French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century

F R E N C H P H I L O S O P H Y IN THE T W E N T I E T H C E N T U R Y In this book Gary Gutting tells, clearly a...

Author: Gary Gutting

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F R E N C H

P H I L O S O P H Y

IN

THE

T W E N T I E T H

C E N T U R Y

In this book Gary Gutting tells, clearly and comprehensively, the story of French philosophy from 1890 to 1990. H e examines the often neglected background of spiritualism, university idealism, and early philosophy of science, and also discusses the privileged role of philosophy in the French education system. Taking account of this background, together with the influences of avant-garde literature and G e r m a n philosophy, he develops a rich account of existential phenomenology, which he argues is the central achievement of French thought during the century, and of subsequent structuralist and poststructuralist developments. His discussion includes chapters on Bergson, Sartre, Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, and Derrida, with sections on other major thinkers including Lyotard, Deleuze, Irigaray Levinas, and Ricoeur. He offers challenging analyses of the often misunderstood relationship between existential phenomenology and structuralism and of the emergence of poststructuralism. Finally, he sketches the major current trends of French philosophy, including liberal political philosophy, the return to phenomenology, and French analytic philosophy. G A R Y G U T T I N G is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, and a leading authority on twentieth-century French philosophy. He is the author of Michel Foucault 's Archaeology of Scientific Knowledge (Cambridge University Press, 1989) and the editor of The Cambridge Companion to Foucault (1994). His many publications also include Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critique of Modernity (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

FRENCH PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY GARY

G U T T I N G

University of Notre Dame

CAMBRIDGE

UNIVERSITY PRESS

PUBLISHED B Y T H E PRESS S Y N D I C A T E OF THE U N I V E R S I T Y OF C A M B R I D G E

T h e Pitt Building, T r u m p i n g t o n Street, C a m b r i d g e , U n i t e d K i n g d o m CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY

PRESS

T h e E d i n b u r g h Building, C a m b r i d g e C B 2 2 R U , U K 40 West 20th Street, N e w Y o r k N Y 1 0 0 1 1 - 4 2 1 1 , U S A 10 S t a m f o r d R o a d , O a k l e i g h , v i e 3166, Australia R u i z de A l a r c o n 13, 28014 M a d r i d , Spain D o c k H o u s e , T h e Waterfront, C a p e T o w n 8001, S o u t h Africa http://www.cambridge.org © G a r y Gutting 2001 T h i s b o o k is in copyright. Subject to statutory e x c e p t i o n a n d to the provisions o f relevant collective licensing agreements, no r e p r o d u c t i o n o f any part m a y take place without the written permission of C a m b r i d g e University Press. First published 2001 Printed in the U n i t e d K i n g d o m at the University Press, C a m b r i d g e Typeface Baskerville u / i 2 . 5 p t

System

3B2

A catalogue recordfor this hook is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data Gutting, G a r y French philosophy in the twentieth century / G a r y Gutting, p.

cm.

Includes b i b l i o g r a p h i c a l references and index. ISBN O-52I-66212-5 - ISBN O - 5 2 I - 6 6 5 5 9 - O (pbk.) i. P h i l o s o p h y French — 20th century. B2421.G88 2001

i94-dc2i

I S B N o 521 66212 5 I S B N 0 521 66559

0

I. Title.

To Anastasia with love r e m e m b e r i n g o u r first d a y i n P a r i s , J u n e 2 0 , 1 9 6 8

Contents

Preface

page x i

A note on references

xiii

List of abbreviations

xiv

PART

I! T H E P H I L O S O P H E R S

OF THE THIRD

REPUBLIC

(l890-I94 ) 0

1

1

F i n - d e - s i e c l e : t h e professors o f t h e R e p u b l i c

3

Positivism

8

Spiritualism: Ravaisson and Renouvier Idealism: Lachelier and Boutroux 2

3

4

3

Philosophy a n d the new university

Science and idealism

9 14 26

Philosophers o f science: Poincare, D u h e m , a n d Meyerson

26

Brunschvicg

40

Bergson

49

Bergson on the history o f philosophy

51

T i m e and free will

56

Matter a n d m e m o r y

60

Creative evolution

66

Religion and morality

75

B e t w e e n the wars

84

Bachelard

85

Blondel

89

N e o - T h o m i s m a n d Maritain

94

Marcel

98

T o w a r d the concrete

102

vii

Contents

Mil PART

Ii: THE

REIGN

OF E X I S T E N T I A L

PHENOMENOLOGY

(194O-I960) 5

119

Sartre

121

Being and nothingness

128

Background

128

T h e basic ontological scheme

131

Consciousness

133

Nothingness and anguish

137

Bad faith

140

Being-for-others

144

Freedom

147

Critique of dialectical reason

6

7

151

Beauvoir

158

Beauvoir and the origins of existentialism

158

T h e second sex

165

Merleau-Ponty

181

T h e phenomenology of perception

186

Merleau-Ponty's conception of phenomenology

186

T h e body

190

Language

192

The Other

195

T h e cogito and the truth of idealism

197

Freedom

203

Phenomenology and structuralism

PART

8

Hi:

STRUCTURALISM

BEYOND

(1960-1990)

T h e structuralist i n v a s i o n

213 215

Saussure

215

Lévi-Strauss

221

Structuralism and phenomenology

224

Philosophy of the concept: Cavaillès, Canguilhem, and Serres

227

T h e high tide of structuralism

234

M a r x and Althusser

235

Freud, L a c a n , and Kristeva

238

Barthes Poststructuralism

9

AND

208

Foucault

244 249

258

Madness

264

Order

267

Contents

10

11

Discipline

278

Sex

282

Derrida

289

Deconstruction

291

Differance

298

Is Derrida a skeptic?

304

Ethics

308

Religion

313

P h i l o s o p h i e s o f difference Lyotard

12

ix

318 318

Deleuze

331

Irigaray

341

Fin-de-siecle a g a i n : " l e t e m p s r e t r o u v e " ?

353

Levinas

353

Ricoeur

363

Recent directions

371

Conclusion: the philosophy of freedom

380

Appendix: philosophy and the French educational system

391

References

394

Index

412

Preface

T h e r e is n o t h i n g s a c r e d a b o u t the c e n t u r y as a unit o f t i m e , b u t there is a relatively self-contained a n d c o h e r e n t story to be told a b o u t F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y f r o m a b o u t 1890 to a b o u t 1990. In telling it,

I

have

exhaustive.

tried There

to

be

comprehensive

are full

chapters

although

o n the

r e g a r d as o f the highest i m p o r t a n c e

by

no

half-dozen

means

figures

a n d substantial sections

I on

a b o u t a d o z e n other m a j o r thinkers. B e y o n d that, I h a v e let the logic

of my

narrative,

completeness, constraints

more

determine

than

whom

I

any

desire

discuss

for

and

o f l e n g t h , it has b e e n i m p o s s i b l e

how.

encyclopedic Given

to a v o i d

the

arbitrary

exclusions. T h o u g h t f u l r e a d e r s will r e g r e t n o m o r e t h a n I that there is little or n o t h i n g o n A n d r e L a l a n d e , A l a i n , S i m o n e W e i l , Pierre Bourdieu, Alain Badiou . . . M y a p p r o a c h has b e e n that o f a historically m i n d e d p h i l o s o p h e r rather than

a historian per

se. I h a v e , accordingly,

paid

more

attention to the i n t e r n a l logic o f ideas t h a n to, for e x a m p l e , socialpolitical c o n t e x t s , e c o n o m i c

determinants,

or the p s y c h o l o g y

influence. I h a v e , h o w e v e r , tried to give a sense o f the

flow

of and

i n t e r a c t i o n o f ideas f r o m o n e thinker to a n o t h e r a n d to e x p l a i n , at least

in

intellectual

terms,

major

changes

in

views

(from,

for

e x a m p l e , i d e a l i s m to existentialism a n d existentialism to poststructuralism). M y m a i n g o a l has b e e n to p r o v i d e the r e a d e r w i t h lucid a n d fair analyses o f w h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s h a v e t h o u g h t a n d o f h o w the t h o u g h t s o f different p h i l o s o p h e r s are related. I h a v e also p a i d s o m e , necessarily limited, attention to the b r o a d e r intellectual c o n t e x t o f French philosophical

thought

(for e x a m p l e ,

German

philosophy,

a v a n t - g a r d e literature, a n d structuralist social science) a n d to its dependence

o n the distinctive F r e n c h system o f e d u c a t i o n .

(The

a p p e n d i x p r o v i d e s a s u m m a r y o f basic facts a n d t e r m i n o l o g y that m a y b e useful for u n d e r s t a n d i n g r e f e r e n c e s to this system.) XI

Preface

Xll

M y first four c h a p t e r s , o n the years b e f o r e W o r l d W a r II, c o v e r m u c h m a t e r i a l s e l d o m discussed in E n g l i s h . I h o p e that r e a d e r s will see the i m p o r t a n c e o f spiritualism, university i d e a l i s m , B e r g s o n , a n d F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y o f science for u n d e r s t a n d i n g the d e v e l o p m e n t s of the latter h a l f o f the century. I also h o p e t h e y will c o m e to share m y a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the intrinsic p h i l o s o p h i c a l v a l u e o f w h a t

thinkers

such as L a c h e l i e r , P o i n c a r é , B r u n s c h v i c g , a n d B l o n d e l a c h i e v e d . M y later c h a p t e r s , c o v e r i n g b e t t e r - k n o w n b u t often quite difficult p h i l o sophers, p u t a p a r t i c u l a r l y strong e m p h a s i s on clarity o f analysis. T h e y also d e f e n d s o m e c o n t r o v e r s i a l j u d g m e n t s a b o u t , for e x a m p l e , the centrality o f Sartre's L'être et le néant, the p h i l o s o p h i c a l i m p o r t a n c e o f B e a u v o i r ' s Le deuxième sexe, the relatively m a r g i n a l role o f structuralism, a n d the significance

of poststructuralism. T h e

Conclusion

presents m y v i e w that t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y is best r e a d as a sustained reflection o n the p r o b l e m o f i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m . I a m especially grateful to those w h o r e a d a n d so p e r c e p t i v e l y c o m m e n t e d o n drafts o f this b o o k : K a r l A m e r i k s , Philip Frederick Crosson, T h o m a s

Bartok,

F l y n n , A n a s t a s i a Friel G u t t i n g ,

and

S t e p h e n W a t s o n . W a r m thanks also to those w h o offered their e x p e r t assessment o f p a r t i c u l a r c h a p t e r s o r sections: Alissa B r a n h a m , D a v i d Carr, Jean G a y o n , Eric Matthews, T o d d May, William M c B r i d e , and E r n a n M c M u l l i n . Philip B a r t o k deserves special m e n t i o n b o t h for his a c u t e close r e a d i n g a n d his i n v a l u a b l e b i b l i o g r a p h i c a l assistance. I also w a n t to t h a n k the U n i v e r s i t y o f N o t r e D a m e ' s

Erasmus

Institute, w h i c h p r o v i d e d financial s u p p o r t a n d a splendid intellectual

atmosphere

for

a

semester's

work

on

this

book.

I

am

especially grateful to the D i r e c t o r , J a m e s T u r n e r , a n d the A s s o c i a t e D i r e c t o r , R o b e r t S u l l i v a n . T h a n k s are also d u e for all the stimulation a n d assistance I r e c e i v e d f r o m the 1999—2000 c o h o r t o f E r a s m u s fellows: T e r r y B a y s , W i l l i a m D o n a h u e , A n i t a H o u c k , P a m e l a J a s o n , Wesley K o r t , Daniella Kostroun, R o g e r L u n d i n , J o h n

McGreevy

and Susan Rosa. S p e c i a l t h a n k s are d u e to H i l a r y G a s k i n , the p h i l o s o p h y editor at C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, w h o suggested that I write this b o o k a n d e n c o u r a g e d m e t h r o u g h o u t its w r i t i n g , a n d to J o c e l y n P y e for e x c e l l e n t copy-editing. Finally, as a l w a y s , b y far m y greatest d e b t is to m y family: to m y c h i l d r e n , T o m , E d w a r d , a n d T a s h a , for all the p r i d e a n d j o y they b r i n g ; a n d to m y wife A n a s t a s i a for the p e r f e c t gift o f l o v i n g a n d b e i n g l o v e d b y her.

A note on references

B o o k s a n d articles are cited simply b y title, w i t h full details g i v e n in the R e f e r e n c e s . A l l citations are in E n g l i s h a n d are f r o m a p u b l i s h e d translation w h e n one is listed in the R e f e r e n c e s . O t h e r w i s e ,

the

English translations are m y o w n . W h e n a text is cited repeatedly, the title is a b b r e v i a t e d (e.g., EN for L'être et le néant) a n d p a g e references are g i v e n in the m a i n text, the first n u m b e r r e f e r r i n g to the F r e n c h original a n d the s e c o n d to the E n g l i s h translation.

Xlll

Abbreviations

A

M a u r i c e B l o n d e l , L'action

CRD

J e a n - P a u l Sartre, Critique de la raison dialectique

CS

L u c e Irigaray, Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un

D

J e a n - F r a n ç o i s L y o t a r d , Le différend

DS

S i m o n e de B e a u v o i r , Le deuxième sexe

DSM

H e n r i B e r g s o n , Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion

EC

H e n r i B e r g s o n , L'évolution créatrice

EDI

H e n r i B e r g s o n , Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience

EDS

L u c e Irigaray, Ethique de la différence sexuelle

EH

L é o n B r u n s c h v i c g , L'expérience humaine et la causalité physique

EN

J e a n - P a u l Sartre, L'être et le néant

FI

Jules L a c h e l i e r , Du fondement de l'induction

LI

J a c q u e s D e r r i d a , Limited Inc.

MC

M i c h e l F o u c a u l t , Les mots et les choses

MJ

L é o n B r u n s c h v i c g , La modalité du jugement

MM

H e n r i B e r g s o n , Matière et mémoire

MF

J a c q u e s D e r r i d a , Marges de la philosophie

PK

M i c h e l F o u c a u l t , Power/Knowledge

PP

M a u r i c e M e r l e a u - P o n t y , Phénoménologie de la perception

PS

C l a u d e L é v i - S t r a u s s , La pensée sauvage

QM

J e a n - P a u l S a r t r e , " Q u e s t i o n de m é t h o d e "

S

M a u r i c e M e r l e a u - P o n t y , Signes

SH

H e n r i P o i n c a r é , La science et l'hypothèse

SR

J e a n - P a u l S a r t r e , " J e a n - P a u l Sartre r é p o n d "

77

E m m a n u e l L e v i n a s , Totalité et infini

VS

H e n r i P o i n c a r é , La valeur de la science

XIV

PART

I

The Philosophers of the Third Republic (1890-1940)

CHAPTER

I

Fin-de-siècle: the professors of the Republic

Abandoning the study of John Stuart Mill only for that of Lachelier, the less she believed in the reality of the external world, the more desperately she sought to establish herself in a good position in it before she died. (Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, iv, 438)

PHILOSOPHY

AND THE NEW

UNIVERSITY

W r i t i n g j u s t after t h e e n d o f W o r l d W a r I, a n a c u t e o b s e r v e r o f t h e F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h i c a l scene j u d g e d that " p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e s e a r c h h a d n e v e r b e e n m o r e a b u n d a n t , m o r e serious, a n d m o r e intense a m o n g us t h a n in the last thirty y e a r s " . T h i s flowering w a s d u e to t h e p l a c e 1

o f p h i l o s o p h y in t h e n e w e d u c a t i o n a l system set u p b y t h e T h i r d R e p u b l i c in t h e w a k e o f the d e m o r a l i z i n g defeat in t h e F r a n c o Prussian W a r . T h e F r e n c h h a d b e e n h u m i l i a t e d b y t h e c a p t u r e o f N a p o l e o n I I I at S e d a n , d e v a s t a t e d b y the l o n g siege o f Paris, a n d terrified b y w h a t m o s t o f t h e b o u r g e o i s i e s a w as seventy-three days o f a n a r c h y u n d e r t h e r a d i c a l socialism o f t h e C o m m u n e . M u c h o f the n e w R e p u b l i c ' s effort at spiritual r e s t o r a t i o n w a s d r i v e n b y a rejection o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a l v a l u e s o f institutional r e l i g i o n , w h i c h it a i m e d to r e p l a c e w i t h a n e n l i g h t e n e d secular w o r l d v i e w . A p r i n c i p a l vehicle o f this enterprise w a s e d u c a t i o n a l r e f o r m a n d specifically t h e b u i l d i n g o f a university system d e d i c a t e d to t h e ideals o f science, reason, a n d humanism. Albert T h i b a u d e t highlighted the importance

o f this r e f o r m

when

republic o f professors".

he labeled the T h i r d

Republic "the

2

P h i l o s o p h y w a s at t h e c e n t e r o f t h e n e w e d u c a t i o n a l

regime,

e x e r t i n g its influence t h r o u g h t h e f a m o u s " c l a s s e de p h i l o s o p h i e " !

2

D o m i n i q u e Parodi, La philosophie contemporaine en France, 9 — 1 0 . In his La république des professeurs.

3

The Philosophers of the Third Republic

4

(1890-1940)

that w a s the m a i n r e q u i r e m e n t for students in F r e n c h p u b l i c h i g h schools (lycées) d u r i n g their last y e a r (when t h e y w e r e s e v e n t e e n to eighteen

years

regulations

old).

3

The

class's m o d e r n

o f 1809 that reestablished

back

to

the m e d i e v a l divisions

history w e n t

of

p h i l o s o p h y into l o g i c , m e t a p h y s i c s , a n d m o r a l i t y a n d stipulated that it b e studied for eight h o u r s a w e e k . T h e r e w a s also i n t r o d u c e d a division t r e a t i n g the history o f philosophy. A r o u n d Cousin

4

1830, V i c t o r

a d d e d p s y c h o l o g y , w h i c h s o o n b e c a m e the m o s t i m p o r t a n t

e l e m e n t o f the c u r r i c u l u m . A l s o , w h e r e the rules o f 1809 h a d g i v e n m e r e l y a set o f r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s for t e a c h i n g a n d a list o f authors, C o u s i n w o r k e d out a d e t a i l e d r e q u i r e d structure. T h e i d e a w a s to c o v e r the w h o l e o f philosophy, b o t h its p r o b l e m s a n d its history, in a y e a r - l o n g g r a n d synthesis. C o u s i n also b e g a n the p r o c e s s o f l a i c i z i n g philosophy, b y r e d u c i n g the role o f religious questions. H i s structure stayed in p l a c e until p h i l o s o p h y w a s e l i m i n a t e d f r o m the c u r r i c u l u m o f the lycées in 1853 u n d e r the S e c o n d E m p i r e . In 1863 p h i l o s o p h y w a s restored to the lycées a n d b e c a m e required

subject

education.

5

for

all students

in the

last y e a r

of

D u r i n g the First E m p i r e , a l y c é e e d u c a t i o n

became

r e q u i r e d for m a n y civil service positions. T h i s m e a n t that, 1863, the

"classe

de p h i l o s o p h i c "

was

extremely

a

secondary

important

after for

F r e n c h s e c o n d a r y students, since it w a s n o w a k e y topic on the e x a m they h a d to pass to r e c e i v e their d e g r e e (the baccalauréat) a n d be eligible for state e m p l o y m e n t . Its i m p o r t a n c e w a s further

empha-

sized b y the r e f o r m o f 1874, w h i c h m a d e p h i l o s o p h y a n d r h e t o r i c separate divisions, e m p h a s i z i n g p h i l o s o p h y ' s a u t o n o m y a n d distinctiveness. M o r e o v e r , since p h i l o s o p h y w a s t a u g h t o n l y in a single y e a r — the final o n e — it w a s p r e s e n t e d as the c u l m i n a t i o n a n d synthesis o f all that h a d g o n e b e f o r e , the " c r o w n " , as it w a s i n e v i t a b l y p u t , o f s e c o n d a r y e d u c a t i o n . It w a s n o t surprising that p h i l o s o p h y

soon

r e p l a c e d r h e t o r i c as the course w i t h the h i g h e s t intellectual status :i

4

5

For an overview o f the structure of the French e d u c a t i o n a l system, see the A p p e n d i x . V i c t o r C o u s i n (1792-1867) was minister of e d u c a t i o n in the 1830s a n d 1840s under the bourgeois m o n a r c h y o f Louis-Philippe. His o w n philosophical position, w h i c h he called eclecticism, tried to synthesize French philosophical p s y c h o l o g y (deriving from M a i n e de Biran) with empiricism, Scottish realism, a n d G e r m a n idealism. D u r i n g the mid-nineteenth century, eclecticism h a d the status of an "official" philosophy in the French university. C o u s i n was also important as an editor, translator, and historian o f philosophy. For a general discussion of French e d u c a t i o n in the later nineteenth a n d early twentieth centuries, see Fritz Ringer, Fields of Knowledge: French Academic Culture in Comparative Perspective, 1890-1920. O n the role of philosophy in France d u r i n g this period, see J e a n - L o u i s Fabiani, Les philosophes de la république.


5

a n d , accordingly, a t t r a c t e d a large n u m b e r o f t h e brightest students interested in s e c o n d a r y t e a c h i n g . S i n c e t h e m a i n g o a l o f t h e university t e a c h i n g o f p h i l o s o p h y w a s to

produce

teachers

for the l y c é e

philosophy

class, there w a s

c o n s i d e r a b l e c o n t i n u i t y b e t w e e n t h e c o n t e n t o f the t w o p r o g r a m s . A t the s a m e t i m e , t h e q u a l i f y i n g e x a m i n a t i o n (the agrégation) for those who

wanted

to t e a c h

philosophy

in t h e lycées

was geared

to

university-level r e s e a r c h r a t h e r t h a n m e r e l y w h a t w e w o u l d think o f as h i g h - s c h o o l t e a c h i n g . T h e result w a s a l a r g e n u m b e r o f t a l e n t e d lycée t e a c h e r s w i t h a h i g h level o f specialist k n o w l e d g e in p h i l o s o p h y ; a n d , o f c o u r s e , the best o f these w e n t o n to take d o c t o r a t e s in p h i l o s o p h y a n d b e c o m e university professors. T h e F r e n c h e d u c a t i o n a l system thus g a v e p h i l o s o p h y a h i g h l y p r i v i l e g e d p l a c e in t h e T h i r d R e p u b l i c . T h e r e w a s a n a u d i e n c e c o m p o s e d o f a g e n e r a l p u b l i c e d u c a t e d in the r u d i m e n t s o f philosophy, as w e l l as a substantial n u m b e r o f s e c o n d a r y s c h o o l t e a c h e r s w i t h specialist k n o w l e d g e o f the subject; a n d there w a s a h i g h l y elite g r o u p o f university professors e n g a g e d in p h i l o s o p h i c a l

research.

