Fogs of War and Peace: A Midstream Analysis of World War III (Praeger Security International)

FOGS OF WAR AND PEACE

Praeger Security International Advisory Board Board Cochairs Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia (U.S.A.) Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Advisory Board, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews (U.K.) Members Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.A.) Th´er`ese Delpech, Director of Strategic Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission, and Senior Research Fellow, CERI (Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques), Paris (France) Sir Michael Howard, former Chichele Professor of the History of War and Regis Professor of Modern History, Oxford University, and Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History, Yale University (U.K.) Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army (U.S.A.) Paul M. Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director, International Security Studies, Yale University (U.S.A.) Robert J. O’Neill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, Oxford University (Australia) Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland (U.S.A.) Fareed Zakaria, Editor, Newsweek International (U.S.A.)

FOGS OF WAR AND PEACE A MIDSTREAM ANALYSIS OF WORLD WAR III

Robert L. Dilworth and Shlomo Maital Foreword by Morris J. Brady, Major General, U.S. Army (Retired)

An AUSA Book

PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL Westport, Connecticut r London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Dilworth, Robert L. (Robert Lex), 1936– Fogs of war and peace : a midstream analysis of World War III / Robert L. Dilworth and Shlomo Maital ; foreword by Morris J. Brady. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN: 978–0–313–36049–7 (alk. paper) 1. World War III. 2. Iraq War, 2003– 3. Afghan War, 2001– 4. Political violence—Middle East. 5. War on Terrorism, 2001– I. Maital, Shlomo. II. Title. D862.5.D55 2008 2008022059 909.83 1—dc22 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. C 2008 by Greenwood Publishing Group Inc. Copyright 

All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2008022059 ISBN-13: 978–0–313–36049–7 First published in 2008 Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents Foreword by Morris J. Brady, Major General, U.S. Army (Retired)

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Preface

xi

Acknowledgments

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1.

Past, Present, Future: Gleaning Clues from History

1

2.

Plotting Our Course: Key Reference Points

36

3.

Dispersing the Fog: A Framework for Analysis

77

4.

The War in Afghanistan: Case Study

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5.

The War in Iraq: Case Study

112

6.

Lebanon War II: Case Study

138

7.

A Comparative Analysis of Belief Systems

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8.

The Road Forward

195

Notes

215

Glossary

221

Index

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Foreword Fogs of War and Peace opens with a worldwide historical view of terror, and calls it World War III. The authors examine the effect of various cultures on international relations and the impact of the media’s portrayal of events on public perceptions. These perceptions eventually become realities on which national actions are based. The entire spectrum of today’s global war on terror is explored in a way that helps dispel the fogs of war and peace in an informative and highly readable fashion. All of this is done in a scholarly manner, using analyses of actual cases and brought up to date as much as the publishing process will allow. The book is as easy to read as this complex and little-understood subject will allow. Readers will be pleasantly surprised by the amount of information and the understanding gained of the increasingly active threat of world terrorism. Maital, whose home is in Israel and knows that the terrorist’s weapon is fear, says, “No, I am not afraid that I or my family will be the victim of terrorism. Road accidents are far more scary and far more likely. I am not afraid of you. But I suggest that you should be afraid of us . . . because we are going to come after you and track you down before you harm us.” An example given of the terrorist’s twisted use of the Qu’ran is the principle of Tattarrus. The doctrine of Tattarrus was developed during the thirteenth century to justify the killing of noncombatant Muslims during battles with Mongol invaders, but has long since been repudiated. However, the terrorists have resurrected Tattarrus to help recruit and inspire their

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suicide bombers by teaching that in a mass killing involving innocent Muslim noncombatants, Allah will know the true believers and take them immediately into heaven to receive their reward. On the other hand the nonbeliever innocents, if they die, will go to hell. Fogs of War and Peace audits many of the political/military organizations in the Middle East: who they really are and what they do, that is, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Hamas, Hezbollah, Taliban, and the loosely organized network of al Qaeda. These organizations are revealingly studied in the context of the Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon wars. Strange as it might seem, the authors point out that the oil-consuming nations of the West are, to a large degree, underwriting radical Islam’s prosecution of their war of terror. Instead of reducing our consumption of oil products, we have, in fact, increased our dependence on Mideast oil, some of the profit of which filters back to terrorist groups. Without an alternate fuel source or even a fuel policy, the West is subsidizing the war of radical Islam that threatens to engulf us. Dilworth and Maital believe that there is always room for dialogue between opposing factions, beginning where there are areas of common acceptance, that can, in time, grow into significant agreement. It is true that talk is cheap. No diplomatic discussion should be refused even if it only lays the groundwork for future meetings. Breakthroughs can come at odd times. As Sun Tzu said, “talk, talk talk; fight, fight, fight.” The book’s long list of recommendations will stir up discussion in any Camp. I am personally at variance with their position on beginning a pullback from Iraq (Chapter 5). The way out is forward, not retreat. The United States has at this writing a new leadership slate; a new, proven strategy and the world’s best army. The Army isn’t broken. It simply has not been funded either to maintain or replace its equipment or to significantly increase its strength. Despite the pace and conditions, reenlistments among service members are at an all-time high. The supreme confidence of the last secretary of defense has been replaced by the measured collegiate leadership that looks to professional military for input. I am betting that the new secretary will not overlook a major portion of the plan, trifle with the troop force deployment list, nor try to finish the job on the cheap. The nation and her soldiers deserve better. To leave Iraq is to invite a struggle with al Qaeda in the United States. It is far better to fight the fanatics where they live. What the authors wind up with is a no-punches-pulled, comprehensive and revealing insight into today’s hottest subject.

Morris J. Brady Major General, U.S. Army (Retired)

Foreword

Major General Morris J. Brady has a distinguished combat record, including command of the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division in Korea during a major confrontation with North Korean forces in 1976—still the most significant confrontation on the ground in Korea since the truce went into effect in 1953. He later served as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans for the U.S. Army in the Pentagon (a position that has since been redesignated Deputy G-3) and as Commandant of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. General Brady fulfilled some special responsibilities during his military career, including oversight of the joint training aspects of Delta Force, the U.S. military’s premier Special Operations Force (SOF) organization. He was designated by the Army leadership to lead the evaluation of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and by the Department of Defense to evaluate U.S. military operations in Cambodia during the Vietnam War. He is both a Master Artilleryman and an Army aviator. He spent extensive time in Saudi Arabia following his retirement from the Army, and continues to have an active interest in the Middle East.

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Preface Lex Dilworth and Shlomo Maital met in December 2004, during a conference hosted in Haifa, Israel, by the Samuel Neaman Institute for Advanced Studies in Science and Technology, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel. As is often the case with associations that develop at conferences, good intentions to stay in touch are rarely followed up on. We lost contact for two years. When Hezbollah rockets began to rain down on Haifa and on Northern Israel in 2006, Lex sent Shlomo an e-mail expressing concern for his safety and that of his family. This opened up a major dialogue that included a comparison of thoughts on the underpinnings of the conflict, world events, and how to go about responding to the threat from global terrorism. Hundreds of e-mails ended up being exchanged. In the process, we discovered that we had a very similar value set and philosophical outlook, while also complementing each other in interesting ways. Lex had extensive military background in the U.S. Army, including service as a general officer, while Shlomo had a long background in economics and business. Shlomo also had twenty-five years of reserve service with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Between the two of us, in terms of active and reserve time, this adds up to sixty-one years of military service. We became friends through this dialogue, and decided after only a short time to write this book together. The size of the project evolved apace of what we thought needed to be addressed. We had started out looking at the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict of 2006 (Lebanon II), but quickly realized that we

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needed to consider a much broader landscape. For example, the situation with Hamas in Gaza needed to be considered, as well as the involvement and influence of Iran, Syria, the Palestinians, and the Lebanese people and their government. We also decided that we needed to examine al Qaeda in depth, the Iraq War, the War in Afghanistan, and global forces and alignments in evidence. It is an interrelated tapestry in an increasingly global world. Every component part influences the others in some way forming a pattern of interdependencies. We realized that we needed to address global terrorism in its totality. Very early we began to discuss the Fog of War, first addressed by the Prussian general and master strategist Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831). It seemed to us that this is receiving inadequate treatment. The “fog effect,” as we refer to it, is not limited to wartime, with its turbulence and chaos. It also occurs in peacetime, a phenomenon that has only recently come to be addressed. Therefore, we felt a need to give attention to the Fog of Peace as well. Both fogs tend to shape events in ways that go well beyond the actual realities. In fact, the fog becomes the reality. We ended up defining each type of fog and assigning stages to them, four stages for the Fog of War and three for the Fog of Peace, creating an analytical framework for evaluating the fog effect in relation to specific events, including nature of the fog, impact of the fog effect, and how to deal with it going forward. Some of the stages that are incorporated relate to mobilizing citizens to the threat, the spark that ignites the conflict, the crescendo effect that occurs as a conflict builds up tempo, the scale-down that usually occurs, and the after-action review of what happened and what it all means. We discussed events during the Vietnam War in relation to the analytical framework in order to test the validity of our model. This demonstrated the fog effect in a dramatic way. During the Tet holiday period in Vietnam in 1968, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces launched synchronized surprise attacks across the country. While the United States and its allies had anticipated some form of attack, the timing and scope of it did achieve some surprise. The attacks were beaten back, with heavy losses to North Vietnamese forces, but not before some significant combat losses to U.S. forces had been realized. There was endless television coverage in the United States and around the world, showing scenes of the U.S. embassy in Saigon under siege, the carnage in Hue, and other scenes of great struggle, destruction, and death. This was perceived as a catastrophic event in the eyes of the American people. Who could blame them for believing that, given what had been reported to them by the media? That was the political reality, and it ended up turning public opinion against the war. The realities on the ground in Vietnam were quite different. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces were dealt a crushing blow. It took them two years to recover and reconstitute their forces. They exposed themselves by coming out in the open, and they paid

Preface

a dear price, but the dearer price was in the effect it had on the political environment in which the war was being fought. The fog effect can be seen in many ways, including distortion of the truth by governments, withholding of information, and psychological operations against an enemy that, in due course, become what the public comes to understand and believe. The media’s natural bent to produce news that drives ratings and advertising revenue, and is based on vivid images (however misleading they may be), also influences how events are reported. In sum, the fog effect plays a major role in what is perceived to be happening and how it is dealt with. We decided that this had to be a major part of what we included in our examination of what we came to call Fogs of War and Peace: A Midstream Analysis of World War III. We believe that we are in World War III, and that this global conflict did not begin yesterday. It is characterized by irregular, asymmetrical warfare, as distinguished from conventional warfare. When you tally up the facts and perspectives in this book, we feel most will agree with us that we are in World War III. We believe that we are only partially prepared militarily to deal with this form of warfare, and are quite unprepared psychologically to deal with the new realities and different kind of enemy. This brought us to our plan for the book, a way of communicating the new realities and promoting better understanding of the issues and how to deal with them. It led to these markers in terms of book design. r Provide a new model for analyzing the impact of the Fog of War and the Fog of Peace. That led to definition of the two types of fog, identification of stages of the fog effect related to each fog, and then describing them, their implications, and what we need to do about them. We have run across no other model of this type in our research. Therefore, we consider it a seminal approach. r Anchor the book with three case studies that serve to illuminate this approach to examining global terrorism, covering the Afghanistan Conflict, Iraq War, and Israeli-Hezbollah Conflict (Lebanon II) of 2006. In each case, the emerging aftermath is viewed as at least as important as the main event/incursion. r Provide short essays in Chapters 1 and 2 that set the stage for the three case analyses and what follows them, demonstrating some of the important nuance with respect to dealing with irregular warfare and insurgencies. The point we make over and over is that it is not just military strategy and action that is involved. Many other things impact what occurs, such as economic, political, and social conditions, including distribution of wealth. r Include the viewpoints of those who view the world differently and would like to see their way of triumph over others, including the dissolution of other societies, such as Israel. All points of the compass need to be

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Preface carefully studied with openness, looking for areas where agreement may be possible, while at the same time looking at the world through clear eyes and an understanding that some things do need to be confronted with the force of military might. However, you hope that the force of ideas will lead to breakthroughs that can produce understanding and peace. One only needs to look back to the end of the Cold War to realize that ideas count as much as military means.

Here is a thumbnail sketch of the book and its logical flow: 1. Chapter 1 gets some fundamental understandings in place and provides a number of essays that present a historical perspective. 2. Chapter 2 provides some important reference points, including 9/11, again using essays. 3. Chapter 3 outlines our model for the Fogs of War and Peace and examines World War II as an example of how the model can be applied. 4. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 cover the Afghanistan, Iraq, and Israel-Hezbollah (Lebanon II) conflicts in case study form, in each instance applying Fogs of War and Peace matrices. 5. Chapter 7 moves to a global perspective in examining differing belief systems, with some focus on the nature of the threat from al Qaeda, Iran, Islam, Sunni-Shi’a divide, areas of potential agreement and disagreement with our Islamic radical foe, and getting into the mind of the terrorists. 6. Chapter 8 provides an overview of challenges we face and the road forward.

We feel the blend of material provided in the book represents a rich mixture, and one that is easy to digest and read. We have chosen not to write a textbook, nor a polemic, nor a work of scholarship. We strove for simplicity, clarity, and elegance. Above all, we wanted it to be an honest work, something that can blow away the fog effect that tends to block our view. To that end, we do not try to disguise our own experience or beliefs, based on what we have learned and what we know. Finally, we deeply believe in the importance of each person learning and understanding how to respond to global terrorism and the very different kind of world war we now find ourselves engaged in, whether we want to be involved or not. Opting out is no longer a choice. We hope that the reader finds the book useful and enlightening. We sincerely hope it achieves our main goal for our readers—dispersing at least some of the fog that surrounds the global conflict now unfolding. And we hope readers will contact us and tell us if this goal was indeed achieved.

Acknowledgments Lex Dilworth This book drew on a rich blend of individuals each of us has known over the years. That collective exposure provided critical background information for this book. General Robert L. (Lex) Dilworth can think of a variety of military associates who imparted both knowledge and wisdom. The late Army Chief of Staff, Creighton W. Abrams, heads the list. He was a lodestar for the Army in terms of clear thinking and deep insight. Abrams was a key influence in Lex’s professional development as a young major in the Pentagon. Lex also remembers the Army brigadier general who briefed him, for about an hour, as the Yom Kippur War of 1973 was drawing to a close. He outlined a key lesson learned, which is covered in our book. It was so important that Lex made it a part of his basic viewpoint in terms of how to win wars. Major General Morris J. Brady, U.S. Army (Retired), was also a key reference point. In Lex’s view, he stands at the very pinnacle of military expertise. He also has broad knowledge of the Middle East and was the person selected by the U.S. Army to lead the evaluation of the Yom Kippur War. He later spent time in Saudi Arabia. His input and support was invaluable throughout book development. Lex is particularly indebted to John Bing, founder of ITAP International and his knowledge of cross-cultural differences. His recommendations were invaluable, including his firsthand and extensive knowledge of

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Afghanistan as a Peace Corps Volunteer. Geerdt Hofstede of Holland, who ranks as the leading researcher in the world on cultural differences, studied our manuscript and made a number of important suggestions. We used his classic work, Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work Related Values (1980 and 2001) as a basic reference. Retired Army Lieutenant Colonel Dick Williams, who has spent much time in the intelligence business, also added important insights. Lex particularly owes a debt of gratitude to his wife, Doris, who endured frequent interruptions in family life as he devoted large blocks of time to research related to this book. The book could not have been written without the close chemistry that existed between Lex and Shlomo Maital. We reached a point of being able to finish each other’s sentences, and both our “mind prints” are so generalized throughout, that it is difficult to remember who contributed what. It was a tremendous collaboration. Shlomo Maital Shlomo Maital acknowledges, first and foremost, the support and friendship of Lex. Our e-mail exchange during Lebanon War II began with Lex’s concern for our well-being, in Haifa under rocket attack, and developed into the mutual effort of Lex and me to make sense of events and pierce the thick fog of war that seemed to envelop the entire world. He also acknowledges the strength and resilience of the million people who live in Israel’s northern region, who endured the attack on their homes, families, and children by over 4000 rockets, for thirty-five days; fifty-one civilian deaths were caused by these attacks, about twelve of them in Haifa. Despite massive chaos, bungling, confusion, deception, and outright lying by some of Israel’s political leaders and a handful of senior military leaders, Israel’s rank-and-file soldiers, some of them reservists, answered the call to the flag and fought hard, notwithstanding fuzzy conflicting orders and inadequate equipment. And despite the war, Israel’s economy had one of its best years ever in 2006 and again in 2007. Maital is grateful to the S. Neaman Institute for Advanced Studies in Science and Technology, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, and its director Professor Nadav Liron, for providing a warm and stimulating environment in which this book could be formulated and written. Those among Israel’s enemies who take delight and comfort in Israel’s failure to win decisively in July 2006 are misguided. When the fundamental flaws revealed by Lebanon War II in Israel’s military and political decision making are fixed—and the process is already well under way—they will find in Israel a formidable foe should they choose to initiate a new conflict. There is some comfort in knowing that Israel’s sworn enemies missed an opportunity. Lebanon War II helped Israel perceive, uncover, and repair

Acknowledgments

potentially disastrous flaws in its decision-making process and in its military operations. The price was heavy, but could have been far heavier. Small countries like Israel have little margin for error. When major errors are made, as they were in Lebanon War II, and these countries still endure and prevail, they must act decisively to prevent repetition. Israel is doing so with vigor, helped by its friends. We would both like to extend our thanks to Jennifer Deutsch, who whipped our matrices into shape and eliminated the thick fog that wrapped early versions. My wife of forty-one years, Sharona, who is also my colleague, coauthor, and best friend, has supported me in this endeavor, as she supported me in all the others. I dedicate this book to her, and to our grandchildren, in the fervent hope that it will in some small way make the world a better place for them.

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1

Past, Present, Future: Gleaning Clues from History Once, on a TV program, a renowned researcher of the brain was asked by a brash TV host to summarize his entire body of research in five words. With equanimity, the guest complied. “Brain cells fire in patterns,” he said. If asked to summarize this book in seventy-eight words, we would say: Current armed conflicts in far-flung parts of the world are not isolated but are part of a single global war with common underlying causes. Inability to see this war in its global context, failure to grasp the true nature of the war, and the lack of unity in responding to it are together combining to cause Western countries to fail. Unless new policies are formulated and embraced, the West will be defeated and the consequences will be staggering.

Alarmist? Hyperbole? We ask readers to maintain an open mind and to hear our case. The main theme of this opening chapter and the following one is this: We are indeed in the midst of a new world war, but one that is utterly different from previous world wars. This war is dominated by real-time media coverage. It distorts, alters, and even creates perceptions that drive reality. Recognition that we are in the midst of a new world war is limited to a very small group of experts and is widely disputed by an even larger group of experts. Moreover, the very term “world war” evokes images of World Wars I and II. World War II ended sixty-three years ago.

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The world has since changed radically. Technology, culture, society, economy, business, politics—all have changed, making old patterns of warfare irrelevant. Einstein once said that education begins when you forget what you learned in school. Perhaps, to paraphrase him, insight begins when you forget what history taught and see the world with fresh eyes. Yet nonetheless, a historical perspective is vital, if only to grasp the enormous differences between World War III and World Wars I and II. The structure of this book is as follows. We begin in Chapter 1 by providing an overview of World War III and its antecedents and present arguments explaining why we believe we are indeed involved in a world war. In this chapter, we argue that in this war victory will occur not on the battlefield—in fact, there is almost no such thing as a battlefield, but rather many scattered ones—because terrorism strikes everywhere: homes, trains, businesses, aircraft, roads. Victory will occur inside the minds of people—in the minds and the hearts (thoughts and emotions) of the combatants and their supporters. This is why an educated citizenry is so crucially important— a citizenry that clearly understands the issues, places the conflict in the proper geographical and historical context, and understands the need for sacrifice when it is called for, for concessions when they are needed, and for stubborn dogged combativeness when it is necessary. The West is investing enormous resources to prosecute World War III, but much of this huge investment is either fruitless, misguided, or actually helping the opposing side, and is in part driven by vested interests who seek profit rather than the well-being of citizens of America, Europe, Israel, and the West. In Chapter 2 we provide some important reference points and begin by examining lessons learned from 9/11. This watershed event, we argue, was tragic in its human loss, quantitatively weak in its damage and impact on the U.S. economy, but powerful in its impact on the consciousness of citizens, after media attention amplified it to dramatic proportions—precisely the effect al Qaeda sought, in this and other terrorist actions. A quantitative analysis of terrorist attacks reinforces this claim. Based on the data one could well argue that the West is winning the war on terror, just as Israel won its war against the Palestinian version of terrorism, the first and second intifadas. But in fact, if World War III is a war for hearts and minds, then America, Europe, and Israel are losing, and will continue to do so as long as they continue on the path they have currently chosen. While the United States continues to spend enormous resources on defense—as much as $500 billion annually, twice that of the next ten largest defense spenders— much of that spending is ineffective for prosecuting the kind of conflict World War III represents. Moreover, by failing to adopt an aggressive energy policy that seeks to develop new alternative sources of energy to replace fossil fuel, America simply oils the wheels of its enemy and its enemies’ capabilities, by keeping the price of oil high and thus generating enormous

Past, Present, Future

oil revenues that find their way to finance terrorist activities. Hence, not only is America’s defense spending misdirected, but it also directly aids its opponents in funding their destructive capabilities. All this takes place against a background of a renewed Cold War, with former Russian President and current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin aggressively acting to restore Russia to its old role of key player, foe of America and at times spoiler, to regain Russia’s former glory. Even as he steps down as president at the end of his second term, and hands nominal power to his successor Dimitri A. Medvedev, he has positioned himself to continue to wield great weight and retain control. And, not least, at least as much as previous world wars and perhaps even more, this world war is driven to a great extent by emotions, by the right side of our brains, rather than by rational interests, driven by the left side of our brains. This is true both of the West and of its opponents. There is a noteworthy lack of what management guru Jim Collins has called “facing the brutal facts.” Had the facts been faced, disastrous policies employed in World War III by the West, policies evidently failing, would have been changed in midcourse. And, as Lebanon’s folly shows, Israel’s northern neighbor could well have been at peace with Israel, like Egypt before it, rather than have experienced two disastrous, destructive wars. Rationality is scarce in the Mid East but it is far from in excess supply elsewhere in the world. After we present our analytical framework in Chapter 3, our argument will be developed more fully in case studies in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Here, we present detailed case-study analyses of the war theaters in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon, respectively. Chapter 7 discusses the competing belief systems. Chapter 8, the final chapter, closes with a summary overview of the challenges we face and the road forward. We begin our journey by examining how the media can powerfully distort our perception of events and hence, directing our focus to conclusions inconsistent with what is truly happening. PERCEPTION IS REALITY: HOW MEDIA DISTORTS EVENTS AND INFLUENCES OUTCOMES One feature of the present age is the domination of the media in many areas of our lives. Whether government-initiated, religion-inspired, or privately originated, we are bombarded with imagery and messages, either manifest or subliminal. They influence what we think, buy, need, or want. The term propaganda entered the vocabulary in the early Catholic Church in Rome. In 1957, the sociologist Vance Packard wrote what was a sensational book at the time—The Hidden Persuaders—an early indication of the pervasiveness and subtlety of advertising strategies to gain our attention and influence our spending habits. That book was reissued in 2007,

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fifty years after its original publication, attesting to the continuing interest in how messages can be manipulated, distorted, and hidden. The influence of what can be referred to as a distortion effect on wars and conflict goes back a long way in world history. If there is a cradle of deception strategies and distortion effect, it would seem to go back at least 1,500 years in China. There are thirty-six strategies for dealing with challenges and warfare that have been passed down from generation to generation in China. They still are of great significance and influence. All Chinese school children are required to study these strategies. The strategies have equal or even greater influence in Japan, where they were integrated with the Samurai Warrior ethos. The titles of some of these strategies provide an idea of what they convey. One is titled “Borrow Another’s Hand to Kill.” Others are, “Make Your Enemy Work While You Wait at Leisure,” “Display Your Forces in the East and Attack in the West,” “Knife Hidden Under the Smiling Face,” “Entice the Tiger to Leave the Mountain,” “Kill the Rooster to Frighten the Monkey,” and “Attack When Near, Befriend When Distant.” One of the strategies can be called an integrative strategy. It is labeled “Chain Links,” the point being that “you need to combine all the tricks, devices and schemes into one interconnected arrangement.”1 The media presence in our lives today has now been magnified many times over by the advent of the Internet and even more recently by the trend toward use of blogs and the nearly instant transmission of video clips through YouTube and other networking sites, where virtually anyone can become a transmitter of news or information, with events reported as they are occurring and distributed all over the world instantly. Such information flows without any control by media organizations and can end up shaping how we interpret events on any given day. We saw this in the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict in 2006, when images of mutilated bodies were almost instantly disseminated. And it is unstoppable. Concerted efforts by Israel’s Air Force during Lebanon War II to shut down Hezbollah’s television network failed. Moreover, the nature of information has changed. It is now dominated not by printed words, as once was the case, but by vivid pictures and images. These images create their own reality and operate powerfully on emotions, far more than the printed word does. We also know that the media can be anything but benign. The images can be manipulated to present a “reality” quite different from what is actually occurring. The Israeli-Hezbollah conflict provides examples, including carefully staged pictures by Hezbollah to incite emotions in the Arab world and around the world. A favorite staged picture was the new, spotlessly clean children’s toy atop a pile of pulverized concrete and other rubble in Beirut. While it takes a certain amount of gullibility to accept such an image at face value when one considers the implausibility of that image— an untouched child’s toy in a sea of destruction—it apparently was taken

Past, Present, Future

as true by many as connoting innocent children killed in that particular bombing. Similar imagery appeared in other pictures. Another staged photograph showed a distraught woman with her hands raised in the air over her head in apparent grief. The giveaway was that the same woman, same pose, appeared in at least three pictures, each with a different background! Another photo showed one plume of smoke rising over a city in South Lebanon. The picture was subsequently doctored to show multiple plumes, apparently implying that Israeli air strikes were random and indiscriminate. Such manipulation of information and images is of course nothing new. Hezbollah has for years made a practice of bringing professional video cameramen along on its missions. This gives the group live footage that it can feed to a media primed to receive it. It then can become a media message that is repeated over and over again, as a way to attract new recruits to Hezbollah’s ranks. This was the case with the September 30, 2000, French video clip of Mohammed Dura, a young boy pinned against a wall in Gaza with his father by crossfire, and ultimately shot to death. It was assumed, then, even by Israel’s chief of staff, that the gunfire came from Israeli soldiers. The result caused, or at least fanned the flames of, the intifada that broke out immediately afterward. Nearly eight years later, new evidence and studies cast doubt on whether Israel was responsible. But the damage has been done and few today care much about the truth or falsity of the interpretation of the video.2 Having media tag along on a mission or show up to cover it can have its downside, as the U.S. Military discovered during an operation in Somalia. A Navy SEAL team (Sea, Air, Land) was to land on a beach at night by rubber rafts. Their faces were blackened and they landed with full combat gear. As the first Navy SEAL landed on the beach in this “secret” military operation, large banks of floodlights came on, revealing a beach crowded with journalists and video cameramen. What the footage ended up showing was a group of Navy SEALS who were totally embarrassed. Someone had obviously compromised the secrecy of the operation. They could easily have endangered the lives of the SEAL team. What distinguishes our jihadist opponents is their great emphasis on information warfare. An Australian military insurgency expert on loan to the U.S. Department of State, David Kilcullen, states: “It is now fundamentally an information fight. The enemy gets that, and we don’t yet.”3 Kilcullen also says: The new element of power that has emerged in the past 30 to 40 years, and has subsumed the rest, is information . . . A revolution happened without us knowing it or paying attention . . . Perception is now truly reality, and our enemies know it.

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The United States, rather than elevating its ability to use information for counterinsurgency purposes and to win hearts and minds, has curtailed such efforts. The United States, for example, closed the U.S. Information Service, with its libraries and cultural centers around the world after the Cold War ended. The U.S Agency for International Development currently has about 2,000 employees. It had 15,000, by comparison, during the Vietnam period. Manipulation of information and imagery has long been the stock and trade of psychological warfare. The classic expression of it was seen in the work of the Nazi Germany Propaganda Minister Paul Joseph Goebbels in World War II. In the current era, it is becoming an art form and an important weapon that can be used to demoralize or misdirect the efforts of an enemy. The al Qaeda terrorist network uses such messages with great regularity, probably with the secondary intent of passing messages to its operatives that are hidden in the commentary or images shown. What this means is that how we act and what drives us in terms of beliefs flows out of what we perceive to be true. And what we perceive to be true depends increasingly on the images we see and are shown. There is a theory in psychology called the Thomas Theorem, after the American psychologist William Isaac Thomas. Thomas wrote in 1928 that “[i]f men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.” Or, in another phrasing: “It is not important whether or not the interpretation is correct—if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.” Thomas was a prophet of the dynamics of World War III. If an image is perceived to be true by enough people, its consequences will be real and sweeping—even if the image has been falsified. Early in the development of this book, the authors concluded that the impact of the imagery and information dissemination must be given high priority when we set about examining something as monumental as World War III—not the possibility of it, but rather the belief that we have already been embroiled in that war for several years, at least since the attacks on the United States on 9/11 of 2001, if not before. We proceeded to build an analytical model that will be explained in Chapter 3, providing “filters” for the examination of what is occurring and has occurred. We break our model into the “Fog of Peace” and the “Fog of War,” and in the process we feel that we cover ground that has not really been addressed before in a disciplined and comprehensive way. The two fogs influence how conflict situations evolve. They also influence final outcomes. We further break our model into stages for each type of fog. Overall, we feel the model provides a very different approach to studying conflicts in terms of how we get into them and how they then evolve. Our model demonstrates how our thinking evolved and is influenced by the fog effect in relation to specific events, such as the war in Iraq. The two fogs are also obviously influenced by the disinformation that is crafted by

Past, Present, Future

our enemies. Our enemies are particularly successful when their imagery and commentary find its way into our media networks, and we end up furthering their cause and passing on this distortion via our own media. That happened during the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel in Lebanon. As a way to show the power of the model and demonstrate what is occurring at “midstream” in what we call World War III, we provide three case studies. They deal with Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon II (the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict of 2006). These case studies also allow us to highlight the global nature of terrorism and how players in the drama, such as the United States, Russia, Iran, and Syria, influence and even try to guide events. Factors, such as declining world oil reserves are also brought into the equation. We present a broad canvas, centered on how the Fog of Peace and the Fog of War drive events, can cloud our thinking and either help to build or reduce the level of conflict. We now proceed to place World War III in the historical perspective of World War II and its aftermath. THE VIEW FROM THE FOOTHILLS Hikers, mountain climbers, and soldiers all know the value of high ground. Our view of the world is far clearer from the top of a hill or mountain than from the bottom, and so is our strategic advantage when we occupy high ground in a conflict. The equivalent of high ground in writing contemporary history is simply the passage of time—looking backward at events and enjoying the way time digests, processes, and organizes history. Time has a way of putting events into proper perspective, whittling them down to size, or blowing them up to their appropriate proportions. Time can turn what seems like a huge event into a tiny footnote, or a small insignificant event into a huge headline. Yet, suppose you were in the thick of events that you felt were monumental, cataclysmic, vitally important, and sincerely believed that it was important to try to understand them and process them as they unfolded— the equivalent of being in the low foothills. Suppose you felt that in the fogs of war and peace, even though you could not see the summit, somehow you had to figure out what was going on so that the effort to reach the top had a better chance to succeed. Suppose you did not have the luxury of allowing time to pass, in order to get a clearer perspective. There are clear signs that the world is in the throes of World War III. A thick fog covers the scene, making it hard to understand what exactly is going on. But unless we truly grasp what is happening in this war, what is going wrong and what is being done right, and what the future may hold, America and Israel, the countries we love and serve, allies in this war, will fare badly and already are.

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Key Success Factors: In business, managers learn to analyze KSF’s (key success factors)—the crucial underlying causes for success. What were America’s KSF’s? Why did the United States win the Cold War?4 According to Singapore founder Lee Kwan Yew, it was in part the result of America’s strategy of “inclusiveness”—“embracing all those countries who opposed communism whatever their governments.” It is widely believed that America lost the Vietnam War. Lee believes America sent half a million troops to Vietnam without properly understanding the history, culture, and values of the Vietnamese people. But According to Lee, “there were enormous ‘collateral benefits’ to East Asia from the Vietnam War [emphasis added]. It prevented the dominoes of Southeast Asia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, from falling [to communist rule]. . . . Without U.S. intervention there would never have been the four East Asian dragons (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore), followed by the four tigers (Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and The Philippines).” And without the dramatic economic success of these eight East Asian countries, and China itself, what Clyde Prestowitz terms the “three billion new entrants to capitalism” would not have happened. And without them, the world would not likely have rejected communism and embraced capitalism almost universally. One of America’s failings, Lee notes, in the current war on terror— what we term World War III—is that U.S. policies are far less inclusive than were those employed during the Cold War. There is a Great Divide between America and Europe, which President Bush has referred to as “Old Europe.” This divide now seems to be narrowing under the new leadership in Germany and France. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France has moved the farthest in seeking improved relations with the United States. President Bush, for his part, now seems more flexible in trying to understand the positions of America’s European allies. There are now sharp and growing divisions between America and Russia. The rivalry between America and China is growing, first over resources (mainly energy), and increasingly, over geopolitical issues. An unstated but widely recognized view in the Pentagon is that America’s next great conflict, if it occurs, will certainly be with China. America’s ability to enlist support in World War III has been severely limited by its inability to generate a wide inclusive coalition of nations with the same perceived interests—as it did during the Cold War. “The costs of [America] leaving Iraq unstable would be high,” Lee wrote recently. “Jihadists everywhere would be emboldened.” He notes that leaders of the Gulf states fear a precipitous U.S. withdrawal would immediately jeopardize their countries. Yet many American leaders appear to support such a withdrawal. “End” is a dangerous word when analyzing human events. Francis Fukuyama wrote a famous essay, titled “The End of History,” about the ultimate triumph of capitalism. He has since had to recant, partially. Many

Past, Present, Future

experts pronounced the “End” of the Cold War. It now has returned, though in a different form. Human affairs and human conflicts are cyclical. They tend to recycle and repeat, always with different nuances, variations, and changes. World War III is complicated by the return of the Cold War, and its protagonists—United States, China, Russia—again appear to hold different worldviews and to have different, often opposing, interests, as does Europe. The future of World War III will depend crucially on whether the “glue” among these three countries is stronger than the centrifugal forces driving them apart. A short-term pursuit of narrow interests by each nation will ultimately prove disastrous for all in the face of the common threat that they face, just as it did before World War I and II. Short-term political capital reaped by supporting a “bring the troops home” policy could prove costly for America and the world. THE “TELEOLOGY” OF GLOBAL CONFLICTS “ . . . Passions . . . and interests.” —Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations

teleology ( tel·e·ol·o·gy ). Pronounced: ’te-lE-’a-l&-jE, ¨ noun Origin: new Latin teleologia, from Greek tele-, telos end, purpose + -logia logy – knowledge of . . . 1a: the study of evidences of design in nature b: a doctrine (as in vitalism) that ends are immanent in nature 2: the fact or character attributed to nature or natural processes of being directed toward an end or shaped by a purpose 3: the use of design or purpose as an explanation of natural phenomena

Over the course of history, each war is fought in—and because of—the rubble left from the previous war. Each successive war plants the seeds of the following war. In global conflicts we reap what we sow. If you believe this notion of “teleology,” ultimate cause and effect—and we offer evidence for it in this section—you have reason for both deep pessimism and boundless optimism. Pessimism, because it suggests wars are inevitable and disastrous pimples on the face of mankind. Optimism, because if we can understand the ultimate cause of wars— their teleology—perhaps, one day, we can eliminate that cause and live together in peace and harmony. In what way does the current World War III flow directly from the aftermath of World War II? In this section we offer a brief overview of World War II, its causes and results, and link it to the current global conflict. In many ways, no war in history has ended in as civilized or as enlightened a manner as World War II—with the world’s wealthiest and most powerful

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nation America offering generous aid not only to its friends and allies, but equally to its vanquished enemies—unprecedented in history. Despite this, sixty years later, we are again at war. Why? What went wrong? This section tries to understand the teleology—the causality—of wars. To say wars are an inevitable result of human nature and human society is to accept them as a fixed part of Nature—like the moon and stars —what is truly a temporary and irrational act of human beings. In science, teleology can be proved by laboratory experiments. In history, teleology can only be surmised. But even though the teleology of wars is not susceptible to proof, it is subject to the test of reason, logic, and wisdom. The teleology of humiliation and vengeance is an integral part of the dynamics of war. In the Middle East, Israel won a surprising and rapid victory in the Six-Day War (June 5–11, 1967). Humiliated vanquished Arab nations met and vowed not to talk peace. Israel’s jubilation was misguided. A surprise attack on October 5, 1973, in the Yom Kippur War, cost Israel heavily, though that war too ended with Israel occupying Arab land. Some believe the perceived Arab victory—wars always end with perceived victories because, objectively, few wars have results that leave any side with net gains—made it possible for Anwar Sadat to travel surprisingly to Jerusalem in 1977, meet with Prime Minister Begin, and eventually sign a peace agreement. The Mid East would be far more explosive without the core peace deal between the Mid East’s dominant nations Egypt and Israel. This bitter dynamic of vengeance teleology presents Israel with a dilemma it has not even begun to solve. If Israel loses a war, its existence ends or is severely threatened—even the perception of a loss (as in Lebanon War II) is a huge risk. If Israel wins a war, the resulting humiliation causes the opposing side to harden its stand and prepare for a rematch. Either way, the result is unhappy for both sides and generates ongoing conflict. Slashing through this dilemma takes high-quality leadership on both sides—a leadership neither side possesses at present. For a time it appeared World War II would end with the same vengeful folly that ended World War I—America began shipping German machinery into other parts of Europe. But that was soon stopped. Instead, on June 5, 1947, Secretary of State, Retired General, George Marshall made a remarkable address at Harvard University, describing an unprecedentedly generous aid plan from America to Europe, drafted in part by State Department expert George Kennan and based on Keynes’ ideas outlined thirty-eight years earlier, in Economic Consequences of the Peace. Marshall’s speech is a masterpiece. It should be read by every world leader today. An excellent book published by Harvard Business School is titled Give Your Speech and Change the World. Few speeches change the world. Marshall’s is a huge exception. When President George W. Bush made his long-awaited Middle East speech on June 24, 2002, another peacemaker’s speech, by George, came

Past, Present, Future

to mind—Secretary of State George C. Marshall’s “Marshall Plan” speech given at Harvard fifty-five years earlier. Marshall’s fifteen-minute 1,170-word speech launched America’s greatest foreign policy success, ended a century of bloodshed between the French and the Germans, and led to the European Union. At the end of World War II, America remembered how the economic depression in Western Europe in 1929–1931 led to the rise of Hitler and vowed this should never recur. Yet $20 billion in low-interest American loans had not helped. Europe was still on the ropes. A new direction was needed. Marshall supplied it. At Harvard Yard, on the afternoon of June 5, 1947, Marshall began by saying the world situation was so complex, ordinary Americans distant from “the troubled areas of the earth” found it hard to understand. Rebuilding Europe will, he said, be longer and harder than had been foreseen. The “vicious circle” of decline, loss of hope, and further decline, must be broken. “It is logical,” Marshall said, “that the United States should do whatever it is able to [restore] normal economic health in the world.” George W. Bush said the same. Describing the vicious circle of Palestinian poverty, terror, Israeli military response, and further suffering, Bush said, “for the sake of all humanity, things must change in the Middle East. It is untenable for Israeli citizens to live in terror. It is untenable for Palestinians to live in squalor and occupation.” But—how to break the cycle? And what can George W. learn from George C.? Marshall insisted European states themselves agree on how to divide up American grants. Otherwise, he felt, the money would cause new quarrels— like children fighting over a chocolate bar—rather than end old ones. “It would be neither fitting nor efficacious,” Marshall said, “for this Government to draw up [a program] unilaterally . . . the initiative must come from Europe.” He demanded the plan be short, swift, and end after four years, so Congress would not fear paying welfare to indigent Europeans forever. And Marshall Plan aid should be offered to all European nations willing to accept the rules of fairness, openness, and free trade. Nobody listens to speeches, Dean Acheson told Marshall. He could not have been more wrong. British Foreign Minister Aneurin Bevan heard about Marshall’s talk on the BBC and at once convened a conference in Paris. Marshall sent Paul Hoffman, who at the time ran the Studebaker automobile company, to Europe to disburse the aid. By April 1948 the efficient Hoffman was writing checks. The aid was speedy—$11.8 billion was paid out between 1948 and the outbreak of the Korean War, on June 25, 1950, or about $16 million a day. The Marshall Plan did not try to feed the hungry Europeans. It helped them feed and clothe themselves. It was magnanimous, giving vanquished Germany and Italy one-fifth of the money.

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European cooperation born in the Marshall Plan ultimately led to the Common Market and European Union. Today, France and Germany are each other’s best customers and have grown wealthy together. There will never be another French-German war. The $11.8 billion in Marshall Plan aid—6 percent of America’s GDP—was arguably the best investment America ever made. In 2006, it amounted to about $130 billion—an enormous amount even by today’s standards. The Europeans used American capital well. In 1945, America produced 75 percent of the world’s GDP, because Asia and Europe were in ruins. Then—even more important than the aid—Europe liberalized its economies, America opened her markets and the European miracle began. Today, the United States and the European Union are an even match. Each produces $10,000 billion in GDP. Marshall won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953. He died in 1959.

WHAT WON THE WAR? In thinking about how the West can win World War III, it is important to understand why the West won World War II. There is deep misunderstanding, we believe, on this issue. Accounts of the war are normally written by historians, or by military experts. Their teleology involves tactics, bravery, and military strategy. For instance, take General George Patton’s bold dash with his armored division across Europe toward Germany. This of course is important. But it is a proximate, not ultimate, cause of victory. The ultimate underlying cause of the Allied victory in World War II was overwhelming economic might, against which Japan and Germany were doomed from the very beginning. They could not begin to match the head of the snake facing them—weapons, planes, tanks, submarines, cruisers, bombs—because the body and tail of the Allied snake was so formidable. Table 1.1 shows the relative magnitude of the Allied GDP vs. that of the Axis powers. In 1940, when war got under way, Allied GDP was only 50 percent bigger than the Axis power’s. But soon, by 1945, the ratio was 5 to 1. For every GDP dollar produced in the Axis countries five GDP dollars were produced in the Allied nations—of which as much as 60 percent went to military production. Table 1.1. GDP: Allies vs. Axis Powers ($ billion, 1990 prices) Country

1938

1939

1940

1941

1942

1943

1944

1945

Allied Total: Axis Total: Allied/Axis GDP

1,629 1,600 1,331 1,596 1,862 2,065 2,363 2,341 685 746 845 911 902 895 826 466 2.38 2.15 1.58 1.75 2.06 2.31 2.86 5.02

Past, Present, Future

As a result of the mismatch between the economic might of the Allies vs. the Axis powers, the only hope of the Axis powers was a quick victory and submission by the Allies. This was Japan’s Pearl Harbor strategy— surprise the Americans, defeat them, humiliate them, and seek surrender. And to some extent it was Hitler’s blitzkrieg strategy. Hitler failed in his plans to invade England. And for Japan, Pearl Harbor was an enormous miscalculation. America was angered, infuriated, energized, and motivated more than humiliated. The moment America decided to engage in a longterm fight, it was clear to Japanese leaders with minimal understanding and objectivity that Japan was ultimately doomed. The five-year war cost futile loss of life, as do all wars. As with all wars, leaders of this fundamental evil cost their people suffering on a scale that can barely be imagined. An interesting implication exists for World War III. Because the war does not match huge armies in a frontal conflict along battle lines, economic might is far less crucial—though the oil wealth of many radical Islamic nations is clearly an important advantage they hold. If the West is to win, it will have to be in ways other than the economic power that free open competitive economies generate. THE TELEOLOGY OF WORLD WAR III With World II ending so nobly with the Marshall Plan Aid Program, unprecedented in nature and scope, how can one argue that the seeds of World War III were sown? As will be shown later, America began constructing its vision for the post-World War II world even before the war ended, at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, on July 1–21, 1944. Its vision was a world driven by political freedom (democracy) and economic freedom (capitalism). That vision has come true. It has created enormous new wealth. It has created three billion new capitalists in Asia. It has created a huge new demand for oil and driven oil prices skyward, making many Islamic Arab and non-Arab oil-producing nations wealthy. But at the same time, it has created huge inequalities both between countries and within countries, and a significant part of the world has been left out of the global system, by choice or by design. A major part of the world has chosen to dispute the American vision of economic and political freedom, and to offer an utterly different vision, based on an Islamic Caliphate (ruler) who will rule over a huge crescent-shaped band of Islamic nations. This vision is enunciated peacefully by some, and advanced with ferocious violence by others. The result is World War III. What is ironic, and puzzling, is that globalization and rapid economic growth has created excess demand for crude oil, whose price at this writing (July 13, 2008) has been as high as $145 a barrel. Some two-thirds to three-fourths of the total world reserves of this precious commodity is held by Islamic nations: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, the United Arab

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Emirates, Qatar, Yemen, Libya, Nigeria, Algeria, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei. One wonders—if World War II, which ended with nobility, still spawns World War III—how in the world will World War III be ended, in a manner that does not spawn the seeds of World War IV? WORLD WAR III: HYPERBOLE? OR REALITY? Before we undertake a midstream analysis of World War III, we must first explain why we believe a world war is currently under way and provide some clear reasoning. We use the term World War III literally, not as a metaphor, as political leaders like to do as when they declare war on poverty, nor as a sensational term designed to call attention to a threat (War on Terror) that may lead to a war. Nor do we use it to call attention to a potential threat or possible world war scenario. The threat is here and now. The world is at war, quite literally. In this section, we explain why. Definition: A world war is a global armed conflict involving many countries, on several continents, closely preceded or followed by acts of war. There is generally a declaration of war, and the “state of war” is legally defined. There are rules of war, defined by the four Geneva Conventions and relating to treatment of civilians and prisoners, among other things. Some 194 countries have signed them.

World War III differs from its predecessors in nearly every way. The initial declaration of World War III was not by a country but by a religious group. The declaration purported to be a religious ruling (an Islamic “fatwa,” a binding ruling issued by a religious leader), signed by Sheikh Usama bin Laden and four others, dated February 23, 1998, and titled: “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders: a World Islamic Front Statement.” This religious decree, in Arabic, cited the Qu’ran as its foundation and states: We issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.5

It is significant that this declaration of war is made in the name of a religion, Islam, mentions the Crusades, and explicitly views the war as a conflict between 1.3 billion adherents of the Islam faith and the world’s 2.1 billion Christians—together comprising half the world’s population. Those

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who reject the notion that this is a clash of cultures should read carefully bin Laden’s proclamation. It is true that a minority, even a small minority, of the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims, supports bin Laden’s declaration and accepts his fatwa. Perhaps a larger minority, which rejects the fatwa, admires to some degree bin Laden and his bold “achievements” against the enemy—America and its supporters. But, as The Economist has noted, a small percentage of a very large number is still a large number of warlike fanatics, capable of extensive mischief and death. They are well financed, using oil revenues soaring on the wings of $100 plus/bbl oil and funneled to them by supporting countries, including Syria and Iran (the latter being the second largest oil producer in OPEC, fourth largest in the world, producing 4 million bbl/day). On August 7, 1998, five months after this declaration of war against American civilians and soldiers and their allies, 220 persons were killed and 4,000 wounded in simultaneous car bomb explosions at U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. The attacks were carried out by local members of al Qaeda and were preceded by the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, with nineteen U.S. servicemen killed, on June 25, 1996. Before that, on February 26, 1993, a car bomb was detonated by Islamic terrorists in the underground parking garage below World Trade Tower One in New York City. Six were killed, 1,000 were injured. The goal was to collapse Tower One onto Tower Two, bringing both down; this failed. But on September 11, 2001, al Qaeda tried again; al Qaeda “promises” were not taken sufficiently seriously. Citizens of eighty nations died in the collapse of the World Trade Towers, though most of the victims were Americans. Why this war is different: World War III differs from other world wars in several significant ways. r More than three years passed between one side (Islamic terrorists) declaring war and their opponent, America, responding with its own declaration. In his statement to a joint session of the U.S. Congress, on September 20, 2001, President George Bush asked, “Who attacked our country?” (In previous wars, the attacker was a nation or nations, and its identity was clear. The world war against Japan began undeclared, with the Japanese attack on America’s Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, but immediately after, war was declared.) His answer: “The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda.” Bush noted al Qaeda’s influence in Afghanistan, and focused his declaration of war on that country. The reason was clear. You cannot formally declare war on the International Red Cross, the Belgian Association of Master Bridge Players—or even on al Qaeda. America attacked the Taliban, who harbored the offending terrorist group al Qaeda and controlled Afghanistan. “Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there” President Bush

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Fogs of War and Peace said. “It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” Bush informally declared war on all global terrorists. r World War III is a war involving terrorism. Definition: Terrorism is defined by the U.S. Department of Defense as “the unlawful use of—or threatened use of—force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.”6 Bin Laden’s February 23, 1998 declaration specifically targets civilians.

r One side is not a country, but a loosely organized group sharing a common ideology and goal, but not occupying a fixed territory.

World War III is indeed a world war, taking place over three continents, but differing from previous world wars in nearly every way. A key difference is the widespread involvement of civilians, who are specifically targeted, the fact that one side is not a country but a loose organization or cause, the fact that the second side waited years before responding to the first side’s declaration of war, and above all, the fact that unlike other wars, this world war cannot be won by occupying territory or defeating armies, because terrorist groups do not generally hold territory nor do they field organized armies (Hezbollah, in South Lebanon, is a partial exception that will be discussed later). It is the first world war in which one of the combatant sides is a group of loosely linked terrorist organizations, though linked to countries such as Syria and Iran that harbor, arm, and fund them. What, then, are the implications of World War III and the way it differs from the previous world wars? We believe that in the West, political leaders have been slow to recognize the threat embodied by this war, perhaps because the scale of loss of life has been relatively small, and because the terrorist organizations have been consistently underestimated, in their intent and abilities. And these same leaders have consistently used tactics that prevailed in previous world wars but that have no prospects of success in World War III. In World War I, on the first day of the Battle of the Somme, July 1, 1916, the British Army lost 55,000 men killed, wounded, or missing in action— before breakfast. American, British, French, German, Israeli loss of life in terrorist attacks in World War III has been nearly two orders of magnitude smaller. This is not because terrorism has been merciful, but because so far it has lacked significant weapons of mass destruction. It explains why the West has been very sensitive to these weapons, when feared to be in the hands of the West’s enemies. When a few Western leaders have finally awakened to this War—and many leaders remain asleep, especially those in Europe—they fought it using tools, concepts, and strategies, both political and military, suited to previous wars but largely unsuited to this one. It is said that economists search for

Past, Present, Future

dropped coins under lampposts, not in dark alleys where the coins fell. Perhaps, similarly, political and military leaders try to prosecute World War III using the tools, weapons, and concepts at hand—those of World War II—rather than those that are truly appropriate and aligned with the core conflict itself. Later, we will address this failing in detail. There is clearly a serious present-day deficit of political leadership. One cannot but recall fondly the farsighted leader of World War II, Winston Churchill, who mobilized the West, and for years tried to alert it to the Nazi danger, unheeded. According to his grandson Winston Churchill III, Churchill identified an underlying ominous threat, one that ultimately led to World War III, some eighty years before the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001.7 In a speech to the British House of Commons, on June 14, 1921, Churchill said: A large number of [Saudi Arabia’s King] Bin Saud’s followers belong to the Wahabi sect, a form of Mohammedanism which bears, roughly speaking, the same relationship to orthodox Islam as the most militant form of Calvinism would have borne to Rome in the fiercest times of [Europe’s] religious wars. The Wahabis profess a life of exceeding austerity, and what they practice themselves they rigorously enforce on others. They hold it as an article of duty, as well as of faith, to kill all who do not share their opinions and to make slaves of their wives and children. Austere, intolerant, well-armed, and blood-thirsty, in their own regions the Wahabis are a distinct factor which must be taken into account.

Bin Laden, of course, is a Saudi Wahabi, as were fifteen of the nineteen suicide bombers who attacked the Pentagon, the White House, and the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. It is a matter for serious study to understand how this relative handful of Wahabi fanatics has managed to change the course of history and destabilize the world.

IS GLOBALIZATION A CAUSE OF WORLD WAR III? The power of population is so superior to the power of the earth to produce subsistence for man, that premature death must in some shape or other visit the human race. The vices of mankind are active and able ministers of depopulation. They are the precursors in the great army of destruction, and often finish the dreadful work themselves. —Thomas Robert Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population, 1798 The World Is Flat. —Book title, by Thomas Friedman, 2005. The Earth is Flat. —Theodore Levitt, Harvard Business Review, 1983.

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In seeking the underlying causes of the war that now envelops us, we must take a long view. It can be argued that one of the root causes reflects the ideas of Thomas Robert Malthus, stated in his famous essay written near the turn of the nineteenth century, almost 200 years ago. It lies in the process sweeping the world known as globalization. We begin with a definition of this complex process. Definition: Globalization is the process in which countries, and the world, embrace capitalism as the organizing principle of their society and economy, based on free open and competitive markets and the free flow of goods, services, information, technology, capital and, to some degree, people. Globalization means both the process, and the end result of the process.

Or, as Prof. Lester Thurow once said, Globalization is a world economy, where you can buy anything, anywhere, anytime, from anyone. In the age of eBay, this is almost literally true. The New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman provides the memorable phrase, the world is flat. On a flat surface, a marble will roll easily in almost any direction; a slight tilt of the tabletop will influence it. In a flat world, a slight competitive advantage will bring goods, services, capital, and wealth to the country enjoying and creating it. And lacking such advantage, it is easy to lose many marbles very quickly. We can place a date on the onset of globalization: November 9, 1989. On that day, the Berlin Wall fell. The two Germanys united, the USSR then collapsed, and nearly three billion people in Asia joined the world economy. While globalization had begun earlier—in fact, on July 7, 1944, as we will explain—it truly triumphed in 1989. Globalization simply creates an enormous winner-take-all experiment. It says to individual countries: Join the game. Join the world economy. If you win—if you succeed in selling your goods, services, wisdom, skills, abilities—in world markets, you will grow wealthier. If you lose—if you cannot compete globally—you will grow poorer. And in fact, you have no choice. Because if you choose not to play and opt out, as much of Africa has done, then you will certainly grow poorer, because you will not have access to the huge pool of capital that travels the world in search of profit, nor to the enormous global markets for goods and services, and without this capital and these markets, you have no chance. The result has been to create a great divide between haves and have-nots. The Triple Divide: In Glacier National Park, Montana, U.S., there is a remarkable place called Triple Divide Peak. At one precise point, water flows in three directions: to the Atlantic Ocean, to the Pacific Ocean, and the Arctic Ocean. Globalization has created a cruel Triple Divide. A small group of countries have grown wealthy—and an even smaller group of individuals within those countries. A group of countries have stagnated, remained where they

Past, Present, Future

have been. And a large group of countries have retreated, fallen backward, grown poorer. The Triple Divide was chronological: November 9, 1989. Here are the data. r Globally, only a small minority of the world’s population has benefited from global capitalism. Of the world’s six billion people, the richest billion living in about twenty-five countries get 78 percent of the world’s GDP and enjoy an average income of $25,000 a year. There, only seven of every 1,000 children die before age 5. In contrast, the poorest 1.5 billion people get an average of $1 a day, or about $400 a year; in fifteen years there will be almost two billion people living at this starvation level.8 r The poorest three billion people living in sixty-one countries get only 6 percent of the world’s GDP, and have a per capita GDP of $2 a day or less.9 There, ninety of every 1000 children die before age 5. An entire continent—Africa—has become deeply impoverished during the past generation. r Since 1970, the wealthiest sixty countries doubled their per capita income. The middle sixty and poorest sixty countries gained little or no ground.

This is truly a Triple Divide. Nothing is more symbolic than the twin problems of obesity and hunger. A billion people in the world are hungry. An equal numbers are obese. Both groups suffer. A transfer of resources from the fat to the thin would help both. (In the United States more than 30 percent of the population is overweight.) Yet in an age of supercomputers, gene therapy, and the Internet, more people go hungry, even more people grow obese, and the absurdity is more tragic than comic. If Malthus focused on food production because, in 1798, 90 percent of the world engaged in agriculture, then in 2006 food again symbolizes the Great Global Divide. In fact, in 2008 we see a world food crisis driven in part by high energy costs and use of agricultural products, such as corn, to produce ethanol as one solution to the skyrocketing price of oil. That effectively reduces the amount of corn available for food consumption. Persistent drought in some areas of the world is another factor. Some refer to the food crisis as a “silent tsunami.” Several countries have stopped exporting rice because of what is perceived as a risk to their own available food supply in the face of growing demand. The have-nots find their daily food cost climbing beyond their reach, triggering food riots in some cases. The good news is that globalization has created unprecedented wealth. The bad news is that only a relative handful of countries and individuals within those countries have gotten it. Today, the haves are under attack by the have-nots. Countries unable to compete in economic wars may seek to acquire leveling weapons (biological, chemical, and nuclear) for military wars so as to match resources possessed

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by the haves. In a sense, the First Gulf War in 1991 was a Malthusian war; Iraq, a relatively poor have-not country, attacked Kuwait, a wealthy have country, in order to acquire Kuwait’s enormous oil resources. In another sense, World War III is a Malthusian war; the extreme inequality of wealth distribution is doubtless an underlying cause. If everyone in the world made more or less the same income (as was the case three hundred years ago, when we were all farmers), would it be easy to recruit, train, and deploy terrorists? Many of the world’s Muslims live in countries that have been blessed with enormous oil wealth. In one sense, this blessing can be seen as a curse. Failing oil, countries like Iran would likely have been forced to reform their economies, open them to world trade and capital flows, modernize, and engage in competition in world markets. It is hard to cite a large Muslim country that has done this, with the possible exception of Turkey, whose constitution defines Turkey as secular, as it has been since the days of Kemal Ataturk in the 1920s. In the end, it is how reality is perceived that drives actions and policies, and not reality itself. This is why World War III is primarily about those perceptions and how they are shaped. We now proceed to examine the battlefield of those perceptions—the battle for hearts and minds.

WINNING THE CRUCIAL WAR FOR HEARTS AND MINDS Wars of subversion and counter subversion are fought, in the last resort, in the minds of the people. —Frank Kitson, Low intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping (London: Faber and Faber, 1971, p. 78; cited in Rosenau,10 p. 1131)

If we are midstream in World War III—where is the battlefield? Iraq? Afghanistan? Lebanon, and the Mideast? Lower Manhattan? The London and Madrid metros? All of those—yet, none of those. The true battlefield lies elsewhere—in the hearts and minds of billions of people. World War III is at its core a struggle over competing ideas. And it will be the most powerful ideas, presented with the most clarity and force, which will win the war, not the most powerful armies. If there is a single principle that is least understood in the West about World War III it is this: World War III is fundamentally about hearts and minds, not about counterterrorism, X-raying luggage, or creating a U.S. Homeland Security department with budgets that far exceed what the department knows how to spend effectively and wisely. We have known this lesson at least since Kitson’s book, and even well before that (the defeat of the Malayan Communist insurgency, for instance).

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Yet, somehow it was forgotten. The most dangerous threat posed by the global jihadist movement—regarded by many as a well-organized, generously funded worldwide insurgency against American, Israeli, Jewish, and Western interests—is probably its ideology, battling for the hearts and minds of over a billion Muslims. If this ideology captures the imagination and energy of millions of young Muslims, the extent of World War III, its toll of lives, and the damage it wreaks, will be far beyond what even the most pessimistic observer can believe today. Yet, it is very hard to identify a consistent, focused, and well-planned countercampaign for the hearts and minds that global jihad seeks. The focus so far has been on technology, machinery, armed forces. There is a huge gap. The Enemy Ideology: In his excellent chapter, William Rosenau describes the key elements of one of the ideas the West faces in World War III— radical Sunni Salafi jihadist ideology, advocating “a return to Islam as practiced by the Prophet” by force of arms, to first destroy “apostate” regimes like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan, while battling unbelievers led by American and Zionist “crusaders.” The basis of this ideology is that the existence of the Islamic umma (nation) is threatened by America, which seeks eradication of Islam. Hence violence is simply a self-defense. This ideology, put forward by Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, argues that it is the obligation of every Muslim to engage in defensive jihad. Part of this ideology is the advocacy of a caliphate (khilafah, or unified Islamic state), led by what Westerners would call a dictator, or caliph. Defeating al Qaeda, Rosenau argues, requires an attack on its ideology. And, he argues, “to be effective, this counterpunch will require more than just allowing alternative worldviews in the Muslim world to be more widely disseminated.” A model for this counterpunch could well be the campaign mounted by the United States during the Cold War. Then, the United States and Britain built a large and effective system for battling Communist ideology. This system included Radio Free Europe and Voice of America. It reached well over half of the Soviet population. What fraction of the 1.3 billion Muslims in the world are reached by any form of Western media? How many of these 1.3 billion people rely on the Arab-leaning satellite channel Al Jezeera (in Arabic, “the island,” referring to the Arab peninsula) for their information? And why, if America and Britain understood that the Cold War could be won by winning hearts and minds, do they fail to understand that World War III, too, is about the same thing? A strong case can be made that the defeat of the USSR in the Cold War came about not because America’s free market economy overwhelmed that of the Soviets, but because of the power of a simple idea: the notion that political freedom is the ultimate good, is desired by all, and cannot survive unless its sibling economic freedom (capitalism) also coexists. This idea was put forward by a relatively obscure Austrian economist, F.A. Hayek,

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in his 1944 book The Road to Serfdom. It was read by Ronald Reagan, who became the U.S. president, and by Margaret Roberts Thatcher, who became the British prime minister, roughly at the same time—and each chose to implement its ideas and to spread them abroad, in part based on mutual friendship and cooperation. With global capitalism prevailing today as the result of the power of an idea, why then in the West is the power of ideas not treated with the respect it deserves, in prosecuting World War III? While homeland security and antiterrorism budgets have ballooned, Rosenau notes that the U.S. State Department’s public diplomacy (a polite term for propaganda) budget is $1 billion/yr., the same now as before 9/11, and a third of 1 percent of the U.S. defense budget. Note that the 2007 Homeland Security Budget is $35.6 billion, an increase of 7 percent over 2006, or $2.3 billion. Little, if any, goes toward hearts and minds. For instance, The Voice of America reaches only one Arab in every fifty. Why should it not reach all of them? Many may not listen, many may reject its ideas—but how can hearts and minds be won, if minds are oblivious to, and hearts unaware of, the key messages? America’s response to Al Jezeera, known as Al Hurra, “the free one,” has been a gigantic flop since its launch in 2004. Why would we expect otherwise, when a member of the governing Broadcasting Board of Governors, Norman Pattiz, says, “We’re not expecting to change people’s minds about anything.”11 DEFINING THE OBJECTIVES When America and the West have defined their objective in World War III as the defeat of terrorism, they may have delivered powerful victories to enemies precisely by shooting at the wrong bull’s eye. Objectively, global jihadic terrorism has had very very few successes. They have alarmed the public, but as Frank Rich notes in his new book The Greatest Story Ever Told,12 the actual successes have been few. Even 9/11, the pinnacle of al Qaeda’s “success,” as tragic as it was, caused some 3,000 deaths—0.00001 of America’s population. In some ways, America’s paroxysm in striking at Afghanistan, then at Iraq, to erase the shame of 9/11, played directly into the hands of the jihadists. Their goal always has been hearts and minds, unlike the United States. As a result, any act of terrorism that gains wide attention—even ones that fail—succeeds, by gaining access to young and impressionable minds who find the struggle against impossible odds, in the face of danger, dramatic, romantic, and worth joining. Some experts even reason that the 9/11 attacks “could have been intended to induce an overreaction by the United States against the Muslim world, and the terrorists might have achieved this objective with the U.S.

