a 1974: 4 8 - 5 6 , Weiskopf 1982: 1 5 4 -

56, C o l l o m b i e r 1990: 3 5 - 3 7 , a n d M a i e r 1994: 3 1 2 - 1 7 ; dynastic affairs in Egypt: T r a u n e c k e r 1979: 40lff. (on the c h r o n o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m s , cf. also T u p l i n 1983: 1 8 5 - 8 6 a n d Lloyd 1994); o n the Athe­ nian intervention in C y p r u s ( a c c o r d i n g to Lysias), cf. T u p l i n 1983 ( w h o dates the o p e r a t i o n s to 390-389). P h o e n i c i a n inscription from Kition: p u b l i s h e d with c o m m e n t a r y by Yon a n d S n y c z e r 1991, 1992 (I follow h e r e the gist o f their interpretation h e r e ) . • The Initial Operations (391-387/386).

T h e entire period c a . 3 9 1 - 3 8 1 poses m a j o r c h r o n o ­

logical a n d historical p r o b l e m s , o n w h i c h s e e T u p l i n 1983 a n d t h e focus by S h r i m p t o n 1991; the dates adopted in the text a r e with reservations ( e x a m i n a t i o n o f the n u m i s m a t i c e v i d e n c e

[coins

struck by T i r i b a z u s ] leads H a r r i s o n [1982a: 3 0 4 - 1 5 ] to d a t e the s e c o n d C y p r u s expedition to 3 8 2 380 [and not 3 8 7 - 3 8 6 ] , b u t his a r g u m e n t s a r e n o l o n g e r c o m p e l l i n g ) . • The King's Peace (386).

S e e m o s t recently the focuses o f U r b a n 1991 a n d B a d i a n 1 9 9 1 .

• A Universal Conflagration?

O n the logical c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n the King's P e a c e a n d the

resumption of Persian p r e p a r a t i o n s for the C y p r u s matter, cf. S i n c l a i r 1978, and the interesting re­ marks of R u z i c k a 1983a ( o n the C l a z o m e n a e p r o b l e m treated by this a u t h o r , cf. also Aikyo 1988); concerning a n c i e n t texts o n the g e n e r a l nature of the revolt, s e e the s u i t a b l e thoughts of W e i s k o p f 1982: 161-92 ( w h o I think, however, u n d e r e s t i m a t e s the threat p o s e d at this date by Evagoras: cf. p. 190); D a t a m e s : S e k u n d a 1988b; o n C i l i c i a a n d the n u m i s m a t i c e v i d e n c e (coins struck by T i r i ­ bazus), cf. L e m a i r e a n d L o z a c h m e u r 1990: 147, a n d D a v e s n e 1979: 162 (but the p r o p o s e d c o n n e c ­ tion with the e l i m i n a t i o n o f t h e syennesis m u s t , I think, b e g i v e n u p , for reasons stated a b o v e ) , a n d especially the systematic presentation by Harrison 1982a: 3 0 4 - 1 5 , as well as C a p e c c b i 1991: 8 5 95; on D a t a m e s ' first c a m p a i g n s , cf. S e k u n d a 1988b; 3 8 - 4 0 ; o n the role of H e c a t o m n u s , cf. Weiskopf 1982: 1 5 7 - 6 0 ( w h o thinks that the 3 9 1 - 3 9 0 c a m p a i g n e n d e d quickly via a n a g r e e m e n t with Evagoras, a n d that there is n o trace of a rebellion by H e c a t o m n u s , w h o , h e s u g g e s t s p e r h a p s a bit excessively [p. 167], did not even participate in the expedition: "Diodorus interpreted h i s a b ­ sence as secret support"), a n d R u z i c k a 1992b: 2 6 - 2 9 (also rebuts D i o d o r u s ' s a n d Isocrates' p r e s e n ­ tations); o n the "king o f t h e Arabs," cf. Briant 1982b: 1 6 3 - 6 4 . T h e theory of a q u a s i - c o l l a p s e o f

Research Notes: Chapter 15

992

Persian d o m i n a t i o n in Palestine b e g i n n i n g with Artaxerxes II is presented (e.g.) by E p h ' a l 198Zb2 0 5 - 6 , b u t on the basis o f a r c h a e o l o g i c a l e v i d e n c e that d o e s not a p p e a r to m e to s u p p o r t this con­ c l u s i o n with certainty (cf. also S t e r n 1982b: 2 5 4 - 5 5 , w h o s e c h r o n o l o g y s e e m s to m e to apply ; . n

stead to a later p h a s e o f t h e reign of Artaxerxes II, t h o u g h it will r e m a i n unverified

nonetheless 1

b e c a u s e a r c h a e o l o g y has a strange t e n d e n c y to r e q u i r e written d o c u m e n t a t i o n as corroboration 1 a m e q u a l l y at a loss to u n d e r s t a n d the relation that B e t l y o n (1986: 6 3 6 ) seeks to establish between the a p p e a r a n c e o f the first Jewish c o i n s a r o u n d 4 0 0 a n d the " d e c a d e n c e " o f the E m p i r e . W e must particularly e m p h a s i z e the cruel a b s e n c e o f written e v i d e n c e on the history o f these regions in these years; the only possibility o f g l i m p s i n g t h e intervention of the central authority is to date Ezra's mission to the 7th year o f Artaxerxes II a n d to s e e it as a n index o f unrest stirred u p by the E g y p t i a n revolt (e.g., C a z e l l e s 1954 j j L e m a i r e 1 9 9 5 a | ) ; h e r e we will not r e o p e n this d e b a t e , which is far from ready to d i e o u t (cf. c h a p . 14/5).

• The Offensive against Evagoras (387/386-383/381).

O n the terms o f the treaty imposed on

E v a g o r a s , cf. Weiskopf 1982: 1 7 8 - 9 2 . F o r reasons p r e s e n t e d in c h a p . 15/1 a b o v e , the t a b l e t A D R T B no. - 4 4 0 p r o b a b l y refers to t h e very b e g i n n i n g o f t h e war a g a i n s t E v a g o r a s ; the text reads; " [ . . . ) the l a n d S a m i n e , a f a m o u s city o f the l a n d K u p r u , w h i c h for m a k i n g [. . J s u n d u o f the land Ianiun i a m i n u w h i c h the king m a d e [. . . ] . " • The Egyptian Defeats.