A c c o r d i n g l y , a faculty o f p h i l o s o p h y p r e s i d e d over the " r e p u b l i c o f professors".

Thibaudet

falls into religious l a n g u a g e

in t r y i n g to

express t h e sublimity o f t h e p h i l o s o p h e r ' s role: " T h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l vocation

embodies

a principle

a n a l o g o u s to a priestly

vocation.

A n y o n e w h o h a s p r e p a r e d for t h e agrégation in p h i l o s o p h y . . . h a s b e e n t o u c h e d , at s o m e p o i n t , like a s e m i n a r i a n , b y t h e i d e a that t h e highest d e g r e e o f h u m a n g r a n d e u r is a life c o n s e c r a t e d to t h e service o f the m i n d a n d that t h e U n i v e r s i t y lets o n e c o m p e t e for positions that m a k e it possible to r e n d e r this s e r v i c e . " Nevertheless,

as E r n s t

Curtius

6

(writing in 1930) e m p h a s i z e d ,

F r e n c h culture r e m a i n e d essentially literary. T h e d o m i n a n t figures w e r e writers such as Z o l a a n d A n a t o l e F r a n c e , w h o w e r e outside t h e university system; a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l w r i t i n g itself w a s literary in t h e sense that, as B e r g s o n said, there w a s " n o p h i l o s o p h i c a l i d e a , n o m a t t e r h o w p r o f o u n d or subtle, that c o u l d n o t b e e x p r e s s e d in t h e language

of everyday

life

[la langue de tout le monde]".

7

Curtius,

i m b u e d w i t h G e r m a n idealism's c o n c e p t i o n o f philosophy, s a w t h e

6

7

La république des professeurs, 139. C i t e d b y Ernst C u r t i u s , The Civilization of France: An Introduction, 100. Fabiani notes, however, that " d u r i n g the p e r i o d 1880-1914 there were n o close connections b e t w e e n professors of philosophy a n d avant-garde w r i t e r s " [Les philosophes de la république, 115). A s w e shall see, that changes with the generation o f the 1930s.

6


(1890-1940)

F r e n c h as s u r r e n d e r i n g the p h i l o s o p h i c a l enterprise " t o literary f o r m a n d a v e r a g e i n t e l l i g e n c e " a n d t h o u g h t this w a s why, a l t h o u g h " i n G e r m a n y intellectual culture m a y be p h i l o s o p h i c a l , in F r a n c e it c a n be literary o n l y " .

8

T h e university p h i l o s o p h y o f the early T h i r d R e p u b l i c

(before

W o r l d W a r I) h a d b o t h the strengths a n d the w e a k n e s s e s o f its p r i v i l e g e d status. T h e h i g h level o f talent a n d the i n f o r m e d critical a u d i e n c e sustained a professional solidity that c o n t e m p o r a r i e s favora b l y (and rightly) c o n t r a s t e d to the e l o q u e n t v a g a r i e s o f V i c t o r C o u s i n ' s e c l e c t i c i s m a n d H y p p o l i t e T a i n e ' s positivism, w h i c h

had

d o m i n a t e d the S e c o n d E m p i r e . A l s o , u n i v e r s a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l e d u c a tion a n d the h i g h social position a n d c o n n e c t i o n s o f professors g a v e p h i l o s o p h y a strong influence o n the g e n e r a l F r e n c h culture. S c i e n tists such as H e n r i P o i n c a r é (brother-in-law o f the p h i l o s o p h e r E m i l e Boutroux)

showed

a

particular

interest

in

philosophical

issues.

M a r c e l P r o u s t (a g r o o m s m a n at B e r g s o n ' s w e d d i n g ) , w a s a friend of L é o n B r u n s c h v i c g , his fellow l y c é e - s t u d e n t in the p h i l o s o p h y c o u r s e o f A l p h o n s e D a r l u . T h e strong p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n t e n t o f the writings o f A n d r é G i d e a n d P a u l V a l é r y is often r e m a r k e d ; a n d the w o r k o f A n d r é M a l r a u x , w h o studied p h i l o s o p h y w i t h A l a i n (the p s e u d o n y m o f E m i l e C h a r t i e r ) , the m o s t f a m o u s o f all l y c é e t e a c h e r s , has b e e n c h a r a c t e r i z e d as " t h e t h o u g h t o f A l a i n t r a n s p o s e d into the n o v e l " . But

privilege

also

encouraged

intellectual

complacency

9

and

d a m p e d the c r e a t i v i t y that c a n rise f r o m r a d i c a l q u e s t i o n i n g b y less socially secure thinkers. W i t h the a r g u a b l e e x c e p t i o n o f B e r g s o n , the p h i l o s o p h e r s o f the early T h i r d R e p u b l i c w o r k e d w i t h i n a relatively n a r r o w b a n d defined b y their t r a i n i n g in the history o f t h o u g h t , their b o u r g e o i s m o r a l ideals, a n d the political realities o f their

time.

C u r t i u s stretches the p o i n t to the m a x i m u m : [French philosophy's] conservative Humanism could not endure either the Pantheism of a world-intoxicated ecstasy, nor the transcendental idealism of the creative spirit, nor the knowledge of salvation which desires redemption and depreciates the value of the world, nor the moral criticism of an heroic will to power. A Hegel, a Schopenhauer, a Nietzsche are unthinkable in F r a n c e . 10

O n the o t h e r h a n d , e s c h e w i n g the ecstasies o f G e r m a n i c m e t a p h y sics — a n d the a t t e n d a n t drive for strong originality — a l l o w e d the 8

9

1 0

The Civilization of France: An Introduction, 99-100. J e a n G u i t t o n , Regards sur la pensée française, 1870—1940, 59. The Civilization of France: An Introduction, 104.


7

F r e n c h professors to c r e a t e a fruitful circle o f sensible c o n v e r s a t i o n , f o c u s i n g on a small set o f k e y topics a n d g r o u n d e d in a c o m m o n f o r m a t i o n a n d strong m u t u a l respect. S u c h c o n v e r s a t i o n w a s c a r r i e d out in the Revue de métaphysique et de morale (founded b y X a v i e r L é o n a n d L é o n B r u n s c h v i c g in 1893) a n d in m e e t i n g s o f the closely r e l a t e d S o c i é t é Française de P h i l o s o p h i e (founded in 1901). T h e d e g r e e of s h a r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g that c o u l d b e a s s u m e d is m o s t striking in André

Lalande's project

of a

Vocabulaire technique et critique de la

philosophic T h i s v o l u m e , w h i c h w e n t t h r o u g h e l e v e n editions b e t w e e n 1900 a n d

1926, offered

detailed définitions

o f the full r a n g e

of

p h i l o s o p h i c a l t e r m s , finally f o r m u l a t e d b y L a l a n d e b u t i n f o r m e d by c o m m e n t a r y f r o m m o s t o f the l e a d i n g p h i l o s o p h e r s o f the p e r i o d . (Lalande's p r o p o s e d definitions w e r e discussed r e g u l a r l y at sessions o f the S o c i é t é , a n d the c o m m e n t s o f m e m b e r s are p r i n t e d b e n e a t h the Vocabulaire''% entries.) T h e w o r k c a m e r e m a r k a b l y close to its g o a l o f " a c h i e v i n g a c c o r d a m o n g p h i l o s o p h e r s — as m u c h as possible — on what they understand b y . . . philosophical t e r m s " . Focused

and

fruitful,

if n o t

drastically

1 1

creative,

early

R e p u b l i c p h i l o s o p h y w a s r a t h e r like m u c h c o n t e m p o r a r y

Third analytic

p h i l o s o p h y (or m e d i e v a l scholasticism), t h o u g h far less t e c h n i c a l a n d rigorous

and

far

more

accessible

to

the

general

culture.

t h o u g h t is n o t likely to m a k e n e w e p o c h s , b u t it is an

Such

effective

c o n t r i b u t i o n to the civility a n d rationality o f the age in w h i c h it finds itself. Politically,

the

philosophers

o f the

Third

Republic,

like

other

m e m b e r s o f the n e w university, o c c u p i e d an interesting a n d i m p o r t a n t position.

1 2

T h e i r social status a n d position as g o v e r n m e n t e m p l o y e e s

o b v i o u s l y m a d e t h e m p a r t o f the e s t a b l i s h m e n t , b u t since t h e y h a d typically b e e n b o r n into intellectual families (with p a r e n t s w h o w e r e t e a c h e r s , writers, p h y s i c i a n s , etc.) t h e y w e r e less i n c l i n e d to identify w i t h the c o n s e r v a t i v e v a l u e s o f the w e a l t h y b o u r g e o i s class. ( T h e y h a d , in P i e r r e B o u r d i e u ' s t e r m s , m u c h m o r e c u l t u r a l c a p i t a l t h a n e c o n o m i c capital.) A c c o r d i n g l y , professors as a w h o l e f o r m e d

an

influential class o f liberal s u p p o r t e r s o f the T h i r d R e p u b l i c ' s ideals, w i t h those w i t h the highest level o f intellectual status g e n e r a l l y the m o s t liberal. S o , for e x a m p l e , in the D r e y f u s affair, w h i c h split F r a n c e 1 1

1 2

Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie, ix. See Fritz Ringer, Fields of Knowledge: French Academic I8 O-I 2O, 9

9

219-25.

Culture in Comparative Perspective,

8


(1890-1940)

at the t u r n o f the century, the m a j o r i t y o f professors at the S o r b o n n e a n d the E c o l e N o r m a l e

Supérieure

supported Dreyfus, and

this

s u p p o r t w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y strong a m o n g p h i l o s o p h e r s . R e f l e c t i n g the T h i r d R e p u b l i c ' s secular l i b e r a l i s m , the

central

c o n c e r n s o f its p h i l o s o p h e r s w e r e science, h u m a n f r e e d o m , a n d the relation b e t w e e n the t w o . U n l i k e the G e r m a n idealists, w h o

felt

t h e m s e l v e s possessed o f intuitive or dialectical m o d e s o f k n o w i n g that far o u t s t r i p p e d the p l o d d i n g efforts o f e m p i r i c a l science, these philosophers

saw

their

reflections

as

grounded

in

an

accurate

u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d a p p r e c i a t i o n o f scientific results. O n the o t h e r h a n d , e v e n those closest to a positivist a c c e p t a n c e o f the u l t i m a t e cognitive a u t h o r i t y o f science r e j e c t e d empiricist e p i s t e m o l o g i e s o f scientific e x p e r i e n c e in favor o f a rationalist active role for the m i n d . In

a parallel

way,

construals

of freedom

typically

avoided

the

d e t e r m i n i s m or c o m p a t i b i l i s m f a v o r e d b y e m p i r i c i s m a n d the subo r d i n a t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n will to an idealist absolute spirit. B e c a u s e o f this l a c k o f s y m p a t h y w i t h the d o m i n a n t traditions of both G e r m a n y and Britain, French thought was very nearly autonom o u s d u r i n g this p e r i o d .

1 3

POSITIVISM

S u r v e y s o f p h i l o s o p h y in F r a n c e f r o m 1870 to 1920 a l m o s t a l w a y s employ

a standard

division

o f their

subject

into three

schools:

positivism, spiritualism, a n d idealism. T h e s e are useful c a t e g o r i e s for u n d e r s t a n d i n g the p r o b l e m s a n d a p p r o a c h e s o f the p e r i o d , b u t they are m u c h less helpful as classifications o f i n d i v i d u a l thinkers. T h i s is p a r t i c u l a r l y so for positivism. T h e t e r m w a s first u s e d b y A u g u s t e C o m t e (1798—1857) to c h a r a c t e r i z e his effort to d e v e l o p a p h i l o s o p h y b a s e d on o n l y the p l a i n (positive) facts o f e x p e r i e n c e -

of which

science p r o v i d e s p a r a d i g m e x a m p l e s — a n d to a v o i d m e t a p h y s i c a l hypotheses.

It c a m e

to b e

applied

to a n y v i e w

that

privileged

e m p i r i c a l science over m e t a p h y s i c a l t h o u g h t . A " p o s i t i v i s t " m i g h t well h o l d strongly scientistic v i e w s such as H u m e a n e m p i r i c i s m or materialistic

1 3

reductionism,

but

not

necessarily.

Many

positivists

Similarly, there was little foreign interest in French philosophy. H a r a l d Hoffding, for e x a m p l e , in his comprehensive history o f m o d e r n philosophy, omits any treatment of French philosophers of the latter half of the nineteenth century, noting that, although they are important in the thought of their o w n country, " t h e y have b r o u g h t n o n e w principles to b e a r on the discussion of p r o b l e m s " (A History of Modern Philosophy, 486).

Fin-de-siecle: the professors of the Republic

9

rejected C o m t e ' s e x c l u s i o n o f t h e o r e t i c a l entities, such as a t o m s , f r o m science, a n d C o m t e h i m s e l f m a i n t a i n e d the irreducibility o f biology

and sociology

to physics

a n d chemistry.

Later,

leading

positivists such as E r n e s t R e n a n a n d H y p p o l i t e T a i n e p a i n t e d g r a n d visions o f historical p r o g r e s s that w e r e w i t h s o m e plausibility l a b e l e d H e g e l i a n . T h i s r e p r e s e n t e d a b r o a d e n i n g a n d dilution o f positivism as it b e c a m e m o r e a g e n e r a l intellectual o r i e n t a t i o n t h a n a welldefined p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n . I n the m i d - n i n e t e e n t h century, positiv i s m w a s still a m a j o r force, b u t its m a i n p r o p o n e n t s w e r e literary figures

such as R e n a n a n d T a i n e r a t h e r t h a n a c a d e m i c p h i l o s o p h e r s .

F r o m 1870 o n it w a s r e j e c t e d b y e v e r y m a j o r p h i l o s o p h e r .

14

N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e positivist spirit survived. It w a s a m a j o r m o t i v a tion for e x t e n d i n g the m e t h o d s o f the n a t u r a l sciences to the h u m a n d o m a i n , l e a d i n g to the seminal w o r k o f D ü r k h e i m in s o c i o l o g y a n d o f P i e r r e J a n e t in e m p i r i c a l p s y c h o l o g y .

15

S u c h w o r k did n o t a s s u m e

or i m p l y that all k n o w l e d g e w a s scientific, b u t it did constitute a c h a l l e n g e to anti-positivist a r g u m e n t s that the specifically domain

was not open

legacies

of positivism

to e m p i r i c a l were

understanding.

the d e v e l o p m e n t ,

human

Other

by Poincare

vital and

D u h e m , o f p h i l o s o p h y o f science as a s e p a r a t e subdiscipline a n d the c e n t r a l role a c c o r d e d d e t a i l e d discussions o f the history a n d results o f science b y v i r t u a l l y e v e r y m a j o r figure f r o m B o u t r o u x to B r u n s c h v i c g a n d B e r g s o n . I n d e e d , b y the 1930s B a c h e l a r d c o u l d r e s p e c t a b l y m a i n t a i n that philosophy, w h i l e n o t r e d u c i b l e to science, should b e identified w i t h the p h i l o s o p h y o f science.

SPIRITUALISM:

Spiritualism h a s a g o o d

RAVAISSON

AND

RENOUVIER

c l a i m to b e the n a t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h y o f

F r a n c e . It is r o o t e d in D e s c a r t e s ' assertion o f t h e epistemic a n d

1 4

1 5

O n e thinker w h o did defend a strong positivist position in the early 1900s w a s Felix L e D a n t e c (1869-1917). Parodi briefly s u m m a r i z e s his views in his survey of the c o n t e m p o r a r y scene; b u t then, in place of his usual critical assessment, h e merely remarks, "it w o u l d be pointless to criticize such w o r k " (La Philosophie contemporaine en France, 57). T h e m a r g i n a l place of positivism is also suggested by the t w o pages devoted to it in L a l a n d e ' s Vocabulaire, in contrast to the four pages o n spiritualism a n d the nine o n idealism. For a l o n g time, there w a s n o sharp distinction d r a w n b e t w e e n p s y c h o l o g y / s o c i o l o g y a n d philosophy. E v e n well into the twentieth century, D ü r k h e i m , Janet, a n d similar thinkers were routinely r e g a r d e d as philosophers a n d included in standard surveys such as Parodi's La philosophie contemporaine en France and Isaac Benrubi's Les Sources et les courants de la philosophic contemporaine en France. E v e n today, the w o r k o f sociologists such as Pierre B o u r d i e u a n d B r u n o L a t o u r has a strong philosophical c o m p o n e n t .


10

(1890-1940)

m e t a p h y s i c a l p r i m a c y o f t h o u g h t b u t does n o t r e q u i r e his m i n d b o d y d u a l i s m . T h e v i e w is, in fact, consistent w i t h a n y o n t o l o g y that allows for these t w o c e n t r a l assertions: that the v a l u e o f h u m a n existence d e r i v e s f r o m the h i g h e r m e n t a l faculties (both intellectual a n d affective) o f i n d i v i d u a l s ; a n d that these faculties are n e i t h e r reducible

to m a t e r i a l processes (including sense e x p e r i e n c e ) n o r

assimilable to a h i g h e r level o f reality (the absolute). Spiritualism is thus a n assertion o f the m e t a p h y s i c a l a n d ethical p r i m a c y o f the i n d i v i d u a l m i n d (l'esprit), against the claims o f m a t e r i a l i s m , empiricism, a n d c e r t a i n sorts o f idealism. O n e o f the earliest a n d m o s t influential spiritualists w a s F r a n ç o i s M a i n e de B i r a n ( 1 7 6 6 - 1 8 2 4 ) . A r g u i n g against L o c k e , H u m e , a n d , especially, C o n d i l l a c a n d the Idéologues, h e m a i n t a i n e d that empiricist r e d u c t i o n s o f m e n t a l life to the flow o f p a s s i n g sense impressions w e r e refuted b y o u r e x p e r i e n c e s o f w i l l i n g (effort voulu), w h i c h r e v e a l a persisting self c o n t i n u a l l y straining against b o d i l y resistance. I n these e x p e r i e n c e s , a unified self or m i n d is r e v e a l e d t h r o u g h w h a t M a i n e de B i r a n calls o u r sens intime (inner awareness). S u c h i n n e r e x p e r i ences o f h u m a n f r e e d o m r e m a i n e d the f o u n d a t i o n o f later spiritualist cases for the ultimate a u t o n o m y a n d v a l u e o f the i n d i v i d u a l . The

spiritualist l e g a c y r e a c h e d early t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y

philosophy

primarily

through

Félix

Ravaisson

French

(1813—1900). R a -

vaisson n e v e r h e l d a university chair ( C o u s i n , w h o h a d initially helped

advance

his career,

blocked

the a p p o i n t m e n t ) .

B u t he

e x e r c i s e d m a j o r influence t h r o u g h a series o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e positions: i n s p e c t o r o f libraries, g e n e r a l i n s p e c t o r o f h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n , a n d , m o s t i m p o r t a n t , c h a i r o f the c o m m i t t e e that set a n d g r a d e d the agrégation e x a m i n a t i o n

in philosophy.

H i s interest

in art l e d to

scholarly w o r k o n D a V i n c i a n d o n a n c i e n t G r e e k sculpture a n d a n a p p o i n t m e n t as c u r a t o r at the L o u v r e , w h e r e h e c a r r i e d o u t a m a j o r restoration o f the V e n u s de M i l o . In 1867, R a v a i s s o n p u b l i s h e d his La philosophie en France au XIXe siècle, a r e p o r t c o m m i s s i o n e d b y the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t o n the o c c a s i o n o f the E x p o s i t i o n o f 1867. S u r v e y i n g the history o f F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y after

1800, h e n o t e d the d o m i n a n t p l a c e o f C o m t e ' s

positivism a n d o f its m a i n rival, the e c l e c t i c i s m o f V i c t o r C o u s i n . Ravaisson

a r g u e d that b o t h these positions h a d failed a n d that

e x i g e n c i e s o f fact a n d a r g u m e n t w e r e d r i v i n g F r e n c h

philosophy

t o w a r d the spiritualism that M a i n e de B i r a n h a d d e v e l o p e d b u t his contemporaries ignored. Ravaisson predicted a n e w philosophical


II

e p o c h d o m i n a t e d b y w h a t he called "spiritualistic r e a l i s m or positiv i s m " ; that is, a p h i l o s o p h y that gives priority to spiritual " f a c t s " in the s a m e w a y that o r d i n a r y r e a l i s m a n d p o s i t i v i s m do to p e r c e p t u a l a n d scientific

facts. S u c h an e p o c h w o u l d , he said, h a v e

" g e n e r a t i n g p r i n c i p l e the consciousness that m i n d itself,

a

self r e c o g n i z e d

as

an

existence

from

as its

[Fesprit] has of

which

all

other

existences derive a n d o n w h i c h t h e y d e p e n d , a n d w h i c h is n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n its o w n a c t i v i t y " .

1 6

H i s p r e d i c t i o n w a s entirely c o r r e c t . B y 1890 R a v a i s s o n ' s b o o k s w e r e , in P a r o d i ' s w o r d s , " t h e b r e v i a r i e s o f all the y o u n g p h i l o s o phers"

1 7

a n d the p h i l o s o p h i c a l a g e n d a w a s b e i n g set b y thinkers

such as L a c h e l i e r , B o u t r o u x , a n d B e r g s o n (all students o f R a v a i s s o n at the

Ecole

Normale), who

were

strongly

sympathetic

to

the

spiritualist view. If, as C o m t e h a d f a m o u s l y said, m a t e r i a l i s m is the c l a i m that the h i g h e r c a n b e e x p l a i n e d b y the lower, spiritualism c l a i m s to e x p l a i n the l o w e r b y the higher. H e r e , o f c o u r s e , the h i g h e r is the m i n d , but not the C a r t e s i a n m i n d that i n c l u d e s a n y e x p e r i e n c e

whatsoever.