Past, Present, Future

invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.”13 The same may be said of Israel’s response to Hezbollah’s kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers on July 11. Enormous destruction on southern Beirut was caused by massive air attacks. Few Lebanese hearts and minds were won over to Israel’s side by this action, even among Lebanese who felt Hezbollah was a danger to Lebanon’s security and well-being. Were the hearts-and-minds consequences of massive air attacks taken into account by the General Staff that planned them, and by the political leadership that authorized and ordered them? If not—why not? Suppose that the overriding goal of World War III is, instead of “winning the war against terrorism,” winning the war against the jihadi ideology of violence, by winning the support of moderate Muslims and keeping them from joining the radical Muslims who support violence. Winning the hearts and minds of 1.3 billion Muslims—how would that new objective alter strategies, tactical deployment, and use of resources? It would alter them radically. Yet there is little evidence that this radical departure from current strategy is even under consideration. Meanwhile, fundamentalist Islamic parties are on the ascent in Turkey, win elections in Malaysia, gain ground in Pakistan, and everywhere are on the rise. RECRUITING In World War II America recruited, mobilized, and shipped abroad eight million soldiers. It was a remarkable feat of organization, and ultimately brought victory in Europe. This feat was spearheaded by General George Marshall, handpicked by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Marshall wanted to lead the fight in Europe but accepted his president’s expressed need to have him stay home to do this vital job. As Chief of Staff, Marshall oversaw the largest military expansion in U.S. history, inheriting an outmoded, poorly equipped army of 200,000 men and, partly drawing from his experience teaching and developing techniques of modern warfare as an instructor at the Army War College, coordinated the large-scale expansion and modernization of the U.S. army into a force of over eight million soldiers by 1942 (a forty-fold increase within three years).14

In World War III, America’s enemies are also recruiting. They do so under the noses of the West, often inside Western nations like Britain, France, Germany, and America. Their recruiting is highly sophisticated. Local conflicts in Chechnya, Kashmir, Mindanao, Moluccas, Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq are used as “local jihads” to train young recruits, to indoctrinate them, gain credibility, and “buy in,” and then use them to generate new recruits. These

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conflicts are used to appeal to the recruits’ sense of injustice, of injury to the cause of Islam. The Shi’a branch of Islam, comprising more than one in every ten Muslims in the world, has at its core the celebration of victimization, believing that succession to the prophet Mohammed was unjustly appropriated by Abu Bakr rather than the rightful Ali. This ideology of the downtrodden can be skillfully employed to play on similar unjust actions by the West at the expense of Shi’a and Islam. The Russian invasion of Afghanistan bred a whole generation of Taliban Islamic radicals; it was where Osama bin Laden won his spurs. Each new such struggle generates its own new generation of jihadi recruits. Here is how one expert describes the recruitment process15 : . . . in Kuwait, Muslim Brotherhood or Salafi groups begin by picking up young boys 12 or 13 years old. An older teenage member will befriend them, involve them in sports and other youth activities. He will ask them to join in group prayers at a mosque after classes. He will then begin to teach them the radicals’ version of Islam and tell them terrifying tales of life after death and the Day of Judgment. In a few years many of the youth are fully committed and ready to commit violence in the service of the cause. Some even decide that their Muslim Brotherhood or Salafi mentors are not Islamic enough and join more violent or terrorist groups. There is an observable progression in individuals who join terrorist organizations from militant to more radical activity and eventually to terrorism.

Kuwait, it is understood, is an officially pro-Western country that was rescued by young American soldiers from the clutches of Saddam’s Iraq in 1991. Similar recruiting goes on widely in Saudi Arabia, ostensibly proAmerican as well. To put it bluntly, facing this concerted and massive recruiting, “we don’t have enough bullets to kill them all”—as a U.S. intelligence officer with vast experience said acerbically16 —even if “killing them all” was a feasible and morally justified objective. A new strategy for winning hearts and minds will succeed if it effectively combines the tactical elements of systematically destroying and weakening enemy capabilities . . . alongside the equally critical broader strategic imperative of breaking the cycle of terrorist and insurgent recruitment and replenishment that have respectively sustained both al Qaeda’s continued campaign and the ongoing conflict in Iraq. . . . At the foundation of such a dynamic and adaptive strategy must be the ineluctable axiom that effectively and successfully countering terrorism as well as insurgency is not exclusively a military endeavor but also involves fundamental parallel political, social, economic and ideological activities.17

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Repeating History: At times it seems almost as if the West is religiously following Santayana’s dictum: Those who do not remember the past will be condemned to repeat it. Insurgencies are not new. Guerillar wars are not new. Terrorism is not new. And they have been defeated soundly in the past. We know how. In 1952, Field Marshall Sir Gerald Templer said, “the shooting side of the business [defeating the Communist insurgency in Malaya] is only 25% of the trouble and the other 75% lies in getting the people of this country behind us.” He did—and the British won. Antiterrorism expert Bruce Hoffman recommends a simple change in language, which can bring a change in mind-set. Drop GWOT (“global war on terror”). Instead use GCOIN (“global counterinsurgency”). The latter knits together the battle for hearts and minds and the military side in a powerful integrated system. Ask the soldiers fighting in Iraq, or in Afghanistan, or elsewhere. They know. They understand. They realize that when local people harbor terrorists or insurgents, ferreting them out of basements and hideaways is nearly impossible; when they emerge, they often surprise and cause loss of life. What will stop local people from giving safe harbor to insurgents? It is the strong interest not to do so, because to do so will make them worse off than if they refused to harbor them. This interest must be created by facts on the ground, and then widely and cleverly broadcast and explained. To some extent, this has been done by the 10th Mountain Division of the U.S. Army in Afghanistan, which has met considerable success. Their success and experience should be benchmarked and should rapidly travel elsewhere, to battles against other terrorist insurgents. U.S. Army and Marine forces have been experiencing similar success in Iraq, especially in al Anbar province. A similar trend can be seen in the Baghdad area. Terrorists, jihadists, insurgents cannot be defeated in a single apocalyptic battle, as for instance, at al Alamein (a famous battleground in North Africa, in World War II, where Rommel was defeated by Field Marshall Montgomery). Winston Churchill famously said: Before Alamein, we never had a victory. After Alamein, we never had a defeat. Such decisive turningpoint battles existed in previous wars—though even then, perception often played a greater role than reality. (America won the Tet offensive battle in the Vietnam War, yet the perception was that the large-scale loss of life amounted to a defeat). Given this, victory in World War III must be redefined, in terms of denying support of people, minds, and resources to those who seek global jihad. Each heart, each mind, must be won, one at a time. But they will never be won, if they are ignored or discounted. It is time to rethink our strategy. Winning the war for hearts and minds will never happen, if this war itself is never declared, nor truly understood place. That is why an educated citizenry is crucial. We now turn to this key subject.

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RESPONDING TO GLOBAL TERRORISM REQUIRES AN EDUCATED AND INFORMED CITIZENRY Few will disagree with the premise that citizens of a country need to be able to read and write and be sufficiently proficient in basic skills to earn a livelihood and contribute to the well-being of their country. In so many words, this can be termed “functional literacy.” Even totalitarian regimes tend to support this, though they may not want an intellectual class to develop that can challenge the control of the government in power or its ideology. In China’s Cultural Revolution, inspired and led by Mao Tse Tung, this class was persecuted and sent to exile in the countryside, setting back China’s economy severely for more than a decade. The Education Commission of the United States in 1991 said the following about literacy, and it still has face validity today: . . . in 1886, one could be considered literate, if s/he could sign his or her name. Now that people need swift and varied information skills and competencies, literacy cannot be measured as a function of “grade” or of a single processing skill such as reading. Literacy in the information age is more likely a function of comprehending in several abstract ways such as through icons (pictures and signs), schema (flow charts, tables, maps) as well as words (whether spoken, written or read). And literacy includes competency in writing and computing.

And how does the United States stack up against these standards of literacy? How can we measure that? In 1992 it was measured in a sophisticated and modern way in the United States for the first time. Called the National Adult Literacy Survey (NALS), it was conducted by the Educational Testing Service (ETS) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Education. The study produced some rather startling results. NALS measured the English literacy skills of a random sample of 26,000 individuals in the United States aged 16 and older. The study also included 1,100 inmates in eighty federal and state prisons, and twelve states signed on to have special, even deeper surveys, conducted at their own expense. Elderly Americans ended up being represented in the study, some as old as 85. Study participants were interviewed for up to forty-five minutes and asked to respond to a series of commonly encountered literacy tasks such as reading a bus schedule, using an automated teller machine, or understanding a judge’s instructions to a jury. Each participant received proficiency scores in three different areas: prose, document literacy, and quantitative literacy. The results were then divided into five levels, with those at level 1 being least proficient and those at Level 5 being most proficient. The results were like a lightning strike on the front pages of America’s newspapers. The study found that 21 to 23 percent of American adults were

Past, Present, Future

functioning at the lowest level (Level 1). That amounted to approximately 40 to 44 million people. Those in this category are at most able to perform tasks involving “brief, uncomplicated text,” such as totaling the amount on a bank deposit slip or locating information in a short news article, but many with difficulty. When Level 2 was added in, there were another 25 to 28 percent of interviewees with limitations—about 50 million Americans. People at this level had skills that were more varied, but still quite limited. They could locate information in a text or an intersection on a map, but had “considerable difficulty” dealing with long texts or doing two-step calculations. The Level 1 and Level 2 results when considered together reflected that about 94 million people in the United States had a very limited functional literacy. As shocking as the results were, they quickly faded from the front pages of the newspapers after only a few days. Literacy specialists indicate that this is characteristic of literacy. It rises up like a phoenix every few years and disappears again. What is not commonly known about the NALS survey at state level, in the twelve states that had the deeper surveys, is that the results could be at least as grim, and even more conclusive, given the larger sample involved. Since the people responsible for working with ETS on the state-level surveys tended to be those in charge of the Adult Education Programs in the state, there was not necessarily great enthusiasm for publicizing the results, since in some respects they were looking at their own “report card.” Between 1994 and 1998, the National Institute of Literacy in the United States conducted what was called the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS). It was a 22-country initiative, targeting age groups 16 to 65. It used the same five levels as used in the earlier NALS study. What the aggregation of data shows is that no country has less than a quarter of its adult population in the zone of difficulty in terms of functional literacy. Sweden seems to be in a better position by a significant margin over other countries in this comparison. The United States is more center of the pack, and with 46.6 percent of its adult citizens falling at Levels 1 and 2, this is a worrisome result. Things have not really improved since the National Adult Literacy Survey of 1992. An editorial that appeared in the New York Times on February 7, 2007, based on new data from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), commonly known as the “National Report Card,” states, American 12th graders are actually performing worse in reading than 12th graders did in 1992 . . . only about 31 percent of 12th graders are proficient in reading . . . The math scores were even worse, with only 23 percent of 12th graders at or above the proficiency level. Three-fourths of high school graduates finish twelfth grade without adequate skills in writing.18

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When you knit together the pieces of this mosaic, it raises two important questions: 1. Can a democracy survive over time if its citizens have only a limited awareness of the world around them and the most bare-bones appreciation of their own democratic institutions? 2. Can the country’s economy realistically continue to prosper with such a drag weight of citizens who lack a high level of functional literacy and have difficulty performing basic tasks and problem solving associated with living a productive life?

During the period when the original NALS Report was released, the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Employment and Training Administration, at the time Roberts T. Jones, returned from some visits to plants that were scheduled to close. He noted the tragedy of seeing people about to come out the doors that were unprepared from a skills standpoint to gain new positions. Their skills were at a low level and in some cases it was questionable if they could effectively be retrained. They had a very thin veneer of basic skills. Global terrorism creates an environment that ups the ante on the need for an educated citizenry. There are signs that the United States needs to devote much greater attention to educating and training its people, starting early in the school systems. I (Dilworth) had a chance to talk with a senior global human resources executive for Motorola a few years ago. He told me how difficult it could be to find young Americans with the scientific and technical skills they needed. As a result, they were flying recruiting teams to places like Eastern Europe, sometimes flying into small landing strips in the countryside. They were finding youth who were often much more capable than what was generally available in the United States in math and science. Another U.S. company needed a pool of young workers with strong advanced math skills. They were looking for a locale in the United States that had such a pool, with the thought of building a facility there. They couldn’t find one. They finally found what they wanted, in Japan. All the issues that have been outlined thus far, combine to reduce the ability of the United States to maintain its economic base and deal with the growing threat from global terrorism. Any country needs to have a wellskilled and healthy human resource pool. It seems rather transparent that when a country allows the robustness of its human resources to erode, that it elevates the risks to its prosperity and survival. It is a Darwinian principle, namely natural selection. The strong survive. One can turn to Japan for a wonderful example of how to continuously focus, in a strategic way, on keeping the education and training programs strong, including mentorship programs (what Peter F. Drucker has referred to as their “Godfather system”).19

Past, Present, Future

Having people skilled in reading, writing, math, and science is not enough. Citizens must also be “literate” in their democratic institutions if they live in a democratic country. They also need to understand world geography, take an active interest in the world around them, and understand the nature of the global terrorist threat at this point in the protracted conflict that is World War III. The government and the media, whether public or private, are obligated to communicate that threat to them in an accurate and honest way. In turn, the citizen has a responsibility for seeking out such information. Kent Barber, wrote a Q&A report on an interview with the author Susan Jacoby in the March 10, 2008 issue of U.S. News and World Report (the title of the piece was, “The Ignorant American.”) Here is what Jacoby said: I was particularly shocked, in a recent National Geographic–Roper study, by how many Americans between the ages of 18 and 24 don’t think it’s important to know a foreign language or know the location of countries in which important news is being made. Not knowing these things is ignorance. Being proud of not knowing them is something else. It’s being both antirational and anti-intellectual. To say that it isn’t important to know a foreign language is just plain stupid.

World War III is a violent clash of people armed with a variety of weapons. But underlying that clash is another conflict—that of cultures. World War III has two distinct contradictory cultures facing off against one another. We now turn to an analysis of this war of cultures. THE WAR OF CULTURES AND THE CULTURE OF WAR: ARE FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY SOURCES OF WEAKNESS OR STRENGTH? World politics is entering a new phase . . . the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic . . . [but rather] cultural . . . the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. —Samuel Huntington, 1993 The wars of kings were over; the wars of peoples had begun. —R.R. Palmer (1793), cited by Huntington

In his controversial 1993 essay, historian Samuel Huntington claims that “from Yugoslavia to the Middle east to Central Asia, the fault lines of civilizations are the battle lines of the future.”20 Later, following 9/11, with

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the rise of global terrorism driven by radical Islam, Huntington’s analysis and central thesis appeared to be validated. Is his message accurate? Is it useful to view World War III as a clash of cultures, or of civilizations—and does this help dispel the fogs of war and peace? Have indeed the wars of peoples begun? And is his prescription for the West—“with alien civilizations the West must be accommodating if possible, but confrontational if necessary”—a correct one? And ultimately, is his moral lesson—“in the final analysis, all civilizations will have to learn to tolerate each other”—feasible and attainable? In this section, we address these fascinating and prickly issues. We begin by asking, what is culture? Definition: Culture is simply shared beliefs or values.

There are over 200 published definitions of culture, but nearly all of them boil down to this: A culture is defined by the set of principles and ideas that are shared by those who belong to that culture. Some disciplines (e.g., primatology) define culture as the way knowledge is transmitted within society and among generations. UNESCO’s definition expands on this: “culture [is] the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of a society or a social group, and encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together with value systems, traditions and beliefs.” Clearly, culture—what we believe—is vital in understanding global conflict, simply because what we believe drives what we do. It is vital to understand culture and its role in World War III because the two combatant sides each perceive it as a clash of opposing values. Radical Islam believes it is at war with modern Crusaders. The Crusades were a series of military campaigns waged between the ninth and eleventh centuries in the name of Christianity, almost always supported by the Pope, which combined pilgrimage with warfare. Their overall aim was to liberate Jerusalem and the Holy Land from the Muslims. The Third Crusade ended with the recapture of Jerusalem by the Muslims led by the Kurdish warrior Saladin (Salah al–Din). To this day Saladin is celebrated and revered by Muslims and his name is invoked often. It is ironic that Saladin’s cultural group, the Kurds, remains to this day the largest subculture or ethnic group in the Middle East, scattered through Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, without its own nation. The frequent reference to Crusades and Crusaders by radical Islamists validates the claim that they perceive the war to be a clash of cultures (of which religion is a key element), as were the Crusades. Is there a unique American culture? Melting-pot societies—America is a leading example of one—blend many cultures, merging those of indigenous people with those brought by immigrants. But in a melting pot, cultures blend together to create a wonderful new “dish” with unique flavors and smells. In an age when multiculturalism has become politically correct—the view that every group, however small, has the innate and inalienable right to

Past, Present, Future

retain its distinctive culture, language, beliefs, and religion—it is legitimate to ask whether Americans still have a common culture. Huntington’s views are clear. In an interview, he argued, Fragmentation and multiculturalism are now eating away at the whole set of ideas and philosophies which have been the binding cement of American society. Over the longer term, the West is going to have to learn how to adapt to a world in which, despite its current preponderance in economic and military power, the balance of power is shifting into the hands of others [emphasis added].

And in a separate interview, he warned against the idea that the world is moving toward a single homogenized global culture that is basically Western—a view he called “arrogant, false and dangerous.” “The peoples of the West must hang together, or they will hang separately,” he cautioned, paraphrasing Benjamin Franklin’s warning to American revolutionaries. In fact, America’s cultural diversity—and indeed that of Israel—is a source of great strength, not weakness. Immigrants, by nature, are people with energy and motivation, willing to take risks and endure hardship for a chance at a better life. Immigration is a self-selection process whereby people with high energy and motivation migrate. Those countries that receive this high-quality human capital benefit. My father (Maital) emigrated from Russia to Canada in 1920, enduring great hardship on the way (a mere youth, he spent a winter in Belgium, unable to obtain immigration papers). Forty years later, I emulated him and emigrated to Israel—though there was no hardship involved. Israel absorbed more than its entire population, as immigrants, in the four-year period after its establishment in 1948. The blend of cultures—East and West—has been a source of energy and strength for Israel over the past 60 years, as it was for Canada and America, and for all societies built on immigration.

Culture is relevant to any analysis of World War III for at least two key reasons. One, because culture is a key component of cohesiveness, in turn a vital condition for the ability to endure the sacrifices that waging war entails; and two, because understanding the culture of opposing peoples is also a necessary condition for waging the war intelligently and successfully. Is America cohesive? The opposing forces in World War III are highly asymmetric. America dominates in resources and in military technology. But its culture seems fractured and lacks cohesion; moreover, the democratic spirit (ironically, a key value in whose name at least some of World War III is waged) leads to spirited debates whenever America decides to take action, for instance in Iraq. Radical Islam views these debates as weakness, and has

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cleverly acted to foster them. In contrast, the opponents of America, far less fond of democracy, seem cohesive, aligned, and fully in agreement and glued together by the principles of (radical) Islam, as they interpret them. This is an overly simplistic view—there is an enormous fault line within Islam between Sunni and Shi’a, the two differing interpretations of Islam, and adherents of these two groups dislike each other perhaps more than they dislike America and Israel; despite these differences, radical Islamic groups are able to cooperate when faced by a common enemy. In fact Sunnis and Shiites seem to welcome that enemy as a binding force to overcome their internal disagreements—a role Israel and opposition to its existence have played for decades. Terrorist groups like Hamas (Sunni fundamentalist) and Hezbollah (Shi’a fundamentalist) work closely together against the common perceived enemy, even though their ideologies clash. Many scholars, including Geert Hofstede, Charles Hampden-Turner, and Alfons Trompenaar have succeeded in quantifying elements of culture and shared beliefs. What their work reveals is that American culture is highly individualistic. Hampden-Turner and Trompenaar presented the following dilemma to managers in many countries, and asked them to pick the one they most agree with: A. “[O]ne way to see a company is as a system designed to perform functions and tasks in an efficient way . . . people are paid for the tasks they perform.” B. “A company is a group of people working together . . . they have social relations with other people. The functioning is dependent on these relations.”

Some 90 percent of Americans agreed with A—compared with 15 percent in China! This individualism, which often expresses itself as internal dissension and disagreement, is related to another cultural variable termed “power distance” by Geert Hofstede (the perceived distance between the highest and lowest-ranking members of an organization) Smaller power distance means individuals feel empowered and have the right to speak up whatever their standing in the hierarchy. Israel has extremely small power distance. Individuals feel empowered. U.S. society is in the moderate range in terms of power distance. The enemies of Western culture regard this as weakness, because they see any dissension as a lack of ability to create the unity of purpose needed for sacrifice and motivation in wartime. In a famous speech after Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said Israel is built on “cobwebs,” meaning that its fractious society is weak, easily swept aside like a cobweb. He may have learned otherwise in Lebanon War II, as did the country he dragged into war.

Past, Present, Future

America is currently in the process of transforming the way it builds and trains its military and the way it fights it wars. So is Israel. The two countries are in fact reinventing their military doctrine together. The new doctrines are well aligned with the individualism and smaller power distance that characterize their cultures. They are also consistent with another core American value—the need for high individual achievement. (Fully 60 percent of American managers disagreed with the statement, “The most important thing in life is to think and act in the manner that best suits the way you really are, even if you don’t get things done”—by far higher than any other country.)21 The Arab-Israel conflict is one of the longest conflicts still raging. It began over a century ago, when Jews began to return to their biblical homeland, Palestine. Ten wars have been fought so far between Israel, the Palestinians, and neighboring Arab countries. Many perceive the conflict as one over land—which piece of land Israel will occupy and which land the Palestinians will occupy. As the fog of war and peace lifts, we see how inaccurate this view is. The conflict is about culture. Israel, an advanced modern Western country with Western values, is stuck like a bone in the Arab Middle Eastern throat. Its presence daily shames the Arab countries, whose per capita incomes are an order of magnitude lower than Israel’s and which have lagged in science, technology, and industry. Whatever land Israel occupies, it will remain an outpost of Western culture in a region dominated by Islam, and increasingly, radical Islam. The implication is that at least in the foreseeable future, there is no choice for Israel but to remain militarily strong, while seeking to persuade its hostile neighbors that Israel is a permanent resident of the Middle East—a view explicitly rejected by Iranian President Ahmedinajad, who repeatedly calls for Israel to be wiped off the map. One of the paradoxes of World War III is that while it is global in nature, it is driven in part by the fragmentation of global politics into smaller and smaller sovereign nations, even while business has become increasingly global in nature. The local nature of politics clashes with the global nature of economics. GLOBAL ECONOMICS, LOCAL POLITICS, AND WORLD WAR III Economics have become global. Communications have become global. Politics have become local. We have expanded our knowledge . . . while shrinking our perspective. This is the biggest challenge facing us. —Henry Kissinger22

Einstein’s principle—“Simplify as much as possible, but not more so”— echoes a much older principle of science known as Occam’s Razor: When choosing between two theories that each explain the world, pick the simplest.

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Six simple words that explain a significant part of the conflict underlying World War III are those of former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger: Economics is global. Politics are local. Therein lies the problem. It is hard to simplify more than those words. There were only sixty-two countries in the world at the onset of World War I. A major reason was that the Great Powers—mainly Britain, along with France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, Holland, and the United States—held colonies. At the end of World War II, there were still only seventy-four countries in the whole world. But decolonization and independence movements brought a major increase. By the year 2006, there were some 192 independent countries who were members of the United Nations, and one additional “country” not belonging to the U.N., The Vatican. There are perhaps an additional twenty or thirty entities that are essentially countries, such as China Hong Kong or Taiwan. Hence, the number of countries has tripled in the past sixty years. The process of decolonization has been a source of armed conflict for decades. Many nations had to fight with force of arms to become independent. In Africa, decolonization has been especially destructive. The colonial powers have drawn almost-random lines on the map, creating countries that cross common tribal, ethnic, and language divisions in a random and mean-spirited fashion. The result has been rebellion, low-level warfare, and economic stagnation. The massacre in Rwanda, resulting from enmity between two tribes enclosed within the same illogical “lines on the map,” is a bitter example, one of many, as is the recent tribal violence in Kenya. The decolonization process ended, essentially, in the 1960s, but it has become an underlying cause of World War III. Here is our reasoning. Once, before globalization, being a citizen of a country conferred major advantages. It gave access to finance, capital markets, trade, shipping, transport, licenses to do business, labor markets, and legal representation. But in the age of globalization, the advantages that a nation-state confers have been enormously reduced. When markets for goods, services, capital, and technology are global—worldwide in nature—one no longer needs the backbone of a nation-state. Economics, business, marketing, entrepreneurship are all global, as Kissinger notes. But in contrast, politics has become increasingly local. If one no longer needs the advantages of a nation-state, then loyalty and support pass to smaller and smaller units: ethnic groups, religious groups, regions, even cities. Indeed, it is no longer sensible to speak about “globally competitive countries,” but rather about “globally attractive regions and cities”—Bangalore (in the state of Kanataka) and Chennai (or Madras, in Tamil Nadu) are magnets for information technology companies, in India, but Ahmedabad is not. There is an inherent internal contradiction between global economics and local politics. Global economics requires global politics—mechanisms to resolve disputes and organize global markets. But few such mechanisms

Past, Present, Future

exist. Instead, politics are now being fought at the local level. Fragmented politics and global economics are a recipe for instability. Future Conflict: There are enormous centrifugal forces at work in the world, which could conceivably cause large countries to fly apart in the future. Among the candidates: Canada (split between French and Englishspeaking Canada), Russia (Islamic ethnic groups in Chechnya and elsewhere), and even China. While Canada held a national referendum on independence for Quebec, in other countries the process is far less peaceful and more bloody. Yugoslavia, now fragmented into several countries along ethnic and religious lines, could be replicated elsewhere in the coming decades. In the future, such conflicts, arising from local politics and global economics, will grow in intensity and in frequency. Redrawing lines on maps is rarely done without armed conflict. This is just one more reason we expect World War III will get worse, before it gets better. Having set the stage for our discussion of World War III, we now proceed to examine some of the war’s basic reference points—among others, defense spending, 9/11, the role of Russia, the Israel-Palestine conflict, terrorism, the global trade in arms, and the price of oil. These are the topics addressed in the next chapter.

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Plotting Our Course: Key Reference Points Being aware of the history that has preceded World War III still leaves an important area of basic knowledge uncovered. It relates to the dynamics of what is occurring and the processes through which events are shaped and unfold. Much of this falls in the area of perceptions—what people believe to be true. What they believe molds their thinking and influences how they problem solve and respond to challenges. If a real problem of major magnitude is perceived to be ordinary or routine, there may be little or no response. This can be a serious liability in an age of global terrorism. Similarly, if our fears are such that any response seems inadequate and prone to failure, we can be left immobilized, helpless, and defenseless by our own inaction. It is like letting a bully in school prevail. In this chapter we provide some key reference points that will help create a critical awareness of what is to follow and, hopefully, will help us plot our course through the fog of World War III. We start with a section on the watershed event of 9/11/01—both a historical milestone and an epochal event. In some respects, 9/11 swept away our innocence and sense of separation from the terrorist attacks and violence elsewhere in the world. We Americans learned that it could happen anywhere, including our own backyard, and that we had no guardian angel to protect us. It also triggered a sense of relative defenselessness, an awareness that such calamities cannot be entirely warded off in an open and free society. The attacks of 9/11 immediately

Plotting Our Course

rewrote how we need to deal with homeland security, including the realization that it would be a costly process and require new forms of security and infrastructure. Because information is so critical in determining what we believe, we discuss how the “distortion effect,” which we later define as the fogs of war and peace, clouds what we see and can lead us to less-than-logical actions. We next turn to quantifying terrorism and find that in spite of all the publicity around terrorism, the actual acts in number are not all that impressive, aside from the daily occurrence of violence in Iraq. However, while the statistics we provide demonstrate a profile well below what our perceptions may suggest, that doesn’t mean that the impact is low. The number of terrorist acts is one thing and the psychological impact of those acts quite another. The terrorists understand the relationship between the two and capitalize on it. They strive to magnify and pyramid what the public perceives by manipulating the imagery and frequently reporting on the same event in a variety of forms over several days. They hope that the media sympathetic to them will be able to spin the report into the wider arena of the Western media, giving it greater legitimacy and impact. They were highly successful at doing this during the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict of 2006. The way one quantifies terrorist acts and their impact also relates to how the combatants value life. Does a near-zero value of life convey strategic advantage to a combatant, one willing to pursue their established goals with little, if any, thought to the human cost? There is obviously a major distinction between the view of life in genuine democracies and how an Islamic terrorist views the world. Establishment of an Islamic state can justify almost any human cost, and those Muslims who die in the process will immediately be given heavenly entrance by Allah as martyrs. We examine this. In considering World War III, one also needs to weigh costs. How do we pay for it? What will be the price? How much should the United States rightfully shoulder? Are we playing into the hands of our opponents by endowing them with a vast revenue stream from oil purchases that they can then turn against us in financing terrorist movements? Can we afford not to curb our appetite for oil imports through better national energy policies? We will address these questions. We will also look at the global arms trade, a major ingredient in terms of funding terrorism and perpetuation of conflict. Other important areas to be examined relate to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the consistency of folly in terms of how Lebanon repeatedly has managed to place itself in harm’s way. We look at the ambiguous position of Russia, a power reemerging on the world scene as a result of oil revenues, a country able to wield influence that can fuel rather than contain terrorism. In Chapter 3 we will move directly to a model presenting an integrated view of the challenges through the prism of the fogs of war and peace.

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THE WATERSHED TRAUMA OF 9/11 Each era has its landmark events that define it in the memories of ordinary people. Those who lived through, or fought in, World War II, a cohort now in its mid-80s or older, will never forget the day victory was declared in Europe—V-E Day, May 8, 1945—or the day victory was declared in Asia— V-J Day, August 15, 1945, now sometimes known as V-P day, or Victory in the Pacific. I (Maital) recall the day, November 22, 1963, that John F. Kennedy was assassinated. I was washing dishes in my student apartment, in Kingston, Ontario, Canada, and heard the news on the radio (I did not have a television at that time). My reaction was utter disbelief. Then, despair. Kennedy led not only America, he led people of goodwill and good hope everywhere, especially young people. I was twenty-one years old at the time. I will never ever forget that day, or the emotions I felt when I heard the news. Most people of my generation, a cohort in its mid-60s or older, recall it just as vividly. 9/11—the assault by kidnapped aircraft on the World Trade Center and on the Pentagon and, potentially, on the White House, on September 11, 2001—was a defining event for the current generation. On the morning of September 11, nineteen terrorists belonging to al Qaeda initiated a series of coordinated attacks on American targets. They began by hijacking four aircraft, taking control of the flight controls, and aiming them as flying bombs at the Pentagon (in Arlington, Virginia) and at the two World Trade Center buildings in New York City. Both World Trade Center buildings collapsed inward and became rubble. Extensive damage and loss of life was caused to the Pentagon. On a fourth hijacked aircraft, apparently destined to crash into the White House, the aircrew and passengers resisted, tried to take back control, and the aircraft crashed into the ground, near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. The total death toll was 2,973 dead, and twenty-four missing and presumed dead. According to the National Commission on Terrorism Attacks on the United States: The details of what happened on the morning of September 11 are complex, but they play out a simple theme. NORAD (North American Air Defense Command) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) were unprepared for the type of attacks launched against the United States on September 11, 2001. They struggled, under difficult circumstances, to improvise a homeland defense against an unprecedented challenge they had never before encountered and had never trained to meet.

The aftermath of this murderous attack was an American assault on the Taliban (who supported and harbored al Qaeda terrorists) in Afghanistan

Plotting Our Course

(see Chapter 4). Some relate it as well to the U.S. attack on Iraq and Saddam Hussein (the second Iraq War). Objectives: Al Qaeda’s objective was clearly a media spectacular event that would draw world attention and enhance its image and its recruiting efforts worldwide. It achieved that objective. Bin Laden himself used the term “spectacular,” saying: “this spectacular will greatly anger America,” and expressed the hope that America’s visceral emotional response would play into his hands.1 Bin Laden hoped that the attack would cause increased American presence in the Middle East, leading to a violent Muslim reaction. He got his wish; America’s invasion of Iraq fulfilled his aspirations and shaped the desired result. In terms of the objective economic and financial damage, it was in fact largely minimal, relative to the U.S. economy and its capital assets. As Gail Makinen notes in her report for the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress: 9/11 is more appropriately viewed as a human tragedy than as an economic calamity. Notwithstanding their dire costs in human life, the direct effects of the attacks were too small and too geographically concentrated to make a significant dent in the nation’s economic output.2

Makinen notes several significant effects of 9/11. First, it marks the end of an era, because it reveals that the United States “is vulnerable to attacks on its home soil.” Elsewhere, we note that a large majority of Americans now believe that they may suffer personal injury from such an attack. The feeling of invulnerability at home—even at the peak of World War II America was not attacked at home, except of course for the assault on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii—was lost instantly on 9/11. The impact was especially felt by the airline industry, as air travel declined by almost half in the month following 9/11. Second, he notes, “the government is now trying to determine the point when terrorism stops being an insurable risk and begins to look more like war.” If it is a war, then the risk is assumed, at least in part, by government. The ambiguity about whether 9/11 was one event in a prolonged war, or an isolated terrorist incident, continues. Our own position is clear and is revealed in the title of this book. What Are the Questions? The American humorist James Thurber once wrote that it is more important to know some of the questions than to know all of the answers. What, then, are the key questions that have arisen in the wake of 9/11? Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld defined them well:

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“Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas (Islamic schools) and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?”3 The answer is evidently a resounding “no.” “Does the U.S. need to fashion a broad integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists?” Here, the answer is clearly, self-evidently, “yes.” “The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorist cost of millions,” Rumsfeld noted. He appears not to have heeded his own queries in his Iraq policy. The response of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (The “9/11” Commission) to Rumsfeld’s questions was to say: These are the right questions. Our answer is that we need short-term action on a long-range strategy: one that invigorates our foreign policy with the attention that the President and Congress have given to the military and intelligence parts of the conflict against Islamist terrorism. The real lesson of 9/11 has not been learned and not been applied. It is best stated by the 9/11 Commission: The small percentage of Muslims who are fully committed to Osama Bin Ladin’s version of Islam are impervious to persuasion. It is among the large majority of Arabs and Muslims that we must encourage reform, freedom, democracy, and opportunity, even though our own promotion of these messages is limited in its effectiveness because we are its carriers.4 The Commission quotes former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who pungently asked, “How can a man in a cave out-communicate the world’s leading communication society? . . . Americans have been exporting our fears and anger,” instead of a vision of opportunity and hope. How the world perceives America and American foreign policy has been forever altered by World War III and by America’s policies. We now proceed to examine this perception. THE CHANGING ROLE AND PERCEPTION OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE WORLD STAGE The United States, although never universally loved in the world, has wielded great influence in international affairs. Some of that influence stemmed from its military capabilities, dating all the way back to the American Civil War, a war from which the United States emerged as a primary military power in the world. But there has also been its influence on world markets and trade, and its demonstration to the world that everyone has a chance to succeed in its free and democratic society. As the Statue of Liberty in New York Harbor has symbolized to wave after wave of immigrants, all are welcome to the “Land of Opportunity.”

Plotting Our Course

My grandparents on both sides of my family (Dilworth) sailed into that harbor and were processed through the facility at Ellis Island. They came from Sweden, and what was at the time East Prussia. There were many “rags to riches,” Horatio Alger-type stories, and many of them were true. America also demonstrated that a wide diversity of nationalities and ethnicities could be brought together and amalgamated into one people. I (Dilworth) heard the distinguished American author, James Michener, talk about these successive waves of immigrants and the wonder of their integration into the U.S. culture. Every conflict in the world or economic calamity seemed to fuel the arrival of new wave—Hungarians after the Revolution of 1956, Cubans after the overthrow of the Batista Government in Cuba in 1959, and Cambodians and Vietnamese after the Vietnam War. Many would settle in the inner cities of America until they achieved sufficient wealth to further migrate to the suburbs. As an interesting statistic, the largest contingent of any nationality in the U.S. Army in World War II was Italian Americans. The ability to be successful in the United States—upward mobility— can be seen in the U.S. military, where a recent Army chief of staff was a Japanese American, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was of Austrian descent. He had come to this country after World War II with his family. His father had fought with the German Army. Each immigrant has his or her story. Most are proud to be Americans, but also proud of their national origin. My (Dilworth) deputy in the U.S. Army at one point was a Hungarian American. His father had carried out the national colors when the Communists seized power following World War II. He rose to the rank of colonel in our Army and culminated his military career as the U.S. military attach´e to Hungary. The aura of the United States remains on the world scene, but American influence and prestige has changed significantly during the period 2001 to 2008. When President George W. Bush took office in 2001, the world was reasonably stable from the U.S. perspective. True, Iraq was an irritant, triggering limited military exchanges when their air defense radars locked on a plane being flown by U.S. or allied aviators over the “No Fly Zone.” Iraq also caused problems for the inspectors sent there to check on any Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) programs. But all things considered, matters were reasonably stable. Then, things began to change. Only nine months after George W. Bush assumed the presidency, the 9/11 attacks by al Qaeda operatives occurred. The casualty figures exceeded the attack on Pearl Harbor in World War II. Some 343 New York City firefighters perished or were declared missing, trying to save occupants of the Twin Towers. The world response to the attacks, aside from supporters of al Qaeda, was sympathetic and supportive. There were demonstrations in some national capitals to show support. With considerable speed, the Bush

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administration pulled together an attack plan for Afghanistan. The attack that was carried out made very effective use of Special Forces soldiers, small elite units that were largely inserted by air and then were able to spot targets for the U.S. Air Force to strike. The attack was successful in displacing the Taliban Government and shredding at least some of the infrastructure being used by the al Qaeda terrorist network to train its operatives. There was little resistance to this U.S. incursion on the world stage. It seemed to be viewed as a logical response to the attack on the United States. However, it quickly became apparent that the newly appointed government in Kabul, Afghanistan, had neither the reach nor influence to control much of the countryside; in addition the U.S. force on the ground was insufficient to do the job. The Afghan warlords largely continued to control their territories. In 2006, responsibility for military support of the Afghanistan Government shifted from the United States to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). That force is trying to make inroads into a Taliban resurgence. The Bush administration next started beating the drums for military action against Iraq. While always couched in terms of diplomatic moves first, there was a sense of an intent to take military action against Iraq even from the beginning. Some political pundits have suggested that the intent was in place even before the Bush administration took office. In any case, there was a great deal of argument put forth by the Bush administration to prepare the country for military action against Iraq. High on the list was the threat that Iraq posed to the United States because of the supposed development of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. That served as the basis for going to war, even though these allegations were later proven false, resulting either from faulty intelligence or from overplaying the limited intelligence the United States possessed. This meant that in the end, the United States had gone to war for a stated purpose that turned out to be false. Very quickly, the Bush administration developed new reasons for the invasion, such as removing the murderous dictator Saddam, and bringing liberty and democracy to Iraq. At this point it is safe to say that the United States, and especially the Bush administration, has lost much credibility around the world. Support for the United States plummeted. A survey by the Pew Research Center reveals that the fraction of the French and German people who viewed the United States “favorably” fell from two in three, to one in three, between 2002 and 2004. In Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, and Turkey, a majority of respondents in 2004 said the United States was “over-reacting” to terrorism.5 According to the same survey: Large majorities in almost every country surveyed think that American and British leaders lied when they claimed, prior to the Iraq war, that Saddam Hussein’s regime had weapons of mass destruction . . . . . . [even in the United States and Britain themselves] about three-in-ten in the U.S. (31%)

Plotting Our Course and four-in-ten in Great Britain (41%) say leaders of the two countries lied to provide a rationale for the war.6

In the Arab world, the bottom dropped out. Support for the United States in Jordan, a country considered to be aligned with the United States hit single digits. Support everywhere seemed to dry up. The complaints about the United States centered on perceived arrogance, especially by the U.S. president. The United States had pushed the views of other countries to the side, and had decided to take unilateral action and not wait for a UN Resolution or for further diplomatic moves to take place. It is small wonder that the United States experienced great difficulty pulling coalition partners together, something the first President George Bush had been able to do masterfully during the first Gulf War. The only primary contributor beyond the United States was Great Britain. Interestingly, former countries of the Warsaw Pact, now allied with NATO, sent some troops, the contingent from Poland being sufficient to be given responsibility for one zone after hostilities supposedly ended. Iraq marked the key bend in the road. That is when things began to unravel for the United States. Iraq signaled a progressive loss of standing and support in the world. As the Bush administration brushed off cautions from its own Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and from other countries, it also failed to give full attention to the generals. The Chief of Staff of the Army went on record as believing that the force to be deployed in Iraq was at least 100,000 short of that needed to secure Iraq in the aftermath of the invasion. His contention was proved correct as the conflict unfolded. He ended up leaving office for retirement earlier than planned. The Secretary of Defense did not even attend his retirement parade. There was then apparently some difficulty getting another serving four-star general to accept the position. The Secretary of Defense ended up pulling a general out of retirement to fill the job. In addition to the credibility problems already cited, the United States has not demonstrated much continuity of interest or involvement in the Middle East. Certainly the United States has supported Israel, but it has not taken a balanced stance, and the Road Map to Peace offered by the Bush administration seems somewhat out of touch with the realities on the ground and what the parties involved can be expected to buy into. The recent so-called Annapolis peace initiative, based on the meeting held there on November 27, 2007, under U.S. auspices between the Israeli and Palestinian Authority leadership, has an air of unrealism and desperation, as the American President and Secretary of State search for a scrap of a “legacy” that history will record as positive. The real question is what to do with Iran. That is a good way to test what the United States can now bring to the table as a member of the family of nations. A military solution, which has been hinted at by the Bush

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administration periodically, seems stillborn for several reasons. First, the United States simply does not have sufficient ground forces. They are tied down in Iraq and elsewhere and there is little strategic reserve to call on. The Air Force can mount a concentrated campaign, but it seems questionable whether that would be conclusive. One has to believe that any nuclear sites under development in Iran are heavily bunkered and hardened, with nothing short of a nuclear weapon able to take them out. Finally, it is extremely doubtful that the American people and the U.S. Congress can be brought to the point of military action against Iran any time soon. A war with Iran does not seem a viable option for many reasons, and it would tend to create more problems than it solves. In terms of diplomatic overtures, what standing does the United States have? The United States has repeatedly refused to talk to Iran, even when the president of Iran addressed a personal letter to President Bush inviting some kind of communication exchange. We address this in both Chapters 7 and 8. Low-level discussions held in Iraq, with Iranian representatives, achieved little. The stark reality is that Iran can probably, unless it is interrupted, produce nuclear weapons in a fairly short period of time. Based on their expressed intent to wipe Israel off the map, and their fervent fanaticism, that is a fearsome outcome to consider. It could draw the entire world into a state of devastation. Iran barely disguises its goal to dominate the Middle East. Though not an Arab nation, Iran has invited itself to Arab League meetings. Many of the Arab nations in the Middle East find the nightmare of a nuclear Iran frightening and destabilizing. Here is a summary of the current U.S. position on the world stage. 1. The United States has a very low level of support in the world right now. Its credibility is at low ebb. There is a distrust of U.S. integrity and intentions. 2. The United States has a very well-trained and capable military, but it is currently almost totally committed in Iraq and Afghanistan, and probably will be into the foreseeable future. 3. World tolerance for unilateral use of force by the United States is quite low. 4. The United States is viewed as extremely biased toward Israel and not capable of balanced approaches that truly consider Palestinian interests and other interests in the region. These perceptions limit U.S. influence beyond Israel. 5. The global economy is now redrawing networks and centers of influence. The rapid rise of China and India is of great significance, and will become increasingly pronounced. The Third World countries are also starting to exert influence, including the Asian Tigers, such as Thailand, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and even more recently, Vietnam.

Plotting Our Course 6. Oil will increasingly be the most important common denominator, shaping how countries map their foreign policy and alliances. A visit in spring 2008 by Vice President Cheney to the Middle East, ostensibly to “make peace,” is apparently aimed mainly at lowering the price of oil, now at record levels.

Power and influence tend to be illusory. They can be hard to quantify. However, when all factors are collectively considered, the United States seems to have moved from being the all-powerful Queen on the chessboard to that of a Bishop or Knight. This is the perception, which apparently has transformed into reality. Can this be corrected and reversed? Only time will tell. Meanwhile, Americans themselves appear to have lost faith in their leader. According to a recent Gallup Poll, Bush reached an unwelcome record. By 64%-31%, Americans disapprove of the job he is doing. For the first time in the history of the Gallup Poll, 50% say they “strongly disapprove” of the president. Richard Nixon had reached the previous high, 48%, just before an impeachment inquiry was launched in 1974.7

World War III is about terrorism. How important have terrorist attacks been? Can they be quantified? If so, how? Are they sufficiently numerous, and effective, to merit the use of the term “World War III”? This is our next subject. QUANTIFYING TERRORISM This section focuses on efforts to quantify terrorism. If indeed we are in the midst of World War III, as we claim, then we should be able to muster data and statistics that show the extent, trends, and magnitude of the war and its human and material costs. Quantitatively, from the onset of the war (which we date from the al Qaeda fatwa in 1998), terrorist incidents worldwide have been relatively small in number and extent, and over time, stable (if the special case of Iraq, treated in Chapter 5 is deleted from the data).8 This is true, despite massive homeland security budgets, despite the near-official “declaration of war on terror” by the United States following the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Towers, and despite the assault on the Taliban in Afghanistan and then on the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. There is very little evidence that massive global antiterror operations and investments have diminished the frequency and extent of attacks on civilian targets designed to sow panic and fear. The opposite may be the case. There is an interesting paradox that quantitative analysis reveals. The efforts of the West to fight terror have not had significant impact (though

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of course one cannot be certain how many serious terrorist attacks were prevented, and not publicized). Nor have the efforts of terrorist jihadist groups to expand the extent and frequency of their operations had much success so far. The intensity of World War III, except for the places where combat confrontations exist, has remained relatively low. For instance, according to the World Health Organization, “In 2002 nearly 1.2 million people worldwide died as a result of a road traffic crash. This represents an average of 3,242 persons dying each day around the world.” This means that in just three days, more people die in traffic accidents worldwide than have been killed in terrorist incidents during the entire five-year period, 2002–2006 (Again—this excludes Iraq, a special case). One wonders how many lives might have been saved had 10 percent of the resources put into antiterrorist measures been invested in better road safety. However, despite the fact that terrorists have little to boast about, in terms of quantitative “achievements,” they have in fact achieved an enormous success in the psyches and minds of those in the West against whom their attacks are aimed. Terrorists have succeeded in sowing fear—which, of course, is one of their main objectives. A recent Gallup Opinion Poll survey asked Americans whether they “worry that they or someone in their family will be a victim of terrorism.” Consistently, close to half say they are “very worried” or “somewhat worried.” Only about one American in every four or five is “not worried at all” by this. This is true, despite the relative paucity of terrorist incidents within the United States, and their recent decline. The extent of this fear is far out of proportion to the objective probability of injury or death at the hands of terrorists. The fear is amplified greatly by the sometimes extreme security measures adopted for, as an example, air safety. When travelers cannot take bottles of water with them onto an aircraft, because of a (yet unproven) risk of a chemical attack, one wonders whether the risk-benefit tradeoff has not tilted far overboard in favor of excessive and unjustified fear. It is the nature of the bureaucratic (and political) mind, to implement safeguards that are excessive, just to cover the smallest of risks, so that after the fact, if some unexpected attack does occur, those in charge of security will not be held liable or responsible. This is the “investigatory commission” mindset—act to cover your behind in the event of a postmortem. It is not in the nature of the bureaucratic mind to carefully weigh risks and benefits and avoid measures that cause extreme discomfort (removal of belts and shoes, for instance, at airline checkpoints) to many millions of people, while barely diminishing risk at all. It is sometimes believed that the terrorists have a large advantage in World War III, because many of them act as suicide bombers, willing to give up their own lives in order to take the lives of those they hate and oppose.

Plotting Our Course

Terrorist groups often make this claim. Is the disdain for human life truly an advantage? We next examine this argument, and find it unpersuasive. HOW COMBATANTS PERCEIVE THE VALUE OF LIFE: DOES A ZERO VALUE OF LIFE CONVEY STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE? Shahid (Arabic). A holy martyr. Literally, “one who bears witness.” Used to refer to suicide bombers as well as saints.

The Russian Marshal Georgi Zhukov once explained Russian tactics in World War II for crossing a minefield. “Our infantry attacks exactly as if [the mines] were not there,” he explained. “Casualties will be no greater than if the territory was defended by machine guns.” His counterpart, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, responded: “No British or American general would last a day with that policy. Americans assess the cost of war in terms of human lives, the Russians, in the over-all drain on the nation.” [emphasis added] This exchange is relevant for our analysis of World War III, because one side values life almost infinitely, while the other side takes pride in valuing life on this earth at almost zero value, especially when certain actions bring the combatant/martyr/saint (“shahid,” in Arabic) to the next, far better world. Radical Islam has argued specifically that the willingness of its terrorist groups to sacrifice their lives, as suicide bombers, is an enormous tactical advantage over enemies who prefer to live rather than die in battle. A passage in the Qu’ran reads: “Think not of those who are slain in Allah’s way as dead. Nay, they live, finding their sustenance in the presence of their Lord”—Qur’an, 2:214. Martyrdom can appear attractive for the downtrodden whose present life seems bleak and without hope. Is this indeed the case? Is the future bleak for Western society? Must it give up its core value, the infinite value of every single life, every living human being, whatever their status, age, income, or religion, or face defeat in battle at the hands of those not only willing to die, but perhaps eager to do so? If so, this is a bitter choice indeed. Our response to this question is clear and firm. Free societies that respect and value life, that treat every life as equally and infinitely valuable, will create thinking individuals who, of their own free will, will be prepared to sacrifice their lives for the good of their country, to defeat an enemy that seeks to destroy their nations’ culture, values, and way of life. Societies that value and respect life are in the long run far stronger and far more effective in war, than societies that discard lives as if they were spent cartridges. We believe history and data are on our side. During World War II the USSR suffered 20,600,000 military and civilian deaths (13,600,000

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military, and about 7,000,000 civilian). This is a staggering 10 percent of the total population of the time!9 The data suggest that Marshal Zhukov accurately reflected Russia’s wartime policy regarding the value of life, as well as the cruelty of the invading German Army in its attacks on Russian cities, especially Stalingrad. The fact that one in ten USSR citizens died in World War II is utterly staggering. An entire age cohort of Russian men was literally decimated. But the data suggest another conclusion. World War II was perceived by the Allies as a real and immediate threat from the Nazis to their freedom, democracy, and way of life. The response was that in America, for example, a large army (by some estimates, 10 million men) was conscripted and many were dispatched to the front in Asia and in Europe. Those who value their lives and the way they are lived are willing, on a broad scale, to offer their lives if needed, in order to defend the lives, freedom, and way of living of others. The conscription, training, and organizing of the U.S. armed forces in World War II was a supreme feat of organization, led in large part by General George Marshall, a close advisor of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Marshall was desperate to join the fighting forces in Europe. But for Roosevelt, he was too valuable at home. At the end of the war, Marshall became Secretary of State under President Harry Truman, and created the Marshall Plan that for the first time in history dispensed generous aid to both friendly and vanquished countries. It was not only American lives that America valued, but all lives, including those of their enemies, at the end of the war. Many will dispute this statement, given that America used nuclear weapons on Japanese civilians. But the underlying motivation of their use was in fact to save lives; a land invasion of Japan, it was felt, would have involved far greater loss of life, both Japanese and American. The nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended the war against Japan almost instantly. World War III: As we fast forward to the global conflicts with terrorist groups taking place today and tomorrow, we find conflicting interpretations of the Qu’ran on the part of Muslims. One the one hand, we have the bin Laden’s declaration of jihad against Jews and Crusaders, which cites the Qu’ran in demanding that Muslims give up their lives in the battle: Almighty Allah also says: “O ye who believe, what is the matter with you, that when ye are asked to go forth in the cause of Allah, ye cling so heavily to the earth! Do ye prefer the life of this world to the hereafter? But little is the comfort of this life, as compared with the hereafter. Unless ye go forth, He will punish you with a grievous penalty, and put others in your place; but Him ye would not harm in the least. For Allah hath power over all things.”

Plotting Our Course

And on the other hand, we have the views of progressive Muslims, who state: At the heart of progressive Muslim identity is the notion that all human life on this planet, Muslim and non-Muslim, female and male, civilian and military, poor or rich, North or South . . . – . . . carries exactly the same intrinsic worth. This essential value of human life is due to the existence of the Divine spirit in all of humanity, the same spirit that, according to the Qu-ran, God breathed into each and every human being [Qu’ran, 15:29 and 38:72].10

Ultimately, on the front lines of World War III, in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Israel, those with Western values struggle to maintain and implement those values, specifically those that attach infinite value to life, in the face of their enemies who find religious fulfillment in sacrificing their own lives and taking the lives of those who do not share their religion. Philosophically, we believe that regardless of whether those values are an asset or a liability in war, they are to be adhered to, implemented, followed, and applied without deviation, and with punishment of overzealous soldiers and officers who betray them. They are intrinsically right, whatever the context or result. In addition, militarily, we believe that in the long run, other things equal, when two sides go to war, the side that most values and respects life will triumph. It is perhaps the ultimate paradox that those who most love and value life will fight hardest, and even sacrifice their own lives, to preserve that core value for their children and descendants. The premise of radical Islam will be proven wrong, and already is. World War III has been accompanied by a huge increase in the arms trade. We now turn to a study of the global arms market and its role in World War III. THE GLOBAL ARMS TRADE “It’s all about money” is a refrain that one hears all the time. Indeed in general—it probably is all about money. Because with the fall of the Berlin Wall, on November 9, 1989, the world chose money—or at least, the competitive effort to make money in free and open markets—as its central organizing principle, not only for business, but for social policy as well. Governments make (or save) money these days by privatizing services they once felt responsible for. There is a sense in which the burgeoning World War III, too, is all about money. A very large industry exists, driven by armed conflict and in turn driving it, which would disappear if world peace broke out—the global arms

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trade. World War III cannot be fully understood without understanding this industry, its magnitude and geopolitical structure. That is the purpose of this section. Weapons production is a major growth industry. The magnitude of spending on weapons is on a strong upward trend. The main implication is that there are strong business interests to seek to maintain the industry that oils the wheels of global conflict by providing weapons each side uses to kill the other side. Consider the small arms industry alone. Some 600 million small arms are in circulation in the world, produced by over 1,135 companies in 100 countries. Every year some 5,000,000 deaths are caused by the use of small arms, or one per minute. In cold quantitative terms, the toll of death and injury caused by terrorism doesn’t hold a candle to the toll taken by small arms.11 Data on the magnitude of the global arms industry and its growth reveals that in order for world peace to break out, experts will need to find alternate employment for capital and labor now invested in weaponry. Global Military Expenditure: A utopian view might have reasonably held that with the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and the end of the Cold War, one could expect military spending to shrivel. And indeed, it did, for several years. But by 2005, defense spending had recovered to its level in 1990. World military expenditure in 2005 totaled 2.5 percent of world GDP, or some $1,000 billion or $173 per capita, up some 34 percent over 1996. About 80 per cent of this increase derives from higher American defense spending, which now accounts for one-half of world defense spending. That is, America spends as much on defense, about $500 billion as all the other nations of the world combined. Analysts estimate that the rising trend of U.S. military expenditure was fueled in part by campaigns in Afghanistan and in Iraq.12 U.S. Defense Spending: When Ronald Reagan became president, in 1980, he kept his campaign promise to attain defense-spending parity with the USSR With the fall of the Berlin Wall, U.S. defense spending peaked and declined. That decline continued, until World War III began (we have dated it to 1998, the fatwa of bin Laden), when defense spending again began to rise and soon reached its Cold War peak levels of about $500 billion The 2008 defense budget will top $515 billion. This huge defense budget is in part the driver of America’s global arms trade. Investments in state-of-the-art defense technology give the United States a strong comparative advantage in weapons of all kinds and create demand for them. Moreover, on the supply side, companies find that the high overhead cost of expensive weapon systems’ research and development can be spread by increasing production runs and selling abroad (when possible), thus raising profits. A major driver of rising U.S. defense spending has been the rising cost of ever-more-sophisticated defense technology. While overall U.S. defense

Plotting Our Course

spending has risen sharply, the costs of labor (essentially, pay for soldiers) has diminished, and today amounts to only 30 per cent of the overall defense budget, or $150 billion out of $500 billion down from 40 percent in 1990. So, ironically, while the strategic requirements of prosecuting World War III require greater attention to, and investment in, paying and equipping, and training ground soldiers, in fact the opposite has occurred—more and more investments are being pumped into expensive technology. Costly “hardware” has crowded out investment in crucial “software” (human capital). One suspects that the strong defense industry lobby in Congress may have something to do with this. Global Arms Trade: The value of international arms exports is estimated at between $40 billion and $50 billion annually (for 2003, latest figure available). After declining sharply up to 2001, world arms exports are now on a steep upward gradient and are back at 1998 levels. No other industry is dominated as exclusively by the United States as the global arms trade.13 America is by far the largest arms exporter, selling more weapons abroad than the next fourteen countries combined. From 1989 (when the Cold War essentially ended) through 1996, $257 billion worth of arms exports took place worldwide, nearly half of it American. Some 60 percent of U.S. arms trade contacts are with developing countries. Moreover, arms sales are on a strong uptrend. Arms sales are dominated by large global companies; such sales by the 100 largest arms-producing companies rose 15 percent in 2004, continuing a trend that began in the late 1990s. According to SIPRI: The combined arms sales of the SIPRI Top 100 (which excludes China) amounted to $268 billion in 2004. Companies in the United States and Western Europe accounted for most of this amount. The dominance of U.S. companies is particularly striking. Of the total arms sales of the Top 100 companies, 63.3 per cent was accounted for by 40 U.S. companies; and 29.4 per cent by 36 West European companies. Four Russian companies accounted for 1.2 per cent of the total value.

Implications and conclusions: In our experience, it is not true that generals fight current wars based on inappropriate lessons learned in previous ones. But there is a sense that past wars color future ones. Industries and technologies based on equipment used in previous wars develop a powerful political and economic momentum. Jobs those industries generate persuade politicians to support continued spending in areas and systems that no longer make strategic sense. The battleship mentality is a powerful survivor. World War III requires systems, weapons, and technologies that differ widely in many ways from those of previous wars. Yet, what former U.S. President and former four-star General Dwight D. Eisenhower once called

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the military-industrial complex continues to lobby successfully for continued spending on weapons that are in many ways no longer suitable. And at the same time, in a world where extremes of wealth and poverty grow larger, an obscenely large fraction of global GDP is invested in arms exports that catalyze conflict rather than contribute to health, education, and well-being. A regrettably large part of the world, mainly in the developed countries, makes a living from the global arms trade. World War III can be prosecuted better, leaner, wiser, with far smaller defense spending, provided it is focused on appropriate technologies, systems, and uses. For this to happen, the vested interests of those who gain from the current situation must be overcome, mainly in the political arena. The chances of this occurring are probably not very high. In the end, World War III, like everything else, is also about money. In every war, the question arises, how can the resources needed to prosecute the war best be raised—from whom, how, and when? In others words, how should we pay for World War III? The question is about how the sacrifices needed to win the war—sacrifices that many political leaders seem intent on ignoring or denying—be distributed among various income groups and parts of the society? This is our next topic. HOW TO PAY FOR WORLD WAR III Wars are costly, in human lives and in resources. The ability to marshal resources and organize them effectively is a crucial component in successful war efforts. It can be argued that World War II was won in large measure because America’s powerful economy succeeded in doubling its output twice during the war, cranking out enormous amounts of weapons, planes, ships, tanks, ammunition, and war material. In contrast, Japan’s relatively weak economy meant that Japan had to bring America to surrender, after its surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, or face certain defeat at the hands of America’s overwhelming economic might—a fact Japanese leaders knew well and understood. Defeat of Germany and the Nazi war machine was in substantial measure because the German economy was mismanaged and eventually crumbled. In his recent book The Wages of Destruction, Adam Tooze explains that the Nazis failed because from 1933 the Nazi economy was a despotic war economy. “It had no blueprint for peacetime,” he notes— and it collapsed. In contrast, the United States entered the war with very high unemployment and prolonged Depression. The war almost instantly ended unemployment, and moreover many women entered the labor force to pick up the slack caused by general mobilization of males. America’s GDP quickly doubled, twice. At the close of World War II, America produced fully 75 percent of all world output.

Plotting Our Course Table 2.1. Defense Spending in Seven Nations ($ billion, 2004) U.S.

Japan

Russia

China

France

Germany

U.K.

