France, Social Capital and Political Activism (French Politics, Society and Culture)

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French Politics, Society and Culture Series

France has always fascinated outside observers. Now, the country is undergoing a period of profound transformation. France is faced with a rapidly changing international and European environment and it is having to rethink some of its most basic social, political and economic orthodoxies. As elsewhere, there is pressure to conform. And yet, while France is responding in ways that are no doubt familiar to people in other European countries, it is also managing to maintain elements of its long-standing distinctiveness. Overall, it remains a place that is not exactly comme les autres. This new series examines all aspects of French politics, society and culture. In so doing it focuses on the changing nature of the French system as well as the established patterns of political, social and cultural life. Contributors to the series are encouraged to present new and innovative arguments so that the informed reader can learn and understand more about one of the most beguiling and compelling of all European countries. Titles include: Gill Allwood and Khursheed Wadia GENDER AND POLICY IN FRANCE Sylvain Brouard, Andrew M. Appleton, Amy G. Mazur (editors) THE FRENCH FIFTH REPUBLIC AT FIFTY Beyond Stereotypes June Burnham POLITICIANS, BUREAUCRATS AND LEADERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS Lessons from Regional Planning in France Jean K. Chalaby THE DE GAULLE PRESIDENCY AND THE MEDIA Statism and Public Communications Pepper D. Culpepper, Bruno Palier and Peter A. Hall (editors) CHANGING FRANCE The Politics that Markets Make Gordon D. Cumming FRENCH NGOs IN THE GLOBAL ERA France’s International Development Role David Drake FRENCH INTELLECTUALS AND POLITICS FROM THE DREYFUS AFFAIR TO THE OCCUPATION David Drake INTELLECTUALS AND POLITICS IN POST-WAR FRANCE Graeme Hayes ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEST AND THE STATE IN FRANCE

10.1057/9780230277908 - France, Social Capital and Political Activism, Francesca Vassallo

Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to Taiwan eBook Consortium - PalgraveConnect - 2011-03-03

General Editor: Robert Elgie, Paddy Moriarty Professor of Government and International Studies, Dublin City University.

David J. Howarth THE FRENCH ROAD TO EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION

Michael S. Lewis-Beck (editor) THE FRENCH VOTER Before and After the 2002 Elections John Loughlin SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT The French Experience Mairi Maclean and Joseph Szarka FRANCE ON THE WORLD STAGE Mairi Maclean, Charles Harvey and Jon Press BUSINESS ELITES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN FRANCE AND THE UK Susan Milner and Nick Parsons (editors) REINVENTING FRANCE State and Society in the Twenty-First Century Gino G. Raymond THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY DURING THE FIFTH REPUBLIC A Crisis of Leadership and Ideology Paul Smith THE SENATE OF THE FIFTH FRENCH REPUBLIC Francesca Vassallo FRANCE, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM Sarah Waters SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN FRANCE Towards a New Citizenship Reuben Y. Wong THE EUROPEANIZATION OF FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY France and the EU in East Asia French Politics, Society and Culture Series Standing Order ISBN 978–0–333–80440–7 hardcover Series Standing Order ISBN 978–0–333–80441–4 paperback (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England



Andrew Knapp PARTIES AND THE PARTY SYSTEM IN FRANCE A Disconnected Democracy?

Francesca Vassallo Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Southern Maine, USA



France, Social Capital and Political Activism

© Francesca Vassallo 2010

No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–0–230–51800–1 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne



All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.

Contents

vi

Preface and Acknowledgments

viii

List of Abbreviations

xi

1 Political Participation and Democracy

1

2 Political Participation in France

18

3 Levels and Styles of Political Involvement

49

4 Political Activism and Social Capital: The French Perspective

71

5 Social Capital in France

99

6 Across Borders: France within the Broader Political Activism Context

115

7 Conclusions: Citizens and Political Activism in France

167

Appendices

180

Notes

185

References

196

Index

204

v



List of Tables, Figures and Graphs

Tables 2.1 2.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 5.1

Political interest in France (1953–1988) Political interest in France (1990–2006) Engagement scale Unconventional political activity – 1981 Unconventional political activity – 1990 Unconventional political activity – 1999 Longitudinal data on association membership in France (1980s–1990s) 5.2 Political association membership and activity – 1981 5.3 Political association membership and activity – 1990 5.4 Political association membership and activity – 1999 5.5 Index of unconventional political activity – PROTEST behavioral and potential 6.1 Correlations: protest and collective level involvement, 1990 6.2 Linear regression models 6.3 Correlations: protest and collective level involvement, The Netherlands 1990 6.4 Correlations: protest and collective level involvement, Germany 1990 6.5 Correlations: protest and collective level involvement, UK 1990 6.6 Correlations: protest and collective level involvement, US 1990 6.7 Conventional: index of conventional political participation 6.8 Association Membership (INDCOLL): Index of collective level memberships in politically oriented associations 6.9 Association activity (INDCOLL2) 6.10 PROTIND – Low/Medium/High 6.11 MODEL 1: Conventional participation index = DEPENDENT VARIABLE (1990) Betas – Standardized Coefficients vi


40 41 77 93 93 94 102 106 106 106 112 119 122 129 129 130 130 134 136 139 142

147




6.12 MODEL 2: Protest index = DEPENDENT VARIABLE (1990) Betas – Standardized Coefficients 6.13 Correlations – FRANCE 1990

vii

152 163

1.1 4.1 7.1 7.2 7.3

The virtuous circle of social integration, political action and democracy Social capital theory and the French exception The traditional pattern of political action French application of traditional pattern of political action French specific pattern of political action

6 75 170 171 171

Graphs 2.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5

Social class and political involvement in France Interest in politics in France – aggregate regional data Interested in politics Interest in politics and gender – 1998 Interest in politics and age – 1998 Interest in politics and education – 1998 Importance of politics variable Discuss politics variable Political action index 2+ Political Protest Action Index – number of activities (France) Index of conventional political participation Index of collective level memberships in politically oriented associations Index of collective level unpaid activity in politically oriented associations Index of unconventional political activity – PROTIND behavioral and potential Index of collective level activity and protest index, 1981 Index of collective level activity and protest index, 1990 Index of collective level membership and protest index, 1981 Index of collective level membership and protest index, 1990 Protest: Index of unconventional political activity (Behavioral and Potential), 1981, 1990


43 85 85 87 87 88 89 90 94 96 109 111 111 113 126 126 127 128 141


Figures

Any discussion on French politics can never be complete. From the time of Tocqueville history has taught scholars of political action that the French case deserves a very close and repeated look. Abundance of activism has often been presented as an example of a healthy society, whose democratic spirit is reflected clearly in citizens’ active participation in the daily lives of the country they live in. Political participation and France go together very easily it seems, but the many cases of political involvement among regular citizens are associated with forms of protests and unconventional action that have at times stigmatized the research on this country’s intensity of political participation. Explaining political behavior in France demands a longitudinal approach, inclusive of the vast French literature on this topic, generally mostly isolated from the parallel research outside of the hexagon on a theme such as political action. French scholars have worked on decoding why the French participated politically and how, whereas researchers from other countries have attempted to present the French model abroad, trying to close the gap between the French results and the rest of the research. As I was reading many of the excellent volumes on political action cases, the gap between what was published in France and what had been read in the United States struck me. France, the ultimate country of political involvement, was not as present in many remarkable studies on political engagement as I would have expected. Still today the French nation remains an accepted reality of strong activism, with many references to revolutionary times, but most of the scholarship on political action has neglected a truly comparative analysis of the French case when it comes to explaining how the French participate and why they do it with certain preferences. That missing piece of the political action research has grabbed my attention and led me to write this book on France, social capital and political activism. The hope of this research is to provide the reader with a good understanding of how relevant political activism in France is, of how it fares when compared to political involvement in other democracies, and of whether this possible French exception would make sense when considering today’s forms of action. viii




ix

When I started my research on this topic I was still a doctoral student. The final product of that research has become an updated manuscript whose contents seem to be regularly supported by the weekly protest event discussed in French politics. Once a political activist, always a political activist I could say: the French are not disappointing me when employing political action so seriously, consistently and traditionally. As it is often the case, many people made this book a reality. Indubitably, I owe a huge debt of gratitude to my mentor, exceptional political activism scholar and excellent human being, Samuel H. Barnes, whose past research has inspired my own and whose spirit has often taught me plenty to prepare me for real life and beyond. Although I have not been in one of his classrooms in years, he is still a professor to me, yet he insists I should stop calling him that (sorry Sam!). Of equal importance to my research journey during the writing of this book is Clyde Wilcox who has often promptly and very comprehensively answered all my questions, in particular when dealing with data. It is thanks to him and the Department of Government at Georgetown University that I was able to receive funding (twice) to attend the University of Michigan’s ICPSR summer school for statistical analysis, a necessary step to complete this manuscript. At the time of my dissertation, Thomas Banchoff and Greg Flynn helped and supported my research interests, advising me during the research project. When it comes to the field work and the related data, I have spent most of my time in France collecting information on political activism as a participant in the Programme International d’Encadrement de la Recherche of the Centre d’Etude de la Vie Politique Française (CEVIPOF). Additionally, many individuals in Paris have helped me, both directly and indirectly, especially when fighting my way through the French bureaucracy! The ICPSR data archives have also provided me with access to the World Values Survey and European Values Survey datasets for my analyses. Similarly, the Observatoire Interrégional du Politique deserves my thanks for giving me access to the regional data. For the final product, I need to express equally my gratitude to Robert Elgie, editor of the series French Politics, Culture and Society at Palgrave Macmillan, for encouragement and useful comments from the beginning, when the manuscript was in its infancy status, to the very end, together with an anonymous reviewer. As parts of my research have also been published previously in the journal French Politics, I am grateful to Palgrave Macmillan as the journal’s publisher for allowing me to reprint here parts of the findings. Finally, at Palgrave in the UK Gemma




x


Francesca Vassallo In a very politically active Paris, France, 2009.



d’Arcy Hughes and Alison Howson have alternated in following my journey, helping me out in many ways, and guiding me successfully to the end. I am sure there are many others I have forgotten in my list of thanks, please forgive me for my increasing memory lapses, I simply keep blaming my age at this stage.

CEVIPOF CNVA CPE CSA EB ESS EU EU25

EVS IPSOS NSMS OIP SOFRES WVS

Centre d’Etudes sur la Vie Politique Française National Council of Associational Life (Conseil National de la Vie Associative) First Employment Contract (Contrat Première Embauche) CSA Opinion Research Institute Eurobarometer European Social Survey European Union 25 Member States of the European Union between May 1, 2004 and January 1, 2007: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. European Values Survey IPSOS Opinion Research Company New Social Movements Interregional Observatory on Politics (Observatoire Interrégional du Politique) SOFRES Opinion Research Company World Values Survey

xi



List of Abbreviations



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1

Democracy and political action: An overview Elections, political campaigns, street protests and debates: the French political landscape always provides an intriguing opportunity for citizens to be active. Even French institutions are keen to make sure individuals take advantage of their right to political expression. For instance, the French government1 informs citizens on how to get involved in associations, from general rules to specific legal details. With the same commitment, the city of Paris hosts an annual forum of associations2 to support and advise a potential average of 55,000 organizations formed in the capital alone. Indirectly, French authorities are encouraging citizens to be responsible participants in the democratic system they are part of, to the point of generating on a regular basis quite a few large gatherings, with the ritual street march, to illustrate specific demands in regard to a new law or government policy. In the fall of 2008 for instance, high school students, parents and teachers joined forces on a Saturday afternoon in a street protest leaving Place d’Italie in Paris to complain about the high school education curriculum reform the government had implemented. In a parallel case a few weeks later, media journalists and technicians from public radio and TV stations assembled at the Tour Eiffel to manifest their disappointment and opposition to a government project changing policies regarding on-the-air commercial promotions and election rules to the national audiovisual council. Equally noticeable, university students and non-profit movements frequently organize marches in support of social themes and underprivileged groups in society. For a long time now, citizens in France have participated in organized street demonstrations quite often, and for a variety of issues. 1



Political Participation and Democracy


Although very active, and at times congested, the political life of a typical citizen in France stands out for its commitment to involvement. This attitude in itself is at the foundation of a healthy democracy, but whether collective involvement in the French Republic is responsible for the country’s strong political activism is not so clear. The research presented in this book questions the link between associational engagement and political participation levels in France, with a focus on two decades, from the 1980s through the late 1990s, including some examples from more recent events. The French situation deserves a specific investigation, because the country can be an active political democracy without the usual expected requirements. As a case study, France can always teach significantly about political activism and democracy. Since citizens have become the true essence of a democracy, different societies have lived and died at the hands of individuals encouraged to participate actively in the daily life of the community they lived in. Many political events in France have been confirmation of this idea: from the well-known French Revolution to the Paris Commune, from the usual strikes and demonstrations, to high voting turnouts and frequent political discussions, without forgetting riots and protest movements that have equally characterized the country. Unquestionably, democracy and people go together: a democracy retains its ultimate character only if its people are actively contributing to the functioning of the government they elect. Without a demos, there cannot be the word democracy. Beyond the general relevance of people’s participation connected to every democratic government, citizens have retained and expanded their rightful role in the political life of their society, in the past as well as in the present. Individuals turn into citizens as they participate, directly or indirectly, in the government of the country whose rights and freedoms they enjoy and cherish. Very appropriately, individual participation in politics has indeed trended upward in the past three decades, showing a constant evolution. The renewed importance of political involvement lies both in the volume and number of areas of participation as well as in its new style. More active and assertive citizens3 have become increasingly self-confident about their potential power to support their particular interests (Olson, 1965) and achieve, overall, their special goals, by making the state pay attention to them. In this interpretation, society has witnessed a shift in the type of interests pursued as well as in the dimensions of associations, as they have refined their professionalization (Barthélemy, 2000, pp. 248–249). Individuals’ commitment to political action has, overall, spread and strengthened, but the forms of



2

3

political activism used have changed. The general result is only good news to democracy, as citizens’ political action guarantees the survival of democratic regimes. The connection between political action and democracy is nothing new. Over time scholars have searched into the realm of social and political integration to find specific elements to boost the quality and longevity of democratic political systems. The underlined link social capital theory has deeply studied and explained tying people’s involvement in group organizations to the creation of networks of communication and cooperation, agents of trust and practice. For citizens, social integration into groups, associations or structured communities is the first step towards a long term commitment in society (Morales and Geurts, 2007, p. 136). The development of social trust, as well as general bonds, among citizens encourages activity overall, with a clear spill over into the political domain. More candidly, political participation has been considered “a completely successful form of civic education for democracy” (Barber, 1984, p. 234). Involvement in associations leads to more activism, as people learn how to interact from others and from specific action, although it is not completely established whether group involvement always generates an active membership (Morales and Geurts, 2007, p. 143) or not (Selle and Strømsnes, 2001, p. 138). For van Deth for instance, mobilization is essential for a successful social integration (van Deth, 1997, p. 2). Other contributions on this specific topic highlight the number of authors who have debated the democratic qualities of associations (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 50), assessed the inexistence of democracy without “vibrant social ties” (Uslaner and Dekker, 2001, p. 185) or insisted on the possible problems when individuals are not integrated into associations: their marginalization can be the cause of loss of trust and fairness in society (Held, 2006, p. 212). The now evident link between citizens’ involvement in society and democracy has required many studies and discussions of methodologies, measures, definitions and findings from different eras and contexts. To understand it all, the reader needs to start from the beginning: a trip across the Atlantic to study one of the first examples of democracy.

Origins of the debate One of the first scholars to address specifically the role of citizens’ groups was Alexis de Tocqueville in his book titled Democracy in America: a recollection of his travels and observations across the Atlantic Ocean in 1831. Although Tocqueville has become an icon in social capital studies





due to his early, and very well supported, contribution to the research, it is still today quite astonishing to read his words as he so eloquently explained the bond between associations and the essence of democracy. Later scholars have mostly admired and commented on this simple link, a finding based upon the study of American New England towns by none other than a Frenchman. Among the many researchers who have discussed and revered Tocqueville’s statements, Benjamin Barber points out how Tocqueville “saw in local institutions and voluntary associations a key to national democracy in America” (1984, p. 234). Even more strongly, other authors have called associations schools of democracy (van Deth, 1997, p. 15) or the engine of participatory democracy (Barthélemy, 2000, p. 82), following the lead that Democracy in America had introduced in the research. The essence of the analysis highlighted how clubs and associations have the ability to socialize individuals into citizens (Foley and Edwards, 1998, p. 7). It is evident that Tocqueville’s vision has not been lost: the original findings have not only been accepted, but indeed perfected since the original presentation. Beyond the quality of the tie between association and democracy, the longevity of the relationship is also impressive. Tocqueville was observing a society that had just started a very minimal democratic practice, the strength of the bond between group involvement and democratic development has resisted over time, across different contexts and cultural spaces, while perpetuating the mission of erasing individual isolation in society (Tocqueville, 1988, p. 508). As the author emphasized, “the habit of acting together” (p. 514) represents the focal point of the theory: individuals are framed within a context of communal action, from social activities in daily lives to political actions. The research has repeatedly tried to update and modernize Tocqueville’s findings, thus the original message has remained loud and clear: Warren states it very directly when he writes that “social integration through associations is necessary for democratic institutions to work” (2001, p. 30). Yet, the direction or exclusivity of the relationship has remained under scrutiny, as the research cannot undoubtedly state that individuals’ regular activity in associations is the only factor conducive to a democratic system. Although civic associations have been portrayed as “guarantors of democracy” (Selle and Strømsnes, 2001, p. 134), the attempt over time to fit Tocqueville’s model of social and political participation to current day democracies (Newton, 1997, p. 584) has required a more thorough analysis. In particular, later observers have made clear that if associations may indeed be beneficial



4

5

at times, they may not be able to contribute to social integration unless they are in a specific political and economic context. The need for an agency is unquestionable (Foley and Edwards, 1998, p. 9), as all associations and organizations operate within a specific framework whose rules are determined in general by the state. Therefore the link between associations and political involvement can exist in part as a concession from the state and in part as a need to challenge the state’s decisions and attract its attention. Tocqueville’s initial thought about the positive role of citizens’ groups indeed related to his view of the strongly dominating and centralized French state, unable to speak on behalf of communities as detached and distant from the people. Yet, the modern democratic state unknown to Tocqueville has also participated in the creation of social integration and social capital, by asking citizens to be involved in very important policy decisions taken by state authorities. The most recent French example of the “Grenelle de l’environnement” would have made Tocqueville proud: French citizens organized in groups, solicited by the government and called by state authorities to plan together the future of the country’s environmental policy.4 Inevitably, two centuries after Tocqueville’s assessment of America the concept itself of democracy has changed, not to mention the possible factors that have led and continue to support the development of a democratic society. In this frame of mind, the simplicity of the connection “social integration -> social capital -> political participation -> democracy” (Figure 1.1) remains proven, but the direction and reliability of the relationship can be questioned. Some scholars have become skeptical about the good of social capital generated by associations, as not all citizens’ groups are equally proficient in developing social capital (Foley and Edwards, 1998, p. 16; Armony, 2004, p. 139) and consequently political activism. Other researchers have shown how high levels of social capital do not translate into strong political participation due to a national, historical–political context (Booth and Richard, 1998; Worms, 2002, p. 141). More critical commentators have questioned the good nature of social capital, at times a source of division and mistrust rather than of cooperation and sharing (Portes and Landolt, 1996; Berman, 1997; Armony, 2004). In the end, social capital may be “essential to prosperity” (Portes and Landolt, 1996, p. 18) but may not be available to all: association members may be the only ones learning from their closed group and consequently enjoying the development of social capital, including closer friendships and collaborations that lead to stronger participation and common goals.





Political Action

Strong Democracy

Social Capital

Social and Political Integration

Figure 1.1 The virtuous circle of social integration, political action and democracy

In this book the focus is only on the positive contributions of social capital, not necessarily because the author wants to ignore its possible side effects. The core of this research is on the impact that the original social capital Tocqueville observed has in its native country, a couple of centuries after the Frenchman’s worries.

Social capital and democracy in France: The puzzle With respect to the generally asserted interpretation that social involvement in group based activism is almost a requirement for a high level of political involvement, as the social capital theory approach suggests, the latest developments of political action modes have presented a serious challenge.5 Countries with high levels of political participation may theoretically show citizens’ political commitment, even independently from group based activism. No association or politically based group



6

7

can claim to be the absolute source of citizens’ activism: voluntary associations may not be enough for democratic development and stability (Armony, 2004, pp. 212–213). If social capital and all the related debates from Tocqueville onwards have highlighted the positive relationship between group involvement and strong political action, scholars in general have not equally concentrated on asserting whether cases of strong political participation may indeed exist without an equally developed social capital tradition. This volume specifically investigates this possibility, because the French case can challenge the link between levels of political integration and political activism. The individual’s new independence from politically-based organizations may have weakened the relationship between group involvement and political commitment. Associations with political goals are no longer the path to citizens’ political activism. Were this the case, typical political institutions like political parties and specific interest groups would be having a much harder time finding reliable, committed citizens who share their goals and mission for a long term allegiance to political causes. Over the decades, participants’ political behavior in France suggests that independent activism is strong and persistent, separately from participation in political associations (Waters, 2003, p. 144). A new politics, namely a new style of citizen politics which “includes a more active participation in the democratic process” (Dalton, 1996, p. 10), due to a growth in political skills and resources, is the product of the desire to become independently active, outside of the traditional channels of political mobilization. At the same time, the individual’s ability to choose what kind of interests and, consequently, organizations to support has constantly improved (Kaase, 1984, p. 305). Political action seems to have changed from elite-driven events (Bourdieu, 1989) to individual-supported activism (Dalton and Kuechler, 1990). The citizen has become cognitively mobilized (Dalton, 1984, 1988), able to interact independently with the surrounding societal structures,6 in an effort to maximize the probability of achieving personal goals. This realization may turn out to be the ultimate nightmare for political leaders looking to “guide” groups of loyal followers in the political arena. Along this line, this book explores the French experience as a country with a long tradition of unquestionable political commitment, while testing the applicability of social capital’s claims to cases with energetic political action, as well as possible low levels of corresponding group involvement. The study employs a variety of sources of data, focusing mostly over almost three decades of political participation in France. The analysis aims at presenting and discussing the condition of French





political activism from the early 1980s until the late 1990s, using extensively three waves of survey data from the World Values Survey (WVS, 1981, 1990) and European Values Survey (1999/2000). In addition to drawing some conclusions regarding even more recent events in the country, the research presents other sources of aggregate data collected and published by scholars at the Centre d’Etudes sur la Vie Politique Française (CEVIPOF) in Paris, as well as aggregate data from the Observatoire Interrégional du Politique (OIP) and the European Commission’s Euro Barometer surveys. The reason behind this various selection of data sources is the need to provide access to a variety of sources of information, for a more meaningful and reliable comparison of the findings. Considering the French level of political action and social engagement, the research can reveal whether France itself fits the social capital explanation so loved by many, or if, indeed, it proposes a new phenomenon in which political action can be detached from levels of collective involvement. In few words, French citizens have been an excellent example of a very active and engaged demos, although they have resisted their involvement in collective groups. More than becoming an outlier, France could represent a challenging interpretation of the relationship that has been supported and promulgated in the discipline for a long time. Results from this research directly challenge assertions about political activism, potentially forcing the social capital paradigm to include a disclaimer regarding the generalization of its application, as requested by the conclusions in other case studies (Jamal, 2007, p. 138). Different levels of activism, together with many assorted forms of political expression, are the essential elements that could present the innovative value of the French case. The French political and societal context is a very good ground to assess how similar, or different, political activists in that country are, in comparison to the general idea of a typical political participant in any studied democracy. In view of the broad interest in political participation, the significance of the analysis that will be developed throughout this volume is not limited to the French case only. Data for the specific case study used in the following chapters are the first step to support broader conclusions in relation to other democracies. Learning from one case to enhance and refine the knowledge about other case studies is always an essential component to any research, regardless of the discipline. If, on one side, France could possibly misbehave according to social capital theory, the same country can indeed become a model of possible political



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activism development for other cases with a weak collective political involvement. In particular, past support for a social capital based democratic development, on the part of international organizations and scholars alike, has led to “dangerous policy recommendations” (Portes and Landolt, 1996, p. 94) that do not take into account national contexts. Countries lacking a good network of citizens’ associations can actually see in the French context a successful example of a politically active democracy. By challenging previous assumptions that a good social network is the guarantee to citizens’ active involvement in the political domain, the French example could give other countries with less developed formal group participation a strong hope for consistent political commitment. In the end, the whole concept of citizens’ activism could end up being reconsidered and reformulated, if strong political participation may happen outside the boundaries of group involvement. Nowadays, citizens want to take center stage and political activism intensity reflects this change.

