FOUCAULT AND HIS INTERLOCUTORS
l3l'i3o ,F12. Fb~ I Gr '1-=1 c . ~ c.,...~-"\
edited and introduced by
Arnold I. Davidson
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
Chicago & London
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637 The University of Chicago Press, ltd., London © 1997 by The University of Chicago All rights reserved. Published 1997 Printed in the United States of America 01 00 99 98 97
5 4 3 2 I
"Report from Mr. Canguilhem on the Manuscript Filed by Mr. Michel Foucault, Director of the Institute Fran~is of Hamburg, in Order 10 Obtain Permission to print His Principal Thesis for the Doctor of Letters" is reprinted with kind permission from Georges Canguilhem. English translation© 1995 by The University of Chicago. "On Histoirt de Ia folie as an Event" is© Le Dibat, 1992. Used with kind permission from Pierre :'I! ora, Editions Gallimard. English translation © 1995 by The University of Chicago. "Introduction to Penser Ia folie: Essais sur Michel Foucault" is © 1992 by Editions Galilee. Used with permission. English translation © 1995 by The University of Chicago. "The Geometry of the Incommunicable: Madness" is© 1968 by Les Editions De Minuit, from Hermes ou Ia communication. Used with permission. English translation © 1996 by The University of Chicago. '"To Do Justice to Freud': The History of Madness in the Age of Psychoanalysis" is © 1994 by Editions Galilee. Reprinted with permission. "Madness, the Absence of Work" is used with permission from The New Press, New York. English translation© 1994 by The University of Chicago. "Human Nature: Justice versus Power" originally appeared in Reflexive Water, edited by }ons Elders,© 1974 by Fons Elders. Reprinted with permission from Fons Elders and Souvenir Press, Ltd. "Foucault Revolutionizes History" is© 1971 by Editions du Seuil, from Writing History by Paul Veyne, English translation © 1984 by Wesleyan University Press. Appendix translated from the original French edition and© by The University of Chicago. Permission granted by the University Press of New England. "Desire and Pleasure" first appeared in Magazine liUeraire, no. 325 (October 1994) as "Desir et plaisir." Used with permission from Gilles Deleuze. English translation© 1997 by The t:niversity of Chicago. "Forms of Life and Forms of Discourse in Ancient Philosophy" is used with permission from Pierre Hadot. English translation © 1990 by The University of Chicago. "The Final Foucault and His Ethics" Is used with kind permission from Paul Veyne. English translation © 1993 by The University of Chicago Press. "Writing the Self" originally appeared in Corps ecri~ no. 5 (1983), and is© 1983 by Presses Universitaires de France. Used with permission. English translation © 1997 by The University of Chicago.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Foucault and his interlocutors I edited by Arnold I. Davidson. p. em. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-226-13713-9 (doth).-ISBN 0-226-13714-7 (pbk) I. Foucault, Michel. 2. Chomsky, Noam. 3. Philosophy. I. Davidson, Arnold Ira. 82430.F72F68 1997 l94-dc21 97-50315 CIP
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984
To Stanley and Cathleen Cavell and To Pierre and Ilsetraut Hadot
Contents
Introduction
Arnold I. Davidson
Structures and Strategies of Discourse: Remarks Towards a History of Foucault's Philosophy of Language
I. MADNESS
Arnold I. Davidson
21
Introductory Remarks to Georges Canguilhem
·Georges Canguilhem
23
Report from Mr. Canguilhem on the Manuscript Filed by Mr. Michel Foucault, Director of the Institut Fran~;ais of Hamburg, in Order to Obtain Permission to Print His Principal Thesis for the Doctor of Letters
. Georges Canguilhem
28
On Histoire de la folie as an Event
Georges Canguilhem
33
Introduction to Penser La folie: Essais sur Michel Foucault
Michel Serres
36
The Geometry of the Incommunicable: Madness
Jacques Derrida
57
"To Do Justice to Freud": The History of Madness in the Age of Psychoanalysis
Michel Foucault
97
Madness, the Absence of Work
II. HISTORY, DIAGNOSTICS, POWER
Michel Foucault and Noam Chomsky
107
Human Nature: Justice versus Power
~yne
146
Foucault Revolutionizes History
Gilles Deleuze
183
Desire and Pleasure
Paul
III. FOUCAULT AND THE ANCIENTS
Arnold I. Davidson
195
Introductory Remarks to Pierre Hadot
Pierre Hadot
203
Forms of Life and Forms of Discourse in Ancient Philosophy
~yne
225
The Final Foucault and His Ethics
Michel Foucault
234 249 252
Writing the Self
Paul
Contributors Index
Structures and Strategies of Discourse: Remarks Towards a History of Foucault's Philosophy of Language
Arnold I. Davidson
With the publication of Michel Foucault's Dits et ecrits in 1994, we are in a new position to begin to assess the significance of his work. We have still not yet reached a firm and stable position, since his courses from the College de France, still unpublished, go well beyond anything that can be found in his books or in Dits et icrits. 1 But with more than three thousand pages of essays, interviews, lectures, prefaces, and reviews-many of them virtually inaccessible as originally published-in Japanese, Portuguese, Italian, German, English, and French, Dits et ecrits requires us to rethink the place of Foucault in twentieth-century intellectual life, allows us to rediscover the scope and importance of his work, and, above all, to recognize his continued philosophical force. We should not underestimate the power of the chronological ordering of these writings, for we can now put together dimensions of Foucault's work that had far too long remained separated in the dispersal of his writing. Ten years after his death, reading through these four volumes, one can almost be seized by the illusion that Foucault has never left us, so pertinent and singular are these texts. It is in light of the publication of Dits et icrits that I want to begin to reconstitute the voices of some of Foucault's most privileged interlocutors. With one exception, which involves the participation of Foucault himself, I have chosen to publish essays by Foucault's French interlocutors, not because they possess, as if by nature, some intrinsic superiority, but because all of these French interlocutors were part of a genuine dia1. Two of Michel Foucault's courses have been published in unauthorized Italian translations, his 1975-76 course at the College de France, Difendere Ia societa (Florence, 1990) and his 1983 course at the University of California, Berkeley, DiJcorso e verita nella l.rer.ia anlica (Rome, 1996).