Total

$467

$46.2

$22.8

$37.2

$52.5

$38.8

$54.5

$252.0

How, then, will the West organize its resources to fight World War III? And how should the burden of war finance be shared? Will America, Israel, and other countries who realize they are engaged in a long and difficult war, World War III, understand that among the “weapons” used to fight this war is the unity of they society—unity of goal, unity of purpose? Will they understand that this unity is built on the perception of equality, not just equality of opportunity but also to a large degree equality of outcome? And will they act accordingly? A very large part of the Western nations’ defense spending is done by the United States, whose annual defense budget far exceeds the combined defense budgets of the dozen nations who rank #2 through #13. We now look in depth at the current sentiment in the West to let America pay for costly weapon systems. When it comes to defense spending, theory and reality have parted company. Theory headed south; reality went north. r With the collapse of the USSR in 1990–1991, the Cold War ended. It was reasonable to theorize that America’s defense spending would shrink substantially. From 1992–1998, it did (in dollar terms, and as a proportion of GDP). But with the end of the Clinton administration and the advent of the George W. Bush administration, defense spending rose. With Russian nuclear submarines rusting in their berths, where did the perceived threat lie (before 9/11)? After 9/11, the Bush administration was outspoken about the threat of global terrorism. But tacitly, preparations were being made for other conflicts, including Iraq and even China. Meanwhile, as Russia’s oil revenue soars, there are signs Russia is rearming. Ex-President Putin ordered, for instance, Russian bombers to resume long-range “training” flights, and Russian aircraft have already done lowlevel passes over American aircraft carriers. r The total dollar amount of U.S. defense spending now exceeds $500 billion annually. This is double the combined defense spending of China, Russia, Germany, France, UK, and Japan. (See Table 2.1.) While America regularly budgets 4.5 percent of its GDP on defense, France budgets 2.5 percent, Germany 1.5, and Japan around 1.0 percent. r America faces strong economic challenges, particularly in Asia. First Japan, then China, has taken advantage of America’s markets to create export-driven growth engines, in turn driving large American trade

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Fogs of War and Peace deficits. In the face of these challenges, America might well have chosen, in theory, to become isolationist, slashing defense spending in order to divert resources to civilian uses that enhance its competitiveness. It has not taken this path. As a result, it continues to be at a disadvantage with competing countries. If America spent the same proportion of GDP as Japan on defense, it would free the sum of $385 billion annually; these resources could increase investment in equipment and software by 30 percent, or close about half of America’s total trade deficit, or zero the Federal budget deficit, or slash personal income taxes. In theory, slashing defense spending is what Americans should logically choose and vote for, in light of the high cost and the failure of America’s allies to bear their fair share of the burden. In practice, Americans have opted for the opposite. r America came to Europe’s rescue against the Nazi threat in World War II. America’s powerful economy generated the resources that fueled the Allied war effort. It might be theorized, then, that Europe might be grateful to the United States for again taking up the slack and placing its enormous technological capabilities and resources into defending the West, allowing Europe to spend its resources elsewhere. The opposite is the case. France is a case in point. France’s (former) President Jacques Chirac has never missed an opportunity to oppose America. “I am totally against unilateralism [i.e. American foreign policy] in the modern world,” he said. The U.S. doctrine of pre-emptive action to thwart national security threats, he added, was “extraordinarily dangerous.” Anti-American conspiracy theories about 9/11 became highly popular in France. Thierry Meyssan, a journalist, claimed in his book L’Effroyable Imposture—“The Big Lie”—that the common view of 9/11 was based on “nothing more than a cover-up” and “lies put forward by officials.” “He wrote that “the attacks of September 11 were masterminded from inside the American state apparatus”—i.e., George W. Bush—as a justification for reckless warfare. By 2002 his book sold more than 200,000 copies in France.

r It is widely believed that President Ronald Reagan’s campaign pledge in 1980 to match the USSR’s defense spending, at $300 billion annually, forced the USSR to spend resources on defense that its civilian economy could ill afford, ultimately leading to its collapse. Reagan kept his promise; defense spending was only $135 billion in 1980, the year Reagan was elected, and was $282 billion in 1988, the year he left office—more than double.14 It was the collapse of the USSR that ultimately created a Greater Europe, including Russia and some of its former Republics. France led the movement toward European unity, under Jean Monnet. If a Greater Europe, embracing 800 million people and a GDP larger than

Plotting Our Course America’s, does come about, then France and Europe will owe a debt to Ronald Reagan and the United States of America for removing the prime obstacle to such a United States of Europe —the USSR. There is no sign of any such gratitude or understanding. r In Kosovo, fighting broke out between the Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Yugoslavian (Serbian) troops, after the Dayton Agreement in 1995. The Yugoslavs refused to sign a cease-fire agreement in 1999, after perpetrating a massacre of Albanian citizens. This triggered a seventy-eight-day NATO bombing campaign, after which Yugoslavia signed. The Europeans found they lacked the proper aircraft and weapons for the job and appealed to the United States which agreed and led the operation. This episode in no way embarrassed Europeans into accelerated defense spending; they continue to rely on American technology and airpower in particular. In theory, Europe will at the least arm itself to keep the peace in Europe. In practice, Europe seems incapable even of that. Now, Kosovo has declared independence, Serbia strongly opposes its independence, Russia backs Serbia—and a new Balkan conflict appears to have begun.

During Lebanon War II, in July–August 2006, France played a key role in gaining a cease-fire agreement, promising to send a large contingent of troops (some 5,000) to a UNIFIL peacekeeping force. After the ceasefire, France waffled, backtracked, stalled, then finally sent 2,000 troops; despite France’s key historical and colonial role in Lebanon, it relinquished command of the UNIFIL contingent to Italy in 2007. In theory, European nations know they must step forward to provide modern well-equipped forces for peacekeeping operations, within Europe and outside it. In practice, when called upon, they seem not capable of doing so. The target force level of the UNIFIL contingent for Lebanon was 15,000. It took considerable time to raise this number of troops, and only part came from European countries. While America does the bulk of the West’s defense spending, it ironically also funds a large part of its World War III enemies’ war effort. This occurs because America has consistently failed, or refused, to undertake energysaving measures that would slash the price of oil. And it is high oil prices that generate hundreds of billions of dollars annually that directly and indirectly fund terrorist activities. OILING THE WHEELS OF THE ENEMY: HOW THE WEST FUNDS ITS ENEMY’S WAR EFFORT Among the many unusual aspects of World War III, perhaps the most remarkable is this fact: One side in the war, by its actions, directly finances the war efforts of the opposing side and supplies it with generous and growing resources. In our opinion, this has never before occurred in history. It was the case, after World War II, that once the war ended, America

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generously helped its vanquished foes, Germany and Japan. But it did not aid their war effort during the war. Yet, this is precisely what America is doing for global terror at this moment. How is this happening? As the world’s largest consumer of crude oil, America’s insatiable appetite for petroleum has contributed to its soaring price. America’s failure to quench its oil thirst or find alternate energy sources has been a key factor in boosting the revenues of oil-producing nations—which include nations like Iran, that are direct organizers and financers of global terrorism. Moreover, booming oil revenues are used by despotic rulers in Islamic nations to remain in power; after these rulers have utterly failed to develop their nations’ non-oil economies, they are crucially dependent on oil revenues and use them to subsidize the standard of living of the poor and working classes. Without these subsidies, political unrest might well unseat them. So, for this reason as well, America is helping keep in power despots who have declared war on America itself. It is using the most powerful weapon it possesses—influence on oil prices—to strengthen its sworn enemies, rather than weaken them [emphasis added].

A Vestpocket History of the Price of Oil: The first oil well drilled in North America was in Ontario, Canada; the American petroleum industry began with a well near Titusville, Pennsylvania, discovered in 1859 by someone boring for salt. Initially the key produce from crude oil was kerosene, used to light lamps. With the internal combustion engine and Henry Ford’s Model T revolution, the focus shifted to gasoline. Coal remained the principal source of fuel for the world until the 1950s, but after that, oil dominated. In September 1960 OPEC—Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries—was founded. It now has eleven member states. They are Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Indonesia. Gabon and Ecuador were once members but no longer are. Indonesia’s membership is in doubt, as it is no longer an oil exporter. Of the eleven countries, eight are Arab and/or Islamic, many openly hostile to the United States and one, Venezuela, while not Islamic, is a sworn foe of the United States. In 1973, following the outbreak of war between Israel, Syria, and Egypt, OPEC declared an oil embargo, and saw the price of oil soar from under $4/bbl to $11. The Shah of Iran, at the time the closest ally of the United States in the Middle East, said: Of course [the world price of oil] is going to rise. Certainly! And how . . . . . . You [Western nations] increased the price of wheat you sell us by 300%, and the same for sugar and cement. You buy our crude oil and sell it back to us, redefined as petrochemicals, at a hundred times the price you’ve paid to us; It’s only fair that, from now on, you should pay more for oil. Let’s say 10 times more.15

Plotting Our Course

World oil prices spiked upward in 1973, and again in 1978–1979, during the hostage crisis; the result was a world recession. OPEC’s members hold two-thirds of the world’s remaining oil reserves and produce over two-fifths of the world’s oil production. Iran is a nation in direct confrontation with the U.S. in World War III. Iran is the second largest oil producer in OPEC and the world’s fourth largest producer. Iran produces 4 million bbls/day, worth $560 m. when oil is priced at $140/bbl, or annually, nearly $200 b. (Saudi Arabai produces 9 million bbls/day, and the U.S. and Russia, about 8). This is fully 20 per cent of Iran’s GDP. Moreover, it is a crucial 20% because it supplies vital dollars needed to pay for imports. Syria, too, is an oil exporter, producing 500,000 bbl/day. Iran and Syria support Hezbollah and are regarded by America as part of the “axis of evil” that supplies resources to terrorist groups.

Current world oil prices (at this writing, about $140/bbl.) are much higher than the levels they reached at their peak in 1978 (about $80/bbl, in 2006 prices), and have more than tripled since 1996. At present, the fear of a global slowdown has failed to moderate oil prices. If World War III broke out officially in 1998, then the war has coincided with a sharp upward spike in the resource on which the Arab and Islamic nations crucially depend. But, is America truly responsible for this? To understand why, we need to understand the simple economics of oil prices. The Basic Economics of Oil Prices: Any price that is set in free, open markets is determined by only two forces: demand (the amounts consumers wish to buy, at various prices) and the supply (the amounts that producers are willing to produce and market, at various prices). The current demand for oil is about 85 million bbl/day. The world supply of oil is about 2 million bbls/day less. The demand for oil is termed “price-insensitive” by economists. This is because in the short run, there are few good substitutes for petroleum-based energy; the wheels of industry run on crude oil, and will grind to a halt without that oil. The supply of oil is also fairly priceinsensitive, in the short run, because it takes a long time to discover and develop new oil fields. As a result, when demand for oil rises, and supply fails to respond, there is excess demand. This results in rising prices. Even a small amount of excess demand—say, 2 million bbl/day—can “spike” prices upward. This has happened frequently in recent years. In 2006 OPEC oil revenues reached a record level of $521.9 billion according to the U.S. Department of Energy— when adjusted for inflation, just slightly below its peak of $572 billion (in 2006 prices) reached in 1980. Much of this money goes straight to America’s foes. Revenues for 2007 and 2008 are considerably higher. America is the world’s biggest oil consumer, using 20 million bbl/day, or fully one-fourth of total world consumption. (In contrast, America’s population is only one-twentieth of the world.) America is also the world’s biggest

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oil importer, because America produces only 7 million bbl/day, meaning it must import 13 million bbl/day daily. (The four largest oil-producing American states are Louisiana, Alaska, Texas, and California, which together produce over half of America’s oil.) America’s insatiable thirst for gasoline, fueled by gas-guzzling SUV’s, has combined with China’s growing demand to drive oil prices upward. China’s demand, while it has risen, is small relative to America’s. China produces about 3.7 million bbl/day and consumes about 8.2; so China’s net oil imports daily are almost one-third of America’s. World oil supply has become stagnant; some experts believe that world’s ability to produce crude oil has peaked. At the same time, world demand for oil continues to grow, as fast-growing nations like China and India add their demand to the already huge and growing demand of America and Europe. By the simple laws of supply and demand, constant supply and rising demand will drive prices up—and prices will rise steeply, the more price-insensitive oil demand is. Case Study: Hurricane Katrina: The State of Louisiana is America’s largest oil producer. When a severe hurricane struck New Orleans, capital of Louisiana, and the Gulf of Mexico in the fall of 2005, offshore production, port facilities, pipelines, and refineries were damaged or closed. The result was a spike in oil prices; at one point, gasoline was $5.87 per gallon at a Georgia station. Since hurricanes often sweep through this area, it is likely this will continue to recur. Is there an alternative for America to importing large amounts of oil and hence supporting its enemies by driving oil prices upward? Brazil, for one, has shown the way. Brazil today produces ethanol from organic materials, and ethanol has replaced 40 percent of Brazil’s gasoline, much of which would otherwise be imported. This is the result of a farsighted program to mandate vehicles that can use either gasoline or ethanol, as well as to expand ethanol production. America too could produce large amounts of ethanol, from corn. As a New York Times columnist notes: there are 34,000 gas stations here (in Brazil) that offer both gasoline and ethanol (compared with around 700 in the U.S.) and because 70 percent of new cars sold here can run on either gasoline or sugar ethanol. As a result, Brazil has replaced about 40 percent of its gasoline consumption with sugar ethanol. I asked Brazilian experts what they’d do if they were the U.S. president. The consensus answer: Require U.S. oil companies to provide ethanol fuel pumps at all their gas stations, require U.S. auto companies to make all their new cars flex-fuel and improve mileage standards, and get rid of the crazy 54-cent tariff we’ve imposed on imported sugar ethanol (to protect our farmers). And then let the market work. (NYT, September 15, 2006)

Rather than import Brazilian ethanol, America has followed a costly and unwise policy of subsidizing corn production for ethanol production.

Plotting Our Course

The result has been to do little to mitigate high oil prices, while contributing to global food inflation. Instead of importing ethanol from Brazil, America makes the so-called biofuels (fuel made from organic matter) from corn. A third of America’s corn crop went into fuel. Fill up a big SUV tank with 70 liters of corn-made ethanol and you have used enough corn to feed a human being for a whole year. American farmers are switching to crops for making ethanol, because of its 200 subsidy programs. So there is less corn and grain for food—for both people and animals. So prices rise. It is hard not to conclude that the goal of this folly was political—to assist politically powerful Midwest farmers, rather than deal with the high price of energy. In general, Republicans oppose interference with market forces. Why, then, has the Bush administration aggressively interfered, through its subsidy programs, with such forces, abandoning its core ideology opportunistically and, perhaps, disastrously? There is yet another alternative to expensive oil that oils the enemies’ wheels: tar sands. In Colorado alone, America has more oil trapped in tar sands than Saudi Arabia has in oil reserves. The problem is, it is exceedingly expensive to release the oil from the tar sands. If a project on the scale of the Manhattan Project were to be launched, focusing resources and America’s scientific and technological brainpower on tar-sand technology, America could free itself from the yoke of dependency on oil imports within five years, and could cease supporting the bank accounts of its sworn enemies. It would no longer be the case that anytime the world “sneezed” (e.g., a hurricane, rebels in Nigeria, war in the Middle East, revolution in Turkmenistan), America’s oil supply catches pneumonia. Americans would sleep much better; its enemies would sleep much worse. If America is to end the senseless continuing subsidization of its enemies, finding alternate energy sources must be given top priority. Few advances would strengthen America’s World War III effort more. After looking in depth at America’s defense spending, and energy policies, our attention now turns to the Middle East and the longstanding IsraelArab conflict. We begin with an analysis of the two Palestinian “uprisings,” known as intifada, which comprise a part of World War III. THE ISRAEL-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT: FIRST AND SECOND INTIFADAS A Personal Note I (Maital) find it necessary to begin with a personal note. I was born and raised in Saskatchewan, Canada, and emigrated to Israel on July 27, 1967. So I have lived in Israel for some forty years. All our children and grandchildren have been born here, and the only thing I love more than my adopted country is my wife and family. Writing objectively about a bitter

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dispute that I have lived through, and even fought in, is clearly impossible. I have personally felt the pain on the Israeli side, but have only indirectly observed the pain on the opposing Palestinian side, though I feel that as a caring individual I am aware of and sensitive to it. Readers should note this personal involvement, and judge what follows accordingly. Background: The word intifada is Arabic for uprising; it literally means “shaking off”—to shake off, or attempt to shake off, an oppressor or occupier. The term has been used in many contexts: in the Moroccan-occupied Sahara, in Lebanon, even in Baghdad in 1952 and later in 2003 (to describe the revolt of Muqtada al Sadr, the Shia’ cleric). But it is mainly used to describe Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation. Henceforth intifada will be assumed to refer to the Palestinian intifada. The Arab-Jewish, and later Arab-Israel conflict has been ongoing for a century or more in what was known as Palestine and later became Israel. There were Arab-Jewish riots in Palestine in 1920, and in 1929, with many deaths; a 1936–1939 Arab revolt; and the 1948 Arab-Israel war, following Israel’s declaration of independence. There followed the Six-Day War (1967), the Yom Kippur War (1973), Lebanon War I (1978–1982), Lebanon War II (2006). These conflicts were largely with surrounding Arab countries. The direct conflict with the Palestinians took place in the context of intifada. The First Intifada began in 1987, subsided in 1990, and ended with the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the creation of the Palestinian Authority under Chairman Yasir Arafat. The Second Intifada is known as the Al Aqsa Intifada (named after the mosque on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem). It began on September 28, 2000, when opposition leader Ariel Sharon ascended the Temple Mount, seen by Arabs as an assault on the site holy to all Muslims. On September 29, after Friday prayers, large-scale riots broke out in the Old City of Jerusalem, and continued in the days following. A key event in the early days of the Second Intifada was the lynching of two Israeli reserve soldiers who entered Ramallah by mistake on October 12 and were arrested by Palestinian police. A Palestinian mob stormed the building, beat the soldiers to death, tore their bodies apart and threw their bodies into the street below. The lynching was captured on television by an Italian TV crew. The brutality of the act, coupled with deaths of Palestinian demonstrators, polarized public opinion on both sides and led to retaliation. Israel launched air strikes on the Palestinian Authority and the conflict escalated. Unlike the First Intifada, known as the War of the Stones, the Second Intifada featured armed Palestinian resistance. A key weapon used by Palestinians was suicide bombing. Israel in turn used “targeted assassinations,” firing missiles at Palestinian militants from helicopters, and launching armed incursions into Palestinian cities and refugee camps, in strengths varying from squads to brigades.

Plotting Our Course

The Second Intifada is thought by some to have arisen in a spontaneous manner, arising from frustration at lack of progress toward improving Palestinian living standards and creating an independent Palestinian state, after failure of the Oslo Accords. But one differing interpretation is that of the Mitchell Committee, chaired by former U.S. Senator George Mitchell, which asserts that a catalyst was the breakdown of the Camp David negotiations on July 25, 2000. The Palestinian Authority, it is alleged, planned and encouraged the outbreak of violence to regain diplomatic initiative. The Palestinian Liberation Organization, led by Arafat, claims Israel reacted to the intifada with excessive use of force. A key image from the Second Intifada was that from September 30, 2000—the widely broadcast TV image of a child, Muhammad al Durrah in Gaza, huddled behind his father against a wall in Gaza as Palestinian and Israeli forces exchanged fire. The boy was shot to death, and cradled in the arms of his father. It was an image that came to define, for many, the conflict, though the precise source of the bullet that killed him was, at least according to Israel, never clearly determined. The Second Intifada has ended. Now, there is talk of a possible Third Intifada, as Hamas and Israel danced toward a possible cease-fire in Gaza in March 2008, with Qasam rocket fire from Gaza on Ashkelon, Sderot, and Western Negev settlements in Israel for now subsiding. Lessons Learned: The precise events and military actions during the two Intifadas are less important than the lessons that can be drawn from them. A major lesson from the First Intifada is that stones are a powerful weapon. Israeli armed forces faced youthful Palestinian demonstrators, often age 16 or younger, throwing stones at soldiers and even at tanks. These images were broadcast on television around the world, and built enormous emotional support for the Palestinian cause. There was no military solution, for Israel, to this intifada. A powerful moral dilemma arose for many Israeli soldiers, many of them reserve soldiers, fathers with children of their own. Stones can cause injury. Their mission was to restore order. Can you fire live ammunition at children, even when those children can grievously harm you? Even tear gas can cause grievous harm. Can you fire rubber bullets? Those too can maim and kill, and in fact did. What if, sheltering behind the stone-throwing children, there are those with Molotov cocktails? This happened often. And if the struggle is about hearts and minds of public opinion abroad, is there any possible way in which a well-armed military force can win hearts and minds, against the underdog drama of brave, defiant stone-throwing youths? And what about the catalyzing TV images broadcast around the world by Al Jazeera—tanks facing stone-throwing youths? Israel learned what other nations have learned before it. Civil disobedience is the most powerful weapon, especially when the occupying power espouses respect for human rights, because there is no effective response

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to it. Some argue that had the Palestinians continued to use this weapon, nonarmed civil resistance, they would have achieved a far larger part of their objectives far faster than they did when they resorted to armed resistance. The Second Intifada is a completely different story. Here the major weapon was suicide bombings. Here is the death toll among Israelis caused by suicide bombers, from 2001 through 2006: 2001 207

2002 452

2003 218

2004 117

2005 45

2006 30

Suicide bombings hardened Israeli public opinion to a considerable degree against the Palestinian cause. I (Maital) can affirm this personally, to the extent that I found myself voting for a right-wing political party in general elections—unthinkable for me a few years ago. According to the declining death toll, Israel found an appropriate response to this weapon, through arrests, incursions, intelligence, checkpoints, and other methods. The response greatly limited the mobility of Palestinians, because of widespread checkpoints and road checks, causing long queues and great frustration. This made it difficult for peaceful Palestinians to travel to work and to school, or to travel to get medical care—and increased frustration with, and hatred of, the Israeli occupation. In this, the extreme jihadists, who led the suicide bombings, succeeded in their mission of driving a wedge between moderates on both sides of the conflict. As the suicide bombings declined, the Palestinians made increasing use of improvised Qasam rockets, a homemade rocket with a range of up to 15 km, with a crude warhead, fired from Gaza into the Western Negev and cities such as Sderot. Some 400 rockets were fired in 2005, and 1,700 in 2006 (even though there was a cease-fire during part of this time; seventysix rockets were fired during the “cease fire,” none by Hamas, but mainly by resistance groups opposing Hamas). Five Israelis died due to rocket attacks in 2005, and two died from them in 2006. In 2007, according to the BBC, 783 rockets were fired at Israeli civilians, with two deaths. As of February 2008 some fourteen Israelis were killed by Qasam’s. As a weapon the Qasam mainly sought to instill panic and fear. Israeli armed forces have been unable to prevent such rocket attacks, as they were unable to stop Hezbollah firing of Katyusha rockets, much more powerful, with much larger warheads, into northern Israel, during the Lebanon War II. Fog of War: A deep fog of war envelops the Israel-Palestine conflict. The living conditions of Palestinians in Gaza, and in the West Bank, too, have deteriorated during the Second Intifada. Up to 200,000 Palestinians used to find well-paid jobs in Israel. This has now dwindled to 10,000 or fewer, as Israel, fearing suicide bombers, has greatly restricted such employment and instead has brought in foreign workers from Thailand and elsewhere. When violence flares, Israel closes entry and exit points into and out of Gaza and the West Bank, greatly damaging trade between the regions.

Plotting Our Course

The electoral victory of Hamas in 2006 in Gaza surprised both Israelis and Americans. Hamas does not recognize the existence of Israel. The election caused Israel, the United States, and to some extent Europe to cut off funds and aid to Hamas and Gaza. Living conditions greatly deteriorated as a result. While Hamas appeared to lose some support as a result, many Palestinians still support Hamas, because unlike the previous Fatah-led Palestinian Authority government Hamas is regarded as more or less free of corruption and thievery (Arafat is widely believed to have siphoned billions of dollars into private accounts abroad). They also support Hamas because they believe Hamas’ determined resistance to Israeli occupation brings them dignity and honor—a very important value for Arab society. Israelis are baffled, not understanding why Palestinians would vote for a political party that inevitably brought them suffering and deprivation, all in return for some vague concept of dignity and honor in resisting the occupiers. Many Israelis are disillusioned, believing that the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Gaza in 2006 should have brought a more conciliatory attitude on the part of Palestinians, rather than Qasam rocket attacks. Palestinians respond that they are living in a cage, or in a jail, because Israel controls all entry and exit, by land, air, and sea, to and from Gaza; the “withdrawal” was, they say, a fiction. Israelis respond that this is necessary to prevent sophisticated weapons from being smuggled in—which appears to be occurring anyway. Israelis wonder why Hamas is making strenuous efforts and spending large sums on smuggling weapons, when the people of Gaza need food and medicine. International aid agencies operating in Gaza repeatedly warn of the desperate situation of the Gazans and the deprivation they suffer; Israelis wonder why, when the Rafah border crossing was breached by Hamas and Gazans in February 2008, with thousands of Gazans spilling out into the Egyptian city of El Arish, could some $150 million be spent there, if the Gazans were poverty stricken and bankrupt? Indiscriminate Use of Force: Has Israel used excessive force against the Palestinian resistance? Israel’s large well-armed army is no match for the ragtag Palestinian militants. More than three times as many Palestinians have died in the intifada as have Israelis.16 Israel claims it targets combatants; yet civilians die in large numbers. Palestinians target civilians in terror attacks, but argue that this is legitimate in resisting a cruel and fierce occupation. What would constitute an appropriate and reasonable use of force by Israel? When Palestinian militants operate in densely populated areas (Gaza is one of the world’s most densely populated regions), civilian casualties result when Israel sends forces against them. Yet the militants say that the resistance occurs in populated areas precisely because they are “occupied.” There is no answer to the question, what is the “appropriate” use of force— only a peace agreement, Palestinian state, and end to Israel’s control over the three million Palestinians will make the force issue irrelevant.

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Conclusions: It is eminently clear to nearly everyone that the IsraelPalestinian conflict will not be resolved militarily. Israel cannot subdue the Palestinian resistance, nor can the Palestinians defeat Israel militarily. The suicide bombings, even at their peak, simply hardened Israeli resistance and public opinion. But no progress is being made toward a negotiated political solution. Israel chooses not to negotiate with Hamas, because Hamas does not recognize Israel’s existence and calls for Israel’s destruction. Negotiating with the Palestinian Authority led by Mohammed Abbas seems futile because Abbas appears to have little power to implement any agreement he might choose to sign. Abbas, in turn, rejects any interim or staged agreement, insisting that negotiations be held on a “final solution” that will create a Palestinian state. Such a final solution seems farther away than ever. America continues to push its “road map” but many experts find this plan vague and lacking in understanding of the needs and aspirations of both sides. Meanwhile, Israel struggles with the political fallout of its perceived failure in Lebanon War II, with a greatly weakened prime minister and government, and with enormous internal dissension, especially between the prime minister and the defense minister. Preoccupation with internal difficulties and with politicians struggling to survive disastrously low approval ratings give negotiation with the Palestinians very low priority. Moreover, with Hamas in Gaza at odds with the Fatah in the West Bank, it is hard to see how a negotiated solution can emerge. All this occurs against the backdrop of growing concern in the moderate Arab world, that the continuing festering Israel-Palestinian conflict provides rocket fuel for radical jihadist groups around the world, who cite the American-backed Israeli oppression of the Palestinians and Palestinian suffering as a cause justifying jihad against the West. The conflict, these nations say, directly endangers the moderate Arab regimes. So, while there appears to be an ever-growing urgency to resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict, or at least begin to work toward a negotiated settlement of it, the chances of such negotiations getting under way seem exceedingly dim. Our own view, a very pessimistic one, is that only after bloody disastrous wars has there come significant progress in the Middle East—for instance, the Israel-Egypt peace agreement that occurred in the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. A major war, involving Israel, the Palestinians, Syria, Lebanon, and perhaps even Iran, could escalate to disastrous proportions. After such a war, the world community may choose to knock stubborn heads together and dictate a peace agreement to both sides, simply because the festering Middle East conflict endangers not only those in the Middle East but world peace as a whole. The question is, must we have a disastrous Middle East war before a settlement is negotiated? And how many people will die before an IsraelPalestinian agreement is signed. (Why not seek agreement and peace before

Plotting Our Course

they die rather than after?) Logic says, avoid war. But reality and emotions seem to imply, we cannot. The broad outline of a final peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians is clear. It will involve Israel withdrawing from a majority of Palestinian lands in the West Bank that it currently occupies. Israel in the past has already agreed to this. But bloodshed and suffering continues, on both sides. As it continues, the extremists on both sides gain the upper hand. And a final settlement recedes even farther into the distance, and the likelihood of full-scale war grows. It appears to us that only strong, effective outside mediation and arbitration can cut the Gordian knot of the quarrel. The problem is, who will arbitrate? America, mired in Iraq, is regarded by the Arab side as far from impartial. Europe is regarded with deep suspicion by Israel. The United Nations is ineffective; it has, for instance, not even begun to prevent or restrict the rearming of Hezbollah forces in South Lebanon, as the UN Resolution creating the cease-fire required. Recently, on March 9, 2008, Israeli intelligence agencies presented their annual intelligence assessment to Israel’s cabinet ministers. It was, said one official, “a bleak picture of the strategic threats surrounding Israel.” According to the report, “the United States’ declining role in the region has left a vacuum for radical elements to fill.” They also warned of the “heightened threat from missiles in the arsenals of a future nuclear-armed Iran, within two years, and Syria. A Hezbollah attack and a stronger Hamas were also in prospect.”17 Perhaps a ray of hope is the energetic diplomacy of moderate Arab nations in the Middle East, led by Egypt. Perhaps, in the end, as with many quarrelsome families, the ultimate peace process will emerge from within, from the nations of the Middle East themselves. Israel’s conflict with its neighbors includes Lebanon, site of two wars, Lebanon War I (in 1982) and Lebanon War II (in July–August 2006). We now examine Lebanon’s role in the Israel-Arab conflict. LEBANON: THE CONSISTENCY OF FOLLY The late historian Barbara Tuchman’s 1984 book The March of Folly recounts four instances of folly in human history. She defines acts of folly as those fulfilling four criteria: r r r r

clearly contrary to the self-interest of the organization pursuing them; conducted over a period of time, not just in one burst of insanity; conducted by a number of persons, not just one madman; people alive at the time pointed out why the act was folly.

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The episodes she recounts are: the Trojan Horse; Renaissance Popes and the Protestant uprising; loss of the American colonies by Britain; and U.S. policy in Vietnam. She might have added a fifth: the Cedars of Lebanon—Lebanon’s policy toward Israel. Nothing symbolizes the March of Folly and resulting tragedy of Lebanon better than Lebanon’s cedar trees, mentioned seventy-five times in the Bible. Some 3,500 years ago, Hiram, King of Tyre (an ancient, and modern, Lebanese city on the Mediterranean, south of Beirut) sold cedar wood to King David for his palace and then sold cedars to David’s son Solomon for the Holy Temple in Jerusalem. With the cedars came skilled workmen. Today the cedars are mostly gone. Forests cover less than 6 percent of Lebanon—far too little for a country half Israel’s size that is three-quarters mountainous—and of those forests, only 3 percent are cedars. Lebanon has ruined its cedars, its forests, and by consistently wrongheaded decisions, ruined its economy. The four million Lebanese are descendants of the seafaring Phoenicians. They were then, and are still today, astute traders and bankers. After achieving independence from France in 1943, Lebanon became the Switzerland of the Middle East (Swisra Ash Shark). Beirut was its Paris. Oil sheikhs came in summer to vacation in the cool Lebanese mountains and brought their money. The Lebanese pound was once solid as a rock, backed by gold acquired when astute Lebanese bankers cashed U.S. dollars for billions in gold during the late 1960s at the then bargain-basement rate of $35/oz price. Until July 12, 2006, Lebanon was one of the most prosperous of the nonoil-producing Arab nations, with a per capita GDP of about $6,000 (three times that of Iran, six times that of Syria). In 2004 Lebanon’s economy grew 6.3 percent, driven in part by 1.3 million tourists. An ambitious $50 billion reconstruction program, undertaken to repair the destruction caused by the 15-year Civil War that ended in 1990, was successful. In 2005, the market capitalization of stocks listed on Beirut’s Stock Exchange doubled. The future looked bright. Some 1.6 million tourists were expected. But they failed to come. The gold is gone, Lebanon owes $35 billion and today it takes 1,500 Lebanese pounds to buy just one American dollar. What went wrong? Those who do not learn from the past, the American philosopher Santayana said, are doomed to repeat it. Dating back to 1948, Lebanon has not learned, repeatedly allowing its territory to become a base for attacks on Israel—even though there has never been a formal declaration of war between the two countries. (Each accuses the other of “acts of war.”) By 1975, some 300,000 Palestinians, who fled during the 1948 War of Independence, had begun to use Lebanon as a base for political and military

Plotting Our Course

activities, mainly through Arafat’s Palestinian Liberation Organization. A civil war between Palestinians (and Sunni Muslim and Druze Lebanese allies), and the Lebanese Maronite Christians, broke out in 1975. This war would end only in 1990, virtually destroying Lebanon’s economy. Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 and occupied the so-called security strip on its southern border for eighteen years, until its withdrawal in 2000. In June 1976 Syria sent 40,000 troops into Lebanon to keep the Maronite Christians from being defeated. However, over the years, Syria shifted its allegiance to the Palestinians; allegiance-shifting is endemic and rapid in Lebanon. Syria remained in Lebanon, dominating it, until the Cedar Revolution. The so-called Cedar Revolution in April 2005—in which the Lebanese seemed to see the light and evicted the Syrian Army—offered hope. But Iran and its surrogate Hezbollah made south Lebanon their bunkered playground. Israel’s response to Hezbollah’s attack caused at least $3.5 billion in damage, equal to 15 percent of Lebanon’s $24 billion Gross Domestic Product. Much of the damage was concentrated in Hezbollah-controlled Beirut suburbs. This particular March of Folly could, and should, have been different. Israel’s northern port, Haifa, is just 25 miles from the Lebanese border. Israel and Lebanon should be good neighbors living together in peace and harmony. Israel’s expertise in reforestation could have helped Lebanon replenish its cedar groves. Tyre and Haifa could have been twin cities. But Tyre launched rockets at Haifa, destroying, rather than building as did King Hiram. Why did the Lebanese allow Hezbollah and radical Islam to use their land as a beachhead, when the consequences were obvious and disastrous? Why has Lebanon insisted repeatedly it would be the last Arab country to make peace with Israel, rather than the first? Why did Lebanon not learn from Egypt and Jordan? In Troy, according to Tuchman, the blind Laocoon (who was a great deal more farsighted than his sighted compatriots) repeatedly warned that the Greeks are not to be trusted. “You can’t bring that thing in here,” he said, “It might be full of Greek soldiers. At least poke it with a spear and see if anyone yelps!” No one listened. In Lebanon, Hezbollah was, and is, Iran’s Trojan Horse. South Lebanon is the only place in the world where Iran has succeeded in exporting its brand of Shia radical Islam to control physical territory. Many Lebanese voices warned against this outcome; some were killed as a result, including Rafik Hariri, former Lebanese prime minister whose assassination on February 14, 2005 is being investigated by the United Nations, with Syria as a prime suspect. It was his death that was a prime trigger for the Cedar Revolution. Hezbollah is the Trojan horse inserted into Lebanon by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards—experts note Hezbollah is perhaps a unit within the Guards and

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its head, Nasrallah, was trained extensively by the Guards in Iran—and by Syria, which is actively arming and rearming it. Does Lebanon’s persistent insistence to remain at war with Israel and to host those who conduct it qualify as an act of folly? It does; it meets all four of the Tuchman criteria. This policy has been maintained, with varying degrees of intensity, for fifty-eight years. Only the folly of the Renaissance Popes lasted longer. The key question of all is, will the cycle of folly, war, and destruction continue? Or will Lebanon create a secure, peaceful Blue Line border, reestablish its sovereignty over its southern border and implement its onegun (only Lebanon’s security forces should be armed) policy? Lebanon’s lovely cedars can flourish again. It can return to the intelligent, delicate, and relatively stable balance it once achieved between Palestinians, Druze, Christians, Shia, Sunni, and other ethnic and religious groups. Or the March of Folly can continue, with only destruction on both sides of the Lebanon–Israel border resulting. On August 30, 2006, the current prime minister of Lebanon, Fouad Siniora, again recited the March of Folly mantra: “Lebanon will be the last country in the Arab world to sign a peace treaty with Israel.” In March 2008, Lebanon again descended into crisis, as the term of the outgoing president expired, and a deadlock in Parliament prevented choice of a new president. America has sent a warship to dock off Lebanon’s coast. Syria foments conflict in Gaza to distract attention from its mischief in Lebanon. The March of Folly continues, in what was once the most pastoral and prosperous of Arab Middle East nations. The next section addresses the role of Russia in World War III, and the changing policies adopted by Russia in the post-Soviet Union era. REEMERGENCE OF RUSSIA In the annals of nations, it is hard to find a more dramatic comeback than that of Russia. In August 1998, Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced Russia could not pay its foreign debts. The ruble collapsed, and with it, Russian banks and its economy. Today Russia’s GDP is growing at 6 percent annually. The growth driver is, of course, oil and gas; Russia now has foreign exchange reserves of $250 billion, Russia’s proven oil reserves of 70 billion bbl are worth, at $60 per bbl, $4.2 trillion, and at $100/bbl, worth $7.0 trillion. Its proven gas reserves, 50 trillion cu. m., are worth $6.0 trillion, even at the reduced price of $120/thousand cu. m., charged Russia’s neighbors, Ukraine and Georgia. Europe now is crucially dependent on Russian natural gas for its energy, as Europe’s own natural gas reserves are rapidly depleting.

Plotting Our Course

Russia is rich in other natural resources, such as timber, nickel, copper, and other metals; these account for over 80 percent of its exports. Meanwhile, Russia’s manufacturing base is obsolete, dilapidated, and starved for investment.18 Russia joined the World Trade Organization, in 2007. Ironically, this happened at a time when the Russian economy was becoming more statecontrolled, rather than less. The Russian government seeks to establish tighter control over its oil and gas resources—a fact Royal Dutch-Shell learned to its sorrow when Russia basically expropriated Shell’s huge Sakhalin Island investment, on the pretext of Shell’s environmental violations. The Fall and Rise of Russia: Vladimir Putin, a former KGB agent, became acting president in 1999, when Boris Yeltsin resigned. He was elected president in 2000 and again in 2004. In 2008 his handpicked successor Dimitri Medvedev was elected. Medvedev has appointed Putin prime minister. Many observers believe that Putin has slowly and surely converted Russia into a one-party system. Putin obviously intends to remain the power behind the Medvedev throne. We tend to forget that Russia is a relatively new nation. According to Richard Pipes, historian of Russia, as recently as 75 years ago, 80 per cent of Russia’s population engaged in agriculture and lived in scattered, largely self-sufficient villages . . . the kind of social cohesion that Westerners took for granted in their own countries was very weakly developed; Russia was not so much a society as an agglomeration of tens of thousands of separate rural settlements . . . National feelings, therefore, were also poorly developed.

Pipes notes that Russia’s cultural heritage includes the absence of social and national cohesion, ignorance of civil rights, lack of any real notion of private property (land belonged to the czars, peasants were the czar’s serfs), and an ineffective judiciary. “Russians relied on the state to protect them from each other,” Pipes notes. “They wanted their rules to be both strong and harsh. . . . Experience has taught Russians to associate weak government—democracy is seen as weak—with anarchy and lawlessness.” Russia’s flirt with capitalism reinforces this view. Middle-class Russians twice lost their savings, in financial crises in 1991 and again in 1998. Inflation has eroded pensions, poverty has grown, and few Russians believe that anyone except the oligarchs have benefited. What Russians Think: Ultimately, a nation’s foreign policy is driven by the dreams, desires, beliefs, and aspirations of its people. There are times, of course, when a disconnect occurs between policies a nation’s leader adopts and what the people desire and support—as appears to be the case at present in the United States. But over the long haul foreign policy is an extension of

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what the people want and believe. So it is important to try to understand what ordinary Russians think. 1. Democracy is viewed as a fraud. As many as 78 percent of Russians said, in 2003, that “democracy is a face for a government controlled by rich and powerful cliques”—which, in fact, is precisely what it is currently in Russia.19 2. When asked to choose between “freedom” and “order,” 88 percent of respondents in a Russian province picked “order”—even though, as Pipes notes, in the West the two reinforce one another, rather than conflict. 3. The judicial system is held “in contempt” as corrupt and subservient to the state. 4. In a 2004 poll, 84 percent of Russians said wealth in Russia can be acquired only through connections (which is true); 80 percent said that inequalities in wealth in modern Russia are excessive, and blamed widespread poverty on the economic system. 5. In 1999, 72 percent of Russians said they wanted to restrict private economic initiative (readers may recall that entrepreneurship was forbidden by the Soviet legal code). 6. Russians suffer from acute inferiority and low self-esteem (as a nation). Russians believe strong government can remedy this, and that it involves military prowess that foreigners respect or even fear. 7. There is nostalgia for the belief that communism made Russia a great power once. Hostility to the West is widespread. The United States is especially disliked, as it has “usurped the global hegemony Russia once enjoyed.”

The bottom line of this analysis is worrisome. “(Putin) has reinstated Russia’s traditional form of government—an autocratic state in which citizens are relieved of responsibility for politics and in which imaginary foreign enemies are invoked to forge an artificial unity.” The only aspiration Putin has not yet achieved, Pipes notes, is Russia’s military prowess. But this, too, will likely happen, given Russia’s enormous and growing stock of petrodollars. Russia’s role, then, may not be so ambiguous as many believe. Look for Russia to challenge America at every opportunity, perhaps not unlike a teenager who disagrees with everything a parent says, not because he believes the parent is wrong but because disagreement proves independence and raises self-esteem. The Cold War in its old form will not return—we may not again see the days when two rival superpowers challenged each other militarily. But we will see global geopolitics, in which nations with growing economic strength—China, India, Brazil, and Russia—demonstrate increased independence in their foreign policy, and in which American hegemony is sharply

Plotting Our Course

diminished. In such a world, America’s success will be determined less by its ability to impose its will on the world, as by its skill in building alliances for the causes in which America believes. The direct implication of the new Russia, then, is, for America, the need for a new way of thinking about the world, based on finding common ground rather than contesting territory. Scenarios of Conflict: Consider this scenario. A new American president is elected in November 2008. Immediately afterward, in January 2009, In Moscow . . . Putin is angry about NATO’s invitation to Ukraine to join and has had President Dimitri Medvedev send a personal note to you (U.S. President) demanding that you rescind the invitation. (No one really doubts that Putin is still pulling the strings.) If not, the note threatens that Russia will start dumping dollars. Russia doesn’t buy much from the U.S. and doesn’t really need the dollars. So this is a credible threat.20

This scenario is not from a science fiction writer. It is by Clyde Prestowitz, former U.S. chief trade representative under Ronald Reagan. To it, he adds sale of dollars by Saudi Arabia (upset by U.S. pressure to democratize), China (seeking to swallow Taiwan), and Japan. And—Iran announces it will test a nuclear bomb. Japan, China, and the European Union tell America to let them—they all need the oil. History is far from over, as Francis Fukuyama claimed, with American dominance unquestioned. In many ways, history is just beginning. Next, we examine the prickly issue of whether, in the conflict between regular armies and irregular bands of terrorists, the latter can in fact be defeated, given their ability to disperse, scatter, retreat, and reappear when convenient. We conclude, contrary to conventional wisdom, that irregular forces can indeed be defeated, and have been in the past, with the use of wise tactics. DIFFUSE WARFARE: CAN IRREGULAR FORCES BE DEFEATED Shortly after the Lebanon War II cease-fire took effect, Israel’s then Defense Minister Amir Peretz—a former national labor leader with no highlevel military command experience of any kind—stated that it was not possible from the outset to defeat and dismantle Hezbollah, since the latter is a guerrilla army. He was quite wrong. It is possible to defeat guerrillas and eliminate them as a fighting force. It has been done and will be done in future, in World War III. At the end of this section, we offer a short case study of an earlier episode—how the British Army defeated communist insurgents in the jungles of Malaya (now Malaysia). In this section, we explore the way forward to do this. The blueprint is supplied by a retired Israeli general who commanded Israel’s naval

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commandos, and then the Navy, General Yedidia (Didi) Ya’ari. He supplied this blueprint in a new book (available so far only in Hebrew), titled Diffuse Warfare (written with another strategy expert, Haim Assa).21 We present in broad outline form the main elements of “diffuse warfare” and “molecular army units.” What follows is a brief paraphrase of the Ya’ari–Assa book. The authors quote Samuel Huntington, who in his 1997 book The Clash of Civilizations and the Making of World Order uses the metaphor of tectonic plates. Just as the earth is built on moving tectonic plates, which rub against each other, collide, and create earthquakes and tsunamis, so are the world’s two great civilizations colliding, in a war, and create low-intensity conflicts that are part of a larger World War III. Low-intensity warfare is warfare against guerrilla units, by nature “low intensity” against small units operating independently as opposed to “high intensity” war involving divisions, armies, navies colliding head-to-head. One proposal is to create two armies: one for high-intensity warfare, slashing through enemy lines, and a second, separate army specializing in lowintensity warfare. The authors reject this idea. They claim that the modern, twenty-first century army can be built in a unified manner for success in both. (America, they claim, succeeded in Iraq in the first stage, high-intensity warfare, but has been less successful in the second phase, low-intensity warfare.) Low-intensity warfare occurs when asymmetry develops between countries—for instance, Lebanon and Israel. In South Lebanon, Hezbollah has built a nation within a nation, which it rigidly controlled until July 12, 2006. It acted independently of the Government of Lebanon, despite having ministers in the Lebanese coalition government. Israel, a nation, acts against Hezbollah, a terrorist organization. This is fundamental asymmetry, different from previous world wars, because nations (like the United States) declare war not against nations or territories, but against terrorist organizations that generally operate without territory, even though in the case of Hezbollah, there was a strip of territory once controlled by Israel, in south Lebanon. That territory, from which Israel withdrew in 2000, without ensuring the control of the territory by Lebanon, turned out to be a base for Hezbollah attacks, culminating in the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers in 2006. Withdrawal, for many senior Israeli officers, was an error that proved very costly. The basic argument for defeating irregulars is based on the “dynamic molecule” army unit, which does not seek to occupy and control territory. First, it operates under a total absence of the “fog of war” (battlefield uncertainty, chaos, and lack of knowledge about who is fighting whom, where, and how). A network of sensors, on the ground, together with unmanned aircraft in the skies, provide local commanders at all levels with clear real-time pictures of the battlefield. The technological advances that have taken place represent fundamental changes in the way one wages war. The

Plotting Our Course

United States, for example, has used unmanned aircraft to attack targets in Afghanistan and elsewhere, with live monitors in the United States guiding the attack based on video images transmitted from the aircraft. Second, small mobile units operate to choose the time and place of battle, and are independent, in that they carry their needs with them. They are small enough and focused enough, and their firepower and weaponry are designed such that minimal casualties are inflicted on civilians, even when warfare occurs within civilian areas (which, in today’s war, is generally the case). This is stressed because today war is broadcast by the media all over the world almost in real time; the legitimacy of the cause will depend, in part, on how the world perceives and civilians are treated and protected. Scenes of carnage involving noncombatants, including women and children, do not win hearts and minds. The dynamic molecule is a unit combining elements of the main armed forces (naval, marine, air, infantry, armor), capable of rapid change on the battlefield, and highly integrated. It is the antithesis of the standard army units: squad, platoon, battalion, brigade, etc. In conventional army units, maneuvers are often cumbersome and slow. Maneuverability is the essence of the dynamic molecule, and like chemical molecules, the military version is continually in motion. The molecule is very hard to find, by the enemy, when it operates, partly because of its mobility and small size. Unlike conventional units, whose firepower is often at least partly longrange, random or “statistical,” the dynamic molecule is close range and therefore far more accurate. Today’s precision weaponry (“smart bombs”) is a good example. The firepower brought down on the Iraqi Presidential Guards, surrounding Baghdad, is a good example of this type of concept. With regard to command and control, the dynamic molecule operates on the basis of a visual view of the battlefield shared by all who operate on it, rather than on verbal or textual intelligence. A kind of competitive model operates (capitalism on the battlefield), the authors claim. “Tenders” are opened, among the molecules, for attack on a designated target. Whoever makes a “winning bid” (best proposal for attacking) and is in the best position to strike wins. It is the network of these molecules, linked together, that makes this possible, as well as the common visual information the network participants possess. Implementing such a system, needless to say, is very complex and does not fully exist at present, but it can be considered entirely feasible and within the technological state of the art. These molecules may require some “linear” capability, to secure and hold territory—but holding territory is not the goal, but rather destroying the enemy’s ability to fight. At times it may be sufficient to destroy the enemy’s communications. (Hezbollah had a powerful modern and robust communications system, which was not damaged during the war; their commander, Hassan Nasrallah, bragged that he was able to hear the screams of wounded Israeli soldiers, transmitted to him by his fighters on the spot.)

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For eighteen years, from 1982 to 2000, Israel occupied a “security strip” in South Lebanon. The initial invasion into Lebanon, which brought Israeli forces to the outskirts of Beirut, was done rapidly and with minimal casualties. But the moment the force held and occupied territory, with long vulnerable supply lines, casualties mounted; attacked by a primitive version of “dynamic molecules,” guerrillas, the advantage of surprise and movement was lost entirely. Israel suffered 1,000 casualties, until it gave up and withdrew in 2000. The dynamic molecule, according to the authors, “is an ad hoc organization made up of air, ground, and naval units, designed for combat, for a defined period of time (avoiding holding territory unless there is a strong reason), in a designated area, whose objective is to achieve the ‘desired effect’ defined by the molecule’s mission.” Every molecule knows, every moment, where other molecules are located, and has intelligence produced by parts of the molecule itself, as well as by other molecules. Each molecule has a “spine,” separate from the molecules, designed solely to support the molecules with intelligence, firepower, and logistical support. This concept is not far removed from the Airland Battle model pioneered by the U.S. Army. It is characterized by great mobility and synchronous operation of diverse units at a high tempo that outpaces the ability of an enemy to respond. The dynamic molecule concept now tilts the equation even farther and hinges on use of Special Forces elements, elite teams that can concentrate superior firepower, accurately and decisively, in small force packages. Advanced helicopters and vertical wing aircraft are used to allow rapid insertion and extraction of forces. This is air mobility personified. It is coupled with light armored vehicles (e.g., Stryker) that can be quickly brought to the battle area. All the pieces of the dynamic molecule concept considered together spell force multiplier. The combination you need is good intelligence, enhanced security for the civilian population, and winning the hearts and minds of the people. That is not an easy combination to deliver, but it has been proven to work in practice (e.g., the Malaysian case study we will be addressing). To pull it off requires a marriage between politics and military means. In Lebanon War II in 2006, Israeli defense forces did not operate in this fashion, although elite commando units were employed intensively in selected operations. On the battlefield, platoons, brigades, divisions were operating using heavy armor in many cases. In contrast, the enemy, Hezbollah forces, did operate very close to the dynamic molecule fashion, within the means they possessed. A good example is the use of katyusha rockets. Israel’s most striking failure during the war was the utter inability to stop, or even reduce, the barrage of Katyusha rockets that fell on northern Israel (some 4,000 of them, during the thirty-four days of war). This weapon is highly inaccurate, and civilians who kept inside shelters or protected rooms avoided injury—though some fifty-one civilians were indeed killed during

Plotting Our Course

the war by rockets. How did Hezbollah succeed in this effort, despite the best efforts of a large, modern, and highly trained Israeli air force? According to leading defense commentator Zeev Schiff, writing in the daily newspaper Haaretz: Hezbollah managed to fire a large number of Katyushas during the war—as many as 240 in one day toward the end of the fighting. The rockets, stored near the launch points in underground shelters or houses, were usually aimed with a direction and trajectory pre-calculated to hit a specific target in Israel. They were usually set up in orchards by arrangement with the grove owners, who were paid by Hezbollah. The two-by-three-meter positions consisted of a hydraulic launch pad in a lined pit. The pad could be raised to fire the 122-mm rockets from a launcher at its center, and then lowered and camouflaged with vegetation. The farmers received instructions by cell phone regarding the number of rockets to launch and in what direction and range. They were often provided with thermal blankets to cover the position in order to keep IAF aircraft from detecting the post-shooting heat signature. There were many dozens of these launchers, widely scattered. Hezbollah claimed to have over 10,000 of them, in position, and fired 4,000 of them. Development of an anti-katyusha weapon (a powerful laser beam known as Nautilus, by American and Israeli engineers, capable of destroying rockets in flight) was cancelled in 2005, owing to budget cuts.

Many of the recommendations made by Ya’ari and Assa have been implemented, by both America and Israel. America has greatly expanded its special forces, after declaring war on terror. Israel, too, has a significant number of special units trained to operate as “dynamic molecules.” However, both armies appear to have adopted both-and, building both conventional and “molecular” forces rather than either-or, basing theory of war solely on the dynamic small mobile unit concept. This is understandable, because there are large conventional armies, with armor and airpower, facing both nations. One may expect that in future, as sensor and other technologies advance, new creative approaches to fighting guerrilla insurgencies will be developed and implemented that remove the inherent advantages guerrilla units enjoy. Case Study: Malaya. In the twelve-year war between largely British forces and communist guerrillas operating in the jungles of Malaya (now Malaysia), the British defeated the guerrillas. The British Permanent Secretary of Defense for Malaya was Sir Robert Thompson, who had served in World War II in jungle warfare, and understood it well. Under Thompson’s strategy, Britain began a “hearts and minds” campaign in 1951, giving medical and food aid to Malays and tribes. At the same time they mounted

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long-range patrols into the jungle, driving the guerrillas deeper and deeper into the jungle and depriving them of needed supplies. Often the guerrillas stole food from locals, earning their enmity and further depriving themselves of local support. The insurgency ended in 1960. The British operation was characterized by mounting of sufficient force to achieve victory; ultimately there were 35,000 British, and 60,000 Commonwealth troops in action, opposing perhaps 30,000 communist rebels. One of the key fallacies held by Israel’s General Staff in Lebanon War II was the belief that overwhelming airpower was sufficient to achieve a decisive result on the ground. From the Israeli Army’s debrief process, it was ultimately realized that this is not true; many senior officers disputed it even in the early stages of the war. America, too, has applied overwhelming airpower, in both Gulf wars. It seems patently clear that airpower alone, without the necessary boots on the ground, doesn’t work. In fact, airpower used indiscriminately, can exacerbate the problem rather than solve it. Despite the history, there are still a number of “arm chair” generals in civilian suits who see airpower as the beginning and the end—“pound them with airpower, and we will win, with minimum loss of life on our side.” It reminds you of the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) period, where the delivery of lethal nuclear blows by air was seen to obviate the need for large conventional ground forces. The United States began to wake up to the inanity of that proposition when confronted with the Korean War in 1950, and found its ground forces ill prepared for ground combat. That led to “a flexible response” doctrine. However, the lesson keeps getting relearned from time to time, most recently in Iraq, where insufficient ground troops were assigned to the task. The need for joint operations is in its ascendancy, with U.S. forces increasingly organized around this concept, including interoperability, with Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps operating as one potent team. The United States has never had a more professional military than it has today. It is now time to place some structure on the confusing and complex events that comprise World War III and supply an analytical framework. To do this, we offer a set of two matrices—one related to the Fog of War, a second related to the Fog of Peace—that serve to define and structure the uncertainty and perplexity that envelops World War III. This is the subject of Chapter 3.

3

Dispersing the Fog: A Framework for Analysis TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS In this chapter, we have several objectives. We begin with four historical events and show how information and the way it is treated by the media have a decisive influence. The “fog of war” has become a clich´e, generally used without the benefit of definition. (A recent use is as the title of the awardwinning 2004 Errol Morris documentary about Robert S. McNamara and how, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, an obscure State Department clerk prevented nuclear war by speaking up to President Kennedy and urging, in the deep fog of crisis, empathy with the Russians.) We therefore build a set of definitions and accompanying framework, breaking “fog of war” down into stages that we hope help clarify and disperse the “fog.” We do the same for the “fog of peace,” a term of more recent origin. Finally, we present our model in the form of two matrices, one for each type of fog. We use the first example outlined below, the buildup to World War II in the United States, to demonstrate use of the model. A matrix for each type of fog, war and peace, ends the chapter, in showing the fog effect in relation to how World War II developed and the media coverage of events. Throughout the chapter, we talk about the subtleties of information flow and media coverage. When one reads historical accounts of world conflicts, there are more than subtle hints that the media played a key role in the buildup to the conflict, such as mobilizing a country’s population for war. Take, for instance, the “yellow journalism” leading up to America’s war with Spain. “Yellow”

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refers not to the color of the papers, but to a comic strip based on the “Yellow Kid” used by competing New York newspapers to boost circulation. The term was later used to refer to sensationalism to raise paper sales. Sent in 1898 to cover a war in Cuba, artist Frederick Remington found only a minor revolt and cabled to his newspaper New York Journal, “there is no war.” Replied his boss William Randolph Hearst, famously: “You furnish the pictures. I’ll furnish the war.” And he did. Circulation rose dramatically. Thick fog invariably envelops the buildup to the war, prosecution of the war itself, and what occurs in the aftermath of the conflict. Here are some examples. We begin with World War II. The Buildup to World War II in the United States: President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) had difficulty bringing the American public to the point of accepting the proposition that U.S. military forces would need to be used to counter the threat from Nazi Germany. In fact, the politics of the time made it very difficult for the president, one of the most popular in American history, even to raise the topic without putting his political capital at risk. The American people remembered the heavy price in human lives paid during World War I. They had withdrawn into their traditional isolationist mode of Fortress America. FDR had to carefully temper the way he dealt with the issues unfolding in Europe and what the public would be told. He gained approval for the Lend Lease Program, opening the way for the buildup of a manufacturing base for weapons production. Between 1941 and 1945, Lend Lease supplied some $50 billion worth of war material to America’s Allies—France, Britain, USSR, China, and others. It was a transparent ruse—“lending,” rather than giving, weapons to Allies, when all knew they would not be returned. This aid was crucial at a time when Britain, in particular, faced severe shortages in vital weapons (especially aircraft and ships). FDR used the media to overcome opposition. He said it was like one neighbor’s lending another a garden hose to put out a fire in his home. “What do I do in such a crisis?” the president asked at a press conference. “I don’t say . . . ‘Neighbor, my garden hose cost me $15; you have to pay me $15 for it’ . . . I don’t want $15—I want my garden hose back after the fire is over.” The public bought this strategic use of “fog.” Key legislation was passed when Republican House member Everett Dirksen sped a bill to passage when sixty-five isolationist Democrat representatives were having lunch. At the same time FDR promised that he would never allow U.S. soldiers to be sent to Europe, a commitment soon to be broken as a result of events. The United States proceeded to become “the Arsenal of Democracy.” Then, the extent of the threat to America’s freedom and well-being began to be appreciated across America. The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, finally and rapidly sealed the national intent and will to go to war. The North Vietnamese Tet Offensive of 1968: The United States and Allied forces delivered a crushing blow to the North Vietnamese after they

Dispersing the Fog

had launched “surprise attacks” across what was then South Vietnam. U.S. intelligence sources knew that such an attack was coming. It took the North Vietnamese two years to reconstitute their forces after the battles that took place. They lost many soldiers and weapon stockpiles. One estimate says North Vietnam had between 75,000 and 85,000 soldiers killed. Many of their units were in tatters. The goal of the offensive, to spur an uprising in the South, was not achieved. Afterward, North Vietnamese military leaders (including General Giap) were despondent, convinced they had failed. And objectively they had. However, the American people saw the imagery of the U.S. embassy in Saigon under siege and the battles in other cities, such as the Imperial City of Hue. One particular photograph galvanized public opinion. It showed a senior South Vietnamese official summarily executing a North Vietnamese soldier with a gunshot to the head on a street in Saigon. It was a powerful example of how a single image, pixels seen around the world, had more impact than body counts and statistics. The Tet Offensive was defeated by American forces but led to a decisive change in American public opinion toward the war. Adding irony to these events, as depicted on the nightly news broadcasts, was the fact that the commander of military forces in Vietnam, General William C. Westmoreland, had bragged almost immediately before the attacks, that the enemy was on the ropes and the war was all but won. Perceptions of these facts were inconsistent with what was being expressed. Then, support for the war was swept away by one particular media event. Walter Cronkite, the venerable and highly respected news anchor on the CBS Nightly News, just back from a trip to Vietnam, unexpectedly closed his program with an editorial saying that the war could not be won. Cronkite had high credibility with American viewers, perhaps higher than many political and military leaders. On the February 27, 1968, newscast, Cronkite said, “it is this reporter’s opinion . . . to say that we are closer to victory is to say that the optimists, who have been wrong in the past, are right today . . . . . . the only reasonable path will be to negotiate . . . not as victors but as honorable people who lived up to their pledge to defend democracy and did the best they could.” When this was coupled with the sights and sounds the American public had been exposed to surrounding Tet, it clinched the belief that U.S. involvement needed to come to an end and the troops brought home. It is interesting to note that there is clear evidence that the war might have been brought to a more favorable conclusion under General Creighton W. Abrams, the general who replaced General Westmoreland. Abrams fundamentally changed the strategy and tactics, but by then the drawdown of U.S. forces had commenced in earnest and he simply did not have the residual forces necessary to pull it off.1 The public view provided by the media of what was happening was so compelling that it trumped any realities to the contrary.