Citizens and political action: Choices in France The figure of an active citizen, according to different behavioral models, has become the focus of scholarly discussions on the topic of political participation.7 The main change registered has been the transition from a largely political mode of mobilization to a cognitive one, in which actors such as state administrations and bureaucracies, political parties, trade unions, churches and professional organizations have lost in effectiveness: their previous ability to organize public interests in specific frameworks could not compete successfully with the citizens’ new expectations. In this sense, the French case is an even more intriguing situation due to the traditionally strong role of the State, a leading actor8 in the daily lives of French citizens in multiple realms: from the economic context to the social environment, from the political arena to the cultural space. In part, the active political engagement in the country is the result of the political and social battles against a state that does not listen or cannot accept negotiations. This specific incapacity to bring change is at the base of social unrest and deep rebellions (Worms, 2002, p. 187), as citizens choose to participate politically in part to weaken the government’s authority (Schain, 2006, p. 143), as much as to simultaneously look at the state for fulfillment of their needs (Chhibber, 1999, p. 11). No country has escaped citizens’ disenfranchisement from politics, in its traditional meaning. Whether some cases have shown an increase





in simple political activism, or an evolution of the types of participation in use, individuals have claimed back their political identity as actors, rather than as followers of “pre-cooked” political action modes. The balance between individual level commitment and group based involvement is what should be researched more consistently. It appears to be a matter of preference for political participants: the choice available is between acting as a member of an organization or as a private individual who has decided to be an independent political participant. In this last circumstance, the person becomes a political activist for the research because a respondent’s level of political interest, frequency of political discussion and depth of political knowledge, represents the measure of an individual’s commitment to politics (in addition to voting). All these manifestations of political involvement feature the person’s own individual contribution to political activism, outside frameworks of organized political commitment.9 The individual political participant enjoys the freedom of personal interpretation of the political matters with which the political activist has to deal. Any possible meaning of political commitment has its origin in the individual’s interpretation of the motivation to act. Very clearly, with this option individual citizens are the best representation of engaged and motivated political involvement, free from the interests of organizations or other institutions. They become the best image of participatory democracy. Equally important in the study of political participation is a person’s membership of specific groups in society. Associations that are politically based should have in particular a relevant influence in the citizens’ perception of opportunities for political action. In this volume, collective level participation is therefore political participation as measured by membership and/or action through politically-oriented groups. These types of associations should show a very strong correlation with political participation among their members. Usually, the individual is constantly incorporated in specific frameworks of action that have been politicized according to the association’s mentality. In these cases, the political participant is not individually active, but collectively involved in the group. The easiest form of such participation is membership, which can also foster action. This link is extremely important in the social capital tradition in which social or political participation is a multiplying factor of forms of political action, as Tocqueville very eloquently pointed out already. Both levels of political involvement, individual and group-based, may actually appeal to political activists. Political gladiators, that is,



10

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participants very committed to politics, can represent the best example of an overlapping situation between the two. It is usually unlikely that an individual who is active in any politically-oriented organization would not consider other means of political expression outside that organization’s framework. Political involvement should therefore bring participants to spread their goals of action as a way to increase their chance of success or of appeal. Citizens have to deal with both aspects of possible action (individual vs. collective), maybe having a specific preference for one of the two, but also enjoy the freedom of changing their preferred option of political involvement. Significantly, the focus on both levels of political involvement is a required element of a study that tries to interpret the French participation phenomenon: from voting turnouts to street demonstrations, from lively political discussions to violent riots – all equal elements of political participation in the French democracy. Particularly in cases in which political participation can be very strong and consistent, the relevance between the two levels of activism, individual vs. group-based, may highlight peculiarities of political action modes. France is the best example to test this assumption. Generally speaking, French participants seem to have achieved such a high level of self-confidence that the benefits of any form of organized activism can be easily balanced by an individual’s increased freedom in participation modes. The trade-off is very clear. Rigid organizational structures and too vague ideological doctrines have proved to be illsuited resources to support new, specialized as well as more concrete interests (Perrineau, 1994; Vedel, 1962). The analysis appears convincing when addressing generational gaps, with younger generations looking for other forms of engagement, “away from associations” (Worms, 2002, p. 158), yet experimenting with unstructured forms of collaboration that do not require memberships to generate a type of social capital (Worms, 2002, p. 159). These assessments have not challenged the intensity of activism in itself: they have questioned the participant’s preference for the level of activism chosen. Still, a choice does not prevent citizens from being active at both levels, which could be theoretically possible, although very demanding. Less experienced participants might simply choose one option as they try to learn how to have an impact in the political domain. Group-based participation has been the focus of the research on political activism since the idea of a “political animal” has been brought to the discussion. The introduction of the civic culture term (Verba and Almond, 1963) has intensified the focus on group activism and





association membership in general. Findings have been discussed and reinforced by further study and the value of group involvement has been restated. In particular, the relevance of such type of participation has become the main attention of authors who realize that: “ever since Alexis de Tocqueville drew attention to them, civil associations are assumed to contribute to the effectiveness and stability of democratic government” (Thomassen and van Deth, 1998, p. 142).10 The meaning of political activism through group based involvement does have, consequently, a higher value: it represents political participation as a superior form of democratic involvement of the citizens of a community, because collective involvement increases the chances of a democratic development. Accordingly, participation can be equated with democracy, especially when it is collective. Along the same line, membership levels contribute to fostering further participation in the political domain, creating a virtuous cycle of citizens’ involvement. Social capital analysis has therefore capitalized on this last aspect of community involvement, stating that the more individuals that are part of social and political groups, the better the quality of the democracy in which they live. More precisely, due to the correlation previously registered between associations and consistent political activism, group involvement in different types of associations has become almost a requirement for the development of a good political action scene. The World Bank has reinforced this interpretation, to the extreme at times, by stating that collective action can “be measured and used as a proxy indicator of underlying social capital”.11 If the study of social movements has added support to this interpretation, the assumption that only cases with high levels of social capital could be good, active democracies may not be well founded. As a complication to the discussion, the social capital measure itself is in constant evolution. Tocqueville’s focus on town meetings has now shifted to membership rates in several types of organizations. Besides the methodological problem with the specific groups considered,12 the idea of social capital is often adapted to the type of society analyzed. From more specific formal political involvement groups, the discipline has moved to more general informal types of associations. Although the link between bowling leagues and political action is rather weak, the civic value of that form of social capital has remained. In this study, social capital is referred to in its more original meaning, as presented by Tocqueville when discussing citizens’ involvement in community meetings: associations with more clear political goals than leisure networks. Social capital should then be identified only in cases of citizens’ participation with a rather evident political motivation. The validity of this



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type of measure is more broadly accepted than social participation in sports associations, for instance, where the political goal is not evident, nor explicit, and the participant is not aware of the political meaning of the act in question. Participation in general is therefore meaningful as long as it indeed contributes to bringing citizens into the political arena of commitment. Association involvement is even more essential to democracy when social groups enjoy a very high level of activity. Whereas some associations are more politically driven than others, some organizations are more active than regular groups, developing a stronger impact on citizens’ participation levels in society in general. As a way to avoid Tocqueville’s overgeneralization of associations’ role in democracy (Warren, 2001, p. 43), whenever the focus of the research is on strongly active associations, decline in their membership numbers is suitably more critical for the democracy in the study (van Deth, 1997, p. 7). Whereas the richness in social capital has been diminishing according to some research, the correlation strength between citizens’ involvement and corresponding political action should have remained unmodified. Among the works that have debated the relationship between political action and social capital, many studies have been comparative in nature and have considered broad institutional and cultural aspects of possible activism. The cases presented have been convincing, but one country in particular was always missing from those conclusions. France seems to have been a research case almost exclusively in French works only; and even in that circumstance in a very limited comparative approach. The lack of a consistent comparison in the study of political activism has also affected the interest in social capital. Although social movements appeared and successfully developed in France in the 1980s, the expected correlation between social capital and political action has been often overlooked. French scholars did study social participation and its impact on democratic institutions, but they seldom linked it more directly to forms of political involvement. Volumes on both political activism and social involvement have been published, but the debate seems, still today, to remain rather separate, as if scholars were trying to keep the two variables in parallel, but detached explanatory models. In general terms, the French intensity in political activism can hardly be challenged, but the individual participant’s level of preferred involvement can indeed contribute to either question or reinforce the validity of social capital studies. Does France represent a strong political activism movement? Do French individuals have preferences with regards to individual vs. group based political involvement? Can the French case





dismiss the evidence presented in previous research? If social capital analysis is not absolutely right, does group based commitment to political action have a real relevance to interpreting the quality and quantity of political activism in a country? Many aspects of political participation are connected to the perception of the individual’s changing role in the political action framework. Whether the participant acts in an isolated or in a controlled associational context affects the type and effectiveness of political action, and consequently the connection between political activity and quality of democracy. The crucial relation between political activism and democracy rests in the practice itself: “people learn to participate by participating” (Held, 2006, p. 213).13 Participation spurs more participation, generating a driving force for democratic engagement. The community of individuals turns into the society of citizens (Tönnies, 1957), whereas participation has fulfilled more than a recreational activity. The need for a social pact as a way to achieve a consistent participation goes back to the social capital discussion in this volume. Against previous conclusions that pointed out a positive correlation between social integration and civic or political participation (from Tocqueville to Putnam to New Social Movements literature), the French case presents evidence of a still strong political activism (however defined), but of a weak social collective integration among its citizens. People do choose to participate in the political arena, but their actions are seldom related to any association or group involvement. French individuals are generally strong participants, but also appear to be infrequent association members or group activists. For France, high levels of conventional and non-conventional political participation seem to correspond to low levels of political collective activism (Bréchon, 1994, p. 164; Schild, 1998, p. 167) compared especially with other peer democracies. Individual level political involvement seems to remain independent from those organizational strategies aiming at driving individual participation in the political domain. French citizens do not abide by network strategies of mobilization, but retain a strong participation commitment at the individual level. In brief, individual choice of action prevails over mobilization strategies related to contextual situations. As a result, the French case seems to fit within the innovative political activism study of the political involvement paradigm of the past three decades, but it also supports the idea that the renewed, strengthened political mobilization might have developed unevenly.14 French citizens are participating much more as individuals than as members of associations or organizations, rejecting, therefore, a more group-based involvement,15



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which would also limit their ability to assess the pros and cons of the participation context. At the same time, following social capital research, we would expect to see France’s strength in political action corresponding to a parallel increase in social integration into organizations or associations. Since political involvement is correlated with other forms of social participation, France’s high levels of political action should be a product of a deeper social integration into collective types of associations, especially those organizations which are politically based. The hypothesis that France may, instead, represent a case of a country with high levels of political participation, but low levels of social integration, measured by association involvement, recalibrates the validity of previous assessments in the social capital research. France may simply rebel against the need for social associations as the most important requirement for a healthy and active democratic life. The French political environment might be a good source of inspiration for other societies whose levels of association participation are disappointing, but who are still aiming to achieve a good level of citizens’ engagement. This situation is particularly relevant for newly democratized countries, where the main immediate scope is the stabilization of the newly formed democratic regime. By employing a comparative approach to the study of citizens’ political participation and its evolution, this book aims at studying the under-researched French case of multiple, competitive forms of political participation, in its different styles and forms of expression. If French scholars have contributed, side by side with North American scholars, to a better, deeper understanding of the political participation phenomenon in the hexagon, the French school’s research approach has mostly been lacking any type of broader comparison of results. Whereas the methodologies used by French researchers corresponded to the more established research tools already displayed by previous American works (voting behavior analysis, surveys, categorization of events and large use of statistical analysis), the main focus of analysis in all French works remained the French case, with limited comparison. If many studies have dealt with the political action topic, political participation in France still appears to reflect the time when Tocqueville was praising American citizens’ involvement, and condemning French individualism. The purpose of multiple types of associations was to guarantee an extended participation of every member of the community in the government of the society.16 This particular aspect was the center of the argument brought by Tocqueville into his discussion of democracy,





regardless of whether the French today believe that individual – and not collective-types of participation – are the most efficient way to a meaningful activism. In any case, the issue of collectivity in political activism seems to remain an important element in determining whether citizens in France would actually be active, and how engaged they would be along the participation scale, as the type of activism displayed has gone through a major reconsideration.

Plan of the book Before getting into more details about the research paradigm itself, a more appropriate introduction to the literature on political participation, its traditions in France, as well as its methodologies, will allow the reader to achieve a better understanding of the terms and models of political activism. The next chapter is an opportunity to get acquainted with the bases and the “vocabulary” upon which the French model of participation will be constructed and presented. Definitions, previous interpretations and the most important positions on the topic are a good starting point as preparation for the specific positioning of the research paradigm in this volume. The discussion in Chapter 3 questions and values the literature on the topic, in its multiple angles of interpretation: as an opposition between the two research trends developed in North America and in France, or as a parallel evolution of the findings and research paradigms of different, competing analytical approaches in the discipline. The extensive presentation of the previous research on political activism in its multiple forms is an important element of addressing any discussion on measures, variables and definitions to be used, especially as a way to familiarize the reader with political action studies. Following the general introduction to the overall knowledge on political activism, the fourth chapter introduces more precisely the political participation paradigm tested in this volume, with the data to be used. While discussing the focus of this work’s research, other sources of data for the French case are debated and compared to the results of the datasets considered for the hypothesis testing. Whereas Chapter 4 focuses on the political action variables, Chapter 5 presents the information on social capital empirical measures and levels in France according to multiple sources. The same chapter explains the specificities of the construction of the different indexes, and starts the analysis of the French situation. Bridging the background information from the previous chapter with the more technically-oriented discussion of the



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comparative findings in Chapter 6, the assertions made in Chapters 4 and 5 lead the reader from the more general statements of the literature to the specific, data-based results of this project. In Chapter 6 the findings from the previous chapters are reconsidered in a strongly comparative perspective within a group of five countries (United Kingdom, Germany, The Netherlands, US and France). Similar indexes for the four comparative cases will be used to redraw the French case’s position in the political participation context. The final step for a full comparative analysis is a series of competitive regression models for the five countries, to highlight the possibly different relevance of specific variables based upon the national context considered. Individual independent variables and indexes are debated, as a way to highlight the most important elements to explain and predict competing forms of political action in different national cases. The conclusions in Chapter 7 present a final, overall view of the meaning of the research, of its questions and, especially, of its findings. By going back to the main thoughts as depicted in this introduction, the broader statements of the final chapter try to tie the initial intentions with the concluding results. A reassessment of the main findings helps the reader to retain the big picture of the research purpose and its validity in the political participation context. More specific results retain their relevance only in relation to larger frameworks of application, including specifically other national contexts. With the French case in mind, the last goal of the book is to verify whether nations can indeed remain strong democracies, with high levels of political activism in society, even without the generally expected social capital criterion. Daily commitment to political activism makes a difference only when the researcher sees it in the larger setting of society’s involvement at large. Before attesting the value of a possibly strong political involvement, the research needs to introduce the multiple meanings of the political action term in the historical context of French political activism. Chapter 2 takes up this challenge.




2

To start on a journey to study the relevance of political activism in France, the reader will need to review a large legacy of knowledge and research on this very topic. Fortunately, Chapter 2 is a bridge between the general research paradigm in this book and the vast amount of information available already. As an essential step to understanding and following the development of the hypotheses in later chapters, the sections that follow will briefly highlight the literature’s position on France’s historical activism and the problems of terminology when someone refers to political participation and its presumed meanings. Once the different terms used to address the study of political action are clear, the last section in the chapter will introduce the first data on political participation in France. As a conclusion this chapter underlines the most important elements that have been accounted for as responsible for political action. The variables presented are a further link between the general findings of political participation research and the more specific French works on the same subject. The gradual shift from the general literature to the more specific variables of analysis allows an easier transition to the technicalities of the index construction section in Chapter 5. The essence of political activism among the French will appear very clearly.

France and political involvement: A history of action Historically speaking, political passion has thrived in France. The high levels and strong frequency of civil unrest and political upheavals are confirmation of a “tradition of revolution” (Hewlett, 2005, p. 8) that is dominating citizens’ involvement in society. The historical character of political participation in France, well before the country resembled 18



Political Participation in France

a democracy, is a key component in understanding even today’s social activity. History has been the first element of explanation used by researchers to address the strong political activity in France (Tilly, 1978, 1986). Authors have focused mostly on the historical meaning of citizens’ activism in the country, underlining a strictly deterministic path to current forms of political engagement. Historians and political philosophers are still today referring to “the way of the fathers” since the French Revolution, treating the past somehow as a curse that has forced French citizens to retain a high level of political engagement. The Old Regime has merged into the modern French political system (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 124), bringing a heavy continuity, where people’s interaction is guided by opposition, rather than coordinated intermediate groups. As much as French history does show plenty of events where political activism dominated, different generations of activists have obviously adapted to new situations. For instance, the street riots of 1968 have been replaced by organized movements with clear demands and expectations, such as in the 2006 case of the Contract Première Embauche (CPE, first employment contract). Revolutions are therefore not current projects, although the word is used to identify mostly changes in ideas brought by discussions and debates, not revolutionary action. Yet, on a few rare occasions, the blunt force of the revolutionary past comes back, such as in the 2005 suburban riots, prompting some scholars to claim that the “force of bloodless revolutionary tradition stays” (Knapp and Wright, 2006, p. 45). The constant presence of a revolutionary past does not help current forms of political action, as that option is always available. Beyond the memory of previous radical political activism, the logic itself of a revolutionary movement is self-defeating as “the revolution will be endless” (National Review, 2005, p. 59) in its everlasting attempt to impose changes in society. French citizens, still close to political activism, have nonetheless lost their patience for violence (National Review, 2005, p. 59) and may very well be “less prepared to take to the streets” (Waters, 2003, p. 14): they have tamed any hope that political activity could become again revolutionary, in its historical sense. Yes to civil unrest, no to revolutions, is the unspoken slogan of French society over the last couple of decades. A second explanation of France’s embrace of political activism is presented instead by sociologists, who highlight people’s possible love for conflict. In their addiction to democracy, citizens in France have interpreted their role in the government of the country as a counterweight to



Political Participation in France 19


the presence of the State, especially when the authorities are responsible for conspiracies and corruption (that is, the Dreyfus affair for instance). Conflict and democracy become synonyms (Hewlett, 1998, p. 3) as it is only with opposition, and at times violence, that there is a process of government, especially after the opportunity of decentralization in France (Appleton, 2000, p. 73). The institutionalization of unconventionality through social movements in the 1980s has not modified the situation. Political expression can only lead to confrontation, as compromise does not come easily, and it is through engagement with other political forces or institutions that the actual democratic process takes place. In the end, French citizens are indeed very politically active because it portrays the survival of their interpretation of a democratic system. Without contestation there is no true democracy, as people are simply acquiescing to the state’s decisions, whose motivations may not reflect citizens’ interests. As the use of intended violence has become less frequent (Hauss, 2008, p. 80), and is seen mostly as the very last recourse when anything else is not effective (Haddad and Balz, 2006, p. 25), a third explanation of strong political involvement in France has come back to life (see one of the most recent cases in Lagrange and Oberti, 2006). Chronologically speaking, sociologists used at the very beginning a psychological reading of cases of mass unrest. The ultimate reason pushing individuals to take part in social upheavals against the order in society came from a psychological need: desperation for a situation that could not be improved in their view. The loss of hope was the final phase of a clear failure in society to provide for the needs of all citizens. Rejection of a social and political system that ignored its failures led to protest and violence, as an emotional reaction and version of political engagement. This type of political activity was nonetheless linked to specific events that acted as catalysts, amplifying the magnitude of the reaction in most situations. Political action was consequently sporadic and mostly disorganized because it was spontaneous and genuine: emotions overtook reason. In this last interpretation of motives for political action in France, political activity itself is strong and generally without a clear program, leading mostly to an immediate reaction that usually does not bring in any long-term change. Whether or not this can indeed be considered a form of political activism depends on the specific event considered. All the explanations used to interpret the case of generally strong political activism in France are useful to understand the reasons behind political involvement, in particular when the research needs to assess



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the multiple elements leading to different choices of action. As one of the main discoveries from more recent studies, political action and its numerous styles of activity have been embraced by more people than ever. More remarkably, political ideologies do not seem to hinder people’s selection of activity, confirming that any research on political action in France needs to accept all explanations for strong activism, whether historical, sociological or psychological in origin. As political activism in France has a long tradition that has been studied over time by different scholars and disciplines, its meanings in research and published volumes have changed following the particular timeframe in question. Observers from different areas and time obviously employed the exact meaning that was the most broadly assumed interpretation of the words “political action”. In this light, in order to correctly comprehend the research findings on political activism in France, the reader needs to get acquainted with the slightly different takes on political involvement that scholars from different contexts, times and research backgrounds have presented in their work.

Meanings and interpretations of political activism Publications on political activism have repeatedly questioned other studies’ previous assumptions and results. In the end, that is what scholars do best. Whereas the initial discovery of the topic of political action had certainly increased curiosity and investigation efforts, later waves of research seem to have shown an improved quality of analysis. Part of the merit goes to the everlasting discussion on the term “political action”. Once the research community accepted the idea of multiple meanings for the same concept, the focus shifted to the multiple contexts in which political involvement could take place. Subsequent efforts added conditions and/or requirements to guarantee the possibility for political action. Detailed analyses have supported broader conclusions on why and how political activism happens. Why do people vote? Why do citizens form a political opinion to guide their actions as political actors? Do individuals need a political goal in order to be active? The evolution of the political participation issue has even gone further considering the specific country setting. In the end, multiple layers and approaches to the investigation have subsequently taken the central spot in the field. For the sake of a good understanding of the more detailed analysis in the next chapters, this section introduces the main aspects of the political participation literature in general, as well as in a more





detailed way, with a specific eye to US and French contributions. The following sections are an in-depth review, with critique, of what previous authors have done and maybe should have done at different points in time. This last comment is truer for the French works than for the American contributions, since one of the reasons for this book is to improve the current understanding of political participation from a French point of view. Starting with the terminology, the meaning itself of the research concept “political participation” deserves a thorough discussion, because its own interpretation has dictated the focus of analysis in the past. Once the chapter has dealt with the terminology aspect of the research, a comprehensive discussion on the contents of political participation can be introduced. The very next section below presents the main works on political action published in the US and in France, highlighting the parallel timeline in most cases. Only from the late 1970s on did the two literatures across the Atlantic seem to coincide in the type of focus and methodological level of analysis used. In particular, the emphasis in the presentation is on the dilemma concerning the exact measuring of participation, a problem that remains present even after an agreement on the meaning of political action has been achieved. The French contribution to the overall literature changes depending upon the timeframe considered. Lagging behind for a couple of decades, French scholars decided to follow the new focus of analysis. In so doing, they have repeated the same mistakes: compartmentalization of forms of political action, extensive focus on conventional activity only for a long period of time, harsh debates regarding the specific measures used, competing levels of analysis (individual vs. macro-setting) that were not merged together and a rich group of publications on political activism from different approaches, although ignoring each other’s findings. In particular, this last point reiterates the relevance of incorporating views on individual level results within the context of group-based forms of political activism. The relationship between the two was always known, but seldom addressed directly in any publications without discrimination against one of the two approaches. The overall, comprehensive approach in this chapter is one way to face and solve that type of problem. The results as presented in later chapters will support this type of approach and its relevance for future research incorporating activism with social integration. The definitions of political participation in the next section are the first step towards the operationalization of the variables employed in this research.



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Dealing with political participation is not an easy task for any scholar. The problem is not so much one of academic, conceptual conflicts, but of uncertainty, confusion and vagueness. The scholarly literature that responds to the “democratic myth of participation” (Vedel, 1962) agrees on the challenge to develop and present a generally precise and widely supported definition of what the words “political participation” stand for (Vedel, 1962, p. 9;1 Memmi, 1985, p. 315; Denni, 1986, p. 19). If some scholars have stated that the term’s multiplicity of meanings makes any definition useless (Verba and Nie, 1975, p. 1), the real methodological problem lies more frequently in the relationship between the definition used and the reliability of the results.2 Acknowledging the complexity of the participation concept (Salisbury, 1975, p. 330) is just the first step toward possible similar definitions of political engagement as the driving elements of the research. It is almost unnecessary to say that the different definitions and understandings of the concept are due to the analytical intricacy of capturing “the whole spectrum of political action” (Topf, 1998, p. 56). Indeed, political participation means a lot to many people, in many different ways. The goal of achieving a more clearly defined variable has sometimes only increased the confusion on what exactly the term political participation represents, especially with regards to the definition needed for the operationalization of the variable, whose existence depended on data availability. At times, political action was only what an author could measure easily and without methodological problems. A more fruitful research therefore has revealed not only an effort to clarify the target of study, but also “a virtual endless number of conceptualizations, operationalizations, schemes, typologies, taxonomies, aspects, dimensions or factors” (Van Deth, 1986, p. 262). Better research did not translate into clearer findings. In the French tradition, Dominique Memmi has tried to capture more precisely this fluid concept. Using a broad selection of North-American works on the subject, he has presented four criteria to delimit the topic of study concerning the political participation literature. In his paradigm, participation has to deal with (1) individuals (not organizations or institutions);3 it has to be (2) a voluntary process, which involves (3) an activity, specifically directed at (4) influencing the government4 (Memmi, 1985, p. 311). His minimal conceptualization of participation in the political domain is a useful, initial tool for the scholar who aims at digging into the political participation literature.



A) Political participation: Confusion and interpretations


Many different emphases on the term “political participation” have presented useful definitions to work with. Meynaud and Lancelot (1961), in the French tradition, were the first scholars to underline the importance of citizens’ “intervention” (p. 6) as a main element in the conceptualization of the participation variable. McClosky’s contribution, instead, focused more on the official, bureaucratic and practical aspect of individual involvement in politics, addressing participation in the selection of public officers and the formation of public policies (1968, p. 252), a concept closer to the idea of involvement as part of a functioning democracy. Verba and Nie’s work on political participation in America was one of the first studies to contribute to the establishment of a major definition of citizens’ political participation in the field. Their 1972 and 1975 publications identified the general consensus in the participation research on two main elements of the definition: activity and influence. Those two words seemed to represent the general agreement, among scholars, on the meaning of political involvement at the individual level, and they remained for a while a point of reference. The 1970s acceptance of a definition that reflected a participation phenomenon that was variegated, as much as limited to its legalized forms of action, supported at the same time the conviction that the research should be focused more on the analysis of behavior, and not so much on the attitudinal implication of citizens’ involvement. In general terms, what happens is important, whereas what could have happened is not. The main problem was the coexistence of an analytical method that was described as being scientifically valid, with possible interpretations of individuals’ pledges of action, that could not be verified unless context-related triggers were employed. The rejection of the attitudinal participation element among researchers seemed to be the consequence of a scholarly concern with the survey method itself, and the reliability of the data collected. Asking individuals what they had done as a form of political participation was considered to be more accepted than asking them what they would have done or were ready to do. The validity of the respondents’ answers was less controversial. Only with the works of Alan Marsh and the Political Action study group did this approach change towards a vision more favorably open to participation measures of action and potential of action. In a certain sense, political psychology stepped into the mainstream data-based research that Verba and Almond had initiated with The Civic Culture. Barnes and Kaase’s project of 1979 extended the limits of analysis on political participation: firstly, it introduced elements of protest in the scale of political action, challenging previous assumptions that political



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participation was limited to legalized forms of action; secondly, it added the behavioral element of action, using more extended cross-national data and highlighting not only the activity level of political involvement, but also its potential one. Referring to a political repertory of action as the sum of all political skills (p. 39), the Political Action volume presented the participation issue from the individual perspective, and assumed a broader possibility of choices for any individual interested in making a clear statement heard – an invitation that turned out to be very appropriate in the French case. Based on a more context- and time-related interpretation of conventional vs. non-conventional forms of action, the study was putting the legality and legitimacy of political participation in a more updated frame of research: a new wave of participation studies, especially in the European context, was forced to include political violence as a form of expression of activism in the late 1970s. Among the second generation of works on the political participation subject, Parry, Moyser and Day (1992) reinforce Verba and Nie’s consensual emphasis on the activity part of the definition of the word “participation”, which they consider mainly as “forms of action” (p. 16). Political Participation and Democracy in Britain focuses almost exclusively on the behavioral part of the political involvement issue, dealing with data on different forms of action in the political domain. The study retains the participation emphasis on the most influential activities of citizens’ involvement, and supports, consequently, the distinction Verba, Kim and Nie made clear in the early 1970s. The study of “participation” has to refer to political action aimed at influencing the political domain: it was an activity that required the individual to go out and do something that was politically-based. This angle of interpretation is very relevant when assessing today the political influence component of citizens’ groups: are they really political? Should associations take on a political role?5 Research on “involvement”, instead, has to deal with the preparation aspect of the participation itself. Variables such as political interest and discussions, newspaper reading and updated knowledge of the political situation were only complementary elements in determining the level of individual political activism. They were definitively highly correlated with the action itself, but they were not considered to be reliable enough to cause action.6 The follow-up on the Political Action study (1990) confirmed the interpretation of a lack of causality between, for example, political interest and level of activism (p. 277), but it also re-emphasized the correlation





between the attitudinal and behavioral components of the participation phenomenon. Additionally, Jennings and Van Deth stated that the variable “involvement”, intended as “the amount of attention paid to political events by the individual”, confirms a “motivational linking of attitudes and behavior” (p. 277). Recently, the scholarship on political activism has tended to uphold the diversity between participation and involvement, namely between action in itself and interest on possible political action, thanks to the increased availability of survey data on actual behavior, whether conventional-type or protest-style.7 Different scales of political participation have presented a more precise relationship between what could be called intellectual participation (interest, discussions, readings) as a preparatory step, and contextual participation (voting, campaigning, writing, protesting, boycotting, and so on) as the final product of involvement. Time- and data-determined definitions remain linked to the scholars’ availability of individuals’ action records. Contextual interpretations are also part of the research projects deal: this was true for the French scholarship as well. For instance, more than 45 years ago Georges Vedel was revealed to be very skeptical on the possibility of resolving the definition dilemma of the participation studies. A debate organized in 1962 by the French Political Science Association on the “dépolitisation” phenomenon could not deny a strong value judgment in every possible definition of political engagement. The simple academic interest in political participation meant a biased position against a possible weaker form of citizens’ engagement in politics. Because of that limitation, the roundtable discussions could not identify the different degrees and forms that the concept of political participation entails: in a certain sense, a good indication of the French case as a whole. Although the 1962 volume had started seeing a change in sectors of political activity among voters,8 the different contributors could not yet clearly separate the possible approaches to the study of citizens’ participation. As Memmi, but also Mayer and Perrineau, points out, initially “political science studies therefore participation as the legal activity exercised towards the political system by the groups authorized to do it at the present. More than legal (since strikes and demonstrations are not prohibited a priori) the study of participation is normative” (Memmi, 1985, p. 313).9 Later, specific works on protest activity and so-called unconventional forms of political action gave their contribution to the normative and legal aspects of participation studies. This stage of academic production expanded both the participation knowledge in the political science field and the theoretical conceptualization



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of a or many participations, depending on the approach and normative position adopted. Ironically, as the quantity of studies on political participation increased, so did the problems of comparability of results: voting turnout vs. political interest rates, political discussion periodicity vs. number of active events, visibility of political demonstrations (such as street protests) vs. organizational activity commitment (such as association memberships). From the historical study presented by Habermas (1962) to the quantitative analysis used by Schild (1998), the main common element remains the need for a constant reconceptualization of the possible forms of participation (Memmi, 1985, p. 361). While Vedel had proposed, since the beginning, a shift in analysis from quantity of participation, due to the definitional inconsistency, to quality of participation (1962, p. 281), the several attempts made at a more specific and delimited unit of analysis have all confirmed that “political involvement is therefore a variable geometry” (Memmi, 1985, p. 366).10 In the end, all those works that have tried to give political participation a less rigid configuration, in the attempt to highlight all its possible variations, have, more or less directly, contributed to state its “plurivocité” (new meanings away from the typical voting pattern), “pluridimensionnalité” (new contexts and topics), and “pluri-legitimité” (other means than the conventional ones), as Memmi argues. The achieved enlarged notion of political participation has fostered the development of more complex analytical models, trying to incorporate the multiple aspects of political engagement, as much as possible. Among the publications that have highlighted more strongly the “action” aspect of the political participation phenomenon, Pascal Perrineau’s work (1994, 1996) has proposed a longitudinal analysis of the participation concept based on the intensity of its activism. His view on participation studies focuses on the evolution in the literature from a typical “active citizen”, as depicted mostly by political theorists such as Tocqueville, but also by political scientists such as Verba and Almond in their work The Civic Culture (1963), to a reality made of a “passive citizen”, such as the one presented by Converse, et al. in The American Voter (1960). Together with the new shift in the paradigm, brought about by the new activism studies of Political Action (1979), The Silent Revolution (1977) and Citizen Politics (1988), both intensity and form of action become the barometer of political participation. Whereas new actors, new interests and new forms of participation take the center place in the field, competing models try to prioritize the different participation components in the explanation.