2
A mold I. Davidson
Iogue with Foucault. He was as affected by their interventions as they were by his texts. They constitute another missing context for his work and help us to understand his appropriations of and struggles with his own philosophical culture. In my opinion, no English-speaking audience could possibly come to grips with Foucault's intellectual specificity in the absence of the context provided by these philosophical surroundings. Of course, as Dits et ecrits makes equally clear, it was not as if Foucault was enclosed within the parameters of French intellectual life. His engagement with political, cultural, and intellectual problems outside of France, formed through his encounters in, among other places, Sweden, Poland, Tunisia, Japan, Brazil, and the United States permeates his work from beginning to end. I am going to focus on what one might call Foucault's philosophy of language or, put otherwise, on some of the ways in which analyses of discourse animated Foucault's work. To begin with, and to give an example of a very un-French philosophical engagement, let me turn to a lecture Foucault delivered in Japan in April 1978, published in Dits et ecrits as "La Philosophie analytique de Ia politique." Despite what one may be tempted to think, the phrase "analytic philosophy" is not used by Fou~ cault as a generic rubric but rather to refer specifically to contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. Discussing the relation between philosophy and power, Foucault suggests that philosophy might "cease posing the question of power in terms of good and evil, but pose it in terms of existence," no longer asking, "is power good or is it bad, legitimate or illegitimate, a question of law or of morality?" but rather asking "this naive question . . . : at bottom, relations of power, in what do they consist?" Foucault proceeds, in a tone reminiscent of Wittgenstein, but without mentioning his name: For a long time one has known that the role of philosophy is not to discover what is hidden, but to make visible precisely what is visible, that is to say, to make evident what is so close, so immediate, so intimately linked to us, that because of that we do not perceive it. Whereas the role of science is to reveal what we do not see, the role of philosophy is to let us see what we see. 2 (One cannot help but invoke for comparison, among other passages, the following from Philosophical Investigations: "It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones.... We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place"[§ 109]; "Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.-Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain . .,
Y
2. Foucault, "La Philosophic analytique de Ia politique" (1978), Dits et ecrits, 19541988, ed. Daniel Defert and Fran~ois Ewald with Jacques Lagrange, 4 vols. (Paris, 1994), 3:540-41; hereafter abbreviated "PA."
Structures and Strategies of Discourse
3
For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us" [§126]; "The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. [One is unable to notice something-because it is always before one's eyes]" [§129].) 3 And so Foucault goes on to indicate that to this extent "the task of philosophy today could well be, What are these relations of power in which we are caught and in which philosophy itself, for at least one hundred and fifty years, has been entangled?" ("PA," 3:541). Finally, in a remarkable and unexpected passage, which I will give in full, Foucault, in effect, justifies his title "La Philosophie analytique de Ia politique" with an explicit reference to Anglo-American analytic philosophy: You will tell me that this is a quite modest, quite empirical, quite limited task, but we have nearby a certain model of a similar use of philosophy in the analytic philosophy of the Anglo-Americans. Mter all, Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy does not give itself the task of considering the being of language or the deep structures of language; it considers the everyday use that one makes of language in different types of discourse. For Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy it is a question of making a critical analysis of thought on the basis of the way in which one says things. I think one could imagine, in the same way, a philosophy that would have as its task to analyze what happens every day in relations of power, a philosophy that would try to show what they are about, what are the forms, the stakes, the objectives of these relations of power. A philosophy, accordingly, that would bear rather on relations of power than on language games, a philosophy that would bear on all these relations that traverse the social body rather than on the effects of language that traverse and underlie thought. One could imagine, one should imagine something like an analytico-political philosophy. Then one should remember that Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy of language truly refrains from those kinds of massive qualifications-disqualifications of language such as one finds in Humboldt or in Bergson-Humboldt for whom language was the creator of every possible relation between man and the world, the creator itself, therefore, of the world as of human beings, or the Bergsonian devalorization that never stops repeating that language is impotent, that language is frozen, that language is dead, that language is spatial, that it can therefore only betray the experience of consciousness and duration [la duree]. Rather than these massive disqualifications or qualifications, AngloSaxon philosophy tries to say that language never either deceives or 3. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford, 1953). On the role of description in Foucault and Wittgenstein, see my "Foucault and the Analysis of Concepts," The Emergence of Sexuality: Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts (forthcoming).
4
A mold I. Davidson reveals. Language, it is played. The importance, therefore, of the notion of game. One could say, in a way that is a bit analogous, that in order to analyze or to criticize relations of power it is not a question of affecting them with a pejorative or laudatory qualification, massive, global, definitive, absolute, unilateral; it is not a question of saying that relations of power can do only one thing, which is that of constraining and compelling. One should not imagine either that one can escape from relations of power all at once, globally, massively, by a sort of radical rupture or by a flight without return. Relations of power, also, they are played; it is these games of power [jeux de pouvoir] that one must study in terms of tactics and strategy, in terms of order and of chance, in terms of stakes and objective. It is a little bit in this direction that I have tried to indicate to you some of the lines of analysis that one could follow. ("PA," 3:541-42]
This Anglo-American model of philosophy provides a basis of analogy for two of Foucault's central claims: first, we should not assume that relations of power have only one function; we should describe power, in all of its diversity and specificity, as it actually works; second, we should take seriously the notion of game, employing the ideas of tactics, strategies, stakes, and so on as tools for the analysis of power relations. Thus, Foucault calls for a descriptive analytic of our jeux de pouvoir rather than a global theory, a fixed picture, of how power must work. I do not know how Foucault's Japanese audience reacted to his no doubt unanticipated analogy, but I suspect that both American and .French audiences will be unprepared to find Foucault supporting his task, "quite modest, quite empirical, quite limited," with the model of analytic philosophy of language, more specifically with the analysis of our everyday language games. Foucault's use of the notion of strategy, his analysis of relations of power as strategic games, certainly had other, also unexpected, sources, since we know, for example, that when he read the texts of the Black Panthers in 1968 he discovered that "they develop a strategic analysis freed of the marxist theory ofsociety." 4 But Foucault wanted to apply the notions of strategy and tactics not only to relations of power but also to discourse, proclaiming, in a one-page text from 1976, the need for a new "political analysis of discourse" that would show discourse to operate as a strategic field, discourse as a field of battle, and not simply as a reflection of something already constituted and preexistent: Discourse-the mere fact of speaking, of employing words, of using the words of others (even if it means returning them), words that the others understand and accept (and, possibly, return from their side)-this fact is in itself a force. Discourse is, with respect to the relation of forces, not merely a surface of inscription, but something 4. Foucault, letter to Defert, Oct. 1968; quoted in "Chronologie," in Dils el icrils, I :33.