T h e spiritualist m i n d is the locus o f o n l y the h i g h e r m e n t a l functions such as i n t e l l i g e n c e , will, a n d aesthetic a p p r e c i a t i o n . It d o e s n o t include l o w e r f o r m s o f m e n t a l i t y (e.g., sense p e r c e p t i o n a n d e m o tions), associated w i t h o u r " a n i m a l " n a t u r e . T h e m i n d or spirit is, t h e n , the locus o f the " p r o p e r l y h u m a n " d i m e n s i o n o f o u r e x p e r i e n c e . T h e p r o j e c t o f spiritualism is, first, to d e s c r i b e , a c c u r a t e l y a n d in detail, o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f ourselves as spiritual b e i n g s ; a n d s e c o n d , to s h o w that e v e r y t h i n g else (the r e a l m o f nature) is s u b o r d i n a t e d to a n d d e p e n d e n t on spirit. T r u e to M a i n e de B i r a n ' s s e m i n a l descriptions, R a v a i s s o n a n d his followers m a d e f r e e d o m the f u n d a m e n t a l feature o f the m i n d , t h e r e b y p l a c i n g creative a c t i o n at the r o o t o f all reality. W h e r e a s M a i n e de B i r a n u n d e r s t o o d f r e e d o m p r i m a r i l y in t e r m s o f the effort e x e r t e d b y the will, R a v a i s s o n e m p h a s i z e d the desire (and therefore the love o f the g o o d ) b e h i n d this effort, a desire he saw as u l t i m a t e l y d i r e c t e d t o w a r d the p e r f e c t g o o d n e s s o f the Christian G o d . A l t h o u g h D e s c a r t e s c a n be r e a d i l y r e g a r d e d as the first F r e n c h spiritualist, since he g a v e clear epistemic a n d m e t a p h y s i c a l priority to

intelligence

and

volition,

Ravaisson

replaced

1 6

La philosophic en France au XIXe siecle, 275.

1 7

La philosophic contemporaine en France, 2g.

the

Cartesian


12

(1890-1940)

d u a l i s m o f m i n d a n d m a t t e r as s e p a r a b l e substances w i t h a distinction b e t w e e n m e n t a l life a n d n a t u r e as t w o i n t e r d e p e n d e n t p o l e s of activity. (Here he w a s i n f l u e n c e d b y the later p h i l o s o p h y o f Schelling, w i t h w h o m he h a d studied in M u n i c h ,

1 8

a n d b y Aristotle's d o c t r i n e

o f f o r m . ) T h i s w a s the basis for his o w n introspective study o f o u r 1 9

e x p e r i e n c e o f h a b i t , a topic s u g g e s t e d b y b o t h M a i n e de B i r a n a n d Aristotle. F o l l o w i n g M a i n e de B i r a n , he saw h a b i t as a p a r a d i g m e x a m p l e o f the u n i o n o f the creative free a g e n c y o f m i n d w i t h the repetitive stability o f the m a t e r i a l w o r l d . In m o v i n g f r o m k n o w l e d g e b a s e d o n explicit reflection to a h a b i t o f implicit u n d e r s t a n d i n g (as a c o o k m i g h t at hrst m a k e c r e p e s b y m e t i c u l o u s l y f o l l o w i n g a r e c i p e b u t later c o m e to toss t h e m off " b y s e c o n d n a t u r e " ) , w e g o f r o m an e x t e r n a l relation to the objects o f o u r k n o w l e d g e to " a n i m m e d i a t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g in w h i c h o b j e c t a n d subject are f u s e d " .

2 0

H e r e w e are

not far f r o m the intuition o f B e r g s o n , w h o w r o t e an e l e g a n t a n d p e r c e p t i v e a p p r e c i a t i o n o f R a v a i s s o n w h e n he s u c c e e d e d h i m in the A c a d é m i e des S c i e n c e s M o r a l e s et P o l i t i q u e s .

21

Spiritualism was typically a conservative position, a comfortable intellectual n i c h e for s u p p o r t e r s o f an elitist b o u r g e o i s politics a n d C a t h o l i c Christianity. B u t there w a s a m o r e r a d i c a l v a r i a n t , that of Charles

Renouvier

(1815-1903), which,

though

always

relatively

m a r g i n a l , e v e n t u a l l y e x e r t e d significant influence. R e n o u v i e r w a s a student at the s a m e time as R a v a i s s o n at the E c o l e N o r m a l e . H e w a s v e r y active in politics at the time o f the 1848 r e v o l u t i o n b u t b e c a m e disillusioned after L o u i s N a p o l e o n ' s c o u p in 1851 d e s t r o y e d h o p e s for a

socialist

democracy.

He

abandoned

politics

for

philosophy,

a l t h o u g h he did later edit a n d p u b l i s h a j o u r n a l , La critique philosophique, a i m e d at a g e n e r a l intellectual a u d i e n c e . R e n o u v i e r

never

h e l d an a c a d e m i c p o s i t i o n (he h a d sufficient i n h e r i t e d w e a l t h to 1 8

1 9

2 0

2 1

W e should not m a k e too m u c h of the personal contact with Schelling. A s B e r g s o n tells us. R a v a i s s o n spent only a few weeks in M u n i c h . Also, Schelling spoke French b a d l y and R a v a i s s o n was not m u c h better at G e r m a n . See H e n r i B e r g s o n , " N o t i c e sur la vie et les oeuvres de M . Félix R a v a i s s o n - M o l l i e n " , in La pensée et le mouvant, reprinted in Oeuvres, 1458. Ravaisson first m a d e his n a m e with a t w o - v o l u m e c o m m e n t a r y on Aristotle's Metaphysics (1837). H e v i e w e d Aristotle as the true founder o f spiritualist philosophy because, even m o r e than Plato, he o v e r c a m e empiricism a n d materialism, by m a k i n g forms the causes of the m o v e m e n t s of real existents a n d locating formal perfection in the mental lives of individual intelligences. O n this a n d other aspects of Ravaisson's thought, see Emile B o u t r o u x ' s very helpful " L a philosophie de Félix R a v a i s s o n " , in his Nouvelles études d'histoire de la philosophie, 194-220. Félix R a v a i s s o n , De l'habitude, 37. H e n r i B e r g s o n , " N o t i c e sur la vie et les oeuvres de M . Félix R a v a i s s o n - M o l l i e n " , in La pensée et le mouvant, reprinted in Oeuvres.


13

m a k e a profession u n n e c e s s a r y ) . A f t e r the c o u p , he left Paris for the south o f F r a n c e , w h e r e he h a d b e e n b o r n , a n d , w o r k i n g there in relative isolation, w r o t e c o n t i n u o u s l y until his d e a t h in 1903, p r o d u c i n g one o f the largest o e u v r e s in the history o f F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y .

22

R e n o u v i e r tied his philosophy, w h i c h he c h a r a c t e r i z e d as " n e o criticism"

(or, s o m e t i m e s ,

"French

c r i t i c i s m " ) , to that o f

Kant,

a l t h o u g h he does n o t s e e m to h a v e p e n e t r a t e d v e r y d e e p l y

into

K a n t ' s t h o u g h t , w h i c h w a s m o r e a starting-point t h a n a c o n t i n u i n g inspiration. W h a t he t o o k f r o m K a n t w a s m a i n l y the i d e a o f our p h e n o m e n a l e x p e r i e n c e as structured b y intellectual c a t e g o r i e s that are c o n d i t i o n s

o f the possibility o f this e x p e r i e n c e . H e

rejected

K a n t ' s n o u m e n a l w o r l d , m a i n t a i n i n g that the p h e n o m e n a l r e a l m is the sole reality. H e also saw p h e n o m e n a l reality as f u n d a m e n t a l l y relational,

excluding

including becoming) which

all

others

are

substance and

from

the

list o f c a t e g o r i e s

m a k i n g relation the

forms.

These

empiricist

basic

(and

category

tendencies

of

were,

h o w e v e r , b a l a n c e d b y the a d d i t i o n o f c a t e g o r i e s w i t h a stronger metaphysical

content than

Kant's.

Specifically,

Renouvier

intro-

d u c e d finality (purpose) a n d p e r s o n a l i t y as essential structures o f the p h e n o m e n a l w o r l d . T h i s led h i m to the characteristic

spiritualist

e m p h a s i s o n the c r e a t i v e c h o i c e s o f i n d i v i d u a l m i n d s as the d r i v i n g force o f reality. R e n o u v i e r ' s ethical a n d political t h o u g h t reflects the centrality o f individual f r e e d o m .

2 3

B u t f r e e d o m is also a c r u c i a l e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l

c a t e g o r y for h i m , since he holds that e x p e r i e n c e , e v e n as i n f o r m e d b y the system o f c a t e g o r i e s , d o e s n o t entirely d e t e r m i n e w h a t w e m u s t a c c e p t as the truth. O u r j u d g m e n t s , f r o m the l o w e s t p e r c e p tions to the highest m e t a p h y s i c a l speculations, a l w a y s involve

an

i r r e d u c i b l e e l e m e n t o f free c h o i c e . Spiritualists such as R a v a i s s o n w e r e u n e a s y w i t h this e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l i n d e t e r m i n i s m a n d e v e n m o r e so w i t h R e n o u v i e r ' s religious v i e w s .

2 4

H i s relativism left n o p l a c e for

a b e i n g o f absolute p e r f e c t i o n , such as the C h r i s t i a n G o d , a n d he also rejected the i d e a o f an a c t u a l infinity - q u a n t i t a t i v e or qualitative — as i n c o h e r e n t . O n the o t h e r h a n d , R e n o u v i e r t h o u g h t that the

2 2

2 3

2 4

R e n o u v i e r ' s most important w o r k is his four-volume Essais de critique générale, Paris: 1854—64. W i l l i a m L o g u e , Charles Renouvier: Philosopher of Liberty, emphasizes R e n o u v i e r ' s ethics and politics a n d provides some useful historical b a c k g r o u n d . R a v a i s s o n offers a g u a r d e d l y sympathetic treatment of R e n o u v i e r in his La philosophie en France au XIXe siècle, n o — 1 8 . T h i s was p r o b a b l y the b e g i n n i n g o f an awareness of R e n o u v i e r ' s w o r k in the w i d e r intellectual community.


14

impossibility

o f an

actual

infinity

required

(1890-1940) a beginning

of

the

universe in t i m e a n d a c c e p t e d p e r s o n a l i m m o r t a l i t y as n e c e s s a r y to m a k e sense o f m o r a l obligations. T h i s l e d h i m to assert the existence o f G o d as c r e a t o r a n d m o r a l i d e a l , b u t he insisted that this b e i n g w a s finite

in b o t h k n o w l e d g e a n d p o w e r (which

finitude,

he

thought,

p r o v i d e s the o n l y p l a u s i b l e solution to the p r o b l e m o f evil). M o r e over, G o d ' s c r e a t i v e role is consistent w i t h h u m a n f r e e d o m since he is, as R e n o u v i e r

put

it, a

"creator

of c r e a t o r s " .

Renouvier's

2 5

h e t e r o d o x t h e o l o g i c a l v i e w s u n d e r l a y his v i g o r o u s p r a c t i c a l o p p o sition to the p o w e r o f the F r e n c h C a t h o l i c C h u r c h , an o p p o s i t i o n focused

during

the

1870s

and

1880s in his j o u r n a l ,

La

critique

philosophique (and its s u p p l e m e n t , La critique religieuse), w h i c h f o l l o w e d a strongly a n t i - C a t h o l i c editorial policy. R e n o u v i e r ' s l a c k o f a p o s i t i o n in the e d u c a t i o n a l establishment, a l o n g w i t h the u n o r t h o d o x y o f his v i e w s , l i m i t e d his influence

on

F r e n c h philosophy. B u t the v i g o r o f his t h o u g h t — n o t to m e n t i o n the h u g e a m o u n t he p u b l i s h e d over a p e r i o d o f sixty-one y e a r s — h a d an u n d e n i a b l e i m p a c t . H e a t t r a c t e d a small g r o u p o f disciples (and the strong a d m i r a t i o n o f W i l l i a m J a m e s ) a n d e v e n t u a l l y r e c e i v e d s o m e v e r y b e l a t e d official r e c o g n i t i o n , i n c l u d i n g e l e c t i o n to the A c a d e m i e des S c i e n c e s M o r a l e s et Politiques in 1900, at the age o f eighty-five. H i s m o s t i m p o r t a n t direct influence w a s on the w o r k o f O c t a v e H a m e l i n , w h o offered a detailed analysis o f R e n o u v i e r ' s w o r k in his Sorbonne course of 1906-7 and whose o w n powerful philosophical system w a s strongly i n f o r m e d b y R e n o u v i e r ' s w o r k .

IDEALISM:

LAGHELIER

AND

2 6

BOUTROUX

M a i n l i n e spiritualist t h o u g h t h a d a n a t u r a l t e n d e n c y to idealism (and, i n d e e d , R a v a i s s o n s o m e t i m e s called the v i e w he c h a m p i o n e d idealism). B u t spiritualism allows the d e n i a l o f the key idealist c l a i m that u l t i m a t e l y o n l y m i n d s exist a n d is c o m m i t t e d to a g e n u i n e plurality

of individual

persons

and,

especially,

to

a

distinction

b e t w e e n finite h u m a n m i n d s a n d the infinite G o d that c r e a t e d t h e m . ( H e n c e the attraction o f spiritualism for C a t h o l i c thinkers, i n c l u d i n g R a v a i s s o n , L a c h e l i e r , a n d B l o n d e l . ) W e n e e d , t h e r e f o r e , to distin2 5

2 6

A d d r e s s to the E d i n b u r g h Philosophical Society (1914), cited by J. A l e x a n d e r G u n n , Modern French Philosophy, 294. O c t a v e H a m e l i n , Le systeme de Renouvier. H a m e l i n also wrote i m p o r t a n t studies of the " s y s t e m s " o f Aristotle a n d Descartes.


5

l

guish at least b e t w e e n spiritualism a n d t h e absolute i d e a l i s m o f a Fichte o r a H e g e l . In a n y case, idealism in F r a n c e d e r i v e d f r o m a p p r o p r i a t i o n s o f K a n t , n o t H e g e l , w h o h a d little influence there b e f o r e t h e 1 9 2 0 s .

27

T h e r e w e r e n o translations o f H e g e l until 1859 (twenty-eight years after his death), a n d it w a s n o t until w e l l into t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y that full F r e n c h versions o f m a j o r b o o k s such as The Phenomenology of Spirit, The Science of Logic, a n d The Philosophy of Right w e r e available. E v e n K a n t ' s influence w a s slow in d e v e l o p i n g a n d b e c a m e i m p o r t a n t o n l y w i t h Jules L a c h e l i e r (1832 —1918), w h o p r e s e n t e d a K a n t i a n a c c o u n t o f scientific r e a s o n i n g in his thesis, Dufondement d e f e n d e d in 1871 a n d p u b l i s h e d t h e n e x t y e a r .

de I'induction,

2 8

L a c h e l i e r ' s thesis is a n e l e g a n t l y w r i t t e n tour de force, w h i c h , in t h e space o f a b o u t 100 p a g e s , e x p a n d s a n analysis o f t h e p r o b l e m o f induction

into

a

comprehensive

idealist

view

o f reality.

The

p r o b l e m o f i n d u c t i o n is that o f finding a n d j u s t i f y i n g p r i n c i p l e s that w a r r a n t the m o v e " f r o m k n o w l e d g e o f facts to k n o w l e d g e o f t h e laws w h i c h o r d e r t h e m " (Du fondement de I'induction [FI\, 3/1). H e endorses t h e c o m m o n v i e w s that t h e c o n c l u s i o n s o f a n i n d u c t i v e inference assert m o r e t h a n its p r e m i s e s a n d so c a n n o t b e g r o u n d e d in t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f d e d u c t i v e logic, a n d that i n d u c t i v e

inferences

r e q u i r e a p r i n c i p l e o f efficient causality, g u a r a n t e e i n g that t h e s a m e p h e n o m e n a will follow w h e n e v e r the s a m e a n t e c e d e n t

conditions

occur. B u t h e a r g u e s that i n d u c t i o n also r e q u i r e s a p r i n c i p l e o f final causality. Efficient causality tells us o n l y that if c o n d i t i o n s are t h e s a m e , t h e s a m e results will follow. Successful i n d u c t i o n also requires that w e k n o w that t h e c o n d i t i o n s a r e t h e s a m e . W e c a n , o f c o u r s e , k n o w f r o m o b s e r v a t i o n that c o n d i t i o n s n o w seem to b e t h e s a m e as they w e r e previously. B u t this gives n o assurance that there are n o t unobserved c o n d i t i o n s that m a k e t h e situation different t h a n it w a s previously. L a c h e l i e r gives t h e e x a m p l e o f t h e b i o l o g i c a l l a w that m e m b e r s o f a g i v e n species g e n e r a l l y p r o d u c e m e m b e r s o f that s a m e species. I f all w e k n e w w a s that t h e s a m e p h e n o m e n a follow if t h e 2 7

2 8

O c t a v e H a m e l i n (1856-1907), m e n t i o n e d above, c o m b i n e d the spiritualism o f R e n o u v i e r with s o m e t h i n g like H e g e l i a n dialectic in his well-regarded Essai sur les elements principaux de la representation (1907). B u t H a m e l i n died early a n d his H e g e l i a n tendencies h a d no extended influence. T h e index to Ravaisson's La philosophie en France au XIXe siecle shows the continuing d o m i n a n c e of p r e - K a n t i a n influences. It lists 6 references to H e g e l , 7 to K a n t , b u t 43 to Leibniz.

16


(1890-1940)

s a m e c o n d i t i o n s occur, " w e w o u l d h a v e to limit ourselves to asserting that the p r o d u c t o f e a c h g e n e r a t i o n w o u l d r e s e m b l e its p r o g e n i t o r s if all the r e q u i r e d

conditions

come

together".

To

g o further

and

m a i n t a i n that the n e w g e n e r a t i o n will a c t u a l l y b e o f the s a m e species as the p r e v i o u s , w e must also k n o w that " a l l these c o n d i t i o n s do in fact c o m e t o g e t h e r " (FI, 11/5). S i n c e w e c a n n o t g e n e r a l l y k n o w this b y direct o b s e r v a t i o n , w e m u s t assume that there is a p r i n c i p l e o f o r d e r at w o r k that g u a r a n t e e s the stability o f species b y m a i n t a i n i n g the s a m e c o n d i t i o n s o f g e n e r a t i o n . B y such a p r i n c i p l e , a feature o f a w h o l e (the stability o f a species) d e t e r m i n e s the d e v e l o p m e n t s o f its parts (the g e n e r a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l organisms). S u c h d e t e r m i n a t i o n is, a c c o r d i n g to K a n t ' s definition,

an instance

of hnal

causality.

A l t h o u g h this e x a m p l e is b i o l o g i c a l , the p o i n t also holds for c h e m i c a l a n d p h y s i c a l systems. W i t h o u t a p r i n c i p l e o f h n a l causality, w e w o u l d know

only a world

o f (efficient)

causal relations a m o n g

objects

defined entirely b y those relations. W e w o u l d h a v e n o access to the familiar w o r l d o f substantial objects that are the e n d u r i n g instantiations o f n a t u r a l kinds. T h e r e are, t h e n , t w o p r i n c i p l e s r e q u i r e d for successful i n d u c t i v e inference: o n e o f efficient causality, " i n virtue o f w h i c h p h e n o m e n a f o r m a series w h e r e i n the e x i s t e n c e o f the p r e c e d i n g d e t e r m i n e s the existence o f the f o l l o w i n g , " a n d one o f h n a l causality, " i n v i r t u e of w h i c h these series, in their t u r n , f o r m systems, in w h i c h the i d e a of the w h o l e d e t e r m i n e s the existence o f the p a r t s " (FI, 12/6). B u t is there a n y w a y to justify these principles? L a c h e l i e r thinks w e c a n d o so b y s h o w i n g that the p r i n c i p l e s are essential to the " c o n c r e t e

a n d p a r t i c u l a r acts b y w h i c h

thought

constitutes itself w h i l e seizing i m m e d i a t e l y u p o n r e a l i t y " (FI, 14/7). B u t n e i t h e r e m p i r i c i s m n o r r a t i o n a l i s m c a n m a k e the case. If, w i t h empiricists,

we

hold

that

knowledge

is m e r e l y

of

phenomenal

a p p e a r a n c e s , t h e n — as the failure o f M i l l ' s justification o f i n d u c t i o n shows — a n y a r g u m e n t for i n d u c t i o n will h a v e to be f r o m p h e n o m enal

experience

and

therefore

valid

o n l y if circular.

If,

on

the

contrary, as rationalists m a i n t a i n , k n o w l e d g e is o f sensorily i n a c c e s sible

things-in-themselves,

then

induction

could

in p r i n c i p l e

be

justified on the basis o f truths a b o u t the structure a n d stability o f the substances or causes b e n e a t h a p p e a r a n c e s . B u t w e h a v e n o access to such substances a n d causes, a n d e v o c a t i o n o f t h e m is m e r e l y " t h e assertion o f a p r o b l e m t r a n s f o r m e d into its s o l u t i o n " (FI, 36/20). (Lachelier also m a i n t a i n s that, e v e n if there w e r e , say, an intellectual

Fin-de-siecle: the professors of the Republic intuition o f things-in-themselves, this w o u l d still give t h e m o n l y as they a p p e a r to us intellectually at a g i v e n m o m e n t , n o t as they are a p a r t f r o m o u r e x p e r i e n c e o f them.) T h e r e is, h o w e v e r , a n o t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e , b a s e d o n the

Kantian

c l a i m " t h a t w h a t e v e r m a y be the m y s t e r i o u s f o u n d a t i o n

beneath

p h e n o m e n a , the o r d e r in w h i c h t h e y follow e a c h o t h e r is exclusively d e t e r m i n e d b y the r e q u i r e m e n t s o f o u r o w n t h o u g h t " . T o see if K a n t m i g h t be right, L a c h e l i e r says that w e should try to establish the t w o p r i n c i p l e s o f i n d u c t i o n " b y s h o w i n g that if t h e y did n o t exist t h e n h u m a n t h o u g h t w o u l d n o t b e p o s s i b l e " (FI, 42/23). A

successful

d e m o n s t r a t i o n will c o n f i r m K a n t ' s v i e w o f the active role o f the m i n d in k n o w l e d g e a n d justify i n d u c t i o n . T h o u g h t is a b o u t the p h e n o m e n a (sensations) o f o u r w o r l d . B u t a t h o u g h t is n o t itself a n o t h e r p h e n o m e n o n n o r is it a b o u t j u s t o n e p h e n o m e n o n . It r e q u i r e s a subject, distinct f r o m the succession o f phenomena,

that exists as a u n i t y over

against this

succession.