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The Current Conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq: As of May 2008, there is some progress being made in Iraq in moving the country forward and strengthening its economy, but this news does not generally reach the television screen. The carnage, even though of reduced scale, dominates the television images. When some mortar rounds landed on Baghdad Airport on February 18, 2008, it became a news bulletin on television screens across America. But there are no news bulletins to herald major achievements in Iraq, such as the growing number of new schools being built or the relative tranquility in many parts of the country. Tranquility is not news. Carnage is news. Torn bodies are news. The sensational is what gets reported, such as the bloody bombing of a marketplace. It is not suggested here that bombings and other outright acts of terror be ignored, but rather that there be more balance in reporting the overall situation. The terrorists understand that the way to get media attention is to launch attacks in Baghdad. That transmits the image that “Rome is burning.” In Afghanistan, when the capital of Kabul was struck in a suicide bombing in September 2006, it was interpreted as clear evidence in the media that a significant setback had occurred. The fact that Kabul, even with that attack, was statistically safer at the time than the streets of Washington, DC, or New York City (which has greatly lowered its crime rate in recent years) barely received mention. This does not mean that everything is proceeding beautifully in Afghanistan. That is anything but true. It is rather a case of having the facts reported more accurately and in a more insightful and balanced manner. The inherent bias of media toward vivid imagery that attracts and keeps the attention of viewers is implacable, powerful, and a key part of the fog of war. The Israeli-Hezbollah Conflict (Lebanon War II): Here the biased media, in general, supported Hezbollah—especially, of course, Qatar-based al Jezeera and Hezbollah’s own satellite channel al Manar, whose “feeds” were widely rebroadcast by other news channels, which churned out the disturbing pictures of people killed by the supposedly indiscriminate Israeli bombing of civilian targets. There was not much mention, even in the Israeli press, about the fact that the firing of 4,000 highly inaccurate rockets by Hezbollah at Israeli cities was by its very nature an indiscriminate attempt to kill civilians. The fact that Israeli targeting was very precise did not receive adequate attention. In the end, Hezbollah captured “the media moment” and came out looking as if they had been the injured party and Israel was the villain. Hezbollah came out perceived by many, especially in the Arab world, as the clear winner, having “successfully” taken on the vaunted Israeli military and fought them to a standstill for thirty-four days. The perception of a Hezbollah victory, supported by the media, became its own reality. When we speak of media, we include governments and movements outside government structures (e.g., al Qaeda), as well as private news

Dispersing the Fog

organizations and Web sites. The dividing line between these media can become rather blurred. Private news organizations owe much of the information they receive to government sources. Therefore, to think that private media operate in a free-ranging and unbiased way is not entirely true. One can also gain an impression at times that a particular private news organization has become an agent of the government. Fox Television News in the United States can legitimately be viewed as a voice of the Republican administration. Many of its officials and talk show hosts were previously employed in Republican administrations. Owner Rupert Murdoch has cleverly parlayed support of an increasingly unpopular administration and the conservative right to gain legislation and regulatory decisions favorable to his business interests. If the private media produce negative press about the government in power, the door to media interviews can be closed and government news sources can dry up. It is necessary to tread a thin line in deciding what to report and how to report it. You might call this “consensual censorship.” It is almost a subconscious pulling of punches so as not to offend anyone and stay within a subvisible safety zone. In our book, we believe it is time to move the media out of the back row and use it as a basic front-row reference point for analysis of conflicts, specifically the Global War on Terrorism, or World War III, as we, and a growing number of people, view it. For some time, we have heard increasing references to “Fog of War,” especially after the popular abovementioned documentary by that name. But we believe that a companion piece to the Fog of War, which is of equal importance, is the Fog of Peace. While relatively little has been written about it, it has received some attention. We found several references to the Fog of Peace. One reference, in particular, caught our eye. On May 14, 2006, a lecture was given by Marc Shulman in which he states: “The Bush Administration wants to keep its efforts to combat Islamic terrorism under wraps. The European Union (EU) wants to deny that Islamic terrorism exists. Western governments are unwilling to tell their people ‘this is our enemy and this is what we’re doing about it.’” While their motivations may differ, they have this in common: a preference for a Fog of Peace. Bush wants to keep some unobservable truths hidden; the EU wants to hide some observable truths.2 As we learn in the study of group dynamics, organizations can also unknowingly generate their own fog and end up disguising the issues even from themselves. A classic example of this self-deception is contained in case studies of the decision-making process in the administration of President John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Bay of Pigs Crisis of the early 1960s. The term “groupthink” was later used to describe what occurred. A group of very bright individuals ended up making decisions that called for invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles, supported at some distance by U.S. air and sea power, with training of the exiles by U.S. operatives (e.g., Central Intelligence Agency)

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in the United States. The operation was almost doomed from the start, and when studied later, it became apparent that the Kennedy cabinet and its advisors had banded together and more or less blindly pursued what they believed the president wanted to do. There was only one person who apparently spoke up and that was the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps at the time, General Shoup. The president, almost as an afterthought, after the decisions had in effect been made, asked if anyone had any comments. General Shoup raised his hand. He then went to a chart board and drew a large circle with a small dot in the middle. The president asked what that was meant to convey. The general said, “The large circle is Cuba, the small dot is the island of Saipan in the Pacific. We lost thousands of U.S. Marines in invading that island in World War II.” He then sat down, having suggested that they might have bitten off more than they could chew. Perhaps remembering the debacle of the Bay of Pigs episode and some of the reasons for it, Henry Kissinger, as President Richard Nixon’s National Security Advisor, and later Secretary of State, reportedly had a habit of sending out memos, as devil’s advocate, which were contrary to what he believed, to stir up debate and identify soft spots in a strategy. Although the Nixon administration ended up besmirched by the Watergate scandal, it deservedly receives high marks on foreign policy. In the Vietnam War, too, we observed this “groupthink” phenomenon. It is documented in the book by David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest. He pointed out that some of the best minds of the time had been assembled, but that they ended up blinding themselves as a group to realities. Truth got swallowed up by the politics. A less generous explanation of what occurred, based on recently declassified information, is entitled “Dereliction of Duty.” Written by Colonel Ron McMaster (then a major serving on the faculty at the U.S. Military Academy), it chronicles how senior members of President Lyndon Johnson’s administration, including general/flag officers, lied to the American public and the U.S. Congress.3 What we seek to accomplish in this book is define the two fogs and place some structure around them, in order to disperse the fog. As already mentioned, the terms tend to be used rather loosely and with little, if any, definition, when they are used in the literature. One might ask why we place such heavy emphasis on these two fogs, which can appear highly abstract and illusory at best. The short answer is that both fogs can decisively change the face of what happens in a conflict, or whether the conflict occurs at all, and the outcome of the conflict. The fogs can also, as already highlighted, be used as a weapon, in providing decisive competitive advantage in a conflict. Further, purposeful distortion of information is in its ascendancy as a means of shaping reality, given the sophistication of today’s communication environment. In Chapter 1 we discussed this distortion effect and a key theorem that needs to be kept in mind constantly—The Thomas Theorem: “If people

Dispersing the Fog

perceive situations to be real, they are real in their consequences.” That axiomatic statement can also be seen in an examination of the thirty-six ancient Chinese strategies we alluded to in Chapter 1. It is, in part, making your opponents believe what you want them to believe by disguising your intentions. As explained in the case of Vietnam, it was employed by the North Vietnamese in turning a decisive military defeat into a major political and strategic victory as a result of the Tet Offensive of 1968. DEFINITIONS We define the two fogs as follows: The Fog of Peace: “In the face of a strategic threat, the Fog of Peace is all those factors that can distort reality and lead to a less than accurate view of the threat and what is needed to sustain an adequate and successful defense posture.” As the great strategic thinker Sir Basil Liddel Hart indicates, the greatest victory is the one you win without having to fire a shot. In some respects the collapse of the Soviet Union fits this mold. Dispersing the fog of peace is an essential precondition for such victories. The Fog of War: The U.S. Joint Service Command and Staff College defines “fog of war’” as “the level of ambiguity in situational awareness experienced by participants in military operations. The term seeks to capture the uncertainty regarding our own capability, adversary capability and adversary intent during an engagement, operation, or campaign.”4 We prefer a slighter broader definition. “The Fog of War includes all those dynamics that manifest themselves in an armed conflict and serve to distort the picture of what is actually occurring, ranging from the chaos and turbulence that characterize a state of war, to purposeful obfuscation by the government or terrorist movements to protect critical information,deceive the enemy, or project an image favorable to their political ends.” An example of this is the elaborate ruse carried out by the Allies in World War II to disguise the exact site of the Normandy invasion to be launched from Great Britain. The Germans were led to believe that the invasion would occur at Calais rather than at Normandy. An entire U.S. Field Army was created on paper, with the legendary General George S. Patton, Jr. to command it. The deception extended to elaborate fabrication of what looked like a large encampment and large fields of tanks and artillery pieces from the air. A high volume of telephone and message traffic emanated from this fictional field army to convey that a major force was being assembled. Diversion of German forces to Calais contributed to the successful Allied landing at Normandy. Human psychology and perceptual interpretation can cause a distortion effect and make things seem different than they are in reality. Herman A. Witkin, a widely respected researcher of cognitive styles, performed research in the 1940s with the now classic studies of “individual differences in perception of the upright in space.” In one experiment, people were placed in a

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room that was constructed in such a fashion that the floor could be gradually tilted from a horizontal plane while visual cues continued to convey that the room was at level. When asked what sensation they felt when encountering a floor that was tilted somewhat, subjects could perceive nothing to be out of order. The floor had to be significantly tilted, and the associated gravitational pull rather pronounced, before subjects would begin to distrust the visual cues.5 Human beings also have various presets, preconceptions, and governing assumptions in the way they perceive their world. Many of these date back to early childhood and adolescence. Morris J. Massey writes about “people being who they are based on, where they were, when.” In other words, people are programmed to a significant degree by what they have experienced in the past. Massey suggests that those individuals brought up with “Rock and Roll” music are going to be “rocking and rolling” into their elderly years. The phenomenal longevity of classic Rock groups from the 1960s and 1970s, as they appear before older audiences who loved them as youths, is partial evidence. There is another phenomenon worth considering. It relates to a frog and a pot of water. The boiling frog story states that a frog can be boiled alive if the water is heated slowly enough—it is said that if a frog is placed in boiling water, it will jump out, but if it is placed in cold water that is slowly heated, it will never jump out. This allegory dates back to experiments done on frogs’ nervous systems, in the 1870s. It is often used in management education. How might one relate this phenomenon to events of the day? One example would be Israel. It allowed itself to be lulled into complacency and relative inaction as the evidence of a buildup of Hezbollah forces and capabilities in South Lebanon gradually piled up over a six-year period (the pot brought to a slow boil). No single catalyzing event occurred to alarm the “frog”—until the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers in July 2006. By that time the “pot” on Israel’s northern border was above boiling point and the damage had already been done. Hezbollah had, by then, a very strong hold on Southern Lebanon, had numerous hardened and hidden sites for the launch of Katyusha rockets in place, had stockpiled armaments, mined large areas, and posed a serious threat to Israel. One cannot wait for the pot to boil if you intend to protect your interests effectively! When analysis is centered on the power of information, importance of perceptions, the distortion of truth, and manipulation of visual imagery, our perspective tends to change. One looks at the situation from a different vantage point. A good analogy is a prism. All kinds of information and media messages flow into the prism, where they are blended, refracted, and diffused, emerging as diverse light rays. If you back audit these emerging rays (call it “information” for our purposes), we may be surprised by what we find. We may easily find we have been deceived by what we saw or were told at a superficial and unprocessed level. In the age of MTV (Music Television),

Dispersing the Fog

when younger people in particular are accustomed to rapid images that change every second, sound-bite conveyance of information and news as rapid-fire images become part of the fogs of war and peace. And awareness of the superficiality of this type of information or the fact that it adds more to fog than to clarity is relatively minimal. Sometimes in management and leadership programs, or in a children’s game, this point is made another way. A circle of people is formed. A rather simple message is whispered in the ear of the first person to pass along. That person whispers the message in the ear of the next person, and so on, until the last person to receive the message openly reports it to the group. It is then compared with the message that started the process. Anyone who has been through such an exercise probably remembers that the message being reported at the end had some very fundamental differences from the initial message. It usually ends up being elaborated on in ways that do not track back to the original message. In some cases, the message can bear little resemblance to the original message. “Mom’s brownies are delicious” becomes “Tom’s frown is suspicious,” or worse. Information can of course be purposely manipulated and the timing of release calculated either to magnify the message or diminish it. One device is to hold back release of bad news until it can be masked in the media by good news. A recent term in wide use is that of “spin.” Spin, among public relations experts, is basically lying—turning bad news, for example, into something positive. If bad news cannot be disguised, it can be reinterpreted and redirected. The very willingness to accept falsehood as legitimate “spin” and public relations reflects how the role of information has changed and how fog can be purposely employed and created. On the battlefield smokescreens can hide troop movements. In the media smokescreens can convey perceptions that are desired and that differ from the underlying reality. In sum, we can no longer dismiss the importance of the use of media in analyzing conflicts—to do so misses the very heart of the story, causing us, perhaps, to end up losing a war. We are in an era of information and the ability to instantly communicate globally. Information, even more than in the past, becomes a weapon of war. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK We now turn to the model we will use to examine three case studies set in World War III—Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon II (the Israel-Hezbollah conflict). To our knowledge, this is one of the first models or frameworks to deal with the Fog of War and Fog of Peace in a disciplined and analytical way, one that can be related to actual events. It is also unique in that it lays out a stage theory for each form of fog. There are three stages in the case of the Fog of Peace (see Table 3.1) and four in the case of the Fog of War, as shown in Table 3.2. These are not discrete stages, although they usually

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Table 3.1. U.S. Involvement in World War II Fog of Peace: Tier One Stages

Event Description

Nature of Fog Effect

Implications

I

Understanding the need to respond by government leaders.

II

Mobilization of public support.

Aggression by Nazi Germany in seizing territory, and the threat from Japan.

Strong public resolve not to be drawn into another conflict outside the continental United States. Also some limited support for Germany initially. U.S. Administration in power not inclined to buck public opinion; would have meant political suicide.

Government slow to respond to threat. Only limited mobilization of resources and industrial base. U.S. military small and ill equipped and trained.

Being unprepared to meet a threat, can be a fatal flaw, especially in an age of global terrorism.

A slow awakening of public support for U.S. involvement and military action.

U.S. Administration had to tread softly because of public distaste for involvement. This created a vacuum in terms of public awareness of the true nature of the threat.

National will to respond to the threat suppressed by paucity of information and lack of government emphasis; a business as usual stance.

Public needs to be kept fully informed, but conflicting forms of information, while absolutely essential in a democracy, can also be a liability at times and cause confusion.

Little beating of war drums by government or media until outright attack by Japan.

Mobilization was constrained by lack of public support for a war effort until the country was directly attacked. Public focus had been on recovery from the Great Depression and the very high unemployment figures.

United States must be at constant high state of defense readiness. In an environment of global terrorism, you cannot let your guard down.

III The spark that Surprise attack on Pearl ignites the Harbor by the Japanese conflict. galvanized public resolve to go to war to defend U.S. interests.

Conclusions

Table 3.2. U.S. Involvement in World War II Fog of War: Tier Two Stages

Event Description

Nature of Fog Effect

Implications

Conclusions

I

Exuberance of response.

Very rapid mobilization once threat became apparent, but still took time because of relatively cold start.

Availability of information and government emphasis on war readiness rapidly climbed to fever pitch.

There is a need to keep the public accurately informed about events— a steady stream of authentic information.

You cannot afford slow start-ups in protecting your national interests. “Better late than never” can be a disastrous proposition. It can be a recipe for defeat.

II

Crescendo effect.

At peak, about 10 million Americans were in the military, and millions more were supporting the war effort in industry. The United States demonstrated the ability to produce war munitions on a grand and unprecedented scale.

There could be a plethora of information, with the government as well as the media demonizing the enemy, especially the Japanese, and demonstrating the brutality of our opponents.

News tends to favor the sensational, with little interest in what can be important background information. Contrary views could be interpreted as treasonous.

There can be great deal of fog at the time of war, including the subtle censorship of ideas and points of view. It can be a time when the rights of free speech and civil rights can become diluted, with the risk that loss of civil rights during war will then remain in effect in peace. It is a balance between national survival and sustainment of a true democracy. It is an especially worrisome issue in an age of global terror, because the threat tends to be unending. (continued)

Table 3.2. (Continued) Stages

Event Description

Nature of Fog Effect

Implications

Conclusions

III Scale down and withdrawal.

With hostilities drawing to a close, the mood of the U.S. public did a 180 degree turn. It was now a race to demobilize and bring the boys home. Any thought of maintaining guard against a Russian threat or other threats was essentially dismissed. It was a mood of euphoria.

Any message suggesting other than a rapid demobilization ended up on the “cutting room floor.” Little else could penetrate the fog.

All media sources converged on a call for rapid demobilization—all other sounds were drowned out. It brought a precipitous demobilization that left the nation unready to quickly respond to the “police action” in Korea only six years later.

There must now be an awareness of the need to keep defense readiness at a high level, because we are no longer blessed with lulls between challenges.

IV Taking stock and refining strategies.

Little inclination to continue any concentrated focus on military readiness. Beyond the professional military, there was no emphasis on keeping military capabilities current and robust. The country wanted to get back to the business of being at peace.

Any interest in debate about defense readiness fell of deaf ears. The United States, with its allies, had prevailed and the world was back to being a relatively safe place. The nation could once again withdraw behind its ocean barriers.

A climate is created that is the very antithesis of military preparedness. The fires were banked. It was back to a small peacetime military.

There is now a strong case for maintaining relatively peak readiness, without regard for the high cost. If you fail to maintain your national security posture at adequate levels, nothing else matters much. You can end up in the dust pan of history. We are in an era of “come-as-you-are” conflicts. There will no longer be time for slow ramp up of defense capabilities.

Dispersing the Fog

play out in the general order outlined. They can blend into one another, and in some cases a later stage will tend to displace an earlier stage—such as the people of a country getting ahead of their governmental leaders in recognizing a threat. We have analyzed, as an example, U.S. prosecution of World War II, with two matrices. The two matrices, one for the Fog of War and other for the Fog of Peace, together produce twenty-eight points of intersection, for analytical purposes. How can they be read and understood? For instance, the reader is asked to look at the Fog of War matrix and Stage Three on the left margin—“Scale Down and Withdrawal (Table 3.2).” Then, move right to the column labeled “Nature of the Fog Effect.” You find that at this stage of the wind-down from World War II, the primary message being heard was rapid and immediate demobilization of U.S. military forces. This was in spite of warnings that a precipitous drawdown could embolden our potential future adversary, Russia. Indeed, six years later the North Koreans invaded South Korea, with an obvious awareness that that the United States had largely dismantled its military. In the Fog of Peace framework, Tier One, the three stages involved are understanding by leaders of the need to respond, mobilization of support, and the “spark” that ignites the conflict (e.g., sinking of the Battleship Maine in the Spanish-American War). In the Fog of War framework, Tier Two involves four stages: the exuberance of response, the “crescendo” effect (amplification and widening of the conflict), scaling down, and “taking stock.” Each stage has its own “fog” effect, implications, and conclusions. This simple framework, we hope, helps bring order to our thinking and assists in dispersing the thick fog that often surrounds global conflicts—fog that is made even thicker by the often-emotional responses that are generated by media coverage. We now proceed to apply our Fog of Peace and Fog of War matrices to deepen our understanding progressively of three crucial World War III battlegrounds: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon. In Chapters 4, 5, and 6 respectively, we discuss these three vital areas of conflict in turn.

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The War in Afghanistan: Case Study Look closely at a topographical map of the Tora Bora area of Afghanistan. It is literally eye-opening, in important ways. Most immediately, it demonstrates the extreme ruggedness of the country. The contour lines on the map are almost superimposed on each other in many areas. It is straight up-and-down country, with jagged ridges and deep ravines. For a ground force on the attack, it can be a nightmare. For the defender it can be a godsend. Writing for the Boston Globe, Charles M. Sennott says this about the mountainous territory along the Pakistani border in Eastern Pakistan: To call these mountains . . . impenetrable or inhospitable would be an understatement. This is some of the most brutal and deadly terrain on earth. It is a mountainous barrier of jagged rock that reaches altitudes of 5,500 meters, or 18,000 feet. To navigate it, a person needs at least a good donkey, a local guide and a lot of time. Here, the most technologically advanced military in the world is reduced to resupplying troops by donkeys. The skeletal remains of past empires—the hulking frames of Soviet-era tanks and helicopters, as well as the crumbled stone foundations of old British colonial outposts—still dot the landscape.1

We note that mountains that reach 18,000 feet in elevation are significantly higher than the highest peak in the U.S. Rocky Mountains, Mount Elbert (14,433 ft/4399 m).

The War in Afghanistan

Couple these land features with deep natural and man-made caves, some of them used by the Mujahideen in the war against the Soviet military, and later improved on by the Taliban and al Qaeda, and the task of dislodging a defending force is made even more difficult. It is not surprising that the Taliban and al Qaeda forces were able to withstand heavy air attacks, and even bunker-busting bombs in some cases. Nor is it surprising that bin Laden of al Qaeda and Mullah Omar of the Taliban, and some of their surviving followers, were able to melt away and cross the border into neighboring Pakistan, escaping along trails and through tunnels that were well masked from the air. The second thing one gains from reviewing that topographical map of Tora Bora is more symbolic. It provides a metaphor in terms of the very different type of war we are now fighting. It is, for example, extremely varied and unpredictable topography, with many steep and slippery slopes, and ragged and treacherous ridges. It is “terrain” not to be navigated without great difficulty and endurance. Prime Minister Tony Blair of England summed it up this way in a speech to members of his Labor Party in England on September 26, 2006. He said in effect that we must understand that we are in a long-term conflict, one that is unlikely to be won or brought to resolution for at least a generation.2 The long-term nature of this conflict is much better accommodated in the East than the West. China and Japan, for example, have longer term mind sets. Cultural studies (to be discussed later in this chapter) suggest that Americans have a relatively short-term orientation. When you examine the cultural make up that can be ascribed to the Islamic world, “Orthodox Muslims take their bearings from the past, not the future” (Commentary in an e-mail to Dilworth from Geert Hofstede on May 2, 2008). As we examine past wars in which the United States has become engaged, we observe that the people of the United States tend to tire rather quickly of wars. For that matter, most of the world’s peoples find wars taxing and undesirable. Since the Vietnam War, which lasted longer (1960 to 1975) than Americans comfortably accept, and was ultimately characterized as a “quagmire,” the American people have become gun-shy of any protracted international conflict. That also seems to relate to an inherent and ingrained tendency, throughout U.S. history, to take an isolationist stance. This isolationist tendency now clashes with the realities of globalization and the nature of the new type of warfare that we are engaged in, a war that can flare up anywhere, at any time, in the form of terrorist attacks. Global terrorism is the trademark of World War III. For the American, “quick in and out” is the approach they prefer in armed conflicts. The 100-hour First Gulf War, in terms of the ground campaign, was made to order. However, that is the type of time line that is today and will remain in the future highly uncommon. Warfare will now take the form of long strings of events over time that tend to be widely diffused, while

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at the same time probably having some concentration in the Middle East and Central Asia. The Israeli’s, in the habit of thinking in terms of short, even six-day wars, ended up confounded by the tenacity and capabilities of the Hezbollah in 2006. For Hezbollah, victory was not outright winning but simply staying in the ring for thirty-four days. This foretells war that is fought largely with unconventional weapons, in unconventional ways, and under unconventional circumstances. If nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons enter the picture, as simple probability says they will, the dangers become substantially elevated. We can learn a great deal from the conflict in Afghanistan about how to act and how not to act in the global war on terror that we call World War III. “Events in Afghanistan dramatize vividly the differences between our Cold War strategy, which focused on one adversarial super power, and the need today to develop a multifaceted strategy that addresses U.S. concerns and interests in a much more complicated and uncertain world” (Adjusting Our National Security Strategy, A Case Study in Triumphs and Tragedies of the Modern Presidency, Dwight Ink, 2002). BACKGROUND Despite its centrality and strategic importance as a crossroads, Afghanistan has not gained much world attention. Afghanistan stands at the center of Central, West, and South Asia. A Web site on the history of Afghanistan states, that “over the centuries, waves of migrating peoples passed through the region described by Arnold Toynbee as a roundabout of the ancient world, leaving a mosaic of ethnic and linguistic groups.”3 One can understand why it is viewed as a crossroads from the fact that Afghanistan shares its border with six other countries (border length in brackets): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Pakistan (2,430 km) Tajikistan (1,206 km) Iran (936 km) Turkmenistan (744 km) Ubekistan (137 km) China (76 km)

From the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December of 1979 until President Mikhail Gorbachev (the last president of the Soviet Union) announced withdrawal of his military forces in 1988, Afghanistan did gain some attention on the world stage. Full withdrawal of Soviet forces was completed in February of 1989. The Soviet Union had used 30,000 troops for the initial invasion. That force ultimately grew to 100,000. The Soviet forces exited

The War in Afghanistan

with 15,000 of their troops having been killed in action and another 37,000 wounded. The Afghans paid a much heavier price, with one million dead and five million who became refugees in neighboring countries. The defeat of the Soviet forces can be attributed to a coalition of tribes, called the Mujahideen (derived from a Persian word that means “warriors”) that came together to fight them, with external and somewhat surreptitious help from the United States, Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, and others. At no point were the Soviet forces able to control more than 20 percent of the country. There is a lesson here. Size of force alone doesn’t necessarily spell ability to control a given area or achieve favorable results. Afghanistan is also not a small area. It is just slightly smaller than Texas, and much larger than Iraq in land area, with 647,500 sq km or 250,000 sq mi. Texas, in contrast, is 261,000 sq mi in area. When the Soviet military forces left, Afghanistan again went to the back pages of the newspapers, even though a conflict against the communistinstalled government continued to rage until April of 1992, when the Mujahideen liberated the capital of Kabul. Afghanistan continued to stay out of the headlines as the next chapter unfolded. Tribes that had banded together to expel a common enemy now began to rediscover their own long-standing differences. A civil war ensued and the Taliban prevailed. From 1996 until 2001, when toppled by the United States and coalition forces, Mullah Omar and the Taliban ran the country. The Taliban had been helped to gain power by bin Laden and the support and money of al Qaeda. In return for this loose alliance, al Qaeda had sanctuary, including training camps for terrorists. At the peak of its influence, the Taliban had gained control of 80 percent of the country. Matters changed dramatically with the attacks on the United States that occurred on September 11, 2001. Bin Laden initially disclaimed any involvement in the attacks, but the evidence quickly piled up proving al Qaeda’s central role. Bin Laden then not only claimed responsibility but flaunted al Qaeda involvement. In September 2006, a videotape surfaced that showed at least two of the attackers on 9/11 at a conference, with bin Laden and other members of the al Qaeda leadership, in 2000. Afghanistan once again came out of the shadows and leaped into the international spotlight. When negotiations with the Taliban to turn over to America al Qaeda terrorists, along with other ultimatums, went unanswered, military action against Afghanistan commenced. The forward cutting edge of that action was infiltration of Special Forces teams to line up support for the forthcoming actions and also lay the groundwork for spotting targets for air attack. Once the air attacks were unleashed on October 11, 2001, one month after 9/11, the Special Forces on the ground played a key role in directing the bombs to the most lucrative targets for disrupting and defeating the Taliban. The employment of Special Forces was extremely sophisticated, robust, and audacious. It was also, by almost any measure, highly

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successful. Linda Robinson’s book, Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces (2004)4 includes extensive coverage of their deployment in Afghanistan and Iraq. The war in Afghanistan has propelled Special Operations Forces to a position of key importance. Michael R. Melillo, writing in “Parameters,” a publication of the U.S. Army War College (Autumn 2006) addresses “Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities.” He says, in part U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) have proven their tremendous utility in prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism. Assigned to lead in planning, synchronizing, and, when directed, executing operations against al Qaeda and its associated terrorist network, U.S. Special Operations Command is no longer considered a force provider to the combatant commanders and has emerged as a key player in combating irregular threats. Colin Gray describes SOF as “entering a golden era” in a world dominated more by irregular than conventional warfare.5

As hostilities began in Afghanistan, forces on the ground were anchored by the Northern Alliance, forces that the efforts of the Special Forces had helped to bring together and solidify. The first external waves related to the ground assault were exclusively U.S. and British, followed closely thereafter by fellow NATO members and other countries. The U.S. military name for the conflict is Enduring Freedom, which remains in effect today. Thirteen of the nineteen countries participating provided Special Operations Forcesrelated assets. Fighting in small teams, Special Forces operators are very highly trained and skilled. They are clearly a force multiplier. They have made a key difference in both Afghanistan and in Iraq. On November 19, 2001, the Taliban fled from the capital city of Kabul, a little over a month after the aerial bombing campaign had commenced. Defenses then began to crumble rapidly across the country. Al Qaeda and Taliban forces began to concentrate about 2,000 of their forces in the Tora Bora cave complex, on the Pakistani border 30 miles southwest of Jalalabad. After extensive fighting, an unknown number of survivors slipped across the border into Pakistan, Mullah Omar and bin Laden among them. Thomas L. Friedman, in his book, Longitudes and Attitudes: The World in an Age of Terrorism (2003), describes the capital of Kabul on January 13, 2003: It is impossible to exaggerate how broken the place is. You know what Ground Zero looks like, where the World Trade Center once stood. Well, probably half of Kabul looks the same way, thanks to twenty-two years of civil war. And the “good” half—with its scanty electricity, no phones, no mail, 10:00 p.m. curfew, and only a bare minimum of food–looks like a caravan ghost town. We might as well do nation building on the moon.

The War in Afghanistan

The protracted nature of the global war on terrorism can be seen in what happened next. First, Afghanistan once again slipped down the flagpole of world interest, much as what occurred after the Soviet defeat. It also began to slip off the U.S. national agenda in terms of military forces and resources devoted to that nation’s stability and development. That fading effect became more pronounced when the war in Iraq commenced and began to draw heavily on U.S. resources, including military forces. Ahmed Rashid, writing for the International Herald Tribune on October 12, 2006, states that “even in Kabul, there is less electricity today than there was under the communists in the 1980s.” That does not suggest a great deal of progress being made. Rashid goes on to say that “since 2001, the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan has failed to deploy enough peacekeeping troops, resources and reconstruction aid.” That shortfall continues. U.S. forces are now complemented by a NATO force that has taken over operational security for the entire country. The combined force level is spread thinly, having to cover a vast expanse of territory until a viable Afghan military can begin carrying a significant load. In the meantime, the Taliban has shown a strong resurgence and is proving much more tenacious than had been anticipated. There seems to be a recognition that the NATO force level in Afghanistan must be significantly augmented, but NATO countries have been slow in meeting their existing commitments and agreeing to send more forces. This resurgence of the Taliban was predictable, since the counterpressure by the United States, its NATO partners, the rather small and underdeveloped central army of Afghanistan, and local tribal support, has been insufficient to adequately contain the insurgency. Another factor also plays a role in the capabilities of the force that can be applied to military missions. All but about half a dozen participating NATO countries have established restrictions on the use of their forces. Some cannot be used at night, others are not allowed to operate in areas of Afghanistan where casualties might be incurred. The restrictions are apparently quite extensive. USA Today reported that “German troops do not go on extended patrols and do not respond to local security events.”6 It can lead one to ask, “Why even have them there?” This kind of restrictions make it extremely difficult for the overall commander to effectively orchestrate use of such forces. It is not the way to win against an enemy unfettered by such restrictions. They lend themselves to satire—“our Army will fight only in daylight, on alternate Tuesdays, if it is not raining, and only provided there is no risk of casualties, and only if the temperature exceeds 20 degrees C. but is below 30 degrees C.” They also mean that the U.S., Canadian, and the few other forces operating without limitations end up with many of the tougher missions. So where are we in Afghanistan? Is defeat being snatched from the jaws of victory? Is there a chance of success trickling through our fingers? The short answer is that the situation is far from lost, but there are pluses and minuses to consider, and only time will tell. In terms of time, it will hinge

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on the ability to stay the course, rapidly adapt to the situation, learn faster than our opponents, and get progressively better at prosecuting such a war, including effective use of the media and winning “hearts and minds.” The Afghan—Pakistan border, especially the area south of Kandahar, is a key area of strength for the Taliban. Osama bin Laden is believed to be in the North Waziristan region of Pakistan or somewhere in Afghanistan along the border. This is the area where the al Qaeda forces originated. They are largely protected there and can launch attacks almost at will, retreating to their sanctuaries to reconstitute their forces before renewing their incursions into Afghanistan. This is reminiscent of the Vietnam conflict. In the Tri-Border area where Vietnam meets Cambodia and Laos, the North Vietnamese would attack in force and then scamper back across the border. They couldn’t be touched until later, when U.S. forces were given a shortterm go-ahead to officially engage in hot pursuit and other operations across the Cambodian border. It was an open secret that U.S. Army Green Berets and other special forces personnel were conducting some missions across the border in both Cambodia and Laos to disrupt North Vietnamese operations, but they were a drop in the bucket. The same thing happened during the Korean War, with North Korean MIG fighters, some flown by Russian pilots flying out of Manchuria, attacking our forces and then scooting back across the Yalu River. Their airfields were so close that UN Forces, when operating near the Yalu River, could watch the planes preparing to take off. But our forces were not allowed to touch them for fear of triggering an even broader conflict. For a good part of the Vietnam War, the North Vietnamese used the Ho Chi Minh trail, barely over the border in Laos and Cambodia, to do their main resupply, but the U.S. Air Force was not allowed to disrupt these enemy movements. It could not get within a few hundred yards of the traffic flow the way the restrictions were written. The North Vietnamese knew the stated rules and simply stayed out of reach. U.S. forces cannot routinely cross into Pakistan to launch military operations. The United States has launched some pinpoint strikes against highvalue targets, such as Taliban leaders, using unmanned Predator aircraft. Without pressure from the Pakistani government to suppress the Taliban on their side of the border, the Taliban and their al Qaeda associates will be able to continue to operate with relative impunity, indefinitely, even gaining strength in the process. The resolve by the Pakistani government to operate against the Taliban on their side of the border seems rather spotty at best. President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan announced in September 2006 that he was withdrawing most of his forces from the disputed area, stating that he had entered into agreements with local tribal leaders to take on the security responsibilities. This is much like putting the fox in charge of the henhouse, or the cat in charge of the cream, because these tribal leaders feel no great affiliation with the central government and are considered quite sympathetic to the Taliban cause.

The War in Afghanistan

Under the new regime in Pakistan, the same folly is now being repeated. Agreements have been struck not to attack these sanctuaries, with the Taliban in those areas in Western Pakistan promising not to pose a threat to the security and stability of Pakistan. It is a case of bargaining from weakness rather than from strength, and a quid pro quo is no more likely to be realized now than in the past. Further, the U.S. Ambassador in Pakistan has resisted efforts to launch additional strikes by Predator missiles flying out of Afghanistan. She fears that this would only add to the precariousness of the situation. This all occurs against a backdrop of perceived meddling by the United States in the internal affairs of Pakistan. Anti-American sentiment runs extremely high, limiting U.S. flexibility. When a U.S. Army major general received assignment instructions to Pakistan in May 2008, it triggered a strong reaction from the government of Pakistan and even led to some street demonstrations. He was a former commander of the prison facility at Quantanamo Bay, Cuba. This was enough in the Pakistani view to disqualify him. His nomination for the post was quietly withdrawn. Before gaining power in 2008 as a part of a coalition government in Pakistan, Zardari, the widower of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who was assassinated, accused the Musharraf government of “playing a double game.” As leader of an opposition party, Zardari said: “We feel the government is running with the hares and hunting with the hounds.” It would appear that Zardari and the new government have picked up the same double standard, although with a somewhat different twist. The government is running with the hares as the hounds are left to hunt at will. There seems little pretense on the part of the government that they will move to try and control territory held by insurgent elements. They have essentially abdicated that role. It seems little different from the situation in Lebanon, where the government pretty much allows Hezbollah the right to call its own tune. Zardari is today working actively within the government coalition to remove President Musharraf. The government coalition wants to restore High Court judges Musharraf fired in 2007 and seeks a constitutional amendment to curb Musharraf’s powers. This internal fight greatly weakens Pakistan’s ability to act against the Taliban in Waziristan. Ahmed Rashid, in his October 12, 2006 article says this: Although NATO forces have killed hundreds of Taliban, there is no quick end to the insurgency in sight as the Taliban move skillfully from mass frontal assaults on NATO positions to one man suicide attacks in Afghan cities.7

He also said, hitting a major continuing issue: NATO has to play a diplomatic role in convincing Pakistan to stop pursuing a dual track policy of supporting the war on terrorism when it comes to capturing al Qaeda leaders, but declining to do the same thing when it comes to the Taliban. Washington has tolerated this dichotomy for the past five

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Fogs of War and Peace years because it placed little importance on restraining the Taliban, but NATO cannot afford to do the same.

General James Jones, former NATO Supreme Commander, appeared before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on September 21, 2006. He stated that the Taliban have their headquarters in Quetta, Pakistan. The Taliban presence in Pakistan is really not well hidden. If the government of Pakistan is unwilling to go in and clean out this hornet’s nest of Taliban and al Qaeda, then NATO may need to take unilateral action, but it would carry with it great risks, especially now, given the current political instability in Pakistan. Any such action must take into account avoiding a level of turmoil in Pakistan that could place the security of its nuclear weapons at risk. Another issue is whether the NATO countries involved in Afghanistan would be willing to make such a bold move, given its unpredictable outcomes. If it were to become solely a U.S. operation, American influence in the region could be even further reduced, even though at near rock bottom already. The fact remains that until the presence of Taliban and al Qaeda fighters operating out of Pakistan is neutralized, the United States and NATO cannot be expected to make any lasting headway. On the plus side of the equation, Afghanistan is in the process of building the necessary infrastructure, after years of war and widespread destruction. According to the CIA Fact Book (February 2008), Afghanistan achieved real GDP growth of 7 percent in 2007 (partly, it is true, owing to a bumper crop of opium poppies; Afghanistan is by far the world’s largest producer of heroin; see below). While agriculture continues to be the largest sector of the economy (38%), the industrial sector (24%) is now showing expansion, expanding especially in more built-up and heavily populated areas. The service sector represents 38 percent of the economy. Eighty percent of the population works in agriculture. More children are now in school and more women and girls now have opportunities not permitted under the harsh regime of the Taliban. Of the more than five million who fled wars in the country, three million have now been repatriated, the largest repatriation in the world in the past thirty years. They are obviously “voting with their feet,” feeling some optimism about the future and stability of their country. The national debt problem has been largely forgiven or otherwise resolved, allowing the World Bank to make significant loans to Afghanistan to help with development of its infrastructure. Eight of every 100 Afghans now have cell phones, but landlines are extremely limited. One can take the growing use of wireless communications as a move toward adopting technology, until one considers that there are only about 600,000 cell phones (2004) and 100,000 main lines (2005) for a country of 31 million people.8 The negative side of the ledger for Afghanistan contains a number of entries. First and foremost, it is an extremely poor country, with a per

The War in Afghanistan

capita GDP of $800 (2007 est.), far less than Iraq. Health care is largely nonexistent. The following quote was found on the official Afghanistan Web site in September 2006: “If you are blind or crippled, no one can help you because those who are not blind and crippled need help as well.” The life expectancy in the country is only 43.34 years, about the same for men and women. By comparison, people live an average of 26 years longer in Iraq. There are inadequate supplies of potable water, and that contributes to disease. The unemployment rate is 40 percent. A closer look reveals that as much as one-third of the GDP comes from sale of opium. Fully 80 percent of the opium that finds its way to the European markets comes from Afghanistan. This amounts to $3 billion of illicit economic activity. (Some 90 per cent of all heroin sold in the UK originates in Afghanistan.) Efforts to reduce the amount of poppies grown in the country have not been effective. The cultivation of poppies and associated opium trade is expanding. The overall literacy rate is about 36 percent, with 51 percent of the men and 21 percent of the women literate, attesting to the more limited opportunities that have been afforded to women. In terms of age structure, 44.6 percent of the population is 14 years old or younger. The median age of the overall population is 17.6 years. The relative youthfulness of the population, stemming from a high birth rate, is both a problem and opportunity. It creates “drag” owing to high dependency ratios (ratio of those who work to those who do not), but if this youthful segment is given opportunities for education and acquisition of skills, it can help fuel the future economy. We see this phenomenon in Ireland. Afghanistan is an Islamic Republic. Eighty percent are Sunni Muslim and 19 percent Shi’a Muslim. It is the reverse in Iraq, where Shi’a Muslims are in the majority. If you read Afghanistan’s 2004 Constitution, there are many things that imply respect for human rights. There are also some articles that seem to collide with human rights and would never have been included in the U.S. Constitution, with its emphasis on separation of church and state. Article 2 (1) [Religion] says: “The religion in the State of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is the sacred religion of Islam.” In Article 2 (2) that follows, it says, “Followers of other religions are free to exercise their faith and perform their religious rites within the limits of the provisions of the law.” However, Article 3 [Law and Religion] seems to say, “yes, but.” This article reads, “In Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of Islam.” In fact, there was a case in 2006 in Afghanistan involving persecution of a Christian, and it could have led to his execution. Under very strong international pressure, the Afghan government sidestepped the issue by exonerating the person on a legal technicality. This book calls attention to the Fogs of War and Peace. Awareness of issues specific to Afghanistan has often been masked by the indifference of the West, lack of accurate media attention, and the distortion effect of a media that reports only “sound bites,” as opposed to in-depth reporting.

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But before being unduly harsh with the media, it also is apparent that the American public has no real thirst for in-depth reporting about places that they feel utterly no connection with. Therefore, the media make the obvious business decision of reporting news that brings high audience ratings and generates advertising dollars (e.g., the court trial of a prominent celebrity). The term quiet corner has relevance to the situation in Afghanistan. A quiet corner is a place barely touched by our consciousness. It is buried deep in the fog. If we are going to win the war on global terrorism, we must pull these topics out of the quiet corners for public consideration and address them. Afghanistan is one quiet corner that must be brought forward in public thinking. The comprehensive nature of the war on terrorism in general is another. In a nutshell, the United States and other countries in the West need to wake up and understand the serious nature of the threat facing them so that they can support the necessary preparedness and response. Once every four years, the United States Defense Department publishes what is called the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).9 The QDR is charged with looking twenty years ahead to determine military strategy and capabilities necessary to prepare the United States for the threats it could face in the future. The last iteration of the QDR was released in 2006. Appearing before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Kerpinevich, U.S. Army (Retired), Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, made the following statement. It can be considered a wonderful encapsulation of the war now being waged: As with most insurgencies victory rests less in the military than in successful treatment of political, economic, and social ills in winning the war of ideas.

NATO has experienced roughly twice the rate of casualties the United States had experienced since assuming the security mission for Afghanistan. This is already causing ripples in those countries contributing to the NATO force. How long will those countries remain steadfast in supporting this important mission, and will they be willing to even sustain their existing contribution? There is a tendency to “dumb down” the challenges in Afghanistan, oversimplifying the formula for bringing lasting stability to the country. It is much more of a challenge than defeating the Taliban. As the Economist magazine reports in its February 2–8, 2008 issue (In the Dark: Afghanistan’s Tribal Complexity), “The war in Afghanistan is not against a monolithic Taliban movement. In much of the country, it is entwined with older struggles rooted in tribalism.” The same article outlines the complexity of the tribalism, with sixty Pushtun tribes and 400 subtribes, “many at odds with one another.” When we cover the war in Iraq in the next chapter, the same tribal phenomenon applies. It is more than sorting out the Sunni, Shia’, and Kurds. Every city, neighborhood, and enclave is somewhat different. The situation is dynamic and you must deal with a variety of factors.

The War in Afghanistan

CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE Those who study culture, or have been immersed in other cultures, know that they can differ in important ways. There can be fundamental differences in outlook across cultures. Language is intertwined with culture. Some have referred to it as a “carrier of culture.” But even when the language is essentially the same, there can be dialectical differences that influence culture, as any American who has spent extensive time in England or Australia will attest. Geert Hofstede, the famous Dutch researcher, has done in-depth research for many years on culture. His research initially involved the administration of over 116,000 survey instruments in fifty countries. It focused on employees in just one company, IBM. Hofstede’s original work for IBM was focused on determining why its corporate rules and processes were accepted differently in different countries. It led Hofstede to identify four empirically derived dimensions of culture (and later a fifth) against which all cultures could be measured. They are referred to as empirically and quantitatively derived because the research led to them.10 Here are the five cultural dimensions (The Fifth Dimension was developed subsequent to the original study of IBM). The description of the dimensions provided below will also carry forward into the case studies in Chapters 5 and 6. THE FIVE CULTURAL DIMENSIONS Power Distance. This shows the degree of hierarchy, the distance between those in authority and followers. The power distance in the United States is small (i.e., organizational hierarchies are rather “flat”)—a short distance between leaders and followers. Israel has an even lower power distance. Malaysia, on the other hand, has the largest power distance in the world in terms of hierarchy. Individualism versus Collectivism. The United States is ranked first of the fifty countries in terms of being most individualistic in Hofstede’s research. Least individualistic (most collectivistic) is Guatemala. For comparison purposes, Israel falls between individualism and collectivism, with a slight skew toward collectivism. Israelis are both highly individualistic and highly group oriented. The two elements, in some societies, are not incompatible or orthogonal. Such is the case here. Uncertainty Avoidance. This considers the extent to which people prefer unstructured, ambiguous, or unpredictable situations or instead would rather have rules, regulations, and controls. The United States ranks quite low, signifying preference for loose rather than highly structured transactions. Singapore demonstrates the least uncertainty avoidance. Israel is high in this cultural characteristic. Japan, France, and Russia are ranked high as well in uncertainty avoidance. They prefer to avoid ambiguity and its attendant anxiety and prefer a higher level of structure in their lives and their work.

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Masculinity versus Femininity (translated as achievement versus a quality of life orientation). Of the original fifty countries (IBM Study), Japan ranks highest in terms of masculinity/achievement orientation. Sweden ranks as the most feminine/quality of life oriented society. The United States is also ranked rather high in masculinity/achievement orientation. Israel ranks squarely in the middle, with relative equality between relationship and quality of life orientations. Long-Term versus Short-Term Orientation. This cultural dimension resulted from research subsequent to the initial IBM study. Hofstede refers to it as the Fifth Dimension, and the number of countries included in this survey was smaller than the first study. In terms of a long-term orientation, China is ahead of all others, closely followed by Japan. The United States is rather low. Germany falls near the center. APPLICATION OF CULTURAL INDICES TO AFGHANISTAN Because Afghanistan has been off the world’s radar screen, to a large extent, it does not surface specifically in the data of any of the cultural studies that have been conducted. Iraq is not visible either. Countries like Israel, Iran, and the Arab countries do appear in Hofstede’s original study. Some of the data, as of Arab countries, can provide some approximations of Afghan culture. We used as a supplementary source a leading international expert on cultural studies, Dr. John Bing, founder of ITAP International, an organization with several branch offices around the world. Bing has worked with many corporations on cultural studies and in preparing corporate executives to enter other cultures. He has also worked very closely with Geert Hofstede. Bing spent three and one half years in Afghanistan living with the people in various parts of the country, when he was with the U.S. Peace Corps. He went back later for a shorter period and speaks Farsi. He continues to follow developments in Afghanistan and maintain contacts. Based on discussions with John Bing and review of all available data, here is the cultural profile that was arrived at for Afghanistan: Individualism versus Collectivism: Collectivistic (John Bing indicates that it is an extremely collectivistic society. You can see that in the centrality of kinship groups). Power Distance: High Power Distance (Very Hierarchical). Uncertainty Avoidance: High Uncertainty Avoidance. Uncertainty creates anxiety, and there are coping mechanisms in human society to deal with it, one of them being religion. In Afghanistan and other Muslim countries, the strong orientation toward the Islamic faith creates structure and discipline that helps offset the uncertain environment. As we point out statistically in Chapter 7, in examining differing belief systems, allegiance to the Islamic faith can trump any sense of national allegiance (e.g., Muslims living in Great Britain place their faith way above British citizenship).

The War in Afghanistan

Masculinity versus Femininity: High Masculinity/Achievement Orientation (Relates to the role of fathers). Long-Term versus Short-Term: Moderately Long-Term Outlook. This is an educated guess. Here are a few additional aspects of the culture in Afghanistan. It is first and foremost an Islamic country, and religion plays a very large role in the way things are done and the way the country is governed. Bing tells a story that underscores the importance of kinship groups and the power of collectivism. One member of a group he was dealing with needed a very large sum of money and one of the other group members stepped forward and “loaned” it to him. A short time later, another member of the group needed money. The individual who had received the earlier loan, stepped forward and gave him the money, probably obviating his ability to pay back the earlier loan he had received. All was well with the group. There was no problem. Group needs had been met. That was what was culturally important. If members of one tribe, or indeed any stranger, need to transit the territory of another, safe passage is, in the absence of open hostility, almost always given. This is an ancient code known as “Pushtunwali,” a variant of traditions of hospitality that run through the Islamic and Arab world back to biblical times, and captured in this quote from the Koran: “Abraham’s nephew Lot [Lut in the Quran] rises to greet the messengers and urges them to stay in his home. When the men of Sodom riot outside his house, demanding that the strangers be delivered into their hands, Lot opposes them. ‘Guard against (the punishment) of Allah,’ he urges them, ‘and do not disgrace me with regard to my guests; is there not among you one right-minded man?’ ” A member of a four-man Navy SEAL team, who survived intense attacks by the Taliban in a mountainous area of Afghanistan near the Pakistani border, sought safe passage from some local tribal leaders who found him (See the book Lone Survivor, by Luttrell, 2007).11 Under the code of Pushtunwali, they defended him from the Taliban, including direct confrontations with them, to give him sanctuary. They did this at some risk to themselves and were instrumental in assisting in his rescue by U.S. Army Rangers. The tradition of hospitality is particularly strong in areas that are still more subject to traditional values, including the eastern part of Afghanistan along the Pakistan border, and this code has equal force across the border in Pakistan. In some other areas of the country, such as Kabul and other urbanized areas, Bing indicates that such mores, including this code, are slowly losing their force as economic development begins to gain momentum. Many changes are taking place in Afghanistan. But for the area the Taliban and al Qaeda use as their operational bases across the border in Pakistan, the ancient code related to safe passage and safe haven continues to make safe the security of their sanctuary. We now offer the Fog of Peace and Fog of War matrices for the case of Afghanistan. (See tables 4.1 and 4.2.)

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Table 4.1. Fog of Peace (Afghanistan Related) Stages

Event Description

Nature of Fog Effect

Implications

Conclusions

I

Understanding need to respond by government leaders.

Increased reports of al Qaeda connection to terrorist activity, including the first attack on the World Trade Center. Focus turns to Afghanistan, as training ground and sanctuary for al-Qaeda.

Afghanistan out of the world spotlight. Slow appreciation for extent of the threat. Little understanding of Afghanistan or that region of the world by the United States. It was in its “zone of indifference” a “quiet corner” of media and public attention.

Problem was allowing the Failure to bring Afghanistan into threat to grow unchecked focus was a near fatal flaw. and not mobilizing public awareness.

II

Mobilization of public support.

A slow awakening of public support, but with superficial knowledge. Never much front-page coverage.

Public dependent on government for updates. Media gives almost no attention to Afghanistan. Public essentially blank on significance of Afghanistan and the issues.

Public in effect trusted their public officials to deal with it. Very little public awareness or knowledge.

Public “flying blind” in terms of Afghanistan and “tuned out” on the issues.

III The spark that The al Qaeda attacks ignites the on the United States conflict. bring a prompt reaction from the government, as al Qaeda involvement is quickly confirmed. A military response is prepared.

Commentary by the government is centered on issues related to response, which is customary in such situations. Media does pick up some background concerning Afghanistan, but not in any great depth, thus a “teachable moment” is largely lost. Public knowledge of Afghanistan remains extremely limited, as it does for the region.

The public remains blind to Afghanistan, whereas there was an opportunity to deepen knowledge, but you end up trying to counter a deeply engrained disinterest in things “foreign.” The interconnectedness in the age of globalization is not yet uniformly appreciated in the U.S. society.

The American public has little interest in other countries. This is an engrained ethnocentrism. The American school systems gave more emphasis to other countries and cultures that could change over time. The aversion to things foreign is ironic in a culture that has always been multicultural, and is now becoming ever more so. The need to understand other cultures is not a nice feature to have in a society today, although it can enrich lives, but rather a necessity in living in an exciting and challenging world.

Table 4.2. Fog of War (Afghanistan Related) Stages I

Event Description

Exuberance Very rapid buildup to of war. Government response. energized and focused. Much media commentary leading to onset of hostilities. Public totally behind the war.

II Crescendo effect.

Aside from the employment of Special Operations Forces prior to the official start of hostilities, the toppling of the Taliban regime took less than a month, and with a rather low number of U.S. troops on the ground.

Nature of Fog Effect

Implications

Conclusions

While Afghanistan hit page one following the military buildup to the war and news on the diplomatic front, there was not a great deal of reporting on the country and its place on the world stage. As highlighted elsewhere, this is characteristic of the U.S. culture. News about other countries is preferred in small bite-size quantities, and sparing of details. The United States is a sound-bite, instant messaging and Blog society.

The military-related actions received attention, but little else. Therefore deeper issues got very little address, and general knowledge of the country was not enhanced.

The military operations as reported by the media and the government were transparent, aside from protecting National Security Information. However, the public learned little about the country or its people.

There was much news coverage of the war, centered on military operations. As stated before, and it was again true in this case, there was little discussion of the country or its culture. Once the Taliban had been removed from power, aside from the interest in finding Bin Laden, focus on Afghanistan faded quickly.

Interest in Afghanistan was Afghanistan continues extremely fleeting. People went back to reside in America’s to be concerned with other things. zone of indifference. Interest dropped like a rock when the hostilities ended, thus following the earlier patterns on Afghanistan, such as the Soviet invasion. In fact, it obviously is a dynamic that extends well beyond Afghanistan. It is a deafness of the U.S. public to what is occurring in other lands.

III Scale down The truth has it that the forces sent into and Afghanistan to begin with were probably withdrawal. “scaled back” below what they needed to be. That seems increasingly true given the Taliban resurgence. However, Afghanistan has essentially been capped in terms of what can be realistically sent there by U.S. military forces, especially the Army and Marines. They are stretched thin by commitments in Iraq and elsewhere. Therefore, the Unites States is boxed into a corner. NATO forces and other non-U.S. assets are unlikely to do the job adequately in securing the country, but there is simply nothing left in the military “cupboard” to significantly change the U.S. military presence in that country. That stands against a sense that Afghanistan may well be the more important piece on the chessboard in the war on global terrorism. There of course has been no substantial withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, nor does it seem possible any time soon.

Most news is concentrated on Iraq. The U.S. administration, if anything, wants to damper any suggestion that a higher troop level is needed in Afghanistan. Higher troop levels overseas are not good politics. In the meantime, Afghanistan is back in the “fog,” largely subvisible.

Afghanistan is in a deadlock situation. The U.S. administration doesn’t really want any questions raised concerning “what should have been.” Therefore, Afghanistan is relegated to relative obscurity, except for occasional media coverage.

Unless something really shattering occurs, the fog will remain intact.

(Continued)

Table 4.2. (Continued) Stages

Event Description

Nature of Fog Effect

Implications

Conclusions

IV Taking stock and refining strategies.

As of September 2006, strategy has shifted to using a NATO-led force for operational security in various areas, and that is expected to grow. The question is whether the force level will be adequate. There have been signs that it is not. Further, there are issues around how effective it can be, given restrictions governing use of such forces by most of the nations in line to contribute forces. There is the question of how long the NATO force can hold together and stay in place. Will there be a will to support this requirement in long term?

Afghanistan continues to be viewed in a low-key way. As indicated, the U.S. government appears to want it that way. Further, the media seem satisfied to leave it there.

Afghanistan is not in the limelight, nor is it expected to move back near center stage unless new events move it there.

Afghanistan is in limbo, gridlock, with rather tepid interest in it.

The War in Afghanistan

INTERPRETIVE NARRATIVE: FOG OF PEACE The matrix contents are largely self-explanatory. In terms of “fog effect,” it can be seen that the U.S. public knew very little about the country, or for that matter that whole region of the world. The average American does not perceive these events or places in the world as affecting them, unless like the Iraq War, casualties mount, and the conflict grows increasingly ugly. Interest in Afghanistan has never been high, and the interest has been focused on such things as U.S. military operations in the country, and then only at critical moments, such as the initial actions against the Taliban. Even with the beginning of a Taliban resurgence in 2006, public interest in Afghanistan did not reach a high level. Some have taken to calling Afghanistan “the forgotten war.” Beyond simply having Afghanistan in the headlines occasionally and a subject of some public discussion, there has really been no significant advance in public knowledge about the country itself and its people. As outlined in the matrix and elsewhere in the book, the U.S. public is not interested in things international. They are viewed as “distant stuff.” They ask: “How does that affect us?” It is a case of a multicultural society that seems to have very little interest in multicultural issues on a global scale. That is, of course, ironic, since the United States has been built on waves of immigrants that came to its shores, and those waves continue today. This isolationist tendency, as already alluded to, has been a feature of U.S. society almost from the beginning. After the first two world wars, the United States withdrew quickly behind its now illusory ocean “fortress walls.” From a business perspective, the United States has been opening up to the world on a major scale, as an architect and formative force in globalization. However, this has not translated into increased awareness of other cultures at the community or family level. That global awareness tends to be limited, such as going to the local Greek food festival, something which satisfies the appetite, but hardly advances cultural knowledge. Apparently only between 23 and 27 percent of the U.S. population (about one person in four) have a passport—a necessary condition today for travel abroad. The proportion for Canada is almost double. The lack of awareness of other cultures begins in the U.S. school system, where it is not usually a key curriculum priority. This is changing now to some degree, but it does not seem to be a major trend. Therefore, it is small wonder that Afghanistan does not find its way into U.S. consciousness, even when it is being temporarily highlighted by events. Sometimes you can see and not see. When it comes to events or countries outside U.S. borders, interest is not high. Interest does not really get “sparked” among the young, and therefore is not carried forward in abundance into their adulthood.

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INTERPRETIVE NARRATIVE The Fog of War matrix has many of the same ingredients as the Fog of Peace matrix. Once again you see Afghanistan in the back row of international interest, but certainly not in the back row in terms of the strategic interests of al Qaeda. If anything, it is in the front row with them, and if Afghanistan can be neutralized and the United States induced to depart, a large victory will be theirs. Afghanistan is arguably more important than Iraq, and its loss would make it much more difficult to deal with Iraq’s future. Al Qaeda’s strategy in Afghanistan, not much different from that in Iraq, is to wear down U.S. interest and resolve. Experts appear to recognize Afghanistan’s importance and centrality. However, public perception in the United States does not. Iraq continues to preoccupy those who take an interest in foreign affairs. Must the United States stay in Iraq as a major military presence to protect its interests and properly respond to global terrorism? The answer could be, in the long run, no. On the other hand, there is a case for believing that the United States must remain a strong presence in Afghanistan, one that is probably much larger than at present. That will be a hard sell to the U.S. Congress and to the American people. However, if there is a belief that U.S. strategy, the war on terrorism, and world peace are fostered by such action, then it will be necessary to deal with the pronounced fog effect that currently blocks consideration of such action. This returns us to the basic reason we wrote this book. The fog effect directly influences what countries are able to do. The war of ideas does not just mean projection of American ideas beyond U.S. shores. It also means dissipating the fog effect internally, within America. That takes leadership, especially political leadership, and skill in communicating, and at a level largely absent from public life today.

CLOSING SUMMARY The War in Afghanistan and our continuing struggle there have taught us some very important lessons. It reminds one of the old adage, “It isn’t over until the fat lady sings.” She clearly has not sung yet in Afghanistan. The Taliban have demonstrated a continuing ability to stage attacks that capture the headlines, such as the killing of over 130 people in two suicide attacks, in as many days, in Afghanistan in February 2008. America entered Afghanistan with the apparent belief that one simply applies sufficient force to take down the regime, and then everything else falls into place. We seem to have carried that same premise into the Iraq War. The thought seems to be that you can do this on the cheap, without the need to concern yourself heavily with what happens next, including whether you maintain stability in the country. While we are certain the

The War in Afghanistan

U.S. government planners would deny it, there was no apparent plan for true nation building in the case of Afghanistan. The then U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, was not receptive to thoughts of committing substantial resources to nation building. In the case of both Afghanistan and Iraq, the force levels to do the job were out of step with reality, if we take into account what would be necessary to consolidate the victory and curb any insurgency. As we will suggest in Chapter 5, the necessary force level was even more understated in Iraq, in spite of strong cautionary flags by the Army Chief of Staff at the time, General Eric Shinzeki. We have paid, and are still paying, dearly for that error. Public policy is in the end shaped on the fulcrum of public opinion. That requires an informed citizenry, a point we made in the previous chapter. It requires options to be fully weighed, with the citizens of the country interested, engaged, and welcomed to participate. The current U.S. administration—the Executive Branch—seems to have been in the habit of masking what is going on and withholding information. The “spin doctors” have been hard at work. The book by Frank Rich, The Greatest Story Ever Sold: The Decline and Fall of Truth (2006), unmasks the deliberate and widespread effort to shape events and project imagery, for political ends, in ways that mislead. The book by Bob Woodward State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III (2006), outlines in part the extent to which information on the War (meaning, here, both the conflicts in Afghanistan and in Iraq) is being withheld from the American public. The fog has rarely been so thick. Fogs of Peace and War become entangled and even merged, as evident in the two Fog matrices on Afghanistan in this chapter. What can help start to untangle these snarled and tangled “fishing lines” is the truth. We must face the brutal facts. And we must use the truth to dissipate the fogs. Our ability to respond to world events appropriately, including the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq, is unlikely to occur until this begins to happen and truth returns as an overriding value. Regrettably, in a partisan heated political environment, truth is the first victim.

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The War in Iraq: Case Study If Vietnam was a quagmire and Afghanistan represents some rugged and harsh real estate, with hope for an eventual favorable outcome, then Iraq is a morass. This chapter is a case study of the war in Iraq, and once again applies our “fogs of war and peace” framework to understanding this complex and ever-changing pattern of events. Morass and quagmire are somewhat similar terms, as defined in Webster’s Dictionary, but they are not identical. A quagmire is “soft land that shakes and yields under foot,” or “a difficult, precarious, or entrapping position.” A morass, on the other hand, is “marsh or swamp.” A morass is something that “traps, confuses, or impedes.” Either a quagmire or a morass can entrap you. A quagmire slows you and creates serious problems, but a morass is likely to stop and cause you even greater problems. If you have a choice, choose the quagmire. In Iraq, America has fallen into a morass. The “confusion” aspect of the term morass fits well with the nature of the Iraq War. It is the first war where America entered for stated reasons and then continued the war for fundamentally different ones. As all those who have followed the situation closely know, the reason for entry was founded on two suppositions: 1. Iraq was linked to the 9/11/2001 attacks on the United States by al Qaeda.

The War in Iraq 2. Iraq was either at the point, or near the point, of having Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), namely nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, with a predilection to use them for attacks on the United Staes and its allies in the region.

If these two reasons had been true, they could have certainly provided an adequate basis for going to war. However, neither of them proved to be true, which at the least gives new meaning to faulty intelligence. It also can suggest that some of the intelligence that existed was “manipulated” to reach the desired conclusions (e.g., a claim by the U.S. president in a State of the Union Address that nuclear material (“yellowcake” uranium) was shipped to Iraq from Niger, a claim that had earlier been proven false). Some polls of American public opinion have reflected the perception that they had been deceived, with information manipulated. On August 22, 2006, President Bush finally admitted that Iraq had no WMD. Despite assertions to the contrary by the U.S. administration, no real link between al Qaeda and Iraq was ever established. Iraq and al Qaeda were not warm bedfellows to begin with. Iraq has a Shi’a majority (though Saddam was Sunni) and al Qaeda is Sunni. It took later events to create inroads for al Qaeda in Iraq. Al Qaeda in Iraq did not exist before the U.S. incursion. The Bipartisan Commission on 9/11 interviewed hundreds of people and checked thousands of documents. Even President Bush and Vice President Cheney testified. The Commission found no evidence to support the claim of an al Qaeda connection. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Let us examine the WMD issue more deeply. It was easy to assign bad intentions to Iraq based on its track record under Saddam Hussein. Chemical weapons had been used twice previously on a large scale, the first such employment of chemical weapons since World War I in Europe. The first use occurred during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1989) and involved both mustard gas and nerve agents. It was used against Iranian forces fighting on the Southern Front and Kurdish Separatists, who were attempting to open up a Northern Front with Iraq with the help of Iran. A number of chemical casualties apparently occurred, but there are no definitive numbers available. The second use was against the Kurds on March 16, 1988. A mixture of mustard gas (an agent used in World War I ) and nerve agents were again used on the Kurdish village of Ikmala, killing 5,000, including women and children, with another 10,000 suffering disfigurement or seriously debilitating injuries. The perpetrator, Ali Hassan al-Majid (the so-called Chemical Ali as he was dubbed by the Kurds) was working under orders from his cousin

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Saddam Hussein. He was condemned to death by hanging for his crimes by an Iraqi tribunal on June 24, 2007. It is sometimes forgotten, conveniently, that at the time of the gas attacks on Iran, America was a strong supporter of Saddam, since Iraq was an enemy of America’s foe Iran. Iraq had been developing a nuclear capability back in the 1970s that was destroyed in 1981 by the Israeli Air force. As for the chemical and biological legs of the WMD triangle, they are relatively easy to bring on line at any point, so much so that there is concern that even small independent terrorist groups, or even individuals, can manufacture and employ a variety of them. That is the reality of biological and chemical weapons. Detecting them, other than through Human Intelligence (HUMINT), can be extremely difficult. Nuclear weapons are another matter. They require much more effort and cross-disciplinary expertise to develop, although one should not forget that nuclear material can be used as part of conventional bomb making— nuclear material wrapped with conventional explosives, including bombs of very small dimensions, creating the spread of radiation (what may be called “briefcase” or “dirty” bombs). While mass casualties are unlikely from such a bomb and radiation casualties limited, since there is no nuclear detonation, it can still be a potent psychological weapon in promoting fear. As the murder of Alexander Litvenenko, a former KGB agent, in England in November 2006 shows, even a millionth of a gram of Polonium 210 can be lethal if ingested. It takes a highly sophisticated laboratory to produce Polonium 210, but once you have it, this radioactive substance is easily concealable and transportable. It could cause a significant problem if introduced into the food chain or a water supply system. Polonium 210 can apparently be purchased legally from a Web site.1 As the two primary reasons for invading Iraq began to lose their legitimacy, the Bush administration quickly retrenched. The original motives were quickly pushed back from public view and replaced by two new reasons for being in Iraq. 1. Saddam Hussein was an evil dictator and needed to be toppled. 2. Democracy must be brought to Iraq and to the region.

It is doubtful that the Bush administration would have been able to sell the war to the U.S. Congress and the American people beforehand, on this revised basis. The rationale for the war has now been transformed yet again. Now Iraq is referred to by the Bush administration as the epicenter of the war on global terrorism. A secondary rationale is to protect the oil reserves, which may be closer to the truth than anything else that has been said. What has characterized the latest Iraq War almost from the outset is a very thick fog effect, with facts about the conflict shaped to fit political ends.