Structures and Strategies of Discourse
5
that brings about effects [non pas seulement une surface d'inscription, mais un operateurj.-' For this very idea of considering discourse as "strategic games of action and reaction, of question and response, of domination and evasion, as well as of battle," where does Foucault draw his inspiration?-"from the investigations carried out by the Anglo-Americans," as he puts- it at the beginning of his extraordinary set of lectures delivered in May 1973 at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro. 6 While criticizing certain Anglo-American analyses for their concern with "strategic games that are interesting, but that seem to me profoundly limited," Foucault goes on to remark that the problem would be to know if one couldn't study the strategy of discourse in a more genuine historical context, or within practices that are of a different kind than those of common-room conversations. For example, in the history of judicial practices it seems to me that one can find again, one can apply the hypothesis, one can delineate a strategic analysis of discourse within genuine and important historical processes. ["V," 2:631-32] And a few pages later, he redescribes the problem as that of introducing rhetoric, the orator, the struggle of discourse within the field of analysis; not to do, as linguists do, a systematic analysis of rhetorical procedures, but to study discourse, even the discourse of truth, as rhetorical procedures, as ways of conquering, of producing events, of producing decisions, of producing battles, of producing victories. In order to "rhetoricize" philosophy [Pour "rhitoriser" la philosophiej. ["V," 2:634] Foucault frames his discussion anew with references to the Greek sophists and to the analyses of Georges Dumezil, but there is every reason to see here the effects of his reading of analytic philosophers, which, as early as 1967, he said allowed him to see how "to treat statements in their functioning."7 As Foucault himself recognized in these 1973 lectures, this way of .treating language was placed at a different level than those earlier analyses that concerned the laws and internal regularities of language (see "V," 2:539). With the invocation of these latter analyses, Foucault was refer-
X
5. Foucault. "Le Discours ne doit pas etre pris comme ..." (1976), Dits et ecrits, 3:123-24. 6. Foucault, "La Verite et les formes juridiques" (1974), Dits et icrits, 2:539; hereafter abbreviated "V." 7. Foucault, letter to Defert, May 1967; quoted in "Chronologie," Dits et ecrits, 1:31.
6
Arnold I. Davidson
ring, most generally, to the type of structural analysis that itself bore a dense relation to his own archaeological investigations, a relation that is not clarified or illuminated simply by daiming that Foucault was a structuralist. If one looks, from an overall perspective, at this dimension of Foucault's work, one sees a surprising set of French and non-French references interacting in the background. Foucault Jinks together, in what might seem to be an almost Borgesian brew, Russell, Wittgenstein, LeviStrauss, Lacan, Dumezil, Althusser, New Criticism, and linguistics as exemplifications of what he calls "analytic reason," and which he opposes to humanism, anthropology, and dialectical thought. 8 The latter triad, induding existentialism and humanist Marxism, and represented by Sartre's Critique de la raison dialectique, cannot take account of"everything that depends on analytic reason and that is deeply a part of contemporary culture: logic, theory of information, linguistics, formalism." 9 The existentialist rejection of the unconscious is related, according to Foucault, to the rejection of the logic of analytic reason. For the philosophical anthropology of existentialism, the unconscious and this logic both represent the same kind of obstacle to be overcome, a threat to the existentialist ideal of transparency: existentialism tried to describe experiences in such a way that they could be understood in psychological forms, or, if you wish, in forms of consciousness, that you could not, however, analyze and describe in logical terms. To put consciousness everywhere and to release consciousness from the web of logic were, on the whole, the great concerns of existentialism, and it is to these two tendencies that structuralism is opposed. 10 This is perhaps one reason why the concept of the unconscious, with its logical structures, plays such an important role in Foucault's early descriptions of both structuralism and his own work. According to Foucault, it is not only that structuralism "calls into question the importance of the human subject, of human consciousness, of human existence" through its analysis of the internal laws of autonomous structures ("I;' 1:653): In a positive manner, we can say that structuralism investigates above all an unconscious. It is the unconscious structures of language, of the literary work, and of knowledge that one is trying at this moment 8. See especially Foucault, "I.: Homme est-il mort?" (1966), Dits et ecrits, 1:540-45. Foucault was repeating these claims as late as 1973 in a non-French context; see "Foucault, le philosophe, est en train de parter. Pensez" {1973), Dits et ecrits, 2:423-25. These remarks are taken from a lecture given on 29 May 1973, in Belo Horizonte. 9. Foucault, "I..:Homme est-il mort?" 1:541. 10. Foucault, "Interview avec Michel Foucault" (1968), Dits et icrits, 1:654; hereafter abbreviated "I."
Structures and Strategies of Discourse
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to illuminate. In the second place, I think that one can say that what one is essentially looking for are the forms, the system, that is to say that one tries to bring out the logical correlations that can exist among a great number of elements belonging to a language, to an ideology (as in the analyses of Althusser), to a society (as in LeviStrauss), or to different fields of knowledge; which is what I myself have studied. One could describe structuralism roughly as the search for logical structures everywhere that they could occur. ["1," 1:653] And then in another interview, given in the same month of 1968, Foucault gives a characterization of his own work that echoes his characterization of structuralism, in that we find again the key terms of the unconscious and logical correlations or structures, here described in terms of rules. My work? You know, it is a work that is very limited. Very schematically, it is this: to try to recover in the history of science, of knowledges [connaissancesj and of human knowledge [savoir humain] something that would be like the unconscious of it. If you wish, the working hypothesis is roughly this: the history of science, the history of know ledges does not obey simply the general law of the progress of reason, it is not human consciousness, it is not human reason that is in some way the keeper of the laws of its history. There is beneath that which science knows of itself something that it does not know; and its history, its development, its episodes, its accidents obey a certain number of laws and of determinations. These laws and these determinations, it is tht;se that I have tried to bring to light. I have tried to extricate an autonomous domain which would be that of the unconscious of knowledge, that would have its own rules, as the unconscious of the individual human being also has its rules and its determinations. 11 This description already anticipates the famous remark of Foucault, in his 1970 preface to the English edition of The Order of Things, that his work is intended to "bring to light a positive unconscious of knowledge," an unconscious that is precisely the site of those rules offormation that make possible the objects, concepts, and theories of scientific discourse, a site that Foucault now also calls the archaeologicallevel. 12 Everywhere that humanism, existentialism, and dialectical reason hoped to find the nature, essence, or freedom of man, analytic reason found unconscious structures and systems of logical correlations. 13 And 11. Foucault, "Foucault n!pond a Sartre" (1968), Dits et ecrits, 1:665-66. 12. Foucault, "Preface a J'edition anglaise" (1970), Dit.s et icrits, 2:9-10; hereafter abbre/ . viated "P." In this text, Foucault also denies quite vigorously that he is a structuralist. The reasons for this denial and the differences between Foucault and structuralism could be the subject of a separate essay. 13. Here, I am reading together the two interviews from March I 969. See especially "I," 1:659 and Foucault, "Foucault repond a Sartre," 1:663-64.