From another definitional perspective, Sofie Duchesne has underlined in her work the existing division between utilitarist and sociological theories of participation. Especially for what concerns the French research participation, it seems that Downs’ or Olson’s versions of homo politicus are not particularly appreciated in the French literature on the subject. Economic models of political involvement have too many simplifications with regards to reality to be considered useful. Instead, together with Pizzorno (1990) and Melucci (1980), Perrineau’s sociological paradigm of identification or individuation accounts for a large part of the French explanation of participation evolution in society. The idea is to use the relationship between the individual and the person’s participation in organizations to explain both stability and change in political engagement. In this sense, phenomena such as political parties’ militants crisis (Perrineau, 1998; Ion, 1997; Ion, Franguiadakis and Viot, 2005) and the end of ideologically-based movements can be consequences of individual personal change. In a similar manner, association cadres lament citizens’ lack of participation in associations and consultations, as only 3–5% of the population decides to regularly get involved (Comité ARP, 2005, p. 58). These assessments are seriously problematic as the foundation of militantism is in people’s concerns about surrounding problems and their commitment to solving social issues that affect larger groups of individuals. Without engagement beyond the personal, militantism cannot develop. The end of the “identification” era, during which the individual felt the need to identify him or herself with the mobilized political activity of a cleavage-based organization, has witnessed the individual’s “individuation” process. This new stage underlines the strength of the person’s individuality, where only in a clear distinction or separation from the others can political mobilization take place. In brief, if Touchard (1962) considered items such as “decline of political participation”, “crisis of political parties”, “deproletarization”, “crisis of the civic status” and “de-ideologization” (31–33), to be cases of political disengagement, according to the new sociological paradigm they are simply consequences of the individual’s social and cultural change. In this sense, disengagement is a new form of articulated participation, under a different connotation. The French sociological model has found a way of going around the political participation definition dilemma, focusing the research not on the different forms of possible participation, but on its very cause. This approach has the advantage of avoiding scholarly discussions on



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the validity of the participation form studied, and fostering more fruitful and variegated models of explanation. The achievement of “the” French model of political mobilization finds its foundations on a general, agreed-upon fluidity of the term political participation itself. While the different works all contribute, in a parallel way, to the participation topic, they also seem to speak to different audiences. Strikingly enough, Vedel had already cautioned in 1962 all students of political engagement that a synthesis of the meanings and interpretations of the subject may not be possible (p. 283). French scholars, indeed, have followed this opinion, maintaining a multiple approach of analysis to the citizens’ engagement phenomenon. However, their multidisciplinary styles remain strictly isolated, preventing much more demanding steps forward in the field of results. In conclusion, all the definitions presented above seem to be grouped according to the different cleavages of participation the authors wanted to use. Four of them can be identified overall: (1) conventional or non-conventional; (2) attitudinal or behavioral; (3) instrumental or expressive; (4) conceptual or operational. Each of them corresponds also to a particular period of research, focusing the analysis on specific elements of participation. Whereas the first cleavage based its typology on the style used, the second emphasized the actual activity more than the individual’s potential. The third cleavage developed as a counter-argument to a too clear division between attitudes and behavior, reinstating the importance of potential of political activism for action. The fourth one represented, instead, the general problem that most scholars faced when the data availability was limited and the hypothesis testing part of the research project could not amply replicate the theoretical paradigm. Parallel to the development of new definitions, the reader needs, therefore, to follow closely the elements used to arrive at their conception. Whether the first generation studies on the topic considered the conventional or protest cleavage as the main issue of discussion, the more “unconventional” times that followed have somewhat reduced the impact of such difference. Events viewed as non-conventional or protest-based in the 1970s and 1980s have become less threatening in the last decade, more particularly so in the case of sudden protest outbursts in the French social and political environment. Some elements of protest such as street demonstrations and boycotts have nowadays lost their initial challenging character, or have even been perceived as institutionalized (Bréchon, 1994, p. 174):11 one French citizen in two was ready to participate in a street protest in early 2006





(Muxel, 2006, p. 1).12 Beyond the actual numbers, the characterization itself of protest has evolved. Violence has strongly diminished in most cases, with the exclusion of isolated antiglobalization groups in France. The types of protest means of today have come a long way from the strongly confrontational and violence-involved actions of the past. If the Political Action study was the work that contributed the most to the understanding of the importance of a different reading regarding the participation value of non-conventional forms of political engagement, New Social Movements (NSM) analysis and a renewed rational choice research were the bases for the spreading of different perspectives. The already present “confusion of languages” (Pizzorno, 1990, p. 74) saw the split between pure research on behavior on one side, and analyses oriented instead towards a more balanced incorporation of political attitude and behavior on the other side, as the source for the next instrumental or expressive cleavage. The instrumental mode represents a measure of political behavior and attitude, to assess a more complete dimension of political participation. Data on European political activism, as presented by Topf, demonstrates that the instrumental mode is actually the dominant one in Europe, although it has shown a slight decline. People with interest in political matters and with a corresponding political activity to influence the political scene represented 41% of the sample in 1974 (Political Action) and 35% in 1990 (World Values Survey [WVS]), although the value increased 8% from 1981 (WVS). The loyal activists then managed to regain their confidence after the general European decline in the 1980s, when NSMs seemed to slow down their effort at action, as confirmed by the same data on the interest variable only. The expressive mode is a measure, instead, of actual action, without the attitudinal component of involvement. The European value for the same period is rather constant, increasing by 3% from 21% in 1974. European citizens seemed to be rather aware of the importance of action in politics, even when they did not have a serious corresponding interest. Yet, more recent data prove to be disappointing as the 2004 EU average of 17% of individuals interested in taking an active role in a group with political goals does not confirm a strong awareness of political activism (European Commission, 2005, p. 77). Overall, the long-term value could represent, therefore, a more limited type of action, in which citizens decide to intervene only to guarantee the functioning of the democratic order. While this type of citizen group action may appear to be the most effective one, it is



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uncertain to state whether general action without motivation could be productive. The instrumental mode has, in fact, the ability to achieve a predetermined target, using multiple means, conventional or not. In this sense, the instrumental mode is probably a better measure of what political participation is about and of what it could achieve. An analysis of the French case with the same data provides an inconsistent reading of whether France should be considered a country of high political activism. A general consensus on the increase of direct political participation13 in France (Bréchon, 1994, p. 175), as well as the level of political participation above voting in general (Kaase and Newton, 1998, Tables 3.3 and 3.4, p. 51, where France is actually above the EU average in 1990), supports the interpretation presented in the research of a strong political activity in the country. However, at the same time, if France according to Topf has one of the highest apathy levels, it is also true that the same data show a steep decline in the ratio between instrumental and expressive modes of participation. While in 1981 the relationship between the two was 3.2, in 1990 it was only onethird of the value (1.1), meaning that the French showed either a much higher action level or a much lower political interest level than nine years earlier. This reading of the political participation phenomenon in the hexagon introduces a different perspective on the high levels of street protests displayed in France. Using the conventional or nonconventional cleavage as the primary analytical tool of research, the conclusions would have suggested that the French have, indeed, a high political participation in both categories. Instead, using the instrumental or expressive cleavage of analysis, it appears that as non-conventional political engagement increased (from 13% in 1981 to 29% in 1990, WVS), the level of the individuals who committed themselves to politics, with both interest and action, decreased abruptly (down to 31% from 42%, WVS). Even more can be said of the respondents who were intellectually-committed to politics, namely individuals with a high political competence level, but no clear political activity, whose rate among the French had decreased from 22% to 8% (!). In brief, the World Values Survey data confirm that the French are very active politically speaking, but they are not as interested in the political domain as they used to be.14 This is further evidence that a more complete interpretation of the meaning of political participation is able to provide a more comprehensive interpretation of citizens’ political engagement.




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After a detailed presentation of the multiple definitions widely used to study political participation, it is time now to present the definition that will be followed in this volume. This project will incorporate two of the analytical cleavages presented above, more specifically the conventional or non-conventional one, and the instrumental or expressive dimensions, as elements of research on political participation. A third cleavage that this study plans to add is the level of activity component. Most of the publications on political participation have considered the phenomenon either at the individual level of engagement, or at the more macro-dimension, the collective-group case. Very few works have tried to combine the two level categories with the conventional or non-conventional cleavage and the instrumental or expressive dimension. Both as a theoretical and methodological point, the definition used in this work gives equal importance to both words of the concept “political participation”. Therefore, it emphasizes the “political” aspect of the involvement, namely participants need to have the expressed intention to deal with or act upon matters of politics. At the same time, the “participation” element of the topic represents the will of individuals to become part, more or less relevant, of the political domain, and of its actions, whether performed by organizations or individuals. Definition of political participation in this study: all activities, performed by individuals, whether at an independent level (independently from a group strategy), or at a collective one (within an organizational context), that deal with situations in the political domain with different intensities of involvement. Examples of these activities can be “intellectual commitment”, like reading political news or discussing politics in general, as well as “action-oriented” commitment, like voting, protesting, writing letters or signing petitions. For terminological purposes, this work will use the words “involvement”, “engagement”, “commitment” and “activism” as synonyms of participation. Although acknowledging the points made by Verba, Kim and Nie, as presented above, on the difference between preparatory or intellectual involvement and more action-prone participation, this research aims at presenting a more balanced view of the value of the term “participation”, intended both as “involvement” and “activism”. A less discriminatory view of the word “participation” is important in giving words and actions the right shared contribution to society’s political engagement overall. A less action-oriented participation



B) Terminology in this study


Who gets active and why? Some initial evidence The French study of political participation has partly confirmed, and partly disconfirmed, the universality of the more established paradigm of citizens’ activism. Based until recently primarily on data collected by the CEVIPOF (1978, 1988, 1995, 1997, 2000) and published in French language volumes mostly, the political action paradigm developed by French scholars deals with all the main variables usually present in the participation equation. However, the identification and explanation of the main determinants of political behavior in France remain closely related to the structural context in which the individual’s choice of political activism takes place. For this reason, although analyzing the main variables of political involvement, the French research on the topic, so far, has also presented interesting peculiarities not incorporated in the traditional (Anglo-Saxon based) model of political participation. If the main findings support the idea of a strong correlation between a high social position and a strong level of political participation, the bases for this relationship are located in the impact on the participation variable of basic elements such as gender, age, income level and education, plus the impact of the social class variable on top. Consequently, the explanatory value of each of those elements in relation to the individual participation level needs to be thoroughly assessed. Past research on the subject has confirmed a direct influence of the main socio-demographic elements (that is, gender, age, education, income) on political activism, but it has also warned that all the main explanatory variables tend to be inter-correlated:15 they affect each other complicating the analysis. This type of clarification should be kept in mind whenever the discussion is on any one of the socio-demographic elements as the main predictor for a specific index of political participation (such as Boy and Mayer, 1997a, pp. 63–4). Gender The gender variable has lost over time some of its explanatory power when it comes to political activism, although less so at the European level (Vassallo, 2006). The reason for this transformation is in the more



definition prompts political communication as a renewed tool to participate, thanks, in particular, to new media technologies. Participation today is also “virtual”, and that counts too, reconsidering possible interpretations of a cost and benefit analysis.


balanced relationship between gender and political participation. Most of the evidence in the literature concerning women’s disadvantage in behavior and potential for political activism has been altered by a changing female role vis-à-vis politics. Women are getting more involved in political participation, though not mainly through conventional means. Their delay in achieving the same political engagement level of the other sex can be shortened through the intervention of other factors. Higher levels of education, and income, as well as a higher age, can all compensate for the gender discrimination element (see Mayer and Perrineau’s table [1992a, p. 29]). Dupeux’s data for France from 1958 showed a ratio of two to one for what concerns the level of political participation between sexes (1960, p. 48). For instance, if 31% of the male group showed a very weak political participation level, that percentage was almost twice as high for women (59%). The same relationship was evident regarding strong political activism: 28% for men, but only 10% for women. According to later studies presented in the Political Action volume, women’s political participation was doomed not only to increase, but in certain cases, to dominate some forms of more aggressive political action. Marsh’s 1979 article on political activism in the late 1970s confirmed that women actually dominated the protest category in some cases (p. 98). Not interested mainly in conventional forms of political participation, women seemed to be on their way to close the participation gap with the other sex, especially through unconventional forms of activism. The new high level of female participation in political matters appeared, therefore, to be a reaction to, rather than participation in, the political domain. Whereas this situation of high female protest behavior was revealed by Marsh and the Political Action data (p. 110), the French data on the same variable two decades later do not seem to correspond to that conclusion. Boy and Mayer, comparing data for France from 1988 and 1995, highlight a decline in the protest index for women (p. 61): the achieved parity on political participation with men seems to have tempered the protest mood of women, and made them shift towards more conventional forms of political expression. The 1990s’ focus on a more planned and structurally organized form of political behavior has, therefore, replaced the type of liberation in political activism registered by Marsh in the 1970s. Only the most recent data from 2006 show a small gap between the two sexes in regards to both conventional and unconventional activism in the country (Muxel, 2006, p. 5). Still, women are lagging behind. Although for those who do choose unconventionality



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as their preferential means of political expression, the gap is virtually closed. Protest women match protest men in France. Whether this is good news for a more effective political action or not, remains to be established. On one side, a more conventional approach to political activism might imply more long term projects, but also better chances of public support by official institutions. On the other side, the determination and aggressiveness of the 1970s (and possibly nowadays) could be more persuasive in making clear what exactly the goal of the action was and what types of results were expected. A trade-off between means and final gains seems to have been indispensable for those active protesters who were leading the political action revolution. The relevance of a preference for direct action for women in the past and today could also be an important clue related to the general importance of direct action as a form of social integration. On this point, Memmi (1985), among others, has highlighted how work involvement actually increases the probability of political participation for women (p. 343), a result that is explained through the sociological integration model.16

Age The age variable has generally shown a positive correlation with political participation, especially in later stages of life. Young people in France seem to have an initial apathy towards using conventional means of political engagement.17 Examples of political activism like voting are chosen by about half of the 18–24 year old cohort as recently as 2006 (Muxel, 2006, p. 5). The severity of the statement has already been confirmed for instance by an IPSOS survey administered in the spring of 2001. According to the data, as discussed in the March 4–5 issue of Le Monde (p. 7), one-third of 17 year old teenagers is not interested at all in politics in general.18 It should also be pointed out that the finding is more important if analyzed with the committed involvement of the same group of teenagers in non-political related matters. For instance, they claimed to be concerned about AIDS, the homeless, world starvation, violence, drugs and unemployment (at least 70% of the sample for each issue), but they correspondingly were not very interested in politics, which might actually be a possible tool to solve those problems. This relationship between age and political interest has indeed undergone a variation, in particular looking at a more long-term analysis. CEVIPOF’s data from 1978 to 2000 have confirmed a persistent decline in political interest in younger generations in France: individuals under





40 years of age have a lower level of political interest than all older generations (Schweisguth, 2002, p. 76). Similarly, lack of political discussions among younger people in France is correspondingly more pronounced (Schweisguth, 2002, p. 77). The change seems to be a generational variation representing a new perspective on politics. A reassessment of younger generations’ political engagement is instead in order when we consider the inverse relationship between age and non-conventional forms of action. Up until today, unconventionality still appeals to younger participants, who are more inclined to consider and employ unconventional (that is, protest) means of action in politics (Muxel, 2006, p. 6). In general, the decline in political interest has not prevented younger individuals from keeping in mind alternative forms of political expression and involvement. Young people’s membership rates in formal associations had already increased from 1983 to 1996 by about 50% (Crenner, 1997, Table 2). With regard to informal networks of social and political engagement that are difficult to measure, the impression is of a strong expansion favored by young participants’ innovative ideas on loose organizations (Worms, 2002, pp. 158–9), yet equally active groups. Despite the fact that the study of age and its link to political activism has been extensive, methodological questions remain. The age relationship with political engagement is according to Bréchon a spurious correlation (1994, p. 167). An individual’s age cannot have a significant direct impact on the political participation phenomenon, unless we consider at the same time, the ongoing effects of education and gender. In this interpretation, the age variable is exclusively a measure of personal experience with politics and acquired ability to deal with political matters in general. Regarding conventional forms of political behavior, high levels of political activity for middle-aged individuals, and low levels of conventional activism for younger and older individuals, reflect, therefore, not only the person’s intention to participate, but also the corresponding contextual opportunity: skills, resources, interests. The traditional positive relationship between age and conventional participation (in its typical single-peaked curve) does not correspond to the political protest case: the literature has consistently pointed out that the relationship shifts its direction, and in this case it is the younger group in the population that manifests a stronger unconventional political activism.19 Nevertheless, age is not the only variable linked to protest action: although Political Action stated that age is the best predictor for protest, and Boy and Mayer confirmed that age is the most important element in the determination of activism (in France), gender



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and education are equally important in the study of political behavior and its determinants (Political Action, 1979, p. 186). Kaase has also later added to the discussion on the impact of age on the political participation level. He has argued that the relationship is more related to the attitudinal aspect of participation than to its behavioral one, due to the inclusion, in the participation model, of the importance of mobilization strategies. Kaase’s contribution convincingly argued that the age impact on protest-styled action can be effectively altered: “actual engagement in protest action is less affected by age because mobilization efforts can overcome the attitudinal ‘deficiencies’ present among older people” (1990, p. 40). In other words, although younger citizens may fit the protester profile better, older individuals can still be active unconventionally, especially when targeted through a resource mobilization approach on specific issues that would benefit them directly. Previous experiences through trade unions involvement or middle class leftist ideals can be good arguments to explain why older generations in French society are still so committed to unconventional activity, in relative comparison to younger participants. In this sense, older protest militants are outdoing younger protesters.

Education The relevance of the education factor was already clear in the French data on political interest since Dupeux’s statement in 1962 that education could work against depoliticization (p. 113). Although Vedel’s correlation of the same variables was inconclusive (1962, p. 20), the education level in itself, but also as an intervening, multiplying factor on other variables, can compensate and even reverse the participation level correlations presented by classical elitist class-based models. Education is a powerful element that can easily alter an individual’s propensity for political activism. For instance, Memmi has commented on the evidence that the relationship between education level and participation, measured by the political interest, shows a strong, positive correlation because cultural capital increases the sense of political competence (1985, p. 359). Specific levels of education affect political knowledge, political interest and a person’s proximity to a political party (Schweisguth, 2002, Table 9, p. 79). Mayer and Perrineau’s data underline, instead, a different type of relationship. The independent variable seems to be political interest and not educational level. In this instance, the political interest level has such an impact on the individual’s participation rate that it bypasses





even the cultural capital factor: in 1988 78% of the citizens defined as active, with a high interest in politics, had a higher education degree; those active citizens who did not have a strong political interest and had a higher degree were only 40% (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992a, p. 34). In brief, if education can compensate for, and weaken, the classical correlation between age and gender on one side, and political participation on the other, political interest as an independent factor has a much stronger impact on the political engagement variable: “the handicaps of participation linked to social and cultural position are basically erased by the interest citizens have for politics” (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992a, p. 34).20 This can be seen also in the old type of political party militants, where ideological commitment was a strong predictor of political participation, despite possible educational hurdles (see Memmi, 1985, p. 359). In the French case, for as much as education does indeed favor a higher level of political involvement in individuals, it is not the only element to have such effect.

Political interest Scholars of political activism consider the level of interest in politics as an initial measure of an individual’s potential for political action. Political interest has also been used to reject statements about general depoliticization, or the increasing apathy of the ordinary political citizen. Today, as in the past, the stability in the level of political interest represents reassuring evidence that if action is not evident, at least interest in political matters can be considered a secondary measure to assess future potential for political activism. Georges Vedel has used exactly this option of analysis to show that the depoliticization phenomenon of the early 1960s was only a temporary event, due to high political activity in France in the previous decade (1962, p. 21).21 Dupeux has supported this same view with the assessment that depoliticization is a short term phenomenon (1962, p. 101), based on a 1958/1953 political interest data comparison. Whereas the “beaucoup” (very) answers diminished by more than half (24% vs. 9%), the “un peu” (somewhat) answers increased by more than half (31.5% vs. 47), showing that the highly interested people were fewer, but that, overall, more people declared themselves to be at least a little bit interested in politics. His final conclusions were therefore optimistic, based also on other analyses of the same data broken down by gender, age, profession and education: “. . . regarding the long-lasting movements, the first part of this study leads us to optimism” (1962, p. 113).22



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Complementary to this interpretation, in the same volume Vedel reassured the French political science world that dépolitisation was, after all, a cyclical phenomenon (1962, p. 285). The French case over time behaved accordingly. Following Dupeux’s work, Tables 2.1 and 2.2 compile levels of political interest for French citizens between 1953 and 2006 to verify whether Dupeux’s findings from 1962 could still be valid after more than 45 years. Overall, there is still a cyclical change. France shows constant increases in political interest among individuals in the periods 1958–1966, 1969–1974 and 1978–1985. The upward trends ended always in a slight decline, as seen in the tables for the periods 1953–1958, 1966–1969, 1985–1988 and more significantly 1990– 2006; but the overall, conclusive trend from this longitudinal look at the data confirms the initial conclusions by Vedel. The level of the respondents highly interested in politics slowly, but constantly, increased from 9% in 1958 to 47.9% in 1997, although with a relevant collapse to 11% as recently as 2006. In general, political participation in France, in its conventional as well as unconventional forms, supports the validity of a positive correlation between political interest and political activism. The only surprising finding pertains to the last period considered, from the mid-1990s on. From 1997 until 2006 the overall level of political interest registered in France declines to around 45% for the respondents declaring at least some interest in politics. Vedel could call the last decade of political interest data in France another possible case of temporary depolicitization. From Tables 2.1 and 2.2 it seems evident that the reliability of a variable such as political interest can be assessed only in a longitudinal study. This point is extremely important from a methodological perspective, if a time comparison of the data should assess a specific trend of evolution. Although Mayer and Perrineau, comparing interest levels for 1974 and 1990 (1992a, p. 149), conclude that the research confirms what was Vedel’s interpretation of a stable participation in the long term (Vedel, 1962, p. 280), their point is rather superficial.23 The consideration of two data points 16 years apart, without really justifying why those two points were taken into consideration, simply avoids the discussion on why the political interest level was increasing up to 1985 and has been decreasing afterwards. Jean Ranger in the 1990 CEVIPOF volume on political participation in France makes the same methodological mistake (1993, p. 130). His consideration of the 1978 and 1988 data points




Interested in Politics

1953

1958

1962

1966

1969

1974

1978

1985

1988

Yes or Very Much Somewhat No, Very Little, or Not At All

24% 31.5% 44%

9% 47% 42.5%

32% 37% 30%

} 37%

20% 38% 30%

} 54%

46.2% 36.1% 17.6%

} 60%

41.6% 37.8% 20.7%

63%

46%

40%

Source: Data for 1953 and 1958 taken from (Dupeux 1962, p. 102). Data for other years taken from SOFRES survey data results presented by (Mayer and Perrineau 1992a, p. 144). SOFRES data aggregated “beaucoup” and “un peu” answers in one category, and “très peu” and “pas de tout” answers in another one. Dupeux’s answers were: “oui ou beaucoup”, “un peu” and “non ou pas de tout.” Data from 1962 through 1969 taken from Sondages, v. 31 n. 1–2 (1969, p. 12): “beaucoup” and “assez” answers aggregated in one category. Data for 1978, 1988, 1995 and 1997 taken from volumes reporting CEVIPOF survey data: “beaucoup” and “assez” answers aggregated in one category.