S e e especially Kienitz 1953- 8 0 - 9 2 a n d L l o y d 1994: 346-48; the

date o f the c a m p a i g n o f P h a r n a b a z u s , T i t h r a u s t e s , a n d A b r o c o m a s a g a i n s t E g y p t (Isocrates) pri­ marily derives from the fact that P h a r n a b a z u s was recalled to the c o u r t a r o u n d 387 (Xenophon, Hell. V. 1.28), from w h i c h it is d e d u c e d that A r i o b a r z a n e s s u c c e e d e d h i m at that time (cf. Weiskopf 1982: 1 2 0 - 2 7 a n d 1989: 2 7 - 2 8 ) ; b u t m a n y u n c e r t a i n t i e s r e m a i n (cf. C l o c h e 1919: 2 3 0 - 3 2 and 1920: 8 5 - 8 8 ) ; a c c o r d i n g to M o y s e y (1986: 10, 15), s o m e c o i n s attributed to P h a r n a b a z u s might h a v e b e e n struck in C i l i c i a b e t w e e n 386 a n d 383, at the time o f preparation for the Egyptian ex­ pedition, b u t other possibilities exist: cf. H a r r i s o n 1982a: 3 1 5 - 2 1 a n d L e m a i r e a n d Lozachmeur 1990: 147, w h o s u g g e s t d a t i n g t h e m instead to t h e 370s (that is, to t h e s e c o n d expedition); concern­ ing the p o s s i b l e offense-oriented m i n d s e t o f Hakoris: n o t e the discoveiy in P h o e n i c i a o f altar bases with t h e c a r t o u c h e o f H a k o r i s , w h i c h a r e generally taken to indicate a n a t t e m p t at an Egyptian offensive (cf. T r a u n e c k e r 1979: 4 3 5 ) , b u t the interpretation r e m a i n s u n c e r t a i n (Lloyd 1994: 347 n. 50). O n the G r e e k m e r c e n a r i e s o n the E g y p t i a n expedition, s e e S e i b t 1977: 8 0 - 8 3 , who notes particularly that it was the first time a Persian a r m y i n c l u d e d so l a r g e a n u m b e r of G r e e k s but with­ o u t offering a m o r e detailed interpretation; a c c o r d i n g to S e k u n d a (1988b: 4 2 ) , D a t a m e s adopted s o m e c o m p o n e n t s o f G r e e k a r m s , a n d it was also h e w h o first established a Persian infantry corps ( C a r d a c e s : N e p o s , Dat. 8.2): o n all these p r o b l e m s , s e e c h a p . 17/3 below. N e c t a n e b o I's coming to power: T r a u n e c k e r 1979: 4 3 5 - 3 6 , M e u l e n a e r e 1963, L l o y d 1994: 3 5 7 - 5 9 ; possible kinship (by m a r r i a g e ) b e t w e e n C h a b r i a s a n d N e c t a n e b o I: K u h l m a n n 1981: 2 7 6 - 7 8 [[but for the convincingly a r g u e d contrary view, see n o w Muss 1994b]]. P h a r n a b a z u s ' s expedition in 373: C l o c h e 1920: 8 8 99; D a t a m e s ' participation in P h a r n a b a z u s ' s e x p e d i t i o n is inferred from N e p o s (Dat. 3.5; 5.1), but the text p o s e s certain p r o b l e m s o f interpretation that are presented a n d treated by S e k u n d a 1988b: 4 0 - 4 1 ; n o o n e c o u l d believe that Artaxerxes would h a v e e n d a n g e r e d the E g y p t i a n expedition to distract D a t a m e s in a c a m p a i g n without glory a g a i n s t a C a t a o n i a n dynast (Dat. 4; 5 . 1 - 5 ) , or that D a t a m e s would have s u d d e n l y rebelled at the very m o m e n t w h e n h e received the c o m m a n d of the a r m y o f E g y p t on the pretext that a c o u r t c a b a l h a d sworn to lose it ( $ 5 . 2 - 5 ) : this would grant a rather naive c o n f i d e n c e

to a text b e l o n g i n g to t h e g e n r e o f family saga; for these reasons,

Weiskopf's reconstruction o f D a t a m e s ' c a r e e r (1982: 2 0 5 - 7 ) strikes m e a s m o r e satisfactory (even if it i n c l u d e s its s h a r e o f s p e c u l a t i o n : we are n o w in the r e a l m of c o m p a r i s o n o f likelihoods, noth­ ing m o r e : the a u t h o r [pp. 2 0 7 - 9 ] thinks that after the victory over Aspis, D a t a m e s was promoted to satrap o f C a p p a d o c i a ) . • Artaxerxes and the Greeks. S e e n o w also S e a g e r , C A H V I : 1 5 6 - 5 8 . 2

Artaxerxes II (405/404-359/358)

and Artaxerxes III (359/358-338)

7 Artaxerxes II, His Satraps, and His Peoples (ca. 366-359/358) • Diodorus and the "Great Revolt" of the Satraps: The Empire in Flames?

993

In all that follows,

I have been greatly influenced by Weiskopf's analyses (1982, 1989), w h i c h contain very innovative, very c o n v i n c i n g interpretations r e n d e r i n g largely obsolete previous work (particularly J u d e i c h )892 and M e l o n i 1951); an up-to-date b i b l i o g r a p h y is found there, s o I will not systematically pro­ vide references; b u t it m u s t b e r e c o g n i z e d that Weiskopf's theses have b e e n vigorously criticized by Moysey 1 9 9 1 - 9 2 ; I m u s t say that this is not my p o i n t of view (cf. Briant 1994b: 127 n. 4 5 ) , w h i l e admitting that Weiskopf's work suffers here a n d there from certain w e a k n e s s e s (cf. below o n O r o n ­ tes' planning): the p r o b l e m is that W e i s k o p f 1982 (doctoral dissertation) has not b e e n p u b l i s h e d , and the evaluations have b e e n m a d e exclusively on the basis of the m i n o r work of 1989 ( h a d it been the other way a r o u n d , I d o u b t whether M o y s e y 1991: 120 c o u l d h a v e criticized W e i s k o p f for not using the n u m i s m a t i c e v i d e n c e , w h i c h , m o r e o v e r , d o e s not fully s u p p o r t s o m e of the historical conclusions that M o y s e y 1989 believes he c a n draw c o n c e r n i n g D a t a m e s ' plans: below; see also Homblower's criticisms, C R 40 [1990]: 3 6 3 - 6 5 ; 1994a: 84). O n D i o d o r u s ' s text specifically, s e e in particular Weiskopf 1982: 3 3 7 - 4 1 , as well as M o y s e y 1975: 9 6 - 9 9 a n d 116-17; cf. also Briant 2

)989a: 3 8 - 3 9 ; o n I G I I 207, s e e in particular the e p i g r a p h i c a n d historical analyses by O s b o r n e 1971, 1 9 8 1 : 5 2 - 5 4 , 1 9 8 2 : 6 1 - 8 0 , M o y s e y 1975: 2 5 4 - 6 5 , 1987, W e i s k o p f 1982: 4 0 1 - 5 , a n d m y s e l f in Briant 1994d; o n T o d 145, cf. the contradictory views of M o y s e y 1975: 1 4 3 - 4 8 and Weiskopf 1982: 398-401 ("a display of d i p l o m a t i c fantasy"), 1989: 8 4 - 8 5 (an analysis that h a s stimulated the lively criticism of M o y s e y 1991: 120; but, b e c a u s e of m a j o r uncertainties I r e c o g n i z e in the text, I d o not think that this d o c u m e n t , in any c a s e , c a n b e c o n s i d e r e d "a m a j o r s t u m b l i n g b l o c k to W.'s thesis," unless o n e s u p p o s e s , as M o y s e y d o e s t h r o u g h a very willful f o r m u l a t i o n , that "only o n e context makes sense").