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Arnold I. Davidson
for Foucault, in the mid and late 1960s, it was precisely the task of analytic reason to "bring to light this thought prior to thought, this system prior to every system" 14 with the consequence that "man no longer holds onto anything, neither his language, nor his consciousness, nor even his knowledge" (" 1," 1 :659), the first divestment due to linguistic analysis, the second due to psychoanalysis, and the third to the archaeology of knowledge. Foucault well knew that the long-standing prestige of dialectical reason in France had functioned as a source of resistance to these new methods of analysis. And he could be biting in his assessment of a certain kind of French intellectual narcissism. But whereas the New Criticism has existed in the United States for a good forty years, and all the great works of logic were done there and in Great Britain, a few years ago one could still count on one's fingers the French linguists ... We have a hexagonal consciousness of culture which sees to it that, paradoxically, De Gaulle can be considered an intellectual. 15 Foucault's reference to linguistics here is far from occasional or superficial; he was deeply interested in the role that linguistic models played with respect to the other sciences humaines. In 1969 he published a remarkable essay, which has gone unnoticed, in .the Revue tunisienne de sciences sociales, entitled "Linguistique et sciences sociales." In this article Foucault discusses various epistemological problems centered around the relationship between linguistics and the social sciences, without ever speaking directly of his own work. Indeed, one would not have been able to discern, on the basis of this essay, that one was dealing with the author of Les Mots et les choses and EArcheologie du savoir. What makes his discussion so significant is that one can find, in this context, the description of problems that Foucault had himself transposed to the history of knowledge. Foucault tells us that structural linguistics is concerned with "the systematic sets of relations among elements" and that these relations are independent in their form from the elements on which they bear; that is, the form of relations is not determined by the nature of the elements involved, and thus these relations are generalizable and can possibly be "transposed to something quite different than elements that would be of a linguistic nature." Given this type of analysis, the important empirical question arises, "Up to what point can relations of a linguistic type be applied to other domains and what are these other domains to which they can be transposed?" But Foucault turns directly to a second question, a question that raises important philosophical and epistemological issues, namely, "What are the relationships that exist between these relations that one can discover in language or in societies in general and what one 14. Foucault, "Entretien avec Madeleine Chap sal" (1966), Dils el ecrils, I :515. 15. Ibid., 1:517.
Structures and Strategies of Discourse
9
calls 'logical relations'?" 16 That is, are these kinds of relations, discovered by structural linguistics and perhaps extendable (this is the first empirical question) to myths, narratives, kinship, and society in general, capable of being completely formalized? If the answer to this question is yes, and Foucault, no doubt having in mind work that had already been done by 1969, proceeds as if it were, then a fundamental epistemological problem emerges. Foucault calls this problem that of "the insertion of logic into the very heart of reality" ("L," 1:824). It is this discovery of the logical structure ofreality, oflogical relations that, of course, are not transparent to consciousness, that is the work of analytic reason, and that elsewhere Foucault says cannot be taken account of by humanism with its dialectical reason. Thus we find a central locus of Foucault's early philosophical battles in the epistemological possibilities and consequences drawn from linguistics. These battles are closely connected to the problem of how to characterize the rationality of analytic reason: Formerly, the rationalization of the empirical was done through and thanks to the discovery of a certain relation, the relation of causality. One thought that one had rationalized an empirical domain when one could establish a relation of causality between one phenomenon and another. And now, thanks to linguistics, one discovers that the rationalization of an empirical field does not consist only in discovering and being able to ascribe this precise relation of causality, but in bringing to light a whole field of relations that are probably of the type that are logical relations. Now these latter do not deal with the relation of causality. Therefore one finds oneself in the presence of a formidable instrument of rationalization of reality, that of the analysis of relations, an analysis that is probably formalizable, and one has realized that this rationalization of reality, so fruitful, no longer passes through the ascription of determinism and of causality. I believe that this problem of the presence of a logic that is not the logic of causal determination is currently at the heart of philosophical and theoretical debates. ["L," 1:824] In light of the passages I have previously cited, where Foucault docs discuss his own work, no one can doubt the significance he attributed to the discovery of this kind of rationalization of reality. To look for logical relations where they had not been previously thought to exist, where one had searched only for causal relations, is to provide a new means of understanding certain domains of reality, of articulating their previously invisible determinations. As if to reemphasize the philosophical significance of this kind of logical rationalization, Foucault goes on to remark that the most important research being done on Marx is not bound by a "primary 16. Foucault. "Linguistique et sciences sociales" (1969), Dits et ecrii.mirians, the, 213, 214 .