The War in Iraq

“Facts” have been so abundant and diverse that the truth can be hard to be found. Political “spin” has been superabundant. In terms of Iraq’s visibility on the world stage, it has spent much more time in the spotlight over the past twenty years than Afghanistan, although the spotlight has not always burned brightly. Iraq has appeared in the headlines only intermittently. When the war with Iran was taking place (1980– 1989), Iraq could garner attention, but it was not very intense. That conflict seemed very distant to the average American and of little import. As is true of that area of the world in general, there was little interest or focus on it in the United States beyond government circles. Even today, interest seems minimal. CNN reported on November 22, 2002, that a National Geographic survey showed that only 13 percent of young Americans, aged 18–24 (military age) could find Iraq on a map.2 Matters changed dramatically with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, prompting a strong response by the United States and its coalition partners in 1991, in what came to be known as the 100-hour War (a misnomer, given the many days of aerial bombardment prior to the introduction of ground forces). This response restored the sovereignty of Kuwait and also protected the oil supply from both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Iraq suddenly became a household name in the United States and elsewhere. The United States stopped short of a regime change at that time, probably to stay within the parameters of the agreement that had brought the coalition partners together. It is probably also true that President George H. Bush decided to keep Hussein in place as a counterforce to Iran and as a way to help maintain relative stability in the region. Following the First Gulf War, which imposed some far-reaching sanctions on Iraq, a long period of relatively low-level tension began, as Iraq creatively worked to circumvent the embargo on its goods, regularly activated air defense radars against coalition aircraft patrolling the established “No Fly Zone,” and rebuffed and impeded the work of the UN Weapons Inspectors. The United States and its partners responded with occasional air attacks to neutralize Iraqi air defenses and command and control facilities that could be used to target coalition aircraft. The epochal event of 9/11/2001—eight years after the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993—began to change the entire equation regarding Iraq. As the United States and an assembly of coalition partners moved against Afghanistan, a conflict covered in the previous chapter, the war drums began to sound in the Bush administration for military action against Iraq. As already mentioned, an alleged al Qaeda connection and development of WMD were used to spur an invasion of Iraq. On October 11, 2002, the U.S. Congress passed the “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution 2002.” We note throughout this book the importance of public perception and the distortion effect

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that can occur in relation to the facts. It is safe to say that the resolution would never have been passed on the basis used to justify the war—the two reasons stated at the start of this chapter—if the truth had been known. It returns us once again to the Thomas Theorem mentioned in Chapter 1 in relation to distortion effect— “If people perceive things to be real, they are real in their consequences.” Even though Iraq has been in the news for some time, there is really very little understanding of that country in the United States beyond combat casualties, roadside bombs, suicide attacks, and cases of extraordinary brutality. Even knowing where Iraq is located geographically can be a muddle, as we noted. The troops were sent in without much background knowledge of Iraq or its culture. A young intelligence officer, an Army captain said, “It’s sinful how little we knew about Islam and the Iraqi culture.”3 In fact there was no real appreciation for the country or other countries in the region. What are some basic things to know about Iraq in terms of geography and demographics? First, it is not a small country. Iraq is slightly more than twice the size of the U.S. state of Idaho. Land area totals 437,072 sq km (168,754 sq mi). This compares with the larger land area in Afghanistan of 647,500 sq km. As is true of Afghanistan, Iraq borders six countries; with only one of them do the two countries share a common border—Iran. The bordering countries and the length of the shared border are shown below in descending order of the length of the border. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Iran (1458 km) (875 mi) Saudi Arabia (814 km) (488 mi) Syria (605 km) (363 mi) Turkey (352 km) (211 mi) Kuwait (240 km) (144 mi) Jordan (181 km) (113 mi)

Iraq’s total borders are 2,194 miles long. This explains in part the relative difficulty of preventing militants from entering Iraq to initiate and engage in acts of terror. The same relative porousness can be found along the U.S. Mexican border. Large areas of the country are uninhabited. Only 13 percent of the land is arable. The economy is centered on the oil sector. Per capita GDP is $2,900 (2006), based on adjustment of Iraq’s currency according to its purchasing power (PPP). This compares with the much lower GDP of $800 for Afghanistan (2007), only 25 percent of that in Iraq. The average life expectancy at birth for the total population is 69.1 years. This compares to 43.34 years in Afghanistan. Seventy percent of the population is Arab. Most are Muslims, with Shi’a in the majority.

The War in Iraq

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 occurred fifteen months after the military action in Afghanistan was undertaken. It was launched, more or less unilaterally by the United States together with “a coalition of the willing,” in the absence of a final resolution by the UN Security Council to authorize use of force. Then-Secretary General Kofi Annan regarded the invasion as a violation of the UN Charter. In September 2004, he stated, “From our point of view and the UN Charter point of view, it was illegal.” Unilateral action by the United States was opposed by several countries in the European Union (EU), as well as China and Russia. Unlike the First Gulf War, the air campaign leading up to the ground invasion was very short and was termed “shock and awe.” On March 20, 2003, the ground invasion began. As was true of the operations in Afghanistan, the actual ground attack was preceded by employment of Special Operations Forces (SOF) to secure oil facilities before the Iraqis could set them afire, as they had done in Kuwait when they withdrew after the First Gulf War. In fact, SOF started infiltrating Iraq even before the air campaign had begun in order to guide strike aircraft. As in the case of Afghanistan, some of the very best SOF assets were brought together, including the U.S. Army’s Delta Force, U.S. Navy SEALS, British SAS, U.S. Air Force Combat Controllers, British 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines, the 15th U.S. Marine Expeditionary Unit, and Polish GROM special forces. Baghdad fell on April 9, 2003, after only three weeks of ground combat. The victory was not all it seemed to be as events proved. Many guerrilla and terrorist groups were active in the area. The fall of Baghdad saw the outbreak of regional violence throughout the country, as Iraqi tribes and cities began to fight each other over old grudges. The Iraqi cities of Al-Kut and Nasiriyah declared war on each other immediately following the fall of Baghdad in order to establish dominance in the new country, and coalition forces quickly found themselves embroiled in a potential civil war.4

What had been an almost picture-perfect military operation and regime change, using 100,000 soldiers and marines from the United States, 30,000 from the United Kingdom, as well as smaller forces from other nations, now began to run into trouble. Most of this trouble could have been nipped in the bud with better prior planning and yet the then-U.S. Secretary of Defense refused to call it an insurgency or concede that there were too few troops on the ground to stabilize and secure the country. There was another huge flaw, aside from greatly underestimating the force level required in the aftermath of the conflict. This flaw was related to the fact that the troops that went into Iraq were primarily combat and logistical troops. The military police in the force needed to deal with the follow-up operations in such a situation were comparatively few in number.

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The Iraqi civilian police force was shredded and discredited throughout the country. It was also of questionable value until screened and retrained. To complicate matters further, the decision was made by Paul Bremer, the U.S. administrator on the ground, to totally disband Iraqi military forces, in the belief that its members were Saddam diehards. This was a crucial mistake. General David Petraeus, commanding the U.S. Army’s 101st Airborne division at the time, unsuccessfully opposed the decision. In retrospect, had we retained a number of the Iraqi military, it would have greatly aided in stabilizing the country in the critical early days following the removal of the existing Iraqi government. The U.S. military had to reorient itself, with army combat units taking on more of a police function, as well as starting to form and train new Iraqi army units, a long and tedious process. However it is viewed, the U.S. military has performed very well and with great professionalism. They have also been very well led at all levels of the military command structure. The initiative shown down to company and platoon level has been inspiring. U.S. Army and Marines adapted to the circumstances very rapidly. The core of the problem in Iraq lies in inadequate numbers, and being dealt a very bad hand by those in civilian leadership positions in the Bush administration. The frequent and prolonged deployments of Army troops and Marines have been highly disruptive of families. The long string of deployments, with little “dwell time” between them, will ultimately tear at the fabric of the force. As General Creighton W. Abrams would say, “People are the Army.” With three and four deployments under the belt to the war zones, this precious commodity begins to wear down. The civilian leadership in the U.S. Department of Defense had repeatedly stated in the media that the commanders in the field would be given whatever they needed to get the job done.5 The truth is that the margin for adding more boots on the ground can only be small and temporary, given the fact that almost all of the U.S. military forces, including Guard and Reserve forces that are combat ready, are either on the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere in the world. Little remains in the U.S. Strategic Reserve. There is almost no margin left. We are talking about an Active Army today that is smaller than the force in being immediately prior to the Korean War (1950–1953). The only differences now are the wholesale employment of Reserve Component forces (Guard and Reserve) and the more lethal weaponry. There are limits to what a force of that size can accomplish, even with its increased lethality, mobility, and high level of professionalism. The erosion of National Guard capabilities in the United States as a result of mass deployments adversely impacts the ability of the states to deal with state and national domestic emergencies, such as hurricanes or biochemical attack. It is small wonder that the American public now seems to feel numb and confused. The casualties continue, but at a somewhat reduced level, as

The War in Iraq

violence declines across Iraq, attesting to better military strategy and greater cooperation from some Iraqi communities. The Report of the Iraq Study Group (ISG), cochaired by former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker III and former Congressman, Lee Hamilton, released in December 2006, called attention to the seriousness of the situation, and stated, “The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating.” Lieutenant General Odiorno, Operational Commander in Iraq, said on January 7, 2007 that things are not improving. That grim assessment has now been turned around as the military situation stabilizes. Now Odiorno will return as the overall commander of U.S. Forces in Iraq, having been a part of the effort that began to turn things around. General David Petraeus is in turn to move up and assume command of Central Command (CENTCOM), giving him responsibility for the overall theater, including Afghanistan. Revised strategies, as well as a slightly higher force level (the so-called surge), seem to have contributed to this turnaround. U.S. Ground forces have now adopted a clear, “secure and hold” strategy, where U.S. forces remain, along with Iraqi forces, to help keep a territory free of insurgents once it is cleared. In the past, U.S. forces had cleared an area and then left it to the Iraqi forces to maintain security. THE COST OF THE WAR What will the Iraq War cost America’s taxpayers? Jamie Wilson, writing in Washington for the Guardian Unlimited pegs the ultimate costs of the war far above current projected estimates. Wilson says the real cost to the United States of the Iraq War is likely to be between $1 trillion to $2 trillion, up to ten times more than previously thought, according to a Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz and a Harvard budget expert. The study, which expanded on traditional estimates by including such costs as lifetime disability and healthcare for troops injured in the conflict, as well as impact on the U.S. economy, concluded that the U.S. government is continuing to underestimate the cost of the war.6 A new set of estimates by the same authors concluded that U.S. military operations in Iraq already have exceeded the cost of the 12-year war in Vietnam and are more than double the cost of the Korean War.7 Stiglitz and Bilmes write: The only war in our history which cost more was the Second World War, when 16.3 million US troops fought in a campaign lasting four years, at a total cost (in 2007, inflation-adjusted dollars) of about five trillion dollars. . . . With virtually the entire armed forces committed to fighting the Germans and Japanese, the cost per troop (in today’s dollars) was less than 100,000 dollars in 2007 dollars. By contrast, the Iraq war is costing upward of 400,000 dollars per troop.

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The human costs of the war should be a cause for special concern. Once again, there has been considerable fog around this issue, including reluctance to disclose the true nature of the cost to our military forces and the cost in terms of Iraqi civilian casualties. The only figures that usually get coverage are the daily losses to U.S. forces in terms of combat deaths, with that number now exceeding 4,000. The growing number of U.S. nonmortal casualties is growing and is now over 40,000. However, this gets little mention. The good news is that the excellence of the military medical system, from the battlefield aid station to hospital care, is superb and swift, with around 90 percent of those wounded surviving. This is a higher percentage than any previous American war. At the same time a significant number of casualties have wounds so severe that they will change their lives for ever. About 9,000 of those wounded have head and spinal cord injuries. U.S. coalition partners have also experienced significant casualties, especially the British. The Iraqi military has also had extensive casualties. The casualty figures can be expected to grow as the Iraqi Army increases in size and the extent of its engagement. The estimates on how many Iraqi civilians have died in the conflict since its inception vary widely. This is a particularly painful aspect of the fog of war. On December 12, 2005, George W. Bush, in a public speech, stated that about 30,000 Iraqi civilians had been killed. Later, an administration spokesperson said that Bush was “basing his statement on media reports, not an official government estimate.” The first Lancet survey (a British medical journal) conducted before and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq reflected 100,000 Iraqis killed. Their second study of mortality among Iraqi civilians, up to October 2006, reflects another 655,000 deaths since their first survey was run. The Iraq Body Count project counts between 43,799 and 48,639 civilian deaths “resulting directly from military actions by the U.S. and its allies” reported in major media through October 8, 2006. An analysis by journalist Juan Cole sheds some light on why it can be difficult to obtain accurate records of Iraqi civilian deaths. First of all, Iraqi Muslims don’t believe in embalming or open casket funerals days later. They believe that the body should be buried by sunset the day of the death, in a plain wooden box, so there is no reason to expect them to take the body to the morgue . . . I personally, believe very large numbers of Iraqi families quietly bury their dead without telling the government anything about it. Another large number of those killed are dumped into the Tigris River by their killers. A fisherman on the Tigris, looking for lunch recently, caught the corpse of a woman. The only remarkable thing about it was that he let it be known to the newspapers. I’m sure the Tigris fishermen throw back unwanted corpses every day.8

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The truth about the number of Iraqi civilian casualties lies somewhere in the middle of all these numbers, but it is safe to say that the number is not inconsiderable. If you are a soldier on the ground and involved with helping to fight the insurgency, it can be difficult to determine friend from foe. Both Sunni and Shi’ia target American forces. Probably the most feared weapon used by insurgents is the Improvised Explosive Device (IED), with some of the more lethal variety being provided by the Iranians. They have become increasingly sophisticated and of greater destructive power. Many are detonated by remote device, such as a cell phone. They are extremely difficult to guard against, and can be accompanied by an ambush. Every time forces move along roadways, they are fair game, and the devices can be very difficult to detect. Sniper attacks now rank as a strong second behind IED’s as a cause of U.S. military casualties. In a heavily populated city, like Baghdad, snipers are extremely difficult to guard against. Here are some of the views of a Marine Corps officer on the War in Iraq, taken from a letter he wrote to his family that found its way to Time magazine (October 6, 2006) and to the in-boxes of general officers and others in Washington. Three brief excerpts from this long letter are shown below. He assigned a label to each point he made. Most Memorable Scene—In the middle of the night, on a dusty airfield, watching the better part of a battalion of Marines packed up and ready to go home after over six months in al-Anbar, the relief etched in their young faces even in the moonlight. Then watching these same Marines exchange glances with a similar number of grunts loaded down with gear as they file past—their replacements. Nothing was said. Nothing needed to be said. Highest Unit Reenlistment Rate—Any outfit that has been in Iraq recently. All the danger, all the hardship, all the time away from home, all the horror, all the frustrations with the fight here—all are outweighed by the desire of young men to be a part of a band of brothers who will die for one another. They found what they were looking for when they enlisted out of high school. Man for man, they now have more combat experience than any Marines in the history of our Corps. Proudest Moment––It’s a tie every day, watching our Marines produce phenomenal intelligence products that go pretty far in tearing apart Bad Guy operations in al-Anbar. Every night Marines and soldiers are kicking in doors and grabbing Bad Guys based on intelligence developed by our guys. We rarely lose a Marine during these raids, they are so well informed of the objective. A bunch of kids right out of high school shouldn’t be able to work so well, but they do.

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Since the start of the post-invasion phase, matters have changed dramatically, compared to the free-ranging movement at the outset. The insurgents have now made movement unsafe for U.S. forces in some areas, except when moving in force. This changing landscape initially brought about a retreat to a few large protected Forward Bases/enclaves, including the Green Zone, where the Iraqi Parliament resides, as well as senior U.S. officials. U.S. forces had tended to operate from Forward Bases, sallying forth to accomplish security missions. Therefore, the Americans became largely cut off from the everyday life of the Iraqi people. It is reminiscent of the base camps in Vietnam. This is now being modified in the Baghdad area and elsewhere, with small operating bases being set up in communities and neighborhoods. This is part of the “clear and hold” strategy now being implemented. It had been tried in the past, but after clearance operations were completed, the areas were turned over to Iraqi forces to hold. That proved largely unsuccessful, in part because the Iraqi forces were not trained to the point of representing a robust force. This time U.S. and Iraqi forces are holding the areas cleared together. It creates an around-the-clock presence in the neighborhoods and provides the population with a greater sense of security. To live in the Green Zone, Fouad Ajami states,9 in his book The Foreigner’s Gift, is to be in another world. Even the food and water used in the Green Zone comes from outside Iraq as a precaution. The journalists “embedded” with U.S. units end up isolated as well, and when one takes the risk of going outside an enclave, accompanied by only one, two, or no bodyguards, to meet with Iraqis on their ground, as Jill Carroll of the Christian Science Monitor did, they may be subjected to assassination or capture. Therefore, the media coverage coming out of Iraq can be secondhand and distanced from actual events. The journalists have reason to be cautious. Over 200 journalists have been killed, most of them Iraqi, many of them supporting foreign news organizations. PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING THE IRAQ WAR In terms of perceptions and penetrating the fog of confusing information/disinformation, what does the American public think of the war? There are numerous public-opinion polls being run almost continuously. We have selected poll results that we consider signposts. They tend to profile the prevailing views of the war. 1. Confidence in the way President George W. Bush is handling the Iraq situation (November 1–5, 2007 NBC/Wall Street Journal Poll). Question asked: In general, do you approve or disapprove of the job that George W. Bush is doing in handling the situation in Iraq? Approve = 27%; Disapprove = 68%; Unsure = 5%

The War in Iraq 2. Possibility of victory in Iraq (November 1–5, 2007 NBC/Wall Street Journal Poll). Question asked: Do you think the U.S. goal of achieving victory in Iraq is still possible, or not? Is Still Possible = 40%; Is Not Still Possible = 54%; Unsure = 6% 3. Withdrawal of U.S. troops (November 1–5, 2007 NBC/Wall Street Journal Poll). Question asked: When it comes to the War in Iraq, which of the following statements comes closer to your point of view? Withdrawal of most troops by 2009 = 55%; Remain until country gets stable = 40%; Unsure = 5% 4. Costs to the United States versus benefits (October 29, 2007 ABC News/Washington Post Poll). Question asked: All in all, considering costs to the United States versus benefits, do you think the War in Iraq was worth fighting for, or not? Worth It = 35%; Not Worth It = 63%; Unsure = 2% 5. Was U.S. right in using military force in Iraq (October 17–23, 2007 Pew Research Center for the People and the Press Survey conducted by the Princeton Survey Research Associates International). Question asked: Thinking about Iraq, do you think the U.S. made the right decision or wrong decision in using military force against Iraq? Right Decision = 39%; Wrong Decision = 54%; Unsure = 7% 6. View of how George W. Bush is handling the situation in Iraq in relation to political party affiliation (October 12–16, 2007 CBS News Poll). Question asked: Do you approve of the way George W. Bush is handling the situation in Iraq? All Adults Republicans Democrats Independents

Approve 26% 58% 8% 18%

Disapprove 67% 35% 89% 72%

Unsure 7% 7% 3% 10%

When one looks across all the polls, one finds support for the war at low ebb, especially among Democratic voters. The spread between the parties is wide, as if they are using very different lenses. However, the overall support for the war is clearly declining. There is also an interest in early extraction of forces from Iraq, but it is tempered by the reality that this needs to be done judiciously. The overall approval rating of President Bush fell to 28 percent in April 2008, with the Iraq War undoubtedly contributing to this record low poll number.

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The American people seem to view the U.S. situation in Iraq as somewhat like a large elephant stuck in a narrow passageway. The elephant has great difficulty finding its way out. If it moves forward, it may find it even more difficult to extract itself. If it tries to back out, it can get badly bruised and scratched and may emerge weakened. There is now a suspicion that we went into the war rather blind to the consequences and were unprepared for how to deal with the “post conflict” period. There was no apparent exit strategy. The great persuasion used by the Bush administration to go into Iraq is now widely viewed as contrived, a self-fulfilling prophesy, with support to go in worth obtaining at all costs, a “case of the end justifying the means.” In the 2004 movie Fog of War cited earlier, about Robert McNamara, he cites the eleven principles that guided his life. One of those principles is: “Lesson #9. Sometimes to do good, you may have to do evil.” That principle appears to be alive and well. However, the amount of good being done is open to debate. There seemed to be an intent to go to war, no matter what, even though there were gestures along the way that tipped the hat to diplomacy. One of the associated costs was that some nations felt rebuffed in their attempt to move forward more deliberately and fully explore diplomatic channels. The United States was seen as arrogantly turning its back on the world community and going its own way as the sole remaining Super Power. That carried some very high costs in terms of U.S. credibility and influence. Much of the goodwill toward the United States that could be found in the Arab community was destroyed. Arab governments in countries that had been inherently friendly to America now found themselves sitting atop a citizenry that was inflamed by U.S. actions, therein realistically restricting what the government is able do in overtly supporting the United States. Jordan and Egypt are examples. The unwillingness of the Bush administration to open up true dialogue with other countries, including Iran and Syria, further hampered the ability of the United States to manage the situation and gain international support. The ISG (Iraq Study Group) Report placed great weight on pursuing diplomatic avenues, including dialogue with Iran and Syria. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and President Bush referred to countries like France and Germany as “Old Europe,” when they stood against the U.S. position on taking military action in Iraq, further exacerbating relations with those countries. The situation seems to be changing for the better, at least in terms of leadership style under Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. However, the largest setback, potentially the most severe, is that we have probably made al Qaeda even stronger. John Tierney, writing in the New York Times about “Lessons in Spin from Osama,” says this: Somewhere, Osama bin Laden must be smiling. Or at least he will whenever his couriers deliver the next batch of press clippings . . . Once again he has

The War in Iraq beaten America at an American game: Public relations. He may be sitting powerlessly in a cave, but his image is as scary as ever. He doesn’t even need to cut a new video. He released an old one last week—the equivalent of a fading musician putting out his greatest-hits album, but it has been getting prime time around the clock. . . . But bin Laden knows something that the Bush administration hasn’t figured out: You don’t actually have to be the strong horse. You just have to look stronger. You can be weak, you can be pummeled in a fight, but as long as your opponent looks more scared than you, you can save face by simply declaring victory.1

Our opponents have proven remarkably adept at getting their message out to the Arab community and using it as a tool to further their interests. You might call it very effective “fog generation.” Mark Santora and Damien Cave, writing in the New York Times on January 21, 2007, address the topic of “Banned Station Broadcasts Voice of Rebels in Iraq.” It calls attention to this phenomenon. A clandestine and banned Iraqi satellite TV station has become a major information outlet for the Sunni insurgency. Attempts to find it and close it down have been so far unsuccessful. The article describes a video aired on this station to describe the type of message imagery being communicated. The video starts with a young American soldier patrolling an Iraqi street. His head is obscured by leaves, so a red target is digitally inserted to draw the viewer’s eye. A split second later, the soldier collapses, shot. Martial music kicks in, a Jihadi answer to John Philip Sousa. The time and the place of the attack scrolls at the bottom of the screen.

THE WAY FORWARD The question now becomes: What are the best U.S. options going forward? There are geopolitical considerations involved that have failed to receive adequate attention. There has probably been no better recent articulation of these considerations than by Lee Kwan Yew, founder and first prime minister of Singapore. Speaking at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Award Ceremony on October 11, 2006, with then-U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and other prominent officials in attendance, he provided some important insights. In terms of what strategy to follow to defeat terrorism, Lee says: To counter terrorism, the U.S. must adopt the principles and policies that guided her responses to Cold War threats. No single power, no single religion, no single ideology can conquer the world, or make it in its own image . . . Different races, cultures, languages and histories require different

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Fogs of War and Peace paths to democracy and a free market. Societies in a globalized world— interconnected by satellite, television, internet and travel will influence and affect each other. What social system best meets the needs of a people at a particular stage in their development, will be settled by social Darwinism.

Lee points out that “the Sunni-Shiite divide [which we address in Chapter 7] goes back to 632 A.D. or after the death of the Prophet Mohammed.” Therefore, to speak of reconciliation between the two sides has to be tempered by an understanding of history. The divide has now become engrained in the culture of the country and is not going to be easily dislodged, if at all. In its worst manifestation, it becomes ethnic cleansing. From a geopolitical perspective, Lee reminds us that the issue of the Sunni–Shi’ia divide extends beyond Iraq, and that having the Shi’ias primarily in control in Iraq has spillover effects in the region. He points out that the U.S. has long relied on its traditional Sunni Arab allies—Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia—to keep the Arab-Israeli conflict in check. Now the power of the Sunni bloc may no longer be able to counter an Iran that supports Muslim militias against Israel–Shiite—Hezbollah in Lebanon and Sunni Hamas in Palestine.

As the United States weighs its options, it has one important factor working for it. There is now a decided belief that the status quo cannot be maintained, and that we must change our direction. We appear to be at a tipping point. There are clear signs of this. It can be seen in the poll results. It can also be seen in the mid-term election results in the United States in November 2006, with Democrats gaining control of both Houses of Congress. This has been widely interpreted as a rejection of the Bush administration’s policies related to the Iraq War. Iraq is on the table, front, and center. A large number of retired flag/general officers in the United States have stood up and voiced objections to the strategies for dealing with Iraq now in place, including a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Vessey. One can also sense some undercurrent in the active duty flag/general officer ranks as well. So what is possible? We need to begin with current realities. r U.S. forces are caught in an environment of deep-seated civil turmoil. That places our military personnel at risk. Roughly 80 percent of all attacks target U.S. military personnel, although 80 percent of those killed in such attacks end up being Iraqi. There is no question that a majority of the Iraqi’s resent the U.S. “occupation” and want our forces to leave.

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r With the introduction of new counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq and

r

r r

r

the troop surge, there is a case for allowing some time to see if such actions can gain further traction and create a foundation for political and sectarian reconciliation, if that is indeed possible. The American people expect a change and view the current protracted war in Iraq as unacceptable. Whether recent changes of policy by the Bush administration will deliver any lasting success remains to be seen. The patience of the American public is about exhausted. Our continued presence in Iraq only exacerbates the situation and creates a place and issue for our enemies to rally around. It also helps al Qaeda gain recruits. We cannot perpetuate for much longer the overextension of our military capabilities by staying mired down in Iraq. That erodes our readiness to defend the United States on a global scale. General George W. Casey, Jr., Army Chief of Staff, in addressing 400 attendees at the January 2008 Association of the United States Army Institute of Land Warfare breakfast said, “The impact of the extended deployments has left the Army ‘out of balance.’” He added that “he expected it would take the Army four years to get back in balance where it can be manned, trained and equipped for offensive, defensive and counterinsurgency operations.” (See AUSA News for March 2008.) It seems wasteful to incur the current financial and human costs over an extended period to “service” and sustain a major presence in Iraq when it seems to be delivering questionable gains to U.S. national security and the war on global terrorism. On the other hand, having a stabilized Iraq serves U.S. interests, those of the region, and the world at large.

What are the possible options? It can be very hard in life to shake yourself loose from where you are at the moment. At a national level, this can in part result from the inertia of political considerations or the extreme difficulty of changing course. But sometimes, it is either a case of change course or run aground. The United States is in that situation. There seems to be no other option than to begin pulling back from Iraq, but it needs to be done in a way that, through diplomacy, begins to put some alternative planking in place. Some of the areas of Iraq can be cleared of U.S. forces early based on low levels of violence (e.g., Kurdish areas). Unless circumstances in Iraq reach some new crisis point, we believe that U.S. forces should be scaled back by about one half by the end of 2009. This should allow a deliberate and orderly withdrawal under a new president. Common sense suggests that the United States will need some residual forces in Iraq or in proximity, including some combat assets, for the next three to five years. Actual size of that residual force, and the timetable for further reductions, will need to be determined in relation to circumstances at the time. This proposed template for scale-back seems realistic in terms of both

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operational needs and political realities. In concert with moves to reduce the U.S. military presence in Iraq, greater attention needs to be given to a campaign to win hearts and minds as a primary strategy for defeating global terrorism. Greater emphasis also needs to shift to Afghanistan, where there is in fact a strong case for major elevation of the U.S. force level, hopefully paralleled by increases in the contributions from NATO countries. The Iraqi government must begin to better orchestrate its efforts to unify the country, distribute national resources equitably, and accelerate its ability to take over security responsibilities. There are serious questions around whether they can or will. The Maliki government tends to take the Shi’ite side. That is where the government’s political base lies, and that perceived lack of balance and lack of evenhandedness works against reconciliation. All solution sets require broader use of diplomacy and demonstration of willingness to be a part of the international community. A change of military strategy by itself will not deliver the desired outcome. The United States by its attitude has set itself apart, alienating other countries. Communication must once again be opened up. Can the current U.S. president achieve this goal? It would be difficult for him to pull off, even if he had more time remaining in office, because around the world he is widely viewed as the problem. It will fall to a new president to do the heavy lifting in resolving issues related to the Iraq War and arrive at solutions. The press has been extremely tentative in stating the hard cold facts. NBC news finally decided to call what is occurring in Iraq a civil war, in spite of the Bush administration’s continuing hesitancy to label it as such. NBC considered their decision to be very significant, akin to Walter Cronkite’s statement (referred to in an earlier chapter) during the Vietnam War, as the CBS News anchor, that the war could not be won.11 It actually seems to fall well short of a “profile in courage.” It rather shows how the U.S. media can be slow to break with what an administration says, even if contrary to all natural instincts. It is part of the fog effect. The press in the United States has sometimes been referred to as the “Fourth Branch of Government,” or Fourth Estate. It has managed to get the truth out, even when faced with intense pressure. This was true during Watergate and the Pentagon Papers era, even though there has been a marked distortion of the truth at times. During the Vietnam War, a senior member of the press corps went to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and addressed its 1,200 students (majors and lieutenant colonels). It was in the early 1970s, as the Vietnam War was entering its de-escalation phase. The military officers always displayed great decorum and warmly greeted speakers, but it wasn’t true this day. There were whistles and jeers. This member of the press had been known to report on the war in ways that, to the military officers who had been there, differed markedly from what they knew to be true on the ground. The Commandant of the school had to come on stage and ask the class to quiet down and show respect.

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Today, the press has relinquished much of its credibility by tending to be overly “safe” in its reporting and hesitant to make waves. Therefore, the press contributes to both the fogs of war and peace. There no longer seems an inclination to assign the media a fourth branch of government designation. It simply doesn’t fit right now. No current news anchor begins to approach the credibility that Walter Cronkite enjoyed in the eyes of the American public. IRAQ AS INSURGENCY When U.S. forces have treated events in Iraq as an insurgency and approached them as such, employing a wide range of techniques beyond military force alone, the results have been encouraging. Perhaps the most significant recent action by the U.S. military is publication of a new Field Manual (FM 3-24) on Counterinsurgency (COIN). This was done in collaboration between the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. This is the first new doctrine on counterinsurgency in the U.S. Army in twenty years, and in twenty-five years in the case of the Marine Corps. This field manual, a template for dealing with an insurgency, became available in early 2007. The doctrine is now being used in Iraq. It is significant that the Army general who was in charge of this effort, David H. Petraeus, has a Ph.D. degree from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School, and has commanded our military forces in Iraq. He is well schooled in counterinsurgency operations and how to deal with such a conflict. He also knows which levers to pull in effectively dealing with the Iraqi’s. Admiral Fallon, the outgoing commander of Central Command, whom General Petraeus will replace, will leave his command assignment early. On March 11, 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates accepted Admiral Fallon’s request for retirement, well before the end of his tour as Commander of Central Command (CENTCOM). While ostensibly a voluntary act on Fallon’s part, he had been seen as out of step with policies of the Bush administration, including opposition to any military action against Iran. Fallon committed the crime of expressing his professional views in public, which ran counter to his president’s somewhat vague policy on this issue. His fate seems similar to that of General Eric Shinzeki, another “Four Star” invited to leave for speaking out on important issues of National Security. This is troubling, because you do not want automatons in senior military leadership positions. In a sense, both seem to have been casualties of the Fogs of War and Peace. CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE What do we know about Iraq’s culture? And how can that knowledge help us disperse the fogs of war and peace and better understand the situation, on the ground, in that war-torn country?

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What is now Iraq approximates to ancient Mesopotamia, sometimes referred to as the cradle of civilization. The modern country of Iraq was the construction of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, brought together by the victorious allies in World War I. Full independence of Iraq occurred in 1932. After a series of coups, Saddam Hussein gained power in 1979. Within a year of gaining power, he took Iraq to war with Iran, with the economies of both countries devastated. The war lasted eight years, from September 1980 until August 1988. The number of casualties on both sides was utterly staggering.12 In 1990, just over one year after the war with Iran ended, Hussein invaded Kuwait, setting off a chain of circumstances that led to the situation today. Ninty-seven percent of Iraqis are Muslims, with 75 to 80 percent Arab. The primary language is Arabic. Based on these three factors, Geert Hofstede’s study of cultures, described in the previous chapter, carries some weight. This is true because Hofstede used in his list of nations the convenience grouping he labeled “Arab Countries.” This can be one legitimate reference point in applying Hofstede’s four original cultural dimensions to Iraq. Since Hofstede’s cultural dimensions were fully explained in Chapter 4, they will not be re-explained here. Here is the cultural profile for Iraq: r Individualism versus Collectivism = Highly Collectivistic (Iran and Turkey are in the same range).

r Power Distance = High Power Distance (matches China and is about the same as Indonesia, India, and West Africa).

r Uncertainty Avoidance = Moderate Uncertainty Avoidance (in the same range as Pakistan and Germany).

r Masculinity versus Femininity (translates as achievement versus quality of life orientation) = Moderate Masculinity/achievement orientation (countries that fall at roughly the same point on the scale include India and Malaysia). r Long-Term versus Short-Term Orientation = Moderately Long-Term (this is admittedly an educated guess, since this dimension was not a part of the original research by Hofstede).

As is true of Afghanistan, Iraq is a Muslim country, and this plays an important role in everyday life. Islamic thought and doctrine is central to the culture. At times in their history, when not burdened by particularly oppressive dictatorships, the Iraqi people have proved to be very enterprising and have placed great emphasis on education. The question that needs to be asked is, how do these cultural dimensions for Iraq (e.g., high-power distance) align with those dimensions associated with the U.S. culture? Are there opportunities for culture clash? The answer

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is yes, and none is so pronounced as in the area of Power Distance. The Iraqi culture orients on hierarchy, “pecking orders,” thick bureaucracy. The United States on the other hand is much less hierarchical, much flatter in the way organizations are structured. This can lead to great frustration on both sides, with the Iraqi’s wanting to do it by the numbers, and the Americans wanting to get on with it! Religion is a factor as well. Tomorrow or the next day, or next week, can be okay in the Iraq culture—“As Allah wills it” or “Inshallah.” Americans want to make the deadlines assigned. This is inherent in the U.S. military culture. “If we say it will get done today, that’s what we mean!” Another area of potential culture clash is Individualism versus Collectivism. The U.S. and Iraqi cultures are at opposite poles in this area. Americans are among the most individualistic people in the world. The Iraqi’s, on the other hand, are highly collectivistic, a characteristic they share with the people of Afghanistan. It can be a case of an individual American ready to take action, while the Iraqi’s collectively debate what to do. The tempo is different as a result. The other cultural dimensions are reasonably well aligned, although Iraqi’s will tend to have a somewhat longer-term orientation than is true of the United States, which has a short-term orientation. We now proceed to apply our fogs of war and peace analytical framework to understanding more deeply the Iraqi context and situation. FOG OF PEACE: THE IRAQI CONTEXT What this matrix conveys is a very slow response to provocations by the Hussein regime over a period of ten years following the First Gulf War. An effective response, including fixing the problems with economic sanctions, might well have constrained Iraq sufficiently to forestall problems of the magnitude experienced later. Dealing with potential WMD would have been more difficult, but could have been advanced by more patient and concerted effort by the United States in working with other countries. The American public was not really in the loop on the need to more effectively clamp or snuff out, as opposed to simply arrest, Iraqi provocations of the moment. (See Table 5.1.) As we stress repeatedly in this book, an informed citizenry is vital and essential. Even when government fails to provide adequate information, the media should be able to willingly make up the difference—that in fact is a major raison d’etre of the media—and part of that can come from public awareness and receptivity, demanding such information. That is difficult, though, when the public has little interest in international affairs and lacks knowledge of geography and the world beyond U.S. shores. Media will not push information, in general, when there is no “pull” or demand. There can be no intellectual curiosity to know, unless there is some grounding in world affairs to begin with. This seems to be a glaring weakness stemming from failures in the U.S. school system.

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Table 5.1. Fog of Peace (Iraq-Related) Stages

Event Description

I

Understanding need to respond by government leaders.

II

Mobilization of Events continued to flow, public support. with confrontations with Iraq treated as business as usual. No real effort to alert public to long-term implications

III The spark that ignites the conflict.

A series of confrontational events following the first Gulf War (1991) required alertness and occasional military response. United States involved with the UN to enforce sanctions, especially with regard to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

The events of 9/11/2001 brought immediate focus to global terrorism and the need to contain it. Iraq was not caught in the general glow of interest in curbing any terrorist threat.

Nature of Fog Effect

Implications

Conclusions

While problems were evident, ones with the potential for growing difficulty, government leaders chose to let things ride, limiting the extent of response and pursuit of long-term solutions.

Public is largely in the dark about long-term implications of the tensions with Iraq and accepted the situation as not critical and largely routine.

Public not informed about potential problems downstream except as Iraq called to task, such as tightening of economic embargo and closure of “leaks” in existing sanctions.

Public was only seeing the tip of the iceberg in terms of brief reports on military responses to Iraqi provocations against U.S. and Coalition aircraft.

Without mobilization of public support, the ability to direct priority attention to the problem was somewhat restricted.

“Perceptions drive public policy.” The public perceptions of what was occurring suggested no alarm or need to break the status quo.

The public had no real foundation of information on Iraq or its significance. Saddam Hussein seemed to be viewed as in irritant but with little potential to threaten the United States. Suddenly, the Bush administration began generating a heightened alert to the possibility of WMD in Iraq.

The public, in the absence of any foundation on the subject, had to rely on the conclusions provided by the federal government.

You need an informed citizenry, and that can be considered a problem today in the United States. The public displays a passivity that grows out of inadequate knowledge of geography, history, and current events. As a result, the public has little basis for questioning government policies or adding their voices to public debate of issues critical to national security and well-being of the country.

The War in Iraq

A citizenry that has no basis for knowing is not positioned to challenge government actions, a detriment to democracy. FOG OF WAR: THE IRAQI CONTEXT In the exuberance and near-exhilaration of the response to the terrorist acts of 9/11, including the conflict in Afghanistan, an extreme “hard sell” was initiated by the Bush administration in arguing for military action against Iraq. This was based on intelligence information that later proved to be faulty, was embellished, or otherwise misused. The public was vulnerable, and in the end had no real option other than to trust what they were being told by their government. The media did not produce much enlightenment or present counterviews to the assertions of the Bush administration. (See Table 5.2.) It became apparent rather quickly that the Bush administration’s declaration of “mission accomplished,” as Hussein was swept from power, was extremely premature and unfounded. The dramatic-staged nature of this declaration is revealing. For the first time in history, on May 2, 2003, an American president landed on the deck of an aircraft carrier in a jet aircraft. You would have believed the carrier was on the high seas from the imagery, but it was actually anchored in San Diego, and the event was staged so that photographers were snapping pictures toward the ocean. George Bush emerged, dressed in full pilot’s pressure suit, to declare the Iraqi war was won. Future presidents will likely be more cautious in their victory proclamations. The continuing “aftershocks” from roadside bombs, suicide bombers, death squads, and raw brutality of the insurgents, who sprang into action as the regular ground operations ended, signaled that the “war” was not over. The growing insurgency merged with a civil war. As outlined elsewhere in the chapter, mistakes were made early in the war, including the preinvasion planning, which acted to derail the ability of U.S. and Coalition forces to establish security and gain an early semblance of stability. Gradually, the fog has begun to disperse, as evidence of deep-rooted and persistent problems have mounted. Recent opinion polls reflect an awakening of the public to the seriousness of the problems, with a large majority of Americans now questioning the war. Through it all, the American public has stood staunchly behind the U.S. military. They are not viewed as the problem, but rather as an institution doing a rather good job under the circumstances. The situation today could have probably been fundamentally improved, and some of the present problems avoided, had there been a greater awareness by the American public of the implications, with accurate information provided beforehand. The fog is now definitely being penetrated. However, the press has remained basically placid. That must change if the full truth on the war is to be made known to the American people.

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Table 5.2. Fog of War (Iraq-Related) Stages

Event Description

Nature of Fog Effect

Implications

Conclusions

I

Exuberance of response.

As planning and execution of the war in Afghanistan began, there was a growing interest by the Bush White House in dealing with Iraq as an opportunity to use the overall momentum generated by 9/11 to settle old scores.

Information, in retrospect, was used in ways that could support what appeared to be predetermined goals. As events were reviewed later, the American people felt that they had been misled by the Bush administration about reasons for the Iraq War and then misrepresentation of the progress being made in Iraq later.

The public was vulnerable because they had no foundation of understanding beyond information the government provided to them.

Important checks and balances in a democracy go beyond those between the three Branches. They also require an active media. “Watergate” shows the power that can be exerted by the press to reveal the truth. Another force is the public itself, but it required that citizens exercise their right to free speech and vote.

II

Crescendo effect.

The invasion of Iraq was quickly consummated, but it was followed by a series of “aftershocks” that grew in intensity and fury. They rapidly graduated from an insurgency to what had the trappings of a civil war.

The fog effect, which continues, is persistent and has included claims that important progress was being made, in spite of well-documented and visible evidence to the contrary. The fog has now been pierced. As the facts become more manifest, it is increasingly clear that information has been tightly held and in some cases distorted to paint a more favorable picture than the facts indicated.

There is a limit to how long you can put an acceptable face on unacceptable outcomes, including monetary and human costs of the conflict. There are several downsides that now become rather hard to deny. U.S. credibility has been diluted internationally. The war has also served to strengthen and embolden global terrorism, rather than promote the process of defeating it.

The information used to gain approval for the Iraq War now raises serious questions that have not been fully answered. It is now very safe to say that the United States attacked another country for reasons that cannot be justified. That is a serious matter, and cannot simply be explained by saying that Hussein was a dictator that deserved to be removed from power.

III Scale-down and withdrawal.

There has been no scaleback, although pressure has been building to start pulling back. However, in the short run, there has actually been some increase in force level on the ground in Iraq (the “surge”). U.S. forces stand in the cross hairs of what looks very much like a civil war along sectarian lines— Suni against Shia against Kurd. The extreme overextension of the U.S. military at present makes it difficult to continue the current operational tempo over an extended period, especially years.

The fog effect continues to be soupy and thick, but it now seems to be getting peeled back layer by layer. Contributing to this is a feeling by the American public that to remain in Iraq for an extended period would be a mistake.

Will the fog peel back sufficiently that there can be a logical and timely response to events? The alternative is “decision by indecision,” and being forced to make decisions under duress that further narrow U.S. options.

To respond effectively to a crisis requires sharing of critical information. That is not being done to the extent necessary, some of it constrained by bitter political partisanship.

IV Taking stock and refining strategies.

This process of taking stock is now occurring “on the fly” in the heat of the crisis (e.g., the Iraqi Study Group).

The Iraqi Study Group provides the hope that the situation can be clarified, laid bare through thorough analysis, with logical and viable strategies for change presented.

A clear assessment is now possible. There is a strong tide running that wants to now confront the issues and solve them. It has bipartisan political support. That is a very positive sign.

It is better to do front-end analysis than rear-end analysis. The first can nip problems in the bud. The rear-end varieties are where you can learn to avoid repeating mistakes.

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In a democracy, the primary defense is the citizens of the country, their understanding, support, trust, and willingness to sacrifice. They must play their role and not blindly accept what they are being told is true. That requires an educated and informed citizenry. It also requires political leadership that tells the absolute truth every day, without spin. Democracy, like capitalism, is about supply and demand—the supply of trust and the demand for truth. CLOSING SUMMARY The Iraq War is a war that was probably unnecessary. It is also an example of an unjustified preemptive attack on another country, thus undermining the moral authority of the United States in the world. The war was poorly conceived and executed, although there are some credible strategic arguments that the war may have been warranted. There are many forms of pressure that the United States could have brought to bear on Iraq, short of an invasion of the country. The United States could have also done a better job of seeking advice from other countries, rather than “stiff arming” them. It also could have given the UN process more time to work. There was much goodwill toward America after the 9/11/2001 attacks. That represented important leverage. However, the United States, in many ways, demonstrated a willingness and intent to go it alone. That caused the United States to be perceived as arrogant, insensitive to the views of others, and even immature in its dealings with the international community. The United States squandered its large reserve of goodwill and sympathy following 9/11. It ended up with a patchwork quilt of coalition partners, and a coalition not nearly so robust as the first George Bush was able to bring together for the First Gulf War through exercise of well-honed diplomatic skills. As a result, the United States has ended up with a mess in Iraq, several dimensions of which are outlined in this book. The government made some glaring miscalculations going into the conflict, and then compounded the problems by further mistakes once the Hussein Regime had been overthrown. The fogs of both war and peace caused decisions to be made that were not well aligned with reality. When one operates based on a false view of reality, created by the fog of bad, distorted information or noninformation, it can be almost impossible to plot a true course and have the right goals in view. The Iraq War proves over and over again that bad information leads to bad decisions, and that if there are no counterpoints or questioning insights from the press, public, and Congress, misinformation flourishes. However, ultimately, the fog starts to disperse. At some point the bad information is piled so high that it starts to topple. We saw that in the

The War in Iraq

Watergate episode, Pentagon Papers, and now see it again in much of what is going on today. At some point the “house of cards” begins to tumble. That is what is happening with the War in Iraq in 2008. Many hope that a return to truth and forthrightness will lead to positive change. There is an old saying in the U.S. Army that “you can’t fool the troops,” at least not for long. This applies equally, we trust and hope, to the American people. Lincoln was right.

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6

Lebanon War II: Case Study In the 1960s, a commercial airliner headed for Japan was likely to refuel at Wake Island, far out in the Pacific. As the aircraft approached, the atoll looked like a flyspeck in a large sea of blue. And as the plane drew closer and circled to land, Wake Island seemed like a postage stamp, akin to landing on the deck of an aircraft carrier. When one looks at a map of the Middle East and zooms in on Israel, one is reminded of tiny Wake Island. Israel is a narrow strip of land surrounded by its Muslim neighbors. The total land area of Israel (within the Green Line, as the 1967 borders are called) is slightly smaller than New Jersey, 20,770 sq km (about 8,000 sq mi). Israel’s population at the start of 2008 was 7.241 million residents. Of this figure, 75.6 percent are Jewish (5.472 million), and 20 percent are Arab (1.449 million). Lebanon is an even smaller nation state, only half the size of Israel, 10,400 sq km (4,015 sq mi) in land area and a population of 3.874 million. When one contrasts Israel and Lebanon with their neighbor, Syria, the contrasts become even more striking. Syria has 185,180 sq km (71,500 sq mi) of land area and a population of 18.881 million, 70 percent larger than the population of Israel and Lebanon combined. Israel borders six neighboring countries/territories: 1. West Bank (307 km) (191 mi) 2. Egypt (238 km) (148 mi) 3. Jordan (238 km) (148 mi)

Lebanon War II 4. Lebanon (79 km) (49 mi) 5. Syria (76 km) (47 mi) 6. Gaza (51 km) (32 mi)

All told, Israel’s borders amount to 989 km (615 mi). In its economy, Israel represents a sharp contrast with its neighbors, with a per capita GDP (adjusted for the purchasing power of its currency) in 2007 of $31,767, according to the World Bank’s World Economic Outlook, ranking 18th in the world. The economy focuses primarily on the service sector (65.7 percent of GDP), with industry ranking second (31.7%). Agriculture represents only 2.6 percentof the economy. Even though Israel has a robust economy, 21 percent of the population falls below the poverty line. The literacy rate is 95.4 percent. It is important to note that the average income level for Israel’s large number of Arab citizens is well below that for Jewish citizens. Another of Israel’s neighbors is Jordan, with a land area of 93,300 sq km (36,000 sq mi). Its population is 5.906 million, about 22 percent less than Israel. Egypt, another neighbor, occupies 995,940 sq km (385,345 sq mi) and has a population of 78.877 million. Hence, apart from Lebanon, compared to its larger neighbors Israel is a “Wake Island,” sandwiched between much larger chunks of real estate. In spite of its size, Israel has shown that it can build a valuable agricultural base through irrigation. Israelis have made desert land flower. They have also become a leader in industry and in use of advanced technologies, including, as widely assumed, the possession of nuclear weapons, even though Israel is not officially listed as a nuclear power. Israel’s dynamic entrepreneurial high-tech sector has been called “Silicon Wadi,” after America’s Silicon Valley, which it resembles. Israel has also proved its ability to maintain a strong military capability, with a well-engineered system for rapidly mobilizing reserve forces in the event of national emergency. It has the most formidable military force in the region in terms of weaponry, including airpower and a large and wellequipped ground force upon full mobilization. Despite the impact of the conflict with Lebanon and Hezbollah in 2006, Israel’s economy grew by more than 5 percent, showing resilience. Israel’s history, including its 1948 War of Independence leading to the creation of the Jewish State in 1948, has been punctuated with armed conflicts with its neighbors (1948–1949, 1956–1957, 1967, and 1973). Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 to expel the PLO from the country. There were frequent clashes between Hezbollah forces and the Israeli military throughout the 1990s. In 2000, Israel withdrew its forces from Lebanon and in September 2004, under the terms of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559, the Lebanese government was to use its army to keep Southern Lebanon free of weapons and combatants, including Hezbollah, which could

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threaten Israel. However, Lebanon took no real action. Hezbollah rearmed, with the active support and intervention of Iran and Syria. There has been an environment of almost constant friction and tension, especially with the Palestinians, throughout Israel’s existence. In each instance of national threat, the Israelis have been able to mobilize themselves to mount an adequate defense, but in some cases, only after great difficulty. The attack by Egypt and Syria in October 1973, called the Yom Kippur War, caught the Israelis by surprise during the Day of Atonement. The Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal before the Israeli forces could respond, quickly eliminating a high sand dike erected by Israel with high-pressure water hoses. Initially, Egyptian forces advanced rapidly in the Sinai, with Israeli tactics partially to blame. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) employed what was called an “Iron Fist” doctrine at the time. It called for placing its armored forces up front. However, the Egyptians had effective antitank weapons supplied or purchased from the Soviet Union and they destroyed hundreds of Israeli tanks. In addition, a quarter of the Israeli air force was destroyed by Russian SAM antiaircraft missiles. The fate of Israel hung in the balance at one point. However, the IDF recovered quickly and began employing infantry and armor as more of a combined arms team. There were also occasions of great audacity on the part of the Israeli forces to gain the upper hand. General Ariel Sharon, defying instructions from his superiors, raced his armor across the Suez Canal in broad daylight on one of the Egyptian bridges that had been put in place. He did this with such speed, that some of the Egyptian forces assumed it was their own armor recrossing the bridge. He then cleared the West bank of the Suez Canal, ending up with an entire Egyptian Army cut off and under siege in the Sinai. There was similar ferocity in defending other sectors, including IDF forces that, while far outnumbered, successfully repelled the Syrian forces on the Golan Heights. Serving a tour in the Pentagon in Washington during this period as a U.S. Army major, I (Dilworth) was visiting the office of a U.S. Army brigadier general. The general was serving in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). He closed the door to his office and said, “If you have a few minutes, I will brief you on the war (the Yom Kippur War of 1973, which was in its final stages). ” He undraped a wall-size map of the battle area, and reviewed the key events. He pointed out what he considered the key to Israeli success, and for that matter the key to victory on any battlefield. He said, “When the Egyptians went beyond page one of their war plan, fighting with Soviet tactics, they ran out of ideas on how to respond to actual events that were unfolding. The Israeli’s, on the other hand, kept improvising and modifying tactics as the battle progressed.” He went on to say, “Here is the big lesson to take away and remember. “The kennel dogs always lose and the wild dogs always win.” The Egyptians

Lebanon War II

were the kennel dogs in this instance, trying to fight a set-piece type of battle. The Israelis, on the other hand, stayed fluid, for the most part, allowed their forces to improvise on the spot, and readily discarded what didn’t work in favor of other approaches. They were wild dogs, unbounded by administrative restrictions and empowered to act. This success by the IDF during the Yom Kippur War probably helped fuel a sense of invincibility on the part of the Israelis. It led to a “halo effect”—the Israeli military always wins, no matter what. You will hear Israelis say, “Thank God for the IDF. They will always carry us through.” The military is a revered institution in Israeli society, and when you look at the track record, you can well understand why. To some degree, events in Lebanon War II have shaken ordinary Israelis’ faith in their military, though far less than in the political leadership that directs the military. Lebanon represents a very interesting case, as the section in Chapter 2— Lebanon: The Consistency of Folly—highlights. Israel and Lebanon could have been economic partners, as has occurred to a significant degree with Egypt and Jordan, countries with which Israel signed peace agreements. However, Lebanon has almost unswervingly stood as an opponent to Israel. There have also been times in its history when it has been economically successful. Until the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990), Lebanon was a relatively prosperous state. Later, by 2006, Lebanon had largely rebuilt its infrastructure after great destruction during the Civil War and was attracting over a million tourists a year. Beirut was bustling with economic activity. The country seemed to be growing in stability and was proud of its progress. A watershed point occurred with the assassination of former President Hariri in February 2005, widely assumed to have been orchestrated by the Syrians. This triggered large street protests, and under pressure from the Lebanese, the United States, the United Nations, and world community, the Syrian intelligence services and military were induced to exit Lebanon. This seemed a positive sign, and another step forward for Lebanon. However, on July 12, 2006 the Israel-Lebanon Conflict began, a conflict that would erase many of the notable strides forward in Lebanon. It began with the capture of two IDF soldiers during a Hezbollah cross-border raid into Northern Israel. This came on the heels of the capture of an IDF soldier in Southern Israel, when Hamas forces tunneled into Israel in order to launch the attack. This attack by Hamas seems to have been instigated by Iran in coordination with Hezbollah in Lebanon. The response by Israel to both sets of abductions was swift. There is a credo in Israeli society that everything possible will be done to recover any of their military personnel, dead or alive. Initial probes by the IDF to recover the soldiers brought a blunt response from Hezbollah, with hostilities quickly growing in intensity. Soon, Hezbollah began launching rockets into Northern Israel, at peak totaling as many as 200 rockets in a day, and 4,000 rockets in all during the thirty-four-day

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war. The Israeli air force responded with broad attacks on Hezbollah strongholds, including those in south Beirut, with devastating effect. However, the air attacks did not suppress the rocket attacks emanating from Southern Lebanon. In fact, they increased. Later it was discovered that Hezbollah had been operating, in part, out of hardened bunkers, some with blast doors, to neutralize even bunker-busting bombs, a technique taught them by Iranian experts. They also placed rocket launchers in the midst of civilians, including the use of apartments in occupied buildings as launch sites. (The Iranian antiship missile fired at an Israeli missile boat offshore was launched from a Beirut apartment.) The Katyusha rockets that were primarily used for these attacks weigh only about forty pounds. Therefore, they could be moved about easily and quickly, even by motorbike, donkey, or other means. This conflict proved a great liability to both Israel and Lebanon, a conflict not brought about by the Lebanese government per se, but rather by a terrorist organization that it had permitted to occupy and gain influence in its territory.1 Had Lebanon lived up to its responsibilities under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559, to which it was a signatory, the Hezbollah would have technically not been in a position to launch the attacks on Israel. That would have avoided the death and destruction that Lebanon ended up experiencing. In a very real sense, Lebanon had once again led itself down the wrong path and ended up paying a heavy price. For its part, the IDF moved very slowly and hesitantly on the ground under the direction of its Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and a defense minister who had little or no military background. (When a new IDF Chief of Staff was promoted, with the prime minister and defense minister officiating, the latter pinned the insignia of rank on his shoulder upside down. No one laughed when the outgoing Chief of Staff corrected it.) Israel finally mobilized a sizable ground force on the border with Southern Lebanon but it was allowed to sit idly for several days, apparently awaiting a government determination of what to do next as international efforts at diplomacy proceeded. Those forces finally moved into Lebanon to clean out the area of weapons and Hezbollah fighters, but time was running out before a cease-fire took effect. The launch of a major attack hours before an expected cease-fire was later the focus of an investigatory committee. There were several casualties of this conflict in Israel. r Israel’s international reputation had been tarnished, and public opinion in the Arab world and elsewhere turned ferociously against Israel. The media initiatives of Hezbollah proved largely successful in painting Israel as a country waging war on civilians, even though the facts proved otherwise. This “fog effect” was highly effective. The Hezbollah rockets were by their very nature inaccurate and indiscriminate. By focusing repeatedly on those few instances when Israeli “smart bombs” went astray and

Lebanon War II killed civilians, Hezbollah was able to project imagery in the Arab media that showed Israel to be doing indiscriminate targeting. When Israel did not actively and aggressively counter such claims, the claims came to be accepted as true. r Israeli Military Intelligence (MI) reports and those generated by the Mossad Intelligence Organization were largely ignored by the government. The buildup of fortifications and a virtual honeycomb of bunkers and rocket launching sites in Lebanon, built over a six-year period, did not go undetected by the intelligence services, although it can be argued that they did not accurately size this effort or accurately judge Hezbollah’s military capabilities and intentions. Prime Ministers Ehud Barak and Ariel Sharon were apparently aware of what was occurring, but elected not to wage a preventive war and open up a second front, while focusing on preventing terrorist activities in Gaza and the West Bank. It is not the first time in history that intelligence indicators have been ignored or downplayed. Most recently, some critical intelligence indicators were ignored leading up to 9/11. r The most troubling casualty was Israel’s vaunted military and its deterrent effect. After the cease-fire took effect, and it was possible to begin peeling back the layers of what had occurred, multiple problems were revealed. It began at the top and centered on questions of professional competency by the prime minister and the defense minister. By most accounts it had been a stumbling and indecisive performance. But it didn’t stop there. It also seemed to run down through the ranks. The general in charge of Northern Command, Major General Udi Adam, had to be pulled out of the line up during the conflict. Accusations have also been made against the competence of the division commanders in the IDF. Deficiencies in training of IDF forces have also surfaced, as well as insufficient funding of defense-related systems. Had the Israeli military trained for the wrong kind of war? After the conflict, mobs of angry Army reservists formed outside the home of the prime minister to protest the way the war had been conducted. Ultimately, events cost the Chief of Staff, an Air Force officer, his job. He had overemphasized airpower and downplayed the need for ground forces. One factor driving the negative perception of IDF performance by Israelis was the expectation that the IDF was capable of defeating an adversary in short order, what may be called a “six-day war syndrome” (after the 1967 Six-Day War). That had largely been the pattern before, and it had come to be accepted as the way things would be in the future.

The fact that Hezbollah was not defeated by the IDF quickly or decisively gave it “bragging rights” in the Arab World. They had stood up to the most powerful military in the region for thirty-four days, something no one else had been able to do. As Israel agonized over its military’s difficulties,

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Hezbollah gloated about it. This allowed Hezbollah to claim victory (in part because Israel’s soul-searching appeared to validate its failure) with international public opinion, and especially the Arab world, which seemed to echo their sentiments and exult. Hezbollah even made the cover of The Economist as “Nasarallah Wins the War” (August 19–25, 2006). Hasan Nasarallah is the leader of Hezbollah, holding the post of Secretary General. VISIBILITY OF COUNTRIES ON THE WORLD STAGE The Middle East, as a generic label, has wide recognition around the world, usually conjuring up images of a hot flaming cauldron of continuous conflict. As pointed out elsewhere in the book, this name recognition does not translate to a depth of knowledge or understanding. The average American knows very little about the Middle East, including its history, geography, or the festering issues that keep the environment of conflict alive. To suggest that there is a strategic connection between events in Iran, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and elsewhere takes the average person beyond the limits of his or her comprehension. The average American simply sees little reason to become emotionally involved in what is happening in the Middle East. It is a distant place, and there is little in their formal education experience to create interest or a sense of connection to events there. In the case of Israel, knowledge of it in the United States is much more complete than for the Middle East in general. There is an engrained belief that the United States is the protector of Israel’s sovereignty and right to exist. History can be shaped by personal relationships. A Jewish friend and business associate of Harry Truman before he became president, Eddie Jacobson, had informed Truman about the issues related to creation of an Israeli State. That apparently played a significant role in Truman’s support for the creation of a Jewish state. In his book on Truman (1992), David McCullough, writes: When the Chief Rabbi of Israel, Isaac Halevi Herzog, called at the White House, he told Truman, “God put you in your mother’s womb so that you could be the instrument to bring the rebirth of Israel after two thousand years.”“I thought he was overdoing things,” said David Niles [who witnessed this], “but when I looked over at the President, tears were running down his cheeks.”2

This strong support for Israel influences U.S. foreign policy today and it could be seen in the support Israel received during the conflict with the Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006. The United States also has a small (5.5 million) but vocal Jewish minority. Memories of the Holocaust have been kept vividly alive through museums and film (e.g., the movie Schindler’s List).

Lebanon War II

Hence, for the reasons outlined, Israel has become a part of the American psyche. The risk is that it can become a block to consideration of multiple points of view that can generate a very thick fog in its own right. The world is not solely a black or white place. Because the United States tends to adopt a one-sided point of view to the Middle East conflict, it undercuts its ability to be an honest broker and exert influence on both sides when trying to negotiate peaceful solutions. This reduces the ability of the United States to broker solutions that can benefit both Israeli and Arab interests. In other words, a one-sided U.S. foreign policy can work against the strategic interests of Israel and the stability of the entire region. As President Bush and his Secretary of State seek to broker a Middle East peace agreement, as their legacy, this perception in the Arab world of American one-sidedness is a major stumbling block. Knowledge of Lebanon in the United Sates is largely nonexistent. When it has surfaced, it has been oriented toward a specific event, such as the bombings by Hezbollah in the early 1980s that killed over 200 U.S. Marines and a number of French peacekeepers near Beirut. That was a momentary crisis, but when it abated and the United States withdrew its peacekeepers, Lebanon once again went off the television screen. The Palestinians have been more visible, usually in relation to suicide bombings and terrorist attacks. That is unfortunate because this negative perception masks the discontent and severe problems that confront the Palestinians, which have helped foster the attacks. While such attacks are brutal and defy human decency, from the Palestinian perspective, they can be viewed as the only real avenue open to them in effectively giving voice to their concerns and gaining traction in promoting their interests, and in preserving their honor in battling a perceived oppressor. Millions of Palestinians have been displaced and squeezed into refuge camps for over half a century. From the standpoint of policy governing displaced refugees, this stands in violation of international law, something that is routinely overlooked. The Palestinians have not been treated well by the Israeli state, including the seizure of their lands for Israeli settlements and other territorial encroachments. As former U.S. President Jimmy Carter indicates clearly in the title of his book, Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid (an unfortunate choice of title that aroused serious protests), there needs to be an effort to bring peace to the Middle East that challenges the entire world.3 That will require us to question old assertions that concentrate on maneuvering for gain and adversarial gaming. King Abdullah of Jordan addressed a Joint Session of the U.S. Congress in March 2007, expressing the belief that resolution of the Palestinian issue is core to everything else, and said we are probably looking at the “last chance” to bring such resolution—though the phrase “last chance” has been used repeatedly in this context in the past. Peace will not be realized in the Middle East until the Palestinian issues are addressed head on, rather than continually marginalized.