40

Table 2.1 Political interest in France (1953–1988)

Political Participation in France 41 Table 2.2 Political interest in France (1990–2006)

Yes or Very Much Somewhat No, Very Little, or Not At All

1990

}

52% 47%

1995

1997

1999

49.4% 35.8% 14.8%

47.9% 37.6% 14.8%

9.2% 27.3% 63.6%

2002

}

2006

40%24 60%

11% 34% 55%

Source: Data for 1978, 1988, 1995 and 1997 taken from volumes reporting CEVIPOF survey data: “beaucoup” and “assez” answers aggregated in one category. Data for 1999 taken from European Values Survey (1999/2000): answers “not very interested” and “not at all interested” were cumulated into one category. Data for 2002 taken from Newton and Montero (2007, Table 10.3, p. 218) who use 2002 ESS surveys. Data for 2006 taken from CEVIPOF-Ministère de l’Intérieur, Le Baromètre Politique Français (2ème vague Automne 2006, p. 16).

for a comparison loses validity when his conclusions support the idea of a slight decrease in political interest among citizens: 46% vs. 42% (of the respondents who declared themselves very much or somewhat interested in politics). Political interest stability among French citizens (Boy and Mayer, 1993a; Bréchon, 1994; Kaase and Newton, 1998) does not eliminate the possibility of a low political participation level, as Bréchon mentions (p. 165), although this would imply a rather complicated costs and benefits reasoning on the part of the individual. A comparison between data on political interest and periodicity of discussion of political matters (WVS, 1981, 1990; EVS, 1999) shows that if 37% of the sample claims to be very interested or interested enough in politics, only 12% of the same sample claims to discuss politics often, with 53% of the same group of people claiming to discuss it once in a while. These findings are remarkably consistent for all three waves of survey. Intention does not lead directly to action in this case. Whether it is from personal interest or ideological motivations, a refusal to participate, although with a high political interest, might be more likely than expected. Political interest overwhelmingly strengthens political activism, but a few times it may also stop it. Income The level of income, once a source of discrimination in determining the individual’s attitude and behavior towards political activism, is today a



Interested in Politics


less relevant explanatory factor. Verba and Nie’s assessment of the SocioEconomic Status (SES) model as the main determinant to investigate citizens’ activism has been updated by a new focus on values (Inglehart) and network strategies (Klandermans, Kriesi and Tarrow, 1988) among some of the newer approaches. Data on income, education and age (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992a, p. 29) complement the evidence on the positive effect of higher forms of education on the participation level. A higher degree of education compensates for a higher income level among citizens (53% vs. 54%), as well as in the relationship between age and education (56% vs. 55%). Of course, when all factors intervene, the participation level in individuals is much stronger: respectively 65% vs. 45% and 70% vs. 39% (!). These findings weaken substantially the validity of the elitist model, according to which the social class element is a strong factor in determining political action. The discovery made in the rejection of any dominant structure of the participation model gives a sense of fairness of chances to all those citizens who would like to be instrumental political participants, with the opportunity to act accordingly whenever they feel ready to do so. Wealth helps as always, but its relevance in assessing political activism has diminished, as standards of living improve. More in-depth analysis of the income variable in the political participation model has confirmed that an individual’s economic status is correlated to the person’s level of political commitment. Yet a longitudinal approach to this evidence has revealed that the relationship between economic level and political activism is spurious, not only because it is determined by other correlated elements such as social and cultural capital, as well as age and gender, but also because the interpretation of what a relevant income level is depends upon time and specific contextrelated factors. The actual threshold of financial stability to determine critical mass for political involvement is difficult to identify.

Social class Although the social class factor remains a strong element in France (Lewis-Beck, 1993, p. 4), its relationship to political engagement has changed as much as the participation environment within which the individual acts. Income and social class have faced somewhat the same destiny: although elements of evidence in the assessment of the political participation model, their relevance has decreased constantly. Confirmation of the impact of revenue on political activism has been



42

supplemented with inquiries about the spurious triangle relationship: income, education, participation. The class variable has also had to “redefine” itself, especially in the French case. If class identification is still strong, the definition of its boundaries is nowadays less clear. To this same conclusion, Mayer and Perrineau’s table (1992a, p. 33) shows that only 6% of the individuals who are defined as active, position themselves on the upper part of the social scale; on the contrary, 22% (more than three times as much) of those active citizens position themselves on the lower part of the social scale. The data seem to confirm that education or political interest is altering the class and participation relation. Membership in higher social classes is not a guarantee of high political engagement. However, through the presentation of the same data in a different format (Graph 2.1), by showing the individuals’ position as percentages of the social class to which they belong, rather than as percentages of active or non active citizens, the class and participation positive relationship partially holds. According to the original dataset, 62.5% of the respondents belonging to a higher social class participate as activists vs. 43.9% of the individuals who positioned themselves on the lower part of the social scale. The latter still participate more in medium level political engagement (44.4%) vis-à-vis the higher social class members (only 28.3%). Social class still makes a difference in French political activism, but its impact is deeply affected by other related factors, like income or education.

70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Completely Apathetic

Minimalist

Lower Classes

Civic

Middle Classes

Active

Upper Classes

Graph 2.1 Social class and political involvement in France Source: Data taken from Mayer and Perrineau (1992a, p. 33) but rearranged by percentages of social class positioning.




44


The relevance of the ideological cleavage for the French case has fully revealed itself only in the early 1990s. The relationship between left or right political identification and intensity of political participation changes according to the type of political activity considered, although the two opposite ideological positions have somewhat become more similar in political action preferences recently. With data from the first studies on this topic in France, there was a general consensus that ideological proximity was not a discriminating element in assessing an individual’s level of political participation. As shown in the summary table for conventional political participation in Mayer and Perrineau (1992a, p. 27), political party proximity is not crucial in affecting the level of activism. Of the individuals who claimed a left political proximity 58% belonged to the group of strong conventional activists. Nevertheless, in the same sample, 60% of the respondents who expressed a political proximity on the right belonged to the same group of strong political activists. Thus party ideology was not a useful element, at that time, in identifying strong activists. Citizens of all ideological positions on the left or right continuum seemed to have the same familiarity with conventional forms of political involvement. Nonetheless, in a more recent assessment, it was found that a person’s political ideology does help in predicting a preference for style of political activism. In the fall of 2006, respondents on the right of the political spectrum in France were more numerous in choosing conventional participation as the primary means of political participation vis-à-vis respondents on the left (Muxel, 2006, p. 5). The relationship changes in the case of protest-oriented political activism. In a subsequent table on mass protest behavior (1992a, p. 136), Mayer and Perrineau rightly point out that in the case of non-conventional political participation ideological views make a relevant difference in the decision to become politically active. In their research 67% of the respondents who claimed to be on the left of the political spectrum showed a strong propensity for non-conventional forms of political involvement. Only 31% of the individuals who instead claimed to be on the right of the ideological continuum exhibited a strong potential for non-conventional political behavior. The ratio of two to one appeared again in the 1995 survey data collection, when the same question was asked. This time, 81% of the survey participants with a left ideological orientation and 43% of the respondents with a right ideological orientation belonged to the high protest activity group (Boy and Mayer,



Ideology

1993b, p. 60). Longitudinal analysis of the data confirmed the initial finding even further. From the 2006 Baromètre Politique Français, left leaning individuals opt for unconventional means of political participation as their only way to participate politically, more so than people who position themselves on the right (Muxel, 2006, pp. 5–6). Political protest activity seems to be, therefore, a “a culture of the left” (Bréchon, 1994, p. 182), a characteristic of individuals with a leftist political orientation, more so than of the participants who proclaim to be on the right of the same spectrum.25 This particular finding, as already presented for instance in the German case study on NSMs (Dalton and Kuechler, 1990), explains the correlation between topics of political activism and styles of activity. The relationship between personal ideological orientation and protest political involvement gives ideology, again, an important position in the study of political behavior. This conclusion is especially important in the French case: the French left political domination of national politics in the 1980s was considered a good source for an increased wave of citizen activism in society. Nevertheless, caution is in order because data on NSMs for France in that period are contradictory. Kaase and Newton (1998) present data on a decreasing support for new social movements in France (1982–1989),26 whereas Duyvendak (1993), and later Waters (2003, p. 11), stated that NSMs were actually alive and “kicking” in France as well, in the same exact period. The conventional aspect of that period, the “cohabitation” phenomenon or, more precisely, its smooth functioning in political decision-making, must have convinced some conventional political participants in France that the ideological cleavage that had divided them for so long could not be considered an element of deep political division any longer, at least beyond its daily apparent function of political disagreement. When it comes to political activism, conventional or protest-oriented, political ideology still has a say on means and styles of action.

Social integration Beyond the positive compensating action of culture and political interest, the French model of citizens’ participation must add the so-called association proximity component. As already mentioned above, association membership seems to confirm sociological paradigms that include a positive correlation between social integration and political participation. Although the direction of the correlation is still very much disputed,27





more scholars today look at the social integration variable for important clues. Confirming NSMs research, an individual level analysis of the French citizen’s relationship with political participation shows that individuals who are members of an association are more likely to get involved in political action: among active citizens 61% of them are close to a trade union28 and 56% are close to other types of associations (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992a, p. 27). Yet, this type of connection has cooled off since the 1980s. Citizens seem now happy to be passive members in associations rather than militants with specific political goals (Joye and Laurent, 1997, p. 178). Nevertheless, French individuals remain very confident about the positive role associations can perform in the renewal of the political domain: two citizens in three believe it (Fonda Association, 2007, p. 12). For methodological reasons, it remains important to be precise about what type of association the research is considering. For instance, data on the French case study in this volume show that, according to the type of associationism analyzed, different conclusions might be reached. Bréchon, using the WVS data (1981, 1990) on the relationship between high politicization and associationism, supported the more general interpretation of a positive correlation between the two. This contribution underlines the data on number of association memberships and level of political activism: 46% of the individuals who claimed to be members of at least one association and 60% of the respondents who claimed to be members of more than one organization belong to the group with the highest level of political involvement (1994, p. 170). The same relationship between association proximity and political activism seems, instead, to change previous assumptions completely according to Schild, who uses EB and WVS data. In the French case, high levels of activism29 correspond to low levels of association membership (trade unions) and low levels of financial support to organizations’ particular goals (Table 5 with data on participation in environment-related associations, 1998, p. 168). In a certain sense, Schild argues that French citizens do protest and support political activities, in their multiple forms and styles, but they do not participate as social capital theorists would phrase it. The implications of these findings lead scholars of the French case to the old question of how strongly structural frameworks contribute to the development of political participation. Is the French political context creating French political activists? On a general note, the structural causality of the French case is assumed through the institutional



46

approach used in developing a research paradigm, for a situation which presents “an atypical explanatory schema” (Forsé and Langlois, 1994, p. 281). However, an analytical paradigm closer to an individual level of analysis can actually better incorporate the possible structural effects of associational organizations on citizens’ political participation rate. In this regard, Kriesi’s work on the insertion into specific personal networks (1993, p. 8) (associations loosely intended), as a way to measure one of the components of citizens’ mobilization potential, tries to deal explicitly with the direct relevance of association memberships on political activism. Although his conclusions strongly support the associationism variable in any participation model, he specifies that the scholar needs to assess the political socialization aspect of the associations considered (Kriesi, 1993, p. 264), meaning the politicization of new cleavages through membership (Kriesi et al., 1995, p. 3). Similarly, Levi questions the ability of all associations to instigate the same level of political involvement in its members (1996, p. 47).30 From a more Tocquevillian position on this same point, Mayer and Perrineau (1992b) do not seem to share the same concern for the political aspect of associationism. Their view of a “communauté” is inclusive, because based on a more sociological approach. Franchi (1986) is also very optimistic about the positive teaching role of associations: citizens learn to share goals and responsibilities, to work together. Along the same lines, Dekker and van den Broek point out the positive effect on political engagement, even with membership in organizations without a political nature (1998, p. 35). Maloney and Roßteutscher (2007, pp. 9–10) equally recognize that all associations can turn into political agents under specific circumstances. Association membership becomes a factor of political engagement because it fosters integration at a collective level. On the same topic, the CSA survey data (1989) support the sociological position. To the question “why are you a member of this (these) organization(s)?” the three most common answers were (1) “for the services and activities that are provided”, (2) “for the contacts with other people” and (3) “to participate in a collective action” (Gaborit, 1991, p. 88). Members seem to grasp the importance of the association activity variable and the possible correlation between membership and activism, beyond the clear definition of a political participation fostered by the association itself. The importance of association participation for political engagement is also clear in relation to the positive effect of associationism on democratic practice. The conclusions reached by Tocqueville, but also by Putnam in his study on Italy, are again indirectly confirmed by the





above mentioned CSA 1989 survey data. To the question “Among the following types of organizations, which one, in your opinion, participates in the democratic expression of society the best?” 33% answered associations, 18% chose public powers, 12% picked trade unions and only 11% (!) considered political parties (Gaborit, 1991, p. 112). The same results are reinforced by a more recent CSA survey (2006) in which seven respondents out of ten in France would participate in associations rather than in a political party (the choice of only 13% of the respondents) to discuss and act in regard to problems in the country (Fonda, 2007, p. 5). In this sense, association membership does contribute to strengthening the democratic value of a community, but it does not necessarily equate democratic involvement with political participation. Associations matter, yet the sizes of their impacts vary. In conclusion, the initial overview of some aspects of political activism in France in this chapter highlights the intricacies of the subject. Studies and research works on how much, how often and in which style French citizens participate politically have confirmed the assumed high intensity of political activism in the country for any groups of individuals. Although specific socio-demographic cleavages underline preferences for political engagement, the presentation and interpretation of the analysis change in relation to the angle of the research. Different scholars in France and other countries have looked at the same variables from a different perspective, emphasizing different analytical levels of interpretations. Overlapping disciplines (political science, history, sociology and economics for instance) involved in the study of participation have focused on different aspects of political activism. Some authors have discussed mostly individual forms of action, whereas others have considered more relevantly collective movements of political involvement. Chapter 3 introduces the various lenses of analysis employed in general, organizes the numerous scholarships and explains their evolution before assessing in the end the French case in a broader context.



48

3

The study of political activism, in France in particular, has benefited over the years from multiple, competing angles of analysis. Researchers have observed and recorded cases of political participation focusing on different actors and preferences of involvement. Whereas all the findings delivered have been very compelling, the lenses of analysis employed have indirectly affected a possible reconciliation among the different conclusions. The first section in this chapter tries to provide a coherent organization of the research approaches used and of their overall findings in the study of political activism and group participation in France. The second part of the chapter provides instead a discussion on the operationalization of the most important variables in the study of political action, leading to the operationalization choices in this book.

Views on French political participation: Angles of analysis The delay in the study of citizens’ participation in the French tradition has had a long-term effect on later stages of research. Even authors who were able to “catch up” with the more advanced American tradition have always had to refer to the American findings as a way to achieve scholarly legitimization. Jean Ranger expresses his frustration by saying that: The subject of depoliticization periodically crops up on the French scene. It seems to me to have long expressed anxiety, almost an inferiority complex, with regard to the Anglo-Saxon model of citizen participation that started to permeate Western European intellectual circles in the 1950s. (Ranger, 1993, p. 109) 49



Levels and Styles of Political Involvement


The origins of French research on political engagement lie in the already mentioned 1962 Vedel volume on the French Political Science Association roundtable. Although the approach and the depth of analysis were different from the voting studies of the North-American tradition of the same period, French scholars started to deal, in a different manner, with the participation phenomenon. They retained a strong normative approach to the subject of research: the focus was on “dépolitisation” more than on participation. The 1960 issue of the Revue Internationale des Sciences Sociales had already confirmed the concerns about the inactivity of the political domain. The findings of both works tried mostly to reassure the political scientist that the depolitization phenomenon was either a temporary one (a short-term view vs. a long-term one) or a possible beginning of new forms of action. In any way today’s scholar would like to read those conclusions, after the initial individual focus the approach to the topic moved to the context in which the phenomenon was taking place. As it seemed logical in France, the State and the administrative system of a class-based society are always the usual suspects. Following the French tradition, the study of participation took consequently an elitist approach. The idea that the political and social systems could be held responsible for the degree of citizen participation in the political domain (Memmi, 1985, p. 321) justified the new wave of research on professional political engagement. Bourdieu (1989), for instance, in his several publications, highlighted the dominating position of the French elites, whose bureaucratic power guaranteed them the exclusivity of effective political participation. The social structure worked as a form of constraint towards all those individuals who would have liked to have a say in the political system. The discriminating factor in the French context was the rigidity of all the organizations regulating political access: political parties, trade unions, bureaucratic elites. The findings on the political system agreed on the presence of professional and exclusive participation elite (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992a, pp. 7–8). This group of active social agents (Gaxie, 1978) maintained the monopoly of the participation phenomenon, directing societal interest according to their own priorities. On the same subject, the scholarship on weak political participation confirms, for the French case, the discrimination problem: some groups in society do participate more than others, because they can participate more and better than others. The foundations of discrimination are, however, different from the ones presented in the American literature.



50

51

It is a system-dominated, self-reinforcing problem for France, whereas it is more of an individual’s social and cultural characteristics explanation in the American case. In the US, people who achieved higher income levels and degrees of education could increase their intensity and quality of participation. In France, higher income and education levels could not be achieved without the social system’s permission. While it remains difficult to compare directly the two countries’ socio-economic groups, and especially the equivalence of their scale, the self-positioning by individuals on the income scale retains its validity. The upper, middle and lower parts of the income scale present the same interpretation to French and Americans, although the economic quantification and the possible cultural aspect attached to each level of the income scale could be assessed as country specific. In this context of analysis, it is safe to say that it is the individual who makes the decision about personal participation possibilities in North America. Contrary to this fact, it is the structural constraints of a closed society that determine the individual’s participation potential in the French case. The state-oriented elite studies of the 1970s delayed the presentation of possible academic explanations for the political participation movement. Only thanks to the CEVIPOF and the use of survey data in the late 1970s, first, and then late 1980s, could French political scientists (although still few) use a different analytical approach to study the engagement problem. Fostered by NSM studies and rejecting Touchard’s prediction1 on the limited value of participation research, L’Electeur Français en Questions2 (1990) aimed at proposing the first comprehensive model of the French voter,3 assembling diverse views on the topic. The analytical innovation of this manuscript, in relation to previous French studies, is confirmed by its translation into English and publication by the University of Michigan Press (1993). The move to data collection and analysis, achieved by some French scholars, paid off, as can be seen by the comprehensiveness of views and findings presented in the CEVIPOF volume. In the very same context, Pierre Bréchon (1994) and Joachim Schild (1998) have contributed to the interpretation of the French political participation situation within the broader European analytical framework. Not only did they use survey data as their major supporting evidence, they also participated in developing a more comparative approach to the study of political activism in France, that is, an analytical context of research which starts from the general model and the data collected, and goes on to explain the French case within the broader sample of countries included. Maloney (2007, p. 4) addresses similar issues in regard to research





on associational membership, where empirical data and a comparative dimension are rarely seen. Behind this new stage of participation research, Mayer and Perrineau (1992a) understood the need for a more analytically comparative analysis of the French situation. They foresaw the need to talk about “a democracy of the people” (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992a, p. 18), through which the individual could better express personal attempts at political participation, aside from traditional standardized forms. The two main works on this new path of analysis, Les Comportements Politiques (1992) and L’Engagement Politique (1994), finally reopened the debate on the possibility of a reinvention of politics (see Vedel, 1962, p. 280). Perrineau’s work, especially, has brought the French tradition on political participation close again to the American findings. Only in the 1990s did French scholars start seeing the development of a cognitive citizen and of new forms of participation. They came to realize that: On one side, old patterns of engagement die, are marginalised or are transformed . . . On the other side, new appearances of engagement are developed. (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992a, pp. 17, 18)4 The introduction of the idea of multiple forms of political participation (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992a, p. 18) shifts the focus of analysis back to the individual. The new literature, based on survey data, distances itself from the previous structural-elitist approach. The reasons for more or less participation are searched again within the individual, with regard to personal changes and engagement potential (see for instance Kriesi, 1993 and his study of the Netherlands, later applied to France in Kriesi et al., 1995). French scholars such as Perrineau find in the study of the individual’s shift from an identification mode to an individuation dimension the solution to the change in the French participation model. Approaching in several instances the NSMs’ debates on different types of engagement organizations (Kriesi, 1993, p. 27), few works on French participation take a clear sociological path of explanation. They deal again with Tönnies’ concept of Gemeinschaft vs. Gesellschaft (Community vs. Society), and often merge the discussions of political behavior and collective forms of action. Still close to macro-level analysis,5 developed during the elitist wave of publications, they prefer to move towards the increasing social movement literature, which is evolving in Europe, rather than to share the individual level of analysis of the American data experts (Inglehart, Dalton, Verba). However, on their side, even those



52

53

few North-American scholars who deal with the French case of political engagement prefer the macro-sociological level to the individual unit of analysis (Tilly, Tarrow). The sociological approach in the French participation studies became dominant at one-point in time because it provided a long-awaited general model of explanation. Pascal Perrineau with his identification or individuation cleavage tried to explain the new concept of the political engagement analysis, proposing that “from the communitarian model of the involved citizen follows the societal model of the associated individual” (Perrineau, 1994, p. 19). It is, therefore, in the relationship between the individual, as participant, and the possible forms of political engagement that the French model sees the explanation of the dépolitisation or répolitisation of the societal context. In this circumstance, the scholarship witnesses an increase in studies on associationism (Haeusler, 1990; Gaborit, 1991) and militancy (Gauchet, 1990), as by-products or co-causes of the participation phenomenon. Jacques Ion’s work (1994, 1997) on the end of the militant figure in French politics belongs to the French quest for a model of political participation. Close to the NSMs and sociological tradition, Ion’s contribution confirms the concept of a newly gained independence of the French citizen vis-à-vis old types of public engagement. Increasing individuality of groups, but also a stronger, more conscious, autonomy of the individuals belonging to an organization, have weakened the collective type of identity upon which traditional forms of participation were based (the identification stage). Multiple memberships in associations have expanded the so-defined horizontal level of participation, in which the individual feels the need to work in collaboration with others, but at a lower intensity level of involvement. The rejection of the previous ideological devotion to a single type of participation could be seen in today’s closest level of engagement and its consequences: the local community (Mabileau et al., 1989; Tiberi, 1995).Mabileau et al.’s comparative study on local political mobilization and participation in France and Great Britain is an important example of the relevance of context. Case studies of local French communities by Patrick Quentin and Phillipe Garraud show that a general sociological model of participation must incorporate local specificities, if it wants to be accurate. In this case, the French part of the research project concluded that associationism elements (network mobilization and strategic rational choice planning) are far better explanations of the participation behavior accounted for in those local communities included in the study. The well-known, as well as contested, Socio-Economic Status (SES) model





of political activism did not have a good explanatory power in the French case in particular. On the contrary, individuals’ personal interests and leaders’ ability to mobilize potential participants proved to be valid elements of explanation. Later research by Joye and Laurent (1997) has confirmed the relevance of the local level, especially when it comes to seeing the impact of associational membership on political activism: more so than at the national level in general (p. 172). In conclusion, the findings of sociological studies on the participation problem suggest that the lack or decrease of political engagement in France has to do with the weakening of collective forms of participation. While a possible weaker collective identity in the political domain, registered in the 1980s–1990s, represents the bad news for the normative view of citizen engagement in a democracy, the good news is that other types and levels of engagement have developed. In reapproaching the American tradition of participation studies, French scholars have developed a parallel path to the research on new forms of engagement. The more sociological-oriented works have dealt with the conventional or non-conventional types of participation; the more political science-oriented publications have regained the individual level of analysis through the survey data approach; the more social movement-leaning contributions have instead dealt with the collective level of identity in political mobilization. In their distinct approaches, each sector of the research retains possible weaknesses. Sociological findings on political participation have analyzed extensively the community, but have often neglected the individual’s own contribution and background. Political science studies have missed the group-level analysis and the environmental constraints and opportunities presented by NSM publications. Although rich in new research directions, the French scholarship seemed, however, to remain rather compartmentalized. This condition is its final limitation, because it prevents the development of a more comprehensive model of participation in which approaches from different disciplines (sociology and political science) could be merged and implemented.6 Following the different approaches presented in the literature, the interpretation of the political activism discussion has faced new phases: the sociological analysis, the New Social Movement moment of fame, and the more acute impact with the introduction of the study of protest forms. As usual, all of them have gone through a constant reinterpretation, challenged by new analytical positions.



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Evolution in the research: Sociological approaches, new social movements and protest forms

The French “communitarian revenge” has presented the idea that the study of political participation should not start with the main political action, namely voting, but with other forms of social participation. In a parallel effort to that of the publications on political action, associations have been mentioned in several works that dealt with citizens’ activism. Their recurrent presence has been strengthened since the late 1980s, when associations have been linked more directly to political activism levels. Along this same line, the consideration of voting as an epiphenomenon of social engagement forms has moved the research one step ahead in the process of participation, addressing issues of social integration and affiliation, as main determinants of involvement (Memmi, 1985, p. 344). In this context, the literature on association involvement in the 1990s belongs to any serious discussion on political participation levels. Whether social integration needs to be of a political type in order to affect the individual’s political activism is not clear overall. After Putnam’s work on Italy (1993), it seems that associationism in its broadest interpretation is a very closely correlated element with political participation, as the Civic Culture had already stated in general. This peculiar interpretation is supported even more by French scholarship, such as Bréchon’s position on the importance of the “context of a movement – it does not matter probably which one” (1994, p. 181). Participation in society seems to have a positive impact on political activity, regardless of the political quality of the societal involvement. Maynaud and Lancelot were of the same idea in 1961, when they were writing about associationism as an “inspiration civique” which could turn into an instrument of political action7 (p. 10). In this sense, the emphasis on “participation” is a major factor in the assessment of individual activism, while the focus on “political” loses its relevance. Other contributors (Joye and Laurent, 1997, p. 180; Milner, 2002, p. 19), including this author, are more selective when considering the impact of social integration forms through associations. The idea of an “association proximity” (Memmi, 1985, p. 347), as an intervening variable in the participation potential, is not, however, uncritically accepted by all scholars. Once again, there are problems with the data. A 40% association membership rate among French citizens in 1990 for instance (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992a, p. 16) conflicts



Sociological analysis


with the CSA 1989 survey results of a mere 29%. While these findings are closer to another SOFRES survey of 1986 (32%), there is still disagreement on how important association membership is in determining the intensity of political participation. Mayer and Perrineau’s contribution rejects the connection between the two, stating that “political participation is indeed a dimension relatively autonomous from social participation” (1992a, p. 16). Rémond (1962) and later Waters (2003) came, instead, to opposite conclusions, as well as Barthélémy (1994), whose study on association militantism aims to explain the situation of a changed political engagement in France. Individual paths, in the end, allow for the identification of the associative life as a powerful factor of social integration and as political socialization and not only as its product: participation in associations instigates political participation, at the very least a political choice and position. (p. 114)8 Numbers on association proximity confirm this assessment: 56% of the individuals defined as active in conventional movements and 52% of the participants showing a strong protest potential in non-conventional types of action declared an association proximity (Mayer and Perrineau, pp. 27, 136). This same position was already clear in 1968, the year of political activism for many reasons. Lancelot’s study on electoral abstentionism dealt with “the multiplying effect” of social participation on electoral behavior (1968, pp. 225–256).9 In the new stage of the French tradition, the increasing interest in association militantism represents the understanding of the modernization of political participation in renewed forms. Associations, as new practices of participation, have adapted to this mobilization function, defining themselves in relation to public power (Barthélémy, 1994, pp. 91–92), and contributing with a new structure to political socialization (p. 92). Fundamentally, they have maintained their innovative relationship with their members. A renewed individual freedom of social integration into associations, also independence in the subsequent political mobilization, justify the rates of increase, although contained, of the French association phenomenon. As Waters (2003, p. 144) points out, citizens’ participation has remained strong, but individuals are now more autonomous participants. If the number of associations in France may not be as high as scholars of cognitive activism would like to believe, the step from an activism based on delegation, to one based on direct action, has taken place



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conceptually (Memmi, 1985, p. 364). The focus on quality of associationism, more than on quantity (Ion, 1997, p. 31), has confirmed that citizen participation has changed first in substance, and then in shape. According to French sources, the shift has taken place from a situation defined as “communitarian/identity-based/with unlimited engagement” to one which underlines better the participational independence of the individual, namely “societal/with defined time and limited goals/monofunctional interests” (Ion, 1997). The individual’s different interests and engagement forms seem, however, to provide an explanation for the disengagement process post-industrial societies have faced. The reasons that are connected directly with the citizen engagement phenomenon are still unclear (Duchesne, 1994, p. 212). The French sociological model can explain why citizens get involved in the political domain the way they do, but not why they participate at all.