• The Initial Revolts: Datames.

In addition to S e k u n d a 1988b (which I do not follow on the

beginnings of the revolt), I have b e e n greatly i n f l u e n c e d in this section by Weiskopf 1982: 1 9 7 - 2 2 0 and 4 1 8 - 2 5 ; on D a t a m e s ' c o i n a g e struck at S i n o p e , cf. Harrison 1982a: 2 6 3 - 6 5 (by c o m p a r i s o n with stratagems d e s c r i b e d by Polyaenus a n d Pseudo-Aristotle).

• The Troubles in Western Asia Minor (366-361).

Ariobarzanes: texts a n d c o m m e n t a r y in O s ­

borne 1 9 8 3 : 5 0 - 5 3 , w h o raises the p r o b l e m of the date; on relations b e t w e e n Ariobarzanes a n d Ath­ ens, cf. also Moysey 1975: 8 0 - 8 4 a n d W e i s k o p f 1982: 3 5 3 - 8 0 ; on A r i o b a r z a n e s ' d e m i s e , cf. theories of Weiskopf 1982: 3 8 1 - 8 5 , who thinks that his son M i t h r a d a t e s then went over to D a t a m e s ' c a m p (on Weiskopf's g e n e a l o g i c a l theories, I m u s t say that in part I share the r e l u c t a n c e of Moysey 1991: 117). Orontes: W e i s k o p f 1982: 3 9 5 - 9 8 ; 1989: 8 9 - 9 0 ; on the c o i n a g e attributed to O r o n t e s , cf. ibid., pp. 388-94; see also Troxell 1 9 8 1 , but his dating to the 350s is certainly wrong: cf. M o y s e y 1989: 123-25; the role of l e a d e r that D i o d o r u s says (XV.91.1) was a c c o r d e d to O r o n t e s by the other sa­ traps is not explained; the a r g u m e n t fails if we r e c o g n i z e with H o m b l o w e r (1982: 1 7 6 - 7 8 ) that Orontes r e m a i n e d satrap of A r m e n i a : but, on Hornblower's a r g u m e n t s , cf. the c o n v i n c i n g critical remarks of O s b o r n e 1982: 67ff. (despite H o m b l o w e r 1994a: 86); A r t a b a z u s a n d Autophradates: cf. Moysey 1975: 119; see especially the d i s c u s s i o n of W e i s k o p f 1982: 4 2 3 - 2 9 ; death of O r o n t e s : cf. Osborne 1973: 5 4 2 - 5 1 ; contra M o y s e y 1975: 109, who thinks that Orontes regained his c o m ­ 2

mand in Mysia. O n I G I I 207 (sale of wheat by O r o n t e s to Athens)- cf. Briant I994d, where I d e m ­ onstrate that the d e e d d o e s not in the slightest reveal a secessionist policy on the part of the satrap (see also Moysey 1987: 100 n. 100, b u t in the context of a c h r o n o l o g i c a l proof that d o e s not per­ suade me: see c h a p . 15/9: "Artaxerxes III a n d Philip II," R e s e a r c h N o t e s , pp. 1005f.).

• The Egyptian Front.

O n the ( d i s p u t e d ) c h r o n o l o g y a n d the p r o b l e m s raised by T a c h o s ' s of­

fensive, cf. C l o c h e 1919: 2 1 2 - 1 8 ; 1920: 9 9 - 1 0 7 , as well as K i e n i t z 1953: 9 6 - 1 0 0 a n d 1 8 0 - 8 1 ; Weiskopf 1982: 4 0 5 - 1 2 ; a n d H o m b l o w e r 1982: 1 7 4 - 7 5 ; on C h a - h a p - i m u a n d his kinship with T a ­ chos and N e c t a n e b o , cf. M e u l n a e r e 1963; T a c h o s ' s offensive is the context in w h i c h was written (with an unfortunate d e g r e e of uncertainty) the (fragmentary) b i o g r a p h i c a l inscription o f the Egyptian O n n o p h r i s , "prophet of the statues of the father o f the king, the general T c h a - h a p - i m o u , "

994

Research Notes: Chapter 15

who a p p a r e n t l y a c c o m p a n i e d T a c h o s (who is n o t n a m e d ) w h e n h e "went to Asia"; comparison with D i o d o r u s ' s version d o e s not resolve all o f the difficulties in the text, a n d it is not even impossible that O n n o p h r i s a c c o m p a n i e d T a c h o s to the G r e a t King's c o u r t (cf. von K a n e l 1980 and 19841 9 8 - 2 0 1 , w h o c o m p a r e s O n n o p h r i s with Ucliahorresnet a n d S a m t u t e f n a k h t ; cf. c h a p . 18/4). • Orontes and the Egyptian Front.

R e g a r d i n g O r o n t e s in Syria ( T r o g u s P o m p e i u s , Pro/. X)

s e e the critique o f W e i s k o p f (1982: 4 0 5 - 1 2 ; 1989: 8 1 - 8 4 ) , who, however, in my o p i n i o n goes too far: I think it is m i s g u i d e d to throw o u t the only direct e v i d e n c e in the record; cf. in contrast the u n c o n v i n c i n g r e m a r k o f O s b o r n e 1973: 537, for his part, fVfoysey (1975: 106) thinks that Orontes tried to join the E g y p t i a n forces in Syria; o n the d e c r e e h o n o r i n g Straton o f S i d o n , cf. in particular M o y s e y 1975: 2 4 4 - 5 3 a n d W e i s k o p f 1982: 4 5 8 - 5 9 ; Austin's ( 1 9 4 4 ) a t t e m p t to infer from the decree that Athens had then taken part in the revolt a g a i n s t Artaxerxes is hardly persuasive; o n the other h a n d , cf. M o y s e y 1987: 9 9 n. 27 a n d 1989: 1 2 0 - 2 1 o n H i e r o n . , Adv. lovinian. 1.45; o n Slraloivs c o i n a g e , w h i c h has s o m e t i m e s , s i n c e B a b e l o n 1910, b e e n t h o u g h t to illustrate a pro-Egyptian pol­ icy, cf. Betlyon 1982: 9 - 1 0 , 2 9 - 3 0 : b u t t h e interpretation poses certain difficulties (cf. Moysey 1989). A c c o r d i n g to D i o d o r u s (XV.92.5-v-), " T a c h 6 s . . . m a d e bold to g o u p to the K i n g by way of Arabia"; this m e n t i o n i m m e d i a t e l y recalls w h a t Arrian wrote (Indica 43.5) c o n c e r n i n g Cambyses' soldiers a n d Ptolemy's troops, w h o c h o s e to return to B a b y l o n by t h e f e a r s o m e route crossing N o r t h A r a b i a (cf. B r i a n t 1982b: 129, 132): b u t why c h o o s e this itinerary, if T a c h o s was then at Si­ d o n ( o n t h e "normal" route, a s also s u g g e s t e d by t h e d e c r e e h o n o r i n g S t r a t o n , cf. B r i a n t 1991b: 7 7 - 7 9 ) ? I m u s t d e c l a r e myself i n c a p a b l e o f r e s p o n d i n g reasonably to the q u e s t i o n , which, more­ over, m a y b e m o o t anyway b e c a u s e o f the m e a n i n g ( u n k n o w n to u s ) that D i o d o r u s assigns to the n a m e "Arabia" (on the use o f this word by C l a s s i c a l authors, cf. B r i a n t 1982b: 1 2 0 - 2 2 ) ; not to men­ tion "Syria" (cf. Sartre 1988). O c h u s ' s c a m p a i g n in Syria: C l o c h e 1919: 2 4 5 - 4 6 ; Weiskopf 1982: 410 a n d 4 6 0 n. 109; T a c h o s a t t h e G r e a t King's court: B r i a n t 1985b: 5 7 - 5 8 . O n T a c h o s s and C h a b r i a s ' s fiscal m e a s u r e s a n d their political r e p e r c u s s i o n s in E g y p t , c f Will 1960; o n the fragile internal situation o f the p h a r a o h s , cf. M e u l e n a e r e 1963: 93; Ray 1986: 149 a n d 256; 1987; as well as B r i a n t 1988a: 1 5 5 - 5 8 a n d the reflections o f Yoyotte 1992. • Back to Datames.