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There is something incongruous about a state, Israel, that has the history of the Holocaust in its collective memory, and can in good conscience promote polices that can be severely deleterious to the health, welfare, and future prosperity of the Palestinian people. In its worst manifestation, it is forgetting Israel’s heritage and embarking on policies that undermine that heritage. The potential for making major gains seems rather stark, but only because there has been very little done to advance goodwill and understanding. Too often an act, such as Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, was interpreted as a sign of weakness by the Palestinians and the Arab world, rather than an attempt at reconciliation of differences. Israel has little margin to play with. Its land area is small and tightly bounded by borders with hostile neighbors, such as Syria and Lebanon (driven by the Hezbollah state within a state). The situation is further aggravated by Iran’s intent to exert wider influence in the region and the declaration of its president that Israel should be wiped off the map. A small nation like Israel has to avoid undue risk to its survival. Unlike larger nations, Israel’s survival remains an ongoing issue and colors its strategy and behavior. The keys to policies that can bring an improved climate in the Middle East are broader involvement by the world community, a more balanced stance by the United States, and greater give and take by Israel, Iran, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as the Hamas and Hezbollah movements. This can open up dialogue that can lead to greater mutual trust. Inducing Hezbollah to be reciprocal in such an undertaking runs counter to their professed intent to undermine Israel in every way possible. Hamas will also be difficult to deal with. It refuses to recognize the existence of Israel (unlike the PLO) and is bent on Israel’s destruction, a goal supported by Iran. Before discarding a proposition that sees the hope of real, potential progress as pie in the sky and totally unrealistic, consider recent world history. Who would have thought that the Soviet Union and the Cold War would dissolve? Watching people dismantle the Berlin Wall with hand chisels was a great moment in human history. In 1985, looking forward in time, would it have seemed plausible that in twenty years the Soviet satellite countries in Eastern Europe would gain independence from their Russian masters and to a significant degree become part of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)? Major change is possible, but it starts with the need to adjust the imagery. In the case of the Middle East, perception needs to shift from one of confrontation to that of cooperation. That is easier said than done, but world history suggests that such shifts are possible. The stakes are high, not only for the Middle East, but for world peace and the defeat of global terrorism. The current situation is lose-lose. Rationality suggests win-win strategies succeed best. But rationality is scarce in the Middle East. However, it is not entirely absent.

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If one looks within Israel itself, one finds that the third largest city, Haifa, has for a very long time demonstrated how Israelis and Arabs can live side by side in harmony, including working together and attending colleges together. It proves that accommodation and cooperation is possible. In 1948, Haifa’s Arabs were asked by its Jews not to flee and were promised safety. Hence, for sixty years, Arab-Jewish relations in Haifa have been very good. Memories in the Mideast are very long. This can work for evil—with repeated cycles of vengeance—or, as in the case of Haifa, for good. In December 2007, President Bush convened a Peace Conference at Annapolis, Maryland. The conference was attended by a number of representatives from the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia and Syria. The Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel attended. This was the first initiative by the United States to broker a peace agreement in seven years. None of the basic sticking points had changed going into the conference, and the Palestinian and Israeli leaders were both unpopular and in weakened positions politically. The fact that the Gaza Strip is now under Hamas control further complicates matters. The conference itself was called on short notice and the agenda was sketchy at best, aside from a statement of hope that a peace agreement could be brought to completion within a year. That is a lofty expectation, given the fact that this initiative has even less going for it than past initiatives that have failed. In addition, the U.S. president entered the conference as a “lame duck,” with only about a year remaining in office. While there is some urgency, including a realization among Arab states that such an agreement can counter Iranian influence in the region, a realist can find little to be optimistic about. Coming to such agreement has much working against it, and the level of distrust between the Israelis and Palestinians has only grown in recent years. Bush’s repeated visits to the region have not had significant positive impact. HEZBOLLAH What is Hezbollah? There seems to be considerable confusion in answering this question. There may also be a tendency to use the term “Hamas” interchangeably with “Hezbollah.” While the two can be allied at times in their conflict with Israel and receive similar support, and even guidance, from Iran, they are distinctly different and represent different forms of Islam. Hamas is Sunni and Hezbollah is Shi’a. Hamas is, of course, primarily centered in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hezbollah also maintains some ties with al Qaeda. Hezbollah was spawned by a distinct version of Islamic Shi’a ideology developed by Ayatolla Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of the Islamic Revolution

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in Iran. Hezbollah began to come together in 1982. That close link with its Iranian roots continues to be strong. An event occurred in 1983 in which Hezbollah seems to have played an important role. Suicide truck bombings killed 241 U.S. Marines and fiftyeight French peacekeepers in Beirut. It tended to put Hezbollah on the map as an organization that would need to be dealt with. From its inception, until the present day, the number one priority of Hezbollah is the elimination of Israel, which it does not consider to be a legitimate or just state. Al Qaeda has become a part of almost every list of terrorist organizations worldwide. The same is not true of Hezbollah. The United States, Israel, the Netherlands, Australia, and Canada consider Hezbollah to be wholly or in part a terrorist organization. However, that is by no means a universal view. Most Arab countries consider Hezbollah to be a legitimate resistance movement. The United Kingdom lists the military wing of Hezbollah as a terrorist group, but not the political side. The European Union does not list Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, nor does Russia. Hezbollah has evolved over time and today is considered to have undergone a “Lebanonization,” becoming a feature of the Lebanese political and social landscape. It runs schools, hospitals, and social programs, as well as playing a key role in infrastructure building projects. In the general election of 2005, it won fourteen of 128 seats nationwide, and all twenty-three seats in Southern Lebanon in the regional elections. In 2004, the Amal-Hezbollah party won 21 percent of the municipalities. All of these results represented gains over previous standings. While it tends to sidestep allegations that it is setting out to create an Islamic state, there can be a suspicion that this is actually Hezbollah’s long-term goal, especially when one considers its Iranian roots. During its early days it had been explicit in wanting that outcome. In the end, Hezbollah seems to have mustered enough power, including the military prowess of its militia, to cower the government into acquiescence, as largely occurred during the conflict with Israel in 2006. In 2008, there is growing tension and undercurrent in Lebanon, punctuated by what appear to be Hezbollah attempts to destabilize the political situation and further weaken the government. Iranian backing is evident, and in May 2008, Saudi Arabia criticized Iran for its activities in Lebanon. A confrontation between Hezbollah and the government in May 2008, when the government attempted to terminate Hezbollah’s private cell phone service (which Hezbollah considers as one of its “weapons”) led to conflict, with Hezbollah seizing a portion of Beirut. The Army stood by without acting, as private militia battled with Hezbollah forces. In the end, the government backed down, further weakening its position. This suggests that Hezbollah may be approaching a point where it will grab for power, especially if Iran stands behind it. There is also the risk of another bloody civil war. This would create almost an untenable situation for Israel, and yet if it

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were to respond with force, it could add fuel to the flames. The best guess is that Hezbollah will continue to progressively weaken the government and try and gain full control through election and administrative processes, thus weakening the ability of Israel or other countries to counter the effort. In the end, Hezbollah does not need a deed to the property to gain its ends. The militant arm of Hezbollah is anything but a ragtag group of guerrillas. It is a highly trained and disciplined force. Its officers undergo intensive training in Iran. It also possesses the most modern weapons and equipment from the arsenals of Syria, Iran, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China. It is not a large force. The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates Hezbollah forces to extend to 600 to 1,000 active fighters, with 3,000 to 5,000 available and 10,000 reservists. According to Jane’s Information Group: Islamic Resistance guerrillas are reckoned to be among the most dedicated, motivated and highly trained of their kind. Any Hezbollah member receiving military training is likely to be in the hands of IRGC (the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps), either in Southern Lebanon or in camps in Iran. The increasingly sophisticated methods used by IRGC members indicate that they are trained using Israeli and U.S. military manuals; the emphasis of this training is on the tactics of attrition, mobility, intelligence gathering and night-time maneuvers.4

Hezbollah used rockets as its instruments of terror during the 2006 conflict with Israel. There were at least five missiles available to Hezbollah during the conflict, with numbers 1, 2, and 5 below used: 1. Katyusha rockets of Russian manufacture (120 millimeter) with a range of 6–15 miles and a 40-pound warhead. This was the primary rocket of choice during the 2006 conflict. 2. Syrian produced model of an Iranian Fajr—3 (240 millimeter) with a range of 30 miles and 200-pound warhead, half of it explosives and the rest shrapnel. This was used in the attack on the railway station in Haifa that killed eight and wounded more than twenty 3. Fajr-5 type missile (333 millimeter) with a range of 40–45 miles and a 400-pound warhead. 4. Iranian Zelzel missile with a range of 60–80 miles. This missile could have reached the outskirts of Tel Aviv had it been used. 5. Iranian C-802 missile, radar guided, used in an attack on an Israeli missile boat.

To support the operations with which Hezbollah is involved takes a great deal of capital. Much of the money apparently comes from donations. Support in both weapons and money also comes from Iran. The U.S.

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Treasury Department has claimed that some of the money comes from the counterfeiting of U.S. currency. Following the attack on the World Trade Center on 9/11, Hezbollah denounced the attack, while not commenting on the attack on the Pentagon. Hezbollah has also claimed that it is staying strictly away from any involvement in Iraq and has no desire to target Americans. The picture it currently paints of itself is as an organization that in effect confines its activity to Lebanon, albeit with some assistance to Hamas in Gaza. This has not always been the case. Hezbollah was blamed for the 1996 suicide bombing of the Khobar Towers apartment complex in Saudi Arabia, in which nineteen were killed. It is also blamed for the 1994 bombing of a Jewish Community Center in Argentina in which eighty-five were killed. Hezbollah justifies its attacks on civilian targets in Israel, such as occurred during the 2006 conflict, on the basis of defending Lebanon. Hezbollah has become highly skilled in using the media as a weapon during both peaceful lulls (Fog of Peace) and during periods of active conflict (Fog of War), manipulating the imagery so that it conveys a story that is damaging to the opponent. Hezbollah has its own TV network, Al Manar. They used this with telling effect against Israel in 2006. Their media would seize on something that was potentially damaging to Israel, magnify it, alter it, and then use it repeatedly and relentlessly to drive home the desired point. Imagery related to the death of children was extensively used. Repeated efforts by Israel’s Air Force to put Al Manar out of action failed. Hezbollah is equally effective in its public relations within Lebanon. Its work in support of social programs has garnered much goodwill from the citizenry. Polls reflect this. During the conflict in 2006, 87 percent of the Lebanese supported Hezbollah. In 2004, 74 percent of Christian Lebanese viewed Hezbollah as a resistance organization (not a terrorist organization). In Gaza, 79.6 percent had “a very good view” of Hezbollah.5 Hezbollah continued to concentrate on generating such goodwill after the August 2006 cease-fire took effect. Their operatives were immediately out in the street with clipboards, going house to house, to determine what assistance would be helpful. This included handing over $10,000 in U.S. currency to families that had their homes destroyed in the bombing, together with an assurance that Hezbollah would rebuild their homes within one year. This was probably made possible by a special infusion of Iranian money. This Hezbollah effort, as well as that of the government, has since stumbled to some extent and failed to deliver promised improvements on schedule. In sum, Hezbollah is a force to be reckoned with. It bolstered its position in Lebanon, the Arab Community, and broader world community as a result of the conflict in 2006 with Israel. While some Lebanese are probably inclined to conclude that Lebanon as a whole came out the loser, most seem to stand by Hezbollah and support what it did. Israel on the other hand lost ground. Hezbollah, supported by Syria, has blocked efforts

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by Lebanon’s Parliament to choose a new Parliament, creating a stalemate that had crisis potential. Recently a compromise was made. THE WAR ITSELF AND THE AFTERMATH The patterns that emerged during the thirty-four-day encounter between Israel and Hezbollah quickly fell into a pattern—massive rocket attacks by Hezbollah were followed by massive air strikes by Israel. Both sides accelerated the intensity of the exchange. In the meantime over one million Israelis remained in bomb shelters for more than a month. Israelis sheltered at their workplace would wait for the all-clear to sound and then go right back to work, an indication of engrained resilience in a population that has come to live with multiple threats. Israel’s GDP growth in 2006 accelerated to over 5 percent, despite the month-long war that closed Northern factories. The employment of ground forces by the Israelis was intermittent, hesitant, and followed by periods of apparent regrouping. The Israeli public could detect the indecisiveness and it became more and more inexplicable and out of phase with what the public had come to expect from their military. Anger turned against the civilian leadership initially, but as time went on it became apparent that something was out of step in the military itself. Not everything could be blamed on higher political authority. The most cataclysmic event of the conflict was the Israeli air attack on the Lebanese city of Qana in July 2006. It did more to turn international public opinion against Israel than any other event. Israel claimed that one of its missiles went astray striking an apartment building. One Israeli official suggested the possibility that the building had collapsed several hours after the air strike for unrelated reasons, such as an ammunition explosion. In any case, there was no question that a number of civilians died in the incident, including a number of women and children. The Lebanese Red Cross counted twenty-seven bodies, including about seventeen children, the youngest being ten months old. News agencies reported as many as fifty-six dead. Hezbollah placed great media attention on this event, including graphic pictures of the carnage that would not have been allowed to appear in the American media. There is also evidence that still photographs were altered by the Hezbollah to make the air attack seem more extensive than it actually was (e.g., multiple smoke plumes over the city versus the one plume that had actually been present). The Hezbollah colored the event as more than a missile that had somehow ended up misdirected. They portrayed it as part of a planned pattern of attacks by the Israeli Air Force against civilian targets. It can be posited that this was the point in time when Israel lost the media war. Its response was muddled, hesitant, and ineffective, as if it were unschooled in how to deal with such potentially injurious media events. Israel ended up suspending its bombing campaign for forty-eight hours in

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order to investigate what had happened, and presumably revisited its rules of engagement. So intense was the international and Arab reaction that U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had to cancel a planned trip to Beirut. Apparently, she knew of the Qana debacle when meeting with Israeli officials, who initially denied it had happened. As the cease-fire approached, there was a plan in the works to employ a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in Southern Lebanon along with Lebanese Army troops. This force was to create a buffer zone in Southern Lebanon and do what UN Security Resolution 1559 had called for from the outset. Could Israel really expect the Lebanese Army forces to act against Hezbollah forces when an indeterminate percentage of those forces could be expected to be either members of Hezbollah or its sympathizers? Would UNIFIL really do its job? Tensions developed between Israel and UNIFIL, especially as concerns with Israel’s reconnaissance flights over Lebanese air space to collect intelligence information continued. UNIFIL even threatened to shoot down Israeli aircraft, including use of antiaircraft missiles against Israeli jets. Israeli scholar Guy Bechor places matters in strategic perspective in his article, “What is Perceived as Empowering in the Middle East Weakens Israel’s Image in the West.”6 He starts out with a question, “Did the horrific scenes of Lebanese casualties shown daily on TV screens worldwide during the recent war in Lebanon weaken or strengthen Israel?” He answers the question by saying it is a paradox; What is perceived as empowering in the Middle East weakens Israel’s image in the West, particularly Europe; and what is perceived in the Middle East as weakness, is perceived as empowering in world opinion.

He goes on to say, The images of Lebanese casualties were perceived as powerful deterrent acts in the Middle East, but sparked harsh criticism globally . . . Experience in the Middle East shows that demonstration of power is more durable in the Middle East’s collective consciousness. Damages to world opinion can be rectified more quickly.

Bechor concludes that regional power is the most important commodity for Israel. He then goes on to say how Israel can in effect win on both regional and international fronts, as Israel looks to the future—breaking out of this paradox. It can do that, in his view, by embarking on belligerent action under the type of conditions that existed during the initial phases of the second Lebanon war, but “Israel must utilize international institutions which it usually holds in contempt.” He also suggests that Israel needs to

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establish a well-oiled public relations network that could be activated on short notice. GAZA AND HAMAS—THE OTHER FRONT One cannot detach Gaza and Hamas from the situation with Hezbollah in Lebanon. The two conflicts are interconnected. Both Hamas and Hezbollah believe that they face a common enemy, Israel. They also share a common sponsor, Iran. In some respects, their religious beliefs also bind them together, even though they come from opposite ends of the Muslim spectrum—Hamas is Sunni and Hezbollah is Shi’a. Hezbollah appears more cohesive, coherent, focused, and well organized than Hamas. In June 2007, Hamas was able to seize control of Gaza by force. They persist in refusing to recognize Israel’s right to exist, and that represents an absolute block to any negotiations between Hamas and the Israeli government. While the focus has frequently been on the Gaza Strip, there is a concentration of Palestinians on the West Bank as well, plus many scattered over the region as displaced persons. When Hamas gained power in Gaza in elections held in January of 2006, it was as if they outran their script at that point. They have had obvious difficulties governing. Their failure to recognize Israel has caused them considerable fiscal difficulty as external funding from the world community dried up and sanctions were imposed. The situation in Gaza has become increasingly dire. Adequate water, electricity, food, and basic public services have become extremely critical. It is a dismal place to be in. People are operating at the bare subsistence level. Since the Israeli army and settlers withdrew from Gaza in 2005 living conditions have not improved. Hamas treated the withdrawal of the Israeli settlers and military presence from Gaza as a sign of weakness. Rather than beginning a process of cooperation, Hamas seemed intent on exploiting this “victory.” Hamas was created in 1987 by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin of the Gaza Wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas views the State of Israel, Gaza Strip, and West Bank as “an inalienable Islamic waqf or religious bequest, which can never be surrendered to non-Muslims.”7 The Hamas charter calls for the eventual creation of an Islamic Republic in place of Israel. This was not voiced publicly during the campaign to gain power in Gaza. In February 2005, the Hamas political leader Khaled Mashal offered to stop armed struggle against Israel if it agreed to return to its 1967 borders, withdraw from all Palestinian territories, and accept the demand for Palestinian “Right of Return.” The Right of Return would give millions of people, who have been refugees, the right to live within the boundaries of Israel. That would be like giving Manhattan Island in New York City back to the Indians. Too much water has gone over the dam to make it practical. A more practical plan is to pay compensation to many of the refugees.

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Those countries and organizations labeling Hamas a terrorist organization, include the United States, Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, Israel, and the European Union. Hamas is banned in Jordan. There is an interesting distinction drawn by the EU, which categorizes Hamas as a terrorist organization, but not Hezbollah. Hamas has a long track record of attacks against Israeli targets, including suicide bombings. They freely mix civilian and military targets. The most deadly attack was the one in 2002 on the Park Hotel in Netanya on March 27, killing thirty people and wounding 140 others. This is also referred to as the Passover Massacre, since it took place on the first festival night of Passover. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have become a popular weapon. A priority has apparently been given to acquiring weapons like those used successfully by Hezbollah during the 2006 conflict with Israel. Funding of Hamas activities comes from a variety of sources, including private donors in Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich Persian Gulf states. Iran provides substantial funding support. Having won the January 2006 legislative elections, Hamas can now tap into public coffers for support. REVIEW/DEBRIEF ON LEBANON WAR II The current situation may be regarded as one of the most dangerous periods in the history of Israel, with its survival and well-being seriously challenged. This threat comes from within Israel as well as from outside. The internal threat is from a government that no longer seems sure of its course or how to mobilize in a rational way to take action. This has stabilized somewhat since the conflict in 2006, and the military seems to have essentially recovered under a new Minister of Defense. The late veteran military commentator Ze’ev Schiff stated this clearly: Sometimes a country has to take a slap in the face in order to wake up to the changed reality around it. That is what happened in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, in which 2,600 were killed, and in the Al-Aqsa Intifada, which claimed more than 1,000 victims. Now Israel has gotten a slap during the war with Hezbollah. It is unfortunate that each time, the searing of Israel’s consciousness involves losses, destruction and suffering.

The other side of the coin, as Schiff pointed out, is that the Arab states have also received a wake-up call, but in the opposite direction. They see opportunity rather than threat. Schiff states: In the Arab states, too, there are many who think the war has created a new reality. In their perception, the Israeli Defense Forces are having a hard time subduing Hezbollah. In Syria they are wondering whether the time hasn’t come to liberate the Golan Heights by force. Advocates of peace

Lebanon War II with Israel in the Arab world are on the defensive. If this is a trend, the way is being paved for another round of war.

GLOBAL FACTORS There has been a lengthening shadow over events in the Middle East. It is Iran. While it is not a visible combatant in either Gaza or Lebanon, its presence is palpable and strongly felt. Long an adversary of Israel, this Shi’a country, which is not an Arab state, is at least as vehement an opponent of Israel as Hezbollah, Hamas, Syria, or other nations in the Arab axis that deny Israel the right to exist. What elevates concerns in relation to Iran, is its perceived intent to join the community possessing nuclear weapons. Iran is the dominant factor on the global chessboard right now in terms of Israel. It presents the largest challenge for Israel and can be a danger to a number of other countries as well. Lately, Iran has asked to attend Arab League meetings, even though Iran is not an Arab country. Princeton University scholar of Islam Bernard Lewis, in his commentary on August 22, 2006, points out the unique risks associated with a nuclear Iran. He says: There is a radical difference between the Islamic Republic of Iran and other governments with nuclear weapons. This difference is expressed in what can only be described as the apocalyptic worldview of Iran’s present leaders.8

Lewis points out that while an attack on the United States is unlikely any time soon, a nuclear attack on Israel would be easier to carry out, even though Israel would almost certainly destroy Iran in a nuclear counterattack. This brings one to the point of having to adjust one’s thinking when it comes to ethics, and what is appropriate in the eyes of the Iranian leadership and radical Islam world. Lewis says it centers on the phrase, “Allah will know its own.” If Palestinians die in a nuclear attack against Israel, it is really inconsequential. They will go directly to Heaven. The non-Muslims, the Jews, and Christians, on the other hand, will go straight to Hell. Allah will know who is who. What this all boils down to is that Iran cannot be expected to be shackled to the same constraints that govern the United States, China, or others in the non-Muslim world, where avoidance of self-destruction and concern for human life have greater importance. This changes the entire equation. There is wide recognition that the prospects of an Iran with nuclear weapons cannot be tolerated by the world community. It would be like allowing a crazy person to have his/her finger on the button that could obliterate humanity. Therefore, there is reason to

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believe, while not absolutely assured, that actions will be taken to curb Iran’s appetite for nuclear weapons. Hopefully, that can be brought about short of use of military force, because everyone would lose if it were to come to that. If Iran is not stopped from acquiring nuclear weapons, it presents a worrisome reality, because Iran might in fact use them in the name of Islam. AVAILABILITY OF OPTIONS GOING FORWARD As Guy Bechor pointed out in discussing the Paradox of Power and Weakness in relation to Israel, it takes an array of strategies in order to achieve significant strategic gains. Israel needs to concurrently influence both regional and international perceptions in their favor. It is possible to strengthen their position in the region while also accruing support from the world community. It can be summed up this way, drawing in part from Bechor’s typology. r Respond forcefully, potently, and quickly to any attack. This is something that has historically been the case, except the 2006 conflict in Lebanon seems to have fallen somewhat short in this respect. The use of force must include the use of ground forces, not Special Operational Forces alone, in association with airpower. What occurred in the recent conflict in Lebanon was an overreliance on airpower to do the job. If the intelligence reports had been adequately considered, this should have been obvious. Instead, an Air Force Chief of Staff tilted the response almost totally toward the use of airpower at the outset, holding to the view that airpower alone would bring the foe to heel. Any real student of history knows that this is “fool’s gold.” Airpower is a major ingredient, but it cannot usually stand alone. You must ultimately seize and control ground. r Israel needs to enlist the support and engagement of the international community. As Bechor points out this is contrary to the way Israel is accustomed to doing business. Israel prefers to directly control what occurs. However, there can be major yields from playing this strategy in a genuine way. It can lead to moves by the international community to help control terrorist activities. The truth is that a number of countries in the region understand that if Hezbollah, al Qaeda, Hamas, and Iran flex their muscles, it can also be prejudicial to them. Israel needs to capitalize on these natural partnerships through quiet and discrete diplomacy. Informal alliances can be as effective as formal ones in many cases. King Hussein of Jordan had a number of secret meetings with Israeli officials, and it played an important role in leading to a peace agreement. r Israel needs to direct priority attention and resources to its ability to aggressively and swiftly mount public relations and media campaigns to promote its interests. It deserves an F grade for its performance during the altercation with Hezbollah in this regard. It was inept. Israel came across like it was a babe in the woods, totally unschooled in effective use

Lebanon War II of the media. Israel should start by studying what worked for Hezbollah, and how to quickly counter the distortion and fabrication that they used to influence world opinion. r There needs to be a renewal of efforts to build trust in the Middle East. The Mitchell Plan needs to be revisited. The Concurrent and Immediately Reciprocal Diplomatic Increments (CIRDI) approach we outline in Chapter 8 also deserves consideration. In this approach one begins with reciprocal actions on a limited scale to build trust and create a platform for more comprehensive moves later. It can be argued that failure to achieve peace agreements in the past has stemmed from trying to take too large a bite of out of the apple, without first building the necessary foundation for agreement. Getting dialogue rekindled will be a delicate and tedious process for Israel. Any olive branch that is extended will tend to be viewed as a sign of weakness. That is why it must occur in tandem with the other strategies being outlined. This can begin with some bold moves, such as release of some of the prisoners held by Israel. That would tend to be well received by the world community and could result in some reciprocal moves to free IDF soldiers. The process only works over time and requires patience. Some form of reciprocal movement by both sides can begin to build a foundation for hope, trust, and progress. The thenPLO leader Yasser Arafat attended the funeral of Prime Minister Rabin. There was some good feeling. If Rabin had lived (he was assassinated by Jewish extremist Yigal Amir on November 4, 1995) there might have been further gains possible. King Hussein of Jordan was also an important force for peace, and his son, Abdullah, follows in his footsteps. Polls show that people are tired of the endless conflict on both sides and would welcome moves to ameliorate it. That certainly seems the case in Israel. r Revisit the “Geneva Accord” of 2003 as a potential way to break away from the log jams that have stopped so many peace initiatives in their tracks. This initiative was interesting from several perspectives, even though it was not brought to fruition. First, it was in effect a private initiative to develop a final status agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians, with some funding from the Swiss government. Secondly, the effort was initiated by former Israeli justice minister Yossi Beilin and former Palestinian minister of information Yasser Abed Rabbo. A number of prominent Israelis signed the agreement that was developed, including several legislators (Mks) from the Labor Party. Brigadier-General Giora Inbar was among them. This proposal addressed some of the key issues and specified some important compromises that would need to be made on both sides. These included: 1. An independent and demilitarized Palestine living alongside Israel. 2. The borders would be predicated on the 1967 lines with some modifications, allowing Israel to retain the Gush Etzion settlements, Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, the Jewish Quarter of the Old City,

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Fogs of War and Peace and the settlement of Ma’aleh Edumim, with the Temple Mount under Palestinian authority. The Wailing Wall would be retained by Israel. 3. Israel would decide how many Palestinian refugees would be admitted to their country. There would be only a few returning to Israel. Right of Return would in effect be dropped as an issue.

Polls at the time showed that 20 to 50 percent of both Israelis and Palestinians supported the guidelines outlined in the accord. Two factors holding back broader support were the fact that the “Right of Return” of Palestinians was not recognized, with Israelis resisting the loss of sovereignty over the Temple Mount. Prime Minister Sharon of Israel was quick to condemn the document, as did Labor Party Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Yasser Arafat cautiously welcomed the document. While this effort did not gain sufficient traction to influence events in a decisive manner, it took on issues that had not been readily debated until then. The proposal is marked by great specificity. Parts of this accord, various increments, could possibly be used to reopen critical debate, but only if the hard-line politics could be overcome in both camps. r The opening up of channels of communication with Syria, and broadening dialogue with other countries in the region. There might even be an opportunity, below the radar, to have some form of quiet discussion with Iran. The question becomes, are new policies and directions possible? Leadership is the critical component, as well as political realities. Prime Minister Olmert seems intent on desperately maintaining his political position at all costs, including the broadening of the coalition of parties to bring in political parties far to the right (e.g., Israel Beitenu Party). This move failed, as this party has now left the Coalition. There are legitimate questions about the viability of the present lsraeli political leadership and early signs of impending elections. Prime Minister Olmert’s credibility has been further weakened in 2008 by reports of illegalities that can potentially bring indictment and his resignation.

The Iraq Study Group (ISG) weighed in on the subject of Iran and Syria, stating, Dealing with Iran and Syria is controversial. Nevertheless, it is our view that in diplomacy, a nation should engage its adversaries and enemies to try and resolve conflicts and differences consistent with its own interests. Accordingly, the Support Group [the establishment of which is recommended in their report] should actively engage Iran and Syria in its diplomatic dialogue, without preconditions.

The same principle applies to Israel.

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r Simple acts of humanity can begin to build trust between Israelis and the Palestinians (Awarta, West Bank). An Associated Press article appeared on November 8, 2006, entitled “Palestinians happy with peaceful olive season.” It reports that for six years Jewish settlers on the West Bank had disrupted their olive harvest and attacked olive farmers. Two West Bank olive farmers had been killed and dozens injured. A ruling by the Supreme Court of Israel caused IDF to protect the Palestinian olive groves. This was favorably received by the olive farmers, since olives are the backbone of Palestinian agriculture, generating over $100 million of annual revenue. One Palestinian olive farmer summed it up this way, “This is a way to build trust.” This was a case where the Israeli government at the highest level moved decisively to correct the injustice. The actions were also strongly supported by the Israeli group, “Rabbi’s for Humans Rights.” An aggregation of such acts of simple humanity can begin to ameliorate hatred and build cooperation.

CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE This section is constructed in a way similar to sections on culture in the chapters on Afghanistan and Iraq, except that Israel and Lebanon will be shown in juxtaposition as side-by-side displays. After showing the cultural characteristics of the two countries in relation to Geert Hofstede’s five dimensions of culture, we will focus on the contrasts between the two countries, as well as differences with the United States. Table 6.1 shows the comparative cultural profile of the two countries. In doing the comparison we recognize that Lebanon has historically comprised two groups, the Christians (multiple sects) and the Muslims. While not a perfect gauge, we used Iran as one index for assessing Lebanon’s cultural make up. It also became obvious to us that the antagonist in the conflict with Israel in 2006 was not the Lebanese people per se, even though a large segment of them supported the actions of Hezbollah, but rather Hezbollah itself, as a highly trained and indoctrinated irregular force that functions as a distinctive substream of Lebanese society. Iran is clearly its sponsor and provides what constitutes a governing value set. Further, both Iran and Lebanon are, in terms of their Muslim content, Shi’a. Finally, as reported by Wikipedia online, “Lebanese Society as a whole is well educated and in some respects similar to the cultures of Mediterranean Europe. It is often considered to serve as Europe’s gateway to Western Asia as well as gateway to the Western World.” In sum, there are many influences in play and you are left to draw together the various pieces and make an educated guess, which is what we have done. Whereas Lebanon is not singled out in Hofstede’s research, Israel appears as a distinct entity. Since Hofstede’s later research on Long Term– Short Term, his Fifth Dimension, addresses neither Israel, Lebanon nor Arab

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Fogs of War and Peace Table 6.1. Comparative Cultural Profile of Israel and Lebanon Area

Israel

Lebanon

Individualism vs. Collectivisim

Moderately High

Low

Power Distance Extremely Low Moderate (Note: Iran falls mid-way in Hofstede’s ranking of the fifty countries in his original research in terms of Power Distance) Uncertainty Avoidance

High

Moderate

Masculinity vs. Femininity (Achievement vs. Relationship)

Moderate

Moderate

Long Term vs. Short Term

Moderate

Moderate

centers, we estimated the result from other background information available to us.

ANALYSIS OF THE COMPARATIVE CULTURAL PROFILES AND POTENTIAL FOR CULTURE CLASH The broadest gap between Israel and Lebanon falls in the area of Power Distance. They are at opposite ends of the spectrum. Power Distance is extremely small in Israel, and by our estimate probably moderate in Lebanon. This translates to a propensity on the part of the Israelis to operate “flat” in their organizations, with fewer layers between the top and the bottom of the structure. That can make for greater speed of communication and more rapid decision making. This difference can have an impact on the nature of diplomatic exchanges. In terms of Individualism versus Collectivism, while a less glaring difference between the two countries, is nevertheless significant. Lebanon is more collectivistic than Israel. While Israel has some heritage flowing out of its history of collectivistic kibbutzim in agriculture, they are moderately high in Individualism. It can be argued that this individualism has contributed to their effectiveness in military operations, where individual soldiers are accustomed to making decisions on their own when they are in tough situations. Other cultural dimensions in Hofstede’s typology fall roughly proximate when Israel and Lebanon are compared. When one compares the United States with Lebanon and Israel, one sees some significant similarities and differences. The United States and Lebanon are not well matched in terms of Individualism versus Collectivism. The United States demonstrated a greater Individualism than any of the other forty-nine countries covered in Hofstede’s original research. Lebanon is

Lebanon War II

entirely opposite, with Low Individualism. It is a highly collectivistic society. The United States has small Power Distance, which in Lebanon it is moderate. These two contrasting cultural dimensions can impact on diplomacy involving the two countries and their ability to communicate. The pace of dialogue can be quite different, like two TV programs on different channels. In terms of the United States and Israel, it is a pretty good match, especially from the standpoint of Individualism and Power Distance. Israel has high Uncertainty Avoidance, whereas it is low in the U.S. The Uncertainty Avoidance of Israel seems rooted in historical events. In history, the hopes of the Jewish people have been repeatedly dashed. They have had to live by their wits and be wary of too quickly accepting an environment as safe. They have frequently found themselves on the edge of calamity. They need to make sure whenever possible that certainty is largely assured. They have done that particularly in the realm of National Security. When struck by an enemy, they “pile on” in making absolutely certain that the opponent is conclusively brought to heel. That mold was somewhat broken during the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict. That conflict did not reach a conclusive end and it leaves the Israelis restive, since the outcome does not align well with the cultural preference for Uncertainty Avoidance. As mentioned in Chapter 4, anxiety is the companion piece of uncertainty avoidance, with coping mechanisms brought to bear to ameliorate it. The strong military “security blanket” Israel keeps in place is one such coping mechanism. Religion also serves this purpose, especially among Orthodox Jews. The problem in 2006 was not the fact that Israel purposely turned its back on the need for security. As pointed out, the Fog of Peace masked the true nature of the threat from the Israeli people, while leaders in the government failed to understand that there was a growing jeopardy resident in the progressive buildup of capability by the Hezbollah forces. Because the true situation was masked from them, anxiety among the citizenry was held in check. They believed that their vaunted military was on top of things. Overall, the United States and Israel line up well from the standpoint of cultural dimensions, and one can see this in the relative comfort demonstrated in the relationship between the two countries. Military collaboration has been particularly harmonious and effective. FOG OF PEACE: INTERPRETATION The Israeli government turned its back on the threat from Hezbollah, electing to move ahead with a strategy of status quo. In the end, status quo is a flawed construct when your adversary has a growing capability and propensity to attack you. In the meantime, the Israeli public was in the dark, with events in Gaza and the West Bank tending to distract attention from the Hezbollah threat.

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Table 6.2. Fog of Peace (Israel-Related) Stages

Event Description

Nature of Fog Effect

Implications

Conclusions

I

Understanding need to respond by government leaders.

Buildup of Hezbollah’s military posture in Southern Lebanon

Government for whatever reason chose to look away, even though the intelligence services seem to have been fully aware of the Hezbollah challenge. Defense spending was reduced, including funding for the Nautilus laser anti-katyusha weapons system.

It is difficult to mobilize support necessary for counter moves when the public is not aware of the seriousness of the threat.

Government must keep serious threats in view, make real-time adjustments in the military capabilities needed to overcome the threat, and maintain public awareness.

II

Mobilization of public support.

Public support was for the withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in 2000 with no thirst for getting caught up in South Lebanon again.

Government did not trumpet significance of Hezbollah buildup in Southern Lebanon, creating a fog of complacency and inaction.

Very little mobilization of public awareness in relation to Lebanon. All eyes were on Gaza and the capture of one IDF solder.

Government must be more alert and build support for funding levels that are in line with what is needed for national security. In this case, government relaxed its focus and failed to generate a clear-eyed appraisal of the threat.

III The spark that The capture of two ignites the IDF soldiers during conflict. an incursion into Northern Israel by a Hezbollah raiding party.

Confusion and sluggishness of the government response to the threat—air attack first, limited and tentative ground next, then finally a large attack, but not without added hesitation and delay, and too close to the cease-fire to allow time to adequately complete the task. Signals to public were uncertain.

With the capture of the two IDF soldiers and initiation of the counterstrike, public opinion moved ahead of its government in favoring a quick major response.

Israel must move aggressively versus a serious threat beforehand, whether from Hezbollah, Syria, or Iran. It is a matter of national survival. Its back is to the wall and it lives in an unfriendly neighborhood.

IV Taking stock and refining strategies.

Growing awareness by Israeli public—even given the strong sense of national unity—that the government let them down badly; moved erratically and indecisively placing undue restrictions on the IDF at times; and, in effect, brought about outcomes that place the nation in jeopardy.

There will probably be an effort by some of the senior government officials to explain shortfalls away and magnify the more favorable things that occurred, but any such distortion effect will probably be seen through by the public and only serve to further exacerbate the desire for major corrective action.

For Israel it is a case of national survival. Therefore, there will be a strong groundswell of support for increased defense spending, greater competence of government officials, and possibly some selective purging of the military leadership. The announced intent of the Minister of Defense to run an in-depth investigation of what went wrong was ill advised. This would have the primary defense official investigating his own organization. It would be better to have a panel of highly respected professionals headed by people of great stature. Panel members should come from outside government (e.g., Retired Major General Levy, a former adviser to the late Prime Minister Rabin). In part the Winograd Committee played this role. But it was not given the powers of a Parliamentary Investigatory Committee.

There is a case for use of a green team/red team concept, each team with top-caliber people to independently, intensively, and quickly examine national security and military preparedness issues. This could elevate the level of debate and dialogue and open the door to a wider range of alternatives.

Table 6.3. Fog of War (Israel-Related) Stages

Event Description

Nature of Fog Effect

Implications

Conclusions

I

Exuberance of response.

Public strongly activated and united in support of response, but more so in Northern Israel because of its proximity to the threat, than in Tel Aviv.

Confusing and questionable statements by the government, such as the boast that 80% of Hezbollah infrastructure had been destroyed, even as the number of rockets being fired against Northern Israel intensified.

Should strive for alignment of public sentiment in relation to national need as quickly as possible. It is disconcerting and produces a credibility gap when there are governmental claims of success that do not match the reality of what is perceived to be happening.

Need for better advance war planning and war preparation, and it all needs to line up properly with the nature of the threat.

II

Crescendo effect.

The ultimate full-scale ground attack with airpower.

Lack of clarity by the government in outlining what was underway. Some of this was functional in confusing the enemy and keeping him off balance, as well as protecting classified information, but the public at times found it difficult to discern any clear strategy. It was like the government was moving forward without any rhyme or reason, doing things spontaneously and on the spur of the moment.

If Israel had done a better job of neutralizing Hezbollah before they were able to build up their arsenal and develop hardened sites in Southern Lebanon, namely an enforcement of UN resolution 1559, much of the pain of the latest conflict might have been avoided.

It is results that count. They should be dealt with through a well-developed and aggressive media strategy. The government seemed to both over-speak and under-speak, and in the end Hezbollah won the media war. The communication strategies require urgent and in-depth review.

Cease-fire and gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon.

Fog effect flowing out of uncertainty regarding multinational forces and the conventions that govern how they operate in relation to the Lebanese army component. This left the speed of withdrawal of Israeli forces in doubt. The even larger question was whether the overall peacekeeping force would be any more than a window dressing.

The implication is that Israel may not be able to live with the arrangement if the peacekeeping force looks the other way as Hezbollah continues to build its posture in South Lebanon, as seems likely. Hezbollah at this point feels emboldened and perceives that Israel’s position has been seriously weakened.

While the best strategic avenues for Israel moving forward are still to be fully developed, it seems probable that the new “status quo” coming out of the conflict is in the end untenable for Israel. Therefore, the possibility of a continuation of active conflict seems likely.

III Scale-down and withdrawal.

Lebanon War II

What the matrix shows is that the government must not only understand the nature of the threat (which it did to some degree), but must also mobilize the public to appreciate the nature of the threat being posed (see Table 6.2). The government failed to do this. As events rapidly accelerated after the capture of the two IDF soldiers, the Israeli public looked for a concentrated and decisive military response. The public expected this. Public irritation and anger grew rapidly over the apparent subdued and hesitant response to the Hezbollah aggression. FOG OF WAR: INTERPRETATION The public was solidly united behind the government as the military response seemed to roll forward, but then the indecisiveness and uncertain moves by the government began to be apparent. The public at this point moved ahead of their government in understanding the need for decisive action. Their government sputtered and stalled in getting any momentum flowing, and there was growing alarm and discontent because of this. (See Table 6.3.) The scale-down and withdrawal phase was also troubled and uncertain. While this was not something the government could entirely control (e.g., how quickly UNIFIL would be able to deploy added forces, and from what countries), the public at that point was inclined to mistrust their government and question its decisions. The taking stock and reviewing strategies phase was a point where matters began to unravel, punctuated by the government’s obvious intent to try to suppress adverse publicity and come out of the episode with a minimum of political damage. Throughout both the fogs of war and peace, the ability to see clearly the nature of the threat and appropriately respond to it was hindered by incompleteness and alteration of the information available. The fog was both unintended and purposeful, distorting the truth and thus impairing the ability of Israel to respond strongly and decisively to the Hezbollah threat to national security. CLOSING SUMMARY The Economist labeled the war in Lebanon “The Accidental War” (July 22, 2006). As it reported, there had been previous altercations along the border that had been largely dismissed, “. . . even when Israel was led by Ehud Barak and Ariel Sharon, tough prime ministers who had been war heroes. Their responses were astonishingly mild.” The Economist suggests that the prime minister, Ehud Olmert, decided to go to war because the double humiliation of IDF captives on both the Gaza and Lebanese fronts “was more than he could survive or Israel could bear.” He also apparently believed that because of his nonmilitary background he had to look strong.

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Whatever the motivators, the war with Hezbollah quickly produced its own dynamics, and they ended up working against Israel. It appears in retrospect that Hezbollah capabilities had been underplayed, whether as a result of arrogance or inattention. This leaves Israel in a difficult situation. The threat has now become magnified and Hezbollah and others in the radical Islamic community have become emboldened. They and others in the Arab world have a sense that Israel is somehow greatly weakened, setting the stage for more decisive action to throw it off balance and even topple it. That perception, right or wrong, may again shape the reality. Israel may not be greatly weakened, but it is obviously not in top form. Its government is struggling to find its way and right itself in the midst of what seems to be a deepening crisis. The IDF now must critically examine itself and once again achieve the level of combat readiness and capability needed. The May 2008 issue of the Atlantic bears the title, “Is Israel Finished?” The Economist Magazine of April 5–11, 2008 contains a special report on Israel. It suggests that “Israel is as prosperous and secure as it’s ever been, but its future looks increasingly uncertain.” While the immediate reflexive response to both the Atlantic and The Economist articles is that Israel must survive, the fact that such serious concerns are being expressed need to be heeded. Israel is clearly in a dangerous period, with no room whatsoever for complacency, even with internal security vastly improved over the past five years. The backdrop to all of this, from a global perspective, is an Iran that is now motivated to up the ante in exerting its will. If it reaches the point of acquiring nuclear weapons, it will move the world to the precipice of a potential conflagration on a grand scale. Israel will be in an even more serious situation at this point. The Iranian mindset, as already pointed out, is not governed by normal conventions relative to the employment of WMD. Iran is driven by a religious zealotry that can block rationality in terms of the usual accepted rules of human decency in the international community. Israel needs to do some serious introspection. Its future hangs in the balance right now and national survival will depend on mobilizing both national will and the resources necessary from within and from without to counter the variety of threats to its very existence. Because of the weariness with conflict in the Middle East, there may be opportunities for progress in ameliorating the harshness, brutality, and insensitivity that have marked recent events. That must begin with the creation of at least a modicum of mutual trust and exploration of reciprocal actions that can build such trust. It requires patience, inspired leadership, and the active support of the world community. Rather than the kind of sweeping approaches that have so often fallen by the wayside (the so-called final settlement) strategies need to focus on moving forward a step at a time. “Grandstanding” leads nowhere. Ultimately, the border of Israel must be redrawn along the Green Line (1967 War), and a true Palestinian State established.

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One can look at the current situation of apparent deadlock in the Middle East and draw the conclusion that meaningful progress is impossible. However, the history of the area chronicles some progress. Here are some milestone events that underscore this point: r Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai under the Israel—Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979.

r Israel and Palestinian officials signed a Declaration of Principles on September 13, 1993 (i.e., Oslo Accords) to guide an interim period of self-rule. r Outstanding territorial disputes with Jordan were resolved on October 26, 1994 as part of the Israel—Jordan Treaty of Peace. r In 2000, Israel unilaterally withdrew from Southern Lebanon. r In 2005, the Israelis unilaterally withdrew from Gaza.

Whenever progress has occurred in the Mideast, it has been as a result not of outside peace brokers like the United States or U.N. per se, but because leaders in the region stepped forward with courage and took often unpopular measures to transform war into peace or nonhostility. For example—Anwar Sadat’s epic journey to Jerusalem in 1977 and the ensuing decision of rightist Prime Minister Menachem Begin to sign a peace agreement and return every scrap of Sinai to Egypt, while withdrawing settlements. Whenever progress has stalled in the Mideast, it has been as a result of lack of such leadership. Leadership today is scarce, not only in the Middle East but worldwide. Perhaps there is some comfort in the knowledge that politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum, and where there is a lack of leadership eventually leaders, sometimes improbable ones, step forward to fill the gap. This is our hope for the Middle East.

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7

A Comparative Analysis of Belief Systems In this chapter, we make the case that it is not sufficient to understand your adversaries. You also need to understand your own thinking, including seldom-visited corners of your mind, staying alert to opportunities to build bridges toward peace and shared goals with those powers that oppose you. If you think only in negative terms, nothing else will be allowed to intrude and you can severely limit the range of options available. When abject defeat of the enemy is sought as a sole goal, even if achieved this goal becomes illusory—because a humiliated enemy will regroup and return to battle, with the burning memory of defeat fueling renewed efforts. How many times in history has this occurred! A win-win strategy is superior, because attempts to achieve win-lose (defeating your adversary) rarely end there—but instead, lead to lose-lose. Losers can almost always find creative ways to inflict pain on perceived winners, even at the cost of additional pain incurred by themselves, especially in the modern era of terror and when fearsome weapons can be obtained by almost anyone with relative ease. Therefore, strategy is at its best when it achieves mutual ends without conflict or losses to national security by any of the parties involved. The three case-study chapters on the Afghanistan conflict, war in Iraq, and Lebanon War II (Israel-Hezbollah conflict of 2006) provide in-depth case studies of events that are linked to global terrorism and counterterrorism.

A Comparative Analysis of Belief Systems

Afghanistan, through the assistance of the Taliban, provided fertile ground for al Qaeda. This was a case of mutual enablement. It was in the end, a synergistic relationship, where each side achieved its immediate objectives. Those two groups have banded together tightly once again in the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan to respond to the severe counterterrorism pressures being leveled against them. If anything, the alliance between al Qaeda and the Taliban has been further strengthened. While Saddam Hussein and his regime were not ultimately linked to the attacks on 9/11 or al Qaeda, the postwar relationship between the insurgents and al Qaeda has now generated some partnerships of convenience that are focused on the ejection of the U.S. “occupiers” from Iraq. This alliance will probably last only so long as this common goal exists. It could subsequently prove to be an alliance difficult to sustain. There are two reasons for this. r The al Qaeda organization is Sunni and the overwhelming majority of Muslims in Iraq are Shi’a. Al Qaeda in Iraq clearly leans toward the Sunni side of the sectarian conflict. r The people of Iraq will tend to see al Qaeda increasingly as a foreign intruder in the governance of Iraq. With a Shi’a dominated government in power, al Qaeda would seem the odd man out. In fact, events in 2007 demonstrate that this is already beginning to occur, with tribal leaders, who are ironically for the most part Suni, joining forces with the U.S. military to expel al Qaeda operatives in their communities.

Lebanon War II represents an extension of tensions and unsettled issues that continue to fester, with the Palestinian situation and struggle for an independent Palestinian state serving as lightning rods for conflict. No one is discounting the possibility of renewed armed conflict between Israel and Hezbollah; Israeli intelligence anticipates such a scenario and many consider it inevitable given past history. None of the underlying causes of the conflict have been resolved. In fact, the inclination of Hezbollah to be combative has probably increased as a result of what is perceived as strengthened world and Arab support. This poses a grave threat to Lebanon’s current government, as Hezbollah maneuvers to further extend its influence and even dominate or displace that government. On January 24, 2007, Hezbollah leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah stated that “the opposition has the political, popular support to bring down the unconstitutional government today.” He went on to say that it is only the patriotic feelings of the opposition and its desire to preserve civil peace that has held back such a regime change. There have been well-orchestrated occasional mass marches by Hezbollah supporters in Lebanon. Israeli citizens seem to feel that their government has let them down. Approval ratings for their prime minister are even lower than those for

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President Bush. There seems to be a feeling that the government is somewhat adrift and disoriented, unable to set a clear rational agenda, direction, and sense of purpose. Israel’s prime minister was even quoted in an interview as saying that a prime minister does not need an “agenda,” meaning, a longterm strategy. Needed or not, no such long-term strategy appears to exist. “Politics is always local,” veteran American Congressman Tip O’Neill liked to say. Combined political–terrorist organizations Hezbollah and Hamas are highly specific to their locale. Hamas exists to support the Palestinian cause, with its primary focus on the Gaza Strip, but with influence on the West Bank as well. The PLO, formed in 1969, had a growing influence under its leader, Yasser Arafat. This included recognition as a nation-state by the United Nations, the United States, and most countries of the world. It continues to have that formal recognition, but has now seen its influence greatly diminished, a process that began even before Arafat’s death. This is paradoxical, because as the PLO’s influence as an organization has declined, the plight of the Palestinian people has shown some occasional ascendancy and increased support in the court of world public opinion. Hamas has clearly eclipsed the PLO since it became the majority government in Gaza. Its strong militia was able in 2007 to wrest control of Gaza from the PLO. Disruptive raids by Israeli military forces, designed to stop the Qasam missile attacks on Israel, add to both the turbulence and economic stagnation in Gaza. In the process the PLO, once the most visible global organization in defense of Palestinian interests, has been in effect emasculated and rendered largely ineffective. Hezbollah, as outlined in Chapter 6, has become increasingly “Lebanonized.” The Taliban, discussed in Chapter 4, is also for the most part confined to a locale, in this case Afghanistan, with Pakistan as a sanctuary, since the overthrow of the Taliban government. Hezbollah, Hamas, Taliban, and now the PLO (in terms of its actual ability to exert organizational influence) can be viewed largely as localespecific, even though there are some signs that Hezbollah is meddling in Iraq by training terrorist cadres. It is important to look beyond terrorist organizations with localized influence when considering global terrorism. Aside from the weakened and transformed PLO, there are now two major players at the global level, al Qaeda and Iran. Libya, once a global player, has officially withdrawn from terrorist activities and scrapped its nuclear weapons ambitions. A number of Libya’s nuclear weapons-related materials were shipped to nuclear facilities in the United States such as Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, for dismantlement and destruction. As an organization, al Qaeda has no boundaries. It views the entire world as its preserve. It has organized attacks around the world, including the notorious attacks on 9/11/2001 in the United States. It likely has sleeper

A Comparative Analysis of Belief Systems

cells in many parts of the world. In addition, new organizations spring up that loosely emulate al Qaeda and affiliate themselves with it. Iran, the other global player, is a sponsor of Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorist organizations. However, Iran has more of a regional tilt, looking for ultimate hegemony over the region, even though it stirs international attention because of its nuclear intentions. It also can make harsh utterances against the United States. It is especially virulent in its attack on Israel, questioning whether the Holocaust ever occurred, and expressing the belief that Israel should be destroyed. Syria can, of course, also cause difficulty, including some interference in Iraq by allowing “foreign fighters” to use its borders to transit into Iraq. Overall, Syria’s activities seem relatively localized. It is also in some respects a minion of Iran, even though in some ways they compete for influence. This chapter addresses these two global players, as well as looking at a variety of other factors that need to be taken into account in fighting terrorism and looking for openings to greater understanding and peace. The following areas will be covered: al Qaeda; the emerging power of Iran; the differing belief systems within Islam, with some definitive analyses to widen understanding of issues and create meaningful dialogue between opposing camps; and finally, touchstones in finding ways to defeat global terrorism and move to more positive ground in international relations. SPOTLIGHT ON AL QAEDA There is no attempt by al Qaeda to disguise its intentions. Rohan Gunaratna1 calls attention to al Qaeda’s uncompromising philosophy. Islamic governments have never been and will never be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are established as they [always] have been, by pen and gun by word and bullet by tongue and teeth.

The Council on Foreign Relations describes al Qaeda as “an international terrorist network led by Osama bin Laden.” Its principal aim is to purge Muslim countries of Western influence and replace their governments with fundamentalist Islamic regimes. It has also evolved into an organization that views the United States as the main obstacle to achieving this result. It feels that it can overcome the United States, even as it helped the Mujahadeen, or “holy warriors,” overcome the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda can rightfully be called the first truly modern global terrorist organization, with its cells and operations now extending to at least 100 countries. Al Qaeda is described by one source in this way2 : [It] is not a terrorist organization in the traditional sense, but rather a brand name used by any number of independent groups throughout the world.

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The core organization we now know as al Qaeda apparently came together about 1988. At this point, Osama bin Laden joined forces with Ayman al Zawahiri, an Egyptian surgeon and his followers. Zawahiri seems to have functioned as one of bin Laden’s mentors. He saw the promise in Osama bin Laden as a terrorist leader. Osama bin Laden’s background is quite different. He comes from a wealthy Saudi family, studied engineering, and gained expertise in military training fighting Russians in Afghanistan. Zawahiri has extensive experience in radical Islamic politics, even to a greater extent than bin Laden. Their personalities and skills seem to complement each other well. A coterie of dedicated and highly skilled Islamic radicals has been formed around this duo. Al Qaeda increasingly sets up its operations in countries that can serve as a comfortable host. The best environments are those with corrupt governments, countries that do not take the terrorist threat seriously, or lack an effective judicial apparatus and counterterrorism capability. Therefore, the Asia-Pacific Region is receiving a great deal of their attention. Indonesia especially fits the criteria. It is also the fourth largest nation on earth and has the largest Muslim population in the world—80 percent of the population is Muslim.3 The Philippines, with 79 million people, while more active in combating terrorism, has a high level of corruption and is a widely scattered island territory, like Indonesia, covering over 300,000 sq km. On the other hand, the Philippines is primarily a Catholic country, with only about 5 percent of its population listed as Muslims. The name al Qaeda was not used publicly until after the attacks on the United States on 9/11/01. The name is Arabic for “the base.” That can also be construed as database, as the organization has long relied on databases and the World Wide Web to network and control its operations, consistent with the need to maintain communications security. It is also an organization that has demonstrated its ability to learn, and can take an initial failure as a bridge to success. The first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 (the “bomb in the basement”) was not effective, but they came back to the target again in 2001 and were successful. As the pressure has mounted to root out al Qaeda, including disruption of its flow of funds and financial operations, it has quickly adapted. Rather than operate hierarchically, al Qaeda operates as a widely diffused network. It can be viewed as a modern organization in the way it organizes its effort. Its communications network, for example, is highly sophisticated. Operational security is central to its survival. Therefore, its operations, like an intelligence organization or a drug cartel’s, are highly compartmentalized. Those who carry out the attacks are unlikely to know the parties that planned or called for them or their whereabouts. Since 9/11 and the strong counterterrorist response, including capture or death of some principal al Qaeda leaders, its way of operating has become even more

A Comparative Analysis of Belief Systems

decentralized, with more and more reliance on affiliated terrorist organizations that share its goals and interests. While al Qaeda argues that it has a Qur’anic (or Koranic) base and is true to the principles of Islam, this is not entirely true. Al Qaeda is in fact somewhat heretical in its belief systems. Gunaratna, in his book, Inside al Qaeda, makes the point that this heresy should be part of the “counterterrorism toolbox” and there should be an active effort to dilute the ideology of extremism. It is one Achilles’ heel of al Qaeda, yet in our view, there is insufficient effort to exploit this by governments and the media (see Chapter 1, “Winning the Crucial War for Hearts and Minds”). Gunaratna also discusses the importance of fatwa (Islamic decree) to promote the kind of martyrdom that creates extreme indifference to death. Gunaratna goes on to say, further diminishing the true credibility of Osama bin Laden as a holy person, It should be borne in mind, however, that the force of a Fatwa depends entirely on who pronounces it, and none of the recognized Islamic authorities (Sunni or Shi’a) regards Osama bin Laden as a person capable of legitimately issuing one.4

There is too much inclination, through silence, to allow al Qaeda and other Islamic organizations to get away with their distortion of the basic tenets of Islam. This is one of the major prevailing “fogs of war and peace.” In the worst case, what comes out of the fog is the impression that all Muslims are radical. Brutality and violence against innocents in the name of religion is not in keeping with mainstream Muslim belief systems, yet we will often hear statements grounded in ignorance suggesting that Islam is inherently a violent religion. Gunaratna says: To win the campaign, the fight against radical Islam should not be confused with the Muslim world, which constitutes one-fifth of humanity or 1.44 billion people . . . Only a miniscule portion of the Muslim public actively supports terrorism.5

In terms of size, no one really knows for certain how large the al Qaeda organization is worldwide. There are probably no more than 20,000 members, and there are probably concentric circles of relative proximity to the inner core. Gaining a place in the inner core organization is extremely selective, and there can be an intense desire to gain entry. Finding recruits is not difficult. To be selected is considered a great honor. Perhaps as many as 100,000 have received training by al Qaeda in its camps around the world. There are no precise numbers. While terrorist attacks can be brought together by quasi or fully independent affiliates, such as those in the Asia-Pacific Region, large attacks,

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such as 9/11, that require highly sophisticated planning and orchestration, seem to be retained by the core element of al Qaeda. Whatever the core element of al Qaeda comprises, it is now considered to be located in an area of Pakistan adjacent to the border with Afghanistan, an area largely outside the influence of the Pakistani government. Al Qaeda exhibits a disinclination to talk about the “Sunni–Shi’a divide,” an issue to be addressed when Islam is discussed later in this chapter. They prefer to be seen as a generic agent for Islam, even though they are clearly associated with the Sunni sect of Islam. One reason for al Qaeda’s comfort level in Afghanistan and Pakistan is that those countries are overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim. This Sunni–Shi’a divide, which goes back centuries, makes it unlikely that Iran will be a warm bedfellow of al Qaeda over the long haul, since like Iraq, Iran is primarily Shi’a. In any case, Iran wants to dictate its own terms, not dance to al Qaeda’s tune. In some ways they are competitors for power and influence, even potential antagonists. Which sect you belong to has great significance in the Islamic world. How dangerous is al Qaeda? The short answer is, “very dangerous.” We believe that there are at least two ways to measure the level of danger, one manifest, and the other, thankfully, latent thus far. The manifest side relates to actual attacks accomplished and they prove the global reach of al Qaeda and its operational skills. These attacks are well known and do not need to be fully listed here. They include, r the 2004 bomb attacks on commuter trains in Madrid, Spain; r The May 2003 car bomb attacks on three residential compounds in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia;

r The November 2002 car bomb attack and attempt to shoot down an r r r r r

Israeli airliner with shoulder-fired missiles in Mombasa, Kenya; The October 2002 attack on a French tanker off the coast of Yemen; The 9/11/2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon; The October 2000 USS Cole bombing; The London subway and bus bombings; and The August 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nariobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

This is, of course, the tip of the iceberg. Al Qaeda has been charged with many attacks in Iraq, and there have been assassinations worldwide that seem to bear the hallmarks of al Qaeda. There also seems to be evident complicity with attacks such as the nightclub bombing in Bali, Indonesia that killed a number of Australian nationals. Aside from successful attacks, there have been others that were broken up before they could occur. The latent threat, and it is a serious one, relates to intended use of WMD. This threat is not something being mused over as a possibility. The threat is real. In a report titled “Spy Lifts Lid on al Qaeda,” in the BBC News of

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November 16, 2006, Gordon Corera reports on an “insider’s view” of the emergence of al Qaeda. The spy involved, who now reportedly works for British and French intelligence, reports that “chemical experiments, including use of gases and poisons on rabbits,” occurred in the 1990s. Few would discount al Qaeda’s interest in using both chemical and biological weapons, and employment of such weapons does not necessarily require a great deal of expertise. However, when high-level expertise is needed, there seems little doubt that al Qaeda can gain access to the most sophisticated expertise in this area as it determines a need. The Bigger Danger Is Probably Nuclear: Paul Williams, journalist and author (The al Qaeda Connection: International Terrorism, Organized Crime, and the Coming Apocalypse, The Vatican) in a symposium on al Qaeda’s Nukes, reported in FRONTPAGEMAG.COM by Jamie Glazov, on November 13, 2006, has this to say: Accounts of the Al Qaeda nukes first appeared in such reputable newspapers as The Jerusalem Report and the London Times, and Arabic magazines, including al-Watan al- Arabi and al-Majallah. These sources verified from British, Israeli, and Russian intelligence sources that bin Laden had purchased tactical nuclear weapons from the Chechen Mafia in 1996 . . . in subsequent years, the foreign press and intelligence sources, including the CIA, have been able to verify additional sales of off-the-shelf nukes and nuclear materials (highly enriched uranium and plutonium) from the former Soviet Union to al Qaeda . . . These sales have been verified by a host of weapons inspectors, including Hans Blix, former director general of the UN’s Atomic energy Agency.