New social movements debate A more comprehensive paradigm is offered by NSMs studies, with a sociological approach that is combined with a macro-level analysis of society at large. To the social integration variable, social movements works add the structural context of the participation phenomenon and the contingency element (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992a, p. 23). After a first opposition of micro vs. macro analysis, the relevance of the organizational context (Salisbury, 1975) at any level of research becomes necessary for any project. “Mobilizing contexts” (Kaase, 1984a) represent a major element to account for in any analytical framework, because they “pull individuals into” the mobilization game (pp. 309– 310). A specific event constitutes the opportunity any citizen has to become politically active on that occasion. Without the specific incident (that is, elections, economic crisis, sudden unemployment, and so on), political involvement would not have appeared. Political participation is therefore the end product of self-starters, who plan the networking action of strategically mobilizing individuals who were not into the game originally. Any study on political activism needs then to present a “dynamic multi-level properties model” (Kaase, 1990, p. 25) to depict the political participation phenomenon in all its stages. In brief, citizens act politically because they find themselves in political situations. The origin of the introduction of the structural element can be seen in Tilly’s historical works on France (1978, 1986). The study of different forms of contention over time and their relation to a political dimension, in a rich quantitative historical analysis combined with a





specific context, was the precursor of Kriesi et al.’s research on the institutionalization of social movement politics. Using a system approach to distinguish the conditions needed to foster an active social movement arena, Kriesi’s work (1993, 1995) complements the sociological findings of the French tradition. The politics of direct action is the product of the politicization of new cleavages in society. The strength and the effectiveness of a new type of cleavage determine the politicization of new forms of participation. Social change remains an important explanatory variable for the New Social Movements research, but its reliability depends on the structural and cultural conditions in which social changes take place. The arenas of political activism are, for instance, the structural constraints that can hinder the development of NSMs the most. Consequently, if the parliamentary and bureaucratic arenas are rather accessible, the potential for different forms of political action will be low. If state institutions are by nature open to civil society and keen to foster consensus, social unrest is unlikely. At the same time, the existence of old, unpacified cleavages, such as the class issue in France10 (see also Lewis-Beck, 1993, p. 4), can delay and limit the politicization of new interests around which to mobilize (Kriesi et al., 1995, p. 4). According to NSMs studies, France appeared to be in an intermediate situation over the last two decades of the second millennium. Initially the state was a provider of initiatives for associational involvement, especially in the area of social policy services (Worms, 2005, p. 12), yet a second wave of association creations developed as a movement to intervene where the state did not (Worms, 2005, p. 16). While the structural constraints may have actually fostered the rise of collective forms of action outside the institutional arenas, the presence of traditional cleavages was an obstacle to the development of new cleavages of action.11 Nevertheless, what action means for NSMs studies is not unanimously defined. Social movement works on participation politics consider today the collective action of expression as a “conventional” form of engagement (Kriesi, 1993, p. 2). The incorporation of direct action as a form of conventional participation has shifted the distinctive feature in participation studies once again. If the cleavage once used was the direct or indirect form of participation, the new trait of identification became the conventional or non-conventional cleavage.

Protest involvement Protest movements are the last stage of evolution of participation studies, both in the American and French traditions. Neglected for a long



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time in the research (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992a, p. 112; Kriesi, 1993, p. 2; Favre and Fillieule, 1994, p. 116), they have acquired a legitimate role in the scholarship on political participation. In the late 1970s, after a decade which reconceptualized the meaning of citizens’ participation (Favre and Fillieule, 1994, p. 117), the Political Action study (Barnes and Kaase, 1979) proposed the first model to include non-conventional forms of action in the political engagement debate. The findings were confirmation of the tight relationship between activism (conventional or not) and political participation. The evidence was that: Rather than being the product of a refusal of engagement, the “protest potential” seems to be the consequence of a willingness to be involved and of a request of something more in the field of participation. (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992a, p. 137)12 Even more, protest action was considered the manifestation of an interest to support the functioning of other democratic means of participation13 (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992a, p. 140). Once more, the research on non-conventional activism validated the relationship between social and political participation: the development of new expectations and demands from a cognitive citizen was not met by the corresponding offer of traditional participation forms (political parties and trade unions, for instance), in the context of increased citizen engagement (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992a, p. 130). Since the 1980s French studies on protest participation have gone from a psychological and sociological approach, with research on mass identities and personal alienation (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992a, pp. 114– 118), to more quantitative data analysis publications, and even on-street interviews of protesters (Favre and Fillieule, 1995). In their analysis of the protest potential in French society, using the CEVIPOF 1988 dataset, Mayer and Perrineau (1992a) both confirm and disconfirm some of the previously accepted findings. While variables such as educational degree, income level, association proximity, political interest and perception of politics have the same type of influence on the individual in conventional as well as in non-conventional movements (see p. 136 vs. p. 27), some other measures (such as, age, partisan affiliation) vary in the opposite direction. This last result on the political proximity of an individual and the corresponding choice of political activity supports Inglehart’s view on the composition of the post-materialist generation, as well as NSMs’ works on the proximity between leftist organizations and social movements evolution (Dalton and Kuechler, 1990; Kriesi, 1993). The relevance





of social class is more ambiguous in regard to protest action. About 50% of the individuals who positioned themselves on the lower part of the social scale, 49% of respondents who positioned themselves on the middle part of the social scale and 49% of the citizens who positioned themselves on the upper part of the social scale have all exhibited a high protest potential (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992a, p. 136). Non-conventional activism seems to bypass class divisions, suggesting materialist as much as post-materialist cognitive citizens. As a concluding statement, the findings of different approaches to political participation in France seem overall to complement each other well. While their contributions have expanded the knowledge of the participation phenomenon in France, the quality of their results must be discussed. The relationship between the methodologies used and the conclusions achieved clarifies the importance of such a discussion in the next section.

Means, styles and preferences: The operationalization problem As much as the definition problem, described in Chapter 2, the operationalization of the political participation phenomenon has kept scholars busy on both sides of the Atlantic. French scholarship has shown its attention to the operational concept element since its first research on the political engagement topic (Vedel, 1962, p. 283). In 1961 Maynaud and Lancelot introduced the question of how to measure the political participation variable correctly (1961, p. 8). A year later, Vedel pointed out the methodological need for a scale of depolitization (1962, p. 23) as a means to clarify interpretations and judgments on the participation problem. Overall, the operationalization of the participation concept is what still divides scholars, not only for the academic need of a precise measure of political participation, but also for the consequent comparability problem of research studies. Any assessment on the political activism variable has to meet the requirements for “reliable empirical evidence’, as Kaase described it (1990, p. 23). The three terms represent the bases for the general acceptance of a valid, data-based, scientifically sound research on the political participation topic. The operational side of those requirements echoes the call for the “completeness and accuracy of measures” (Marsh and Kaase, 1979, p. 168) and the claim for a unit of measure able to reflect the multidimensionality of the political activism concept (Salisbury, 1975, p. 329).



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Following the analytical evolution of participation studies in France, scholars seem to have come to terms with the multiple measures of political engagement. The reasons for this research tolerance lie in the possible expansion of findings, based on the different operationalizations of the participation phenomenon, as well as in the impossibility to achieve a generally agreed upon distinct measure of participation. Authors from different disciplines obviously showed preferences. Measures from sociological studies did not impress empirical political scientists, and vice versa. The main acknowledgment is the existence of different measures for different kinds of participation: “The scale of difficulty of political practices does not seem therefore to have to be only one” (Memmi, 1985, p. 360).14 The rejection of a “uniformity of participation” contributes to the step forward made in the research, with the understanding that voting could represent neither the only, nor the most important form of political engagement (Memmi, 1985, p. 349). Georges Dupeux’s contribution in the 1960 special issue of the Revue Internationale des Sciences Sociales stands as the very first attempt to quantify the political participation variable in the French context according to different assessments of its meaning. Using an index of participation from “strong” to “completely non-existent”, Dupeux combined data on voting and other conventional forms of political involvement, such as participation in public meetings, knowledge of electoral campaign programs, as well as attempts to influence others’ opinions. The final results reinforced the tendency in political science at that time to present the citizen as a non-involved element of society. The first index on political participation in France revealed that 18% of the sample declared a strong political activism, whereas almost half of that sample (46%) showed very weak political engagement. Dealing with participation composite indexes on French data did not become, however, a solid tradition in the French scholarship on the topic. Whereas voting indexes were widely used in the early works on political participation, their validity has weakened constantly, because their participation measure method relies on the contingent circumstances of an election. In this sense, the possibility for any citizen to become active is strictly dependent on the frequency of elections. The biased assumption in this part of the research not only undermines any citizen’s electoral activity (since constrained by the number of elections), but also focuses its measure on a rather passive form of political participation: a mere choice among predetermined options. The main mistake is, as Mayer and Perrineau put it, that “the passive citizen and the active militant are placed on the same level” (1992a, p. 13).15





Nevertheless, the inclusion of new measures of political participation has confirmed that the voting activity is probably the easiest one of all. Barnes and Kaase found that as the type of political activity requires a more demanding form of involvement, its participation rate diminishes, and that one third of the population is excluded from higher forms of political activity (Memmi, 1985, p. 330). On the same point, Memmi has highlighted the mediocre level of other forms of participation visà-vis the most simple ones (pp. 326–327). Although voting is still a second-best measure of political participation, a longitudinal view of the research confirms that scholars of the French political activity phenomenon insisted on using it, due to the already mentioned French data issue (Boy and Mayer, 1990; Lewis-Beck, 1993; Mayer and Perrineau’s political active participation index, see below for a discussion on this measure). While it was somewhat acceptable that the Vedel volume (1962) could only use voting turnouts and political interest rates, because of the limited availability of data at that time, it is rather incomprehensible that today some scholars still use a voting index as their measure of political participation, especially for the French case. As a matter of fact, any analysis of the French situation of participation based on voting turnouts cannot be a comprehensive one, since the voting rate in France has not been changing considerably until more recent periods. On average, it was stable around 75–80% (depending on the type of elections: legislative vs. presidential (Lewis-Beck, 1993, p. 2)), limiting the possibility of any deeper conclusions on how political participation forms and their effectiveness have evolved longitudinally. Frank Wilson’s study on Interest-Group Politics in France (1987)16 has been an example, rather early on in the field, of the necessity to develop new measures, especially if variables are based on survey data and interview findings of how French citizens and interest organizations participate in the political domain. The limited academic usefulness of a voting turnout measure is confirmed by the analytical change in participation research. The shift from a participation to many participations has rejected the singledimensionality of political engagement, forcing the inclusion of new forms of political activity (Memmi, 1985, p. 357) through indexes and scales. Some scholars of protest movements (Favre and Fillieule, 1994, 1995) have even gone farther in their call for diversification of the instruments of measure, dealing with the intensity level of new forms of participation, and addressing the research concerns regarding the influence of degrees of difficulty, according to the measure of political activism examined. Overall, the conclusion is that different



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measurement instruments for political participation allow for a more comprehensive view of the general evolution of the political engagement phenomenon in France. The fact that some people would choose some forms of action more than others, because of their own personal, social and cultural features (level of interest in public affairs or conflict propensity, for instance, Memmi, 1985, p. 360), is a good reason to accept a diversity of measures, in order to grasp the diverse character of participation. Beyond the voting rate research on France, the other measures used in the scholarship on political participation have been rather disappointing. Only more recently (Bréchon, 1994; Schild, 1998) has a more refined methodological approach, incorporated in a comparative, quantitative analysis, presented a more comprehensive view of the political participation situation. Among previous research attempts, Mayer and Perrineau (1992a) have tried, unsatisfactorily, to apply to the French case some measures used in the American scholarship. A comparison between the Political Action data on newspaper reading and political discussions with friends, for the book’s five countries (data from 1974), and France’s political information level on the presidential elections, acquired through TV sources, as well as on the political discussion variable during the European elections (both French variables from 1978 and 1988), have confirmed France’s low score in this type of political engagement forms. France had the second lowest ranking on political information, two points higher than Austria, and the lowest percentage for political discussions with friends, 3% below Germany (1979, p. 17). Considering that this type of data may give an initial hint at the political participation situation in France, Mayer and Perrineau’s scale of conventional engagement (1992a, p. 18) confirms that there is something responsible for the weak intensity level of citizens’ activity. For instance, whereas almost 24 million people have followed TV political information sources on the presidential elections (1988), only about 16 million have had political discussions on the European elections (1989). Furthermore, only 2 million people have talked with a party activist in the context of the European elections (1989) and only 1.2 million have participated at a political meeting for the same occasion. The disproportion between so-defined low intensity activity (watching TV) and high intensity participation (talk to people and take part in political events) is clear. A different, less methodologically sound, approach is the one presented by Topf in his contribution on “Beyond Electoral Participation” in the Beliefs in Government series (Kaase and Newton, 1998). The author





does not construct an index of non-conventional political participation, but prefers to provide a longitudinal analysis of non-electoral political participation, combining data from different datasets (The Civic Culture, Political Action, WVS and EB). Using different data, and a comparative approach, Topf reaches different conclusions. His measure of political participation in Europe is a combination of action and potential, such as political interest for instance, with a better scale of participation intensity. According to the data pulled from Political Action and the World Values Surveys, levels of political participation in Europe from 1974 until 1990 have overall increased: the percentage of individuals who showed some political activity went from 27% to 46%, while the group of real activists increased from 4% to 10% (1998, p. 68). In Topf’s analysis, France follows the same pattern, fitting perfectly within the averaged participation model. In the French case, the percentage of the respondents claiming to have performed some types of political participation increased 5% from 1981 to 1990 (WVS), reaching the West German value (57%), and positioning the country above the European average of political activism (1998, p. 69). Overall, a broader use of several measures of political participation seems to confirm the findings on the French increase of political activism in a European comparison. Boy and Mayer (1997) have used CEVIPOF data for 1978, 1988 and 1995, testing the stability of a variable correlated to political participation such as personal interest in political matters. Their final assessment is supportive of the idea that an index for political participation, including the most important items determining an individual’s level of political activism, can provide a better reading of the multiple variables affecting the level and type of participation. Whether using political interest or discussions on politics, the conclusions presented by Boy and Mayer are all in the same direction (1997, pp. 60–61): stability or even increase in political participation in France. The creation of a participation intensity scale seems, therefore, a logical goal in the field. Whereas some authors have opted for indexes, others have simply tried to compare variables over time, to assess a longitudinal evolution in the intensity of participation. In their 1992 book Mayer and Perrineau had favored the index option, although with some surprising decisions on its construction. They used a 3-point index based on: (1) level of political information acquired from TV or radio; (2) vote in the first round of the 1988 presidential election; (3) registration on electoral lists for 1988. The index appears to be rather biased in favor of voting activity. In this regard, the book’s assessment of political



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activity is primarily based on traditional or conventional, and somewhat passive, limited expression forms of political engagement. The political participation in this volume instead aims at creating a more diverse index of participation intensity, able to measure different types of participation according to their respective value. An index of participation should be forged in relation, firstly, to the level of activity and, secondly, to the preference given to some forms of activism over others. The second option offered in the research, the longitudinal variable comparison, relies, of course, on data availability. In this context, the most often used political participation variable in this type of analysis has been the political interest level. Although the level of interest in politics cannot directly measure political activity, its relationship with any form of political activism is considered a good starting point to determine whether political engagement is strong. In this sense, political interest is the direct cause of political activity (Vedel, 1962, p. 15), although this assumption proposes, once again, a rather traditional interpretation of the words “political participation”. In addition, the reliability of the political interest level can be accepted today without major concerns. Van Deth (1990, p. 281) has finally cleared all doubts regarding the methodological value of the respondent’s self-assessment of the political interest variable. Although questionable because a singleitem measurement, with no precise meaning, and interpreted sometime as a consequence of an individual’s political activity more than as its origin (pp. 283–284), Van Deth’s testing of a scale of political interest, based on a series of complementary questions, has confirmed the previous conclusions on the validity of the political interest item. Therefore, once the scholar has overcome the subjective component of the individual’s answer to the political interest question (Vedel, 1962, p. 15),17 this type of research approach can highlight how a possible decrease in traditional forms of political participation (for instance, political party memberships in the French case) does not deny a still high level of political interest. Overall, a France-specific comparison of findings and conclusions on the effectiveness of the different measures of political participation shows agreement, and only a couple of divergent points. Among those few discrepancies in longitudinal analysis studies, we can find the relationship between city size and activism. Dupeux (1962) reinforces the French tradition’s interpretation of a perfect participatory democracy only in small villages (Tocqueville, but also Todd (1988)), stating that the biggest decrease in political participation between 1953 and 1958





took place in large cities (19% vs. 4.5%). Mayer and Perrineau, instead, support the opposite view: larger cities probably favor more variegated types of activism (1992a, p. 27).18 In light of the many demonstrations, and suburban riots between 2005 and 2006 (Kesselman, 2009, p. 166), the city component remains a very relevant element of analysis. Smaller cities do not necessarily represent a ghost environment for political activism though. A second discrepancy is in the assessed relationship between economic dissatisfaction and political participation. While the traditional cleavage approach, supported by a general sociological position, would state that the most active individuals should probably be the most economically unsatisfied citizens, Dupeux’s contribution tends to unveil that myth. Depoliticization was more common in 1958 among individuals who were the most dissatisfied about their economic possibilities. A general consensus is present, instead, on individual interest in politics, across generations (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2 in the previous chapter). If the level of interest is constantly increasing, the use of political interest, as a way to measure political participation, could also contribute to revealing how, and why, political activity varies according to different circumstances. Its validity has been supported, in a parallel way, by the decreasing measure of the perception of politics as a difficult topic to deal with (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992a, p. 27; Ranger, 1993, p. 116). Yet, higher levels of political interest do not mean necessarily a stronger political saliency in the opinion of citizens who are interested in politics, but do not consider it that essential in their lives (Van Deth, 2000, p. 138). In conclusion, the paradox of citizen participation in France needs different measures for different types of participation, in order to properly assess intensity and variation of the political activity phenomenon. A simple comparison of the indexes used for the French case, for instance, can easily show the reader how important it is to be careful in the conclusions drawn from the use of a specific political activity index. Contrasting statements on how to interpret France’s position on the political participation scale in a comparative approach are the product of methodological differences in the index operationalization. Even when using the same data, the choice of which single-item questions to use for the index construction has led to different conclusions. For a clear example, it is useful to compare the types of indexes used and the results obtained from works that presented data analysis from the same datasets.



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In the French context, issues with a political action index construction concern the use of EB and WVS databases, because of the lack of many available data archives on French political participation. Kaase (1992) and Bréchon (1994) have been able to test their hypotheses on French political behavior in a broad comparative approach, using both EB and WVS. After the Political Action and Continuities in Political Action volumes, Kaase has continued his comparative analysis on protest action within a European-wide framework, using different indexes and scales related to the type of participation considered. For instance, from EB data (1989), he has created an index of Civil Disobedience (1992, p. 80) and one of Legal Uninstitutionalized Participation (p. 81). For each index he has decided to present its behavioral only value and its behavioral and attitudinal measure: a decision which follows, probably, from the criticisms of the Political Action scale construction. The items used for the Civil Disobedience Index were participation in strikes, occupations, illegal demonstrations. The second index, the one measuring Legal Uninstitutionalized Participation, was instead composed of singleitem answers to questions on participation in boycotts, petitions, legal demonstrations and citizen initiatives. In both cases, the conclusions were similar. Using the Civil Disobedience Index, France had the highest value on both the behavioral only and behavioral and attitudinal scales. France ranked first with 20.6% for the behavioral value19 and with 67.9% for the potential and action value (p. 80).20 According to the second index, France remained one of the high political activity countries in Europe. For what concerns the behavioral value of Legal Uninstitutionalized Participation, French citizens ranked second with 12.7%;21 for the behavioral and potential score, France represented the third highest value with 59.1%, behind Germany with 66% and Great Britain with 65.4% (p. 82). Overall, Kaase’s conclusions were rightly convergent on the finding that “only the French are relatively active, and way above the European average” (p. 80). Dekker, Koopmans and van den Brock (1997) employ a combination of European values survey data and records on protest mobilization from newspaper articles between 1977 and 1989 to classify France as a case of “relatively radical protest repertoire” (p. 229) when it comes to behavior in a European framework. France’s record includes the highest percentage of violent protest events (33%) during the period considered (p. 228). Bréchon’s index of direct political participation (read unconventional activism) follows more closely the methodological inheritance of the



Indexes and scales: Past examples


Anglo-Saxon school. After a 7-point index developed in the Political Action volume, and a 5-point index developed in Mayer and Perrineau (1992a), Bréchon uses WVS data on France from 1981 and 1990 to dichotomize a 5-point index on unconventional political activism. Following Mayer and Perrineau in using the same questions (approval of material damages, painting of slogans on walls, building occupation, street protest demonstration and strikes) to create the index, Bréchon considers all the respondents with a score of at least two as strong political activists, supporting Kaase’s reading of a renewed protest-style activity in France, as well as Mayer and Perrineau’s conclusion regarding the 1988 data, in addition to Boy and Mayer’s updated analysis with 1995 data, using the same index construction methodology. This latest approach of data assembling has the characteristic of being particularly rigorous and precise. An opposite example would have been the already cited work by Topf, in which, as the author himself first recognizes,22 there is no clear reading on whether it is the conventional or non-conventional aspect of political participation that generates an increase in political activity in Europe overall, and particularly in France. However, Topf’s real contribution lies in his focus on modes of political activism. For instance, in a table in his contribution to Beliefs in Government (Table 3.5, p. 74) the four modes of involvement considered (apathetic, detached, expressive and instrumental) present an interesting interpretation on the increase of political participation from a different angle. The focus is not on simple quantity, nor on style of involvement, but rather on the possible causes of political participation. These quick examples of previous indexes are important to understand the validity of the index measures used in this volume. Starting from the choice of multiple variables representing political participation in the next sections and the development of indexes of political activism and social capital in the next two chapters, this operationalization of the variables allows for a clearer testing of the hypotheses.

Does France fit then? The overview of research and studies on political action in France, as a single case or in a comparative framework, shows that the French example has struggled to match up to other countries’ findings. Differences in levels of political activity as well as in styles of political involvement are combined with different types of measures and methodologies employed. The country is unquestionably a prominent



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case of political engagement, but the forms and shapes of political action are not so typical, especially when compared with similar democracies. For a clear and sound understanding, the French model of political participation should include all the typical socio-demographic variables, basic value orientations, economic as well as cultural aspects, the institutional constraints present and the direct, as well as intervening, effects of association membership on social and political integration. It is through the combination of those elements that a more comprehensive explanation of the participation level of individuals in politics can be achieved. As much as on the right side of the equation for the political activism model (the independent variables), the components on the left side (the dependent variables) should also be able to represent, as broadly as possible, the different elements of the political participation concept. Contrary to the use of voting turnout as the only or most important measure of political participation, the dependent variable side in the equation model on citizen political activism should therefore vary, to include as much as possible the multiple aspects and levels of political activism: 1. Conventional-individual level participation 2. Group-based participation 3. Protest type participation These three variables better represent the multiple dimensionality of the participation phenomenon, but they also allow for a more precise study of the relationship between some variables and different forms of political activity. The measure of any of the three possible participation variables relates specifically to the individuation of a particular relationship between the independent variables and the type of participation considered. The operationalization problem of the different participations runs parallel to the definitional dilemma presented in the interpretations section in the previous chapter. It is therefore time to get familiar in the next chapter with the conceptualization of the research paradigm and its operationalization, with a more technical presentation of the hypothesis testing section of the project. All the variables presented so far as determinants of political participation modes, as well as the different approaches used in the literature, will be helpful tools to understand the functioning and importance of a political participation paradigm connecting styles of




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action with levels of involvement. The connection between levels of activism and citizens’ forms of social involvement is key to the explanation of the French situation, in particular when compared to similar relationships in other countries. Chapter 4 introduces the bases of the French paradox of political activism.


4

As the culmination of the long development of the French political action paradigm, this chapter starts with a direct discussion based upon the three specific research questions in this volume. 1) Is France strongly politically active? How? 2) Does France consequently have a high level of social capital as well? How is it measured? 3) Where does France stand in comparison to other countries in regard to the link between political activism and social integration? The general hypothesis is that the stronger the level of political participation recorded in France, the more likely the country is to have a well-developed social capital wealth, as social integration induces to political participation. Due to some evidence, France is therefore an important test case of this important link, as presented in the previous chapters. The first section provides a general summary of the main conclusions presented thus far, adds the specific details on the levels and types of political action considered and measured in this research, and introduces the sources for the data used. The second section follows this path by testing the first hypothesis of the research, in regard to forms of conventional and unconventional political action, with a longitudinal view over the 1980s–1990s.

Participation vs. activism: The French paradox The literature on political participation, whether strictly related to the French case or not, supports the general argument regarding an 71



Political Activism and Social Capital: The French Perspective


increase in quantity and quality of political activism. The general “cognitive” citizen, as presented in the findings in the previous chapters, is present in the French political environment as well. According to the data on the political participation phenomenon, France has shown that Tocqueville’s country belongs to the group of cases that have confirmed a constantly active political commitment in the past three decades. The center of the discussion regarding France, and its political participation level, concerns the idea that the French case differs regarding the causes that led to its current position as a very politically active country. Nevertheless, France fits the pattern of political activism, since the country reflects the same type of evolution in political involvement as other cases studied. In this context, the paradox of the French case rests upon the fact that the relationship between independent and dependent variables in the French situation does not correspond to the previous findings asserted by the political participation theory. Although the data on French political action levels support the French cognitive evolution, with rather high percentages of individuals involved both conventionally and unconventionally, the group of participants who actually belong or act in a politically based organization is comparatively small. In this regard, the research in this book claims that France had an unbalanced political action development, which did increase political activity (whether conventional [Grunberg, 1996, p. 34]1 or protest-oriented [Mayer and Perrineau, 1992a]), but it did so mostly at the individual level, without a parallel evolution of a proportionate collective level political activity. This interpretation would explain why even with an associational life, the intensity of militancy in France has declined (Schain, 2006, p. 148). One of the participation dimensions the literature has considered throughout the research on political activism has been an opposition between individual action and collective action. As Colette Ysmal has highlighted in her study on the French electorate, social and political integration acts on different aspects of political participation through organizations (Ysmal, 1988, p. 108). For the first time, the 1978 CEVIPOF study on that year’s political elections has delineated a new type of politically active citizen: an active “homo politicus” who participated consistently in the political domain, but who refused, at the same time, any form of collective level engagement (Ysmal, 1988, p. 112).2 A specific rejection of any type of “political belonging” to groups or communities, reflected, in part, a sense of mistrust and disappointment towards the effectiveness of the political system represented mainly



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by political parties. In sum, France seems to show evidence regarding an active political citizen, whose political activism repertory is varied and broad, but who engages in political action, conventional and not, mostly at the individual level, betraying the social integration element of the association proximity paradigm. France could therefore challenge the claim presented by social capital theorists who argue that, generally, individuals who join or volunteer for associations are more likely to be involved in society, including in its political domain. In the French case, social capital does not have the same type of relevance in relation to political participation levels that studies on other countries have stressed. French citizens appear to be more active today, politically speaking, but their type of political commitment is almost exclusively individually based, away from forms of collective involvement such as, for examples, memberships in political parties, trade unions, or other politically oriented organizations. Any paradigm attempting to explain the strongly increased political activism in France should try to account for the lack of collective social integration. If the French case shows supporting data for a high level of political activism, measured in different ways, and low corresponding levels of social integration commitment, such as association proximity, measured by either membership in politically based organizations or unpaid activity in such associations, then in order to explain the French case the paradigm should be modified accordingly. Such findings, achieved through a quantitative testing of the hypothesis of a French paradox, would defy the widely supported arguments of a strong, positive correlation between social integration and political participation. The use of the association proximity variable in the French case can contribute to the refinement of the argument introducing political participation as a variable dependent on social commitment in society (civic participation). France has defied the social capital paradigm of such authors as Tocqueville (originally), Robert Putnam (1993, 2000), and many social movement scholars who have always emphasized the importance of social participation in associations as a leading element in the determination of a steady political activism in democracies. The French situation questions the social capital findings so far presented for other countries, and can show that social capital is not an indispensable element for the development of a rich, active political participation in a democratic system. The study of the French case tests the position that social capital itself is both necessary and sufficient to bring democracy to any country (Krishna, 2002, pp. 14–15).