T r a d i t i o n a l (pre-critical) v i e w s l o c a t e this distinctness a n d u n i t y in the t h i n k i n g subject's existence as a m e t a p h y s i c a l s u b s t a n c e separ a t e d f r o m the w o r l d it e x p e r i e n c e s . B u t , g i v e n this s e p a r a t i o n , there is n o w a y to u n d e r s t a n d h o w t h o u g h t c o u l d ever k n o w the w o r l d outside o f it. It w o u l d h a v e to r e m a i n e n c l o s e d in its o w n a u t o n o m o u s existence. For k n o w l e d g e to be possible, t h o u g h t m u s t r a t h e r be a u n i t y in virtue o f its relation to the w o r l d o f p h e n o m e n a ; that is, t h o u g h t m u s t be o n e precisely b e c a u s e it unites the succession o f p h e n o m e n a into a single w o r l d that is the object o f its e x p e r i e n c e a n d k n o w l e d g e . T h e unity o f t h o u g h t is n o t that o f an a u t o n o m o u s m e t a p h y s i c a l act b u t t h a t o f a f o r m p r o v i d i n g c o h e r e n c e a n d h e n c e intelligibility to the flux o f sensations. R e f l e c t i o n on o u r e x p e r i e n c e i m m e d i a t e l y reveals that one aspect o f this c o h e r e n c e a n d intelligibility is the single time a n d space in which phenomena

occur. B u t , L a c h e l i e r a r g u e s , s p a c e a n d

time

a l o n e are n o t sufficient to unify p h e n o m e n a into a c o h e r e n t w o r l d . P h e n o m e n a existing in the s a m e space a n d t i m e c o u l d still o c c u r in total i n d e p e n d e n c e o f one a n o t h e r a n d n e v e r p r o v i d e a c o h e r e n t o b j e c t for t h o u g h t . P h e n o m e n a m u s t also be unified t h r o u g h their i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n b y l a w s o f n e c e s s a r y c a u s a l succession. S u c h l a w s o f efficient causality p r o v i d e the unity n e e d e d for p h e n o m e n a to b e c o h e r e n t objects o f t h o u g h t . " T h u s , all p h e n o m e n a are subject to the l a w o f efficient causes, b e c a u s e this l a w is the o n l y f o u n d a t i o n to w h i c h w e c a n attribute the unity o f the universe, a n d in its t u r n this

18


(1890-1940)

unity is the s u p r e m e c o n d i t i o n o f the possibility o f t h o u g h t " (FI, 4 7 / 26). L a c h e l i e r further m a i n t a i n s that the p h e n o m e n a l w o r l d , precisely b e c a u s e it is g o v e r n e d b y efficient causality, m u s t be a m e c h a n i s t i c w o r l d ; that is, a w o r l d consisting entirely o f m o t i o n s d e t e r m i n e d by their a n t e c e d e n t m o t i o n s . P h e n o m e n a

o c c u r in s p a c e a n d

time;

c o n s e q u e n t l y their unity m u s t be a u n i t y that exists t h r o u g h s p a c e a n d time. B u t the o n l y possible f o r m o f unity t h r o u g h space a n d time is c o n t i n u o u s m o v e m e n t , u n d e r s t o o d as c o n t i n u o u s c h a n g e o f spatial l o c a t i o n o v e r time. A l l p h e n o m e n a

must be

movements.

W h a t w e h a v e , t h e n , is a system o f m o v e m e n t s g o v e r n e d at every p o i n t a n d m o m e n t b y strict l a w s o f efficient causality: a m e c h a n i s t i c universe. O u r K a n t i a n t u r n seems to h a v e led to w h a t L a c h e l i e r calls an "idealistic m a t e r i a l i s m " (FI, 69/38). B u t w e h a v e n o t yet t a k e n a c c o u n t o f the role o f h n a l causality. It m i g h t s e e m that w e c a n n o t effect a K a n t i a n d e r i v a t i o n o f final causality since the distinctness a n d u n i t y o f the subject (and h e n c e the possibility o f t h o u g h t ) are g u a r a n t e e d b y efficient causality a l o n e . B u t L a c h e l i e r m a i n t a i n s that the u n i t y so g u a r a n t e e d is " i n c o m p l e t e a n d s u p e r f i c i a l " (FI, 76/42). T h i s is b e c a u s e an o b j e c t g i v e n simply as p a r t o f a m e c h a n i c a l system o f efficient causes is n o t g i v e n as a f u l l - b l o o d e d t h i n g in its o w n right (an instance o f a structured kind) b u t o n l y as, so to speak, a p l a c e - h o l d e r in the c a u s a l n e t w o r k . It has n o intrinsic c o n t e n t b u t exists o n l y t h r o u g h its causal relations to o t h e r items in the n e t w o r k . T h i s c o r r e s p o n d s to the p o i n t

made

a b o v e , in o u r analysis o f i n d u c t i v e i n f e r e n c e , that efficient causality b y itself g u a r a n t e e s o n l y that the s a m e results follow f r o m the s a m e c o n d i t i o n s , n o t that the s a m e c o n d i t i o n s will r e g u l a r l y r e c u r ; r e g u l a r r e c u r r e n c e is n e c e s s a r y for the stability o f e n d u r i n g kinds. T h i s sort o f stability (or, equivalently, a w o r l d o f things w i t h e n d u r i n g natures) is, as w e h a v e seen, g u a r a n t e e d o n l y b y a p r i n c i p l e o f final causality. L a c h e l i e r a c k n o w l e d g e s that t h o u g h t c o u l d exist in the d i m i n i s h e d w o r l d o f m e r e efficient causality. B u t he m a i n t a i n s that this w o u l d b e a " p u r e l y abstract e x i s t e n c e " , b e c a u s e it w o u l d be in a w o r l d w i t h n o substantial c o n t e n t . S u c h an existence " w o u l d b e , so far as t h o u g h t is c o n c e r n e d , a state o f illusion a n d d e a t h " (FI, 79/44). H e therefore c o n c l u d e s that the fully r e a l (concrete) existence o f consciousness requires a p r i n c i p l e o f final causality. The

reality

of

final

causality

radically

transforms

Lachelier's

p i c t u r e o f the w o r l d . T h e truth o f c o s m i c reality is n o t "idealistic


19

m a t e r i a l i s m " , w h i c h in fact expresses m e r e l y the a b s t r a c t m e c h a n i c a l skeleton o f a robust p u r p o s i v e n a t u r e . M o v e m e n t still c o n f o r m s to the p a t t e r n s o f m e c h a n i c a l l a w s , b u t it is n o w seen to be u l t i m a t e l y d e r i v e d f r o m forces that express the w o r l d ' s intrinsic teleology. T h e s e forces are n o t i n t e r v e n i n g outside causes; they flow directly f r o m the i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n o f n a t u r a l objects. I n d e e d , L a c h e l i e r

insists

that force is n o t a t h i n g in itself b u t " o n l y the t e n d e n c y o f m o v e m e n t t o w a r d an e n d " (FI, 93/51). M o s t i m p o r t a n t , the p r i o r i t y o f (teleological) force over m o v e m e n t implies the p r i o r i t y o f f r e e d o m over d e t e r m i n i s m . A n e n d c a n n o t e x t e r n a l l y d e t e r m i n e the m e a n s (movements) that b r i n g it a b o u t b e c a u s e the e n d does n o t exist until the m e a n s h a v e p r o d u c e d it. R a t h e r , " t h e m e a n s dispose t h e m s e l v e s in the o r d e r fitted to realize the e n d " (FI, 87/48). C o n s e q u e n t l y , requires that the forces i n f o r m i n g n a t u r a l m o v e m e n t s b e n e o u s t e n d e n c i e s to the r e l e v a n t ends. O n

finality sponta-

the a b s t r a c t level

of

efficient causes, the p u r e l y q u a n t i t a t i v e f o r m a l structures o f n a t u r a l d e v e l o p m e n t s are still m e c h a n i c a l l y d e t e r m i n e d . B u t the qualitative c o n t e n t o f c o n c r e t e things is the c o n t i n g e n t p r o d u c t o f s p o n t a n e o u s activity.

29

M e r e s p o n t a n e i t y is n o t full f r e e d o m . E v e r y p a r t o f n a t u r e enjoys a certain f r e e d o m (and h e n c e life a n d e v e n t h o u g h t ) in that its goals are a c h i e v e d b y its innate t e n d e n c y t o w a r d t h e m , n o t b y m e c h a n i s t i c d e t e r m i n a t i o n . B u t f r e e d o m in its full sense consists " i n the p o w e r o f v a r y i n g one's p u r p o s e s a n d in c o n c e i v i n g n e w i d e a s " (FI, 9 7 / 5 3 - 4 ) . A n i m a l s act w i t h a f r e e d o m limited to the precise m e a n s o f fulfilling goals set for t h e m b y n a t u r e , as w h e n a bird c h o o s e s materials a n d l o c a t i o n s for its nest. R a t i o n a l b e i n g s such as h u m a n s ,

however,

e m p l o y intelligence n o t j u s t to a c h i e v e p r e - g i v e n goals b u t also " t o conceive

an infinite n u m b e r

undertakes

to realize

of pure

externally"

(FI,

ideas w h i c h

o u r will

98/54). F r e e d o m

then

properly

u n d e r s t o o d is n o t , as so m a n y p h i l o s o p h e r s h a v e t h o u g h t , the will's u n c o n s t r a i n e d c h o i c e o f m e a n s o f a c t i o n ; it is r a t h e r the intellect's i n v e n t i o n o f n e w g o a l s o f a c t i o n . L a c h e l i e r a r g u e s that f r e e d o m in this sense is r e q u i r e d b y the p r i n c i p l e o f final causality " s i n c e the systematic unity o f n a t u r e c o u l d n o t be r e a l i z e d e x c e p t as the result o f original i n v e n t i o n a n d c r e a t i o n s p r o p e r l y s o - c a l l e d " (FI, 97/54). W e see, t h e n , the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n effected b y the n e e d to i n c l u d e 2 9

In his Etudes sur k syllogisme, L a c h e l i e r argues that the syllogism provides the appropriate logic for the qualitative while m a t h e m a t i c a l logic (including the logic o f relations) is appropriate for the quantitative.


20

(1890-1940)

the p r i n c i p l e o f final causality in o u r a c c o u n t o f k n o w l e d g e a n d the world:

"the

realm

of hnal

causes, b y p e n e t r a t i n g the r e a l m

efficient causes w i t h o u t d e s t r o y i n g it, e x c h a n g e s e v e r y w h e r e

of

force

for inertia, life for d e a t h , f r e e d o m for f a t a l i t y " (FI, 1 0 1 / 5 6 , translation modified). T h e result is n o l o n g e r the "idealistic m a t e r i a l i s m " o f the w o r l d as a n e x u s o f efficient causes b u t w h a t L a c h e l i e r calls a "spiritualistic

r e a l i s m " , in w h i c h

mechanism

is s u b o r d i n a t e d

to

hnality a n d " e v e r y b e i n g is a force, a n d e v e r y force is a t h o u g h t w h i c h tends t o w a r d a m o r e a n d m o r e c o m p l e t e c o n s c i o u s n e s s of i t s e l f " (FI, 1 0 2 / 5 6 , translation modified). L a c h e l i e r ' s h n a l insistence on " r e a l i s m " r a t h e r t h a n " i d e a l i s m " reflects n o t an assertion o f a reality i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h o u g h t - he r e m a i n s an idealist in rejecting this — b u t r a t h e r an insistence on the m e t a p h y s i c a l a u t o n o m y

of

i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n s , w h i c h he refuses to assimilate to a n y absolute t h o u g h t . T h i s keeps o p e n a p a t h to L a c h e l i e r ' s C a t h o l i c c o m m i t m e n t to an afterlife o f p e r s o n a l salvation a n d immortality. B u t this is n o t a p a t h that he thinks c a n b e t r a v e l e d b y p h i l o s o p h i c a l reflection since on it w e " c r o s s , b y an act o f m o r a l faith, b e y o n d the b o u n d a r i e s b o t h o f t h o u g h t a n d o f n a t u r e " (FI, 102/56). L a c h e l i e r p u b l i s h e d v e r y little b e y o n d his thesis on i n d u c t i o n ,

3 0

b u t his influence w a s i m m e n s e , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h r o u g h his t e a c h i n g at the E c o l e N o r m a l e , w h e r e he w a s maître de conférences (a p o s t r o u g h l y e q u i v a l e n t to a R e a d e r

at a British university or an

American

associate professor) f r o m 1864 to 1875, a n d , like R a v a i s s o n , t h r o u g h his later p o s i t i o n as c h a i r o f the c o m m i t t e e that set the agrégation in philosophy. H i s w r i t i n g a n d t e a c h i n g set h i g h standards o f c o n c e p tual subtlety a n d r i g o r a n d also m a d e serious e n g a g e m e n t w i t h K a n t de rigueur a m o n g his pupils, i n c l u d i n g , m o s t p r o m i n e n t l y , B o u t r o u x and B e r g s o n .

3 1

E m i l e B o u t r o u x ( 1 8 4 5 - 1 9 2 1 ) d o m i n a t e d the a c a d e m i c p h i l o s o p h y o f the

Third

Republic

teacher, L a c h e l i e r ,

through World War

I. H e

as maître de conférences at the

followed

Ecole

( 1 8 7 7 - 8 6 ) , w h e r e he t a u g h t B e r g s o n , B l o n d e l , a n d D ü r k h e i m . 3 0

3 1

his

Normale He

W e should, however, m e n t i o n his famous article, " P s y c h o l o g i c et m é t a p h y s i q u e " (translated as " P s y c h o l o g y and M e t a p h y s i c s " in The Philosophy of Jules Lachelier), first published in 1885. in w h i c h L a c h e l i e r develops his idealism via a description of psychological experience (developed in opposition to positivist reductionism) a n d with a particular emphasis on the role of the will. B e r g s o n was not formally a student o f Lachelier, since he did not enter the Ecole N o r m a l e until 1878, three years after Lachelier stopped teaching there. But Lachelier was a strong influence on B e r g s o n , w h o dedicated his doctoral thesis to him.

Fin-de-siècle: the professors of the Republic formulated

21

his m a j o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l ideas in his thesis, La contingence

de les lois de la nature (1874). H i s later w o r k consisted o f r e f o r m u l a t i o n s o f these v i e w s (particularly in De Vidée de loi naturelle dans la science et la philosophie contemporaine [1895]) a n d n u m e r o u s i m p o r t a n t studies in the history o f p h i l o s o p h y (from 1888 to 1902 he w a s professor o f the history o f m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y at the S o r b o n n e ) . B o u t r o u x w a s also a l e a d i n g figure in " o f f i c i a l " F r e n c h a c a d e m i c life, a role that, p e r h a p s , led to his w r i t i n g , in 1915, Philosophy and War, one o f those unfortunate

books

osophy

connecting

German

aggression

with

German

phil-

3 2

B o u t r o u x s h a r e d the g e n e r a l c o n c e r n w i t h the tension b e t w e e n science a n d f r e e d o m . H e e n d o r s e d L a c h e l i e r ' s p i c t u r e o f a w o r l d in w h i c h free a n d p u r p o s i v e c r e a t i v i t y h a d p r i o r i t y over the abstractions

o f scientific

causality

but was

dissatisfied

with

Lachelier's

K a n t i a n willingness to a c c e p t a total scientific d e t e r m i n i s m for the p h e n o m e n a l w o r l d . B e c a u s e o u r lives are led in this w o r l d , B o u t r o u x a r g u e s , this c o n c e s s i o n to d e t e r m i n i s m m e a n s that a n y g i v e n h u m a n a c t i o n is the n e c e s s a r y p r o d u c t o f past actions. P e r h a p s I h a v e a n o u m e n a l n a t u r e (or c h a r a c t e r ) that has b e e n c r e a t e d b y a c h o i c e outside the d e t e r m i n i s t i c n e t w o r k . B u t t h e n m y f r e e d o m has b e e n entirely spent in the c r e a t i o n o f this c h a r a c t e r , w h i c h b e c o m e s the d e t e r m i n i n g cause o f all m y i n d i v i d u a l actions. " A strange d o c t r i n e " , he c o n c l u d e s , " o n e that r e g a r d s . . . r e p e n t a n c e , c o n q u e s t s o f self, struggles b e t w e e n g o o d a n d evil, as b u t the n e c e s s a r y events o f a d r a m a the issue o f w h i c h has b e e n d e c i d e d u p o n

beforehand".

M o r e o v e r , B o u t r o u x a d d s , e v e n this c h a r a c t e r c a n n o t be p r o p e r l y r e g a r d e d as m y free c r e a t i o n . A s a p a r t o f the intelligible ( p h e n o m enal) w o r l d , it too must b e l o n g to a deterministic

system.

The

K a n t i a n effort at r e c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f r e e d o m a n d d e t e r m i n i s m succ e e d s o n l y in p l a c i n g f r e e d o m a n d h e n c e " m o r a l i t y in a s p h e r e inaccessible to h u m a n c o n s c i o u s n e s s " . A s a result, " t h i s hypothesis w o u l d p r e v e n t us f r o m p a s s i n g a n y m o r a l j u d g m e n t either o n others or on o u r s e l v e s " .

3 3

B o u t r o u x c o n c l u d e s t h a t the assertion o f h u m a n f r e e d o m m u s t be at the e x p e n s e o f a deterministic v i e w o f p h e n o m e n a ; to justify the c l a i m that w e are free, w e m u s t establish that the p h e n o m e n a l w o r l d d e s c r i b e d b y science is i n d e t e r m i n i s t i c . T o say that the w o r l d is For an A m e r i c a n e x a m p l e of this genre, see G e o r g e Philosophy. La contingence de les lois de la nature, 169, 170.

S a n t a y a n a , Egotism and German


22

(1890-1940)

indeterministic is to say that the l a w s g o v e r n i n g it are n o t necessary. H e r e B o u t r o u x has in m i n d three senses o f necessity: the analytic necessity o f l o g i c a l truth, the synthetic a p r i o r i necessity o f K a n t i a n truths a b o u t the c o n d i t i o n s o f possible e x p e r i e n c e , a n d the e m p i r i c a l necessity o f de facto c o n s t a n t correlations. H e u n d e r t a k e s to s h o w that, in all o f these senses a n d at e v e r y level, there is n o necessity in the w o r l d . H i s a p p r o a c h is n o t h i n g if not c o m p r e h e n s i v e a n d s y s t e m a t i c .

34

It b e g i n s b y distinguishing a

series o f six successively m o r e specific levels o f d e s c r i p t i o n . T h e hrst level (that o f " b e i n g " , in B o u t r o u x ' s t e r m i n o l o g y ) is s i m p l y that o f an a g g r e g a t e o f separate individuals. S u b s e q u e n t levels c o r r e s p o n d to further specifications o f these individuals. T h e s e c o n d l e v e l (that of " g e n e r a " ) a d d s that the individuals h a v e n a t u r e s a l l o w i n g t h e m to be d i v i d e d into qualitatively similar classes; the third (that o f " m a t t e r " ) m a k e s the i n d i v i d u a l s m a t e r i a l b e i n g s , e x t e n d e d in space a n d time; the fourth (that o f " b o d i e s " ) a d d s that t h e y are s t r u c t u r e d m a t e r i a l substances, for e x a m p l e , a t o m s or c o m p o u n d s o f a t o m s ; the hfth (that o f " l i f e " ) that t h e y are o r g a n i s m s ; the sixth (that o f " m a n " ) that they are intelligent. For e a c h level, B o u t r o u x a r g u e s that there is neither

e x t e r n a l n o r i n t e r n a l necessity; that is, the level is not

r e q u i r e d to exist in v i r t u e o f a p r e c e d i n g level (external necessity), nor, g i v e n

its e x i s t e n c e ,

are there

necessary

laws

governing

its

d e v e l o p m e n t (internal necessity). In so a r g u i n g , he m u s t , o f course, s h o w that there is n o e x t e r n a l or i n t e r n a l necessity o f a n y o f the three types (analytic, synthetic a p r i o r i , a n d e m p i r i c a l ) . H e must, t h e n , p r o v i d e six a r g u m e n t s against necessity for e a c h level, for a g r a n d total o f thirty-six a r g u m e n t s . T h e r e are, h o w e v e r , j u s t a few basic p a t t e r n s to B o u t r o u x ' s a r g u m e n t s . T h e s e p a t t e r n s are w e l l illustrated in his t r e a t m e n t o f b e i n g , the first

level o f reality. H e r e

we

begin with nothing more

than

c o l l e c t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l b e i n g s a n d do n o t a s s u m e that t h e y

a

are

intelligent, alive, substantial, m a t e r i a l , or e v e n g r o u p e d into distinct g e n e r a . B o u t r o u x ' s first q u e s t i o n is a b o u t e x t e r n a l necessity: is there a n y t h i n g outside the r e a l m o f a c t u a l b e i n g (in the r e a l m o f m e r e possibility) that r e q u i r e s the existence o f a c o l l e c t i o n o f beings? Certainly, there is n o a n a l y t i c necessity, n o c o n t r a d i c t i o n in asserting that a g i v e n c o l l e c t i o n o f b e i n g s d o e s n o t exist. A n existent is a

M a t h i e u Schyns offers an excellent a c c o u n t o f B o u t r o u x ' s sometimes difficult a r g u m e n t a tion in La philosophie d'Emile Boutroux.