\nualization, 163-64, 172 .\t:srhdus, 46 .-\gt:. See Episteme .\gt: of Rt:ason, 4 7 .~;;ruu·mml. 1H3 n. 2, Hl5-S7, ISS-91 ,\historicism, l 0 .\khcnw. 101 ,\Jexander the Great, 207, 208 .\lieuatiuu, ~5, 50, 51, 55, 79, 87, 88, 90, 9H. I32 .~lu~;ia. 99 .\lterit y. ·19. 50 .-\lthmser. Louis. 6, 9 Ambrose. 205. 2I9 .-\mbrose of Milan, 209 .-\nalysis. 7 ;md structural analysis, 10-13 and the analytic situation, 76, 78 gent:alogical, 229 lingutstic, S-9 micro. ISH. 190, 191 micro vs. macro, Hl4-S6 of power. 4. 15 the analnic situation, 90 .-\uah-tic reason. 6 v~. dialenit·s, 9-1 0 .-\uard10-syndicalism, 128-29 Anrient philosophy texts and their production, 216-17. See also Philosophy; Spiritual exercises AtKients, the. See Ancient philosophy; Politics; Power; State .\nglo-A.merican Philosophy. See Philosophy .\mhropology. 6, 78-80, 100, 104, 174 ami culture. II 0 .\lll.i·atomi,Ht, II .\nti]Mchiatrv. :~I .\ntonin the Pious, 21 I .\]Jparatus. 'in• Di.<positij' .\tTe,ila,, 20H
Archeology, 6, 7, 8, 54, 55 n. 4, 82, 135, 181-82 Archive, 81, 113 Aries, Philippe, 233 Aristotelianism, 2IO, 214, 215 Aristotle, 205, 218 Arnim, Hans von, 208 Aron, Raymond, 31. 35 Art and technique, 76 Artaud, Antonio, 37, 51, 67, 68, 73, 84, 84 n. 17, 97, 103 Asceticism, 234 Ascetics. See Ethics Asianism, 22I Askesis, 199, 200, 201, 235, 236 Assemblage. See Agencement Asylum, 48, 74 Ataraxia, I 98 Athanasius, 234, 235, 247 Athenaeus, 208 Atopia, 21l-12 Attribution, ll6-17 Augustine, Saint, 148, 163, 205, 206, 209, 218,220,221,222 Aulus Gellius, 209 Autarkeia, 19!! Author, the, 175. See also Foucault, Michel Auto-da-fe, 149 Babinski, Joseph, 48 Bachelard, Gaston, 54, 55 Barthes, Roland, 222 Baudelaire, Charles, 86 Behavioral science. See Behaviorism Behaviorism, 126-27 Belie[ See Ideology Bemachtigungstrieb (drive for power), 95 Benigne, Jacques, 171 Bergson, Henri, 3, 177-78, 199 Bernard, Paul, 208 Berthelot, Pierre, 54 Biceti:e, 36, 42
Index Bichat, Marie Fran~;ois Xavier, 85, 117, 124 Biology, 109, 170 and the concept of life, 110-12 Biopower, 34, 190, 191 Bios, 211 Birth of Tragedy, The (Nietzsche), 37 Black Panthers, 4 B1anchot, Maurice, 33, 87 Blasphemy, 100, 101 Body, the, 43, 164 n. 5, 188, 214, 244. See also Mind/body problem Boethius, 205, 206, 209 Bonnafe, Lucien, 33 Border, 63 Bourgeoisie, the, 48, 132, 181, 187 Bread and Circuses (Veyne), 152, !54 Break. See Rupture Bricolage, 219 Brunschvicg, Leon, 74 Caillois, Roger, 33 Calcidius, 209 Canguilhem, Georges, 14, 15, 21, 201 and World War II, 33-34 On the Normal and the Pathological, 35 Cannibalism, 168 Capitalism, 39 n. 2, 129, 132, 164 n. 5, 187, 189 Cartesian Meditations (Husser!), 219-20 Cartesian moment, 68, 70 Cassien, 235 Cassiodorus, 205 Castel, Robert, 34 Causality, 9-10 Censorship, 100 Cezanne, Paul, 182 Chance, 4 Change, 10, 12, 126-27, 156 Cha~Rene,37,225,226
Charcot, J.-M., 29 Charenton, 101 Chaste!, Andre, 223 Chekhov, Anton, 51 Chomsky, Noam, 15 and his approach to history, 112-14 Christianity, 164, 186, 187, 200 and contemplation, 198 and Hellenism, 204 and meditation, 223 and morality, 49 and profundity, 114 and proximity, 40 and public spectacle, 14 7-53 and sexuality, 167, 226
253
and space, 46 and spiritual writing, 2:~5 and teleology, 91-92 n. 21 and temptation. 166, 237 theology absorbing philo>ophy. 19~1 Chrysippus, 208, 210, 215 Cicero, 152,209,215,217 Class. See Human nature; Power; Prolet;u·iat, the Classical Age, the, 47, 62 Cleanthes, 215 Cleopatra, 207 Clermont-Fenand, 14, 33 Code of 1808, 100 Cogito. See Subject "Cogito and the History of Madness'" (Derrida), 72 Colbert, Jean-Baptiste, 37, 47 College de France, I, 13, 16, :{5, 17:{. 200. 204, 222, 224, 226 Comment j'ai ecril certains de mes livres (Roussel), 104 Compensation, I 00 Condition and madness, 41 Confession, 34, 92, 237, 235 Confessions (Augustine), 206, 222 Consciousness, 9, 165, 176, 179-80 and representation, 86 nature of, !58 Consolabon of Philo5ophy (Boethiusl, 206 Cooper, David, 31 Correspondence, 236 Courcelle, Jeanne, 206 Courcelle, Pierre, 204 Courtly love, 18.'}, 190 Creative Mind, The (Bergson), 177-71:1 Creativity, 108, 113, 114-23, 125 and its oppression, 141 and politics, 128-29 Cupiilitas, 164 n. 5 Cuvier, Georges, 191 Cynics, the, 235 Damiens,
Robert-Fran~ois,
167
De elocution.e (Demetrius), 243
De rerum natura (Lucretius), 216, 222 Death, 86-88, 99, 197-98, 214, 222-2:1. 231-33, 242 Death drive, 70 Delacroix, Ferdinand, 8G Deleuze, Gilles, 16, 160, 163", 172 Demetrius, 243 Democracy, 129
254
Index