" G r a n d i o s e " p l a n s o f D a t a m e s : O l m s t e a d 1948: 4 1 9 , followed by Moy­

sey 1975: 1 0 7 - 8 (n. 25) a n d H a r r i s o n 1982a: 4 1 1 - 1 3 ; cf. also O s b o r n e 1973: 537 n. 104, who draws the rather s u r p r i s i n g c o n c l u s i o n f r o m Polyaenus's text that D a t a m e s , just like O r o n t e s , got as far as Syria; position contrary to W e i s k o p f 1982: 4 2 4 ( n o w see a l s o the d o u b t s o f H o r n b l o w e r 1994a: 87); on the c o i n s o f T i r i b a z u s a n d P h a r n a b a z u s struck in C i l i c i a , cf. H a r r i s o n 1982a: 3 0 4 - 2 0 and Moy­ sey 1986. T h e interpretation of D a t a m e s ' c o i n s ( d i s c u s s e d in the text) is from M o y s e y 1989: J08— 19, esp. 1 0 9 - 1 2 ; while e m p h a s i z i n g that it is a "conjecture," the author thinks that the comparison with Polyaenus is "a p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n , given the l o n g e n m i t y toward the king a n d the prece­ d e n t for s u c h a n invasion e s t a b l i s h e d b y C y r u s the Younger" (p. 110); the author, without expla­ n a t i o n , a p p e a r s to think that D a t a m e s ' goal was to drive Artaxerxes II from t h e throne, which a p p e a r s to m e highly d e b a t a b l e ( M o y s e y 1975: 1 1 3 - 1 4 offers the s a m e r e a s o n i n g r e g a r d i n g Oron­ tes, b u t neither is there anything in O r o n t e s ' c o i n a g e to s u g g e s t it p r o c l a i m s royal a m b i t i o n on his part: cf. W e i s k o p f 1982: 3 8 8 - 9 4 ; H o r n b l o w e r 1982: 1 7 8 - 7 9 ; M o y s e y 1989: 1 2 3 - 2 5 ) . Ann at Uruk ( p r o b l e m u n k n o w n to M o y s e y 1989): cf. S t o l p e r 1990b: 561 (in t h e context o f a strictly chrono­ l o g i c a l a r g u m e n t ) ; cf. also K u h r t 1987a: 151 (observation m a d e by O e l s n e r ) , and now especially B e a u l i e u 1992: 5 4 - 6 0 ; for the b a s i s o f his interpretation, the a u t h o r c o m p a r e s (p. 110) the policy he attributes to the satrap with what h e c o n s i d e r s the s p r e a d o f the c u l t "of the Meso/K>frtmttm god­ dess Anahita" by Artaxerxes II ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) : but, for all sorts o f reasons, this c o m p a r i s o n is to­ tally invalid ( c h a p . 15/8: Anahita a n d Istar, p p . 6 7 8 f f ) . O n D a t a m e s ' b a c k g r o u n d , cf. Briant 1987a: 19 n. 4 7 a n d 27 n. 116, a n d ( i n d e p e n d e n t l y ) S e k u n d a 1988b: 3 5 - 3 6 , as well as L e m a i r e ' s studies on the L u v i a n n a m e T a r k u m a w a f o u n d o n certain c o i n s attributed to D a t a m e s : cf. L e m a i r e 1989: 1 4 4 - 4 9 a n d 1991c: 2 0 3 - 5 : " D a t a m e s was a local dynast carrying out the j o b o f satrap, then com­ m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f at the heart o f the Persian E m p i r e " ( b u t without s u m m a r i l y e x c l u d i n g the other

Artaxerxes U (405/404-359B58)

and Artaxerxes 111 (359/358-338)

995

hypothesis: " T a r k u m a w a was a local C i l i c i a n dynast o f w h o m we have not a single e c h o a n y w h e r e else")-

• Mausolus and the Revolts.

In g e n e r a l , s e e H o r n b l o w e r 1982, Weiskopf 1982: 22 Iff., a n d

Ruzicka 1992b: 1 5 - 7 5 ; d i s c u s s i o n s will b e f o u n d there of m a n y controversial aspects of C a r i a n in­ stitutions (the existence or not of a C a r i a n

koinon,

for e x a m p l e ) , w h i c h I d o not think it useful to

treat here in detail (on M a u s o l u s ' s relations with the C a r i a n cities, s e e n o w the r e m a r k a b l e d o c u ­ ment published by B l i i m e l 1990); a c c e s s i o n of M a u s o l u s : H o r n b l o w e r 1982: 3 4 - 4 0 ; regarding the phrase patroa arkhe, it c a n without d o u b t be c o m p a r e d with a f o r m u l a u s e d in a n inscription (hoposes [ges/khoras] Maussolos arkhe), o n w h i c h s e e the a p p r o p r i a t e reflections of H o r n b l o w e r 1982: 154; let us simply e m p h a s i z e that the t e r m i n o l o g y d o e s not imply that M a u s o l u s o c c u p i e d a n ex­ ceptional situation vis-a-vis other satraps; from t h e G r e e k p o i n t of view, in fact, a satrap's territorial power c o u l d b e d e s i g n a t e d perfectly with t h e word

arkhe:

arkhe

2

(cf. I G I I 207a line 15:

ek tes Orontou

see O s b o r n e 1982: 7 3 - 7 4 ) ; on M a u s o l u s ' s b u i l d i n g projects, s e e Hornblower 1982: 223ff.