23

synthesis o f possibility a n d actuality (the a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f a possibility), a n d there is n o l o g i c a l necessity for a n y s u c h synthesis. N o r c a n it be m a i n t a i n e d that the v e r y possibility o f e x p e r i e n c e requires the a c t u a t i o n o f a specific set o f possible b e i n g s . In the d o m a i n o f e x p e r i e n c e , the possible is simply that w h i c h m a y or m a y n o t be given

as

an

object

of

experience.

Our

experiential

knowledge

(science) tells us a b o u t c o n n e c t i o n s that exist a m o n g the a c t u a l i z e d possibilities, b u t the m e r e fact o f e x p e r i e n c e d o e s n o t r e q u i r e that certain possible b e i n g s be a c t u a l i z e d . N o r , hnally, is it possible to a r g u e that w e k n o w as a m a t t e r o f e m p i r i c a l fact that a n y o f the objects o f our e x p e r i e n c e had to be a c t u a l i z e d . S o the existence o f b e i n g s is a c o n t i n g e n t fact, n o t an e x t e r n a l l y i m p o s e d necessity. B u t , g i v e n this e x i s t e n c e , are there n e c e s s a r y laws for the d e v e l o p m e n t o f a c o l l e c t i o n o f b e i n g s (i.e., i n t e r n a l necessity)? B o u t r o u x hrst a r g u e s that there c a n be n o q u e s t i o n o f a logical necessity b e c a u s e d e v e l o p m e n t a l l a w s r e q u i r e us to think o f the b e i n g s t h e y g o v e r n as in certain respects stable a n d

unchanging,

w h e r e a s the m e r e i d e a o f a c o l l e c t i o n o f b e i n g s is consistent w i t h their b e i n g in r a n d o m flux. A s to the possibility o f a K a n t i a n a p r i o r i causal c o n n e c t i o n , B o u t r o u x a g r e e s that the i d e a o f a p r o d u c t i v e cause w o u l d h a v e to be a p r i o r i , since it g o e s b e y o n d a n y t h i n g g i v e n in o u r e x p e r i e n c e . B u t he notes that, precisely for this r e a s o n , w e h a v e n o basis for p o s t u l a t i n g a m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n n e c t i o n that is not g r o u n d e d in e x p e r i e n c e . It m i g h t be m a i n t a i n e d that there is still the e m p i r i c a l necessity o f a scientific law, w h i c h is r e v e a l e d b y e x p e r i ence

and

does

determine

that

one

phenomenon

follow

upon

another. B u t B o u t r o u x a r g u e s , hrst, that e v e n an e x a c t c o r r e s p o n dence

between

cause

and

effect

would

not

prove

a

necessary

c o n n e c t i o n . E v e n if, for e x a m p l e , o b s e r v a t i o n o f gases s h o w e d that the p r o d u c t o f pressure a n d v o l u m e w a s a l w a y s e x a c t l y e q u a l to a c o n s t a n t m u l t i p l i e d b y t e m p e r a t u r e , this m i g h t m e r e l y s h o w that gases

have

possible.

always

But

more

behaved

this w a y ;

important,

he

deviations

argues,

is the

might fact

still that

be our

o b s e r v a t i o n s are n e v e r able to s h o w the e x a c t v a l i d i t y o f a law. W e m e a s u r e pressure, v o l u m e , a n d t e m p e r a t u r e o n l y u p to a certain r a n g e o f uncertainty, a n d c o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n these

phenomena

m a y b e i n d e t e r m i n a t e precisely w i t h i n this r a n g e . B o u t r o u x d e p l o y s similar a r g u m e n t s for the h i g h e r levels o f reality. H e e x c l u d e s l o g i c a l necessities o f existence or d e v e l o p m e n t a l l a w s b y s h o w i n g that e a c h successive l e v e l involves n e w features a n d laws


24

(1890-1940)

that are n o t i m p l i e d b y the p r e c e d i n g levels. For e x a m p l e , a w o r l d of n o n - m a t e r i a l g e n e r a a n d species is d i s c o n t i n u o u s , w h e r e a s a w o r l d o f m a t t e r is e x t e n d e d a n d h e n c e c o n t i n u o u s ; a n d m a t t e r m a y v a r y in size a n d position w i t h o u t c h a n g i n g qualitatively, so that the qualitative l a w s o f n o n - m a t e r i a l g e n e r a c a n n o t d e t e r m i n e p u r e l y q u a n t i tative relations a m o n g m a t e r i a l entities. K a n t i a n a p r i o r i claims o f existence or causal c o n n e c t i o n he rejects b y s h o w i n g that o u r a c t u a l experience

of

phenomena

does

not

support

such

claims.

For

e x a m p l e , a l t h o u g h m e t a p h y s i c i a n s m a y u n d e r s t a n d the solubility o f sugar in w a t e r in t e r m s o f u n o b s e r v a b l e p o w e r s i n f o r m i n g these t w o substances, scientific o b s e r v a t i o n reveals o n l y that there is a constant c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n sugar's m e l t i n g a n d its b e i n g p u t into water. Finally, B o u t r o u x rejects claims o f e m p i r i c a l necessity b y a r g u i n g , first, that e x p e r i e n c e n e v e r e x c l u d e s the possibility that a g i v e n level o f o b j e c t m i g h t n o t exist. For e x a m p l e , e v e n if w e k n e w that living cells w e r e the p r o d u c t s o f certain c h e m i c a l r e a c t i o n s , w e w o u l d not k n o w that such r e a c t i o n s h a d to o c c u r or that cells did n o t m e r e l y h a p p e n to f o l l o w f r o m t h e m . A n d B o u t r o u x a l w a y s e x c l u d e s the e m p i r i c a l necessity o f l a w s b y a p p e a l i n g to the i n e x a c t n e s s in o u r k n o w l e d g e o f the c o r r e l a t i o n s t h e y express. For the case o f o r g a n isms, he suggests that the l a w s g o v e r n i n g t h e m (e.g., the l a w

of

a d a p t a t i o n , w h i c h says that species v a r y to survive in n e w c i r c u m stances) are so i m p r e c i s e that b i o l o g y d o e s n o t in fact constitute a positive science. B o u t r o u x ' s defense o f i n d e t e r m i n i s m has a distinctly positivist, a n t i - K a n t i a n , anti-idealist b e n t . H e takes for g r a n t e d the a u t h o r i t y o f scientific

descriptions,

rejects

logical

analysis

of concepts

as

irrelevant to questions o f truth a b o u t the w o r l d , a n d insists o n an empiricist r e a d i n g o f i m m e d i a t e e x p e r i e n c e that r e p l a c e s K a n t i a n necessities w i t h H u m e a n c o r r e l a t i o n s . T h i s positivist b e n t is e v e n m o r e o b v i o u s in De l'idée de loi naturelle dans la science et la philosophic contemporaine, w h e r e B o u t r o u x m a k e s his case b y a direct analysis of scientific results r a t h e r t h a n b y abstract p h i l o s o p h i c a l tion.

3 5

argumenta-

B u t his a c c o u n t is also relentlessly a n t i - r e d u c t i v e , w i t h e a c h

successive level o f reality distinguished b y n e w traits (the c o n t i n u i t y o f matter, the s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f life, the m o r a l f r e e d o m o f h u m a n beings) that c a n n o t be e x p l a i n e d v i a " l o w e r " c a t e g o r i e s . M o r e o v e r ,

^

H e r e , as w e shall see, B o u t r o u x ' s views have important similarities to those o f his brotherin-law — with w h o m he also h a d close intellectual contacts — H e n r i Poincaré.


25

the distinctive features o f e a c h o n t o l o g i c a l level are a l w a y s further and richer achievements of freedom. B o u t r o u x deploys

positivist

e p i s t e m o l o g y in the service o f spiritualist ontology. R a v a i s s o n a n d L a c h e l i e r m i g h t w e l l q u e s t i o n his m e a n s , b u t t h e y w o u l d a g r e e w i t h his result.

CHAPTER

2


It's like t h e rules o f l o g i c o r scientific l a w s , r e a l i t y c o n f o r m s t o them more Poincare:

o r less, b u t r e m e m b e r

he's by no means

the great

certain

that

mathematician

mathematics

is a

rigorously exact science. (Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, m , 149)

T h e n a r r a t i v e o f F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y d u r i n g the hrst t w o d e c a d e s o f the

twentieth

century

consists

o f three

intertwined

stories: t h e

d e v e l o p m e n t o f p h i l o s o p h y o f science as a n i n d e p e n d e n t discipline, the solidification o f university i d e a l i s m in t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f L e o n B r u n s c h v i c g , a n d t h e brilliant rise o f B e r g s o n ' s spiritualist m e t a p h y sics. T h i s

chapter

treats the hrst t w o topics, a n d t h e f o l l o w i n g

c h a p t e r is d e v o t e d to B e r g s o n .

PHILOSOPHERS

OF SCIENCE:

POINCARE,

DUHEM,

AND

MEYERS ON

A l t h o u g h F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h e r s h r m l y rejected positivism, t h e y still recognized Lachelier

t h e centrality o f science and Boutroux,

for p h i l o s o p h i c a l

in particular,

insisted

reflection.

o n t h e n e e d to

c o n s t r u c t a u n i h e d a c c o u n t o f n a t u r e that s h o w e d h o w t h e truths o f science a n d o f h u m a n f r e e d o m Such

a synthesis

involved

combined

exhibiting

in a c o h e r e n t

t h e limitations

whole.

o f science

( i n d e t e r m i n i s m , a b s e n c e o f hnality) that r e q u i r e us to c o m p l e m e n t it w i t h m e t a p h y s i c a l a c c o u n t s if w e are to describe t h e full c o n c r e t e ness o f reality. nature

called

This

enterprise

for serious

of developing

philosophical

a metaphysics

reflection

on

of

scientific

k n o w i n g , w h i c h in t u r n r e q u i r e d a t h o r o u g h a c q u a i n t a n c e w i t h t h e methods

a n d results

o f science.

Moreover,

t h e survival

of the

G o m t e a n i d e a that science h a d to b e u n d e r s t o o d as a historical 26

Science and idealism phenomenon

27

led to a r a p i d d e v e l o p m e n t o f the e p i s t e m o l o g y

of

science, a historically b a s e d effort to u n d e r s t a n d the structure

of

1

science as a c o g n i t i v e enterprise. In p r i n c i p l e , the n e w e p i s t e m o l o g y o f science c o u l d h a v e r e m a i n e d entirely s u b o r d i n a t e d to the goals o f the m e t a p h y s i c s o f n a t u r e . In p r a c t i c e , it e m e r g e d as m o r e a n d more

an

autonomous

study

o f science

in its o w n

terms,

d e c r e a s i n g c o n c e r n for i n c l u d i n g scientihc results in a

with

synthetic

m e t a p h y s i c a l v i e w o f n a t u r e as a c o n c r e t e w h o l e . T h e m o v e to a u t o n o m y is p e r h a p s clearest in the p h i l o s o p h i c a l reflections o f H e n r i P o i n c a r e (1854—1912). A s a distinguished m a t h e m a t i c i a n a n d scientist, P o i n c a r e h a d little t r a i n i n g in p h i l o s o p h y a n d n o interest in the spiritualist a n d idealist o r i e n t a t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h e r s such as R a v a i s s o n a n d L a c h e l i e r . (Neither are m e n t i o n e d in his three m a i n b o o k s o n p h i l o s o p h y o f science, a n d e v e n B e r g s o n receives o n l y o n e p a s s i n g reference.) O n the o t h e r h a n d , P o i n c a r e w a s well a w a r e o f c u r r e n t p h i l o s o p h i c a l issues a b o u t the n a t u r e a n d limitations o f science a n d w a s v e r y s y m p a t h e t i c to the ideas o f B o u t r o u x , his friend a n d brother-in-law, a b o u t the c o n t i n g e n c y o f laws. Poincare's w r i t i n g s on m e t h o d o l o g i c a l topics set a m o d e l for a n e w p h i l o s o p h i c a l a p p r o a c h to science, one that p l a c e d a h i g h p r e m i u m on careful discussion o f the c o n c e p t u a l f o u n d a t i o n s o f p a r t i c u l a r theories a n d , on this basis, d e v e l o p e d sophisticated analyses o f the k e y c o n c e p t s o f o b s e r v a t i o n , law, theory, a n d e x p l a n a t i o n . H e w a s , a l o n g w i t h M a c h a n d D u h e m , a f o u n d e r o f the p h i l o s o p h y o f science that b e c a m e so c e n t r a l in t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y analytic philosophy. P o i n c a r e w a s , h o w e v e r , less n a i v e l y logical

positivist

philosophers

of

empiricist t h a n the

science

who

came

after

early him.

R e f l e c t i n g the K a n t i a n i s m o f his m i l i e u , he a c k n o w l e d g e s the role of t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n in scientihc o b s e r v a t i o n , a n d his sophistic a t e d c o n v e n t i o n a l i s m gives the m i n d an active role in the constitution o f e m p i r i c a l objects a n d truth. B u t his w o r k derives m o r e f r o m reflection on scientific p r a c t i c e t h a n f r o m p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r i n ciple, l e a d i n g h i m , for e x a m p l e , to different a c c o u n t s o f c o n v e n t i o n s in g e o m e t r i c a l a x i o m s , e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s , a n d theories; a n d his a p r i o r i c a t e g o r i e s , such as simplicity, are m o r e a f u n c t i o n o f p r a g m a t i c utility t h a n o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n d i t i o n s o f e x p e r i e n c e . !

In the first lesson of his Course in Positive Philosophy (1830—42), C o m t e h a d e m p h a s i z e d the n e e d to trace " t h e course actually followed by the h u m a n m i n d in action, through the e x a m i n a t i o n o f the methods really e m p l o y e d to obtain the exact k n o w l e d g e that it has already a c q u i r e d " {The Essential Comte, 32).

28


(1890-1940)

A m o n g P o i n c a r e ' s m o s t i m p o r t a n t v i e w s are his a c c o u n t o f the roles o f h y p o t h e s e s in science a n d his defense o f the objectivity o f scientific

knowledge.

In La

science et I'hypothese, he

distinguishes

several kinds o f h y p o t h e s e s , e a c h w i t h a distinctive a n d essential role in scientific i n q u i r y (La science et I'hypothese [SH],

3/28). T h e hrst k i n d

c o m p r i s e s g e n e r a l c l a i m s testable b y o b s e r v a t i o n . T h e y are essential to science's p r o j e c t o f f o r e s e e i n g the future, an enterprise inconsistent w i t h the p o p u l a r v i e w o f science as simply a b o d y o f certain facts, p r o v e n b y o b s e r v a t i o n . G e n e r a l e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h e s e s are b y their v e r y n a t u r e an e x t r a p o l a t i o n b e y o n d w h a t o b s e r v a t i o n gives a n d so are a l w a y s o p e n to refutation b y s u b s e q u e n t

experience.

T h e y are m o s t often explicitly f o r m u l a t e d g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s , s u p p o r t e d but

not

logically

entailed

by

experimental

data;

for

example,

K e p l e r ' s laws o f p l a n e t a r y m o t i o n , b a s e d on T y c h o B r a h e ' s o b s e r v a tions o f the solar system. T h e r e are also u n c o n s c i o u s h y p o t h e s e s of this sort, u n t h i n k i n g a s s u m p t i o n s , often e n g r a i n e d in o u r l a n g u a g e , about

how

nature

must

behave.

(Poincare

cites e x a m p l e s

from

A m p e r e ' s w o r k on e l e c t r o d y n a m i c s a n d notes the v a l u e o f rigorous m a t h e m a t i c a l f o r m u l a t i o n s in b r i n g i n g s u c h a s s u m p t i o n s to light.) P o i n c a r e notes that scientists should try to m a k e h y p o t h e s e s o n e at a time, so that t h e y will k n o w j u s t w h a t has b e e n refuted b y a n e g a t i v e e x p e r i m e n t a l result. ( D u h e m , as w e shall see, will q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r this is in fact possible.) P o i n c a r e a r g u e s that a falsified h y p o t h e s i s is not a failure o f science. A scientific h y p o t h e s i s is f o r m u l a t e d o n the basis o f w h a t w e h a v e r e a s o n to e x p e c t , a n d the failure o f o u r e x p e c t a t i o n s p o i n t s to the existence o f a n e w p h e n o m e n o n

that

represents an a d v a n c e in o u r k n o w l e d g e . H e also distinguishes a subclass o f e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h e s e s that are " p e r f e c t l y n a t u r a l a n d f r o m which

one c a n h a r d l y e s c a p e " (SH,

187/135). E x a m p l e s o f such

a s s u m p t i o n s (no d o u b t often u n c o n s c i o u s p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e t h e y are so natural) are that the influence o f v e r y distant b o d i e s is negligible, that q u a n t i t a t i v e effects v a r y c o n t i n u o u s l y w i t h their causes, a n d that nature b e h a v e s a c c o r d i n g to b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s o f symmetry.

Such

h y p o t h e s e s , for all their o b v i o u s n e s s , m a y t u r n out to b e falsified b y o b s e r v a t i o n , a l t h o u g h t h e y are so f u n d a m e n t a l that " t h e y are the last that o u g h t to be a b a n d o n e d " (SH, 188/135). Poincare

also

thinks

that

some

scientific

hypotheses

are

not

e m p i r i c a l l y testable at all. T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t e x a m p l e s are claims that s e e m to be substantive e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h e s e s b u t t u r n out to be "reducible

to

disguised

definitions

or

conventions"

(SH,

3/28).


29

C o n s i d e r , for e x a m p l e , the q u e s t i o n o f the g e o m e t r i c a l structure of p h y s i c a l space. For a l o n g t i m e , there s e e m e d to be n o d o u b t that this w a s E u c l i d e a n , since there s e e m e d to be n o c o h e r e n t alternative to the familiar a x i o m s o f E u c l i d e a n g e o m e t r y (such as, for e x a m p l e , that t w o lines intersect in at m o s t o n e point). T h e o n l y q u e s t i o n c o n c e r n e d the n a t u r e o f the necessity o f these a x i o m s : w e r e they analytic truths, d e r i v a b l e f r o m the v e r y d e h n i t i o n s o f basic g e o m e trical t e r m s (as L e i b n i z held) or w e r e they, as K a n t

maintained,

synthetic a p r i o r i truths r e q u i r e d as c o n d i t i o n s o f possible e x p e r i e n c e ? B u t a c c o r d i n g to P o i n c a r e , the d e v e l o p m e n t in the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y o f a l t e r n a t i v e , n o n - E u c l i d e a n g e o m e t r i e s refuted b o t h these

claims

by

showing

that

the

Euclidean

axioms

were

of not

necessary. S u c h g e o m e t r i e s c o n t a i n e d a x i o m s c o n t r a r y to those o f E u c l i d (those o f R i e m a n n i a n g e o m e t r y , for e x a m p l e , a l l o w e d distinct lines to intersect in m o r e t h a n o n e point) a n d c o u l d , m o r e o v e r , b e p r o v e d to be self-consistent if E u c l i d e a n g e o m e t r y w a s . T h i s put t h e m o n a l o g i c a l a n d c o n c e p t u a l p a r w i t h E u c l i d e a n geometry. O f c o u r s e , e v e n if E u c l i d e a n g e o m e t r y is n o t the o n l y c o n c e p t u a l possibility, it m i g h t s e e m to b e the o n l y one s u p p o r t e d b y e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e . D o precise m e a s u r e m e n t s n o t show, for e x a m p l e , that the three interior angles o f a triangle a d d u p to 180 d e g r e e s ? Euclidean

geometries

require

sums

lesser

degrees.) O n e difficulty w i t h this i d e a -

or

greater

suggested by

(Non-

than

180

Boutroux's

t r e a t m e n t o f m e a s u r e m e n t - is that the n o n - E u c l i d e a n n a t u r e

of

p h y s i c a l g e o m e t r y m i g h t be a p p a r e n t o n l y b e y o n d the limits o f the a c c u r a c y o f o u r c u r r e n t m e a s u r e m e n t s . B u t a c c o r d i n g to P o i n c a r e e v e n u n l i m i t e d a c c u r a c y in m e a s u r e m e n t c o u l d n o t establish the e m p i r i c a l truth o f o n e g e o m e t r y over a n o t h e r b e c a u s e w e

would

a l w a y s be free to r e i n t e r p r e t the m e t r i c (that is, the w a y in w h i c h m e a s u r i n g i n s t r u m e n t s v a r y in different

parts o f space) u s e d

to

m a k e the m e a s u r e m e n t s . P e r h a p s , for e x a m p l e , if w e a s s u m e that o u r m e a s u r i n g rods are p e r f e c t l y rigid b o d i e s , o u r

measurements

will s u p p o r t E u c l i d e a n geometry. B u t the v e r y s a m e m e a s u r e m e n t s will s u p p o r t a n o n - E u c l i d e a n g e o m e t r y o n the a s s u m p t i o n that the lengths o f o u r rods v a r y w i t h their p o s i t i o n . (We m i g h t , o f course, try to m e a s u r e o u r m e a s u r i n g rods at v a r i o u s l o c a t i o n s — say b y t i m i n g light rays that w e shot b a c k a n d forth a l o n g their l e n g t h . But

the

result

of

these

meta-measurements

would

depend

on

e q u a l l y u n t e s t a b l e a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t the s p e e d a n d straightness of the light rays.) P o i n c a r e c o n c l u d e s , t h e n , that the q u e s t i o n o f the

30


(1890-1940)

g e o m e t r y o f p h y s i c a l space c a n be r e s o l v e d o n l y b y our specifying a convention. T h i s d o e s n o t , he insists, p u t the n a t u r e

o f s p a c e u p to

our

a r b i t r a r y c h o i c e . O u r c h o i c e o f a c o n v e n t i o n is n o t a w h i m ; it is b a s e d o n p o w e r f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f c o n v e n i e n c e (e.g., simplicity). O u r c h o i c e is free in the sense o f n o t c o m p e l l e d b y logic or o b s e r v e d facts,

but

it is n o t

arbitrary.

In

fact,

Poincare

maintains

that

" E u c l i d e a n g e o m e t r y is, a n d will r e m a i n , the m o s t c o n v e n i e n t " [SH, 70/65), n o t o n l y b e c a u s e o f o u r familiarity w i t h it a n d its o b v i o u s a d e q u a c y to e v e r y d a y e x p e r i e n c e s , b u t also b e c a u s e o f its g r e a t e r intrinsic simplicity.