Political Activism and Social Capital


If the French example supports the interpretation of a global, improved citizen involvement in politics overall, it remains to be determined how well France fits the rest of the cognitive paradigm and of its derivative statements. The first question to ask is how the country host of the French Revolution copes today with forms of political activism outside its traditional frame. Part of the discussion, in the political science discipline, aims at underlining how an increased political activism could focus mostly on innovative means of political action. In the French case, the importance of unconventional political action may have a stronger relevance due to France’s historical experience with “non-traditional” means of protest. Gérard Grunberg seems to support this interpretation when he envisions a mass return to political action in France, after the 1980s apathy, but mostly in a protest-styled form, as a sort of reaction to disappointment and mistrust of the French system of political parties’ institutional control (Grunberg, 1996, p. 40). This position has been supported repeatedly: equally significant were examples of farmers’ demonstrations in 1990, fishermen’s protests in 1994 and just in the fall of 2005 suburban riots on the part of underprivileged residents. Without going into details on the importance of the French Revolution in the European political landscape, it appears evident that France’s flirting with unconventionality in political action can hardly be questioned. Although some forms of unconventional political protest may be the typical form of political action for some social categories, like students or members of the working class (Grunberg, 1996, p. 39), their relevance in the French case applies to society at large. For this reason, the first part of this investigation must deal with the study of the relationship between forms of political action in France. The hypothesis to be tested is whether France actually shows a preference for either conventional or unconventional means of political activism on its path to an increased commitment to citizen participation in the political domain. Since France has escaped several milestone studies on the relevance of protest activity as a form of effective political action, does the French case resemble those of Germany, the US and the Netherlands as presented in the Political Action volume? In following a clearly cognitive evolution of citizen involvement in politics, does France rely more on a specific form of political activism? Respecting the several statements on the constant need to redefine what conventional and unconventional is (Denni, 1986, p. 12; Grunberg, 1996, p. 39), once this first part of the hypothesis is tested, the subsequent step in the research relates to the application



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of the social capital paradigm to the French political activism phenomenon. In this context, the second part of the hypothesis testing refers to the interpretation of social capital theory in connecting social integration to political participation. Acknowledging what Tocqueville, and later on Putnam, stated, a French case with a probable high, strong political participation should support the theory that bases its relevance on social commitment as a main element in determining political activity in society. Since France can show this high, active political involvement, France should also reveal, according to social capital convictions, a strong, enthusiastic form of social integration, as a solid base of individual social involvement, and, consequently, political activism. How good of a fit then is France, according to the social capital paradigm? Do high levels of political activism in the hexagon derive from a strong social integration variable, respecting therefore the social capital theory? (see Figure 4.1). The heart of this research lies in the idea that France defies the social capital theory assumptions, and, as a matter of fact, undermines the statement that a strong, positive correlation between political participation and social integration is the most relevant explanation of levels of activism. The reasons for this challenging argument are found on one side in (1) the incorrect formulation of social capital theory, and on the other in (2) the context-specific elements of the French political environment. The main assumption behind the civil society contention has based the relationship between social integration and political activism exclusively at the collective level of individual involvement. Social capital cannot develop, unless there is a group: individuals need others to enjoy Social Capital Theory

Political Participation

French Case

Political Participation

Social Integration

Figure 4.1

Social Integration

Social capital theory and the French exception





and contribute to the creation of social capital. The studies of Tocqueville, Putnam and new social movements have correlated examples of social commitment to collective forms of involvement (associations, organizations and any type of groups socially organized) with politically oriented activism. However, social integration theory, as presented so far, has neglected types of political participation that might be individually based only. Therefore, while it is definitively proven that social organizations are a correlated variable with collective political activism (whether in political parties, trade unions, professional associations or any other politically- or non politically-based citizen associations), it remains to be assessed whether an individually-based type of political action is always correlated with forms of social integration. In particular, in cases when levels of organization memberships are low, and corresponding values for activism are high, the circumstance prompts a new investigation of the assumed correlation between the two variables. Civil society arguments, as well as social integration studies, have neglected this possible particular case in their research. Since the French case shows a strong, individually-based type of political participation, in different styles and forms, its case could not conform, at least so far, to social integration theory, leaving French citizens mostly in a situation of “anomaly”. If social integration models would consider the level of political activism involved, social capital studies would realize that social capital is not indispensable to achieve a strong and constant form of citizen political participation in society. The presentation of social capital as sufficient and necessary for democracy cannot explain the French situation satisfactorily. Individual level political activism can develop independently from a strong base of social capital. France represents that case, so far neglected: it shows high levels of political activism, conventional and non-conventional, at the individual level, but it does not show the same intensity for the group-based level of political involvement. In considering the political participation variable, the hypothesis testing will operationalize political involvement according to its level of engagement: namely, individual or collective. Questioning Denni’s statement that “Every behavior can, in a particular circumstance, become a means of political expression”3 (1986, p. 16), the first step in developing the research hypothesis is the categorization of different types of political participation actions. As presented in the initial part of Chapter 2, an official, broadly agreed upon consensus on how to group political activities does not exist;4 but, in order to test the paradigm introduced in this volume, a formal operationalization of the political



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Levels

Means of Political Participation: Engagement Scale

4 – ACTIVE

PROTEST

Non-Conventional

A. to cause material damages B. to paint slogans on walls C. to occupy an administrative building D. to take part in street demonstrations E. to go on strike

3 – ACTIVE

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Conventional Collective

A. to get in contact with officials on social problems B. to get in contact with official at the local or national level on particular problems C. to form a group to solve local problems D. to join and participate actively in local organizations E. to work with others on local problems

(identification)

2 – ACTIVE

INDIVIDUALISM

Conventional

A. to send messages of support or complaint to politicians B. to get in contact with officials at the local or national level on particular problems C. to attend political meetings D. to convince friends to vote accordingly E. to actively participate in political discussions F. to be informed about politics

Individual (individuation)

1 – PASSIVE SUPPORT (identification)

A. to vote at elections (collective identity)

0–

APATHY

The activity categories have been compiled using as sources: Mayer and Perrineau (1992a, pp. 15, 17, 132), who refer themselves to other sources.

activity items is indispensable for the hypothesis testing section of the research. For this reason, Table 4.1 presents a summary of the levels of political participation variables used in the discipline, as a way to categorize the elements that should be included in the construction of the political activity scales for quantitative testing. Beyond the apathy level (0), which identifies a total indifference for political activity or any type of involvement, the first level of political participation considered is voting, labeled as passive support (1). Following what the literature has



Table 4.1 Engagement scale


already assessed, namely that voting is an expression of political participation aside from other forms of conventional political activity,5 and that it represents today a very mild type of engagement6 depending on several uncontrolled elements, such as timing of elections and importance of individual vote, it remains clear that voting is not a strong form of political expression, but a very weak one in relation to other types of possible political activity. If voting has been considered as a “zero degree” engagement (Grunberg, 1996, p. 33), it still maintains for some scholars a relevance that is much more than formal: Grunberg, for instance, includes it in his research on political participation evolution because every citizen’s political vote expresses that individual’s belonging to the country’s decisions. The vote for some scholars reflects the first step of the political participation phenomenon. The subsequent level of political involvement, according to the engagement scale presented below, is individual conventional activism (2). Conventional political activity at the individual level represents that “individuation” stage of political involvement (Perrineau, 1994): the individual’s personal political realization separated from forms of collective identification represented, for instance, by political party membership. The political citizen who performs any of the six actions associated with this level of participation corresponds to the newly established cognitive citizen. At this level, the means of participation used are conventional ones, and they require a minimum to medium amount of engagement. From the strongest type of involvement, the actions recorded are: (A) to send messages of support or complaint to politicians, (B) to get in contact with officials at the local or national level on particular problems, (C) to attend political meetings, (D) to convince friends to vote accordingly, (E) to actively participate in political discussions and (F) to be informed7 about politics. The third level of participation on the scale corresponds to the active collective conventional (3) stage, equivalent to the social movements case. Citizens at this level of engagement prefer to act collectively, feeling the need for a new “identification” within a group (political parties, trade unions, professional organizations, and so on), through which their political activity becomes possible. The types of means used are still conventional ones, and require a medium to high intensity of commitment. According to the individuals’ intention of engagement and the political structure opportunity, the types of action, from the more demanding ones downward, are: (A) to contact officials on social problems, (B) to contact officials at the local or national level on particular problems, (C) to form a group to solve local problems, (D) to join and



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participate actively in local organizations and (E) to work with others on local problems. The fourth level of participation, active non-conventional (4), goes beyond the individual or collective dimension of activism. The focus of protest action is on the non-conventional means used. At this stage, the intensity level of political participation is the highest one possible, and individuals strongly feel the need to be heard. Protest activity posits five types of action, from the least involving one to the most challenging one: (E) to go on strike, (D) to take part in street demonstrations, (C) to occupy administrative buildings, (B) to paint slogans on walls, (A) to cause material damages. The literature mentioned in Chapter 2, together with the data introduced so far, as well as in the next section of this chapter, confirm the interpretation of a French case with high values of active political participation at the conventional individual (1) and non-conventional (4) levels. At the same time, the French political situation seems to show a corresponding weak level of collectively based political activism (3): French political activists, whether using conventional or protest-styled means of expression, increase their intensity of political involvement as expected according to the general cognitive evolution, but they also seem to skip, on purpose, one level of political participation, in order to avoid collective forms of political action. The operationalization of the different levels of political activism (individual, collective and protestoriented) as explained below will become the first methodological step in the hypothesis testing of the missing collective political action element. The relationship, quantitatively established among the different components of political participation, could confirm whether the collective type of political involvement is, indeed, the least favored one among French citizens. The relevance of this improved political participation paradigm questions the validity of resource mobilization theory studies, which have unconditionally tied political involvement to organizational strategies (Klandermans, 1988; Melucci, 1985; Tarrow, 1988, 1991). In addition to undermining the findings of mobilization research on the need for a good organization, as a means to be able to activate the political involvement of some elements in society,8 the so-far-missed consideration of the actual level of political activism, especially in the French case, dismisses the reliability of network strategies of mobilization as indispensable, and necessary, schemes to create guided political activity (Klandermans, 1986, 1988; Kriesi, 1993). Consequently, the French case can support the existence of a new window of opportunities in relation





to participation in political arenas. The most important element remains the possibility for the individual to choose whether to act independently from associations. If indeed the participant’s preferred level of commitment is not group-based, then it could be implied that association mobilization strategies might not work in the French case. French participants might be able to resist involvement in associations with political goals, indirectly supporting claims that rational choice interpretations of personal motivations for political involvement are correct. The second element defying the validity of social capital paradigms relates to the specificities of the French case, in particular to the formation of the political participation tradition. Several elements in the literature on political activism – the Anglo-Saxon school as well as the French cluster – have emphasized the French case as an environment where the typical relationships among variables have been somewhat altered. It remains difficult to pinpoint exactly the elements contributing to the French situation. Among the many possible explanatory variables, the opposition between “individuation” and “identification” (Perrineau, 1994), a type of political activity based on direct action more than on delegation (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992a; Favre and Fillieule, 1995), and the traditional weakness of political parties and trade unions (Leca, 1989, p. 61; Bréchon, 1994, p. 164;9 Ion, 1997) are the most frequent sources of evidence to be cited. At the same time, the tradition of protesting against something (usually the State) more than in favor of something else (Favre and Fillieule, 1995; also Leca, 1989, p. 53, regarding the role of the French state as guarantor of every citizen’s social, political and economic rights), as well as today’s undermined relationship between ideological positioning and political objectives, due to the increased weakening of ideological identification even in the French political environment (Ion, 1994, 1997), are all explanations widely used in participation studies. Completing the framework of possible accounts, the 1901 Association Law that has imposed, and still does, a formal, official registration of every type of association with the Préfecture, no matter how small the proposed association might be, has contributed to constrain French individuals’ attitudes towards engagement at the collective level. Yet, the registration must occur only when the association needs a legal persona and does not require any communication of any sort when the same group ceases to exist. Although passed more than a century ago, the 1901 Association Law has marked an important new phase in how citizens look at the State. The relevance of the law is still today remarkable; some authors glorify it as “one of the greatest founding texts of democracy” (Franchi, 1986,



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p. 12). In essence, it stated for the first time a new vision for the country, as groups of individuals were now able to promote collective interests in addition to the State. This signaled the end of the “subordination of private initiative to public action” (Barthélemy, 2007, p. 5), empowering associations of private citizens to represent society’s general interest. The French providing State was no longer the only actor to know better about the nation’s interests. Much later, the French government actually worked to reinforce the presence of associations in society, supporting associational life through the creation of the National Council of Associational Life (CNVA), with a decree in 1983. In this new institution, the Prime Minister has access to a group of advisers with the scope to study and research developing measures towards associational life in France. For as much as a required registration may limit some associations from coming to life, the benefits of state support seem to outbalance the possible disadvantages. All explanatory factors above have not, however, prevented French citizens from developing a strong, solid and active pattern of political behavior, conventional as well as non-conventional, away from their weak individual engagement into collective forms of social integration. France’s political context has defied the social integration theory of social capital as a necessary and indispensable element for an active political society and it should be considered as an essential case for any related hypothesis testing. The consequences of a reformulated paradigm of political participation in the French model, challenging the hypothesis stated by social capital theorists, could have serious implications for political action studies at large. If, on one side, Tocqueville might still be right on the assumption that France lacks the collective type of integration that a society “ought to develop” for the sake of a vivid and functioning democracy, this missing collective element in French society has not prevented the strong development of constant, individual political involvement across time. In the French case, the lack of well-developed collective political activity does not challenge either the quantity or the quality of a political participation element which is active and in good health. The relevance of such a claim, against the broadly acknowledged statements on the necessity of social capital as a primary element for a good, healthy political activity in a democracy, can be summarized in three points: 1. Social capital based research seems to be missing an important variable in the qualification of what type of political activity





social integration can actually lead to. Levels of political activism (individual or collective) in conventional and non-conventional types of political participation do have an impact on the importance of the social integration theory. In particular, societies with strong individual types of political engagement do develop effective political activity, even in the absence of a rich, well-developed stock of social capital (integration) of associations, organizations or any other collective-level type of personal involvement in society (whether politically oriented or not). 2. A case can be made that in order to develop constant, effective political participation (as a base for a stable, healthy democratic practice), the development of strong associational involvement is not essential as social capital theory asserts. Without any doubt, a good social movements network would strengthen the solidity of political activism in a society, but its lack thereof would not prevent the development of a strong, lively political activism, in different styles. 3. The use of the French case can show that a quantitative testing of social integration theory can identify a better model to be used. The problem with the social involvement research claims relates not so much to the type of social activity considered (strictly politically oriented or not), but to the type of political commitment included in the study. A result that could superficially be regarded as an anomaly based upon social activism analysis, it can, instead, present the research with a further clarification on how the individual’s relationship between social and political involvement actually works. Dismissing the relevance of an individually based style of political participation because it is not the final product of collective forms of association, identification and consequent commitment would simply neglect an important aspect of the multiple faces of political activism. All the dimensions of involvement in the political domain should be studied as possible pertinent elements in the general concept of individual political activity. Both individual and collective forms of political action equally belong to the field of citizens’ political involvement. Social capital theory should incorporate both dimensions in the presentation of its political participation analytical paradigm. In order to verify the validity of such analytical claims, the stages of the hypothesis testing part of the project will build on three steps of analysis. The first step to be presented in the remainder of this chapter concerns the data on French political participation: testing whether France does represent a case of strong political activism, measured by different variables used in the discipline in previous research. The second



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step as explained in the next chapter is a logical consequence of the testing of the social theory paradigm. The section on “Social Capital Levels and Measures” in France will provide longitudinal data on the development of social integration into associations, organizations and any group that could be referred to as politically oriented. A simple, initial comparison between data from these two sections will reveal whether France can indeed be pointed to as a case of increased political participation, corresponding to an equally increased or strong level of social capital potential. After this general overview of the findings on French political activism and collective level social involvement, the last section in Chapter 5 will introduce a more in-depth analysis of the datasets used to examine the political participation paradigm in the French case. The methodological part of the chapter will present the questions used and the index construction procedure followed, as well as introduce the main results on the participation scales and the initial statistical analyses. The evidence in the subsequent sections will highlight whether France can, and how it can, fit the social capital model: if the relationship between strong social and political participants still holds, its relevance for French political activism is insignificant. Other groups in the population might be very active politically without showing any important correlation to the social integration variable, especially when the study deals with political integration. The first group of answers to the research questions on political activism in France is presented in the next section.

Typical French activists: Data on French political participation intensity As the first step of the hypothesis testing, it is important to examine whether France can still be grouped together with other cases recording high levels of political participation. Using different types of studies, including French and North American publications, as a way to guarantee the most ample consideration of the term political participation, several authors using multiple (at times contrasting) measures have overall agreed that France does exhibit consistently high levels of political action, especially when non-conventional forms of political activism are introduced in the research.10 To support that claim, this section presents further data on political participation levels in France respecting the general division in the literature between conventional and non-conventional forms of political activity. The sources for most of the quantitative data presented below are three databases: (1) “Le Baromètre





du Fait Régional. L’action Régionale: Images et Attentes (1998)”, from the Observatoire Interrégional du Politique (OIP); (2) the “World Values Survey” No.6160, 1990–1993, whose French data section, administered in 1990 as well as in 1981, has similar, if not identical, questions on political participation, in its several components; (3) the “European Values Survey” No. 3975, 1999–2000, whose French questionnaire was administered in 1999. These datasets, overall, have information on enough of the different participation activity items, as presented in Table 4.1 in the previous section, to allow a rather thorough and reliable hypothesis testing of the proposed French political paradigm. The measures available concerning conventional political participation are unfortunately limited to11 the political action type A of level 1 (voting activity), types E and F, and in some measure C (included as the individual’s declared proximity to a political party) of level 2. In relation to level 3 – collective conventional political participation – the datasets have information regarding the political action cases E and D, for politically-oriented associations as well as non-politically-oriented associations. Corresponding data available for level 4 of the engagement scale – non-conventional political activism – are fortunately complete for three of the datasets considered: WVS (1981, 1990) and EVS (1999).

Conventional political participation Levels of conventional political participation in France have always suggested strong citizen activism in the political domain. Starting from the first level of political activity according to the scale in Table 4.1 in the previous section, the voting turn-out variable confirms that, on average, 75–80% of the electorate has actually voted in the national political elections during the 1980s–1990s (Lewis-Beck, 1993a). Although showing supporting evidence for a constantly high and stable electoral participation,12 the French case also underlines expected variations among different levels of electoral participation (local, regional, national and EU supranational level), supporting the interpretation that the voter does indeed grasp the political relevance of the type of elections for which the citizens’ votes are required.13 The strength of electoral turnout in France is unquestionable, even in light of more recent cases of abstentionism. French citizens appreciate the voting procedures and follow political campaigns to make a decision. Aside from electoral activity, another element for judging the level of conventional political activism in France is the evolution of the individual’s political interest. As already highlighted in Tables 2.1 and 2.2



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(Chapter 2), France confirms the general Western European country’s steady increase in political interest among citizens. Data from the OIP (1998) (Graph 4.1) confirm that the percentage of individuals who claimed to have a strong or rather strong interest in politics has remained on average constant during the 1990s14 (about 40% of the sample interviewed). Equivalent conclusions can be reached using different datasets. The 40% cap of respondents who show a strong or rather strong political interest appears in the CEVIPOF survey data as well. Graph 4.2 shows a slightly different interpretation of French citizens’ relationship with politics. If both CEVIPOF and OIP data place France in perfect accordance with the political interest variable interpretation, showing high levels of political interest for a country that fully follows

40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 1993

1994

Very Much Graph 4.1

1995

1996

Rather

1997

Somewhat

1998 None

Interest in politics in France – aggregate regional data15

Source: “Le Baromètre du Fait Régional. L’action Régionale: Images et Attentes”, Observatoire Interrégional du Politique (1993–1998). Regional averages.

60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 1981 Very Graph 4.2

1990 Some

Not Very

1999 Not at All

Interested in politics

Source: World Values Survey (1981, 1990) and European Values Survey (1999).





the political participation cognitive evolution, a different result can be achieved with a rephrasing of the same question. The World and European Values Survey for 1981, 1990 and 1999 asked French citizens whether they were interested in politics (not how strong their political interest was). The findings highlight a decline in overall interest in politics for the 1981, 1990 and 1999 respondents. The main result can be seen regarding the percentage change of individuals not very interested in politics: that group of respondents increases from 11.2% (1981) to 30.9% (1999); at the same time, the group of respondents who claimed to have some interest in politics declined from 56.6% to 27.3%! Such a sharp decrease in interest in politics could be interpreted as a form of distrust in politics itself. Discussions in the literature on the relationship between the two different questions asked underline the fact that a question investigating the level of political interest measures the abstract interest of a person in politics (including the respondent’s more neutral interpretation of the word “politics”). The WVS question on interest in politics seems, instead, to be measuring the level of interest in actual politics, relating to a more concrete interpretation of the word “politics”,16 and therefore bringing out any possible negative feeling towards what politics might represent. In brief, if “political interest” is a measure of the intellectual level of interest in politics, “interested in politics” measures the actual, daily attachment of the individual to current political issues, including possible negative, less abstract views of what politics portrays. From this finding, OIP data can be used in a more interesting approach, pointing at the way in which the political interest variable has developed, depending on the cleavage considered for analysis. Keeping in consideration the type of relationship between each demographic variable and political participation (loosely defined)17 percentages of political interest for 1998 and some of the corresponding sample’s demographic elements reveal surprising results. The first interesting finding from an analysis of this type is the relationship in 1998 between political interest and gender (Graph 4.3). After a broad agreement in the research on the fact that, in general, the gender gap, especially for conventional political participation analyses, has slowly disappeared, thanks to increased education and higher income levels for women in the past 30 years, the French case seems to disprove that optimistic statement. In 1998, the ratio between men and women who stated that they were very much interested in politics was still two to one! The puzzling gap is confirmed by data from the same sample regarding those respondents who stated that they have no interest



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40.0% 35.0% 30.0% 25.0% 20.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0% Male Very Much Graph 4.3

Female Rather

Somewhat

None

Interest in politics and gender – 1998

Source: “Le Baromètre du Fait Régional. L’action Régionale: Images et Attentes”, Observatoire Interrégional du Politique (1998). Regional averages.

whatsoever in politics. While one-fifth of the male sample appeared to be not at all interested, almost one-third of women in the group had the same answer. A second surprising result comes from a cross-tabulation of the political interest variable and the respondent’s age group (Graph 4.4). In this instance as well, national level data for France show a steep, alarming gap between age groups interested in politics. Although the discipline overall still supports the interpretation of a positive relationship between age and conventional political participation levels, the type of strong correlation shown by the cross-tabulation is astonishing.18 The 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 18–24

25–34

Very Much Graph 4.4

35–49 Rather

50–64

65+

Somewhat

None

Interest in politics and age – 1998






50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% No Degree Elementary

Very Much Graph 4.5

High School Rather

College

Somewhat

Higher than College None

Interest in politics and education – 1998


ratio between the youngest age group (18–24) and the oldest one (65+) for what concerns the respondents who claimed to be very much interested in politics is two to one. The graph clearly shows a strong, positive correlation between age and political interest, with only less than onethird of individuals between the age of 18 and 34 having expressed a very strong political interest. On the contrary, for the same intensity of political interest, the percentage is higher than 40% for those above the age of 50. A third significant result can be assessed in Graph 4.5, where crosstabulation findings for political interest and education levels are presented in a visual format. Confirming the general statement of the political participation literature on the relationship between sophistication level and political interest, France shows a strong, consistent positive correlation between level of educational degree achieved and intensity of political interest. Only 5.1% of individuals with no degree claimed to be very much interested in politics, while the value for those with a degree higher than a college bachelor’s degree is almost four times as high (19.3%). The corresponding interpretation is highlighted by the data on the respondents who claimed no political interest whatsoever. If 46.9% of the respondents with no degree (almost half) claimed no political interest at all, only 11.4% of those with a degree higher than a postgraduate one and 18.9% of those with a university degree stated the same. An initial look at data on political participation and its relationship to the usual demographic variables supports, once again, the general



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statements in the research on political activism and its related elements. Data on the overall stability in the political interest variable also show some interesting details on the French participation situation. The 1998 OIP survey used confirms a still present gap for gender, age and education. While the strong, positive correlation between political interest, age and educational level corresponds to the general theory on the development of conventional activism, the gender gap seems to be a relevant element to study more closely. In regard to political interest, women seem to be lagging behind men, although this finding might not prevent an equally strong political activity for both genders. The main predictors of political participation seem to have a still strong predicting value, even in the French case, confirming the literature paradigm and the more specific direction of the correlations. If political interest may appear as a form of abstract variable of political participation, other questions measuring the more intellectual aspect of political involvement can help analyze the overall value of the political commitment variable in France. One element that can explain, for instance, the discrepancy concerning the political interest variable of the WVS and EVS, on one side, and the OIP data, on the other, is the relationship with the respondent’s assessment of the relevance of politics. Graph 4.6 reveals an important piece of information that is helpful in the reinterpretation of the findings of Graph 4.2. Those same individuals, who claimed to be less interested in politics, in relation to the previous survey in 1981 (although it was not a panel study), claimed that politics is not such an important issue of concern. As a matter of fact, 67.4% of the sample in 1990 and 64.6% of the 1999 sampled group declared that politics is not very or not at all important, giving 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% Very

Quite 1990

Graph 4.6

Not Very

Not at all

1999

Importance of politics variable19

Source: World Values Survey (1990) and European Values Survey (1999).





a good corresponding coherence to the answer for interest in politics. About one third of the respondents in both surveys still regarded politics as relevant, a number that has since increased to about 45% according to the 2004 Special Eurobarometer (European Commission, 2005, p. 72), placing France marginally above the EU25 average of 44%. This new evidence suggests that the findings from Graph 4.2 can be reassessed using the individual’s interpreted relevance of politics to state a person’s interest in political matters. As an overall expectation, political interest and perceived relevance of politics are intertwined: as the second variable increases, so does the first one, in a generally rationally understanding. Yet, van Deth has pointed out cases where higher levels of political interest have been associated with lower levels of importance in politics: in his opinion the possible effects of social capital (van Deth, 2000). The French case does not support that finding, on the contrary it shows how relevance of politics has increased parallel to interest in politics over the last two decades in general. Any possible restraining effect the individual’s personal interpretation of the importance of politics might have on the respondent’s interest in politics seems to lack the same impact on a more active measure of conventional political participation. Graph 4.7 highlights that more than one third of the sample (for all three surveys) never discussed politics. The same survey confirmed that while only about 11.8% often discuss politics, a stable half of the French sample discusses politics at times. These elements support the general interpretation, so far presented, that France does show stability and at least a medium, and at times strong, conventional political involvement. 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Often

At Times 1981

Graph 4.7

1990

Never 1999

Discuss politics variable

Source: World Values Survey (1981, 1990) and European Values Survey (1999).