(the degree o f H e l l e n i z a t i o n a n d its forms a r e t h e topic o f p o l e m i c between G u n t e r 1985 a n d Hornblower 1990a; cf. a l s o the useful r e m a r k s of S h e r w i n - W h i t e , C R 34/2 (1984): 2 5 7 - 5 9 , w h e r e additional b i b l i o g r a p h i c a l references will b e f o u n d , as well as the analysis by S t a m a t i o u 1989: 3 7 9 85 on borrowings from t h e A c h a e m e n i d i c o n o g r a p h i c repertoire a n d their injection into C r e e k forms; cf. also the r e m a r k s o f V o n G a l l 1989: 505 a n d n. 2, a n d now the articles c o l l e c t e d in Isager 1994)—a p r o b l e m well illustrated elsewhere, in particular at X a n t h u s b u t at S i d o n a s well; o n his foreign policy, cf. H o r n b l o w e r 1982: 107ff. (with the reflections, p p . 1 5 2 - 5 3 , on the possible "nor­ malcy" of M a u s o l u s ' s initiatives); on this point, cf. also W e i s k o p f 1982: 2 7 0 - 8 5 , as well a s the useful c o m m e n t a r y by M o y s e y (1989. 1 2 6 - 3 0 ) o n M a u s o l u s ' s c o i n a g e ; a l s o , o n a specific point (Mausolus's interference in L y c i a n affairs), B o r c h h a r d t 1993a: 78: a stela with the C a r i a n d o u b l e axe, he says, is e v i d e n c e o f burial o n the spot o f a C a r i a n p h r o u r a r c h w h o had settled at L i m y r a — a theory that s e e m s rather weak to m e ; on satrapal duties o f M a u s o l u s , cf. H o r n b l o w e r 1982: 13711 and 161-65 o n the p r o b l e m o f royal/civic taxes, on w h i c h point, s e e also C o r s a r o 1985 a n d Frei 1990: 1 6 6 - 6 8 a n d t h e text p u b l i s h e d by B o u s q u e t 1986 (on M a u s o l u s ' s position in t h e E m p i r e , s e e also chap. 16/18 below, at the e n d ) . O n the interpretation ( M a u s o l u s as a rebel) s o m e t i m e s given to these a n e c d o t e s , cf. Weiskopf 1982: 2 3 2 - 3 5 ; on t h e texts m e n t i o n i n g c o n s p i r a c i e s , cf. ibid. 252— 56, who quite rightly stresses ( p p . 2 3 0 - 3 1 ) that the Arlissis affair shows rather that at this d a t e Arta­ xerxes s u p p o r t e d M a u s o l u s a n d that thus there was n o p r o o f there o f a n y rebellious m i n d s e t o n t h e part of the dynast ( o n Arlissis's position in t h e royal court, cf. the highly s p e c u l a t i v e r e m a r k s o f H e l tzer 1994: 1 1 6 - 1 9 ) ; on T o d 138.2, cf. also B E 1990: 276; on the a c c u s a t i o n s of lying m a d e a g a i n s t ambassadors to the G r e a t K i n g , cf. Hofstettei 1972: 1 0 2 - 4 ; o n M a u s o l u s ' s behavior d u r i n g t h e re­ volt, cf. H o r n b l o w e r 1982: 1 7 0 - 8 2 ( t h e p a s s a g e is primarly devoted to a general d i s c u s s i o n o f the revolt: but cf. O s b o r n e 1982: 6 7 - 7 2 ) ; w h i l e fully stressing the paucity of t h e r e c o r d , H o r n b l o w e r suggests that M a u s o l u s did i n d e e d enter into revolt (likewise R u z i c k a 1992b: 7 6 - 8 9 in a d i s c u s s i o n that is not the m o s t satisfactory portion of t h e book); contrary position ( w h i c h I a d o p t here overall) of Weiskopf 1982: 2 6 3 - 7 0 a n d 1989: 4 5 - 4 6 a n d 6 5 - 6 8 (a position contested by M o y s e y 1991: 119); we may a d d at this point that M a u s o l u s ' s participation in the revolt has a l s o b e e n d e d u c e d from the X a n t h u s trilingual (cf. D u p o n t - S o m m e r 1979: 1 6 6 - 6 7 ) ; b u t this inscription m u s t b e left o u t o f consideration, for it n o w a p p e a r s that its d a t e is later (below a n d c h a p . 16/5).

• From Caria to Lycia.

O n what follows, discussions will b e found (often contradictory b e ­

cause of the weakness o f t h e d o c u m e n t a r y record) in every article a n d work devoted to Lycia in the fifth and fourth centuries: H o u w i n c k ten C a t e 1961: 8 - 1 3 ; C h i l d s 1981: 7 0 - 8 0 ; Bryce 1980 (article devoted specifically to Pericles) a n d 1986: 1 0 9 - 1 4 ; on Pericles, see the sources gathered by B o r c h ­ hardt 1976b: 9 9 - 1 0 8 , in the context of a description a n d interpretation of the dynast's

herdon;

the

results o f surveys at L i m y r a ( c o m p a r e d with other satrapal or official residences) have recently b e e n presented by B o r c h h a r d t 1990 a n d in B o r c h h a r d t ( e d . ) 1990: 7 5 - 8 4 (cf. now B o r c h h a r d t 1993a); the recent inscriptions p e r t a i n i n g to Pericles are p u b l i s h e d by W o r r l e 1991 a n d 1993; on the L y c i a n