2

P o i n c a r e also thinks that s o m e o f the f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s of physics are c o n v e n t i o n a l . H e r e w e often b e g i n w i t h an e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h e s i s , say that b o d i e s attract one a n o t h e r in inverse p r o p o r t i o n to their distance or that e n e r g y is c o n s e r v e d in c l o s e d systems. T h e r e is c o n s i d e r a b l e

evidence

for

the h y p o t h e s i s ; it has v e r y

fruitful

c o n s e q u e n c e s a n d e v e n t u a l l y b e c o m e s c e n t r a l to o u r w a y o f t h i n k i n g a b o u t p h y s i c a l p h e n o m e n a . A t this p o i n t , w e b e g i n m a i n t a i n i n g the hypothesis e v e n in the face o f c o n t r a r y e v i d e n c e . I f t w o b o d i e s s e e m to m o v e a c c o r d i n g to s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n the inverse s q u a r e law, w e take this as e v i d e n c e that there are o t h e r forces o p e r a t i v e , n o t that the l a w is invalid. I f e n e r g y seems n o t to b e c o n s e r v e d , w e assume

that the

system is n o t closed. Eventually, w h a t w a s

an

e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h e s i s b e c o m e s a p r i n c i p l e true b y definition, a n d the rest o f o u r physics is built a r o u n d it. (We c a n , o f c o u r s e , d e c i d e to cease t r e a t i n g a p r i n c i p l e as a definition, b u t that too is a c o n v e n tional decision.) P o i n c a r e s h o w e d h o w the history o f m o d e r n physics supports his distinction b e t w e e n e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h e s e s a n d definitional p r i n c i p l e s . P o i n c a r e w a s f o r c e d to a careful c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the objectivity o f science b y the w r i t i n g s o f one o f his students, a brilliant m a t h e m a t i cian-turned-philosopher,

Edouard

Le

Roy.

Le

Roy

argued

that

P o i n c a r e ' s d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f the c o n v e n t i o n a l i t y o f certain scientific principles should be e x t e n d e d to all o f science: " t h e scientist creates [fait] the o r d e r a n d d e t e r m i n i s m that he i m a g i n e s he discovers in t h i n g s " . W h y , after all, c a n w e n o t e x t e n d to all scientific claims the 3

2

3

T h i s v i e w has, o f course, b e e n proven w r o n g , at least for the purposes of theoretical physics, by the general theory of relativity, w h i c h describes the universe in terms o f a R i e m a n n i a n g e o m e t r y of variable curvature. E d o u a r d Le Roy, " S c i e n c e et p h i l o s o p h i c " , 513.

Science and idealism analysis that P o i n c a r é

gives for the l a w

3 of gravitation

and

1

the

c o n s e r v a t i o n o f e n e r g y ? It m a y s e e m that this suggestion m i s u n d e r stands P o i n c a r é 's analysis. T h e

c o n v e n t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r o f certain

scientihc h y p o t h e s e s w a s u n c o v e r e d , in effect, b y s e p a r a t i n g t h e m into t w o c o m p o n e n t s , one c o n v e n t i o n a l , the o t h e r e m p i r i c a l . S o , P o i n c a r é p o i n t s out (La valeur de la science [VS], s t a t e m e n t The stars obey Newton's

2 6 0 / 3 3 4 - 5 ) , the

laws is b r o k e n u p into: Gravitation

obeys Newton's laws a n d Gravitation is the only force acting on the stars. T h e first c o m p o n e n t s t a t e m e n t m a y be t r e a t e d as a c o n v e n t i o n a l definition, b u t t h e n the s e c o n d m u s t be r e g a r d e d as an e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h esis, falsihable b y o b s e r v a t i o n . T h e latter, t h e n , r e m a i n s as a c l a i m of fact o n w h i c h the truth o f the N e w t o n i a n t h e o r y d e p e n d s . B u t such a response will n o t satisfy L e Roy, w h o m a i n t a i n s that e v e n scientihc facts are c r e a t e d b y the scientist: " F a r f r o m b e i n g i m p o s e d o n h i m f r o m outside, scientific facts a r e , in t r u t h , m a d e [faits] b y the scientist w h o asserts t h e m . "

4

Here Le Roy's thought,

inspired b y B e r g s o n , is that the sole reality truly g i v e n to the m i n d is an u n s t r u c t u r e d c o n t i n u u m o f p a s s i n g time (la durée).

5

This con-

t i n u u m is n o t accessible to the intellect a n d is r e v e a l e d o n l y b y an extra-intellectual intuition. A l l the structures o f science are i m p o s e d b y the m i n d on this c o n t i n u u m : " T h e facts are c a r v e d out [taillés] b y the m i n d in the a m o r p h o u s m a t t e r o f the G i v e n . " I f so, there are n o 6

o b j e c t i v e l y g i v e n scientihc facts, m e r e l y the free decisions o f the intellect to divide reality u p in c e r t a i n c o n v e n t i o n a l w a y s . T h e p o i n t o f this division is to p r o v i d e us w i t h rules o f a c t i o n as g u i d e s t o w a r d p r a c t i c a l goals. T h e rules w o r k , b u t o n l y b e c a u s e w e h a v e f o r m u l a t e d t h e m so that t h e y will. A s a result, " o u r c a l c u l a t i o n s are n o t , p r o p e r l y speaking, true, b u t t h e y are effective. T h e i r f a v o r a b l e results are less the success o f o u r science t h a n o f o u r a c t i o n . "

7

P o i n c a r é ' s i m m e d i a t e response to this e x t r e m e c l a i m is that the v e r y success o f o u r rules o f a c t i o n is p r o o f that science is n o t p u r e l y o u r c r e a t i o n : " I f science did n o t s u c c e e d , it c o u l d n o t serve as [a] rule o f a c t i o n . " Further, the p r a c t i c a l success o f science derives f r o m its ability to p r e d i c t the future. A c c o r d i n g l y , " t h e r e is n o e s c a p e from this d i l e m m a : either science d o e s n o t e n a b l e us to foresee, a n d t h e n it is valueless as a rule o f a c t i o n ; or else it e n a b l e s us to foresee . . . " U n positivisme n o u v e a u " , 145. See below, chapter 3. " S c i e n c e et p h i l o s o p h i e " , 517. ' " L a Science positive et la l i b e r t é " , 3 3 8 - 9 .

4

5

6


3->

(1890-1940)

a n d t h e n it is n o t w i t h o u t v a l u e as [a] m e a n s o f k n o w l e d g e "

(VS,

240-1/324). T h i s response is effective in p r i n c i p l e , b u t h o w do w e k n o w that it does n o t tell against P o i n c a r e as well as L e R o y ? P e r h a p s P o i n c a r e ' s i n t r o d u c t i o n o f c o n v e n t i o n into o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f science u n d e r m i n e s the i d e a o f an objective scientific fact a n d m a k e s e v e n his o w n position v u l n e r a b l e to his d i l e m m a . T o r e s p o n d a d e q u a t e l y to L e Roy, P o i n c a r e n e e d s an a c c o u n t o f the n a t u r e o f scientific facts. H e has such an a c c o u n t , b a s e d on a distinction, a c k n o w l e d g e d b y Le

Roy,

between

brute

facts

(les fails

bruts) a n d

scientific

P o i n c a r e ' s c o m p l a i n t against L e R o y is that he tries to

facts.

separate

entirely the b r u t e fact f r o m scientific w o r k , so that the first exercises n o c o n s t r a i n t on the s e c o n d . P o i n c a r e m a i n t a i n s that a scientific fact is simply a translation o f a b r u t e fact into a p a r t i c u l a r (scientific) l a n g u a g e a n d , as s u c h , has to f o l l o w constraints i m p o s e d b y the b r u t e fact. H e offers the e x a m p l e o f the " f a c t s " a b o u t an eclipse of the sun. T h e r e is a c o n t i n u u m , b e g i n n i n g w i t h the c o m m o n - s e n s e fact that it is g e t t i n g dark, a n d m o v i n g t h r o u g h ever h i g h e r levels of scientific i n t e r p r e t a t i o n such as, An eclipse occurred at nine o'clock, An eclipse occurred at the time predicted by Newton's laws, a n d The eclipse occurred because of the earth's revolution around the sun. In fact, e v e n o u r "common-sense" impression

fact involves

of obscurity"

(VS,

a minimal

interpretation

of

245/327), so that it is really

first "the this

i m p r e s s i o n r a t h e r t h a n the assertion " I t is g e t t i n g d a r k " that is the b r u t e fact. A t e a c h stage b e y o n d the sheer i m p r e s s i o n o f darkness, this

brute

fact

is

expressed

in

increasingly

rich

and

nuanced

l a n g u a g e . B u t , P o i n c a r e m a i n t a i n s , e a c h such e x p r e s s i o n is c o n strained b y the b r u t e fact it is t r y i n g to f o r m u l a t e . G r a n t e d ,

we

c h o o s e to express the fact t h r o u g h the simple qualitative c a t e g o r i e s o f dark a n d light or t h r o u g h the far m o r e sophisticated c a t e g o r i e s of the h e l i o c e n t r i c theory. B u t in all cases, g i v e n the c a t e g o r i e s w e h a v e c h o s e n , s o m e f o r m u l a t i o n s are better t h a n others (it w o u l d n o t d o to say It is getting lighter or The sun is in front of the moon); a n d this is b e c a u s e o f the c o n t r o l l i n g role o f the b r u t e fact w e are t r y i n g to express. T h i s r e s p o n s e m a k e s scientific a n d c o m m o n sense, b u t it scarcely resolves the p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s raised b y L e R o y ' s position. For the dispute b e t w e e n h i m a n d P o i n c a r e d e p e n d s o n the n a t u r e of " b r u t e f a c t s " : w h e t h e r there are a n y such things a n d , if there are, w h e t h e r t h e y h a v e the m i n i m a l c o n c e p t u a l structure r e q u i r e d to


33

c o n s t r a i n "scientific f a c t s " . R e s o l v i n g such issues w o u l d r e q u i r e a m u c h closer p r o b i n g t h a n P o i n c a r é is p r e p a r e d to u n d e r t a k e o f the precise n a t u r e o f the c o n c r e t e e x p e r i e n c e in w h i c h w e alleged

"brute facts".

S u c h p r o b i n g will be

encounter

a high priority

for

s u b s e q u e n t p h i l o s o p h e r s o f e x p e r i e n c e such as B e r g s o n a n d , later, Sartre a n d M e r l e a u - P o n t y . B u t P o i n c a r é has little interest in the nature

of experience, just

as

he

has little

interest

in

Kantian

questions a b o u t the c o n d i t i o n s o f possible e x p e r i e n c e . H e is, p e r h a p s rightly, c o n t e n t w i t h o u r h u m d r u m , c o m m o n - s e n s e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f "fact" and "experience". Pierre D u h e m (1861 —1916) w a s also a p r o m i n e n t scientist (and an e v e n m o r e p r o m i n e n t historian o f science), but, unlike

Poincaré,

v e r y interested in f u n d a m e n t a l issues o f e p i s t e m o l o g y a n d m e t a p h y sics. N o n e t h e l e s s , his w o r k , like P o i n c a r é ' s , h e l p e d constitute philo s o p h y o f science as an a u t o n o m o u s discipline. In La théorie physique D u h e m insisted on a s h a r p split b e t w e e n the w o r l d k n o w n b y science a n d the w o r l d o f m e t a p h y s i c a l truth. In his view, the o b j e c t science w a s m e r e l y the sensory a p p e a r a n c e s

o f things. T h e

of real

w o r l d b e n e a t h these a p p e a r a n c e s — for D u h e m a d o m a i n o f A r i s totelian substances — w a s inaccessible to scientihc scrutiny a l t h o u g h o p e n to n o n e m p i r i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e a s o n i n g . D u h e m e n f o r c e d this e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l d u a l i s m w i t h his c o n t e n t i o n that e m p i r i c a l science has n o e x p l a n a t o r y capacity. T o e x p l a i n is to trace p h e n o m e n a b a c k to their r e a l causes i n the r e a l m o f m e t a p h y s i c a l substances. S c i e n c e , h a v i n g n o access to such c a u s e s , c a n m e r e l y f o r m u l a t e a n d systematize e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s d e s c r i b i n g the p h e n o m e n a . A c c o r d i n g to D u h e m , scientific p r a c t i c e has often b e e n c o n f u s e d b y efforts to use theories to e x p l a i n . T o e l i m i n a t e this c o n f u s i o n , he distinguishes

between

the

explanatory

aspects o f a n y g i v e n theory. W h a t

and

the

representational

a t h e o r y represents are p h e -

n o m e n a . S c i e n c e c o n c e r n s itself w i t h m e a s u r a b l e features o f the p h e n o m e n a l w o r l d a n d associates t h e m w i t h m a t h e m a t i c a l s y m b o l s . T h e s e s y m b o l s , in t u r n , are c o n n e c t e d to one a n o t h e r in m a t h e m a tical p r o p o s i t i o n s . T h e p r o p o s i t i o n s are f o r m e d w i t h a v i e w to l o g i c a l consistency

and

considerations

of convenience

(e.g.,

simplicity).

T h e y are also c o n s t r u c t e d in the h o p e that c o n c l u s i o n s f r o m t h e m will, w h e n

deduced

translated b a c k into o b s e r v a t i o n a l

terms,

a c c o r d w i t h e x p e r i e n c e d p h e n o m e n a . D u h e m insists, h o w e v e r , that there is n o r e a s o n to think there is o n e p a r t i c u l a r set o f m a t h e m a t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s o b s e r v a t i o n a l l y s u p e r i o r to all o t h e r sets. M a n y different


34

(1890-1940)

w a y s o f r e p r e s e n t i n g p h e n o m e n a m a t h e m a t i c a l l y w o u l d y i e l d interesting

and

useful

conformities

with

the

phenomena.

There

is,

accordingly, n o r e a s o n to think that the m a t h e m a t i c a l structures o f e v e n the m o s t e m p i r i c a l l y successful t h e o r y tell us w h a t underlies a n d e x p l a i n s p h e n o m e n a . T h o s e w h o speak o f theories as e x p l a i n i n g p h e n o m e n a , r a t h e r t h a n j u s t d e s c r i b i n g a n d p r e d i c t i n g t h e m , misu n d e r s t a n d the significance o f t h e o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n . S u c h m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g l e a d s to a fruitless c o n c e r n w i t h the details o f t h e o r e t i c a l structures, b a s e d o n the false i d e a that these details p r o v i d e the d e e p truth a b o u t n a t u r e . In fact t h e y are j u s t c o n v e n i e n t — a n d h a r d l y u n i q u e — tools for r e p r e s e n t i n g p h e n o m e n a . C o r r e s p o n d i n g to D u h e m ' s distinction b e t w e e n e x p e r i e n c e d p h e n o m e n a a n d t h e o r e t i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is his distinction "practical

facts"

and

"theoretical

facts".

A

practical

between fact

is

a

description o f p h e n o m e n a in o r d i n a r y o b s e r v a t i o n a l l a n g u a g e (for e x a m p l e , This paperweight is heavy, or a basic g e n e r a l i z a t i o n such as Heavy objects fall translation example,

to earth when dropped). A

o f the This

practical

fact

into

a

theoretical symbolic

fact is the

language

(for

body of mass m is being acted on by a force g). T h i s

distinction is v e r y similar to P o i n c a r é ' s b e t w e e n " b r u t e f a c t s " a n d "scientific

facts",

but

in

his La

théorie physique,

Duhem

rejects

P o i n c a r é ' s v i e w that the scientific description is merely a (convenient) translation o f the b r u t e f a c t .

8

H e p o i n t s out that, j u s t as there are

n u m e r o u s alternative scientific descriptions o f a n y g i v e n b r u t e fact, so t o o there description.

same

scientific

There is a current of n amps in the circuit, for

are n u m e r o u s

b r u t e facts w i t h the

example,

translates b r u t e facts a b o u t the b e h a v i o r o f a n y n u m b e r o f e x p e r i m e n t a l set-ups for m e a s u r i n g electric c u r r e n t . P o i n c a r é a d m i t s this b u t says that it m e r e l y reflects the v a r i e t y o f l a w s c o n n e c t i n g currents w i t h different w a y s o f m e a s u r i n g t h e m . D u h e m a g r e e s b u t m a i n t a i n s that this s h o w s that o u r t h e o r e t i c a l description o f the b r u t e fact as a current

in

a

circuit

is n o t

a mere

translation

but

a

complex

t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the fact. H i s c o n c l u s i o n is that theoretical facts are n o t basic scientific truths; t h e y are a l r e a d y c o m p l i c a t e d instruments o f c a l c u l a t i o n that h a v e n o truth v a l u e in their

own

right. It follows d i r e c t l y that scientific l a w s a n d t h e o r i e s c a n n o t

8

be

See D u h e m ' s c o m m e n t s on Poincaré's distinction in The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory [La théorie physique], 149—51.


35

r e g a r d e d as simply i n d u c t i v e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s f r o m o b s e r v e d (practical) facts. T h e initial scientific descriptions o f such facts a l r e a d y assume

a theory about them. But D u h e m

s h o w i n g that l a w s

a n d theories

does n o t see this as

are, as L e

Roy

maintains,

the

a r b i t r a r y c r e a t i o n s o f o u r m i n d s . A s w e h a v e seen, l a w s a n d theories c a n be rejected if t h e y h a v e c o n s e q u e n c e s that, w h e n translated b a c k into the l a n g u a g e o f p r a c t i c a l facts, t u r n out to b e false. O f c o u r s e , Duhem

also f a m o u s l y

holds that there c a n n e v e r b e a

decisive

refutation o f a n y single t h e o r e t i c a l h y p o t h e s i s b e c a u s e a n y e m p i r i c ally m e a n i n g f u l d e d u c t i o n will r e q u i r e several h y p o t h e s e s to derive its

conclusion.

(There

will,

for

example,

be

hypotheses

giving

t h e o r e t i c a l descriptions o f o u r m e a s u r i n g a p p a r a t u s or stating the a b s e n c e o f v a r i o u s distorting forces.) A n y e m p i r i c a l refutation will s h o w o n l y that at least o n e o f the r e l e v a n t h y p o t h e s e s is false. D u h e m ' s p o i n t h e r e , h o w e v e r , is n o t the skeptical one that n o test c a n justify r e j e c t i n g a h y p o t h e s i s . H e is simply n o t i n g the i n a d e q u a c y o f p u r e logic to g r o u n d such a rejection. T h e r e is, he says, s u c h a t h i n g as " g o o d s e n s e " , w h i c h e n a b l e s us to m a k e r a t i o n a l j u d g m e n t s a b o u t cases " t h a t d o n o t fall u n d e r the h a m m e r o f the p r i n c i p l e o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n " . It m a y be difficult for scientists to a c h i e v e consensus 9

a b o u t such cases, b u t e v e n t u a l l y there will e m e r g e a s h a r e d j u d g m e n t a b o u t w h a t it is r a t i o n a l to c o n c l u d e .

1 0

D u h e m ' s a c c o u n t o f science is, as he e m p h a s i z e s , strictly positivist in the sense that it rejects a n y u n d e r l y i n g o n t o l o g y for

scientific

theories. T h e m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n t e n t o f science is n o t h i n g b e y o n d the common-sense

world given

in the

"practical

facts"

of

ordinary

e x p e r i e n c e . T h e o r i e s f u n c t i o n simply as i n s t r u m e n t s o f c a l c u l a t i o n w i t h o u t r e v e a l i n g the reality b e n e a t h the a p p e a r a n c e s o f o r d i n a r y e x p e r i e n c e , w h i c h is w h y t h e y h a v e n o e x p l a n a t o r y force. S c i e n t i h c results

are,

therefore,

strictly

independent

of any

metaphysical

claims: t h e y c a n n e i t h e r establish n o r refute a n y t h e o r y a b o u t the real n a t u r e s o f things. B u t D u h e m thinks n o n e t h e l e s s that w e c a n

The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, 217. O n a related issue, D u h e m agrees with Poincare that there are cases of theoretical principles that are not o p e n to empirical refutation because they c o m e to have the status of definitions. But he rejects Poincare's v i e w that there are some principles (e.g., the axioms of E u c l i d e a n geometry) so e n t r e n c h e d in our thought that w e could never reject them. " T h e history o f physics shows us that very often the h u m a n m i n d has b e e n led to overthrow such principles completely, though they have b e e n r e g a r d e d by c o m m o n consent for centuries as inviolable a x i o m s " (The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, 212).

3

6


(1890-1940)

h a v e k n o w l e d g e o f the reality b e n e a t h a p p e a r a n c e s a n d that, m o r e over, scientific results are n o t irrelevant to that k n o w l e d g e . D e v e l o p i n g a m e t a p h y s i c a l a c c o u n t (or, as D u h e m often puts it, a c o s m o l o g y ) requires first o f all close attention to the p r a c t i c a l facts g i v e n in

experience,

apart

from

any theoretical

interpretations.