90


91

Non-conventional political participation The research’s on-going reconsideration of what political participation represents has been a fundamental element in the introduction of nonconventional means of political activity in the study of participation. Besides the discipline’s obstacle to the study of protest activity as a useful and/or effective means of individual involvement in the political domain, the methodological aspect of the protest measure has also kept scholars discussing. Research projects using surveys as a way to identify the importance of protest in politics have struggled to establish the reliability of a measure of non-conventional political activity. Issues on whether to consider actual or potential behavior, equally present in the discussions on the conventional political participation measure, included another element of possible disagreement: the respondent’s reluctance to state honest opinions about forms of protest behavior even when only potential political activity was the subject of the study. Researchers had doubts on whether individuals would acknowledge activities that, when they were first measured in surveys, might have still been illegal. This reticence did not support, for sure, the reliability of the survey methodology, already questioned on the same issue in relation to conventional political activities. After several attempts (Marsh, 1979; Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Kaase, 1992), the literature on the political participation topic overcame the indisposition towards protest styled political activism. The inclusion of non-conventional means of individual political involvement led to a stronger base for analysis only with the increasing number of studies on the rising unconventionality of participation forms. The political participant’s more constant use of non-conventional means of political action became evidence itself of what a part of the research in the discipline tried to point out much earlier. Data on the protest styled political activities in France are available only from the 1980s on. The most complete and reliable source of information on French citizens’ positions towards unconventional political involvement are the World and European Values Surveys of



In conclusion, this first section on conventional political participation, measured by voting turnout, political interest and involvement in political discussions, reflects the general agreement in the literature presented in the previous chapters. The French case shows a consistent, strong political activism by conventional means. The same can be stated and supported by evidence for protest-style political commitment.


1981, 1990 and 1999. The question on political non-conventionality responded to the discussion on whether to measure potential or behavior, when the subject of analysis was strongly contested. The survey gains its incredible methodological validity in the choice made to measure non-conventional political activity. As a way to respond, in part, to methodological criticisms on previous attempts at measuring protest, the WVS questions aimed at measuring both potential and behavior, giving researchers an excellent source to test the actual, as well as potential, impact of protest activity, as a form of political participation. The question regarding protest activity included three different dimensions: (1) “have done” (behavior); (2) “might do” (attitude); and (3) “would never do” (negative aspect of potentiality). The respondent was therefore asked to reveal personal attitudes towards forms of protest political activity (sign petition, join a boycott, take part in lawful demonstrations, take part in unofficial strikes, occupy a building), and to state, at the same time, past behavior regarding those five forms of non-conventional activity. The importance of the attitudinal as well as behavioral measure of non-conventional political activity allowed authors to respond to previous criticisms concerning the actual impact of attitude on behavior, confirming the consistent, positive mild correlation between intention and action (not considering possible mobilizing elements of a specific political context). In the French case, data from 1981, 1990 and 1999 handed a double confirmation (Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4): • First, French citizens’ unconventional political activism was reflected across the five forms of protest activity. If signing a petition or taking part in lawful demonstrations remained the two most popular forms of political protest, 9% of the respondents who occupied a building (1999) and 12.6% of the individuals who took part in an unofficial strike confirmed the idea of a broad array of forms of action, even when unconventionality implies harder and riskier forms of protest. • Second, unconventional political participation in general is growing in France, whether measured by attitude or behavior. As a matter of fact, the gap between action and intention for lawful demonstrations has disappeared. More people in 1999 had participated in a lawful demonstration than individuals who had simply taken into account the possibility of doing it. The situation was the opposite in 1981. The only two forms of political protest to suffer a temporary decrease in 1990 (attitude measure) are unofficial strikes and building occupation, revealing a propensity for less violence-prone types



92

93

of unconventional political participation in the late 1980s. Yet, by 1999 the more demanding and challenging forms of unconventional political action record increased numbers, substantially more for the attitudinal measure in the survey. The simplest and least challenging form of unconventional activism, petition, also registers a remarkable increase over time, to the point where by the end of the 1990s this type of activity could be conventional in reality, as almost seven citizens in ten used it. The unconventional political participation data for the period 1980s–1990s in France seems to confirm that signing a petition and taking part in a lawful demonstration are the hardcore forms of protest activity, with a minority of French citizens20 assiduously using more “extreme” forms of activism. This introduction to a more detailed presentation of the French situation in relation to unconventional forms of political activism is consistently supported by several other sources of data. Topf’s use (1998) of the WVS data has led him to the conclusion that, in a more European comparative approach, France is indeed above average (57%, Europe: Table 4.2 Unconventional political activity – 1981 Type of Action Have Done Might Do Would Never Do Valid N.

Sign Petition

Join Boycott

Lawful Demonstration

Unofficial Strikes

Occupy Building

45.3% 33% 21.8%

11.5% 38.1% 50.4%

26.7% 31.5% 41.8%

10.1% 26.3% 63.6%

7.3% 25.6% 67.2%

1162

1113

1159

1127

1127

Source: World Values Survey (1981). Overall N. 1200.

Table 4.3 Unconventional political activity – 1990 Type of Action Have Done Might Do Would Never Do Valid N.

Sign Petition

Join Boycott


Unofficial Strikes

Occupy Building

53.7% 29% 17.3%

12.5% 40.2% 47.4%

32.7% 32.4% 34.8%

10.1% 24.9% 65.1%

7.9% 24.8% 67.4%

959

906

956

933

917

Source: World Values Survey (1990). Overall N. 1002.





Table 4.4

Unconventional political activity – 1999

Type of Action Have Done Might Do Would Never Do Valid N.

Sign Petition

Join Boycott


Unofficial Strikes

Occupy Building

68.3% 22.4% 9.2%

13.2% 43% 43.2%

39.7% 33.9% 26.4%

12.6% 31.9% 55.5%

9% 35.3% 55.7%

1592

1481

1568

1510

1503

Source: European Values Survey (1999). Overall N. 1615.

55.6%21 ). Based upon several components of political behavior above voting, Topf has created an index of political action in general, which he has dichotomized in strong activity (all cases above 2) and weak political involvement (all cases at 2 or below). In his group of countries with high political activity above voting, he places Germany and the Netherlands next to France, confirming the previous findings of the Political Action study. Questionable in this finding is not the strength of the French value according to the index, which is confirmed by other French studies (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992a, for instance), but the gap in the quantitative comparison of the French case with the others. According to Topf’s data, reproduced in Graph 4.8, France was already way above Germany and the Netherlands in 1981, but over the next 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 1981 France Graph 4.8

1990 Germany

The Netherlands

Political action index 2+

Source: Topf (1998): Percentage of those with strong political involvement (p. 69).



94

95

decade the French rate of increase in unconventional political activity is much lower than for the other two countries. In France, the percentage of individuals with high protest activity increased by 5%, while the other two countries increase by at least 9%. In a certain sense, the figures confirm France’s strongly active political protest levels, but they also question the possible French long-term evolution, since the country’s curve of protest activity seems to become less steep. For the scholar, it remains difficult to assert from this type of presentation of the data whether France represents the general pattern of participation evolution, or whether it is Germany or the Netherlands that represent the new trend in unconventional political protest. Whether France’s index of unconventional political activism is actually slowing down in the 1990s or not, Kaase’s analysis of political protest in France (and in Europe at large) in 1989 suggests that there is absolutely no doubt about the high level of unconventional political activity on French soil. Kaase’s construction of two indexes to measure political protest (1992), using Eurobarometer data (1989), leads him to assess the situation of protest activity based upon a Civil Disobedience Index (which includes strikes, occupations, illegal demonstrations) and a Legal Uninstitutionalized Participation Index (including boycotts, petitions, legal demonstrations). In both cases, the final conclusion is that France does have one of the highest, if not the highest, spots on the unconventional participation country list. Kaase’s analysis clearly shows that France ranks first, with 20.6% of the sample interviewed for the Civil Disobedience Index (p. 80) expressing a high behavioral value.22 Confirming high protest action data, France retains its first spot for the same index using both the potential and action measures, with 67.9%, ahead of Great Britain, second with 60.7%. Taking into consideration the Legal Uninstitutionalized Participation Index, the data support Kaase’s interpretation of the French case. French citizens ranked second on their behavioral value, with 12.7% of the sample having a high legal, but uninstitutionalized, participation.23 The potential and behavioral measure for the same index ranks France third with 59.1%, behind Germany first with 66% and Great Britain second with 65.4%. Overall, the analysis of France’s actual position in the unconventional political participation scene is overwhelmingly supported by the different indexes used. Bréchon’s construction of a political protest index (1994) to assess the French longitudinal pattern validates again not only the WVS and EVS data (1981, 1990, 1999) but also the methodological logic of a 5-point index (used by Mayer and Perrineau as well), instead of




96


60% 50% 40% 30%

10% 0% 1981

1990 0

Graph 4.9

1

2

3+

Political Protest Action Index – number of activities (France)

Source: Bréchon (1994, p. 175).

the 7-point one presented by the Political Action project. By considering actual behavior regarding protest action, Bréchon assesses the reliability of the five items incorporated in the survey: material damages, slogan painting, building occupation, street protest and strike.24 The Political Protest Action Index presented by Bréchon measures the number of protest actions expressed by the respondents in 1981 and 1990. Data in Graph 4.9 reveal the general increase in political protest actions, with a 7% decrease in no actual protest behavior, and a slight increase in the other forms of political protest, except for the category with one action only. The main result is the 50% increase in the category of individuals who stated two protest actions in 1981. Upward protest participation does not imply, however, a more effective or meaningful means of political activity. The overall stability or increase in political participation in France, in different styles, as summarized by Boy and Mayer (1993b), seems to be related more to the expressive aspect of participation than to its instrumental goal. Topf’s ratio of instrumental over expressive political participation (using WVS 1981, 1990) shows that France’s value went from 3.2 in 1981, to 1.1 in 1990. The reason behind such a decline rests upon the 11% decrease in instrumental unconventional political activity, and a parallel 16% increase in expressive protest behavior (1998, p. 85). As a possible implication, if quantity of protest activity has indeed gone up, its real value, namely the instrumental use of unconventional political participation, has actually lost momentum, and, it has, maybe, undermined the whole relevance of an increased protest activism. Interpretations of protest movements by sociologists at the time may have been more relevant



20%

97

in light of this change. Yet, more detailed research on this particular aspect of unconventional activity dismisses this concern. Survey data of actual participants at a demonstration in Paris in February and March 1995 show a much higher level of instrumentality in the individual’s perception of protest activity. Answers from the datasets compiled by Pierre Favre and Olivier Fillieule25 hand two important confirmations on the interpretation of the French political activity situation. First, those French citizens who were unconventionally active did prefer unconventional political activity to conventional means of political participations. To the question “Here is a list of means people use to make their opinions and claims heard. Would you be ready to use them?”, the respondents approved as follows: “(Non-Conventional participation) Strike 95%, Petition Signing 94%, Participation in illegal demonstration 94%; (Conventional participation) Wear a pin 79%, Contacting your representative 77%”. The second finding from this innovative methodology of surveying actual participants during demonstrations shows that individuals who manifest such a high level of protest behavior and potential do actually consider it to be effective, supporting a more instrumental role for protest activity, besides its possible expressive dimension. To the question about the effectiveness of the participation means used, the respondents stated: “(Non-Conventional activity) Strike 92%, Petition signing 63%, Participation in illegal demonstration 88%; (Conventional activity) Wearing a pin 50%, Contacting your representative 65%”. People who were participating in a street demonstration actually displayed a high instrumentality for the type of political activity they were choosing. The individual’s interpretation of whether unconventional political activity retains its original strength and effectiveness in relation to less effective, but also more acceptable, forms of conventional involvement is supported by longitudinal data on people’s general positioning vis-à-vis protest behavior. The puzzle suggests that there is indeed a minority of unconventional protesters who might determine the rather strong political participation phenomenon in France (see also Table 5.4 and Graph 5.4 for related analysis in the next chapter). Once again, the information presented expresses the general doubt among some scholars about how to clearly measure participation, and not potential or intention to, if specific context mobilizing factors are not accounted for.26 A more detailed analysis should also consider the availability of protest action to participate in, and whether the respondent questioned about such unconventional activity can determine a priori circumstances that could





change a person’s approval for a type of action. The protest opportunity element remains an intervening variable to assess not only the country’s level of unconventional activism, but also the country’s success in turning potential into action. The overall conclusions from this first section of the hypothesis testing suggest that France enjoys a strong, lively and consistent political activism, according to different measures used, and different styles of participation considered. The second phase of the analysis in the next chapter considers whether the same country that shows such a lively political participation environment is also a case of strong social capital, with a high level membership and activity rate in politically oriented associations. Chapter 5 includes the introduction to the data collected on associations and members in France, as well as the indexes construction section in preparation for a more thorough comparative analysis of the French political activism case.



98

5

The discussion on forms and intensities of political action in France in the previous chapter has confirmed the long-term strong activism that the country has been known for. When dealing with conventional political participation, or even more particularly in cases of protest activity, the French numbers from different databases have all provided a unanimous verdict. French activism in politics is alive and strong; citizens are interested in their role in democracy and make sure they are heard, regardless of the situation. The political activism of the 1980s and 1990s, up until the early 2000s, cannot be used as a proxy measure for an equal level of social and political integration. If social integration should function as a springboard for political engagement, the evidence on political activism in France cannot equally represent the level of social capital in French society. This chapter tests the assessment of social capital in France, looking particularly at association membership and activity from different sources of data. The results create an indirect comparison with the levels of political activism already presented and are useful to calibrate the validity of social capital theory when the link between social and political integrations is considered. The second part of the chapter introduces the specific indexes as they are calculated from measures in the survey data employed in the research. The technicalities of the three indexes, one for conventional activism, the second for unconventional participation and the third for social integration, are an initial step towards the statistical analysis in Chapter 6. The findings from this chapter highlight another set of conclusions in regards to the uneven development of political engagement and social involvement in France. 99



Social Capital in France

100


The importance of association proximity, as the social capital argument has sometimes been referred to, is not always accepted by all scholars. Whether some authors claim that it is impossible to relate social integration to political participation (Leca, 1989, p. 61), it remains evident that active political activity has always been correlated in the discipline with high levels of association interest. Yet the research cannot disprove in what measure the correlation is a spurious one, namely a relationship due to other intervening factors, common to both variables. The social capital literature has been convincing when presenting social participation in collective forms of aggregation as a “multiplying factor” (Lancelot, 1968) of political activity. Once again, the relationship between social and political integration could not be equated with political activism, because the causal link has always been missing.1 Works on political participation have dealt with the association element, especially those closer to NSM literature, but they have always tried to actually quantify the real impact of associational social activity on the political activism potential and behavior of the individual. Political scientists do not always agree on the extension of the social capital impact on the political involvement variable, questioning not only the correlation strength, but also its relevance (Mayer and Perrineau vs. Barthélemy, for instance). Originally, the argument derived from the choice of association membership included in the studies. Although social integration in general has some positive influence on political activism, the specific types of association are more likely to make an impact on a country’s level of political participation are organizations and clubs with clear and direct political goals. These types of associations with a more direct political motive will be the only ones considered in the hypothesis testing in this chapter as well as in Chapter 6, as this volume wants to assess how collective forms of activism, as generated by associations, can indeed affect the level of political action, in a country where political involvement is often present. This selection of associations to include in the study is really the most favorable one for a verification of social capital positions and the expectations should be for a strong connection between integration in these associations and different acts of political participation in France. A longitudinal assessment of the importance of association memberships in French social life reveals that over the last 25 years around 36% of the population seems to be constantly involved in groups. In a certain sense, this finding would seriously undermine any interpretation



Social capital levels and measures

that would advocate voting as a simple epiphenomenon of social engagement, since the situation in France does not correspond to this assessment. Many more citizens vote than join a group or a club. Table 5.1 introduces several sources of data related to the general association membership rate in France during the time framework specifically considered in this volume. The main conclusion from the data is an unquestionable rate of membership in associations, broadly defined, that stays around 36% of the population on average.2 The same number is recorded by the Special Eurobarometer “Social Capital” in 2004 (p. 65), where in comparative terms this is above the European average of active participation in civic groups (29% for the EU25). In a long-term view, associations in France have exponentially increased: new associations per year went from 12,633 in 1960 to 39,437 in 1982 (Forsé, 1984, p. 128), and from 60,479 in 1993 to 62,162 in 1994 (Conseil National de la Vie Associative, 1996, p. 81). Eleven years later the averaged annual number reaches 67,000 (Barthélemy, 2007, p. 10), showing a progressive, although slow, increase. This progression seems, however, to have stalled, as the growth rate of new associations has collapsed since the 1990s to as low as 5% per year (Conseil National de la Vie Associative, 2007, p. 74). The last five years have seen an instable increase tendency as well: there is no long term pattern of associational expansion. Yet, slowly France has witnessed the creation of more associations, whose life span may not last long, as their actual mortality rate is only speculated at around 50% ten years after their creation. There is a consensus that French citizens have the opportunity to choose from a larger selection of possible clubs or organizations, but it is still not clear whether this abundance of associations helps political involvement concretely. Optimistic data for political activity should be scrutinized more closely. In this context, Forsé agrees on the corresponding irrelevance of association formation in the domain of politics, when studies include new organizations related to sports and recreational activities, groups which hardly have any political meaning. One of the most recent surveys (Institut National de la Jeunesse et de l’Education Populaire (INJEP), 2001) confirms that more than 60% of individuals with membership in associations in France belonged to either sports or cultural groups (p. 50), a rate that has shrunk to an average of around 45% between 1995 and 2005 (Barthélemy, 2007, p. 13). Although the ratio of new associations per year between those groups strictly politically oriented and those others organized around sport interests decreased from about 1 to 14 in 1937 to about 1 to 6.2 in 1982,5 most of the



Social Capital in France 101

Mayer and Perrineau (1992a)

Gaborit (1991)

Mayer and Perrineau (1992a)

Crenner (1997)

INJEP (2001)

European Commission (2005)

SOFRES 1986

CSA 1989

WVS 1990

INSEE 1996

CSA 2001

32% Membership rate

29% Membership rate

40% Membership rate

43% Membership rate

37% Membership rate3

Special Eurobarometer 223 2004 36% Membership rate4



102

Table 5.1 Longitudinal data on association membership in France (1980s–1990s)

real increase occurred between 1960 and 1982, when the number of new politically-based associations grew by 406% vis-à-vis an increase of only 18% from 1977 to 1982. The assessment becomes even clearer in a longer view: political associations and clubs grew by 130% between 1975–1986 and 1987–1994, yet since then their numbers have collapsed (Conseil National de la Vie Associative, 2007, pp. 117–118). Between 2001 and 2005 alone, creations of such associations have decreased by an astonishing 72% (!) (Conseil National de la Vie Associative, 2007, p. 108), suggesting that people may indeed get involved but not in politically oriented associations. The concern expressed by associational leaders, in regard to a corresponding lack of more participation from citizens (Fonda Association, 2007), has actually been the case since the INSEE in 1996 confirmed a rather stable participation rate in association, although more organizations were established (Crenner, 1997). Overall, the importance of politically-oriented organizations seems to spread in society, but its relevance is still lower than for other types of non-politically related citizens groups. More recent data on the number of associations in France confirm a good rate of new associations created each year, but only if we consider all associations, especially those non-politically oriented. Thorough studies on the French association world are generally more reassuring, because they underline the importance of social organizations at large in society. Many authors confirm that sport and cultural associations are much more popular than political ones. In particular, they all agree that interest in politically oriented organizations is much less strong (Haeusler, 1988; Héran, 1988a, p. 17). Overall membership rate in associations at large is about 10–15%6 higher than the 30% average for political organizations up until the 1990s. However, higher rates for general associations are questioned (Haeusler, 1988; Héran, 1988a, p. 22), since the French law does require registration of new associations, but not registration of their termination, prompting speculation about inflated numbers. Works on the overall association culture in France confirm the lack of a strong, motivated militantism, as pointed out by political scientists. In part because the most popular associations are those based on sport, third age and culture,7 those individuals actually belonging to politically oriented organizations are clearly a minority. Even for more popular associations, the weak militantism problem is the end result of many processes at once. The value of a membership in an association has declined with the citizens’ assertion of their own personal orientations and needs. Loyalty towards groups is less strong than it used





to be, and it is considered at times a burden. Informal groups, especially among younger generations in France, have possibly a stronger hand in the creation of unmeasured social capital than official associations (Worms, 2002, pp. 158–9). Associations today are more the sum of each individual member rather than a single collective. Participants are more cautious and selective about groups and clubs, choosing wisely and sporadically to belong to a collective: long-term and deeply loyal memberships are rarer by the year. Finally, former militants may have realized that groups and associations can often be ineffective, co-opted by the state or simply neutralized and/or ignored by political actors in charge of final policy decisions (Barthélemy, 2007, p. 23). Praises of high membership rates for new associations do not consider the multiple membership issue, which once again hits primarily political organizations. There is clearly a member selection, because “relatively few of those represented in sport or third-age associations, the joint-members play a central role in the functioning of the association network with a militant vocation, which goes from politics to religion” (Héran, 1988a, p. 33).8 Judging by the number of association memberships, while 58% of sports organizations members held that membership exclusively, the same rate was 22% for political associations members (Héran, 1988a, p. 38; 1983 data). Up to 50% of association members in general have multiple memberships (Barthélemy, 2007, p. 13). The point reinforces the criticism that any discussion on social capital should regard the effective number of exclusive members in any specific association, and not the number of associations simply, or the total number of association members, because of the shifting multiple membership element. This problem seems to have escalated in more recent times, as a phenomenon of “association zapping”, when members of associations change their affiliation from one group to the next based upon a shift in personal interests (Worms, 2005, p. 22). If only about one-third of the population seems to actively support and participate in associations in general, those individuals who do belong to associations become the best example of how the social capital paradigm should be working. By now, actual members have become more active inside the association of their choice (Crenner, 1997, Barthélemy, 2007, p. 13), in part due to necessity. Data from Mayer and Perrineau (1992a) for 1995 confirm that the association dimension does make a difference, contrary to what other observers argue without reliable data (Leca, 1989, p. 62,9 for instance): 56% of the persons strongly active unconventionally and 52% of the individuals active conventionally belong to at least one association. The findings are not



104

so positive if the research considers the data drawn from the street demonstration survey published by Favre and Fillieule (1995). A clear bit of evidence from the political activism research from the past has been the relevance of a small minority of activists from the intelligentsia, whose involvement and behavior represent the perfect implementation of the rules laid out by the typical political action paradigm: social and political integration do correspond, as stated by the social capital theory. Whether previous research, especially NSM studies, has verified this assessment, the data in the street demonstration participants survey collected in Une Enquête par Sondage dans les Manifestations de Rue (1995) can, for the first time, directly correlate active conventional participation with association involvement and membership. Those same respondents who choose the strike as their first means of political expression (95%) did not seem to rank so high on the association proximity scale. The demonstration sample’s association membership data show that only one third of the participants belonged to a political party (33%), a few more people were members of a trade union (37%), and almost half of the sample confirmed belonging to at least one association (48%). The reader has to keep in mind that the individuals interviewed were taking part in a street protest, making their probability of belonging to that group of intelligentsia activists very high.10 As a matter of fact, the intuition is correct, because it is confirmed by the respondent’s answer to another question during the interview. In answer to the question “Is this the first time you demonstrated?”, a mere 7% said yes, while an overwhelming 92% answered no. In addition, to be more precise on the type of participant involved in the survey, of the individuals who claimed to be demonstrating not for the first time, 66% stated that they do it regularly (more than three times a year), 28% only one to three times a year and 6% admitted they participate in demonstrations rarely. Another recent source to investigate levels of collective commitment by individuals is the WVS survey, with questions on specific membership and activity in a broad variety of associations. As explained already, to make the argument stronger, Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 present data only for associations that usually have a particular political orientation as the base of their existence. A first look at the tables shows that there is a serious gap between the level of association membership for political activists (as presented by the demonstration survey data) and the general individual who shows a medium to high level of political participation (in any style). Declared membership rate and activity in any of the four associations considered is far from being close to the average of





Table 5.2

Political association membership and activity – 1981

Membership

Trade Unions

Political Parties

Community Action

Professional Associations

YES NO Activity in Associations YES NO

9.2% 90.8%

2.5% 97.5%

1.3% 98.7%

4.2% 95.8%

2.8% 97.2%

1.2% 98.3%

0.7% 99.3%

1.8% 98.3%

Source: World Values Survey 1981. N. 1200.

Table 5.3


Membership

Trade Unions

Political Parties

Community Action


YES NO Activity in Associations YES NO

5.2% 94.8%

2.7% 97.3%

3.3% 96.7%

5% 95%

2.4% 97.6%

1.6% 98.4%

2.9% 97.1%

3.1% 96.9%

Source: World Values Survey 1990. N. 1002.

Table 5.4


Membership

YES NO

Trade Unions

Political Parties

Local Community Action


4% 96%

2% 98%

2.3% 97.7%

3.1% 96.9%

Unfortunately values for activity in associations were not available in this wave. Source: European Values Survey 1999. N. 1615.

30%. Although community action and professional types of association manifest a slow increase in membership as well as in activity, membership in trade unions decreases by more than half over two decades, and membership and activity in political parties has an irrelevant gain. Overall, the long-term situation does not change: levels of social collective integration in France are very low, even when only politically oriented associations are considered. The analysis and interpretation of the data become more confusing when an observer considers the general opinion



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French citizens have of associations overall. As recently as January 2006, 86% of the respondents in a survey declared to have a good opinion of associations, 83% of the same sample trusted associational leaders and 71% viewed associations as important for the political debate (Fonda Association, 2007). Still, few French citizens join them. The assessment in 2002 seems to be rosier, according to data from the European Social Survey. However, Newton and Montero (2007, p. 212) show in their Table 10.1 numbers representing not only membership in multiple associations, but also figures for participation, money donations and voluntary work. France’s rate of 11% in 2002 is much higher than the corresponding number from the European Values Survey three years earlier. In relation to the other 21 European countries included in the study, the French case still comes in with the fourth lowest level for trade union participation and the second lowest score for participation in political associations. In both cases, France scores below the European average in the research.11 The goal of an association might be one of the reasons why actual membership is so low, when corresponding political participation is on average medium-high. Individuals do participate, as shown by Favre and Fillieule’s survey work, but they do it for different reasons. In particular, citizens decide to take to the street to express their opinions, mostly against certain policies or actions, not in favor, for instance, of an organization.12 The responses from those participants interviewed during a demonstration confirmed that to the question: “With your participation in the demonstration, you wanted primarily to”, protesters answered “oppose the government’s policy (47%), support the action of the organizations that called the protest (28%), get satisfaction for your claims (9%)”. Thus, almost half of the political activists protested against the government, which in France is rather common, while less than one third were there to support an organization, suggesting that their sense of belonging to collective forms of social action is limited and possibly extemporaneous. Further, when there is a sense of belonging, it acquires a “responsibility” flavor. In the same sample, respondents who declared that it was not their first demonstration also expressed the main reason for their participation: “for duty 76%, for pleasure 21%”. In a sense, political activists seem to feel the pressure to become professionals, although only 56%13 of the individuals who were participating at a demonstration during the survey actually belonged to one of the associations that called for the demonstration.14 In addition, respondents who claimed to belong to one of the demonstration sponsoring associations (96% belonged





to a political party, 86% belonged to a trade union, 79% belonged to an association) can be labeled, without any doubts, the hard-core of the “Protest Professionals Inc.”, the intelligentsia of associationism and political involvement. The presentation of the French average membership rate in associations, whether politically oriented or more general ones, confirms that although in a longitudinal approach memberships have steadily, yet weakly increased, the ratio between citizens’ participation in politically oriented associations and their corresponding political activism is very uneven.15 High levels of strong political activism have corresponded to medium to low levels of association membership and association activities (as also presented in the next section). It remains to be determined what exactly the link between the two issues is, using more detailed and appropriate statistical analysis of the measures considered. The next section introduces more specific statistical analysis findings on the puzzling correspondence between weak social integration and strong political activism in France.