996

Research Notes: Chapter 15

dynastic c o i n a g e , s e e m o s t recently Z a h l e 1989 a n d M o y s e y 1989: 1 3 0 - 3 4 . O n the p l a c e of Pericles (before his s u p p o s e d revolt): in the very d e t a i l e d a n d interesting description h e gives of the friezes on the heroou o f Pericles, B o r c h h a r d t ( 1 9 7 6 b : 1 2 1 - 2 3 ) sees t h e west frieze o f h o r s e m e n as an illus­ tration o f t h e p a r a d e s held regularly in the satrapal courts imitating c e r e m o n i e s in the central court (fig. 54, p. 673 here); a c c o r d i n g to t h e author, a l o n g s i d e Pericles t h e h o r s e m a n dressed in Persian style (no. 22) c a n b e identified a s Artaxerxes III, "co-regent with his father, Artaxerxes II" (cf. color p h o t o g r a p h [restoration] o n the cover a n d p . 169 o f B o r c h h a r d t [ed.] 1990, a n d also in B o r c h h a r d t 1993a: 49: "It is the y o u n g Artaxerxes III, w h o p u t d o w n the Satraps' Revolt," and plate 21): there w e have a n e x p r e s s i o n of t h e "thesis of d e p e n d e n c y " so often d i s c u s s e d by Borchhardt (cf. his 1983 a r t i c l e ) — n a m e l y , that by d o i n g so, Pericles r e c o g n i z e d Persian sovereignty; on thepolitical level the interpretation m i g h t b e a c c e p t a b l e , b e c a u s e Pericles' u r b a n i z a t i o n program did not conflict with Persian s u p e r v i s i o n — a position recently restated by W o r r l e ( 1 9 9 1 : 2 1 5 - 1 7 ) , ac­ c o r d i n g to which Pericles' b u i l d i n g activities at L i m y r a a n d especially his royal titulature (cf. also W o r r l e 1993) s h o u l d b e s e e n as existing in the context of a political-ideological competition with X a n t h u s ; o n t h e other h a n d , a s B o r c h h a r d t suggests, the identification o f the future Artaxerxes is tathet d u b i o u s (why O c h u s , rather than h i s father, Artaxerxes II?). Pericles' c o n q u e s t s at Limyra: Weiskopf 1982: 2 8 9 - 9 0 a n d 3 3 2 - 3 3 (and p p . 2 1 1 - 1 3 on the p r o b l e m s p o s e d by Artumpnra/Artcmbares: stresses t h e uncertainty o f t h e e v i d e n c e ; o n this point, cf. also Worrle 1993: 1 8 9 - 9 0 and the position o f K e e n 1992a b e l o w ) . X a n t h u s : o n t h e A r b i n a s inscriptions, s e e their publication by B o u s q u e t 1975 a n d 1992 (who, in a g r e e m e n t with L a r o c h e a n d against C h i l d s 1979, convincingly restates the restoration K h e r i g a / G e r g i s a n d n o t K h e r e i in t h e L y c i a n inscription o n the Pillar); see also Savalli 1988; o n the c o n q u e s t s o f A r b i n a s , cf. R o b e r t 1978b (with the i m p o r t a n t reservations of B o u s q u e t 1975: 145, d e v e l o p e d in B o u s q u e t 1992: 1 7 7 - 7 8 , 1 8 0 - 8 1 : A r b i n a s used C a u n u s as the b a s e for his d e p a r t u r e ) ; o n the m o n u m e n t o f the N e r e i d s , its i c o n o g r a p h i c p r o g r a m , date, and a u t h o r (Arbinas), s e e from n o w o n the exhaustive p u b l i c a t i o n o f D e m a r g n e - C h i k l s 1989 (which tenders o b s o l e t e the interpretations of S h a h b a z i 1 9 7 5 : 1 0 4 - 8 ) ; 1 note in p a s s i n g that in a recentupdate (Topoi 2 [ 1992]; 322), P D e m a r g n e writes: "I m u s t say that for the s c u l p t e d decoration which C h i l d s a n d I d e s c r i b e d , m a n y points a p p e a r o p e n to criticism," a n d a g a i n , on Persian influences, "that r e s e m b l e s Persepolis, by b r i n g i n g Persepolis to life; similarly in t h e h u n t i n g a n d war scenes"; on the s i e g e s c e n e s , cf. C h i l d s 1978 ( w h o stresses [pp. 9 1 - 9 3 ] that these a r e really historicizing s c e n e s ) ; on the a u d i e n c e s c e n e s , cf. G a b e l m a n n 1984: 4 3 - 4 9 ; c o n c e r n i n g t h e political interpreta­ tion o f L y c i a n dynastic m o n u m e n t s a n d inscriptions, w e m a y also stress that the invocation of G r e e k g o d s is n o t u n a m b i g u o u s ( c f D e m a r g n e 1975 a n d W o r r l e 1991: 2 ) 6 - 1 7 ) ; the s a m e may be true for s o m e invocations o f L y c i a n g o d s ( M e l c h e r t 1993: 34 n. 4). S a r c o p h a g u s o f Payava: c f De­ m a r g n e 1 9 7 4 : 6 1 - 8 7 , as well a s B r y c e 1986: 111, a n d S h a h b a z i 1975: 1 3 5 - 4 8 ; on the Persian arma­ m e n t s in s o m e o f t h e war s c e n e s , cf. B e r n a r d 1964; o n t h e L y c i a n inscriptions, cf L a r o c h e 1974a: 1 3 7 - 3 9 , on the a u d i e n c e s c e n e o f A u t o p h r a d a t e s , cf. G a b e l m a n n 1984: 5 9 - 6 1 , w h o stresses its specificity, s i n c e a c c o r d i n g to h i m on the a u d i e n c e s c e n e o n other X a n t h i a n m o n u m e n t s the dynast, n o t the satrap, is s h o w n (cf. the presentation of the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m on p p . 61-62, with discussion of B o r c h h a r d t ' s " d e p e n d e n c y theory"); on the d a t e ( a n d its uncertainties), c f De­ m a r g n e 1974: 86 ( G a b e l m a n n 1984: 61 p l a c e s it too assuredly at t h e m o m e n t of t h e Satraps' Re­ volt; C h a u m o n t ' s c h r o n o l o g i c a l hypotheses 1990: 6 0 0 - 6 0 2 a r e baseless); o n Autophradates and X a n t h u s , cf. also Weiskopf 1982: 2 9 0 - 9 1 . O n t h e "revolt" of Pericles, s e e H o m b l o w e r 1982: 18182 (who stresses the thinness o f the e v i d e n c e ) , a n d particularly the painstaking analysis of Weiskopf 1982: 2 8 6 - 9 1 , w h o s e c o n c l u s i o n s (local struggle a n d n o participation in a general revolt) strike me as highly convincing. Cf. n o w t h e i m p o r t a n t work of K e e n 1992a ( c h a p . 7 is d e d i c a t e d specifically to Pericles o f L i m y r a ) , w h i c h I was a b l e to c o n s u l t t h r o u g h t h e author's k i n d n e s s , but only after my m a n u s c r i p t h a d already b e e n finalized; I will s i m p l y m e n t i o n that, c o n c e r n i n g the dynast's policy toward t h e Persians a n d the satrapal revolts, K e e n develops views different from those espoused here; w h i l e h e t o o thinks that the b u i l d i n g p r o g r a m established by the dynast at Limyra and his

Artaxerxes II (405/404-359/358)

and Artaxerxes III (359/358-338)

997

own political a m b i t i o n s did not at first conflict with the a c c e p t a n c e of A c h a e m e n i d supervision (illustrated by the P e r s i a n i z i n g d e c o r a t i o n of the

heroon of

the a c r o p o l i s ) , nonetheless he believes

that the dynast really did revolt a r o u n d 370; a c c o r d i n g to h i m , this rebellion was c a u s e d by a desire on the part of the central authority to increase imperial supervision of the region ( u p o n the death 0

f Arbinas, two Persians, A r t e m b a r e s a n d M i l h r a p a t e s , were sent by A u t o p h r a d a t e s to take c o m ­

mand of western a n d eastern L y c i a , respectively: the a u t h o r m a k e s it a p r e c e d e n t to the o r g a n i z a ­ tion known from the X a n t h u s T r i l i n g u a l u n d e r the satrapy of P i x o d a r u s ) ; Pericles would have b e e n conquered a r o u n d 361 a n d e x e c u t e d . T h e r e is n o t h i n g surprising a b o u t interpretive differences, because the d o c u m e n t a t i o n is hopelessly f r a g m e n t e d and a m b i g u o u s . Nevertheless, I stress that Keen was not aware of the n e w e p i g r a p h i c discoveries p u b l i s h e d by Wbrrle 1991, particularly, in this context, the inscription c o n c e r n i n g the dynast's family: in his c o m m e n t a r y , W o r r l e ( 1 9 9 1 : 215 n. 62) resolutely takes the s i d e of Weiskopf: as for the s e c o n d d o c u m e n t (the letter), the editor (whom I follow in the text) shows how it m o d i f i e s our view o f the dynast's power before a n d e s p e ­ cially after his death ( 1 9 9 1 : 2 2 4 - 3 3 , esp. 2 3 2 - 3 3 ) . • A

Summary of the Discussion.