Democritus, 239 Derrida, Jacques, 14, 15. Su also Foucault, Michel Descartes, Rene, 14, 40, 46, 47, 48, 58. 5960, 61, 62, 69, 72, 73, 77, Ill, 113, 114, 118, 199, 220. 227 Description, 2-3, 43-44 Desire, 167, 185-87, 188-90 definition of, 163, 189 Deterritorialization, 186, 187, 188, 189, 191 Diachrony, 170 Dialectics, 6, 7, 9-10, 49, 98 Diogenes Laertius, 214 Discontinuity. See Rupture Discours sur l'histoire universelle (Benigne), 171 Discourse, 2-13, 146, 147, 167, 171, 177, 181-82 analysis of, 16 and history, 156-58 and its archive, II and science, 12, 110 and the prediscursive, 170-71 on philosophy, 198-99,201 political analysis of, 4-5 Dispositij; 179 n. 2, 183-89, 190-91 Dissemination, 184 Dreyfus, Hubert, 35 Drugs, 189 Dumas, Georges, 33 Dumezil, Georges, 5, 6, 16, 33, 40, 201 n, 8 DunsScotus, 169n. 7,170,179 Ecole Normale Superieure, 26, 33 Ecrits (Lac an), 61 Elders, Fons, 15 Elements (Euclid), 218, 222 ElemenL1 of Theology (Prod us), 211, 222 Empiricism, 3, 9 Encyclopedia (Hegel), 79-80 Enlightenment, the, 25 Epictetus, 236, 239 Epicureanism, 196-98,211,213,215,238, 241,246 Epicurus, 210,212,214,215,222-23,239 Episteme, 65, 71, 82, 86, 88, 92, 95, 147 n. 3 Essence. See Human nature Ethics, 16, 22, 25, 29, 32, 200-201, 225-26, 230-33 Ethics (Spinoza), 222 Euclid, 218, 222 Evil Genius, 69, 70-79, 90
Ewald, Fran~ois, 28 Exceptionality, 147, 149-50, 153, 158, 176, 182 Exclusion, 69-70,97-98 Exempla, 232 Exercices spirituels el philosophie antique (Hadot) summary of, 195-200 Existentialism, 7, 50, 199 Explanation, 2 Exteriority, 97 Ey, Henri, 33
Factors of IT~Sanity, The (jackson), 83 n. 15 Fascism, 132 Faust (Goethe), 223 Ferenczi, Sandor, 61 Feudalism, 185, 187, 191 Ficino, Marsilio, 223 Finitude. See Death Flaubert, Gustave, 158 Fold (pli), 99-100, 101, 102, 104 Force relations of, 185, 188 FonV~ 64, 70,84,90,95 Foucault, Michel and a historical unconscious, 156 and AIDS, 232 and antipsychiatry, 35 and antiquity, 225-26 and debate with Derrida, 14, 57-58, 58-59 n. 1, 68, 69-70 and dialectics, 49 and exempla, 232 and Georges Canguilhem, 21 and his death/final illness, 28, 226, 231-33 and his intellectual formation, 13 and his methodology, 36-37,49, 52-53 and his originality, 160-61, 229 and his writing style, 37, 41-42 and historical practice, 153-57 and history, 40 and linguistics, 146 n. 1 and literature, 15, 102, 225 and misconceptions of his work, 146, 160,175,228-29 and philosophy~history, 169 n. 7 and Pierre Hadot, 200 and psychology, 30 and suicide, 225-26 and the contexts of his work, 1-2 and the progression of his thought, 21, 28,32, 92,183-84
Index and the transcendental, 228 as author, 41 as continental philosopher, 13 as historian, 36, 71-72, 73, 74, 147, 156, 159,160,172,175,181-82,226-27 as humanist, 177 as philosopher, 168, 170, 177 as structuralist, 6, 30 on his role as author, 32 opposed to existentialism, 6 Works: "Discours ne doit pas etre pris comme ... , Le," 5 "Linguistique et sciences sociales," 8-13 "Philosophie analytique de Ia politique, La;· 2, 3-4 "Preface a !'edition anglaise," 7, 10, 13 "Surles fa!;Ons d'ecrire histoire," 10, 12 "Verite et les formes juridiques, La," 5 "Verite et pouvoir," 28 Archeology of Knowledge, The, 8, 16, 21, 34, 82, 166 n. 6, 184 Birth of the Clinic, The, 31, 35, 84, 85, 181 Care of the Self, The, 22, 32, 200, 230 Discipline and Punish, 16, 21, 29, 31, 32, 183-87, 190-92 Dits elicrits, 1, 14, 22 History of Madness, The, 14, 21, 22,23-27, 28,29-30,32,34,36-56,57-96,109 History of Madness, The, and Freud's works, 66-67 n. 8 History of Madness, The, and historical rela· tion to psychoanalysis, 81 History of Madness, The, and its alterna· tions (charniere), 64-80, 86-91, 95 History of Madness, The, and its historical conditions, 62 History of Sexuality, The, 29, 35, 90-94, 181, 184-89, 190-91 interviews with, 6, 7, 8, 28, 92, 188 lectures at the College de France, 1, 35 Menta/Illness and Psychology, 82, 84, 87 OrderofThings, The, 7, 8, 10,11-12,35, 82, 86, 88, 89, 109, 146 Raymond Roussel, 75 Use of Pleasure, The, 28, 200, 230. See also Hadot, Pierre; Veyne, Paul Freedom, 40 French Revolution, 25 Freud, Sigmund, 22, 29, 34, 35, 38, 58, 5960, 62, 80, 81, 110, 156, 170, 184 and contemporaneity, 68 and his place in history of madness, 63-68
255
and modernity, 85 and prohibition, 101 as cultural historian, 74 as doorkeeper (huissier ), 64 as genius, 82-84 coupled with Nietzsche, 6R-73, 78, 79, 89 in The Hi1tory of Sexuality (Foucault), 90-92 return to, 65, 67 n. 8 works in The History of Madness, 66-67 n. 8 Works: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 70, 72, 82, 84,94-95 The Interpretation of Dreams, 61. See also Evil Genius Freudian man, 84-87 Freudian revolution, 26 Friedmann, Georges, 224 Fromo, 244, 246 Fundanus, 236 Furor/inanitas, 10 1 Galen, 208 Garaudy, Roger, I 0 Genealogy, 173, 181 C.enealogy of Morals, The (Nietzsche), 173, 174 Genius, 120 Gericault, Theodore, 86 Gladiatorship, 147-50, 166 Goethe, johann Wolfgang von, 191, 207, 223 Goldschmidt, Victor, 196 Government. See Ideology. Politics. Power. Practice. State Goya y Lucientes, Francisco Jose de, 51, 86 Greco-Roman culture, 205, 234-47 Greco-Roman texts, 207-9 Greco-Roman thought history of, 207-10, 221-24. See also Gladiatorship; Politics; Power; Practice Greek cultural practices, 98 Greek love, 99 Greek tragedy, 45 Grille, 117, 127 Guattari, Felix, 185 Hadot, Pierre importance to Foucault, 199-202 summary of his work, 195-99 Haunting, 70-72 Hegel, G. W. F., 26, 79
256
Index