Index construction, methodology and frequencies Based mostly on aggregate-level data on political participation and social capital, this section will deal strictly with statistical analysis, using individual level data from the WVS databases. The measures employed to verify French citizens’ engagement levels are complementary components of the political participation dimension: conventional political activism, political integration and protest activity. Each of the three indexes is composed of different factors that represent the type of activity involved, according to the engagement scale (Table 4.1) and the literature on the subject. For instance, the protest activity index is a sum of possible actions expressed by the individual that could range from going on strike (E) to causing material damages (A). The conventional political participation index is composed of the individuals’ level of political interest, frequency of political discussion and self-assessed saliency of politics. In this last case, only the political discussion element is part of the individual conventional level as presented in Table 4.1: the other two components of the index are supported by the general scholarship on political activism. Conventional participation index The first index to be constructed using the World Values Surveys (1981, 1990)16 databases17 is the conventional political participation index.



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50% 40% 30%

10% 0% 1981 Low Graph 5.1

1990 Medium

High

Index of conventional political participation

Source: World Values Survey (1981, 1990).

Combing data on political interest, frequency of political discussion and personal saliency of politics, the first scale18 provides a general understanding of the political action potential in a country. Frequently linked to political sophistication, conventional activism in France does not seem to be incredibly high, considering the components of political activism included in the measure (Graph 5.1). For the political interest and saliency of politics answers, individuals who expressed no interest at all received zero points; respondents who were not very interested or who said politics was not very important received one point. All individuals in the sample who admitted to being quite interested in politics and who considered politics to be quite important had a score of 2 points; the respondents with the highest score on both answers received 3 points for each component. Similarly, the political discussion variable was recoded as a component of the conventional activism index. The “never” answers received zero points, the “at times” option was worth two points and the “often” answer contributed three points to the final score of the conventional action index. Overall, the possible score for 1990 went from 0 to 9, whereas the same score for 1981 had a scale from 0 to 6, since the saliency of politics variable in the WVS database was not available.19 The first results from the first index seem to suggest that French political activism in the 1980s did not parallel the supposedly increasing trend in political participation shown in other countries. The data from the very beginning and the end of that decade confirm more stability than increase. More interesting, the overall percentages illustrate a case in which, once again, the so-called “political gladiators”



20%


of political activism remain below 15% of the population at large. In both cases, more than 40% of the sample exhibited a low level of conventional political activism, a circumstance rather surprising based upon the general interpretation of the French scholarship on the topic. Challenging the traditional assumption that measures of conventional activism are more available to be recorded than unconventional political action, because conventional involvement is less demanding and more frequent, the French case shows individuals very involved in unconventional activity (Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 in the previous chapter, for instance), but whose corresponding level of conventional political commitment is lower. Somehow, people with low scores on the conventional political participation index are more involved in more demanding, protest-oriented forms of political action. The peak of activity on the political participation dimension has moved from one side to the other, questioning the instrumentality of political actions that are not guided by a corresponding level of political interest or even sophistication.20

Collective level participation index To create a measure of collective level of political integration for French citizens, this study has used data from questions on the individual’s actual membership and “unpaid voluntary work” in four political associations: (1) political parties or groups, (2) trade unions, (3) local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality and (4) professional associations.21 Two indexes were created to represent membership and activity in associations. For each membership or activity stated, the respondent received one point, so that every scale has a cumulative potential from 0 to 4. Graphs 5.2 and 5.3 present the frequencies of the collective membership and activity scales, for both years included in the study. Judging from the data, two main conclusions come to mind immediately regarding membership levels: first, the samples show a weak social integration level, since membership rates are very low and, second, the numbers remained low almost a decade later. An overwhelmingly large group of the respondents do not belong to any association of political nature (87.2% and 88% respectively) and those who belong to two or more associations are less than 4% in each sample. French citizens seem to ignore political associations in their political involvement plans. Data on the professed activity in politically oriented associations worsen the general interpretation of the French political integration



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100% 80% 60%

20% 0% 1981

1990 0

1

2

3

4

Graph 5.2 Index of collective level memberships in politically oriented associations Source: World Values Survey (1981, 1990). N. 1200, N. 1002.

100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 1981

1990 0

1

2

3

4

Graph 5.3 Index of collective level unpaid activity in politically oriented associations Source: World Values Survey (1981, 1990). N. 1200, N. 1002.

status. The percentage with no activity in any politically oriented associations reaches 94.8% of the sample in 1981, and it slightly improves nine years later. The findings give a pessimistic interpretation of any effort to possibly strengthen collective activity among individuals who have a high political participation potential. As a very meaningful result for a scholar of political participation, the consistency of the measure gives more support to the index reliability:22 the data clearly show a chronic low level of collective political involvement, without major changes a decade later.



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The creation of a protest styled participation index, using the same datasets, provides the research with a coherent measure of unconventional political attitudes and activity. The protest scale aims at representing both dimensions of political participation through protest means, keeping in mind both potential and behavior, as a way to have a comprehensive measure of unconventionality among individuals. The index does not want to over-measure either behavior or potential: it seeks to respect and follow the general rules on scale construction and the frequent calls for more detailed and precise indexes, but also for more parsimonious measures.23 Graph 5.3 and Table 5.5 present the frequencies of the protest scales created with WVS data. PROTEST is a cumulative index of unconventional potential and activity, determined by the respondents’ answers to a question checking for their past activity (“have done”), their potential future activity (“might do”) and their complete rejection of any possible activity (“would never do”). The survey included five items as possible elements representing unconventional political action, providing the project with a comprehensive and generally established agreement on their reliability: signing a petition, joining a boycott, attending a lawful demonstration, joining unofficial strikes and occupying buildings. All the items correspond to the conceptual framework presented for the unconventional activity (4) of the engagement scale (Table 4.1). Table 5.5 Index of unconventional political activity – PROTEST behavioral and potential Levels

1981

1990

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

18.3% 10.3% 12.9% 12.4% 12.7% 9.1% 7.8% 5.8% 4.3% 3.2% 2%

15.3% 9.1% 14% 12.2% 12% 9.6% 8.3% 7.1% 6.5% 3.6% 2.5%

Source: World Values Survey (1981, 1990). N. 1200, N. 836.



Protest participation index

For the index construction, the “would never do” option contributed 0 points to the scale, the “might do” answer contributed 1 point to the index, and the “have done” statement added 2 points to the scale. Overall, the protest index value could go from 0 to 10, weighting past unconventional action stronger than expressed protest potential, as the findings in the literature generally confirm. From the PROTEST index, a second scale has been constructed, PROTIND, from the breakdown of the first index into three categories: low (values 0 to 3), medium (values 4 to 7), high (values above 7). This second scale allows an easier interpretation of where the sample positions itself in relation to the unconventional political activity measure.24 Data from the PROTEST index frequency table (Table 5.5) confirms the medium to high level of unconventional activity and potential among French citizens. While the longitudinal view can assess a modest increase in intensity of protest, at all levels,25 the frequency confirms a much more important interpretation: overall almost 50% of the sample (49.6) exhibit a medium to high level of political involvement. If only 15.3% expressed no protest attitude or activity at all (1990), 35.3 % corresponded to a low level of protest, 37% to a medium one and 12.6% of the sample to a high level of protest commitment (Graph 5.4). Overall, the protest scales show half of the samples with a low level of protest involvement, but the other half with a medium to high level of unconventional commitment. A longitudinal analysis of the data supports a general upward trend in the use and/or support for a type of unconventional political participation, measured by the respondent’s

60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 1981 Low (0–3) Graph 5.4 potential

1990 Medium (4–7)

High (> 7)

Index of unconventional political activity – PROTIND behavioral and

Source: World Values Survey (1981, 1990). N. 1185, N. 836.





self-assessed potential and activity. The finding is not a surprise: other research works had presented the unusual link between low levels of associationism and high protest intensity for France, especially in a comparative view26 (Dekker, Koopmans, and van den Broek, 1997, p. 229). Yet, once more, previous research had seldom analyzed the French case in detail and had simply avoided any emphasis on the possible French model of social and political activism. The presentation of the indexes, for the political conventional and unconventional measures, as well as the integration level, sets the ground for the main hypothesis-testing part of this investigation, with more advanced statistical and comparative analyses of the data. In the next chapter, France is directly compared to five other countries, advanced democracies, whose measures of conventional and unconventional activism can help in gaining a more thorough understanding of how indeed France fares when its standing in political activism is placed in a comparative environment, using exactly the same measures and sources of data.



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The creation of the political participation indexes introduced in the previous chapter allows the research project to answer the three questions presented by the French participation paradigm in this book. Using the conventional activity index, the protest measure and the individual’s participation in politically-based associations, in conjunction with frequencies, cross-tabulations, correlations and regression models, the reader will be able to discover, one step at a time, the relevant meaning of a political participation case in which the individual’s political integration network is very limited. In this sense, this chapter specifically connects France to other cases of advanced democracies, putting forward a direct comparison on the bases of political participation figures. Three types of findings are relevant for the validity of this project. The first result comes from the understanding that high levels of political activity, conventional or unconventional, may not correspond directly to social integration in politically-related associations, as scholars have discussed. In other words for instance, an individual may vote regularly, but may not be involved with groups or associations. Starting from a basic assumption that individuals who are strong political participants are also very involved in politically-oriented associations, as social capital theory states, the first part of the hypothesis testing in the following pages deals specifically with the validity of this statement. Do citizens, who are proven political participants, whether conventionally or unconventionally, follow the social capital paradigm? Are strong political participants equally eager members of political groups? The second part of the explanation can confirm that the French case remains a country with a solid level of political activity, although a weak example of collective level involvement. The challenge of this situation 115



Across Borders: France within the Broader Political Activism Context


affects directly the assessments of social capital theory, and its stated need for strong social integration as a necessary base for the development of citizens’ political activism. If individuals who are political participants are not integrated in politically-based associations, do levels of collective involvement in the same associations stand out in relation to political activism, in a cross-country comparison? If the French case might reveal the presence of political activists who may indeed be following a traditional pattern to political activity – via association membership and action – this group of professional activists would represent the best example of a successful interpretation of social capital theory. Yet this pattern of behavior may be valid for hardcore political participants only, not for other activists, who do participate, but do not like to be involved through associations in order to be political participants. Many more people express themselves politically, in different styles, without feeling the need to comply with the social integration requirements of the social capital theory of political activism. The third possible conclusion from the analysis of the findings in the next sections comes from the relevance of some variables in the explanation of the different styles of political action. A particular relationship between one or more of the independent variables used in the regression models for the five countries analyzed could contribute to an explanation for the nature of political activism in France. The balance between unconventional and conventional involvement as well as the impact of elements such as age, religion, ideology and gender are the focus of investigation in the last part of the hypothesis testing. Among the many questions that will be addressed are the relationship between the collective involvement measure and the simple participation variable. In which case do association memberships and activities contribute to increased political activism? Do socio-demographic variables prevail in their impact on the individual’s level of political involvement? If participation through politically-based associations is not the key to identifying protesters in France, what variable is? Are other measures replacing the social capital’s element of collective participation in the French model equation? An innovative contribution to the explanation of political participation levels based upon the particular impact of a specific element in an individual’s life can expand, and refine, the terms of political action laid out by the association involvement literature. Association and/or group involvement rates may not do it for the French. The ultimate conclusion would then mean an insignificant position for groups and associations in the hexagon, as their role in fostering civic participation may not be relevant. Even further, the action



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of associations may be extraneous to the richness and dynamicity of democratic participation: quite a disappointing result for many and an expected finding instead for Tocquevillian followers. In this context, more traditional elements of the political behavior research might still be key variables in any explanations provided. The discussion now concentrates therefore on three main issues: (1) do politically-based associations really matter in the study of political activism? (2) Do levels of association membership and activity affect the actual intensity of political action, no matter how they are measured? And (3) are there particular elements in the French case that can reinterpret the validity of the social capital theory statements?

Results from the participation models Index level comparison The initial point to verify the developed paradigm on political participation in France is a simple comparison based on each index’s value. This first step can suggest whether we should be talking about the interchangeability of forms of political-oriented action. According to part of the literature, individuals have a series of possible participation options they could use, and they actually make a selection depending on their necessity (Kaase and Marsh, 1979, p. 135). However, some other scholars have pointed out, based on different participation levels, that individuals seem somewhat limited in the forms of engagement they choose, sticking, mostly, to the same one (Memmi, 1985, p. 358). The same point is supported by the still rather reduced rate of participation in most post-industrial societies, notwithstanding the several new options offered: “the variety of means of expression available to citizens does not seem, however, to cause a particular civic passion” (Mayer and Perrineau, 1992a, p. 36).1 More recently though, Newton and Montero have argued against a specialization method at the country level: the intensity of political activism in one country is generally similar across types of political activity (2007, p. 222). In this context, the indexes comparison can allow us to check whether the conventional individual level of participation, the collective level personal involvement or the protest type of commitment has a stronger importance for individuals who have to choose a means of engagement. For instance, considering the data introduced above in section A, in relation to individual political interest and periodicity of political discussion, as well as the rate of membership and activity in politically



Across Borders


oriented associations, as presented in section B, it appears evident as a first assessment of the findings that French citizens do prefer individually based types of political involvement to collectively-determined forms of political commitment and action. If it is true that the two forms of political involvement are correlated, conventional individual activity seems to prevail over organization integration in association structures. As recently as 2004, only one French citizen in five was interested in having an active role in a politically oriented group (European Commission, 2005, p. 77). For as much as this figure may seem low, the French number is representative of the EU-25 average. A second conclusion can be drawn from a comparison of data for collective level integration and declared protest involvement. According to the data presented in the previous chapter (Graphs 5.2 and 5.3), French individuals show a weak collective level of involvement, measured by both membership and activity. On the contrary, French levels of protest involvement (Table 5.5 and Graph 5.4), measured by potential and activity, confirm the general view of about 50% of French citizens unconventionally active in the political domain.2 Judging from the data analyzed in this research, French individuals clearly like collective level forms of political participation the least.

Index correlation intensity The second step in the hypothesis testing has to deal with a possible correlation among the indexes. The goal is to show whether, and in what proportion, each index can contribute to support or hinder other levels of activity, testing at the same time the validity of the engagement scale presented. Different modes of political participation obviously affect each other: the correlation intensity is an easy and quick statistical test to assess how much voting for instance affects street protest or signing a petition influences a person’s level of interest. Starting with the most studied style of political participation, conventional activity shows from the beginning a peculiar correlation with what concerns the French in this study. The relationship with the political integration index and the protest index should be a positive one, as discussed in the literature in general, but the strength of the correlation is the relevant point in the research. The direction of the Pearsonian correlation3 should respect the assumption that conventional activity overall is, indeed, the first step to political expression, a stepping-stone upon which further political involvement is built. Since conventional forms of activism are, commonly, less demanding



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and easier to perform, individuals with at least some level of political activity will be more likely to be conventionally than unconventionally involved. Citizens in general start their involvement in politics in easier forms of participation. Along the same line of reasoning, the protest styled action is instead the last step considered political involvement, since its costs are much higher and its type of activism is more demanding. The index comparison based upon the Pearsonian correlation values can question the traditional ranking between conventional activity and political integration, and between political involvement and protest action. As a second comment on the French case, the correlation between the unconventional involvement scale and the collective level participation index should correspond to the literature’s overall findings of a positive relationship, although its strength in this research’s case should be weak. Mild positive correlations among different forms of political participation have been supported throughout the research on political involvement, especially across the conventionality dimension, with the most unconventionally politically active individuals also extremely active conventionally: the stronger the collective level of conventional activity, the stronger the protest level of activity. This point in particular supports the overall cross-style participation phenomenon, where countries do not specialize in specific types of activism, but show generally similar levels of activism across the styles (Newton and Montero, 2007). Table 6.1 introduces the findings on the correlation values among the three indexes considered. Unfortunately for the hypothesis testing validity, correlations for the 1981 indexes are not significant, and therefore cannot be interpreted in the following discussion. Nonetheless, the table presents significant correlations that support the general idea of a positive, but weak, relationship between collective forms of politically oriented involvement and corresponding forms of protest activity. Table 6.1 Correlations: protest and collective level involvement, 1990 Indexes of Collective Participation/Protest Action CONVENTIONAL INDCOLL INDCOLL2

Conventional

Protest (0–10)

Protest (0–3)

1 0.284 0.224

0.429 0.248 0.178

0.387 0.251 0.175

All correlations significant at the 0.01 level. See Index Construction section in previous chapter for interpretation of index scale.



Across Borders


The most interesting finding comes from the size of the correlation coefficients for the conventional dimension of activism. As supposed and expected, the signs of the correlations are all positive, supporting even further the general understanding of a possible “participation spillover” in political activities. Individuals who are politically sophisticated will be prone to investigate how they can have an impact on the political system; they will start by using common means of action, apart from voting, to make a direct claim. Once conventional actions are not successful, political participants will be pulled into associations that claim they can help them to represent their interests and possibly foster political activism based upon common causes. Citizens in France are keen to make an impact: their final goal is to indeed influence the political scene, regardless of the participation means they are required to use. In a certain sense, the end justifies the means. The involvement escalation usually ends with protest activity as the ultimate resource of political action, not as a mutually exclusive form of activism with more conventional type of engagement, but as a parallel venue to political expression. Among the French public in general, political participation does not have limits. The correlation shown in Table 6.1 presents an unusual situation. Conventional activity seems indeed to more strongly support protest action than political integration in associations with specific political goals. The correlation value between the conventional index and the protest indexes is higher than the corresponding one with the scores of collective level involvement (INDCOLL and INDCOLL2), suggesting that higher levels of conventional activism contribute more convincingly to increase protest action than to foster individual’s participation in politics through politically-based associations. The finding confirms a possible interpretation of a French political participant who is very active conventionally and unconventionally, but who relegates participation through associations to a secondary option. Political activism in France does not seem to be a reflection of involvement in a series of networks of community participation. In the case considered here specifically, the 1990 WVS sample shows a peculiarity that deserves every scholar’s speculations. The strength of the correlation between the first association measure (INDCOLL) and the protest index (PROTEST) is actually higher than the one between the activity association variable (INDCOLL2) and the same protest index, meaning that unconventional political activity and collective forms of commitment are positively correlated. Yet, as expected, the intensity of the correlation is higher for non-activity collective involvement,



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like association memberships, rather than for the association activity variable. Consequently, these findings could question previous conclusions on the individual’s broader spectrum of political expression, whether conventional or not, and propose, instead, a more distinctive pattern. According to the WVS data for 1990, French respondents with a higher protest index tend to prefer association membership to association activity, maybe because associations do not allow or encourage unconventional political activity. This point encourages additionally a possible discussion of how indeed individuals can behave once they become members of an association. On one side, there is an ideal understanding that association members enjoy a very high level of individual freedom inside the group which they belong to (Waters, 2003, p. 25). On the other side, the institutionalization of rules in the associations and the necessary collaboration with institutional bodies contrast this view (Barthélemy, 2007, pp. 14–15). Due to possible constraints deriving from association memberships, it remains interesting to envision the possibility of protesters who actually limit their range of possible political activity, because their preference goes to unconventional means exclusively. This case scenario would undermine some of the conclusions in the research on the evolution of political participation, where scholars have clearly praised the increased number of possible means of political action in any individual’s repertory of political action.

Equation models The final step in the hypothesis testing procedure has to do with a more precise statistical analysis on the relationship between, on one side, the usual components of participation, and, on the other side, each of the political participation measures constructed in this research. The model will highlight whether, and in what direction, a relationship exists between one of the indexes and the control variables, including the other indexes as independent variables, where feasible. Linear regression models (Table 6.2) will test the possibility of a self-reinforcing mobilization level, where control variables, through the intervening effect of two indexes, could act differently depending on the factors included in the model. For instance, for the protest activity equation model, the conventional political participation measure can reinforce or weaken the negative relationship between age and protest activity, due to a parallel high level of political information, incorporated into the model through the components of the conventional action index.



Across Borders


Table 6.2

Linear regression models

a)

CONVENTIONAL = α + ß1 age + ß2 gender + ß3 employment status + ß4 ASSOCIATION INVOLVEMENT (Membership, Activity, both) + ß5 change attitude propensity + ß6 L/R + ß7 religion + ß8 PROTEST (0–10) + ∈

b)

PROTEST = α + ß1 age + ß2 gender + ß3 employment status + ß4 ASSOCIATION INVOLVEMENT (Membership, Activity, both) + ß5 change attitude propensity + ß6 L/R + ß7 religion + ß8 conventional activity + ∈

In the end, many variables affect people’s involvement in politics, and these same variables influence each other. Values of association membership and activity should further support the corresponding level of unconventional political activity in the second equation model. This step should verify the possible negative relationship between protest activity levels and collective as well as individual conventional level political engagement, questioning the research statements on a broader variety of political activity means, which included, without discrimination, conventional and nonconventional methods of political involvement. A negative sign for the coefficients of the protest index as the dependent variable in the regression equation would undermine the conclusions of a generally broader repertory of political action for citizens at large, with people using more or less equally conventional and protest-styled means of political activity. A typical individual would not then escalate from conventional political activism to protest forms of expression, demonstrating instead a specialization in one specific method of political engagement. If unconventionality in political participation is what always weakens conventional forms of political engagement, collective levels of political involvement should always support political activity, as the social capital theory asserts. Overall, the scope of the regression is that the equations could detect the different influence of the included variables on the multiple types of political participation considered. They can evaluate the direction of the relationship as much as the strength, in the attempt to present a more comprehensive model of political engagement for citizens in different countries. For instance, according to the scholarship presented in Chapter 2, we should expect a strong, positive relationship between age and conventional activity, but a negative one for political integration activity and protest action types of participation. Older citizens are more prone to be active conventionally: they vote, discuss politics, write to



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their representatives, volunteer for political parties. Younger individuals are more inclined to use alternative means of political action as well, preferring specifically unconventionality, in particular in the French case (Muxel, 2007, pp. 5–6). The gender dummy variable should have a negative coefficient in both equation models, namely women are less likely to participate conventionally individually or in a protest action, whereas they are more likely to participate in an organizational setting form of political engagement. For the education variable, there should be a positive relationship with the conventional and the collective activity indexes, but a negative one with the protest activity index, although some members of the protest activity intelligentsia showed a higher educational level. The association membership rate should confirm a negative relationship with the two participation indexes, since some of the data presented so far highlighted the weak associational proximity of most of the protest-based participants. Typical protesters do not seem to appreciate the opportunities offered by association activity, instead they are wary of the limitations in their own political action by association rules, policies or even bureaucracy. In this research’s hypothesis, integration into associations is not the main predictor for an individual’s political engagement. For the relationship between employment status and political engagement, the direction in the different participation variables is not so clear. While there should be a positive relationship between stronger work involvement and both conventional and collective level activity, the relationship with non-conventional forms of participation is difficult to determine a priori. The development of postmaterialist movements has introduced high-level income respondents in the protest styled group of participants, although the bases for their non-conventional participation have to do more with newly empowered citizens’ action than with monetary claims. However, in the particular French context, where strikes are often used, and citizens who are not yet part of the employment sector (read students) are already very active politically, the employment status element (professionally active vs. non-active) might show an unusual political behavior. Contrary to the many statements in resource mobilization research and in the rational choice approach, individuals without a clear opportunity to be organized can overcome the free-rider dilemma and understand the broader relevance of “participation”. If there is a country where this can be recorded, France is definitively a top guess.



Across Borders


On the ideological position, the left or right scale should have a negative relationship with the two measures of participation. Activists at the conventional, collective and protest level should come more from the left than the right of the political spectrum, although the French right has shown a strong positive correlation with integration in associations, which could affect the relationship between the left or right scale and the collective activity index.4 The same prediction could be proposed for the religion variable. Religious individuals are usually less active in political matters than nonreligious people, unless their religious beliefs are discussed in a political approach.5 The reader should also be aware that a link to different religions expresses a different effect on political activism. Catholics seem to be the least involved politically overall, for sure in comparison to Protestants. This said, the French situation remains a question mark because of the French state’s official secular status. A final note on the “attitude towards change” dimension must show caution. This independent variable measures the degree to which individuals show a predisposition to cause and accept change in society in general. Besides possible political motivations that might be responsible for the political opportunity context of a country’s levels of political activism, every person’s propensity to cause or accept change in general could affect the political participants’ choice of a specific type of action, its corresponding style, and even the relevance of political action itself. The propensity to change factor should always show a positive correlation with political participation at large, expressed in different styles, but it might not be a very important predictor if more stable personal characteristics close to the political context are present. Some citizens may welcome change in general, but unless there is a specific reason or event to favor change, it does not mean that change in a society will take place necessarily. The main challenges in regard to the propensity to change variable are (1) to overcome the impact of socio-demographic characteristics and (2) to resist a political system’s unwillingness and/or opposition to change. In conclusion, all three steps of the hypothesis testing procedure should allow for a confirmation or disconfirmation of a new “France exception”, as presented in this book. If French citizens prefer to participate at the individual level and in a protest manner, more than in a collective form of action, this could lead the scholar to the assessment that the linear correlation between the political activity intensity level and the social integration rate does not hold in the French context. In this statement resides the meaning of the French paradox of political participation.



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The next section will present the final results of the testing design, at the same time introducing the reader to a more comparative approach to the French political participation model, comparing the data and statistical analysis results collected for the French case with the same type of data for four other countries: the US, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and West Germany. All four additional cases have been considered in the 1979 political participation study, Political Action, allowing this research to draw not only a contemporary comparison among different national contexts, but also on a longitudinal analysis of possible paths of convergent political participation models.

Relevance of the political integration network The correspondence between individuals’ participation in political organizations and their level of political action can be tested by running cross-tabulations of the two variables in the French case, using the different measures available. Looking at measures of membership and activity in the politically-oriented organizations nine years apart (1981 and 1990), the data can assess the actual merit of the social capital indicators. The direction of the relationship between association participation and political involvement is crucial in determining whether group-level commitment can indeed be a supporting element leading to political action, a foundation of the social capital theory. Whereas the link can be used to explain why professional participants are active across the spectrum of possible means of involvement, many other participants, regular citizens, not dedicated activists, may not fit the same paradigm. A quick glimpse at the data in Graph 6.1 can reassure the scholar of social capital that indeed stronger participants seem to behave as expected by that literature’s claims. The table shows values from the 1981 dataset, where levels of unpaid activity in politically-based associations are positively correlated with the research protest index. Individuals who maintained to have performed little unpaid activity in any of the four organizations considered in the project are not likely to be strong protesters. Among the respondents with no activity at all in any of the associations studied, only 7.9% belonged to the highest level of the protest index. More than half of the same group of individuals (56.6%) showed instead a low level of protest activity. That type of relationship is reversed as the index of collective activity increases. Data from the 1990 survey support the same analysis (Graph 6.2). In this sample, the strength of the relationship between the two variables is more considerable: a little more than half of the respondents with



Across Borders

126


60% 50% 40%

20% 10% 0% 0 Low Protest Graph 6.1

1 Medium Protest

2 High Protest

Index of collective level activity and protest index, 1981

Source: World Values Survey (1981). Cross-tabulation significant p

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