That is disturbing information, but it does not tell the whole story. Williams goes on to say that research laboratories in Pakistan under Dr. A.Q. Khan (later removed by the president of Pakistan when it was found he had sold nuclear technology to North Korea) had assisted al Qaeda, along with twenty of his nuclear scientists and technicians, to maintain and modify these weapons, including turning them into highly portable weapons. A working assumption must be that al Qaeda has probable possession of these weapons with the intent to use them. The report just cited indicates that an al Qaeda field commander in Afghanistan recently called for Muslims to leave the United States, particularly the cities of Washington and New York. Whether factual or not, that sounds an ominous note. Dr. Harry W. Kushner, chair of a major university department of criminal justice, in commenting on Paul Williams’ assertions regarding the al Qaeda’s possession of nuclear weapons, states, precious little is being done to avert an American Hiroshima. We are more than five years past the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and millions of steelframe ocean-going containers enter our ports without inspection . . . Each

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Fogs of War and Peace one has the potential to contain a weapon of mass destruction that could be detonated when the ship reaches an American port or offloaded and transported to be detonated in one of our major U.S. cities.6

It is, of course, one thing to have the capability to use weapons of mass destruction, and quite another to have the intent to use them. The intent seems to be present. Gunaratna says about al Qaeda in this regard: “It will have no compunction about employing chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons against population centers.” If any attack on the United States using weapons of mass destruction by al Qaeda were to occur, the question becomes: what can the United States do about it? Al Qaeda is able to hide in the shadows from the standpoint of any retaliation. It is not like being attacked by a nation-state. If a nation harbors al Qaeda, as the Taliban did in Afghanistan, you can of course deal with the sheltering country. But it may not be nearly so clear-cut in the future. Should Pakistan be held to account if such an attack occurs? They already have al Qaeda operating out of Pakistan, claiming inability to constrain the Taliban or al Qaeda, and yet U.S. policy considers Pakistan an ally in the war on global terrorism. There have been serious questions raised regarding purposeful support of the Taliban, and possibly al Qaeda, by the Pakistani government, particularly its Intelligence Services. It becomes apparent that al Qaeda cannot be allowed sanctuary anywhere, and U.S. foreign policy with regard to Pakistan seems in need of recalibration as a result. Is Pakistan really our ally if it will not allow the U.S. or NATO forces flexibility to enter Pakistan to eliminate such sanctuaries? However, there is another factor that cannot be overlooked in talking about Pakistan. That government walks a thin line in supporting the United States when most of its population is not favorable to the United States and questions any alliance with America. In fact, the government of Pakistan that has now gained power is more inclined to challenge the United States than was true of the previous regime. They view the United States as meddling in Pakistan’s internal affairs. The view that the United States is heavy-handed in its dealings with other nations is perceived to be true in a number of countries in the Middle East, including Egypt and Jordan. We should remember that before Pakistan “changed its spots,” and decided it was in its best interests to align with the United States, it had been one of the only two countries in the world to recognize the Taliban government. Politics does indeed make for strange bedfellows. As we pointed out in Chapter 4 on Afghanistan, we believe that Pakistan is watching to see which way the wind blows, including our steadfastness in Iraq, and is prepared to turn on a dime, if necessary, to align with whatever seems convenient to promoting its interests. Depending on how it is accomplished, any retaliation, even economic, can strengthen rather than

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weaken al Qaeda’s hand, by painting the United States as an oppressor and an aggressor. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in retrospect can be seen to have strengthened the cause of Islamic radicalism and brought it many recruits. We are dealing with a complex mosaic when it comes to countering terrorism. Factors need to be delicately balanced in arriving at the right mix of strategies. In a number of cases, actions not related to military action may prove the best avenue in undercutting global terrorism. Since 9/11, it appears from the perspective of al Qaeda that the United States has become more difficult to target. “Hard” targets, such as the New York Stock Exchange in New York City, or even airports, have become much harder to assault. Some attempts against hard targets, such as John Reid’s attempt to blow up a transoceanic airliner with shoe bombs, have been foiled. That is a good news. However, there is no shortage of “soft” targets that can be hit and it is literally impossible to protect against every threat. For the reasons outlined, al Qaeda can be expected to shift its attention to soft targets. They include such things as shopping malls, schools, water supply systems, the food chain, commuter trains, and anything else that can be expected to produce mass casualties and panic. There is no shortage of such soft targets. The Economist, in an article on global terrorism,7 speaks of al Qaeda as “On the March, Not on the Run.” It also states that intelligence agencies see worrying signs of al Qaeda’s revival. It would be extremely unwise to feel any measure of safety or security in the fact that something on the scale of 9/11 has not been repeated. The capability, intent, and will are all in evidence. It is not a time to let our guard down. PROFILE OF AL QAEDA Here is a rough summary profile of al Qaeda. r A diffuse, decentralized, loosely knit organization, one capable of functioning even when centers of its operation are disrupted.

r Relatively small in terms of core numbers, but with a cadre that is very highly trained and motivated.

r Is run as a modern business, with remuneration, leave policies, health care, and the kind of personnel practices that characterize a corporation.

r Is extraordinarily difficult to penetrate because of its intense cohesiveness and the refined selection and training processes it uses.

r Operations are highly compartmentalized to avoid any general compromise.

r Musters itself for attacks with meticulous reconnoitering of the target, extensive and detailed advance planning, repeated rehearsal, and great care in selecting those who will carry out the attacks and lose their

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Fogs of War and Peace lives (none of the nineteen terrorists who carried out the 9/11/01 attacks appear to have wavered at the time of the attack). r Likes to deal in simultaneous attacks in the same or different cities—one of its trademarks.

To defeat al Qaeda will require drying up its sanctuaries and killing or capturing its leaders. Industrialized countries of the world certainly do not favor or condone the disruption of economic markets that al Qaeda can cause. While some countries may take silent momentary pleasure in seeing pain inflicted on the United States it is doubtful that any of them have an interest in seeing al Qaeda succeed in its ambitions. Even an overwhelmingly Muslim country like Turkey, historically secular in its orientation, has a primary interest in becoming a part of the European Economic Community and promoting its economic interests. Very few Turks, perhaps less than 5 percent, have any interest whatsoever in creating an Islamic Republic. Increasingly, it is recognized that al Qaeda and radical Islamic groups have their eye on Europe. There has even been talk of creating a “Eurorabia.” France, with close to 10 percent of its population Muslim, has some special concerns. The United Kingdom also has a significant Muslim population, some 3 percent of its total. The United States, by comparison, has about 1 percent of its population who are Muslims. The actual number is not precisely known, but there is clear evidence that the number of Muslims in the United States is growing rapidly. In sum, al Qaeda cannot be taken lightly, but it can be defeated. The question is how long will it take, and what will be the ultimate cost of overcoming the challenge, including cost in human life? SPOTLIGHT ON IRAN Iran is the “Queen” on the regional chessboard in the Middle East and the Israeli—Palestinian issue casts a cloud over everything else that is occurring. In fact, the more one examines events in the region, the more it becomes obvious that everything is highly interconnected. Solutions tend to emerge through an examination of those relationships and interconnections, rather than considering Iran or any other arena in the Middle East in isolation. Iran has been a thorn in the side of the United States for at least the past twenty-eight years. One could even go back further and discuss the clandestine U.S. intervention to help dissidents overthrow the government of Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953. However, the watershed year for Iran was 1979—twenty-nine years ago. Four things happened in 1979 that set the stage for where we are today. r The government of the Shah of Iran, which was oriented toward the West and was viewed as friendly to the United States, was overthrown by Islamic fundamentalists.

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r An Islamic Republic was created, with a new constitution. r The U.S. embassy in Tehran was seized and fifty-two U.S. embassy employees taken captive for 444 days.

r A war broke out with Iraq that ended up lasting eight years. The United States broke off diplomatic relations with Iran. There has been some informal engagement with Iran over the intervening years, and many will remember the Iran-Contra affair, illegal actions committed by some members of the Reagan White House (e.g., Oliver North), supposedly without the knowledge of the president. For the most part, diplomatic relations between the two countries have been in a “deep freeze.” Iran now moves to center stage again, not simply because it was declared part of the “Axis of Evil” by the Bush administration, but rather because of its nuclear intentions and oil resources. It is also seen as one key, along with Syria, to resolving the Iraq War. Iran has also been increasingly active in asserting its influence in the Middle East, including support for Hezbollah, Hamas, threats to Israel’s right to exist, and active meddling in Iraq on the side of those who oppose the United States and its coalition partners. In January 2007, the Iranian ambassador to Iraq declared that Iran would increase the supply of weapons to Iraq and provide military training. The nuclear issue has tended to tower over all others and there has been unanimity within the UN Security Council that the issue must be dealt with, and sanctions imposed, along with development of economic incentives to persuade Iran to step back from its nuclear plans. Russia and China have been less stringent than others from the standpoint of imposing sanctions. Russia’s position is that sanctions should deal solely with measures that keep Iran from developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, while shying away from constraints on travel or any freezing of assets. The European Union, because of its economic ties with Iran, has resisted going as far as the United States would prefer in the area of economic sanctions. Only Germany has been somewhat receptive. Despite this, three UN Security Council resolutions defining sanctions on Iran have been passed. The New York Times reported on February 4, 2007, in a news analysis by William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, entitled “Iranian Boast Put to Test,” that Iran’s claims to progress with its uranium enrichment program may be largely bluster and designed for political purposes. They have apparently had great difficulty getting their centrifuges to operate properly, but even if this is true, the Iranians could be as close as four years away from having a nuclear weapon. Israeli intelligence estimates that Iran could have a nuclear bomb as early as 2009. A significant amount of the nuclear-related activity seems centered on Natanz, where two cavernous halls, buried deep underground to defend against attack, are located. That facility is half the size of the Pentagon. Inspectors from the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency were at one time able to visit that complex, but what is occurring

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there now is shrouded in secrecy and beyond the scrutiny of the world community. Thus far, Iran has used a variety of diplomatic ploys to drag out negotiations over its nuclear program, while not relinquishing what it sees as its right to develop its nuclear capabilities. Iran is always careful to state that it has no intention of developing nuclear weapons and plans to abide by the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the United Nations has found itself misled by Iranians (Seymour Hersh, New Yorker, April 17, 2006) when they have made inspections. The stage now seems set for major confrontation, and both the United States and Iran at times seem to be pushing in that direction, but for different reasons. Let us examine the way the stage is being set, starting with a background point about Iran. This country has few friends in the region. The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in the U.S. State Department (October 2006) indicates that Iran’s relations with many of its Arab neighbors have been strained by Iranian attempts to spread its Islamic revolution, a strictly ideological goal. In 1981, Iran supported a plot to overthrow the Bahrain Government. In 1983, Iran expressed support for Shi’ites who bombed Western embassies in Kuwait, and in 1987, Iranian pilgrims rioted during the hajj (pilgrimage) in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Nations with strong fundamentalist movements, such as Egypt and Algeria, also mistrust Iran. The unpopularity of Iran in the region is accompanied by unpopularity of the ruling regime among its own people. Nicholas D. Kristof, writing in the New York Times on September 12, 2006, says: I’ve never seen a country where the government is so unpopular as in Iran, with the possible exception of Myanmar [formerly Burma]. The government is so corrupt, tyrannical and incompetent that it will eventually collapse— unless America attacks its nuclear sites and triggers a nationalistic surge of support for the regime.

As in China, which has thousands of unreported demonstrations and protests of discontent each year, little expression of dissent gets reported in the controlled press in Iran. However, there is discontent, and protests are occurring. The Foundation for Democracy in Iran (FDI), on May 24, 2006, reported clashes between protesting university students and security forces occurring in Tehran, Hamedan, and Zanjan. Forty police officers were injured. Another incident occurred on March 12, 2006 involving violent clashes in the Kurdish city of Piranshahr, near the border with Iraq. Angry residents attacked government buildings. The riot took place following the murder of a resident by Islamic militiamen. On March 10, 2006, several thousand Iranian women demonstrated in downtown Tehran on International Women’s Day. In the fall of 2007, university students hissed

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and jeered when their president appeared for a speaking engagement at their university. This is probably just a small sample of what is actually occurring. The regime seems intent on shoring up internal controls to further bolster its hold on power. Iran has in effect two militaries, one a traditional one and another the Revolutionary Guards, the most trusted and feared. Members of the Revolutionary Guards have been moved in to fill positions in the government to insure unswerving loyalty to the regime and Islamic principles. Anyone running for elected office must be cleared to run by the Assembly of Experts, a popularly elected body of eighty-six religious scholars. They have done an effective job of blocking any run for public office if the candidate does not fully live by Islamic Law and willingly support where the government chooses to go. some of the causes of unpopularity of the regime probably relate to current issues confronting society and the slowness and ineptitude of the government in resolving them. According to the World Fact Book published by the CIA, these issues include: air pollution, inadequate supplies of potable water, water pollution from raw sewage, deforestation, and soil degradation (salinization). There is considerable fog swirling around how to address these issues in the United States. The Bush administration focuses on the threatened nuclear capability, and while there is a tipping of the hat to diplomacy, much as occurred in the buildup to the Iraq War, there seems to be a behind-thescenes emphasis on preparing to use the military card. On a more visible level, the Bush administration has deployed an added carrier battle group to the Gulf region as an obvious counter to Iran. However, use of a military card seems to have a deeper objective, namely a regime change. This is also a page out of the book on how the Iraq War unfolded. Seymour Hersh in an April 17, 2006 article in the New Yorker states that “there is a growing conviction among members of the U.S. military, and in the international community, that President Bush’s ultimate goal in the nuclear confrontation with Iran is regime change.”8 One former defense official, who still deals with sensitive issues for the Bush administration, told Hersh that “ . . . military planning was premised on the belief that ‘a sustained bombing campaign in Iran will humiliate the religious leadership and lead the public to rise up and overthrow the government.’ I was shocked when I heard it, and asked myself, ‘What are they smoking?’” The fact that the regime may be unpopular does not translate to an overthrow of the government by the people when the country is under attack by an external power. That is when national pride kicks in, motivating a people to stand as one. It would be the best thing that could happen for a regime that is receiving mixed support from its people. Such an attack would also tend to inflame Muslims everywhere and draw intense criticism around the world.

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In reviewing what is implied by using military force in this instance, there are some things to bear in mind. r There are questions about the status of the nuclear program in Iran, especially the time required to bring a nuclear weapon on line. There is no “smoking gun,” per se, even given all the rhetoric. If they were to pursue the actual development of nuclear weapons, an intent they disclaim, how long would it really take? Estimates vary, with Meir Dagan, the head of Israel’s intelligence agency, looking at a time line of only one or two years. The U.S. Intelligence Community issued a report in 2008 suggesting that Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons development. This only served to prompt President Bush to again warn against Iran’s intentions. r Where are the nuclear-related sites? Some are known, but not all. There seems to be a consensus that targets to hit would number in hundreds, including possibly some chemical sites. If the complexes are well hardened and deep in the ground, traditional bunker-busting bombs would probably not do the job. That means one has to turn to other means. Options include using nuclear weapons and Special Operations Forces. Anyway you slice it, this would be a very complex undertaking and one that cannot really rest on use of airpower alone. Any resort to employment of nuclear weapons could have disastrous consequences. r Iran would not sit in its hands while the attack occurs. It almost certainly has some form of retaliatory plan, including possibly activating terrorist sleeper cells in the United States. What if Iran were able to manage to use some nuclear weapons of its own? That is not an impossibility. If they were to use a tactical nuke (smaller yield weapon), the United States would face a dilemma, in making a similar response, since it no longer possesses tactical nuclear weapons in its inventory. The United States might be forced to raise the stakes and resort to use of strategic nuclear weapons of much higher yield. Once the nuclear threshold is crossed, further use of such weapons becomes more likely. r How would such an attack impact the situation within Iraq, Afghanistan, and Israel’s security? How would the rest of the world react? Those are big questions. It is not possible to answer all such questions ahead of time. The outcome is likely to take on a shape that has not entirely been anticipated. If the United States takes action unilaterally, or Israel takes the action and the United States backs the play, world reaction will be extremely adverse and probably swallow up any remaining credibility that the United States has on the world stage.

There is an obvious cause for anxiety about the possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons because of the apocalyptic nature of the regime. They could be insane enough to use them. However, the United States needs

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to move beyond a spectrum of response that ranges from unbending accusatory utterances to military response. It needs to look for openings for dialogue, such as identifying areas of common ground. The problem is that both sides do not want to appear to be watering down their positions. One IAEA official commented to Hersh, in the New Yorker article cited earlier, that “there’s nothing the Iranians could do that would result in a positive outcome. American diplomacy does not allow for it. Even if they announce a stoppage of enrichment, nobody will believe them. It is a dead end.” There seems to be a growing sentiment that the United States should now reach out and establish direct dialogue with Iran and Syria. Iran has offered to participate in such talks and bring Syria in as well. In March 2007, Iran, Syria, and the United States were among twelve nations that met in Iraq to discuss how to stabilize the situation in Iraq. This one-day conference was limited in its outcome. While polite handshakes were exchanged between members of the U.S., Iranian, and Syrian delegations, it did not lead to any sidebar discussions in a bilateral mode, as some had hoped for. The conference did lead to an agreement to meet again, with subcommittees to be formed that would meet in the meantime. On the other hand, there have been limited discussions, specific to Iraq, between Iran and the United States in 2007 and in 2008, at the ambassadorial level, hosted by Iraq. They apparently gave no address to other issues, such as Iran’s nuclear program. While the door is barely ajar, it does show that talks between the United States and Iran are possible. The Bush administration, and the new administration that will take office in early 2009, need to move toward deepening U.S. involvement with the world community rather than trying to go it alone. That may be difficult in an administration where the leader seems to feel he is on a messianic quest to bring democracy to the Middle East. The irony is that the Bush administration has done precious little to revive the Middle East peace process until recently. The Muslim world also tends to see the U.S. president as operating out of a double standard, preaching democracy in the Middle East while at the same time supporting regimes that have authoritarian or only marginally democratic governments. It would be a tragedy to have the situation with Iran’s emerging nuclear capabilities evolve into another war. That need not be the outcome. With all the strong language that has been unleashed by Iran, coupled with the resistance of the United States to direct talks, a bridge can possibly be built on common interests. For example, Iran doesn’t want Iraq to spin out of control either. There is a pragmatic side to the Iranian character. They are also good negotiators and can move along logical lines. Even if you object strongly to President Mahmood Ahmadi-Najad’s statements, he is intelligent, well educated and no one’s fool.

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At the end of the day we cannot afford to have Iran with a nuclear weapons capability. To have an apocalyptic regime with its finger on a nuclear trigger is a folly the world cannot allow to occur. With all the negatives around the situation with Iran, events can occur that suggest that positive outcomes are possible. The New York Times reports on January 30, 2007, in an article by Michael Blackman, that Iran and Saudi Arabia are collaborating to mediate Lebanon’s political crisis and to avoid civil war. This has apparently included some indications that Teheran has been leaning on Hezbollah. The associated commentary in the article points to what may be a loss of political strength by the President of Iran, Mahmood Ahmadi Najad. This diplomatic cooperation by Iran, including the placing of pressure on Hezbollah, flies in the face of most current perceptions of Iran, even though it is too early to say what the long-term significance will be, if any. This initiative is confounding from the standpoint of U.S. foreign policy. Blackman states: The Saudi-Iranian efforts have put Washington in an awkward position, since it is trying to reduce Iran’s regional influence. But since a stable Lebanon is also an American priority, American officials have watched the efforts without interfering.

THE DIFFERING BELIEF SYSTEMS WITHIN ISLAM Islam is not one universal belief system. As is true of Christianity, it can take various forms, while at the same time adhering to some basic core themes. One example of this is the Sunni–Shi’a divide, differing views that go back almost to the beginning of the faith. We see this divide influencing the sectarian violence that is occurring in Iraq. However, it has a bearing on events far beyond Iraq. It influences any comprehensive assessment of Islam and the dynamics that foster conflict as a part of World War III, because Islam is one of the central aspects of that war. As already indicated, al Qaeda downplays the divide, speaking of Islam as one. The divisions within Islam have not been adequately addressed, including the Principle of Tattarus (toleration for the killing of innocents). An understanding of these differences can influence strategies for dealing with global terrorism. Having knowledge of these differences can also help in formulating strategies that can promote harmony rather than confrontation. Some of the areas we will address are: the Nature of Islam; the Sunni– Shi’a Divide; the Principle of Tattarus and its implications; significant statistics and trends; and, what it implies for combating terrorism. The Basics of Islam. As is true of Christianity and Judaism, Islam traces its religious heritage back to Abraham. Islam is also a monotheistic religion, worshipping one God (Allah). Muslims consider Christians and Jews

A Comparative Analysis of Belief Systems

“people of the book,” recognizing the common beginning with Abraham. Therefore, there is a tolerance for Christians and Jews from the standpoint of letting them practice their faith in Islamic countries. However, that doesn’t necessarily mean smooth sailing for Christians and Jews. The majority of the Muslims in the world are not Arabs and in fact only 20 percent of them come from Arab countries. Overall, there are about 1.2–1.4 billion Muslims in the world and this number is rising rapidly as a result of a birthrate higher than for most other groups. It now stands as the world’s second largest religion, with 20 percent of the world’s population as members, in contrast with 33 percent for Christianity. The religion began in Arabia in the seventh century under the leadership of Muhammad, who Muslims consider as the final great prophet. He is believed to have received revelations from Allah through the Angel Gabriel from 610 CE until his death in 632 CE. These revelations were memorized by his followers and recorded in a single volume called the Qur’an. Muslims believe that the Qur’an is the undistorted and literal word of God. The place of worship for Muslims is the mosque (or masjid in Arabic). Islam is founded on Five Pillars. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Shadadaha: There is none worthy of worship but God. Salat: To pray five times a day facing toward Kaba in Mecca. Zashat: Giving charity to the poor and needy by able Muslims. Sawn: The art of obligatory fasting during the month of Ramadan. Hajj: To make at least one pilgrimage to Dhu al Hijjan in the City of Mecca during your lifetime.

It is hard to read extracts from the Qur’an without coming away believing that Islam is fundamentally a peaceful and compassionate religion. On the other hand, conservative Christian author and radio pastor Dave Hunt claims that there are more than 100 verses in the Qur’an advocating the use of violence to spread Islam [see Islam: Is it a Religion of Violence or Peace (Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance)]. At the same time, it would be quite easy to gather up statements from the Old Testament that speak of “an eye for an eye” and “a tooth for a tooth” and convey harshness of action between human beings—for example, the Book of Joshua in the Old Testament. In short, both the Bible and the Qur’an contain statements that can be lifted out of context and used to frame a negative, even violent argument. However, the essence of both Christianity and Islam, as well as Judaism, is peaceful. The danger comes from radical jihadists, organizations like al Qaeda, who distort the basic principles that underlie Islam in order to further their own political ends. The Sunni-Shi’a Divide. The conflict between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims dates back to the very beginning of the religion. There were major clashes

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that occurred, including one in Iraq in the sixteenth century. There have also been times when there was relative harmony between these two major sectarian groups. This has been true at times in Iraq. Today in Pakistan you see relative harmony between the Sunni majority of 77 percent and the Shi’a minority of 20 percent. This is one reason al Qaeda experiences a comfortable haven in Pakistan. Its Sunni orientation aligns with the primary leaning in the country. The majority of Muslims in the world are Sunni. It would be wrong to cite the inherent division between Sunni and Shi’a as the primary reason for the sectarian violence currently gripping Iraq. It is seen by some Islamic scholars as more of a political power struggle that can be conveniently ascribed to sectarian differences. What are the roots of the divide within Islam? Both Sunni and Shi’a practice the same fundamental faith. The differences lie in the way the two major sectarian groups within Islam interpret Islamic principles. Both Sunni and Shi’a accept the Five Pillars of Islam, but the Shi’a Muslims add several other practices. The Sunni–Shi’a divide can be summed up as follows: Shi’a Muslims, the second largest branch, differ from the Sunni in rejecting the authority of the three caliphs. They honor different accounts of Muhammad hadith and have their own legal tradition. The concept of Imanah (leadership) plays a central role in doctrine. Shi’a Muslims hold that leadership should not be passed through a system such as the caliphate, but rather descendants of Muhammad should be given the right of Imams.9

The term caliphate, used in this quotation, means successor or representative. Muhammad died without naming a successor or leaving in place a system for choosing one. Therefore, a process was developed. As indicated, the Shi’a do not support this process, but rather want descendants of Muhammad in key leadership positions. Between this division, there are also “progressives” (who may be radical jihadists), who can be either Sunni or Shi’a, who favor development of their own personal interpretations of the Qur’an. This is the fertile ground in which an al Qaeda can shape Islam to suit its purposes. The young are most susceptible to indoctrination in principles that are out of step with the Qur’an because they are not steeped in Islamic tradition. The Principles of Tattarrus and Its Implications. The Principle of Tattarus is used to support the radical Jihadist agenda, as concerns the killing of innocent people. It provides grounds for justifying the killing of men, women, and children who are noncombatants, such as now occurs regularly in the bombings in Iraq. It was a justification for the attacks on 9/11. In the thirteenth century the theologian Ibn Tayiminh developed a Tattarrus doctrine (meaning “dressing up”) to justify the killing of noncombatant Muslims during battles with Mongol invaders. The doctrine has subsequently been generally repudiated within Islam.10

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Here are two of the interpretations that have been made to justify such acts of violence against noncombatants: r The Qur’an calls for expulsion of any non-Muslim invaders . . . the death of noncombatants is an inevitable byproduct of this action.

r The death of innocent Muslims is acceptable if it leads to a truly Islamic regime being installed in the country.

Two Islamic theologians take an opposing view concerning the correctness of the Tattarrus doctrine: r Shiekh Mohammad Tantarni, Dean of Cairo al Al-Azha University, and a leading Islamic authority, states: Nothing in Islam justifies the deliberate killing of noncombatants. Tattarrus applies to collateral damage in a war between two regular armies, and not to action perpetrated by self-styled combatants.

r Najih al Ibrahim, an Egyptian theologian, criticizes what he considers abuse of Tattarrus: No one can use Tattarrus to justify shedding of innocent blood. The only time that Tattarrus is allowed is when Muslim combatants kill a fellow Muslim who is captured by the infidel and may, under torture, reveal secrets that could help the infidel against the true believers. Aside from that, shedding of blood is the greatest of sins in Islam.

It is hard to articulate any justifiable argument for what is occurring in Iraq today, including the killing of people attending funerals, killing people heading to a mosque for worship, killing of people in wedding parties, blowing up buses with children on them, and attacking people as they eat in restaurants or shop for their daily food. It is small wonder that there is so much debate around this issue within Islam. There is certainly outrage, but it seems to live side by side with support for the insurgents, either out of fear or genuine allegiance. Too often it ends up with retaliatory acts that help create a continuing cycle of violence. The U.S. presence in Iraq helps the jihadists recruit new waves of terrorists. This may dissipate as the U.S. presence becomes less of a factor. Significant Statistics and Trends. Looking at the way the Sunni–Shi’a influence is distributed across countries in the Middle East can be useful. Table 7.1 lists the countries in the Middle East and whether they are principally Sunni or Shi’a Muslim. To the extent countries choose to take sides along sectarian lines, there can be, in the worst case, a Balkanization effect in the region. We already see some banding together taking place. For example, Saudi Arabia, Jordan,

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Fogs of War and Peace Table 7.1. General Sunni–Shi’a Division of Middle Eastern Countries Country Iran Syria Lebanon Jordan Iraq Saudi Arabia Egypt Kuwait Pakistan Afganistan

Sunni

Shi’a X

X X X X X X X X X

Kuwait, and Egypt can build a protective circle based on their Sunni orientation and distrust of Iranian intentions. Iran and Iraq also have a kinship from the standpoint of their Shi’a orientation, and this will probably continue to build, whether the United States likes it or not. Iranian President Ahmedinejad recently made a highly publicized state visit to Iraq, the first such visit in decades, and was warmly welcomed. A particularly interesting piece of the equation in the Middle East is Syria. Its Sunni orientation sets it apart from Iran, even though one can see cooperative actions occurring between the two. It is evident why Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon can operate in relative comfort with each other. Each has a Shi’a majority. However, the relative weight of the Sunni and Shi’a in a given country should not be taken as a sure index to harmony. As has already been stated, there is more harmony than disharmony across the Islamic faith. In the Afghanistan War with the Soviet Union, as reported in Chapter 4, Sunni and Shi’a Muslims operated together in causing the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces. There is an issue of national security for some countries that have large resident Islamic populations, such as Great Britain and France. Do the Muslims assimilate or align themselves more with their religion than with the country in which they reside? In the United States there seems to be a view, although not well researched to our knowledge, that Muslims are well assimilated. The actual number of Muslims in the United States is not known. Estimates range widely. Assimilation of Muslims is clearly a problem in a number of countries. A report filed by the Director General of M15 in Great Britain (roughly the equivalent of the CIA in the United States) on the terrorist threat facing their

A Comparative Analysis of Belief Systems Table 7.2. Percentage of Muslims Who Identify with Their Country or Religion First Country Great Britain Spain Germany France Pakistan Jordan Egypt Turkey Indonesia Nigeria

Citizen First

Muslim First

7 3 13 42 6 21 23 19 30 25

81 9 66 46 87 67 59 51 36 71

country and other countries is rather enlightening. Their survey summarizes evidence on the extent to which Muslims identify with their host country versus their religion. Table 7.2 shows the result, with Great Britain listed first. Numbers shown are percentages. Great Britain ranks first in “Muslim First” attitudes among Western nations. These figures are telling. They certainly point to a problem in Great Britain, including the ability of radical Islam groups to recruit terrorists there. The numbers for Pakistan are also a cause for concern. Even in a country like France, with a balance between those who view themselves first as French versus those who first view themselves as Muslims, there can be an undercurrent that can be destructive, as can be seen in riots in France in 2005–2006 concerning Muslim rights in French society. When considering Islam in its totality, the primary debate today is the growth of the radical elements within the faith. It is a fierce debate within Islam, and there is much at stake. Will the mainstream followers of Islam allow a radical wing to remake the basic doctrine undergirding the faith, and allow a pervasive permissiveness when it comes to the killing of noncombatants— the loosest possible interpretation of Tattarus by those few Muslims who still believe it is a valid principle? What This All Means in Fighting Terrorism. Rather than the United States investing most of its resources in military means and homeland security, we need to place much greater emphasis on winning the war for hearts and minds. Primary solutions lie in the political arena. In pursuing this theme, as the essay in Chapter 1 indicates, the West has fought this kind of war successfully in the past. It can do so again. We have the right message if we use it.

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From a Western perspective people the world over want individual freedom and the right to live in peace and prosperity. That is not necessarily the yardstick in all countries. We tend to dress all countries in our clothes (i.e., United States), a case of clinging to our own culture as a universal belief system, and we can be as a result blind to other cultures. To a significant degree that contributes to the fog effect when we try to decipher realities, and this can lead us to false conclusions. Al Qaeda and the other radical Jihadists actually have a “soft underbelly.” Their targeting of innocents needs to receive extensive spotlighting. That is blatantly inconsistent with mainstream Islam. This is as noxious to many Muslims as it is to non-Muslims. It becomes the grist for attacking al Qaeda on the basis of their flawed and ideologically incorrect interpretation of the Qur’an. Ideally, this outcry needs to come from Muslims. Any primary attack from the United States will be less effective. The corollary to this is that the United States needs to open up much greater dialogue with Islamic governments and greatly elevate the expenditure of funds for radio and TV programming to Muslim countries in delivering the message. Voice of America has been getting some increased funding support, but much more is needed. Some Definitive Analyses. It is important to look inside the minds of those who have views contrary to our own. It is in a sense the old adage of “knowing your enemy,” but that is not the right way to frame it. If you are going to negotiate and explore paths to peace, it is important to broaden your outlook. What we want to do is explore both similarities and differences. Where is the “opponent” right? What can be used as bridges to agreement? Even in dealing with egregious regimes that we have little in common with, and may deeply distrust for very good reasons (e.g., North Korea), we should not rule out any prospect for agreement. To get to an understanding with terrorist regimes, of course, runs against everything we believe in, but we can in fact probably find some common ground with countries, including those who support terrorism, like Iran. That is the direction taken for the five brief analyses of “common ground” that follow. r Those things that Islamic terrorist organizations seem to share (from their perspective). We intuitively know what is on this list. The United States is viewed as heavy-handed and is believed to have a pronounced bias toward Israel, a country to be despised and distrusted. The anger seems much more intense in relation to the Bush administration than Americans in general. Israel has badly mistreated the Palestinians and has no legal right to their territory. Islam is the only effective counter to Western non-Muslim influence and oppression.

A Comparative Analysis of Belief Systems Time is on their side, since “The Great Satan” (the United States) does not have the will to sustain a countercampaign over time. Their way is the only right way and can lead to the establishment of Islamic Republics around the world.

r Looking to the soul of terrorism Martyrdom is good, and the most esteemed possible outcome. Therefore death in the battle for Islam is a glorious goal, and one to be welcomed, not feared. If innocent Muslims are killed in the process, that’s okay. “Allah will know them,” and they will go directly to heaven and receive their rewards. On the other hand, if non-Muslim innocents die, they will go straight to Hell. If you are a Palestinian, it can be perceived that the only way to make your voice heard is through violent acts, since the normal paths to justice are blocked.

r Areas where there can be a basis for meaningful dialogue and agreement There is an interest in the stability of Iraq and Lebanon because of the adverse impact a destabilization of these countries would have on the region. Therefore, even Iran is not that interested in a precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. There are opportunities for long-term harmony in the Middle East, certainly as concerns Israel and the Palestinians. Polls taken in the area indicate that people are bone weary of struggle and constant conflict. The obstacles to progress are deep distrust, pride (neither side wants to come across as dealing from weakness), and the radical elements on both sides that are almost totally unyielding. Earlier agreements and studies that have never been brought to fruition, particularly the Geneva Accord that was developed by respected players from both sides as an effort outside of government processes, showed promise. The Geneva Accord reflects flexibility in allowing Israel to retain some settlements beyond the pre-1967 boundaries. Such a process of arriving at agreement will need to begin with baby steps first to build the level of trust. Allowing Iraq to have a nuclear program under strict controls to guard against nuclear weapons development, with very stringent international sanctions should they attempt to develop them. This would be brought about by world pressure and by the United States beginning a dialogue with Iran. The United States needs to walk in Iran’s shoes in understanding their viewpoint. From Iran’s perspective, they are being subjected to a double standard and pushed around. It is okay for

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Fogs of War and Peace Pakistan and India, for example, to have nuclear programs and weapons, as well as Israel, but Iran is being blocked. To allow them to have a nuclear program with weapons safeguards is a middle way.

r Allegations by terrorist regimes and organizations against the West that have some basis in fact It is claimed that private Arab lands have been seized by the Israelis for establishment of Israeli settlements in violation of international law. It is argued that Israel is guilty of human rights violations for the way they are continuing to treat the Palestinians, including what amounts to incarceration in enclaves, as a result of the security fencing that is situated on Arab land. The Secretary General of the United Nations has declared the fencing to be illegal. It greatly restricts movement, economic activity, and availability of basic services, including water. The United States takes unilateral actions in the Middle East without regard for the interests of the countries in the region, such as the unpremeditated attack on Iraq.

A Letter from the President of Iran to the President of the United States. The president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadi-Najad, sent a letter to President George W. Bush on May 8, 2006. It was the first known communication from an Iranian president to a U.S. president in over a quarter century. The act itself was as important as the contents, and it was in effect an overture to begin some dialogue. Bush dismissed it. From all appearances this is a letter that may have been written personally by the Iranian president. In it he appears to reach out for contact and try and build a context for discussion. Mahmood Ahmadi-Najad states that “September 11 was a horrendous incident. The killing of innocents is deplorable and appalling in any part of the world.” Apparently well aware of the fact that Bush is a religious person, he cites Jesus Christ, including his mention in the Qur’an. He uses the tenets of Christianity to show incongruence with events that are taking place, as well as pointing out that both Christianity and Islam seek peace in worshiping one God. He makes a strong point about the needless War in Iraq, and the lives it has cost, which he states as over 100,000, as well as setting Iraq development back fifty years. He makes strong points about Israel and questions whether the Holocaust ever actually occurred. He has been known to call for Israel’s destruction. All and all, this is not a wild-eyed letter. President Bush could have acknowledged the letter without commenting on the specific points made. That could have been viewed favorably and seen as statesmanlike. On November 29, 2006, President Mahmood Ahmadi-Najad released a second letter, this time an open letter to the American public. It calls attention to “the many

A Comparative Analysis of Belief Systems

wars and calamities caused by the U.S. administration.” He tells the American people that they have been fooled into accepting their government’s policies, especially toward Israel. While the Iran president’s point of view is for the most part diametrically opposed to that of the United States, and certainly Israel, there can still be virtue in opening up dialogue, possibly through a U.S. envoy, as mentioned earlier, much as Henry Kissinger paved the way for the ultimate opening with China. Touchstones in finding ways to defeat terrorism and move to more positive ground in international relations. r We need to adopt a different mindset, one that is open to possibilities,

r

r

r

r

as opposed to orienting almost exclusively on plotting law enforcement and militarily oriented counterterrorist actions. How can we change the nature of the equation, get to new understandings, and explore new ground? In other words, how can we “get outside the box”? There is virtue in dialogue and striving for diplomacy and use of nonmilitary leverage points, such as economics, to achieve objectives and quell terrorism. In waging a counterterrorist campaign, it is generally accepted that about three-quarters of what needs to occur falls outside military action. Most countries of the world want stability, not instability. An unstable environment destroys economic activity, and in an age of globalization, if one segment of a system goes down it can bring down an entire system across a number of countries. Manufacturing activities can be broadly distributed for one product. The stability of Iraq seems to be an important bargaining chip and area for dialogue. The Roadmap for Peace, or something like it, needs to be brought back to life. The long-term stability of the Middle East and the long-term survival of Israel require that the Palestinian situation now be brought to a head and resolved. This will require realism on both sides, because the fact that Israel exists cannot be undone. Therefore, the contentious issue of Right of Return needs to be set aside. Israel cannot live with it. However, there can be an Independent State of Palestine created, including some Israeli withdrawal of settlements. There is a case for returning the Shaba Farms area to Lebanon (land that was appropriated by Syria in the 1950s and then captured by Israel in the 1967 war. Syria now concedes the fact that it belongs to Lebanon). Both sides will need to make concessions. Because of the level of distrust and hatred, actions need to be taken in small concurrent increments, with both sides proving goodwill at each juncture. The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza was bad a policy in terms of its unilateralism. The Palestinian side viewed it as a windfall and sign of Israeli weakness, which it then set out to exploit. It would have been much

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Fogs of War and Peace better if Israel had exacted substantive reciprocal commitments from the Palestinian Authority. Admittedly, the political environment placed Prime Minister Sharon in a position of having to move rather quickly and on a broad scale. However, in the long run, it is small concurrent increments, with both parties required to quickly show good faith and reciprocity on a time table that can progressively lead to a better situation. It also promotes meaningful dialogue.

The ultimate goals are harmony and security of the Israeli population and state, together with justice for the long-suffering Palestinians. There are sufficient persons of goodwill on both sides to catalyze this process and to at least begin to achieve those goals. Let their voices be heard.

8

The Road Forward Not all of our readers are likely to agree that we are currently experiencing World War III. But most, perhaps, will agree that the world is in a period of great volatility, especially in the Middle East. We believe that when one scans the world’s geopolitical landscape and considers the complex interplay of forces now evident, they will conclude that the world has moved well beyond the leading edge of major conflict. What is needed are strategies to dampen the spread of conflict and turn the world away from war and in the direction of peace. The challenges today are far different from the past. There are multiple tinderboxes that can ignite conflict around the world. We use the analogy of the fire in the basement, namely the Middle East, which can spread to the rest of the global house and engulf it if it is not brought under control. To see the nature of the threat requires a strategic viewpoint, looking at the global conflict from a big-picture systems perspective, as opposed to reasoning tactically and concentrating on bits and pieces that comprise the whole. What makes World War III different? As our summary matrix suggests (see Table 8.1), in presenting our multidimensional global concept, the characteristics of this war include stateless opponents, no fixed battle areas, and no declarations of war. It is also defined by its murkiness and lack of clear definition. This pervasive vagueness helps fuel the fogs of war and peace. “Spin” is defined as the act of providing a distinctive interpretation of events and ideas, especially as used by politicians and other interest groups

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to sway public opinion, as in “let’s put a favorable spin on this story.” When this murkiness and fog now prevailing in the world is given “spin”—as is occurring constantly in the form of propaganda and distortion of the facts— we end up with a very thick fog indeed. It leaves a confused state, with both politicians and average citizens having an ill-defined view of how to deal with the various issues and conflicts. The matrix also shows the key role played by the clash of cultures and thought processes. This gets very little attention, in part because citizens of the United States have little grasp of other cultures. It is usually not a part of the school curriculum, and this lack of awareness and sensitivity to other cultures becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy in adulthood—what we do not understand or know, we tend to fear, avoid, and ignore. Perhaps this is why Americans misjudge their opponents so badly. In the worst case, we default to the biases, prejudices, and assumptions of our own culture in judging the intentions of others. We expect their reactions to in event to be similar to our own. Think of an Iran with nuclear weapons. An Iran with WMD will not necessarily have the same constraints on their use that typifies Western values. The paradox is that possession of nuclear weapons by the North Koreans, with all of their idiosyncrasies and strangeness, can perhaps be more predictable than a nuclear tipped Iran. They are at least focused on the present and not on martyrdom and life after death. If one scans the list of cultural differences included in our matrix, one finds that those in the West have a much different view of the world than do Islamic radicals. In fact, Americans and Europeans have a different way of thinking and relating to their environment than found in many parts of the world. Americans and Europeans can take a more linear view, whereas Asians, Middle Easterners, and Africans are less linear and have a longerterm orientation than Americans. Japanese and Chinese have the longestterm orientations in the world. Americans have a shorter time horizon and are inductive in their reasoning processes, building logical conclusions in a straight line. Most of the world’s people are more inclined to deductive reasoning, starting with the big picture first. They also tend to be more inclined to think in terms of relationships. They have extended families rather than nuclear families. These cultural distinctions and the research behind them are explained in Chapter 4. Collectively, they show that non-U.S. and European cultures are more “Field Dependent” in having a wide-angle lens of the world and its interdependencies. Americans are by their nature more “Field Independent,” operating with much independence from the environment around them. You can see this in Hofstede’s cultural dimension of Individualism versus Collectivism. Most of the world is collectivistic, with Americans hard over on the individualism side of the scale (most pronounced of any of the fifty nations in Hofstede’s initial milestone study). Some of that decided

Table 8.1. A Multidimensional Global Concept

Distortion Effect

Clash of Cultures and Thought Processes

Fog of Peace

West: United States and Most EEC

Stage 1

Understanding Need

Left Brain Thinking r Inductive Reasoning r

Stage 2

Mobilization of Support

Individualistic r Low Power Distance r

Spark Igniting Conflict

Short-Term Orientation r Low Uncertainty Avoidance r Monochronic r

Stage 3

Fog of War

East: Islamic Radicals

World War III (Characteristics)

Stateless Opponent (Religious Zealots) Global Terrorist Threat Murky and Ill Defined

Stage 1

Exuberance of Response

Right Brain Thinking r Deductive Reasoning r

No Fixed Battle Area (No Front or Rear)

Stage 2

Crescendo Effect

Collectivistic r High Power Distance r

No Declaration of War

Stage 3

Scale-down and Withdrawal

Short-Term Orientation r

Stage 4

Taking Stock/Refining Strategies

High Uncertainty Avoidance r Monochronic r

PRODUCT OF COLLISION = A CONFUSION OF ENDS AND MEANS

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tilt in the direction of individualism and field independence is now showing some meltdown as the society becomes increasingly multicultural. To repeat the point made earlier in the book for emphasis—we should not view all practicing Muslims in a negative way. That is a grave disservice. It is only a tiny fringe of Muslims that represent any threat to the West. One can use the analogy of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Most Protestants and Catholics detested the cruelty and killings that took place. The same applies to those of the Islamic faith. They share the desire for peace and eschew violence. At the same time we cannot underestimate the ability of small groups of motivated fanatics to disrupt our lifestyle, the serenity and safety of our lives, and our peace of mind. It is also evident that radical elements of Islam have gained strength in recent years by capitalizing on a rising tide of anti-Americanism and anger over the Iraq War and perceived U.S. arrogance. In the matrix, we once again show the stages assigned to the fog of war and the fog of peace. We believe that this straightforward model can help us better understand and map the dynamics of the fogs that obscure our ability to see events in realistic terms. Throughout the book, we have highlighted what we consider to be the key facts, did our best to interpret them, provided some personal anecdotes from our own experience, and then provided our overall thoughts on the practical implications. Therefore, much of what we hold to be true has already been revealed. However, it may be useful to synthesize and organize what appears important and reduce it to a summary form. While much of what is outlined in the book paints a rather gloomy picture of current world events, we were constantly searching for paths that can lead to greater world peace. In the end, confrontation only leads to further conflict. The aftermath of World War I, as we show in Chapter 1, led directly to World War II. Therefore, there is a reason to emphasize the importance of discussion between and among nations. We believe that too often the relationship and communication between nations has been categorized as either negotiation or conflict. Sometimes the parties are not ready to take up negotiation. Negotiation as a process can be limiting and difficult to instigate in some cases, as can be seen in the relationship with North Korea. We believe that most experienced negotiators would agree that there is a period, especially in dealing with highly contentious relationships, when the parties simply need to open up to some low-key discussion at the outset and then try to build on that opening. The recent agreement with North Korea shows this approach has promise. Experts who teach negotiation skills to managers stress this aspect. Wise negotiators spend far more time listening than talking. They gather information and understanding, building crosscultural understanding in the process. But when the parties involved in a conflict, or a potential conflict, do not speak regularly, there is no hope for such understanding or insights.

The Road Forward

Once some discussion takes place, then dialogue, which runs deeper than mere information-gathering can ensue, leading to a better mutual understanding. At that point, negotiations may become possible. With all the current debate about whether the United States should engage in comprehensive direct talks with Iran, it is worth noting that Iran was helpful to the United States in support of its early operations in Afghanistan. That cooperation could have been capitalized on, but there seems to have been little or no follow-up by the U.S. government. As former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, codirector of the Baker-Hamilton Report of the Iraqi Study Group (ISG) (2006), has stated, the United States maintained dialogue with the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. Therefore, it is hard to understand a stance that disallows meaningful direct talks with Iran and Syria today. It now appears that the advice given by the ISG has been partially heeded, but the United States continues to set preconditions that will govern the dialogue. Accepting these might be seen as capitulation and loss of face (loss of faith is extremely important in many parts of the world) on the part of the other party before the discussions begin. That is not a way to build trust and open up true dialogue. It conveys the message: “You’re wrong, we are right, and we can only get somewhere if you agree with us up front.” That is not negotiation, and it is certainly not diplomacy! Even in a bad marriage, dialogue can be a path to renewed understanding and reconciliation. Syrian President Bashaar Assad is widely regarded as an extremist who harbors terrorist groups like Islamic Jihad and Hamas and collaborates closely with Iran. Yet, in December, 2006 at least four U.S. senators met with Assad (Bill Nelson, Christopher Dodd, John Kerry, and Arlen Spector), with several citing the Baker-Hamilton Report and its emphasis on diplomacy as the motivator of their visits. In the case of Senator Bill Nelson of Florida, and perhaps the other senators, the U.S. State Department ended up facilitating the visit, to include trip planning. This does not imply that the visits were viewed with enthusiasm by the Bush administration. Three of the four senators were Democrats. But at least dialogue took place. There are three stages that we identify in opening up communication with a country with which there is an antagonistic relationship. They are discussion, dialogue, and negotiation. To have no form of genuine communication with another power whatsoever with whom a conflict exists is problematic. It begins nowhere and it leads nowhere. It leaves only further conflict as a probable scenario. Beyond intelligence information that may be available, the conflict becomes a game of guessing at what the other party has in mind, sometimes leading to conclusions at odds with the other party’s true intentions. Wars begin in this way. What a country declares in public can be quite different from what is conveyed in private dialogue. We can experience an impasse in normal one-on-one human relationships between people, where two individuals refuse to speak to each other

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for years, sometimes out of a sense of deep hurt and injured pride. Neither wants to be the first to give in. When something leads the two people to reconnect, such as the death of a mutual loved one, it can be found that the point of disagreement has stemmed from miscommunication, a situation that only grew and festered over time, until how the dispute started came to be forgotten. The Baker-Hamilton Report contains seventy-nine recommendations. The largest number is linked to diplomacy. The report tilts the axis of emphasis from military action to diplomatic action. Let us recall an actual case, cited in the previous chapter. On May 8, 2006, the president of Iran, Mahmood Ahmadi-Najad (few outside of Iran know how to pronounce the name properly) addressed a letter to President George Bush. It is believed that much, if not all, of its contents may have been written by him personally. Whatever his intentions in writing the letter, the contents of which were widely distributed throughout the world, in the most favorable case it can be a viewed as the president of Iran personally reaching out to the U.S. president after a quarter century of official silence between the two countries. When you read the letter carefully, as we did, it seems unmistakable that the Iranian president is stating his honest views. We may not like the man personally and disagree with most of his views, but they do seem to represent a forthright statement of his perspective. That can be a starting point for discussion. While some of the contents can be termed noxious, including his expressed belief that the “alleged” systematic killing of six million Jews in World War II represents only a claim and requires further research, he has the facts right in some other cases. It has become a dreadful clich´e that one makes peace with enemies, not with friends. It is less of a clich´e that one never makes peace with enemies without communicating with them. We must look beyond the points that we strongly object to and consider those that contain kernels of truth and on which we can potentially agree. Ahmadi-Najad indicates in the letter that he considers the attacks on the United States on 9/11 a horrendous act, and that the killing of innocents anywhere in the world is deplorable and appalling. Certainly we agree with him on this point. He indicates that the United States considered Saddam Hussein of Iraq as an ally against Iran, only to decide later that Hussein was a harsh dictator needing to be removed. This seems an accurate reading of history. America supported Saddam Hussein for many years, including during the period when he gassed Kurdish villagers. The Bush administration immediately dismissed the letter from the president of Iran. Readers can make their own judgment. Could something have been gained by at least acknowledging the letter and welcoming the possibility of continued discourse? Would that have weakened President Bush’s position? We think not. It might well have brought a favorable reaction around the world and been viewed as statesmanship. Beyond any point

The Road Forward

related to good public relations, it might have brought the beginnings of an inroad to peace between the two countries after long estrangement. It is entirely possible that Ahmadi-Najad is simply a wily tactician and that the letter was tactical, insincere, and manipulative. But it is also true that, as is often said in Israel, you always make peace with your enemies, never with your friends. It is well known that the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin abhorred Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat. Yet he negotiated with him, and shook hands with him. All the national players in the Middle East are looking for a way to avoid greater hostilities. Polls of the citizenry in the region seem emphatic about this. We believe an important opportunity was missed in acknowledging the letter from the president of Iran. It could have opened up some discussion between the two leaders and helped reduce the level of mutual enmity and tension. AROUND THE WORLD What follows are our summary views in several areas, including how to either extricate ourselves from a conflict or move to a more favorable posture. We admit that solutions to most major problems can require a level of national will, political leadership, and national sacrifice that may be difficult or impossible to muster. That does not subtract in the least from the need to state what needs to be achieved in forthright terms. Sometimes points of view that seem outside the boundaries of the possible become feasible when you consider the harsh alternatives. We believe that we stand at a critical crossroads in human history and that decisions made over the next few years can either doom us or move us to resolve long-standing and daunting issues. The Iraq War. The situation in Iraq remains largely unsettled. The “surge”—the substantial increase in American troops serving in Iraq, announced by President Bush in January 2007—has been effective in curbing suicide attacks and reducing roadside bombings. It also seems to have reduced both U.S. and Iraqi casualties. Operational security has greatly improved as a result of the “seize and hold” strategy. Communities in some instances have resumed normal activity and freedom of movement. By October 2007, production of electricity had surpassed prewar levels, even though it still falls short of demand. Al Qaeda has now been resisted and largely dislodged in al Anbar province and some other areas. The more stable environment is allowing overall economic activity to move forward with less disruption, even though the unemployment rate, especially among young Iraqis, is very high, reaching 75 percent in some areas. The unemployment situation provides al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations with an opportunity to attract new recruits.

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The picture of progress has not been without dips and downsides. April 2008 saw some resurgence of U.S. casualties and frequent shelling of the Green Zone, the supposedly safe area where key U.S. and Iraqi offices are located. Fighting around Basra and in the Sadr City area of Baghdad ended the cease-fire that had been in effect. It also has become obvious that the Iraqi Army, although improved, has difficulty when it is not backed by strong U.S. military support. In some instances, U.S. Army and Marine Corps units have had to quickly replace Iraqi units in the fight. You can train people to fight, but they also need to have the will to engage in combat operations against a tenacious enemy. The political climate has not substantially improved as yet, but there have at least been some encouraging signs. Political reconciliation stands as the Achilles’ heel. No matter how well the military operations are going, it is only a limited gain until the political situation stabilizes. If we were to abruptly take away the military “crutch” we provide, things could unravel, given an Iraqi military not yet ready to operate decisively in large-scale operations. Some units of the Iraqi Army, on the other hand, especially small elite special forces units, have been highly effective. There is also a tendency by the Shi’a-dominated government to show hesitancy in supporting the development and financing of Sunni police elements in areas that are being freed of al Qaeda. The United States has had to move in and fill the void in some instances, including paying salaries and equipping the forces, something that can end up being a major friction point between the U.S. military and the Iraqi government. It is well appreciated by those who understand counterinsurgency doctrine that the largest part of the solution resides in the political domain, not military action. Without effective governance, some reconciliation of sectarian differences, and a government that is credible with the people of Iraq, the long-term prognosis is poor. While the Iraqi military seems to be making gains in its capability, the National Police appear to be riddled by corruption, rife with sectarian favoritism, and is still of only limited effectiveness. It has even been suggested that they dismantle the National Police and start over. They can be more of a liability than an asset as presently constituted. Dwight Ink, in writing about the need for the United States to adjust its national strategy, says: “To believe that a country emerging from chaos can develop democratic processes and institutions without establishing a viable government with the capacity to serve its people is an oxymoron. The longer the need for government reform is delayed, the more difficult it is for donors to help countries reform.” We certainly see this in the case of Iraq. Attempts to bring about meaningful governmental reform have experienced gridlock, while the United States provides its military muscle to buy time. But as Dwight Ink suggests,

The Road Forward

the longer you delay the essential reform, the more difficult the reform becomes. The degree of corruption in evidence further complicates matters, because reform inherently involves curtailing illegalities. When U.S. forces begin a substantial withdrawal, it could trigger a return to more violent conditions. The various tribes may well end up in conflict with each other when the U.S. presence begins to fade, as they jockey for power and influence. There is a tendency to oversimplify the circumstances in Iraq. It can be viewed as three sectarian groups competing for resources and influence—Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurds. But one needs to look at the situation city by city, even neighborhood by neighborhood. The tribal makeup in a given area is a key dynamic. That can be more important in specific areas than tallying up the numbers of people there from the different sectarian groups. This is one reason why the suggestion by some U.S. politicians that the country be subdivided along sectarian lines makes little sense. Further, many areas are hybrid mixtures of sectarian groups. It would involve an inordinate displacement of populations and could even lead to form of ethnic cleansing. It is an example of a lack of deep understanding of Iraqi society and politics. The absurdity of this approach can be seen in areas of Baghdad that have been carved up into small enclaves and neighborhoods surrounded by concrete barriers. That containment can keep people from attacking each other, but it does not lead to lasting harmony. It can be compared to the long security-fence in Israel that divides Palestinian populations and families in some instances, becoming a form of incarceration, blocking economic activity, impeding travel, and starving the Palestinians in terms of access to essential services. To declare it a successful strategy because violence is down really misses the point. It only defers a real solution and seeds further conflict. What strategic options does the United States have in moving forward with regard to Iraq? We must begin with some undeniable truths. r The U.S. military cannot maintain its current level of deployment much longer. It is stretched far too thin. It is placing a severe strain on the force, even as the U.S. Army and Marine Corps ramp up to the higher strength levels authorized by the U.S. Congress. r Popular support for the war continues to be very low, although not as low as it had been. r The war is being fought largely with borrowed money and is well on the way to surpassing the trillion dollar mark. This drain on resources cannot be supported indefinitely. It blocks the ability of the U.S. government to deal with essential societal issues, including the deterioration of infrastructure, support for important social programs and development of alternative energy programs that can break the dependency of the United

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The best strategic option for the United States is, we believe, a gradual phase down, resisting arguments for a hurried exit. But we need to begin ramping down in a way that removes at least half of our forces by the end of 2009. Such a “marker” must be established for planning purposes. Beyond that, the drawdown has to be done with great care. America’s enemies will turn any such withdrawal announcement into an extravaganza of victory celebrations. This should not be a major consideration when optimizing strategy. We feel that a draw down of the force level in Iraq by roughly one-half by the end of 2009 (the end of the next president’s first year in office) is politically realistic and allows sufficient time for orderly retrograde in terms of logistics. Despite the political rhetoric calling for almost immediate removal of U.S. forces, there seems to be an understanding that a precipitous pullout would be unwise. The counterinsurgency strategy now playing out must be given some time to work, rather than being undercut, as occurred during the Vietnam War. With roughly half the force level still in place by the end of 2009, given our suggested strategy, we can be prudent in judging further withdrawals. We believe the American people may be ahead of their elected representatives in government in recognizing this. The American people want our troops brought home, but they don’t want to undercut them either or place them at further risk through a chaotic withdrawal process. The Conflict in Afghanistan and Its Linkage to Pakistan. If we are interested in immobilizing al Qaeda and curtailing its ability to promote terrorist activity, Afghanistan from the beginning has been the main event. Any claim that Iraq is the center of the problem is a fabrication and creation of the Bush administration. The invasion of Iraq stirred up a hornet’s nest and made that war a manifestation of American overreach and heavy-handedness.

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Al Qaeda in Iraq was brought to life by the invasion of Iraq. It was not there before the war. The conditions in Afghanistan are less stable and secure than seems to be generally appreciated. It is a case of “out of sight, out of mind.” Full support from some of the NATO countries, such as living up to commitments made, has been hard to come by in some instances. In February 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates attributed some of the hesitancy to live up to commitments by NATO countries as linked to their continued opposition to the war in Iraq. Some of the NATO countries contributing forces also place so many restrictions on employment of their forces that full integration of the force leaves much to be desired. Canada’s Prime Minister Stephen Harper recently initiated a Parliamentary debate on the continuing presence of Canadian forces in Afghanistan, making the point that it is unfair to demand that Canadian troops continue to fight and die when NATO countries do not do their share. The United States has had to move in 3,000 more U.S. Marines to meet the gap, with further augmentation likely in 2008. In the meantime, al Qaeda and Taliban forces are able to cross the border from Western Pakistan into Afghanistan at will. There is no “hot pursuit” agreement in place with Pakistan that allows U.S. and NATO forces to track terrorists to their hideouts in Pakistan. The Pakistani military under President Musharraf was not effective in rooting out al Qaeda and Taliban. It will probably be even less effective under the new regime that assumed power in 2008, especially given their inclination to keep their hands off of the areas in which the terrorists operate. This can ultimately create a situation where the terrorist elements could destabilize Pakistan. So long as al Qaeda and Taliban fighters have sanctuaries in Pakistan, there is little likelihood of Afghanistan arriving at real stability. From the perspective of Afghanistan and NATO, it is like bailing water out of a boat with a large hole in its side. You end up bailing out the water as more comes in to replace it. Until the flow of Taliban out of their sanctuaries in Pakistan into Afghanistan is stemmed, the ability to truly stabilize Afghanistan is unlikely. The assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who was bidding for a return to power in Pakistan, has added to the ferment. The stability of Pakistan now seems to hang in the balance. In our opinion, it is the most troubling development in the Middle East, given the fact that any overthrow of the government could put a large arsenal of nuclear weapons in the wrong hands. The dynamics are complex and difficult to predict. The dangers were further elevated in April 2008 as the new political leadership in Pakistan announced a planned accord with militants in the Pakistan–Afghanistan border region. Similar agreements in the past have delivered no real benefit value. They are in the end simply appeasement and do not reduce the dangers. There is no reason to believe that it will be any different this time.

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What needs to be done to move forward? An important start point is to understand that Afghanistan is far more pivotal than Iraq. As part of that recognition, the military force level needs to be greatly increased. As we state in Chapter 4, the force needs to be at least doubled. While risky, it seems imperative that we also make the tough decision and continue cross-border operations to keep al Qaeda and Taliban off-balance and less able to mount operations in either Afghanistan or against the government of Pakistan. An unmanned Predator used to kill an al Qaeda leader in Pakistan in January, 2008 seems to herald the beginning of selective actions in this area. However, the ability to launch such attacks now seems even more problematical. The current ambassador to Pakistan has been hesitant to endorse such strikes given the political volatility in Pakistan. Anti-American sentiment is intense right now. The al Qaeda Threat. There are those who claim al Qaeda is on the run. This claim is specific to Iraq. Others hold the view that al Qaeda is undergoing a worldwide resurgence elsewhere. We side with those who see the threat growing. One cannot gauge al Qaeda strength and prowess on the basis of current events in Iraq. There have clearly been inroads made against al Qaeda stemming from better intelligence and the fortuitous discovery of detailed records kept by the organization. We stated in early versions of Chapter 4, in writing about the Iraq War, written eighteen months ago, that al Qaeda would encounter growing difficulty in Iraq. This is coming to pass. Al Qaeda overstepped itself by assassinating a number of tribal leaders. They now find themselves being pushed out in large areas of the country. The fact that they are Sunni, in a country where a majority are Shi’a, does not help their cause. They are like a “foreign body” and subject to rejection. It must disturb al Qaeda when they consider that Iraqi Sunni’s themselves are taking up arms against them in collaboration with U.S. military forces. The picture beyond Iraq is different. Al Qaeda, as mentioned in Chapter 7, has cells (usually multiple) operating in at least 100 countries. The situation in Pakistan has already been highlighted. The facts suggest that al Qaeda is capable of mounting concentrated and synchronized attacks on the scale of 9/11, including use of dirty nuclear bombs (radioactive material wrapped in conventional explosives). Use of chemical and biological agents also remains a distinct possibility. Vigilance is necessary. However, the best preventative, thinking long term and strategically, is to dry up their sources of support. This can be done, but it requires a more enlightened foreign policy by the United States than we have seen in recent years. To do it effectively requires cooperation among nations, not the United States seeking to dictate terms at every turn. The most effective ultimate counter to terrorism is the worldwide desire for stability of economic markets. Al Qaeda runs directly counter to this goal and therefore is the odd man out if the world community bands together against this terrorist organization. Global capital markets are a vital part of today’s sensitive interdependent global economy.