Heidegger, Martin, 85, 85 n. 19, 88, 93, 199,222,223,227,229,231 n. 1 Henry, Paul, 205 Heraclitus, 222 Hermeneutics, 61, 222 Heterodoxy, 101 Hett>rosexuality, 167 Hipponates, 172 Histoire des mriations, 171 f lisrorv. 49-50, 71-72 and change, 156 and difference, 89 and human pmgress, 167 and invariant tac:tors, 173-75 and rule, 157-58 and the social sciences, 172-73 and truth, 171, 176, 181,226-27 as false object, I 82 limits of ohjectivity, 31 prani rt> of, 15 3-5 7. See also Topos History of ideas, 7, 8, 11, 4 7, 4R, 53, 56, 82 and attribution, 115-16 and change, 12 and truth, 114-15. See also Greco-Roman thought Hi~tory of knowledges. See History of ideas History of thought. See History of ideas Hiilderlin. Friedrich, 67, 68, 73, 84, 84 n. 17. 191 Homosexuality, 100, 167 Horace, 223 Hubri.1, 98 Human natme, 7, 15, 118, 163 n. 5, 174, 229 and change, 126-27 and class, I:12 andjustice, 138-39 and social conditions, 123-24 and social theory, 131-32 as epistemological indicator, 107 as neural/cognitive structure, 11 0 definition of, I 09. See aL10 Biology; Creativity Human sciences, the, 86, 88, 102, 175-76, 204.222 Humanism, 6, 7 Humboldt, \Vilhelm von, 3, 113 HupomnemoJn, 236-40, 242, 247 Husst>rl. Edmund, 169 n. 7, 179-RO, 21920,221 Hvppolite,Jean, 33, 34 Ideology. 151, 155-56, 157-59, 161, 163, 184, 187
and belief, 164-66 and practice, !54 Individual vs. society, 163 n. 5 Individuality, 179. See also Creativity Intellectual, the, I, 8, 13-14, 188, 189 191-92 and homo nouus, 204 Internalization, 43 International law, I34-35 Internment, 21, 24, 25, 29, 30, 41, 42, 43, 52-53 Introduction aIa philosophie de l'histoire (Aron), 31 Jackson, John Hughlings, 82-83 n. 15,85 Janet, Pierre, 74, 83 Jaspers, Karl, 33 Jones, William, 1I8 Justice, 77 n. I4, 133, 135-36 and legality, 136 as political end, 128-45 as power, 136 Kant, Immanuel, 89, 228, 229 Kleist, Heinrich von, 191 Knowledge, 77 n. 14, 91 Lacan,Jacques, 6, 61-62,63,85 n. 19, 88, 95, 146, 177 Laetitia, 149 Lagache, Daniel, 33, 61 Laing, R. D., 31 Language,3, 121 and everyday language, 102 and its doubleness, lO 1 and knowledge, 107-9 and philosophy, 2-13, 61 and play, 101 and practice, 154 and prohibition, 100-104 and psychoanalysis, 79 and reality, 177 and unconscious structures, 6 Language games, 3, 4 Law and oppression, 136 Lawrence, D. H., I90 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 114, 115 Letter to Herodotus (Epicurus), 215 Letterman, David, I 7 Letters (Epicurus), 214 Lellres grecques en Occident de Macrobe aCassiodore, Les (Courcelle), 204-5
Index Levi-Strauss, Claude, 6, 7 Libabius, 223 Libido, the, 82 Liebknecht, Karl, 139 Limit, 43, 4 7, 51, 89, 97. See also Death; Madness Linguistics, 5, 6, 173 and analysis, 117 and behaviorism, 115 and errors, I 00 and knowledge, 119-21 and linguistic models, 10-11 and relation to social sciences, !!. See also Analysis Literary criticism, 103 Literature and madness, 26. See also Foucault, Michel; Madness Loi d'airain (law of bronze), 39 Look (regard), 24 Louis XIV, 228 Louis XV, 167 Lucian, 208, 211 Lucretius, 209, 216, 222 Lukacs, Georg, 179 Macrobius, 205, 209 Madec, Goulven, 220 Madness, 21, 25, 124, 161, 164, 176, 177, 184, 189. See also Psychiatry; Psychology; Reason; Suicide; Unreason and art, 67, 68 and contemporaneity, 71 and contemporary society, 140 and culture, 56 and culture of, 53 and description, 180 and duality of space, 45-49 and exclusion, 38 and exclusion/inclusion, 84 and its structures, 52-53 andlanguage,37-38,50,51,81,99 and literature, I 02-4 and negation, 49-52 and politics, 52 and prohibition, 10 l-4 and psychosis, 87 and reason, 80 and schizophrenia, 87 and space, 42-43 and suicide, 48 and thaumaturgy, 74-77 and the poor, 40, 47, 52 and unreason, 65
257
as absence of work, 47. 52, 102 as defining characteristic of humanity, 98-99 . as exclusion, 30, 42-43 as foundation of rationalism. 46 as limit, 47 · as melanchol>·· 48 as monomania, 25 as moral insanity, 25 as practice, 168-71 definition of, 50-51 dialogue with psvchoanalvsis. 67-61! history of, 30, 40-41.42, .47-4!:1. 51-52, 53,58,68 history of and psychoanalvsis, 60-96 methodology of history of. 53-56 relation to contemporary praC'tin•, 51\-;')6 restructured, 40 the end of, 97-100 vs. unreason, 24-25 Madness and Civilization (Foucault). Ser Foucault, Michel, The Hi.IIOI)' of Mtulum Major, Rene, 56 Malebranche, Nicolas, 46, 177 Mallarme, Stephane, 102, Ht1 Man and the end of man, H9 Mania, 99 Mao Tse-tung, 132 Marcus Aurelius, 149, 214, 235, ~44, 246-47 Marcuse, Herbert, 174 Marius Victorious, 209 Martianus Capella, 205, 209 Marullus, 242 Marx., Karl, 9, 10, 144, !56, 175 n. 9. 182 Marxism,6, 15,116,169-70 n. 7, 179.180 and reality, 177 Masoch, Leopold von Sacher-, 190 Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology (MIT), 143, 144-45 Materialism, 165 Mathematics, 114 Matter, 170, 171, 179 Mauss, Marcel, 147 McNamara, Robert, 143 Medicine, 25, 98, 104, 124-25, 172, 181 and medical theory, 52-53 history of, 117 Meditation, 213-14, 235-36, 245 Meditations (Descartes), -!6. 69. 220 Medit-ations (Marcus Aurelius). 21-t Melancholy. See Madness Mendeleyev, Dmitry, 54
258
Index