T h e s e c o m m o n - s e n s e truths are the f u n d a m e n t a l d a t a o f m e t a p h y sics. T h e trick is to separate t h e m f r o m the t h e o r e t i c a l a c c r e t i o n s that w e so easily confuse w i t h the p l a i n truth. H e r e is r e q u i r e d the finesse

o f the

subtle

and imaginative

mind

(/'esprit de finesse), as

o p p o s e d to the l o g i c a l r i g o r o f the g e o m e t r i c a l m i n d (I'esprit geometrique)}

G i v e n an a d e q u a t e g r a s p o f the p r a c t i c a l facts, p u r e r e a s o n

1

c a n p e n e t r a t e to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the m e t a p h y s i c a l reality l y i n g b e n e a t h t h e m . For D u h e m , the c o r e o f Aristotle's p h i l o s o p h y

of

nature is still the best e x p r e s s i o n o f m e t a p h y s i c a l truth, a l t h o u g h this truth m u s t be s e p a r a t e d f r o m the mass o f o u t d a t e d science

that

Aristotle a n d his successors built u p a r o u n d it. Duhem

r e c o g n i z e s o u r inveterate t e n d e n c y to m o v e f r o m

the

p r e d i c t i v e success o f scientific t h e o r i e s to a b e l i e f that they are true, to a s s u m e , as he puts it, that o u r m o s t successful theories p r o v i d e a " n a t u r a l classification" o f objects, r a t h e r t h a n j u s t a c o n v e n i e n t b u t dispensable system o f c o n c e p t u a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . H e insists that this move

is

a

matter

o f faith

rather

than

knowledge;

ontological

inferences f r o m e v e n the best c u r r e n t t h e o r y are u n g r o u n d e d , since the p r o b l e m s o f the m o m e n t often r e q u i r e t h e o r e t i c a l structures that will h a v e to b e s u b s e q u e n t l y a b a n d o n e d . B u t he also a g r e e s that it is possible to c o n s t r u c t g o o d m e t a p h y s i c a l a r g u m e n t s f r o m the history of

science,

convergence nomena.

when, toward

There

as

in

fact

a single

is a b s o l u t e l y

happens, unified no

empirical,

e x p l a i n or e x p e c t such c o n v e r g e n c e description

o f the p h e n o m e n a

this

theory

history

exhibits

o f all n a t u r a l scientific

no reason w h y

a

phe-

reason

to

adequate

should n o t r e q u i r e t w o or

more

m u t u a l l y i r r e d u c i b l e t h e o r e t i c a l systems. B u t the fact o f c o n v e r g e n c e supports the c o n c l u s i o n that there is a c o h e r e n t reality u n d e r l y i n g the w o r l d o f a p p e a r a n c e s . M o r e o v e r , D u h e m m a i n t a i n s , t h e r e will be an a n a l o g y b e t w e e n the scientific t h e o r y that gives an ideally a d e q u a t e d e s c r i p t i o n o f p h e n o m e n a a n d the c o s m o l o g y that explains w h y the p h e n o m e n a are as t h e y are. W i t h a t h o r o u g h g r o u n d i n g in

1 1

For D u h e m ' s version o f this Pascalian distinction a n d his application of it to the history of science, see The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, chapter 4.


37

the history o f science, w e c a n discern an overall d i r e c t i o n in the d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e o r e t i c a l structures, f r o m w h i c h w e c a n m a k e an educated

guess a b o u t w h a t

would

be

the

nature

o f an

ideally

a d e q u a t e theory. H i s o w n r e a d i n g o f the historical d a t a w a s that the c o n v e r g e n c e is n o t t o w a r d m o d e r n atomistic theories b u t t o w a r d a generalized

thermodynamics

strongly

analogous

to

Aristotelian

n a t u r a l philosophy. D u h e m ' s e n d o r s e m e n t o f A r i s t o t e l i a n i s m is n o t u n c o n n e c t e d w i t h his C a t h o l i c religious faith. C e r t a i n l y , he saw his b e l i e f as r e q u i r i n g a " s p i r i t u a l i s t " m e t a p h y s i c s such as he f o u n d in Aristotle a n d his m e d i e v a l successors, as o p p o s e d , say, to a m e t a p h y s i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m or n a t u r a l i s m . N o r did D u h e m d e n y that it w a s i m p o r t a n t to his faith to s h o w that there c o u l d be n o c o n t r a d i c t i o n s b e t w e e n C a t h o l i c d o c t r i n e s a n d scientihc results. B u t he insists that his v i e w o f science w a s d e v e l o p e d in c o m p l e t e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f his religious c o m m i t m e n t a n d should b e entirely c o n v i n c i n g to n o n b e l i e v e r s . In this sense, it is n o t , as A b e l R e y suggested, the " p h y s i c s o f a b e l i e v e r " .

1 2

D u h e m ' s positivist rejection o f science as e x p l a n a t o r y a n d realistic w a s c h a l l e n g e d b y the w o r k , likewise d e e p l y i n f o r m e d b y the history o f science, o f E m i l e M e y e r s o n (1859—1933). M e y e r s o n hrst a r g u e s that e x p l a n a t i o n has b e e n the consistent a i m o f science t h r o u g h o u t its history. Scientists f r o m Aristotle t h r o u g h G a l i l e o a n d N e w t o n to M a x w e l l a n d Einstein h a v e tried to discover the true n a t u r e

of

p h y s i c a l reality a n d to use this as a basis for e x p l a i n i n g o b s e r v e d phenomena.

Duhem,

of

course,

agrees

but

sees

the

drive

for

e x p l a n a t i o n as a d e a d - e n d that has distracted scientists f r o m their true business o f d e s c r i b i n g p h e n o m e n a . B u t a c c o r d i n g to M e y e r s o n , w h e n scientists " d e s c r i b e " p h e n o m e n a t h e y are really r e p l a c i n g the i n a d e q u a t e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f c o m m o n sense w i t h m o r e

accurate

scientihc i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . H e a c c e p t s the distinction b e t w e e n b r u t e or p r a c t i c a l facts a n d t h e o r e t i c a l or scientihc facts a n d a g r e e s w i t h D u h e m that the distinction is b e t w e e n t w o different i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . "The

1 2

scientist makes scientihc facts a n d n o t b r u t e f a c t s " , but, in

A b e l Rey, " L a philosophic scientifique de M . D u h e m " , 44ft and 133m D u h e m ' s response, " T h e Physics o f a B e l i e v e r " , is included as an a p p e n d i x to The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. E d o u a r d L e R o y was likewise a strongly c o m m i t t e d C a t h o l i c (although, unlike D u h e m , he was a strong o p p o n e n t of scholastic Aristotelianism). H e also insisted that his hyper-conventionalist view o f science did not derive from his religious faith. O n the other h a n d , L e Roy's extension of his conventionalism to religious d o g m a s , w h i c h he presented as merely rules for g u i d i n g action, resulted in his views being included in Pius X ' s c o n d e m n a t i o n of m o d e r n i s m (in his encyclical " P a s c e n d i g r e g i s " o f 1907).


38

(1890-1940)

m a k i n g a scientific fact, the scientist " h a s e x a c t l y f o l l o w e d the s a m e process w h i c h c o m m o n sense e m p l o y e d in c r e a t i n g the b r u t e f a c t " a n d has t h e r e b y p r o d u c e d an i m p r o v e d v e r s i o n o f p r a c t i c a l f a c t s .

1 3

T h e resulting t h e o r e t i c a l facts are, t h e r e f o r e , better descriptions o f p h y s i c a l reality a n d , as such, h a v e the o n t o l o g i c a l significance that D u h e m a c c o r d s to p r a c t i c a l facts: t h e y are d a t a f r o m w h i c h w e must c o n s t r u c t a m e t a p h y s i c a l cosmology. It follows that this c o n s t r u c t i o n is c a r r i e d out n o t b y t r a n s e m p i r i c a l m e t a p h y s i c s b u t b y t h e o r e t i c a l science itself. M e y e r s o n ' s realistic v i e w o f t h e o r y is i n t i m a t e l y c o n n e c t e d to his f a m o u s thesis that to e x p l a i n is to identify. A c c o r d i n g to this thesis, to e x p l a i n a p h e n o m e n o n scientifically is to identify it w i t h a t h e o r e t i c a l description that r e p l a c e s our c o m m o n - s e n s e

description.

So,

for

e x a m p l e , the kinetic t h e o r y e x p l a i n s h e a t b y identifying it as the m o t i o n o f m o l e c u l e s , a n d e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c t h e o r y e x p l a i n s the c u r r e n t in a circuit b y identifying it w i t h the flow o f electrons. M e y e r s o n supports this thesis t h r o u g h detailed historical studies o f c h e m i c a l and physical histories.

14

theories,

studies that

challenge

Duhem's

positivist

H e also uses the thesis to a r g u e that a surd o f irrationality

underlies the scientific enterprise. S i n c e to e x p l a i n is to identify, a total e x p l a n a t i o n o f the u n i v e r s e w o u l d r e q u i r e r e d u c i n g it to a sheer undifferentiated

unity. T h i s , h o w e v e r , c o n t r a d i c t s the p l u r a l i t y o f

objects that a l w a y s confronts science a n d that, accordingly, p o s e s an i m p a s s a b l e limit on r a t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n . Despite Duhem,

important and

disagreements

Meyerson

represent

a m o n g themselves, a

single

new

and

Poincaré, distinctive

a p p r o a c h to p h i l o s o p h i c a l reflection o n science. T h e y are positivist in their effort to a v o i d m e t a p h y s i c a l a s s u m p t i o n s a n d empiricist in their insistence o n the c e n t r a l role o f o b s e r v a t i o n a n d e x p e r i m e n t . B u t their p o s i t i v i s m does n o t e x t e n d to the d o g m a t i c e l i m i n a t i o n of all m e t a p h y s i c a l i n q u i r y a n d their e m p i r i c i s m is a sophisticated sort that allows for the m i n d ' s active role in the constitution o f b o t h theory

and

experience.

They

also

all

emphasize

the

need

for

p h i l o s o p h e r s o f science to o p e r a t e out o f an i n t i m a t e a c q u a i n t a n c e w i t h the a c t u a l p r a c t i c e o f science, b o t h historical a n d c o n t e m p o r a r y . N o t o n l y the spirit o f their a p p r o a c h b u t also m a n y o f their specific 1 3

1 4

Emile M e y e r s o n , Identity and Reality, 378. T h e s e studies are found b o t h in Identité et réalité a n d , especially, in De l'explication dans les sciences. Later, in La déduction relativiste, he supports his views by an analysis of Einstein's theory of relativity.

Science and idealism formulations

of problems

and

discussions,

and

contemporary

39

solutions are their

directly

thought

has

relevant

to

maintained

a

significance outside o f F r a n c e u n u s u a l in F r e n c h thinkers o f their period. A t the s a m e t i m e , its positivism a n d e m p i r i c i s m s e p a r a t e d the n e w philosophy continued

of to

science dehne

from

the

mainline

spiritualism

French

and

philosophy

idealism in

the

that Third

R e p u b l i c . T h e s e p a r a t i o n w a s d e e p e n e d b y the s p e c i a l i z e d t r a i n i n g in science a n d its history that the n e w discipline r e q u i r e d . and

Brunschvicg

combined

traditional

interests w i t h

1 5

Bergson

specialized

w o r k o n scientihc issues. Eventually, h o w e v e r , F r e n c h p h i l o s o p h y of science b e c a m e a n e a r l y a u t o n o m o u s d o m a i n , r e s p e c t e d a n d influential in the F r e n c h university, but, especially after the rise o f existential philosophy,

mostly

left

to

a

small

circle

of

specialists.

Gaston

B a c h e l a r d a n d G e o r g e s C a n g u i l h e m w e r e , as w e shall see, i m p o r t a n t h g u r e s in the g e n e r a l e d u c a t i o n o f successive g e n e r a t i o n s o f students at the S o r b o n n e . B u t , a p a r t f r o m the e x c e p t i o n a l case o f M i c h e l F o u c a u l t , t h e y h a d relatively little influence

o n existentialist

and

post-structuralist p h i l o s o p h e r s d o m i n a n t f r o m the 1940s o n . O u t s i d e o f F r a n c e , after the rise o f logical positivism, p h i l o s o p h y o f science took a f o r m a l , n o n - h i s t o r i c a l t u r n for w h i c h the F r e n c h tradition w a s u n c o n g e n i a l . T h e F r e n c h in t u r n w e r e disdainful o f w h a t they saw as the n a i v e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n a l i s m o f logical positivism a n d its insensitivity to the a c t u a l p r a c t i c e o f science. Later, w h e n historicist r e a c t i o n against positivism t o o k h o l d ,

the

English-speaking

p h i l o s o p h e r s o f science r e d i s c o v e r e d m a j o r t h e m e s a r t i c u l a t e d l o n g before

b y the F r e n c h t r a d i t i o n , such as the t h e o r y - l a d e n n e s s

of

o b s e r v a t i o n a n d the irreducibility o f scientihc r a t i o n a l i t y to logic. B u t b y t h e n the t w o a p p r o a c h e s w e r e t o o far a p a r t for

fruitful

i n t e r a c t i o n . T h e F r e n c h c o u l d h a r d l y share the e x c i t e m e n t o f w h a t they rightly saw as old n e w s ;

1 6

a n d the British a n d A m e r i c a n s h a d

scant interest in discussions w h i c h , if t h e y r e a d t h e m at all, l a c k e d

1 5

1 6

A l s o relevant here is the fact that Poincare, D u h e m , and M e y e r s o n were all, in different w a y s , outsiders to the close c o m m u n i t y o f the philosophers o f the T h i r d R e p u b l i c . All were trained in science rather than philosophy. D u h e m , at least partly because o f his conservative religious and political views, never received a call to Paris a n d r e m a i n e d t h r o u g h o u t his career at the provincial university of B o r d e a u x . M e y e r s o n was b o r n in L u b l i n , Russia (now Poland), e d u c a t e d in G e r m a n y , a n d never held a teaching position in France. W h e n G e o r g e Steiner chided Foucault for (in Les mots et Us choses) not m e n t i o n i n g K u h n . Foucault r e s p o n d e d that he h a d instead cited a thinker w h o h a d anticipated K u h n , G e o r g e s C a n g u i l h e m ("Foucault responds 2", 60).


4 8 6 ; d N i z a n , 104; and Sartre, 108 Buber, M . , 101, 360 Butor, M . , 260 J

a n

G a l v e z J . , 235 C a m u s , A . , 126, 183, 374 C a n g u i l h e m , G , 37, 3g n i 6 , 85, 228-32, 2 6 0 - 1 , 381 C a p e k , M . , 67 n i 4 capitalism, D e l e u z e a n d G u a t t a r i on. 339-4 C a p u t o J . , 3131127, 3161129 C a r n a p , R., 378 1161 Castoriadis, C , 320 112 C a t h o l i c i s m , Althusser and, 237 n 2 i ; B e a u v o i r a n d , i 5 8 ; B e r g s o n and, 82, 114: Blondel and, 84, g3; B o u t r o u x and, 8g; D u h c m and, 37; L a c h e l i e r a n d , 20; L e R o y and, 37 1112; M a r c e l and, 102; M a r i o n and. 377; M a r i t a i n and, 84, M e r l e a u - P o n t y and, 102 n24, 114, 181—2; R e n o u v i e r and, 14; spiritualism and, 12, 14; see aim M a r i t a i n , neo-Thomism 1

causality, 5 8 - 9 ; a n d D e r r i d a ' s differance, 299; efficient, 15—20; final, 15—20 Cavaillcs, J., 228, 378 C a w s , P., 155 1141 C e n t r e de R e c h e r c h e en Epistémologie A p p l i q u é e ( C R E A ) , 378 C e n t r e N a t i o n a l e de la R e c h e r c h e Scientifique ( C N R S ) , 393 Certificat d'aptitude au professorat de l'enseignement du second degré ( C A P E S ) . 392 C h a r , R., 255 Charticr, E., see A l a i n C h i s h o l m , R., 5g Chomsky, N , 216 classe de philosophie, 3-4, 382 Classical A g e , Foucault on, 265—6, 270—1, 279 C o h a n - S o l a l , A . , 159 n i C o l l è g e de France, 3 8 2 - 3 , 393 C o l l è g e de Philosophie, 290 113, 354 C o l l è g e de Sociologie, 103

413

C o l l è g e International de Philosophie, 289-90, n2, 393 Collins, J., 128 m 8 c o m m u n i s m , Althusser and, 235, 238; Foucault and, 259; M e r l e a u - P o n t y and, 183-4, 206-7; " n e w p h i l o s o p h e r s " and, 371—2; Sartre and, 125—6, 183—4, 206—7; see also M a r x i s m community, 76, 79, 101, 167—8, 308—g, 375, 376 C o m t e , A . , 8, 11, 27, 45 concept, D e l e u z e on the, 336-7; philosophy of the, 227-34 concrete, the, 50, 102-17, 252, 259 C o n d i l l a c , E., 10 consciousness, 47, 5 8 - 9 , 68, 71, 74, g2, 108. m , 129, 133-7, 5 2 , 166, 194-5; d freedom, 147; a n d negation, 139—40; planes of, 65; see also being-for-itself, being-forothers, f r e e d o m , idealism couple, the, 1 7 9 - 8 0 , 352 C o u r t i n e , J . - E , 376 C o u r t u r a t , L., 377 C o u s i n , V , 4, 10 :

a n

creative evolution, 6 6 - 7 4 Culler, J., 215 n i , 244 n26, 304 n i 7 Curtius, E., 5, 6 Darlu, A., 6 Dasein, 256, 356, 372, 377 D a v i d s o n , D., 370 Davis, C , 361 n i 7 D c W a c h l e n s , A . , 122 n5 deconstruction, 291-7, 374 Defert, D., 285 n2i Delacour, J., 64 ng D e l e u z e , G , 113, 234, 250, 255, 3 3 1 - 4 1 , 388, 389; a n d G u a t t a r i , 339-41 democracy, 97, 334, 373 D e r r i d a , J., 113, 123 n7, 250, 289-317, 354 112, 388, 393; and Bataille, 252-3; and Blanchot, 252-3; a n d Foucault, 289-90, 308; a n d Heidegger, 254, 256; a n d Husserl, 289, 291, 2g6, 2g7 m o , 301—2; and Irigaray, 350—1; and Levinas, 354 112; and Ricoeur, 369 1136; a n d Sartre, 129 1119, 389; and Saussure, 293, 3 0 0 - 1 , 302, 303; a n d skepticism, 304—8; works: " L a différance", 291, 299-301; The Gift of Death, 313-7; Glas, 254, 291, 297 m o ; Limited Inc., 305—7; Of Grammatology, 303, 307; Speech and Phenomena, 291, 301 Descartes, R., 9, 11, 54, 186, 233, 252, 355. 377 D e s c o m b e s , V , 209, 232—3, 363 n2i

414

Index

desiring-machines, 341 determinism, 2 1 - 5 , 58, 92, 1 4 7 - 8 , 383; see also causality D e w s , P., 236 n20, 320 n4 differance, D e r r i d a on, 298—302 difference, D e l e u z e o n , 334—36; sexual, in I r i g a r a y 341—2 différend, 321-31 D i p l ô m e d'Études A p p r o f o n d i e s ( D E A ) , 391 D i p l ô m e d'Etudes Universitaires G é n é r a l e s ( D E U G ) , 391 discipline, Foucault on, 278-82 discourse vs. figure, 319-20 doctorat d'état, 391 doctorat d'université, 391 Dosse, F , 210 n i 9 , 364 n27,112g Dreyfus affair, 7—8 Dreyfus, H . , 256-7 D u f r e n n e , M i k e l , 364 D u h e m , E., 9, 27, 33-8, D u m é z i l , G., 261 ng, 393 D u p o n t , C . , 105 n32 duration, 51, 53, 5 5 - 6 , 64, 7 3 - 4 D ü r k h e i m , E., 9, 20, 78, 210, 382

101; M a r i t a i n on, 95; N a n c y o n , 374—5; Sartre on, 133, 142; see also essence existence, philosophy of, 114—5, 117, 181, 235, 284, 286, 386; see also existentialism existentialism, 98, 102—3, 3 > > 4 > 386—7, 389; a n d M a r x i s m , 126, 151-2, 155, 235, 238; B e a u v o i r and, 160, 161-3, 164, 165, 169—70, 177; Foucault and, 260; H e i d e g g e r and, 252, 255—6; M a r c e l a n d , 386—7; N a n c y and, 3 7 4 - 5 ; see also existence, philosophy of n

I 2 2

I2

experience, 3 8 5 - 6 exteriority, 355; see also interiority Fabiani, J.-L., 4 n5, 5 n7, g o n i 2 face, 3 5 7 - 8 facts, see scientific facts Farias, V , 376 feminism, a n d Levinas, 363 n 2 i ; B e a u v o i r on, 175—80, D e r r i d a a n d Irigaray o n , 351—2; see also Beauvoir, Irigaray, L e D o e u f f Ferry, L., 354 n i , 3 7 2 - 4 , 379, 388 F i c h t e J . , 4 3 , 373 n46 figure, see discourse Flaubert, G., 126, 127

Ecole N o r m a l e Supérieure, 8, 105 n 3 i , 181 n i , 236 1118, 382, 392 École Pratiques des H a u t e s Études, 393 educational system, French, 3 - 5 , 3 8 2 - 3 , 39!-3 élan vital (vital impetus), 66, 68, 70, 75, 80, 115 n 8 emotions, m o r a l a n d religious, 76; Sartre on, 129-30 E n g e l , E , 378 enjoyment, 357, 359 epistemological break, 86—7, 229—30, 236 Esprit, see M o u n i e r , E. essence, B e a u v o i r o n , 165, 177; M a r i t a i n on, 95; M e r l e a u - P o n t y on, 186, 187-8. 199—200; N a n c y on, 374—5; Sartre on, 131-2, 142; see also existence 5

ethics, B e r g s o n on, 7 5 - 8 ; B r u n s c h v i c g o n , 47; D e r r i d a on, 308-13; Ferry and R e n a u t on, 373; Foucault on, 286—8; Irigaray on, 347—8; L y o t a r d o n , 327—9; L e v i n a s on, 356, 357—8, 361—2; R i c o e u r on, 370; Sartre on, 124-5 ethnology, see a n t h r o p o l o g y event, D e l e u z e o n , 338 evil, R i c o e u r o n , 365—6

fluids, Irigaray on, 347 F l y n n , T., 1521139 Foucault, M . , 39, 85, 113, 123 n7, 2 2 7 - 8 , 230. 232, 234, 250, 2 5 8 - 8 8 , 381, 389; and Bataille, 252—3; a n d B a c h e l a r d a n d C a n g u i l h e m , 2 6 0 - 1 ; and B l a n c h o t , 252-3; and D e l e u z e , 339; a n d Heidegger, 256—7, 273; a n d M a r x i s m , 259; and p h e n o m e n o l o g y , 259—60; and Sartre, 260, 261, 358—60; works: Discipline and Punish, 278-82; History of Madness, 264-7; history of Sexuality, 2 8 2 - 8 ; The Order of Things, 267-78 foundationalism, 39, 2 9 4 - 5 , 3 7 France, A . , 5 Frank, M . , 339