The Road Forward

They are especially sensitive to terrorist threats. Protecting them, and the global economy, requires coordinated global policies. The interdependency of countries in the economic sphere is growing. Products often end up bearing the fingerprints of many nations, with designs shared and parts manufactured in a number of countries. The products then flow to market through a variety of conduits. Financial markets tend to operate in tandem since the “Big Bang” in the 1980s that created one international financial arena, one that never sleeps. This intricate web of international relationships runs directly counter to any force that would try and disrupt it. It has long been appreciated that economics can be used as a weapon. In our view, the momentum of world economic markets today stands as a growing barrier to those stateless movements, like al Qaeda, that strive to impose their will by creating regimes driven by radical theocracies that run counter to economic vitality. But at the same time, the fragile global system is vulnerable to concerted strategic assaults on it. Without wishing to offer ideas to the enemies of that system—they doubtless have sufficient of their own—the global pervasiveness of container ships, and the disruption caused by explosives in a single container, either announced or unannounced in advance by a terrorist, are worrisome. And there are many other areas equally sensitive. Israel and Its Neighbors. Volatility marks the current state of affairs. One can say that the situation is always somewhat tenuous—Churchill’s definition of the situation in Ireland as “critical, desperate but not serious” applies to the chronically volatile Middle East—but there are now some major new causes of concern to be dealt with. On the surface, matters may seem reasonably stable, but when you consider the totality of recent events, vulnerabilities of any peace process become evident. Suicide bombings are less of a factor, largely because of extraordinary measures taken by Israel, including construction of a rambling and expansive security fence. But such measures have severely restricted the movements and economic activity of Palestinians. It has led to an intensification of hatred and mutual distrust. The continued appropriation of Arab land further exacerbates the situation. There have been signs, including former President Jimmy Carter’s meetings with a high-level Hamas official in Syria in April 2008, that Hamas may be more receptive to negotiation, and even to recognizing Israel. However, there has been no formal overture by Hamas to this effect. Gaza under Hamas control is more stable in terms of internal security. The struggle with the PLO has been removed. However, this really does not tell the story. Hamas control can be harsh. Access to the outside world by the Palestinians in Gaza, whether by land, sea, or air, has essentially been shut down by Israel. Export and import traffic is largely at a halt. As a result, economic activity is at low ebb. In February 2008, Hamas broke through barriers at the Raffah crossing, on the border with Egypt, in order to open movement of people and goods across the border with Egypt. The

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barriers were quickly rebuilt by the Egyptians and travel has been choked off by the Egyptian government. From a humanitarian standpoint, it is a sad state of affairs. Through it all, Hamas still refuses to recognize Israel’s right to exist. Control of Gaza by Hamas complicates any agreement on a Palestinian State, unless it is only to be a West Bank entity. There are some signs that a reopening of the border crossings, and a cease-fire, brokered by Egypt may occur. Continuing violence in Gaza reverberates in Egypt, where a strong and revived Moslem Brotherhood opposition threatens the regime of President Mubarrak. Egypt has a strong interest in quieting the situation. Lebanon remains a country fraught with uncertainties. It is difficult to gauge the direction events will head. In the worst case, there could be another civil war. As we indicate in Chapter 2, Lebanon seems to have an uncanny ability to make the wrong turns in terms of its own self-interests. Hezbollah still has capabilities that could lead to a renewed conflict with Israel, perhaps as a way of further strengthening its already strong position in Lebanon. Israeli intelligence predicts such a renewed conflict, though not perhaps in the coming year. Syria continues to be a negative influence. The worst case is that Syria will reassert itself in Lebanon or test Israel militarily. Syria still demands a return of the Golan Heights. Return of the Golan was back, renewed as an option after the 2006 conflict between Israel and Lebanon, but the pendulum now seems to have swung away from such action. There seem to be some openings to meaningful discussions with Syria if they are pursued without fanfare or preconditions. Since the conflict with Lebanon and Hezbollah in 2006, Israel has done much breast-beating and soul-searching over the poor performance of its defense forces during that conflict. Its military strategies and capabilities have been strengthened as a result, including changes in military leadership, all for the better. Israel would be a much more formidable opponent now than it was in July 2006. The reported strike against the nuclear facility under construction in Syria in early September 2007 is a case in point. In the event of war, Israel does not have the luxury of trading space for time. As a country with little land area, Israel has its back to the wall from the first moment of a conflict. It has to respond vigorously, swiftly, and even with preemptive military strikes to survive. The large and growing number of rockets, even primitive ones, in possession of Israel’s enemies—able to strike at Israel’s cities and civilian population—makes such a rapid and effective response even more critical. What are the possible strategies for moving forward? Let us begin by understanding that the current tactical status quo cannot last. Israel must turn to longer-term strategic solutions, but it is difficult for Israel to do so. It creates a dilemma. Suicide bombings in Israel dropped off so significantly, that the nation’s security officials now dare to talk of its success in the area

The Road Forward

of internal security, but the very steps that are being taken to thwart suicide bombers appear to collide with the government’s agenda for achieving peace with the Palestinians. (I. Kershner, May 3, 2008, New York Times). If Israel assumes a more conciliatory stance, which we believe is important, it risks being seen as weakened by the Arab world. This perpetual dance between conciliation and deterrence is a dance of futility. One particular issue related to Israel is seldom discussed, yet it is critical to Israel’s future. It needs to be discussed. It relates to the large component of the Israeli population (over 1.4 million) that is Israeli-Arab. They feel set apart, “second-class” citizens, especially when Israel is referred to as the Jewish State—as is occurring as part of the sixtieth anniversary of Israel. When you walk in their shoes, their point of view becomes understandable. The New York Times reported on May 7, 2008 (Ethan Branner), in an article entitled, “After 60 years, Arabs in Israel are Outsiders,” that “several right-wing rabbis have forbidden Jews from renting apartments to Arabs or employing them.” The same article reports that “a majority of Jews, polls show, favor a transfer of Arabs out of Israel as part of a two-state solution, a view that a decade ago was thought extreme.” In effect, lines are hardening in all directions, with Israel managing to progressively paint itself into a corner that can end up being self-destructive in the long run. The Israeli-Arab issue is but one example. Common sense would suggest that there is merit in working to better integrate Israeli-Arabs into Israel’s mainstream, but to do that might entail dropping the label “Jewish State.” But such moves will probably be extremely limited, given the current deep divisions, religious historical doctrine, and prejudices. The fact remains that the Israeli-Arabs are entitled to equality of treatment as Israeli citizens, and not to deal with the issue constitutes injustice and represents a ticking time bomb. In a sense, it is a “hearts and minds” issue. Branner sums it up this way: “As Israel toasts its 60th anniversary in the coming weeks, rejoicing in the Jewish national rebirth and democratic values, the Arabs who make up 20 percent of its citizens will not be celebrating. Better off and better integrated than ever in their history, freer than a vast majority of the Arabs, Israeli’s 1.3 million [reported as 1.4 million in another source] Arab citizens are still far less well off than Israeli Jews and feel increasingly unwanted.” To the evident dangers up ahead, we suggest progressive gains over time in building harmony and a platform for agreement. We refer to this approach as concurrent and immediately reciprocal diplomatic increments (IRDI). This approach centers on the need to build trust as a part of the process at every stage. It calls for moving in small increments, with both sides immediately expected to demonstrate their good faith in clear and measurable ways. In the world of business, this might be called achieving small quick wins for both sides. This can gradually turn the atmosphere from a poisoned one into a conciliatory and cooperative one, directing attention

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from talking war to talking peace. Every act would need to be hinged on a definitive statement of expected reciprocity and tied to time. This kind of process takes time, but it can be more politically effective than trying to do things in a unilateral way (e.g., the withdrawal of settlements from Gaza by Israel without any expectation of reciprocity). The Bush administration push for a final-settlement agreement, as a desperate try for a “legacy” achievement, seems to us somewhat misguided, as it begins in the absence of a fundamental trust between the parties that is a necessary condition. If such an incremental process shows promise, it might then be possible later to move to larger change increments. A key element of incremental progress must be the improvement in the everyday living conditions of the Palestinian population. This will do much to reduce the grassroots support of extremist elements. A master strategy, agreed to by all sides, would need to be negotiated as the starting point. Goals and some proposed incremental reciprocal increments, contributed by all the players, would begin the process. The ground rules, including immediate and measurable reciprocity, would be mapped. An example might be the return of the Shaba Farms to Lebanon in return for better specified security safeguards for Israel along its Northern border with Lebanon. The incremental approach is similar in some respects to the Mitchell Plan (named after former U.S. Senator George Mitchell of Maine), which wisely talked of building trust as a critical start point. As indicated in Chapter 6, there could be value in revisiting the Geneva Accord of 2003. It could point the way to some of the reciprocal increments that could be matched up in engineering IRDIs as a way to begin dissolving the current impasse. Issues Related to Iran. Iran continues to be a thorn in the side of the Middle East and casts a shadow beyond it. With Iraq no longer serving as an obstacle or counterforce, Iran has felt greater freedom to exert its will in the Middle East. Reduced U.S. credibility and influence in the region contributes to this. Iran shows signs of wanting to be the preeminent power in the region, even creating a state of hegemony. It has defied world pressure in pressing ahead with its nuclear programs, professing all the while that it is not interested in producing nuclear weapons. Its hatred of Israel even extended in 2007 threatened to attack Israel. Iran is a Shi’a-dominated country and therefore has a natural affinity now to align with Iraq, another country with a Shi’a majority. This outflanks Saudi Arabia with its Sunni majority. The Bush administration has become increasingly strident in condemning Iran for interference in Iraq and its nuclear ambitions, with a suggestion that the United States has all options on the table, which by implication include the military option. Russia at the same time is vocal in opposing any thought of an attack on Iran. When one considers the collateral damage and unintended consequences that an attack on Iran would cause, any such attack seems foolhardy at this point in time. Iran is perhaps two to five

The Road Forward

years away from a nuclear weapon, assuming it is pursuing this option. As indicated in Chapter 7, the U.S. intelligence community in 2008 casts some doubt on Iran’s intention to pursue nuclear weapons development. The current Iranian government has become increasingly unpopular. A U.S. attack on Iran would tend to shore up support for the beleaguered regime. Consistent international pressure, particularly given the serious economic state in which Iran currently finds itself, may serve to achieve the desired ends. That certainly deserves to be pursued before thought is given to any form of military action. We feel that military action at this juncture would be a serious strategic blunder. However, we also feel that Iran cannot be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons. The very worst case the world can contemplate is to have people in control of nuclear weapons who place little value on human life. We may reach a juncture where there is no option other than to strike Iran militarily, but we are not at that point now. If there is a truly concerted effort by the world community to impose economic sanctions, they could work. However, the Chinese are not inclined to increase the pressure and Russia sees economic advantages in continuing matters the way they are. Russia also seems to take delight in challenging the United States at almost every turn, and profits from its business dealings with Iran. When considering the situation in the Middle East and its implications for Israel, we end up with two key conclusions. The first relates to resolution of the Palestinian issues. They are central to peace in the Middle East. Issues related to the Palestinians are lightening rods for conflict and serve to mobilize the radical Islamic movements. Israel finds itself on its sixtieth anniversary in the greatest peril since it became a nation state in 1948, with the United States the first to recognize it. The dangers are from within as much as from outside. The same holds true for solutions. In the end, as unpalatable as it may be to many Israelis, there must be a withdrawal of most Israeli settlements, both legal and illegal, on the West Bank. That means moving back in large part to the 1967 line. Nothing would chill Islamic radicalism more than that act. It could create the foundation for lasting peace, paving the way for a two-state solution. It could also serve to remove the Hamas grip on Gaza. It is not suggested that such a result be brought about in one large move. As already indicated, we see it being done in bite size increments over time. It would not involve unilateral moves, as was true in Gaza, but rather concurrent acts of reciprocity. There can be mutual benefits to the Palestinians and the Israelis. The end result could be a major reduction of tension and friction in the Middle East. The second issue related to Israel concerns its political system, the processes of governance. The processes of the Israeli government, particularly the multiplicity of parties and the constant shifting of voting blocks and coalitions, make it difficult to mobilize action on a significant scale. The

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piecemeal tactics of generating the necessary majority for action can swallow up the strategic needs of the nation, including actions that need to be taken to ensure its survival. It is not a matter of changing the processes of government, but rather the dynamics. The need is for a national leadership that will exert sufficient integrity and strength to mobilize the actions that Israel needs to confront long-standing problems. The same principle has relevancy to the United States. What are the possible strategies for moving forward? The United States needs to work more closely with the world community. It also needs to strive for more direct contacts with Iran in seeking ways out of the present impasse. There must be more give and take in any such talks, as opposed to laying down the gauntlet. Rather than move in the direction of conflict, or even anticipate it, some bold strokes to show good faith would help. What would happen, for instance, if the president of the United States expressed the view that the current contentious environment could be ameliorated by reopening official diplomatic channels between the two countries, including exchange of ambassadors? That might be viewed as true statesmanship, and it would be a refreshing change from an atmosphere of wall-to-wall negativism. A new U.S. president may be able to pull this off. THE ROAD FORWARD Let us face the brutal facts. We, in the West, are at this juncture of time losing World War III. We are certainly not winning it. We can turn things around, but we have no time to lose. We must first admit to the seriousness of the threat and then mobilize national will in the United States to confront it. That has not happened up to this point. Our leaders may say that we are a nation at war, but we are not really geared up psychologically to fight it and the expression “war on terrorism” is taken as metaphorical and abstract—like the “war on poverty.” Winning World War III, or bringing it to a successful conclusion, will require a concerted effort by the entire world community to resolve the current challenges. As is true in the United States, the world community is not geared up to mount an effective response. The War is viewed by many as a localized and distant problem, confined largely to irrational enemies in the Middle East. But nothing could be further from the truth. To the extent that we sit back and hope that the issues will resolve themselves, the ability to counter the forces contributing to the threat will become more and more difficult to deal with. Decision by indecision can lead to calamity. As John Donne wrote, the global bell is tolling, and it is tolling for everyone of us. Do we not hear it? There is much more that is possible in reducing the base of support for terrorists, than is currently being done. When an environment is turbulent, unstable, corrupt, poorly governed, and the people largely impoverished,

The Road Forward

there is fertile ground for terrorism. On the other hand, when the situation becomes more secure, stable, and offers economic opportunity to the average citizen, the environment then becomes much less hospitable for terrorists. Their base begins to dry up. Basil Liddel Hart, the noted strategic thinker, talked of the use of the “indirect approach” to achieve your strategic goals. The ideal outcome is to obtain your ends without firing a bullet or loss of lives. These strategies, because of their indirectness, can seem tangential and obscure. They also require time and patience to realize results. For example, the war on world poverty can lead to inroads against terrorism. However, such strategies require fortitude and the ability to see beyond the obvious. The connection between world poverty and the war on terrorism may not seem transparent, but it is very strong. Perhaps the best concrete example of this principle is the program of Mohammad Yunus of Bangladesh, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize for 2006. Starting very small, and using his own meager funds to seed the effort initially, he began offering micro-loans to the poor, over 90 percent of them women, in Bangladesh. This began with his visit to a village suffering famine, offering some $40 loans out of his pocket to villagers—and surprisingly, finding the money not only was paid back, but utterly changed the lives of capital-starved villagers at the mercy of usurious moneylenders. The honor system applied. Conventional wisdom said that you would never get the money back. However, there was almost a zero rate of default on the loans. From this nucleus, and outside government channels, Yunus built a business that now extends to 100 countries, millions of loan recipients, and billions of dollars loaned. Yunus’ experiment evolved in to the multibillion dollar micro-finance Grameen Bank. Many have found their way out of poverty as a result. The poor are in effect shareholders in this business, and some of the formerly poor are now on the corporate board. Yunus now speaks of creating a “Social Business Model” designed along these lines, focused on helping to improve the standard of living in the world. As Yunus sees it, his vision will not be realized until you need to go to a “Poverty Museum” to see what poverty “was” like once, but no longer exists. Yunus is an example of a person who changed the world by the power of his vision. His vision is shared by management professor C.K. Prahalad, who speaks of the “fortune at the bottom of the pyramid” and calls for businesses not only to employ the poor but also to design products to sell to them, for the mutual gain of all. There are many inspiring possibilities. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has proven the kinds of inroads that can be made against disease through the use of private funds, sometimes mixed with government funds. Their work has led to important advances in Africa in the area of health care. Large numbers of people have either avoided disease or been saved through the work of this Foundation, and with the support of Warren Buffet who has

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contributed many billions to it. The fact that this foundation has funds at its disposal that rival the World Health Organization (WHO) gives one pause. If a private foundation can do so much, cannot the nations of the world do more? It is an amalgam of many such innovative grassroots efforts that can end up leading to major gains. It simply takes vision and will. It requires a broader awareness of what is possible by better equalizing distribution of wealth in the world, which in turn, can represent a major counterweight in uprooting terrorism. You need both long-term and shorter-term strategies operating in tandem. We believe that with hope and conviction almost anything is possible. We also believe that the challenges associated with World War III can be met, and the war can be won and global terrorism defeated. It requires the mustering of will and resources. It also requires leadership of the first order. As the U.S. presidential candidate Barack Obama has said, “It is the audacity of hope.”

Notes CHAPTER 1 1. See Chin-Ning Chu, The Asian Mind Game (New York: Scribner, 1991) for a complete coverage of these strategies and the supporting details. 2. See Bernard Edinger and Eetta Prince-Gibson, “Still Not at Rest,” Jerusalem Report, March 4, 2008. 3. Quoted in George Packer, “Knowing the Enemy: Can Social Scientists Redefine the ‘War on Terror’?” The New Yorker, December 18, 2006, pp. 60–69. 4. This section is based in part on a speech given at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, award ceremony, October 11, 2006, at the Mandarin Oriental Hotel Ballroom, New York, by former Singapore founder and prime minister, and current Chief Mentor, Lee Kwan Yew. It is also based on Lee’s Washington Post article, “The Cost of Retreat in Iraq,” March 8, 2008. 5. Source: www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm. 6. www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/teach/alqaeda/glossary.html. 7. In a speech made on March 3, 2006; source http://www.vcrisis. com/index.php?content=letters/200608220451. 8. World Bank, World Development Report 1999/2000. 9. Ibid. 10. William Rosenau, “Waging the ‘War of Ideas,’ ” chapter 72 of McGraw Hill Homeland Security Handbook, available online from www.rand.org. 11. Matthew Craft, “US Channel a Turn-Off,” guardian.co.uk, Monday, February 16, 2004. 12. Frank Rich, The Greatest Story Ever Sold: The Decline and Fall of Truth From 9/11 to Katrina (New York: Penguin Press, 2006).

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Notes 13. G.F. Treverton, H.S. Gregg, D. Gibran, and C.W. Yost, “Exploring Religious Conflict.” Rand National Security Research Division Conference Proceedings 2005, www.rand.org, p. 30. 14. Source: Wikipedia, “George Marshall.” 15. Angel Rabasa, “Moderate and Radical Islam,” Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Defense Review Terrorism and Radical Islam Gap panel, November 3, 2005, U.S. House of Representatives, p. 4. 16. Cited by Bruce Hoffman, “Islam and the West: Searching for Common Ground—The Terrorist Threat and the Counter-Terrorism Threat,” testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 18, 2006, p. 15, www.rand.org. 17. Ibid., p. 15. 18. National Assessment of Educational Progress: The Nation’s Report Card. Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education: Washington, 2005. 19. Peter Drucker, “What We Can Learn from Japanese Management—The ‘Godfather’ System.” J. Nurs. Adm. January 1979 9(1): 4–6, 28. 20. Samuel Huntington. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993. 21. Charles Hampden-Turner and Fons Trompenaar, Building Cross-Cultural Competence (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2000), p. 126. 22. Ibid., p. 192.

CHAPTER 2 1. Gail Makinen, “The Economic Effects of 9/11: A Retrospective Assessment,” Congressional Research Service, September 27, 2002, www.fas.org/ irp/crs/RL31617.pdf. 2. Ibid. 3. Radio Interview with Secretary Rumsfeld on “Bill Bennett’s Morning in America,” August 22, 2006. 4. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, www.9-– 11commission.gov/report/911Report Ch1.htm. 5. http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=206. 6. Ibid. 7. Susan Page, “Poll finds Americans Split on Taking Military Action in Iran,” USA Today, November 27, 2007. 8. Much of this section is based on data taken from the MIPT database. MIPT is the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), a nonprofit organization dedicated to preventing terrorism on U.S. soil or mitigating its effects. See www.tkb.org (tkb stands for “The Knowledge Base”). 9. Source: www.bbc.co.uk. 10. Makinen, “The Economic Effects of 9/11.” 11. Source: Control Arms Campaign, sponsored by Amnesty International, Oxfam and the Int. Network on Small Arms. 12. Source: SIPRI (www.sipri.org). 13. Most of the data in this section come from www.sipri.org, the Web site of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Notes 14. Economic Report of the President, 2006, Table B-80. 15. W. LeFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War: 1945–1971 (New York: John J. Wiley, 2002), p. 292. 16. This section is based on A.A. Weinreb and Avi Weinreb, “Has Israel Used Indiscriminate Force?” Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2002, www.meforum. org/article/175. 17. See www.debka.com/ and www.worldbulletin.net/ (accessed on March 10, 2008). 18. See “The Trouble with Russia’s Economy,” The Economist, March 1–7, 2008. 19. Makinen, “The Economic Effects of 9/11.” 20. Source: C. Prestowitz, Three Billion New Capitalists (New York: Basic Books, 2006). 21. Yedidia (Didi) Ya’ari, Haim Assa, Diffuse Warfare: Warfare in the 21st C. (Lohama Ze’ira: HaMilchama b-Meah v-21) (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 2006).

CHAPTER 3 1. See Lewis Sorley’s, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999). 2. See: “The Fog of Peace,” http://americanfuture.net/?cat=23, May 14, 2006, “the fog of peace.” 3. H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1998). 4. Joint Service Command and Staff College, Advanced Command and Staff Course Notes dated 2001. 5. See Herman A. Witkin and Donald R. Goodenough, Cognitive Styles: Essence and Origins—Field Dependence and Field Independence, Psychological Issues, Monograph 51 (New York: International Universities Press, Inc, 1981).

CHAPTER 4 1. Charles M. Sennott, “Afghan Role Changing, Quarry Still Elusive,” Boston Globe, September 12, 2006. 2. news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk politics/5382590.stm. 3. www.afghan-web.com/history/. 4. Linda Robinson, Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces. Public Affairs (New York: Perseus Books, 2004). 5. Col. Michael R. Melillo, “Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities,” Parameters, U.S. Army War College (Autumn 2006): 22–35. 6. USA Today, September 29–October 1, 2006, Weekend Edition. 7. http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/postglobal/needtoknow/2006/10/. 8. July 2006, est., CIA Fact Book. 9. Department of Defense, QDR, Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006.

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Notes 10. His basic research is contained in his seminal work, Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1984; second edition, 2004), later extended by important follow-on research. 11. Marcus Luttrell, Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of SEAL Team 10 (Hardcover) (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 2007).

CHAPTER 5 1. www.informationweek.com/internet/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=196513797. 2. http://archives.cnn.com/2002/EDUCATION/11/20/geography.quiz/index. html. 3. See Fouad Ajami’s book, The Foreigner’s Gift (2006) in which he devotes a chapter to “States of Mind: The Liberator’s Bewilderment.” 4. Source: Wikipedia. 5. “This country and the leadership of the Defense Department are going to ensure that our military forces have the resources to successfully carry out their mission. To suggest otherwise is simply wrong.” U.S. Department of Defense, November 5, 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/home/dodupdate/For-the-record/ docs/2006–11-04a.html. 6. Linda Bilmes and Joseph Stiglitz, “The Economic Costs of the Iraq War: An Appraisal Three Years After the Beginning of the Conflict.” National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge MA, working paper 12054, February 2006. 7. Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes, The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict. New York: W.W. Norton, 2007. 8. http://www.juancole.com/2007/04/15-percent-increase-in-iraq-deaths.html. 9. Fouad Ajami, The Foreigner’s Gift: The Americans, the Arabs, and the Iraqis in Iraq (Hardcover) (New York: Free Press, 2006). 10. John Tierney, “Lessons in Spin from Osama,” The New York Times, September 12, 2006. 11. American professors who specialize in the study of civil wars say that most of them agree that the conflict in Iraq is a civil war. “I think that at this time, and for some time now, the level of violence in Iraq meets the definition of civil war that any reasonable person would have,” said James Fearon, a political scientist at Stanford, who in September 2006 testified to Congress on the Iraq war. Source: International Herald Tribune, www.iht.com/articles/2006/11/26/news/civil.php 12. “Casualty figures are highly uncertain, though estimates suggest more than one and a half million war and war-related casualties—perhaps as many as a million people died, many more were wounded, and millions were made refugees. Iran acknowledged that nearly 300,000 people died in the war; estimates of the Iraqi dead range from 160,000 to 240,000. Iraq suffered an estimated 375,000 casualties, the equivalent of 5.6 million for a population the size of the United States. Another 60,000 were taken prisoner by the Iranians. Iran’s losses may have included more than 1 million people killed or maimed.” Source: www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/iran-iraq.htm.

Notes

CHAPTER 6 1. Six countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, officially list Hezbollah, or its external security arm, as a terrorist organization. 2. David McCullough, Truman. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993). 3. Jimmy Carter, Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid (Hardcover) (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006). 4. http://www.janes.com/. 5. Source: Wikipedia. 6. Guy Bechor, “Paradox of Power and Weakness: What Is Perceived as Empowering in Mideast Weakens Israel’s Image in West,” Ynet, October 16, 2006, www.ynet.co.il/english/articles/0,7340,L-3315457,00.html/. 7. Source: Wikipedia. 8. Bernard Lewis, “Does Iran Have Something in Store?” (on-line), opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110008768.

CHAPTER 7 1. R. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 7. 2. Source: Wikipedia. 3. According to the CIA Fact Book. 4. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, p. 9. 5. Ibid., p. xliv. 6. Harvey Kushner, Holy War on the Home Front: The Secret Islamic Terror Network in the United States (Hardcover) (New York: Sentinal HC, 2004). 7. “On the March, Not On the Run,” The Economist, January 18, 2007, www. economist.com. 8. Seymour M. Hersh, “Annals of National Security—The Iran Plans: Would President Bush Go to War to Stop Tehran from Getting the Bomb?” New Yorker, April 17, 2006, www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/04/17/060417fa fact. 9. Source: Wikipedia. 10. See “Religious Tolerance: When Does Islam Permit the Killing of Muslim Noncombatants? The Principle of Tattarus,” Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance, http://www.religioustolerance.org/islkill.htm, November 13, 2006. See also: Amir Taheri, “To Kill or Not to Kill,” New York Post, June 10, 2005.

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Glossary Al Qaeda Al Qaeda means “The Base” in Arabic. It is an international alliance of terrorist organizations founded in 1988 by Osama bin Laden and other veteran “Afghan Arabs” after the Soviet War in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda has attacked targets in several countries, the most notable being the September 11, 2001 attacks that occurred in New York City and Northern Virginia. The group has been defined as “a radical Sunni Muslim umbrella organization established to recruit young Muslims into the Afghani mujahideen, and it aims to establish Islamist states throughout the world, overthrow ‘un-Islamic regimes’, expel U.S. soldiers and Western influence from the Gulf, and capture Jerusalem as a Muslim city.” Durand Line The Durand Line, named for Sir Mortimer Durand, was established as the unofficial border between Afghanistan and British India by Britain in 1893. It now marks the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is a poorly marked border running 2,610 kilometers (1.610 mi) and is a source of continuing tension and dispute. Leaders of the Pashtun tribes on both sides of the Durand Line do not recognize it. For 84 percent of its distance, the line follows physical features, such as rivers, with the remaining 16 percent a result of demarcation reports generated in 1894–1895. The Russians further mapped the line in the 1980s. In a real sense, it is an artificial border, and

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you can run into issues on the ground related to which country you are traveling through. It complicates border security missions. Gaza Strip The Gaza Strip is a coastal strip of land along the Mediterranean, bordering Egypt on the south-west and Israel on the north and east. It is about 41 kilometers (25 mi) long, and between 6 and 12 kilometers (4–7.5 mi) wide, with a total area of 360 square kilometers (139 sq mi). The territory takes its name from Gaza, its main city. It has about 1.4 million residents, all Palestinians. The Strip itself and its population are nominally governed by the Palestinian National Authority, though following the June 2007 battle of Gaza, actual control is in the hands of the de facto government dominated by Hamas. Israel controls the strip’s airspace and offshore maritime access. The Gaza Strip is not currently recognized internationally as a de jure part of any sovereign country. Golan Heights The Golan Heights or Golan is a plateau on the border of Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. It is about 1250 square kilometres in area. The name “Golan” refers both to the historical name of a geographic region, and, in contemporary usage, to territory captured by Israel from Syria in the Six-Day War (the captured territory also includes parts of Mount Hermon, which is a different geographic region than Golan Heights). Syria asserts the Heights are within the governorate of al Qunaytirah. Israel captured the Heights from Syria in the 1967 Six-Day War (and again in the 1973 Yom Kippur War) and has occupied them since then. Most of the population of around 53,000 fled. In the 1970s, new Jewish settlements were founded in the captured area. In addition to its strategic importance the Golan Heights is part of the Jordan River watershed, which provides a significant portion of Israel’s water supply. In 1981, Israel applied its “laws, jurisdiction and administration” in the Golan Heights with the Golan Heights Law, governing it as part of its North District. This annexation was not internationally recognized and United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 considers the area part of Israeli-occupied territories. Israel maintains it may retain the area under the text of Resolution 242 calling for its right for “safe and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.” Hamas Hamas acronym for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya or “Islamic Resistance Movement” is a Palestinian Sunni Muslim militant organization. Hamas was created in 1987 by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin of the Gaza wing of the Muslim Brotherhood at the beginning of the First Intifada. Best known in Israel and the West for its suicide bombings and other attacks directed against civilians and Israeli military and security forces targets, Hamas’ charter (written in 1988 and still in effect) calls for the destruction of the State of

Glossary

Israel and its replacement with a Palestinian Islamic state in the area that is now Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Hamas is listed as a terrorist organization by Canada, the European Union, Israel, Japan, and the United States, and is banned in Jordan. Australia and the United Kingdom list the militant wing of Hamas, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades as a terrorist organization. Since the death of Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat, Hamas’ political wing has entered and won many local elections in Gaza, Qalqilya, and Nablus. In January 2006, Hamas won a surprise victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections, taking seventy-six of the 132 seats in the chamber, while the ruling Fatah party took forty-three. Hezbollah Hezbolla (Arabic, literally “party of God”) is a Shi’a Islamic political and paramilitary organization based in Lebanon. It follows an Islamist Shi’a ideology developed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Hezbollah first emerged during the Lebanese Civil War as a militia of Shi’a followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini, trained, organized, and funded by a contingent of Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Hezbollah’s three main goals are to eradicate Western colonialism in Lebanon, bring to justice those who committed atrocities during the war (specifically the Phalangists), and establish an Islamic government in Lebanon. Hezbollah has realized that the goal of transforming Lebanon into an Islamic state is not practical at this time and has temporarily abandoned it. Islam Islam is a monotheistic religion originating with the teachings of Muhammad, a seventh century Arab religious and political figure. The word Islam means “submission,” or the total surrender of oneself to God (Allah). An adherent of Islam is known as a Muslim, meaning “one who submits (to God).” There are between 1 billion to 1.8 billion Muslims on the basis of self-identification, making Islam the second largest religion in the world, after Christianity. Muslims believe that God revealed the Qur’an to Muhammad, God’s final prophet, and regard the Qur’an and the Sunnah (words and deeds of Muhammad) as the fundamental sources of Islam. They do not regard Muhammad as the founder of a new religion, but as the restorer of the original monotheistic faith of Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and other prophets. Islamic tradition holds that Judaism and Christianity distorted the messages of these prophets over time either in interpretation, in text, or both. Islam includes many religious practices. Adherents are generally required to observe the Five Pillars of Islam, which are five duties that unite Muslims into a community. In addition to the Five Pillars, Islamic law (Sharia) has developed a tradition of rulings that touch on virtually all aspects of life and society. This tradition encompasses everything from practical matters like

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dietary laws and banking to warfare. Almost all Muslims belong to one of the two major denominations, the Sunni and the Shi’a. The schism developed in the late seventh century following disagreements over the religious and political leadership of the Muslim community. Roughly 85 percent of Muslims are Sunni and 15 percent Shi’a. Islam is the predominant religion throughout the Middle East, as well as in parts of Africa and Asia. Large communities are also found in China, the Balkan Peninsula in Eastern Europe, and Russia. There are also large Muslim immigrant communities in wealthier and more developed parts of the world, such as Western Europe and the United States. About 20 percent of Muslims live in Arab countries. Jihad The term jihad means “waging war on behalf of Islam.” Jihad may be declared against apostates, rebels, highway robbers, violent groups, un-Islamic leaders, or military exertion against non-Muslim combatants. In some interpretations jihad may include civil disobedience. In the languages of nonIslamic cultures, the term is usually used to refer to Muslim “Holy War” or any violent strife invoking Allah Islamic Sunni Islam Islamic prophet Muhammad Ahl al-Bayt Shi’a Imams infallible Ali ibn Abi Talib Fatimah caliphs Twelvers Azerbaijan Iran Iraq Ismaili Sevener Alawites Druzes. Principle of Tattarus The Principle of Tattarus is used to support the radical Jihadist agenda as concerns the killing of innocent people. It provides grounds for justifying the killing of men, women, and children who are noncombatants. It was a justification for the attack on the World Trade Center in New York City on 9/11/2001. The principle was developed in the thirteenth century by the theologian Ibn Tayiminh. The Tattarus doctrine means “dressed up” to justify the killing of noncombatant Muslims during battles with the Mongol invaders. The doctrine has subsequently been generally repudiated within Islam. Qur’an The Qur’an ¯ (Arabic: literally “the recitation;” also sometimes transliterated) is the central religious text of Islam. Muslims believe the Qur’an to be the book of divine guidance and direction for mankind and consider the text in its original Arabic to be the literal word of God, revealed to Muhammad over a period of twenty-three years and view the Qur’an as God’s final revelation to humanity. Special Operations Forces (SOF) The U.S. Special Operations Forces is the official category that the U.S Department of Defense lists in the U.S. military units that have a training specialization in unconventional warfare and special operations. In the continental United States, most SOF units fall administratively under their assigned branch of the military, but organizationally under U.S.

Glossary

Special Operations Command. Operational control of deployed units falls under the respective COCOM and its Special Operations Command structure. However, the Secretary of Defense can place all Special Operations Forces, as well as U.S. Navy SEAL units, selected units of the U.S. Air Force, and other units under the direct control of the SOCOM, usually in time of active hostilities. The Department refers to such units (and similar foreign organizations) as Special Operations Forces (SOF). U.S. SOF units have the same basic role in warfare as the special forces of most other countries, supplying small, elite units that can operate far behind enemy lines on sabotage, reconnaissance, counterinsurgency, and other missions. Most have extensive airborne training. Counter-Terrorist Units: 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (SFOD-D) “Delta Force” (U.S. Army). Navy Special Warfare Development Group “DEVGRU” (U.S. Navy) (formerly SEAL TEAM 6). The 24th Special Tactics Squadron U.S. Air Force). Intelligence Support Activity (known under various codenames since 1989, including Centra Spike, Torn Victor and Gray Fox). Special Operation Forces—United States Army: 75th Ranger Regiment (“Rangers”), 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) (“Night Stalkers”), U.S. Army Special Forces (“Green Berets”), 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne), 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne). United Navy: SEALs (SEa, Air, Land); SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Teams, Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen (SWCC “Swics,” Special Boat Teams), EOD (Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Units), Naval Special Clearance Team. United States Marine Corps: United States Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command Marine Force Reconnaissance (Reconnaissance and Direct Action), Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), Radio Reconnaissance Platoon, Fleet Antiterrorism Security Teams (FAST), Special Reaction Teams (SRTs). West Bank The West Bank, also known as Judea and Samaria, is a landlocked territory on the west bank of the Jordan River in the Middle East. Since 1967 most of the West Bank has been under Israeli military occupation. After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1922, this territory was part of the British Mandate of Palestine. The 1948 Arab-Israeli War saw the establishment of Israel in parts of the former mandate, while the West Bank was captured and annexed by Jordan. The 1949 Armistice Agreements defined its interim boundary. From 1948 until 1967, the area was under Jordanian rule, though Jordan did not officially relinquish its claim to the area until 1988. It was captured by Israel during the Six-Day War in 1967. With the exception of East Jerusalem it was not annexed by Israel, although most of the West Bank remains under Israeli military occupation. Most of the residents are Palestinians, although large numbers of Israeli settlements have also been built in the region.

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Index Note: The letter “t” indicate a table. Abbas, Mohammed, 64, 147 Abdullah, King of Jordan, 145 Abrams, General Creighton W., 79, 118 Acheson, Dean, 11 Adam, General Udi, 143 Afghanistan attack on, 38–39, 41–42 background, 92–100 cultural indices, 102–3 fog of peace matrix, 103, 104t–5t, 106 fog of war, 80 fog of war matrix, 103, 107t–9t, 110 geography of, 92 importance of, 110 physical terrain, 90–91 Soviet invasion, 24, 92–93 summary view, 204–6 Sunni–Shi’a distribution, 188, 188t Taliban/al-Qaeda relationship, 169 “Aftershocks,” 133, 134t Ahmedinajad, Mahmood assessment of, 183

on destruction of Israel, 33 letter to American public, 192–93 letter to Bush, 192, 200–1 loss of political strength, 184 visit to Iraq, 188 Ajami, Fouad, 133 Al Aqsa Intifada, 60, 154 Al Hurra, 22 Al Jezeera, 21, 22 al-Qaeda and Afghan war, 91, 93, 94, 205 brief history of, 172 core element, 173–74 danger of, 174 as global terrorist organization, 170–72 and Iraq war, 113, 201 Islamic interpretation, 173 and 9/11 impact, 2 9/11 objectives, 39 organization of, 172–73 philosophy of, 171 profile of, 177–78

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Index al-Qaeda (cont.) psychological warfare, 6 size of, 173 “soft underbelly,” 190 strategy to defeat, 178 summary view, 206–7 and Taliban, 169 targets of, 177 term, 172 Tierney’s view of, 124–25 Annan, Kofi, 117 Annapolis Peace Conference, 43, 147 Arab-Israeli conflict, 33, 60 Arab-Jewish conflicts, 60 Arafat, Yasser (Yasir) Geneva Accord revision, 158 negotiations with Rabin, 201 Palestinian Authority, 60 Rabin’s funeral, 157 Armitage, Richard, 40 Arms trade, 51–51 “Arsenal of Democracy, The,” 78 Assa, Haim, 72, 75 Assad, Bashaar, 199 Ataturk, Kemal, 20 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, 115–16 Baker, James, III, 119, 199 “Banned Station Broadcast Voice of Rebels in Iraq,” 125 Barak, Ehud on the Geneva Accord revision, 158 Hezbollah buildup, 143 Lebanon War II, 165 Barber, Kent, 29 Bay of Pigs Crisis, 81–82 Bechor, Guy, 152, 156 Begin, Menachim, 10, 167 Best and the Brightest, The (Halberstam), 82 Bevan, Aneurin, 11 Bhutto, Benazir, 97, 205 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 213–14 Bing, John, 102, 103 bin Laden, Sheikh Osama (Usama) Afghanistan invasion, 24 Afghan war, 91, 93, 94, 96

as holy person, 173 9/11 objectives, 39 proclamation of, 14–15, 48 religious beliefs, 17 Blackman, Michael, 184 Blair, Tony, 91 Brazilian ethanol production, 58 Bremer, Paul, 118 Bretton Worlds, 13 Bush, George H. W., 115 Bush, George W. Ahmedinajad letter, 192, 200–201 Annapolis Peace Conference, 147 approval rating, 45, 123, 169–70 declaration of war, 15–16 foreign policy, 8, 10–11, 124 Iran policy, 45–46, 179, 181, 183 on Iraqi casualties, 120 on Iraqi WMD, 113 Iraq policy, 43, 201 9/11 response, 41–42 and world stability, 41 Caliphate, 13, 21, 186 Carter, Jimmy, 145, 207 Case studies Afghanistan, 90–103, 104t–5t, 106, 107t–9t, 110–11 Iraq war, 112–22, 132t, 133, 134t–35t. 136–37 Lebanon War II, 138–62, 160t, 162t–64t, 165–67 Casey, General George W., 127 Casualties Iraq war, 120–21 World War II, 47–48 Cave, Damien, 125 Cedar Revolution, 67 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Fact Book Afghanistan (2008), 98–99 Iran, 181 Chemical weapons, 113 China Cultural Revolution, 26 defense expenditures, 53, 53–54 distortion effect, 4 oil consumption, 58 World War III policy, 9

Index Chirac, Jacques, 54 Churchill, Winston, 17, 25 Churchill, Winston, III, 17 Clash of Civilizations and the Making of World Order, The (Huntington), 72 “Clear and hold,” 122 “Coalition of the willing,” 117 Cold War end of, 49 ideological battle, 21 inclusiveness policy, 8 renewal of, 3, 8–9 Cole, Juan, 120 Collectivism in Afghanistan, 102 cultural dimension, 101 decline of, 196, 198 in Iraq, 130 Israel/Lebanon comparison, 160t, 160–61 Collins, Jim, 3 Common Market, 12 Concurrent and immediate reciprocal diplomatic increments (CIRDI), 157, 209–10 Congressional Research Service, 39 “Consensual censorship,” 81 Corera, Gordon, 174–75 Cronkite, Walter, 79, 128 Crusaders, 21, 30 Cultural Revolution, 26 Culture definition of, 30 worldwide differences, 196, 197t Decolonization, 34–35 Defense expenditures United States, 2, 50–51, 53t, 53–55 worldwide, 50–51, 53t, 53–55 “Dereliction of Duty,” 82 Dialog, 198–99 Diffuse Warfare (Ya’ari/Assa), 72 Dirksen, Everett, 78 Discussion, 199 Disinformation, 6–7 Distortion effect, key reference points, 4, 37 Dura (Durrah), Mohammed, 5, 61

“Dwell time,” 118 “Dynamic molecule” army unit, 73–75 East Asia, 8 Economic Consequences of the Peace (Keynes), 10 Education Commission of the United States, 26 Egypt description of, 139 Hamas border crossing, 207–8 peace accord with Israel, 10 Sunni–Shi’a distribution, 187–88, 188t Einstein, Albert, 2, 33 Eisenhower, Dwight David, military-industrial complex, 47, 51–52 el Alamein, 25 “End of History, The,” 8 Enduring Freedom, 94 Energy policy, 2–3 Ethanol, 58–59 European Union, 12 “Facing the brutal facts,” 3 “Fatwa,” 14, 173 Femininity (quality of life) Afghanistan, 103 cultural dimension, 102 Iraq, 130 Israel/Lebanon, 160t “Field Dependent,” 196 Field Manual (FM 3–24) on Counterinsurgency (COIN), 129 Five Pillars, 185, 186 Fog of peace Bay of Pigs Crisis, 81–82 definition of, 83 distortion effects, 197t model of, 6–7, 37, 77 stage theory, 85, 89 term, 81 Fog of peace matrix Afghanistan, 103, 104t–5t, 106 Iraq, 131, 132t Israel, 161, 162t, 165 World War II, 86t, 89

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Index Fog of war Afghanistan, 80 definition of, 83 distortion effects, 197t Iraq, 80 Israeli-Hezbollah conflict, 80 Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 62–64 model of, 6–7, 37, 77 stage theory, 85, 89 Tet Offensive, 78–79, 83 World War II buildup, 78 Fog of war matrix Afghanistan, 103, 107t–9t, 110 Iraq, 133, 134t–35t, 136 Israel, 163t–164t, 165 World War II, 87t–88t, 89 Food crisis, 19 Foreigner’s Gift, The (Ajami), 122 “Forgotten war, The,” 106 Foundation for Democracy in Iran (FDI), 180 Fourth Estate, 128 France defense expenditures, 53, 53t Lebanon War II, 55 Moslem assimilation, 189, 189t Friedman, Thomas flat earth theory, 17, 18 on Kabul, 94 Frog in boiling water, 84 Fukuyama, Francis, 8–9 Gates, Robert, 124, 129 Gaza strip Hamas control, 147, 153, 2007 Israeli withdrawal, 167 Geneva Accord (2003) revisited, 157–58 Germany defense expenditures, 53, 53t Nazi failure, 52 Give Your Speech and Change the World (Harvard Business School), 10 Global arms trade, 49–52 Globalization decolonization, 34–35 definition, 18

lack of interest in, 106 onset of, 18 triple divide, 18–20 Goebbels, Paul Joseph, 6 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 92 Great Britain. See United Kingdom Greatest Story Ever Told, The: The Decline and Fall of Truth (Rich), 22, 111 “Group-think,” 81, 82 Gulf War (1991) Malthusian war, 19–20 United States’ role, 115, 132t Gunaratna, Rohan, 171, 173 Haifa, Israeli-Arab relations, 147 Halberstam, David, 82 “Halo effect,” 140 Hamas attacks on Israel, 154 description of, 147, 153 in the Gaza strip, 147, 153, 207–8 local politics, 170 nonrecognition policy, 208 Second Intifada, 62, 63 as a terrorist organization, 154 Hamilton, Lee, ISG, 119 Hampden-Turner, Charles, 32 Harper, Stephen, 205 Hart, Sir Basil Liddel, 83, 213 Hayek, F. A., 21–22 Health care system (Afghanistan), 99 Hearst, William Randolph, 78 Hersh, Seymour, 181, 183 Hezbollah attack on marine, 145, 148 description of, 147 ideology of, 147–48 in Lebanon, 67–68 Lebanon War II, 139–40, 141–44, 166 local politics, 170 low-intensity warfare, 72, 74–75 Qana attack, 151–51 renewed conflict potential, 169 slap in the face, 154 time orientation, 92 training/equipment, 149

Index Hidden Persuaders, The (Packard), 3–4 Hiroshima, bombing of, 48 Hitler, Adolf, 13 Hoffman, Bruce, 25 Hoffman, Paul, 11 Hofstede, Geert cultural dimensions, 101, 159–60, 196 power distance, 32 Hospitality, 103 Huntington, Samuel clash of civilizations, 29–30 on multiculturalism, 31 tectonic plates metaphor, 72 Hurricane Katrina, 58 Hussein, Saddam and al-Qaeda, 169 attack on, 39 overthrow of, 133 regime of, 130 WMD track record, 113–14 Ideology, 21 “Ignorant American, The,” 29 Immigrants, 31, 41 Improvised Explosive Device (IED), 121, 154 “Inclusiveness,” 8 Individualism Afghanistan, 102 cultural dimension, 101 Iraq, 130 Israel/Lebanon, 160t, 160–61 rise of, 196, 198 United States, 160 Information, 85 Information warfare, 5 Ink, Dwight, Iraq policy, 202–3 Inside al-Qaeda (Gunaratna), 173 International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS), 27 International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A) American policy, 183 Iran, 180 International Women’s Day, 180 Intifada (“shaking off”), 60–62

Iran and al-Qaeda, 174 global politics, 170, 171 Hezbollah support, 67–68, 140, 148, 149–50 nuclear potential, 155–56, 166, 179–80, 184 oil production, 57 possible consequences of force, 182 recent history, 178–79 regime’s unpopularity, 180–81 summary view, 210–11 Sunni–Shi’a distribution, 188, 188t Iraq Ahmedinajad’s visit, 188 and al-Qaeda, 169, 206 attack on, 39 brief history, 130 civil war, 126, 128 cultural indices, 130 fog of peace matrix, 131, 132t fog of war matrix, 133, 134t–135, 136 geography of, 116 Sunni–Shi’a distribution, 188, 188t war casualties, 120–21 Iraq Body Count project, Iraqi casualties, 120 Iraq–Iran war, 130 Iraq Study Group Report (ISG), 119, 124, 158 recommendations, 200 Iraq War administration’s justification, 112–13, 114, 115 administration’s strategy, 42, 43, 119 American opinion of, 122–25 assessment of, 136–37 campaign, 117–19 cost of, 119–22 costs of withdrawal, 8 insurgency approach, 129 summary view of, 201–4 the way forward, 125–29, 204 “Iron Fist,” 140 Islam al-Qaeda’s interpretation, 173 divided view of martyrdom, 48–49

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Index Islam (cont.) fundamental beliefs, 184–85 time orientation, 91 Islamic Resistance guerrillas, 149 Israel American perception of, 144–45 Arab population, 209 assimilation of immigrants, 31 cultural dimensions, 159–60, 160t, 161 current government, 169 current situation, 154 description of, 138–39 First Intifada’s lessons, 61–62 fog of peace matrix, 161, 162t, 165 fog of war matrix, 163t–64t, 165 Hamas attacks, 154 milestones, 167 military forces, 139 multiparty system, 211–12 options going forward, 156–59 overreach to Hezbollah kidnapping, 23 and Palestinians, 145–46 peace accord with Egypt, 10 power distance, 32 summary view, 207–10 time orientation, 92 Israel Defense Forces (IDF), 140–41 Israel–Egypt Peace Treaty, 167 Israeli-Arab conflict milestones, 167 Israeli-Hezbollah conflict, fog of war, 4–5, 80. See also Israeli-Lebanon War II; World War III Israeli-Palestinian conflict fog of war, 62–64 in Lebanon, 37 peace agreement outline, 65 Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty, 167 Jacobson, Eddie, 144 Jacoby, Susan, 29 Japan defense expenditures, 53t, 53–54 distortion effect, 4 educational focus, 28 Pearl Harbor strategy, 13, 52

“Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders: A World Islamic Front Statement,” 14 Jihadists information warfare, 5 recruiting adherents, 23, 24 Johnson, Lyndon B., 82 Jones, General James, 98 Jones, Robert T., 28 Jordan description of, 139 Sunni–Shi’a distribution, 187–88, 188t Kennan, George, 10 Kennedy, John F. assassination of, 38 Bay of Pigs Crisis, 81–82 Kenyan embassy bombing, 15 Keynes, John Maynard, 10 Key reference points, 2, 36–37 Key success factors (KSF), 8 Khan, A. Q., 175 Khobar Towers (Saudi Arabia) bombing, 15, 150 Kilcullen, David, 5 Kissinger, Henry foreign policy memos, 82 global/local disparity, 33, 34 Korean War, 76, 96 Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), 55 Kristof, Nicholas D., 180 Kushner, Harry W., 175–76 Kuwait Gulf War, 19–20 Iraqi invasion of, 115, 130 jihadist recruiting, 24 Sunni–Shi’a distribution, 187–88, 188t “Land of Opportunity,” 40–41 Language, 101 Lebanon American knowledge of, 145 brief history of, 66–68 cultural dimensions, 159, 160–161, 160t current situation, 169 description of, 138

Index Hezbollah’s role, 148–51, 208 summary view, 208 Sunni–Shi’a distribution, 188, 188t “Lebanonization,” 148, 170 Lebanon War II Arab-Israeli conflict, 60 campaign, 151–53 fog of peace matrix, 161, 162, 165 fog of war, 80 fog of war matrix, 163t–64t, 165 France’s role, 55 Hezbollah’s role, 139–40 impact of, 142–43, 166 Israeli military, 74, 75, 140–42 Lee Kwan Yew impact of Vietnam War, 8 Iraq strategy, 125–26 L’Effroyable Imposture (The Big Lie) (Meyssan), 54 Lend Lease Program, 78 “Lessons in Spin from Osama,” 124–25 Lewis, Bernard, 155 Libya, 170 Literacy rates in Afghanistan, 99 in Israel, 139 in the United States, 26–27 Litvenenko, Alexander, 114 Longitudes and Attitudes: The World in an Age of Terrorism (Friedman), 94 Long-term orientation Afghanistan, 103 cultural dimension, 102 Iraq, 130 Israel/Lebanon, 160t al Majid, Ali Hassan (Chemical Ali), 113–14 al-Manar, Hebollah satellite channel, 80 Makinen, Gail, 39 Malaya, 75–76 Malthus, Thomas Robert, 17, 18 March of Folly, The (Tuchman), 65 Marshal, George aid plan, 10–11, 12, 48 military recruitment, 23 “Marshall Plan,” 10–12, 13, 48

Masculinity (achievement) Afghanistan, 103 cultural dimension, 102 Iraq, 130 Israel/Lebanon, 160t Mashal, Khaled, Hamas, 153 Massey, Morris J., 84 Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces (Robinson), 94 McMaster, Colonel Ron, 82 McNamara, Robert, 124 Media Afghanistan coverage, 99–100 build up to conflicts, 77–78 Hezbollah use of, 150 influence of, 3–7 Iraq/Afghanistan wars, 80 Iraq civil war, 128 Iraq coverage, 115 Iraq rebel broadcast, 125 Israeli-Hezbollah conflict, 89 organizations, 80–81 Tet Offensive coverage, 79 Medvedev, Dimitri, 3, 69 Melillo, Michael R., 94 Message passing game, 85 Meyssan, Thierry, 54 Michener, James, 41 Middle East American perception of, 144 Iranian goals, 180 key policies, 146 milestones, 167 “Midstream,” 7 Military/defense expenditures United States, 50–51 worldwide, 50, 53t, 53–55 Mitchell, George, 61 “Molecular army units,” 72–75 Monnet, Jean, 54 Morass definition, 112 Moslems assimilation in West, 188–89, 189t demography of, 185 view of, 198 Mossadegh, Mohammed, 178 Mossad Intelligence Organization, 143 Mubarrak, Hosni, 208

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Index Mujahideen (holy warriors), 93, 171 Multiculturalism, 30–31 Musharraf, Pervez, 96 Muslim Brotherhood, 153 Mustard gas, 113 Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) period, 76 Nagasaki, 48 Nasrallah, Sheik Hassan on “cobwebs,” 32 Iranian training, 67–68 on Lebanese government, 169 Lebanon War II, 144 National Adult Literacy Survey (NALS), 26–27 National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), 27 National Commission on Terrorism Attacks on the United States on the absence of preparation, 38 antiterrorism strategy, 40 on Iraqi connection, 113 National Guard, 118 National Institute of Literacy, 27 “National Report Card,” 27 Nation states, 34 Natural gas reserves, 68, 69 Negotiations, 198–99 Nerve agents, 113 9/11 al-Qaeda objectives, 22–23 and attack on Iraq, 112, 132t Bush administration response, 41–42 as reference point, 2 as watershed event, 36–37, 38–40 Nixon, Richard, 83 “No Fly Zone,” 115 Normandy invasion, 83 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Afghan commitment, 205 Afghan war, 95, 98, 100, 108t, 109t Afghanistan, 42 North Vietnam, 78–79, 83 Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, 180 Nuclear weapons and al-Qaeda, 174–76

Iran, 155–56, 166, 179–80, 184 Iraqi possession of, 114 Obama, Barack, 214 Oil reserves in Islamic nations, 13–14 price history, 56–59 in Russia, 68, 69 World War III, 7 “Old Europe,” 124 Olmert, Ehud Annapolis Peace Conference, 147 Lebanon War II, 142, 165–66 Omar, Mullah, 91, 93, 94 Opium, 98, 99 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 56 Oslo Accords First Intifada, 60 and Palestinian self-rule, 167 Packard, Vance, 3 Pakistan and the Afghan war, 96, 97, 98 eastern terrain, 90 summary view, 205 Sunni–Shi’a divide, 186, 188t support of Taliban/al-Qaeda, 176 Palestine Liberation Organization, 170 Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid (Carter), 145 Palestinian Authority, 60 Palestinians American perception of, 145 summary view, 211 Palestinian State, 166 Paris Peace Conference, 130 Passover Massacre, 154 Pattiz, Norman, 22 Patton, General George, 12, 83 Pearl Harbor, 13, 52, 78 Pentagon attack, 38 Perception of terrorism, 37, 40–45 Perceptual studies, 83–84 Peretz, Amir, 71 Petraeus, General David counterinsurgency doctrine, 129 Iraq war, 118, 119

Index Pew Research Center survey (2004), 42–43 Pipes, Richard, 69, 70 Powell, Colin, 43 Power distance Afghanistan, 102 cultural dimension, 101 Iraq, 130–131 Israel/Lebanon, 160, 160t, 161 term, 32 United States, 161 Prestowitz, Clyde, 8, 71 Prism, 84–85 Propaganda, 3 Psychological warfare, 6 “Pushtunwali,” 103 Putin, Vladimir, 3, 69 Qana, 151–52 Qasam rockets, 62 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (2006), 100 Quagmire, 91, 112 Quiet corner, 100 Qu’ran and bin Laden “fatwa,” 14 Islam’s view of, 185 on martyrdom, 47 Rabin, Yitsak, 157, 201 Radical Islam. See Jihadists cultural beliefs, 30, 31–32 cultural differences, 196, 197t Radio Free Europe, 21 Rashid, Ahmed, 95, 97–98 Reagan, Ronald defense spending, 50, 54 ideological view, 22 Iranian policy, 179 Religion Afghanistan, 99, 103 Iraqi culture, 130, 131 Remington, Frederick, 78 Rice, Condoleezza, 152 Rich, Frank, 22, 111 “Right of Return,” 153, 158 Road Map to Peace, 43 Road to Serfdom, The (Hayek), 21–22

Robinson, Linda, 94 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 23, 78 Rosenau, William, 21, 22 Rumsfeld, Donald and Afghan war, 111 on diplomacy, 124 key questions, 39–40 Russia defense expenditures, 53, 53t economic revival, 68–69 public perception in, 69–70 ruble collapse, 68 World War II casualties, 47–48 World War III policy, 9 Sadat, Anwar, 10, 167 Saladin, 30 Samurai Warrior ethos, 4 Santayana, George, 25 Santora, Mark, 125 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 8 Saudi Arabia jihadist recruiting, 24 Sunni–Shi’a distribution, 187–88, 188t Schiff, Ze’ev Arab-Israeli situation, 154–55 Lebanon War II, 75 SEAL team, 5 “Secure and hold” strategy, 119 “Seize and hold” strategy, 201 Sennott, Charles M., 90 Shahid (martyr), 47 Sharon, Ariel on Geneva Accord revision, 158 Lebanon War II, 143, 165 and Second Intifada, 60 Shi’a Islam, 23. See also Sunni–Shi’a divide Shinzeki, General Eric, 111, 129 “Shock and awe,” 117 Short-term orientation Afghanistan, 103 cultural dimension, 102 Iraq, 130 Israel/Lebanon, 160t Shulman, Marc, 81 “Silent tsunami,” 19

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Index “Silicon Wadi,” 139 Siniora, Fouad, 68 Six-Day War, 10, 60 “Six-day war syndrome,” 143 Small arms industry, 50 Somalia, 5 Somme, Battle of the, 16 Special Operation Forces (SOF) Afghan war, 93–94, 107t Iraq war, 117 “Spin,” 85, 195–96 Staged pictures, 4–5 State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III (Woodward), 111 Stiglitz, Joseph, 119 Suicide bombing and Hamas, 154 in radical Islam, 46, 47 during Second Intifada, 60, 62 Sunni Salafi jihadist ideology, 21 Sunni–Shi’a divide and al-Qaeda, 174, 184 geographic distribution, 187–88, 188t historical, 126, 185–86 summary of differences, 186 Syria description of, 138 dialog with, 199 Hezbollah support, 140, 150–151 local politics, 171 open dialogue with, 158 summary view, 208 Sunni–Shi’a distribution, 188, 188t Taliban and Afghan war, 95, 96, 98, 110, 205–6 and al-Qaeda relationship, 169 attack on, 38–39, 41–42 formation of, 93 local politics, 170 origin of, 24 Pakistani support, 176–77 at Tora Bora, 91, 94 Tanzanian embassy bombing, 15 “Targeted assassinations,” 60 Tar sands, 59

Tattarrus principle description of, 184, 186, 187 principle, objections to, 187 Teleology, 9 Templer, Sir Gerald, 25 Terrorism common ground, 190–192 definition of, 16 negotiation/dialog strategy, 198–99 psychological impact, 37 quantification of, 37, 45–47 touchstone policies, 193–94 “Terrorism toolbox,” 173 Tet Offensive, 78–79, 83 Thatcher, Margaret Roberts, 22 Thomas Theorem, 6, 82–83, 116 Thomas, William Isaac, 6 Thompson, Sir Robert, 75 Thurow, Lester, 18 Tierney, John, 124–25 Time orientation Afghanistan, 102 cultural dimension, 102, 196 Iraq, 130 Israel/Lebanon, 160t Tooze, Adam, 52 Tora Bora Afghan war, 94, 107t physical terrain, 90 symbolic terrain, 91 Tribalism, 100 Triple Divide Peak, 18 Trompenaar, Alfons, 32 Truman, Harry Israeli policy, 144 Marshall Plan, 48 Trust, 159 Tuchman, Barbara, 65–66, 67, 68 Turkey, 20 Umma (nation), 21 Uncertainty avoidance Afghanistan, 102 cultural dimension, 101 Iraq, 130 Israel/Lebanon, 160t United States, 161

Index United Kingdom (UK) defense expenditures, 53, 5t3 Malayan insurgency, 75–76 Moslem assimilation, 188–89, 189t United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 152 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559, 139–40, 142 United States biofuel production, 58–59 cultural dimensions, 160–161 current world perception of, 40–45 defense/military spending, 2, 50–51, 53t, 53–55 fear of terrorism, 46 information counterinsurgency, 6 Iranian policies, 178–79 Israeli policy, 144–45 Korean War, 76 Moslem population, 178 oil dependence, 56, 57–58 power distance, 32 time orientation, 91 World War II casualties, 47 World War III policy, 9 United States Agency for International Development, 6 United States Information Service, 6 United States military inadequate forces, 117–18 “out of balance,” 127 Values, 37, 47–49 Vessey, General John, 126 Vietnam War border area, 96 East Asian impact, 8 media coverage, 128 War, Violence, Principle of Tattarrus, 186–87 Voice of America, 21, 22 Wages of Destruction, The (Tooze), 52 Wahabi sect, 17 Wake Island, 138, 139 War Chinese strategies, 4

current state of, 1–2 low intensity, 72–74 teleological analysis, 9, 10 War of the Stones, 60 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) al-Qaeda, 174–76 Iraq, 113–19, 132t Westmoreland, General William C., 79 Williams, Paul, 175 Wilson, Jamie, 119 Witkin, Herman A., 83–84 Women, Afghanistan, 98, 99 Woodward, Bob, 111 World Economic Outlook, Israel’s economy, 139 World Health Organization (WHO), 46 World Trade Center (1993) bombing attack, 15, 115 World Trade Center (2001) al-Qaeda attack, 15, 38, 115 al-Qaeda emergence, 172 World Trade Organization (WTO), 69 World War, 14 World War I, causalities, 16 World War II allied success, 12t, 12–13 build up to, 78 economic power, 52 end of, 9–10, 13 fog of peace model, 86t, 89 fog of war model, 87t–88t, 89 landmark events, 38 Marshall Plan, 11–12, 48 military recruitment, 23 World War III absence of inclusiveness policies, 8 characteristics of, 195, 197t costs of, 37, 52–55 decolonization, 34–35 globalization, 17–20, 34 hearts and minds, 20–22, 24, 25 objectives, 22–23 reality of, 14–17 relationships among world powers, 9 thesis of, 2–3 time orientation, 91–92 winning, 212–13

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238

Index Ya’ari, Yedidia (Didi), 71–72, 75 Yassin, Sheikh Ahmed, 153 “Yellow journalism,” 77 Yeltsin, Boris, 68, 69 Yom Kippur War Arab-Israeli conflict, 60, 64

campaign, 140–141 cost of, 10 slap in the face, 154 Yunus, Mohammad, 213 Zhukov, Georgi, 47, 48

About the Authors ROBERT L. (LEX) DILWORTH is a retired U.S. Army Brigadier General and Associate Professor Emeritus at Virginia Commonwealth University. He served for over thirty-one years in the Army, including five years in Asia and another three in Europe. Six tours of duty were spent in the Washington area, two in the Army Chief of Staff’s Office in the Pentagon. He was appointed as the 54th Adjutant General of the Army (TAG). He served twice with infantry divisions, in Vietnam and Korea, including service as a division chief of staff. Lex has long had an interest in international affairs, and has written on such subjects as the power relationships related to the Pacific Rim. He taught Global Human Resource Development and Cross-Cultural Awareness at the graduate level for twelve years, using a curriculum that he designed. He is also recognized for his international work with Action Learning, and coauthored a book on Action Learning: Images and Pathways in 2003 with Verna Willis of Georgia State University. He has a bachelor’s degree in Advertising and Public Relations from the University of Florida, a master’s degree in Public Administration from the University of Oklahoma, a master’s degree from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (the first member of his Army branch to earn one), a master’s degree in Education from Columbia University, and a doctorate in Adult and Continuing Education from Columbia University. He has also attended advanced Management and Business programs at Harvard University, Northwestern University, and the University of Michigan.

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About the Authors

He is also a graduate of the regular course at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Professional Military Comptroller School at the Air University, where he graduated first in his PMCS class. SHLOMO MAITAL serves as Academic Director of TIM—The Technion Institute of Management—and Senior Researcher at the S. Neaman Institute at Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel. TIM is Israel’s leading executive development institute and a pioneer in action-learning methods. He was a Visiting Professor for twenty years at MIT Sloan School’s Management of Technology M.Sc. Program, teaching over 1,000 research and development engineers from forty countries. He is the author or coauthor of ten books, including Innovation Management (SAGE, India, 2006); Executive Economics (The Free Press), translated into seven languages, and Managing New Product Development and Innovation (Elgar: Cheltenham, UK, 2000). He is editor of Recent Advances in Behavioral Economics (Elgar: May 2007) He is a pioneer in behavioral economics and cofounder of SABE-Society for Advancement of Behavioral Economics.. He has published over eighty scholarly articles in refereed journals. He has also written guest editorials for Barron’s, and writes regular columns for the Jerusalem Report (fortnightly). Shlomo Maital has served as Director of the National & Economic Planning Authority, Economics Ministry, Government of Israel. He has taught some 1,100 senior managers from 200 Israeli companies and consulted with such leading ones as Intel and bank HaPoalim. His research currently focuses on profit-driven innovation—how to combine creativity and discipline to achieve marketing success. During his academic career he has spent three sabbatical years at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, as well as a year and a half at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC. Dr. Maital received his bachelor of arts degree, with Honors, from Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada. He also received a master’s degree from Queen’s University, and later a master’s degree in Economics from the University of Manchester in the United Kingdom. He has a Ph.D. from Princeton University. In addition to his academic pursuits, Dr. Maital served from 1969– 1980 in the Artillery Corps reserves of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). From 1980–1994 he served in the Navy reserves. He is an avid jogger, and completed the New York Marathon in 1985 and the Boston Marathon in 2007. In February 2008 he climbed Mt. Kilimanjaro with his son Yochai.