Mental illness, 98-100, 104. See also Madness; Psychiatry; Psychology Mentalities, 158, 165 "Michel Foucault, anti-psychiatre?" (Zolla), 31 "Michel Foucault, philosophe" (Miller), 35 Michl-/ Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Dreyfus ami Rabinow), 35 Michelet, Jules, 3 7, 212 Middle Ages, the, 36, 149 Miller, Jacques-Alain, 35 Mind nature of, 120-21 Mind/body problem, Ill, 113-14 Minkowski, Eugene, 33 Mirror. See Madness. Reason Modernity, 60, 67, 85 Moliere, 172. See Poquelin, Jean-Baptiste Monde, Le (Paris), 227 Monomania. See Madness Montaigne, Michel Eyquem de, 74, 77, 77 n. 14, 223 Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, 48 Moral insanity. See Madness Multinational corporations, 131, 143 Multiplicity, 162, 184 Murder, 174-75 Nature. See Human nature Neoplatonism, 198,210,220 Nero, 149 Nerval, Gerard de, 67, 68, 73, 84, 84 n. 17, 97 New Criticism, 6, 8 Newton, Isaac, Ill, 113-14, 118 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 37, 45, 46, 51, 67, 68, 75, 84, 104, 148, 158, 169 n. 7, 173, 174, 175 n. 9, 181, 181 n. 15, 199, 225, 227. See also Freud, Sigmund and genealogy, 175 Noble Savage, 48 Nollet, Abbe, 54 Norm, 29 definition of, 51 Normalization, 21, 29 and Foucault's attacks on, 31-32 Navalis, 84 Objectivization, 81, 153, 159, 160-61, 162, 168, 169, 171, 181 Oedipus, 100 Oedipus Rex (Sophocles), 225 On IM Normal and the Pathological (Canguilhem), 35
Orestes, 36 Origen, 215 Origin, 172 Ousia, 209 Pacific ism, 13 7 Pakistan, 143 Palestinian-Israel conflict, 227 Panopticism, 184 Paradigm. See Episteme Paralysis. See Madness Pascal, Blaise, 77, 77 n. 14, 114, 159 Passeron, Jean-Claude, 226 Paul, Saint, 220, 221 Pentagon Papers, 135 Petrus Ramus, 203, 207 Phenomenology, 166 n. 6, 169-70 n. 7, 179-80 Phenomenology of the Mind (Hegel), 26 Philo, 219 Philo of Alexandria, 208, 224 Philo of Larissa, 208 Philology, 204 Philosophia, 199, 207, 209,210-16 Philosophy, 128, 158, 204 ancient philosophy, 16 and ancient philosophers, 211-15 and ancient schools, 210, 212-15 and bricolage, 219 and daily life, 211 and dialogue with psyt:hology, 26-27 and discursive practice, 227-29 and madness, 26 and rhetoric, 5 and the history of science, 55 n. 4 and wisdom, 198, 211-13 Anglo-American, 2, 3, 5 as a way of life, 201-2 history of, 1-2, 14 in the Middle Ages, 199 in the university, 199 purpose of, 2-3, 14-15, 197, 224, 22930,231 schools and their philosophical exercises, 217-19. See also Greco-Roman thought; various philosophical schools and concepts Pinel, Philippe, 24, 25, 29, 74, 75, 76, 78, 80, 101 Pinguet, Maurice, 233 Pithiatism, 48 Plastic arts and madness, 26 Plato, 211,218,219,222
Index Platonism, 208, 210, 213, 214, 215, 218, 219 Play. See Language Pleasure, 90, 149, 188-90, 197 and power, 94-96 vs. sex, 228 Pliny, 152, 244 Plotinus, 198.205,211,214,216,217,218, 219 Plutarch, 213.217,235,236,237 Poetry, 230 Police, 24 Political activism, 130-31, 132-34, 135-36, 139,230 and decentralization, 140-42, 145 and labor, 141 and student groups, 141-43 Politics and ancient government, 150-52, 153 and ancient practices, 149-51 and practice, 154 and repression, 128-29 and technology, 5, 143-44 use of violence, 137. See also Political activism Polyglotism, 6 Pontifical Catholic University of Rio deJaneiro, 5 Poquelin, Jean-Baptiste, 168, 177 Pornography, 148 Porphyry, 205,214 Positivism, 38, 75,147,160,168,170,172, 173-74, 182 and medicine, 50 and mental illness, 55-56 and psychology, 25. See also Psychology Post Card, The (Derrida), 72 Power, 15, 29, 77 n. 14, 90, 91, 136, 159, 174, 176, 177, 183, 184, 185-86, 191-92. and class structure, 138 and class warfare, 136-39 and information control, 144 and knowledge, 192, 227, 229 and philosophy, 2, 3 and pleasure, 94-96 and political institutions, 130 and political oppression, 131 and regulation of sex, 32 and the ancient world, 149-52 andthelaw, 132-35 and the university, 144 and truth, 188 as political end, 128-40
259
games of, 4 relations of, 4 technologies of, 32. See also Will to power Practice, 34, 146, 159-63, 164-67, 167-68, 181-82,214. See also Foucault, Michel, as historian; Spiritual exercises and government, 155 Principal Doctrines (Epicurus), 214 Principles (Origen), 215 Prison, 167, 172, 228 Process historical, 5 Proclus, 215, 218, 222 Production, 153, 159, 170 n. 7, lBO Progress and scientific thought, 121, 122-23 Proletariat, the, 187 and power, 136-39 definition of, 140-41 Psychiatry, 24-25, 26, 29, 34, 60, 62 and its categories, 40 and knowledge, 100 and power, 130 archeology of, 36 contemporary practice's relation to madness, 53-56 history of, 23, 30 prehistory of, 25 Psychoanalysis, 8, 34-35, 50, 52-53, 60, 62, 63, 65, 81, 82 n. 15, 84, 101, 186 and authority, 74 and break with psychology, 67 and its foundation, 86-88 and its internal contradictions, 80-81 and its limit, 87 and its psychiatric heritage, 76 and modern madness, 86-87 and pansexualism, 91 and secrecy, 74-75 and techne, 76 and thaumaturgy, 87, 88 and totality, 75 dialogue with unreason, 67 history of, 92-93 on trial, 73-74, 78, 87 origin of, 23 Psychoanalyst and multiple roles, 53 as subject, 78 as thaumaturge. 48, 74-77 Psychology, 65 analytical psychology, 83 and positivism, 26, 67 and the abnormal, 50
260
Index
l'~\'('holo~v
(mnlinmd) ot; 48 s, 241 ori~in
Rabinow, Paul, 35 Racine. 46 Rrwwau~ Xr•jJ!m,•. 37, 41, 49, 72, 73 RareLKtion. l.'i9. 228 Rarity. St'e Exceptionality Rea,nn,24-25,25, 115,171,173,212,229 and occultism, 74 and therapy, 49 as mirror image of madness, 47-49, 97-91'1 as mirror image of unreason, 45-46 dchnition of, 5 I history ot 80 Rrrhndws ph_~siologiques (Bichat), 86 Rahenlws sur les "Confessions" de saint AuJ:111/iltP (Courcelle), 205-6 Rei!. .Johann Chl"istian, 24 Relation. St•e Structm·e Relati\ism. 175 Renaissance. the, 26, 36 <md amiquity, 221-22 Repetition compulsion, 70, 95 Repression, 167, 184, 186-87 Return oft he repressed, 170, I 74, 176 Rn.•ue tunisimne de sciences sociales, 8 Rogatianus, 211 Romanttcism. 222 Roudinesco. Elisabeth, 57 Rousseau, .Jean-Jacques, 48, 222 Romscl. Raymond, 73, 84,84 n. 17, 103, 104
Rule, 7, II, 123,157-58 an