0 _ i

J 3^0, 3^5

fraternity, 180 freedom, 11, 13, 380—90; and poststructuralism, 3 8 8 - 9 ; B e a u v o i r on, 387; B e r g s o n on, 5 6 - 6 0 , 384; B o u t r o u x on, 21—5; B r u n s c h v i c g on, 47; Ferry and R e n a u t on, 373; L a c h e l i e r on, 19—20; Levinas o n , 359—60; M e r l e a u - P o n t y on, 203-8, 3 8 7 - 8 ; N a n c y o n , 3 7 4 - 5 ; Sartre o n , H7~5h 3 5 9 - « = 3 8 7 - 8 6

creative evolution E w a l d , F , 285 n2i

Freud, S., 174, 186, 238-44, 3 3 9 - 4 ; 3 5 i Sartre on, 141 1130, 149; see also psychoanalysis Fry, C , 113 n52 Fullbrook, E. a n d K., 161 n i o

existence, B e a u v o i r on, 165, 177; M a r c e l on.

fundamental project, 148—9

evolution, B e r g s o n o n , 68-70, 78, 81; see also

1

6

Index G a d a m e r , H.-G., 367 1133 Garaudy, R., 235 G a r r i g o u - L a g r a n g e , R., 94, 96 genealogy, 278, 2 8 5 - 6 , 288 G e n e t , J . , 125, 127

4!5 Foucault, 27; and L e v i n a s , 353-4; and Merleau-Ponty, 182, 184, 1 8 6 - 8 ; and N a z i s m , 376; a n d Sartre, 129—31, 132—3; early influence in France, 105, 106, 107—8; recent French interest in, 376—7; see also p h e n o m e n olo gy

G e r m a n philosophy, 5—6, 21, 380—1, 382 G e w i r t h , A . , 77 1127 Gide, A., 6

hypokhâgne, 392

gift, D e r r i d a on, 310, 313; M a r i o n on, 377; Mauss on, 210—11 Gilson, E., 94, 96, 97 G l u c k s m a n n , A . , 371—2 G o d , Bergson on, 79, 81—2; Blondel on, 90, 91, 92—3; Brunschvieg on, 48; D e r r i d a on. 313—17; Irigaray on, 349—50; L e v i n a s on, 360—1; M a r c e l on, 100—1, 102; M a r i o n on, 377; M a r i t a i n on, 95, 96, 97; R e n o u v i e r on,

hypotheses, scientific, 28-30 Hyppolite, J., 89 n n , n o n48, 113, 115 n 57, 258

13—14; spiritualism and, 11, 14; see also

idealism, a n d Bachelard, 87—8; a n d Brunschvieg, 40, 42—3; a n d Lachelier, 20; and M a r c e l , 98; a n d spiritualism, 14—15; Bergson on, 61—2; G e r m a n , 5—6, 109—13. 380; M e r l e a u - P o n t y on, 196, 197-203; 380; see also B o u t r o u x , Brunschvieg, H e g e l , Lachelier

religion

Idéologues, 10

G o l d m a n , L., 235 ni7 G o o d m a n , N., 338 n6i grammatology, 293

imagination, 88—9, 129—30

grandes écoles, 392, 393

induction, 15-20 infinity, 355 intellectual, specific vs. universal, 263 intelligence, 71—4 intentionality, 108, 134-5 interiority, 356—7, 358; see also exteriority intuition, 7 1 - 4 , 95, 100 Irigaray, L., 179, 341-52, 388

i m m a n e n c e , 171—2, 178; see also transcendence

indeterminism, 21-5; see also causality

Granger, G.-G., 377, 378 n6i Guattari, E , 339-41 Guitton, J., 6 119 G u n n , J. Alexander, 14 1125 G u r v i t c h , G., 106 G u r w i t s c h , A . , 105 1132 habit, 12, 75 H a m e l i n , O . , 14, 15 n27 H a r d t , M . , 334 n i 5 H e g e l , G., 109-13, 115, 236, 254, 335, 355, 380-1 Heidegger, M . , 102 n24, 106, 107, 108, 115, H°> 5 > 3 5 ° . 3 5 3 - 4 . 37 "3> 3 " ; D e r r i d a , 254, 256; a n d Foucault, 256-7, 273; French translations of, 36; and N a z i s m , 256, 376; a n d poststructuralism. 255—7; - Sartre, 129—31 Henry, M . , 376 H e r b r a n d , J . , 378 H e r i n g , J . , 105 hermeneutics, R i c o e u r on, 366—9, 371 H o c k i n g , W. E., 115 1158 HöfTding, H . , 8 n i 3 Holland, E., 339 n23 Hollier, D., 107, n37 homosexuality, 283, 287, 348 hospitality, D e r r i d a on, 309 Howells, C . , 254 1144, 389 111 H u m e , D., 10, 385 humor, B e r g s o n on, 72 Husserl, E., 102 1124, 115, 228, 380-1; and 2

2

2

a n a

8 0

1

a

n

d

Jakobson, R., 222 James, W , 14 Janet, P., 9, 50 J a n i c a u d , D., 50 n2, 377 1158 Jankélévitch, V , 74 1126, 82-3 Jaspers, K . , 102 n24, 363 Jaurès, J., 50 J o a n of A r c , 173 j u d g m e n t , 4 1 - 3 , 4 6 - 7 ; regulative vs. determinate, 329 Judt, T., 126 n i 4 justice, 311—13, 320—1 K a n t , I., 29, 252, 329, 390; Bergson and, 54—6; B o u t r o u x and, 21; Brunschvieg and, 45, 46, 74, 77; D e l e u z e and, 329, 337-8; Ferry a n d R e n a u t and, 372-3; Foucault and, 261—2, 270, 272—3; Lachelier and, 15—18; M e r l e a u - P o n t y and, 116, 186; R e n o u v i e r and, 13; Sartre and, 132 Kearney, R., 361

khâgne, 392 K i e r k e g a a r d , S., 90, 109 n44, 140, 360; and D e r r i d a , 313—16

4i 6

Index

Kitcher, P., 69 1117 K l e u t g e n , J., 94 k n o w l e d g e / p o w e r , 2 7 8 - 9 , 284 K o j è v e , A . , 103, 110-13, 235 K o s a k i e v i c z , O . , 161 K o y r é , A . , 110

linguistics, 215-21

Kristeva, J., 243-4, 253> 254 n o K u h n , T., 39 n i 6 , 86, 232 4

L a Fontaine, J. de, 233

literature, Sartre and, 121, 123-4; B e a u v o i r on, 161—2; D e r r i d a on, 296—7; and philosophy, 102-3, 252-4, 2 9 6 - 7 , 381 L o c k e , J., 10 logocentrism, 294, 369, 374 L o g u e , G., 13 n23 Lucretius, 233 Lukâcs, G , 235 n i 7 lycée, 4, 391

L a c a n , J., 110, 238-43, 250, 275, 344, 346; and L y o t a r d , 3 1 8 - 1 9 ; a n d Ricoeur, 260 365

L y o t a r d , J . - E , 3 1 8 - 3 1 , 388, 389, 393

Lacey, A . R., 59 n4, 67 n i 4 Lachelicr, J., 14-20, 25, 26, 27, 74, 89, 91, 383; and Ricoeur, 368 1133; on H e g e l , 109

M a c h , E., 27 Macherey, P., 236 madness, Foucault on, 264-7 M a i n de B i r a n , F , 4 114, 10, 84, 91 maître de conférences, 391 maîtrise, 391 M a l l a r m é , S., 127 1116 Malraux, A., 6

L a c o i x , J., 92 n i 5 L a c o u c - L a b a r t h e , P., 376, 388, 393 Ladrière, J., 200 n i 3 , 228 L a g n e a u , J . , 368 1133 Lalande, A., 7 language, and p h e n o m e n o l o g y , 226; D e r r i d a and, 252, 292, 300-2; Foucault a n d , 252-3, 257, 260, 268-71, 277; L y o t a r d on, 3 1 8 - 9 , 326—7; M e r l e a u - P o n t y on; 192—5, 202—3; R i c o e u r on, 368-70; the unconscious as (Lacan), 240-4; see also linguistics, phrases, Saussure Latour, B., 9 n i 5 Lavelle, L., 84 law, D e r r i d a on, 311—12; scientific, B o u t r o u x on, 2 2 - 4 ; D u h e m o n , 3 4 - 5 ; Poincaré on, 28-30; Le D a n t e c , F , 9 n i 4 Le Doeuff, M . , 143 1131, 379 Le Roy, E., 3-32, 37 1112, 89 Le Saulchoir, 94 Lefebvre, H . , 113 n52, 235 Lefort, C , 184 rï], 320 n2 Leibniz, G., 54, 233 L e S e n n e , R., 84 Levinas, E., 106, 107, 3 5 3 - 6 3 , 390; and Descartes, 355; a n d feminism, 363 n 2 i ; and Heidegger, 353, 354, 3 5 5 - 6 , 357; and Husserl, 353, 354; a n d J u d a i s m , 354, 361; and M a r x i s m , 354 Lévi-Strauss, G., 123 n7, 209, 210, 211, 221-7, 250, 368, 382, 393; and Merleau-Ponty, 208-10, 2 2 4 - 5 , 3 8 7 - 8 ; d Sartre, 225-7, 387-8 a n

Lévy, Benny, 128 n i 8 Lévy, B e r n a r d - H e n r i , 371—2, 374 1148 L é v y - B r u h l , 78 Libera tore, M . , 94 licence, 234 n i 5 , 391 Lilla, M . , 373 1147

M a r c e l , G., 98-102, 105, 115, 123 n7, 354, 360, 363, 384; and Bergson, 115 n58; and Brunschvicg, 104,1128; and Merleau-Ponty, 102 n24; on Sartre, 122 115 M a r i o n , J - L . , 376-7 M a r i t a i n , J., 84, 9 4 - 8 , 384 M a r x , K., 110-13, 152, 186, 2 3 5 - 8 ; see also Marxism M a r x i s m , 151-7, 250, 339-41, 354, 372, 388; see also c o m m u n i s m , M a r x materialism, 6 1 - 2 , 9 1 - 2 M a u r r a s , C , 97 Mauss, M . , 2 1 0 - n M a y 1968, 238, 253, 320, 371, 372 M c B r i d c , W., 122 n5 M c C o o l , G., 94 n i 7 M c N e i l l , J , 91 n i 4 M e h l , R., 364 n27 M e i n o n g , A . , 378 memory, 61, 63—6 Mercier, D., 94 Merleau-Ponty, M . , 3, 102 n24, 104-5, 9 > n o , 121, 181-212, 251, 258, 355, 3 8 4 - 5 , 387—8, 393; a n d Beauvoir, 161 m o ; and Bergson, 113—17, 384; a n d Lévi-Strauss, 208-10, 224-5, 3 8 7 - 8 ; a n d L y o t a r d , 325 117; a n d M a r c e l , 102 1124; and Sartre, 123, 126, 181-4, 195, 196, 197, 203-8, 3 8 4 - 5 ; Foucault on, 273-4; works: Phenomenology of Perception, 185, 186-208; 77K Structure of Behavior 184—5; Th Visible and the Invisible, 185, 2 0 7 - 8 , 2 0 9 - 1 0 I0

e

metaphor, 242, 297, 369 M e y e r s o n , E., 3 7 - 8 , 84, 85, 108 Mill, J , 16

Index Pius X I , 97

mimesis, 276 mind-body problem, 60-6 M o i , T., 143, n 3 i , 163 M o o r e , F. T. G., 71 n i g morality, see ethics M o u n i e r , E., 102 n24, 181, 363 multiplicity, D e l c u z e on, 3 3 2 - 4 Musil, R . , 3 7 8 mysteries, 100 mythologies, 244-7

Plato, 293, 346-7, 355 Poincarc, H . , 6, 9, 26, 2 7 - 3 3 , 85 politics, 3 2 9 - 3 1 , 375; see also political theory political theory, 373-4; see also politics positivism, 8-9, 1 0 - 1 1 , 251; B o u t r o u x a n d , 25; B r u n s c h v i c g a n d , 43, 45; French philosophy o f science and, 26, 39—40 Poster, M . , 235 n i 6 poststructuralism, 249-57, 372—4, 377. 388-90 p o w e r / k n o w l e d g e , 2 7 8 - 9 , 284 problems, 100 Protagoras, 322 Proust, M . , 6, 50, 108, 131, 339 psychoanalysis, 342-4; see also Freud, Kristeva, Lacan

N a b e r t , J., 368 n33 Nancy, J.-L., 3 7 4 - 6 , 388, 38g narrative, 369—70 nausea, 107, 137 negation, 138—40, 147 n e o - T h o m i s m , 94—6, 102, 384 new philosophers

(nouveaux philosophes),

371—2

N i c o d , J., 378 Nietzsche, F , 186, 234, 253 n39, 2 5 4 - 5 , 386: D e l e u z e on, 333 N i z a n , P., 103—4, 6 > 7 , 3 N o b e l Prize, 51, 381 norms, C a n g u i l h e m on, 231—2; Foucault o n . 266, 280-1; L a c a n on, 239; L y o t a r d o n , IQ

I 0

I 2

328; see also ethics nothing, 68 n i 5 , 91; see also negation, nothingness nothingness, 138-9 objectivity, scientific, 3 0 - 3 O l l é - L a p r u n e , L., 91 ontology, see being order, Foucault o n , 267—78 other, the, 144-7, O t t , H., 376

l 6

417

5 - 8 , 95-7> 355-9 :

Q u e n e a u , R., 107, n o Q u i n e , W., 50 111, 302 n i 4 R a b i n o w , P., 257 Ravaisson, F., 1 0 - 1 2 , 13, 14, 15, 25, 27, 84, 91, 383 R a w l s , J., 379 realism, 62, 8 7 - 8 , 132-3, 197-8 reduction, p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l , 187, 273, 376-7; cidetic, 187-8 reflection, p r i m a r y vs. s e c o n d a r y (Marcel), 99—101 Reid, X , 385 relativity theory, 30 n2, 38 n i 4 , 53 n3; Bergson o n , 67 n i 4 religion, 12, 20, 37, 4 7 - 8 , 89, 93, 377; Bergson on, 78—82; D e r r i d a on, 313—17; Irigaray on, 349—50; Levinas o n , 360—1; R i c o e u r o n ,

364—5; Sartre on, 128 n i 8 ; see also G o d Parodi, D . , 3, 9, 1 1 , 4 3 , 8 4 - 5 Pascal, B., 40, 89 Péguy, C , 50 Peperzak, A . , 356 n , 359 ng, 362 1119 perception, 6 1 - 3 PfeifFer, G , 106 4

p h e n o m e n o l o g y , 129-31, 186-90, 228, 376-7; and ontology, 121—3, 150—1, 206—8; a n d Ricoeur, 365—6, 370—1; a n d structuralism. 208-12, 224-7, 251; Foucault on, 273-4,

276; see also Heidegger, Husserl philosophy, analytic, 7, 27, 321, 370, 3 7 8 - 9 , 382, 383, 390; D e r r i d a o n , 2 g 3 - 4 , 2g5-7; in French education, 3 - 5 , 3 8 2 - 3 , 3 9 1 - 3 ; poststructuralist critique of, 390 phrases, L y o t a r d on, 322—8 P i a g e t J . , 50 Pius X , 37

Renaissance, Foucault on, 265, 269—70 R e n a n , E., 9, 90 R e n a u t , A . , 354 n i , 379, 388 Renouvier, C . , 1 2 - 1 4 , 383 repetition, D e l e u z e o n , 336 representation, B e r g s o n o n , 61—4; D e l e u z e on, 331, 336—8, 341; D e r r i d a on, 256; D u h e m on, 33-4; Foucault on, 270-2, 275; Irigaray on, 347, 350, 351; Lévi-Strauss on, 222; Saussure on, 217-18 resemblance, Foucault on, 269—70; Irigaray on, 347 ^

Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 7 Rey, A . , 37 Richir, M . , 364 1129 Ricoeur, P., 102 n24, 106, 234, 363—71; a n d Husserl, 364, 3 6 5 - 6 , 371; a n d Jaspers, 363; and L e v i n a s , 370; a n d M a r c e l , 363; a n d

Index

4i8 Ricoeur, P. (cont.) Merleau-Ponty, 364; a n d Sartre, 364, 365: on h e r m e n e u t i c s , 366—g; on psychoanalysis, 367 R i m b a u d , A . , 241 R o b b c - G r i l l e t , A . , 260 Rorty, R., 308 R o t h , M . , 1 1 0 n45~7 R o u s s e a u , J.-J., 2g3, 2g8, 302, 303 Roussel, R., 260 R o y c e , J., 104 n28 Russell, B., 136 n27 Rylc, G., 188 1112 same, the, 354-5 S a n t a y a n a , G , 21 n32 Sartre, J . - P , 33, 43 n : 8 , 47, 5 g - 6 o , g2, g8, 105, 106, 107-8, i o g , n o n46, 121-57, 251,

374 48> 379, 381, 384-5- 3 8 7 - 8 , 3 9 ° ; B e r g s o n , 114—15; and Foucault, 276—7; and Freud, 141 n30, 14g; and Heidegger, 12g—31; a n d Husserl, 12g—31, 132—3; and Lévi-Strauss, 225-7, 3 8 7 - 8 ; a n d Levinas, 354, 3 5 8 - 6 0 , 3 8 7 - 8 ; and M a r x i s m , 1 2 5 - 6 , 151-7; and Merleau-Ponty, 123, 126, 1 8 1 - 4 , 195, 196, 197, 203-8; and Nancy, 374 n48, 3 7 5 - 6 ; and structuralism, 225-7, 276-7; works: Being and .Nothingness, 122, 128-51, 358, 387; C r i t i q u e o f Dialectical R e a s o n , 126, 151—7, 387; The Family Idiot, 126, 127-8; The Flies, 151 n37; Nausea, 107; No Exit 146 n33; Saint Genet, 125; What Is Literature?, 123-4; Th Words, 127 n

a

e

Saussure, F., 209, 2 1 5 - 2 1 , 222 Scheler, M , , 106, 18g schizophrenia, D e l e u z e and G u a t t a r i on, 339-4 Schlick, M . , 378 S c h o p e n h a u e r , A . , 90, 91 Schyns, M . , 22 n34 science, limitations of, 51—4, 134, 188—9; objectivity of, 3 0 - 3 ; philosophy of, 9, 26—40, 229—34, 260—1, 381; progress of, 44-6, sciences, h u m a n , 267—8, 274—6 sciences, social, 9 n i 5 , 3 8 1 - 2 ; see also anthropology, D ü r k h e i m , Lévi-Strauss, M a u s s , structuralism scientific facts, 3 1 - 3 , 3 4 - 5 , 37-8 Searlc, J., 290, 291, 370 self-deception, see b a d faith Seilars, W., 302 1114 Serres, M . , 8 n8, 232-4, 234 n i 5 Sertillanges, A . - D . , 94, 114 sexual difference, Irigaray o n , 341—2 1

n

d

sexuality, history of, 282-8 Shakespeare, W., 369 Shestov, L., 105 Simons, M . , 160 118 situation, 14g skepticism, D e r r i d a and, 304—8 social sciences, see sciences, social Socialisme ou B a r b a r i e , 320 Société Français de la Philosophie, 7 Sollers, P., 243, 253 S o r b o n n e , 3g2 Sorel, G., 50 speech, D e r r i d a on, 2 g 2 - 3 , 2g8, 302-3; L a c a n o n , 241—2; L e v i n a s on, 357; Saussure o n , 216, 217; see also writing Spencer, H . , 230 Spicgelberg, H . , 106 ^ 3 - 5 , 133, 137 n28, 182 114 S p i n o z a , B., 40, 54, 78; D e l e u z e o n , 333-4 spiritualism, g - 1 4 , 25, g i , 382, 383 Steiner, G , 3g n i 6 Steward, J., 182 n2 structuralism, 208-12, 215-57, 381; and p h e n o m e n o l o g y , 224-7, 3 8 7 - 8 ; R i c o e u r on, 3 6 7 - 8 ; see also Lévi-Strauss; sciences, social supplement, 302-3 surrealism, 102—3 "suspicion, masters o f " , 367 1133 Taine, H . , 6, 9, 90 Teilhard de C h a r d i n , P , 82 n29 Tel quel, 238, 253-4 temps modernes, Les, 123, 126, 181, 182, 183-4, 345 text, D e r r i d a o n , 305—6; see also books Thao, Tran Duc, n o T h i b a u d e t , A . , 3, 5 T h o m i s m , see n e o - T h o m i s m totality, 3 5 5 - 6 totems, 222-4 trace, 303-4, 311, 361 1115 transcendence, 170—1, 178, 349, 355; see also immmanence Troubetzkoy, N., 222 truth, a n d poststructuralism, 2 5 0 - 1 , 255; B r u n s c h v i c g on, 43; D e l e u z e on, 331, 336; D e r r i d a o n , 304—8, 311; Foucault's history of, 285; L y o t a r d on, 320—1; M e r l e a u - P o n t y on, 201—2; vs. mimesis, 376 unconscious, Foucault on, 260, 261, 275; L a c a n on, 240—2, 318—19; Lévi-Strauss on, 224; L y o t a r d o n , 3 1 8 - 1 9 ; R i c o e u r on, 367; Sartre o n , 149; see also Freud, psychoanalysis

Index Vadee, M . , 86 114

Whitford, M . , 350 n27, 351 n2g

Valcry, P., 6, 50, 253 1139 V a n B r e d a , H . L., 184 V e y n e , P , 260 n8 V i e n n a C i r c l e , 188, 378 Virgoulay, R., 91 n i 3 vital force, see élan vital Vuillcmin, J., 377, 378 n 6 i

will, Blondel o n , 9 2 - 3 ; R i c o e u r on, 3 6 5 - 6 ,

W a h l , J., 105, 108 1140, 109-10, 290 n3,

370 Wittgenstein, L., 378 w o m e n , 1 6 4 - 5 , ! 6 5 - 8 o ; a n d biology, 169-70, 170-2, 178; as other, 1 6 5 - 8 ; see also feminism W o r m s , F., 65 n u writing, D c r r i d a o n , 2 9 1 - 3 , 2 9 5 - 7 , 298, 302—3; see also speech

354 Weber, L., 43 n i 8 Weil, S., 43 m 8 , 105 n 3 i , 164 n i 4

Z e n o , 51, 304 Z o l a , E., 5

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