Basically,

I

object to the views recently expressed by D a n ­

damaev 1989a a n d Petit 1993, for reasons laid out e l s e w h e r e ( B r i a n t 1993c; 1994b: 1 2 3 - 2 5 ) . I m u s t also share my doubt'! a b o u t a recent article by M o v s c ; (1992; cf. also 1991) setting out hit hesita­ tion about Weiskopf 1989 a n d restating the g r a n d a m b i t i o n s of O r o n t e s a n d the c o o r d i n a t i o n of the revolts (pp. 1 6 2 - 6 4 ) . M o y s e y uses several p a s s a g e s in Plutarch's

Life of Artaxerxes to

state that

the power of the a g i n g Artaxerxes was c o n s i d e r a b l y w e a k e n e d by court c o n s p i r a c i e s a n d that this situation certainly e n c o u r a g e d the rebellious satraps; all the while stressing (as in M o y s e y 1991) that "this new p e r s p e c t i v e on the health of the Persian E m p i r e at the e n d of the 360s and the b e ­ ginning of the 350s d o e s not reinforce the traditional theory o f the e n d of the A c h a e m e n i d dynasty as the 'sick m a n ' of the fourth century" (p. 165), he n o n e t h e l e s s thinks that the king's physical and psychological w e a k n e s s explains the vigor of the satrapal revolts: " T h e struggle within the c o u r t , the king's a d v a n c e d a g e , [and his] p a r a n o i d nature ignited the volatile m i x t u r e of satrapal a m b i t i o n and the forces of i m p e r i a l disunity." T h i s , I think, grants too m u c h i m p o r t a n c e to Plutarch's view of the court c o n s p i r a c i e s (cf. p. 161). M o y s e y 1991 criticizes W e i s k o p f for his hypercriticism o f the fourth-century G r e e k s o u r c e s that s p e a k of the A c h a e m e n i d E m p i r e (setting u p , moreover, on p. 122, a very s u r p r i s i n g c o m p a r i s o n b e t w e e n Weiskopf 1989 a n d B a l c e r 1987, j u d g i n g the latter more "plausible" [sic]); b u t o n the level of historical m e t h o d , it s e e m s to m e far m o r e a r g u a b l e that he himself a c c o r d s this merit to a flat r e a d i n g of s u c h ideologized texts as Plutarch's

xerxes and

Nepos's

Life of Datames: "In

Life of Arta­

any c a s e , there is n o g o o d reason for d e n y i n g the validity

of Plutarch's a n d N e p o s ' e v i d e n c e " ( M o y s e y 1992: 166; 120 a n d n. 23, a n d m o r e specifically o n Plutarch, see c h a p . 15/1: T h e G r e e k A u t h o r s ' V i e w , p p . 612ff. a n d c h a p . 15/2: P r o p a g a n d a a n d L e ­ gitimation, p p . 62 Iff.. C o m p a r i s o n of the texts shows that Plutarch's "psychological portrait" o f the aging Artaxerxes II is not truly descriptive b u t instead is i n c l u d e d within a n ideologically h o m o g e ­ neous whole, contrary to what the a u t h o r suggests w h e n like m a n y others h e contrasts Artaxerxes II and Artaxerxes III, while h e h i m s e l f o b j e c t s to the "weakness" of Arses a n d D a r i u s III ( 1 9 9 1 : 121; 1992: 167); but, if we read D i o d o r u s X V I . 4 0 . 5 - 6 in c o m p a r i s o n with D i o d o r u s X V I I . 30.7, we m u s t "conclude" that Artaxerxes III was just as "weak" as D a r i u s III or Artaxerxes II (cf. c h a p . 17/3: ' M e m n o n , the Persian S a t r a p s , a n d D a r i u s III," p. 790). In other words, a n d even if we m a y regret the fact, the fourth-century G r e e k d o c u m e n t a t i o n d o e s not truly allow u s to prepare royal portraits that arc properly i n d i v i d u a l i z e d from e a c h other. Finally, a s I h a v e tried to show, the king was a c ­ tively s u p p o r t e d by high officials, i n c l u d i n g the son that P l u t a r c h portrays in the m o s t u n f a v o r a b l e light—namely O c h u s , to w h o m Artaxerxes II (in 360 or 359, or just before his death) entrusted an army to fight T a c h o s (successfully). D e s p i t e the obvious i m p o r t a n c e of the G r e a t King's p e r s o n , the survival of the system was thus not linked solely to his physical and m e n t a l health; the system possessed its o w n d y n a m i c (illustrated, as it h a p p e n s , by the role played by the crown p r i n c e : or, the prince who p r o c l a i m s h i m s e l f crown p r i n c e ) ; this d y n a m i c a p p e a r s to m e to h a v e acted m o r e

Research Notes: Chapter 15

998

in the direction of imperial unit)' than disunity. T h i s is in a way c o n f i r m e d by the e n d of the story s i n c e , after all, if there really were several revolts (but not a c o o r d i n a t e d g e n e r a l insurrection) j j m u s t b e observed that the central authority prevailed! Rather than u s i n g Plutarch uncritically to derive the i m p r e s s i o n that s i n c e p e r h a p s 370 the central power had b e e n paralyzed by its dynastic struggles (1992: 164), t h e a u t h o r m i g h t have taken a look at the B a b y l o n i a n texts (see chap. 15/| a b o v e ) : h e w o u l d h a v e taken into a c c o u n t that in 370 t h e k i n g led h i s a r m y in a c a m p a i g n against 2

R a z a u n d a in M e d i a (ADRTB no. - 3 6 9 ; Stolper, CAH V I : 239), a n d that three years later another tablet refers to a battle won by "the royal army, " A D R T B n o . - 3 6 6 ) .

8. At the Heart of •

Power

In the Royal Residences.

O n the b u i l d i n g works at B a b y l o n , cf. Vallat 1989a and Stolper

2

CAH V I : 2 5 9 - 6 0 ; new p a l a c e at S u s a : Vallat 1979 (inscriptions), L a b r o u s s e a n d B o u c h a r l a t 1972 B o u c h a r l a t a n d L a b r o u s s e 1979, B o u c h a r l a t a n d S h a h i d i 1987; and o n the t o m b (generally) attrib­ uted to Artaxerxes II at Persepolis: cf. S c h m i d t 1970: 9 9 - 1 0 2 a n d C a l m e y e r 1990a: 13-14 (under ?

this theory, t h e inscription n a m i n g the bearer p e o p l e s p u b l i s h e d by K e n t u n d e r the s i g l u m A P m u s t b e attributed to Artaxerxes II); o n Artaxerxes Ill's b u i l d i n g s at Persepolis: cf. T i l i a 1977: 6 8 74, R o a f 1983: 128, a n d C a l m e y e r 1990a: 1 2 - 1 3 ; w e m a y a d d in p a s s i n g that a c c o r d i n g to Frve 1982 the A r a m a i c inscription o n D a r i u s I's t o m b at N a q s - i R u s t a m may d a t e to Artaxerxes II or III,

• Artaxerxes U, Mithra, and Anahita: Sources and Problems.

O n the texts a n d depictions

illustrating these divinities, I refer to t h e d i s c u s s i o n in c h a p , 6 / 6 a b o v e ; I r e m a r k in passing that, always following Plutarch (Art. 23.7-*-), d u r i n g the illness of Atossa (his daughter-wife), Artaxerxes II prayed to the G o d d e s s H e r a , "to this o n e a l o n e o f all t h e deities h e m a d e o b e i s a n c e , by laying his h a n d s u p o n the earth; a n d his satraps a n d favourites m a d e s u c h offerings to the g o d d e s s by his direction, that all a l o n g for sixteen furlongs, betwixt the court a n d her t e m p l e , the road was filled u p with gold and silver, p u r p l e a n d horses, devoted to her"; C h a u m o n t (1958: 1 6 5 - 6 6 ) thinks that Anahita is h i d i n g b e h i n d H e r a ; I d o not s e e the basis for s u c h a theory (already p r o p o s e d without d i s c u s s i o n by H i i s i n g 1933: 18), for never in C l a s s i c a l texts is Anahita s o d e s i g n a t e d , as well as the fact that earlier on ($3.2), Plutarch refers to Anahita with the n a m e Athena ( C l e m e n 1920b: 87 and B o y c e 1982:220 s u g g e s t identifying S p e n t a Armaiti b e h i n d H e r a , for reasons that escape me altogether); it is true that s e e k i n g a pertinent g o d d e s s b e h i n d h e r G r e e k veil p o s e s very delicate p r o b l e m s (on H e r a at H i e r a p o l i s B a m b y k e , cf. O d e n 1977: 5 5 - 5 8 ) . D i n o n ' s m e n t i o n of theciga/mata of Water a n d F i r e ( c o n f i r m e d for F i r e b y M a x i m u s of Tyre: C l e m e n 1920a: 66): R a p p (1865: 4 5 - 4 6 ) sets h i m s e l f to proving it d o e s n o t c o n t r a d i c t the statements o f H e r o d o t u s a n d Strabo (I i m a g i n e a similar theory is f o l l o w e d by B o y c e 1982: 221: ". . . fire, t h e only i c o n pevmissable for a true follower o f Zoroaster," but without q u o t i n g D i n o n ; d o u b t l e s s she is referring to the beliefs of the Parsees); I stress s i m p l y that in this c a s e it is necessary to explain w h a t the G r e e k s meant by the word agalma(la) a p p l i e d to F i r e a n d Water, s i n c e the word is not at all a m b i g u o u s , and if (as is u s u a l ) we a c c e p t the the m e a n i n g 'cult statue' in B e r o s s u s , why s h o u l d it b e rejected in inter­ preting D i n o n ? As I stress in t h e text, the p r o b l e m c o m e s from the fact that w e c a n n o t assign a single m o n u m e n t to t h e c o m m a n d o f Artaxerxes: o n this point, cf. also the remarks of Rapin 1992b: 1 0 8 - 1 6 . O n the s a n c t u a r i e s of Anahita in Asia M i n o r : we have n o reason to think that they g o b a c k to Artaxerxes alone; b e s i d e s , C o o n e y ' s analysis ( 1 9 6 5 ) o f a f e m a l e statuette found in Egypt suggests c o n s i d e r i n g it a replica o f o n e o f the statues o f Anahita erected t h r o u g h o u t the E m p h e in the time of Artaxerxes I I — a theory that s e e m s p a r a d o x i c a l to m e , s i n c e E g y p t was then outside the E m p i r e . It is m o r e o v e r entirely typical that M e m p h i s is not precisely n a m e d in Berossus's l i s t — w h i c h merely confirms t h e administrative v a l u e o f the e v i d e n c e ( " T h e Imperial Realm, p. 680). A few s u p p l e m e n t a r y remarks o n M i t h r a , without venturing too deeply into a difficult and delicate subject: 1.

O n the basis o f e x a m i n i n g i c o n o g r a p h i c m a t e r i a l s , Bivar often stressed the importance of the m o t i f o f the c o m b a t o f lion and bull, in w h i c h h e sees a reference to the gods of death in

Artaxerxes II (405/404-359/358) and Artaxerxes III (359/358-338)

999

various cultures a n d a sort of M i t h r a i c syncretism; h e also sees a Mithraic reference on s o m e coins struck by M a s a e u s in C i l i c i a (Bivar 1975a; cf. also Bivar 1970); the theory m a k e s m e wonder; 2

T h e m o s t fascinating d o c u m e n t is certainly the X a n t h u s Trilingual: we k n o w that the Ara­ maic version n a m e s the divine triad as follows: " L ' T W ( L a t e ) , < R T M W § (Artemis), and H § T R P N ' (xsaOrapati-)," the last of w h i c h obviously n a m e s M i t h r a with the epithet "Lord o f Power"; the discovery p r o m p t e d i m p o r t a n t r e m a r k s from M a y r h o f e r (1973b: 277, 279; 1979: 184-85), a detailed c o m m e n t a r y by D u p o n t - S o m m e r (1976), a n d a theory by Bivar (1988b; on the identification of this "god-satrap," M i t h r a and S a r a p i s , a n e q u a t i o n that the a u t h o r believes was w i d e s p r e a d in the A c h a e m e n i d p e r i o d ) ; against D u p o n t - S o m m e r ' s position, D o w n e y (1986: 3 0 4 - 5 ) s u p p o s e s that it is unlikely " b e c a u s e of the lack of e v i d e n c e of the presence of M i t h r a in Asia M i n o r at the date of the X a n t h u s stela"; b u t , precisely, I a m c o n ­ vinced that M i t h r a was q u i t e w i d e s p r e a d , for reasons given elsewhere: R T P 4 6 0 - 6 2 , b a s e d on late e v i d e n c e to be s u r e , b u t n o n e t h e l e s s u s a b l e ; on e p i g r a p h i c d o c u m e n t s of a n earlier period n a m i n g Mithra in Asia M i n o r , s e e also Lipiilski 1975: 1 7 6 - 8 4 (magus of M i t h r a in C a p p a d o c i a in a G r e e k - A r a m a i c inscription) a n d B E 1983 no. 437 (kata magous Mithren, in C a p p a d o c i a as well);

3.

Micha